DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Technical Surveillance Soviet/Satellite Agents

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

HMMW-10893

1. Station fully agrees with Headquarters concerning the value of concentrating LIFEAT or LIENVOY coverage on suspected and/or known Soviet, Satellite and Cuban agents residing in Mexico City. The Station in the past has undertaken this type coverage and will continue such coverage in the future as LIFEAT and LIENVOY facilities become available for assignment to these targets. As Headquarters is aware, this Station can and will cover any possible target Headquarters considers of high enough priority to cover.

2. For example, Carmen BRUFAU Civit was covered for 1956, 1957, 1960 and 1961; the results were not considered of sufficient value to continue the coverage.

3. Presently, Elena VASQUEZ Gomez, one of the persons referred to in reference, works for General Lazaro CARDENAS del Rio, pro-Communist former President of Mexico. Coverage of CARDENAS by LIENVOY means a certain amount of coverage of VASQUEZ Gomez.

Willard C. Curtis

Distribution:
3 - Hqs
4 - Files

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
28 Aug. 1962	31 Aug. 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-19700

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-32/1

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING: XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED: For Your Information

REFERENCE : HMMA-19129, 1 June 1962

1. Project LIFEAT has been renewed for the period of 1 July 1962 through 30 June 1963 in the amount of $99,000.00.

2. Please note that this means a cut of $3,193.00 from the Station's original request for $102,193.00 to $99,000.00. WHD was allocated $99,000.00 for this Project for FY 63.

3. This reduction was made by reducing "Miscellaneous Op Expenses" from $4,000.00 to $807.00.

4. KUTUBE and KUDESK Staffs concurred in recommending renewal. KUDESK reiterated that the facilities of this Project could and should be used for the coverage of known or highly suspected agents of the Soviet/Satellite and Cuban intelligence services in Mexico. KUDESK notes that some twenty of these agents have been documented in detailed target studies which were forwarded to the Station.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City

50-6-32/1

DATE TYPED: 31 July 1962

DATE DISPATCHED: 9 AUG 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMM-10803

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-32/1

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	[illegible]
RID/MIS	[illegible]
~~RID/IS~~	
~~RID/FI~~	
WH/3 Mexic	

1 - WH/3/Mexi Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexico	Lee G. Norris	nr	5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/PO/A		Ruth Geary

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	3 Aug 1962	J. C. KING

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[illegible]3592

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT : Project LIFEAT (Renewal)

WH - Mexico City

1. The attached project, originating in WH Division, is presented for renewal for the period 1 July 19[illegible] through 30 June 19[illegible]. The project supports a unilateral telephone tap operation which provides daily information on the activities of official foreign installations in Mexico City and personnel thereof, as well as coverage of the activities of selected individuals and groups.

2. Authority is requested to obligate $[illegible],000 from the DD/P-WH Division budget in fiscal year 19[illegible], subject to the availability of funds. Of this amount $1[illegible],[illegible]0[illegible] is estimated for administrative salaries; $4[illegible],41[illegible] for field agent salaries; $20,[illegible]2[illegible] for basehouse rentals; $[illegible],[illegible] for equipment; $2,100 for local transportation; and $[illegible] for miscellaneous operational expenses.

3. The Field Project Outline and review which are forwarded by the Division with a covering memorandum, give a clear description of the project activity and accomplishments. The project has been in continuous operation since 19[illegible], starting with a single tap against the Soviet Legation in Mexico City and now covering as many as thirty lines in a given month. The project is staffed by an "outside" case officer (Career Agent David M. WILSTED (p) of Project LI[illegible]), four contract agents who do administrative work, and twenty-one field agents including monitors and linesmen. During the past year the project provided coverage of the home phones of three Soviet Intelligence officers, the Polish Embassy, the Yugoslav Embassy, major firms dealing in the transshipment of U.S. goods to Cuba, American Communists in Mexico, and exile and revolutionary groups in Mexico. CI information was obtained and additional security was provided Station operations. Although coverage of the official Soviet and Czech installations became a joint operation with the Mexican Government in LIENVOY, Project LIFEAT remains available to resume coverage of these installations should a change in the local government or its attitude to CIA participation necessitate such change.

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For the future, the Station has hopes of employing LIFEAT assets in "hot mike" operations which will require access to telephone centrals and cables. It is the opinion of the Station that the support provided the Station operations, the CI/CE information, and the ability to cover sensitive targets without revealing our interest to liaison services justifies the expenditure of funds, time, and personnel under this project. The overall performance of all agents in the complex continued to be good; no security problems were encountered which were not solved by the personnel involved.

4. Appropriate Special Staff components recommend renewal. The FI Staff notes that the project continues to be a most useful operational asset of the Station and in addition has produced thirty-seven positive intelligence disseminations, six of which were of particular interest concerning the illegal transshipment of goods to Cuba. FI/D comments that one item of direct interest to FI/D was received from Project LIFEAT and that the technical coverage of the diplomatic installations would afford valuable assistance to the planning and conduct of any FI/D endeavor to mount operations. The CI Staff reiterates that the facilities of this project could and should be used for the coverage of known or highly suspected agents of the Soviet/Satellite/and Cuban intelligence services in Mexico. CI notes that some twenty of these agents have been documented in detailed target studies which were forwarded to the Station.

5. I recommend renewal of Project LIFEAT and invite the Division's attention to the recommendations of CI Staff in paragraph 4 above.

L. M. Hines
L. M. HINES
Chief, LSP/PG

Approved: M Karamessines — 27 July 62
(signature) (date)

Attachments:
Project Outline LIFEAT
FI Memoranda

Staff Coordination:
For FI Staff -s/C. Laine
For CI Staff -s/T. Harned
For FI/INT -s/R. Estep
For TSS -s/T. Strange
For FI/D -s/V. Lelenfiter

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19 JUL 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director (Plans)

THROUGH: DDP/PG

SUBJECT: Project LIFEAT Renewal

FI Staff recommends renewal of Project LIFEAT. This unilateral audio effort continues to be a most useful operational asset of the station as indicated by the specific examples furnished in the renewal request. In addition, it produced 37 positive intelligence disseminations, six of which were of particular interest concerning illegal transhipment of U.S. goods to Cuba.

J. LLOYD GEORGE
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Attachment
Project

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9 July 1962

Project LIFEAT WH/Mexico

(Audio Operation)

1. FI/INT files contain 37 positive information disseminations attributed wholly or in part to Project LIFEAT during the year 1 July 1961 through June 1962. They were concerned principally with contacts between Mexican Communists or leftists and Cubans or individuals of the Soviet Bloc, and with the travel of Latin Americans to the Soviet Bloc and Cuba. Six reports of particular interest consisted of information on Transcontinental S.A., a company allegedly engaged in the illegal transshipment of US goods to Cuba. Other reports of significance dealt with the contacts and activities of former Guatemalan President Juan Jose AREVALO Barmeja, now living in Mexico. There was reporting on Nicaraguan and Spanish exile activity in Mexico and on the revolutionary sentiment and expectations of other Latin American nationals.

2. LIFEAT has provided positive intelligence of value and of relevance to customer requirements and to objectives of the PNIO. It has been pointed out in the renewal request that the production of positive information is incidental to the projects primary function as a support and CI/CE operation.

3. RENEWAL IS RECOMMENDED.

HAYDEN ESTEY
Chief, FI/INT/RE

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Cryptonym		Division	Station
LIFEAT		WH	Mexico City

Type of Project

Provides Mexico City Station with a unilateral telephone tap operation which has been in existence for 11 years.

Case Officer	Ext.	Room & Bldg
Lee G. Norris	5940	3 B 0003 Hq

Project Information

New	x Renewal (Check One)
Amendment Extension	Project Period
	1 July 1962 To 30 June 1963

Comments and Recommendations

KUDESK/ICG concurs in the recommendation that the LIFEAT Project renewal request be approved.

Date of Evaluation	Signature of CI/ICG Reviewing Officer	Signature of Chief, CI/ICG
13 July 1962	Wade E. Thomas	L Metzl by PGZ

Form 1486

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(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM: LIFEAT

TYPE OF ACTION			
	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION	WH Division
	AMENDMENT NO	FIELD STATION	Mexico City
X	RENEWAL FY 1963	BRANCH: WH/3	DESK: Mexico
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER	Lee G. Norris
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO: 3 B 0003	BUILDING: Hq / EXTENSION: 5940

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISION

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (And signature)	DATE	COPY NO.	MEMORANDUM ATTACHED YES	NO	DATE
CWH/3/Mexico	John M. Whitten					
CWH/3	Ned P. Holman	19 JUN 1962				
WH/B&F	Robert D. Carter	21 JUN 1962				
WH/PO/A	Clark V. Simmons by [signature]	26 June 1962				
C/WHD for	J. C. King [signature]	26 June 1962				

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	TO	TOTAL AMOUNT	FY	AMOUNT
1 July 1962	30 June 1963	$ 99,000.00	1963	$ 99,000.00

APPROVING AUTHORITY: DDP/PG

SIGNATURE:

DATE:

FORM 6-60 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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19 June 1963

LIFEAT Project Renewal Request

1. It is requested that the attached LIFEAT Renewal Request be approved for the period of 1 July 1962 through 30 June 1963 in the amount of $99,000.00, all of which falls within FY 1963. $99,000.00 was programmed for FY 1963 in the WHD allocation.

2. This Project provides the Mexico City Station with a unilateral telephone tap operation which has been in existence for the past 11 years.

3. While the primary object of this Project is not the production of positive intelligence, it was in whole or in part the source of 30 positive information disseminations. In addition to this production and support of other Station operations, it provides ODENVY with information concerning the American Communist Group in Mexico.

4. Emergency recontact instructions have not been established for the agents of this Project since it is believed the operation would cease in case a situation should arise where they would be applicable.

5. No training programs for any LIFEAT personnel are anticipated during the renewal period.

6. WH Division recommends renewal of the LIFEAT Project based on the attached field request. WH Division has cut the field request from $102,193.00 to $99,000.00.

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: IP/ARD/RETIRED PROJECTS UNIT G-E-53

EXTENSION:

NO: 13-175/77 Box 30

DATE:

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/1/FI 3E65			[initials]	Please attach Basic to the attached doc. Basic is still classified to file #50-6-32/1 from IP/files -
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11. RETURN TO: IP/ARD/RETIRED PROJECTS UNIT				per our records we have retired volumes dating back thru 60-61 so we don't have the document here. WH/1/FI (our files date back to 1969)
12. G-E-53 [illegible]				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS [X] SECRET | CONFIDENTIAL | INTERNAL USE ONLY | UNCLASSIFIED

PROJECT REVIEW AND PROJECT OUTLINE (PARTS I AND II)

CRYPTONYM LIFEAT CASE OFFICER Jeremy L. NIARCOS

STATION MEXICO CITY CHIEF OF STATION Willard C. CURTIS

ENCL - 1 - HMMA 19129 1 Jun 62

50-6-32/1

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PROJECT LIFEAT

PROJECT REVIEW

I. Product of the Project

A. Soviet Coverage

As noted in last year's Project LIFEAT renewal request, LIFEAT coverage of the official Soviet installation was discontinued on 22 June 1960 when the parallel liaison project LIENVOY assumed coverage of this target. In early January 1962 LIFEAT undertook coverage of the home phones of three of the most active Soviet Intelligence officers. This was in response to the continuing Station CI program which includes the monitoring of Soviet contacts, and the guidance received from KUDESK Staff at the time of the last LIFEAT renewal. As of this date, this coverage has not been active for sufficient time to fully evaluate its usefulness. However, it is believed that such coverage has the potential to add materially to the Station's effort in the CI field. Although not designed to provide positive intelligence, some by-product of this type has been obtained. Samples are as follows:

HMM-6364, 8 May 1962 (Briefing of Mexican Pro-Marxist Journalist by Soviet Embassy)
HMM-6382, 15 May 1962 (Mexican Traveller to the USSR)
HMM-6376, 11 May 1962 (Refutation of Rumors that Soviet Cosmonaut TITOV will visit Mexico)

B. Polish Embassy

LIFEAT has remained the primary source of information on this target and the only successful, continuing penetration of the target. The information provided to the interested Case Officer has in the past been described as "unique" and "invaluable". This description holds with equal emphasis for the present as well as the past. Selective examples of the valuable positive intelligence product of this coverage are:

HMMA-17448, 28 July 1961 (Henryk POTASZ)
HMMA-17647, (LIFEAT/LAURICLE), 25 August 1961
HMMA-17694, 1 September 1961 (Irena Halina ZORAWSKA)
HMMA-17876, 29 September 1961 (Movement of Polish Nationals)

ENCL. - 1 - HMMA - 19129 CS COPY 50-6-32/1

HMMA-18058, 27 October 1961 (Satellite Trade in Mexico)
HMMA-18074, 31 October 1961 (Activities of Polish Embassies in Mexico and Brazil)
HMMA-18913, 27 April 1962 (RYBAT/Eugenlusz SKOTNICKI)
HMMA-18915, 27 April 1962 (RYBAT/Eugenlusz SKOTNICKI)
HMM-5743, 7 July 1961 (Possible Purchase of Ships from Poland)
HMM-5894, 14 September 1961 (Trade Between Mexico and Poland)
HMM-5921, 26 September 1961 (Polish Plans to Buy Zinc from Mexico)

C. Cuban Coverage

LIFEAT was able to provide coverage of major firms dealing in U.S. goods transshipment via Mexico to Cuba. This technical operation not only provided initial leads which alerted the Station to these companies, but also was able to provide continuing information on the daily activities of the companies involved. Coverage of certain Cuban personages arranging for illegal transshipment of U.S. goods to Cuba was also provided including their contacts and general activities. Samples of the positive intelligence production from this Cuban commercial coverage are as follows:

HMMA-18073, 31 October 1961 (Ruben SAUREZ Y Alvarez, Representative in Mexico of the Cuban Bank of Foreign Commerce)
HMMA-18538, 2 February 1962 (Cuban Commercial Activities)
HMM-5883, 26 September 1961 (Cuban Commercial Activities)
HMM-5915, 22 September 1961 (Transcontinental, S.A.)
HMM-6012, 14 November 1961 (Mexican Firm Shipping U.S. Goods to Cuba)
HMM-6220, 27 February 1962 (Lorenzo L. SAUNDERS, Vice President of Transcontinental, S.A.)

D. American Communists in Mexico

As in the past, most of the targets in this group have been covered at the request of ODENVY, and the raw take has been partially processed by them. During the period July 1961 through May 1962, approximately 680 reels of take were passed to local ODENVY for their processing. The most valuable information gleaned from the targets in this field continues to deal with contacts, travel, and general activities of the American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM).

Typical examples of the reporting based on LIFEAT coverage of the ACGM are:

HMMA-17318, 3 July 1961 (Albert MALTZ)
HMMA-17388, 14 July 1961 (Enos Regnet WICHER, Maria WICHER)
HMMA-17389, 14 July 1961 (Carl SEBORER)
HMMA-17419, 21 July 1961 (Clarina OVERGAARD, Anders OVERGAARD)
HMMA-17455, 25 July 1961 (Dalton TRUMBO, Cleo TRUMBO)
HMMA-17611, 18 August 1961 (Noah SEBORER/Albert MALTZ/ Charles SMALL)
HMMA-17760, 12 September 1961 (Maurice ZEITLIN)
HMMA-17806, 19 September 1961 (Albert MALTZ)
HMMA-17855, 26 September 1961 (U.S. Citizens Travel to Cuba)
HMMA-17860, 29 September 1961 (Albert MALTZ)
HMMA-18097, 3 November 1961 (Charles SMALL)
HMMA-18492, 23 January 1962 (Albert MALTZ/Noah SEBORER/ Charles SMALL)
HMMA-18827, 10 April 1962 (Albert MALTZ/Noah SEBORER/ Charles SMALL)

E. Exile and Revolutionary Activities

LIFEAT continues to provide information on the exile and revolutionary groups active in Mexico, which information is of the greatest value to the Station and not available from other sources. The emphasis of the LIFEAT effort in this area has been directed toward coverage of Nicaraguan, Guatemalan, and more recently Spanish Republican exiles. The product has been most rewarding in this coverage. Examples of productivity in this past project year:

HMMA-17489, 4 August 1961 (Alejandro GALINDO)
HMMA-18420, 5 January 1962 (Teodora MARTEN Rodriguez)
HMMA-18468, 16 January 1962 (Travel of Salvadorans to Cuba)
HMM-5920, 26 September 1961 (Activities of Nicaraguan Exiles in Mexico)
HMM-6142, 18 January 1962 (Plans of Guatemalan Army Officers to Attempt Coup)
HMM-6191, 17 February 1962 (Guatemalan Revolutionary Activity)
HMM-6230, 2 March 1962 (Contacts of Juan Jose AREVALO Bermejo in Mexico City)
HMM-6292, 2 April 1962 (Return to El Salvador of Colonel Oscar OSORIO)
HMM-6311, 13 April 1962 (Contacts of Juan Jose AREVALO Bermejo)

HMM-6344, 1 May 1962 (Activities of Spanish Republicans in Exile)
HMM-6349, 4 May 1962 (Views of Juan Jose AREVALO on Peruvian Presidential Candidate)
HMM-6359, 4 May 1962 (Contact Between Claudio SANCHEZ de Albornoz, President of the Council of Spanish Republic, and Juan Simeon VIDARTE, Spanish Exile in Mexico)
HMM-6379, 11 May 1962 (Opinion of Spanish Republican Exiles on Current Strikes in Spain)

F. Counter-Intelligence Information

By its latest Related Mission Directive, Mexico City Station's major responsibilities continue to lie in the field of CI/CE matters. LIFEAT was able to provide a valuable contribution in the attainment of the Station's objectives in this field. Coverage included that on Carlos Humberto ILLESCAS, who is acting in a covert liaison capacity between the CP and the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Besides the continuing operational support in the CI/CE field, the following informational reporting was provided:

HMM-5742, 7 July 1961 (Travel of Mexican Leftists Behind Iron Curtain)
HMM-5836, 18 August 1961 (Activities of Mexican Student of the University of Peoples' Friendship)
HMM-5977, 24 October 1961 (Interview of Prominent Marxist with Polish Conselor)
HMM-6322, 20 April 1962 (Contacts between Carlos FUENTES Macias, Mexican Communist Writer, and Polish Diplomats)
HMM-6337, 27 April 1962 (Activities of Ernesto AYALA Mercado, Bolivian Ambassador to Mexico)
HMM-6377, 11 May 1962 (Scholarship for Study in Warsaw to Jorge TAMAYO, Jr., Mexican Marxist Intellectual)

G. Operational Support and Leads Provided other Station Operations

During the past project year LIFEAT continued actively supporting Mexico City Station through production of leads unobtainable through other assets and generally providing other Station operations the secure support only available through a unilateral telephone tap operation. The following is a selected list, together with a brief description, of major contributions of operational support and leads provided through LIFEAT:

LIFEAT/Cuban: The most noteworthy LIFEAT contribution to Station efforts in the Cuban operations field was that of providing leads pinpointing the activities of Transcontinental, S.A. in the illegal transshipment of U.S. materials to Cuba via Mexico. LIFEAT was able to continue coverage of the activities of this company despite the efforts of the company to lose itself in the Mexican business community by changing the name it operated under to Inversiones Mexicanas, S.A. and changing its location and telephone number. Valuable information on the commercial commodities needed by the Castro regime, methods and contacts used in their procurement, and information on the contacts of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico were obtained.

LIFEAT/Czechoslovakian: LIFEAT coverage of the home phones of two Czech intelligence officers provided some leads to their contacts, but more importantly, provided greater security to KUBARK when one of their CIS officers, Miloslav CECH, was singled out for a defection attempt. Through LIFEAT "livemonitoring" of both the original and followup defection attempts, the KUBARK assets were provided maximum protection from possible attempts by CECH to alert his coworkers or arrange entrapment of the KUBARK personnel involved.

LIFEAT/Polish: Probably the most "classic" example of the use of a telephone tap in providing a lead which could develop into a vital penetration of the Polish intelligence occurred recently in the BEKNAVE/BECHICK operation. LIFEAT provided the initial leads which made the Station aware of the possibilities of an operation and has continued to provide vital information for Station's development of the operation. It is the Station's opinion that this one instance of service by LIFEAT was well worth the cost of the entire project for the year. (Full information forwarded in MEXI 0462 and MEXI 0463). Also of great interest to the Station were the LIFEAT provided leads which revealed Jan SLUSARZ, Attache of the Polish Embassy in Mexico, had purchased an automobile which had been stolen in the U.S. and driven to Mexico. In this operation, in which a defection attempt was considered, LIFEAT provided not only the initial leads, but also daily operational information vital to the Station's efforts in this case.

LIFEAT/Yugoslavian: In this coverage of the Yugoslavian Embassy LIFEAT is providing the basic data necessary in establishing operations against this target. Since the Station is expanding its coverage of Yugoslavian activities, much vital data on personalities, contacts, and services obtained by the target establishment must be provided. It is this exact type of coverage that LIFEAT is geared to provide in addition to the operational leads which will be forthcoming as this coverage progresses. The interested case officer, noting LIFEAT is his only present source of information, feels the take which LIFEAT provides and will

continue to provide in this area is vital and basic to the mounting of any operations against the Yugoslav target.

LIFEAT/Soviet/Double Agent: LIFEAT support has provided needed supporting information in backing Station double agent operations. In this area the success of the operation is obviously dependent upon the veracity of the agent. LIFEAT provides information which enables the interested case officer to determine the veracity of the agent involved. LIFEAT also provides a needed check upon the activities of the double agent.

LIFEAT/Spanish Republican: LIFEAT coverage of Spanish Republican exiles in Mexico City have enabled the Station to monitor the activities of the various groupings of the exiles, including the projected attempt on the life of the senior ODACID official in Mexico. LIFEAT has covered personalities of exile factions both involved in planning this attempt and those opposed to it. Coverage of targets in this area also enables the Station to keep abreast of the plans and activities of the various groups which make up the Spanish Republican exile community in Mexico City.

LIFEAT/CI-CE Coverage: LIFEAT leads in this area are exploited in the reporting of travel of important Communists, particularly to Cuba and Iron Curtain countries, and the travel of U.S. citizens, especially Communists and Leftists, to Cuba. Through coverage of the American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM) LIFEAT has provided ODENVY with an increasing amount of information on the leftist activities of relatives and friends of the ACGM who reside in the U.S. One of the noteable items in this regard is providing data on the overt and covert efforts of the blacklisted "Hollywood Ten" to regain their former status in the U.S. film industry.

Finally, and certainly not of least importance, Station security has been enhanced through LIFEAT periodic coverage of former Station assets, like LIVESTOCK-1 and LIVESTOCK-2, who could be a danger to particular Station operations or personnel. Monitoring of certain terminated agents is considered especially valuable where these agents were involved in the more sensitive operations.

H. Conclusion

It is the opinion of the Mexico City Station that the support provided other Station operations, the CI/CE information and leads, and the ability of the unilateral LIFEAT operation to cover sensitive targets without revealing Station interest

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to the liaison forces, well justify the expenditure of funds, time, personnel, and security risk. As it has been noted in the past, that even with the Station's envolvement in the parallel, but liaison, LIENVOY operation, a change in attitude by the present local government administration or a change in government administrations could end KUBARK participation in that liaison project. For that reason, LIFEAT, in addition to maintaining its present heavy coverage, must be available to once again undertake coverage of the official Soviet and Czech official targets in Mexico City. Therefore, LIFEAT's present orientation, though toward supporting Station operations and CI/CE mission rather than toward targets which would provide positive intelligence, leaves it readily available for recall into the Soviet-Czech coverage. It is the Station's firm opinion that the LIFEAT project provides a substantial and vital contribution in fulfilling the several priority objectives of the Station's Related Mission Directive.

I. There is attached a list of the HMMs produced from LIFEAT provided material during the period July 1961 through May 1962 as a by-product of the project's prime responsibility of providing support to Station operations.

II. Progress of the Operation

The objectives of the LIFEAT Project are of a continuing nature and are therefore not considered for fulfillment during any given period of time. For this reason percentage figures as to completion of project objectives cannot be drawn. However, an indication of the coverage provided in working toward fulfillment of the objectives can be noted in that 14,000 pages of raw text were produced in the period July 1961 through May 1962. LIFEAT has been in daily operation during the review period with the average number of lines covered per month being 20, with a high in March 1962 of 28 lines covered.

III. Planning for the Future

As was indicated at the time of the last project renewal, LIFEAT hopes to remain uncommitted to coverages that require the expenditure of a great portion of LIFEAT resources but provide coverage of but one target...such as Soviet Embassy coverage. It is added emphatically, however, that should the need arise for LIFEAT to again assume such responsibilities, it is fully able to do so. Until such time LIFEAT will continue to enjoy greater flexibility in the employment of its assets, especially in the areas in which the Station does not wish to reveal its interest or operations to the liaison forces involved in the LIENVOY operation.

As to particular areas of operations, the Station has hopes of employing LIFEAT assets in "hot mike operations which require access to telephone

centrals and cables. The feasibility of using LIFEAT in this type of operation has already been proven, in a recent operation with the LIERODE installation as a target. Seven reels of "hot mike" take were obtained in test runs on checking both the operation (including installation of the "miked" instrument in the office of the head of the LIERODE official installation) and the equipment which was of radical design and conceived and built by the KURIOT technician assigned to Mexico City Station under deep cover. Unfortunately, before continuous operation could get underway, the LIERODE installation decided upon complete renovation of its telephone system, including the installation of a switchboard. This, at least temporarily, precludes further operation against this particular target, unless a direct line is installed there. However, it is the intention of the Station to attempt coverage of other targets of interest. In these plans LIFEAT plays the key role in installation, line and series cross maintenance, basehouse procurement and maintenance, and processing of take. From the brief test runs via the LIERODE operation noted above, it is believed that "hot mike" operations, supported and maintained by LIFEAT, can greatly aid the Station in its coverage of responsibilities under its present Related Mission Directive.

IV. Performance of Agents

The overall performance of all agents employed in the LIFEAT complex continued to be good during the period of the project review, with security being stressed in all phases of the operation. No security problems were encountered which were not solved by the personnel involved. Since the success of the LIFEAT operation depends largely upon the security of its personnel, Headquarters clearances and evaluation of new personnel will continue to be sought on those new additions who pass a strict field assessment.

V. Expenditures

Approval for renewal of Project LIFEAT was granted 8 September 1961 for FY 1962 in the amount of $98,973.03. The proposed budget for FY 1963 is broken down in the attached Field Project Outline Renewal Request, Part II, and totals ~~$102,168.00.~~ ~~98,993.00~~ 94,000.00

VI. Status of Commitments

There are no commitments other than those noted in the project outline submitted herewith and in the individuals contracts and oral agreements (memoranda of oral agreements were forwarded as necessary) of the various LIFEAT personnel.

Even now with the shift of operational emphasis to Station operations support, it is thought significant to include a list of HMM's produced through April 1962 (10 months of the project year) as a by-product in the LIFEAT operation.

HMM 5742
HMM 5743
HMM 5836
HMM 5883
HMM 5894
HMM 5915
HMM 5920
HMM 5921
HMM 5960
HMM 5975
HMM 5977
HMM 5985
HMM 5987
HMM 6012
HMM 6015
HMM 6142
HMM 6162
HMM 6191
HMM 6220
HMM 6230
HMM 6266
HMM 6292
HMM 6311
HMM 6322
HMM 6337
HMM 6340
HMM 6344
HMM 6349
HMM 6359
HMM 6364
HMM 6376
HMM 6377
HMM 6379
HMM 6382
HMM 6390

PROJECT LIFEAT

PROJECT OUTLINE, PART I

1. Area of Operations

This operation is run from Mexico City Station and is concerned with targets located within Mexico City.

2. Purpose

The purpose of this project is to provide, unilaterally, daily information on the activities of official foreign installations in Mexico and the personnel thereof, as well as coverage of the activities of selected individuals and groups in response to both Station needs and Headquarters requests. Presently, LIFEAT stresses flexibility of coverage with support of Station operations and CI/CE coverage receiving the greatest emphasis.

3. Background

Project LIFEAT was originated on 3 October 1950 as a unilateral telephone tap operation. Actual initiation of operations under this authority occurred on 18 January 1951, and the operation has run continuously from that date. The project was opened with the installation of a single tap and has grown in the past eleven years to coverage of as many as thirty lines in a given month.

The LIFEAT Project is a unilateral operation completely independent from any liaison arrangement. It is staffed by KUBARK contract employees with the majority of personnel being indigenous controlled agents.

During the past eleven years, Project LIFEAT has produced more than 83,500 (estimate) pages of operational and intelligence information in direct support of Mexico City Station's specific objectives, and contributed materially to the intelligence gathering activities connected with the Soviet-Satellite Bloc and more recently with the Cuban representatives in Mexico. In addition, LIFEAT has been of considerable value in monitoring the activities of the American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM), as well as the activities of the exile groups and local Communists.

14-00000

With the LIENVOY's assumption of coverage of the Soviet and Czechoslovakian official installations in July 1960, LIFEAT assets were released from continuous coverage of these two targets. These assets were then employed in direct support of Station operations--a role ideally suited for a unilateral operation such as LIFEAT, and extremely important to the security and success of Station operations. LIFEAT, after spending much of Project Year 1961 - 1962 programing to this new role and redirecting its assets, has now adjusted to this role and is fully employed in this vital assignment.

4. References

a. HMMA-17199, 12 June 1961 (LIFEAT Renewal Request for FY 1962)
b. HMMW-10085, 14 September 1961 (Approval of LIFEAT Renewal for FY 1962)

5. Objectives

a. To identify Soviet and satellite intelligence personnel in Mexico and to provide information on the nature and extent of their clandestine intelligence and propaganda activities in Mexico.

b. To collect information of the Satellite officials both as to their activities as well as information of biographic nature.

c. To support specific Station operations, especially in the recruitment, defection, Communist Party penetration and counter-intelligence fields.

d. To collect information on prominent Mexican Communists and pro-Communists and their activities.

e. To collect information on prominent Communists, other than Mexican, active in Mexico, and to identify them and their associates and activities.

f. To collect information on exile groups and individuals active in Mexico.

g. To provide coverage of targets of opportunity in Mexico City in support of Station objectives and Headquarters' requests.

6. Targets

For objectives a and b:

a. Selected Soviet intelligence officers home phones.

b. Selected Satellite officials office and home phones.

c. Selected private phones being used by known and suspected Satellite intelligence personnel.

For objective c:

d. Selected telephones as requested by Station Case Officers in support of their going and/or projected operations.

For objective d:

e. Telephone conversations from residences of senior Communists and pro-Communists.

For objective e:

f. Telephone conversations from residences of known American Communists residing in Mexico City.

For objective f:

g. Telephone conversations from the residences or offices of prominent exile leaders or their contacts in Mexico City.

For objective g:

h. Telephone conversations which can be monitored from targets of opportunity.

7. Tasks

Case Officer - Jeremy L. NIARCOS

a. Supervise the operational and administrative activities of all LIFEAT personnel.

b. Maintain awareness of and provide direction in all matters pertaining to the operational management of the LIFEAT Project.

c. Provide guidance and day-to-day supervision of special operational phases of LIFEAT coverages.

d. Coordinate information received from the LIFEAT coverage with other Station operations, and coordinate as necessary with the Station personnel responsible for the parallel LIENVOY operation.

e. Maintain LIFEAT capabilities for mounting operations against targets of opportunity.

f. Maintain supervision over basehouses, equipment, and training of personnel assigned to the LIFEAT operations.

8. Coordination

a. Information produced by LIFEAT, primarily a Station operational support asset, is closely coordinated with other operations of the Mexico City Station. No operational coordination is required with any other geographical area, but they are advised of any information produced by LIFEAT which may be of interest to them.

b. Project LINOG which supports the principal "outside" Case Officer, David M. WILSTED, is effected in coordination with Project LIFEAT.

c. Coordination with the parallel, but liaison project - LIENVOY, is closely coordinated between the responsible Case Officers of both projects, particularly relating to the division of coverage between the two operations, thereby assuring that the unilateral LIFEAT operation will not be endangered by the indigenous personnel of the LIENVOY operation.

9. Personnel

a. Career and Contract Agents

(1) David M. WILSTED (201-009195), principal "outside" Case Officer.
(2) Wayne C. DRABAND (201-255095), outside assistant to David M. WILSTED. DRABAND was introduced into the LIFEAT operation in November 1961 as a replacement for Ralph B. RAFANELLI who was transferred from Mexico PCS in the fall of 1961. His OA was amended 14 November 1961 to cover his use in the LIFEAT Project. Although DRABAND possessed only limited knowledge of clandestine activity when first employed, under WILSTED's instruction and Case Officer guidance, plus his own willingness and capacity for work, it appears he will prove a valuable addition to the LIFEAT complex.

(3) LIEMBRACE-8 (201-111616) has been introduced to the LIFEAT operation as a standby technician backup to WILSTED, but will be actively employed in the operation only in the event of WILSTED's prolonged absence or incapacity. If and when such action is necessary, LIEMBRACE will then be carried under Project LIFEAT. LIEMBRACE-8's OA was amended to reflect this assignment on 7 April 1962.

(4) Carol K. ZINSMEISTER (201-117968), LIFEAT processor/translator and former basehousekeeper who can be temporarily reassigned basehousekeeping duties.

(5) Olga A. PARFINIK (201-117978), LIFEAT processor/translator. OA for LIFEAT employment dated 28 September 1954.

b. Field Agents

(1) LIFEUD-1, OA granted 17 October 1950 (201-182704)
(2) LIFEUD-2, OA granted 14 August 1951 (201-117971)
(3) LIFEUD-3, OA granted 14 December 1953 (201-117971)
(4) LIFEUD-4, OA granted 1 October 1953 (201-117743)
(5) LIFEUD-5, OA granted 16 December 1953 (201-117744)
(6) LIFEUD-6, OA granted 28 September 1954 (201-117978)
(7) LIFEUD-7, OA granted 21 October 1954 (201-117980)
(8) LIFEUD-8, OA granted 31 March 1955 (201-119521)
(9) LIFEUD-9, OA granted 27 April 1956 (201-117984)
(10) LIFEUD-10, OA granted 13 September 1956 (201-114085)
(11) LIFEUD-11, OA granted 21 August 1956 (201-113595)
(12) LIFEUD-12, OA granted 6 August 1956 (201-113569)
(13) LIFEUD-13, OA granted 13 September 1956 (201-115833)
(14) LIFEUD-14, OA granted 26 September 1956 (201-117972)
(15) LIFEUD-15, OA granted 19 January 1957 (201-126315)
(16) LIFEUD-16, OA granted 2 July 1958 (201-222786)
(17) LIFEUD-17, OA granted 13 August 1956 (201-114086)
(18) LIFEUD-18, OA granted 2 October 1957 (201-185370)
(19) LIFEUD-19, OA granted 18 May 1960 (201-262488)
(20) LIFEUD-22, (formerly LILILLY-1), amendment of OA requested 24 April 1962 (201-288248)
(21) LIFEUD-23, (formerly LILILLY-2), amendment of OA requested 24 April 1962, (201-305604)

c. During the past project year the following personnel were dropped from Project LIFEAT:

(1) Ralph B. RAFANELLI (201-176295), staff agent, was reassigned PCS after completing his second tour in Mexico on 8 October 1961.

(2) Olivia N. GLADMON (201-117751), LIFEAT processor, has given notice that due to her planned return to the United States for necessary eye surgery during June 1962, her employment with LIFEAT must be terminated. Agent quit-claim and secrecy agreement have been executed.

(3) Leona C. GANDARA (201-225710), employed by LIFEAT only for standby support during the past year and one half, now is employed for support and clerical work for MKCHARITY.

(4) LIFEUD-20, (formerly LIMITATION-5), (201-102308), and LIFEUD-21, formerly LIMITATION-6 (201-117981) will be terminated as of the end of the present LIFEAT project year (30 June 1962). Plans for use of this couple as basehousekeepers were cancelled when LIFEUD-22 and LIFEUD-23, who are more desirable choices, became available for LIFEAT use. Termination has been discussed fully with these indigenous agents, and termination arrangements were accomplished on a friendly and mutually agreeable basis (as in all LIFEAT terminations, separation is made on the basis of Mexican custom and/or law).

10. Operational Clearances

See Section 9 above.

11. Cover

There are no changes in the cover of personnel who have been previously employed in the LIFEAT operation. With the new agents employed since the last project renewal, cover is as follows:

a. Wayne C. DRABAND has natural cover of a retired U.S. civil servant presently in Mexico with his wife, an employee of a U.S. government agency.

b. LIEMBRACE-8 has natural cover of a retired U.S. businessman of many years residence in Mexico City.

c. LIFEUD-22 has natural cover of a Cuban exile employed by a Mexican firm in Mexico City. He works regular hours at his cover employment and partakes in LIFEAT activities before and after work and during lunch hours.

d. LIFEUD-23, the mother of LIFEUD-22, has natural cover of housekeeper for her son and performs her LIFEAT duties only in their home.

12. Contact and Communications

Daily contact is maintained between the Case Officer and the agents employed in the project. These contacts are made in a clandestine manner with varying patterns established for car pickups, foot contacts, and emergency meetings. Pre-arranged signals are employed in setting and accomplishing the meetings. When heavy or bulky material is to be passed, meetings are held at night. Entrance to the basehouses by other than the basehousekeepers is made only on the basis of strict necessity; such as need for equipment repair, installation for new line coverages, or line coverage cut off.

Telephone contact concerning the project and with the agents is kept to a minimum. Pre-arranged open code is used for phone conversations between Case Officers and agents. Alternate and emergency communications have been arranged and are reviewed frequently by the personnel using them.

These systems of contact and communication appear suitable for the project and function adequately from the security and utility standpoints. Locations and times of meetings are reviewed periodically and are changed frequently to decrease the possibility of arousing the suspicions of the residents of areas in which meetings are held.

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13. **Control and Motivation**

Control and motivation are primarily based on two factors: ideology and financial gain. A secondary factor is the fear of reprisal from the local police should discovery occur.

14. **Security**

During the past project year there were no incidents which were beyond the capability of the personnel immediately involved to isolate and remedy immediately. In contrast to previous years, there was no instance of telephone work crews approaching a basehouse to check or remove the tap lines running to that basehouse. Some of the "crosses" made in the telephone centrals have been removed by the central's workmen, but these are of no danger to the operation unless a full investigation is made of one of these unusual connections. During the past project years no such investigation has been undertaken, and no suspicion of the LIFEAT linemen has been revealed to date.

As for the past few years the telephone company is continuing its efforts toward modernization of the Mexico City telephone system. This effort includes changing from overhead lines to underground cables, cleaning off of the unused overhead "dead lines" and installation of new equipment throughout the city. These innovations will continue to cause security problems for the LIFEAT complex, but it is believed that these problems are not insurmountable. To meet this challange to LIFEAT security and to prepare for the day when access to telephone distribution lines is further reduced by their placement in underground cables, LIFEAT has recently succeeded in having one of its linemen (LIFEUD-2) selected to attend a four month special course in cable work. When he completes this course (in July 1962), LIFEUD-2 will have working access to all cableways and cable termination boards in Mexico City. This access will be invaluable from both the present security and operational standpoints as well as for the future when LIFEAT will be forced to tap directly from the underground telephone cables. As a standard procedure the LIFEAT personnel continuously work to devise new methods to increase security, as well as train in security procedures, so as to continue the high level of security enjoyed by LIFEAT in the past.

15. **Training**

Initial training of new personnel and continuing refresher training for the experienced personnel are handled primarily by the "outside" case officer, David M. WILSTED. Minor repair and maintenance of equipment as well as emergency security procedures are stressed and continually reviewed with the agents.

16. Equipment and Support

As noted in last year's renewal request, LIFEAT equipment is generally old and much of it is now obsolete. With funds provided in last year's renewal, LIFEAT (within the past month) has begun to acquire some new equipment, particularly audio recorders. A review of the equipment situation in the LIFEAT setup has convinced both WILSTED and the responsible Case Officer that a near-complete modernization program of the equipment used in LIFEAT must be undertaken during the coming project year. The local KURIOT technician has on a number of ocassions expressed his amazement at the superior product produced by LIFEAT with the outmoded and ancient equipment (in terms of use hours) which the LIFEAT complex had to rely on. Therefore, with the funds requested in Part II of this renewal request, LIFEAT should be completely equipped with adequate gear, particularly audio and dial tape recorders, by the expiration of FY 1963. Admittedly, there is involved large, one-time expenses in complete replacement of such expensive items during a single project year. However, it is a necessary move, due entirely to great wear borne by the equipment. This wear is now causing such a rash of breakdowns that the outside principal agent must spend a disproportionate amount of his time in maintenance work.

17. Timetable

LIFEAT has been in almost constant operation since its inception in January 1951, and as a vital Station operational support asset, it is planned to continue it indefinitely.

PROJECT LIFEAT

PROJECT OUTLINE, PART II

18. Estimated Costs

The following are the estimated costs for Fiscal Year 1963. All figures are U.S. dollars per year ($US 1.00 equals 12.50 Mexican pesos). Changes in estimated costs for particular items will be noted. These reflect not only the continued inflationary trend in the Mexican economy, but also the shift in operational emphasis from prime coverage of Soviet/Satellite activities to support of Station operations. In this latter case particular line coverage is of shorter duration, causing greater expense in installation and removal of tap lines and crosses. In the agent salary category total expense in contract agent salaries has been reduced somewhat, due primarily to dropping certain contract agents, while expenses for field agent category has risen, due to the granting during past project year of long overdue salary raises to all but three LIFEAT field agents.

a. Salaries

(1) Career and contract agents

David M. WILSTED (GS-12 equivalent) no expenses included in Project LIFEAT as he is supported entirely by Project LINOG		
Wayne C. DRABAND	$ 5,300	
LIEMBRACE-8 (since this agent is not used actively in LIFEAT, and is carried only as standby technician while employed under MKCHARITY he will continue to be funded out of other appropriate project.)		
Carol K. ZINSMEISTER	5,400	
Olga A. PARFINIK	4,500	
Replacement for Olivia N. GLADMON	3,600	
		$18,800

(2) Field Agents

LIFEUD-1	5,860
LIFEUD-2	2,750
LIFEUD-3	1,960

LIFEUD-4	2,115	
LIFEUD-5	3,650	
LIFEUD-6	3,500	
LIFEUD-7	2,640	
LIFEUD-8	2,785	
LIFEUD-9	2,115	
LIFEUD-10 (no salary)		
LIFEUD-11 (no salary)		
LIFEUD-12 (no salary)		
LIFEUD-13 (no salary)		
LIFEUD-14	3,650	
LIFEUD-15	845	
LIFEUD-16	1,585	
LIFEUD-17 (no salary)		
LIFEUD-18 (no salary)		
LIFEUD-19	1,500	
LIFEUD-22	2,400	
LIFEUD-23	1,800	
LIFEUD-1's assistant	160	
Christmas bonus (in accordance with local custom, this amounts to one month's pay) and gifts where necessary	4,100	
		$43,415

b. Basehouse Rentals

ANNEX III	2,688	
ANNEX IV	2,760	
ANNEX VI	2,500	
ANNEX VII	1,728	
ANNEX VIII	3.072	
ANNEX IX	2,880	
ANNEX to replace ANNEX I	2,000	
c. Basehouse utilities and expenses	2,000	
d. Allowance for customary rental increase when lease renewed	1,200	
		$20,828
e. Purchase of new recorders and dial tape recorder for necessary replacement/modernization	12,250	

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f. Local purchase of replacement parts, wire, expendable supplies (as paper, paper tape, carbon paper, typewriter ribbons, wrapping paper, manila envelopes) and emergency and special equipment	800	
		$13,050
g. Transportation		
QP car used by DRABAND	500	
LIFEUD-7, car rent	500	
LIFEUD-8, car rent	500	
LIFEUD-14, car rent	300	
ZINSMEISTER mileage	300	
		$ 2,100
h. Miscellaneous ops expenses (Included loss of rent deposits, fund for medical expenses and/or fatalities, termination payments *, bribe-, expenses involved in moving and setting up basehouses, and expenses of covering targets of opportunity.)	~~4,000~~ ~~800.00~~ 807.00	
GRAND TOTAL		~~$102,193~~ ~~98,993~~ 99,001.00

NOTE: Station programed LIFEAT at $US 105,948 for FY 1963.

* All terminations of indigenous personnel will be in accordance with Mexican law and will include lump sum separation settlement, transportation and moving expense payments, and any bonus due at the time of the termination.

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50-6-32/1

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING

PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMW-10085, 14 Sept 1961

Project LIFEAT expires on 30 June 1962. Please forward renewal request to arrive in Headquarters no later than 1 June.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
3 April 1962	6 - APR 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-10563

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-32/1

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexico	Sara Prosser	nr	2555

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	4 APR 1962	J. C. KING

10563

ROUTING	INITIAL
1 - WH/3/Mexi/Chrono	
RID/AN	
WH/3M	

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING: X — NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED: For your information only

REFERENCE : HMM-A-17199, 12 June 1961

1. The LIFEAT Project was renewed on 8 September 1961.

2. LIFEAT Project was approved for $98,973. Please note that this means a cut of $12,700 from the Station's original request for $111,673. The cut at Headquarters was made for several reasons: 1) to fall within the approved programed figure of $99,000; 2) during FY 1961 only approximately $81,000 was obligated and since no expansion was planned, an increase of almost $30,000 could not be justified; 3) to keep the approving authority within KUDOVE.

The cuts were made in the following places:

	Station request	Approved
Equipment:		
Local purchase	$ 2,500	$1,800
New equipment	4,500	2,500
Other Ops expenses	15,000	5,000

3. KUTUBE and KUDESK Staffs concurred in recommending renewal. KUTUBE/D remarked that the project included coverage of highly selective KUTUBE/D interests through technical means and stated that the project provided several items of operational interest not otherwise obtainable, as well as operational leads and background data useful in target assessment. KUDESK Staff reiterated that coverage should continue to be given to carefully selected known or suspect Soviet/Satellite agents in support of the Station's intensified KUDESK type program.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City

DATE TYPED: 14 Sept. 1961

DATE DISPATCHED:

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMM-W-10085

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-32/1

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

1 - Subject
1 - WH/Registry
1 - WH/3/Mex/Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexico	C. L. Bustos-Videla	mrd	3162

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD		J. C. KING

WH/3/Mexico

DISPATCH

SECRET

PROJECT APPROVAL NOTIFICATION

PROJECT	LIFEAT	[ ] CA	[X] FI/CI	[ ] PROPRIETARY [ ] SUBSIDY [X] DIRECT

ACTION		AREA
	NEW PROJECT	DIVISION: WH
	AMENDMENT	BRANCH: WH/3
X	RENEWAL	DESK: Mexico
	TERMINATION	CASE OFFICER: C. Bustos-Videla — EXTENSION: 3162
	EXTENSION	
	OTHER	

AUTHORIZATION

APPROVING AUTHORITY	TOTAL AMOUNT APPROVED	FY	AMOUNT
C/DDP	$ 90,973	1962	$90,973
		196	

PERIOD OF APPROVAL FROM 1 July 1961 TO 30 June 1962

FINANCIAL CODE SYMBOL: 2135-5701-5906

CONDITIONS OF APPROVAL

SIGNATURE DDP/PG [signature]

DATE 11 SEP 1961

DISTRIBUTION

1	FINANCE DIVISION	1	~~SSA-DD/S~~	1	BUDGET DIVISION	1	OPERATING DIVISION CHIEF OF SUPPORT	1	CASE OFFICER	1	DDP/PG

FORM 5-60 849 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(5)

14-00000

SECRET

PROJECT ACTION

LIFEAT

TYPE OF ACTION			
	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION	WHD
	AMENDMENT NO	FIELD STATION	Mexico City
X	RENEWAL FY 1962	BRANCH 3	DESK Mexico
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER	Charlotte Bustos-Videla
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO 1015 · BUILDING Barton Hall	EXTENSION 3162

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISION

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (And signature)	DATE	COPY NO.	MEMORANDUM ATTACHED YES	NO	DATE
C/WH/3/Mexico	Steward D. Burton					
C/WH/3	Ned P. Holman					
WH/B&F	Robert D. Carter					
WH/PO/A	John G. Heyn					
C/WHD	J. C. King					

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (And signature)	DATE	COPY NO.	YES	NO	DATE

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	TO	TOTAL AMOUNT	FY	AMOUNT
1 July 1961	30 June 1962	$ 98,973	1962	$ 98,973.00
			196	$

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
DDP/PG/FI/Proj		

FORM 6-60 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

SUBJECT: Request for Approval of Project LIFEAT

1. It is requested that the LIFEAT Project be renewed for the period 1 July 1961 through 30 June 1962 for a total of $98,974. This project has been programmed for $99,000 and funds are available in WH Division for FY 1962. During the last fiscal year approximately $81,000 was obligated.

2. No training programs for any LIFEAT personnel are anticipated for the renewal period.

3. Any number of emergency conditions could be listed which might affect the smooth running of this operation. Among them would be the break in diplomatic relations or hot war between Mexico and the United States or the discovery of this unilateral asset by the Mexican Government. Emergency recontact instructions have not been established for the agents of this project since it seems likely that the operation would cease in case of such conditions and the agents would be of no further value.

4. This project was the source of 128 intelligence reports during the past year, 85 of which were disseminated. The remainder were used for Headquarters background only since the information was either partially previously reported, overt, or of no interest to customer agencies. The following evaluations were received:

"Mexican Technicians Going to Work in Cuba" - State Department said this report was of moderate importance and that the information was new and useful.

"Nicaraguan Revolutionary Activities in Mexico" - State Department said that this report was of moderate importance and that the information was new and useful.

"Propaganda Activities of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico" - State Department said that this report was of moderate importance and useful as new information. USIA commented that the same report was of major importance.

"Mexican Government Purchase of Soviet Radioisotopes" - OSI reported that this dissemination was of little importance and that the information was already sufficiently known. ORR said that it was of moderate importance and more details were required.

"Projected Arrival in Mexico of Polish Travel Officials" - State Department said that this report was of moderate importance and the information was new and useful. They expressed a continuing interest in this type of reporting.

"New Policy of the Soviet Commercial Office in Mexico" - ORR reported that this information was new but only of moderate importance.

5. WH Division recommends renewal of the LIFEAT Project based on the field request attached. WH Division has cut the field's original request for $111,673 to $98,974.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: [redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: [illegible]

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 50-6-32/1

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 12 June 1961

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Project Renewal Request

RE: "43.3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
- MARKED FOR INDEXING
- X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: As noted

REFERENCE(S):

1. Forwarded herewith and under separate cover for Headquarters processing is the LIFEAT Project Renewal Request covering FY 1962. This consists of a comprehensive review of Project LIFEAT for the period July 1960 through June 1961, and a Project Outline divided into Parts I and II.

2. It is noted that the total of funds requested for the coming project year exceeds that granted for the past year, but it is felt that the additional funds are necessary, and realistically reflect the needs of the operation.

3. It is requested that Project LIFEAT be renewed for the period July 1961 through June 1962 in the amount of $111,673.

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C. CURTIS

9 June 1961

Attachment:
Project Renewal h/w and u/s/c

Distribution:
4 - Headquarters w/4 cys att h/w and u/s/c
2 - Files

AN
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DES / NFD
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Remove from Project: [illegible]
CS Classification: 50-6-32/1
JOB # [illegible]
Box: [illegible] Fold: 2

CS COPY

50-6-32/1

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: [redacted]

CONTINUED

PAGE NO

14-00000

SECRET/KAPOK

PROJECT REVIEW AND PROJECT OUTLINE (PARTS I AND II)

CRYPTONYM LIFEAT

CASE OFFICER Edward P. SECHEN

ASSISTANT CASE OFFICER Jeremy L. NIARCOS

STATION MEXICO CITY

CHIEF OF STATION Willard C. CURTIS

SECRET/KAPOK

12 June 1961

PROJECT LIFEAT

PROJECT REVIEW

I. Product of the Project

A. Soviet Embassy

LIFEAT technical surveillance of the Soviet Embassy and Commercial Office telephone lines was discontinued on 22 June 1960 for security reasons. The withdrawal of LIFEAT from coverage of this target hinged on the 20 June 1960 suggestion by LITENSOR to Chief of Station, Mexico City, that the liaison tap operation LIENVOY undertake operations against the Soviet/Satellite targets located in Mexico City. In order not to reveal to LITENSOR that a unilateral tap operation was already providing coverage of these targets, it was necessary for the Chief of Station to agree to LIENVOY extending its coverage to include Soviet/Satellite operations. LIFEAT immediately severed its coverage of both Soviet and Polish phones so as not to jeopardize the continuing unilateral LIFEAT operation and the personnel involved therein. No security breach resulted from the switch from LIFEAT to LIENVOY coverage due largely to the thoroughness and speed of the LIFEAT personnel. LIFEAT security and compartmentation was not harmed to any degree whatever. (Note: LIFEAT again resumed coverage of the Polish Legation--now Embassy--when it developed that LIENVOY did not have the ready capacity to provide "take" from both the Czechoslovakian and Polish official installations.)

B. Polish Embassy

During the past project year, LIFEAT remained the primary source of information on this target and the only successful, continuing penetration of the target, technical or otherwise. The interested Case Officer has described the LIFEAT contribution as "unique" and "invaluable". Examples of the positive intelligence product of the LIFEAT/Polish coverage are:

HMMA-15431, 3 August 1960 (Aleksander SEKIER)
HMM-5133, 22 August 1960 (Promotion of Polish Minister in Mexico to Rank of Ambassador)
HMM-5144, 24 August 1960 (Polish Minister of Shipping to Attend Mexican Independence Celebration)
HMM-5186, 22 September 1960 (Projected Arrival in Mexico of Polish Travel Officials)
HMMA-15696, 28 September 1960 (Jan SLUSARZ)

HMMA-15722, 30 September 1960 (Piotr WASILUK's Order for Tape Recorder)
HMM-5338, 9 December 1960 (Appointments to Polish Missions in Latin America)
HMMA-16255, 11 January 1961 (Gita STERN)
HMMA-16306, 20 January 1961 (EXCORN/RYBAT)
HMMA-16467, 15 February 1961 (Possible Polish Sponsored Audio Operation)

C. Cuban Embassy

The emphasis of the LIFEAT operation during the past year has been placed on coverage of Cuban official, intelligence and propaganda activities. Direct support of Station operations in the JMZIP area has rendered immeasurable assistance to the responsible Case Officers. On various occasions LIFEAT support has involved extended periods of live-monitoring target telephones, thereby providing excellent security for Station assets taking part in sensitive operations. LIFEAT/Cuban coverage has also enabled the Station officers to check the veracity and activities of various penetration agents in the Cuban Embassy, again providing increased operational security and increased exploitation of these agent assets. Although LIFEAT has been employed primarily as an operational support asset in the Cuban area, the following are examples of the valuable and abundant positive intelligence production furnished by LIFEAT:

HMM-5044, 9 July 1960 (Oil From Mexico For Cuba)
HMMA-15499, 17 August 1960 (AMSHAD-1)
HMM-5101, 10 August 1960 (Canadian Delegates to Cuban Youth Congress)
HMM-5207, 6 October 1960 (Dissension at Cuban Embassy in Mexico)
HMM-5330, 9 December 1960 (Cuban Propaganda Activities in Mexico)
HMM-5398, 4 January 1961 (Activities of Prensa Latina, Cuban News Agency)
HMM-5541, 17 March 1961 (Cuban Commercial Activities in Mexico)
HMM-5573, 7 April 1961 (Cuban Request for Mexican Co-sponsorship of UN Resolution)
HMM-5592, 19 April 1961 (Recruitment of Mexican Technicians to Work in Cuba)
HMM-5613, 28 April 1961 (Collection of Medicines for Shipment to Cuba)
HMM-5627, 3 May 1961 (Links Between Cuban Embassy and Pro-Cuba Demonstrations in Mexico City)
HMMA-17001, 12 May 1961 (Travel of U.S. Citizens to Cuba
HMM-5647, 17 May 1961 (Visit of Cuban Petroleum Technicians to Mexico)

D. American Communists in Mexico

As in the past, most of the targets in this group have been covered at the request of ODENVY, and the production has been partially processed

by them. During the period July 1960 through May 1961, approximately 280 reels of raw "take" were passed to local ODENVY for their processing. The most valuable information gleaned from coverage of the targets in this field continues to deal with contacts, travel, and activities of the American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM). The following is a sample of the reporting based on the LIFEAT coverage provided in this area during the past project year:

HMMA-15467, 10 August 1960 (Travel of Noah SEBORER and Family)
HMMA-15481, 12 August 1960 (Marianne de PERALTA (nee YAMPOLSKY)
HMMA-15917, 9 November 1960 (Berthe Neham SMOLIKOFF)
HMMA-16051, 30 November 1960 (Paul STEVENSON, aka Pablo O'HIGGINS)
HMMA-16111, 9 December 1960 (Max SPARER)
HMMA-16179, 21 December 1960 (Albert MALTZ)
HMMA-16214, 30 December 1960 (Samuel J. NOVICK)
HMMA-16328, 25 January 1961 (David HALPERIN)
HMMA-16342, 25 January 1961 (Enos Regnet WICHER)
HMMA-16404, 3 February 1961, (Noah, Anna, and Robert SEBORER)
HMMA-16565, 1 March 1961 (Margaret Larkin MALTZ)
HMMA-16747, 29 March 1961 (Enos and Maria WICHER)
HMMA-16802, 7 April 1961 (Noah and Anna SEBORER)

E. Exile and Revolutionary Activities

LIFEAT continues to provide data on the exile and revolutionary groups active in Mexico. The bulk of the LIFEAT effort in this field was directed toward the coverage of the Nicaraguan exiles, and the results were most rewarding in this area. Examples of productivity:

HMM-5264, 2 November 1960 (Nicaraguan Exile Activities in Mexico)
HMM-5193, 27 November 1960 (Edelberto TORREZ Espinoza)
HMM-5375, 30 December 1960 (Travel of Honduran Leonel Roberto SAVILLON to Cuba)
HMM-5376, 30 December 1960 (Travel of Nicaraguan Communist)
HMM-5396, 6 January 1961 (Views of Salvadoran Ambassador on Political Situation in El Salvador)
HMM-5452, 8 February 1961 (Americans in Nicaraguan Revolutionary Movement)
HMM-5549, 24 March 1961 (Use of Cuban Embassy as Guatemalan Communist Channel for Messages to Cuba)
HMMA-17025, 17 May 1961 (Travel of Guatemalans)

F. Counter-Intelligence Information

Mexico City Station's major responsibilities continued to lie in the field of CI/CE matters during the past year, and LIFEAT was able to provide a substantial contribution toward the attainment of the Station's objectives in this field. In particular, coverage of the following known

Communists added much to the Station's efforts: Xavier GUERRERO Saucedo and his wife, Clara Porcet de GUERRERO; Carmen BRUFAU Civit; and Juan Luis CAMPOS Villalobos. Besides the operational support in the CI/CE field, the following informational reporting was provided by LIFEAT:

HMM-5154, 31 August 1960 (Activities of Vicente LOMBARDO Toledano, Mexican Marxist Leader)
HMM-5333, 9 December 1960 (Clara Porcet de GUERRERO)
HMM-5339, 9 December 1960 (General Lazaro CARDENAS del Rio)
HMM-5533, 10 March 1961 (Activities of the Latin American Peace Conference)
HMM-5652, 19 May 1961 (Communist Support of Student Demonstration at Puebla)
HMM-5655, 19 May 1961 (Meeting of Luis MARTINEZ Menocal with Communists in Mexico)

G. Operational Leads and Support Provided Other Station Operations

During the past project year, LIFEAT continued to support Mexico City Station through the timely production of useful leads, notably in the field of Cuban operations, and provision of continuing support to other Station operations. The following is a selective list of the use made of leads provided by LIFEAT:

LIFEAT/Cuban: In this phase of the LIFEAT operation the most important operational function has been the use of LIFEAT leads in checking the veracity and activities of the KUBARK agents in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico. LIFEAT live-monitoring was employed in the case of Guillermo HERNANDEZ Vega to determine the success of this suspected Cuban penetration of the AMIRON program in contacting Cuban officials or pro-Cuban Mexican officials while he was held in custody by Mexican authorities and Station assets. In another case LIFEAT provided leads which enabled Station assets to monitor a clandestine meeting between a member of the Cuban Embassy staff and one Manuel ROJAS Villa (aka James Bradford STEWART), a fugitive from ODYOKE and a potential CASTRO agent, and ultimately return ROJAS to ODYOKE jurisdiction. LIFEAT was also able to determine the whereabouts of another suspected CASTRO agent, Oscar RODRIGUEZ Meruna. LIFEAT leads and support provided increased security for Station assets involved during the defection of Jose PARDO Llada, CASTRO "propaganda" minister, and provided leads for KUCAGE play on the reaction to the defection within the Cuban Embassy in Mexico.

LIFEAT/Polish: LIFEAT provided vital support in the BECORN recruitment attempt which increased the security of the operation and gave a quick and secure means of evaluating the chances of success of the operation. In this effort, LIFEAT support included long periods of live-monitoring three separate telephone lines. LIFEAT leads also pointed out a local cafe which is a front for much Polish intelligence activity in the

Mexico City area. It has been determined through LIFEAT leads that this cafe is headquarters for a suspected Polish technical operation directed against an official U.S. installation in Mexico City. LIFEAT also provided support for a Station mounted audio operation against the Polish Embassy in Mexico City. Through LIFEAT leads proper support for the operation was arranged.

Coverage of a CI/CE nature was exploited in covering travel of important Communists, particularly to Cuba, and the travel of U.S. citizens, especially Communists and leftists, to Cuba. Travel plans of American Communists were provided to ODENVY well in advance of the actual travel. Activities of local Communists and their participation in demonstrations and CASTRO-support projects was shown through LIFEAT information.

H. Conclusion

It is the opinion of the Mexico City Station that the support provided other Station operations, the CI/CE information, and in particular the ability of the unilateral LIFEAT operation to cover sensitive targets without revealing Station interest to liaison forces, well justify the expenditure of funds, time, personnel, and security risk. It is to be noted that even though the Station is involved in the parallel LIENVOY liaison operation, a change in the attitude of the local government or the change in local government administration could well end KUBARK participation in that liaison project. For that reason LIFEAT must be available to resume the coverage of the Soviet/Satellite targets which it previously provided. It is recognized by the Station that the LIFEAT complex, if allowed to disintegrate, could not be readily reorganized if need for its services in the Soviet/Satellite field was required at a future date. Therefore, LIFEAT's present orientation, though toward targets of a CI/CE nature rather than targets providing positive intelligence, leaves it available for immediate recall into the field of Soviet/Satellite operations. Of necessity, LIFEAT operations in certain areas have been curtailed to some extent and total coverage reduced during the trial period when guide lines were being formed in relation to operating with a parallel but liaison operation (i.e., LIENVOY). However, it is the Station's opinion that even with the temporarily reduced coverage provided by LIFEAT, this project still provides a substantial and essential contribution in fulfilling the several priority objectives of the Station's Related Mission Directive.

I. There is attached a complete list of the [illegible] produced from LIFEAT provided material during the period July 1960 through May 1961 (see attached page).

II. Progress of the Operation

The objectives of the LIFEAT Project are of a continuing nature and are therefore not considered for fulfillment during any given period of time. For this reason percentage figures as to completion of project objectives cannot be drawn. However, an indication of the coverage provided in working

toward fulfillment of the objectives can be noted in that 12,000 pages of raw text were produced in the period July 1960 through May 1961. LIFEAT has been in daily operation during the review period with the average number of lines covered being 12. Generally, this coverage can be broken down as follows:

Cuban Embassy and related lines	4	
Polish Embassy and related lines	3	
American Communists	2	
Targets of Opportunity	3	
	12	TOTAL

III. Planning for the Future

Following the suggestion provided by Headquarters in renewing Project LIFEAT for FY 1961 (FY and project year coincide), the Station is expending every effort to maintain LIFEAT as a secure, compartmented, unilateral operation even though on the presently reduced scale, so as to have readily available for service this flexible support asset with its proven capacity for coverage of almost any target in Mexico City. Also in line with Headquarters suggestion LIFEAT will attempt to increase its coverage of those individuals suspected of maintaining clandestine contact with the RIS.

In the future, the unilateral LIFEAT operation, with the removal from its responsibility the coverage of the Soviet and Czech lines, will tend to be more flexible, with greater percentage of its capacity available for shifting to new targets as they are presented, and able to adjust readily to new situations. It is noted that this may result in a lower quantity of positive intelligence production, but will increase the CI/CE production which has always been basic to the LIFEAT project.

IV. Performance of Agents

The overall performance of all agents employed in the LIFEAT complex continued to be good during the period of the project review, with security being stressed in all phases of the operation. No security problems were encountered which were not solved by the personnel involved. Since the success of the LIFEAT operation depends largely upon the security of its personnel, Headquarters clearances and evaluation of new personnel will continue to be sought on those new additions who pass a strict field assessment.

V. Expenditures

Approval for renewal of Project LIFEAT was granted in August 1960 for the FY 1961 in the amount of $[illegible],[illegible]01.00. The proposed budget for FY 1962 is broken down in the attached Field Project Outline, Part II, and totals $98,973.00.

VI. Status of Commitments

There are no commitments other than those noted in the project outline submitted herewith and in the individual contracts and oral agreements (memoranda of oral agreements were forwarded as necessary) of the various LIFEAT personnel.

The following is a complete list of the 118 HCMs which were based wholly or in part on LIMEAT supplied material during the period July 1960 through May 1961. This represents a 21% increase over the same period of last project year. However, with LIMEAT termination of Soviet and Czech coverage, a drop in the total HCM production can be expected during the coming project year.

HCM-5032	HCM-5332	HCM-5462
5045	5333	5465
5047	5338	5473
5065	5339	5480
5095	5342	5497
5098	5343	5503
5100	5347	5505
5101	5348	5507
5133	5354	5511
5137	5356	5532
5144	5362	5533
5154	5372	5534
5159	5375	5536
5169	5376	5541
5172	5378	5545
5174	5379	5549
5180	5380	5550
5186	5381	5552
51[illegible]7	5382	5560
51[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
5207	5384	5570
5214	5386	5573
5226	5387	5575
5235	5392	5587
5245	5393	5588
5247	5398	5590
5261	5400	5592
5264	5406	5613
5268	5407	5625
5277	5408	5627
5289	5409	5630
5297	5410	5639
5299	5413	5641
5309	5418	5642
5310	5426	5643
5319	5428	5647
5321	5437	5652
5329	5443	5655
5330	5446	5660
	5452	

SECRET/KAPOK

12 June 1961

PROJECT LIFEAT

PROJECT OUTLINE, PART I

1. Area of Operations

This operation is run from the Mexico City Station and is concerned with targets located in Mexico City.

2. Purpose

The purpose of this project is to provide, unilaterally, daily information on the activities of official foreign installations in Mexico and the personnel thereof, as well as coverage of the activities of selected individuals and groups in response to both Station needs and Headquarters requests. Presently, coverage of the official Cuban and Polish installations have top priority in the LIFEAT operation.

3. Background

Project LIFEAT was originally approved on 3 October 1950 as a unilateral telephone tap operation. Actual initiation of operations under this authority occurred on 18 January 1951, and the operation has run continuously from that date. The project was opened with the installation of one tap and has grown in the past ten years to continuous coverage of from 12 to 20 lines.

The LIFEAT project is a unilateral operation completely independent from any liaison arrangement. It is staffed by KUBARK staff and contract employees with the greater majority of personnel being indigenous controlled agents.

During the past ten years, Project LIFEAT has produced more than 76,000 pages of operational and intelligence information in direct support of the Mexico City Station's specific objectives, and has contributed materially to the intelligence gathering activities connected with the Soviet and Satellite Bloc and more recently with the activities of the Cuban representatives in Mexico. In addition, LIFEAT has been of considerable value in monitoring the activities of the American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM), as well as the activities of exile groups and local Communists.

4. References

a. HMMA-15252, dated 29 June 1960 (LIFEAT Renewal Request for FY 1961)

b. HMMW-9086, dated 8 September 1960 (Approval of LIFEAT Renewal for FY 1961)

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5. Objectives

a. To identify Satellite intelligence personnel in Mexico and to provide information on the nature and extent of their clandestine intelligence and propaganda activities in Mexico.

b. To collect information on the Satellite officials both as to their activities as well as information of biographic nature.

c. To identify Cuban intelligence personnel in Mexico as well as determine the activities of Cuban officials which are inimical to the interests of the U.S.

d. To collect biographic information on Cuban officials assigned to Mexico and provide daily coverage of their activities.

e. To collect information on prominent Mexican Communists and pro-Communists and their activities.

f. To collect information on prominent Communists, other than Mexican, active in Mexico, and to identify them and their associates and activities.

g. To collect information on exile groups active in Mexico.

h. To collect information on targets of opportunity in Mexico.

6. Targets

For objectives a and b:

a. Selected Satellite officials' office and home phones.

b. Selected private phones being used by known and suspected Satellite intelligence personnel.

For objectives c and d:

c. Telephone conversations from the Cuban Embassy, including long distance calls from Havana, as well as selected telephone calls from residences of Cuban officials.

For objective e:

d. Telephone conversations from the residences of senior Communists and pro-Communists.

For objective f:

e. Telephone conversations from residences of known American Communists residing in Mexico City.

For objective g:

f. Telephone conversations originating from residences or offices of prominent exile leaders in Mexico City.

For objective h:

g. Telephone conversations which can be monitored from targets of opportunity.

7. Tasks

Case Officer - Edward F. SECHEN
Assistant Case Officer - Jeremy L. NIARCOS

a. Supervise the operational and administrative activities of all LIFEAT personnel; staff, contract and indigenous.

b. Maintain awareness of and provide direction in all operational matters pertaining to the management of the LIFEAT Project.

c. Provide guidance and day-to-day supervision of the operational phases of LIFEAT coverages in the field of Polish, Cuban, and American Communists operations.

d. Coordinate information received from the LIFEAT coverage with other Station operations, and coordinate as necessary with the Station personnel responsible for the parallel LIENVOY operation.

e. Maintain LIFEAT capabilities for mounting operations against targets of opportunity.

f. Maintain supervision over warehouses, equipment, and training of personnel assigned to the LIFEAT operation.

8. Coordination

a. Information produced by LIFEAT, primarily a Station operational support asset, is closely coordinated with other operations of the Mexico City Station. No operational coordination is required with any other geographical area, but they are advised of any information produced by LIFEAT which may be of interest to them.

b. Project LIMOG which supports the principal "outside" Case Officer, David M. WILSTED, is effected in coordination with Project LIFEAT.

c. Coordination with the parallel, but liaison project, LIENVOY is closely organized within the Station in two fields: (1) the daily checking

between Case Officers of both projects, particularly relating to the division of coverage between the two operations, to assure that the unilateral LIFEAT operation will not be endangered by the indigenous personnel of the LIENVOY operation; and, (2) the daily processing of LIENVOY/Soviet "take" by the LIFEAT processor and basehousekeeper Carol K. ZINSMEISTER. The Station believes this latter point does not "cross" operations unnecessarily since ZINSMEISTER's long and discrete service within the LIFEAT complex gives her both the sense of security and the background necessary for secure processing of the Soviet "take". (Note: The processed Soviet material is not returned to the liaison forces after receipt from ZINSMEISTER, but is returned to the Station where it is summarized by Station personnel and then passed to liaison as having come from KUBARK Headquarters.) ZINSMEISTER is equally valuable, and indeed essential, in her LIFEAT basehousekeeper assignement because of her experience in dealing with the security problems arising from conducting a technical basehouse, as well as her ideal natural cover as wife of one of Mexico's foremost medical doctors.

9. Personnel

a. Staff agents

Ralph B. RAFANELLI (201-176295), who for the past four years has functioned as the assistant to the "outside" Case Officer for the LIFEAT operation, completes his second tour in June 1961 and will return to Headquarters PCS during the fall or early winter of 1961. It is planned to replace him with a locally recruited person, ODYOKE citizen if possible, who possesses natural commercial cover. Several candidates are presently being considered for this position. As soon as the Station is able to determine the best qualified individual, full PRQ I and II and clearance request will be forwarded for Headquarters processing.

b. Contract Agents/Employees

(1) David M. WILSTED (201-009195), principal "outside" Case Officer.

(2) Olivia N. GLADMON (201-117751), processes tapes and performs clerical duties.

(3) Carol K. ZINSMEISTER (201-117968), LIFEAT basehousekeeper (ANNEX IV) and processes all tapes from LIENVOY/Soviet "take".

(4) Leona C. GANDARA (201-225710), presently employed only on a standby basis for LIFEAT support.

c. Field Agents

(1) LIFEUD-1, OA granted 17 October 1950 (201-182704)

(2) LIFEUD-2, OA granted 15 August 1951 (201-117970)

(3) LIFEUD-3, OA granted 14 December 1953 (201-117971)

(4) LIFEUD-4, OA granted 1 October 1953 (201-117743)

(5) LIFEUD-5, OA granted 16 December 1953 (201-117744)

(6) LIFEUD-6, OA granted 28 September 1954 (201-117978)

(7) LIFEUD-7, OA granted 21 October 1954 (201-117980)

(8) LIFEUD-8, OA granted 31 March 1955 (201-119521)

(9) LIFEUD-9, OA granted 27 April 1956 (201-117984)

(10) LIFEUD-10, OA granted 13 September 1956 (201-114085)

(11) LIFEUD-11, OA granted 21 August 1956 (201-113595)

(12) LIFEUD-12, OA granted 6 August 1956 (201-113569)

(13) LIFEUD-13, OA granted 13 September 1956 (201-115833)

(14) LIFEUD-14, OA granted 26 September 1956 (201-117972)

(15) LIFEUD-15, OA granted 19 January 1957 (201-126315)

(16) LIFEUD-16, OA granted 2 July 1958 (201-222786)

(17) LIFEUD-17, OA granted 13 August 1956 (201-114086)

(18) LIFEUD-18, OA granted 2 October 1957 (201-185370)

(19) LIFEUD-19, OA granted 18 May 1960 (201-262488)

(20) LIMITATION-5, OA amended for LIFEAT 20 March 1961 (201-102308)

(21) LIMITATION-6, OA amended for LIFEAT 20 March 1961 (201-117981)

d. During the past project year the following personnel were dropped from Project LIFEAT:

(1) Alice M. CAILLETEAU (201-119967) was dropped in July 1960 when she returned to PBPRIME with her husband upon his resignation from KUBARK.

(2) Woodrow D. GABBOTT (201-14465) is now employed exclusively as an outside contact for the Station's Satellite Case Officer and should no longer be considered as a member of the LIFEAT complex.

(3) Wallace L. KAWOHL (201-033959) was terminated as an active agent in June 1960 at his own request and with the concurrence of the Station. Agent quit-claim and secrecy agreement were obtained. No security problems are considered likely to occur since KAWOHL's parents continue to be employed as basehousekeepers for LIFEAT and are dependent upon continued LIFEAT salary for their livelihood. At the time of the termination, it was realized that he would continue to enter the basehouse which his parents controlled, and therefore his clearance was amended to reflect this situation. (Reference: HTA-15946).

10. Operational Clearances

See Section 9 above.

11. Cover

There are no changes in the cover of the personnel presently employed in Project LIFEAT from that noted in previous project renewals.

12. Contact and Communications

Daily contact is maintained between the Case Officers and the agents employed in the project. These contacts are made in a clandestine manner with varying patterns established for car pickups, foot contacts, and emergency meetings. Pre-arranged signals are employed in setting and accomplishing the meetings. When heavy or bulky material is to be passed, meetings are held at night. All movement in and out of the basehouses by Case Officers is done in cars ostensibly owned by the agents residing in those basehouses. Entrance to the basehouses on foot by other than the basehousekeepers is made only in emergency situations.

Telephone contact concerning the project and with the agents is kept to a minimum. Pre-arranged open code is used for phone conversations between Case Officers and agents.

Alternate and emergency communications have been arranged and are reviewed frequently by the personnel using them.

These systems of contact and communication appear suitable for the project and function adequately from the security and utility standpoints. Locations and times of meetings are reviewed periodically and are changed frequently to decrease the possibility of arousing the suspicions of the residents of areas in which meetings are held.

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13. Control and Motivation

Control and motivation are primarily based on two factors: ideology and financial gain. A secondary factor is the fear of reprisal from the local police should discovery occur.

14. Security

During the past project year there were no incidents which were beyond the capability of the personnel immediately involved to isolate and remedy immediately. One basehouse was closed for "cooling off" after a telephone company work party came to the basehouse to check the lines running to it. This party was stalled long enough to cut back the "tap" lines at the roof level and the house cleared of all compromising equipment and material. Later the work party entered and checked the lines which proved to be "dead" lines. The extra lines were then removed and the work party left the premises and there was no further trouble. (Note: In Mexico City there is much "dead line" running throughout the city which causes no end of difficulty for the telephone company in installation and repair work. Therefore, the phone company assigns work parties to various areas to clean up the extra unused "dead lines" in order to bring a degree of organization to the telephone system. This work is now being pursued vigorously and is approaching completion in large areas of the city.) The basehouse involved in the above incident has now been moved to a different location and is back in operation.

At the present time the telephone company is making a general effort to modernize the Mexico City telephone system. This effort includes changing from overhead lines to underground cables, cleaning off the unused overhead "dead lines", and installation of new equipment throughout the city. These innovations will cause increasing security problems for the LIFEAT complex, but it is believed that the problems are not insurmountable. Part of the solution will of necessity involve the use of a greater number of basehouses to diversify the coverage and to reduce the number of lines running to any one basehouse. This will cause an increase in expense for the project, but is considered desirable and necessary. It may eventually be necessary for LIFEAT to enter the underground cables in order to provide access to selected targets and maintain the security of the basehouses. The LIFEAT personnel are continually working to devise new methods as well as maintaining training in security so as to continue the high level of security enjoyed by LIFEAT in the past.

15. Training

Initial training of new personnel and continuing refresher training for experienced agents is handled primarily by the "outside" Case Officer, David H. WILSTED. Minor repair and maintenance of equipment as well as emergency security procedures are stressed and continually reviewed with the agents.

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16. Equipment and Support

As has been mentioned in last year's renewal request, much of the LIFEAT equipment, upon whose reliability the success of the information collection is based, will require replacement in the near future. The great percentage of the equipment has been in long and continuous service, while much of the special equipment is no longer being manufactured. When present diminishing commercial stocks of replacement parts are exhausted, new units will be required for LIFEAT with the attendant large, one-time purchase expense.

17. Timetable

LIFEAT has been in almost constant operation since its inception in January 1951, and it is planned to continue it indefinitely.

12 June 1961

PROJECT LIFEAT

PROJECT OUTLINE, PART II

18. Estimated Costs

The following are the estimated costs for Fiscal Year 1962. All figures are U.S. dollars per year ($1.00 U.S. equals 12.50 Mexican pesos). Some increases in particular items will be noted. These reflect the increased cost of living and especially the continuing rise in rental costs in the Mexico City area, plus the necessity of moving basehouses for security reasons discussed in Part I of this Project Outline.

a. Salaries

(1) Staff and contract personnel

Ralph B. RAFANELLI, GS-9 (for maximum of 6 months)		
Salary	$3,500	
Quarters	1,150	
Deep Cover Differential	525	
Replacement for RAFANELLI	4,000	
Carol K. ZINSMEISTER	5,500	
Plus 10% raise	550	
Olivia N. GLANTON	4,200	
Leona C. GANDARA	900	
		$20,325

(2) Field agents

LIFEUD-1		$5,760
LIFEUD-2		2,496
LIFEUD-3		1,776
LIFEUD-4		1,920
LIFEUD-5		3,648
LIFEUD-6		3,500
LIFEUD-7		2,400
LIFEUD-8		2,400
LIFEUD-9		1,920
LIFEUD-10	(no salary)	
LIFEUD-11	(no salary)	
LIFEUD-12	(no salary)	
LIFEUD-13	(no salary)	
LIFEUD-14		3,648
LIFEUD-15		768
LIFEUD-16		1,440
LIFEUD-17	(no salary)	
LIFEUD-18	(no salary)	
LIFEUD-19		1,200

LIFEUD-1's assistant	144	
LIMITATION-5	760	
LIMITATION-6	300	
Due to the continuing rise in ~~the cost of~~ living, plus the fact that the majority of the above listed agents have not received the pay raise reflected in last year's project renewal, it will be manditory to grant an across the board 10% pay raise during FY 1962.	3,400	
Christmas bonus (in accordance with local customs, this amounts to one month's pay for each agent) and gifts where necessary.	3,200	
		$40,680

b. Basehouse Rentals

ANNEX I (formerly LIMERICK Main Base)	$2,200	
ANNEX IV	2,760	
ANNEX VI	2,200	
ANNEX VII	1,728	
ANNEX VIII	3,072	
ANNEX IX	2,880	
ANNEX X	2,688	
ANNEX to be selected	2,500	
c. Basehouse utilities and expenses	2,000	
d. Allowance for customary (for Mexico City) 10% rental increase when lease renewed	2,000	
		$24,028

e. Equipment

Local purchase of emergency and special equipment	$1,800	
New equipment, especially recorders and reels	2,500	
		$4,300

f. Miscellaneous

(1) Expendable supplies such as paper, carbon paper, paper tape, manila envelopes, wrapping paper, $2,000

(2) Transportation

RAFANELLI's CP car	$600
LIFEUD-7 car rent	675
LIFEUD-8 car rent	675
LIFEUD-14 car rent	290
ZIMSMEISTER mileage	400

(3) Other operational expenses (covers loss of rental deposits, fatalities, medical expenses, termination payments,* expenses involved in moving and setting up base-houses, expenses involved in covering targets of opportunity) 5,000

$ 2,640

GRAND TOTAL $98,973

* Any termination of indigenous personnel will be in accordance with Mexican law and will include lump sum separation settlement, transportation and moving expense payments, and any bonus due at the time of termination.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING: X

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Project LIFEAT expires on 30 June 1961. It is requested that your recommendation for renewal be pouched so that it reaches Headquarters prior to 1 June 1961.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City

DATE TYPED: 18 April 1961

DATE DISPATCHED: 19 APR 1961

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-9689

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-32/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

XXX

1 - RI
1 - WH/Mexico
1 - WH/Mailroom

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexico	N. Walton	ac/WH/Mexico	2555

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	18 APR 1961	J. C. KING

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: HMM-W-9086

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 50-6-32/1

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

DATE: S

FROM: Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: Operational
LIFEAT Project Renewal

RE "433" -- (CHECK "X" ONE)
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: Per paragraph 2

REFERENCE(S):

HMM-A-15252, 29 June 1960

1. The LIFEAT Project was approved on 26 August 1960 for a total of $98,901. Headquarters reduced the original request from the field to bring the total Project budget more in line with the programmed figure of $90,000 and the actual obligations of the previous year, which were only $73,884. The following changes were made on the field's request:

	Field Request	Approved
Salaries: Ralph B. RAFANELLI (to reflect legislative pay raise)	$ 6,505.00	$6,995.00
Miscellaneous Operating Expenses	25,000.00	9,000.00

2. Staff comments on the Project renewal request were:

a) KUTUBE/OPS said that the Station is to be commended on its handling of the requested Bloc coverage by LIENVOY while maintaining LIFEAT capability and limiting coverage to those lines most profitable. KUTUBE noted the increased emphasis on exploitation of operational information. In order to continue this aspect of the operation, the Station is faced with the difficult problem of selectivity in targeting and processing take from these two large projects. Every possible effort should be made to increase the efficiency of processing to maintain LIFEAT at its present high level. In KUTUBE/OPS's opinion, LIFEAT personnel and capability must be carefully maintained in face of the easier but less secure LIENVOY.

b) KUDESK stated that this unilateral asset should be continued despite the fact that we are running a similar operation with the local government. It is hoped that the Station will soon be able to use this asset in the investigation of individuals known to be in clandestine contact with the RIS, for the purpose of determining whether or not they may be recruited.

c) KUTUBE/D notes that the project has been of high value.

3. Attached for the information of the Station is a copy of the memorandum prepared in WH to transmit the project for approval.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

CS COPY

Attachment: 1 (3 pages), KAPOK
Per paragraph 3

2 September 1960

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City

Hqs Distribution:
1 - Subject
1 - WH/Registry
1 - WH/3/Mexi/Chrono

WH/3/Mexi/CLZehrung:mrd

50-6-32/1

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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PAGE NO

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CRYPTONYM: LIFEAT | HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:
OPERATING DIVISION: WHD | Charlotte L. Fehrung
FIELD STATION: MEXICO CITY | ROOM NO: 2121 Barton Hall
TARGET AREA: MEXICO CITY | EXTENSION: 2555 or 3152
| DATE: 22 July 1960

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Project Renewal

1. It is requested that the LIFEAT Project be renewed for the period 1 July 1960 through 30 June 1961 for a total of $98,901.00. Last fiscal year the project was approved for $123,830 of which $73,884 was obligated. The approved programmed figure was $90,000 for Fiscal Year 1961. The extra $ 9,000 required would come from the following programmed projects:

LIMOTOR - $2,000
LIVERY - $1,000
LIENVOY - $6,000

2. Subsequent to the preparation by the Station of the attached Project review and renewal request for LIFEAT, the following situation developed in Mexico which has directly affected the entire LIFEAT Project. At a meeting with the Chief of Station on 25 June 1960, LITEMPO asked the Station and LIELEGANT to immediately begin covering the Soviet, Polish and Czech Embassy under LIENVOY. LITEMPO suggested that the Mexicans translate the Spanish and that the Station forward the tapes to Washington for translation of the Russian, Polish and Czech portions. The Chief of Station had no alternative but to express great interest in the coverage of targets of such importance. In order to protect the security of the LIFEAT operations, the Station stopped the LIMERICK and LITHES (LIVERY had not been in operation for the past six months for security reasons) coverage on 22 June, prior to the LIENVOY activation. It was determined that LIENVOY would cover 5 Soviet and 2 Czech lines. The take continues to be processed by LIKESTER and LIELIFORM. The LIENVOY monitors extract from the Spanish only the most important points for the daily resumens which are passed to LITEMPO. LIELEGANT has been told we will inform him of pertinent information obtained (ostensibly from Headquarters processing) of the Soviet and Czech text for passing to LITEMPO. LIFEAT will continue its unilateral coverage of Polish and other targets of interest.

3. The Station does not anticipate any problem connected with the exploitation of leads since LIELEGANT has evinced no interest in this matter. In view of the lack of language capabilities by the Mexicans and our ability to control what is passed (ostensibly from Headquarters), the Station sees no problems arising from the present arrangement.

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4. The Station does not intend to cut down on independent LIFEAT operations since there are plenty of targets to keep both LIENVOY and LIFEAT occupied.

5. The LIFEAT Project was the source of 99 positive intelligence reports, 72 of which were disseminated. Those not disseminated were considered by Headquarters to be of value for operational background or were outdated. FR made the following evaluations of LIFEAT reports:

"Mexican Interest in Procurement of Naphthalene from Czechoslovakia," of value, probably true, and of importance to receive further reports.

"Soviet Commercial Activities," of value, probably true, and of importance to receive further reports.

"Soviet Plans to Sell Newsprint to Mexican Government Agency," of little importance.

"Soviet Negotiations for Mexican Cotton," of average value, useful as new information.

The Department of State made the following evaluations of LIFEAT reports:

"Mexican Efforts to Sell Sugar to the USSR," of value, possibly true, and of importance to receive further reports.

"Purchase of Soviet Tractors by Mexican Government," of slight value.

"Soviet Negotiations for Mexican Cotton," of average value, useful in confirming other reports.

6. The Station used LIFEAT information in the preparation of memoranda directed to the Embassy and FBI representatives in Mexico in reply to local requests for information. During the period July 1959 through May 1960, 154 memoranda were furnished the Embassy and 69 memoranda were furnished the FBI based on LIFEAT information.

7. WH Division feels that the positive and CE information received from LIFEAT is invaluable. Most of the information is not available from other Station assets. Reports on travel and the identification of target personalities often serve to confirm information previously received. LIFEAT assets also have been used effectively to check on recently-terminated agents to ascertain that the termination was secure. LIFEAT also has been used to check on reports by double agents that they have contacted or been contacted by their respective Soviet or Satellite contacts.

8. Information received from LIFIRE is passed to WH/4 and any operations undertaken on the basis of such information are closely coordinated with that Branch.

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9. Information received from the LITAUS, LIVERY, and LIMERICK phases is supplied the EE and SR Case Officers at the Station for exploitation of leads and extracting of pertinent background information. At Headquarters there is close coordination between EE, SR and WH on the dissemination of positive reports and the operational exploitation of CE/CI leads. C/EE/C stated on 18 July 1960 that the Czech desk fully endorses the renewal of the LIFEAT Project and that they have found the information obtained from this project to be especially useful in following the movements of persons of interest and the activity and identification of target personnel. Please see attached memoranda from EE/P and SR which express their support of this project renewal.

10. Project BESHOOTH, which supports Woodrow D. CAMBOT, who processes the LITAUS take, is coordinated with Project LIFEAT.

11. Emergency recontact instructions will be arranged with the agents under this project if a situation which might require such instructions threatens Mexico.

12. It is requested that the LIENVOY Project be renewed on the basis of this memorandum and the attached review and renewal request prepared by the Mexico City Station.

COORDINATION:

Ned P. Holman, AC/WH/3

C. W. Anderson, WHD/Proj/Officer

Approved for Transmittal: J. C. King, Chief/WHD

Approved: J. C. King, Chief/WHD

Date

Attachments:
- Station Project Review and Renewal Request
- Folder with past renewals
- Memorandum from SR Division
- Memorandum from EE/C
- Form 680 (in quad)
- Envelope containing true name

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMA-15252 [redacted]1796

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-6-32/1

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 29 June 1960

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Project Renewal Request

RE: (CHECK "X" ONE)
- MARKED FOR INDEXING
- X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: Renewal of Project LIFEAT

REFERENCE(S):

HMMW-7955, 14 August 1959

1. There is attached a comprehensive Review of Project LIFEAT for the period July 1959 through June 1960 and a Project Outline divided into Part I and Part II for easier processing.

2. It is to be noted that the amount requested in the attached renewal request, $114,411, is $19,419 under that amount approved for Project LIFEAT for the past project year. Station Mexico feels this reduction in cost will not adversly affect the operational impact of the project.

3. It is requested that Project LIFEAT be renewed for FY 1961 in the amount of $114,411.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

23 June 1960

Attachments:
1. Odd pages (five copies) - attached herewith.
2. Even pages (five copies) - under separate cover.

Distribution:
3 - WHD (with five copies of odd and even pages)
3 - Files (with complete project renewal request)

AB	[illegible]
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Remove from Project: [illegible]
CS Classification: 50-6-32/1
JOB # [illegible]
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FORM 10-57 53 — USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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PAGE NO

SECRET/KAPOK

PROJECT REVIEW AND PROJECT OUTLINE

PARTS I AND II

Cryptonym LIFEAT — Case Officer Edward P. SECHEN

Station MEXICO CITY — Chief of Station Willard C. CURTIS

Assistant Case Officer Jeremy L. NIARCOS

SECRET/KAPOK

CS COPY

50-6-32/1

PROJECT REVIEW - PROJECT LIFEAT

I. Product of the Project

A. Soviet Embassy

1) Soviet Commercial Activities:

During the past project year, the LIMERICK phase of Project LIFEAT has provided detailed and continuing reports on the increased Soviet efforts to participate in Mexican commercial markets. The following is a partial but representative list of the reports submitted on this subject.

HMM-4322, 12 June 1959, Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico.
HMM-4567, 6 November 1959, Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico.
HMM-4855, 1 April 1960, Soviet Purchase of Mexican Cotton.
HMM-4857, 6 April 1960, Soviet Purchase of Mexican Pineapple.
HMM-4858, 6 April 1960, Soviet Plan to Sell Newsprint to Mexican Government Agency.

2) Soviet Diplomatic Activities:

Project LIFEAT provided coverage of many of the Soviet Diplomatic activities in Mexico. It was able to show the relationships maintained between the Soviet and Satellite missions in Mexico, as well as the increased official contact between the Cuban and Soviet governments.

MEXI-4304, 21 August 1959, Meeting os Soviet and Cuban Ambassadors to Mexico.
HMM-4618, 20 November 1959, Increased Relations of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico with the Latin American Diplomatic Missions.
HMM-4768, 8 February 1960, Preparation of Soviet Propaganda in Mexico for Shipment to Cuba.

3) Soviet Cultural Activities:

LIFEAT has provided detailed information concerning the Soviet cultural activities in Mexico. Examples of such reports are:

HMM-4415, 5 August 1959, Soviet Plans to Bring Soviet Exposition to Mexico.

HMM-4449, 28 August 1959, Soviet Plans to Bring Pyatnitskiy
Chorus to Mexico from Canada.

HMMA-14677, 16 March 1960, Soviet Cultural Activities.

4) Background Information on, and Movement of, Soviet Officials:

Through LIFEAT information, the Station has been able to maintain a current roster of the Soviet Embassy personnel assigned to Mexico. LIFEAT has been further utilized to give information on job assignments within the Soviet Embassy, and to determine in advance departures, arrivals, and replacements of Embassy personnel. Large quantities of background personality information concerning the official and private lives of members of the Soviet staff were also provided.

HMM-4323, 11 June 1959, Scheduled Travel of Soviet Officials.
HMMA-14065, 6 November 1959, Activities of Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Ivanovich BAZYKIN.
HMMA-13614, 24 August 1959, Retirement System for Soviet Diplomats.

5) Goods and Services:

Throughout the past year, LIFEAT information has been of use to Project LIMESA. Of particular note have been leads concerning various properties in which the Soviets were interested.

6) Miscellaneous Activities of the Soviet Embassy:

LIFEAT material which does not fall into any one category but which deals with the Soviets and their association and related activities has been reported as necessary.

B. Czech Legation*

Information obtained on the Czech Legation during the period under review was essentially the same as that obtained from the Soviet Embassy. Although this target was covered only from July 1959 to January 1960 (due to the security problem posed by extensive telephone company cable renovation work in the vicinity of the basehouse serving the target), valuable intelligence was gained during the period of actual coverage. Examples

of reports from this source are:

HMMA-13295, 10 July 1959, Czech Legation Activities.
HMMA-13522, 14 August 1959, Czech Embassy Activities.
HMM-4513, 30 September 1959, Czech Interest in Importing Mexican Copper.
HMMA-13919, 9 October 1959, Czech Diplomatic Couriers.
HMM-4576, 6 November 1959, Czech Plans to Setup Commercial Company in the Free Zone of Curacao.

(*Czech Legation raised to Embassy status during July 1959)

C. The Polish Legation

The type of LIFEAT information gathered on the Polish Legation closely parallels that gathered from the Soviet and Czech targets. LIFEAT remains the primary source of information on this target.

HMM-4458, August 1959, Proposed Mexican Art Exhibit in Poland.
HMMA-13718, 11 September 1959, Influence of Polish Minister on Mexican U. N. Voting.
HMM-4482, September 1959, Polish Commercial Interest in Cuba.
HMM-4544, 23 October 1959, Polish Commercial Activities.
HMMA-14843, 20 April 1960, Activities of Polish Technical Investigators.
HMMA-15055, 27 May 1960, Activities of Alexander BEKIER.

D. American Communists in Mexico

Most of the targets in this group have been covered at the request of ODENVY, and the production has been partially processed by them. Approximately 370 reels were passed to ODENVY for their processing during the period June 1959 - April 1960. The most valuable type of information obtained on these targets deals with travel, contacts, and activities of the American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM). The following is a sample of the reports furnished through coverage of this target group.

HMMA-13792, 25 September 1959, Albert and Margaret MALTZ.
HMMA-14191, 4 December 1959, Albert MALTZ.
HMMA-14885, 27 April 1960, Maria WICHER.
HMMA-15135, 10 June 1960, Noah SEBORER.
HMMA-15144, 15 June 1960, Maria WICHER.

E. Cuban Embassy

LIFEAT has provided timely information on the activities and personalities of the Cuban Embassy. Of particular interest has been the indications provided by LIFEAT of closer relations and increasing contact between the Cuban and Soviet officials in Mexico. LIFEAT was also able to provide a firm indication of the Soviet-Cuban announcement of resumption of diplomatic relations two weeks in advance of the actual event. Examples of LIFEAT Cuban coverage are:

HMM-4489, 24 September 1959, Recall of Cuban Military Attaches in Mexico.
HMM-4649, 4 December 1959, Pro-Cuba Publication in Mexico.
HMM-4907, 27 April 1960, Projected Joint Announcement by Cuban and Soviet Governments.
HMM-4919, 29 April 1960, Travel to Cuba of Soviet Ambassador in Mexico.

F. Exile and Revolutionary Activities

LIFEAT continued to provide information on the exile and revolutionary groups active in Mexico. Coverage of the Nicaraguan Communist exiles was particularly rewarding for the operational information provided.

HMM-4317, 12 June 1959, Letter from a Guatemalan Communist Concerning the Seventh World Festival of Youth.
MEXI-4271, 13 August 1959, Travel of Nicaraguan Communists.
HMM-4450, 4 September 1959, Nicaraguan Revolutionaries' Efforts to Meet a Former President of Mexico.
MEXI-4488, October 1959, Travel of Dra. Concepcion PALACIOS Herrera, Nicaraguan Communist.
HMM-4967, 25 May 1960, Activities of Rafael RAMIREZ Delgado.

G. LAURICLE Information

During the period of the project review, LIFEAT, as in the past, continued to contribute materially to several matters of LAURICLE interest.

H. Counter-Intelligence Information

CI/CE matters continued to constitute a major portion of the Mexico City Station's priority objectives during the review period. Project LIFEAT was able to provide a substantial contribution to the attainment of these objectives. Of particular note in this respect has been coverage provided on known Communist Party members, especially valuable being that provided on Juan Luis CAMPOS Villalobos.

I. Operational Leads and Support Provided Other Station Operations

During the period covered by this project review, LIFEAT continued to support the Mexico City Station through its timely production of leads which were especially useful, and in most cases essential, in assuring the success of other Station operations. The following is a list, necessarily selective, of the use made of leads from, and support of other projects rendered by Project LIFEAT.

LIFEAT/LIMERICK: 1) Of special note is the support provided to the Station's AEIMPULSE operation. Leads and information rendered by LIFEAT enabled the responsible Case Officer to prepare adequately for this recruitment attempt of an officer of the Soviet Embassy. Following the actual attempt, LIFEAT/LIMERICK was used as a security device to protect the Station assets employed in the operation. 2) As noted in I A. (5) above, Project LIMESA was provided with continuing support by Project LIFEAT. Notable among the information and leads provided were those concerning specific properties which the Soviets were interested in renting and/or buying. 3) LIFEAT has provided a check on double-agent LITARDY-1, giving verification of his activities and contacts. A similar check has also been provided on the activities of informant LIPAGAN-1.

LIFEAT/LIVERY: 1) This phase of LIFEAT closely supported the projected LITACIT physical penetration operation aimed at the LIVERY establishment in Mexico City. LIFEAT provided essential information on the rosters of night duty officers as well as background information on the target. 2) LIFEAT/LIVERY provided support for the installation of technical surveillance against LITACH. Without the information provided by LIFEAT, this operation would have been extremely hazardous at best, and probably would have been entirely impossible.

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LIFEAT/LITMUS: 1) LIFEAT provided information which lead to the successful recruitment of agent BEYAN who was in a position to provide information on BESOOT. 2) LITMUS leads also lead to the attempted, but unsuccessful, recruitment of one Una WARREN, believed to have been a contact of Polish officials in Mexico. 3) LIFEAT leads also lead to the surveillance of a clandestine meeting of Alexander BEKIER, Polish Counselor of Legation in Mexico. Due to the advance notice of the meeting given by LIFEAT, MKCHARITY was given time to plan technical coverage of the meeting and prepare especially fabricated equipment for this coverage. 4) LIFEAT was also responsible for the discovery of the location of a Polish Intelligence basehouse. This information was operationally important to the responsible Case Officer.

LIFEAT/LIERODE: In this phase of the LIFEAT project leads have been most rewarding in terms of agents actually recruited and operations supported by LIFEAT provided information. 1) LIERODE produced leads which were directly responsible for the recruitment of agents LITANGO-1 and LITAMIL-3, while providing security check and information which have increased the value of agent LITANGO. 2) The defections of LITAINT-1 and LITAG-1 were greatly aided by LIFEAT leads and information. The internal reaction to the defections in the target establishment were also readily available through LIFEAT. 3) At present LIERODE is providing coverage, both from a security and informational standpoint, of the attempt to place a recruited agent as Mexico-based advisor to a high official of the Cuban Intelligence. This operation is largely dependent upon LIFEAT leads and support for security coverage of the agent's activities. 4) LIFEAT/LIERODE has been unusually successful in providing information which has enabled the Station to identify nearly all the Cuban agents operating in Mexico. Due to the increasing importance of the Cuban target, these revelations are of utmost importance.

Coverage of a CI/CE nature was provided by LIFEAT targeted against a recruited member of the Mexican Communist Party, and has produced leads on semi-clandestine travel of party members behind the Iron Curtain, as well as providing a check on the veracity of the agent.

Project LIFEAT has been employed also in support of the highly sensitive LIEMIT operation.

J. Conclusion

It is the opinion of the Mexico City Station that the support provided to other Station operations, the CE information obtained, and the positive intelligence gathered by Project LIFEAT well justify the expenditure of KUBARK assets in terms of funds, personnel, time and security risk. The information produced by this operation has materially contributed to several priority objectives of the Station's Related Mission Directive.

K. There is attached herewith a complete list of HMMs produced from LIFEAT provided material during the period July 1959 through May 1960. (See attached sheet.)

II. Progress of the Operation

Since the Project LIFEAT objectives are unique in that they are of a continuing nature and not designed to be fulfilled within a given period, no statistics can be cited from which a percentage of coverage on each objective can be calculated. A general indication can be given of the coverage provided by the project when it is noted that approximately 15,000 pages of raw text were provided in the July 1959 to May 1960 period. LIFEAT has been in daily operation during the review period with the number of lines covered varying from 12 to 18. Generally, these can be broken down as follows:

Soviet Embassy	5 lines	
Polish Legation and Polish Counselor	3 lines	
Czech Legation (Embassy)	2 lines	(Coverage suspended January '60 for reason given in I. B above)
American Communists	2 lines	
Cuban Embassy	3 lines	
Targets of Opportunity	3 lines	

III. Planning for the Future

Following the suggestion and guidance provided by Headquarters when renewing Project LIFEAT for FY 1960, the Station plans to limit its coverage to no more than twenty lines at any given time, with the possible exception of targets of opportunity which could be covered for short periods

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in addition to the normal coverage. The coverage of Soviet and Satellite installations will remain basic to LIFEAT and will be exploited to the maximum degree possible. Due to the increased importance of information on Cuban activities, coverage of the Cuban Embassy and personnel staffing the Embassy will be increased during the coming project year. Targets of Opportunity will continue to be exploited as permitted by personnel, equipment, and access limitations.

IV. Performance of Agents

The general overall performance of the agents employed under LIFEAT continued to be good with security being stressed in all phases of the operation. No security problems were encountered which were not readily solved by the personnel concerned. Since a high degree of security is required for the operation of LIFEAT, it is planned that any possible agent candidates will be thoroughly screened and Headquarters clearance obtained before they are in any way approached for operational use.

V. Expenditures During the Period Under Review

Approval for the renewal of Project LIFEAT was granted on 16 July 1959, for the period 1 July 1959 through 30 June 1960, in the amount of $123,830. ~~In its continuing attempt to provide practical economy without decreasing operational efficiency, Station Mexico submits the itemized proposed LIFEAT budget for FY 1961 (contained in the attached Field Project Outline, Part II) in the amount of $114,411, a reduction of approximately $19,000 from the previous year's approved budget.~~

VI. Status of Commitments

There are no commitments other than those provided for in the project outline submitted herewith and the individual contracts of several LIFEAT personnel.

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The following is a complete list of the 97 HMMs which were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT supplied material during the period July 1959 through May 1960.

HMM-4351
HMM-4355
HMM-4358
HMM-4364
HMM-4387
HMM-4388
HMM-4397
HMM-4399
HMM-4407
HMM-4415
HMM-4425
HMM-4447
HMM-4449
HMM-4450
HMM-4451
HMM-4452
HMM-4457
HMM-4458
HMM-4459
HMM-4460
HMM-4481
HMM-4482
~~HMM-4484~~
HMM-4485
HMM-4489
HMM-4493
HMM-4520
HMM-4534
HMM-4539
HMM-4550
HMM-4563
HMM-4575
HMM-4544
HMM-4567
HMM-4572
HMM-4513
HMM-4576
HMM-4582
HMM-4588
HMM-4589
HMM-4591
HMM-4613
HMM-4614
HMM-4618
HMM-4631
HMM-4636
HMM-4637
HMM-4640
HMM-4649
HMM-4667
HMM-4672
HMM-4678
HMM-4691
HMM-4703
HMM-4704
HMM-4706
HMM-4707
HMM-4710
HMM-4711
HMM-4712
HMM-4718
HMM-4724
HMM-4726
HMM-4729
HMM-4737
HMM-4742
HMM-4761
HMM-4762
HMM-4979
HMM-4768
HMM-4771
HMM-4790
HMM-4803
HMM-4836
HMM-4843
~~HMM-4849~~
HMM-4855
HMM-4857
HMM-4858
HMM-4876
HMM-4877
HMM-4879
HMM-4891
HMM-4892
HMM-4893
HMM-4895
HMM-4904
HMM-4907
HMM-4918
HMM-4919
HMM-4921
HMM-4924
HMM-4943
HMM-4958
HMM-4963
HMM-4964
HMM-4966
HMM-4967
HMM-4971
HMM-4972
HMM-4975

PROJECT OUTLINE

PROJECT LIFEAT

PART I

1. Area of Operations

This project is run from the Mexico City Station, and is concerned with targets located in Mexico City.

2. Purpose

The purpose of this project is to determine Soviet and Satellite plans, activities and connections with other Communist elements through the use of technical surveillance. This purpose is in consonance with the Related Mission Directive for Mexico, dated 20 November 1959, Priority A, Objective one.

3. Background

Project LIFEAT was originally approved on 3 October 1950 as a unilateral telephone tap operation. Actual initiation of operations was on 18 January 1951, and the project has run continuously from that date. The project was begun with the installation of one telephone tap, and has been expanded to the present average coverage of 18 lines.

Project LIFEAT is a unilateral operation completely independent from any liaison arrangement. It is staffed by KUBARK staff and contract employees with a substantial number of local indigenous controlled agents.

During the past nine years, Project LIFEAT has produced more than 64,000 pages of operational and intelligence information in direct support of the Mexico City Station's objectives specifically, and has contributed materially to the intelligence gathering activities connected with the Soviet and Satellite Bloc. In addition, Project LIFEAT has been of considerable value and assistance in monitoring the activities of the American Communist community residing in Mexico City as well as activities of Cubans and exiles in Mexico.

4. References

a. HMMA-12936, 22 May 1959, Renewal Request for FY 1960.

b. HMMW-7955, 14 August 1959, Approval of Renewal Request for FY 1960

5. Objectives

a. To identify Soviet and Satellite intelligence personnel and to collect information on the nature and extent of their clandestine intelligence and propaganda activities in Mexico.

b. To collect information on Soviet and Satellite commercial, diplomatic, cultural and military personnel and their activities in Mexico.

c. To collect biographic information of Soviet and Satellite officials.

d. To collect information of the movements, assignments and positions of Soviet and Satellite personnel.

e. To collect biographic information on Cuban officials assigned to Mexico and provide coverage of their activities.

f. To collect information on prominent Mexican Communists and pro-Communists and their activities.

g. To collect information on prominent Communists, other than Mexicans, active in Mexico and to identify them and their associates.

h. To collect information on exile groups active in Mexico.

i. To collect information on targets of opportunity in Mexico.

6. Targets (as related to project objectives)

For objectives "a" through "d",

a. Selected Soviet Embassy and commercial office telephone conversations.

b. Selected Satellite office and home phones.,

For objective "e",

c. Telephone conversations from the Cuban Embassy and selected telephone calls from residences of Cuban officials.

For objective "f",

d. Telephone conversations from the residences of senior Communists and prominent pro-Communists.

For objective "g",

e. Telephone conversations from the residences of known American Communists residing in Mexico City.

For objective "h",

f. Telephone conversations originating from the residences of offices of prominent exile leaders in Mexico City.

For objective "i",

g. Telephone conversations which can be monitored from targets of opportunity.

7. Tasks

Case Officer - Edward P. SECHEN
Assistant Case Officer - Jeremy L. NIARCOS

a. Supervise the operational and administrative activities of all LIFEAT staff, contract, and indigenous personnel.

b. Maintain awareness of and provide direction in all operational matters pertaining to the management of the LIFEAT Project.

c. Provide guidance and day-to-day supervision of the operational phases LIFEAT/LIMERICK, LITMUS, LIVERY, LIERODE, and the American Communist Group in Mexico activities.

d. Coordinate information received from LIFEAT/LIMERICK with other Station Mexico operations.

e. Maintain LIFEAT capabilities for mounting operations against targets of opportunity.

f. Maintain supervision over basehouses, equipment, and training of personnel assigned to the LIFEAT operation.

8. Coordination

a. Information produced by LIFEAT, primarily a Station support operation, is closely coordinated with other operations at the Mexico City Station. No operational coordination is required with any other area, but they are kept advised of any information produced by LIFEAT which may be of interest to them.

b. Project LINOG which supports the principle outside LIFEAT Case Officer, David M. WILSTED, is effected in coordination with Project LIFEAT.

9. Personnel

a. Staff Agents:

Ralph B. RAFANELLI - under unofficial commercial cover (201-176295)

b. Contract Agents/Employees:

1. David M. WILSTED (201-009195) - principle outside Case Officer. Career agent
2. Alice M. CAILLETEAU (201-119967) - clerical work C-47041
3. Olivia N. GLADMON (201-117751) - processes tapes and does clerical work C-46946
4. Carol K. ZINSMEISTER (201-117968) - processes major portion of LIFEAT take. C-24742
5. Wallace L. KAWOHL (201-033959) - basehouse operator C-3977
6. Leona C. GANDARA (201-225710) - LIFEAT clipping. C-61057 (CSR - 24 June 1958 →)
7. Woodrow D. GABBOTT (201-14465) - processor for LITMUS tapes under Project LESHUTH

c. Field Agents:

1. LIFEUD-1, OA granted 17 October 1950, (201-183704) C-739
2. LIFEUD-2, OA granted 14 August 1951, (201-117970) C-1412

SECRET/KAPOK

3. LIFEUD-3, OA granted 14 December 1953, (201-117971) C-7152
4. LIFEUD-4, OA granted 1 October 1953, (201-117743) C-6970
5. LIFEUD-5, OA granted 16 December 1953, (201-117744) C-7466
6. LIFEUD-6, OA granted 28 September 1954, (201-117978) C-30405
7. LIFEUD-7, OA granted 21 October 1954, (201-117980) C-31929
8. LIFEUD-8, OA granted 31 March 1955, (201-119521) C-33182
9. LIFEUD-9, OA granted 27 April 1956, (201-117984) C-45672
10. LIFEUD-10, OA granted 13 September 1956, (201-114085) C-50464
11. LIFEUD-11, OA granted 21 August 1956 (201-113595) C-50455
12. LIFEUD-12, OA granted 6 August 1956 (201-113596) C-50157
13. LIFEUD-13, OA granted 13 September 1956 (201-115833) C-50750
14. LIFEUD-14, OA granted 26 September 1956 (201-117972) C-32015
15. LIFEUD-15, OA granted 19 January 1957 (201-126315) C-54096
16. LIFEUD-16, OA granted 2 July 1958 (201-222786) C-70322
17. LIFEUD-17, OA granted 13 August 1956 (201-114086) C-63109 (wife of LIFEUD-14)
18. LIFEUD-18, OA granted 2 October 1957 (201-185370) C-50457 (wife of KAWCHL)
19. LIFEUD-19, OA granted 18 May 1960 (HMMA-14933) (201-262488) mother of Raymond H GERENDE (LIENTIFY) resides with LIVERY basehouse. C-79349

d. No personnel were dropped from the project during the past project year.

10. Operational Clearances:

See section 9 above.

11. Cover

The cover of personnel employed in Project LIFEAT remains the same as noted in the last project renewal.

12. Contact and Communications

a. Daily contact is maintained between the Case Officers and the agents in this project. These contacts are made in a clandestine manner with varing patterns established for car pickups, foot contacts, and emergency meetings. Pre-arranged signals are employed in setting and accomplishing the meetings. When heavy or bulky material is to be passed, meetings are held at night. All movement in and out of the basehouses by the Case Officers and Principle Agents is done in cars ostensibly owned by agents, except in the case of LIVERY basehouse where the agents are too old to drive. One of the indigenous agents is used to contact LIVERY base. Entrance to basehouses on foot by other than the residents of the house is

SECRET/KAPOK

made only in great emergencies.

b. Telephone contact concerning the project and with the agents is kept to a minimum. Pre-arranged open code is used for phone conversations between Case Officers and agents.

c. Alternate and emergency signals have been arranged and are reviewed frequently by the personnel using them.

d. These systems of contact and communication appear suitable for the project and function adequately from a security viewpoint. Locations and times of meetings are reviewed periodically and are changed frequently to decrease the possibility of discovery.

13. Control and Motivation

Control and motivation are primarily based on two factors: ideology and financial gain. A secondary factor is the fear of reprisal from the local police should discovery occur.

14. Training

Initial training of new personnel and refresher training for experienced agents is handled primarily by the outside case officer, David M. WILSTED. Minor repair and maintainance of equipment as well as emergency security procedures are stressed and continually reviewed with the agents.

15. Equipment and Support

It is believed that much of the technical equipment upon which the continued successful collection of LIFEAT material depends will require replacement in the near future. The largest percentage of this equipment has been in nearly continuous operation from the initiation of the project in January 1951 and much of this equipment is no longer being manufactured. When present limited commercial stocks of replacement parts are exhausted, new units will be required for LIFEAT.

16. Timetable

LIFEAT has been in almost constant operation since its inception in January 1951 and it is planned to continue it indefinitely.

PROJECT OUTLINE

PART II

PROJECT: LIFEAT

17. Estimated Costs

The following are the estimated costs for FY 1961. All figures are U.S. dollars per year. ($1.00 dollar U.S. equals 12.50 Mexican pesos) Due to the continued rise in the cost of living, and especially to the expected increase in rental costs that is a chronic feature of the Mexico City scene, a moderate increase in some LIFEAT costs will be noted, ~~even though the overall total requested is $10,419 under that approved for FY 1960.~~

a. Salaries:

1. Staff and contract Personnel

Ralph B. RAFANELLI GS-10	
Salary	$ 6, ~~505.00~~ 995.00
Quarters	2,304.00
Carol K. ZINSMEISTER (salary)	5,500.00
Alice N. CAILIETEAU (salary)	2,000.00
Olivia N. GLADMON (piecework)	4,200.00
Wallace L. KAWOHL (salary)	1,728.00
Leona C. GANDARA (salary)	900.00

$ 23,137.00
490.00
$ 23,627.00

2. Field Agents

LIFEUD-1	5,760.00
LIFEUD-2	2,496.00
LIFEUD-3	1,776.00
LIFEUD-1's helper	144.00
LIFEUD-4	1,920.00
LIFEUD-5	3,648.00
LIFEUD-6	3,500.00
LIFEUD-7	2,400.00
LIFEUD-8	2,400.00
LIFEUD-9	1,920.00
LIFEUD-10 No Salary	
LIFEUD-11 No Salary	
LIFEUD-12 No Salary	
LIFEUD-13 No Salary	
LIFEUD-14	3,648.00
LIFEUD-15	768.00
LIFEUD-16	1,440.00
LIFEUD-17 No Salary	
LIFEUD-18 No Salary	
LIFEUD-19	960.00

Due to the continued rise in the cost of living, plus the fact that the majority of the above listed field agents have not received a pay raise in recent years even though the work load increased and the quality of work performed has imporved, it is anticipated that the 10% over-all pay raise provided for, but not given, in FY 1960 will be necessary in FY 1961:

3,200.00

Christmas bonus (In accordance with local custom, this amounts to one month's pay for each agent) and gifts where necessary:

3,000.00

$ 38,930.00

b. Basehouse rentals, utilities, and expenses:

LIMERICK Main Base	$ 1,920.00	
LIVERY Relay Base	504.00	
ANNEX IV	2,760.00	
ANNEX VI	1,920.00	
ANNEX VII	1,728.00	
ANNEX VIII	3,072.00	
ANNEX IX	2,880.00	
Proposed Relay Base	480.00	
Plus 10% customary increase in rent when lease contract renewed	1,600.00	
		$ 16,864.00

c. Equipment:

Local purchase of emergency and special equipment	$ 2,500.00	
New equipment such as reels and recorders	3,000.00	
		5,500.00

d. Miscellaneous:

1. Expendable supplies such as paper, paper tape, etc. — 2,000.00

2. Transportation

RAFANELLI QP Car	600.00
ZINSMEISTER mileage	400.00
LIFEUD-5 car rent	290.00
LIFEUD-7 car rent	675.00
LIFEUD-8 car rent	675.00
LIFEUD-14 car rent	290.00

att ... 15252   50-6-34/1

3. Other operational expenses (covering loss of deposits, fatalities, termination payments*, medical payments, emergency moving bills, renovation of basehouses, expenses in covering targets of opportunity) ~~25~~ 9,000.00

$ ~~29,930.00~~ 13,930.00

GRAND TOTAL $ ~~114,411.00~~ 98,401.00

*Any termination of indigenous personnel will be in accordance with Mexican law and will include lump sum separation settlement, transportation and moving expense payments, and any bonus due at the time of termination.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

253

DATE : 23 JUNE 6Ø

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : RG 2, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, S/C 2

JUN 24 18 06 60

REC'D ... SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 16Ø26

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 5782

REF: DIR 35879 (OUT 3?257) *

FORWARDING LIFEAT RENEWAL TWO POUCHES 29 JUNE 1 JULY DUE KAROK CLASSIFICATION.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *REQUESTED LIFEAT PROJ RENEWAL SOONEST.

LIFEAT /

~~SECRET~~

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ORIG : C. ZEHRUNG
UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO
EXT : 2555
DATE : 21 JUNE 1960

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 5

INFO: [illegible] CI/OA, S/C 2

ROUTING: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

PRECEDENCE: DEFERRED; X ROUTINE; PRIORITY; OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JUN 21 23 46 '60
REC'D CABLE SECT

OUT88257

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 35879

REQUEST LIFEAT PROJ RENEWAL SOONEST. ADVISE POUCHING DATE.

END OF MESSAGE

Lifeat Dur[illegible]

J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

N. P. HOLMAN, AC/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

SECRET

20 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH

SUBJECT : Renewal of WH Division FI/CI Projects over $100,000

1. There is set forth below a list of WH Division FI/CI Projects, with an authorization of over $100,000, which expire as of 30 June 1960:

Project	Authorization
LIFEAT	$123,830

2. Possibly renewal actions are already in course of preparation for the above projects. If not, however, it is strongly urged that appropriate project action be submitted as soon as possible, and in any event not later than 15 July, so that these renewals can be submitted to DDCI for approval in timely fashion.

3. The same request applies to any other WH Division FI/CI projects, currently authorized for amounts under $100,000, if renewal will request authorization in excess of that figure.

S. M. Hines
S. M. HINES
Chief, DDP/PG

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: HMMW-7955

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 50-6-32/1

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM : Chief, WHD

DATE: [illegible] 1959

SUBJECT : LIFEAT Project Renewal

RE "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED : Exploitation of LIFEAT leads

REFERENCE(S)

1. The LIFEAT Project renewal submitted in HMMA-12936 was approved on 16 July 1959 for the period 1 July 1959 through 30 June 1960 for a total of $123,830 for fiscal year 1960. The Station will note that monies requested for the support of Woodrow D. GABBOTT (ps) were subtracted from the request made by the Station for project funds. GABBOTT is supported by the BESMOOTH Project, an EE support project.

2. The following staff comments were made when the Project was submitted for approval:

a. "RQM has continued its rating of "C" on the disseminated positive information from the Project, noting a slight increase in the disseminations, and commenting that it provides interesting information to customers on the nature and extent of Bloc commercial activities in Mexico, data useful in economic analyses, and reports on exile activities in Mexico.

b. "KUTUBE/D recommended renewal of LIFEAT observing that the leads produced by the operation have been of operational value to LAURICLE activities conducted in Mexico City in the past year. KUTUBE/D comments also that the Project has afforded and can be expected to continue to afford CE protection from time to time for activities of particular LAURICLE interest.

c. "KUTUBE/OPS has observed that Project LIFEAT has been a most useful operational asset in the Mexico City Station for the past nine years, continuously providing KUBARK with a window into important targets. KUTUBE/OPS requests that the next project renewal point out what agent recruitments by the Station have resulted from or been supported by the operational information secured by the project.

d. "KUDESK commented that it well known that Mexico is being used by the RIS as a base for third country operations directed against the United States. Over a period of years LIFEAT has supplied valuable leads which have resulted in the identification of a large number of persons in clandestine contact with RIS officers; further investigation in several cases produced information which strongly indicated that the persons involved were actively assisting the RIS. While such information is, of itself, of interest and importance, our responsibility in the CI field imposes the obligation to determine what those persons are doing for the RIS and this can be done only by recruiting and doubling them. It is therefore suggested that LIFEAT leads and reports of investigations based on them be reviewed for the purpose of selecting a limited number of the more promising targets. Thereafter, Station assets including LIFEAT should be used to obtain the operational data necessary to determine that a target is recruitable, and then a pitch should be made. Much time and effort will be required for such a program, but the potential rewards fully justify it, and the value of LIFEAT, as a CI asset, will be materially increased.

3. Chief, KUTUBE, in recommending the Project for renewal to Deputy Director, KUBARK, requested that at the time of the next Project renewal, the Division should review the relationship and coordination of Project LIFEAT operations with those active and proposed under Project LIENVOY.

50-6-32/1

FORM — USE PREVIOUS EDITION — CLASSIFICATION — PAGE NO

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO HMMW-7955

4. In addition to the formal comments cited above, during the process of obtaining approval for LIFEAT, the Project was subject to various and sundry criticisms in its present form. Therefore, Headquarters suggests that the Station bear this in mind and during the coming year make every effort to increase the operational value of this Project. If the LIENVOY Project is a success operationally and the leads are followed up and developed, WH Division anticipates that it will encounter difficulty in obtaining approval of a similar Project as large and as expensive as LIFEAT unless it is demonstrated to the complete satisfaction of Headquarters that the expense involved in the LIFEAT Project is justified and that the results of the exploitation of project developed leads prove useful in attaining the Station CS objectives. Among the comments received are:

a. Although the purpose and objectives of the project as stated in the FPO call for the collection of information, the operational intent is to make use of this information for an eventual recruitment of Sino-Soviet and Satellite diplomats and/or their contacts. It is realized that diplomats who are susceptible to defection or recruitment in place are few and far between and that the Station is always alert for such targets and is conscientious in their development. However, the Case Officer should keep in mind the more easily accessible and more vulnerable (though secondary) targets, i.e. the many contacts, friends, employees, etc. whose development could well lead to the primary targets. Headquarters feels it is this secondary category where more emphasis can be made. The recruitment in place of such individuals could be extremely valuable for the entire CI/CE program of the Station.

b. The lack of development and exploitation of leads from LIFEAT operations has been raised many times. In view of the limited reporting to Headquarters on the exploitation of operational leads, it has been difficult to state whether the leads are being followed up, who the targets are, and whether consideration is being given to recruitment approaches. Headquarters requests that in each monthly summary the Station supply more info under the section labaled "Exploitation of Leads". The statement "leads resulting from LIFEAT information are followed up by other Station assets" is meaningless without some explanation of the lead follow ups. Headquarters would like to know the names and some operational information concerning the persons who seem to be of most interest and who have been under investigation during the period covered by the monthly summary.

5. On page 6 of your covering memorandum on the FPO (HMMA-12936), you indicate that during the coming year the Station expects to expand its coverage to approximately 24 lines. Headquarters would like to suggest that consideration be given to limiting coverage to a number of lines which can be effectively exploited.

6. It is requested that Headquarters be informed in more detail in all cases where information obtained through LIFEAT has been used to support other important Station operations.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

6 August 1959

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/3/Mexico

WH/3/Mexico/[illegible]

FORM 53a	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T		PAGE NO 2

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	~~SECRET~~
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.	HMM-A-13145
TO	Chief, WHD
INFO	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.	50-6-32/1
FROM	Chief of Station, Mexico
DATE	19 June 1959
SUBJECT	LIFEAT/LIFEAT Agent Status
RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)	X MARKED FOR INDEXING; NO INDEXING REQUIRED; INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED	Note new cryptonyms
REFERENCE(S)	HMMW-7761, 10 June 1959

1. Agent Service Records are being submitted on LIPSTICK-17, LIPSTICK-22 and LIMESTONE-10. LIPSTICK-17 and LIPSTICK-22 were unable to remain in Station's jurisdiction due to the health of a minor child and have returned to the north of this country.

2. Through oversight*LIQUATION-4(201-185370, OA of 2 Oct. 1957) who is now carried as LIFEUD-17 and*LIMITATION-7(201-114086, OA No. C-50457 dated 13 August 1956) and who is now carried as LIFEUD-18 were omitted from the Project Renewal Request. It is requested that their names be added to the list of Project personnel. They are not paid a salary but due to the occupation of their spouses are witting of the LIFEAT activity.

not eadable

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

GFB
16 June 1959

Distribution;

3 - HQS

50-6-32/1

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS

CLASSIFICATION

PAGE NO

14-00000

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI

SUBJECT : Project LIFEAT Renewal

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

Name: J. E. Brady
Room: 2114 [illegible] Hall
Ext.: 2555 or 3172
Date: 15 June 1959

1. It is requested that the LIFEAT Project be renewed for the period 1 July 1959 through 30 June 1960 for a total of $135,145.00.

2. Attached is the Field's Project Review, together with a revised Project Outline, which clearly set forth the present status of the Project. It is believed that the activity described herein continues to justify the time and expense involved, and hence merits renewal for the forthcoming year.

3. In March 1959 we asked the Federal Bureau of Investigation for their evaluation of the usefulness of information on American Communists which originated from LIFEAT and whether they wished to continue receiving such information. On 2 April 1959, the Federal Bureau of Investigation replied that the information has been of value to them from intelligence and investigative viewpoints and they wish to continue receiving such information.

4. LIFEAT was the source of information concerning the plans of Albert MALTZ and his wife for their trip to Europe and behind the Iron Curtain in May, June and July 1959. Through LIFEAT we learned that they were planning to try to contact Alfred Kaufman STERN and his wife Martha Dodd STERN and Maurice and Edith HALPERIN, American Communists who fled behind the Iron Curtain during the past two years. Based on information made available through LIFEAT, Headquarters has made arrangements for the MALTZ' to receive baggage searches and discreet surveillances at various points on their trip.

5. The Czech and Polish Desks in EE Division and the appropriate Desk in SR Division were asked to comment on the value of LIFEAT to them. All desks agreed that LIFEAT was a very valuable source of general background information on the Soviet, Czech and Polish diplomats and often provided information which could be obtained through no other source. The Czech Desk commented that LIFEAT was of most value as a support asset to the Station, providing leads which might be developed into operational assets by the Station personnel. In May 1959 the Polish Desk sent

Woodrow C. GABBOT (re-see LIFEAT personnel section) to Mexico PCS to process the take from the LITMUS phase of LIFEAT. They feel that with this Contract Agent processing LITMUS, this phase will greatly increase in value during the coming year. GABBOT will be in a position to call operational leads to the attention of the Station Case Officer immediately for exploitation. SR noted that LIFEAT has been an invaluable support asset for [illegible] and has been at times the only source of information for the important SR operation.

6. The State Department evaluated LIFEAT reports on the following subjects to be of value and probably true. They wish to continue receiving reports on these subjects.

"Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico"
"Soviet Attempt to Barter Equipment for Mexican Coffee"
"Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico"

OCR evaluated a report on "Soviet Attempt to Barter Equipment for Mexican Coffee" and a report on "Polish Embassy Interest in Mexican Copper Concentrates" to be of value.

Attachments:
- FPD (in quad)
- Folder with past approvals
- Form 610 (in quad)
- Envelope with true names

[illegible] Wahlgren, C/WH/III

C. W. Anderson, AD/FI

J. C. King, C/WHD

Date

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: HMM-7761
		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 50-6-32/1

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT : LIFEAT/LIFEAT Agent Status

ACTION REQUIRED: See Below

REFERENCE(S): HMMA-12936, 22 May 1959 (KAPOK)

DATE: 10 JUN 1959

RE- (CHECK "X" ONE)
- MARKED FOR INDEXING
- X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

1. According to Headquarters records, LIPSTICK-17, LIPSTICK-22, LIQUATION-4, and LIMITATION-7 have been cleared for use in the LIFEAT Project. Since the above mentioned agents are not included in the LIFEAT Field Project Outline, you are requested to notify Headquarters whether or not you wish their clearances to be kept active for future use in the Project. Please forward Agent Service Records on those who have been terminated.

2. You are also requested to submit an Agent Service Record for LIMESTONE-10 who, according to the referenced dispatch, was terminated last year for security reasons.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

5 June 1959

Distribution:
- 3 - Mexico City
- 1 - WH/Mailroom
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- 1 - RI

M. Therrien

WH/III/Mexico/M.Therrien:jlc

CS COPY

50-6-32/1

FORM — USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS — CLASSIFICATION — PAGE NO

SECRET

5 June 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT : Change of Cryptonyms for LIFEAT Indigenous Personnel

The following agents under the LIFEAT Project have been assigned new cryptonyms as follows:

LIMEWATER	OC 739	LIFEUD-1
LIMEWATER-1	C-50649	LIFEUD-2
LIMEWATER-2	C-[illegible]4357	LIFEUD-3
LIMITATION-3	OC 6970	LIFEUD-4
LIQUATION	OC 7495	LIFEUD-5
LILACE	C-30405	LIFEUD-6
LIMESTONE-4	C-31[illegible]19	LIFEUD-7
LIPSTICK-18	C-33182	LIFEUD-8
LIMESTONE-8	C-45672	LIFEUD-9
LIMESTONE-9	C-50464	LIFEUD-10
LIQUATION-2	C-50455	LIFEUD-11
LIPSTICK-35	C-50157	LIFEUD-12
LIPSTICK-37	C-50750	LIFEUD-13
LIQUATION-1	C-38015	LIFEUD-14
LIQUATION-3	C-54096	LIFEUD-15
LIMEWATER-6	C-70322	LIFEUD-16

R. N. Dahlgren
Chief, WH/III

Distribution:
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1 - Memo Chrono
1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/M.Therrien:jlc

DISPATCH

SECRET

HMM-A-12936
[redacted]-1631

50-6-32/1

TO: Chief, WHD

INFO:

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico

DATE: 22 May 1959

RE "43" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
X MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Project Renewal Request

ACTION REQUIRED: Renewal of Project LIFEAT for FY 1960

REFERENCE(S): REF: HMM-W-6820, 24 Sept. 1958

1. There is attached a Review of Project LIFEAT for the period 1 July 1958 to 30 June 1959.

2. Part I of the Outline has been revised this year. Station Mexico felt that with the number of revisions which have been made since a complete project renewal request was submitted for FY 1958, this was warranted. It should be noted that for purposes of uniformity all indigenous personnel in the LIFEAT complex have now been given on cryptonym and at present this breakdown goes from /1 to /16. Any future personnel changes will be added to this numbering series.

3. Part II is submitted in its entirety.

4. It is requested that Project LIFEAT be renewed for FY 1960 for the amount indicated herein.

Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments: 1. Odd pages(5 sets)
2. Even pages(5 sets) S.C

Distribution:

3 - HQS w/5 sets atts

AN
AB X
IN
PS
BY
DES UFD
PI

FPS/GFB
21 May 1959

Remove from Project: 50-6-32/1
CS Classification:
JOB #
Box: Fold:

50-6-32/1

FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

SECRET

CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

~~SECRET KAPOK~~

Attachment to
HMM-A-12936
KAPOK-1631

PROJECT REVIEW - LIFEAT

1. **Product of the Project**

The Soviet Embassy

a. Soviet Commercial Activities;

During the past year reports submitted from screening the LIFEAT/LIMERICK take of the two established Soviet commercial offices have provided a great amount of detail concerning Soviet efforts to sell in the Latin American market. Following is a list of a few of the reports submitted as a result of the intelligence gained from this source;

HMM-3[illegible], 27 Aug. 1958 - Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico

HMM-3[illegible], 21 Jan. 1959, Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico

MEXI-[illegible], 2 Feb. 1959, Identity of Soviet Technician

HMM-[illegible], 18 Feb. 1959, Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico

HMM-[illegible], 18 Mar. 1959, Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico

HMM-[illegible], 10 Apr. 1959, Commercial Contact of USSR and Poland in Mexico

HMM-[illegible], 17 Apr. 1959, Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico.

b. Soviet Diplomatic Activities;

This project has provided coverage and details of some of the diplomatic activities of the Soviets in Mexico. It has served to show the relationships maintained, culturally, socially and diplomatically between the Soviets and the members of the Satellite establishments in Mexico.

HMM-A-11723, 17 Dec. 1958, Soviet Embassy Reception on 7 Nov. 1958

HMM-A-11794, 24 Dec. 1958, Soviet Delegates to Inauguration of President Adolfo LOPEZ Mateos

~~SECRET KAPOK~~

52-6-32/1

c. Soviet Cultural Activities:

Information produced by LIFEAT has given details of Soviet activities in connection with cultural activities. Examples of such reports are:

HMM-A-11594, 26 Nov. 1958, Soviet Representative at World Film Festival Held in Mexico City, 10-28 Oct. 1958 - Ivan A. PYRYEV

HMM-A-12225, 25 Feb. 1959, Soviet Participants in Pablo CASALS International Competition Held in Jalapa 18 Jan. - 1 Feb. 1959

HMM-3923, 31 Dec. 1958, Pablo CASALS Participants

HMM-4004, 2 Feb. 1959, Pablo CASALS Competition Participants

MEXI-3634, 2 Apr. 1959, Contact with Chinese Ballet Troupe

d. Movement of Soviet Officials:

Through LIFEAT coverage a roster of Soviet personnel currently in Mexico has been maintained by Station Mexico. This has been the primary source of such information. LIFEAT has enabled the Station to determine in advance when departures can be expected and has also been a factor in determining job assignments and replacements for departing personnel.

e. Soviet Embassy Contacts:

Contact reports of the Soviets are compiled and provided for Headquarters as necessary. These reports are of considerable operational value in identifying regular and/or occasional local and foreign contacts of the Soviets. Following are examples of this type of coverage:

HMM-A-12295, 4 Mar. 1959, Soviet Contacts in Mexico - Haile ATSBEHA, Ethiopian

HMM-A-11838, 7 Jan. 1959 - Orville M. MULLIKIN

f. Personality Reports on Soviet Officials;

LIFEAT has provided the Station with the most productive source of information concerning the private and official lives of the Soviets assigned to Mexico. These reports have been submitted on individuals, e.g., HMM-A-11463, 5 Nov. 1958, Activities of Yevgeniy M. POPOV, Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, June 1957 - October 1958; HMM-A-11569, 10 Dec. 1958, Boris G. PUTILIN, Employee, Military Attache Office, Mexico City; HMM-A-12755, 30 April 1959, Boris M. STRELTSOV, and HMM-A-12000, 28 Jan. 1959, Aleksandr M. BROVKIN.

g. Goods and Services;

Information on Goods and Services obtained from LIFEAT was used in Project LIMESA.

h. Miscellaneous Activities of the Soviet Embassy;

LIFEAT material which does not fall into any one category but which deals with the Soviets and their associates and related activities has been reported as necessary.

The Czech Legation

The information obtained on the Czech Legation during the period under review is essentially the same as that from the Soviet Embassy. Representative of the reports submitted from this information are the following personnel reports;

HMM-A-12069, 4 Feb. 1959, Alois LICEK

HMM-A-12067, 4 Feb. 1959, Jaroslav KREJZA

HMM-A-12091, 4 Feb. 1959, Bedrich PISTORA and

HMM-A-12128, 11 Feb. 1959, Oldrich SPORCR.

The Polish Legation

Information on this installation parallels that on the Czech and Soviet installations. The largest amount of information concerning

the Polish Legation has been procured from LIFEAT. Following are examples of reports from this source;

HMM-A-12420, 18 Mar. 1959, Contacts of Aleksandr BEKIER, Polish Counselor

HMM-A-10883, 20 Aug. 1958, Mieczyslaw WLODAREK, Polish Minister

HMM-A-12376, 11 Mar. 1959, Antonio O. MARCEYNSKY

HMM-A-12393, 11 Mar. 1959, Polish Legation publication.

Mexican Communist Party and Communist Fronts

A significant amount of information concerning the Communist Party in Mexico and the Communist front organizations in Mexico was obtained from LIFEAT. Information from LIFEAT has been invaluable in supplementing agent coverage of the front-organizations which exist here. Examples of this type reporting include;

HMM-A-11411, The Narciso BASSOLS Family and Polish Legation

HMM-A-11412, 5 Nov. 1958, Travel of Narciso BASSOLS.

American Communists in Mexico

Most of these targets have been covered at the request of ODENVY and the production has been partially processed by them. A total of 572 reels was provided them for processing during a 10-month period ending 30 April 1959. Samples of the reporting done from this source include;

HMM-A-12719, 24 April 1959, Noah and Anna SEBORER

HMM-A-12013, 28 Jan. 1959, Anna and Noah SEBORER

HMM-A-12460, 20 Mar. 1959, Albert MALTZ

HMM-A-11851, 7 Jan. 1959, Albert MALTZ.

Foreign Dissident Groups in Mexico

LIFEAT provided partial coverage of Cuban exile groups and gave current information on the status of the "26 July Movement" prior to its overthrow of the BATISTA government in Cuba and has continued to

provide information on the current status of the Cubans in Mexico.

LAURICLE Information

LIFEAT has contributed materially to several matters having LAURICLE interest.

Counter-Intelligence Information

CI/CE matters constitute a major portion of the Mexico City Station's priority objectives. Project LIFEAT has contributed to the attainment of these objectives. The two BGMORNING installations have provided valuable information for the responsible Case Officer on the matters involved therein.

Conclusion

The Mexico City Station believes that the product of the LIFEAT Project measured against the expenditure of KUBARK assets in terms of personnel, time, security risks and funds well justifies its renewal. The information produced by this operation has materially contributed to several priority objectives of the Station's Related Mission Directive.

2. Progress of the Operation

Definite progress has been made in reporting on the objectives of the LIFEAT Project. However, since LIFEAT objectives are of a continuing nature and are not designed to be achieved, no statistics can be cited as to the percentage of coverage on each objective. A general indication of the coverage can be derived when it is realized that some 10,000 pages of raw text in 10 months are the direct result of the operation from which the statistics cited above were derived. Except for a period in July and August 1958, following the termination of members of the James O. AYCALL family, LIFEAT has been in daily operation with some 12-16 lines being covered. These may be broken down as follows:

Soviet Embassy	5 lines
Czech Legation	2 lines(moved during this period and only in operation for approximately 2 months)
Polish Legation	3 lines(third installed in April 1959)
American Communists	3 lines
Remainder	5 lines.

3. Planning for the Future

During the coming year Station capabilities will be expanded to permit monitoring of approximately 24 lines. Basic coverage of Soviet, Czech and Polish activities will be continued to the maximum extent possible and assets and capabilities will be maintained for exploiting important targets of opportunity. At the present time and with the new system effected for LIFEAT lines, Station believes that 24 will be the maximum number of lines which can be properly handled and handled securely by the personnel currently available for LIFEAT.

4. Performance of Agents

In general the performance of the LIFEAT agents has been good and secure during the past year. The personnel from the AYCALL group were terminated during this period and compartmentation has been employed in the re-assignment of tasks among LIFEAT chain. In view of the high degree of security necessary for the personnel involved in this operation, it is planned to screen very carefully any possible candidates before they are approached for use in this operation after prior approval has been procured from Headquarters for an approach.

5. Expenditures during Period under Review

Approval was granted for the period under review, 1 July 1958 - 30 June 1959 to spend $159,590.00. The proposed LIFEAT budget for FY 1960 is contained in the attached Field Project Outline Part II.

6. Status of Commitments

There are no commitments other than those provided for in the outline and the individual contracts of several LIFEAT personnel.

PROJECT OUTLINE

PROJECT: LIFEAT

PART I

1. Area of Operations

This project is run from the Mexico City Station. It is concerned with targets located in Mexico City.

2. Purpose

The purpose of this project is to determine Sino-Soviet and Satellite plans, activities and connections with other Communist elements through the use of technical surveillance. This purpose is in consonance with the Related Mission Directive for Mexico, Priority A, Objective One.

3. Background

Project LIFEAT was initially approved on 3 October 1950. Actual operations began 18 January 1951 and have run continuously since that time. The LIFEAT Project was begun with the installation of one telephone tap and has been expanded since that time to where the present coverage averages 18 lines.

Project LIFEAT is a unilateral operation. It is completely independent from any liaison arrangement and is staffed by KUBARK staff and contract employees with a substantial number of local indigenous controlled agents.

During the past eight years Project LIFEAT has produced more than 55,000 pages of operational and intelligence information in direct support of the Mexico City Station's objectives specifically and has contributed materially to the intelligence gathering activities connected with the Sino-Soviet and Satellite Bloc. In addition, Project LIFEAT has been of considerable value and assistance in monitoring the activities of Americans residing in Mexico City in which ODENVY has major interest.

4. References

a. HMM-A-10198, 31 May 1958, Renewal Request for FY 1959

b. HMM-W-6820, 24 Sept. 1958, Approval of Renewal Request for FY 1959.

5. Objectives

a. To identify Soviet and Satellite intelligence personnel and to collect information on the nature and extent of their clandestine intelligence and propaganda activities in Mexico.

b. To collect information on Soviet and Satellite commercial, diplomatic, cultural and military personnel and their activities in Mexico.

c. To collect biographic information on Soviet and Satellite officials.

d. To collect information on the movements, assignments and positions of Soviet and Satellite personnel.

e. To collect information on prominent Mexico Communists and pro-Communists and their activities.

f. To collect information on prominent Communists, other than Mexicans, active in Mexico and to identify them and their associates.

g. To collect information on exile groups active in Mexico.

h. To collect information on targets of opportunity in Mexico.

6. Targets

For objectives "a" through "d" -

a. Selected Soviet Embassy and commercial office telephone conversations.

b. Selected Satellite office and home phones.

For objective "e" -

c. Telephone conversations from the residences of senior Communists or pro-Communists.

For objective "f" -

d. Telephone conversations from the residences of known American Communists.

For objective "g"

e. Telephone conversations emanating from the residences and/or offices of selected targets, i.e., LIERODE, in Mexico.

For objective "h" -

f. Telephone conversations which can be monitored of targets of opportunity, e.g., BOMORNING.

7. <u>Tasks</u>

Case Officer - Edward P. SECHEN

Asst. Case Officer - Gene F. BRADDOCK

a. Supervise the operational and administrative activities of all LIFEAT staff, contract and indigenous personnel.

b. Maintain awareness and provide direction in all operational matters pertaining to the management of the LIFEAT Project.

c. Provide guidance and day-to-day supervision of the operational phases ~~LIFEAT/LIMERICK, LITMUS, LIVERY~~, LIERODE, BOMORNING and American Communist Group in Mexico activities.

d. Coordinate information received from LIMERICK with other Station operations.

e. Maintain LIFEAT capabilities for mounting operations against targets of opportunity.

f. Maintain supervision over basehouses and training of the personnel therein.

8. <u>Coordination</u>

a. Information produced by LIFEAT is closely coordinated with other operations at the Mexico City Station. No operational coordination is required with any other area but they are kept informed of any information produced by LIFEAT which may be of interest to them.

b. Project LINOG, which supports David M. WILSTED, who is the principal outside LIFEAT Case Officer, is effected in coordination with Project LIFEAT.

c. Project BESMOOTH which supports Woodrow D. ENSOT, the [illegible] from the [illegible] is effected in coordination with Project LIFEAT. [illegible] C.O.

9. <u>Personnel</u>

a. Staff Agents;

Ralph B. RAFANELLI - under unofficial commercial cover(201-176295)

14-00000

~~SECRET KAPOK~~

Attachment
HMM-A-12936
KAPOK-1631
Page 10

b. Contract Agents/Employees:

1. David M. *WILSTED(201-009195) - principal outside case officer

2. Alice M. *CAILLETEAU(201-119967) - clerical work C-47041

3. Olivia N. *GLADMON(201-117751) - processes tapes and does clerical work

4. Carol K. *ZINSMEISTER(201-117968) - processes major portion of LIFEAT take.

5. Wallace L. *KAWOHL(201-033959) - basehouse operator

6. Leona C.*GANDARA(201-) - LIFEAT clipping

~~7. Woodrow D. *GABBOT(201-114465) - processor for LITMUS take~~

c. Field Agents:

*LIFEUD-1 formerly LIMEWATER(201-183704) OA 17 Oct. 1950

*LIFEUD-2 formerly LIMEWATER-1(201-117970) OA 14 Aug. 1951

*LIFEUD-3 formerly LIMEWATER-2(201-117971) OA 14 Dec. 1953

*LIFEUD-4 formerly LIMITATION-3(201-117743) OA 1 Oct. 1953

*LIFEUD-5 formerly LIQUATION(201-117744) OA 16 Dec. 1953

*LIFEUD-6 formerly LILACS(201-117978) OA 28 Sept. 1954

*LIFEUD-7 formerly LIMESTONE-4(201-117980) OA 21 Oct. 1954

*LIFEUD-8 formerly LIPSTICK-13(201-119521) OA 31 Mar. 1955

*LIFEUD-9 formerly LIMESTONE-8(201-117984) OA 27 Apr. 1956

*LIFEUD-10 formerly LIMESTONE-9(201-114085) OA 13 Sept. 1956

*LIFEUD-11 formerly LIQUATION-2(201-113595) OA 21 Aug. 1956

*LIFEUD-12 formerly LIPSTICK-35(201-113596) OA 6 Aug. 1956 C-50157

*LIFEUD-13 formerly LIPSTICK-37(201-115833) OA 13 Sept. 1956 C-50150

*LIFEUD-14 formerly LIQUATION-1(201-117972) OA 26 Sept. 1956 C-38C15

*LIFEUD-15 formerly LIQUATION-3(201-126315) OA 19 Jan. 1957 C-54096

*LIFEUD-16 formerly LIMEWATER-6(201-222786) OA 2 July 1958. C-70322

d. Personnel dropped from the Project:

Following indigenous personnel were terminated for security reasons during FY 1959:

LIMESTONE-1
LIMESTONE-2
LIMESTONE-3
LIMESTONE-5
LIMESTONE-7
LIMESTONE-10.

Frances M. MENZIE resigned during FY 1959.
'Anar N DELACRUZ is not now active but her clearance is being kept open.
Daniel K. BROMUND returned PCS to Headquarters during this period.
Louise J MARINO was transferred to LIEMPTY Project in February 1959.

10. Operational Clearances

Please see 9.

11. Cover

~~Woodrow D. GABBOT enjoys fictional cover as Researcher for a PBPRIME Research Council.~~

Other cover remains the same as that submitted in HMM-A-7063 except for David M. WILSTED who is engaged in insurance business since he has procured his "Inmigrado" status.

12. Contact and Communications

a. Daily contact and communications between the Case Officer and the agents and undercover personnel in this Project is maintained in a clandestine manner. Various patterns have been established by which the agents and case officers follow pre-arranged signals for meetings. When heavy or bulky material is to be passed, pre-arranged

meetings are held at night. All movement in and out of bases by the Case Officers and Principal Agents is done in cars ostensibly owned by agents except in the case of LIVERY where agents are too old to drive. One of the indigenous agents is used to contact LIVERY base. Entrance to bases on foot is made only in great emergencies.

b. Telephonic contact concerning the Project and with agents is kept to a minimum and code is used for phone conversations between Case Officers and agents.

c. Alternate and emergency signals have been arranged.

d. In general these systems of contact and communication appear to be suitable for the Project and function adequately from a security viewpoint. Locations and times of meetings are changed frequently to prevent discovery.

13. Control and Motivation

Control and motivation seem to be based on two factors primarily; ideological and monetary. A third controlling factor would be fear of reprisal from local police should discovery occur.

14. Equipment and Support

It is believed probable that a great deal of replacement equipment will be required by the Project during FY 1960 since much of the current equipment installed and working has been in use for the length of the Project and since this equipment is no longer being manufactured, replacement parts will be unobtainable soon and new units will be required.

15. Timetable

LIFEAT has been in almost constant operation since its inception in January 1951 and it is planned to continue it indefinitely.

PROJECT OUTLINE

PART II

PROJECT: LIFEAT

17. Estimated Costs

The following costs are estimated for FY 1960. All figures are in U.S. dollars per year. It will be noted that owing to the rise in the cost of living and especially to much higher rents and to intended expansion, LIFEAT costs will be higher than in the past.

a. Salaries:

1. Staff and Contract Personnel

Ralph B. RAFANELLI, GS-9	
Salary	$5985.00
Quarters	2304.00
~~Woodrow D. GABBOT~~	
~~Salary~~	~~9890.00**~~
~~**(Since this subject's contract has not been received, this figure is based on statement he is GS-13 and minimum figure taken)~~	
~~Quarters~~	~~1728.00~~
Translator(LIMERICK) GS-12 not yet named(This is established in hopes that the Project will be able to live-monitor portion of LIMERICK traffic)	
Salary	8330.00
Quarters	2400.00
Transportation	1000.00
HHE move	1500.00
Carol K. ZIRSMEISTER - salary	5400.00
Alice N. CAILLETEAU - salary	2000.00
Olivia N. GIADMON - piecework	4200.00
Wallace L. KAWOHL - salary	1728.00
Leona C. GANDARA - salary	900.00
TOTAL	$47,365.00

11,618 $35,747.00

2\. Field Agents — Presently — Possible Raise

Field Agents	Presently	Possible Raise
LIFEUD-1	$5764.61	
LIFEUD-2	2498.00	
LIFEUD-3	1633.00	
LIFEUD-1's helper	144.12	
LIFEUD-4	1921.54	
LIFEUD-5	3650.92	
LIFEUD-6	3000.00	
LIFEUD-7	2113.69	
LIFEUD-8	1921.54	
LIFEUD-9	1633.31	
LIFEUD-10 no salary		
LIFEUD-11 no salary		
LIFEUD-12 no salary		
LIFEUD-13 no salary		
LIFEUD-14	3650.92	
LIFEUD-15	768.61	
LIFEUD-16	960.77	

(Due to continued increases in cost of living, it is expected than an over-all raise of 10% will be made during FY 1960 to the agents above listed. Adjustments will be made in peso amounts should devaluation of the peso occur during FY 1960) $3300.00

Christmas bonus (In accordance with local custom this amounts to one-month's pay for each agent) and gifts where necessary $3,000.00

TOTAL $35,961.03

b. Basehouse rentals, utilities and expenses

LIMERICK Main Base	$1969.55
LIVERY Relay Base	585.00
ANNEX IV	3000.00
ANNEX VI	2260.00
ANNEX VII	2000.00
ANNEX VIII	3375.00
Proposed basehouse	3500.00
TOTAL	$16,689.55

c. Equipment

Local purchase of emergency and special equipment	$2500.00	
New equipment, i.e., reels, recorders	3000.00	
TOTAL		$5,500.00

d. Miscellaneous

1. Supplies(paper,rolls,etc.)2000.00

2. Transportation

RAFANELLI QP car	600.00
ZI SMEISTER mileage	400.00
LIFEUD-7 car rent	675.00
LIFEUD-5 car rent	290.00
LIFEUD-8 car rent	675.00
LIFEUD-14 car rent	290.00
TOTAL	2930.00

3. Other operational expenses(to cover loss of deposits, fatalities, serious emergencies, separation payments, medical payments, emergency moving bills, renovation of basehouses and expenses involved in covering targets of opportunity) 25,000.00

TOTAL	29,930.00
GRAND TOTAL	$135,445.~~50~~
	11 615
	$123,527

50-6-32/

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

039 RAY/JLS

DATE: 19 MAY 59

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 5

INFO: CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, S/C 2

ROUTING

MAY 20 0930Z 59

ROUTINE

IN 18853

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 3899 (WARE ACTING)

CRYPTONYM NUMBER 518 ASSIGNED LIFEAT INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL THROUGH/16 AS FOLLOWS: 1. LIMEWATER; 2. LIMEWATER-1; 3. LIMEWATER-5; 4. LIMITATION-3; 5. LIQUATION; 6. LILACE; 7. LIMESTONE-4; 8. LIPSTICK-18; 9. LIMESTONE-8; 10. LIMESTONE-9; 11. LIQUATION-2; 12. LIPSTICK-35; 13. LIPSTICK-37; 14. LIQUATION-1; 15. LIQUATION-3; 16. LIMEWATER-6.

END OF MESSAGE

File Lifeat/Dunn Plans

S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMW-7649

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-6-32/1

DATE: 13 MAY 1959

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED: See below.

RE - (CHECK "X" ONE)
- MARKED FOR INDEXING
- X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S):

HDGM-6820, 24 September 1958

Project LIFEAT expires on 30 June 1959. It is requested that the Station's request for the Project renewal be submitted to Headquarters prior to the expiration date.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

11 May 1959

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City

1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/3/Mexico/Chrono
1 - RI

WH/III/Mexico/E. I. SCALETTI:mpm

13 May 59

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMM-W-6820

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-6-32/1

DATE: 24 SEP 1958

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT : Operational/LIFEAT Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED : None

RE "X" (CHECK "X" ONE)
- MARKED FOR INDEXING
- X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

a. HMMA-10198, 31 May 1958
b. HMMW-6555, 3 July 1958
c. MEXI-2031, 22 July 1958

1. Project LIFEAT was renewed on 9 September 1958 for the period 1 July 1958 through 30 June 1959 for a total of $159,590.

2. KUTUBE/OPS recommended that the Station make an increased effort to reduce the amount of paper work for the case officer to allow him sufficient time to go beyond the surveillance-investigative phase of handling the many operational leads and be in a position for more agent recruitment efforts. KUTUBE suggested that several of the lines which are of marginal value be deactivated, temporarily at least, to assist in this effort.

3. The project review forwarded with HMMA-10198 was submitted for approval as prepared in the field with the exception of Part II which had to be retyped in view of the number of changes and additions required. The only changes made in the Project review - LIFEAT section was the deletion of several examples of reports originating from several LIFEAT sources. These deletions (such as the last five examples of reports on Soviet Commercial Activities) were made because the reports did not originate with LIFEAT eventhough they did concern the Subject being discussed. Part I of the Project Outline excerpts submitted by the field was also submitted for approval--the only change made was the omission of the field's request for a change in paragraph 6 of the Project Outline on Objectives. Headquarters did not think subparagraph "f" should be deleted.

4. Attached for our information and records is a complete copy of the Renewal Request. It is requested that you review the memorandum, "WH Division's Comments on the LIFEAT Project Renewal", and the new Part II, paying particular attention to the personnel included therein. This request is being made in view of the conflicting information Headquarters received from the Station Case Officer who was on TDY in Headquarters (DIR 31900-16 July 1958) and from the field (MEXI-2031) in reply to HMMW-6555.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

19 September 1958

Attachments: Even pages (KAPOK)
u/s/c: Odd pages (KAPOK)

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City (w/a)
1 - WH/Mexico Chrono
1 - WH/Mailroom.
1 - RI

Scaletti
WH/3/Mexico/E.I.SCALETTI:ngs

CS COPY

50-6-32/1

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

022 CR/WS/

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 11

S E C R E T

DATE : 22 JULY 1958

22

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/OA, S/C 2

JUL 24 07 34 58

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 19357

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 2031

LIFEAT

REF: HMMW 6555

1. PARA 1. ONLY LIEDDY TO BE USED.

2. PARA 2. SUBJECTS IDENTICAL. NO PLANS TO USE.

3. PARA 3. LIMESTONE 10 NOT USED. HUSBANDS SERVICES TERMINATED 15 JULY 58. LIPSTICK 37 NO RECORD EMPLOYMENT AT STATION. LIMESTONE 9 WITTING BUT NEVER USED PER STATION RECORDS.

4. PARA 4. NEW LICOOL PROJECT BEING WRITTEN. DO NOT INCLUDE WITH LIFEAT.

5. PARA 5. SUBJS OF MEXI 1816 (IN 44759) FIRED 15 JULY. PLAN TO REPLACE SO PLEASE ALLOW FOR REPLACEMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

S E C R E T

14-00000

SECRET

24 July 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Project LIFEAT/LIMERICK

REFERENCE: Memorandum for Chief, SR from Chief, WH/III dated 2 July 1958

According to a telephone call from Herb Manell of SR/10 on 23 July 1958 SR Division believes that information produced by Project LIFEAT on the RIS and the Soviets is most valuable. He stated that this project is the chief source of information other than physical surveillance.

The only recommendation that SR Division would make is that the field be more selective in the reporting that is transmitted to Headquarters. (This recommendation has already been passed to the field)

John B. Brady
C/WH/Mexico

SECRET

17 July 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/III

SUBJECT : LITMUS Phase of LIFEAT Project

REFERENCE : WH/III Memorandum dated 2 July 1958

1. Due to a period of dormancy, the LITMUS phase of the LIFEAT Project has furnished a relatively small amount of reporting, during the past year, concerning BEDOX officials and their activities in Mexico. While small in quantity, the information furnished has been of considerable operational value because of the nature of the operation and the fact that it serves as a major source of data on the BEDOX target. The LITMUS operation has furnished accurate travel data, information on the function and scope of activity engaged in by the BEDOX personalities we are interested in and has helped us determine the number of contacts the BEDOX installation maintains with the local citizenry in the course of its activities. In the last case, the LITMUS operation has linked a local citizen, long suspected of Soviet Bloc intelligence activity, with one known and one suspected BEDOX intelligence officer serving under diplomatic cover in Mexico. This local citizen is now the subject of an extensive effort to prove his Soviet Bloc intelligence role and to determine the extent of his activity. Finally, the LITMUS operation has begun to furnish valuable operational data on a BEDOX personality who has recently arrived to assume a consular post. This particular BEDOX official was recommended to the field as a target of interest because of his past intelligence background. We feel confident that the LITMUS operation will aid considerably in our effort to monitor the activities of this individual.

2. Now that the LITMUS phase of the LIFEAT operation has, once again, begun to function, we believe that the information obtained therefrom will show a steady increase in operational value during the coming year.

PETER K. HEIMANN
Chief, SR/P

14-00000

SECRET

16 July 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/III

SUBJECT: Project LIFEAT

REFERENCE: Memorandum for Chief, EE/Czechoslovakia from Chief, WH/III, subject as above, dated 2 July 1958

Before its suspension in January 1958, the LIVERY phase of Project LIFEAT provided biographic data on the members of the Czech Legation in Mexico City which EE/C found useful in the evaluation of these individuals as possible targets. If the LIVERY phase of the project is resumed, it is anticipated that it would continue to provide similarly useful information. For this reason EE/C is interested in seeing Project LIFEAT renewed.

PHILO DIBBLE
Chief, EE/Czechoslovakia

SECRET

14-00000

554 MJ/SW/

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : C. ZTHRUNG
UNIT : WHD
EXT : 2555
DATE : 16 JULY 1958

554

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING

16 10 30Z 58
CABLE SEC

	DEFERRED	X	PRIORITY
	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/OA, TSS 4, S/C 2

OUT 50935

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 31906

REF HMMW 6555

NO NEED REPLY PARAS ONE, TWO, THREE, FIVE REF. DISCUSSED WITH SECHEN. LICOOL NOT INCLUDED LIFEAT RENEWAL REQUEST. RE PARA FOUR REF HQS DOES NOT THINK LICOOL FALLS UNDER OBJECTIVES, TARGETS, ETC MKCHARITY PROJ NOR IS IT AN OP WHICH SHOULD BE FUNDED BY KURIOT. THEREFORE SINCE STATION WISHES WITHDRAW LICOOL FROM LIFEAT REQUEST NEW PROJ SOONEST SO LICOOL EXPENSES CAN BE COVERED BY APPROVED PROJ.

END OF MESSAGE

LIFEAT/1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

~~SECRET~~

R. H. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR:	FI/OPS - Projects Branch	HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER	
CRYPTONYM	: LIFEAT	Name:	J. R. Brady
		Room:	2111, Barton Hall
DIVISION	: Western Hemisphere	Ext.:	2555
		Date:	16 July 1958
STATION	: Mexico City		

1. It is requested that the LIFEAT Project be renewed for the period 1 July 1958 through 30 June 1959 for a total of ~~$159,589.76~~. 159,590 156,055 INF

2. Attached is a Project Review of LIFEAT which was prepared by the field, a memorandum giving WH Division comments on the LIFEAT Project Renewal, and revisions to those sections of the Field Project Outline Part I which have changed since last year when a new Project Outline was submitted. A new Part II containing a detailed breakdown of the estimated costs for FY 1959 is also attached.

ROBERT N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

J. C. KING, C/WHD

Attachments:
- WH Division Comments on LIFEAT Project Renewal
- Project Review - LIFEAT
- Project Outline Part I (Excerpts)
- Project Outline Part II
- Folder with past Renewals
- Form 680 (in quad)
- Envelope with true names

SECRET

SECRET

WH Division Comments on LIENVOY Project Renewal

1. At the end of January 1958, telephone linemen discovered our tap on the LIVERY installation leading into one of our base houses. As a result of this all LIFEAT operations were suspended as of 31 January and 1 February 1958 pending the outcome of what appeared to be an involved investigation by the Mexican Telephone Company. The LIMEWATER's disclosed that the telephone company was not investigating the situation and the operation was secure. The first line from the LIMERICK group was put in again on 17 March 1958. During the same month coverage of one American Communist was also re-instated. As of the end of April, the Station had coverage on the following lines: 3 LIMERICK, 1 LITMOSPHERE, 1 LITMUS, 1 American Communist, 1 Target of Opportunity, and 1 Mexican Soviet Contact. Since the partial re-instatement of LIFEAT coverage there has been no indication that suspicion of the activity exists on the part of the Mexican Telephone Company or security services. In order to provide more secure LIFEAT coverage, a new system of installation of technical surveillance is now in effect. This system prohibits the opposition from detecting any LIFEAT lines with a voltage meter.

2. The following new personnel have been included in this Project renewal request:

a. LIEMPTY (Leona C. GANDARA - ps), a U. S. citizen and wife of a Staff Agent, was issued CSA on 24 June 1958 as a LIFEAT processor. The field is preparing a contract for her. (C-61557)

b. LIMENU-1 (Janet N. DELACOUR - ps), a U. S. citizen, was issued an Operational Approval on 31 January 1958 for use as a LIFEAT processor. She is motivated by patriotic loyalty. Financial remuneration will provide additional control. The field has been requested to prepare a formal contract for her. (C-64393)

c. LIMEWATER-6 is an employee of the Mexican Telephone Company and is LIMEWATER's assistant. His motivation at this time is believed to be financial. A POA was granted LIMEWATER-6 on 14 May 1958. An Operational Approval has been requested. (C-70322)

d. LIQUATION-4, wife of LIQUATION-1, occupies a basehouse with her husband. She received an OA on 2 October 1957. She will receive no remuneration.

3. LIMESTONE-9, LIMESTONE-10, LIQUATION-2, LIPSTICK-35, LIPSTICK-37 and LIMITATION-7 are still active under Project LIFEAT. They receive no remuneration. Therefore, their names do not appear on the list of LIFEAT agents on the attached Part II of the Project Outline.

SECRET

4. LIMITATION-5 (C-24845) and LIMITATION-6 (C-39418) who were included under Project LIFEAT when it was last renewed, have been withdrawn from this project and were included under the LIESTICK Project renewal which was approved on 3 December 1957.

5. The LICOOL phase has been removed from Project LIFEAT since these two technical operations are completely compartmented. The funding for LICOOL and its facilities will be covered by another project.

SECRET/KAPOK

Attachment to HMM-A-10196
KAPOK-1401

PROJECT REVIEW - LIFEAT

1. **Product of the Project**

The Soviet Embassy -

a. Soviet Commercial Activities:

During the past year reports submitted from screening the traffic of the two established Soviet Commercial Offices in Mexico have provided a great amount of detail concerning Soviet efforts to sell in the Latin American market, both heavy industrial merchandise and movies and literature. Knowledge of their methods of transshipping and attempts at concealment of point of origin of products has been gleaned from this take. As a result of this knowledge, reports on the firms with whom they are doing business have been procured and provided for background information. Following are a list of the reports submitted as a result of intelligence procured from this source:

HMM-3035 Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico
HMM-3165, Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico
HMM-3286 - Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico, December 1957
~~HMM-3253 - Soviet Commercial Contacts in Mexico - Michoacana del Occidente, S. de R.L.~~
~~HMM-3264 - Soviet Commercial Contacts in Mexico - Servicio Agricola, S.A.~~
~~HMM-3139 - Anilinas y Productos Quimicos S. de R.L.~~
~~HMM-3406 - Imports into Mexico from Soviet Union~~
~~HMM-A-9519 - American Cyanid Co., Calco Chemical Division~~

b. Soviet Diplomatic Activities:

This project has provided coverage and details of some of the diplomatic activities of the Soviets in Mexico. It has served to show the relationships maintained, culturally, socially and diplomatically, between the Soviets and the members of the Satellite establishments in Mexico.

HMM-3215, Soviet Attendance at Yugoslav Reception
HMM-3351 - Reception at Soviet Embassy.
HMM-2992 - Diplomatic Activities of Soviet Embassy, Mexico City
HMM-2849 - Diplomatic Activities of Soviet Embassy, Mexico City

c. Soviet Cultural Activities:

Information produced by LIFEAT has given details of Soviet activities in connection with publications, cultural institutes, and related activities. Examples of such reports are:

HMM-2870 - Soviet Embassy Reception for Mexican Musicians
HMM-2847 - Cultural & Propaganda Activities of Soviet Embassy
HMM-3080, Cultural & Propaganda Activities of Soviet Embassy

SECRET/KAPOK

d. Soviet Military Activities:

Monthly reports on the activities of Soviet military personnel, knowledge of which was obtained from LIFEAT, and their contacts in military circles in Mexico have proved to be of especial interest to ODYOKE service attaches in Mexico.

e. Movements of Soviet Officials:

Through LIFEAT coverage a roster of Soviet personnel presently in Mexico has been maintained by Station Mexico. This has been the primary source of such information. LIFEAT has enabled the Station to determine in advance when departures can be expected for the Soviets, prior to their permanent departure, normally stock up on clothing and occasionally other items throught to be in short supply in the USSR.

f. Soviet Embassy Contacts:

Contacts reports of the Soviets are compiled and provided Headquarters as necessary. These reports are of considerable operation value in identifying local and foreign Communists with whom the Soviets are in regular contact. Following are examples of this type of coverage:

HMM-2841 - MONTES y BRADLEY (fnu)
HMM-3199 - Narciso BASSOLS Contacts with the Soviet Embassy.

g. Personality Reports on Soviet Officials:

LIFEAT has provided the Station with the most productive source of information concerning the private and official lives of the Soviets assigned here. These reports have been submitted on dindividuals, e.g. HMM-A-9504, Aleksey N. CHERKASOV, and also under one cover, HMM-A-9656, January 1958 Report of Personnel Activities.

h. Goods and Services:

Periodic reports of the persons and institutions known to be providing goods and services to the Soviet Embassy have been of considerable value in developing and mounting a LAURICLE operation. Information of this type has also been of considerable value to the Station in the LIMZSA operation.

i. Miscellaneous Activities of the Soviet Embassy:

LIFEAT material which does not fall into any one category but which deals with the Soviets and their associates and related activities has been reported as necessary.

The Czech Legation

The information obtained on the Czech Legation during the period under review is essentially the same as that from the Soviet Embassy. To avoid repetition, only a brief summary of the information submitted will be given here.

14-00000

a. Czech Personnel Reports:

HMM-3164, Activities of Zdenek KVITA and HMM-3230, Travel of Czech Legation personnel, are examples of the type of reports made from the personality and activity information acquired from LIFEAT coverage of this installation. HMM-3262, Cocktail Party at Czech Residence, is an example of the reports from this source on diplomatic activities of this installation.

b. Spot Reports on Czech Legation Activities:

Reports on a spot basis which were of interest included:

~~HMM-3074, Czech Concern over Possible Expulsion from Mexico.~~

Polish Legation

Information on this installation closely parallels that obtained on the Czech Legation and the Soviet installations. The largest amount of information concerning the Polish installation has been procured from LIFEAT. An example of reports from this source is HMM-3161, Leon KILARSKI, Polish Commercial Attache. Another is HMM-3130, Suspicious Contact of Edward RUDSKI, Josef Isaak GENSCHAFT.

Mexican Communist Party and Communist Fronts

A significant amount of information concerning the Communist Party in Mexico and the Communist front organizations in Mexico was obtained from LIFEAT. Information from LIFEAT has been invaluable in supplementing agent coverage of the front-organizations which exist here. Examples of this type of reporting are as follows:

HMM-3193 - Narciso BASSOLS and Family;
HMM-3176 - Travel of Pro-Communists

American Communists in Mexico:

One of the most extensive and productive coverages maintained through LIFEAT during this past year was directed against American Communists in Mexico. Most of these targets have been covered at the request of ODENVY and the production has been partially processed by them for the justification of one of their dicts in their local establishment. A total of 361 reels have been the result of the coverage since 1 July 1957 until 25 April 1958.

Foreign Communists in Mexico and Mexican Communists:

LIFEAT continued to provide partial coverage of Eduardo MACHADO Morales, Venezuelan Communist, until the time of his departure for return to Venezuela. LIFEAT also provided some 50 reels of coverage on Diego RIVERA, well-known Communist Mexican painter, until his dealth in November 1957. From this coverage it was determined that RIVERA was sufficiently concerned over the departure of the former Soviet Cultural Attache, Yuriy PAPOROV, that he arose from his sick bed in order to make the trip to Veracruz by car to insure that PAPOROV's departure was without incident.

Project Review Attachment to HMM-A-10198
KAPOK-1401

LAURICLE Information:

LIFEAT has contributed materially to several matters having LAURICLE interest.

Counter Intelligence Information:

CI/CE matters constitute a major portion of the Mexico City Station's priority objectives. Project LIFEAT has contributed more leads and general information on the Soviet aspect of this subject than all other Station sources. A few representative samples of this type of information are the following:

HMM-A-9121, Suspicious Soviet Contact
HMM-A-9135 - Sergio KIRCEV Rassvetaef
HMM-A-8552, Vladimir SOKOLOV; Col. Jesus de LEON Toral, 6 November 1957
LCMAYPOWL

Jewish Communist Activities:

Coverage of the Jewish Communist leader, Samual MAGIDIN Magidin, has confirmed the continuing decline of the local Jewish Communist movement. It has also provided the Station with information on those former members who continue to meet at irregular intervals on an informal basis.

Conclusion:

The Mexico City Station believes that the product of the LIFEAT Project measured against the expenditure of KUBARK assets in terms of personnel, time, security risks and funds well justifies its renewal. The information produced by this operation has materially contributed to several priority objectives of the Station's Related Mission Directive.

2. Progress of the Operation -

Definite progress has been made in reporting on the objectives of the LIFEAT Project. However, since LIFEAT objectives are of a continuing nature and are not designed to be achieved, no statistics can be cited as to the percentage of coverage on each objective. A general indication of the coverage can be derived when it is realized that some 15,000 pages of raw text are the direct result of the operation from which the statistics cited above were derived. Except for a period from 1 February - 11 April 1958 LIFEAT has been in daily operation with some 18 to 23 lines being covered. Generally, these may be broken down as follows:

Soviet Embassy -	7 lines
Czech Legation -	2 lines
Polish Legation -	2 lines
American Communists -	5 lines
Remainder -	7 lines

Attachment to [illegible]-10138
[illegible]-1401

3. Planning for the Future

During the coming year Station capabilities will be expanded to permit monitoring of approximately 28 lines. Basic coverage of Soviet, Czech and Polish activities will be continued to the maximum extent possible and assets and capabilities will be maintained for exploiting pertinent targets of opportunity. At the present time and with the new system being used for LIFEAT lines, Station believes that 28 will be the maximum number of lines which can be handled properly and securely by the personnel presently assigned here for LIFEAT.

4. Performance of Agents

In general the performance of the LIFEAT agents has been good and secure during the past year. It is hoped that within the coming year the remainder of the [illegible] group will be securely and permanently removed from the Project and replaced by well-compartmented personnel. In view of the high degree of security necessary for the personnel involved in this operation, it is planned to screen very carefully any possible candidates before they are approached for use in this operation after prior approval for an approach has been secured from Headquarters.

Additional comments concerning the production, security and cover of individual agents will be found in the attached amendment to the field outline which was submitted with [illegible]-5708.

5. Expenditures during Period under Review

Approval was granted for the period under review, 1 July 1957 - 30 June 1958, to expend $156,647. The proposed LIFEAT budget for FY 1959 is contained in the attached field project outline Part II.

6. Status of Commitments

There are no commitments other than those provided for in the outline and the individual contracts of several LIFEAT personnel.

14-00000

Attachment to HMM-A-10198
KAPOK-1401

PROJECT OUTLINES
(Excerpts)

PROJECT LIFEAT

3. Background

Project LIFEAT was initially approved 5 October 1950. Actual operations began on 18 January 1951 and have run almost continuously since that time. The LIFEAT operation was begun with the installation of one telephone tap and has since expanded to an average of 23 telephone lines.

Project LIFEAT is a unilateral operation. It is completely independent from any liaison arrangement and it is staffed by KUBARK personnel, both staff and contract, together with a substantial number of local indigenous controlled agents.

During the time of its operation Project LIFEAT has produced more than 50,000 pages of operational and intelligence information in direct support of the Mexico City Station's objectives specifically and has contributed materially to the intelligence gathering activities connected with the Sino-Soviet bloc. In addition, Project LIFEAT has been of considerable value and assistance in monitoring the activities of Americans residing in Mexico City in which ODENVY has an interest and also has, at the direction of Headquarters, installed special taps on targets of opportunity.

4. References

HMM-A-7063, 5 June 1957 - Request for Renewal of Project
HMM-W-5708, 16 December 1957 - Approval of Project for FY 1958.

6. Objectives - ~~Omit "g"~~

7. Tasks

Case Officer - Edward P. SACHEN
Assistant Case Officer - Gene F. BRADDOCK

a. Supervise the operational and administrative activities of all ~~KAPOK~~ LIFEAT staff, contract and indigenous personnel.

b. Maintain awareness and provide direction in all operational matters pertaining to the management of the LIFEAT Project.

c. Provide guidance and day-to-day supervision of the operational phases LIFEAT/LIMERICK, LITHOSPHERE, LIMBUS, LIVERY and American Communist Group in Mexico activities.

SECRET/[illegible]

Attachment to HMMA-10198
KapOk-1401

-2-

d. Coordinate information received from LIMERICK with other Station operations.

e. Maintain LIFEAT capabilities for mounting operations against targets of opportunity.

f. Maintain supervision over basehouses and training of the personnel therein.

9. Personnel

The following are changes from FY 1958 for FY 1959:

Daniel K. BROMUND arrived at Station Mexico to assume duties as translator of LIFEAT/LITMUS material and relief translator on LIFEAT/LIMERICK.

14. Equipment and Support

It is considered essential that new equipment be provided for LIFEAT for FY 1959 in view of the fact that much of the equipment in current use has been steadily in operation since the inception of the project in 1951. Also, in view of expected expansion of the project and the possibilities of live monitoring, additional equipment in first-class condition will be necessary. A backlog of 10 new recorders and 300 reels along with repair parts is considered a minimum for efficient continuance of the project.

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SECRET KAPOK

Attachment to HMMA-10198 KAPOK-1631

LIFEAT PROJECT OUTLINE - PART II

17. Estimated Costs

The following costs are estimated for FY 1959. All figures are in U.S. dollars per year. It will be noted that owing to the rise in the cost of living and especially to much higher rents and to intended expansion, LIFEAT costs will be higher than in the past.

a. Salaries:

(1) Staff and Contract Personnel:

Ralph B. RAFANELLI, GS-7 (promotion to GS-9 in the mill)

Salary	$5985.00
Quarters	2100.00

Daniel K. BROMUND, GS-12

Salary	8810.00
Quarters	2100.00
Travel & TDY to border to renew tourist visa & to Washington, D.C. to pick up rentista papers.	400.00

Translator (LIMERICK), GS-12 not yet named (This position has been indicated in view of the hope that the Project will be able to live-monitor at least a portion of LIMERICK traffic. There is a Staff Agent slot available under this project).

Salary	8000.00
Quarters	2100.00
Transportation	1000.00
HHE move	1500.00

Janet N. DELACOUR (2.02/hr)	4000.00	
~~Nadine M. CHAROUSEK~~	~~3600.00~~	Delete
Leona C. GANDARA	4000.00	
Carol K. ZINSMEISTER - Salary	5400.00	
Francis M. MENZIES - Salary	2504.00	
Alice N. CAILLETEAU - Salary	2425.00	
Olivia N. GLARMON - Piece work	4200.00	
Louise J. MACHIMO - Salary (Will be included under LIPSTICK Project when it is renewed 1 September 1958)	1850.00	
TOTAL	56,375 ~~60014.00~~	53,375 ~~60014.00~~

(2)

Field Agents	Presently	Possible Raise
LIMEWATER	5284.22	
LIMEWATER/1	2209.77	
LIMEWATER/2	1441.15	
LIMEWATER's helper	144.12	
LIMEWATER/6	960.77	

SECRET KAPOK

Attachment to HMM-A-10198
KAPOK-1401

-4-

Field Agent	Presently	Possible Raise
LIMESTONE/1	1441.15	
LIMESTONE/2	576.46	
LIMESTONE/3	1921.54	
LIMESTONE/4	1922.54	
LIMESTONE/5	768.61	
LIMESTONE/7	1441.15	
LIMESTONE/8	1441.15	
LIPSTICK/18	1729.38	17[illegible]
LIMITATION	1729.38	
LIMITATION/3	1921.54	
LIQUATION	3650.92	
LIQUATION/1	3650.92	
LIQUATION/3	768.61	
LILACS ($2.58 per hr.)	3,000.00	

(Due to recent increases in the cost of living, it is expected that an over-all raise of 10% will be made to agents during FY 1959. In April 1958 a new import tax of 40-60% was imposed by the government with the resultant increase in commodities in general use. Adjustments will be made in peso amounts should the devaluation of the peso occur during this FY. 3,300.00

Christmas bonus and presents 3,000.00
(One month salary to each agent, in accordance with local custom. Also special gifts in some cases.)

Salary total ~~42,302.38~~ 42,305.00

b. Basehouse rentals, utilities and expenses

LIMERICK Basehouse	1729.38
ANNEX IV	3050.00
LIFEAT Repair Base	1540.00
ANNEX II	1452.00
ANNEX III	1360.00
ANNEX V	3060.00
LITHUS Basehouse	1452.00
LIVERY Basehouse (replacement for old blown base)	2100.00
LITHOSPHERE Basehouse	2000.00
LIVERY Relay Base	2000.00
Proposed basehouse (German Embassy coverage)	2000.00

Total ~~21,743.38~~ 21,745.00

SECRET [illegible]

Attachment to HM-A-10198
KAPOK-1401

-5-

c. **Equipment**

Local purchase of emergency and special equipment	2500.00	
New equipment, i.e. recorders, reels	3000.00	
Total		5,500.00

d. **Miscellaneous**

(1) Supplies (paper, rolls, wire, tubes, tape, plans, parts) — 2000.00

(2) Transportation

LIMESTONE/3 car rent	600.00
RAFANELLI QP car expense	500.00
KIRSMEISTER mileage	350.00
LIMESTONE/4 car rent	400.00
LIMITATION car rent	300.00
LIQUATION/1 car rent	300.00
LIMESTONE/7 car rent	600.00

(3) Other operational expenses (to cover loss of deposits on rents, fatalities and other serious emergencies, separation payments, medical expenses, emergency moving bills, and to cover targets of opportunity) — 25,000.00

Total	~~30,030.00~~ 30,130	~~30,030.00~~ 30,130

GRAND TOTAL ~~$145,864.76~~ 156,055

SECRET [illegible]

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMM-W-6555
TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 50-6-32/1
INFO		DATE
FROM : Chief, WHD		RE: "X" (CHECK "X" ONE)
SUBJECT : LIFEAT Project Renewal		MARKED FOR INDEXING X NO INDEXING REQUIRED INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED: Cable Reply, Submit Agent Termination Reports where appropriate		
REFERENCE(S): HMMA-10198		

PRIORITY

It is requested that you reply by cable to the following questions so that the request for renewal of the LIFEAT Project can be submitted.

1. Approval to insert the following persons at the salaries indicated. Please correct salaries listed below if they are wrong.

LIEDDY - $4,000
LIMENU/1 - $4,009
Nadine M. CHAROUSEK - $3,640

2. The following have been cleared for use under LIFEAT since the last Project renewal. Since they were not mentioned in your request for renewal, have they been activated under Project LIFEAT and should they be included in our request for renewal? Are any funds required to cover their use?

LIQUATION/4
Subject of HMMW-5906

3. The following agents were included under the LIFEAT Project renewal of last year. Since none of them receive pay their names did not appear on Part II of the Project Outline attached to reference. Therefore, Headquarters does not know whether they are still active under the Project. In our request for renewal we must indicate the names of all agents who have been dropped from the project during the past project year and the present use being made of each agent. Please indicate those agents who are no longer under Project LIFEAT and what use is being made of each. If they are not active, please submit agent service records on them. If they are being used for other work please submit new PRQ II's and requests to amend their Operational Approvals. Unless advised to the contrary, Headquarters will assume the following are still active under Project LIFEAT:

LIMESTONE-9	LIPSTICK-35
LIMESTONE-10	LIPSTICK-37
LIQUATION-2	LIMITATION-7

4. The covering dispatch to your request for LIFEAT Project renewal stated that LICOOL and the provision for Harvey C. MULFORD had been removed from LIFEAT. Since MULFORD is covered by Project MKCHARITY, Headquarters assumes you intend to carry out LICOOL operations under Project MKCHARITY. In view of the fact Project MKCHARITY is a KURIOT Project which supports KURIOT Staff Agents Harvey C. MULFORD and Alice N. HADZELLI and provides for technical equipment and technical services, Headquarters does not believe LICOOL belongs under MKCHARITY. If LICOOL were included under MKCHARITY, the latter project would have to be amended to provide for such operational activity and to provide funds for base houses, base house-keepers, and processors of LICOOL take.

P R I O R I T Y

We believe LICOOL is best placed under LIFEAT, where it has been included in the past. The only alternative would be a new project to cover LICOOL operations. Therefore, it is requested that you comment by cable on the above by indicating a new Project Outline will be forthcoming, or requesting us to include LICOOL in our LIFEAT Project Renewal. If the latter is the case, please indicate the number of LICOOL base houses, rent per year for each, names and salary of any LICOOL base housekeepers and processors not already included in your request for LIFEAT Project Renewal request, and any additional expenses which should be included. Also indicate how many LICOOL operations are active at the present in addition to the one proposed in HMMI-1577, dated 30 June 1958.

5. With reference to HMMI-1816 (20 June 1958), Headquarters plans to leave LIMESTONE's 1, 2, 3, 5, and 7 in the LIFEAT Project when it is submitted for renewal. We will indicate that LIMESTONE's 1, 2 and 7 are not active under the Project but funds for continued payments to them are included because of security reasons emanating from their past use and knowledge acquired under Project LIFEAT. If it is decided to terminate any or all of them the money can be used for that purpose.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

3 July 1958

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/Mexico/Chrono
1 - RI

WH/III/Mexico/E.J.SCALETTI:nps

14-00000

SECRET

2 July 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OPS

ATTENTION : Mr. Robert Brown

SUBJECT : Project LIFEAT

1. The WH/Mexico Desk is now in the process of requesting the annual renewal of Project LIFEAT for the period 1 July 1958 - 30 June 1959.

2. During the past year a considerable amount of operational and intelligence information from the LCMAYFOWL phase of this project has been forwarded to your office. In view of the pending project renewal, it would be appreciated if you would forward to the WH/Mexico Desk at your earliest convenience a memorandum evaluating this project with regard to your area and sphere of interest.

R. N. Dahlgren
Chief, WH/III

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/3/Mexico/Chrono
1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/CZehrung:mpm

SECRET

DESENSITIZED

VIA: Air Pouch (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH NO. [illegible]-A-10198 [illegible]1401

50-6-32/1

TO : Chief, WH Division

DATE: 21 May 1958

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— LIFEAT Project Renewal

Reference: HMM-W-5708, 16 December 1957

ACTION REQUESTED: Renewal of Project LIFEAT for FY 1959

1. There is attached a Review of Project LIFEAT for the period 1 July 1957 to 30 June 1958.

2. In accordance with the suggestion made in reference, Part I of the Project Outline has been revised only in those sections where there have been personnal changes of the operation has been otherwise altered in a basic aspect.

3. Part II is submitted in its entirety. LICOOL and the provision for Harvey C. MULFORD have been removed from this section, thereby cutting the budget from the sum requested for FY 1958.

4. It is requested that Project LIFEAT be renewed for FY 1959 for the amount requested.

Willard C. Curtis

Willard C. Curtis

Encl. (Odd pages herewith
Even pages USC)

EPS/GFB/bct
15 May 1958

Distribution
3 - Hqs
2 - Files

AB
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PS
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DES UFD
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Remove from Project: DMANGO
CS Classification: 50-6-32/1
JOB # 73-115/77
Box: 30 Fold: 2

CS COPY

CLASSIFICATION

50-6-32/1

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

14-00000

SECRET / LIFEAT

Attachment to HMM-A-10196
KAPOK-1401

PROJECT REVIEW - LIFEAT

1. Product of the Project

The Soviet Embassy -

a. Soviet Commercial Activities:

During the past year reports submitted from screening the traffic of the two established Soviet Commercial Offices in Mexico have provided a great amount of detail concerning Soviet efforts to sell in the Latin American market, both heavy industrial merchandise and movies and literature. Knowledge of their methods of transshipping and attempts at concealment of point of origin of products has been gleaned from this take. As a result of this knowledge, reports on the firms with whom they are doing business have been procured and provided for background information. Following are a list of the reports submitted as a result of intelligence procured from this source:

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HMM-3165, Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico
HMM-3286 - Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico, December 1957
~~HMM-3253 - Soviet Commercial Contacts in Mexico - Michoacana del Occidente, S. de R.L.~~
~~HMM-3264 - Soviet Commercial Contacts in Mexico - Servicio Agricola, S.A.~~
~~HMM-3139 - Anilinas y Productos Quimicos S. de R.L.~~
~~HMM-3404 - Imports into Mexico from Soviet Union~~
~~HMM-A-9519 - American Cyanid Co., Calco Chemical Division~~

b. Soviet Diplomatic Activities:

This project has provided coverage and details of some of the diplomatic activities of the Soviets in Mexico. It has served to show the relationships maintained, culturally, socially and diplomatically, between the Soviets and the members of the Satellite establishments in Mexico.

HMM-3215, Soviet Attendance at Yugoslav Reception
HMM-3351 - Reception at Soviet Embassy.
HMM-2992 - Diplomatic Activities of Soviet Embassy, Mexico City
HMM-2849 - Diplomatic Activities of Soviet Embassy, Mexico City

c. Soviet Cultural Activities:

Information produced by LIFEAT has given details of Soviet activities in connection with publications, cultural institutes, and related activities. Examples of such reports are:

HMM-2870 - Soviet Embassy Reception for Mexican Musicians
HMM-2847 - Cultural & Propaganda Activities of Soviet Embassy
HMM-3080, Cultural & Propaganda Activities of Soviet Embassy

SECRET / LIFEAT

CS COPY
50-6-52/1

14-00000

SECRET

Project Review | Attachment to HMM-A-10198 KAPOK-1401

d. Soviet Military Activities:

Monthly reports on the activities of Soviet military personnel, knowledge of which was obtained from LIFEAT, and their contacts in military circles in Mexico have proved to be of especial interest to ODYOKE service attaches in Mexico.

e. Movements of Soviet Officials:

Through LIFEAT coverage a roster of Soviet personnel presently in Mexico has been maintained by Station Mexico. This has been the primary source of such information. LIFEAT has enabled the Station to determine in advance when departures can be expected for the Soviets, prior to their permanent departure, normally stock up on clothing and occasionally other items throught to be in short supply in the USSR.

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Contact reports of the Soviets are compiled and provided Headquarters as necessary. These reports are of considerable operation value in identifying local and foreign Communists with whom the Soviets are in regular contact. Following are examples of this type of coverage:

HMM-2841 - MONTES y BRADLEY (fnu)
HMM-3199 - Narciso BASSOLS Contacts with the Soviet Embassy.

g. Personality Reports on Soviet Officials:

LIFEAT has provided the Station with the most productive source of information concerning the private and official lives of the Soviets assigned here. These reports have been submitted on individuals, e.g. HMM-A-9504, Aleksey N. CHERKASOV, and also under one cover, HMM-A-9856, January 1958 Report of Personnel Activities.

h. Goods and Services:

Periodic reports of the persons and institutions known to be providing goods and services to the Soviet Embassy have been of considerable value in developing and mounting a LAURICLE operation. Information of this type has also been of considerable value to the Station in the LIMESA operation.

i. Miscellaneous Activities of the Soviet Embassy:

LIFEAT material which does not fall into any one category but which deals with the Soviets and their associates and related activities has been reported as necessary.

The Czech Legation

The information obtained on the Czech Legation during the period under review is essentially the same as that from the Soviet Embassy. To avoid repetition, only a brief summary of the information submitted will be given here.

SECRET

50-6-32/1

a. Czech Personnel Reports:

HMM-3164, Activities of Zdenek KVITA and HMM-3238, Travel of Czech Legation personnel, are examples of the type of reports made from the personality and activity information acquired from LIFEAT coverage of this installation. HMM-3262, Cocktail Party at Czech Residence, is an example of the reports from this source on diplomatic activities of this installation.

b. Spot Reports on Czech Legation Activities:

Reports on a spot basis which were of interest included:

~~HMM-3054, Czech Concern over Possible Expulsion from Mexico.~~
HMM-3126 New Location of Czech Legation Commercial Office and Skoda Exposition

Polish Legation

Information on this installation closely parallels that obtained on the Czech Legation and the Soviet installations. The largest amount of information concerning the Polish installation has been procured from LIFEAT. An example of reports from this source is HMM-3161, Leon KILARSKI, Polish Commercial Attache. Another is HMM-3130, Suspicious Contact of Edward RUDSKI, Josef Isaak GENSCHAFT.

Mexican Communist Party and Communist Fronts

A significant amount of information concerning the Communist Party in Mexico and the Communist front organizations in Mexico was obtained from LIFEAT. Information from LIFEAT has been invaluable in supplementing agent coverage of the front-organizations which exist here. Examples of this type of reporting are as follows:

HMM-3193 - Narciso BASSOLS and Family;
HMM-3176 - Travel of Pro-Communists

American Communists in Mexico:

One of the most extensive and productive coverages maintained through LIFEAT during this past year was directed against American Communists in Mexico. Most of these targets have been covered at the request of ODENVY and the production has been partially processed by them for the justification of one of their slots in their local establishment. A total of 381 reels have been the result of the coverage since 1 July 1957 until 25 April 1958.

Foreign Communists in Mexico and Mexican Communists:

LIFEAT continued to provide partial coverage of Eduardo MACHADO Morales, Venezuelan Communist, until the time of his departure for return to Venezuela. LIFEAT also provided some 50 reels of coverage on Diego RIVERA, well-known Communist Mexican painter, until his death in November 1957. From this coverage it was determined that RIVERA was sufficiently concerned over the departure of the former Soviet Cultural Attache, Yuriy PAPOROV, that he arose from his sick bed in order to make the trip to Veracruz by car to insure that PAPOROV's departure was without incident.

LAURICLE Information:

LIFEAT has contributed materially to several matters having LAURICLE interest.

Counter Intelligence Information:

CI/CE matters constitute a major portion of the Mexico City Station's priority objectives. Project LIFEAT has contributed more leads and general information on the Soviet aspect of this subject than all other Station sources. A few representative samples of this type of information are the following:

HMM-A-9121, Suspicious Soviet Contact
HMM-A-9135 - Sergio KIREEV Rassvetaef
HMM-A-8552, Vladimir SOKOLOV; Col. Jesus de LEON Toral, 6 November 1957
LCHAYFOWL

Jewish Communist Activities:

Coverage of the Jewish Communist leader, Samuel MAGIDIN Magidin, has confirmed the continuing decline of the local Jewish Communist movement. It has also provided the Station with information on those former members who continue to meet at irregular intervals on an informal basis.

Conclusion:

The Mexico City Station believes that the produce of the LIFEAT Project measured against the expenditure of KUBARK assets in terms of personnel, time, security risks and funds well justifies its renewal. The information produced by this operation has materially contributed to several priority objectives of the Station's Related Mission Directive.

2. Progress of the Operation -

Definite progress has been made in reporting on the objectives of the LIFEAT Project. However, since LIFEAT objectives are of a continuing nature and are not designed to be achieved, no statistics can be cited as to the percentage of coverage on each objective. A general indication of the coverage can be derived when it is realized that some 15,000 pages of raw text are the direct result of the operation from which the statistics cited above were derived. Except for a period from 1 February - 11 April 1958 LIFEAT has been in daily operation with some 18 to 23 lines being covered. Generally, these may be broken down as follows:

Soviet Embassy -	7 lines
Czech Legation -	2 lines
Polish Legation -	2 lines
American Communists -	5 lines
Remainder -	7 lines

SECRET/KAPOK

3. Planning for the Future

During the coming year Station capabilities will be expanded to permit monitoring of approximately 28 lines. Basic coverage of Soviet, Czech and Polish activities will be continued to the maximum extent possible and assets and capabilities will be maintained for expliting important targets of opportunity. At the present time and with the new system being used for LIFEAT lines, Station believes that 28 will be the maximum number of lines which can be handled properly and securely by the personnel presently assigned here for LIFEAT.

4. Performance of Agents

In general the performance of the LIFEAT agents has been good and secure during the past year. It is hoped that within the coming year the remainder of the AYCALL group will be securely and permanently removed from the Project and replaced by well-compartmented personnel. In view of the high degree of security necessary for the personnel involved in this operation, it is planned to screen very carefully any possible candidates before they are approached for use in this operation after prior approval for an approach has been secured from Headquarters.

Additional comments concerning the production, security and cover of individual agents will be found in the attached amendment to the field outline which was submitted with HMM-W-5708.

5. Expenditures during Period under Review

Approval was granted for the period under review, 1 July 1957 - 30 June 1958, to expend $156,647. The proposed LIFEAT budget for FY 1959 is contained in the attached field project outline Part II.

6. Status of Commitments

There are no commitments other than those provided for in the outline and the individual contracts of several LIFEAT personnel.

Attachment to HMM-A-10198
KAPOK-1401

PROJECT OUTLINE
(Excerpts)

PROJECT LIFEAT

3. Background

Project LIFEAT was initially approved 3 October 1950. Actual operations began on 18 January 1951 and have run almost continuously since that time. The LIFEAT operation was begun with the installation of one telephone tap and has since expanded to an average of 23 telephone lines.

Project LIFEAT is a unilateral operation. It is completely independent from any liaison arrangement and it is staffed by KUBARK personnel, both staff and contract, together with a substantial number of local indigenous controlled agents.

During the time of its operation Project LIFEAT has produced more than 50,000 pages of operational and intelligence information in direct support of the Mexico City Station's objectives specifically and has contributed materially to the intelligence gathering activities connected with the Sino-Soviet bloc. In addition, Project LIFEAT has been of considerable value and assistance in monitoring the activities of Americans residing in Mexico City in which ODENVY has an interest and also has, at the direction of Headquarters, installed special taps on targets of opportunity.

4. References

HMM-A-7063, 5 June 1957 - Request for Renewal of Project
HMM-W-5708, 16 December 1957 - Approval of Project for FY 1958.

6. Objectives - ~~Omit "f"~~

7. Tasks

Case Officer - Edward P. SECHEN
Assistant Case Officer - Gene F. BRADDOCK

a. Supervise the operational and administrative activities of all ~~KAPOK~~ LIFEAT staff, contract and indigenous personnel.

b. Maintain awareness and provide direction in all operational matters pertaining to the management of the LIFEAT Project.

c. Provide guidance and day-to-day supervision of the operational phases LIFEAT/LIMERICK, LITHOSPHERE, LITMUS, LIVERY and American Communist Group in Mexico activities.

Attachment to HMM-A-10198
KapOk-1401

d. Coordinate information received from LIMERICK with other Station operations.

e. Maintain LIFEAT capabilities for mounting operations against targets of opportunity.

f. Maintain supervision over basehouses and training of the personnel therein.

9. Personnel

The following are changes from FY 1958 for FY 1959:

Daniel K. BROMUND arrived at Station Mexico to assume duties as translator of LIFEAT/LITMUS material and relief translator on LIFEAT/LIMERICK.

14. Equipment and Support

It is considered essential that new equipment be provided for LIFEAT for FY 1959 in view of the fact that much of the equipment in current use has been steadily in operation since the inception of the project in 1951. Also, in view of expected expansion of the project and the possibilities of live monitoring, additional equipment in first-class condition will be necessary. A backlog of 10 new recorders and 300 reels along with repair parts is considered a minimum for efficient continuance of the project.

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SECRET KAPOK

Attachment to HMM-A-10196 KAPOK-1401

LIFEAT PROJECT OUTLINE - PART II

17. **Estimated Costs**

The following costs are estimated for FY 1959. All figures are in U.S. dollars per year. It will be noted that owing to the rise in the cost of living and especially to much higher rents and to intended expansion, LIFEAT costs will be higher than in the past.

a. **Salaries:**

(1) **Staff and Contract Personnel:**

Ralph B. RAFANELLI, GS-7 (promotion to GS-9 in the mill)

Salary	$5985.00
Quarters	2100.00

Daniel K. BROMUND, GS-12

Salary	8810.00
Quarters	2100.00
Travel & TDY to border to renew tourist visa & to Washington, D.C. to pick up rentista papers.	400.00

Translator (LIMERICK), GS-12 not yet named (This position has been indicated in view of the hope that the Project will be able to live-monitor at least a portion of LIMERICK traffic. There is a Staff Agent slot available under this project).

Salary	8000.00	
Quarters	2100.00	
Transportation	1000.00	
HHE move	1500.00	
Janet N. DELACOUR (2.02/hr)	4000.00	
~~Nadine M. CHAROUSEK~~	~~3640.00~~	← delete Om7
Leona C. GANDARA	4000.00	
Carol K. ZINSMEISTER - Salary	5400.00	Om7
Francis M. MENZIE - Salary	2508.00	
Alice N. CAILLETEAU - Salary	2425.00	
Olivia N. GLADMON - Piece work	4200.00	
Louise J. MACRINO - Salary (Will be included under LIPSTICK Project when it is renewed 1 September 1958)	1850.00	
TOTAL	~~60014.00~~ 56375.00	~~60014.00~~ 56375.00 Om7

(2) **Field Agents**

Field Agents	Presently	Possible Raise
LIMEWATER	5284.22	
LIMEWATER/1	2209.77	
LIMEWATER/2	1441.15	
LIMEWATER's helper	144.12	
LIMEWATER/6	960.77	

SECRET KAPOK

Attachment to HMM-A-10198
KAPOK-1401

Field Agent	Presently	Possible Raise
LIMESTONE/1	1441.15	
LIMESTONE/2	576.46	
LIMESTONE/3	1921.54	
LIMESTONE/4	1921.54	
LIMESTONE/5	768.61	
LIMESTONE/7	1441.15	
LIMESTONE/8	1441.15	
LIPSTICK/18	~~1729.38~~ 1732.00	
LIMITATION	1729.38	
LIMITATION/3	1921.54	
LIQUATION	3650.92	
LIQUATION/1	3650.92	
LIQUATION/3	768.61	
LILACE ($2.58 per hr.)	3,000.00	

(Due to recent increases in the cost of living, it is expected that an over-all raise of 10% will be made to agents during FY 1959. In April 1958 a new import tax of 40-60% was imposed by the government with the resultant increase in commodities in general use. Adjustments will be made in peso amounts should the devaluation of the peso occur during this FY. — 3,300.00

Christmas bonus and presents — 3,000.00
(One month salary to each agent, in accordance with local custom. Also special gifts in some cases.)

Salary total — ~~42,302.38~~ 42,365.00

b. **Basehouse rentals, utilities and expenses**

LIMERICK Basehouse	~~1729.38~~ 1730.00
ANNEX IV	3050.00
LIFEAT Repair Base	1540.00
ANNEX II	1452.00
ANNEX III	1360.00
ANNEX V	3060.00
LITMUS Basehouse	1452.00
LIVERY Basehouse (replacement for old blown base)	2100.00
LITHOSPHERE Basehouse	2000.00
LIVERY Relay Base	2000.00
Proposed basehouse (German Embassy coverage)	2000.00

Total — ~~21,743.38~~ 21,745.-

50-6-32/1

c. Equipment

Local purchase of emergency and special equipment	2500.00	
New equipment, i.e. recorders, reels	3000.00	
Total		5,500.00

d. Miscellaneous

(1) Supplies (paper, rolls, wire, tubes, tape, plans, parts)	2000.00	
(2) Transportation		
LIMESTONE/3 car rent	600.00	
RAFANELLI QP car expense	580.00	
ZINSMEISTER mileage	350.00	
LIMESTONE/4 car rent	400.00	
LIMITATION car rent	300.00	
LIQUATION/1 car rent	300.00	
LIMESTONE/7 car rent	600.00	
(3) Other operational expenses (to cover loss of deposits on rents, fatalities and other serious emergencies, separation payments, medical expenses, emergency moving bills, and to cover targets of opportunity)	25,000.00	
Total	~~30,030.00~~ 30130.00	~~30,030.00~~ 30130.00
GRAND TOTAL	~~$145,864.76~~ $156,055.00	

Changes made per discussion with [illegible] [signature]

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR

DISPATCH NO. [illegible]

50-6-32/1

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DATE: 18 APR 1958

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM: Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - LIFEAT Renewal

Project LIFEAT expires on 30 June 1958. It is requested that the Station's request for project renewal be pouched so that it reaches Headquarters prior to 1 June 1958.

J. C. KING
C/WHD

14 April 1958

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - FI
1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/[illegible]

(Releasing officer) J. C. KING, C/WHD

(Coordinating officer)

(Authenticating officer) [illegible], C/WH/III

CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

50-6-32/1

14-00000

SECRET

3 February 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OPS - Projects Branch

SUBJECT : Amendment to Project LIFEAT

1. It is requested that Project LIFEAT be amended to authorize the payment of $1820 compensation to Nadine M. CHARNUSEK for the period 1 January 1958 through 30 June 1958 (the expiration date of the project). Funds now available in Project LIFEAT are sufficient to cover payment to CHARNUSEK.

2. CHARNUSEK will serve as a processor of LIFEAT material. She received Provisional Operational Approval (C-62445) on 12 December 1957. A contract check list to provide a payment of $1.75 an hour compensation has been prepared for Contract Personnel Division.

3. CHARNUSEK has above average motivation to do the work required of her. Motivation is a prime consideration in work of this type. CHARNUSEK will listen to LIFEAT tapes (in English until her Spanish language ability permits work on Spanish tapes). She will type summaries of the material on these tapes. The handling of the tapes and summaries will be between CHARNUSEK and her father-in-law, LIMEWATER (C-739). Her cover will be that of housewife.

F. S. DAHLGREN,
C/WH/III

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/III/Memo chrono
1 - WH/III/Mexico chrono
1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/LSulc:jck

SECRET

19 December 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OPS - Projects Branch

SUBJECT : Amendment to Project LIENVOY

1. It is requested that Project LI[illegible] be amended to include the payment of $1820 compensation to Nadine M. CHAR[illegible]K for the period 1 January 1957 through 30 June 1958 (the expiration date of the project).

2. CHAR[illegible]K will serve as a processor of L[illegible] material. She received Provisional Operational Approval (C-66264) on 13 December 1957. A contract check list to provide a payment of $1.75 an hour compensation has been prepared for Contract Personnel Division.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - WH/Mexico/Chrono
VI - Subject

SECRET

14-00000

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMM-A-5708
50-6-32/1
[redacted] 589

CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: GENERAL - Operational/LIFEAT
SPECIFIC - Project Renewal and Amendment

Reference: HMMA-7063

1. Project LIFEAT was renewed on 30 October 1957 for the period 1 July 1957 through 30 June 1958 for a total of $130,154 for FY 1958. The Station will note that Headquarters rewrote the Project Outline and Project Review which were submitted in HMMA 7063. This was done to facilitate subsequent renewals of the complex LIFEAT Project. As regards the Project Outline, if no major changes occur during the next project year, the Station will only have to submit a Part II to the Project Outline, and any changes which may have affected Part I, principally those concerning personnel. The rewritten Project Review should be used by the Station as a format for next year's Review. By following these procedures, it is believed that we can avoid the re-writing and retyping of the entire Project and make it simpler for the Field Case Officer to prepare the renewal request.

2. Project LIFEAT Amendment was approved on 5 December 1957 for a total of $26,493 for fiscal year 1958, thus raising the total amount authorized for the present project year to $156,647. This Amendment authorized the establishing of a bank account of $20,000 for Daniel K. BROMUND for cover purposes, against which a Letter of Credit will be obtained so that he may obtain Rentista status in Mexico. (See HMMW-5691 for details on this Letter of Credit).

3. The Amendment also requested authority to incorporate Roland K. WINGSNESS as an additional Staff Agent in the Project. A total of $6,493 for the remainder of the project year was requested to cover WINGSNESS' expenses and this amount was broken down as follows:

Salary ($7,785 per year)	$3,893
Allowances (Quarters up to $2,000)	1,000
Other (Educational-in accordance with R-20-610 dated 9 February 1956 estimated at	300

AB/hun
AB X
IM
PS
AX
DBS | HFD
FI
ARD

(Releasing officer) (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

Remove from Project KDIMANCO
CS Classification: 50-6-32/1
JOB # 73-173/78
Box: 32 Fold: 2

CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

A RECORD COPY

FORM NO. 51-29 JUN 1949

50-6-32/1

Travel (PC3 Air to Mexico for family) $ 500
Household Effects, Movement 600

This additional obligation for Project LIFEAT was approved with the authorization to add another competent staff agent; however, Roland E. WINGHES [illegible] was not approved pending completion of the necessary action to waive existing personnel management restrictions on transferring employees from KUCHAI to KUJCVE and until suitable cover has been arranged by Cover Division. This problem has not yet been settled but you will be notified as soon as a definite decision has been reached regarding the transfer of WINGHES to KUJCVE and subsequently to Mexico City on PCS.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

Attachment:
Project LIFEAT Outline and Project Review, 1/2 of pages herewith and 1/2 of pages, u/s/c

10 December 1957

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City, w/1/att. herewith and w/1/att. u/s/c
1 - WH/III/KAPOK Chrono, w/o/att.
~~2~~ - Subject, w/o/att.

WH/III/Mexico/CZehrung:mjn

J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

14-00000

C/ [illegible]
WHD
2555
9 DECEMBER 1957

MEXICO CITY

[illegible]- 48520
x OUT - 71383
[illegible]

MEXI

REF: MEXI 724 (IN 43718)

1. ~~[illegible] FUNDS authorized these renewals~~ broken down:

A. LIVESTOCK: $52,318 FY 58 AND $7,350 FY 59

B. LIFESTICK: $82,417 FY 58 AND $16,483 FY 59

C. LIF[illegible]T: $156.647 FY 58

2. DISPATCHES FOLLOW.

END OF MESSAGE.

LATEST PROJ RENEWALS APPROVED

LIFEAT/A

J. C. KING, [illegible] [illegible] C/WH/III

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : L. D. PUCKETT
UNIT : WHD
EXT : 2555
DATE : 9 DECEMBER 1957

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DEC 10 19 46 57
REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : FI/CPS, CE 4, S/C 2, OP 2, S/C 2

	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

71170
OUT 71170

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 48374

RE: MEXI 0718 (IN 43260) *

1. LIFEAT AMENDMENT APPROVED 5 DEC FOR BROMUND RENTISTA COVER. NOW CONVERTING STAFF AGENT AND MAKING FINAL COVER ARRANGEMENTS. ESTIMATE DEPARTURE HQS 18 DEC BY CAR.

2. REGRET IMPOSSIBLE SEND GABBOTT TDY OR PCS PRIOR 1 FEB DUE USUAL DELAY MEXI ENTRY NON-U.S. CITIZEN. SIMILAR TO MOOIMAN CASE.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *REQUESTED IF GABBOTT'S PCS CAN BE EXPEDITED OR TDY IN MEANTIME.

EE/P/MR. SZCZEPANSKI By Phone LDP

WH/PERSONNEL PC Bowers

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

5-6017

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Chief of Operations, DD/P

SUBJECT : Project LIFEAT (Amendment)

1. The attached project, originating in WH Division, is designed to determine Sino/Soviet/Satellite plans, activities, and connections with other Communist elements through independent audio-surveillance operations in Mexico. It is presented for your approval of two amendments: the first, to permit the utilization of Roland K. WINGSNESS (p) as an additional Staff Agent in the project, and the second, to establish for cover purposes a $20,000 U. S. bank account for Staff Agent Daniel K. BROMUND (p) in order that he may obtain Rentista status in Mexico.

2. Authority is requested to obligate an additional $26,493 from the DD/P-WH Division budget for fiscal year 1958. Sufficient funds are available in the WH Division budget. If approved, these two amendments will raise the total amount authorized for the present project year, 1 July 1957 through 30 June 1958, to $156,647. Project LIFEAT was renewed by the DDCI on 30 October 1957 in the amount of $130,154.

3. Attached is the LIFEAT Project Outline, which sets forth the important factors involved in the operation; a WH Division memorandum, dated 31 October 1957, which explains the proposal for securing Rentista status for BROMUND; and a WH Division memorandum, dated 13 November 1957, which requests authority to incorporate WINGSNESS into the project as a Staff Agent.

4. CCB/NC comments that according to Finance Division, establishing a bank account for BROMUND is the only means of satisfying the requirements of the Mexican government. The Letter of Credit must be irrevocable and allow a stated withdrawal per period (as in this case, per quarter) in order that the full amount cannot be liquidated before the expiration of the Rentista. CCB/NC recommends approval in this connection. In addition CCB/NC recommends approval of the proposed use of WINGSNESS, provided that his cover, which has not been determined as yet, be coordinated with CCB/NC sufficiently in advance to allow CCB/NC to state any objections deemed necessary and to take effective action toward establishing sound cover.

SECRET

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5. I recommend approval of these two amendments, subject to the conditions as stated by CCB/MC in paragraph four, above.

/s/ W. Lloyd George *
W. LLOYD GEORGE
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Concur: [illegible] — COP-DD/P — 5 DEC 1957 — Date

Approved: Signed C. P. CABELL — DDCI — 5 DEC 1957 — Date

Attachments: Project Outline LIFEAT
Memorandum, 31 October 1957
Memorandum, 13 November 1957

Staff Coordination:
For C/FI/OPS s/R. Bryant
For C/CI/OA s/J. Burton
C/CCB/MC s/J. Southard
For C/CI s/H. Brown

Responsible Officers:
Hdqts. - Louis D. Puckett
Field - Charles Anderson

* Amendment approved to extent that a competent additional staff agent may be added to the project and the Letter of Credit underwritten. However the addition of Wingness per se is not approved until the necessary personnel management restriction currently in effect have been complied with.

/s/ L.G.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Project Renewal

1. LIFEAT Project was renewed for the period 1 July 1957 through 30 June 1958. It is requested that this Project be amended to include Roland E. WINOSNESS as a Staff Agent.

2. WINOSNESS is a Staff Employee attached to ORR. He recently completed a four month TDY in Mexico City where he performed his work in a highly satisfactory manner and the Chief of Station, Mexico City, has specifically requested his PCS assignment under Project LIFEAT. Approval will be requested of Chief of Operations to transfer WINOSNESS to the DDP from DDI as soon as this Project Amendment has been approved. A Staff Agent slot is already available under Project LIFEAT which can be filled by WINOSNESS. As soon as WINOSNESS becomes a DDP employee, WHD plans to give him intensified language training and to send him to Mexico after the first of the year.

3. Although Daniel K. BROMUND was included in the LIFEAT Project Renewal as a Russian translator, the volume of material produced under LIFEAT in the Russian language is increasing at such a rate that the services of two Russian translators are required. WINOSNESS also will be used as an assistant Case Officer, will administer at least two safe houses, will do regular line inspections and make technical repairs at the listening posts, and will be required to prepare finished operational and intelligence reports based on his own and other LIFEAT agents' raw reports. WINOSNESS is well qualified to perform all these tasks.

4. Authority is requested to obligate an additional $6,493 for Project LIFEAT for the last half of the present project year. A breakdown of this amount is as follows:

WINOSNESS Salary: ($7,785 per year)	$3,893
Allowances: (Quarters up to $2,000)	1,000
Other (Educational-in accordance with R-20-610 dated 9 February 56 estimated at-)	300
Travel: PCS Air to Mexico for family	500
Household Effects, Movement	800
TOTAL	$6,493

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

File Lifeat

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OPS - Project Branch

CRYPTONYM LIFEAT

DIVISION Western Hemisphere

STATION Mexico City

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

Name Louis D. Puckett
Room 2110 Barton Hall
Ext. 2559
Date 13 November 1957

It is requested that Project LIFEAT be amended to include Roland E. WITNESSES as a Staff Agent under this project. The additional cost to the project for the remainder of the project year will be $6,493. The attached memorandum sets forth details of this amendment.

ROBERT N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

CHARLES APPLE, WH/FI

COLLINS ALDEN, WH/STAFF/CHIEF

DATE

Attachments
Memoranda (4)
Form No. 680 (4)
Envelope w/True Name Card

SECRET

FI OPERATIONAL AUTHORIZATION

TO : FINANCE DIVISION

THROUGH: FI/PLANS/PROJECTS BRANCH, FI/ADMIN/BF

SUBJECT: LIFEAT (APPROVAL OF PROJECT) ; ______ (ACCOUNT NO.) ; WH/III/Mexico (COUNTRY, AREA DIVISION)

SECTION 1. TO BE COMPLETED BY PROJECTS BRANCH

THE ABOVE PROJECT HAS BEEN APPROVED FROM 1 July 1957 TO 30 June 1958 IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF $______ AS BROKEN DOWN BELOW.

______ FI/PLANS/PROJECTS BRANCH ______ DATE

SECTION 2. TO BE COMPLETED BY CASE OFFICER

BREAKDOWN OF REQUESTED TOTAL	FISCAL YEAR 1958	FISCAL YEAR
COMPENSATION	$ 3,093	$
ALLOWANCES	1,300	
TRAVEL	1,300	
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES		
OTHER:		
TOTAL	$ 6,193	$

ACCOUNTING DETAILS

TYPE OF PROJECT (Check one): [X] REGULAR [ ] SUBSIDY [ ] PROPRIETARY

METHOD BY WHICH PAYMENTS ARE TO BE MADE

FUNDS TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR BY: (Check one)
- [X] REGULAR FINANCIAL ACCOUNTINGS (AFR 30-10)
- [ ] RECEIPTS ONLY (CFR 9.4)
- [ ] OTHER (Explain):

SECTION 3. TO BE COMPLETED BY DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE ______ DIVISION BUDGET FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ______ CONTAINS SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO MEET THE OBLIGATIONS OUTLINED ABOVE.

______ DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER ______ DATE

SECTION 4. OTHER APPROVALS

FINANCE DIVISION MUST HAVE, IN ADDITION TO FI PROJECT APPROVAL, SPECIFIC WRITTEN APPROVAL ON CERTAIN TYPES OF EXPENDITURES BEFORE FUNDS CAN BE ADVANCED. INDICATE BELOW ANY APPROVALS IN THIS CATEGORY THAT HAVE BEEN SECURED:

- [ ] PURCHASE OF AUTOMOBILE
- [ ] PURCHASE OF MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT
- [ ] RENTALS IN EXCESS OF THAT PERMITTED BY REGULATION.
- [ ] APPROVAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN WHEN REQUIRED
- [ ] OTHER (Explain):

SECTION 5. ADDITIONAL CRYPTONYMS, PSEUDONYMS, ETC.

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF OR DESIGNEE	DATE
L. D. Puckett	8555		

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

004 HM/JM/ATP

DATE : Ø1 NOV 57

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI, S/C 2

NOV 2 06 5 57

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 2993Ø

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI Ø521

REQUEST REPLY MEXI 739 (IN 24781).*

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED AMENDMENT RESEARCH REPORT ON LIFEAT.

FILE TITLE Proj LIFEAT - Development Plans

INITIALS

DATE PROC

50-6-32/3

ENCLOSURE

DATE OF DOC 1 Nov 57

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/OPS - Projects Branch

CRYPTONYM LIFEAT

AREA DIVISION Western Hemisphere

STATION Mexico City

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

Name Louis D. [illegible]

Room 2112 [illegible]

Ext. 2555 or 3162

Date 31 October 1957

1. It is requested that the LIFEAT project be amended to include authorization to open a bank account of $20,000 for Daniel K. BROMUND (Staff Agent). Project LIFEAT was approved for renewal for the period 1 July 1957 to 30 June 1958.

2. Subsequent to the renewal of Project LIFEAT, it was determined that the cover appropriate for Daniel K. BROMUND would be that of a Rentista. In order to obtain Rentista status from the Mexican Government, it is necessary to show documents which prove that the applicant has an income of approximately $350 per month for a period of five years. On approval of this amendment, it is planned to open an account for Daniel K. BROMUND for the amount of $20,000 against which the bank will issue him a Letter of Credit which will permit him to draw against this account at the rate of $1,000 quarterly. This Letter of Credit will then be used to obtain Rentista status for BROMUND. This Letter of Credit will be held by the Station and will be passed to BROMUND for use once every three months. BROMUND will use this Letter of Credit, withdrawing his $1,000 quarterly, and will immediately deposit this money and the Letter of Credit with the Finance Officer at the Station. These deposits will be accounted for in the Station's accountings.

3. To protect the United States Government's interest, the necessary Declarations of Trust and/or Assignment of Interest as determined by the Finance Division will be executed and filed with the Monetary Branch, Finance Division.

ROBERT H. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

CHARLES AMBLE, WH/FI

COLLINS ALMON, WH/Staff/Chief

DATE

Attachments
1. Form 680 (quad)
2. Envelope w/true name

SECRET

14-00000

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMM-W-5390

SECRET CLASSIFICATION

HAPOX #564

50-6-32

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL - Administrative/LIFEAT
SPECIFIC - Procurement of Recorders

Reference: HMMA-8143 (KAPOK 1106), 2 October 1957

ACTION REQUIRED: Clarification of request for recorders.

1. Paragraph four, e, of reference contains a request for ten used EKOTAPE recorders. However, it is not clear whether this request is in addition to or in place of the request contained in MEXI 918, dated 9 August 1957. The recorders requested in MEXI 918 were forwarded to the Station under cargo numbers 20369 and 20370 on 16 and 17 September 1957 (see DIR 35369 and DIR 35748), and probably arrived at the Station after the referenced dispatch was written.

2. There are no used EKOTAPE recorders available at Headquarters for shipment to the Station. However, KURIOT has advised the Desk that should any used recorders become available at Headquarters or at other field stations, they will make every effort to send them to Mexico City. As the Station probably knows, EKOTAPE recorders are no longer manufactured.

3. KURIOT requested that the Station be informed that KURIOT appreciates the technical report contained in the reference. They will investigate further the technical problems experienced by the Station; the Station will be advised of any significant developments. KURIOT considers that six months use from the Revere heads, under LIFEAT operating conditions, is quite good.

4. In view of the unavailability of used EKOTAPE recorders and the recent shipment of ten new REVERE recorders, Headquarters will take no further action on the referenced request unless requested to do so by the Station.

Remove from Project KDMANGO
CS Classification: 50-6-32/1
JOB # 73-175/77
Box: 30 Fold: 4

RECORD COPY

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

(Releasing officer) (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

SECRET CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29 JUN 1949

50-6-32/1

AN / AB X / IN / PS / RI / DES NFD / FI / ARD

HMM-W-5390

16 October 1957

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/Support
1 - WH/Logistics
1 - TSS/ASD
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - RI
1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/LDPuckett:mjm

WH/Support

50-6-32/1

WH/Logistics

for J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

TSS/ASD Mr. Bartley

for R. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OPS - Projects Branch

CRYPTONYM: LIFEAT

DIVISION: Western Hemisphere

STATION: Mexico City

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

Name: [illegible]

Room: 2112 Barton Hall

Ext.: [illegible]

Date: 22 Jul 1957

1. The attached project outline is presented for renewal for the period 1 Jul 1957 through 30 June 1958. The project outline is accompanied by a review of LIFEAT activities during the past year.

2. In support of the renewal of Project LIFEAT there are attached memoranda prepared by CI/OPS/WH, EE/P and EE/C.

3. A brief historical resume of Project LIFEAT may be found in Section three of the project outline.

F. [illegible], C/WH/III

G. [illegible], WH/FI

C. [illegible], WH/Staff/Chief

J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

DATE

Attachments:
- Review of LIFEAT Project
- Revised LIFEAT PPO
- Form 600 in quad.
- Memoranda from CI/OPS/WH, EE/P and EE/C
- LIFEAT Project Approvals
- LICOOL Project Approvals
- Envelope containing true names of case officers and agents.

14-00000

REVIEW OF PROJECT LIFEAT TO
ACCOMPANY REQUEST FOR RENEWAL

1. Product of the Project

The Soviet Embassy

a. Soviet Commercial Activities

Reports submitted during the past year have conveyed a substantial amount of detail concerning Soviet economic and commercial policy in Mexico, and to a lesser extent, in adjacent areas. This information has reflected the types of products the Soviets are selling and purchasing in Mexico, the names of their intermediaries, details on prices, procedures used for arranging sales and purchases and the manner of affecting shipments. This information has been screened from extensive and prolonged coverage of Soviet Embassy commercial traffic and appears to be accurate and detailed. Within the past year traffic concerning the Soviet commercial office in Mexico has increased considerably and remains the Station's primary source for information on Soviet commercial activities. Pertinent examples of this type of information may be found in:

HMM-2176, dated 1 March 1957 "Tentative Deal for Ecuadorian Coffee" (CS-3-[illegible] File)

HMM-1973, dated 15 October 1956 "Mexican Exports to the USSR" (CS-[illegible] File)

HMM-1760, dated 19 October 1956, "Sale of Soviet Ferrous Metal in the U. S." (CS-[illegible] File)

b. Soviet Diplomatic Activities

Project LIFEAT coverage of Soviet diplomatic activities appears to have been quite thorough and enlightening during the past year. Reports submitted on these activities have indicated some relationships the Soviets are developing with the Mexican Government, with other Latin American governments, and with other foreign diplomatic representatives. LIFEAT operations have also established some facts concerning the relations among the Soviets, Poles and Czechoslovakians in Mexico City. Some indication has been received on the relations between the Soviets and the Yugoslavs. Reports of this type provide some evidence as to whom the Soviets seem to be engaged in a drive to establish contacts in various departments of the Mexican

-2-

Government and when they appear to be conducting a drive to cultivate other Latin American diplomats. The reactions of both the Mexicans and the Latin Americans to these advances are often shown in later traffic. Briefly, the Soviets do not seem to get a very good reception from the Latin Americans, but are well received by the diplomatic representatives of India and Indonesia. The reports have shown an improvement in Soviet relations with the Yugoslavs, which were practically non-existent for several years in Mexico City. The reports show further that the Soviets, Poles and Czechs have frequent business and social interchanges. The following reports are cited as examples of this type of information:

> HMM-2327, dated 16 January 1957, "Diplomatic Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, November 1956."

> HMM-2395, dated 6 February 1957, "Diplomatic Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, December 1956."

> HMM-2465, dated 27 February 1957, "Diplomatic Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, January 1957."

c. Soviet Cultural Activities

Information produced by LIEMPTY reflects in detail Soviet cultural activities in connection with publications, cultural institutes, travel of Mexicans to the USSR for cultural purposes, visits of Soviet cultural figures to Mexico and data concerning how their local arrangements are made. Examples of such reports are:

> HMM-2329, dated 18 January 1957, "Cultural and Propaganda Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, November 1956."

> HMM-2377, dated 30 January 1957, "Cultural and Propaganda Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, December 1956."

> HMM-2460, dated 27 February 1957, "Cultural and Propaganda Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, January 1957."

HMM-2326, dated 16 January 1957, "Visit of Soviet Artists to Mexico."

d. Soviet Military Activities

Monthly reports are prepared from LIFEAT information on contacts between Soviet and Mexican military personnel. They reflect the identities of the local military figures with whom the Soviets maintain contact and in most cases contain some data on the reasons for the contact. These reports are of particular interest to the U.S. service attaches in Mexico.

e. Movements of Soviet Officials

The arrivals and departures of Soviet officials have been reported in almost every instance during the past five years through LIFEAT coverage. Frequently the Station has determined forthcoming departures long before they took place by careful study and interpretation of LIFEAT materials indicating Soviet contacts with local clothiers and other merchants selling luxury items - it is the habit of Soviets, prior to departure from Mexico, to stock up on items which are not available in the USSR. This type of coverage is of particular interest to ONI/NAVY.

f. Soviet Embassy Contacts

Monthly reports of contacts by members of the Soviet diplomatic corps are compiled and submitted to Headquarters. These reports are of considerable value in planning agent operations against the Soviets. They are also of operational assistance in identifying local and foreign Communists with whom the Soviets maintain regular contact. The following reports are examples of this type of coverage:

HMM-2376, dated 30 January 1957, "Contacts of Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, December 1956."
(25-3 34,772 [illegible])

HMM-2459, dated 27 February 1957, "Contacts of Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, January 1957."
(25-3,2,5,2,[illegible])

g. Personality Reports on Soviet Officials

LIFEAT has been a very productive source for collecting personality information on Soviets. Such data as Soviet contacts, marital situations, official duties, etc., are of value in determining which officials may be susceptible to recruitment

and/or defection. A case in point would be the present Soviet Naval Attache, Grigori [illegible]. A recent study of his background and habits indicated that his wife might be vulnerable to recruitment because she was having amorous relations with one of her husband's subordinates. A sample of the personality report series may be found in [illegible], dated 1 May 1957, subject: "Boris Pavlovich [illegible]".

h. Goods and Services Provided to the Soviet Embassy

Periodic reports of the persons and institutions providing goods and services to the Soviet Embassy have been of considerable value in developing and mounting a [illegible] operation. This type of information is valuable in determining the identity of individuals having access to the Soviet Embassy who can later be recruited by the Station as controlled agents. [illegible]-2[illegible]2, dated 27 February 1957, subject: "Goods and Services Used by the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, December 1956 - January 1957", is an example of the Station's reporting of this type of operational information.

i. Miscellaneous Activities of the Soviet Embassy

LIENVOY material relating to the Soviet Embassy, which does not fit into any general category, is set forth each month in a series of reports on miscellaneous activities. These reports include such random information as banking transactions, landscaping activities, evidences of internal construction, etc. The following reports are cited as examples of this type of information:

HMM-2375, dated 30 January 1957, "Miscellaneous Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, December 1956."

HMM-2[illegible], dated 27 February 1957, "Miscellaneous Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, January 1957."

The Czech Legation

The information obtained on the Czech Legation during the past year is basically the same as the information obtained on the Soviet Embassy; consequently, to avoid repetition in this review, only the highlights of Czech Legation coverage are mentioned.

a. Data Pertaining to Czech Personnel

The LIENVOY collection effort in this connection has been productive. Reports have reflected personality data, official functions and domestic matters pertaining to Czech staff members and information suitable for use in planning defection approaches.

The following reports are cited as examples of this type of information:

HMM-1896, dated 28 September 1956, "Czech Legation Personnel."

HMM-1959, dated 17 October 1956, "Czech Legation Personnel."

HMM-2330, dated 18 January 1957, "Czech Legation Personnel."

b. Spot Reports on Czech Legation Activities

Spot reports are submitted periodically on matters of interest which pertain to the Czech Legation. Examples of these reports are:

HMM-1779, dated 10 September 1956, "Proposed Czech-Mexican Barter Transaction."
CS-104650

HMM-1814, dated 19 September 1956, "Travel of Czech Commercial Representatives."

HMM-1577, dated 9 October 1956, "Travel of Enrique CASTRO Garcia."
CS-107787

HMM-1987, dated 24 October 1956, "Czech Delegates to the XX International Congress of Geology."

Polish Legation

As with the Czech Legation, information pertaining to the Polish Legation parrallels closely the type of information reported about the Soviet Embassy. By far the largest amount of information obtained on the Polish Legation during the past year has resulted from LIFEAT coverage. Biographic information on Polish staff members has been forwarded to Headquarters. The following examples of spot reports were forwarded for Headquarters' dissemination:

HMM-1744, dated 29 August 1956, "Polish Legation Reception Commemorating 11th Anniversary of Day of Liberation."
CS-103442

HMM-1748, dated 31 August 1956, "Polish Legation Contacts with Polish Delegates to the Eighth International Radiology Congress."

HMM-2431, dated 20 February 1957, "Polish Legation Contacts with Carlos Augusto L..N (Venezuelan Communist)."

HMM-2532, dated 29 March 1957, "Release of Rosendo GOMEZ Lorenzo."

HMM-5941, dated 9 January 1957, "Julius KATZ-SUCHY."

Mexican Communist Party and Communist Fronts

A significant amount of information was received from LIFEAT during the past year concerning the Mexican Communist Party and Communist Party front organizations. The latter included information on the Circulo de Estudios Mexicanos, the Mexican Peace Movement, the Society of Friends of China and various art fronts. This information has been of value in supplementing agent coverage of these organizations. The following reports are examples of this type of information:

HMM-1657, dated 18 July 1956, "Narciso SO SOLS."

HMM-2285, dated 28 November 1956, "Xavier GUERRERO Saucedo and Clara Porset de GUERRERO."

American Communists in Mexico

One of the most extensive and productive coverages initiated through LIFEAT during the past year was directed against American Communists in Mexico. Most of these targets were covered at the request of ODENVY and the production was processed in part by ODENVY. A total of 342 reels of information were recorded on three separate cases. A fourth case, LCMAYFO-L, was mounted at the suggestion of ODENVY just 15½ hours after the Station received the request from Headquarters. The Station has received three commendations from Headquarters on the LIFEAT coverage of this case and Edward P. SECHEN received a personal commendation from the DCI for his work on this operation. Over 90 reels of valuable information have been produced since the beginning of this operation on 9 February 1957.

Mexican Government

During the early part of 1957 LIFEAT coverage provided the means for the Station to assess reports from another source concerning the hardening of the Mexican Government's attitude toward foreign Communists. LIFEAT coverage of various individual targets provided reliable information on the arrests of the foreign Communists Mario SOSA Navarro, Joaquin ORDOQUI, Jacobo

[illegible] Zender and [illegible] and tended to confirm data on the same matters obtained through other Station sources. LIENAT also added details which were not available to other Station sources, such as the names of the persons who sought to help those imprisoned. For example, LIENAT established that the Venezuelan Communist leader, [illegible] Morales, was the person holding the passport of Joaquin [illegible] at the time of his arrest; this fact, among others, makes [illegible] appear to be one of the most important foreign Communists in Mexico. The below listed reports contain information of this type:

HMM-A-6240, dated 6 March 1957

HMM-A-6242, dated 6 March 1957

HM -1769, para four, dated 12 September 1956, is cited as containing an apparently reliable report to the effect that in 1956 the Mexican president told the editor of one of Mexico's leading newspapers that he should play down or omit anti-U. S. articles and opinions.

LA[illegible] Information

LIENAT has contributed materially to several matters having LA[illegible] interest.

Counter Intelligence Information

CI/CE matters constitue a major portion of the Mexico City Station's priority objectives. Project LIENAT has contributed more leads and general information on the Soviet aspect of this subject than all other Station sources combined. A few representative samples of this type of information are listed below:

HMM-1958, dated 9 October 1956, and HMM-2286, dated 2 January 1957 describe contacts between Narciso BA[illegible], leading Mexican pro-Communist, and Viktor N. G[illegible], his Soviet case officer.

HMM-2420, dated 8 February 1957, sets forth arrangements for clandestine contact between Colonel Jesus de LEON Toral, of the Mexican General Staff College, with his Soviet case officer.

HMM-2270, dated 19 December 1956, sets forth contacts between Nikolay R[illegible], Soviet intelligence officer, and Jesus MAZ[illegible] Fernero, Mexican Naval officer.

H2-A-4463, dated 23 April 1956, and [illegible]-2276, dated 20 December 1956, describe a lengthy series of contacts between "Frans" H[illegible], an Ethiopian student in Mexico, and Boris P. K[illegible], Soviet intelligence officer.

Checks on Double Agents

Several of the Station's double agents have been monitored through LIFEAT while in contact with the Soviet [illegible], thereby enabling the Station to verify portions of their reports and hence providing means for establishing the veracity of the agents' reports to the Station. Among those monitored during the past year were LIBELER, LILM[illegible], LI[illegible] and LISTOCK-1.

Jewish Communist Activities

LIFEAT coverage of the Jewish Communist leader, Aaron Jose PRZYSWA Margulos, has provided information on the decline of the Jewish Communist movement and the relative inactivity of PRZYSWA in Communist matters.

Coverage of the Jewish Communist leader, Samuel [illegible] Bagidin, confirmed the decline of the local Jewish Communist movement and the final liquidation of its headquarters. It also produced the names of the few active members who continue to meet informally. It was of value in covering the arrest of Chone SHEINBAUM, a member of the Jewish Communist group, and the deportation of Jacobo HURWITZ Zender, known Communist agent.

Further, LIFEAT has established that the Liga Popular Israelita, a Jewish Communist front organization, is almost defunct and quite inactive.

Hidden Microphone Operation

One LI[illegible] type operation is presently active. It is directed against the residence of the Soviet Counselor of Embassy and has caused a great deal of concern with the technical problems of installing the equipment and recording conversations properly in order that acceptable production of operational data might be obtained. A TSS technician is presently at the Station correcting these deficiencies; and, recent cable reports have provided valuable information which tends to confirm previous tentative conclusions that the Soviet Counselor of Embassy is a suitable target for a concentrated defection approach. The Station is currently making the necessary plans to approach the target, having already received Headquarters' approval.

Conclusion

The Mexico City Station and the Headquarters Mexico Desk agree that the product of the LIENVOY Project measured against the expenditure of Agency assets in terms of personnel, time, security risks and funds well justifies its renewal. The information produced by this operation has contributed materially and substantially to several priority objectives of the Mexico City Station's Related Mission Directive.

2. Progress of the Operation

Definite progress has been made in reporting on the objectives of the LIENVOY project; however, all LIENVOY objectives are of a continuing nature and are not designed to be fully achieved. For this reason, no statistics can be cited as to the percentage of coverage on each objective. A general indication can be derived of the scope of the project by realizing that approximately 15,000 pages of summary text have been obtained from LIENVOY during the past year. An average of 23 simultaneous coverages on a 24 hour per day basis has been maintained during this review period. Generally, these coverages may be broken down as follows:

Soviet Embassy	8 lines
Czech Legation	2 lines
Polish Legation	2 lines
American Communists	3 lines
Remainder	8 lines

3. Planning for the Future

During the coming year Station capabilities will be expanded to permit monitoring approximately 30 lines. Basic coverage of Soviet, Czech and Polish activities will be continued to the maximum extent possible and assets and capabilities will be maintained for exploiting important targets of opportunity. At the present time the Station believes that 30 lines are about the maximum load the technical agents assigned to LIENVOY can properly handle and protect. The Station is currently preparing plans for submission to Headquarters which call for the establishment of a similar but separate and compartmented LIENVOY-type operation. Such a project would have new agents not previously associated with or knowledgeable about LIENVOY.

4. Performance of Agents

The Station has reported that in general the performance of the LIENVOY agents has been good during the past year. However, ~~some of the agents connected with the group based on the family~~

of the former head agent James [illegible] (deceased) have not been performing in a completely satisfactory manner. Those agents are gradually being replaced by new and fully compartmented agents. The Station continues to face recruitment problems, however, since the LIFEAT employment qualifications are quite rigid. The basic qualifications are:

a. Absolute discretion

b. Willingness to cover a base 24 hours daily for long periods of time.

c. Willingness to obey complex orders for long periods of time.

d. Willingness to live in a situation of constant danger.

Additional comments concerning the production, security and cover of individual agents will be found in the attached field project outline.

5. Expenditures During Period Under Review

Approval was granted for the period under review, 1 July 1956 - 30 June 1957, to expend $113,931. The total amount of funds obligated for Project LIFEAT during FY 1957 was $99,167. The proposed LIFEAT budget for FY 1958 is contained in the attached field project outline.

6. Status of Commitments

There are no commitments other than those provided for in the field project outline and the individual contracts of several LIFEAT personnel.

14-00000

PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM: LIFEAT

PART I

1. Area of Operations

This project will be run from the Mexico City Station. It will be concerned with targets located in Mexico City.

2. Purpose

The purpose of this project is to determine Sino-Soviet plans, activities and connections with other communist elements through the use of technical surveillance. This purpose appears to be in consonance with the Related Mission Directive for Mexico (dated 7 May 1957), Priority A, Objective One.

3. Background

Project LIFEAT was approved initially on 3 October 1950. Actual operations began on 18 January 1951 and have run continuously since that time. The LIFEAT operation was begun with the installation of one telephone tap and has expanded since that time to an average daily monitoring of 23 telephone lines and from one to four hidden microphone installations (the microphone operations were originally under a separate project—LIC[illegible]OL).

Project LIFEAT is a unilateral operation. It is completely independent from any liaison arrangement and is staffed by Agency staff and contract employees together with a substantial number of local indigenous controlled agents.

During the past six years Project LIFEAT has produced more than [illegible],000 pages of operational and intelligence information in direct support of the Mexico City Station's objectives specifically and has contributed materially to the intelligence gathering activities connected with the Sino-Soviet Bloc. In addition, Project LIFEAT has been of considerable value and assistance in monitoring the activities of Americans residing in Mexico City in which ODENVY has major interest.

4. References

a. HMMA-4503, 9 May 1956 (Station's request for renewal of LIFEAT Project.)

b. HDSW-3710, 19 November 1956 (Headquarters' notification to the Station of the renewal of the LIFEAT Project.)

5. <u>Objectives</u>

a. To identify Soviet and Satellite intelligence personnel and to collect information on the nature and extent of their clandestine intelligence and propaganda activities in Mexico.

b. To collect information on Soviet and Satellite commercial, diplomatic, cultural and military activities in Mexico.

c. To collect biographic information on Soviet and Satellite officials.

d. To collect information on the movements, assignments and positions of Soviet and Satellite personnel.

e. To identify and collect information on prominent Mexican Communist Party (PCM) officials.

f. To collect information on the plans and activities of the Mexican Communist Party (PCM).

g. To collect information on the activities of prominent Jewish Communists residing in Mexico.

h. To collect information on the activities of American Communists and other targets of opportunity living in Mexico.

6. <u>Targets</u>

For Objectives "a" - "d":

a. Selected Soviet Embassy and Commercial Office telephone conversations.

b. Telephone conversations from the residences of selected Soviet Officials.

c. Conversations emanating from the residences of selected Soviet Officials (hidden microphone installations).

d. Selected Czech Legation, Czech Commercial Office and Polish Legation telephone conversations.

e. Conversations emanating from the New Polish Legation (hidden microphone installations).

For Objectives "e" and "f":

f. Selected telephone conversations originating within the Mexican Communist Party (PCM) headquarters.

g. Telephone conversations from the residences of senior PCM and other Communist officials' residences.

For Objective "g":

h. Telephone conversations from the residences of selected Jewish Communists.

For Objective "h":

i. Telephone conversations from the residences of known American Communists.

j. Telephone conversations, and other conversations which can be monitored by technical means, of targets of opportunity.

7. Tasks

Senior Case Officer - Thomas G. URQUHART
Assistant Case Officer for LIMERICK phase - Arthur S. STOUGH

a. Supervise the operational and administrative activities of all LIFEAT staff, contract and indigenous personnel.

b. Maintain awareness and provide direction in all operational matters pertaining to the management of the LIFEAT Project.

c. Provide guidance and day-to-day supervision of the LIMERICK, LITHOSPHERE and LITHOGRAPHY phases of the LIFEAT Project.

d. Co-ordinate information received from LIMERICK with other Station operations.

e. Maintain LIFEAT capabilities for mounting operations against targets of opportunity.

Case Officer - Matthew S. UMOLEY

a. Provide guidance and day-to-day supervision of the LICOOL phase of the LIFEAT Project.

b. Conduct the training of all personnel assigned to the LICOOL phase.

c. Maintain LICOOL capabilities for mounting operations against targets of opportunity.

14-00000

d. Insure that all operational and intelligence information receives appropriate handling by the LI[illegible] personnel involved and, where appropriate, other Station personnel.

Case Officer - Harvey P. [illegible]

a. Provide guidance and day-to-day supervision of the LIVERY phase of the LIFEAT Project.

b. Conduct the training of all personnel assigned to the LIVERY phase.

c. Insure that all operations and intelligence information receives appropriate handling by the LIVERY personnel involved and where appropriate by Station personnel.

d. Co-ordinate information received from LIVERY with other Station operations.

Case Officer - (To be assigned later)

a. Provide guidance and day-to-day supervision of the LITMUS phase of the LIFEAT Project.

b. Conduct the training of all personnel assigned to the LITMUS phase.

c. Insure that all operations and intelligence information receives appropriate handling by the LITMUS personnel involved and where appropriate by Station personnel.

d. Co-ordinate information received from LIVERY with other Station operations.

The tasks of all other personnel assigned to the LIFEAT Project are stated or implied in Sections 9 and 11, below.

8. Co-ordination

a. Information produced by the LIFEAT Project is closely co-ordinated with all other operations at the Mexico City Station. No operational co-ordination is required with any other area, but they are kept informed of any information produced by the Project, which may be of interest to them.

b. Project LIMOC, which supports David E. WILSTED, who is the principal outside LIFEAT Case Officer, is effected in co-ordination with Project LIFEAT.

c. LIFEAT Project is co-ordinated with Project LI[illegible] under which LI[illegible] and LI[illegible]-1, who perform work for Project LIFEAT, are carried.

d. In specific instances this project is co-ordinated with O[illegible] representatives and activities in Mexico.

9. Personnel

The following persons will participate in the LIFEAT Project during Fiscal Year 1958.

a. Staff Agents:

(1) Ralph F. RAFANELLI, who is under unofficial commercial cover, acts as assistant Case Officer.

(2) Daniel K. BR[illegible], formerly a Staff Employee with SR Division, will be a Staff Agent with the Mexican Station to do translation of LI[illegible] material. He was granted a Security Approval on 23 February 1951. Until his arrival the Station is utilizing the Services of Rowland K. W[illegible] on a TDY basis.

b. Contract Agents/Employees:

(1) David H. WILSTED. With the death of James O. A[illegible] (p) in March 1956, WILSTED has become the principal outside Case Officer in the LIFEAT Project, and also assists with the processing of some of the LIFEAT material. He is supported by and is the only agent under Project LINOO which was approved on 24 May 1957. The purpose of the LINOO Project is to establish WILSTED as a long-term deep cover asset in Mexico City. WILSTED received an Operational Approval on 2 November 1951.

(2) Alice H. CAILLERE[illegible] does ZOMAR processing for LIFEAT material. She received a covert security approval on 28 May 1956.

(3) Olivia H. GLA[illegible] (LIGI[illegible]), is used to process LIFEAT tapes and prepare ZOMAR abstracts. She received an Operational Approval on 30 July 1956.

(4) Frances M. HE[illegible]ZIE does clerical work for Project LIFEAT. She received a covert security approval on 5 August 1955.

(5) Carol K. ZI[illegible]ISTER (LICALI[illegible]-1) processes a major part of the LI[illegible]RICK material. She received an Operational Approval on 3 June 1955.

(6) Louise J. MACRINO (LIENS[illegible]) will process LIFEAT material. She received an Operational Approval on 6 September 1955. A covert security approval is being requested.

c. Field Agents:

(1) LILACS, David M. W[illegible]'s wife, assists in translating and preparing reports from LIFEAT material. She received an Operational Approval on 28 September 1954.

(2) LIMESTONE-1 is a base house operator. He received an Operational Approval on 11 September 1953 and has an oral contract effective 1 October 1953.

(3) LIMESTONE-2 is an assistant base house operator. He received an Operational Approval on 25 November 1953 and has an oral contract effective 1 December 1953.

(4) LIMESTONE-3 is a base house operator. He received an Operational Approval on 29 December 1953 and has an oral contract effective 1 October 1953.

(5) LIMESTONE-4 is a base house operator. He received an Operational Approval on 21 October 1954 and has an oral contract effective 1 November 1954.

(6) LIMESTONE-5 is an assistant base house operator. He received an Operational Approval on 21 March 1955.

(7) LIMESTONE-7, wife of the late James O. AYCALL, has been used as a base house operator. She received an Operational Approval on 3 July 1956.

(8) LIMESTONE-8 is an assistant base house operator and processor of tapes. She received an Operational Approval on 27 April 1956.

(9) LIMESTONE-9 received an Operational Approval on 13 September 1956.

(10) LIMESTONE-10, wife of LIMESTONE-3, received an Operational Approval on 13 September 1956.

(11) LIMEWATER is an employee of Telefonos de Mexico, local telephone company. He provides the basic information necessary for running the Project. He received an Operational Approval on 17 October 1950 and has an oral contract effective 1 October 1950.

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(12) LIMITATION-1 is charged with aspects of the technical portion of the operation. He received an Operational Approval on 14 August 1951 and has an oral contract effective 1 October 1953.

(13) LIMITATION-2, works with and has duties similar to his cousin, LIMITATION-1. He received an Operational Approval on 11 December 1953 and has an oral contract effective 1 January 1954.

(14) LIMITATION is a base house operator. He received Operational Approval on 3 April 1951 and 30 September 1952 and is under an oral agreement effective 1 May 1951.

(15) LIMITATION-3, LIMITATION's father, is an assistant base house keeper and processor of LIFEAT material. He received an Operational Approval on 1 October 1953 and is under an oral contract effective 1 November 1953.

(16) LIMITATION-5 is a base house operator. He received an Operational Approval on 15 February 1954 and on 20 August 1954. He is under an oral agreement effective 1 March 1954.

(17) LIMITATION-6 assists LIMITATION-5, her husband, with the base house. She received an Operational Approval on 3 January 1956.

(18) LIMITATION-7 is an assistant base house operator. He received an Operational Approval on 13 August 1956.

(19) LIPSTICK-18 is a base house operator. He received Operational Approvals on 31 March 1955 and 25 October 1955 and is under an oral agreement effective November 1954.

(20) LIPSTICK-35 is an assistant base house operator and is the wife of LIPSTICK-18. She received an Operational Approval on 6 August 1956.

(21) LIPSTICK 37, a relative of LIPSTICK-18, is an assistant base house operator. She received an Operational Approval on 13 September 1956.

(22) LIQUATION has been a base house operator and may retire during the coming project year. He received an Operational Approval on 16 December 1953 and is under an oral contract effective 1 January 1954.

(23) LIQUATION-1, LIQUATION's brother, is a base house operator. He received an Operational Approval on 26 September 1955.

(24) LIQUATION-2, wife of LIQUATION, is a base house operator. She received an Operational Approval on 21 August 1956.

(25) LI[illegible]-3 is an assistant base house operator and processor of LIENVOY material. She received an Operational Approval on 19 January 1957.

(26) Unwitting assistant to LI[illegible] for routine office work.

LI[illegible] and LI[illegible]-1, who handle Czech languages tapes for the LI[illegible] Project, are included under the LI[illegible] Project since the translation of the material and application of it to Czech operations are considered LI[illegible] functions. LI[illegible] received an Operational Approval on 3 July 1951 and his wife, LI[illegible]-1, received one on 5 May 1952.

O[illegible]'s local office processes certain tapes from targets of primary interest to them.

There are a total of 41 persons who work full and part time on the LIENVOY Project. It is expected that two more processors and one additional technician will be added during Fiscal Year 1958.

d. Personnel Dropped from the Project:

The following Staff Agents returned to Headquarters on PCS during the last project year: Lewis [illegible]. NICKLAS, Chester [illegible]. P[illegible]IC VE, and Norman F. WANGE OW.

LIPSTICK 13 left Mexico City.

10. Operational Clearances

See item 9.

11. Cover

(1) Ralph B. RAFAELLI: Fully documented employee of LIFINGER, who has in the past provided similar cover for undercover agents.

(2) Daniel K. BROWN[illegible]: The Station is in the process of arranging [illegible]'s cover.

(3) David S. WILSTE[illegible]: Partner in small family-run machinery business. His Mexican documentation is complete and legitimate.

(4) Alice H. CAILLETEAU: Housewife

(5) Olivia S. GLAD[illegible]: Retired woman residing with daughter and known to have independent income from retirement from former job.

(6) Frances M. MENZIE: Housewife

(7) Carol E. ZINSMEISTER: Housewife

(8) Louise J. MACHADO: Housewife, wife of LIPSTICK-19

(9) LILACK: Housewife

(10) LIMESTONE-1: She is an elderly person and hence can logically have an income from family estate. Does not attract attention.

(11) LIMESTONE-2: Brother of LIMESTONE-1 and resides with her. Is elderly and can pass as a poor relative and retainer.

(12) LIMESTONE-3: Has been engaged in obtaining small government contracts and moves in and out of various government offices. Unfortunately his cover is not really good and steps must be taken to improve it if he is to remain in our employ.

(13) LIMESTONE-4: Elderly woman who has had large business enterprises in the past and who does not need to explain her source of income for this reason.

(14) LIMESTONE-5: Father-in-law of LIMESTONE-3 and ostensibly dependent on him.

(15) LIMESTONE-7: Widow of James O. AYCALL, who was widely regarded as a man of means. Hence she ostensibly lives on his estate. This woman has a tendency to live beyond her means, however, and is a cause for anxiety.

(16) LIMESTONE-8: Relative of LIMESTONE-4. They reside together. This agent is a widow and ostensibly lives on an inheritance.

(17) LIMESTONE-9: Housewife

(18) LIMESTONE-10: Housewife

(19) LIMEWATER: His natural cover is of employee of the local telephone company, which he has been for a number of years.

(20) LIMEWATER-1: Enjoys natural cover as a telephone company employee.

(21) LIMEWATER-2: Enjoys natural cover as a telephone company employee.

(22) LIMITATION: He is an architect and follows an almost full time career in that business while his relatives manage the LI[illegible] Base.

(23) LIMITATION-3: Very elderly retired person who formerly had a large business and whose income therefore is not open to question.

(24) LIMITATION-5: Accountant with a large firm.

(25) LIMITATION-6: Wife of LIMITATION-5. She handles most of the routine work LIMITATION-5 has done for the Station in the past.

(26) LIMITATION-7: Housewife

(27) LIPSTICK-18: This agent's cover, that of plumber and electrician is not satisfactory. It appears, however, that he may be put into another type of operation sometime this year.

(28) LIPSTICK-35: Housewife

(29) LIPSTICK-37: Dependent relative of LIPSTICK-18.

(30) LIQUATION: Businessman with office in the city. He spends a good deal of time on selling machinery while LIQUATION-2 and LIQUATION-3 mind the base.

12. Contact and Communications

a. Contact and communications between the case officer and the agents and undercover personnel in this operation is maintained in a clandestine manner. Various patterns have been established by which the agents and the case officers follow prearranged signals for the meetings. When heavy or bulky material is to be passed, the meetings are always held at nights. All movement in and out of bases by the Case Officers and Principal Agents is done in cars ostensibly owned by the base agents, except in the case of LIVERY, where the agents are too old to drive. One of the local agents is usually used to contact the LIVERY base. Entrance to the bases by foot is made only in great emergencies.

b. Telephonic contact concerning the Project is kept to a minimum and a code system of digits and cryptonyms has been devised for use by the agents and case officers for phone conversations.

c. Alternate and emergency signals have been worked out.

d. In general these systems of contact and communication have been in practice for over six years and appear to have been suitable to the work. In detail, locations and times of meetings have been changed frequently.

13. Control and Motivation

The indigenous agents on this project are motivated by the

following factors:

a. The LI[illegible]ATER group: Motivated by high salaries and LI[illegible], himself, by pro-[illegible] feelings. One of his sons is at present studying there. They are further controlled by fear of police action.

b. The LI[illegible]T[illegible] group: Motivated by family loyalty, good salaries and pro-[illegible] outlook. They are further controlled by fear of police action.

c. The LIMITATION group: Motivated by pro-[illegible] sentiments, LIMITATION being a [illegible] citizen and LIMITATION-3 having resided there for many years.

d. The LIPSTICK group: Motivated by family loyalties, good salaries and personal loyalty to LIPSTICK.

e. The LIQUATION group: Motivated by family loyalty and good salary. LIQUATION, himself, is anti-Communist. Control is ideological and monetary.

14. Equipment and Support

It is believed that the supply of equipment for LIFEAT currently at the Station is sufficient to carry the operation through the calendar year 1957, but it is possible that simultaneous breakdown of quantities of the older equipment, dating from 1951 and in constant use since then, would necessitate the placing of separate orders for replacements.

15. Timetable

LIFEAT has been in almost constant operation since its inception in January 1951 and it is planned to continue it indefinitely.

PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM LIF[illegible]AT

PART II

14. Estimated Costs

The following costs are estimated for FY 1958. All figures are in U. S. dollars per year. LIF[illegible]AT costs will be higher than in the past because of rises in the cost of living (especially increased rents) and intended expansion.

a. Salaries

1. Staff and Contract personnel:

Ralph B. RAFANELLI, GS-7	Salary	$4,525.00		
	Quarters	2,000.00		
			6,525.00	
~~Unnamed~~ Daniel K. Bromond LIMERICK processor (GS-12)	Salary	7,570.00		
	Quarters	2,200.00		
	PCS Travel	2,000.00		
			11,770.00	
~~Unnamed LITOCK translator~~ Included under New Project Besmooth	~~Salary~~	~~6,500.00~~		
	~~Quarters~~	~~2,000.00~~		
	~~PCS Travel~~	~~2,000.00~~		
			~~10,500.00~~	
Carol K. ZIMMEISTER	Salary	5,400.00	5,400.00	
Frances M. MENZIE	Salary	2,504.00	2,504.00	
Alice H. CAILLETEAU	Salary	2,425.00	2,425.00	
Olivia H. GLADMON	Salary	3,880.00	3,880.00	
Louise J. MACRINO	Salary	3,360.00	3,360.00	~~46,364.00~~ 35,864.00

X.N.

2. Field agents

	Presently	
LIMEWATER	5280.00	
LIMEWATER-1	2208.00	
LIMEWATER-2	1440.00	
LIMESTONE-1	1440.00	
LIMESTONE-2	576.00	
LIMESTONE-3	2208.00	
LIMESTONE-4	22 8.00	
LIMESTONE-5	768.00	
LIMESTONE-7	1538.00	
LIMESTONE-8	1728.00	
LIMITATION	2112.00	
LIMITATION-3	1920.00	
LIMITATION-5 (not hired yet)		
LIQUATION	3840.00	
LIQUATION-1	3840.00	
LIQUATION-3	768.00	
LI TICK-18	1728.00	
LILACE ($2.02 per hour, 120 hrs. per month)	2504.00	
LIMEWATER assistant	144.00	
Possible raises	2000.00	
Christmas bonus and presents (One month salary to each agent, in accordance local custom. Also special gifts in some cases)	3000.00	41,250.00

b. Base house rentals, utilities and expenses

LIMERICK base house	2050.00	
LITHUS base house	2000.00	
LIVERY base house	2000.00	
LITHOSPHERE base house	2000.00	
LCMAYFOWL base house	1800.00	
Proposed base house	2900.00	
LIPMAT base shop	2000.00	
Proposed base house	2700.00	
Proposed base house	2800.00	
LICOOL-6 base	600.00	
Proposed LICOOL base	600.00	
		21,450.00

c. Equipment

Local purchase of emergency and special equipment	5,000.00	5,000.00

d. Miscellaneous

1. Supplies (paper rolls, wire, tubes, tape, pens, parts)	2,000.00	2,000.00
2. Transportation		
LIM[illegible]ICK car rent	300.00	
Carol K. [illegible] mileage	350.00	
LITMU[illegible] base car rental	700.00	
LIV[illegible]Y base car rental	700.00	
LITHO[illegible] base car rental	400.00	
(MV 2047)	1440.00	
Proposed base car rental	700.00	
		4,590.00
3. Other Operational Expenses (To cover loss of deposits on rents, fatalities and other serious emergencies, separation payments, medical expenses, emergency moving bills; and to cover targets of opportunity)		20,000.00
Grand Total		~~110,654.00~~ 130,154.00

17. Special Problems and Commitments

None not reflected in the Project Outline

DESENSITIZED
Per CSN 43-43

VIA: AIR (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. HMM-A-7370

#1012

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WH Division

DATE: 12 July 1957

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

MICROFILMED
JAN 2 1962
DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE

SUBJECT: GENERAL— LIFEAT/Operational

SPECIFIC— Operations report for June 1957

REF: HMM-A-7141

The following report is keyed to the headings required in FN 52-670 sec 3c2.

a. Processing of information: No change. The LCMAYFOWL phase of the operation was live monitored all day and during the early evening hours. A large number of ZOMAR abstract sheets, made out by Olivia Gladmon and Alice Gailleteau, were forwarded to Headquarters. Gladmon was also used on the processing of the Maurice HALPERIN target. During June the new system of making numerous carbon copies of the traffic was further developed and hence more copies were made available for clipping and putting into "P" (201) files. Routine reporting on monthly developments, particularly pertaining to the LIMERICK phase, was continued on the same basis as in the past.

b. Exploitation of leads: Leads connected with the visit of the alleged Communist agent Jacobo MUCHNIK, from Argentina were followed through the Maurice HALPERIN line and were coordinated with other activities on the case. From LIFEAT coverage it was also ascertained that LCMAYFOWL was in contact with Boris P. KOLOMYAKOV, RIS case officer stationed at the Soviet Embassy. This knowledge, obtained by voice recognition of KOLOMYAKOV in a single contact with the LCMAYFOWL target, resulted in the mounting of a physical surveillance of the LCMAYFOWL target which confirmed the existence of the contact and enable the station to derive further information of importance. In a third instance, LIFEAT contact between a Mexican Army officer and an RIS officer enabled the station to make plans to cover a meeting between them scheduled for 3 July 1957. Finally, coverage of LIMERICK targets commercial lines enabled the station to direct various investigations which resulted in the identification of several commercial contacts of that establishment.

c. Liaison: Not applicable.

d. Security: Security on the project remained without substantial change. Nothing further has developed from the alleged blackmail plot of April 1957. On the other hand, the activities of the local telephone company, which is now more solvent than in many years because of a new financial setup, continued to cause problems and temporary suspensions of work. LITMUS was not run during the entire month and the Maurice HALPERIN phase was suspended after about a week's operation owing to the presence of telephone crews in the same block as the base house as well as at other points along the LITMUS segment of the net. It was observed

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CLASSIFICATION

50-6-32/1

that the telephone crew had the habit of putting a high ladder up to the roof of any house upon which they wished to work, whereas in the past it had been their custom to ring the doorbell, ask permission to go to the roof and do so through the house where they wished to work. This new custom brought about the need to study emergency procedures and redraw them. A limited experiment was made on one line with some success. This experiment consisted of leaving the hot stub of one line on the base roof as usual, but instead of leading it directly into the operations room, as previously, it was attached loosely to a lead-in made of softer wire of the type used for interior installations. In the moment of need, the base operator had merely to haul on the soft lead, which therewith parted from the outside wire. Upon reaching the roof, therefore, the telephone men found only a stub ending in random fashion. This emergency method is considered better than none but is satisfactory for no more than one line at a time. It is the further disadvantage in that the outside wire stub is "hot" and could be checked by the telephone crew who, as they have done in the past on a few occasions, might call the target on that hot stub to see where he was located. In general, the station continues to recommend that when telephone crews are working near a base or along its net, crosses should be pulled and the operation suspended till the crews have left the neighborhood. An exception was made in the Halperin case because it was hoped the line would shed light on LCMAYFOWL.

e. Technical: No technical problems were encountered in June 1957.

f. Personnel and Administrative: No problems of a personnel or administrative nature were noted.

g. Miscellaneous: LIFEAT Annex IV was rented early in June and is being readied for use on three to five targets during July. LIMERICK Annex II is still out of service owing to the absence of LICATION and the continuance of work in the zone by the telephone company. LIVERY is out of service owing to the retirement of LIMESTONES 1 and 2 from active duty on account of the alleged blackmail plot of April 1957. LIMERICK Annex III is out of service and will not be recommissioned. One of its LIMERICK target lines was changed over to LIMERICK main base on 28 June. The other two lines from Annex III should be installed at LIMERICK main base during July.

During June 1957 the following lines were monitored part or full time:

7 - LIMERICK office lines out of 8 existing. Two were suspended for some two weeks because of the telephone company activity in their zone.
2 - LITHOSPHERE lines
1 - LCMAYFOWL line
1 - Maurice HALPERIN line (for about a week only)

During June the following cables, HMMs and informational HMMAs were based entirely or in part on LIFEAT:

50-6-32/1

MEXI 487
MEXI 498
MEXI 507
MEXI 523
MEXI 525
MEXI 528
MEXI 554
MEXI 563
MEXI 564
MEXI 565
MEXI 578
MEXI 579
MEXI 580
MEXI 581
MEXI 589

MEXI 592
MEXI 595
MEXI 601
MEXI 610
MEXI 618
MEXI 626
MEXI 625
MEXI 627
MEXI 628
MEXI 629
MEXI 634
MEXI 636
MEXI 657
MEXI 659
MEXI 662

HMM-2697
HMM-2698
HMM-2699
HMM-2700
HMM-2713
HMM-2719
HMM-2732
HMM-2734
HMM-2735
HMM-2736
HMM-2745
HMM-2746
HMM-2747
HMM-2757
HMM-2761

HMMA-7102
HMMA-7147
HMMA-7196
HMMA-7204
HMMA-7207
HMMA-7232
HMMA-7237
HMMA-7259
HMMA-7267
HMMA-7281
HMMA-7290
HMMA-7300

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C. CURTIS

TGU/ewf
11 July 1957

Distribution:
3 - Hqs
2 - Files

9 July 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/3 Mexico

SUBJECT: Project LIFEAT

REFERENCE: Memorandum for Chief, EE/Czechoslovakia from Chief, WH, subject as above, dated 3 July 1957

The LIVERY phase of Project LIFEAT continues to provide considerable biographic data on the members of the Czech Legation in Mexico City, which EE/Czechoslovakia finds most useful in the evaluation of these individuals as possible targets for recruitment, either in Mexico City or upon their assignment to another overseas post. For this reason EE/Czechoslovakia is interested in seeing Project LIFEAT renewed.

PHILO DIBBLE
AC/EE/C

SECRET

9 July 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH

SUBJECT: Project LIFEAT/LITMUS

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 3 July 1957 concerning the renewal of Project LIFEAT for the period 1 July 1957 through 30 June 1958. The LITMUS portion of this project is of primary interest to the Polish Branch, and as part of the increasing priority of KUBARK interest in Poland and Polish targets, it is strongly recommended that the project be continued.

2. This reaffirmation of our interest in LITMUS is based on the coverage it afforded up to December 1956 at which time the case officer/monitor handling LITMUS departed Mexico. This coverage was mainly of operational value in providing the following types of information:

(a) indications of Legation plans to move which lead to the station's investigating the possibilities of installing microphones in strategic places which would have immeasurably improved our knowledge of Polish activities in Mexbo.

(b) Legation security practices which are useful in predicting or interpreting changes elsewhere.

(c) Repatriation effort which has been of interest in itself and is of potential value in determining what part of this effort is connected with the PIS activity in Mexico.

(d) Travel and other information concerning the TDY presence in Mexico of important PIS personalities which assists in the world wide coverage of these individuals.

(e) Some information about the PIS representatives assigned to the Legation.

(f) Confirmatory information concerning some basic aspects of developmental activities such as LIMETRIC.

(g) Biographic and personality information in varying degrees of completeness about each of the individuals

SECRET

assigned to the Legation and some indication as to their activities and contacts. This data is most useful in assisting in the assessment and selection of these individuals as potential recruitment targets.

(h) Positive intelligence concerning commercial, cultural/propaganda, and diplomatic activities of the Legation personnel. The fact that the disseminations have been relatively few, is due to the usual limitations inherent in this type of audio operation.

3. The method of reporting information from LITMUS (separate reports on Legation officials and on the various subjects of interest) has been extremely well done and most useful to EE/P in assessing any specific personality, or an operational situation. It is hoped that with this basic information from LITMUS now available in each case, the station will be able to put the operational leads to use. Our recommendation for the continuance of LITMUS is based on the assumption that KUBARK operations in Mexico against the Poles will now be aimed primarily at the clarification of the status of the PIS in Mexico, the recruitment of Polish officials within the Legation, and answering the basic question of what the Poles are doing in Mexico. It is believed that LITMUS is essential to the support of this effort.

4. As an example of our interest in Mexico and LITMUS, it is pointed out that a Satellite case officer from the EE Division is currently preparing to depart for Mexico. It is also planned that a Polish speaking contract agent, experienced in Polish operations including monitoring audio efforts, will be sent to Mexico in the near future to work on LITMUS and to assist this case officer.

PETER K. HEIMANN
Chief, EE/P

14-00000

SECRET

3 July 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/CPS

ATTENTION : Mr. Robert Brown

SUBJECT : Project LIFEAT

1. The WH/Mexico Desk is now in the process of requesting the annual renewal of Project LIFEAT for the period 1 July 1957 - 30 June 1958.

2. During the past year a considerable amount of operational and intelligence information from the LINAYFOWL phase of this project has been forwarded to your office. In view of the pending project renewal, it would be appreciated if you would forward to the WH/Mexico Desk at your earliest convenience a memorandum evaluating this project with regard to your area and sphere of interest.

for J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

SECRET

SECRET

3 July 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, EE/Poland

SUBJECT : Project LIFEAT

1. The WH/Mexico Desk is now in the process of requesting the annual renewal of Project LIFEAT for the period 1 July 1957 - 30 June 1958.

2. During the past year a considerable amount of operational and intelligence information from the LIDMUS phase of this project has been forwarded to your office. In view of the pending project renewal, it would be appreciated if you would forward to the WH/Mexico Desk at your earliest convenience a memorandum evaluating this project with regard to your area and sphere of interest.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

WH/III/Mexico/LDPuckett:mjm

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - Subject

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

3 July 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, EE/Czechoslovakia

SUBJECT : Project LIFEAT

1. The WH/Mexico Desk is now in the process of requesting the annual renewal of Project LIFEAT for the period 1 July 1957 - 30 June 1958.

2. During the past year a considerable amount of operational and intelligence information from the LIVERY phase of this project has been forwarded to your office. In view of the pending project renewal, it would be appreciated if you would forward to the WH/Mexico Desk at your earliest convenience a memorandum evaluating this project with regard to your area and sphere of interest.

for J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

SECRET

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL [X] SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/III/Mexico

NO.

DATE 26 June 1957

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECD	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/Mexico/LSulc	27 JUN 1957		JJ	
2. C/WH/Mexico		1957		
3. C/WH/III	1 July	1	D	
4.				
5. WH/Staff/Chief	1 Jul	1	CW	
6.				
7. C/WHD	1 Jul	1	CW	
8.				
9.				
10. FI/OPS - Projects Branch ATTN: Miss Emma Paxson	2 JUL 1957	5 JUL 1957	EP	Attachment being held by your office.
11. WH-Mexico				PROJECT ACTION RECEIVED FI/OPS/Projects Branch 2 July, 1957
12.				
13.				
14.				10 & 11 returned per conversation with Mr. Pept(?) Since this is not to be effective until August, we will have to await project renewal
15.				

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS [X] SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

26 June 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OPS - Projects Branch

SUBJECT : Amendment to Project LIFEAT

1. It is requested that Project LIFEAT be amended, effective 15 August 1957, to permit Daniel K. BROMUND (ps) to replace Lewis D. NICKLAS (ps).

2. BROMUND will monitor LIFEAT coverage and will process the resultant reels. He will be employed in translation and the preparation of reports based on this translation. He will also be employed in analysis of LIFEAT production and the preparation of special reports written on his analysis.

for J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

APPROVED: ____________________
Chief, FI/OPS

Attachment:
1 Envelope containing true names

SECRET

VIA AIR (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO [illegible]-7053
[illegible]-986

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 5 June 1957

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational
SPECIFIC— Project Plan - LIFEAT

1. The attached Project Plan for LIFEAT is submitted for Headquarters approval and renewal.

2. It will be noted that the attached plan calls for an expansion in coverage and additional personnel.

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C. CURTIS

4 June 1957

TGU/gfb

Cryptonyms - and in some cases real (target) names - have been used in the attached because of the difficulties in writing a [illegible] with numerous identities.
WC

Attachments:

1. Herewith left portion odd-numbered pages
2. UNDER SEPARATE COVER left portion even-numbered pages
3. UNDER SEPARATE COVER right portion odd-numbered pages
4. UNDER SEPARATE COVER right portion even-numbered pages

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Distribution:

3 - HQS(w/5 sets atts)

Remove from Project KDMANEO
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CLASSIFICATION

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ATT HMMA 7063

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CRYPTONYM: LIENAT   FIELD CASE OFFICERS: Thomas S. URQUHART
Matthew S. DINGLEY
Harvey P. D[illegible]HOLZ
Not present

STATION: Mexico City   CHIEF OF STATION: Willard C. CURTIS

1. The attached Field Project Outline is submitted for approval for the Fiscal Year 1958. In accordance with Field Instruction No. 236-1, 7(d), (dated 23 October 1953), the following information is submitted.

Product of the basic project

During the current fiscal year production from LIENAT has been quite voluminous. The Soviet phase alone has accounted for some 6,000 pages of summary text and constitutes somewhat less than half the coverage yielded by the total project. The following general categories of information have been developed through LIENAT and are cited below with a few examples of production(see references to specific reports and dispatches in the following paragraphs).

2. The Soviet Embassy

Information on the Soviet Embassy derived from LIENAT has been voluminous and extensive reports have been furnished on the following matters:

a. Soviet Commercial Activities.

Reports such as HMM-2498, 8 March 1957; HMM-2054, 6 November 1956; and HMM-1975, 19 October 1956 have conveyed a substantial amount of month-to-month detail concerning Soviet economic and commercial policy and actions in Mexico and to a lesser extent in adjacent areas. This information reflects the types of products the Soviets are selling or purchasing in the area, the names of their intermediaries, details on prices, manner of arranging deals, and manner of effecting shipments. This information was screened out and briefed from extensive and prolonged coverage of Soviet Embassy commercial traffic and appears to be fully authentic as well as rich in detail. Reference is also made to HMM-2476, 1 March 1957(Tentative Deal for Ecuadorian Coffee); HMM-1973, 18 October 1956(Mexican Exports to the USSR); and HMM-1760, 18 October 1956(Sale of Soviet Ferrous Metal in the US) as examples of specific spot reports based on information derived from the same source. During the past year traffic concerning the Soviet commercial office in Mexico has increased a great deal and remains this Station's primary source on all such matters.

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b. Soviet Diplomatic Activities

Reference is made to HMM-2327, HMM-2395 and HMM-2465 as examples of the type of monthly reports now being submitted relative to the diplomatic activities of the Soviet Embassy. These reports, based almost entirely on LIFEAT, indicate some relationships the Soviets are developing with the Mexican Government, with other Latin American governments, and with other foreign diplomatic representatives. They also shed some light on the relations between the Soviets, Poles and Czechs in Mexico City; and even on the relationships between the Soviets and the Yugoslavs. Reports of this type show when the Soviets seem to be engaged in a drive to establish contacts in various departments of the Mexican Government and when they appear to be conducting a drive to cultivate Latin American diplomats. The reactions of both the Mexicans and the Latin Americans to these advances are often shown in the corresponding traffic. The Soviets, in general, do not seem to get a very good reception from the Latin Americans, but on the other hand, LIFEAT shows that they are well received by the diplomatic representatives of India and Indonesia. The diplomatic reports have also shown an improvement of relations with the Yugoslavs(which were non-existent for several years here). The traffic and reports further show that the Soviets, Poles and Czechs have frequent interchange and other join in days of sport or other entertainment.

c. Cultural and Propaganda Activities

HMM-2329, HMM-2377 and HMM-2460 are cited as examples of the monthly summaries of Soviet cultural activities based on LIFEAT materials. They reflect in detail Soviet activities in connection with publication, cultural institutes, travel of Mexicans to the USSR for cultural purposes, visits of Soviet cultural figures to Mexico and data concerning how their local arrangements are made. HMM-2326 is cited as an example of a separate report on the visit of some Soviet musicians to Mexico.

d. Contacts of the Soviet Embassy

HMM-2376 and HMM-2459 are examples of monthly summaries of contacts of the Soviet Embassy. These are of value in planning agent operations against the Soviets since they list various contacts known to be maintained by them. This type of report also lists the local and foreign Communists with whom the Soviets are in contact each month, together with a description of the nature of the contact when known.

e. Miscellaneous Activities of the Soviet Embassy

LIFEAT material relating to the Soviet Embassy, which does not fit into any general category, is set forth each month in a series of reports on miscellaneous activities. These reports include such random information

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as banking transactions, landscaping activities, evidences of internal construction, etc. Examples of this type of report are HM-2375 and HM-2446.

f. Military Activities of the Soviet Embassy

HM-2391 and HM-2450 are examples of monthly reports of Soviet contacts with Mexican military circles and are derived almost entirely from LIFEAT. They reflect the identities of the local military figures with whom the Soviets maintain contact and in most cases contain at least some data on the reasons for the contact. These reports are of considerable interest to American service attaches in Mexico.

g. Goods and Services of the Soviet Embassy

HM-2452 is an example of periodic reporting on the persons and institutions providing goods and services to the Soviet Embassy. These reports have been of particular interest in developing the LIMESA Project and resulted in the making of a contact in the cleaning business through which this Station obtained entry for one of its agents into the Embassy. (Cf HMM-A-6872).

h. Personality Reports on Soviet Officials

HMMA-6851 is a sample of a series of personality reports on Soviet officers prepared mainly from LIFEAT materials. LIFEAT reflects varying amounts of information on the Soviets. Some are frequently heard and much data accumulated on their contacts, marital situations, official duties, etc. These data have been used on occasion for studying possible defection pitches and will probably be used more in the future. In the case of the current Soviet Naval Attache, Grigori NIKIFOROVS, his habits were studied mainly through LIFEAT and note was made that his wife might be vulnerable because she was having amorous relations with one of her husband's subordinates. (MEXI 524; MEXI 495; MEXI 447).

i. Movements of Soviet Officials

The arrivals and departures of Soviet officials have more often been ascertained through LIFEAT than through any other source. The Station has been able to advise of movements out of Mexico through LIFEAT in almost every case where such travel took place in the past five(5) years. Frequently the Station has received notice of movement long before it took place by studying contacts of the Soviets with local clothiers, etc. since it has been the Soviet custom to stock up on clothing and various luxuries prior to leaving Mexico. The arrivals of many Soviets have been learned of only through LIFEAT, even in a number of cases when the Soviets travelled

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through the U.S. HMMI-853, 4 March 1957, is an example of this type of coverage. Notice of this arrival first appeared in the traffic on 26 February 1957. HMM-A-6842 is referred to as an example of this Station's coverage of unusual Soviet "courier" travel, in part based on LIFEAT.

j. Various Spot Reports

HMM-2081, describing the Soviet Embassy reception of 7 November 1956, is cited as an example of numerous spot reports on Soviet Embassy activites on which information was obtained mainly or entirely through LIFEAT. These reports are also put out to cover the travel of Soviets in the country of Mexico(HMMI-907, travel of Pavel IATSKOV, Soviet Consul, to Nuevo Laredo on 11 March 1957).

3. Czech Legation

LIFEAT has provided considerable information on the Czech Legation during the past year. The information thus obtained is roughly parallel to that obtained on the Soviet Embassy, and periodic general summaries have been forwarded in HMM-1605, HMM-1632, HMM-1693, HMM-1997, HMM-1747, HMM-2349 and others.

a. Personnel data

Personnel data on staff members of the Czech Legation have been forwarded in such reports as HMM-1896, HMM-1959, HMM-2330 and others. This data has been of use not only in reflecting personality data, official functions and domestic matters pertaining to Czech staff members but also in planning defection approaches.

b. Spot Reports

From time to time spot reports on matters of especial interest in connection with the Czech Legation have been forwarded, among which reference is made to the following entirely or partially based on LIFEAT:

HMM-1779, Proposed Barter Transaction;
HMM-1814, Travel of Czech Commercial Representatives;
HMM-1935, Vera Marie PLASILOVA;
HMM-1977, Travel of Enrique CASTRO Garcia; and
HMM-1987, Czech Delegation to Geological Congress.

c. LIFEAT Coverage

During most of the year LIFEAT coverage of the Czech Legation was confined to the two phones in the main Legation building but early in 1957 one of the two lines of the Commercial Office was crossed and very high production received. It is projected that this basic coverage will be continued to the extent circumstances permit.

4. Polish Legation

By far the greatest amount of information derived on the Polish

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Legation in the past year, as well as every year since 1951, has been through LIENVOY. As in the cases of the Soviets and Czechs, this information is generally forwarded in periodic general summaries, of which HMM-1547, HMM-1610, HMM-1619, HMM-1667, HMM-1787, HMM-2018 and HMM-2173 are cited as examples. Biographic information on Polish staff members has been forwarded in such reports as HMM-1886, HMM-1800 and HMM-1929.

The following reports are cited as examples of spot reports on items believed to be of especial interest relating to the Polish Legation:

HMM-1744, Polish Legation Reception
HMM-1748, Polish Legation Contacts with Polish Delegates to Radiological Congress
HMM-2431, Polish Legation Contacts with Carlos Augusto LEON (Venezuelan Communist)
HMM-2532, Release of Rosendo GOMEZ Lorenzo and
HMMA-5941, Juliusz KATZ-SUCHY.

5. Combined Reports

HMM-1739, entitled "Soviet Bloc Economic Penetration in Mexico" is an example of a report of a general nature based on LIENVOY coverage of Poles, Czechs and Soviets.

6. Counter-intelligence matters

Counter-intelligence matters constitute the major FI portions of this of this Station's related Mission Directive and LIENVOY has contributed more leads and general information on the Soviet aspect of this subject than all other Station sources combined. The following reports are cited as examples of many of this type of reports and information developed in this category:

a. HMM-1958, HMM-2286, describing contacts between Narciso BASSOLS, leading Mexican pro-Communist, and Viktor N. VOLOTOV, his Soviet case officer who appears in LIENVOY under the name of "LOPEZ."

b. HMM-2218, HMM-2262 and HMM-1336, dealing with the contacts between the leading Venezuelan Communist, Carlos Augusto LEON and his Soviet case officer, Boris P. KOLOMYAKOV. A comparison of readings from LIENVOY/LIMERICK with LIENVOY coverage on the Venezuelan Communist Party Officer Eduardo MACHADO Morales indicates that LEON is probably the intermediary between the Soviets and the Venezuelan exiles.

c. HMM-2420, setting forth arrangements for clandestine contact between Colonel Jesus de LEON Toral, of the Mexican General Staff College, with his Soviet case officer.

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d. HMM-A-4463, HMM-2232, HMM-2276, setting forth a lengthy series of contacts between "Frans" WILL, an Ethiopian student in Mexico, and Boris P. KOLOMYAKOV, Soviet intelligence officer.

e. HMM-A-6744, which sets forth the history of the contacts between Heracio SANDOVAL, ODENVY agent, and Boris P. KOLOMYAKOV.

f. HMM-2270, setting forth contacts between Nikolay R. [illegible]ZOV, Soviet intelligence officer, and Jesus MAZO Le[illegible]ucro, Mexican naval officer.

g. HMM-A-5416 and HMM-A-4216, which deal with the possible contacts of a Mexican parachutist named Edward Albert [illegible] with the Soviet Embassy and which possibly has some importance to counter-intelligence within the U.S.

h. HMM-A-5941, Juliusz KATZ-SUCHY (Polish Intelligence Matter), setting forth this subject's activities and contacts while in Mexico. This report was largely based on LIFEAT.

and i. Many others.

7. Double Agent Checking

During the past year, as in previous years, a number of this Station's double agents have been monitored through LIFEAT in contact with the Soviet Embassy, thus enabling the Station to verify certain portions of their reports and hence leading to a better chance to evaluate the agents. Among those heard in the past year were LIBELER, LIBELER's son, LILEMONADE, LIFACE and LINSTOCK-1. In each case LIFEAT tended to confirm the Station's good opinion of the agent. On the other hand, several recent contacts former Station agent LIVESTOCK-3 and the Soviets indicate that LIVESTOCK-3 may be "playing" with the Soviets or endeavoring to do so.

8. LAURICLE

Reference is made to HMM-A-5923 (HMM-OM-843) which sets forth data on Soviet LAURICLE matters, derived mainly from LIFEAT. Personality data on LAURICLE figures, especially in the Polish and Czech establishments, has been accumulated and studied as a major Station objective.

9. Intentions and Activities of the Mexican Government

During the early part of 1957 LIFEAT enabled the Station to assess reports it was receiving from another source concerning the changing and hardening of the Mexican government's attitude towards foreign Communists. LIFEAT coverage of various individual targets gave solid information on the arrests of the foreign Communists Mario SOSA Navarro, Joaquin ORDOQUI,

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Jacobo [illegible] Zender and Chone S[illegible] and tended to confirm data on the same matters obtained from Station agent LI[illegible]-2. LI[illegible] also added details which were not available to other Station sources, such as the names of the persons sought to help those imprisoned. For example, it was learned that the Venezuelan Communist leader Eduardo MACHADO Morales was the person who was holding the passport of Joaquin ORDOQUI at the time of his arrest, which fact, among others, makes MACHADO appear to be one of the most important foreign Communists in Mexico. Reference is made to the following reports which contain information of this general type: H[illegible]A-6240 and H[illegible]A-6242.

H[illegible]-1769(p. 4) is cited as containing a seemingly reliable report to the effect that in 1956 the Mexican president told the editor of one of Mexico's leading newspapers that he should play down or omit anti-US articles and opinions.

10. Information on the Mexican Communist Party and Communist Fronts

During the past year considerable day to day detail was received from LIFEAT concerning the Mexican Communist Party and its fronts. The latter included the Circulo de Estudios Mexicanos(the intellectual author of which was covered in LIFEAT) and the Mexican Peace Movement, Society of Friends of China and various art fronts(through coverage of an officer of those movements.) This information was of value in supplementing agent coverage of those organizations and occasionally provided information unknown to the agents. (Cf HMM-1657 and HMM-2285)

11. American Communists in Mexico

One of the most extensive and productive coverages through LIFEAT in the past year was directed against American communists in Mexico. In this period several American targets were covered at the request of ODENVY and the production processed in part by them and in part by this Station. ODENVY assumed the task of reporting most of the information on these subjects but provided the station with carbon copies of their summaries of the pertinent reels and of the reports based thereon. The subjects thus covered for ODENVY were as follows, with a listing of the number of reels passed on each:

a. Noah SEBORER, possible American espionage agent for the Soviets (23 reels)
b. Frederich Vanderbilt FIELD, American Communist, and his wife, Anita Boyer FIELD(254 reels)
c. Asa ZATZ Dolinski, American Communist agent(55 reels.)

12. Of particular importance in the coverage by LIFEAT was the Alfred Kaufmann STERN // and Martha Dodd STERN case which was of particular interest not only to KUBARK but

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also to ODENVY. This case was a part of the Jack SOBLE espionage case; and LIENVOY coverage of the STERNs has been outstandingly excellent. In fact, the Station has had three(3) commendations from Headquarters on the LIENVOY coverage of this case and Edward P. SECHEN had a personal commendation from ASS.MAN on his work(LIENVOY) on the case. Over ninety(90) reels have been produced by LIENVOY on the STERNs between 9 February and 27 May 1957. Another interesting facet of this coverage is that on 8 February (at 1630 hours) 1957 a cable from Headquarters asked that the Station attempt to institute LIENVOY coverage on the STERNs. At 1000 hours on 9 February 1957 LIENVOY coverage had been completed and was producing.

13. Miscellaneous Coverages

During the past year the following individual targets have been covered for periods of time varying from one month to a full year:

a. Aaron Jose PSZYSZA Margules, Jewish Communist leader. The coverage reflected the decline of the Jewish Communist movement and the relative inactivity of PSZYSZA and was suspended.

b. Noah SEBORER, American Communist. He and his wife work for a travel agency and their traffic has reflected many details concerning the movements of Americans in and out of Mexico, many of them Communists.

c. Samuel MAGIDIN Magidin, Jewish Communist leader. This coverage confirmed the decline of the local Jewish Communist movement and the final liquidation of its headquarters. It reflected the names of the few active members who continue to meet informally. It was of especial value in covering the arrest of Chone SHEINBAUM, member of the Jewish Communist group, and in covering the deportation of Jacobo HURWITZ Zender, known Communist agent. From this coverage details were learned concerning the names of the lawyers used by the defendants, together with a considerable view of the methods and secondary contacts.

d. Alfred K. (and Martha Dodd) STERN(see para 12), which was probably the most outstanding technical surveillance operation ever mounted by this Station and which is still continuing.

e. Eduardo MACHADO Morales, Venezuelan Communist. This coverage conveyed a host of details on the machinations and activities of the Venezuelan Communists in Mexico and to a lesser degree provided information on their contacts with the Soviets and Mexican Communists.

f. Xavier GUERRERO. This coverage contained considerable detail on the Communist party, Society of Friends of China, Peace Front and other organizations of which GUERRERO was a member. It also contained details of great interest on various Latin American Communists and Americans with whom the GUERREROs were in contact. Information derived from this line

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was used in inducing the Mexican Government to deport Mario SOSA Navarro and thus provided the Station with the means to test one of its more potent sources as well as check the accuracy of his progress reports.

g. Narciso BASSOLS. BASSOLS is a leading collaborator of the Soviets in Mexico. Coverage of his traffic showed him in contact with his Soviet case officer and gave details of interest on Mexican political matters and one important Communist front, the Circulo de Estudios Mexicanos, of which BASSOLS was the intellectual author though not a member.

h. Asa ZATZ Dolinski, American Communist mentioned above.

i. Headquarters of the Liga Popular Israelita, Jewish Communist front. This coverage reflected that the Liga was almost defunct.

j. Fernando Alberto MILIA, Argentine Naval Attache, who was covered briefly in connection with the proposed defection of a Soviet official with whom he was in contact.

14. Microphone Phase

LIFEAT Project also includes the LICOOL phase. Reference is made to MEXI 006 which describes a current LICOOL installation directed against a Soviet official.

15. Summary

In summary, LIFEAT constitutes one of Mexico City Station's chief assets; and it is the belief of COS Mexico that this operation (which is wholly KUBARK's and has no liaison or other service involved) is by far the best operation of its kind KUBARK has in the world.

a. Accomplishments

On a general average over the past year LIFEAT has consisted of twenty-two (22) to twenty-three (23) simultaneous coverages, each of 24 hours per day. The targets covered have included major coverage of all those which rank highest in the Station's RRD (Soviets, Poles and Czechs) as well as a large number of selected targets of opportunity. Approximately 15,000 pages of summary text have been obtained from the project. This information, though fragmentary at times and at times difficult to understand, is nevertheless documentary in nature. In detail, average coverage of the targets at the Station has been as follows:

Soviets	8 Lines	American Communists	3 lines
Czechs	2 lines	Remainder	8 lines.
Poles	2 lines		

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b. Planning for the Future

Current planning calls for the continuation of about 24 lines of coverage with bases and personnel being assembled to permit an increase to about 30 lines, local circumstances permitting. Basic coverage will be continued to the fullest extent possible on the Soviets, Poles and Czechs, which coverage of individual and targets of opportunity will be shifted so as to produce the greatest possible amounts of important information. At present it is believed that 30 lines is about the maximum the technical agents on this one operation can mount and protect properly. In order to get more coverage, the Station will likely establish (if Headquarters approves) a separate, independent LIFEAT-type operation, with new principals.

c. Performance of Agents

While in general the performance of the LIFEAT agents has been good in the past year, some of those connected with the group based on the family of former head agent James O. AYCALL have not been acting in a satisfactory manner. These are gradually being weeded out and new, more effective and fully compartmented base operators are being substituted for them. The Station's problem in this connection is difficult since it is hard to recruit persons who combine the following qualifications necessary for base house operations:

i) absolute discretion;
ii) willingness to cover the base 24 hours daily, year after year;
iii) suitable cover;
iiii) willingness to obey complex orders to the letter year after year;
and iiiii) willingness to live in a situation of constant potential danger.

d. Status of Approved Commitments

LIFEAT Project (as approved in HMM-W-3740) contains most of the elements which will be necessary in Fiscal 1958. The main difference that will be noted in the attached Field Project Outline is that costs will be higher and one more base house will be added to the current list.

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PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM LIFEAT FIELD CASE OFFICERS Thomas J. URQUHART

1. Area of Operations Mexico City, Mexico

Matthew S. [illegible]

Harvey P. [illegible]

(Open)

CHIEF OF STATION Willard C. CURTIS

2. Purpose

To mount various types of technical surveillance operations, mainly telephonic, against the Soviet, Czech and Polish diplomatic missions in Mexico; against important contacts of those installations; and against leading Mexican and non-Mexican Communists and Communist sympathizers.

3. Background

This project was first approved 3 October 1950 and has been extended each year thereafter. Actual operations began 18 January 1951 and have been continuous, with small breaks for security or other operational reasons from that date. The project was last approved in HMM-W-3740, 19 November 1956.

LIFEAT has been run since its inception without liaison and no plans now exist to change this arrangement.

Over the past 6 years and 3 months LIFEAT has expanded from coverage of one(1) line to coverage of an average of about twenty-four(24) lines, each being covered 24 hours per day. In all, over 40,000 pages of documentary information on prime station targets has thus been obtained from this operation.

4. Reference

HMM-W-3740, 19 November 1956, contains the last renewal of this project.

a. This project has been one of the outstanding KUBARK operations in the world. Certain elements at Headquarters recognize this. Chief, SR/CE states to this Station during his visit in January 1957 that this was the only "LIFEAT-type" operation which was wholly KUBARK's and he said it was

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the best such operation. From knowledge, COS Mexico has, it is known that (unless something has developed very recently) LIFEAT is the best operation of its kind which KUBARK has.

b. Headquarters has stated:

i. In DIR-03198 of 18 Feb. 1957, "HQS commends Station prompt and effective coverage and handling this case";

ii. In DIR-09958 of 29 March 1957, "Good work";

iii. In DIR-11936 of 12 April 1957, "ODENVY and we(HQS) are most gratified by iniative and success your coverage".

All of these referred to LIFEAT coverages.

c. The Director has personally commended the Station officer for his work in one line's coverage in this operation; and has orally stated to COS, Mexico that this is an excellent operation.

5. Objectives

To carry out this Station's obligations in conformity with its Related Mission Directive, through technical surveillance operations. The product from this operation is coordinated with other Station operations, with especial attention to Soviet, Polish and Czech activities.

6. Targets

Primary targets covered in this operation are:

Soviet Embassy and residences of Soviet officials;
Czech Legation;
Polish Legation; and
Alfred Kaufmann(and Martha Dodd) STERN.

Secondary targets are:

Soviet, Polish and Czech agents;
Mexican and foreign Communists; and
American Communists.

7. Tasks

a. To maintain and operate existing project facilities and establishments;

b. To augment similar coverage when need or opportunity arises;

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c. To recruit, train and administer such agents as the project requires;

d. To issue such reports as are deemed necessary, based on material acquired from the project;

e. To coordinate information obtained from the project with other Station operations;

and f. To provide EURIOT with operational information and reports on experience obtained from the project.

8. Coordination

LIFEAT information is very closely coordinated with all other operations at this Station but does not require operational coordination with any other area. However, when the project yields information of interest to other areas, these areas are informed.

9. Personnel

It is intended that the following personnel will participate in the LIFEAT Project during Fiscal Year 1958:

a. Case Officers

Case Officer: Thomas J. URQUHART*
Case Officer for LICOOL phase: Matthew S. DINGLEY*
Case Officer, Czech Legation phase: Harvey F. DEMMHOLZ*
Case Officer, Polish Legation phase: to be named*
General asst. Case Officer: David H. WILSTED(U.S. citizen) - technical - contract agent(has own commercial firm which furnished his cover)
General Asst. Case Officer: Ralph RAFAELLI(U.S. citizen) - commercial
General Asst. Case Officer: Arthur S. STOUGH* /unofficial cover/

* Denotes Diplomatic cover

b. Operations agents

1. LIEMPATER. Field Agent, Operational Clearance 739, dated 17 October 1950. He is an employee of Telefonos de Mexico, local telephone company, who provides the basic information necessary for running the project.

2. LIEMPATER-4. Field agent. Operational clearance 1412, 14 Aug. 1951. He is charged with aspects of the technical portion of the operation.

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3. LI[illegible]-2. Field agent. Operational Clearance 7452, 11 Dec. 1953. This agent works with [illegible]-1 and has similar duties.

4. LIMESTONE-1. Field agent, Operational Clearance 6799, 11 Sept. 1953. Base house operator.

5. LI[illegible]NE-2. Field agent. Operational Clearance 7347, dated 25 Nov. 1953. Asst. base house operator.

6. LIMESTONE-3. Field agent. Operational Clearance 7585, 28 Dec. 1953. Base house operator.

7. LIMESTONE-4. Field agent. Operational Clearance C-31989, 21 Oct. 1954. Base house operator.

8. LIMESTONE-5. Field agent. Operational Clearance C-32742, 21 March 1955. Asst. base house operator.

9. LIMESTONE-7. Field agent. Operational Clearance in H[illegible]-3265, 13 July 1956.

10. LIMESTONE-8. Field agent. Operational clearance in DIR-09743, 1 May 1956. Asst. base operator and processor of tapes.

11. LIMESTONE-9. Field agent. Operational Clearance C-50464, 24 Sept. 1956

12. LIMESTONE-10. Field agent. Operational Clearance C-50758, 24 Sept. 1956.

14. LIMITATION-3. Field agent. Operational Clearance 5970, 1 Oct. 1953. Asst. base operator and processor.

13. LIMITATION. Field agent. Operational Clearance 5977, 30 Sept. 1952. Base operator.

15. LIMITATION-7. Field agent. Operational Clearance C-50457, 13 Aug. 1956. Asst. base operator.

16. LIMITATION-5 and LIMITATION-6. Field agents. Operational clearance in H[illegible]-W-2800, 13 Jan. 1955, and HKM-W-1333, 19 Mar. 1954. To be used as base operator.

17. LIQUATION. Field agent. Operational Clearance 7495, 16 Dec. 1953. Has been base operator but may retire. However, he should be kept on the rolls until a definite decision is made.

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18. LIQUATION-1. Field agent. Operational Clearance forwarded in HDMA-2252, 5 Oct. 1955. Base operator.

19. LIQUATION-2. Field agent. Operational Clearance C-50455, 21 August 1956. Base operator.

20. LIQUATION-3. Field agent. Operational Clearance C-54096, 19 January 1957. Asst. base operator and processor.

21. LIPSTICK-18. Field agent. Operational Clearance C-33182, dated 31 March 1955. Base operator.

22. LIPSTICK-35. Field agent. Operational Clearance C-50157, 6 August 1956. Asst. base operator.

23. LIPSTICK-37. Field agent. Operational Clearance C-50750, 13 Sept. 1956. Asst. base operator.

c. Processors of recorded tapes

24. Carol K. ZIMMEISTER, contract agent. Operational Clearance C-29842, 1 July 1954. Processes major portion of Soviet target material.

25. LILACE. Field agent. Clearance contained in HDMA-1742, 15 Oct. 1954. General processing.

26. Alice N. CAILLETEAU. Contract employee. Cleared in HDMA-3051, 20 April 1956. ZOMAR processing.

27. Frances M. MENZIE. Contract agent. Cleared in HDMA-2763, 28 December 1955. General processing.

28. Olivia GLANNON. Contract agent. Clearance by virtue of contract dated 1 January 1957. General processing and ZOMAR processing.

29. Unwitting assistant to LIEMATE for routine office work.

(NOTE: LIERINGE and LIERIFORM-1, who handle Czech language tapes, are included in the LILOGTROT Project. In addition to the above processors, assistant Case Officers STOUEH and WILSTED also engage in processing. ODENVY's local office processes certain tapes from targets of primary interest to them. LIENSTONE-8 and LIQUATION-3 alternate assistant base operator duties with those of processing.)

Total personnel, part or full time on Project: 37.

NOTE: It is also expected that two(2) more processors, and one(1) additional technician will be added during Fiscal Year 1958.

10. Operational Clearances

Cf Item 9.

11. Cover

a. Cover for the case officers noted in 9a, diplomatic or commercial (unofficial) see 9 a.

b. Set forth below is a discussion of the cover of the non-diplomatic personnel in the operation.

1. David R. [illegible]: Partner in small family-run machinery business. His Mexican documentation is complete and legitimate.

2. Ralph RAFAELLI: Fully documented employee of [illegible], who has in the past provided similar cover for undercover agents.

3. LIEWATER: His natural cover is of employee of the local telephone company, which he has been for a number of years.

4. LIEWATER-1: Enjoys natural cover as a telephone company employee.

5. LIEWATER-2: Enjoys natural cover as telephone employee.

6. LIESTONE-1: She is an elderly person and hence can logically have income from family estate. Does not attract attention.

7. LIESTONE-2: Brother of LIESTONE-1 and resides with her. Is elderly and can pass as a poor relative and retainer.

8. LIESTONE-3: Has been engaged in obtaining small government contracts and moves in and out of various government offices. Unfortunately his cover is not really good and steps must be taken to improve it if he is to remain in our employ.

9. LIESTONE-4: Elderly woman who has had large business enterprises in the past and who does not need to explain her source of income for this reason.

10. LIESTONE-5: Father-in-law of LIESTONE-3 and ostensibly dependent on him.

11. LIESTONE-7: Widow of James O. [illegible]ALL, who was widely regarded as a man of means. Hence she ostensibly lives on his estate. This woman has a tendency to live beyond her means, however, and is a cause for anxiety.

12. LIMESTONE-8: Relative of LIMESTONE-4. They reside together. This agent is a widow and ostensibly lives on an inheritance.

13. LIMESTONE-9: Housewife.

14. LIMESTONE-10: Housewife.

15. LIMESTONE-11: Housewife.

16. LIMITATION: He is an architect and follows an almost full time career in that business while his relatives manage the LIMAT base.

17. LIMITATION-3: Very elderly retired person who formerly had a large business and whose income therefore is not open to question.

18. LIMITATION-7: Housewife.

19. LIMITATION-5: Accountant with a large firm. His wife (LIMITATION-6) handles most of the routine work he has done for the Station in the past.

20. LIQUATION: Businessman with office in the city. He spends a good deal of time on selling machinery while LIQUATION-2 and LIQUATION-3 mind the base.

21. LIQUATION-1: Has been out of town working on a contract. Previously was a student and had adequate cover for part-time work. When he returns to LIMAT his cover will be similar to that of LIQUATION.

22. LIQUATION-2: Housewife.

23. LIQUATION-3: Elderly widow who resides part time with her children, hence not likely to arouse suspicion.

24. LIPSTICK-18: This agent's cover, that of plumber and electrician, is not satisfactory. It appears, however, that he may be put into another type of operation sometime this year.

25. LIPSTICK-35: Housewife.

26. LIPSTICK-37: Dependent relative of LIPSTICK-18.

27. Carol K. ZIMMEISTER: Housewife.

28. LILACE: Housewife

29. Alice K. CAILLETEAU: Housewife

30. Frances M. [illegible]: Housewife.

31. Olivia A. HAR[illegible]: Retired woman residing with daughter and known to have independent income from retirement from former job.

12. Contact and Communication

Contact and communication between the case officers and the agents and undercover personnel in this operation is maintained in a clandestine manner in generally the same form as in previous years. Reference is made to [illegible]-A-4503, 9 May 1956, for a general description of this system, which appears to have been successful.

13. Control and Motivation

Reference is made to [illegible]-A-4503 under this heading.

14. Equipment and Other Support

It is believed that supplies of equipment for LIFEAT currently at the Station are sufficient to carry the operation through the calendar year 1957, but it is possible that simultaneous breakdown of quantities of the older equipment, dating from 1951 and in constant use since then, would necessitate the placing of separate orders for replacements.

15. Coordination

LIFEAT is coordinated with all other projects at this Station.

16. Timetable

LIFEAT has been in almost constant operation since its inception in January 1951 and it is planned to continue it indefinitely.

17. Estimated Costs

The following costs are estimated for FY 1958. All figures are in U.S. dollars per year. It will be noted that owing to rises in the cost of living and especially to much higher rents and to intended expansions, LIENVOY costs will be higher than in the past.

a. Salaries

1. Staff and Contract personnel:

Name	Item	Amount	Total
Ralph S. RAFANELLI, GS-7	Salary	4,525.00	
	Quarters	2,000.00	
			6,525.00
David H. WILSTED	Salary	6,400.00	
	Quarters	2,200.00	
	Educ.All.	500.00	
			9,100.00
Unnamed LIENVOY processor (GS-12)	Salary	7,570.00	
	Quarters	2,200.00	
	PCS Travel	2,000.00	
			11,770.00
Unnamed LIENVOY translator	Salary	6,500.00	
	Quarters	2,000.00	
	PCS Travel	2,000.00	
			10,500.00
Carol K. ZIMMEISTER	Salary	5,400.00	5,400.00
Frances L. LENZIE	Salary	2,504.00	2,504.00
Alice H. CAILLETEAU	Salary	2,425.00	2,425.00
Olivia H. GLADMON	Salary	3,880.00	3,880.00
Harvey C. HALWARD	Salary	10,320.00	
	Quarters	2,300.00	
	PCS Travel	2,000.00	
			14,620.00
			66,724.00

2. Field agents

	Presently	Possible raise
LIEMPTER	5200.00	
LIEMPTER-1	2203.00	(at 2300, up 300)
LIEMPTER-2	1450.00	(at 1500, up 250)
LIMESTONE-1	1440.00	
LIMESTONE-2	576.00	
LIMESTONE-3	2208.00	(at 2300, up 300)
LIMESTONE-4	2208.00	(at 2300, up 300)
LIMESTONE-5	768.00	
LIMESTONE-7	1536.00	
LIMESTONE-8	1728.00	(at 1800, up 300)
LIMITATION	2112.00	(at 2200, up 400)
LIMITATION-3	1920.00	(at 2000, up 550)
LIMITATION-5(not hired yet)		
LIQUATION	3840.00	(at 4000, up 1100)
LIQUATION-1	3840.00(new deal)	
LIQUATION-3	768.00	
LIPSTICK-13	1728.00	(at 1800, up 200)
LILACE ($2.02 per hour, 120 hrs. per month)	2504.00	
LIEMPTER assistant	144.00	
Christmas bonus and presents (One month salary to each agent, in accordance local custom. Also special gifts in some cases)	3000.00	39,250.00

b. Base house rentals, utilities and expenses

LIMERICK base house	2050.00	
LITMUS base house	2000.00	
LIVERY base house	2000.00	
LIMOSPHERE base house	2000.00	
LIMAYFUEL base house	1800.00	
Proposed base house	2900.00	
LIFEAT base shop	2000.00	
Proposed base house	2700.00	
Proposed base house	2800.00	
LICOOL-6 base	600.00	
Proposed LICOOL base	600.00	21,450.00

c. Equipment

Local purchase of emergency and special equipment	2,000.00	
New car - LISTED	3,500.00	
		5,500.00

d. Miscellaneous

1. Supplies (paper rolls, wire, tubes, tape, pens, parts) — 2,000.00 — 2,000.00

2. Transportation

Item	Amount	Total
LI[illegible]ICK car rent	300.00	
David H. [illegible] Auto expense	340.00	
Carol K. ZH[illegible] mileage	350.00	
LI[illegible]US base car rental	700.00	
LIV[illegible]Y base car rental	700.00	
LI[illegible]OSPH[illegible] base car rental	400.00	
(I.V.2047)	1440.00	
Proposed base car rental	700.00	
		4,930.00

3. Other Operational Expenses

(To cover loss of deposits on rents, fatalities and other serious emergencies, separation payments, medical expenses, emergency moving bills; and to cover targets of opportunity) — 20,000.00

Grand Total — 159,854.00

Page 21
Attachment to [illegible]-7053
[illegible]936
5 June 1957

52-6-32/1

SECRET

1 February 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/CPS - Projects Branch

SUBJECT : Amendment to Project LIFEAT

1. It is requested that Project LIFEAT be amended to include the purchase of a LIFEAT/LIMERICK basehouse in the amount of $20,000. The lease on the present LIFEAT/LIMERICK base expires in April.

2. The LIFEAT/LIMERICK base is the principal base of operations covering Mexico City's number one priority targets. The location of this base must be moved since the lease on the present base cannot be renewed. Furthermore, a decision has been reached whereby new operational techniques will be initiated which will necessitate round-the-clock operations in the base by station cleared personnel in order to satisfactorily cover the targets. This will undoubtedly necessitate the acquisition of a more securely controlled base of operations. The station does not believe such a base can be acquired other than by purchasing the property indicated. However, every effort will be made to lease this property providing leasing arrangements can be made to meet the security requirements of the operation.

3. At present additional funds are not needed in the LIFEAT Project to cover the purchase of a new basehouse. Should more funds be needed before the project expires, they will be requested at a later date.

J. C. KING
CWH

APPROVED: ____________________
CHIEF, FI/CPS

JOSEPH R. GROVES

APPROVED: ____________________
D/ DIRECTOR, LOGISTICS

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 50-6-32/4
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 3

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE VR, EUR 8, SB 8, CI/OPS, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 151600Z CITE OTTAWA 4139

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

REDCOAT

15 FEB 67 01388

REF A MEXICO CITY 0121 (IN 88249)

B MEXICO CITY 9919 (IN 77928)

LOCAL LNERGO REP PASSED REF INFO RE LOWRY TO SMABOVE 13 FEB 67.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

LIFEAT

50-6-32/4

15 FEB 67

14-00000

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 50-6-34/4
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 41

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DISSEM BY AP

ACTION: WH 8

☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, C/CI, EUR 8, SB 8, WH/COG 8, C/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2

SECRET 272155Z CITE MEXICO CITY 0121

DIRECTOR INFO OTTAWA

REDCOAT

REF: MEXICO CITY 9919 (PLS RELAY TO OTTAWA)

1. PER LIFEAT DON LOWRY AGAIN CALLED LEONOV 19 JAN IDENTIFYING HIMSELF AS FROM CANADA. LOWRY HAD BEEN UNABLE TO CONTACT ESCARTIN AT CUBAN EMBASSY, BUT LEONOV SAID HE COULD NOT HELP HIM AND THAT HE SHOULD KEEP TRYING.

2. LOCAL LNERGO HAS RECORD OF ONE DONALD ROBERT LOWRY, BORN 26 NOV 1914 OR 1915 IN WALKERVILLE OR WINDSOR, ONTARIO. LOCAL LNERGO IS NOTIFYING THEIR REPRESENTATIVES IN WASHINGTON AND OTTAWA TO SEE IF LOWRY STILL ON WANTED LIST.

3. STATION HAS LIONION PHOTO OF MAN WHO VISITED CUBAN EMBASSY ON 9 JAN AND SHOWS SOME RESEMBLANCE TO VERY OLD LNERGO PHOTO OF DONALD ROBERT LOWRY. CAN POUCH PRINTS IF OTTAWA STATION WISHES.

4. SUBSTANCE OF THE ABOVE AND INFO IN REF MAY BE PASSED TO SMABOVES, DISGUISING SOURCE. REQUEST OTTAWA STATION COORDINATE ANY ACTION WITH LNERGO.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

(handwritten annotations: IN 79228; "in contact with Soviet Embassy Mexico City"; "Cit. Canadian? in contact w/ Sov Emb. Mexico City"; 50-6-34/4; 27 JAN 67)

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RID COPY

FILE SB 8 WH/COG 8 C/OPS

S E C R E T 132130Z CITE MEXICO CITY

MICROFILMED FEB 21 1967 DOC. MICRO. SER.

DIRECTOR

REDCOAT

1. LIFEAT REPORTS THAT MAN GIVING HIS NAME AS DON LOWRY (ALMENCO), EVIDENTLY AMERICAN, WAS IN CONTACT WITH SOVIET PRESS ATTACHE LEONOV 201-132139 ON 9 JAN AND ALSO WITH CUBAN CULTURAL ATTACHE RICARDO ESCARTIN FERNANDEZ SAME DAY. LOWRY SAID HE HAD NEWSPAPER AND MAGAZINE EXPERIENCE AND HAD ALSO BEEN RADIO AND TELEVISION ANNOUNCER. ESCARTIN FERNANDEZ HAD AGREED TO SEND HIS LETTER AND WRITING SAMPLES TO CUBA IN NEXT POUCH AND TOLD HIM CHANCES WERE MAYBE TWENTY PERCENT, EVIDENTLY OF HIS GETTING A JOB THERE. LOWRY HAS TO WAIT AROUND MEXICO FOR TWO WEEKS, APPARENTLY UNTIL HE HEARS FROM CUBA.

2. LEONOV WAS NON-COMMITTAL BUT SAID HE WOULD INTRODUCE LOWRY TO SOVIET CONSUL ON 10 JAN. CONVERSATION INDICATES THAT LOWRY HAD FIRST ASKED LEONOV ABOUT A JOB AND LEONOV HAD SUGGESTED HE TRY THE CUBAN EMBASSY.

3. REQUEST CABLED HEADQUARTERS TRACES. INFORMING LOCAL LNERGO.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

NO HQS TRACES

50-6-32/4
13 JAN 67

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM: Chief of Station, Port au Prince

SUBJECT: LIMUD/LIFEAT: Disposition of Tapes

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Ref: DIRECTOR 68776, 23 January 1967
Action required. As determined by Headquarters.

1. As requested in reference, Station Port au Prince is pouching to Headquarters all of the LIMUD/LIFEAT cards currently on file at the Station. Please return to Station copies of those cards containing sufficient information to be of value to Station.

2. Station is in agreement with Headquarters that a hard copy of the tapes should be sent directly from Station Mexico City to Headquarters in order that Headquarters may expedite the processing of the material. However, Station suggests that in order to reduce the overall processing time and eliminate what could be duplication of effort, only Headquarters receive a copy of the tapes. Then Headquarters, when processing the original tapes, could retape those Creole portions and send a composite tape to the Station for translation.

3. Station currently has a backlog of the LIMUD/LIFEAT tapes. Please advise whether these tapes also should be sent to Headquarters for processing.

4. Headquarters comments and suggestions are welcome.

[signature]
Matthew H. ONUS

Distribution:
2-Chief, WH
1-Mexico City

DEFERRED

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HTPA-1973

DATE: 26 January 1967

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER:

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Deputy Chief WH/C

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
TYPIC/LIFEAT/Transmittal of Traffic of Subject of 201-735575 and LICLOVE-2

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Attached as A are copies of traffic covering the Subject of 201-735575 for the period 1, 2, 4, and 7 June 1966. This traffic was provided Station Mexico by LIFEAT.

2. Attached as B are copies of traffic covering LICLOVE-2 for the period 30 May - 12 June 1966. This traffic was also provided Station Mexico by LIFEAT.

3. Attachments are being forwarded KAPOK and under separate cover.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:
A & B a/s KAPOK u/s/c

Distribution:
3 - DCWH/C w/atts u/s/c
1 - C/WHD w/o atts
4 - FILES

LIFEAT
CB
DEFERRED
50-6-32/4

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-29211

DATE
16 June 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-32/4

14-00000

2P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, [illegible]
Chief, WHD

HMM

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Port-au-Prince

SUBJECT: [illegible]T/[illegible]-1
Translation of Creole Portions of LI[illegible]T Tapes

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. H[illegible]-28440, 8 March 1966
B. H[illegible]-28489, 14 March 1966
C. H[illegible]-28534, 22 March 1966
D. H[illegible]-28594, 29 March 1966
E. HMMA-28701, 11 April 1966
F. H[illegible]-28761, 25 April 1966
G. H[illegible]-28834, 3 May 1966

MICROFILMED
JUN 2[illegible] 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Action: FYI

1. Attached for addressees information are translations of the Creole language portions of the [illegible] tapes forwarded in references. The translations were done by [illegible]-1. Conversations which have no operational or intelligence value have not been included.

2. In 29 GF 22 3.2 the journal Combatant cannot be identified by the station. Can headquarters identify the journal?

3. The Judy in 29 GF 98 17.5 is probably Judith [illegible], the Costa Rican communist friend of the [illegible].

4. 29 [illegible] 101 [illegible] is a very interesting conversation. Evidently Pierre [illegible] has just returned from Miami and San Juan, Puerto Rico where he went to meet his mother. Ton Ton CILLA[illegible] is Fritz CIL[illegible] who is believed to have forged a signature while illegally ordering a new Haitian postage stamp issue. CI[illegible] planned to keep the stamps and sell them at a profit to stamp dealers. According to a P[illegible] (Haitian CP) clandestine journal, an Edmond [illegible] was a Haitian delegate to the Tri-Continental Conference in Havana in January 1966. However this name was probably a pseudonym. Per Consulate files, Edmond [illegible], [illegible] 3 December 1915, Cayes, Haiti traveled to and from the [illegible] in June 1960. The Cuban approach to [illegible] in San Juan is the first direct confirmation of Cuban exile activity directed at Haiti in Puerto Rico. Gerard [illegible]

(a [illegible])

CS COPY

5[illegible] - [illegible] - 34/4

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: H[illegible]-18[illegible]

DATE: 1[illegible] June 1966

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-4-121

19 June 1934 Gonaives, Haiti is a Haitian lawyer/economist/labor leader. ... knows him as an active intelligent leftist labor lawyer. Subject of H..A-1715, a station contact, reported that on 29 October 1965, LATORTUE spoke before a symposium on Haiti in San Juan. LATORTUE called for the overthrow of the socio-economic structure of Haiti including the "money-grabbing" bourgeoisie. Past source reporting reveals LATORTUE as a very capable, energetic intellectual with a genuine gift of leadership. He received a Haitian law degree, studied economics in Paris for six years and received a U.S. Government grant to attend a Harvard seminar on marketing in 1962. While in Haiti he appeared to be pro-American. At the San Juan symposium LATORTUE declared that every Haitian would resist U.S. intervention in Haiti and condemned the U.S. State Department for meddling in Haitian exile affairs. MANIGAT is probably Leslie MANIGAT (201-297822) born 16 August 1930, Port-au-Prince, a resident of ... . Though MANIGAT is a known leftist, this is the first indication from within CP circles of his close ties with the Communist parties. It would appear from the information and implications in the telephone conversation that both LATORTUE and MANIGAT have ties with the Communist parties but that they are not bound by party discipline or dogmatism.

5. The "zero" (ph) mentioned in 29 CP 128 2.0 is unknown to station. Can addressees recognize the name as a clinic or hospital in Mexico or in the Soviet Bloc? The zero is pronounced z e r o (Merriam-Webster pronounciation keys).

6. The LA ROA of 29 CP 137 18.5 is probably Joseph BARRON of HTPA 1791, 24 Feb 1966.

7. The DUVAL in 29 CP 139 8.7 is probably Guy DUVAL, DPOB 28 August 1935, Miragoane who accompanied Gerard PIERRE-CHARLES from Mexico City to Moscow in August 1964. Station notes that some mail for the GPCs is being received by the DUVALs.

JOSEPH C. B...SON

Attachment:
Translation of Tapes

Distribution:
2-COS, Mexico City w/orig. att.
2-C/WHD w/1cy att.

Attachment to HTPA-1859

29 GP 82 1.2

This conversation is about "The Comedians", a book written about Haiti by Graham Greene. Gerard and Suzie are talking to Pierre Lelong. Pierre says the book was the novel of the month of February in the U.S. Book is about Duvalier. Gerard has heard that foreigners are making money on Haitian heads by writing such stories but he has also heard that Greene was in contact with a person who really gave him full information. Pierre says there was a review of the book in L'Edition and he has saved it. Gerard asks Pierre if he has the latest edition of the newspaper Combatant. Pierre has it and promises to return it.

29 GP 85 3.0

Suzie calls Gerard PIERRE CHARLES. Roger has left Suzie a note. Gerard failed to go where he had planned. Gerard called Dorce but Dorce wasn't there. He went to the Embassy for 15-20 minutes but he couldn't find him. (Conversation probably about Aldi Castor's visa.) Gerard asks how everything came out. The wife of the Chief of Police came over to fix the thing about the little girl. The police never suspected anybody and they don't think anybody like that had it. Suzie says Claudette finally found her passport. Claudette went to a (convent?) and someone stole her handbag which contained her passport, money and license to work. Everything was returned the next day with a check for $500. Claudette had to return the $500.

29 GP 85 9.0

Suzie with Gerard. Suzie asks Gerard if he saw a number on the front or back of something (papers)? No. There is nothing written by hand. Gerard received three copies and they are looking for two more.

29 GP 98 17.5

Suzie calls Gerard. Suzie asks Gerard if Aldi has come by. Suzie says she is going back to the Embassy. Gerard has changed everything and the man will come by around 2:00 to pick him up. Judy called to ask when she should come.

29 GP 103 4.9

Pierre Lelong calling Suzie Pierre-Charles. Suzie asks Pierre when he returned. He just arrived, but without his mother. Suzie asks Pierre how Lillian and her friends were. They were fine. Tonton CINEAS had been arrested and had been shot. Also, something is supposed to start in Haiti. Tonton CINEAS was in touch with someone named Maitre Edmond PIERRE. Clement CHARLES was also involved

in the affair. $80,000 was involved. The person that gave him the news was a friend of Clemard CHARLES. A newspaper in N.Y. named El Tiempo has written about an invasion of Haiti. El Tiempo reported that someone named Vixama was involved. Pierre was in a store in San Juan, Puerto Rico buying some cloth when a Cuban girl approached him and asked him if he was Haitian. The girl was accompanied by a Cuban man and they asked Pierre questions about Haitian history. They asked Pierre if he knew anything about Duvalier. Pierre explained he was opposed to Duvalier. The Cubans said there were people in San Juan planning to "catch" Duvalier. Pierre implies that the Cuban man lives in Mexico. Gerard PIERRE CHARLES takes the phone. Gerard tells Pierre that someone named Silvie is on the border. Gerard asks Pierre if he has brought the merchandise. Yes. Pierre went to the post office to pick up a package and they were going to open the package to inspect it but Pierre told the clerk it was not necessary to inspect it. The post office clerk said the declared value was too high, and he had to open it. When he opened it he found it was a handwritten manuscript so the clerk asked no more questions. Everything went alright. Pierre mentions that during his trip overseas (San Juan) he met Gerard LATORTUE. Gerard asks Pierre what LATORTUE's financial status was. Pierre thinks LATORTUE is working at the University of Mayaguez. Pierre says there are a lot of Haitians in Puerto Rico that are interested in doing something (against Duvalier?) but most are without families. They are petty bourgeois or engineers working in San Juan. The bourgeois Haitians now have stores in Puerto Rico. Gerard asks Pierre if LATORTUE mentioned anything about his uncle Francois LATORTUE. No, he did not. LATORTUE might come to Mexico soon on a tourist visa. He has to go through some routine to get the visa. Gerard tells Pierre that Francois LATORTUE is up to his neck in politics in Haiti. LATORTUE said that the leftist party was really mistreating MANIGAT and LATORTUE didn't like it. Everytime MANIGAT opens his mouth something happens. The leftist parties likened MANIGAT to Castro. Like Castro, MANIGAT talked too much and did too many things. MANIGAT showed his card too much and that is why they are mistreating him. It was the Communist party that put MANIGAT where he is, just as the CP put Castro where he is. LATORTUE has written an article to counter what has happened to MANIGAT. Gerard says he knew MANIGAT 10 years ago in Haiti. LATORTUE has written an article condemning American intentions of landing in Haiti. LATORTUE x is Professor of Economics at the University of Mayaguez. LATORTUE is trying to leave Puerto Rico and go somewhere else where he can find better work.

29 GP 105 25.7

Gerard is talking to Suzie about a title of property. She cannot find it. She asks about Daniel.

29 GP 106 2.7

Gerard calls Pierre LELONG and asks Pierre to drop by tonight. Has Pierre found 2 packages of papers? One contains papers for Suzie's course and the other is a package of white blank paper for mimeographing.

29 GP 107 20.2

Suzie calls Gerard. Suzie is near the "guy's" house. She wants some money to get a large roll of paper and wants to write a check for the people that are going to send "those things" this afternoon. Gerard asks if she received any news. Yes. Gerard asks Suzie to buy some flash bulbs for his camera.

29 GP 118 3.0

Suzie with Benoit. Benoit excuses himself for not coming. He will come by tomorrow night about 8:00 p.m. when he gets out of school. Has Suzie received any news from Gerard? No. Suzie asks about Pierre Louis. Pierre Louis is doing alright.

29 GP 118 11.2

Suzie calls Vincent. Long time no see. Vincent kids Suzie about her travels, vacation, new house, and car. She asks about Angelica. Benoit is coming over tomorrow. Angelica's brother came in for a vacation. Vincent asks Suzie if there is any other news. No. Still the same as in February from the newspaper Ralliement. The same story. Vincent says that he has no news about Haiti but he got a letter from the family saying that the economic situation is very rough. Vincent asks about Aldi. He scored 9.10 on an exam. Suzie asks Vincent if he has seen CINEAS (ph) (sounds like somebody at the Mexican University). Vincent says everybody at the University is against him.

29 GP 128 2.0

Gerard is talking to an uidentified person. Gerard explains to the person that before he travels "they" will give him a test which will show if he has TB or not. If the test is positive, they will give him medecine to stop or cure it. The unidentified person is afraid and Gerard tries to tell him that it is not serious because if it were, "they" would have given him special treatment in the "zero". The unidentified person says that he has just come out of school and has had pneumonia.

29 GP 128 10.0

Gerard with Suzie. WARRON wants to know what time he should arrive because he is doing something very important. He should come around 2:00.

SECRET

29 GP 129 12.7

Suzie with Sonya. Susie and Sonya are going to the theater. They mention Maggie who told them that they shouldn't go; they won't understand anything.

29 GP 137 18.5

M calls M...CN and asks M to come right away.

29 GP 139 8.7

Pierre LELONG calls Suzie. Suzie has friends with her now. She asks if there is a letter. He said there is an open letter. When Pierre came in he found all the leters opened on the table. There is a letter from DUVAL. They must be yesterday's letters.

29 GP 140 16.2

Suzie x with Claudette LELONG. Suzie thanks Claudette for the gift and the translation. There had been a lecture at the University given by someone who spoke only French. The person came Tuesday night and left this morning. How does Suzie feel after all that translating? She is O.K.; its her field. She is moving today. Claudette tells her Gerard is going to be suprised when he comes back. Suzie tells Claudette that she will tell Pierrot to tell his friend in Miami that her brother Aldi is coming up soon.

29 GP 146 7.0

Suzie calls Bernard. They talk about Suzie's new house. She is a big bourgeoise now. She asks for Sonya's address.

22 GP 5 9.5

(Ti Ben is a nickname for Benoit.) Ti Ben with Suzie. B couldn't come because he wasx busy working but by Saturday he will try to have everything ready. She will call him and let him know. Suzie asks B if they are already on strike. B says medical school hasn't started yet. B proposed a plan for a strike but three of them didn't like the idea. They decided to wait and see what happens. Suzie asks B if he has news from Haiti. He heard some troops had landed in Haiti. Suzie asks what kind of rumors he had heard. B: "Duvalier has burned half of Cap Haitien. A Haitian told him that". Suzie has heard that there was a landing in Haiti and Duvalier killed 15,000 people. One Thursday a newspaper El ? announced a landing in Haiti. The newspaper Verdades announced that there had been a wave of repression in Haiti. Some American boats and airplanes were surrounding Haiti. The Haitian government protested to the Americans but the Americans said that it was just a routine check/protection of the islands. Suzie says that Monrod PHILLIPE was shot because of the CINEAS affair. Suzie asks B if he has heard from the Haitian Embassy. No. B's philosophy course had been suspended.

SECRET

END

From 2050, 7 June (Tuesday) to 0700, 8 June 1966

2.0 Out to 25-20-00. Sergio (Martinez Barroso) with Cecilia, who answers. Has lost the address. It is Dante, behind the Hotel Tecali. Dante #23.

2.5 Out to 03. Time is 2200, 7 June.

2.7 Out to 03. No rings.

From 0700 to 2100, 8 June (Wednesday) 1966

After 0915, 8 June

2.7 In. Sra. Olga (v) with Juanita, who answers. The men aren't going to come to lunch. About what to fix lunch....

After 1115, 8 June

3.2 Out to 03, twice. No rings, complete. Time is 1146, 8 June.

After 1345, 8 June

3.5 Out to 03. Time is 1419, 8 June.

3.7 In. Sra. Olga (v) with maid, who answers. They (she and another woman) are coming home for lunch now...about lunch...

4.0 Out to 17-30-59. MI asks WO, who answers, for Jose Mora. Who is calling? A friend from Cuba.
Jose Mora takes phone. MI has a letter for JM from Carlos Mora. Could he come by tonight to pick it up at Cuban Embassy? ALL RIGHT, but if he can't come by tonight, please leave it with "portero" and MO will pick it up tomorrow. Fine. How is Carlos (Mora)? MO did not see him. He (Carlos) only left the letter there at MI's office.
~~XXX~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXX~~
4.5 Out to 24-99-72. Hangs up.

4.7 Out to 35-40-00. MI asks WO, who answers Aeronaves de Mexico, for 4 reservations for tomorrow's flight to Los Mochis. There is no flight tomorrow. There is one day after tomorrow. They fly Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, at 0945. ~~XXXXXXXXX~~ They have to change planes in Culiacan, flight 125. The return flight leaves Los Mochis at 1335 on Tuesdays Thursdays and Saturdays. Then, they will reserve the tickets for day after tomorrow with return flight on Saturday.
WO checks and says the four are confirmed on flight 1009 to Culiacan and they have requested confirmation from there on. Call back tomorrow. Jose Caveira, Hugo del Pino, ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Enrique Lanza and Sergio Martinez are the ones going. Phone 25-09-14, his office phone. His home phone 31-01-06.

After 1800, 8 June

7.0 Out to 09, twice. No rings complete. Olga Martinez Barroso asks for operator 134.
WO takes phone. Re Habana call of Civeira. Still no circuit to Habana. They are out of order.

50-6-52/4

7.5 In. MO asks Olga (v), who answers, for Sr. Civeira.
Civeira takes phone. Blasin (?pn) called. Wanted to talk to C. Fine. They have to go by Aeronaves de Mexico before 1300 for tickets to Los Mochis. There is a flight leaving every day. Martinez Barroso called ~~and there~~ is no flight until day after tomorrow.
MI takes phone. There is no direct flight to Los Mochis. In any case they have to go to pay for tickets. Have to go before 1330. MI will go by so MO and MI can go by for tickets.

8.0 In. WO with maid, who answers...wrong number.

8.2 In. WO with maid, who answers. Asks if this is house of Ambassador. Yes, it is house of Sr. Martinez. WO then says it is wrong number. Maid thinks Martinez B. is Amb.

8.5 In. WO with Juana, who answers, for Enriqueta.
Maid comes to phone. About WO's work...maids...WO and (Sra.) went downstairs at 1500. Maid just got back. Sra. went on to the embassy. About visiting Enriquita this Sunday. WI is not sure if she will be off on Sunday....WO's Sra. is having guests on Saturday evening...

Reel off at RT 10.2, 2100, 8 June 1966

From 2100, 2 June (Thursday) to 0650, 3 June 1966

From 0650, 3 June (Friday) to 0730, 4 June 1966

After 0900, 3 June

2.0 In. WO with WI, her mother (maid), who answers. Both are maid types...about why she has not called...will see one another tomorrow.

2.7 In. Sra. with maid, who answers, about fixing the fish....rice.

After 1240, 3 June

3.7 In. Sra. with maid, who answers, about lunch....They will be home around 1330 or 1400. Set table in dining room - for four people.

4.7 In. Sra. with maid, who answers. They are leaving now so she can start frying the fish.

After 1435, 3 June
After 1930, 3 June

5.0 In. No answer.

After 2120, 3 June

5.2 Out to 03. Time is 2253, 3 June.

From 0730, 4 June (Saturday) to 0855, 5 June 1966

After 0950, 4 June

5.5 In. Sra. with maid, who answers. Is everything all right? Yes. Has Juanita left (for my off)? Not yet.

After 1200, 4 June

5.7 In. Sra. with maid, who answers. Has Juanita left? No. Peal some potatoes to fry them...

After 1445, 4 June

6.0 In. MO with Sra., Olga, who answers. MO is her husband. MO is going home now. MO had to come to the Embassy with some things because he got the interview (appt) today. He is coming now.

After 1640, 4 June

6.2 Out to 14-13-26. MI asks MO, who answers at Cuban Embassy, if ????Rubio??? left. About 30 minutes ago. MO is Jorrin.

After 1900, 4 June

6.5 In, 4 times. No answer, complete. WO with maid, who answers.

6.5 contd.
Maid types...WO called a while ago, but got no answer. WI has been here....Is WI going home tomorrow? Yes. WO can't go because she doesn't have money...WI will lend her money....WO is going to quit her job. WI is not happy either....WI is Enriqueta. WO will see if she can go tomorrow....

After 2130, 4 June

11.0 In. WO with Enriqueta, who answers. WO is waiting for her. She has been ringing the bell...about going home...WO is on the corner of Melchor Ocampo right now...WI just awakened....

From 0855 to 1915, 5 June (Sunday) 1966

11.2 In. MO with Juanita (maid), who answers. Asks if ....? (Sra.) is there. Will see. Check to see (if she or he) is asleep.
Juanita takes phone. Yes, someone is asleep because (he or she) had guard duty. All right.

12.0 In. MO with Juanita, who answers. Asks if Sergio is up. No, went to sleep very late. Does MO want to talk to the Sra? No, just tell him when he awakens that they are waiting for him at the Embassy.

12.2 Out to 14-~~32~~ 13-26. Sergio with MO, who answers. Did MO call? Yes. They wanted to know if he was up. Sergio will be at the Embassy in 30 minutes. About sending a car for him if there is a car there - in 30 minutes. There is no one there now (with a car), but will send one if one arrives.

13.0 Out to 14-13-26. Sergio asks Nico, who answers, for Lasa (ph).
MO takes phone. Hasn't no one gone by (a car)? No one is there. Sergio will go there now.

13.2 In. Lansa (or Lasa) with Olga, who answers. Has Sergio left? Yes. He waited for a while for Hugo to come for him in car. Sergio has not car. But he has left now...Sergio spent all night at Embassy on guard duty.

13.7 Out to 14-13-26. Olga with Nico, who answers. Has Sergio left? He just left.

~~After 1230, 5 June~~
After 1530, 5 June

14.0 In. No answer.

Reel off at RT 14.2, 1915, ~~6~~5 June 1966

From 0810, 1 June (Wednesday) to 0645, 2 June (Thursday) 1966

After 1100, 1 June

2.0 In. WO with WI, who answers. WO needs some pamphlets for schoolwork. She has wrong number. This is house of Amb.

2.2 In. WO with WI, who answers. (Maid types...WI is WO's mther.) Why didn't WO call her yesterday, was woried about her....abot what WO has done....will come by to see her in a little bit.

After 1230, 1 June

2.5 Out to 03. Time is 1250, 1 June.

After 1500, 1 June

3.0 Out to 14-13-26. Dials without dial ~~ing~~ tone.
Out to 14-13-26. Olga (inside) with WO, who answers at Cuban Embassy. Olga has to do an errand and will be in a little late. Remember to get ready to go "there." Olga will go, but later on. Is Olga better? A little better...grippe. Olga is at home now.

3.0 Out to 03. Time is 1519, 1 June.

After 1635, 1 June

After 2120, 1 June

3.2 Out to 03. Time is 2251, 1 June.

Reel off at RT 3.2, 0645, 2 June 1966

JUN 6

From 0645 to 2100, 2 June (Thursday) 1966

2.0 Out to 03, twice. No rings, complete. Time is 0737, 2 June.

After 0900, 2 June

2.2 Out to 03. Dials without dial tone.

2.2 Out to 03. Time is 1042, 2 June.

After 1210, 2 June

2.2 Out to 03. Time is 1303, 2 June.

2.5 Out to 17-89-76. WI (maid) with WO, who answers. Want Sr. Torres to go by check a stove - Manuel Todos Santos. He has not come by (although they phoned previously). Manuel Todos los Santos 7-79A.

After 1410, 2 June

2.7 In. WO with Kata (maid), who answers. How is everything? Fine. Has child had lunch? Yes. Juanita is with child - upstairs. Had a good lunch....WO is child's mother.

After 1610, 2 June

3.0 Out to 03. Time is 1638, 2 June.

After 1830, 2 June

3.2 In. WO with WI (maid), who answers. Greetings. (WO is WI's daughter.) How did things go? Fine. Will they go home this weekend? WO can't. Doesn't have money. WI got her money. Is Sra. going to pay her every 2 weeks? Thinks so. How much did she pay her? $200. Sra. told Juanita that she didn't want WI to go to WO's house. Got very angry the other day and made a scene at the Embassy with WO's Sra., that it looked like she was trying to steal her maid. Made a scene in front of everyone. That is why she doesn't want WI to go to WO's house (WO works for a woman of Cuban Embassy too). WO went with the Sra. to Sears. They (people where she works) went out last night. WO was afraid. They were throwing stones from the other house. Sra. said that these were the Americans who are angry with the Cubans. That there may even be war if they continue this way (maids interpretation of U.S.-Cuba relations). WO says neither Sr. nor Sra. were there last night. WI says that she and her husband (that is couple for whom she works) have to be on guard duty tonight and won't be home until very late. Also they are not coming to have dinner.

Sra. where WO works paid her for 15 days yesterday, but WO prefers she pay her whole month. Will tell her.

3.2 contd.

WO thinks she won't stay long with Sra. They expect more and more or her. They went to Sears today and walked all the way. She (Sra.) won't pay for a cab. This time el Señor took them (there), but after that and other times, never pays for a cab. A lot of walking and WO's feet are swollen from so much walking. Then, WO is not bad off there. She is alone there (doesn't work with another person), not so much work...Will see about this.

WO will phone WI on Saturday. WI only goes out in the mornings. And not always...Juanita sometimes goes for chicken and tortillas...

Reel off at RT 5.0, 2100, 2 June 1966

14-00000

LIFEAT

HMM-09775 TDCS0314/09444-65	Travel to Mexico of Family of Emilio Cordero Michel Dominican Exile
HMM-10084 CS-311/01530-66	El Siglo XXI, Publishing House to be Directed by Arnoldo Orfila Reynal
MEXI7065 IN-01912 -80476	Dissatisfaction of PVP with Max Pastor Parra Leader of the JSC (Communist Youth) Costa Rica

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XXXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Santo Domingo

INFO: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Coverage of Dominican Embassy, Mexico City

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Attached for Addressees' information and retention are copies of the transcripts of the LIFEAT coverage of the Dominican Embassy in Mexico City, reels 21 through 34 for the period 2 to 9 May 1966.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:
As stated above, h/w

Distribution:
2 - COS, Santo Domingo, w/atts
1 - Chief, WHD, w/atts

CS COPY

50-6-32/4

1 att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-28943	10 May 1966
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	50-9-3

1990

attachment to HMMA-28843

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.

2 mayo 66.

L2-M2-T21-

1045-1730 hrs.-

00- - Entrada.- 1045 hrs.- (conversación iniciada)- HD GUZMAN con HF hacen planes para verse pero GUZMAN dejó ayer el chofer que tenia y CARLOS no puede salir solo porque tiene licencia de la Republica y que le digas " al amigo que estamos como un clavo arriba de la carretera con la punta para arriba y que no hay que apurarse por la otra cuestión y que le des un abrazo y ya sabes que estamos aquí por si no nos volvemos a ver o a hablar". HF que está bien.- 12-

12- - Bloqueado.- 24-

24- Entrada.- 1048 hrs.- HF pregunta que requisitos hay para sacar visa a Santo Domingo o ir a trabajar por dos meses allá. MARINA pregunta si tienen algún contrato para trabajar. HF que si que es de una oficina de contadores para ir a hacer unas auditorias en Santo Domingo y algunas poblaciones del interior y que la oficina esta acreditada y es la Hans & Hans. MARINA dice que hace falta una carta bancaria y otra de la oficina donde trabaja, certificado de conducta de la policia, tres fotografias y llenar un formulario y si es urgente pagar el cable para su contestación rapida ya que si es por oficio tarda de 20 a 25 dias y urgente son 5 o 6 dias, y que cabe aclarar si van a trabajar para el Gobierno entonces es distinto. HF que despues que pase a verla le dirá como están las cosas.- 59-

atch to HMMA-28843

50-6-33/

59- Salida.- MARINA reclama los sobres que no le han llegado. HF BERMUDEZ dice que hoy mismo pasa a dejarlos.- 74-

74- -Bloqueado.- ruidos.- 86-

86- Entrada.- HF por datos para visa para ir a Santo Domingo como turista. MARINA le proporciona los datos.- 108-

108- Salida.- (Carteros Zona Uno)- MARINA saluda al señor INCLAN y pregunta si hay alguna valija para la embajada. Este dice que no hay nada.- 118-

118- Salida al 03 por la hora.-1103 hrs.- 121-

121- Salida.- 1108 hrs.- MARINA por MIGNON. HF dice que no está.- 127-

127- Salida al 13-21-92.- GUZMAN pregunta por el Lic. ENRIQUEZ SAVIÑON. HF dice que anda por la sub-dirección. GUZMAN pide se le diga que le llamaré mas tarde porque ahora sale a la calle - 136-

136- Entrada.- 1155 hrs.- HF pregunta por el Embajador, de parte del señor GRULLON de la República Dominicana. TAPIA dice que el embajador no está y que el puede atenderlo. Despues HF GRULLON CORDERO saluda a TAPIA y dice que ayer llegó y quería avisarle a MARCIO si es que estaba lista la película de nosotros o sea CAÑA BRAVA para hacer las pruebas. TAPIA dice que MARCIO tiene mas de 15 días en Santo Domingo. GRULLON que ésta tarde a las seis van a tener la exhibición de la película para que

(hoja dos) ...

... la vean. TAPIA aclara que MARCIO tiene mes y medio en Santo Domingo. GRULLON creía que la semana pasada se había venido para acá. TAPIA que no que sigue allá y que hay como diez o doce compañeros dominicanos a las conferencias que hay y tiene compromisos con cenas, reuniones, etc. y que verán la forma de reunirse pronto. Después HD MAZO (?) saluda a FRANK GRULLON CORDERO. Este dice que le manda saludos VICTOR y que anoche llegué. MAZO dice que hoy recibió una carta de FELLO y le dice que tu venías para acá y que iba a tratar en Gobernación lo de la visa. GRULLON dice que ya se la dieron y ya los avisó por cable y que hoy van a tener la exhibición de la película en el Condominio de los Productores de la avenida División del Norte a las seis de la tarde. MAZO tratará de estar allí pues conoce el lugar. GRULLON que trate de llevar a todos los que pueda pues es una película "muy nuestra" y si algo se ofrece estoy en el Hotel Reforma. HD es el Coronel MARCOS JORGE MORENO y dice que también el lo puede llamar a su casa al 49-12-92. GRULLON que está bien.- 183-

183- Entrada.- 1208 hrs.- MIGNON saluda a TERE y pregunta por MARINA. Esta dice que acaba de salir y le avisa que ya está viviendo de nuevo en los apartamentos Carmen pues antes vivió dos años allí. MIGNON conoce a la dueña de los apartamentos o sea doña CARMEN y lo mejor que tiene TERE es que tiene su tranquilidad de espíritu y no es espectadora de nada y además eres muy inteligente para llevar bien las cosas. TERE da las gracias y dice que presisamente por eso lo hizo. MIGNON pide diga a MARINA a su regreso que le llamó y que desea a TERE que resuelva sus problemas de sus hijos y se vuelva a casar y cambia de tema y dice que ella se va a fin de mes para la patria. TERE

(hoja tres) ...

...le dá gusto saber que se vá y cree que ya todo está en calma. MIGNON cree que le pueda tocar alguna bala. TERE que nada de eso pues ella hace poco regresó y encontró aquello muy distinto. MIGNON pregunta cual es la impresión que TERE traé de allá. Esta dice que " .. bueno.. pues JUAN BOSH.. tiene la mayoría". MIGNON que entonces nada hay que hablar " y como tu sabes que JUAN y yó somos como dos hermanos, tu puedes tener la absoluta seguridad y eso no te lo digo por hablar, porque a mí no me gusta hablar mucho; que si algo puedo hacer por tí, lo haré". TERE le da las gracias. MIGNON agrega " y con toda justicia porque te lo mereces". TERE sigue dando las gracias y ella bién sabe como MIGNON se lleva con los amigos dominicanos. MIGNON sigue ofreciendo su ayuda y comenta: " ..Pues.. JUAN lo primero que me va a decir.. mira vieja - porque así me dice "vieja"-- y sientate aquí y dí lo que tu quieres", así lo que yo pueda hacer por tí TERE basta y sobra que sea madre y tengas dos hijos para que yo te ayude con todo mi corazón. TERE que gracias y gracias.. gracias.- 217-

217- Bloqueado.- 224-

224- Salida.- 1215 hrs.- Coronel FERNANDEZ pide envien un agente de seguros de la AMA para que vean su auto y llenar los requisitos o bien pasar a su domicilio que es Herodoto 30-102 y con teléfono 45-98-23. MF toma nota y ofrece enviar al agente. - 254-

254- Entrada.- 1234 hrs.- MF por el Corl. JORGE MORENO. TAPIA dice que no está. MF es SONIA -pero antes dijo que era MIROSLAVA- y pregunta como está. TAPIA dice que bien pero la otra noche ...

(hoja cuatro)

... ella no se quiso dormir con él. SONIA dice que como quería "que me acostara contigo si allí estaba mi hijo, y además estabas muy borracho y traías una pistola que hasta de balazos le querías dar al perro.. y hasta me pusiste bien espantada y dije ..hay. en la madre.." TAPIA si recuerda algo de eso y tuvo que decirle a un chofer de taxi en la calle que se llevara su auto a su casa porque "yo ya no podía manejar". SONIA dice que " vi que estabas muy encabronado y no sabía que hacer" y que se acaba de cambiar de casa y su nuevo teléfono es 43-29-67 y que le avise lo mismo al Corl.MORENO y que alguno de ellos le preste $500.00 para acabar de cambiarse a su departamento nuevo. TAPIA está sin un centavo y están en espera de que llegue "la paga".- 324-

324- Entrada.- 1240 hrs.- HF de la agencia de viajes Ultra-Mar Express para datos o requisitos de visa. TAPIA proporciona los datos.- 355-

355- Salidas ocupadas y sin contestación.- 405-

405- Entrada.- 1250 hrs.- HF con su amor TERESITA para disculparse que ayer no le pudo hablar pues anduvo por la Universidad. TERE por estar esperando su llamada no salió del hotel. HF se apellida CARDOSO y dice que anduvo con ANGEL y con LEONEL y que despues del futbol se fueron a casa de LEONEL y pregunta si tiene dinero que le preste. TERE dice que no le han pagado. CARDOSO necesita dinero para comprarse zapatos y quiere que TERE aunque sea consiga dinero prestado. TERE tratará de ver si consigue porque ella tambien quiere comprarse zapatos.- CARDOSO si consigue el dinero pide le llame antes de las cinco y media al 17-81-00.- 479-

(hoja cinco)

14-00000

479- Salida.- GUZMAN pide comunicarse a papeleria. MF dice que llame mas tarde porque la señora salió a comer.- 499-

499- Salida.- GUZMAN pregunta por el Lic. ENRIQUEZ. MF dice que salió a comer y no tarda y ella lo llamará en cuanto llegue. GUZMAN que sea antes de las dos porque los pasaportes que dijo ENRIQUEZ que iba a enviar no han llegado y los está esperando para sus visas de cortesia tal como lo trataron en la mañana. MF va a investigar eso y despues le avisará.- 516-

516- Entrada.- 1325 hrs.- CRISTINA con GUZMAN y con TERE para saber si se ven mas tarde y se ponen a "cotorrear" sobre vestidos y deudas que tienen.- 569-

569- Salida al 24-51-29.- 1333 hrs.- MARINA con MIGNON para avisar que ya está el Coronel MAURICIO FERNANDEZ en las oficinas pero si le quiere llamar a su casa es el 45-98-23 y que hay otro el de su recamara pero no recuerda bien que número es, y que le llegaron dos cartas y una es para el Patronato de las Actividades de Alta Especialización Docente del Instituto Politecnico Nacional y otra de Santo Domingo que cree que es de NELSON ANTONIO ARCINIEGA dice que es para ella. MIGNON ofrece pasar o llamarle mañana a FERNANDEZ y recoger esas cartas.- 616

616- Salida.- (Instituto de Cardiología)- MARINA pregunta el teléfono de Nutrición. MF que es el 19-57-00.- 631-

631- Salida al 19-57-00.- 1339 hrs.- (Nutrición)- MARINA pregunta por el Dr. GARCIA PATRONI. MF dice que espere un momento. MARINA espera y despues cuelga.- 684- (hoja seis)

684- Entrada sin contestación.- 692-

692- Entrada.- MF por YADIRA.- ya salió.- 695-

695- Entrada.- 1602 hrs.- sin contestación.- 750-

750- Salida al 13-21-92.- 1720 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta por el Lic. ENRIQUEZ. MF dice que regresa en una hora. GUZMAN le volverá a llamar.- 767-

767- Salida al 18-07-00.- 1725 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta por el Dr. SCHEKER. MF dice que es la ext.808 pero no contesta. GUZMAN pide se le diga que le llamó.- 810-

810- Entrada.- 1728 hrs.- TERE pregunta que quieren con ella. GUZMAN dice que fué don RENE quien le llamó y quiere saber si recogió el sobre que le dió YADIRA. TERE lo tiene en el cuarto y que despues le iban a decir con quien habia que mandarlo. TERE pregunta si la monja llegó. TERE no sabe pues ella acabad de llegar. GUZMAN que entonces mañana van a mandar ese sobre con TAPIA y que está lacrado. TERE dice que tiene un sello de la COPREDAL. GUZMAN que asi es.- 855-

855- Entrada.- 1730 hrs.- MF saluda a GUZMAN y pregunta que van a tomar "la fria". GUZMAN está aquí trabajando y que por eso llamó a YADIRA para recoger un sobre, pero ya se solucionó. MF si le da tiempo lo espera para tomar un café.- 890-

- -

. . . (..7.-12- 2 may.66)

4989 ..1.-

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.

2 mayo 66.

L2-M2-T22-

1755-1824 hrs.-

00- Salida al 18-07-00.- 1755 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta por el Dr. SCHEKER.- sin contestación.- 18-

18- Salida al 13-21-92.- 1810 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta por el Lic. ENRIQUEZ. HF dice que espere un momento. Despues ENRIQUEZ se disculpa con "el doctor" GUZMAN porque resulta que la camioneta del banco chocó y alli iban las personas que le entregarian los pasaportes. GUZMAN dice que de eso queria avisar pues llegaron a verlo a las dos y cinco con los pasaportes y ya se les dio la visa por un año con entrada y salida y asi que ya no hay problema y no se les cobró ningún centavo y cambiando de tema sobre el asunto que le consultó en la mañana, ENRIQUEZ que lo tiene pendiente pero uno de los que comisionó para eso se enfermó pero mañana sin falta se lo informa y ya recuerda que es sobre los datos de CORTINA PORTILLA (del Lic.EUSTAQUIO CORTINA PORTILLO de quien piden datos confidenciales para el gobierno dominicano). GUZMAN que si y que tiene entendido que uno de los hermanos de CORTINA es director de la Financiera. ENRIQUEZ va a pedir mayores datos y mañana se los informará. GUZMAN cambia de tema y pregunta si fué a ver al Dr.SCHEKER. ENRIQUEZ dice que no, pero que le consiguió la cita con SANCHEZ MIRELES (del ISSTE) y no se lo pudo comunicar porque tuvo que atender a la delegación belga y todo el dia estuvo con ellos. GUZMAN que entonces mañana le llamará.- 44- (hoja uno)

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44- Salida sin contestación.- varias veces.- y ocupado.-75-

75- Salida al 18-52-86.- 1824 hrs.- (Seguros)- GUZMAN pide comunicarse a Papeleria, preguntar por LUCHITA GAMAS. MF dice que espere un momento. Despues MF dice que nadie contesta y si quiere le ~~puede~~ dar recado. GUZMAN que le diga que le llame a la embajada.- 122-

122- Entrada.- LUCHITA con su amor GUZMAN para disculparse que a la una salió a comer y hace rato ya iba de salida y que ahora que lo vea le dirá como hacerle para le llame sin problemas. GUZMAN pasará por ella a las siete "y adios chula".-134-

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. - . (..2.-L2-2 mayo 66)

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EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.
3 mayo 66.
L2-M2-T23-
0910-1123 hrs.-

00- Entrada sin contestación.- 04-

04- Salida al 39-68-50.- 0910 hrs.- HORTENSIA pregunta por su amor ARMANDO RODRIGUEZ, pero le informan que no está.- 11-

11- Salida.- HORTENSIA con su otro amor RAFAEL para reprocharle que ayer la dejó esperando. RAFAEL no pudo y se citan para el lunes a la misma hora y mismo lugar.- 23-

23- Salida al 22-68-29.- 0944 hrs.- HORTENSIA pregunta por HERNANDEZ. Despues GUZMAN pregunta a HERNANDEZ si ya tiene las cosas del Coronel. Este dice que no que hasta mañana pasará a dejarlos. GUZMAN que pase hoy por la franquicia de los cigarrillos.- 42-

42- -Bocina descolgada y salida ocupada.- 55-

55- Entrada.- 1030 hrs.- Coronel FERNANDEZ saluda a MARINA y pide diga a don RENE que no podrá llegar a la embajada porque sigue enfermo. Despues GUZMAN dice que se cuide por el mal tiempo y que si algo se ofrece le mandará avisar y ademas hay una invitación de la Presidencia de la Republica para la toma o jura de la bandera el dia 5 en el socalo de la ciudad.- 80-

80- Salida al 12-25-78.- 1036 hrs.- (Oficina Internacional del Trabajo)- CARMITA de parte de GUZMAN pide hablar con el Director o Sub-Director. MF dice que espere un momento. Despues GUZMAN saluda a GERALDO DE MELLO EBOLI Director General y dice que acaban de recibir un oficio de la Cancilleria de Santo Domingo para solicitar la inscripción del señor PEDRO MOTA MORILLO que es Director General de Servicios de Empleos y Registro de Desocupados del Ministerio del Trabajo y que figura como candidato del país al curso regional de los servicios de empleos en el Perú para el mes de Agosto y quiere saber si hay que mandar algún oficio o nota. EBOLI que solo una nota confirmando ésta conversación teléfonica y que por vuelta de correo notifique a Santo Domingo que es indispensable que el gobierno me mande los formularios específicos. GUZMAN dice ya tenerlos en la mano y se los podrá proporcionar. EBOLI que está bien y que el mientras mandará un cable a Ginebra notificando esto ingreso para continuar con los formularios en la selección de candidatos. GUZMAN que gracias.- 129-

129- Salida.- (Air France)- GUZMAN pregunta el vuelo 700 que ruta tiene. MF que es el 702 y sale México-N.Y.-París- Niza y sale martes, jueves, viernes, sabados y domingos y hasta el 31 de mayo es el 702 pero despues cambia al 700 sin llegar a Niza.- - 142-

142- Entrada.- 1051 hrs.- MF secretario de la Embajada de Corea pregunta por GUZMAN para agradecerle su cooperación para asistir a la ceremonia de las credenciales de la Embajada de Corea y quiere saber cuando es la toma de posesión Presidencial. GUZMAN dice que las elecciones son el primero de Junio, pero no se ..
(hoja dos)

... sabe que dia es la toma de posesión. MF que quiere saber la fecha para poder mandar una delegación de su país a esa toma. GUZMAN ofrece comunicarselo a su tiempo. MF que gracias. - 168-

168- Salida al 03 por la hora.- 1053 hrs.- y bocina descolgada.- - 175-

175- Salida al 09.- 1056 hrs.- sin contestación.- 182- MARINA desea se le informe sobre unas llamadas que hicieron a Santo Domingo despues de 29 de abril. MF que llame al 18-82-20.- 187-

187- Salida al 18-82-20.- 1058 hrs.- sin contestación.- 196- MARINA desea saber el importe de llamadas de larga distancia a Santo Domingo a partir del 29 de abril pasado. MF dice que necesitan que ellos den las fechas y lugares a donde llamaron. -209-

209- Salida.- MD pregunta el teléfono de la Canada Dry. MF que es el 17-31-27.- 221-

221- Entrada.- 1102 hrs.- HF de una agencia de viajes pide datos para visa a pasaporte mexicano. TURC le proporciona los requisitos.- 247-

247- Salida al 43-37-50.- 1105 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta sobre el asunto o pedido para el Coronel FERNANDEZ. MF dice que todavia se hacen la nota y que mande a su chofer a las cinco a recoger el pedido en las oficinas de Diagonal San Antonio en el 2do.piso. GUZMAN que está bien y en todo caso mandará al hijo del coronel. - 267-

(hoja tres)

4988

7- Salida ocupada.- 274-

274- Salida al 19-56-10.- 1111 hrs.- sin contestación.- ocupada. - 300- (Instituto de Cardiología)- GUZMAN pregunta por el Dr. PEGUERO de Consulta Externa. HF dice que espere un momento. -346- HD GRULLON saluda a PEGUERO y pregunta como se siente. Este dice que ya un poco mejor. PEGUERO que hay que hacer planes para ir mañana a Zacahuisco y que se ponga de acuerdo con GUZMAN que tiene auto, y pregunta si le ha llegado algo para él. GRULLON que solo una correspondencia de credito educativo y tambien para el Dr. EDUARDO ALVAREZ porque cree que es dinero. PEGUERO que si es asi se lo recoja y se lo lleve. Despues PEGUERO saluda a TAPIA. Esta pregunta con quien comentó lo de la otra noche que anduvieron " con las viejas". PEGUERO dice que con nadie. TAPIA dice que ayer le llamó la mujer "esa" (SONIA) y que hay que organizarse para verla mañana "pues creo que todavia está borracha".- risas.- Quedan de verse mañana a las siete y media en casa de PEGUERO y que irá tambien PATRONI. Despues GRULLON le informa que tambien hay un sobre de la Dirección de Bellas Artes y de Educación para pedir datos de sus becas para su credito educativo y que está firmado por el Vice-Ministro de Educación RAFAEL GONZALEZ TIRADO. PEGUERO se entera y pide se la lleve para ver ese asunto y llenar el cuestionario.-419-

419- - Bloqueado.- 423-

423- Salida al 12-16-39.- 1121 hrs.- CARMITA con HECTOR RENDON (el maricón) para saber si se ven hoy por la tarde. HECTOR dice que esta trabajando por las tardes. CARMITA quiere ir a la Villa a dejarle unas cosas que le llegaron a SALVADOR (RENDON) - 440-

(hoja cuatro)

440- Entrada.- 1125 hrs.- HF de la ANCOSAD pregunta por TAPIA. CAROITA dice que espere. Despues HF cobrador de ANCOSAD para saber si puede pasar a dejar sus recibos. TAPIA dice que está muy flojo de dinero y le pagará los tres juntos en cuanto llegue su cheque. HF que el reglamento es que si se acumulan tres recibos se le dará de baja. TAPIA dice que se los lleve juntos. HF que es dificil localizarlo ni por teléfono. TAPIA que antes de venir le llame para preparar su dinero.- 465-

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. - . (..5.-12-3 may.66)

4904..1.-

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.

3 mayo 66

L2-M2-T24-

1218-1344 hrs.-

00- Entrada sin contestación fuera y bloqueado.- 15-

15- Salida al 35-56-08.- 1218 hrs.- (Oficialia Mayor de Gobernación)- GUZMAN pregunta por la Licenciada MONTERO para saludarla y avisarle que ayer le mandó unas notas. MONTERO dice que espere un momento. Despues HF dice que sobre sus peticiones de visa de ANTONIO JORGE GARCIA se está localizando y creo que para mañana esté lista y de los otros tres ya están haciendo los oficios y mañana mismo pueden pasar por ellos. GUZMAN que por favor y que sobre todo el del sobrino del agregado militar. HF EMILIANO SANCHEZ FEON dice que está bien.- 41-

41- Salida sin contestación.- 60-

60- Entrada.- 1246 hrs.- HF hija de la señora ALVAREZ pregunta por FRANK TAPIA para saludarlo y explicar que el paquete que le mandan a su hermano es una trampa para cazar tigres. TAPIA que entonces el va a informar a Relaciones porque el no va a poder pedir una exoneración de fuero diplomatico en un bulto que contiene una cosa simple ya que pueden creer que estoy metiendo contrabando y si fuera ropa o alguna cosa de comer lo haría, pero en ese caso se tienen que pagar cerca de mil dolares de impuesto por una simple trampa para caceria. HF que entonces de todos modos gracias.- 83- (hoja uno)

4991

83- Entrada sin contestación.- 87-

87- Entrada.- 1305 hrs.- HF pregunta por TERESITA PEÑA. TAPIA dice que espere.- cortan.- 98-

98- Salida al ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~.- (Centro de Capacitación)- TERE PEÑA pregunta por el maestro TENORIO.- cortan.- 112-

112- Salida sin contestación.- 117-

117- Salida al 12-04-40.- 1310 hrs.- MARTHA pregunta el precio de los cubiertos que vio el anuncio en Novedades. HF que salió a comer el personal y es mejor que llame mas tarde porque ella no sabe.- 124-

124- Entrada.- 1311 hrs.- HF por GUZMAN, CARMITA dice que no está y que si deja recado.- 131-

131- Salida ocupada.- y sin contestación.- 141-

141- Salida al 46-10-02.- 1321 hrs.- MARINA saluda a LULY y pregunta como han estado .. bla.. bla..- asuntos familiares. - y falta de sirvientas.- 210-

210- Salida al 19-13-09.- 1328 hrs.- ocupado.- 213- MARINA pregunta por la señora MUÑOZ PEÑA para saludarla. Esta dice que no le pegaron y que sigue sintiendose enferma. MARINA dice que mañana pueden pasar por ella para llevarla a Cardiologia y le den una revisada.- bla.. bla..- sin importancia.- 241- (hoja dos)

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241- Entrada.- 1330 hrs.- HF de la Agregaduria Militar de la Embajada de Venezuela, quiere saber si el Agregado Militar de la Dominicana va a ir a la Asociación de Agregado Militares. MARINA dice que no están los militares y que mañana le podrá informar. HF que resulta que estan en reunión los agregados y lo están esperando. MARINA va a tratar de localizarlo para darle su recado.- HF que ella está en el 14-36-20.- 261-

261- Salida al 49-12-92.- 1333 hrs.- MARINA pregunta por el Coronel MARCO JORGE MORENO. HF EDELINA dice que no está. HD es TITO PEÑA y dice que llamaron de la Asociación de Agregados Militares y que los estan esperando o que llame al 14-36-20. ADEVILA que está bien.-286-

286- Salida al 03 por la hora.- 1334 hrs.- 290-

290- Salida al 19-85-90.- 1337 hrs.- (Suits Emperador)- CARMITA pregunta por el señor DEL OLMO de la oficina de Turismo. HF dice que espere un momento, despues le dice que no está.- 307-

307- Entrada.- 1338 hrs.- HF por GUZMAN. HORTENSIA dice que no está. HF LIBONEY (?) pregunta entonces por TAPIA. HORTENSIA dice que espere un momento. Despues LIBONEY saluda a TAPIA y pregunta como está la familia. TAPIA que bien. LIBONEY dice que va a mandar a su esposa a Puerto Rico a que la operen allí porque así se sienteeeon mas tranquilidad y aquí tiene muchos problemas y quiere arreglar los documentos sacando - pasaporte dominicano. TAPIA dice que no hay problema y que el tiene que hacer un permiso para que su esposa salga o sacando un acta notarial.- TAPIA no sabe muy bien como está eso pero ...

(hoja tres)

... es mejor que se legalice bien o saque un pasaporte mexicano de la niña porque sino despues van a descubrir el truco de que cuando llegó o donde está la visa de la niña, etc. y hay que aclarar que ella nació en México. LIBONEY que está bien y pregunta si TAPIA sale de vacaciones. TAPIA dice que no podrá salir. LIBONEY si algo se le ofrece le llamará a la embajada. - 353-

353- Entrada.- 1342 hrs.- HF con su amor YADIRA para avisarle que se podrán ver hasta mas tarde porque tiene mucho trabajo. - 372-

372- Salida ocupada.- 381-

381- Salida al 11-84-20.- 1344 hrs.- YADIRA pregunta por TAPIA primero y despues por la señora AIDA. HF dice que espere un momento.- YADIRA espera y cuelga.- 410-

410- Salida ocupada.- 414-

414- Entrada sin contestación.- 419-

419- Entrada.- RENE FIALLO pregunta por TERE PEÑA. HORTENSIA dice que espere un momento. Despues RENE dice a TERE que lo espere un momento en unos 10 o 12 minutos para poner unas cosas al escritorio de TAPIA y de GUZMAN.- 437-

437- Entrada.- HF por FRANK. FIALLO dice que no está. HF Es NATACHA SANCHEZ DE TAPIA (esposa de FRANK TAPIA) y saluda a RENE y se despiden familiarmente.- 455- (hoja 4- L2-3 may.66)

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EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 23-77-85.

3 mayo 66.

L2-M2-T25-

1724-1730 hrs.-

00- Salida al 45-98-23.- 1724 hrs.- GUZMAN saluda a la niña AURORA y pregunta por su papá el Coronel MAURICIO FERNANDEZ. Esta dice que está en el baño. Despues doña JOSEFA (esposa de FERNANDEZ) dice que espere un momento. Luego GUZMAN pregunta a "CHIFU" FERNANDEZ como se siente. Este dice que bien. GUZMAN pregunta si puede mandar a su hijo CARLOS por las cosas o GUZMAN mismo va por ellas. FERNANDEZ que mejor vaya el porque CARLOS no está. GUZMAN que está bien.- 24-

24- Salida.- GUZMAN pregunta por la señorita. MF dice que le llame al otro teléfono.- 30-

30- Salida al 43-58-77.- 1730 hrs.- (Importadora Mercantil - Mexican)- GUZMAN pregunta si ya tiene listo el pedido del coronel FERNANDEZ. MF dice que en cinco minutos estará listo. GUZMAN mandará a su chofer con una tarjeta a recoger todo. MF que está bien y que es Diagonal San Antonio 1116-segundo piso. -47-

47- Entrada sin contestación.- 51-

- - - - - (1*- L2- 3 may.66)

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EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-35.-

4 mayo 66.

L2-M2-123-

0930-1032 hrs.-

51- Salidas ocupadas.- 60-

60- Salida al 22-62-29.- 0930 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta a HERNANDEZ si mañana se van o puede pasar hoy a la embajada. ~~XXXXXX~~ HERNANDEZ podrá pasar a verlo mas tarde a su cuarto del hotel. GUZMAN dice que ya no está en el hotel sino en un departamento de la calle Petén #347-5. HERNANDEZ pasará mañana entre diez a once a verlo.-86-

86- Entrada.- 0933 hrs.- HF por el horario de atención de parte de la Volkswagen de México. GUZMAN que de diez a dos de lunes a viernes solamente.- 90-

90- Salida al 35-51-37.- 0940 hrs.- GUZMAN desean comprar 100 ejemplares de la Cartilla Diplomática escrita por LEONARDO - ENRIQUEZ. MT dice que se le pasará el pedido a la persona que se encarga de los pedidos. -113-

113- Entrada.- 0946 hrs.-HF reclama el pago de renta de las - oficinas donde está la Embajada y se debe el mes de abril y el mes que cursa. GUZMAN no sabe de eso y es mejor llamar el jueves porque hoy casi ni vendrán las empleadas.- 127-

127- (hoja dos)

127- Salida al 10-08-17.- 1000 hrs.- CARMITA pregunta por MIGUEL HERNANDEZ. HF que ha de ser MIGUEL GONZALEZ pero no está. CARMITA dice que hay un encargo que entregarle y que se comunique a la embajada. MF que está bien.- 152-

152- Entrada.- 1013 hrs.- HF por GUZMAN para avisar que la persona encargada de surtir las cartillas diplomáticas no contesta su teléfono y tratará de estarle llamando para surtir su pedido.- 163-

163- Entrada.- 1015 hrs.- Dr. CABRERA saluda a GUZMAN y pregunta por TAPIA. GUZMAN dice que no está. CABRERA quedó de llamar hoy con TAPIA para el asunto de una carta que le iba a hacer. GUZMAN dirá a TAPIA sobre su asunto. CABRERA dice que pasará como a la una a la embajada.- 172-

172- Entrada.- HF pregunta la dirección del Consulado. MARINA que es Durango 217 esquina con Valladolid.- 177-

177- Entrada.- MIGUEL GONZALEZ se reporta y pregunta por CARMITA. Esta dice que ella le llamó para avisarle que tiene una carta y un litro de ron que le quiere entregar. MIGUEL pasará a la embajada.- 187-

187- Salida al 46-65-70.- 1032 hrs.- YADIRA con su amiga VICTORIA para saber en que paró la novela de la sirvienta.. bla.. bla..- - Y despues comentan sobre el mal tiempo que hace y que llueve mucho " al carajo".- bla.. bla..- YADIRA recibió carta de su mamá que está en Santo Domingo y que se siente enferma de la presión.- se despiden.- 244-

(hoja tres)

244- Salida ocupada.- 253-

255- Entrada.-HP con MARINA para saber si ha llamado MARCOS. Esta dice que no y comentan lo de una pelicula de DOLORES DEL RIO. - 269-

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(..4.- L2- 4 mayo 66)

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EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.

4 mayo 66.

L2-M2-726-

1115-1236 hrs.-

00- - Bloqueado.- 06-

06- Salida al 18-50-40.- 1115 hrs.- (Viana y Cia)- MD pide comunicarse a reparaciones. MF dice que está ocupada la linea y que si espera. MD que está bien.- Despues cuelga.- 77-

77- Entrada.- 1125 hrs.- MF con MARINA para saludarla y comentar sobre el mal tiempo que hay en la ciudad y quedan de verse mas tarde.-94-

94- Entrada.-1130 hrs.- MF por el Coronel JORGE MORENO. MARINA dice que no ha llegado.- 97-

97- Entrada.- MF por el Coronel JORGE. MARINA dice que no ha llegado y solo está FERNANDEZ.- 102-

102- Salida al 18-50-40.- 1133 hrs.- (Viana y Cia)- MD otra vez por el departamento de Reparaciones. MF dice que espere un momento.- despues cuelga.- 146-

146- Salida al 18-50-40.- 1137 hrs.- (Viana)- MD quiere reportar que el refrigerador que compró tiene el foco fundido.- MF dice que espere un momento.- cuelgan.- 199-

(hoja uno)

199- Salida.- 1143 hrs.- (Viana)- HF dice tener tres horas queriendo tratar el asunto de su refrigerador y nadie le hace caso. HF que ella pasa la comunicación al departamento pero nadie contesta.- despues cuelga.- 247-

247- Salida sin contestación.- y ocupado.- 319-

319- Entrada.- 1153 hrs.- HF con MARINA para saber si ha llegado o llamado MARCOS. Esta dice que no, y comentan sobre el mal tiempo que hay en la ciudad y que dicen que en Santo Domingo está nevando, pero no lo creen. Quedan de llamarse mas tarde. - 344-

344- Salida al 12-16-39.- 1157 hrs.- (Petrolizadora)- CARMITA pregunta por HECTOR [illegible]. HF dice que espere un momento. - Despues CARMITA con HECTOR (el de la voz de maricón) para saber que hay de su hermano SALVADOR (novio de CARMITA). Este dice que ha tratado de localizarlo y no lo ha visto y va a ver si el viernes se reunen.- 393-

393- Entrada.- 1201 hrs.- HF Ing. PUGIBET pregunta por el Coronel MORENO. MARINA dice que no ha venido y si gusta dejar recado en caso que venga. PUGIBET que le diga que lo llame a al teléfono 13-09-25 o 13-65-15 y que le diga que estará de seis a ocho de la noche y para mayor dato le diga que es el cuñado del Coronel MORA. MARINA que está bien.- 419-

419- Entrada.- HF por el Corl. MORENO. MARINA cree que ya no regrese hoy.- 424-

(hoja dos)

424- Entrada.- Dr. CABRERA pregunta por el Cónsul TAPIA. MARINA dice que espere un momento. Despues TAPIA informa que ya le dijo a TERE le haga la carta, y puede pasar por ella a eso de la una y media. CABRERA que está bien.- 443-

444- Entrada.- MF por el Corl.JORGE. MARINA dice que no ha llegado.- 447-

447- Salida.- (Despacho Lomeli)- MARIN desea saber sobre los departamentos que se rentan casi frente a la Embajada Dominicana. MF dice que ya se rentaron.- 460-

460- Salida ocupada.- y sin contestación.-515-

515- Entrada.- MF ALVAREZ se reporta. MARINA dice que le llegó una carta de crédito educativo pero dinero no le ha llegado. ALVAREZ tiene desde febrero que no recibe dinero, y que mejor la carta se la abra porque no puede ir a recogerla. MARINA la abre y da lectura de su contenido de la cual piden rinda una declaración sobre sus ingresos de postgraduado y en que hospitales está haciendo sus servicios, con fines de renovar contrato de becado. Y que esas cartas llegaron igual para NEGUERO, PEÑA MELO, YUBERES y GARCIA PATRONI. ALVAREZ que gracias.- 576-

576- Salida ocupada.- 592-

592- Salida.- (Embajada de Haití)- MARIN confirma la asistencia de RENE FIALLO para visitar al Embajador de ese país hoy en la tarde a la reunión invitada. MF que está bien.- 605-

(Sigue [illegible]).

605- Salida ocupada.- 622-

622- Salida.- 1224xhrs.- (Servicio Internacional)- MARINA pregunta si hay algún mensaje o cable para la embajada. HF que no hay ninguno y que llame al 19-09-06.- 636-

650- Salida al 19-09-06.- MARINA pregunta si hay algún cable para la embajada.-HF dice que no hay nada.- 678-

678- Salida.- 1234 hrs.- (Carteros Zona uno)- MARINA pregunta por INCLAN para saber si hay alguna valija para la embajada. HF dice que no hay nada.- 699-

699- Salida al 49-12-92.- 1236 hrs.- MARINA pregunta por el coronel [illegible]. H dice que no está. MARINA pide le diga a su papá (de HF [illegible])... - (SE TERMINA LA GRABACION POR ROTURA DE LA CINTA MAGNETICA)-- 730----

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5008

[illegible] .- 88-77-85.

4 mayo 66.

L2-[illegible]-T27-

1259-1329 hrs.-

00- Salida sin contestación.- 05-

05- Salida al 39-60-30.- 1259 hrs.- HORTENSIA pregunta por su amor ARMANDO RODRIGUEZ para pedirle el dinero de la renta. ARMANDO se lo lleva el viernes porque hoy no tengo dinero.-31-

31- Entrada.- MP con MARINA para saber si habló MARCOS. MARINA dice que no vino porque tiene el auto descompuesto y que despues llamó a su casa y dijo que no estaba. MP espera a MARINA a las dos para ir a comer juntas.- 42-

42- Salida al 03 por la hora.- 1306 hrs.- 45-

1313 hrs.

45- Entrada.- MP por el Coronel [illegible]. YADIRA dice que no vino hoy. MP que entonces con JOHN FRANK T[illegible]. YADIRA dice que espere. Despues MP MARTA comenta con T[illegible] que MARCOS es un bandido como todo dominicano pues lo está esperando que pase por ella para llevar unos papeles a Gobernación. TAPIA dice que lo puede llamar a su casa al 49-13-92. MARTA dice que ya lo tiene y que no solo le urge su asunto sino la visa de MARTINA RICUR que tiene mas de un mes que no sale. TAPIA que si pidió la visa como MARTA entonces no va a salir nunca. - risas. MARTA termina conque le llamará a MARCOS a su casa.- 69-

(hoja uno)

5008

69- Entrada.- NF equivocado.- 74-

74- Entrada.- NF por GUZMAN. HORTENSIA dice que ya salió y tal vez regrese mas tarde. NF que le diga que llamó la señorita GAMAS (CHELITO GAMAS amor de GUZMAN)-.79-

79- Entrada.- 1320 hrs.- RENE FIALLO pregunta por GUZMAN. MARINA dice que ya salió y que regresa al rato. FIALLO que entonces con TERESITA. Despues FIALLO pregunta a TERE si terminó el texto del mensaje cifrado que hicieron anoche con LEONTE. TERE se lo entregó ya a GUZMAN. FIALLO que vea si no se ha enviado, porque tambien dejó en el escritorio de GUZMAN... CORTAN. -- fuera.- 95-

95- Entrada.- FIALLO continua con TERE y pide vea si GUZMAN comparó el texto corregido en la parte final del cable y que se refiere a una constancia conjuntamente presentada por varios países tales como Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Colombia, Panamá, Venezuela y Dominicana; porque yo no sé si al corregir puse todos los países. TERE va a revisar eso porque ella no recuerda haber visto eso..- SE CORTA.- 114-

114- 1326 hrs.
Entrada.- FIALLO continuá con TERE e insiste que vea esa copia corregida en el escritorio de GUZMAN y vea si hay otros papeles en que hicieron algunas correcciones porque temo que haya omitido alguna cosa en el cable y que tambien tenga bajo su custodia hasta que llegue GUZMAN y en caso que no llegue los meta en alguna de las gabetas del escritorio. TERE que está bien. -Despues FIALLO dica a TAPIA que bajando las escaleras me saltó un pensamiento desagradable pero que no tuvo tiempo de

(hoja dos) ...

14-00000

708 ...3.-

... regresar para advertir que GUZMAN tuviera cuidado de dejar el mensaje en clave que dejó sobre su escritorio, ya que TAPIA recordará cuando en dias pasados se le llamó de Cuernavaca para que proporcionara la clave del descifrador, entonces debió GUZMAN tener cuidado de ese trabajo en la inteligencia de que TAPIA tambien se diera cuenta de ese trabajo, para no prestarse a malas interpretaciones. TAPIA dice que " yo lo tengo a usted en un concepto demasiado elevado para dejar se andar con niñorias y cualquier cosa que suceda, quiero que sepa que jamas yo preguntaré porque fué, ni tendré porque pensar mal de usted", o sea que para mi es usted uno de los hombres que he conocido y usted lo sabe en muchas ocasiones en su presencia y en su ausencia. RENE dice que dado a las circunstancias de sus ausencias quiere tener en TAPIA un amigo. TAPIA rie y dice que el puede depositar toda la confianza que guste y que el trabajará junto y de acuerdo y que no soy el tipo que anda con niñerias y esas cosas. RENE lo sabe y agradece sus conceptos.- 165-

165- Entrada.- 1329 hrs.- NF con YADIRA para hacer planes a salir a comer hoy o comer por la noche entre las amigas de - siempre o bien mañana que no trabajan por ser día festivo.-203-

203- Entrada.- EMILIO CORDERO dice a TERE que GUZMAN le pidió le dijera que el cable que le ayudó en la mañana a pasar y si a las dos no ha llegado GUZMAN por él, que entonces lo mando con HORTENSIA a Gobernación que es en donde están ahorita. TERE que don RENE le dijo que revisara ese cable si estaba completo de los paises en una corrección y que RENE ordenó dejara ese cable en una gabeta del escritorio de mismo RENE, asi que es mejor que GUZMAN le llame para ver que hacer.- 228-

(hoja tres)

228- Entrada.- MT con TERE para citarse en casa de ella por la tarde.- 242-

242- Salida al 03 por la Hora.- 1343 hrs.- 244-

244- Entrada.- GUZMAN pregunta novedades. HORTENSIA que le devolvieron el pasaporte que le dió y las franquicias las tuvo que llevar a Relaciones y hasta el viernes se las devuelven.
- Despues GUZMAN con TERE. Esta dice que lo que le dió GUZMAN a copiar no es para cifrarlo, porque don [illegible] llamó y le dijo si ya lo había pasado y que revisara si estaban completos los países y que si GUZMAN no estaba que los dejara en una gaveta. GUZMAN está de acuerdo y el pasará mas tarde.- 266-

268- Salida.- [illegible] con MT para saludarla y decirle que ayer por la tarde le estuvo llamando para invitarla a salir. MT dice que no salió y que el teléfono para nada llamó... bla.. bla...-
- y planes para mañana que es día festivo y que no trabajan.-331-

331- Entrada.- MT por YADIRA para saber si van a salir por la tarde. YADIRA acepta. MT se llama VICTORIA.- 354-

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(..4.-12- 4 may.68)

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.

4 mayo 66.

L2-M2-T28-

1825-1924 hrs.-

00- Entrada.- 1825 hrs.- sin contestación.-MF pregunta por su "papi", pero se equivocó.- 06-

06- Salida ocupada y bocina descolgada.- 20-

20- Salida al 19-02-09.- 1844 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta a donde tiene que hablar para hacer algunas aclraciones sobre la llegada de cables internacionales. MF dice que llame al 19-08-06.- 36-

36- Salida al 19-02-06.- 1844 hrs.- GUZMAN quiere saber si hay algún cable procedente de Santo Domingo. MF que llame al 19-09-06.- 41-

41- Salida al 19-09-06.- GUZMAN quiere saber si ha llegado algún cable de Santo Domingo. MF dice que no ha llegado nada pero en tanto lo tengan se lo enviarán a la embbajada. GUZMAN que en todo caso a la suite Emperador. MF que está bien.- 53-

53- Entrada.- 1924 hrs.- LUCHITA GAMES pregunta a su amor GUZMAN si se van a ver. Este dice que todavia tiene mucho trabajo y pregunta si se acordó del asunto de aquel señor. CHELO que si pero que es conocido por otros lados de la Financiera pero allí nadie lo conoce, pero ella tiene una tarjeta de un despacho que se dedica a investigar personas. GUZMAN dice que uno de los

(hoja uno) ...

... hermanos trabaja en la Financiera. ~~XXXX~~ LUCHITA que ahora que lo vea le entregará esa tarjeta. GUZMAN le llamará a su casa despues de las seis y media.- Y no tengo para cuando salir ya que me tienen como esclavo. - 71-

71- Entradas sin contestación.- 88-

88- Salidas sin contestación.- y ocupadas.- 107-

~~107-~~ ~~salida~~ - - - - - (..2.- 12- 4 may.66)

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.

5 mayo 66.

L2-M2-T28-

1139-1236 hrs.-

107- Salida.- GUZMAN saluda a HERNANDEZ y dice que va a estar en la embajada hoy. HERNANDEZ le mandará su pedido y pregunta si el tiene la cuenta del Coronel FERNANDEZ. GUZMAN no está seguro pero sea como mil ciento óchenta. HERNANDEZ tratará de pasar cuanto antes a verlo.- GUZMAN lo espera antes de las once.- 122-

123- Entradas sin contestación.- 141-

141- Salida.- (Suite Emperador)- GUZMAN pregunta por RENE FIALLO. MF dice que acaba de salir.- 154-

154- Entrada.- MF RENE FIALLO dice estar llamando desde hace rato y nadie contesta. GUZMAN dice que el contestaba pero nadie lo hacia fuera y que el lo llamo al Hotel para avisarle que se recibió un cable confirmando lo de la fecha que se mando en el otro cable, y es junio. RENE dice que se alegra y que pasará al rato a la embajada para ver eso sobre lo que ayer se estuvo escuchando y la razón a las reservas finales y ademas dando cuenta por si hay alguna presión de parte de ellos "allá con los paises interesados" ya que seria algun error lamentable o un mal entendido de compañeros. GUZMAN que está bien.- FIALLO ademas comenta que anoche le llamó MARIA JOSEFA la esposa de FERNANDEZ CAMINERO

(hoja tres) ...

..y le dijo que había extrañado su ausencia y que ofreció mandarle un cable y tambien ofrecio acompañarla hoy y para ese caso aunque sea se van en un taxi para ayudarla. GUZMAN que está bien.- 204-

204- Entrada.- 1139 hrs.- ID.- MF pregunta por el Lic. ~~XXXXX~~ MARCIO VELOZ MAGIOLO. RENE FIALLO dice que no está en México ni regresará al país. MF pregunta entonces por la señora DE VELOZ. RENE que tambien se fué a Santo Domingo. MF pregunta quien se quedó en su lugar. RENE dice " tienen el gusto de hablar con el que se encargó de la Embajada y soy RENE FIALLO Encargado de Negocios y Ministro Plenipontenciario".. MF dice que le habla MARUJA FEXEIRO DE LLAVONA de padres gallegos y dominicana de nacimiento y hace un mes y medio mandó a la ciudad de México porque ella vive en Torreón, Coahuila;dos pasaportes de sus hijos para renovarlos y son a nombre de MARIA ISABEL y JOSE ANTONIO LLAVONA FEIXEIRO y resulta que son menos de 4y3 años y ellos quieren ir a Santo Domingo y quiere tener la seguridad de que estén en la embajada porque los mandó con un español VICENTE VIDARETA - es VILLARDEL y ademas ella quiere ir a Santo Domingo porque ella es española de nacimiento no dominicana y tiene que renovar sus documentos que se vencen el 6 de julio y sus hijos si son dominicanos con domicilio en calle Abelardo Rodriguez Urdaneta #11 en Santo Domingo muy cerca de donde viven los padres de MARCIO VELOZ. RENE ofrece investigar eso y se lo informará despues. MARUJA dice que ella vive en la Avenida Morrán #580 Colonia Jardín en Torreón o el teléfono de su esposo que es dueño del café Colón y se llama JOSE MANUEL LLAVONA FERNANDEZ - español-, con telefono 2-74-75. RENE que está bien y que va a hacer lo posible par resolver su problema. -- 356-

(hoja cuatro)

356- Salida.- (Apartamentos Carmen)- GUZMAN pide el departamento 28 con la señora TERESITA PEÑA. HF dice que salió.- 372-

372- Salida al 02.- LD.- 1225 hrs.- GUZMAN quiere hacer una llamada a Torreón con cargo al 2-74-75 con la señora MARUJA FEIXEIRO DE LLAVONA o su esposo JOSE MANUEL LLAVONA FERNANDEZ. HF toma nota y dice que espere un momento.- Despues GUZMAN informa a la señora MARUJA que los pasaportes que dice que mandó con un señor ya le fueron visados hace dos días y todos sus trámites quedaron arreglados. MARUJA dice que la señora esposa de MARCIO VELOZ es hermana de una cuñada que ella tiene y por eso se valió de enviar los pasaportes a visar. GUZMAN dice que ya quedaron autorizados sus visas y una persona los recogió y los llevó tal vez para Torreón. MARUJA que está bien y que gracias.- (lineas cruzadas)- Y MARUJA reconoce a LEONTE como hermano de JOSE y de JAIME y que ella es muy amiga de doña JOSEFA mamá de LEONTE.. bla.. bla..- Despues se ponen a platicar sobre las amistades y la familia que ambos son conocidos.- 448-

448- Entrada.- HF Lic. ARRIETA por el Corl.MARCOS JORGE. GUZMAN dice que fué a la ceremonia del zocalo a una jura de bandera del Ejercito Mexicano y no vendrá.- 455-

455- Salida al 14-02-76.- 1236 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta "por su señorita Coronel y etc.. TAPIA". HF pregunta de parte de quien. GUZMAN que " de la embajada de Nigeria". Despues GUZMAN saluda a TAPIA y dice que le quizo llevar sus mariachis para sus mañanitas. TAPIA rie. GUZMAN le felicita en su día. TAPIA da las gracias. GUZMAN dice que acaba de recibir un cable y que ..

(hoja cinco)

.. dice: "Embajador de México, a TAPIA, recibe felicitaciones cumpleaños, abrazos para todos, firma MANUEL LARA Y BOLIVAR". TAPIA se entera y da las gracias, y dice que su esposa y su familia fueron a las pirámides de Teotihuacan; cambia de tema y pregunta que lió traía RENE con el cable cifrado. GUZMAN dice que nada y que era otro cable grande y ya quedó todo arreglado, y que " ese hombre es mas bruto que el gobernador", cambia de tema y dice que hay que mandarle un regalo a esa muchacha. TAPIA pregunta por el papelito que le dio de unos cubanos residentes norteamericanos y que hay que ver en Gobernación ese asunto pues son tres cubanos que le trajo MARICH. GUZMAN no tiene ese papel pero lo va a buscar y a la vez pregunta si recuerda que se renovaron dos pasaportes de dos niños hijos de unos españoles que viven en Torreón. TAPIA que si que se lo dió a una vieja española fea. GUZMAN que está bien y saludos.- TAPIA antes de colgar comenta " que el viejo me llamó para pedirme disculpas sobre que no me habia enterado del cable cifrado que habian hecho entre "el viejo" y GUZMAN, y que me pusiera inmediatamente al habla contigo y que estaba molesto porque yo estaba pensando que me habian pasado por arriba, y que no lo tomara asi y que el me daba plena confianza, etc." - risas.- GUZMAN comenta que asi es mejor para que se de cuenta que no quiere nada " entre bastidores".- risas.- TAPIA comenta " que está loco ese viejo". GUZMAN rie y dice que hasta pronto.- 531-

531- Salida.- (Aeronaves)- GUZMAN pregunta por la hora de llegada del vuelo 481 procedente de Miami. HF que a las 16:00 hrs.- 539-

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. - . (..6.- L2- 5 may.66)

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.

6 mayo 66.

L2-M2-T29-

0851-1046 hrs.-

00- Entrada sin contestación.- 07-

07- Salida al 22-68-29.- 0851 hrs.- (Exclusivas Bennet)-
GUZMAN pregunta por HERNANDEZ para pedirle que no vaya a venir hoy a la embajada sino hasta mañana y que se traiga las muestras. Y lo de la vajilla. HERNANDEZ que estará a las diez o diez y media.- 18-

18- Salida ocupada.- 23-

23- Salida al 21-36-70.- 0915 hrs.- HORTENSIA pregunta por su amor MAGAÑA y si van a verse hoy. Este dice que hasta el lunes para que pienses lo que te dije. HORTENSIA dice " estás pedo y si no quieres venir entonces mañana si, y no te hagas payaso".
- bla.. bla..- sin importancia.- 45-

45- Salida al 17-51-27.- 0916 hrs.- HORTENSIA pregunta por OSCAR RODRIGUEZ de la Canada Dry, pero alli no trabaja nadie con ese nombre.- 53-

53- Salida ocupada.- 59- equivocada.- y ocupado.- y sin contestación.-103-

(hoja uno)

103- Salida al 13-74-92.- 0925 hrs.- HORTENSIA pregunta por su amor ZAMORATE para saber si se pueden ver. Este dice que mientras siga actuando como niña y siga creyendo en los Santos Reyes no volverá a salir con ella y que ya es una mujer que debe de hacer las cosas por si misma. HORTENSIA se enoja y le dice hasta luego. - 126-

126- Salida sin contestación.- 136-

136- Salida al 33-01-80.- 0931 hrs.- HO pide a MF MARIA ELENA que anote en su libreta que voy a ir a la Embajada Americana, luego a la Dominicana y despues de la Procuraduria. MARIA que está bien.- 143-

143- Entrada.- MIGNON saluda a MARINA y dice que tiene un trabajo que terminar antes del dia 25 porque se quiere ir para el dia 23 "allá". MARINA se alegra. MIGNON invita a MARINA y a TERE PEÑA a comer hoy un mangú de platanos.. - Ambas aceptan.- 168-

166- Salida al 25-59-12.- 1011 hrs.- ocupado.- y bocina descolgada.-180- (Pajelería Commus)- MARINA pregunta por el señor VIDAL para avisarle que hace tres dias tiene el dinero de la renta del cuarto. VIDAL mandará recogerlo con su recibo.- 204-

204- Salida.-(Información)- MARINA por el número de Agua Electropura. IF que es el 33-13-00.-- 209-

209- Salida al 33-13-00.- 1017 hrs.- equivocado.- con Electrolux.- despues dicen que es 46-29-30.- Y luego MARINA hace pedido de agua electropura.- 1020 hrs.- 245-

(hoja dos)

245- Entrada.- 1021 hrs.- HF pregunta si hay alguna correspondencia para JOSE PEREZ. MARINA dice que no hay nada.- 258-

258- Entrada.- 1033 hrs.- HF desea informes para visa, pues habla de los Establecimientos Nosie y x tambien saber los requisitos para poder legalizar una carta poder para pedir el traspaso de maquinas en la Republica Dominicana. MARINA que primero ir a Gobernación y a Relaciones Exteriores y ya legalizados por esas dependencias puede pasar a la embajada bajo conocimiento de algún notario y que cuesta la legalización la cantidad de cinco dolares. HF que gracias.- 272-

272- Entrada.- 1040 hrs.- HF pregunta por el Corl.JORGE. TERE dice que no está. Despues GARCIA saluda a LORENTE GUZMAN y pide le diga que lo llame al 11-90-43 con ANDRES GARCIA.- 283-

283- Entrada.- 1046 hrs.- CRISTINA saluda a MARINA y pregunta si ha llegado esa gente. Esta dice que no y que anoche llamó y no contestaba el teléfono y que hay que esperar hoy a ver que hay. CRISTINA dice que hoy va a la recepción de la embajada de Etiopía y que vea si en gobernación ya le dieron el permiso de residencia. MARINA pide le llame mas tarde entonces.- 310-

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. - . (..3.-L2- 6 mayo 66)

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.

6 mayo 66.

L2-M2-T30-

1058-1208 hrs.-

00- Entrada.-1058 hrs.- MF de parte del señor GEORGE KATKINGSON del diario Los Angeles Times que solicitó una visa para ir a Santo Domingo y que es de nacionalidad norteamericana y que ya tuvo una visa de periodista y la quiere renovar. MARINA dice que espere un momento. Despues MF GEORGE dice que el - consiguió antes una visa que le dieron en San Juan de Puerto Rico para la Dominicana y que ahora quiere volver para el asunto de llevar la notas periodisticas de las elecciones de su país y se quiere evitar tener que ir a San Juan a renovar. MARINA que hay que hacer todos los trámites de nuevo aquí, ya que son otras reglas y es mejor que deje el número de su teléfono para llamarlo cuando llegue el Cónsul. GEORGE dice que es 35-89-69 y que es GEORGE NATANSON y está ~~xxdixx~~ radicado en México para los asuntos de su periodico en Centro America.- 56-

56- Entrada.- 1104 hrs.- LUCHITA GAMES con GUZMAN su amor y saber si se ven hoy. Este dice que si y pregunta por el número de la agencia que le ofreció darle. LUCHITA a la tarde que se vean se lo dará porque no lo trajó consigo. GUZMAN le llamará a las cuatro y media.- 68-

68- -Bocina descolgada.- 83-

83- Salida.-(Embajada de Corea)- MARINA dice que hay una correspondencia que llegó de Santo Domingo para esa embajada y no hay ..

(hoja uno)

... con quien enviarla y de ser posible pasen a recogerla. MARINA aclara que proviene del Ministerio de Relaciones de Santo Domingo. HF que está bien y que gracias.- 93-

93- Salida al 18-29-93.- 1115 hrs.- (Ceremonial)- MARINA pregunta por FLORES TEJADA. HF dice que salió a la calle. MARINA pide se le diga que el señor GUZMAN desea tener una conferencia con él, con fines de tratar un asunto de su - Gobierno y que se le señale una cita. HF que está bien.-104-

104- Salida.- sin contestación.- 110-

110 Entrada.- 1117 hrs.- HF informa que de León,GTO, llaman al Corl.MARCOS JORGE MORENO. Despues HF ANDRES saluda a MARCOS y pregunta si recibió su telegrama de felicitación por el santo de MARCOS. Este dice que si y que gracias. ANDRES que ha estado haciendo gestiones ante la Ferretera el Bajió para el prestamo de unos 200 y que será una letra de cambio a seis meses de pago con intereses. MARCOS le llamará mas tarde para darle la respuesta. ANDRES tiene una comida que [illegible] le da al Obispo para congraciarse. MARCOS le llamará tarde como a las siete. ANDRES que a su despacho o sea el 3-17-02 y allí espera su llamado. MARCOS que está bien.- 134-

134- Salida al 14-02-76.- 1124 hrs.- YADIRA saluda a TAPIA y dice que si va a venir a la Embajada. FRANK TAPIA pregunta que necesita. YADIRA que sobre unos documentos y una visa que pide el corresponsal del diario Los Angeles Times o sea NATANSON que quiere ir a Santo Domingo y que la vez pasada se la dieron en Puerto Rico. TAPIA dice que entonces se vaya a Puerto Rico a sacarla, despues dice que pasa al rato.- 149- (hoja dos)

149- Salida al 19-55-93.- 1126 hrs.- YADIRA por DEL OLMO, pero todavia no llega.- 154-

154- Salida ocupada.-y sin contestación.- 168-

168- Entrada.- 1128 hrs.- MF ADELINA ELIAS DE MORENO con su esposo el Coronel MARCOS JORGE MORENO para avisar que va al salón y que despues pase por ella. MARCOS que está bien y que solo sacó reintegro en la Loteria.- 180-

180- Salida al 35-56-08.- 1133 hrs.- (Oficialia Mayor)- HORTENSIA pregunta por la señorita MONTERO. Despues GUZMAN saluda a la Licenciada MONTERO. Esta dice que sus dos oficios pendientes de firma desde el miercoles no los tienen sino hasta hoy mas tarde y de los otros dos están pendientes de que se despache. GUZMAN que está bien y explica que hay tres medicos dominicanos que vinieron a México con visa por tres meses y sus pasaportes son oficiales con visa diplomática y se vencen el dia 8 y que Relaciones explica que hay que llamarles o solicitar el cambio por oficio. MONTERO que asi es y que despues le mando los oficios para que se despachen luego.- 201-

201- Salida al 13-21-92.- 1139 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta por el Lic. ENRIQUEZ para saludarlo. Este dice que estuvo un poco enfermo y con mucho trabajo, y que ya logró informes "sobre esa persona y que el último puesto que todavia tiene es en una compañia fraccionadora de terrenos y mas bien es al amparo de su hermano JUAN CORTINA PORTILLO, quien es la cabeza del grupo, y que ha ocupado otros puestos siempre bajo la celula de su hermano JUAN y que "él" (EUSTAQUIO CORTINA PORTILLO) es una buena persona..

(hoja tres)

...completamente honorable y digna de todo crédito" y que el ultimo dato como antes le dijo está como Presidente de una compañía de terrenos fraccionados, pero la persona que le dió ese dato dijo que eso era hace seis meses y hasta la fecha no se ha logrado comprobar. GUZMAN pregunta si logró investigar de que filiación politica o social es mas o menos. ENRIQUEZ sabe que es igual que todos sus hermanos o sea de un grupo completamente catolico practicante y siempre ha estado en un circulo de hombres catolicos formados hace tiempo por un grupo de hombres que estuvieron o estudiaron con el padre jesuita RAMON SILVA o RAMON MARTINEZ SILVA. GUZMAN toma nota y dice que se lo agradece mucho porque sus datos son valiosos. ENRIQUEZ que nada tiene que agradecer " doctor" si sus datos son en cierto punto cortos. GUZMAN que no y que verán que dia se reunen con las esposas a cenar juntos. ENRIQUEZ que está bien y que anoche estuvo platicando con el Dr. ROCHAC y dice que los conoce. GUZMAN dice que el Dr. ROCHAC es intimo amigo de mi padre y es una bella persona. ENRIQUEZ dice que salió hoy fuera y no sabe cuando podrá regresar a Santo Domingo hasta " que lo llamen".
- 236-

236- Entrada.- 1143 hrs.- CRISTINA con MARINA para saber si "está el señor". MARINA que si que está platicando con don KIKE. CRISTINA que va a esperar y al rato lo llamará porque lo quiere "coger a como dé lugar".- 248-

248- Entrada.- 1145 hrs.- MF quiere preguntar si para ir a Haití y Antillas Holandesas se tiene que sacar visa con la Dominicana. MARINA dice que no es necesario porque no tienen que tocar Dominicana para llegar a esos otros paises.- MF platica que ..
(hoja cuatro)

.. ella tiene familiares en Santo Domingo trabajando en la Oficina Sanitaria Panamericana y en caso de poder ir a eso país podrá gestionar su visa allá mismo. MARINA que lo ayuda en mucho pero de todos modos tiene que hacer las gestiones desde la embajada de aquí.- 292-

292- Entrada.- 1150 hrs.- CRISTINA con MARINA y pregunta por MARCOS (JORGE MORENO). Este dice que espere un momento. Despues CRISTINA dice que sabe que hace mal en llamarle pero para ella es suficiente estar esperando tanto y lo que le hizo el miercoles está muy mal ya que ella desde el 21 de abril está tratando de hablarle por ultima vez sin tener que molestarlo más. MARCOS guarda silencio. CRISTINA que solo le quiere saber su opinión para un viaje a Santo Domingo que ella quiere hacer y que no habia salido antes porque su hija está enferma. MARCOS dice que aquí no se puede hablar para nada. CRISTINA que ya se que te molesta hablar con-migo pero será la ultima vez que lo hago pero yo quiero saber tú consejo para ir a Santo Domingo y lo demas está por demas hablar y quedamos como amigos y total. Y que ya con los desaires que me haces ya es suficiente. MARCOS que no es momento para hablar y menos aquí y que el lunes nos vemos y no puedo seguir hablando porque hay mucha gente. CRISTINA que entonces nos vemos el lunes "enfrente donde ~~xxxxx~~ siempre". MARCOS que está bien.- 328-

328- Salida equivocada.- y sin contestación.- y siguen salidas equivocadas.- 427-

427- Salida al 19-55-90.- 1206 hrs.-(Hotel Emperador)- YADIRA por su amor DEL OLMO, pero no ha llegado y pide le diga que "su esposa lo llamó".- 433- (hoja cinco)

433- Entrada.- 1208 hrs. HORTENSIA pide a MARINA informa a GUZMAN que está en el zocalo, pero que estuvo en Gobernación y que todavia no estaban los oficios, y que si quiere que regrese a Gobernación. MARINA despues de informar dice que se venga mejor para la embajada pero rápido.- 449-

449- Salida sin contestación.- y equivocada.- 474-

474- Entrada.- HF por el Coronel MORENO. GUZMAN dice que ya salió. HF que es el Ing. LUGIDET.- 484-

484- Salida.- equivocada.- 490-

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. - . (..6.-L2- 6 may.66)

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.

6 mayo 66.

L2-M2-T31-

1354-1402 hrs.-

00- Entrada.- HF para cobrar la renta del local que ocupa la embajada. MARINA dice que hay un cheque por un mes y es por la cantidad de $1,200.00. HF pasará a recogerlo.- 07-

07- Entrada.- HF de la Embajada de Noruega, para saber quien es el encargado de Negocios. MARINA dice que es RENE FIALLO. HF que es para una invitación que le enviarán.- 13-

13- Salida al 03 por la hora.- 1341 hrs.- 16-

16- Salida sin contestación y ocupado.- y equivocado.-31- - al 03 por la hora.- 1313 hrs.- 34-

34- Entrada.- HF de la Embajada de Dinamarca quiere saber si todavia es Ministro de Relaciones en Dominicana el Dr. CARLOS FEDERICO PEREZ Y PEREZ. GUZMAN dice que sí. HF que es para enviar una correspondencia y tambien saber el nombre del Vice-Ministro. GUZMAN que es el Dr. MANUEL GUERRERO POUS porque el anterior Lic. RAMON MENDIA LISTER es representante ahora en las NNUU. HF que tambien el Jefe del Protocolo lo es todavia FRANCISCO JOSE NADAL RINCON. GUZMAN dice que sí. HF que gracias.- 47-

47- -Salida.-(Ceremonial)- GUZMAN por FLORES TEJADA. HF que llame despues de las cinco porque ya salió al aeropuerto.- 54-

54- Entrada.- ~~333xxxxx~~.- HF ANGEL por YADIRA. MARINA dice que salió la suegra y esposa de FRANK TAPIA. ANGEL que está bien. (es el esposo de YADIRA y se llama ANGEL DEL OLMO ~~xxxx~~ y trabaja en el servicio de turismo del Hotel Emperador)- 60-

60- Entrada.- HF con MARINA para comentar que su hija está enferma y que hace rato estuvo hablando con MARCOS JORGE MORENO y que le dijo que tenia que hablar con ella el lunes.(HF es CRISTINA amante del Corl.MORENO)- Y que a la noche van a la recepción de la Embajada de Etiopiá.- 107-

107- Entrada.- Corl. MAURICIO FERNANDEZ pregunta por LEONTE para saber si puede firmar el giro al portador. Este dice que si. - 118-

118- Salida.- equivocada.- 123- y sin-contestación.- y ocupada. - 146-

146- Entrada.-HF dice ser pasante de Medicina y quiere irse a la Dominicana en calidad de interno en algún hospital. MARINA que solo hay que cubrir los requisitos de visa y se le podrá aceptar. HF dice que termina sus estudios a fín de año y tiene tiempo de ir tramitando sus asuntos. MARINA que está bien.-165-

165- Salida equivocada.- 172- y salida al 03 por la hora.- 1350hs - 175-

175- Entrada.-1355 hrs.- HF con TERESITA PEÑA para saber a donde vá mas tarde. esta dice que iba a ir con CRISTINA a la recepción de la Embajada de Etiopía pero antes van con MARINA a casa de

(hoja dos) ...

.. MIGNON en un carro. HF que está bien. TERE dice que vino el doctor CABRERA - dominicano- quien se va para la patria y anda vendiendo el auto en mil dolores y que vale como 30 mil, y que es un Ford. HF se interesa y pregunta a donde hablar con CABRERA. TERE que al 19-56-52 y 19-56-53, y que sale mañana a Pachuca y el domingo se va a Miami para despues a Santo Domingo.- 216-

216- Salida.- HORTENSIA pregunta por ARTURO RODRIGUEZ.- - equivocado.- 226-

226- Salida sin contestación.- 240-

240- Salida al 21-36-70.- 1402 Hrs.- HORTENSIA por el señor MAGAÑA para avisarle que "le habló aquel y que quiere verla con el niño". MAGAÑA que entonces lo dejan para el lunes. HORTENSIA le dice: " está pedo y quiere verte hoy". MAGAÑA que primero arregla tus asuntos personales y despues nos vemos y despues le corta.- 270-

270- Salida equivocada.- y sin contestación.- 288-

288- Entrada sin contestación.- 310-

- -

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-55.
6 mayo 66.
L2-M2-T32-
1736-1900 hrs.-

00- Salida al 19-55-90.- 1736 hrs.- (Hotel Emperador)- GUZMAN pregunta por don RENE FIALLO. MT MERCEDES FERNANDEZ DE FIALLO dice que salió para la embajada Suiza y que despues iba a pasar a las oficinas. GUZMAN vino porque se lo dijo y va a tener que esperarlo. MERCEDES porque se va a entrevistar con el embajador suizo. GUZMAN lo va a esperar de todos modos y si no viene mas tarde entonces mañana vendrá.- 22-

22- Entrada.- HF ROLAND DALLAS de la Agencia de Noticias Reuter de Londres, quiere saber si hay una reunión de productores de azucar en México y si la Dominicana está representada. GUZMAN no sabe y pregunta cuando comienza esa reunión. ROLAND que tiene informes de Londres que debe de comenzar hoy y que participan Perú, Brasil, Dominicana, Colombia y México. GUZMAN dice que espere un momento. despues dice que si le quiere llamar mañana a las once porque yo soy un empleado de la embajada y no sé de eso. ROLAND que gracias.- 44-

44- Salida.- RENE pide el apartamento 201 con el señor TAPIA. - MF dice que espere un momento. Despues RENE dice a TAPIA que tienen aquí una dificultad en un cable cifrado que estámos trabajando y resulta que el sello de la embajada no está en el escritorio de doña MARINA y que GUZMAN le dice que el se lo dió a RENE para un visado de cortesia en la mañana y de modo que no ...

(Sigue uno)

.. está el sello y necesitan mandar esos cables hoy mismo. TAPIA tarda en llegar unos diez minutos. RENE que está bien.63-

63- Salida al 18-52-86.- 1830 hrs.- ocupado y sin contestación.- - 87-

87- Salida al 14-02-86.- 1835 hrs.- RENE por TAPIA.- equivocado. - 94-

94- Salida al 14-02-76.- 1835 hrs.- RENE pregunta por FRANK TAPIA. H' dice que espere un momento. Despues RENE dice a TAPIA que no hay necesidad que se venga. TAPIA que el no sabe de ese asunto de descifrar y que yo tenia la cable pero es en mensajes de llegada, mas no para salidas y eso a lo pudo... risas. RENE que entonces va a dejar a GUZMAN que haga todo y que ya encontraron el sello de la embajada que MARINA dejó en el escritorio mio y ya se lo he dicho que yo no la quiero acusar de que las cosas se le olvidan y todavia asegura de no hacer las cosas. TAPIA que si y que asi se pasa el tiempo olvidandosele las cosas. Y que hoy en la mañana decia que estaban perdidos unos cheques que al final los encontrarón. RENE que es una pobre mujer que está perdiendo la memoria y se despiden.- 130-

130- Entrada.- 1845 hrs.- MARINA pregunta a GUZMAN si se le quedó en su auto un broche de ella. GUZMAN lo recogió y lo tiene guardado.- 140-

140- Entrada.- 1847 hrs.- TERESITA PEÑA con GUZMAN para saber que se ofrece. GUZMAN que es por el sello que no aparecia.- Pero ya lo encontraron y acaba de llegar otro cable cifrado y "el viejo ya se fué a la recepción de Haití".- 158- (hoja dos)

14-00000

135- Salida al 18-29-93.- 1850 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta por el señor FLORES TEJADA del Ceremonial de Relaciones. [illegible] dice que ya no vino por la tarde a trabajar pero ella [illegible] que la llamó si es que llega o hasta mañana.- 174-

174- Entrada.- 1900 hrs.- CHELITO GAMES con su amor GUZMAN y saber a que horas se ven. GUZMAN que dentro de media hora allí en su casa. CHELITO la espera en la puerta de la casa.-181-

- -

. - . (..3.- L2- 6 mayo.66)-

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-65.
7 mayo 66.
L2-M2-T33-
1046-1454 hrs.-

00- Entrada.- sin contestación.- 03-

03- Entrada.- HF CHELITO GAMES saluda a su amor GUZMAN y pregunta que hace. Este dice que trabajando. CHELITO dice que se " va a quedar seco de tanto trabajar". GUZMAN que si " y si tú no me cuidas peor". CHELITO si lo quiere atender y se verán hoy. GUZMAN le llamará mas tarde a las doce a su ofinina.- 08-

08- Entrada.- CRISTINA con GUZMAN y con TERESITA PEÑA para comentar que su hija TERITA está un poco enferma y que citó a MARINA para mañana en casa y comer juntas.. bla.. bla..- sin importancia.- 38-

38- Salida al 12-04-93.- 1046 hrs.- (Carteros Zona Uno)- GUZMAN pregunta por IBULAN para saber si ha llegado alguna - valija o correspondencia para la embajada. Este dice que no y que le llame mas tarde.- 45-

45- Entrada.- HF por CARMITA CASTILLO de parte de SALVADOR - RENDON. GUZMAN dice que los sabados no trabaja .- 49-

50- Entrada.- 1036 hrs.- SONIA por JORGE MORENO o por TAPIA. GUZMAN dice que hasta el lunes estarán porque hoy no vienen.- - 53- (hoja uno)

55- Salida al 18-29-93.- 1100 hrs.- GUZMAN saluda a FLORES TEJADA del Ceremonial de Relaciones y dice que le llama porque el Encargado de Negocios RENE FIALLO acaba de recibir un cable de nuestro gobierno y de que tiene que comunicarle ciertas cosas al Canciller CARRILLO FLORES y para ello solicita una audiencia. FLORES dice que el Ministro salió de viaje a los Estados Unidos o sea por Nueva York y Washington, pero en cuanto regrese se le solicitará la entrevista o si es urgente se podrá gestionar con el Primer Sub-Secretario. GUZMAN que como es una cosa directa con el Canciller entonces van a esperar por la semana si es que no tarda mucho en regresar, y que el lunes le avisará. FLORES que está bien.- 74-

74- Salidas ocupadas.- 110-

110- Salida al 12-04-93.- 1150 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta por INCLAN para saber si llegó siempre valija. Este dice que no. GUZMAN a la vez pregunta los requisitos que se necesitan para enviar valija de aquí de México a la Dominicana. INCLAN no sabe ya que son cosas diferentes al servicio de correo y para ello es mejor preguntar a Comunicaciones. GUZMAN que gracias.- 127-

127- Salida ocupada.- 136-

136- Salida al 19-89-04.- 1158 hrs.- (Oficina de Personal de Comunicaciones)- RENE FIALLO desea saber a quien hay que dirigirse para los trámites de envió de una valija por vía aerea para el gobierno Dominicano. MF que debe de llamar al 18-06-60 ext.271 que es el Departamento de Transportes.- 159-

(hoja dos)

159- Salida sin contestación.-178-

178- Salida al 21-70-51.- 1200 hrs.- (Jefatura de Correos)- FIALLO pide informes sobre como y donde depositar una valija diplomática para Dominicana. MF que en las oficinas centrales de las calles de Tacuba y Ruiz de Alarcón.- 194-

194- Salida sin contestación.- y ocupadas.- 220-

220- Entrada.- 1210 hrs.- HF de la Administración Central de Correos avisa a GUZMAN que les llegó una valija diplomática y como es sabado tiene que pasar a recogerla mas temprano y que es de parte de INCLAN y estarán hasta las dos de la tarde. GUZMAN que gracias.- 227-

227- Entrada.- 1211 hrs.- CHELITO GAMES con su amor GUZMAN para comentar que llegó valija, y que GUZMAN va a ir a retirarla del correo y le llamará despues para verse mas tarde.-235-

235- Salida al ~~24-~~ 23-41-54.- 1232 hrs.- ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ MERCEDES DE FIALLO se interesa por el departamento que se renta en las calles de Lerma esquina con Tiber o sea atrás del Hotel María Isabel. MF con acento de norteamericana le informa y que renta $4,500.00 al mes.- ~~XXXXXXXX~~ MERCEDES quiere uno mas barato para dos personas.- 268-

268- Salida sin contestación.-275-

275- Salida.- ~~XXXXXXXX~~ MERCEDES por un departamento que rentan y que ella necesita por tres meses.- HF ofrece los que tiene en Rhin 29 (Apartamentos Carmen donde habita TERESITA PEÑA) y otros mas en Petrarca y Newton, Polanco.- 321- (hoja tres)

321- Salida ocupada.- 327-

327- Entrada.- 1250 hrs.- MF por GUZMAN. MERCEDES DE FIALLO dice que salió a recoger una valija y regresa mas tarde o bien hasta el lunes. MF es CHELITO GAMES y dice que llama de Seguros Progreso y que es sobre un cobro de un seguro (?).(Efectivamente CHELITO que es amor de GUZMAN trabaja en Seguro Progreso de la calle de Madero 69)- 344-

344- Salida al 14-83-89.- 1254 hrs.- MERCEDES DE FIALLO pide informes sobre el apartamento de Herodoto 30. MF dice que lo puede pasar a ver a la hora que guste.-371-

372- Salida.- MERCEDES por informes de un departamento pero ya está rentado.- 379-

379- Entrada.- sin contestación fuera.- 383-

383- Salida sin contestación.- 390-

390- Salida al 13-70-44.- 1301 hrs.- (Cine Mundial)- GUZMAN pregunta por RAMON CARVAJAL para saludarlo y ponerse de acuerdo en caso que llame la NENA para hacer planes y salir de paseo mañana. RAMON está de acuerdo.- 411-

411- Salida al 45-72-69.- ~~xx~~- 1302 hrs.- MB MERCEDES DE FIALLO pregunta por el departamento que rentan amueblado.- 427-

427- Salida al 11-25-10.- MERCEDES por informes del departamento amueblado que rentan en la calle Venecia 34, Colonia Juarez.- - 438-

(hoja cuatro)-

458- Entrada.- 1310 hrs.- CHULITO GAMES pregunta a GUZMAN si se van a ver porque ella ya sale del trabajo y se va para su casa. GUZMAN entonces le llamará mas tarde a su casa porque tiene mucho trabajo y qué sobre el dinero del cobrador lo ~~xxxxxx~~ resuelve el lunes pero hoy de todos modos se han de ver.- 481-

481- Salida sin contestación.- 512-

512- Salida al 46-23-24.- 1331 hrs.- MERCEDES DE FIALLO se interesa por los apartamentos de la calle de Lerma HF que los puede pasar a ver con el velador JOSE./- 525-

525- Salida al 46-41-07.- 1333 hrs.- MERCEDES por datos del departamento de rentan en la calle de Pachuca. HF lo corta.- 542-

542- Salida al 20-99-05.- ~~1454hrs.~~- MERCEDES pregunta por la señora CEBRIAN para saber lo del departamento que se renta y que a ella la recomienda la Agencia (?). HF dice que la señora no está y que tarda en regresar.- 563-

563- Salida al 20-99-05.- 1454 hrs.- MERCEDES DE FIALLO con la señora CEBRIAN para saber sobre el departamento que renta y que es por tres meses porque no tiene la seguridad de continuar ya que pasando las elecciones de su país tal vez salgan del país o tal vez nó. Y quedan de llamarse el lunes para ponerse de acuerdo en que si lo rentan o no por el tiempo antes mencionado. - 708-

708- -Salida.-(Suite Emperador)- RENE FIALLO pide a HF le mande un taxi a la embajada.- 750-

(hoja cinco)

750- Salida.-(Emperador)- MERCEDES DE FIALLO pregunta si mandaron el taxi. MF que si y que tarda cinco minutos en llegar.- 766-

766- Entrada sin contestación.- 812-

- -

. - .   (..6.-L2- 7 mayo 66)

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.

9 mayo 66.

~~23k~~- L2-M2-T34-

0904-1212 hrs.-

00- Entradas sin contestación.- 16-

16- Salida al 22-66-29.- 0904 hrs.- GUZMAN saluda a HERNANDEZ y dice que el sabado lo estuvo esperando y quiere verlo hoy. HERNANDEZ lo espera por la tarde en su casa. GUZMAN que está bien porque necesito eso hoy. (HERNANDEZ es de la distribuidora Benot quien les vende vinos, cigarrillos, etc. de importación). - 25-

25- Entrada.- 0910 hrs.- HD MARCOS JORGE MORENO se reporta. GUZMAN dice que espere un momento. Despues HD saluda a MORENO y pregunta si no lo recuerda que es su viejo amigo de Santo Domingo y que tu estabas de Comandante de la Guardia en Palacio. MORENO lo recuerda y pregunta si es MINELLA. HD dice que si y que llegó ayer a dar un paseo y a saludar a los amigos y como no conocia esto a eso vino, y vino con su esposa y están en el Hotel Oxford en la calle Mariscal 67 y que vino a conseguir las visas de Guatemala. MORENO va al rato a llegar a la embajada. Despues otro HD saluda a MORENO y le dice "vagabundo" - risas. Y que se vino manejando desde Guatemala pero ahora que está en la ciudad de México no se atreve a meterse a las calles por el tráfico enorme. MORENO pide lo esperen un rato pues no tarda en llegar. HD dice que en Santo Domingo le mandaron un libro de PEREZ FERREIRA que se titula "Guerra o Patria" y lo dejó en ...

(hoja uno)

... Guatemala, pero en la pagina 128 te mencionan y dice sobre una forma brillante de las actuaciónes de MORENO o sea que dice: " el Coronel MARCO ANTONIO JORGE MORENO fué relevado de la - Victoria despues de haber derrotado a mas de cinco mil presos politicos y que eso le costo que lo sacaran de allí", asi que quiere decir que tu nombre está para la historia ya porque figuras en un libro. MORENO se alegra de saber eso y dice que al rato se verán. HD vino con GALLARDO con su esposa e hijos y despues irán a buscar a BRUNO para verse todos juntos.- 77-

77- Entrada.- 0959 hrs.- HF de parte de HORTENSIA pregunta por MARINA para avisarle que está enferma y que se tuvo que ir al Seguro y que llegará mas tarde. GUZMAN que está bien.- 85-

85- Entrada.- 1001 hrs.- LD.- HF en INGLES pregunta por RENE FIALLO. MARINA en mismo INGLES informa que no está y que llega en una hora, o que llame al Hotel Emperador.- 110-

110- Entrada.- 1012 hrs.- HF por JOSE FRANK TAPIA el Cónsul. MARINA dice que espere un momento. Despues HF ARNEDOS pregunta si le manda eso. TAPIA que si que lo espera. ARNEDOS se lo manda en un sobre y pregunta como está la familia. TAPIA que bie tódos y pide que la carta que le va a mandar se la haga llegar lo mas pronto posible porque es urgente.- ARNEDOS si debe de suspender por algo el viaje se lo avisará, porque va a hablra con DENIS para ver si ella tambien va y que le manda a la persona para que le arreglo el pasaporte y la visa. TAPIA que está bien.- 126-

126- Entrada.- 1015 hrs.- MERCEDES DE FIALLO pregunta si les han llamado. Dona MARINA que a don RENE le llamaron de Estados

(hoja dos) ...

... Unidos que les dijo que estaba en una junta y que llamaran mas tarde. MERCEDES que si llama le diga que ya sale para el Congreso a buscarlo. MARINA que está bien.- 134-

134- Salida al 46-65-70.- 1019 hrs.- YADIRA dice a MARIA que por la tarde se ven para comer juntas.- 142-

142- Entrada.- 1021 hrs.- HP por la dirección de la Embajada. GUZMAN se la proporciona.- 145-

145- Salida al 46-65-70.- 1024 hrs.- MARINA pregunta de parte de MARINA como amaneció el niño. HP dice que ya bien y que ella va a esperar a su hombre que llegue hoy.- 158-

158- Salidas sin contestación.- 174-

174- Entrada.- 1049 hrs.- CRISTINA con CARMITA y con MARINA para saludarse y preguntar como sigue la hija de MARINA o sea LILIANA. MARINA dice que ya mejor. CRISTINA está esperando porque MARCOS JORGE la cito a las diez y media en la puesta de Palacio de Hierro de Durango, y estará llamando para saber si llega a la embajada. MARINA que está bien.- 193-

193- Entrada.- 1108 hrs.- HP por el agregado de Prensa. YADIRA dice que llame al 24-31-29 (~~xxxxx~~ -- es con la MIGNON)- 204-

204- Entrada.- 1110 hrs.- MERCEDES DE FIALLO pregunta si llegó su esposo RENE. GUZMAN y despues MARINA dice que la están esperando. Despues MERCEDES reclama a RENE que la hizo ir a buscarlo. RENE le dice " mi vida perdoname, y me tuvo que venir". MERCEDES
(hoja tres) ...

... fué al banco a hacer el deposito. RENE que está bien y que el está en espera de una llamada de Estados Unidos, pero no dejaron dicho de que ciudad era, pero si es de Estados Unidos lo primero que he pensado es en ABRIL, pero tiene que estar esperando de nuevo la llamada. MERCEDES que no ha de ser nada grave de lo contrario te hubieran dejado recado.- 240-

240- Entrada.- 1119 hrs.- CRISTINA pregunta por MARINA para saber si llegó a la embajada MARCOS JORGE MORENO. Esta dice que vino por un rato pero va a salir de nuevo porque anda con los agregados militares del Salvador y otros que lo vinieron a buscar. CRISTINA creia que lo estaba huyendo y pregunta si anda uniformado. MARINA dice que no.-CRISTINA que entonces si regresa le diga que el miercoles tratará de hablar con el, porque yo no puedo estarlo esperando mas hoy.- 260-

260- Entrada.- 1127 hrs.- CRISTINA ahora con TERESITA para decirle que MARCOS la tuvo esperando casi una hora y que ahora tendrá que esperar otro dia para ver cuando se digna verla.. bla. - bla..- Y quedan de verse mañana.- 346- bloqueado.-352-

352- Salidas sin contestación y ocupadas.- 373-

373- Salida.- Coronel FERNANDEZ reclama a la empresa Tele-Rex que del televisor que compraron está en malas condiciones y necesita que lo vayan a ver a su domicilio de Herodoto 30-102 y que lo vendió JUAN VALDEZ. -MT toma el reporte.- 402-

402- Salida al 45-45-86.- 1140 hrs.- ocupado.-y sin contestación. -418- equivocado.-427- FERNANDEZ con su hija y despues con su

(hoja cuatro) ...

... esposa JOSEFA NUÑEZ y pide que llame a la agencia en que compraron la televisión para que de los datos de factura y démas. Y que mañana va a tener que hacer mas cena porque invitó a unos amigos militares y a MARCOS.- 454-

454- Salida al 37-03-16.- 1143 hrs.- HD por MANUEL. HF dice que no está. HD que le diga que no le quieren pegar en la embajada porque la maquina no está aquí. HF dice que se espere y que ahora van a reclamar.-496-

496- Entrada.- 1145 hrs.- CRISTINA avisa a MARINA que ya va de salida y tiene que estar a una misa y que despues hacen planes para mañana.- 515-

515- Entrada.- 1147 hrs.- MF MERCEDES LERO pregunta por GUZMAN. MARINA dice que espere un momento. Despues MERCEDES pregunta si ya llegó la visa del Dr. (?). GUZMAN que van a esperar que se la manden de Relaciones. MF MERCEDES que son tres visas y que una de ellas es de su mamá. Despues MD TERESITA dice que llame despues para mientras llegan esas visas.- 554-

554- Entrada.- 1155 hrs.- MIGNON saluda a MARINA y dice que acaba de recibir una carta del xx señor ese de Santo Domingo preguntandole por su visa. MARINA va a ver eso y pregunta si se va siempre el 23 para que aproveche la toma de posesión. MIGNON se quiere ir antes y quien sabe si espere para la fecha de la toma de posesión. Despues MIGNON informa a GUZMAN que acaba de recibir una carta de FEDERICO que quiere saber sobre sus visas. GUZMAN que ya salió el chofer por ellas a Gobernación. MIGNON se quiere ir para el dia 18 y quiere llevarse la visa para FEDERICO. GUZMAN le arregla el asunto el miercoles.- 597-

597- Entrada sin contestación.- fuera.- y salida sin contestación.- y ocupado.- 635-

635- Salida.- (Ceremonial)- TERESA pregunta el número de teléfono donde se celebró la conferencia de desnuclearización. HP dice que es el 26-25-60.- 659-

659- -Bocina descolgada.- 667-

667- Salida al 26-25-60.- 1205 hrs.- (CORREDAL)- TERESA pide comunicarse con alguna persona del archivo, pues RENE FIALLO desea solicitar unos documentos sobre las ultimas declaraciones del CORREDAL. HP dice que espere un momento. Despues RENE dice que es el delegado de la Dominicana ante la CORREDAL y necesita con urgencia de las dos ultimas sesiones que no fueron repartidas por falta de tiempo o sea con el acta final que suman tres y sus mociones conjuntas que se sometió a la mesa en el momento de cerrar y que fueron los paises actuantes Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Perú, Panamá, Dominicana y Venezuela. HP toma y ofrece mandar esos documentos a mas tardar mañana. RENE que en todo caso si a las dos no le llegan puede pasar por ellos porque tiene que hacer su comunicación oficial ante su gobierno.- 738-

738- Salida al ~~xxx~~.- CARMITA pide comunicarse a la oficina de Turismo del Hotel Emperador, pero no hay nadie. - 757-

757- Salida al 46-09-73.- 1212 hrs.- GUZMAN saluda a MARTIN y pregunta que hay de nuevo. Este dice que nada que en el trabajo fecundo y creador. GUZMAN pregunta si ya sabe que llegó un nuevo

(hoja seis) ...

... Jefo de Misión. MARTIN no lo sabía y pregunta si entonces ya renunció a su cargo MARCIO VELOZ. GUZMAN que no que este nuevo que viene llega como Encargado de Negocios, y cambia de tema y dice que está en éstos momentos escribiendo una carta para ROBERTO ZUÑIGA y compañía que es la agencia aduanal y que en su nombre va JOSE FRANCISCO TAPIA para hacer esas gestiones de la franquicia diplomatica de libre importación del automovil en forma ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ temporal según acuerdo de la oficina de Registro Federal de Automoviles. MARTIN está de acuerdo y el mismo puede darle contestación a esa solicitud. GUZMAN que es conveniente hacer el endoso de la factura y demás documentación..... - SE TERMINA EL ROLLO.- 835-

- -

. - .   (..7.-L2- 9 mayo 66)

50-6-32/4

14-00000

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Forwarded herewith is verbatim conversation between Judith FERRETTO and Adelina ZENDEJAS on 20 November 1965. (Source: LIFEAT)

Willard C. CURTIS

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As stated - Herewith

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CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA 27885

DATE: 15 December 1965

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/KAPOK

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201 - 020481

14-00000

99 FEB No. 13 20 Nov 65

JUDY: Mujer, ya te arreglaron el teléfono?

AZ: Ya

JUDY: Te he llamado.

AZ: Sí, lo tuve muy mal, se mojaron los cables, porque los acomodadores de los teléfonos vinieron y lo plantaron y yo les dije que todavía no estaba puesto y dijeron no importa, ahora voy a tener que pagar la nueva instalación.

JUDY: Y eso no va por cuenta de ellos?

AZ: No. Y como le haces o no haces si no te quedas sin teléfono.

JUDY: Ah sí hay cosas que no puede uno ni pelearlas. Cómo llegó tu mamá, quería en primer lugar saber eso.

AZ: Pues llegó muy cansada con la altura luego pues le dió gripa y luego pues la impresión, si a uno le produce impresión un viaje así, imagínate para ella que a su edad va a consumar el sueño de su vida y a ver de bulto todo lo que se imaginaba

JUDY: Pues fíjate que el otro día te quise decir, pero como estabas tan ocupada con..te acuerdas? allá en el Instituto que había recibido carta de Carlos y habla de tipor sumesto y me pone además..te voy a leer donde dice: Recibí también carta de ADELINA donde me dice cosas muy bonitas tuyas. Bueno me encanta que hayas conocido a (no entiendo nombre) me dices cuando viene...(Judita termina de leer y dice:, el muchacho se fué sin avisarme desgraciadamente, yo quería mandarle una botella de Tequila y se fue;(pero está internado desde 2 días antes de que mi mamá llegara a Roma,- AZ habla)..JUDY: El muchacho? AZ: No, Carlos. JUDY: Ah sí el habla aquí de eso, que le traerá óptimos resultados.

AZ: Llegando a Roma lo internaron y estará hasta hoy en el hospital.

JUDY: Depende mucho de las enfermeras no? pregunta (se ríen) (continúa leyendo la carta)..."cuídate mucho en escribirme, te espero la próxima vez en Trieste, un abrazo para tí, un abrazo para Adelina, dile que a pesar de mi buena voluntad no he encontrado a su madre. — Contreras?

AZ: No la pudo encontrar porque se puso muy malo en Trieste; exactamente los días que mi mamá estaba en Roma él ya estaba en camino a Ferrara, porque le escribió a Carlitos y le dijo lo mismo y le dijo que me buscara y el maldito muchacho si no me encuentra en El Día no me lo dice, por cierto que le pregunté por su mamá y me dijo: "bueno, vive en Cuautla más tranquila, tú sabes.."

JUDY: Esta carta es del 30 y el muchacho salió el 30 y me dice: pasado mañana ingreso al hospital. Le voy a contestar esta semana-

AZ: Le voy a escribir yo también, él quisiera que todos los días le escribieran.

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JUDY: De pasada le mandaré un traguito de Tequila como recuerde de este hermoso país.

AZ: Tú sabes que no puede tomar nada, por eso le encerraron

JUDY: No, lo encerraron por lo de su pierna.

AZ: Pero por eso, no puede tomar nada, Carlitos me dijo eso, que no se había querido internar y lo había estado alarga y alarga porque iba a tener una dieta tremenda entre ella ni gota de alcohol ni gota de vino, dice: "y tú ya sabes cómo es mi papá".

JUDY: qué otra cosa te iba a decir..mira, de lo de Carlos Pellicer que hablamos para digo tan a la carrera...

AZ: (interrumpe) yo hablé con él

JUDY: Sí él me dijo. te enteraste bien de todo domo fué (AZ la interrumpe y dice: Sí la leí.) Judy continúa: Ah leíste la carta..

AZ: Después me dijo, no hay nada que hacer, yo le hable al otro día. me dijo: mira vino el secretario del señor con su montón de excusas y me hizo un montón de halagos, se estuvo más de media hora conmigo y ante eso me ha desarmado completamente.

JUDY: Sí, pero sí se puede publicar la carta.

AZ: Pero en dónde, en El Día no la publican.

JUDY: No la publican? Yo la mandé a todos los lugares que pude, me entiendes? fuera.

AZ: No, ni de chiste, yo le dije: mira, yo podría hacer un comentario y me contestó: lo entiendo, además creo que no se puede hacer, así me dijo ese día.

JUDY: Yo estuve con él, en la casa.

AZ: (interrumpe) me dijo que había hablado a "Política" a ver si acaso pero a cualquier revista o periódico que la publique, le quitan el papel, así tranquilamente, yo compré "Siempre" pensando que ya saliera algo y ni una palabra, ni Sucesos fíjate tú.

JUDY: Ah, antes de que se me olvide, qué hay en lo de MADRAZO Angelina

AZ: Bueno mira él ya no aguantó, porque los intereses creados en el PRIson superiores a la buena intención de él.

JUDY: Espérate un segundito.,,, Ya perdona.

AZ: Bueno, entonces, él pues en verdad trataba de hacer un partido y.. de purificarlo vamos.. y los intereses creados más la propaganda en contra de él, pagada por esos intereses no le permitió realizar lo que él quería.

JUDY: Verdad que es un hombre muy honrado?

AZ: El es honrado, muy muy honrado, un poco desbocado como buen Tabasqueño, un poco arbitrario, porque él en su vida ha ido así a brincos y ha superado las cosas, pero pues las mañas de todo esto y además intereses personales terribles, en Chihuahua, en Sinaloa, en donde el latifundismo de los nuevos ricos de los nue-

(cont..

vos Porfiristas, pues no se deja ganar para nada y luego cuando no hay en realidad un movimiento popular desde la base, organizado donde no hay una militancia verdadera ningún partido e incluyo al (JUDY la interrumpe diciendo "claro, claro" y no se escucha el nombre del partido) qué puedes tu hacer, si yo a veces pienso que cómo López Mateos no aventó todo al diablo se fue a la Derecha completamente.

JUDY: Ni sabes que está muy enfermo.

AZ: López Mateos?

JUDY: Sí, porque yo tengo de cliente a la señora Alvarez Amézquita, que son muy amigos, bueno y un día de estos me estuve [illegible] las quejas de cómo está de mal el doctor, entre otras cosas, dice que está bueno, una cosa tremenda, que no quiere hacer caso y que se está matando, bueno y que va a ir con el Lic. López Mateos, van a CHILE no? entonces yo [illegible] le dije: pues si nadie tiene influencias sobre él porque usted no le habla como amiga del Lic. López Mateos que le hable a él, porque tiene una diabetes y no hace ningún caso, está malísimo, tiene una úlcera, toma tragos, en fin matándose no? pero entonces me contesta ella, pero si López Mateos está igual o peor, porque un día de estos casi se nos muere de un dolor de cabeza, casi casi se les muere, me dice: pero ya usted sabe lo que es la cosa de la política y del poder y eso, dice: él estaba feliz esperando el nombramiento este, porque no pueden estar sin esas cosas.. me lo dijo ayer.

AZ: Yo me imagino que algo tenía porque..

JUDY: Interrumpe.. me lo dijo como cosa seria, que se les quiso morir..

AZ: Yo tengo una carta de é., contestando el telegrama del día de su santo y ..(JUDY interrumpe y le pide que espere un momento).. AZ continúa: me puso una carta pero además le he tenido algunas cosas, sobre todo con esto de la Olimpiada y he estado llamando y entonces me pareció tan extraño que inclusive la secretaria de Humberto aparecía como enferma y el ayudante que por última vez tomó el teléfono me dijo: A. maestra, si es usted, le voy a dar el teléfono de San Jerónimo pero no diga usted que yo dije que la señora está enferma, me entiende usted?... Y yo pensé algo le ha de pasar, quizá allí se la ha arrebatado la gente tanto a Adolfo que ha preferido encerrarse en su casa y hacerse todo y ya Humberto ya está allí, trasladado parte de su oficina y está trabajando allí. Luego le hablé a la Sra. Gregor y me dijo: mire, el Lic. Romero está muy ocupado porque el señor tiene muchas cosas, pero yo no le pregunté porque ya se cómo fastidia, pero sí me dió pena porque dije que estará enfermo, porque eso de que se encierre en su casa es muy extraño, por eso algo debe saber.

Yo quise hablar con Eva y le hablé a Amelia su hermana que es mi conducto porque aunque ya no es Presidenta todavía tiene una ola de gente allí y me dijo: vamos a hacer una cosa, espera a que pase el 15 de noviembre y que termine toda la preparación del viaje de Aldolfo (corr. Adolfo) y ya hacemos una cita para que la veas aquí mejor. Ahora que no sabía si Eva acompañaría a Adolfo y también eso me hizo pensar qué cosa será, porque los dos van uno por un

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lido y otro por otro cuando tienen trabajo, pero si ya ova va a acompañarlo es que él está enfermo.

JUDY: No pues yo sé, que estuvo seriamente mal.

AZ: Tiene diabetes emocional, se le sube la azucar por normas y se le baja por normas. Yo lo había visto bastante bien y de repente se ha desaparecido, yo creía que estaba trabajando en la intervencion, en esto, en lo de Chile, pero mira las gentes que se ponen graves graves durar mucho.

AZ: Se murió Ana Mayeb, tenía anemia hemolítica. Del páncreas, no hay nada que hacer, además le dio bronconeumonía y se fué volando. Murió el martes 9, tú llegaste un día antes del acto verdad? bueno, entonces yo era la que iba a hablar, yo tenía 39 de calentura, ese día me viste muy mal.

JUDY: No hablamos por teléfono el día que tú estabas preparando el discurso. Entonces fué cuando quería yo hablar contigo de todas estas cosas, excepto de lo del Lic. López Mateos.

AZ: Era ese el día, había muerto un día antes, había tenido tanto lío y tanta cosa, me había emberrinchinado porque me habían nombrado y no puedo dar conferencias, no tengo tiempo para preparar y así me dá mucho coraje ir a hacer por serías y más en el club de la Unión Soviética, entonces lo había escrito pero lo tenía que resumir porque eran muchas hojas y no tenía más del tiempo preciso para terminar, revisar y corregir y luego pues otras veces yo puedo hablar, pero ahora que tengo este ruidito en el oído, tú no sabes qué desesperación porque me pongo nerviosísima, luego tenía calentura, total al entrar al acto me dijeron murió Ana Mayeb.

JUDY: Yo hace mucho no la veía, porque yo donde solía encontrarme con ella era allá, ya tú sabes, con esta amiga que vive en la Av. Veracruz. Esa noche cenó allí con nosotros, pues todavía estaba Pere aquí.

AZ: Bueno pues ella fue la primera que me dijo que era un caso muy difícil en que en otra situación se podría hacer algo, pero que cómo íbamos nosotros a pedir cosas.

JUDY: Ah bueno, de esto te quería hablar también, de lo que me contó Carlos Pellicer, tú lo debes saber bien, de la gestión de un grupo de hombres de lo más destacado de México, de personalidades en todos los campos, de la gente muy honrada, etc. y pusieron en manos de Carlos Pellicer una petición al "Barbón" no para que le libere ni nada de eso no? sino para que se sep. de ella y las razones, es una cosa muy respetuosa, me dijo Carlos y perfectamente humana. Entonces Carlos debió haber ido en representación del grupo a depositar en manos de...

AZ: No le van a contestar nada.

JUDY: No, no no, ir personalmente a la isla, me entiendes?

AZ: Pues no le van a hacer caso.

JUDY: Y resulta que entonces el se queja con mucha razón porque aquí estaba Luisa cuando eso, y estaba furiosa porque hagan cosas así. Entonces se fue aquí, donde una es su amiga o amigo, que es el

(cont..

embajador, porque son muy amigos, y le dijo y le pidió el visado y le negaron el visado. Francamente Adelina, eso da vergüenza.

AZ: Pues no me extraña.

JUDY: Y me dijo, están haciendo un Gobierno democrático o qué.

AZ: Bueno, eso no lo entienden.

JUDY: No, no Adelina no, ya esas líneas no se pueden tener a estas alturas.

AZ: Bueno, pues mira, ese día del entierro, yo hablé con una gente de allá, que fue porque esta mujer ayudó mucho en toda la represión y eso, fue al entierro, entonces yo fui en la mañana a las 8:30 y me estuve allí hasta las 10:30 en que me fuí a mi trabajo ... (JUDY la interrumpe y le pide que espere un momento) AZ continúa: y le dije yo no voy a ir al cerrito pero volveré al salir del trabajo, y efectivamente en la noche con todo y la calentura me fuí pero andaba muy mal, la tarde estaba horrible. Estuve hablando con esa gente que ha estado allí en mayo de este año y me dijo que el "Chino" negaba todo y que allí había confesado todo, pero absolutamente todo.

JUDY: Sí, el asunto no es que sea o no

AZ: (interrumpe) y grita que se está quemando pues se le derramó el té.

AZ: Te voy a decir que para mí es una cosa muy grave, porque esto debe haber creado una situación para los compañeros terrible, desde que mi papá fué a verla, que no lo dejaron hablar más que 10 minutos...

JUDY: (interrumpe) bueno mira nadie está pidiendo que la liberen, es una cosa de un respetuoso de los valores muy grandes de México que respetan a ese Gobierno y que yo creo que si a gentes que son como son se les ha dado visa...

AZ: Ya no se les da visa a nadie.

JUDY: Bueno, pero ahí hay gente que ha ido y ha vuelto y sigue allí y es asquerosa, para esos sí hay visados y que no hay visado para un individuo que ha defendido todo el tiempo este gobierno que lo respeta como se debe, que se dirige en nombre e que va en representación de la gente más limpia de México, que no le están diciendo al DR. CASTRO póngala y le rogamos que haga esto o lo otro, me entiendes? porqué no le dan un visado que vaya personalmente y le diga tenemos ciertas [illegible], no se las podemos decir y se fue y ya, eso es lo que hacen Adelina eso lo hacen en todos los países del mundo sin excepción, entonces esto sí da una vergüenza y lo que ayuda aquí es a aumentar a que este grupo de gentes tenga que empezar con justa razon a hablar mal de este gobierno.

AZ: Bueno yo creo que Carlos ya no será más Presidente del Instituto

JUDY: El está invitado además para presidir el jurado de algo, que hay allí, un concurso, en la Casa de las Américas, entonces lo que

cont..)

quería yo Adelina, es que tú le escribieras a tu papá.

AZ: Yo no puedo escribir, porque le tengo que mandar la carta abierta, yo escribo con un gran cuidado, mira, lo operaron, tú sabes cómo es su estado? yo no, al fin supe de qué le habían operado, porque una amiga mía que me ha mandado pedir medicinas y que me mandó los dos últimos libros de mi papá, fue la que me lo dijo, entonces yo metí una carta para la hija, le pregunto de los niños, de mi papá y le digo que estoy muy angustiada porque no sé de qué lo habrán operado, que me tiene muy intranquila la operación de mi papá, le platico cosas totalmente familiares, entonces esta persona me contestó diciéndome: a su papá lo operaron de hemorroides y ya está mejor, cosa que me dió gusto porque yo inmediatamente le mandé el "Hemroid" que es lo que yo tomo y que me escapé de la tercera operación. No he recibido contestación, no sé nada, pero yo por intuición comencé a no escribir más de cosas permitidas, eso lo envié por correo, pero lo que yo llevo allí, a la Embajada, le digo al embajador aquí está la carta y él me dice: no Angelina no faltaba más, y le repito: léala, yo no me voy contenta si usted no la lee.

JUDY: Y porqué tú no hablas con él

AZ: No, porque entonces va a resultar lo siguiente: que no vuelvo a entrar a la Embajada, porque yo sé de una gente que hizo eso y no la dejan entrar.

JUDY: Entonces yo no quiero ir allí, ni que haya otra revolución, con toda honradez te lo digo, porque eso no es lo que uno quiere, así como lo oyes se lo suelto al primero que encuentre.

AZ: Te voy a decir una cosa, las otras revoluciones están consolidadas y aceptadas.

JUDY: No y no, no se trata de estar dejando entrar al enemigo ni mucho menos, ni se les está irrespetando. O respetan las medidas democráticas o que no hagan revoluciones.

AZ: Pues no te puedo decir muchas cosas por teléfono, que sé,

JUDY: Luisa estaba indignada, me dijo: eso da vergüenza, lástima que estuvo aquí nuestro papá días antes, si él hubiera estado aquí ... hubiera hablado, si hubiera ido a plantear esta cosa como da vergüenza.

AZ: Pues sí, no lo ve nadie, mis hermanas la vieron en julio, los dos días que estuvieron, dicen que está muy avejentada muy flaquita a ellas les dijo que no sabía nada, entonces mi otra persona, que es una persona que a mí me parece todo crédito, me dijo, bueno la cosa es que el ... y ... ... no ... ...

JUDY: Pero ellos están presos o qué?

AZ: Sí, Joaquín estuvo muy enfermo, lo dejaron ir a la casa que le han ... a la señora, ella está totalmente aislada, pero estaba con su mujer y con su hijo en cuanto se mejoró lo volvieron a encerrar.

JUDY: Pues eso era lo que quería yo hablar contigo, porque realmente

cont..)

pues... ah, y ya la retacharon a [illegible].

AZ: absolutamente. Ya la retacharon.

JUDY: Mira, un día de estos el ex-marido de [illegible], estaba yo con unos amigos en la Comercial Mexicana y andaba él allí como sonámbulo hecho un viejito, ya no tiene ni pelo, pero qué barbaridad.

AZ: Yo lo ví a él hace días y le pregunté por ella, porque siempre le pregunto y me dijo: ella... Yo le dije que la había visto en enero, que iba con los niños, así y allá, me [illegible] allá. Entonces me dijo: sí vino [illegible] los niños y se regresó, pero me lo dijo así con una cosa de amargura terrible y entonces le dije y se va a quedar definitivamente? no, me dijo, regresa en tres días y creo que no volverá, entonces después alguien me dijo que seguro no la volverían a dar la visa.

JUDY: Pues qué barbaridad, que tenga la gente así que hablar, con la razón en la mano.

AZ: Quien sabe, yo [illegible] no [illegible] juicios, yo no sé qué habrá.

JUDY: No, mira por grave que sea, nadie se está metiendo a ver la gravedad o no gravedad.

AZ: Que al [illegible] lo llevaron a Checoeslovaquia, custodiado a carearlo etc etc, lo llevaron a París a carearlo y la investigación ha sido poco...

JUDY: Eso yo no lo discuto, ni discuto culpabilidad o no, justicia o no nadie se está metiendo en eso, es una cosa [illegible] respetuosa la petición.

AZ: Bueno, te voy a decir a qué grado están las cosas de extremas, yo junto medicinas porque sé que hay cosas de [illegible]troenterolo[illegible] la que no pueden tratar, la gente se les muere.

JUDY: Yo estoy horrorizada por lo de [illegible] que la acaban de operar de cáncer en Pra[illegible] la trasladaran para allá.

AZ: No, no tengas eso.

JUDY: No Adelina, si ese cáncer está maligno, está pésimo,

AZ: Bueno pues medicinas sí puedes mandar.

AZ: Eso no se cura con medicinas Adelina sino con tratamiento.

JUDY: Los grandes especialistas no están ya allí y la experiencia es la experiencia. [illegible] al cuidado de una de las mejores especialistas de allá, que la ve cada mes, imagínate.

AZ: Pues, yo mando medicinas y siempre llevo la caja, en eso he sido muy [illegible] siempre, cuando el portero no me dice: voy a avisarle al embajador, le digo: aquí está la caja, le dice que es de parte mía y que puedo revisar todito. Ahora cuando se abre la puerta y va a avisarle al embajador, entro y saco y todo lo extiendo, y le digo ahora ud. lo empaqueta como quiera. A mí no me han vuelto a invitar a nada, yo sé que tienen recepciones muy cerradas a mí no me han invitado a nada, a nada.

(cont..

JUDY: Sí, ya se, aunque para uno es mejor.

AZ: A nada, siempre yo invito a los agregados culturales, a los [illegible]. Antes siempre iban, ahora no van. Creo que esta actitud les va a hacer perder al Instituto Mexicano-Cubano.

JUDY: Como no van a perder, pues no te digo la calidad de gentes, pregúntale a Carlos cuando regrese de Tabasco que te diga la lista más o menos de la gente, creo que serán 40 o algo así, gentes escogidísimas.

AZ: Y ya te digo, de mi papá, directamente bueno ni su hija, ni la mamá, nadie de ellos me escribe, yo sé a través de esta persona y te digo, quiero que consiga usted esto que me imagino son parte de [illegible] ellos, cómo se los podemos pagar. Inclusive yo le dije bueno mire si hay ocasión con algún diplomático, y se lo [illegible] que fuera con diplomático, mínimo 4 botellas de ron, que son las que pueden salir de allá y ojalá me llegaran para Navidad, salen en 90. pesos mexicanos así de que son como [illegible] dls. cada una. Y yo me estado ajustando a lo que se pueden enviar porque yo no estoy ahora en condiciones de enviar 5.0 pesos de regalos como antes lo hacía con tanto sacrificios porque JUDITH, me ha quedado una deuda de la casa de 20 mil pesos que yo tengo que salir en el año que entra y yo me jubilo, yo voy a tener una casa muy cómoda, muy agusto para trabajar, claro que hasta donde yo pueda sostener el coche, mientras me dan gasolina y chofer, el día que no, lo agarro lo vendo y me [illegible], yo no puedo manejar con este oído lo intenté hace poco y me dí una mareada tan horrible que a las tres cuadras le dije al chofer, mire tome el volante, yo no puedo.

JUDY: Bueno, vamos a ver cuando nos vemos de todas maneras Adelina.

AZ: Sí yo te tengo tu regalo

JUDY: Tenemos que hablar de verdad y vernos, tú me avisas porque ya sales en vacaciones.

AZ: Cuáles vacaciones? Tengo vacaciones sólo en la escuela, pero nada más, lo que puedo hacer es [illegible] del Instituto una tarde para que nos veamos, porque de otra manera no nos podremos ver y así hay todavía tanto polvo que no me atrevo a invitarte a comer.

JUDY: Ya tengo aquí a una muchacha, y por cierto ya te dejo porque le tengo que estar diciendo, es nueva, muy buena me está saliendo, voy a descansar un poco porque ya no aguantaba, 3 años y medio de estar como [illegible] de carga.

AZ: Yo prefiero pagar para que me trabajen, desde a qué hora me pongo a hacer las cosas. Salgo a las 8 de la mañana regreso a las 3, como y con esto del oído son las 2 de la mañana y yo no me he dormido, [illegible] [illegible].

JUDY: Bueno, me le da un abrazo a su mamá, dígale que pregunté por ella.

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HMMA-27555

cont..)

AZ: Sí ya sabe que eres tú, nos vemos adiós.

JUDY: Adiós.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 26

ORIG : DAVID [illegible]/hdp
UNIT : WE/4/X
EXT : 5559
DATE : 23 September 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-776046

SECRET

TO : ROME MEXICO CITY

24 SEP 65

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WE 2 INFO: VR , FILE RID COPY

TO ROME INFO MEXI CITE DIR

45331

PER OIRM-24382 PARA 7, PLS ADVISE WHETHER YOU CONCUR DISCONTINUING LI[illegible] COVERAGE CARLO COCCIOLI (201-776046) WHILE CONTINUING WATCHLIST HIS TRAVEL OUTSIDE MEXICO.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WE/EXT WH/1 Mr. Fisher (telecoord) C/WE/4

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Enrique SEMO Calev

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Attached for Headquarters' information and retention are copies of the LIFEAT coverage on Subject, reel #269 through reel #272 for the period 2 through 14 July 1965 and reel #1 through reel #16 for the period 31 July through 16 August 1965.

2. This coverage was temporarily discontinued from 15 through 30 July because of technical difficulties with the instrument in the Semo home.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated in paragraph 1

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD, w/att

File:
Litemp Reel

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-26,933	19 August 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-745927

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING; XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED; ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING; MICROFILM

TO: Chief, EED

INFO: Chief, WHD

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: DMLET/LIFEAT/Operational
Transmittal of LIFEAT Tapes and Transcripts

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Forwarded herewith for translation of the Yugoslav portions are the following LIFEAT tapes: 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 & 14. Also forwarded are the following Spanish transcripts: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 & 14.

2. Because of the DMSAUCE/1 flap, the Spanish transcripts of the LIFEAT tapes will continue thru the end of this week (10 April), after that there will be no transcribing done in the field.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
1. As Stated (HEREWITH)

Distribution:
2 - EED w/att h/w
~~1~~ - WHD w/o/att
2 - Files

File
LIFEAT Prod.

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-25814

DATE: 8 April 1965

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-8-2/9

CONFIDENTIAL
(COLLECTOR/INITIATOR: DECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO DATA ADDED BELOW)

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY Department of State

EVALUATING AGENCY

DATE OF DISTRIB. February 1963	DISSEM. NUMBER CS-3/538,352	
CHIEF COUNTRY Yugoslavia/Mexico	FIELD NUMBER HMMA-20344	PLEASE RETURN EVALUATION

SUBJECT Yugoslav Commercial Activities in Mexico

BY WAY OF INR/CS - ROOM 6173

EVALUATOR: Please complete this evaluation within __ days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is priority/standard. Indicate choices by "x." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one X in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further notes on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:

A
	1. *Major*	IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.
X	2. MODERATE	
	3. LITTLE	
	4. NO	

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

B — CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:
	1. SIGNIFICANTLY.
	2. SUBSTANTIALLY.
X	3. MODERATELY.
	4. NEGLIGIBLY.

C — ACCURACY.
	1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE.
X	2. CREDIBLE.
	3. *Doubtful.*
	4. *False.*
	5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE D.

D — RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION.
X	1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION.
	2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION.
	3. *Sufficiently known.*
	4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS.
	5. *Conflicts with previous information.*
	6. *Appears to be fabrication.*

E — USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:
	1. *More detail.*
	2. *Less detail, more summary.*
	3. *Less fragmentary approach.*
	4. *Better organization.*
	5. *Better observation or better exploitation of source, or both.*
	6. (STATED IN COMMENT.)
X	7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS.

OUR COLLECTION NEEDS

F — OTHER REPORTING MEETS:
X	1. OUR IMPORTANT NEEDS.
	2. OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
	3. MOST OF OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
	4. FEW OR NONE OF OUR NEEDS.

G — (ONLY IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT SATISFIES IT:
	1. FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED.
	2. *Partially. Portion of requirement may be closed.*
	3. PARTIALLY, BUT NEED CONTINUES.
	4. NEGLIGIBLY.

H — (IF SUBJECT IS IMPORTANT TO YOU, OTHER REPORTING DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM NEEDS, AND YOU HAVE FILED NO REQUIREMENT:)
	1. WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT SOON.
	2. OUR NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR CS REPORTING.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

We would appreciate your comments evaluating this report.

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

As a status report, document is of moderate value. Generally negative progress of Yugo attempts to establish a commerical foothold in Mexico not in itself of great interest to this office, at this time, but would increase in interest in direct relation to information on decision of Belgrade to grant a loan to Mexican govt.

EVALUATOR	NAME (Please print)	COMPONENT	PHONE
	P. Adler	INR/RSB/EA	x 3803
	DATE REQUEST RECEIVED. Mar 1	DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED Mar 6	

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

(COLLECTOR/E[illegible]UAT[illegible] RECLASSIFY ACCORDING T[illegible] [illegible]ATA [illegible]ED BELOW)

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY State Department

EVALUATING AGENCY

DATE OF DISTRIB. 27 January 1961	DISSEM. NUMBER CS-3/463,061	Lefeat [illegible]
Chief Country Mexico/Cuba	FIELD NUMBER HMM-5400	10 Apr. 61

Subject Mexican Technicians Going to Work in Cuba

EVALUATOR: Please complete this evaluation within 60 days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is standard. Indicate choices by "X." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one X in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further NOTES on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:

A

	1. *Major*	IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.
X	2. MODERATE	
	3. LITTLE	
	4. NO	

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

B CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:

	1. SIGNIFICANTLY
	2. SUBSTANTIALLY
X	3. MODERATELY
	4. NEGLIGIBLY

C ACCURACY.

	1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE
X	2. CREDIBLE
	3. *Doubtful*
	4. *False*
	5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE D.

D RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION.

	1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION
X	2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION
	3. *Sufficiently known*
	4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS
	5. *Conflicts with previous information*
	6. *Appears to be fabrication*

E USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:

	1. *More detail*
	2. *Less detail, more summary*
	3. *Less fragmentary approach*
	4. *Better organization*
	5. *Better observation or better exploitation of source, or both.*
X	6. (STATED IN COMMENT)
	7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS.

OUR COLLECTION NEEDS

F OTHER REPORTING MEETS:

	1. OUR IMPORTANT NEEDS.
	2. OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
	3. MOST OF OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
	4. FEW OR NONE OF OUR NEEDS.

G (ONLY IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT SATISFIES IT:

	1. FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED.
	2. *Partially. Portion of requirement may be closed.*
	3. PARTIALLY, BUT NEED CONTINUES.
	4. NEGLIGIBLY

H (IF SUBJECT IS IMPORTANT TO YOU, OTHER REPORTING DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM NEEDS, AND YOU HAVE FILED NO REQUIREMENT:)

	1. WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT SOON.
	2. OUR NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR CS REPORTING.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

This report would have been of greater value if it had included some comment on the political orientation of the technicians (if any) and whether they were being sent by the Mexican Government or were hired on a purely personal basis.

EVALUATOR	NAME (*Please print*) Lawrence S. Eagleburger	COMPONENT State/INR/RAR/MAB	PHONE 182-2097
	DATE REQUEST RECEIVED March 17, 1961	DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED March 22, 1961.	

FORM 10-35 EDITION

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CONFIDENTIAL
(COLLECTOR/EVA[illegible] RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO [illegible]ED BELOW)

UFFAT Translation

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY Department of State
EVALUATING AGENCY

DATE OF DISTRIB. 2 November 1960	DISSEM. NUMBER CS-3/454,933 RAIL	L. Bright L. Fait Lumvel
Chief Country Mexico/Nicaragua	FIELD NUMBER HMM-5264	20 [illegible]

Subject Nicaraguan Revolutionary Activities in Mexico

EVALUATOR: Please complete this evaluation within 60 days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is XXXXX/standard. Indicate choices by "x." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one X in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further NOTES on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:

A
	1. *Major*	IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.
✓	2. MODERATE	
	3. LITTLE	
	4. NO	

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

B CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:
	1. SIGNIFICANTLY
	2. SUBSTANTIALLY
✓	3. MODERATELY
	4. NEGLIGIBLY

C ACCURACY.
	1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE
✓	2. CREDIBLE
	3. *Doubtful*
	4. *False*
	5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE D.

D RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION.
	1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION
✓	2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION
	3. *Sufficiently known*
	4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS
	5. *Conflicts with previous information*
	6. *Appears to be fabrication*

E USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:
	1. *More detail*
	2. *Less detail, more summary*
	3. *Less fragmentary approach*
	4. *Better organization*
	5. *Better observation or better exploitation of source, or both.*
	6. (STATED IN COMMENT)
	7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS.

OUR COLLECTION NEEDS

F OTHER REPORTING MEETS:
	1. OUR IMPORTANT NEEDS.
	2. OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
	3. MOST OF OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
	4. FEW OR NONE OF OUR NEEDS.

G (ONLY IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT SATISFIES IT:
	1. FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED.
	2. *partially. Portion of requirement may be closed.*
	3. PARTIALLY, BUT NEED CONTINUES.
	4. NEGLIGIBLY

H (IF SUBJECT IS IMPORTANT TO YOU, OTHER REPORTING DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM NEEDS, AND YOU HAVE FILED NO REQUIREMENT:)
	1. WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT SOON.
	2. OUR NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR CS REPORTING.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR	NAME (Please print) RT Morrison	COMPONENT INR/RAR-P	PHONE 3327
	DATE REQUEST RECEIVED Nov 15/60	DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED Nov. 16/60	

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(COLLECTOR/EVALUATOR: RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO DATA ADDED BELOW)

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY Department of State
EVALUATING AGENCY

DATE OF DISTRIB.	1 November 1960	DISSEM. NUMBER	CS-3/454,903
Chief Country	Mexico/Cuba	FIELD NUMBER	HMM-5245

Subject: Propaganda Activities of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico

EVALUATOR: Please complete this evaluation within 60 days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is XXXXX/standard. Indicate choices by "x." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one X in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further NOTES on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF: (IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.)

A
- 1. *Major*
- ✓ 2. MODERATE
- 3. LITTLE
- 4. NO

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

B CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:
- 1. SIGNIFICANTLY
- 2. SUBSTANTIALLY
- ✓ 3. MODERATELY
- 4. NEGLIGIBLY

C ACCURACY:
- 1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE
- ✓ 2. CREDIBLE
- 3. *Doubtful*
- 4. *False*
- 5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE D.

D RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION.
- 1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION
- ✓ 2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION
- 3. *Sufficiently known*
- 4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS
- 5. *Conflicts with previous information*
- 6. *Appears to be fabrication*

E USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:
- 1. *More detail*
- 2. *Less detail, more summary*
- 3. *Less fragmentary approach*
- 4. *Better organization*
- 5. *Better observation or better exploitation of source, or both.*
- 6. (STATED IN COMMENT)
- 7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS.

OUR COLLECTION NEEDS

F OTHER REPORTING MEETS:
- 1. OUR IMPORTANT NEEDS.
- 2. OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
- 3. MOST OF OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
- 4. FEW OR NONE OF OUR NEEDS.

G (ONLY IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT SATISFIES IT:
- 1. FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED.
- 2. *partially. Portion of requirement may be closed.*
- 3. PARTIALLY, BUT NEED CONTINUES.
- 4. NEGLIGIBLY

H (IF SUBJECT IS IMPORTANT TO YOU, OTHER REPORTING DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM NEEDS, AND YOU HAVE FILED NO REQUIREMENT:)
- 1. WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT SOON.
- 2. OUR NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR CS REPORTING.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR	NAME (Please print)	COMPONENT	PHONE
	RT Merrison	INR/RAR-P	3327
	DATE REQUEST RECEIVED	DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED	
	Nov 18 60	Nov 18 60	

10-59

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(COLLECTOR/EVALUATOR: RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO ... ADDED BELOW)

IFEAT Prod folder

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY OSI
(EVALUATING AGENCY)

DATE OF DISTRIB.	26 September 1960	DISSEM. NUMBER	CS 3/451,014
Chief Country	Mexico/Soviet Union	FIELD NUMBER	HMM 5159

Lifted 18 Jan 61

Subject: **Mexican Government Purchase of Soviet Radioisotopes**

EVALUATOR: Please complete this evaluation within 30 days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is XXXXXX standard. Indicate choices by "x." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one x in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further NOTES on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF: (IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.)

1. MAJOR
2. MODERATE
3. LITTLE — **A3**
4. NO

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:

1. SIGNIFICANTLY
2. SUBSTANTIALLY
3. MODERATELY
4. NEGLIGIBLY — **B4**

ACCURACY:

1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE
2. CREDIBLE — **C2**
3. *Doubtful*
4. *False*
5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE D.

RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION:

1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION
2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION
3. *Sufficiently known* — **D3**
4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS
5. *Conflicts with previous information*
6. *Appears to be fabrication*

USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:

1. *more detail*
2. *Less detail, more summary*
3. *Less fragmentary approach*
4. *Better organization*
5. *Better observation or better exploitation of source, or both.*
6. (STATED IN COMMENT)
7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS. — **E7**

OUR COLLECTION NEEDS

OTHER REPORTING MEETS:

1. OUR IMPORTANT NEEDS. — **F1**
2. OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
3. MOST OF OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
4. FEW OR NONE OF OUR NEEDS.

(ONLY IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT SATISFIES IT:

1. FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED.
2. *partially. Portion of requirement may be closed.*
3. PARTIALLY. BUT NEED CONTINUES.
4. NEGLIGIBLY

(IF SUBJECT IS IMPORTANT TO YOU, OTHER REPORTING DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM NEEDS, AND YOU HAVE FILED NO REQUIREMENT:)

1. WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT SOON
2. OUR NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT AND CS REPORTING. — **H2**

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

Coordinated with LSD/SI - C. W. DeLong

EVALUATOR	NAME (Please print) WALLACE W. HOWARD (signature: Harold F. Clark)	COMPONENT OSI/NED	PHONE 3955
	DATE REQUEST RECEIVED	DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED	

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(COLLECTOR/EVALUATOR: RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO DATA ADDED BELOW)

LIFEAT
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CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY United States Information Agency
EVALUATING AGENCY

DATE OF DISTRIB.	1 November 1960	DISSEM. NUMBER	CS-3/454,903
Chief Country	Mexico/Cuba	FIELD NUMBER	HMM-5245

Subject: Propaganda Activities of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico

EVALUATOR: Please complete this evaluation within 30 days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is XXXXXX/standard. Indicate choices by "x." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one X in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further NOTES on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:

A

X	1. *Major*	IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.
	2. MODERATE	
	3. LITTLE	
	4. NO	

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

B CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:

	1. SIGNIFICANTLY
X	2. SUBSTANTIALLY
	3. MODERATELY
	4. NEGLIGIBLY

C ACCURACY:

	1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE
	2. CREDIBLE
	3. *Doubtful*
	4. *False*
X	5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE D.

D RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION.

	1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION
X	2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION
	3. *Sufficiently known*
	4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS
	5. *Conflicts with previous information*
	6. *Appears to be fabrication*

E USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:

	1. *More detail*
	2. *Less detail, more summary*
	3. *Less fragmentary approach*
	4. *Better organization*
	5. *Better observation or better exploitation of source, or both.*
	6. (STATED IN COMMENT)
X	7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS.

OUR COLLECTION NEEDS

F OTHER REPORTING MEETS:

X	1. OUR IMPORTANT NEEDS.
	2. OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
	3. MOST OF OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
	4. FEW OR NONE OF OUR NEEDS.

G (ONLY IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT SATISFIES IT:

	1. FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED.
	2. *Partially. Portion of requirement may be closed.*
	3. PARTIALLY, BUT NEED CONTINUES.
	4. NEGLIGIBLY

H (IF SUBJECT IS IMPORTANT TO YOU, OTHER REPORTING DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM NEEDS, AND YOU HAVE FILED NO REQUIREMENT:)

	1. WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT SOON.
	2. OUR NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR CS REPORTING.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

Information on Cuban propaganda activities in Latin America is of major and continuing importance to this office, which must evaluate the nature, scope, and extent of those activities in order to combat them.

EVALUATOR

NAME (Please print)	COMPONENT	PHONE
Flora M. Roth	Office of Research and Analysis, USIA	182-5475
DATE REQUEST RECEIVED	DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED	
November 8, 1960	November 14, 1960	

14-00000

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(COLLECTOR/EVALUATOR: RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO DATA ADDED BELOW)

LIFEAT
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CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY Department of State
EVALUATING AGENCY

DATE OF DISTRIB.	3 October 1960	DISSEM. NUMBER	CS-3/451,671	
Chief Country	Mexico/Poland	FIELD NUMBER	HGM-5186	4

Subject: Projected Arrival in Mexico of Polish Travel Officials

EVALUATOR: Please complete this evaluation within (?) days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is XXXX standard. Indicate choices by "X." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one X in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further NOTES on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:

A
- 1. *Major*
- ✓ 2. MODERATE
- 3. LITTLE
- 4. NO

} IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

Is this information of sufficient use or value to warrant dissemination?

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

B CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:
- 1. SIGNIFICANTLY
- 2. SUBSTANTIALLY
- ✓ 3. MODERATELY
- 4. NEGLIGIBLY

C ACCURACY:
- 1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE
- ✓ 2. CREDIBLE
- 3. *Doubtful*
- 4. *False*
- 5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE D.

D RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION:
- ✓ 1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION
- ✓ 2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION
- 3. *Sufficiently known*
- 4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS
- 5. *Conflicts with previous information*
- 6. *Appears to be fabrication*

E USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:
- ✓ 1. *More detail*
- 2. *Less detail, more summary*
- 3. *Less fragmentary approach*
- 4. *Better organization*
- 5. *Better observation, better explanation of source, or both*
- 6. (STATED IN COMMENTS)
- 7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS.

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

Information of this nature is of value to RAR, for it provides new data and/or corroboration of information from other sources on Latin American–Bloc contacts. RAR has continuing interest in receipt of reports of this nature.

OUR COLLECTION NEEDS

F OTHER REPORTING MEETS:
- 1. OUR IMPORTANT NEEDS.
- 2. OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
- 3. MOST OF OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
- 4. FEW OR NONE OF OUR NEEDS.

G (ONLY IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT SATISFIES IT:
- 1. FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED
- 2. *partially. Portion of requirement may be closed.*
- 3. PARTIALLY, BUT NEED CONTINUES.
- 4. NEGLIGIBLY

H (IF SUBJECT IS IMPORTANT TO YOU, OTHER REPORTING DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM NEEDS, AND YOU HAVE FILED NO REQUIREMENTS):
- 1. WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT SOON.
- 2. OUR NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR CS REPORTING.

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EVALUATOR	NAME (Please print)	COMPONENT	PHONE
	[illegible]	INR/RAR	7
	DATE REQUEST RECEIVED	DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED	
	[illegible]	[illegible]	

CONFIDENTIAL
(COLLECTOR EVALUATOR: RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO DATA ADDED BELOW)

LIFEAT
Production

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY ORR Rec in ORR 53-60
EVALUATING AGENCY

DATE OF DISTRIB.	26 September 1960	DISSEM. NUMBER	CS-3/451,014	Lifeat
Chief Country	Mexico/Soviet Union	FIELD NUMBER	HMM-5159	31 Oct 60

Subject Mexican Government Purchase of Soviet Radioisotopes

Due 27 October 1960

EVALUATOR: Please complete this evaluation within 60 days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is XXXXX/standard. Indicate choices by "x." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one X in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further NOTES on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:
- 1. *Major*
- ✓ 2. MODERATE
- 3. LITTLE
- 4. NO

IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:
- 1. SIGNIFICANTLY
- 2. SUBSTANTIALLY
- ✓ 3. MODERATELY
- 4. NEGLIGIBLY

ACCURACY:
- 1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE
- ✓ 2. CREDIBLE
- 3. *Doubtful*
- 4. *False*
- 5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE 9.

RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION:
- 1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION
- 2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION
- 3. *Sufficiently known*
- 4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS
- 5. *Conflicts with previous information*
- 6. *Appears to be fabrication*

USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:
- 1. *More detail*
- 2. *Less detail, more summary*
- 3. *Less fragmentary approach*
- 4. *Better organization*
- 5. *Better observation or better exploitation of source, or both.*
- 6. (STATED IN COMMENT)
- 7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS.

OUR COLLECTION NEEDS:

THIS REPORTING MEETS:
- OUR IMPORTANT NEEDS.
- OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
- MOST OF OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
- FEW OR NONE OF OUR NEEDS.

(IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT MEETS IT:
- FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED.
- *Partially. Portion of requirement may be closed.*
- PARTIALLY, BUT NEED CONTINUES.
- NEGLIGIBLY

SUBJECT IS IMPORTANT TO YOU, OTHER REPORTING DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM NEEDS, AND HAVE FILED NO REQUIREMENTS:
- WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT SOON.
- OUR NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR CS REPORTING.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

It is impossible to tell if the USSR prices to Mexico are in line with world prices or not. According to a 1957 Soviet price list, potassium is 3 rubles per millicurie, iodine is 8 to 13 rubles per millicurie and gold is 1 to 3 rubles per millicurie depending upon the form of the carrier. According to the report the average price is $0.15 per millicurie. The quantities of each isotope however, are not given.

Radio isotope prices have changed in the US markedly over the past few years. For example, the price for gold 198 has changed from 20 cents per millicurie prior to May 1959 to 6 cents per millicurie after May 1959. Unless more detailed information is obtained, the information has only moderate value to us.

NAME (Please print)	COMPONENT	PHONE
WILLARD S. SMITH	ORR/[illegible]/N	x3942

DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED

CONFIDENTIAL

(COLLECTOR/EVALUATOR: RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO DATE ADDED ON FRONT) 17 JUN 1960

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY ORR

EVALUATING AGENCY

DISSEM. NUMBER	DATE OF DISTRIB.	FIELD NUMBER
CS-3/439,064	1 June 1960	HCM-1983

Chief Country Mexico/Soviet Union

Subject New Policy of Soviet Commercial Office in Mexico

EVALUATOR: Please complete this valuation within 60 days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is priority/standard. Indicate choices by "X." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under Evaluator's Comments. Normally, put one x in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further NOTES on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:

A.
1. *Major*
X 2. MODERATE
3. LITTLE
4. NO

IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

B. CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:
1. SIGNIFICANTLY
X 2. MODERATELY
3. NEGLIGIBLY

C. ACCURACY:
1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE
X 2. CREDIBLE
3. *Doubtful*
4. *False*
5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE D.

D. RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION
1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION
X 2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION
3. *Sufficiently known*
4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS
5. *Conflicts with previous information*
6. *Appears to be fabrication*

E. USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:
1. *More detail*
2. *Less detail; more summary*
3. *Less fragmentary approach*
4. *Better organization*
5. *Better observation or better exploitation of source, or both.*
6. STATED IN COMMENTS
7. NO DEFECT AFFECTS USEFULNESS

REQUIREMENTS

F. (ONLY IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT SATISFIES IT:
1. FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED.
2. *Partially. Part of requirement may be closed.*
3. PARTIALLY. [illegible] CONTINUES.
4. NEGLIGIBLY.

G. DEGREE TO WHICH [illegible] REPORTING PROVIDES ESSENTIAL INFORMATION ON SUBJECT:
1. FULLY
2. SUBSTANTIALLY
X 3. LITTLE
4. NONE

H. (IF IN G YOU CHECKED "LITTLE" OR "NONE," AND [illegible] NO REQUIREMENT.)
1. WE [illegible] PRESENT A REQUIREMENT WITHIN [illegible] DAYS.
X 2. OUR [illegible] DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR [illegible] REPORTING.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

NAME (Please print)	COMPONENT	PHONE
Robert Naper	ORR/S/TF/SP	5636

REQUEST RECEIVED

DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED

CONFIDENTIAL

(COLLECTOR/EVALUATOR RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO DATA [illegible] ON FRONT) 29 JU[illegible]

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY ORR — EVALUATING AGENCY

DISSEM. NUMBER	DATE OF DISTRIB.	FIELD NUMBER
CS-3/439,528	8 June 1960	HMM-4963

Chief Country: Mexico/Soviet Union — Due 15 July 1960

Subject: Disagreement between Mexican Businessman and Soviet Commercial Officer over Money Owed for Tractors Purchased by the Mexican Government

EVALUATOR: Please complete this evaluation within 60 days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is priority/standard. Indicate choices by "x." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one x in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further notes on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:

A
- 1. *Major*
- 2. MODERATE
- X 3. LITTLE
- 4. NO

} IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

B CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:
- 1. SIGNIFICANTLY
- X 2. MODERATELY
- 3. NEGLIGIBLY

C ACCURACY:
- X 1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE
- 2. CREDIBLE
- 3. *Doubtful*
- 4. *False*
- 5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE D.

D RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION:
- X 1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION
- 2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION
- 3. *Sufficiently known*
- 4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS
- 5. *Conflicts with previous information*
- 6. *Appears to be fabrication*

E USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:
- 1. *More detail*
- 2. *Less detail, more summary*
- 3. *Less fragmentary approach*
- 4. *Better organization*
- 5. *Better observation or better exploitation of source, or both.*
- 6. (STATED IN COMMENT)
- 7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS.

REQUIREMENTS

F (ONLY IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT SATISFIES IT:
- 1. FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED.
- 2. *Partially. Portion of requirement may be closed.*
- X 3. PARTIALLY, BUT NEED CONTINUES.
- 4. NEGLIGIBLY

G DEGREE TO WHICH OTHER (NON-CS) REPORTING PROVIDES ESSENTIAL INFORMATION ON SUBJECT:
- 1. FULLY
- X 2. SUBSTANTIALLY
- 3. LITTLE
- 4. NONE

K (IF IN G YOU [illegible] "LITTLE" OR "NONE," AND IF YOU HAVE [illegible] NO REQUIREMENT.)
- 1. WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT WITHIN 30 DAYS.
- 2. OUR NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR CS REPORTING.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR	NAME (Please print)	COMPONENT	PHONE
	Robert Naper	ORR/S/TF/SP	8036
	DATE REQUEST RECEIVED	DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED	
		11 July 1960	

FORM 10-58 39 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

(COLLECTOR/EVALUATOR RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO DATA ENTERED ON FRONT)

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY ORR

EVALUATING AGENCY

DISSEM. NUMBER	DATE OF DISTRIB.	FIELD NUMBER
CS-3/434,304	18 April 1960	HCM-4858

Chief Country: Mexico/Soviet Union — Due 17 May 1960

Subject: Soviet Plan to Sell Newsprint to Mexican Government Agency

EVALUATOR: Please complete this evaluation within 60 days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is priority/standard. Indicate choices by "X." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one x in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further notes on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:

A
- 1. Major
- 2. Moderate
- X 3. Little
- 4. No

} IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT.

B CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:
- 1. SIGNIFICANTLY
- X 2. MODERATELY
- 3. NEGLIGIBLY

C ACCURACY:
- 1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE
- 2. CREDIBLE
- 3. *Doubtful*
- 4. *False*
- X 5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE D.

D RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION.
- 1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION
- 2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION
- 3. *Sufficiently known*
- X 4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS
- 5. *Conflicts with previous information*
- 6. *Appears to be fabrication*

E USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:
- 1. *More detail*
- 2. *Less detail, more summary*
- 3. *Less fragmentary approach*
- 4. *Better organization*
- 5. *Better observation or better exploitation of source, or both*
- 6. (STATED IN COMMENT)
- 7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS.

REQUIREMENTS

F (ONLY IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT SATISFIES IT:
- 1. FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED
- 2. *Partially. Portion of requirement may be closed.*
- 3. PARTIALLY, BUT NEED CONTINUES.
- 4. NEGLIGIBLY

G DEGREE TO WHICH OTHER (NON-CS) REPORTING PROVIDES ESSENTIAL INFORMATION ON SUBJECT:
- 1. FULLY
- 2. SUBSTANTIALLY
- 3. LITTLE
- X 4. NONE

H (IF IN G YOU CHECKED "LITTLE" OR "NONE," AND IF YOU HAVE FILED NO REQUIREMENT.)
- 1. WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT WITHIN 30 DAYS.
- X 2. OUR NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR CS REPORTING.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR	NAME (Please print)	COMPONENT	PHONE
	Eugene Erro	ORR I/HS	4285
	DATE REQUEST RECEIVED	DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED	
		26 May 60	

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION			
Operational/LAURICLE	RI FILE NO.	50	6	32/4
	DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. HMMA-15007		DATE 18 May 1960	
	SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION	
ANALYST	DATE PROCESSED	DISSEMINATED IN	DATE	

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

THIS REFER [illegible] SECRET DOCUMENT
FILED IN T[illegible] CONTROL
SECTION BY TS-175906

18 May 1960

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL   file LIFEAT [illegible]

(COLLECTOR/EVALUATOR: RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO D[illegible] ADDED ON FRONT)

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY ORR   Ruth H Mersch
EVALUATING AGENCY

DISSEM. NUMBER	DATE OF DISTRIB.	FIELD NUMBER
CS-3/428,266		HMM-4761

Chief Country: Mexico / Soviet Union

Subject: Soviet Negotiations for Mexican Cotton

Due 25 March 1960

EVALUATOR: Please complete this valuation within __ days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is priority/standard. Indicate choices by "X." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one X in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further NOTES on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:

A
- [ ] 1. *Major*
- [X] 2. Moderate
- [ ] 3. Little
- [ ] 4. No

(Importance in relation to our needs.)

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

B. CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:
- [ ] 1. Significantly
- [X] 2. Moderately
- [ ] 3. Negligibly

C. ACCURACY:
- [ ] 1. Substantially true
- [X] 2. Credible
- [ ] 3. *Doubtful*
- [ ] 4. *False*
- [ ] 5. Cannot be judged. See D.

D. RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION:
- [ ] 1. Useful for confirmation
- [X] 2. Useful for new information
- [ ] 3. *Sufficiently known*
- [ ] 4. At present we lack other information to judge accuracy or usefulness
- [ ] 5. *Conflicts with previous information*
- [ ] 6. *Appears to be fabrication*

E. USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:
- [ ] 1. *More detail*
- [ ] 2. *Less detail, more summary*
- [ ] 3. *Less fragmentary approach*
- [ ] 4. *Better organization*
- [ ] 5. *Better observation or better exploitation of source, or both.*
- [ ] 6. (Stated in comments)
- [X] 7. No defect affecting usefulness.

REQUIREMENTS

F. (ONLY IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED:) REPORT SATISFIES IT:
- [ ] 1. Fully. Requirement can be closed
- [ ] 2. *Partial - Portion of requirement may be closed.*
- [ ] 3. Partial, but need continues.
- [ ] 4. Negligibly

G. DEGREE TO WHICH CITED (NON-CS) REPORTING PROVIDES ESSENTIAL INFORMATION ON SUBJECT:
- [ ] 1. Fully
- [ ] 2. Substantially
- [ ] 3. Little
- [ ] 4. None

H. (IF IN G YOU CHECKED "LITTLE" OR "NONE," AND IF YOU HAVE FILED NO REQUIREMENT.)
- [ ] 1. We will present a requirement within 30 days.
- [ ] 2. Our need does not warrant a requirement for CS reporting.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR	NAME (Please print)	COMPONENT	PHONE
	POPE, FLETCHER, Jr.	CRR/M/AG	x3552
	REQUEST RECEIVED	DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED	
	15 Mar. 1960	29 Mar. 1960	

FORM [illegible] OBSOLETE   CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL Scribner file LIFEAT Prov

(COLLECTOR/EVAL [illegible]: [illegible] TO [illegible] ADDED ON FRONT)

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY Department of State

EVALUATING AGENCY

[illegible]	DATE OF DISTRIB.	FIELD NUMBER	
S-3/423,266	19 February 1960	HMM-4761	Lifeat

Chief Country: Mexico/Soviet Union

Subject: [illegible]

EVALUATOR: Please complete this evaluation within 60 days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is priority standard. Indicate choices by "X." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one X in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further notes on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:

- 1. Major
- X 2. Moderate
- 3. Little
- 4. No

} IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:

- 1. Significantly
- X 2. Moderately
- 3. Negligibly

APPEARS:

- X 1. Substantially true
- 2. Credible
- 3. Doubtful
- 4. False
- 5. Cannot be judged

RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION:

- X 1. [illegible]
- 2. [illegible]
- 3. [illegible]
- 4. [illegible]
- 5. Conflicts with previous information
- 6. Appears to be fabrication

[illegible]:

- 1. More detail
- 2. Less detail, more summary
- 3. Less fragmentary approach
- 4. Better organization
- 5. [illegible]
- 6. [illegible]
- X 7. [illegible]

REQUIREMENTS:

[illegible]

- 1. Fully. [illegible]
- 2. Partially. [illegible]
- 3. [illegible]
- 4. [illegible]

[illegible]

- 1. [illegible]
- 2. Substantially
- 3. Little
- 4. None

[illegible]

- 1. [illegible]
- 2. [illegible]

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

Is this information of sufficient use or value to warrant dissemination? Please comment.

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

[illegible] Although the [illegible] the more complete [illegible]

Information [illegible] similar type [illegible] would be valuable [illegible]

[illegible]

86

EVALUATOR	NAME (Please print)	COMPONENT	PHONE
	Donald P. Scribner	[illegible]	[illegible]
	DATE REQUEST RECEIVED	DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED	
	Feb 29, 1960	March 4, 1960	

LIFEAT 15 December 1959

CS 3/421,574

HMM-4567
15 February 1960

SUBJECT: Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico

What specific aspects of this report are of use? Of value? Please indicate and comment.

Information on the type of machinery offered or sold to Mexico or to Latin America is available from overt sources.

Information on prices is interesting and useful. Price quotations would be more helpful if specifications as well as serial numbers were available. Information indicating whether Soviet prices conform to or vary from world market prices.

Information on goods that the Soviets are interested in buying is of some importance, although this is generally available from overt sources.

14-00000

SECRET

See HMMW 8486, 11 Feb 1960, LAURICLE, filed C/WHD's office,

This dispatch was written by FI/D in reply to HMMA 14362, 20 Jan 1960 and should be reviewed before LIFEAT or LIFHIT are submitted for renewal.

IMPORTANT

LIFEAT/MHM prod
LIFEIT/ops

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	SECRET/KAPOK	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMM-A-14372 KAPOK-1737
TO	Chief, WHD	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
INFO	Chief, KUDOVE: Attn: Division D	
FROM	Chief of Station, Mexico	DATE 20 January 1960
SUBJECT	Projects LIFEAT and LIEMIT	RE: (CHECK "X" ONE) MARKED FOR INDEXING / X NO INDEXING REQUIRED / INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED	See para. 5	
REFERENCE(S)	HMM-A-13934, 16 Oct. 1959; HMM-A-13828, 2 Oct. 1959	

1. During the recent TDY visit to this Station of David M. FREDLUND(p) of KUTUBE D, the interrelationship between the conversations recorded under Project LIFEAT which bear on Soviet Communication and the regular provision of the hard copy of Soviet official diplomatic communications obtained by the LIEMIT activity were discussed. The Station indicated that frequently LIFEAT obtained conversations which referred directly to specific messages: by content; by seeking clarification of garbled or missing groups; by officials who are to or have signed the message in question; and on one or two occasions the messages (admittedly not sensitive) were dictated to secretaries over the telephone.

2. Examples of the above conversations were forwarded to Headquarters in reference dispatches. The conversations with FREDLUND resulted in the suggestion that KUTUBE D should regularly receive the LIFEAT material when it relates to Soviet messages. Also that KUTUBE D in forwarding this type of LIFEAT material to ODENCH would record that the drop copies of the Soviet messages are normally forwarded to ODENCH (source LIEMIT) and that if there is any value to ODENCH in tying the two sources together for further processing by ODENCH, the Station would cross-reference the forwarding dispatch numbers. This Station would appreciate receiving, at an early date, any Headquarters comments.

3. This Station is willing to continue to exploit LIFEAT material for LAURICLE purposes should this be judged of value by Headquarters. At the present time Willard C. CURTIS is personally handling this phase of LIFEAT reporting.

4. KUTUBE D should note that at the present time the LIEMIT source is providing Soviet, Japanese, Czech and Polish drop copies to the Station. The traffic is over one-month old upon receipt and is in Station's hands only for a few hours. The source is capable however of obtaining traffic from all sources filing officially in Mexico City and the Station can do this without increasing the operational risk.

5. The Mexico City Station would appreciate any comments or guidance on either this phase of LIFEAT reporting or of LIEMIT which KUTUBE D could give.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

18 Jan. 1960

Distribution:

3 - HQS(1 - Chief, KUDOVE:
Attn: Division D)

CLASSIFICATION | PAGE NO.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	SECRET/KAPOK
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.	HMM-A-14393 KAPOK-1739
TO	Chief, WHD
INFO	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.	50-8-11
FROM	Chief of Station, Mexico
DATE	22 January 1960
SUBJECT	Soviet Communications
RE	(CHECK "X" ONE) MARKED FOR INDEXING / X NO INDEXING REQUIRED / INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED	Please route this dispatch via KUTUBE/D

REFERENCE(S)

A. HMM-A-14372;
B. HMM-A-14383

SOURCE: LIFEAT

1. Under reference B photographs of hard copies of Soviet traffic for November 1959 were forwarded to Headquarters. (SOURCE: LIEMIT)

2. On 27 November 1959 the following conversation took place:

"Anatoliy Alekseyevich PAVLENKOV tells Vladimir KOLOKOLNIKOV that he just spoke with New York. PAVLENKOV says that BEGLOV(ph) called. PAVLENKOV says that Moscow wants to know how many luncheons and dinners there were yesterday. PAVLENKOV says he counted 3 luncheons and one dinner. PAVLENKOV says that a cable should be sent saying that on the 26th the bankers gave a luncheon for MIKOYAN and that MIKOYAN gave a dinner for the officials of the Government. Another thing Moscow wants to know what word was left out in KOLOKOLNIKOV's cable which was about KOLOKOLNIKOV's account at Poza Rica. In BELTRAN's speech there apparently was one word left out by the operators. KOLOKOLNIKOV will look at the text and see what it is. PAVLENKOV will come over and then they will send the cable. KOLOKOLNIKOV then suggests that they call BEGLOV in New York and give him this information. KOLOKOLNIKOV will do that.

"KOLOKOLNIKOV tells WO(woman outside) to write down what he tells her. KOLOKOLNIKOV tells her that yesterday the Ministry of Industry and Trade, SALINAS, and the President of the Banco Exterior, ZEVADA, gave a luncheon for MIKOYAN at the Hotel Ambassador. In the evening A.I. MIKOYAN gave a dinner for officials of the Mexican Government. KOLOKOLNIKOV adds that the speech that ROLDAN(should be ROLDAN instead of BELTRAN) made the works "to show" were left out. KOLOKOLNIKOV tells her to send this to Moscow. KOLOKOLNIKOV will call tomorrow and let WO know when he will return. KOLOKOLNIKOV has to get his visa from the American Embassy."

words?

Willard C. Curtis

Willard C. CURTIS

20 January 1960

Distribution:

3 - HQS

COPY FILED IN 50-6-6/4

CLASSIFICATION SECRET/KAPOK

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/KAPOK	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: HMM-A-14392 KAPOK-1738
TO: Chief, WHD		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 50-8-11
INFO:		
FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico		DATE: 22 January 1960
SUBJECT: Soviet Communications		(CHECK "X" ONE) MARKED FOR INDEXING
		X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED: Call to Attention of KUTUBE/D		INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S): A. HMM-A-13934
B. HMM-A-14372

SOURCE: LIFEAT/LIMERICK

1. The following is a quotation of a conversation held on 2 December 1959:

> A man outside called the Soviet Embassy, introduced himself as Yevgeniy N. VOYEVODIN and asked Yelena Ivanovna FILIPOVA, secretary of the Commercial Office, if he could still send a cable off(that late) on that date. FILIPOVA promised to try to get the cable off. VOYEVODIN then said he wished the cable sent to: RAZNOEKSPORT, Moscow, 9019, 9021 and then dictated:
>
> "Exposition will close on 15th of December. To deliver the souvenirs is too late.
>
> VOYEVODIN."

2. It is requested that this pouch be routed via KUTUBE/D.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

20 Jan. 1960

Distribution:

3 - HQS

FILED IN

SECRET/KAPOK

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/RAPOK

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: HMM-A-14374 / RYPOK-1760

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 50-8-11

DATE: 22 January 1960

TO: Chief, WHD

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico

SUBJECT: Soviet Communications

ACTION REQUIRED: Please route this dispatch via KUTUBE/D

CHECK "X" ONE: MARKED FOR INDEXING / X NO INDEXING REQUIRED / INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S):
A. HMM-A-14372;
B. HMM-A-14333.

1. Under reference B photographs of hard copies of Soviet Embassy traffic (Source: LIMMIT) for November 1959 were forwarded to Headquarters.

2. On 28 November 1959 Vladimir KOLOKOLNIKOV spoke with Ivan Ivanovich (possibly DANILOV) in New York. KOLOKOLNIKOV said he wished a cable sent to Moscow concerning the departure of Anastas I. MIKOYAN (Soviet Vice Premier who had been visiting Mexico, 18-28 November 1959). KOLOKOLNIKOV said he himself would fly out "on Monday." A woman took the telephone and KOLOKOLNIKOV dictated the following:

> "Today at 0900 local time the First Deputy Minister of the Council of Ministers USSR, A.I. MIKOYAN, and his escorting party flew out of the Capital of Mexico on the Il-18 for the Fatherland. MIKOYAN was seen off at the airport by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, Manuel TELLO; the Minister of Foreign Trade, Raul SALINAS; Minister of Education, TORRES Bodet; and officials of the Foreign Ministry. The Soviet Ambassador to Mexico also saw A.I. MIKOYAN off, V.I. BAZYKIN, and workers of the Soviet Embassy. Before the flight out A. I. MIKOYAN made a short speech in which he thanked the President of Mexico, LOPEZ Mateos, members of the Mexican Government, the whole Mexican people for the warm reception which was shown him and his escorting party in their country."

3. KOLOKOLNIKOV then dictated another cable. This cable was the message that MIKOYAN sent from aboard his plane to the President of Mexico thanking him for the reception that he received in Mexico. (NOTE: The translator "slipped" and did not transcribe this cable verbatim.)

Willard C. CURTIS

20 January 1960

Distribution:

3 - HQS

14-00000

SECRET

From: Mexico, Mexico City | Report No: HMM-1831 | Local File No:

No. of Pages: 1 | No. of Enclosures: 1(for Station files only)

Report Made By: Thomas G. URQUHART | Approved By: Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
By copy to: 3 - Hqs(1 for KUWRAP)
2 - Files(1 w/att)

Orally to:

Source Cryptonym: A. LIKAYAK-2
B. LIFEAT/LIMERICK

References: HMM-1765, 12 Sep. 1956, p.9

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

SUBJECT: Alicia ROMERO G. (Garzun)

Source obtained the information contained in the attached report from his sister, who is a journalist, and from a copy of the magazine on which subject is employed. He also obtained information from an address investigation on subject. Owing to the type of information developed on ROMERO, she is being included in this Station's series of LCIMPROVE subjects.

Classification

SECRET

FORM NO. 51-59
FEB 1948

1 COPY

50-6-32/4

SECURITY INFORMATION

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY: Mexico

SUBJECT: Alicia ROMERO G. (Garzun)

REPORT NO: HMM-1331

DATE OF INFO: May - August 1956

DATE ACQUIRED: 12 Sept. 1956

PLACE ACQUIRED: Mexico City

DATE OF REPORT: 19 Sept. 1956

SOURCE, SOURCE EVALUATION, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: Source A: Mexican business with contacts in journalistic circles B-2 (paras 1, 3, 4 and 5) Source B: Source with access to Soviet official circles in Mexico B-doc (para 2)

The following information has been developed on Alicia ROMERO a suspicious contact of Grigori NIKIPORETS, Soviet Naval Attache, Mexico

1. An investigation of Avenida Coyoacan 624-2, the residence given as that of subject, showed it to be occupied by Maria Eugenia Romero de HARO. Her husband is related to Captain Antonio HARO Oliva, husband of Nadia HARO Oliva, who is an actress in a show called "The Four Colonels."

2. It has been ascertained that on 7 May 1956 a man described as Major HARO Oliva, a movie producer, was in contact with Iuri PAPOROV, Soviet Cultural and intelligence officer. Mexico

3. Alicia ROMERO G. has been identified as in charge of the photographic department of a magazine named FRAZ, published at Avenida Juarez 20-22 in Mexico City.

COMMENT: A copy of this magazine is being retained in Station files.

The director of the magazine is Jorge HARO Cabrera, husband of Maria Eugenia Romero de HARO (noted above) and he resides at Avenida Coyoacan 624-2. He pays 750 pesos per month rent.

4. Alicia ROMERO G. is the sister-in-law of Jorge HARO Cabrera. She is the daughter of Maria de la Luz (widow) de ROMERO. Alicia ROMERO reportedly is the mistress of various politicians. She claims her home to be at Av. Coyoacan 624-2. Alicia ROMERO is reported to be pro-Communist and to be a member of the PRI. She is to be supported by that party in the forthcoming elections for the post of Federal Deputy.

COMMENT: Her connections with politics and politicians explain some of the report noted in the reference.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

FORM NO. 51-58 APR 1953 PREVIOUS EDITIONS MAY BE USED.

50-6-32/14

(20)

YURIY PAPOROV. 201-82485 CIT: USSR SOVIET CULTURAL AND INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. Δ MEXICO ASCERTAINED THAT ON 7 MAY 56 SUBJ WAS IN CONTACT WITH MAJOR HARO OLIVA, A MOVIE PRODUCER. DOI SEPT. 1956

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

John M. Whitten:js
CWH/3
5613
28 June 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING: 1, 2, 3 LOGS, 4, 5, 6

TO: MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8
INFO: CI, CI/OPS, FI, S/C

DEFERRED
R ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 50937

LIFEAT

REF MEXI 5162 (IN 68160)*

REF MISTAKENLY SLUGGED TYPIC. TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE TAPES BEEN TRANSCRIBED? IF NOT TRANSCRIBED, CAN MEXI DO IT? IF TRANSCRIBED, ERASE TAPES. IF NOT AND MEXI CANNOT HANDLE, POUCH TO DIR. ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH CMT: *Mexi queried Hqs as to its desire have pouched tapes LIFEAT ESLARD-1 coverage for period resided Hotel Maria Angelos.

WH/COPS

C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

ORIG : N. JUDKINS:dd
UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO
EXT : 5940
DATE : 22 APRIL 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

file LIFEAT Ops

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/RA, ~~FI, TSD 5~~, S/C

25 APR 63 18 58z

DEFERRED SIG CEN
ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 35066

REF: MEXI 4201 (IN 19807)*

1. HQS APPROVES LOAN OF ONE STERILE SPARE B-10 DIAL PULSE RECORDER TO DURKIN.

2. HQS URGES CLOSE SUPPORT TREASURY/NARCOTICS INVESTIGATIONS. MEXI MAY PROVIDE DURKIN WITH OCCASIONAL LIFEAT COVERAGE PROVIDED NO LIFEAT TAKE GIVEN TO MEXICANS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *William J. Durkin, Treasury rep assigned to Mexico investigating narcotics traffic, approached Station re dial recorder for phone tap on Mexican target.

TSD BRUCE LA ROSE (BY PHONE)
CI/OPS FRANK HUGHES F.M. Hughes
WH/COPS
CI/R&A/TC [signature]

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JOHN M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

14-00000

SECRET

1 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/Personnel

SUBJECT: Recruitment of a Retired CIA or Military Officer for Contract Status in Mexico.

1. Mexico City needs a replacement in September or October 1963 to work on a technical operation. The Station does not want a staff employee, but a Contract Agent.

2. The Contract Agent would need the following requirements:

   a. Must be retired, and move permanently to Mexico under cover of a retired U. S. citizen, with the appropriate guaranteed income required under Mexican law. ($320 for husband and wife per mo.)

   b. Must have technical training which would enable him to work on a technical operation, possibly involving the care and upkeep of recorders, etc.

   c. Must have a working knowledge of Spanish, or the ability to acquire this fluency prior to arrival in Mexico.

   d. It will be necessary for the employee to work with people, make early and late meetings, and to spend a good deal of time driving around town. Therefore, the candidate must drive a car and be physically fit to work long hours.

3. It is requested that information on any candidates be furnished WH/3/MEXICO or C/WH/3 for consideration.

John M. Whitten
C/WH/3

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig. and 1 - Addressee
1 - W/FEAT/SUPPORT

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING

ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	ABSTRACT
	MICROFILM

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : LIFEAT Security

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REF: HMMA 20305, 3 December 1962

1. Reference problem was discussed by KURIOT with David N. WILSTED, during the latter's TDY at Headquarters in early December 1962.

2. KURIOT recommends the following solution and has furnished the attached material for delivery to WILSTED for his use:

a. The terminal identification system consists of two fluids. Vial "A" is collodion in which is mixed a small amount of phenolphthalein and is intended to be used by the person who originally connects the wires. Generously daubed on the end of the screw, this solution dries almost immediately in a water repellent, invisible coating.

b. The second vial "B" contains household ammonia. If the dauber in this bottle is drawn down the row of terminals in the connection box, the tip of any screw which was previously treated with the phenolphthalein will immediately turn a dark red color and then will vanish after a minute. The ammonia can be reapplied and this reaction will repeat itself a couple of times before more phenolphthalein has to be reapplied.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment:
1 box with two vials of liquid (U/S/C)

Distribution:
C&1 - COS, Mexico City w/att (USC)

50-6-32/3

DATE TYPED: 7 January 63

DATE DISPATCHED: [illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-11200

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-32/3

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/Mexico - Bustos:rlr			5940

ROUTING	INITIAL
1 - Chrono	
1 - TSD/AOB	Mr. McBee
RID/MIS	
~~RID/FS~~	
~~RID/FI~~	
C/WH/3	
~~DESTROY~~	

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
TSD/AOB		Mr. McBee (draft)

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	7 JAN 1963	J. C. King

53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET/RYBAT~~

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, Task Force W Attn: Willard NAUMAN

INFO.: Chief, WH: Chief, KUDESK

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: GYROSE/ Jose Ordoqui

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Forwarded herewith are the following items pertaining to Subject:

   a. LIFEAT references;

   b. Salient reports from other agent sources;

   c. References to close contacts of Subject;

   d. Exemplars of various types of Mexican police agent reporting;

   e. Roughed-out drafts of police agent reporting. These have been viewed and tentatively approved by COS, Mexico. Copies have been retained at the Station.

2. Station Mexico is submitting separately its proposals on the technical and operational aspects of this operation.

Willard C. Curtis

Distribution:
2 - TFW w/att
1 - C/WH w/o att
1 - Chief, KUDESK w/o att
2 - Files

DATE TYPED: 26 Dec. 1962

DATE DISPATCHED: 28 Dec. 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-20425

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET/RYBAT~~

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, KUBIOT

INFO: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Security

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: See below.

1. The purpose of this dispatch is to request Headquarters' assistance in a problem involving clandestine markings for terminals in a telephone cable cross box.

2. Specifically, it is desired to have the capability of recognizing which cable terminals in a box are being used for telephone tapping without having any markings apparent to unauthorized persons. This system is needed for use in the event that taps must be disconnected quickly under the threat of a possible security problem.

3. The tap connections are made by LIFEAT telephone company personnel and the terminals could be marked by them at the time the tap is made. The connections sometimes have to be removed by another person who is not familiar with the connections.

4. It is felt that a quick drying, transparent glue or lacquer that would fluoresce brightly under UV illumination would be appropriate. A material that could be removed later by wiping or chipping it away would be desirable but this characteristic is not vital.

5. The system must be usable in open shade, although some additional shade might be had by partially closing the doors of the box, and the light source must be portable and if possible have the appearance of an ordinary flashlight. The light source can be brought within two inches of the terminals.

50-6-32/3

(Continued)

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
3 Dec. 1962	

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-20305

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-32/3

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-20305

6. This sytem is needed as soon as possible for use during December 1962 and January 1963. Therefore, Headquarters' early assistance or recommendation would be greatly appreciated.

Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
2 - C/KURIOT
1 - C/WHD
3 - Files

50-6-32/3

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/[illegible]

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Progress Report for October 1962

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: A. HMMA-20156
B. MEXI 2384

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSFHB-F 52-6-1, section V, paragraph 2 (d) (1).

A. EXPLOITATION OF LEADS

(1) LIFEAT/Soviet During the reporting period, LIFEAT coverage of Svyatoslav F. KUZNETSOV provided an important and valuable check confirming the reporting of a number of KUBARK controlled double agents targeted against this Soviet officer. Also, coverage of the Soviet Bulletin Office, although not considered vital, does complete Station coverage of the Soviet target and does provide daily information on the activities and contacts of the Bulletin Office personnel.

(2) LIFEAT/Polish LIFEAT continued to provide vital information concerning the BEKNAVE/BECHICK operation with coverage of both individuals and their daily activities.

(3) LIFEAT/Yugoslav Besides the usual coverage of day-to-day activities of the official installation, LIFEAT leads have indicated the possibility of a successful recruitment of a Mexican employee of that installation. LIFEAT information will become even more valuable for continuing assessment of the potential agent and forming of a plan for approach to the Mexican in question.

(4) LIFEAT/Communist Party Coverage in this area gave Station its first information concerning the second arrest of LINLUCK, as well as providing some information on important persons in the Mexican Communist movement.

(Continued)

Remove from Project:
CS Classification:
JOB #
Box:

CROSS REFERENCE TO

RECORD COPY

DATE TYPED: 28 Nov. 1962

DATE DISPATCHED:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-20261

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-32/3

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/[illegible]

(5) LIFEAT/Exile LIFEAT provides continuing coverage of the daily activities and contacts of Juan Jose AREVALO Bermejo. Although most of the leads gathered will depend on future exploitation, one contact with an ODYOKE official was noted by LIFEAT (see reference b).

(6) LIFEAT/Cuban Of late, much of the emphasis of the LIFEAT operation has been directed toward support of Station operations in this area. Coverage included monitoring of the activities of AMSTET-1 for the interested Case Officer. This information provided daily leads for the Case Officer in his contacts with AMSTET-1 . LIFEAT also covered three lines in support of the AMSTRUT operation. Of this support the interested Case Officer has noted LIFEAT provided very valuable coverage of the important AMSTRUT operation during October. The coverage gave valuable operational leads and resolved what would otherwise have been areas of uncertainty or groundless suspicion. This allowed the case officers to move with more certainty in developing the operation than would otherwise have been prudently possible. It is noted that LIFEAT's continuing coverage is proving to be most helpful.

(7) LIFEAT/American Communists LIFEAT continued to provide information of interest to ODENVY. Travel and contacts of the ACGM are particularly worthwhile.

(8) LIFEAT/Miscellaneous LIFEAT continued its coverage of former Station asset LIVESTOCK-2. This was in keeping with Station's policy of making periodic checks of the activities of former, potentially dangerous agents.

It should be noted that it is the Station's opinion that LIFEAT's excellent overall service, plus its ability to provide unilateral coverage of targets of opportunity on short notice (sometimes on as little as two hours notice), make LIFEAT a dependable daily contributor to the fulfilling of the Station's mission.

B. PROCESSING OF TAKE

No change from previous report.

C. LIAISON

During the month of October the two playback recorders used by the ODENVY processor broke down. These were repaired by the LIFEAT technician, David M. WILSTED. ODENVY continued to process take from the LIFEAT/American Communists in Mexico lines.

D. SECURITY

There have been no known adverse security incidents effecting the LIFEAT operation during the reporting period. LIFEAT meeting sites continue to be changed periodically. The fourteen regular and six alternate sites used for daily contact between the Station Case Officer and WILSTED and Wayne C. DRABAND are considered adequate. Numerous meeting sites are used for contacts between WILSTED/DRABAND and the basehouse keepers.

E. TECHNICAL

Audio and dial tape recorders ordered by the Station in support of the LIFEAT operation began to arrive at the end of October. These were placed in immediate service. It is noted that the automatic tape stop on the new model Revere audio recorder has thus far proven to be of no use to the operation

and on occasion has caused some minor problems. It is believed that these problems are temporary and will be eliminated when WILSTED has time to by-pass this cut off switch.

The new Annex VI (see reference A) was placed in full operation on 23 October and presently provides coverage of four target lines.

F. COVERAGE

During the month of October 1962, LIFEAT covered a total of 25 target lines. Coverage by target was as follows:

1. Soviet Bulletin Office
2. Svyatoslav F. KUZNETSOV
3. Aleksandr G. SIDOROV
4. and 5. Polish Embassy (two lines)
6, 7, 8, 9, and 10. Yugoslav Embassy (five lines)
11, 12, and 13 BEKNAVE/BECHICK operation
14. Juan Jose AREVALO Bermejo
15. Peter WATKINS
16. AMSTET-1
17, and 18. AMSTRUT operation
19. Psychiatrist attending AMSTRUT-2
20. Carlos ILLESCAS
21. Suspected PCM safehouse
22. LIVESTOCK-2
23. Albert (Margaret) MALTZ
24. Charles SMOLIKOFF (aka SMALL)
25. Noah SEBORER

G. PERSONNEL

LIEMBRACE-8 was reintroduced to LIFEAT in order that he may brush up on its daily operation. LIEMBRACE-8 will temporarily replace David M. WILSTED as LIFEAT technician during the latter's home leave December 1962 and January 1963.

Steps were initiated to amend the clearance of LIEMPTY-19 for work as a part time LIFEAT processor/translator.

2. During the reporting period, LIFEAT operation provided a total of 62 reels of raw take from ACGM lines to local ODENVY for their processing. In addition, a number of memos were prepared by the Station for passing to local ODACID and ODENVY based wholly or in part on LIFEAT provided material.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD
2 - Files

50-6-32/3

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/[illegible]

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Progress Report for September 1962

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: HMMA-19843

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSFHB-F 52-6-1, Section V, Paragraph 2 (d) (1).

A. EXPLOITATION OF LEADS

(1) LIFEAT/Soviet In this reporting period LIFEAT provided vital information and live-monitoring support during the installation phase of a successful Station technical operation targeted against Aleksandr G. SIDOROV, Soviet Military Attache in Mexico.

(2) LIFEAT/Cuban This coverage provided valuable operational support during the period leading up to the recruitment of AMSTRUT-2 giving timely advance information of AMSTRUT-2's arrival in Mexico, as well as his day to day activities and contacts. Following AMSTRUT-2's recruitment, LIFEAT gave an excellent account of AMSTRUT-2's activities for those periods he was not under the control of his case officers. This was invaluable proof of his full cooperation with KUBARK and added a safety factor for the case officers making the recruitment and initial handling which would not have been otherwise available.

(3) LIFEAT/Polish and LIFEAT Yugoslav These coverages continue to provide excellent information of the daily activities of the Satellite officials assigned to Mexico. The LIFEAT support of the BEKNAVE/BECHICK operation continues as noted in reference.

(4) LIFEAT/Exile LIFEAT coverage of Juan Jose AREVALO Bermejo provides information and operational leads which, though valuable now, would be invaluable if ODYOKE's policy toward AREVALO becomes sufficiently defined to fully exploit all the information provided by LIFEAT.

(Continued)

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 8 Nov. 1962

DATE DISPATCHED:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: [illegible]1887
HMMA-20156

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-32/3

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/[illegible]

(5) LIFEAT/American Communists LIFEAT continues to provide information of interest to ODENVY (who initially requested this coverage and processes this take.) Local ODENVY has noted recently that the information concerning travel of American leftists to Mexico and their contacts while here are particularly worth while.

(6) LIFEAT/Miscellaneous LIFEAT coverage was reinstituted on LIVESTOCK-2 in Station periodic check on the activities of this former agent.

B. PROCESSING OF TAKE

No change from previous report (see reference).

C. LIAISON

No change from previous report (see reference).

D. SECURITY

There have been no known adverse security incidents effecting the LIFEAT operation during the reporting period. The "coyote" incident noted in reference, paragraph 1.D. is now settled and should pose no further difficulty to this operation.

E. TECHNICAL

No change from previous report (see reference).

F. COVERAGE

During the month of September 1962, LIFEAT covered a total of 16 target lines. Coverage by target was as follows:

1. Soviet Bulletin Office
2. Svyatoslav F. KUZNETSOV
3. Aleksandr G. SIDOROV
4. BECHICK's place of employment.
5. Individual considered for cut out in BEKNAVE/BECHICK operation
6. and 7. Polish Embassy (two lines)
8., 9., and 10. Yugoslav Embassy (three lines)
11. Juan Jose AREVALO Bermejo
12. Peter WATKINS
13. LIVESTOCK-2
14. Albert MALTZ
15. Charles SMOLIKOFF (aka SMALL)
16. AMSTRUT Operation

G. PERSONNEL

LIFEUD-24 and LIFEUD-26 obtained a basehouse on 29 September which will take the place of the old Annex VI (closed when LIFEUD-5 and LIFEUD-11 were terminated due to their pending divorce). It has been decided to retain the same annex designation, i.e., Annex VI, since the area of coverage is the same as that provided by the old basehouse.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/[redacted]	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-20156 [redacted]-1887

2. During the month of September 1962, LIFEAT operation provided a total of 54 reels of raw take from the ACGM lines to the local ODENVY office for their processing. In addition, a number of memos were prepared by the Station for passing to local ODACID and ODENVY based wholly or in part on LIFEAT provided material.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

50-6-32/3

SECRET

memo outgoing

5 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: DEBRIEFING OF DAVID M. WILSTED (ps)

1. On 1 June 1960 Mr. John G. Hayn and Mr. John Kennedy of WHD, Mr. Robert Brown of CI/OPS, Mr. Robert Bryant of FI/OPS and Mr. Charles Bray of FI/D met with David M. WILSTED (ps).

2. WILSTED emphasized that the whole telephone system in Mexico City is undergoing a reformation. The company Telefonos de Mexico, S.A., has sub-contracted this work of cleaning up and reorganizing the phone system to the independent firm, Intel. They are cleaning up unused and old lines, putting in new and spare lines, redefining exchange areas, laying underground cables, etc. Eventually we should be better off because there should be more surplus lines. The renovation work has hampered much of the LIFEAT work, principally because many of the lines now are underground and we cannot get access to them before they enter the central. This is particularly true with respect to the Czech Embassy, to whose telephone lines we cannot obtain access from the vantage point we now occupy.

3. WILSTED said that we try to keep track of the activities of "Intel" but since they seem to attack "Colonias" at random, we have no prior warning of their presence in a certain area.

4. In the recent past, Mexico has been using houses for listing posts for security reasons. We have more control over the access of phone company inspectors or repairman to houses. However, under new regulations, all new apartment buildings must have telephone lines installed in the building by the phone company during the construction phase. This means that the lines and their destination are concealed. WILSTED proposed that this will mean we can again use apartments since we can siphon off a line destined for use by another tenant in such a way that the phone company cannot trace its destination without tearing the building apart and we can then install a separate line to the building and hook up the subscriber to this line which, if checked, will belong to a legitimate subscriber.

5. One system which has been used effectively is to take one-half of two separate pairs which have one faulty line each. These two half pairs then form one good pair which we can use.

6. WILSTED explained that it cost about 3000 pesos to get a regular telephone. This entails the purchase of a telephone company bond, which later can be sold.

SECRET

7. Personnel involved in the tapping of the lines are:

Rene - who has access to the centrals. He contacts the following men:
Two brothers
Jose - does exchange connections.

8. The take from each basehouse is collected early in the morning before office hours by RAFANELLI. He only enters one basehouse which is occupied by an elderly couple. All other contacts are in automobiles made at different spots each day of the week. RAFANELLI then takes the material to a meeting between him, WILSTED and SECHEN where RAFANELLI turns the material over to SECHEN and they all discuss the problems and plans for the day.

9. According to WILSTED there is no live monitoring done by any of the basehouse keepers.

10. There follows a list of the basehouses and the lines covered at each base:

a) Calero 39 - formerly covered American consules, now no lines. Being held for future use.

b) Juanacatlan 179 - Cuban residence
Russian Commercial
E. T. (Nicaraguan)

c) Atlixco 47 - 2 Polish
Seborer
Tropete
Bekier

d) Tenansingo - Cuban military office
Cuban Ambassador's office
Campos (travel agency)
1 spare

e) Aristoteles 80 - UAR
Ejercito Nacional 540 (name of person unknown)

f) Suderman & Horacio - facilities for three lines. Formerly processed the Czech lines. Now nothing but being held open.

g) Cuautla 131 - 3 Soviet Embassy (tapped in the Central)
1 Soviet propaganda office (tap in box)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING

TO: Chief, JMWAVE

INFO.: Chief, Task Force W   Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: GYROSE/AMSTRUT - Transmittal of LIFEAT Coverage

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Attention Martin O. HIBBERT

Attached in accordance with conversations with Martin O. HIBBERT, are LIFEAT transcriptions in the AMSTRUT-2 case for 11-26 and 28-30 September and 1 October 1962.

Willard C. CURTIS

CS [illegible] 19-6-56/3 — LIFEAT OPS

Attachment:
52 pages

Distribution:
2 - TFW w/o att. CS/[illegible]
3 - WHD w/o att.
1 - JMWAVE w/att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO: X-TF-W/REG

DATE TYPED: 9 October 1962

DATE DISPATCHED: 9 October 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-19988

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER:

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, EE

INFO: Chief, WH; COB, Monterrey

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: BEDOX/LIFEAT

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES: DIR-38331, 26 September 1962

Attached herewith find a copy of MNTY 0600 requested by Headquarters in reference.

Willard C. Curtis

Distribution:
2 - WH w/att; 1 - COB, Mnty w/o att
1 - EE w/att
3 - Files

50-6-32/3

DATE TYPED: 26 Sept. 1962

DATE DISPATCHED: 28 Sept. 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-19882

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-32/3

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

14-00000

TO [illegible] INFO [illegible] 0600
NUMBER

[illegible] 1 SAID [illegible] [illegible] AS DOCTOR, BLOND [illegible] HAIR, TALL, AGE [illegible] 25, [illegible] 2 AUGUST 1 DAY ONLY. CONTACTED JOSE LUNA ORTIZ, YOUTH [illegible] COAHUILA STATE COMMITTEE PCM. PURPOSE OF VISIT WAS CONTACT HIM.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COPY

[illegible] CLASSIFICATION
INCOMING

07/1542Z

Att 6 HMMA-19882

50-6-32/3

14-0000

Where is

Aug 61 - June 62

?

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/[redacted]

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Progress Report for August 1962

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

AN / AB / IN / TS / EX / DES / NFD / PI / ARD

Ref : A) HMMA 19641
B) HMMA 19129

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHB-F 52-6-1, Section V, paragraph 2 (d) (1).

A. Exploitation of Leads

(1) LIFEAT/SOVIET With the departure of Vladimir G. NOVIKOV during the month of August 1962, it was decided that LIFEAT should pick up coverage of his replacement Svyatoslav F. KUZNETSOV. The continued coverage of Aleksandr G. SIDOROV, which includes extensive periods of live-monitoring and special processing of the take, is considered essential to those Station assets involved in the attempt to place the technical surveillance noted in last month's report (see reference A). Coverage of the Soviet Bulletin Office continues to provide interesting personality data on Soviet officials assigned to Mexico.

(2) LIFEAT/POLISH LIFEAT coverage in support of the BEKNAVE/BECHICK operation continues to be vital to that operation. Additional coverage for this operation has been undertaken, leads from which will probably determine future direction of the operation as well as aid KUBARK in controlling the operation.

(3) LIFEAT/YUGOSLAV In this area LIFEAT provided the information that a cousin of a recently assigned KUBARK deep cover agent, Victor W. OBOLD (ps) will be travelling to Mexico in the near future. This cousin is a long-time Communist Party official and a chance meeting with him could have destroyed OBOLD's carefully prepared cover. Due to LIFEAT advanced warning, proper security safeguards have been arranged. LIFEAT has also provided travel information on Yugoslav officials from the United States which was of great interest to ODENVY.

(Continued)

RECORD COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 20 Sept. 1962

DATE DISPATCHED:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-19843

[redacted] 1942

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-32/3

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Remove from Project: [illegible]
CS Classification: [illegible]
JOB # 73-175/71
Box: 71 Fold: 6

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/[redacted]

(4) LIFEAT/EXILE LIFEAT coverage in this area has been most rewarding in providing leads to the contacts of Juan Jose Arevalo Bermejo, former Guatemalan President. Spanish Republican Exiles were covered for approximately one-half month in August, at which time it was decided that the coverage no longer provided sufficient leads and information to justify continued LIFEAT effort.

(5) LIFEAT/American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM) This coverage is at the request of the local office of ODENVY and the processing of take in this area is done by that office. One of the most interesting items provided from this coverage was the fact that the American Communists Albert MALTZ and Margaret Larkin MALTZ had separated and that Albert MALTZ would probably reside in the U.S. with Margaret remaining in Mexico. Concerning the LIFEAT coverage of the ACGM, the local office of ODENVY wrote on 23 August 1962: "This office feels that the coverage mentioned is quite valuable and many useful leads are obtained from this coverage, particularly with regard to travel in and out of Mexico of American Communists who are in contact with individuals on whom coverage is maintained".

B. Processing of Take

No change from that noted in reference A.

C. Liaison

No change from that noted in reference A.

D. Security

During the early part of August 1962 a group of "coyotes" was uncovered in the telephone company in Mexico City and a number of arrests were made. This group had organized a unit including linemen, centralmen, installation crew, warehousemen, and workers in the office responsible for providing service to new clients. It was the purpose of the "coyote" group to provide service, for a price, to those individuals whose requests for installations had been turned down by the telephone company due to limited availability of cables and contacts. (Note: The company generally keeps a certain number of "spare pairs" in each cable for its own use in providing special service, company phones, and for rerouting during repairs to other cables. It was these spare pairs and contacts which the "coyotes" used to provide illegal phone service.) This telephone company within the telephone company would also collect monthly fees from their "subscribers". When the story came out, the telephone company had special police stationed in each central and spot checks made of linemen and crews to prevent recurrence. It was therefore necessary for the LIFEAT linemen to refrain from any clandestine activity for a period of almost four weeks so as not to be accidentally picked up as a member of the "coyote" group. LIFEUD-1 has reported that the situation is now back to normal with the special police details and special checkups terminated. No compromise of the LIFEAT operation resulted from the above incident.

E. Technical

In addition to re-supplying LIFEAT with audio recorders (as reported in reference A), the Station has ordered ten new dial tape recorders for the project. Funds for this purpose were included in the latest Project Renewal Request (forwarded by reference B).

F. Coverage

During the month of August 1962, LIFEAT covered a total of 15 target

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	SECRET/[redacted]	HMMA-19843 [redacted] 1942

lines. The coverage by target was as follows:

1. Soviet Bulletin Office
2. Svyatoslav F. KUZNETSOV
3. Aleksandr G. SIDOROV
4. BECHICK's place of employment (and place of contact with BEKNAVE)
5. and 6. Polish Embassy (two lines)
7., 8., and 9. Yugoslav Embassy (three lines)
10. Juan Jose AREVALO Bermejo
11. Peter WATKINS
12. Juan Simeon VIDARTE Franco Romero
13. Dr. Eugenio ARAUZ
14. Albert MALTZ
15. Charles SMOLIKOFF (aka SMALL)

G. Personnel

The basehouse operators for LIFEAT Annex VI, LIFEUD-5 and LIFEUD-1[illegible], after a long period of family disagreements, have mutually decided on a divorce. Both are being terminated by KUBARK since their usefulness as basehouse keepers for the project will end with their divorce. The agents have agreed to the termination and it will be accomplished on a friendly basis. (Agent Service Records will be forwarded). Therefore, it has been necessary to close Annex VI and terminate coverage of the lines provided by that basehouse. LIFEUD-24 and LIFEUD-26 have been recruited to replace the terminated couple and are presently looking for a suitable basehouse which could fully replace the old Annex VI. (Note: POA was granted for LIFEUD-24 on 28 June 1962 and OA was requested. Also, OA was requested for LIFEUD-26 on 30 August 1962.)

During the absence of Woodrow B. GABBOT (ps), the processor of the Polish language portions of the Polish Embassy take, a replacement in the person of contact agent BETUMBLE was provided by Headquarters. He performed well with no known security hazard to himself or LIFEAT. BETUMBLE departed Mexico City on 17 September 1962. Until GABBOT's return Polish portions of this take are being translated by the Station Satellite Case Officer.

2.A. During the month of August 1962, the LIFEAT operation provided a total of 45 reels of raw take from the ACGM lines to the local ODENVY office for their processing. In addition, a number of memos were prepared by the Station for passing to local ODACID and ODENVY based in whole or in part on LIFEAT provided material.

B. The following reports were based in whole or in part on positive intelligence which is provided as a by-product of the LIFEAT operation:

HMM-6605
HMM-6626
HMM-6663
HMM-6667
HMM-6670

[signature] for
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD
2 - Files

50-6-32/3

FORM 10-57 53a (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	SECRET/[redacted]	CONTINUED	PAGE NO. THREE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO: Chief, SR Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Operational/Transmittal of LIFEAT Report

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Ref: HMMA-19741, 4 September 1962
Action: Per Paragraph Two.

1. Transmitted herewith in attachment is a LIFEAT report of 10 September 1962, of a second telephone call from Moscow to Vladilan Ivanovich SAMOKHIN, Head of the Soviet Information Bulletin Office in Mexico City.

2. Headquarters is requested to advise if it has interest in receiving any further such reports.

Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated above.

Distribution:
2 - WH w/att
1 - SR w/att
3 - Files

lifeat opo

DATE TYPED: 18 Sept. 1962

DATE DISPATCHED:

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-19826

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

PROCESSING

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Progress Report for July 1962

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHB-F 52-6-1, Section V, paragraph 2 (d) (1):

A. Exploitation of Leads

(1) LIFEAT/SOVIET LIFEAT coverage in this area was concentrated on known RIS officers: Vladimir G. NOVIKOV and Aleksandr G. SIDOROV. The most rewarding lead from this coverage during July was that SIDOROV would be absent with his entire family from his apartment for nearly two months, and more importantly, that no one would be continuously watching the apartment during that time. Based on this information, the Station has been able to make the necessary preparations for establishing technical surveillance of this apartment. LIFEAT coverage of the Soviet Bulletin Office, in addition to the above coverages, has provided information on the daily activities of individual Soviet officials assigned to Mexico, including collection of travel and biographical data.

(2) LIFEAT/POLISH LIFEAT coverage has been vital to the BEKNAVE/BECHICK operation. LIFEAT has even provided live-monitoring of an international call to BECHICK from a former admirer. Also in the Polish area, LIFEAT provided names of Polish Embassy contacts who were invited to Polish national holiday celebrations at the Polish Embassy, as well as information concerning the impending arrival of the new Polish Ambassador.

(3) LIFEAT/YUGOSLAV In the Station's increased operations against this target, basic biographical, personnel assignment, and personnel daily activity information is essential. LIFEAT has been providing just this type information since coverage commenced in May.

(continued)

RECORD COPY

DATE TYPED: 21 August 1962

DATE DISPATCHED:

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-19641 [redacted]-1922

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-32/3

Remove from Project:

CS Classification:

JOB # [illegible]

Box: [illegible] Fold: [illegible]

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

(4) LIFEAT/EXILE LIFEAT coverage of exile and revolutionary groups has been concentrated on coverage of Central American and Spanish Republican groups and individuals. Coverage of Juan Jose AREVALO Bermejo, former President of Guatemala, has provided the Station with valuable information concerning his contacts and future plans. Further, LIFEAT covered LIGIRD-1's contact with AREVALO and later revealed AREVALO's conviction that the Station asset, LIGIRD-1, is involved in a plot to assassinate AREVALO. Coverage of Spanish Republicans displayed the internal dissentions aroused by the plans of a small group of the Mexico-based exiles to assassinate certain prominent persons with plastic bombs, and ultimately told of the departure from Mexico to Cuba of two individuals implicated in the plot.

(5) LIFEAT/American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM) Targets covered in this category are in answer to a long standing requirement laid on by ODENVY and approved by Headquarters. In the past ODENVY has noted the coverage as valuable and worthwhile to them. As in the past reliable information was provided on the activities, travel, and contacts of the ACGM.

B. Processing of the Take

LIFEAT processors continue to process all take for the LIFEAT operation except for the three ACGM lines which are processed by the local ODENVY office.

C. Liaison

No change.

D. Security

No security incidents directly affecting the operation or future of LIFEAT were noted during July 1962. The assignment of special telephone company crews to make a survey of spare telephone lines available for use of new subscribers may cause problems when these crews uncover a "spare" line used in a LIFEAT coverage. However, since these crews have no authority (or desire) to trace down the lines to their ultimate destination, normal LIFEAT security practices should negate this danger. A second development which could cause future problems is the possible assignment of a LIENVOY technician to check telephone centrals to see exactly who else may be carrying on LIENVOY type work. As of this date LIFEAT personnel, who have been provided with the true name of this individual, have never heard of him working in any central in Mexico City. As of this moment it appears this will not develop into a threat to LIFEAT operations.

E. Technical

New recorders provided in May to LIFEAT are now in operation and appear superior to previous models used. It is planned, with the approval of Project LIFEAT for FY 1963, to completely re-equip LIFEAT with new recorders and possibly dial tape recorders.

F. Coverage

During the month of July 1962, LIFEAT covered a total of 16 target lines. Specifically, the coverage by target was as follows:

1. Soviet Bulletin Office
2. Vladimir G. NOVIKOV

3. Aleksandr G. SIDOROV
4. BECHICK
5. and 6. Polish Embassy (two lines)
7. and 8. Yugoslav Embassy (two lines)
9. Juan Jose AREVALO Bermejo
10. Peter WATKINS
11. Juan Simeon VIDARTE Franco Romero
12. Dr. Eugenio ARAUZ
13. LINEB-1 (one line covered for this double agent operation)
14. Albert MALTZ
15. Noah SEBORER
16. Charles SMOLIKOFF

G. Personnel

Clearance was received on LIFEUD-24 and he will commence work shortly to fill the gap left with the resignation of Olivia N. GLADMON (ps). (See project renewal forwarded HMMA-19129.) A deep-cover agent, OBOLD, was made available to process completely the take from the Yugoslav lines. He is working out well with no evident security danger to either himself or LIFEAT.

2. A. Since submission of the last Project LIFEAT Renewal Request and Project Review, 72 reels of LIFEAT on the American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM) have been passed to the local office of ODENVY. In addition, a number of memos were prepared by the Station for passing to the local ODACID and ODENVY based in whole or in part on LIFEAT provided material.

B. Despite the fact that LIFEAT is used primarily to support Station operations, some positive intelligence is gathered as a by product of the operation. The following reports were forwarded to Headquarters based on LIFEAT material:

HMM-6421
HMM-6452
HMM-6479
HMM-6499
HMM-6565

3. The Station has applied the RYBAT control to this dispatch to ensure the Desk's control of the information contained herein.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

21 August 1962

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

50-6-32/3

Mx file 3735

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: HMMA-17815 / 1920

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 50-6-32/3

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 22 September 1961

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Report for April, May, June, July, and August 1961

ACTION REQUIRED: For your information

REFERENCE(S):

RE: "43-5" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHB-F 52-6-1, section V, paragraph 2 (d) (1):

a. Exploitation of Leads

(1) LIFEAT/LIERODE with related lines continued to provide valuable information for use in support of Station operations. However, coverage of the LIERODE official installation was cut on 19 May for security reasons. The following leads were provided: As a result of a LIFEAT provided lead, the Station was able to develop an operation in cooperation with the Mexican Government whereby Mario CHAVEZ, Guatemalan who is representative of the Castroite Bohemia, was placed under Mexican surveillance and ultimately arrested. LIFEAT also provided a check on the activities of LITANGO-1. Further, provision of travel information to and from Cuba by Nicaraguan and Guatemalan exiles was of continuing importance.

(2) LIFEAT was employed as a check of the activities of former KUBARK agents LIVESTOCK-2 and LIVESTOCK-3. This coverage has contributed measurably to Station security.

(3) LIFEAT/LITMUS provided vital coverage of the LITMUS official installation during the EECORN recruitment operation. Also of value were the leads pointing to two suspected LITMUS Intelligence Service agents. Other Station assets are now investigating these leads.

(4) LIFEAT coverage of the American Communist Group in Mexico City (ACGM) continues to provide excellent coverage of the activities, travel, and contacts of the American Communists living in Mexico. This information is of primary importance to ODENVY.

b. Processing of Material

LIFEAT processors continue to process the take from the LIENVOY/LIMERICK coverage.

c. Liaison

No change.

d. Security

No adverse incidents were noted during the reporting period. However, coverage of the LIERODE official installation was cut when LIENVOY technicians began regular checks of those lines.

e. Technical

No change.

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CS Classification: 50-6-32/3
JOB # ...
Box: ... Fold: ...

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50-6-32/3

FORM 10-57 53 — USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

X CONTINUED

f. Coverage

The number of lines covered by LIFEAT during the reporting period varied greatly due to the moving of two basehouses. However, the number covered averaged 12, with the breakdown as follows:

LIERODE, and related lines	2
LITMUS, and related lines	3
American Communists	3
Local Communists	2
Targets of Opportunity	2

g. Personnel

The assistant outside case officer, Ralph B. RAFANELLI (ps), will depart Mexico City for a new assignment within the next month. David M. WILSTED (ps) will undertake complete outside work for LIFEAT for a temporary period while a locally obtained replacement for RAFANELLI is being cleared and trained.

2a. During the reporting period information from 236 LIFEAT reels on coverage of the American Communists in Mexico was passed to the local office of ODENVY. In addition, numerous memos were prepared by the Station for passing to the local ODACID and ODENVY based on LIFEAT provided material.

b. The following reports were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT material:

HMM-5570	HMM-5625	HMM-5652
5573	5627	5655
5575	5630	5659
5587	5639	5660
5588	5641	5717
5590	5642	5742
5592	5643	5743
5613	5647	5836

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

19 September 1961

Distribution:
3 - Headquarters
2 - Files

CS Copy

52-6-32/3

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMA-16838 / 1881
TO: Chief, WH Division	DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-6-32/3
FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City		DATE: 14 April 1961
SUBJECT: LIFEAT Report for March 1961		(CHECK "X" ONE) MARKED FOR INDEXING; X NO INDEXING REQUIRED; INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED: Information Only.		
REFERENCE(S)		

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHB-F 52-6-1, section V. paragraph 2 (d) (1):

a. Exploitation of Leads

(1) LIFEAT/LIERODE, with related lines, continued to receive emphasis from the LIFEAT operation during the reporting period. The appropriate Case Officer considers the check of penetration agents LITAMIL-3, LITAINT-7, and LITALUS-3 through LIFEAT to be of utmost value in controlling these agents and checking their activities. In addition, LIFEAT provided extremely valuable information in the defection of Jose PARDO Llada, giving leads for both FI and PP exploitation. Aid was also given in providing a check of the AMIRON AWOLS in Mexico. In a related occurance, LIFEAT provided information that indicates the Cuban Embassy in Mexico is being used as a Guatemalan Communist communication channel to exiles in Cuba. LIFEAT also provided daily information on travellers to Cuba.

(2) LIFEAT/LITMUS provided information for use in the BECORN operation. It is also of continuing importance as a daily check on the activities of the LITMUS personnel in Mexico.

(3) During the recent Latin American "Peace Conference", LIFEAT provided information on the delegates to the Conference, especially the U.S. delegates, as well as the activities of the Conference.

(4) LIFEAT coverage of Noah SEBORER provided advance information on the travel to the United States of Anna SEBORER and Maria and Enos WICHER. The actual departure and return of these American Communists was also confirmed through LIFEAT.

b. Processing of Material

There has been no change in the processing of the internally produced LIFEAT take. LIFEAT processors continue to process the take from the LIENVOY/LIMERICK coverage.

c. Liaison

No change.

Remove from Project
CS Classification:
JOB #
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d. Security

No adverse occurances were noted during the reporting period.

e. Technical

50-6-32/3

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE. | CLASSIFICATION: SECRET | X CONTINUED | PAGE NO. 1

No change.

f. Coverage

The number of lines covered by LIFEAT during the month of March 1961 was 12. The breakdown follows:

LIERODE, and related lines	4
LITMUS, and related lines	4
American Communists	1
Local Communists	2
Targets of Opportunity	1

g. Personnel

No change.

2. a. During the reporting period, information from twenty-nine LIFEAT reels on coverage of American Communists in Mexico was passed to the local office of ODENVY. In addition, numerous memos were prepared by the Station for passing to local ODACID and ODENVY based on LIFEAT provided material.

b. The following reports, cables, and information dispatches were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT material:

HMM-5497
HMM-5505
HMM-5507
HMM-5511 (MEXI-7492)
HMM-5532 (MEXI-7577)
HMM-5533 (MEXI-7580)
HMM-5534 (MEXI-7585)
HMM-5536
HMM-5541
HMM-5545 (MEXI-7639)
HMM-5549
HMM-5550 (MEXI-7681)
HMM-5552
HMM-5560
HMM-5563

MEXI-7494
MEXI-7502
MEXI-7561
MEXI-7564
MEXI-7600
MEXI-7613
MEXI-7615
MEXI-7626
MEXI-7677

HMMA-16555
HMMA-16564
HMMA-16565
HMMA-16600
HMMA-16607
HMMA-16608
HMMA-16625
HMMA-16627
HMMA-16633
HMMA-16639
HMMA-16664
HMMA-16665
HMMA-16687
HMMA-16710
HMMA-16725
HMMA-16728
HMMA-16735
HMMA-16738
HMMA-16740
HMMA-16747
HMMA-16771

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

12 April 1961

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

50-6-32/3

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: Automobile License Check

MICROFILMED MAY 2 [illegible] 1961 DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

HMMA 16477, 15 February 1961

The results of Headquarters investigation revealed that the automobile mentioned in reference is registered to one Lewis *CIMINO, 2711 Chesley Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland. Headquarters traces on CIMINO were negative. [auto noted attend 201-183704]

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City

DATE TYPED: 21 March 1961

DATE DISPATCHED: 23 MAR 1961

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-9610

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-32/3

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

RC - WH/Reg
1 - WH/Mexico

ROUTING	INITIAL
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RI/FI	
WH/3M	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST		EXT
WH/3/Mexico	C.Cudney	ngw	AC/WH/Mexico	2555

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	22 1961	J. C. KING

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: [redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: [illegible]A-16767 / [illegible]978

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-6-32/3

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 29 March 1961

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Report for February 1961

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ACTION REQUIRED: Information only

REFERENCES: [illegible]A-16605

1\. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHB-F 52-6-1, Section V, paragraph 2 (d)(1):

a. Exploitation of Leads

(1) LIFEAT/LIFIRE continued to be an essential check on the activities and veracity of the penetration agents LITALUS-3, LITALUS-4, LITAINT-7, and LITAMIL-3. It also provided daily information on the activities of the Cuban official installation as well as coverage of long-distance calls received by that installation from Havana, Cuba. In relation to the AMIRON AMOLS in Mexico, LIFEAT was able to help confirm that none of the AMOLS contacted the Cuban Embassy. LIFEAT also picked up the return from Cuba of Oscar RODRIQUEZ Moruna (person who desired employment as a Cuban G-2 agent).

(2) LIFEAT/LITMUS continued to provide the interested Case Officer with daily information on the activities of the officials of the LITMUS installation in Mexico City.

(3) LIFEAT, through coverage of Xavier GUERRERO Saucedo and his wife, Clara Porcet de GUERRERO, was able to provide information on preparation activities of the recent Latin American Peace Conference held in Mexico City. This line also provided information of GUERRERO's contacts with other Communists, particularly Francis W. and Libby Campbell PARK, Canadian Communists now residing in Mexico.

(4) Coverage of Noah and Anna SEBORER revealed the plans of Anna SEBORER to travel to the U.S., and gave precise itinerary and flight schedule for this travel. LIFEAT was also able to provide the plans and travel schedule on Enos and Maria WICHER's travel to California. This information is of interest to ODENVY and was passed locally to that office.

b. Processing of Material

No change.

c. Liaison

No change.

d. Security

Contractual arrangements for a new basehouse, Annex VIII, have been all but completed. It is believed that this move will once again enable full secure use of the experienced basehouse keepers who were envolved in the security question noted in paragraph 1 (a)(d) of Reference. In order to further improve LIFEAT's coverage and security, the Station is also considering a move of Annex I if a suitable new site can be located. Headquarters will be advised of any progress made in this respect.

e. Technical

No change.

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CS Classification: 50-6-32/3
JOB # [illegible]/77
Box: [illegible] Fold: 6

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FORM 53 — USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: [redacted]

X CONTINUED

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

f. Coverage

The total number of LIFEAT lines varied from eight to eleven during the reporting period. The normal breakdown is as follows:

LIFRODE and related lines	4
LITMUS and related lines	3
American Communists	1
Targets of Opportunity	3
Total	11

g. Personnel

No change.

2. a. During the reporting period, information from 28 LIFEAT reels on coverage of American Communists in Mexico was passed to the local office of ODENVY for its information. Memos to ODACID and ODENVY were also based on LIFEAT provided material.

b. The following reports, cables and information dispatches were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT material during the reporting period:

HMMA-16535	HMM-5507	MEXI-7241
16534	5505	7248
16533	5503 (via MEXI-7462)	7335
16503	5497	7345
16500	5475	
16498	5470 (via MEXI-7381)	
16495	5462	
16478	5465	
16456	5452	
16455	5443	
16440	5446	
16404		
16397		
16394		
16390		

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

28 March 1961

Distribution:
3 - Headquarters
2 - Files

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-16659
TO Chief, WH Division	DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 50-6-32/3
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		DATE 8 March 1961
SUBJECT LIFEAT Report Covering August, September, October, November, December 1960 and January 1961		X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED Information only		

REFERENCES

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHB-F 52-6-1, Section V, paragraph 2 (d)(1):

a. Exploitation of Leads

(1) LIFEAT/LIFRODE, with related lines, provided overall coverage of the local Cuban and exile activities, and was considered extremely valuable in support of Station operations in the Cuban area. LIFEAT coverage of the Cuban Embassy enabled the appropriate Case Officer to check the veracity and activities of the penetrations of that installation; particularly LITAMIL-3, LITAINS-3, and LITAINT-5. It was also invaluable in the debriefing of LICOZE-1. LIFEAT material was the basis of an effective KUBARK inspired press release concerning derogatory activities of Cuban Embassy personnel.

LIFEAT leads were of special value in two "one-time" operations. The first of these was the ability of LIFEAT to provide advance information on a meeting arranged between Hugo ROJAS Villa (aka James Bradford STEWART) and a Cuban Embassy official. As a result of the lead time given by LIFEAT, the Station was able to provide surveillance of the meeting and arrange for the detention of ROJAS. Ultimately, ROJAS (a fugitive from ODENVY) was returned to ODYOKE jurisdiction through Station action. In a second case LIFEAT provided follow-up information which, when provided to ODURGE, lead to the apprehension of Thomas Howard GRIGGS (aka Carl JOHNSON). He, too, had attempted to arrange a meeting with Cuban officials in Mexico, and was under warrant for abduction in Chicago, Illinois.

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LIFEAT information was heavily drawn upon in the case of Guillermo HERNANDEZ Vega, possible Castro agent, who was suspected of penetrating the AMIRON program. Through LIFEAT the Station was able to monitor HERNANDEZ's attempts to contact various Mexican and Cuban officials and to arrange for his return to MADD before any such contacts were made.

(2) LIFEAT/LITEUS continued to provide daily information on the official Polish installation in Mexico City which is described by the interested Case Officer as "invaluable and unique." During this reporting period, major contribution has been in providing the leads which determined that a local cafe is a front for much Polish intelligence activity in the area. It has been further indicated that this cafe is the Headquarters for a suspected Polish operation directed against the ODACID installation (previously fully reported to KUCLUB, KUDIRECT, and KUTUBE/D in HMMA-15514, HMMA-15995, and HMMA-16222. The telephone of this cafe has been added to the LIFEAT coverage with resulting increase of Station knowledge of Polish Intelligence activity.

Also of major interest was the LIFEAT support of a Station audio operation against the Polish Embassy in Mexico City. In this, LIFEAT provided the information on delivery date of a KUBARK "bugged" piece of equipment ordered by the Polish Embassy. As a result of the lead time provided, the Station was able to promptly initiate base house procurement and other support for this operation.

Remove from Project HD in H160/ CS Classification: 50-6-32/3 JOB # 75-73/77 Box: 52 Fold: 6

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION SECRET | X CONTINUED | PAGE NO. 1

50-6

As a continuing asset, LIFEAT provided daily notice of the activities and movements of Polish officials. In one case LIFEAT provided advance information concerning travel plans of one Jan KRZYWICKI, a person on the Polish Watch List.

(3) During the reporting period LIFEAT added to the security of the Station in checking on present and past agent assets. Of particular note was the coverage of the activities of LIFIRE, LIVESTOCK-1, and LIVESTOCK-2.

(4) Until terminated for security reasons (see SECURITY, below), LIFEAT coverage of the U.A.R. Embassy provided independent check of the activities of the members of that installation. Of note were the LIFEAT revealed meetings between Vicente LOMBARDO Toledano, former Mexican President Lazaro CARDENAS and the previous U.A.R. Ambassador Anouar HATEM. This coverage also provided information concerning the visit of an Algerian rebel delegation to Mexico.

(5) LIFEAT provided coverage of the local Communists, the American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM), and lately on two important Canadian Communists living in Mexico. In its coverage of local Communists LIFEAT provided coverage of Carmen BRUFAU Civit (admitted former Soviet agent), Xavier GUERRERO Saucedo and his wife, Clara Porcet de GUERRERO, and Juan Luis CAMPOS Villalobos. LIFEAT provided leads indicated the place of employment of BRUFAU, as well as much of her daily routine, thereby allowing the Station to initiate physical surveillance of her. LIFEAT coverage of CAMPOS, of interest to the Station's Communist Party Penetration Program, revealed his insincerity in cooperating with KUBARK, and as a result efforts toward his full recruitment were terminated with minimum danger to Station assets. Recently, at Headquarters request, LIFEAT reinitiated its coverage of the GUERREROS. This coverage has already provided information of the continuing contact between the GUERREROS and Frank and Libby PARK, Canadian Communist "inmigrantes" to Mexico and members of the Labor Progressive Party (Canadian CP). The Station hopes to mount a more comprehensive coverage of the PARKS as a result of the LIFEAT lead. In the LIFEAT coverage of the ACGM, of particular interest was the advance travel plans of Albert MALTZ, Noah and Anna SEBORER (as well as the travels of their sons Carl and Robert SEBORER), Maria and Enos WICHER, and Grace and Sam NOVICK. Daily activities of the ACGM are provided through LIFEAT to the local office of ODENVY.

(6) The LIFEAT complex provided the security check of the private office telephones of the Chief of Station and Deputy Chief of Station, as well as checks of the home telephones of certain of the Station officers (as reported in HMMA-16465). Since this service is unique and of value to Station security, it will be utilized periodically to guard against hostile audio surveillance.

b. Processing of Material

There has been no change in the processing of the internally produced LIFEAT take. LIFEAT processors continue to process the take from the LIENVOY/LIMERICK coverage.

c. Liaison

In November 1960, the local office of ODENVY requested that coverage of Albert MALTZ be re-initiated. This was done for a short period. However, due to the start of telephone company cable work in the area of basehous Annex IV, coverage had to be terminated. Technical surveillance will be resumed when cable work has been completed.

d. Security

Operations at basehouse Annex VIII had to be discontinued on 10 October 1960 when the telephone company's installation crews moved into the area of that basehouse and actually approached the annex to investigate the number of lines entering the house. The crew was put off until the next day with the standard, and normal for Mexico City, excuse that the "Senor" was not at home and they could not enter without his permission. By the time the crew returned on the following day, the basehouse had been completely cleared of all equipment, the lines cut back to the roof-line and their ends treated with acid to give them an aged appearance. The crew was allowed to enter the basehouse to check (and ultimately remove) the extra lines, with the admonition that it was about time they cleaned up that mess on the "Senor's" roof. Operations will be resumed when a suitable new basehouse site has been located and equipment installed. There have been no security repercussions since the removal of the extra lines by the telephone company.

The only other security note was in relation to Annex IV and was covered in LIAISON section above.

f. Coverage

The number of lines covered by LIFEAT during the reporting period has ranged from 9 to 15, but has averaged 12. The normal breakdown of the LIFEAT coverage is as follows:

LIERODE and related lines...........3
LITMUS and related lines...........3
American Communists.................1
Local Communists....................2
Targets of Opportunity.............3

It is hoped that once the telephone company has completed its present city-wide cable and installation work, at least in the areas of the basehouses, LIFEAT will be able to increase its coverage to 15 or 18 lines. The targets for this 3 to 6 line increase are already noted by the Station.

g. Personnel

No change since last report. Headquarters is reminded that the second tour of Ralph B. RAFANELLI (ps) will end in June 1961. It is requested that a qualified replacement be provided from Headquarters.

2. a. During the reporting period, information from one hundred thirty LIFEAT reels on coverage of American Communists in Mexico was passed to the local office of ODENVY for its information.

b. The following reports, cables and information dispatches were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT material during the reporting period:

HMM-5095 (via MEXI-6008)	HMM-5186
5098	5187
5100	5193
5101	5207
5133	5214
5137	5226
5144 (via MEXI-6171)	5235
5154	5245
5159	5247
5168	5261
5172	5264
5174 (via MEXI-6346)	5268
5180 (via MEXI-6359)	5277

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. [illegible]A-16605

1967

HMM-5289
5297
5299
5309
5310
5319
5321
5329
5330
5332
5333
5338
5339
5342
5343
5347
5348
5354
5356 (via MEXI-6937)
5362
5372 (via MEXI-6979
5375
5376

HMM-5378
5379
5380
5381
5382
5383
5384
5386
5387
5392
5393
5398
5400
5406
5407
5408
5409
5410
5413 (via MEXI-7187)
5418
5426 (via MEXI-7187)
5428
5437 (via MEXI-7212)

HMMA-15431
15467
15472
15480
15481
15499
15537
15552
15571
15580
15655
15657
15695
15696
15697
15701
15722
15734
15762
15765
15778
15792
15799
15814
15877
15865
15917

15936
15971
16037
16051
16052
16078
16108
16111
16114
16147
16179
16185
16214
16234
16235
16255
16270
16304
16306
16320
16328
16330
16342
16370

MEXI-6000
6048
6062
6114
6371
6429
6433
6437

MEXI-6511
6561
6587
7052
7055
7078
7096
7119

FORM 10-57 53a (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T

[X] CONTINUED

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	~~SECRET~~	HB?A-16605 ... 1967

In addition to the above, approximately 30 memos based on LIFEAT procured information were passed to local ODACID, and 20 memos were passed to local ODENVY.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

3 March 1961

Distribution:
3 - Headquarters
2 - Files

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMA-16477

TO : Chief, WH Division

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-6-32/3

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 15 February 1961

SUBJECT: Automobile License Check

RE "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
- MARKED FOR INDEXING
- X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED - See below.

REFERENCE(S)

1. It is requested that a prompt check of the following license plate be made and the results forwarded to Mexico City Station:

Maryland 1960 plate
CE 5574
1960 Grey Ford

2. This automobile was observed in front of the home of LIFEUD-1 on 9 February 1961. The driver, an English speaking man, was accompanied by a woman of latin features. The man entered LIFEUD-1's home at about 1030 on the above date.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

13 February 1961

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

50-6-32/3

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING: X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: Carmen BRUFAU Civit

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMW-9065, 1 September 1960

The interested Headquarters component has expressed a desire to review the LIFEAT take to date on Subject. Please forward copies to Headquarters and send copies of future take on a monthly basis.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City

1 - RI
1 - WH/Registry
1 - WH/3/Mexi/Chrono

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
16 December 1960	27 DEC 1960

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-9314

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-32/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexi	John G. Heyn	bj C/WH/3/Mexico	2555

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD		J. C. KING

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

076

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 8 NOV 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : COP, CA 2, CA/PRG, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, S/C 2, ADDP/A

ROUTING 1 2 3 4 5 6

NOV 9 0814Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 40047

DIR INFO SALV CITE MEXI 6594

REFS: A. DIR 09836 (OUT 55644)

B. DIR 09975 (OUT 55756)

C. DIR 09835 (OUT 55643)

1. MEXI PLANS MOUNT LIFEAT COVERAGE SALV EMB AND LIENVOY COVERAGE "EDITORIAL POPULAR" (MIGUEL ANGEL VAZQUEZ E. SALV COMMIE LEADER) SOONEST.

2. LIMUD NOW COVERING "EDITORIAL POPULAR" AND CARLOS BARRIENTOS MORAN SALV STUDENT AND MEMBER FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO SANDINO (FRS). PLAN LIMUD COVERAGE MAURICIO DE AL SELVA SALV COMMIE MEXI.

3. MEXI HAS NO PENETRATIONS OR LEFTISTS FOR TASK BUT PLAN SEND LIMASK CENTRAL AMERICA INCLUDING SALV SHORTLY. LIMASK "COVER" THAT OF EDITOR "VOZ DE AMERICA LIBRE". PLANS WILL BE SET FORTH

LIFEAT

SEPARATE CABLE.

4. NO INFO RE NEW SALV REGIME FROM MEXI SOURCE THUS FAR. ON 6 NOVEMBER LIOOZS-1 REPORTED NO INFO SALV SITUATION. HE WILL QUERY PORTUONDO CUBAN AMB RE ABOVE WHEN OPPORTUNE.

5. MEXI REQUESTS HQS AND SALV APPROVAL SHYROCK TDY SALV FEW DAYS ORDER FAMILIARIZE SELF BACKGROUND EVENTS AND PERSONALITIES COUP AND CONSEQUENTLY BETTER EVALUATE INFO RECEIVED MEXI.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED STATIONS CONDUCT FULLEST POSSIBLE COVERAGE OF INCOMING MAIL FROM EL SALVADOR AND CABLE PRIORITY SALIENT INTEL ON SITUATION THERE.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: CHARLES W. ANDERSON
UNIT: WH/FI
EXT: 3995 648
DATE: 3 NOVEMBER 1960

TO: MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 5

INFO: CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1 MEXI	4
2	5
3	6

DEFERRED 3 23 01 Z 60
ROUTINE CABLE SEC
X PRIORITY INITIALS
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS

OUT 88628

TO MEXI PRIORITY INFO CITE DIR 09820

1. DESIRE MOUNT LIFEAT OR LIENVOY COVERAGE SALVADORAN EMBASSY SOONEST AND CABLE PRIORITY PERTINENT INFO POLITICAL SITUATION SALVADOR.

2. CAN STATION SUGGEST COVERAGE ANY OTHER TARGETS WHICH MAY PRODUCE ON THIS VITAL MATTER?

END OF MESSAGE

LIFEAT OPS

R. D. Gahagan
CWHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/3/MEXICO
COORDINATING OFFICERS

John Whitten
AC/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

 Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 17 SEP 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 2 (MR HEYN WH NOTIFIED 1855 17 SEP 60)

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, COP, ADDP/A, C/CI, C/CI/RA, C/FI 2, C/FI/D 4, C/FE 4, D/OC 2, S/C 2

ROUTING 1 2 3 4 5 6

SEP 17 2214Z 60

PRIORITY

IN 14365

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 6348

RYBAT

file LIFEAT/OPS

REF A DIR 00992 (Out 70506) *

B DIR 01226 (Out 70522) **

1. STATION TAKING FOLLOWING ACTIONS:

A. MKCHARITY[1]-PREPARING MOVE SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT TO SAFE AREA. MULFORD[2] TO SPEND MORE TIME IN LIFINGER[3] COVER OFFICE. STEHLIK[4] INSTRUCTED STAY AWAY FROM MKCHARITY[1] BASE. LIMAT[5] OPERATION INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED. DUE PHILIP L. ALPHER[10] KNOWLEDGE MKCHARITY[1] CONSIDER THIS OP COULD BE MOST SERIOUSLY AFFECTED.

B. LIMESA[6]/LIMUST[7]-PLAN MOVE ALL TECH GEAR FROM UNIT 11 AND SUSPEND UNIT 15 LICALLA ACTIVITIES.

C. LIFEAT[8]-REVISING AND REVIEWING LP CUTOFF AND EVACUATION

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

ROUTING

PAGE 2

IN 14365 MEXI 6348

PLANS. DUE COMPARTMENTATION AND BELIEVED LIMITED ALPHER[10] KNOWLEDGE THIS OP, DO NOT CONSIDER COMPROMISE LIKELY.

D. LIENVOY[9]-NO DEFINITIVE ACTION BEING TAKEN NOW DUE LIAISON NATURE OP.

2. HQS REQUESTED PROVIDE CONTINUING ADVICE LATEST APPRAISALS ALPHER'S[10] AND OTHER ARRESTED TECHS KNOWLEDGE ABOVE AND ALL OTHER STATION OPS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S Comments:

* Headquarters informed the field stations that LCHARVEST(11) audio operation against NCNA in Havana was compromised.

** Stated that all security precautions should be taken since it was possible that all audio perations could be affected.

SECRET

Copy No.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/[redacted]

HMMA-15595
[redacted] 1445

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 50-6-32/3

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 31 August 1960

SUBJECT: - LIFEAT Monthly Report

MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: - Information only.

REFERENCE(S):

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHB-F 52-6-1, section V, paragraph 2 (d) (1):

a. Exploitation of Leads

1) LIFEAT/LIERODE provided information which assisted in the press exploitation of the story of Gladys Izquierdo Martinez de DELGADO, wife of the recently deported (with the help of LIFEAT provided material) Cuban agent Francisco DELGADO Garcia. LIERODE coverage was also the origin of the lead which gave access to Cuban agent Elpi CASANOVA.

2) LIFEAT coverage was reactivated 18 July on LIVESTOCK-2 as a Station security operation to check the activities of the potentially dangerous former agent.

3) LIFEAT also continued to provide the only independent means of checking the veracity of Jose Luis CAMPOS Villalobos who is of interest to the Station's Communist Party Penetration Program.

4) LIFEAT coverage of the American Communist Noah SEBORER provided the itinerary of SEBORER's trip, which commenced 17 August, to Havana, New York, Moscow, and Tel Aviv.

b. Processing of Material

The LIFEAT complex continues to process the take from the LIENVOY Soviet coverage.

c. Liaison

No change.

d. Security

No change.

e. Technical

No change.

Remove from Project
CS Classification: 50-6-32/3
JOB #
Box: Fold:

AB | AB | IB | PS | SX | DES | NFD | FI

f. Coverage

LITMUS and related lines	4 (two initiated in July)
LIERODE and related lines	4
American Communists	1
U.A.R. Embassy	1
Targets of Opportunity	2
Total	12

RECORD COPY

50-6-32/3

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/[redacted]

[X] CONTINUED

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMA-15595 [redacted] 1445

TO

INFO

FROM

DATE

SUBJECT

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

- MARKED FOR INDEXING
- NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

PAGE TWO

g. Personnel

David M. WILSTED (ps) returned from home leave and resumed duties as outside Case Officer for Project LIFEAT on 23 July.

2 a. During the month of July 1960, twenty-seven (27) reels were passed to the local ODENVY office for processing from the LIFEAT coverage of American Communists in Mexico. Reels from the LIENVOY coverage of American Communist Sam BROOKS continued to be passed to ODENVY as LIFEAT material.

b. The following reports, information dispatches, cables, and memoranda were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT material during the month of July 1960:

HMM-5032 (via MEXI-5835)	HMMA-15275	MEXI-5835
HMM-5045	HMMA-15277	MEXI-5941
HMM-5047	HMMA-15307	MEXI-5943
HMM-5065	HMMA-15309	
	HMMA-15328	
	HMMA-15402	
	HMMA-15408	

c. Four (4) memoranda were passed to ODACID and two (2) to ODENVY during the month which were based on LIFEAT acquired information.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

29 August 1960

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

50-6-32/3

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

CONTINUED

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/[redacted]

HMMA-15394
[redacted]1835

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

50-6-32/3

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 27 July 1960

SUBJECT: - LIFEAT Monthly Report, June 1960

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ACTION REQUIRED: - None. For your information.

REFERENCES:

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHB-F 52-6-1, Section V, Paragraph 2 (d) (1):

a. Exploitation of Leads

LIFEAT/LIMERICK continued to provide advance information on arrivals, departures, work assignments, and contacts of the Soviet officials in Mexico City. In this area LIFEAT provided the following: advance travel information on the return of First Secretaries Yevgeniy BOCHKOV and Yuriy ALEKSANDROV from consultations in the USSR, advance information on the arrival in Mexico of the Georgian Ballet on 1 June and its subsequent departure for Cuba on 20 June accompanied by Assistant Cultural Officer Aleksandr BROVKIN, and advance information on the assignment and arrival of new Consular Officer Serafim V. DUNIN. LIFEAT leads provided on the continuing attempts of the Soviets to rent apartments are being checked by the Station surveillance team.

LIFEAT/LIERODE continued to provide excellent coverage of the activities of the Cuban Embassy staff, particularly providing exploitable coverage of Cuban intelligence activities. Of major importance during the month of June was the acquisition of leads on the activities of Cuban "tourist" Francisco DELGADO Garcia. As a result of these leads, passed to the Mexican government in disguised form, DELGADO was arrested on the night of 7 July and thereafter deported. LIFEAT information also enabled the responsible Case Officer to alert agent LIMASK to threats made by DELGADO to have LIMASK arrested. The LIERODE related coverage of the telephone of Santiago GARCES Arroyo has enabled the Station to maintain a check on the activities of AMSHAD-1, including his possible role as middle-man in a "frozen pesos for sugar" deal reported in MEXI-5794.

LIFEAT/LITMUS provided information on the activities of the Polish Legation during June, particularly noting the travel plans of Polish Intelligence Officer Thadeusz ZIOLKOWSKI.

LIFEAT coverage of a member of the Mexican Communist Party (PCM) is used in checking the veracity of Juan Luis CAMPOS Villalobos who is of interest to the Station's Communist Party Penetration Program.

LIFEAT also agreed to support Project LIENVOY in the processing of the Soviet take when LIENVOY picked up coverage of the Soviet lines LIFEAT was forced to relinquish on 22 June 1960 (See SECURITY below). LIFEAT, though short of processors, agreed to the processing when it was learned that LIENVOY would be unable to process the added coverage it had undertaken.

Remove from Project: [illegible]
CS Classification: 50-6-32/3
JOB # [illegible]
Box: [illegible] Fold: 6

b. Processing of Material

Due to the desire of COS that ZINSMEISTER continue to process the take it obtains from the Soviet lines, LIFEAT processor Carol ZINSMEISTER (ps) will undertake the processing of the take of these lines

FORM 53

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/[redacted]

X CONTINUED

PAGE NO. 1

which LIENVOY now provides. This is exactly the work previously done by ZINSMEISTER and the only difference is that tapes are made at a different location. However, this does require close coordination within the Station of these two operations.

A problem which has arisen with the withdrawal of the Soviet coverage from LIFEAT responsibility (see SECURITY below) and the "outage" experienced earlier in June on two of the most productive Soviet lines, is the extreme drop in the production of positive intelligence from LIFEAT coverage. It is hoped that with more intensive exploitation of the coverage still available, plus exploitation of new lines being installed by LIFEAT, that the production of positive intelligence will again measure up to that previously provided by LIFEAT.

c. Liaison

No change other than the closer inter-office liaison with Project LIENVOY due to the above noted LIFEAT processing of LIENVOY take and the increased reel and finished product exchange this entails.

d. Security

On 21 June 1960 LITENSOR suggested to COS that LIENVOY begin operations against the Soviet and Satellite targets in Mexico City. In order not to indicate that the unilateral LIFEAT operation was providing this coverage, it was necessary for COS to agree to this suggestion. So as not to jeapordize LIFEAT operations and personnel, LIFEAT coverage was suspended on the Soviet Embassy and Polish Legation, and the applicable "crossea" were pulled and cleaned. This was accomplished by 1030 on 22 June 1960. Coverage continued on the home of Aleksandr BEKIER, Polish Conselor of Legation, since no security problem seemed to be raised by continued coverage of this line.

e. Technical

The arrival in early June of a portion of the replacement parts requested for LIFEAT use has enabled LIFEAT personnel to perform much needed repair and maintenance work on the aging LIFEAT equipment.

f. Coverage

LIMERICK	5 lines (All pulled 22 June for security reasons)
LITMUS	3 lines (2 pulled 22 June for security reasons)
LIERODE and related lines	5 lines
American Communists	1 line
U.A.R. Embassy	1 line (Initiated 7 June)
Target of Opportunity	1 line

g. Personnel

No change.

2. a. During the month of June 1960, eleven (11) processed reels from LIFEAT coverage of American Communists in Mexico were passed to the local office of ODENVY as well as seventeen (17) reels from ODENVY's processing. Reels from the LIENVOY coverage of American Communist Sam BROOKS continued to be passed to ODENVY as LIFEAT material during the month of June 1960.

b. The following reports, cables, information dispatches and memoranda were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT material during the month of June 1960:

HMM-4983 (via MEXI-5665)
HMM-4990 (via MEXI-5686)
HMM-5014

HMMA-15088
HMMA-15116
HMMA-15129
HMMA-15134
HMMA-15135
HMMA-15144
HMMA-15168
HMMA-15175
HMMA-15180
HMMA-15196
HMMA-15203
HMMA-15232
HMMA-15239
HMMA-15246
HMMA-15266

MEXI-5710
MEXI-5745
MEXI-5771
MEXI-5786
MEXI-5794
MEXI-5799
MEXI-5818

c. Eight (8) memoranda were passed to ODACID and ten (10) to ODENVY during the month of June 1960 which were based on LIFEAT acquired material.

Willard C. CURTIS

25 July 1960

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

14-00000

DISPATCH

~~SECRET/RYBAT~~

HMMA-15400
RYBAT-1625

TO : Chief, WH Division

50-6-75

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

27 July 1960

SUBJECT: Monthly Activities Report on LIENVOY

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ACTION REQUIRED: None. For your information.

REF: HMMA-15170, RYBAT-1402

On the evening of 18 June COS met with LITENSOR at the home of LIELEGANT (see MEXI-5761). Among other subjects discussed, LITENSOR urgently suggested that COS arrange coverage of the Soviet/Satellite installations. Since this coverage is obviously one of great interest to KUBARK, COS was left with no alternative but to enthusiastically accept LITENSOR's suggestion. LIELEGANT was equally enthusiastic about the suggestion and requested COS to furnish a list of target lines as soon as possible. On 21 June Malcolm Q. EDELAND passed to LIENVOY/2 a list of 4 Soviet, 2 Polish, 2 Czech and 2 Yugoslav lines. The Polish, the Czech, Yugoslav and 1 Soviet line were placed within two days. Meanwhile all LIFEAT Soviet/Satellite lines were removed. After due consideration it was decided to advise LIENVOY/2 that we would prefer to drop the 2 Polish lines and at least one Yugoslav line and use all remaining available lines (LIENVOY can handle a maximum of 30 lines, always keeping two spares) to cover a total of five Soviet lines and keeping the two Czech lines already in operation. This was agreed to but the four additional Soviet lines could not be placed immediately due to the temporary absence from the city of LIENVOY/3 whose aid was needed to fulfill this assignment.

The eventuality of a request from high Mexican officials for LIENVOY coverage of Soviet/Satellite with its attendant affect upon LIFEAT had been foreseen by the Station for sometime. On at least two previous occasions when a hint was made to COS by lesser officials than LITENSOR, COS was able to dissuade these officials on the basis of lack of qualified personnel for processing, transcribing, and exploiting the take that would come from taps against Soviet/Satellite installations. However, on the above occasion when LITENSOR even went so far as to suggest that the translations could be handled by language experts at Headquarters COS was in no position to argue this point with LITENSOR. The actual implementation of the change over of Soviet/Satellite coverage from LIFEAT to LIENVOY (LIFEAT went back on Polish Legation in late June) was accomplished smoothly, with no flaps and the Station does not envision any problems, certainly, in the immediate future.

The processing and transcribing is being handled in exactly the same fashion as before i.e., LIENVOY is doing the taps only, LIFEAT personnel are processing the tapes from LIENVOY. As far as the Mexicans are concerned, the tapes are being forwarded to Headquarters for processing with the transcriptions being sent back to the Station for our information. The Station has promised LIENVOY/2 and LIELEGANT a monthly summary of any interesting highlights that appear in these transcriptions.

file

2(5)

53

~~SECRET/RYBAT~~

X

Between the dates 9 to 14 June during the visit of DORTICOS, LIENVOY covered 10 of the 20 lines of the Del Prado Hotel where the DORTICOS party was staying. This coverage was for 24 hours daily and the LIENVOY personnel monitored all calls coming to and going from the DORTICOS suite (see MEXI-5731). This service was requested by the Station the day before DORTICOS arrival in Mexico City and was readily agreed to and immediately put into affect thru the efforts of LIENVOY/2. Considerable information of interest and value was obtained from this operation as well as quantities of operational data.

Also, during the month of June LIENVOY/9 was dispatched to Cuba on a special assignment per HMMW-8766. LIENVOY/9 successfully accomplished his mission, returning on 6 July. The results from this mission will be forwarded to Headquarters in a separate dispatch.

1. There follows the third monthly activities report on LIENVOY covering the month of June 1960:

A. Exploitation of Material Obtained

During the month of June a total of 29 lines were in operation against the following targets:

1. Gral. Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
2. Sam Brooks
3. Gral. Lazaro Cardenas Del Rio
4. Lic. Alonso Aguilar Monteverde
5. CTAL
6. Ing. Jorge L. Tamayo
7. Russian Embassy
8. Leopoldo Arenal Bastar
9. David Alfaro Siqueiros
10. Problemas Agricolas y Industriales
11. Vicente Lombardo Toledano
12. Czech Embassy
13. Joaquin Basanta Lopez
14. Ing. Jorge L. Tamayo
15. D. F. S.
16. D. F. S.
17. Jorge L. Tamayo
18. Francisco Galindo Ochoa
19. Francisco Galindo Ochoa
20. Amalia Solorzano de Cardenas
21. Dr. Lauro Ortega
22. Manuel Sousa Hermida
23. Lic. Enrique Gonzalez Pedrero
24. Czech Embassy
25. Prensa Latina
26. Embajada Cubana
27. Czech Embassy
28. Yugoslav Embassy
29. Armando Lopez Betancourt

Plus 10 lines - Hotel Del Prado - DORTICOS suite 9-14 June (see MEXI-5731)

B. Processing of Material

With the closing of Unit C (see HMMA-15200) the two processors retained under the project, LIENVOY/6 and LIENVOY/7

were transferred to the Intercept Center where they are now responsible for doing the full transcription of the tapes covering lines of interest to KUBARK.

C. Liaison

During the month of June COS was in contact with LIELEGANT on the average of four times each week. As stated in paragraph one above, COS met with LITENSOR on 18 June.

D. Security

It is believed that the security of the project has been improved with the closing of Unit C and the elimination of all Unit C personnel with the exception of LIENVOY/6 and 7 who were transferred to the Intercept Site. During the absence of Arnold F. AREHART, Malcolm Q. EDELAND was in direct contact with LIENVOY/2 and took advantage of this contact to repeatedly stress the necessity for tight security of this operation as well as personal security of the various LIENVOYs. For operational efficiency, contact once a week will be maintained between LIENVOY/2 and EDELAND.

E. Technical

Early in June AREHART returned to Headquarters to convert to Staff Agent and pick up his family to return Pcs Mexico City. He and his family arrived 24 June. AREHART reported on his return that some of the equipment was in need of attention but that there were no technical problems during his absence.

F. Personnel

With the elimination of Unit C the following personnel were terminated during the month of June:

LITABLE/2
LITABLE/3
LITABLE/4
LIENVOY/13

G. Production

The following fifty-seven (57) reports, cables and information dispatches were based wholly or in part on LIENVOY during the month of June 1960.

HMMA-15084
HMMA-15093
HMMA-15094
HMMA-15095
HMMA-15103
HMMA-15107
HMMA-15142
HMMA-15147
HMMA-15170
HMMA-15172
HMMA-15200
HMMA-15201
HMMA-15217
HMMA-15249

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-15400 RYBAT-1425

HMMA-15260
HMMA-15262

MEXI-5682
MEXI-5688
MEXI-5689
MEXI-5698
MEXI-5703
MEXI-5717
MEXI-5731
MEXI-5732
MEXI-5736
MEXI-5746
MEXI-5754
MEXI-5761
MEXI-5762
MEXI-5763
MEXI-5764
MEXI-5779
MEXI-5786
MEXI-5788
MEXI-5803
MEXI-5813

HMM-4974
HMM-4989
HMM-4991 (MEXI-5705)
HMM-4992
HMM-4993
HMM-4997
HMM-4998 (MEXI-5719)
HMM-4999 (MEXI-5720)
HMM-5001
HMM-5014
HMM-5016
HMM-5018
HMM-5019 (MEXI-5797)
HMM-5022
HMM-5023
HMM-5025

Willard C. CURTIS

26 July 1960

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

Secret

2(3)

Attachment to: HMMA-15325

Subject: Douglas C. NISLEY's (p) Report for June 1960

13 July 1960

1. During June the LIENVOY project put taps on the telephones of the Czech and Yugoslav Embassies. Anticipating a possible LIENVOY tap on the Polish Legation, the LIFEAT project removed its tap on this installation lest it be discovered by LIENVOY. The Station now receives Czech and Yugoslav reels every day from LIENVOY. The LIFEAT tap on Aleksander BEKIER's line continues, a tap on Stanislaw ADAMOWICZ has just begun to produce, and a tap on the Polish Commercial Office is under consideration. Eventually, when the Station is confident that the LIENVOY project will not tap the Polish Legation lines, the LIFEAT project will be able to reinstitute its coverage of this target.

2. A daily flow of photographs is coming from Richard Z. SPATHAR (p) in the LIHABIT/2 basehouse. The Station now has possession of the LITABBY/2 basehouse, but for various reasons it will not be useable for a while, and consideration is being given again to using LITABBY/1 as a base for photographic surveillance of the Polish Legation. No photographic site is available, or under consideration, for the Yugoslav Embassy.

3. As of 30 June, then, the situation is as follows:

a. Czech Embassy: Daily photographic and telephone coverage, augmented by a considerable quantity of information from LIFIRE air passenger manifests, visa requests submitted to the U.S. Embassy, and LIMAT mail intercepts.

b. Polish Legation: No photographic coverage. Telephone coverage limited to the taps on the BEKIER and ADAMOWICZ lines. Relatively slight information from visa requests, since there are fewer Poles than Czechs in Mexico City, and also because the Poles are apparently unable to take home leave. Little information from LIFIRE air passenger manifests, for the same reasons. Rather more information from LIMAT.

c. Yugoslav Embassy: Telephone but no photographic coverage. Very little information from visa requests or from LIFIRE. LIMAT is a good source of information, but mostly on commercial topics.

d. Other EE Targets: No information worth mentioning, because of the lack of any other diplomatic installations. LIFIRE submits occasional reports on the arrival and departure of individual EE satellite personalities.

Secret

4. Processing the source material listed above absorbs a large part of NISLEY's time. LIBRIFORM handles the translation of the Czech material, and BESMOOTH of the Polish material. There is no translator for the Yugoslav mail and telephone intercepts. NISLEY listens to the Spanish conversations on the Yugoslav reels, and attempts an occasional translation of the more interesting bits of Serbo-Croat correspondence with the aid of the dictionary kindly supplied by Headquarters. NISLEY meets BESMOOTH every day to pick up the Polish translations. LIBRIFORM and SPATHAR are still being met daily by Harvey P. DENENHOLZ (p), after his PCS departure in July this will become NISLEY's responsibility, as will the handling of LIMITATIONs 4 and 5, LIFEBLOOD, LINILE and LIBALSA.

5. Beside the daily scanning of source material, one of the month's more important activities was the updating of the table of organization of the Czech Embassy. This has now been completed. Photographs of departed Czech personnel were forwarded to Headquarters in HMMA-15081, 15106, and 15120. Of the sixty Czechs (including wives, but not children) known to be stationed in Mexico City, photographs are lacking for twenty. SPATHAR has photographed about the same number of unidentified people repeatedly entering the Czech Embassy; copies of these photos are being given to the LIEMBRACE surveillance team, and it is expected that one by one these people will be followed home and identified.

6. The Polish table of organization had already been determined, with the possible exception of one newcomer to the Polish Commercial Office who has not yet been completely identified, and there were no changes during the month. It is believed that most of the Yugoslavs have been identified.

7. The process of accumulating information on Czech personnel has not yet gone far enough for the Station to pick one or two likely targets for concentrated attention. A newcomer, positively identified as a Czech Intelligence officer, arrived on 30 June and will naturally receive all possible coverage. The Station received a proposal from Headquarters for special attention to be paid to Jaroslav VALENTA, the Commercial Attache; unfortunately, VALENTA had just departed on home leave, so action is being deferred until his return in August.

8. Among the Poles, concentrated attention is being paid to Aleksander BEKIER and Stanislaw ADAMOWICZ by means of telephone taps. The newly arrived Polish Intelligence officer will, if technically possible, receive the same coverage as soon as his permanent address is determined, although this will probably mean dropping the BEKIER line. Physical surveillance was run on Tadeusz ZIOLKOWSKI and Henryk POTASZ during the month, the former being

an identified and the latter a suspected intelligence officer; in both cases the surveillance was dropped after the subject showed signs of becoming tail conscious. The ZIOLKOWSKI surveillance lasted several days and revealed a number of possible IS contacts which are now being followed up. The POTASZ surveillance was blown practically immediately.

9. File studies have now been completed and Target Personality Data Forms executed on all Poles except the custodial personnel, Henryk POTASZ (whose form is in the process of completion), and the three newcomers about whom little is yet known. As a result of this activity, Roman CZYZYCKI and Mieczyslaw WLODAREK have tentatively been selected as worthy of closer concentration, the former on a long-term basis and the latter on a short-term basis. CZYZYCKI is interesting because he is ambitious and apparently not intellectually committed to the regime, he is the close assistant of Aleksander BEKIER and hence has access to information of value, his entire family is with him, and he is young enough to be able to make a new life for himself if flight should become necessary. Attempts are now being made to develop a contact to him through one of his many acquaintances in the Mexican press.

10. WLODAREK is interesting mainly because he is Minister, and because he seems to be dissatisfied with his prospects. HMMA-15177 of 17 June transmitted information about a possible avenue of approach to him. Information received more recently disclosed that the doctor, who had been tentatively spotted as a means of access to Mrs. WLODAREK, is indeed anti-Communist but is also on unfriendly terms with Mrs. WLODAREK. ODACID personnel, who had been asked to cultivate WLODAREK at diplomatic functions, have reported that WLODAREK has not attended any at which they have been present. No likelihood is now foreseen of any means of contact to WLODAREK, and indications are that his recall may take place some time this summer.

11. An attempt early in June to recruit a source close to Tadeusz ZIOLKOWSKI failed when it was discovered that the individual did not have the access she had been believed to have. Details were sent to Headquarters in HMMA-15116 of 8 June.

12. Information on a possible source of operational intelligence on Czech personnel was obtained from LIKAYAK/2 and forwarded to Headquarters in HMMA-15082 of 3 June and HMMA-15199 of 22 June. The mail intercept on the Czech accommodation address has begun to function, but so far has produced nothing of value.

13. MEXI-5653 of 6 June and HMMA-15195 of 17 June transmitted information from and about BEFUNNY obtained from LIFEBLOOD.

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ [redacted]	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMA-15319 [redacted] 1503
TO: Chief, WH Division	DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-6-32/3
INFO		
FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City		DATE: 13 July 1960
SUBJECT: LIFEAT Monthly Report, May 1960		MARKED FOR INDEXING
ACTION REQUIRED: For your information.		X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
REFERENCE(S):		INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

AN X
AB X
IN
PS
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D39 | NPD
FI
AGP

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHB-F 52-6-1, section V, paragraph 2 (d) (1):

a. Exploitation of Leads

During the month of May 1960, Project LIFEAT continued to provide excellent coverage of the activities of the official Soviet and Cuban installations in Mexico City, the Station's top priority targets. The following are specific, though necessarily selective, contributions made by LIFEAT through provision of exploitable leads and support to Mexico City Station.

1) The most outstanding single contribution of the LIMERICK phase of Project LIFEAT during the period of this monthly review was the providing of information to the responsible Case Officer which confirmed the validity of agent LITARDY-1. This double agent turned himself into ODENVY, and thus to KUBARK, during the latter part of the review period. LIFEAT/LIMERICK provided data on the activities and Soviet contacts of LITARDY-1, thus enabling the case officer to adequately plan productive use of this new asset.

2) LIMERICK continued to provide Project LIMESA with support in the form of information on goods and services provided to the Soviets from the local economy. Of special interest was information on specific apartments which the Soviets were considering renting. LIMERICK also continued to provide valuable information on Soviet commercial activities which has been reported separately.

3) Also provided was information of a CE nature concerning specific assignments of personnel within the Soviet Embassy, advance travel plans of Soviet officials, and arrivals, departures, and addresses of Embassy staff members. The following are examples of this category of information:

a) Vitaliy Borisovich SHUBIN arrived 11 May 1960 and is probably the Intelligence Officer replacement for Yevgeniy LAPSHEV. The address of SHUBIN was also provided by LIFEAT.

b) Aleksandr BROVKIN was assigned duties as Assistant Cultural Officer to replace Vladimir NOVIKOV during the latter's home leave.

c) Valentin BAKULIN was appointed Soviet Film Officer in charge of distribution of Soviet films, including propaganda films.

d) Advance notice was given of the 20 May arrival of the Soviet delegation to the International Cotton Conference held in Mexico City, and noted that the delegation would be composed of Dmitriy MAITOV, Boris FIRSOV, Abdulla SULTANKHODZKAYEV, and Vladilyena TERESHCHINA.

3) Advance information was provided on the following travel: Soviet Ambassador BAZYKIN to leave 21 June 1960 for home leave in the USSR; planned departure of Vladimir NOVIKOV, Cultural Officer, for home leave in the USSR and return to Mexico; departure for home leave 31 May 1960 of known RIS officer Colonel Dmitriy KUZNETSOV; that thirteen Soviet officials are returning to the USSR during the months of July and August 1960 with no indication that these are to be replaced (Five of these are known RIS officers; Yuriy CHELPANOV, Pavel KOVALEV, Yevgeniy LAPSHEV, Vladimir MAKOVKIN, and Grigori YEFREMOV).

4) Due to advance information provided through LIFEAT/LITMUS, the Station was able to cover a clandestine meeting of Alexandr BEKIER, Polish Counselor of Legation in Mexico, and provide identification of BEKIER's contact. Through coordination with MKCHARITY and the Station's KURIOT representative, both audio and photo surveillance of the meeting were arranged.

5) LIFEAT/LIERODE significantly supported the Station's efforts in the Cuban operations field by providing leads that lead to and assisted in the recruitment of agent LITALUS-3, a penetration of the Cuban Embassy who is to be handled by LITALUS-1. LIERODE is also utilized as a continuing check on the activities of the newly recruited agent.

6) The Station's CE priority has been supported through coverage of the phone used by PCM members Juan Luis CAMPOS Villalobos and Mario PEREZ Marin. This coverage has provided information of value concerning addresses, phone numbers, and contacts of other PCM members. It has also been employed as a cross-check of statements made by CAMPOS to Howard O. MOSCHIANO.

7) LIFEAT provided information on travel planned and accomplished by associates of the American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM) particularly that of Maria WICHER to Moscow, the return of Albert MALTZ to Mexico, and the planned travel of Noah SEBORER to Moscow in August.

b. Processing of Material

During the month of May 1960, the quantity of raw information processed was noticeably reduced, and thus the amount of positive intelligence derived was also reduced, due to the "outage" on certain of the most productive LIFEAT lines. Principally involved were the Soviet lines, including one week break on an Embassy line, three weeks on the Soviet Motion Picture Office line, and one week on the Soviet Commercial Office line. These "outages" were primarily due to the telephone company pulling the LIFEAT crosses, or the target telephone being out of order.

c. Liaison

As in the past, the only liaison connected with Project LIFEAT is in passing reels from coverage of the American Communists in Mexico to ODENVY for their processing. No other liaison is considered necessary or desireable.

d. Security

No security problems arose that were not readily solved by the personnel concerned, nor did these jeopardize the operation.

e. Technical

The only technical problems encountered were those falling within the province of the telephone company, as noted in 1. b above, or the normal malfunctions encountered in the aging LIFEAT equipment. These last were repaired as rapidly as possible with the aid of the replacement parts recently forwarded by Headquarters. No major "outages" were due to LIFEAT originated technical problems.

f. Coverage

LIMERICK	5 lines (outages as noted in 1. b above)
LITMUS	3 lines
LIERODE and related lines	5 lines
American Communists	1 line
Targets of Opportunity	2 lines

g. Personnel

David M. WILSTED (ps) departed Mexico City on 21 May 1960 for home leave and Headquarters consultation of approximately two months duration. His duties as outside Case Officer and principal technician have been undertaken by Ralph B. RAFANELLI (ps) and LIFEUD-8.

2. a. During the month of May 1960, information from twenty-three LIFEAT reels on coverage of American Communists in Mexico were passed to the local ODENVY office for its information. During the period 10 May through 16 June LIFEAT processed this take as the ODENVY processor was on home leave. Twenty-six reels of LIENVOY coverage of Sam Brooks were also passed to the local ODENVY office under the guise of LIFEAT material.

b. The following reports, cables, information dispatches, and memoranda were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT material during May 1960:

HMM-4921
HMM-4924
HMM-4943
HMM-4958 (via MEXI-5610)
HMM-4963
HMM-4964
HMM-4966
HMM-4967
HMM-4971
HMM-4972
HMM-4975 (via MEXI-5640)
HMM-4979 (via MEXI-5643)

HMMA-14942
HMMA-14950
HMMA-14956
HMMA-14969
HMMA-14991
HMMA-15004
HMMA-15040
HMMA-15049
HMMA-15055
HMMA-15058

MEXI-5662
MEXI-5615
MEXI-5593
MEXI-5586
MEXI-5575
MEXI-5566
MEXI-5521

c. Seven (7) memoranda were passed to ODACID and ten (10) to ODENVY during the month of May 1960 which were based on LIFEAT acquired information.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

402

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 30 JUN 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 7

INFO : DDP, COP, ADDP/A, S/C 2*

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JUL 1 2139Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 19430

DIR CITE MEXI 5813

5813

RYBAT LIENVOY

REF DIR 35367 (OUT 89228)**

1. RE PARA 4, LIENVOY WILL COVER FIVE SOVIET AND TWO CZECH LINES WITH TAPES PROCESSED BY ZINSMEISTER AND LIBRIFORM. LIENVOY MONITORS WILL EXTRACT FROM SPANISH FOR RESUMEN WHAT IS CONSIDERED OF INTEREST LITENSOR. LIELEGANT TOLD WE WILL INFORM HIM OF PERTINENT INFO OBTAINED (OSTENSIBLY FROM HQS PROCESSING) OF SOVIET AND CZECH TEXT FOR PASSING LITENSOR. LIFEAT WILL COVER POLISH AND OTHER CURRENT TARGETS. FOR SECURITY REASONS CZECH LINES HAVE NOT BEEN COVERED BY LIFEAT FOR PAST SIX MONTHS.

2. RE PARA 5; (A) NO CURRENT PROBLEM RE EXPLOITATION LEADS SINCE LIELEGANT HAS EVINCED NO INTEREST THIS MATTER. (B) PERSONNEL UNIT C TERMINATED AND BASE CLOSED. VIEW LIENVOY LACK LANGUAGE AND EXPLOITATION CAPABILITY AND OUR ABILITY CONTROL WHAT IS PASSED (OSTENSIBLY FROM HQS), STATION SEES NO IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS. WILL POUCH DETAILS JUNE LIENVOY MONTHLY ACTIVITIES REPORT.

3. THIS DEVELOPMENT FORESEEN BY STATION SINCE LIENVOY BEGAN; NO INTENTION CUT DOWN ON LIFEAT (INDEPENDENT) OPS AND HAVE SUFFICIENT WORK FOR BOTH.

END OF MESSAGE

LIFEAT/98

SECRET

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

PAGE 2

IN 19430 MEXI 5813

TO INFO CITE

C/S COMMENTS: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT JMNET CABLES.

**CONCERNED PHONE TAPS AND LITENSOR OFFER RE OVERTHROW CASTRO.

SECRET

410

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

DATE : 24 JUN 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 6 (MR HEYN, WH DIV NOTIFIED 1910 24 JUN)

INFO : COP, ADDP/A, S/C 2

ROUTING

JUN 24 2226Z 60

PRIORITY

IN 16468

5786

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 5786

RYBAT LIENVOY LIFEAT JMNET

REF DIR 36367 (OUT 89228)*

1. RE PARA 6 REF, STATION HAS TAKEN ADEQUATE SECURITY PRECAUTIONS. LIFEAT COVERAGE CUT PRIOR LIENVOY ACTION. LIMERICK AND LITMUS COVERAGE TERMINATED 22 JUNE 1020 HOURS.

2. WILL REPORT SOONEST ON FUTURE HANDLING THESE PORTIONS LIFEAT AND LIENVOY.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *SUGGESTED LIFEAT COVERAGE BE CUT ON LINES TO BE COVERED BY LIENVOY.

~~SECRET~~

Copy No.

14-00000

8 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/WH/3/Mexico

SUBJECT: LIFEAT

1. During my recent visit to Mexico I had a good chance to go over many of the ins-and-outs of this project with the Case Officer and with other officers in the Station. At Station staff meeting I stated that reporting on CI material derived from the project was inadequate and COS appeared to go along with this view. The concensus I got from the Case Officers was that the SR Case Officer is not sufficiently alert to the need for reporting on the CI aspects of the matter and is limiting himself to strictly servicing SR Division matters. Various Case Officers cited instances to me of conversations pointing to new clandestine relationships or containing previously known clandestine relationships in the Soviet field which have not been reported. Owing to a lack of time, I was unable to examine the records myself, but I am inclined to accept those statements as true.

2. The Case Officer gave me a general run-down of the situation of the agents on this project and it appears that everything is running very well. He told me that in his new project outline, which will be up in a week or two, he is including some raises to some of the agents. He told me that on his last round of pay raises he had some difficulty here at headquarters. If any difficulty seems forthcoming this time, I should like to have the matter brought to my attention because, as you know, I feel very strongly on this matter and fought the same battles with headquarters for at least five years.

3. In speaking with the Case Officers on the Cuban side, as well as on the CI, it was apparent that LIFEAT remains probably the biggest single source of information available to the Mexico City Station and that every effort should be made to continue its smooth functioning. If this means a couple of hundred pesos increase to each agent semi-annually or annually, it does not seem to be too much of a strain and I do not see why we should have any trouble. When I compare the salaries of the base operators and processors on this project, especially considering the illegal position they are in, with those of relatively unproductive agents elsewhere in Mexico and in many other Stations, I cannot help but feel that we are buying a great deal for our money in this project.

CHARLES W. ANDERSON
WH/FI

cc: CI/OPS/WH (Mr. Brown)

6 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: DEBRIEFING OF DAVID M. WILSTED (ps)

1. On 1 June 1960 Mr. John G. Heyn and Mr. John Kennedy of WHD, Mr. Robert Brown of CI/OPS, Mr. Robert Bryant of FI/OPS and Mr. Charles Bray of FI/D met with David M. WILSTED (ps).

2. WILSTED emphasized that the whole telephone system in Mexico City is undergoing a reformation. The company Telefonos de Mexico, S.A., has sub-contracted this work of cleaning up and reorganizing the phone system to the independent firm, Intel. They are cleaning up unused and old lines, putting in new and spare lines, redefining exchange areas, laying underground cables, etc. Eventually we should be better off because there should be more surplus lines. The renovation work has hampered much of the LIFEAT work, principally because many of the lines now are underground and we cannot get access to them before they enter the central. This is particularly true with respect to the Czech Embassy, to whose telephone lines we cannot obtain access from the vantage point we now occupy.

3. WILSTED said that we try to keep track of the activities of "Intel" but since they seem to attack "Colonias" at random, we have no prior warning of their presence in a certain area.

4. In the recent past, Mexico has been using houses for listing posts for security reasons. We have more control over the access of phone company inspectors or repairman to houses. However, under new regulations, all new apartment buildings must have telephone lines installed in the building by the phone company during the construction phase. This means that the lines and their destination are concealed. WILSTED proposed that this will mean we can again use apartments since we can siphon off a line destined for use by another tenant in such a way that the phone company cannot trace its destination without tearing the building apart and we can then install a separate line to the building and hook up the subscriber to this line which, if checked, will belong to a legitimate subscriber.

5. One system which has been used effectively is to take one-half of two separate pairs which have one faulty line each. These two half pairs then form one good pair which we can use.

6. WILSTED explained that it cost about 3000 pesos to get a regular telephone. This entails the purchase of a telephone company bond, which later can be sold.

14-00000

7. Personnel involved in the tapping of the lines are:

Rene - who has access to the centrals. He contacts the following men:
Two brothers
Jose - does exchange connections.

8. The take from each basehouse is collected early in the morning before office hours by RAFANELLI. He only enters one basehouse which is occupied by an elderly couple. All other contacts are in automobiles made at different spots each day of the week. RAFANELLI then takes the material to a meeting between him, WILSTED and SECHEN where RAFANELLI turns the material over to SECHEN and they all discuss the problems and plans for the day.

9. According to WILSTED there is no live monitoring done by any of the basehouse keepers.

10. There follows a list of the basehouses and the lines covered at each base:

a) Calero 39 - formerly covered American commiss, now no lines. Being held for future use.

b) Juanacatlan 179 - Cuban residence
Russian Commercial
E. T. (Nicaraguan)

c) Atlixco 47 - 2 Polish
Seborer
Tropeta
Bekier

d) Tenanzingo - Cuban military office
Cuban Ambassador's office
Campos (travel agency)
1 spare

e) Aristoteles 30 - UAR
Ejercito Nacional 530 (name of person unknown)

f) Suderman & Horacio - facilities for three lines. Formerly processed the Czech lines. Now nothing but being held open.

g) Cuautla 131 - 3 Soviet Embassy (tapped in the Central)
1 Soviet propaganda office (tap in box)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM:

RID/

NOTE: In the absence of comments or indication of action taken, this cover sheet will be destroyed when the document is filed.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1.				
2.				
3. AC/WH/3		27/5/60		7
4. MEXICO/Hqs			31 V	
5. Burton				
6. Hughes				
7. Reports		1 June, 1 June, 2 June		mv
8. Br 4				
9. WH/FI		3 June	6	
10. Tarin C/OPS/WH		7 June		
11.			9 JUN 1960	
12. F/D Hbry		13 Jun	13 Jun	
13. SB/10 1700		15 JUN 1960	16 JUN 1960	
14.				
15.				
16. Remove from Project: CS Classification: JOB #				
17. Box: Fold:				
18.				
19. CH/FI/M				
20.				

COMMENTS

DESENSITIZED
per CSM 43-43

Copy

RECORD COPY

4 to 9&10: This is the first expanded Monthly Report since my visit to the station. The inclusion of this section on Exploited Leads marks a signal improvement over former monthly reports.

Nice

Copy detached

file

2(3)

ENCLOSURE | ABSTRACT | INDEX | FILE NUMBER

DATE MICROFILMED | DOCUMENT DATE | DOCUMENT NUMBER HMMA-14991

FORM 4-58 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET/[redacted]

HMMA-14991
[redacted]-1773

TO: Chief, WH Division

50-6-32/3

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

20 May 1960

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Monthly Report, April 1960

DESENSITIZED

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ACTION REQUIRED: Information only.

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHB-F 52-6-1, section V, paragraph 2 (d) (1):

a. Exploitation of Leads

1) The LIMERICK phase of the LIFEAT operation is able continuously to provide the interested case officers with background personality information on the members of the Soviet Embassy staff, as well as travel information on Soviet officials and diplomatic couriers. During the month of April 1960, this type of information was exploited for the following:

a) Viktor Nikolayevich GLOTOV, First Secretary, will be the replacement for Vladimir Georgiyevich NOVIKOV as Cultural Officer when the latter leaves for the USSR on 29 May 1960. He will also act as the Soviet Ambassador's executive secretary during the home leave of Vladimir Ivanovich CHERNYSHEV. CHERNYSHEV departed for leave on 17 April.

b) Nikolai ZHOUGANOV was the replacement for Anatoliy Konstantinovich YEMELYANOV, Commercial Office employee who works "upstairs" in the Chancellery rather than in the Commercial Office. This indicated that ZHOUGANOV may be a code clerk.

c) Confirmation that four aliens are employed in the Chancery as teachers, one of whom teaches English.

d) Indications of increased contact between the Soviet and Cuban officials as noted in the travel of Soviet officers to Havana and conversations between the Cuban Embassy and the Soviet Ambassador indicating an announcement of importance was to be made on 8 May, possibly concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the USSR.

e) Through the review of past LIFEAT traffic and the direct statements of the Soviet Embassy personnel in discussions of "duty rosters", it has been determined that a reduction in the Embassy staff is in progress. Future LIFEAT information should disclose whether this reduction is of a permanent or temporary nature.

f) Advance travel notice on Soviets such as CHERNYSHEV, NOVIKOV, Semeon FEDOROV, and couriers Vladimir BYKOV and Valentin KUZNETSOV.

LIFEAT/LIMERICK also revealed a serious rift which has developed between the Soviet Commercial Office and one of its primary commercial

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FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET [redacted]

X CONTINUED

contacts, Mony DESWAAN, over the latter's failure to pay the Soviets for two shipments of Russian farm tractors for which DESWAAN has received payment from the Mexican Government, the ultimate purchaser. LIFEAT indicates DESWAAN has made himself unavailable to the Soviets since two of his checks have "bounced" for lacks of funds. LIFEAT further noted that the Soviets are concerned over reports that DESWAAN is planning an early summer trip to Europe with his entire family.

LIMERICK provided valuable support to the Station's AEIMPULSE operation by furnishing detailed information on the DeSwaan and Esteve Brothers commercial dealings with the Soviets. It was also employed as a security device after the conclusion of the above operation.

Leads were provided on two properties of interest to the Soviets, Calle Mazatlan #208 and Calle Chilpancingo #13, which were a valuable contribution to the LIMESA Project.

II) LIFEAT/LITMUS was the source of information on the arrival in and departure from Mexico City of Polish officials Jozef WINEWICZ, former Polish Ambassador to Washington, and Boleslaw JELEN.

III) LIFEAT/LIERODE continued to provide excellent operational leads concerning Cuban and exile operations. Of particular note was the ability of Station Mexico to warn an ODACID officer of a possible "walk-in" provocation attempt by an agent of the Cuban Embassy. LIERODE also provided information on four American citizens who entered Mexico on their way to Honduras to join an anti-Somoza revolutionary attempt.

b. Processing of Material

Although the LIFEAT project must be considered primarily a Station support project, an effort to further exploit LIFEAT for positive intelligence has been made by assigning the assistant case officer the task of coordinating the efforts of the appropriate area case officers and the Station reports officer in matters concerning LIFEAT produced information. Although this system has been tested only during the month of April, it is hoped that it will prove of value in increasing the positive intelligence take from LIFEAT provided material.

No change was made in the manner of processing the raw LIFEAT reels during the month of April.

c. Liaison

As in the past, the only liaison connected with Project LIFEAT is in passing reels from coverage of the American Communists in Mexico to ODENVY for their processing. No other liaison is considered necessary or desireable.

d. Security

LIFEAT/LIVERY continued to remain out of operation due to the extensive telephone company installation and renovation work being carried on in the vicinity of the LIVERY basehouse. No definite date can be given for the completion of the telephone company work.

e. Technical

No change.

f. Coverage

LIMERICK	5 lines	
LITMUS	2 lines	
LIERODE and related lines	5 lines	(one terminated 27 April due to lack of value.)
American Communists	1 line	
Targets of Opportunity	2 lines	(one installed 1 April, and one installed 25 April.)

g. Personnel

No change.

2. a. During the month of April 1960, twenty-two (22) reels were passed to the local ODENVY office from LIFEAT coverage of American Communists in Mexico. Reels from the LIENVOY coverage of American Communist Sam BROOKS continued to be passed to ODENVY as LIFEAT material until 12 April at which time LIENVOY coverage of BROOKS was discontinued.

b. The following reports, cables, information dispatches, and memoranda were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT material during the month of April 1960:

HMM-4855
HMM-4857
HMM-4858
HMM-4876
HMM-4877
HMM-4879
HMM-4891
HMM-4892
HMM-4893
HMM-4895
HMM-4904 (via MEXI-5485)
HMM-4907 (via MEXI-5490)
HMM-4918 (via MEXI-5507)
HMM-4919 (via MEXI-5508)

HMMA-14762
HMMA-14843
HMMA-14855
HMMA-14885
HMMA-14892

MEXI-5373
MEXI-5424
MEXI-5435
MEXI-5441
MEXI-5451
MEXI-5453
MEXI-5463
MEXI-5467
MEXI-5494
MEXI-5496

c. Eleven (11) memoranda were passed to CDACID and ten (10) to ODENVY during the month of April 1960 which were based on LIFEAT acquired information.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

17 May 1960

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMA-14856 [redacted] 1764

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

TO : Chief, WH Division

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-6-32/3

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 20 April 1960

SUBJECT: - LIFEAT Monthly Report - March 1960

RE "A" (CHECK "X" ONE)
- MARKED FOR INDEXING
- X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: - Information only.

REFERENCE(S)

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHB-F 52-6-1, Section V, paragraph 2 (d) (l):

a. Exploitation of Leads.

LIMERICK continues to be extremely useful in providing background information on Soviet personalities for the SR case officer as well as movement reports on these personalities which are of interest to the local ODACID chief. The LIMERICK phase of LIFEAT also provided support to the Station's AEIMPULSE operation.

LITMUS provided information concerning the impending transfer of Polish Consul Tadeusz ZIOLKOWSKI.

LIERODE has provided important information enabling the Station to follow closely the defection of LITAG-1 as well as the ensuing reaction in the target establishment, and was employed as a security device and information media in the preparations for the defection of LITAINT-1.

LIFEAT provided excellent leads on Nicaraguan exile activities while also providing an independent check on agent LITANGO-1.

LIFEAT was employed for protective security in connection with the dismissal of LIVESTOCK-2 until 18 March, at which time it was decided that LIVESTOCK-2 no longer posed a threat to the Station's security.

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b. Processing of Material

No changes have been made in the processing of either LIFEAT reels or LIFEAT derived intelligence.

c. Liaison

No change.

d. Security

LIVERY remained out of operation due to the extensive telephone company renovation work being carried on in the vacinity of the LIVERY basehouse.

e. Technical

No change.

Remove from Project:
CS Classification:
JOB # 73-125/77
Box: 30 Fold: 6

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/[redacted]

[X] CONTINUED

PAGE NO. 1

50-6-32/3

f. Coverage

LIMERICK	5 lines
LITMUS	2 lines
LIERODE and related lines	5 lines
American Communists	1 line
Targets of Opportunity	3 lines (two of these lines terminated mid-March, and one terminated 3 March.)

g. Personnel

No change.

2. a) During March 1960, twenty-seven (27) reels were passed to ODENVY from LIFEAT coverage of American Communists in Mexico. Reels from the LIENVOY coverage of Sam BROOKS continued to be passed to ODENVY as LIFEAT material for their processing.

b) The following reports, cables, information dispatches, and memoranda were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT during the month of February 1960:

HMMA-14618	HMM-4803	MEXI-5267
HMMA-14624	HMM-4836	MEXI-5275
HMMA-14672	HMM-4843	MEXI-5283
HMMA-14677	HMM-4849	MEXI-5287
HMMA-14683		MEXI-5296
HMMA-14700		MEXI-5332
HMMA-14711		MEXI-5353
HMMA-14718		MEXI-5361
HMMA-14719		MEXI-5367
HMMA-14731		

Twenty-one (21) memoranda were passed to ODACID and one (1) to ODENVY during the month of March 1960 which were based on LIFEAT acquired information.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

19 April 1960

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMA-14688

[redacted] 1756

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico

DATE: 16 March 1960

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Monthly Report - February 1960

ACTION REQUIRED: Information only.

REFERENCE(S)

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

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1. The following report is submitted in accordance with FN 52-670, paragraph 3 (c) (2):

a. Processing of information

No changes have been made in the manner of processing LIFEAT material.

b. Exploitation of leads

LIMERICK provided the identitites of several contacts of RIS officer, Alexander PRIKHODKO. This coverage also revealed the possible sale of property located near the Soviet Embassy to the Soviets. LIMERICK further provided coverage of the activities of suspect RIS agent, Gabriel UKAEGBU. LIMERICK also provided support for the AEIMPULSE operation.

LIFEAT continued to be employed as a protective security aid in connection with the dismissal of LIVESTOCK-2.

LIERODE has provided an independent check on agent LITANGO-1, and coverage of Cuban intelligence operations. LIERODE also provided a lead on Santiago GARCES Arroyo, who is to establish a Cuban secret service.

c. Liaison

No change

d. Security

LIVERY continued to be out of operation due to telephone company renovation work in the vicinity of the LIVERY base house.

e. Technical

No new developments.

f. Personnel and Administration

Jeremy L. NIARCOS (p) reported to Mexico City Station to replace Gene F. BRADDOCK (p) as assistant case officer in the LIFEAT operation.

Remove from Project: [handwritten]
CS Classification: [handwritten]
JOB # [handwritten]
Box: [handwritten] Fold: [handwritten]

g. During February 1960, the following lines were in operation:

LIMERICK	5 lines
LITMUS	2 lines
LIERODE and related lines	5 lines
American Communists	1 line (coverage was resumed on 23 February)
Targets of Opportunity	1 line

2. During February 1960, seven (7) reels were passed to ODENVY from LIFEAT coverage of American Communists in Mexico. Reels from the LIENVOY coverage of Sam BROOKS, American Communist residing in Mexico City, were passed to ODENVY as LIFEAT material for their processing.

3. The following reports, cables, information dispatches, and memoranda were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT during the month of February 1960:

HMMA	MEXI	HMM
14448	5076	4761
14457	5079	4762
14458	5086	4768
14468	5088	4771
14504	5094	4790
14511	5155	
14512	5158	
14514	5160	
14517	5213	
14571	5221	

Twenty-three memoranda were passed to ODACID and six to ODENVY during February 1960 which were based on LIFEAT produced information.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. Curtis

15 March 1960

Distribution:
✓3 - WHD
2 - Files

50-6-32/3

DISPATCH

SECRET

HMMA-1751

TO: Chief, WHD

INFO:

DESENSITIZED per CSH 43-43

50-6-32/3

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico

March 1960

SUBJECT: Operational
LIFEAT Monthly Report - January 1960

ACTION REQUIRED: Information only

MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S): HMM-A-14403, 22 January 1960

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with FN 52-670 paragraph 3(c)(2):

A. Processing of Information

No changes have been made in the manner of processing LIFEAT material.

B. Exploitation of Leads

LIFEAT continues to be utilized as a protective security measure in connection with the dismissal of LIVESTOCK-2.

LIVERY provided several useful leads for the Case Officer.

LITMUS provided information enabling the Station to identify a safehouse presently used by the Polish IS.

LIERODE continues to be a major source of information regarding exile activities.

LIMERICK material provided information on Soviet communications which was forwarded to HQS for KUTUBE D processing.

C. Liaison

No change.

D. Security

LIVERY lines were suspended due to the activity of telephone company personnel involved in the installation of new cables in the area continuous to the LIVERY basehouse. No other security problems were encountered.

E. Technical

No new developments.

F. Personnel and Administration

No change.

G. Miscellaneous

During the month of January 1960 the following lines were in operation:

LIMERICK	5 lines
LITMUS	2 lines
LIVERY	2 lines(off for security reasons for a part of the month)
LIERODE and related lines	7 lines(one discontinued during this period)
American Communists	1 line(off on 13 January)

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Remove from Project: [illegible]
CS Classification: [illegible]
JOB # [illegible]
Box: 2 Fold: 3

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

SECRET

X CONTINUED

PAGE NO. 1

CS COPY

50-6-32/3

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CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	SECRET	HMMA-14573 [illegible]-1751

Eleven reels were given ODENVY from LIFEAT coverage of American Communists in addition to which reels from LIENVOY coverage of Sam BROOKS, American Communist, were also passed to ODENVY for processing as being LIFEAT material.

2. The following reports, dispatches, cables and memoranda were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT material during January 1960:

MEXI-4898	MEXI-4912	MEXI-4913	MEXI-4915	MEXI-4917
MEXI-4919	MEXI-4926	MEXI-4938	MEXI-4939	MEXI-4941
MEXI-4954	MEXI-4960	MEXI-4990	MEXI-5004	MEXI-5021
MEXI-5028	MEXI-5031			
HMMA-14355	HMMA-14372	HMMA-14392	HMMA-14393	HMMA-14394
HMMA-14403	HMMA-14411	HMMA-14415	HMMA-14417	HMMA-14421
HMMA-14317	HMMA-14418	HMMA-14422	HMMA-14425	HMMA-14433
HMMA-14436	HMMA-14444	HMMA-14448		
HMM-4703	HMM-4704	HMM-4706	HMM-4707	HMM-4710
HMM-4711	HMM-4712	HMM-4718	HMM-4724	HMM-4726
HMM-4729	HMM-4737	HMM-4742		

During the month of January 1960, nineteen memoranda were passed to ODACID, five to ODENVY and two each to ODIBEX, ODUNIT and ODOATH attaches which were based on LIFEAT information.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

26 February 1960

Distribution:

3 - HQS

5[illegible]-6-32/3

DISPATCH

SECRET/[redacted]

HMM-A-14403
[redacted]-1741

TO: Chief, WHD

INFO:

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

50-6-32/3

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico

DATE: 22 January 1960

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Monthly Report - December 1959

ACTION REQUIRED: Information only

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S): HMM A-14253, 15 Dec. 1959

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with FN 52-670, paragraph 3(c)(2);

A. Processing of Information

No changes have been made in the manner of processing LIFEAT material.

B. Exploitation of Leads

LIMERICK provided information for Station action and also through live-monitoring gave protection to personnel involved in the activity with the LUNIK.

LIFEAT is still being used as a protective security measure in connection with the dismissal of LIVESTOCK-2.

LIERODE has revealed the identities of Cuban agents on the outside, i.e., in an unofficial position.

LIVERY provided the CO with information used in the KACHTIK Operation. (HMM-A-14317, RYBAT-1300, 13 Jan. 1960.)

C. Liaison

No change.

D. Security

No problems encountered which have not been readily resolved by the personnel involved.

E. Technical

Nothing new to report.

F. Personnel and Administrative

No change.

G. Miscellaneous

During December 1959 the following lines were in operation:

LIMERICK	5 lines
LITMUS	2 lines
LIVERY	2 lines
LIERODE and related lines	6 lines
Targets of Opportunity	2 lines
American Communists	1 line

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Remove from Project:
CS Classification: 50-6-32/3
JOB # 63-125/77
Box: 32 Fold: 6

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET/[redacted]

X CONTINUED

PAGE NO. 1

50-6-32/3

2. During December 1959 thirty-one(31) reels were given ODENVY from LIFEAT coverage of American Communists in Mexico. Reels from the LIENVOY coverage of Sam BROOKS, American Communist, were passed to ODENVY as LIFEAT material for their processing.

3. The following reports, cables, information dispatches and memoranda were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT during December 1959:

HMM-A-14191
HMM-4667 HMM-4672 HMM-4691 HMM-4712
HMM-4678 HMM-4649 HMM-4640
MEXI-4734 MEXI-4735 MEXI-4773 MEXI-4789
MEXI-4792 MEXI-4814 MEXI-4831 MEXI-4842
MEXI-4844

Fifteen memoranda were passed to ODACID and five to ODENVY during December 1959 which were based on LIFEAT provided information.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

20 Jan. 1960

Distribution:

3 - HQS

SECRET

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: [redacted] Vol I
Development & Plans

INCLUSIVE DATES: 6 Jan 1965 - 2 Oct 1972

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: LAD/DDO
ROOM: 3C 34

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
26 MAY 78		DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
5 July 78		D. HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
21 JUL 1978		HARDWAY	Hardway
12/20/78		HARDWAY	Hardway
[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

SECRET

3-62 OP-61 (3-76)

14-00000

SECRET

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: KDAFGHAN Vol I
Development + Plans

INCLUSIVE DATES: 6 Jan 1965 - 2 Oct 1972

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: LAD/DDO

ROOM: 3C 34

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
24 MAY 78		DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
5 July 78		D HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
21 JUL 1978		HARDWAY	Hardway
12/20/78		HARDWAY	Hardway
12/21/78		[illegible]	Kark

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

SECRET

3-62 OP-61 (3-76)

E

RETIRED

Project Renewal Requests

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CONFIDENTIAL

NOTICE

THIS FILE HAS BEEN PROCESSED AND RETIRED. DO NOT ADD ANY DOCUMENTS TO THIS FOLDER. FORWARD CS DOCUMENTS THAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THIS FOLDER TO IP/RPU GE-58.

NOTICE

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 2-66 2593

(7-13)

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

SUBJECT AND PROJECT FILE REQUEST AND FIELD NOTIFICATION OF ACTION

FROM: (Headquarters component) WH/1

TO: IP/AN

TO: (Station/Base) MEXICO CITY

FROM: (Division) WHD

INFORMATION FOR REQUESTERS

COMPLETE ITEMS 1 THROUGH 12.

ITEM 3 - ALL FILE TITLES MUST BE STERILE SINCE THEY WILL APPEAR ON THE FIELD COPIES AND ON MACHINE LISTS.

ITEM 6 - ALL REMARKS MUST BE STERILE.

ITEM 7 AND 8 - USE FIRST THREE LETTERS OF DISPATCH SYMBOLS FOR FIELD STATIONS AND LIST HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED NUMERIC CODES.

ITEM 10 - ENTER OLD TITLE WHEN AMENDING A TITLE. CITE ANY FILES, SUCH AS 201 OR PROJECT FILES THAT ARE RELATED TO THE FILE COVERED BY THIS REQUEST. ITEM 10 MAY ALSO BE USED TO GIVE REASONS FOR THE ACTION BEING REQUESTED, TO IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF MATERIAL TO BE PLACED IN A FILE OR TO MAKE OTHER EXPLANATORY REMARKS.

ITEM 11 - A RECORDS OFFICER MUST SIGN ALL FILE ACTION REQUESTS. CONSULT YOUR RMO ON ANY PROBLEMS THAT ARISE.

INFORMATION CONCERNING FILE

1. TYPE OF FILE: [ ] SUBJECT [X] PROJECT

2. CODE (FILE) NUMBER: COUNTRY NUMBER 50; CATEGORY NUMBER 6; SPECIFIC SUBJECT NUMBER 122/1

3. FILE TITLE (SPECIFIC SUBJECT) (PROJECTS LIMITED TO 15 SPACES): KDAFGHAN Development & Plans

ACTION REQUIRED

4. ANALYSIS ACTION: OPEN FILE; [X] CLOSE FILE (INDICATE DISPOSITION); AMEND FILE TITLE; REOPEN

5. DISPOSITION: [X] RETAIN IP/ARD; DESTRUCTION RECOMMENDED THRU (DATE)

6. REMARKS (FOR FIELD DISTRIBUTION)

[struck out text]

7. INTERESTED STATIONS (PROJECTS ONLY): MEXI

8. INTERESTED HEADQUARTERS DESK (LIST ACTION DESK FIRST): 50

9. **FILES ACTION**: HOLD IN CS FILES; RESTRICTED; [X] UNRESTRICTED; PREPARE FOLDER AND SEND TO REQUESTER; CHARGE PERMANENTLY TO (OFFICER & DESK)

10. COMMENTS (INCLUDE SPECIAL HEADQUARTERS ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS)

VERIFIED

11. ENDORSEMENT — SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O.: Grace Palmer, #630

12. COORDINATION — SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. (WHEN APPLICABLE)

13. RID APPROVAL — REQUEST APPROVED BY: Charles D. Carner

EFFECTIVE DATE: 1 March 1973

CODE (FILE) NUMBER: 50 | 06 | 122/1

FORM 12-63 812 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS MFG 12-65

SECRET

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1—CS COPY

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S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE OF CRYPTONYM CHANGE - 20/04/71

KDAFGAN

FORMER CRYPTONYM - LIONION

CRYPTONYM CHANGE AUTHORIZED BY - ARMSTRONG (SC OR RID SECTION CHIEF)

COMPONENT - RID/AN

CABLE OR DOCUMENT REFERENCE (FROM ITEM 10 OF FORM 812) - HMMS-7138

N-O-T-I-C-E

THIS IS AN RID NOTICE OF A CHANGE IN FILE TITLE CRYPTONYM CAUSED BY COMPROMISE. IT IS TO BE PLACED IN THE FILE INDICATED AND TO REMAIN THEREIN AS A PERMANENT OFFICIAL CS RECORD.

S-E-C-R-E-T

FILE IN - 050-006-122/01

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: Termination of Project KDAFGHAN

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

The KDAFGHAN Project was officially terminated on 22 September 1972. The reason for termination was VWBLANKET contamination.

Edward K. LAUBOCKER

Distribution: 2-COS, Mexico City

CS COPY

E2, IMPDET
CL BY: 055272

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-19157	2 OCT 1972
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-122/1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	Perry Smith	md (27 Sept 72)	6954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/FI	27 Sept 72	[signature]
WH/Plans		[signature]

AN / AB / IN / PS / BX / DES / RFD / FI

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1		John C. Murray

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG. 11-69 (40)

DISPATCH

S E C R E T

20 September 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : Termination of Project KDAFGHAN

1. Project KDAFGHAN, approved for FY 72 and FY 73 in the amount of $11,950 each year, covered Mexico City Station's observation post targetted against the Cuban Embassy and Consulate in Mexico. OP operators KDAFGHAN-1 and his dependent mother KDAFGHAN-2, Cuban exiles resident in Mexico since 1960, were the only human assets in the project.

2. As a result of the JMYAK damage assessment and other security considerations it was decided that the project should be terminated and the agents resettled in another country. DIRECTOR 285255 amended the project for FY 72 to a total of $20,950 to provide for the termination and resettlement of the agents. The agents were terminated in August 72 and are now being resettled in Spain. DIRECTOR 300167 concurred in terminating the project as of 31 August 72.

3. In view of the developments in paragraph 2, above, WH/FI recommends approval of this termination request.

Robert D. Wiecha
C/WH/FI

SECRET

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM	KDAFGHAN
TYPE OF ACTION	X FI/FC
NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	
AMENDMENT NO.	
RENEWAL FY 19	
EXTENSION	
TERMINATION	XX
DIVISION	Western Hemisphere
FIELD STATION	Mexico
BRANCH	WH/1
DESK	
CASE OFFICER	John Davis
DATE	25 Aug 72
ROOM NO.	3E04
BUILDING	Hqs
TEL. EXT. RED	9424
TEL. EXT. BLACK	6924

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
C/WH/1	John C. Murray [signature] /Sd	29 Aug 72	29 Aug 72		X
C/WH/COG	Lawrence Sternfield [signature]	30 AUG 1972	30/8/72		X
C/WH/B&F	John T. Boeck [signature]	31 AUG. 72	1 Sept 72		
C/WH/SS	Richard B. Wright [signature]		1 Sept 72		
C/WH/FI	Robert D. Wiecha [signature]	Sept 21		✓	
C/WH/Plans	John D. Wilson [signature]	21 SEP 1972			✓

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

(Type in Organizational Element and Name Below Only When Concurrence Obtained by Originating Element.)

		DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL FUNDS AUTHORIZATION
		$	19	$
			19	$

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
C/WHD	[signature]	22/9/72

FORM 848 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS 5-69

SECRET

(5)

SECRET

25 August 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : Project KDAFGHAN Termination

1. A request for termination action is contained in paragraph four, herein.

2. Project KDAFGHAN is a support project which provides the Mexico City Station with fixed photographic and physical surveillance of the Cuban Embassy and Consulate in Mexico City. The objectives of the project are to furnish photographic coverage of the Cuban installation during daylight hours, to assist the Station in compiling dossiers on officials of the installation, and to fulfill various requirements in support of other Station Cuban operations. The KDAFGHAN project encompasses two assets, KDAFGHAN-1 and KDAFGHAN-2, who have been associated with the project since 1962.

3. While this project may be of some value to the FBI (FBI compares KDAFGHAN photographs with the photographs of known leaders of extremist groups in the U.S. as well as with photographs of persons who are subjects of identification orders prepared on badly wanted fugitives in the U.S.), it is of little value, as presently constituted, to Mexico City Station. There are other means of obtaining photographs of PCS and TDY Cuban personnel.

4. In early 1972 the Station mounted a thorough CI review of all Cuban operations in an attempt to improve their overall security. Although KDAFGHAN-1 passed the SGSWIRL with no apparent deception, his Cuban exile status, the long period of time he has been operating his OP site in close proximity to the Cuban Embassy, and the potential (perhaps immediate) danger presented by his and KDAFGHAN-2's Cuban relatives made

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 055272
WN-SISM

SECRET

it clear that the agents should be terminated. In view of the aforementioned, as well as security considerations in the JMYAK case, WH/1 requests approval to terminate this project effective 31 July 1972. In order to meet termination commitments, project KDAFGHAN was amended on 30 June 1972 by DIRECTOR 285255 in the amount of $9,000, increasing the project's authorization from $11,950 to $20,950 for FY 1972. KDAFGHAN-1 and KDAFGHAN-2 were terminated on 1 August 1972. There were no security incidents during the termination.

John C. Murray
C/WH/1

Murray:md

1972

SECRET

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CITE DIRECTOR 285255

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY

TYPAT PLUMYAK

REF: MEXICO CITY 20301 (IN 649510)

1. IN ORDER PROVIDE FOR COSTS OF AGENT TERMINATIONS FOLLOWING PROJECTS ARE AMENDED FOR FY 72:

A.	KDTUCK	$8,451	(NEW TOTAL $ 48,451)
B.	KDULSTER	10,500	(NEW TOTAL 20,350)
C.	KDADORN	7,136	(NEW TOTAL 22,856)
D.	KDAFGHAN	9,000	(NEW TOTAL 20,850)
E.	KDFACTOR	9,844	(NEW TOTAL 28,844)
F.	KDACROBAT	7,728	(NEW TOTAL 44,197)
G.	KDVAULT	6,296	(NEW TOTAL 15,420)
H.	KDCALVERT	80,950	(NEW TOTAL 160,950)
I.	KDLADDER	1,040	(NEW TOTAL 17,552)
J.	KDABSCOND	3,150	(NEW TOTAL 24,785)
K.	KDADAGE	21,354	(NEW TOTAL 72,921)

(CONTINUED)

SECRET

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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 28525

PAGE 2

L. KDRAIL 2,400 (NEW TOTAL 10,400)

M. KDPACIFY 1,800 (NEW TOTAL 7,800)

N. KDSALEM 8,800 (NEW TOTAL 31,200)

2. FILE: 50-6-128/1, 50-6-89/1, 50-6-80/1, 50-6-122/1, 50-6-74/1, 50-6-114/1, 50-6-58/1, 50-6-72/1, 50-6-131/1, 50-125-27/1, 50-6-144/1, 50-6-126/1, 50-6-110/1, 50-6-38/1. EX-2 APDIR WH-[illegible]

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/1

WH/SS

WH/B&F

C/MPS/BG

C/WH/[illegible]

DDP

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: Project KDAFGHAN Renewal FY 1972 and FY 1973

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

The Project KDAFGHAN Renewal for the period 1 July 1971 to 30 June 1973 was approved by the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division on 29 June 1971 in the amount of $11,950 for FY 1972 and $11,950 for FY 1973.

Roger W. Bicego
Roger W. BICEGO

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-18507

DATE: 2 JUL 1971

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-122/1

Internal Dist:
1 - RI
1 - Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1/John Davis/kk/30 June 71			6955

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH 1	30-6-71	John C. Murray

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

14-00000

SECRET

(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

CRYPTONYM: KDAFGHAN

TYPE OF ACTION		
NEW PROJECT APPROVAL		DIVISION: Western Hemisphere Division
AMENDMENT NO.		FIELD STATION: Mexico City
RENEWAL FY 1973	X	BRANCH: WH/1 — DESK: WH/1
EXTENSION		CASE OFFICER: John Davis — DATE: 16 June 71
TERMINATION		ROOM NO.: 3 E 04 — BUILDING: Hqs — TEL. EXT.: RED 9354, BLACK 6955

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (And Signature)	DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
C/WH/1	John C. Murray	16/6/71	16/6/71		
C/WH/COG	Lawrence Sternfield	17 June 71			✓
C/WH/B&F	for L. O. Healy	17 Jun 71	6-17-71		
C/WH/SS	Richard B. Wright		6-23-71		✓
C/WH/FI	Richard S. Welch		6/25/71		
C/WH/Plans	John R. Cassidy	28 JUN 1971	28 JUN 1971		

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

(Type in Organizational Element and Name Below Only When Concurrence Obtained by Originating Element.)

		DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL FUNDS AUTHORIZATION
1 July 71	30 June 73	$23,900	1972	$11,950
			1973	$11,950

APPROVING AUTHORITY: C/WHD for

SIGNATURE: [signature]

DATE: 29 JUN 1971

FORM 848 5-69 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(5)

KDAFGHAN - Mexico City, Mexico - FI/CI Support Project Targetted Against the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. FY 1972 Cost: $11,950. FY 1973 Cost: $11,950.

KDAFGHAN Project Finance History

	APPROVED	OBLIGATED
FY 1970	$11,165	$11,165
FY 1971	$11,094	$11,094

Purpose

KDAFGHAN is a support project which provides the Mexico City Station with fixed photographic and physical surveillance of the Cuban Embassy and Consulate in Mexico City. The objectives of the project are to furnish photographic coverage of the Cuban installation during daylight hours, to assist the Station in compiling dossiers on officials of the installation and to fulfill various requirements in support of other Station Cuban operations.

Description

The KDAFGHAN Project continues to encompass two assets, KDAFGHAN-1 and KDAFGHAN-2, who have been associated with the project since 1962. Both agents continue to furnish information on a timely basis on the personalities and activities of the Cuban target. A description of the individual assets is set forth below:

a. KDAFGHAN-1 (201-288248): A Cuban lawyer in exile in Mexico who left Cuba in 1960. He has been the principal agent of the KDAFGHAN Project since 1962. KDAFGHAN-1's cover is that of a translator and would-be writer. Family holdings from his deceased father also provide financial backstopping. All photographic coverage of the main Embassy gate through final printing and mounting is processed by KDAFGHAN-1.

b. KDAFGHAN-2 (201-305604): KDAFGHAN-2 is the mother of KDAFGHAN-1. Her cover is that of a dependent mother. KDAFGHAN-2 acts as KDAFGHAN-1's assistant and fill-in whenever he is away from the basehouse.

Changes

The only major change during the project year was the installation of a TV monitor/robot camera combination during October 1970, the month designated as "Cuban month." This added coverage contributed to the compilation of target studies on several Cuban officials. These studies will be used as a starting point for future operations, namely the recruitment/defection of these officials.

Accomplishments

1. The main value of the production of the KDAFGHAN Project has been in establisning the pattern of various Cuban Embassy employees. The monitoring has also revealed which automobiles the various employees usually drive. Photographic coverage of the visitors to the main gate of the Cuban Embassy and logs of the movement of Cuban Embassy personnel have proved very useful in identifying new Cuban PCS employees in Mexico. Normally the Station has been able to match movements of new and old employees during the initial period when duties and contacts were being turned over to the new employees and so identify their duties. KDAFGHAN has provided current photographs of TDY and transiting Cuban officials and Headquarters has often provided positive identifications of these persons. Norberto Hernandez, a DGI headquarters officer visiting Mexico, was identified in this way.

2. The Station utilizes KDAFGHAN photographic coverage and logs to verify the visits of Station assets to the Cuban Embassy.

3. KDAFGHAN also provides coverage of what appears to be American visitors to the Cuban Embassy main gate. In the case of Americans who arrive in automobiles bearing U.S. license plates, the license plate number, car description, and sterile copies of photographs are given to the FBI for identification. A significant result of the KDAFGHAN operation included a photographic of a specific individual - an old FBI target - who had been seen visiting the Cuban installation.

4. KDAFGHAN also provided useful coverage for the KDACOUSTIC-3 operation, an operation aimed at the recruitment or defection of a DGI officer. This coverage enabled the Station to determine KDACOUSTIC-3's movements, an important factor in timing the calls and visits of our access agents. This use of the operation should prove extremely valuable during the coming year since a more aggressive recruitment program against the Cuban target is planned.

Problems and Security

No agent control or operational problems have been reported. Neither were there any security problems encountered during the period. Gerald D. FAHLANGER continues to be the Case Officer and handler of KDAFGHAN-1. FAHLANGER has met and could continue to meet KDAFGHAN-2 in an emergency. The alternate Case Officer is Terence D. SISTONE who meets KDAFGHAN-1 when FAHLANGER is not available. Both Case Officers are known to the assets in alias, and both meet KDAFGHAN-1 in a safehouse. During February 1971 the safehouse was changed in compliance with normal operational security. Meetings are generally held once a week. More frequent contact can be made by telephone. In an emergency, anyone can call KDAFGHAN-1 at his home and say they are a friend of "Pepe Simon." KDAFGHAN-1 will reply "I haven't seen him since last Christmas." KDAFGHAN-1 speaks English.

Coordination:

The Ambassador is aware of our efforts against the Cuban target in general. He has not been specifically briefed on this operation.

Future Plans:

The Station is constantly examining the possibility of an audio installation at the main gate of the Cuban Embassy. A successful audio device would serve, in most cases, to identify the individuals who are photographed by KDAFGHAN-1 since they normally identify themselves to the gate house attendant. There are a few Station assets who have occasional access to the gate house, and it is conceivable that one of them could place a quick plant device, provided security conditions are favorable. The Station currently has under consideration a recruitment effort against a lower level employee of the Cuban Embassy who would be of tremendous help in such an operation.

Costs:

1. General: This renewal request is for FY 1972 in the amount of $11,950 and FY 1973 in the amount of $11,950.

2. Source of Funds: Project KDAFGHAN is included in the Western Hemisphere Division's Operating Program in the amount of $10,844 for FY 1972 and $10,844 for FY 1973. The additional Funds required are to be absorbed from within the WH Division allocation.

3. Project Budget: The following is a cost breakdown for the preceding, current, and next fiscal years:

	FY 1971 Obligations (Estimated)	FY 1972 Request	FY 1973 Projection	FY 1974 Projection
KDAFGHAN-1 Salary	$ 4,800	$ 5,088*	$ 5,088	$ 5,088
KDAFGHAN-2 Salary	1,920	2,112*	2,112	2,112
Christmas Bonus	560	600*	600*	600
KDAFGHAN Basehouse Rent (Observation Post)	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200
KDAFGHAN Safehouse (for Station meetings with KDAFGHAN-1)	864	1,200	1,200	1,200
Utilities for Safehouse and Basehouse	500	500	500	500
Miscellaneous Expenses (film, paper, chemicals, stationary)	1,250	1,250	1,250	1,250
TOTALS	$11,094	$11,950	$11,950	$11,950

*Increases reflect the "cost-of-living" granted effective 1 January 1971.

4. Foreign Currency: There are no special requirements for foreign currency.

5. Commitments: Upon termination, the agents will be paid a termination bonus not to exceed three month's salary.

6. Funding: Case officers pay the assets directly. The funds are accounted for with end receipts obtained from the assets. KDAFGHAN-1 has sufficient private income to cover the JKLANCE funds he receives.

7. Accountability: All funds are accounted for by receipts and/or certifications as required by Agency regulations.

Annexes:

None.

DISPATCH

SECRET

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: Project LIONION Renewal FY 1971

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. The Project LIONION Renewal for FY 1971 was approved by the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division on 26 June 1970 in the amount of $11,094. A copy of the Renewal is being forwarded by split transmission.

Douglas F. TASSELL

Attachments:
A) Left Side h/w
B) Center u/s/c via split transmission
C) Right Side u/s/c via split transmission

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS, Mexico City w/att h/w & u/s/c via split transmission

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-17977	1 JUL 1970 30 June 1970
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-122/1

RI - 1
CHRONO - 1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	Scott Holloway	nh	6924

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1		John C. Murray

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM: LIONION

TYPE OF ACTION	X	FI/C		CA	
NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION: Western Hemisphere Division				
AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION: Mexico City				
X RENEWAL FY 1971	BRANCH: One		DESK:		
EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER: Fred Kravcov			DATE: 24 June 70	
TERMINATION	ROOM NO.: 3E04	BUILDING: Hqs	TEL. EXT.:	RED: 9041	BLACK: 6954

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
AC/WH/1	Charles M. Bounds (signed)	24 June	24 June		
AC/WH/B&F	Wyatt B. Thompson (signed)	6/24	6/25		
C/WH/SS	Richard B. Wright (signed)		6-25-70		✓
C/WH/FI	Richard S. Welch (signed)		26/6/70		
C/WH/Plans	Robert B. Moore (signed)	26 JUN 1970	6/26		

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

(Type in Organizational Element and Name Below Only When Concurrence Obtained by Originating Element.)

		DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL FUNDS AUTHORIZATION
1 July 1970	30 June 1971	$ 11,094	1971	$ 11,094
			19	$

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
C/WHD	(signed)	[illegible] JUN 1970

FORM 5-69 648 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(5)

14-00000

LIONION - Mexico City, Mexico - FI/CI Support Project Targetted Against the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. FY 1971 Cost $11,094.

	Approved	Obligated
1966	$10,718	$ 9,142
1967	11,328	11,590
1968	11,466	9,726
1969	11,258	10,803
1970	11,994	10,844 (Estimated)

Purpose:

The LIONION Project provides the Mexico City Station with fixed, selective photographic and physical surveillance of the Cuban Embassy and Cuban Consulate in Mexico City. It is designed to provide information in support of Priority A, paragraphs 2 and 4 of the current Operating Directive, that is, the Cuban target present in Mexico and the support rendered by Cubans in Mexico to exile and other leftist groups in Mexico.

Description:

1. The LIONION Project currently encompasses two agents, LIONION/1 and LIONION/2, a basehouse directly across from the Cuban compound, and a safehouse for meetings with Station Case Officers. The two agents furnish photographic coverage during daylight hours of the main entrance to the Cuban Embassy. In addition, on a spot basis, photographic coverage and visual surveillance of the Cuban Consulate entrance is possible. The agents also act as dispatchers for the unilateral LIEMBRACE surveillance team when the LIEMBRACE team is being used against Cuban target individuals. A description of the individual assets is set forth below.

2. LIONION/1 (201-288248): A Cuban lawyer in exile in Mexico who left Cuba in 1960. He has been the principal agent of the LIONION Project since 1962. LIONION/1's cover is that of a translator and would-be writer. Family holdings in

Tampa, Florida, inherited from his deceased father also provide financial backstopping. LIONION/1 received his "immigrado" (permanent immigrant) status in 1965 and now has a good deal of immunity from harassment from Mexican immigration authorities. All photographic coverage of the main Embassy gate through final printing, cropping, and mounting is processed by LIONION/1. LIONION/1 and LIONION/2 maintain a log which indicates when a photograph was taken, and pertinent identifying data. License numbers of cars used by various Cuban Embassy personnel are recorded as well as license numbers of cars of unidentified persons visiting the Cuban Embassy.

3. LIONION/2 (201-305604): Mother of LIONION/1. Her cover is that of a dependent mother. As with LIONION/1, she has "immigrado" status and has been associated with the LIONION Project since 1962. LIONION/2 acts as LIONION/1's assistant and fill-in whenever he is away from the LIONION basehouse.

Changes:

During the project year, the pulse camera coverage of the Cuban Consulate entrance was discontinued. Little or no use was being made of the product from this camera. One reason for limited use was that there was no real way to readily fix the time--or the day-- a particular photo was taken. There were no other significant changes in the project during FY 1970.

Accomplishments:

1. The LIONION production for FY 1970 consisted almost entirely of photographic coverage of visitors to the Cuban Embassy main entrance and of logs of the movement of Cuban Embassy personnel and visitors. This proved very useful in identifying new Cuban Embassy PCS employees in Mexico. The monitoring also revealed which cars the various employees usually drove.

2. LIONION also took photographs of what appeared to be American visitors to the Cuban Embassy front gate. In the case of Americans who arrived in automobiles bearing U.S. license plates, the license plate numbers, car descriptions, and sterile copies of photographs were given to LNERGO for identification.

3. The Station also used the LIONION photographic coverage and log to check on the reports of Mexican and other JKLANCE assets who claimed to have visited the Cuban Embassy. In the case of some assets, LIONION/1 was given a photograph of the agent and told to be particularly alert at certain times of certain days to confirm the agent's entry and exit. This proved particularly useful in checking AVDIME/1's story of contact with the Cubans. It also confirmed LIRELIC/1's visit to the Cuban Embassy at an early stage in Station recontact with LIRELIC/1.

Problems:

1. No agent control or operational problems have been reported. Neither were there any security problems encountered during the period. LIONION/1 was met in a safehouse on an average of once per week by Andrew E. PELLEMENT, in alias. Following PELLEMENT's departure in late May, Gerald D. FAHLANGER took over the responsibility for the LIONION Project. FAHLANGER, in alias, meets LIONION/1 approximately once per week. In January 1970, the Station had LIONION/1 change the safehouse used for meetings with Station officers. He signed a one-year lease on the new apartment, in alias. LIONION/1 uses the apartment on weekends and evenings to lend credence to the cover story he used in renting; i.e., that he lives out-of-town and maintains this small apartment in Mexico City for use during his frequent visits.

2. Station visits to the LIONION basehouse were limited to three during the reporting period. These were made during non-daylight hours. LIONION/1 picked up the Station officer away from the LIONION basehouse area and drove the officer to the basehouse in LIONION/1's own car. The basehouse has a driveway off the street entrance-way which facilitates entry during non-daylight hours.

3. During the Project Year, the pulse camera and the electronic equipment used with the LISAMPAN operations were removed from the basehouse, thus reducing the amount of compromising equipment in the basehouse.

14-00000

Coordination:

The Ambassador is aware of our efforts against the Cuban target in general. He has not been specifically briefed on this operation.

Future Plans:

1. The Station is re-examining the various points of view which the LIONION basehouse provides of the Cuban Embassy complex in order to determine what steps can be taken to improve the usefulness of the LIONION product. For instance, from the window in the room where the pulse camera previously was installed, an excellent view can be had of the Cuban Embassy garden and the walkways between the three Cuban Embassy buildings--as well as the Consulate. The Station plans to have LIONION/1, on a spot-check basis, observe the garden area. In this way, the Station hopes to update its information on the location of the various officers' offices, the general pattern of movement and activity, etc. This area will also be observed during the night to see if it can be determined which areas are being used for living quarters or offices.

2. It is also planned to assess LIONION/1's ability to observe and draw appropriate conclusions from his observations, and to write these up for the Station.

3. Depending on the need for Consulate coverage, the installation of closed circuit TV coverage of the Consulate entrance is being considered.

4. The Station is being queried as to emergency contact arrangements with LIONION/1.

Costs:

1. General: This renewal request is for the period 1 July 1970 through 30 June 1971 (FY 1971), in the amount of $11,094.

2. Source of Funds: Project LIONION is included in the Western Hemisphere Division's FY 1971 Operating Program in the amount of $10,000.

3. Project Budget: The following is a cost breakdown for the preceding, current and next fiscal years:

	FY 1970 Estimated Obligations	FY 1971 Request	FY 1972 Projection
LIONION/1 Salary	$ 4,800	$ 4,800	$ 4,800
LIONION/2 Salary	1,920	1,920	1,920
Christmas Bonuses	560	560	560
LIONION Basehouse Rent (Observation Post)	1,200	1,200	1,200
LIONION Safehouse (for meeting with case officers)	864	864	864
Utilities for both	500	500	500
Miscellaneous Expenses (Film, paper, chemicals, etc.)	1,000	1,250	1,000
TOTALS	$10,844	$11,094	$10,844

4. Foreign Currency: There is no need for foreign currency which the Station cannot provide. There are no non-JKLANCE funds involved in this project.

5. Commitments: LIONION/1 and LIONION/2 receive, in addition to their regular salary, the equivalent of one month's salary as a Christmas bonus. LIONION/1 is reimbursed for operational expenses related to the project. In the event of termination, each agent will receive thirty days actual notice.

6. Funding: All funds are passed by the case officers during the safehouse meetings with LIONION/1 who receipts for the funds on the spot. The amount of funds used under this project are not enough to arouse the suspicion of LIONION/1 by the authorities should he be apprehended. He has sufficient private income to cover the JKLANCE funds he receives.

7. Accounting: All funds are accounted and certified for in accordance with JKLANCE regulations.

8. Annexes: None.

14-00000

ORIG: CMBOUNDS
UNIT: WH/1/R
EXT: 6924/9424
DATE: 8 September 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 21

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 21 PER

INDEX / NO INDEX / RETURN TO BRANCH / FILE RID / FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH-8 INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, TSD-6, FI-2

SECRET

00 23 46Z SEP 69

CITE DIRECTOR 36226

TO MEXICO CITY

LIONION

REF: MEXICO CITY 1132 (IN 19170)*

1. IN ORDER ASSIST HEADQUARTERS EVALUATION LIONION PULSE CAMERA COVERAGE WOULD APPRECIATE STATION ADVICE FOLLOWING:

A. IF NO VISITORS ENTERING LIRING MAIN GATE, DOES LIONION/1 AUTOMATICALLY SHIFT AND COVER LIRING CONSULATE EVEN THOUGH CONSULATE BEING COVERED BY PULSE CAMERA?

B. IF INDIVIDUAL ATTEMPTS ENTER MAIN GATE AND THEN PROCEEDS TO CONSULATE, DOES LIONION/1 FOLLOW AND PHOTO ENTERING AND DEPARTING CONSULATE?

C. WHAT IS STATION'S ESTIMATE OF PERCENTAGE OF LIONION/1 COVERAGE OF INDIVIDUALS ENTERING AND DEPARTING CONSULATE? FROM PAST CORRESPONDENCE HEADQUARTERS HAS GAINED IMPRESSION LIONION/1 COVERS CONSULATE AS EFFECTIVELY AS PULSE CAMERA.

D. IS LIONION/1 STILL LOCATED SAME BASEHOUSE AS PULSE CAMERA?

AN / AB / IN / PS / BX / DES / FI / WH/1

50-6-122/1

08 Sep 69

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☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF:
RID/E FILE, VR.

PAGE TWO
(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 36226

TO

2. FILE: 50-6-122/1.

END OF MESSAGE

* WH Comment: Station advised presently obtains many pictures of LIRING Consulate visitors since most first time visitors try enter through main gate which primary LIONION photo target.

William V. Broe
C/WHD

CI/SO

AC/WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ACTION: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, PI/AN, CI, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS, FI 2, TSD 6

#203

SECRET 072247Z AUG 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 1132

DIRECTOR

7 Aug 69 IN 18170

LIONION

1. IN ATTEMPT ELIMINATE MARGINAL OPS, STATION INTENDS TERMINATE LIONION-1 PULSE CAMERA COVERAGE EFFECTIVE 1 SEPTEMBER UNLESS HQS INDICATES IT CONSIDERS PRODUCT OF SUFFICIENT VALUE TO WARRANT RETENTION. STATION PRESENTLY OBTAINS MANY PICTURES OF LIRING CONSULATE VISITORS SINCE MOST FIRST-TIME LIRING VISITORS TRY ENTER THROUGH MAIN GATE WHICH PRIMARY TARGET LIONION PHOTO COVERAGE. ALSO MANY CONSULATE VISITORS LATER PHOTOGRAPHED AT AIRPORT. IT NOT POSSIBLE HAVE LIONION-1 COVER BOTH ENTRANCES SIMULTANEOUSLY, BUT HE ABLE MOVE EQUIPMENT TO COVER CONSULATE IF NEED ARISES.

2. FILE 50-6-122/3.

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50-6-122/1
07 AUG 69

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: LIONION Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMA-37024, 25 April 1969

Project LIONION has been renewed for FY 1970 in the amount of $11,994, as forwarded by the Station.

Norris W. DAMICONE

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
CS COPY	HMMW-17364	8 July 1969 (11 JUL 1969)
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-122/1

RI - 1
CHRONO - 1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1/A1	Malone	cms	4167

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC WH/1	8 Jul 69	Ernest J. Tsikerdanos

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM: LIONION

TYPE OF ACTION		X FI/CI		CA		OTHER
	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION: Western Hemisphere Division				
	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION: Mexico City				
X	RENEWAL FY 1970	BRANCH: One		DESK		
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER: Al Malone		DATE: 16 June 69		
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO.: 3E04	BUILDING: Hqs.	TEL. EXT.	RED: 1973	BLACK: 4167

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
AC/WH/1	Ernest J. Tsikerdanos	16/6/69	17/6/69	✓	
C/WH/B&F	Elliotte C. Want	6/17	6/17		
C/WH/SS	George R. Thompson	18 JUN 1969			
AC/WH/FI	David L. Smock	21 June 69		✓	
WH/EXO	Donald C. Marelius	23 JUN 1969	26 June		

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

		DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL AMOUNT
1 July 69	30 June 70	$ 11,994	1970	$11,994
			196	$

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
C/WHD	[signature]	5 JUL 1969

FORM 12-64 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

16 June 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : LIONION Project Renewal Request

1. Approval is requested of the LIONION Project for the period 1 July 1969 through 30 June 1970 (FY 1970) for $11,994. Funds are available.

2. Project LIONION is a support project which provides the Mexico City Station with fixed photographic and physical surveillance of the Cuban Embassy and Consulate in Mexico City. The surveillance is conducted by two indigenous agents located in a basehouse directly across from the Cuban compound. At times the principal agent also acts as a dispatcher for the LIEMBRACE surveillance team. Information is radioed to the team concerning the departure of Cuban officials, thus allowing the team to remain a more discreet distance from the target.

3. As reflected in the attached Project Renewal, an audio device planted in the gatehouse of the compound could be monitored at the LIONION basehouse, aiding greatly in identifying visitors. Since the time the Station submitted the renewal, however, this device ceased to function along with the rest of the LISAMPAN devices. This installation was monitored through carrier current from the LISAMPAN/LISASH basehouse, also situated in front of the compound. Since the connection between the two basehouses was by carrier current only, and since the agents in each basehouse are unaware of the other's activity, a possible compromise of the LISAMPAN/LISASH activity should not affect LIONION security.

4. Although the LIONION Project does not produce disseminable positive intelligence, it is considered by the Station as essential to its Cuban operations. The 4,100 or more selective individual photographs produced annually,

coupled with the visual observations, were effective in providing timely operational information. In addition, over 8,000 feet of pulse camera film is produced annually, recording the image of each visitor to the Consulate. The years of experience of the principal agent have given him intimate knowledge of the target personalities. He often brings matters to the immediate attention of the Station without having been levied the specific requirement to do so. As a result, the Station is aided greatly in keeping abreast of the day to day activities of the Cuban compound.

5. In recent months, the LIONION Project was useful to the Station in checking out statements made by ESMARROW-1.

6. In March 1969, the Project provided photos of three U.S. citizens who visited the Cuban Embassy and were suspected of being draft dodgers. The photos were passed to the FBI within three hours of the request for information.

7. Other than the loss of the audio device in gatehouse, there have been no changes. The operation continues to run smoothly.

8. Approval is recommended.

Ernest J. Tsikerdanos
Acting Chief, WH/1

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
TO Chief, WH Division		MARKED FOR INDEXING
	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM

SUBJECT Operational/LIONION
LIONION Project Renewal for FY 1970

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Renewal of Project

Reference : HMMW-17154, 11 April 1969

1. Attached is the Station's renewal request for Project LIONION. The Project should be submitted for renewal for the period 1 July 1969 through 30 June 1970 for a total of $11,994.

2. Information concerning the performance of LIONION-1 and the project operations during the second and third quarters of FY 1969 has been elaborated, and a separate LIONION Progress Report for this period will not be prepared. The Station will submit a regular progress report to cover the period 1 April through 30 June 1969 in July 1969.

For Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
1. Renewal, right side; h/w
2. Renewal, left side, u/s/c

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/att - 2 copies)

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 37024	25 April 1969
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	50-6-122/1

SECRET

LIONICH PROJECT RENEWAL REQUEST

Project LIONICH

Station Mexico City

Field Case Officer Andrew E. PELLEMENT

Chief of Station Willard C. CURTIS

FORWARDED BY SPLIT TRANSMISSION
NO FIELD DISSEMINATION

SECRET

S/c att: 1
HMMA-37024

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50-6-16

SECRET

LIONION PROJECT RENEWAL

A. Objectives

1. Project LIONION, a long-term support project designed to provide fixed photographic, technical, and physical surveillance of the PBRUMEN Embassy and Consulate in Mexico City, has the following specific objectives:

a. To furnish photographic coverage during daylight hours of the main entrances to the target installation.

b. To operate as a listening post in support of technical operations against this target to complement the photographic coverage.

c. To radio dispatch physical surveillance teams against persons associated with the target.

d. To assist the Station in compiling information for individual dossiers on officials of the target installation.

e. To fulfill various requirements in support of other Station PBRUMEN operations.

2. The above-cited objectives are in agreement with the over-all objectives of Station Mexico City.

B. Changes

Oliver D. CIMOCH assumed administrative and operational responsibility for Project LIONION in December 1967 and continued this responsibility until his departure in December 1968. Pending arrival of CIMOCH's replacement, the Project was handled by Station Officer Gerald D. FAHLANGER and Station WOACRE representative, Walter W. CORNBURY. On 28 February 1969, LIONION-1 was introduced to Andrew E. PELLEMENT, who assumed Project responsibility effective that date.

C. Intelligence Production

As an operational support project, Project LIONION does not produce disseminable positive intelligence. Quantitatively, during CY 1968, the Project provided over 4,000 selective individual photographs of persons and/or vehicles entering the target installation and over 8,000 feet of pulse camera film. There has

SECRET

been no formal audio product from Project LIONION since July 1968 when the transcription of the LISAMPAN/DOG traffic was terminated. As reported extensively in HMMA 36553, 19 February 1969, the Station has been unable to activate LISAMPAN/BAKER since 16 January 1969. A qualitative analysis of the LIONION product is discussed in paragraph D below. The Station is unable to evaluate the worth of the pulse camera operation since the bulk film, undeveloped, is pouched directly to Headquarters. The cost of this portion of the operation is minimal, however, since it is limited to the cost of the film and development at Headquarters. The camera works automatically and requires only minimal maintenance.

D. Effectiveness

1. Project LIONION is considered by Station Mexico City as essential to its PBRUMEN operations. It has consistently proven highly effective and responsive to Station requirements of both long and short range nature. LIONION-1, the Project's only full time agent, continues to furnish on a timely basis, information on the personalities and activities of the target personnel. LIONION-2 continues to backstop LIONION-1 and substitute for him when he is away from his post. At the age of 70, she is not able to man the LIONION base full time, and her sight is failing. She is able to photograph visitors, however, and live monitor the LISAMPAN/DOG traffic. LIONION-2's role as a backstop to LIONION-1 insures continuous coverage of the target during daylight hours, five days a week. LIONION-1's more than six years of experience working on the same target continue to produce an increasingly complete and accurate identification of the staff and visitors to LIRING. These years of experience have developed an agent knowledgeable of WOFIRM operational and security requirements who will often bring to the Station's attention those matters which he feels are of immediate interest without having special requirements levied upon him and without waiting for the next regularly scheduled meeting with his Station contact. He has on numerous occasions notified the Station of the presence of suspect PBRUMEN security types. He has also frequently passed along operational leads of use to the Station in other aspects of its PBRUMEN operations.

2. The addition of LISAMPAN/DOG to the LIONION basehouse has noticeably increased LIONION-1's ability to identify new visitors to the target and at times, determine the nature of their business. The LISAMPAN/DOG product was channeled to the LIONION basehouse by carrier current from LISAMPAN/LISASH on 10 April 1968. Since its primary value is as an aid to LIONION-1 in identifying LIRING visitors, its product has not been recorded

or transcribed since July 1968. LIONION-1 live monitors the traffic from his basehouse. LISAMPAN-1 who mans the LISASH base has been told nothing of the LIONION base and LIONION-1 was offered no explanation concerning the manner in which LISAMPAN/DOG production is channeled to him. Thus a possible compromise of the LISASH basehouse, linked directly to LIRING, would not compromise the LIONION basehouse which has no direct link with the target.

3. Project LIONION was of direct assistance to the Station on two separate occasions in recent months:

a. As a result of information received on a priority basis (the same day as requested) from LIONION-1, the Station was able to verify certain statements made by ESMARROW-1 concerning the location of LIRING officials at specific times. LIONION-1 reported the times at which these officials came in and out of the LIRING compound and provided a description of the clothes they were wearing at the time. LIONION-1's information raised the possibility that ESMARROW-1 might at least have been confused in his reporting of the times at which he met LIRING personnel, etc.

b. In March 1969, LIONION-1 was able to provide pictures of three WOLADY males, who, although unidentified, fitted the general description and time frame furnished by LNERGO. The latter suspected that two or three WOLADY draft dodgers might visit LIRING to arrange travel to PBRUMEN. The Station was able to furnish LNERGO with pictures of the three together with a report of their arrival and departure from LIRING within three hours of its request for information. Additional information was promptly forwarded to LNERGO as it became available from LIONION-1.

4. During the past year, LIONION-1 acted as a dispatcher for the LIEMBRACE surveillance team on a number of occasions. By utilizing his vantage point in the area of the target, he is able to radio information to the LIEMBRACE team on the arrival and departure of LIRING officials thus allowing the team to remain at a distance from the target unseen by possible counter-surveillance from the target. The Station plans to use LIONION-1 in this role more extensively in the coming year whenever surveillance of LIRING personnel entails the team's presence near the LIRING compound. Such utilization of LIONION-1 should lessen the risk of exposure of the team to the PBRUMEN IS.

5. LIONION-1, himself, continues to provide the consistently high level of productivity that has characterized his work in past years. As mentioned above his response to priority requirements continues to be most gratifying. He is prompt in submitting both operational and administrative reports to the Station. He is ready, at a moments notice, to change personal plans when a need for his services arises. After five years without a substantial vacation, LIONION-1 plans a three week trip from 4 - 25 May to Europe (Italy, Greece, France) and the U.S.A. He originally requested five weeks to make this trip for which he has long saved his money, but quite willingly shortened the trip to three weeks at the Station's request and added that he would postpone the entire trip if the Station thought his services were more needed at home. In order to help defray the cost of making a second trip to Europe to complete his original itinerary, the Station will give LIONION-1 a gift of $250 on 1 May 1969 and will tell him that consideration will be given in 1970 to providing an equal amount, but no decision can be made on that second gift until mid-1970.

E. Problems

1. LISAMPAN/BAKER: As reported in HMMA 36553, 19 February 1969, LISAMPAN/BAKER was turned off for security reasons on 16 January 1969 at 1345 hours. All subsequent attempts to reactivate it have been unsuccessful. Headquarters was requested to review all available Station information on this to decide whether BAKER's abrupt end was the result of a compromise or whether it was somehow connected with the installation of TELEX equipment at LIRING.

2. LISAMPAN/DOG: The LISAMPAN/DOG/LIETRAP installation is generally working well. There have been numerous occasions when due to unknown circumstances the audio reception has either been bad or non-existent. Walter W. CORNBURY and PELLEMENT visited the LISAMPAN/LISASH basehouse and found no problem with the monitoring equipment there. The trouble may have resided with the central office of the LIRISK company and was probably not the result of technical counter-surveillance of LIRING. As of 3 April 1969, LISAMPAN/DOG was working properly and automatically.

3. There have been no significant personnel, security, morale or administrative problems since the last project renewal.

F. Liaison

Not applicable to Project LIONION.

G. Interagency Coordination

Not applicable to Project LIONION.

H. Plans

1. The Station plans to continue to exploit LIONION-1's experience, training and location to provide the photographic and technical coverage cited above. In addition, the Station will continue to make use of LIONION-1 as a dispatcher in surveillances of LIRING personnel.

2. In order to check the LISAMPAN/DOG take for items of possible value to other Station operations, LISAMPAN/1 will be instructed to record the DOG traffic for the three week period while LIONION-1 is on vacation. These tapes will be given to Richard C. HABOUSH for an analysis of their operational worth and technical quality. HABOUSH will transcribe them if the contents warrant.

I. Costs

1. For the past project year, 1 January 1968 through 30 June 1969, it is estimated that the total project cost will be about $16,250. It is approved for $16,632.

2. For the renewal period of 1 July 1969 through 30 June 1970, it is requested that $11,894 be approved. Estimated figures for FY 1971 are provided below together with the breakdown for FY's 1969 and 1970. The major addition to the FY 1971 figures is a possible raise for LIONION-1 and LIONION-2. These figures are broken down as follows:

	FY 1969	FY 1970	FY 1971
Salaries:			
LIONION-1	$ 4,704	$ 4,800	$ 5,200
LIONION-2	1,860	1,920	2,000
Xmas bonuses	550	560	610
Rents:			
LIONION Basehouse	1,200	1,200	1,200
LIONION Safehouse	864	864	864
Utilities for both	500	500	500
Operational Expenses:			
Film	700	1,000	1,000
Paper	400	450	450
Chemicals	250	300	300

Miscellaneous:			
Operational	50	150	350
Special gift to LIONION-1	250	250	
Total	$11,328	$11,994	$12,474

3. A detailed accounting was prepared each month by LIONION-1 covering expenses chargeable to his revolving fund. His accounting has been most satisfactory in all respects, and such accountings will be continued during the ensuing project year.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

PROCESSING

PRO-CESSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, WHD

INFO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: Processing and Exploitation of Photographic Coverage of LIRING by the AMOT Organization.

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference: HMMA-33841, 17 January 1968

1. The following comments are for the information and assistance of those officers who are in the process of determining the future of the LIONION operation:

a. The AMOTs have received and reviewed a number of the prints from the LIONION operation and report that it is a time-consuming and largely unproductive effort.

b. The practical results of such a review, i.e., the identification of the greatest number of visitors to LIRING, can be realized best through the widest circulation of the prints among the AMOT staffers, contacts, and informants. This practice would result in wide knowledge of the existence of the operation, and in the expenditure of many man-hours which, it appears, could be more productively spent in other pursuits.

c. The AMOT organization currently does not have either the qualified personnel or available space and equipment to process the film as suggested in paragraph three of reference. Until they move into new quarters, (in, hopefully, mid-1968, the single AMOT photographer will be working in very tight quarters.

2. It would appear from JMWAVE's experience with AMOT exploitation of the LIONION operation, that further activity in this connection at JMWAVE would be unwarranted.

James N. Ahamanos

James N. AHAMANOS

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD
2 - COS/Mexico City
2 - WH/COG

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
12 Feb 1968	FEB 13 1968

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGT-21267

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
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ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: LIONION Renewal of Project

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA 33595, 5 December 1967

Project LIONION has been renewed for the period of 1 January 1968 through 30 June 1969 for the sum of $16,632. This figure includes $5,374 for FY 68 and $11,258 for FY 69.

Ronald L. PERRODIN

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS, Mexico City

Cuban

50-6-122/1

GROUP 1
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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
CS COPY	HMMW 16131	5 FEB 1968 1 February 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	50-6-122/3

RI

CHRONO

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	Daly	bb	6954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	2 Feb	W. J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG. 1-66 (40)

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: LIONION/Processing and Exploitation of Impulse Camera Film by AMOTS

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA 33841, 17 January 1968

Headquarters concurs in the proposal made in reference that the LIONION impulse camera film be processed and reviewed by the AMOTS.

Ronald L. PERRODIN

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS, Mexico City

50-6-122/1

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW 16106	1 FEB 1968 / 29 January 1968
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-122/1

RI

CHRONO

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	Daly	bb	6954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/COG	30 Jan 68	Earl J. Williamson

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	29 Jan 68	W. J. Kaufman

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG. 1-66

DISPATCH

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

CRYPTONYM: [illegible]

TYPE OF ACTION						
	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION: Western Hemisphere Division				
	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION: Mexico City				
X	RENEWAL FY 1968-69	BRANCH: One		DESK:		
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER: [illegible]			DATE: 10 Jan 68	
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO.: [illegible]	BUILDING: [illegible]	TEL. EXT.	RED: 0041	BLACK: [illegible]

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
C/WHD	[illegible]				
C/WH/[illegible]	Elliot C. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		
C/WH/SS	George R. Thom[illegible]		22 Jan 68		✓
C/WH/[illegible]	Thomas Polgar		21 Jan 68		
WH/EXO	Donald C. [illegible]	[illegible]	29/1		

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

		DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL AMOUNT
1 Jan 68	30 June 69	$ 16,632	1968	$ [illegible]
			1969	$ 11,[illegible]

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
C/WHD	William V. Broe	[illegible] JAN 1968

14-00000

SECRET

10 January 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Renewal of Project LIONION

1. Approval is requested to renew Project LIONION for the period 1 January 1968 through 30 June 1969 for $16,632 including $5,374 for FY 1968 and $11,258 for FY 1969. WH Division programmed $11,800 for this activity for FY 1969 and funds are available. Funds requested for this renewal are slightly less than the previous year due to a reduction in support costs.

2. This project provides Station Mexico City with photographic and physical surveillance of the Cuban Embassy and Consulate in Mexico City. In addition, the project principal agent is able to observe and record the patterns of activity and personal associations of various Cuban personnel and visitors to the Embassy and Consulate. This effort has been of assistance in planning recruitment attempts against target personnel. The principal agent also performs ad hoc functions for the Station such as dispatching the surveillance team against selected Cuban personnel and renting and maintaining a safehouse. This project naturally does not produce positive intelligence.

3. Plans for the forthcoming period include using the project basehouse and the two project agents as LP operators in the expansion of an existing technical operation targeted against the Cuban Embassy. There is also a possibility that the photo coverage of the Cuban Consulate entrance will cease shortly as this coverage has not proved particularly useful. It is not anticipated that these changes will substantially affect the cost of the project.

4. It should be noted that the $4,800 operational loan made to LIONION-2 in February 1966 has been completely repaid. The security of this project is considered satisfactory.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

74-00000

REQUEST FOR PROJECT RENEWAL

Project LIONION

Field Case Officer *[signature]*
Cornelius L. PEUVION

Station Mexico City

Chief of Station *[signature: Willard C. Curtis]*
Willard C. CURTIS

Renewal of the LIONION Project is requested for the period 1 January through 31 December 1968 for a total of $11,258--$5,374 for FY 1968 and $5,884 for FY 1969.

[illegible] BY [illegible] TRANSMISSION
NO FIELD DISSEMINATION

CS COPY

50-6-122/1

S/C ATT. # 2 to HMMA-33595

H/W ATT. # 16 HMMA-33595

PROJECT LIONION RENEWAL REQUEST

A. Objectives:

1. Project LIONION is a long-term support project designed to provide fixed photographic, technical, and physical surveillance of the PBRUMEN Embassy and Consulate in Mexico City. The specific objectives are:

a. To furnish photographic coverage during the daylight hours of the main entrances to the target installations.

b. To maintain in readiness a listening post to support technical operations against the targets.

c. To radio dispatch physical surveillance teams against persons associated with the targets.

d. To provide for a mechanism which can fulfill various miscellaneous PBRUMEN support requirements.

2. The above-cited objectives are in agreement with the over-all objectives of Station Mexico City.

B. Changes:

In late January 1967 the operational and administrative responsibilities for Project LIONION were transferred from Howard A. TRECKLER to Cornelius L. PEUVION. No agent handling, control, or administrative problems were encountered during the past year.

C. Intelligence Production:

As noted in Section A above, Project LIONION is an operational support project and does not produce disseminable positive intelligence. During the past year this project did provide over 5000 individual photographs of persons and/or vehicles entering or leaving the target installations, as well as approximately 8000 feet of pulse camera film. Information on the comings and goings of target personnel and visitors to the installations, which LIONION-1 provides in daily logs, has been incorporated into Station files and on occasion made available to other stations or LNHARP agencies, i.e., LNERGO. LIONION has been particularly useful in spotting new employees whose photos are then passed to LITAMIL-7 for identification.

D. Effectiveness:

1. Project LIONION is considered by the Station to be highly effective and essential. In addition to providing the valuable photographic coverage cited above, LIONION-1 continues to provide interesting observations on the personalities and activities of the personnel working in the targets. LIONION-1 reporting is being incorporated into the recruitment operations targeted against LIRING-2 and LIRING-16.

2. In early July LIONION-1 obtained and furnished a new safe apartment which is being used for sensitive or lengthly meetings with LIRESORT-1 as well as LIONION-1. The safe site has been stocked with a sufficient supply of food so as to allow two persons to live there for at least three days in the event the Station ever needs a cooling-off site for an agent or defector.

3. Throughout the past project year LIONION-1 continued to function effectively as the radio dispatcher for the LIEMBRACE Surveillance Team. Much of this effort was expended in estimating the movement/habit pattern of LIRING-2, a prerequisite for his pending recruitment.

E. Problems:

1. On 27 June LIONION-1 was hospitalized for emergency surgery to treat a perforated ulcer. Since LIONION-2's presence was required at the hospital during the operation and also throughout the postoperative convalescence period, photographic coverage was suspended until 10 July.

2. Other than a temporary postoperative morale slump on the part of LIONION-1, there have been no significant personnel, security, or administrative problems.

F. Liaison:

Not applicable to Project LIONION.

G. Interagency Coordination:

Not applicable to Project LIONION.

H. Plans:

1. The Station plans to continue to exploit LIONION-1's experience, training, and location to provide the photographic coverage cited above. In addition, the Station plans to make more extensive use of the operational log books and personality observations provided by LIONION-1 in support of an intensive physical penetration program.

14-00000

2. During the ensuing period, the Station plans to utilize LIONION-1 and LIONION-2 as LP operators for a portion of the LISAMPAN technical penetration operation. It is anticipated that this additional task will not be levied on LIONION-1 and LIONION-2 until after 1 January 1968.

I. Costs:

1. For the past project year, 1 January through 31 December 1967, it is estimated that the total project cost will be about $9,000. It is approved for $11,666.

2. For the renewal period of 1 January through 31 December 1968, it is requested that $11,258 be approved. This is broken down as follows:

	FY 1968	FY 1969	Total
Salaries: (Including Xmas bonus)			
LIONION-1	$ 2,208	$ 2,576	$ 4,784
LIONION-2	900	1,050	1,950
Rents:			
LIONION Basehouse	450	450	900
LIONION Safehouse	264	264	528
Utilities	150	150	300
Supplies:			
Film	600	600	1,200
Paper	312	304	616
Chemicals	150	150	300
Miscellaneous	90	90	180
Miscellaneous Operational Expenditures	250	250	500
Total	$ 5,374	$ 5,884	$11,258

3. It should be noted that the operational loan made to LIONION-2 to enable her to qualify for inmigrado status in Mexico (see Cost Section of previous project renewal request) has been completely repaid. The loan, which was placed in an escrow-type account, was withdrawn in monthly increments by LIONION-1 and incorporated into his revolving fund. A detailed accounting was prepared each month by LIONION-1, a practice which will be continued during the ensuing project year.

J. Technical Annex:

Project LIONION continues to receive excellent technical support from the local WOACRE representative, Walter W. CORNBURY.

K. Other:

While LIONION-2's failing eyesight precludes her filling in for LIONION-1 over any extended period of time, she has continued to perform in an excellent manner in support of LIONION-1.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: LIONION

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See Below

1. Prior to submitting the LIONION project for renewal 1 January 1968, Headquarters requests the Mexico City station comment on the desireability of continuing the photography of persons entering and leaving the PBRUMEN Consulate. As the station is aware this film is no longer reviewed at JMWAVE and there are no present plans to resume this practice since in the past it proved unproductive and costly. The film has never been reviewed on a regular basis at Headquarters and has been referred to only once for identification purposes during the past year. At present the film as received at Headquarters is developed (negatives only) and placed into storage.

2. Headquarters realizes this coverage is potentially valuable and undoubtedly this film contains photographs of assorted revolutionaries and others of CI/FI interest; but the value lies in the ability to identify the persons being photographed and until we have this capability - and personnel to sort out and follow-up the leads - there seems

(Continued..)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS, Mexico City
2 - COS, JMWAVE

50-6-122/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-16029	15 December 67
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-122/1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1/Daly		sl	

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/COG	15 Dec 67	Carl J. Williamson

RI
CHRONO

ABSTRACT

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	15 Dec	W.J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG. 1-66

DISPATCH

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-16029

little justification in continuing this coverage.

3. It would be appreciated if along with the station's recommendations an estimate of the cost of this particular portion of the LIONION activity could be included.

Ronald L. PERRODIN

50-6-122/1

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / X NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIONION Project Renewal Request

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

DESENSITIZED per DOI 70-12

Reference: HMMW-15195, 24 January 1967

Attached is the Station's renewal request for Project LIONION. The Project should be submitted for renewal for the period 1 January through 31 December 1968 for a total of $11,258.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:
 A. Renewal Request, right side (h/w)
 B. Renewal Request, left side (u/s/c) ATT'd 15 DEC 67

Distribution:
 Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/atts - 2 copies each)

2 ATT

CS COPY

50-6-122/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 33595	5 December 1967
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-122/1

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / X NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: PERUMEN LIONION - Approval of Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference : HMMA-30793, 7 December 1966

Project LIONION was renewed as submitted in reference on 23 January 1967 in the amount of $11,666.00 for the period 1 January through 31 December 1967.

Andrew F. MERTON

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

50-6-122/1

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-15195

DATE: 24 January 1967 (26 JAN 1967)

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-122/1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	J. Stewart	pem	6954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RI
Chrono

ABSTRACT X INDEX

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	1/25	

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM: LIONION

TYPE OF ACTION		X FI CI	CA	OTHER
	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION: Western Hemisphere Division		
	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION: Mexico City		
X	RENEWAL FY 1967-68	BRANCH: One	DESK:	
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER: Jack Stewart	DATE: 4 Jan '67	
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO.: 332; BUILDING: Ames	TEL. EXT.:	RED. / BLACK: 3654

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATE In	DATE Out	DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
C/WH/1	W. J. Kaufman			
C/WH/B&F	Robert D. Carter			
C/WH/SS	George R. Thompson			
C/WH/FI	Thomas Polgar		2/1/67	
WH/EXO	Donald C. Marelius	20 JAN	2/2/67	

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

		DATE	COPY NO.	MEMO ATTACHED YES	NO	DATE

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	TO	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	REVISED TOTAL
1 Jan 1967	31 Dec 1967	$ 11,666.00	1967	$ 5,574.00
			1968	$ 6,092.00

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
C/WHD	William V. Broe	23 JAN 1967

FORM 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(5)

14-00000

SECRET

4 January 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Renewal of Project LIONION (Photographic/Technical Coverage of Cuban Embassy in Mexico)

ACTION REQUIRED: Approvals Requested Paragraphs One and Four

1. Approval is requested to renew Project LIONION for the period 1 January through 31 December 1967 at an annual expenditure of $11,666.00, including $5,574.00 for FY 1967 and $6,092.00 for FY 1968. WH Division programmed $12,000.00 for this activity for FY 1967 and funds are available. The Project cost has been increased by $668.00 over the previous year, occasioned by a small monthly raise for the Principal Agent and a new provision for miscellaneous operational expenditures.

2. Although this two-man Project does not produce positive intelligence, it contributes substantially and directly to the coverage of the Cuban Embassy and Consulate in Mexico, producing photographs in bulk of personnel and visitors as well as information on patterns of activity and personal associations, and supporting recruitment attempts. It is contemplated that the Project will afford support to the extensive technical penetration of the Cuban Embassy (LISAMPAN) currently scheduled for installation in mid-January 1967. One of these penetrations is scheduled for the Embassy gatehouse where visitors would normally identify themselves upon entering. Information from the gatehouse is to be transmitted securely to the LIONION basehouse as well as to the LISAMPAN listening post. By collating this and other LISAMPAN information with the photography, it is hoped to be able to identify photographically many of the visitors to the Embassy.

SECRET

3. The physical security of the photo-basehouse has been improved and the overall security of the Project is considered to be satisfactory.

4. It will be noted that in February 1966 the Station assisted LIONION-2, a Cuban citizen, to qualify for Mexican immigrant status with a loan of $4,800.00, which was reduced to $2,640.00 as of 31 December 1966 at a repayment rate of $240.00 per month. This loan is being protected by an appropriate Memorandum of Trust. Approval is requested to continue this arrangement until LIONION-2's immigration status is settled, estimated to occur by 30 November 1967.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

NIR

INFO.

DESENSITIZED per DOI 20-17

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: PBRUMEN/OPERATIONAL/Transmittal of LIONION Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached herewith and under separate cover for addressee are an original and five copies of the LIONION Project Renewal request.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
LIONION Project Renewal
Left hand side herewith
Right hand side under separate cover

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/att
2 - FILES

CS COPY

50-6-122/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-30793	7 ~~November~~ 1966
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	50-6-122/8

GROUP 1: Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET/KAPOK

REQUEST FOR PROJECT RENEWAL

Project LIONION

Station Mexico City

Field Case Officer [signature]
Howard A. TRECKLER

Chief of Station Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

NO FIELD DISSEMINATION

CS COPY

SECRET/KAPOK

50-6-122/1

L. Side ATT. #1 to HMMA-30793

R. Side ATT. #2 to HMMA-30793

LIONION PROJECT RENEWAL

A. Current Objectives:

There have been no changes in the objectives of the LIONION Project as set forth in the renewal request of last year.

B. Changes:

Howard A. TRECKLER has assumed the duties of Case Officer for LIONION since the departure of Lawrence F. BARKER in August 1966. TRECKLER is known to LIONION-1 and 2 as "Jose" or "Joe". TRECKLER meets with LIONION-1 at least once each week and sees LIONION-2 only if he visits the LIONION basehouse. With the departure of Hugh T. FRANCOTTE (P) in August 1966, Walter W. CORNBURY (P) assumed the duties of technical consultant for the project. CORNBURY is known to LIONION-1 and 2 as "Jack". LIONION-1 is being given a pay increase of $8.00 (U.S.) per month effective 1 January 1967. There are no other changes contemplated for the coming year.

C. Intelligence Production:

The intelligence production is the same as that reported in the renewal request for last year. It is difficult to estimate the intelligence value in numbers of reports as there are so few positive reports made from this type of production on the photographic end of the project. But this photographic coverage is of inestimable operational intelligence value in coverage of the PBRUMEN target. Should the LISAMPAN operation become active, part of LIONION's time will be used in support of that operation.

D. Effectiveness:

The Station's estimate of the value of this project has not changed from that expressed in the renewal request of last year. LIONION has further established his importance to the Station's operational activities by demonstrating his ability to spot surveillance targets at LIRING from only a physical description provided by the Case Officer. If the planned LISAMPAN activity gets underway, LIONION observations and insight into activities of LIRING will be increased greatly.

The apartment spotted by LIONION-1 and obtained by the Station across from LIRING that was mentioned in last year's renewal request is scheduled to be utilized in the LISAMPAN operation. The location of LIONION-1 across from the target and his background knowledge built up over the years are invaluable assets to the Station's coverage of the primary target of the Related Mission Directive.

E. Problems:

There were no major problems during the past year. One security problem involved the claimed spotting of some of the photographic equipment from the street by David M. WILSTED (P). A thorough check of the basehouse by LIONION-1 and the Case Officer failed to reveal any such equipment as being visible from the street. However, additional security measures were taken by darkening the background in the room behind the equipment through hanging of heavier drapes on the window, drapes on the wall, and putting up a portable screen behind the equipment. This also serves as a security check against the prying eyes of the household servant as LIONION-1 can now open the door fully to the room when the servant pages him and she cannot see the equipment. The other problem is the obtaining of inmigrado status for LIONION-2. This involves the depositing of funds to a bank account and is discussed under paragraph I.

F. Liaison:

There is no liaison involved in the project.

G. Interagency Coordination:

Not applicable.

H. Plans:

It is planned to have LIONION-1 keep special logs on the activities of selected targets in LIRING as he has done over the past year. With the case officer handling LIONION-1 directly on a weekly basis, it is planned to continue picking his brains for additional details on the LIRING target. Hopefully LIONION-1 and 2 will be utilized for assistance in covering the proposed take from the LISAMPAN operation.

I. Costs:

For Calendar Year 1966:

1. In the period 1 January through 30 June 1966, $4,500.00 was expended. The projected expenditure for July 1966 through 31 December 1966 is $5,000.00. This total project year expenditure is approximately $1,000.00 under that approved by Headquarters. However, this amount is probably due to having drawn film and other supplies from overall Station support without their having been charged off against the Project

2. For the period 1 January 1967 through 31 December 1967

Expenditures for	FY 1967	FY 1968
Salaries:		
LIONION-1	$2,210.00	$2,578.00
LIONION-2	900.00	1,050.00
Rents:		
LIONION Basehouse	600.00	600.00
LIONION Safehouse	264.00	264.00
Utilities	150.00	150.00
Supplies:		
Film	600.00	600.00
Paper	360.00	360.00
Chemicals	150.00	150.00
Miscellaneous	90.00	90.00
Miscellaneous Operational Expenditures	250.00	250.00
TOTAL	$5,574.00	$6,092.00

The total for FY 1967 is $11,666.00. Approval of this amount is requested. Note that the salary figures include the salary raise for LIONION-1 and the usual one month pay Christmas bonus for LIONION-1 and 2. An additional provision has been made for miscellaneous operational expenditures as there may be a recurrence of same as in the past project year for which no provision was made. Provision is being made for charging of funds for supplies to the LIONION Project which was not done last year in order that more accurate bookkeeping may be followed.

In addition, the Station has had to make a loan to LIONION-2 for gaining status to qualify for inmigrado status in Mexico. This loan is held in a savings account in a Mexican bank to prove to the Mexican authorities that LIONION-2 can support herself. Funds are withdrawn from this account monthly, sometimes with interest, and deposited to a checking account where LIONION-1 withdraws the funds and they are applied to the revolving account for financing the operation. The initial balance deposited to the account in February 1966 was $4,800.00. Withdrawals have been made at the rate of $240.00 per month and as of 30 October 1966, the total account had been reduced by $1,680.00, leaving a balance in the account of $3,120.00 which should carry the account through November 1967. A separate dispatch follows with the Memorandum of Trust and necessary details on the account. Approval is requested for continuance of this account in order that LIONION-2 may obtain her inmigrado status.

J. Other:

LIONION-2 continues to perform in an excellent manner in support of LIONION-1.

SECRET/KAPOK

PROJECT RENEWAL REQUEST

CRYPTONYM LIONION

FIELD CASE OFFICER Lawrence F. Barker
Lawrence F. BARKER

STATION Mexico City

CHIEF OF STATION Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

The attached Project is presented for renewal.

CS COPY

FORWARDED BY SPLIT TRANSMISSION
NO FIELD DISSEMINATION.

SECRET/KAPOK

50-6-122/1

L.SIDE OF ATT #1 HMMA-27754 R.SIDE OF ATT #1 HMMA-27754

A. Current Objectives. The original objectives of the project have not changed but have been added to in the last year. The project is functioning well as a technical (primarily photographic) surveillance operation against the PBRUMEN Embassy in Mexico City. It is designed to:

1. Furnish photographic coverage during daylight hours of the two entrances of the target installation.

2. Dispatch physical surveillance teams against persons associated with the target.

3. Keep in readiness a listening post (LP) for the monitoring and recording of technical penetrations of the target.

4. Assist the Station in building up individual dossiers on officials of the target installation.

5. Monitor Station activities involving direct contact with the target, and furnish an observation post (OP) for other Station assets.

Objectives 4 and 5 are additions to those objectives set forth in the original project outline.

B. Changes. There have been no changes in personnel and none are contemplated in the coming year. It is being proposed in separate correspondence that some of the work load now on LIONION-1 be shifted to Headquarters, specifically the development of film.

LIONION-1's pay was increased 40 dollars a month effective 15 March 1965.

C. Intelligence Production. The operation has produced thousands of excellent photographs, many of which are shared with Headquarters and Station JMWAVE. Information on the comings and goings of target personnel and visitors to the target installation has been incorporated into many Station files (primarily personality files -- individual dossiers). No precise statistics are available on this production. It has been very heavy. Station JMWAVE should perhaps be called upon for an independent evaluation of LIONION production it has received .

D. Effectiveness. The project is considered both highly successful and essential by the Station. In addition to excellent photographic coverage provided by the LIONION agents, the Station has found in LIONION-1 a first class asset for other operational duties. The LIONION basehouse was essential to mounting and monitoring the LIRHYME recruitment (and harassment) operation. C/O Wallace B. ROWTON sat with LIONION-1 for several weeks, observing the movement pattern of LIRHYME-1. LIONION-1 manned one of three radios used by the Station when LIRHYME

was invited to appear for confrontation outside the Embassy. Without the LIONION base and the expert knowledge of LIONION-1 of target personnel and activities, such an operation as LIRHYME could not have been mounted. It might be noted that this operation was an attempt to satisfy the top priority requirement laid on Station Mexico by Headquarters. It is expected that additional similar operations will depend to a large extent on the facilities provided by the LIONION operation.

Another very effective performance by LIONION-1 was his obtaining -- by sharp observation and quick, intelligent, secure action -- an apartment in a building directly across the street from the target Embassy. The Station had been seeking an apartment in this building for many years.

E. Problems. The problem of cover for LIONION-1 worked out well during the year to the point where it ceased being a problem. By living his cover as a translator he was enabled to build in strong self protection when called upon to do some translations for the office of the President of Mexico. Toward the end of the year, LIONION-1 received the coveted status of "inmigrado" which confers a great deal of immunity from harrassment by Mexican authorities.

The only problem now besetting the project is LIONION-1's excessive work load. As indicated above, an attempt is being made to alleviate this load.

F. Liaison. The operation has no liaison connection. LIONION-1's connection with the Mexican Presidency is non-operational.

G. Interagency Coordination. Not applicable.

H. Plans. It is planned to make better use of LIONION-1's observations and operational log books during the coming year rather than settle for his excellent photographs alone. It has been found that he can often supply valuable additional information because of his "feel" for those persons who are under constant observation from the LIONION base. LIONION-1 can read significance into activity which might go unnoticed or be misinterpreted by observers with less experience. LIONION-1 will also be called upon for assistance in future recruitment operations as in LIRHYME. Several such operations are being contemplated for calendar 1966, the period for which project is being requested.

I. Costs.

1. For calendar 1965:

In the period 1 January through 31 October 1965 $7,218.20 had been expended. At this rate some $9,200.00 will be expended in the concluding project year.

2. For the next period (calendar 1966):

<u>Monthly costs</u>

Salaries:	LIONION-1	$ 360.00
	LIONION-2	150.00
Rents:	LIONION Basehouse	100.00
	LIONION Safehouse	44.00
	Utilities	25.00
Supplies:	Film	95.00
	Paper	60.00
	Chemicals	25.00
	Miscellaneous	15.00
	Monthly total	$ 874.00

Allowing for customary year-end bonuses of one month's salary for both agents, the figures for FY 1966 and FY 1967 would be $5,244.00 and $5,754.00 respectively, or a total for the calendar year 1966 of $10,998. Approval of this amount is requested.

J. Other. LIONION-2, although not specifically mentioned above, continues to perform in a splendid manner as assistant to LIONION-1.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/Renewal Request for Project LIONION

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMW 14073, 1 November 1965

Attached by split transmission is a renewal request for the LIONION Project.

Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Left Side - Herewith
Right Side - Under separate cover

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/att
2 - Files

CS COPY

50-6-122/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA 27754	29 November 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET/KAPOK	50-6-122/1

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Acting Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: PBRUMEN/LIONION — Transmittal of Approved Project

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

REFERENCES: HMMA-27754, 29 November 1965.

ACTION: FYI

Project LIONION was approved on 22 January 1966 in the amount of $10,998.00 for the period 1 January 1966 through 31 December 1966. The foregoing amount is broken down into $5,244.00 for Fiscal Year 1966 and $5,754.00 for Fiscal Year 1967.

Andrew F. MERTON

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

LIONION
50-6-122/1

25 January 1966

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-14301	27
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-122/1

RI
CHRONO

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/1/Mexico	J. Stewart	sav	4506

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DC/WH/1		J.H.V. Fisher

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM: LIONION

TYPE OF ACTION			
	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION	Western Hemisphere
	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION	Mexico City
X	RENEWAL FY 1966	BRANCH: 1	DESK: Mexico
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER: J. Stewart	DATE: 1 Jan 66
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO.: GH-43; BUILDING: Hdqs	TEL. EXT.: RED 9325, BLACK 4506

X FI/CI | CA | OTHER

CONCURRENCIES OF DIVISION

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATE	DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
C/WH/1	W. J. Kaufman	11 Jan 66	
WH/B&F	Robert D. Carter	11 Jan 66	
WH/SS	W.E. Brooks	[illegible]	
C/WH/FI	Thomas Polgar	19/1/66	
WH/EXO	Donald C. Marelius	22/1/66	

CONCURRENCIES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

		DATE	COPY NO.	MEMO ATTACHED YES	NO	DATE

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	TO	AMOUNT OF ACTION	FY	TOTAL AMOUNT
1 Jan 66	31 Dec 66	$ 10,998.00	1966	$ 5,244.00
			1967	$ 5,754.00

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
Chief, WHD	William V. Broe	22/1/66

FORM 6-65 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(5)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Renewal of Project LIONION (photographic/ technical coverage of Cuban Embassy in Mexico)

1. Approval is requested to renew Project LIONION for the period 1 January through 31 December 1966 at an annual expenditure of $10,998.00, including $5,244.00 for FY 1966 and $5,754.00 for FY 1967. WH Division programmed $10,750.00 for this activity for FY 1966. Funds are available. The Project cost has been increased by $520.00 over the previous year, occasioned by a small raise for the Principal Agent.

2. The Project has contributed substantially and directly to coverage of the Cuban Embassy and Consulate in Mexico and is considered highly successful and essential by Station Mexico City. It has produced a large quantity of excellent photographs of target personnel and visitors and has furnished valuable data on their patterns of activity and personal associations. It has also rendered valuable support to Station recruitment attempts against Cuban Embassy personnel and maintains an ever ready facility for support of any technical penetrations of this target accomplished by other Station activities. The Project has had no security or administrative problems. The Station has submitted regular progress reports.

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

LIONION PROJECT RENEWAL

A. Current Objectives: This Project is a technical, currently primarily photographic, surveillance operation against the Cuban Embassy and Consulate in Mexico City. Its original objectives, still current, include furnishing photographic coverage during daylight hours of the Embassy and Consulate entrances; furnishing a control point for dispatching physical surveillance teams against persons associated with the target; and furnishing a listening post (LP) in readiness to monitor and record technical audio penetrations of the target. Two new objectives added during the Project year include assisting Station Mexico City to build up individual dossiers on target officials; and affording an observation post for Station activities involving direct contact with the target. These new objectives are in consonance with Priority A, Objective 1 of the current Related Mission Directive for Station Mexico City.

B. Changes: There have been no changes in personnel and none are contemplated during the coming year. Headquarters is assuming the task of developing some of the film exposed under this Project. LIONION-1's pay was increased $40 per month effective 15 March 1965.

C. Intelligence Production: The Project is not designed to produce disseminable information. It produced thousands of excellent photographs during the year which were shared with Headquarters and Station JMWAVE. Information on the comings and goings of target personnel and visitors to the target have been incorporated into many Station files, principally the dossier files. No precise statistics are available, but at least 100 exposures are made daily during target working hours.

D. Effectiveness: The Project is considered highly successful and essential by the Station. In addition to the excellent photographic coverage provided, LIONION-1, the Principal Agent, has developed into a first-class asset for other operational duties. The Project Basehouse was essential to mounting and monitoring the Station's attempt at recruitment and subsequent harassment of a sensitive target employee. The Case Officer in charge of the attempt sat with LIONION-1 for several weeks observing the movement pattern of the target employee. LIONION-1 manned one of the radio dispatch posts used to control the physical surveillance of the target employee while near the Basehouse.

Without the Basehouse and LIONION-1's expert knowledge of the target personnel and activities, such an operation could not have been mounted. The operation itself was an attempt to satisfy the top priority requirement laid on Station Mexico City by Headquarters. It is expected that future similar operations will depend to a large extent on the facilities provided by this Project.

Another very effective performance by LIONION-1 was his obtaining, by sharp observation and quick, intelligent and secure action, an apartment in a building directly across the street from the target. The Station had been seeking an apartment in this building for many years.

E. Problems: The only problem currently besetting the Project is the excessive work load on the Principal Agent. To alleviate this, Headquarters is assuming the task of developing some of the film produced by the Project.

Cover for LIONION-1 has ceased to be a problem. He has received his permanent immigrant status and now has a good deal of immunity from harassment from Mexican immigration authorities. He was able to get his translator cover backstopped directly out of the Office of the President of Mexico and thus has a strong protective security factor built into it.

F. Liaison: The Project has no liaison connection. LIONION-1's cover backstop with the Office of the President of Mexico is non-operational.

G. Interagency Coordination: Not applicable.

H. Plans: It is planned to make better use of LIONION-1's observations and operational logbooks during the coming year rather than to settle for his excellent photographs alone. It has been found that he can often supply valuable additional information because of his "feel" for those persons who are under constant observation from the Basehouse. He can read significance into activity which might go unnoticed or be misinterpreted by observers with less experience. He will also be called upon for assistance in future recruitment operations similar to the case mentioned in paragraph D above. Several such operations are being contemplated for calendar year 1966, the period for which the Project renewal is being requested.

I. Costs: For calendar year 1965:

In the period 1 January through 31 October 1965, $7,218.20 has been expended. At this rate, some $9,200.00 will be expended by the end of the calendar year 1965.

Monthly costs:

Salaries:	LIONION-1	$ 360.00
	LIONION-2	150.00
Rents:	LIONION Basehouse	100.00
	LIONION Safehouse	44.00
	Utilities	25.00
Supplies:	Film	95.00
	Paper	60.00
	Chemicals	25.00
Miscellaneous Operational Expenses:		15.00
	Monthly Total:	$ 874.00

One-time costs:

It is customary in Mexico to give a year-end bonus amounting to one month's salary:

LIONION-1	$ 360.00
LIONION-2	150.00
Total:	$ 510.00

3. Calendar Year Total

Fixed monthly expenses	$ 10,488.00
One-time expenses	510.00
Total	10,998.00

4. Fiscal Year Breakdown

Fiscal Year 1966	$ 5,244.00
Fiscal Year 1967	5,754.00
	10,998.00

J. Other: LIONION-2, although not specifically mentioned above, continued to render excellent support as an assistant to LIONION-1.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING; XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED; ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING; MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: Project Approval FBRUKEN/LIONION/Plans

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA 25110, 6 January 1965

1. Project LIONION, as submitted in reference, has been approved by Headquarters for the period 1 January 1965 through 31 December 1965. The two agents have been redesignated LIONION-1 (201-288248) and LIONION-2 (201-305604).

2. In order to assist Headquarters evaluation of the LIONION Project, we request that periodic progress reports on LIONION include details of CI/CE data furnished, and examples of leads developed from such information.

Chester D. DAINOLD

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City

50-6-122/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW 13406 CS COPY	
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-123/1

RI
Chrono

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	

DESTROY

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/1	R. Scutt:jah		4507

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER
C/WHD		DESMOND FITZGERALD

DISPATCH

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM: LICHICK

TYPE OF ACTION			
XX	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION	Western Hemisphere
	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION	Mexico City
	RENEWAL FY 196	BRANCH: WH/1	DESK: Mexico
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER	R. Leutt
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO. [illegible] / BUILDING Hqs.	EXTENSION [illegible]

FI-CI | CA

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISION

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (And signature)	DATE	COPY NO.	MEMORANDUM ATTACHED YES	NO	DATE
C/WH/1	W. J. Kaufman by [signature]	28 Jan				
WH/B&F	Robert Carter [signature]	1 Feb 65				
C/WH/LS	W. E. Brooks [signature]	2/3				
C/WH/RC	H. Littell [signature]	2/4				
WH/PCA	Gerard Droller [signature]	2/16/65				
WH/EXO	Samuel Halpern [signature]	19 Feb 65				

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	TO	TOTAL AMOUNT	FY	AMOUNT
1 January 1965	31 December 1965	$ 10,478	196[illegible]	$ [illegible]
			196[illegible]	$ [illegible]

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
Chief, WH Division	[signature] Halpern	19 Feb 65

16 February 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/EXO

SUBJECT : LIONION Project

1. LIONION is a new project which is submitted in the amount of $10,478. This is a photographic surveillance operation targetted against the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. Two agents are involved; LIONION-1, a young Cuban lawyer in exile, and LIONION-2, his mother. The agents act as observers and photographers. LIONION-1 is also used as a dispatcher for the LIEMBRACE surveillance team, from which he is compartmented, to cover individuals associated with this target. These agents were previously used in connection with the unilateral telephone tap operation against the Cuban Embassy. The current photographic operation began in the latter part of 1962, and was previously funded under Cuban FI funds. The operation has provided valuable data for the identification of Cuban Embassy personnel and visitors, and on their patterns of action and personal associations.

2. The security of this operation, particularly the agent's cover for status and the communications arrangements, appear reasonably sound. Both agents know that they are working for AIS, and LIONION-1 was successfully FLUTTERED in October 1963. However, LITAMIL-7 and LITAMIL-9, who are penetrations of the Cuban Embassy, are aware of this activity, as they are used to help identify individuals photographed.

3. Approval for the LIONION Project is recommended. It is requested that, in order to assist Headquarters' evaluation, project reporting include details of CI/CE data furnished, and examples of leads developed from such information.

GERARD DROLLER
C/WH/POA

[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : Approval of Project LICHION

1. Approval is requested of the attached LICHION Project Outline, and authorization of an annual expenditure, effective 1 January 1965, of $10,478 (FY 65-$5,004; FY 66-$5,474). Funds are available for this project.

2. Mexico Station agents LITAMIL-7 and LITAMIL-9, penetrations in place of the Cuban Embassy, are aware of the existence of the LICHION photographic activity. This knowledge on the part of these two assets is essential to the exploitation of the photographic take.

3. WH/1 recommends approval of the LICHION Project.

A. G. Spera

W. J. Kaufman
Chief
WH/1

Attachment:

Project Outline

SECRET/[illegible]

OFFICE OF ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

1. THIS DOCUMENT IS CH

2. RETURN THIS DOC
RM GA-50, ON FILE/VOLUME: KDAFGHAN VOL. I.

3. IF YOU FORW SUPPORT
INDIVIDUAL 50-6-122/2

VE DATES: 25 SEPT 64 – 14 MAR 72

179 IAL UNIT/LOCATION: LAD/DDO

ROOM: 3C24

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
26 MAY 78	5/26/78	Dan Hardway	Dan Hardway
5 July 78		D. HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
21 JUL 1978		HARDWAY	Hardway
12/20/78		HARDWAY	Hardway
12/12/78		Berk	Berk

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

PROJECT KDAFGHAN VOLUME I SECTION SUPPORT No. 50-6-122/2

Folder 2

LE

RETIRED FILE
DESENSITIZED

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTICE

THIS FILE HAS BEEN PROCESSED AND RETIRED. DO NOT ADD ANY DOCUMENTS TO THIS FOLDER. FORWARD CS DOCUMENTS THAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THIS FOLDER TO RID/RPU GE-58.

NOTICE

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 3-65 2593 (7-13)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

FROM: (Headquarters component)
WH/1

TO :
IP/AN

SUBJECT AND PROJECT FILE REQUEST AND FIELD NOTIFICATION OF ACTION

TO : (Station/Base)
MEXICO CITY

FROM: (Division)
WHD

INFORMATION FOR REQUESTERS

COMPLETE ITEMS 1 THROUGH 12

ITEM 3—ALL FILE TITLES MUST BE STERILE SINCE THEY WILL APPEAR ON THE FIELD COPIES AND ON MACHINE LISTS

ITEM 6—ALL REMARKS MUST BE STERILE.

ITEM 7 AND 8—USE FIRST THREE LETTERS OF DISPATCH SYMBOLS FOR FIELD STATIONS AND LIST HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED NUMERIC CODES

ITEM 10—ENTER OLD TITLE WHEN AMENDING A TITLE. CITE ANY FILES, SUCH AS 201 OR PROJECT FILES THAT ARE RELATED TO THE FILE COVERED BY THIS REQUEST. ITEM 10 MAY ALSO BE USED TO GIVE REASONS FOR THE ACTION BEING REQUESTED, TO IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF MATERIAL TO BE PLACED IN A FILE OR TO MAKE OTHER EXPLANATORY REMARKS.

ITEM 11—A RECORDS OFFICER MUST SIGN ALL FILE ACTION REQUESTS. CONSULT YOUR RMO ON ANY PROBLEMS THAT ARISE.

INFORMATION CONCERNING FILE

1. TYPE OF FILE: [ ] SUBJECT [x] PROJECT

2. CODE (FILE) NUMBER

COUNTRY NUMBER	CATEGORY NUMBER	SPECIFIC SUBJECT NUMBER
50	6	122/2

3. FILE TITLE (SPECIFIC SUBJECT) (PROJECTS LIMITED TO 15 SPACES)
KDAFGHAN Support

ACTION REQUIRED

4. ANALYSIS ACTION
[ ] OPEN FILE
[x] CLOSE FILE (INDICATE DISPOSITION)
[ ] AMEND FILE TITLE
[ ] REOPEN

5. DISPOSITION
[x] RETAIN IP/ARD
[ ] DESTRUCTION RECOMMENDED THRU (DATE)

6. REMARKS (FOR FIELD DISTRIBUTION)

7. INTERESTED STATIONS (PROJECTS ONLY)
MEXI

8. INTERESTED HEADQUARTERS DESK (LIST ACTION DESK FIRST)
50

9. FILES ACTION
[ ] HOLD IN CS FILES
[ ] RESTRICTED
[x] UNRESTRICTED
[ ] PREPARE FOLDER AND SEND TO REQUESTER
[ ] CHARGE PERMANENTLY TO (OFFICER & DESK)

10. COMMENTS (INCLUDE SPECIAL HEADQUARTERS ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS)

RECORD

11. ENDORSEMENT
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O.
Gloria Farmer #630

12. COORDINATION
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. (WHEN APPLICABLE)

13. RID APPROVAL
REQUEST APPROVED BY
Charles M. Conner

EFFECTIVE DATE
1 March 1973

CODE (FILE) NUMBER
50 | 06 | 122/2

FORM 812 (1-63) OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS MFG 12-65

SECRET

39

1—CS COPY

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE OF CRYPTONYM CHANGE - 20/04/71

KDAFGAN

FORMER CRYPTONYM - LIONION

CRYPTONYM CHANGE AUTHORIZED BY - ARMSTRONG (RO OR RID SECTION CHIEF) COMPONENT - FIO/AN

CABLE OR DOCUMENT REFERENCE (FROM ITEM 10 OF FORM 812) - HMMS-7138

N-O-T-I-C-E

THIS IS AN RID NOTICE OF A CHANGE IN FILE TITLE CRYPTONYM CAUSED BY COMPROMISE. IT IS TO BE PLACED IN THE FILE INDICATED AND TO REMAIN THEREIN AS A PERMANENT OFFICIAL CS RECORD.

S-E-C-R-E-T

FILE IN - 050-006-122/02

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 10-1 — ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

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BY — AT — Z

DISSEM BY 28 PER — #

ACTION UNIT TSD-EOO

FILE. VR IP/AN, WH8, DDP, FI

ACTION NO.

6 - KDAFGHAN/Sup

S E C R E T 141955Z MAR 72 CITE MEXICO CITY 19236 — 560483

DIRTECH INFO PANTECH, DIRECTOR

AQUATIC KDAFGHAN KDFACTOR

REF A. HMMA-41502

B. PANTECH 18798 (IN 559398)

1. PLS PROCURE TWO 1000 MM CATADIOPTRIC LENSES WITH CAMERAS AS REQUESTED REF A.

2. FOR PANTECH: NOT NECESSARY PROCURE SPOTMATICS UNLESS ADVISED DIFFERENTLY BY DIRTECH. GP-1.

S E C R E T

SECRET

S E C R E T

TO	Chief, [illegible]SPICE
INFO.	Chief, WH Division; Chief, WOACRE
FROM	Chief of Station, Mexico City
SUBJECT	AQUATIC KDAFGHAN KDFACTOR ~~Replacement of Telephoto Lenses~~

Reference: MEXICO CITY 15654

1. Two of the Station photographic operations, KDFACTOR and KDAFGHAN, have been using the [illegible] and [illegible] Balscope and [illegible] camera combination for approximately twelve years. These two operations provide valuable photographic coverage of two [illegible] targets and new equipment is required to improve the photographic quality and increase the capability for longer coverage during the day when light conditions are poor.

2. The Balscope in the KDAFGHAN-1 OP has a 15 X eyepiece and is located in a very small room. A full length true telephoto lens of 1000 mm will not fit into the space without taking out a concrete wall partition. Therefore a compact catadioptric lens is required for the project.

3. The Balscope in the KDFACTOR-2 OP should also be replaced by the same type of lens system mentioned in paragraph 2. The Balscope now in use is operated from the top of a table where KDFACTOR-2 must also stand to take pictures over a high wall in the foreground. The system must be removed from the table when not in use and stored in a locked foot locker. For these reasons the lens and camera should be light and compact to facilitate their use and storage.

4. As can be seen from paragraphs two and three a light weight compact lens system is desired for both projects and the Station

-continued

Distribution:
2 - C/[illegible]SPICE
2 - C/WHD
2 - C/WOACRE 2 cc to TSD/PEG

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-42,592	13 January 1972
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S E C R E T	50-6-18

So anxious to replace the old units. The operators are starting to climb the walls after [illegible] years of [illegible] through the Falscope. A verbal request had been [illegible] to [illegible] to obtain two 1000 mm catadioptric optical systems with [illegible] cameras. Please advise when these units can be obtained and the [illegible] procedures. [illegible] has started the action on at least one of these systems through [illegible].

Charles F. [illegible]

14-00000

2531

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WOACRE

INFO.: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
Chief, MKSPICE

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: AQUATIC/KDAFGHAN
Renewal of Passports for KDAFGHAN-1 and KDAFGHAN-2

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMW-17955, 11 June 1970

The WOACRE-issued Cuban passports for Subjects have expired. It is requested that new passports be prepared for them. According to KDAFGHAN-1, the new passports should carry the same numbers as the old passports. The passports, and current photographs of Subjects, are being forwarded under separate cover. It is requested that the old passports be returned.

Elsie I. SCALETTI

Attachment:
As stated u/s/c

Distribution:
√Orig. & 1 - Chief, WOACRE (w/att. u/s/c)
1 - Chief, WHD (w/o/att)
1 - Chief, MKSPICE (w/o/att)

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50-6-122/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 41480	7 January 1972
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	~~201-305604~~ ~~FPN: P-7,097~~

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DISSEM BY 15 PER ____ #

C - KDAFGHAN/Support

ACTION UNIT WH8 — FILE, VR Logs 4 — (4)

ACTION NO 125

S E C R E T 091856Z NOV 71 CITE MEXICO CITY 18173 9Nov IN 465586

DIRECTOR

ADMIN LOGS KDAFGHAN

1. REQUEST OBTAIN AND POUCH TO STATION ON PRIORITY BASIS FOR KDAFGHAN ONE EACH: APRON, CLOTH, F/U/W PAKONOMY PRINT DRYER MODEL 13-S.N.-5932. MFR: PAKO CORPORATION, MINNEAPOLIS 40, MINN.

2. REQN 559-19-72 APPLIES. GP-1

S E C R E T

Dirtech has answered

[signature]

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 33 PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT: TSDE-00

FILE, VR IP/AN WH 8 DDP FI (6)

ACTION NO.

(24) **SECRET** (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

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S E C R E T 211720Z OCT 71 CITE MEXICO CITY 18014 (ROSTEDT ACTING)

DIRTECH INFO DIRECTOR, PANTECH

AQUATIC/KDAFGHAN

20 Oct 71 451868

1. KDAFGHAN-1 HAS FOR YEARS USED BALSCOPE LENS WITH 20 X EYEPIECE FOR ID PHOTOGRAPHY OF VISITORS AND EMPLOYEES ENTERING KDACOUSTIC. TO IMPROVE QUALITY PHOTOGRAPHY AND INCREASE CAPABILITY DURING EVENING HOURS WHEN LIGHTING POOR STATION PREFERS A PHOTOGRAPHICALLY CORRECTED 1000 MM TELEPHOTE LENS FOR PROJECT. PLS ADVISE AVAILABILITY OF ABOVE LENS FROM WOACRE STOCK. IF PROJECT TO BE CHARGED FOR LENS NOTIFY STATION.

2. MKSPICE DOES NOT HAVE THIS TYPE LENS IN STOCK. GP-1.

S E C R E T

re file in KDAFGHAN - Support 7/26

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 18

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ACTION UNIT C/TSD 3 — INFO FILE, VR C/PY/SPX, C/WH 8, DDP, C/FI 2

ACTION NO. 133

S E C R E T 222053Z OCT 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 4653

22 OCT IN 191057

DIRTECH INFO PANTECH, DIRECTOR

RYBAT AQUATIC

REF: DIRTECH 0131 (IN 189977)

1. FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF EQUIPMENT USED IN PROJECTS (ONE EACH OF ITEMS LISTED):

A. LILYRIC:

TELESCOPE, BALSCOPE BAUSCH AND LOMB.;

CAMERA, SP, 35 MM, EXAKTA W/O LENS;

CAMERA, PENTAX MDL H3V;

B. LICALLA:

TELESCOPE, S-E, BAUSCH AND LOMB., BALSCOPE;

CAMERA, SP, 35 MM, EXAKTA, WO/LENS;

C. LIONION:

BINOCULARS, 10Z50, TASCO, JAP MDL;

TELESCOPE, BAUSCH AND LOMB BALSCOPE SR.;

CAMERA, PENTAX 35 MM;

DRIER, PHOTO PAKONOMY MDL 13.;

ENLARGER, LEITZ WETZLER FOCOMAT IC;

MOTOROLA HANDIE-TALKIE FM RADIOPHONE;

Wheeler

SECRET

FILE: LIONION/Sup

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY [ ] ISSUED [ ] SLOTTED

BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

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2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT

INFO: FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 4653 S E C R E T

MOTOROLA RADIOPHONE;

CAMERA, RETINA;

LENS, RETINA 50MM;

LENS, RETINA 35MM;

LENS, RETNA 80MM.

2. FILE: ~~TRAYAEWXWM~~ 50-6-32/2. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING; XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED; ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING; MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.:

FROM: Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Document Receipt for LIONION Passports

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMW - 17955, 11 June 1970

Forwarded under separate cover is the document receipt for the LIONION passports.

for/Horace E. PRALLETT

Attachment:
document receipt (u/s/c) 7 July 1970

1 att.

Distribution:
✓Orig. and 2 - Chief, WHD (w/att, u/s/c)

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 39115	26 June 1970
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	✓50-6-122/2

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING; XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED; ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING; MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: PBRUMEN LIONION TECHS/Request for Renewal of PBRUMEN Passports for LIONION-1 and LIONION-2

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Renew passports and return

Reference : HMMW - 13,672, 3 June 1965

1. Forwarded under separate cover in true name pouch are the WOACRE PBRUMEN passports for LIONION-1 and LIONION-2, issued by Reference. These passports have expired, and the Station understands that they can be renewed for another period. Due to the sensitivity of the LIONION operation, Subjects cannot obtain regular PBRUMEN documentation locally, and must have them in order to leave Mexico and return.

2. It is requested that WOACRE revalidate the passports and return them to the Station for re-issuance to Subjects.

for/John A. PROBERT

7 May 70

Distribution:
Orig. and 2 - Chief, WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 38843	27 April 1970
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-122/2

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / X NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: LICNION/Impulse Camera Film

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See below

References:
A. HMMA-33841, 17 January 1968
B. UFGT-21267, 12 February 1968
C. UFGT-21342, 22 February 1968

1. In view of references A and B and the small cost involved in operating the impulse camera Headquarters will continue to process this film.

2. Request JMWAVE pouch the film cited in reference C to Headquarters for processing.

Ronald L. PERRODIN

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS, Mexico City
1 - COS, JMWAVE

CS COPY

50-6-122/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-16194	1 March 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	50-6-122/1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	Dnv	rc	6954

RI

CHRONO

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/COG	3/5/68	Paul E Oberst

ABSTRACT WH/1

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	1 Mar 68	W. J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

AUDIT Report

[illegible]

November 1963, and we recommended that the matter be investigated. The current audit disclosed that little or no action has been taken on this matter.

Recommendation: We recommend that the Station determine whether FREAPANE owes WOFIRM for 1963 [illegible] company profits, and notify FREAPANE of the results of the investigation.

Safehouse Rent in Excess of Lease Not Adequately Documented

[illegible] The most recent lease for the LIONION safehouse (MEXI-62) was dated in 1962 and provides for monthly rental payments of MN 650. Since then, the rental payments have been increased to MN [illegible]50 per month, but the lease has not been changed because, in accordance with local custom, the landlord is reluctant to enter into a new lease due to the costs involved and the income tax implications.

Recommendation: We recommend that a memorandum for the record showing the revised rent be prepared and approved by the Chief of Station or other designated Station official.

Revision of Education Allowance Requires Adjustment of Amounts Paid

Education allowances for Mexico City were revised for some grades during the current school year; however, the Station did not retroactively adjust the allowances already paid, as required by section [illegible] of the Standardized Regulations.

Recommendation: We recommend that education allowances paid for the current school year be recomputed and adjusted to the revised allowances.

Proceeds of Property Sale Not Recorded in Finance Records

[illegible] In our review of property transactions, we noted two instances (Vouchers [illegible] and [illegible]) where accountability was dropped because, according to the property vouchers, the property

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City
Attn: Walter W. CORHBURY
Chief of Station, Panama City

Chief, WOACRE

AQUATIC/LIONION
Technical Information

Reference: HMMA 31767 dated 11 April 1967

1. LIONION 1 photographic results continue to be satisfactory for all concerned. It is therefore advisable that no changes in procedure be made at this time.

2. It is apparent that LIONION 1 relayed the incorrect developing formula for the pulse camera film. Perhaps this error is due to his inactivity in processing such film for over a year. Since the conception of this operation all pulse camera film has been developed in Microdol X. On the other hand, Tri X film used in the LIONION 2 operation (Pentax camera and Balscope) has traditionally been developed in Acufine.

3. All pulse camera film is processed at Headquarters by an automatic Huston system. Time and temperature information which the lab uses would be of little value to your development procedure. The results of your recent test indicate that it should be satisfactory for an occasional check on the equipment.

4. The difference between Plus X Negative and Plus X Pan film is worth only one half "f" stop, which should cause no problem if you decide to use the latter.

Albert J. LASCOFF

Distribution:
2 - COS/Mexico City
1 - COS/Panama City

50-6-122/3

LIONION
Sequence

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

HMMS 5358

25 April 1967

SECRET

TSD/POB RWH ery 2378

1 - TSD/Reg
1 - WH/1
1 - WH/2
1 - TSD/TOPS
2 - POB files

WH/1 25 Apr Mr. Stewart by phone x6955

WH/2 " Mr. Hidalgo " x5421

TSD/TOPS " Mr. Roming in draft

TSD/COP

QUENTIN C. JOHNSON

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

ORIG: Polly Pike/cmo
UNIT: WH/Logistics
EXT: 6282
DATE: 4 April 1967

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 24 PER

CONF: WH-8 RID COPY
INFO: FILE, VR, LOGS 4, TSD 6

SECRET 5 1901Z CITE DIRECTOR 89630

TO MEXICO CITY

LIONION

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 0912 (IN 34374)*

PX PAN-417 FILM ASA 125 CAN BE USED BY CLOSING DOWN CAMERA LENS ONE HALF F-STOP SMALLER OPENING. ALTERATION TO HQS PROCESSING NOT NECESSARY. REQN 559-59-67 WILL FURNISH ASA 80, PXN-417 WHICH IS A NON-STOCKED FILM. FYI, STOCK NUMBER 6750-H03-0513 IS FOR PX PAN-417 ASA 125. DO NOT RE-ORDER PXN-417 FILM BY THIS STOCK NUMBER.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH/COMMENT: LIONION Pulse Camera has been using PXN-417 film ASA 80, but supply just received is PX Pan 417 ASA 125.

50-6-122

Telecoord:
TSD/POB, Dick Thayer
OL/SD/CCDB, Catherine Van Combos
WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

R.L. KING
C/WH/LOG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

25/1

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE VR TSD6, AOG54,

S E C R E T 311730Z CITE MEXICO CITY 0912

DIRECTOR

LIONION TECHS

REF A MEXICO CITY 0681 (IN 21452) 31 MAR 67 IN 34374

B RQN NO 559-59-67

LIONION PULSE CAMERA HAS BEEN USING PXN-417 FILM ASA84. SUPPLY JUST RECEIVED IS PX PAN 417 ASA 125. IF LATTER USED WITH SAME SETTING IN LIONION CAN HQS COMPENSATE IN DEVELOPMENT? IF NOT PLEASE MONITOR REF (B) AND EXPEDITE SHIPMENT OF PROPER FILM.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

NNNN

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief, WOACRE Attn: Geoffrey K. BLOXALD

INFO: Chief, WH; COS, Panama City (Clement L. BROCK)

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: AQUATIC/LIONION Pulse Camera

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: See paragraph 5.

1. The LIONION Pulse Camera has been working for well over a year with no major technical problem. A few months ago the 100 foot film magazine had to be repaired because the supply spindles had tightened and put an excessive strain on the motor.

2. More recently, the battery supply had dropped to about 22.5 volts or so causing erratic operation. The sensor relay between the VLS-2 and the camera suffered the most because of chattering and consequently arcing between the points.

3. To prevent failures of this type in the future, Raymond L. BARCENAS is making a small battery charger at a nominal cost that can be floated across the batteries keeping them fully charged. We are doing it this way rather than ordering a DC power supply because it is less expensive than a commercial model and will not be bothered by house current interruptions or fluctuations. If however, WOACRE/PB foresees any problems by doing it this way, please inform us.

4. On a recent visit to LIONION and a check of the equipment, it was found that the lens of his FOCOMAT 1C enlarger has a fungus like smudge between the elements. We cannot detect any degradation in print quality but would like to have a new one in case this is a fungus and it gets worse.

5. In summation it is requested that WOACRE/PB provide the following to Mexico City, charge 7135-2403.

a. Sensor Relay believed to be a Potter-Bromfield 5A5089 but please check;

b. Comments on the power supply;

c. Lens for a Leitz FOCOMAT 1C.

Distribution:
2 - WOACRE
1 - WH
1 - Panama

CS COPY

Willard C. CURTIS

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-31294

DATE: 7 February 1967

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-122/2

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING; X NO INDEXING REQUIRED; ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING; MICROFILM

TO: Chief, KURIOT Attn: Peter T. SWINEHART

INFO.: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: AQUATIC/PBRUMEN/LIONION -- Transmittal of 35mm Pulse Camera

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: MEXI-3960

1. The attachment contains the defective 35mm Pulse Camera previously reported in referenced cable. Very little additional information can be supplied, concerning this mechanical failure, other than that reported in the reference. This particular camera was installed on 16 June 1965 and operated normally from that date until the afternoon of 28 June, at which time it began to continually blow fuses. Hugh T. FRANCOTTE entered the LIONION photographic basehouse that night, and when it was found that the problem could not be corrected on the scene, the camera was removed and taken to MKCHARITY for further troubleshooting. It was finally discovered that the shutter motor was malfunctioning and partially burned-out. Joseph M. RESCIGNO stated that since there was a definite "short" in the motor, this would cause the camera fuses to constantly blow.

2. Also included in the attachment are two (2), one hundred foot capacity, film magazines. Both of these magazines are faulty, causing the film to jam. They were both in use with the previous Pulse Camera which became inoperative during late May and was forwarded to KURIOT Headquarters for repair. FRANCOTTE had two (2) new magazines in stock, and they were issued to LIONION/1 for use with the camera presently being returned for repair or replacement.

Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Camera
Film magazines

CS COPY FILED IN 50-6-18

Distribution:
2 - KURIOT, w/atts
1 - WH, w/o atts

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-26520

DATE: 1 July 1965

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-18

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: X MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: COS, Mexico City ATTN: Hugh T. FRANCOTTE and ATTN: Lawrence F. BARTER

INFO.

FROM: Chief, KURIOT

SUBJECT: AQUATIC
Passports for LIONION -1 and 2. Case 5670, 5670-A

PRIORITY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Paras 2, 3

REF: HMMA-26017, 4 May 1965

1. New passports were issued for LIONION -1 and for LIONION -2 in accordance with your request. These documents as well as the 2 old passports are being sent to you in true name pouch.

2. The documents have a validity period of 5 years from date of issue; however, please return them to KURIOT after the passports have served their purpose. Please sign one copy of the document receipt form accompanying the documents.

3. When the LIONIONS -1 and 2 have received their immigration papers, please try to send the original documents to KURIOT for a brief examination. If they cannot be sent, KURIOT would like to have color-annotated photocopies of them.

LEON T. CISSEL

ATTACHMENT: 1 envl.
1. Documents, U/S/C/T/N/P

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - COS, Mexico City, w/att

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

50-6-122/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
19 - 137 - 415	HMMW-13,672 PRIORITY	
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
27 May 1965	SECRET	50 - 6 - 122/2

1 - TSD/REG
2 - WH/1
1 - Case 5670
1 - Case 5670-A
1 - AB/4 Files
1 - AB/4 Chrono
1 - RID/AN

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
TSD/AB/4	Wesley Parcells	vcs	3284

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/1		Mr. Spera, by Phone X-4507

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/TSD/OA		ROBERT BUSSEY

AB/1 FI / PR DDSF / WH/1 / ABSTRACT INDEX

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION TSD 6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TSD TIME 1330

INFO FILE, VR, WH 7, EI, WH/C 8

S E C R E T 291651Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 3960

29 JUN 70 IN 01364

AQUATIC PBRUMEN LIONION

PULSE CAMERA BEGAN CONTINUALLY BLOWING FUSES AFTERNOON 28 JUNE. FRANCOTTE PERFORMED BASIC CHECKS THAT NIGHT AND REMOVED CAMERA FOR FURTHER TROUBLESHOOTING MKCHARITY. TROUBLE BELIEVED TO BE CENTERED AROUND DEFECTIVE SHUTTER MOTOR. MOTOR CHECKED MKCHARITY AND FOUND PARTIALLY BURNED OUT. REPAIRS CANNOT BE MADE MEXI. REQUEST REPLACEMENT CAMERA SOONEST. MALFUNCTIONING UNIT TO BE POUCHED HQS 1 JULY. TEMPORARY PHOTOGRAPHIC SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT INSTALLED LIONION BASE HOUSE MORNING 29 JUNE.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 29

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
Mexico City

ACTION
TSD 6

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE VR, WH/C 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, WH 7

S
E C R E T 171815Z

DIR CITE MEXI 3829

17 JUN 65 IN 92775

AQUATIC PBRUMEN LIONION

REF TM 593898, 8 JUNE 1965.

PULSE CAMERA CABLES FORWARDED VIA REF, RECD 16 JUNE. CAMERA INSTALLED AND TESTED SAME NIGHT AND IS OPERATING SATISFACTORILY.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, KURIOT

INFO.: Chief, WH Division
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: AQUATIC/PBRUMEN/Issuance of LIONION Passports

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

DOC. MICRO. SER.
NOV 9 1973
MICROFILMED

References: (A) MEXI 3234, 28 April 1965
(B) DIR 06231, 1 May 1965

2P

1. Attached (USC) are the expired genuine PBRUMEN passports of LIONION-1 and LIONION-2 together with two photographs and five signature specimens of each agent.

2. It is requested that new PBRUMEN passports be prepared by KURIOT and pouched to the Station as soon as possible.

3. The assumption of reference B that passports obtained at the PBRUMEN Embassy in Mexico City are actually issued in the PBRUMEN Capitol City is correct.

4. The old passports should be returned to the Station as the Mexican immigration visas appearing of pages 11 and 19 of the LIONION-1 and LIONION-2 passports, respectively, must be in the possession of the Subjects until they are granted their final immigration documents.

continued

Remove from Project: DAFGHAN
CS Classification: 50-6-122/2
JOB # 75-493/79
Box: 24 Fold: 2

Attachment:
As stated - (USC)

TSD/18
Case No.
5670-A

Distribution
2 - C/KURIOT w/att (USC)
1 - C/WHD w/o/att To WH/1
1 - COS, JMWAVE w/o/att - Out Pouch
3 - Files

DOC FORWARDED W/O S/C
BY RID/AN 11 May 65

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CS COPY

50-6-122/2

No att for Hqs.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
D-50-137-415	HMMA-26017	4 May 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	50-6-122/2

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-26017

5. The Station is investigating through LICRAFT-1 the passport issuing service in the Miami area, as mentioned in reference cables, and will forward details in separate correspondence. Examples of Miami-issued passports will be made available for Headquarters perusal.

6. The Station wishes to express its appreciation to KURIOT for prompt action in response to reference A.

Lawrence F. Barker
for Willard C. CURTIS

INDEX X YES [ ] NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 50-6-122/2
X-REF TO FILE NO. D 19-137-415
FILE RID [ ] RET. TO BRANCH [ ]
DESTROY X SIG. T. C. Kline

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 28

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM C/TSD/AA/4
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
TSD 6

ADVANCE COPY [ ] ISSUED [ ] SLOTTED [ ] TUBED

INFO
VR. FILE DDP, WH/C8, WH7, C/OPS, FI, C/CA

DOC. MICRO. SER.
NOV 9 1973
MICROFILMED

S E C R E T 290025Z

CDIR WAVE CITE MEXI 3234

29 APR 65 IN 54659

PAQUATIC TYPIC LIONION

1. PBRUMEN ORDINARY PASSPORTS FOR LIONIONS 1 AND 2 HAVE EXPIRED. SUBJS CANNOT TRAVEL FROM MEXI BECAUSE MEXI GOVERNMENT WILL NOT ISSUE REENTRY PERMIT IN EXPIRED PASSPORT, PBPRIME GOVT WILL NOT ISSUE VISA IN ABSENCE MEXI REENTRY PERMIT. MEXI GOVT STANDS PAT EXPLAINING, RIGHTLY, THAT PBRUMEN EMB WILL ISSUE NEW PASSPORT TO ANY PBRUMEN CITIZEN REGARDLESS OF POLITICIAL LEARNINGS HENCE LIONIONS MUST GET NEW PASSPORTS.

2. FOR REASONS OPERATIONAL SECURITY LIONIONS CANNOT VISIT EMB FOR NEW PASSPORTS SINCE THEY KNOWN BY SIGHT TO EMB PERSONNEL AS MEXICAN NEIGHBORS. THIS SITUATION RESULTED IN COMPLICATED AND EXPENSIVE CXO ESCORTED "BLACK" BORDER CORSSINGS BY LIONIONS LAST YEAR WHEN THEY VISITED RELATIVES IN PBPRIME.

3. CAN HQS OR JMWAVE ISSUE NEW PBRUMEN PASSPORTS FOR BOTH AGENTS? PLS CABLE PROCEEDURE. MEXI PREPARED POUCH OLD PASSPORTS AND SPARE PHOTOS. LIONIONS WISH TRAVEL SOON.

4. FYI JMWAVE: LICRAFT-1 RECENTLY PURCHASED TWO EXCELLENT NEW PBRUMEN PASSPORTS IN JMWAVE AREA FOR HIS SONS, AT COST 75 DOLLARS

50-6-122/2
29 Apr 65

SECRET

D 19-137-415

Remove from Project KDAFGHAN
CS Classification: 50-6-122/2
JOB # 73-442/79
Box: 24 Fold: 2

TSD/IB

SECRET

EACH. IF HAVE [illegible] THIS BUSINESS, BELIEVE STA CAN GET THEM FROM LICRAFT.

SECRET

CFN

PLEASE [illegible] 4001 RE ACTION INDICATORS

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
TO: Chief, KURIOT Attn: Peter T. SWINEHART	XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO: Chief, WH Division		MARKED FOR INDEXING / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM

SUBJECT: AQUATIC/Operational -- Availability of the Nikon Television System

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. At the time of Hugh T. FRANCOTTE's departure from Headquarters, KURIOT had recently begun an extensive evaluation of the Nikon closed circuit television system. If this particular system is now considered "operational", FRANCOTTE wishes to be so advised, as there may be a possible application for it in support of an operation at the Mexico City Station. Lawrence F. BARKER was recently briefed by FRANCOTTE on the Nikon system, and is now interested in obtaining additional facts concerning it. BARKER, who is responsible for the LIONION Project, foresees a possibility for its use in the LIONION photographic basehouse.

2. It was thought that perhaps the system could be further "operationally tested" at this basehouse, and at the same time, the Station could examine the possibility of a permanent installation. Presently, LIONION/1 is utilizing a Balscope and Pentax camera for obtaining photographic coverage of the entrance to the PBRUMEN Embassy. Provided the television camera could be equipped with a telephoto lens of about the same focal length as the combination of the Balscope and 20X eyepiece, this system might be a suitable substitute for the equipment now in service.

3. It is requested that the Mexico City Station be advised if the Nikon television system is available, and Headquarters thoughts concerning the testing of it at the LIONION basehouse.

Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
2 - KURIOT
1 - WH

CS COPY FILED IN 50-6-122/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
201-	HMMA-25981	29 April 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	50-6-122/1

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : ..Sprague/ory
UNIT : TSD/POB
EXT : 2873
DATE : 15 Sept 64

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING
1 | 4
2 | 5
3 | 6

15 SEP 64 R 39z

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : TSD 6
INFO : WH 7, CI, CI/OPS, FI, VR

Bustos

TO PRITY MEXI INFO CITE DIR 52651

AQUATIC LIONION

REF MEXI 0982 (IN 79741)*

1. PULSE CAMERAS BEING MODIFIED AND RECONDITIONED BY CONTRACTOR TO CORRECT FAULTS SURFACED DURING LIONION OP. ~~MINIMUM TIME OF~~ AVAILABILITY FIRST CAMERA THREE WEEKS PROVIDING NO UNFORESEEN DIFFICULTIES OCCUR.

2. IF PRESENT CAMERA INOPERABLE SUGGEST RETURN TO ROBOT AND VLS-2 OR K-100 WITH BURST BRACKET AND VLS-2 FOR INTERIM OPERATIONAL COVERAGE.

3. A SECOND CAMERA WILL BE SENT MEXI AS SOON AS RECONDITIONING COMPLETED FOR USE STANDBY.

- END OF MESSAGE -

TSD/COMMENT: *LIONION pulse camera malfunctioning. Request Hq forward replacement.

Lionion Logs 2

WH/1/Mexico Miss Bustos by phone x4523

TSD/PB Mr. Ericlson in draft

[signature]
SIDNEY GOTTLIEB
C/TSD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[signature]
ROBERT BUSSEY
C/TSD/OA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

SUBJECT AND PROJECT FILE REQUEST AND FIELD NOTIFICATION OF ACTION

FROM: (Headquarters component) WH/1

TO: IP/AN

TO: (Station/Base) Mexico City

FROM: (Division) WHD

INFORMATION FOR REQUESTERS

COMPLETE ITEMS 1 THROUGH 12.
ITEM 3 - ALL FILE TITLES MUST BE STERILE SINCE THEY WILL APPEAR ON THE FIELD COPIES AND ON MACHINE LISTS.
ITEM 6 - ALL REMARKS MUST BE STERILE.
ITEM 7 AND 8 - USE FIRST THREE LETTERS OF DISPATCH SYMBOLS FOR FIELD STATIONS AND LIST HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED NUMERIC CODES.

ITEM 10 - ENTER OLD TITLE WHEN AMENDING A TITLE. CITE ANY FILES, SUCH AS 201 OR PROJECT FILES THAT ARE RELATED TO THE FILE COVERED BY THIS REQUEST. ITEM 10 MAY ALSO BE USED TO GIVE REASONS FOR THE ACTION BEING REQUESTED, TO IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF MATERIAL TO BE PLACED IN A FILE OR TO MAKE OTHER EXPLANATORY REMARKS.
ITEM 11 - A RECORDS OFFICER MUST SIGN ALL FILE ACTION REQUESTS. CONSULT YOUR RMO ON ANY PROBLEMS THAT ARISE.

INFORMATION CONCERNING FILE

1. TYPE OF FILE: ☐ SUBJECT ☒ PROJECT

2. CODE (FILE) NUMBER

COUNTRY NUMBER	CATEGORY NUMBER	SPECIFIC SUBJECT NUMBER
050	006	074/2

3. FILE TITLE (SPECIFIC SUBJECT) (PROJECTS LIMITED TO 15 SPACES)

KDFACTOR

ACTION REQUIRED

4. ANALYSIS ACTION: OPEN FILE; AMEND FILE TITLE; X CLOSE FILE (INDICATE DISPOSITION); REOPEN

5. DISPOSITION: X RETAIN; DESTRUCTION RECOMMENDED THRU (DATE)

6. REMARKS (FOR FIELD DISTRIBUTION)

7. INTERESTED STATIONS (PROJECTS ONLY): HMM

8. INTERESTED HEADQUARTERS DESK (LIST ACTION DESK FIRST): 050

9. FILES ACTION

X HOLD IN CS FILES; RESTRICTED; X UNRESTRICTED; PREPARE FOLDER AND SEND TO REQUESTER; CHARGE PERMANENTLY TO (OFFICER & DESK)

10. COMMENTS (INCLUDE SPECIAL HEADQUARTERS ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS)

11. ENDORSEMENT — SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R.O.: [signature] #630

12. COORDINATION — SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R.O. (WHEN APPLICABLE)

13. RID APPROVAL — REQUEST APPROVED BY: [signature]

EFFECTIVE DATE: 23 July 1973

CODE (FILE) NUMBER: 50 | 06 | 74/2

FORM 12-63 812 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

38 1—CS COPY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 11-1

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DISSEM BY 38

ACTION UNIT: ISD-EOO — FILE, VR — WH8, DDP, EI

ACTION NO.

S E C R E T 141955Z MAR 72 CITE MEXICO CITY 19236

560483

DIRTECH INFO PANTECH, DIRECTOR

AQUATIC KDAFGHAN KDFACTOR

REF A. HMMA-41502

B. PANTECH 18798 (IN 559398)

1. PLS PROCURE TWO 1000 MM CATADIOPTRIC LENSES WITH CAMERAS AS REQUESTED REF A.

2. FOR PANTECH: NOT NECESSARY PROCURE SPOTMATICS UNLESS ADVISED DIFFERENTLY BY DIRTECH. GP-1.

S E C R E T

File KDAFGHAN and KDFACTOR Support [illegible]

Does this mean WH/COG handling?

YEP

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 1

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: 15

C29

ACTION UNIT: WH 8 | INFO | FILE, VR, TSD 6

ACTION CHANGE

ACTION NO.

MEXICO CITY 19236 (STATION & NUMBER) IN 560963-A (IN NUMBER)

C/S COMMENT: THE ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED

FROM : TSD (DIVISION)

TO : WH (DIVISION)

BY : Bob Lowery TSD 3121 (NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

IN COORDINATION WITH : Kim Goodmans WH 6252 (NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

SECRET

RW

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: KDFACTOR Project Amendment

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Project KDFACTOR was amended 10 December 1971 for $4,260 for FY 1971 to cover the termination bonuses for KDFACTOR-1 and KDFACTOR-7. The Project amendment also provides funds of $19,000 for FY 1972 and $20,000 for FY 1973.

2. One of the provisos of the Project amendment is that the Station furnish Headquarters an updated security review of this operation with particular attention of the knowledgeability of terminated agents and their families. The Station should also address itself to the contingency that the present sites or personnel will be blown and investigate alternate means of continuing the KDFACTOR coverage. Please forward the security review to arrive at Headquarters no later than 15 March 1972.

Leslie D. CLEBANOFF

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM

Dist:
2 - COS, Mexico City

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-18773	23 DEC 1971 typed 21 Dec 1971
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-74/2

1 - WH/1
1 - IP

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1/FI/CI	Hernandez	dm	4167

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	21-12-71	John C. Murray

PREVIOUS EDITION. (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.: Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Turnover of LIEMPTY Project

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None. For your information.

REFERENCE : HMMA-39,679, 28 October 1970

1. Primary responsibility for the operational and administrative handling of the LIEMPTY Project was transferred, effective 1 December 1970, within the Station from the REDTOP to the Operational Support Section. This transfer was made as part of our effort to consolidate basic support functions in the Operational Support Section, and to relieve the REDTOP Section of activities which do not contribute directly to the pursuit of priority recruitment targets. However, the REDTOP Section will continue to be the principal consumer of the LIEMPTY product as received from the LILYRIC and LICALLA photo surveillance points. It will also be the main provider of guidance and requests for special LILYRIC/LICALLA coverage.

2. The previous REDTOP Case Officer (Bruce H. FERNALD) introduced the new Case Officer, Howard T. BAGAUS, to LIEMPTY-9, -13, and -14 in early December. LIMOUSINE, owner of the LILYRIC property, will continue to be handled by Timothy M. ARCHBOLD of the REDTOP Section.

Howard J. Archadle

Howard J. ARCHADLE

DISTRIBUTION:
~~2~~ - C/WHD
1 - C/SBD

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
HMMA-39,832	9 December 1970
CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
SECRET	50-6-74/1

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BY: AT:

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY: 24 PER

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH-8 ☐ RID COPY INFO. FILE, VR. LOGS-4

767

SECRET 112130Z JUL 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 0915 11 Jul 69 IN 00900

DIRECTOR

ADMIN/LOGS/LIEMPTY

REFERENCES: A. DIRECTOR 19485

B. BOOK DISPATCH 6678

C. HMMTA-9673

1. KEYED TO REFERENCE B.

A. RAMBLER AMERICAN SEDAN

B. 1969

C. SERIAL AK-17560

D. MV-2947

E. 3258.25 USD PURCHAS PLUS 97.75 USD MEXICAN TAX; TOTAL 3356.00 USD.

G. REGISTERED AS GERENDE PERSONAL VEHICLE. RECORDED ON FINANCE VOUCHER 00038 DTD 9 JULY 1969

2. DISPOSAL MV - 2606 REPORTED REFERENCE C.

SECRET

LIEMPTY 202

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG: Damon Watters/sah
UNIT: WH/Logistics
EXT: 6282
DATE: 10 July 1969

SECRET 14

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 24 PER

INDEX NO INDEX RETURN TO BRANCH FILE RID
FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH-8 FILE, VR. LOGS-4

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET

10 22 02 Z JUL 69

CITE DIRECTOR 19485

TO MEXICO CITY

ADMIN LOGS LIEMPTY

REF: DIRECTOR 83554

REQUEST STATION ADVISE STATUS MV-2947 AND DISPOSITION MV-2606. INFO NEEDED SOONEST FOR COMPILING NEW BUDGET ESTIMATES.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/1

DISTRIBUTION:

OL/SD/FSB/VS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

R. L. KING
C/WH/LOG

50-6-74

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 16

SECRET

ORIG: H. Peverill/jt
UNIT: WH/Logistics
EXT: 6282
DATE: 13 March 1969

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ___ PER ___ #

INDEX / DESTROY / RETURN TO ___ BRANCH / FILE RID
NO INDEX / FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH8 | RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, LOGS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 13 23 11 MAR 69 CITE DIRECTOR 83554

TO MEXICO CITY

ADVIS LOGS LILMPTY

REF: MEXICO CITY 9438 (IN-11843)*

1. STATION AUTHORIZED DISPOSE MV-2606 PER FR 45-31(3) AND REPLACE LOCALLY WITH 1969 RAMBLER, COST NOT TO EXCEED $4000.00. MV-2947 APPLIES TO NEW VEHICLE.

2. ADVISE DESCRIPTION MV-2947 AND DISPOSAL ACTION MV-2606 WHEN ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH BD-6678.

3. FILE: 50-6-74/2

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: *Reference requested approval to replace locally a 1963 Rambler which has reached 78,000 miles and is in need of repairs.

WH/B&F [signature]

WH/1 [signature]

DISTRIBUTION:

OL/SD/FSB/VS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

R. L. KING
C/WH/LOG

13 Mar 69
50-6-74/2

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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DISSEM BY 76 PER

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, LOGS 4, MPS/BG

959

S E C R E T 112210Z MAR 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 9438 (Mexi)

DIRECTOR

LIEMPTY LOGS

11 MAR 69 IN 11843

1. REQUEST APPROVAL REPLACE MV-2606, USED BY RAYMON H. GERENDE AS LIEMPTY PRINCIPAL AGENT. REPLACEMENT REQUESTED ON FOLLOWING GROUNDS:

J. VEHICLE NEARLY SIX YEARS OLD AND HAD 72,000 MILES AS OF 1 MARCH 1969.

B. IN NEXT SIX MONTHS VEHICLE WILL NEED REPAIRS TO ENGINE, BRAKES, STEERING AND BODY, ESTIMATED COST OF WHICH EXCEEDS 50 PER CENT OF CURRENT CASH VALUE OF CAR, WHICH ESTIMATED AT 1000 DOLLARS.

2. PLAN REPLACE MV-2606 WITH EQUIVALENT VEHICLE, COST NOT TO EXCEED 4000 DOLLARS. BELIEVE LOW-PRICED AMERICAN BRAND SEDAN SUCH AS RAMBLER AMERICAN WILL FIT OPERATIONAL, SECURITY, AND COVER REUIREMENTS. NECESSARY MONHDCAVAILABLE IN PROJECT AS STATION PROJECTS FY69 LIEMPTY OBLIGATIONS AT 38,000 DOLLARS AGAINST PROJECT APPROVAL OF 43,320 DOLLARS FOR FY69.

3. IF APPROVED, PLS INCREASE FIELD PROCUREMENT ALLOTMENT.

4. FILE: 50-6-74/2.

S E C R E T

CS COPY

SECRET

11 Mar 69
50-6-74/2

14-00000

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INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

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X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 76 PER

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, LOGS 4, MPS/BG

959

S E C R E T 112210Z MAR 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 9438

DIRECTOR

11 Mar 69 IN 11643

LIEMPTY LOGS

1. REQUEST APPROVAL REPLACE MV-2606, USED BY RAYMON H. GERENDE AS LIEMPTY PRINCIPAL AGENT. REPLACEMENT REQUESTED ON FOLLOWING GROUNDS:

J. VEHICLE NEARLY SIX YEARS OLD AND HAD 78,000 MILES AS OF 1 MARCH 1969.

B. IN NEXT SIX MONTHS VEHICLE WILL NEED REPAIRS TO ENGINE, BRAKES, STEERING AND BODY, ESTIMATED COST OF WHICH EXCEEDS 50 PER CENT OF CURRENT CASH VALUE OF CAR, WHICH ESTIMATED AT 1000 DOLLARS.

2. PLAN REPLACE MV-2606 WITH EQUIVALENT VEHICLE, COST NOT TO EXCEED 4000 DOLLARS. BELIEVE LOW-PRICED AMERICAN BRAND SEDAN SUCH AS RAMBLER AMERICAN WILL FIT OPERATIONAL, SECURITY, AND COVER REQUIREMENTS. NECESSARY MONHDCAVAILABLE IN PROJECT AS STATION PROJECTS FY69 LIEMPTY OBLIGATIONS AT 38,000 DOLLARS AGAINST PROJECT APPROVAL OF 43,320 DOLLARS FOR FY69.

3. IF APPROVED, PLS INCREASE FIELD PROCUREMENT ALLOTMENT.

4. FILE: 50-6-74/2.

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

HMMA 35208, 8 August 1968

LIEMPTY/6 terminated amicably and resettled by his son-in-law - was content with termination bonus of $4,736. Following termination, effective 31 May 1968, the LIMITED base house went out of existence - station did not retain apartment since coverage from LILYRIC is completely satisfactory. LILYRIC personnel have done such good work that station now has better coverage than ever and at less cost.

14-00000

ORIG: Nancy Perkins/rc
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954
DATE: 19 Apr 68

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 14

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY: 30 PER
CONF: WHP

[ ] INDEX [ ] DESTROY [ ] RETURN TO ____ BRANCH [ ] FILE RID
[ ] NO INDEX [ ] FILE IN CS FILE NO.
[ ] RID COPY
INFO: FILE, VR, MPS/BG2, ADDP, C/OA

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 19 22 22 Z CITE DIRECTOR 93000

TO MEXICO CITY File LIEMPTY Support

REF: MEXICO CITY 5263 (IN 93773)*

1. LIEMPTY PROJECT STILL BEING PROCESSED. IF APPROVED AS SUBMITTED, WILL ~~CONTAIN~~ approve total of $42,185 FOR FISCAL 68. STATION SHOWS $31,071 OBLIGATED AS OF 31 MARCH, LEAVING BALANCE OF $11,114. ON BASIS PAST EXPENDITURES, CAN PROJECT ROUTINE DISBURSEMENT OF ABOUT $10,000 DURING APRIL,MAY AND JUNE, WHICH WOULD INDICATE INSUFFICIENT FUNDS TO PAY $4,736 ~~NON~~ BONUS, BARRING UNLIKELY POSSIBILITY YOUR UNLIQUIDATED OBLIGATIONS CAN BE LIQUIDATED SO AS TO COVER IT.

2. RATHER THAN RETRIEVE PROJECT BEFORE APPROVAL IN ORDER TO AMEND IT, SUGGEST YOU TERMINATE LIEMPTY/6 AND CLOSE LIMITED (IN MAY) AND PAY BONUS 1 JULY FROM FY 69 FUNDS. [redacted]

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Wish terminate LIEMPTY/6 and pay bonus. Will project funds cover this?

for WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WH/B&F [signature]

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☑ NO

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X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☑

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM

ACTION: WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO: FILE, VR, CI/OA, COPS/BG 2

S E C R E T 181745Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY (Mexi) 18 APR 68 IN 53773

DIRECTOR

LIEMPTY

1. STATION PLANS TERMINATE LIEMPTY 6 AND CLOSE LIMITED BASE HOUSE EFFECTIVE 31 MAY 68. LIMITED COVERAGE NO LONGER COMPLETELY RELIABLE OR THOROUGH DUE ADVANCING AGE AND FAILING HEALTH LIEMPTY-6. LILYRIC BASE HOUSE WILLING AND ABLE INCREASE WORKING HOURS TO PROVIDE FULL SIX DAY COVERAGE. LICALLA TO CONTINUE UNCHANGED. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT SALARY INCREASES PLANNED FOR LILYRIC AND LICALLA PERSONNEL, ESTIMATE ANNUAL SAVINGS OF 4000 DOLLARS THRU LIMITED TERMINATION.

2. REQUEST APPROVAL PAY LIEMPTY-6 TERMINATION BONUS OF 59,200 PESOS (4736 DOLLARS) BASED ON STANDARD MEXICAN FORMULA OF THREE MONTHS SALARY PLUS ONE MONTH FOR EACH FULL YEAR OF SERVICE (THIRTEEN YEARS), AT CURRENT SALARY RATE [illegible] PESOS.

3. PLS ADVISE STATUS LIEMPTY PROJECT RENEWAL ACTION AND INFORM STATION TOTAL FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR FY 68. NEED INFO TO DETERMINE IF SUFFICIENT FUNDS AVAILABLE TO COVER [illegible] TERMINATION BONUS.

S E C R E T

SECRET

AN FW	FI	
PS	DEPT	LOH/1
ABSTRACT	X	INDEX

18 April 68
50-6-74/2

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH

INFO: Chief, SB

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY/Memoranda of Oral Commitments

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith are authentic copies of Memoranda of Oral Commitments reflecting salary increases for the following LIEMPTY agents:

a. LIEMPTY-9 : Salary increased from 4,000 pesos to 4,500 pesos per month.

b. LIEMPTY-14 : Salary increased from 1,800 pesos to 1,900 pesos per month.

c. LIEMPTY-26 : Initial salary set at 700 pesos per month.

d. LIEMPTY-27 : Salary increased from 1,500 pesos to 1,800 pesos per month.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:
MOCs (4)

Distribution:
2 - C/WH, w/atts.
2 - C/SB, w/atts.

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DO NOT REMOVE

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-34573	2 May 1968
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-74/2

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH

INFO: Chief, SB

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY Properties

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMW-15952, 27 November 1967

1. Headquarters' confusion regarding the various LIEMPTY properties is understandable, although each change in location was duly reported as it occurred, and at various times project renewal requests, progress reports, and other correspondence has pinpointed the locations of the base houses involved. The confusion undoubtedly stems from the unfortunate fact that LIMITED and LILYRIC in effect exchanged approximate locations in 1966 without changing cryptonyms. Up to this point, LIMITED had been in a building owned by WOFIRM (with LIMOUSINE fronting for WOFIRM). LILYRIC had been renting an apartment in a building in which WOFIRM had no financial interest. In 1965, however, LIMOUSINE bought the property containing the building in which LIMITED had been located, razed the building, and built a new building in which an apartment was rented to the Station (the rent, however, was to be returned to the Station for three years as partial payment on the loan which the Station had given LIMOUSINE so that he could buy the building). For various operational reasons it was decided to put the LILYRIC personnel into the new building, instead of the LIMITED crew. LIMITED was therefore moved into the building which LILYRIC had occupied. At this point, of course, new cryptonyms should probably have been assigned in order to avoid the confusion which has evidently developed. (This was not, however, simply a switch of personnel - each base house retained its organizational integrity, which is undoubtedly why crypts were not changed). As far as LICALLA is concerned, the confusion

........continued

Distribution:
2 - C/ WH, w/att.
2 - C/SB, w/att.

Attachment:
Identity Sheet (under separate cover)

18 Jan 68

CS COPY

50-6-74/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-33814	8 January 1968
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-74/2

probably stems from the fact that, while its location has not changed, it is located within the LIMUST building, which is owned by WOFIRM (with LIMOUSINE acting as "front") and which is administered within the LIMESA project. As stated, however, all of this has been carefully documented for Headquarters. The LIMOUSINE purchase of the old LIMITED building generated considerable correspondence (see particularly MEXI 2159 and DIR 77745 of January 1965). HMMA-28322 and HMMA-30403 spelled out the reasons for switching LILYRIC and LIMITED, and the completion of the move was reported in HMMA-30687. Finally, sketches and plans of the LILYRIC and LIMITED houses in their new locations were forwarded with HMMA-31303, dated 7 February 1967. As far as LICALLA is concerned, its location and status was never open to question, and its location in the LIMUST complex is regularly mentioned in LIMESA progress renewal requests. The Station understands that a memo describing the locations of the various base houses was attached to the most recent LIMESA project renewal request when it was submitted to the staffs by WH/1.

2. Personnel within the base houses is also well-documented (most of the LIEMPTY progress reports have identified each agent in each house), and the personnel have never been switched from house to house. Perhaps the best rundown of these personnel is Raymond H. GERENDE's security review, forwarded with HMMA-31164, 24 January 1967.

3. Station Real Property reports are also, with one exception (MEXI-41), up-to-date and they reflect current conditions. MEXI-03 does, of course, include LICALLA. Nevertheless, the Station asked for $1800 for rent and utilities for the following reasons: first of all, utilities are an unrecoverable expense no matter who owns the apartment. Secondly, the rent, even though returned to the Station because WOFIRM owns the building, must physically be paid by the occupant of LICALLA. He, in turn, is reimbursed by the Station via GERENDE. LIMOUSINE eventually returns the money, at which time it is credited to expense. This could, of course, be handled differently, but the Station has always found it convenient to finance in this manner, largely because finances with LIMOUSINE are handled on a semi-annual basis. The reimbursement, therefore, often comes many months after the payment.

4. The Station neglected to cancel MEXI-41, which should be done as it refers to LILYRIC in its old location, before the move in 1966. LILYRIC is now MEXI-132, and is in the building owned by LIMOUSINE. Rent payments are, as originally intended, being used to help liquidate LIMOUSINE's debt, and, as instructed in HMMS-4814, 15 June 1966, the Station is crediting this money to miscellaneous receipts. There can be, therefore, no question of the need to include money for LILYRIC rent and utilities in the LIEMPTY project. LILYRIC rent is, and has been since the apartment was occupied in October 1966, 3,000 pesos per month, which amounts to $2,880 per year ($3,200 has been requested in order to include utilities). Headquarters is correct in stating that the agreed-upon figure for the rent in this new building was 2,300 pesos per month. Station files indicate that the reason for the increase (and this apparently was not reported to Headquarters) was that the bank which holds the major part of LIMOUSINE's loan had determined that 3,000 pesos was a fair price for the apartment. The Station had, of course, no choice but to go along with this.

5. The Station has no record of MEXI-02, but it is likely that this is the old LIMITED apartment, which was indeed purchased by WOFIRM (via LIMOUSINE) in 1955. But since that building was later purchased and razed by LIMOUSINE, the old LIMITED apartment ceased to exist. The LIMITED base house was subsequently transferred to the building which had previously housed LILYRIC (but not to the same apartment), and LIMITED is

now carried, in its current location, as MEXI-113. As was the case with old LILYRIC, the rent money is not returned to the Station; WOFIRM has no financial interest in the building. Thus it is evident that the LIEMPTY project renewal, which used to say 'LIMITED and LICALLA rents are returned to Station by LIMOUSINE and credited to Station miscellaneous receipts" should now carry the footnote "LICALLA rent is returned to the Station and credited to expense; LILYRIC rent is, and will be through September 1969, returned to the Station by LIMOUSINE and credited to miscellaneous receipts as partial payment on Station loan to LIMOUSINE."

6. Finally, the LIEMPTY darkroom is the room where the films taken by LICALLA, LILYRIC, LIMITED, and LIENTRAP are developed, printed, and (on request) enlarged by LIEMPTY-4. This darkroom is located in GERENDE's apartment, and he is paid 1,000 pesos per month for maintenance of the darkroom in recognition of the fact that one room in his living quarters has been turned into a darkroom, and his electric and water bills are substantially higher than they would normally be without a darkroom on the premises. GERENDE is building a house which he expects to occupy in February 1968. His plans for the house specifically include a LIEMPTY darkroom, and he will continue to be paid 1,000 pesos per month for this. To cover this payment in the new house, MEXI-137 has been written and will be forwarded to Headquarters shortly.

7. In answer to paragraph 5 of reference, it is hoped that the following summary will end the confusion:

a. LICALLA

(1) MEXI-03
(2) Address under separate cover (Identity-1).
(3) LICALLA has been in operation at its present location since 1956, originally as a rented property. In September 1957 the building in which LICALLA is located (which consists of four units, collectively known as LIMUST) was purchased by the Station, with LIMOUSINE acting as a front.
(4) Actual cost is nothing, since property is owned by WOFIRM. The original purchase price for the four units was $40,000.00 with an additional $20,000.00 spent on renovation. Rent is paid for cover purposes at the annual rate of $1,248.00
(5) Cost of utilities is estimated at $552.00 annually.
(6) Since June 1957, LIEMPTY-9 (originally LIPSTICK-39) has operated the LICALLA base house. No other LIEMPTY agents are associated with LICALLA.

b. LIMITED

(1) MEXI-113
(2) Address under separate cover (Identity 2)
(3) LIMITED has been in its current location since December 1964, and it is a rented property. At its previous location, the LIMITED base had been in operation from 1953 until September 1964.
(4) Annual rent is $1,440.00
(5) Annual cost of utilities is estimated at $560.00.
(6) LIEMPTY-6 (originally LIPSTICK-14) has operated the LIMITED base house (in both locations) since 1955. No other LIEMPTY agents are associated with LIMITED.

c. LILYRIC

(1) MEXI-132
(2) Address under separate cover (Identity 3)
(3) LILYRIC has been in its present location since October 1966, when the new building was completed and ready for occupancy. It is a rented property, although for three years beginning 1 October 1966 the rent is to be returned to the Station as partial payment on a loan to LIMOUSINE. This loan was made to permit LIMOUSINE to purchase the property and construct the building in which LILYRIC is located. This property had previously belonged to WOFIRM and had contained the building in which LIMITED had been located. LILYRIC was previously (November 1956 to September 1966) located in a rented property (the same building, but not the same apartment, in which LIMITED is now located).
(4) Annual rent is $2,880.00.
(5) Estimated annual cost of utilities is $320.00.
(6) LIEMPTY-13 (originally LIJERSEY-2) has operated the LILYRIC base house (in both locations) since LILYRIC was established in 1956. He is supported by his wife (LIEMPTY-14), and his son (LIEMPTY-27). Another son, LIEMPTY-26, has also worked in LILYRIC. (Because LIEMPTY-13 has a full-time job, LIEMPTY-14 does most of the photographic work, assisted by LIEMPTY-27. LIEMPTY-13 does some of this work, and makes all meetings with GERENDE.)

d. LIEMPTY photo lab.

(1) MEXI-137
(2) Address (as of February 1968) under separate cover (Identity 4).
(3) Actually, no property as such is involved here. The Chief of Station authorized payment to GERENDE for the use of a room in his quarters as a darkroom in 1964, after GERENDE was moved out of a base house in which he lived (rent-free) and maintained the dark room.
(4) and (5) Annual cost is $960.00, including utilities.
(6) The occupant is GERENDE, although the photo processing is normally done by LIEMPTY-4.

8. It is hoped that the above will shed some light on the problem; the Station will be glad to answer any further questions Headquarters may have.

Vincent P. Rizzuto [signature]
FOR/Willard C. CURTIS

50-6-74/2

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO:

HMMA-33814, 9 January 1968

IDENTITY SHEET

Identity (1)	Benjamin Hill 15
Identity (2)	Pedro Antonio de los Santos 104, apt. 17
Identity (3)	Gelati 2 (as this is a corner house it is also known as Pedro Antonio de los Santos 100), Penthouse
Identity (4)	Calle Bezares, Colonia Molino de Bezares, Mexico 10, D.F.

S/C ATT #1 HMMA 33814

CS COPY

50-6-74/2

SECRET

14-00000

F'. LIEMPTY Support

DISPATCH SECRET

Chief, WH Division

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Admin/Finance - Station Accounting for December 1967.

ACTION REQUIRED: Paragraph 3.

REFERENCE : A. HMMT-8387
B. Book Dispatch 0279

1. Attached is a copy of the subject accounting. The original was forwarded to the Office of Finance by reference A.

2. As requested in reference B, there are no FY-1966 unliquidated obligations. FYI: FY-1967 unliquidated obligations are as follows:

SUPPORT	$1,784.00
LIHALO	232.15
LIP	169.45
LILISP-X	2,021.30

In addition, upon receipt of LIEMBINY refunds for safehouse rent collections for the period January thru June 1967, Projects LIMESA and LIEMPTY will be credited in like amounts.

3. It is requested that FY-68 advices of suballotments for all Station's activities be forwarded as soon as available and that "Notifications of Project Approval Action" for Projects LICONGA and LIOGLE be amended to increase FY-68 funds available in the field as follows:

LICONGA - to $9,700 (for quarters, operational travel, rental of safehouse, and miscellaneous operational expenses).
LIOGLE - to $20,000 see HMMA-33469.

Attachment:
As Stated Above.

for/WILLARD C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD, w/att.

HMMT-8583

12 January 1968

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.:

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY Properties

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. The presence of so many new desk personnel at headquarters - people who are unfamiliar with station history - means that we must turn to you with questions oftener than you might wish. Our present question concerns property involved in LIEMPTY. (We are submitting the project as received from the field, but do not understand the background very well.)

2. HMMA-11257 of 16 January 1959, a project renewal, said that "approximately one year ago the LICALLA base was purchased by KUBARK through LIMOUSINE", and we have not found any cables or dispatches which would show a change in that status. Does MEXI 03 LIMUST/LIMESA (see Real Property Report of August 1967) include LICALLA? If so, and if we own LICALLA, why does it cost us $1800 a year for rent and utilities? (Up until the submission dated 1963 the project renewal used to say "LIMITED and LICALLA rents are returned to station by LIMOUSINE and credited to station miscellaneous receipts" but after that time this sentence was eliminated.)

(Continued..)

Distribution:
2-COS, Mexico City

50-6-74/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-15952	27 November 1967
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-74/2

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	N. Perkins	sl	

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RI
CHRONO

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1		W. J. Kaufman

3. LIMITED is a different problem complicated by the fact that we are no longer sure what the name refers to. Originally we bought LIMITED and then sold it in January 1965 to LIMOUSINE who put up a new building on the lot and saved an apartment for our use. LIMOUSINE now owns the new building, but "MEXI 02, LIMITED Safehouse" is shown on the Real Property Report as "purchased" by WOFIRM in 1955 - should this not be corrected? A further complication is that HMMA -31164, GERENDE's January 1967 security review, speaks of LILYRIC in its present new location, inhabited by LIEMPTY/13, /14 and /27. Has the old LIMITED been re-christened LILYRIC because of its new inhabitants? When was it completed and are we still withholding rent from LIMOUSINE in settlement of his payment to us for the property. The REAL Property Report shows LILYRIC, MEXI 41, as having been leased in 1958 and costing $1030 to maintain ($856 rent, $44 reparis, and $130 utilities). It also shows MEXI 132 LIMEPTY, LIMOUSINE, LILYRIC as having been rented in October 1966 for $2880 a year. (Which is more than the 2,300 MN monthly rent for the flat in his new building which LIMOUSINE agreed that we would withhold for a period of two years after completion in partial settlement of his purchase of the LIMITED property.) (HMMA 25310, 3 February 1965.)

4. What does the LIEMPTY darkroom consist of?

5. We are, as you can see, confused. Would you be kind enough to send us a brief summary of each of the four LIEMPTY properties.

a. name and property (MEXI) number

b. address (under separate cover)

c. date purchased, sold, rented, etc.

d. Basic cost (original cost if purchased, annual cost if rented)

e. cost of utilities

f. occupants

6. If rental money which we pay out for cover reasons is subsequently returned to us, should it be included in a project?

T.H.B.

Theresa H. BACHARDY

14-00000

File LIEMPTY/[illegible]

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

ORIG: [illegible]
UNIT: [illegible]
EXT: [illegible]
DATE: [illegible] 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ____ PER ____ # ____

INDEX DESTROY RETURN TO ____ BRANCH FILE RID

NO INDEX FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pico) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

TO MEXICO CITY

REF: HMMA 33059*

FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES PLEASE LEAVE [illegible] TRUCK UNDER LIEMPTY AND DO NOT INCLUDE IN LIFEBRACE RENEWAL.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Plan transfer LIEMPTY truck to Project LIFEBRACE.

not sent. Msg. carried by Langdon (CP) on 17 Oct.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING; XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED; ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING; MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WHD

INFO.:

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIEMBRACE/LIEMPTY - Transfer of Responsibility for the LIENTRAP Vehicle

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For your information

References : MEXICO CITY-2600
MEXICO CITY-2654

1. In July 1967 the responsibility for the LIEMPTY Project passed from the Station Support Section to the REDTOP Section, where it more reasonably belongs. However, the LIENTRAP segment of the LIEMPTY Project has little to do with REDTOP activities and more rightly belongs in the Support Section. The Station, therefore, decided to transfer the LIENTRAP vehicle, LIEMPTY-10 and LIEMPTY-11 to the LIEMBRACE Project with LIEMBRACE-3 to be the Principal Agent. This decision was based on both security and operational efficiency considerations. The formal change of command was made on 10 August 1967 in a meeting between GERENDE, LIEMPTY-10 and LIEMBRACE-3.

2. Certain members of the LIEMBRACE surveillance team were already knowledgeable of the existence of the LIENTRAP vehicle and its operators from past operations and also from the old LIPSTICK Project. Conversely, LIEMPTY-10 was knowledgeable of the existence of the surveillance team and knew some of the members of the team (LIEMBRACE-4 is the step-son of LIEMPTY-10). By placing the vehicle under the command of LIEMBRACE-3, there was no breakdown of compartmentation.

continued...

Distribution:
3 - Chief/WHD

16 Oct 67: Oral message sent back to station via Al Reynolds to the effect that we feel it impolitic to present a surveil ance poject in the neighborhood of $62,000, so please keep the truck under LIEMPTY for admin. purposes (and use it anyway you want.) C/WH/1 did not want to send a written message on this. NP

CROSS REFERENCE TO: 50-6-74

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA - 33059

DATE: 12 September 1967

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-72/1

3. On the other hand, the LIENTRAP vehicle was the most vulnerable part of the LIEMPTY complex and a roll-up of the truck could lead to Raymond H. GERENDE, Principal Agent for LIEMPTY, and from GERENDE to the sensitive LIEMPTY photo basehouses. Thus, by attaching the LIENTRAP vehicle to the LIEMBRACE surveillance team we have actually improved the security of the LIEMPTY Project somewhat.

4. On the operational efficiency side, the benefits which will accrue from having the truck tied-in with the surveillance team for use in dispatching are obvious. In many areas of the city, such as around the market areas and third class hotels, an ostensibly empty truck attracts much less attention than a person on foot or even a passenger car. The ability to dispatch a target and at the same time take photographs of the target and any companions has its operational advantages. Hopefully, in some of the target-of-opportunity coverages now provided by the surveillance team, it will be possible to take photographs of the person with whom the PBSTEAL officer meets. Certainly, if the team takes an unidentified subject home after a target-of-opportunity discovery, by allowing the team leader to place the photo truck on the home we will speed-up the receipt of photographs.

5. LIEMBRACE-3 was told that LIEMPTY-10 and 11 have certain accomodation addresses which they must check on a routine basis and that any assistance given the LIEMBRACE team should not interfere with this task. It was stressed to LIEMBRACE-3 that under no circumstances should team members transport or otherwise assist in the servicing of the accomodation addresses. LIEMBRACE-3 was briefed on the normal activity of the LIENTRAP truck in providing photographic coverage of addresses in which the Station has an interest. As for handling the use of the truck, the following caveats were laid upon LIEMBRACE-3:

a. LIEMBRACE-3 should discuss the normal activities of LIENTRAP only with LIEMBRACE-1, the assistant team leader.

b. The truck is not to be used in active mobile surveillance without the approval of the Station.

c. The truck will be used for dispatching purposes only in those areas in which passenger vehicle and/or foot dispatching are not feasible.

d. LIEMPTY-10 and LIEMPTY-11 will not be used for active surveillance nor will they be introduced to team members who do not presently know their true identities.

6. Operationally, the efficacy of the use of the LIENTRAP truck in coordination with the LIEMBRACE team has been proven in the coverage and surveillance of a letter-drop on Mexico City. Please see references for details of this operation, which could not have been accomplished in a secure manner without the truck assisting the team. No problems have been noted as a result of the change in command structure for the LIENTRAP truck.

7. Financially, one possible problem is evident in the new arrangement. Headquarters has limited the costs of the LIEMBRACE Project to US$ 50,000 per year and it will not be possible for the Project to remain within this figure with the LIENTRAP vehicle and personnel included therein. The Station does not see this as a great problem because the Operational Program includes the cost of those assets in the LIEMPTY Project and the transfer will merely mean a decrease in LIEMPTY equal to the increase in LIEMBRACE.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

LI[illegible] Support

14. As approved by Headquarters, the present LIENTRAP vehicle will be replaced by a new Ford "Econoline" truck in the near future. Before the old LIENTRAP vehicle is sold, it will be used to cover residences of the [illegible]/NYXIS opposition who are living in Mexico City.

HMMA - 32068
23 May 67

" The LIENTRAP vehicle has been replaced." HMMA 33455, 8 Nov 5[illegible], Project Renewal

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WHD

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIMOUSINE/LIEMPTY/LILYRIC - Occupants of Building at Gelati #2

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information

References : A. HMMW-15157, 18 January 1967
B. HMMA-31303, 7 February 1967

1. Station wishes to correct somewhat the information provided in Reference B. Because of changing of plans and an error on Raymond H. GERENDE's part, the number of floors of the building located at Gelati #2 was given incorrectly in Reference B. The plans forwarded as attachments to Reference B were correct. The description in the dispatch should be corrected to show a ground-floor, three floors with two apartments each and a penthouse.

2. The occupants of the building, all of whom were checked and approved by the Station before leasing are:

Ground Floor Business - A beauty salon is located on this floor which is operated by Nelly Infante de Garcia. Her lease was signed on 1 December 1966 and is valid until 31 May 1969. She pays $152.00 US per month rent.

Second Floor - Apartment 1 - Dr. Hector MUNOZ Franco. His lease was signed on 1 September 1966 and is valid until 31 August 1967. He pays $128.00 US per month rent.

Apartment 2 - Alicia MADRIGAL Osorio rented this apartment on 1 November 1966 and she plans to vacate at the end of April 1967. She pays $84.00 US per month.

continued...

Distribution:
3 - Chief/WHD

CS COPY

50-6-74/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 31837	18 April 1967
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-74/1

Third Floor - Apartment 3 - This apartment is rented by the Eighth Electoral District for use as an area office. The contract was signed on 1 February 1967 and is valid until 31 July 196[illegible]. The rent paid on this apartment is $112.00 US per month.

Apartment 4 - Edmundo [illegible]. His contract was signed on 1 December 1966 and is valid until 30 November 1968 with a rent of $80.00 US per month.

Fourth Floor - Apartment 5 - Willfreid and Edith ASCHENBRENNER. Under the terms of their lease, which was signed on 1 October 1966 and is valid until 30 September 1967, they pay $96.00 US per month rent.

Apartment 6 - This apartment is rented by Richard P. MAPES who pays $72.00 US per month. His contract was signed on 1 October 1966 and is valid until 30 September 1967.

Penthouse - The penthouse is leased by Andres GOYENECHEA O. who pays $240.00 US per month rent. His contract was signed on 1 September 1966 and is valid until 30 August 1967.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

ORIG: S.L.Yaxley/sly
UNIT: WH/Logistics
EXT: 6282
DATE: 7 April 1967

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 53 PER ____ #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 50-6-74/1

CONF: WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, LOGS 4,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 7 22 29 Z CITE DIRECTOR 90695

TO

MEXICO CITY

LIEMPTY

REF: MEXICO CITY 0996 (IN-38335)*

PURCHASE OF MV-2823 FOR $3440.91 AUTHORIZED.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH/COMMENT: Station requested approval to increase amount of Ford Econoline from $3200.00 to $3440.91.

WH/1 Nancy Perkins
WH/B&F David W. McAllister

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

R. L. KING
C/WH/LOG

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 14

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION WH8 RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, MFS/BG-2

S E C R E T 060035Z CITE MEXICO CITY 0996 6 Apr 67 IN 38335

DIRECTOR

REF A DIRECTOR 88210

B DIRECTOR 46928

REQUEST AUTHORIZED AMOUNT FOR MV-2823 BE INCREASED FROM $3200.00 TO $3440.91 WHICH NEW PRICE OF FORD ECONOLINE NOW GOING INTO PRODUCTION AFTER 6 MONTHS LAPSE. NEW PRICE INCLUDES MANDATORY SAFETY EQUIPMENT INCLUDING FIRE EXTINGUISHER, SEAT BELTS AND WINDSHIELD WASHER NOT PREVIOUSLY REQUIRED BY MEXICAN LAW AND RADIO WHICH NECESSARY TO COVER TRANSMITTING EQUIPMENT TO BE INSTALLED BY WOFACT.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WHD

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY/Status of LIEMPTY-5

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information

Reference : HMMW-15270, 23 February 1967

1. LIEMPTY-5 is the wife of LIEMPTY-4, the operator of the photography base used in processing the pictorial take received from the various units within the LIEMPTY complex. As such, she sometimes assists LIEMPTY-4 in the photo processing work. She is carried as a part-time basehousekeeper because she must remain at home as added security when photographs are being processed and/or being held until the scheduled meeting between LIEMPTY-4 and Raymond H. GEREND taken place and the photographs passed for onward transmittal to the Station.

2. The Station regrets that LIEMPTY-5 was not included in the last Project Renewal Request, but the oversight probably resulted because LIEMPTY-5 does not receive a salary at the present time. The Station wishes to keep her present Memorandum of Oral Commitments, which calls for an hourly salary, in effect in case her services as a salaried asset are needed in the future.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - Chief/WHD

LIEMPTY Support
50 6 74/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-31515	6 March 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-150615

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG: A. C. Kumro/sly
UNIT: WH/Logistics
EXT: 6282
DATE: 26 October 66

SECRET

DISSEM BY ___ PER ___ # ___

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH-6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET (DATE AND TIME FILED) 26 18 31 Z CITE DIRECTOR 46928

TO MEXICO CITY

LOGS LIEMPTY

REF: A. MEXICO CITY 8920 (IN-22107)*
B. DIRECTOR 45720**
C. MEXICO CITY 8962 (IN-25013)***

MV-2823 APPLIES. COST NOT TO EXCEED $3200.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH/COMMENT: *Requested authority replace MV-2279 with panel truck at maximum cost of $3200.
**Approved disposal of MV-2279 and authorized replacement if project funds available.
***Provide MV number. Approximately $10,000. available.

WH/1 C. Bustos (telecon)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

R. L. KING
C/WH/LOG

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 5

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

B1 7

ACTION WH 8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE VR LOGS 4

SECRET 251500Z CITE MEXICO CITY 5962

DIRECTOR

25 Oct 65 IN 25013

REF: DIRECTOR 45720

PLEASE PROVIDE MV NUMBER FOR NEW TRUCK.

APPROXIMATELY TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS AVAILABLE.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

NNNN

Supply/Support

Bustos

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 16

ORIG: R. L. King/sly
UNIT: WH/Logistics
EXT: 6282
DATE: 21 October 66

FILE RID / INDEX / NO INDEX / FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

DISSEM BY 52 PER #

DESTROY / RETURN TO ___ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 RID COPY | INFO: VR, FILE, LOGS 4, MPS/BG 2

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET | (DATE AND TIME FILED) 21 20 42Z | CITE DIRECTOR | (REFERENCE NUMBER) 45720

TO MEXICO CITY

REF: MEXICO CITY 8920 (IN-22107)

APPROVAL GRANTED SELL MV--2279, CAN REPLACE IMMEDIATELY ONLY IF CURRENT PROJECT FUNDS CAN ABSORB COST, WHICH HDQS. DOUBTS. OTHERWISE MUST INCLUDE COST IN NEXT PROJ APPROVAL AND PURCHASE AFTER 1 DECEMBER. ALSO ASSUME THAT FY-67 PROGRAMMED AMOUNT OF $45,000 CAN ABSORB COST OF NEW TRUCK. SEE HMMS-4969. PLS COMPLY WITH BOOK DISPATCH 5373, DATED 7 MARCH 1966.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH/COMMENT: Requested disposal and replacement of MV-2279.

WH/1, C. Bustos (telecon)
WH/B&F, Mr. Connor (in draft)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

R. L. KING
C/WH/LOG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 1

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DISSEM BY 38

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, LOGS 4

S E C R E T 210017Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8920

DIRECTOR

1. REQUEST AUTHORITY TO REPLACE MV-2279 LIEMPTY TVA SLOT NUMBER 2 WITH FORD ECONOLINE PANEL TRUCK. MAXIMUM COST $3200.00.

21 OCT 66 IN 22107

2. MV-2279 PURCHASED 1959. ODOMETER READING 4900 MILES. EXCESSIVE OIL USE INDICATES NEED FOR MAJOR OVERHAUL OR REPLACEMENT OF ENGINE. TRUCK SINCE USED AGAINST MANY TARGETS. CONTINUED USE HAZARDOUS FROM SECURITY STANDPOINT.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

6 September 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CCS

FROM : WH Division

SUBJECT : Project Funding Plan/Project LIEMPTY (FI)

A. Identification of Activity

1. Project cryptonym: LIEMPTY

2. Approved for: 1 December 1965 - 30 November 1966: $41,500
   FY 1966 - $25,520
   FY 1967 - $15,980

3. Proposed successive fiscal year budget: Same

4. Brief statement of project aims, character and structure:

The purpose of this project is to provide support for mobile (1 truck) and stationary (3 base houses) photographic surveillance; one base house is also used as a dispatching base for a physical surveillance team. This project covers one Mexican Contract Agent who serves as Principal Agent for the eight Mexican field agents under the Project.

B. Funding History

1. The Contract Agent receives his salary directly from the Mexico City Station Case Officer ($540/month). He also receives money from the Station which he uses to pay the field agents their salaries (total of $1.760/month) and operational expenses. Receipts are received.

2. Funds have always been handled in this manner.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 12 TOTAL COPIES 28

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM: Director BY 24

ACTION: LOGS-4 ☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO: FILE, VR, WH-8, SOD-6, WH/C-8

S E C R E T 161803Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7641 IN 39026 16 June 66

LOGISTICS INFO DIRECTOR

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 02750

JBECHO

PLEASE SHIP 240 ROLLS OF STOCK NUMBER 6750-292-9666

FILM TRI-X 35MM, 36 EXP ROLLS ON REF IURADIAL FLIGHT. $158.60

NEEDED FOR UNEXPECTED HIGH DEMAND FOR LIEMPTY PROJECT.

CITE REQUISITION NUMBER 539-73 66 FAN 6135-2390. STA APT

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

O.K.

LIEMPTY Bgt

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 3

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM: MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH/C

RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA

SECRET 282130Z

PRIORITY WAVE INFO DIR CITE MEXI 6403

28 FEB 65 IN 64418

REF WAVE 9343 (IN 63107)*

RESERVATIONS CONFIRMED AT GENEVA. ADVISE IF NECESSARY TO MEET.

SECRET

CFN

6403 9343 GENEVE

BT

SECRET

ETA 3 MAR

LIEMPTY / LCFLUTTER
Evans - Kinsey ...
...

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Memoranda of Oral Commitments

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith are three authentic copies of Subject memoranda covering the following agents used within Project LIEMPTY and reflecting recent salary adjustments:

	LIEMPTY-6	201-082444
	LIEMPTY-9	201-136454
	LIEMPTY-10	201-121190
	LIEMPTY-11	201-119960

for Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - Chief WH Division
Atts herewith

CROSS REFERENCE TO: P-2464, P-2488, P-2453, P24-73

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-28138

DATE: 25 January 1966

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-74/2

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING; XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED; ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING; MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Memoranda of Oral Commitments

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith are three copies of subject memoranda covering the following agents used within Project LIEMPTY and reflecting recent salary adjustments:

LIEMPTY-9	201-136454
LIEMPTY-11	201-119960
LIEMPTY-14	201-167567

for [signature]
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
~~3 MOC ea. h/w~~
filed in individual 201 files

CS COPY

50-6-74/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-26232	1 June 1965
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-74/2

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM 15

ORIG: C. Bostos - Videla
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4507
DATE: 10 March 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-5762

SECRET

ROUTING

ROUTINE

TO: MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8
INFO: OL 4, BPA, VR, FILE

TO MEXI INFO. CITE DIR 91497

LIEMPTY LIMOUSINE

REF: MEXI 2732 (IN 19326)*

APPROVAL GRANTED DELAY INTTIAL PAYMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Limousine wishes delay initial payment for limitdd property for 90 days.

WH/Log J. Wisniewski

TELCOORD OL/RECD Bill Cabanis, DC/RECD/OL

TELCOORD DC/LOG, GEORGE MELLON

Raford W. Herbert
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG: Joseph F. McMahon
UNIT: WH/Logistics
EXT: 7282
DATE: 4 December 1964

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

4 DEC 64 21 14z

SIG CEN

TO: MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8   INFO: OL 4, VR, FILE

TO MEXI   INFO: CITE DIR 68656

REF: A. DIR 66008
B. MEXI 1798 (IN 34773)*

REQUEST FOR $500 INCREASE FOR MV 2676 PER REF B APPROVED.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH/COMMENT: Requested increase from $3000 to $3500.

C/WH/1

Telecon:
OL/PD, Mr. Gauvreau

RAFORD W. HERBERT
AC/WH DIVISION
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JOSEPH F. MCMAHON
CHIEF, WH LOGISTICS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

14-00000

ORIG: John T. Martin
UNIT: WH/Logistics
EXT: 7282
DATE: 23 November 1964

MESSAGE FORM
SECRET

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

23 Nov 64 19 45 z
SIG CEN

TO: MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8   INFO: OL 4 VR FILE

Buses

TO MEXI   INFO   CITE DIR 66008

REF MEXI 1667 (IN26899)*

DISPOSAL OF MV 2284 AUTHORIZED AND LOCAL PROCUREMENT REPLACEMENT VEHICLE COST NOT TO EXCEED $3000 APPROVED. MV2676 APPLIES. DISPATCH FOLLOWS.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH/COMMENT: Request authority dispose of MV2284 and replace with new compact cost not to exceed $3000;

DC/WH/1 [signature]

Telecon:
OL/TD/VSB, Maj. Fred
OL/PD. Mr. Gauvreau

DESMOND FITZGERALD
CHIEF, WH DIVISION
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS
SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JOSEPH F. MCMAHON
CHIEF, WH LOGISTICS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 13

32 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM Mexico City

ACTION DC 4

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED TUBED UNIT TIME BY

INFO. VR. FILE WH 7

S E C R E T 1923..Z 20 Nov 64 IN 26899

DIR CITE MEXI 1667 (EASBY ACTING)

JBECHO

1. REQUEST AUTHORIZATION DISPOSE MV 2284 WITH 75,000 MILES. COST NEEDED REPAIRS AND OVERHAUL EXCEED 30 PERCENT LOCAL MARKET VALUE.

2. WISH REPLACE WITH NEW COMPACT 8 CYLINDER FORD WITH STANDARD EQUIPMENT FOR USE OLIVER G. SCANTLING. DUE SCANTLING BUSINESS CONNECTIONS WITH LOCAL FORD CAN GET 15 PERCENT DISCOUNT AND GOOD TRADE IN ALLOWANCE MV 2284 WHICH ALSO FORD. COST NOT TO EXCEED $3,000. DUE ALTITUDE, TRAFFIC CONDITIONS, NATURE SCANTLING ASSIGNMENTS, 8 CYLINDER VEHICLE NEEDED.

3. SUFFICIENT FY 1965 FUNDS AVAILABLE PROJECT LIEMPTY THIS PURCHASE.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

47 SECRET

ROUTING

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : OL 4, RF, VR

S E C R E T 240224Z

DIR CITE MEXI 6642

24 Oct 63 IN 46326

LIEMPTY

1. REQ AUTHORITY DISPOSE MV 2286 CHEVROLET 1958. MILAGE 65,000. NEEDS EXTENSIVE REPAIR DUE AGE AND USE.

2. REQUEST AUTHORITY REPLACE WITH LOCAL PURCHASE RAMBLER CLASSIC 4 DOOR AT $US 3,050. STANDARD FACTORY INSTALLED EQUIPMENT INCLUDES RADIO, WHITE WALL TIRES, CIGARETTE LIGHTER, CLOCK.

3. ABOVE ASSIGNED RAYMOND H. GERENDE. FUNDS AVAILABLE PROJECT LIEMPTY THIS PURCHASE.

S E C R E T

Liempty Support ... Lindley

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Memoranda of Oral Agreement

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For your information

Forwarded herewith are three copies of Subject memoranda covering the following agents employed under Project LIEMPTY and reflecting recent salary adjustments:

LIEMPTY - 4	201-117967
LIEMPTY - 6	201-082444
LIEMPTY - 8	201-121189
LIEMPTY - 9	201-136454
LIEMPTY - 10	201-121190
LIEMPTY - 11	201-119960
LIEMPTY - 14	201-167567

Cover and KUBARK job assignments of above agents remain as previously reported.

Willard C. CURTIS

50-6-74/2

Attachments:
As stated above

Distribution:
3 - WH w/3 cpy ea att.
2 - Files

Encl - 7

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 11 Jan 1963

DATE DISPATCHED: 15 Jan 1963

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-20491

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-74/2

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

14-00000

Lienpty Lienzo

DISPATCH

[illegible]

FROM: Chief of Station, [illegible]

TO: Project [illegible]

SUBJECT: Cancel MP Authority

REFERENCE: [illegible]-1667, 15 December 1960

[illegible] 1961

Project LIENPTY [illegible] suggested that Headquarters cancel this MP authority.

[illegible]

9 February 1961

Distribution:
3 - [illegible]
3 - Files

14-00000

DISPATCH

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: HMMA-16426
TO: Chief, WH Division		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO
INFO		
FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City		DATE: 8 February 1961
SUBJECT: LIEMPTY/Memoranda of Oral Commitments		RE: (CHECK "X" ONE) MARKED FOR INDEXING; X NO INDEXING REQUIRED; INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED: None, for Hqs. info only		
REFERENCE(S)		

Attached for Headquarters files are copies of recently revised Memoranda of Oral Commitments on several LIEMPTY agents:

LIEMPTY-4	201-117967
LIEMPTY-6	201- (No Station record of 201 number) 201-324444
LIEMPTY-8	201-121189
LIEMPTY-9	201-136454
LIEMPTY-11	201-119960
LIEMPTY-13	201-119961
LIEMPTY-14	201-167567

Willard C. Curtis

Willard C. Curtis

3 February 1961

Distribution:
3 - WHD w/3 cys ea of 7 atts
2 - Files

50-6-74/2

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

CONTINUED

PAGE NO

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

PROCESSING

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM: Chief, WH

SUBJECT: Field Procurement of MV-2320 - Project LIEMPTY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

HMMS-1241, dated 5 Feb. 1960

1. Reference dispatch gives authorization to procure one 2-4 door, used sedan for Project LIEMPTY, MV-2320. Authorization was valid until 3 May 1960.

2. Headquarters has no record of procurement of this vehicle. If this sedan has been purchased please comply with paragraph 2 of reference and return signed Declaration of Trust.

3. If the purchase has not been made at this date please advise Headquarters if the Station still intends to secure the sedan and give justification for an extension of authority to purchase.

END OF DISPATCH

3 - Mexi

Distribution:
1 - WH/LOG
1 - WH/REG
1 - OL/SD/VS

DATE TYPED: 9 Dec. 1960

DATE DISPATCHED:

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMS-1667

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/LOG	P. G. PIKE	nd	4591

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/3		[signature]
Tele coord: OL/SD/VS	9 Dec. 60	with J. Herman

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
WH/SUPPORT		Paul E. Arneson

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS ... WHICH MAY BE USED.

DISPATCH

SECRET

OPERATIONAL AUTHORIZATION

TO : FINANCE DIVISION

THROUGH: PROJECTS BRANCH, FI/OPS; BUDGET AND FISCAL BRANCH, FI/SG

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY (CRYPTONYM OF PROJECT) ; (ACCOUNT NO.) ; WH/3/Mexico (OPERATING DIVISION AND COUNTRY)

SECTION 1. BREAKDOWN OF REQUESTED FUNDS (To be completed from data in project outline)

THE TOTAL FUNDS BEING REQUESTED FOR ABOVE PROJECT, AMOUNTING TO $, ARE BROKEN DOWN AS FOLLOWS:

BREAKDOWN AND TOTAL	FISCAL YEAR 1961	FISCAL YEAR 1962	
COMPENSATION	$ 23,000	$ 15,000	$
ALLOWANCES			
TRAVEL	1,500	1,000	
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES	5,900	4,100	
EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES	1,500	1,000	
OTHER:			
TOTALS	$ 31,900	$ 21,100	$

SECTION 2. ADMINISTRATIVE (To be completed by project officer)

INDICATE ANY DETAILS THAT WILL ASSIST FINANCE DIVISION IN MAKING ADVANCES, DISBURSEMENTS AND ACCOUNTINGS

A. TYPE OF PROJECT (Check one)

X REGULAR | SUBSIDY | PROPRIETARY

B. METHOD BY WHICH PAYMENTS ARE TO BE MADE

C. FUNDS WILL BE ACCOUNTED FOR BY (Check one)

1. X REGULAR FINANCIAL ACCOUNTINGS (FHB 30-1500-1 or FHB 30-1500-4)
2. RECEIPTS ONLY (R 230-200)
3. OTHER (Explain):

SECTION 3. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS (To be completed by operating division budget officer)

I CERTIFY THAT, TO MEET THE ESTIMATED OBLIGATIONS OUTLINED IN SECTION 1:

A. -- FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE IN THE DIVISION'S BUDGET FOR THE FY 1961.

B. -- FUNDS HAVE BEEN PROGRAMMED FOR THE FY 1961.

SIGNATURE OF OPERATING DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER | DATE

SECTION 4. AUTHORIZATION (To be completed by Projects Branch, FI/OPS)

THE ABOVE PROJECT HAS BEEN APPROVED FROM 1 Dec 1960 TO 30 Nov 1961 IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF $ 53,000 AS BROKEN DOWN IN SECTION 1.

SIGNATURE FOR PROJECTS BRANCH, FI/OPS | DATE

SECTION 5. ADDITIONAL CRYPTONYMS, PSEUDONYMS, ETC.

Raymond G. GEREDE
Oliver G. SCANTLING
Louise G. MACRINO

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER: C.L.Zehrdng | EXTENSION: 2535 | SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF OR DESIGNEE | DATE

FORM 4-59 680 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (3)

013

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 22 SEP 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : TSD 4

INFO : WH 4, OL 3, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

SEP 23 0210Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 16961

DIR CITE MEXI 6378

6378

AQUATIC

1. POUCH SOONEST TWO ENLARGER BULBS FOR MODEL 57100 EXACT 35 ANDREAS VEIGEL STUTTGARD-BAD CANNSTATT. MACHINE WILL TAKE PHILIPS 125 V 100 W P28 TYP 6257 C/05 SOCKEL UNTEN WITH SOCKET MARKING A 032. NONE AVAILABLE MEXI.

2. FOR LIEMPTY BASE WHICH PROCESSES ALL LIMMERICK OP PHOTOS. ADDRESS QUINTON N. OUSLER FOR PROPER DELIVERY.

END OF MESSAGE

Liempty / Ousler

SECRET

Copy No.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FI OPERATIONAL AUTHORIZATION

TO : FINANCE DIVISION

THROUGH: FI/PLANS/PROJECTS BRANCH, FI/ADMIN/BF

SUBJECT: ____ (APPROVAL OF PROJECT); ____ (ACCOUNT NO.); ____ (COUNTRY, AREA DIVISION)

SECTION 1. TO BE COMPLETED BY PROJECTS BRANCH

THE ABOVE PROJECT HAS BEEN APPROVED FROM [illegible] TO [illegible] IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF $ 54910.00 AS BROKEN DOWN BELOW.

____ FI/PLANS/PROJECTS BRANCH ____ DATE

SECTION 2. TO BE COMPLETED BY CASE OFFICER

BREAKDOWN OF REQUESTED TOTAL	FISCAL YEAR 1962	FISCAL YEAR [illegible]
COMPENSATION	$ 32600	$ 26100
ALLOWANCES	1260	900
TRAVEL	[illegible]	1225
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES	1000	[illegible]
OTHER: [illegible]	5000	2200
TOTAL [illegible]	$ 42473	$ 36425

ACCOUNTING DETAILS

TYPE OF PROJECT (Check one) [✓] REGULAR [ ] SUBSIDY [ ] PROPRIETARY

METHOD BY WHICH PAYMENTS ARE TO BE MADE

FUNDS TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR BY: (Check one)
- [✓] REGULAR FINANCIAL ACCOUNTINGS (ASR 30-10)
- [ ] RECEIPTS ONLY (CFR 9.4)
- [ ] OTHER (Explain):

SECTION 3. TO BE COMPLETED BY DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE [illegible] DIVISION BUDGET FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 19[illegible] CONTAINS SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO MEET THE OBLIGATIONS OUTLINED ABOVE.

____ DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER ____ DATE

SECTION 4. OTHER APPROVALS

FINANCE DIVISION MUST HAVE, IN ADDITION TO FI PROJECT APPROVAL, SPECIFIC WRITTEN APPROVAL ON CERTAIN TYPES OF EXPENDITURES BEFORE FUNDS CAN BE ADVANCED. INDICATE BELOW ANY APPROVALS IN THIS CATEGORY THAT HAVE BEEN SECURED:

- [✓] PURCHASE OF AUTOMOBILE
- [ ] PURCHASE OF MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT
- [ ] RENTALS IN EXCESS OF THAT PERMITTED BY REGULATION
- [ ] APPROVAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN WHEN REQUIRED
- [ ] OTHER (Explain):

SECTION 5. ADDITIONAL CRYPTONYMS, PSEUDONYMS, ETC.

[illegible handwritten entries]
4567891[illegible] 2[illegible]1920, 24

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF OR DESIGNEE	DATE
[illegible signature]	[illegible]		

FORM NO. 680 REPLACES FORM 59-104
1 JUN 55 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(3)

14-00000

SECRET

9 December 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI - Projects Branch

SUBJECT : Purchase of One Automobile and Increase of LIEMPTY TVA by One

1. According to the Project Renewal Request for LIEMPTY from the Mexico City Station, they plan to increase the LIEMPTY surveillance team during the coming year by two agents. To maintain the efficiency of an enlarged team, they will require one additional automobile.

2. It is requested that the TVA for LIEMPTY be increased by one automobile and that the Station be authorized to purchase locally this automobile for use under the LIEMPTY Project.

J.C. King
C/WHD

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - Addressee
1 - Subject
1 - Chrono

LIEMPTY/Support

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FI OPERATIONAL AUTHORIZATION

TO : FINANCE DIVISION

THROUGH: FI/PLANS/PROJECTS BRANCH, FI/ADMIN/BF

SUBJECT: LI[illegible]TY (APPROVAL OF PROJECT); _____ (ACCOUNT NO.); WH/III/Mexico (COUNTRY, AREA DIVISION)

SECTION 1. TO BE COMPLETED BY PROJECTS BRANCH

THE ABOVE PROJECT HAS BEEN APPROVED FROM 1 [illegible]er 1959 TO 30 [illegible]mber 1959 IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF $ 95,300.00, AS BROKEN DOWN BELOW.

FI/PLANS/PROJECTS BRANCH ____ DATE ____

SECTION 2. TO BE COMPLETED BY CASE OFFICER

BREAKDOWN OF REQUESTED TOTAL	FISCAL YEAR 1959	FISCAL YEAR 1960
COMPENSATION	$ 37,710.00	$ [illegible]3,[illegible].00
ALLOWANCES	1,[illegible].00	[illegible]
TRAVEL	4,750.00	[illegible]
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES	5,[illegible]50.00	[illegible],750.00
OTHER:	21,000.00	———
TOTAL	$ [illegible]5,5[illegible].00	$ [illegible]9,[illegible].00

ACCOUNTING DETAILS

TYPE OF PROJECT (Check one) [ ] REGULAR [ ] SUBSIDY [ ] PROPRIETARY

METHOD BY WHICH PAYMENTS ARE TO BE MADE

FUNDS TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR BY: (Check one)
- [x] REGULAR FINANCIAL ACCOUNTINGS (APR 30-10)
- [ ] RECEIPTS ONLY (CFR 9.4)
- [ ] OTHER (Explain):

SECTION 3. TO BE COMPLETED BY DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE ____ DIVISION BUDGET FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ____ CONTAINS SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO MEET THE OBLIGATIONS OUTLINED ABOVE.

DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER ____ DATE ____

SECTION 4. OTHER APPROVALS

FINANCE DIVISION MUST HAVE, IN ADDITION TO FI PROJECT APPROVAL, SPECIFIC WRITTEN APPROVAL ON CERTAIN TYPES OF EXPENDITURES BEFORE FUNDS CAN BE ADVANCED. INDICATE BELOW ANY APPROVALS IN THIS CATEGORY THAT HAVE BEEN SECURED:

- [ ] PURCHASE OF AUTOMOBILE
- [ ] PURCHASE OF MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT
- [ ] RENTALS IN EXCESS OF THAT PERMITTED BY REGULATION
- [ ] APPROVAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN WHEN REQUIRED
- [ ] OTHER (Explain):

SECTION 5. ADDITIONAL CRYPTONYMS, PSEUDONYMS, ETC.

Raymond H. [illegible]erende (ps)
Oliver G. Scantling (ps)

LI[illegible]TY - 3,-4,-5,-6,-7,-8,-9,-10,-11,-12,-13,-14,-15,-16,-17

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF OR DESIGNEE	DATE
John [illegible] [illegible]rady	2555		

FORM NO. 680 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 59-104 WHICH IS OBSOLETE. (3)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

SUPPORT ANNEX - TABLE OF VEHICULAR ALLOWANCE

1. PROJECT	2. SENIOR STAFF	
	4. AREA	
	A. DIVISION	WHD
	B. BRANCH	III
3. TYPE OF ACTION (Check one)	C. DESK	
A. NEW TVA		
✓ B. AMENDMENT OF EXISTING TVA		

5. REQUESTED ACTION

ITEM	TYPE	TOTAL ON HAND	TOTAL PRESENT TVA	TOTAL PROPOSED TVA
A.	SEDAN		4	5
B.	STATION WAGON			
C.	OTHER (List below)			
(1)				
(2)			1	1
(3)				
(4)				
(5)				
D.	TOTALS		5	6

6. REVIEWED BY			7. APPROVAL REQUESTED BY		
SIGNATURE LOGISTICS OFFICER	DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE CHIEF, ADMIN.	DIVISION	DATE

8. APPROVED		9. AUTHORIZED	
BY DIRECTION OF DDP	DATE	BY DIRECTION OF DD/S	DATE

FORM NO. 1116 TEST
1 NOV 58

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(20-36)

316 RLF/SW/

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 31 JUL 59

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : DD/S, SSA, OL 3, S/C 2

ROUTING

AUG 1 2057Z 59

ROUTINE

IN 48642

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 4204

RE HMMS 761
HMMS 737

REQUEST MV AUTHORITY FOR LOCAL PURCHASE NOT EXCEED $3500 OF FOURTH LIEMPTY CAR AUTHORIZED BY REF B. WILL BE USED BY LIJERSEY SURVEILLANCE TEAM.

END OF MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

501/5L/CG/CG/

ORIG: JAMES S. BURWELL
UNIT: WH LOGISTICS
EXT: 4591
DATE: 3 APRIL 1959

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

TO: MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 5
INFO: DD/S, SSA, OL 3, S/C 2

DEFERRED APR 3 19 43 59
X ROUTINE REC'D CABLE SECT.
PRIORITY
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

OUT89600

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 20062

RE: A. MEXI 3593 (IN 37255)
B. MEXI 3630 (IN 39968)*

1. REF A APPROVED. COST NOT TO EXCEED $3500. MV 2283 APPLIES.

2. AUTHORITY GRANTED REPLACE REF B VEHICLES NOT TO EXCEED $3000 EACH. MV 2284 MV 2285 AND MV 2286 APPLY.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED AUTHORITY REPLACE MV'S [illegible], 2147 AND 2148.

Tele Coord
OL/SD - S. DePyssler

PAUL E. ARNESON
C WH SUPPORT
RELEASING OFFICER

C WH BR III
COORDINATING OFFICERS

JAMES S. BURWELL
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

Copy No.

470/DMCL/CG/[illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE 2 APR 59

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 5

INFO DD/S, SSA, OL 3, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

APR 3 0338Z 59

ROUTINE

IN 39968

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 3630

LIEMPTY

RE: A. HMMA 11257

B. HMMA 11368

C. HMMS 637 PARA 4

1. REQUEST CABLE AUTHORITY REPLACE MV'S 2041, 2147 AND 2148 FOR SECURITY REASONS IMPLIED REFS A AND B.

2. HQS AWARE EFFORTS INCREASE SECURITY AND COMPARTMENTATION SUPPORT PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT. ABOVE 1952 MODEL VEHCILES HAVE BEEN USED ON MANY INVESTIGATIONS BY SEVERAL DIFFERENT AGENTS. CONSIDER IMPERATIVE INCREASE LIEMPTY SECURITY BY IMMEDIATE REPLACEMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T-

Copy No.

14-00000

6:8/cc/cc/cc/

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : R. M. HERMAN
UNIT : SUPPLY
EXT : 2559
DATE : 17 FEBRUARY 1959

ROUTING

FEB 17 21 47 :59
REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : CL 3

INFO : WH 4, CO/S, CSA, S/C 2

	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT73536

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 13232

LIEMPTY/JBECHO

APPROVE MEXI 3318(IN 20248) FOR PANEL TRUCK. MV 2279 APPLIES

END OF MESSAGE

C/S Comments: Requested replace MV 2138 by trade-in plus $2000.

Telecon Coord - J. Burwell
WH/LOG

COORDINATING OFFICERS

For CHIEF, SUPPLY DIVISION
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

R. M. Herman
VEHICLE SECTION
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 141 WCJ/LSB/LSB/ 13 FEBRUARY 1959

S E C R E T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 14 10 21Z 59

REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : DD/S, SSA, OL 3, S/C 2

ROUTINE

IN 20248

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 3310

LIEMPTY

RE: A. HMMW 7257

B. HMMA 12095 PARA 10 D

C. HMMT 669

CAN REPLACE LIENTRAP (MV-2138) ON TRADE-IN PLUS $2,000.

PLEASE CABLE AUTHORIZATION.

END OF MESSAGE

LIEMPTY/Bus

S E C R E T

Copy No

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

File
Br. 3

FI OPERATIONAL AUTHORIZATION

TO : FINANCE DIVISION

THROUGH: FI/PLANS/PROJECTS BRANCH, FI/ADMIN/BF

SUBJECT: LIENVY (APPROVAL OF PROJECT) ; 9/3570-33-164 (ACCOUNT NO.) WH/III/Mexico (COUNTRY, AREA DIVISION)

SECTION 1. TO BE COMPLETED BY PROJECTS BRANCH

THE ABOVE PROJECT HAS BEEN APPROVED FROM 1 December 1958 TO 30 November 1959 IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF $ 95,300.00, AS BROKEN DOWN BELOW.

FI/PLANS/PROJECTS BRANCH ________ DATE ________

SECTION 2. TO BE COMPLETED BY CASE OFFICER

BREAKDOWN OF REQUESTED TOTAL	FISCAL YEAR 1959	FISCAL YEAR 1960
COMPENSATION	$ 32,710.00	$ 23,500.00
ALLOWANCES	1,070.00	1,400.00
TRAVEL	4,750.00	1,250.00
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES	5,350.00	3,750.00
OTHER:	21,000.00	———
TOTAL	$ 65,580.00	$ 29,800.00

ACCOUNTING DETAILS

TYPE OF PROJECT (Check one): X REGULAR ☐ SUBSIDY ☐ PROPRIETARY

METHOD BY WHICH PAYMENTS ARE TO BE MADE

FUNDS TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR BY: (Check one)
- X REGULAR FINANCIAL ACCOUNTINGS (AFR 30-10)
- ☐ RECEIPTS ONLY (CFR 9.4)
- ☐ OTHER (Explain):

SECTION 3. TO BE COMPLETED BY DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE WH DIVISION BUDGET FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1959 CONTAINS SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO MEET THE OBLIGATIONS OUTLINED ABOVE.

DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER ________ DATE 26 NOV 1958

SECTION 4. OTHER APPROVALS

FINANCE DIVISION MUST HAVE, IN ADDITION TO FI PROJECT APPROVAL, SPECIFIC WRITTEN APPROVAL ON CERTAIN TYPES OF EXPENDITURES BEFORE FUNDS CAN BE ADVANCED. INDICATE BELOW ANY APPROVALS IN THIS CATEGORY THAT HAVE BEEN SECURED:

- ☐ PURCHASE OF AUTOMOBILE
- ☐ PURCHASE OF MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT
- ☐ RENTALS IN EXCESS OF THAT PERMITTED BY REGULATION
- ☐ APPROVAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN WHEN REQUIRED
- ☐ OTHER (Explain):

SECTION 5. ADDITIONAL CRYPTONYMS, PSEUDONYMS, ETC.

Raymond H. Cerendo (ps)
Oliver G. Scantling (ps)

LIENVY - 3,-4,-5,-6,-7,-8,-9,-10,-11,-12,-13,-14,-15,-16,-17

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF OR DESIGNEE	DATE
John B. Brady	2555		

FORM NO. 680 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 59-104 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(3)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMA- 11710

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-6-25/3
50-6-74/2

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 10 December 1958

SUBJECT: Operational/LIEMPTY Station File Breakdown

RE: "X" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: None, for Headquarters information only

REFERENCE(S): (A) HMMW-6968, 31 October 1958, Paragraph one.
(B) HMMA-11257,

In reply to the request contained in reference (A), listed below is the Station's file breakdown for the LIEMPTY Project:

50-6-74/1 - Plans & Developments
/2 - Support
/3 - Operations (General)
/3A - Operations (GERENDE Contact Reports)
/3B - Operations (SCANTLING Contact Reports)
/4 - Production

50-6-74/5 - LIMITED Administration
/5A - LIMITED Operations
/5B - LIMITED Logs

50-6-74/6 - LILYRIC Administration
/6A - LILYRIC Operations
/6B - LILYRIC Logs

50-6-74/7 - LICALLA Administration
/7A - LICALLA Operations
/7B - LICALLA Logs

50-6-74/8 - LIENTRAP Administration
/8A - LIENTRAP Operations
/8B - LIENTRAP Logs

50-6-74/9 - LIJERSEY Administration
/9A - LIJERSEY Operations

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

WC:anc
5 December 1958

Distribution:

3 - Hqs

2 - Files

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

CONTINUED

14-00000

MEMORANDUM FOR:	FI/OPS - Projects Branch
CRYPTONYM :	LIENVOY
DIVISION :	Western Hemisphere
STATION :	Mexico City

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

NAME: John D. Brady
ROOM: 2112 Barton Hall
EXT.: 2555
DATE: 24 November 1958

1. It is requested that the LIENVOY Project be approved for the period 1 December 1958 through 30 November 1959 for a total of $95,380.00.

2. WH/Personnel has been requested to locate a Staff Agent to fill the BAP-ELOO slot formerly under the LIFETICK Project. This slot will be transferred to the LIENVOY Project and will be filled by a person who will be responsible for the directions of the physical surveillance team under this project.

R. W. Dahlgren, C/WH/III

C. W. Anderson, WH/FI

J. C. King, C/WHD

Date

Attachments:
FPO (in quad)
Form 680 (in quad)
Table of Vehicular Allowance
Justification for Purchase of Automobiles
Envelope with true names

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET

HMMA-6930

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

50-6-21/2

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT : Operational/LIJERSEY Agents Not Included under Project LIEMPTY

ACTION REQUIRED : Agent Service Records

REFERENCE : HMMA-11257

	RE INDEXING (CHECK ONE)
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

The following LIJERSEY Agents have active Operational Approvals but were not included under Project LIEMPTY. It is requested that the Station inform Headquarters whether these agents were ever recruited and whether the Station wishes to have their Operational Approvals remain active. Please submit Agent Service Records on these agents where appropriate.

LIJERSEY-14	(201-200231)
LIJERSEY-15	(201-209991)
LIJERSEY-16	(201-209153)
LIJERSEY-17	(201-208615)
LIJERSEY-19	(201-209139)
LIJERSEY-20	(201-215073)

OLIVER G. GALBOND

28 October 1958

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/Mexico Chrono
6 - Subject files
1 - RI

WH/3/Mexico/E.I.SCALETTI mgs

CS COPY

50-6-21/2

BASE FILE COPY

50-6-21/2

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

CONTINUED

PAGE NO

24 November 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OPS-Projects Branch

SUBJECT : Justification for Automobiles under Project LIEMPTY

1. It is requested that the Mexico City Station be authorized to purchase three used sedans for use by the LIEMPTY surveillance team. The Station plans to expand the LIEMPTY surveillance team into a larger, well-trained physical surveillance asset. They will need three automobiles. Private automobiles or commercial transportation will not be satisfactory since the cars must be outfitted with two-way radios.

2. Authority is also requested to purchase a panel truck to be used in the LIENTRAP operation under this Project which mounts mobile photographic surveillances.

3. It is also requested that a quasi-personal car be authorized for Oliver C. Scantling (ps). Scantling is an indigenous agent under oral contract. A car is a prerequisite for his work for KUBARK which includes casings, surveillances, and investigations. Because of the sensitive nature of his work, and the heavy use made of the car, the Station has decided that Scantling should be furnished a QP car.

4. LIEMPTY agents were formerly carried under the LIJ[illegible] and LIPSTICK Projects. The vehicles used by the LIEMPTY agents under these other Projects will be disposed of and new ones will be purchased after the above TVA has been approved. The vehicles which will be replaced are MV 2148, MV 2147, MV 2138, and MV 2041. One of the surveillance cars will be new and will not replace an old car. It was decided that these vehicles should be replaced rather than transferred to the LIEMPTY Project for security reasons and because of the age of the automobiles. The automobiles are 1951 and 1952 models and have been used for sensitive surveillance work for over two years. The panel truck which was used in the LIENTRAP Operation under the LIPSTICK Project has been operating for two years in all parts of the city and has become a security threat. The fact that the LIPSTICK surveillance team knows that the truck exists, even to the point that one of the team members is the listed owner of the truck, also dictates replacement of this vehicle.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

SECRET
(When Filled In)
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

SUPPORT ANNEX - TABLE OF VEHICULAR ALLOWANCE

1. PROJECT: LIEMPTY	2. SENIOR STAFF
	4. AREA — A. DIVISION: WHD
	B. BRANCH: III
	C. DESK: Mexico
3. TYPE OF ACTION (Check one): X A. NEW TVA; B. AMENDMENT OF EXISTING TVA	

5. REQUESTED ACTION

ITEM	TYPE	TOTAL ON HAND	TOTAL PRESENT TVA	TOTAL PROPOSED TVA
A.	SEDAN 2 or 4 door, 5 passeng r American or foreign		0	4
B.	STATION WAGON			
C.	OTHER (List below)			
(1)	truck, panel, American or foreign mfg.		0	1
(2)				
(3)				
(4)				
(5)				
D.	TOTALS		0	5

6. REVIEWED BY			7. APPROVAL REQUESTED BY		
SIGNATURE LOGISTICS OFFICER	DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE CHIEF, ADMIN.	DIVISION	DATE

8. APPROVED		9. AUTHORIZED	
BY DIRECTION OF DDP	DATE	BY DIRECTION OF DD/S	DATE

FORM 9-57 1116 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(20-38)

29 October 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/Personnel

SUBJECT : Request for Staff Agent ~~to fill BAP-8100~~ Slot in Mexico City

1. It is requested that WH/Personnel locate a Staff Agent to fill the BAP-8100, IO (FI), GS-12 slot in Mexico City which was recently vacated by Wilfred O. CLOWER(ps).

2. This Agent must be bilingual in Spanish and should have operational experience, expecially in physical surveillance techniques. It would be helpful if the candidate also has area knowledge. He will be expected to spot, develop, recruit, and direct surveillance assets.

3. It is requested that a suitable candidate be located as soon as possible so that the Contract Agent now performing these functions can be relieved of this responsibility and can devote his time to other tasks.

R. H. Dahlgren
Chief, WH/III

WH/3/Mexico/CZehrung:ngs

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/Mexico Chrono
1 - Subject

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

FROM: (Headquarters component)
WH

TO :

TO : (Station/Base)

SUBJECT AND PROJECT FILE REQUEST AND FIELD NOTIFICATION OF ACTION

FROM: (Division)

INFORMATION FOR REQUESTERS

COMPLETE ITEMS 1 THROUGH 12.

ITEM 3 - ALL FILE TITLES MUST BE STERILE SINCE THEY WILL APPEAR ON THE FIELD COPIES AND ON MACHINE LISTS.

ITEM 6 - ALL REMARKS MUST BE STERILE

ITEM 7 AND 8 - USE FIRST THREE LETTERS OF DISPATCH SYMBOLS FOR FIELD STATIONS AND LIST HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED NUMERIC CODES.

ITEM 10 - ENTER OLD TITLE WHEN AMENDING A TITLE. CITE ANY FILES, SUCH AS 201 OR PROJECT FILES THAT ARE RELATED TO THE FILE COVERED BY THIS REQUEST. ITEM 10 MAY ALSO BE USED TO GIVE REASONS FOR THE ACTION BEING REQUESTED, TO IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF MATERIAL TO BE PLACED IN A FILE OR TO MAKE OTHER EXPLANATORY REMARKS.

ITEM 11 - A RECORDS OFFICER MUST SIGN ALL FILE ACTION REQUESTS. CONSULT YOUR RMO ON ANY PROBLEMS THAT ARISE.

INFORMATION CONCERNING FILE

1. TYPE OF FILE: [ ] SUBJECT [X] PROJECT

2. CODE (FILE) NUMBER

COUNTRY NUMBER	CATEGORY NUMBER	SPECIFIC SUBJECT NUMBER
50	6	74/02

3. FILE TITLE (SPECIFIC SUBJECT) (PROJECTS LIMITED TO 15 SPACES)

KDFACTOR

ACTION REQUIRED

4. ANALYSIS ACTION

	OPEN FILE		CLOSE FILE (INDICATE DISPOSITION)
X	AMEND FILE TITLE		REOPEN

5. DISPOSITION

	RETAIN		DESTRUCTION RECOMMENDED THRU (DATE)

6. REMARKS (FOR FIELD DISTRIBUTION)

FORMERLY LIEMPTY

7. INTERESTED STATIONS (PROJECTS ONLY)
HMM

8. INTERESTED HEADQUARTERS DESK (LIST ACTION DESK FIRST)
50

9. FILES ACTION

	HOLD IN CS FILES		RESTRICTED		UNRESTRICTED		PREPARE FOLDER AND SEND TO REQUESTER		CHARGE PERMANENTLY TO (OFFICER & DESK)

10. COMMENTS (INCLUDE SPECIAL HEADQUARTERS ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS)

11. ENDORSEMENT
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O.

12. COORDINATION
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. (WHEN APPLICABLE)

13. RID APPROVAL
REQUEST APPROVED BY
[signature]

EFFECTIVE DATE

CODE (FILE) NUMBER

050	006	074/02

FORM 12-63 812 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS MFG. 4-64

SECRET

1-CS COPY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CASE FILE REQUEST

TO: RI/ANALYSIS SECTION

DATE: 24 October 1958

FROM: (Requester's Name) Charlotte Zehrung

COMPONENT	BUILDING	ROOM NO.	TELEPHONE
WH	Barton	2120	2758

1. CASE TITLE

LIBERTY/ Support

4. ACTION REQUESTED

X	OPEN FILE AS INDICATED.
	AMEND FILE AS INDICATED.
	CLOSE FILE
X	RESTRICT FILE TO (DESK). WH/III/Mexico
X	PERMANENT CHARGEOUT TO (DESK). WH/III/Mexico
	PREPARE FILE FOLDERS AND SEND TO REQUESTER.

2. COUNTRY AND NUMBER: 50 (Mexico)

3. CATEGORY AND NUMBER: 6 Operational

5. COMMENTS: (Include brief description of file or project)

Photo and physical surveillance coverage and support for station.

RECORD COPY

6. FOR RI USE ONLY

1. PROJECT STATUS

2. FIELD STATION(S)

3. HDQRS. COMPONENT(S)

7. ENDORSEMENT

THIS REQUEST SATISFIES RECORDS REQUIREMENTS.

C L Zeiring
RI/ANALYSIS

EFFECTIVE DATE: 29 Oct 1958

8. APPROVAL

REQUEST APPROVED

[illegible]
FOR CHIEF, RI

RI CASE TITLE NUMBER

			N.S.
50	6	71/2	

FORM NO. 812 1 DEC 56 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(38)

ATTACHMENT "3"

HMMTA - 31303 - 7 February 1967





FACHADA SUR

14-00000



FACHADA

esc 1:50

14-00000



piedra
c. servicios
pasta
toilet
cocina
cocina
cocina
comercio
R-5
AL COLECTOR
ORIENTE
CORTE



this floor not added in an economy measure.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DIRECTOR

EL SALVADOR

WH 8

DDP, WH/SA 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, VR

SECRET 282140Z

DIR CITE SALV 5229

WH DIV CUBA CUBAN DEF

* Provide details of approach made by [Liaison asset] to Target

REF DIR 44137

1. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS PARA 3 REF, [Liaison official] [Liaison asset] [Target] [Liaison's] ... [Liaison asset] [Liaison] TOLD [ ] THAT [Target] HAD REFUSED TO SERVE AS INFORMANT FOR GOES ON SECURITY GROUNDS; CITED CASE OF STUDENT WHOSE REPUTATION RUINED IN UNIV A COUPLE OF YEARS AGO AFTER BEING COMPROMISED AS POLICE AGENT. [Target] THEN RAISED POSSIBILITY OF WORKING FOR [US], PROBABLY BECAUSE IT WELL KNOWN AROUND UNIVERSITY THAT [Liaison asset] ENJOYS CLOSE RELATIONS WITH [US] CULTURAL ATTACHE, AND ONCE GIVEN [US] SCHOLARSHIP.

2. AT MEETING WITH [Station asset] ON 27 AUG, [CI officer] TOLD HIM THAT WE HAVE DECIDED TO LET THE DUST SETTLE ON THE RUSSIAN PROFESSORS FLAP BEFORE FOLLOWING UP PITCH TO [Target], AND TO TAKE NO FURTHER ACTION THIS CASE UNTIL ADVISED. [Station asset] DID NOT QUESTION THIS RATIONALE AND PROMISED TO COMPLY.

3. PLS IDENTIFY [WH DW] REP MENTIONED PARA 2 REF.

SECRET

SECRET

FBI

29 Dec. 67 Miami
Re: MDC

Confidential

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING; X NO INDEXING REQUIRED; ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING; MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: AKULE/MHSPAWN/AMMOP
Plans for ODCA Mid-April Congress

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: JMWAVE 0180

MICROFILMED DEC 1967 DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. The purpose of this dispatch is to report the comments of AMMOP-1 on 30 November regarding the forthcoming Organizacion Democrata Cristiana de America (ODCA) Congress. AMMOP-1 said that the precise date of the Congress is yet to be set though it is still scheduled for mid-April. He now feels that he will have a copy of the formal agenda by the end of December which is a full month earlier than reported in the reference. While AMMOP-1 is not a member of the committee preparing the agenda, he said that he is being kept generally informed of developments and that once the agenda is prepared he should be in a position to influence a revision of the agenda in the event that there are no items concerning Cuba or that the items listed are not satisfactory. He said that the principal person with whom he is in contact on this matter is Rafael CALDERA and that it will be through CALDERA that he would hope to make his influence felt. AMMOP-1 also said that he has been assured by CALDERA that the Cuban case will be prominent in the agenda.

2. We will continue to keep Headquarters informed of developments on this end.

Roger E. Marchbank
Roger E. MARCHBANK

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG

19-300-10

COPY

DEC 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO: 201-767219

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-29068

DATE: 1 December 1967

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 19-300-10

FBI

20 Oct. 67 Miami
Re: ADC
Confidential

FBI

30 Aug. 67
Miami
Re: MDC no class.

5 June 67 Miami
Re: MDC
Confidential

C/WH/COG

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chiefs, All WH Stations and Bases

INFO.

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: Christian Democracy in Latin America

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None, FYI.

The following analysis has been prepared in WH Division and is transmitted to all WH Division Stations and Bases as a review of the current status of Christian Democracy in Latin America and an updating of Headquarters' view on the movement. We believe the subject matter merits close and careful study by all Station operations and reports officers whose comments are solicited. FYI, this material, in a shorter and sanitized form was published in the 3 March issue of the Current Intelligence Weekly Review, and will thus be widely disseminated throughout the intelligence community. However, the WOGEAR study could not include much of the "Conclusions" section since it was interpretative and had operational overtones. Thus we've decided to send the full text herein in book dispatch form.

1. The decisive victory of Eduardo Frei in the September 1964 Chilean Presidential election led many to hope that Christian Democracy might develop significantly throughout Latin America competing with Communism on ideological grounds and offering an alternative, democratic route to social and economic progress. Christian Democracy's advocacy of "Third Force" concepts plus frequent manifestations of anti-Yankee syndrome caused some observers to swallow hard, but there was no denying that these concepts had an emotional appeal. This political charisma, coupled with a commitment to basic social reform and opposition to Communism, and presented within an ideological framework stressing the dignity of the human person, comprised a package of considerable attractiveness to the Latin American, particularly the student and middle class elements. This dispatch will review the current status of the CD parties and the role of organizations -- ODCA, CLASC, Party youth and student wings and European CD groups -- which

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: BOOK DISPATCH 5961

DATE

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

HQS FILE NUMBER

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/CA Joseph DiStefano	gb (8 March 1967)	5006

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/1		(in draft)
WH/2		(in draft)
WH/3		(in draft)
WH/4		(in draft)
WH/5		(in draft)
WH/6		(in draft)
WH/7		(in draft)

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD		William V. Broe

DISPATCH

represent key factors in the development of the Christian Democratic movement in Latin America. Our major purpose is to determine, some two years after the Frei victory, whether the generally enthusiastic assessment of Christian Democratic prospects engendered by this highly significant election was justified.

I - CURRENT BALANCE SHEET OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY

2. Parties of Current Significance. Christian Democratic parties are generally agreed to be of current political significance in only four Latin American countries -- Chile, Venezuela, El Salvador and Peru.

a. The Chilean PDC is the only party with the responsibility of governing; the solid victory of Frei in the 1964 presidential election was followed by an even more impressive showing in the March 1965 congressional election. However, the Party's reform program is being implemented with less than deliberate speed, no progress has been made in weakening Marxist leadership domination of the urban labor force, and indications are that Frei's moderation will be increasingly challenged by the left wing of the PDC.

b. The COPEI Party of Venezuela has strong hopes of duplicating the victory of the Chilean Party in 1968 and appears to have narrowed the gap between itself (22 percent of the electorate in 1963) and the governing Accion Democratica Party (32 percent). COPEI Secretary General Rafael Caldera, one of the few Latin American CD leaders of international stature, is expected to be the Party's standard bearer in his fourth try for the presidency.

c. In El Salvador, the PDC garnered 29 percent of the votes in the March 1966 legislative election and one of its leaders, Jose Napoleon Duarte, retained the mayoralty of San Salvador. In less than six years the PDC has become the leading opposition party. It has little chance of capturing the presidency in 1967, but should be a strong contender by 1972, with Notre Dame-educated Mayor Duarte the likely candidate.

d. The Peruvian PDC formed a coalition with the Popular Accion (AP) Party in 1963; it currently holds two cabinet positions. Some would argue that the Peruvian CD (with only 4 percent of the votes in 1963) has no real future in competition with the dominant AP and the long-established APRA, both reformist parties, and thus should not be included in a listing of significant CD parties. Some weight is added to this argument by the very recent split off of a dissident faction of the PDC into a separate party. However, the inclusion of the Peruvian party here is based primarily on the fact that it is the only CD group participating in a coalition government and thus contributes an element of stability to the political scene in Peru.

3. Parties of Moderate Potential. Applying even the most generous criteria to the judgement of potential, there are not more than four CD parties -- in the Dominican Republic, Panama, Brazil and Guatemala -- that might develop as moderately important forces over the next five years.

a. The Dominican PRSC stands as a prime example of CD irresponsibility from the time Caonabo Javier took over Party leadership in the wake of the Dominican Revolution in April 1965. It has collaborated with the entire spectrum of Marxist-lining parties, and moderation of its extreme militancy in the near future appears unlikely. The PRSC has developed a small but talented cadre of leadership, primarily from the university ranks, and is buttressed by the strongest CLASC affiliate (CASC) in the Hemisphere.

b. The Panamanian PDC was registered some five years ago and polled only 3.1 percent of the votes in 1964. Although it continues a miniscule party, it has made significant organizational strides and its philosophy of social justice gives it roots lacking by most Panamanian parties, which are largely personalistic or tied to financial interests. If the Panama CD succeeds in expanding its middle-class base and attracts militants from the predominantly negro and mestizo population, it could become a force of some importance.

c. While the Brazilian PDC polled a mere 4 percent of the vote in 1964, the Party has significant strength in three key states of the Center-South (Parana, Sao Paulo, and Guanabara). Like all other pre-Castello Branco political parties, the PDC was unable to campaign under its own banner in the presidential and parliamentary elections of late 1966. Expanded political activity will probably be permitted after the seating of President Costa e Silva in March 1967, but it is expected that the number of legally recognized political parties will be limited. It appears likely that the PDC will have to merge with another party if it is to compete in the legislative life of the country. If the PDC joins with a party that has strength outside the present PDC strongholds, and the PDC message and mystique sets the tone for such a new political entity, the net result could be expanded importance for Christian Democracy in Brazil.

d. The Guatemalan PDC was only recently recognized as a legally constituted party. This nascent group has good strength in the youth and student movement and growth potential in the important campesino sector. Current direction of the party leaves much to be desired; PDC leader Rene de Leon appears honest and intelligent but he has little organizational flair or charisma. His leadership is being challenged by a group of militant "Young Turks" on the left. With more vigorous leadership and the development of middle echelon cadres the party could develop significantly.

4. Parties of Insignificance. The remaining nine Christian Democratic parties -- in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Uruguay -- show scant promise of developing into forces of national importance over the next five years. Leadership of even modest stature exists only in Argentina (Salvador Allende, Horacio Sueldo) and Bolivia

(Rem- di Natale). These parties appear doomed to the role of bridesmaids to the handful of parties that really count.

II - PARTY YOUTH WINGS

5. CD Strength in Universities Ahead of Party Strength. As with all political groups in Latin America, the vast majority of CD party militants are drawn from the ranks of student appendages active in the local universities. In most countries of the hemisphere, CD voting strength on the campus is much more significant than the political strength of the parent party. A few examples illustrate this point: In Panama, the Party polled 3.1 percent of the vote in 1964 (and probably would poll not more than 5 percent today), while its University youth got 12.8 percent in the January 1966 election. The Dominican PRSC received 5.4 percent of the vote in 1962 (and its present strength could well be lower because of internal divisions and leadership conflicts), but its youth wing on the campus garnered 40.2 percent of the vote in May 1966. In Venezuela, COPEI polled 22 percent of the vote in 1963; its student wing on the campus of the Central University, however, polled 40.2 percent of the vote in 1966. These comparitive figures suggest some conclusions which are presented in Paras. 19 and 20 below.

6. Radicalization of Youth Wings. Several CD leaders, most notably Frei and Caldera, have expressed considerable concern over the growing radicalization of party youth wings. That youth groups of every political stripe assume positions to the left of their parties is nothing new, but the situation in several CD groups has gotten badly out of hand. In several countries only an opaque line divides the positions assumed by CD youth groups (or important wings) from the stance assumed by Marxist youth elements. In Venezuela, the wing of the COPEI youth headed by Marta Sosa is so "far-out" it has earned the sobriquet "the Astronauts." Chilean President Frei reportedly told a German Christian Democrat that his youth wing is in danger of becoming Marxist. In Panama, the dominant wing of the CD youth has assumed positions at least as radical as the Communists. And in the Dominican Republic the Social Christian group in the National University is allied with the Communist students.

7. Youth Tending to Push Parties Further Left. The great concern of responsible party leaders is that youth input to the parties will swell the ranks of the radical wings and push the parties further left. Some observers believe that the CD youth problem has been exaggerated and that the "hot heads" will mellow once they participate directly in party life and cope with hard political reality. While this is partially true, we would take issue with this relaxed view. The raw material to be molded is far different than it was ten years ago; since that time the demand for revolutionary (even convulsive) change has mushroomed -- and among the youth the cry has assumed din proportions. The natural mellowing process will no longer produce the same magic.

8. Need for Training. Some believe that the only way of arresting the CD youth drift to the left in the foreseeable future lies in massive and intensive youth and political cadre training. Efforts in this direction to date (at IFEDEC, several national political training institutes, ORMEU and various student training

courses) have been discouraging. In most instances the teachers share identical biases with the students with the result that misconceptions are reinforced and no new horizons are opened up. Frei and Caldera have asked the German Institute for International Solidarity to increase its support in the student training field, but the Germans, while recognizing the serious need, have thus far declined to increase their commitment. To accomplish anything significant, the Germans believe a massive program must be launched (which would tax their current resources), and they wonder whether the CD youth situation has been permitted to drift too long to salvage.

III - <u>THE IMPACT OF CLASC ON THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT</u>

9. <u>CLASC Poses Serious Danger for CD Movement</u>. A KUMONK study points out that "Organized labor could contribute substantially to the development of well-organized CD political parties in the hemisphere, but it also offers the best chance for CD extremists to cause harm to the movement." Few would argue that how the CD movement fares and the image it projects depend in not insignificant measure on the posture assumed and progress achieved by CLASC. More often than not, the judgement of a mass movement is based on the worst element comprising it -- and in this regard CLASC is challenged only by the party youth and student wings. As an organized labor force CLASC has been a dismal failure (with the exception of its campesino arm); its only impact and sole <u>raison d'etre</u> up to this time has been as a political action instrument with primary appeal to the working classes. It is unlikely that CLASC, under Maspero leadership, will mellow as do parties when they achieve the responsibility of government.

10. <u>CLASC Has Maintained Posture of Independence</u>. Despite its "Christian" label, CLASC has consistently maintained that it is not subservient to the Christian Democratic movement or any member party. The statement cannot be disputed, for while CLASC is guilty of most of the same aberrations as the least responsible of the CD parties, it invariably commits its follies independently, (often, in fact, setting an example that is emulated by the parties). But while CLASC can defend its claim of independence, it is also true that CLASC does not discourage the belief that it is the chosen labor instrument of the Christian Democratic movement, although this label has never been formally bestowed.

11. <u>Closer Ties Between CLASC and CD Movement Appear Likely</u>. It appears likely that a more organic participation of CLASC in CD affairs is in the offing. A Seminar was held in Montevideo from 11 - 23 April (sponsored by the Christian Democratic Formation Institute -- IFEDEC) for officials of CLASC who are also officers of Christian Democratic parties. The Seminar, called for the specific purpose of arranging closer coordination between the CD political movement and the Christian labor movement, resulted in the signing of the "Carta de Montevideo" on 20 April. The Act calls for formal representation of ODCA in both the Christian labor organization and CD party labor departments. To this end, a Coordinating Committee was formed -- the <u>Comite Relacionador Y Coordinador De Organizaciones Laborales Y Funcionales De Los Partidos Democrata Cristianos</u>. The Act appeals to the CD parties

to request ODCA approval of the creation of this Coordinating Committee and ODCA recognition of CLASC as its chosen hemispheric labor instrument. The eventual approval of the ODCA leadership appears likely; indeed, it is doubtful that the Act would have emerged from the Montevideo Seminar if informal agreement of the ODCA leadership had not been obtained in advance.

12. Negative CLASC Influence on Party Youth Wings. Closer CLASC identification with the CD political movement will likely rub off negatively on the CD youth wings which invariably are further left than their parent parties and identify much more closely with the revolutionary image and mystique CLASC has sown and propagated. It is perhaps significant that CLASC has intensified its efforts since January to establish youth appendages to the Christian labor movement. This initiative appears to have made greatest progress in Central America.

IV - THE ROLE OF ODCA

13. ODCA Contributes Little Positive Direction. The Latin American CD parties formed their regional organization in Montevideo in 1949 -- the Organizacion Democrata Cristiana de America (ODCA). The current officers of ODCA are:

President	:	Rafael Caldera, Venezuela
Vice President	:	Hector CORNEJO Chavez, Peru
Vice President	:	Rene DE LEON Schlotter, Guatemala
Secretary General	:	Tomas REYES Vicuna, Chile

ODCA has consistently assumed an anti-Yankee posture on a broad range of key issues (most forcefully on the American intervention in the Dominican Republic) but on balance has been less strident in its criticism than several of its member parties (notably the Chilean, Bolivian and Dominican CD's), probably because of Caldera's restraining hand. The Organization would merit much closer attention than we have given it to date if it had substantial influence on or authority over member parties, or could apply sanctions against national groups. But ODCA amounts to little more than a fraternity. Its member parties have little ideological homogeneity and the cement of their union appears to be based more on revolutionary mysticism (which most parties are careful to qualify with adjectives like peaceful, democratic and Christian) and on negative factors (hostility to the U.S., capitalism and the oligarchies), than on a foundation of CD doctrine or basic agreement on just what they want.

14. Efforts to Firm Up the ODCA Role. We have asked contacts in European CD circles to prod ODCA to set criteria for membership and behavior and that the Europeans weigh petitions for support from the Latin American parties and organizations against these criteria. DYVOUR officers have argued that while the Europeans cannot realistically require nascent and ill-trained CD groups in Latin America to hold to the same rigid standards of political morality that have evolved in Europe, neither should the Europeans

continue to tolerate and thus abet the irresponsibility of the Latin CD parties because there are no standards at all. ODCA leader Caldera appears to recognize the need for at least some basic ideological common ground among ODCA-member parties. But no signal success has been achieved in this direction to date and we are not at all sanguine that even modest progress will be made in this regard in the foreseeable future. Reporting on the Congress of the World Christian Democratic Union (WCDU) held in Lima in April 1966 indicates clearly that the Latin American parties will not submit without combat to any effort (whether initiated by the European financial backers of the CD movement or by ODCA) that aims at imposing standards and controls that will impinge on their complete freedom of action.

15. Formation of Central American Regional Grouping. The Central American CD parties met in El Salvador in July 1966 to establish a smaller regional grouping, The Union Democrata Cristiana de CentroAmerica (UDCCA). This action does not appear to reflect any element of pique with ODCA (the relations of COPEI and Rafael Caldera with the Central American parties appear close and cordial) but rather a desire to establish a smaller and more cohesive unit that can better address itself to the problems common to the area and, to a lesser extent, to the individual CD parties. UDCCA is comprised of five parties (in Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama), with the possibility that a sixth party will be formed in Honduras.

V - EUROPEAN CD ROLE AND INFLUENCE

16. The European Christian Democratic Union (ECDU). The European CD parties were first to establish a regional organization, the Nouvelle Equipe Internationales (NEI) in 1947. The NEI never played a major role in world Christian Democratic affairs. From the outset the Latin American parties maintained their closest ties with individual leaders of the CD movement in Europe, particularly those involved in financial operations with the sister parties and CLASC in Latin America. The NEI became progressively less significant and in recent years was virtually moribund. But in mid-1965 the organization was revamped and re-christened as the European Christian Democratic Union (ECDU). Its newly elected President, Mariano Rumor, Secretary General of the Italian PDC, appears intent on making the ECDU a strong organization which will at least match the Socialist International in stature.

17. European Financial Support to the CD Parties. The two CD organizations which have contributed most heavily to the support of the Latin American CD parties and related organizations are the Institute for International Solidarity (IIS) and the International Solidarity Foundation (FIS). Between them they will contribute an estimated $800,000 to $1,000,000 to the CD parties and CLASC in Calendar Year 1967. It was recently reported that the COPEI party of Venezuela will receive $480,000 for the 1968 election from FIS at the rate of $160,000 per year commencing in 1966.

a. The IIS. The Institute for International Solidarity, headed until recently by Dr. Peter Molt (the new Director is Adolf Herkenrath), is an arm of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation of the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Like its

Social Democratic counterpart (the Friedrich Ebert Foundation), the bulk of IIS's operating budget comes from the German Government. IIS maintains several permanent representatives in Latin America and supports several CD activities directly. But it also contributes more than fifty percent of the FIS budget.

5. The FIS -- The International Solidarity Fund was formally created on 30 March 1964 to avoid duplication of financial support efforts on the part of the European CD parties and other CD-oriented groups in Latin America. The name was later changed to the International Solidarity Foundation (FIS) to avoid confusion with the solidarity fund of CISC and other organizations. The FIS operates as an arm of the ECDU, with headquarters in Rome. Its most important leaders are: Dr. Johannes Schauff (President of the FIS, a German national and close personal friend of Konrad Adenauer), Mariano Rumor, Adolf Herkenrath and August Vanistendael (Secretary General of the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions -- CISC).

18. Difference in Function of IIS and FIS. From the start of its activities, the Germans and Italians have contributed almost the entire FIS budget (in 1964, for example, Vanistendael contributed only $15,000 from the CISC International Solidarity Fund). FIS appears to be the exclusive European CD channel for organizational support to the Latin American CD parties. While the IIS is the rich partner in the IIS-FIS tandem and could easily fund the Latin American parties directly, the FIS channel is preferred by the Germans and has two major advantages: First, since FIS is a regional solidarity instrument with representation (but not contributions) from all the European parties, the responsibility for support to certain controversial Latin parties is watered down and distributed among the European CD's collectively. Thus a Latin American government or party in competition with the local CD's cannot easily make a formal demarche to the IIS or the German government. Second, it is easier to obfuscate the magnitude of European organizational support to the Christian Democratic movement in Latin America if it is channeled through a multi-party organization. The Germans have limited IIS funding to less controversial areas -- support to youth and student formation, political training institutes and CLASC training institutes. (See Attachment A for a detailed flow chart.)

CONCLUSIONS

19. CD's Challenge Communist Domination of the University. It was noted in Para. 5 above that almost without exception CD strength in the university greatly exceeds the voting strength of the parent party. The same is true of the Communists, and it is a fact that Communist/Christian Democratic strength on the campus is overwhelmingly dominant throughout the hemisphere. Few would take issue with the conclusion that the vast majority of university youth are attracted to movements projecting an inspirational message (the word "inspirational" more accurately characterizes the CD movement than does "ideological") or an aura of revolutionary mystique. During the past few years Communist voting losses in the university have been picked up mainly by the Christian Democrats -- the vote has shifted from one movement with a message to another. It would appear that the Christian Democrats are the only political group capable of challenging the Communists' hemispheric domination of the campus.

20. CD Strength in University No Indicator of CD Party Strength or Potential. From the foregoing, however, it does not follow that the growth of CD strength in the university presages a corresponding increase in CD party strength. While voting patterns in the university provide valuable insights on population (particularly youth) attitudes and aspirations, these patterns are not a reliable barometer of either organized party strength or future potential. In no country of Latin America is the voting strength of the CD's or the Communists nearly as strong among the population at large as it is on the campus. One reason is that the university population of Latin America is less than 2 percent of the total population. The CD campus leader almost invariably graduates from student politics to more direct party involvement when he leaves the university -- even if the party has no discernable future. It would appear, however, that the non-university youth (lacking the pseudo-intellectual pretensions and the self-bestowed elite label of the university-trained) are much less inclined to vote and militate for Christian Democracy simply because it has emotional or inspirational appeal.

21. CD Failure to Transform Affinity of Lower Classes Into Votes. The inadequately educated and the lower social classes in Latin America are inevitably motivated by the pragmatism of the possible; to vote for a party that has limited potential to achieve national power, simply because it espouses views that hit responsive chords, is a luxury he believes he cannot afford. Better, he thinks, to vote for the least objectionable of the traditional parties. Christian Democracy remains basically a middle-class movement. With few exceptions (Chile, the Dominican Republic and to a lesser extent Venezuela) it has scant worker or campesino appeal. By and large, Christian Democracy has failed to reach those on the lower rungs of the social ladder.

22. Individual Party Fortunes Appear Unaffected by CD Progress Elsewhere. Many expected, or at least hoped, that the Frei victory in Chile would give impetus to the development of the CD movement throughout the hemisphere. This has not happened. There is no evidence that individual CD parties were either assisted or hindered in their development by the Chilean success story. And yet the view persists that the Chilean victory was a boon to the movement's potential and progress. During the past year COPEI leader Rafael Caldera has broadcast a variation on this theme that several European CD leaders have taken up. They argue that COPEI must emerge victorious in the 1968 election if the CD movement is to maintain its momentum, for an ideologically based movement cannot avoid peaking off, and gradually down, if it has only one significant victory to cite over a period of several years. We would reject the view -- based on election results in Argentina, Colombia, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay -- that individual party fortunes will be affected in any significant measure by the successes or failures of sister parties elsewhere. What appears to emerge from these elections is rather solid evidence that the national parties will sink or swim on their own devices, based largely on leadership abilities, the development of middle echelon cadres, organizational talents, appeal to the "socially disinherited," and the pragmatism of local issues and considerations. International events (with rare exception) count for little, and the influence of ODCA and the successful CD parties even less.

23. Growth Potential Exists, But Much Less Than Originally Anticipated. The CD movement has made only modest progress the past two years. Indications are that the development of the movement will be much slower and less extensive than many anticipated in the first flush of enthusiasm following the Frei victory, for it has many problems to resolve. Chief among these, perhaps, is CD failure to reach the lower social classes and to develop a significant worker base. The chances of CLASC contributing positively to correct this failure appear remote. Another major problem is the absence of an ideological commonground, despite the lip service paid to the Papal Encyclicals and the Catholic social philosophers, and the failure to enunciate minimum behavioral standards that these philosophical roots would impose. This deficiency is the root cause of two manifestations: First, a propensity to consort with Communist and assorted Marxist groups (e.g., in Colombia, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic and Panama). Second, the progressive radicalization of party youth wings which threatens to push the parent parties further left. The fact, remains, nevertheless, that Christian Democracy is the most unified non-Communist movement in Latin America. It cannot be labeled democratic or anti-Communist because of the behavioral aberrations of several national parties.

24. Need for Eclectic Operational Approach to CD's. The ranks of those who viewed Christian Democratic prospects with great enthusiasm two years ago -- including the European financial backers of the movement -- have dwindled considerably. But those who have been critics of Christian Democracy from the outset (many of whom might be described as the "visceral denigrators") have displayed no more perception in evaluating CD prospects. The head-in-the-sand generalization that Christian Democracy has no future does not stand the challege of investigation. Neither does the assertion that Christian Democracy is the hemispheric wave of the future. The only valid generalization that might be made on CD prospects is that all generalizations are false. We would submit that the only valid approach to the CD phenomenon is to assess the movement and make operational judgements on a country-by-country basis. There are some countries where the collapse of the party would be no loss. The key question is: Can the party develop as a positive element in national political stability? If so, it is incumbent on the Station to develop assets within the party and to examine the need for operational involvement. Station posture toward the CD movement must be based on the raw realities of the local situation, case by case.

RUTHERFORD J. LYNER

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SOME BUDGETARY SUPPORT

Support To:
Political Training Institutes
Training Institutes of CLASC
(Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unionists)
Youth and Student Training

Organizational Support To:
Political Parties

Secret

No Foreign Dissem

File:
CD file
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

Special Report

Christian Democracy in Latin America

Secret

№ 1100

3 March 1967

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CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA

The decisive victory of Eduardo Frei in the September 1964 Chilean presidential election led many to hope that Christian Democracy would develop significantly throughout Latin America, competing with Communism on ideological grounds and offering an alternative, democratic route to social and economic progress.

No such trend has yet developed. The Christian Democratic movement's appeal is to students and middle class, a relatively small percentage of the population in most Latin American countries. Its concepts of basic social reform and the dignity of the human person may appeal to the workers, but they still cast their vote on a pragmatic basis for the least objectionable of the established parties that have an immediate chance of governing.

The movement's progress is likely to be hampered by its lack of strong leaders and effective labor organizations to compete against the entrenched positions of other political movements.

Current Balance Sheet

The Christian Democratic movement is generally agreed to be of current political significance in only four Latin American countries--Chile, Peru, Venezuela, and El Salvador.

In only one of these--Chile--is the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) the governing party. Frei's solid victory in the 1964 presidential election was followed by an even more impressive showing in the March 1965 congressional election. However, the party's reform program has run into difficulty in the upper house of Congress, which is still controlled by the opposition; no progress has been made in weakening Marxist domination of the urban labor force; and Frei's moderation has been increasingly challenged by the left wing of his own party, which may capture control in the next two or three years.

The only other Christian Democratic party with a claim to a role in government is the one in Peru. It was brought into a pre-election coalition by the dominant Popular Action Party in 1963 and, although it gained only four percent of the votes, it holds two cabinet posts. Its voting strength has been weakened recently by the defection of a dissident faction which formed a separate Popular Christian Party.

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA



EDUARDO FREI
President of Chile,
Latin America's Christian Democratic leader.

RAFAEL CALDERA
Venezuelan presidential aspirant and
number-two Latin American Christian Democrat

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Venezuela's Christian Democrats (COPEI) have strong hopes of duplicating the victory of the Chilean party in 1968 and appear to have narrowed the gap between their 22 percent of the electorate in 1963 and the governing Democratic Action's 32 percent. COPEI Secretary General Rafael Caldera, one of the few Latin American CD leaders of international stature, is expected to be the party's standard bearer in his fourth try for the presidency. He has recently come out in favor of a politically expedient move to the right, thus filling the vacuum of the center-right of the Venezuelan political spectrum and opening new sources of support.

In El Salvador, the PDC garnered 31.2 percent of the votes in the March 1966 legislative election and one of its leaders, Jose Napoleon Duarte, retained the mayoralty of San Salvador. In less than six years the PDC has become the leading opposition party. It has little chance of capturing the presidency in 1967, but should be a strong contender by 1972, with Notre Dame - educated Mayor Duarte the likely candidate.

Applying even the most generous criteria to the judgment of potential, there are not more than four other CD parties--in the Dominican Republic, Panama, Brazil, and Guatemala--that might develop as moderately important forces over the next five years.

The Dominican Revolutionary Social Christian Party (PRSC), led by Coanabo Javier, has abandoned, at least for the time being, the irresponsible policies it adopted after the April 1965 revolt and has moved toward the political center. The party has made its opposition to the Balaguer government clear, but has also indicated that it intends to operate within bounds acceptable to the President. The PRSC hopes that this moderate line will increase its following and enable it to improve on the poor showing it made in the 1966 elections. The party has developed a small but talented cadre, primarily from the university ranks.

The Panamanian PDC was registered some five years ago and polled only 3.1 percent of the votes in 1964. Although it continues a minuscule party, it has made significant organizational strides and its philosophy of social justice gives it roots lacked by most Panamanian parties, which are largely personalistic or tied to financial interests. The PDC is currently negotiating with the mass-based Panamenista Party of Arnulfo Arias--Panama's largest--in hopes of forming a coalition for the May 1968 elections. The CDs have offered to provide the Panamenistas with much-needed administrative skills in return for a share of the assembly seats in the next election. A long-range goal would be to acquire support within Arias' party and inherit his mass following when he passes from the scene.

The Brazilian PDC polled only four percent of the vote in

1962, but the party had significant strength in three important south-central states (Parana, Saõ Paulo, and Guanabara). Like all other Brazilian parties, it was abolished during a political reorganization under the Castello Branco administration. Most of its members then affiliated with the progovernment ARENA party and campaigned under its banner in the November 1966 congressional elections. It is unlikely that there will be any significant expansion in the number of political parties--the new Brazilian constitution sets down stringent standards that virtually eliminate the possibility of a repetition of the former proliferation of parties. The former PDC has made no attempt to reconstitute itself, but its former members will probably join with like-minded congressmen to pursue policies consistent with Christian Democratic ideology.

The Guatemalan PDC was only recently recognized as a legally constituted party. This group, which is being financed by Catholic sources in Germany and Belgium, has some strength in the youth and student movement and some growth potential among the campesinos who make up more than half the population. Current direction of the party leaves much to be desired; its leader, Rene de Leon, appears honest, but he has little organizational flair or popular appeal. With more vigorous leadership and the development of a middle-echelon cadre, the party might develop significantly--particularly if the incumbent Revolutionary Party (PR) administration fails to resolve basic problems confronting it.

The remaining nine Christian Democratic parties--in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Uruguay--show scant promise of developing into forces of national importance over the next five years. Leadership of even modest stature exists only in Argentina (Salvador Alende, Horacio Sueldo) and Bolivia (Remo di Natale).

Party Youth Wings

As with all political groups in Latin America, the vast majority of CD party militants come from student organizations in the local universities. In most countries of the hemisphere, CD voting strength on the campus is much greater than the political strength of the parent party. A few examples illustrate this point: In Panama, the party polled 3.1 percent of the national vote in 1964 (and probably would poll not more than 5 percent today), but its university youth got 12.8 percent in the January 1966 campus election and 24.4 percent in January 1967. The Dominican PRSC received 5.4 percent of the vote in 1962 (and its present strength could well be lower because of internal divisions and leadership conflicts), but its youth wing on the campus garnered 40.2 percent of the vote in May 1966. In Venezuela, COPEI polled 22 percent of the vote in 1963; its student wing on the campus of Central University, however, polled 40.2 percent of the vote in 1966.

Several CD leaders, most notably Frei in Chile and Caldera in Venezuela, have expressed considerable concern over the growing radicalization of party youth wings. In several countries the positions assumed by CD youth groups (or important wings) are almost indistinguishable from those of pro-Communist youth elements. In Venezuela, the wing of the COPEI youth headed by Marta Sosa is so "far out" it has earned the sobriquet "the Astronauts." Chilean President Frei reportedly told a German Christian Democrat that his youth wing is moving dangerously far to the left. In Panama, the dominant wing of the CD youth has assumed positions at least as radical as the Communists. And in the Dominican Republic the Social Christian group in the National University, while differentiating itself from the Communist students on certain issues, has frequently taken a parallel line.

The great concern of responsible party leaders is that these students, as they progress from campus to parent party, will swell the ranks of the radical wings and push the parties further left. Other observers, however, expect the "hotheads" to mellow once they participate directly in party life and cope with hard political reality. Both views can be defended. Some mellowing is inevitable, but in the past ten years the demand for revolutionary (even convulsive) change has mushroomed--and among the youth the cry has assumed much greater proportions.

Both German and American observers have commented that massive and intensive political training of youth and political cadres might arrest this drift to the left. Frei and Caldera have specifically asked the West German CD party's Institute for International Solidarity to increase its support in the student training field. However, the Germans, who have long been proponents of organizational programs in Latin America, appear inclined to the position in the youth and student field that party leaders have permitted the situation to deteriorate too long for even a massive training program to produce a moderating trend.

The Labor Arm

A major influence in the development of the Christian Democratic movement will be the actions and attitudes of its labor organization, the Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unionists (CLASC). So far, as an organized force, it has been a dismal failure except among the campesinos. Its only impact and sole purpose up to this time has been as a political action instrument with primary appeal to the working classes. In this role, it has earned a reputation for independent action and irresponsibility that has reflected negatively on the whole movement despite CLASC's vigorous claims that it is not subservient to the Christian Democratic political leaders.

In spite of the apparent differences between CLASC and

the CD movement, a closer and more formal relationship appears to be in the offing. Last April, officials of CLASC who are also officers of the Christian Democratic parties met in Montevideo to arrange closer coordination between the two groups. To accomplish this goal, they proposed that both the CD party labor departments and CLASC be granted formal representation in the Christian Democratic Organization of America (ODCA), the regional grouping formed in 1949.

The plan has not yet been implemented, but eventual ODCA approval appears likely. Closer CLASC identification with the CD political movement may have an adverse effect on CD youth wings, which--being further left than their parent parties--have identified more closely with CLASC's revolutionary image. Since the first of the year, CLASC has intensified its efforts to create its own youth groups and appears to have made some progress, especially in Central America.

The Role of ODCA

In its 17 years of existence, ODCA has not evolved beyond a sort of fraternity held together more by negative factors such as hostility to the US, to capitalism, and to the oligarchies, than by any basic agreement among its members on doctrine or principles. Moreover, the individual parties have made very clear that they will fight any effort--whether initiated by ODCA or by the European financial backers of the CD movement--to impose standards and controls that will impinge on their freedom of action.

In general, ODCA takes a slightly less hostile line on US policies than that of its member parties. This probably results from the influence of its president, Rafael Caldera of Venezuela. The organization's two vice presidents are Hector Cornejo Chavez of Peru and Rene De Leon of Guatemala. Tomas Reyes Vicuna of Chile is its secretary general.

Only in Central America has there been any move toward a more cohesive unit geared to area problems. A smaller regional group, the Christian Democratic Union of Central America, was organized last July. It now has five member parties, in Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama, and a sixth may be formed in Honduras.

European Role and Influence

Although Latin American Christian Democracy like the European variety, has its roots in the profoundly humanistic and democratic ideas of the French philosopher Jacques Maritain, it does not contain the European fascist concept of the corporate state. The European reaction to the growth of Communism in the 1930s had little effect on the Latin American CDs; consequently the Americans were moving to the political left as the Europeans were moving to the right.

Not until 1947 did the newly important and affluent European

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Johannes Schauff

SOME BUDGETARY SUPPORT

Support To:
Political Training Institutes
Training Institutes of CLASC
(Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unionists)
Youth and Student Training

Organizational Support To:
Political Parties

CDs attempt to coordinate international CD activity through an organization they called the New International Team (NEI). This organization never achieved any significance because European influence in Latin America had already been undermined by a basic difference in political philosophy and because the Latin American parties had been maintaining individual relations with the various European groups. These ties were strictly on vague ideological grounds and for financial reasons.

The two heaviest European contributors to the Latin American parties are the Institute for International Solidarity (IIS) and the International Solidarity Foundation (FIS). Between them they will contribute an estimated $800,000 to $1,000,000 to the American CD parties and CLASC in calendar year 1967. In addition, it was recently reported that the COPEI party of Venezuela will receive $480,000 for the 1968 election from FIS.

The IIS, under the direction of Adolf Herkenrath, is an arm of the West German Christian Democratic Union with the bulk of its budget coming directly from the German government. It maintains several permanent representatives in Latin America and supports youth and student groups, political training institutes, and CLASC organizations.

The FIS, under the leadership of Dr. Johannes Schauff, operates as an arm of the European Christian Democratic Union (ECDU), successor to the NEI. Since its creation in 1964, Germans and Italians have contributed almost its entire budget. FIS appears to be the exclusive European channel for organizational support to the Latin American parties. It has assumed this responsibility because it is composed of representatives of all the European parties. Thus the responsibility for support to certain controversial Latin parties is watered down and distributed among the European CDs collectively. Furthermore, a Latin American government or party in competition with the local CDs cannot formally protest its funding activities to the German government.

Outlook

The modest progress made by the Christian Democratic movement in the past two and a half years suggests that its development will be much slower and less extensive than many anticipated in the first flush of enthusiasm following the Frei victory.

One major problem is its failure to reach the lower social classes and to develop a significant worker base. Its strength in the universities and its ability to compete with Communist groups on the campus create unfounded optimism. The "inspirational" approach that attracts the college student has no comparable appeal among the inadequately educated lower classes.

Neither does a victory for one party seem likely to have

any major effect on the fortunes of another. What appears to emerge from CD gains or losses in recent elections is rather solid evidence that the national parties will sink or swim on the basis of their own leadership abilities, organizational talents, and approach to local issues. International events count for little, and the influence of ODCA and the successful CD parties for even less. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

* * *

7 FEB 1967 Miami
RE : MDC
SECRET

25 Nov. 1966 New Jersey
RE: IGNACIO VALLADARES RODRIGUEZ CONFIDENTIAL

31 Oct. 1966 Miami, Fla.
RE: MDC CONFIDENTIAL

30 SEPT. 1966 NEW JERSEY
IGNACIO VALLADARES RODRIGUEZ
CONFIDENTIAL

29 Aug. 1966 Miami, Fla.
RE: MDC SECRET

14-00000

REPORT COVER SHEET | S E C R E T | PROCESSING ACTION

FROM: JMWAVE	REPORT NO.: UFG-8473	COVER SHEET XXX MARKED FOR INDEXING
REPORTING OFFICER: Henry J. SLOMAN	DATE OF REPORT: 8 August 1966	NO INDEXING REQUIRED / RID DATA REPORTED SEPARATELY
REPORTS OFFICER: John C. TARBELL/vkl	PROJECT:	CS DISSEMINATION 6
APPROVING OFFICER: Philip G. ELMARD	SOURCE CRYPT: AMOT-245	RCS DISSEMINATION

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
4 - Hqs	State
1 - DCS	FBI
2 - Santo Domingo HDC	I&NS
2 - Santiago de los Caballeros	Customs
2 - Caracas HVC	Border Patrol
2 - Guatemala City HGG	USCG

MICROFILMED AUG 18 1966

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

TYPIC

SOURCE: AMOT-245 in AMOT reports as follows: Para. 2: DD-1874 from Palacio BARBEITE, 10 June 1966, and DD-1888, 6 July, from BARBEITE and Angel HERNANDEZ; paras. 3 to 7 and source comment 2, DD-1888; para 8 and source comment 5, DD-1883, 23 June, which included a copy of the document; para. 9: DD-1892, 15 July, from HERNANDEZ, DD-1895, 21 July, from a conversation between HERNANDEZ and Jorge MAS, and DD-1902, 3 August; para. 10, DD-1892; para. 11, DD-1874 from Ignacio VALLADARES; source comment 1: DD-1874 and DD-1890, 14 July, from Laureano BATISTA.

AMCRUMP-1's true name appears in this report. Information available in his 201 indicates that he was "suspended" on 25 February 1966, and there is no record of contact since that time.

RID: Index / 201-265279

Name: BATISTA Falla, Laureano
Sex : M
DPOB: 1 May 1935, Havana, Cuba
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Elected organization secty of Natl Executive Committee of MDC at congress 25-27 Feb 66. Trip to DR on behalf of MDC, June 66.

22

Group 1: Excluded from Automatic Downgrading and Declassification

19-300-10

FORM 1467

CS COPY

SECRET

Page two of Cover Sheet UFG-8473

Name: BAZAN, Arnaldo
Sex : M
DPOB: ?
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre in DR. Connection with MDC base. Formerly with La Salle College of Camaguey, Cuba.

Name: HERNANDEZ Rojo, Angel
Nickname: Baby, El Baby
Sex : M
DPOB: 4 Sept 33, Havana Cuba,
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre in Miami. Second in command of military dept of MDC.

Name: BARBEITE Freyre, Placido A.
Sex : M
DPOB: 19 Nov 38, Batabano, Havana Prov, Cuba
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre in Miami. Chf of military dept of MDC.

Name: PALACIOS San Juan, Armando
Sex : M
DPOB: ?
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre. President of MDC in Puerto Rico.

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE. A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence.) F: Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources.)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY: Cuba/Dominican Republic | REPORT NO.

SUBJECT: C Activities of the MDC; Possibility of Reactivating a Base in the Dominican Republic, Condition of Boats, Possible Alliances With Other Emigre Organizations

DATE OF REPORT: 8 August 1966

NO PAGES:

REFERENCES:

DATE OF INFO.: 29 May to late July 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ: United States, Miami ~~(10 June to 3 August 1966)~~ | UFG-8473

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A member of a group of Cuban émigrés trained in the techniques of information collection. This group has provided useful reports since 1961.

1. Summary: Laureano Batista Falla, leader of the Movimiento Democrata Cristiano (Christian Democratic Movement), returned to Miami in late June 1966 from the Dominican Republic, where he allegedly obtained pledges of support for his anti-Castro undertakings from the Chief of the Air Force of the Dominican Republic, pending the approval of President Balaguer. However, the military department of the MDC recently issued a document in which it voiced its discouragement, primarily due to lack of funds. Although representatives of the MDC have discussed the signing of agreements with representatives of the Students' Revolutionary Directorate (DRE) and the Cuban Representacion in Exile (RECE), no alliances have yet been formed.

2. Laureano Batista Falla, organization secretary of the National Executive Committee of the MDC, left Miami on 6 June 1966 for Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, and returned to Miami on 26 June. On 29 June he met with other leaders of the MDC to inform them of the results of his trip.

3. Batista said that during discussions held with General Juan N. Folch Perez, Chief of the Air Force of the Dominican Republic, he had requested that Folch cooperate with the MDC by allowing the MDC to maintain Base Luna, located at Estero Balsa, near the town of Pepillo Salcedo (N 19-43, W 71-45). According to Batista, Folch indicated his willingness to cooperate and offered the following assistance, subject to the approval of President Balaguer, whom Folch said he will consult:

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

E	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	OCR	FBI /2

SO # USIA ( ) I&NS ( )

FI	1	WHC/SI	1	E/IB/R	1
RR	1	WHC/WAVE	1	E/MADR	1
RE	3	WHC/CA	1		
CICS	1				
MO	1	CI/OPS/WH	2	WH/PACY(CINCSO)	1

LS IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 1, DO/H 1, | Liaison | CS | COORD. | RELEASE.

a. The use of five islets facing Santiago de los Caballeros City for a military base. (SIC.).

b. Authorization for MDC personnel to move into and out of the Dominican Republic in a clandestine manner.

c. Transportation of MDC war materiel from Miami aboard Dominican Air Force planes.

4. Batista said that he had visited Base Luna and on several occasions talked with Arnaldo Bazan, a Cuban residing in Santiago de los Caballeros, who is the recipient of $ 3500. per month sent by the MDC to the Dominican Republic for the maintenance of Base Luna. Bazan, who had arranged Batista's meeting with Folch, was described by Batista as having formerly been with the La Salle College of Camaguey. Batista claimed that the chief of Santiago de los Caballeros had made arrangements for the procurement of a house to be occupied by the MDC members who are in charge of Base Luna.

5. Batista expressed enthusiasm regarding Folch's proposals, and stressed the necessity of acting immediately, including sending MDC personnel to the Dominican Republic. He directed Angel Hernandez Rojo, second in command of the military department, to prepare a plan to operate from the Dominican Republic, and Placido Barbeite Freyre, chief of the military department, to prepare an estimate of the cost of the plans that the necessary money could be obtained.

6. Although Barbeite agreed with Batista regarding the need for preparation of operational plans and an estimate of the cost, he basically opposed Batista's advocation of initiating immediate action. He felt that it was inadvisable to attempt the implementation of the plans until Balaguer's reaction is known. Hernandez' views coincided with those of Barbeite. The meeting ended without a solution to the disagreement.

7. At the meeting Batista reported that dissension exists within the MDC in Puerto Rico, particularly between Armando Palacios San Juan and Humberto Perez Herrera, president and military chief respectively. Palacios claims that Perez does not report to the president on military plans and activities. However, Barbeite defended Perez' action with the argument that military matters do not really fall within the scope of responsibilities of the president.

8. The military department of the MDC set forth its views in a document dated 29 May. This document included the following points:

a. Discontent is becoming evident because of the lack of activity which, in turn, results from the lack of funds. The sum mentioned is $10,000.[5]

b. No change in United States policy is anticipated. A base of operations outside of the United States is considered to be so vitally important that the military department would be willing to operate an illegal base if the resources were made available.

c. The condition of the boats is such that the MDC has no sea transportation. The boats are described as follows:

(1) The CADELLO I is docked across from Brito's Boat Yard at Stock Island, Florida.[6] The boat is in need of repairs on the deck and superstructure, and the installation of electronic navigational equipment would be required to put it in operational condition. Current docking and routine maintenance costs are not being paid. Efforts to make commercial use of this boat have not been successful. This boat is considered ideal for activities which might be undertaken if there were a base from which to operate, but under the present circumstances the expense which this boat represents is not justifiable. It is recommended that consideration be given to selling the CADELLO I if an operational base is not established within four months.

(2) The KYA-ORA,[7] which was donated to the MDC by a member of the military department, is in drydock at Nuta's Boat Yard in Miami. There are leaks in the hull.

(3) The LANCHA AZUL[8] is in need of repairs, as well as trailer. Repairs on this boat are being given priority, and will proceed as money becomes available.

d. Informal discussions have been held with representatives of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE, Students' Revolutionary Directorate), and there is an "agreement in principle" to coordinate future actions. There is no political commitment.

9. In July Jorge Mas Canosa, chief of press and propaganda of Representacion Cubana en el Exilio (RECE, Cuban Representation in Exile), proposed that the MDC enter into a pact with RECE, and indicated that some members of MDC ~~will~~ be offered full-time employment preparing military plans for the RECE. As of late July no formal agreement had been reached.

10. Hernandez, who feels that Ramon Font Saumell[9] is incapable of formulating military strategy, favors the formation of a pact between the MDC and RECE xgax which would exclude Font from participating in the preparation of plans for military operations. Hernandez also said that he plans to attempt the reorganization of the military department of the MDC in order to replace Barbeite in a less important position than that which he currently occupies.

...y department of the MDC in order
...Barbeite from his present position to an unimportant
position in the department.

11. In early June Ignacio Valladares Rodriguez[10] expressed a desire to participate in action against Cuba with the MDC. Barbeite agreed to inform Valladares when an operation is to be carried out. Before Valladares left Miami on 6 June for Dover, New Jersey, he said that within a month he would send a 57mm recoilless rifle, a 50-caliber machine gun, and an unstated number of M-1 and Garand rifles. His address in Dover is Dover Cliff Apartments, apartment 21.

1. Source Comment. At the time of his departure, Batista told the executive committee that he was going directly to Caracas, Venezuela. It was not until after his return that it was learned that he had not gone to Caracas or to Guatemala as he had planned. He later explained that while he was in Puerto Rico he telephoned his relative in Guatemala and was informed that the latter had "failed in his efforts."

   Field Comment. Presumably he was referring to an interview with President Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro which Batista had earlier said had been arranged by his cousin. (Cf. ~~UFG-8328~~) TD ...

3. Headquarters Comment: In early August 1964, Folch was reported to have been in charge of Dominican ~~airxtox~~ Armed Forces aid in a ~~x~~ caching operation for Cuban exiles in the Monte Cristi area. See TDCS-314/01722-66. ~~In TDCSDB-315/00798-66.~~ Another source reported ~~that~~ in September 1964 approximately 30 Cuban exiles were taking training at a camp near Punta Presidente (N 19-47, W 71-46). See TDCSDB-315/00798-66 for more information.

4. The location of the house was not given.

5. Source Comment. The document, as originally drafted, was modified because Barbeite felt that the tone was too strong. Also, the amount of money requested was reduced to $10,000.

   Field Comment. An earlier report from the same source reported that the document was being prepared, and that $75,000 would be requested. (Cf. UFG-8327) (CS-DB-3-/01722-66)

Field Comments.

6. The CADELLO I (FL 7579 F), an 83-foot boat, is a former U.S. Coast Guard patrol boat. The boat yard referred to is the Syncrolift Boat Yard on Stock Island which is owned by Mike Brito. Stock Island is on U.S. Highway 1, between Key West and Boca Chica.

7. The KYA-ORA, or KIA-ORA, has Florida registration FL 8665 E.

8. The LANCHA AZUL has been described as a high-speed launch. (Cf. ~~UFG-8327~~). Besides the CADELLO I, the MDC has been reported to own the VICKY I, a blue V-23; the PUNCHIN CHIA (FL 9256 SC), a 33-foot boat; and BERNARDO II.

CS DB-315/01721-66

9. Font is chief of military operations of Comandos L, which has an alliance with RECE. (Cf. UFG 8423) (CSDB-315/02202-66)

10. Valladares arrived in Miami on 27 May with weapons which he gave to the MDC. He offered to supply weapons to the MDC and the Association of Veterans of the Bay of Pigs (Brigade 2506).

FBI

29 June 66 New York
Re: MOC Secret

7 June 66 Florida
Re: MOC Secret

S E C R E T

XX

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

Chief, WHD
ADMIN/TYPIC
Station Files on Cuban Counterrevolutionary and Exile Organizations

REFERENCE: UFGT-16343, 31 May 1966

1. We are returning Volume VII of the MDC file which you sent with the reference for Headquarters to review as a sample of a group of 80 files which are no longer useful to the Station. Headquarters appreciates your interest in this aspect of records improvement, considering the need for retrieval, but would like to defer a decision until IDENTITY, a KUBARK employee who is retiring soon but is now engaged in writing historical studies, can visit the Station to survey these files with others.

2. IDENTITY plans to visit JMWAVE for several days about the end of July to size up and review certain records for writing a history of the Station. Therefore, we would like the 80 background files to be left intact for his visit. Afterwards a decision will be made on their retirement or other disposition.

3. If space for storing the files is critical we will authorize forwarding them to Headquarters, but will prefer your holding them temporarily to assist with the historical research cited above.

Claude F. GOTTFRIED

Attachment:
1. Identity, u/s/c
2. MDC File, h/w

Distribution:
3-COS/JMWAVE, w/att. 1 & 2

UFGS-8398

S E C R E T

1-WH/RMO, w/att.1
1-WH/C/ESEC, w/att.1
1-WH/C/CA/PP, w/att.1
1-Historical Staff

WH/RMO NOEL C. WILSON/pap

C/WH/C/CA/PP STEPHEN G. CHACONAS

C/WH/C/CA

C/WH/C/MO

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT

TO UFGS-5398

IDENTITY - Paul Loeb

SECRET

FBI

Miami, Fla.
3 June '64
Re: MDC Confidential

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES

26 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED File M. D. C

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR, CI/OA, CA2, CA/PROP, CA/O4, CI/IC2, FI, FI/INT, WH 8

ACTION

RE LIMA CONF 25-26 APRIL,

21 APR 65 ·0858

S E C R E T 210217Z

LIMA INFO DIR CITE WAVE 0321

TYPIC AMMOP

REF A. WAVE 0031 (89790)*

B. DIR 75895

AMMOP-1, IDEN, DEPARTING MIAMI 0200 HRS 21 APRIL ON PERUVIAN AIRLINE FLIGHT 55 TO ATTEND REF CONFERENCE.

S E C R E T

CFN 0321 0031 75895 AMMOP-1 MIAMI 0200 HRS 21 PERUVIAN 65

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

[CLASSIF]IED MESSAGE C TOTAL COPIES 26

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	PP	5	FI
2		6	
3	MO	7	
4		8	

FROM JMWAVE

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UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE VR, C/IOA, CA2, CA/PROP, OA/O4, CI/IC2, FI, FI/INT, WAB,

ACTION

21 APR 66 IN 00953

S E C R E T 210017Z

LIMA INFO DIR CITE WAVE 0322

TYPIC AMMOP

REF WAVE 0321 (IN 00958)

IDEN: ERNESTO RODRIGUEZ DIAZ, MDC SECRETARY
FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

S E C R E T

CFN 0322 0321 ERNESTO RODRIGUEZ DIAZ MDC

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: [ ] YES [ ] NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID [ ] RET. TO BRANCH [ ]
DESTROY [ ] SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

15 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH 8 [X] RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY [ ] ISSUED [ ] SLOTTED [ ] TUBED

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C 8, SOD 6, CI/OPS, CI/OA

S E C R E T 151851Z

SDOM INFO DIR CITE WAVE 0194 15 APR 66 IN 07580

DYVOUR AMMOP

1. AMCRIB-1 (IDEN) CONTACTED BY DULCE DE LA MAZA RODRIGUEZ, NIECE OF PRSC LEADER ANTONIO ROSARIO, WHO TRAVELED THROUGH JMWAVE AREA. DE LA MAZA HAND CARRIED LETTER TO AMCRIB-1 DATED 4 APRIL FROM FRANCISCO CORDOVA, PRSC SECY OF INTL AFFAIRS, WHICH REQUESTED AMCRIB-1 ARRANGE FOR PURCHASE AND SHIPMENT OF TWO OR THREE USED CARS TO BE USED FOR PRSC PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION ACTIVITIES IN DOMREP. LETTER WAS ACCOMPANIED WITH $1462 FOR PURCHASE AND SHIPMENT COSTS OF CARS.

2. AMCRIB-1 TELEPHONED ROSARIO EVENING 11 APRIL TO CONFIRM LETTER AND AGREED TO PROVIDE AID IN PROCURING CARS. ROSARIO INFORMED AMCRIB-1 THAT HE EXPECTED RECEIVE NOMINATION AS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE OF PRSC AT PARTY ASSEMBLY ON 17 APRIL AND STATED HE WOULD SELECT CESAR ESTRELLA AS HIS RUNNING MATE. ROSARIO ALSO INDICATED HE EXPECTED SOME ELECTORAL SUPPORT FROM UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF APJ MEMBERS.

S E C R E T

CFN: 0194 AMCRIB-1 DULCE DE LA PAZA RODRIGUEZ PRSC ANTONIO ROSARIO JMWAVE AMCRIB-1 4 FRANCISCO CORDOVA PRSC -1 PRSC DOMREP $1400 -1 11 -1 PRSC 17 CESAR ESTRELLA API

PT

NNNN

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 1/8 TOTAL COPIES 27

15 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C 8, SOD 6, CI/OPS, CI/OA

S E C R E T 151742Z

SDOM INFO DIR CITE WAVE 0195 15 Apr 66 IN 97588

DYVOUR AMMOP

REF: WAVE 0194 (IN 97578)

IDEN: JESUS ANGULO CLEMENTE, SECRETARY OF MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRATA CRISTIANO OF CUBA.

S E C R E T

CFN: 0195 0194 JESUS ANGULO CLEMENTE MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRATA CRISTIANO CUBA

BT

NNNN

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 13 TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JM WAVE

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH8, CI/ICZ, CI/SA, FI, FI/INT2, CA2, CA/PROP, CA/O4

SECRET 141654Z

DIR INFO LIMA QUIT CITE WAVE 0167 14Apr63 ..625

TYPIC AMMOP

REF: WAVE 0132 (IN 94948)*

AMCRIB-1 RECEIVED AIR TICKET THRU IDEN EFFORTS AND WILL DEPART 0245 HOURS 14 APRIL FOR LIMA. HE INSTRUCTED MONITOR ALL EVENTS FOR DEBRIEFING ON RETURN.

SECRET

*RE PRETRIP BRIEFING FOR ATTENDANCE WORLD CHRISTIAN DEMO

CFN: 0167 0132 AMCRIB-1 0245 14 LIMA

BT

SECRET

NNNN

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 18 TOTAL COPIES 32

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH8, [illegible], CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT2, CA2, CA/PROP, CA/O4

S E C R E T 141634Z

DIR INFO LIMA QUIT CITE WAVE 0168

14 Apr 63 IN 96626

TYPIC AMMOP

REF: WAVE 0167 (IN 96625)

IDEN: JULIO MONCAGATTA

S E C R E T

CFN: 0168 0167 JULIO MONCAGATTA

SECRET

BT

NNNN

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 13 TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED File MDC

FROM JM WAVE

ACTION

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE, VR, WHE, CI/ICZ, CI/OA, FI, FI/INTZ, CA2, CA/PROP

SECRET 141654Z 14 Apr 65 IN 56625

DIR INFO LIMA QUIT CITE WAVE 0167

TYPIC AMMOP

REF: WAVE 0132 (IN 94245)*

AMCRIB-1 RECEIVED AIR TICKET THRU IDEN EFFORTS AND WILL DEPART 0245 HOURS 14 APRIL FOR LIMA. HE INSTRUCTED MONITOR ALL EVENTS FOR DEBRIEFING ON RETURN.

SECRET

*RE PRETRIP BRIEFING FOR ATTENDANCE WORLD CHRISTIAN DEMO

CFN: 0167 0132 AMCRIB-1 0245 14 LIMA

BT

SECRET

NNNN

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 18 TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP	5	RI
2		6	
3	CA	7	
4	MD	8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE, VR, WH8, C/ICG, C/OH, FI, FI/INT 2, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/04

SECRET 141634Z

DIR INFO LIMA QUIT CITE WAVE 0168

14 Apr 65 IN 96626

TYPIC AMMOP

REF: WAVE 0167 (IN 96625)

IDEN: JULIO MONCAGATTA

SECRET

CFN: 0168 0167 JULIO MONCAGATTA

SECRET

BT

NNNN

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief, WH

INFO: Chief of Station, Santiago

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: AMMOP/Operational
AMMOP Circular Letter to Identity A Leaders and Organizations

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AR : FYI

REF: WAVE 9754

1. As indicated in reference, the AMMOP organization on 15 March 1966 sent a circular letter based on Fidel Castro's 13 March speech to Identity A individuals and organizations. The letter, which was signed and composed by AMMOP/1 and which was accompanied by transcripts of the speech, condemned Castro's attack on Chilean President Eduardo Frei; requested support for Frei's position; and asked the recipients to join the struggle maintained by the Cuban people to overthrow Fidel Castro and prepare for the freedom of Cuba from Communism.

2. The youth wing of the AMMOP group, headed by AMCRIB/1, mailed a letter to its Identity A youth contacts based on the 13 and 20 March speeches by Fidel Castro along the lines cited above. Included in this letter were the strong anti-Castro statements made by Identity B. Copies of both letters are forwarded under separate cover.

3. According to AMMOP/1, his letter was replayed by FUSEE and was the basis for an article in a Santiago newspaper by Identity C.

Philip G. ELMARD

Attachments:
A. Identities - u/sc
B. Cys of Ltrs - u/sc

Distribution:
3 - WH/C w/atts
2 - COS, Santiago w/atts
2 - C/WH - w/atts

*Please furnish HQS File Number

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGA-24893	31 March 66 (APR 4 1966)
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: *

SECRET

To WH/C
U/sc att #A to
UFGA-24893

IDENTITIES: A. Christian Democratic Party

B. Alfredo Lorca

C. Jorge Roman

SECRET

SECRET

Marzo 15 de 1966

Estimado demócratacristiano:

Después de leer una copia literal del discurso pronunciado por Castro, en la escalinata de la Universidad de La Habana, el pasado 13 de marzo, me considero obligado con el Gobierno, el Partido Demócrata Cristiano y el pueblo chileno, que fueron innoblemente atacados por Castro durante el transcurso de su alocución, a expresar mi opinión con relación a dicha ofensa.

Digo obligado, porque el hecho de ser demócratacristiano cubano, integrante de esa gran comunidad de seres humanos que un día se dieron a la tarea de realizar una revolución en libertad y que lamentablemente vieron tronchadas sus aspiraciones al comprobar que las mismas eran ahogadas por la sangre vertida en los paredones de fusilamientos por héroes como Porfirio Ramirez, Presidente de la FEU de la provincia de Las Villas en Cuba y el Dr. Humberto Sorí Marín, Comandante del Ejército Rebelde y autor de la primera Ley de Reforma Agraria; debe servirme de experiencia para expresar lo que pienso decir a través de estas lineas. Digo obligado, porque en igual forma que nosotros hemos pedido en múltiples oportunidades, colaboración y solidaridad con nuestra lucha, solicitud que lamentablemente no ha sido respondida por algunos, alegando unas veces desconocimiento y otras imputándonos incomprensión con el "proceso revolucionario" que se está llevando a cabo en Cuba, no queremos que en esta oportunidad en que son los compañeros chilenos los que necesitan de nuestra solidaridad, vayamos a encontrar a alguien que por desconocimiento, no se decida a respaldar públicamente al Gobierno, Partido y pueblo de Chile en la actitud cívica y valiente adoptada frente a las ofensas expresadas por Castro durante su discurso, entre las cuales transcribimos las siguientes: "A decir verdad, siempre he creido que Frei es un representante de la burguesía chilena, que su gobierno es un gobierno de la burguesía. Jamás he creido que Frei vaya a hacer ninguna revolución".... posteriormente, al referirse a los sucesos provocados por los comunistas en la mina de cobre del Salvador donde murieron varias personas dijo: "Frei es un reaccionario Frei ha demostrado con este hecho, no ser un individuo de mano firme, sinó un individuo cobarde, que abusa del poder,......

SECRET

Frei ha demostrado ser un mentiroso. Frei ha demostrado ser un politiquero vulgar que para justificar su sanguinario gesto, trata de culpar a la Tri-Continental. Frei se desenmascara. Frei demuestra al pueblo de Chile y al mundo qué tipo de revolución es la que va a hacer, qué tipo de gobierno es el que va a llevar adelante. Es decir, no una revolución sin sangre, sinó una política de sangre sin revolución; sangre sin revolución, esa es la política de Frei, sangre sin revolución, ese es el gobierno de Frei, sangre sin revolución, esa es la política de la Alianza para el Progreso".

Después de estas expresiones, no podemos menos que salirle al paso a Castro y a la camarilla que desgobierna hoy a Cuba, e instar y pedir mayor colaboración con los patriotas que hoy ofrendan sus vidas por liberar a Cuba, a fin de evitar no solo la continuada masacre de cubanos que se lleva a cabo en la Isla, sino también ponerle fin a todos estos incidentes bochornosos para la historia, en los que aparece un cubano, ofendiéndo públicamente ante el mundo a un Presidente, a un Partido y a un pueblo que a contrario sensus de lo que él esta haciendo en Cuba, sí está realizando una revolución en libertad, sí ha defendido en todo momento el sano nacionalismo, sí se ha puesto de frente cuantas veces las circunstancias lo han requerido a los oligarcas y explotadores.

Para terminar, sólo me queda reiterarle, que en nombre de la solidaridad que une a todos los demócratacristianos, exprese públicamente, su deseo de colaborar con la lucha que mantiene el pueblo cubano por derrocar al castrocomunismo y poder realizar en Cuba, una verdadera revolución en libertad, así como su respaldo a la actitud asumida por el Gobierno, el Partido Demócrata Cristiano y el pueblo chileno en los actuales momentos.

Pendiente de su atención y respuesta y dejando constancia de mi mayor consideración, quedo suyo

Cordialmente,

Ernesto Rodriguez
Sec. de Relaciones Internacionales del
MDC de Cuba

14-00000

SECRET

JUVENTUD DEMOCRATA-CRISTIANA DE CUBA.
1732 N.E. 7th St.
MIAMI, FLA. U.S.A.

Miami, Marzo 17 de 1966

Estimado compañero:

La JDC de Cuba, fiel al pensamiento de nuestro Apostol José Martí que dice:"ver en silencio un crimen es cometerlo", no ha querido marginarse del daño que Castro quiere hacerle a la Revolución en Libertad, que está realizando el Presidente Eduardo Frei, su Gobierno y el Partido Demócrata Cristiano de Chile.

Consciente de que es posible que no te hayan llegado muchas de las informaciones relacionadas con los innobles ataques públicos de Castro a Frei y su Gobierno, calificándo al Presidente de "representante de la burguesía chilena", "reaccionario" "mimado del imperialismo yanqui y guardián de sus intereses en Chile".....etc. Hemos querido comunicarte, no sólo los ataques de Castro a Frei, sino una de las muchas respuestas que se le han dado a Castro. Nos referimos a la que en dias pasados hiciera el Diputado Demócrata-Cristiano Chileno, Alfredo Lorca y que a continuación transcribimos "Realmente, Fidel Castro es un caso digno de análisis. Hace pocos dias atrás, según expresaron diputados que estuvieron en Cuba, Castro dijo que Frei era un gran Presidente. Agregó que si el hubiera estado en Chile, habría hecho lo mismo que Frei.

Pero ahora, porque se le ha tocado la epidermis de la Tri-Continental, Frei se transforma en un Castro Cualquiera.

Yo estuve en Cuba -añadió Lorca- en 1959 cuando Castro subió al poder. En esa ocasión le pregunté al ver a tantos hombres armados, si pensaba reorganizar al ejército. Y él me contestó, con ese modo tan tropical: "chico, armas para qué cuando se tiene al pueblo".

Sin embargo, -añadió Lorca- en los siete años que Fidel tiene al pueblo detrás de él, anda más armado que un militar en plena guerra. En Chile, todos los Presidentes que yo recuerdo, los

radicales, el Sr. Ibáñez, el Sr. Alessandri, el propio Sr. Frei, han recorrido todo el país sin gendarme, ni pistoleros a sueldo como los que utiliza Castro.

No se puede decir que Frei sea un cobarde, un mentiroso y un déspota como Fidel Castro afirma - añadió Lorca- . En cambio él está resguardado por metralletas y no puede dormir, ni se le conoce domicilio fijo porque los hijos de los muertos en el paredón le buscan. Además -puntualizó Lorca- vale la pena destacar que nadie se ha ido de Chile. En cambio, es público y notorio que más de 300 000 personas han huido del paraíso fidelista. Y me atrevo a pensar que si Fidel Castro diera libertad a quienes quieren irse de Cuba, se quedaría solo con sus barbas y su hermano Raúl, porque Camilo Cienfuegos ya no está. Dicen que se cayó de un avión.

Finalmente, Lorca recordó el caso del que fuera Presidente de los tribunales populares de Cuba, Sorí Marín."Es un hombre íntegro, puro y extremadamente justo", decía Castro de él. "Estoy seguro que núnca condenaría a quien no mereciera la pena de muerte". No obstante una mañana amaneció de mal genio y el Sr. Sorí Marín se convirtió en un agente de la Central de Inteligencia de los Estados Unidos. Resultado: hizo fusilar a ese hombre puro, íntegro y justo."

Estas palabras, expuestas por el Diputado D.C. Alfredo Lorca, señalando algunas de las muchas contradicciones de Castro, ratifican una vez más lo que la JDC de Cuba a través de sus dirigentes, le ha venido diciendo a toda la juventud demócratacristiana de América y que hoy, con más fuerza y moral que núnca nos permite pedirte en nombre de la solidaridad que nos une, que expongas públicamente tu respaldo a la Revolución en Libertad que viene realizando el Pueblo, Gobierno y Partido Demócrata Cristiano de Chile así como tu colaboración a la lucha que mantiene el pueblo cubano por derrocar al castrocomunismo existente en nuestra Patria.

Consciente de que nuestra solicitud será escuchada por tí, y seguros de que nos darás a conocer la atención que has de prestarle, quedo a tu entera disposición

Jesús Angulo
Presidente de la JDC de Cuba

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 31

26 SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE, VR, WH8, CA2, CA/PROP, CA/O4, FI, FI/INT, CI/OA, CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 042230Z

DIR INFO LIMA QUITO CITE WAVE 0031 (INGHURST ACTING)

TYPIC AMMOP

REF A DIR 75895 *

B WAVE 9034 (IN 51776)

4 APR 65 IN 88790

1. AMCRIB-1 ADVISED BY IDEN A THAT REF A LIMA CONFERENCE SCHEDULED FOR 23-26 APRIL, PRECEDED BY YOUTH SEMINAR 15-22 APRIL.

2. AMCRIB-1 HOPES OBTAIN TICKET THRU EFFORTS OF IDEN B. IF NOT SUCCESSFUL, STATION PLANS FINANCE AMCRIB-1 TRIP TO ATTEND BOTH MEETINGS UNLESS ADVISED CONTRARY.

3. AMMOP INVITED IDEN C, 201-749991, FORMER WAVE ASSET WORKING IN QUITO, ATTEND REF CONFERENCE AS MEMBER AMMOP DELEGATION. IF IDEN C ATTENDS, WILL PAY OWN WAY.

4. PLS NOTE AMCRIB-10 OF REF B SHOULD BE AMCRIB-1.

S E C R E T * WORLD CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC CONGRESS SCHEDULED LIMA 11-14 MARCH.

CFN 0031 75895 9034 AMCRIB-1 A A 23-26 APRIL 15-22 APRIL AMCRIB-1 B NOT SUCCESSFUL AMCRIB-1 AMMOP C 201-749991 AMMOP C AMCRIB-10 B AMCRIB-1

SECRET

BT

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 31

26 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	PP	5	
2		6	EI
3	CA	7	
4	RR	8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH8, CAZ, CA/PROP, CA/O4, FI, FI/INT, CI/OA, CI/IC2

ACTION

S E C R E T 042230Z

DIR INFO LIMA QUIT CITE WAVE 0032 INGHURST ACTING

4 APR 66 IN 89798

TYPIC AMMOP

REF WAVE 0031 (IN 87790)

IDEN A. UIJDC

IDEN B. JULIO MONEAGATTA, JUDCA SECY. GEN.

IDEN C. JOSE M. ILLAN

S E C R E T

CFN 0032 0031 A UIJDC B JULIO MONEAGATTA JUDCA SECY GEN C JOSE M ILLAN

BT

SECRET

REPORT COVER SHEET	SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
JMWAVE	REPORT NO. UFG-7960	COVER SHEET MARKED FOR INDEXING
Henry J. SLOMAN Sylvia B. MONESTIER	DATE OF REPORT 15 February 1966	NO INDEXING REQUIRED OPS DATA REPORTED SEPARATELY
REPORTS OFFICER John C. TARBELL/vkl	PROJECT	CS DISSEMINATION
APPROVING OFFICER Philip G. ELMARD	SOURCE CRYPT AMOT-245	TDCS DISSEMINATION

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY		EXTRA-AGENCY
4 - Hqs 1 - DCS 2 - Caracas 2 - Lima 2 - Santiago 2 - Bogota	1 - JMBAR	State FBI I&NS Customs USCG

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

TYPIC

SOURCE: AMOT-245 in DD-1768, 11 February 1966. Field Comment 2 was received from AMCRIB-10, orally, on 14 February.

RID: No Index

Group 1: Excluded from Automatic Downgrading and Declassification

CS COPY

19-300-10

FORM 1467 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20)

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F: Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).
APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO.

SUBJECT Christian Democratic Movement to Hold Congress in Miami, 24 to 27 February 1966

DATE OF REPORT 15 February 1966

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. Early February 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ. United States, Miami (7 to 14 February 1966)

UFG-7960

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A member of a group of Cuban emigres trained in the techniques of information collection. The group has provided useful reports since 1961.

1. The Movimiento Democrata Cristiano (MDC, Christian Democratic Movement) in Miami will hold a congress from 24 to 27 February 1966.[1] Delegations of Christian Democrats from Venezuela, Peru, Chile, Colombia, and Germany will attend the congress.[2]

2. The MDC is preparing to hold elections for positions on the executive committee.

Field Comments:

1. The Eighth National Congress of the MDC was held in Miami from 19 to 21 February 1965. Delegations from Puerto Rico and Mexico attended. (Cf. CSDB-312/00790-65)

2. Another source, who is a member of the MDC, reported that invitations had been extended to delegations from these countries, but that no replies have been received, except from Peru, which only acknowledged receipt of the invitation.

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NO DISSEM ABROAD

GROUP 1
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DISTRIBUTION

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 7 MAY 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION : IWOG 2

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DD/P, COP, ADDP/A, CA 2, CA/PMD, CA/PRO, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/RQM 6, FI/D, WH 10, DD/I, AD/CI, OS 2, S/C 2.

ROUTING

MAY 7 2154Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 36643

TDCS-3/436,741

TO DIR INFO CITE HAVA 4513

INTEL 05, 08

SUPDATA SOURCE [HANS ARTURO BODEWIG 7 LEUENBERGER] WHO GAVE INFO TO HAVA STATION REPR REF HAVA 4414 (IN 33466)* FILED 062225Z REPORT CLASS SECRET HKH-2283 (ALSO RCVD 2783) CUBA SUBJ SETTING OFF OF BOMBS BY JUVENTUD ACCION CUBANA ANTICOMUNISTA DOI 30 APR - 3 MAY 60 PADA CUBA HABANA 5 MAY 60 APR 2 SOURCE CUBAN WHO CLAIMS CONTACTS IN JACA (F)

C/S COMMENT: *A report regarding Cuban youth plans for sabotage on 30 April.

IWOG COMMENT:

NO SEPARATE CABLE DISTRIBUTION IS BEING MADE OF THIS TDCS.

C/WH	2	WH/4	2	OS/SSD/BAUMAN	1
WH/REG	2	WH/FI	1		
WH/EXEC	1				
WH/RE	1				
WH/PW	1				

TDCS PRECEDENCE
X ROUTINE
PRIORITY

BASED ON: HKH 2783
NO PROJECT

LIAISON: *

DATE DISTRIBUTED: 8 MAY 1960 0005Z

RELEASING IWO: Charles J Beckman
CHARLES J. BECKMAN

S-E-C-R-E-T

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SECRET

RID COPY

SECRET ...542 CITE JMWAVE 3413

DIRECTOR

TYPIC

1. EVENING 5 OCTOBER ORLANDO BOSCH GIVEN THREE YEAR SUSPENDED SENTENCE BY NAPLES COURT WHEN FOUND GUILTY OF TRANSPORTING EXPLOSIVES WITHOUT LICENSE IN APRIL 66. TWO COMPANIONS TO BE TRIED SEPARATELY.

2. EVENING 5 OCTOBER AMOT REPORTED THAT AMTAUP-2 HAD BEEN TELEPHONED BY JORGE CUITERREZ ULLA, CHIEF OF PROPAGANDA OF MIRR, TO ATTEND PRESS CONFERENCE 6 OCTOBER. AMTAUP-2 ALSO REPORTED THAT AT TRIAL JORGE VEGA, BOSCH DEFENSE ATTORNEY, HAD MADE STATEMENT TO COURT TO EFFECT THAT BOSCH SHOULD NOT BE CONVICTED BECAUSE HE WAS TRYING TO FREE ... AND FROM COMMUNIST DOMINATION AND IN DOING SO WAS NOT ACTING ANY MORE ILLEGALLY THAN WAS NOFACT, WHICH WAS CONDUCTING SAME TYPE OF ACTIVITY FROM A BASE LOCATED AT THE "CAYO GORDO" SECTION OF NAPLES.

3. "CAYO GORDO" UNDOUBTEDLY IS GARBLE FOR GORDON PASS AREA OF NAPLES AT WHICH BERTHING SITE FOR JMWAVE MARK I SWIFT

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

[illegible] [illegible] IS LOCATED. HOWEVER, RIGGER HAS [illegible] [illegible] SEPTEMBER WHEN REMOVED FOR OPS UPP AND REPAIRS. WAS SCHEDULED RETURN TO BERTH CIRCA 1 OCTOBER BUT THIS POSTPONED BECAUSE OF HURRICANE INEZ. [illegible] AT TARPON PROPERTIES BERTH, KEY LARGO, WILL NOT BE [illegible] [illegible] NAPLES SITE. AS HQS AWARE LATTER SITE ALREADY SCHEDULED FOR TERMINATION OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 66.

4. UPON RECEIPT AMOT INFO JMWAVE CONTACTED AND BRIEFED AGENTS SERVING AS CUSTODIANS AT NAPLES SITES. TO DATE THEY HAVE NOT REPORTED ANY QUERIES. OFFICIALS OF COVER CORPORATION, (GULFLANT) WHICH OWNS RIGGER AND RENTS BERTHING SITE WERE ALERTED AND BRIEFED 6 OCTOBER.

5. MORNING 6 OCTOBER AMTAUP-2 REPORTED PRESS CONFERENCE NOT [illegible] [illegible] BUT THAT GUTIERREZ STATED HE HAD PHONED UPI, AP, [illegible] HERALD TO GIVE THEM PRESS RELEASE INCLUDING VEGA CLAIM RE [illegible] ACTIVITIES NAPLES AREA.

6. AS OF [illegible] HRS 6 OCTOBER STATION HAD NOT SEEN ANY [illegible] [illegible] OF ALLEGED VEGA STATEMENTS. MIAMI HERALD AND MIAMI NEWS COVERAGE OF [illegible] TRAIL DID NOT MENTION [illegible] [illegible] NAPLES PRESS COVERAGE OF TRIAL.

SECRET

7. AT GUTIERREZ REQUEST AMTAUP-2 TAPED STATEMENT FOR RADIO PROGRAM. REVIEW OF STATEMENT BY AMOT SHOWS THAT WOFACT NOT MENTIONED.

8. ALTHO NO FIRM EVIDENCE TO DATE ANTICIPATE THAT MIRR MAY SEEK PUBLICIZE FURTHER "REVELATIONS" RE JMWAVE ACTIVITY, NOTABLY RE COMBINED OPS FACILITIES, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL. INFO FROM AMOT AND OTHER CONTACTS IN EXILE COMMUNITY INDICATES FELIPE RIVERO AND HIS ANC GROUP ALSO TALKING OF "EXPOSING" WOFACT ACTIVITIES. STATED AIM OF BOTH GROUPS IS TO SHOW "TWO-FACED" ATTITUDE OF U.S. GOVT WHICH STOPS ANTI-COMMUNIST EXILE FIGHTERS FROM USING U.S. AS BASE FOR ACTION AGAINST CASTRO CUBA BUT ALLOWS WOFACT TO CARRY OUT SUCH ACTIVITY. FURTHER AIMS ARE TO SHOW EXILE COMMUNITY THAT MIRR AND ANC ARE "ACTIVIST" GROUPS AS COMPARED WITH OTHER EXILE ORGS AND TO RIDICULE AND TRY INTIMIDATE THOSE CUBANS WHO WORK FOR JMWAVE.

9. STATION EVALUATES INCIDENT AS HAVING NO SIGNIFICANT ADVERSE EFFECT ON OPS OR GENERAL STATION SECURITY. STATION HAS DIRECTED INCREASED STATE OF VIGILANCE AT ALL COMBINED OPS SITES BUT DOES NOT ENVISAGE ANY BASIC CHANGES IN COVER

14-00000

SECRET

[illegible] S E C R E T

[illegible] SECURITY PROCEDURES WHICH HAVE PROVIDED REQUIRED LEVEL OF PLAUSIBLE DENIAL PLUS EFFECTIVE MASKING OF SENSITIVE DATA RE COMBINED OPS.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

DATE : 27 MAY 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION: TFW 10(MR CHARLES MATT, TFW, NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1830 27 MAY)

INFO : DCI, DDP, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PRG, CA/PROP, S/C 2

PA/PROP

MAY 27 2216Z 62

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 41885

[illegible] DIR CITE WAVE 4277

GYPOSE

1. MIAMI HERALD 27 MAY CARRIES FRONT PAGE ITEM BY JAMES BUCHANAN ENTITLED "MIRO FADES AS EXILE CHIEF: THREE LATIN LEADERS BEHIND RAY". ARTICLE FLATLY STATES MIRO AND COUNCIL HAVE BEEN REPLACED BY MANUEL RAY WITH [illegible] GOV MUNOZ MARIN, PRES ROMULO BETANCOURT AND FORMER PRES JOSE FIGUERES, THAT RAY HAS TAKEN OVER POST "WITH THE BLESSING OF THE UNITED STATES". FURTHER, ARTICLES STATES "FROM VARIETY SOURCES HERALD LEARNED THAT MIRO WAS NOTIFIED OF CHANGE ONLY THIS WEEK" AND THAT RAYS REAPPOINTMENT AS "CHIEF IN EXILE" CAME FROM "UNDER-GROUND IN CUBA" ACCORDING TO JOAQUIN GODOY, PROVISIONAL MRP HEAD IN MIAMI. AFTER FURNISHING RESUME CUBAN ACTIVITIES SINCE ORIGIN OF AMBUD, ARTICLE CREDITS CUBANS IN MIAMI WITH SAYING "NEW MAN IN FIELD" IS ADOLF A. BERLE JR. WHO HAS BEEN SPECIAL ASST TO STATE DEPT AND IS ALSO MEMBER OF PRES KENNEDY'S SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON LATIN AMERICA". IMPLICATION BEING THAT BERLE IS RUNNING NEW UNITED STATES SPONSORED CUBAN EFFORT.

2. THIS RELEASE CAUSING SOME FUROR IN LOCAL CUBAN COLONY TO EXTENT AT LEAST ONE OPS AGENT DESTINED FOR (ISOLATION) TRAINING HAS ASKED TO BE RELIEVED IF THERE ANY TRUTH THIS STORY. MEANWHILE WAVE

SECRET

[illegible]

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

PAGE 2

WAVE 4077 IN 41885

CHECKS WITH KNOWLEDGEABLE CONTACTS HAS PRODUCED LITTLE OTHER THAN WILLIAM S. WIBALDA'S STATEMENT THAT BUCHANAN JOURNALISTIC REPUTATION INDICATES HE INACCURATE AND SENSATIONALIST. AMCLATTER-1 AND PASSOVOY ATTEMPTING DISCREETLY TRACE BUCHANAN SOURCE FOR "U.S. BLESSING."

3. BUCHANAN HAS PREVIOUSLY ATTACKED MIRO IE DURING RETURN PLAYA GIRON PRISONERS MIAMI. HAVE NO REAL INSIGHT INFO SIGNIFICANCE THESE ATTACKS BUT BELIEVE THEY COULD REFLECT BUCHANAN OR MIAMI HERALD ATTEMPTS FORCE CHANGES IN UNITES STATES POSTURE RE CUBA.

4. EXPECT ARTICLE WILL HAVE FURTHER REPROCUSSIONS AS IT SPREADS. WISH ALERT HQS THAT IT MAY BE NECESSARY INITIATE ACTION DISCREDIT BUCHANAN STORY AS WELL AS REASSURE MIRO. WILL FORWARD SUGGESTIONS THIS REGARD AFTER WE HAVE OPPORTUNITY FURTHER ASSESS STORY'S IMPACT.

5. POUCHING CLIPPING 28 MAY

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

536

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 24 OCT 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LONDON

ACTION : IW 2

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, COP, ADDP/A, C/CA, CA/PMO, CA/PRG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 6, FI/D, BELL 5, WH 16, WE 7, DD/I(A), DD/I(L), AD/CI, OS, S/C 2.

MRP

ROUTING: 1 2 3 4 5 6

OCT 24 2131Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 11257

TDCS -3/490,978

DIR INFO CARA CITE LOND 8769

ANDRE ACTING

INTEL DYVOUR

SUPDATA SOURCE (SMOTH) 01

TIME FILED 1310Z

NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL OEL-30,995 CUBA

SUBJ STATEMENTS OF MANOLO RAY

DOI OCTOBER 1961

PADA ENGLAND LONDON 24 OCTOBER 1961

SOURCE (OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE) FROM "SOURCE WITH GOOD CONTACTS AMONG EXILES IN CARACAS".

IW COMMENT:

NO SEPARATE CABLE DISTRIBUTION IS BEING MADE OF THIS TDCS.

						TDCS PRECEDENCE
WH/REG	5	WH/4/PM	2	WE/R	1	
WH/RE	1	WH/PACY	2	WE/6/R	2	
WH/FI	2	WH/1/V	1			
WH/PW	1	OS/SSD	1			XX ROUTINE
WH/4	2	WE/P	4			PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO: E.J.H. DELANEY

DATE DISTRIBUTED: 24 OCTOBER 2244 Z 61

BASED ON: OEL-30,995 (HP/SMOTH) 01

LIAISON: C

f.l.c.i
pa/prop

SECRET

3/PN

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET (When Filled In) NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY CUBA

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/490,978

SUBJECT STATEMENTS OF MANOLA RAY, EXILE LEADER OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

DATE DISTR. 24 OCTOBER 1961

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. OCTOBER 1961

REFERENCES IN 11257

PLACE & DATE ACQ. ENGLAND, LONDON (24 OCTOBER 1961)

FIELD REPORT NO. OCL-30,995

APPRAISAL 3

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE (OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE) FROM "SOURCE WITH GOOD CONTACTS AMONG EXILES IN CARACAS". 24

1. MANOLO RAY, EXILE LEADER OF MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO (MRP - PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT) SAID IN EARLY OCTOBER THAT HE WAS FIRMLY OPPOSED TO ANY INVASION OF CUBA, INSISTING THAT CASTRO'S OVERTHROW WAS TO BE ACHIEVED BY INTERNAL RESISTANCE AND THIS HAD ALREADY STARTED.

2. THE MRP WAS ORGANIZED THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND AND SUPPORTED BY ALL CLASSES OF THE POPULATION. IT HAD MEMBERS IN ALL 33 TRADE UNIONS, THE G-2, MILITIA AND THROUGHOUT THE ADMINISTRATION. RAY ESTIMATED 80 PERCENT OF POPULATION WERE OPPOSED TO CASTRO, THOUGH MAJORITY WERE NOT ACTIVELY SO. HE CONSIDERED THE MRP AT PRESENT ENJOYED MORE SUPPORT THAN THE ORIGINAL REVOLUTION HAD

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET . NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	EXO	FBI

INS TREASURY REPCINCLANT

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

1/PV

HAD AGAINST BATISTA.

3. THE MRP WAS PRESENTLY SHORT OF ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES BUT THE POSITION WAS IMPROVING. (A MILITIA CAPTAIN WAS RECENTLY SENTENCED TO 30 YEARS IN PRISON FOR PASSING ARMS TO THE MRP). NO HELP WHATSOEVER HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY THE INTERNAL RESISTANCE FROM THE "SOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES, WHO PROVIDED SUPPORT FOR THE INVASION". THESE SOURCES WERE STILL THINKING INEFFECTUALLY IN TERMS OF A FURTHER INVASION.

4. THE GENERAL ATTITUDE OF THE RESISTANCE IN CUBA TOWARDS THE EXILES WAS ONE OF INDIFFERENCE MOUNTING TO CONTEMPT FOR SPECIFIC MOVES SUCH AS THE PROPOSED PROMOTION OF A CUBAN GOVT IN EXILE. WHAT THE RESISTANCE WANTED WAS FUNDS AND THE RETURN, BY INFILTRATION, OF TRAINED EXILES, PARTICULARLY COMMUNICATION EXPERTS.

5. ON THE TIMING OF CASTRO'S OVERTHROW, RAY SAID CASTRO WOULD NOT LAST ANOTHER YEAR. HE ADDED THAT THE SITUATION IN CUBA IMMEDIATELY AFTER CASTRO'S DOWNFALL WOULD BE DANGEROUS AND COULD DEVELOP INTO A CIVIL WAR.

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE. CINCLANT, CINCARIB.

END OF MESSAGE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

TO: Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: TYPIC/Operational
Debriefing Report - Santiago SANCHEZ de la Torre

PROCESSING: XXX MARKED FOR INDEXING

ACTION REQUIRED: None

REFERENCES: (A) WAVE 2733, dated 15 August 1963
(B) MEXI 5507, dated 26 July 1963

MICROFILMED

Transmitted herewith, FYI, is a debriefing report on Santiago SANCHEZ de la Torre. Subject arrived in the U. S., via Mexico in late August, 1963. The debriefing contains information re the MRR roll up in May, 1962. Attachment "A" contains a list of subject's friends that are currently employed in power plants in Cuba. Attachment "B" is a debriefing report on Angel BENCOMO who Sanchez believes was responsible for the MRR roll up.

END OF DISPATCH

ATTACHMENTS:
Debriefing Reports, 1 cy ea. herewith

INDEX

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RI/AN
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Distribution:
3-C/SAS, w/atts/h/w

CROSS REFERENCE: CS COPY

DATE TYPED: 4 Oct. 63

DATE DISPATCHED: OCT 11 1963

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-11653

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 19-132-5-96/3

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

3 September 1963

DEBRIEFING REPORT : Santiago SANCHEZ de la Torre - aka "Jose Antonio"

DATE & PLACE : Safehouse #182, 29-30 August (0900 - 1300 hrs)

CASE OFFICER : Clarence E. SNERYAGE

1. Subject began to work against the CASTRO regime with the MRP in 1960. At that time he was employed in the Santa Clara power plant as a technician. His job was controlling the amount of electric current that was distributed. (Attachment "A" contains a list of Subject's friends currently employed in power plants in Cuba). On 17 April 1961 Subject made contact with a KUBARK infiltration team and began to assist the team. Team consisted of Segundo *BORGES, "Pepe" *GONZALES and *AMARGO/1. Case Officer Comment: AMARGO/1 has confirmed the fact that Subject worked with his team in Cuba. Subject permitted the team to install their RS-1 set in his house located at #219 Carretera de Camajuani in the City of Santa Clara. He also safehoused the team on occasion and permitted them to hold meetings at his house. After the failure of Playa Giron the team reorganized the MRR in Las Villas Province, selecting Subject to be the Civil Coordinator of the movement in that province. Enrique *ORTEGA was selected as the Military Coordinator. On 21 July 1961, while ORTEGA and Subject were in Havana for discussions with MRR leaders *AMHOOK/1 and Juan *FALCON, the KUBARK infiltration team and many other members of the MRR in Las Villas, including Subject's wife, were arrested. (Discussions were about actions to take place 26 July 1961).

2. Maria *RODRIGUEZ Posa, from Santa Clara, age 50/55 yrs, called ORTEGA in Havana and told him not to return to Santa Clara as many people had been arrested. ORTEGA passed the information to Subject but as subject thought it applied only to ORTEGA he returned to Santa Clara late at night on 22 July. He went to his home and on 23 July proceeded to work at the power plant. Maria RODRIGUEZ Posa intercepted him on his way home for lunch and told him that the G-2 was at his home and that they also were going to the power plant to arrest him. Subject also learned that there was surveillance on his home on the night of 22 July 1961, but the person watching the house had gotten drunk and did not see subject when he returned from Havana. From that moment until entering an Embassy on 6 September 1962, subject lived "black".

3. Subject proceeded to the outskirts of Santa Clara where a friend, Efrain *WAREN, resided. His friend told him to go to Havana. While driving to Havana Subject met another person who informed him that the G-2 had a roadblock on the highway at Colon, Matanzas, and that all cars were being searched. On 24 July 1961, Subject went to a beach called "GANUZA" located on the north coast of Las Villas near Corralillo. Subject's sister has a home at "Ganuza" so he left his car there and proceeded to Havana with some friends of his sister. Later the G-2 confiscated his auto. (It is interesting to note that the G-2, after confiscating subject's auto at the beach, believed that Subject had departed from Cuba. Subject thereafter communicated with his wife by sending her letters in jail via Miami where they were postmarked).

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UFGA-11653

4. On 25 July 1961 Subject went to the house of an MRR leader, FNU JIMENEZ in Havana. When Subject approached JIMENEZ house he noticed a "blind move as if someone was watching" so he did not go in. He walked two blocks to a bus stop. From the bus stop he could observe the house and he noticed that a car departed at a "high rate of speed". Later that day Subject made contact with ORTEGA at the house of Mario *IRIVE in Fontanar, Havana. IRIVE still lives in Havana) ORTEGA told Subject of the MRR plans for the following day (26 July). ORTEGA said that the movement was "going ahead with their plans" even though they were aware of JIMENEZ arrest. Subject resided for approximately one week at the home of Jose *MELGAREJO in Varadero. MELGAREJO continues to work for the GOC at this time. He is the Deputy Chief of "Asphalt Consolidated" for the entire country. (In April 1962 Subject's wife escaped from the Womens' Prison at Guanajay, Pinar del Rio. She also was safehoused at MALGAREJO's house). Subject claims that MALGAREJO is a "good man" who also has a home located at Avenida de los OCUJES #221 in Santa Catalina (outskirts of Havana). MALGAREJO's wife and sons reside with him. Subject spent approximately one month in the above house (Aug.-Sept. 61).

5. From October 1961 Subject resided with Ester *CRUZ, a person he had known for 10 years. While living with CRUZ he changed his appearance - lost much weight, dyed and curled his hair, obtained contact lenses. (C/O Comment: Ester CRUZ was arrested approximately 9 May 1962 during the "roll up" of the MRR. She is in jail at this time). In November 1961, Subject met Jose Luis *ARANGO from Camaguey. ARANGO was at that time military coordinator for the MRR and used the name "Angelito". FNU *REYES, Aka LUCAS, who was the MRR Coordinator of Las Villas introduced Subject to ARANGO. REYES is from Yaguajay, Las Villas. Subject met REYES through Oscar *MADRUGA, Aka "Anibel" whom he had known since 1959. ARANGO encouraged Subject to begin working for the MRR again. An ID card in alias from a medical laboratory was obtained for Subject. He then obtained a briefcase and began selling medical supplies. MADRUGA's cousin, Jose *FERNANDEZ, owned the laboratory "*ROMBERG LABORATORY". FERNANDEZ worked for AMBRONC/5. After AMBRONC/5 was captured two actual MRR members met FERNANDEZ and requested that he continue to work. FERNANDEZ did not know the men and denied that he worked for the movement).

6. In late November, 1961 Subject moved into a "guest house" where several other MRR members resided. House is called "House of Maria de la *GALLEGA" and is located on "J" Street between 21st and 23rd Streets, Vedado. Subject met "Fernando", the Security Chief of the MRR at the guest house. Fernando continues to work in the underground. He also met Oscar MADRUGA there. He met Roberto *SANCHEZ who also continues to work in the underground. MADRUGA had gone to the hills of Las Villas but returned to Havana. Another MRR man residing there was Roberto *FERNANDEZ. Arturo *MUGARRA and #AMSALON/1 visited the house on occasion. Subject was once picked up at the house by AMSALON/1. During this period FNU REYES, Aka Lucas, was arrested and Subject began to work with MUGARRA. In December 1961 ARANGO took asylum. There was much conflict in the MRR during this period between AMHOOK/1 and AMBRONC/5. (Subject has many letters pertaining to this conflict but they were left in Mexico. AMBIDDY/1 is having someone pick up the letters. Case Officer will attempt to obtain these letters and review them. Subject claims he did not hand carry them to the U.S., as he thought our officials would seize them).

421BR

7. In January 1962, Arturo MUGARRA and Roberto SANCHEZ were preparing to depart from Cuba. When AMJAVA/4 and AMBRONC/5 arrived in Havana they changed their minds. (C/O Comment: A woman named Emilia del *MAS was living with MUGARRA. This girl later came to the USA via the Brazilian Embassy) MUGARRA's group consisted of Roberto *SANCHEZ, Angel *CANETE, Eddy *GALENO who "is bad, likes money, women, etc"., and subject. GALENO called Subject here in Miami on 28 August and wants to talk with him).

8. MUGARRA informed AMBRONC/5 that he had doubts about Juan F. *BUSTAMENTE, Aka "Roly", as he had asked too many questions re what AMBRONC/5 had brought to Cuba. AMBRONC/5 decided to call a "false meeting" of the chiefs of the movement to test BUSTAMENTE but "someone objected to this". In February 1962, a meeting of the leaders of the MRR took place and AMBRONC/5 reorganized the movement. Subject met AMBRONC/5 only twice - once in February 1962 at the house of Angel CANETE and another time in March, 1962 when the assassination of Juan *MARINELLO failed. The Operation failed as the automobile to be used in the assassination attempt was stolen on the day of the proposed Operation. The driver of the car was to be Orlando *CRUZ, brother of Ester CRUZ. The MRR suspected Orlando CRUZ after this incident as he is a person who "likes money" and the theft was"quite a coincidence". (Orlando CRUZ is presently in Miami. He called Subject on 28 August and wants to see him). AMBRONC/5 informed the group in March to suspend all operations until he returned from a trip he was taking to the USA with MUGARRA and Jose *RODRIGUEZ Pecheco. AMBRONC/5 placed Angel *CANATE in charge of the radio sets. CANATE was selected to be the only person in direct contact with the RADOP in place of Juan BUSTAMENTE, Aka "Roly". MUGARRA gave subject two radio sets; one was placed in the apartment of a sister-in-law of subject located at 23rd and I Sts., Vedado, Apt. #11D. The other set was located at *A Street between 3rd and 5th Sts., Vedado, the home of Carlos *CADENAS. The only persons who knew the locations of the sets were the Radop, Juan FALCON, the MRR Chief and Angel CANATE. During AMBRONC/5's trip to the USA in April, 1962, Juan BUSTAMENTE, Aka "Roly" discovered where the radios were hidden. Subject had contact with FALCON and CANATE during April.

9. On 2 May 1962 AMBRONC/5 and MUGARRA returned from the USA. Enrique *CEPERO and MUGARRA's common-law-wife waited for them in the Blue Studebaker Lark. AMBRONC/5 and MUGARRA were late in arriving, however, and the group had departed from the area.

10. Subject later discovered that the G-2 had captured a "large radio" in the apartment of a radio technician named *TROVADIUS. TROVADIUS, when captured, fired at the G-2 and was himself wounded in the shoulder. Later TROVADIUS reported that he had seen Juan FALCON in prison and that FALCON had said "people in the G-2 had told me that no one would be wounded or killed".

11. The Radop *(AMBUMP/1) informed subject on Wednesday (9 May 1962) to take the radio set out of the house. Rumors were already circulating that the Radop and FALCON were captured. Owners of the house where the radio was cached had moved to Santa Clara for Mothers' Day. As Subject was in contact with Congo PECHECO during this time he did not attempt to pick-up the radio until Thursday (10 May) at 0700 hrs. Subject entered the apartment building (12 stories high) by the rear. Upon arrival he discovered that the glass doors on the terrace were opened (apartment was located on the eleventh floor). These windows are seldom opened.

Subject entered the building with his briefcase containing a pistol. He noticed two men "loitering in the lobby". He took the elevator to the 9th floor, departed, and walked to the eleventh floor. Subject was wearing soft shoes. He walked quietly to the apartment and heard a voice say "don't talk so loud as no one will come in". Subject then proceeded to the next apartment occupied by a friend of the movement. The friend said she had heard noises since the preceding night in the apartment. Subject then took the stairs to the 9th floor and entered the elevator. He got off on the ground floor and proceded to the house on [Carlos 08 Tercero Ave.] where the other radio was cached (Owner's name is [CABANES]). Upon arrival at the house he discovered that the woman who owned the house was outside in her housecoat talking to a stranger. Subject then departed from the area, called a friend of [CABANES] who went to the house. The friend was arrested, held a week and released. Subject then tried to pass this information to [Arturo MUGARRA] but [MUGARRA] had disappeared. He later discovered that [MUGARRA] knew that the radios were discovered and that TROVADIUS had been shot.

12. On 9 May [Juan FALCON] the radio operator (AMJUMP/1), [Pepe GUTIERREZ, Aka Peluza], [Estar CRUZ] and [Jose SEOANE] were arrested. When subject heard of these developments he hid in the Guanabo area. During this period 9th to 28th of May, he saw [MUGARRA] approximately eight times. He later heard that the G-2 had taken over a house in Guanabo, located 3 blocks from where he was hiding. Subject heard that the G-2 had taken a "blond thin man there" (Possibly AMBRONC/5). G-2 remained at the house for four days.

13. Subject then departed from Guanabo for a few days. When he returned in June 1962 he met Sylvia LNU, the person who resided at the house where the "blond thin man named CARLOS" was taken. Sylvia and subject met in the water in front of their houses. Sylvia is the wife of a BATISTA Naval Captain who lives in Miami. She has two "little girls". Sylvia said that "CARLOS" used to live at her house and after being captured he was returned there with the G-2. The G-2 was searching for a "plastic case and envelopes" (pads and crystals). Sylvia told subject that she had seen the envelope and that when Enrique CEPERO's family informed her that he was captured she hid everything in the house that could incriminate "Carlos" under the dog house in the back yard". "Carlos" talked as if he had been drugged when he returned to the house with the G-2. They searched the entire house bringing "Carlos" back and forth several times for four days. Sylvia was forced to open the door whenever anyone arrived and the caller was arrested. Sylvia was interrogated and the house was under surveillance for approximately a month. A friend of Sylvia's from outside Cuba visited her during this period and was arrested and held for a week. Sylvia said the items she buried looked like "pads and maps wrapped in plastic". Although she claimed the material was turned over to the MRR subject has doubts that this was done.

13/BE

14. During September 1962 Subject and his wife entered the Uruguayan Embassy to remain in asylum until 19 June 1963 when they arrived in Mexico City via Safe Conduct.

15. Attachment "B" is a report on Angel BENCOMO who subject believes was responsible for the MRR "roll-up".

Clarence E. SMERYAGE

SECRET

ATTACHMENT "A"

*TALLAPIEDRA - (Power Plant)

1. Ing. Manolito *FERNANDEZ - Superintendente
2. Ing. Luis F. de *LEON - Superintendente Auxiliar
(Bomb Thrower)
3.

* *

REGLA - (Power Plant)

1. Delfin *RODRIGUEZ - Operator Control Room
2. Ing. *ROSS - Superintendent

* **** ***

DESPACHO NARANJITO - (Sub-Station)

1. Jaime *GUIU

****** *

OFICINA PRINCIPAL DE DESPACHO

1. Carlos *MANUEL Pena - Auxiliar of Superintendent
(May be throw a bomb)- He can give good information.

* **

DESPACHO SANTA CLARA (Santa Clara Dispatching Office)

1. Pedro *LUCAS Galvez (Jefe Despacho) - Dispatch Chief
2. Agustin *GARCIA Cabalet - Despachador - (Dispatcher)

* *

Vladimir S. *KLITTING.

Att. A to UFGA-11653

19-300-11

ATTACHMENT "B"

Debriefing of Santiago SANCHEZ de la Torre

SUBJECT: Angel BENCOMO (BENCOMO reportedly was responsible for the MRR roll-up per SANCHEZ - See MEXI-5507)

1. Angel BENCOMO is approximately 19 years old, has brown skin, short, stocky, approximately 150 lbs. BENCOMO was formerly a miliciaman in Camaguey and a friend of Arturo *MUGARRA. BENCOMO entered the MRR via Eddy *GALENO during March 1962, when he was employed by the Abras Publicas in Camaguey. BENCOMO had trouble with his superiors, quit the militia, etc. GELENO brought BENCOMO to Havana where BENCOMO began working in resistance with Jose RODRIGUEZ Pecheco and Santiago SANCHEZ. (BENCOMO did not meet Arturo MUGARRA in Havana). SANCHEZ "tested BENCOMO" and he appeared to be OK i.e., disciplined, quiet, etc. SANCHEZ then began using BENCOMO to pick-up radios, minox cameras, etc. This activity took place between March and May 1962.

2. Arturo MUGARRA was arrested in May 1962 in a cafeteria in Havana where he went to dispose of an automobile. GALENO was to meet MUGARRA at the cafeteria. MUGARRA and his brother arrived at the cafeteria, turned the car (Cadillac) over to the prospective buyer and sat down. A mechanic drove the car to test it and returned with two G-2 cars. Although GALENO was present and was questioned he was not arrested.

3. From May to September 1962, SANCHEZ saw BENCOMO often. In September SANCHEZ went into an Embassy but "heard that BENCOMO was arrested and held until November". In January 1963 SANCHEZ heard from BENCOMO via SANCHEZ' sister. BENCOMO wrote a letter (which SANCHEZ still has) saying that he was working for the MRR in the streets. BENCOMO said he did not want to seek asylum but was considering going to the house of Luis *PERALES in Oriente (PERALES formerly was operating in the hills of Yayuajay but went to Havana to hide out in Jan.-Feb. 1962). In February 1963, SANCHEZ received another letter from his sister saying that BENCOMO was a G-2 man. BENCOMO identified himself as a G-2 man to PERALES in December 1962, and asked PERALES to cooperate with him. PERALES told SANCHEZ' sister of BENCOMO's proposition in January 1963. Since that time PERALES has disappeared.

Att "B" to UFGA-11193

19-300-11

13/BR

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Burke, William P. Jr.
01775

INCLUSIVE DATES: 1947 - 1962

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: CS Files

ROOM: 5E 13

DELETIONS, IF ANY: NONE

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
2:20 27 Dec 78		Chuck Berk	Chuck Berk
2:45 27 Dec		DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

BURKE WILLIAM P

TERMINATED 01775

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 56
Revised November 1959
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER I-1, F.P.M. 56-103

AGENCY CERTIFICATION OF INSURANCE STATUS
Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act of 1954

1. FULL NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) (First) (Middle)
Burke William P., Jr.

2. DATE OF BIRTH (MONTH, DAY, YEAR)
October 22, 1900

3. CHECK THE REASON FOR TERMINATING INSURANCE

(a) ☐ SEPARATED
(b) ☒ RETIRED
(c) ☐ DIED — WAS EMPLOYEE, AT TIME OF DEATH, AN APPLICANT FOR CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT? ☐ YES ☐ NO
(d) ☐ 12 MONTHS NON-PAY STATUS
(e) ☐ OTHER (Specify)

4. CHECK APPROPRIATE BOX CONCERNING S. F. 54, DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY

(a) ☐ CURRENT S. F. 54 ATTACHED
(b) ☒ A CURRENT S. F. 54 IS NOT ON FILE WITH THIS AGENCY
(c) ☐ A CURRENT S. F. 54 IS ON FILE IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (OR EQUIVALENT)

NOTE: IF EMPLOYEE (A) DIED OR (B) IS RETIRING OR RECEIVING FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION UNDER CONDITIONS ENTITLING HIM TO RETAIN FREE LIFE INSURANCE, ATTACH CURRENT S. F. 54, IF ANY, TO ORIGINAL S. F. 56 AND CHECK BOX 4 (a) ON ORIGINAL AND ALL COPIES OF S. F. 56. IF NO CURRENT S. F. 54 IS ON FILE, CHECK BOX 4 (b). IN ALL OTHER CASES, SHOW WHETHER OR NOT CURRENT S. F. 54 IS ON FILE BY CHECKING BOX 4 (b) OR (c). A CURRENT S. F. 54 IS ONE THAT HAS NOT BEEN CANCELED BY EMPLOYEE OR AUTOMATICALLY BY TRANSFER OR PRIOR TERMINATION OF INSURANCE.

5. DATE OF EVENT CHECKED IN ITEM 3 (MONTH, DAY, YEAR)
October 27, 1962

6. ANNUAL COMPENSATION RATE (CONVERT DAILY, HOURLY, PIECEWORK, ETC. RATE TO ANNUAL RATE) ON DATE IN ITEM 5.
17,925.00 PER ANNUM

7. DATE OF NOTICE OF CONVERSION PRIVILEGE (SF 55) TO EMPLOYEE (MONTH, DAY, YEAR)

8. I CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM, AND CORRECTLY REFLECTS OFFICIAL RECORDS, AND THAT THE EMPLOYEE NAMED WAS COVERED BY FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' GROUP LIFE INSURANCE ON THE DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 5. (SIGN ORIGINAL ONLY)

[signature] 17 DEC 1962
(Personal signature of authorized agency official) (Date)

B. DeFelice — Insurance Officer - Alternate
(Type name of authorized agency official) (Title)

Central Intelligence Agency — 2430 E St., N.W., Washington 25, D.C.
(Name of agency) (Mailing address of agency)

SEE OTHER SIDE
FOR
INSTRUCTIONS TO EMPLOYING AGENCY

PART 3 — FILE COPY

14-00000

31 OCT 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
001775	BURKE WILLIAM P JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
RETIREMENT (OPTIONAL)	10 27 62	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V / CF TO V	V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	X		3242 2221 4000	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDI OO CONTACT DIVISION U.S. FIELD NEW ORLEANS OFFICE	NEW ORLEANS, LA.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
IO CONTACT	0195	OC

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0132.21	15 8	17925

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
45	10					10 22 00		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX
			03H0000				

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT) | 36. SERV. COMP DATE | 37. LONG COMP. DATE | 38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES) | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS); 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)) | 42. LEAVE CAT CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
11-2-62 [signature]

1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

Bar 10/31/62

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

(4-61)

14-00000

PSC: 31 OCT 22

OCT

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
001775	BURKE WILLIAM P JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
RETIREMENT (OPTIONAL)	[illegible] 31 72	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	3242 222 [illegible]	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
IO CONTACT	0165	OC

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0132.21	15 6	17325

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition (4-61)

14-00000

Executive Registry
62-7824

23 OCT 1962

Mr. William P. Barke
6300 Saint Charles Avenue
New Orleans 18, Louisiana

Dear Mr. Barke:

As you bring to a close eighteen years of service to your country, I want to join your friends and co-workers in wishing you well and hoping that you find the years ahead filled with enjoyment and satisfaction.

It takes the conscientious efforts of many people to do the important work of this Agency. You leave with the knowledge that you have personally contributed much to our success in carrying out our mission. Your faithful and loyal support has measured up to the high ideals and traditions of the Federal service.

May I express to you my appreciation and extend warmest wishes in the years ahead.

Sincerely,

(Signed) JOHN A. McCONE

John A. McCone
Director

Distribution:
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1 - DCI
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1 - DC/EAB/SO
1 - D/Pers
1 - C/BSD
1 - OPF
1 - BCB Retirement
1 - BCB Reader

Originator: /S/ Harry W. Little, Jr.
Director of Personnel
22 OCT 1962

Concur: SIGNED
DC/EAB/SO
19 OCT 1962

OP/BSD/RSagaient (18 October 1962)

14-00000

103

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956 , SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS: EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
BURKE WILLIAM P JR	001775	82500	V	15 0	$15810	15 8	$17925

'201' FILE

REPORT OF HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD

DATE: 2 October 1962

The Honor and Merit Awards Board having considered a recommendation that:

NAME: (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	POSITION TITLE
BURKE,	William	Patrick, Jr.	Chief, New Orleans Field Office

PRESENT GRADE	OFFICE ASSIGNED TO	STATION
GS-15	DDI/OO	New Orleans

BE AWARDED: Intelligence Medal of Merit

☐ FOR HEROIC ACTION, ON

☒ FOR MERITORIOUS ACHIEVEMENT OR SERVICE DURING THE PERIOD

☒ APPROVES THE RECOMMENDATION ☐ DISAPPROVES THE RECOMMENDATION

☐ APPROVES, BUT IN LIEU THEREOF, RECOMMENDS THE AWARD OF:

CITATION

Mr. William P. Burke, Jr., is hereby awarded the Intelligence Medal of Merit for his outstanding service to the Central Intelligence Agency. As Chief of the New Orleans Field Office since its inception in 1947, Mr. Burke labored unceasingly in developing programs which have produced important information on a continuing basis. In his role as Agency representative, he has been successful in establishing relationships which have furthered the mission of the Agency and enhanced its reputation in the area. In his role as office chief, he has provided leadership of the highest order to his associates, and leaves behind him a legacy of achievement in keeping with the best traditions of service to the United States.

(Recommendation approved by DD/I on 14 September 1962)

REASONS FOR DISAPPROVAL OF RECOMMENDED AWARD

APPROVED

(Signed) Marshall S. Carter

Deputy DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

5 OCT 1962

DATE

SIGNATURE /s/ Harry W. Little, Jr.

TYPED NAME OF CHAIRMAN, HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD: HARRY W. LITTLE, JR.

SIGNATURE /Sgd/ Robert M. Gaynor

TYPED NAME OF RECORDER: ROBERT M. GAYNOR

FORM 8-62 382 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 14 September 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 1775 ✓

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): BURKE, William P., Jr.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: ~~VOLUNTARY~~ RETIREMENT (optional)

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 DAY [illegible] YEAR 62

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: X V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3242-2221-4000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDI/OO Contact Division U.S. Field New Orleans Office

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: New Orleans, La.

11. POSITION TITLE: ~~Intelligence Officer~~, Chief — IC Contact

12. POSITION NUMBER: K 0195

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: OC

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0132.21

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15-8

17. SALARY OR RATE: ~~$15,810~~ 17,925

18. REMARKS:

cc Payroll; Security

Subject is re-employable.

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: S. M. ASHCRAFT, Chief, Contact Division, OO — DATE SIGNED: 30 Oct 62

19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: J. LAROCQUE, JR. Acting Assistant Director, OO — DATE SIGNED: 30 Oct 1962

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: US — 20. EMPLOY. CODE: 18 — 21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC) — 22. STATION CODE — 23. INTEGREE CODE — 24. POSITION CODE: 2 — 25. DATE OF BIRTH: 10 | 3 | 2[illegible] — 26. DATE OF GRADE — 27. DATE OF LEI

28. NTE EXPIRES — 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE — 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 = CSC, 3 = FICA, 5 = NONE) — 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 3 BH,00,0,0 — 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA — EOD DATA — 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. — 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE — 36. SERV. COMP. DATE — 37. LONG. COMP. DATE — 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR/RESV, PROV/TEMP) — 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE — 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS); 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)) — 42. CIVILIAN INT. CODE — 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA — 44. STATE TAX DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 11-1-62 [illegible]

46. O.P. APPROVAL: H. F. Heggen By [signature]

DATE APPROVED: 31 Oct 62

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EMPLOYEE NOTICE OF RESIGNATION

I RESIGN EFFECTIVE ____________ (Date) FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:

OCT 31 2 03 PM '62

[illegible]

MY LAST WORKING DAY WILL BE	DATE SIGNED	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

FORWARD COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING SALARY CHECKS AND BONDS, TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, Zone, State)

[illegible] Ave.,
[illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS

Items 1 thru 7 and Items 9 thru 18a - The initiating office should fill in each of the referenced items. Items 3 thru 7 and 9 thru 18 require information which pertains only to the action requested, and NOT to the current status of the employee unless specific items remain unchanged.

Item 5 - "Category of Employment" should show one of the following entries:

Regular	Summer	WAE
Part Time	Detail Out	Consultant
Temporary	Detail In	Military
Temporary - Part Time		

Item 9 - "Organizational Designations" should show all levels of organization pertinent to identifying the location of the position:

FIRST LINE:
- Major Component (Director, Deputy Director, etc.)
- Office, Major Staff, etc.
  - Division or Staff (subordinate to first line)
    - Branch
      - Section
        - Unit

Item 11 - "Position Title" should reflect the standard abbreviated title given in the most current edition of the Position Control Register or reported on Form 261, Staffing Complement Change Authorization.

Item 18b - Signature should be that of the official authorized to approve for the Career Service to which the employee belongs. If more than one Career Service is involved, the gaining Career Service should approve and the other Career Service should concur in Item 18, Remarks.

ROUTING - The original only of this form will be forwarded to the Office of Personnel through the appropriate Career Service official(s). In the case of requests specified in HB 20-500-1, which require advance approval of or notification to the Office of Security or the Office of the Comptroller, one copy only will be sent to the Office(s) concerned.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I) SCD: 15 Jul 1944

1. PERS. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	3. SEX	4. DATE OF BIRTH	5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE
01775	Burke, William Patrick, Jr.	M	Oct 1900	18 Sep 1947

6. MARITAL STATUS	7. DEPENDENT(S) (Exclud. employee) NO.	YEAR(S) OF BIRTH	8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S)	SPOUSE
Married	1	1937	NA	NA

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS	MEMBERSHIP	OTHER STATUS	10. LAST MED. RPT.	QUAL. FOR	EVAL. FOR
		Rejected	Oct 1957	US Field	Annual

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS	NONE	SERVICE	GRADE	ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT. 1	RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT. 2	TO BE DEFERRED CAT. 3	RETIRED
	X						

12. ASSESSMENT DATE	13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE	14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE
9 Jul 1947	None	None

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT
1925-42 Self-Employed, New Orleans, La - Lawyer
1942-45 Military Service, US Marine Corps, Major - Division Legal Officer
1945-47 Administered Financial Matters Concerning Family Estate

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION
1915-19 Loyola Univ, New Orleans, La - AB Arts & Sciences
1920-23 Harvard Law School - LLB
1923-24 Trinity College, Cambridge, England - English Literature Research
1924-25 Tulane Univ., New Orleans, La - LLB

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested): None

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING
1954 CIA Orientation
1959 Mgmt for Contact Div

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Sep 1947	I.O.	0132.21	P-7		OO/Contact/Contr/Actg R Mgr IAC	New Orleans
Sep 1948	"	0132.21	P-8		CO/Contact Br/Reg Mgr N. O.	"
Mar 1952	"	0132.21	15	OO	OO/ContactDiv/Ch, N.O. Off	"
Jul 1960	LWOP					"
Sep 1960	I.O.-Contact	0132.21	15	OC	OO/ContactDiv/Ch,New Orleans Off	"

20. DATE REVIEWED	21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY	22. ITEMS 1-18 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE
	25 Sep 1962 OP/POD/QAB/hms	2 Dec 1957

FORM NO. 1200 (PART I) 1 FEB 57 REPLACES FORM 1080 (PART I) WHICH IS OBSOLETE. SECRET PROFILE (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO.	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)
01775	

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
BURKE, William Patrick, Jr.	Oct 1900

23.



24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Letter of Appreciation 1948 from AD/Operations prior to leaving Agency for having created an effective field office in less than a year, excellent relations with clients and local Armed Forces Representatives and high morale of office.

Commendation 1954 from DD/P for thorough and expeditious contribution made by DDI Personnel to urgent need for intelligence about Guatemala.

27. DATE REVIEWED	28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY
25 Sep 1962	OP/POD/QAB/hms

FORM NO. 1 FEB 57 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1060 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE. SECRET PROFILE (4)

SECRET

0 2 MAY 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Operations

SUBJECT: William P. Burke, Memorandum of Performance

William P. Burke, Chief, New Orleans Field Office continues to manage his office in a thoroughly competent and efficient manner. He is extremely conservative by nature and finds it difficult to act without the most careful consideration of all factors involved. While this approach might be a handicap in some areas it tends to be an asset in New Orleans. In spite of this tendency he willingly and efficiently devotes all his time and energy to the solution of a problem in an emergency. He represents the Agency well and maintains the highest respect in his community.

E. M. ASHCRAFT
Chief, Contact Division

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

GEORGE G. CAREY
Assistant Director for Operations

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

0 2 MAY 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Operations

SUBJECT: William P. Burke, Memorandum of Performance

William P. Burke, Chief, New Orleans Field Office continues to manage his office in a thoroughly competent and efficient manner. He is extremely conservative by nature and finds it difficult to act without the most careful consideration of all factors involved. While this approach might be a handicap in some areas it tends to be an asset in New Orleans. In spite of this tendency he willingly and efficiently devotes all his time and energy to the solution of a problem in an emergency. He represents the Agency well and maintains the highest respect in his community.

E. M. ASHCRAFT
Chief, Contact Division

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

GEORGE G. CAREY
Assistant Director for Operations

SECRET

21 June 61

Memo for File - William P. Burke

Subject: Longevity Step Increase

In reviewing this file under the Security reinvestigation program, it was noted that the 3rd LSI (as GS-15) was proposed to be made effective on 18 Sept 60, but that the effective date had been changed by Payroll to show 16 Oct 60. Reason for the change is presumed to be due to LWOP. Form 560 shows 225 hours of LWOP during the waiting period. If those figures are correct, then there was no "excess" LWOP, since the law provides that a maximum of 240 hours of LWOP is creditable toward completion of the waiting period in the case of LSI's.

I called this case to the attention of Joe Tracy, C/Payroll, who will review LWOP records and, if required, issue a memorandum to correct the effective date of the last LSI.

GCS

Gene C. Stevens

SECRET

30 JUN 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Operations

SUBJECT: William P. Burke, Memorandum of Performance

William P. Burke, Chief of the New Orleans Field Office, continues to manage his office in a thoroughly competent and efficient manner. Mr. Burke is a conservative who sometimes finds it difficult without most careful and protracted consideration of all factors involved to adjust to changes in methods and objectives particularly those peculiar to clandestine support. While his conservatism added to his meticulous legalistic approach might be something less than desirable in certain areas it is a definite asset in New Orleans. When called upon in emergency he willingly and efficiently devotes his entire time and energy to the solution of the problem regardless of personal inconvenience. Mr. Burke represents the Agency well in his area and readily maintains respect in the community.

E. M. ASHCRAFT
Chief, Contact Division

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

George G. Carey
Assistant Director for Operations

3 JUL 1961

SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Operations

SUBJECT: William P. Burke, Memorandum of Performance

William P. Burke, Chief of the New Orleans Field Office, continues to manage his office in a thoroughly competent and efficient manner. Mr. Burke is a conservative who sometimes finds it difficult without most careful and protracted consideration of all factors involved to adjust to changes in methods and objectives particularly those peculiar to clandestine support. While his conservatism added to his meticulous legalistic approach might be something less than desirable in certain areas it is a definite asset in New Orleans. When called upon in emergency he willingly and efficiently devotes his entire time and energy to the solution of the problem regardless of personal inconvenience. Mr. Burke represents the Agency well in his area and readily maintains respect in the community.

E. M. ASHCRAFT
Chief, Contact Division

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

George G. Carey
Assistant Director for Operations

3 JUL 1961

SECRET

14-00000

1960

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
101775	BURKE WILLIAM P JR	DDI/CONT	V-40	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA.	YR	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA.	YR
GS 15	9	$15,550	09	21	58	GS 15	Z	$15,810	10	16	60

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☒ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP: 24.6

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION
☐ P.S.I. ☒ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS Employee has served an aggregate of 10 years in present, equivalent, or higher grade and at the top of present grade since 9-19-48. This is the third longevity step increase.

14. AUTHENTICATION

PAYROLL BRANCH

E. ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 8-58 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a AND 560b. SECRET OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

14-00000

V to V	V to UV	SECRET (When Filled In)	REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION	DATE PREPARED Mo 9 Da 14 Yr 60
UV to V	UV to UV			

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth	4. Vet. Pref.	5. Sex	6. CS EOD
101775	[illegible]RKE WILLIAM P JR	Mo 10 Da 22 Yr 03	None 0, 5 Pt 1, 10 Pt 2 — Code 1	M 1	Mo 0[illegible] Da 13 Yr 47

7. SCD	8. CSC Retire	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Appt. Affid'v	11. FEGLI	12. LCD	13.
Mo 07 Da 15 Yr 44	Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	50 USCA 403 J	Mo Da Yr	Yes-1 No-2 Code	Mo 0[illegible] Da 13 Yr 47	Yes-1 No-2 Code 2

CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDI - CO CONTACT DIVISION NEW ORLEANS OFFICE	2531	NEW ORLEANS, LA.	75033

16. Dept. Field	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
Dept. - USfld. - Frgn. - Code 4	INTEL OFF (CON) (CH)	0105	GS	0132.21

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade	25. PSI Due	26. Appropriation Number
15 9	$15550	OC	Mo 09 Da 19 Yr 48	Mo XX Da XX Yr XX	1242 2221

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
RETURN TO DUTY FROM LWOP	571	Mo 9 Da 7 (~~12~~) Yr 60	Regular		

PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
	2531		75033

33. Dept. Field	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
Dept. - USfld. - Frgn. - Code				

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade	42. PSI Due	43. Appropriation Number
	$		09 19 48	09 15 60	

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)	Date Approved
E. M. ASHCRAFT, Chief, Contact Division, OO	George G. Carey GEORGE G. CAREY Assistant Director for Operations	15 SEP 1960
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): Ann L. Budresky		

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control	15	9-16-60	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	D V Mulcahy MED	9/16/60

Remarks

CK per M. Derosier 9-16-60 15

Continued On Reverse Side

FORM NO. 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION 3-59 (4)

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BLT: 7 SEPT 1960

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth (Mo. Da. Yr.)	4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD (Mo. Da. Yr.)
101775	BURKE WILLIAM P JR	10 22 00	1	M 1	09 15 47

7. SCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No-2) Code	CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt Affidav. (Mo. Da. Yr.)	11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code	12. LCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	13. Mil. Serv. Credit (Yes-1, No-2) Code
07 15 44	1	50 USCA 403 J			09 18 47	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDI OO CONTACT DIVISION NEW ORLEANS OFFICE	2531	NEW ORLEANS, LA.	75033

16. Dept.-Field (Dept-2, USfld-4, Frgn-6) Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
4	INTEL OFF (CON) (CH)	0195	GS	0132.21

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade (Mo. Da. Yr.)	25. PSI Due (Mo. Da. Yr.)	26. Appropriation Number
15 9	$ 15550	OC	09 19 48	XX XX XX	1242 2221

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date (Mo. Da. Yr.)	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
RETURN TO DUTY FROM LEAVE WITHOUT PAY	50	09 07 60	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDI OO CONTACT DIVISION NEW ORLEANS OFFICE	2531	NEW ORLEANS, LA.	75033

33. Dept.-Field (Dept-2, USfld-4, Frgn-6) Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
4	INTELL OFF (CON) (CH)	0195	GS	0132.21

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade (Mo. Da. Yr.)	42. PSI Due (Mo. Da. Yr.)	43. Appropriation Number
15 9	$ 15550	OC	09 19 48	09 18 60	1242 2221

44. Remarks

POSTED
9-22-60 [illegible]

DT

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1150

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

V to V	V to UV	UV to V	UV to UV	DATE PREPARED Mo 5 Da 27 Yr 60

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo Da Yr	4. Vet. Pref.	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD
1775	BURKE, William P., Jr.	10 22 00		M	

7. SCD	8. CSC Retmt	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Appt. Affidav.	11. FEGLI	12. LCD	13.

CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDI/OO Contact Division New Orleans Office		New Orleans, La.	

16. Dept.- Field	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
Dept.-Usfld. XX Code 4	Intelligence Officer (Contact) (CH)	195	GS	0132.21

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade	25. PSI Due	26. Appropriation Number
15-9	$14,450 15550	OC	09		0242-2221

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo Da Yr	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Date
LEAVE WITHOUT PAY*	1	7 18 60	Regular	96	

NTE 19 Aug 60 THRU COB 10 Sept 60

PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code

33. Dept.- Field	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade	42. PSI Due	43. Appropriation Number
	$				

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)	Date Approved
E. M. Ashcraft, Chief, Contact Division	GEORGE G. CAREY Assistant Director for Operations	1 Jun 60
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) Ann L. Budresky 2271		

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control			E. Release		
C. Classification			F. Approved B.		

Remarks *Personal reasons. It is requested that Mr. Burke be granted 25 days of leave without pay commencing 18 July and ending ~~10 August 1960~~.

To take a trip ... 10 Sept 60 per ...

Continued on reverse side

FORM 1152a (USE PREVIOUS EDITION)

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

PAS: 26 AUGUST 1960

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo. Da. Yr.	4. Vet. Pref Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD Mo. Da. Yr.
101775	BURKE WILLIAM P JR	10 22 00	1	M 1	09 18 47

7. SCD Mo. Da. Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Appt Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Code	12. LCD Mo Da Yr	13. Code
07 15 44	1	50 USCA 403 J			09 18 47	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDI OO CONTACT DIVISION NEW ORLEANS OFFICE		NEW ORLEANS, LA.	

16. Dept.-Field Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
4	INTEL OFF (CON) (CH)	0195	GS	0132.21

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade	25. PSI Due	26. Appropriation Number
15 9	$ 15550	OC			0242 2221

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
LEAVE WITHOUT PAY (THRU COB 10 SEPT 1960)	61	BOB 07 29 60	REGULAR	70	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDI OO CONTACT DIVISION NEW ORLEANS OFFICE	2531	NEW ORLEANS, LA.	75033

33. Dept.-Field Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
4	INTEL OFF (CON) (CH)	0195	GS	0132.21

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
15 9	$ 15550	OC	09 19 48	XX XX XX	1242 2221

44. Remarks

POSTED
8-30-60 WR

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1150

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
OC	BURKE WILLIAM P JR	101775	25 31	GS-15 9	$14,450	$15,550

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

14-00000

SECRET

10 MAY 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Operations

SUBJECT: William P. Burke, Memorandum of Performance

1. William P. Burke, Chief of the New Orleans Field Office, continues to manage his office most efficiently and to demonstrate thorough knowledge of his area. His inherent conservatism and somewhat legalistic approach tend to make it difficult for him to accept change and methods peculiar to clandestine support without most careful consideration of all the factors involved.

2. Mr. Burke represents the Agency well in his area. His conservatism is to a degree an asset in New Orleans; it could conceivably be a handicap elsewhere.

E. M. Ashcraft

E. M. ASHCRAFT
Chief, Contact Division

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

George G. Carey 20 MAY 1960

George G. Carey
Assistant Director for Operations

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE 24 Feb. 1960
PROT. 0-60

TO : Chief, OO/CD
Director of Security
Director of Personnel

FROM : Chief, Communications Security Staff

SUBJECT: Revocation of Cryptographic Clearance - William P. Burke

1. The cryptographic clearance held by Subject has been revoked under the provisions of CIA Regulation 90-500. Revocation is effective 9 Feb 60.

2. Subject is not authorized to have continued custody of, access to, or otherwise gain further knowledge of staff cryptographic material or information. Subject has been informed of this revocation, has been debriefed concerning cryptographic and related communications security matters, and has signed a Debriefing Statement acknowledging continuing responsibility for the protection of all cryptographic information obtained during the tenure of his cryptographic clearance.

FOR THE CHIEF, COMMUNICATIONS:

[signature]
Chief, Protective Branch

Distribution:
1 - OO/CD
1 - Security Office (Debriefing Statement Attached)
1 - Personnel Office (Wing 1-H Curie Hall)
1 - OC-S/PROT File

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 3-53 1597b (9)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 101775

30-158

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE
BURKE, William P.	10/22/1900	M	GS-15

5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT
OC	Intelligence Officer (Contact)	OO/CD/New Orleans

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

	NOT ELIGIBLE		MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING	X	DECLINED	X	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	11. REPORTING PERIOD (From - To)	SPECIAL (Specify)
31 May 1959	Sept 58 - Mar 59	

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
NO. 1: Management of a domestic field office.	6	NO. 4: Obtaining cooperation of non-governmental sources in his area.	6
NO. 2: Analysis of assigned area for intelligence potential.	6	NO. 5: Liaison with Federal and local agencies and officials in his area.	4
NO. 3: Planning and carrying out effective intelligence collection.	6	NO. 6: Support of other elements of CIA in his area.	3

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 29 12 12 PM '59

Subject possesses complete integrity and thorough knowledge of his area. He is able to assess the potential of sources and to obtain their full cooperation. He is inclined toward a legalistic approach which makes him somewhat less than receptive to new ideas and methods particularly when understanding support of the clandestine services is required. His conservatism is, to an extent, an asset in his area; it could be undesirable in some other assignments.

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
100	Subject is located in New Orleans.

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

	EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS		REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
	OTHER (Specify):		

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
23 April 59	Chief, CD/OO	E. M. Ashcraft /s/

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

X	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
	I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
28 APR 1959	AD/O	George G. Carey /s/

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
101775	BURKE, WILLIAM P.	DDI/CONT 7	V-40	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 15	5	13,970	09	16	51	GS 15	X & Y	14,210 14,450	09	21	58

REMARKS
EMPLOYEE HAS SERVED AN AGGREGATE OF 10 YEARS IN PRESENT, EQUIVALENT, OR HIGHER GRADE AND AT THE TOP OF PRESENT GRADE SINCE 16 Sep 51. THIS IS THE FIRST AND SECOND LONGEVITY STEP INCREASES.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
E. M. ASHCRAFT	24 Feb. '59	E M Ashcraft

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560 1 MAR 56 — SECRET — PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
101775	BURKE, WILLIAM P.	DDI/CONT	V-40	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 15	5	13,970	09	16	51	GS 15	X & Y	14,210 14,450	09	21	58

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE [X] NO EXCESS LWOP [ ] EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
[ ] IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
[ ] IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK | 11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS
EMPLOYEE HAS SERVED AN AGGREGATE OF 10 YEAR IN PRESENT, EQUIVALENT, OR HIGHER GRADE AND AT THE TOP OF PRESENT GRADE SINCE 16 SEP 51. THIS IS THE FIRST AND SECOND LONGEVITY STEP INCREASES.

14. AUTHENTICATION

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560b
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

1958

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8. of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
BURKE, William P.	10/22/00	M	OC

5. OFFICE/DIVISION BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
OO/Contact/New Orleans	Intelligence Officer (Contact) (CH)

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-15	9 September 1958	9/9/57 - 9/8/58

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): INITIAL [ ] ; ANNUAL [X] ; REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [ ] ; REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [ ] ; SPECIAL (Specify) [ ]

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT [ ] HAS [X] HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT: **Subject not available in Washington area.**

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

x	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER HAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
17 Sept 58 ~~27 August 1958~~	[signature] E. M. ASHCRAFT	Chief, CD/OO

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

DATE 9-22-58
11/58

[ ] CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
18 Sept 58	[signature] GEORGE G. CAREY	AD/O

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: **5**

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

Need to list does Bates

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others doing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE	CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
GIVING LECTURES	DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS	PREPARES SUMMARIES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS	TRANSLATES GERMAN
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	MANAGES FILES	DEBRIEFING SOURCES
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	OPERATES RADIO	KEEPS BOOKS
TYPING	COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES	DRIVES TRUCK
TAKING DICTATION	WRITES REGULATIONS	MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
SUPERVISING	PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE	EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NUMBER
NO. 1 Management of domestic field office	6	NO. 4 Obtaining the effective support of non-governmental sources and contacts in his area	6
NO. 2 Analysis of assigned area for intelligence potential	6	NO. 5 Liaison with Federal and local agencies and officials in his area	4
NO. 3 The planning and carrying out of effective intelligence collection	6	NO. 6 Support of other elements of CIA in his area	3

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject possesses complete integrity and thorough knowledge of his area. He has the ability to assess the potential of sources and to obtain their full cooperation. He is inclined toward a legalistic approach which renders him somewhat less than receptive to new ideas and methods, particularly where understanding support of the clandestine services is required. This conservatism is to a degree an asset in the area and the duties to which he is assigned but could be undesirable in some other assignments.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? [ ] YES [X] NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
BURKE, William P.	10/22/00	M	OC

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
OO/Contact/New Orleans	Intelligence Officer (Contact) (CH)

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-15	9 Sept. 1958	9/9/57 - 9/8/58

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): [ ] INITIAL [X] ANNUAL [ ] REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [ ] REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [ ] SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
~~27 August 1958~~ 17 Sept. 58	[signature] E. M. ASHCRAFT	Chief, CD/OO

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
18 Sept '58	[signature] GEORGE G. CAREY	AD/O

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 2

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? [X] Yes [ ] No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	3	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	3	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

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OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Subject will leave New Orleans only for an overseas post. He will not do so for duty in Washington. In view of the fact that his intelligence experience is entirely in the field of domestic collection, it is difficult to conceive of such an overseas assignment. He is eminently qualified to continue in his present assignment.

MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

No training or experience planned or required except periodic meetings of Contact Division Field Chiefs.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

See Section G.4. above.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
- X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
- 1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
- 2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
- 3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
- 4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
- 5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	3	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	3	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	3	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6) 101 775	LANGUAGE DATA RECORD

PART I—GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30)		
	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
BURKE, William P.	October	22	1900

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39)			5.
	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	
	April	9	1957	✓ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.
2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.
3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-45)

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D.	Speaking (43)
1.	I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.
2.	I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.
3.	I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.
4.	I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.
5.	I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E.	Understanding (44)
1.	I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.
2.	I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.
3.	I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.
4.	I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.
5.	I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.
2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.
3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.
4. NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED	SIGNATURE
9 Apr 57	William P. Burke
(46)	(47)

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
BURKE WILLIAM P JR	101775	GS-15-5	$12,690	$13,970

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT
PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE: 8 Sep 58

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

GENERAL

SECTION I

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): BURKE William Patrick Jr.

2. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): 6300 St. Charles Ave., New Orleans 18, La.

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): 6300 St. Charles Ave., New Orleans 18, La.

4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: Twinbrook 7-2485

5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE: Louisiana

PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

SECTION II

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.: BURKE Mrs Frances Kittredge

2. RELATIONSHIP: Wife

3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country): 6300 St. Charles Ave., New Orleans 18, La.

4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country). INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: none

5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: Twinbrook 7-2485

6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER: none

7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION: none

8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.
none

MARITAL STATUS

SECTION III

1. CHECK (X) ONE: SINGLE [ ] MARRIED [X] WIDOWED [ ] SEPARATED [ ] DIVORCED [ ] ANNULLED [ ]

2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS
Never separated, divorced nor marriage annulled

BURKE WILLIAM P JR — 01775

NAME OF EMPLOYEE	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE	TELEPHONE EXT.	SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)
63-545-BE-73		X YES / NO	2271	

DO NOT FOLD, STAPLE, SPINDLE, OR MUTILATE

RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

INSTRUCTIONS

THIS FORM MUST BE RETURNED WHETHER YOU HAVE HAD OVERSEAS SERVICE OR NOT.

PLEASE READ CAREFULLY INSTRUCTIONS ON ACCOMPANYING CARD, THEN FILL OUT THIS FORM AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE.

DO NOT WRITE IN COLUMN	WHERE SERVICE WAS PERFORMED	PCS-1 TDY-2 (ENTER NO.)	FROM MO	FROM YR	TO MO	TO YR	SERVICE AS CIVILIAN-1 MILITARY-2 (ENTER NO.)	RESPONSIBLE U.S. GOV'T. DEPT. OR AGENCY	DO NOT WRITE IN COLUMN
310	Territory of Hawaii	1	05	45	10	45	2	US Marine Corps	540

IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS NEEDED, CHECK HERE [ ] AND ASK YOUR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER FOR SUPPLEMENTAL CARDS

SECRET

FORM 1451

OCCUPATION: Housewife — (unemployed, last two employers) Not employed. Once employed by Town & Country., N.O.La.

20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): not employed

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

SECRET

FORM 444b 4-57 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

1958 doc
Periodic History Statement w/atts (1954)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE OF SPOUSE (From- and To-) BY MONTH AND YEAR
Sep 1942 - Dec 1945

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE	23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED
U S Marine Corps	U. S.

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN
CIA, New Orleans Field Office, Sept 1947 to date.

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) None	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
2	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
3	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
4	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? [ ] YES [X] NO

2. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? [X] YES [ ] NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

3. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? [ ] YES [X] NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 3 ABOVE, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.

5. WITHOUT REFERENCE TO YOUR SALARY, STATE OTHER SOURCES OF RECURRENT INCOME NOT INDICATED BY PRECEDING ITEMS.
Dividends on stocks, capital gains, interest, rents and an annuity.

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

6. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS:

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
Whitney National Bank	New Orleans, La.
Hibernia National Bank	" " "
National American Bank	" " "
National Bank of Commerce	" " "

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? [ ] YES [X] NO

8. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 7 ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

SECTION VI — CITIZENSHIP

1. COUNTRY OF CURRENT CITIZENSHIP: U. S.

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY (CHECK (X) ONE): [X] BIRTH [ ] MARRIAGE [ ] OTHER (Specify):

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? [ ] YES [X] NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS: - - -

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First papers, etc.)
- - -

SECTION VII — EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

[ ]	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	[ ]	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
[ ]	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	[ ]	BACHELOR'S DEGREE
[ ]	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	[X]	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
[ ]	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	[ ]	MASTER'S DEGREE [ ] DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT: MAJOR	SUBJECT: MINOR	DATES ATTENDED: FROM	DATES ATTENDED: TO	DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR HRS. COMPLETED (Specify)
Loyola University of the South	Phil	Eng	1915	1919	AB	1919	?
Harvard Law School	Law		1920	1923	LLB	1923	?
Cambridge Univ., England	Eng	--	1923	1924	none	--	?
Tulane University Law School	Law		1924	1925	LLB	1925	?

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED: FROM	DATES ATTENDED: TO	TOTAL HOURS
none				

4. MILITARY TRAINING (Full time duty at specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED: FROM	DATES ATTENDED: TO	TOTAL WEEKS
Headquarters US Marine Corps	Military Law	Oct 1944	Feb 1945	about 12

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE
—

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VIII — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE KNOWLEDGE GAINED AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT OTHER THAN ORGANIZATION EXPERIENCE. UNDER COLUMN "TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE," INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, COASTS, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY: RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Cambridge, Eng.	General only	1923-4	X		X	

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL FOR EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE

I attended Trinity College, Cambridge, for about nine months.

3. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE GAINED KNOWLEDGE AS A RESULT OF ORGANIZATION ASSIGNMENT OR ACTIVITY.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY: HDQTS ASSIGNMENT	FIELD ASSIGNMENT	TRAINING
None					

SECTION IX — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (W.P.M.) 20 ?
2. SHORTHAND (W.P.M.) none
3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM: GREGG / SPEEDWRITING / STENOTYPE / OTHER (Specify)

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, etc.) none

SECTION X — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES, ATHLETIC AND SPORTS ACTIVITIES, ETC. IN WHICH YOU PARTICIPATE. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH
Golf, Fishing, Tennis, Badminton, Bridge, Piano. Proficiency - fair.

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK
None

3. EXCLUDING EQUIPMENT NOTED IN SECTION X, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES, ETC.
None

4. IF YOU ARE A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (Pilot, Electrician, Radio Operator, Teacher, Lawyer, CPA, Medical Technician, etc.), INDICATE THE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE, NAME OF ISSUING STATE, AND REGISTRY NUMBER, IF KNOWN.
Member of the Bar of Louisiana. Also licensed to practise before Federal Courts

5. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue) 1926
6. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue) 1960

SECRET

SECTION X CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (*Do not submit copies unless requested*) INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (*Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.*)

None

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

None

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

None except public speaking incident to legal practise.

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

None.

SECTION XI ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*): Sep 1947 to Date
2. GRADE: GS 15
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: Office of Operations/ Contact Division/ N.O.
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: 10 (inc. 3 WAEs)
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Chief, New Orleans Field Office.
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: Supervision and direction of professional and clerical employees. Carrying out policy and operational directives issued by headquarters. Maintaining liaison with other governmental agencies. Collecting and reporting positive foreign intelligence information. Appropriate duties incidental to the above.

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

(*Use additional pages if required*)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XII — CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (Including stepchildren and adopted children) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.	1 x	2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.	1

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX M	SEX F	CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
Mrs Frances K Burke	wife	1906		x	US	6300 St. Charles Ave New Orleans 18, La.
Patricia W Burke	daughter	1937		x	US	" " " "

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

DATE COMPLETED	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECRET

14-00000

7P.P.
Doc 1947
Doc

doc date,
26 May 1947

Standard Form 57 - June 1946
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

Form approved. Budget Bureau No. 50-2046.

4257

INSTRUCTIONS.—Answer every question completely. Typewrite or print. If you are applying for a specific Civil Service examination, read the announcement carefully and follow its directions. Mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

1. Name of examination, or kind of position applied for:

2. Optional subject (if mentioned in examination announcement):

3. Place of employment applied for:

4. (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last)
William Patrick Burke, Jr.

5. Street and number or R. D. number:
6300 St. Charles Ave.

City or post office (including postal zone), and State:
New Orleans, La.

6. Legal or voting residence (State): Louisiana
7. Office phone: UP 1447 Home phone: UP 1447

8. Place of birth (city and State; if born outside U. S., name city and country):
New Orleans, La.

9. Date of birth (month, day, year): 22 Oct. 1900
10. Age last birthday: 46
11. [X] Male [ ] Female
Weight: 202

12. [X] Married [ ] Single
13. Height without shoes: 6'1½"

14. Have you ever been employed by the Federal Government? [X] Yes [ ] No
If now employed by the Federal Government, give present grade and date of last change in grade:
Major USMCR (inactive duty) 15 Aug. 1945

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	YES	NO
15. (a) Would you accept short-term appointment if offered, for— 1 to 3 months?		X
3 to 6 months?		X
6 to 12 months?		X
(b) Would you accept appointment, if offered— in Washington, D. C.?		X
anywhere in the United States?		X
outside the United States?		X

15. (c) If you will accept appointment in certain locations ONLY, give acceptable locations:
New Orleans, La.

(d) What is the lowest entrance salary you will accept? $ 8000.00 per year.
You will not be considered for positions paying less.

(e) If you are willing to travel, specify: [X] Occasionally [ ] Frequently [ ] Constantly

16. EXPERIENCE.—You are requested to furnish all information asked for below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to determine your qualifications for the position for which you are applying. In the spaces provided below describe EVERY position you have held. Use a separate block for EACH position. You may also include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Start with your PRESENT position and work back, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Explain clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position. Describe your experience in the Armed Services in question 17 (Military Experience).
(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 4 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.
(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

PRESENT POSITION

Dates of employment: (Month, year) From: To present time
Exact title of your present position: See appendix "A".
Salary or earnings: Starting $ per; Present $ per
Place of employment (city and State):
Description of your work:
Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment and division:
Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfr. of locks, etc.):
Number and kind of employees supervised by you:
Name and title of immediate supervisor:
Reason for desiring to change employment:

16—47799-3

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

17. MILITARY EXPERIENCE.—In order to make the most [illegible] in the service, write in Item (a) "No other than [illegible] service schools" and indicate in Item (c) all [illegible] in duty assignment, showing dates of such assignment.

(a) First Special Service School attended:

See appendix "B"

Location:

Dates attended (months, years):

From: To:

Rating received at end of this training:

(b) What were you taught in First Special Service School?

(c) Duty assignment or rating after this training (give all important changes in duty assignment whether or not you attended a Service School).

(d) What did you do during this duty assignment?

Dates of duty assignment (months, years):

From: To:

(e) Second Special Service School attended:

Location:

Dates attended (months, years):

From: To:

Rating received at end of this training:

(f) What were you taught in Second Special Service School?

(g) Duty assignment after this training:

(h) What did you do during this duty assignment?

Dates of duty assignment (months, years):

From: To:

List on a separate sheet of paper any additional experience, training, service, or special duty assignments during military service or hospitalization.

18. EDUCATION.—Circle highest grade completed
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Mark (x) the appropriate box to indicate satisfactory completion of:

☐ Elementary School ☐ Junior High School ☒ Senior High School

(a) Give name and location of last high school attended: Jesuits High School, New Orleans, La.

(b) Subjects studied in high school which apply to position desired: English, History.

(c) Name and Location of College or University	Major	Dates Attended From	To	Years Completed Day	Night	Degrees Conferred Title	Date	Semester Hours Credit
Loyola University, N.O. La	A & S	1915	1919	x		AB	1919	?
Harvard Law School, Cambridge	Law	1920	1923	x		LLB	1923	?
Tulane University, N.O. La	Law	1924	1925	x		LLB	1925	?

(d) List Your Chief Undergraduate College Subjects	Semester Hours	List Your Chief Graduate College Subjects	Semester Hours
Philosophy, Eng. Science	?	Law and English Litt.	
		Spent year (1923-1924) at Trinity Coll.	
		Cambridge Univ. England in Eng. Litt.	
		research.	

(e) Other training such as vocational, business, or other courses given through the Armed Forces Institute (show name and location of school), or in-service training in a Federal agency:

Judge Advocate General of Navy;
USMC Institute

Subjects Studied	Dates Attended From	To	Years Completed Day	Night
Military Justice	1944	1945	x	
~~Post-Exchange Actg.~~	"	"	x	

19. Indicate your knowledge of foreign languages.

Language	Reading Exc.	Good	Fair	Speaking Exc.	Good	Fair	Understanding Exc.	Good	Fair
French			x			x			

(a) How was your knowledge of foreign languages acquired?

School and private lessons

(b) If you have traveled or resided in any foreign countries, indicate (1) names of countries, (2) dates and length of time spent there and (3) reason or purpose (e.g. business, education, etc.):

England, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, etc. Study and recreation.

20. List any special skills you possess and machines and equipment you can use, such as operation of short wave radio, multilith, comptometer, key-punch, turret lathe, scientific or professional devices.

Approximate number of words per minute in typing 40 shorthand

21. Are you now or have you ever been a licensed or certified member of any trade or profession such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.?

☒ Yes ☐ No Give kind of license and State: Lawyer; Louisiana

First license or certificate (year):

Latest license or certificate (year): Continuous.

22. Give any other qualifications not covered elsewhere in this application such as (a) your more important publications (do NOT submit copies unless requested); (b) your patents or inventions; (c) public speaking and public relations experience; (d) membership in professional or scientific societies, etc.

Practising lawyer in New Orleans for about fifteen years; member New Orleans and Louisiana State Bar Associations.

16—47000-3

14-00000

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23. REFERENCES — List three persons living in the United States or Territories who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16 (EXPERIENCE).

	FULL NAME	BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1.	James Gilly, Jr.	V.P. Whitney National Bank, N.O.La	Banker
2.	Judge W. W. Westerfield	Court of Appeals, New Court House Bldg., N. O. La.	Judge
3.	Fred N. Ogden	American Bank Bldg. N. O. La.	Broker.

24. May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, etc.? ☐ Yes ☐ No Not employed.

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answers by placing X in proper column.	YES	NO
25. Are you a citizen of the United States?	X	
26. Do you advocate or have you ever advocated, or are you now, or have you ever been a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X
27. Within the past 12 months, have you habitually used intoxicating beverages to excess?		X
28. Since your 16th birthday, have you ever been convicted, or fined, or imprisoned, or placed on probation, or have you ever been ordered to deposit bail for the violation of any law, police regulation or ordinance (excluding minor traffic violations for which a fine of $25 or less was imposed)? If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 38 below. Give in each case (1) the date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed your fingerprints will be taken.		X
29. Have you ever been discharged or forced to resign for misconduct or unsatisfactory service from any position? If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 38 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.		X
30. Do you receive an annuity from the U. S. or D. C. Government under any retirement act or any pension or other compensation for military or naval service? If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 38 reason for retirement, that is age, optional, disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years service, amount of retirement pay, and state what retirement act and cause if retired from military or naval service.		X
31. Are you an official or employee of any State, Territory, county, or municipality? If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 38.		X
32. Does the U. S. Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage) with whom you live or have lived within the past 24 months? If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 38 for EACH such relative (1) full name, (2) present address, (3) relationship, (4) department or agency by whom employed, and (5) kind of appointment.		X
33. Have you ever had a nervous breakdown? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X
34. Have you ever had tuberculosis? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column.	YES	NO
35. Have you any physical defect or disability whatsoever? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.	X	
36. (a) Were you ever in the United States Military or Naval Service during time of War?	X	
(b) Is the word "honorable" or the word "satisfactory" used in your discharge or separation papers to show the type of your discharge or separation?	Inactive Reserve.	
(c) Was service performed on an active full time basis with full military pay and allowances?	X.	

(d) Date of entry or entries into service	Date of separation or separations
8 Sept. 1942	Inactive duty 19 Dec. 1945
Branch of service (Army, Navy, M. C., C. G., etc.)	Serial No. (if none, give grade or rating at time of separation)
USMCR	013458 Major USMCR

IF YOUR ANSWERS TO THIS QUESTION (No. 36) INDICATE THAT YOU ARE ENTITLED TO VETERAN PREFERENCE, SUCH PREFERENCE WILL BE CREDITED IN THE EXAMINATION. IF APPOINTED, YOU WILL BE REQUIRED TO FURNISH TO THE APPOINTING OFFICER, PRIOR TO ENTRY ON DUTY, OFFICIAL EVIDENCE OF SEPARATION FROM YOUR LATEST PERIOD OF ACTIVE SERVICE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES DURING TIME OF WAR. DO NOT SUBMIT PROOF OF DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION WITH THIS APPLICATION.

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column.	YES	NO
37. (a) If you served in the U. S. Military or Naval Service during peacetime ONLY, did you participate in a campaign or expedition and receive a campaign badge or service ribbon?		X
(b) Are you a disabled veteran?		X
(c) Are you the unmarried widow of a veteran?		X
(d) Are you the wife of a veteran who has service-connected disability?		X

IF YOUR ANSWER TO QUESTION 37 (a), (b), (c), OR (d) IS "YES" AND YOU WISH TO CLAIM VETERAN PREFERENCE, ATTACH TO THIS APPLICATION VETERAN PREFERENCE CLAIM (CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FORM 14) TOGETHER WITH THE NECESSARY PROOF SPECIFIED THEREIN.

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICE ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 36 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on .... 19....

Signature .... Title ....

38. Space for detailed answers to other questions. Indicate item numbers to which answers apply.

ITEM No.		ITEM No.	
35.	Defective distant vision, corrected by glasses		

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

FALSE STATEMENT ON THIS APPLICATION IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW (U. S. CODE, TITLE 18, SECTION 80).

I certify that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

Date 26 May 1947. Signature of applicant [signature]

(Sign your name in ink, one given name, initial or initials, and surname. If female, prefix Miss or Mrs. and if married give your own given name, e.g., "Mary L. Doe.")

14-00000

WILLIAM R. BURKE

APPENDIX "A"

HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT.
(Sec. 21 in Form [illegible]; Sec. 16 in USCSC Std. Form 57)

The following is a complete account of my business and professional activities since my return to New Orleans, from England, in the fall of 1924.

I had obtained a law degree from Harvard in [illegible], but, as the law of Louisiana differs in many important respects from the Common Law, I entered Tulane University Law School, in October 1924, to study Louisiana Civil Code subjects. In the afternoons I worked as a researcher for the law firm of Spencer, Gidiere, Phelps and Dunbar, (now Phelps, Dunbar, Marks and Claverie) 1[illegible] United Fruit Co. Bldg., New Orleans, La.

In July 19[illegible] I received the degree of LLB from Tulane, passed the Louisiana Bar examinations, and entered practise as an associate of the firm named above. My salary was, as I recall it, $100.00 per month, plus 75% of the fees on the business which I originated. Such fees were negligible. My work consisted in research on matters assigned by members of the firm, and the handling of minor matters of litigation.

Among the clients of the Spencer firm was the New Orleans Bank & Trust Co., a small bank which had been organized a few years previously. In 19[illegible] the bank decided to open a Trust Department, and offered me the job of organizing and running it, at a salary of $[illegible] per year. I accepted, organized the department and operated it successfully until 1931. My work consisted in collecting wills, trusts and custodianship accounts, investing the funds of beneficiaries, administering estates and handling receiverships.

In 19[illegible] the discount department of the New Orleans Bank & Trust Co. got into difficulties, and, for the protection of the depositors, the entire bank was taken over by the Interstate Trust & Banking Co., of New Orleans. No loss was suffered by any of the customers of the Trust Department. I became Assistant Trust Officer of the Interstate Bank, and could have remained there indefinitely, but I disliked the environment and the policies of the management, and I could see very little prospect for advancement, so I resigned when the trust accounts had been transferred.

In the fall of 1931 I organized a corporation which was to erect a moving-letter on Canal St., similar to the one on the Times Building in New York. Revenues were to be derived from the sale of advertising which was to be interspersed among news dispatches. It proved impossible, however, to sell sufficient contracts to make the operation profitable, and I liquidated the corporation in the early part of 19[illegible].

Two of my classmates at Tulane, Eberhard P. Deutsch and R. Emmett Kerrigan had been practising law together since graduation, and were becoming quite successful. They asked me to join them, and, in the summer of 19[illegible], I became a member of the firm of Deutsch & Kerrigan & Burke. For the next five years we engaged in the general civil practise of law in all City, State and Federal Courts. Among others, we represented the Billingsley Engineering Co., the Item Co., Ltd., publisher of one of the local daily papers, the Standard Dredging Co., and a number of insurance companies, and local corporations and individuals.

My work covered the whole field of civil corporate and individual practice: the preparation of pleadings, interviewing witnesses, conducting litigation, writing briefs, arguing cases in the instant and appellate courts, examining titles, administering estates, handling taxation matters, etc. My income averaged approximately $[illegible] per annum.

I resigned from the firm in 19[illegible] and continued practise, as an individual, with offices in the Canal Bank Building, until I entered military service in 19[illegible]. My income during that period varied between five and eight thousand dollars.

I was on active duty in the U.S. Marine Corps from September 19[illegible] to December 1945. While I was overseas my mother died, leaving a considerable estate. I was named executor in her will, and, after my return, I spent several months in administering

WILLIAM P. BURKE

APPENDIX "A"

the estate, transfering the securities and working out some rather complicated taxation matters.

I had decided, while in service, that I did not want to return to active law practise. The clients I had had before the war were being adequately served by other attorneys, and it would have meant starting all over again from scratch. I did not want to do that, so I began looking for a business in which I could invest capital and my services. Naturally, I have found quite a few, but none, as yet, which meets my requirements.

I am a member of the Board of Directors of the following corporations: The National Service & Appraisal Co., of Chicago, Ill., which is in the credit reporting business; the Cahill Realty Co., of St. Louis, Mo., a family real estate company; The Equitable Real Estate Co., Ltd., of New Orleans; and Miracle Services, Inc., a company which some of my associates and I organized recently to operate "Launderettes" in this territory.

I have been active in Civic matters, acting as team captain in drives of the Community Chest, and have taken part in drives by the Red Cross, The Anti-Tuberculosis Society, the Cancer Society, etc. I am a member of the Board of the Children's Bureau, a Chest agency, and a member of its finance committee.

WILLIAM P. BURKE

APPENDIX "B"

MILITARY SERVICE.
(Sec. 16 in Form 2105; Sec. 17 in USCSC Std. Form 57)

In the spring of 1942 the war came pretty close to New Orleans. There were submarines in the Gulf, tankers were being torpedoed as they left the river, and the hospitals were filled with horribly burned seamen. I was anxious to do what I could, but I felt that at my age there was little hope of taking an active part. I became an Air Raid warden, and helped sell some War Bonds, and I thought that was about all I would be able to do.

Then the Marine Corps came out with an announcement that commissions were open in Aviation Intelligence to men up to 45 years of age. I saw the Recruiting Officer, and he recommended me for such a commission. Nothing happened for some time, so when I was next in Washington on business I went to Marine Corps Headquarters and looked up Colonel Walford, whom I had know in New Orleans.

He ascertained that Aviation Intelligence was filled up, but stated that he would be glad to have me in the Recruiting Division, and that I might transfer to Aviation Intelligence later on. I was delighted to get into the Marine Corps, and accepted a commission as Captain on 8 September 1942.

After an indoctrination course at Quantico, Va., I was ordered to San Antonio, Tex., as assistant recruiting officer. I remained there for three months, devoting most of my time to the Student Officer procurement program in the various Texas colleges.

In December, 1942, the Marine Corps, which had, prior to that time, been an exclusively volunteer organization, was placed under the Selective Service System, and Marine Corps Headquarters decided to follow the lead of the Navy and appoint a Marine officer as liaison to each state Selective Service Headquarters. I was one of those appointed, and was ordered to Raleigh, N.C. on 12 January 1943.

The post at Raleigh was one of some importance because of the large Marine Corps bases at New River, Cherry Point and Edenton, at which over one hundred thousand Marines were in training, and at which construction and maintainance programs involving several hundred millions of dollars were in operation. It was my duty to supervise the induction of all North Carolina selectees who were assigned to the Marine Corps through the Selective Service System, and to represent the various Marine Corps installations in their dealings and disputes with local draft boards concerning the deferment of about five thousand civilian employees.

In addition, I took an active part in the administration of the Selective Service Headquarters in Raleigh and throughout the state, interviewing registrants, their employers and dependents, advising local and appeal boards, setting up replacement schedules for various industries and passing on the merits of about eleven thousand appeals.

The work was interesting and productive, and living in Raleigh was certainly "good duty", but I had never lost my desire for overseas duty and made two attempts to transfer to Aviation, both of which were unsuccessful. Then, in September 1944 I heard that Marine Divisions overseas were badly in need of Legal Officers, and I immediately applied for transfer. I was ordered to Headquarters for indoctrination, and, after a tour of duty in the office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, I was sent to Camp Lejeune in February 1945 for further training. In April 1945 I sailed from San Francisco, and in May I joined the Fourth Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, at Maui, as Division Legal Officer. I continued in that post until the war ended and I procured a transfer to the inactive list.

A Marine Division consists of approximately 1[illegible],000 men. The Division Legal Officer is directly responsible to the Commanding General for the administration of military justice throughout the command, and supervises the work and findings of all General, Summary and Deck Courts, as well as those of all Boards of Investigation and Courts of Inquiry. He advises the Commanding General on the action to be taken as Convening Authority or Immediate Superior in Command. In addition he advises the Commanding General and Chief of Staff on all legal matters arising out of contact with natives, with civilian and military authorities and with the owners of training areas

WILLIAM P. BURKE

APPENDIX "B"

used by the troops. Moreover, he acts as Legal Assistance Officer to the Division, which involved, during my term of office, the giving of legal advice and service to about eight hundred individuals.

I returned to the United States on 25 October 1945, and completed my terminal leave on 19 December 1945.

During my term of service my superiors rendered reports on my fitness each ninety days. All of these reports were favorable, and many of them contained commendations. I was promoted to Major in August 1945, to rank from May 1943, and I hold a permanent commission as Major in the Reserve. My file number is 013458.

Rec. recd: 6 Jan 1957

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8 of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
BURKE, William P., Jr.	22 Oct 1900	M	OC

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
Operations/Contact/New Orleans Office	IO (Contact) (Ch)

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-15	9 September 1957	9/9/56 - 9/8/57

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): [ ] INITIAL [X] ANNUAL [ ] REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [ ] REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [ ] SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT [ ] HAS [X] HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:
Subject is stationed in Louisiana.

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify)
	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
31 Oct 57	E. M. Ashcraft (signature)	Chief, Contact Division

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

Posted Pos. Control BY GW DATE 11-1-57
Reviewed by PLD Rett 11/4/57

[ ] CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
31 Oct 1957	George G. Carey (signature)	Assistant Director for Operations

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: **5**

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY. HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
NOV 12 3 36 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare, in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE	CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
GIVING LECTURES	DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS	PREPARES SUMMARIES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS	TRANSLATES GERMAN
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	MANAGES FILES	DEBRIEFING SOURCES
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	OPERATES RADIO	KEEPS BOOKS
TYPING	COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES	DRIVES TRUCK
TAKING DICTATION	WRITES REGULATIONS	MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
SUPERVISING	PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE	EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NUMBER
NO. 1 Management of domestic field office	6	NO. 4 Obtaining the effective support of non-governmental sources and contacts in his area	6
NO. 2 Analysis of assigned area for intelligence potential	6	NO. 5 Liaison with Federal and local agencies and officials in his area	4
NO. 3 The planning and carrying out of effective intelligence collection	6	NO. 6 Support of other elements of CIA in his area	3

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Complete integrity; knowledge of area, familiarity with source potentials and attitudes, ability to obtain close cooperation of non-governmental sources at high level; loyalty to staff. Somewhat inclined to take legalistic approach to relationships with other elements of CIA and other IAC local representatives, with consequent loss of flexibility.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
BURKE William P., Jr.	22 Oct 1900	M	OC

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
Operations/Contact/New Orleans Office	IO (Contact)

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-15	9 September 1957	9/9/56 - 9/8/57

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): [ ] INITIAL [X] ANNUAL [ ] REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [ ] REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [ ] SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
31 Oct 57	E. M. Ashcraft	Chief, Contact Division

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
31 Oct 57	George G. Carey	Assistant Director for Operations

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 2

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? [X] Yes [ ] No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	3	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	3	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION
80

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

He is willing to leave the New Orleans area for an overseas tour, but not for duty in Washington. Since his background has been entirely in the general collection field, and since he has no substantive training, it is difficult to conceive of such an overseas position. He is eminently suited to continue in his present assignment.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL NOV 1 1965 ... ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

No further training or experience planned or considered necessary, with the exception of periodic meetings of the CD/OO field chiefs.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

See Section G(4) above.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
- X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
- 1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
- 2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
- 3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
- 4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
- 5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	3	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	3	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
5	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	4	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
[illegible]	William	P., Jr.	22 Oct 1900	M	OC

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
Operations/Contact/New Orleans Office	IO (Contact)

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-15	9 September 1956	9/9/55 - 9/8/56

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)				
		INITIAL	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR	SPECIAL (Specify)
	X	ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE	

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS [X] HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT: Subject is stationed in Louisiana.

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
7 Nov 56	E. M. Ashcraft (signature) E. M. ASHCRAFT	Chief, Contact Division

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

BY [initials] DATE 11-13-56
Posted For Control
Reviewed by [initials] 11/15

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
8 [illegible]	George G. Carey (signature) GEORGE G. CAREY	Assistant Director for Operations

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: **5**

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY. HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY. OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during the rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of that specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE	CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
GIVING LECTURES	DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS	PREPARES SUMMARIES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS	TRANSLATES GERMAN
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	MANAGES FILES	DEBRIEFING SOURCES
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	OPERATES RADIO	KEEPS BOOKS
TYPING	COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES	DRIVES TRUCK
TAKING DICTATION	WRITES REGULATIONS	MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
SUPERVISING	PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE	EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
NOV 13 2 23 PM '56
MAIL ROOM

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NUMBER
NO. 1: Management of domestic field office.	6	NO. 4: Obtaining the effective support of non-governmental sources and contacts in his area.	6
NO. 2: Analysis of assigned area for intelligence potential.	6	NO. 5: Liaison with Federal and local agencies and officials in his area.	4
NO. 3: The planning and carrying out of effective intelligence collection.	6	NO. 6: Support of other elements of CIA in his area.	3

D. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

The ability to obtain high degree of cooperation from important industrial and educational sources in his area; ability to plan and direct the operations of his office with efficiency and exceptionally high standards; complete integrity. This integrity, coupled with a somewhat legalistic approach to many problems, tends to make him somewhat inflexible in his approach to the sometimes unusual requirements of Intelligence, particularly when they concern clandestine matters.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? [ ] YES [X] NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
BURKE William P., Jr.	22 Oct 1900	M	OC

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
Operations/Contact/New Orleans Office	IO (Contact)

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-15	9 September 1956	9/9/55 - 9/8/56

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): INITIAL [ ] ; ANNUAL [X] ; REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [ ] ; REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [ ] ; SPECIAL (Specify) [ ]

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
7 Nov 56	E. M. Ashcraft (signature) E. M. ASHCRAFT	Chief, Contact Division

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
8 ... 1956	George G. Carey (signature) GEORGE G. CAREY	Assistant Director for Operations

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: **2**

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? [X] Yes [ ] No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER:
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	3	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	3	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

SECRET

(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

70

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

He has indicated his unwillingness to leave the New Orleans area, he is eminently fitted to continue in his present job and, with the possible exception of logistics, it is difficult to conceive of another area in CIA to which he would readily adapt.

MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

No further training or experience planned or considered necessary, with the exception of periodic meetings of the CD/OO field chiefs.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

See Section G (4) above.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
- X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
- 1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
- 2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
- 3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
- 4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
- 5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15 RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	3	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	3	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
5	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	4	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in agency personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The agency selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career service; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

CODED

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

TO THE SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

annual 9-9-56 next report due

BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control WR	OCT 18 1955
Reviewed by FIO	GC 10/20/55

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I (To be filled in by Administrative Officer)

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. CAREER DESIGNATION
BURKE, William P., Jr.	22 Oct 1900	M	OC

5. DATE OF ENTRANCE ON DUTY	6. OFFICE ASSIGNED TO	7. DIVISION	8. BRANCH
9 September 1947	Operations	Contact	New Orleans Office

9. NATURE OF ASSIGNMENT	10. IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION:	11. GRADE
☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD	New Orleans, Louisiana	GS-15

12. DATE THAT THIS REPORT IS DUE	13. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
9 September 1955	9/9/54 - 9/8/55

SECTION II (To be filled in by Supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION
Chief, New Orleans Office GS-0132.21-15	19 September 1948

3. WHAT SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO HIM DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency):

The active management of a major domestic field office. This includes: (1) the supervision and direction of the professional and clerical personnel of that office; (2) within the broad directives of the Contact Division, the assessment of the intelligence capability of his assigned area, the conduct of methodical exploitation of the intelligence sources within his area, and the maintenance of close and effective relationship with Contact Division Headquarters for the purpose of directing local exploitation along the lines of current requirements and priorities; (3) the effective support of all elements of the Agency, required within his area; and (4) the maintenance of all Federal, State and local liaisons necessary to the accomplishment of his mission.

READ THE ENTIRE FORM BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLETE ANY ITEM

SECTION III

I certify that, during the latter half of the period covered by this report, I have discussed with the rated individual the manner in which he has performed his job and provided suggestions and criticisms wherever needed. I believe that his understanding of my evaluation of his performance is consistent with my evaluation of him as evidenced by this fitness report and I have informed him of his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness. If performance during the report period has been unsatisfactory, there is attached a copy of the memorandum notifying him of unsatisfactory performance.

This report ☐ has ☑ has not been shown to the individual rated.

THIS DATE	NAME AND SIGNATURE OF RATER (Employee's immediate supervisor)
5 October 55	E. M. Ashcraft — E. M. ASHCRAFT

I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT (Comments, if any, are reflected by attached memorandum)

THIS DATE	NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (Official next higher in line of authority)
6 Oct 55	George G. Carey — GEORGE G. CAREY

FORM NO. 45 1 JAN 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET (4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at each statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have a definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	NOT OBSERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES: A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
SAMPLES: B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.											X			
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.											X			
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.												X		
4. HAS INITIATIVE.											X			
5. UNEMOTIONAL.								X						
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.												X		
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.											X			
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.								X						
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.										X				
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.										X				
11. CALM.								X						
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.							X							
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.											X			
14. GETS THINGS DONE.												X		
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.											X			
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.												X		
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.													X	
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.											X			
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.												X		
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.											X			
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.											X			
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.								X						
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.									X					
24. EVEN DISPOSITION								X						
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT											X			

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.											X			
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.									X					
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".										X				
29. TOUGH MINDED.											X			
30. OBSERVANT.												X		
31. CAPABLE.												X		
32. CLEAR THINKING.											X			
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.											X			
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.	X													
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.												X		
36. DELIBERATE.											X			
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.										X				
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.							X							
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.									X					
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.										X				
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.											X			
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.											X			
43. HAS DRIVE.											X			
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.													X	
45. VERSATILE.										X				
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.										X				
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.											X			
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.												X		
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.												X		
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.												X		

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Complete integrity, high standards of behavior and accomplishment, the ability to induce cooperation at a high level, experience in domestic collection.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

Somewhat inflexibly high moral and ethical standards.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS.

Integrity and general competence.

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? [X] NO [ ] YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

None, beyond periodic visits to Division headquarters.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

See B above.

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

- [ ] 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
- [ ] 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
- [ ] 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
- [ ] 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
- [X] 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
- [ ] 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? [X] NO [ ] YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

- [ ] 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
- [ ] 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
- [ ] 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
- [ ] 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- [ ] 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- [ ] 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

None applicable. He is capable of greater responsibilities in certain areas

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the agency.*

- [ ] 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE AGENCY AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
- [ ] 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY... IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
- [ ] 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS.. WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
- [ ] 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY IS INDIFFERENT ... HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
- [ ] 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY ..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR AGENCY..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
- [ ] 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
- [X] 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE AGENCY.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

- [ ] 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
- [ ] 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
- [ ] 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
- [ ] 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE AGENCY.
- [X] 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
- [ ] 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AGENCY.
- [ ] 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE AGENCY.

SECRET

SECRET

ISSUED IN LIEU OF FORM 50

NATURE OF ACTION CHANGE IN OCCUPATIONAL CODE AND/OR TITLE.

EFFECTIVE DATE 31 MARCH 1955

POSITION TITLE	NEW CODE	NAME	POSITION NUMBER	
IO-CONTACT-CH	GS-0132.21	BURKE WILLIAM P JR	K 195	10177

APPROVED HARRISON G. REYNOLDS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

14-00000

WILLIAM P. BURKE
Post Office Box 1016
New Orleans, La.

6 December 1954

Mr. C. F. Camp
Chief, Personnel Procurement
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Camp:

I am today in receipt of your letter of 1 December 1954 concerning Mr. Clapp's visit and Mr. McBride.

I was not in New Orleans at the time when Mr. Clapp was here and accordingly did not have the pleasure of seeing him.

I am sorry that Mr. Clapp did not succeed in making contact with Mr. McBride. If I happen to learn of a more recent address of Mr. McBride, I shall pass the information on to you.

Very truly yours,

[signature]

William P. Burke

WPB/gn

DD/P - 1-1931-b

SEP 16 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT: Commendation of DD/I Personnel

1. For the past several months my office has had an urgent and a continuing need for intelligence about Guatemala -- for intelligence in such variety that at one time or another almost every DD/I component contributed.

2. Each of them -- offices as well as individuals within the DD/I area -- responded with a highly impressive alacrity and completeness. Their contributions were thorough in their coverage and fast in their preparation.

3. It is difficult to cite the work of particular individuals and components of DD/I, because much inconspicuous but essential labor must never have come to my attention. Risking the chance that such work might unfairly go unrecognized, I nevertheless believe that the work of the following individuals and units deserves special recognition:

John M. Armstrong, Milton H. Brown, Archie C. Bush and David L. Campa, OCI.

Miss Dorothy A. Brandan, William P. Burke, Hunter C. Leake and Lloyd A. Ray, New Orleans field office, OO/C.

William Buchanan, Kansas City field office, OO/C.

Miss Betty Didcoct and David F. Haley, Geography Division, ORR.

Norman E. Greenawalt, Charles D. Stockton, Milton S. Venezky and Robert J. Voskuil, Cartography Division, ORR.

Zygmund Lenchert, Richard V. Shamo and John E. Wilson, Photo Intelligence Division, ORR.

Harry A. McCrea and David R. McLean, OO/C.

Lawrence Snitzer, New York field office, OO/C.

Office of Research and Reports which put its major resources at our disposal. ORR's geographic research area freely gave us the time of trained cartographers and interpreters. Without their skills, and the endless hours they applied those skills for us, our operations would have been most difficult. ORR's economic research area contributed less only because we asked for less; economic intelligence was not as vital as geographic intelligence to this operation. In addition, the major economic contribution was recognized and commended in my 7 June 1954 memorandum to you.

Foreign Broadcast Information Division which monitored Guatemalan and related broadcasts with more than its usual care, and, among other special activities, arranged a direct wire service so that our field headquarters unit received the monitored broadcasts immediately. The entire division turned to its task with such unity that singling out for commendation the work of any of its people is impossible.

Foreign Documents Division which gave us translations quickly and in the priority needed. Its service was the more remarkable for its lack of a Western Hemisphere unit. Initiative, flexibility, and willingness were substituted for this organizational lack.

Contact Division which provided a wide variety of services we requested, and on its own initiative proposed other useful services. It redoubled collection of Central American intelligence information by its net-work of domestic field stations, it carefully watched the southern ports of entry into the United States on a 24-hour day basis, it provided us with commercial news clipping services and the texts of news broadcasts, and it located, surveilled and in many cases interviewed Guatemalans within the United States in whom we were interested.

CIA Library, especially its Book Branch. All components, however contributed. Its clipping service was reliable, alert, and keen to render maximum service. The Information Section promptly handled numerous spot requests and gave resourceful assistance well beyond the confines of its routine duties. The Book Branch surveyed periodical and scholarly literature meticulously, and thus uncovered much information useful to a psychological campaign.

Graphics Register whose Photo Branch and Film Branch both gave services much beyond the normal course of duty, and showed ingenuity in locating and preparing special materials.

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SEP 28 1954
BY: [illegible] DATE

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	2. GRADE	3. POSITION TITLE
BURKE,	William	P., Jr.	GS-15	Intelligence Officer (Chief) CD-OO

4. OFFICE	STAFF OR DIVISION	BRANCH	DEPT'L. / FIELD	IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION
DDI/OO	Contact	New Orleans	[x] Field	

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT: From 9/9/53 To 9/8/54

6. TYPE OF REPORT: [ ] Initial [X] Annual [ ] Special [ ] Reassignment [ ] Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

General and detailed supervision, direction and support of the activities of personnel attached to the New Orleans Office, with a view to insuring the highest standard of professional and clerical performance and the most complete coverage of the area within this office's jurisdiction. Interpretation and implementation of policies originated by higher echelons. Maintenance of liaison with field installations of other IAC agencies for the purpose of effecting coordination of domestic intelligence collection. Collection and reporting of positive foreign intelligence information from domestic nongovernmental sources. Provision of support to other components of CIA.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
None			

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

In the type of work in which I am presently engaged.

10.

31 August 1954 — DATE

W P Burke Jr — SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

He performs these duties conscientiously and efficiently.

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1952

SECRET

(Over) (4)

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

By the maintenance of his office and official relationships in an area of peculiar traditional independence and integrity, on a firm and high level.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

To continuing his present efforts to reach a broader understanding of the whole intelligence problem, both within CIA and in the IAC complex. To a more tolerant approach to support problems.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

He is capable of greater responsibilities now.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

No.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

None, other than periodic visits to OO/C headquarters.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

24 Sept. 54 — DATE

[signature] — SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

27 Sept '54 — DATE

George G. Carey — SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

PLEASE READ INSTRUCTION SHEET BEFORE PREPARING THIS FORM

STATEMENT OF FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SERVICE

BURKE, William F. Jr.

OFFICE	DIVISION
OO	Contact
BRANCH	SECTION
	New Orleans Off.

I. FEDERAL CIVILIAN SERVICE (BEGIN WITH THIS AGENCY AND FOLLOW IN REVERSE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER)

AGENCY	LOCATION	FROM			TO			TOTAL SERVICE		
		DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.
Central Intelligence Agency	New Orleans, La.	✓	9	1947	5	6	52	27	3	4
Total Civilian Service										

II MILITARY SERVICE (INCLUDE ONLY PERIODS OF ACTIVE DUTY; DO NOT INCLUDE TERMINAL LEAVE)

BRANCH OF SERVICE	FROM			TO			TOTAL SERVICE		
	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.
U S Marine Corps (Reserve)	8	9	1942	31	10	1945	26	1	1
Total Military Service							24	1	1

III CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that the above Civilian and Military service is complete and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

11 Dec 1951.
DATE

W. F. Burke Jr.
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

IV REMARKS: (CONCERNING ABOVE SERVICE)

V FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE ONLY

TOTAL CREDITABLE SERVICE

DAYS	MONTHS	YEARS
23	5	7

MAY BE CONTINUED ON NON-DETACHABLE REVERSE SIDE

1. Agency and organizational designation: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OO [illegible] New Orleans Office
2. Pay roll period: [illegible]
3. Block No. 4238
4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name: Mr. William P. Burkes Jr
6. Grade and salary: GS-15 $10,750.00

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	TAX	RET.	BOND			NET PAY
7. Previous normal										
8. New normal										
9. Pay this period										

10. Remarks:

PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE
EFFECTIVE 24 OCT. 1951
SALARY ADJUSTED TO $ 11,800.00

11. Appropriation(s)

12. Prepared by

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase. ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. (a) Efficiency rating is good or better than good and service and conduct requirements certified: (b) [signature] (Signature of Other Authentication)	19. Suspense date
9/16/51	3/19/50	$10,750.00	$11,000.00		10/12/51

20. LWOP date (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)
Period(s):

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP [illegible] .... Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126a
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Feb. 3, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

10/11/51

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

NOTICE OF CHANGE IN POSITION SLOTTING AND OR CHANGE IN POSITION DESIGNATION

NO CHANGE IN GRADE IS INVOLVED

DATE OF T O APPROVAL 6 FEB 1952
EFF DATE OF POSITION SLOTTING 24 MARCH 52

OO CONTACT DIVISION

NAME & TITLE	PERSONS GRADE SERIES			POSITION NUMBER
BURKE WILLIAM P IO CHIEF	GS	132	15	K195
RAY LLOYD ANTHONY INTEL OFFICER	GS	132	14	K196
LEAKE HUNTER C II INTEL OFFICER	GS	132	14	K19601
BRANDAO DOROTHY A ADM ASSISTANT	GS	301	7	K197
LATNO JOAN MGT INTEL OFFICER	GS	132	7	K198
NAGEL GERTRUDE G SECRETARY STENO	GS	318	5	K199
DUFFY GLADYS E SECRETARY STENO	GS	318	5	K19901
ANDERSON MAY HELEN CLERK STENOGRAPHER	GS	312	4	K200

HOUSTON OFFICE

NAME & TITLE	PERSONS GRADE SERIES			POSITION NUMBER
RISCHE ERNEST A IO CHIEF	GS	132	15	K201
HAYNES BEN P INTEL OFFICER	GS	132	14	K202
IVES GEORGE O INTEL OFFICER	GS	132	13	K203

14-00000

Public Law 513, approved May 13, 1950, 81st Congress (2nd Session), is quoted verbatim herewith:

"AN ACT

"To enhance further the security of the United States by preventing disclosures of information concerning the cryptographic systems and the communications intelligence activities of the United States.

"BE IT ENACTED BY THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN CONGRESS ASSEMBLED. That whoever shall knowingly and willfully communicate, furnish, transmit, or otherwise make available to an unauthorized person, or publish, or use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States any classified information (1) concerning the nature, preparation, or use of any code, cipher, or cryptographic system of the United States or any foreign government or (2) concerning the design, construction, use maintenance, or repair of any device, apparatus, or appliance used or prepared or planned for use by the United States or any foreign government for cryptographic or communication intelligence purposes; or (3) concerning the communication intelligence activities of the United States or any foreign government, or (4) obtained by the processes of communication intelligence from the communications of any foreign government knowing the same to have been obtained by such processes, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

"Sec 2. (a) The term 'classified information' as used herein shall be construed to mean information which, at the time of a violation under this Act, is, for reasons of national security, specifically designated by a United States Government Agency for limited or restricted dissemination or distribution

"(b) The terms 'code' cipher', and 'cryptographic system' as used herein shall be construed to include in their meanings, in additions to their usual meanings, any method of secret writing and any mechanical or electrical device or method used for the purpose of disguising or concealing the contents, significance, or meanings of communications.

"(c) The term 'foreign government' as used herein shall be construed to include in its meaning any person or persons acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of any faction, party, department, agency, bureau, or military force of or within a foreign country, or for or on behalf of any government or any person or persons purporting to act as a government within a foreign country, whether or not such government is recognized by the United States.

"(d) The term 'communication intelligence' as used herein shall be construed to mean all procedures and methods used in the interception of communications and the obtaining of information from such communications by other than the intended recipients.

"(e) The term 'unauthorized person' as used herein shall be construed to mean any person who, or agency which, is not authorized to receive information of the categories set forth in section 1 of this Act, by the President, or by the head of a department or agency of the United States Government which is expressly designated by the President to engage in communication intelligence activities for the United States.

"Sec. 3. Nothing in this Act shall prohibit the furnishing, upon lawful demand, of information to any regulary constituted committee of the Senate or House of Representatives of the United States of America, or joint committee thereof."

I, William P. BURKE, do hereby certify that I have read, and thoroughly understand, Public Law 513, quoted above.

Signed: Wm P Burke

Date : 6 Nov. 1950

Witness : Jean M. Latona

Position: Communicator, N.D.

Date : 6 November 1950

STANDARD FORM 50 (6 PARTS)
OCTOBER 1949
PROMULGATED BY
CHAPTER 1 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

MM (gk) 130

1. NAME (MR. — MISS — MRS. — ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. William P. Burke, Jr. 101773

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 10/22/1900

3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:

4. DATE: 4/11/50

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Periodic Step Increase *

6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 3/19/50

7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: CIA Admin. Inst. 20-4 Dated 12/9/49

FROM		TO
Regional Manager GS-15 (Intelligence Officer)	8. POSITION TITLE	Regional Manager GS-15 (Intelligence Officer)
GS-15 $10500.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-15 $10750.00 per annum
Operations Contact New Orleans Office	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Operations Contact New Orleans Office
New Orleans, Louisiana	11. HEADQUARTERS	New Orleans, Louisiana
[X] FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	[X] FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL	
		X		Bu.PY-192

15. SEX: M

16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION: FROM: 2105900 TO: 529-303

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: [X] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED STATE: Louisiana

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

*Last equivalent salary increase 9/19/48

Efficiency Rating: Excellent
Approved 3/20/49

Conduct Report: Satisfactory
Dated 3/6/50

vdP 4/11/50

Andrew E. Van Esso

ANDREW E. VAN ESSO
Chief, Administrative Staff
22 SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1949

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

14-00000

Standard Form No. 51
August 1946
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Form approved.
Budget Bureau No. 50-R012

REPORT OF EFFICIENCY RATING

ADMINISTRATIVE-UNOFFICIAL ( )
OFFICIAL:
REGULAR (X) SPECIAL ( )
PROBATIONAL ( )

As of 3/19/50 based on performance during period from 3/22/49 to 3/19/50

William E. Burke, Jr. (Name of employee) Intelligence Officer GS-15 (Title of position, service, and grade)

OO, Contact (Organization—Indicate bureau, division, section, unit, field station)

ON LINES BELOW MARK EMPLOYEE		CHECK ONE:
✓ if adequate − if weak + if outstanding	1. Study the instructions in the Rating Official's Guide, C. S. C. Form No. 3823A. 2. Underline the elements which are especially important in the position. 3. Rate only on elements pertinent to the position. a. Do not rate on elements in *italics* except for employees in administrative, supervisory, or planning positions. b. Rate administrative, supervisory, and planning functions on elements in *italics*.	Administrative, supervisory, or planning ☐ All others ☐

- ____ (1) Maintenance of equipment, tools, instruments.
- ____ (2) Mechanical skill.
- ____ (3) Skill in the application of techniques and procedures.
- ____ (4) Presentability of work (appropriateness of arrangement and appearance of work).
- ✓ (5) Attention to broad phases of assignments.
- ____ (6) Attention to pertinent detail.
- ____ (7) Accuracy of operations.
- ____ (8) Accuracy of final results.
- ✓ (9) Accuracy of judgments or decisions.
- \+ (10) Effectiveness in presenting ideas or facts.
- ____ (11) Industry.
- ____ (12) Rate of progress on or completion of assignments.
- ✓ (13) Amount of acceptable work produced. (Is mark based on production records? Yes (Yes or no))
- ____ (14) Ability to organize his work.
- \+ (15) Effectiveness in meeting and dealing with others.
- ____ (16) Cooperativeness.
- ____ (17) Initiative.
- ____ (18) Resourcefulness.
- \+ (19) Dependability.
- ____ (20) Physical fitness for the work.
- \+ (21) *Effectiveness in planning broad programs.*
- ____ (22) *Effectiveness in adapting the work program to broader or related programs.*
- ____ (23) *Effectiveness in devising procedures.*
- \+ (24) *Effectiveness in laying out work and establishing standards of performance for subordinates.*
- ____ (25) *Effectiveness in directing, reviewing, and checking the work of subordinates.*
- ____ (26) *Effectiveness in instructing, training, and developing subordinates in the work.*
- ____ (27) *Effectiveness in promoting high working morale.*
- ____ (28) *Effectiveness in determining space, personnel, and equipment needs.*
- ____ (29) *Effectiveness in setting and obtaining adherence to time limits and deadlines.*
- ____ (30) *Ability to make decisions.*
- ____ (31) *Effectiveness in delegating clearly defined authority to act.*

STATE ANY OTHER ELEMENTS CONSIDERED

____ (A) ____
____ (B) ____
____ (C) ____

STANDARD Deviations must be explained on reverse side of this form	Adjective Rating
Plus marks on all underlined elements, and check marks or better on all other elements rated	Excellent
Check marks or better on all elements rated, and plus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Very Good
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and all weak performance overcompensated by outstanding performance	Good
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and all weak performance not overcompensated by outstanding performance	Fair
Minus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Unsatisfactory

Adjective Rating
Rating official.. E
Reviewing official.. E

Rated by Lyman Kirkpatrick (Signature of rating official) Chief Contact Div. (Title) 16 March 1950 (Date)

Reviewed by [signature] (Signature of reviewing official) AD/OO (Title) 20 Mar 1950 (Date)

Rating approved by efficiency rating committee 3/20/50 (Date) Report to employee E (Adjective rating)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—68177-6

PERIODIC PAY INCREASE REPORT

TO	THIS DATE
Mrs. Firmin Contact	3/2/1950

In order to determine whether the employee named below is eligible for a periodic pay increase it is necessary that his (or her) immediate supervisor execute the following "Conduct Report" and obtain the signature of the highest supervisor having knowledge of the employee's conduct.

CONDUCT REPORT

NAME OF EMPLOYEE	POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE
William P. Burke	Intell. Off. GS-15

[X] This employee's conduct has been satisfactory.

[ ] This employee's conduct has been unsatisfactory for the following reasons:

Last equivalent salary increase 9/19/48
Eff. Rating - E - 3/20/49
Effec. Date 9/19/50
2105908
529-368

F. McClellan

SIGNATURE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	DATE
Lyman Kirkpatrick	6 March 1950	[illegible]	

FORM NO. 37-105
OCT 1949

RETURN TO: PERSONNEL DIVISION
ATT: TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS BRANCH

14-00000

1949

STANDARD FORM NO. 50 PART I
UNITED STATES
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
OCTOBER 1946

FORM APPROVED
BUDGET BUREAU NO. 50-R054

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

NM (an) 130

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—FIRST—MIDDLE INITIAL—LAST)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. William P. Burke, Jr.	10/22/1900		10-28-49

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Conversion-Class. Act of 1949	10-30-49	Letter - DCI - 10-28-49

FROM		TO
Regional Manager P-8 (Intelligence Officer)	8. POSITION TITLE	Regional Manager GS-15 (Intelligence Officer)
P-8 $10,305.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, SALARY	GS-15 $10,500.00 per annum
Operations Contact New Orleans Office	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Operations Contact New Orleans Office
New Orleans, Louisiana	11. HEADQUARTERS	New Orleans, Louisiana
[x] FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	[x] FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL

13. REMARKS

R. F. McClellan

Acting Chief, Personnel Division

14. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

15. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5 PT.	10 POINT: DISAB.	WIFE	WIDOW	WWII	WWI	OTHER
	X				X		

16. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL
		X	

Bu. CP-182 MM 11/10/49

17. SEX	18. RACE	19. APPROPRIATION	20. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	21. DATE OF OATH (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	22. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 2105900 TO: 329-308	Yes		Louisiana

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1948

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

14-00000

Standard Form No. 51
August 1946
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Form approved.
Budget Bureau No. 50-R012.1

REPORT OF EFFICIENCY RATING

ADMINISTRATIVE-UNOFFICIAL ( )
OFFICIAL:
REGULAR (X) SPECIAL ( )
PROBATIONAL ( )

As of 3/19/49 based on performance during period from 9/19/48 to 3/19/49

William P. Burke, Jr. (Name of employee) — Intelligence Officer, P-8 (Title of position, service, and grade)

OO, Contact (Organization—indicate bureau, division, section, unit, field station)

ON LINES BELOW MARK EMPLOYEE		CHECK ONE:
✓ if adequate − if weak + if outstanding	1. Study the instructions in the Rating Official's Guide, C. S. C. Form No. 3823A. 2. Underline the elements which are especially important in the position. 3. Rate only on elements pertinent to the position. a. Do not rate on elements in *italics* except for employees in administrative, supervisory, or planning positions. b. Rate administrative, supervisory, and planning functions on elements in *italics*.	Administrative, supervisory, or planning ☐ All others ☐

...... (1) Maintenance of equipment, tools, instruments.
...... (2) Mechanical skill.
...... (3) Skill in the application of techniques and procedures.
...... (4) Presentability of work (appropriateness of arrangement and appearance of work).
...... (5) Attention to broad phases of assignments.
...... (6) Attention to pertinent detail.
..+.. (7) Accuracy of operations.
..+.. (8) Accuracy of final results.
..+.. (9) Accuracy of judgments or decisions.
......(10) Effectiveness in presenting ideas or facts.
......(11) Industry.
......(12) Rate of progress on or completion of assignments.
......(13) Amount of acceptable work produced. (Is mark based on production records? .... (Yes or no))
......(14) Ability to organize his work.
..+..(15) Effectiveness in meeting and dealing with others.
..+..(16) Cooperativeness.
..+..(17) Initiative.
..+..(18) Resourcefulness.
..+..(19) Dependability.
......(20) Physical fitness for the work.

...... (21) *Effectiveness in planning broad programs.*
...... (22) *Effectiveness in adapting the work program to broader or related programs.*
...... (23) *Effectiveness in devising procedures.*
..+.. (24) *Effectiveness in laying out work and establishing standards of performance for subordinates.*
..+.. (25) *Effectiveness in directing, reviewing, and checking the work of subordinates.*
...... (26) *Effectiveness in instructing, training, and developing subordinates in the work.*
..+.. (27) *Effectiveness in promoting high working morale.*
...... (28) *Effectiveness in determining space, personnel, and equipment needs.*
...... (29) *Effectiveness in setting and obtaining adherence to time limits and deadlines.*
..+.. (30) *Ability to make decisions.*
..+.. (31) *Effectiveness in delegating clearly defined authority to act.*

STATE ANY OTHER ELEMENTS CONSIDERED

...... (A) ....
...... (B) ....
...... (C) ....

STANDARD Deviations must be explained on reverse side of this form	*Adjective Rating*
Plus marks on all underlined elements, and check marks or better on all other elements rated	Excellent
Check marks or better on all elements rated, and plus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Very Good
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and all weak performance overcompensated by outstanding performance	Good
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and all weak performance not overcompensated by outstanding performance	Fair
Minus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Unsatisfactory

	Adjective Rating
Rating official	E
Reviewing official	E

Rated by Lyman Kirkpatrick (Signature of rating official) — Chief, Contact Br. (Title) — 23 March 1949 (Date)

Reviewed by [signature] (Signature of reviewing official) — Asst. AD/OO (Title) — 24 March 1949 (Date)

Rating approved by efficiency rating committee 3-28-49 (Date) Report to employee E (Adjective rating)

ST

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—20177-4

14-00000

PHYSICAL QUALIFICATION RECORD

NAME	NATURE OF ACTION
BURKE, WILLIAM P.	E.O.D.
TITLE OF POSITION	**GRADE**
Regional Manager	P-8
DEPARTMENT OR FIELD	
Field	

Subject was found physically [xxx] fit [ ] unfit for duty with this organization in the above grade and position. 11 September 1947

RECOMMENDATIONS:

28 December 1948

DATE

[signature]

SIGNATURE OF PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS OFFICER

FORM NO. 38-57
NOV 1948

14-00000

RESTRICTED

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

NAME	CLASSIFICATION / INITIAL / DATE
William P. Burke, Jr.	[initials] 9-21-48
	VICE / IA / VV / NEW ✓ — Bu. # F-172 12-4-47

NATURE OF ACTION	QUALIFICATION & REVIEW / INITIAL / DATE
~~Transfer &~~ Promotion	[initials] 9-21-48

EFFECTIVE DATE	
19 September 1948 ~~Immediately~~	21959.0 5 29-308 Scha-45 [illegible] 9-23-48

FOR SEPARATIONS, TRANSFERS OUT, AND RESIGNATIONS LAST WORKING DAY:	APPROVED: [stamp] 1948
	Walter C. [illegible] SIGNATURE (EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR)
FOR RESIGNATIONS FROM FEDERAL SERVICE ONLY SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:	J. T. [illegible] - 15 Sept '48 SIGNATURE (EXECUTIVE FOR A&M)
	J. F. Kelly 15 Sept 48 SIGNATURE (CHIEF, PERSONNEL BRANCH)

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Asst. Regional Manager (Intelligence Officer) P-7	Regional Manager (Intelligence Officer) P-8
GRADE AND SALARY	P-7, ~~$8179.50~~ 8509.50 p.a.	P-8, $10,305.00 p.a.
OFFICE	Operations	Operations
BRANCH	Contact	Contact Br
DIVISION	Control	New Orleans Office
SECTION	Southern I.A.O.	—
OFFICIAL STATION	New Orleans, Louisiana	New Orleans, Louisiana
DEPT. OR FIELD	Field	Field 130

REMARKS:

RECOMMENDED: ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ George G. Carey

GEORGE G. CAREY
Assistant Director for Operations

DATE 15 Sept, 1948.

FORM NO. 37-3 OCT 1946

RESTRICTED

(1514)

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
UNITED STATES
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
OCTOBER 1946

FORM APPROVED
BUDGET BUREAU NO. 50-R066

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

130

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

(cs) 130

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS. FIRST-MIDDLE INITIAL-LAST)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. William P. Burke, Jr.	10/22/1900		9/17/1948

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Transfer & Promotion	9/19/1948	Schedule A-45

FROM		TO
Asst. Regional Manager P-7 (Intelligence Officer)	8. POSITION TITLE	Regional Manager P-8 (Intelligence Officer)
P-7 $8509.50 per annum Bu.#7800	9. SERVICE, GRADE, SALARY	P-8 $10,305.00 per annum
Operations Contact Control Southern I.A.O.	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Operations Contact Branch New Orleans Office
New Orleans, Louisiana	11. HEADQUARTERS	New Orleans, Louisiana
X FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	X FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. REMARKS

DOG - 09/19/48
CSEDD - 09/15/47
LCD - 09/15/47

[signature] WJK 9/24/48
WILLIAM J. KELLY
Chief, Personnel Branch
14. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

15. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT WIFE	10 POINT WIDOW	WWII	WWI	OTHER
	X				X		

16. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: Bu.#7-192 12/4/47

NEW	VICE	I A	REAL
		X	

17. SEX	18. RACE	19. APPROPRIATION	20. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO)	21. DATE OF OATH (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	22. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM 2195900 TO 529-308	Yes		Louisiana

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1948 783384

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Executive for Administration and Management DATE: SEP 15 1948

FROM : Assistant Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion of Mr. William Patrick Burke, Jr.

1. It is requested that the attached recommendation for promotion of Mr. William P. Burke, Jr. from P-7 to P-8 be approved even though Mr. Burke has not served the required time in-grade as established in Paragraph 4c of Administrative Instruction No. 20-1. This recommendation is based upon the fact he has served in his present capacity as Acting Chief, New Orleans Office, OO/C, for approximately one year and his performance of duty has been outstanding.

2. Mr. Burke entered on duty as Acting Chief, New Orleans Office, OO/C, on 9 September 1947 in which capacity he is still serving. The position of Chief, New Orleans Office, has been allocated as a P-8.

3. Subsequent to assuming his duties as Acting Chief of the New Orleans Office, Mr. Burke displayed great initiative and unusual ability in planning his organization and without any loss of time, placed it on a highly productive basis. Mr. Burke has not overlooked any possible sources of intelligence within his area, and is submitting extremely valuable reports, particularly those that pertain to Latin America. In addition, Mr. Burke's office has produced comprehensive reports on the intelligence potentialities of Houston, Texas and Tulsa, Oklahoma, convincing this office that field offices in both localities will be justified.

4. Mr. Burke's accomplishments as Acting Chief, New Orleans Office have been outstanding. Due to his unusual leadership the morale of his office personnel has been maintained at a high level, despite heavy working conditions.

5. Mr. Burke received an A.B. degree from Loyola University, New Orleans, in 1919 and LLB degrees from Harvard Law School and Tulane University in 1923 and 1925 respectively. In addition, he spent one year of study at Cambridge University, England. Upon graduation from law school, he became affiliated with various prominent law firms in New Orleans, and in 1937 established his own firm which he operated on a successful level until his entry into the military service during World War II.

6. Mr. Burke has an outstanding military record, having served approximately three years in the U. S. Marine Corps during World War II, and being honorably released from duty with the rank

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

of Major. During his tour of duty with the U. S. Marine Corps, he served in the capacity of liaison officer with Selective Service and later, as legal officer with the Fourth Marine Division in the Pacific.

7. By reason of his civilian and military experience and wide acquaintanceship in New Orleans, Mr. Burke is exceptionally well qualified for his present assignment and is performing his duties in an outstanding manner. In view of his superior accomplishments and contributions to the successful operation of the Contact Branch, it is strongly recommended that Mr. Burke's promotion to the grade of P-8 be approved.

George G. Carey

GEORGE G. CAREY

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

19 May 1948

Mr. William P. Burke
P. O. Box 1016
New Orleans, 6, Louisiana

Dear Bill:

Prior to leaving CIA, I want to record my sincere appreciation of the fine job done by you in New Orleans.

Your achievement is all the more noteworthy when it is remembered that you started in your city singlehanded and with little guidance or precedence. Within the space of less than a year, you have created an effective field office which is now making a significant contribution to national intelligence.

Inspections reveal that your relations with the local Armed Forces representatives as well as with your clients are excellent. Noted also is the high morale in your office.

Please accept my congratulations for this splendid record and accept my gratitude for your loyal support.

With best wishes for your continued success,

Very sincerely,

EDWIN L. SIBERT
Brigadier General, USA
Assistant Director for Operations

ELS:rn

cc: Personnel Files ✓
Chief, OO/C

14-00000

Standard Form No. 51, Rev.
Approved Dec. 1943
C. S. C. Dept. Cir. No. 458

Form approved
Budget Bureau No. 50-R012.
Approval expires Mar. 30, 1945.

REPORT OF EFFICIENCY RATING

ADMINISTRATIVE-UNOFFICIAL ( )
OFFICIAL:
REGULAR (✓) SPECIAL ( )
PROBATIONAL or TRIAL PERIOD ( )

As of 3/31/48 based on performance during period from 9/9/47 to 3/31/48

William F. Burke (Name of employee) Intelligence Officer P-7 (Title of position, service, and grade)

Operations, Contact (Organization—Indicate bureau, division, section, unit, field station)

ON LINES BELOW MARK EMPLOYEE		CHECK ONE:
V if adequate — if weak + if outstanding	1. Study the instructions in the Rating Official's Guide, C. S. C. Form No. 3823A. 2. Underline the elements which are especially important in the position. 3. Rate only on elements pertinent to the position. a. Do not rate on elements in italics except for employees in administrative, supervisory, or planning positions. b. Rate administrative, supervisory, and planning functions on elements in *italics*.	Administrative, supervisory, or planning ☑ All others ☐

...... (1) Maintenance of equipment, tools, instruments.
...... (2) Mechanical skill.
...... (3) Skill in the application of techniques and procedures.
...... (4) Presentability of work (appropriateness of arrangement and appearance of work).
+ (5) Attention to broad phases of assignments.
...... (6) Attention to pertinent detail.
...... (7) Accuracy of operations.
...... (8) Accuracy of final results.
+ (9) Accuracy of judgments or decisions.
+ (10) Effectiveness in presenting ideas or facts.
...... (11) Industry.
...... (12) Rate of progress on or completion of assignments.
...... (13) Amount of acceptable work produced. (Is mark based on production records? ....) (Yes or no)
...... (14) Ability to organize his work.
+ (15) Effectiveness in meeting and dealing with others.
...... (16) Cooperativeness.
...... (17) Initiative.
+ (18) Resourcefulness.
+ (19) Dependability.
...... (20) Physical fitness for the work.

+ (21) *Effectiveness in planning broad programs.*
...... (22) *Effectiveness in adapting the work program to broader or related programs.*
...... (23) *Effectiveness in devising procedures.*
+ (24) *Effectiveness in laying out work and establishing standards of performance for subordinates.*
+ (25) *Effectiveness in directing, reviewing, and checking the work of subordinates.*
+ (26) *Effectiveness in instructing, training, and developing subordinates in the work.*
+ (27) *Effectiveness in promoting high working morale.*
+ (28) *Effectiveness in determining space, personnel, and equipment needs.*
...... (29) *Effectiveness in setting and obtaining adherence to time limits and deadlines.*
+ (30) *Ability to make decisions.*
...... (31) *Effectiveness in delegating clearly defined authority to act.*

STATE ANY OTHER ELEMENTS CONSIDERED

...... (A) ....
...... (B) ....
...... (C) ....

STANDARD
Deviations must be explained on reverse side of this form

	Adjective rating
Plus marks on all underlined elements, and no minus marks	Excellent
Plus marks on at least half of the underlined elements, and no minus marks	Very good
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and any minus marks overcompensated by plus marks	Good
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and minus marks not overcompensated by plus marks	Fair
Minus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Unsatisfactory

	Adjective rating
Rating official	E
Reviewing official	E

Rated by [signature] (Signature of rating official) Chief F/D (Title) .... (Date)

Reviewed by Lyman Kirkpatrick (Signature of reviewing official) Deputy Ch/ Intell. Br. (Title) 1 April 1948 (Date)

Rating approved by efficiency rating committee 5/3/... (Date) Report to employee E (Adjective rating)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—28177-8

16856

Assistant Director for Operations 9 October 1947

Executive Director

Identification for Contact Specialists

1. Attached are:

a. Three original letters of introduction dated 9 October 1947, signed by the Director of Central Intelligence, registration number 104, copy 1 - 3, to be issued to Mr. William P. Burke, Jr., Chief of the New Orleans office of your Contact Branch, and copies 4 and 5 for record purposes.

b. Three original letters of introduction dated 9 October 1947, signed by the Director of Central Intelligence, registration number 105, copy 1 - 3, to be issued to Mr. Jay B. L. Reeves, Chief of the Pittsburgh office of your Contact Branch, and copies 4 and 5 for record purposes.

c. Three original letters of introduction dated 9 October 1947, signed by the Director of Central Intelligence, registration number 106, copy 1 - 3, to be issued to Mr. Harrison G. Reynolds, Chief of the Boston office of your Contact Branch, and copies 4 and 5 for record purposes.

d. Sample of letter of introduction to be used in connection with above letters, to be written and signed in each case by the field office chief concerned.

2. The Assistant Director for Operations may request additional similar letters when new field offices of the Contact Branch are established and when field office chiefs are changed.

3. Instructions relative to accounting for the registered letters signed by the Director will be issued to you direct from the Central Records Division of the Services Branch, A&M.

4. The Chief, Personnel Branch, A&M, will place a notation with the personnel records of each field office chief to whom these letters are issued, and will be responsible that these individuals are not reassigned or separated until these registered letters have been accounted for and withdrawn for destruction.

5. The Assistant Director for Operations and the Executive for Inspection and Security will cause such inspections to be made of the use of these means of identification as will insure maintenance of adequate security in connection therewith.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

L. T. SHANNON
~~Acting Executive Director~~ Exec for A&M.

4 Enclosures
1. Ltr from DCI re William P. Burke (copies 1-5)
2. Ltr from DCI re J[illegible] L. Reeves (copies 1-5)
3. Ltr from DCI re H[illegible]on G. Reynolds (copies 1-5)
4. Sample ltr of intr[illegible]tion to be used by chiefs of [illegible]

cc: Chief, Pers Br.
cc: Chief, Svcs Br (for C.R.)
cc: Exec for I&S

14-00000

12 September 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief, Personnel Branch
Executive for A & M

SUBJECT: Detail of William P. Burke, Jr.

REFERENCE: 37-3, "Personnel Action Request," dated 10 July 1947

It is hereby requested that your records be marked to show that Mr. Burke has been designated Acting Manager of the New Orleans Interagency Office. It is not intended to recruit anyone against the P-8 Manager position.

Hayden Channing
HAYDEN CHANNING
Executive Officer
Contact Branch

14-00000

AFFIDAVIT

STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
(DEPT. OR ESTAB.) ______________ (BUREAU OR OFFICE)

WASHINGTON, D. C.
(PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT)

I, WILLIAM P. BURKE, JR. , DO HEREBY SWEAR (OR AFFIRM) THAT I AM NOT ENGAGED IN ANY STRIKE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THAT I WILL NOT SO ENGAGE WHILE AN EMPLOYEE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; THAT I AM NOT A MEMBER OF AN ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES THAT ASSERTS THE RIGHT TO STRIKE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, AND THAT I WILL NOT WHILE A GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE BECOME A MEMBER OF SUCH AN ORGANIZATION.

W. P. Burke, Jr.
(SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE OR APPOINTEE)

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS 11th ~~ninth~~ DAY OF September, 19 47 AT Washington, STATE OF D. C.

Elizabeth Morrison
Appointment Clerk

Chapter 145, Title II, Sec. 206
Act of June 26, 1943

FORM NO. 37-24
SEP 1946

(1590)

14-00000

Standard Form No. 61a
Approved January 28, 1941
U. S. Civil Service Commission
C. S. C. Dept. Cir. No. 409

OATH OF OFFICE, AFFIDAVIT, AND DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP (Department or Establishment) ________ (Bureau or Division) WASHINGTON, D. C. (Place of Employment)

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I, WILLIAM P. BURKE, JR.,
Do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT

Do further swear (or affirm) that I do not advocate, nor am I a member of any political party or organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence; and that during such time as I am an employee of the Federal Government, I will not advocate nor become a member of any political party or organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence.

C. DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

Do further certify that (1) I have not paid or offered or promised to pay any money or other thing of value to any person, firm, or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment; (2) I will inform myself of and observe the provisions of the Civil Service law and rules and Executive orders concerning political activity, political assessments, etc., as quoted on the attached Information for Appointee, and [strike out either (3) or (4)]

(3) the answers given by me in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this sheet are true and correct;

~~(4) the answers contained in my Application for Federal Employment, Form No. ...., dated ...., 19...., filed with the above-named department or establishment, which I have reviewed, are true and correct as of this date, except for the following (if necessary, use additional sheet; if no exceptions write "none"; if (4) is executed, the reverse of this sheet need not be used):~~

W. P. Burke Jr.
(Signature of Appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this ~~10th~~ 11th day of September A. D., 19 47

at Washington (City), D. C. (State)

[SEAL] Chapter 145, Title II, Sec. 206 Act of June 26, 1943

Elizabeth Morrison
(Signature of Officer)

Appointment Clerk
(Title)

NOTE.—If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown

16—32804-2

9 September 1947 (Date of Entrance on Duty) — Asst. Regional Manager, P-7, $5179.50 (Position to which appointed) — 23 Oct 1900 (Date of Birth)

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form, if required, is to be completed before entrance on duty. Every question must be answered. Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancelation of application or dismissal after appointment. False personation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. Present Address 6300 St. Charles Avenue, New Orleans 15 La.
(Street and Number) (City and State)

2. Who should be notified in case of emergency? Mrs Wm P. Burke — wife
(Name) (Relationship)
6300 St. Charles Ave New Orleans La
(Street and Number) (City and State)

3. Does the U. S. Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (either by blood or marriage) with whom you live or have lived within the past 6 months? Yes or No? NO If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 12.

Name	Post office address (Give street number, if any)	(1) Bureau and (2) Temporary or not, (3) Department or office in which employed	Relationship	Married or single	Age
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

4. Place of birth New Orleans La
(Town) (State or Country)

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	Yes	No
5. Are you a citizen of the United States?	X	
6. If foreign born, have you furnished proof of naturalization or citizenship to (1) the U. S. Civil Service Commission?		X
(2) this agency in connection with this appointment?		X
7. Since you filed application resulting in this appointment, has there been any change in the status of your citizenship or of the persons through whom you gained your citizenship?		X
8. (a) Do you hold any position or office under the United States or any State, Territory, County, or Municipality? If so, state the place, position, and salary under Item 12.	X	
(b) Are you willing to resign such position or office if it becomes necessary to do so in order to hold the Federal position?	X	
9. Do you receive any pension or other benefit for military or naval service or an annuity from the U. S. or D. C. Government under any Retirement Act? If so, give details under Item 12 stating whether you were retired for age, length of service, or disability; amount of retirement pay and under what retirement act, and rank, if retired from military or naval service.		X
10. Since you filed application resulting in this appointment, have you been discharged for misconduct or unsatisfactory service, or forced to resign from any position? If so, give under Item 12 where employed, name and address of employer and the reason for discharge in each case.		X
11. Since you filed application resulting in this appointment, have you been arrested, or summoned into any civil or military court as a defendant, or indicted for or convicted of any offense (felony or misdemeanor)? If so, for each case give under Item 12 (1) the date, (2) the name and location of the court, (3) the nature of the offense or violation, and (4) the penalty, if any, imposed, or other disposition.		X

12. Space for detailed answers to other questions.

ITEM NO.	Write in left column numbers of items to which detailed answers apply
8	U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
	Inactive duty status

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable civil-service rules, the War Service Regulations, and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, purchase of office, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, promise to observe provisions regarding political activity, and particularly for the following:

(1) **Identity of appointee** with the applicant whose appointment was authorized. The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and/or other pertinent papers. The physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) **Age.**—If discrepancy exists between the date of birth and that on application, and if definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment.

(3) **Citizenship.**—The responsibility for observance of provisions of appropriation acts prohibiting or restricting the employment of [illegible] rests with the appointing officer. The Civil Service Commission indicates on applications showing foreign birth that citizenship has been verified. The appointing officer should verify citizenship if the list of eligibles or the letter of authority from the Commission makes the appointment subject to proof of citizenship, or if the application shows foreign birth but does not indicate on its face that citizenship has been proved. If the answer to question 4 of this form shows foreign birth and the application shows birth in the United States, the case should be referred to the Civil Service Commission.

(4) **Members of Family.**—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of the family in the classified service, no other member of such family is eligible for appointment in that service. Minors do not establish a different family merely by living at an address different from that of the parents. Doubtful cases involving more than two members of family, including all pertinent evidence, should be referred to the Civil Service Commission or its duly authorized representatives for decision. Under War Service Regulations, the members of family provision does not apply to temporary appointments for one year or less.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—33304-1

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
UNITED STATES
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
OCTOBER 1946

FORM APPROVED
BUDGET BUREAU NO. 50-R084

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

MI(gv)

130

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-FIRST-MIDDLE INITIAL-LAST)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. William P. Burke, Jr.	10/22/1900		9 September 1947

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Excepted Appointment	9/9/1947	Schedule A-20

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Assistant Regional Manager P-7 (Intelligence Officer)
	9. SERVICE GRADE, SALARY	P-7 $5179.50 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Operations Contact Control Southern I.A.O.
	11. HEADQUARTERS	New Orleans, Louisiana
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. REMARKS

No-Strike Affidavit has been properly executed.

This appointment is made subject to the satisfactory completion of a trial period of one year.

Pay Adj 7/11/48

WILLIAM J. KELLY
Acting Chief, Personnel Branch

14. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

15. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT WIFE	10 POINT WIDOW	WWII	WWI	OTHER
X					X		

16. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL
	X		

Bu. #P-~~21.04~~ 200.
3/2/47

17. SEX	18. RACE	19. APPROPRIATION	20. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO)	21. DATE OF OATH (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	22. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 2185900.001 528-143 TO	Yes	11 September 1947	Louisiana

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1947

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

Investigation Report

Date: 28 August 1947

Number: 32458

Subject: [illegible], William [illegible]., Jr.

To: Chief, Personnel Branch

1. Investigation directed by: [illegible]

2. Sources of information:

3. Remarks

4. Recommendation:

SECURITY APPROVAL RECOMMENDED, THOUGH SUBJECT TO THE RECEIPT OF DEROGATORY INFORMATION AT SOME FUTURE DATE. INTERVIEW WAIVED

60 UNLESS THE APPLICANT ENTERS UPON DUTY WITHIN [illegible] DAYS FROM ABOVE DATE, THIS APPROVAL BECOMES INVALID.

By [signature]
Security Officer
ERMAL P. GEISS ✓

jm

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-101
DEC 1946

14-00000

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

NAME: William P. Burke, Jr.	BUDGET: 2185900.001 / 5-28-143 — INITIAL / DATE 8-8-47, 9-2-47
NATURE OF ACTION: ~~New~~ Excepted Appointment	CLASSIFICATION — INITIAL / DATE 8-6-47
EFFECTIVE DATE: ~~3~~ 9 September 1947	VICE / IA / VV / NEW — Au # F-21.14 3/1/47
FOR SEPARATIONS, TRANSFERS OUT, AND RESIGNATIONS LAST WORKING DAY:	EMPLOYMENT — INITIAL / DATE 7/28/47
FOR RESIGNATIONS FROM FEDERAL SERVICE ONLY SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:	Schedule A-20 — CHIEF, PERSONNEL DIV — INITIAL / DATE 8/5/47

	FROM	TO
TITLE		asst ~~Acting~~ Regional Manager (Intelligence Officer)
GRADE AND SALARY		P-7 @ $179.50
OFFICE		Operations
BRANCH		Contact
DIVISION		Control
SECTION		~~W.I.A.O.~~ Southern R.A.O.
OFFICIAL STATION		New Orleans, La. ~~Washington, D. C.~~
DEPT. OR FIELD		Field

REMARKS: * According to travel regulations. Secy. 7/21

Forms 38-1, 57, copy of Priority Request letters attached.

No Control

Approved for appointment in grade P-7 at entrance salary of $8179.50 subject to security clearance.

FOR THE DCI:

advised branch 8-29
branch O.K. 8-29

WALTER C. FORD
Captain, USN
Executive Director

RECOMMENDED: OFFICE CHIEF, BRANCH CHIEF, OR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER	DATE
For Hayden Channing [signature]	7-10-47

FORM NO 37-3
OCT 1946

(1514)

WILLIAM P. BURKE

6300 St. Charles Avenue, New Orleans 15, La.

6 July 47 11 July 47

CONTACT: Invited to Washington for interview & introductory course

5 1/4 days	$6.00	31.50
Fr: New Orleans, La. to D.C. & return		92.35
Taxi from station to hotel & return		.40
		$124.25

10 JULY 1947

JAMES H. DIXON, CHIEF
ADMINISTRATION & SERVICES

DONALD V. MULCAHY, CHIEF
PERSONNEL PROCUREMENT SECTION

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

9 July 1947

MEMORANDUM: Executive for Inspections and Security

SUBJECT: William Patrick Burke, Jr.

In compliance with CIG Directive 15 and with authority from the Projects Review Committee, this branch will open an Inter Agency Office in New Orleans, Louisiana as soon as the necessary personnel may be processed for employment. This Southeastern area of the United States represents a fertile field for the operations of the Contact Branch and it is deemed advisable to open a New Orleans office at the earliest possible date.

Mr. William Patrick Burke, a native of New Orleans, a graduate of Harvard and Tulane University Law Schools and a former Major in the U. S. Marine Corps is under consideration for employment as the Acting Regional Manager for this office. In order that his employment may be effected in the shortest possible time, it is respectfully requested that a priority security investigation be granted on this individual. It is realized that the total number of allowable priority investigations is very limited, but in the instant case, the circumstances are such that the compliance with this request will measurably aid in the accomplishment of the mission of this branch.

John F. Blake
Assistant Executive Officer
Contact Branch

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

ASSIGNMENT DESCRIPTION FORM

(This form fully completed (see note * at bottom of sheet) in duplicate must accompany request for admission of candidate to Assessment or Training Classes)

Request for:
(a) Assessment XXXX
(b) Training

Candidate's name in full: WILLIAM PATRICK BURKE, Jr.

Cover name if necessary: ____ Date: July 7, 1947

Age 46 Sex M Marital Status: Married Branch: Contact Desk: Field

Specific station to which candidate is going: New Orleans, La.

For consultation call:

George B. McManus	2311	2210 E. St.	103
Branch Officer Sponsoring Candidate	Phone Extension	Bldg	Room No.

Has Security Check been completed? ____

Type of Cover: ____
(Military; Govt. Official; Professional; Business; etc.)

Title of projected assignment: (a) Contact Specialist (b) Acting Regional Manager

Civil Service classification and salary level of projected position: P-7 @ 8179.50

What will be the specific duties of the candidate? (A detailed and concrete description is essential; a general job title is not satisfactory.): Will organize and run the New Orleans Inter-agency office in the initial stages Has to establish and maintain contact with the top executives of American business, industrial and educational institutions. Must be able to sell CIG to them, gain their confidence and establish a discreet channel throug which all foreign intelligence available to those organizations can flow to his office.

What are the promotional opportunities in the projected position? Good

What will be the administrative or supervisory responsibilities of the candidate? (If none, write "none".) May eventually have to direct the activities of one P-6 and one CAF-7.

Will the candidate work alone or with other people? With others.

If the latter, how many and what will be the candidate's actual working relationship to them, e.g., closely cooperative or relatively independent? The two mentioned above. Close cooperation.

Will the candidate be working directly under a supervising officer? No

If not, how will his work be directed and reviewed? By Washington

What will be the living and working conditions under which the candidate is expected to operate? ____

* For reasons of security, details such as student's true name or specific mission may be omitted in the case of undercover personnel, if so desired by the Desk.

FORM NO. 51-1 (Edition of ... 1946 may be used)
OCT 1946

SECRET
(over)

What special qualifications do you wish the candidate tested for? Sense of security as he must live a normal life in his own home town while conducting a discreet operation. Ability to discriminate between valuable intelligence information and worthless. Ability to arrange facts cogently on paper. Tact and discretion.

What period and type of training is considered necessary for the candidate before placement in the field? About three weeks in Head Office and then Inter-Agency Offices.

What special skills or knowledge related to the job does the candidate possess?

Loyola University, New Orleans, AB, 1919, Harvard Law School, LLB, 1923. Legal banking, business and Marine Corps experience.

Indicate knowledge of foreign languages:
("Slight", "Fair", "Good")

	Read	Speak	Write
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			

The following information is required only in the case of candidates scheduled for training:

Previous background in intelligence work:

Foreign residence and foreign education

Occupational history: (job descriptions and dates only)

Signed: [illegible]

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Branch Officer Sponsoring Candidate

CONFIDENTIAL

16 June 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Deputy Director, CIG

THROUGH: Chief, Personnel Division

Subject: Assessment of William Patrick ~~Burke, Jr.~~

Reference: Procedures Governing Payment of Per Diem and Travel, Approved Under Project 00-5.

In accordance with the above referenced procedures, it is hereby requested that approval be granted for payment of per diem and travel for the purpose of bringing Mr. Burke to Washington for assessment.

Mr. Burke was recently interviewed in New Orleans by Chief, Control Division, and Chief, Field Division, of the Contact Branch of this Office and is recommended as being well qualified for the Regional Managership of the New Orleans Interagency Office. It is considered that, in view of the importance of the proposed position to the accomplishment of the Contact Branch mission, no final decision as to his employment should be made without the benefit of assessment.

This office is anxious to activate the New Orleans Interagency Office as soon as possible and requests your approval in order that an early date for Mr. Burke's visit to Washington may be made.

E. L. Sibert

E. L. SIBERT
Brigadier General, U. S. A.
Assistant Director for Operations

24 June
Approved
Edwards
Actg. Ex. Dir.

CONFIDENTIAL

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Personnel file:
Thomas B. CASASIN

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: Sources and methods

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
9.8.78	10/10	Betsy WOLF	Betsy Wolf

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

14-00000

THIS FOLDER CONTAINS ALL PERTINENT INFORMATION/DOCUMENTS FROM CASASIN'S (P) PERSONNEL FOLDER FOR PERIOD 1955-1962. (IN MID 1962 CASASIN WENT OVERSEAS.)

14-00000

casasin

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART

SERIAL NO.		DATE OF BIRTH	EOD DATE
2		Jan 1924	20 Nov 1949

MARITAL STATUS	DEPENDENTS		US NATURALIZATION DATE(S)
Married	3	1923 1950 1953	NA NA

CAREER STAFF STATUS	MEMBERSHIP	OTHER STATUS	LAST MED. EVAL. QUAL. FOR	QUAL. FOR
	Jul 1954		Jul 1962 PCS C/S	PCS C/S

CURRENT RESERVE STATUS	NONE SERVICE	GRADE	ACTIVE DUTY	RELEASE	RETIRED
	X				

ASSESSMENT DATE	PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE	LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE
None	None	None

NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1943-48 Military Service, US Army, 1st Lt. - Civil Censorship Officer, Japanese Translator & Instructor, Liaison Officer
1949 Guido Publishing Co, Baltimore, Md - County Editor of weekly paper
1949 Baltimore Housing Authority, Md - Administrative Officer

NON-CIA EDUCATION

942 Trinity College, Conn - French
1940-42 Sir George Williams College, Montreal, Canada - French
1945 Univ of Michigan, Army Language School - BA(1947), Oriental Civilization, Japanese
1951-52 Georgetown Univ Graduate School - International Relations

FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)

French - R, P, S, U, High; W, Inter(Feb 1962); Trans & Interp Aug 1957
Japanese - P, S, U, Inter(Mar 1962); R, W, Elem; Trans & Interp Aug 1957

AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1949-50 [redacted]
1950 [redacted]
1950 [redacted]
1950 [redacted]
1954 [redacted]
1954 [redacted]
1954 [redacted]
1954 [redacted]
1960 Cland Serv Review
1962 [illegible]
1962 [illegible] Writer's Inst
1962 French

CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE - OCCUPATIONAL CODE	GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
[redacted]					
[illegible] 1955	[illegible] Ops Off				
Jan 1955	" " "	0136.01	14	DI	DDP/SR/FE Area	Tokyo
[illegible] 1960	Ops Off	0136.01	14	D	DDP/SR/Ch, Br 6	HQ
Sep 1962	" "	0136.01	14	D	DDP/SR/FE Area	
[redacted]					

DATE REV.	21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY	22. ITEMS 1-16 REVIEWED AND VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE
0 Apr 19..	[illegible]	[illegible]

14-00000

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)

SER. SERIAL NO.:

DATE OF BIRTH: Jan 192[illegible]

23. SUMMARY OF EVALUATIVE REPORTS FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS

24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUT ... QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: [illegible], 1955 from Director, FBI and the DCI for service in connection with Soviet Defectors.

Commendation 1955 from CIA Defector Coordinator for cooperation and competence in the handling of the defectors.

Commendation 1955 from the DCI for high degree of personal competence and devotion to [illegible].

Letter of Appreciation 1960 for suggestion which proposed revisions of Form 1050.

Appreciation 1961 from Commandant, USAF Command and Staff College for fine lecture.

27. DATE REVIEWED: 20 Apr 1964

28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY: [illegible]

FORM NO. 1 FEB 57 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1050 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE. SECRET PROFILE

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

37833

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply write "not applicable." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.
2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? YES (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

CASASIN

A. FULL NAME Mr. Miss Mrs. (Use No Initials) [redacted] (First, Middle, Last) Telephone: Office: NOT Ext. APPLICABLE Home: HO-7983

PRESENT ADDRESS [redacted] ST. PAUL ST - BALTIMORE, MD, USA (St. & No., City, State, Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS [redacted] ST. PAUL ST - BALTIMORE, MD, USA (St. & No., City, State, Country)

B. NICKNAME [redacted] WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? NONE

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? NOT APPLICABLE

HOW LONG? ______ IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS ______ (Where? By What Authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH 20 JAN 1924 PLACE OF BIRTH BALTIMORE, MD, USA (City, State, Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP USA (Country) BY BIRTH? YES BY MARRIAGE? ______

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE # NOT APPLICABLE ISSUED ______ (Date) BY ______ (Court)

AT ______ (City, State, Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? NO (Yes or No) ______ (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? ______ TO ______ ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? ______ (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS NOT APPLICABLE

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? NO GIVE PARTICULARS ______

FORM NO.

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? N/A

PORT OF ENTRY? ______ ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? ______

LAST U.S. VISA ______ Number ______ Type ______ Place of Issue ______ Date of Issue

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 24 SEX MALE HEIGHT 5'9½" WEIGHT 140

EYES BROWN HAIR BROWN COMPLEXION DARK SCARS FOREHEAD

BUILD SLENDER OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES NONE

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE YES MARRIED ______ DIVORCED ______ WIDOWED ______

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR SEPARATION, DIVORCE OR ANNULMENT ______

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE — INCLUDE ANNULMENTS — USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE NOT APPLICABLE
First Middle Maiden Last

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE ______

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE ______ St. & No. City State Country

LIVING OR DECEASED ______ DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH ______ PLACE OF BIRTH ______ City State Country

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ WHEN ACQUIRED? ______ WHERE? ______ City State Country

OCCUPATION ______ LAST EMPLOYER ______

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM ______ Date TO ______ Date BRANCH OF SERVICE ______

COUNTRY ______ DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T. SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN ______

14-00000

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents)

1. NAME NOT APPLICABLE RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
   CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. & No. / City / State / Country)
2. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
   CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. & No. / City / State / Country)
3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
   CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. & No. / City / State / Country)

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME JOHN (First) BENJAMIN (Middle) [redacted] (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED LIVING DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR, LAST, ADDRESS [redacted] ST. PAUL ST, BALTIMORE-18-MD-USA (St. & No. / City / State / Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 21 NOV 1893 PLACE OF BIRTH CENTREVILLE, MARYLAND, USA (City / State / Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY N/A

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? BIRTH WHERE? ______ (City / State / Country)

OCCUPATION AUTO DEALER LAST EMPLOYER EAST END AUTO CO- BALTIMORE

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS [redacted] PULASKI HWY, BALTIMORE, MD, USA (St. & No. / City / State / Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM 1915 (Date) TO 1919 (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE ARMY AVIATION

COUNTRY USA, GT. BRITAIN DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.

NONE

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME ADRIENNE (First) MARGUERITE (Middle) [redacted] (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED DECEASED DATE OF DECEASE 5 DEC 1947 CAUSE CANCER

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS [redacted] MILFORD AV, BALTIMORE, MD, USA (St. & No. / City / State / Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 14 AUG 1900 PLACE OF BIRTH ROMANS, DRÔME, FRANCE

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? 1921 (?) WHERE? BALTO, MD, USA (City / State / Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NOV. 1919 - NEW YORK

14-00000

OCCUPATION MILLINERY BUYER LAST EMPLOYER EMPORIUM WORLD MILL'Y CO.

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS UNKNOWN, CHICAGO, ILL, USA
St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM NONE TO ______ BRANCH OF SERVICE ______

COUNTRY ______ DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.

NONE

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters)

DL 73452

1. FULL NAME HENRI ADRIEN [redacted] AGE 23
First Middle Last

PRESENT ADDRESS [redacted] SIMMONS AV, BALTIMORE, MD, USA - USA
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

2. FULL NAME ______ AGE ______
First Middle Last

PRESENT ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

3. FULL NAME ______ AGE ______
First Middle Last

PRESENT ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

4. FULL NAME ______ AGE ______
First Middle Last

PRESENT ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

5. FULL NAME ______ AGE ______
First Middle Last

PRESENT ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME NOT APPLICABLE
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED ______ DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH ______ PLACE OF BIRTH ______

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ WHEN ACQUIRED? ______ WHERE? ______
City State Country

OCCUPATION ______ LAST EMPLOYER ______

14-00000

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME NOT APPLICABLE
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED ________ DATE OF DECEASE ________ CAUSE ________

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH ________ PLACE OF BIRTH ________

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ________

CITIZENSHIP ________ WHEN ACQUIRED? ________ WHERE? ________
City State Country

OCCUPATION ________ LAST EMPLOYER ________

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. NAME HENRY [illegible] RELATIONSHIP GREAT-UNCLE AGE 65(?)

CITIZENSHIP FRENCH ADDRESS 27 RUE EDITH CAVELL, NICE FRANCE
St. & No. City State Country

2. NAME CHARLES GRANDGERARD RELATIONSHIP SECOND COUSIN AGE 55(?)

CITIZENSHIP [illegible] ADDRESS % OTIS ELEVATORS, BUENOS AIRES AR
St. & No. City State Country

3. NAME ________ RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ________

CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U.S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.

1. NAME CMDR. ROBT LEE [illegible] RELATIONSHIP COUSIN AGE 30

CITIZENSHIP USA ADDRESS N.O.B., NORFOLK, VIRGINIA
St. & No. City State

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ________

2. NAME ________ RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ________

CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ________

3. NAME ________ RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ________

CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ________

14-00000

SEC. 12. EDUCATION

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL PS #63 / McDONOGH SCH. ADDRESS BALTIMORE, MD, USA / PIKESVILLE, MD, USA
City State Country

DATES ATTENDED 1930-34-37 GRADUATE? YES

HIGH SCHOOL LOYOLA HIGH, MONTREAL, ADDRESS MONTREAL, QUE, CANADA
City State Country

DATES ATTENDED 1937-1940 GRADUATE? YES

COLLEGE SIR GEO WILLIAMS COLL. ADDRESS MONTREAL, QUE, CANADA
City State Country

DATES ATTENDED 1940-1942 DEGREE NONE

COLLEGE U OF MICHIGAN ADDRESS ANN ARBOR, MICH, USA
City State Country

DATES ATTENDED 1945 (see P13) DEGREE B.A.

SEC. 13. MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOV'T SERVICE—U.S. OR FOREIGN

USA — ARMY — 1/LT — FEB 1943-OCT 1948
Country Service Rank Dates of Service

GHQ FEC-TOKYO, JAPAN — 0-937200 — HONORABLE
Last Station Serial No. Type of Discharge

REMARKS: WHILE ENLISTED, SERIAL WAS 31316266

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER 5-A ADDRESS HARTFORD, CONN.

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON

SEC. 14. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST.

FROM 15 AUG 48 TO 30 SEP 48

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY DEPT / ARMY

ADDRESS CCD-GHQ-FEC APO 500 POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO, U.
St. & No. City State Country

KIND OF BUSINESS CIVIL CENSORSHIP NAME OF SUPERVISOR ROBT. SPAULDING

(MILITARY) TITLE OF JOB LIAISON OFFICER SALARY $ 251 PER MONTH

YOUR DUTIES INTELLIGENCE ANALYST; REPORTS COORDINATOR + WRITER

REASONS FOR LEAVING RETURN TO USA FOR SEPARATION FROM ARMY.

FROM 1 APR 48 TO 15 AUG 48

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY DEPT / ARMY.

14-00000

ADDRESS CCD-GHQ-FEC APO 500 POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO, USA
St. & No. City State Country

(MILITARY) KIND OF BUSINESS CIVIL CENSORSHIP NAME OF SUPERVISOR VINCENT MERCOLA

TITLE OF JOB DEPUTY CHIEF, News Agency SALARY $ 351 PER MONTH

YOUR DUTIES Asst chief of principal Allied press censorship bureau in Japan.

REASONS FOR LEAVING CENSORSHIP SECTION ELIMINATED

FROM 1 NOV 46 TO 31 MAR 48

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY DEPT / ARMY

ADDRESS CCD-GHQ-FEC APO 309-POSTMASTER-SAN FRANCISCO USA
St. & No. City State Country

(MILITARY) KIND OF BUSINESS CIVIL CENSORSHIP NAME OF SUPERVISOR ROBT. SPAULDING

TITLE OF JOB CHIEF CENSORSHIP SUB-STA SALARY $ 321 PER MONTH

YOUR DUTIES Operated field censorship surveillance detachment

REASONS FOR LEAVING TRANSFERRED TO HQ IN TOKYO

FROM 15 MAR 46 TO 15 AUG 46

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY DEPT / ARMY

ADDRESS ARMY LANGUAGE SCHOOL FT. SNELLING, MINN, USA / PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY, CAL, USA
St. & No. City State Country

(MILITARY) KIND OF BUSINESS CIVIL AFFAIRS TNG NAME OF SUPERVISOR YUTAKA MUNAKATA

TITLE OF JOB RESEARCH EDITOR SALARY $ Army PER SGT.

YOUR DUTIES REVISED ARMY MANUALS, PREPARED CIVIL AFFAIRS COURSES.

REASONS FOR LEAVING COMMISSIONED; TRANSFERRED TO JAPAN

FROM NOV 1941 TO JUL 1942

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY T. EATON CO, LTD.

ADDRESS ST. CATHERINE ST, MONTREAL, QUE, CANADA
St. & No. City State Country

KIND OF BUSINESS DEPT. STORE NAME OF SUPERVISOR F.T. CLAYDON

TITLE OF JOB PHOTOGRAPHIC SALESMAN SALARY $ 20 PER WEEK

YOUR DUTIES SOLD CAMERAS AND PHOTO SUPPLIES

REASONS FOR LEAVING WAS PART-TIME JOB ACCEPTED WHILE IN COLLEGE

SEC. 15. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS:

NOT APPLICABLE

SEC. 16. GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES — IN THE U.S. — WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY — (GIVE RESIDENCE AND BUSINESS ADDRESSES WHERE POSSIBLE.)

	Name		Street and Number	City	State
1.	CAPT. GORDON WALLACE	BUS. ADD.	ALS-PRESIDIO/	MONTEREY	CAL.
		RES. ADD.	2160 COOLEY,	PALO ALTO	CAL.
2.	MR. GEORGE MOORE	BUS. ADD.	U/CALIFORNIA	BERKELEY,	CAL.
		RES. ADD.	571 NORTH,	OAKLAND,	CAL.
3.	MR. JOHN CHEATHAM	BUS. ADD.	117 E. PATRICK	FREDERICK,	MD.
		RES. ADD.	101 E. CHURCH	FREDERICK,	MD.
4.	MR. T. G. DRISCOLL	BUS. ADD.	1131 K ST. N.W.	WASH.	DC.
		RES. ADD.	305 S. ROYAL	ALEXANDRIA	VA.
5.	MR. R. H. KUNZMAN	BUS. ADD.	UP BUREAU	DES MOINES	IOWA
		RES. ADD.		UNK	

SEC. 17. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES — NOT REFERENCES, SUPERVISORS OR EMPLOYERS — (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

	Name		Street and Number	City	State
1.	MR. GEORGE FINNEY	BUS. ADD.	DEPT /AF	WASHINGTON	DC.
		RES. ADD.	2310 VALLEY DR.	ALEXANDRIA	VA.
2.	DR. MORRIS CRANE	BUS. ADD.	BALTIMORE AV	PHILADELPHIA	PA.
		RES. ADD.	"	"	"
3.	MR. BRADFORD COOLIDGE	BUS. ADD.	DEPT/STATE	WASHINGTON	DC
		RES. ADD.			
4.	MISS FLORENCE MIDDLEBROOK	BUS. ADD.		NONE	
		RES. ADD.	11 ARBORDALE	WETHERSFIELD,	CONN.
5.	MR. ANTHONY SAS	BUS. ADD.		UNK	
		RES. ADD.	323 E. 39TH	BALTIMORE,	MD.

14-00000

SEC. 18. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THIS U.S. — (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

	Name		Street and Number	City	State
1.	MR. FRANK DUCHARME	BUS. ADD.	TRAVELERS INS.	HARTFORD,	CONN.
		RES. ADD.	26 LILLEY	W. HARTFORD	CONN.
2.	MR. JAMES KNOX	BUS. ADD.	G. FOX CO.	HARTFORD,	CONN.
		RES. ADD.		UNK	
3.	MRS. LOUIS FRANKLIN	BUS. ADD.	ALBERT STEIGER	HARTFORD,	CONN.
		RES. ADD.		UNK	

SEC. 19. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? YES IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS BALTIMORE NATIONAL BANK, HIGHLANDTOWN BRANCH, BALTIMORE, MD.

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? NO
GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT:

D. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES — IN THE U.S.

	Name	Address (St. & No.)	City	State
1.	LEE'S INC	[illegible] EASTERN AV.	BALTIMORE,	MD.
2.	MONTGOMERY WARD	[illegible] AV.	OAKLAND 16,	CAL.
3.				

SEC. 20. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

From	To	St. No.	City	State	Country
1933	1937	[redacted] PRESSTMAN ST	BALTIMORE	MD	USA
1937	1939	[redacted] HARVARD AV	MONTREAL	QUE	CANADA
1939	1942	[redacted] MOUNTAIN ST	MONTREAL	QUE	CANADA
1942	1942	[redacted] LILLEY RD	W. HARTFORD	CONN	USA
1942	1942	MILITARY SERVICE			
1948	PRESENT	[redacted] ST. PAUL ST	BALTIMORE,	MD,	USA

SEC. 21. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

	From	To	City or Section	Country	
A.	JUN 1937	SEP 1937	PARIS	FRANCE	VISIT
	JUL 1934	JUL 1934	NIAGARA PENINSULA	CANADA	VISIT
	SEP 1937	JUL 1942	MONTREAL	CANADA	RESIDENCE

FROM OCT 1944 TO JAN 1945 NORTHERN EUROPE WAR SERVICE
City or Section / Country / Purpose

FROM SEP AUG 1945 TO OCT 1945 TOKYO, SENDAI JAPAN MIL OCCUPATION
City or Section / Country / Purpose

FROM ______ TO ______
City or Section / Country / Purpose

B. LAST U.S. PASSPORT—NUMBER, DATE, AND PLACE OF ISSUE: UNKNOWN

HOW MANY OTHER U.S. PASSPORTS HAVE YOU HAD? NONE GIVE APPROXIMATE

DATES:

PASSPORTS OF OTHER NATIONS:

SEC. 22. CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

1. AMERICAN VETERANS COMMITTEE (MEMBER AT LARGE)
Name and Chapter / St. & No. / City / State / Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: NOV 1945 - JAN 1948

2. RESERVE OFFICERS ASS'N WASHINGTON DC USA
Name and Chapter / St. & No. / City / State / Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: OCT 1948 - PRESENT

3.
Name and Chapter / St. & No. / City / State / Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

4.
Name and Chapter / St. & No. / City / State / Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

5.
Name and Chapter / St. & No. / City / State / Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

6.
Name and Chapter / St. & No. / City / State / Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

7.
Name and Chapter / St. & No. / City / State / Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

SEC. 23. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT" "FAIR" OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE JAPANESE SPEAK FLUENT READ FAIR WRITE FAIR

LANGUAGE FRENCH SPEAK FLUENT READ FLUENT WRITE FLUENT

LANGUAGE ________ SPEAK ________ READ ________ WRITE ________

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU: INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH:

SWIMMING, SKIING, HORSEMANSHIP, FOOTBALL - GOOD.
BASEBALL, ICE HOCKEY, LACROSSE, VOLLEYBALL, BADMINTON - FAIR.
PHOTOGRAPHIC PROCESSES - STRONG AMATEUR INTEREST.

C. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION?

HAVE AN ABILITY TO WRITE, EITHER REPORTORIAL OR EDITORIAL, WHICH MIGHT BE SUITABLE FOR RESEARCH OR SPECIAL REPORTS WRITING.

D. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1939:

NONE OTHER THAN DEPT OF ARMY FOR COMMISSION AS OFFICER.

E. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIV, WAR DEPT, + FBI CONDUCTED LOYALTY CHECK SOMETIME BETWEEN FEB 1947 AND JUN 1947.

14-00000

12

SEC. 24. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES? NO

IF "YES", EXPLAIN: ______

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? YES IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? OCCASIONAL WINES AND LIQUOR

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE: NO

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

NO

SEC. 25. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME JOHN B. [redacted] RELATIONSHIP FATHER

ADDRESS [redacted] ST. PAUL ST. BALTIMORE MD USA

St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 26. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

NO

14-00000

SEC. 27. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA (City and State) DATE 25 NOV 1948

Henriette C. Driscoll (Witness) [redacted] (Signature of Applicant) CASASIN

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

14.- I HAVE NEVER HELD A FULL-TIME CIVILIAN JOB, SINCE I ENTERED THE ARMY DIRECTLY FROM COLLEGE.

19.- I HAVE NEVER BOUGHT ANYTHING ON CREDIT. THEREFORE, I HAVE LISTED THREE CONCERNS WITH WHICH I HAVE TRANSACTED NORMAL BUSINESS.

12.- I ACQUIRED SUFFICIENT CREDITS FROM THE ARMY JAPANESE SCHOOL AT THE U OF MICHIGAN TO RECEIVE A B.A. DEGREE, IN ABSENTIA, WHILE STILL ON ACTIVE SERVICE.

FROM SEP 1942 TO DEC 1942 I COMPLETED ONE SEMESTER AT TRINITY COLLEGE, HARTFORD, CONN.

Casasin

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 81, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Canc. 6 Jan. 1955 rwc

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
MR. [redacted] Crozier	20 Jan. 1924		11 Jan. 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
PROMOTION	E.O.D. 16 Jan 1955	50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Area Ops Officer (Br. Ch) BC-171-13	8. POSITION TITLE	Area Ops Officer BCF-189-14
GS-0136.01-13 $8360.00 per annum 8560	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.01-14 $9600.00 per annum
DDP/SR SR/5	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR Far East Area Japan Office of the Chief
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Tokyo, Japan
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB	10-POINT OTHER	14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
			X							SD-FI

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 5-3400-20 TO: 5-3400-55-015	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Md.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

Subject to approved medical clearance prior to being sent overseas.

"Transfer TO Unvouchered funds FROM Vouchered funds."

POSTED
JAN 17 1955

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Deputy Assistant Director for Personnel

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

rvs

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
MR. [redacted] Casasin	20 Jan 1924		19 Jan. 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
PROMOTION (AMENDMENT)*	B.O.B. 16 Jan 1955	50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Area Ops Officer (Br. Ch) SC-171-13	8. POSITION TITLE	Area Ops Officer BCF-189-14
GS-0136.01-13 $8560.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.01-14 $9600.00 per annum
DDP/SR SR/5	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR Far East Area Japan Office of the Chief
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Tokyo, Japan
FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL [x]	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	FIELD [x] DEPARTMENTAL [ ]

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE / WWII / OTHER / 5-PT. [x] / 10-POINT (DISAB. / OTHER)

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW / VICE / I.A. / REAL. — SD-DI

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 5-3400-20 TO: 5-3400-55-015	Yes		[ ] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED STATE: Ill.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

*This action amends Item #9, on the "from" side, on Notification dated 11 Jan. 1955, to show the correct salary, previously shown as $8360.00 per annum.

Subject to approved medical clearance prior to being sent overseas.

"Transfer TO Unvouchered funds FROM Vouchered funds."

FOLDED
my 1/20/55

...ANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

...uty Assistant Director for Personnel   22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954—313733

14-00000

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1953 - 967576

Occupational designation	2. Pay roll	3. Sheet No.	4. Slip No.
		5-3400-20	

Name (and ... number when appropriate)	6. Grade and salary
Cassiern	GS-13 $8360.00

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.			NET PAY
...											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks: J-8990

SALARY ADJUSTED TO: EFFECTIVE 13 MAR. 1955 PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE

11. Appropriation(s): SR 7

12. Prepared by: NZ 9 Nov 54

13. Audited by:

[X] Periodic step increase [ ] Pay adjustment [ ] Other step increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
Jan 55	5 Jul 53	$8360.00	$8560.00	(Signature or other authentication)

LWOP date (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP following periods) (Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP) Less LWOP Total excess ... Initials of Clerk

FORM NO. 1126d—Revised ... by Comp. Gen., U. S. General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): MR. [redacted] Cassasin
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan. 1924
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 26 Sept. '56

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): REASSIGNMENT
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 21 OCT 1956

7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops Officer BCF-189-14		Area Ops Officer BCF-189-14
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-14 $10,535.00 p.a.		GS-0136.01-14 $10,535.00 p.a.
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS			DDP/SR Far East Area Japan Office of the Chief
11. HEADQUARTERS			Tokyo, Japan
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	[ ] FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL		[XXX] FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL (D)

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

RE-SLOTTING FOR NEW APPROVED T/O.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): Robert D. Lovelace
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Phyllis M. Landrum Ext. 4407

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE: NONE | WWII | OTHER | 5 PT. | 10 POINT (DISAB / OTHER)

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW | VICE | I.A. | REAL.
SD: DI

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 7-3400-55-015
TO: 7-3400-55-015

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE [ ] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED
STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
R.A. Skeels (Gus), FI/CMO
DATE: 2 Oct 56

USED IN LIEU OF SF50 NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	(initials)	11 OCT 1956
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	T&B: 10-9	
E.		
F. APPROVED BY	Robert H. [signature] per [signature] 9 Oct '56	

REMARKS: POSTED 11 OCT 1956

OFFICE OF DEF

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
506102	[illegible]	DDP/SR	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
14	2	$10,535	07	15	56	14	3	$10,750	01	12	58

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

9. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

8. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS 4 7-4/0 4005

14. AUTHENTICATION

CF

C.H.STEWART

J.H. TMK 1/25

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 1 MAR 56 560a SECRET PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
[redacted] Caszzten	506102	GS-14-3	$10,750	$11,935

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
506102	[redacted] Caszzten	DDP/SR 8	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
14	2	$10,535	07	15	56	14	3	$10,750	01	12	58

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
BELIC, GEORGE	15 Jan 1958	George N Belic

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560 SECRET PERSONNEL FOLDER

14-00000

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
DI	[redacted] Castren	506102	48 40	GS-14 4	$12,075	$12,990

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
506102	Castren [redacted]	DDP/SR 10	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 14	3	$11,835	01	12	58	GS 14	4	$12,075	07	12	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE

GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS
4 742

14. AUTHENTICATION

G. M. STEWART

DIP 8/5/59
HF 7/31/59

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM 560a

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER

14-00000

ARF: 30 SEPT 1960

SECRET (When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
006102	Cavasin [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS	10 02 60	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
			X		1234 1000 1000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP SR SR 6 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER BR CH	0050	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	14 4	12990

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)
16	10	60300	SR	75013		1	01 20 24		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES)	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
				1		

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

E.D.ECHOLS

dg 10-2-60

Form 6-60 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

GE 10/18/60

134-1000-10

3040 / 80 / 3120

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
006102	Casasin [redacted]	60 300 V 7	

5. Old Salary Rate				6. New Salary Rate				7. Type Action		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 14	5	$13,250	01/08/61	GS 14	6	$13,510	07/08/62			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP / / EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

Jul 5 12 05 PM '62

FED PAYROLL BRANCH

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

E.D.ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
006102	Casasin [redacted]	DDP/SR 7	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
GS-14	4	$12990	07	12	59	GS-14	5	$13250	01	08	61

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☒ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION
☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

Jan 5 12 56 PM '61

FED PAYROLL BRANCH

E.D.ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 8-60 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a AND 560b. SECRET OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

14-00000

BAB: 16 AUG 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
006102	[redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
RESIGNATION	08 04 62	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V / CF TO V	V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
X			3234 1000 1000	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/SR SR/6 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER BR CH	0050	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	14 6	13510

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
45	10					01 20 24		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE)	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
			1B00091	EOD DATA		

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG. COMP. DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP)	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	44. STATE TAX DATA
CODE: 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS); 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)		FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO); CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES); CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

POSTED
dy 8-20-62

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

E.D. ECHOLS

LLG 8/16/62

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET
(When Filled In)

14-00000

SECRET

13 September 1960
(Date)
File No. K-1328

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : [redacted] Cassin

1. Cover arrangements ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/or~~ have been completed for the above-named Subject.

2. Effective 12 September 1960, it is requested that your records be properly blocked ~~xxxxxxx~~ to deny ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ Subject's current Agency employment to an external inquirer.

3. Operating component must take necessary action to block ~~xxxxx~~ telephone locator by submitting the Personnel Information Card, "Office File Copy," Form No. 642, to Machine Records Division, Office of the Comptroller, Room 107 Curie Hall, Attention: Miss Wenkenbach.

~~4. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~

Paul P. [signature]
HARRY W. LITTLE, JR.
Chief, Central Cover Division

cc: SSD/OS
Operating Division - SR

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

SECRET

D7

14-00000

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED TO CONFIDENTIAL

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
MR. [redacted] Casasin	20 Jan 1924		13 Dec 54

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)

PROMOTION

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: 5 Jan. '55

B. APPROVED: 16 Jan 1955

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops Officer (Br. Ch.) BC-171-13		Area Ops Officer BCF-189-14
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-13 $8360.00 p.a.		GS-0136.01-14 $9600.00 p.a.
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR SR/5		DDP/SR Far East Area Japan Office of the Chief
11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.		Tokyo, Japan
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL [X]		FIELD [X] DEPARTMENTAL [ ]

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary) PERIODIC STEP INCREASE [illegible] 2 Jan 55

PLEASE TRANSFER FROM VOUCHERED TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS. $560.00 [illegible]

Memo stating why fitness report not necessary. [illegible]

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title) Robert [illegible] W. Muenster

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY Signature: [signature] Title: DD/P Admin.

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension) Phyllis M. Landrum Ext. 3748

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL.

SR:FI

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 5-3400-20 TO: 5-3400-55-015	Yes		CLAIMED [ ] PROVED [ ] STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Effective date per [illegible] 1-11-55 [illegible]

Conc. by Asborne 1-11-55 [illegible] 1-11-55

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	[initials]	4 Jan	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[initials]	5 Jan 55	
E.			
F. APPROVED BY	[signature] 1-5-55		

APPROVED BY FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD DATE: DEC 21 1954

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	DATE OF BIRTH	CASE OR CLAIM NUMBER
Cain	Unk	58-201

There is on file in the Casualty Affairs Branch, Benefits and Casualty Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee for an illness, injury, ~~or death~~ incurred on 4 Feb 1958.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BCD REPRESENTATIVE
15 July 1958	B. [signature]

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM NO. 1076
1 SEP 56

(4-21-35)

14-00000

(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
[redacted] Casasin	X	57-41

There is on file in the Casualty Affairs Branch, Benefits and Casualty Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, ~~or death~~ incurred on 3 December 1958.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BCD REPRESENTATIVE
28 AUG 1959	B. [illegible]

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 9-58 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4-21-35)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED Mo	Da	Yr
09	12	60

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date of Birth Mo	Da	Yr	4. Vet. Pref.	Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD
006102	[redacted] Currier	01	20	24	10 Pt.-2	1	M	

7. SCD	8. CSC Retmt.	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav.	11. FEGLI Code	12. LCD	13. Mil. Serv. Credit LCD
				1		

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP SR FAR EAST AREA TOKYO STATION SOVIET BRANCH		TOKYO, JAPAN	

16. Dept.-Field Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
3	OPS OFFICER BR CH	189	GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade	25. PSI Due	26. Appropriation Number
14 4	$ 12,990	D	1 16 55	7 18 61	1134 7000 3000

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Date
REASSIGNMENT TRANSFER OF FUNDS to Vouchered		10 02 60	REGULAR		

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP SR SR 6 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF		WASH., D. C.	

33. Dept.-Field Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
1	OPS OFFICER - BR CH	50 D-15	GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade	42. PSI Due	43. Appropriation Number
14 4	$ 12,990	D			1234 1000 1000

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): ANDREW L. BUSBY CH/SR/PERSONNEL

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): A. Busby

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): E. C. JOHNSON X4407

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board	Rowland Gage	9/16/60	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		10-10-60	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	F. Sullivan	10 - 11

Remarks: Two copies of this action have been forwarded to the Office of Security.

Recorded by CSPD 10-5 W/P

14-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)		
306102	[redacted] Casasin		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION		4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
RESIGNATION		5 . 4 . 62	REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF		7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		3234 [illegible]	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	
11. POSITION TITLE		12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFF CLR BR CH		..5?	D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	14 6	1351?

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150 4-62 Use Previous Edition

(4-9?)

14-00000

16 - Aug - 62 (When Filled In)

XXF

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 July 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006102
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted] Casasin
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Resignation
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 DAY 04 YEAR 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: X | V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3234 1000 1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/SR SR/6 Office of the Chief
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer (Br Ch)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0050
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 06
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 13250 570 13510
18. REMARKS: Copy furnished Vouchered Payroll.

Recorded by CSPD

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ANDREW L. BUSBY, C/SR/PERSONNEL | DATE SIGNED
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER | DATE SIGNED: 7/24/62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOURS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
45	10	60300 / SR	15013		1	01 20 24		

28. NTE EXPIRES | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) CODE | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 160 09.1 | 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.) | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE | 37. LONG. COMP. DATE | 38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD (1 - YES, 2 - NO) | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES) | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)) | 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: Ag 8-15-62
46. O.P. APPROVAL: [signature] | DATE APPROVED: 7/24/62

FORM 8-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4)

14-00000

EMPLOYEE NOTICE OF RESIGNATION

I RESIGN EFFECTIVE 4 August 62 (Date) FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

To accept private employment.

MY LAST WORKING DAY WILL BE	DATE SIGNED	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
4 August 62	23 July 62	[illegible]

FORWARD COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING SALARY CHECKS AND BONDS, TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, Zone, State)

INSTRUCTIONS

Items 1 thru 7 and Items 9 thru 18a - The initiating office should fill in each of the referenced items. Items 3 thru 7 and 9 thru 18 require information which pertains only to the action requested, and NOT to the current status of the employee unless specific items remain unchanged.

Item 5 - "Category of Employment" should show one of the following entries:

Regular	Summer	WAE
Part Time	Detail Out	Consultant
Temporary	Detail In	Military
Temporary - Part Time		

Item 9 - "Organizational Designations" should show all levels of organization pertinent to identifying the location of the position:

FIRST LINE: Major Component (Director, Deputy Director, etc.) Office, Major Staff, etc.
- Division or Staff (subordinate to first line)
  - Branch
    - Section
      - Unit

Item 11 - "Position Title" should reflect the standard abbreviated title given in the most current edition of the Position Control Register or reported on Form 261, Staffing Complement Change Authorization.

Item 18b - Signature should be that of the official authorized to approve for the Career Service to which the employee belongs. If more than one Career Service is involved, the gaining Career Service should approve and the other Career Service should concur in Item 18, Remarks.

ROUTING - The original only of this form will be forwarded to the Office of Personnel through the appropriate Career Service official(s). In the case of requests specified in HB 20-800-1, which require advance approval of or notification to the Office of Security or the Office of the Comptroller, one copy only will be sent to the Office(s) concerned.

SECRET

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 144
JANUARY 1952
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAPTERS L1 AND R3

STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL AND MILITARY SERVICE

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used in determining creditable service for *leave purposes* and retention credits for *reduction in force*. The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through IV.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*) CASASIN [redacted]

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 January 1924

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENTS (*Do not include military service.*)

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TO— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
None CIA	49	11	20				

4. LIST PERIODS OF SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TO— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	DISCHARGE (*Hon. or dishon.?*)
United States Army	43	Feb	15	48	Oct	27	Yes; honorable

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (*LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar*)	FROM— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TO— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TOTAL YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☒ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

7. ARE YOU:
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.
I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

1 August 51
(DATE)

CASASIN
[redacted]
(SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this ____ day of ____ (MONTH) 1952 at ____ (CITY) (STATE)

SEAL

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. CSC STATUS (*For permanent employees only*) ☐ YES ☐ NO

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY
5	8	12

12. TOTAL SERVICE: 5 8 12

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*):

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TRAVEL AGREEMENT BY STAFF EMPLOYEES ASSIGNED TO PERMANENT DUTY STATION OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

1. In accordance with the policy of the Central Intelligence Agency, I agree to serve outside the continental United States a minimum tour of 24 months from the date of my arrival at my permanent post of duty, unless said tour is sooner terminated by the Government for its convenience, or it is terminated by the Agency for circumstances that are considered by it to be beyond my control.

2. It is understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control in less than 12 months from the date of arrival at said post, I shall reimburse CIA for all travel expenses, including storage and per diem, incurred in the transporting of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to my permanent post of duty, and shall pay all return travel and transportation expenses to the United States.

3. It is further understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control subsequent to the twelfth month but prior to the completion of my tour of duty, I shall pay all return expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to the United States.

CASASIN.

WITNESS:

Lorene E. Norbeck

Office of Personnel
Lorene E. Norbeck

Date: 9 August 1957

FORM NO. 911a REPLACES FORM NO. 55-104 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

SECRET

4011

9 December 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS/CSB

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-15 - [redacted] CASASIN - (1)

REFERENCE : Your memorandum dated 8 October 1958

1. The SR Division and the Chief of Station, Tokyo (FJTT-1950, attached) recommend the promotion of [redacted] to GS-15.

2. Mr. [redacted] was last promoted 16 January 1955. On 17 February 1955 he arrived in Tokyo to serve as the senior SR officer in the FE field area, his present assignment. In this position he has continued to display qualities of leadership, initiative, imagination and thoroughness which resulted in his rapid rise in the Agency.

3. The very facts of Mr. [redacted]'s youth in relation to his responsibilities and the fact that promotion to his present level has been rapid, caused the Division and the Chief of Station, Tokyo to hold until this time a recommendation for his promotion which was submitted in June 1957. Most careful consideration has convinced us that not only is Mr. [redacted] deserving of the recommended promotion, but his elevation to the higher grade will be in the best interest of the Career Service and meet definite Division requirements for a senior officer at the GS-15 level.

[signature]
CHARLES KATEK
Acting Chief, SR Division

Distribution:
Orig & 6 - Addr

SECRET

14-00000

INFORMATION ADDRESSEE: Chief, FE

Chief, SR

Chief of Station, Tokyo

SUBJECT: REDWOOD/ADMINISTRATIVE
Promotion of [redacted]

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. FJTT-1950

DATE

REFERENCE(S): FJTW-11531 (RYBAT), dated 11 October 1957

ACTION REQUIRED: See paragraph 2

Baker - 2
Moury - 3
Nelson - 4

1. In line with paragraph 2 of Reference, after a period of six months we submitted an additional promotion fitness report on [redacted] under cover of FJTT-0801 dated 28 May 1958. Inasmuch as [redacted] was then at Headquarters on TDY, we requested that he review this fitness report and assumed that in doing so he would also discuss with [redacted]'s promotion, which both he and [redacted] felt was to be strongly recommended.

2. [redacted] was, however, not shown this fitness report at Headquarters, nor did he have the opportunity to discuss [redacted]'s promotion with [redacted]. In reviewing our records we are now concerned at the possibility of some administrative slip-up and would appreciate a word of advice as to how this promotion action is proceeding. We would like to reiterate that we now have not the slightest hesitation in recommending [redacted] for promotion and find that the fitness report submitted with FJTT-0801 still reflects our current high appreciation of his abilities and progress.

20 November 1958

Distribution:
2 - Chief, SR
2 - Chief, FE

Pers/S/Pers
✓ Pers

CONTINUED

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

FORM NO. 53 TEST
1 SEP 56

CLASSIFICATION

Attachment to
FJTA-19609

MEMORANDUM No. 360   18 June 1957

TO : Chief of Station

FROM : Chief, Soviet Branch

SUBJECT: [redacted] - Recommendation for Promotion
[redacted] CASASIA

1. [redacted] has been under my supervision as Deputy and Case Officer for approximately fifteen months. Based on the knowledge of [redacted] as an individual gained during this period and upon his actual performance, I recommend that he be entered for consideration on the SR Division GS-14 to GS-15 promotion list at this time - June 1957. The slot and job which he now occupies, Chief, Soviet Branch, is, of course, adequate to accommodate such a promotion.

2. [redacted] operational performance has been outstanding and notably versatile during this period. He has engaged primarily in liaison and has been personally effective in terms of results achieved almost daily, in terms of reports, operational data, and joint enterprise; while, overall, he has established enduring professional relationships from which the organization as a whole should benefit for some time to come. In addition, owing in large part to unique personal talents, linguistic and otherwise, [redacted] has handled a number of unilateral cases most effectively. In the office, too, as well as in face-to-face operational situations, [redacted] has been outstanding. He has a flair for and a facility with the written word as evidenced by the amount of general and particular correspondence which he has initiated, and he knows the organizational "drill" intimately and from way back. Thus, I feel that he is qualified for the recommended promotion by ability and experience in both the internal and external aspects of the profession.

3. Relative to the more personal characteristics involved in the term managerial ability, judgments are necessarily more subjective but here, too, I consider [redacted] to be qualified in maturity, in judgment, and in experience. He would most certainly be a supervisor who could perform all the chores or handle all the situations which he would be calling upon subordinates to take care of, in itself, the beginning of any good supervisory relationship. In actual fact, he has had considerable experience in this regard already and the principal shortcoming I have noticed is a tendency to "carry" others by an extension of his own industry. [redacted] is not without his difficulties in the area of personal relationships. He is a purist at times and manifestly impatient in certain human situations where a shrug of the shoulders would be the

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...st reply. These characteristics do not always make for the best personal relations but are frequently obviated by intellect and above all are correctable and are being corrected.

4. In sum, [redacted] qualifications, broad experience and proven abilities dominate his age, the only factor militating against a promotion at this time. It is therefore my sincere recommendation that a promotion recommendation be forwarded to Headquarters for consideration in the current mid-year lists.

Edward MARELIUS [redacted]

Print Educational Previous document

SECRET

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9 December 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS/CSB

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-15 — [illegible] CAS ASIN — (1)

REFERENCE: Your memorandum dated 8 October 1958

REFERENCE: [illegible]-11531 (...) [illegible]

1. The FE Division and the Chief of Station, Tokyo ([illegible], attached) recommend the promotion of [illegible] to GS-15.

2. Mr. [illegible] was last promoted 16 January 1955. On 27 February 1955 he arrived in Tokyo to serve as the senior CE officer in the FE field area, his present assignment. In this position he has continued to display qualities of leadership, initiative, imagination and thoroughness which resulted in his rapid rise in the Agency.

3. The very facts of Mr. [illegible]'s youth in relation to his responsibilities and the fact that promotion to his present level has been rapid, caused the Division and the Chief of Station, Tokyo to hold until this time a recommendation for his promotion which was submitted in June 1957. Most careful consideration has convinced us that not only is Mr. [illegible] deserving of the recommended promotion, but his elevation to the higher grade will be in the best interest of the Career Service and meet definite Division requirements for a senior officer at the GS-15 level.

CHARLES [illegible]
Acting Chief, FE Division

Distribution:
Orig & 6 - Addr

SECRET

14-00000

C O P Y

FJTT-1950

TO: Chief, SR

25 November 1958

FROM: Chief of Station, Tokyo

SUBJECT: Promotion of [redacted] CASASIN (1)

REFERENCE: FJTW-11531 (RYBAT) dated 11 Oct 1957

1. In line with paragraph 2 of Reference, after a period of six months we submitted an additional promotion fitness report on [redacted] under cover of FJTT-0801 dated 28 May 1958. Inasmuch as Baker was then at Headquarters on TDY, we requested that he review this fitness report and assumed that in doing so he would also discuss with Maury [redacted] promotion, which both he and Nelson felt was to be strongly recommended. (1)

2. Baker was, however, not shown this fitness report at Headquarters, nor did he have the opportunity to discuss [redacted] promotion with Maury. In reviewing our records we are now concerned at the possibility of some administrative slip-up and would appreciate a word of advice as to how this promotion action is proceeding. We would like to reiterate that we now have not the slightest hesitation in recommending [redacted] for promotion and find that the fitness report submitted with FJTT-0801 still reflects our current high appreciation of his abilities and progress.

WILLIAM E. NELSON

14-00000

COPY
Attachment to
FJTA-19609

MEMORANDUM No. 360 18 June 1957

TO: Chief of Station

FROM: Chief, Soviet Branch

SUBJECT: [redacted] CASASIN Recommendation for Promotion

(1) = CASASIN

1. [redacted] (1) has been under my supervision as Deputy and Case Officer for approximately fifteen months. Based on the knowledge of [redacted] as an individual gained during this period and upon his actual performance, I recommend that he be entered for consideration on the SR Division GS-14 to GS-15 promotion list at this time - June 1957. The slot and job which he now occupies, Chief, Soviet Branch, is, of course, adequate to accommodate such a promotion.

2. [redacted] (1) operational performance has been outstanding and notably versatile during this period. He has engaged primarily in liaison and has been personally effective in terms of results achieved almost daily, in terms of reports, operational data, and joint enterprise; while, overall, he has established enduring professional relationships from which the organization as a whole should benefit for some time to come. In addition, owing in large part to unique personal talents, linguistic and otherwise, (1) [redacted] has handled a number of unilateral cases most effectively. In the office, too, as well as in face-to-face operational situations, (1) [redacted] has been outstanding. He has a flair for and a facility with the written word as evidenced by the amount of general and particular correspondence which he has initiated, and he knows the organizational "drill" intimately and from way back. Thus, I feel that he is qualified for the recommended promotion by ability and experience in both the internal and external aspects of the profession.

3. Relative to the more personal characteristics involved in the term managerial ability, judgments are necessarily more subjective but here, too, I consider (1) [redacted] to be qualified in maturity, in judgment, and in experience. He would most certainly be a supervisor who could perform all the chores or handle all the situations which he would be calling upon subordinates to take care of, in itself, the beginning of any good supervisory relationship. In actual fact, he has had considerable experience in this regard already and the principal shortcoming I have noticed is a tendency to "carry" others by an extension of his own industry. (1) [redacted] is not without his difficulties in the area of personal relationships. He is a purist at times and manifestly impatient in certain human situations where a shrug of the shoulders would be the best reply. These characteristics do not always make for the best personal relationships but are frequently obviated by intellect and above all are correctable and are being corrected.

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CASASIN'S

4. In sum, [redacted] qualifications, broad experience and proven abilities dominate his age, the only factor militating against a promotion at this time. It is therefore my sincere recommendation that a promotion recommendation be forwarded to Headquarters for consideration in the current mid-year lists.

EDWARD MARELIUS

14-00000

1 June 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, CS Career Service Board

SUBJECT : Nominations for Promotion to GS-15

REFERENCE : Memorandum dated 14 May 1958 from Secretary, CS Career Service Board

1. After reviewing GS-14 employees assigned to the SR Division, I wish to again recommend the promotion of CASASIN [redacted] Chief, Soviet Branch, Tokyo to GS-15. I concur also in the attached recommendation for the promotion of [redacted] CIA officer prepared by the Chief of Base, Berlin.

2. The Chief of Station, Tokyo and I recommended CASASIN'S [redacted]'s promotion in December 1953. This earlier recommendation presented the personal qualities of Mr. [redacted]. I wish simply to point out at this time that since early 1954, Mr. [redacted] has more than fully discharged responsibilities at the GS-15 level. I believe that it is definitely time to elevate him to the level at which he has been performing more than satisfactorily for over 5½ years.

Charles Katek

CHARLES KATEK
Acting Chief, SR Division

Distribution:
Orig & 6 Addressee w/att

14-00000

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. *The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff; and*
2. *A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.*

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 90 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to make the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that he knows where he stands.

BY DATE 29 NOV 1955
Posted Pos. Control P9S
Reviewed By PCD [signature] 12/7/55

FIELD REPORT

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

CASASIN

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY	1. DATE OF BIRTH	2. SEX	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION
[redacted]	20 Jan 1924	M	(1) FI, (2) FP

4. GRADE	5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current)
GS-14	USSR Base, Tokyo — SR 8-3-4

6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT	7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
30 September 1955	17 February - 30 September 1955

SECTION II *(To be completed by field supervisor)*

1. CURRENT POSITION	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION
Chief, USSR Base, Tokyo 0136.01	19 February 1955

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS *(List in order of frequency)*

A. As Chief of Operating Base:
   1. Manage and direct all operations against target area, and monitor products.
   2. Supervise system of development and exploitation of operational leads.
   3. Supervise proper administration and support of operations, including finances.
   4. Conduct or supervise effective liaison with other KUBARK elements, with other Government agencies abroad and, when appropriate, with representatives of other governments.

B. As Senior SR Division Officer in Area:
   1. Consult with or advise other KUBARK and non-KUBARK units on target area, government, and IS characteristics.
   2. Make available to other KUBARK and non-KUBARK units area specialists, as required.

SECTION III *(To be completed at headquarters only)*

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER (True)	2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD (True)
Carleton B. Swift	W. Lloyd George

3. THIS REPORT [X] WAS [ ] WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.

4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS.	5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES
Nov. 1955	Phyllis M. Lankum

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORM NO. 45a JUL 54.

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SECTION IV

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

This section is provided as an a[illegible] describing the individual. Your desc[illegible]on is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meanin[illegible] relation to a particular job or assign[illegible]t. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply [illegible] some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	NOT OBSERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE	APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE	APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE	APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE
SAMPLES: A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X			
SAMPLES: B. PRACTICAL.					X	
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.						X
2. CAN MADE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.						X
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.					X	
4. HAS INITIATIVE.						X
5. UNEMOTIONAL.						X
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.						X
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.						X
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.						X
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.					X	
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.						X
11. CALM.						X
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.					X	
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.						X
14. GETS THINGS DONE.						X
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.						X
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.						X
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.						X
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.						X
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.						X
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.						X
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.						X
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.						X
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.						X
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.						X
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.						X

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(When Filled In)

Item	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.														X
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.											X			
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".												X		
29. TOUGH MINDED.												X		
30. OBSERVANT.												X		
31. CAPABLE.													X	
32. CLEAR THINKING.														X
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.												X		
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.												X		
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.													X	
36. DELIBERATE.													X	
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.												X		
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.											X			
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.													X	
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.												X		
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.														X
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.													X	
43. HAS DRIVE.												X		
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.												X		
45. VERSATILE.													X	
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.													X	
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.											X			
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.												X		
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.													X	
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.												X		

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Capable operations officer with broad understanding of Soviet problems.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SIN... STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? [XXX] NO [ ] YES. IF YES,

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

- [ ] 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
- [ ] 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
- [ ] 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
- [ ] 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
- [ ] 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
- [XXX] 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? [XXX] NO [ ] YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

- [ ] 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
- [ ] 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
- [ ] 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
- [XXX] 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- [ ] 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- [ ] 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

- [ ] 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
- [ ] 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
- [ ] 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS..WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
- [ ] 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
- [ ] 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- [XXX] 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- [ ] 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating: skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

- [ ] 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
- [ ] 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
- [ ] 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
- [ ] 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- [ ] 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
- [ ] 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
- [XXX] 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

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(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. CHASAN — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
[redacted]	20 Jan. 1924	M	DI

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
Japan Station (REDWOOD)	Area Operations Officer

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-14		1 October 1955 to 30 September 1956

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): [ ] INITIAL [X] ANNUAL [ ] REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [ ] REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [ ] SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
15 November 1956	Edward M. [signature]	Chief, Soviet Branch

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
21 November 1956	W. Lloyd George	~~Chief of Operations~~

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? [X] Yes [ ] No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
2		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (*truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds*) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (*First line supervisor*)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (*Second line supervisors*)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (*Executive level*)
3		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (*Specify*)

FORM NO. (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS 45 AND 45a SECRET Potential

14-00000

(when filled in)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER. Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. C95951N GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
[redacted]	20 Jan. 1924	M	DI

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
Japan Station (REDWOOD)	Area Operations Officer

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-14		1 October 1955 to 30 September 1956

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): INITIAL; X ANNUAL; REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR; REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE; SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT [X] HAS [ ] HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

- X THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
- THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
- X I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
- IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
- I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
15 November 1956	Edward W. Arelius	Chief, Soviet Branch

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

Posted Pos. ... BY R DATE 19 JAN 1957
Reviewed ... [initials] 1-22-57

[ ] CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
21 November 1956	W. Lloyd George	Chief of Operations

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 3 11 13 AM '57
MAIL ROOM

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	*HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE*	*CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS*
GIVING LECTURES	*DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS*	*PREPARES SUMMARIES*
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	*ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS*	*TRANSLATES GERMAN*
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	*MANAGES FILES*	*DEBRIEFING SOURCES*
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	*OPERATES RADIO*	*KEEPS BOOKS*
TYPING	*COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES*	*DRIVES TRUCK*
TAKING DICTATION	*WRITES REGULATIONS*	*MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING*
SUPERVISING	*PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE*	*EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA*

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Deputy to Branch Chief	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Supervising	4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Conducts Foreign Liaisón	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Prepares correspondence and reports	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Prepares and manages projects	4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6: Handles admin routine	4

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject has really superb natural equipment for work in this Organization in terms of mental capacity, psychological bent and affinity for the things and people he comes against. He tops this off with industry and language ability among other natural aptitudes. On the debit side and measured against the best, he is a bit shy of humor and personal understanding in some situations, qualities which mitigate more against acceptability than job competence.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? [X] YES [ ] NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

Subject is an all around performer capable of a primary, in place of his present secondary, responsibility.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF [illegible] THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION
Six

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Subject has a high all around potential. With respect to supervision below, he tends to support subordinates from his own energy rather than to bring them along the hard way, and a normal tendency to avoid the categorical "no" - both tendencies easily correctable.

JAN 3 11 15 AM '57
MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Routine refresher training as appropriate.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

All normal. No limiting factors.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
X	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET (When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. C 45A5IN — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
[redacted]	20 Jan. 1924	M	DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE		
Tokyo Station RID/CCD	Area Operations Officer		
7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)	
GS-14		1 October 1956 to 30 September 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): INITIAL; X ANNUAL; REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR; REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE; SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
23 Oct 57	Lloyd GEORGE [signature]	CCS, Tokyo

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
16 Oct 1957	Edward [signature]	Chief SOV Branch Japan Station

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: **7**

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER:
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
2		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (*truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds*) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (*First line supervisor*)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (*Second line supervisor*)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (*Executive level*)
3		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (*Specify*)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ... SECRET — Potential (4)

SECRET

(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

15

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Subject is well suited for this business and the business for him. He should progress steadily to positions of great responsibility.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Normal refresher a/o preparatory training as required.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

No limiting facters or personal circumstances known to the rater

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS, HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
[illegible]	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. CASASIN GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
[redacted]	20 Jan. 1924	M	DI

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
Tokyo Station REDWOOD	Area Operations Officer

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-12		1 October 1956 to 30 September 1957

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): INITIAL [ ] ANNUAL [X] REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [X] REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [ ] SPECIAL (Specify) [ ]

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT [ ] HAS [ ] HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT. Completed at Headquarters; subject not available (Copy sent to field.)

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.	IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.	I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.	

B. THIS DATE	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
16 Oct 1957	Edward [signature]	Chief SOV Branch Japan Station

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

DATE 27 NOV 1957
Posted Per. Card [initials]
Reviewed by PCD [initials] 11/12

[ ] CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
23 OCT 57	Lloyd GEORGE [signature]	COS, Tokyo

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 30 1 50 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE	CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
GIVING LECTURES	DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS	PREPARES SUMMARIES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS	TRANSLATES GERMAN
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	MANAGES FILES	DEBRIEFING SOURCES
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	OPERATES RADIO	KEEPS BOOKS
TYPING	COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES	DRIVES TRUCK
TAKING DICTATION	WRITES REGULATIONS	MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
SUPERVISING	PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE	EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO.	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO.	RATING NUMBER
1. Deputy to Branch Chief	5	4. Supervising	4
2. Conducts Foreign Liaison	6	5. Prepares correspondence and reports and handles administrative routine	5
3. Prepares and Manages Projects	4	6. Developes and handles Agents	5

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject has excellent natural equipment for employment in this organization in terms of his intelligence and natural apptitudes. Additionally, he brings a great deal of area knowledge and language ability to his present assignment. During the period covered by this report he has displayed great industry and devotion to duty in a variety of circumstances and achieved notable results in production and in the creation of both short and long-term assets for his unit. On the debit side I would say that he is somewhat too businesslike in many personal situations to the point of being almost humourless. This, however, is a quality which he does not permit to intrude upon the necessities of his operational work although it often shows in office relationships.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY....WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE....BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? [ ] YES [X] NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

14-00000

(When Filled In)

FITN. S REPORT (Part II) POTEN. .L

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. EASASTA GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
[illegible]	20 Jan 1924	M	DI

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
FE, TOKYO, JAPAN	Area Ops Officer

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-14		1 October 1957 - 9 April 1958

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR		SPECIAL (Specify)
		ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE	X	Promotion

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
27 May 1958	William E. Nelson	

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
27 May 1958	John E. Baker	

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? [X] Yes [ ] No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	2	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

10 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

His potential for advancement is excellent. He has the right blend of operational know-how and supervisory talent to undertake positions of wider scope than he now holds. Although his advancement has been rapid for his age, his maturity, poise and common sense almost completely eliminate age as a factor in his potential for a more senior job.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Subject deserves at sometime within the next year or two the opportunity to broaden his experience either by command of a small station or advancement to a more responsible job in a large one.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

None

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
- X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS, HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
- 1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
- 2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
- 3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
- 4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
- 5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	5	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	5	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	5	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET SK 8.
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8. of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. 0A5151A **GENERAL**

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
[redacted]	20 Jan 1924	M	DI

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
FE, TOKYO, JAPAN	Area Ops Officer

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-14		1 October 1957 - 9 April 1958

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	X	SPECIAL (Specify) Promotion
		ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE		

SECTION B. **CERTIFICATION**

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT [X] HAS [ ] HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

x	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
27 May 1958	William E. Nelson	

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control	[signature]	14 JUL
Reviewed by TOD	[signature]	7/24/58

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN PREPARED UNDER CRITERIA [illegible] AT THIS STATION AND IN CONSONANCE [illegible] IN ORDER TO MAKE FITNESS [illegible] REPORTS AS [illegible] AND [illegible] AS POSSIBLE

[ ] CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
27 May 1958	John E. Baker	

SECTION C. **JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION**

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

5/6 INSERT RATING NUMBER

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY. OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	*HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE*	*CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS*
GIVING LECTURES	*DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS*	*PREPARES SUMMARIES*
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	*ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS*	*TRANSLATES GERMAN*
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	*MANAGES FILES*	*DEBRIEFING SOURCES*
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	*OPERATES RADIO*	*KEEPS BOOKS*
TYPING	*COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES*	*DRIVES TRUCK*
TAKING DICTATION	*WRITES REGULATIONS*	*MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING*
SUPERVISING	*PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE*	*EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA*

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 As branch chief directs and plans operations of denied area branch.	5/6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts liaison with other U.S. agencies	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts operational liaison with local security services.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Develops and handles agents	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject is an exceedingly well-equipped operations officer. He is mature, intelligent, has a thorough background in operations in his area and the ability to grow in his job. His operational planning and execution is usually impeccable. He has the loyalty of his subordinates and the respect of his equals and supervisors. He is particularly effective in dealing in the liaison field where his good sense and disinterest in "fighting the problem" produces a maximum of cooperation and good will. If he has any minor fault as a supervisor, it is not in impatience with his subordinates, as reflected in previous evaluations, but in an occasional unwillingness to say no to them.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A — GENERAL

CASASIN

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE
[redacted]	20 January 1924	M	GS-14

5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT
		SR, Tokyo, Japan

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS					
NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER		DEFERRED	
PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED	

9. TYPE OF REPORT			
	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	11. REPORTING PERIOD	SPECIAL (Specify)
31 May 1959	From 10 Apr 58 To 31 Mar 59	

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
No. 1: Supervises and directs operational branch of some 17 persons	5	No. 4: Case officer	6
No. 2: Conducts operational liaison with local intelligence and security services.	6	No. 5:	
No. 3: Conducts liaison with U.S. military and civilian intelligence services	6	No. 6:	

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

14-00000

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

APR 22 11 19 AM '59 MAIL ROOM

Subject continues as one of the most capable, professional and hard working of the branch chiefs in the Station. Working against a tough denied area problem, he demonstrates imagination, drive, excellent area background and knowledge, and a high degree of productivity. He definitely has the potential for an even more responsible position.

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
27 April 1959	signed on transmittal

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
22	

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

- [ ] EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
- [ ] REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
- [ ] OTHER (Specify):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
27 April 1959	DC Tokyo Station	William Nelson signed on transmittal

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

- [x] I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
- [ ] I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
- [ ] I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
- [ ] I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
27 April 1959	C/Tokyo Station	John E. Baker signed on transmittal

SECRET

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE
[redacted]	20 Jan 1924	M	GS-14

5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT
DI		FE/Tokyo Sta/SR

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS: NOT ELIGIBLE / MEMBER / DEFERRED / PENDING / DECLINED / DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL / REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR / X ANNUAL / X REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE / SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

11. REPORTING PERIOD From 1 Apr 59 — 24 June 60

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
No. 1: Chief, Soviet Branch, responsible for activities of 24 staff and 6 contract employees	6	No. 4: Case officer	5/6
No. 2: Responsible for station SR planning, budgeting, and operating activities	6	No. 5:	
No. 3: Representing the station at varied levels in all SR matters	6	No. 6:	

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

In most respects, this officer is one of the best I have known in this agency. He has a broad and deep knowledge of his target area, as well as of his "host" country; an excellent and proven degree of operational "know-how"; the ability to write and speak lucidly and effectively and with apparent ease; and a very high degree of motivation and devotion to duty. He can be expected to continue his dynamic and imaginative pursuit of a most difficult target. It is my opinion that this officer has great potential and is ready for increased responsibilities which would involve the promotion for which he has been recommended. As for training, a good managerial course might help to bring into even sharper focus his many talents.

> This report has been prepared in accordance with F E Division standards which recognize the principle of rating the individual against the group. Thus an 'average' rating reflects an entirely satisfactory performance.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
23 June 1960	[redacted]/s/ on transmittal

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

- [ ] EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
- [ ] REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
- [ ] OTHER (*Specify*):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
23 June 1960		Adam Brindle(P) signed on transmittal

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

- [x] I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
- [ ] I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
- [ ] I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
- [ ] I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
	COS, Tokyo	John Baker/s/ on transmittal

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Recorded by CSPD

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE
[illegible]	20 January 1924	M	GS-14

5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT
D	Branch Chief	OC/SR/6

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS: NOT ELIGIBLE / MEMBER / DEFERRED / PENDING / DECLINED / DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL / REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR / X ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE / SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

11. REPORTING PERIOD From July 1960 To October 61

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

Specific Duty	Rating No.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises large functional branch of thirty-seven staff and fifteen contract personnel.	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Plans and programs for operations support, including initiation of new support activities.	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises preparation of, and sometimes personally prepares, special studies both on own initiative and on request.	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts liaison with various components of the Agency and with other agencies.	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares and presents briefings.	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Supervises maintenance of SR Division records on Soviet defectors, supports exploitation of defectors and participates in their resettlement.	5

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

14-00000

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstra[illegible] current position. Indicate suggestions [illegible] employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

20 NOV '61
MAIL ROOM

Mr. [redacted] has a good knowledge of Soviet matters and generally is very well informed. He continually demonstrates much initiative and a high degree of productivity. He is stimulating to his associates, businesslike and delegates work easily. He appears very self-confident and he is dynamic.

Mr. [redacted] supervises a very large and key branch engaged in a wide variety of activities, a difficult job which he does well.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
9 November 1961	[redacted]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
Twelve	

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

	EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS		REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
	OTHER (Specify):		

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
9 November 1961	SR/Chief of Plans and Operations	[illegible]

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

X	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
	I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
21 NOV 1961	Chief, SR Division	JOHN M. MAURY

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

6 August 1962

CASASIN

Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report

Subject:

My last statements concerning the performance of should be extended to cover the remainder of his service as Chief of SR/6. He departed headquarters for a field assignment 31 July 1962.

QUENTIN C. JOHNSON
Chief of Operations and Plans
SR Division

CONCUR: HOWARD J. OSBORN
Chief, SR Division

14-00000

Casasin

6 August 1962

Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report

Subject: [redacted]

My last statements concerning the performance of [redacted] should be extended to cover the remainder of his service as Chief of SR/3. He departed headquarters for a field assignment 31 July 1962.

QUENTIN C. JOHNSON
Chief of Operations and Plans
SR Division

CONCUR:
EDWARD J. O'BRIEN
Chief, SR Division

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: HARVEY, WILLIAM K.
O.P. FILE

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: PERSONAL & UNRELATED TIME PERIOD MATERIAL

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
15 AUG 78		DAN HARDWAY	Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

14-00000

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: HARVEY, WILLIAM K.
OP FILE

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: PERSONAL & UNRELATED TIME PERIOD MATERIAL

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
15 AUG 78		DAN HARDWAY	Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

14-00000

NEW YORK TIMES
14 JUNE 1976

W. Harvey, C.I.A. Aide, Dead; Linked to Anti-Castro Plotting

William K. Harvey, reportedly the head of a special Central Intelligence Agency group set up in the 1960's to plan the removal of foreign leaders by means including assasination, died of a heart attack last Wednesday in an Indianapolis hospital.

Mr. Harvey, who was 60 years old, was said to have been in charge of the agency's efforts against Prime Minister Fidel Castro of Cuba. He was among 10 agents whose identities were disclosed by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence after an investigation in 1975 of alleged assassination plots by the United States.

William E. Colby, then Director of Central Intelligence, had argued that disclosure of the names of agents would put them in jeopardy of retaliation by "irrational groups."

Mr. Harvey testified before the Senate committee that he had been told by superiors that the Castor assasination plot had been aproved at the highest levels of the government, and that he had discussed the efforts with his immediate superior, Richard Helms, who later became director of the agency.

Mr. Harvey moved to Indianapolis in 1969 after retiring from the agency, where he had worked for 22 years. He worked for the Federal Bureau of Investigation from 1940 to 1947.

At the time of his death, Mr. Harvey was law editor for Bobbs-Merrill Publishing Company.

He was buried Saturday at South Cemetery in Danville, just west of Indianapolis. He is survived by his wife, Clara Grace, a daughter, Sally, and a son, James D. Harvey.

14-00000

68-134

13 FEB 1968

Mr. William King Harvey
23 West Irving Street
Chevy Chase, Maryland 20015

Dear Bill:

I am sorry that due to a busy schedule and my absence for several days during the Christmas holidays I didn't have an opportunity to see you prior to your retirement at the end of the year.

Red White has told me of his visit with you, and I am particularly appreciative of your expression of continued loyalty to the Agency and your offer to be of assistance should an appropriate occasion arise.

I extend to you, personally and officially, my sincere appreciation for the important work you have done and my warmest hopes that you will find full enjoyment in the years ahead.

Sincerely,

/s/ Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

OP/BSD/RB/MJRoper:jsc
Rewritten:ExDir:sbo
Distribution:
0 - Adse
1 - ER
1 - C/EAB/OS
1 - D/Pers
~~1~~ - OPF
1 - RB

(Concurred in by C/EAB/OS on 8 Jan 68)

NOTE: Covert correspondence

Mr. William King Harvey
28 West Irving Street
Chevy Chase, Maryland 20015

Dear Bill:

As you reach the end of your active career of Government service, I want to join your friends and colleagues in wishing you continued success and satisfaction in your retirement.

You have been privileged to face the challenge of important responsibilities during your more than twenty-six years of service to your country. The success with which you have met them should be a source of lasting pride and satisfaction to you.

May I extend to you, personally and officially, my sincere appreciation for the important work you have done and my warmest hopes that you will find full enjoyment in the years ahead.

Sincerely,

Richard Helms
Director

Distribution:
O - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - C/EAB/CS
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - RB
1 - RB Reader

Originator: [illegible]
Director of Personnel

Concur: [illegible] **
C/EAB/CS

OP/BSD/RB/[illegible]Roper:jsc (26 December 1967)

**NOTE: Covert correspondence.

14-00000

SECRET

(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 28 December 1967

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 051164

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): HARVEY, William K.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Retirement - CIA Retirement System (Voluntary) AND DISABILITY

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 DAY 31 YEAR 67

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6 FUNDS: V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF — X

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 8136-1186

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sec. 233

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/EUR Development Complement

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Wash., D. C.

11 POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

12 POSITION NUMBER: 9997

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 18 1

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 27055

18 REMARKS

Mr. Harvey is not recommended for the Agency Reserve List.

Coord w/ Mike Roper, RB, by telecon 12/29/67.

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL | DATE SIGNED | 18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER | DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 45 | 20 EMPLOY CODE: 10 | 21 OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC, ALPHABETIC) | 22 STATION CODE | 23 INTEGREE CODE | 24 HQDTRS. CODE: 1 | 25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.): 09 13 16 | 26 DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.) | 27 DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA. YR.) | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30 RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE, CODE) | 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR) | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY REQ NO. | 34 SEX

CBJ CC00

35 VET PREFERENCE (CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT) | 36 SERV COMP DATE (MO. DA YR.) | 37 LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR.) | 38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR RESV PROV TEMP, CODE) | 39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE, 0—WAIVER 1—YES, HEALTH INS. CODE) | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) | 42 LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO, CODE, NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44 STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO, CODE, NO TAX EXEMP., STATE CODE)

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 1-9-68 [illegible]

46 OP APPROVAL: Emmett D. Echols

DATE APPROVED: 28 Dec 1967

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET

13 DEC

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Request for Voluntary Retirement - William K. Harvey

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval; this recommendation is contained in paragraph 4.

2. Mr. William K. Harvey, GS-18, Operations Officer, European Division, Clandestine Services, has applied for voluntary retirement under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50j, to be effective 30 December 1967.

3. Mr. Harvey has been designated a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System and meets the technical requirements for voluntary retirement under the System. He is 52 years old with over 26 years of Federal Service. This service includes over 20 years with the Agency of which more than 9 years were in qualifying service overseas. The CIA Retirement Board has recommended that his application for voluntary retirement be approved. I endorse this recommendation.

4. It is recommended that you approve the voluntary retirement of Mr. William K. Harvey under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50j.

/s/ Emmett D. Echols

Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

The recommendation contained in paragraph 4 is approved:

/s/ Richard Helms	15 DEC 1967
Director of Central Intelligence	Date

SECRET

Distribution:

0 - Return to D/Pers
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - RB Soft file (w/hold)
1 - RB Reader

OP/FSD/RE/MJRoper:tlh (7 December 1967)
Retyped: OP/FSD/BDeFelice:jas (11 December 1967)

14-00000

Personal Information

7:25 - [illegible]
not in

? 18

25,890

Op. officer

Conv. 2-25-67

EOD. 30 Sept. 47

2:25 - [illegible]

10 --
12. not in
12.45 not in
1:15 not in
1:30 not in
2:00 not in

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

STATEMENT of EARNINGS and DEDUCTIONS

NAME	EMPLOYEE NO.	PAY PERIOD DATE	ROLL	COST CENTER	STA
HARVEY WILLIAM K	061164	04/09 05/06	01	1361186	000

CD	EARNINGS NORMAL	EARNINGS OTHER	DESCRIPTION
01	199200		REG SAL

NOTE: THIS FORM IS ISSUED ONLY WHEN AN EMPLOYEE ENTERS ON DUTY OR THERE IS ANY CHANGE IN THE PAY ACCOUNT

CD	DEDUCTIONS NORMAL	DEDUCTIONS OTHER	DESCRIPTION
41	35014		F/TAX 1
53	1102		INS WEAPA
54	1000		INS FEGLI
57	750		INS UALIC
61	1374		0820 HOSP 2
75	12948		AGY RET

ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION DATA								REFUND DUE FROM EMPLOYEE			NET PAY		
PP	OT/HRS	HT/HRS	ND/HRS	RATE	O/T-HT AMT	N/D AMOUNT		CD	NORMAL	OTHER	CD	NORMAL	OTHER
											99	147012	

REMARKS:

PAID AT HQS.
147012

FORM 1315 (10-51)

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 27 February 1967

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)
061164	HARVEY, WILLIAM K

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH / DAY / YEAR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
CONVERSION FROM FSR STATUS	02 / 25 / 67	REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V; V TO CF; CF TO V; CF TO CF: XX

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 7136-~~1207~~ 1186

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUR
~~FOREIGN FIELD~~ Dec Comf.
~~SOUTHERN REGION~~
~~ROME STATION~~
~~OFFICE OF THE CHIEF (UNASSIGNED)~~

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Wash, D.C. ~~ROME, ITALY~~

11. POSITION TITLE: ~~CHIEF OF STATION~~ ofc Officer

12. POSITION NUMBER: ~~0000~~ 9997

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	~~0136.05~~ 0136.01	18-1	$ 25,890

18. REMARKS

cc payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
Richard F. Westerman, C/EUR/Personnel		[signature]	2/28/67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOURS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR
56	10	9997	[illegible]	[illegible]		1	09 13 16		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR; 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE; 30 RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 3—FICA, 5—NONE) CODE; 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE; 32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR; EOD DATA; 33 SECURITY REQ NO; 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT); 36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR; 37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR; 38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE; 39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0—WAIVED, 1—YES), HEALTH INS. CODE; 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS); 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)); 42 LEAVE CAT CODE; 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO), CODE, NO TAX EXEMPTIONS; 44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO), CODE, NO TAX EXEMP, STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46 OP APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
3-15-67 mw	[signature]	2 Mar 67

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 27 February 1967

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 061164
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): HARVEY, WILLIAM K
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 24 YEAR 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF: XXX
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 7136-1186
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/EUR CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: ~~Int Security~~ OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS (FSR)
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 18-1
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 25,890 (24,220 / 24,770)

18. REMARKS: From: ~~DDP/EUR/FF/COS, ROME~~
Subject departed the Station 21 March 1966.

Other.

cc security

Security [illegible] SR/CS 3/15/67
[illegible] 3/16/67

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Richard F. Westerman, E/F/Personnel
DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [signature]
DATE SIGNED: 3/15/67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HDQTRS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF LEI
37	1	4497	[illegible]	73 [illegible]		1	09 13 16		

28 NTE EXPIRES | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30 RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 3—FICA, 5—NONE) | 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 CORRECTION-CANCELLATION DATA | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY REQ NO. | 34 SEX

35 VET. PREFERENCE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT) | 36 SERV COMP DATE | 37 LONG COMP DATE | 38 CAREER CATEGORY | 39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE (0—WAIVED, 1—YES) | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS); 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) | 42 LEAVE CAT CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 0—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44 STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 3-15-67
46. OP APPROVAL: [signature]
DATE APPROVED: [illegible]

FORM 2-66 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

14-00000

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Rome

Director of Personnel

KUBLOGAGE - - Notification of Designation as a Participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System

Action: As indicated
REF: Book Dispatch 5096 & OIRS - 7566

1. You have been found to be qualified as a participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System and have been so designated effective 21 November 1965.

2. Although such designation under present statutes is viewed favorably by most persons, the regulation governing this retirement system gives the individual the right to appeal such a determination if he deems the designation adverse to his best interests. In order that this technical requirement may be satisfied, you are hereby notified of your right to appeal. An appeal with reasons therefore must be received in Headquarters within 60 days of the date of this dispatch or acceptance of designation will be assumed. Any questions that you may have in connection with your designation that cannot be answered by referring to Book Dispatch 5096 should be forwarded to Headquarters.

3. We believe that the benefits of the Organization Retirement System are superior to the benefits of the Civil Service Retirement System. However, there are a few situations in which an employee at the time of retirement may have so many years of service (almost 37) that he would receive a higher annuity under the Civil Service system. Because of this, the policy decision has been made that a participant in the Organization system who would receive a higher annuity under the Civil Service system may, not later than one year prior to his retirement, apply to be removed from our system and transferred to the Civil Service system. Thus, you should not anticipate this contingency as a factor in deciding whether you regard your designation as a participant adverse to your best interests.

21 DEC 1965

/s/ Richard B. Egan 15 DEC 1965

RICHARD B. EG

OIRS - 7779

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 16 November 1965

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)
061164	HARVEY, WILLIAM K.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH / DAY / YEAR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	11 / 21 / 65	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
	CF TO V	XXX	CF TO CF	6136-1267	PL 88-643 Sect. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/WE ROME STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	ROME, ITALY

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
FIRST SECRETARY CHIEF OF STATION	0262	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR GS	0136.05	01 2 18 1	24,284 $ 25,382

18. REMARKS

EMPLOYEE WILL BE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND OF HIS RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

1 cc to OP/BSD/RB
1 cc to CCS
1 cc to Finance through CCS

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
Philip C. B[illegible]	18 NOV 1965		

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOURS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
28	10	5062	WE	36533		3	09 13 16	05 17 59	05 17 59

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
		2					

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT)	36. SERV COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR TEN / PROV TEMP / CODE)	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE, 0-WAIVER 1-YES, HEALTH INS. CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMP / STATE CODE)

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. OP APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
[illegible]	[illegible signature]	[illegible]

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 28 MARCH 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 061164
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): HARVEY, WILLIAM K.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 6 DAY 30 YEAR 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CC | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3136-6300-1014
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WE
ROME STATION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: ROME, ITALY

11. POSITION TITLE: ~~CHIEF OF STATION~~ Secretary
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0262
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP		17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR		02	0	15,900
GS ~~(OC)~~	0136.01	18	1	20,000

18. REMARKS
FROM: DDP ~~TASK FORCE W~~/OFFICE OF THE CHIEF/0662.

APPOINTMENT MEMO TO DCI SENT ON 27 MARCH 1963.

259 SENT TO MEDICS ON 15 MARCH 1963. Security Approval Granted by Pers. SD/SS 4/3/63

REQUEST ALL NECESSARY CLEARANCES BE GRANTED PRIOR TO 1 JUNE 1963.

COPIES SENT TO FINANCE AND SECURITY. CSPD [illegible] 06/27/63

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: THOMAS M. FISHER, C/WE/PT
DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [signature]
DATE SIGNED: 24 June 63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE OR OF	24. HOOTRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	6243	WE	31533		3	09 13 16		

28. NTE EXP RES | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 4 - NONE) | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.) | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE | 37. LONG. COMP. DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR/RES, PROV/TEMP) | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE) | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)) | 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED: 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED: 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [signature] 6/27/63
46. O.P. APPROVAL: [signature]
DATE APPROVED: 28 June 63

FORM 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152a.
6-62

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

14-00000

SECRET

CD/P 3-5554

12 JUN 1963

Executive Registry 63-4940

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Appointment of Mr. William K. Harvey Chief of Station, Rome, Italy

1. This is to make a matter of written record the appointment of Mr. Harvey as Chief of Station, Rome, Italy, effective on or about 30 June 1963. Mr. Harvey will replace Mr. Francis I. G. Coleman, who is scheduled to attend the next session of the National War College. Verbal approval was given by you and by the Director.

2. A biographic data sheet, including information regarding his Agency experience and training, is attached.

William D. O'Ryan
WILLIAM D. O'RYAN
Chief
Western Europe Division

Attachment
Biographic Profile (Part I)

CONCUR:

Richard Helms — 1? JUN 1963
Deputy Director (Plans) — (Date)

APPROVED:

Marshall S. Carter — 2? June '63
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence — (Date)

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

22 May 1963

Mr. William K. Harvey

Dear Bill,

I wish to express my real appreciation for the time you have devoted to Agent Panel affairs. Your operational experience and personal knowledge of many of the individual staff agents and career agents have provided a sound basis for your contributions to Panel decisions concerning their promotions and reassignments. I look forward to the time, after your overseas assignment, when we may have the pleasure of your service in a similar capacity.

Sincerely,

W. Lloyd George

W. Lloyd George
Chairman, CS Agent Panel

Bill, may I add in my own hand and words real appreciation for your wisdom, objectivity and help

Lloyd

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 24 August 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 561164 ✓
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): HARVEY, WILLIAM K. ✓
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 6 DAY 8 YEAR 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / X CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3132 - 1000 - 1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: Task Force W, Office of the Chief
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer — CH ~~Chief~~ Exec.. Coord
12. POSITION NUMBER: BA-662
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR ~~GS 15~~
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 02-10 ~~18 1~~
17. SALARY OR RATE: $14900 ~~$18500~~ ✓
18. REMARKS: ~~PRA for the duration of Task Force W~~ from FI staff tray 4

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: [signature] for Louis Armstrong — DATE SIGNED: 8/27/62
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [signature] — DATE SIGNED: 8/28/62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HQTRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LE
37	10	61100 / TF10	75013		1	09 31 16		

28. NTE EXPIRES; 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE; 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 = CSC, 2 = FICA, 3 = NONE); 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE; 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA; EOD DATA; 33. SECURITY REQ. NO.; 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 = NONE, 1 = 5 PT., 2 = 10 PT.); 36. SERV. COMP. DATE; 37. LONG. COMP. DATE; 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR/RESV, PROV/TEMP); 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 = WAIVED, 1 = YES; HEALTH INS. CODE); 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)); 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE; 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS); 44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [signature] Kearney 08/25/62
46. O.P. APPROVAL: [signature] for OP Pers — DATE APPROVED: 29 Aug 62

1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

14-00000

Pre - 1959 personnel actions

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I)

1. PERS. SERIAL NO.		SCD: 15 Jan 1941
061164		

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	3. SEX	4. DATE OF BIRTH	5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE
HARVEY, William King	M	13 Sep 1915	29 Sep 1947

6. MARITAL STATUS	7. DEPENDENT(S) (Exclude employee)	NO.	YEAR(S) OF BIRTH	8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S)	SPOUSE
Remarried		3	? ? ?	NA	?

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS	MEMBERSHIP	OTHER STATUS	10. LAST MED. RPT.	QUAL. FOR	EVAL. FOR
	?		May 1967	Current Duties	Annual Exec

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS	NON	SERVICE	GRADE	ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT. 1	RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT. 2	TO BE DEFERRED CAT. 3	RETIRED
	X						

12. ASSESSMENT DATE	13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE	14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1931-33 Danville Gazette, Indiana - Reporter & Printer
1934-35 Indiana Univ, Bloomington - Publicity Writer (athletics)(PT)
1937-40 Self-employed, Maysville, Kentucky - Attorney-at-Law
1940-47 Dept of Justice, FBI, DC/NYC/Pittsburgh, Pa - Special Agent & Supervisor/

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

1933-37 Indiana Univ, Bloomington - LLB (with Distinction) Law, Psych, Philos, Journalism

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)

German - R,High; W,P,S,U,Inter; Interpret - Oct 1961

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1963 Italian

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE	GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Sep 1947	Intel Of	P-6		OSO/FBS/Ch, Inf'TUSSRDIV	Hq
May 1948	" "	P-7		OSO/COPS/FBS/DCh, ForeignBr	"
Dec 1948	" "	P-7		OSO/COPS/DOPC/DCh, ForeignBr	"
Mar 1949	" "	P-7		OSO/COPS/DCh, Ops for CE	"
Oct 1949	" "	GS15		OSO/Ch, Stf-C&ACh, Stf-D	"
Feb 1951	Chief Stf E	16		OSO/Ch, Staff E	"
Dec 1951	I O	16		OSO/Ch, Plans Staff	"
Dec 1952	Ops Of	16		DDP/EE/GerMis/BOB/COB	Bonn
Nov 1953	I O	16	FI	DDP/EE/GerMis/BOB/COB	Berlin
Dec 1954	Area Ops Of 0136.01	16	FI	" " " "	"
Jan 1956	" " " 0136.01	17	DI	DDP/EE/GerSta/BOB/COB	"
May 1959	Chief of Base 0136.01	18	DI	" " " " " "	"
	Sep 1959 return to Hq				
Oct 1959	Ops Of 0136.01	18	DI	DDP/Ch, FI/D	Hq
Jun 1962	" " 0136.01	18	D	DDP/Ch, Task Force W	"
Jun 1963	Chief of Sta 0136.01	18	D	DDP/WE/Rome Sta/COS	Rome
Jun 1965	" " " 0136.05	18	D	" " " "	"
Feb 1967	Ops Of 0136.01	18	D	DDP/EUR/Dev Comp	Hq
Dec 1967	Retirement (voluntary - CIARDS)				

20. DATE REVIEWED	21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY	22. ITEMS 1-19 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE
22 Sep 1971	obs	No

FORM 8-57 1200 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET PROFILE (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 061164

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Harvey William K.	13 Sept 1916	M	GS-18	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Chief of Station	DDP/WE/Italian	Rome

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT	10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY	INITIAL / REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)	X ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):	SPECIAL (Specify):
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1964 - 31 March 1965

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Chief of Station, Rome	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Handles Station relationship with Ambassador and Embassy and the Base in Milan.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Supervises CA Program.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Engaged in reorientation of Station FI Program.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: O

15 JUN 1965

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET

(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Harvey has continued to manage the Agency's activities in Italy with the same enthusiasm and drive which characterized the description of his approach to the Station Chief role in his past Fitness Report.

In his efforts to reorient the Rome Station's FI program toward Soviet-Satellite targets Mr. Harvey has devoted considerable energy to acquiring the basic information needed for this task. This has been well reported and the responsibilities for carrying out this shift in operational approach have been precisely delegated. It is still early to assess the results operationally but the reorientation has been well organized. As an early indication of the trend this is taking, several successful technical operations have been established which are well on target.

To accomplish the objectives of the CA responsibilities of the Rome Station Mr. Harvey has acquired the most competent officers with this highly specialized skill and has staunchly supported their efforts to prosecute this program which remains extensive. He has considerably improved the Station relationship with Embassy officers, including the Ambassador, by devoting greater effort to this necessary phase of the Station Chief's role and the Ambassador, during a recent trip to Washington, made special mention of the degree of confidence he had in the Station's reporting and in the extent to which it has kept him properly informed.

During the period under review Mr. Harvey acquired a Deputy Station Chief - for whose arrival he had waited more than 6 months. He has delegated general management of the Station's activities to this officer, who has applied himself diligently to this task and the results have been promising. Mr. Harvey has been receptive to headquarters guidance, is extremely prompt and thorough in replying to his correspondence.

(cont'd)

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE	
I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Employee at Field Station

2. BY SUPERVISOR		
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 24	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 2 June 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/WE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William D. O'Ryan

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL		
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL		
DATE 3 June 65	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL ADDP	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Thomas H. Karamessines

SECRET

SECRET

William K. Harvey

Fitness Report for Period 1 April 1964 - 31 March 1965

Section C (cont'd)

Some administrative details, such as the reports on the performance of officers whose evaluation he was reluctant to make, Mr. Harvey has had a tendency to postpone despite repeated efforts to provoke him into timely response.

I have rated Mr. Harvey's overall performance outstanding in recognition of his superior supervisory ability, his unusual skill in expressing his views and his determination to accomplish his basic objectives regardless of the obstacles which he encounters. The Rome Station is complex, is engaged in some highly sensitive operations which must be guided with a strong hand and by an officer with a degree of professionalism which Mr. Harvey is well able to supply as a result of his extensive operational experience.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 061164

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
HARVEY	William	K.	13 Sept 1916	M	GS-18	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Chief of Station	DDP/WE/Italian	Rome

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT		10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT	
X	CAREER		INITIAL
	RESERVE	X	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	TEMPORARY		ANNUAL
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
	1 April 1965 - 27 September 1965

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- **W - Weak** — Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- **A - Adequate** — Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
- **P - Proficient** — Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
- **S - Strong** — Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- **O - Outstanding** — Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Chief of Station, Rome	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Handles Station relationship with Ambassador and Embassy and the Base in Milan.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Supervises CA Program.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Engaged in reorientation of Station FI Program.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5:	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: O

28 OCT 1965

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS
Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.	

My rating of the performance of this officer remains the same as the description of his performance which is contained in his fitness report for period ending 31 March 1965.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE William K. Harvey	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 30	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Mr. Harvey is currently at his overseas post.	
DATE 27 September 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, WE Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William D. O'Ryan
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the evaluations given Mr. Harvey on duties No. 2, 3 and 4. I believe duty No. 2 could have been rated "outstanding" rather than "strong," with justification. I also think, however, that duty No. 1, involving the overall administration and management of the Station and its personnel, should more appropriately be rated "proficient," or perhaps "strong."

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
21 October 1965	ADDP	Thomas H. Karamessines

SECRET

14-00000

what date?

Colored photograph removed this date and forwarded with Biographic Profile to Mr. McCone via Mr. Henry Oosthoek, WH/Pers. Mr. Oosthoek cleared with Mr. Gene Stevens, Chief, T&R Branch, POD/OP, the removal of picture.

V. Graham, OP/POD/CAB
5E-2508 HQS
Ext. 7771



14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SE: 9 JAN 68

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OLF

1 SERIAL NUMBER	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
061164	HARVEY WILLIAM K

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4 EFFECTIVE DATE	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
RETIREMENT VOLUNTARY UNDER THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	12 31 67	REGULAR

6 FUNDS	V TO V		V TO CF	7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	8135 1100 0000	P.L. 88-643 SECT. 233

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/EUR DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12 POSITION NUMBER	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	9997	D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE AND STEP	17 SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	18 1	27055

18 REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ. Code	21 OFFICE CODING	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH	26 DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF LEI
45	18					09 13 18		

28 NTE EXPIRES	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction Cancellation Data	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX
			CE 00000				

35 VET PREFERENCE | 36 SERV. COMP DATE | 37 LONG COMP DATE | 38 CAREER CATEGORY | 39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE | 42 LEAVE CAT CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44 STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

D. ECHOLS

POSTED

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg 10-67 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

FLW

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
HARVEY WILLIAM K	061164	44 997	CF	GS 18 1	$25,890	$27,055

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

E.I. 16 MAR 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

CCE

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
061164	HARVEY WILLIAM K

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
CONVERSION FROM FSR STATUS	CCE 02 25 67	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
			X		7136 1186 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/EUR DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	9997	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	18 1	25890

18. REMARKS

OTHER
WASH., D.C.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Nagtn. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
56	18	44997	EUR	75013		1	09 13 16		

28. NTE EXPIRE MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - CIA, 3 - FICA, 4 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES)	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BJT: 16 MAR 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
061164	HARVEY WILLIAM K

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	02 24 67	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	7136 1186 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/EUR DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
FIRST SECRETARY OPS OFFICER	9997	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR GS	0136.01	01 2 18 1	24770 25890

18. REMARKS

OTHER
ROME, ITALY

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC)	21. OFFICE CODING (ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	18	44397	EUR	75013	1	1	09 13 16		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - CIA, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE)	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX
				EOD DATA		

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG COMP. DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	44. STATE TAX DATA
0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.); 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)		FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO); CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO); CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
3-17-67

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
HARVEY WILLIAM K	061164	50 630	CF	GS 18 1	$25,382	$25,890

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
HARVEY WILLIAM K	061164	50 630	CF	GS 18 1	$24,500	$25,382

14-00000

JGD: 19 NOV 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OD/pers

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
061164	HARVEY WILLIAM K

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	11 21 65	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
				X	6136 1267 0000	PL 88-643 SECT. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/WE ROME STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	ROME, ITALY

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
FIRST SECRETARY CHIEF OF STATION	0262	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR GS	0136.05	01 2 18 1	24284 25382

18. REMARKS

ROME, ITALY
EMPLOYEE WILL BE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND OF HIS RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
28	10	50630	WE	36533	1	3	09 13 16	05 17 59	05 17 59

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 0 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO	34. SEX
		2					

35. VET. PREFERENCE (CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE; 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
11-26-65 [illegible]

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

56

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS 06/16/65

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
061164	HARVEY WILLIAM K

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
SERIES CODE ADJUSTMENT	06 07 65	

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
					5136 1267 0000	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/WE DIVISION	ROME, ITALY

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
CHIEF OF STATION	0262	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.05	18	

18. REMARKS

POSTED
6 21 65

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B 1-63 MFG 1-63 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RZR: 28 JUNE 63

ODF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
061164	HARVEY WILLIAM K

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	06 30 63	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	CF TO V: X	CF TO CF	3136 6300 1014	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/WE ROME STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	ROME, ITALY

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
1ST SECRETARY CHIEF OF STATION	0262	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR GS	0136.01	02 0 18 1	15300 20000

WASH., D.C.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC)	(ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	62630	WE	36533	1	3	09 13 16		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO DA YR)		33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX
					EOD DATA		

35. VET. PREFERENCE (CODE: 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP DATE	37. LONG COMP. DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RES, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE: 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (CODE: 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
07/02/63 JK

28 JUN 1963

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-61)

(When Filled In)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1958 , SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
HARVEY WILLIAM K	061164	61100	CF	13 1	$18500	18 1	$20000

14-00000

PSC: 12 SEPT 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OKF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
061164	HARVEY WILLIAM K

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT (CORRECTION)	06 08 62	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
			X		3132 1000 1000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP TASK FORCE W OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
SP ASST TO COORD OPS OFFICER CH	0662	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR GS	0136.01	02 0 18 1	14900 18500

18. REMARKS

THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150 EFFECTIVE DATE 06/08/62 TO SHOW THE INTEGRATED TITLE, CLASSIFICATION, GRADE, STEP, & SALARY WHICH WERE PREVIOUSLY OMITTED.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC)	(ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
57	10	61100	TFW	75013	1	1	09 13 16		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE)	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE)	(MO DA YR)		33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX
				37	06 08 62	EOD DATA		

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT.)	36. SERV. COMP DATE	37. LONG. COMP. DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP)	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

BAB 9/12/62

09/18/62 DK

FORM 8-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-31)

(When Filled In)

14-00000

DAE: 31 AUG 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
[illegible]	HARVEY WILLIAM K

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	[illegible] 09 62	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
			X		3102 1060 1000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
TASK FORCE W OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER CH	0062	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	18 1	18500

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING Numeric	Alphabetic	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	[illegible]	01100	TFW	75013			[illegible] 12 18		

28. NTE EXPIRES | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) CODE | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT) | 36. SERV. COMP DATE | 37. LONG COMP DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 - WAIVES, 1 - YES) | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS); 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)) | 42. LEAVE CAT CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED 9/5/62 [signature]

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

8/31/62 [signature]

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED
1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
DI	HARVEY WILLIAM K	561164	41 09	GS-18 1	$17,500	$18,500

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

PAS: 18 AUGUST 1960

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth (Mo. Da. Yr.)	4. Vet. Pref. Code	5. Sex	6. CS-FOD (Mo. Da. Yr.)
561164	HARVEY WILLIAM K	09 13 15	0	M 1	09 29 47

7. SCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	8. CSC Retmt (Yes-1 No-2) Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt Affidav. (Mo. Da. Yr.)	11. FEGLI (Yes-1 No-2) Code	12. LCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	13. Code
12 09 40	1	50 USCA 403 J			09 29 47	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FI STAFF DIVISION D OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	4109	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept.-Field Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
1	SP ASST TO COORD OPS OFFICER CHIEF	0872	FSR GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade (Mo. Da. Yr.)	25. PSI Due (Mo. Da. Yr.)	26. Appropriation Number
02 18 1	$ 14900 18500	D	05 17 59	XX XX XX	0127 1003 1000

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date (Mo. Da. Yr.)	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
CONVERSION TO PERMANENT SUPERGRADE RANK *		07 27 60	REGULAR	QM	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FI STAFF DIVISION D OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	4109	WASH., D.C.	75013

33. Dept.-Field Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
1	SP ASST TO COORD OPS OFFICER CHIEF	0872	FSR GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade (Mo. Da. Yr.)	42. PSI Due (Mo. Da. Yr.)	43. Appropriation Number
02 18 1	$ 14900 18500	D	05 17 59	XX XX XX	1123 1003 1000

44. Remarks

* THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ON 27 JULY 1960 APPROVED YOUR PERMANENT GRADE AS GS-18.

2.29.60 WI

E. D. ECHOLS

FORM NO. 1150a 1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

Pre 1960
Personnel actions

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 061164

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
HARVEY	William	K.	13 Sept 1916	M	GS-18	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Chief of Station	DDP/WE/Italian	Rome

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: X CAREER; RESERVE; TEMPORARY; CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C); SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL; X REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR; ANNUAL; REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE; SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1965 - 27 September 1965

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
- P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
- S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Chief of Station, Rome	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Handles Station relationship with Ambassador and Embassy and the Base in Milan.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Supervises CA Program.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Engaged in reorientation of Station FI Program.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5:	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: O

2 S OCT 1965

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

MAIL ROOM

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

My rating of the performance of this officer remains the same as the description of his performance which is contained in his fitness report for period ending 31 March 1965.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE William K. Harvey	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 30	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Mr. Harvey is currently at his overseas post.	
DATE 27 September 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, WE Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William D. O'Ryan
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the evaluations given Mr. Harvey on duties No. 2, 3 and 4. I believe duty No. 2 could have been rated "outstanding" rather than "strong," with justification. I also think, however, that duty No. 1, involving the overall administration and management of the Station and its personnel, should more appropriately be rated "proficient," or perhaps "strong."

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
21 October 1965	ADDP	Thomas H. Karamessines

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 061164

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Harvey William K.	13 Sept 1916	M	GS-18	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Chief of Station	DDP/WE/Italian	Rome

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1964 - 31 March 1965

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- **W - Weak** — Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- **A - Adequate** — Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
- **P - Proficient** — Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
- **S - Strong** — Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- **O - Outstanding** — Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Chief of Station, Rome	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Handles Station relationship with Ambassador and Embassy and the Base in Milan.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Supervises CA Program.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Engaged in reorientation of Station FI Program.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: O

15 JUN 1965

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Harvey has continued to manage the Agency's activities in Italy with the same enthusiasm and drive which characterized the description of his approach to the Station Chief role in his past Fitness Report.

In his efforts to reorient the Rome Station's FI program toward Soviet-Satellite targets Mr. Harvey has devoted considerable energy to acquiring the basic information needed for this task. This has been well reported and the responsibilities for carrying out this shift in operational approach have been precisely delegated. It is still early to assess the results operationally but the reorientation has been well organized. As an early indication of the trend this is taking, several successful technical operations have been established which are well on target.

To accomplish the objectives of the CA responsibilities of the Rome Station Mr. Harvey has acquired the most competent officers with this highly specialized skill and has staunchly supported their efforts to prosecute this program which remains extensive. He has considerably improved the Station relationship with Embassy officers, including the Ambassador, by devoting greater effort to this necessary phase of the Station Chief's role and the Ambassador, during a recent trip to Washington, made special mention of the degree of confidence he had in the Station's reporting and in the extent to which it has kept him properly informed.

During the period under review Mr. Harvey acquired a Deputy Station Chief - for whose arrival he had waited more than 6 months. He has delegated general management of the Station's activities to this officer, who has applied himself diligently to this task and the results have been promising. Mr. Harvey has been receptive to headquarters guidance, is extremely prompt and thorough in replying to his correspondence.

(cont'd)

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
	Employee at Field Station

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
24		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
2 June 1965	C/WE	William D. O'Ryan

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
3 June 65	ADDP	Thomas H. Karamessines

SECRET

William K. Harvey

Fitness Report for Period 1 April 1964 - 31 March 1965

Section C (cont'd)

Some administrative details, such as the reports on the performance of officers whose evaluation he was reluctant to make, Mr. Harvey has had a tendency to postpone despite repeated efforts to provoke him into timely response.

I have rated Mr. Harvey's overall performance outstanding in recognition of his superior supervisory ability, his unusual skill in expressing his views and his determination to accomplish his basic objectives regardless of the obstacles which he encounters. The Rome Station is complex, is engaged in some highly sensitive operations which must be guided with a strong hand and by an officer with a degree of professionalism which Mr. Harvey is well able to supply as a result of his extensive operational experience.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 061164

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Harvey	William	K.	1916	M	18	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Chief of Station, Rome	DDP/WE/Italy	Rome

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY / CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C) / SPECIAL (Specify)

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL / REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR / X ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE / SPECIAL (Specify)

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 March 1963 - 31 March 1964

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Chief of Station, Rome	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Handles Station relationship with Ambassador and Embassy and Station Bases.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Supervises correspondence with headquarters on entire complex Station program.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Supervises CA Program.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Engaged in reorientation of Station FI program.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: O

12 AUG 1964

FORM 6-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
AUG 11 11 19 AM '64

Mr. Harvey's management of the Agency's program in Italy has to date been characterized by the forcefulness and drive which have gained for him in previous assignments a reputation for dynamism. He has undertaken to reorient the Rome Station's FI program toward Soviet-satellite targets and any delay in this reorientation has been due fully to our inability for administrative reasons to supply the personnel he desires on the time schedule which he would prefer.

Although not by inclination oriented toward the objectives of CA, he has preserved and guided the most complex CA program in Western Europe with understanding and skill. To accomplish this it has been necessary for Mr. Harvey to learn the intricasies of an extremely complex local political situation. This he has set about to do with confidence. His accumulated experience in earlier assignments has equipped Mr. Harvey with a self-assurance and confidence which I have rarely seen equalled in any other officer. The continuance of ideal relationships with the key Embassy officials in Rome has been somewhat handicapped by the sudden death of the principal officer in the Embassy who was knowledgeable of our program and the impossibility of bringing into knowledge of our activity the next lower level echelon of Embassy officials for reasons beyond Mr. Harvey's control. This handicap has been overcome over the past year and Mr. Harvey is currently supervising extremely sensitive political operations and contacts to the satisfaction of the Ambassador and his headquarters.

He delegates responsibilities skillfully to those officers under his command who are best qualified and by his own outstanding performance, which is always at its best under heavy stress, he earns an intense loyalty from these personnel. He demonstrates cost-consciousness and outstanding supervisory ability.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
27/2/65	[signature]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
12	Report will be shown to employee upon return from overseas.	
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
28 July 1964	C/WE	William D. O'Ryan [signature]

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
17 AUG 1964	Deputy Director for Plans	[signature] Richard Helms

SECRET

SECRET

18 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT: Fitness Report - Mr. William K. Harvey

1. This Fitness Report covers the period from 1 April 1962 to 15 January 1963 during which Mr. Harvey was Chief, Task Force W.

2. As a senior officer in the Clandestine Services, Mr. Harvey has behind him a long record of professional accomplishment achieved during tours in Washington as well as seven years in Berlin. He is thoroughly grounded in the tradecraft of clandestine activities, and has brought to each and every assignment an intelligent, thorough, and uncommonly conscientious approach. His qualities of leadership are attested to by the loyalty and devotion of those colleagues who have worked under his direction. If anything, there has tended to grow up within the Clandestine Services a coterie of officers who have come to regard themselves as "Harvey men", a development which Mr. Harvey himself has not encouraged but which demonstrates the strong emphasis on first-class tradecraft which he has insisted upon in each assignment.

3. As Chief, Task Force W, Mr. Harvey had the task of organizing and developing a large operational team devoted to the acquisition of intelligence and the handling of special operations directed at Cuba. He was obliged to work within a complicated bureaucratic framework, a fact which made the clearing of actions a laborious and time-consuming exercise. Under his direction, the Task Force grew substantially in size and in professional competence with the result that when the Cuban crisis arrived in October intelligence assets were in place to make a significant contribution to the overall intelligence picture. Mr. Harvey devoted considerable ingenuity, long hours of personal time, and great energy to this enterprise, and, although certain aspects of the intra-governmental coordination of the operations had rough sledding, his net achievement was the establishment of an effective, going concern with momentum which carries on to the present.

4. Mr. Harvey, after a strong performance as Chief, TFW, has been assigned as Chief of Station, Rome, and is now preparing himself to take over at that post in the coming months.

Thomas H. Karamessines
Assistant Deputy Director (Plans)

Reviewing Official:

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

29 APR 1963

Read 23/4/63

SECRET

14-00000

OD/Pers

15 OCT 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT: William K. Harvey - Memorandum in lieu of fitness report for period 30 March 1960 - 10 May 1962

1. It is difficult to prepare a fitness report on this outstanding officer, largely because forms do not lend themselves to measuring his many unique characteristics. His strengths are in professional knowledge and competence in the operational field, in a toughness of mind and firmness of attitude, while the latter in past years have moved him into positions that were sometimes stronger than superior officers, with a responsibility for adjustments necessary in matters of policy in relation to Agency position in the community, were able to handle easily, his own closeness to policy positions of the Agency within the U.S. community in the last two years has found him with a real ability to handle policy matters and to adjust to necessities, without losing his firmness and his independence of thought.

2. He is sometimes accounted to be less than outgiving of information about operational matters in which he is engaged, yet it should be remembered that this characteristic has been part and parcel of a sound operational attitude in his career. He has a wide knowledge of personalities within the officer corps of the DD/P and is for the most part a good selector of officers to accomplish necessary tasks. He handles people well. He has a tremendous energy and is a loyal officer both to his superiors and to the purposes of the Clandestine Services of CIA.

3. He is one of the few distinctly outstanding officers in the DD/P.

W. Lloyd George

W. LLOYD GEORGE
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

8 September 1960

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

The following statement relates to the performance of William K. Harvey, GS 18, Chief of FI, Division D.

This officer has held a series of responsible positions in DD/P and its predecessor clandestine intelligence organization for well over ten years. He excels in the field of clandestine operations in general and especially so in that phase of clandestine staff and operational activities concerned with the procurement, handling and exploitation of highly sensitive and critical intelligence and operational materials.

His performance generally over the recent years has proved him to be one of the outstanding officers of the DD/P organization. He has demonstrated clearly superior performance both in staff responsibility at Headquarters and as Chief of Base in a very important field station where he was directly engaged in supervising and carrying on operations successfully against targets of the highest priority.

In the period under review, June 1959 to March 1960, he took over and directed functioning of one of DD/Ps most sensitive components charged with achievement by special means against targets of the highest importance. This included carrying on negotiations and liaison with other components of CIA and other Agencies and Departments of the U. S. Government concerned with his special field. His performance of this responsibility in many respects has been outstanding. He has continued to demonstrate his fitness to handle a wide range of positions of major responsibility within the clandestine service.

Among his outstanding characteristics are: thorough understanding of his profession and ability to make this clear to persons of high level whose knowledge of the Clandestine Services is general. He is firm, tenacious, and on occasions strongly aggressive in pursuit of his point of view. While this may sometimes make for difficulty on the part of those in higher echelons who wish to dispose of a complicated problem easily and quickly, this officer's persistence in carefully

presenting his arguments and in holding to them until their fact and logic prevail or until policy factors override, makes him a highly valuable asset to CIA.

Rater [signature]
W. Lloyd George
C/FI

Reviewer [signature]
Richard Helms
COPS

14-00000

SECRET

0/0

14 January 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

ATTENTION: Chief, Records and Services Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Germany

SUBJECT: Fitness Report - William K. Harvey
November 1957 - January 1959

1. Subject's abilities and performance are too generally known to require detailed comment. One of the very senior officers in KUDOVE he has been chief of what is probably the largest and most productive overseas Base of KUBARK for approximately seven years. During this period Subject has been personally responsible for a number of operational successes, some of which have been of national importance. Possessed of driving energy, determination and initiative, he has few equals in professional experience and competence. Throughout his administration of the Base he has established and maintained exceedingly high standards of accomplishment, discipline and endeavor. Subject's judgement, on occasion, is impulsive and proposals of the Base have been, from time to time, advanced and defended with greater vehemence and more exhaustively than the occasion, objectively speaking, required. Subject's basic self-discipline, good sense and loyalty, however, have prevented any such incidents, which are in large measure manifestations of the highly charged atmosphere and insistent operational pressures of Berlin, from developing into serious friction with the German Station or Washington headquarters.

2. It has been a pleasure to serve with this officer and, during his assignment, he has consistently rendered dedicated and effective service of the very highest order.

John A. Bross

CONCUR:

CHIEF, EE DIVISION

RYBAT
SECRET

14-00000

Harvey, W. K. EE —

Chief of Base 6548-81-7530

Berlin

18 June 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

ATTENTION: Chief, Records and Services Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Germany

SUBJECT: Fitness Report - William K. Harvey
January 1959 - June 1959

I have nothing to add to the memorandum dated 14 January 1959. Subject continues to render an outstanding performance.

John A. Bross

I certify that I have seen this Fitness Report

William K. Harvey

CONCUR:

James Critchfield
Chief, Eastern European Division

SECRE.

14-00000

Pre 1959 Fitness Reports

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Harvey, William K.	Son-James	68-0535

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 7 March 1967.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
3 January 1968	B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-59 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4-21-35)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Harvey, William	Self	68-0533

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 30 July 1964.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
3 January 1968	R. D. Felice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Harvey, William K.	Daughter-Sally	68-0534

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 3 August 1967.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
3 January 1968	B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-59 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4-21-33)

14-00000

*Items Indicated by a Star are to be Completed by the Payee.

(Agency)

TRAVEL REIMBURSEMENT VOUCHER

2. D.O. VOUCHER NO.

3. BU. VO. NO.

*4. PAYEE'S COMPLETE NAME AND ADDRESS

William K. Harvey
28 West Irving Street
Chevy Chase, Md. 20015

*5. TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

A. Number	B. Dated
6-69348	2/23/66
6-69348A	5/13/66

6. D.O. PAID BY

*7. EMPLOYEE NUMBER (State Only)

253900

*8. TRAVEL ADVANCE STATUS

A. Old Balance	$ -0-
B. Applied This Voucher	$ -0-
C. New Balance	$ -0-

9. OFFICIAL STATION (State Only)

Rome to Dept.

*10. STATEMENT OF GOVERNMENT FURNISHED TRANSPORTATION

A. GTR or Voucher No.	B. Valuation	C. Carrier*	D. Class	E. Point to Point Travel (1) from	(2) to
LI 302,207	$1302.90	SS Constitution	1st	Naples	New York
IO 359,316	271.35	AF TWA	Economy	Munich	Washington

*11. PAYEE CERTIFICATE: *I hereby certify that this voucher and attachments are correct and just in all respects, and that payment or credit has not been received.***

A. Date: March 1967 B. Signature: William K. Harvey

12. PAYMENT CALCULATION

*A. Amount Claimed (See Item 19.) $ 649.61

B. Differences, if any $

C. Amount Allowed (Verified correct to Approp. ____________) $

D. Applied to Advance (See Item 8B.) $

E. Net to Payee $

13. ADMINISTRATIVE APPROVAL: Recommended for approval.

A. Date B. Signature

Name:

Title

*14. PREVIOUS PAYMENTS: The next previous Vo. paid under same travel auth. was:

A. D.O. Vou. No. B. Paid (mo. & yr.) C. D.O. Name and Symbol

15. CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT: *Pursuant to authority vested in me, I certify this voucher is correct and proper for payment:*

A. Date B. Authorized Certifying Officer's Signature

Name:

Title:

16. METHOD OF PAYMENT (For Paying Office Use Only)

A. Cash or Dep. Check Amt. B. Exchange Rate C. U.S. $ Equivalent *D. Date

E. Treasury or Depository Check No. and Name of Depository

*F. Payment Received

(Payee's Signature)

17. ACCOUNTING CLASSIFICATION			D. Organization (State Only)	E. Function (State Only)	F. Object	G. Paying Office (State Only)	H. Paying Date (State Only)	I. Amount
A. Fund	B. Allotment	C. Oblig. (T/A) No	USIA: Activity/Sub-Activity					

* Item 10C - If carrier was foreign ship registry, attach certificate of readiness.

** FRAUDULENT CLAIM - Falsification of any item in an expense account works a forfeiture of the claim (28 U.S.C. 2514) and may result in a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than 5 years or both (18 U.S.C.).

FORM FS-286
6-65

14-00000

FORM FS-[illegible] (THIS SIDE MAY BE USED AS A SUPPLEMENTAL SHEET) Page 2

*18. CLAIM (Show complete itinerary, and transportation expenses for persons and things for which reimbursement is claimed, or expenses [illegible] weights, measures and attach [illegible] receipts.)

REMARKS (Names and Ages of Dependents, explanation for use of foreign registry ship, rates of exchange, etc.)

Concurrent travel
Wife
Daughter, Sally, Age 7
Separate travel
Son, James, born December 1947

Lire 625/$1 DM 4/$1

Dates 1966 (A)	Local Time (B)	Itinerary and Description (C)	Per Diem Days (D)	Daily Rate (E)	Amount Per Diem (F)	Amount Other (G)
		FORWARDED				
Mr. Harvey, Wife, and Daughter						
Mar.21	0700	LV. Rome via private auto				
	1130	AR. Naples				
		163 miles at 12¢				19.56
		Autostrada tolls L.1750				2.80
		Required fees for auto (Ford)				
		at dock				
		Preparation of car L.1500				
		Auto check-in fee L.1000				
		L.2500				4.00
		Baggage transport Rome				
		to Naples L.3500				5.60
		Baggage transfer charges				
		for hold baggage L.9350				14.96
	2300	LV. Naples	3/4	6	11.25	
Mar.22 thru30		At sea	9	6	135.00	
Mar.31		At sea	1	2	5.00	
*19. COLUMN TOTALS (Sum of which forwarded to Item 12A. on face of voucher)					151.25	46.92

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE [illegible]

18. CLAIM (Show complete itinerary, ... of transportation expenses for persons and things ... which reimbursement is claimed, as excess, above weights, mileages and attach all receipts.)

REMARKS (Names and Ages of Dependents, explanation for use of foreign registry ship, rates of exchange, etc.)

Dates 19 66 (A)	Local Time (B)	Itinerary and Description (C)	Per Diem Days (D)	Daily Rate (E)	Amount Per Diem (F)	Amount Other (G)
			FORWARDED		151.25	46.92
April 1	0800	AR. New York				
	1200	LV. New York via personal auto				
	1830	AR. Washington				
		269 miles at 12¢				32.28
		Tolls				4.55
		Dock charge for release of car				2.50
		Baggage transfer charge				
		at New York pier	1	16.00	40.00	15.00
		Railway express charges for				
		shipment of 337 lbs. of				
		baggage from New York to				
		Washington				23.40
Travel	of son	James				
June 2		LV. Munich via AF				
		AR. Paris				
June 5	1200	LV. Paris via TWA 803				
	1500	AR. New York				
19. COLUMN TOTALS (Sum of which forwarded to Item 12A, on face of voucher)					191.25	124.65

FORM FS-285 (THIS SIDE MAY BE USED AS A SUPPLEMENTAL SHEET) Page 2

18. CLAIM (Show complete itinerary ... transportation expenses for persons and things ... which reimbursement is claimed; on effects, show weight, measure and attach all receipts).

REMARKS (Names and Ages of Dependents, explanation for use of foreign registry ship, rates of exchange, etc.)

Dates 1966 (A)	Local Time (B)	Itinerary and Description (C)	Per Diem Days (D)	Daily Rate (E)	Amount Per Diem (F)	Amount Other (G)
		FORWARDED			191.25	124.65
June 5	1630	LV. New York via TW 203				
	1807	AR. Washington Nat'l Airport				
		Air travel from Munich is				
		less expensive than $302.90				
		economy air FARE from Rome				
		to Washington				
		Airport tax in Munich DM500				1.25
		Direct scheduling from Munich				
		via air				
June 2	0740	LV. Munich via LH 161				
	0830	AR. Frankfurt				
	1215	LV. Frankfurt via PA 107				
	1745	AR. Washington				
		Per diem ½ @ 16.00 less 35%			5.20	
		Shipment of air freight from				
		Munich to Washington (85lbs.)				67.10
		Deferred home leave travel for				
		Mr. Harvey, James and Sally				
		19. COLUMN TOTALS (Sum of which forwarded to item 12A. on face of voucher)			196.45	193.00

18 CLAIM (Show complete itinerary [illegible] transportation expenses for persons and things [illegible] reimbursement is claimed, on effects, [illegible] weights, measures and attach all receipts.)

REMARKS (Names and Ages of Dependents, explanation for use of foreign registry ship, rates of exchange, etc.)

Dates 19 (A)	Local Time (B)	Itinerary and Description (C)	Per Diem Days (D)	Daily Rate (E)	Amount: Per Diem (F)	Amount: Other (G)
		FORWARDED			196.45	193.00
June 28	0900	LV. Washington via personal auto	3/4	16.00	30.00	
June 29	1500	AR. Indianapolis	3/4	16.00	30.00	
		Mileage 584 @ 12¢				70.08
July 22	0900	LV. Indianapolis via personal	3/4	16.00	30.00	
		auto				
July 23	1500	AR. Washington	3/4	16.00	30.00	
		Mileage 584 miles @ 12¢				70.08
		Cost by auto is less than				
		cost by rail with scheduling				
		as follows:				
June 28	1900	LV. Washington via rail				
June 29	1205	AR. Indianapolis				
July 22	1505	LV. Indianapolis via rail				
July 23	0915	AR. Washington				
		Per diem 2 x $16.00 x 2.5 $80.00				
	RT 1st	class rail (Family Plan) 169.40				
	RT Sleeping accomodations (Bed-room, plus roomette is least expensive)	76.96 $326.36				
19. COLUMN TOTALS (Sum of which forwarded to Item 12A. on face of voucher)					316.45	333.16

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

QUALIFICATIONS SYSTEM RECORD CHANGE

APPLICANT CODING DATA

1. ID	2. APPL. NO.	3. NAME
<• 2	6-DIGITS •	MUST CONTAIN 20-DIGITS •

4. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	5. DATE CODED (MO DA YR)	
•	•	THE DATA ABOVE (ITEMS 2 THRU 5) WILL BE FILLED IN WHEN CODING AN APPLICANT FOR THE FIRST TIME. THIS FORM IS THEN ATTACHED TO FORM 1962, MASTER QUALIFICATIONS CODING RECORD.

LANGUAGE CODING DATA - FORM 444c

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME (3-LETTERS)	4. LANGUAGE DATA CODE: BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
<• 3	•061164	• HAR	•BF71	4	3	3	3	3	2	61

5. DATE SUBMITTED (MO DA YR)	6. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	
•10 02 61	•09 13 15	WHEN FORM 444c DENOTES NO LANGUAGE COMPETENCE, ENTER THE FOLLOWING IN ITEM 4: "NO++LANGUAGE" (12-DIGITS)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST DATA

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME (3-LETTERS)	4. CODE (C-A-D)	5. LANGUAGE DATA BEFORE TEST: BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
<• 5	•	•	•	•							

6. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST: BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR	7. DATE OF TEST (MO DA YR)	
•								•	DATA FOR ITEM 2 THRU 7 IS EXTRACTED FROM FORM 1273, LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA.

QUALIFICATIONS RECORD CHANGE

1. ID	2. EMP/APPL NO.	3. NAME (3-LETTERS)	
<• 4	•	•	ENTER UNDER "TYPE" - A - ADDITION TO RECORD; C - CHANGE TO EXISTING RECORD; D - DELETION OF DATA FROM EXISTING RECORD

TYPE	CODE # 1 BASE	1	2	3	YR	CODE # 2 BASE	1	2	3	YR
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				

FORM 10-64 1962a

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4-51)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)	
061164	**LANGUAGE DATA RECORD**

PART I—GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30) MONTH	DAY	YEAR
HARVEY, William	9	13	15

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39) MONTH	DAY	YEAR	5.
German				☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

(2) I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

(3) I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

CODED
TO
DATE 30 NOV 1961

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

(3) MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.
2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.
$\textcircled{3}$ I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.
4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.
5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.
2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.
$\textcircled{3}$ I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.
4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.
5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.
$\textcircled{2}$ I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER. -- [illegible]
3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.
4. NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED	SIGNATURE
10/2/61	*[signature]*
(46)	(47)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Print) 7-24 LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT 25-26
0 61164	HARVEY	WILLIAM	K.	50

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	ARRIVAL MONTH	DAY	YEAR	DEPARTURE MONTH	DAY	YEAR	COUNTRY	OMIT
1 - PCS (*Basic*) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	3				03	21	66	ITALY	565

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	DEPARTURE MONTH	DAY	YEAR	RETURN MONTH	DAY	YEAR	AREA(S)	OMIT
2 - TDY (*Basic*) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
X	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (*Specify*)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
IN 80062	22 March 1966

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	X	REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
C & L DIVISION		DATE 3/29/66	SIGNATURE Jackie E. Persinger
X C & T DIVISION			

FORM 10-64 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-10)

14-00000

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION

Office of the Director General

G.P.O. BOX No. 5103B.,
MELBOURNE

[illegible] May, 1966.

My dear [illegible],

My Liaison Officer in Rome has told me of the tremendous assistance and co-operation that he and his section received at all times from Mr. W.K. Harvey.

I understand that Mr. Harvey has now returned to Washington and I would like to say how much I appreciate all that he has done to assist the work of my officers in Rome.

With kindest regards and best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

[signature]

(C.C.F. SPRY)

The Honorable W.F. Raborn,
Director,
Central Intelligence Agency,
WASHINGTON.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2526 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Prune) / FIRST / MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6	7-24	25-26
061164	ELSTSY, WILLIAM K.	50

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	ARRIVAL MONTH	ARRIVAL DAY	ARRIVAL YEAR	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	COUNTRY	OMIT
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	1				01	08	66	ITALY	365

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	RETURN MONTH	RETURN DAY	RETURN YEAR	AREA(S)	OMIT
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
X	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
IN 26160	4 Jan. 1966

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	X REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
C & L DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
X C & T DIVISION	13 Jan. 1966	Beverly Y. C[illegible]

FORM 10-64 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification (4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6	(Print)	7-24		25-26
61164	HARVEY	William	K	50

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	ARRIVAL MONTH	ARRIVAL DAY	ARRIVAL YEAR	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	COUNTRY	CMIT
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	1	06	30	63				ITALY	365

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	RETURN MONTH	RETURN DAY	RETURN YEAR	AREA(S)	CMIT
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
X	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: Rome 9510 (IN 70727)

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD:

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	FISCAL DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
X	FINANCE DIVISION	[illegible]	[illegible]

FORM 9-58 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4-10)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE 130470 FEB 961

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-5	(Print)	6-23		24-25
[illegible]	[illegible]			34

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	ARRIVAL MONTH	ARRIVAL DAY	ARRIVAL YEAR	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	COUNTRY	OMIT
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37-39		39-41

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	RETURN MONTH	RETURN DAY	RETURN YEAR	AREA(S)	OMIT
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37-39		39-41
		04			05				801

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
[illegible]	

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
FISCAL DIVISION FINANCE DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE

FORM 8-58 1451a SECRET (4-10)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE 130471 FEB 961

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE — LAST (Print) / FIRST / MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-5	6-23	24-25
[illegible]	[illegible]	34

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	ARRIVAL MONTH	ARRIVAL DAY	ARRIVAL YEAR	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	COUNTRY	OMIT
1 - PCS (*Basic*) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37-38		39-41

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	RETURN MONTH	RETURN DAY	RETURN YEAR	AREA(S)	OMIT
2 - TDY (*Basic*) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37-38		39-41
	[illegible]	10	[illegible]	[illegible]	11	0[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	801

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (*Specify*)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
[illegible]	

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
FISCAL DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
FINANCE DIVISION	[illegible]	[illegible]

FORM 6-58 1451a SECRET (4-10)

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In) O/R - [illegible] T & R

INSTRUCTIONS: COMPLETE IN DUPLICATE. THE DATA RECORDED ON THIS FORM IS ESSENTIAL IN DETERMINING TRAVEL EXPENSES ALLOWABLE IN CONNECTION WITH LEAVE AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE, OVERSEAS DUTY, RETURN TO RESIDENCE UPON SEPARATION, AND FOR PROVIDING CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY INFORMATION REQUIRED IN THE EVENT OF AN EMPLOYEE EMERGENCY. THE ORIGINAL OF THIS FORM WILL BE FILED IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) (First) (Middle)
HARVEY William King

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN APPOINTED | LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad)

PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE
48 W. Irving St. Chevy Chase, Md

2. MARITAL STATUS

CHECK (X) ONE: [ ] SINGLE [X] MARRIED [ ] SEPARATED [ ] DIVORCED [ ] WIDOWED [ ] ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, INDICATE PLACE OF MARRIAGE: Berlin — DATE OF MARRIAGE: 3/2/54

IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE — DATE OF DECREE

IF WIDOWED, INDICATE PLACE SPOUSE DIED — DATE SPOUSE DIED

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	TELEPHONE NUMBER	
Clara Grace, Nee Follick	Above		
NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	AGE
James	Same	M	12
Sally		F	18 Mo.
NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NUMBER	
Deceased			
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NUMBER	
Sara K. Harvey	1615 Northwood Drive Indianapolis, Ind	[illegible] 2579	

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE AGENCY FOR EMERGENCY PURPOSES?
Mother

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle): Wife - Above — RELATIONSHIP:

HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) — HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: OL 4-5178

BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE — BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION?
[X] YES [ ] NO

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF?
[X] YES [ ] NO

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE?
[X] YES [ ] NO

THE PERSONS NAMED IN ITEM 3 ABOVE MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

INDICATE ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS: Hamilton National Bank & Bank of Silver Spring

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. (CONTINUED)

IN WHOSE NAME(S) ARE THE ACCOUNTS LISTED?

self & wife Jointly

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? [X] YES [ ] NO. IF "YES", WHERE IS DOCUMENT LOCATED?

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? [X] YES [ ] NO. IF "YES", WHO POSSESSES THE POWER OF ATTORNEY?

wife

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
	11/4	William K Harvey

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

OD/Pers

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

TUTORIAL TRAINING REPORT

03/11/63 - 06/17/63

Student	: William K. Harvey	Office	: WE
Year of Birth:	1915	Service Designation:	D
Grade	: 18	No. of Students	: 1
EOD Date	: 09/47	Instructor:	Mrs. M. Lutyk

This is to certify that William K. Harvey received 92 hours of tutorial training in ITALIAN language.

Beginner : X

Non-beginner :

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: Bengt C. Herder

BENGT C. HERDER
Chief Instructor

10/21/63
Date

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

14-00000

Pre 1961 Personnel material

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 28 November 1966

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Harvey, William K.

3. POSITION TITLE:

4. GRADE: GS-18

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH:

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 6765 Room 3E 30

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

- [ ] PRE-EMPLOYMENT
- [ ] ENTRANCE ON DUTY
- [ ] TDY STANDBY
- [ ] SPECIAL TRAINING
- [XXX] ANNUAL - Executive
- [ ] RETURN TO DUTY
- [ ] FITNESS FOR DUTY
- [ ] MEDICAL RETIREMENT
- [ ] HQQS/TDY
- [ ] OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD	
STATION	
TDY OR PCS	
TYPE OF COVER	
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY	
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED	

- [ ] RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA	
STATION	
NO. OF DEP.'S	

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION *(One block must be checked)*

- [ ] YES
- [ ] NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE:

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: | EXT.:

10. COMMENTS

QUALIFIED FOR CURRENT DUTIES AT HEADQUARTES

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE: 24 MAY 1967

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF: JOHN E. FRALLIC
PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS OFFICER

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (20)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 31 January 1966

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): HARVEY, William K.

3. POSITION TITLE:

4. GRADE:

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: WH

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.:

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

- [ ] PRE-EMPLOYMENT
- [ ] ENTRANCE ON DUTY
- [ ] TDY STANDBY
- [ ] SPECIAL TRAINING
- [XX] ANNUAL
- [ ] RETURN TO DUTY
- [ ] FITNESS FOR DUTY
- [ ] MEDICAL RETIREMENT
- [ ] HOQS/TDY
- [ ] OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD
STATION
TDY OR PCS
TYPE OF COVER
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED

- [ ] RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA
STATION
NO. OF DEP.'S

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

- [ ] YES
- [ ] NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE

ROOM NO. & BUILDING | EXT.

10. COMMENTS

Qualified for Current Duties

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

31 January 1966

DATE: 31 January 1966

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF: Peter J. Gaughan

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST
17 March 1965

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle)	3. POSITION TITLE	4. GRADE
HARVEY, William K.	COS	GS-18

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH	6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.
WE DIVISION	7157

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

- [ ] PRE-EMPLOYMENT
- [ ] ENTRANCE ON DUTY
- [ ] TDY STANDBY
- [ ] SPECIAL TRAINING
- [ ] ANNUAL
- [ ] RETURN TO DUTY
- [ ] FITNESS FOR DUTY
- [ ] MEDICAL RETIREMENT
- [ ] HDQS/TDY
- [XX] OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD	10 March 1965
STATION	Rome
TDY OR PCS	PCS
TYPE OF COVER	Integree
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY	2
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED	0

- [ ] RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA	
STATION	
NO. OF DEP.'S	

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION *(One block must be checked)*

- [XX] YES
- [ ] NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: MARCO OBOSTEPHAN, WE/PT

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 4 B 4404 — EXT. 7157

10. COMMENTS

259 forwarded at request of Joe Cline. QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED O S PCS

JOE W. CLINE

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE: 3 22 65

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (26)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 17 March 1965

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Dependents of HARVEY, William K.

3. POSITION TITLE: COS

4. GRADE: GS-18

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: WE DIVISION

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 7157

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

- [ ] PRE-EMPLOYMENT
- [ ] ENTRANCE ON DUTY
- [ ] TDY STANDBY
- [ ] SPECIAL TRAINING
- [ ] ANNUAL
- [ ] RETURN TO DUTY
- [ ] FITNESS FOR DUTY
- [ ] MEDICAL RETIREMENT

Dependents:
Wife: Clara G.
Dau : Sally J., 10 Aug 58

- [ ] HDQS/TDY
- [XX] OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD	10 March 1965
STATION	Rome
TDY OR PCS	PCS
TYPE OF COVER	Integree
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY	2
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED	0

- [ ] RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA	
STATION	
NO. OF DEP.'S	

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

- [XX] YES
- [ ] NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: [signature]
MARGE GRISTEPHAN, WE/PT

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 4 E 4404

EXT.: 7157

10. COMMENTS

259 forwarded at request of Joe Cline.

QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED O S
PCS
JOE W. CLINE

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. 3 22 63 SECRET (26)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST
16 May 1963

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle)	3. POSITION TITLE	4. GRADE
William K. Harvey	Chief of Station	GS-18

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH	6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.
WE Division	

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

- [ ] PRE-EMPLOYMENT
- [ ] ENTRANCE ON DUTY
- [ ] TDY STANDBY
- [ ] SPECIAL TRAINING
- [ ] ANNUAL
- [ ] RETURN TO DUTY
- [ ] FITNESS FOR DUTY
- [ ] MEDICAL RETIREMENT
- [ ] HDQS/TDY
- [X] OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD	o/a 1 July 1963
STATION	Rome
TDY OR PCS	PCS
TYPE OF COVER	Integree
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY	3
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED	0

- [ ] RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA	
STATION	
NO. OF DEP.'S	

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

- [X] YES
- [ ] NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE	
MARGE GROSTEPHAN	
ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 4 B 4404	EXT. 7157

10. COMMENTS

Request evaluation for above PCS.

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE	SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (128)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 16 May 1963

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Dependents of William K. Harvey

3. POSITION TITLE: Chief of Station

4. GRADE: GS-18

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: WE Division

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 5256

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

- [ ] PRE-EMPLOYMENT
- [ ] ENTRANCE ON DUTY
- [ ] TDY STANDBY
- [ ] SPECIAL TRAINING
- [ ] ANNUAL
- [ ] RETURN TO DUTY
- [ ] FITNESS FOR DUTY
- [ ] MEDICAL RETIREMENT
- [ ] HQS/TDY
- [XX] OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD	o/a 1 July 1963
STATION	Rome
TDY OR PCS	PCS
TYPE OF COVER	Integree
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY	3
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED	0

- [ ] RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA	
STATION	
NO. OF DEP.'S	

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

- [X] YES
- [ ] NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Marge Grostephan
MARGE GROSTEPHAN

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 4 B 4404

EXT.: 7157

10. COMMENTS

89's on file in medical office - per telephone conversation 16 May 63

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

QUALIFIED FOR ... ASSIGNMENT

DATE: JUN 1963

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(20)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 25 January 1962

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): HARVEY, WILLIAM K.

3. POSITION TITLE: Chief

4. GRADE: GS-18

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: FI/Division D

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 8471

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

- [ ] PRE-EMPLOYMENT
- [ ] ENTRANCE ON DUTY
- XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
- [XXX] TDY STANDBY
- [ ] SPECIAL TRAINING
- [ ] ANNUAL
- [ ] RETURN TO DUTY
- [ ] FITNESS FOR DUTY
- [ ] MEDICAL RETIREMENT
- [ ] HDQS/TDY
- [XXX] OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD	28 January 1962
STATION	Panama City, Panama
TDY OR PCS	TDY
TYPE OF COVER	Official State Department
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY	NONE
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED	

- [ ] RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA	
STATION	
NO. OF DEP'S	

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

- [XX] YES
- [ ] NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: [signature]

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 1505 - L Building

EXT.: 4464

10. ~~REPORT OF EVALUATION~~ COMMENTS

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

[illegible stamp]

DATE: [illegible] 1962

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF: [signature]

FORM 10 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 20 October 1960

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Harvey, William K.

3. POSITION TITLE: Division Chief

4. GRADE: GS-18

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: FI Staff, Division D

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 8471

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

- [ ] PRE-EMPLOYMENT
- [ ] ENTRANCE ON DUTY
- [ ] OVERSEAS RETURN
- [ ] TDY STANDBY
- [ ] SPECIAL TRAINING
- [ ] ANNUAL
- [ ] RETURN TO DUTY
- [ ] FITNESS FOR DUTY
- [ ] MEDICAL RETIREMENT
- [XX] OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD	28 October 1960
STATION	Germany and Switzerland
TDY OR PCS	TDY
TYPE OF COVER	State Integree
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY	none
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED	

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

- [XXX] YES
- [ ] NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: [signature] G. A. Kennedy, Jr.

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 1505 L

EXT.: 4464

10. REPORT OF EVALUATION

Subject departed on another TDY prior to evaluation. However is Qualified for proposed TDY.

DATE: 2 NOV 1960

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF: [signature]

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I. REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY G.A. KENNEDY, FI/D ADMIN

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)		2. DATE
HARVEY, William K.		9 April 1960
3. TO POSITION	4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH	5. GRADE
	FI/Division D	GS-18

6. TYPE OF POSITION
- [XXX] Departmental
- [ ] U.S. Field
- [ ] Overseas

7. EVALUATE FOR
- [ ] EOD
- [XXX] Overseas TDY
- [ ] Returnee
- [ ] Pre-Employment
- [ ] Annual
- [ ] Special (Specify)

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION
- [ ] Qualified for Full Duty (General)
- [ ] Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
- [ ] Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
- [ ] Disqualified

Remarks:

QUALIFIED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DUTIES AND PROPOSED TDY O/S [illegible]

14 JUN 1960

Roland

MEDICAL OFFICE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY

1. NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	2. DATE
HARVEY	William	K.	Sept 1957

3. TO POSITION	4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH	5. GRADE
Germany	DDP/EE/	GS-16

6. TYPE OF POSITION
- [ ] Departmental
- [ ] U.S. Field
- [x] Overseas PCS

7. EVALUATE FOR
- [ ] EOD
- [x] Overseas PCS
- [ ] Returnee
- [ ] Pre-Employment
- [ ] Annual
- [ ] Special (Specify)

Second tour.

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION
- [ ] Qualified for Full Duty (General)
- [ ] Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
- [ ] Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
- [ ] Disqualified

Remarks: Please notify Corinne L. Hassell, x3041, of results.

QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED PCS O/S ASSIGNMENT OCT 9 1957

[signature]
MEDICAL OFFICER

SECRET

..EPORT OF PHYSICAL QUALIFICATIONS

NAME	DATE
Harvey, William King #1	8/21/52

FOR VOUCHERED EMPLOYEE ONLY

NATURE OF ACTION	TITLE OF POSITION
GRADE	[ ] DEPT. [ ] FIELD

SUBJECT FOUND [ ] FIT [ ] UNFIT FOR DUTY IN THE ABOVE GRADE AND POSITION.

FOR UNVOUCHERED EMPLOYEE ONLY FI

SUBJECT QUALIFIED FOR:

[ ] FULL DUTY OVERSEAS [X] LIMITED DUTY OVERSEAS [ ] DUTY IN USA ONLY

PROFILE SERIAL (MILITARY ONLY) [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

DEFECTS NOTED AND/OR RECOMMENDATIONS:

Non-arduous O.K. for TDY O/S where medical facilities are available.

PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS OFFICER

FORM NO. 37-32 NOV 1951 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 37-32 AND 37-57, WHICH MAY BE USED. (28)

OSO

REPOR. PHYSICAL QUALIFICATIONS R DUTY

31 Jan 51 194

Harvey, William K. WAS GIVEN A PHYSICAL

EXAMINATION ON THIS DATE AND FOUND QUALIFIED FOR

#1 Overseas

[ ] FULL DUTY OVERSEAS [ ] LIMITED DUTY OVERSEAS [ ] DUTY IN USA ONLY

PROFILE SERIAL (FOR ARMY EM ONLY) [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

DEFECTS NOTED:

Approved for TDY. To report to Medical after TDY

JOHN R. TIETJEN, M.D.

FORM NO. 37-32
DEC 1948

PHYSICAL QUALIFICATION RECORD

NAME	NATURE OF ACTION
HARVEY, WILLIAM K.	E.O.D.
TITLE OF POSITION	**GRADE**
Intelligence Officer	P-7
DEPARTMENT OR FIELD	
Departmental	

Subject was found physically [XXX] fit [ ] unfit for duty with this organization in the above grade and position. 10 May 1948

RECOMMENDATIONS:

2 February 1949
DATE

John R. Tietjen
SIGNATURE OF PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS OFFICER

FORM NO. 38-57
NOV 1945

14-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

REPORT OF PHYSICAL QUALIFICATIONS FOR DUTY

~~15 December~~ 194 8

Harvey, William OO WAS GIVEN A PHYSICAL

EXAMINATION ON THIS DATE AND FOUND QUALIFIED FOR

$1

[X] FULL DUTY OVERSEAS [ ] LIMITED DUTY OVERSEAS [ ] DUTY IN USA ONLY

PROFILE SERIAL (FOR ARMY EM ONLY) [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

DEFECTS NOTED: None

Capt., MC

FORM NO. 37-32
NOV 1947

(1053)

14-00000

7-20

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

REPORT OF PHYSICAL QUALIFICATIONS FOR DUTY

~~10 [illegible]~~ 194

[illegible] WAS GIVEN A PHYSICAL EXAMINATION ON THIS DATE AND FOUND QUALIFIED FOR

[illegible]

[XXX] FULL DUTY OVERSEAS [ ] LIMITED DUTY OVERSEAS [ ] DUTY IN USA ONLY

PROFILE SERIAL (FOR ARMY EM ONLY) [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

DEFECTS NOTED:

None

John R. [illegible]

FORM NO. 37-32
JAN 1947

JOHN R. [illegible], CAPT MC

(1053)

14-00000

Standard Form 57 — June 1946
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

Form approved.
Budget Bureau No. 50-R046

INSTRUCTIONS — Answer every question [illegible] Typewrite or print in INK. If you are applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination read the examination announcement carefully and file with the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the office all other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

1. Name of examination, or kind of position applied for:

2. Optional subject (if mentioned in examination announcement):

3. Place of employment applied for: C.I.O.

4. (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (first name) (middle) (maiden, if any) (last): William King Harvey

5. Street and number or R. D. number: 2627 39th Street N.W.

City or post office (including postal zone) and State: Washington, D. C.

6. Legal or voting residence (State): Kentucky — 7. Office phone No.: — Home phone: OR 2914

8. Place of birth (city and State; if born outside U. S., name city and country): Danville, Indiana

9. Date of birth (month, day, year): 9/13/15 — 10. Age last birthday: 31 — 11. X Male ☐ Female

12. X Married ☐ Single — 13. Height without shoes: 5 feet 11 inches — Weight: 185 pounds

14. Have you ever been employed by the Federal Government? X Yes ☐ No

If now employed by the Federal Government, give present grade and date of last change in grade:

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ Approved ☐ [illegible]	Material ☐ Submitted ☐ Returned	Entered register
Notations:	App. Review: Approved	

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 points (tent.)	
			☐ 10 points	
			☐ Wife or Widow	
			☐ Disal.	
			☐ Being investigated	
INITIALS AND DATE				

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	YES	NO
15. (a) Would you accept short term appointment, if offered, for— 1 to 3 months?		X
3 to 6 months?		X
6 to 12 months?		X
(b) Would you accept appointment, if offered— in Washington, D. C.?	X	
anywhere in the United States?	X	
outside the United States?	X	

15. (c) If you will accept appointment in certain locations ONLY, give acceptable locations:

(d) What is the lowest entrance salary you will accept per year: CAF 13 / P 6

You will not be considered for positions paying less.

(e) If you are willing to travel, specify: ☐ Occasionally X Frequently ☐ Constantly

16. EXPERIENCE — You are requested to furnish all information asked for below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to determine your qualifications for the position for which you are applying. In the spaces provided below describe EVERY position you have held. Use a separate block for EACH position. You may also include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Start with your PRESENT position and work back, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Explain clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position. Describe your experience in the Armed Services in question 17 (Military Experience).
(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 4 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.
(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

PRESENT POSITION

Dates of employment (Month, year) From: To present time	Exact title of your present position: — Salary or earnings: Starting, $ per; Present, $ per
Place of employment (city and State):	Description of your work:
Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person) If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment and division:	
Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfr. of locks, etc.):	
Number and kind of employees supervised by you:	
Name and title of immediate supervisor:	
Reason for desiring to change employment:	

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

14-00000

Employment	Position / Description
From 12/9/40 To 8/22/47. Place of employment: Washington, D. C. N.Y., N.Y., Pittsburgh, Pa., Name and address of employer: FBI - Dept. of Justice. Kind of business: Law Enforcement-counter Intelligence. Number and kind of employees supervised by you: various. Name and title of immediate supervisor: D. M. Ladd. Reason for leaving: voluntary	Exact title of your position: Special Agent & Supervisor. Salary: Starting $3200 per annum; Final $7000 per annum. Description of your work: Supervision of Counter-Intelligence operation
From 9/37 To 12/40. Place of employment (city and State): Maysville, Ky. Name and address of employer: Self. Kind of business or organization: Practice of Law. Number and kind of employees supervised by you: —. Name and title of immediate supervisor: None. Reason for leaving: Voluntary	Exact title of your position: Attorney-at-law. Salary or earnings: Starting $ per; Final $ per. Description of your work: General Practice of Law
From 6/31 To 9/33. Place of employment (city and State): Dansville, Indiana. Name and address of employer: Danville Gazette, Danville, Indiana. Kind of business or organization: Newspaper. Number and kind of employees supervised by you: None. Name and title of immediate supervisor: Alvin Hall, Editor. Reason for leaving: Voluntary	Exact title of your position: Reporter & Printer. Salary or earnings: Starting $ per; Final $ per. Description of your work: General Newspaper Publishing business
From To. Place of employment (city and State): Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person) If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture, etc.): Number and kind of employees supervised by you: Name and title of immediate supervisor: Reason for leaving:	Exact title of your position: Salary or earnings: Starting $ per; Final $ per. Description of your work:

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 58) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

16—47790 1

14-00000

17. MILITARY [illegible] ... to the service, write in item (a) "No attending ... schools" and indicate in item (c) all important ... duty assignment, showing dates of such assignments.

(a) First Special Service School attended: **NONE**

(b) What were you taught in first Special Service School?

Location:

Dates attended (months, years):

From: To:

Rating received at end of this training:

(c) Duty assignment or rating after this training (give all important changes in duty assignment whether or not you attended a Service School):

(d) What did you do during this duty assignment?

Dates of duty assignment (months, years):

From: To:

(e) Second special Service School attended:

(f) What were you taught in Second special service school?

Location:

Dates attended (months, years):

From: To:

Rating received at end of this training:

(g) Duty assignment after this training:

(h) What did you do during this duty assignment?

Dates of duty assignment (months, years):

From: To:

List on a separate sheet of paper any additional experience, training, service, or special duty assignments during military service or hospitalization.

18. EDUCATION—Circle highest grade completed: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

(a) Give name and location of last high school attended: **Wiley High School Terre Haute, Indiana**

Mark (x) the appropriate box to indicate satisfactory completion of

☐ Elementary School ☐ Junior High School ☒ Senior High School

(b) Subjects studied in high school which apply to position desired:

(c) Name and Location of College or University	Major	Dates Attended From—	To—	Years Completed Day	Night	Degrees Conferred Title	Date	Semester Hours Credit
Indiana University Bloomington, Indiana	LAW	1933	1937	6		LLB	9/37	180

(d) List Your Chief Undergraduate College Subjects	Semester Hours	List Your Chief Graduate College Subjects	Semester Hours
Journalism	20	Law	95
Phil & Psych	20		

(e) Other training, such as vocational, business, study courses given through the Armed Forces Institute (show name and location of school), or "in service training" in a Federal agency:

Subjects Studied	Dates Attended From—	To—	Years Completed Day	Night

19. Indicate your knowledge of foreign languages.

Language	Reading Exc.	Good	Fair	Speaking Exc.	Good	Fair	Understanding Exc.	Good	Fair
German			x						

(a) How was your knowledge of foreign languages acquired? **Study**

(b) If you have traveled or resided in any foreign countries, indicate (1) names of countries, (2) dates and length of time spent there and (3) reason or purpose (e.g., business, education, recreation)

20. List any special skills you possess and machines and equipment you can use, such as operation of short-wave radio, multilith, comptometer, key punch, turret lathe, scientific or professional devices:

Approximate number of words per minute in typing **50** shorthand ....

21. Are you now or have you ever been a licensed or certified member of any trade or profession, such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)

☒ Yes ☐ No Give kind of license and State **Attorney**

First license or certificate (year) **'37 at Law - Ind. & Ky**

Latest license or certificate (year) **'47**

22. Give any special qualifications not covered elsewhere in your application such as:
(a) your most important publications (do NOT submit copies unless requested)
(b) your patents or inventions
(c) public speaking and public relations experience
(d) membership in professional or scientific societies, etc.

16—67790-8

23. REFERENCES.—List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16 (EXPERIENCE).

FULL NAME	BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete address including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1. B. F. Small	Sycamore Bldg-Terre Haute, Indiana	Atty
2. E. L. Zeigler	Cochran Bldg., Maysville, Ky.	Atty
3. A. M. Thurston	C.I.O.- Washington, D. C.	

24. May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, etc.? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column.	YES	NO
25. Are you a citizen of the United States?	X	
26. Do you advocate or have you ever advocated, or are you now or have you ever been a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X
27. Within the past 12 months, have you habitually used intoxicating beverages to excess?		X
28. Since your 16th birthday, have you ever been convicted, or fined, or imprisoned, or placed on probation, or have you ever been ordered to deposit bail for the violation of any law, police regulation or ordinance (excluding minor traffic violations for which a fine of $25 or less was imposed)? If your answer is "Yes" list all such cases under Item 38 below. Give in each case (1) the date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed your fingerprints will be taken.		X
29. Have you ever been discharged or forced to resign for misconduct or unsatisfactory service from any position? If your answer is "Yes" give in Item 38 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.		X
30. Do you receive an annuity from the U. S. or D.C. Government under any retirement act or any pension or other compensation for military or naval service? If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 38 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional, disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service, amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act, and rating if retired from military or naval service.		X
31. Are you an official or employee of any State, Territory, county, or municipality? If your answer is "Yes" give details in Item 38.		X
32. Does the U. S. Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage) with whom you live or have lived within the past 6 months? If your answer is "Yes" show in Item 38 for EACH such relative: (1) full name, (2) present address, (3) relationship, (4) department or agency by whom employed, and (5) kind of appointment.		X
33. Have you ever had a nervous breakdown? If your answer is "Yes" give complete details in Item 38.		X
34. Have you ever had tuberculosis? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column.	YES	NO
35. Have you any physical defect or disability whatsoever? If your answer is "Yes" give complete details in Item 38.		X
36. (a) Were you ever in the United States Military or Naval Service during time of War?		X
(b) Is the word "honorable" or the word "satisfactory" used in your discharge or separation papers to show the type of your discharge or separation?		
(c) Was service performed on an active full time basis, with full military pay and allowances?		

(d)

Date of entry or entries into service:	Date of separation or separations:
Branch of service (Army, Navy, M. C., C. G., etc.)	Serial No. (If none, give grade or rating at time of separation.)

IF YOUR ANSWERS TO THIS QUESTION (No. 36) INDICATE THAT YOU ARE ENTITLED TO VETERAN PREFERENCE, SUCH PREFERENCE WILL BE CREDITED IN THE EXAMINATION. IF APPOINTED, YOU WILL BE REQUIRED TO FURNISH TO THE APPOINTING OFFICER PRIOR TO ENTRY ON DUTY, OFFICIAL EVIDENCE OF SEPARATION FROM YOUR LATEST PERIOD OF ACTIVE SERVICE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES DURING TIME OF WAR. DO NOT SUBMIT PROOF OF DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION WITH THIS APPLICATION.

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column.	YES	NO
37. (a) If you served in the U. S. Military or Naval Service during peacetime ONLY, did you participate in a campaign or expedition and receive a campaign badge or service ribbon?		
(b) Are you a disabled veteran?		X
(c) Are you the unmarried widow of a veteran?		X
(d) Are you the wife of a veteran who has service-connected disability?		X

IF YOUR ANSWER TO QUESTION 37 (a), (b), (c), OR (d) IS "YES" AND YOU WISH TO CLAIM VETERAN PREFERENCE, ATTACH TO THIS APPLICATION VETERAN PREFERENCE CLAIM (CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FORM 14) TOGETHER WITH THE NECESSARY PROOF SPECIFIED THEREIN.

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICE ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 36 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on .... 19.....

....
Agency Title

38. Space for detailed answers to other questions (indicate item numbers to which answers apply).

ITEM No.		ITEM No.	

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

FALSE STATEMENT ON THIS APPLICATION IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW (U. S. CODE, TITLE 18, SECTION 80)

I certify that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

Date ....

Signature of applicant ....
(Sign your name in INK (one given name, initial ... surname). If female, prefix Miss or Mrs. and if married use your own given name ...)

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

INSTRUCTIONS: ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS COMPLETELY. IF QUESTION DOES NOT APPLY WRITE "NOT APPLICABLE". WRITE "UNKNOWN" ONLY IF YOU DO NOT KNOW THE ANSWER AND CANNOT OBTAIN THE ANSWER FROM PERSONAL RECORDS. USE A SEPARATE SHEET OF PAPER FOR EXTRA DETAILS ON ANY QUESTION OR QUESTIONS FOR WHICH YOU DO NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT ROOM. ATTACH TWO RECENT PASSPORT SIZE PICTURES TO THIS FORM. DATE TAKEN WRITTEN ON THE BACK OF EACH. TYPE, PRINT OR WRITE CAREFULLY; ILLEGIBLE OR INCOMPLETE FORMS WILL NOT RECEIVE CONSIDERATION.

HAVE YOU READ AND UNDERSTOOD THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS? YES [x] NO [ ]

SECTION 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

NAME	FIRST	MIDDLE	LAST	TELEPHONE
MR. [x] MISS [ ] MRS. [ ]	William	King	Harvey	OR 2914

PRESENT ADDRESS — STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
2627 39th Street N.W.	Washington, D. C.		U.S.A.

LEGAL RESIDENCE — STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
Maysville		Kentucky	U.S.A.

NICKNAMES	OTHER NAMES THAT YOU HAVE USED
None	None

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES?	HOW LONG?
None	None

IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (WHERE, WHEN AND BY WHAT AUTHORITY)
None

DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH — CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
9/13/15	Danville,	Indiana	U.S.A.

PRESENT CITIZENSHIP	ACQUIRED BY:
US	BIRTH [x] MARRIAGE [ ] NATURALIZATION [ ]

NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE	NUMBER	DATE ISSUED	NAME OF COURT

LOCATION OF COURT	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY

PREVIOUS CITIZENSHIP	DATE HELD	FROM:	TO:
None			

OTHER CITIZENSHIPS (GIVE PARTICULARS)
None

STEPS TAKEN TO CHANGE PRESENT NATIONALITY (GIVE PARTICULARS)
None

LAST U.S. PASSPORT	NUMBER	DATE	PLACE OF ISSUE
	None	-	-

ALL OTHER U.S. PASSPORTS YOU HAVE HAD (GIVE APPROXIMATE DATES)
None

PASSPORTS OF OTHER NATIONS
None

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S.	DATE OF ARRIVAL IN THIS COUNTRY	PORT OF ENTRY	PASSPORT OF COUNTRY
	-	-	-

LAST U.S. VISA	NUMBER	TYPE	DATE	PLACE OF ISSUE
	-	-	-	-

SECTION 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE	SEX	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	EYES	HAIR
31	M	5'	185	Green	Blonde

COMPLEXION	SCARS	BUILD
Fair	Triangular scar rt. cheek	Medium stocky

OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES
mustache

SECTION 3. MARITAL STATUS

MARRIED [X] WIDOWED [ ] SINGLE [ ] DIVORCED [ ]	SEPARATED [ ]	DATE OF SEPARATION OR DIVORCE	PLACE
	-	-	-

REASON FOR SEPARATION OR DIVORCE: -

NOTE: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND AND GIVE DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

NAME OF WIFE OR HUSBAND	FIRST	MIDDLE (FOR WIFE, MAIDEN)	LAST	DATE OF MARRIAGE
	Elizabeth Howe	McIntire	Harvey	4/4/34

PLACE OF MARRIAGE	(HIS OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
Bloomington, Indiana		Flemingsburg, Kentucky			U.S.A.

LIVING [X] DECEASED [ ]	DATE OF DECEASE	CAUSE
	-	-

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
	2627 39th Street N.W.	Washington, D. C.		U.S.A.

DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
2/3/16	Flemingsburg,		Kentucky	U.S.A.

CITIZENSHIP	DATE ACQUIRED	WHERE ACQUIRED	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
USA	Birth			-	-

OCCUPATION	LAST EMPLOYER
Housewife	War Department - MDW - 1942-'44

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
	Pentagon Bldg	Washington D. C.		USA

DATE OF MILITARY SERVICE	FROM:	TO:	BRANCH OF SERVICE	COUNTRY
	-	-	-	-

OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN (GIVE DETAILS)
See above, War Dept., MDW - Washington, D. C. 1942-1944

SECTION 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (INCLUDE PARTIAL DEPENDENTS) NONE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	AGE

CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	AGE

CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
	NONE			

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	AGE

CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY

SECTION 5. PARENTS

NOTE: FOR STEPFATHER, STEPMOTHER AND/OR GUARDIAN, GIVE THE SAME INFORMATION AS REQUIRED BELOW ON SEPARATE SHEET

NAME OF FATHER	FIRST	MIDDLE	LAST	LIVING [ ] DECEASED [X]
	Drenan	R. (only)	Harvey	

DATE OF DECEASE	CAUSE
7/25/16	Spinal Meningitis

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
	S. Tennessee St.	Danville,	Indiana	U.S.A.

DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
1888	Danville	Indiana		U.S.A.

CITIZENSHIP	DATE ACQUIRED	WHERE ACQUIRED	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
USA	Birth			-	

OCCUPATION	LAST EMPLOYER
Attorney	Self

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
	Danville	Indiana		U.S.A.

SECTION 5. PARENTS (CONTINUED)

SECTION 5. PARENTS (CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2)

DATE OF MILITARY SERVICE	FROM: None	TO: -	BRANCH OR SERVICE -	COUNTRY -

OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN (GIVE DETAILS): None

NAME OF MOTHER	FIRST	MAIDEN	LAST	LIVING / DECEASED
Sara	Jewel	King	Harvey	LIVING [X] DECEASED [ ]

DATE OF DECEASE	CAUSE
-	-

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
	607½ South Center Street	Terre Haute,	Indiana	U.S.A.

DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
1890	Danville	Indiana	U.S.A.

CITIZENSHIP	DATE ACQUIRED	WHERE ACQUIRED CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
USA	Birth		-	

OCCUPATION	LAST EMPLOYER
Professor	Indiana State Teachers College

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
		Terre Haute,	Indiana	U.S.A.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN (GIVE DETAILS): None

SECTION 6. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (INCLUDING HALF-, STEP- AND ADOPTED BROTHERS AND SISTERS)

NAME	FIRST	MIDDLE	LAST
		None	
PRESENT ADDRESS	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE / COUNTRY
NAME	FIRST	MIDDLE	LAST
		None	
PRESENT ADDRESS	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE / COUNTRY
NAME	FIRST	MIDDLE	LAST
PRESENT ADDRESS	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE / COUNTRY

SECTION 7. PARENTS-IN-LAW

NAME OF FATHER-IN-LAW	FIRST	MIDDLE	LAST	LIVING / DECEASED
	James	Marvin	McIntire, Sr.	LIVING [X] DECEASED [ ]

DATE OF DECEASE	CAUSE
-	-

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
	480 Mt. Carmel Avenue	Flemingsburg,	Kentucky	USA

DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
1880	Fleming County,	Kentucky	usa

CITIZENSHIP	DATE ACQUIRED	WHERE ACQUIRED CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
USA	Birth		-	

OCCUPATION	LAST EMPLOYER
Attorney	Self

NAME OF MOTHER-IN-LAW	FIRST	MAIDEN	LAST	LIVING / DECEASED
	Nannie	Ross	McIntire	LIVING [ ] DECEASED [X]

DATE OF DECEASE	CAUSE
1942	Arteris-scleroscis

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
	480 Mt. Carmel Avenue	Flemingsburg,	Kentucky	USA

DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
1886	Fleming County,	Kentucky	USA

CITIZENSHIP	DATE ACQUIRED	WHERE ACQUIRED CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
USA	Birth		-	

OCCUPATION	LAST EMPLOYER
Housewife	—

SECTION 8. RELATIVES

NOTE: INDICATE BELOW THE RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO LIVE ABROAD, ARE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF A FOREIGN POWER, ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES, OR ARE MARRIED TO NON-CITIZENS.

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	AGE
NONE		

CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY

REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION:

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	AGE
NONE		

CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY

REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION: NONE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	AGE

CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY

REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION:

NOTE: INDICATE BELOW THE RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE, IN MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE (UNITED STATES OR FOREIGN)

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	AGE
Dwight Harvey	Cousin	45 approx.

CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
USA-Birth	Not known to me as present			

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN): Colonel - U.S. Army

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	AGE

CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN):

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	AGE

CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN):

SECTION 9. EDUCATION

SCHOOL	ADDRESS	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
Public Schools	Danville, Indiana / Terre Haute, Indiana			USA

DATES ATTENDED FROM	TO	DEGREE
1921	1928	8 yrs. Elementary Credit

SCHOOL	ADDRESS	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
Wiley High School	Terre Haute, Indiana			USA

DATES ATTENDED FROM	TO	DEGREE
1928	1931	H.S. Diploma

COLLEGE	ADDRESS	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
Indiana University	Bloomington Indiana			USA

DATES ATTENDED FROM	TO	DEGREE
1933	1937	LLB with Distinction (2 yrs. credit)

COLLEGE	ADDRESS	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
-	0			

DATES ATTENDED FROM	TO	DEGREE
-	-	-

SECTION 10. SELECTIVE SERVICE (CONTINUED TO PAGE 5)

SECTION 10. SELECTIVE SERVICE [illegible]

CLASSIFICATION	ORDER NUMBER	APPROXIMATE INDUCTION DATE	BOARD NUMBER
II-A- II-A	1194	None	K 113

ADDRESS OF BOARD STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE
Maysville, Mason County,	Kentucky	USA

IF DEFERRED, STATE REASON: Yes, 1940-1947 Special Agent- FBI- US Dept of Justice

SECTION 11. MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE - UNITED STATES OR FOREIGN

COUNTRY	SERVICE	SERVICE DATES FROM:	TO:
USA	FBI-US D of J	12/9/40	8/22/47

GRADE	SERIAL NUMBER	TYPE OF DISCHARGE
Special Agent	----------	Voluntary Resignation

LAST STATION	COMMANDING OFFICER
Washington, D. C.	----------

REMARKS:

SECTION 12. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT (USE ADDITIONAL SHEET IF NECESSARY)

NOTE: INCLUDE BELOW PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESS AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE LAST 5 POSITIONS AND COVER AT LEAST 15 YEARS.

EMPLOYER	JOB TITLE
R. H. King Construction Co.	Laborer

ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE	KIND OF BUSINESS
Danville, Indiana	Bridge Construction

YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY	NAME OF SUPERVISOR
Construction Worker	R. H. King

DATES COVERED FROM:	TO:	SALARY	PER
5/26	9/26	$10	week

REASONS FOR LEAVING: Return to school

EMPLOYER	JOB TITLE
Danville Gazette	Reporter & Printer

ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY STATE	KIND OF BUSINESS
Danville	Indiana	Newspaper

YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY	NAME OF SUPERVISOR
Editoral and Mechanical Work	Alvin Hall, Editor

DATES COVERED FROM:	TO:	SALARY	PER
1931	1933	$10-$15	week

REASONS FOR LEAVING: To Enter University

EMPLOYER	JOB TITLE
Indiana University	Publicity Writer

ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY STATE	KIND OF BUSINESS
Bloomington	Indiana	See above

YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY	NAME OF SUPERVISOR
Writing Athletic Publicity	Various

DATES COVERED FROM:	TO:	SALARY	PER
Partime 1934	1935	$10-(Approx)	week

REASONS FOR LEAVING: Voluntary Resignation

EMPLOYER	JOB TITLE
Self	Attorney-at-law

ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	KIND OF BUSINESS
210 Cowart Street	Maysville	Ky	Practice of Law

(CONTINUED TO PAGE 6)

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SECTION 12. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT (CONTINUED FROM PAGE 5)

YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY			NAME OF SUPERVISOR
General Legal Practice			None
DATES COVERED FROM: 1937	TO: 1940	SALARY: $1500-$2200	PER: year
REASONS FOR LEAVING: To enter FBI			

EMPLOYER			JOB TITLE
Federal Bureau of Investigation			Special Agent & Supervisor
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER: Department of Justice Bldg.	CITY: Washington,	STATE: D. C.	KIND OF BUSINESS: Law Enforcement and counter intelligence
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY: Counter-Intelligence			NAME OF SUPERVISOR: J. Edgar Hoover
DATES COVERED FROM: 12/9/40	TO: 8/22/47	SALARY: $3200-$7000	PER: Annum
REASONS FOR LEAVING: Voluntary Resignation			

EMPLOYER			JOB TITLE
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	KIND OF BUSINESS
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY			NAME OF SUPERVISOR
DATES COVERED FROM:	TO:	SALARY	PER
REASONS FOR LEAVING			

NOTE: IN SPACE BELOW GIVE DETAILS CONCERNING ANY POSITION FROM WHICH YOU MAY HAVE BEEN DISCHARGED OR WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LEFT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT ENTIRELY FAVORABLE.

DETAILS:

Absolutely None

SECTION 13. CHARACTER REFERENCES-FIVE IN THE UNITED STATES (GIVE BUSINESS ADDRESS WHERE POSSIBLE)

NAME	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE
D. F. Nowell	Jersey Ridge Rd.	Maysville,	Ky.
B. F. Small, Atty	Sycamore Bldg.	Terre Haute	Indiana
J. M. Finch, Sr.	Bank of Maysville	Maysville,	Ky.
Harry Stewart	Chief of Police PD	Maysville,	Ky.
E. L. Zeigler, Atty	Cochran Bldg.	Maysville,	KY

SECTION 14. SOCIAL ACQUAINTENCES-FIVE IN THE UNITED STATES (GIVE BUSINESS ADDRESS WHERE POSSIBLE)

NAME	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE
A. H. Thurston	% C.I.G.	Washington,	D. C.
Matthew McGuire	U.S. District Court	Washington,	D. C.
J. A. Bennet, Lt. Col.	Andrews Field,		Maryland
L. Whitson	Room 1734 Dept. of Justice	Washington,	D. C.

SECTION 15. NEIGHBORS-THREE IN THE UNITED STATES (AT YOUR LAST NORMAL ADDRESS)

(CONTINUED TO PAGE 7)

SECTION 15. NEIGHBORS-THREE IN THE UNITED STATES (AT YOUR LAST NORMAL ADDRESS)

NAME	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE
Richard Frear	2627 39th St. N.W.	Washington,	D. C.
H. John Holzberg	2629 39th St. N.W.	Washington,	D. C.
Richard Gallaher	2629 39th St. N.W.	Washington,	D. C.

SECTION 16. MISCELLANEOUS

DID YOU EVER HAVE OR DO YOU NOW HAVE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES? YES [ ] NO [ ]
IF ANSWER IS "YES" EXPLAIN BELOW:

DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED INTOXICANTS? In Moderation

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENCE, AND DISPOSITION OF CASE.

NO

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? YES [ ] NO [X]
IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

SECTION 17. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? YES [X] NO [ ] IF ANSWER IS "NO", STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME.

NAMES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

Peoples Bank of Fleming County, Flemingsburg, Kentucky

State National Bank, Maysville, Kentucky (Acct recently closed)

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN BANKRUPTCY? YES [ ] NO [X] IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE PARTICULARS:

SECTION 18. CREDIT REFERENCES-THREE IN THE UNITED STATES

NAME	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE
Peoples Bank of Fleming County	Flemingsburg,	Kentucky	
State National Bank	Maysville,	Kentucky	
J. Garfinckel & Co.	Washington, D. C.		

SECTION 19. RESIDENCES FOR PAST 15 YEARS

FROM:	TO:	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
3/1942	Date	2627 39th St. N.W.	Washington,	D. C.	
2/1942	3/1942	Gracen Court, Center Avenue	Pittsburgh,	Pa.	
1/41	2/1942	40-71 Elbertson Street	Elmhurst, L.I.	N.Y.C.	N.Y.

(CONTINUED TO PAGE 8)

SECTION 19. RESIDENCES FOR PAST 15 YEARS (CONTINUED FROM PAGE 7)

FROM:	TO:	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
9/1937	12/1940	[illegible]	Maysville,	Ky.	USA
1933	1937	Various	Bloomington,	Ind.	USA
1931	1933	E. Main	Danville	Ind.	USA
1928	1931	[illegible] S. Center St.	Terre Haute,	Ind.	USA

SECTION 20. RESIDENCES OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES NONE EXCEPT VISIT CANADA

FROM: (MO. AND YR.)	TO: (MO. AND YR.)	CITY OR SECTION	COUNTRY	PURPOSE
9/40	9/40	Canada	(S.Ste. Marie)	Fish

SECTION 21. CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NOTE: IN SPACE BELOW LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND ORGANIZATIONS OF ALL KINDS TO WHICH YOU HAVE BELONGED, OTHER THAN RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES, POLITICAL PARTIES AND LABOR UNIONS. INCLUDE ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR A BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY OF WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN A MEMBER OR TO WHICH YOU HAVE GIVEN SUPPORT.

NAME	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
Sigma Chi		Bloomington,	Indiana	USA
Phi Delta Phi		"	"	"
Order of Coif		"	"	"
Rotary International		Maysville	Ky.	USA
Natl. Rifle Association		Various		
Boy Scouts of America		Various		
FBI Recreation Association		Washington, D. C.		

SECTION 22. LANGUAGES-FOREIGN (STATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT", "FAIR" OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE
German		Slight	

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SECTION 23. GENERAL QUALIFICAT[illegible]

INDICATE ANY SPECIAL KNOWLEDGE OR TRAINING YOU HAVE. ALSO, SET FORTH ANY QUALIFICATIONS AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION.

Specialist in counter Intelligence, operations, analysis, and evaluation

SECTION 24. SPORTS AND HOBBIES

Fishing, hunting, firearms

SECTION 25. EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP
Mrs. Elizabeth M. Harvey	wife

ADDRESS (STREET AND NUMBER)	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY	TELEPHONE
2527 39th Street N.W.	Washington, D. C.			OR 2914

SECTION 26. INFORMATION AND FINAL COMMENTS

NOTE: YOU ARE INFORMED THAT CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED, AND YOU ARE INVITED TO MAKE ANY CHANGES (OR ADDITIONS) IN YOUR STATEMENTS THAT YOU MAY THINK ADVISABLE.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION, IF SO, DESCRIBE, IF NOT, ANSWER, "NO".

NONE

SECTION 27. CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY INTENTIONAL MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR MY IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL.

SIGNED AT ______________________ (City) (State) DATE ______________________

______________________ Witness ______________________ Signature of Applicant

SECRET

27 August 1947

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT OF WILLIAM KING HARVEY

PERSONAL:	Birth: September 13, 1915 Place: Danville, Indiana Leg Res: Maysville, Kentucky
PARENTAGE:	Father: Drenan R. Harvey Birth: 1888 Place: Danville, Indiana Mother: Sara Jewel King Harvey Birth: 1890 Place: Danville, Indiana
RELATIVES ABROAD:	None
EDUCATION:	Wiley High School, Terre Haute, Indiana Dates: 1928 to 1931 Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana Dates: 1933 to 1937 LLB degree
EXPERIENCE:	Danville Gazette - Newspaper, Danville, Indiana Dates: 1931 to 1933 Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana Dates: 1933 to 1937 Practice of Law, Maysville, Kentucky Dates: 1937 to 1940 F.B.I., Special Agent Dates: 1940 to August 22, 1947
MILITARY:	None
TRAVEL:	Visited Canada for one month in September 1940 on vacation.
MARITAL STATUS:	Married to: Elizabeth Howe McIntire Harvey Birth: February 3, 1916 Place: Flemingsburg, Kentucky Dependents: None besides wife Father-in-law: James Marvin McIntire, Sr. Birth: 1880 Place: Fleming County, Ky. Mother-in-law: Nannie Rose McIntire - now deceased Birth: 1886 Place: Fleming County, Ky.

Washington address and telephone number:

2627 - 39th St., N. W.
Washington, D. C. Tel: ORdway 2914

Emergency Addresses: Mrs. Elizabeth H. Harvey
2627 - 39th St., N. W.
Washington, D. C. Tel: ORdway 2914

27 August 1947

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT ON WILLIAM KING HARVEY

PERSONAL: Birth: September 13, 1915 Place: Danville, Indiana
Leg Res: Maysville, Kentucky

PARENTAGE: Father: Drenan R. Harvey
Birth: 1888 Place: Danville, Indiana
Mother: Sara Jewel King Harvey
Birth: 1890 Place: Danville, Indiana

RELATIVES ABROAD: None

EDUCATION: Wiley High School, Terre Haute, Indiana
Dates: 1928 to 1931
Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana
Dates: 1933 to 1937 LLB degree

EXPERIENCE: Danville Gazette - Newspaper, Danville, Indiana
Dates: 1931 to 1933
Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana
Dates: 1933 to 1937
Practice of Law, Maysville, Kentucky
Dates: 1937 to 1940
F.B.I., Special Agent
Dates: 1940 to August 22, 1947

MILITARY: None

TRAVEL: Visited Canada for one month in September 1940 on vacation.

MARITAL STATUS: Married to: Elizabeth Howe McIntire Harvey
Birth: February 3, 1916 Place: Flemingsburg, Kentucky
Dependents: None besides wife
Father-in-law: James Marvin McIntire, Sr.
Birth: 1880 Place: Fleming County, Ky.
Mother-in-law: Hannie Ross McIntire - now deceased
Birth: 1886 Place: Fleming County, Ky.

Washington address and telephone number:

2627 - 39th St., N. W.
Washington, D. C. Tel: ORdway 2914

Emergency Addressee: Mrs. Elizabeth M. Harvey
2627 - 39th St., N. W.
Washington, D. C. Tel: ORdway 2914

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27 August 1947

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT ON WILLIAM KING HARVEY

PERSONAL:	Birth: September 13, 1915 Place: Danville, Indiana Leg Res: Maysville, Kentucky
PARENTAGE:	Father: Drenan R. Harvey Birth: 1888 Place: Danville, Indiana Mother: Sara Jewel King Harvey Birth: 1890 Place: Danville, Indiana
RELATIVES ABROAD:	None
EDUCATION:	Wiley High School, Terre Haute, Indiana Dates: 1928 to 1931 Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana Dates: 1933 to 1937 LLB degree
EXPERIENCE:	Danville Gazette - Newspaper, Danville, Indiana Dates: 1931 to 1933 Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana Dates: 1933 to 1937 Practice of Law, Maysville, Kentucky Dates: 1937 to 1940 F.B.I., Special Agent Dates: 1940 to August 22, 1947
MILITARY:	None
TRAVEL:	Visited Canada for one month in September 1940 on vacation.
MARITAL STATUS:	Married to: Elizabeth Howe McIntire Harvey Birth: February 3, 1916 Place: Flemingsburg, Kentucky Dependents: None besides wife Father-in-law: James Marvin McIntire, Sr. Birth: 1880 Place: Fleming County, Ky. Mother-in-law: Nannie Ross McIntire - now deceased Birth: 1886 Place: Fleming County, Ky.

Washington address and telephone number:

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Emergency Addresses: Mrs. Elizabeth M. Harvey
2627 - 39th St., N. W.
Washington, D. C. Tel: ORdway 2914

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27 August 1947

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT ON WILLIAM KING HARVEY

PERSONAL:	Birth: September 13, 1915	Place:	Danville, Indiana
	Leg Res: Maysville, Kentucky		
PARENTAGE:	Father: Drenan R. Harvey		
	Birth: 1888	Place:	Danville, Indiana
	Mother: Sara Jewel King Harvey		
	Birth: 1890	Place:	Danville, Indiana
RELATIVES ABROAD:	None		
EDUCATION:	Wiley High School, Terre Haute, Indiana		
	Dates: 1928 to 1931		
	Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana		
	Dates: 1933 to 1937 LLB degree		
EXPERIENCE:	Danville Gazette - Newspaper, Danville, Indiana		
	Dates: 1931 to 1933		
	Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana		
	Dates: 1933 to 1937		
	Practice of Law, Maysville, Kentucky		
	Dates: 1937 to 1940		
	F.B.I., Special Agent		
	Dates: 1940 to August 22, 1947		
MILITARY:	None		
TRAVEL:	Visited Canada for one month in September 1940 on vacation.		
MARITAL STATUS:	Married to: Elisabeth Howe McIntire Harvey		
	Birth: February 3, 1916	Place:	Flemingsburg, Kentucky
	Dependents: None besides wife		
	Father-in-law: James Marvin McIntire, Sr.		
	Birth: 1880	Place:	Fleming County, Ky.
	Mother-in-law: Mamie Ross McIntire - now deceased		
	Birth: 1886	Place:	Fleming County, Ky.

Washington address and telephone number:

2627 - 39th St., N. W.
Washington, D. C. Tel: ORdway 2914

Emergency Addresses: Mrs. Elisabeth M. Harvey
2627 - 39th St., N. W.
Washington, D. C. Tel: ORdway 2914

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SECURITY OFFICE

Investigation Report

Date: October 8, 1947

Number: 32814

Subject: HARVEY, William King

To: CPD (2)

1. Investigation directed by: RHC

2. Sources of information: OSO

3. Remarks

4. Recommendation:

SECURITY APPROVAL RECOMMENDED. THOUGH SUBJECT [illegible] OF DEROGATORY INFORMATION AT SOME [illegible]RE DATE. INTERVIEW WAIVED. [illegible] THE APPLICANT E[illegible] UPON DUTY WITHIN [illegible] DAYS FROM ABOVE DATE. THIS APPROVAL BECOMES INVALID.

Branch notified of this approval. Copy (orig.) sent to Spattal [illegible] 9 Oct. 1947.

By RHC/[illegible]
Security Officer
ROBERT H. CUNNINGHAM

CC: Mr. Judson H. Lightsey

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CONF[illegible]

FORM NO. 38-101
DEC 1946

(1794)

14-00000

MEMORANDUM

Re: William King Harvey

A complete and thorough investigation has been conducted on this employee and he was found suitable for employment in this agency.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

TO : Chief, Communications

DATE: 8 August 1952

Acting
FROM : Chief, Security Division

SUBJECT: HARVEY, William King
32514

In reply to your memorandum this is to advise that subject meets the current requirements for cryptographic clearance and is approved for such duties as of this date.

E. P. Geiss
E. P. Geiss

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Personal + 3rd Agency Material

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: ~~[illegible]~~ FRONT NATIONALE
(NATIONAL FRONT)
LOOSE DOCUMENTS

INCLUSIVE DATES: ______

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE MEMORANDUM DATED 20 DECEMBER 1948
(FRONT NATIONALE FRANCE)

THIRD AGENCY

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LONDON

9 August 1944

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

-21

COUNTRY France
SUBJECT Resistance and Labor organization in Normandy; Civilian Attitudes.

ORIGINAL REPORT NO GV-130
DATE OF REPORT 24 July 1944
EVALUATION B-2

CONFIRMATION
SUPPLEMENT
CORRECTION

SOURCE OSS - 3rd Army
SUB SOURCE

DATE OF INFORMATION Undated
PLACE OF ORIGIN France

NUMBER OF PAGES 2
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AL

1. The Conseil de la Resistance in Cherbourg is composed of three main groups: the O.C.M., Liberation and the Front National:

The Chief of the Conseil de la Resistance, M. Greslin, is an O.C.M. leader and his organization holds the majority of seats in the Conseil. The O C.M. is generally composed of merchants, landowners and notables who, prior to the armistice, were Rightists or extreme-Rightists.

Liberation, which claims to have been the most active and efficient movement in the Department, is led by and generally composed of Socialists and C.G.T. men. In fact all the Resistance Socialists and Union men are members of Liberation.

As in the rest of France, the Front National is here the Communist Party's resistance organization. It is not as influential here as it is reported to be in other regions.

2. The right hand man to M. Greslin is M. Bocher (Beauchet), who seems to be as well the most prominent labor leader of the department. Bocher is at the same time secretary of the Regional Socialist Federation, secretary of the Merchant Sailor's Union, secretary of the Union des Syndicats, representative of the I.T.F. and head of the local Liberation movement. He is a very efficient man and seems to be respected and esteemed even by his political adversaries.

3. The enthusiasm in favor of the Allies described in the newspapers should not be overestimated. The Norman did not like the Germans and is glad that they have been thrown out. But a very

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great number of people here are suspicious of Resistance because of the presence of Communists and Socialists. Moreover, they are very reserved towards foreigners as a rule, and they are not sure of what the Allies intend to do. They are also puzzled about the currency which has been introduced. On the part of Labor, there is a sincere enthusiasm for the victories of the democracies somewhat tempered by the way local problems are handled by military authorities. For example, the ~~Army or the Navy~~ have hired dozens of workers to repair the Cherbourg harbor, but ~~they have done it~~ without consulting the unions. (They have Thus) given work to ~~a lot of~~ former Todt workers, more or less reliable, while skilled workers who were in Resistance Movement are left unemployed. Instances of this kind are frequent.

14-00000

[illegible]

Report No. [illegible]

Report from [illegible]

[illegible]

Information Date	[illegible]
Report Date	[illegible]
Dissemination Date	[illegible]
Value	[illegible]
Source	[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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-4

Notes of [illegible]

[illegible] is in full [illegible] ... [illegible] The [illegible] ... [illegible] political parties, and their strength [illegible] ... [illegible] place [illegible] ... It is difficult to estimate [illegible] ... [illegible] to be about equal [illegible]

[illegible] ... he pointed out [illegible] ... in 1939, of [illegible] ... he stated that if elections were held [illegible] ... the Socialists [illegible]

[illegible] that the political situation is confused by the existence of [illegible] and that since the [illegible] ... [illegible] political [illegible] ... [illegible] he states [illegible] ... [illegible]

[illegible], in private conversation, and [illegible] Socialist [illegible] in a speech before the [illegible] of the [illegible] ... [illegible]

[illegible]

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[illegible]

[illegible] Greek [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

6. [illegible] consultant [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] are likely [illegible] [illegible] influenced by the clerk [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] however [illegible] [illegible] February.

7. [illegible] consultant [illegible] the CIC [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and large [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

8. [illegible]

9. [illegible]

10. [illegible]

11. [illegible]

that the CO[illegible] not maintaining a sufficiently independent and opposition attitude.

12. Regarding relations of the Socialist Party with resistance groups, [illegible] Soldani, member of the Comité Fédéral of the party for the [illegible] and member of the [illegible], expressed his deep regret over the fact that fusion between the Socialist Party and the [illegible] now seems impossible. He said he had hoped this fusion of the [illegible] of the [illegible] with the best elements of the Socialist Party would constitute a great rejuvenated Socialist Party of the future. During the debate on this subject, [illegible], almost explosive exception to an insinuation by [illegible], member of the Bureau Directeur of the party, that the leaders of the [illegible] were simply a group of [illegible] who were trying to take advantage of the situation to gain political power.

13. As for foreign policy, the Congress expressed itself as opposed to the hegemony of any one great power, whether it be Britain, the United States or Russia, and in favor of a system of collective security, with all the democratic nations of the world equally represented in an international association of nations. This association should [illegible] its own army, credit, transport, etc. in order to be able to guarantee the peace. Regarding the treatment of Germany, the Congress voiced its opposition to any dismemberment of the country, but approved a long occupation with a severe allied control of all German industry and endorsed also a long-range program for the reeducation of German youth.

14. Communist Party. According to [illegible], secretary of the [illegible] section of the Socialist Party, the Communists claim to have 4,000 registered members in the [illegible]. Communist leaders interviewed declined to quote any figures.

15. [illegible], president [illegible] member of the [illegible], related that the Communists have gained many new followers in the [illegible] since the war, at the expense of the Socialists. He claims this is due to a large extent from the Communists' nationalist policy [illegible] young, vigorous leaders as compared with the Socialists [illegible] the [illegible] leaders representing the old regime. He stated that the policy of the Communist Party would remain nationalist in the future; that it would be difficult to return to a revolutionary program.

16. [illegible] asserted that the Communists get along better with the Christian Democrats than with the Socialists, since the latter — as he put it — place party interests above the national interests.

17. The Communists are opposed to the holding of elections next February, [illegible] reasons [illegible] follows: the elections were asked for before the [illegible] of the [illegible] by the Allies [illegible] population [illegible] the Allies that [illegible] and the country [illegible] the Allies recognized the [illegible] Government [illegible] the [illegible] million prisoners and deportees [illegible] to the polls. [illegible], however, the [illegible] Communists are opposed to the elections in their fear of losing [illegible] strength which [illegible] the various departments [illegible].

mental and [illegible] liberation committees. [illegible], M. [illegible] indicated his [illegible] opposition to the holding of elections at the present time since the women's vote constituted an experiment and he was [illegible] of conducting such experiments while France was still at war. (He [illegible] well feel that to hold elections now would mean a loss of strength for the [illegible] as well as for the [illegible].) [illegible] Allegre, Communist municipal delegate, stated flatly that he believed the elections would be postponed, although the party is making its plans so as to have everything in readiness in case the elections are held in February.

18. Both [illegible] the [illegible] chief [illegible] the [illegible] of the Var, M. [illegible], for not being [illegible] enough in his [illegible] of the department, particularly the procurement of adequate food supplies. [illegible] for his personal courage and for his active participation in resistance activities but pointed out that he was formerly secretary of the [illegible] at Toulon and that he [illegible] not broken away from the old habits of the plodding permanent fonctionnaire.

19. [illegible] described Admiral [illegible], [illegible] of Toulon, as a [illegible] of the old tradition — along with the great majority of high [illegible] officers at the Toulon naval base.

20. According to [illegible], the Toulon edition of [illegible], the [illegible] paper published in Marseille, has a daily circulation of 1[illegible],000 and a Sunday circulation of [illegible],000.

21. [illegible] Republicain [illegible]: The Toulon section of the [illegible] was formed about [illegible] months ago. The officers are [illegible], president; [illegible], secretary; M. [illegible], [illegible]. [illegible] the process of [illegible]; [illegible] hopes to have it organized before the end of the year. [illegible] a membership [illegible] the Toulon section of [illegible] but this appears to be an exaggeration. [illegible] stated that the Toulon edition of the [illegible] paper, [illegible], [illegible] local circulation of [illegible]. This Toulon edition was started [illegible].

22. The [illegible] Feminine [illegible] is the women's adjunct of the [illegible] at Toulon. [illegible] making serious efforts to capture the women's [illegible], series of [illegible] free weekly political lectures, starting 13 [illegible] 194[illegible] has been organized by the [illegible].

23. Radical-Socialist Party: It is [illegible] that the [illegible] Socialists [illegible] as a political force in the Var [illegible] party headquarters has been established in Toulon, [illegible] from one brief newspaper announcement, no [illegible] of any Radical-Socialist activity was discovered.

24. [illegible], of the [illegible], is optimistic over the possibility of fusion between the [illegible] and the [illegible] in the Var [illegible] after the agreement just reached between the two [illegible] in the [illegible] of the Gard. On the other hand, [illegible], of the [illegible], points out that many members of his organization are hesitant about uniting with the [illegible], because they see in this an attempt

[illegible] to [illegible] the [illegible]. However, [illegible] are still continuing between the two groups. [illegible] of the [illegible] not Communists [illegible] the positions [illegible] responsibility in [illegible] held by Communists.

[illegible] According to [illegible], representative of the [illegible] in the [illegible] workers of the [illegible] in October 19[illegible] [illegible] 24,9[illegible] members in 1937. [illegible] of the most urgent [illegible] before the [illegible] in the [illegible] of the [illegible] of salaries. [illegible] workers are too highly paid [illegible] to the salaries of [illegible] skilled workers in other trades. This [illegible] created by the [illegible] was paid very well in order to [illegible] labor [illegible] certain high [illegible]. For example, workers in the building trades [illegible] getting up to [illegible] per hour, while skilled [illegible] earn only 12 francs [illegible]. [illegible] points out [illegible] it is not possible to [illegible] all salaries to the [illegible] levels [illegible] by the Germans, since this would cause an inflationary [illegible]. Therefore the [illegible] faced with the delicate task of working [illegible] for the [illegible] to a certain extent [illegible] some salaries and the [illegible] of others.

[illegible] and Military [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] Colonel [illegible] [illegible] quarters [illegible], about 7 km [illegible] of [illegible], a [illegible] private estate formerly occupied by [illegible] ([illegible]).

[illegible] [illegible] part of the [illegible] of the 15[illegible] Military Region [illegible], Basses Alpes, Hautes Alpes, Alpes Maritimes [illegible] [illegible] the command of [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] that he had [illegible] detachments out on expeditions against the

29 [illegible] stated [illegible] [illegible] elements of [illegible] been reported [illegible] Toulon [illegible] in [illegible] but [illegible] elements [illegible] in the [illegible] circulating in [illegible] in Toulon to [illegible] Thus [illegible] do [illegible] in [illegible] for all [illegible]

30 [illegible], who was formerly [illegible] chief of the [illegible] Intelligence, [illegible] still a member of the [illegible] committee of [illegible] Intelligence, claims [illegible] in [illegible] of the [illegible] of the [illegible] that the [illegible] were [illegible] their spare time to [illegible]

31 [illegible] According to Lt. Colonel [illegible] of the War [illegible] in the [illegible] at [illegible] command of Colonel [illegible] consists of [illegible] and is preparing to [illegible] shortly for the front to join the [illegible] In Toulon, [illegible] formed on [illegible] to one of the [illegible]

[illegible] Relations

32 [illegible] stationed in [illegible] and [illegible] themselves [illegible] principally [illegible] The fol[illegible] general [illegible] at Toulon [illegible] French would [illegible] possible

33 [illegible] side, the French are, to a greater or lesser degree, resentful [illegible] Toulon, [illegible] of [illegible] food [illegible] the civilian population [illegible] In Toulon, about [illegible] of [illegible] required for [illegible] were sold at [illegible]

34 [illegible] to [illegible] well, [illegible] the [illegible] the Gaullist Government.

35. [illegible] people [illegible] the decision of the Government [illegible] In that connection, he stated that [illegible] had no confidence in the [illegible] of the [illegible] region.

[illegible] Situation

36. [illegible] Construction. [illegible] suffered heavily from [illegible] the [illegible] center of town [illegible] of the [illegible] Bureau of Reconstruction, of a total of 36,[illegible] houses in [illegible], [illegible] entirely destroyed, 1,[illegible] damaged and [illegible] damage. [illegible] since it is [illegible] difficult to obtain building [illegible] houses which [illegible] partially [illegible] of the [illegible] people [illegible] are temporarily living with friends and relatives [illegible] from the [illegible] normal [illegible] of 30,[illegible] to 35,[illegible]

37. [illegible] of building materials [illegible]:

8,[illegible] tile shingles for roofing
3,[illegible] tons of bricks
5,[illegible] tons of [illegible]
1,[illegible] tons of cement
1,[illegible] tons of lime
200,[illegible] square meters of window panes.

[illegible] repair [illegible]

38. [illegible] conditions in [illegible] children, [illegible] 3 months [illegible]

39. [illegible] fact [illegible] of [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] improvement [illegible] However, [illegible] to [illegible] food [illegible] place.

41. [illegible] supply [illegible]. The streets [illegible] exist [illegible] with [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]	Breakfast	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	
	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] (Chr[illegible] [illegible])
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] aux arts, Sports, [illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] et [illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] des [illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible], [illegible], [illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] des [illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] de la [illegible] Nationale
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] de la [illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

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Report No. F-489
Report from France

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[illegible] Oct [illegible] 47

Notes on Toulon

1. [illegible] is in full [illegible] with [illegible] for elections [illegible] for next [illegible]. The [illegible] and [illegible] are the [illegible] of the [illegible] political parties, and their strength [illegible] to be [illegible] divided. The Christian Democrats ([illegible]) are lagging [illegible] place [illegible] the Radical-Socialist [illegible] very [illegible]. As for the [illegible] organizations, both the [illegible] ([illegible]) and [illegible] ([illegible]) are [illegible] strong [illegible] in the [illegible]. It is difficult to estimate the extent of their regular following [illegible] their leaders [illegible] unwilling to [illegible] any figures [illegible] but both appear to be about equal in strength to the [illegible] Communists.

2. [illegible] according to [illegible] the Socialist party has [illegible] in Toulon (as compared [illegible] in the [illegible] of [illegible] (as compared with [illegible] before the war). He pointed out that [illegible] traditionally a Socialist stronghold. In 1939, of [illegible] conseillers generaux [illegible] were Socialists and [illegible]; he stated that if elections were held [illegible], the Socialists [illegible] come out ahead.

3. [illegible] feels that the political situation is confused by the existence of the [illegible] and the [illegible], and that since the work of the [illegible] is over, these groups should disappear and give way to the political parties. He maintains that the leaders of the [illegible] are motivated by [illegible] of personal interest, their object being to replace the old [illegible] and the old leaders. He states that [illegible] of the Socialist party with the [illegible] will not be accomplished, and that individual Communists joined the [illegible] simply to [illegible] the [illegible] elements in that organization and [illegible] the influence of the [illegible].

4. [illegible] in private conversation, and [illegible], Socialist [illegible], in a speech before the Congress of the Socialist Federation of the [illegible] at Toulon, [illegible] September 1944, [illegible] for holding [illegible] in [illegible]. [illegible] pointed out that present [illegible] of [illegible] were not representative of the [illegible] of the people [illegible] public opinion. [illegible] proof of popular [illegible] before [illegible] considered [illegible] Liberation [illegible] the people. [illegible] the [illegible] (almost [illegible]), [illegible].

5. [illegible] feels it possible that the [illegible] may [illegible] pressure on the government [illegible] of the elections [illegible] order in France although he does

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[illegible] the attention [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of the practically unanimous popular support of General De Gaulle.

6. The Socialists [illegible] a certain [illegible] of the women's vote. They feel that the women are likely to be strongly influenced by the clergy when they go to the polls. Despite this fact, however, the Socialists [illegible] [illegible] elections to be held next February.

7. The Socialist party [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] throughout the [illegible] of Toulon, with [illegible] display of posters and propaganda material, and huge paintings of [illegible] and Jean Jaures. The Toulon edition of Le Provencal, the Socialist paper published at Marseille, [illegible] daily [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] a small kind of [illegible] frequent meetings of the Toulon Section and of local sub-sections are held.

8. [illegible] of the [illegible] of the Var: The [illegible] Socialist Congress of the [illegible] of the Var was held Sunday, [illegible] December, at Toulon, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of the party and Mayor of [illegible]. About 300 delegates and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the small [illegible] as each party section in the Department being represented by [illegible] delegates. The meeting [illegible] all day, with a break for lunch. It was conducted in a serious, business-like manner.

9. The [illegible] debate centered on the [illegible] of the activities to the Front National of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of the Socialist deputies of the [illegible]. The Congress unanimously adopted a motion presented by the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] would be [illegible] to continue in the Front National on the condition that all his public propaganda appearances were devoted exclusively to the interests of the Socialist Party, as [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible] position in which he was placing himself and the Socialist Party by [illegible] an active part in the leadership of the [illegible], the question of the [illegible] unions was raised; [illegible] [illegible] in favor of the [illegible] unions, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] opposed. [illegible] refused to accept the conditions imposed on him by the Congress, and resigned from the party. At [illegible] the Congress unanimously [illegible] a resolution rejecting his resignation and excluding him from the party.

10. There was [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] on the question of collaboration with the Communist Party, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] a motion in favor of opening [illegible] [illegible] with the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] level with a view toward [illegible] unity between the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] killed. However, [illegible] motion was finally voted unanimously approving [illegible] continuation of discussions on a [illegible] [illegible] national [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] unity of the working class, and [illegible] [illegible] the desire of [illegible] [illegible] for harmonious relations with [illegible] [illegible]. The [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] no desire to be anti-[illegible] [illegible] but expected, in return, that the Communists would not be anti-Socialist.

11. During the debate, there was [illegible] criticism of the [illegible] [illegible] against the Socialists [illegible] the [illegible] and [illegible] local [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] by the Communists through [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

that the CGT was not maintaining a sufficiently independent and apolitical attitude.

12. In discussing relations of the Socialist Party with resistance groups, M. Soldani, member of the Bureau Federal of the party for the Var and member of the [illegible], expressed his deep regret over the fact that fusion between the Socialist Party and the [illegible] now seems impossible. He said he had hoped this fusion of the socialists of the [illegible] with the best elements of the Socialist Party would constitute a great regenerated Socialist Party of the future. During the debate on the subject, he took vigorous, almost explosive exception to an insinuation by [illegible], member of the Bureau Directeur of the party, that the leaders of the [illegible] were simply a group of arrivistes who were trying to take advantage of the situation to seize political power.

13. As for foreign policy, the Congress expressed itself as opposed to the hegemony of any one great power, whether it be Britain, the United States or Russia, and in favor of a system of collective security, with all the democratic nations of the world equally represented in an international association of nations. This association should have its own army, credit, transport, etc. in order to be able to guarantee the peace. Regarding the treatment of Germany, the Congress voiced its opposition to any dismemberment of the country, but approved a long occupation with a severe allied control of all German industry and commerce and a long-range program for the reeducation of German youth.

14. Communist Party. According to M. [illegible], secretary of the Toulon section of the Socialist Party, the Communists claim to have 4,000 registered members in the Var. Communist leaders interviewed declined to quote any figures.

15. M. Fothier, president Communist member of [illegible], maintains that the Communists have gained many new followers in the Var since the war, at the expense of the Socialists. He claims that this results to a large extent from the Communists' nationalist policy and also from their young, vigorous leaders, as compared with the Socialists who still have the same leaders representing the old regime. He stated that the policy of the Communist Party would remain nationalist in the future; that it would be difficult to return to a revolutionary program.

16. Fothier asserted that the Communists get along better with the Christian Democrats than with the Socialists, since the latter - as he put it - placed party interests above the national interests.

17. The Communists are opposed to the holding of elections next February. Their reasoning ostensibly is as follows: the elections were scheduled before the recognition of the Provisional Government by the Allies as a means of holding a popular referendum and thus showing the Allies that De Gaulle and the country were behind him. Now that the Allies have recognized the De Gaulle government, the pressing need for immediate elections no longer exists. Besides, it would be only fair to wait for the return of the three million prisoners and deportees before proceeding to the polls. According to M. [illegible] of [illegible], however, the real reason the Communists are opposed to the elections is their fear of losing some of the strength which they now hold on the various depart-[illegible]

mental and local liberation committees. Incidentally, M. Arrighi himself indicated his personal opposition to the holding of elections at the present time, since the women's vote constituted an experiment and he was not in favor of conducting such experiments while France was still at war. (Arrighi may well feel that to hold elections now would mean a loss of strength for the [illegible] as well as for the Communists.) Etienne Allegre, Communist municipal delegate, stated flatly that he believed the elections would be postponed, although the party is making its plans so as to have everything in readiness in case the elections are held in February.

18. Both Allegre and Pothier criticized the prefect of the Var, M. Sevie, for not being vigorous enough in his handling of the affairs of the department, particularly the procurement of adequate food supplies. Pothier praised Sevie for his personal courage and for his active participation in resistance activities but pointed out that he was formerly secretary of the sous-prefecture at Toulon and that he had not broken away from the old habits of the plodding government fonctionnaire.

19. Pothier described Admiral Lemoert, prefet maritime of Toulon, as a reactionary of the old tradition – along with the great majority of higher naval officers at the Toulon naval base.

20. According to Allegre, the Toulon edition of Rouge-Midi, the Communist paper published in Marseille, has a daily circulation of 1[illegible],000 and a Sunday circulation of 15,000.

21. Mouvement Republicain Populaire: The Toulon section of the MRP was formed about [illegible] months ago. The officers are, M. Labrosse, president; M. Jouzian, attorney, secretary; M. Garnier, worker at the Naval Arsenal, treasurer. A departmental federation of the MRP is in the process of organization; Labrosse hopes to have it organized before the end of the year. Labrosse claims a membership in the Toulon section of 1,[illegible] – but this appears to be an exaggeration. Labrosse stated that the Toulon edition of the Christian Democrat newspaper, Le Provencal, published at Marseille, has a local circulation of 2,000. This Toulon edition was started [illegible].

22. The Union Feminine Civique et Sociale (UFCS) is the women's adjunct of the MRP at Toulon. As in Paris, the MRP in Toulon is making serious efforts to capture the women's vote. A series of three free weekly political lectures, starting 13 December 1944 has been organized by the UFCS.

23. Radical-Socialist Party. It is universally stated that the Radical-Socialists are practically absent as a political force in the Var. No party headquarters has been established in Toulon, and aside from the brief newspaper announcement, no sign of any Radical-Socialist activity was discovered.

24. [illegible] and [illegible]. Pothier, of the [illegible], is optimistic over the possibility of fusion between the [illegible] and the [illegible] in the Var échelon after the agreement just reached between the two groups in the department of the Gard. On the other hand, Arrighi, of the [illegible], points out that many members of his organization are hesitant about uniting with the [illegible], because they see in this an attempt

on the [illegible] of the [illegible] to absorb the [illegible]. However, he states that discussions are still continuing between the two groups. [illegible] asserts that although many members of the [illegible] are not Communists all the positions of responsibility in that organization are held by Communists.

25. [illegible] According to [illegible] Bessone, representative of the CGT on the CDL, there were [illegible] registered members of the CGT in the Var on [illegible] December 19[illegible], as compared with 24,907 members in 1937. Bessone considers one of the most urgent problems before the CGT in the Var to be that of the stabilization of salaries. Some workers are too highly paid [illegible] in comparison to the salaries of equally skilled workers in other trades. This [illegible] of affairs was created by the [illegible] who paid very well in order to attract labor to certain high-priority jobs. For example, workers in the building trades are getting up to [illegible] francs per hour, while skilled [illegible] and [illegible] earn only 12 francs per hour. Bessone points out that it is not possible to raise all salaries to the highest levels established by the Germans, since this would cause an inflationary trend. Therefore, the CGT was faced with the delicate task of working at the same time for the reduction -- to a certain extent -- of some salaries and the raising of others.

[illegible] and Military [illegible]

26. [illegible] Républicaines de Sécurité and Gardes Civiques [illegible] The Forces [illegible] de Sécurité have a total strength of [illegible] officers and men in the Var, under the command of Lt. Colonel [illegible] Barrat. Their headquarters are at [illegible], about 7 km. west of Toulon, at the Chateau [illegible], a requisitioned private estate formerly occupied by the Vichyite [illegible] (Groupes Mobiles de Réserve).

27. The two companies under Barrat form part of the [illegible] of the 15th Military Region ([illegible], Hautes Alpes, Basses Alpes, Alpes Maritimes, Bouches-du-Rhône, [illegible]) [illegible] by Regional Commissioner [illegible] and placed under the command of General [illegible]. The [illegible] are an official, paid militia, working under the prefect in each department of the 15th Military Region, with the principal task of combatting [illegible], collaborationists and black marketeers and of maintaining order. In the Var, the [illegible] has the additional task of guarding the [illegible] political prisoners at the camp of [illegible]. Members of the [illegible] in the Var are all former [illegible]. The men are paid 2,[illegible] francs monthly; officers and non-commissioned officers receive regular army pay.

28. [illegible] stated that he is badly in need of arms and equipment for his men. There are uniforms for only [illegible] percent of his [illegible] men, and their total arms consist of [illegible] German [illegible] and [illegible] light machine guns. Barrat pointed out that it would mean a great deal for the discipline of his men if they could all be properly armed and equipped. He hastened to add that in spite of circumstances, discipline was good. An inspection tour of the quarters, however, revealed a rather indifferent discipline; the men lacked the military smartness and bearing of trained soldiers. German prisoners working on the premises were more prompt than the members of the [illegible] to come to attention and salute at the approach of Lt. Colonel Barrat.

29. Barrat stated that he had sent detachments out on expeditions against the

29. [illegible] stated that he had sent detachments [illegible] on expeditions against the [illegible] blanc -- elements of which had been reported in various localities in the [illegible] -- but so far without success. The [illegible] was not [illegible] made contact with these elements anywhere in the [illegible]. [illegible] also has [illegible] circulating in civilian clothes in Toulon to help stamp out the black market. Thus far, the [illegible] made 250 arrests in [illegible], for all offenses.

30. [illegible], who was formerly departmental chief of the [illegible] Patriotiques, and who is still a member of the departmental committee of the [illegible] Patriotiques), claims [illegible] for the [illegible] in the [illegible]. [illegible] stated [illegible] of the [illegible] were the [illegible] of the [illegible], [illegible] that the former were unpaid civilians devoting only their spare time to this task.

31. [illegible]. According to [illegible], Colonel [illegible], and the remaining [illegible] of the [illegible] are grouped in the [illegible]-Brigade des [illegible] at [illegible], under the command of Colonel ([illegible]) [illegible]. This unit consists of about 1,000 men, and is preparing to leave shortly for the front to join the 1st French Army. In Toulon, former [illegible] members have formed an Amicale des [illegible]. According to one of the members, the Amicale has a total membership of [illegible].

Franco-American Relations

32. American sailors stationed in Toulon report a number of cafe fights and arguments between themselves and Frenchmen, principally over women. The feeling is fairly general among American sailors at Toulon that the French would overcharge an American at every opportunity possible.

33. On their side, the French are, to a greater or lesser degree, resentful over the American bombing of Toulon, which destroyed a large part of the city; over American treatment of German P/W's; and over the fact that American food supplies for the civilian population have not arrived in greater quantities. [illegible] (a Corsican, about 55, veteran of the last war and [illegible] for over two years during this one) remarked bitterly that American soldiers and sold cigarettes, rations and soap at high black market prices and had not given anything away, contrary to what was expected of them. Cigarettes were sold at 50 to 100 francs a pack; soap at 50 francs a cake.

34. [illegible], Communist member of the [illegible] and director of La Liberte du Var, stated [illegible] a general feeling that [illegible], [illegible] to Vichy, [illegible] continued relations with the Vichy Government even after his recall; that Washington was not pleased with the De Gaulle government and would have preferred [illegible] Giraud or a counterpart to De Gaulle; that a report was circulating in [illegible] circles to the effect that three days before the liberation of [illegible], American diplomatic representatives had penetrated into the city and had [illegible] with Vichy officials the possibility of setting up a new French government replacing the De Gaulle Government.

35. [illegible] stated that [illegible] people [illegible] the [illegible] to [illegible] the decision of the Government to [illegible] the [illegible] Civiles [illegible]. In that connection, he stated that [illegible] and the [illegible] since [illegible] had no confidence in the police [illegible] of the [illegible] men who have served the Vichy regime.

[illegible] Situation

36. [illegible] Destruction. Toulon has suffered heavily from Allied bombing. The [illegible] was particularly hard hit, but a good deal of destruction was caused in the center of town as well. According to the municipal bureau of Reconstruction, of a total of 16,[illegible] houses in Toulon, 993 were entirely destroyed, 1,[illegible] more than 50 percent destroyed and [illegible] more suffered damage. Since it is extremely difficult to obtain building materials to make repairs, houses which were only partially damaged are deteriorating rapidly from the effects of the weather. Many people made homeless are temporarily living with friends and relatives, in makeshift quarters; a large number have not yet returned to Toulon from the interior, where they had sought refuge during the bombings. Toulon's normal population of 160,000 had dropped to [illegible] at the end of August; it had risen to [illegible] at the end of October, or [illegible] about 110,000.

37. The municipal [illegible] reconstruction estimates needs of building materials for repairs as follows:

8,[illegible] tons of tile shingles for roofing
3,[illegible] tons of bricks
5,[illegible] tons of plaster
1,[illegible] tons of cement
1,[illegible] tons of lime
200,[illegible] square meters of window panes.

Temporary roofing repairs are being made with [illegible].

38. [illegible] Food conditions in Toulon are bad, the most serious shortages being milk for children, and fats and oils. There is only enough milk to permit distribution to infants up to 9 months. According to Dr. [illegible], in order to provide milk for the [illegible] children of [illegible] months, 6[illegible] cans of condensed milk would be required daily. Another [illegible] cans daily would be needed for the 1,500 children [illegible] months - 3 years of age. [illegible] the urgency of this problem. Dr. [illegible] recommends that if American milk is shipped to Toulon, it [illegible] directly to the municipality for distribution, instead of to the Red Cross. He claims that on previous occasions when American milk was distributed through the French Red Cross, much of it found its way into the black market and never reached the children for whom it was intended.)

39. Despite the fact that the Var is an important producer of olive oil, there is a serious shortage of this product on the market. According to Allegro, [illegible] in charge of [illegible], whatever stocks of olive oil do exist in the region are blocked by the [illegible] de Ravitaillement for distribution throughout France. This is a source of discontent among the people

However, distribution of [illegible] ... [illegible] with the [illegible] ... It is expected that [illegible] will improve by the end of the year. At present, olive oil sells [illegible] francs per litre on the black market, but as [illegible] even [illegible] black market [illegible] when available, it sold for [illegible] francs [illegible] supply.

40. The [illegible] ration of [illegible] is [illegible] considered satisfactory and the [illegible] ration of about [illegible] grams [illegible] is felt to be a considerable improvement over the [illegible] grams received during the occupation. However, people seemed to expect a more immediate and greater improvement in the food situation with the coming of the Allies than has actually taken place.

41. Public Services: Electricity, gas and water supply are normal. The streets are partially lighted at night. [illegible] services are functioning in Toulon and its suburbs. There is one [illegible] train [illegible] to Marseille, and one [illegible] daily [illegible] with the Marseille-[illegible] train.

* * * * * * * * *

ANNEX

[illegible]

		[illegible] Movement
Frank Arnal	President	[illegible]
Amiges	Vice President	[illegible]
Rigon	Vice President	[illegible]
[illegible]drin	Secretary	Communist
[illegible]		Communist
[illegible]		Socialist
[illegible]		[illegible] (Front National)
[illegible]		Franc-Tireur
[illegible]		Catholique
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		CGT
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
		[illegible]
Mme. [illegible]		[illegible] Françaises

[illegible]

	Responsibility	Party or Resistance Movement
[illegible]	President of Delegation [illegible] Police	[illegible]
[illegible]	Finances	FTN (Chrétien [illegible])
[illegible]	Reconstruction, [illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	Instruction publique, Beaux Arts, Sports, Theatre	[illegible]
[illegible]	Oeuvres de guerre et [illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	Ravitaillement	[illegible]
[illegible]	Travaux [illegible] communaux, [illegible], controle des travaux [illegible]	[illegible] (Communist)
[illegible]	Ravitaillement	Communist Party
[illegible]	[illegible], affaires [illegible], Defense passive, quais, ports et [illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible], sinistres et [illegible] fugies	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]-civil, contributions, [illegible]	Socialist
[illegible]	Personnel, regie des [illegible]	CGT
[illegible]	[illegible], pompes funebres, abattoirs	CGT
[illegible]	Services publics [illegible]	CGT
[illegible]	[illegible]	Mouvement [illegible] de la Liberation Nationale
[illegible]	[illegible], [illegible], [illegible], [illegible]	Union des Femmes Francaises
[illegible]	[illegible], Sports	Federation de la Jeunesse Patriotique
[illegible]	Hygiene, [illegible]	Loge Maconnique
[illegible]	Contentieux	(Independante)
[illegible]	Service des [illegible], Nettoiement, Assainissement, [illegible] et [illegible]	(Independant)

[illegible]

K 6

Toulouse 12 Septiembre 1945.

INFLUENCIA DE LOS COMUNISTAS EN TOULOUSE

Los comunistas influyen totalmente en el "FRONT NATIONAL" y su diario "LE PATRIOTE", de Toulouse.

Asimismo en el COMITE FRANCE-ESPAGNE, cuyo Presidente Jean CASSOU, a pesar de no pertenecer al Partido Comunista, se deja maniobrar por el.

Igualmente en el Comite FRANCE-U.R.S.S.

- - - - - -

14-00000

SECRET

Report No. : F-6937
Date of Report : 28 April 1946
Information : Current

FRANCE: POLITICAL

Reported Replacement of "Front National" by a New Paper

The following report is from a member of the staff of "Front National" and is a close friend of Thorez. This information was disclosed directly to a well-tried source, who has extensive contacts in French press circles:

1. It appears improbable that "Front National" will continue to be published after the elections, because of the breaking down of this political formation, which is of no further interest - except perhaps a marginal one - to the Communist Party. However, until now, Thorez has been opposed to its disappearance.

2. At present the leaders of the CP are planning to replace it by a more effective organ, and are studying three possible solutions:

(a) A newspaper which might be called "Ce Matin", and which would be supplementary to "Ce Soir" which would be responsible for its publication. The directors of "Ce Soir", which is a successful paper, are opposed to this idea, because they do not see the necessity for placing an additional load on the budget.

(b) A paper exclusively for women and which would treat all questions interesting to women: the home, the factory, food, the child, clothing, education, etc. But it is wondered if women have not adopted the habit of reading their husbands' paper, and would not be reluctant to indulge in the expense of an extra paper.

(c) An evening paper which would sell for 3 fr., and which would be similar to "Le Monde" in form, and would be the leftist opposite number of that paper. This paper would be destined particularly for the elite, and would stress cultural matters, accurate documentation, etc. The difficulty lies in assembling a first rate editorial staff to handle the political, economic, financial and artistic departments of such a paper.

3. It appears likely that a decision will be reached before the end of May.

SECRET

Distribution: 3 May 1946

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Bern

SSU/SD PARIS

Hampshire/Bramley II

14-00000

RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

Code Name .... Other Code Names .... | REF. MAPS | CARD NO. F65

Name FRONT NATIONAL ([illegible])

Pre-D-Day .... D-Day ....

Address (i) .... (ii) ....

Hides (i) .... (ii) .... (iii) ....

Proof of Identity ....

Description: Height .... Weight .... Build .... Colour of Eyes ....

Distinguishing Peculiarites ....

Zones of Operations Z N

~~Sub~~-Organisors COLBERT represents the MOVEMENT CONSEIL DE LA RESISTANCE

W/T Operator ....

Experience ....

Remarks Resistance movement supposed to be run by the Communists strongest in the North but has some following in Z S.

1219

14-00000

From: Marseille Report No: W-M-633 Local File No:

No. of Pages: 8 No. of Enclosures:

Report Made By: H. R. SHERIDAN HRS Approved By:

Distribution:
By copy to: 0 Orally to: 0

C.F.D.I

Source Cryptonym: HOMOHEDRAL References:

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

Although this report is based principally on information received from HOMOHEDRAL, the chief facts have been confirmed by HOMESTRETCH and HOMOGENE. Much of the information, especially the excerpts from CADI reports, was taken from the original CADI documents which HOMOHEDRAL lifted from the CADI files. (One of HOMOHEDRAL's sub-agents got the char-woman who cleans the CADI offices to lift a few reports each night for a period of a week.) The Italian immigrant sent by this station to the CADI office is Ettore GUIDETTI.

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Mars-1

Classification SECRET

Form No. 51-88

29-4-11-2

14-00000

Subject:	Comite D'Action et de Defense des Immigres	Report No.:	WPM-338
		Date of Information:	See below
Place Acquired:	Marseille	Date Acquired:	22 April 1949
Evaluation:	C-2	Date of Report:	29 April 1949
Source:	HOMOHEDRAL		

1. The Comite d'Action et de Defense des Immigres (CADI) was organized at Paris in November 1944 and operated overtly until ordered dissolved as a subversive group by a decree of the Ministry of the Interior in December 1948.

2. The principal organisations which joined to form CADI are as follows:

- Parti Communiste Francais
- Confederation Generale du Travail
- Conseil National de la Resistance
- Front National
- Union des Femmes Francaises
- Union des Patriotes Sovietiques
- Comite Italien de la Liberation
- Comite d'Unite de la Defense Juive
- Union National de la Colonie Tcheco-Slovaque en France
- Union Democratique des Hongrois en France
- Aide a la Patrie Polonais
- Front National Armenien
- Italia Libera
- Front National Roumain
- Union de la Jeunesse Republicaine de France
- Union Nationale Espagnole en France
- Federation des Espagnols Resident en France

3. As the name CADI implies, the organisation was formed to aid foreign immigrants in France. It was not ostensibly founded as a political organisation, nor was it ostensibly designed to support any particular political party. Its apparent purpose was rather to give social and legal aid to any and all immigrants in France. Its social program was quite simple and was largely devoted to the distribution of food, clothing, shelter, and money to needy immigrants. Its legal program was two-fold: first, it offered legal assistance to the individual immigrants through its lawyers; and secondly, it sponsored a series of measures in the Chamber of Deputies which were designed to benefit the status of all immigrants.

Classification
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4. The measures which CADI sponsored were officially known as the "resolutions pour la promulgation d'un Statut Juridique des Immigres", and demanded the following benefits for the immigrants:

a. That "Cartes de residence privileges" be granted to all immigrants, without exception, after three years residence in France.

b. That immigrants be allowed to choose their place and type of employment.

c. That immigrants be granted all the social benefits to which a French citizen is entitled.

d. That expulsion from France be made dependent on a court order, rather than on a decree of the Ministry of the Interior.

5. CADI sponsored the above measures for all immigrants. For those certain immigrants who had volunteered for service in an Allied army, or had taken part in the Resistance, or had been deported to Germany, CADI made the following demands:

a. That naturalization be granted by judges of the peace upon simple proof of the immigrant's claim to be in one of the above categories, and that all other naturalization requirements be waived.

b. That all invalids, deportees, and widows of men of this category be entitled to the same social benefits as French citizens of similar classification.

c. That the term "Mort pour la France" be added to the titles of the deceased of all immigrants of this category.

6. For those immigrants of the above category (para 6 5) who preferred to maintain their original citizenship, CADI demanded:

a. That they be allowed to choose their place and kind of work and that they be permitted to change their profession whenever they so desired.

b. That they receive all social benefits granted to French citizens.

c. That all "administrative measures resulting from their antifascist activity before and during the War be annulled." (Field comment: This is a direct translation from the French and refers to any legal actions taken against immigrants who, as Communists, refused to obey the orders of the French government between September 1939 and the German attack on Russia.)

7. CADI was largely successful in realising its demands, for the Statute of Immigrants which was passed by the Consultative Assembly (the Statute was composed of the ordonnance of 24 March 1945, the ordonnance of 2 November 1945, the ordonnance of 19 October 1945, the ordonnance of 25 October 1945, and the decree of 25 December 1945) gave to immigrants an equality of rights approximate to those enjoyed by a French citizen. The most active supporter of the CADI measures in the Consultative Assembly in 1945 was Madeleine BRAUN, prominent Communist and one of the leaders of the Front National. The Communist Party and the CGT also heavily backed these measures.

8. Paragraphs 4 through 6 represent CADI's original program; it was overt, it was designed to benefit all immigrants, and it was supposedly non-political. To implement its program, CADI established branch offices throughout France in the cities which had large numbers of immigrants. These branch offices were known as Centres d'Action de Defense des Immigres. CADI also took the lead in organising the annual National Congress of Immigrants (Congres National des Immigres), the first one of which was held in Paris on 25 January 1945. M. ABERACHA, representative of the Ministry of Industrial Production presided. In 1946, CADI again sponsored the congress, now called the International Congress of Immigrants in France (Congres International des Immigres en France), which took place in Paris 16 February to 17 February. Some 15,000 delegates, representing 3 million immigrants of all nationalities, attended. Justin GODARD, president of CADI, made the principal speech. Louis SAILLANT, secretary-general of the CGT and president of the CNR, was a member of the sponsoring committee and sat on the speakers' platform. The sponsors' committee for the 1947 Congress which was also held at Paris in February, consisted of Justin GODARD, Louis SAILLANT, Jacques DUCLOS, Albert BAYET (delegate of the Ligue des Droits de L'Homme), PINEAU (director of the Union de Jeunesse Republicaine de France), Madeleine BRAUN, and Joseph NORDMANN (lawyer for the Lettres Francaises in the KRAVCHENKO trial).

9. Although the ostensible and apparent purpose and activities of CADI were those outlined in paragraphs 3 to 8, its true purpose and its clandestine activities were quite different. CADI was not the non-political organisation that it professed to be, but was in fact a tightly controlled Communist organisation. To be sure, the legislative measures it supported benefited all immigrants, but they were designed primarily to help Communist immigrants. Similarly, CADI's program of aid to immigrants was restricted solely to Communist or pro-Communist immigrants. The true purpose of CADI was to aid Communist and

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pro-Communist immigrants to enter France; to aid them in establishing themselves in France; to place them in industries, mining, and agriculture; to organize them into faithful followers of the Communist Party; and finally to control them.

10. In order to realize its true purpose, CADI embarked on a clandestine program which may be divided into three major parts: the supplying of certain necessary identification papers to illegal Communist immigrants, the placing of these immigrants in certain jobs, and the organizing of these particular immigrants, along with all the foreign laborers in France, into submissive groups which would follow the orders of the CGT and the Communist Party.

11. Evidence of this first activity is found in the CADI office in Marseille. This office is currently operating a program whereby any avowed Communist immigrant coming to the office is furnished a "carte de travailleur etranger", is given a job in industry or agriculture, and, for the sum of 5,000 francs, is furnished with a naturalization decree.

12. (Field Comment:

Having heard from two sources that CADI was operating such a program, this station sent on 10 March 1949 one of source's sub-agents, an Italian immigrant who had entered France clandestinely, to the Marseille CADI, at 8 Place de la Prefecture, to ascertain if these reports were true. At CADI our sub-agent was received by George LINIVER. Our sub-agent then presented himself as an Italian immigrant who entered France clandestinely and asked that he be given a "carte de travailleur etranger". LINIVER asked our sub-agent who had sent him to CADI, to which the sub-agent replied, "I am a Communist." LINIVER asked to see the sub-agent's Party card, and the latter showed it to him. LINIVER then asked the sub-agent if he had a job in France, to which the sub-agent replied in the negative. LINIVER told the sub-agent to return in two weeks at which time he would give him an "autorisation de sejour", and in three weeks, he would provide him with a "carte de travailleur etranger". LINIVER also promised to give our sub-agent an agricultural job in Sete (Herault). Finally, LINIVER told our sub-agent that for 5,000 francs he would provide him with naturalization papers. Our sub-agent replied that he wanted such papers, but that he would first have to acquire the money. The interview ended with both men raising their fists in the Communist salute.

13. From questioning our sub-agent, it appears that the papers CADI furnishes are genuine papers which they obtain through the connivance of certain individuals in the Marseille Prefecture.

The sub-agent's sister unfortunately died in Paris on 18 March. The sub-agent then left immediately for Paris and has not yet returned. Upon his return to Marseille, this station will send him back to CADI to claim his "carte de sejour" and "carte de travailleur etranger". We will also give him 5,000 francs with which to acquire his naturalisation papers and we will direct him to accept the proferred job in Sete.)

14. Additional evidence that CADI is engaged in supplying these papers is found in the fact that on the 24, 28, and 29 of January 1949 four foreigners presented themselves at the office of the Confederation Generale des Internes et Deportes Politique de la Resistance et des Victimes de l'Oppression Nazie et du Racisme" where, thinking they were at the CADI office, they asked that they be given "cartes de sejour". These men were:

- MILLER, Robert - born in Baden, Germany
- JACOBSOHN, Carl - born in Hamburg, Germany
- GEORGES, Moriss - born in Szekelyudvarhely, Hungary
- LASZLO, Alexandre - born in Marosvasarhely, Hungary

These four had entered France clandestinely and each had been told before leaving his own country to apply to CADI for his French papers.

15. The following excerpts from CADI reports indicate CADI's activity in placing immigrants in industries and in agriculture.

a. "The Poles sent by CADI into the iron and coal mines number 40,000. In addition CADI has placed 80,000 Polish agricultural workers in France." (Field comment: From a report by LOUKA, delegate of the Conseil National Polonais en France.)

b. "In the large chemical and metallurgical factories of Marseille one-third of the employees are immigrants. In the Acieries du Nord, 340 workers are foreigners; the Cotel Plant, 483 workers are immigrants. CADI has placed many of these men and will continue to place as many again." (Field comment: From a report of Guido ZAMIS, CADI secretary in Marseille.)

c. "There are 3,800 foreigners in the coal mines at Carmaux-les-Mines. CADI has placed 80% of these men." (Field comment: From a report of the CADI representative for the TARN department.)

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16. The following excerpts from CADI documents indicate CADI's activity in organising the immigrant laborers into submissive groups ready to follow CADI-CGT-Communist orders:

a. "It is necessary that CADI take the lead in organising these foreign laborers in strong and democratic unions. We must protect them from their capitalist oppressors and we must aid them in their struggle against their employers. In CADI and in the CGT, the immigrant finds his strength." (Field comment: From a report by Louis PETIT, one of the organisers and national leaders of CADI.)

b. "It is through CADI that the immigrant masses are able to mobolise for the tasks which lie before the whole country. It is CADI which must educate the immigrants in the ways of true democracy and it is for CADI to lead them in their struggle." (Field comment: From a report of LAROCHE, secretary-general of CADI.)

c. "Before the war, the countries from which these immigrants came were under the control of Fascist and reactionary regimes. The immigrants left their homes without hope of returning. Now things have changed; the countries from which they came are today true democracies and they now have the problem of helping those of their former citizens who are now living outside their borders. It is CADI who, working with these democratic governments, is attempting to obtain the rights of liberty and democracy for these immigrants now in France." (Field comment: From a letter written by Louis PETIT.)

d. "We are proud to be from a region where the majority are immigrants, the immigrants who organised the great strike of 100,000 workers during the occupation under the leadership of Auguste LECOEUR. In those times, all orders were executed clandestinely, and we will execute them today with the same enthusiasm. CADI must lead the way." (Field comment: From a speech by the CADI secretary in the Pas-de-Calais.)

e. "The control of the recruiting of immigrant workers must be done in a rigorous manner by CADI and the French workers unions. We must prevent the immigrant worker from becoming a tool in the hands of the capitalists." (Field comment: From a speech by GIOVETTI, (fnu), delegate of Italia Libera.)

17. Further evidence of CADI's activity in organising the immigrant workers is found in CADI files. Report after report from various CADI delegates throughout France list by

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nationality the number of immigrants in their areas, and in addition many of the reports note the number of these immigrants who are under CADI control. These reports are all similar, and it is sufficient to quote from one: "More than 50% of the miners in the Loire basin are immigrants; of these, the following percentages adher to CADI: 95% of the Poles, all the Yugoslavs, 80% of the Portuguese, 60% of the Italians, and 75% of the Hungarians." (Field comment: From a report by CADI secretary from the Loire.)

18. Although supposedly dissolved by Ministerial decree in December 1948, CADI continues to operate clandestinely throughout France. Its present national president is Justin GODARD, former minister; FRYDMAN, (fnu), a member of the Comite d'Unite de la Defense Juive, is vice-president; LAROCHE, (fnu), is secretary-general. National Headquarters are located at 100 rue de l'Universite, Paris. The principal organisations supporting CADI today are those listed in paragraph 9, except for those of these organisations which have ceased to exist.

19. CADI functions in conjunction with these organisations and in addition it has its own delegates scattered throughout France in the industrial and mining regions. Among the CADI delegates are the following:

- HORCADO - delegate of the Federation des Espagnols Residant en France
- LOUKA - delegate of the Conseil National Polonais en France
- GIOVETTI - delegate of Italia Libre
- KOVACS, Muranyi - secretary-general of the Union Democratique des Hongrois en France
- PAPAS - member of the Front National Hellenique
- MELIK - member of the Front National Armenien
- VINCIOUERRA - president of the Union des Voluntaires Etrangers
- SORU - delegate of the Front National Rouman
- CONTI, Mme. Germaine - secretary of the CADI in Paris
- ZELENY - delegate of the Union Nationale de la Colonie Tcheco-Slovaque en France
- GUERRIERO - member of the Federation des Immigres Portuguais
- HOLLAND - delegate of CADI on Eastern France
- FRYDMAN - vice-president of CADI; delegate of the Comite d'Unite de la Defense Juive.
- PETIT, Louis - one of the organisers and responsibles of CADI

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(Field comment: It is realised that some of the organizations of which these men are listed as delegates have been dissolved, notably Italia Libra and the Front National Armenien. However, the names of the individuals and their affiliations are shown exactly as they appeared on CADI documents.)

20. CADI is well-financed. Its principal financial support comes from the Communist Party and the CGT. (Field comment: CADI documents acknowledge unspecified contributions from these organisations. One of source's informants, the chief of the Foreigners' Section of the Marseille Prefecture, has stated that he knows the Marseille CADI has an undetermined quantity of rubles, presumably received from the Communist Party.)

21. In Marseille, the CADI office was established by Guido ZANIS and George LINIVER in March 1946. It was originally located on the Blvd. du Muy, but in September 1947 it transferred to 3 Marche des Capucins. In February 1948 it moved to 97 rue Longue des Capucins and then, after it was ordered dissolved, it continued to function clandestinely at 2 Place de la Prefecture, where it remains today. ZANIS remains the director of the Local CADI, assisted by LINIVER.

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WFM-339
5 Aug. 1948

14-00000

SECRET

Subject:	[illegible]	Report No:	[illegible]
		Date of Information:	[illegible] August 19[illegible]
Place Acquired:	[illegible]	Date Acquired:	[illegible] August 19[illegible]
Evaluation:	B-3	Date of Report:	[illegible] August 19[illegible]
Source:	[illegible]		

1. The Chief of the [illegible] [illegible]

2. Actually the [illegible] composed of two [illegible]

3. A certain [illegible] with the [illegible] among these is [illegible]

4. [illegible]

5. [illegible]

Classification SECRET

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SECRET

14-00000

22 November 1948

From: Paris	Report No: [illegible] Local File No:
No. [illegible]	No. [illegible]: 1 rpt
Report Made by: [illegible]	Approved by: [illegible] Ackerman

Distribution
By copy to: Wash. - 2
[illegible] - [illegible]
[illegible] - 1

Orally to

Source Cryptonym: [illegible] References:

Source, Operational Data, and Comments

Attached is a report entitled "Further Arrests and Restrictive Measures by the French Surete to Halt Rumanian CP Activity."

SECRET
Classification

REGISTRY [illegible]

14-00000

[illegible] Further Arrests and Restrictive Measures by the French Surete [illegible] Rumanian CP Activity

[illegible] -4150

[illegible] 15 - 17 Nov 1948

[illegible] Nov 1948

Place [illegible] France, Paris

[illegible] 12 Nov 1948

Evaluation [illegible]

Source [illegible] 1

1. The following persons, all of whom have been particularly active in connection with Rumanian Communist Party affairs, especially within the Paris legation, were arrested by the French Surete on 15 November:

> [illegible] UMITRU, a cobbler, and member of the Front National Roumain (Field Comment: [illegible] has previously been reported by source as a rich man, though cobbler by profession. He has property at [illegible] (Seine et Oise). At Paris, he lives at [illegible] rue Anjou. He is a frequent visitor and telephone caller at the Rumanian Embassy.)
>
> [illegible], member of the Front National Roumain
>
> Marta-[illegible], legation employee
>
> [illegible] VILLARD, a French citizen and noted Communist.
>
> In addition to the above and belonging to the same category is [illegible], who was arrested on 17 November.

2. The apartments of the foregoing were searched, but apparently nothing of importance was found. Subsequently, the five incarcerated persons were released.

3. The Association des Roumains Amis de la France (Front National) was dissolved by order of the Surete, which has also forbidden the publication of the newspaper La Roumanie Libre.

SECRET

[illegible] REGISTRY

FORM NO. [illegible]

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

[illegible] -0295

[illegible]

Chief, [illegible] — 29 April 1949
Attn: [illegible] Benson
Chief of Station, Marseille

[illegible] Prominent Communist [illegible] Cannes
[illegible] RICARD

Ref: [illegible]

1. Subject is a prominent Communist in Cannes and is currently one of the leading members of the "Combattants de la Liberte" in that city. He was one of the organizers of the "Front National" in the Alpes-Maritimes.

2. In 1945 he was elected mayor of Cannes (which also made him mayor of La Bocca, a quarter of Cannes). He ran for re-election as mayor in October 1947, but was defeated.

3. In 1945 he was also elected as a Conseiller General in the canton of Cannes, but was defeated when running for re-election to this office on March 20-27, 1949.

4. In 1947, he was elected as a Conseiller Municipal in Cannes and currently holds this office.

5. Subject is married and has one daughter, aged 20. His address is Chalet Cerone, Cannes (on the road to Antibes).

H. R. SHERIDAN

Copies to:
Wash-2
Mars-1

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REGISTRY COPY

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OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: [illegible] (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. WFPA-7526

SECRET CONTROL
U.S.A. OFFICIALS ONLY
CLASSIFICATION

TO: Chief, FDW

DATE: 26 March 1951

FROM: Chief of Station, Paris

SUBJECT: GENERAL: Transmittal
SPECIFIC: List of Alleged Communist dominated organizations

1. Attached is a copy of a list given to Leon H. S[illegible]man recently by Jack West, Legal Attache. The attachment was originally given to West by Keith Angell, Security Office, ECA-OSR, Paris. Mr. Angell advised that he had received this list from a source in the Prefecture of Police, Paris, and that it is based upon information in Prefecture files and investigation by that agency.

2. It will be noted that this list is apparently of quite recent date in that these international organizations recently expelled from France (IFDW, WFDY, WFTU) are noted as "dissolved".

3. Mr. West also transmitted a copy of this list to Mr. William Crawford in the Embassy here.

Gustav Peterson

FDW - 3 (3 copies 5 pg att)
Files - WFPA - 1
Comm - 1 (1 att)

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[illegible]-44

[illegible] 75226

[illegible] COMMUNISTES

Parti Communiste Français, 44 rue le Peletier; 120 rue Lafayette.

Amicale des Anciens de la Mer Noire, 23 rue Cronstadt (15eme).

Amicale des Veuves de Guerre, 30 rue Rene Boulanger (10eme) Bot. 21.31.

Amicale des Volontaires de l'Espagne Republicaine, 46 rue du Fg Montmartre,
(9eme) - Pro. 02.49

Amicale Nationale des Elus Municipaux communistes de France, 1 rue de Maubeuge
(9eme) Tru. 78.31

Amicale Nationale des Elus Republicains de France, 1 rue de Maubeuge (9eme)
Tru. 78.31

Amis de la Commune, 37 rue du Louvre (2eme)

Amis de la Nature, 19 rue St-Georges (9eme) - Tru. 49.86

Amies de la Paix: 37 rue Jouvenet (16eme) - Jas. 86.04

Amities Franco-polonaises 9 boulevard des Italiens (2eme) - Ric. 01.35.

Association des Travailleurs Scientifiques, 37 rue Geoffroy St-Hilaire (5eme)

Association d'Etudes et d'Informations municipales, 1 rue de Maubeuge (9eme)
Tru. 78.31

Association Nationale des Anciens F.F.I. - F.T.P.F. et de leurs Amis,
27 boulevard des Italiens (2eme) - Ric. 46.27

Association Nationale des Cheminots Anciens Combattants, 9 rue Lanterne-court,
Mar. 04.97

Association Nationale des Familles de Fusilles, 10 rue Leroux (16eme) Fle. 71.80

Association Nationale des Rapatries d'Indochine, 19 rue St-Georges (9eme)
Tru. 09.83

Association des Veuves Orphelins Ascendants Victimes des deux Guerres,
3 rue de Tilsitt (8eme)

Association Republicaine des Anciens Combattants, 46 Fg Montmartre (9eme)
Pro. 02.49

Centre de Diffusion du Livre et de la Presse (C.D.L.P.), 142 Boulevard Diderot (12eme) Dor. 41.39 - 41.05 - 51.30.

Centre Laique de Formation du Personnel d'Encadrement des Oeuvres pour l'Enfance, 8 av. Mathurin Moreau (19eme) - Bot 66.50

Combattants de la Paix et de la Liberte, 3 rue des Pyramides (1er) Ope. 35.87

Comite Francais de Defense des Immigres, 15 Fg Montmartre (10eme) Prov. 82.78

Comite Francais de la Jeunesses Democratique, 19 rue St-Georges (9eme) Tru. 00.83

Confederation Generale de l'Agriculture, 11 bis, rue Scribe (9eme) Ope. 50.90

Comite National des Ecrivains, 2 rue de l'Elysee (8eme) Anj. 05.79

Comite National des Journalistes, 2 rue de l'Elysee (8eme)

Comite National des Pharmaciens, 13 rue Ballu (9eme)

Confederation Nationale des Locataires, 25 rue Arthur Rozier (19eme) Nord. 72.51

Confederation Generale du Commerce et de l'Industrie, 169 rue du Temple (3eme) - Tur. 52.15

Confederation Generale Unifiee de l'Artisanat, 10 rue des Filles du Calvaire (3eme) - Tur. 53.29

Conseil National de la Resistance, 1 rue Vernet (8eme) - Ely 30.53.

Cooperative de Production et de Diffusion du Film, 31 rue de Chabrol (9eme) Pro. 07.05

Editeurs Francais Reunis, 33 rue St-Andre des Arts (6eme) - Ode. 73.24

Editions de la Jeunesse, 9 rue Humblot (15eme) - Seg. 12.91

Editions Sociales, 64 Bld Auguste Blanqui (13eme) - Gob. 45.41

Federation des Chorales et Groupes Artistiques de la Jeunesse, 9 rue Humblot (15eme) - Seg. 15.01

Federation des Locataires, 32 bis, Bld Richard Lenoir (11eme) Roq. 95.20

Federation Francaise des Cine-Clubs, 2 rue de l'Elysee (8eme) Anj. 9 .54

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Federation Musicale Populaire, 2 rue de l Elysee (8eme) - Anj. 91.54

Federation Nationale des Deportes Internes et Resistants Patriotes,
10 rue Leroux (16eme) - Kle. 71.50, 59.10, 87.52.

Federation Nationale des Combattants Prisonniers de Guerre, 46 rue Copernic
(16eme) - Pop. 43.92

Federation Nationale des Deportes du Travail, 5 rue du Fg Poissonniere (10eme)
Prov. 15.01

Federation Nationale des Directeurs de Colonies de Vacances,
29 rue St-Merri (4eme)

Federation Nationale de Lutte Anti-Tuberculeuse, 2 av. Mathurin Moreau (19eme)
Bot. 56.65

Federation Nationale des Prisonniers de Guerre, 62 rue Chaussee d'Antin (9eme)
Tri. 43.23

Federation Nationale des Sinistres, Mairie de Noisy le Sec, Nord. 96.59

Federation Sportive et Gymnique du Travail, 19 rue St-Georges (9eme) Tru. 49.88

France - Espagne, 4 Cite Monthiers (9eme) Tri. 05.26

France - Roumanie, 16 rue Vezelay (8eme) Lab. 26.68

France - Tchecoslovaquie, 18 rue Bonaparte (6eme) - Ode. 20.20

France - U.R.S.S., 29 rue d'Anjou (8eme), Anj. 19.54

France - Vietnam, 40 rue d'Argout (8eme), Lou. 08.20

Front National, 10, rue St-Georges (9eme) Tru. 40.84

Ligue Francaise de l'Enseignement, 3 rue Recamier (6eme) Lit. 88.71

Mouvement des Intellectuels Francais pour la Defense de la Paix,
3 rue des Pyramides (1er) Ope. 39.02

Mouvement National Judiciaire, Palais de Justice, Bld du Palais (4eme)

Plein Air Jeunes, 9 rue Humblot (15eme) Seg. 11.01

Radio - Liberte, 5 rue Lamartine (9eme) Tru. 71.82

Secours Populaire Francais, 11 Bld Montmartre (2eme) Cent. 27.70

Travail et Culture, 5 rue des Beaux-Arts - Paris (6) Dan. 99.00

Tourisme et Travail, 58 rue d'Hauteville (9). Pro. 80-48 et 30.19

Union de la Jeunesse Republicaine de France, 9 Rue Humblot (15)
Segur 10.44

Union des Architectes Francais, 14 Rue du Cherche-Midi (6)

Union des Artistes Modernes, Club Mallet-Stevens, Rue Mallet-Stevens

Union des Arts Plastiques, 2 Rue de l'Elysee (8) Anj 91.54

Union des Camps et Palais de la Jeunesse, 9 Rue Humblot (15)
Segur 11.01

Union des Chirurgiens Dentistes Francais, 22 Rue [illegible] (16)

Union des Femmes Francaises, 12 Rue d'Astorg (8). Anj. 38.66

Union des Ingenieurs et Techniciens Francais, 2 Rue de l'Elysee (8)

Union des Jeunes Filles de France, 9 Rue Humblot (15). Seg. 11.70

Union des Juifs pour la Resistance et l'Entr'Aide, 14 Rue de Paradis

Union des Medecins Francais, 2 Rue de Sese (8). Opera 74.40

Union des Vaillants & Vaillantes, 5 Bd Montmartre (9). Cen. 75.51

Union Francaise des Anciens Combattants, 20 R. de la Chaussee d'Antin

Union Francaise des Auberges de la Jeunesse, 140 Bd Haussmann (8)

Union Francaise Universitaire, 19 Rue de Jussieu (5). Por. 15.38

Union Nle des Etudiants de France, 15 Rue Soufflot (5) Dant. 71.40

Union Nle des Intellectuels, 2 Rue de l'Elysee. Anj. 91.54

Union Nle des Spectacles, 2 Rue de l'Elysee, Anj. 91.54

Union Nle des Vieux Travailleurs, 8 av. Mathurin Moreau (19)
Nord. 17.23.

Bureau du Congres Mondial des Partisans de la Paix, 2 rue de l'Elysee
Anj. 18.29

Bureau de Liaison des Intellectuels de la Defense de la Paix, (Issu du Congres de Wroclaw), 2 rue de l'Elysee, Anj. [illegible]

Federation Democratique Internationale des Femmes, 17 rue Jouvenet (16)
Jasmin 85.04 (Dissolved)

Federation Internationale des Anciens Prisonniers Politiques, 10 rue Leroux (16)
Kle. 71.50

Federation Internationale des Juristes Democrates, chez Me. Joe Nordmann,
12 Quai Bourbon (4) Dant. 72.45

Federation Mondiale de la Jeunesse Democratique, 21 rue de Chateaudun (9)
Tru. 18.95 (Dissolved)

Federation Syndicale Mondiale, 1 rue Vernet (8), Ely. 30.50 (Dissolved)

14-00000

11P

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

WFMA-0186

6 October 1948

TO: Chief, FBW — Communist Activities

THROUGH: Chief of Station, Paris,

FROM: Chief of Station, Marseille

SUBJECT: Organisation of the French Communist Party in the Marseille Area

INTEL

The following is a survey of the organisation and membership of the French Communist Party in the Marseille Area:

Departmental Federation: headquarters, 18 Allées Leon Gambetta

Federal Secretary: Denis BIZOT

Federal Secretariat: of French CP, Marseille area:

Pierre DOIZE
Josette REIBAUT
Marius COLOMBANI

Federal Bureau:

Denis BIZOT - in charge of political section
Pierre DOIZE
Josette REIBAUT
Marius COLOMBANI
Lucien MOLINO - 19 Blvd. Bordillat
Jean CRISTOFOL
Pierre EMMANUELLI - in charge of Press-Propaganda
Ludovic TROUIN - in charge of organisation
Pascal POSADO
Henri BERTINI
Rene LALLEMAND
Yvonne ESTACHY
Paul COURTIEU
Jean CLAVERIE (alias POLLUX) - in charge of recruiting and interior police. A particularly dangerous person.

Federal Committee

SECRET

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[illegible]

François [illegible]
Lucien [illegible]
Joseph ALDAL[illegible]
[illegible]

Foreigners in the French Communist Party number about 7,0[illegible], and are divided as follows:

Italians	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	2,[illegible]	(of which 200 are [illegible])
[illegible]	600	
[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	

[illegible]

[illegible]

- 4 -

ORGANIZATIONS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

Union des Femmes Françaises, Marseille Area

Headquarters: 41 Cours Lieutaud

Departmental Office:

Secretary: Simone [illegible]
Members: Catherine [illegible]
(4,000) Jeanne LAUJIER

Union de la Jeunesse Républicaine de France, Marseille Area

Headquarters: 83 Rue de [illegible]

Fed. Sec'ty.: Lucien [illegible]

Secretary: RIGAUD

About 1,100 members

Union des Jeunes Filles de France, Marseille Area

Secretariat: [illegible]

[illegible]

Headquarters: [illegible]

President: [illegible]

Vice President: [illegible]

Sec'y. Gen'l: [illegible]

Treasurer: [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Prof. [illegible]

(cont'd.)

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WFMA- 186

Honorary Members of the Committee:

CALLAS (Ex chief of FTP in the Bouches-du-Rhone)
CAPDRALI (Cmdt)
CLAUDIE (Cmdt)
GILETTE (Lt. Col.)
GRANVILLE (Colonel)
MORVAN (Cmdt)
PELLETIER (Colonel)
PETRE (Colonel)
POZZO DI BORGO (Cmdt)
SIMON (Colonel)
SENATORE (Cmdt)

Membership: 3,500, of which 3,000 are members of CP, 300 are CP sympathisers and 200 non-sympathizers

Organ ... ... C.P.

Secours Populaire Francais

Headquarters: 5 rue Villeneuve
Secretary: OLIVI
Fed. Officers: DEVIL
CHERI
MANETTI
ROIG
BOSCHESCHI
ARNOUX
CATALA

Vaillants et Vaillantes

Fed. Commissaire: Charles LECA
Fed. Director: Paul ESTEVE
This movement is directed at youths of less than 18 yrs.

Université Nouvelle

Members: Casimir JOUSSERON, Prof. at University of Aix
Georges MOUNIER, Writor
Francis HALBWACHS, Fellow at University of Aix
This movement is directed at university groups.

Amies de la Paix

President: Perrine SOOS

(2)

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LFMA-186

Association France-Roumanie

Committee Members:

CERMOLACE | MONTROUNON
CLERISSY | Dr. PETIT
COHEN | RUYSSEN
FROLY | ROOLIAND
GLOCASTY | SACHTER
HAINICLE | SERAN
LION | THERAN
TOSTET

Association France-URSS

Headquarters: 68 rue Montgrand

Association Nationale des Fusilles et Massacres

Sec'y. General: Mme. GEORGES
Legal Counselor: Mlle. JUIFFRA

Association des Volontaires pour l'Espagne Republicaine

Headquarters: 4 rue St. Jacques

Association Republicaine des Anciens Combattants — Marseille area

Headquarters: 4 rue St. Jacques
President: Adrien MOUTON
Secretariat: SENATORE and J. MOUTET
Treasurer: J. CLERC
This organization is made up of 60 sections

Union Francaise des Anciens Combattants

President: RIEU-ROY
Vice-Pres: DUPUY
Sec'y-Gen: GUERINI
Treasurer: BRISSEC

Officiers de Reserve Republicains

Headquarters: 20 Blvd. Paul Peytral
Honorary Presidents: GRANIER and PETRE
Secretary: BAUD
Asst. Sec'y: PAC
Treasurer: OLOT

(3)

SECRET

Front National

Headquarters: 18 Allees Leon Gambetta

Groupement National des Refractaires et Maquisards

Headquarters: 41 and 43 rue Grignan
Dept. Sec'y: FROLY

Milices Patriotiques

President: RIPERT
(RIPERT was in command of a CRS unit which was dissolved after the events of December 1947, and is now chief of a Communist shock troop group.)

Federation Nationale des Deportés et Internés Patriotes

Headquarters: 54 La Canebiere
President: Colonel PETRE
Vice-Pres: Abbe COGNAC

Italia Libera

Headquarters: 55 rue d'Alger
President: Mario MAGLIOCCO
Secretary: Aurelio BERTINO

Front National Armenien

Headquarters: 67 rue Longue des Capucines
President: SAATDJIAN
Secretary: HATORIKIAN

PC Espagnol

Departmental Director: Fausto JIMENEZ

VARIOUS OTHER COMMUNIST-AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS

MUR
Union Republicaine et Resistante pour l'Union Francaise
Benjamins et Benjamines
Pionniers et Pionnieres
Federation Nationale des Sinistres
Association des Veuves de Guerre
Comités d'Entreprises
Comité de Vigilance
Comité de Defense de la Republique
Bureau Annexe Sud des Vietnamiens, An affiliation of the Delegation Generale des Vietnamiens de France

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UFMA-186

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IMPORTANT [illegible] CENTERS

Marseille	Miramas
Arles	Port de Bouc
Aubagne	Marignane
La Ciotat	Gardanne
Martigues	St. Louis du Rhone
St. Chamas	

In case of Communist insurrection, it would be necessary to count on 12 to 15 thousand "die-hards", and 20 to 25 thousand who would be apt to side with the Communists.

RESULTS OF THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS OF 1946

Votes case	404,231
Communist votes	157,452 (38.9% of total)

RESULTS OF THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS OF 1947

Number of mayoralities to be elected	117
Number of Communists defeated	26 (22%)
Number of Communists elected	17 (14.5%)

POLITICAL MAJORITIES IN MUNICIPALITIES

Prior to 1947 - 19 municipalities Communist controlled (16.2%)
After 1947 - 12 municipalities Communist controlled (10.3%)
Municipal elected jobs held by Communist:
1945 - 498 1947 - 408

(3)

SECRET

WFMA-186

- 4 -

COMMUNIST PARTY SECTION ADDRESSES IN MARSEILLE

1er Arrondissement: headquarters, 60 rue de Lorette
political sec'y., Louis CALISTI

2eme Arrondissement: Headquarters, 20 rue St. Saens
Political sec'y., Leon MERINO

3eme Arrondissement: headquarters, 21 rue Guerin

4eme Arrondissement: headquarters, rue Maurel, Maison du Peuple

5eme Arrondissement: headquarters, 108 Bard Baille

6eme Arrondissement: headquarters, 10V Blvd. Vauban, Maison du Peuple

7eme Arrondissement: headquarters, 191 rue d'Endoume

8eme Arrondissement: headquarters, Chemin du Rouet
Political sec'y., PELLEGRINI

9eme Arrondissement: headquarters, 12 route de Cassis

10eme Arrondissement: headquarters, Ber Port, 69 Ave. Delessert

11eme Arrondissement: headquarters, 162 Route Nationale, St. Marcel

12 emeArrondissement: headquarters, St Barnabe, 18 Chemin de St. Julien

13eme Arrondissement: headquarters, 82 Ave. de St. Just

14eme Arrondissement: headquarters, Bard de Pons, Bon Secours

15eme Arrondissement: headquarters, 10 Route de Lyon

16eme Arrondissement: Estaque Gare, Bordure du chemin de fer

Section de Saint Louis: Political secretary, BERT

Section de la Belle de Mai: headquarters, 31 rue Guerin

Section St. Lazare: headquarters, 3 Place de Strasbourg

Section Marine: headquarters, 25 Blvd. des Dounes

Section Plaine: headquarters, 39 Place Jean Jaures

(2)

SECRET

29-4-5-233

NAMES AND LOCATIONS OF COMMUNIST PARTY CELLS IN MARSEILLE

Name	Location
Cheminots	Gare St. Charles
APAL	Vieux Marseille
Abattoirs	
Air France	Marignane
Albert POS	Sebastopol
Alexandre BLANC	Sorgues
AUDIAS	PTT, rue Honnorat
"	La Madrague
BACCI	Trousat
BARBUSSE	Quartier Lodi
CASATIINI	Bar du Telephone, 20 rue de Lyon, ARENC
CHAINAND	Estaque Bar du Littoral
COLLOMB	3 Marche des Capucins
DEVERDER	Porte d'Aix, 3 Place de Strasbourg
DI BUSTO	Bar Moderne, Avenue d'Arenc
Des Douanes	Bar Robert, 40 rue Emile Zola
Fveche	60 rue de Lorette
Entreprise Paoli	Rue Kleber
Excelsior	Blvd. Pons
FIFI TURIN	12 Chemin de Cassis, Ste. Marguerite
FLEURY	3 Marche des Capucins
Hopital de la Timone	(under leadership of SEASSEAU)
Jean PEREZ	60 rue de Lorette
IVALDI	Bar des Amis, 9 rue Pautrier
Jean THINQUET	Bar de la Veranda, rue des Grands Carmes
LAFFORGE	Bar Amer Picon, 3 Blvd. National
Louis PORTA	3 Place de Strasbourg
MANTAUZIER	60 rue de Lorette
Paul LANGEVIN	2 rue Moisson
Securite Sociale	3 rue Moutet
Vieux Marseille	60 rue de Lorette

SECRET

WFMA-186

COMMUNISTS HOLDING ELECTED OFFICES IN BOUCHES-DU-RHONE

Deputies

Francois BILLOUX, Marseille
Paul CERMOLAGE, Marseille
Jean CRISTOPOL, Marseille
Lucien LAMBERT, Marseille
Adrien MOUTON, Arles
Raymonde NEDELEC, Marseille

Counselors of the Republic

Mamoelle BOUVET (alias DUMONT, Mireille)
Charles COSTES
Leon DAVID

Members of the General Council

Jean BARAILLER
Marcel BADUIN
Denis BIZOT
Pierre EMMANUELLI
Edmond GARCIN
Louis GAZAGNAIRE
Rene GAUTHIER
Martin GONTIER
Jean LAERO
Clement MILLE
Raymonde NEDELEC
Josette REYBAUT
Jean SENATORE
Ludovic TROUIN

F. D. Noyes
F. D. NOYES

(2)

SECRET 29-4-5-237

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: TARASOFF, BORIS D.
OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FILE

INCLUSIVE DATES:
CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: C/LAD
ROOM:
DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
28 June		DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

TARASOFF, BORIS D. 019477

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled in)

TCKM, 11-3070

60 9
73/3 BCO

27 April 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Transactions & Records Branch, Control Division, Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : Custody of Honor and Merit Award presented to Mr. Boris D. Tarasoff

Because of security restrictions, the Honor and Merit Awards Board is acting as custodian of the subject's Honor Award and related papers listed below:

Certificate of Merit

When security restrictions no longer prevail, the Awardee may obtain his award by calling the Executive Secretary.

Ellin B. Glenn
Executive Secretary
Honor and Merit Awards Board

Distribution:
Original - Subject's OPF (No. 019477)
1 - C/WH Support Staff
1 - HMAB Case File

S-E-C-R-E-T

Ad. 70

[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. [illegible] D. T[illegible]

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Plans

THROUGH : Chief, W.H Division

SUBJECT : Certificate of Merit

1. The Honor and Merit Awards Board is pleased to not[illegible] [illegible] that the award named above will be conferred on you in recog[illegible] [illegible] the excellent service you have rendered this Agency. Security con-siderations relevant to the award are explained in the attached memo-randum from the Office of Security.

2. The award will be presented to you at a ceremony to [illegible] in the near future. Members of your family, Agency associate[illegible] intimate friends who are aware of your Agency affiliation may [illegible] the ceremony.

3. Invitations to the ceremony will be extended [illegible] the Secretar[illegible] Honor and Merit Awards Board, Office of Personnel, extension 3[illegible]. Please send to that office the names and phone numbers of the guests you would like to have invited, and indicate any dates on which yo[illegible] [illegible] not be available for such a ceremony.

[illegible]

ROBERT M. GAYNOR
Recorder
Honor and Merit Awards Board

Distribution:
- Orig - Addressee
- 1 - C/WH
- 1 - D/Pers Reader Chrono/OPF
- 1 - Sec't, HMAB
- 1 - Recorder, HMAB

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED	3 November 1970
1. SERIAL NUMBER	019477
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	[illegible]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	RETIREMENT (MANDATORY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH / DAY / YEAR)	11 / 30 / 70
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / X CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE	1135 0990
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	P.L. 88-643 Sect. 235c
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 1 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
11. POSITION TITLE	OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER	0489
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP	12 5
17. SALARY OR RATE	$ 16,084

18. REMARKS

Not Recommended for Reemployment

1 - Finance

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
Henry L. Berthold C/WH/Pers	4 Nov 70	[signature]	4 Nov 70

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HDQTRS. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
45	10				3	11 12 08		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE)	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
			EE LLDC				

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.) | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE | 37. LONG. COMP. DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR RESV PROV/TEMP) | 39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE (0—WAIVED 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE) | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) | 42. LEAVE CAT CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. OP APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
11-5-70 [initials]	[signature]	11.05.70

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Tarasoff, Boris	Self	70-0502

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 2 Jan 69-5 Oct 69.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
14 January 1970	[illegible]

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-58 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4-21-35)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Tarasoff, Boris	Wife-Anna	68-0264

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 22 June 1967.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
25 September 1967	B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-59 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. (4-21-35)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 25 AUGUST 1967

Field	Entry
1. SERIAL NUMBER	019477
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (Month / Day / Year)	09 / 10 / 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	V TO V; CF TO V; V TO CF; XX CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE	8135 0990
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 1 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
11. POSITION TITLE	OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER	0489 HXXX
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP	12 3
17. SALARY OR RATE	$ 11685

18. REMARKS

FROM: SAME/0418 [redacted]

1 - Finance

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
[signature] Henry L. Berthold C/WH/Personnel	25 August	[signature]	

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING (Numeric / Alphabetic)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HQTRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH (Mo. Da. Yr.)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	5629 / WH	45075		3	11 [illegible] 28		

28. NTE EXPIRES (Mo. Da. Yr.) — 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE — 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—OTHER, 3—FICA, 4—NONE) CODE — 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE — 32. CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA (Type, Mo. Da. Yr.) — EOD DATA — 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. — 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (Code: 0—NONE, 1—5 PT., 2—10 PT.) — 36. SERV. COMP. DATE (Mo. Da. Yr.) — 37. LONG. COMP. DATE (Mo. Da. Yr.) — 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR. RESV, PROV. TEMP; Code) — 39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE (Code: 0—WAIVED, 1—YES; Health Ins. Code) — 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (Code: 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS); 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) — 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE — 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (Form Executed 1—YES 2—NO; Code; No. Tax Exemptions) — 44. STATE TAX DATA (Form Executed 1—YES 2—NO; Code; No. Tax Exemp.; State Code)

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION — 46. O P APPROVAL: [signature] — DATE APPROVED: 6 Sep 67

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

2 AUG 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THROUGH : DDP/OP [signature]

SUBJECT : [redacted] Request for Early Home Leave

1. In accordance with HR 20-30b(3), it is requested that approval be granted for [redacted] [redacted] to begin home leave short of tour.

2. [redacted] has been [redacted] in Mexico City since 5 June 1963. He last returned from home leave on 13 January 1966 but because his wife's parents are in very poor health, the Station has requested on his behalf that the date of his home leave be advanced to 23 September 1967.

3. The Station and [redacted] are aware of the requirements to extend his next tour in Mexico City by the number of days his present tour will be reduced.

4. [redacted], a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System, will reach mandatory retirement age in November 1968. At that time he will be converted to contract employee status in order that the Division may retain his unique skills. (There is a continuing requirement for [redacted]' services as the Station's Russian and Spanish translator which could not be met as effectively by the utilization of other personnel.)

5. If this request is approved, please coordinate on the attached cable to Mexico City.

SECRET

SUBJECT: [redacted]S, Request for Early Home Leave

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Attachment:
Bio Profile

CONCUR:

A DDP/OP ________________ 3 Aug 1967
Date

APPROVED:

Director of Personnel ________________ 3 Aug 67
Date

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

OP-865

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
ppm Patricia P. MacDougall WH/Personnel 3D5309	6815	DATE 1 August 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WH/Personnel			[initials]	
2. C/WH/1 3B4403			[initials]	Call Linda x 4516
3. SB/Pers 5B4804			[initials]	
4. C/WH/SS 3D3102			[initials]	Hand Carry
5. C/WHD 3D3107	2 AUG 1967		[initials]	
6. Mr. Collins CSPS/AP GG10	3 Aug. '67		Dmc	Subject has had 24 months continuous service in Mexico since 6 September 1960. CCS has no objection. 6 to 10. This is in accord with the agreement you reached discussing this with Chief, WH.
7.				
8. [redacted]				
9.				
10. DDP/OP 3C29	3 AUG 1967	3 Aug	[initials]	6 to 10 & 12. Recommend approval. Douglas M. Collins
11.				
12. D/Pers 5E56			[initials]	
13. WH/Pers 3D5309				
14. C/WHD 3D3107				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

ORIG: [illegible]
UNIT: WH PERSONNEL
EXT: 6813
DATE: 1 AUGUST 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 14

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 30 PER

CONF: C/WH 6 [ ] RID COPY

[ ] INDEX [ ] DESTROY [ ] RETURN TO ___ BRANCH [ ] FILE RID
[ ] NO INDEX [ ] FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE, VR, C/OPSER, D/OP, C/CCS3, C/CSPS

SECRET

3 22 30 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 2 3 1 6 8

TO: MEXICO CITY

RYBAT/

REFS: A. HMMT-7717
B. FR 20-145 (3)
C. HMMT-7964

1. DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL APPROVES REF A REQUEST FOR HOME LEAVE SHORT OF TOUR. NEXT TOUR WILL BE EXTENDED BY NUMBER DAYS PRESENT TOUR SHORTENED.

2. HQS HAS DECIDED NOT TO GRANT EXCEPTION RETURNING FEINGLASS TO CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT EM SYSTEM BUT INSTEAD PLANS HIS USE AS A CONTRACT EMPLOYEE FOLLOWING RETIREMENT UNDER AGENCY SYSTEM IN NOVEMBER 1968. (SEE HB-5495 RE EMPLOYMENT OF ANNUITANTS)

3. WILL ADVISE RE TDY REPLACEMENT AND EXACT TIMING.

Mr. Conner (SB) x6412 will fill TDY.

//END OF MESSAGE//

D/PERS [signature]
DDP/OP [signature]
C/CSPS [signature]
C/WH/1 [signature]
C/WH PERS [signature]

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

GEORGE R. THOMPSON
C/WH/SS

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 29 MARCH 1967

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 019477
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [illegible]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 04 DAY 09 YEAR 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | XX CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 7135-0990
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH I
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0418
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~11306~~ 11685

18. REMARKS

FROM: SAME/0400

1 - Finance

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Robert D. Cashman, Chief, WH Personnel — DATE SIGNED: 29 March

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER — DATE SIGNED: 4 Apr 67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOURS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	10	5164	WH	15075		3	11 02 22		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 3—FICA, 5—NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT)	36. SERV COMP DATE	37. LONG. COMP. DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	44. STATE TAX DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: C4-11-67
46. O.P. APPROVAL: Don H. Lutscher — DATE APPROVED: 5 Apr 67

FORM 2-66 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

XXB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

6 5 1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 12 December 1966

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 019477

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [illegible]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 DAY 18 YEAR 66

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / X CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 7135-0990

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE:

12. POSITION NUMBER:

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:

16. GRADE AND STEP: 12

17. SALARY OR RATE: $

18. REMARKS

EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL | DATE SIGNED | 18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER | DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE | 20 EMPLOY CODE | 21 OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC, ALPHABETIC) | 22 STATION CODE | 23 INTEGREE CODE | 24 HQOTRS CODE | 25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.) | 26 DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.) | 27 DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR) | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30 RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 3—FICA, 5—NONE) CODE 2 | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR) | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY REQ NO | 34. SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE (CODE; 0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT) | 36 SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR) | 37 LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR) | 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR RESV PROV TEMP; CODE) | 39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE; 0—WAIVER, 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE) | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) | 42 LEAVE CAT CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44 STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 12-1366 N

46 O P APPROVAL: See memo signed by D/Pers dated 30 NC 19

DATE APPROVED:

FORM 2-66 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
OP-4-7-66

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET

XXB

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 APRIL 1965

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 019477
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [illegible]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH APR | DAY 11 | YEAR 65
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | X CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5135 0990
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH BRANCH 3 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0400
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 10,250
18. REMARKS:
FROM: GS-11.3/$9,240

TO BE EFFECTIVE 11 APRIL 1965

Recorded by CSPD

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ROBERT D. CASHMAN C/WH/PERS — DATE SIGNED: 4/9/65

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [signature] — DATE SIGNED: 9 Apr 65

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOQTRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
22	10	51700	WH	45075		3	11 02 08	4 11 65	4 11 65

28. NTE EXPIRES — 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE — 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—FICA, 3—NONE) CODE — 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE — 32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA — EOD DATA — 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. — 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT) — 36. SERV. COMP. DATE — 37. LONG COMP. DATE — 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR. RESV, PROV. TEMP) — 39. FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE (0—WAIVED, 1—YES), HEALTH INS. CODE — 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) — 42. LEAVE CAT CODE — 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO), CODE, NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS — 44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO), CODE, NO. TAX EXEMP, STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [signature] 04/09/65

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Joseph B. Ragan — DATE APPROVED: 9 APR 1965

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
[illegible]	Self	[illegible]

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on [illegible] 1961. [illegible] infection

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
5 SEP 1963	B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-55 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4-21-35)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 14 MAY 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 019277
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT Career
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: 06 05 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3135-5700-1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP WH / BRANCH 3 / MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO, MEXICO
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 400
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 8575
18. REMARKS:

1 COPY TO FINANCE DIV.

1 COPY TO SECURITY

Recorded by CSPD

19a. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ROBERT D. CASHMAN, C/WH/PERS — DATE SIGNED: 5/14/63

19b. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER — DATE SIGNED: 21 May 63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	24. CONTRACT CODE
13	10	4700 / 64	45075	3

35. VET. PREFERENCE: 1 — 36. SERV. COMP. DATE: 06 05 63 — 37. LONG. COMP. DATE: 02 20 56

38. CAREER CATEGORY: C

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: 1

EOD DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 6/05/63

46. C.P. APPROVAL — DATE APPROVED: 29 May 63

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152a

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 14 May 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 019477
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): TARASOFF, BORIS D. 06/04/62
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RESIGNATION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3235-1990-1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP WH CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: I O FOREIGN DOC
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0132.62
16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 8575
18. REMARKS

FROM: SAME

1 COPY TO FINANCE DIVISION

Received by CSPD

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ROBERT D. CASHMAN, C/WH/PERS — DATE SIGNED: 5/14/63

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: for Milton Smith — DATE SIGNED: 21 May 1963

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. VOTERS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
45	10				1	11 02 03		

28. NTE EXPIRES | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.) | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE | 37. LONG. COMP. DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR/RESV, PROV/TEMP) | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS); 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)) | 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44. STATE TAX DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [signature] 06/05/63

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Charles W. Claxon — DATE APPROVED: 28 May 63

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152a

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EMPLOYEE NOTICE OF RESIGNATION

I RESIGN EFFECTIVE ____ (Date) FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:		
MY LAST WORKING DAY WILL BE ·	DATE SIGNED	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Boris D. Tarasoff
FORWARD COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING SALARY CHECKS AND BONDS, TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, Zone, State)		

INSTRUCTIONS

Items 1 thru 7 and Items 9 thru 18a - The initiating office should fill in each of the referenced items. Items 3 thru 7 and 9 thru 18 require information which pertains only to the action requested, and NOT to the current status of the employee unless specific items remain unchanged.

Item 5 - "Category of Employment" should show one of the following entries:

Regular	Summer	WAE
Part Time	Detail Out	Consultant
Temporary	Detail In	Military
Temporary - Part Time		

Item 9 - "Organizational Designations" should show all levels of organization pertinent to identifying the location of the position:

FIRST LINE: Major Component (Director, Deputy Director, etc.) Office, Major Staff, etc.
- Division or Staff (subordinate to first line)
  - Branch
    - Section
      - Unit

Item 11 - "Position Title" should reflect the standard abbreviated title given in the most current edition of the Position Control Register or reported on Form 261, Staffing Complement Change Authorization.

Item 18b - Signature should be that of the official authorized to approve for the Career Service to which the employee belongs. If more than one Career Service is involved, the gaining Career Service should approve and the other Career Service should concur in Item 18, Remarks.

ROUTING - The original only of this form will be forwarded to the Office of Personnel through the appropriate Career Service official(s). In the case of requests specified in HB 20-800-1, which require advance approval of or notification to the Office of Security or the Office of the Comptroller, one copy only will be sent to the Office(s) concerned.

SECRET

MHC: 5 JUNE 63

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
019477	TARASOFF BORIS D

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
RESIGNATION	06 04 63	REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	X	CF TO V		CF TO CF	3235 1890 1000	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
I O FOREIGN DOC	9997	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0132.62	11 3	8575

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 30 OCTOBER 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)
019477	TARASOFF, BORIS D.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (Month / Day / Year)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	11 / 26 / 62	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	3235-1990-1000	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/WH CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	WASHINGTON, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
I O Foreign Dir	9997	OD

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0132.62	11 3	$ ~~8310~~ 8,575

18. REMARKS

FROM: DDI/FDD/USSR BR/MATERIALS & INDUSTRY SECT./WASH. D.C.

CONCURRENCE

[signature]

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
P. C. BOWERS WH/PERS OFCR	10/31/62	[signature]	5 Nov 62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING (Numeric / Alphabetic)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HQTRS. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH (Mo. Da. Yr.)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	3	4997 WH			1	11 02 08		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE)	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG. COMP. DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR/RESV, PROV/TEMP)	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS); 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. O.P. APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
Sec Conc FD [signature] 11/21/62	[signature]	11/23/62

FORM 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152A.
4-62

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

21 April 1960

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo. Da. Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD Mo. Da. Yr.
119477	TARASOFF BORIS D	11 02 08	1	M 1	02 20 56

7. SCD Mo. Da. Yr.	8. CSC Reimt. Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Code	12. LCD Mo. Da. Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit Code
06 02 51	1	50 USCA 403 J			02 20 56	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDI OO FDD USSR BRANCH MATERIALS & INDUSTRY SECT.	2720	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept.-Field Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
2	IO FOREIGN DOC	1146	GS	0132.48

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
10 1	$ 6505	OD	06 14 59	06 12 60	0243-1010-0000 ~~9 4300 20 001~~

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
Promotion	30	5 1 60	Regular	01	

25

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDI/Office of Operations Foreign Documents Division USSR Branch Materials & Industry Section	2720	Washington, D. C.	

33. Dept.-Field Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
2	IO (Foreign Doc)	1146	GS	0132.48

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
11 01	$7,030	OD	5 1 60	10 29 61	0243-1010-0000

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) Talbot Bielefeldt, Chief, USSR Branch

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) Myron Shpur, Ext. 4876

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title) J. J. Bagnall (signature)
J. J. BAGNALL
Chief, Foreign Documents Division

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control	(initials)		E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	(signature)	

Remarks

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

(4)

W/c file 4/26

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

5 June 1959

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth (Mo. Da. Yr.)	4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code	5. Sex	6. CS-LOD (Mo. Da. Yr.)
	TARASOFF, Boris D.	11 02 08	1	M	02 20 56

7. SCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No.-2) Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. (Mo. Da. Yr.)	11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code	12. LCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	13. Mil. Serv. Credit LCD (Yes-1, No-2) Code

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDI/Office of Operations Foreign Documents Division USSR Branch Materials & Industry Section		Washington, D. C.	

16. Dept.-Field (Dept-, USfld-, Frgn-) Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
2	IO (Foreign Doc)	1147	GS	0132.48

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade (Mo. Da. Yr.)	25. PSI Due (Mo. Da. Yr.)	26. Appropriation Number
09 03	$ 6285	OD	5 17 57	5 15 60	9-4300-20-001

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date (Mo. Da. Yr.)	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
Promotion		6 14 59	Regular		

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDI/Office of Operations Foreign Documents Division USSR Branch Materials & Industry Section		Washington, D. C.	

33. Dept.-Field (Dept-, USfld-, Frgn-) Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
2	IO (Foreign Doc)	1146	GS-	0132.48

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade (Mo. Da. Yr.)	42. PSI Due (Mo. Da. Yr.)	43. Appropriation Number
10 01	$ 6505	OD	6 14 59	6 17 60	9-4300-20-001

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) Talbot Bielefeldt
Chief, USSR Branch

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
Myron Shpur, Ext. 575

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
J. J. BAGNALL
Chief, Foreign Documents Division

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control	[signature]	10 1959	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	[signature]	

Remarks

(4)

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

SECRET

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1950 - FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.- One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. Boris D. Tarasoff
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 2 Nov 1908
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 2 May 57

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Promotion
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: asap
B. APPROVED:

7. C.S. CR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Foreign Docs. Officer - K653.04-X		Foreign Docs. Officer - K653.04
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0132.48-7, $4660.00 p.a.		GS-0132.48-9, $5440.00 p.a.
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDI/Office of Operations Foreign Documents Division USSR Branch		DDI/Office of Operations Foreign Documents Division USSR Branch
11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.		Washington, D. C.
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	[ ] FIELD [X] DEPARTMENTAL		[ ] FIELD [X] DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): Talbot Bielefeldt, Chief, USSR Branch

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Myron Shpur, ext. 576

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: [signature]
Title: J.J. BAGNALL, Chief, Foreign Docs. Div.

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD-OD

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM:
TO: 7-4301-20

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE [ ] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED
STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	GW	5/7/57
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY [signature]

16—57320-4

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
Mr. Boris D. Tarasoff	2 Nov 1908		27 Sep 56

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: ASAP
B. APPROVED:

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Foreign Documents Off. - K777.99(Cl.)	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Foreign Documents Off. - K653.04-7
GS-0132.48-7, $4525.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0132.48-7, $4525.00 per annum
~~DDI-Office of Operations~~ ~~Foreign Documents Division~~ ~~USSR Branch~~	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDI/Office of Operations Foreign Documents Division USSR Branch
~~Washington, D.C.~~	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
[ ] FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	[ ] FIELD [X] DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Present incumbent (James Whalen) will be resigning cob 28 September.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title) Talbot Bielefeldt
Chief, USSR Branch

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension) Myron Shyar, Ext. 5/6

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: [signature]
[illegible] B. [illegible]
Title: Acting Chief, Foreign Documents Division

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD-OD

15. SEX	16. APPROPRIATION	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	FROM: 7-4301-20 TO:	Yes		[ ] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	[initials]	10/2/56
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY

CONFIDENTIAL

10—67339-4

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL CHAPTER

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
Mr. Boris D. Tarasoff	2 Nov. 1908		25 June 56

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
Reassignment and Change of Service Designation

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: ASAP
B. APPROVED: 9 Sept. 56 ~~16 AUG 1956~~

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intell. Assistant - BVP - 8141		Foreign Docs. Officer - K777.99(OL)
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0301.28-7, $4525.00 per annum		GS-0132.46-7, $4525.00 per annum
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FI Staff Division D Project PBJOINTLY Office of the Chief Branch 2 Section B.		DDI/Office of Operations Foreign Documents Division USSR Branch
11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.		Washington, D. C.
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL [X]		FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL [–]

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)
Action has been coordinated with Career Service Boards concerned.
Two copies forwarded to Office of Security.
Loss Notice attached.
Concur for PB Jointly: R G Ledford 8/29/56

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title) Talbot Bielefeldt
Chief, USSR Branch

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
Myron Shpur, Ext. 576

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: J J Bagnall
Title: J. J. BAGNALL, Chief, For. Docs. Div.

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

From: SD-D
To: SD-OD

15. SEX	16. APPROPRIATION	17. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	FROM: 6-2306-23 TO: 9-4301-20	Yes		[ ] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS
[illegible]

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS CONTROL	[initials]	~~[date]~~ 8-16-56	
C. CLASSIFICATION			No F.I. Report — only more spts & Project.
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			
F. APPROVED BY	Robert ... Stricklen ... 9/7/56		

10—67230-4

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.–Miss–Mrs.–One given name, initial(s), and surname)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
TARASOFF, Boris Dimitri	Nov. 2, 1908		18 Aug. 1955

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:	7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT		
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)	B. APPROVED: 20 Feb. 56	

	FROM—	TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER		~~Intel-Analyst~~ (Gen) Intel Asst BVP-6141
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY		~~GS-0132.36-07~~ GS-0132.28-7 $4525
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS		DD/P FI Staff PB Jointly Division D Project [redacted] Office of the Chief Branch 2 Section B
11. HEADQUARTERS		Washington, D. C.
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL DI

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Request Expedite Clearance for PB Jointly Action Coordinated with "D" and DI CS Ponlet RCS

B. REQUESTED BY: Frank B. Rowlett
FRANK B. ROWLETT, Chief, FI/STD

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension) Harvey Connor X3030

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

SD:D

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES–NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: TO: 6-230c-23			☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	JDS	22 Aug	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY: R. H. Strickler — RC Tofford 8/19/55

10—67320-8

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

1. DATE OF INTERVIEW: 6/12/55
2. PLACE: Berkeley, Calif.
3. PREVIOUS APPLICATION: [ ] Yes [X] No
4. INTERVIEWER: JFWinter
5. REFERRED BY: Rusby/FR
6. NAME (last name first, in caps): TARASOFF, Boris Dimitri
7. PERMANENT ADDRESS: 16315 Bevil Way, San Leandro, Calif. TELEPHONE: FR 60718
8. BUSINESS ADDRESS: TELEPHONE:
9. TEMPORARY ADDRESS: TELEPHONE:
10. DATE OF BIRTH: 11/2/03
11. PLACE OF BIRTH: EKATERINOSAV, Russia
12. CITIZENSHIP: [X] U.S. [ ] OTHER (list Country) ACQUIRED BY: [ ] Birth [X] Naturalization (Date)
13. [ ] Single [ ] Married [ ] Widow(er) [ ] Divorced
14. NO. OF DEPEND. (Excluding Wife)
15. FOREIGN RELATIVES, INCLUDING WIFE (REG. 10-9)
None

16. EDUCATION (SCHOOLS, DEGREES, DATES, MAJORS, THESIS TITLE, GRADE AVERAGE OR CLASS STANDING, EXTRA-CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES, ETC.)

Russian University, New York, N.Y. 1924-26. General Course.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

17. MAJOR EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (EMPLOYERS, POSITIONS, DUTIES, SALARIES, REASONS FOR LEAVING)

1/52 to present: YWCA, Oakland, Calif. Building Eng. $305. mo.
12/45-10/51: American National Red Cross, Cleveland, Ohio. Building Maintenance man. $265 mo

18. MILITARY EXPERIENCE (BRANCH, SERIAL NO., STATIONS, TRAINING DUTIES, COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES, RANK HELD, RESERVE STATUS, CURRENT PROFICIENCY AND INTEREST). INCLUDE ALSO DRAFT, ACTIVE MILITARY OR RETIRED STATUS.

USArmy. T/4. 2/41-11/45. Honorable Discharge. 2024S233. Was Special Agt. in Germany and was used as interpreter between US and Soviet forces for short while.

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(4.11)

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

19. AREA KNOWLEDGE (AREAS, TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE, HOW ACQUIRED)

Ger., WW II

20. LANGUAGE FACILITY (GIVE TESTS WHEN SKILL WARRANTS AND RATE BELOW)

Language	Native Fluency	Fluent but Foreign	Adequate for Translator	Adequate for Research	Adequate for Travel	Limited	Acquired By
Russian		r,s,w,u					Study and home
German					r,s,w,u		Residence
French					r,s,w,u		Study

21. SALARY REQUESTED GS 7 — 22. POOL INTEREST [ ] Yes [ ] No

23. ACCEPTABLE STATION — Washington, D.C. [X] Yes [ ] No; Anywhere in U.S. [X] Yes [ ] No; Overseas [X] Yes [ ] No — PREFERENCE LIMITATIONS

24. HEALTH Good

25. FORMS GIVEN [X] PHS [X] App. [X] ... [X] Sec. ... [ ] ... Required

26. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATION (APPEARANCE, MANNERS, PERSONALITY, MATURITY, MOTIVATION, FLEXIBILITY, INTELLIGENCE, EMOTIONAL STABILITY, QUALIFICATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE WORK, CAREER PLANNING, OVER-ALL IMPRESSION, PERTINENT UNFAVORABLE FACTORS)

PROFESSIONAL

There's nothing outstanding about Tarasoff - just an average joe trying to make a living and without the ambition, energy, perspicacity to make use of a saleable article: knowledge of Russian. Physically he's sort of soft, tends to be overweight - he's about 5'8"tall, and about 190 in weight. His personality is on the negative side, his manner dull.

Tarasoff was greatly interested in the possibility of working for the US Government. He wants that security. And he has about reached the end of the line salary wise as a maintenance man or building superintendent. Tarasoff is willing to work in D.C. but insists on a GS 7 because he has to support a wife and two children. He does not mind the sedentary aspects of Project Detail - I doubt if he'd be interested in anything that wasn't sedentary. He also liked the the other aspects of Detail and I would think from talking with him that he would be quite able to handle a job on Detail. He can translate - reads with a great deal of ease. His PHS I notice indicated he's interested only in o/s - this is not what he told me; he is interested in US also but he will go o/s if necessary.
I recommend Tarasoff for a GS 7 on Project Detail.

27. RECOMMENDED FOR ~~Pushy/Project Detail~~ — 28. SERIAL NUMBERS

29. TESTS — 30. J. Winter (Signature of Interviewer) — 7/4/55 (Date)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. PERS. SERIAL NO.	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I)	SCD: 2 Jun 1951
019477		

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	3. SEX	4. DATE OF BIRTH	5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE
[illegible]	M	2 Nov 1908	20 Feb 1956

6. MARITAL STATUS	7. DEPENDENT(S) (Exclud. employee)	NO.	YEAR(S) OF BIRTH	8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S)
Married		3	1923 1965 1949	1936 Russia Spouse: NA

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS	MEMBERSHIP	OTHER STATUS	10. LAST MED. EXT.	QUAL. FOR	EVAL. FOR
	Feb 1959		Mar 1963	PCS O/S	PCS O/S

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS	NONE	SERVICE	GRADE	ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT.-1	RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT.-2	TO BE DEFERRED CAT.-3	RETIRED
	X						

12. ASSESSMENT DATE	13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE	14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE
None	Feb 1956	None

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT
1936-40 J. F. Sullivan, General Contractor, Bronx, NY - Supervisor of Crews
1941-45 Military Service, US Army, CIC, T/4 - Special Agent
1945-51 American National Red Cross, Cleveland, Ohio - Building Maintenance
1951 Aero-Tech, Oakland, Calif - Shop Maintenance (2 mos)
1952-56 YMCA, Oakland, Calif - Building Engineer

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION Born and lived in Russia until 1920, in Istanbul 1920-23
1924-26 Russian Univ of New York, NYC - Russian English, History
1927 Cooper Union Art School, NYC - Fine Arts (10 mos)
1944-5 MITC, Camp Ritchie, Md - CIC (2 mos); 1945 Univ of Pa - German Lang
1950-51 Cooper School of Art, Cleveland, Ohio - Commercial Art
1953-54 Oakland Art Institute Oakland Calif - Advertising Art

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)
Russian - R,W,P,S,U Native; Transl & Interpr - Apr 1957
Ukranian - R,W,S,U Inter; P High - Apr 1957 - Interpr
White Russian (Byelo) - R,W,S,U Inter; P High; Interpr - Apr 1957
(Continued on next page)

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING
1956 English Usage Review
1957 Intel Orient
1957 Basic Country Surv-USSR for FDD
1958 Non-clerical Basic Typing
1959 Writing Workshop
1962-3 Spanish

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Feb 1956	Intel Asst	0301.28	7	D	DDP/FIStf/DivD/PBJOINTLY	Hq
Jun 1956	" "	0132.48	7	OD	OO/FDD/USSR Br	"
Sep 1956	For Docs Off	0132.48	7	OD		"
May 1957	" " "	0132.48	9	OD	" " " "	"
Jun 1959	I.O. (For Doc)	0132.48	10	OD	OO/FDD/USSR Br/Mater&IndusSec	"
May 1960	" " "	0132.48	11	OD	" " " " " " "	"
Nov 1962	" " "	0132.48	11	OD	DDP/WH/CS/CS Dev Comp)	"
Jun 1963	Ops Off (SA)	0136.01	11	D	DDP/WH-3	Mexico City
Apr 1965	" " "	0136.01	12	D	DDP/WH-1	" "

20. DATE REVIEWED	21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY	22. ITEMS 1-18 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE
10 Nov 1969	hms /hc	14 Jun 1960

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I - Continued)

PERS. SERIAL NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
019477	[redacted] Tarasoff, Boris	2 Nov 1908

17. Foreign Language Abilities - Continued:
Bulgarian - R,W Inter (Apr 1959) P,S,U Slight; T None - Apr 1959
Slovak - R,U High; P Native; W,S,T None - Apr 1957
Polish - R (Inter) P,S,U Slight; W,T None - Jun 1959
Czech - R Inter (Feb 1960)
Serb-Croat(Serb) - R Inter (May 1959)
French - R Inter; W,P,S,U,T None - Disclaims proficiency Feb 1967

DATE REVIEWED	PROFILE REVIEWED BY
10 Nov 1969	hms/hc

FORM 1200-1a 3-67 SECRET PROFILE (4)

14-00000

SECRET

PERS. SERIAL NO.	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)	
19477		DATE OF BIRTH
NAME (Last-First-Middle) TARASOFF, Boris Dimitri		Nov 1908

26. SUMMARIES OF EVALUATIVE REPORTS FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS



Color Photo Inserted Behind

Biograhpic Profile in

TRUE NAME



27. DATE REVIEWED	28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY
10 May 1960	OP/POD/QAB/hms

FORM NO. 1 FEB 57 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1050 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE. SECRET 57 PROFILE

RET
(Wh... led In)

BI...PHIC PROFILE (...RT 2)

PERS. SERIAL NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
019477	Tarasoff, Boris D.	2 Nov 1968

23. PHOTOGRAPH

24. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

25. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

26. DATE REVIEWED	27. PROFILE REVIEWED BY
10 Nov 1969	hms/hc

FORM 2-68 1200 (PART 2) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

PROFILE (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 019177

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
[illegible]	2 Nov 1908	M	GS-12	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Officer	DDP/WH/1	Mexico City

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

- X CAREER
- RESERVE
- TEMPORARY
- CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

- INITIAL
- X ANNUAL
- SPECIAL (Specify):
- REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 28 February 1969

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 January 1968 thru 31 December 1968

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- **W - Weak** Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- **A - Adequate** Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
- **P - Proficient** Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
- **S - Strong** Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- **O - Outstanding** Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Translation of Russian language product into English transcript	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Preparation of personality and assessment reports on individual Soviets based on the above.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Translation of Russian letters into English	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Transcription of English language conversations	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5:	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

FEB 25 1 45 PM '69

This officer continues to consistently perform at the excellent level which has characterized his work in this Station for several years. His high level of personal dedication and professional competence have become standard.

From his daily work he has an intimate knowledge of and insight into the personalities of individual Soviets and the personal inter-relationships existing between members of the local Soviet colony. The character analyses which he prepares are excellent and an invaluable aid to our Soviet program.

He has had no professional, administrative, or personal problems during the reporting period.

His knowledge of Spanish continues to improve and aids him considerably in his work.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

BY EMPLOYEE

1\. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
28 Jan 60	[redacted] Jaravoff Bocca D

BY SUPERVISOR

2\.

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
41 months		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
28 Jan 69	Ops Officer	Paul L. Dillion /s/

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

3\. COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The reviewing officer concurs with the ratings given in Section B and in the narrative evaluation of this officer's performance in Section C. He continues to perform his duties in a superior fashion.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
28 Jan 69	Chief of Station	Winston M. Scott /s/

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 019477

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
[illegible]	[illegible]	M	GS-12	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Officer	DDP/WH/1	Mexico City

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: X CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY / CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C) / SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL / REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR / X ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE / SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 29 February 1968

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 January 1967 - 1 January 1968

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Translation of Russian language telephone product into English transcript.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Preparation of personality and assessment reports on individual Soviets based on the above.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Translation of Russian letters into English.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Transcription of English language conversations.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5:	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

24/[illegible]

22 MAY 1968

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This officer continues to perform his duties in the excellent manner that we have come to expect during the 4 1/2 years that he has served in the Station. His work is an indispensable part of the Station's program.

He has had no professional, administrative or personal problems during the reporting period.

He continues to study Spanish in which he shows satisfactory improvement.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
	/s/ [redacted]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
29		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
	Ops Officer	Paul Dillon

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The Reviewing Officer concurs in the ratings given this officer and in the narrative evaluation of his performance.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
16 February 1968	Chief of Station	Winston Scott

SECRET

SECRET

C-2532 (Biladeau)
5 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Transactions and Records Branch
Office of Personnel

ATTENTION: Mary Coriden

SUBJECT: Boris D. TARASOFF
Anna TARASOFF

1. Cover arrangements are in process, and/or, have been completed for the above-named subjects.

2. Effective immediately, it is requested that your records be properly blocked to deny subjects' current Agency employment to an external inquirer.

THOMAS K. STRANGE
Deputy Chief, CCS/NC

cc: ID/SO

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

SECRET

EOD: 30 NOV 70

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OEB

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Field	Entry
1. Serial Number	019477
2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	Tarasoff, Boris D
3. Nature of Personnel Action	RETIREMENT (MANDATORY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. Effective Date (Mo. Da. Yr.)	11 30 70
5. Category of Employment	REGULAR
6. Funds (V to V / V to CF / CF to V / CF to CF)	X (CF to V)
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	1135 0990 0000
8. CSC or Other Legal Authority	P.L. 88-643 SECT. 235 B
9. Organizational Designations	DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 1 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION
10. Location of Official Station	MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
11. Position Title	OPS OFFICER
12. Position Number	0489
13. Service Designation	D
14. Classification Schedule (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. Occupational Series	0136.01
16. Grade and Step	12 5
17. Salary or Rate	16084
18. Remarks	

T-P-1M

RECORD OF LEAVE DATA TRANSFERRED

1. Last Name: TARASOFF First Name: Boris Initial(s): D

2. Appointment Data — Entered on duty: ; F/T ; P/T
Subject to Sec. 203(d), 1951 Leave Act: Yes ☐ No ☐
Ceased to be subject to Sec. 203(d) on ______ Annual Leave Bal. ______

3. Total Service for Leave (as of date of separation): Years ___ Months ___ Days ___ ☐ More than 15 years

4. Date and Nature of Separation: 11/30/70 RETIREMENT

SUMMARY OF ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE (HOURS)

	Annual	Sick
5. Balance from prior leave year ended 1/10 19 70	360	900
6. Current leave year accrual through 11/28 19 70	184	92
7. Total	544	992
8. Reduction in credits, if any (current year)	0	0
9. Total leave taken	168	0
10. Balance	376	*992

11. Total hours paid in lump sum: 360 hrs + 2 holidays
12. Salary rate(s): $16,084.00
13. Lump sum leave dates: From 0830 12/1/70 to 2/03/71 — 1700 (Hours)

24. [signature] (Signature) 1/5/71 (Date)
FOR CHIEF PAYROLL (Title) (Telephone)

SUMMARY OF HOME LEAVE (DAYS)

14. Date arrival abroad for HL purposes ______
15. Current balance as of ______ 19__
16. 12-month accrual rate ______
17. Dates leave used, prior 24 months ______
18. Monthly accrual date ______
19. Calendar days credit for next accrual date ______
20. Date basic service period completed ______

MILITARY LEAVE

21. Dates during current calendar yr. ______ to ______
22. Dates during preceding calendar yr. ______ to ______

ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY

	LWOP or AWOL or Furlough Suspension (Hours)
23. During leave year in which separated	
24. During step-increase waiting period which began on 4/5/70	0
25. During 12-month HL accrual period (dates)	0

Remarks: SCD: 6/2/51
*Unused Sick Leave—992hrs —"U.S.C. Ch 63"

Standard Form 1150
November 1965
1150-106

U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM SUPPLEMENTS 296-31 AND 990-2

14-00000

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
019477	[illegible]	51 620	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 12	4	$14,727	04/07/68	GS 12	5	$15,173	04/05/70		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE [illegible] DATE [illegible]

- [ ] NO EXCESS LWOP
- [ ] IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
- [ ] LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY [illegible]

FORM 7-56 560 E Use previous editions — PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION (4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN,	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
[illegible]	019477	51 620	CF	GS 12 4	$15,611

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206
PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949,
AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
[illegible]	019477	51 620	CF	GS 12 3	$11,685	$12,225

1011

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
019477	[illegible]	51 620	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	7. NEW SALARY RATE Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	8. TYPE ACTION SI	ADJ.
GS 12	3	$12,225	04/09/67	GS 12	4	$12,607	04/07/68		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE [signature] DATE 7 Feb 68

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION (4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT
OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
[illegible]	019477	51 620	CF	GS 12 4	$12,607	$13,392

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SE: 12 SEPT. 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCB

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
019477	Zarasell, Bruno D

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	09 10 67	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
				X	3135 0990 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 1 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	0459	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	12 3	11685

18. REMARKS

18 Sep 67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING Numeric	Alphabetic	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	51620	WH	45075		3	11 02 08		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX
		1 - CSC, 2 - CIA, 3 - FICA, 4 - NONE					

35. VET. PREFERENCE	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG. COMP. DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT				0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES	

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	44. STATE TAX DATA
0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.); 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)		FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

9/13/67

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET MAH

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-81) (When Filled In)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

E.IT: 13 APR 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCE

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
019877	[handwritten, partly obscured]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	04 09 67	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
				X	7135 0990 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH I MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	0418	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	12 3	11685

18. REMARKS

POSTED ON OF-4b

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
32	10	51620	WH	45075		3	11 02 08		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - CIA, 3 - FICA, 4 - NONE)	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG. COMP. DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS; 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

[signature]

POSTED

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Serial No.	Name		
019477	[redacted]	51 670	CF

Old Salary Rate				New Salary Rate			
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date
GS 12	2	$11,306	04/10/66	GS 12	3	$11,665	04/09/67

Remarks and Authentication

NO EXCESS LWOP
IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

POSTED ON OF-40

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: [signature] DATE 15 Feb 67

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 019477
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): Tarasoff, Boris D.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: 12 13 66
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: CF TO V — X
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 7135 0990 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT. 203
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: WH/MEXI
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
11. POSITION TITLE:
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12
17. SALARY OR RATE:
18. REMARKS: EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE | 20. Employ Code | 21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC, ALPHABETIC) | 22. STATION CODE | 23. INTEGREE CODE | 24. Hdqtrs. Code | 25. DATE OF BIRTH | 26. DATE OF GRADE | 27. DATE OF LEI

28. NTE EXPIRES | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - CIA, 3 - FICA, 4 - NONE) CODE: 2 | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT) | 36. SERV. COMP DATE | 37. LONG COMP DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS; 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS) | 42. LEAVE CAT CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
[illegible]	019477	51 620	CF	GS 12 2	$10,987	$11,306

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
[illegible]	019477	51 620	CF	GS 12 1	$10,250	$10,619

Bcl

1. Serial No	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
019477	[illegible]	51 620 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	6. NEW SALARY RATE Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	7. TYPE ACTION PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 12	1	$10,619	04/11/65	GS 12	2	$10,987	04/10/66			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: [signature]

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DUE: 9 APR 65

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCB

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
013477	[illegible]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
PROMOTION	04 11 65	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V		V TO CF		7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		5135 0990 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/WH BRANCH 3 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	0400	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	12 1	10250

18. REMARKS

POSTED ON OF-4b 14 APR 1965 PK

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
22	10	51700	WH	45075		3	11 02 08	04 11 65	04 11 65

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE / MO DA YR		33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
					EOD DATA		

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT.)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES) HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE, NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE, NO TAX EXEMP, STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED 04/13/65 WK

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

14-00000

WH

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
019477	[redacted]	64 700 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 11	3	$ 8,575	10/28/62	GS 11	4	$ 8,840	10/27/63			

POSTED ON

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY Joseph B. Ga

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: [signature] DATE [illegible] 1963

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

WH

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
[redacted]	019477	51 700	CF	GS 11 4	$ 8,840	$ 9,250

POSTED ON
5 JAN 1964

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LLG: 5 JUNE 63

OAB

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 019477
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): [illegible]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT (CAREER)
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 06 05 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF — X (CF TO V)
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3135 5700 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 3
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0400
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 8575

18. REMARKS:

POSTED ON [illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING (Numerical / Alphabetic)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)
13	10	64700 WH	45075		3	11 02 08	05 01 60	10 28 62

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1-CSC, 2-FICA, 3-NONE)	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
		1				00000	M1

35. VET. PREFERENCE	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG. COMP. DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
1	06 02 51	02 20 56	C	1	

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (Code / No. Tax Exemptions)	44. STATE TAX DATA
1	6	0 / 0	

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
06/11/63 [illegible]

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

5 JUN 1963

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

JGD 28 AUG 63

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
019477	TARASOFF BORIS D

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
RESIGNATION (CORRECTION)	06 04 63	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	4235 1990 1000	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP WH CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
I O FOREIGN DOC	9997	OD

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0132.62	11 3	8575

18. REMARKS

THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150 EFFECTIVE DATE 06/04/63 AS FOLLOWS:
ITEM # 13 SERVICE DESIGNATION WHICH READ, D TO READ, OD.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)
45	18					11 02 08		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX
			1BD0091				

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE: 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

E. D. ECHOLS

POSTED 09/25/63

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET 28 AUG 1963

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MHC: 5 JUNE 63

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
019477	TARASOFF BORIS D

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
RESIGNATION	06 04 63	REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	X	CF TO V		CF TO CF	3235 1890 1000	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP WH CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
I O FOREIGN DOC	9997	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0132.62	11 3	8575

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
45	18					11 02 08		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE)	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
			1BD0091				

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG. COMP. DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP)	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED: 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED: 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED 06/06/63 JK

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET 5 JUN 1963

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

ABM: 26 NOV 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
019477	TARASOFF BORIS D

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	11 26 62	REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	X				3235 1990 1000	50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP WH CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
I O FOREIGN DOC	9997	OD

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0132.62	11 3	8575

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC)	(ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
37	18	64997	WH	75013		1	11 02 08		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (CODE: 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR)	37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE: 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (CODE: 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED: 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED: 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
12/10/62 K

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

11/26/62 abm

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1964, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
TARASOFF BORIS D	019477	86100	V	11 2	$ 7820	11 2	$ 8310

2-13-1010

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
019477	TARASOFF BORIS D	86 100 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS-11	2	$ 8,310	10/29/61	S-11	3	$ 8,575	10/28/62			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ ✓ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS [initials] AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: [signature] DATE: 10/24/62

E. C. ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
19A77	TARASOFF BORIS D	PRI/FED 2-23	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 11	1	$ 7,560	05/21/60	11	2	$ 7,820	10/29/61			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

E.D. ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

SECRET

Form 560 (4-51) Obsolete Previous Edition

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
OD	TARASOFF BORIS D	119477	27 20	GS-11 1	$ 7,030	$ 7,560

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

BWS: 29 APR 1960

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
119477	TARASOFF BORIS D	11	02	08	1	M 1	02	20	56

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Code
06	02	51	1	50 USCA 403 J					02	20	56	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDI 00 FDD USSR BRANCH MATERIALS & INDUSTRY SECT.	2720	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept.-Field Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
2	10 FOREIGN DOC	1146	GS	0132.48

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
10 1	$ 6505	00	06	14	59	06	12	60	9 4300 20 001

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Date
PROMOTION	30	05	01	60	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDI 00 FDD USSR BRANCH MATERIALS & INDUSTRY SECTION	2720	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept.-Field Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
2	10 (FOREIGN DOC)	1146	GS	0132.48

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
11 1	$ 7030	00	05	01	60	10	29	61	0243 1010 0000

44. Remarks

POSTED 19 MAY

SECRET

FORM NO. 1150 1 MAR 52 — 15-3-60 SECRET (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

MCM 12 JUNE 59

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth (Mo. Da. Yr.)	4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD (Mo. Da. Yr.)
119477	TARASOFF BORIS D	11 02 08	1	M 1	02 20 56

7. SCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No-2) Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. (Mo. Da. Yr.)	11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code	12. LCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	13. (Yes-1, No-2) Code
06 02 51	1	50 USCA 403 J			02 20 56	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDI OFFICE OF OPERATIONS FDD USSR BRANCH MATERIALS & INDUSTRY SECT.		WASH., D. C.	

16. Dept.-Field (Dept-2, USfld-4, Frgn-6) Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
2	10 FOREIGN DOC	1147	GS	0132.48

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade (Mo. Da. Yr.)	25. PSI Due (Mo. Da. Yr.)	26. Appropriation Number
09 3	$ 6285	00			9 4300 20 001

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date (Mo. Da. Yr.)	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
PROMOTION	30	06 14 59	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDI OO FDD USSR BRANCH MATERIALS & INDUSTRY SECT.	2720	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept.-Field (Dept-2, USfld-4, Frgn-6) Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
2	10 FOREIGN DOC	1146	GS	0132.48

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade (Mo. Da. Yr.)	42. PSI Due (Mo. Da. Yr.)	43. Appropriation Number
10 1	$ 6505	00	06 14 59	06 12 60	9 4300 20 001

44. Remarks

FORMED
16 JUN 1959

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

a E 6/15/59

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
119477	TARASOFF BORIS D	DDI/FDD - 25	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA	YR.
GS 9	2	$ 6,135	05	18	58	GS 9	3	$ 6,285	05	17	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE [X] NO EXCESS LWOP [ ] EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
[ ] IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
[ ] IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD.

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK [initials]

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

[initials]

14. AUTHENTICATION

MAY 11 11 50 AM '59
PAYROLL BRANCH

S. M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560b
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

IN LIEU OF FORM 1150 THIS NOTIFICATION EFFECTS RESLOTTING RESULTING FROM R-20-250

SER #	NAME	SD	OLD SLOT	NEW SLOT	DATE
119477	TARASOFF BORIS D	OD	0653.04	1147	02/24/59

4-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
119477	TARASOFF BORIS D	DDI/FDD 25	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 9	1	$ 5,440				GS 9	2	$ 5,575	05	18	58

REMARKS

BD

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
TALBOT BIELEFELDT	1 April 1958	T Bielefeldt

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

FORM NO. 560
1 MAR. 56

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
119477	TARASOFF BORIS D	DDI/FDD	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 9	1	$ 5,440				GS 9	2	$ 5,575	05	18	58

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE [X] NO EXCESS LWOP [ ] EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
[ ] IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
[ ] IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
TARASOFF BORIS D	119477	GS-09-2	$ 5,575	$ 6,135

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER B., FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
MR. BORIS D. TARASOFF 119477	2 Nov 1908		17 May 1957

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
PROMOTION 30	19 May 1957	50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Foreign Documents Off. K-653.04
GS-0132.48-7 $4660.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0132.48-9 $5440.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 232040	DDI/CO Foreign Documents Division USSR Branch
	11. HEADQUARTERS 2	Washington, D. C.
FIELD / DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	FIELD / X DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10-POINT
			X	

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-OD

15. SEX	16. APPROPRIATION	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO)	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W FROM: 7-4301-20 750-13 TO: Same	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. REMARKS:

4 EOD 02/20/56

POSTED
17 MAY 1957
GW

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel — SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

717-#123157

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4.	5. ALLOTMENT
119477	TARASOFF BORIS D	DDI/FDD -25	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
7	1	$ 4,525	02	20	56	7	2	$ 4,660	02	24	57

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
Talbot Bielefeldt	7 Jan 57	T. Bielefeldt

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

STANDARD FORM 50 (5 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGE[NCY]

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

are

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
MR. BORIS D. TARASOFF 119477	2 Nov 1908		3 October 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
REASSIGNMENT 56	7 Oct 1956	50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
K-777.99	8. POSITION TITLE	Foreign Documents Off. K-653.04-7
GS-0132.48-7 $4525.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0132.48-7 $4525.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 232840	DDI/Office of Operations Foreign Documents Division USSR Branch
	11. HEADQUARTERS 2	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL	
				SD-CD

15. SEX	16. APPROPRIATION	17. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO)	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M W	FROM: 7-4301-20 750-13 TO: Same	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. REMARKS:

4 ECD 02/20/56

POSTED
OCT 5 1956

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PARTS)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

(TRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEN(

1v1

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S) AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. Boris D. Tarasoff	2 Nov 1908		13 Sep 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
57 Reassignment (Change of Service Designation)	9 Sep 1956	50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Intell. Asst. EVP-0141	8. POSITION TITLE	Foreign Docs. Off. K-777.99
GS-0301.28-7	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0132.48-7 $4525.00 per annum
DDP/FI Staff Division D, Project FB Jointly Office of the Chief Branch 2, Section B	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 232040	DDI/OO FDD USSR Branch
	11. HEADQUARTERS 2	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT (DISAB.)	10-POINT (OTHER)
			X		

1

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				From: SD/D To : SD/CD

15. SEX	16. APPROPRIATION	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO)	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M W	FROM: 7-2306-23 750-13 TO: 7-4301-20	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

1

20. REMARKS:

4 EOD 02/20/56

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1956-378647

773 9/14/56

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 21, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

[illegible]RAL INTELLIGENCE AGEN[illegible]

F.C. 14 Dec. 1955
C.-1?35 tat

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
MR. [illegible] D. T[illegible]	2 Nov. 19[illegible]		20 Feb. 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
[illegible]	20 Feb. 195[illegible]	50 USCA 4[illegible]

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Intel. Asst. BVP-8141
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-301.28-7 $4525.00 p.a.
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FI Staff Division D Project PBJ[illegible] Office of the Chief Branch 2 Section B
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
FIELD / DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	FIELD / DEPARTMENTAL x

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB	10-POINT OTHER
			x		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD:D ECC

15. SEX	16. APPROPRIATION	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO)	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	FROM: TO: 6-2396-23	Yes	20 Feb. 1956	CLAIMED / PROVED; STATE: Calif.

20. REMARKS:

Subject to the satisfactory completion of a trial period of one year.
Subject to the satisfactory completion of a medical examination.

RC-93

DOG: 2/2?/56
CSFOD: 2/20/56
LCD: ?/20/56
SCD: 6/02/51

PSI Due: 2/24/57

FOLDED
[illegible signature]

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955 - [illegible]

[illegible] 2/20/56

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 019477

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
[redacted]	2 Nov. 08	M	GS-12	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Off	DDP/WH/Br.1	Mexico City

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL	XX	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 January - 15 July 1970

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Translation of Russian language materials into English transcript.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Preparation of personality and assessment reports on individual Soviets based on above.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Transcription of English language conversations.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

14 AUG 1970

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	Rating Letter
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 7-68 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This officer has continued to perform his assigned tasks in superior fashion. Not only is he a skilled transcriber/translator, he is also able to put his experience and knowledge into words in preparing character analyses which have been of great value to the Station's operational program. Although his work load is often quite heavy, he can always be counted on to complete his assignments promptly and he willingly puts in the extra time frequently needed.

His team spirit and dedication are shown by the fact that on several occasions, in spite of advancing age and recent illness, he spent long hours in base houses on live-monitoring assignments. He will be greatly missed when he retires in the near future.

As previously noted, this officer does not handle operational funds or have supervisory responsibilities. He has had no cover problems, nor has he required any unusual administrative support, other than that which is to be expected in connection with his forthcoming retirement.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
	/s/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
19 months		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
	Ops Officer	Donald F. Vogel /s/

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the above ratings and comments. I am not able to add any meaningful comments due to the highly specialized nature of Subject's duties.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
	Deputy Chief of Station	Paul V. Harwood /s/

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 019477

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
[handwritten, redacted]	2 Nov 1908	M	GS-12	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Officer	DDP/WH/Br.1	Mexico City

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

XX	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
28 February 1970	1 January thru 31 December 1969

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- **W - Weak**: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- **A - Adequate**: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
- **P - Proficient**: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
- **S - Strong**: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- **O - Outstanding**: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Translation of Russian language materials into English transcript.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Preparation of personality and assessment reports on individual Soviets based on the above.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Transcription of English language conversations.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4:	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5:	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	Rating Letter
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 45 1-65 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This officer continues to perform his assigned duties in a superior fashion. Illness put him out of action for some time, but otherwise the Station received the fine performance which has come to be routine with him. This officer's experience and dedication make it possible for him to work effectively with an absolute minimum of supervision. He responds instinctively to items of operational significance, and his experience and knowledge make it possible for him to write penetrating analyses of target personalities, and interrelationships among these persons, based solely on what he hears.

This officer has also been called upon to transcribe material from audio operations, in addition to the telephone material which is his normal assignment. He has also handled this well, although his advancing age and less acute hearing make this task much more difficult for him.

While not called upon to use Spanish normally, he has sufficient fluency to handle material in Spanish when required.

This officer uses his time well and takes good care of the equipment assigned to him. He does not handle operational funds nor does he have any supervisory responsibilities.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS
1.	BY EMPLOYEE
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT
DATE: 20 January 1970	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: [redacted] /s/
2.	BY SUPERVISOR
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 12 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
20 January 1970	Donald F. Vogel /s/	Ops Officer

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I can add nothing substantive to the above report since I have little opportunity to deal at first hand with Subject's output. The rating officer is both meticulous and fair and I have full confidence in his evaluation of Subject.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
20 January 1970	Chief, Ops Officer	Paul V. Harwood /s/

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
	019477

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
[illegible]	2 Nov. 1908	M	GS-12	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Officer	DDP/WH/1	Mexico City

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT	10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
X CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY	INITIAL / REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)	X ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):	SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
28 February 1969	1 January 1968 thru 31 December 1968

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Translation of Russian language product into English transcript	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Preparation of personality and assessment reports on individual Soviets based on the above.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Translation of Russian letters into English	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Transcription of English language conversations	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5:	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	Rating Letter
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 6-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

FEB 25 1 46 PM '69

This officer continues to consistently perform at the excellent level which has characterized his work in this Station for several years. His high level of personal dedication and professional competence have become standard.

From his daily work he has an intimate knowledge of and insight into the personalities of individual Soviets and the personal inter-relationships existing between members of the local Soviet colony. The character analyses which he prepares are excellent and an invaluable aid to our Soviet program.

He has had no professional, administrative, or personal problems during the reporting period.

His knowledge of Spanish continues to improve and aids him considerably in his work.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
28 Jan 60	[redacted]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
41 months	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
28 Jan 69	Ops Officer	Paul L. Dillion /s/

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The reviewing officer concurs with the ratings given in Section B and in the narrative evaluation of this officer's performance in Section C. He continues to perform his duties in a superior fashion.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
28 Jan 69	Chief of Station	Winston M. Scott /s/

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 019477

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): [illegible]
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 2 Nov 1908
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-12
5. SD: D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer
7. OFF DIV BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WH/1
8. CURRENT STATION: Mexico City
9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: XX CAREER | RESERVE | TEMPORARY | CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C) | SPECIAL (Specify):
10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL | REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR | XX ANNUAL | REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE | SPECIAL (Specify):
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 28 February 1968
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to): 1 January 1967 - 1 January 1968

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Translation of Russian language telephone product into English transcript.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Preparation of personality and assessment reports on individual Soviets based on the above.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Translation of Russian letters into English.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Transcription of English language conversations.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

24 May 61

22 MAY 1968

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

FORM 45 4-65 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This officer continues to perform his duties in the excellent manner that we have come to expect during the 4 1/2 years that he has served in the Station. His work is an indispensable part of the Station's program.

He has had no professional, administrative or personal problems during the reporting period.

He continues to study Spanish in which he shows satisfactory improvement.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

BY EMPLOYEE

1\. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
	/s/ [illegible]

BY SUPERVISOR

2. MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
29		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
	Ops Officer	Paul Dillon

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

3\. COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The Reviewing Officer concurs in the ratings given this officer and in the narrative evaluation of his performance.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
16 February 1968	Chief of Station	Winston Scott

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
[illegible]

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
[illegible]	2 Nov 1908	M	GS-12	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Officer	DDP/WH-1	Mexico City

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT		10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT	
XX CAREER · RESERVE · TEMPORARY		INITIAL	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)		XX ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):		SPECIAL (Specify):	

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
28 February 1967	1 January 1966-31 December 1966

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- W - Weak — Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- A - Adequate — Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
- P - Proficient — Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
- S - Strong — Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- O - Outstanding — Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 — Translation of Russian language telephone tap product into English transcript.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 — Preparation of personality and assessment reports on individual Soviets based on the above.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 — Translation of Russian letters into English.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 — Translation of Spanish language telephone product into English and transcription of English conversations	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

27 MAR 1967 14 JUN 1967

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	Rating Letter
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

[redacted] continues to show a high degree of competence in his primary responsibility, which is translating and transcribing Russian telephone conversations. He works quickly and accurately and has a fine feeling for the subleties of the Russian language. His character analyses of Soviets have been of great assistance in the Station's operational planning. He continues to maintain his deep cover status well and presents no problem of either an administrative or a personal nature. His wife continues to assist him with his work, and together they make an excellent team.

Subject is very cost conscious in his operational duties.

SECTION D

CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

BY EMPLOYEE

1.

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
3 Feb 67	/s/ [redacted]

BY SUPERVISOR

2.

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
3 Feb 67	Ops Officer	/s/ Cynitha Hausmann

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

3.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I agree with the rating officer's evaluation. The Station is fortunate that [redacted] intends to remain permanently in Mexico where he makes an invaluable contribution to the SB Section's program and presents no difficulties whatsoever.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
3 Feb 67	Ops Officer	/s/ Paul L. Dillon

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 019477

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
[redacted]	2 Nov 08	M	GS-12	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Officer	DDP/WH/1	Mexico City

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER
	RESERVE
	TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
	SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL
XX	ANNUAL
	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 16 August 1965 - 31 December 1965

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- **W - Weak**: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- **A - Adequate**: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
- **P - Proficient**: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
- **S - Strong**: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- **O - Outstanding**: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Translation of Russian telephone and audio products into English transcript	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Processing transcribed telephone materials into a format which allows for immediate analysis and filing	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Preparation of personality and assessment reports on individual Soviets on the basis of the above material	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

POSTED ON OF-4b

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	Rating Letter
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
AUG 15 2 02 PM '66
JUN 24 4 26 PM '66

There has been no change in the excellent performance of this officer and his wife, a contract employee, who assists him in all facets of his work.

There have been no problems of either a professional or personal nature during the reporting period.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

BY EMPLOYEE

1\. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
16 June 1966	[redacted] /s/

BY SUPERVISOR

2. MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
9 1/2		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
16 June 1966	Chief/SR/Mex.	Paul J. Dillon /s/

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

3\. COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
16 June 1966	Chief of Station	Winston M. Scott /s/

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

12 AUG

FITNESS REPORT (CONTINUED)

Jaradoff, Boris D

Subject has not been in a supervisory position and his present assignment outside on unofficial cover working as a loner gives no indication as to his supervisory ability. It is believed Subject probably serves best as an independent analyst without supervisory responsibilities.

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
017477
~~264216~~

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Jardin [redacted]	2 Nov 1908	M	GS-12	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Operations Officer	/WH/1	Mexico City

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL	X	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
30 Sep 1964 - 15 Aug 1965

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- **W - Weak** — Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- **A - Adequate** — Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
- **P - Proficient** — Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
- **S - Strong** — Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- **O - Outstanding** — Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Translation of Russian language telephone and audio product into English transcript.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Preparation of characterization-assessment personality reports on the Soviet complement.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Processing of transcribed telephone materials into format facilitating immedicte analysis and handling by the Station.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

POSTED ON

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

25 APR 1966

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject has continued to demonstrate a very high level of interest and competence in his work. Beyond the relatively technical aspect of producing transcriptions, which he accomplishes with timeliness, accuracy and thoroughness, he strives to provide the Station and Headquarters with an insight in depth on the local Soviet complement. He does this capably, particularly when one understands the limitations of his technical access. His wife, a contract employee, assists him in the preparation of the technical product. However, her over-all contribution goes beyond this, since Subject and his wife work together in effort to distill the meaning of their product in terms of personality assessment. They are uniquely well adjusted to their deep cover circumstances, are of little burden administratively to the Station, and are presently interested in continuing their assignment in Mexico City indefinitely.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. **BY EMPLOYEE**

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
4 February 1966	/s/ [illegible]

2. **BY SUPERVISOR**

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
26		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
22 Dec 1965	Operations Officer	Herbert Manell /s/

3. **BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Chief of Station, Mexico City concurs in this Fitness Report as submitted by [redacted]'s supervisor for the period reported.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
12 April 1966	Chief of Station	Winston M. Scott /s/

SECRET

14-00000

38

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
[illegible]	2 Nov 1908	M	[illegible]	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Operations Officer	DDP WH 3	Mexico City

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY / CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C) / SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL / X ANNUAL / SPECIAL (Specify): / REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR / REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 November 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 4 June - 30 November 1963

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Translation of Russian language telephone and audio product into English transcript.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

POSTED ON [illegible]

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: P

21 NOV 1963

FORM 45 4-62 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

The relatively limited period of Subject's assignment to the Station, coupled with the normal complications attendant to a staffer's conversion to the DDP and to a deep cover status on a first assignment abroad, compels the supervisor to make a tentative assessment only at this time. However, from all indications to date it would appear that Subject and his family are acclimating themselves very well to the environmental, cover and work situation. Subject is interested in his work, applies himself conscientiously and is prompt in completing his assignments whether the work load for a day is light, or is heavy and requires unpaid overtime concentration. The translation product is presently exact and conforms to the Station's standards for such work. As Subject becomes more familiar with specific Station requirements, through experience and with closer supervision than afforded to date, he will be able to make a more imaginative contribution to his work, an effort that he has already begun.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE	
I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 25 October 1963	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /S/ [redacted]

2. BY SUPERVISOR		
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 4	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 25 October 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Operations Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /S/ Herbert Manell

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL		
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL		
DATE 15 NOV	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/[illegible]	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE [signature]

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TRAINING REPORT

Spanish Basic Reading, Speaking, Writing
(900 hours, full time)

02/24/63 - 02/15/63

Student	: Boris D. Tarasoff	Office	: WH
Year of Birth	: 1908	Service Designation	: D
Grade	: 11	No. of Students	: 4
EOD Date	: 02/56	Instructor	: Mrs. L. Edwards

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHOD

This is a 20-week, full-time course. The general aim of the course is to enable the student to use the spoken language with moderate facility and accuracy in a large number of everyday situations while providing a basis for further learning of the language either by actual use in the area or by further formal study. The major objectives of the course are to develop an ability; 1) to distinguish and produce the sounds of the language; 2) to use a large variety of basic sentences and expressions in the spoken language and apply them by re-combination to new situations; 3) to comprehend spoken Spanish in a variety of current everyday situations; 4) to develop the skills and techniques needed to read Spanish texts with minimum use of the dictionary; 5) to write the language in basic form, including letters, telegrams, short composition, etc.

The entire working day, 5 days a week, is devoted exclusively to language study. Four to five hours daily (a maximum of 25 hours a week) are devoted to guided drill and conversation practice with native speakers. The balance of the day is devoted to language laboratory drill and preparation of assigned material. Three days at mid-term and the final week of the course are spent in a special language-house in which Spanish is spoken exclusively.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

Student progress is evaluated primarily on oral recitation in the form of drills and free conversation based on memorized material. In addition, several tests are given during the course. The number of students receiving each adjectival rating on overall course performance is shown below. This student's rating is indicated by the asterisk.

Incomplete	Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Excellent
1		2*	1

Mr. Tarasoff's application and interest throughout the course was unstinting. Progress in all course objectives was modest but steady. In future study particular attention should be given to pronunciation and structure.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: LAWRENCE C. [illegible] — Chief Instructor — 11 Jun 63 — Date

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

29 OCT 1962
Seen by Employee

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 019477

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Tarasoff Boris D.	2 Nov 1908	M	GS-11	OD

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
IO (Foreign Doc)	CO/FDD/USSR Branch	Hq.

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT			10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT		
	CAREER		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	RESERVE		ANNUAL	X	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	TEMPORARY		SPECIAL (Specify):		
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
21 October 1962	1 Oct 61 - 20 Sept 1962

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak — Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate — Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient — Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong — Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding — Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Reads Russian-language newspapers, periodicals and books to find information of intelligence value on Soviet heavy and construction machinery industries	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Evaluates materials found in published sources for processing through internal reports or through contract translations	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Extracts and translates items for internal reports	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Compiles Quarterly Scheduled report, Commodity Output of USSR Union Republics	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Scans Russian-language newspapers, periodicals, and books and selects items of interest to the entire Industry and Materials Section of USSR Branch, FDD	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

24 Jy '62

During his rating period, as during his entire tour of duty in FDD, Mr. Tarasoff has demonstrated himself to be a mature highly-capable intelligence officer. His professional ability and personality contributed greatly to the smooth operation of his section.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE: 20 Sept 1962	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: Boris D. Tarasoff	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 1 yr, 10 mos.	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE: ~~24~~ 19 ~~19~~ Sept 1962	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Chief, Industry and Materials Section, USSR Branch	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: EDWIN R. STRAKNA
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I agree with this rating. Mr. Tarasoff has common sense and intelligence sense. He appreciates the significance of information, for intelligence purposes, both in the fields for which he is responsible and in other fields as well.

His ability to scan rapidly a great volume of Russian-language material, and extract or note items of value, will be sorely missed.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
24 ~~19~~ Sept 1962	Chief, USSR Branch	TALBOT BIELEFELDT

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 19477

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE
Tarasoff, Boris D.	2 November 1908	M	GS-11

5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT
OD	IO (Foreign Doc.)	OO/FDD/USSR Branch

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

	NOT ELIGIBLE		MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	11. REPORTING PERIOD (From- To)	SPECIAL (Specify)
31 Oct 1961	1 Oct 60-31 Sep 61	

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
NO. 1 Reads Soviet newspapers, journals, and books for information on Soviet heavy machine building, industrial organizations, on subjects covered by other section members.	7	NO. 4 Compiles quarterly scheduled report Commodity Output of USSR Union Republics	5
NO. 2 Judges value of information in Soviet publications, and selects such information for publication in scheduled reports or for contract translation.	6	NO. 5 Performs special assignments for other CIA components, such as interpreting from tapes and writing reverse translations.	6
NO. 3 Writes and compiles articles for scheduled reports.	5	NO. 6	

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 6

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — **NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE**

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Serious-minded, hard-working, well-informed. Has profound knowledge of the USSR, its people, and its institutions. Innately an intelligence officer, he has the ability to discern news of intelligence value where others see nothing. Maintains an image of the world, the USSR, the US and the CIA in his mind, and seldom makes incorrect prediction or estimate regarding World or Soviet affairs.

His intellectual maturity of the Russian language makes him adaptable to a large variety of assignments. Is characterised by resolutnes, steadfastness, and ability to resist pressure or propaganda.

His work in the section has been excellent throughout, and he covers subject fields equivalent to the work of 3 people in 1955. He works very well as part of a team.

His qualifications are an asset both for work in FDD and for assignments involving personal contacts and utilizing spoken Russian.

SECTION F — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
25 October 1961	

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
9	Is at present on detached duty. Will be dhown copy on his return.

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

[ ] EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS	[ ] REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
[ ] OTHER (Specify):	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
25 October 1961	Chief, Industry & Materials Section	Edwin R. Strakna

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

X	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
	I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

This supervisor tends to rate a little high in his over-all evaluations; Mr. Tarasoff's performance is not*outstanding in every respect; however, he is a superior employee, and has an unusual amount of native common sense and intelligence insight.

*literally

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
25 October 1961	Chief, USSR Branch	Talbot Bielefeldt

SECRET

14-00000

31 OCT 1960

Seen by OD/CSB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 19477

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE
Tarasoff	Boris	D.	2 Nov 1908	M	CS-11

5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT
CD	IO (For. Doc)	CO/FDD/USSR Branch

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

NOT ELIGIBLE	X MEMBER	DEFERRED	
PENDING	DECLINED	DENIED	

9. TYPE OF REPORT

INITIAL	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify)	

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 Oct 60

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To: 1 Oct 59–30 Sep 60

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
NO. 1: Scans Soviet documents for information on a wide range of industrial subjects for use in his own and others' reports	6	NO. 4	
NO. 2: Writes intelligence information reports on chemical, metallurgical, construction, and power machinery	5	NO. 5	
NO. 3: Handles special projects, oral and written, as required	5	NO. 6	

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE					X		
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS					X		
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

His native Russian language facility is of tremendous assistance to the section and the agency. His rapid scanning of Soviet documents for his own projects turns up valuable bits of information on other subjects, which he is always careful to refer to the proper persons. He is always ready to assist with language problems and if he doesn't know the answer he exhausts all possible means to find it. He is called on for special branch or division projects involving reverse translations, and he has held a number of TDY assignments requiring spoken Russian. The morsels of intelligence gleaned for his own reports from the masses of material which he scans are briefly and tersely stated. Is a systematic worker, keeps good files, and avoids duplication. Plans and organizes his activities carefully so that he always manages to complete a project well ahead of the target date. Has constant informal contact with all his consumers and goes to any length to give them what they want, provided that their request is reasonable and justifiable. If they ask for something which he knows is of no value or which has been duplicated elsewhere, he has no difficulty in persuading them to cancel the requirement, since they have learned that they can trust his work and his genuine desire to help. It is not hard to discern that he sometimes gets bored with the monotony of his work, but an occasional tour of TDY is generally sufficient to revive his enthusiasm for another year at his desk. Has an uneven temperament, sometimes gloomy and sometimes bantering, but only rarely does this affect his working relationships.

NOV 3 9 04 AM '60 MAIL ROOM

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
52	Employee on TDY

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

- EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
- REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
- OTHER (Specify):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
25 Oct 60	Chief, Materials and Industry Section, USSR Branch	Rosamund E. Deutsch

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

- X I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
- I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
- I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
- I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
28 October 1960	Chief, USSR Branch	Talbot Bielefeldt

SECRET

3 NOV 1959 Seen by OD/CSR

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 19,477

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE
Tarasoff, Boris D.	2 Nov 1908	M	GS-10

5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT
OD	IO (Foreign Documents)	OO/FDD/USSR Branch

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

	NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify)			

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	11. REPORTING PERIOD From To
31 Oct 1959	20 Nov 58–30 Sep 59

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
NO. 1: Scans Soviet documents for intelligence information on a wide range of industrial subjects	6	NO. 4:	
NO. 2: Writes reports based on the above material	4	NO. 5:	
NO. 3: Does special scanning, translation, and research jobs as required	5	NO. 6:	

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES					X		
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE					X		
WRITES EFFECTIVELY				X			
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

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SECRET

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions. Shows skill and good judgment in extracting data on a wide range of technical subjects from Soviet documents, which he scans with great rapidity. His written reports based on this material present good intelligence information; however, they suffer slightly from small inaccuracies in syntax and grammar, and there are occasional passages where the meaning is vague or the logical connection between facts has not been made clear. This type of passage may be further complicated by his lack of native familiarity with the precise English idiom and his tendency sometimes to use the wrong connective. However, any such failings in the use of English are entirely offset by his superior knowledge of Russian. His promptness in submitting reports and in completing other assignments is exceptional. Maintains close relations with consumers and goes out of his way to fill all their requirements to the letter. His greatest asset to the section, branch, and division is his native Russian fluency and his knowledge of the USSR. He not only serves as consultant and authority on ~~XX~~ the Russian language for the section and branch, but takes on extra jobs as translator or interpreter as required by the division or the agency. His natural intelligence has enabled him to do on-the-spot or rush jobs in fields in which he has had no background. He continues to learn and to retain his knowledge. During a period when his well-deserved promotion was blocked because of thelack of a slot, a situation which was unfortunate but the fault of no one in his office, he became a bit rebellious and reluctant to take on extra duties which he otherwise would have accepted. He feels, and rightly so, that he is capable of more challenging and perhaps more interesting assignments which require the use of spoken Russian. Every opportunity has been given him to find such a permanent assignment, and he has just been on extended TDY involving such activities.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
29 Oct 1959	Serge D. Tarasoff

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
3 yrs, 4 mo	

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS	REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
OTHER (Specify)	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
28 Oct 1959	Chief, Industry and Materials ~~XXXXX~~ Section, USSR Branch	Rosamund E. Deutsch Rosamund E. Deutsch

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

X	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
	I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
29 October 1959	Chief, USSR Branch	T. Bielefeldt TALBOT BIELEFELDT

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8. of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
TARASOFF, Boris D.	2 November 1908	M	CD

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
CC/FDD/USSR Branch	IO (Foreign Doc)

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-09	11 December 1958	21 November 1957 - 20 November 1958

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): [ ] INITIAL [X] ANNUAL [ ] REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [ ] REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [ ] SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT [X] HAS [ ] HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED; IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
20 Nov 58	Rosamund E. Deutsch [signature]	Chief, Materials & Industry Sec, USSR Br.

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

DATE
11-26-58
Posted
12/1/58

[ ] CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
29 Nov 1958	Talbot Bielefeldt [signature]	Chief, USSR Branch

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: **5**

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the most important SPECIFIC duties performed during the rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE	CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
GIVING LECTURES	DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS	PREPARES SUMMARIES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS	TRANSLATES GERMAN
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	MANAGES FILES	DEBRIEFING SOURCES
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	OPERATES RADIO	KEEPS BOOKS
TYPING	COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES	DRIVES TRUCK
TAKING DICTATION	WRITES REGULATIONS	MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
SUPERVISING	PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE	EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NUMBER
NO. 1: Scans Soviet documents for intelligence material on a wide range of technical fields	5	NO. 4: Maintains technical files	5
NO. 2: Writes technical reports	4	NO. 5:	
NO. 3: Serves as language consultant	5	NO. 6:	

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job. Works hard. Reads Russian rapidly and looks out for material of interest to others as he scans. Is adaptable and flexible and handles several different technical fields with equal facility. Can tackle almost any subject without previous experience and turn out a good job. His native knowledge of Russian is of considerable benefit to the whole section. Selects the salient points from masses of useless or repetitive material with intelligent judgment, and compiles reports which are pointed and concise. His only deficiency of any consequence is the slight awkwardness and occasional lack of clarity in his written English style. His English has improved considerably during the past two years, but sometimes the failure to use the most precise term or the right connective complicates for the reader a conception which is perfectly clear to the writer.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

Not necessarily better suited, but a position requiring the use of native Russian speaking ability would also be suitable.

SECRET

SECRET

(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
TARASOFF Boris D.	2 November 1908	M	OD

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
OO/FDD/USSR Branch	IO (Foreign Doc)

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-09	11 December 1958	21 November 1957 - 20 November 1958

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): [ ] INITIAL [X] ANNUAL [ ] REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [ ] REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [ ] SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
20 Nov 58	Rosamund E. Deutsch *Rosamund E. Deutsch*	Sec. USSR Br. Chief, Materials & Industry

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
20 Nov 1958	Talbot Bielefeldt *T. Bielefeldt*	Chief, USSR Branch

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: **6**

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? [X] Yes [ ] No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER:
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION.

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
	2	A. GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	0	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	0	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	0	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

28

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL Should have been promoted months ago, but has been prevented by lack of a slot. His inherent intelligence should enable him to learn rapidly any new fields, processes, or policies required. He is patient in dealing with people, and goes out of his way to help those who come to him for assistance. He has the ability to carry responsibility without worrying about it.

MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. **FUTURE PLANS**

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

He is anxious to have a tour of duty overseas, and since he has not been able to advance in his present job because of conditions beyond his control, his efforts to find such a position have not been discouraged.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

After a single tour of overseas duty, which he will not accept unless his wife can accompany him without losing her CIA status, he would like to settle down permanently in the U.S.

SECTION I. **DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL**

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
- X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
- 1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
- 2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
- 3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
- 4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
- 5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	3	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	3	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
3	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	3	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
3	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
3	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
3	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	3	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	3	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
3	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	3	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
3	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	4	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section 'A' below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
TARASOFF Boris D.	2 November 1906	M	OD

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
OO/FDD/USSR Branch	Foreign Documents Officer

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-9	11 December 1957	21 November 1956 - 20 November 1957

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): INITIAL [ ] ANNUAL [X] REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [ ] REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [ ] SPECIAL (Specify) [ ]

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT [ ] HAS [ ] HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

- [X] THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
- [ ] THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
- [X] I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
- [ ] IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1, OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
- [ ] I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
13 Nov 57	Rosamund E. Deutsch *Rosamund E. Deutsch*	Chief, Industrial Sec USSR Branch

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control	*Ju*	[illegible] NOV
Reviewed by [illegible]	*[illegible]*	11/19/57

[ ] CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
15 Nov 1957	Taffiet Bielefeldt *T. Bielefeldt*	Chief, USSR Branch

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: **5**

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) 1 NOV 55 — REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

Performance (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE	CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
GIVING LECTURES	DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS	PREPARES SUMMARIES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS	TRANSLATES GERMAN
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	MANAGES FILES	DEBRIEFING SOURCES
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	OPERATES RADIO	KEEPS BOOKS
TYPING	COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES	DRIVES TRUCK
TAKING DICTATION	WRITES REGULATIONS	MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
SUPERVISING	PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE	EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL NOV 13 12 10 PM '57 MAIL ROOM

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NUMBER
NO. 1 Analyzes Soviet documents and selects intelligence information	5	NO. 4	
NO. 2 Compiles intelligence reports	4	NO. 5	
NO. 3 Serves as consultant on linguistic matters	5	NO. 6	

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present jo

Minor difficulties with English usage do not prevent him from turning out reports which are concise and to the point. Ideas are in general clearly formulated, although there are occasional instances of inexactness of expression. Because of his native facility in the Russian language, on the other hand, he is frequently consulted on all levels throughout the branch on matters involving interpretation of the foreign text. He is not an eager beaver, and because of his language fluency can accomplish as much as others in less time and with less effort. Probably works at full capacity only under pressure, and for this reason some of his best contributions have been on special projects with target dates, several of which have covered material outside his field of responsibility. His disposition is generally patient, stable, and unruffled.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? [X] YES [ ] NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY

Although present performance is entirely satisfactory, he is not in a position here to utilize fully his Russian language speaking facility.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

GENERAL

SECTION E.

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
TARASOFF Boris D.	2 November 1908	M	OD
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: OO/FDD/USSR Branch	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Foreign Documents Officer		
7. GRADE: GS-9	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 11 December 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 21 November 1956 - 20 November 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): INITIAL [ ] ANNUAL [X] REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [ ] REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [ ] SPECIAL (Specify)

CERTIFICATION

SECTION F.

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
13 Nov 57	Rosamund E. Deutsch [signature]	Chief, Industrial Sec USSR Branch

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
15 Nov 57	Albert Bielefeldt [signature]	Chief, USSR Branch

ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

SECTION G.

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? [X] Yes [ ] No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing his supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
	2	A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	2	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	0	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PROGRAMS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	0	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND REQUIRE SPECIALIZED SUPERVISION
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

DATE BY Posted Pos. Control 11/19/57

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

SECRET

Potential (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

16

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Because of his innate capacity I would judge that after initial adjustments, and with application, he will always be able to meet the requirements of a given situation. His day to day activities will not always give evidence of this versatility, and it may sometimes come as a surprise.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

He is now getting teaching experience by teaching one class in Basic Russian and another in Russian Conversation.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

Because of his age, he would like to have a tour of overseas service within the next two or three years, before he settles down here to a permanent assignment.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
- X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
- 1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
- 2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
- 3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
- 4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
- 5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	3	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	3	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
3	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	3	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
3	3. HAS INITIATIVE	3	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
3	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
3	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	3	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	3	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
3	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	3	18. IS OBSERVANT	3	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
3	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	1	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section A below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
TARASOFF Boris D.	2 Nov 1908	M	SD-OD

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
OO/FDD/USSR Branch	Foreign Documents Officer

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-7	11 Dec 1956	June 56 - 20 Nov 56

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): X INITIAL; ANNUAL; REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR; REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE; SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT [X] HAS ~~HAS NOT~~ BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT: ~~Supervisor temporarily in another office.~~

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER HAS BEEN SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
4 Dec 56	Rosamund E/ Deutsch [signature]	Chief, Industrial Section, USSR Branch

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

BY [initials] DATE 12-11-[illegible]

Posted Pos. Control [illegible]

Reviewed by PUD [illegible] 12/19

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
10 Dec 56	Talbot Bielefeldt [signature]	Chief, USSR Branch

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

Performance (4)

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) 1 NOV 55 — REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
DEC 11 10 12 AM '56
MAIL ROOM

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during the rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	*HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE*	*CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS*
GIVING LECTURES	*DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS*	*PREPARES SUMMARIES*
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	*ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS*	*TRANSLATES GERMAN*
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	*MANAGES FILES*	*DEBRIEFING SOURCES*
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	*OPERATES RADIO*	*KEEPS BOOKS*
TYPING	*COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES*	*DRIVES TRUCK*
TAKING DICTATION	*WRITES REGULATIONS*	*MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING*
SUPERVISING	*PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE*	*EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA*

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 extracts information from Soviet documents	4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 compiles technical intelligence reports	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 maintains files of machine models and plants	4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

I feel that Mr. T. has not yet been on the job long enough to demonstrate his maximum capacities. Although he came with no background in his specialized field, he has shown considerable facility in acquiring technical information and building up his technical vocabulary. He has a good eye for intelligence. Although he has not native English fluency, his reports are pointed, concise, and, except for occasional minor points of grammar, very well expressed indeed. Owing to his persistence and application, he was rated second highest in a class in English usage. Soon after his EOD, the analyst whom Mr. T. was assisting was transferred, leaving him with full responsibility for covering a field which was still very new to him. He has done an exceedingly good job under the most unpropitious circumstances. He needs to develop fuller utilization of varied research methods, but this will be easier as he becomes more familiar with the materials and problems with which he has to deal. His native Russian fluency is a decided asset. He is calm, cooperative, and easy to work with.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY....WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? [X] YES [ ] NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

His native Russian fluency might be better utilized in some other type of position, although his performance on his present job is entirely satisfactory.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
TARASOFF	Boris	D.	2 Nov 1908	M	SD-OD

5. OFFICE DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
OO/FDD/USSR Branch	Foreign Documents Officer

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-7	11 Dec 1956	June 1956 - 20 Nov 56

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): [X] INITIAL [ ] ANNUAL [ ] REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [ ] REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [ ] SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
4 Dec 56	Rosamund E. Deutsch [signature]	Chief, Industrial Section, USSR Branch

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
10 Dec 1956	Talbot Bielefeldt [signature]	Chief, USSR Branch

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: **3**

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? [ ] Yes [ ] No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER:
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
	0	A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	0	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	0	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	0	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	0	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	0	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
	0	OTHER (Specify) For the reasons stated on the Performance Report, I feel it is not possible to make a fair estimate of his supervisory potential at this time.

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

Potential (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

4 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

I feel ~~xx~~ very definitely that Mr. Tarasoff's overall potentials are greater than he has had an opportunity to show thus far. This will doubtless be reflected in his next evaluation.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
DEC 10 12 AM '56
MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Since Mr. T. has been on duty such a short time, present plans are simply to give him further training in his present job and to allow him to develop to his maximum capacity there. He will soon be enrolled in the I.O.C.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

His native Russian fluency should be taken into account.

REVIEWING OFFICIAL'S COMMENTS: I do not think he so nearly average in all respects as indicated in Sec. I, below. I do not know him well enough to disagree with most of the ratings, but I would rate him "4" on items 7, 15 and 29, at least. Quiet, unobtrusive, modest, cooperative. Have seen few indications of initiative, but such not to be expected while he is learning a new job; no reason to assume incapable of initiative. T.Bielefeldt

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

- X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
- 1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
- 2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
- 3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
- 4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
- 5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	3	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	3	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
3	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	3	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
3	3. HAS INITIATIVE	3	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
3	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	3	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
3	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	3	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	3	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
3	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	3	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	3	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	3	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	3	27. IS VERSATILE
3	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	3	18. IS OBSERVANT	3	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
3	9. GETS THINGS DONE	3	19. THINKS CLEARLY	3	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
3	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	3	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THROUGH : CSPS
CCS/NOC
Office of Security
CI Staff

SUBJECT : Summary of Agency Employment -
Mr. Boris D. Tarasoff. [illegible]

1. Mr. Boris D. Tarasoff, a Translator/Transcriber with the Agency since February 1956, will retire effective 30 November 1970. Your approval is requested for him to use the attached employment history.

2. For your information, we have been advised by the Mexico City Station that once Mr. Tarasoff has retired to Guadalajara, Mexico, except for establishing new social relationships, he will probably not be asked to go into any detail about his past cover jobs that would require anyone to call upon these firms for backstopping confirmation. In the event he should become involved in any post-retirement activities that might require checking into his past, Mr. Tarasoff will contact Headquarters for instructions.

Richard B. Wright
Chief, WH Support

Attachment:
Employment Resume

SECRET

SUBJECT: Summary of Agency Employment - Mr. Boris D. Tarasoff, [redacted]

CONCUR:

C/CSPS — Date: 4 Nov 70

C/CCS — Date: 6 Nov 70

Director of Security — Date: 10 Nov 70

for C/CI Staff — Date: 18 Nov 70

1956-1959: I worked for various establishments in Washington, D.C., as a translator from Russian into English, such as the Library of Congress, and various other translating firms, which abound in Washington, with a salary varying in accordance with the output of translated material, from $500.00 to 1,000.00 per month.

1959-1963: I was employed by USJPRS Bureau of Standards, Dept of Commerce Wash, D.C. ~~I joined~~ ~~USJPRS on Western Avenue in Washington, D.C., which is a company under contract to the Dept. of State, the Dept. of Defense and on occasion to the Dept. of the Interior (fish hatcheries division)~~. I worked as an analyst and translator, at home most of the time, translating and analyzing articles from newspapers and technical magazines. I was paid $8.00 for 1,000 words for ordinary material, $10.00 for technical and $12.00 for scientific subjects. Also, I was ~~hired~~ hired by the Dept. of State to be an interpreter for two Soviet delegations at $25.00 per diem plus expenses. I spent five weeks with each of them.

1963-1970: After leaving USJPRS I came to Mexico with my wife and children to avoid the weather extremes of the USA XXXXXXX and to look into possibilities of profitable investments that could aid me financially after my retirement. My income during this period came from annuities and the moneys lent to my brother-in-law in Cleveland, Ohio, who is a successful real estate man and the owner of an amusement machines business (Cadillac Music Co.) in which I had invested some money previously. ~~I was also connected by mail with a Linguistics Studies firm, Room 212, 419 Boylston St., Boston 16, Mass. Frequently some of my friends from USJPRS would send me some special articles for translation. I would charge the above organizations in accordance with the time spent in translating. This amounted to roughly $10,000.00 a year.~~

H MHT-10577

1956-1959: I worked for various establishments in Washington, D.C., as a translator from Russian into English, such as the Library of Congress, and various other translating firms, which abound in Washington, with a salary varying in accordance with the output of translated material, from $500.00 to 1,000.00 per month.

1959-1963: I was employed by USJPRS Bureau of Standards, Dept. of Commerce, Washington, D.C. I worked as an analyst and translator, at home most of the time, translating and analyzing articles from newspapers and technical magazines. I was paid $8.00 for 1,000 words for ordinary material, $10.00 for technical and $12.00 for the scientific subjects. Also, I was utilized by the Dept. of State to be an interpreter for two Soviet delegations at $25.00 per diem plus expenses. I spent five weeks with each of them.

1963-1970: After leaving USJPRS I came to Mexico with my wife and children to avoid the weather extremes of the USA and to look into possibilities of profitable investments that could aid me financially after my retirement. My income during this period came from annuities and the moneys lent to my brother-in-law in Cleveland, Ohio, who is a successful real estate man and the owner of an amusement machines business (Cadillac Music Co.) in which I had invested some money previously.

14-00000

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:
- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle): [illegible]
DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year): 1908
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER:
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY: [illegible]
LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code):

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☐ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE
I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☒ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE
I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE
I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print): X [redacted]

DATE: 14 February 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY
(official receiving date stamp)

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1968
(For use only until April 14, 1968)
176-101

3 JUN 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]

SUBJECT : Retirement Planning

1. The established policy of the Agency favors early retirement of its employees who, as you know, are normally expected to retire when they become eligible for a full annuity. The prospect of retirement deserves serious thought and planning, and you should therefore know that you will be eligible for retirement, according to our records, during **November, 1970.**

2. Planning ahead can bring about, with each passing year, definite progress toward your retirement goals. The Agency is anxious to assist you in planning for your retirement. It is even more important, as an employee, that you begin now to plan for this occasion.

3. You deserve to know as much as possible about the general subject of retirement and more specifically about the retirement policy itself, your annuity, life and health insurance protection, opportunities for other employment, Social Security benefits, and educational materials available on the subject. The Agency feels that this type of information and advisory service should be made available to you at least five years prior to the date of your eligibility.

4. You are requested to call the Executive Secretary of the Board, Mr. Howard G. Phillips, on extension 6872 to arrange an appropriate time to discuss any plans you may have and benefits available to you upon retirement.

/s/ Howard G. Phillips

Lawrence R. Houston
Chairman
Agency Retirement Board

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if S4)	DATE (from item S-1)	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true)	DATE (from item S-2)
[illegible]	15 Oct '64	Herbert Manell	22 Oct 1964
DATE RECEIVED [illegible]	DISPATCH NUMBER:	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE:	
[illegible]	HMMT-4961		

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH	2. SERVICE DESIGN	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE	4. STATION OR BASE	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER
1908	D	Intell Officer GS-11	Mexico D.F. Mexico	

6a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD	6b. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE	6c. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ	6d. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE
5 June 1963	5-6 Dec. 1965	13 Dec 1965	15 Jan. 1966

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

Wife - 43
Son - 17

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

There are no health or other personal circumstances perventing a return to post or assignment to another foreign post. However two factors, of operational and personal nature, should be considered: Subject and family have already initiated and are in the process of completing the relatively complicated procedure of legalizing their continued residency in Mexico as "rentistas" (retired persons). Secondly, Subject's son's secondary school education is being completed in Mexico. Transfer to another foreign post could negatively affect the completion of his secondary schooling.

9. [illegible]
(also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8)

1. Translation and transcription of Soviet technical product.

2. Preparation of characterization and assessment studies on the local Soviet complement.

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

If returned to post for a second tour, continuation of Spanish language instruction.

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

11A. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

N.A.

11B. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 (*for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice*) IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

[2] EXTEND TOUR 18 MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO ~~30 November 1966~~ (DATE)

[ ] BE ASSIGNED TO HDQTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY: INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE. 1ST CHOICE ______ 2ND CHOICE ______ 3RD CHOICE ______

[3] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION: INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION 1ST CHOICE Spain 2ND CHOICE Uruguay 3RD CHOICE Buenos Aires

[1] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION (Please note that planned departure is Dec 65, due to factor that son finishes his school year on 30 Nov 65.)

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

The Station recommends and urges that Headquarters approve Subject's return to Station. His performance meets every Station requirement. For Subject's work, continuity is essential to obtain maximum effective product.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

WH Division recommends that FEINGLASS' tour of duty in Mexico City be extended until December 1965 as requested in section 6 B, and that he return for a second tour of duty following home leave.

DATE ______ TITLE C/WH/PERS SIGNATURE ROBERT D. CASHMAN

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:

Approved extension to end of 1965 followed by home leave and second tour.

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. HMMS-3905 DATED: 22 Dec 1964

CABLE NO. ______ DATED: ______

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: Dwight M. Collins (SIGNATURE) DATE: 22 Dec 1964

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : C. Bustos
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 17 Feb 64

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

17 FEB 64 20 04z

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH-8
INFO : CCS-3, OP-2, CI/OA, VR

SIG CEN

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 01920

REF: MEXI 8219 (IN 19281)*

HDQS HAS POLICE STATEMENT OF GOOD CONDUCT FOR [redacted] HAS NOTARIZED STATEMENT FROM BANK ATTESTING ANNUAL DEPOSITS $5,500. SINCE BANK WOULD NOT INCLUDE IN LETTER MORE THAN ACTUAL DEPOSITS, HDQS OBTAINED NOTARIZED LETTER FROM COVER DIVISION NOTIONAL FIRM STATING FEINGLASS HAS YEARLY INCOME $6,000 FROM VARIOUS INVESTMENT SOURCES HANDLED BY THEM. HDQS PLANNING MAIL THESE THREE DOCS TO MEXI CONSULATE ASKING THEM AUTHENTICATE DOCUMENTS AND MAIL TO PO BOX WASHINGTON WHICH USED BY DYVOUR. UPON RECEIPT HDQS WILL POUCH MEXI.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH Comment: Requested what action Hdqs taking to get bank statement for FEINGLASS to facilitate his processing a rentista petition.

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

CCG/NC Baladeau (by phone)
WH/PERS ~~Baladeau~~ RENEHAN (by phone)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

Copy No.

14-00000

[illegible] 1 5 JUN 1963

Mr. [redacted]

Dear Mr. [redacted]

[illegible] have been [illegible] to you while [illegible] and obligations [illegible]

2. [illegible] Staff Agent Personnel [illegible] $8575.00 [illegible] GS 11[3] [illegible], allowances and [illegible] procedural variations [illegible]

(a) [illegible] your cover [illegible] the gross [illegible] from this organization [illegible] except as [illegible] you as a Staff Agent [illegible] is to be remitted [illegible] period [illegible] specified.

(b) Your Federal income taxes will be withheld and reported in conformance with HR 20 [illegible] or any subsequent regulations or procedures promulgated by [illegible]. For your information [illegible] payments due you Federal income taxes [illegible] when added to the income tax withholdings [illegible] normally made from [illegible] in connection with this organization [illegible] you will be [illegible] to make [illegible] with HR 20 [illegible] procedures to be followed [illegible] taxes imposed upon you.

(c) This organization [illegible] you an amount equal [illegible] your gross salary [illegible] Fund. This amount will be [illegible] this organization [illegible] you will be [illegible] satisfactory [illegible]

(d) [illegible] gross [illegible] allowance will [illegible]

[illegible] position [illegible] Security [illegible] such contributions for [illegible] and retirement may be considered [illegible]

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such case a [illegible] you receive as a result of your participation in such program [illegible] be returned to this organization. Whether participation in a particular cover facility program is involuntary will be determined by this organization.

2. Nonofficial Cover Premium Pay. You are hereby authorized Nonofficial Cover Premium Pay in conformance with applicable organizational issuances. For your information currently this premium pay is ten per cent of your base salary [illegible] additional taxable compensation to [illegible] payable for that period of time you are assigned under [illegible]

3. [illegible] You are hereby authorized an equalization [illegible] applicable organizational issuances.

4. [illegible] You [illegible] entitled to travel, transportation [illegible] with the regulations of this organization [illegible] personnel will be [illegible] cover organizations [illegible]

5. [illegible] You hereby agree that your assignment abroad will be for a minimum of two years from the date of your arrival at your permanent post of duty unless such assignment shall be sooner terminated by the Government for its convenience. Your violation of such agreement may result in regulatory travel penalties. HR 22-6 provides that if the agreement is violated during the first year of duty abroad, expenditures for travel and transportation to the post, including per diem while at headquarters and storage of effects, shall be reimbursed by the employee. If the agreement is violated after the first year of duty, but before the completion of the minimum tour agreed to above, return travel at Government expense shall not be allowed.

AGREED [redacted]

6. Security. You will be required to keep forever secret this Supplement and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Ross H. [signature]

Personnel Officer

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

CASE OFFICER: [illegible] | DIVISION: [illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS: See [illegible] for guidance. Complete all items, inserting "N" when items are not applicable. Forward original and TWO copies for preparation of contract.

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: [illegible] | DATE: [illegible] 1963

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME [X] PSEUDO [ ] TRUE — [illegible]
2A. PROJECT:
2B. PERMANENT STATION: Mexico City, Mexico
3. ALLOTMENT NO.: 3135-5700-1000
3A. FUNDS: [ ] V [X] UV
4. SLOT NO.:
5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES: None
6. INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY PRIOR TO THIS CONTRACT. [X] YES [ ] NO (If yes, describe and include dates and salary.) Staff employee 20 Feb 1956 - Present GS-11
7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date): Staff
7A. MEDICAL CLEARANCE: [X] OBTAINED [ ] INITIATED [ ] NOT REQ'D
8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" [X] YES [ ] NO
9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT [X] YES [ ] NO
10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): Staff Agent

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: [illegible]
12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN [ ] YES [ ] NO
13. AGE: [illegible]
14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): [illegible]
15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Washington, D.C.
16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): 5109 [illegible] St., N.W. Wash., D.C.
17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate): [ ] SINGLE [X] MARRIED [ ] WIDOWED [ ] ANNULLED [ ] SEPARATED [ ] DIVORCED
18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:
Wife, 40
Son, 14
Dau, 17
19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY [X] YES [ ] NO
RELATIONSHIP:
Brother
Wife

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE: No
21. VETERAN: Yes
22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat): N.A.
23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: U.S. Army
24. RANK OR GRADE: Enl.
25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE [ ] YES [X] NO
26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA [ ] YES [X] NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY: GS-11 3, $8575
28. POST DIFFERENTIAL: ---
29. COVER (Breakdown, if any): ---
30. FEDERAL TAX WITHHOLDING: COVER [ ] YES [ ] NO; CIA [X] YES [ ] NO

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS w/family $3,000
32. POST: ---
33. OTHER: Allowances applicable to staff agent under non-official cover.
34. COVER (Breakdown, if any): ---

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES [X] PCS [ ] DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL [ ] FOREIGN OPERATIONAL
36. WITH DEPENDENTS [X] YES [ ] NO
37. HHE TO BE SHIPPED [X] YES [ ] NO
37A. HHE TO BE STORED [X] YES [ ] NO
38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED [ ] YES [X] NO
39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL [ ] YES [X] NO
40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH

Wife, U.S., 40, 5 May 1923
Son, U.S., 14, 20 Mar 1949
Dau, U.S., 17, 22 Dec 1945

Approved [illegible] Agent Panel
3 June 63
D. [illegible] Collins
Secretary, [illegible] Agent Panel

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH [X] CIA REGULATIONS [ ] COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION: Yes
43. ENTERTAINMENT: Yes
44. OTHER:
45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.

CASE OFFICER: [illegible] | DIVISION: [illegible]
TELEPHONE EXTENSION: [illegible] | DATE: 16 May 1963

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS (See R 20-615, R 20-620, R 20-670, R 20-1000, and HB 20-620-1, HB 20-1000-1 and/or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel.)

All benefits applicable to Staff Agent
Non-official cover premium pay.

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check): PROPOSED [ ] ESTABLISHED [X]
48. TYPE (Check): PROPRIETARY [ ] SUBSIDIZED [ ] CULTURAL [ ] EDUCATIONAL [ ] COMMERCIAL [ ] MILITARY [ ] TOURIST [X] OTHER [ ]

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS: NA [ ] YES [ ] NO [ ] COMPLETE [ ] PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.) [X] TOTAL [ ] PARTIAL [ ] NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION: Indefinite (DAYS / MONTHS / YEARS)
52. EFFECTIVE DATE: 31 May 1963
53. RENEWABLE: [X] YES [ ] NO
54. TERMINATION NOTICE (Number of days): ---
55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION: Per Agency regulation [X] YES [ ] NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION (CI, FI, PP, other): FI

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Translator - Russian, Spanish

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

20 Feb 56 - Sep 1962 - FDD/USSR Branch/ Hqs
Sep 62 - Present - Full time Spanish Language Training

59. EDUCATION (Check Highest Level Attained): [ ] GRADE SCHOOL [X] HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE [ ] TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE [ ] BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE [X] COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE [X] COLLEGE (No degree) [ ] COLLEGE DEGREE [ ] POST GRADUATE [ ] MA [ ] PhD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY (Check Appropriate Degree Competency)

LANGUAGE	SPEAK Fluent	SPEAK Average	SPEAK Poor	WRITE Fluent	WRITE Average	WRITE Poor	READ Fluent	READ Average	READ Poor
Russian	X			X			X		
Spanish		X			X			X	

All Slavic languages intermediate on Agency exams

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: Russia

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

USSR, Turkey, All Western Europe in war, 6 mos Mexico

SECTION XV — EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CIA

63. GIVE INCLUSIVE DATES, POSITION TITLE OR TYPE WORK, SALARY AND REASON FOR LEAVING.

See staff employee official file

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (Use other side if necessary)

[ ] OVER

APPROVAL

TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE

STANDARD FORM 144
JANUARY 1952
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL AND MILITARY SERVICE

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used in determining creditable service for *leave purposes* and retention credits for *reduction in force*. The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through IV.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*): Tarasoff, Boris Dimitri

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 2 Nov. 1908

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENTS (*Do not include military service.*)

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TO— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
CIA	56	02	20				

4. LIST PERIODS OF SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TO— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	DISCHARGE (*Hon. or dishon.?*)
U.S. Army	1941	2	3	1945	Oct	20	Honorable

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☑ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (*LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar*)	FROM— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TO— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TOTAL YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS? ☐ YES ☐ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

7. ARE YOU:
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.

I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

20 Feb. 1956 (DATE) — Boris D. Tarasoff (SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 20th day of Feb. (MONTH) 1956 at Washington, D. C. (CITY) (STATE)

SEAL — [signature]

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. CSC STATUS (*For permanent employees only*) ☐ YES ☐ NO

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY

12. TOTAL SERVICE: 4 yrs. 8 mos. 18 days

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*):

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

(OVER)

PART III.—DETERMINING CREDITABLE SERVICE AND SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE FOR LEAVE PURPOSES

	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS
TOTAL SERVICE (*Item 13*)			
NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Item 13*)			
CREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes*)			

ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE (*Present agency*)	56	02	20
LESS CREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes*)	4	05	18
SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE (*Leave purposes*)	51	04	02

verified 4/19/57

PART IV.—DETERMINING CREDITABLE SERVICE AND SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE FOR REDUCTION IN FORCE PURPOSES

(To be completed only in those cases when the amount of creditable service for reduction in force purposes differs from the amount creditable for leave purposes)

	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS
TOTAL SERVICE (*Item 13*)			
NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Item 14*)			
CREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes*)			

ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE (*Present agency*)			
LESS CREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes*)			
SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE (*RIF purposes*) (*Enter as the "service computation date" on the employee's "Service Record Card," SF-7*)			

REMARKS:

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—66459-1

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Complete in duplicate. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. The original of this form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
TARASOFF	BORIS	DIMITRI	079-05-9624

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY APPOINTED	LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad)
5109 - 45 St. N.W., Wash D.C.	5109 - 45 St. N.W., Wash. D.C.
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE as above	**HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE** as above

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

SINGLE	MARRIED	SEPARATED	DIVORCED	WIDOWED	ANNULLED
	✓				

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE: Cleveland, Ohio	DATE OF MARRIAGE
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE: na	DATE OF DECREE
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED: na	DATE SPOUSE DIED

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S): na

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	TELEPHONE NO.	
Anna	5109 - 45 St., N.W. Wash D.C.	363-1944	
NAMES OF CHILDREN	**ADDRESS**	**SEX**	**DATE OF BIRTH**
Barbara	as above	f	22 Dec 45
Raymond		m	20 Mar 49
NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian)	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NO.**	
TARASOFF, DIMITRI	deceased		
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian)	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NO.**	
TARASOFF, ROMANA	deceased		

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY. Mrs. C.C. CORNELLA

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle)	RELATIONSHIP
CORNELLA, HENRY Mrs	SISTER-IN-LAW
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) 31599 GATESMILLS BLVD, PEPPERPIKE, OHIO	**HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER**
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE	**BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION**

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.)	YES	X
	NO	
IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.)	YES	X
	NO	
DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.)	YES	X
	NO	

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. If such notification is not desirable because of health or other reasons, please so state in item 6 on the reverse side of this form.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 4-60 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

Union Trust Company District of Columbia

Boris D. + Anna Tarasoff

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? [X] YES [ ] NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

in our own possession

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?
[X] YES [ ] NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

[illegible] 3677 [illegible] Blvd. [illegible], Ohio

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? [ ] YES [X] NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
Washington D.C.	29 May 1963	Boris D. Tarasoff

CONFIDENTIAL

CERTIFICATE OF ATTENDANCE

I certify that on MAR 15 1956 (DATE) I have attended the Induction Course specified by Regulation 25-110.

BORIS DIMITRI TARASOFF
(NAME) - Please print

☐ CLERICAL ☐ STENOGRAPHIC ☑ OTHER

OFFICE DDP / FI

GS- 7 (Grade)

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED AUGUST 1950)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY — Washington, D. C.
(Department or agency) (Bureau or division) (Place of employment)

I, Boris Dimitri Tarasoff, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

20 Feb. 1956 — [signature]
(Date of entrance on duty) (Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 20th day of Feb., A. D. 1956;

at Washington, D. C.
(City) (State)

[SEAL] [signature]
(Signature of officer)

Appointment Clerk
(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

14-00000

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (*street and number, city and State*): WESLEY HALL 4?26 21st STR. N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C.

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH: NOV. 2 1905 | (B) PLACE OF BIRTH (*city or town and State or country*): EKATERINOSLAV RUSSIA

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY: ANNA TARASOFF | (B) RELATIONSHIP: WIFE | (C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE: 16315 BEVIL WAY, SAYLER?, CALIF. | (D) TELEPHONE NO.: BR 6-0172

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (*Give street number, if any*)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*		X
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date and reason in each case.*		X
9. HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED (NOT INCLUDING TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH YOU WERE FINED $25 OR LESS, OR FORFEITED COLLATERAL OF $25 OR LESS) SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY
	HAVE YOU RECEIVED [illegible] A LUMP-SUM [illegible] OR [illegible] U.S. GOVERNMENT [illegible]?
	☐ YES ☐ NO
	HAS LEAVE [illegible] EXPIRED?
	☐ YES ☐ NO

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee*.—It is the duty of the appointing officer to guard against impersonation and to determine beyond reasonable doubt that the appointee is the same person whose appointment was authorized. The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and other pertinent papers. If the appointee qualified in a written examination, the signature on this form should be compared with the signature on the declaration sheet, which was signed in the examination room. His physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age*.—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship*.—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family*.—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members of family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

14-00000

019477	[illegible]	GS -12	D	MH	AA0810500310
EMP#	NAME	SCHD-GR	SD	ORG	AA-ITEM

AE0100014936 AB0020200023 EC004ZUZI845 VF061ZUXXX45
EC00G99HRK45 VJ06G99HBK45 VR00G99HAF23 TA04G99HAU26
TC00G99HAK54 FM004SAUXA56 PH206SYXJK51 FL005SYKAA40
BK5070000467 BQ2110111459 BQ2740504457 BQ301 60
BQ361 59 BQ5111111459 BQ5455555357 BC5733433257
BQ6033433257 ZYPI69690000 ZM5 XXXXXX69

"Retired Nov 1979"
"Not Recalled for Retirement"

S-E-C-R-E-T

FEB

SECRET

119477

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT Return to QAB 1A04 Curie

THIS DATE 1957

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there have been changes since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

DATE 25 OCT 1957

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. FULL NAME (*Last-First-Middle*): TARASOFF, BORIS DIMITRI

2. CURRENT ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, Zone, State*): 2819 - Gainsville Str. S.E. Washington, D.C.

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, Zone, State*): 2819 - Gainsville Str. S.E. Washington, D.C.

4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: LUdlow 4-1380

5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE: Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

SECTION II — PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (*Last-First-Middle*) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.: Tarasoff, Anna

2. RELATIONSHIP: wife

3. HOME ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country*): 2819 - Gainsville Str. Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country*). INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: 2430 - E Street, Washington, D.C.

5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: LUdlow 4-1380

6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER: EXecutive 3 - 6115

7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 8491

8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (*Spouse, Mother, Father*) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK (X) ONE: SINGLE [ ] MARRIED [X] WIDOWED [ ] SEPARATED [ ] DIVORCED [ ] ANNULLED [ ]

2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

WIFE OR HUSBAND: If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.

3. NAME (*First*) Anna (*Middle*) (*Maiden*) Adamoviez (*Last*) Tarasoff

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE: 10 March 1945

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (*City, State, Country*): Cleveland, Ohio

6. HIS (*or her*) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE (*No., Street, City, State, Country*): 13610 - Benwood Ave., Cleveland, Ohio, U.S.A.

7. LIVING: YES [X] NO [ ]

8. DATE OF DEATH

9. CAUSE OF DEATH

CODED FOR QUALIFICATIONS DATE 2 OCT 1957

10. CURRENT ADDRESS (*Give last address, if deceased*): 2819 - Gainsville Str., S.E., Washington, D.C.

11. DATE OF BIRTH: 5 May 1923

12. PLACE OF BIRTH (*City, State, Country*): Cleveland, Ohio, U.S.A.

13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S.-DATE OF ENTRY

14. PLACE OF ENTRY

15. CITIZENSHIP (*Country*): U.S.A.

16. DATE ACQUIRED: At birth

17. WHERE ACQUIRED (*City, State, Country*): Cleveland, Ohio, U.S.A.

18. OCCUPATION: Temporary clerical position

19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (*Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers*): CIA

20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, State, Country*): 2430 - E Street, Washington, D.C.

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From- and To-) BY MONTH AND YEAR	
~~3 Feb 1941 - 20 Oct 1945~~	
22. BRANCH OF SERVICE: ~~Army~~	23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED: ~~U.S.A.~~
24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN	

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
2	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
3	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
4	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? X YES ☐ NO

2. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

3. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
Anacostia National Bank	2844 - Alabama Ave, S.E., Washington, D.C

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? [X] YES [ ] NO

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

I had been adjudged bankrupt by the U.S. District Court of New York on 29 Oct 1940 in the case of Orel Delicateesen, 1456 Lexington Ave. N.Y.C.

6. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? [ ] YES [X] NO

7. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS

8. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? [ ] YES [X] NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES", GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

SECTION VI — CITIZENSHIP

1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*: U.S.A.

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE: [ ] BIRTH [ ] MARRIAGE [X] OTHER *(Specify)*: Naturalized

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? [ ] YES [X] NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION *(First papers, etc.)*

SECTION VII — EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE		OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE		BACHELOR'S DEGREE
	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE		GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
X	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS		MASTER'S DEGREE / DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT: MAJOR	SUBJECT: MINOR	DATES ATTENDED: FROM	DATES ATTENDED: TO	DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR. HOURS SPECIFY
Russian University of N.Y., N.Y.C.	General		1924	1926			

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED: FROM	DATES ATTENDED: TO	TOTAL MONTHS
Cooper Union Art School in New York City	Fine Arts	1927	1927	10
Cooper School of Art in Cleveland, Ohio	Commercial Art	1950	1951	21

4. MILITARY TRAINING *(Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)*

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED: FROM	DATES ATTENDED: TO	TOTAL MONTHS
MITC Camp Richie, Md	CIC Course	1944	1945	2
University of Penn. Philad. Pa.	German Language, CIC	April	1945	1

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

Advanced CIC Course, Oberursel, Germany, in July 1945

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VIII — FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES

LANGUAGE (List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence. Indicate your proficiency to read, write or speak by placing a check (X) in the appropriate boxes)	EQUIVALENT TO NATIVE FLUENCY R	W	S	FLUENT BUT OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN R	W	S	ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH R	W	S	ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL R	W	S	LIMITED KNOWLEDGE R	W	S	NATIVE TO COUNTRY	PROLONGED RESIDENCE	CONTACT WITH PARENTS ETC.)	ACADEMIC STUDY (ALL LEVELS)

COMPETENCE - IN ORDER LISTED; R - READ W - WRITE S - SPEAK; HOW ACQUIRED

2. IF YOU HAVE CHECKED "ACADEMIC STUDY" UNDER "HOW ACQUIRED", INDICATE LENGTH AND INTENSIVENESS OF STUDY

3. DESCRIBE YOUR ABILITY TO DO SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE WORK INVOLVING VOCABULARIES AND TERMINOLOGY ON THE SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY OR ANY OTHER SPECIALIZED FIELD

SECTION IX — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE KNOWLEDGE GAINED AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT. UNDER COLUMN "TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE", INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, COASTS, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY: RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Russia (Ukraine)	General	1908 - 1920	Native			
Turkey (Istambul area)	General	1920 - 1923	Yes			
Germany (U.S.Zone)	General	May 1945 -Oct 1945				U.S. Army

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL FOR EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE
Russia - I am a native of that country
Turkey - I lived there as a stateless person for 3 years
Germany - I was with the U.S. Army of Occupation

SECTION X — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (W.P.M.)	2. SHORTHAND (W.P.M.)	3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM: GREGG	SPEEDWRITING	STENOTYPE	OTHER (Specify):
30					

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, etc.)

SECTION XI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH Badminton - fair, Soccer - Fair, Photography - good, Philately - good, Oil-painting - good, Reading - good.

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS, RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK My training and experience with the CIC would indicate the type of work for which I am best qualified.

3. EXCLUDING EQUIPMENT NOTED IN SECTION X, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES, ETC.

4. IF YOU ARE A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (Pilot, Electrician, Radio Operator, Teacher, Lawyer, CPA, Medical Technician, etc.), INDICATE THE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE, NAME OF ISSUING STATE, AND REGISTRY NUMBER, IF KNOWN.

5. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue)	6. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue)
-	

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XI CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIAL OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (Do not submit copies unless requested) INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

Public Speaking and public relations experience on the Executive Board of Greater Alameda County C.I.O. Council

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

Chairman of the Circle of Youth "Russian Culture", New York, N.Y. 1937 - 1940
The National CIC Association, 1956 - present

SECTION XII ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): 2 Mar 1956 to 27 Jun 1956
2. GRADE: 7
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/FI/CI/ICD
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: none
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Intelligence Assistant
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: Research, analysis, and translation of materials in the Russian Language, including extensive work with microfilmed materials.

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): 27 Jun 1956 - 9 Sep 1956
2. GRADE: 7
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: OO/FDD/BU
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: none
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Intelligence Assistant
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: Reading newspapers and periodicals, abstracting information of intelligence value and compiling it into reports.

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): 9 Sep 1956 - present
2. GRADE: 7
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: OO/FDD/BU
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: none
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Foreign Documents Officer
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: Abstraction of intelligence information from Soviet newspapers and periodicals and compiling it into reports.

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

(Use additional pages if required)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XIII — CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (Including stepchildren and adopted children) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. **2**

2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. **1**

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX M	SEX F	CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
~~Anna Tarasoff~~	~~wife~~	~~1923~~		~~x~~	~~USA~~	2819 - Gainsville Str. ~~S.E., Washington, D.C.~~
Barbara Tarasoff	duaghter	1945		x	USA	same as above
Raymond Tarasoff	son	1949	x		USA	same as above

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

EOD Date: 20 Feb 1956

Places of residence:

18 Feb 1956 - 7 Jul 1956 Wesley Hall, 1426 21st Str., Washington, N.W., D.C.

7 Jul 1956 - 1 Dec 1956 3605 - Minnesota Ave. S.E., Washington, D.C.

1 Dec 1956 - Present 2819 - Gainsville Str. S.E., Washington, D.C.

DATE COMPLETED: 19 April 1957 | SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: Boris D. Tarasoff

SECRET

SECRECY AGREEMENT

June 12, 1955
Date

1. I am aware of the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency by reason of the sensitive nature of its work, must observe very strict security measures.

2. I agree to honor the requests of the Central Intelligence Agency relative to my application for employment or rendition of services whether it be accepted or rejected.

3. I agree not to inform anyone that I am being considered for a position in the Central Intelligence Agency, unless specifically authorized by a representative of the Central Intelligence Agency.

4. I agree not to disclose processing procedures I have observed in the Central Intelligence Agency.

5. I agree not to discuss by name or otherwise, any individuals with whom I have talked in the course of my application for employment to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Boris D. Tarasoff
Signature

[signature]
Witness

14-00000

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

[illegible]

14-00000

CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT [illegible] FOR ALL PERIODS. [illegible] CASUAL EMPLOYMENT [illegible] INCLUDE ALL PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

14-00000

14-00000

14-00000

[illegible]

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

STAFF AGENT CLEARANCE

DATE : 28 May 1963

YOUR REFERENCE: Request for Security Clearance dated 28 May 1963

CASE NO. : 104887

TO : Chief, Contract Personnel Division

ATTN. : Staff Agents Branch

SUBJECT [redacted] Jaradeff, Pires (?)

1. This is to advise that a security clearance is granted for the employment of the Subject as a Staff Agent, GS-11, by DDP/WH/3, in the capacity of

Operations Officer at Mexico City, Mexico.

2. If your office should desire at a later date to change the status or use of the Subject, a request to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

3. Unless arrangements are made within 60 days for entrance on duty within 120 days, this Approval becomes invalid.

4. As a part of entrance on duty processing:

[ ] A personal interview in the Office of Security must be arranged by your office.

[XX] A personal interview is not necessary.

[ ]

W. A. Osborne
CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OS

FORM 10-62 1989 CONFIDENTIAL (9-40)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECURITY APPROVAL

Date: 14 December 1955

Your Reference: C-1235 DDP FI

Case Number: 104887

TO: Chief, Records & Services Division
Personnel Office

FROM: Chief / Security Division
Personnel

SUBJECT: TARASOFF, Boris Dimitri

1. This is to advise you of security action in the subject case as indicated below:

☒ Security approval is granted the subject person for access to classified information.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of Paragraph D of Regulation 10-9 which provides for a temporary appointment pending completion of full security investigation.

☐ The Director of Central Intelligence has granted a provisional clearance for full duty with CIA under the provisions of paragraph H of Regulation 10-9

2. Unless the subject person enters on duty within 60 days from the above date, this approval becomes invalid.

3. Subject is to be polygraphed as part of EOD procedures.

EB McNamara advised 12/6/55 Tat will call

Ermal P. Geiss

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-101
FEB 1952

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: OCONNELL, JAMES
OP FILE

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: OP

ROOM: 5E13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
4 pm 12 SEPT 78		PAT ORR	[signature]
2 : SEP 1978		ORR	

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

OCONNELL, JAMES P. TERMINATED 84

7 OCT

OPF

6-29

28 August 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT : Intelligence Medal of Merit for Mr. James P. O'Connell, Jr.

The Honor and Merit Awards Board is pleased to notify you that the Intelligence Medal of Merit has been approved for Mr. James P. O'Connell, Jr., and requests that you inform him of the award. Arrangements for presentation may be made with the Executive Secretary, Honor and Merit Awards Board, extension 3645, room 412, Magazine Building.

/s/ R. L. Austin, Jr.

R. L. Austin, Jr.
Recorder
Honor and Merit Awards Board

Distribution:
O & 1 - Addressee
1 - OPF w/forms 382 & 600
1 - Exec Sec/HMAB
1 - Recorder/HMAB

14-00000

DD/M&S 73-3362

REPORT OF HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD

73-4966

DATE: 10 August 1973

The Honor and Merit Awards Board having considered a recommendation that:

SERIAL OR ID NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BIRTHYEAR	SEX	TYPE EMPLOYEE
009784	O'CONNELL, James Patrick, Jr.	1917	M	Staff

OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT	SD	SCHEDULE	GRADE	STATION
D-M&S/OS	SS	GS	16	

BE AWARDED

Intelligonce Medal of Merit

☐ FOR HEROIC ACTION ON

☒ FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE OR ACHIEVEMENT DURING THE PERIOD September 1965 - June 1973

☒ RECOMMENDS APPROVAL ☐ DOES NOT RECOMMEND APPROVAL

☐ RECOMMENDS AWARD OF

UNCLASSIFIED CITATION

Mr. James P. O'Connell, Jr. is hereby awarded the Intelligence Medal of Merit in recognition of his especially meritorious service with the Central Intelligence Agency for more than 21 years. Mr. O'Connell's broad knowledge of Agency security activities and his unusual executive talent are factors that have been instrumental in his making a truly significant contribution to the mission of this Agency. Throughout his career, Mr. O'Connell, an unusually dedicated officer, has consistently displayed a high degree of professionalism, reflecting great credit on him and the United States Government.

REMARKS

(Recommendation approved by A-DD/M&S on 16 July 1973)

APPROVED

/s/ Vernon A. Walters

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

27 AUG 1973

DATE

SIGNATURE: /s/ John F. Blake

TYPED NAME OF CHAIRMAN, HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD: John F. Blake

SIGNATURE: (Signed on Original)

TYPED NAME OF RECORDER: R. Austin, Jr.

FORM 8-69 382 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(4)

14-00000

OIF

SECTION A

039784	O'CONNELL, James P.	
Security	7041	
1333 Elsinore Ave, McLean, Virginia 22101		U.S.
Intelligence Medal of Merit		June 1973
Virginia	Wife	

SECTION B

20. FULL NAME

24. FULL NAME

CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ACT WAS PERFORMED

26. LOCATION | 27. INCLUSIVE DATES | 28. TIME OF DAY

29. PREVAILING GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS AND OBSTACLES ENCOUNTERED

30. DATES FOR WHICH AWARD RECOMMENDED

SECTION C

34. OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF PERSON RECOMMENDED AT TIME OF SERVICE

Deputy Director for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security

35. COMPONENT OF STATION (Designation and location)

Office of Security, Headquarters

Executive direction and supervision of all Office of Security activities in the areas of physical, technical, and overseas security for the Agency. This addition... included the supervision and guidance to area Security Officers assigned to other Agency components throughout the world. This position re... providing advice ...

37. INCLUSIVE DATES FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED

September 19[illegible] - June 1973

40. FULL NAME

44. FULL NAME

SECRET

14-00000

Off

Mr. James P. O'Connell has responsibility for providing executive direc[illegible] and guidance to a highly sensitive and complex area of Agency security. This [illegible] physical, technical and overseas security ar[illegible] since August 1968. Previ[illegible] this he served in the positions of Chief, Security Policy and Executive Staff, A[illegible]nt Deputy Director for Investigations and Operational Support and as Chief, Regional [illegible]rity Officer for the Far East. All of these positions required not only a broad [illegible]ledge of Agency and security activities but also an unusual executive ability, which [illegible] O'Connell's case has been consistently rated as "Strong" to "Outstanding." [illegible]rther evidence of his many contributions and dedication to the Agency and Office [illegible] are the many kudos he has received to date. He received commendations in 19[illegible] [illegible]wo in 1959, in 1961, 1965, 1969; letters of appreciation in 1969, 1971, and 1973. [illegible] space and the sensitivity of many of these recognitions do not permit a full and co[illegible]te analysis, they are indicative of the caliber of professionalism and dedication [illegible] has been expected of him.

In summation, Mr. O'Connell has demonstrated, particularly after assum[illegible] executive responsibilities in this Office, an unusual and selfless dedication and profes[illegible]lism that has [illegible] a hallmark of his service to this Agency and the country. [illegible] record to date [illegible] difficult to emulate and is a distinct credit to the Office and the Agency.

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

47. RECOMMENDED BY: Charles W. Kane — Deputy Director of Security — [illegible] JUL 1973

SECTION C

HEAD OF Security CAREER SERVICE (Career Service or designee) — [illegible] JUL 1973

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CAREER SERVICE — [illegible] Information Services

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF OPERATING COMPONENT — [illegible] Management & Services — [illegible] 73

14-00000

CIF

36. Duties and Responsibilities. (Continued)

senior Agency officials on a broad range of security matters with senior advisor status to the Director of Security. The incumbent also formulated, recommended and implemented security policies, procedures and measures to protect the security integrity of Agency activities.

14-00000

4 September 1973

Mr. James P. O'Connell
1333 Elsinore Avenue
McLean, Virginia 22101

Dear Mr. O'Connell:

As you reach the end of your active career of Government service, I want to join your friends and colleagues in wishing you continued success and satisfaction in your retirement.

You have been privileged to face the challenge of important responsibilities during your many years of service to your country. The success with which you have met this challenge should be a source of lasting pride and satisfaction to you.

May I extend to you, personally and officially, my sincere appreciation for the important work you have done and my warmest hopes that you will find full enjoyment in the years ahead.

Sincerely,

/s/ W. E. Colby

W. E. Colby
Director

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - ROB
1 - ROB Reader

Originator: ______________________
Director of Personnel

OP/RAD/ROB/PJS/lks

14-00000

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

29 JUN 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT : Request for Voluntary Retirement - Mr. James P. O'Connell, Jr.

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval in paragraph 3.

2. The employee named above has applied for voluntary retirement under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50j.

Grade: GS-16 Position: Security Officer
Career Service : Security
Office/Division : Office of Security
Date Requested for Retirement: 29 June 1973
Age at that Date : 56
Years of Creditable Service : 27
Years of Agency Service : 21
Years of Qualifying Service : 5

3. The applicant's Career Service and the CIA Retirement Board recommended that the request be approved. I endorse these recommendations.

/s/ Harry B. Fisher

Director of Personnel

4. The recommendation contained in paragraph 3 is approved:

/s/ Robert S. Wattles

Deputy Director for Management and Services

Date

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

14-00000

Distribution:
0 - Return to Director of Personnel
2 - DD/M&S
1 - D/Pers
1 - Applicant
X - OPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

OP/RAD/ROB/DEChickering:baw/3257 (29 June 1973)

SUMMARY OF AGENCY EMPLOYMENT

NAME: James P. O'Connell
ADDRESS: 1333 Elsinore Avenue, McLean, Virginia
HOME TELEPHONE: 356-9666

Central Intelligence Agency December 1951 - June 1973

Employment consisted of:

Executive direction, supervision and acted as principal advisor on physical, technical and overseas security matters. This entailed global responsibilities in providing security support for all Agency activities and operations.

Formulated and recommended security policies and procedures on an Agency-wide basis along with providing advice and guidance to senior Agency officials on a broad range of security matters.

Executive supervision of Agency investigative and operational intelligence support, some of which are unique to foreign intelligence operations. This required providing guidance and direction to such activities and ensuring the investigative efforts or supportive functions adequately fulfilled the needs of Agency-wide security.

Principal senior security liaison contact with other U.S. Government agencies and departments engaged in security and counterintelligence efforts.

Senior Security Officer responsible for providing overall personnel, physical, and technical security protection for Agency intelligence operations, facilities, and personnel in the Far East area.

Senior Investigator responsible for planning and reviewing investigative efforts in the tri-state area of Washington, D.C. and in the support of foreign intelligence operations. This included support to the Agency's employment and personnel security program and required liaison with Federal, state, and local officials who could assist in such activities.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 20 June 1973

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 009784
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): O'CONNELL, J. P., JR.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY UNDER CIA RETIREMENT & DISABILITY SYSTEM)(CANCELLATION N.S.C.A.
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 06 DAY 29 YEAR 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: XX V TO V
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 3271-0500-0000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): Public Law 88-643 Section 233
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DD/M&S/OFFICE OF SECURITY DD/PHYSICAL, TECHNICAL & OVERSEAS SECURITY OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: SECURITY OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0459
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16/7
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 36,000
18. REMARKS: Subject's last working day is 29 June 1973.

[signature]

cc/CSB - info
cc/payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: | DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Edward K. O'Malley, C/A&TS/PP | DATE SIGNED: 6/21/73

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOOTRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
45	10				1	02 19 17		

28. NTE EXPIRES | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—ORGN, 3—FICA, 5—NONE) | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: Ø, BJ, ØØ, Ø, Ø | 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT., 2—10 PT.) | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE | 37. LONG COMP. DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY | 39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE (Z—WAIVED, 1—REG, 2—REG/OPT, 3—INELIGIBLE) | HEALTH INS. CODE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) | 42. LEAVE CAT CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO, CODE, NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO, CODE, NO. TAX EXEMP., STATE CODE)

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: B.B. 6-28-73
46. O.P. APPROVAL: Harry B. Fisher
DATE APPROVED: 21 June '73

FORM 9-70 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

03 JUL 1973

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 19 June 1973

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 009784
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): OCONNELL J P JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 06 DAY 24 YEAR 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 3271 0500
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect.203
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDM&S/OFFICE OF SECURITY
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE:
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:
16. GRADE AND STEP:
17. SALARY OR RATE: $
18. REMARKS:

E2 IMPDET CL BY

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL | DATE SIGNED
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER | DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE | 20 EMPLOY. CODE | 21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC, ALPHABETIC) | 22 STATION CODE | 23. INTEGREE CODE | 24 HOQTRS. CODE | 25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.) | 26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.) | 27 DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.) | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—ORGN, 3—FICA, 5—NONE) CODE: 2 | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.) | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT) | 36 SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.) | 37 LONG COMP DATE (MO. DA. YR.) | 38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR. RESV PROV TEMP) CODE | 39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0—WAIVER, 1—REG, 2—REG/OPT, 3—INELIGIBLE) HEALTH INS. CODE | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) | 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO), CODE, NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS | 44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO), CODE, NO. TAX EXEMP., STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: BB
46 O.P APPROVAL: See memo signed by D/Pers dated 6/11/73
DATE APPROVED

FORM 1152 9-70 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
OP-1 1-71
20 JUN 1973

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20314

73-6374

7 February 1973

75-164

The Honorable James R. Schlesinger
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Langley, Virginia 22101

Dear Mr. Schlesinger

Please convey to Mr. Howard J. Osburn, your Director of Security, my sincere appreciation for the excellent briefing which was recently provided for me by personnel of the Office of Security. The briefing and technical demonstrations accompanying it were both personally informative and professionally rewarding.

A special note of thanks is due to Mr. Ermal Geiss, Deputy Director of Security, Mr. James O'Connell, Deputy Director for Physical, Technical, and Overseas Security, and Mr. Edward F. Sayle, Chief, Special Activities Operations Branch. Their considerate attention, sincere interest, and cooperative spirit were deeply appreciated.

Sincerely

William A. Temple
WILLIAM A. TEMPLE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

1 MAR [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: James P. O'Connell

SUBJECT : Frank G. Wisner Dedication Ceremony

1. In a memorandum to the Deputy Director for Support, the Director of Central Intelligence expressed his thanks and appreciation to all who participated in making the Frank G. Wisner Memorial Service a dignified and tasteful ceremony. The Deputy Director for Support also expressed appreciation and thanks.

2. I wish to add my appreciation also for your contribution in making the ceremony an outstanding success.

3. A copy of this memorandum is being placed in both your Administrative and Official Personnel Files.

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 18 [illegible] 1968

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 000791
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): O'CONNELL, J. P., Jr.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 | DAY 01 | YEAR 68
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: CF TO CF — V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 5271-0500
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS/Office of Security
DD/Physical, Technical & Overseas Security
Office of the Deputy Director
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: Security Officer
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0450
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16/5
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ [illegible]

18. REMARKS

From: DDS/OS/Executive Staff/CC #0701

CC:Payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL | DATE SIGNED
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Howard J. Osborn; Edward K. O'Malley | DATE SIGNED: 19 July 68

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HDQTRS. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	16240	SEC	750B		1	02 19 17		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.) | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—OTHER, 3—FICA, 5—NONE) CODE | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.) | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT) | 36. SERV. COMP DATE | 37. LONG. COMP DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR RESV PROV TEMP) CODE | 39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0—WAIVED, 1—YES), HEALTH INS. CODE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS); 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) | 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO), CODE, NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS | 44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO), CODE, NO TAX EXEMP., STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 8-1-68 [initials]
46. OP APPROVAL: [signature]
DATE APPROVED: 26 JUL 1968

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

DD/S 69-4658

15 OCT 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Commendation

1. The Committee on the Security of Headquarters Building in a series of twelve meetings between May and August 1969 conducted a detailed study and analysis of each facet of security of the Headquarters Building. I know that considerable time and effort were given to preparation of the detailed briefings, supplemental studies and reports, contributions to the formal report and implementation of the recommended corrective measures. I am appreciative of the efforts and contribution made by your staff to this important piece of business. Although I am sure that many of your staff have worked on this project, my attention has been drawn particularly to these officers:

Buckley, Robert	Kane, Edward J.
Carrico, H. Clifton	King, Joseph F.
Elliott, Robert N.	Mantoni, Rudolfo
Farrell, Francis M.	– McCord, James W., Jr.
Fennessey, Robert E.	McGinn, John B.
Geiss, Ermal P.	O'Connell, James P.
Good, Charles B.	Parr, Laurence
Green, James P.	Petit, Alan F.
Griffin, Robert B.	Sullivan, Arthur H.
Hayes, Robert J.	Todd, Orin H.
Herlihy, John F.	

2. I would appreciate it if you would pass this commendation on to the individuals concerned. Copies of this commendation have been forwarded to the Office of Personnel for inclusion in the Official Personnel File of each of the above officers.

R. L. Bannerman
Deputy Director
for Support

CONFIDENTIAL

O'CONNELL, James P.

[69-T30311]

10 March 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John W. Coffey

I want to express my appreciation to you personally and through you to Howard Osborn and the other of your associates who contributed so effectively to the visit of the President on Friday. The arrangements were flawless; the security first-class without being intrusive. I am well aware of the amount of work and planning which went into the successful outcome. I particularly want to commend the good sense and judgment which prevailed throughout. It is easy to push people around. It is difficult to take proper precautions and at the same time make everyone feel as though it were his or her party. Thank you very much. Well done!

Richard Helms
Director

cc: Acting Executive Director

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DDIS

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 20 January 1967

Field	Entry
1 SERIAL NUMBER	009784
2 NAME (Last-First-Middle)	O'Connell, James P.
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	Reassignment
4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (Month/Day/Year)	01 / 15 / 67
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	Regular
6 FUNDS	X V TO V
7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE	7271-0103
8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	50 USC 403J
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDS/Office of Security Security Policy & Executive Staff Office of the Chief
10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D.C.
11 POSITION TITLE	Security Officer
12 POSITION NUMBER	0701
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	SS
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	1810.01
16 GRADE AND STEP	16 ~~3~~ 4
17 SALARY OR RATE	~~$21,415~~ 22085

18 REMARKS

The present incumbent, Mr. Edward J. Kane, will be reassigned, effective 29 January 1967.

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
		Ernest L. Hardt Chief, PersPr/A&TS/OS	20 Jan 67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOURS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH	26 DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF LEI
57	10	16130	SEC	7503		1	03 19 15		

28 NTE EXPIRES · 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE · 30 RETIREMENT DATA (1—CS, 2—FICA, 3—NONE) · 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE · 32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA · EOD DATA · 33 SECURITY REQ NO

35 VET PREFERENCE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT) · 36 SERV COMP DATE · 37 LONG COMP DATE · 38 CAREER CATEGORY · 39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE (0—WAIVED, 1—YES) · 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2—BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YEARS; 3—BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YEARS) · 42 LEAVE CAT CODE · 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS) · 44 STATE TAX DATA

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46 O.P. APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
1-26-67 [signature]	[signature]	23 Jan 67

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

APPLICATION FOR SERVICE CREDIT PROCESSED THROUGH REGULAR CHANNELS PER CENTRAL COVER.

DATE: 15 February 1966

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James P. O'Connell, Jr. 25 February 1966

THROUGH : Head of CS Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Non-eligibility for Designation as a Participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System

1. As you may know, we are in the process of reviewing the employment history and current career field of all employees in the Agency to identify those who are eligible for designation as a participant in the new CIA Retirement and Disability System. In this process, the initial review of each case is made by the individual's Career Service. If the Head of his Career Service nominates him for participation in the system, this nomination is reviewed by the CIA Retirement Board which recommends final action to me. However, if the Head of the Career Service advises that the employee does not meet the basic requirements of HR 20-50 for participation, I have accepted this finding without further review by the CIA Retirement Board. This practice has been adopted in the interest of expediting this screening process so that those employees who are eligible to participate in the system may be designated participants as soon as possible.

2. In your case, the Head of your Career Service has advised me that you do not meet the requirements of HR 20-50 for designation as a participant and I have accordingly made the formal determination required by the regulation that you are not eligible for designation. From a review of your record it appears that the decision of your Career Service was based upon the fact that you do not have sufficient time prior to completing 15 years of service with the Agency in which you could complete a minimum of 60 months of qualifying service as required by regulation. My determination that you are not eligible at this time for designation in no way affects your current status under the Civil Service Retirement System, nor does it preclude reconsideration of your eligibility to participate in the CIA System if you should meet the requirements for designation in the future.

3. Should you desire further information concerning the requirements for designation as a participant in the CIA Retirement System, I suggest that you read paragraph e of HR 20-50 and paragraph 5 of the Employee Bulletin dated 30 July 1965, entitled "Public Law 88-643, The Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees."

4. It is always possible that the records upon which the determination made in your case may have been incomplete or inaccurate regarding your actual employment history with the Agency. If, after studying the materials cited above, you have questions regarding the determination that you are not eligible to participate in the CIA Retirement System, please feel free to contact officials of your Career Service. They are familiar with the details of your case and will gladly discuss them with you. In addition, you may wish to discuss your case with the CIA Retirement Staff located in Room 6E-1319 Headquarters (extension 6001). If such discussions do not resolve any questions you have regarding your eligibility, you may request that your case be formally considered by the Board. However, this request must be made within 30 days of the date of this memorandum.

Emmett Echols

GROUP 1

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 6 OCTOBER 1965

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)
009784	O'CONNELL, J.P. Jr.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH / DAY / YEAR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
Reassignment and transfer to vouchered funds. (CORRECTION)	09 / 26 / 65	Regular

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
	X	CF TO V		CF TO CF	0271-0300	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDS/OFFICE OF SECURITY DEP DIR INVESTIGATIONS ~~AND~~ OPERATIONAL SUPPORT OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR	WASHINGTON, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
SECURITY OFFICER	0522	SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	1810.01	16-3	$ 20,045

18. REMARKS

Corrects effective date of previous action which read 08-15-65. to 09-26-65

Date 7 OCT 1965

Security approval has been granted for this request
Chief, Personnel Security Division

cc

15A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	15B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
		Ernest L. Hardt, Chief/Pers./ADTS	

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGRITY CODE	24. HOURS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
23	10	16320	SEC	11512		1	02 1917		

28. DATE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 3—FICA, 5—NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
				16 08 15 65			

35. VET PREFERENCE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT)	36. SERV COMP DATE	37. LONG COMP DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RSV, PROV, TEMP)	39. FEDERAL HEALTH INSURANCE (0—WAIVED, 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS); 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. CP APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
10/13/65		10/4/65

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 17 August 1965

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)
009784	O'CONNELL, J. P., Jr.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH / DAY / YEAR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS	08 / 15 / 65	REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V; V TO CF; X CF TO V; CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6271-0300

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS
DDS/OFFICE OF SECURITY
DEP ~~DIV~~ INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
~~OFFICE OF THE CHIEF~~
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
SECURITY OFFICER	0522	SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	1810.01	16 3	$ 20,045

18. REMARKS

Telephonic Concurrence, Jay Newman, DDP/FE Personnel, 13 August 1965.

Date: 18 AUG 1965

Security Approval has been granted the use contemplated by this request.
Steven L. Kuhn
A/Chief, Personnel Security Division

lcc Cl. Br.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
		Ernest L. Hardt, Chief/[illegible]	18 Aug 65

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY. CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOURS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH	26 DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF LEI
16	10	16375	SEC	2005		1	02 19 17		

28 NTE EXPIRES; 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE; 30 RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 3—FICA, 5—NONE); 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE; 32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA; EOD DATA; 33 SECURITY REQ. NO.; 34 SEX

35 VET. PREFERENCE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT); 36 SERV. COMP. DATE; 37 LONG COMP. DATE; 38 CAREER CATEGORY; 39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE; 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)); 42 LEAVE CAT CODE; 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA; 44 STATE TAX DATA

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION		46 O P APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
From FE [illegible]	9/27/65	[signature] for [illegible]	27 Sept 65

FORM 8-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 15 June 19[illegible]

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 009784
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): O'CONNELL, J. P., Jr.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 DAY 18 YEAR 1965
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6137-1600 ~~5271-0301~~
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: ~~DDS/OFFICE OF SECURITY~~ ~~INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION~~ ~~OFFICE OF THE CHIEF~~ Regional — DDP FE Foreign Field, FE JKO OKINAWA STATION, ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION, SECURITY UNIT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: ~~WASHINGTON, D. C.~~ Okinawa Island, US POSS
11. POSITION TITLE: SECURITY OFFICER (15)
12. POSITION NUMBER: ~~0411~~ 4171
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): CS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 ~~2~~ 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~19,590~~ 20,245

18. REMARKS

I certify that this promotion is absolutely necessary in accordance with Action memorandum A-436, dated January 23, 1965.

[signature]
SS Career Service

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL | DATE SIGNED

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [signature] Ernest L. Hardt, Chief, PersBr/[illegible] — DATE SIGNED: 15 June 1965

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOURS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26 DATE OF GRADE	DATE OF LEI
					3	02 19 17		

28. NTE EXPIRES — 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE — 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 3—FICA, 5—NONE) — 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE — 32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA — EOD DATA — 33. SECURITY REQ NO. — 34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 3—10 PT) — 36. SERV COMP DATE — 37. LONG COMP DATE — 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR RESV PROV, TEMP) — 39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE (0—WAIVED, 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE) — 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) — 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE — 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) — 44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 7-13-65 [initials]

46. OP APPROVAL: [signature] — DATE APPROVED: 12 July 65

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 — EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 30 August 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)
009784	O'Connell, J[illegible] P. JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH / DAY / YEAR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
Reassignment	09 / 13 / 62	Regular

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF (X)

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
3137-7000-3361	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/FE FE/JAO-Okinawa Station Administrative Section Security Unit	Okinawa Island, US Poss

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
Security Officer ~~SS-15~~	4171	SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	1810.01	15 ~~2~~ 3	$ 14,[illegible]

18. REMARKS

From DDP/FE/Undetermined

[illegible]

1 - Security
1 - Finance

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
Lee Austin, CFE/Pers		[signature]	

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HQTRS. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	56400 / FE	15513		3	2 / 19 / 17		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE)	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG. COMP. DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR/RESV, PROV/TEMP)	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. O.P. APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
[signature]	[signature]	9-11-62

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 23 May 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 009784

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): OCONNELL, ~~James~~ P. Jr.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment and Transfer to Confidential Funds

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 | DAY 27 | YEAR 62

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: V TO V | X V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2137-7000-3361

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE
FE/JAO- ~~Atsugi Base~~ *
~~Administrative Section~~
~~Security Unit~~ Unassigned

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Unstationed ~~Atsugi, Japan~~

11. POSITION TITLE: Security Officer ~~88-15~~

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0000 ~~3169~~

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 ~~3~~ 2

17. SALARY OR RATE: ~~14,360~~ 14,055

18. REMARKS

From: DDS/OS/DD Invest-Oper Sup/SS Div/OC/0370

259's submitted to Medical Staff
Subject to depart o/a 8 June 1962
Any questions inquire FE/PE/JAO-KOR x5271 H.E. Eissner
*For slotting purposes only until slots transferred to Okinawa. Subject to be physically located at Okinawa

1cc - Finance Div.
1cc Security

Security 6/1/62
MM 6/4/62

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: R. L. Staten ACFE/Pers | DATE SIGNED

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER | DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGRITY CODE	24. POSITION CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
20	10	56 000 / FE	99999		3	02 19 17		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 = CSC, 3 = FICA, 5 = NONE)	31. SEPARATE DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33. CREDIT NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 = NONE, 1 = 5 PTS., 2 = 10 PTS.) | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE | 37. LONG. COMP. DATE | 38. MIL. SERV. CREDITED (1 = YES, 2 = NO) | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 = WAIVED, 1 = YES; HEALTH INS. CODE) | SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.), 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.)) | LEAVE CAT. CODE | FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) | STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: See Career Sec. [signature] 5-31-62

46. C.P. APPROVAL: [signature]

DATE APPROVED: 5-31-62

FORM 8-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

28 July 1960

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth (Mo. Da. Yr.)	4. Vet. Pref.	5. Sex	6.
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		

7. SCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1 No-2) Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. (Mo. Da. Yr.)	11. FEGLI	12. LCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	13. Code
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]			[illegible]	

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY DD INVEST & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SECURITY SUPPORT DIVISION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	[illegible]	WASH., D. C.	[illegible]

16. Dept. - Field (Code)	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
2	INVESTIGATOR	[illegible]	GS	[illegible]

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade	25. PSI Due	26. Appropriation Number
15-1	$13,130	SS	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date (Mo. Da. Yr.)	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	[illegible]	[illegible] 60	Regular	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS Office of Security DD Invest & Operational Support Sec. Sup. Div., Office of the Chief	[illegible]	Washington, D.C.	

33. Dept. - Field (Code)	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
D 2	Security Officer	370	GS	1810.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade	42. PSI Due	43. Appropriation Number
15-1	$ 13,730.00 pa	SS			1271-1030-1000

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): H. E. Steele, Ch. Pers. Br., A&TS/OS

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): J. Marlene Reimers, Ext. 2063

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): H. E. Steele — Chief, Personnel Branch, A&TS/OS

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement	[illegible]	
B. Pos. Control	[signature]	[illegible]	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	[signature]	

Remarks

FORM NO. 1152 1 MAR 57

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(4)

14-00000

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

24 X February 1960

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo. Da. Yr.	4. Vet. Pref.	5. Sex	6. CS EOD Mo. Da. Yr.
109784	OCONNELL J P JR	02 19 17	1	M 1	12 17 51

7. SCD Mo. Da. Yr.	8. CSC Retmt.	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav.	11. FEGLI	12. LCD Mo. Da.	13. Credit LCD
11 07 45	1	50 USCA 403 J			12 17	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY DD INVEST & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SAN FRANCISCO FIELD OFFICE	3125	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept.-Field Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
4	INVESTIGATOR	0187	GS	1810.22

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade	25. PSI Due	26. Appropriation Number
15 1	$12770	SS	06 123 159	12 125 160	0271 2051 0000

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT*	47	3 16 60	Regular		

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS Office of Security DD Invest & Operational Support Security Support Division Office of the Chief		Washington, D.C.	

33. Dept.-Field Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
D 2	Investigator	436.83	GS	1810.22

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade	42. PSI Due	43. Appropriation Number
15-1	$12,770.00 pa	SS	6 23 59	12 25 60	0271-1030

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): H. E. Steele, Ch. Pers. Br., A&TS/OS

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): J. Marlene Reimers, Ext. 2063

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): H. E. Steele — Chief, Personnel Branch, A&TS/OS

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control	CH		E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	D Mueller	

Remarks: "This request for PRA is to permit the utilization of this employee's unusual background and qualification in a Headquarters assignment for a period of approximately 2 years." H. E. Steele, Ch. Pers. Br., A&TS/OS

Grade 15 maximum ... no ... and no ... approval is contemplated ... R Utting ... Div (4) ... ATD

FORM NO. 1152 1 MAR 57 PRA

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

14-00000

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth (Mo. Da. Yr.)	4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD (Mo. Da. Yr.)
50734	OCONNELL J P JR	02 19 17	1	M	12 17 51

7. SCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1 No-2) Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Appt. Affidav. (Mo. Da. Yr.)	11. FEGLI (Yes-1 No-2) Code	12. LCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	13. Mil. Serv. Credit, Leo (Yes-1 No-2) Code
11 07 45	1	50 USCA 403 J		1	12 17 51	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY DD INVEST . OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SAN FRANCISCO FIELD OFFICE	3 25	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field (Dept - USfld - Frgn -) Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
3	INVESTIGATOR	0187	GS	1810.22

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade (Mo. Da. Yr.)	25. PSI Due (Mo. Da. Yr.)	26. Appropriation Number
15 1	$ 12770	SS	06 28 59	12 25 60	9 7100 30 041

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date (Mo. Da. Yr.)	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
transfer VOUCHERED FUNDS		12 27 59	R		

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

B 11

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code

33. Dept. - Field (Dept - USfld - Frgn -) Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
4				

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade (Mo. Da. Yr.)	42. PSI Due (Mo. Da. Yr.)	43. Appropriation Number
	$				0271-2051-0000

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)
H. E. Steele, Ch., Pers. Br., A&TS/OS

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
Delphia Nutter Ext. 2064

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
Chief, Personnel Branch, A&TS/OS

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		21 Dec	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks

REQUEST CHANGES BE MADE BY SECURITY ONLY

(4)

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

Date Prepared Mo	Da	Yr	V to V	X V to UV	UV to V	UV to UV	CS - LOD
6	25	59					

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date of Birth Mo	Da	Yr	4. Vet. Pref.	Code	5. Sex	LOD Mo	Da	Yr
	O'CONNELL, James P.	2	19	17	None-0, 5 Pt.-1, 10 Pt.-2		Male			

7. SCD Mo	Da	Yr	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo	Da	Yr	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo	Da	Yr	13. Mil. Serv. Credit LCD Yes-1 No-2	Code

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

9

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS Office of Security DD Invest & Operational Support Security Support Division Support Branch, Office of the Chief		Washington, D. C.	

16. Dept.-Field	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
Dept.- Usfld.- Frgn.- D	2	Investigator	311	GS	1810.22

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	25. PSI Due Mo Da Yr	26. Appropriation Number
14-3	$11,835.00 pa	SS	11 20 55	06 15 60	9-7100-[illegible]-003

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo Da Yr	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
PROMOTION *Transfer to C Funds*	~~03~~ 07	06 28 59	Regular	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

11

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS Office of Security DD Invest & Operational Support San Francisco Field Office	3125	Washington, D. C.	750/3

33. Dept.-Field	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
Dept.- Usfld.- Frgn.- U	3	Investigator	187	GS	1810.22

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	42. PSI Due Mo Da Yr	43. Appropriation Number
15-1	$12,770.00 pa	SS	06 28 59	12 25 61	9-7100-30-041

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): H. E. Steele, Ch. Pers. Br., A&TS/OS

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): *Sheffield Edwards* Director of Security

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement	25 JUN 1959	
B. Pos. Control	[illegible]	27 JUN 1959	E.		
C. Classification			F.		26 June [illegible]

Remarks

Transfer to Unvouchered Funds from Vouchered Funds. W-4 and D-4A Forms attached.

[illegible]

Security Approval has been granted for the use contemplated by this request. Personnel Security Division

REQUEST CONTACTS BE MADE BY SECUR. Y ONLY

FORM 12-57 1152a (USE PREVIOUS EDITION) SECRET (4)

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): MR. JAMES Patrick O'CONNELL JR.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 19 Feb '17
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 6-23-55
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): PROMOTION
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: A. PROPOSED: 24 Jul 1955 B. APPROVED:
7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

	FROM—	TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Investigator T311-13	Investigator T311
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1810.22-13 $8560.00 pa 9205	GS-1810.22-14 9600.00 pa 10,320.00
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	~~DDA Security Office~~ DDS/Office of Security; DD/Invest & Operational Support; ~~Special Security Division~~ Security Support Div.; ~~District Field Office~~ Support Branch, Off. of Chief	DD/S Office of Security; DD/Invest. & Operational Support; Security Support Division; Support Branch, Office of the Chief
11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.	Washington, D. C.
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	DEPARTMENTAL X	DEPARTMENTAL X

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): E. W. Schmidt

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): H. E. Steele Ext. 2063

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY: Signature: [signature] Title: Executive Officer/OS

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE: 5 PT. X

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: SD-SE

15. SEX: M 16. RACE: W 17. APPROPRIATION: FROM: ~~[illegible]~~ TO: 5-7103-20

18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): YES

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: CLAIMED PROVED STATE: Va

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	[initials]	6/23/55
C. CLASSIFICATION	[initials]	
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY: [signature] for [signature] 7/18/55

14-00000

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951—FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL, CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED
VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
MR. JAMES P. (Patrick) O"CONNELL Jr.	19 Feb '17		5/18/55

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:	7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
REASSIGNMENT		
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)	B. APPROVED: 5 JUN 1955	

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Investigator T323		Investigator 311-13
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1810.22-13 $8560.00 pa		GS-1810.22-13 $85[illegible].00 pa
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDA/Security Office Special Security Division District Field Office		DDS/Office of Security DD/Invest & Operations Support Security Support Division Support Branch/ Off of Chief
11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.		Washington, D. C.
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	[X] FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL		[ ] FIELD [X] DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Transfer TO Vouchered Funds FROM UNVouchered Funds. W-4 Form attached.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): H.E.Steele, Ch, Pers. Br., ADTS, SO

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Jane Giesing Ext. 2063

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: H. E. Steele
Title: Ch, Personnel Branch, ADTS, SO

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-SE

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M.	W	FROM: 5-7130-30 TO: 5-7103-20	Yes		[ ] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Date: 20 MAY 1955
Security Approval has been granted for the use contemplated by this request
Chief, Personnel Security Division

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		6-14-55	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY: H. C. Clenbain for [signature] 6/10/55

SECRET

19—67329-2

14-00000

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951 - FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL CHAPTER 81

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. JAMES Patrick [illegible], Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: [illegible] '17
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 11/8/54

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): REASSIGNMENT
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: ASAP
B. APPROVED: [illegible] 1954

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Investigator [illegible]	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Investigator [illegible]
GS-1810.22-13 $[illegible].00 pa	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1810.22-[illegible] $8[illegible].00 pa
DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Cover Support/Sp Inq Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDA/Security Office Special Security Division District [illegible] Office
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
FIELD / DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	FIELD / DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)
Transfer from Vouchered Funds to Unvouchered Funds. [illegible] form attached.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): [illegible], Pers. [illegible]

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): [illegible]

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: [signature]
Title: [illegible]

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

SD-[illegible]

15. SEX
16. RACE
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: [illegible]-[illegible]-20
TO: [illegible]

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): YES
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: CLAIMED / PROVED
STATE:

21 STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS
Concurred by [illegible] 17 Nov 1954 [illegible] 3 Dec '54
Effective date [illegible] Dec '54

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	[initials]	[illegible]
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[initials]	11/24/54
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY [signature]

SECRET

10—67339-2

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): [illegible] ARCH [illegible], JR.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: [illegible] 1917
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: [illegible]

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): [illegible]
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: ASAP
B. APPROVED: 25 Apr 54

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Investigator ([illegible]) T311	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Investigator T311
GS-1810-13 [illegible].00 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1810.??-13 [illegible].00 per annum
DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Oper Support Sp[illegible] Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Oper Support Sp[illegible] Section
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE DUE 2 May 1954

TO SALARY $ 8560.00

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): [illegible] W. Schmidt, Chief, [illegible]

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): [illegible]

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: [signature]
Title: Chief, [illegible]

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL.

15. SEX: [illegible] 16. RACE: [illegible]

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: [illegible]-103-20
TO: [illegible]-103-20

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	[initials]	21 Apr 54
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[initials]	[illegible]
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY [signature: Ralph S. [illegible]]

SECRET

10—67250—8

14-00000

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

SECURITY INFORMATION

VOUCHERED

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
MR. JAMES P. O'CONNELL, Jr.	2/19/17		12/1/53

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
REASSIGNMENT

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 20 DEC 53

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Investigator(Gen) T126	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Investigator(Gen) T311
~~GS-1810-13 $8300.00 per annum~~	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1810-13 $8300.00 per annum
Inspection & Security Office ~~Special Security Division~~ ~~Operations Branch~~ Project Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Oper.Support/Sp.Inquiry Section
~~Washington, D. C.~~	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
Ervin W. Schmidt, Chief, AS/TS

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
F. F. Cyrus, Ext. 2063

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: [signature]
Title: Chief, Adm. & Tng. Staff

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

CS-SE

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION
M	W	FROM: 4-7103-20 TO: 4-7103-20

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	[initials]	12/1
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[signature]	12/7/53
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY [signature] 12/16/53

SECRET

10—67329-8

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
MR. JAMES P. O'CONNELL, JR.			10/14/52

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
PROMOTION

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 9 Nov 52

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Investigator(Gen) T126.04-12		Investigator(Gen) T126.04
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1810-12 $7040.00 pa		GS-1810-13 $8360.00 pa.
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Inspection & Security Office Special Security Div. Operations Branch		Same Same Same
11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.		Same
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL		☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title: EXECUTIVE OFFICER

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWI	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

15. SEX | 16. RACE | 17. APPROPRIATION 11X2100
FROM: 7103-00
TO: Sch. A 3-116 (a)

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	C Taylor	29 Oct 52
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY [signature] 11-3-52

10—67229-0

14-00000

PERSONNEL [illegible]TION REQUEST | [illegible]GISTER NUMBER

NAME	REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE
O'CONNELL, James P.	12 [illegible] 50
NATURE OF ACTION: REASSIGNMENT	WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED) LAST WORKING DAY: EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Investigator(Gen) T127.10	Investigator(Gen) T126.04-12
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-1810-12 $7040.00 pa	Same
OFFICE	Inspection & Security Office	Same
DIVISION	Special Security Division	Same
BRANCH AND SECTION	Admin Pool - Operations Staff	Operations Staff
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D. C.	Same
	DEPARTMENTAL [x] FIELD [ ]	DEPARTMENTAL [x] FIELD [ ]

REMARKS:

RECOMMENDED:

5 September 1952 — DATE

E. W. Schmid — SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHI[illegible] ADM. OFFICER

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED: 25 Sept 52 C. Taylor

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE | SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C.S.C. NO.		DATE APPROVED
NEW	VICE	T.A.	REAL

DATE | SIGNATURE

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: [illegible]

ALLOTMENT: 21-03-52

CSC AUTHORITY: [illegible]

DATE SIGNATURE 30 | SIGNATURE [illegible]

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE | SIGNATURE

APPROVALS [ ] SUBJECT TO SE[illegible] CLEARANCE

DATE | SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE 9-30-52 | SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF [illegible]

FORM NO. 37-3
NOV 1949

14-00000

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

REGISTER NO.

NAME: O'CONNELL, James Patrick, Jr.	REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE: MAR 31 1952
NATURE OF ACTION: New Appointment	WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED) LAST WORKING DAY: EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Investigator General
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-12 $7040.00 pa
OFFICE	5 March 52	Inspection & Security Office
DIVISION		Special Security Division
BRANCH AND SECTION		Admin Pool Operations Staff
OFFICIAL STATION		Washington, D. C.
	DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐ 1810

REMARKS:

C#1915

Transfer leave from UV Funds.

Slot #7 JM

Concur for the chief of I & S Staff – W. A. Osborne Mar 5, 1952 apu 3 ... 54.

RECOMMENDED:

13 February 1952 (DATE) — C. F. HENRY (SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. ...)

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT	TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS
DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED	APPROPRIATION: 2 1 2 3 9 ...
CLEARANCE REQUESTED: DATE / TYPE — CLEARANCE APPROVED: DATE / TYPE	ALLOTMENT: 710 ...
	C. S. C. AUTHORITY: Sch. A-6-1 ...
DATE / SIGNATURE	DATE SIGNATURE: 3/6/52 — SIGNATURE: [signature]
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL RELATIONS: DATE / SIGNATURE: JMZ
BUREAU NO. 6893 — C. S. C. NO. — DATE APPROVED 2-28-51	APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE
NEW / VICE / L A / REAL	DATE / SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE
DATE 3/6/52 — SIGNATURE Eugene P. Kilcon	DATE 3-10-52 — SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF D Mulcahey
EFFECTIVE DATE	

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mrs. Grim 1313 L Bldg

TO : Personnel, Room ~~1621~~ ~~"L"~~ Building

DATE: 10 January 1952

FROM : Special Security Division

SUBJECT: O'CONNELL, James P., Jr. - Administrative

1. Due to the nature of the assignment of this employee at this time, there is no objection in mentioning our Agency in connection with transferring the necessary papers and leave record from the former Agency.

2. It is requested that this be done by Personnel as soon as possible.

Ervin W. Schmidt

ERVIN W. SCHMIDT
Assistant to the Chief
Special Security Division

CONFIDENTIAL

To: CFD, Payroll Section

I hereby authorize and direct CFD Payroll Section to mail future payroll checks to my bank to be credited to my checking account.

Name of Depositor JAMES P. O'CONNELL JR.

Account No. S 8545

Name of Bank NATIONAL SAVINGS & TRUST CO.

Address of Bank NEW YORK AVE & 15 ST N.W.

James P. O'Connell Jr.
Signature of Employee

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

SECRET

I am aware of the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency, by reason of the sensitive nature of its work, must observe very strict security measures. I agree to honor the requests of CIA relative to my application whether it be accepted or rejected. I agree not to inform anyone that I am being considered for a position in CIA. If questioned directly, I will say that I have applied for positions in various government agencies, and if pressed for an answer will acknowledge that CIA is one of them but will attach no particular significance to such application. I agree not to disclose personnel procedures I have observed in CIA. I agree not to discuss by name or otherwise, any individuals with whom I have talked in the course of my application to CIA.

Signed: James P. O'Connell Jr
Date: Dec. 17, 1951

SECRET

14-00000

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 1)

O'CONNELL, James Patrick, Jr. — 19 Feb 1917

Married — 2 — Dec 1954 — Sep 1967 — Prop TDY

Assessment date: None — None — None

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1940-41 US Gypsum Co, Jersey City, NJ - Office Clerk
1941-43; 1946-47 James P. O'Connell [illegible], NYC - Foreman, Office [illegible]
1943-44 Manufacturers Machine & Tool [illegible], NYC - Warehouse Supervisor
1944-46 Military Service, US Navy, [illegible]
1947-51 Dept of Justice, FBI, DC - Special Agent

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

1935-39 St John's Univ, Brooklyn, NY - [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] - Code [illegible] & Cypher (3 mos)
1947 FBI Academy, Quantico, Va - Invest [illegible] (3 mos)

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested): None

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1952 Spec Sec Trng	1962 Ops Support	1962 Sec Off Fld Crs
1952 Nat'l Intel Orient	1962 Spec Sec [illegible]	[illegible]
1954 Staff Crypto	1962 [illegible]	[illegible]
1955 Basic Mgmt	[illegible]	[illegible]

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (Continued on next page)

Effective Date	Position Title & Occupation	Code	GS		Organization	Station
Dec 1951	Investigator (Gen)	1810.03	[illegible]		[illegible]	
Nov 1952	"	1810.03	13		[illegible]	"
Mar 1953	"	1810.03	13		[illegible]/Ch	"
Oct 1953	"	1810.03	13	SS	[illegible]/Ch, Special [illegible]	"
Mar 1954	Investigator	1810.22	13	SS	[illegible]/Ch, Ops Support Br	"
Oct 1954	"	1810.22	13	SS	[illegible]/Ch, District Fld [illegible]	DC Field
Dec 1954	"	1810.22	13	SS	OS/[illegible]/Ch, Support Br	Hq
Nov 1955	"	1810.22	14	SS	" " " " "	"
Jun 1959	"	1810.22	15	SS	OS/Dep Ch, Security Sp [illegible]	"
Apr 1960	"	1810.22	15	SS	OS/Chief, Security Su[illegible]	"
Jul 1962	Security Off	1810.01	15	SS	[illegible]	[illegible]
Sep 1963	" "	1810.01	15	[illegible]	DDP/FE/JAO/Security Unit	"
Jul 1965	Security Off (Apr-Jun 1965 Acting [illegible])	[illegible]	[illegible]	SS	DDP/FE/JAO/Security Unit	"
Sep 1965	" "	[illegible]	16	SS	OS/[illegible]	Hq
Jan 1967	" "	1810.01	16	[illegible]	OS/[illegible], Security Policy & [illegible]	"
Aug 1968	" "	1810.01	16	SS	OS/[illegible]/Deputy Director	"

20. Date revised: 1 Jun 1973 — 21. Profile revised by: [illegible]/cal — E 2 IMPDET CL BY 012026

Form 1200 (PART I) use previous editions. SECRET — PROFILE

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I - Continued)

[illegible], Jr

[illegible] - Continued:

1967 [illegible] Lecture
1967 [illegible]
1969 [illegible] on [illegible] Ops/Brookings



DATE REVIEWED: 1 Jun 1973

PROFILE REVIEWED BY: [illegible] cal

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 010026

14-00000

FILE SERIAL NO.
06571

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)

NAME (Last-First-Middle)
CONNELL, James Parrish, Jr.

23.

26. Additional Information - Continued:

Appreciation 1962 from DCI to OS personnel who contributed so effectively to the visit of the President to the Agency 7 Mar 1962.

Appreciation 1971 from D/OS for Subject's contribution in making the Frank G. Wisner Dedication Ceremony a success.

Appreciation 1973 from Brigadier General Temple, USAF to the DCI for the excellent briefing provided by the Office of Security.

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Commendation 1954 from C/SR for contribution to successful management of the FEFILTER Project; concurrence by the Dir of Security.

Commendation 1959 from Dir of Security for many years of outstanding performance in Operational Support, upon his assignment as Deputy Chief, SSD.

Commendation 1960 from Chief of Ops for imaginative handling of many aspects of Project [illegible].

Commendation 1961 from Director, Security USIA, for assistance rendered the USIA.

Commendation 19[illegible] from COS for performance of assigned duties in a superior manner while serving in the capacity of Acting D/OS.

[illegible] made by OS personnel in connecting a [illegible] of the Headquarters Building.

(Continued above)

27. DATE REVIEWED
1 Jun 1973

28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY
emm/ cal

FORM NO. 1203 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1050 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE.
1 FEB 57

SECRET

PROFILE

E-2 IMPDET
CL BY 010028

24 April 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Narrative Fitness Report
Mr. James P. O'Connell
Deputy Director of Security for
Physical, Technical and Overseas Security

1. This Fitness Report covers the period from 1 April 1971 to 31 March 1972. The rating period covers the third full year that Mr. O'Connell has served as the Deputy Director of Security for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security.

2. The directorate which Mr. O'Connell supervises is geographically widely separated in the Headquarters area. This separation adds complexities to the task of supervising the directorate and coordinating the activities of three Divisions, operating over a broad spectrum of activities and responsibilities. During the reporting period, one of the Divisions of Mr. O'Connell's directorate took on an important, added responsibility--the security of automatic data processing. This function covers the complexity of maintaining security in a rapidly expanding activity replete with serious security problems because of the severe compaction of information resulting from rapid advances and acceptability of technology in the field of data handling. The achievements of the Physical Security Division, the Technical Division, and the Overseas Security Support Division require a high degree of coordination in order to avoid contradictions detrimental to a unified security policy.

3. In spite of the difficulty of supervising divisions remotely located from his office, Mr. O'Connell has applied and achieved effective supervision. The Divisions moved forward in an

innovative manner and have been effective in discharging their responsibilities.

4. Mr. O'Connell also spearheads the security program which furnishes Security Officers to overseas stations and domestic operations as necessary. Mr. O'Connell has taken a personal interest in this activity and has been of considerable assistance to the Office of Security Career Board in the assignment of Security careerists to those positions.

5. During the last Fitness Report, the description of Mr. O'Connell's performance was raised from "Strong" to "Outstanding." He has continued his performance in such a manner as to warrant an OUTSTANDING rating.

6. Mr. O'Connell has seen this Fitness Report.

Ermal P. Geiss
Deputy Director of Security

SEEN BY:

James P. O'Connell — 24 April 1972 (Date)

CONCURRENCE:

Howard J. Osborn — 28 April 1972 (Date)
Director of Security
Reviewing Official

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 0097[illegible]

GENERAL

SECTION A

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
O'CONNELL, J. P., Jr.	02/19/17	M	GS-16	SS

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Security Officer	OS/PTOS/ODD	Washington, D.C.

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: X CAREER | RESERVE | TEMPORARY | CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C) | SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL | X ANNUAL | REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR | REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE | SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 1972

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1971 - 31 March 1972

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

SECTION B

- **U-Unsatisfactory** — Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- **M-Marginal** — Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
- **P-Proficient** — Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
- **S-Strong** — Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- **O-Outstanding** — Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	

FORM 7-68 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

26 April 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Narrative Fitness Report -16
Mr. James P. O'Connell
Deputy Director of Security for
Physical, Technical and Overseas Security

1. This is a narrative Fitness Report which covers the period from 1 April 1970 through 31 March 1971.

2. During this entire period, Mr. O'Connell has served as the Deputy Director of Security for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security. The rating period covers his second full year in that position. The Directorate which Mr. O'Connell heads has gained added importance and increased attention during the year. It encompasses an area of activity which is vitally important to the Office of Security and the Agency as a whole. Mr. O'Connell has given considerable attention to efforts which decrease our vulnerability at the hands of foreign opposition as well as from domestic efforts resulting from national unrest. Mr. O'Connell has shown improvement in the over-all coordination of his responsibilities throughout the current rating period. He supervises his people in an effective manner and anticipates problems so as to simplify their solutions.

3. During the previous rating period, Mr. O'Connell's performance was considered to be STRONG with several outstanding features. During the year, I consider that there has been sufficient addition to the outstanding areas of his performance to raise his over-all rating to OUTSTANDING.

4. Mr. O'Connell has seen this Fitness Report.

Ermal P. Geiss
Deputy Director of Security

SEEN BY:

James P. O'Connell — 29 April 71
Date

CONCURRENCE:

Howard J. Osborn — 30 APR 1971
Director of Security — Date
Reviewing Official

14-00000

EYES ONLY
SECRET

29 APR 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : Narrative Fitness Report
Mr. James P. O'Connell
Deputy Director of Security for
Physical, Technical and Overseas Security

OC 7984- SEC-SS

1. This Fitness Report covers the period from 1 April 1968 through 31 March 1969.

2. Mr. O'Connell was appointed Deputy Director of Security for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security in August 1968 and this Rating covers his performance during this period as well as his performance as Executive Officer from 1 April 1968 to 1 August 1968.

3. Mr. O'Connell, as Deputy Director of Security for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security, is responsible for the supervision of three large and complex divisions of this Office. In addition, he is responsible for providing policy and technical guidance to our Area Security Officers assigned to other components of the Agency and in the field. Upon assuming his duties in August 1968, Mr. O'Connell was quick to grasp the general scope and nature of these varied and complex activities. He is an alert and intelligent supervisor and he recommended and put into effect several significant personnel and organizational changes within his Directorate which have resulted in significant improvement in the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the Directorate. Recently, he was instrumental in creating a new Overseas Security Support Division made necessary by the dissolution of this Office's regional security staff in Frankfurt, West Germany. He is an astute manager and an

22 MAY 1969 CK

EYES ONLY
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effective supervisor. He brings to the performance of his duties broad knowledge and experience of security procedures and practices. He has been most effective in keeping a close rein on budgetary obligations within his Directorate.

4. Mr. O'Connell is personable and articulate and is able to express himself well in both written and oral form. His career is marked by steady advancement and consistently high level performances. He possesses all of the requisite qualities of a senior Security executive. However, I feel that he has not as yet applied all of these qualities to their maximum potential in his performance as DD/PTOS. Mr. O'Connell has one Division Chief who is extraordinarily capable and effective in producing results. Conversely, however, he presents one of the most difficult supervisory problems in the Office because of certain personal characteristics. I don't feel, and I believe that Mr. O'Connell would agree with me, that he has yet gotten on top of this individual as well as he should. I am convinced, however, that he is fully aware of the problem and is working hard to achieve the proper supervisory balance. I rate his performance, on balance, as STRONG with many outstanding features. I have complete confidence in Mr. O'Connell's ability, judgment and excellent potential. He is a valued career asset to this Office and the Agency.

5. Mr. O'Connell has seen this Fitness Report.

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

EYES ONLY
SECRET

EYES ONLY
SECRET

SEEN BY:

James P. O'Connell

29 APR 1969
Date

CONCUR:

for Deputy Director for Support
Reviewing Official

16 May 1969
Date

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - ~~DDS~~

EYES ONLY
SECRET

14-00000

EYES ONLY
SECRET

DD/S 68-2461

29 APR 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : Narrative Fitness Report
James P. O'Connell
Chief, Executive Staff

1. Mr. O'Connell has served as Chief, Executive Staff of this Office from 1 April 1967 to 31 March 1968, the rating period covered by this Fitness Report.

2. Mr. O'Connell has been most effective in the administration and direction of the complex and varied activities encompassed in the functions in the Executive Staff of this Office. He has been effective in directing the staff in the formulation and implementation of basic security policies and procedures. In addition, he has performed diligently in continuing review of the considerable volume of paper that transits the Office of the Director of Security. He has been meticulous in ensuring that staff work and correspondence leaving this office is up to the highest standards and has been very effective in arranging priority action in meeting short deadlines. As the initial professional recipient of the majority of correspondence received by this Office for action, he has been very effective in applying his knowledge of the basic organization of the Office to the assignment of action with appropriate coordination.

3. Mr. O'Connell is a personable and articulate senior executive who writes particularly well. He has had extensive experience as a Security careerist, both in Headquarters and overseas, and his career has been marked by rather rapid advancement and a record of fine performances in positions of increasing responsibility. I have no reservations about rating his performance in this position over the past year as OUTSTANDING.

20 MAY 1968

EYES ONLY
SECRET

4. In searching for an area where Mr. O'Connell might strive for further improvement, I am hard put to find any in the light of his consistently high performance record. I do believe, however, that Mr. O'Connell has lost or appears to have lost some of his enthusiasm and eager initiative which marked his performance for the first six months in this position. It is possible that this is due to the fact that the problems we encounter today require more measured and considered judgment as opposed to enthusiasm and initiative. Nonetheless I would like to see Mr. O'Connell strive for a better balance in these essential performance characteristics

5. Mr. O'Connell has seen this report.

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

SEEN BY:

James P. O'Connell — 2 9 APR 1969
Date

CONCUR:

Deputy Director for Support
Reviewing Official — 15 May 1969
Date

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - DD/S

SECRET

COVER CONTROL OF RETIREMENT PROCESSING

Retirement Operations Branch Office of Personnel	FILE DATE 7 June 19[illegible]
ETIREE [illegible]	CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

On the basis of a review of the records of the Central Cover Staff, the following action is to be taken on processing retirement documentation for the person named above.

TYPE RETIREMENT		CIVIL SERVICE		CIARDS	DATE				
COVER		OVERT ROUTINE		COVERT (OFFICIAL COVER) LOCK-UP		COVERT (NOC) SPECIAL	RETENTION OF AWARDS	YES	NO
CORRESPONDENCE		OVERT		COVERT		THRU CCS			

FINANCES

ANNUITY PAYMENTS SHOULD BE		U.S. GOV'T. CHECK		OTHER (Payment instructions follow)	
TAX DOCUMENTATION SHOULD BE		CIA	CSC	OTHER (MEMO FOLLOWS)	
REQUEST TRANSFER OF FUNDS FROM CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION		YES	NO	INTERNAL TRANSFER	

INSURANCE

FEGLI		OVERT		COVERT	MAINTAIN RECORDS INTERNALLY ONLY

TYPE OF HOSPITALIZATION CARD:

AUTHORIZATION TO CONVERT INSURANCE		YES		CONVERSION MUST BE APPROVED BY CCS

RESERVE

MEMBER OF CIVILIAN RESERVE		YES		NO		OVERT		COVERT

REMARKS

CHIEF, COVER SUPPORT BRANCH, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

THIS SECTION TO BE COMPLETED BY OFFICE OF SECURITY

________________ NO SECURITY OBJECTIONS TO ABOVE.

OTHER INSTRUCTIONS AS FOLLOWS:

CHIEF, EMPLOYEE ACTIVITY BRANCH, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FORM 3429 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (4-5-13)   SECRET   E-2 IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

7 - OFF. PERS. FILE ROOM

SECRET

31 March 1959
(Date)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : James P. O'Connell

1. Cover arrangements are in process, and/or, have been completed for the above-named Subject.

2. Effective 11 November 1951, it is requested that your records be properly blocked ~~revised~~ to deny ~~acknowledge~~ Subject's current Agency employment to an external inquirer.

3. Operating component must take necessary action to block ~~record~~ telephone locator by submitting the Personnel Information Card, "Office File Copy", Form No. 642, to Machine Records Division, Office of the Comptroller, Room 107 Curie Hall, Attention: Miss Wenkenbach.

4. This memorandum confirms an oral request of 30 March 1959, Mr. R. A. Leigh, 1608 L Building, Ext. 4571.

HARRY W. LITTLE, JR.
Chief, Central Cover Division

cc: SSD/OS
Operating Division

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RCS: 5 JULY 73

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
009784	OCONNELL J P JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM AND CANCELLATION OF NSCA	06 29 73	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
X	CF TO V	CF TO CF	3271 0500 0000	PL 88-643 SECT 233

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDM&S/OFFICE OF SECURITY DEP DIR PHYSICAL, TECHNICAL AND OVERSEAS SECURITY OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
SECURITY OFFICER	0459	SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	1810.01	16 7	36000

18. REMARKS

"IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-23A(2), AN EMPLOYEE WILL HOLD SUPERGRADE RANK FOR SUCH TIME AS THE DIRECTOR MAY DETERMINE, REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF THE DUTIES PERFORMED."

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)
45	10					02 19 17		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1-CSC, 2-CIA, 3-FICA, 4-NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
			GBJ0000				

35. VET. PREFERENCE (CODE: 0-NONE, 1-5 PT., 2-10 PT.)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV., TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE: 0-WAIVER, 1-YES; HEALTH INS. CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (CODE: 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
BB
7-9-73

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DMS: 21 JUNE 73

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 009784
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): OCONNELL J P JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 06 | DA 24 | YR 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | CF TO V | V TO CF | CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 3271 0500 0001
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT. 203
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDM&S/OFFICE OF SECURITY
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE:
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16
17. SALARY OR RATE:
18. REMARKS: "IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-23A(2), AN EMPLOYEE WILL HOLD SUPERGRADE RANK FOR SUCH TIME AS THE DIRECTOR MAY DETERMINE, REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF THE DUTIES PERFORMED."

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE | 20. Employ Code | 21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC) | 22. STATION CODE | 23. INTEGREE CODE | 24. Hdqtrs Code | 25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR) | 26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR) | 27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR) | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1. CSC, 2. CIA, 3. FICA, 5. NONE) CODE: 2 | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. Correction / Cancellation Data (TYPE, MO DA YR) | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ NO | 34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE (CODE; 0 NONE, 1-5 PT, 2-10 PT) | 36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR) | 37. LONG. COMP DATE (MO DA YR) | 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, PROV; CODE) | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE; 0 WAIVER, 1 YES; HEALTH INS CODE) | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (CODE; 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS) | 42. LEAVE CAT CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED 6-27-73

DMS

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET (When Filled In)

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 5 U.S.C. 5305 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11691 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 07 JANUARY 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009784	16 200	V	GS 16 7	$36,000

DD/P TOS   Gemm 13   A37

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
009784	OCONNELL J P JR	16 200	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	7. NEW SALARY RATE Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	8. TYPE ACTION SI	ADJ.
GS 16	6	$34,623	07/12/70	GS 16	7	$35,612	07/09/72		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE   DATE

[X] NO EXCESS LWOPO   0

[X] IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

[ ] LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS NB   H.E.FISHER   AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions   PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION   (4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 92-210 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11637 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 9 JANUARY 1972

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009784	16 200	V	GS 16 6	$34,623

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-6[illegible] [illegible] EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED [illegible] THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009784	1A 240	V	GS 16 6	$32,819

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009784	16 240	V	GS 16 5	$30,087

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH [illegible] 2[illegible] OF P[illegible] 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 114[illegible] PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY [illegible] DCI AS [illegible] IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 [illegible] 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009784	16 24[illegible]	[illegible]	GS 16 5	$[illegible]8,364

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009764	16 130	V	GS 16 4	$23,079	$25,118

EXEC STAFF
SF

A 37

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
009764	OCONNELL J P JR	16 130	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	7. NEW SALARY RATE Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	8. TYPE ACTION SI	ADJ.
GS 16	4	~~23,079~~ 25,118	07/17/66	GS 16	5	~~23,778~~ 25,870	07/14/68		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Howard J. Osborn DATE 7/17/68

☑ NO EXCESS LWOP

☑ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AM AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 009[illegible]
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): [illegible] JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: [illegible] A.S.C.A.
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO DA YR — [illegible]
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

6. FUNDS — V TO V — V TO CF — CF TO V — CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No Chargeable: [illegible]
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDS/SECURITY
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: [illegible]

11. POSITION TITLE: SECURITY OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: [illegible]
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: [illegible]

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: [illegible]
16. GRADE AND STEP: [illegible]
17. SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE | 20. Employ. Code | 21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC, ALPHABETIC) | 22. STATION CODE | 23. INTEGREE CODE | 24. Hdqtrs Code | 25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR) | 26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR) | 27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR) | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 CSC, 2 CIA, 3 FICA, 5 NONE; CODE) | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. Correction/Cancellation Data (TYPE, MO DA YR) | EOD DATA | 33. SECUR REQ NO | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (CODE; 0 NONE, 1-5 PT, 2-10 PT) | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR) | 37. LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR) | 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP; CODE) | 39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE; 0-WAIVER, 1-YES; HEALTH INS. CODE) | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (CODE; 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)) | 42. LEAVE CAT CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
11-16-72

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg. 11-71 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

A-37

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
009784	OCONNELL J P JR	16 240	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 16	5	$30,087	07/14/68	GS 16	6	$30,972	07/12/70		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Howard J Osborn DATE 5/7/70

[X] NO EXCESS LWOP

[X] IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

[ ] LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS mgs AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 Use previous editions PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION (4-31)

FLW: 6 AUG 68

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
009734	OCONNELL J P JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	08 01 68	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
X					3271 0500 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDS/OFFICE OF SECURITY DD/PHYSICAL, TECHNICAL & OVERSEAS SECURITY OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
SECURITY OFFICER	0459	SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	1810.01	16 5	25879

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC)	(ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	16240	SEC	75013		1	02 19 17		

28. NTE EXPIRES | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 CSC, 2 CIA, 3 FICA, 4 NONE; CODE) | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. Correction/Cancellation Data | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ NO | 34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE (CODE; 0 NONE, 1 5 PT, 2 10 PT) | 36. SERV COMP DATE | 37. LONG COMP DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY | 39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (CODE; 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)) | 42. LEAVE CAT CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
8-9-68 m

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

FVD

SECRET Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009784	15 375	V	GS 16 3	$2[illegible]	$20,975

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009784	15 130	V	GS 15 4	$22,085	$23,079

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BJT: 27 JAN 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
009784	OCONNELL J P JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	01 15 67	REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V / CF TO V		V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	X				7271 0103 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDS/OFFICE OF SECURITY SECURITY POLICY & EXECUTIVE STAFF OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
SECURITY OFFICER	0701	SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	1810.01	16 4	22085

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	16130	SEC	75013		1	02 19 17		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR) | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - CIA, 3 - FICA, 4 - NONE) CODE | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO, DA, YR) | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT) | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR) | 37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR) | 38. CAREER CATEGORY CODE | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE: 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE) | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.); 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)) | 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED: YES / NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

Serial No.	Name	Cost Center Number	
009784	OCONNELL J P JR	45 400	CF

11F

Old Salary Rate: Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	New Salary Rate: Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date
GS 15	4	$18,170	04/23/63	GS 15	5	$18,740	06/20/65

Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

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776

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009784	16 375	V	GS 16 3	$20,975	$21,415

H40

Serial No.	Name	Cost Center Number	
009784	OCONNELL J P JR	16 375	V

Old Salary Rate: Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	New Salary Rate: Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date
GS 16	3	~~$20,975~~ 21,415	07/08/65	GS 16	4	~~$21,___~~ 22,055	07/17/66

Remarks and Authentication

NO EXCESS LWOP
IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS , AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE DATE

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NCN. 14 OCT 65

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

NF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 009794
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): OCONNELL J P JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS (CORRECTION)
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 09 26 65
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF — X
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6271 0300 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDS/OFFICE OF SECURITY, OD/INVESTIGATIONS & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: SECURITY OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0522
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 20245
18. REMARKS: THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150 TO CHANGE THE EFFECTIVE DATE WHICH READ, 08/15/65, TO READ, 09/26/65.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. Action Code	20. Employee Code	21. Office Coding Numeric	Alphabetic	22. Station Code	23. Integree Code	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. Date of Birth	26. Date of Grade	27. Date of LEI
53	10	16375	SEC	75013		1	2 19 17		

28. NTE EXPIRES
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE 16; MO DA YR 08 15 65
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY LEO NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE
37. LONG COMP. DATE
38. CAREER CATEGORY
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED 6

FORM 1150 (1-62) Use Previous Edition

SECRET (When Filled In)

A
NJM: 8X 13 8 AUG 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
009784	OCONNELL J P JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS	08 15 65	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V / CF TO V	V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
X (CF TO V)			6271 0300 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDS/OFFICE OF SECURITY DEP DIR INVESTIGATIONS & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR	WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
SECURITY OFFICER	0522	SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	1810.01	16 3	20245

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC)	(ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Mandatory Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
16	10	16375	SEC	75013		1	02 19 17		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE)	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
				EOD DATA		

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG. COMP. DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM FE
B

POSTED 10/65

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

378, 12 JUL 65

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
009784	OCONNELL J P JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
PROMOTION	07 18 65	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
				X	6127 1600 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/FE FOREIGN FIELD FE/JKO - OKINAWA STATION ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION SECURITY UNIT	OKINAWA ISLAND, US POSS

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
SECURITY OFFICER	4171	SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	1810.01	16 3	20245

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
22	10	45400	FE	75513		3	02 19 17	07 08 65	07 08 65

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (CODE: 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE: 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (CODE: 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPT; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

7/19/65 kn

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

14-00000

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND OCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009784	45 400	CF	GS 15 4	$16,005	$17,210

1. Serial No	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
009784	OCONNELL J P JR	56 400 CF 16	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 15	3	$15,525	06/24/62	GS 15	4	$16,005	06/23/63			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

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770

6/18/63

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 13 August 1963

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 550 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LA 87 - 79[illegible] AND OCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956 , SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS: EFFECTIVE 1[illegible] OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009784	36400	CF	15 3	14330	15 3	15525

ABM: 13 SEPT 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
009784	OCONNELL J P JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	09 13 62	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	3137 7000 3361	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP FE FE JAO OKINAWA STATION ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION SECURITY UNIT	OKINAWA ISLAND, US POSS

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
SECURITY OFFICER	4171	SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	1810.01	15 3	14380

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	56400	FE	75513		3	02 19 17		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE)	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG. COMP. DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP)	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	44. STATE TAX DATA
0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)		FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO), CODE, NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO), CODE, NO. TAX EXEMP., STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Bai 9/13/62

09/24/62 2

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-81)

(When Filled In)

14-00000

Serial No.	Name	Cost Center Number
009784	OCONNELL J P JR	24-425 V

Old Salary Rate: Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	New Salary Rate: Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date
GS 15	2	$19,055	12/25/60	GS 15	3	$19,380	06/24/62

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP / / EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ABM: 25 MAY 62

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 009784
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): OCONNELL J P JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 05 27 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / X V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2137 7000 3361
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP FE
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: UNDETERMINED
11. POSITION TITLE: SECURITY OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0000
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: 19055
18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. Action Code	20. Employ. Code	21. Office Coding Numeric	Alphabetic	22. Station Code	23. Integree Code	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. Date of Birth	26. Date of Grade	27. Date of LEI
20	10	56000	FE	99999		3	02 19 17		

28. NTE EXPIRES | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT) | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE | 37. LONG COMP. DATE | 38. MIL SERV CREDIT/LCD (1 - YES, 2 - NO) | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES) | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.); 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.)) | 42. LEAVE CAT CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

NOTED

14-00000

1. EMP. SER. NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
109784	OCONNELL J P JR	[illegible]		

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA	YR	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA	YR
GS 15	1	$13,730	06	28	59	GS 15	2	$14,055	12	25	60

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION

☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

E.D.ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 2-60 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a AND 560b. SECRET OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

AES: 5 AUG 1960

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex		6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
109784	OCONNELL J P JR	02	19	17	1	M	1	12	17	51

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. Yes-1 No-2 Code
11	07	45	1	50 USCA 403 J					12	17	51	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY DD INVEST & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SECURITY SUPPORT DIVISION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	3119	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept.-Field (Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6) Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
2	INVESTIGATOR	0436.83	GS	1810.22

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
15 1	$ 13730	SS	06	28	59	12	25	60	0271 1030

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	56	08	07	60	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY DD INVEST & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SEC. SUP. DIV., OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	3119	WASH., D.C.	75013

33. Dept.-Field (Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6) Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
2	SECURITY OFFICER	0370	GS	1810.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
15 1	$ 13730	SS	06	28	59	12	25	60	1271 1030 1000

44. Remarks

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
SS	OCONNELL J P JR	109784	31 19	GS-15 1	$12,770	$13,730

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ARE: 1 MAR 1960

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo. Da. Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD Mo. Da. Yr.
109784	OCONNELL J P JR	02 19 17	1	M 1	12 17 51

7. SCD Mo. Da. Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No-2) Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code	12. LCD Mo. Da. Yr.	13. Mil. Retir. Credit (Yes-1, No-2) Code
11 07 45	1	50 USCA 403 J			12 17 51	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY DD INVEST & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SAN FRANCISCO FIELD OFFICE	3125	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept.-Field (Dept-2, USfld-4, Frgn-6) Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
4	INVESTIGATOR	0187	GS	1810.22

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
15 1	$12770	SS	06 28 59	12 25 60	0271 2051 0000

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	67	03 06 60	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY DD INVEST & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SECURITY SUPPORT DIVISION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	3119	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept.-Field (Dept-2, USfld-4, Frgn-6) Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
2	INVESTIGATOR	0436.83	GS	1810.22

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
15 1	$12770	SS	06 28 59	12 25 60	0271 1030

44. Remarks

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ARE: 22 DEC 1959

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. Code	5. Sex		6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
109784	OCONNELL J P JR	02	19	17	1	M	1	12	17	51

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Code
11	07	45	1	50 USCA 403 J				1	12	17	51	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY DD INVEST & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SAN FRANCISCO FIELD OFFICE	3125	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept.-Field Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
3	INVESTIGATOR	0187	GS	1810.22

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
15 1	$12770	SS	06	28	59	12	25	60	9 7100 30 041

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS	01	12	27	59	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY DD INVEST & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SAN FRANCISCO FIELD OFFICE	3125	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept.-Field Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
4	INVESTIGATOR	0187	GS	1810.22

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
15 1	$12770	SS	06	28	59	12	25	60	0271 2051 0000

44. Remarks

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

JEC:26 JUNE 59

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth (Mo. Da. Yr.)	4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD (Mo. Da. Yr.)
509784	OCONNELL J P JR	02 19 17	1	M 1	12 17 51

7. SCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No-2) Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. (Mo. Da. Yr.)	11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code	12. LCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	13. Mil. Serv. Credit Code (Yes-1, No-2)
11 07 45	1	50 USCA 403 J		1	12 17 51	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY DD INVEST & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SECURITY SUPPORT DIV SUPPORT BRANCH, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF		WASH., D. C.	

16. Dept. - Field (Dept-1, USfld-3, Frgn-5) Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
2	INVESTIGATOR	0311	GS	1810.22

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade (Mo. Da. Yr.)	25. PSI Due (Mo. Da. Yr.)	26. Appropriation Number
14 3	$11835	SS			9 7100 20 003

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date (Mo. Da. Yr.)	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
PROMOTION TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS	07	06 28 59	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY DD INVEST & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SAN FRANCISCO FIELD OFFICE	3125	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field (Dept-1, USfld-3, Frgn-5) Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
2	INVESTIGATOR	0137	GS	1810.22

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade (Mo. Da. Yr.)	42. PSI Due (Mo. Da. Yr.)	43. Appropriation Number
15 1	$12770	SS	06 28 59	12 28 60	9 7100 30 041

44. Remarks

FORWARD
6D

M. STEWART

FORM NO. 1150a 1 MAR 57

(4)

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
109784	CCONNELL J P JR	DDS/SEC	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 14	2	$11,595	05	19	57	GS 14	3	$11,835	11	16	58

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
H. E. Steele	10 Oct, 1958	H. E. Steele

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 1 MAR. 56 560 SECRET PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
109784	CCONNELL J P JR	DDS/SEC	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 14	2	$11,595	05	19	57	GS 14	3	$11,835	11	16	58

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP
10. INITIALS OF CLERK
11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

G. H. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 1 MAR 56 560b

S E C R E T

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE
12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI
DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
		GS-14-2	$10,535	$11,595

14-00000

SECRET

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
109784	OCONNELL J P JR	DDS/SEC	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
14	1	$10,320	11	20	55	14	2	$10,535	05	19	57

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

9. CHECK ONE ✓ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
109784	OCONNELL J P JR	DDS/SEC	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
14	1	$10,320	11	20	55	14	2	$10,535	05	19	57

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
Hi Eastland Steele	5 April 1957	H. E. Steele

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE CERTIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954-320080

1. Agency and organizational designations	2. Payroll period	3. Block No.	4. Slip No.
		6-B103-20	

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate): O'Connell, James P., Jr.

6. Grade and salary: GS-13 - $9205.00

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F.I.C.A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks

11. Appropriation(s): Security - 8

12. Prepared by: MG - 10/4/55

13. Audited by

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

dab

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. James Patrick O'Connell, Jr.	19 Feb 1917		18 Nov 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Promotion	20 Nov 1955	50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Investigator T-311-13	8. POSITION TITLE	Investigator T-311
GS-1810.22-13 $9420.00 Per Annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1810.22-14 $10,320.00 Per Annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDS/Office of Security DD/Invest and Operational Support Security Support Division Support Branch Office of Chief
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL [ ]	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL [XX]

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT (DISAB)	10-POINT (OTHER)
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL	
				SD/SS

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION — FROM: 6-7103-20 TO: Same

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE: [ ] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED STATE:

20. REMARKS:

POSTED

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Director of Personnel

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1953 - 380600

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PA)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 81, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

rec. 20 May 1955 rws

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
MR. JAMES PATRICK O'CONNELL, JR.	19 Feb 1917		3 June 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
REASSIGNMENT	B.O.D. 5 June 1955	50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Investigator T-323	8. POSITION TITLE	Investigator T-311-13
GS-1810.22-13 $8560.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1810.22-13 $8560.00 per annum
DDA/Security Office Special Security Division District Field Office	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDS/Office of Security DD/Invest & Operational Support Security Support Division Support Branch Off of Chief
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
[X] FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	[ ] FIELD [X] DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD-SE

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 5-7130-30 TO: 5-7103-20	Yes		[ ] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED STATE: Va.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE
EFFECTIVE 13 MAR. 1955
SALARY ADJUSTED TO: $9265

POSTED
14 JUN 1955

"Transfer TO Vouchered funds FROM Unvouchered funds."

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

CONFIDENTIAL

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1954-O-318798

TJ 6/13/55

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Conc. 17 Nov. 1954

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
MR. JAMES PATRICK O'CONNELL, JR.	19 Feb 1917		3 Dec. 1954

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
REASSIGNMENT	B.O.B. 5 Dec. 1954	50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Investigator T-311	8. POSITION TITLE	Investigator T-323
GS-1810.22-13 $3560.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1810.22-13 $3560.00 per annum
DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Oper Support Sp Inq Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDA/Security Office Special Security Division District Field Office
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
[ ] FIELD [X] DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	[X] FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			x		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-82

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVIT (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 5-7103-20 TO: 5-7130-30	Yes		[ ] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED STATE: Va.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

"Transfer TO Unvouchered funds FROM Vouchered funds."

FOLDED

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Deputy Assistant Director (Personnel)

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954

14-00000

1. Agency and organization designation

2. Pay roll 10/5 | 6-[illegible]-20

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
O'C[illegible], JAMES P. Jr.

6. Grade and salary
GS 13 $8360.00

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY		TAX	BOND	F.I.C.A.		NET PAY
7. Previous period										
8. New period										
9. For this period										

10. Remarks

11. Appropriation(s)
SECURITY 8

12. Prepared by
reb/3/10/54

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
9MAR54	9MAR52	$8360.00	$8560.00	(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods) Periods

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126b—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen. U.S.
Nov. 8, 1950 General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

neo

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. James Patrick O'Connell, Jr.	19 Feb 1917		23 Apr 1954

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Reassignment	25 Apr 1954	50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
Investigator (Gen) T311	8. POSITION TITLE	Investigator T311
GS-1810-13	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1810.22-13 $8360.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Oper Support Sp Inq Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

CD-SE

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 4-7103-20 TO: Same	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Va.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 81, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR. – MISS – MRS. – ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. James Patrick O'Connell, Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 19 Feb. 17
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 9 Dec. 53

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Reassignment
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 20 Dec. 53
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Investigator (Gen) T126	8. POSITION TITLE	Investigator (Gen) T311
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1810-13 $8360.00 per annum
Inspection & Security Office Project Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Oper. Support/Sp. Inquiry Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
[ ] FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	[ ] FIELD [X] DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

verified

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

CD-3E

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-7103-20 TO: same
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES – NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE [ ] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Personnel Director

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

12/10/53

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

Inspection & Security Office

VOUCHERED

Used in lieu of SF-52 &/or or SF-50 to document the following types of personnel actions involving no change in grade or salary; (a) Change in Title (b) Change of Position No. (c) Reassignment within Division without series Code change All Class series are the same on the From and To sides.

T/O App.: 1/14/53

Eff. Date: 2/15/53

NAME	ORG.INF.& POS.TITLE	SCHEDULE SERIES-GRADE	SLOT NOS.	ACTION	ORG.INF.& POS.TITLE	SCHEDULE SERIES-GRADE	SLOT NOS.
Interrogation Research Branch	(cont'd.)					Interrogation Res.Branch	
Greenwood, Austin E.	Interrog.Sp.	GS-11	T95.06	b,c	Interrog.Sp.	GS-301-11	T95.07-11
Wuerth, Howard J.	Interrog.Sp.	GS-9	T96.03	b,c	Interrog.Sp.	GS-301-9	T96-9
Kuhn, Steven L.	Interrog.Sp.	GS-9	T96	b,c	Interrog.Sp.	GS-301-9	T96.01-9
O'Connor, James P.	Interrog.Sp.	GS-9	T96.04	b,c	Interrog.Sp.	GS-301-9	T96.02-9
Bittorf, Walter F.	Polygraph Tech.	GS-11	T222	b	Polygraph Tech.	GS-1671-11	T278
SSD Office of the Chief						SSD Office of the Chief	
Gromek, Helen	Secy.Steno.	GS-5	T130.04	b,c	Secy.Steno.	GS-318-5	T284
Special Referral Branch						Special Referral Branch	
Livingstone, John A.	Inv.CE	GS-11	T108.01	a,b,c	Inv.Gen.	GS-1810-11	T286.02-11
Sprouse, James M.	Inv. CE	GS-9	T108.04	a,b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-9	T108.01-9
Hoatson, Chester R.	Inv. Gen.	GS-11	T128.05	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-11	T108.02
Collins, Wallace C.	Inv. Gen.	GS-11	T128.02	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-11	T108.04
Lach, Stanley	Inv. CE	GS-9	T109.02	a,b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-9	T109
Stembridge, Sidney D.	Inv. CE	GS-9	T109	a,b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-9	T109.01
Cox, Thomas A.	Inv. CE	GS-7	T109.01	a,b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-7	T109.02-7
Lunsden, Dorothy S.	Secy.Steno.	GS-5	T110	b	Secy. Steno.	GS-318-5	T287-5
Ryan, Mary P.	Clerk Steno.	GS-[illegible] 4	T52	b,c	Clerk Steno.	GS-312-[illegible] 4	T111-[illegible]
Banks, Isabelle	Clerk typing	GS-3	T141.01	b,c	Clerk typing	GS-301-3	T141-3
Operations Branch, Project Section					Operations Br.	Project Section	
O'Connell, James P.	Inv. Gen.	GS-13	T126.04	b,a	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-13	T126
Kroppy, Joseph F.	Inv. Gen.	GS-12	T127.07	b,a	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-12	T127.01
Hamby, Louis L.	Inv. Gen.	GS-11	T127.08	b,a	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-11	T127.03-11
Carver, Carol J.	Secy.Steno.	GS-5	T130.01	b,a	Secy.Steno.	GS-318-5	T130
Brodeur, Ruth C.	Clerk Steno.	GS-4	T131.03	b,a	Clerk Steno.	GS-312-4	T131
Delmar, Margaret J.	Clerk Steno.	GS03	T131.07	b,a	Clerk Steno.	GS-312-3	T131.01-3
Benini, Tulia Anne	Clerk Steno.	GS-4	T131	b,a	Clerk Steno	GS-312-4	T131.02
Covert Security Branch						Covert Security ~~Branch~~ Sect	
Olson, Edwin C.	Inv. Gen.	GS-12	T127.03	b,a	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-12	T289-12
Carter, Albert T.	Inv. Gen.	GS-12	T127.05	b,a	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-12	T290

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

App.by: [signature] Staff or Div. Chief

App. by: [signature] Class & Wage Div.

App. by: [signature] Personnel Div.

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. James Patrick O'Connell, Jr.	19 Feb. '17		7 Nov. 52

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Promotion	9 Nov. 52	Schedule A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Investigator (Gen.) T126.04-12	8. POSITION TITLE	Investigator (Gen.) T126.04
GS-1810-12 $7040.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1810-13 $8360.00 per annum
Inspection and Security Office Special Security Division Operations Staff	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	
FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL [x]	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL [ ]

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE | WWII X | OTHER | 5-PT. X | 10-POINT DISAB. | OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW | VICE | L.A. | REAL.

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	1IX2100 FROM: TO: 7103-00	yes		CLAIMED X PROVED [ ] STATE: Va.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

Assistant Chief, Personnel Division

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1952-810704

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR. — MISS — MRS. — ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. James Patrick O'Connell, Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 19 Feb. '17
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 30 Sept '52

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Reassignment
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 12 Oct. '52
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Schedule A-6.116(b)

	FROM		TO
8. POSITION TITLE	Investigator (Gen.) T127.10		Investigator (Gen.) T126.04-12
9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1810-12 $7040.00 per annum		GS-12
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Inspection and Security Office Special Security Division Admin. Pool-Operations Staff		Same Same Operations Staff
11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.		
12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	FIELD / DEPARTMENTAL X		FIELD / DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE / WWII X / OTHER / 5-PT. X / 10-POINT (DISAB / OTHER)

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW / VICE / L.A. / REAL.

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 11X2100 TO: 7103-00
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: CLAIMED X PROVED — STATE Va.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or cancelled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING
Chief, Personnel Division

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

EM 9.30.52

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952-810794

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

INSPECTION & SECURITY OFFICE

CODE "T"

SPECIAL SECURITY DIVISION

NAME	TITLE	GRADE SERIES	POSITION NUMBER
OPERATIONS STAFF CONTINUED			
FERRALL, Francis I.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-9	T128-9
MOONEY, James J.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-7	T128.01-7
DIEDRICH, Robert C.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-11	T128.02
BELT, Charles	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-11	T128.03
KOHN, Patricia	Secretary(Steno)	GS-318-5	T129-5
BLACK, Dorothy M.	Secretary(Steno)	GS-318-5	T130
VASS, Carol J.	Secretary(Steno)	GS-318-5	T130.01
NICKLAU, Elaine	Secretary(Steno)	GS-318-5	T130.02
PIRRONE, Marie	Secretary(Steno)	GS-318-4	T130.03-4
ST.IVANYI, Elaine	Secretary(Steno)	GS-318-4	T130.04-4
BAIWIR, Frances E.P.	Secretary(Steno)	GS-318-5	T130.05
GROMEK, Helen	Clerk Stenographer	GS-312-4	T131
OLDHAM, Katherine B.	Clerk Stenographer	GS-312-4	T131.01
MASCIOCCHI, Norma	Clerk Stenographer	GS-312-4	T131.02
CHECHILE, Rose Mary	Clerk Stenographer	GS-312-4	T131.03
BRIGHTMAN, Joan Lois	Clerk Stenographer	GS-312-4	T131.04
LEITH, Elizabeth A.	Clerk Stenographer	GS-312-4	T131.05
ADMINISTRARIVE POOL			
OPERATIONS STAFF			
GREENER, William E., Jr.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-11	T126.05-11
CARROLL, Thomas M.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-12	T127.08
PARR, Laurence G.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-11	T127.09-11
O'CONNELL, James P.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-12	T127.10
LAFFERTY, LaVerne	Clerk Stenographer	GS-312-4	T131.07

h- Cl. - 3 March 1952
ACD

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PARTS)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR. - MISS - MRS. - ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. James Patrick O'Connell, Jr.	19 Feb. 1917	# 2	31 March 1952

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Excepted Appointment	31 Mar. 1952	Sch. - A - 6.116 (3)

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Investigator General GS — 12
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS — 12 1810 $7040.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Inspection & Security Office Special Security Division Admin. Pool Operations Staff
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
FIELD / DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	FIELD / DEPARTMENTAL X

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL	
				Da. #6893 23 Feb. 1951

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 2123900 TO: 7103	Yes	31 March 1952	X CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Va.

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES, AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS

(7)

This appointment is subject to the satisfactory completion of a trial period of three months.

SF # 61 Affidavit executed.

Chief Personnel Division 09
ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

FD + MR
26 MAR

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME		DATE
O'CONNELL, James ~~Patrick~~ P., Jr.		13 February 1952
NATURE OF ACTION		EFFECTIVE DATE
RESIGNATION		COB ~~13~~ 30 March 1952

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Investigator General	
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-12 $7040.00 pa	
OFFICE	Inspection & Security Office	
DIVISION	Special Security Division	
BRANCH	SSD Pool Admin Pool	
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D. C.	

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
	C. F. HENEY (signature)	
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER	
	(signature) 3-16-52	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER)

REMARKS:

Please transfer leave to "V" funds.

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

GPO 16—63306-1

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME	DATE
O'CONNELL, James ~~Patrick~~ P., Jr.	5 December 1951

NATURE OF ACTION	EFFECTIVE DATE
New Appointment	17 December 1951

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Investigator General
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-12 - $7040.00 p.a.
OFFICE		Inspection and Security Office
DIVISION		Special Security Division
BRANCH		SSD Pool Admin Pool
OFFICIAL STATION		Washington, D. C.

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
G. E. Ball 9534	C. J. KING Administrative Officer	
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER	
Gilbert 12/14/51	D Mulcahy	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES [✓] NO [ ]

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO-STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON 17 December 1951

SECURITY CLEARED ON 10 December 1951

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED NA

ENTERED ON DUTY 17 December 1951

DOG 11/04/50
EOD 12/17/51
LCD 12/17/51

SERVICE DATES VERIFIED
BY Rmw DATE 2 DEC 1954

Robert J. Hayes
(SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER)

1810

REMARKS:

Slot No. 6
1 PHS attached. Security has retained the necessary papers for processing.
Recruitment Request No. 1862

REQUEST CONTACTS BE MADE
BY SECURITY ONLY

CUT IN PAYROLL FILES
CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS BRANCH

Posted 12 Jan
Upd 5/3/54

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
EYES ONLY

24 April 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Narrative Fitness Report
Mr. James P. O'Connell
Deputy Director of Security for
Physical, Technical and Overseas Security

1. This Fitness Report covers the period from 1 April 1971 to 31 March 1972. The rating period covers the third full year that Mr. O'Connell has served as the Deputy Director of Security for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security.

2. The directorate which Mr. O'Connell supervises is geographically widely separated in the Headquarters area. This separation adds complexities to the task of supervising the directorate and coordinating the activities of three Divisions, operating over a broad spectrum of activities and responsibilities. During the reporting period, one of the Divisions of Mr. O'Connell's directorate took on an important, added responsibility--the security of automatic data processing. This function covers the complexity of maintaining security in a rapidly expanding activity replete with serious security problems because of the severe compaction of information resulting from rapid advances and acceptability of technology in the field of data handling. The achievements of the Physical Security Division, the Technical Division, and the Overseas Security Support Division require a high degree of coordination in order to avoid contradictions detrimental to a unified security policy.

3. In spite of the difficulty of supervising divisions remotely located from his office, Mr. O'Connell has applied and achieved effective supervision. The Divisions moved forward in an

SECRET
EYES ONLY

innovative manner and have been effective in discharging their responsibilities.

4. Mr. O'Connell also spearheads the security program which furnishes Security Officers to overseas stations and domestic operations as necessary. Mr. O'Connell has taken a personal interest in this activity and has been of considerable assistance to the Office of Security Career Board in the assignment of Security careerists to those positions.

5. During the last Fitness Report, the description of Mr. O'Connell's performance was raised from "Strong" to "Outstanding." He has continued his performance in such a manner as to warrant an OUTSTANDING rating.

6. Mr. O'Connell has seen this Fitness Report.

Ermal P. Geiss
Deputy Director of Security

SEEN BY:

James P. O'Connell — 24 April 1972
Date

CONCURRENCE:

Howard J. Osborn — 28 April 1972
Date
Director of Security
Reviewing Official

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 009784

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
O'CONNELL, J. P., Jr.	02/19/17	M	GS-16	SS

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Security Officer	OS/PTOS/ODD	Washington, D.C.

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT	10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
X CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY	INITIAL / REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)	X ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):	SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
30 April 1972	1 April 1971 - 31 March 1972

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

1 MAY 1972

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	

FORM 7-68 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

EYES ONLY
SECRET

26 April 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Narrative Fitness Report -16
Mr. James P. O'Connell
Deputy Director of Security for
Physical, Technical and Overseas Security

1. This is a narrative Fitness Report which covers the period from 1 April 1970 through 31 March 1971.

2. During this entire period, Mr. O'Connell has served as the Deputy Director of Security for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security. The rating period covers his second full year in that position. The Directorate which Mr. O'Connell heads has gained added importance and increased attention during the year. It encompasses an area of activity which is vitally important to the Office of Security and the Agency as a whole. Mr. O'Connell has given considerable attention to efforts which decrease our vulnerability at the hands of foreign opposition as well as from domestic efforts resulting from national unrest. Mr. O'Connell has shown improvement in the over-all coordination of his responsibilities throughout the current rating period. He supervises his people in an effective manner and anticipates problems so as to simplify their solutions.

3. During the previous rating period, Mr. O'Connell's performance was considered to be STRONG with several outstanding features. During the year, I consider that there has been sufficient addition to the outstanding areas of his performance to raise his over-all rating to OUTSTANDING.

EYES ONLY
SECRET

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

EYES ONLY
SECRET

4. Mr. O'Connell has seen this Fitness Report.

Ermal P. Geiss
Deputy Director of Security

SEEN BY:

James P. O'Connell — 27 April 71
Date

CONCURRENCE:

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security
Reviewing Official

30 APR 1971
Date

EYES ONLY
SECRET

29 April 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Narrative Fitness Report
Mr. James P. O'Connell
Deputy Director of Security for
Physical, Technical and Overseas Security

1. This Fitness Report covers the period from 1 April 1969 through 31 March 1970.

2. The rating period covers the first full year that Mr. O'Connell has served as Deputy Director of Security for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security at the GS-16 level.

3. The year encompassed in the rating period has seen myriad complex and varied additional responsibilities develop within Mr. O'Connell's Directorate. Specifically, he has supervised the activation and implementation of the Overseas Security Support Division, a new component within the Office and an extremely important one. He has supervised the first full year of implementation of the Interagency Training Center at Hedgeneck, Maryland, which falls within the purview of the Chief, Technical Division. Finally, he has been a participant in an overall survey of the security of the Headquarters Building and has supervised the Chief, Physical Security Division in developing and applying new physical security techniques and realistic principles of physical security. Mr. O'Connell is a capable and efficient supervisor. He is a veteran in the Office of Security and has a knowledge of all of the various ramifications of the Agency's total security mission.

4. Mr. O'Connell is poised and expresses himself very well, both in oral and written form. I evaluate Mr. O'Connell's performance over the past year as STRONG with several outstanding features. I have confidence in his judgment and ability and consider him a valuable career asset of this Office. His has been a difficult task in that as well as assuming new and additional functions, he has been burdened with the supervision of one Division Chief who has proven to be extremely difficult to handle over the years. In fairness to Mr. O'Connell, I should add that no one in this Office has been particularly effective in supervising this individual who is now slated for early retirement. I believe that with this individual's departure Mr. O'Connell should be able to achieve a more coherent integration of his Directorate's functions in the interest of further efficiency and effectiveness.

5. Mr. O'Connell has seen this Fitness Report.

Ermal P. Geiss
Deputy Director of Security

SEEN BY:

James P. O'Connell

1 5 MAY 1970
Date

14-00000

EYES ONLY
SECRET

CONCUR:

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security
Reviewing Official

29 APR 1970
Date

EYES ONLY
SECRET

CERTIFICATION OF ATTENDANCE

NAME OF SCHOOL OR FACILITY: Brookings Institute

COURSE : Conf. for Fed. Ex. on Business Ops.

COURSE DATES : 18 - 23 May 1969

GRADE (IF GIVEN) : ____________

EXTERNAL TRAINING REQUEST NUMBER : 024745

I certify the above to be true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

James P. O'Connell 5/26/69
SIGNATURE DATE

NOTE: This form is to be used only when the facility attended does not give official completion information.

TRAINING COMPLETED

Request No. 024745

Date [illegible]

EYES ONLY
SECRET

29 APR 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : Narrative Fitness Report
Mr. James P. O'Connell
Deputy Director of Security for
Physical, Technical and Overseas Security

OC 7784- SEC-SS

1. This Fitness Report covers the period from 1 April 1968 through 31 March 1969.

2. Mr. O'Connell was appointed Deputy Director of Security for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security in August 1968 and this Rating covers his performance during this period as well as his performance as Executive Officer from 1 April 1968 to 1 August 1968.

3. Mr. O'Connell, as Deputy Director of Security for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security, is responsible for the supervision of three large and complex divisions of this Office. In addition, he is responsible for providing policy and technical guidance to our Area Security Officers assigned to other components of the Agency and in the field. Upon assuming his duties in August 1968, Mr. O'Connell was quick to grasp the general scope and nature of these varied and complex activities. He is an alert and intelligent supervisor and he recommended and put into effect several significant personnel and organizational changes within his Directorate which have resulted in significant improvement in the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the Directorate. Recently, he was instrumental in creating a new Overseas Security Support Division made necessary by the dissolution of this Office's regional security staff in Frankfurt, West Germany. He is an astute manager and an

EYES ONLY
SECRET

effective supervisor. He brings to the performance of his duties broad knowledge and experience of security procedures and practices. He has been most effective in keeping a close rein on budgetary obligations within his Directorate.

4. Mr. O'Connell is personable and articulate and is able to express himself well in both written and oral form. His career is marked by steady advancement and consistently high level performances. He possesses all of the requisite qualities of a senior Security executive. However, I feel that he has not as yet applied all of these qualities to their maximum potential in his performance as DD/PTOS. Mr. O'Connell has one Division Chief who is extraordinarily capable and effective in producing results. Conversely, however, he presents one of the most difficult supervisory problems in the Office because of certain personal characteristics. I don't feel, and I believe that Mr. O'Connell would agree with me, that he has yet gotten on top of this individual as well as he should. I am convinced, however, that he is fully aware of the problem and is working hard to achieve the proper supervisory balance. I rate his performance, on balance, as STRONG with many outstanding features. I have complete confidence in Mr. O'Connell's ability, judgment and excellent potential. He is a valued career asset to this Office and the Agency.

5. Mr. O'Connell has seen this Fitness Report.

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

14-00000

EYES ONLY
SECRET

SEEN BY:

James P. O'Connell

29 APR 1969
Date

CONCUR:

for Deputy Director for Support
Reviewing Official

16 May 1969
Date

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - ~~DDS~~ OS/HATS/FD

EYES ONLY
SECRET

EYES ONLY
SECRET

68-2461

2 9 APR 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : Narrative Fitness Report
James P. O'Connell
Chief, Executive Staff

1. Mr. O'Connell has served as Chief, Executive Staff of this Office from 1 April 1967 to 31 March 1968, the rating period covered by this Fitness Report.

2. Mr. O'Connell has been most effective in the administration and direction of the complex and varied activities encompassed in the functions in the Executive Staff of this Office. He has been effective in directing the staff in the formulation and implementation of basic security policies and procedures. In addition, he has performed diligently in continuing review of the considerable volume of paper that transits the Office of the Director of Security. He has been meticulous in ensuring that staff work and correspondence leaving this office is up to the highest standards and has been very effective in arranging priority action in meeting short deadlines. As the initial professional recipient of the majority of correspondence received by this Office for action, he has been very effective in applying his knowledge of the basic organization of the Office to the assignment of action with appropriate coordination.

3. Mr. O'Connell is a personable and articulate senior executive who writes particularly well. He has had extensive experience as a Security careerist, both in Headquarters and overseas, and his career has been marked by rather rapid advancement and a record of fine performances in positions of increasing responsibility. I have no reservations about rating his performance in this position over the past year as OUTSTANDING.

EYES ONLY
SECRET

4. In searching for an area where Mr. O'Connell might strive for further improvement, I am hard put to find any in the light of his consistently high performance record. I do believe, however, that Mr. O'Connell has lost or appears to have lost some of his enthusiasm and eager initiative which marked his performance for the first six months in this position. It is possible that this is due to the fact that the problems we encounter today require more measured and considered judgment as opposed to enthusiasm and initiative. Nonetheless I would like to see Mr. O'Connell strive for a better balance in these essential performance characteristics

5. Mr. O'Connell has seen this report.

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

SEEN BY:

James P. O'Connell — 29 APR 1968
Date

CONCUR:

Deputy Director for Support
Reviewing Official — 15 May 1968
Date

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - DD/S

069784-Jew

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Transactions & Records Branch/OP

FROM : Chief, External Training Branch/RS/TR

SUBJECT : Completion of External Training 26 SEP 1967

This is to advise you that James O'Connell training request # 020602 attended the following external training program :

COURSE : Exec. Seminar in Automatic Data Processing

INSTITUTION: Civil Service Commission

DATE : 7-8 September 1967

GRADE : None

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

[signature]

Attachments:

- __ Grade Report
- __ Certificate of Completion
- __ Roster of Participants
- X Training Report by Student
- __ Training Report by Institution
- __ None
- __ Other: __________

GROUP I
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and
Declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF TRAINING AT NON-CIA FACILITY
(Forward Original and One)

TO : Director of Training ATTN : Registrar/TR THROUGH: Training Officer	FROM : James P. O'Connell OFFICE: Office of Security DATE : 12 September 1967
1. FACILITY ATTENDED Civil Service Commission 1900 E Street, N.W. Washington, D. C.	2. DATES OF TRAINING 7 - 8 September 1967

3. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAM

Executive Seminar in Automatic Data Processing

4. YOUR TRAINING OBJECTIVES

A broad orientation of the ADP field both in and out of government.

5. EVALUATION OF PROGRAM (Include: a. Strengths and weaknesses of program. b. Identify any outstanding speakers and their specific topics or area of instructional competence.)

I found the seminar extremely informative and worthwhile from the standpoint of examining the historical progression of the ADP from several points of view. All the speakers were highly qualified in their particular field and their presentations were well prepared. All were exceptionally apt in fielding questions.

Mr. Bert Engelhardt, Associate Director, ADP Management Center, CSC, was a gracious host and handled his role as moderator in a truly professional manner. He has an engaging, friendly personality and is effectively articulate. If I were to single out any weakness it would be Mr. Engelhardt's lecture. He spoke on the Systems Analyst. In his presentation he seemed not to take into consideration the professional level of the group and devoted an inordinate amount of time on basic managerial precepts. This seemed to have an irritating effect on the participants who by virtue of their positions had considerable experience in the management field.

Overall I would say, notwithstanding the above observation, it is an interesting and effective program.

6. ATTACHED ARE		YES	NO
	TRANSCRIPT OF GRADES		X
	CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETION		X

7. I CERTIFY THAT I ATTENDED THE TRAINING PROGRAM DESCRIBED ABOVE.

James P. O'Connell
SIGNATURE

NOTE: Upon receipt of this report, with attachments as applicable, a certification of completion will be forwarded to the Office of Personnel for inclusion in your official folder.

FORM 4-63 1049 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(36-45)

009 784
55
16 GR
4
/

18 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : James P. O'Connell
Fitness Report

1. This memorandum will supplement the information contained in Mr. Victor R. White's memorandum of 10 April 1967, since Mr. O'Connell was reassigned to the position of Chief, Security Policy and Executive Staff on 9 January 1967.

2. This then covers the period from 9 January 1967 to 31 March 1967. During this period, Mr. O'Connell quickly justified the selection for this key position in the Office of Security and has already begun to demonstrate his executive talents in this position.

3. Although the period for which he is being rated in this position is too short to be characterized definitively or finally, I would say that his progress thus far justifies an unqualified rating of "Outstanding".

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

27 [illegible]

SECRET

10 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : O'CONNELL, James P.
(Outstanding Fitness Report)

The attached Fitness Report reflects an Outstanding performance. Mr. O'Connell is a senior executive in the Office of Security who has recently been assigned to an important Staff Chief function. In view of Mr. O'Connell's career progress, no special recognition for this outstanding performance is considered necessary at this time.

Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

Attachment

SECRET

10 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : O'CONNELL, James P.
(Fitness Report)

This is an annual Fitness Report on the above employee for the period ending 9 January 1967. Mr. O'Connell was reassigned from Assistant Deputy Director of Security (IOS) to Chief, Security Policy and Executive Staff, and the Director of Security will add comments for the remainder of the rating period ending 31 March 1967.

As Assistant to the DDS(IOS), Mr. O'Connell applied exceptional executive talent in sharing with me the responsibility for the direction of the investigative and operational support programs in the Office of Security. It is felt that Mr. O'Connell made an outstanding contribution to the management of IOS at a time of the heaviest work pressures in our history. Mr. O'Connell has a calm, clinical approach to work problems, and his solutions to these problems reflect the soundness of his judgment and the breadth of his experience. He expresses himself clearly and concisely in both writing and speech. As Assistant DDS(IOS), he demonstrated sound management concepts and acute cost consciousness. His strength as a supervisor is reflected in the universal respect he enjoys among all subordinates.

I regard Mr. O'Connell's performance as ADDS(IOS) as "Outstanding."

Victor R. White
Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

SECRET

SUBJECT: O'CONNELL, James P.
(Fitness Report)

Noted by Employee:

James P. O'Connell — 10 April 1967
Date

Reviewing Official Comments:

Howard J. Osborn — 4/16/67
Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security — Date

* See memo.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 009784

GENERAL

SECTION A

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
O'CONNELL, James P., Jr.	02/19/17	M	GS-16	SS

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Security Officer	OS/IOS/Off. of DD	Washington, D. C.

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT		10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT	
X	CAREER		INITIAL
	RESERVE		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	TEMPORARY		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)	X	ANNUAL
	SPECIAL (Specify):		SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
25 April 1966	16 August 1965 - 31 March 1966

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

SECTION B

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: See attached Memorandum	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

22 APR 1966

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

18 April 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : O'CONNELL, James P.
(Fitness Report)

1. This is an Annual Fitness Report on the above employee for the period ending 31 March 1966. Mr. O'Connell is currently assigned as Assistant Deputy Director of Security (IOS), a position he assumed in September 1965. He was promoted to GS-16 at the time he assumed these responsibilities on the basis of a long period of distinguished service that was culminated in his assignment as Regional Security Officer for the Far East.

2. As my Assistant, Mr. O'Connell shares with me the responsibility for the direction of the investigative and operational support programs of the Office of Security. He brings to this position a wealth of experience, sound management concepts, and the ability to meet and solve complex administrative problems. I have implicit confidence in his judgment, and he enjoys the full respect of all of his associates. Mr. O'Connell has made an outstanding contribution to the management and direction of IOS at a time when our work load is the highest in history. He is susceptible to innovation and has a keen appreciation of cost factors in meeting his managerial responsibilities. He has a unique ability to put work problems in the proper focus, does his job without fanfare, and maintains extremely high standards of work accomplishment.

3. Mr. O'Connell's performance fully justifies his promotion to the supergrade level and, in the relatively short time he has been in his current assignment, his overall performance is considered unusually strong with many outstanding aspects.

Victor R. White
Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

SUBJECT: O'CONNELL, James P.
(Fitness Report)

18 April 1966

Noted by Employee:

James P. O'Connell — 18 April 1966
Date

Reviewing Official:

Howard J. Osborn — 19 April 1966
Date

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

TRAINING REPORT

MANAGERIAL GRID SEMINAR (50 hours) DATES: 8-13 May 1966

Student : James P. O'Connell, Jr. Office : OS

Year of Birth: 1917 Service ~~Designation~~ SS

Grade : 16 No. of Students : 33

EOD Date : December 1951

COURSE OBJECTIVES AND METHOD

Course objectives are to aid participants to: learn the managerial theories contained in the Grid; understand their personal managerial styles in Grid terms; evaluate convictions about managerial values; develop team action skills; increase candidness of communication; strengthen the use of critique for problem-solving and learning; and acquire an appreciation of Organization Culture and Development.

The method of learning offers a challenge to all participants regardless of level or experience. A Grid Seminar is not "taught" in the usual sense. In Grid teams, participants solve complex management problems. Objective solutions are made available. Individual and team performance is repeatedly assessed. Various measuring instruments are used to evaluate effectiveness.

Critique sessions assist each participant to understand how he might change his own behavior to increase his problem-solving effectiveness. Thus managers are not told the best way to manage, but they learn by convincing themselves.

About twenty to thirty hours of study are completed as prework. Insights gained are deepened and personalized during the intensive 50-hour Seminar.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance only. No attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Robert B. [signature] 7 JUN 1966

Chief Instructor Date

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 009784

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
OCONNELL JAMES P. JR.	19 Feb 1917	M	GS-15	SS

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
ACTING DCOS	DDP/FE OKINAWA	Okinawa

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL	XX	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 31 March 65 - 15 June 65

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Memo in lieu of Fitness Report (See Section C)	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER:

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JUL 14 10 15 AM '65
MAIL ROOM

The period of this report is less than 90 days from the date of subject's annual report.

A Memo in Lieu of Fitness Report was prepared on subject for the period 12 September 1964 - 31 March 1965 and all comments in that memo remain in effect.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
29 June 1965	JAMES P OCONNELL JR. /s/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
29 June 1965	COS	JAMES D. ANDREWS/s/

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Comments of reviewing officer of last report remain in effect.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

8 April 1965

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: [redacted] James P. O'Connell
Period 12 September 1964 - 31 March 1965

[redacted], chief of the Regional KUSODA Support Staff for nearly three years, is 43 years old and a career employee with more than 13 years service. Although this has been his first overseas tour, he and his family are well adjusted to foreign assignment, and he is apparently able and willing to serve in any position offered.

As the senior KUSODA officer in the Far East, he directs the activities of six officers on his own staff as well as supervises and provides guidance to all other KUSODA officers assigned in the Far East; in addition he monitors the performance of three other KUSODA officers attached to this Station. In this supervisory role, he has an excellent insight into the abilities of his staff and definitely holds the respect of his subordinates.

As the senior KUSODA officer he is my principle adviser on many KUSODA matters. His judgment is mature, his evaluations usually sound. He is dependable and I believe his loyalty to our service and his superiors is above question.

He operates his staff well, is cost conscious and requires an absolute minimum of supervision from Station command.

He maintains excellent liaison relationships with other island services.

[redacted] will continue to develop and can assume positions of greater responsibility.

I rate this officer as Strong--on the high side.

/s/ James D. Andrews, COS

READ: /s/ James P. O'Connell

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 009784

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
O'Connell James P	19 Feb 17	M	GS-15	SS

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Security Officer	DDP/FE/JKO	Okinawa

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT		10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT	
X	CAREER		INITIAL
	RESERVE		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	TEMPORARY	X	ANNUAL
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
May 65	12 Sept 64 - 31 March 65

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak — Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate — Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient — Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong — Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding — Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 — Memo in lieu of Fitness Report attached	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

2 MAY 1965

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

APR 30 2 08 PM '65

MAIL ROOM

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
8 April 1965	/s/ James P. O'Connell

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
8 April 1965	Chief of Station	/s/ James D. Andrews

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See attachment

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

O'CONNELL, James P.

Comments of Reviewing Official:

I agree with the rating officer's comments. Mr. O'Connell has been a credit to the Okinawa Station and to his parent Career Service.

Signature of Reviewing Official: William E. Colby Date

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 009784

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
O'Connell James P.	19 Feb 17	M	GS-15	88

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Security Officer	DDP/FE/JKO	Okinawa

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

- X CAREER
- RESERVE
- TEMPORARY
- CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

- INITIAL
- X REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ANNUAL
- REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 64 - 11 Sept 64

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- W - Weak — Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- A - Adequate — Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
- P - Proficient — Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
- S - Strong — Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- O - Outstanding — Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Memo in lieu of Fitness Report attached	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

30 SEP 1964

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 9 08 AM '64
MAIL ROOM

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
11 Sep 64	/s/ James P. O'Connell

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
11 Sep 64	COS	/s/ Alan Warfield

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the comments of the rating officer. Though I am not in a position to deal directly with Mr. O'Connell, I am aware of responsibilities and fully appreciative of excellent support rendered to the COS, Okinawa and to Area FE Stations of the Security Staff at Okinawa.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
25 SEP 1964	Acting Chief, Far East Division	Robert J. Myers

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

2 September 1964

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: [redacted]
Period 1 April 1964 - 1 September 1964

A full fitness report was prepared by me on this officer on 15 April and therefore this memorandum, being prepared in connection with my transfer, will merely supplement the previous report.

During the past five months I have had further evidence to substantiate the statements made concerning [redacted]s maturity and dependability. He has been my chief counselor in a recent reappraisal of standards of behavior from a security standpoint. His opinions and advice are always carefully thought through, devoid of fear induced over caution, and realistic.

[redacted] continues to be a good supervisor. He knows his people, their capabilities and limitations. They respect him for his leadership.

In liaison with other security activities [redacted] has established excellent relationships which have frequently proven their value. He has considerable talent for liaison which should be kept in mind in selecting his next assignment.

/s/ Alan Warfield

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 009734

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
O'Connell	James	P Jr.	19 Feb 17	M	GS-15	SS

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Security Officer	RSS /	Okinawa

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify): Memo in lieu of FR		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 31 March 63 - 31 March 64

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- **W - Weak**: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- **A - Adequate**: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
- **P - Proficient**: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
- **S - Strong**: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- **O - Outstanding**: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

27 MAY 1964

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

11 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Administration and Training Staff

SUBJECT : Fitness Report of James O'Connell

I concur in the attached evaluation of Mr. James O'Connell's performance for the period 31 March 1963 to 31 March 1964. In addition, I wish to add that Mr. O'Connell has accomplished his fine performance with a minimum of supervision and direction from this Office which is responsible for support to the Overseas Security Officers.

E. M. WINTERS
Deputy Director of Security (PPS)

Attachment:
Fitness Report

27 MAY 1964

14-00000

SECRET

15 April 1964

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: [redacted] James O'Connell, GS-16

Period 31 March 1963 - 31 March 1964

James O'Connell [redacted] is Chief, Regional Security Staff, FE. As such he has performed a fine job in meeting the requirements of FE Stations for security services and in gaining acceptance for the security program. The requirements have been considerably accelerated during past months due to the unsettled conditions in the FE Area. Also support to Headquarters projects has been added to the security office. Perhaps too frequently a job which falls to the station and which cannot be properly identified with one component falls to the Regional Security Staff. O'Connell [redacted] while keeping his eye on his primary responsibilities has been most helpful and cooperative in handling secondary duties.

He is a mature officer, seasoned by experience and training. He is calm and poised in crisis situations. His dependability and personality are genuine assets to the Station.

O'Connell [redacted] is a good supervisor who promotes team work among his people, who is opposed to waste, and has demonstrated his interest in efficiency and economy.

O'Connell [redacted] makes a sincere effort to separate the Regional Security office from the Station Security office, however, this is difficult if not impossible to do. Perhaps the Station is as much to blame as the overlapping of the various security functions. Surely it is understandable that the Chief of Station wants the best advice he can get on a security matter of concern to him and will turn to the senior officer available. This is an especially tempting recourse with such a fine officer as O'Connell [redacted] close at hand.

He has responded well to the call for economy and although he has little latitude in this respect he has instituted some restrictions that will result in savings. He writes lucidly and succinctly.

I am pleased that he is to be at this Station for another year.

/s/ Alan D. Winfield

READ: [redacted]

27 MAY 1964

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE
O'Connell James P., Jr.	19 February 17	Male	GS-15

5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT
SS	Security Officer	OS/IOS/OSD/CC

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

	NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		~~DENIED~~

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	11. REPORTING PERIOD From To	SPECIAL (Specify)
30 April 62	March 61 - ~~March~~ 62	

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							
RESOURCEFUL							
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							
THINKS CLEARLY							
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 9-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

10 September 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT: O'CONNELL, James P.
(Fitness Report)

Mr. O'CONNELL is completing eleven years of Agency service. He holds a Bachelor of Science Degree from St. John's University and his experience qualifications include four years of service with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

This evaluation covers Mr. O'CONNELL's performance as Chief of the Security Support Division. During this period the accomplishments of the Division reflected a high caliber of leadership. Mr. O'CONNELL has displayed outstanding executive ability and a broad understanding of the investigative, support, and security problems inherent in the job. Mr. O'CONNELL applies his abilities well and obtains a high level of work productivity and quality. He has considerable capacity for further development and is currently assigned as Chief, Regional Security Support Staff, FE.

It is felt that Mr. O'CONNELL's present assignment will add to the breadth of his experience and coupled with his proven talents for administration will insure the development of his potential for greater responsibility at the executive level.

Victor R. White
Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

Reviewing Official:

Sheffield Edwards
Director of Security

Noted By Employee:
(Mr. O'Connell is on PCS assignment and not available. A copy of this Fitness Report will be furnished him.)
James P. O'Connell

SECRET

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that

James P. O'Connell

has attended and successfully completed the

SECURITY OFFICE

SPECIAL TRAINING COURSE

Security Officer Field Course #12

during the period 14 May *to* 25 May 1962

William A. Kotapish

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, CIA

WASHINGTON, D.C.

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that

James P. O'Connell

has attended and successfully completed the

SECURITY OFFICE

SPECIAL TRAINING COURSE

Physical Security Training Course #8

during the period 23 April *to* 11 May 1962

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, CIA

WASHINGTON, D.C.

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

Introduction to Intelligence No. 50
40 hours, full-time 19 - 23 March 1962 45 students

Student : O'Connell, James P., Jr. Grade: GS-15 Year of Birth: 1917

EOD Date : December 1951 Office : Security

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS

Introduction to Intelligence has four objectives: (1) to instruct the student in the basic concepts of intelligence and the role of national intelligence within the Government; (2) to describe the intelligence community: its members, their duties, and their relationship to CIA; (3) to define and describe the functions of CIA and identify the components performing them; and (4) to explain the processes and means by which CIA fulfills its responsibilities for collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence.

Lectures given by Orientation Faculty members and guest speakers take up about half the time; seminar and review exercises, about one fourth; and study periods and training films, the remaining quarter. An Intelligence Products Exhibit, representing all the Offices of the DD/I, puts on display the products of those Offices and by visual aids demonstrates the activities of each Office.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

Student achievement is judged on the basis of a 40 item multiple choice test on course content given the last day of the course. On the basis of this test each student is given an adjectival rating. The number of students in this class receiving each adjectival rating is shown below. This student's rating is indicated by the asterisk.

Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Excellent
0	22	23*

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: [signature] 23 March '62
Chief, Orientation Faculty Date

S E C R E T

TRAINING REPORT

Counterintelligence Familiarization Course No. 30
80 hours full-time 29 January - 9 February 1962

Students: 17

Student: O'CONNELL, James P.,Jr.

Year of Birth: 1917

EOD Date: December 1951 Grade: GS-15 Office: OS/Ops.Support Div.

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS

This course, designed for the staff employee who requires a basic knowledge of counterintelligence doctrine and methodology, aims to increase his understanding of this activity by (a) acquainting him with current counterintelligence concepts and objectives and the organization and functions of counterintelligence targets, (b) familiarizing him with skills and techniques employed in detecting, investigating, and operating against targets, and (c) showing him how to report, record, and disseminate counterintelligence information.

The student is instructed through the media of lectures, directed reading, tours, training films, examinations, class exercises, and discussions.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

The overall adjectival rating and comments below are derived from a review of the student's performance in class discussions, three written problems, and two objective tests. The written problems involve name tracing, an examination of a counterintelligence interrogation and the dissemination of information about an individual of counterintelligence interest.

OVERALL ADJECTIVAL RATING

EXCELLENT

COMMENTS

Mr. O'Connell contributed significantly to class discussions. His performance throughout the course demonstrated a sound comprehension of the instruction. His handling of the problem situations was thoroughly professional.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: M. E. O'Brien
Chief Instructor

27 Feb. 1962
Date

S E C R E T

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

Operations Support No. 50
120 hours, full-time, Phase I 2 - 20 April 62 8 Students
80 hours, full-time, Phase II 23 April - 4 May 62 10 Students

Student : O'CONNELL, James P., Jr. Year of Birth: 1917

EOD Date: December 1951 Grade: GS-15 Office : OS

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS

The Operations Support Course emphasizes the role of support personnel in clandestine activities and their responsibility in originating material of a support nature at headquarters and in the field. The Course objectives are to provide the student with (1) an appreciation of the interrelationship between operating functions and support functions; (2) an understanding of some of the basic principles and techniques of Agency operations; (3) a knowledge of procedures, regulations and problems pertinent to the necessary support of operational activities.

a. Phase I covers instruction on organization, functions and responsibilities of the Clandestine Services; basic principles of clandestine activity accompanied by practical exercises; project and agent management; familiarization with defensive and offensive audio surveillance.

About fifty per cent of Phase I consists of lectures, briefings, and discussions; about thirty-five per cent is devoted to field exercises, practical written assignments, practice problems, and observing films as training aids in basic tradecraft. The remainder of the time is devoted to studying and testing.

b. Phase II includes name checks, records procedures, foreign travel, finance and property accounting, dispatch, pouch, cable and message-writing procedures. For this phase, problems have been developed to represent situations as they normally occur at a Class B Station.

About thirty-five per cent of Phase II is composed of lectures, briefings, and discussions; about fifty per cent is devoted to practice problems and practical written assignments. The remainder of the time is devoted to studying and testing.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

The adjectival ratings on this student for each major area of this course are the result of an evaluation of his work on his individual projects, on the other exercises, and on the final examination. Comparative judgment takes into account students in preceding classes as well as the present one. The numbers show how many students received each rating. An asterisk (*) shows the rating this student received. The rating the student receives represents the student's performance in the course with no allowance made for difference in age, education, experience and so forth.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

NAME O'CONNELL, James P. Jr.

MAJOR CATEGORIES

PHASE I	UNSAT	SAT	EXCELLENT
1. Tradecraft - Recognition of elementary principles.	0	2	6
2. Casing - Written observation of an assigned site.	0	2	6
3. Personal Meeting Plan - Written paper emphasizing techniques of effecting clandestine meeting.	0	5	3
4. Personal Meeting - Carrying out student's plan.	0	4	4
5. Contact Report - Written report of clandestine personal meeting.	0	2	6
6. Operational Support Procedures - General knowledge of Clandestine Services Organization and Functions; Agent and Project Management.	0	2	6
PHASE II			
1. Originating Headquarters and Field Dispatches. Indexing Requirements. Field Pouch Manifest.	0	2	8
2. Preparation of Headquarters and Field Cables. Writing and Indexing Messages. Use of Message Writing Techniques.	0	7	3
3. Type II Property Accounting - Fundamentals and Execution of Records.	0	1	9
4. Foreign Travel - Currency Conversion and Completion of Travel Voucher.	0	4	6
5. Familiarization with Class B Accounting and Preparation of Records.	0	0	10
6. Clandestine Services Headquarters and Field Support Procedures.	1	4	5

COMMENTS

Student cancelled per Office of Security, 6 April 1962.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: [signature] Chief Instructor — 18 May 1962 Date

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

3 AUG 1961

28 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Security

FROM: Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

SUBJECT: O'CONNELL, James P.
(Fitness Report)

Mr. O'Connell is completing ten years of Agency service and his experience qualification includes four years of service with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He holds a Bachelor of Science Degree from St. John's University.

This evaluation covers Mr. O'Connell's first year assignment as Chief of the Security Support Division. It is felt that the outstanding accomplishments of this Division during this period are in large measure attributable to Mr. O'Connell's managerial skill. During this time the Security Support Division, without additional personnel, has increased its production substantially and in the area of operational support has handled many unique and diverse assignments.

Mr. O'Connell has a keen and analytical intellect and a broad understanding of the investigative and security problems inherent in his job. He applies these qualities with his talent for administration to make for an overall outstanding performance.

Mr. O'Connell has the capacity for further development and his future training should be directed to senior management courses to insure the full development of this potential.

Victor R. White

Reviewing Official:

R. L. Bannerman
Acting Director of Security

Noted by Employee:

James P. O'Connell

SECRET

16 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)

SUBJECT: O'CONNELL, James P.
(Fitness Report)

1. This report constitutes an evaluation of Mr. O'CONNELL's performance as Deputy Chief, Security Support Division and as Chief, Security Support Division.

2. It is pertinent to note that by virtue of a sustained performance of outstanding proportions Mr. O'CONNELL was promoted on 4 May 1959 to the position of Deputy Chief, Security Support Division, and on 4 April 1960 to the position of Chief, Security Support Division.

3. During the rating period Mr. O'CONNELL's performance amply justified and confirmed the previous assessments of his potential executive caliber. He has demonstrated in his recent assignments highly advanced administrative ability and judgment of an excellence considerably more than that required in the discharge of his increased responsibilities.

4. He has continued to display a marked dedication to the welfare of his office and the Agency. His approach to the discharge of responsibilities within his purview has been progressive and sound in all respects. His contribution has been invaluable.

5. In terms of potential, Mr. O'CONNELL's overall performance and his demonstrated talents and gifts of personality continue to constitute him as being qualified for a future of increasingly important service.

David E. Hanlon
Assistant Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

Fred H. Hall
Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)

NOTED BY EMPLOYEE:

James P. O'Connell

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RECEIVED
[illegible] SS/CSB
CFB

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE
O'CONNELL, James P., Jr.	19 February 1917	male	GS-14

5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT
SD-SS	Investigator	OS/Sec. Sup. Div., Support Branch

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

	NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	11. REPORTING PERIOD From / To	SPECIAL (Specify)
30 April 1959	12/17/57 — 3/31/59	

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 — SEE ATTACHED		SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2		SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3		SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							
RESOURCEFUL							
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							
THINKS CLEARLY							
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							
OTHER (Specify)							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

4 September 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT: O'CONNELL, James P., Jr. (Fitness Report)

1. This report constitutes a continuing evaluation of Mr. O'CONNELL's performance as Chief, Support Branch, Security Support Division.

2. Mr. O'CONNELL's performance in terms of productivity and quality has been outstanding in every respect. His responsibilities have been most exacting and demanding, not only because of the administrative requirements involved, but also because of the urgent and unprecedented nature of the problems he is called upon to handle. Many of these problems have had Agency-wide implications and have been of interest to high Agency officials. He has met the challenges presented to him in a superb fashion and in a manner reflecting credit upon himself and the Security Office. In addition to this statement of evaluation, it should be noted that Mr. O'CONNELL, upon the recent completion of his assignment as Chief, Support Branch, SSD, and his promotion to Deputy Chief, SSD, received a commendation from the Director of Security commending him for his over-all splendid performance with particular reference to his handling of an ultra sensitive matter of interest to the highest authorities of the Agency.

3. In terms of potential, Mr. O'CONNELL's performance, his impressive physical appearance and personality, coupled with his proven powers of judgment and administration, in the opinion of the rater constitute him as being of potential executive caliber.

David E. Hanlon
Acting Assistant Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Support)

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

Fred H. Hall
Acting Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Support)

NOTED BY EMPLOYEE:

James P. O'Connell

SECRET
(When Filled In)

8

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
O'CONNELL, James P., Jr.	19 Feb. 1917	male	SD - SS

5. OFFICE/DIVISION BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
OS/Sec. Sup. Div., Support Branch	Investigator

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-14	17 December 1957	17 December 1956 - 17 December 1957

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): INITIAL; X ANNUAL; REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR; REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE; SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT [✓] HAS [ ] HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

✓	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
✓	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS ~~AND WEAKNESSES, SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.~~		

B. THIS DATE	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
25 November 1957	[signature] FRED H. HALL	Ass't Dep. Dir. of Sec.(I & S)

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

DATE
Action Pr... E.P. 19 DEC 1957
... LWD 12/23/57

[ ] CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
25 November 1957	[signature] ROBERT H. CUNNINGHAM	Dep. Dir. of Security(I & S)

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE	CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
GIVING LECTURES	DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS	PREPARES SUMMARIES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS	TRANSLATES GERMAN
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	MANAGES FILES	DEBRIEFING SOURCES
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	OPERATES RADIO	KEEPS BOOKS
TYPING	COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES	DRIVES TRUCK
TAKING DICTATION	WRITES REGULATIONS	MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
SUPERVISING	PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE	EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NUMBER
NO. 1: SUPERVISES	6	NO. 4: COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES	6
NO. 2: RECOGNIZES AND SOLVES INVESTIGATIVE PROBLEMS	6	NO. 5: DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS	6
NO. 3: EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA	6	NO. 6: PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE	6

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Mr. O'CONNELL is an excellently trained and widely experienced investigator who has demonstrated the ability to coordinate and supervise the unique and diverse investigative and security ~~ms~~ problems inherent in the work of the Agency. He willingly discharges his responsibilities and cheerfully accepts the necessity to meet these responsibilities at all hours of the night, on weekends, holidays, etc. He is a dedicated Career employee and has no significant weaknesses.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☑ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
O'CONNELL, James P., Jr.	19 Feb. 1917	male	SD - SS

5. OFFICE/DIVISION BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
OS/Sec. Sup. Div., Support Branch	Investigator

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-14	17 December 1957	17 December 1956 - 17 December 1957

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): INITIAL [ ] ANNUAL [X] REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [ ] REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [ ] SPECIAL (Specify) [ ]

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
25 November 1957	[signature] WILLIAM H. HALL	Ass't Dep. Dir. of Sec.(I & S)

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
25 November 1957	[signature] ROBERT H. CUNNINGHAM	Dep. Dir. of Security(I & S)

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: **5**

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? [✓] Yes [ ] No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER:
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	2	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	3	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) 1 NOV 55 — REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

SECRET

Potential (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

69 MONTHS

DEC 13 2 33 PM '57 ROOM

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

The fine performance which Mr. O'CONNELL has given over a period of years in several different assignments indicates a good potential for development and advancement.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Mr. O'CONNELL is obtaining fine developmental experience in the varied responsibilities of his position as Chief, Support Branch, Security Support Division. No specific, formal training is planned at this time.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

As a matter of personal choice, Mr. O'CONNELL would prefer not to go overseas on a PCS assignment at this time. However, as a Career employee, he recognizes his responsibility to serve wherever the requirements of the Agency may dictate.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
- X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
- 1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
- 2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
- 3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
- 4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
- 5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	5	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	5	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	5	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	5	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
5	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	4	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
O'CONNELL, James P., Jr.	19 Feb. 1917	male	SD-SS

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
OS/Sec. Sup. Div., Support Branch	Investigator

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-14	17 December 1956	16 December 1955 - 16 December 1956

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): INITIAL [ ] ANNUAL [X] REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [ ] REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [ ] SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT [✓] HAS [ ] HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

- [✓] THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
- [ ] THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
- [✓] I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
- [ ] IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
- [ ] I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
27 November 56	Fred H. Hall [signature]	Chief, Security Support Div.

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Per. Cont.	[initials]	21 DEC 1956
Reviewed by	[initials]	12/64

[ ] CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
30 Nov 56	[signature]	Dep. Dir. of Security (I&S)

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: **5**

1. - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY, HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2. - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE: ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3. - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4. - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5. - A FINE PERFORMANCE, CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6. - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) 1 NOV 55 — REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE. SECRET Performance (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE	CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
GIVING LECTURES	DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS	PREPARES SUMMARIES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS	TRANSLATES GERMAN
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	MANAGES FILES	DEBRIEFING SOURCES
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	OPERATES RADIO	KEEPS BOOKS
TYPING	COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES	DRIVES TRUCK
TAKING DICTATION	WRITES REGULATIONS	MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
SUPERVISING	PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE	EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
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MAIL ROOM

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NUMBER
SUPERVISING	6	COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2		**SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5**	
COMPREHENSION OF INVESTIGATIVE PROBLEMS	6	DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3		**SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6**	
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA	6	PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE	6

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Mr. O'Connell is a versatile, intelligent employee who always promptly accepts and discharges his responsibilities willingly. He is an experienced, able investigator and a capable supervisor. He has no significant weaknesses.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☑ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
O'CONNELL, James P., Jr.	19 Feb. 1917	male	SD-SS

5. OFFICE DIVISION BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
OS/Sec. Sup. Div., Support Branch	Investigator

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-11	17 December 1956	16 December 1955 - 16 December 1956

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): INITIAL [ ] ANNUAL [X] REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [ ] REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [ ] SPECIAL (Specify) [ ]

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
27 November 56	Fred H. Hall	Chief, Security Support Div.

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
30 Nov 56	Robert H. Cunningham	Dep. Dir. of Security (I&S)

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: **4**

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

DATE 21 DEC 1956

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? [X] Yes [ ] No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	2	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	3	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
2		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE. SECRET Potential (4)

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(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

57

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Mr. O'Connell's potential is excellent. He is intelligent, interested in his work and is a career minded employee.

DEC 12 3 09 PM '56

MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Mr. O'Connell has already capably handled several different positions in the Security Office, both at Headquarters and in the domestic field office organization and has completed several training courses. No specific training is planned at this time.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

As a matter of personal choice, Mr. O'Connell would prefer to remain in a domestic assignment at this time. However, as a Career employee, he recognizes and accepts his responsibility to serve wherever his services are required.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
- X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
- 1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
- 2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
- 3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
- 4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
- 5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	5	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	5	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	5	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	5	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
5	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	4	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in agency personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The agency selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career service; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

CODED

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

TO THE SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that it is a general way he knows where he stands.

A 17 Dec 56 next report due

Posted Per. Card DATE DEC 20 ... 12-28-55

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I (To be filled in by Administrative Officer)

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. CAREER DESIGNATION
O'CONNELL, James P. Jr.	19 Feb. 1917	Male	SD-SE

5. DATE OF ENTRANCE ON DUTY	6. OFFICE ASSIGNED TO	7. DIVISION	8. BRANCH
17 December 1951	Security	Security Support	Support

9. NATURE OF ASSIGNMENT	10. IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION	11. GRADE
[XX] DEPARTMENTAL [ ] FIELD		GS-14

12. DATE THAT THIS REPORT IS DUE	13. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
17 December 1955	5 November 1954 to 16 December 1955

SECTION II (To be filled in by Supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION
Chief, Support Branch, Security Support Division (1810.22)	14 December 1954

3. WHAT SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO HIM DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency):

From 5 November 1954 through 13 December 1954, Mr. O'Connell was Assistant Special Agent in Charge of a Security Support Division field office where he supervised a large number of clerical and professional employees engaged in investigating individuals and/or organizations to be employed or used by the Agency and in conducting investigations in support of various Agency activities. From 14 December 1954 to date, Mr. O'Connell has been Chief of the Support Branch, Security Support Division, where he has supervised the activities of clerical and professional employees engaged in directing the very complex and highly important Operational Support and Cover Support activities.

READ THE ENTIRE FORM BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLETE ANY ITEM

SECTION III

I certify that, during the latter half of the period covered by this report, I have discussed with the rated individual the manner in which he has performed his job and provided suggestions and criticisms wherever needed. I believe that his understanding of my evaluation of his performance is consistent with my evaluation of him as evidenced by this fitness report and I have informed him of his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness. If performance during the report period has been unsatisfactory, there is attached a copy of the memorandum notifying him of unsatisfactory performance.

This report [X] has [ ] has not been shown to the individual rated.

THIS DATE	NAME AND SIGNATURE OF RATER (Employee's immediate supervisor)
8 December 55	[signature]

I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT. (Comments, if any, are reflected by attached memorandum)

THIS DATE	NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (Official next higher in line of authority)
14 Dec 55	[signature]

FORM NO. 45, 1 JAN 55 — REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM WHICH MAY BE USED. (4)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descrip[illegible] Dec 28 [illegible] each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer disti[illegible] if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	NOT OBSERVED	CATEGORIES: DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES: A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.												X		
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.												X		
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.							X							
4. HAS INITIATIVE.												X		
5. UNEMOTIONAL.										X				
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.											X			
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.												X		
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.												X		
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.												X		
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.											X			
11. CALM.												X		
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.												X		
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.											X			
14. GETS THINGS DONE.												X		
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.												X		
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.												X		
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.													X	
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.												X		
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.											X			
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.												X		
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.												X		
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.											X			
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.												X		
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.												X		
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.											X			

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Item			
26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.		X	
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.		X	
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".		X	
29. TOUGH MINDED.	X		
30. OBSERVANT.		X	
31. CAPABLE.		X	
32. CLEAR THINKING.	X		
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.	X		
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.		X	
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.		X	
36. DELIBERATE.	X		
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.		X	
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.	X		
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.		X	
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.		X	
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.		X	
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.	X		
43. HAS DRIVE.		X	
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.			X
45. VERSATILE.		X	
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.	X		
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.		X	
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.		X	
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.		X	
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.			X

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Mr. O'Connell is an experienced and highly skilled investigator and investigative supervisor. He obtains and maintains the respect of his subordinates, associates and supervisors. He willingly accepts and discharges responsibilities.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

None.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

No.

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? [X] NO [ ] DEC 28 '10 ... '95

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

None, at this time.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

[ ] 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
[ ] 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
[ ] 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
[ ] 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
[X] 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
[ ] 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? [X] NO [ ] YES. IF YES, WHAT?

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the agency.*

[ ] 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE AGENCY AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
[ ] 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY... IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
[ ] 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS.. WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
[ ] 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY IS INDIFFERENT ... HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
[ ] 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY ..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR AGENCY..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
[X] 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
[ ] 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE AGENCY.

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

[ ] 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
[X] 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
[ ] 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
[ ] 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
[ ] 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
[ ] 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

[ ] 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
[ ] 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
[ ] 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
[ ] 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE AGENCY.
[ ] 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
[X] 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AGENCY.
[ ] 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE AGENCY.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

10

The Fitness Report is an important factor in agency personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The agency selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career service; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

TO THE SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate with his previous supervisor to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

Posted ... 11/29/54
Re... 12/3/54

A Next due date 17 Dec 55

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I (To be filled in by Administrative Officer)

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. CAREER DESIGNATION
O'Connell James P.	10 Feb '27	M	SD-SE

5. DATE OF ENTRANCE ON DUTY	6. OFFICE ASSIGNED TO	7. DIVISION	8. BRANCH
17 December 1951	DD/Security	Special Security	Operations Br.

9. NATURE OF ASSIGNMENT	10. IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION	11. GRADE
☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD		GS-13 4

12. DATE THAT THIS REPORT IS DUE	13. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
22 November 1954	12-16-53 to 11-5-54

SECTION II (To be filled in by Supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION
Chief, Operational Support/Special Inquiry Desk	October 1953

3. WHAT SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO HIM DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency):

He has been responsible at the supervisory level for supervising all investigative cases of an operational support or special inquiry nature. In this field he has worked in major and delicate areas of Agency activity directing matters of utmost sensitivity and import to the Agency. The normal demands of the matters referred to him require expert, skilled, sensitive investigative activity which can only be accomplished when supervised with outstanding judgment and overall knowledge. He has also served as Deputy Chief of the Operations Branch, handling at the administrative level normal and involved matters arising in Branch level operations. He has also served as Assistant to the Deputy Chief, Special Security Division, where his duties were in the major field of coordination.

READ THE ENTIRE FORM BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLETE ANY ITEM

SECTION III

I certify that, during the latter half of the period covered by this report, I have discussed with the rated individual the manner in which he has performed his job and provided suggestions and criticisms wherever needed. I believe that his understanding of my evaluation of his performance is consistent with my evaluation of him as evidenced by this fitness report and I have informed him of his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness. If performance during the report period has been unsatisfactory, there is attached a copy of the memorandum notifying him of unsatisfactory performance.

This report ☐ has ☒ has not been shown to the individual rated.

THIS DATE	SIGNATURE OF RATER (Employee's immediate supervisor)
12 November 1954	David E Hanlon DAVID E HANLON

I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT (Comments, if any, are reflected by attached memorandum)

THIS DATE	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (Official next higher in line of authority)
12 November 1954	Robert A. Cunningham

FORM NO. 37-189 1 MAY 54 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	CATEGORIES													
	NOT OB-SERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES: A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.													X	
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.													X	
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.													X	
4. HAS INITIATIVE.													X	
5. UNEMOTIONAL.														X
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.													X	
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.													X	
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.													X	
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.														X
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.													X	
11. CALM.														X
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.													X	
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.													X	
14. GETS THINGS DONE.													X	
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.													X	
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.														X
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.													X	
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.													X	
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.													X	
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.													X	
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.														X
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.													X	
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.													X	
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.														X
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.														X

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Item	Rating
26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.	X
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.	X
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".	X
29. TOUGH MINDED.	X
30. OBSERVANT.	X
31. CAPABLE.	X
32. CLEAR THINKING.	X
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.	X
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.	X
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.	X
36. DELIBERATE.	X
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.	X
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.	X
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.	X
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.	X
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.	X
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.	X
43. HAS DRIVE.	X
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.	X
45. VERSATILE.	X
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.	X
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.	X
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.	X
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.	X
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.	X

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

An highly outstanding versatility in Division operations at the administrative, supervisory, and operational levels. He has a highly developed ability to handle with firm, deliberate, and excellent judgment matters of great urgency and import. He also possesses a highly developed skill in handling personnel, analyzing performances, and recommending adjustments and reassigrments.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

NA

SECRET

PERSONNEL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MAY 22 3 12 PM '54

MAIL ROOM

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS ... OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

NA

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? [X] NO [ ] YES

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

Training in the Agency Management Program.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

NA

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

- [ ] 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
- [ ] 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
- [ ] 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
- [ ] 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
- [X] 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
- [ ] 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? [ ] NO [ ] YES. IF YES, WHAT?

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the agency.*

- [ ] 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE AGENCY AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
- [ ] 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY... IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
- [ ] 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS.. WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
- [ ] 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY IS INDIFFERENT ... HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
- [ ] 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY ..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR AGENCY..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
- [X] 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
- [ ] 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE AGENCY.

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

- [ ] 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
- [ ] 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
- [ ] 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
- [ ] 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- [X] 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- [ ] 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

- [ ] 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
- [ ] 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
- [ ] 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
- [ ] 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE AGENCY.
- [ ] 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
- [X] 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AGENCY.
- [ ] 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE AGENCY.

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

BY DATE
16 November 1953

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. GRADE	3. POSITION TITLE
O'CONNELL, James P., Jr.	GS-13	Investigator (Gen.)

4. OFFICE	STAFF OR DIVISION	BRANCH	DEPT'L. / FIELD	IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION
Security	Special Security Div.	Operations Br.	[XXX] DEPT'L. [ ] FIELD	

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT	6. TYPE OF REPORT
From 17 Dec 52 To 16 Dec 53	[ ] Initial [XXX] Annual [ ] Special [ ] Reassignment [ ] Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

During the first period of this report from December 1952 to May 1953, I served as Chief, Project Unit. This involved the direction of six supervisors and five clerical employees. This Unit concerned itself with the handling of covert clearances on personnel being utilized in the larger Agency projects. In addition, I was designated the Security Office representative of the Projects Administrative Planning Staff which required my making spot decisions regarding security aspects of the projects under discussion. From May 1953 until October 1953, I was designated Deputy Chief, Operations Branch. This assignment carried with it administrative and supervisory duties as delegated by the Chief, Operations. I also assumed the duties of the Chief in his absence. This involved the supervision of the Covert Records Section and the six desk components of the Operations

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

10.

26 March 1954 — DATE

James P. O'Connell, Jr. — SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Mr. O'Connell's performance is described as outstanding. It is pertinent also to note that Mr. O'Connell's performance has been characterized by a splendid motivation flowing from an obvious disposition on his part to place the interest of the Agency and Division above personal considerations.

14-00000

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

He has demonstrated that he possesses to an extremely high degree the ability to analyze and evaluate problems often times on an emergency basis and to recommend courses of action or to act on the basis of very sound judgment. He has also demonstrated an advanced ability in the field of administration at all levels (continued below - Item 20)

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

By familiarizing himself as far as possible with problems in the Divisional administrative and policy making fields with a view to analyzing for his own knowledge high level approaches and solutions.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

Mr. O'Connell has the present potential of handling greater responsibilities. This ability should constantly develop in degree to the point where his future potential would be increased.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Mr. O'Connell's abilities are such that it may be observed that at this point his assignments may be regarded in terms of his abilities being utilized where most needed.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

Agency training and rotation in the field of management and, generally, training which will provide Mr. O'Connell with more specific and detailed knowledge of the administration and problems of other components of the Agency.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

19 May 1954 — DATE

[signature] — SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

20 May 54 — DATE

[signature] — SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

with which he has been concerned. His approach in this respect is from a general overall standpoint with considerations and actions taken which indicate his ability to consider problems in terms of their general implications to the Division rather than to his specific operation. More specifically, his performance has been noteworthy because it demonstrates a comprehensive knowledge of security problems and the administration of the Security Office. Constantly he is called upon to represent the Division and SO in negotations and conference with representatives of other components of the Agency regarding specific operational problems. He has handled such assignments with a high degree of tact and good judgment demonstrating a definite public relations ability.

SECRET

Section 7 (Cont.)

Branch. Since October 1953, I have served as Chief of the OS/SI Desk. I am charged with the direction of five case supervisors and five clerical employees. The unit handles all requests for operational support assistance emanating from other components of the Agency. This includes the setting up and servicing of covert letter drops; supervision of all escort and courier missions, and the scheduling of appropriate type surveillances. The unit also supervises cases and projects that are by their nature extremely sensitive.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

BY DATE
3 May 54

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. GRADE	3. POSITION TITLE
O'CONNELL, James P., Jr.	GS-12	Investigator (Gen.)

4. OFFICE	STAFF OR DIVISION	BRANCH	[X] DEPT'L. [ ] FIELD	IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION
I&S	SSD	Cps.		

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 11-17-51 To 11-17-52

6. TYPE OF REPORT [ ] Initial [ ] Reassignment [X] Annual [ ] Reassignment of Supervisor [ ] Special

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated.

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

As unit chief of the Project Desk, I am charged with supervision of the processing of security clearances for covert personnel to be utilized on the larger projects of the Agency. This involves the directing of seven case supervisors and five clerical employees. These supervisors are engaged in the scheduling of field investigations, making security appraisals and ultimately issuing a security determination for the covert personnel concerned. As an adjunct to this I also supervise necessary operational support to projects as requested. My position further requires that from time to time I represent the Division in conferences with operational units in regard to pertinent security aspects of covert projects.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
Agent's Basic Training Course	Washington, D.C.	3 Weeks	1/7/52 to 1/25/52
CIA Orientation Course	Washington, D.C.	4 Days	11/18/52 to 11/21/52

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?

Security.

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

10. 3/13/53 — DATE

James P. O'Connell Jr. — SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 15 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Mr. O'Connell has shown his ability in the position of Desk Chief to organize his work and supervise personnel on his "Desk" in such a way as to operate the Desk at maximum effectiveness and efficiency. Mr. O'Connell handles himself in a most impressive and effective way in dealing with other personnel of the Agency in problems relating to security factors in major projects of the Agency. Established deadlines have always been met by Mr. O'Connell and his judgment in rendering decisions has been most adequate.

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1952

SECRET

(Over) (4)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

Mr. O'Connell's ability to organize his work and supervise others and make proper decisions are items in his performance that are considered outstanding.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

Mr. O'Connell's services are excellent in all respects.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

Greater responsibilities could immediately be assigned to Mr. O'Connell if a suitable vacancy existed in the Division.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Mr. O'Connell is well suited for his present position. It is felt that at this time his service in his present position is of most benefit to Mr. O'Connell and the Agency.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

No rotation is recommended at this time. The Division is planning a training program for Headquarters agents which Mr. O'Connell will attend.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE. Services have been satisfactory.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

6 April — DATE

Edward [illegible] — SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in Item 20.)

1 April 53 — DATE

Fred Hall — SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

aq

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type): 009784

NAME (last) (first) (middle): O'CONNELL JAMES P.

DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year): FEB 19, 1917

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 104 03 8105

EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY: 009784

LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code):

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance [ ] (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance [X] (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance [ ] (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print): James P. O'Connell

DATE: 12 February 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

BENEFITS & COUNSELING OFFICE OF PERSONNEL FEB 15 2 55 PM '68

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T JANUARY 1968 (For use only until April 14, 1968.) 176-101

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle)	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
O'CONNELL JAMES PATRICK	2/19/17	104 03 8105
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY	LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	LANGLEY VIRGINIA	

HAVE YOU EVER BEFORE FILED AN "ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE"? [X] YES [ ] NO

If "YES," your last such form remains in effect and you should not file this new form unless you want to change the old one. (See Instructions for Employees on page 4.)

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance [ ] (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance [X] (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance [ ] (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 DATE AND SIGN. RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print): Jim P. O'Connell

DATE: 9 Feb 1973

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176
APRIL 1968
FPM Supplement 870-1
176-102

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle)	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
O'CONNELL, James P.	Feb. 19, 1917	104 03 8105
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY	LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	
CIA	Washington, D. C. 20505	

HAVE YOU EVER BEFORE FILED AN "ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE"? ☐ YES ☒ NO
If "YES," your last such form remains in effect and you should not file this new form unless you want to change the old one. (See Instructions for Employees on page 4.)

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance → [X] (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE
I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance → [ ] (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE
I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance → [ ] (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE
I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 DATE AND SIGN. RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print): James P. O'Connell

DATE: 20 March 1970

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY
(official receiving date stamp)

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176
APRIL 1968
FPM Supplement 870-1
176-102

14-00000

SECRET (When Filled In)

NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	SEX	YEAR OF BIRTH
O'Connell	James	P., Jr.	M	1917

GRADE	E.O.D. DATE (Mo. Da. Yr)	OFFICE, STAFF, DIVISION
GS-[illegible]	Dec. 1951	[illegible]

EDUCATION (Level attained and major subjects): B. S. Economics Degree

TESTING: P.E.T.I.N. / F.L.A.T.B.

COURSE	DATE ENTERED	DATE COMPLETED	REMARKS
INTELLIGENCE ORIENTATION (Or equivalent)	19 Mar.	[illegible]. 1962	(1st two weeks only)
OPERATIONS SUPPORT ([illegible] Phase)	2 Apr.	20 Apr. 1962	
OPERATIONS FAMILIARIZATION (or equivalent)			
CI OPERATIONS			
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES			
MANAGEMENT	4 April	15 April 1955	
SUPERVISION			
Int. Intell. Orient.	18 Nov.	21 Nov. 1952	

SECRET

FORM [illegible] 618 — TRAINING RECORD

NAME (Last)	First	Middle	SERIAL NO.	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	SECRET (When Filled In)
O'CONNELL, James P.		(2)				

GRADE | EOD DATE (Mo-Da-Yr) | ASSIGNMENT | MISCELLANEOUS (Date)

EDUCATION (level attained and major subjects) | DATE TESTED | SCORE

SCHOOL

DEGREE AND DAY

MAJOR

MINOR

P.E.T.I.N. / F.L.A.T.B. / TYPING / CLERICAL / [illegible]

COURSE	DATE ENTERED	DATE COMPLETED	
INTELLIGENCE ORIENTATION (or equivalent)			
OPERATIONS SUPPORT			
OPERATIONS FAMILIARIZATION			
CI FAMILIARIZATION			
MANAGEMENT			
WRITING WORKSHOP			
INTELLIGENCE REVIEW			
Staff Crypto		1954	

TRAINING RECORD

14-00000

SECRET (When Filled In)

COURSE	DATE ENTERED	DATE COMPLETED	REMARKS
SPECIAL AGENTS COURSE			
S. D. FIELD COURSE			
PHYSICAL SECURITY			
Special Security Training		1962	
Protect Intel Against Espionage & Theft		1966	
ADP Lecture		1967	

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY INFORMATION

LANGUAGE	TEST DATE	R	W	S	U	TEST DATE	R	W	S	U	TEST DATE	R	W	S	U

SECRET

SECRET (When Filled In)

COURSE	DATE ENTERED	DATE COMPLETED	REMARKS
CI Familiarization	29 Jan.	9 Feb. 1962	
PHOTOGRAPHY (TSS)			
LOCK PICKING (TSS)			
Am. Abroad (Okinawa)	13 Dec.	14 Dec. 1961	
Writing Workshop (OTR)	13 Feb.	8 Mar. 1962	(DD/S Special)
SPECIAL AGENTS #7	8 Jan.	25 Jan. 1962	
SOFC #12	14 May	25 May 1962	
PHYSICAL SECURITY Co. #8	23 April	11 May 1962	
DS AUDIO COUNTERMEASURES			
Sr. Mgtment. Seminar	8 May	13 May 66	ISO
Exec. Seminar in ADP	7 Sept	8 Sept 67	CSC
Conf. for Federal Execs on Busi. Ops	18 May	23 May 69	Brookings

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET (When Filled In)

NAME	First	Middle		SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
O'Connell	James			X	1927

GRADE	E.O.D. DATE (Mo. Da. Yr)	OFFICE, STAFF, DIVISION
[illegible]	Dec. 1951	[illegible]

EDUCATION (level attained and major subjects)

B. S. Economics Degree

TESTING

P.E.T.A.

F.L.A.T.S

COURSE	DATE ENTERED	DATE COMPLETED	REMARKS
INTELLIGENCE ORIENTATION (or equivalent)	19 Mar.	[illegible] 1962	(1st two weeks only)
OPERATIONS SUPPORT ([illegible] Class)	2 Apr.	20 Apr. 1952	
OPERATIONS FAMILIARIZATION (or equivalent)			
CI OPERATIONS			
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES			
MANAGEMENT	[illegible] April	15 April 1956	
SUPERVISION			
[illegible] Intell. Orient.	13 Nov.	21 Nov. 1952	

SECRET

FORM 513

TRAINING RECORD

(45)

NAME Last	First	Middle	SERIAL NO.	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	SECRET (When Filled In)
O'CONNELL,	James	P. (4)				

GRADE	EOD DATE (Mo-Da-Yr)	ASSIGNMENT	MIDCAREERIST (date)

EDUCATION (level attained and major subjects)

		DATE TESTED	SCORE
SCHOOL	P-E-T-A		
	F-L-A-T-S		
DEGREE AND DATE	WRITING		
MAJOR	TYPING		
MINOR	SHORTHAND		

COURSE	DATE ENTERED	DATE COMPLETED	REMARKS
INTELLIGENCE ORIENTATION (or equivalent)			
OPERATIONS SUPPORT			
OPERATIONS FAMILIARIZATION			
CI FAMILIARIZATION			
MANAGEMENT			
WRITING WORKSHOP			
INTELLIGENCE REVIEW			
Staff Crypto		1954	

FORM 513 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

TRAINING RECORD

DUPL

SECRET

SECRET (When Filled In)

COURSE	DATE ENTERED	DATE COMPLETED	REMARKS
SPECIAL AGENTS COURSE			
S. O. FIELD COURSE			
PHYSICAL SECURITY			
Special Security Training		1962	
Protect Intel Against Espionage & Theft		1966	
ADP Lecture		1967	

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY INFORMATION

LANGUAGE	TEST DATE	R	W	P	S	U	TEST DATE	R	W	P	S	U	TEST DATE	R	W	P	S	U

SECRET

SECRET (When Filled In)

COURSE	DATE ENTERED	DATE COMPLETED	REMARKS
CI Familiarization	29 Jan.	9 Feb. 1962	
PHOTOGRAPHY (TSS)			
LOCK PICKING (TSS)			
Am. Abroad (Okinawa)	13 Dec.	14 Dec. 1961	
Writing Workshop (OTR)	13 Feb.	3 Mar. 1962	(DD/S Special)
SPECIAL AGENTS #7	8 Jan.	25 Jan. 1962	
SOFC #12	14 May	25 May 1962	
PHYSICAL SECURITY Co. #8	23 April	11 May 1962	
SS AUDIO COUNTERMEASURES			
Sr. Mgtment. Seminar	8 May	13 May 66	ISO
Exec. Seminar in ADP	7 Sept	8 Sept 67	CSC
Conf. for Federal Execs on Busi. Ops	18 May	23 May 69	Brookings

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

13 March 1967

As per Directive dated, 17 February 1967, the following Office of Security personnel attended a two hour ADP lecture given by the Office of Computer Services in the Main Auditorium on 9 March 1967:

ANDERSON, Theodore M.
BICKINGS, Betsy Ann
BIELSKI, Christine A.
BRECHBIEL, Beulah
BRIDGETT, Thomas L., Jr.
BRINSON, Mabel H.
BUCCI, Frederick F.
BUCKLEY, Richard F.
BURNS, Donal J.
BUTLER, Paul J.
BYNAKER, Marian K.
CALLAHAN, James W., Jr.
CANTY, William J.
CAPONE, Michaelann
CARPENTIER, Patrick L.
CARROLL, Kenneth F.
CARROLL, Patricia Jean
CASEBOLT, Maxine
CLAYTON, H. Kenneth
COLLINS, Wallace C.
COULTRY, Jean C.
CULLEN, Daniel A.
CULLINAN, Peggy T.
CURTIS, Dorothy V.
DALY, John T.
DALY, Thomas J.
DAVIS, Georganne Francis
DEEGAN, Helen
DEPOY, Flossie Louise
DETERS, Bernadette
DE VAUGHN, Lindal Gail
DIXON, Shirley M.
EIGENBRODE, Pauline S.
FARGO, Edward I.
FARR, James R.
FLOYD, Lewis
FOOTE, Phyllis N.
FULLERTON, Stanley
GARDINER, John F.
GEISS, Ermal P.
GOODRICH, Kenneth S., Jr.
GREEN, James P.
HALL, Delphian H.
HAMBY, Louis L.
HARDT, Ernest L.
HARRINGTON, John T., Jr.
HASTY, Bunia V.
HASTY, Rufus B.
HAUGHERY, William M.
HICKS, Eartha'
HILLIER, Floyd W.
JUSELL, Ralph H.
KELLAM, Sandra E.
KELLEHER, William V.
KING, Joseph F.
KUBISKEY, Rollis A.
LAMM, Frances
LATTANZE, Richard F.
LIGHT, Judith Marie
LOCKMAN, Louis Lee

SECRET

Group I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

LONG, Joan Patricia
LUIBL, Dolores M.
LYON, N. Harris
MAHONEY, Frank M.
MAKINSON, Rae
MANTONI, R. J.
McGREW, William M.
McLEOD, Loretta B.
McMAHON, Francis J.
MELKERSON, Carroll A.
MORGAN, Patsy
MORRISSEY, Raymond
MULLANE, Jeremiah J.,
MURPHY, Joseph E.
MURTEN, Russell E.
NEWMAN, William M.
NOE, T. P.
NOFFSINGER, Martha
O'CONNELL, James P.
O'REILLY, Edward T.
PAINTER, Alana A.
PALMER, Harold L.
PAYNE, Leonard H., Jr.
PETIT, Alan F.
PILLAR, Raymond
PITTMAN, Elizabeth G.
RAINES, John W.
RECTOR, Harry C.
REIMER, Charles F.
ROMAGNOLI, Julius S.
ROMIG, Clyde E.
RUBINO, Dominic J.
SANDELS, John M.
SAVELSBERG, Lillian
SCANLAN, Frank J.
SCHWEGMANN, George C.
SNELSON, Frances Arlene
STEGMAIER, John E.
STEPHAN, James M.
SULLIVAN, Edmond A.
SWIFT, Gerald J.
TACKETT, Charles L.
TAVENNER, Patricia A.
THOMAS, Henry E., III
TUGGLE, Holcombe T.
VASALY, L. W.
VASS, Frances Jean
VERY, Patricia L.
WALLS, William M.
WELSH, Vera D.
WETRICH, Thomas D.
WIENCKOWSKI, Louis
WRIGHT, Richard H.

Robert E. Leidenheimer
Robert E. Leidenheimer
Chief, Training Branch, A&TS/OS

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 7 October 1963, and the information brochure for PCS returnees, dated May 1964.

James P. O'Connell
Signature

18 August 1965
Date

JAMES P. O'CONNELL

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

24 June 1965

James P. O'Connell, Jr.
SUBJECT: Commendation for [redacted]
Ernest.dem Berkaw

1. When [redacted] was moved to Saigon/O'Connell on rather short notice, I named [redacted] as Acting D/COS. He served in this capacity from early April until his departure on 16 June 1965.

2. Within a matter of days he was performing the assigned duties in a superior manner. He most certainly demonstrated sound judgment, dependability and mature tolerance. The latter is an essential for the daily problems unique to any post type service.

3. As to his executive or leadership qualities I believe I can save several paragraphs by stating simply that within a week of assuming his new assignment I left on a 6-day TDY and within 30 days departed south for over 3 weeks and in each case departed with absolute assurance the Station was in good hands, and it was.

4. I would appreciate it if this document could be passed to Chief, KUSODA and if appropriate a copy placed in his personal file.

/s/ James D. Andrews, COS

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS: Submit in duplicate when ordered overseas or whenever designated place of residence, marital or dependency status changes. This information is important in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at Government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and in determining transportation expenses allowable in connection with shipment of remains of employee or member of family.

1. NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) O'Connell (First) James (Middle) P.

2. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ HOME LEAVE POINT

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN APPOINTED: Arlington, Virginia

LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (if appointed abroad):

PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Home Leave Point: c/o John J. Deane, 426 N. Casey Key, Osprey, Florida (Father-in-law)

3. MARITAL STATUS

Status	Place	Date
☐ SINGLE / ☒ MARRIED	PLACE OF MARRIAGE: Brooklyn, New York	DATE OF MARRIAGE: 24 May 1941
☐ DIVORCED	PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE:	DATE OF DIVORCE DECREE:
☐ WIDOWED	PLACE SPOUSE DIED:	DATE SPOUSE DIED:

4. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State)	TELEPHONE
Virginia P. O'Connell	826 Whispering La., Falls Church, Va.	

NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State)	SEX	AGE
Maureen P. O'Connell	SAME	F	23
Virginia D. O'Connell		F	19
James P. O'Connell		M	17
John D. O'Connell		M	11

NAME OF FATHER (or male guardian)	ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State)	TELEPHONE
Deceased		

NAME OF MOTHER (or female guardian)	ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State)	TELEPHONE
Deceased		

5. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME	RELATIONSHIP
John J. O'Connell	Brother

ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State)	TELEPHONE
#2 Old Hills Lane, Port Washington, New York	PO5 3312

THE PERSONS NAMED IN ITEM 4 ABOVE WILL ALSO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE, DUE TO HEALTH OR OTHER PERTINENT REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE UNDER "REMARKS."

VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

THE FOLLOWING AGENCY ENDORSED LIFE AND HOSPITALIZATION INSURANCE POLICIES ARE IN FORCE IN MY NAME: THE "POLICY NO." SHOULD BE ENTERED IF POSSIBLE, SINCE THIS INFORMATION WILL ASSIST IN EXPEDITING ACTION BY THE INSURANCE COMPANY SHOULD A CLAIM BECOME PAYABLE.

6. FULL NAME OF COMPANY	ADDRESS OF HOME OFFICE	POLICY NO.

7. I HAVE COMPLETED THE FOLLOWING: WILL ☐ YES ☐ NO POWER OF ATTORNEY ☐ YES ☐ NO

8. REMARKS:

Change in Home Leave Point APPROVED:
[signature]
[illegible] Personnel
13 Apr 61

15 APR 1965 [stamp]

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
Okinawa, R.I.	30 March 1965	[signature]

FORM NO. 61 1 JUL 54 REPLACES FORM 37-78 WHICH MAY BE USED.

CONFIDENTIAL (4)

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if SA)	DATE (from item 5-1)	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true)	DATE (from item 5-2)
James P. O'Connell, Jr.	26 Oct 64	James Andrews	26 Oct 64
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: FE/P/JKO 10 Nov 64	DISPATCH NUMBER: TMW 376517	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE:	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH	2. SERVICE DESIGN	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE	4. STATION OR BASE	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER
19 Feb 1917	SS	C/~~Regional~~-Security Support Staff, GS-15	Okinawa	ODIBEX

6A. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD	6B. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE	6C. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ	6D. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE
26 Jul 62	15 Jun 65	15 Aug 65	15 Aug 65

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU: 4 Dependents

Wife - 48 yrs. Son - 17 yrs.
Daughter- 22 yrs. Son - 11 yrs.

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

None.

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (see special note on transmittal form). (also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8)

SEE ATTACHED SHEET.

10. TRAINING DESIRED: INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

Management courses.

(4)

FORM 5-63 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

11a. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

I would prefer to be assigned to a position that would allow me to use my past experience in investigative or operational support activities.

11b. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 (*for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice*) IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

☐ EXTEND TOUR ______ MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO ______ (DATE)

[1] BE ASSIGNED TO HQDTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY: INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE
1ST CHOICE Investigations Division 2ND CHOICE Operations Support Div. 3RD CHOICE Field Office

☐ BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION: INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION
1ST CHOICE ______ 2ND CHOICE ______ 3RD CHOICE ______

☐ RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Station concurs in Subject's preferences. He would be eminently qualified for an assignment, for example, as chief, investigations division. Although a good supervisor, it is recommended that the training he requests in the field of management be approved; despite his grade, the organization's mid-career program would probably be more effective than some external programs.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

FE Division defers to the SS Career Service for determination of Subject's next assignment.

DATE 13 Nov. 64 TITLE CFE/PERS SIGNATURE Robert L. Staten

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:

Chief, Investigations Division in accordance with request in Sec. 11b (above)

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. ~~FGOS - 4659~~ DATED: ~~13 Jan 1965~~

CABLE NO. ______ DATED: ______

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: Robert E. O'Brien (SIGNATURE) DATE: 13 January 1965

Robert E. O'Brien

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR:

As Senior Security Officer in the Far East, I have the following responsibilities and duties:

1. The overall security responsibility for all stations and bases within the cognizance of the area division.

2. Administers and supervises the Regional Staff whose mission includes conducting Security Audits of all FE stations and bases; administering polygraph examinations, audio countermeasure inspections, physical and technical security matters and air ops security support.

3. Monitors the performance of Career Security Officers assigned to individual stations from the standpoint of effectiveness and productivity.

4. Security Officer to the Senior War Planner, Honolulu.

5. COMINT Security Officer for all FE installations.

6. Security and alternate Control Officer for the clearance system governing special projects in the Far East of the Office of Special Activities.

7. Furnishes security advice and guidance to the Chief of Station, Okinawa as requested.

8. Maintains a regional liaison capability with other U.S. Government agencies in the FE area.

9. Performs sensitive security inquiries as directed by Headquarters.

ATTACHMENT HEREWITH TO FCOT-6937
dtd 22 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: [redacted] James P. O'Connell (1)
Period July 62 – Aug 63

1. In accordance with FR 20-8 b (2) this memorandum is written in lieu of submission of Form 45.

2. (1) [redacted] has been attached to Okinawa Station since 24 July 1962. As Chief, Regional KUSODA Staff, Okinawa, he has the responsibility of providing KUSODA support to all FE and SEA Stations. Although as Chief of Station, Okinawa I do not have supervisory responsibility over the Regional KUSODA Program, I am pleased to state that in my opinion he has carried out his work in a commendable manner.

3. In addition to carrying out his Regional responsibilities, (1) [redacted] has been very helpful to Okinawa Station. He has established excellent rapport with the military and has ably assisted the Station in several delicate problems. In approaching any problem [redacted] (1) is objective, tactful, and exercises good judgment.

4. It would be a pleasure to serve with him at any time.

Ernest F. Saylor
ERNEST F. SAYLOR
COS, Okinawa

READ: [redacted] (1)
James P O'Connell

20 JUN 1963

CONFIDENTIAL

ATTACHMENT HEREWITH TO FCOT-6937
dtd 22 May 1963

James P. O'Connell, Service Designation--SS, Security Officer, DDP/FE/JKO
for period 24 July 1962 - 22 May 1963, GS-15

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: [redacted] James P. O'Connell

1. In accordance with FR 20-9 b (2) this memorandum is written in lieu of submission of Form 45.

2. [redacted] has been attached to Okinawa Station since 24 July 1962. As Chief, Regional KUSODA Staff, Okinawa, he has the responsibility of providing KUSODA support to all FE and SEA Stations. Although as Chief of Station, Okinawa I do not have supervisory responsibility over the Regional KUSODA Program, I am pleased to state that in my opinion he has carried out his work in a commendable manner.

3. In addition to carrying out his Regional responsibilities, [redacted] has been very helpful to Okinawa Station. He has established excellent rapport with the military and has ably assisted the Station in several delicate problems. In approaching any problem [redacted] is objective, tactful, and exercises good judgment.

4. It would be a pleasure to serve with him at any time.

/S/ George E. Meloon, COS

READ:

/S/ James P. O'Connell

Reviewer Comments: Subject has placed emphasis on his required responsibility as contrasted to Okinawa security problems. This emphasis plus his personality and professional reputation has enabled a definite contribution to the Regional Far East security function, in spite of the fact that there is an inherent tendency to bypass Okinawa on security matters since it is not in the command channel to all FE Stations.

/S/
Raymond F. Drummond
CFE/Support

CONFIDENTIAL

28 JUN 1963

3 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Administrative & Training Staff

SUBJECT : O'CONNELL, James P.
Personal Matter (Last Will and Testament)

On June 28, 1962, Mr. O'Connell communicated with the undersigned and asked that the following information be properly recorded:

> He advised that on 28 June 1962, both he and his spouse had executed Last Wills and Testaments. He is maintaining in his possession a copy of the mutual Wills. The originals are in the custody of Joseph Keating, Esq., 150 Little Falls Road, Falls Church, Virginia. Mr. Keating is the Attorney who drew up the Testaments.

David E. Hanlon
Executive Officer

file
7/5

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

T/R

Complete in duplicate. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. The original of this form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
O'CONNELL	JAMES	P.	104-03-8105

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY APPOINTED	LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad)
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA	
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE	HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE
FALLS CHURCH, VIRGINIA	FALLS CHURCH, VA

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

SINGLE	MARRIED	SEPARATED	DIVORCED	WIDOWED	ANNULLED
	✓				

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE	DATE OF MARRIAGE
BROOKLYN NEW YORK	MAY 24 ~~APRIL 4~~ 1941
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE	DATE OF DECREE
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED	DATE SPOUSE DIED

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S).

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	TELEPHONE NO.	
VIRGINIA P. O'CONNELL	826 WHISPERING LANE		
NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
MAUREEN	FALLS CHURCH VIRGINIA	F	22 APR 42
VIRGINIA D.		F	26 FEB 46
JAMES P.		M	17 AUG 47
JOHN D.		M	4 JAN 54
NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.	
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.	

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY.
MOTHER AND BROTHER

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle)	RELATIONSHIP
O'CONNELL, JOHN	BROTHER
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
2 OLD HILLS LANE, PORT WASHINGTON NY	PO
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE	BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION

Question	YES	NO
IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.)	✓	
IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.)	✓	
DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 5.)	✓	

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. If such notification is not desirable because of health or other reasons, please so state in item 5 on the reverse side of this form.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

NATIONAL SAVINGS AND TRUST CO.
15 + PENN. AVE N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C.
VIRGINIA P + JAMES P. O'CONNELL JR.

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☐ YES ☑ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?
☐ YES ☑ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☑ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
	20 April 1967	James P. O'Connell

CONFIDENTIAL

7 JAN 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: DD(IOS)

SUBJECT : James O'Connell
Ervan Kuhnke

1. I am pleased to forward the attached letter from the Director, Office of Security, USIA commending Messrs. O'Connell and Kuhnke for assistance rendered the United States Information Agency.

2. Please bring this correspondence to the attention of Messrs. O'Connell and Kuhnke with my personal thanks for their good work.

3. After it has served its purpose, this correspondence should be forwarded to A&TS for filing in appropriate Administrative and Personnel files.

Sheffield Edwards
Director of Security

Attachment

Distribution:
Orig. & 3 - Addressee
1 - Commendation File
1 - Chrono

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON

January 26, 1961

Dear Shef,

I would like to take this opportunity to belatedly express the sincere appreciation of both my office and the Broadcasting Service of this Agency for the assistance rendered by employees of your staff, Mr. James O'Connell and Mr. Ervon Kuhnke in September and December of last year. This assistance consisted of picking up tape recordings prepared by Radio Moscow in the possession of Mr. Paul Frederick Dauer, 1923 De La Vina Street, Santa Barbara, California and delivering them to my office for the information of our Broadcasting Service. In addition to this service, Mr. Kuhnke of your staff readily volunteered to see that these tapes were returned to Mr. Dauer and this latter service was performed last month.

The excellent spirit of liaison co-operation evidenced by your staff is most gratifying to me and it is hoped that I might be of service in some similar matter in the future.

Sincerely,

Paul J. McNichol, Director
Office of Security

Colonel Sheffield Edwards
Director, Office of Security
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

14-00000

SECRET

27 FEB 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF SECURITY

SUBJECT : PROJECT HARPSTAR

1. With the successful launching of Project "HARPSTAR" I would like to take this opportunity to thank you and your staff for the efficient support given FE Division in this matter.

2. I wish especially to compliment Mr. James P. O'Connell of your staff for his imaginative handling of the many aspects of this complicated operation.

[signature]

Richard Helms
Chief of Operations

SECRET

4 May 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James P. O'Connell

THROUGH : Deputy Director (IOS)

SUBJECT : Commendation

1. Upon your reassignment from Chief, Operational Support Branch to Deputy Chief, SSD, I wish to forward my personal commendation for your many years of outstanding performance in operational support. You have displayed not only an unusual aptitude in the security handling of support, but have evidenced a highly professional intelligence approach to the many problems given you. As example, I cite a recent case where through certain assets of this office, you arranged for and directed the spotting, recruitment, briefing, cover and cut-out arrangements for an agent engaged in a very sensitive operation of interest to the highest authorities in the Agency, and conducted it on an "Eyes Only" basis.

2. In this operation, as in many others, you have exercised imagination with both judgment and discretion; all of which has brought great credit to this office, the Deputy Director (IOS), your Division, and, of course, yourself.

3. I congratulate you and am confident of your continued success in the office and in the Office of Security Career Service.

4. I am arranging to file copies of this letter in your Personnel and Administrative files.

Sheffield Edwards
Director of Security

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - DD(IOS)
[illegible]

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

9 DEC 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: James O'Connell, Jr.

SUBJECT: Notification of Membership in the Career Staff

1. On behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence, it gives me pleasure to inform you that your application for membership in the Career Staff has been accepted by the CIA Selection Board. The effective date of your membership is 17 December 1954.

2. Please indicate that you have received this notification by signing in the space provided below and return it to the Head of your Career Service. He will forward it to the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board.

3. Because your membership in the Career Staff is classified information, it is necessary that this notification be conveyed to you in this manner. The application for membership which you signed has been endorsed on behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence by the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board and placed in your permanent Official Personnel Folder.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Harrison G. Reynolds
Harrison G. Reynolds
Chairman, CIA Selection Board

Noted:
[illegible signature]
Date: [illegible]

SECRET

FORM NO. 511, 1 APR 55 (4)

14-00000

SECRET

CAREER SERVICE QUESTIONNAIRE

SECTION I (To be completed by employee)

NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	AGE	GRADE	NO. OF MOS. IN GRADE	CAREER DESIGNATION
O'CONNELL	James	F.	37	13	21	CD-SE

STAFF OR DIVISION	BRANCH	POSITION TITLE
SSD	Operations	Investigator General, Desk Chief

NO. OF MOS. IN PRESENT POSITION	NO. OF MOS. IN OSS	NO. OF MOS. IN CIG	NO. OF MOS. IN CIA
10	0	0	32

DATA ON ALL PERMANENT DUTY OVERSEAS OR IN U.S. FIELD (Include any TDY during last two years)

APPROXIMATE DATES OF SERVICE		LOCATION		TDY	PCS	COMMENTS
FROM	TO	COUNTRY	STATION			
None						

INDICATE WILLINGNESS TO SERVE TOUR OF DUTY OVERSEAS PCS

A [ ] YES B [X] ONLY UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS C [ ] NO

INDICATE ASSIGNMENT PREFERENCE IF PRECEDING ANSWER IS "A" OR "B"

PREFERENCE	COUNTRY	STATION	TYPE OF POSITION
1ST	Germany	Frankfurt	Security Officer
2ND	Netherlands	The Hague	" "
3RD	Switzerland	Zurich	" "

IF ANSWER ABOVE IS "B" STATE CONDITIONS; IF ANSWER ABOVE IS "C," EXPLAIN YOUR REASONS

Wish to have family reside with me.

INDICATE GEOGRAPHIC AREAS OVERSEAS IN WHICH YOU WILL NOT SERVE AND EXPLAIN REASONS

I do not wish an assignment which would interfere with childrens' education or health.

INDICATE RELATIONSHIP AND AGE OF EACH DEPENDENT TO BE MOVED OVERSEAS

wife - 37 yrs
daughter - 12 yrs
daughter - 8 yrs
son - 7 yrs
son - 8 mos.

INDICATE KNOWN MEDICAL RESTRICTIONS WHICH THE AGENCY HAS IMPOSED ON YOUR SERVICE

None

FORM NO. 59-174
1 JUN 54

SECRET

*MAY BE CONTINUED UNDER REMARKS ON REVERSE SIDE. (4)

SECRET

INDICATE ANY UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES CONCERNING DEPENDENTS (old age, chronic illness, need for special educational facilities, etc.) OR ANY UNUSUAL PERSONAL SITUATION WHICH WOULD AFFECT YOUR OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

None.

DESCRIBE TYPES OF HEADQUARTERS AND U.S. FIELD POSITIONS FOR WHICH YOU WOULD LIKE TO BE CONSIDERED AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL COMPONENT IN WHICH YOU WOULD LIKE TO SERVE

Security Officer in any agency component.

REMARKS

DATE 2 Sept. 54

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James P. O'Connell

SECTION II (To be completed by employee's supervisor)

INDICATE APPROXIMATE TIME (months) WHEN EMPLOYEE CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR OVERSEAS SERVICE

3 months

INDICATE APPROXIMATE TIME (months) WHEN EMPLOYEE CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR ANOTHER HEADQUARTERS OR U.S. FIELD ASSIGNMENT

3 months

COMMENTS ON AVAILABILITY AND EMPLOYEE'S PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT

Mr. O'Connell is presently supervising an all important Desk in the Division and in connection with his overall versatility in the administrative field, his ~~ability~~ availability is limited by the fact that he would have to assist in training a replacement. His preference is logically stated with the further comment that his ability is so advanced that he would qualify as a top ranking Security Officer.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR [signature] 9/3/54

PERSONNEL OFFICER WILL FORWARD ORIGINAL TO OFFICE OF PERSONNEL AND FIRST COPY TO APPROPRIATE CAREER SERVICE BOARD

*MAY BE CONTINUED UNDER REMARKS

SECRET

Chief, Special Security Division 26 April 1954

Director of Security

Commendation for Messrs. James P. O'Connell, Jr. and William J. Cotter

1. The attached memorandum from the Chief, SR, dated 23 April, commending the services of Messrs. James P. O'Connell and William J. Cotter of the Special Security Division is forwarded to you with great pleasure.

2. Please bring this to the attention of Messrs. O'Connell and Cotter and extend to them my personal commendation and thanks for the excellent services which the subject memorandum reflects. Copies of these commendations are to be included in the Security and Personnel files of Messrs. O'Connell and Cotter.

Sheffield Edwards

14-00000

COPY

20 April 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT: Commendation of Security Office Personnel

1. It is with pleasure that I wish to pass to your Special Security Division a personal commendation of two officers who have assisted materially in the establishment and continued successful management of the AEFILTER project.

2. Confronted with a sudden requirement to deploy several security officers to a new activity here in the United States, Mr. James P. O'Connell, Jr., contributed materially to the project in the coordination of several neighborhood checks, re-assignment of several Security Office personnel, the preparation of two safe houses on short notice, and the reception of sensitive alien personnel under the strictest security precautions. Mr. O'Connell has put in many hours on this project, well beyond his normal routine, and several times at great personal inconvenience.

3. I wish, at the same time, to commend specifically the security officer who went under the operational alias of [redacted] William J. Carter. This officer supervised five other highly qualified and experienced officers in the preparation of elaborate house-breaking safeguards for the first safe house acquired under Project AEFILTER. [redacted] Carter did his job not only thoroughly but quite cheerfully, despite actual personal hardship.

4. It is all too seldom that the Divisions get around to giving credit where it is due, even in the domestic activities of DD/P. In these two cases, however, I feel that this commendation is the least token that can be proffered to two devoted and skilled civil servants.

5. I suggest that copies of this memorandum be included in the personnel files of both Mr. O'Connell and [redacted] Carter

DANA B. DURAND
CSR

COPY

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 144
JANUARY 1952
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAPTERS LI AND RI

STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL AND MILITARY SERVICE

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used in determining creditable service for *leave purposes* and retention credits for *reduction in force*. The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through IV.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*): O'CONNELL, JAMES P. JR.

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 19 FEB 1917

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENTS (*Do not include military service.*)

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TO— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WASHINGTON, D.C.	41	3	3	51	11	30	SPECIAL AGENT
CIA	51	12	17	52	12	21	1/7/45 12/9/57

4. LIST PERIODS OF SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TO— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	DISCHARGE (*Hon. or dishon.?*)
U.S. NAVY	44	10	4	46	2	15	HON.

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☑ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (*LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar*)	FROM— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TO— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TOTAL YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☑ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

7. ARE YOU:
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☑ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☑ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☑ NO

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.

I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

_________________ (DATE) James P. O'Connell Jr. (SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this ______ day of ______ (MONTH) 1952 at ______ (CITY) ______ (STATE)

SEAL

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. CSC STATUS (*For permanent employees only*) ☐ YES ☐ NO

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY
4	8	28
1	—	5
1	4	12

12. TOTAL SERVICE: 7 - 1 - 15

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*):

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

(OVER)

10—66489-1

14-00000

JAMES P. O'CONNELL

the

8 January 1952 25 January 1952

C. F. Henry

28 January 1952

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED AUGUST 1950)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

Central Intelligence Agency (Department or agency) (Bureau or division) (Place of employment)

I, James P. O'Connell, Jr., do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

17 December 1951 (Date of entrance on duty)

James P. O'Connell Jr. (Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 17th day of Dec., A. D. 1951,

at Wash. D.C. (City) (State)

[SEAL]

Robert J. Hayes (Signature of officer)

Appt Clerk (Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

16—55150-8

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (street and number, city and State)
3212 SOUTH 9 ST. ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH: FEB 19 1917
(B) PLACE OF BIRTH (city or town and State or country): ELMHURST NEW YORK

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY: VIRGINIA P. O'CONNELL
(B) RELATIONSHIP: WIFE
(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE: 3212 SO. 9 ST. ARLINGTON VIRGINIA
(D) TELEPHONE NO.: JA2-3622

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☒ NO
If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (Give street number, if any)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*	X	
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date and reason in each case.*		X
9. HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED (NOT INCLUDING TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH YOU WERE FINED $25 OR LESS, OR FORFEITED COLLATERAL OF $25 OR LESS) SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—It is the duty of the appointing officer to guard against impersonation and to determine beyond reasonable doubt that the appointee is the same person whose appointment was authorized. The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and or other pertinent papers. If the appointee qualified in a written examination, the signature on this form should be compared with the signature on the declaration sheet, which was signed in the examination room. His physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members-of-family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

DMB

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS.

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD	GRADE
009784	O'CONNELL, J. P., Jr.	02/19/17	SS	16

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE ☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1. Brookings Institution - Seminar on	Public and Business Policy	17 May	18 May 1972	
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 7-69 444n USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (4-51)

 7 3 MAY 1972

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X) RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM) 2. SHORTHAND (WPM) 3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (Active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (*Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian*)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	RESIDENT / AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State, Country*)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE: 4/5/73

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: James P. O'Connell

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

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SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD	GRADE
009784	O'CONNELL, J. P., Jr.	19 Feb 1917	SS	GS-16

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE ☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)	
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER	
7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 7-69 444n USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X): RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM) 2. SHORTHAND (WPM) 3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY):

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG: ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (*Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian*)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	RESIDENT / AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State, Country*)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE 30 April 1972

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James P. O'Connell

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

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SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD
009784	O'CONNELL, James P.	2/19/17	SS

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE ☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1. Brookings Institute	Federal Executive Seminar	May 1969		1 week
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:
2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)	
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER	
7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

SECRET

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GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

20 OCT [illegible]

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X) RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.		MAY 6 10 54 AM '70					
2.							

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM) 2. SHORTHAND (WPM) 3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG: ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED *(Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)*

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	RESIDENT / AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE: 13 April 1970

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: James P. O'Connell

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

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SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
009784	O'CONNELL, James P.	19 Feb. 1917

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE ☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)	
5. OCCUPATION	**6. PRESENT EMPLOYER**	
7. CITIZENSHIP	**8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)**	**9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED**

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

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SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1. Japan, Okinawa, Hong Kong, Bangkok, Laos, Rangoon,		2 Oct. 1967					TDY
2. Philippines	none	to 6 Nov. 1967					TDY

(Knowledge acquired by — check (X))

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM) 2. SHORTHAND (WPM) 3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED — CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM

☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG: ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (*Extended Active Reserve Duty, or as Civilian*)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	RESIDENT / AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State, Country*)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
25 April 1968	James P. O'Connell

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(When Filled In)

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QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not. Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
009784	O'CONNELL, James P.	19 Feb 1917

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE ☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1.							
2.							

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.					
2.					

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:
2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)
3. DATE OF BIRTH
4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION
6. PRESENT EMPLOYER
7. CITIZENSHIP
8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)
9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

	NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

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SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X): RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.			MAY 1	11 00 AM '69			
2.							

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM) 2. SHORTHAND (WPM) 3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (*active*) ☐ STANDBY (*inactive*) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (*Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian*)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	RESIDENT / AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State, Country*)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X REMARKS

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
2 March 1969	[signature]

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QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP SER NO	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	3. SEX	4. DATE OF BIRTH	5. SCHEDULE, GRADE, STEP
089784	OCONNELL J P JR		02/19/17	GS -16-04

6. SD	7. POSITION TITLE	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT	9. LOCATION (Country, City)
SS	SECURITY OFFICER	SEC	WASH., D.C.

SECTION II AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY 24	59/04/04	59/04/18
~~VOLCANO ISLANDS~~ OKINAWA, RYUKU IS.	PCS 45	62/07/25	65/08/18

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED
DATE: [illegible]
4 AUG 67 [initials]

SECTION III EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
BACH	ECONOMICS, GENERAL	ST JOHNS UNIV NY	39

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SECTION IV GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY CHECK (X): RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT

SECTION V TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM): NONE
2. SHORTHAND (WPM):
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM: ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER-SPECIFY
4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (comptometer, mimeograph, card punch, etc.)

SECTION VI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.
   BASKETBALL - GOOD
   PIANO-ORGAN - ABOVE AVERAGE
   CARPENTRY - GOOD
2. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4, SECTION V, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF RADIO TRANSMITTERS (indicate CW speed sending & receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, EDP AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL DEVICES.
   NONE
3. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, PHYSICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ☒ NO
4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 3 ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATION AND THE ISSUING STATE, MUNICIPALITY, ETC. (Include license registry number if known)
5. FIRST LICENSE, CERTIFICATE (year of issue)
6. LATEST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)
7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (do NOT submit copies unless requested). INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (non-fiction or scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)
   NONE
8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED
   NONE
9. PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
   NONE

SECRET

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When Filled In

SECTION VII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION

3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY SERVICE RECORD (Active Duty Only)

1. MILITARY ORGANIZATION (Army, Navy, etc. - specify): NONE

2. BRANCH OR CORPS

3. DATES OF SERVICE (extended active duty) FROM TO

4. STATUS (Regular, Reserve, etc. - specify)

5. RANK, GRADE OR RATE (at separation if past service)

6. SERIAL, SERVICE OR FILE NUMBER

7. CHECK TYPE OF SEPARATION

- ☒ HONORABLE DISCHARGE
- ☐ RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY
- ☐ RETIREMENT FOR AGE
- ☐ RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE
- ☐ RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY
- ☐ RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY
- ☐ UNDUE HARDSHIPS
- ☐ OTHER (Specify)

8. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES (record the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS NONE

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG

- ☐ ARMY
- ☐ NAVY
- ☐ MARINE CORPS
- ☐ AIR FORCE
- ☐ COAST GUARD
- ☐ NATIONAL GUARD
- ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE

2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK

3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY active ☐ STANDBY inactive ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES (record the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)

6. IF YOU ARE CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO A RESERVE OR NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING UNIT, IDENTIFY THE UNIT AND ITS ADDRESS

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Active Duty, Reserve Status or as Civilian)

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
1.	NONE			RESIDENT / CORRESPONDENCE / AGENCY SPONSORED
2.				RESIDENT / CORRESPONDENCE / AGENCY SPONSORED
3.				RESIDENT / CORRESPONDENCE / AGENCY SPONSORED
4.				RESIDENT / CORRESPONDENCE / AGENCY SPONSORED
5.				RESIDENT / CORRESPONDENCE / AGENCY SPONSORED

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SECTION VIII

AGENCY EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year)	2. LOCATION (Country, City)	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH
SEPT 65 - JAN 67	HEAD QUARTERS	OFFICE OF SECURITY
4. TITLE OF JOB		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB
ASSIST DEP DIR SECURITY, INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT		GS 16

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

ASSISTED THE DDS/IOS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF DOMESTIC FIELD OFFICES, SUPERVISED OPERATIONAL SUPPORT ACTIVITIES AND THE PROCESSING OF COVERT INVESTIGATIONS AND CLEARANCES. THIS INVOLVED THE SUPERVISION OF THREE DIVISION CHIEFS, ONE STAFF CHIEF AND EIGHT SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE ALL OF WHOM WERE AT THE GS15 LEVEL. REPRESENTED THE OFFICE AT INTRA AND INTER AGENCY MEETINGS ON MATTERS CONCERNING OPERATIONAL SUPPORT AND INVESTIGATIONS. FUNCTIONED AS THE DDS/IOS IN HIS ABSENCE.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year)	2. LOCATION (Country, City)	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH
JULY 1962 - JUNE 65	OKINAWA, RYUKU ISLANDS	FE DIVISION
4. TITLE OF JOB		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB
CHIEF FE REGIONAL SECURITY STAFF		GS15

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SECURITY PROGRAM IN THE FAR EAST. FUNCTIONED WITH A STAFF COMPOSED OF AUDIO COUNTERMEASURES TEAM, 3 POLYGRAPH EXAMINERS AND TWO GENERALISTS. SCHEDULED SECURITY AUDITS WHICH WERE PERIODICALLY WERE CONDUCTED AT ALL FE STATIONS AND BASES AND UPON REQUEST AT SOD AND DDS+T INSTALLATIONS. WAS AVAILABLE TO PERSONALLY HANDLE SENSITIVE SECURITY MATTERS AT THE REQUEST OF HEADQUARTERS AND CHIEFS OF STATIONS. RESPONDED TO ALL REQUESTS FOR POLYGRAPH COVERAGE, PHYSICAL SECURITY MATTERS AND TECHNICAL NEEDS SUCH AS AUDIO COUNTERMEASURES AND ALARM SYSTEMS. WORKED IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH COMSEC IN INSPECTING COMMO FACILITIES IN THE AREA. MADE RECOMMENDATIONS IN COORDINATION WITH THE FE ENGINEERS FOR STRUCTURAL CHANGES AND INNOVATIONS TO IMPROVE SECURITY. MAINTAINED LIAISON WITH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY COUNTERPARTS. WAS SECURITY ADVISOR TO SRWAC PLANS OFFICER, HAWAII.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year)	2. LOCATION (Country, City)	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH
JUNE 1959 - JUNE 62	HEAD QUARTERS	DDS/IOS
4. TITLE OF JOB		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB
CHIEF OPERATIONAL SUPPORT DIVISION		GS15

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

ADMINISTERED ACTIVITIES PERTAINING TO THE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT TO THE CLANDESTINE SERVICES AND OTHER AGENCY COMPONENTS. THIS CONSISTED OF ACCEPTING REQUIREMENTS AND ANALYZING THE BEST METHODS OF IMPLEMENTING THEM THROUGH THE O/S FACILITIES. SUPERVISED HEADQUARTERS PERSONNEL WHO GAVE THESE ASSIGNMENTS TO THE DOMESTIC FIELD OFFICES. THE NATURE OF REQUESTS RANGED FROM SIMPLE TYPE SUPPORT SUCH AS A LETTER DROP TO THE COMPLEX HANDLING OF A HIGH LEVEL DEFECTOR WHICH INVOLVED ESCORTS, SAFE HOUSE FACILITIES, SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES ETC.

PERSONALLY HANDLED SENSITIVE CASES FOR DIRECTOR OF SECURITY

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SECTION VIII — AGENCY EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (Cont'd)

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year)	2. LOCATION (Country, City)	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION BRANCH
NOV 55 - JUNE 59	HEADQUARTERS	SECURITY SUPPORT DIV. /OS
4. TITLE OF JOB		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB
CHIEF, SUPPORT BRANCH		GS 14

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

THIS WAS BASICALLY SAME AS PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED ASSIGNMENT. THE SUPPORT BRANCH BECAUSE OF IT'S EXPANSION OF ASSIGNMENTS WAS ELEVATED TO DIVISION STATUS.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year)	2. LOCATION (Country, City)	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION BRANCH
DEC 54 - NOV 55	WASHINGTON, D.C.	DISTRICT FIELD OFFICE SPECIAL SECURITY DIV. /OS
4. TITLE OF JOB		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB
ASSIST. SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE		GS13-GS 14

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

ASSISTED THE SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE IN ADMINISTERING THE DISTRICT FIELD OFFICE. THIS ENTAILED THE SUPERVISION OF FIFTY INVESTIGATIVE AGENTS WHO CONDUCTED INVESIGATIONS ON AGENCY APPLICANTS, INDIVIDUALS WHO MAY BE OF INTEREST OF THE AGENCY IN EITHER AN OVERT OR COVERT MANNER. WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE NATIONAL AGENCY CHECKS CONDUCTED BY DFO IN THE VARIOUS GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. ALSO HAD SUPERVISORY COGNIZANCE OVER THE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT ASSIGNMENTS GIVEN THE DFO.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year)	2. LOCATION (Country, City)	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION BRANCH
JULY 52 - DEC 54	HEADQUARTERS	SPECIAL SECURITY DIV /OS
4. TITLE OF JOB		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB
CHIEF, PROJECT DESK		GS 13

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

RESPONSIBLE FOR SEVEN SUPERVISORS WHO PROCESSED COVERT CLEARANCE ACTIONS ON INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE TO BE EMPLOYED WITH OR ASSOCIATED WITH THE AGENCY. REPRESENTED OS AT INTRA AGENCY COMMITTEE MONITORING PROPRIETARY PROJECTS. GAVE ADVICE AND GUIDANCE ON SECURITY PROBLEMS INVOLVING OPERATIONAL PROJECTS. DELIVERED LECTURES ON SECURITY MATTERS FOR OTR.

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SECTION IX	MARITAL STATUS		
1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Re-married. SPECIFY) NO CHANGE			
2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)			
3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)		
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER		
7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)		9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION X — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
JAMES P JR	SON	8/17/47	U.S	1833 ELSINORE AVE McLEAN, VIRGINIA
JOHN D	SON	1/4/54	U.S.	" "

SECTION XI — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
SOCIETY OF FORMER FBI AGENTS (WASHINGTON D.C.)	WASHINGTON, D.C.	1952	DATE

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
31 March 1967	James P. O'Connell

SECRET

O CONNELL JAMES P (1) 652 OS (2) (3) 665 (4)

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF GRANTING OR OF REVOCATION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC CLEARANCE

THE ABOVE-NAMED INDIVIDUAL (ITEM 1) HAS BEEN GRANTED A CRYPTOGRAPHIC CLEARANCE (OR THE CRYPTOGRAPHIC CLEARANCE HELD BY THIS INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN REVOKED) UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF HR 92-4. THE CLEARANCE (ITEM 2) OR REVOCATION (ITEM 4), IS EFFECTIVE AS OF THE MONTH AND YEAR SHOWN ABOVE. SUBJECT HAS BEEN BRIEFED OR DEBRIEFED, AS APPROPRIATE, CONCERNING CRYPTOGRAPHIC AND RELATED COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY MATTERS AND HAS SIGNED A BRIEFING/DEBRIEFING STATEMENT, AS APPROPRIATE, ACKNOWLEDGING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROTECTION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION. UPON REVOCATION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC CLEARANCE SUBJECT IS NOT AUTHORIZED TO HAVE CONTINUED CUSTODY OF, ACCESS TO, OR OTHERWISE GAIN FURTHER KNOWLEDGE OF STAFF CRYPTOGRAPHIC MATERIAL OR INFORMATION.

WHEN EMPLOYEE NO LONGER REQUIRES THE CLEARANCE IN ORDER TO PERFORM HIS HER ASSIGNED DUTIES, IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY STAFF, OC, BE NOTIFIED THAT THE CLEARANCE MAY BE REVOKED.

DISTRIBUTION:
1 - EMPLOYEE'S COMPONENT (ITEM 3)
1 - OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS:

Jean Paul DeBlois

CHIEF, ~~PROCEDURES~~ DOCTRINES BRANCH, CSS

FORM 12-63 1597b USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

DEC

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

109734

THIS DATE

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): O'CONNELL JAMES PATRICK JR.
2. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): 826 WHISPERING LANE FALLS CHURCH, VIRGINIA
3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): SAME AS 2.
4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: CLEARBROOK 6-1891
5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE: VIRGINIA

SECTION II — PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.: O'CONNELL VIRGINIA
2. RELATIONSHIP: WIFE
3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country): 826 WHISPERING LANE FALLS CHURCH VIRGINIA
4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country). INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: HOUSEWIFE
5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: CL6-1891
6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER:
7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION:
8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.
   ANNA C. O'CONNELL (MOTHER) 2 OLD HILLS LANE, PORT WASHINGTON N.Y.

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK (X) ONE: [ ] SINGLE [X] MARRIED [ ] WIDOWED [ ] SEPARATED [ ] DIVORCED [ ] ANNULLED
2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

WIFE OR HUSBAND: If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.

3. NAME (First): VIRGINIA (Middle): P. (Maiden): DEANE (Last): O'CONNELL
4. DATE OF MARRIAGE:
5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country): BROOKLYN, N.Y.
6. HIS (or her) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country): 1815 MADISON PLACE, BROOKLYN N.Y.
7. LIVING: [X] YES [ ] NO
8. DATE OF DEATH:
9. CAUSE OF DEATH:
10. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased): 826 WHISPERING LANE FALLS CHURCH, VA.
11. DATE OF BIRTH: 18 JAN 1917
12. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): NEW YORK N.Y.
13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY:
14. PLACE OF ENTRY:
15. CITIZENSHIP (Country): U.S.
16. DATE ACQUIRED: BIRTH
17. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country):
18. OCCUPATION: HOUSEWIFE
19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers): HARRY WINSTON (1944)
20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): 5TH AVE N.Y.C.

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From and To) BY MONTH AND YEAR

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE | 23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
2	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
3	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
4	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? [X] YES [ ] NO

2. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

3. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
NATIONAL SAVINGS + TRUST CO.	15 ST + NEW YORK AVE, N.W.
	WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? [ ] YES [X] NO

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

6. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? [ ] YES [X] NO

7. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS

8. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? [ ] YES [X] NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES", GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

SECTION VI — CITIZENSHIP

1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP (Country)

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE: [ ] BIRTH [ ] MARRIAGE [ ] OTHER (Specify):

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? [ ] YES [ ] NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First papers, etc.)

SECTION VII — EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

[ ]	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	[ ]	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
[ ]	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	[ ]	BACHELOR'S DEGREE
[ ]	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	[ ]	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
[ ]	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	[ ]	MASTER'S DEGREE [ ] DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR. HOURS SPECIFY
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL MONTHS
		FROM	TO	

4. MILITARY TRAINING (Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL MONTHS
		FROM	TO	

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XI CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (Do not submit copies unless requested). INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

SECTION XII ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): DEC 1951 - MAY 1952
2. GRADE: 12
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: OS/SSD/OPERATIONS BRANCH
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: 5
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: CHIEF, COVERT SECURITY CLEARANCE DESK
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: SUPERVISED THE ACTION REQUIRED TO INITIATE INVESTIGATIVE ACTION FOR ULTIMATE CLEARANCE DETERMINATION ON COVERT EMPLOYEES

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): MAY 1952 - MAY 1953
2. GRADE: 13
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: OS/SSD/OPERATIONS BRANCH
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: 10
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: CHIEF, PROJECT DESK
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: BASICALLY SAME AS PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT ONLY ON THIS DESK PERSONNEL INVOLVED WERE ASSOCIATED WITH LARGE PROJECTS AND NOT ONLY WERE INDIVIDUAL CLEARANCES HANDLED BUT THE OVERALL SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE PROJECTS WERE EXAMINED

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): MAY 1953 - MARCH 1954
2. GRADE: 13
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: OS/SSD/OPERATIONS BRANCH
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: 40
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: DEP. CHF. OPERATIONS BRANCH
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: SUBORDINATE TO CHF. OPERATIONS AND PERFORMED HIS FUNCTIONS IN HIS ABSENCE. ALSO REGULARLY HANDLED DELEGATED DUTIES FOR HIM. INVOLVED SUPERVISION OF FIVE CLEARANCE + ONE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT DESKS.

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): MARCH 1954 - OCT 1954
2. GRADE: 13
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: OS/SSD/OPERATIONS BRANCH
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: 10
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: CHIEF OPERATIONAL SUPPORT DESK
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: SUPERVISED ALL REQUESTS FOR OPERATIONAL SUPPORT MADE TO THE OFFICE OF SECURITY. THIS INCLUDED CASES INVOLVING TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT SURVEILLANCES, CUSTODIAL DETAILS ETC. I WAS ASSIGNED TO THIS UNIT TO HANDLE ITS REORGANIZATION

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): OCT 1954 - DEC 1954
2. GRADE: 13
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: ASST. SPEC. AGT IN CHGE. DISTRICT FIELD OFFICE
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: 50
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION/OS
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: ASSISTED SAC IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE FIELD OFFICE. THIS INCLUDED SUPERVISING THE SCHEDULING OF CASES TO THE AGENTS, GIVING THEM GUIDANCE IN INVESTIGATING THE CASES REVIEWING COMPLETED INQUIRIES (Use additional pages if required)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XIII	CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS
1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (*Including stepchildren and adopted children*) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.	2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (*Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.*) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX M	SEX F	CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
MAUREEN	DAUGHTER	1942		✓	U.S.	Newlin Lane
DIANE	"	1946		✓	"	Falls Church, VA
JAMES	SON	1947	✓		"	"
JOHN DEANE	"	1954	✓		"	"

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

FORMER ADDRESS
1317 SOUTH BUCHANAN ST. ARLINGTON, VA.
(1952-55)

SECTION 7

5. DEC. 1954 TO PRESENT CHIEF, SUPPORT BRANCH
20 EMPLOYEES GRADE 14
ADMINISTER 3 UNITS THAT HANDLE (A) OPERATIONAL SUPPORT MATTERS OF A GENERAL NATURE (B) SPECIAL SUPPORT PROJECTS INCLUDING DOMESTIC MAIL DROPS (C) CASES INVOLVING SECURITY/COVER ASPECTS INCLUDING COVERT SITE SURVEYS, ADJUDICATION OF REQUESTS FOR BUILDING BADGES TO COVERT EMPLOYEES. AS CHIEF OF THIS BRANCH I'M CALLED UPON FROM TIME TO TIME, TO REPRESENT OS AT INTER + INTRA AGENCY CONFERENCES, GIVE LECTURES REGARDING ACCOMPLISHMENTS + POTENTIAL OF OS IN SUPPORT FIELD AND PERSONALLY HANDLE HIGHLY SENSITIVE ASSIGNMENTS.

DATE COMPLETED	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
12 April 1957	James P. O'Connell Jr.

SECRET

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "NA." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? YES (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

Telephone: Office ______ Ext. ______ Home JA2-3622

A. FULL NAME (Use No Initials) Mr. JAMES (First) PATRICK (Middle) O'CONNELL JR (Last)

PRESENT ADDRESS 3212 SOUTH 9 ST. (St. and Number) ARLINGTON, (City) VIRGINIA, (State) USA (Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS ABOVE (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

B. NICKNAME JIM WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? NONE

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? NA

HOW LONG? NA IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS NA

(Where?) (By what authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH 2/19/17 PLACE OF BIRTH ELMHURST (City) NEW (State) YORK (Country)



IF USA (Country) BY BIRTH? YES BY MARRIAGE? ______

CERTIFICATE NO. NA ISSUED NA (Date) BY NA (Court)

(State) (Country)

PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? NA (Yes or No) (Country)

AT DATES? NA TO NA ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? NA (Country)

NA

STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? NO GIVE PARTICULARS:

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? NA

PORT OF ENTRY? N.A. ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? NA

LAST U. S. VISA .... (Number) NA (Type) .... (Place of Issue) .... (Date of Issue)

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 34 SEX MALE HEIGHT 6'3" WEIGHT 210 LBS

EYES BLUE HAIR BROWN COMPLEXION FAIR SCARS NONE

BUILD LARGE OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES ....

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE .... MARRIED ✓ DIVORCED .... WIDOWED ....

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS .... NA

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE—INCLUDING ANNULMENTS—USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE VIRGINIA (First) PATRICIA (Middle) DEANE (Maiden) O'CONNELL (Last)

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE NEW YORK, NY. 5/24/41

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE 1815 MADISON PLACE (St. and Number) BKLYN (City) NY. (State) (Country)

LIVING OR DECEASED LIVING DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 3212 SO. 9 ST. (St. and Number) ARLINGTON (City), VIRGINIA (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 1/18/17 PLACE OF BIRTH BROOKLYN (City), NEW YORK (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY .... NA

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? BIRTH WHERE? NA (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION HOUSEWIFE LAST EMPLOYER DEANE FLYING SCHOOL

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS FLOYD BENNETT (St. and Number) AIRFIELD (City), BKLYN (State), NY. (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM N.A. (Date) TO NA (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE NA

DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN COUNTRY NA

NA

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents):

1. NAME MAUREEN RELATIONSHIP DAUGHTER AGE 9
   CITIZENSHIP USA ADDRESS 2212 So. 4 ST. ARLINGTON VA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
2. NAME DIANE RELATIONSHIP DAUGHTER AGE 5
   CITIZENSHIP USA ADDRESS SAME AS ABOVE (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
3. NAME JAMES RELATIONSHIP SON AGE 4
   CITIZENSHIP USA ADDRESS SAME AS ABOVE (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME JAMES (First) PATRICK (Middle) O'CONNELL (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED DEC. DATE OF DECEASE 4/12/51 CAUSE HEART AILMENT

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 8833 ST. JAMES AVE, ELMHURST, N.Y. (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 5/12/80 PLACE OF BIRTH BROOKLYN (City) NEW YORK (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP NA WHEN ACQUIRED? NA WHERE? NA (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION TRUCKING & WAREHOUSING LAST EMPLOYER OWN BUSINESS

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS 69 GUERNSEY ST. BKLYN, NY (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM NA (Date) TO NA (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE NA

COUNTRY NA DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

NA

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME ANNE (First) JENKINS (Middle) O'CONNELL (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED LIVING DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 8833 ST. JAMES AVE ELMHURST, NY (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 3/19/91 PLACE OF BIRTH CORONA, NEW YORK

CITIZENSHIP US A WHEN ACQUIRED? BIRTH WHERE? NA (City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

16-62333-1

OCCUPATION HOUSEWIFE LAST EMPLOYER NA

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM NA TO NA BRANCH OF SERVICE NA

COUNTRY NA DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

NA

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters):

1. FULL NAME John J. O'Connell (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE 28
   PRESENT ADDRESS 8133 St. James Ave, Elmhurst, N.Y. (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship) USA

2. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

3. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

4. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

5. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME John J. Deane (First) (Middle) (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS Box #42B Rte 1 [illegible] Florida (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 6/24/90 PLACE OF BIRTH Brooklyn, N.Y.

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? NA (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Retired LAST EMPLOYER [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Kathryn (First) Lantry (Middle) Deane (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS Box # 4 B Route 1 (St. and Number) (City) Niceville (State) Florida (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 4/14/97 PLACE OF BIRTH New York City, N.Y.

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? NA (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Housewife LAST EMPLOYER NA

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. NAME NA RELATIONSHIP NA AGE NA
   CITIZENSHIP NA ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
2. NAME NA RELATIONSHIP NA AGE NA
   CITIZENSHIP NA ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
3. NAME NA RELATIONSHIP NA AGE NA
   CITIZENSHIP NA ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U. S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

1. NAME NA RELATIONSHIP NA AGE NA
   CITIZENSHIP NA ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) NA
2. NAME NA RELATIONSHIP NA AGE NA
   CITIZENSHIP NA ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) NA
3. NAME NA RELATIONSHIP NA AGE NA
   CITIZENSHIP NA ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) NA

16-62859-1

14-00000

SEC. 12. POSITION DATA

A. KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR INVESTIGATIVE

B. WHAT IS THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? 2040.00
(You Will Not Be Considered For Any Position With A Lower Entrance Salary.)

C. IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY: OCCASIONALLY ✓

FREQUENTLY ______, CONSTANTLY ______

D. CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED: IN WASHINGTON, D. C ✓

ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES ______, OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES NO

E. IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, SPECIFY LOCATIONS:
PREFER EASTERN STATES

SEC. 13. EDUCATION

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ST. BARTHOLOMEW ADDRESS ELMHURST (City) N.Y. (State) (Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1/23 TO 1/31 GRADUATE? YES

HIGH SCHOOL XAVIER H.S. ADDRESS 30 W. 16 ST. (City) NEW YORK (State) N.Y. (Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1/31 TO 1/35 GRADUATE? YES

COLLEGE ST. JOHN'S UNIVERSITY ADDRESS BROOKLYN (City) NEW YORK (State) (Country)

MAJOR AND SPECIALTY ECONOMICS YEARS COMPLETED 4

DATES ATTENDED 1/35 TO 1/39 DEGREE B.S. in ECO.

COLLEGE ______ ADDRESS ______ (City) (State) (Country)

MAJOR AND SPECIALTY ______ YEARS COMPLETED ______

DATES ATTENDED ______ DEGREE ______

CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS ACCOUNTING, ECONOMICS
ENGLISH

CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS ______

14-00000

SEC. 14. ACTIVE U. S. OR FOREIGN MILITARY SERVICE

U.S.A (Country) NAVY (Service) ENSIGN (Rank) 10/2/44 3/10/46 (Dates of Service)

ARMED GUARD CENTER N.Y. (Last Station) 404547 (Serial Number) ~~[illegible]~~ RESERVE (Type of Discharge)

REMARKS:

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER 256 ADDRESS JACKSON HEIGHTS, N.Y.

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON USNR

INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS NONE

SEC. 15. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST. (List all civilian employment by a foreign government, regardless of dates.)

FROM 3/2/47 TO 11/30/51 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) GS 12

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ADDRESS WASHINGTON (St. and Number) D.C. (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS INVESTIGATIVE NAME OF SUPERVISOR R. B. Hood

TITLE OF JOB SPECIAL AGENT SALARY $7040.00 PER ANNUM

YOUR DUTIES INVESTIGATE MATTERS OF CRIMINAL NATURE, THOSE PERTAINING TO THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE COUNTRY, CONDUCT BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS ON PROSPECTIVE & PRESENT EMPLOYEES OF GOVERNMENT.

REASONS FOR LEAVING TO SEEK A POSITION WITH GREATER ADVANCEMENT POSSIBILITIES

FROM 3/15/46 TO 3/1/47 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE)

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY JAMES P. O'CONNELL TRUCKING CO.

ADDRESS 69 [illegible] ST. (St. and Number) BROOKLYN (City) NEW YORK (State) USA (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS TRUCKING & WAREHOUSING NAME OF SUPERVISOR J. P. O'CONNELL SR.

TITLE OF JOB SPACE MGR. SALARY $3900.00 PER ANNUM

YOUR DUTIES OPERATED BUSINESS CONSISTING OF 12 TRUCKS AND WAREHOUSE. MANAGED ALL PHASES, SUCH AS MAINTENANCE, BILLING, DISPATCHING, IN ABSENCE OF MY FATHER WHO WAS IN SEMI-RETIREMENT DUE TO ILLNESS

REASONS FOR LEAVING FATHER RETURNED

16-62855-1

FROM 3/2/43 TO 10/1/44 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE)

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY MANUFACTURERS MACHINE & TOOL CO.

ADDRESS 10 LAFAYETTE ST. NEW YORK, N.Y. USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS PRECISION PARTS NAME OF SUPERVISOR [illegible] GELSTON

TITLE OF JOB WAREHOUSE SUPERVISOR SALARY $ 3380.00 PER ANNUM

YOUR DUTIES IN COMPLETE CHARGE OF LARGE WAREHOUSE IN WHICH WERE STORED FINISHED & SEMI-FINISHED PARTS OF THE NORDEN BOMBSIGHT AND OTHER NAVAL ORDNANCE MATERIAL

REASONS FOR LEAVING TO ENTER NAVAL SERVICE

FROM 9/41 TO 3/43 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE)

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY JAMES P. O'CONNELL TRUCKING CO

ADDRESS 64 GUERNSEY ST. BROOKLYN N.Y. USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS TRUCKING NAME OF SUPERVISOR J.P. O'CONNELL SR.

TITLE OF JOB FOREMAN SALARY 2080.00 PER ANNUM

YOUR DUTIES SUPERVISED LOADING & UNLOADING OF TRUCKS TO & FROM RAILROAD YARDS TO THE WAREHOUSE.

REASONS FOR LEAVING TO OBTAIN A DEFENSE JOB

FROM 3/40 TO 9/41 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE)

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY U.S. GYPSUM COMPANY

ADDRESS 63 HENDERSON ST. JERSEY CITY N.J. USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS BUILDING MATERIALS NAME OF SUPERVISOR D. ALLEN

TITLE OF JOB PRICE CLERK SALARY $ [illegible] PER ANNUM

YOUR DUTIES PRICED MATERIALS FOR THE EASTERN SALES DISTRICT AND HANDLED ORDERS AND CORRESPONDENCE FOR SALES DIVISION

REASONS FOR LEAVING [illegible]

SEC. 16. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS:

No

SEC. 17. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT," "FAIR," OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE French SPEAK Slight READ Fair WRITE Fair

LANGUAGE .... SPEAK .... READ .... WRITE ....

LANGUAGE .... SPEAK .... READ .... WRITE ....

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU: INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH:

Baseball — Fair
Basketball — Fair
[illegible] — Fair

C. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION? [illegible] supervisor at my [illegible] place of employment I was designated assistant field supervisor and as such was required on occasion to administer the work of several to 100 men. This included the assigning of work, supervising cases, submitting efficiency ratings on employees and being generally responsible for all their activities

D. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE, SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT-WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES:

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING 45 SHORTHAND ....

16—02358-1

E. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION, SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, ETC.

IF YES, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE N/A

FIRST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR) N/A LATEST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR) ____

F. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS:

(1) YOUR MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (DO NOT SUBMIT COPIES UNLESS REQUESTED)
(2) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(3) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(4) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

N/A

G. HAVE YOU A PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? IF ANSWER IS "YES," EXPLAIN:

NO

H. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS:

NO

14-00000

SEC. 18. GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES IN THE U. S. WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY. (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number City State

1. [illegible] BUS. ADD. RES. ADD. [illegible]

2. [illegible] BUS. ADD. RES. ADD. [illegible]

3. [illegible] BUS. ADD. RES. ADD. [illegible]

4. [illegible] BUS. ADD. RES. ADD. [illegible]

5. [illegible] BUS. ADD. RES. ADD. [illegible]

SEC. 19. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES — NOT REFERENCES, RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS, OR EMPLOYERS. (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number City State

1. [illegible] BUS. ADD. RES. ADD. [illegible]

2. [illegible] BUS. ADD. RES. ADD. [illegible]

3. [illegible] BUS. ADD. RES. ADD. [illegible]

4. [illegible] BUS. ADD. RES. ADD. [illegible]

5. [illegible] BUS. ADD. RES. ADD. [illegible]

SEC. 20. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U. S. (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number City State

1. [illegible] BUS. ADD. RES. ADD. [illegible]

2. [illegible] BUS. ADD. RES. ADD. [illegible]

3. [illegible] BUS. ADD. RES. ADD. [illegible]

SEC. 21. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ____ IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS [illegible]

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? No
GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT: [illegible]

D. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES—IN THE U. S.
1. NAME [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible] (St. and Number) (City) (State)
2. NAME [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible] (St. and Number) (City) (State)
3. NAME [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible], PA (St. and Number) (City) (State)

SEC. 22. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

FROM	TO	(St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
2/50	Present	[illegible]
2/48	2/50	3009 So. 25 St.
1/47	2/48	[illegible] St. [illegible], PA
3/46	1/47	9432 [illegible]
4/44	3/46	Box [illegible]
6/43	4/44	[illegible] 31 St. [illegible] N.Y.
1/41	6/43	[illegible]
2/23	1/41	[illegible] N.Y.

SEC. 23. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

A. FROM NA TO NA — NA (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)
FROM .... TO .... (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)
FROM .... TO .... (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)
FROM .... TO .... (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)
FROM .... TO .... (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)

SEC. 24. CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

1. NA (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ....

2. NA (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: NA

3. .... (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ....

4. N/A (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

5. N/A (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

6. N/A (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

7. N/A (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

SEC. 25. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED, ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES?

IF "YES," EXPLAIN: NO

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? YES IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? MODERATION

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE:

NO

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

NO

E. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1940:

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

16—63366-1

F. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

FBI - FEB 1947

SEC. 26. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME Virginia F. O'Connell RELATIONSHIP Wife

ADDRESS 3212 So. 7 St. Arlington Virginia
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 27. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

No

SEC. 28. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT Arlington Virginia DATE 1/4/51
(City and State)

William Cotts
(Witness)

[signature] O'Connell Jr.
(Signature of Applicant)

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—62455-1

SEC. 15 EMPLOYMENT

9/39 TO 3/40 SEVERAL PART TIME JOBS DOING BOOKKEEPING + SALES WORK

5/39 TO 9/39 GARDEN CITY BEACH CLUB
ATLANTIC BEACH LONG ISLAND NY
ASSISTANT MGR. 150.00 PER MO.
REASON FOR LEAVING: SEASONAL WORK

1/39 TO 5/39 ABRAHAM + STRAUSS INC.
BROOKLYN NEW YORK
DEPARTMENT STORE
CREDIT DEPARTMENT - INTERVIEWER
INTERMITTENT EMPLOYMENT DEPENDING UPON STORES NEED FOR HELP.

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE 6 September 1962

PROT 2-230

TO : **Director of Security**

Director of Security

Director of Personnel

FROM : Chief, Communications Security Staff

SUBJECT: Notification of Cryptographic Clearance - **James P. O'Connell**

1. Subject employee has been granted a cryptographic clearance under the provisions of ~~CIA Regulation 90-500~~ HR 90-4. Clearance is effective 8 June 1962.

2. Subject has been informed of the granting of clearance, has been briefed concerning cryptographic and related communications security matters, and has signed a Briefing Statement acknowledging responsibility for the protection of cryptographic information.

3. When Subject employee no longer requires the clearance in order to perform his assigned duties, it is requested that the Communications Security Staff (2411 "I" Bldg., Ext. 3021) be notified by Director of Security, that the clearance may be revoked.

FOR THE CHIEF, COMMUNICATIONS:

Jean Paul DeBlois

JEAN PAUL DeBLOIS
Chief, Protective Branch

Distribution:
1 - **Director of Security**
1 - Security Office (Briefing Statement attached)
1 - Personnel Office
1 - OC-S/PROT File

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 3-59 1597a

SECURITY APPROVAL

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

Date: 10 December 1951

TO: Chief, Personnel Division

Your Reference:

FROM: [redacted]
Chief, Special Security Division

Case Number: 66483

SUBJECT: O'CONNELL, James P.

1. This is to advise you of security action in the subject case as indicated below:

[X] Security approval is granted the subject person for access to classified information.

[ ] Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of Paragraph D of Regulation 10-9 which provides for a temporary appointment pending completion of full security investigation.

[ ] The Director of Central Intelligence has granted a provisional clearance for full duty with CIA under the provisions of Paragraph H of Regulation 10-9.

2. Unless the subject person enters on duty within 60 days from the above date, this approval becomes invalid.

3. Subject is an applicant for a position in I&S.

ROBERT H. CUNNINGHAM

Jea

SECRET

14-00000

RECORD OF

PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT

SERVICE RETURNED TO

FEDERAL RECORDS CENTER IN

ST. LOUIS, MO.

DATE 1 AUG 1974 RK

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: TARASOFF, ANNA
OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FILE

INCLUSIVE DATES:
CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: C/LAD
ROOM:
DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
28 June		DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

14-00000

SECRET

26 March 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR : Office of Finance/C&TD

SUBJECT : Verification of Contract Service for Sandra B. CAZAZZUS (P), Terminated Contract Employee

1. During period 8 April 1957 through 8 September 1953, subject served as an Agency Staff Employee. During this period, subject was a participating member of the Civil Service Retirement System.

2. During period 15 July 1964 through 19 October 1970, subject served as a part-time contract employee on a prearranged regular scheduled tour of duty. With respect to this period of service:

(a) Period 15 July 1964 through 7 September 1967 is creditable for purposes of Civil Service Retirement. Since subject was covered by Social Security during this period, Civil Service Retirement deductions were not withheld.

(b) During period 8 September 1967 through 19 October 1970, subject was a participating member of the Civil Service Retirement System.

3. Action Required:

(a) Office of Finance: Please post the above information to subject's retirement records.

(b) DDP/WH/Contracts: For your information.

/s/ [illegible]
Chief
Contract Personnel Division

Distribution:
Orig - O/F/C&TD
1 - WH/Contracts
1 - CPD subject file
1 - CPD chrono

SECRET

14-00000

11 MAR 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Civil Service Retirement Credit

1. It is requested that information be provided as to the creditable service for the Civil Service Retirement program for the following individuals.

Kurt B. CANEPA
Sandra B. CAZAZZUS
Ralph M. SAMOSKA
Jesse D. WITCHARD

2. Although the named individuals are no longer employed by the Organization, the creditable service can be of particular significance to each.

3. Your early attention to the request will be appreciated.

for William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

SECRET

23 March 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Sandra B. CAZAZZUS

Following are the total number of hours for each year worked by Sandra B. CAZAZZUS under contract. The information was provided this office by Payroll.

Period of Service From	To		Actual Hours Worked
15 Jul 64	Dec	1964	551 hours
Jan 65	Dec	1965	789
Jan 66	Dec 66	1966	1091
Jan 67	Dec 67	1967	1092
Jan 68	Dec	1968	1486
Jan 69	Dec	1969	1414
Jan 70	19 Oct	1970	1217

Dow:

This gal had two contracts. The first one included a leave benefit. This first K ended and was immediated replaced by a 2nd K, which included Civil Service Retirement.

From the number of hours worked I feel we can make a determination that she during the full period she worked [illegible] in a part-time basis on a prearranged reg. sch. tour of duty. If you concur, I will write a std. type memo to C/Finance.

Subject is now terminated, but in WH field with her husband. Bill Kenehan has a dispatch in asking that Hqtrs. verify her total K service.

Paul.
23 Mar 71

ok - DK

SECRET

Contract Service — Sandra B. CAZAZO (P)

Date	Action	Compensation	Equivalent
8 Apr 57 – 8 Sep 63	CIA Staff Employee service		
15 Jul 64	Contract Employee with Social Security. No LPAs or PSIs.	$2.59 p.h.	
14 Aug 64	Pay increase	2.72	
10 Oct 65	Pay increase Authorized future LPAs.	2.82	
3 Jul 66	LPI	2.90	
7 Sep 67	Contract terminated	2.90	
8 Sep 67	Contract Employee with ~~Social~~ Civil Service Retirement and LPAs. No PSIs.	2.90	
8 Oct 67	LPI	3.03	
14 Jul 68	LPI	3.12	GS-05/5
13 Jul 69	LPI	3.37	GS-05/5
28 Dec 69	LPI	3.57	GS-05/5
19 Oct 70	Contract terminated	3.57	"

NOTE: On 24 Mar 1971, subject's official Staff Employee file was reviewed. It reflected; (a) staff employee service from 8 Apr 57 to 8 Sep 63; (b) during entire period was a participating member of the Civil Service Retirement System; (c) she was on LWOP during period 12 Jun-8 Sep 63; and her SF-144 dated 8 Apr 57 reflect no prior Federal Service.

1. LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	INITIAL(S)	2. APPOINTMENT DATA			3. TOTAL SERVICE FOR LEAVE (as of date of separation)
TARASOFF	ANNA	A	Excepted appt. 9/8/67	F T	P T X	

4. DATE AND NATURE OF SEPARATION

Contract terminated 10/19/70

Subject to Sec 203(d), 1951 Leave Act Yes ☐ No ☐

Ceased to be subject to Sec 203(d) on ________ Annual Leave Bal ________

Years	Months	Days

☐ More than 15 years

SUMMARY OF ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE (HOURS)

	ANNUAL	SICK
5. Balance from prior leave year ended 1/10 19 70	275	256
6. Current leave year accrual through 10/17 19 70	89	56
7. Total	364	312
8. Reduction in credits, if any (current year)		
9. Total leave taken	0	0
10. Balance	364	312

11. Total hours paid in lump sum 360hrs 2 holidays

12. Salary rate(s) $3.57 p/h

13. Lump sum leave dates From 0800 10/17 to 1700 12/22/70 0 (Hours)

26. Certified correct by: [signature] (Signature) ________ (Date)

Auth cert. officer (Title) ________ (Telephone)

SUMMARY OF HOME LEAVE (DAYS)

14. Date arrival abroad for HL purposes NONE
15. Current balance as of ________ 19__ ________
16. 12-month accrual rate ________
17. Dates leave used, prior 24 months ________
18. Monthly accrual date ________
19. Calendar days credit for next accrual date ________
20. Date basic service period completed ________

MILITARY LEAVE

21. Dates during current calendar yr. ________ to ________
22. Dates during preceding calendar yr. ________ to ________

ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY

	LWOP or Furlough (Hours)	AWOL or Suspension (Hours)
23. During leave year in which separated	0	0
24. During step-increase waiting period which began on 8/14/64	0	0
25. During 12-month HL accrual period (dates)		

REMARKS

SCD 7/15/64

Standard Form 1150
November 1965
1150-106

RECORD OF LEAVE DATA TRANSFERRED

U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM SUPPLEMENTS 296-31 AND 990-2

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 013175
2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): CAZZUS SANDRA B
PREPARED: 02/13/7_

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CONTRACT TERMINATION (18CHLGI)

4 EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 12 DA _ YR 70

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CONTRACT-TYPE A (S)

6 FUNDS: V TO V / X V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 1135-0920

8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP DIRECTORATE WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIV

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: UNSPECIFIED

11 POSITION TITLE: TRANSLATOR

12 POSITION NUMBER:

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (PART TIME) GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1045.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 05 5

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 3.78 LRI: 071564 DOG: 071564

18 REMARKS

STATUS INFORMATION

BIRTH DATE: 23 SEX: F MARITAL ST: MAR NO. DEPENDENTS: 00
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: 071564 FED SERVICE COMP:
HOSPITILIZATION: F PLAN:
TYPE RETIREMENT: CSC
FEGLI: YES PREV. GOVT SERV: 5 SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: H A/L INC: 3 S/L INC: 3

CONTRACT INFORMATION

EFF DATE: 090857 EXPIRATION DATE: 090771 DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 071564
REFERRING OFFICER: WH ADMIN REFR ORG: WH PHONE: 4-60

ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES

TAX STAFF: Y	FED EXMP:	STATE EXMP:	STATE:
TRAVEL: NNN	OPS EXPNSE: N	HOUSING: N	POST/EQUAL: N
HOME LEAVE: 0	DIFFERENTIAL: N	OFFSET CLAUSE: N	STD GOVT: N
LEGISL PAY: Y	PREMIUM PAY : N	ALLOWANCE COMM: N	EDUCATION: N
STEP INCRS: N	OTH TAX ENTL: N	OTHER ALLOWNS : N	SEPARATION: N

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERISK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

(4-51)

Form 7-66 11503 MFG. 11-69 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET

DUPLICATE

CLEARANCE SHEET FOR TERMINATION OF CONTRACT PERSONNEL

THIS FORM MUST BE SIGNED AND SUBMITTED IN DUPLICATE

DATE: 25 January 1971

PERSONAL DATA

NAME (Last, First, Middle - true or pseudonym)	OFFICE AND BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
CAZAZZUS, Sandra B. (P)	DDP/WH/1
LOCAL ADDRESS: Mexico City, Mexico	PERMANENT ADDRESS: Cleveland, Ohio
PERMANENT STATION OR BASE: Mexico City, Mexico	POSITION OR FUNCTIONAL TITLE: Contract Employee, Type B

CONTRACT DATA

DATE CONTRACT EFFECTIVE	DATE CONTRACT LAST RENEWED	DATE CONTRACT EXPIRES	DATE OF CONTRACT TERMINATION
15 July 1964	8 September 1970	7 September 1971	19 October 1970

REASON FOR CONTRACT TERMINATION

Retirement of husband.

INTERNAL STAFF OR DIVISION CLEARANCES *(Add or delete as applicable)*

COMPONENT	CLEARED BY	DATE	REMARKS
FINANCE			
LOGISTICS			
XXXXXX			
Security			

CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER	CLEARED BY (Signature)	DATE
	W.S. Renehan, C/WH/Contracts	

SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWING OFFICES

(OFFICES NOT REQUIRING INTERVIEW WILL SO INDICATE)

OFFICE	SCHEDULE DATE	SCHEDULE TIME	SCHEDULE LOCATION	INTERVIEWING OFFICIAL
CENTRAL COVER STAFF				CLEARED BY (Signature): DATE:
OFFICE OF SECURITY PSD			OS #131 751 13 July 64	CLEARED BY (Signature): DATE:
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL CPD				CLEARED BY (Signature): DATE:

REVIEWED:

REMARKS (Please initial)

Duplicate - advance copy to OF/CSTD/CEAS 30 October 1970.

/s/ Dow H. Luetscher
Special Cont[illegible] Officer

STAFF OR DIVISION AND BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	SIGNATURE OF STAFF OR DIVISION RESPONSIBLE OFFICER	DATE
C/WH/1		

FORM 3-67 1689 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(9)

14-00000

HIGH 3 BASED ON LAST 3 YEARS ON CONTRACT

OCT 67 - DEC 67	$1607.07
JAN - DEC 68	4549.34
JAN - DEC 69	4935.06
JAN - OCT 70	4335.49

$14428.89 ÷ 3 = $4809.63
HIGH 3 AVERAGE

1½% x 4809.63 x 5 = $360.70
1¾% x 4809.63 x 5 = 420.85
2% x 4809.63 x 2.5 = 240.48
$1022.03 ANNUITY

HIGH 3 BASED ON LAST 3 YEARS AS STAFF

JUN 62 - JUN 63	$5515	GS 6/4
JUN 61 - JUN 62	5160	6/3
JAN 61 - JUN 61	2497	6/2
JUN 60 - DEC 60	2255	5/2

$15457 ÷ 3 = $5152.33

HIGHER ANNUITY

1½% x $5152.33 x 5 = $386.45
1¾% x $5152.33 x 5 = 450.85
2% x $5152.33 x 2.5 = 257.63
$1094.93 ANNUITY

14-00000

CPZ.2245 (P) TARASOFF 8 FEB

1. She is not eligible for retirement annuity until she's 62 yrs old - in 5 May 1985.

STAFF (CSR) Apr 57 - Jun 63 Sept 63
→ CONTRACT (SS) Jul 64 - Sept 67
" (CSR) Sept 67 - Oct 70

for [illegible] No Refund of Retirement deductions has been made, either from Staff or Contract employment.
form 2802

Resignation effective 7 Sept 1963 } ~~$1781.83~~

57-63	CS Deductions while a Staffer	$1781.83
67-70	" Contract	961.24
	TOTAL	$2743.07

Sept $2.90
8 Oct 67 $3.03
14 Jul 3.12
Stone

Sept 67 $6.09 Dec 67
68 $4549.34
69 4935.06
Oct 70 4335.49

Oct 70
Apr 57
13 yr 6 MONTHS
5152.33
3)15457.00
15 3 6
15 10
15

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, W H Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: ADMIN/CONTRACTS - Termination Sandra B. CAZAZZUS

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Sandra B. CAZAZZUS' contract was terminated effective 19 October 1970. Since her husband is retiring, she will no longer be available for employment.

2. Submitted herewith is a signed contract termination and termination secrecy oath.

Zachary T. Abarta
Zachary T. ABARTA

Attachments:

Contract termination - - - Orig & 1 h/w
Termination secrecy oath - Orig & 1 h/w

Distribution:

Orig & 2 - Chief, WH Division w/att.

Rec'd 30 OCT 1970

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMT 10,578	22 October 1970
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

SECRET

TERMINATION SECRECY OATH

I, Sandra B. CAZAZZUS, am about to terminate my association with the Organization. I realize that, by virtue of my duties with the Organization, I have been the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of our country. I am aware that the unauthorized disclosure of such information is prohibited by the espionage laws of our government which specifically requires the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Accordingly, I SOLEMNLY SWEAR, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF DURESS, AS FOLLOWS:

1. I will never divulge, publish, or reveal by writing, word, conduct, or otherwise any information relating to the national defense and security and particularly information of this nature relating to intelligence sources, methods, personnel, fiscal data, or security measures to anyone, including, but not limited to, any future governmental or private employer, private citizen, or government employee or official without the express written consent of the Chief of the Organization or his authorized representative.

2. I have been invited to submit in writing any monetary claims I may have against the Organization or our government which may in any way necessitate the disclosure of information described herein. I have been advised that any such claims will receive full legal consideration. In the event, however, that I am not satisfied with the decisions of the Organization concerning any present or future claims I may submit, I will not take any other action to obtain satisfaction without prior written notice to the Organization, and then only in accordance with such legal and security advice as the Organization will promptly furnish me.

3. I do not have any documents or materials in my possession, classified or unclassified, which are the property of, or in custodial responsibility of the Organization, having come into my possession as a result of my duties with the Organization or otherwise.

4. During my exit processing and during my period of employment with the Organization I have been given an opportunity to report all information about the Organization, its personnel, and its operations which I consider should receive official cognizance. Hence, I am not aware of any information which it is my duty, in the national interest, to disclose to the Organization, nor am I aware of any violations or breaches of security which I have not officially reported, except as set forth on the reverse side of this sheet or on other attachments.

30 OCT 1970

SECRET

OS/ID

5. I have been advised that, in the event I am called upon by the properly constituted authorities to testify or provide information which I am pledged hereby not to disclose, I will notify the Organization immediately; I will also advise said authorities of my secrecy commitments to our government and will request that my right or need to testify be established before I am required to do so.

6. I am aware of the provisions and penalties of the espionage laws of our government and am fully aware that any violation on my part of certain matters sworn to by me under this oath may subject me to prosecution under the terms of these laws, and that violation of other portions of this oath are subject to appropriate action, including such dissemination of the violation as the circumstances warrant.

I have read and understand the contents of this oath and voluntarily affix my signature hereto with the full knowledge that this oath was executed for the mutual benefit of myself and our government, and that it will be retained in the files of the Organization for its future use or for reference by me at any time in the future that I may be requested or ordered to testify or disclose any of the matters included within the scope of this oath.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and seal this 16 day of October 1970.

Sandra B. Cazazzus (SEAL)
Signature Sandra B. CAZAZZUS

Witnessed by me this 16 day of October 1970,

at Mexico City, Mexico.

[signature]
Signature

SECRET

Miss Sandra B. CAZAZZUS

Dear Miss CAZAZZUS

You are hereby notified that your services under a contract with the United States Government, effective 8 September 1967, are to be terminated at the convenience of the United States Government pursuant to paragraph 4 of said contract, and that the 30 days' notice required by the contract begins 19 September 1970.

You are reminded of the contents of paragraph 4 of said contract which read as follows:

"_____. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the United States Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under applicable laws and regulations."

Your signature in the space provided below is acknowledgement of the contents hereto.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

By [signature]
Field Contracting Officer

Acknowledged:

Sandra B. Cazazzus

Witness:

[signature]

Reviewed:

____
Contract Approving Officer

Rec'd via HMMT-11578 30 Oct 70 routed with term. sheet (1489)

SECRET

SECRET

NON-STAFF PERSONNEL DATA SHEET

DATE: 12 Oct 70

INSTRUCTIONS:
1. SUBMIT FOR:
   A. CONTRACT EMPLOYEES (TYPE A, B AND CAREER)
   B. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS UNDER WRITTEN CONTRACT OR NOC (US CITIZENS OR RESIDENT ALIENS ONLY)
2. THIS FORM IS NOT APPLICABLE FOR OPERATIONAL OR FIELD AGENTS
3. COPIES OF THE FORM WILL BE RETAINED BY THE ORIGINATING COMPONENT (NUMBER OF COPIES AT ITS DISCRETION) AND BY CSPS/AGENT BRANCH (1 COPY ONLY)

NAME (LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE)			SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
CAZAZZUS, Sandra B. (P)			Female	5 May 23
MARITAL STATUS	**NO. DEPENDENTS**	**YEAR(S) OF BIRTH**	**NATIONALITY**	**LAST MEDICAL EXAM**
Married	2	1945, 49	U.S.A	Unknown
DATE OF LATEST SECURITY/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		**JOB TITLE**		**COMPONENT**
Type B, 13 July 1964		Transcriber		DDP/WH/1
CONTRACT CATEGORY	**EFFECTIVE DATE**	**EXPIRATION DATE**	**SALARY**	**GRADE EQUIVALENT**	**PROJECT OR FAN #**
Type B	15 July 64	7 Sep 71	$3.67	GS-5/6	SUPPORT

BENEFITS	YES	NO
SOCIAL SECURITY	X	X
FECA DEATH AND DISABILITY	X	
ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE	X	
CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT	X	
CIA RETIREMENT OR COMMERCIAL CIA ANNUITY		X
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE	X	
CONTRACT LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE		X
MISSING PERSONS BENEFITS	X	
OTHER (EXPLAIN)		

NON-CIA EDUCATION

High School Graduate

NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

DATES FROM - TO	EMPLOYER	LOCATION	FUNCTION	SALARY
1944-45	Cleveland Trust Company	Cleveland, Ohio	Bookkeeper	
1955-56	American Trust Company	San Leandro, California	Commercial Bookkeeper	

CIA TRAINING

CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (BEGINNING WITH EOD)

DATES FROM - TO	FUNCTION	CONTR. CAT.	LOCATION	PROJECT	SALARY	GRADE EQUIV.
Apr 57-Jun 63	Clerk-Typist	Staff	Hqs		EOD as Resign, as	GS-4 GS-6
Jul 64-present	Transcriber	B	Mexico City	SUPPORT	$3.67	GS-5/6

SECRET

SECURITY

FACTORS AFFECTING SUBJECT (PUBLIC EXPOSURE - PRESS, RADIO, TV); KNOWN OR SUSPECTED IDENTIFICATION TO OTHER THAN CIA STAFF PERSONNEL, INTELLIGENCE, OR SECURITY SERVICES.

COVER

A. PRESENT COVER IS: ☐ OFFICIAL ☒ NON-OFFICIAL Performed her secretarial/transcribing duties outside the Station.

DIVISION EVALUATION OF COVER SECURITY:

Satisfactory

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE:

Satisfactory

ADAPTABILITY (SUBJECT AND FAMILY) TOWARDS DUAL LIFE

No problem.

B. PREVIOUS COVER WAS: ☒ OFFICIAL ☐ NON-OFFICIAL (GIVE BRIEF DESCRIPTION IF NOC)

MOBILITY

INDICATE LIMITING FACTORS BOTH PERSONAL AND OPERATIONAL

FUTURE UTILIZATION

INDICATE PLANS OR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USE AFTER CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

None

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 21

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

Bill Montgomery
CCS/CTS
6697
12 October 1970

FILE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

INDEX | NO INDEX | RETURN TO ______ BRANCH | FILE RID

FILE IN CS FILE NO.

35 PER

CCS 2 | INFO | FILE, VR, WH 8, OCC 2, OPS 3

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 13 OCT 70 21 47z CITE DIRECTOR 077157

MEXICO CITY

JBCENT/ADMIN

1. PLEASE ADVISE DOUGLAS J. FEINGLASS AND SANDRA B. CAZAZZUS THAT THE FLAT RATE TAX HAS INCREASED TO 18.4 PER CENT EFFECTIVE WITH PAY PERIOD ENDING 20 SEPTEMBER 1970.

2. STATION SHOULD START WITHHOLDING TAX AT HIGHER RATE IMMEDIATELY. DISPATCH FOLLOWS.

END OF MESSAGE

COORD: WH/F

WH/CON

WH/FI/NCC

C/WH/SS

C/CCS/CTS

14 00

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

SECRET

Miss Sandra B. CAZAZZUS

Dear Miss CAZAZZUS

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 8 Sept. 1967, as amended, which expires 8 Sept. 1970.

Effective 8 Sept. 1970, said contract, as amended, is extended for one (1) year.

All other terms and conditions of said contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

By [signature]
Contracting Officer

Accepted:
[signature: Sandra B. Cazazzus]

Witness:
[signature]

Approved:

Concur: [signature]
DDR[illegible]

Date:

REVIEWED:
/s/ Dow H. Luetscher
Special Contracting Officer

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, WH Division
ADMIN/CONTRACTS
Sandra B. CAZAZZUS, Contract Provisions

Reference: HMMT-9892

1. Reference indicated Sandra B. CAZAZZUS is a Contract Employee who is required to perform her duties during various hours of the day as well as a varying number of hours in order to meet operational deadlines.

Reference asked that the contract for CAZAZZUS be amended to provide reimbursement of six hours per day when in a leave status and for paid holidays retroactively to 8 September 1967.

2. The request is answered by the Station's explanation--unless and until there has been established in advance a regular tour of duty, an individual is not eligible for leave or holiday pay (see FHB 20-1 and FR 20-13).

In the event the basic criteria is met (FHB 20-1), the effective date could not be retroactive.

Hugh E. WESTBY

Distribution: 2-COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMS-6559	22 SEP 1969
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	

1-WH/1
1-WH/Contracts
1-WH/Registry

OFFICE	ORIGINATOR	TYPIST	EXT
WH/Contracts	J.Renehan	md (17 Sept 69)	4460

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/1		

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE (RELEASING)
C/WH/SS		George R. Thompson

UNCLASSIFIED | INTERNAL ONLY | CONFIDENTIAL | [X] SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Anna A. Tarasoff

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
RID/D&P/INCOMING GB-12	x7737	Hmmact 9892
		DATE 10 SEP 1969

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Chief/WH/Reg.	11 SEP 1969			
2.				
3. CWH/SS				
4.				?
5. WH/contract	13 Sept 69	13 Sept		
6. C/WH/1				Your comments please. Subject's contract already provides for sick and annual leave effective 15 July 64, and she is considered a part-time contract employee on a regularly scheduled tour of duty. Subject's contract does not provide for overtime and holiday time. Her contract would have to be amended to include this provision.
7.				6-8 Pls advise that under terms of contract cannot approve Para 3 request.
8. WH/Contracts				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS [X] SECRET | CONFIDENTIAL | INTERNAL USE ONLY | UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: ADMIN/CONTRACTS
Sandra B. CAZAZZUS (C/E) (132830) - Contract Entitlements

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. Book Dispatch - 6496
B. Book Dispatch - 6144

1. Subject is a contract employee who is required to perform her duties during various hours of the day (including a varying number of hours) in order to meet operational deadlines.

2. Even though CAZAZZUS' contract allows her annual and sick leave benefits, she has not been reimbursed for any leave during the period 8 September 1967 to the present. In addition, the Station has not reimbursed her for any holidays, WOLADY or local, while other contract employees whose contracts call for a regularly scheduled tour of duty, have received compensation.

3. Since subject has worked an average of 30 hours per week, with Headquarters concurrence, it is recommended that she be reimbursed six hours per day when in a leave status and for paid holidays retroactively to 8 September 1967, the effective date of her present contract.

for/John A. KAUBERT

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMT - 9892	3 September 1969
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR : Office of Finance

FROM : Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Contract Extension for.
~~[illegible]~~

1. Effective 8 September 1969 the contract (as amended) for the subject individual, effective 8 September 1967 is extended for a period of one (1) year.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

RB/DA
5 Sept 69

SECRET

Group 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Contract Extension

It is requested that the contract for the following named individual(s) be amended to extend the term as indicated.

CAZAZZUS, Sandra B. Through 7 September 1970

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

DATE:

CTC No. ____________________

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

ATTENTION: Chief, Compensation and Tax Division

VIA: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Tax Assessment for ____________________

1. A flat rate covert tax assessment of this individual's gross, taxable Agency entitlements has been approved as indicated below. An acknowledged Letter of Tax Instruction has been [ ] will [ ] will not [ ] be forwarded. The Station/Base will be [ ] has been [ ] advised of this assessment.

Tax Assessment Rate	Effective Date
seventeen and three-tenths (17.3) per cent	14 [illegible]

2. This is a new assessment [ ] a revised assessment [ ].

3. Other payroll factors pertinent to this tax assessment action are as follows:

CONTACT APPROVAL:

/s/ Dow H. Luetscher

Chief, C.P.D.

APPROVED:

____

Executive Secretary, Covert Tax Board

DISTRIBUTION: Orig & 1 - Addressee: 1 Copy CPD: 1 Copy Area Division: 2 Copies CCS

FORM 9-69 2643 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(1-4-21)

3 - CPD

14-00000

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, WOGAME

ADM/JBCENT - Douglas J. FEINGLASS (p)
Sandra B. CAZAZZUS (p) - Revision of Tax Assessment Rate

REFERENCE: Letter of Tax Instruction, HMMS-5711, 14 Dec 1967

1. Please advise FEINGLASS that his flat rate percentage tax assessment has been revised by the Tax Staff from thirteen and nine-tenths (13.9) per cent, established by reference, to twenty and eight-tenths (20.8) per cent, effective 29 June 1969, T/Y 1969. This revision is necessary as his income and tax position have changed to such a degree as to make the previous tax assessment rate unrealistic. A computation of the revised tax rate is attached.

2. This assessment revision is incorporated by reference as an amendment to FEINGLASS' Letter of Tax Instruction.

3. From the information submitted to the Tax Staff, it appears that FEINGLASS' daughter qualifies as a dependent. The new tax computations are based on five exemptions. Also, FEINGLASS should list five exemptions on his 1969 tax return.

VICTOR D. UNITSKY

Attachment: As Noted

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS (w/att)
1 - C/CPD (wo/att)
1 - OF/C&TD/CPB (wo/att)
1 - C/WH/1 (wo/att)
1 - WH/Contracts

HMMS-6524

11 August 1969

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S E C R E T

NOTE FOR FILE:

CAZAZZUS' husband's (FEINGLASS) retirement date extended to Nov. 70.

25 JUN 1969

[initials]

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/[redacted]

PROCESSING: XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.: Chief, SB Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Annual Fitness Report - Sandra B. CAZAZZUS

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Attached are copies of an Annual Fitness Report on Sandra B. CAZAZZUS.

2. CAZAZZUS and her husband make a good and efficient team on the duties assigned to them.

Willard C. CURTIS

orig routed to:
WH/CX6, 11 Feb 69
DC/WHD 11 Feb 69
WH/1 ?
WH/contracts, 18 Feb 69
CPD 19 FEB 1969

Attachment: herewith

Distribution:
(2)- C/WH Division w/att.
1 - C/SB Division w/o att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMT-9523	29 January 1969
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/[redacted]	HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

SECRET

FIELD TRANSMITTAL - FITNESS REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS

The following items of the Fitness Report will NOT be completed by field personnel preparing the report for transmitted to Headquarters:

SECTION A, items 1, 6, and 7
SECTION D, items 1, 2, and 3 *(Only in respect to "Typed or Printed Name and Signature")*

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS FITNESS REPORT	DATE 28 January 1969	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE (In pseudonym) Sandra B. CAZAZZUS

2. I CERTIFY THAT, EXCEPT FOR ITEMS OMITTED UNDER THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL ITEMS APPEARING ON THE ATTACHED FITNESS REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS OR REGULATIONS

DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR (In pseudonym)
28 January 1969	Francis J. COIGNE

DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (In pseudonym)
28 January 1969	Willard C. CURTIS

SPECIAL NOTE

Fitness Reports must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information and methods of operation, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of specific duties may be reported in Section B. However, the nature, source, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the position titles and description of specific duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases, general statements of specific duties will be included in Section B indicating the level of responsibility.

FORM 4-62 45a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
CAZAZZUS	Sandra	B.	5 May 1923	F		

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Contract Employee	DDP/WH/1	Mexico City

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
X	SPECIAL (Specify): Contract employee				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 January 1968 thru 31 December 1968

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
- P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
- S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Selecting and processing transcripts in Spanish and English into workable format for Station analysis and filing.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Handling administrative matters for her husband.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	Rating Letter
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This employee continues to assist and compliment her husband, a Staff Agent, in an unusually efficient team. She pre-edits transcribed materials and puts usable material into a form roady for filing, thus saving analytical and clerical time in the Station. Her knowledge of Russian and Spanish, analytical ability, overall efficiency and interest in her work all contribute to a fine performance.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 28 January 1969	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Sandra B. CA[illegible]US (signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal)	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 28 January 1969	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE (signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal) Paul L. Dillon
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL		

The reviewing officer concurs with this report. Subject and her husband continue to form an efficient and valuable team.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
28 January 1969	Chief of Station	(signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal.) Winston M. Scott

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief, WOMOLD

INFO: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: ADMINISTRATIVE/TRAINING
Language Training

ACTION REQUIRED: Information Only

As of 1 March 1968 the below listed personnel were receiving voluntary Spanish language training paid for by the organization or LNGOLD:

- Sandra B. CAZAZZUS
- Francis J. COIGNE
- Humphrey K. FEADSHIP
- Douglas J. FEINGLASS
- Henry N. LANGDON
- Keith R. LEVENDERIS
- Wanda G. PANKPINTO
- Clárice F. PARDECK
- Cora B. RAUSKIND
- Joseph F. TRECANTI

and the wives of Walter W. CORNBURY and Gerald D. FAHLANGER.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - Chief, WOMOLD
2 - Chief, WH Division

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMT-8919

DATE: 9 April 1968

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

14-00000

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle)	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
CAZAZZUS Sandra B	1923	
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY	LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance → [ ] (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance → [X] (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance → [ ] (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)

Sandra B. Cazazzus

DATE

14 February 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

MAR 5 '68 CONT DIV.

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

DUPLICATE COPY—For Agency Use 3

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1968
(For use only until April 14, 1968)
176-101

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

Approved BoB 50-R0 385

Statistical Stub (SF 176-T)

To be completed only by employees who checked either box "A" or box "C" on the election form.
The purpose of this stub is to furnish statistics on the initial registration under the liberalized life insurance program.

Question	Answer		Code
1. Which box did you check?	Box A	[ ]	1
	Box C	[ ]	2
2. Did you have regular insurance under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program on January 1, 1968?	Yes	[ ]	1
	No	[ ]	2
3. Your sex?	Male	[ ]	1
	Female	[ ]	2
4. Are you now married?	Yes	[ ]	1
	No	[ ]	2
... born?			

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: Sandra B. CAZZAZUS

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Please forward a completed form 89 on Sandra B. CAZZAZUS for review by the Medical Staff.

Hugh E. WESTBY

Distribution:
2-COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMS-5798

DATE

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/Personnel	PPMacDougall	lvr *6 Feb.68	681

COORDINATING

1 - WH/Pers
1 - WH/Reg
1 - WH/1

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/Pers		
C/WH/1		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/SS		George R. Thompson

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
CAZAZZUS Sandra B.	5 May 1923	F		

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Contract Employee	DDP/WH/1	Mexico City

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
X	SPECIAL (Specify): Contract employee				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 January 1968 thru 31 December 1968

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak — Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate — Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient — Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong — Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding — Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Selecting and processing transcripts in Spanish and English into workable format for Station analysis and filing.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Handling administrative matters for her husband.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 6-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This employee continues to assist and compliment her husband, a Staff Agent, in an unusually efficient team. She pre-edits transcribed materials and puts usable material into a form ready for filing, thus saving analytical and clerical time in the Station. Her knowledge of Russian and Spanish, analytical ability, overall efficiency and interest in her work all contribute to a fine performance.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 28 January 1969	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Sandra B. CAZAZZUS (signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal)	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 28 January 1969	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE (signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal) Paul L. Dillon
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The reviewing officer concurs with this report. Subject and her husband continue to form an efficient and valuable team.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
28 January 1969	Chief of Station	(signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal.) Winston M. Scott

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

FIELD TRANSMITTAL - FITNESS REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS

The following items of the Fitness Report will NOT be completed by field personnel preparing the report for transmittal to Headquarters:

SECTION A, items 1, 6, and 7

SECTION D, items 1, 2, and 3 (Only in respect to "Typed or Printed Name and Signature")

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS FITNESS REPORT	DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE (In pseudonym)
	28 January 1969	Sandra B. CAZAZZUS

2. I CERTIFY THAT, EXCEPT FOR ITEMS OMITTED UNDER THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL ITEMS APPEARING ON THE ATTACHED FITNESS REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS OR REGULATIONS

DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR (In pseudonym)
28 January 1969	Francis J. COIGNE

DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (In pseudonym)
28 January 1969	Willard C. CURTIS

SPECIAL NOTE

Fitness Reports must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information and methods of operation, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of specific duties may be reported in Section B. However, the nature, source, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the position titles and description of specific duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases, general statements of specific duties will be included in Section B indicating the level of responsibility.

FORM 4-62 45a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (4)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM: Chief, WOGAME

SUBJECT: AIR/JECENT - FEINGLASS/CAZAZZUS - Tax Administration

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: HSST-8732, 15 December 1967

1. Forwarded under separate cover is the name and address of the notional organization for FEINGLASS to use on his tax return. Also forwarded under separate cover is a brief outline of the nature of the notional.

2. As previously discussed in a Headquarters tax briefing, this notional would not issue any tax documentation and was not to be used for any purpose other than their tax return. This return was to be kept in a safe place, since the return would indicate a different cover than what they are using in Mexico.

3. In the event FEINGLASS ever indicates that the use of the notional is necessary for purposes other than the tax return, this requirement should be cleared by Headquarters prior to actual use.

VICTOR D. UNITSKY

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS (w/SCA)
1 - WH/Contracts (wo/att)

Attachment (USC)

SECRET

FIELD TRANSMITTAL - FITNESS REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS

The following items of the Fitness Report will NOT be completed by field personnel preparing the report for transmitted to Headquarters:

SECTION A, Items 1, 6, and 7

SECTION D, Items 1, 2, and 3 *(Only in respect to "Typed or Printed Name and Signature")*

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS FITNESS REPORT	DATE 16 FEB. 68	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE (In pseudonym) Sandra B. CAZAZZUS [signature]

2. I CERTIFY THAT, EXCEPT FOR ITEMS OMITTED UNDER THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL ITEMS APPEARING ON THE ATTACHED FITNESS REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS OR REGULATIONS

DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR (In pseudonym)
16 Feb 1968	Francis J. COIGNE [signature]
DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (In pseudonym)
16 Feb 1968	Willard C. CURTIS [signature]

SPECIAL NOTE

Fitness Reports must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information and methods of operation, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of specific duties may be reported in Section B. However, the nature, source, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the position titles and description of specific duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases, general statements of specific duties will be included in Section B indicating the level of responsibility.

FORM 4-62 45a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
CAZAZZUS Sandra B.	5 May 23	F		

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Contract Employee	DDP/WH	Mexico City

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
XX	SPECIAL (Specify): Contract Employee				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 January 1967 - 31 December 1967

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Selecting and processing transcripts in Spanish and English into workable format for Station analysis and filing.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handling administrative matters for her husband.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Subject continues to complement her husband as a part of an efficient team. Her expeditious processing of transcript materials (so that they come to the Station ready for filing) saves the Station a great deal of work and time. Her language and analytical abilities are utilized to pre-edit material and cut out the superflous. She continues to show interest in her work at which she is very efficient.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
16 Feb 68	/s/ Sandra B. CAZAZZUS

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
29		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
16 Feb 63		/s/ Francis J. COIGNE

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The Reviewing Officer concurs in this Report. This employee and her husband form an efficient and valuable team.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
16 Feb 1968	Chief of Station	/s/ Willard C. CURTIS

SECRET

If typewriter is not available, bear down with ballpoint pen to make legible copies.

Standard Form No. 2809
U.S. Civil Service Commission
FPM Supplement 890-1
June 1967

HEALTH BENEFITS REGISTRATION FORM

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM

(Read instructions on back of last page. The only typewriter or ballpoint...)

New Carrier's Control No. 11252435

Old Carrier's Control No.

TO EMPLOYING OFFICE: SHOW OLD CARRIER'S CONTROL NUMBER ONLY IF ELECTION IS TO CANCEL ENROLLMENT OR TO CHANGE OPTIONS OR TYPE OF ENROLLMENT IN THE SAME PLAN.

PART A

ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

1. NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE INITIAL): Tarasoff, Anna A.
2. DATE OF BIRTH (Use numbers) MONTH DAY YEAR
3. ARE YOU NOW MARRIED? YES 1 NO 2
4. YOUR MAILING ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET) (CITY) (STATE) (ZIP CODE)
5. SEX MALE 1 FEMALE 2

IMPORTANT

IT IS ILLEGAL FOR AN EMPLOYEE OR A MEMBER OF HIS FAMILY TO BE COVERED UNDER MORE THAN ONE ENROLLMENT. IF YOU ARE ALREADY COVERED THROUGH THE FAMILY ENROLLMENT OF ANOTHER FEDERAL OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA EMPLOYEE OR ANNUITANT YOU MUST REGISTER NOT TO ENROLL OR THE OTHER ENROLLMENT MUST BE CANCELED OR CHANGED TO SELF ONLY. SIMILARLY, IF A FAMILY MEMBER LISTED BY YOU IN PART B IS COVERED THROUGH HIS (OR HER) OWN ENROLLMENT, YOU CANNOT ELECT A FAMILY ENROLLMENT UNLESS THE FAMILY MEMBER CANCELS HIS (OR HER) ENROLLMENT.

PART B

FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO ENROLL OR CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN.

If enrollment is for self only, answer item 1. If enrollment is for self and family, also answer item 2.

IF YOU ARE CHANGING YOUR ENROLLMENT ALSO FILL IN PART D.

1. I elect to enroll in a health benefits plan as shown below. I authorize deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to cover my share of the cost of the enrollment. (Copy the information requested below from back page of brochure of the plan you select.)

NAME OF PLAN	OPTION (HIGH OR LOW)	ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER

2. In space below list all eligible family members without exception. List your wife or husband first, then your unmarried children under age 22, including (a) legally adopted children and (b) stepchildren, foster children, and illegitimate children who live with you in a regular parent-child relationship. Include also any unmarried child over 22 who became disabled before age 22 and who, because of the disability, is incapable of self support. (Attach a doctor's certificate for a disabled child age 22 or over, if one is not already on file.) DO NOT LIST PARENTS OR OTHERS WHO ARE NOT ELIGIBLE FAMILY MEMBERS. THEY WILL NOT RECEIVE BENEFITS, EVEN IF THEY ARE DEPENDENT ON YOU AND ARE LISTED.

NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)	NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)
Wife or Husband	1		6
	2		7
	3		8
	4		9
	5		10

PART C

FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH NOT TO ENROLL OR IF YOU WISH TO CANCEL YOUR ENROLLMENT.

PLACE AN "X" IN ITEM 1 OR 2, WHICHEVER APPLIES

1. I ELECT NOT TO ENROLL IN A PLAN UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM. [X]

Covered on husb's policy

2. I ELECT TO CANCEL MY PRESENT ENROLLMENT UNDER THE CODE NUMBER SHOWN BELOW [ ]

Present Enrollment Code Number

PART D

FILL IN THIS PART, AS WELL AS PART B, TO CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

ANSWER ITEMS 1, 2, AND 3 TO SHOW ENROLLMENT CODE BEING CHANGED AND ELIGIBILITY FOR CHANGE

1. ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER OF PRESENT PLAN
2. NUMBER OF EVENT WHICH PERMITS CHANGE. (See table on back of duplicate for proper number.)
3. DATE OF EVENT WHICH PERMITS CHANGE. MONTH DAY YEAR

PART E

ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

Norma Sue Carpenter for Anna A. Tarasoff [initials]
(YOUR SIGNATURE—DO NOT PRINT)

12-28-67
(DATE)

WARNING.—Any intentional false statement in this application or willful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both. (18 U.S.C. 1001.)

PART F

TO BE COMPLETED BY AGENCY.

1. NAME AND ADDRESS (INCLUDING ZIP CODE) OF EMPLOYING OFFICE

[signature] HEALTH BENEFITS OFFICER (ALTERNATE)

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED AGENCY OFFICIAL)

2. DATE RECEIVED IN EMPLOYING OFFICE: 12-28-67
3. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ELECTION: 12-31-67
4. PAYROLL OFFICE NO.
5. SF 2811 REPORT NO.

REMARKS

FOR USE ONLY BY AGENCY.

Contract Emp.
9-8-67
WH

5132830

14-00000

SECRET

DATE 22 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Insurance Branch/BSD/OP
Benefits and Services Division

This is to advise you that Anna A. Tarasoff has been employed under an Agency personal services contract effective 8 September 1967. The Contract authorizes participation in Civil Service Retirement, FEGLI and Federal Health Insurance.

Subject's contract is the administrative responsibility of DDP/WH.

Dow H. Luetscher
Chief
Contract Personnel Division

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City X

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Sandra B. CAZAZZUS, Contract

Action Required: As Noted

References : A. HD-6144
B. MEXICO CITY 2718

1. In view of Reference B and inasmuch as Sandra B. CAZAZZUS was in the Headquarters area, a new contract was prepared granting her the benefits of Reference A. The contract was signed by CAZAZZUS and has been forwarded for related processing.

2. Attached is a copy of the contract effective 8 September 1967 for CAZAZZUS. She elected FEGLI but declined the health insurance as she is included under her husband's policy. CAZAZZUS was thoroughly briefed on the provisions of the contract as well as the provisions of her previous contract.

STATION ACTION:

As CAZAZZUS is payrolled by the Station, related deductions for the new benefits (Civil Service Retirement and FEGLI) are to be made by the Station. Social Security deductions will, of course, cease as there is no cover requirement for mandatory Social Security coverage.

3. During the briefing, CAZAZZUS inquired about the use of sick leave. She was informed sick leave can be used in the same manner and per the same regulations as when she was formerly a

(continued)

Attachment:
As stated

Distribution:
2-COS, Mexico City, w/att, h/w

HMGS - 5679

SECRET

WH/Contracts/WSRenehan: gms (17 Nov 67) 4460

1-WH/Contracts w/att
1-WH/1 w/att
1-WH/Reg wo/att

C/WH/1

14-00000

staffer. The point involved was whether she had been granted sick leave during her "maternity leave" in 1965. She was advised that possibly she did receive payment covering the period which her accrued sick leave represented; and, possibly at that time she had only a minimal balance accrued.

STATION ACTION:

It is suggested the Station review her leave/pay account for the above cited period and advise her of the details involved.

Should the records reflect she had a balance but was not provided the leave, a pay adjustment may be made up to the balance at that time with an appropriate reduction of her current sick leave balance. NOTE: She was advised she could not have sick leave accrued since that time applied retroactively.

It is further suggested the Station Admin or Finance Officer conduct the briefing due to the necessity for the briefer to have a rather technical knowledge of leave.

Hugh E. WESTBY

8 Sep 67

Miss Sandra B. Cazazzus

Dear Miss Cazazzus:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer of this organization, hereby contracts with you, as a contract employee under the terms and conditions set forth below:

1. New Benefits. By virtue of your employment relationship under this agreement you are:

(a) Covered under the Civil Service Retirement Act in conformance with rules and regulations applicable to appointed employees of this organization. From the basic compensation paid you hereunder there shall be deducted the appropriate rate percentage (presently 6-1/2%) for deposit and eventual crediting to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. Social Security deductions required by virtue of your cover activities will not be reimbursed you by this organization.

(b) Covered under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Act in conformance with rules and regulations applicable to appointed employees of this organization unless you execute a written waiver of such coverage. The Government is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder.

(c) Eligible for coverage under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act in conformance with rules and regulations applicable to appointed employees of this organization. The Government is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder. Because of your eligibility under this Act (whether or not you choose to enroll), your coverage under the contract employees health program shall cease thirty-one (31) days after the effective date of this agreement.

2. Your previous contract with the United States Government, effective 15 July 1964, is herein terminated by mutual consent of the parties thereto.

3. All provisions of said previous contract not in conflict with this agreement are incorporated by reference into and made a part of this agreement.

14-00000

SECRET

4. This agreement is effective as of 8 September [illegible] and shall continue thereafter for two (2) years unless sooner terminated as set forth in your previous contract. If this agreement becomes effective during an overseas assignment nothing contained herein shall be construed as extending that assignment beyond its originally contemplated duration or invalidating your entitlement to return travel expenses (if applicable) upon completion of that assignment.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Sandra B. Cazazzus

WITNESS:

____

APPROVED:

____

DISPATCH

SECRET

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, [illegible]

SUBJECT: [illegible] - [illegible]/[illegible] - Tax Handling

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

The [illegible] Tax Committee has approved a flat rate assessment of [illegible]/[illegible]'s Federal tax obligation, beginning with tax year 1967. Attached is the letter of tax instruction which [illegible] should review. The original must be signed and returned to Headquarters.

VICTOR D. [illegible]

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS (w/att)
1 - [illegible]/Contracts (w/att)

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	[illegible]-5711	6 December 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	

14 1966

Letter of Tax Instruction for FEINGLASS/CAZAZZUS

1. Based on discussions held with tax representatives of the Organization, an assessment of your Organizational income has been approved to satisfy your Federal tax obligation.

2. The assessment computation is based on an estimate of your taxable compensation from the Organization and your estimate of other income from outside sources. The assessment computation results in a percentage of your salary being withheld each pay period to completely satisfy your tax obligation. For tax year 1967 thirteen and nine-tenths (13.9) per cent will be withheld, effective 28 August 1967. The computation is attached.

3. In computing your assessment rate, you have been granted a basic tax credit of $250.00. This credit is not guaranteed, but is granted to give reasonable assurance that you will not pay a higher tax than you would under ordinary reporting procedures.

4. Future changes in your income or tax status may justify a revision of the assessment rate. In this event this agreement would be amended accordingly.

5. It is important that you file a tax return directly with Internal Revenue that is consistent with your cover status. Care and accuracy in preparing this return are necessary. Any tax liability resulting from the tax computation on this return will be satisfied by your own funds. A certified true copy of this tax return must be forwarded to us upon your submission of the original to Internal Revenue. Provided below are specific criteria to assist you in the preparation of the tax return:

A. You will be provided with the name of a notional organization to be used on your 1967 tax return. The only income you will report will be income shown on your (FEINGLASS) earning statement. You will not report your wife's income or tax withholding nor will you report any withholding that was made from your salary.

B. The income that is shown (using the notional as a source) will be reported on the Form 2555 (Statement to Support Exemption of Income Earned Abroad) and will be exempted from tax, due to your residence overseas. You will base your exemption on physical presence abroad. For tax year 1967 you will report your income as being earned prior to home leave and therefore fully excludable because the qualifying period, which ended on the date you left Mexico for home leave, included an eighteen-month period abroad.

C. Other income must also be reported on this tax return, including interest from the Credit Union, which will be indicated without identifying the Credit Union by name.

6. You may request an advance of funds for payment of foreign income or related (income) taxes assessed against income received from or guaranteed by the Organization. Accounting for these funds will be made in the form of copies of the receipted tax bills (or other acceptable tax documents) which will be forwarded to the home office for approval and write-off of expense.

7. Please acknowledged the original of this letter and return to Headquarters, attention: Covert Tax Committee.

8. We appreciate your cooperation in arranging these details.

VICTOR D. UNITSKY
Secretary
Covert Tax Committee

Acknowledged:

____

Date________________________

14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED | CONFIDENTIAL | SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Hendren		
2			
3	11/17 2:35		
4			
5			
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Mr. Kaufman reviewed and declined to coordinate, feeling that time was no longer appropriate for this message.

file

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. | DATE

J. Fisher

UNCLASSIFIED | CONFIDENTIAL | SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions

14-00000

FORM 7-66 12 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

1. MESSAGES ARE CONSIDERED ROUTINE UNLESS A HIGH PRECEDENCE IS INDICATED IN THE ADDRESS LINE.
2. SEND ORIGINAL AND YELLOW COPY TO CABLE SECRETARIAT WITH SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS.
3. DO NOT ERASE OUT AND CONTINUE TYPING. DO NOT EXCEED TYPEWRITTEN CHARACTERS PER LINE, INCLUDING SPACES. END TEXT LINES WITHIN THE RIGHT MARGIN GUIDE APPROPRIATE FOR YOUR TYPEWRITER.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG: WSRenehan
UNIT: WH/Contracts
EXT: 4460
DATE: 12 September 1967

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ______ PER ______ # ______

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

TO MEXICO CITY

REF: DIRECTOR 34619

IN DISCUSSING REF WITH FEINGLASS PLEASE EXPRESS OUR SYMPATHY DEATH OF CAZAZZUS MOTHER.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Ref advised CAZAZZUS can take physical on return Mexico.

C/WH/1 ______________________

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WILLIAM S. RENEHAN
C/WH/CONTRACTS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 8

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM

ACTION WH8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, SB8, CCS3, CSPS, OP2, D/MS2

8 Sep 67 IN 47516

S E C R E T Ø72355Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2718

DIRECTOR

REDCOAT

1. SANDRA B. CAZAZZUS DEPARTING SEP WITH MINOR SON FOR MOTHER'S FUNERAL IN CLEVELAND, OHIO. SHE UNABLE COMPLETE PHYSICAL HERE, PLANS DO SO AT HQS.

2. ALSO INCOMPLETE IS CONTRACT REVIEW FOR NEW BENEFITS PER BOOK DISPATCH 6144. STATION SUGGESTS THIS BE ACCOMPLISHED AT HQS DURING FEINGLASS CONSULTATION 31 OCT.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

A Contract
9/8/67

Physical as dependent will be taken at Hqs. 1375 259 cont 9/8/67

Mr. Fisher will brief Subject DIR 91144 Designated & will contact when she & husband arrive in Hqs 9/8/67

14-00000

PPMacDougall/lvr
WH/Personnel
6815
18 August 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

FILE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 3 PER

INDEX / DESTROY / RETURN TO ___ BRANCH / NO INDEX / FILE IN CS FILE NO.

RID COPY

INFO. FILE VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 29114

MEXICO CITY 10 22 00'Z

RYBAT

REF: A. MEXICO CITY 2499 (IN 34006)
B. HMMS-5433

1. TDY HQS INCLUDED IN FEINGLASS TRAVEL ORDER. SHOULD PLAN ARRIVE HQS 31 OCTOBER 1967.

2. FAMILY SHOULD TAKE PHYSICALS IN FIELD AND FORWARD RESULTS. FEINGLASS WILL TAKE PHYSICAL WHILE HQS.

3. REF B POUCHED 16 AUGUST ANNOUNCES ARRIVAL TDY REPLACEMENT 18 SEPTEMBER 1967.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Ref A requested home leave beginning ~~18~~ 23 Sept. with TDY Hqs. to discuss 1968 retirement.

Ref B gave info on TDY replacement for FEINGLASS.

C/WH/1

JACOB D. ESTERLINE
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

EDWARD K. O'MALLEY
AC/WH/PERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

COPY NO.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 18

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

7

ACTION D/MS 2 ☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR WH 8 CCS 3 CI/PS OP2

S E C R E T 261615Z CITE MEXICO 1893

DIRECTOR 26 Jun 67 IN 98383

HBDRAW

REF: MEXICO CITY 1888 (IN 97294)

CAZAZZUS ILLNESS DIAGNOSED AS FLOATING KIDNEY. RELEASED FROM HOSPITAL 24 JUNE 1967. NO OPERATION PLANNED.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ACTION 28 D/MS 2 ☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, CCS 3, OP 2

S E C R E T 240020Z CITE MEXICO CITY 1888 24 JUN 67 IN 97294

DIRECTOR

HBDRAW

SANDRA B. CAZAZZUS ADMITTED TO AMERICAN BRITISH COWDRAY HOSPITAL 22 JUNE 1967 WITH SEVERE ABDOMINAL PAIN. PRELIMINARY DIAGNOSED AS KIDNEY DISORDER. WILL ADVISE FURTHER.

S E C R E T SECRET

BT

June 26

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 132830

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)
2. DATE OF BIRTH
3. SEX: F
4. GRADE
5. SD
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT
8. CURRENT STATION: Mexico City
9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY / CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C) / SPECIAL (Specify):
10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: XX INITIAL / ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR / REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE / XX SPECIAL (Specify): Contract Employee
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 January 1966-31 December 1966

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Selecting and processing transcripts in Spanish and English into a workable format for Station analysis and filing	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Handling administrative matters for her husband and herself.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This is the first time a fitness report has been prepared on CAZAZZUS herself, although previous fitness reports on her husband, Douglas J. FEINGLASS, have mentioned her valuable contribution. She and FEINGLASS continue to work as an excellent team. CAZAZZUS works conscientiously and quickly and saves the Station a great deal of time in the routine processing of paper and tapes. Her interest in the subject matter and her analytical ability enable her to weed out superfluous material and assist FEINGLASS in his translations and analyses.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

BY EMPLOYEE

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

BY SUPERVISOR

2. MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
7 months		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

3. COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with the rating officer's evaluation of CAZAZZUS. She compliments her husband perfectly

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

SECRET

FIELD TRANSMITTAL - FITNESS REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS

The following items of the Fitness Report will NOT be completed by field personnel preparing the report for transmitted to Headquarters:

SECTION A, items 1, 6, and 7

SECTION D, items 1, 2, and 3 *(Only in respect to "Typed or Printed Name and Signature")*

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS FITNESS REPORT	DATE 3 Feb 67	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE (In pseudonym) Sandra B. CAZAZZUS

2. I CERTIFY THAT, EXCEPT FOR ITEMS OMITTED UNDER THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL ITEMS APPEARING ON THE ATTACHED FITNESS REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS OR REGULATIONS

DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR (In pseudonym)
3 Feb 67	Jonathan L. WEENING

DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (In pseudonym)
28 Feb 67	Francis J. COIGNE

SPECIAL NOTE

Fitness Reports must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information and methods of operation, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of specific duties may be reported in Section B. However, the nature, source, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the position titles and description of specific duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases, general statements of specific duties will be included in Section B indicating the level of responsibility.

FORM 6-62 45a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

Miss Anna A. Tarasoff

Dear **Miss Tarasoff**:

Reference is made to your current contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer.

Effective **22 August 1966**, said contract is amended by deleting all reference to income taxes therefrom, and by adding thereto the following paragraph:

" **8**. Taxes. As an employee of the Government you must satisfy your Federal tax liability on taxable income paid to you under paragraph **one (1)** above. Such income may be paid you by or through a cover facility. Because of cover, operational, and security considerations the Tax Committee of this organization is authorized to make certain determinations and establish procedures which will result in the full satisfaction of your Federal income tax liability on said income. It is specifically understood and agreed that such determinations and procedures, whether oral or written, constitute an integral part of this contract and are legally incorporated herein by reference."

All other terms and conditions of said contract remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Contracting Officer

SECRET

Group 1 -- Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

DATE:

CTC No. 3

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

ATTENTION: Chief, Compensation and Tax Division

VIA: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Tax Assessment for

1. A flat rate covert tax assessment of this individual's gross, taxable Agency entitlements has been approved by the Covert Tax Committee as indicated below. An acknowledged letter of tax instruction ☐ is ☐ will be forwarded.

Tax Assessment Rate	Effective Date
[illegible]	[illegible]

2. Other payroll factors pertinent to this Covert Tax Committee tax assessment action are as follows:

[illegible]

Approval Chief, CPD

Secretary, Covert Tax Committee

SECRET

Anna A. Taraeff

4 June 1966

MISS [redacted]

Dear Miss [redacted]

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 15 July 1966, as amended, which expires 14 July 1966.

Effective 15 July 1966, said contract, as amended, is extended for a period of two (2) years.

All other terms and conditions of said contract remain in full force and effect.

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY Willard C. Curtis

ACCEPTED:

WITNESS: Irving G. Chonsky

APPROVED:

WH CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Office of Finance

INFO: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Admin/Finance-Salary Increase-Sandra B. CAZAZZUS, Employee Number 132830

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Information only.

REFERENCE: HMMS-4512, dated 6 January 1966

Furnished herewith is acopy of acontract amendment for Sandra B. CAZAZZUS covering the legislative salary increase as of 10 October 1965. The amendment was not prepared in time for CAZAZZUS to sign it before going on home leave and consequently had to await her return.

WILLARD C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As Stated Above

Distribution:
2 - Office of Finance, w/att
1 - Chief, WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMT-6164	17 January 1966
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

SECRET

Anna H Clarcoff

Dear Miss [redacted]

Reference is made to your present contract with the United States Government as represented by the Contracting Officer.

Effective 10 October 1965, said contract is amended by includi[ng] therein provision for compensation increase of the Federal Emplo[yees] [S]alary Act of 1965, in conformance with policies and procedures of th[e] Organization. Said contract is amended also to include the fo[llowing] sentence in paragraph one, entitled "Compensation":

"Compensation will be increased based on legislative pay increases."

All other terms and conditions of the contract remain in fu[ll] force and effect.

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNME[NT]

BY Willard C. Curtis

ACCEPTED:

[signature]

WITNESS:

Irving A. Ozonsky

[signature]

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Office of Finance

Salary Increase - [illegible], Employee Number [illegible]

The Office of Finance has not received a contract amendment for the 10 October 1965 salary increase which the Station has paid Subject as reflected on Station T/-489-66. Therefore, in the absence of a contract amendment, it would appear that CAZAZZUS is being overpaid. Please advise.

SHIRLEY K. Y[illegible]

Distribution:
3 - COS/Mexico City

HMMW - 4512 6 January 1966

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C&TD/APB/CFAS/R.Landry/rkm 2294

2 - WH Division WH/BF
3 - C&TD/APB/CFAS
1 - RI/DP
1 - OF/Registry
X - CPD

WH/SS

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM: MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8 — ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO: FILE VR, OF 2, CCS 3.

S E C R E T 081945Z

DIR CITE MEXI 5550

8 DEC 65 IN 10658

REF: DIR 62414

1. 1964 COVERT TAX RETURNS FOR BENADUM, LIMOTOR 19 (BARBARA C. HUFIG), PINEINCH, SANDAMANIE BEING SENT BY HMMT 6018 10 DEC POUCH. NOT POUCHED EARLIER AS OVERLOOKED IN STATION ADMIN FILES.

2. RETURN FOR CAZAZZUS SENT HMMT 5399 APR 23 (JOINT WITH S.A. DOUGLAS J. FEINCLASS). RETURN FOR LIFUED 30, NOW RITA N. BLAZIK, SENT HMMT 5908, 28 OCT 65.

3. LIHUFF 1 SUBMITTED RETURN THROUGH OVERT CHANNELS; SIGNED COPY BEING POUCHED HQS.

4. WILL REPORT ON TICHBORN SEPARATELY.

S E C R E T

CFN 5550 62414 1964 BENADUM LIMOTOR 19 BARBARA C HUFIG PINEINCH SANDAMANIE HMMT 6018 10 NOT POUCHED CAZAZZUS HMMT 5399 APR 23 DOUGLAS J FEINCLASS LIFUED 30 RITA N BLAZIK HMMT 5908 28 65 LIHUFF 1 HQS

BT

SECRET

SECRET

ANNA A. TAKHSOFF

Dear Miss

Reference is made to your present contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer.

Effective 14 August 1964, said contract is amended by including therein provision for compensation increase of the Government Employees Salary Reform Act of 1964, in conformance with the policies and procedures of this organization.

All other terms and conditions of the contract remain in full force and effect.

O/R

New rate $2.72 P/hour

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY Willard C. Curtis
Contracting Officer

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

REVIEWED:

/s/ Joseph B. Ragan
Special Contracting Officer

14-00000

DISPATCH

C/WH/SS

CPD

~~BD 4659 Tax Info~~

c/o CCS - Chan 19 - Hignet 5270.

14-00000

DISPATCH

TO: Chief, [illegible]

FROM: Chief of Station, [illegible]

SUBJECT: Effective Date for [illegible] - [illegible]

REFERENCE: A. [illegible]
B. [illegible]

The effective date of [illegible] contract [illegible] July 19[illegible].

Station [illegible]

for [illegible].

[illegible]

Distribution:
3 - [illegible]

[illegible] August 19[illegible]

Orig rec'd & fwd - 17 Aug 64
WH/B&F
CPD-5 E69
CFD/CEAS-2276[illegible]

SECRET
(EVEN WHEN BLANK)

№ SD 48769 A

DATE 29 July 1964

I DO HEREBY DECLARE THAT MY TRUE AND LEGAL SIGNATURE IS:

(SIGNATURE) [signature]

Anna Tarasoff
(NAME, PRINTED OR TYPEWRITTEN)

WITNESS: [signature]
Herbert Manell

RIGHT THUMB PRINT

SECRET

SECRET
(EVEN WHEN BLANK)

№ SD 48769 B

DATE 29 July 1964

I DO HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IN MY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, I WILL USE THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURE WHERE REQUIRED:

(SIGNATURE) [signature]

Sandra B. CAZAZZUS
(NAME, PRINTED OR TYPEWRITTEN)

WITNESS: [signature]
Gerald F. GESTETNER

RIGHT THUMB PRINT

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

CONTRACT TYPE B SECURITY APPROVAL

DATE : 15 July 1964

YOUR REFERENCE: Memorandum dated 13 July 1964

CASE NO. : 131751

TO : WH/PERS

SUBJECT : TARASOFF, Anna A.

1. This is to inform you of Security Approval of the Subject person for Contract Type B employment as specified in your request under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-53.

2. Unless arrangements are made within 60 days to contract with Subject within 120 days, this Approval becomes invalid.

3. This office is to be advised when a Contract is signed by Subject and when the Contract is terminated.

4. As a part of this contracting process:

[ ] A polygraph interview must be arranged by your office.

[X] A polygraph interview is not necessary.

[ ]

W. A. Osborne

W. A. Osborne

CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OS

FORM 10-62 1992a

CONFIDENTIAL

(9-60)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

TO: CI/Operational Approval and Support Division	DATE: 13 July 1964
X Personnel Security Division/Office of Security	FROM: WH/PERS GH-4408
SUBJECT: (True name) Tarasoff, Anna	PROJECT: Station Support
CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES	CI/OA FILE NO.
	RI 201 FILE NO. — SO FILE NO. 131751

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		COVERT NAME CHECK
X	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL Type B		SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO field investigation)
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

Mexico City, Mexico

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

Her principal responsibility will be to assist her husband, a Staff Agent, in the transcribing and processing of the Station's LIENVOY/LIFMRICK product.

Subject resigned from staff employee status on 8 September 1963.

She has been with her husband in Mexico during interim period

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	X	

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED		PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED		GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO:

6. RI TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD
	NO DEROGATORY INFO.		DEROGATORY ATTACHED
	LIST SOURCES CHECKED		
	NOT INITIATED (Explanation)		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
W.S. Renehan	6577	W.E. Brooks

FORM 1-62 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (9)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO: Chief, SR Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: ADMINISTRATIVE/[illegible] WAE Contract

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMT-9691

1. Transmitted under separate cover attachment are three copies of a signed field contract completed on the Subject of reference.

2. Her principal responsibility will be to assist her husband Douglas J. FEINGLASS (P) in the transcribing and processing of the Station's LIENVOY/LIERRICK product. The part-time employment of Subject will permit FEINGLASS to devote considerably more effort and concentration on the preparation of assessment studies on the [illegible] complement.

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD. C. CURTIS

Orig & 1 [illegible] - 17 July 64 c/w+/SS w+/BDF EPD 5E69 EFD/2EAS 6E65

Attachment:
As stated above (USC)

Distribution:
2 - WHD, w/att
1 - SRD, w/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
[illegible stamp]	HMMA-[illegible]	12 June 1964
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

15 Jul [illegible]

Mrs. Anna A. ~~Tasaroff~~ Tarasoff

Dear Mrs. Tasaroff:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you, as a Contract Employee, for the use of your services and the performance of duties of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the use of your services and the performance of specified confidential duties, you will be compensated in an amount calculated at the rate of $2.53 per hour. Payments will be made as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to the Government. Taxes will be withheld therefrom and submitted by the United States Government.

2. Benefits. (a) You will be entitled to death and disability benefits equal to those authorized under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, as amended. Claims by you, your heirs or legal representatives under this paragraph will be processed by the Government in accordance with its procedures in such manner as not to impair security.

(b) You will be entitled to sick and annual leave equal to and subject to the same rules and regulations applicable to Government employees. Such annual leave may only be taken at times and places approved in advance by appropriate representatives of the Government.

(c) You will be entitled to continuance of pay and allowances in a manner similar to that set forth in the Missing Persons Act (50 U.S.C.A., App. 1001-1015).

(d) The Government will withhold from the compensation due you under this agreement social security deductions in conformance with the basic social security legislation, as amended, and the procedures of this Organization. For reasons of security, all inquiries concerning your relationship to the social security system shall be made directly to this Organization, and in no event may any such problem be presented by you or on your behalf to any representative of the governmental unit responsible for implementing the social security program.

3. Execution of Documents. If in the performance of services under this contract you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has, in fact, been purchased with monies of the U.S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

4. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

14-00000

5. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

6. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

7. Term. This contract is effective as of [illegible], and shall continue thereafter for a period of two (2) years unless sooner terminated either:

(a) By thirty (30) days' actual notice by either party hereto, or

(b) Without prior notice by the Government in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be extended upon notice from the Government. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY Winston M. Scott
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

Anna A. Tasaroff
Anna A. Tasaroff

WITNESS: Herbert Minard

APPROVED:

REVIEWED:

Special Contracting Officer

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
1 | 4
2 | 5
3 | 6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, SR 7, VR

S E C R E T 022215Z

DIR CITE MEXI 9621

REDCOAT

IMMEDIATE ACTION

REF: HMMS-2050, 11 JUNE 1963

2 JUL 63 IN 95704

1. PER DISCUSSIONS WITH WALLACE A. DEMOLAT, STATION WISHES EMPLOY WIFE OF DOUGLAS J. FEINGLASS ASAP TO ASSUME PART OF LATTER'S LIENVOY TRANSLATION AND TRANSCRIPTION DUTIES. WOULD FREE HIM TO CONCENTRATE MORE ON PREPARATION ASSESSMENTS-CHARACTERIZATIONS OF SOV COMPLEMENT.

2. REQUEST HQS INITIATE CLEARANCE. FORWARDING FIELD CONTRACT WHICH WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE REF.

S E C R E T

Recd July 9

Clearance granted

SECRET

Copy No.

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Mexico XX

Chief, WHD

Wife of Douglas J. FEINGLASS

Please inform Subject that her resignation from staff employee status has been processed and made effective as of 8 September 1963.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 Mexico City

HMMS-3145 23 September 1963

S E C R E T

WH/PERS W.S.Renehan ecm 7555

Distribution:
1 - WH/Reg
1 - WH/PERS

C/WH/3

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / X NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico

INFO:

FROM: Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: Wife of Douglas J. FEINGLASS

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

1. The wife of Douglas J. FEINGLASS has asked that she be considered for employment in a contractual capacity. She was advised that biographic information would be forwarded and that whether or not her services were used would be up to the Station.

2. Subject has previously submitted her resignation from staff status and was processed out effective 7 June and placed on 90 days LWOP. In the event there is a requirement for her services within the 90 day period, she may be hired in a contract capacity without further clearances. Her contract should contain provision for Civil Service coverage; other benefits would be in accord with her contractual status as outlined in FHB 20-1000-1. At the time the contract is forwarded Headquarters, a functional description of her duties should also be forwarded.

3. Subject is scheduled to leave with her two children by train in 16 June. She and the children will enter on tourist cards. They have also applied for regular passports.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment:
Biographic Profile, USC

Distribution:
3 Mexico City, w/att. USC

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMM-S-2980	11 June 1963

14 JUN 1963

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET RYBAT

HQS FILE NUMBER:

Distribution:
1 - WH/Pers

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/Pers	W.S. R[illegible]	blr	75[illegible]

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/?	14 JUN 1963	[signature]

RELEASING

SECRET/RYBAT

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT

HMM-S-2980

DOB: 5 May 1923

POB: Cleveland, Ohio

HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE: 1942

CHILDREN: Daughter - Barbara, 21 Dec 1945
[illegible], 20 Mar 1949

EXPERIENCE: 1944 - 1945 Cleveland Trust Co., Cleveland, Ohio
Commercial Bookeeper

1955 - 1956 American Trust Co., San Leandro, Calif.
Commercial Bookeeper

8 Apr 1957 EOD KUBARK, Clerk, GS-4

14 Jul 1957 PBJointly, Clerk

9 Mar 1958 KUDESK, Intell Clerk

2 Nov 1958 Promotion, GS-5

8 Jan 1961 Promotion, GS-6

7 Jun 1963 LWOP for 90 days at end of which time resignation will be effected.

FITNESS REPORT: 30 June 1961 - 30 June 1962, Overall Rating "A"
(Transliterates Russian Material "P")

TRAINING: Basic Supervisors, 2-13 May 1960

TEST: Russian, Reading "E"

SECRET/RYBAT

MEMORANDUM RECEIPT

7 June 1963
DATE

TO: W.S.Renehan, WH/Pers

FROM: Mrs. Anna Tarasoff

SUBJECT: Receipt of Advance of Funds for Transportation from Washington, D. C. to Mexico City

I hereby acknowledge receipt of the following:

$525.00 in conjunction with Subject. It is understood that this advance is for ~~xxxxx~~ lowest first class rail travel Washington to Mexico City, Mexico and related costs, and anticipated per diem for three days for myself and two dependent children. Accounting for the advance will be submitted to the Mexico City Station.

Anna Tarasoff
Anna Tarasoff
SIGNATURE OF RECIPIENT

Please return ________ signed copy(ies) of this receipt

To ____________________

7 June 1963
DATE RECEIVED

FORM NO. 752 REPLACES FORM 38-60 WHICH MAY BE USED.
1 AUG 53

(33)

SECRET

7 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Personnel Security Division, Office of Security

SUBJECT: Mrs. Anna Tarasoff, Contract Employee Clearance

1. It is requested that clearance be granted for the employment of Mrs. Anna Tarasoff as a Contract Employee, Type A or B at the Mexico City, Mexico Station to provide clerical services.

2. Mrs. Tarasoff is presently a GS-6, staff employee. She is being reassigned to the CS Development Complement and placed on a 90 day LWOP status effective COB 7 June in order to join her husband.

3. In the event the Mexico Station can use her services she would be employed in a contractual capacity and her resignation from staff employee status would be effected the day prior to the effective date of contract.

4. In the event additional information is desired, please contact Mr. William Renehan, extension 7555.

W. E. BROOKS
Chief, WH Support

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 5 June 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 045935
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): TARASOFF, ANNA
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: LWOP AND REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 6 / DAY 7 / YEAR 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | CF TO V | V TO CF | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3127-1790-1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP CI STAFF / CI DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: INTELL CLERK
12. POSITION NUMBER: 81 3971
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0313.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 6 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 5,545. hourly rate 2.67 / 2.54

18. REMARKS

FROM: DDP CI STAFF/SPECIAL INVESTIGATION GROUP/PROJECTS BR/INTELL CLK/WASH., D.C/0151

Employee's last working day 7 June 1963.

LWOP (HHB 20-1 Para. 10 a.) Leave of absence to accompany husband to new station - not to exceed 90 days.

cc to security and finance

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: [signature] CI STAFF — DATE SIGNED: 5 Jun 63

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER — DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE | 20. EMPLOY. CODE | 21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC, ALPHABETIC) | 22. STATION CODE | 23. INTEGREE CODE | 24. POSITION CODE | 25. DATE OF BIRTH | 26. DATE OF GRADE | 27. DATE OF LEI

28. NTE EXPIRES | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECT/CANCELLATION DATA | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.) | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE | 37. LONG. COMP. DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR/RESV - PROV/TEMP) | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE) | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS); 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)) | 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION | 46. C.P. APPROVAL | DATE APPROVED

(4)

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

PUBLIC SCHOOLS
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

WOODROW WILSON HIGH SCHOOL

PUPIL'S PERMANENT RECORD

LAST NAME OF PUPIL	FIRST NAME	MIDDLE NAME
TARASOFF	BARBARA	

Translator (Jr.)

PARENT OR GUARDIAN	OCCUPATION
Boris Dmitri Tarasoff	Analyst - U.S.Government

RESIDENCE	TEL.
5109 - 45th Street, N.W.	EM 2-6990
RESIDENCE	TEL.

PLACE OF BIRTH	DATE OF BIRTH	SEX
Ohio	12.22.45	F

DATE OF ENTRY 9.6.61 FROM Kramer Jr.
DATE OF WITHDRAWAL TO
DATE OF RE-ENTRY FROM
DATE OF WITHDRAWAL TO
DATE OF RE-ENTRY FROM

NINTH GRADE

SUBJECT	GRADE	UNIT
English	A	1
Anc. & Med. History	A	1
Algebra 1 & 2	B	2
French		
Gen. Math		
Latin 1 & 2	A	2
Typing		
Gen. Science		
Biology	A	1

UNOFFICIAL

TEST RECORD

UNOFFICIAL

YEAR BEG. 9.6.61 — SECTION 112-2 RCS

SUBJECT	TEACHER	SEM.	FINAL	UNIT
English 2H	ALQ	A	A	1
Mod. History				
Pl. & Solid Geom.	ARG	C	B	1
French 1H	ALF	A	A	1
Latin 3H	[illegible]	A	A	1
Spanish				
Chemistry				
Biology				
Chem. H	AML	B	B	1
U.S. History	SS		A	1
Physical Ed. 2a-b	CGR DM	B	B	1/2
Military Science				

	SEM. I	SEM. II
Department	A	A
Days Present	91½	81
Days Abs. Ex.	1	1½
Days Abs. Unex.	-	-
Times Tardy	-	-

YEAR BEG. 9.5.62 — SECTION 112-3 RCS

SUBJECT	TEACHER	SEM.	FINAL	UNIT
English 3H	LRG	A		
U.S. History				
French 2H	WLF	A		
Latin 4H	SWA	A		
Spanish				
German 1P	RAM	A		
Physics R	JE	A		
Physical Ed. 3	CGR	A		
Military Science				

UNOFFICIAL

	SEM. I	SEM. II
Department	A	
Days Present	90½	
Days Abs. Ex.	2½	
Days Abs. Unex.	0	
Times Tardy	0	

YEAR BEG. — SECTION

SUBJECT	TEACHER	SEM.	FINAL	UNIT
English				
Government				
French				
Latin				
Spanish				
Chemistry				
Physical Ed.				
Military Science				

	SEM. I	SEM. II
Department		
Days Present		
Days Abs. Ex.		
Days Abs. Unex.		
Times Tardy		

YEAR BEG. — SECTION

SUBJECT	TEACHER	SEM.	FINAL	UNIT
English				
Physical Ed.				
Military Science				

	SEM. I	SEM. II
Department		
Days Present		
Days Abs. Ex.		
Days Abs. Unex.		
Times Tardy		

Son - Raymond

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: VITALE, GUY
OP FILE

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: PERSONNEL MATTERS OUTSIDE TIME FRAME

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
3:30 25 AUG 78		GAETON FONZI	[signature]
26 AUG 1978 0950		HARDWAY/FONZI	[signature]

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

VITALE, GUY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 17 Feb 69

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 003620

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): VITALE, GUY

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY) UNDER THE CIA RETIREMENT - CIA & DISABILITY SYS

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 28 YEAR 69

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: X | V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 9235 0620

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): P.L. 88-643 Sect. 233

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
WH/COG
OPERATIONS BRANCH
WH SECTION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: INTELLIGENCE ASST (B)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 1685

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0301.26

16. GRADE AND STEP: 08 6

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 8984

18. REMARKS:

Last working day is 28 February 1969.

1152 telecoord. w/Paul Seidel, R.B. - dmw 3/3/69

INTEL ASST OCCUPYING INTEL ANALYST SLOT

1 - Finance
~~1 - Security~~

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Henry L. Berthold, C/WH/Personnel — DATE SIGNED: 17 Feb 69

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [signature] — DATE SIGNED: [illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. EMPLOY CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. HOURS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.): 12 16 17
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—ORGN, 3—FICA, 4—NONE) CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: OBJ CODE O.
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.)
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE (CODE: 0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT)
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)
37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)
38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR. RESV / PROV/TEMP; CODE)
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE: 1—WAIVER, 2—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE)
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (CODE: 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)
44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 3-6-69 JE
46. OP APPROVAL: [signature]
DATE APPROVED:

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 17 Feb 69

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 003620

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): VITALE, GUY

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY) UNDER THE CIA RETIREMENT - CIA & DISABILITY SYS.

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 28 YEAR 69

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 9235 0620

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): P.L. 88-643 Sect. 233

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
WH/COG
OPERATIONS BRANCH
WH SECTION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: INTELLIGENCE ASST (S)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1685

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0301.26

16 GRADE AND STEP: 08 6

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 8984

18. REMARKS

Last working day is 28 February 1969.

1152 telecoord. w/Paul Seidel, R.B. - dmw 3/3/69

INTEL ASST OCCUPYING INTEL ANALYST SLOT

1 - Finance
~~1 - Security~~

SA/ESPS 20 Feb 69

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Henry L. Berthold, C/WH/Personnel

DATE SIGNED: 17 Feb 69

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [signature]

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22 STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HDQTRS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26 DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	27 DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)
45	10				1	6 16 17		

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA (1-CS, 2-CSGH, 3-FICA, 4-NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34 SEX
		0	BJ00.00.				

35 VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0-NONE, 1-5 PT., 2-10 PT.)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA. YR.)	37 LONG COMP DATE (MO DA. YR.)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR. RESV, PROV. TEMP) CODE	39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0-WAIVED, 1-YES) / HEALTH INS. CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO, CODE, NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44 STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO, CODE, NO. TAX EXEMP., STATE CODE)

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 3-6-69 JE

46 O P APPROVAL: K. Lowden

DATE APPROVED:

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

14-00000

JLB: 10 MAR 69

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

REF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)		
003620	VITALE GUY		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION		4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
RETIREMENT VOLUNTARY UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM		02 28 69	REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF		7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		9235 0620 0000	P.L. 88-643 SECT. 233
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	
11. POSITION TITLE		12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
INTELLIGENCE ASST		1685	D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0301.28	08 6	8984

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition (4-51)

SECRET

28 FEB 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. Guy Vitale

THROUGH : Head of CS Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Approval of Request for Voluntary Retirement

1. I am pleased to inform you that your request for voluntary retirement under the CIA Retirement and Disability System has been approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. Your retirement will become effective 28 February 1969 and your annuity will commence as of 1 March 1969. The annuity is payable on the first day of the month following that for which it accrued. You may be assured that every effort will be made to expedite delivery of your first check following completion of the administrative processing required to effect your retirement.

3. You will receive a lump-sum payment for your accrued annual leave up to 30 days or for whatever amount of leave credit you carried over from the last calendar year if that amount is more than 30 days.

/s/ Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - D/Pers
1 - OP Files
1 - Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

OP BSD ROB/PJSeidel:jef (27 February 1969)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CERTIFICATION OF SEPARATING EMPLOYEE	Name (Last-First-Middle) VITALE, GUY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD - ATTACH TO OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of the following forms and/or information concerning my separation from CIA as indicated by check mark:

✓	1. Standard Form 8 (Notice to Federal Employee about Unemployment Compensation).
✓	2. Standard Form 55 (Notice of Conversion Privilege, Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance).
	3. Standard Form 56 (Agency Certification of Insurance Status, Federal Employers' Group Life Insurance Act of 1954).
	4. Standard Form 2802 (Application for Refund of Retirement Deductions).
✓	5. Form 2595 (Authorization for Disposition of Paychecks).
	6. Applicable to returnee (resignee from overseas assignment). I have been advised of my right to have a medical examination before my separation from this Agency and of the importance of such a medical check to my health and well-being. ☐ Appointment arranged with Office of Medical Services. ☐ Appointment for Office of Medical Services examination declined.
	7. I have been informed of "conflict of interests" policy of the Agency and foresee no problem in this regard concerning my new employment.
	8. Form 71 (Application for Leave).
	9. CSC Pamphlet 51 (Re-employment Rights of Federal Employees Performing Armed Forces Duty).
	10. Instructions for returning to duty from Extended Leave or Active Military Service.

Signature of Employee	Date Signed
Guy Vitale	28 Feb 69
Address (Street, City, State, Zip Code) 1730 "H" St. N.W. Wash. D.C.	Correspondence ☐ Overt ☒ Covert

SECRET

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 18 February 1969

FILE NUMBER: 11326

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 003620

ID CARD NUMBER:

TO: (Check)

- CHIEF, RECORDS AND CONTROL
- CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
- X CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action)

ATTN: Chief Support Staff

REF: Retirement Debriefing

SUBJECT: VITALE, Guy

OFFICIAL COVER: BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED / X DISCONTINUED

UNIT:

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)	X CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)
A. TEMPORARILY FOR ______ DAYS EFFECTIVE DATE COB ______ B. CONTINUING AS OF COB	DATE (as of COB) FROM EOD
SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)	NA SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
ASCERTAIN THAT ______ W-2 BEING ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)	OK RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS.
SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR-240-2e)	DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK - FOR CCS INTERNAL USE ONLY
SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR-240-2e)	
SUBMIT FORM 2688 X FOR HOSPITALIZATION CARD	

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

COVER HISTORY:
Oct 49 - Jan 57 Hqs/Overt
Jan 57 - Mar 60 Greece/DAC
Mar 60 - Present Hqs/DAC

SUBJECT IS TO INDICATE CIA AS PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT FOR ENTIRE PERIOD, BUT IS NOT TO REVEAL SPECIFIC PLACES OR LOCATIONS OF COVER ASSIGNMENTS.

FORWARDING ADDRESS: UNKNOWN

EMPLOYMENT ADDRESS: UNKNOWN

RF/kas

DISTRIBUTION: COPY 1 - RCD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - D/OS
COPY 4 - OL/TELSVC
COPY 5 - CCS - CHRONO
COPY 6 - CCS - FILE

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 8-68 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (13-20-43)

SECRET

SDF: 20 FEB 69

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
003620	VITALE, GUY

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	02 23 69	REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	X	CF TO V		CF TO CF	9235 0620 0000	PL 88-643 SECT. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/WH	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
		D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
		08	

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - CIA, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction / Cancellation Data (TYPE, MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
		2					

35. VET PREFERENCE (CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE; 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED 2-20-69 Je.

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition Mfg 10-67

SECRET

FVD

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 7 FEBRUARY 1969

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)
003620	VITALE, GUY

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (Month / Day / Year)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	02 / 23 / 69	REGULAR

6. FUNDS		7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
X V TO V; CF TO V	V TO CF; CF TO CF	9235 - 0620	PL 88-643 Sect. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/WH	WASHINGTON, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
		D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
			$

18. REMARKS

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING (Numeric / Alphabetic)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOQTRS. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1-CSC, 3-FICA, 5-NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX
		2					

35. VET. PREFERENCE (CODE: 0-NONE, 1-5 PT, 2-10 PT)	36. SERV COMP DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CODE)	39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE: 0-WAIVED, 1-YES; HEALTH INS. CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (CODE: 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. O P APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
	[signature]	13 FEB 69

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

OP-1 1-66

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14

14-00000

69-1750

Executive Registry
69-2024

17 APR 1969

Mr. Guy Vitale
1730 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear Mr. Vitale:

As you bring to a close more than twenty-six years of service to your country, I want to join your friends and co-workers in wishing you well and hoping that you find the years ahead filled with enjoyment and satisfaction.

It takes the conscientious efforts of many people to do the important work of this Agency. You leave with the knowledge that you have personally contributed to our success in carrying out our mission. Your faithful and loyal support has measured up to the high ideals and traditions of the Federal service.

May I express to you my appreciation and extend my best wishes for the years ahead.

Sincerely,

SGD Richard Helms
Richard Helms
Director

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - ER
1 - C/EAB/OS
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - ROB
1 - ROB Reader

Originator: ____________________
Director of Personnel

Concur: SIGNED 2 APR 1969
C/EAB/OS

OP/RAD/ROB/PJSeidel:jef (1 April 1969)

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Request for Voluntary Retirement
Guy Vitale

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval; this recommendation is contained in paragraph 4.

2. Mr. Guy Vitale, GS-08, Intelligence Analyst, Western Hemisphere Division, Clandestine Services, has applied for voluntary retirement under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50j, to be effective 28 February 1959.

3. Mr. Vitale has been designated a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System and meets the technical requirements for voluntary retirement under the System. He is 51 years old with over 28 years of Federal service. This service includes over 2[illegible] years with the Agency of which 5 years were in qualifying service. The Head of the Clandestine Services Career Service and the CIA Retirement Board have recommended that his application for voluntary retirement be approved. I endorse these recommendations.

4. It is recommended that you approve the voluntary retirement of Mr. Guy Vitale under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50j.

Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

The recommendation contained in paragraph 4 is approved:

/s/ Richard Helms

Director of Central Intelligence — Date

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 13 December 1965

Field	Entry
1 SERIAL NUMBER	003620
2 NAME (Last-First-Middle)	VITALE, Guy
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	REASSIGNMENT
4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (Month / Day / Year)	12 / 28 / 65
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6 FUNDS	X V TO V
7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	6235-1162
8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH WH/C Miami Operations Branch PM Section
10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D.C.
11 POSITION TITLE	INTELL. Asst. (D)
12 POSITION NUMBER	1506
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS (07)
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0301.23
16 GRADE AND STEP	08 (4)
17 SALARY OR RATE	$ 7553

18 REMARKS

From WH/C/MOB, PM Sec., #1142

P.R.A. per HR 20-21c(3) NTE December 1967.

Recorded By CSPD

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
ROBERT D. CASHMAN, C/WH/Pers.	20 Dec 65	[signature]	21 DEC 1965

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOURS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26 DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF LEI
37	10	51526	WHP	25015		/	10 16 17		

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ. NO.	34 SEX
12 27 67	.83						

35 VET. PREFERENCE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT) | 36 SERV. COMP. DATE | 37 LONG COMP. DATE | 38 CAREER CATEGORY | 39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE (0—WAIVER, 1—YES) | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS); 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) | 42 LEAVE CAT CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44 STATE TAX DATA

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46 O P APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
12-23-65 H	[signature]	12-23-65

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Guy Vitale — 20 October 1965

THROUGH : Head of D Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Non-eligibility for Designation as a Participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System

1. As you may know, we are in the process of reviewing the employment history and current career field of all employees ~~in the~~ Agency to identify those who are eligible for designation as a participant in the new CIA Retirement and Disability System. In this process, the initial review of each case is made by the individual's Career Service. If the Head of his Career Service nominates him for participation in the system, this nomination is reviewed by the CIA Retirement Board which recommends final action to me. However, if the Head of the Career Service advises that the employee does not meet the basic requirements of HR 20-50 for participation, I have accepted this finding without further review by the CIA Retirement Board. This practice has been adopted in the interest of expediting this screening process so that those employees who are eligible to participate in the system may be designated participants as soon as possible.

2. In your case, the Head of your Career Service has advised me that you do not meet the requirements of HR 20-50 for designation as a participant and I have accordingly made the formal determination required by the regulation that you are not eligible for designation. From a review of your record it appears that the decision of your Career Service was based upon the fact that you have 15 years or more of Agency service, but have not as yet performed 60 months of qualifying service as required by regulation. My determination that you are not eligible at this time for designation in no way affects your current status under the Civil Service Retirement System, nor does it preclude reconsideration of your eligibility to participate in the CIA System if you should meet the requirements for designation in the future.

3. Should you desire further information concerning the requirements for designation as a participant in the CIA Retirement System, I suggest that you read paragraph e of HR 20-50 and paragraph 5 of the Employee Bulletin dated 30 July 1965, entitled "Public Law 88-643, The Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees".

4. It is always possible that the records upon which the determination made in your case may have been incomplete or inaccurate regarding your actual employment history with the Agency. If, after studying the materials cited above, you have questions regarding the determination that you are not eligible to participate in the CIA Retirement System, please feel free to contact officials of your Career Service. They are familiar with the details of your case and will gladly discuss them with you. In addition, you may wish to discuss your case with the CIA Retirement Staff located in Room 6E-1319 Headquarters (extension 6001). If such discussions do not resolve any questions you have regarding your eligibility, you may request that your case be formally considered by the Board. However, this request must be made within 30 days of the date of this memorandum.

Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

SECRET

Group I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 12 December 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 003620
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): VITALE, Guy
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 01 DAY 20 YEAR 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | CF TO V | V TO CF | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3232-1000-1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP / Task Force W / FI/CI Branch
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (D)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0683
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS (09)
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 08 (3)
17. SALARY OR RATE: $6500

18. REMARKS

Promotion recommendation attached. Fitness Report submitted previously.

Recorded by CSPD

2 A

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Louis W. Armstrong — LOUIS W. ARMSTRONG, C/TFW/Pers. DATE SIGNED: 14 Dec 62

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [signature] DATE SIGNED: 1/7/63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC)	(ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. VOTERS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
32	10	61300	TFW	75013		1	10 16 17		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.) | 29. SPEC. REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) CODE | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.) | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.) | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.) | 37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.) | 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR/RESV, PROV/TEMP) CODE | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE: 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE) | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)) | 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS): 1 ... 15 01 | 44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [signature] 01/_/63

46. O.P. APPROVAL: [signature]

DATE APPROVED

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 12 December

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)
003620	VITALE, Guy

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH / DAY / YEAR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
PROMOTION		REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	3232-1000-1000	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP Task Force W FI/CI Branch	Washington, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER (D)	0633	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS (09)	0136.01	08 (3)	$6500

18. REMARKS

Promotion recommendation attached. Fitness Report submitted previously.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
LOUIS W. ARMSTRONG, C/TFW/Pers.			

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HDQTRS. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR/RESV, PROV/TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE: 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. O.P. APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED

FORM 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 12 March 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 003620
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): VITALE, Guy (NMI)
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 03 DAY 18 YEAR 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | X CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2235-1400-1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH Branch 4 FI/CI Sec.
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: INTELL ASST
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0685
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0301.28
16. GRADE AND STEP: 07 (3)
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 5685

18. REMARKS

From: DDP/EE/CS/Dev.Compl.,D.C.

Security Approval ... 3/6/62

CONCURRENCE: Frank Driscoll (per phone)
EE/Personnel Officer

3/16/62

1 copy to Security

19. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: JAMES DURHAM, WH/4/Pers.Officer
DATE SIGNED:
19a. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [signature]
DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 16 | 20. EMPLOY. CODE: 16 | 21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC [illegible] ALPHABETIC [illegible] | 22. STATION CODE: [illegible] | 23. INTEGREE CODE | 24. MOTORS CODE | 25. DATE OF BIRTH: 10 16 17 | 26. DATE OF GRADE | 27. DATE OF LEI

28. NTE EXPIRES | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSR, 3 - FICA, 4 - NONE) | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA | EOD DATA | 33. SECUR. REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.) | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE | 37. LONG. COMP. DATE | 38. FMI SERV. CREDIT/LCD (1 - YES, 2 - NO) | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES) | HEALTH INS. CODE | 40. SOC. SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)) | 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: T. J. Kearney 03/21/62
46. O.P. APPROVAL: [signature]
DATE APPROVED:

FORM 8-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4)

14-00000

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

6 June 1960

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo. / Da. / Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD Mo. / Da. / Yr.
503620	VITALE GUY	10 / 16 / 17	1	M 1	09 / 13 / 49

7. SCD Mo. / Da. / Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. / Da. / Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. / Da. / Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit, LCD Yes-1 No-2 Code
10 / 24 / 42	1	50 USCA 403 J			09 / 13 / 49	2

25

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP EE ATHENS STATION OPERATIONS STAFF RECORDS INTEGRATION SECTION	5231	ATHENS, GREECE	29501

16. Dept. - Field (Dept - USfld - Frgn -) Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
5	INTELL ASST	1809	GS	0301.28

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. / Da. / Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. / Da. / Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
07 1	$ 4980	DS	09 / 06 / 59	09 / 04 / 60	0139 9350 3018

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. / Da. / Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	17	06 / 12 / 60	REGULAR	25	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT EE DIVISION	5268	WASH., D.C.	25013

33. Dept. - Field (Dept - USfld - Frgn -) Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
1		6612 00		

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. / Da. / Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. / Da. / Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
	$	D			0320 1998

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): C/EE/Personnel [signature] 6 7 60

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): Annell M. Weiland X3884

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title):

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board	[signature]	6/8/60	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		14 JUN 1960	E.	[stamp]	
C. Classification			F. Approved By	[signature] 6-13-60	

Remarks: In-casual

FCS RETURNEE

Form No. 1152 (4)

14-00000

Pre 1960 Requests for Personnel Action

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I)

1. PERS. SERIAL NO.: 03620 — SCD: 24 Oct 1942

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	3. SEX	4. DATE OF BIRTH	5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE
VITALE, Guy (nmn)	M	Oct 1917	13 Sep 1949

6. MARITAL STATUS	7. DEPENDENT(S) (Exclud. employee)	NO.	YEAR(S) OF BIRTH	8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S)
Single		0		NA — SPOUSE

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS	MEMBERSHIP	OTHER STATUS	10. LAST MED. RPT.	QUAL. FOR	EVAL. FOR
	Jul 1954		Apr 1960	Dept Duties	O/S Returnee

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS	NONE	SERVICE	GRADE	ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT.-1	RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT.-2	TO BE DEFERRED CAT.-3	RETIRED
	x						

12. ASSESSMENT DATE	13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE	14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE
None	None	None

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1938-41 Various jobs for short periods of time; also unemployed during part of this time.
1942-46 Military Service, US Army, Sgt
1946-49 Library of Congress, DC - Book Room Attendant

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

1937-38 Kents Hill Jr College, Maine
1948-50 George Washington, DC - Poli Sci

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested): None

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1962 Rcds Off Crs

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SO	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Sep 1949	Messenger	0302.01	CPC 3		C&D/Admin/Mail&CourierSect	Hq
Sep 1950	File Clerk	0305.01	GS-3		R&E/Map/Proc&RefBr	"
Jul 1951	" "	0305.01	4		RR/Geo/Map Library Br	"
Nov 1952	" "	0305.01	4		ORR/Ch,GeoRes/MapLibrary/ProcBr	"
Sep 1956	" "	0305.01	5	IR	" " " " " " "	"
Dec 1956	Clerk	0301.26	5	DS	DDP/SE/OpsDiv/Rpts,Index&Biog	Athens
Oct 1957	"	0301.26	6	DS	" " " " " " "	"
Aug 1958	Intel Asst	0301.28	6	DS	DDP/SE/OpsStf/RI Section	"
Sep 1959	" "	0301.26	7	DS	" " " " " "	"
Jun 1960	" "	0301.26	7	D	DDP/EE/CS/CSDevComp	Hq
Mar 1962	" "	0301.26	7	D	DDP/WH/Br-4/FI/CI Sec	"
Jan 1963	Ops Off	0136.01	8	D	DDP/TFW/FI/CI Br	"

20. DATE REVIEWED	21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY	22. ITEMS 1-19 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE
25 Jan 1965	hc	No

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO.	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)
03620	

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
VITALE, Guy (nmn)	Oct 1917

23. SUMMARIES OF EVALUATIVE REPORTS FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS



24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Commendation 1960 from Ch, EE Logistics for services rendered while on a temporary assignment to EE Division Logistics Office.

27. DATE REVIEWED	28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY
25 Jan 1965	hc

FORM NO. 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1050 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE.
1 FEB 57

SECRET PROFILE (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I)

SCD: 24 Oct 1942

1. PERS. SERIAL NO.: 003620

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): VITALE, Guy (nmn)

3. SEX: M

4. DATE OF BIRTH: 16 Oct 1917

5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE: 13 Sep 1949

6. MARITAL STATUS: Single

7. DEPENDENT(S) (Exclud. employee): NO. 0 | YEAR(S) OF BIRTH:

8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S): NA | SPOUSE:

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS: MEMBERSHIP Jul 1954 | OTHER STATUS:

10. LAST MED. RPT.: Apr 1960 | QUAL. FOR: Dept Duties | EVAL. FOR: O/S Returnee

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS: NONE x | SERVICE: | GRADE: | ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT.-1: | RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT.-2: | TO BE DEFERRED CAT.-3: | RETIRED:

12. ASSESSMENT DATE: None

13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE: None

14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE: None

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1939-41 Various jobs for short periods of time; also unemployed during part of this time.
1942-46 Military Service, US Army, Sgt
1946-49 Library of Congress, DC - Clk; Libr Asst

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

1937-38 Kents Hill Jr College, Maine
1948-50 George Washington, DC - Poli Sci
1957 American Mission Sch, Athens, Greece - Greek (3 mos)

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested): None

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1962 Rcds Off Crs

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Sep 1949	Messenger	0302.01	CPC 3		C&D/Admin/Mail&CourierSect	Hq
Sep 1950	File Clerk	0305.01	CS-3		R&E/Map/Proc&RefBr	"
Jul 1951	" "	0305.01	4		RR/Geo/Map Library Br	"
Nov 1952	" "	0305.01	4		ORR/Ch,GeoRes/MapLibrary/ProcBr	"
Sep 1956	" "	0305.01	5	IR	" " " " " " "	"
Dec 1956	Clerk	0301.26	5	DS	DDP/SE/OpsDiv/Rpts,Index&Biog	Athens
Oct 1957	"	0301.26	6	DS	" " " " " " "	"
Aug 1958	Intel Asst	0301.28	6	DS	DDP/SE/OpsStf/RI Section	"
Sep 1959	" "	0301.26	7	DS	" " " " " "	"
Jun 1960	" "	0301.26	7	D	DDP/SE/CS/CSDevComp	Hq
Mar 1962	" "	0301.26	7	D	DDP/WH/Br-4/FI/CI Sec	"
Jan 1963	Ops Off	0136.01	8	D	DDP/TFW/FI/CI Br	"
May 1965	" "	0136.01	8	D	DDP/WH/C/Miami Ops Br	"
Dec 1965	Intel Asst	0301.28	8	D	" " " " " "	"
May 1968	Intel Anal	0132.35	8	D	DDP/WH/C	"

20. DATE REVIEWED: 6 Feb 1969

21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY: hc

22. ITEMS 1-19 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE: No

FORM 8-57 1200 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET PROFILE (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO.	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)
03620	

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
VITALE, Guy (nmn)	16 Oct 1917

23.



24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Commendation 1960 from Ch, ES Logistics for services rendered while on a temporary assignment to ES Division Logistics Office.

27. DATE REVIEWED	28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY
6 Feb 1969	hc

FORM NO. 1 FEB 57 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1050 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE. SECRET PROFILE (4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 003620

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Vitale, Guy	10/16/17	M	08	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Intelligence Asst.	DDP/WH/COG	Hqs.

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT		10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT	
X	CAREER		INITIAL
	RESERVE		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	TEMPORARY	X	ANNUAL
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
July 1968	1 July 67 - 30 June 68

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Analysis and Research of clandestine service documents for information pertinent to the criteria of the CUIS/LA Subversive machine program.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Assists personnel with machine name traces and other operational support assistance.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Preparation of biographic input sheets for machine processing into the Cuban IS program.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: As Branch Records Officer insures compliance with CS Records directives including authorization for destruction of CS documents.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5:	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

9 AUG 1968

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: P

FORM 4-68 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Vitale since he was assigned to me initially on a part-time basis and later as a full time assistant has performed adequately as an input analyst in addition to his proficient work as a Records Officer and General support assistant. The quality of his input has been good and his production has helped considerably in cutting down the size of the input backlog. Mr. Vitale also continues to perform the Records Officers function for the branch with a sound knowledge of general records procedures. His attitude and attendance record continue to reflect a willingness to assist the branch in whatever way necessary. In addition Mr. Vitale's valuable background knowledge on a former vital portion of the branch's effort continues to be utilized to a considerable extent. He gets along well with his colleagues and contributes to the smooth running of the office.

Mr. Vitale is presently within 2 years of retirement or 4 years, if he does not receive an overseas assignment. He has told the career panel, he would accept an overseas assignment to either Vietnam or Laos. In view of his experience with paramilitary operations, it is felt this would be a more fitting assignment for him than the present one, even though he has been performing quite satisfactorily.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
7/18/68	[signature] Vitale

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
9		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
18 July		Alva King [signature]

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the evaluation of this employee as presented above.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
13 July 1968	C/WH/COG/OS	Thos. J. Barrett [signature]

SECRET

SECTION C/Continued NARRATIVE COMMENTS

For approximately four months during 1967, Mr. Vitale worked with me in providing Headquarters' support to JMWAVE in its conduct of special operations into PBRUMEN. In such a role, Mr. Vitale's knowledge of the history, mechanics, requirements and PBRUMEN personnel of these operations was invaluable in (1) the preparation of operational proposals for the 303 Committee, (2) the provision of timely operational information periodically requested by the front offices of both WH/COG and WHD, and (3) the briefing of WOFIRM personnel newly assigned to JMWAVE to assist in these operations. While under my supervision, Mr. Vitale was a conscientious, loyal, cooperative employee who readily and willingly performed all tasks assigned to him in an exceptional manner. He always expressed his willingness to work as many hours as necessary to finish the task at hand. He has a very pleasant personality, gets along well with his fellow workers and exhibits a good sense of cost consciousness in the use of government equipment and materials. The rating letter "S" most accurately reflects the level of performance of Mr. Vitale during the period he was under my supervision.

Robert J. Weatherwax

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 003620

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
VITALE Guy	16 Oct 17	M	GS-08	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Intell Asst	DDP/WH/COG	Washington

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 July 1966 - 30 June 1967

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Maintains project and agent 201 files for the Branch's paramilitary program.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Locates and maintains material for use in briefings and in the conduct of liaison with other government agencies.	A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Aids in conducting name traces and in processing operational clearances.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: As Branch Records Officer, insures compliance with CS records directives, including authorization for destruction of CS documents.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Assists in conduct of input to Cuban I.S. Machine Records Program.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

31 AUG 1967

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	Rating Letter
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

AUG 31 9 26 AM '67

Mr. Vitale continues to perform his duties as an operational support assistant capably. His background knowledge of Cuban paramilitary operations has provided the Branch with very useful continuity. His ability and experience in locating material and in handling records for headquarters support to WH/COG Special Operations contribute substantially to the Branch's operational support effort. Mr. Vitale carries out his assigned duties in a willing, loyal and highly dependable manner. He recently has been given an additional assignment on the CUIS Machine Input Program which he is handling in a highly efficient manner. He gets along well with his colleagues and contributes to the smooth running of the office. He does not have supervisory responsibilities, but does show concern for efficient and economical use of government property.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
25 Aug '67	[signature]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
12		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
25 August 1967	Section Chief, PM Operations	Ernest Chiocca [signature]

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

As noted in the last Fitness Report, I concur generally in the supervisor's ratings of Mr. Vitale's performance as listed; but I must again note that these are duties which could be performed by a more junior clerical type and that Mr. Vitale should not be considered as performing GS-8 level Intelligence Assistant work at a Proficient rating. Indeed, he is, in my opinion, not qualified for such a role and his official position title should be changed to prevent any misunderstanding as to the somewhat unique nature of his value to the Agency.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
28 AUG 1967	C/WH/COG/MO	Robert A. Ortman [signature]

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

11 May 1960
File K-4849

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : VITALE, Guy, nmi

1. Cover arrangements are in process, and/// have been completed for the above-named Subject.

2. Effective 1 April 1960, it is requested that your records be properly blocked ///////// to deny ////////// Subject's current Agency employment to an external inquirer.

3. //

Paul P. Stewart
HARRY W. LITTLE, JR.
Chief, Central Cover Division

cc: SSD/OS

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

SECRET

FORM 1-59 1580a (4-13-40)

5-17-60
GR

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ALE: 10 MAR 69

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)		
003620	VITALE GUY		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION		4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
RETIREMENT VOLUNTARY UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM		02 28 69	REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF		7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 9235 0620 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: P.L. 88-643 SECT. 233
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH WH/COG OPERATIONS BRANCH WH SECTION		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.	
11. POSITION TITLE: INTELLIGENCE ASST		12. POSITION NUMBER: 1685	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0301.26	16. GRADE AND STEP: 08 6	17. SALARY OR RATE: 8984

18. REMARKS

---

1. LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	INITIAL(S)
VITALE	GUY	

4. DATE AND NATURE OF SEPARATION: 2-28-69 RETIREMENT CIARDS

2. APPOINTMENT DATA: Entered on duty 9-13-49; F.T X; P.T. Subject to Sec. 203(d), 1951 Leave Act: Yes ☐ No ☐. Ceased to be subject to Sec. 203(d) on ____ Annual Leave Bal. ____

3. TOTAL SERVICE FOR LEAVE (as of date of separation)

Years	Months	Days
26	4	4

☐ More than 15 years

SUMMARY OF ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE (HOURS)

	Annual	Sick
5. Balance from prior leave year ended 1-11-1969	274	1655
6. Current leave year accrual through 3-08-1969	24	12
7. Total	298	1667
8. Reduction in credits, if any (current year)	0	0
9. Total leave taken	4	0
10. Balance	294	1667

11. Total hours paid in lump sum 274 hrs
12. Salary rate(s) $8984.
13. Lump sum leave dates: from 0830 3-3-69 to 4-18-69 1030 (Hours)

26. Certified correct: [signature] 4/2/69 (Date)
FOR CHIEF PAYROLL (Title) 143-2585 (Telephone)

SUMMARY OF HOME LEAVE (DAYS)

14. Date arrival abroad for HL purposes
15. Current balance as of ____ 19__
16. 12-month accrual rate
17. Dates leave used, prior 24 months
18. Monthly accrual date
19. Calendar days credit for next accrual date
20. Date basic service period completed

MILITARY LEAVE

21. Dates during current calendar yr. ____ to ____
22. Dates during preceding calendar yr. ____ to ____

ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY

	LWOP or Furlough (Hours)	AWOL or Suspension
23. During leave year in which separated	0	0
24. During step-increase waiting period which began on 1-14-68	0	0

25. During 12-month HL accrual period (dates):

REMARKS: SCD 10-24-42

Standard Form 1150
November 1965
1150-106

RECORD OF LEAVE DATA TRANSFERRED

U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM SUPPLEMENTS 296-31 AND 990-2

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 9 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
VITALE GUY	003520	51 300	V	GS 08 6	$ 8,614	$ 8,984

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

O.C. 5/10/68

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
003620	VITALE GUY

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	05 04 68	

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	8235 0620 0000	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/WH DIVISION WH SECTION	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
INTEL ANALYST	1465	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0132.35	08	

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
5/17/68

14-00000

C/WH/COG

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
003620	VITALE GUY	51 500	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 08	5	$ ~~XXXXX~~ 8368	01/16/66	GS 08	6	$ ~~XXXXX~~ 8614	01/14/68		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE [signature] DATE 17 Nov 67

[X] NO EXCESS LWOP

[ ] IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

[ ] LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS NM   AUDITED BY [initials]

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions   PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION   (4-31)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962,"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
VITALE GUY	003620	51 500	V	GS 08 5	$ 7,781	$ 8,008

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962,"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT, 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
VITALE GUY						

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301
PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949,
AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 4 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
VITALE GUY	003620	51 500	V	GS 08 4	$ 7,290	$ 7,553

G-33

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
003620	VITALE GUY	51 500 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 08	4	$ 7,553	01/19/64	GS 08	5	$ 7,791	01/16/66			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS GT AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: [signature] DATE 23 Nov 65

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 1-65 560E Mfg. 3-65 (4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PJH: 29 DEC 65

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
003620	VITALE GUY

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	12 28 65	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V / CF TO V	V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
X			6235 1162 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/WH WH/C MIAMI OPERATIONS BR/PM SECTION	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
INTELLIGENCE ASST	1506	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0301.28	08 4	7553

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC)	(ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	51500	WH	75013		1	10 16 17		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO, DA, YR)		33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
12 27 67	83				EOD DATA		

35. VET. PREFERENCE (CODE: 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAN, PROV, RESV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE: 0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (CODE: 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED CODE: 1 - YES, 2 - NO; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED 12-29-65

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS 05/27/65

1 SERIAL NUMBER	2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE)
003620	VITALE GUY

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	05 31 65	

6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	5235 1162 0000	

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/WH DIVISION WH C MIAMI OPS BR PM SEC	WASH., D. C.

11 POSITION TITLE	12 POSITION NUMBER	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	1142	D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE AND STEP	17 SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	08	

18. REMARKS

POSTED
6-10-65 [initials]

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B 1-63 MFG 1-63 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51) (When Filled In)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

14-00000

1 Serial No	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
003620	VITALE GUY	49 300 V 37F	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 08	3	$ 6810	01/20/63	GS 08	4	$ 7020	01/19/64			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY [signature]

SALARY CONTINGENT ON CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: [signature] DATE: 3 Dec 63

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (451)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
VITALE GUY	003620	49 300 V	GS 08 3	$ 6,500	$ 6,810

14-00000

BAB: 18 JAN 63

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
003620	VITALE GUY

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
PROMOTION	01 20 63	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
X	CF TO V	CF TO CF	3232 1000 1000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP TASK FORCE W FI/CI BRANCH	WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	0683	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	08 3	6500

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Headqrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
22	10	61300 TFW	75013		1	10 16 17	01 20 63	01 20 63

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.) | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO, DA, YR) | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (CODE: 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT) | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE | 37. LONG COMP. DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE: 0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE) | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (CODE: 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.); 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)) | 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
02/21/63

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

23 JAN 1963 Bab

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND
DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956 , SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS.
EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
VITALE GUY	003620	61000	V	07 4	$ 5850	07 4	$ 6095

232-1000

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
003620	VITALE GUY	61 000 V 2A	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 07	3	$ 5,685	09/03/61	GS 07	4	$ 5,850	09/02/62			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP / / EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number		4. LWOP Hours
03620	VITALE GUY	DDP/FE	UV	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last PR. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	Adj
GS 07	2	$ 5,520	09/04/60	07	3	$ 5,685	09/03/61	X		

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9/26/61

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 7-60 560 Obsolete Previous Edition SECRET (4-61)

ABM: 20 MAR 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
003620	VITALE GUY

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS	03 18 62	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
X	CF TO V	CF TO CF	2235 1400 1000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP WH BRANCH 4 FI CI SEC	WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
INTELLIGENCE ASST	0685	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0301.28	07 3	5685

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Vet Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
16	10	64450 WH	75013		1	10 16 17		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX
				EOD DATA		

35. VET. PREFERENCE	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG. COMP. DATE	38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT LCD	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
503620	VITALE GUY	DDP/CE	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 07	1	$ 5,355	09	06	59	GS 07	2	$ 5,520	09	04	60

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP
10. INITIALS OF CLERK
11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION
☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

HLF 7/23/60

E.D.ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 8-58 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a AND 560b. SECRET OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
D	VITALE GUY	503620	52 88	GS-07 1	$ 4,990	$ 5,355

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ARE: 10 JUNE 1960

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo. Da. Yr.	4. Vet. Pref.	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD Mo. Da. Yr.
503620	VITALE GUY	10 16 17	1	M 1	09 13 49

7. SCD Mo. Da. Yr.	8. CSC Retmt.	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav.	11. FEGLI	12. LCD Mo. Da. Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit, LCD
10 24 42	1	50 USCA 403 J			09 13 49	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP EE ATHENS STATION OPERATIONS STAFF RECORDS INTEGRATION SECTION	5231	ATHENS, GREECE	29501

16. Dept. - Field	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
5	INTELL ASST	1809	GS	0301.28

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
07 1	$ 4980	DS	09 06 59	09 04 60	0139 9350 3018

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	67	06 12 60	REGULAR	25	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT EE DIVISION	5288	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
1	INTELL ASST	061260	GS	0301.28

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
07 1	$ 4980	D	09 06 59	09 04 60	0320 1998

44. Remarks
CASUAL (PCS RETURNEE)

POSTED
16 JUN 1960

FORM NO. 1150a
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

Pre 1960 Notifications
of Personnel Action

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 003620

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Vitale, Guy	10/16/17	M	08	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Intelligence Asst.	DDP/WH/COG	Hqs.

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT		10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT	
X	CAREER		INITIAL
	RESERVE		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	TEMPORARY	X	ANNUAL
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
July 1968	1 July 67 - 30 June 68

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Analysis and Research of clandestine service documents for information pertinent to the criteria of the CUIS/LA Subversive machine program.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Assists personnel with machine name traces and other operational support assistance.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Preparation of biographic input sheets for machine processing into the Cuban IS program.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: As Branch Records Officer insures compliance with CS Records directives including authorization for destruction of CS documents.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5:	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

9 AUG 1968

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: P

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Vitale since he was assigned to me initially on a part-time basis and later as a full time assistant has performed adequately as an input analyst in addition to his proficient work as a Records Officer and General support assistant. The quality of his input has been good and his production has helped considerably in cutting down the size of the input backlog. Mr. Vitale also continues to perform the Records Officers function for the branch with a sound knowledge of general records procedures. His attitude and attendance record continue to reflect a willingness to assist the branch in whatever way necessary. In addition Mr. Vitale's valuable background knowledge on a former vital portion of the branch's effort continues to be utilized to a considerable extent. He gets along well with his colleagues and contributes to the smooth running of the office.

Mr. Vitale is presently within 2 years of retirement or 4 years, if he does not receive an overseas assignment. He has told the career panel, he would accept an overseas assignment to either Vietnam or Laos. In view of his experience with paramilitary operations, it is felt this would be a more fitting assignment for him than the present one, even though he has been performing quite satisfactorily.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE: 7/18/68	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: [signature]	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 9	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE: 18 July	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Alva King
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the evaluation of this employee as presented above.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
13 July 1968	C/WH/COG/OS	Thos. J. [illegible]

SECRET

SECTION C/Continued NARRATIVE COMMENTS

For approximately four months during 1967, Mr. Vitale worked with me in providing Headquarters' support to JMWAVE in its conduct of special operations into PBRUMEN. In such a role, Mr. Vitale's knowledge of the history, mechanics, requirements and PBRUMEN personnel of these operations was invaluable in (1) the preparation of operational proposals for the 303 Committee, (2) the provision of timely operational information periodically requested by the front offices of both WH/COG and WHD, and (3) the briefing of WOFIRM personnel newly assigned to JMWAVE to assist in these operations. While under my supervision, Mr. Vitale was a conscientious, loyal, cooperative employee who readily and willingly performed all tasks assigned to him in an exceptional manner. He always expressed his willingness to work as many hours as necessary to finish the task at hand. He has a very pleasant personality, gets along well with his fellow workers and exhibits a good sense of cost consciousness in the use of government equipment and materials. The rating letter "S" most accurately reflects the level of performance of Mr. Vitale during the period he was under my supervision.

Robert J. Weatherwax

14-00000

Fil Contract

SECRET

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 003620

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
VITALE Guy	16 Oct 17	M	GS-08	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Intell Asst	DDP/WH/COG	Washington

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT		10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT	
CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY		INITIAL	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)	X	ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):		SPECIAL (Specify):	

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
	1 July 1966 - 30 June 1967

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Maintains project and agent 201 files for the Branch's paramilitary program.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Locates and maintains material for use in briefings and in the conduct of liaison with other government agencies.	A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Aids in conducting name traces and in processing operational clearances.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: As Branch Records Officer, insures compliance with CS records directives, including authorization for destruction of CS documents.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Assists in conduct of input to Cuban I.S. Machine Records Program.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

31 AUG 1967

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: P

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

AUG 31 9 26 AM '67

Mr. Vitale continues to perform his duties as an operational support assistant capably. His background knowledge of Cuban paramilitary operations has provided the Branch with very useful continuity. His ability and experience in locating material and in handling records for headquarters support to WH/COG Special Operations contribute substantially to the Branch's operational support effort. Mr. Vitale carries out his assigned duties in a willing, loyal and highly dependable manner. He recently has been given an additional assignment on the CUIS Machine Input Program which he is handling in a highly efficient manner. He gets along well with his colleagues and contributes to the smooth running of the office. He does not have supervisory responsibilities, but does show concern for efficient and economical use of government property.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
25 Aug '67	Guy Vitale

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
12		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
25 August 1967	Section Chief, PM Operations	Ernest T. Chiocca / Ernest Chiocca

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

As noted in the last Fitness Report, I concur generally in the supervisor's ratings of Mr. Vitale's performance as listed; but I must again note that these are duties which could be performed by a more junior clerical type and that Mr. Vitale should not be considered as performing GS-8 level Intelligence Assistant work at a Proficient rating. Indeed, he is, in my opinion, not qualified for such a role and his official position title should be changed to prevent any misunderstanding as to the somewhat unique nature of his value to the Agency.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
28 AUG 1967	C/WH/COG/MO	Robert A. Ortman

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 003620

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
VITALE Guy	16 Oct 17	M	GS-08	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Intelligence Analyst	DDP/WH/C	Wash., D.C.

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT	10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY	INITIAL / REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)	XXXX ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):	SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
	1 July 1965 - 30 June 1966

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak — Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate — Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient — Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong — Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding — Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Maintains project and agent 201 files for an extensive paramilitary program.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Locates and maintains material for use in briefings and the conduct of liaison with other government agencies.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Aids in conducting name traces and processing clearances.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: As Branch Records Officer, insures compliance with CS records directives, including authorization for destruction of CS documents.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5:	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	Rating Letter
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

29 JUL 1966

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

JUL 26 4 07 PM '66

Mr. Vitale's principal qualification is his background knowledge of the operational history of Cuban paramilitary operations. This has afforded the branch considerable continuity. He is a very willing worker who gets along well with fellow employees. His knowledge of and experience in handling records and locating material makes him valuable in headquarters support of WH/Cuba paramilitary case officers - a task he performs in a loyal and dependable manner.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
11 July 1966	[signature]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
10 months		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
	C/WH/C/MO/PM	[signature] Bryan Mills

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I have had opportunity to observe subject's performance closely for nine months and while I generally concur in his supervisor's ratings of the duties as listed, it should be noted that these same duties could be performed equally well by a more junior Intel Clerk or Intel Assistant and, therefore, the overall rating as a GS-8 Intel Assistant does not accurately reflect his capability. In my opinion it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for subject to perform competitively with other Intel Assistants at a GS-8 level, and I recommend his position title be changed to Ops Support Assistant, a role in which he performs capably.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
25 July 1966	C/WH/C/MO	[signature] Robert A. Ortman

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 003620

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
VITALE, Guy	16 Oct 17	M	GS-08	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Officer	DDP/WH/C	Washington D.C.

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
31 July 1965	1 July 64 - 30 June 65

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Processes name traces and clearances; traces and maintains agent 201 files.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Conducts research for preparation of reports and plans.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Maintains office files on a complex project.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Prepares cable or dispatch replies to name trace requests.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Records Officer - Insures compliance with CS records, directives and authorizes destruction of CS documents.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

22 JUL 1965

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

JUL 23 12 00 PM '65

Mr. Vitale's longevity on the project makes his services increasingly valuable. This is particular true in briefing and orienting new officers. He continues to do an exceptional job in assisting his office on a most complex project where many of his colleagues have transferred primarily because of the many demands and frustrations caused by this extraordinary project. Mr. Vitale continues to be a most loyal, cooperative and willing worker, getting along well with all hands. His maturity and many years of experience in his field, in addition to his great general knowledge, make him a most valued employee when compared to colleagues of similar rank. It is because of this that I have again rated Mr. Vitale very high. Although Mr. Vitale has no supervisory responsibilities and fully realizing his limited potential as a senior operations officer, I feel he is still undergraded and should be promoted to the next higher grade at the earliest opportunity. Because Mr. Vitale's job and performance have remained almost exactly the same as during the previous year, this fitness report is also very similar.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
13 July 65	[signature]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
46 months		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
13 Jul 1965	C/WH/C/MO/PM	[signature] Calvin Hicks

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The reviewing official does not use the same rating scale as the supervisor; therefore, would rate subject one letter lower in the first three duties and P in the overall performance. Subject is conscientious, pleasant and has an excellent "stay-on-the-job" approach.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
20 July 1965	C/WH/C/MO	[signature] Walter T. Cini

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 49300

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
VITALE Guy	16 Oct 17	M	GS-08	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Officer	DDP/SAS	Washington, D.C.

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY / CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C) / SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL / X ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR / REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE / SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
31 July 1964	1 July 1963 - 30 June 1964

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
- P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
- S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
No. 1: Processes name traces and clearances; traces and maintains agent 201 files.	O
No. 2: Conducts research for preparation of reports and plans.	S
No. 3: Maintains office files on a complex project.	S
No. 4: Prepares cable or dispatch replies to name trace requests.	P
No. 5: Records Officer - Insures compliance with CS records, directives and authorizes destruction of CS documents.	P
No. 6:	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

14 AUG 1964

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14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

MAIL ROOM

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Vitale continues to do an exceptional job in assisting his office on a most complex project. His longevity on the project, coupled with his continued objectivity, makes his services increasingly valuable. This is in contrast to many of his colleagues who have transferred because of the many extreme demands and frustrations caused by this extraordinary project. Mr. Vitale continues to be a most loyal, cooperative and willing worker, getting along well with all hands. His maturity and many years of experience in his field, in addition to his great general knowledge, make him a most valued employee when compared to colleagues of similar rank. It is because of this that I have again rated Mr. Vitale very high. In addition, and fully realizing his limited potential as a senior operations officer, I feel he is still undergraded and should be promoted to the next higher grade at the earliest opportunity.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
July 23, 64	[signature]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
34 months		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
15 July 1964	C/WH/SA/MOB/PM	Calvin W. Hicks

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Undersigned concurs in the ratings of the specific duties and performance in current position of Mr. Vitale. Mr. Vitale has been concerned with the Cuban effort for several years and his personal knowledge of past events is extremely helpful.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
28 July 1964	C/WH/SA/MOB	Colonel Arthur A. Maloney

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

81

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 003620

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
VITALE Guy	16 Oct. 1917	Male	GS-8	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops. Officer	DDP/S.A.S.	Washington, D.C.

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT			10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT		
	CAREER			INITIAL	
	RESERVE		X	ANNUAL	
	TEMPORARY			REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR	
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE	
	SPECIAL (Specify):			SPECIAL (Specify):	

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
31 July 1963	1 July 1962 to 30 June 1963

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
- P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
- S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Processes name traces and clearances. Traces and maintains agent 201 files.	S/O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Conducts research for preparation of reports and plans.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Maintains office files on a complex project.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Prepares cable or dispatch replies to name trace requests.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Records Officer - Insures compliance with CS records, directives and authorizes destruction of CS documents.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

9 AUG 1963

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET

(When Filled In) OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

AUG 5 9 40 AM '63

MAIL ROOM

Subject continues to do an exceptional job in assisting his office in the formulation of reports and plans by his research and ability to quickly make name traces and ferret out information from the various agency sources.

During the past year subject has continued to be a most cooperative, loyal and willing worker on a project that due to its nature is more frustrating, and demands more with less apparent return than most projects. As on his previous fitness report, I have rated him very high, primarily due to the fact that ~~he's mature~~ his maturity and many years experience with the Agency have made him of much more immediate value than most of his colleagues in the GS 7-9 level. Consequently, although he has made GS-8 within the past year, I feel he is still undergraded and should be promoted to GS-9 at the earliest opportunity.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
June 13, 63	Guy Vitale

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
22 mths.		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
12 June 63	DC/SAS/MOB/FM	Calvin W. Hicks

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

While not wishing to detract from the value of subject's duties or from the manner in which he performs them, I do have strong doubts as to whether the nature of his duties warrant promotion to GS-9 even if they were performed in an outstanding manner. During the next year additional duties of a more demanding nature will be placed on subject and I will want to weigh his performance under those circumstances before recommending promotion.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
6/13/63	C/SAS/MOB/FM	Charles W. Matt

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 003620

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
VITALE Guy	16 Oct. 1917	M	GS-7	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Intell. Asst.	DDP/TFW/FI Br.	Wash., D.C.

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY / CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C) / SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL / REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR / ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE / SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
31 July 1962	1 Sept. 1961 to 30 June 1962

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Processes name traces and clearances - Traces and maintains agent 201 files.	S/O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Conducts research for preparation of reports and plans.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Maintains office files on a complex project.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Prepares cable or dispatch replies to name trace requests.	A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Records Officer - Insures compliance with CS Records, Directives and authorizes destruction of CS documents.	A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	Rating Letter
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject has done an exceptional job in assisting his office in the formulation of reports and plans by his research and ability to quickly make name traces and ferret out information from the various agency sources concerned.

He at all times has been a most cooperative, loyal and willing worker with good security habits. Although, he does not have the ambition or drive to get to the top of the ladder that many younger officers may have (not everybody can or wants to be Chief, but can still be one of the best indians in the business), his great store of general knowledge and many years of agency experience have made him of much more immediate value than most of his colleagues in the GS-7-9 level, and it is because of this that he has received such a high rating. Consequently, it is recommended that Mr. Vitale be promoted to the next higher grade at the earliest opportunity.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
Aug 21, 1962	Guy Vitale

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
10 MONTHS		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
21 August 1962	TFW/PM/OPS	C.W. HICKS

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
21 August 1962	DC/TFW/PM	C.W. MATT

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

Released by CSPD

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 30 Oct. [illegible]
3. SEX
4. GRADE
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: WH/4
8. CAREER STAFF STATUS: NOT ELIGIBLE / MEMBER / DEFERRED / PENDING / DECLINED / DENIED
9. TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL / REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR / ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE / SPECIAL (Specify)
10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
11. REPORTING PERIOD From To 31 Aug 67

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

Specific Duty	Rating No.	Specific Duty	Rating No.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1		SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Research Work Required in the Preparation of Reports.	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Assistant to C/O (leg man)	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Maintenance of Office Files	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Safehouse Keeper	7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Intel Ass't.	5

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES					X		
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT					X		
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E **NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE**

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Subject is very versatile and can be utilized effectively on an assignment involving heterogeneous duties. His ability to function as an agent handler is extremely commendable. Subject is able to communicate equally well with "high or low level agents." He further demonstrated his usefulness in the preparation of research papers and the maintenance of files. Supervisor feels that Subject's productivity and effectiveness is dependent on whether he is in a position that he personally likes (It should be noted that Subject is 44 yrs old).

Subject has demonstrated that he can assume greater responsibilities. (During the period covered he travelled to Puerto Rico and New Orleans on assignments not under control of the Supervisor)..

SECTION F **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
28 Feb. 62	Guy Vitale

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
9 months	~~Employee at Hqs~~

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

- [ ] EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
- [ ] REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
- [ ] OTHER (Specify):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
12 FEB 62	C/O	Thomas G. Clines THOMAS G. CLINES

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

- [ ] I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
- [ ] I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
- [ ] I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
- [x] I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Subject was assigned activities for which reviewing official was responsible for a period of two months.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
13 Feb. 62	FM Relations Off. [illegible]	Glenn J. Farnsworth GLENN J. FARNSWORTH

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE
VITALE Guy	10/16/17	M	GS-7

5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT
DS	Intelligence Assistant	EE/Germany (casual)

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

	NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL	X	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To: 1 May 60 - 15 Nov 60

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
NO. 1: Process name traces	3	NO. 4:	
NO. 2: Process POA's.	4	NO. 5:	
NO. 3:		NO. 6:	

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 3

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							
RESOURCEFUL					X		
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES				X			
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES				X			
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT				X			
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE					X		
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS					X		
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS					X		
OTHER (Specify):					X		

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E	NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Mr. Vitale was assigned to the S&T Section of the German Branch on a casual basis from 1 May to 15 November 1960. His duties consisted entirely of processing name traces and POA's. Although he had little experience in this type of work, he performed his duties in a thoroughly satisfactory manner. He was always polite to his fellow employees and did his best to contribute to the smooth operation of the section.

SECTION F	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.	
DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 6 1/2	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Already reassigned prior to preparation of this fitness report.	
	IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.	
EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS	REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS	
OTHER (Specify):		
DATE 21 Nov 60	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/EE/G/S&T	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Herbert W. Natzke
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	
I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.		
I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.		
I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.		
I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.		
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL See attached sheet.		
DATE 23 Nov 60	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/EE/Germany	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William J. Graver

SECRET

Section 3. Comments of Reviewing Official:

This employee had no qualifications for assignment in the German desk or German operational field. He was carried in the German Branch in a casual status while an assignment suitable to his talents was being located. The fitness report for the period of his duty with the German Branch is accordingly only a record of the fact that he loyally and diligently carried out assigned tasks to the best of his ability.

William J. Graver
Chief, EE/Germany

14-00000

Pre 1960 Fitness Reports

2 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, EE Personnel

SUBJECT : Commendation - Mr. Guy Vitale

1. The Eastern European Division Logistics Office wishes to commend Mr. Guy Vitale for the manner in which he conducted himself while on temporary assignment in this office. Rather than sit idle awaiting a new assignment, Mr. Vitale volunteered his services and was given various logistical general services jobs and duties which he carried out with enthusiasm and effort rarely seen in a person in his status. We found him as an enthusiastic-willing worker who gave selflessly of his time and showed a strong devotion to duty.

2. A copy of this commendation should be made a part of the employee's permanent 201 file.

S. DANILUCK
Chief, EE Logistics

14-00000

Pre 1960 FRQ &
certifications for insurance
and retirement

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (Filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP. SER. NO.	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	3. SEX	4. DATE OF BIRTH	5. SCHEDULE GRADE STEP
083620	VITALE GUY	M	10/16/17	GS -08-05

6. SD	7. POSITION TITLE	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT	9. LOCATION (Country, City)
D	INTELLIGENCE ASST	AW	WASH., D.C.

SECTION II — AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
GREECE	PCS-52	57/01/01	60/01/24
Vieques Island, Puerto Rico	TDY-10 days	61/4/01	61/04/10

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED
DATE: 10 JUL 67 INITIALS: [illegible]

SECTION III — EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
	NO COLLEGE DEGREE ON RECORD		

FORM 1-67 444J May 2-67

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

67 JUL ENTD (4-51)

SECRET
When Filled In

SECTION III — EDUCATION (Cont'd)

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS City, State, Country	YEARS ATTENDED From-To	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM TO	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM / QTR HRS (Specify)
1.						
2.						
3.						
4.						

5. IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				
3.				

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1. American Mission School, Athens, Greece	Greek Language	57/2	57/4	3 mo.
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				

AGENCY-SPONSORED EDUCATION

Specify which, if any, of the education shown in Section III was Agency sponsored

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IX — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried. SPECIFY)

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH

4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)

5. OCCUPATION

6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP

8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)

9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION X — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS

SECTION XI — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP TO

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
5 June '67	Guy Vitale

SECRET

14-00000

Pre 1960 – PHS, CLEARANCE request & appl. forms

RECORD OF

PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT

SERVICE RETURNED TO

FEDERAL RECORDS CENTER IN

ST. LOUIS, MO.

DATE May 1970

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Personnel file:

Thomas B. CASASIN (J. Richardson)

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: Sources and methods

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
9.8.78	10:10	Betsy WOLF	Betsy Wolf

RICHARDSON, JACQUES G. 006102

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 5 April 1972

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)
006102	Richardson, Jacques

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH / DAY / YEAR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
RESIGNATION	08 / 14 / 72	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
				X	5136-1231	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/EUROPEAN DIVISION, FOREIGN FIELD FRENCH AREA PARIS STATION PARIS ANNEX	PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	0668	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	15 8	$31,554

18. REMARKS

24065

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
William C. Cooley, C/E/Pers	8 Aug	[signature]	9 Aug 72

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOOTRS. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
45	10				3	01 20 24		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1-CS, 2-OHGN, 3-FICA, 5-NONE)	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
			AA HRIFF				

35. VET PREFERENCE (0-NONE, 1-5 PT., 2-10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG. COMP. DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR/RESV, PROV/TEMP)	39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE (0-WAIVER, 1-REG, 2-REG/OPT, 3-INELIGIBLE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO, CODE, NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO, CODE, NO. TAX EXEMP., STATE CODE)

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. O.P. APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
8-9-72 mw	Don H. Lustiche[r]	9 AUG 1972

FORM 9-70 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

10 AUG 1972

(4)

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 10 JULY 1970

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)
006102	[illegible]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH / DAY / YEAR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
EXTENSION OF PRA ~~NTE 24 FEB 1971~~	07 / 20 / 70	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
				XX	1136-1231	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/EUR FOREIGN FIELD FRENCH AREA PARIS STATION PARIS ANNEX	PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER (14)	0668	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	15 7	$ 27,463

18. REMARKS

cc: PAYROLL

NTE 24 Feb 1971

*PRA Per HR 20-17 e(1)(b)

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
WILLFORD C. TAYLOR, C/E Pers	7/13/70	[signature]	14 Jul 1970

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HQTRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
32	10	4462[illegible]	EUR	3[illegible]		3	07 20 [illegible]		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX
02 24 71	82			EOD DATA		

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT., 2—10 PT) | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE | 37. LONG COMP. DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0—WAIVED, 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE) | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS); 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS) | 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. O.P. APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
7-23-70 MW	[signature]	[illegible]-70

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

XXB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 25 FEB 1969

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): Richardson, [illegible]

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXTENSION OF PRA NTE: 1 year

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 25 YEAR 69

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / XX CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 9136 1231

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUR
FOREIGN FIELD
CENTRAL REGION
PARIS STATION
ANNEX, PARIS

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0668

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 15 7

17 SALARY OR RATE: 23,734 (~~$ 23,075~~)

18 REMARKS

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: WILLFORD C. TAYLOR, C/E/Pers — DATE SIGNED: 2/26/69

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER — DATE SIGNED: 3-4-69

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOOTRS. CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH	26 DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF LEI
37	10	41 [illegible]	EUR	24065		3	01 20 24		

28 NTE EXPIRES	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ. NO.	34 SEX
02 24 70	52						

35 VET. PREFERENCE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT.) | 36 SERV COMP DATE | 37 LONG COMP DATE | 38 CAREER CATEGORY | 39 FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS); 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) | 42 LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44 STATE TAX DATA

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 3-7-69

46 OP APPROVAL — DATE APPROVED: 3/7/69

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 — Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 24 February 1967

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006102
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Williamson, [illegible]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 26 YEAR 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF — XX (CF TO CF)
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 7136-1231
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/EUR FOREIGN FIELD CENTRAL REGION PARIS STATION ANNEX, PARIS
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (14)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0668
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15-6
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 20,585
18. REMARKS: ~~X~~ PRA-per HR ~~21e (2)~~ 21-17D(B) for ~~duration~~ of present tour.

Slotting for new T/O.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Richard F. Westerman, C/E/Personnel
DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [signature]
DATE SIGNED: 2 MAR 1967

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOOTRS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF LEI
37	10	4[illegible]	[illegible]	2[illegible]		3	01 20 24		

28 NTE EXPIRES	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ. NO.	34 SEX
03 25 69	82						

35 VET PREFERENCE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT); 36 SERV. COMP DATE; 37 LONG COMP DATE; 38 CAREER CATEGORY; 39 FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE; 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)); 42 LEAVE CAT CODE; 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA; 44 STATE TAX DATA

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 3-3-67 [initials]
46. OP APPROVAL: [signature]
DATE APPROVED: [illegible]

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

7 55

XXB

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 29 March 1966

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Richardson, [illegible]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 04 DAY 10 YEAR 66

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / X CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6136-1231

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WE
FOREIGN FIELD
PARIS STATION
INTERNAL OPERATIONS SECTION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0885

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: $19,415

18. REMARKS:
EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL | DATE SIGNED | 18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER | DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HDQTRS. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
28	10	5064	[illegible]	24045		3	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

28. MTE EXPIRES | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: 82 | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 3—FICA, 5—NONE) CODE: 2 | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT) | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE | 37. LONG. COMP. DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY | 39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS); 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) | 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44. STATE TAX DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [signature]

46. OP APPROVAL: See memo signed by D/Pers dated 31 MAR 1966

DATE APPROVED: 31 Mar 66

FORM 5-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

OP-2 1-66

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 10 FEBRUARY 1964

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted] Richardson, Jacques

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 15 YEAR 64

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CC CF TO CF

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4136-6250-1012

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WE
PARIS STATION
INTERNAL OPERATIONS SECTION

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0885

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 15 4

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 17,210

18. REMARKS

FROM: DDP WE/PARIS STATION/0886.

PRA IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-21c (2) FOR DURATION OF TOUR.

NTE ~~November 1967~~
03/14/66

CSPD

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: GEORGE MOGANNAM, AC/WE/PT — DATE SIGNED: 6 Feb 64

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [signature] — DATE SIGNED: 10 Mar 64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. EMPLOY CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING — NUMERIC: 50600 — ALPHABETIC: WE
22. STATION CODE: 54015
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HDQTRS. CODE: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: 06 [illegible] 24
26. DATE OF GRADE:
27. DATE OF LEI:
28. NTE EXPIRES: 03 14 66 ~~11 30 67~~
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: 182
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE — CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE / MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE — 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37 LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV / PROV TEMP / CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE — 0—WAIVED 1—YES — HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE — 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS); 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMP. / STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [signature] 3/19/64

46 O P APPROVAL: [signature] — DATE APPROVED: 17 Mar 64

FORM 6-53 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(14)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 11 AUGUST 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: [redacted]
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Richardson, Jacques [handwritten; redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH / DAY / YEAR): [illegible]

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CC CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4136-6250-1012

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WE
PARIS STATION
EXTERNAL OPS SECTION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: ~~0887~~ 0886

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 4

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 16,005

18. REMARKS:

FROM: DDP SR FOREIGN FIELD/WE AREA/FRANCE/PARIS/0240

PRAed IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-580, PARA 4 (b).

COPIES SENT TO FINANCE AND SECURITY.

ROOCC CORD

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: GEORGE MOGANNAM, AC/WE/PT [signed]

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [signed]

DATE SIGNED: 15 Oct '63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HQRS/FIELD CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)
37	10	50 600 / WE	24015		3	[illegible]		

28. MTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.)		33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
10 12 65	84				EOD DATA		

35. VET. PREFERENCE (CODE: 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR/RESV, PROV/TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE: 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (CODE: 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [signed] 10/22/63

46. O.P. APPROVAL: [signed]

DATE APPROVED: [illegible]

SECRET

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152a.

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 23 January 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: [illegible] 402
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [illegible]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Promotion
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 03 YEAR 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / X CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3134 4008 1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/SR - FOREIGN FIELD
Western European Area
France
Paris
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Paris, France
11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0240
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 16005
18. REMARKS: From same slot.

PRA in accordance with HR 20-21c(3) for a period not to exceed 2 years.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ANDREW L. BUSBY, C/SR/PERSONNEL
DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [signature]
DATE SIGNED: 24 Jan 63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HQTRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
22	10	60660	SR	24265		3	01 30 34	02 03 63	02 03 63

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: 80
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 4 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE, MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD: 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [initials] 8 FEB 1963
46. O.P. APPROVAL: [signature]
DATE APPROVED:

FORM 8-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 July 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: [illegible]
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [illegible]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Excepted Appointment (Career)

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 | DAY 05 | YEAR 62

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: V TO V | CF TO V | V TO CF | X CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3134 4008 1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/SR
Western European Area
France
Paris

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Paris, France

11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

12. POSITION NUMBER: 240

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 06

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 13510 pa

18. REMARKS:
Last day at Headquarters will be 31 July 1962
~~[illegible]~~ Departing U. S. around ~~XXXXXXXX~~ end of August 1962.

259's submitted.

Copy furnished Office of Security.

c 7/54

WE concurrence on the telephone 11 July by Roland Ault, Acting DC/WE
Dw Collins

Recorded CSPD

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ANDREW L. BUSBY, C/SR/PERSONNEL
DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Dw Collins
DATE SIGNED: 24 July '62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETICAL)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HQTRS. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
13	10	[illegible] / SR	24665		3	01 20 24	01 16 55	01 05 61

28. NTE EXP RES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA		33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
		1			EOD DATA	26102	M

35. VET. PREFERENCE	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG. COMP. DATE	38. MIL. SERV. CREDITED	39. FEGLI	HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
1	03 07 44	11 20 49	C	1		042-20-5339

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPT.	STATE CODE
1	8		C	C —			—	—

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 7/5 15-62

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Joseph B Ragan Dsi
DATE APPROVED: 7/24/62

SECRET

FORM 8-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (4)

6 August 1962

Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report

Subject:

My last statements concerning the performance of should be extended to cover the remainder of his service as Chief of SR/6. He departed headquarters for a field assignment 31 July 1962.

[illegible] C. JOHNSON
Chief of [illegible] and Plans
[illegible] Division

CONCUR: [illegible] J. OSBORN
Chief, SR Division

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 July 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006102
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): RICHARDSON/ JACQUES Jr.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Resignation
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: 05 04 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: X V TO V
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 8234 1300 1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/SR, SR/6, Office of the Chief
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer (Br Ch)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0050
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 6
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 13510
18. REMARKS: Copy furnished Vouchered Payroll.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ANDREW L. BUSSY, C/SR/PERSONNEL

19A. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER — DATE SIGNED: 7/3/62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
22. STATION CODE: 2013
25. DATE OF BIRTH: 01 20 24

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 7-15-62

46. C.P. APPROVAL — DATE APPROVED: 7/24/62

FORM 8-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EMPLOYEE NOTICE OF RESIGNATION

I RESIGN EFFECTIVE 4 August 1962 (Date) FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

To accept private employment.

MY LAST WORKING DAY WILL BE:	DATE SIGNED	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
4 August 62	23 July 62	[signature]

FORWARD COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING SALARY CHECKS AND BONDS, TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, Zone, State)

INSTRUCTIONS

Items 1 thru 7 and Items 9 thru 18a - The initiating office should fill in each of the referenced items. Items 3 thru 7 and 9 thru 18 require information which pertains only to the action requested, and NOT to the current status of the employee unless specific items remain unchanged.

Item 5 - "Category of Employment" should show one of the following entries:

Regular	Summer	WAE
Part Time	Detail Out	Consultant
Temporary	Detail In	Military
Temporary - Part Time		

Item 9 - "Organizational Designations" should show all levels of organization pertinent to identifying the location of the position:

Major Component (Director, Deputy Director, etc.)
Office, Major Staff, etc.
Division or Staff (subordinate to first line)
Branch
Section
Unit

Item 11 - "Position Title" should reflect the standard abbreviated title given in the most current edition of the Position Control Register or reported on Form 261, Staffing Complement Change Authorization.

Item 18b - Signature should be that of the official authorized to approve for the Career Service to which the employee belongs. If more than one Career Service is involved, the gaining Career Service should approve and the other Career Service should concur in Item 18, Remarks.

ROUTING - The original only of this form will be forwarded to the Office of Personnel through the appropriate Career Service official(s). In the case of requests specified in HB 20-800-1, which require advance approval of or notification to the Office of Security or the Office of the Comptroller, one copy only will be sent to the Office(s) concerned.

SECRET

14-00000

DATE: 16 AUG 62

SEC

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)		
076122	RICHARDSON JACQUES		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
RESIGNATION	[illegible] 04 62	REGULAR	
6. FUNDS: X V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
	3234 [illegible]		
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION		
11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	
OPS OFF CLR BR CH	[illegible]5	[illegible]	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.[illegible]	14 6	[illegible]35[illegible]

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition (4-81)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED Mo	Da	Yr	1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date of Birth Mo	Da	Yr	4. Vet. Pref. Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD
09	12	60	006102	RICHARDSON, JACQUES	01	20	24	1	M	

7. SCD Mo Da Yr — 8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code — 9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority — 10. Apmt. Affidav. — 11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code: 1 — 12. LCD — 13. MIL. SERV. CREDIT. LCD

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations:
DDP SR
FAR EAST AREA
TOKYO STATION
SOVIET BRANCH

15. Location Of Official Station: TOKYO, JAPAN

16. Dept.-Field Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
3	OPS OFFICER BR CH	189	GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade	25. PSI Due	26. Appropriation Number
14 4	$ 12,990	D	11 16 55	7 2 61	1134 7000 3000

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Date
REASSIGNMENT TRANSFER OF FUNDS to Vouchered		10 02 60	REGULAR		

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations:
DDP SR
SR 6
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

32. Location Of Official Station: WASH., D. C.

33. Dept.-Field Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
1	OPS OFFICER - BR CH	50 D-15	GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade	42. PSI Due	43. Appropriation Number
14 4	$ 12,990	D			1234 1000 1000

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): ANDREW L. BUSBY CH/SR/PERSONNEL
C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): A. Busby
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): E. C. JOHNSON X4407

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board	[signature]	9/16/60	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		10-15-60	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	[signature]	

Remarks: Two copies of this action have been forwarded to the Office of Security.

[stamp] CSPD 10-5-60

FORM 12-57 1152a USE PREVIOUS EDIT. (4)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Richardson Jacques G.	X	59-41

There is on file in the Casualty Affairs Branch, Benefits and Casualty Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, ~~or death~~ incurred on 3 November 1958

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BCD REPRESENTATIVE
28 AUG 1959	B. DeFelice

NOTICF OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 9-58 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4-21-35)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	DATE OF BIRTH	CASE OR CLAIM NUMBER
RICHARDSON, Jacques G.	Unk	58-201

There is on file in the Casualty Affairs Branch, Benefits and Casualty Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee for an illness, injury, ~~or death~~ incurred on 4 Feb 1958.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BCD REPRESENTATIVE
15 July 1958	[signature]

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM NO. 1076
1 SEP 56

(4-21-35)

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED TO CONFIDENTIAL

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs—One given name, initial(s), and surname): MR JACQUES G. RICHARDSON
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan 1924
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 13 Dec 54
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): PROMOTION
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: 5 Jan. '55
B. APPROVED: 16 Jan 1955
7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM—	TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops Officer (Br. Ch.) BC-171-13	Area Ops Officer BCF-189-14
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-13 $8360.00 p.a.	GS-0136.01-14 $9600.00 p.a.
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR SR/5	DDP/SR Far East Area Japan Office of the Chief
11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.	Tokyo, Japan
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	[ ] FIELD [X] DEPARTMENTAL	[X] FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

PLEASE TRANSFER FROM VOUCHERED TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS. $560.00 MJ

Memo stating why fitness report not necessary. MJ

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): Robert M. Muenster
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Phyllis M. Landrum Ext. 3748
D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: [signature]
Title: DD/P Admin.

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: SD:FI

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
X			X		

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 5-3400-20 TO: 5-3400-55-015
18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE [ ] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Effective date per Jean in BX rec'd 1-11-55 MJ

Conc by Osborne 1-11-55 recd 1-11-55

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	MJ	4 Jan
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[initials]	5 Jan 55
E.		
F. APPROVED BY	[signature] 1-5-55	

REMARKS:

APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
DATE: DEC 21 1954

SECRET

10—57829-2

13-00000

SECRET
Security Information

DD/P

PERSONNEL DATA SHEET

NAME: Jacques G. Richardson AGE: 31 DATE: 13 Dec 1954

STATION Washington, D.C.
AND DUTIES: Area Ops Off. DD/P UNIT: SR
(Br. Ch.)

PRIMARY CAREER
DESIGNATION: SD:FI

PRESENT GRADE: GS-13

PRESENT T/O SLOT BC-171
NUMBER AND GRADE: GS-15

PROPOSED GRADE: GS-14

PROPOSED T/O SLOT BCF-189
NUMBER AND GRADE: GS-15

CIA TRAINING:
SOC - 9 Jan - 3 Feb 1950
Ops Course - 20 Feb - 17 Mar 1950
Adv. Ops Course 27 Mar - 21 Apr 1950
CE Course 4 Jan - 22 Jan 1954
Audio-Surveillance 29 Nov - 1 Dec 1954 - Flaps & Seals 2 & 3 Dec 1954

EDUCATION:
University of Michigan, 1945 - BA
Georgetown University - 1951 to 1952

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY:
Japanese & French - Fluent
Mandarian, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese & German - Fair

ASSESSED: DATE: TYPE OF POSITION: RESULTS:

EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO CIA (excluding SSU-OSS):
Feb 1943 to Aug 1946 - US Army
Sept 1946 to Mar 1948 - Civil Intell. USA
Apr 1948 to Oct 1948 - Civil Intell. 1st Lt. (over)

SUMMARY OF CIA-SSU-OSS ASSIGNMENTS INCLUDING PREVIOUS GRADES AND DATES:
APT - 7-18-50 - Intell Asst. GS-7 - OPC/FE/FE-3, Japan
PRO - 10-1-50 - Intell Officer, GS-9 - OPC/FE/FE-3, Japan
PRO & REAS - 4-29-51 - Intell Officer, GS-11 - OPC/FE/FE-3
PRO - 1-20-52 - Ops Officer - GS-12 - OPC/FE/FE-3
REAS - 2-17-52 - Ops Officer - GS-12 - OPC/EE/EE-4, Great Russian Sec., Wash, D.C.
REAS - 12-7-52 - Intell Officer(Dep.Ch.) GS-12 - DDP/SR - SR-5 O/C
PRO - 7-5-53 - Intell Officer (Dep. Ch) -GS-13 - DDP/SR - SR-5 O/C
REAS - 2-28-54 - Area Ops Off. (Br. Ch.) GS-13 - DDP/SR - SR-5

RECOMMENDED BY: CONCURRENCES:

Chief, SR/Admin [signature] Chief, SR [signature]

RECOMMENDATION OF CAREER SERVICE BOARD:

EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO CIA (excluding SSU-CSS)

Publications "Press Censorship in Japan" Army Info Digest Nov 1949 to Numerous news items, 2 editorials while editor, graduate term papers on Yugoslavia, China, Korea & Afghanistan.

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): Jacques G. Richardson
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 [illegible]
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST:
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment
6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: 14 Feb 1954 B. APPROVED:
7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	~~Intell Officer (Dep Chief)~~ DEPUTY CHIEF (FO) FC-190-13		Area Ops Officer (Br. Ch.) FC-171-13
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-132-13 $8360.00		GS-0136.01-13 $8360.00
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	~~DDP/SR~~ SR-5 (Far East Branch) Office of the Chief		DDP/SR SR-5
11. HEADQUARTERS	~~Washington, D.C.~~		Washington, D.C.
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL [X]		FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL [X]

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): Charles H. Dixson

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Phyllis M. Landrum Ext. 3748

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY Signature: Charles H. Dixson Title: SR Personnel Officer

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	SEC.

CD:FI

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-3400-20 TO: 4-3400-20
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO):
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE [ ] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED STATE:
21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	[illegible]	2/16
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[illegible]	[illegible]
E.		
F. APPROVED BY	Roy W. [illegible] 2/18/54	

REMARKS: [illegible handwriting]

SF-52

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. Jacques D. Richardson
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan. 1924
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 30 Mar. 1953 (May)
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Promotion
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 5 July 53
7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Deputy Chief I.C. BC-190-12		Deputy Chief I.C. BC-190-13
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-132-12 $7040.00		GS-132-13 $8360.00
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR Division SR-5 Far East Office of the Chief		DDP/SR Division SR-5 Far East Office of the Chief
11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.		Washington, D.C.
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL [XX]		FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL [XX]

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

BC-190

LTB [illegible] DDP/ADMIN 25 June 53

APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
DATE: JUN 24 1953

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): ~~Chief~~ Charles H. Dixson [signature]
D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: [signature] B. Powell
Title: FI/CMO.

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Phyllis M. Landrum Ext. 3748

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

FI

15. SEX
16. RACE
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: TO:
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE [ ] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	OCD	1 July	
E.			

F. APPROVED BY [signature] 7/1/53

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

16—67829-8

14-00000

PERSONN ACTION REQUEST

REGISTER NO.

NAME: RICHARDSON, Jacques G.	REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE: 17 Feb.
NATURE OF ACTION: Reassignment	WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED): LAST WORKING DAY: EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Operations Officer	Operations Officer
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-12 $7040	GS-12 $7040
OFFICE	OPC	OPC
DIVISION	FE	FE
BRANCH AND SECTION	FE-3	FE-4 Great Russian Section
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D. C.	Washington, D. C.
	DEPARTMENTAL [X] FIELD [ ]	DEPARTMENTAL [X] FIELD [ ]

REMARKS:

~~S.617~~

(S. 480) JK 132

510

KJR

RECOMMENDED

5 Jan. 52
(DATE)

(SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER)

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT: DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED	TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS: APPROPRIATION: 2723900 ALLOTMENT: 2011 C. S. C. AUTHORITY: Sch A 6 x (6 d)
CLEARANCE REQUESTED: DATE / TYPE; CLEARANCE APPROVED: DATE / TYPE	DATE SIGNATURE: 2-15-52 SIGNATURE: B. R.
DATE / SIGNATURE	PERSONNEL RELATIONS: DATE / SIGNATURE
CLASSIFICATION: BUREAU NO. 9845; C. S. C. NO.; DATE APPROVED 1/17/52; NEW; VICE; L.A. ✓; REAL	APPROVALS: [ ] SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE; DATE; SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE
DATE 2/5/52 SIGNATURE O.P. Gilbert	DATE; SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF
EFFECTIVE DATE	

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—62400-1

14-00000

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

REGISTER NO:

NAME	REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE
RICHARDSON, Jacques G.	20 Jan. 52
NATURE OF ACTION: Promotion	WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED) LAST WORKING DAY: EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Operations Officer	Operations Officer
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-11 ~~$5400.00~~ 5940	GS-12 ~~$6400.00~~ 7040
OFFICE	OPC	OPC
DIVISION	FE	FE
BRANCH AND SECTION	FE-3	FE-3
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D. C.	Washington, D. C.
	DEPARTMENTAL [X] FIELD [ ]	DEPARTMENTAL [X] FIELD [ ]

REMARKS: S-617

132

9930

RECOMMENDED:

30 Oct. 51 (DATE)

George O. Ruddy [illegible] EXO/FE (SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER)

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED: W. [illegible]

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE / SIGNATURE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION:
ALLOTMENT: 2 2 3 3800
C. S. C. AUTHORITY: 2017 Sch. A 6.116 (b)

DATE SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE
1-18-52	[illegible]

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C. S. C. NO.	DATE APPROVED
9845		1/17/52

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL
		✓	

DATE	SIGNATURE
1/17/52	[illegible]

EFFECTIVE DATE

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE / SIGNATURE

APPROVALS [ ] SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE / SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF
JAN 1 - 1952	D Mulcahy

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—62486-1

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

REGISTER NO. 5814

NAME: RICHARDSON, JACQUES G.	REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE: 29 April 51
NATURE OF ACTION: ~~Transfer~~ Promotion	WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED) LAST WORKING DAY: EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer GS-9	Intelligence Officer
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-9, $4600 p/a	GS-11, $5400 p/a
OFFICE	OPC	OPC
DIVISION	FE	FE
BRANCH AND SECTION	FE-3 Japan Sec.	FE-3
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D. C.	Washington, D. C.
	DEPARTMENTAL [X] FIELD [ ]	DEPARTMENTAL [X] FIELD [ ]

REMARKS: 178 In grade since ~~14 Feb 51~~ 1 Oct 50

S-14

#3729

RECOMMENDED:

14 March 1951
(DATE)

George A. Kuder for RICHARD G. STILWELL, Chief, FE Division
(SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER)

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT	TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS
DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED: [signature] 30 Mar 51	APPROPRIATION: 2115900
CLEARANCE REQUESTED: DATE / TYPE — CLEARANCE APPROVED: DATE / TYPE	ALLOTMENT: 841-101
DATE / SIGNATURE	C. S. C. AUTHORITY: Sch a 6.116(A)
	DATE SIGNATURE: 5-1-51 SIGNATURE: [signature]
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL RELATIONS
BUREAU NO. 2992 / C. S. C. NO. 3032 / DATE APPROVED 6-2-49	DATE / SIGNATURE: [signature]
NEW / VICE / L.A. ✓ / REAL	APPROVALS: SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE — DATE / SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE
DATE 3/31/51 SIGNATURE: H. B. Gilbert	DATE: 27 Apr — SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF: Charles W. Cleaver
EFFECTIVE DATE	

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—62159-1

14-00000

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

REGISTER NUMBER 2938

NAME	REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE
RICHARDSON, JACQUES G.	17 Feb 1951
NATURE OF ACTION: Excepted Appointment	WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED) LAST WORKING DAY: EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Intelligence Officer
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-9, $4600 p/a
OFFICE		OPC
DIVISION		FE
BRANCH AND SECTION		FE-3, Japan Section
OFFICIAL STATION		Washington, D. C.
	DEPARTMENTAL [ ] FIELD [ ]	DEPARTMENTAL [X] FIELD [ ]

REMARKS: 132

S-6 FE-39 JBEDICT # 4998

Transfer leave ~~&~~ unvouchered funds.

Please move Holland, Anthony from S-6 to S-7, FE-3, Japan, Washington Hdqrs.

Concur for [illegible] and security Emil Pl[illegible] 1/19/51

Ch [illegible] Security Br. 1/25/51

RECOMMENDED:

9 January 1951 (DATE) — for RICHARD G. STILWELL, Chief, FE Division (SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER)

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED: 23 Jan '51 [illegible]

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE / SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C.S.C. NO.	DATE APPROVED
2977	3051	6-2-49

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL
		✓	

DATE: 1/17/51 SIGNATURE: [illegible]

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: 2113900

ALLOTMENT: 841-101

CSC AUTHORITY: Sched. A 6.11 a (f)

DATE SIGNATURE: 2-28-51 SIGNATURE: [illegible]

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE / SIGNATURE [illegible]

APPROVALS [ ] SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE / SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE / SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF [illegible]

FORM NO. 37-3 NOV 1949

GPO 850 50-278

SECRET

SECRET

SECRECY AGREEMENT

1. I, ~~Dallas L. Caunter~~ Richardson, Jacques G., understand that by virtue of my duties in the CIA I may be the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of the United States and which belongs to the United States. This information and intelligence, together with the methods of collecting and handling it, are classified according to standards set in the State, War, and Navy Departments. I have read and understand the provisions of the Act of Congress of June 15, 1917 (Espionage Act), as amended, concerning the disclosure of information relating to the National Defense and I am familiar with the penalties provided for violation thereof.

2. I agree that I do not now, nor shall I ever possess any right, interest, title or claim in or to any of the information or intelligence or the methods of collecting or handling of it which has come or shall come to my attention by virtue of my connection with the CIA, but shall always recognize the property right of the United States of America in and to such matters.

3. I do solemnly swear that I will never divulge, publish nor reveal either by word, conduct, or by any other means such classified information, intelligence or knowledge, except in the performance of my official duties ~~and in accordance with the laws of the United States~~, unless specifically authorized in writing in each case by the CIA.

4. I understand that no change in my assignment or employment will relieve me of my obligation under this oath and that the provisions of this oath will remain binding upon me even after the termination of my services with the United States.

5. I understand that my employment by the CIA is conditioned upon my understanding of and strict compliance with "Security Regulations _____," and the appendices thereto.

6. I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

In witness whereof I have set my hand and seal this 21st day of November 1949.

x Dallas L. Caunter ~~(Seal)~~

Sworn to before me this 21st day of November 1949.

at Washington, D.C.

Joseph S. Rel

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I) [illegible]: 7 [illegible] 196[illegible]

1. EMPL. SERIAL NO.: [illegible]

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [illegible]

3. AGE: [illegible] 4. DATE OF BIRTH: Jan 19[illegible] 5. EOD [illegible] COMP. DATE: 29 Nov 1949

6. MARITAL STATUS: Married 7. [illegible] EMPLOYED: [illegible] YEAR(S) OF BIRTH: 3 [illegible] 1950 [illegible]

US NATURALIZATION DATE(S): [illegible]

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS — MEMBERSHIP: Jul 1954 OTHER STATUS: [illegible]

[illegible] QUAL. FOR: [illegible] 1962 PCS C/S EVAL. FOR: PCS C/S

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS — NONE SERVICE: X GRADE: [illegible] ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA DATE: [illegible] RELEASE MIL. SER. DATE: [illegible] TO BE RETIRED DEF. RED. DATE: [illegible]

12. ASSESSMENT DATE: None 13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE: None 14. LANGUAGE AP[illegible]: None [illegible] TEST DATE: [illegible]

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1943-48 Military Service, US Army, 1st Lt. - [illegible] Officer, Japanese Translator [illegible], Liaison Officer

1949 [illegible] Publishing Co, [illegible], Md - [illegible] Editor of weekly paper

1949 Baltimore Housing Authority, Md - Administrative Officer

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

1942 Trinity College, Conn - French

1940-42 Sir George Williams College, Montreal, Canada - French

1945 Univ of Michigan, Army Language School - [illegible] (1947); Oriental Civilization, Japanese

1951-52 Georgetown Univ Graduate School - International Relations

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested): French - R, P, S, U, High; W, Inter (Feb 1962), Trans & Interp Aug 1957; Japanese - P, S, U, Inter ([illegible] 1962), R, W, Elem; Trans & Interp Aug 1957

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1949-50 UTCA

1950 Intel Orient

1950 Ops

1950 Ops Famil

19[illegible] [illegible] Ops

19[illegible] Audio Surv [illegible]

19[illegible] [illegible] Audio Surv [illegible]

19[illegible] [illegible] Seals

1960 Cland Serv Review

1960 [illegible]

1961 [illegible]

1962 French

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECT. DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Nov 1949	I.O.	0132.0[illegible]	7		[illegible]/[illegible]	HQ
Oct 1950	" "	0132.0[illegible]	9		[illegible]	"
Apr 1951	" "	0132.03	11		[illegible] Ch, FE Br	"
Jan 1952	Ops Off	0136.01	12		" " " " "	"
Jul 1953	" "	0136.01	13		DDP/SR/[illegible] Ch, FE Br	"
Feb 1954	Area Ops Off	0136.01	13	FI	DDP/SR/Ch, FE Br	Tokyo
Jan 1955	" " "	0136.01	14	DI	DDP/SR/FE Area	HQ
Oct 1960	Ops Off	0136.01	14	D	DDP/SR/Ch, Br 6	Paris
Sep 1962	" "	0136.01	14	D	DDP/SR/WE Area	"
Feb 1963	" "	0136.01	15	D	" " " "	"
Oct 1963	" "	0136.01	15	D	DDP/WE/Internal Ops	"
Mar 1964	" "	0136.01	15	D	DDP/WE/Internal Ops	"
Feb 1967	" "	0135.01	15	D	DDP/EUR/FF/CenReg	

20. DATE REV.: 20 Apr 19[illegible] 21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY: [illegible] 22. ITEMS 1-19 REVIEWED AND VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE: No

FORM 1[illegible]

SECRET [illegible] FILE

SECRET

PERS. SERIAL NO.	[illegible] PROFILE (PART 2)	
NAME [illegible]		DATE OF BIRTH [illegible] 192[illegible]

23. SUMMARIES OF EVALUATION REPORTS FOR THE PAST [illegible] YEARS

24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE [illegible] QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION [illegible] 1955 from Director, FBI and the DCI for service in connection [illegible]

Commendation 1955 from CIA Defector Coordinator for cooperation and competence in the handling of two defectors.

Commendation 1955 from the DCI for high degree of personal competence and devotion to [illegible].

Letter of Appreciation 1960 for suggestion which proposed revisions of Form 1050.

Appreciation 1961 from Commandant, USAF Command and Staff College for fine lecture.

27. DATE REVIEWED: 20 Apr 1964

28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY: [illegible]

FORM NO. 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1050 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE.
1 FEB 57

SECRET

PROFILE (4)

006102

20 Jan 1924

Married

None

Effective Date	Position Title & Occupational Code		Grade		Organization	Location
Nov 1949	I.O.	[illegible]	7		OPC/Ops Sv/[illegible]	[illegible]
Oct 1950	" "	[illegible]	9		OPC/FE-5	"
Apr 1951	" "	[illegible]	11		OPC/5 Ch, FE Br	"
Jan 1952	Ops Off	[illegible]	12		" " "	"
Jul 1953	" "	[illegible]	13		[illegible]	"
[illegible]	Area Ops Off	[illegible]	13	[illegible]	[illegible]	Tokyo
[illegible]	" " "	[illegible]	14	[illegible]	[illegible] Area	[illegible]
Oct 1960	Ops Off	[illegible]	14	D	[illegible]	[illegible]
Aug 1962	(Resignation from SE Status)					
Aug 1962	(Excepted Appt to SA Status)					
Sep 1962	Ops Off	0136.01	14	D	SR/WE Area	Paris
Feb 1963	Ops Off	0136.01	15	D	SR/WE Area	"
Oct 1963	Ops Off	0136.01	15	D	WE/External Ops	"
Mar 1964	Ops Off	0136.01	15	D	WE/Internal Ops	"
Feb 1967	Ops Off	0136.01	15	D	EUR/FF/CentReg ParisSta	"

29 Apr 1964

PROFILE

SECRET

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: [illegible]202

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Off	[illegible]	Paris

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY / CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C) / SPECIAL (Specify)

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL / ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR / REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE / SPECIAL (Specify)

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: [illegible]

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): [illegible] 197[illegible] to 31 March 197[illegible]

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U–Unsatisfactory Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

M–Marginal Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.

P–Proficient Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.

S–Strong Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O–Outstanding Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: [illegible] employment as [illegible] of a foreign scientific publication for the purpose of further developing access to [illegible] and [illegible] the overall cost of the [illegible]	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Uses his cover to gain access to [illegible] and [illegible] on eventual access and [illegible] against the local [illegible]	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Develops and assesses [illegible] with whom he has made contact as well as access prospects to the local [illegible] and [illegible] targets.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Responds to various station requirements including investigative work.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Reports on the above activities.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	Rating Letter
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 7-69 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDIT.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET

SECTION C — [illegible]

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During the period under review, Subject managed to gain full-time employment as a senior executive of an [illegible] government subsidized scientific publication at a time of economic slowdown when jobs were not easy to get. He did this without help from Headquarters or the Station. Such an achievement is a tribute to Subject's fluency in French, his ability to write, his general scientific know-how and his good business sense. Over half of his salary therefore is now paid by this company. In converting to full-time employment, a major adjustment, Subject's contribution to the Station operations in the M[illegible] and T[illegible] fields against which he is targetted temporarily decreased somewhat. Subject continued, however, to maintain contact with three local M[illegible] officials and initiated contact with three others. He also continued to search for new leads to personalities in the priority areas assigned to him. Subject has the capability to call on local scientists or technicians of just about any nationality with the possible exception of T[illegible] citizens. He has used this near-unique potential well.

Subject has had occasional difficulty switching from "professional" or intellectual subjects in his development of M[illegible] personalities or access prospects to more down-to-earth interests necessary --con't--

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
9 June 1971	/s/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
18 months	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
	Handling Officer	/s/

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The Station submitted comments on Subject officer recently in C[illegible]-16549 (8 April 1971), to which we should add that Subject has, largely on his own merits, acquired a solid and potentially highly useful cover employment. However, this new employment will demand a very substantial amount of time and energy from Subject, and the unanswerable question at the moment relates to his availability for Organizational tasks. We shall need additional time and careful working with this officer to determine the answer, since the fiscal outlay from the Organization to support his continued stay in Paris is still quite

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
24 [illegible] 1971	[illegible]	

SECRET

[illegible] REPORT

Section C (continued)

to the development of human relations. His forte is therefore more in the field of spotting and making operational contacts than in that of more than short-range operational development. Subject's operational situation makes it impossible for him to attempt recruitments. Thus, his very real achievements are not by essence of the spectacular variety.

Subject's reporting has been satisfactory and continues to be copious. He could, however, further improve the selectivity of the leads provided the Station and make more of an effort to "digest" the information contained in his reports.

Although Subject has, at present, no supervisory function, he has repeatedly requested such a responsibility. He is careful with operational expenses and has exercised good security.

During the period under review, additional efforts have been made to make full use of Subject's potential and integrate him further in the work of the Station component with which he works. He is a particularly valuable asset for the Station programs directed against the local [illegible] and [illegible] targets.

Section B (continued)

substantial. In a word, is it worth it? We do not yet know, although our initial impressions are favorable.

On the fitness report itself, this rater would have preferred an "P" rating for specific duty number one; Subject may ultimately deserve an "S", but it does not seem warranted at the present time. However, I believe the overall rating would more properly have been in the higher range of the "P" category, rather than "S", but it is of course a subjective judgment of the rating officer, who is more intimately and directly involved with Subject on a frequent basis.

In sum, the cover is superb, and only time will reveal to what extent the cover requirements permit a full measure on behalf of the Organization. We are following this aspect closely and will be commenting upon it subsequently as we gain experience and knowledge.

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
	20 Jul 1934 [partly illegible]	M	GS-15 [partly illegible]	[illegible]

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
	[illegible]	Berlin [partly illegible]

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

- X CAREER
- RESERVE
- TEMPORARY
- CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

- INITIAL
- X ANNUAL
- SPECIAL (Specify):
- REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1969 - 31 March 1970

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Established and maintains a legitimate [illegible] publishing representation for the purpose of developing natural access to Station targets.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Uses his cover to develop leads on eventual access or support type assets to be used by the Station against the local [illegible] target.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Responds to various Station requirements including investigative work.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Initiates contact with selected local [illegible] targets and undertakes to develop sufficient rapport with them to provide operational assessments.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	-
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS [partly illegible] SECRET [partly illegible]

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

The comments of the rating officer are limited to the period from October 1969 to March 1970 during which he worked with Subject. The previous rating officer has added his comments to allow coverage of the total indicated period from April 1969 to March 1970. During this period Subject was integrated in a new team assigned to the local S&T and Commercial [illegible] target. Subject's recent activity has been very productive indeed. Subject used the excellent potential given to him by his cover to skillfully spot and assess access agent candidates. As Subject's operational situation in Paris precludes making recruitment, the most promising of these candidates was placed in contact with a Station officer during social events Subject organized. At the same time, Subject continued his efforts to develop personal relationship with several [illegible]ers. The beginning of personal, as opposed to purely professional, relations with a major [illegible] target enabled him to obtain insight into the target's beliefs and personality which was the best the Station had to date. Subject also managed to establish contact with two other [illegible] representatives of interest. This, in one case, required almost six months to accomplish via a combination of patience, skill and determination. Subject is an experienced officer. He is cost conscious and practices good security. The Station has no other asset with the necessary scientific and editorial know-how, fluent French and local knowledge to replace Subject. In view of this and the recent progress made by Subject in response to very specific requirements and his willingness to try to establish personal and, hopefully, social relations with access prospects and [illegible] targets, the Station recently recommended that he be extended in Paris. At the same time, the Station recommended that Subject's cover be reinforced by full-time employment with Subject's current [illegible] publishing employer.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
	/s/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
	Handling Officer	/s/

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL /s/

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

As previous Station correspondence and [illegible] reports will reflect, this officer has been the subject of varying evaluations and projections in recent years. In fairness to him, however, it is equally true that an officer under non-official cover reflects, in the level and quality of his performance, the amount and type of guidance, direction and push he receives from the responsible inside case officer. Making allowances for these variables, this officer's past record has not been impressive; however, it is also correct to note that he has improved substantially during the latter part of the period under review, and that if the Station can work out some fiscal arrangement which will reduce the heavy financial input

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
12 [illegible] 1970	[illegible]	/s/

Section F 3 continued

from the Organization. His continued presence at this Station definitely appears to be warranted for a [illegible] period to reach more definite conclusions concerning the level of [illegible] performance over a somewhat longer period than that reflected by this report.

On balance, we are pleased that [illegible] officer has responded so well to greater case officer direction and that [illegible] has undertaken somewhat more aggressive efforts to expand his [illegible] contacts in immediate proximity to the primary Station targets. This officer does bring many talents to bear on his operational activity: he has [illegible] fluent French, a solid and [illegible] cover, and a vast [illegible] of contacts in the local community. Nonetheless, it will require additional [illegible] to explore these contacts in depth, select those which appear to be [illegible] viable, and pursue them actively either to the point of recruitment by another officer or elimination from further development, for whatever reason.

In sum, in spite of the recognized and commendable improvement in this officer's performance during the period under review, the reviewer submits that the letter grade for specific duties 2 and 4 would more properly have been a "P", and that the overall rating, at this point, would more accurately be set at a level between "P" and "S", probably closer to the former than the latter.

This reviewing comment has been read by the officers who prepared the Fitness Report.

14-00000

SECRET

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 037300

SECTION A

1. NAME	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
[illegible]	25 [illegible]	[illegible]	FS-15	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Officer	[illegible]	Paris

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY / CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C) / SPECIAL (Specify)

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL / REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR / ANNUAL (X) / REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE / SPECIAL (Specify)

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 May 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): [illegible] - 31 March 1963

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Establishment and maintenance of cover as a genuine working member of his profession.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Spotting and assessing persons of operational interest to Paris Station and to other stations.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Investigating of organizations and phenomena of operational interest to the Station.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Collection of positive and operational information using his cover for entree.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION — RATING LETTER: S

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

FORM 45 (4-62) OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

See attached sheet.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
15 May 1963	

2. BY SUPERVISOR

THIS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
6½ months	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
15 May 1963	Ops Officer	/s/ James Flint

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See attached sheet.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
20 May 1963	CPS Officer	/s/ Edward Ryan

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

The assignment of this employee to the field under non-official cover was designed to compensate for the loss of an employee in an official cover slot which was cut from the Station's CS/SID allotment of personnel positions.

During the reporting period this employee has accomplished with success the convincing establishment of his cover in a complex milieu, and has been accepted as legitimate by his professional colleagues, the persons whom he meets under cover, and the French authorities. It should be noted that his ability to assume his cover has been largely the result of his own efforts over a period of years to acquire and maintain a familiarity with the general scientific field.

During the reporting period he has developed a wide circle of contacts in the scientific and journalistic fields and applies a long background in a variety of assignments in KUDOVE to the determination and assessment of operational potential among these contacts. At the same time his cover organization, in which only four persons are witting of his actual status, has shown itself to be more than satisfied with his performance of his cover duties.

This employee requires a minimum of detailed operational supervision; it is necessary in specific cases only to indicate the operational or informational objectives.

From the point of view of administrative support, his attention to detail and meticulousness reduce the problems of his support by the Station to a minimum.

This employee uses the French language continuously, and his facility is such as to permit him to handle himself excellently in a broad range of complex technical subjects. He has in addition undertaken specialized French language training to develop this capability further. His operational reporting is excellent both with regard to clarity and pertinence.

In the immediate future he will be assigned case work, for the most part in fields where it will complement, and be complemented by, his independent operational activities and cover work.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

13 September 1960
(Date)
File No. K-1328

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : Jacques G. RICHARDSON

1. Cover arrangements [illegible] have been completed for the above-named Subject.

2. Effective 12 September 1960, it is requested that your records be properly blocked [illegible] to deny [illegible] Subject's current Agency employment to an external inquirer.

3. Operating component must take necessary action to block [illegible] telephone locator by submitting the Personnel Information Card, "Office File Copy," Form No. 642, to Machine Records Division, Office of the Comptroller, Room 107 Curie Hall, Attention: Miss Wenkenbach.

4. [illegible]

HARRY W. LITTLE, JR.
Chief, Central Cover Division

cc: SSD/OS
Operating Division - SR

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

SECRET

27

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EOD: 10 AUG 72

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OLE

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
008102	[illegible], Jacques

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
RESIGNATION	08 14 72	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	3132 1231 0000	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/EUROPEAN DIVISION FOREIGN FIELD FRENCH AREA PARIS STATION PARIS ANNEX	PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	0868	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	15 8	31554

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
45	10					01 30 24		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1-CSC 2-CIA 3-FICA 5-NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction / Cancellation Data	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO	34. SEX
			GAHMFOG				

35. VET PREFERENCE (0 NONE, 1-5 PT, 2-10 PT); 36. SERV. COMP. DATE; 37. LONG. COMP DATE; 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR RESV PROV TEMP); 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0-WAIVER 1-YES) HEALTH INS. CODE; 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE — CODE: 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS); 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS); 42. LEAVE CAT CODE; 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO, CODE, NO TAX EXEMPTIONS); 44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO, CODE, NO TAX EXEMP, STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED 8-11-72 [initials]

R. B. FISHER

FORM 5-66 1150 · Mfg. 10-67 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
006102	Richardson, Jacques	44 620	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 15	7	$29,099	01/26/69	GS 15	R	$29,907	01/23/72		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE George K McGuinness DATE 20 Dec 71

- [ ] NO EXCESS LWOP
- [ ] IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
- [ ] LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION (4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 92-210 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11637 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 9 JANUARY 1972

NAME	SERIAL	ORG.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
Richardson, Jacques	006102	44 735	CF	GS 15 7	$30,701

SECRET

BEG: 01 JUN 71

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

CCB

1 SERIAL NUMBER	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
006102	Richardson, Jacques

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
EXTENSION OF PRA- NTE: 24 FEBRUARY 1973	02 25 71	REGULAR

6 FUNDS	V TO V		V TO CF	7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	1136 1231 0000	50 USC 403 J

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/EUR FOREIGN FIELD FRENCH AREA PARIS STATION PARIS ANNEX	PARIS, FRANCE

11 POSITION TITLE	12 POSITION NUMBER	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	0668	D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE AND STEP	17 SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	15 7	29039

18 REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC)	(ALPHABETIC)	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Category Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26 DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF LEI
37	10	44620	EUR	24065		3	01 20 24		

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA (1 CSC, 2 CIA, 3 FICA, 4 NONE)	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction/Cancellation Data	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX
02 24 73	82						

35 VET PREFERENCE	36 SERV COMP DATE	37 LONG COMP DATE	38 CAREER CATEGORY	39 FEGLI	HEALTH INSURANCE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA	44 STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
6-2-71 [signature]

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition Mfg. 6-70

SECRET

ARS

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-656 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
[redacted] Richardson, Jacques	006102	44 620	CF	GS 15 7	$29,099

14-00000

SECRET

BBG: 17 AUG 70

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCB

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)		
006102	Richardson, Jacques		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
EXTENSION OF PRA NTE: 24 FEBRUARY 1971	07 20 70	REGULAR	
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V (X) / CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
CF TO V: X	1136 1231 0000	50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION		
DDP/EUR FOREIGN FIELD FRENCH AREA PARIS STATION PARIS ANNEX	PARIS, FRANCE		
11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION	
OPS OFFICER	0668	D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	15-7	27463

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC)	(ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	44620	EUR	24065		3	01 20 24		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1-CSC 2-CIA 3-FICA 4-NONE)	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction / Cancellation Data	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
02 24 71	22							

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0-NONE, 1-5 PT, 2-10 PT) | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE | 37. LONG COMP DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0-WAIVER, 1-YES; HEALTH INS. CODE) | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS); 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS) | 42. LEAVE CAT CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

R.S.WATTLES

POSTED

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg. 10-67 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

FVD

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51) (When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
Richardson, Jacques	006102	44 600	CF	GS 15 7	$25,909

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
Richardson, Jacques	006102	44 620	CF	GS 15 7	$27,463

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
Richardson, Jacques	006102	44 600	CF	GS 15 6	$20,585	$21,469

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
Richardson Jacques	006102	44 600	CF	GS 15 6	$21,469	$23,075

EVR

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
006102	Richardson, Jacques	44 600	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 15	6	$23,075	01/29/67	GS 15	7	$23,734	01/26/69		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: [signature] DATE: 11 Dec 68

- [ ] NO EXCESS LWOP
- [ ] IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
- [ ] LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS: [initials] AUDITED BY: Don H. Lutscher

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EJH: 8 MAR 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCB

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
006102	Richardson, Jacques

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	02 26 67	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. USC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
				X	7136 1231 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/EUR FOREIGN FIELD CENTRAL REGION PARIS STATION ANNEX, PARIS	PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	0668	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	15 6	20585

18. REMARKS

POSTED ON [illegible] 10 MAR 67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC)	(ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	44600	EUR	24065		3	01 20 24		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
02 25 69	82						

35. VET. PREFERENCE	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG. COMP. DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE	42. SERVICE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

E.D. ECHOLS

POSTED 3-3-67

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504
PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949,
AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
Richardson, Jacques	006102	50 600	CF	GS 15 5	$19,415	$19,978

1. Serial No	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
006102	Richardson, Jacques	50 600 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 15	5	$19,978	01/31/65	GS 15	6	$20,585	01/29/67			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ NO EXCESS LWOP
/ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

25 JAN 1967

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: [signature] DATE 11 Jan 67

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 1-65 560E Mfg. 3-65 (4-51)

RZF: 7 APR 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCB

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
006102	[illegible]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	04 10 66	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
			X		6136 1231 0000	SECTION 203 P.L. 88-643

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/WE FOREIGN FIELD PARIS STATION INTERNAL OPERATIONS SECTION	PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	0885	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	15 5	19415

18. REMARKS

EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC)	(ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
28	10	50600	WE	24065		3	01 20 24	02 03 63	01 31 65

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1-CSC, 2-FICA, 3-NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
	82	2					

35. VET. PREFERENCE	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG. COMP. DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

WE

1. Serial No	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
006102	Richardson, Jacques	50 600 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 15	4	$18,170	02/03/63	GS 15	5	$18,740	01/31/65			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY BK

25 JAN 1965

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: [signature] DATE [signature]

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
Richardson, Jacques	006102	50 600	CF	GS 15 5	$18,740	$19,415

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES
Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

MHC: X 13 MAR 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCB

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
006102	Richardson, Jacqueline [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	03 15 64	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
				X	4136 6250 1012	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP WE PARIS STATION INTERNAL OPERATIONS SECTION	PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	0885	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	15 4	17210

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC)	21. OFFICE CODING (ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	50600	WE	24065		3	01 20 24		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
03 14 66	82						

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.) CODE	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR)	37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES) CODE	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
03/23/64 DK

E.D. ECHOLS

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET (When Filled In)

20 MAR 1964

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND OCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
Richardson, Jacques	006102	50 600	CF	GS 15 4	$16,005	$17,210

POSTED CF-4b 8 JAN 1964

MHC:1128 OCT 63

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCB

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
006102	Richardson, Jacques

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	10 13 63	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
			X		4136 6250 1012	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP WE PARIS STATION EXTERNAL OPS SECTION	PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	0886	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	15 4	16005

18. REMARKS

POSTED CF-4b

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC)	(ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	50600	WE	24065		3	01 20 24		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.)		33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
10 12 65	84				EOD DATA		

35. VET. PREFERENCE (CODE: 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RES, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE: 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (CODE: 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS., 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

14-00000

(P)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ADPD 08/17/63

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER	2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE)
006102	Richardson Jacques

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	07 14 63	

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	4136 6250 1012	

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/SR DIV	PARIS, FRANCE

11 POSITION TITLE	12 POSITION NUMBER	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	0240	D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE AND STEP	17 SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	15	

18 REMARKS

POSTED

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

E.D. ECHOLS

Form 1150B 1-63 MFG. 1-63 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

19 AUG 1963

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

EAB: 1 FEB 63

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCB

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
000102 ~~037367~~	Richardson, Jacques

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
PROMOTION	02 03 63	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	3134 4008 1000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP SR FOREIGN FIELD WESTERN EUROPEAN AREA FRANCE PARIS	PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	0240	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	15 4	16005

18. REMARKS

POSTED [illegible] FEB 27 1963

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
22	10	60600	SR	24065		3	01 20 24	02 03 63	02 03 63

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
	80						

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.) CODE	36. SERV. COMP DATE	37. LONG. COMP. DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES) CODE	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS) CODE	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

E.O. [illegible]

POSTED FEB 27 1963

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition 11 FEB 1963

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

AUTOMATED PSI RECORD ADJUSTMENT

SERIAL NO.	LEI YR MO DA	PSI DUE DATE YR MO DA	ORGANIZATION CODE OFFICE	DIVISION	CURRENT GRADE	STEP
	62 07 08	64 07 05	DDP/	SR	GS-14	6

PROJECTED GRADE	STEP	NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MAX. 20 CHARACTERS
GS-14	7	Richardson, Alfred [redacted]

FUND V/CF	SCHED.	CURRENT SALARY (OR HOURLY RATE)	PROJECTED SAL. (OR HOURLY RATE)	ID CODE
CF	GS	$14,970	$15,865	C

REMARKS

Subject received a PSI 07/08/62 to GS-14-6 so will not be due another until 07/05/64.

(2/27/62)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956 , SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
Richardson, Alfred [redacted]	006162 ~~[illegible]~~	40600	CF	14 6	313510	14 6	$14970

14-00000

PSC: 20 AUG 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OAB

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
[illegible]	Richardson, Jacques

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT (CAREER)	08 05 62	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	3134 4008 1000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP SR WESTERN EUROPEAN AREA FRANCE PARIS	PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	0240	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	14 6	13510

18. REMARKS

POSTED ON [illegible]
Jlw 22 Aug 62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC)	(ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
13	10	60600	SR	24065		3	01 20 24	01 16 55	01 08 61

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1-CSC, 2-FICA, 3-NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
		1				06102	M1

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0-NONE, 1-5 PT., 2-10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG. COMP. DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY CODE	39. FEGLI CODE (0-WAIVER, 1-YES)	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
1	03 07 44	11 20 43	C	1		042205339

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1-YES, 2-NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE
1	8		0	0				

41 codes: 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS.; 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS.

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
[illegible] 8-21-62

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

[illegible] 8-20-62

14-00000

DAB: 16 AUG 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
006102	RICHARDSON JACQUES

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
RESIGNATION	08 04 62	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
X					3234 1000 1000	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/SR SR/6 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER BR CH	0050	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	14 6	13510

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
45	10					01 20 24		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE)	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
			1BD0091				

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG. COMP. DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	44. STATE TAX DATA
0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.); 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)		FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	FORM EXECUTED; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

POSTED 8-20-62

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

E.D. ECHOLS

LLG 8/16/62

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-81)

(When Filled In)

14-00000

234-1010-10

3040 / 80 / 3120

1 Serial No	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
006102	RICHARDSON JACQUES	60 300 V 7	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 14	5	$13,250	01/08/61	GS 14	6	$13,510	07/08/62			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP / / EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-31)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
006102	RICHARDSON, JACQUES D.	DDP/SR 7	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
GS-14	4	$12990	07	12	59	GS-14	5	$13250	01	08	61

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☒ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION ☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

E.D. ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 8-59 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a AND 560b. SECRET OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

ARF: 30 SEPT 1960

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
006102	RICHARDSON JACQUES

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS	10 02 60	REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	X	CF TO V		CF TO CF	1234 1000 1000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP SR SR 6 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER BR CH	0050	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	14 4	12990

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC)	(ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
16	10	60300	SR	75013		1	01 20 24		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE)	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, NO. DA. YR.)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (CODE: 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG. COMP. DATE	38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES)	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
					1		

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (CODE: 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

[illegible] 10-22-60

L1

Form 1150 6-60 Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

(4-51)

G 3 10/18/60

14-00000

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE CERTIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In)

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954-310030

1. Agency and organizational designations	2. Payroll period	3. Block No.	4. Slip No.
		UV	

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)	6. Grade and salary
RICHARDSON, JACQUES [illegible]	GS-14 $10,320

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F.I.C.A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks	11. Appropriation(s)	12. Prepared by
	SR 9	pcs 3 May 56
		13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. ~~Performance rating is satisfactory or better.~~
15Jul56	16Jan55	$10,320	$10,535	SERVICE AND CONDUCT ARE SATISFACTORY (Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods) Period(s)

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP) ☐ In pay status at end of waiting period. ☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

4 SEP 1956 Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S. October 26, 1954, General Regulations No. 102

CONFIDENTIAL PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
DI	RICHARDSON JACQUES	506102	48 40	GS-14 4	$12,075	$12,990

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
506102	RICHARDSON JACQUES	DDP/SR 10	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 14	3	$11,835	01	12	58	GS 14	4	$12,075	07	12	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS 4 742

14. AUTHENTICATION

G. M. STEWART

JHP 8/5/59
HCF 7/31/59

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560a 1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
RICHARDSON JACQUES	506102	GS-14-3	$10,750	$11,835

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
506102	RICHARDSON JACQUES	DDP/SR 8	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
14	2	$10,535	07	15	56	14	3	$10,750	01	12	58

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
BELIC, GEORGE	15 Jan 1958	George N Belic

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET

FORM NO. 560
1 MAR. 56

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
506102	RICHARDSON JACQUES	DDP/SR	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
14	2	$10,535	07	15	56	14	3	$10,750	01	12	58

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

CF

14. AUTHENTICATION

C. M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
MR. JACQUES S. RICHARDSON	20 Jan. 1924		26 Sept. '56

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)

REASSIGNMENT

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:

B. APPROVED: 21 OCT

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops Officer BCF-189-14		Area Ops Officer BCF-189-14
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-14 $10,535.00 p.a.		GS-0136.01-14 $10,535.00 p.a.
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS			DDP/SR Far East Area Japan Office of the Chief
11. HEADQUARTERS			Tokyo, Japan
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL		[XXX] FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL (D)

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

RE-SLOTTING FOR NEW APPROVED T/O.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title) Robert D. Lovelace [signature]

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension) Phyllis M. Landrum Ext. 4407

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY

Signature:

Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE: NONE | WWII | OTHER | 5 PT. | 10 POINT: DISAB. | OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW | VICE | I. A. | REAL.

SD: DI

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION FROM: 7-3400-55-015 TO: 7-3400-55-015

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

USED IN LIEU OF SF 50 NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

R. A. Skeels (Gus), FE/CMO 2 Oct 56

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS CONTROL	[initials]	11	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	743	10-9	
E.			

POSTED 11 OCT 1956

F. APPROVED BY Robert A. [signature] per [signature] 9 Oct '56

SECRET

Agency and organizational designations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952 - 997874

1. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)	2. Pay roll	3. Block No.	4. Slip No.
RICHARDSON, Jacques D.		5-3400-20	
	6. Grade and salary: GS-13 $8360.00		

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks: $ 8990

[illegible] ADJUSTED TO: [illegible]
[illegible] 13 MAR. 1955
[illegible] TO DCI DIRECTIVE

11. Appropriation(s): SR 7

12. Prepared by: NZ 9 Nov 54

13. Audited by:

[X] Periodic step-increase [ ] Pay adjustment [ ] Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
2 Jan 55	5 Jul 53	$8360.00	$8560.00	(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods): Period(s).

[ ] No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
[ ] [illegible] at end of [illegible]
[ ] (To LWOP status at end of closing period.)

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R-, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

rvs

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
MR. JACQUES G. RICHARDSON	20 Jan 1924		19 Jan. 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
PROMOTION (AMENDMENT)*	E.O.D. 16 Jun 1955	50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Area Ops Officer (Br. Ch) BC-171-13	8. POSITION TITLE	Area Ops Officer BCF-189-14
GS-0136.01-13 $8560.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.01-14 $9600.00 per annum
DDP/SR SR/5	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR Far East Area Japan Office of the Chief
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Tokyo, Japan
FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL [X]	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	FIELD [X] DEPARTMENTAL [ ]

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE / 5-PT. / 10-POINT (DISAB. / OTHER) — X

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW / VICE / (?) / REAL. — SD-DT ~~SD-~~

15. SEX: M 16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION — FROM: 5-3400-20 TO: 5-3400-55-015

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: [ ] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED STATE: Md.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

*This action amends Item #9, on the "from" side, on Notification dated 11 Jan. 1955, to show the correct salary, previously shown as $8360.00 per annum.

Subject to approved medical clearance prior to being sent overseas.

"Transfer TO Unvouchered funds FROM Vouchered funds."

my 1/20/55

...ANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

...puty Assistant Director for Personnel

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954-313798

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 81, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Conc. 6 Jan. 1955 rvs

1. NAME (MR.–MISS–MRS.–ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
MR. JACQUES G. RICHARDSON	20 Jan. 1924		11 Jan. 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
PROMOTION	E.O.D. 16 Jan 1955	50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Area Ops Officer (Br. Ch) BC-171-13	8. POSITION TITLE	Area Ops Officer BCF-189-14
GS-0136.01-13 ~~$8360.00~~ 8060 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.01-14 $9600.00 per annum
DDP/SR SR/5	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR Far East Area Japan Office of the Chief
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Tokyo, Japan
FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL [X]	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	FIELD [X] DEPARTMENTAL [ ]

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-FI

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 5-3400-20 TO: 5-3400-55-015	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Md.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

Subject to approved medical clearance prior to being sent overseas.

"Transfer TO Unvouchered funds FROM Vouchered funds."

RECORDED
JAN 17 1955

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Deputy Assistant Director for Personnel

CONFIDENTIAL

OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. Jacques G. Richardson	20 Jan. 24		16 Feb. 54

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Reassignment	28 Feb. 54	50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Deputy Chief (IO) BC 190-13	8. POSITION TITLE	Area Ops. Officer(Br. Ch) BC171-13
GS-132-13	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.01-13 $8360.00 per annum
SR-5 (Far East Branch) Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR SR-5
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L. A.	REAL.	
				CD-FI

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 4-3400-20 TO: same	yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Deputy Assistant Director for Personnel

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

*U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1953 — 249347

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. Jacques G. Richardson	20 Jan. 24		3 July 53

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Promotion	5 July 53	Sch. A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Deputy Chief I. O. BC-190-12	8. POSITION TITLE	Deputy Chief I. O. BC-190-13
GS-132-12 $7040.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-132-13 $8360.00 per annum
DDP/SR Division SR-5 Far East Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR Division SR-5 Far East Office of the Chief
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Same
[ ] FIELD [XXX] DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	[ ] FIELD [XX] DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	11X2100 FROM: 3400-20 TO: Same	Yes		[ ] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Acting Chief, Personnel Division

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

LAZ 7-3-53

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 1952-210794

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

14-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. Jacques G. Richardson	20 Jun 24	f510	16 Feb 52

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Reassignment	17 Feb 52	Schedule A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Operations Officer	8. POSITION TITLE	Operations Officer
GS-12-132 $7040.00 p. a.	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-12-132 $7040.00 p. a.
OPC FE FE-3	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OPC EE EE-4 Great Russian Section
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL [X]	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL [X]

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE [X]

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: Du 9845 1/17/52

15. SEX: M 16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION: FROM 2123900 TO 2011

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: [X] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED STATE: Md.

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES, AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

(S.LEO)

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

D. V. MULCAHY
Personnel Division
22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

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STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PARTS)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION (N.r)

1. NAME (MR. - MISS - MRS. - ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. Jacques C. Richardson	20 Jan. 1924	9930	18 Jan. 52

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Promotion	20 Jan. 52	Schedule A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Intelligence Officer GS-11	8. POSITION TITLE	Operations Officer GS-12
GS-11-132 $5940.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-12-132 $7040.00 per annum
OPC FE FE-3	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OPC FE FE-3
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
[ ] FIELD [x] DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	[ ] FIELD [x] DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	x		x		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL
		x	

Bu. 9845
1/17/52

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES - NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM 2123900 TO 2017	yes		[x] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED STATE Maryland

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES, AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

(517)

E. V. MULCAHY
Personnel Division
22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1950 O-899878

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

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STANDARD FORM 50
OCTOBER 1949
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

(ml)

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. Jacques G. Richardson	20 Jan. 1924	#5729	23 April 1951

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Transfer and Promotion	29 April 1951	Schedule A-6,116(b)

FROM		TO
Intelligence Officer, GS-9	8. POSITION TITLE	Intelligence Officer, GS-11
GS-9-132 $4600.00 per. annum. Bu.#2974	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-11-132 $5400.00 per. annum.
OPC FE FE-3 Japan Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OPC FE FE-3
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
FIELD / DEPARTMENTAL X	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	FIELD / DEPARTMENTAL X

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE X | WWII | OTHER | 5-PT. X | 10-POINT (DISAB. / OTHER)

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW | VICE | I.A. X | REAL. — Bu.#2996 CSC#3032 6/3/49

15. SEX: M 16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 2115900 TO: 841-101

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT OF AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: X CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Md.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

(778)

PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

H. C. Clinkscale

H. C. CLINKSCALE
Personnel Division

22. SIGNATURE AND AUTHENTICATION

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

12

STANDARD FORM 50 (6 PARTS)
OCTOBER 1949
PROMULGATED BY
CHAPTER R 1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

F.C. 1/19/51 (ml)

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. Jacques G. Richardson	20 Jan. 1924	14938	19 Feb. 1951

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Excepted Appointment	19 Feb. 1951	Schedule A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Intelligence Officer, GS-9
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-9-132-$4600.00 per. annum.
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OPC FE FE-3, Japan Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
FIELD / DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	FIELD / DEPARTMENTAL X

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE / WWI / OTHER / 5-PT. X / 10-POINT (DISAB. / OTHER)

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW / VICE / I.A. X / REAL — Du.#2974 CSC#3051 6/2/49

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 2115900 TO: 841-101	Yes	19 Feb. 1951	X CLAIMED ☐ PROVED ☐ STATE: Ill.

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES, AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

Trial period has been completed.

H. C. Clinkscale

H. C. CLINKSCALE
Personnel Division

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING: 09

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

3-3-51

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1950-890878

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

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SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME		DATE
RICHARDSON, JACQUES G.		9 January 1951
NATURE OF ACTION: Resignation		EFFECTIVE DATE: ~~Cob~~ 18 Feb 1951

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer V	
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-9, $4600 p/a	
OFFICE	OPC	
DIVISION	FE	
BRANCH	FE-3 Japan Section	
OFFICIAL STATION	Tokyo, Japan	

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
	for RICHARD G. STILWELL Chief, FE Division	
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER	
	[signature]	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON ____________

SECURITY CLEARED ON ____________

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED ____________

ENTERED ON DUTY ____________

____
SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

S-49 FE-39 JBEDICT

Transfer leave ~~from~~ to unvouchered funds.

- not due US for travel costs

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

GPO 83-500393

SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME	DATE
Jacques G. Richardson	7 September 1950
NATURE OF ACTION	**EFFECTIVE DATE**
Promotion	1 October 1950

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Assistant	Intelligence ~~Assistant~~ Officer ✓
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-7 $3825 p/a	GS-9 $4600 p/a
OFFICE	OIC	OIC
DIVISION	FE	FE
BRANCH	FE 3	FE 3
OFFICIAL STATION	Japan	Japan

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS: [signature]

FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR: [signature] Richard ... , FE

CLASSIFICATION: F-757 9/13/50 [signature] Thomas

PERSONNEL OFFICER: [signature]

EXECUTIVE

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON ______

SECURITY CLEARED ON ______

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED ______

ENTERED ON DUTY ______

______
SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS: Employee EOD with CIA 30 Nov 49 as GS-7 130

Charged to FE-11, JBEDICT, Position No. ~~X~~ 49, Japan

BRD H

44

FORM NO. 37-1 NOV 1949

SECRET

GPO 050 50-284

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED

ENTRANCE ON DUTY RECORD

TO: OPC	DATE: 18 July 1950
	BUILDING: "K" — ROOM: 1044
FROM: PERSONNEL OFFICER	EOD DATE: 18 July 1950

NAME OF EMPLOYEE: RICHARDSON, Jacques		
POSITION TITLE: Intelligence Assistant	GRADE: GS-7	SALARY: $3825.00 per annum
PAYROLL: unvouchered funds	DUTY STATION: Japan	
DATE SECURITY CLEARED: 10 June 1949	DATE OATH OF OFFICE ADMINISTERED: 18 July 1950	
DATE PERMANENT IDENTIFICATION REQUESTED: 18 July 1950	DATE FINGERPRINTED: 18 July 1950	
DATE BRIEFED BY SECURITY: 18 July 1950	DATE OF PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: Not Applicable	
DATE 24 MONTH AGREEMENT SIGNED: 18 July 1950		

EMPLOYEE'S EMERGENCY ADDRESS: Mrs. Harriette D. Richardson (Wife)
6601 Old Bladensburg Road,
Silver Spring, Maryland Tele: SL 3983

EMPLOYEE'S LOCAL ADDRESS: Same as above

REMARKS:

POSTED

SIGNATURE OF PERSONNEL OFFICER
ROBERT S. RATTLES

FORM NO. 37-75
DEC 1949

RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME RICHARDSON, JAQUES G. ~~Ballard [illegible] (Pseudo)~~		DATE 15 July 1950
NATURE OF ACTION Resignation		EFFECTIVE DATE COB 17 July 1950
	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Assistant	
GRADE AND SALARY	GS 7, $3825 p/a	
OFFICE	OPC	
DIVISION	Operations	
BRANCH	FBD	
OFFICIAL STATION	~~Unassigned~~ Tokyo, Japan	

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR RICHARD G. STILWELL Acting Chief, FE	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER Robert [illegible]	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON ____________

SECURITY CLEARED ON ____________

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED ____________

ENTERED ON DUTY ____________

____
SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

Subject to be entered on duty on unvouchered funds in his true name of Jacques G. Richardson. The effective date of his true name appointment is 18 July 1950.

[illegible initials]
Frederick [illegible] Richards
Authorized Certifying Officer

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME	RICHARDSON, JACQUES G.	DATE	7 November 1949
NATURE OF ACTION	Excepted Appointment	EFFECTIVE DATE	20 November 1949

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Intelligence Officer GS-7
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-7, $3825.00
OFFICE		CPC Ops Staff
BRANCH		FED Area III
DIVISION		SO-11-JBEDICT
OFFICIAL STATION		Tokyo, Japan

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER [signature]	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES [x] NO [ ]

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON 21 November 1949

SECURITY CLEARED ON 10 June 1949

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED 21 November 1949

ENTERED ON DUTY 20 November 1949

DCG-07/05/53
CSECD - 11/10/49
EOD 11/26/49

[signature]
SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

Orientation acknowledged 21 November 1949 JSR

[stamp] VERIFIED BY [initials] DATE 1-13-55

Frederick ... Authorized Certifying Officer

FORM NO. 37-1 AUG 1949 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE NOT TO BE USED.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

SECTION A — GENERAL

Field	Entry
1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	Richardson, Jeffrey
2. DATE OF BIRTH	20 Jan 24
3. SEX	M
4. GRADE	GS-15
5. SD	D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	Ops Off
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	DDP/EUR
8. CURRENT STATION	Paris
9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT	X CAREER; RESERVE; TEMPORARY; CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C); SPECIAL (Specify):
10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT	INITIAL; X ANNUAL; SPECIAL (Specify):; X REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR; REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	31 May 1971
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)	1 April 1970 to 31 March 1971

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory — Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

M-Marginal — Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.

P-Proficient — Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.

S-Strong — Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O-Outstanding — Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Gained full-time employment as a senior executive of a foreign scientific publication for the purpose of further developing access to Station targets and appreciably lowering the overall cost of the operations in which he is involved.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Uses his cover to gain access to MHHARSH personnel and spot leads on eventual access and support-type assets directed against the local MHHARSH and TPFAST targets.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Develops and assesses MHHARSH officials with whom he has made contact as well as access prospects to the local MHHARSH and TPFAST targets.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Responds to various Station requirements including investigative work.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Reports on the above activities.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	Rating Letter
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 7-68 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During the period under review, Subject managed to gain full-time employment as a senior executive of an HBSPRITE government subsidized scientific publication at a time of economic slowdown when jobs were not easy to get. He did this without help from Headquarters or the Station. Such an achievement is a tribute to Subject's fluency in French, his ability to write, his general scientific know-how and his good buisness sense. Over half of his salary therefore is now paid by this company. In converting to full-time employment, a major adjustment, Subject's contribution to the Station operations in the MHHARSH and TPFAST fields against which he is targetted temporarily decreased somewhat. Subject continued, however, to maintain contact with three local MHHARSH officials and initiated contact with three others. He also continued to search for new leads to personalities in the priority areas assigned to him. Subject has the capability to call on local scientists or technicians of just about any nationality with the possible exception of TPFAST citizens. He has used this near-unique potential well.

Subject has had occasional difficulty switching from "professional" or intellectual subjects in his development of MHHARSH personalities or access prospects to more down-to-earth interests necessary --con't--

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

BY EMPLOYEE

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT and D.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
9 June 1971	/s/ Thomas B. CASASIN

BY SUPERVISOR

2.

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
18 months		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
	Handling Officer	/s/ Francis S. Sherry

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

3. COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The Station submitted comments on Subject officer recently in OFPT-16549 (8 April 1971), to which we should add that Subject has, largely on his own merits, acquired a solid and potentially highly useful cover employment. However, this new employment will demand a very substantial amount of time and energy from Subject, and the unanswerable question at the moment relates to his availability for Organizational tasks. We shall need additional time and careful working with this officer to determine the answer, since the fiscal outlay from the Organization to support his continued stay in Paris is still quite

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
24 May 1971	DCOS	/s/ Hugh Montgomery

SECRET

FITNESS REPORT

Section C (continued)

to the development of human relations. His forte is therefore more in the field of spotting and making operational contacts than in that of more than short-range operational development. Subject's operational situation makes it impossible for him to attempt recruitments. Thus, his very real achievements are not by essence of the spectacular variety.

Subject's reporting has been satisfactory and continue to be copious. He could, however, further improve the selectivity of the leads provided the Station and make more of an effort to "digest" the information contained in his reports.

Although Subject has, at present, no supervisory function, he has repeatedly requested such a responsibility. He is careful with operational expenses and has exercised good security.

During the period under review, additional efforts have been made to make full use of Subject's potential and integrate him further in the work of the station component with which he works. He is a particularly valuable asset for the Station programs directed against the local MHMARSH and TPFAST targets.

Section D (continued)

substantial. In a word, is it worth it? We do not yet know, although our initial impressions are favorable.

On the fitness report itself, this rater would have preferred an "S" rating for specific duty number one; Subject may ultimately deserve an "O", but it does not seem warranted at the present time. Moreover, I believe the overall rating would more properly have been in the higher range of the "P" category, rather than "S", but it is of course a subjective judgment of the rating officer, who is more intimately and directly involved with Subject on a frequent basis.

In sum, the cover is superb, and only time will reveal to what extent the cover requirements permit a full measure on behalf of the Organization. We are following this aspect closely and will be commenting upon it subsequently as we gain experience and knowledge.

14-00000

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Richardson J

DO NOT COMPLETE	FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY		
NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if SA) [redacted]	DATE (from item S-1) 17 Oct 69	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) Murat Natirboff	DATE (from item S-2)
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: 12 December 1969	DISPATCH NUMBER: OFPT-15240	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE:	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH	2. SERVICE DESIGN	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE	4. STATION OR BASE	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER
20 I 1924	CS	S&T project manager, Area Ops Off, GS 15	Paris	

6A. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD	6B. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE	6C. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ	6D. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE
5 Sep 1967	Please see 11B	Summer 1970	o/a 1 October, 1970

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

2: (at that time) 42 and 17

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

I would like very much to use my fluent French in my next assignment, as well as make use of my extensive exposure to science and technology -- both operations and and the larger world of the scientist and the engineer in today's evolving societies and economies. I would most especially hope to use my long experience in non-official cover activities and the managerial exposure accumulated thereby.

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (see special note on transmittal form). (also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8)

- I planned, established and operated a long-range S&T spotting-assessment activity against sensitive targets, and a shorter range similar local activity during a period marked largely by an adverse political climate.
- I planned, developed and exploited, and modified a non-official cover in order to mask our operational activity, and integrated these into the broader ranging overall activities of a major field Station.
- I managed the non-official cover activity of viable professional/commercial cover organizations. The tasks included many business and production aspects as well as management of the firm's /unwitting/ personnel in the field and from the home office.
- I assisted other Stations and Bases, upon their request, in spotting-assessment activities, in local search and surveillance of targets, and in recruitment.
- As my original non-official cover became modified as a result of mergers, I was able to develop, alone, continuing cover to serve our needs of operational access as well as those of 'status' cover.

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

(a) the senior-most management course offered through the Organization;
(b) a review course of activities within the CS and the Organization as a whole;
(c) at least audit the S&T course, if that is still being offered.

If (a) is possible through a civil school away from Headquarters, I would have no objection to the displacement involved.

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

11a. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

First choice: to manage a large-scale non-official cover project in a French-speaking technically advanced locale.
Second choice: chief of station or base (cover non-official or official) in an area where I can combine my experience and linguistic ability.
Third choice: to be assigned to Staff training, preferably training (a) senior unit or project managers, or (b) JCTs.
Fourth choice: to be assigned to Staff personnel work -- above the Division level -- where new personnel are screened, tested and evaluated, then assigned.
Fifth choice: to work on the Intelligence side of the house.

11b. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 (for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice) IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

☐ EXTEND TOUR ______ MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO ______ (DATE)

[3] BE ASSIGNED TO HQTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY; INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE. 1ST CHOICE Staff Training 2ND CHOICE Personnel 3RD CHOICE Intelligence

[2] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION; INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION 1ST CHOICE Brussels 2ND CHOICE Geneva 3RD CHOICE Ottawa

[1] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION; with different responsibilities

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Station recommends that Subject return PCS to Headquarters at the end of his current tour. We would welcome a replacement who is capable of functioning in the same general cover context, but any such individual must also be able to spot and thoroughly access agent candidates. He should also handle a number of agents in the same field. We are, in short, seeking an officer who will aggressively exploit his cover.

---- continued----

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

No decision has been made concerning next assignment

DATE 24 Aug 70 TITLE C/E/PERS SIGNATURE Willford C. Taylor

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. ______ DATED: ______

CABLE NO. ______ DATED: ______

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: ______ (SIGNATURE) DATE: ______

SECRET

Field Reassignment Questionnaire (continued)

12. develop new operational leads on his own initiative, and at the same time be prepared to take over and run assets related to his own cover employment.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Richardson, [illegible]	20 Jan 1924	M	GS-15	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Off	DDP/EUR/F	Paris

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: X CAREER; RESERVE; TEMPORARY; CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C); SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL; X ANNUAL; SPECIAL (Specify):; REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR; REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1969 - 31 March 1970

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- **U—Unsatisfactory**: Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- **M—Marginal**: Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
- **P—Proficient**: Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
- **S—Strong**: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- **O—Outstanding**: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Established and maintains a legitimate S&T publishing representation for the purpose of developing natural access to Station targets.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Uses his cover to develop leads on eventual access or support type assets to be used by the Station against the local MHHARSH target.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Responds to various Station requirements including investigative work.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Initiates contact with selected local MHHARSH targets and undertakes to develop sufficient rapport with them to provide operational assessments.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5:	-
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

29 JUN 1970

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

The comments of the rating officer are limited to the period from October 1969 to March 1970 during which he worked with Subject. The previous rating officer has added his comments to allow coverage of the total indicated period from April 1969 to March 1970. During this period Subject was integrated in a new team assigned to the local S&T and Commercial MHMARSH target. Subject's recent activity has been very productive indeed. Subject used the excellent potential given to him by his cover to skillfully spot and assess access agent candidates. As Subject's operational situation in Paris precludes making recruitment, the most promising of these candidates was placed in contact with a Station officer during social events Subject organized. At the same time, Subject continued his efforts to develop personal relationship with several MHMARSHers. The beginning of personal, as opposed to purely professional, relations with a major MHMARSH target enabled him to obtain insight into the target's beliefs and personality which was the best the Station had to date. Subject also managed to establish contact with two other MHMARSH representatives of interest. This, in one case, required almost six months to accomplish via a combination of patience, skill and determination. Subject is an experienced officer. He is cost conscious and practices good security. The Station has no other asset with the necessary scientific and editorial know-how, fluent French and local knowledge to replace Subject. In view of this and the recent progress made by Subject in response to very specific requirements and his willingness to try to establish personal and, hopefully, social relations with access prospects and MHMARSH targets, the Station recently recommended that he be extended in Paris. At the same time, the Station recommended that Subject's cover be reinforced by full-time employment with Subject's current WOLADY part-time employer.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

BY EMPLOYEE

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
	/s/ [redacted]

BY SUPERVISOR

2.

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
	Handling Officer Chief, SR II	/s/ Francis Sherry /s/ Murat Natirboff

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

3. COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

As previous Station correspondence and fitness reports will reflect, this officer has been the subject of varying evaluations and projections in recent years. In fairness to him, however, it is equally true that an officer under non-official cover reflects, in the level and quality of his performance, the amount and type of guidance, direction and push he receives from the responsible inside case officer. Making allowances for these variables, this officer's past record has not been impressive; however, it is also correct to note that he has improved substantially during the latter part of the period under review, and that if the Station can work out some fiscal arrangement which will reduce the heavy financial input

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
19 May 1970	DCOS	/s/ Hugh Montgomery

SECRET

Section D3 continued

from the Organization, his continued presence at this Station definitely appears to be warranted for a sufficient period to reach more definite conclusions concerning the level of sustained performance over a somewhat longer period than that reflected by this report.

On balance, we are pleased that this officer has responded so well to greater case officer direction and that he has undertaken somewhat more aggressive efforts to expand his range of contacts in immediate proximity to the primary Station targets. This officer does bring many talents to bear on his operational activity: he has absolutely fluent French, a solid and exploitable cover, and a vast range of contacts in the local community. Nonetheless, it will require additional time to explore these contacts in depth, select those which appear to be operationally viable, and pursue them actively either to the point of recruitment by another officer or elimination from further development, for whatever reason.

In sum, in spite of the recognized and commendable improvement in this officer's performance during the period under review, the reviewer submits that the letter grade for specific duties 2 and 4 would more properly have been a "P", and that the overall rating, at this point, would more accurately be set at a level between "P" and "S", probably closer to the former than the latter.

This reviewing comment has been read by the officers who prepared the Fitness Report.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
[illegible]	20 Jan 1924	M.	GS-15	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Officer	DDP/EUR/France	Paris

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT		10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT	
X CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY		INITIAL	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)		X ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):		SPECIAL (Specify):	

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
	1 October 1968 - 31 March 1969

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Establishes and maintains a legitimate S&T publishing representation for the purpose of developing natural access to Station targets.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Develops cover pretexts to meet WOLADY and third national of operational interest in the S&T community.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Responds to Station ad-hoc requirements on the local internal target.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Develops potential agent prospects in the S&T community to the point where they can be recommended as Station agent candidates.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

20 OCT

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

OCT 9 1 35 PM '69

During this reporting period subject had very markedly increased the tempo of his activities and contacts. Many agent prospects have been screened and contacts were established with people of interest to several elements of the Station. Subject is particularly thorough and outstanding on specific investigations where he utilized cover in a skillful and imaginative way. He has improved in terms of people development but in this respect he is still best with people in a professionally related context rather than a contrived social context. As mentioned in the previous report subject's cover assignment does not allow him to make recruitments. Subject has a high degree of cost consciousness and does not exercise any supervisory responsibilities.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

BY EMPLOYEE

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
11 June 1969	/s/ [illegible]

BY SUPERVISOR

2.

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
5 June 1969	Ops Officer	/s/ Murat Natirboff

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

3. COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I do not concur in this rating. I would have given the employee STRONG in the performance of his cover responsibilities, that is to say in the manner in which he has created and expanded his cover. I would have restricted myself to PROFICIENT, however, in assessing his exploitation of that cover for operational purposes. For a fuller treatment of this staff agent's performance, suggest that reference be made to the KCC Status Report, submitted 26 May 1969, via OFPA-39925.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
23 JUNE 1969	Chief of Station	/s/ David kE. Murphy

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Richardson, Sigfried	20 Jan 1924	M	GS-15	D'

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Officer	DDP/EUR/France	Paris

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY / CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C) / SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL / REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR / ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE / SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1967 - 30 September 196? (typed: 31 March 196?)

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
- P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
- S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Establishes and maintains a legitimate S&T publishing representation for the purpose of developing natural access to Station targets.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Develops cover pretexts to meet WCLADY and third national of operational interest in the S&T community.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Responds to Station ad-hoc requirements on the local internal target.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Develops potential agent prospects in the S&T community to the point where they can be recommended as Station agent candidates.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5:	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	Rating Letter
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Since the last reporting period Subject's efforts were directed by the Station toward the spotting, developing and assessing WCLADY S&T agent candidates in terms of recruitment and inclusion in the Station's S&T spotting network.

Subject has done thorough and at times imaginative spade work in this field despite the fact that the mission was not as successful as anticipated. Recent progress however would indicate that the next reporting period would be more productive.

Subject continues to respond to ad-hoc specific assignments in an exemplary manner.

Because of the nature of his cover assignment Subject is not authorized to make recruitments.

Subject has a high degree of cost consciousness. He does not exercise any supervisory responsibilities under his cover assignment.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. **BY EMPLOYEE**

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
24 Oct. 1968	/s/ [illegible]

2. **BY SUPERVISOR**

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
28 Oct. 1968	Ops Officer	/s/ Murat Natirboff

3. **BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See attached.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
	Chief ofStation	/s/ David E. Murphy

SECRET

ADDENDUM, Form 45 (Fitness Report), for period March 67-March 68.

Section D

As the individual being rated, I would like to add some remarks to those prepared by the rating officer.

The assignment I have includes managerial responsibilities which (a) are essential to the continued existence and security of the cover mechanism as a vehicle for operational exploitation, and (b) are not necessarily visible to those "on the inside."

In the case of (a), I must engage in a constant orchestration of the cover and the facilities it offers. This means maintaining a managerial equilibrium to insure that cover work will not become, of itself, so demanding that it negates the cover's utility to the CS. In effect, the top officers and middle managers of the cover corporation [who are not cleared and witting] have to be satisfied that their demands are met (or cannot be), or else manipulated in order to neutralize or reject their demands. After all, the cover position is to them a legitimate, normal, workaday post in their firm. What work is done at their bidding, it follows, must be accomplished according to the high standards of thoroughness and accuracy which they have set.

In the case of (b) -- which derives from (a) -- and can prove to be so demanding that the needs of the CS could no longer be served, the incumbent is required to manage a span of human contacts at several levels in order to preserve his cover position and enhance its value to the CS. This means planning, directing and managing the work of multinational, multicultural teams of technical correspondents, as well as meetings and negotiations to improve the [cover firm's] relations with similarly widespread individuals at the levels of editor-in-chief, publisher, corporate vice-president, president, and chairman of the board. These levels are scattered not only through industry, but have their analogs as well in government, higher education, and professional societies.

Having previously managed both a CS base and the principal denied-areas operating component of a major field Station, I can report quite honestly that my present managerial responsibilities exceed the former -- despite the apparent lack of "supervisory responsibilities" in my present position.

3. It is difficult to place in the proper perspective the contribution of this senior staff agent to Paris Station operations. On the one hand, Subject has established superb cover in the scientific and technical field which should have afforded him virtually unlimited access to persons of interest to us, both Soviet and potential access agents. In evaluating the manner in which the employee set up and managed this cover, I would tend to agree with his comments to the fitness report on the managerial demands on him although these comments are somewhat overdrawn.

The principal difficulty has been the time it has taken to relate the cover potential to the specific operational requirements of the Station. We have not received from CASASIN as many leads and assessment reports to persons of operational interest in the S&T field as we think he could have produced. It may be that the earlier listing of the project (viewed as a regional undertaking) contributed to this.

Recently we have noted significant improvement in that we have received responses to requests we have made for assessment and development of potential access agents within a cover context. We hope, therefore, that this last year of CASASIN's stay will be the most productive ever. It is unfortunate that the cover must end because of the cover company's decisions over which we had no control.

/s/ David E. Murphy

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
[redacted]	20 Jan 24	M	GS-15	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Officer	DDP/EUR/France	Paris

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT		10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT	
CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY		INITIAL	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)	XXX	ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):		SPECIAL (Specify):	

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
	1 April 1966 - 31 March 1967

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Establishes and maintains a legitimate S&T publishing representation for the purpose of developing natural access to Soviet S&T personnel.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Develops cover pretexts to meet, assess, and recommend as agent candidates WOLADY and Third Nationals in the HBFAIRY S&T community.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Contacts and develops local Soviet Bloc personnel.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Develops cover pretexts to attend selected scientific conferences.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Responds to local Station adhoc operational requirements.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

31 AUG 1967

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject continues to maintain a secure effective cover mechanism. In this reporting period the whole thrust and objectives of this cover facility have been changed from pursuit of targets designated by Headquarters at international conferences to pursuit of the local Soviet presence. This has caused a major readjustment and Subject is now beginning to produce the type of leads that help the Station achieve its local operational objectives.

Subject continues to show a well organised methodical approach to his cover and operational tasks.

Subject is cost conscience.

HQRS. NOTE: Subject has no supervisory responsibilities.

Seth T. Crawford
Chief, E/F

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS
1.	BY EMPLOYEE
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT
DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Employee is on h/l. Report will be shown to him upon his return.	
DATE 9 August 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/Murat Natirboff

3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL		

I rarely see the written product of this employee's efforts and know little of his work except as I am informed of it by his supervisor in the Station. I have the impression, however, that the employee is responding to his supervisor's guidance and is not by any means simply drifting along paths indicated by his cover work, which can be a temptation when an employee has, as is true in this case, rather limited contact with his colleagues who work under official cover on the same target. I thus concur in the evaluation on the basis of limited knowledge.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
9 August 1967	Ops Officer	/s/Robert E. Owen

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
[redacted]	20 Jan. 1924	M	GS-15	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Officer	DDP/WE/French	Paris

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY / CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C) / SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL / REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR / XX ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE / SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 3 June 1965 - 31 March 1966

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could rang[e] ... [placi]ng on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe actio[n] ...

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfacto[ry] ... or excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are b...

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

List up to six of the most important specifi... Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONL... ...s in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Establishes and maintains a legitimate S&T publishing representation for the purpose of developing natural access to Soviet S&T personnel	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Develops cover pretexts to attend selected scientific conferences where targeted Soviet S&T personnel are expected	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Contacts, develops and assesses Soviet S&T personalities at international conferences.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Participates as an inside spotter, manager and key team member in recruitment operations against Soviet S&T personnel	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Spots, develops and assesses Soviet, third national and PBPRIME agent candidates in HBFAIRY	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

POSTED ON ...

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject has done an outstanding job in creating a [illegible] mechanism which enables direct access to an important target group. This job was performed [illegible]fully, securely, intelligently and imaginatively. Subject is an experienced, highly capable senior professional officer in every sense of the term. He is a thoroughly organized self-disciplined person who can operate effectively outside a normal Station complex. He has the supple mind required to learn highly technical cover tasks and perform these in a skilled manner. He organizes the performance of these cover duties in such a manner as to extract the most operational mileage. Subject has spotted, assessed, developed, and in special cases recruited. He is extremely articulate, and an excellent writer. Despite his deep cover status, he submits timely finished operational and information reports. His management, administration, and record keeping of both his cover and operational duties is excellent.

Although Subject has had long experience in supervisory capacities, his present singleton cover status does not require supervisory duties.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE
4 May 1966	/[redacted]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	
4 May 1966	Ops Officer	/s/Murat Natirboff

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
4 May 1966	Ops Officer	/s/Robert E. Owen

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Richardson, Jacques	20 Jan. 1924	M	15	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Officer	DDP/WE/French	Paris

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL	X	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1964 - 2 June 1965

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- **W - Weak** — Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- **A - Adequate** — Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
- **P - Proficient** — Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
- **S - Strong** — Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- **O - Outstanding** — Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Contact, cultivation and assessment of, and collection of biographic and operational intelligence on Soviet scientific and technical targets, and on other Soviets and other nationalities to whom he has access through his cover.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Spotting and assessment of potential operational assets to be used against the targets specified under Specific Duty No. 1.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Execution of operational assignments as directed by Hqs and field stations concerned, whether of a KUTUBE, KUWOLF or KUDESK nature.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Preparation or acquisition of cover firm written material as operational information to increase his access and flexibility in furtherance of Specific Duties Nos. 1 through 3.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Planning, directing and managing overseas bureau of cover firm, with emphasis on exploitation of the cover to meet operational requirements.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

POSTED ON BK OF-4b 6 JUL 1965

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: O *

30 JUN 1965

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

SECTION C. NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

JUL 1 1 56 PM '65

During the reporting period this employee as a staff agent has continued the
solidification of his cover and the expansion of his operational activity within his
cover to a point where he represents as deeply buried a staff officer as can be found in
anyone with his past organizational background. From the point of view of the host
country authorities he appears to be completely legitimate. From the more important
point of view of his targets, he also apparently has been accepted, and not through a
lack of opportunity for scrutiny, for what he claims to be. He thus represents for
KUBARK an asset who has not only solid status and access cover, but also the demonstrated
capability for exploiting his cover for specific and aggressive operational undertakings.

As has been stated in past fitness reports, his present capability directly and openly
to approach operational targets through the vehicle of his cover is the result of his own
efforts, in which he has devoted a tremendous amount of work not only to establish and
enhance the foundations of the cover, which requires a considerable amount of work for
the cover company, but to devise and exploit ways and means by which the cover activity
may be applied directly to operational tasks and programs. In addition to operational
activity in his country of assignment, he has also been used in Hqs-directed activity in
other countries, usually involving direct contact with target individuals, and in addi-
tion he has contributed greatly to the acquisition of operational information for the
use of Hqs components in their overall approach to Soviet scientific and technical tar-
gets.

It would be difficult to fault this employee with respect to energy, professional
skills, and mental capacity. He is a keen student of his operational environment and
very skillful in analyzing the possibilities it offers for application toward operational
objectives. He shows considerable resourcefulness in devising logical and credible

(continued)

SECTION D. CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

BY EMPLOYEE

1\. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
1 June 1965	/s/ [illegible]

BY SUPERVISOR

2\.

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
1 June 1965	Ops Officer	/s/ James M. Flint

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

3\. COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Since the Reviewing Officer in the field has not indicated his views
on this Fitness Report, I would like to make a comment of my own. Without
wishing to detract from anything the Supervisor has said about Subject's per-
formance, I feel obliged to note that the ratings given him in this report are
higher than those given, for example, to any Branch Chief in this Division, and,
as such, are inconsistent with the grading pattern of the Division as a whole.

Reviewing Officer

2 June 1965 Chief, External Operations Section /s/ Robert E. Owen

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
24 June 65	DC/WE	Edward Ryan (signature) Edward Ryan

SECRET

SECTION C continued

approaches to operational problems and personalities, and expends considerable effort in maintaining a level of specialized knowledge sufficient to backstop his cover and to ensure the maximum exploitation of his contacts with target organizations and individuals. His command of spoken, written, and technical French is excellent.

From the point of view of supervision, this employee in his present position requires guidance only insofar as to identify specific targets and for him to protect himself in situations where he does not have, by virtue of his not having access to official files, specialized information. Otherwise, he requires no supervision other than the periodic provision of policy and operational directives.

This employee has always been conscious and punctillious in his preparation of operational and administrative reports, including financial accountings, and his reporting in general, despite the burdens imposed by the necessity for minimizing the risks inherent in the lack of access to classified storage, leaves nothing to be desired.

Other than the funds for operational activities, this employee currently has no responsibility for the programming and use of personnel, space, equipment, and funds.

With respect to dedication to his job, this employee has practically speaking single-handedly built his present cover/operational position despite a number of negative factors inherent to his situation such as relative isolation, meager opportunity for contact with his professional group, and expensive area of assignment, and an exposed cover situation where the necessity for living cover is compounded by the necessity of avoiding mistakes which might jeopardize cover. His dedication to and enthusiasm for accepting the challenge ofthis assignment, and his willingness to continue on in it, deserve particular mention, particularly since he would perhaps justifiably feel that his present assignment may leave him outside the mainstream of competitive organization progression.

This employee's health and family situations leave nothing to be desired, as his proven mobility in the execution of operational assignments attests.

It should further be noted that with respect to the problem endemic to deep-cover assignments of allocation of time between cover work and operational activity, this employee comes very close to the happy norm of making cover work complement operational work, and making operational work contribute where possible to the enhancement of cover.

While this employee's assignment to date has essentially been a one-man show, it is recommended that serious consideration be given to expanding the operational complex which he has created in order to capitalize on his experience, the work he has put in to date, and his own management capabilities.

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*(Section B) - No special recognition of Subject's "Outstanding" overall performance is being requested at this time.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
[handwritten, partly obliterated]	20 Jan 1924	M	GS-15	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops. Officer	DDP/WE/France	Paris

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY / CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C) / SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL / X ANNUAL / SPECIAL (Specify): / REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR / REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 May 1964

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1963 - 31 March 1964

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
- P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
- S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Finding, cultivating unwittingly and assessing new target personalities among Soviet scientists, engineers and other technical specialists.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Continuing the assessment and unwitting development of established targets in the same category.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Development of similar leads on target personalities from other denied areas; making recruitments outside base country.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Development and assessment of technical personalities of inter[...]'s internal (domestic) programs.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Managing and directing cover company's foreign bureau and its assets to strengthen own cover and diversify access for KUTUBE, KUWOLF and KUDESK purposes.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6: Researching, writing and editing own and others' material published by cover company to strengthen cover and diversify access for KUDOVE operational purposes.	O

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

26 JUN 1964

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

JUN 25 11 28 AM '64

This employee combines the relatively rare combination of a senior and broadly experienced intelligence officer under working cover providing both long-term status in his country of residence (and in Europe in general) and access for a variety of operational functions, including spotting, assessing, contact with Soviet bloc nationals of specific interest, investigative measures, assessment in depth of ostensibly cover-company hired persons, and attendance at a broad range of national and international specialized meetings. Development of the capability operationally to exploit his cover has been the achievement of the employee himself. In so doing he has at the same time achieved genuine acceptance by his cover company associates (most of whom are unwitting) and his colleagues in his cover profession and related professions.

In undertaking operational tasks this employee has consistently shown initiative imagination, security consciousness, and application of both operational and substantive background to the problem at hand. He has put a conscious effort into improving his already excellent command of the French language, and his grasp of a variety of specialized scientific and technical fields has been achieved basically as a result of his own efforts.

His management of operational reporting, finances, and the administrative problems connected with his cover status has been exemplary.

It should be noted that during the reporting period, this employee has not had the benefit at all times of specific pinpointed operational direction. As of the end of the reporting period, Headquarters assumed control of his activities against specific Soviet targets on a Europe-wide basis.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
25 May 1964	/s/ [illegible]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
Eighteen		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
25 May 1964	Ops. Officer	/s/ James Flint

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
25 May 1964	Ops. Officer	/s/ Robert E. Owen

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Richardson, Jacques

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 037367 006172

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
[redacted]	20 Jan 1924	M	GS-15	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Officer	DDP/SR	Paris

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY / CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C) / SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL / X ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR / REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE / SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 May 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 10 September 1962 - 31 March 1963

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Establishment and maintenance of cover as a genuine working member of his profession.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Spotting and assessing persons of operational interest to Paris Station and to other stations.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Investigating of organizations and phenomena of operational interest to the Station.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Collection of positive and operational information using his cover for entree.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5:	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

POSTED ON 16 July 63 [stamp]

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

15 JUL 1963

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

See attached sheet.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 15 May 1963	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [redacted] /s/	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 6½ months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 15 May 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ James Flint
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL See attached sheet.		
DATE 20 May 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL OPS Officdr	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Edward Ryan

SECRET

Richardson, Jacques

SECRET

SECTION C

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

The assignment of this employee to the field under non-official cover was designed to compensate for the loss of an employee in an official cover slot which was cut from the Station's ODACID allotment of personnel positions.

During the reporting period this employee has accomplished with success the convincing establishment of his cover in a complex milieu, and has been accepted as legitimate by his professional colleagues, the persons whom he meets under cover, and the French authorities. It should be noted that his ability to assume his cover has been largely the result of his own efforts over a period of years to acquire and maintain a familiarity with the general scientific field.

During the reporting period he has developed a wide circle of contacts in the scientific and journalistic fields and applies a long background in a variety of assignments in KUDOVE to the determination and assessment of operational potential among these contacts. At the same time his cover organization, in which only four persons are witting of his actual status, has shown itself to be more than satisfied with his performance of his cover duties.

This employee requires a minimum of detailed operational supervision; it is necessary in specific cases only to indicate the operational or informational objectives.

From the point of view of administrative support, his attention to detail and meticulousness reduce the problems of his support by the Station to a minimum.

This employee uses the French language continuously, and his facility is such as to permit him to handle himself excellently in a broad range of complex technical subjects. He has in addition undertaken specialized French language training to develop this capability further. His operational reporting is excellent both with regard to clarity and pertinence.

In the immediate future he will be assigned case work, for the most part in fields where it will complement, and be complemented by, his independent operational activities and cover work.

SECRET

SECRET

6101

6 August 1962

Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report Richardson, Eugene

Subject: [redacted]

My last statements concerning the performance of [redacted] should be extended to cover the remainder of his service as Chief of SR/6. He departed headquarters for a field assignment 31 July 1962.

Quentin C. Johnson
QUENTIN C. JOHNSON
Chief of Operations and Plans
SR Division

CONCUR: Howard J. Osborn
HOWARD J. OSBORN
Chief, SR Division

1961.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Recorded by CSPD

FITNESS REPORT

Richardson, Jacques

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME	(Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE
[illegible]		20 January 1924	M	GS-14

5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT
D	Branch Chief	OC/SR/6

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

	NOT ELIGIBLE		MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	11. REPORTING PERIOD (From To)	SPECIAL (Specify)
	July 1960-October 61	

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

Specific Duty	Rating No.	Specific Duty	Rating No.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises large functional branch of thirty-seven staff and fifteen contract personnel.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts liaison with various components of the Agency and with other agencies.	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Plans and programs for operations support, including initiation of new support activities.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares and presents briefings.	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises preparation of, and sometimes personally prepares, special studies both on own initiative and on request.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Supervises maintenance of SR Division records on Soviet defectors, supports exploitation of defectors and participates in their resettlement.	5

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. **SECRET** (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — **NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE**

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Mr. [redacted] has a good knowledge of Soviet matters and generally is very well informed. He continually demonstrates much initiative and a high degree of productivity. He is stimulating to his associates, businesslike and delegates work easily. He appears very self-confident and he is dynamic.

Mr. [redacted] supervises a very large and key branch engaged in a wide variety of activities, a difficult job which he does well.

SECTION F — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
9 November 1961	[redacted] /s/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
Twelve	

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

	EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS		REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
	OTHER (Specify):		

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
9 November 1961	SR/Chief of Plans and Operations	QUENTIN C. JOHNSON (signature)

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

X	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
	I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
21 NOV 1961	Chief, SR Division	JOHN M. MAURY (signature)

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE
RICHARDSON Jocque	20 Jan 1924	M	GS-14

5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT
DI		FE/Tokyo Sta/SR

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS: NOT ELIGIBLE / PENDING / MEMBER / DECLINED / DEFERRED / DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL / X ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR / X REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE / SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

11. REPORTING PERIOD From 1 Apr 59 - 24 June 62

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

Specific Duty	Rating No.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Chief, Soviet Branch, responsible for activities of 24 staff and 6 contract employees	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Responsible for station SR planning, budgeting, and operating activities	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Representing the station at varied levels in all SR matters	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Case officer	5/6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5:	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

In most respects, this officer is one of the best I have known in this agency. He has a broad and deep knowledge of his target area, as well as of his "host" country; an excellent and proven degree of operational "know-how"; the ability to write and speak lucidly and effectively and with apparent ease; and a very high degree of motivation and devotion to duty. He can be expected to continue his dynamic and imaginative pursuit of a most difficult target. It is my opinion that this officer has great potential and is ready for increased responsibilities which would involve the promotion for which he has been recommended. As for training, a good managerial course might help to bring into even sharper focus his many talents.

This report has been prepared in accordance with F E Division standards which recognize the principle of rating the individual against the group. Thus an 'average' rating reflects an entirely satisfactory performance.

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
23 June 1960	Jacques Richardson/s/ on transmittal

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

- [ ] EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
- [ ] REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
- [ ] OTHER (Specify):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
23 June 1960		Adam Brindle(P) signed on transmittal

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

- [x] I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
- [ ] I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
- [ ] I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
- [ ] I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
	COS, Tokyo	John Baker/s/ on transmittal

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE
RICHARDSON, Jacques	20 January 1921	M	GS-1[illegible]

5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT
		SR, Tokyo, Japan

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

	NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 May 1959

11. REPORTING PERIOD From 10 Apr 58 To 31 Mar 59

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
NO. 1: Supervises and directs operational branch of some 17 persons	5	NO. 4: Case officer	6
NO. 2: Conducts operational liaison with local intelligence and security services.	6	NO. 5:	
NO. 3: Conducts liaison with U.S. military and civilian intelligence services	6	NO. 6:	

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E **NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE**

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

JUN 22 11 19 AH '59
MAIL ROOM

Subject continues as one of the most capable, professional and hard working of the branch chiefs in the Station. Working against a tough denied area problem, he demonstrates imagination, drive, excellent area background and knowledge, and a high degree of productivity. He definitely has the potential for an even more responsible position.

SECTION F **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

BY EMPLOYEE

1. *I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.*

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
27 April 1959	signed on transmittal

BY SUPERVISOR

2.

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
22	

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

[ ] EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS	[ ] REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
[ ] OTHER (Specify):	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
27 April 1959	DC Tokyo Station	William Nelson signed on transmittal

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

3.

- [X] I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
- [ ] I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
- [ ] I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
- [ ] I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
27 April 1959	C/Tokyo Station	John E. Baker signed on transmittal

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SR 8

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
RICHARDSON JACQUES	20 Jan 1924	M	DI

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
FE, TOKYO, JAPAN	Area Ops Officer

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-14		1 October 1957 - 9 April 1958

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): INITIAL [ ] ANNUAL [ ] REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [ ] REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [ ] SPECIAL (Specify) [X] Promotion

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT [X] HAS [ ] HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

- [X] THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
- [ ] THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
- [ ] I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
- [ ] IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
- [ ] I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
27 May 1958	William E. Nelson	

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control		11 JUL
Reviewed by PCD		7/24/58

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN REVIEWED UNDER CRITERIA ... AND IN CONFORMANCE ... [illegible]

[ ] CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
27 May 1958	John E. Baker	

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5/6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY. HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY. OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) 1 NOV 55 — REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

Performance (4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE	CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
GIVING LECTURES	DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS	PREPARES SUMMARIES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS	TRANSLATES GERMAN
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	MANAGES FILES	DEBRIEFING SOURCES
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	OPERATES RADIO	KEEPS BOOKS
TYPING	COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES	DRIVES TRUCK
TAKING DICTATION	WRITES REGULATIONS	MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
SUPERVISING	PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE	EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL JUN 26 2 18 PM '58 MAIL ROOM

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO.	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO.	RATING NUMBER
1 As branch chief directs and plans operations of denied area branch.	5/5	4 Conducts liaison with other U.S. agencies	6
2 Conducts operational liaison with local security services.	6	5	
3 Develops and handles agents	6	6	

D. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject is an exceedingly well-equipped operations officer. He is mature, intelligent, has a thorough background in operations in his area and the ability to grow in his job. His operational planning and execution is usually impeccable. He has the loyalty of his subordinates and the respect of his equals and supervisors. He is particularly effective in dealing in the liaison field where his good sense and disinterest in "fighting the problem" produces a maximum of cooperation and good will. If he has any minor fault as a supervisor, it is not in impatience with his subordinates, as reflected in previous evaluations, but in an occasional unwillingness to say no to them.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
RICHARDSON JACQUES	20 Jan 1924	M	DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: FE, TOKYO, JAPAN	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Area Ops Officer		

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-11		1 October 1957 - 9 April 1958

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): [ ] INITIAL [ ] ANNUAL [ ] REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [ ] REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [X] SPECIAL (Specify) Promotion

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
27 May 1958	William E. Nelson	

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
27 May 1958	John E. Baker	

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? [X] Yes [ ] No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	2	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

10 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

His potential for advancement is excellent. He has the right blend of operational know-how and supervisory talent to undertake positions of wider scope than he now holds. Although his advancement has been rapid for his age, [illegible] [illegible], poise and common sense almost completely eliminate age as a factor in his potential for a more senior job.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Subject deserves at sometime within the next year or two the opportunity to broaden his experience either by command of a small station or advancement to a more responsible job in a large one.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

None

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
- X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
- 1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
- 2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
- 3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
- 4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
- 5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	5	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	5	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	5	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section A below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) RICHARDSON (First) Jacques (Middle)
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan. 1924
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: Tokyo Station RSDXCCD
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Area Operations Officer
7. GRADE: GS-14
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP:
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 1 October 1956 to 30 September 1957
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): INITIAL / ANNUAL / X REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR / REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE / SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT [ ] HAS [ ] HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT.
Completed at Headquarters; subject not available (Copy sent to field.)

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE: 16 Oct 1957
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Edward Marchi[signature]
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief SOV Branch Japan Station

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

Posted For Cont[illegible] — BY [initials] — DATE 7 NOV 1957
Reviewed By [illegible] [initials] 11/11

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section. [ ] CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

A. THIS DATE: 23 Oct 57
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Lloyd GEORGE [signature]
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: COS, Tokyo

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 30 1 50 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE	CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
GIVING LECTURES	DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS	PREPARES SUMMARIES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS	TRANSLATES GERMAN
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	MANAGES FILES	DEBRIEFING SOURCES
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	OPERATES RADIO	KEEPS BOOKS
TYPING	COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES	DRIVES TRUCK
TAKING DICTATION	WRITES REGULATIONS	MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
SUPERVISING	PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE	EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NUMBER
NO. 1: Deputy to Branch Chief	5	NO. 4: Supervising	4
NO. 2: Conducts Foreign Liaison	6	NO. 5: Prepares correspondence and reports and handles administrative routine	5
NO. 3: Prepares and Manages Projects	4	NO. 6: Developes and handles Agents	5

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject has excellent natural equipment for employment in this organization in terms of his intelligence and natural apptitudes. Additionally, he brings a great deal of area knowledge and language ability to his present assignment. During the period covered by this report he has displayed great industry and devotion to duty in a variety of circumstances and achieved notable results in production and in the creation of both short and long-term assets for his unit. On the debit side I would say that he is somewhat too businesslike in many personal situations to the point of being almost humourless. This, however, is a quality which he does not permit to intrude upon the necessities of his operational work although it often shows in office relationships.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? [ ] YES [X] NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

GENERAL

SECTION E.

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
RICHARDSON Jacques	20 Jan. 1924	M	DI

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
Tokyo Station REDWOOD	Area Operations Officer

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-14		1 October 1956 to 30 September 1957

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): [ ] INITIAL [X] ANNUAL [ ] REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [ ] REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [ ] SPECIAL (Specify)

CERTIFICATION

SECTION F.

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
23 Oct 57	Lloyd GEORGE [signature]	COS, Tokyo

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
16 Oct 1957	Edward Mor... [signature]	Chief SOV Branch Japan Station

ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

SECTION G.

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

RATING NUMBER: **7**

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? [ ] Yes [ ] No. If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
2		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisor)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
3		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

DATE ... NOV 1957

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

Potential (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

15

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Subject is well suited for this business and the business for him. He should progress steadily to positions of great responsibility.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Normal refresher a/o preparatory training as required.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

No limiting factors or personal circumstances known to the rater

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
- X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
- 1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
- 2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
- 3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
- 4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
- 5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
X	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
RICHARDSON Jacques	20 Jan. 1924	M	DI

5. OFFICE/DIVISION BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
Japan Station (REDWOOD)	Area Operations Officer

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-14		1 October 1955 to 30 September 1956

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): INITIAL [ ] ; ANNUAL [X] ; REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [ ] ; REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [ ] ; SPECIAL (Specify) [ ]

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT [X] HAS [ ] HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
15 November 1956	Edward M'Anelius	Chief, Soviet Branch

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

BY DATE
JAN 1957
Posted
1-22-57

[ ] CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
21 November 1956	W Lloyd George	Chief of Operations

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

7. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during the rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE	CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
GIVING LECTURES	DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS	PREPARES SUMMARIES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS	TRANSLATES GERMAN
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	MANAGES FILES	DEBRIEFING SOURCES
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	OPERATES RADIO	KEEPS BOOKS
TYPING	COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES	DRIVES TRUCK
TAKING DICTATION	WRITES REGULATIONS	MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
SUPERVISING	PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE	EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 3 11 18 AM '57
MAIL ROOM

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

Specific Duty	Rating Number	Specific Duty	Rating Number
No. 1: Deputy to Branch Chief	5	No. 4: Supervising	4
No. 2: Conducts Foreign Liaison	6	No. 5: Prepares correspondence and reports	6
No. 3: Prepares and manages projects	4	No. 6: Handles admin routine	4

8. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject has really superb natural equipment for work in this Organization in terms of mental capacity, psychological bent and affinity for the things and people he comes against. He tops this off with industry and language ability among other natural aptitudes. On the debit side and measured against the best, he is a bit shy of humor and personal understanding in some situations, qualities which mitigate more against acceptability than job competence.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY....WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE....BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? [X] YES [ ] NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

Subject is an all around performer capable of a primary, in place of his present secondary, responsibility.

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(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
RICHARDSON JACQUES	20 Jan. 1924	M	DI

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
Japan Station (REDWOOD)	Area Operations Officer

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-14		1 October 1955 to 30 September 1956

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): INITIAL [ ] ; ANNUAL [X] ; REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [ ] ; REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [ ] ; SPECIAL (Specify) [ ]

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
15 November 1956	Edward M Archer [signature]	Chief, Soviet Branch

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
21 November 1956	W. Lloyd George [signature]	~~Chief of Operations~~

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? [X] Yes [ ] No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER:
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
2		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
3		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) 1 NOV 55 — REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

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Potential

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3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

Six

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Subject has a high all around potential. With respect to JAN 3 11 15 AM '57 below, he tends to support subordinates from his own energy rather than to bring them along the hard way, and a normal tendency to avoid the categorical "no" - both tendencies easily correctable.

MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Routine refresher training as appropriate.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

All normal. No limiting factors.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
X	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

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(When Filled In)

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors [illegible] the report is accurate and complete. Primary [illegible] rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that [illegible] way he knows where he stands.

CODED BY [illegible] DATE 29 NOV 1955
Posted Pos. Control P&S
Reviewed by PUD [illegible] 12/7/55

FIELD REPORT

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE [illegible]

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY	1. DATE OF BIRTH	2. SEX	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION
Jacques Richardson	20 Jan 1924	M	(1) FI, (2) PP

4. GRADE	5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current)
GS-14	USSR Base, Tokyo

SR 8-34

6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT	7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
30 September 1955	17 February - 30 September 1955

SECTION II (To be completed by field supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION
Chief, USSR Base, Tokyo 0136.01	17 February 1955

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency)

A. As Chief of Operating Base:
1. Manage and direct all operations against target area, and monitor products.
2. Supervise system of development and exploitation of operational leads.
3. Supervise proper administration and support of operations, including finances.
4. Conduct or supervise effective liaison with other KUBARK elements, with other Government agencies abroad and, when appropriate, with representatives of other governments.

B. As Senior SR Division Officer in Area:
1. Consult with or advise other KUBARK and non-KUBARK units on target area, government, and IS characteristics.
2. Make available to other KUBARK and non-KUBARK units area specialists, as required.

SECTION III (To be completed at headquarters only)

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER (True)	2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD (True)
Carleton B. Swift	W Lloyd George

3. THIS REPORT [X] WAS [ ] WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.

4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS.	5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES
7 Nov. 1955	Phyllis M. Lankrum

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORM NO. 45a
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(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale under each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	NOT OBSERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES: A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.													X	
2. CAN MADE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.												X		
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.											X			
4. HAS INITIATIVE.												X		
5. UNEMOTIONAL.												X		
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.														X
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.													X	
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.												X		
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.											X			
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.												X		
11. CALM.													X	
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.											X			
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.												X		
14. GETS THINGS DONE.													X	
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.														X
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.												X		
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.													X	
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.												X		
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.													X	
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.												X		
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.													X	
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.												X		
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.													X	
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.												X		
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.													X	

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26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".
29. TOUGH MINDED.
30. OBSERVANT.
31. CAPABLE.
32. CLEAR THINKING.
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.
36. DELIBERATE.
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.
43. HAS DRIVE.
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.
45. VERSATILE.
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Capable operations officer with broad understanding of Soviet problems.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

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(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? [XXX] NO [ ] YES. IF YES,

NOV 22 11 07 AM '55

MAIL ROOM

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

- [ ] 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
- [ ] 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
- [ ] 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
- [ ] 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
- [ ] 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
- [XXX] 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? [XXX] NO [ ] YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

- [ ] 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
- [ ] 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
- [ ] 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
- [XXX] 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- [ ] 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- [ ] 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

- [ ] 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
- [ ] 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
- [ ] 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS..WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
- [ ] 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
- [ ] 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- [XXX] 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- [ ] 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

- [ ] 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
- [ ] 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
- [ ] 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
- [ ] 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- [ ] 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
- [ ] 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
- [XXX] 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

DATE
Rel Kufer 8/11/54
R.T. 8/18/54

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	2. GRADE	3. POSITION TITLE
Richardson	Jacques G.		GS-13	Area Ops. Officer CD-FI

4. OFFICE	STAFF OR DIVISION	BRANCH	DEPT'L. / FIELD	IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION
DDP	SR	SR/5		

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 18 July 1953 To 17 July 1954

6. TYPE OF REPORT: Initial [ ] Reassignment [ ] Annual [X] Reassignment of Supervisor [ ] Special [ ]

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

18 July 53 - 31 Jan 54

a. Manage and direct the activities of an overseas operating branch.
b. Assist the division chief of operations in the planning of new and continued oper'ns.
c. Assist the division chief in personnel programming in support of branch and field station activities.

1 Feb 54 - 17 Jul 54

a. Establish new domestic activities branch.
b. Develop and manage operational program of this branch, insuring (1) continuity of treatment by qualified personnel, (2) processing of intelligence requirements, and (3) expeditious movement of finished intelligence.
c. Multilateral liaison with other elements of CIA, the Government, and foreign IS.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
Counterespionage (OTR)	Washington	3 weeks	22 January 1954

(In addition to the duties indicated in §7 above, I also give a 3-hour lecture at the CE course (advanced phase) approximately every six weeks.)

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED? I am primarily interested in a foreign assignment where I could apply the various espionage and CE techniques it has been my responsibility to manage and plan for in recent years.
IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).
My work at headquarters has become somewhat narrowing in that I am losing language abilities and opportunity for direct contact with foreigners.

10.

3 July 1954
DATE

Jacques G. Richardson
SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.
Richardson is a superior officer in the performance of his duties. He is efficient, precise, and energetic, and brings considerable imagination and foresight to the operational problems confronting him. His concept of staff organization and responsibility is of a high caliber. In handling personnel, he is perceptive and serious, and his judgment and motivation are of the highest quality.

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MAY 1952

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SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

This officer has been outstanding as a staff officer. He is unusually talented in his balancing of jurisdictional equities. This ability reflects a broad competence, however, and should not be construed so as to limit his future duties.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

This officer's devotion to his duties and professional convictions sometimes inclines him toward inflexible declarations of position. This fault, a minor one in officers of considerable potential, will be corrected by increased responsibility and experience.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

This officer is prepared for promotion and for increased responsibilities in command or staff duties.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Richardson is presently well placed. See below.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

Tradecraft training and a field assignment. Both are planned in the next six months.

FI\Training

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

29 July 54
DATE

[signature]
SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

21 July '54
DATE

[signature]
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

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SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	2. GRADE	3. POSITION TITLE
RICHARDSON	Jacques	D G.	GS-13	Emp. Intell.Off. (Chief) CD FI

4. OFFICE	STAFF OR DIVISION	BRANCH		IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION
DDP	SR	SR 5 FE Br.	[X] DEPT'L. [ ] FIELD	

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 2-18-53 To 7-18-53

6. TYPE OF REPORT [ ] Initial [X] Annual [ ] Special [ ] Reassignment [ ] Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

a. Supervise and manage a foreign geographic branch; this includes a total of 51 authorized personnel at Hq and in the field stations. b. Direct and coordinate all project development. c. Detect and explore potential operational leads. d. Coordinate intra-division activities with appropriate branches, inter-division activities with appropriate divisions, senior staffs, and elements outside DD/P and CIA. e. Determine the suitability of new personnel, continued employment and rotation of incumbent personnel, and make available incumbent personnel on loan basis to other divisions, etc. f. Apportion the operational and administrative workloads within the branch sections and desks, and their personnel. g. Adapt changing field situations and problems to the organization and operation of the branch, making the branch best serve the needs of the field stations. h. Review continuously all requirements imposed on the branch, and transmit them clearly to the field.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed

None (I was overseas part of the time covered by this report).

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED? I am principally interested in the building and successful operation of American intelligence abroad, both in theory and in practice.

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS). The only remark I can make here is the one I stated in the previous report: the administrative responsibilities of a branch chief do not enable him to be a purely operational individual. If it were possible to carry less of an administrative load, I would enjoy devoting all of my time to the refinement of the intelligence process and its techniques in my area of concern.

10.

22 October 1953 — DATE

Jacques G. Richardson — SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

During this period Mr. Richardson was promoted from Deputy Branch Chief to Branch Chief, in recognition of his extremely good performance. Not enough time has elapsed to be able to evaluate him fully on all aspects of his new position. However, his handling of the Branch has been unusually good from a management point of view and there is every reason to believe that in the planning and direction of operational activities the same high standard will prevail.

JPH

(Over)

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1952

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

He is a good organizer and a good leader. He is methodical and thorough in his planning and supervision of substantive activities, while at the same time he maintains close and sympathetic relations with his subordinates. His knowledge of them and of their personalities and problems is outstanding.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

He should continue to develop his knowledge of operations and operational procedures.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

He is well equipped to advance through increasing levels of responsibility.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Well placed at present.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

Assignment to a field position in the not-too-distant future.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

26 October 1953 — DATE

[signature] — SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

26 October 1953 — DATE

[signature] — SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	2. GRADE	3. POSITION TITLE
RICHARDSON,	Jacques	G.	GS-12	I.O. (Dep. Chief)

4. OFFICE	STAFF OR DIVISION	BRANCH	[X] DEPT'L. [ ] FIELD	IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION
DDP	SR	SR-5 Far East		

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 2-18-52 To 2-18-53

6. TYPE OF REPORT [ ] Initial [X] Annual [ ] Special [ ] Reassignment [ ] Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.
Assist the Branch Chief in management of the Branch and its overseas stations (3); at present, I act as Branch Chief about 25%-30% of the year. Supervise the planning and preparation for approval of all basic plans, programs, and projects. This involves thorough discussion with each of seven (7) desk chiefs of the purposes and procedures for accomplishing any single mission under any given project, including target analysis (whether FI or PP), preparation of intelligence annexes, logistic and fiscal requirements, specific personnel needs, etc. Am responsible for working directly with the Division's Intelligence Branch for control of requirements, ops intelligence, and reports. Am responsible for maintaining liaison with appropriate staffs and other Divisions who must coordinate any action or document. Assist or direct, as required, specific mission planning at overseas stations on TDY. Supervise preparation of all periodic reports; interview candidate empl's.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
International Politics, 102	Graduate School Georgetown University, Washington.	4 months: 3 hours' credit	5 June 1952

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?
I am primarily interested in the conception, planning, and operational management of FI and PP activities, and ops policy and control.
IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).
This differs from my present assignment essentially in that a Branch Chief or his Deputy becomes so involved in administrative detail that he cannot always give his undivided attention to project management and agent handling problems. Otherwise, I feel that my background and experience qualify me for the functions I aspire to perform.

10.
7 February 1953 — DATE
JRichardson — SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE. As Deputy Branch Chief, Mr. Richardson has performed his duties, taken as a whole, in a superior manner. His timely and efficient preparation of intelligence annexes, logistic and fiscal requirements and reports has been particularly outstanding. During three to four months of the past year, Mr. Richardson has acted as Branch Chief. The review of Branch operations under Mr. Richardson's direction, during the writer's absence, indicated his complete competence in supervising Branch activities. His supervision of the planning and preparation for approval of basic plans and projects of the seven (7) desk chiefs has been superior. Mr. Richardson also participated in the planning and dispatch of a difficult operational mission, acting in the capacity of Senior Case Officer. On this mission his liaison with representatives of one of the Military Services was conducted in a manner which enhanced cooperation between that Service and this Agency.

FORM NO. 37-151 MAY 1952

SECRET

(Over) (4)

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?
Mr. Richardson's performance was noticeably outstanding with respect to his thorough knowledge of every activity of the Branch. He was in position to assume direction of Branch activities at any time. He also kept himself thoroughly briefed on Division policies and planning in order to give timely instruction and guidance to the Branch overseas stations.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?
Mr. Richardson has a very thorough background in two (2) languages, French and Japanese. He would benefit substantially by learning the Russian language. He is meticulous with respect to his attention to details, sometimes to the point of concealing the broader picture from his view. It would be well for Mr. Richardson to direct his attention to the broad scope of Branch activities rather than to concentrate on its details.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.
Mr. Richardson is fully qualified to assume the duties of the chief SR Division representative at a field station. In order to assume this responsibility in the most efficient manner, it is recommended that Mr. Richardson serve a minimum period of time of approximately six (6) months as the assistant to the present chief of the field station.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)
Mr. Richardson could serve effectively in a staff function for either FI or PP activities. This does not mean, however, that his present duties are not better suited to his qualifications.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?
Mr. Richardson has already been recommended for overseas assignment in the Far East during the past year. He has area knowledge and command of the Japanese language, having served in Japan previously with the United States Army. His duties at Headquarters have been so pressing that his departure for overseas assignment is being delayed until an adequate replacement may be trained.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

March 31 1953 — DATE

George G. [illegible] — SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

March 30 1953 — DATE

David B. Girard — SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

14-00000

WARNING—Do not fill out this form until you have read all instructions.	**DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY** CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM	STANDARD FORM NO. 2808 JUNE 1966 U.S. Civil Service Commission FPM Supplement 831-1 2808-104

A. INFORMATION CONCERNING THE DESIGNATOR

1. NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (Month)	(Day)	(Year)	3. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
RICHARDSON	Jacques	Gabriel	Jan	20	1924	042 20 5339

4. DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH PRESENTLY OR LAST EMPLOYED, INCLUDING BUREAU OR DIVISION

5. CLAIM NUMBER IF RETIRED
CSA—

I, the employee or former employee identified above, canceling any and all previous designations of beneficiary heretofore made by me, do now designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries named below to receive any lump-sum benefit which may become payable under the Civil Service Retirement Act after my death. I understand that this designation of beneficiary will not affect the rights of any survivors who may qualify for annuity benefits after my death, and that this designation will remain in full force and effect unless or until canceled by me in writing.

B. INFORMATION CONCERNING THE BENEFICIARY OR BENEFICIARIES

TYPE OR PRINT FIRST NAME, MIDDLE INITIAL, AND LAST NAME OF EACH BENEFICIARY	TYPE OR PRINT ADDRESS (Including ZIP Code) OF EACH BENEFICIARY	RELATIONSHIP	SHARE TO BE PAID TO EACH BENEFICIARY (See Example)
Pamela A. Richardson	5 villa Madrid, 92 Neuilly, France	Dau	One half
Michelle D. Richardson	5 villa Madrid, 92 Neuilly, France	Dau	One half

DUPLICATE

I hereby direct, unless otherwise indicated above, that, if more than one beneficiary is named, the share of any deceased beneficiary or beneficiaries who may die before a lump-sum benefit becomes payable shall be distributed equally among the surviving beneficiaries, or entirely to the survivor. If none of the beneficiaries are alive when the lump-sum benefit becomes payable, this designation shall be void.

January 12, 1972
DATE OF THIS DESIGNATION (MONTH) (DAY) (YEAR)

(SIGNATURE OF DESIGNATOR—DO NOT PRINT)

C. WITNESSES (A witness is ineligible to receive payment as a beneficiary)

WE, THE UNDERSIGNED, CERTIFY THAT THIS INSTRUMENT WAS SIGNED IN OUR PRESENCE.

(SIGNATURE OF WITNESS—DO NOT PRINT)	(NUMBER AND STREET)	(CITY, STATE, AND ZIP CODE)
Richard W. Butler	13219 Allerton Ave	Rockville, Md.

PRINT OR TYPE YOUR NAME AND ADDRESS (Including ZIP Code) TO INSURE RETURN OF COPY

Jacques G. Richardson
c/O Mrs T. G. Driscoll
722 South Royal Street
Alexandria VA 22134

(Reserved for Receiving Stamp of U. S. Civil Service Commission)

MAR 2 10 43 AM '72
PERSONAL AFFAIRS

THIS DUPLICATE WILL BE RETURNED TO YOU

Standard Form No. 1152
Form prescribed by
Comptroller General, U. S.
October 23, 1950
(Gen. Reg. No. 104, Supp. No. 1)

DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY

UNPAID COMPENSATION OF DECEASED CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE

IMPORTANT
Read instructions on back of duplicate before filling in this form

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE EMPLOYEE:

NAME— (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year)
RICHARDSON	Jacques	Gabriel	Jan 20 1924

DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED

(Department or agency) (Bureau) (Division)

I, the employee identified above, canceling any and all previous Designations of Beneficiary heretofore made by me, do now designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries named below to receive any UNPAID COMPENSATION *due and payable under existing law after my death. I understand that this Designation of Beneficiary relates solely to Unpaid Compensation as defined in section 2 of the act of August 3, 1950, Public Law 636, and in nowise will affect the disposition of any benefit which may become payable under the Retirement Act applicable to my Government service. I further understand that this Designation of Beneficiary will remain in full force and effect, unless or until canceled by me in writing, so long as I am continuously employed in the above department or agency.*

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE BENEFICIARY OR BENEFICIARIES:

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
Pamela A. Richardson	5 villa Madrid 92 Neuilly France	Dau	One half
Michelle D. Richardson	5 villa Madrid 92 Neuilly France	Dau	One half

I hereby direct, unless otherwise indicated above, that, if more than one beneficiary is named, the share of any deceased beneficiary who may predecease me shall be distributed equally among the surviving beneficiaries, or entirely to the survivor. I understand that this Designation of Beneficiary shall be void if none of the designated beneficiaries is living at the time of my death.

I hereby specifically reserve the right to cancel or change any designation of beneficiary at any time in the manner and form prescribed by the Comptroller General of the United States, and without knowledge or consent of the beneficiary.

January 12 1972
(Date of execution—month, day, year) (Signature of employee)

WITNESSES TO SIGNATURE:

[signature] 1321 [illegible] (Signature of witness) (Number and street) (City, zone number, and State)

(Signature of witness) (Number and street) (City, zone number, and State)

PRINT OR TYPE NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYEE

Jacques G. Richardson
c/o Mrs ?. G. Driscoll
722 South Royal Street
Alexandria VA 22314

THIS SPACE RESERVED FOR RECEIVING DATA OF EMPLOYING AGENCY
[illegible stamp]
(Indicate date and by whom received)

DELIVER BOTH COPIES TO THE PROPER OFFICER OF YOUR AGENCY—DUPLICATE WILL BE NOTED AND RETURNED

16—62919-1

DUPLICATE

14-00000

Standard Form No. 54
January 1968
U.S. Civil Service Commission
FPM Supplement 990-1
54-106

DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT
Read instructions on back of duplicate before filling in this form

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE INSURED:

NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)

DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year)

PLACE AN "X" IN THE APPROPRIATE BOX BELOW TO SHOW WHETHER YOU ARE:

☐ AN EMPLOYEE ☐ RETIRED, OR AN APPLICANT FOR RETIREMENT ☐ RECEIVING FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION BENEFITS OR AN APPLICANT FOR SUCH BENEFITS

IF YOU ARE RETIRED OR RECEIVING FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION GIVE YOUR "CSA," "CSI," "A," or "X" NUMBER

(CSA, CSI, A, or X number)

DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH PRESENTLY EMPLOYED (If retired, former department or agency):

(Department or agency) (Bureau) (Division) (Location—City, State, and ZIP Code)

I, the individual identified above, canceling any and all previous Designations of Beneficiary under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program heretofore made by me, do now designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries named below to receive any amount of LIFE INSURANCE and ACCIDENTAL DEATH INSURANCE due and payable at my death. I understand that this Designation of Beneficiary will remain in full force and effect, with respect to any amount payable, unless or until canceled by me in writing, or until such time as it is automatically canceled (see regulation "f" on reverse side of duplicate copy).

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE BENEFICIARY OR BENEFICIARIES (SEE EXAMPLES OF DESIGNATIONS):

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address (including ZIP Code) of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary

For each type of insurance (regular and optional): (1) I hereby direct, unless otherwise indicated above, that if more than one beneficiary is named, the share of any beneficiary who may predecease me shall be distributed equally among the surviving beneficiaries, or entirely to the survivor. (2) I understand that this Designation of Beneficiary shall be void if none of the designated beneficiaries is living at the time of my death.

I hereby specifically reserve the right to cancel or change this Designation of Beneficiary at any time without knowledge or consent of the beneficiary.

(Date of execution—month, day, year) (Signature of insured)

WITNESSES TO SIGNATURE (*A witness is ineligible to receive payment as a beneficiary*):

Richard [illegible] (Signature of witness) 13219 [illegible] (Number and street) Rockville, Md. (City, State, and ZIP Code)

(Signature of witness) (Number and street) (City, State, and ZIP Code)

PRINT OR TYPE NAME AND ADDRESS (including ZIP Code) OF INSURED

THIS SPACE RESERVED FOR RECEIVING AGENCY

(Indicate date and by whom received)

SEE REVERSE SIDE OF DUPLICATE COPY FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON WHERE TO FILE THESE FORMS.
DO NOT FILE WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' GROUP LIFE INSURANCE.

DUPLICATE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, European Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Paris

SUBJECT: ADMIN/Personnel
[redacted] - Change of Beneficiary Forms

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Richardson, Jacques

Forwarded herewith and under separate cover are change of beneficiary forms completed [redacted] Since [redacted] will be at Headquarters during home leave towards the end of February, it is suggested that he be contacted during his TDY if additional information is required.

Carolyn A. Tanzola
Carolyn A. TANZÓLA

Attachments:
1. Flight & Accident Plan, h/w
2. SF-2808, U/S/C via TNP
3. SF-54, U/S/C via TNP
4. SF-1152, U/S/C via TNP

CABLE BOARD
24 FEB

Distribution:
3-Chief, Eur-Div w/att #1-h/w; #2,3,4-usc-tnp

Dick

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OFPT-17469	10 February 1972
	CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

52 74-57

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

SECRET

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) Richardson (middle) DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year) 20 Jan 1924 SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance — [X] (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE
I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance — [ ] (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE
I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance — [ ] (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE
I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print) Richardson, Jacques

DATE 1 March 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY
(official receiving date stamp)

MAR 19 3 42 PM '68

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1968
(For use only until April 14, 1968)

B 52 74-57 SECRET

S E C R E T

31 July 1962
Date

THIS IS TO C[illegible] THE [illegible] [illegible]RE OF THE PROVISIONS OF REGULATION [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]BRUARY 1959 CONCERNING THE PERSONAL C[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] EMPLOYEES OVERSEAS.

[illegible]
Signature

S E C R E T

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 17 | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

DISSEM BY 32 PER

ACTION UNIT C/EUR 5

FILE, VR C/NOCHD 2 C/CCS 2 D/DP D/SECUR 4

ACTION NO. 071

JPB

S E C R E T 011654Z JUN 72 CITE PARIS 28959 (RILANDER ACTING)

1 JUN IN 625469

DIRECTOR

RYBAT ADMIN PERS TOPSY WODEEP WOGAME

REF: DIRECTOR 271979

1. APPRECIATE REF ACTION WHICH WILL HELP AVOID ANY SECURITY PROBLEM FOR CASASIN. RE PARA TWO REF THERE IS NO CHANCE THAT UNCAIRD WILL QUERY FEDERAL RECORDS CENTER DIRECTLY. UNCAIRD CONDUCTS NO APPLICANT INVESTIGATIONS ITSELF. SECURITY CLEARANCE FOR AMERICAN APPLICANTS IS U.S. GOVT, NOT UNCAIRD, REQUIREMENT. THEREFORE, BELIEVE UNNECESSARY TO TAKE ANY FURTHER ACTION TO BACKSTOP PRIOR EMPLOYMENT. ONLY REQUIREMENT NOW IS FOR ROUTING REPORT FROM CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION INDICATING FAVORABLE SECURITY DETERMINATION FOR [redacted] Richardson, Jacque

2. NO FILE. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if SA)	DATE (from item S-2)	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true)	DATE (from item S-3)
[illegible]	3 Feb. 1969	David Murphy	3 Feb. 1969
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: 20 February 1969	DISPATCH NUMBER: TM-798947	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE:	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH	2. SERVICE DESIGN	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE	4. STATION OR BASE	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER
20 I 1924	CS	S&T project manager, Area Ops Off, GS 15	Paris	LPCVER

6a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD	6b. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE	6c. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ	6d. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE
5 Sep 1967	Please see 11B	Summer 1970	o/a 15 August 1970

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

3: (at that time) 42, 19 and 16

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

My younger daughter should graduate from high school in Europe in June, 1970. Because she should not be transferred at that critical scholastic juncture, I would like to remain in the field another nine months to see her through her senior year.
In my next assignment, I would like to use my fluent French from time to time, if possible.

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (see special note on transmittal form).
(also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8)

- I planned, established and operated a long-range S&T spotting-assessment activity against sensitive targets, and a shorter-range similar local activity in an adverse political climate.
- I planned, developed and exploited an adapted non-official cover to mask the operational activity, integrated into the further-ranging overall activities of a major Station.
- I managed the non-official cover activity as a viable professional/commercial activity, including many business and production aspects, as well as the local handling of the firm's [unwitting] personnel.
- I assisted other Stations and Bases, at their request, in spotting-assessment activities, in local search and surveillance activities, and in recruitment.
- As part of my original non-official cover withdrawal because of a corporate merger, I developed independently continuing cover to serve operational access needs as well as those of status cover.

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

I would like to take (a) the seniormost management course offered by or through the Organization as well as (b) a review course of activities within the CS and the Organization as a whole. In addition, I would also like to (c) audit, at least, the S&T course, if that is still being offered.

If (a) is possible through a civil school away from Headquarters, I would have no objection to the displacement involved.

SECRET

(4)

FORM 5-63 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

11A. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

First choice: to manage a large-scale non-official cover project in another French-speaking, technically advanced area (such as metropolitan Geneva or Brussels).
Second choice: chief of station or base (cover official or non-official) in an appropriate area.
Third choice: to be assigned to Staff training, preferably training (a) senior unit or project managers or (b) JOTs.
Fourth choice: to be assigned to Staff personnel work -- above the Division level -- where new personnel are screened, tested and evaluated, then assigned.

11B. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 (for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice) IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

[1] EXTEND TOUR nine MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO c/a 15 June 1970 (DATE)

[4] BE ASSIGNED TO HDQTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY: INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE. 1ST CHOICE ______ 2ND CHOICE ______ 3RD CHOICE ______

[2] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION: INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION 1ST CHOICE Geneva 2ND CHOICE Brussels 3RD CHOICE [illegible]

[3] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION, with different responsibilities.

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

We are anxious to have this employee remain in his present assignment until 1970. You will note his first choice in para 11-A, to manage a large scale non-official cover project. It is possible we will have such a requirement here by 1970, but cannot yet be definite. If this develops positively, we will discuss with the employee.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

EUR Division recommends that [redacted] request for an extension of his current tour until June 1970 be approved.

DATE 3/11/69 TITLE C/E/PERS SIGNATURE Willford C. Taylor

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT: Extended to June 1970

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. OFPS-1126 DATED: 11 July 69

CABLE NO. ______ DATED: ______

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: Charles B. [illegible] (SIGNATURE) DATE: 7/16/69

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (true)	DATE (from item 5.1)	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true)	DATE (from item 5.2)
[illegible signature]	9 Dec 1963	James Flint	27 Dec 1963
NAME [redacted] OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:			DATE

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH	2. GRADE	3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE AND GRADE	7A. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD ON THIS TOUR
20 Jan 1924	GS-15	Operations Officer, GS-15	10 September 1962
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION (if known)		5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE: Paris	7B. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM FIELD: September 1965
6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR: None			7C. EXPECTED DATE OF ARRIVAL AT HEADQUARTERS PCS

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY (see special note on Transmittal Form):

Staff agent assigned to a major overseas station, exploiting the cover provided by a major firm of technical periodical publishers. I take my instructions from a section chief within the station, and report in writing on the progress of my cover development and its operational exploitation.

For operational reasons, I develop and assess operational leads in the FI, CI and CA areas, principally against denied area targets. I also handle local investigations and such cases as the station determines will fit into my cover, or which I can otherwise handle in alias. I travel to other field stations to handle such tasks as they request or Hq directs. I handle all cover tasks as they appear.

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

I would like to continue to serve essentially in the same capacity as described above, although I would like eventually to add more supervisory and managerial functions to my responsibilities. I would like to expand the operating base provided by the cover organization by taking on several journeymen case officers to work with me against both denied area and host country targets, and to make the cover facility and the access it provides of more versatile use to both the station and to KUDOVE as a whole.

My second choice would be to return to Hq, and use the knowledge and experience I have gained in my present job to (1) select staff personnel who will be placed in non-official cover, (2) select the cover mechanisms proper, (3) train our personnel for the proper discharge of their total responsibilities while serving under such cover.

B. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION (refer to catalog of courses, if available):

The completion of work toward a master's or doctor's degree in the physical or life sciences, or in the management/administration of the sciences and their personnel.

SECRET

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT (continued)

C. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 (for 1st, 2nd and 3rd choice) IN THE BOXES BELOW:

[1] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION, after a one-year extension of my present tour

[2] BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE ASSIGNMENT IN HEADQUARTERS, INDICATE CHOICE OF COMPONENT:
1ST. CHOICE OTR 2ND. CHOICE Cover Group 3RD. CHOICE Office/Personnel

[3] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION, BASED ON QUALIFICATIONS:
1ST. CHOICE Geneva 2ND. CHOICE Brussels 3RD. CHOICE New Zealand/Canada

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS? INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS 25

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

Wife, will be 37 in 1965; two daughters, 15 and 12 in 1965

11A. INDICATE ANY CHANGE IN YOUR PERSONAL OR FAMILY SITUATION WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT

Next post should have high school facilities teaching in French or in English.

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 5-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Chief, External concurs in subject's wish for one year extension and return for second tour after home leave in the fall of 1965. However, subject's wish as expressed in 9.A. of having case officers working under him is not feasible at this time.

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 5-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE CAREER SERVICE OFFICER OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMPONENT TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Recommend Home Leave and return for another tour.

SR Concurs. A. B[illegible] 2-20-64

16. NAME OF CAREER SERVICE OFFICER OR PERSONNEL OFFICER	SIGNATURE
DATE 6 February 1964	G.K. Mogannam (signed)

FOR USE OF CAREER SERVICE

17. EMPLOYEE [X] HAS [ ] HAS NOT BEEN NOTIFIED OF PLANNED REASSIGNMENT	18. REFERENCE DISPATCH NO. OFPS-7995 CABLE NO.
19. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME Dwight M. Collins	20. SIGNATURE (signed)
21. TITLE Secretary, CS Agent Panel	22. DATE 26 February 1964

23. COMMENTS

Approved extension of present tour to September 1965, followed by home leave, and then second tour.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

INSTRUCTIONS: Use R 20-10-2 and HR 20-1000-1 for guidance. Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and TWO copies for preparation of contract.

CASE OFFICER: Ruth W. Paul X6356
DIVISION: SR
TELEPHONE EXTENSION: For contract info call Mr Johnson X5963
DATE: 9 July 1962

GENERAL

SECTION I

1. NAME [x] PSEUDO [ ] TRUE:
2A. PROJECT: NA
2B. PERMANENT STATION: Paris, France
3. ALLOTMENT NO.: 3234-4008-1000
3A. FUNDS: [ ] V [x] UV
4. SLOT NO.: 240
5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES: James M. Kennicott (P) John F. Reynolds John R. Williams, John F. Martin (A)
6. INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY PRIOR TO THIS CONTRACT. [x] YES [ ] NO (If yes, describe and include dates and salary.) Staff Employee since 1949
7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date): SI
7A. MEDICAL CLEARANCE: [ ] OBTAINED [xx] INITIATED [ ] NOT REQ'D.
8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" [xxx] YES [ ] NO
9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT [X] YES [ ] NO
10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): [redacted]

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.
12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN [ ] YES [ ] NO
13. AGE: 38
14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): January 20, 1924
15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Alexandria, Virginia
16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Alexandria, Virginia
17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate): [xxx] SINGLE [ ] MARRIED [ ] WIDOWED [ ] ANNULLED [ ] SEPARATED [ ] DIVORCED
18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:
Three - Wife, age 34
Daughter, age 8
Daughter, Age 11
19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY [ ] YES [xx] NO RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE: NA
21. VETERAN: Yes
22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat):
23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: U. S. Army
24. RANK OR GRADE:
25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE [ ] YES [YY] NO
26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA: NA [ ] YES [ ] NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY / 28. POST DIFFERENTIAL: Pay entitlements equating to GS-14 (step 6) including premium pay $13,570
29. COVER (Breakdown, if any):
30. FEDERAL TAX WITHHOLDING: COVER [X] YES [ ] NO; CIA [X] YES [ ] NO

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS / 32. POST: In accordance with regulations
33. OTHER:
34. COVER (Breakdown, if any):

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES: [xxx] PCS [ ] DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL [ ] FOREIGN OPERATIONAL
36. WITH DEPENDENTS: [xxx] YES [ ] NO
37. HHE TO BE SHIPPED: [xx] YES [ ] NO
37A. HHE TO BE STORED: [xx] YES [ ] NO
38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED: [xxx] YES [ ] NO
39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL: [xxx] YES [ ] NO
40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH:
Wife, U. S. Citizen, age 34, DOB 19 June 1928
Daughter, U. S. Citizen, age 8, DOB 5 September 1953
Daughter, U. S. Citizen, age 11, DOB September 1950

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH [xxx] CIA REGULATIONS [X] COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION: As authorized
43. ENTERTAINMENT: As authorized
44. OTHER: As authorized
45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH [ ] CIA REGULATIONS [ ] COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.

CASE OFFICER: Ruth Paul X6356
DIVISION: SR
TELEPHONE EXTENSION: For contract info
DATE: 9 July 1962

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS call Ev Johnson X5923

46. BENEFITS (See R 20-615, R 20-620, R 20-670, R 20-1000, and HB 20-620-1, HB 20-1000-1 and or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel.)

All Staff Employee benefits

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check): PROPOSED [ ] ESTABLISHED [XX]

48. TYPE (Check): PROPRIETARY [ ] SUBSIDIZED [ ] CULTURAL [ ] EDUCATIONAL [ ] COMMERCIAL [XX] MILITARY [ ] TOURIST [ ] OTHER [ ]

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS: [XX] YES [ ] NO [ ] COMPLETE [ ] PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.) [X] TOTAL [ ] PARTIAL [ ] NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION: DAYS [ ] MONTHS [ ] YEARS [ ]
52. EFFECTIVE DATE:
53. RENEWABLE: [XXXX] YES [ ] NO
54. TERMINATION NOTICE (Number of days):
55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION: [ ] YES [ ] NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION (CI, FI, PP, other)

FI and CA

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Handling and supervision of field agents already recruited.
Spotting, assessment and development of agent candidates or projects.
Recruitment of agent candidates outsideFrance when necessary.
Clandestine support of own and other station operations.

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Photographic equipment salesman
Newspaper assistant XXXXX editor
Assistant to planning division of housing authority of a major city
Operations Officer for past 12 years

59. EDUCATION (Check Highest Level Attained): GRADE SCHOOL [ ] HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE [ ] TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE [ ] BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE [ ] COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE [ ] COLLEGE (No degree) [ ] COLLEGE DEGREE [X] POST GRADUATE [ ] MA [ ] PHD [ ]

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY (Check Appropriate Degree Competency)

LANGUAGE	SPEAK Fluent	SPEAK Average	SPEAK Poor	WRITE Fluent	WRITE Average	WRITE Poor	READ Fluent	READ Average	READ Poor
French		X			X			X	
Japanese		X				X		X	
Russian	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	X

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: USA

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

Canada, Japan, Western Europe thru residence, study and travel

SECTION XV — EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CIA

63. GIVE INCLUSIVE DATES, POSITION TITLE OR TYPE WORK, SALARY AND REASON FOR LEAVING

Newspaper assistant editor - $2,100
Assistant to planning division of housing authority $3,100

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (Use other side if necessary)

[ ] OVER

APPROVAL

DATE | TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OPERAT... | DATE | TYPED NAM...

9 December 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS/CSB

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-15 - Jacques G. RICHARDSON

REFERENCE : Your memorandum dated 8 October 1958

1. The SR Division and the Chief of Station, Tokyo (FJTT-1950, attached) recommend the promotion of Jacques G. Richardson to GS-15.

2. Mr. Richardson was last promoted 16 January 1955. On 17 February 1955 he arrived in Tokyo to serve as the senior SR officer in the FE field area, his present assignment. In this position he has continued to display qualities of leadership, initiative, imagination and thoroughness which resulted in his rapid rise in the Agency.

3. The very facts of Mr. Richardson's youth in relation to his responsibilities and the fact that promotion to his present level has been rapid, caused the Division and the Chief of Station, Tokyo to hold until this time a recommendation for his promotion which was submitted in June 1957. Most careful consideration has convinced us that not only is Mr. Richardson deserving of the recommended promotion, but his elevation to the higher grade will be in the best interest of the Career Service and meet definite Division requirements for a senior officer at the GS-15 level.

Charles Katek

CHARLES KATEK
Acting Chief, SR Division

Distribution:
Orig & 6 - Addr

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

TO: Chief, SR

INFORMATION ADDRESSEE: Chief, FE

FROM: Chief of Station, Tokyo

SUBJECT: REDWOOD/ADMINISTRATIVE
Promotion of [redacted]

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: FJTT-1950

DATE

REFERENCE(S): FJTW-11531 (RYBAT), dated 11 October 1957
ACTION REQUIRED: See paragraph 2

Richardson - 1
Baker - 2
Maury - 3
Nelson - 4

1. In line with paragraph 2 of Reference, after a period of six months we submitted an additional promotion fitness report on [redacted] under cover of FJTT-0601 dated 28 May 1958. Inasmuch as [redacted] was then at Headquarters on TDY, we requested that he review this fitness report and assured that in doing so he would also discuss with [redacted] [redacted]'s promotion, which both he and [redacted] felt was to be strongly recommended.

2. [redacted] was, however, not shown this fitness report at Headquarters, nor did he have the opportunity to discuss [redacted]'s promotion with [redacted]. In reviewing our records we are now concerned at the possibility of some administrative slip-up and would appreciate a word of advice as to how this promotion action is proceeding. We would like to reiterate that we now have not the slightest hesitation in recommending [redacted] for promotion and find that the fitness report submitted with FJTT-0601 still reflects our current high appreciation of his abilities and progress.

20 November 1958

Distribution:
2 - Chief, SR
2 - Chief, FE

Rev/S/Perv
✓ Rev

CONTINUED

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

FORM NO. 53 TEST
1 SEP 56

CLASSIFICATION

(40)

COPY
Attachment to
FJTA-19609

MEMORANDUM No. 360

18 June 1957

TO : Chief of Station

FROM : Chief, Soviet Branch

SUBJECT: [redacted] - Recommendation for Promotion
Jacques RICHARDSON

1. [redacted] has been under my supervision as Deputy and Case Officer for approximately fifteen months. Based on the knowledge of [redacted] as an individual gained during this period and upon his actual performance, I recommend that he be entered for consideration on the SR Division GS-14 to GS-15 promotion list at this time - June 1957. The slot and job which he now occupies, Chief, Soviet Branch, is, of course, adequate to accommodate such a promotion.

2. [redacted] operational performance has been outstanding and notably versatile during this period. He has engaged primarily in liaison and has been personally effective in terms of results achieved almost daily, in terms of reports, operational data, and joint enterprise; while, overall, he has established enduring professional relationships from which the organization as a whole should benefit for some time to come. In addition, owing in large part to unique personal talents, linguistic and otherwise, [redacted] has handled a number of unilateral cases most effectively. In the office, too, as well as in face-to-face operational situations, [redacted] has been outstanding. He has a flair for and a facility with the written word as evidenced by the amount of general and particular correspondence which he has initiated, and he knows the organizational "drill" intimately and from way back. Thus, I feel that he is qualified for the recommended promotion by ability and experience in both the internal and external aspects of the profession.

3. Relative to the more personal characteristics involved in the term managerial ability, judgments are necessarily more subjective but here, too, I consider [redacted] to be qualified in maturity, in judgment, and in experience. He would most certainly be a supervisor who could perform all the chores or handle all the situations which he would be calling upon subordinates to take care of, in itself, the beginning of any good supervisory relationship. In actual fact, he has had considerable experience in this regard already and the principal shortcoming I have noticed is a tendency to "carry" others by an extension of his own industry. [redacted] is not without his difficulties in the area of personal relationships. He is a purist at times and manifestly impatient in certain human situations where a shrug of the shoulders would be the

best reply. These characteristics do not always make for the best personal relations but are frequently obviated by intellect and above all are correctable and are being corrected.

4. In sum, [redacted] qualifications, broad experience and proven abilities dominate his age, the only factor militating against a promotion at this time. It is therefore my sincere recommendation that a promotion recommendation be forwarded to Headquarters for consideration in the current mid-year lists.

Edward MARELIUS [redacted]

9 December 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS/CSB

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-15 - Jacques G. RICHARDSON

REFERENCE : Your memorandum dated 8 October 1958

1. The FE Division and the Chief of Station, Tokyo ([illegible], attached) recommend the promotion of Jacques G. Richardson to GS-15.

2. Mr. Richardson was last promoted 16 January 1955. On 27 February 1955 he arrived in Tokyo to serve as the senior FI officer in the FE field area, his present assignment. In this position he has continued to display qualities of leadership, initiative, imagination and thoroughness which resulted in his rapid rise in the Agency.

3. The very facts of Mr. Richardson's youth in relation to his responsibilities and the fact that promotion to his present level has been rapid, caused the Division and the Chief of Station, Tokyo to hold until this time a recommendation for his promotion which was submitted in June 1957. Most careful consideration has convinced us that not only is Mr. Richardson deserving of the recommended promotion, but his elevation to the higher grade will be in the best interest of the Career Service and meet definite Division requirements for a senior officer at the GS-15 level.

CHARLES [illegible]
Acting Chief, FE Division

Distribution:
Orig & 6 - Addee

COPY

FJTT-1950

25 November 1958

TO: Chief, SR

FROM: Chief of Station, Tokyo

SUBJECT: Promotion of Jacques G. RICHARDSON

REFERENCE: FJTW-11531 (RYBAT) dated 11 Oct 1957

1. In line with paragraph 2 of Reference, after a period of six months we submitted an additional promotion fitness report on RICHARDSON under cover of FJTT-0801 dated 28 May 1958. Inasmuch as Baker was then at Headquarters on TDY, we requested that he review this fitness report and assumed that in doing so he would also discuss with Maury RICHARDSON's promotion, which both he and Nelson felt was to be strongly recommended.

2. Baker was, however, not shown this fitness report at Headquarters, nor did he have the opportunity to discuss RICHARDSON's promotion with Maury. In reviewing our records we are now concerned at the possibility of some administrative slip-up and would appreciate a word of advice as to how this promotion action is proceeding. We would like to reiterate that we now have not the slightest hesitation in recommending RICHARDSON for promotion and find that the fitness report submitted with FJTT-0801 still reflects our current high appreciation of his abilities and progress.

WILLIAM E. NELSON

COPY
Attachment to
FJTA-19609

MEMORANDUM No. 360

18 June 1957

TO: Chief of Station

FROM: Chief, Soviet Branch

SUBJECT: Jacques RICHARDSON - Recommendation for Promotion

1. Jacques Richardson has been under my supervision as Deputy and Case Officer for approximately fifteen months. Based on the knowledge of Richardson as an individual gained during this period and upon his actual performance, I recommend that he be entered for consideration on the SR Division GS-14 to GS-15 promotion list at this time - June 1957. The slot and job which he now occupies, Chief, Soviet Branch, is, of course, adequate to accommodate such a promotion.

2. Richardson's operational performance has been outstanding and notably versatile during this period. He has engaged primarily in liaison and has been personally effective in terms of results achieved almost daily, in terms of reports, operational data, and joint enterprise; while, overall, he has established enduring professional relationships from which the organisation as a whole should benefit for some time to come. In addition, owing in large part to unique personal talents, linguistic and otherwise, Richardson has handled a number of unilateral cases most effectively. In the office, too, as well as in face-to-face operational situations, Richardson has been outstanding. He has a flair for and a facility with the written word as evidenced by the amount of general and particular correspondence which he has initiated, and he knows the organizational "drill" intimately and from way back. Thus, I feel that he is qualified for the recommended promotion by ability and experience in both the internal and external aspects of the profession.

3. Relative to the more personal characteristics involved in the term managerial ability, judgments are necessarily more subjective but here, too, I consider Richardson to be qualified in maturity, in judgment, and in experience. He would most certainly be a supervisor who could perform all the chores or handle all the situations which he would be calling upon subordinates to take care of, in itself, the beginning of any good supervisory relationship. In actual fact, he has had considerable experience in this regard already and the principal shortcoming I have noticed is a tendency to "carry" others by an extension of his own industry. Richardson is not without his difficulties in the area of personal relationships. He is a purist at times and manifestly impatient in certain human situations where a shrug of the shoulders would be the best reply. These characteristics do not always make for the best personal relationships but are frequently obviated by intellect and above all are correctable and are being corrected.

8. In sum, Richardson's qualifications, broad experience and proven abilities dominate his age, the only factor militating against a promotion at this time. It is therefore my sincere recommendation that a promotion recommendation be forwarded to Headquarters for consideration in the current mid-year lists.

EDWARD MARELIUS

1 June 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, CS Career Service Board

SUBJECT : Nominations for Promotion to GS-15

REFERENCE : Memorandum dated 14 May 1958 from Secretary, CS Career Service Board

1. After reviewing GS-14 employees assigned to the SR Division, I wish to again recommend the promotion of Jacques Richardson, Chief, Soviet Branch, Tokyo to GS-15. I concur also in the attached recommendation for the promotion of Paul Haines prepared by the Chief of Base, Berlin.

2. The Chief of Station, Tokyo and I recommended Mr. Richardson's promotion in December 1958. This earlier recommendation presented the personal qualities of Mr. Richardson. I wish simply to point out at this time that since early 1954, Mr. Richardson has more than fully discharged responsibilities at the GS-15 level. I believe that it is definitely time to elevate him to the level at which he has been performing more than satisfactorily for over 5½ years.

Charles Katek

CHARLES KATEK
Acting Chief, SR Division

Distribution:
Orig & 6 Addressee w/att

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 144
JANUARY 195?
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAPTERS L1 AND R3

STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL AND MILITARY SERVICE

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used in determining creditable service for *leave purposes* and retention credits for *reduction in force*. The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through IV.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*): RICHARDSON, Jacques G.

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 January 1924

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENTS (*Do not include military service.*)

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TO— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
None CIA	49	11	20				

4. LIST PERIODS OF SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TO— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	DISCHARGE (*Hon. or dishon.?*)
United States Army	43	Feb	15	48	Oct	27	Yes; honorable

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (*LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar*)	FROM— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TO— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TOTAL YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☒ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

7. ARE YOU:
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.

I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

1 August 57 (DATE) — Jacques G. Richardson (SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this ______ day of ______ (MONTH) 1952 at ______ (CITY) ______ (STATE)

SEAL

______

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. CSC STATUS (*For permanent employees only*) ☐ YES ☐ NO

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY
5	8	12

12. TOTAL SERVICE: 5 | 8 | 12

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*):

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

(OVER)

TRAVEL AGREEMENT BY STAFF EMPLOYEES ASSIGNED TO PERMANENT DUTY STATION OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

1. In accordance with the policy of the Central Intelligence Agency, I agree to serve outside the continental United States a minimum tour of 24 months from the date of my arrival at my permanent post of duty, unless said tour is sooner terminated by the Government for its convenience, or it is terminated by the Agency for circumstances that are considered by it to be beyond my control.

2. It is understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control in less than 12 months from the date of arrival at said post, I shall reimburse CIA for all travel expenses, including storage and per diem, incurred in the transporting of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to my permanent post of duty, and shall pay all return travel and transportation expenses to the United States.

3. It is further understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control subsequent to the twelfth month but prior to the completion of my tour of duty, I shall pay all return expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to the United States.

WITNESS:

Lorene E. Norbeck
Office of Personnel
Lorene E. Norbeck

Jacques G. Richardson
(Employee)
Jacques G. Richardson

Date: 9 August 1957

14-00000

12C [illegible]

INSURANCE QUESTIONNAIRE

1. NAME (Last) RICHARDSON (First) Jacques (Middle) G.
2. THIS DATE 28 Dec 54

3. THE FOLLOWING AGENCY SPONSORED INSURANCE PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN EXPLAINED TO ME:

- [X] WAR AGENCIES EMPLOYEES PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION (WAEPA)
- [X] MUTUAL BENEFIT OF OMAHA
- [X] GROUP HOSPITALIZATION INCORPORATED
- [X] AIR TRIP INSURANCE

4. ITINERARY (To be completed only for individuals making application for Air Trip Insurance):

5. I AM NOW PARTICIPATING, OR WOULD LIKE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FOLLOWING INSURANCE PROGRAMS:

TYPE OF POLICY	DESIRED	NOW HAVE	POLICY NUMBER	DEDUCTIONS AUTHORIZED EACH PAY PERIOD	CASH PAID
GEHA - Heath	[illegible]	✓			
Fed. Emp Ins		✓			

J Richardson
SIGNATURE

6. I DO NOT ELECT TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY OF THE STATED INSURANCE PROGRAMS:

SIGNATURE

7. EMPLOYEE INTERVIEWED BY:

CPB: RWSloan
SIGNATURE

IaCB:
SIGNATURE

8. REMARKS:

These forms were returned to me 17 Feb 55 in envelope. The forms have not been signed by the Insurance office indicating that individual did not report to that office. RWS

Per phone info from insurance office 21 Feb 55 P/R deductions are to start eff 26 Feb 55 RWS

When completed, the original of this form should be forwarded to T&RB for incorporation in the employee's official personnel folder. The copy should be forwarded to CPB for retention in CPB fil

(4)

FORM NO. 37-190
1 MAR 54

14-00000

1-3688

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

G2-AP

3 DEC 1954

SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation

TO: Director of Central Intelligence
Washington 25, D. C.
ATTN: Deputy Director of Plans

Jacques G. Richardson

1. I have received a letter from Major General Boniface Campbell, Commanding General, Army Intelligence Center, expressing appreciation for a presentation by Mr. [redacted] at Fort Holabird in October 1954. Mr. [redacted] also arranged for presentations by two other speakers at the Army Intelligence Center. A copy of General Campbell's letter is attached.

2. The remarks contained in this letter are a source of real satisfaction to me, and I take this opportunity to add my appreciation to that expressed by General Campbell.

Arthur G. Trudeau
ARTHUR G. T[illegible]
Major Gen[illegible]
A. C. of [illegible]

1 Incl
Cy ltr fr Gen
Campbell dtd
12 Nov 54

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED APRIL 1, 1948)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

CIA (Department or agency) — OPC (Bureau or division) — WASHINGTON, D. C. (Place of employment)

I, Jacques Gabriel Richardson, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers contained in my Application for Federal Employment, Form No. SF-57, dated ...., 19...., filed with the above-named department or agency, which I have reviewed, are true and correct as of this date with the exceptions noted in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form. (If no exceptions, write "None" on the Declaration of Appointee.)

Jacques Gabriel Richardson
(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 13th day of July, A. D. 19 50,

at Washington, (City) D. C. (State)

Frank G. [illegible]
(Signature of officer)

[SEAL]

(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

16—65100-1

14-00000

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. *Question 5 is to be answered in all cases, otherwise answer only those questions which require an answer different from that given to the corresponding questions on your application form. If no answers are different, write "NONE" in Item 10, below.* Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (*street and number, city and State*)
8601 Old Bladensburg Rd Silver Spring Md.

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan 1924 | (B) PLACE OF BIRTH (*city or town and State or country*): Baltimore, Md.

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY: HARRIETTE D. RICHARDSON | (B) RELATIONSHIP: WIFE | (C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE: 8601 Old Bladensburg Rd-SS-Md | (D) TELEPHONE NO.: SL-3783

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☒ NO
If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (*Give street number, if any*)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*		X
8. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		X
9. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED, OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION, OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and/or other pertinent papers. The physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members-of-family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10—[illegible]

ESPIONAGE

1. Unlawfully obtaining or permitting to be obtained information affecting national defense.—That (a) Whoever, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense with intent or reason to believe that the information to be obtained is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation, goes upon, enters, flies over, or otherwise obtains information concerning any vessel, aircraft, work of defence, navy yard, naval station, submarine base, coaling station, fort, battery, torpedo station dockyard, canal, railroad, arsenal, camp, factory, mine, telegraph, telephone, wireless, or signal station, building, office, or other place connected with the national defense, owned or constructed, or in progress of construction by the United States or under the control of the United States, or of any of its officers or agents, or within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, or any place in which any vessel, aircraft, arms, munitions, or other materials or instruments for use in time of war are being made, prepared, repaired, or stored, under any contract or agreement with the United States, or with any person on behalf of the United States, or otherwise on behalf of the United States, or any prohibited place within the meaning of section 6 of this title; or (b) whoever for the purpose aforesaid, and with like intent or reason to believe, copies, takes, makes, or obtains, or attempts, or induces or aids another to copy, take, make, or obtain, any sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, document, writing, or note of anything connected with the national defense; or (c) whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, receives or obtains or agrees or attempts or induces or aids another to receive or obtain from any person, or from any source whatever, any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note, of anything connected with the national defense, knowing or having reason to believe, at the time he receives or obtains, or agrees or attempts or induces or aids another to receive or obtain it, that it has been or will be obtained, taken, made or disposed of by any person contrary to the provisions of this title; or (d) whoever, lawfully or unlawfully having possession of, access to, control over, or being intrusted with any document, writing, code book, signal, book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, willfully communicates or transmits or attempts to communicate or transmit the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it on demand to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it; or (e) whoever, being intrusted with or having lawful possession or control of any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, note, or information, relating to the national defense, through gross negligence permits the same to be removed from its proper place of custody or delivered to anyone in violation of his trust, or to be lost, stolen, abstracted, or destroyed, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten years and may,

in the discretion of the court, be fined not more than $10,000. (Sec. 1, Title I, act 15 June 1917 (40 Stat. 217), as amended by sec. 1, act 28 March 1940 (54 Stat. 79; 50 U.S.C. 31)).

2. Unlawfully disclosing information affecting national defense.— (a) Whoever, with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, communicates, delivers, or transmits, or attempts to, or aids or induces another to, communicate, deliver, or transmit, to any foreign government, or to any faction or party or military or naval force within a foreign country, whether recognized or unrecognized by the United States, or to any representative, officer, agent, employee, subject, or citizen thereof, either directly or indirectly, any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, note, instrument, appliance, or information relating to the national defense, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than twenty years: Provided, That whoever shall violate the provisions of subsection (a) of this section in time of war shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for not more than thirty years; and (b) whoever, in time of war, with intent that the same shall be communicated to the enemy, shall collect, record, publish, or communicate, or attempt to elicit any information with respect to the movement, numbers, description, condition, or disposition of any of the armed forces, ships, aircraft, or war materials of the United States, or with respect to the plans or conduct, or supposed plans or conduct of any naval or military operations, or with respect to any works or measures undertaken for or connected with, or intended for the fortification or defense of any place, or any other information relating to the public defense, which might be useful to the enemy, shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for not more than thirty years. (Sec. 2, act 15 June 1917 (40 Stat. 218; 50 U.S.C. 32)).

I have read and understand the provisions of the above.

Witness:

Joseph S. Riff

21 November 1949

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED APRIL 1, 1947)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER A4 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

CIA (Department or agency) OPC (Bureau or division) WASHINGTON, D. C. (Place of employment)

I, Richardson Jones G [redacted], do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers contained in my Application for Federal Employment, Form No. SF-57, dated 1 October, 19 48, filed with the above-named department or agency, which I have reviewed, are true and correct as of this date with the exceptions noted in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form. (If no exceptions, write "None" on the Declaration of Appointee.)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 21st day of November, A. D. 19 49,

at Washington, (City) D. C. (State)

[SEAL] [signature] (Signature of officer)

[signature] (Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

16—46160-1

14-00000

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. *Question 3 is to be answered in all cases, otherwise answer only those questions which require an answer different from that given to the corresponding questions on your application form. If no answers are different, write "NONE" in Item 10, below.* Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (*street and number, city and State*)

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH | (B) PLACE OF BIRTH (*city or town and State or country*)

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY	(B) RELATIONSHIP	(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE	(D) TELEPHONE NO.
HARRIETTE D. [redacted]	WIFE	7.. S. LOYAL ST., ALEXANDRIA, VA.	TE 8506

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☐ NO

If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (*Give street number, if any*)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?		
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*		
8. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		
9. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED, OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY
	NONE

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and/or other pertinent papers. The physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members-of-family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—53509-1

1604 Curie

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT
PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

50 6102 QAB

THIS DATE: 7 August 1957 NOV

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): RICHARDSON, Jacques Gabriel
2. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): Box 888 APO 500, San Francisco, California
3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): 722 South Royal Street, Alexandria, Virginia
4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: Tokyo 2636-3928
5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE: Virginia

SECTION II — PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.: DRISCOLL, Theodore Gotzian
2. RELATIONSHIP: Father-in-law
3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country): 722 South Royal Street, Alexandria, Virginia
4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country). INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: Council of State Governments, 1025 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D.C.
5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: TEmple 6-8506
6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER: EXecutive 3-6715
7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION:
8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.
Mr Henri A Richardson (Brother), 3039 Macomb Street NW, Washington, D.C. (EM-3-6093)

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK (X) ONE:

SINGLE	MARRIED	WIDOWED	SEPARATED	DIVORCED	ANNULLED
	X				

2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

SPOUSE: If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.

3. NAME (First) (Middle) (Maiden) (Last)
4. DATE OF MARRIAGE
5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country)
6. ADDRESS OF SPOUSE BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country)
7. LIVING — YES / NO
8. DATE OF DEATH
9. CAUSE OF DEATH
10. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased)
11. DATE OF BIRTH
12. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S.-DATE OF ENTRY
14. PLACE OF ENTRY
15. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
16. DATE ACQUIRED
17. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country)
18. OCCUPATION
19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers)
20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)

CODED ... 18 DEC 1957

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

FORM 444b 4-57 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE OF SPOUSE (From- and To- by MONTH AND YEAR)	
22. BRANCH OF SERVICE	23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED
24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN	

SECTION IV — RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
1	Mme Henry Bit (pronounced Bee)	Mother's aunt	65?
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES: 27, avenue Edith Cavell, Nice, Alpes Maritimes, France		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country): France	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT: About 3 times a year, by mail	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT: May 1957
2	M. Felix Breton	Mother's 2d cousin	70?
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES: 13, rue Grenota, Paris XIIIe, France		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country): France	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT: Once a year, by mail	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT: Christmas, 1956
3	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
4	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES

I have met each of the above relatives only once in my life.

SECTION V — FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? [XX] YES [ ] NO

2. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? [ ] YES [XX] NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

3. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? [ ] YES [XX] NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 3 ABOVE, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.

5. WITHOUT REFERENCE TO YOUR SALARY, STATE OTHER SOURCES OF RECURRENT INCOME NOT INDICATED BY PRECEDING ITEMS.

Annual dividends on modest investments in stocks, credit union, and cooperative.

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

6. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
Clarendon Trust Company,	Arlington 10, Virhinia

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? [ ] YES [X] NO

8. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 7 ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

SECTION VI — CITIZENSHIP

1. COUNTRY OF CURRENT CITIZENSHIP: USA

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE: [X] BIRTH [ ] MARRIAGE [ ] OTHER (Specify):

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? [ ] YES [X] NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First papers, etc.)

SECTION VII — EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

[ ]	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	[ ]	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
[ ]	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	[ ]	BACHELOR'S DEGREE
[ ]	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	[XX]	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
[ ]	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	[ ] MASTER'S DEGREE	[ ] DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR HRS. COMPLETED (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
Graduate School, Georgetown University	Int'l	Rel'ns	Jun 51	May 52	N o	n e	24 hours

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL HOURS
		FROM	TO	

4. MILITARY TRAINING (Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL WEEKS
		FROM	TO	

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

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(When Filled In)

SECTION X CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (Do not submit copies unless requested). INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

Am an experienced intelligence briefer.

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

Member, British Interplanetary Society, London.
Associate member, American Astronautical Association, New York.

SECTION XI ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): Nov 1949 - Oct 1951
2. GRADE: 7 - 11
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: OPC/FE/3 - Desk intelligence officer
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: One to three
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Soviet desk officer
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: Prepared, conjointly with OSO/FDS/FE, operational plans against Soviet Far Eastern targets.

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): Oct 1951 - Dec 1953
2. GRADE: 12- 13
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/SR/5; deputy chief, then chief
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: up to 23
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Branch deputy chief, then Branch chief
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: Supervised and directed SR plans and projects targeted against Soviet Far East.

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): Jan 1954 - Dec 1954
2. GRADE: 13
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/SR/COPS/DR - Chief
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: 18
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Chief of special defector reception project
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: Direct and supervise the reception, debriefing, intelligence exploitation, resettlement and legalization of two high level Soviet intelligence officers granted political asylum in the USA.

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): Feb 1955 - Mar 1956
2. GRADE: 14
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/SR - NA/SR Base, Tokyo - Chief
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: 22
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Chief of Base
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: Direct and supervise field plans and projects based in Japan and Okinawa, targeted against Soviet Far Eastern targets.

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): Mar 1956 - Jun 1957
2. GRADE: 14
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/SR - Tokyo Station Soviet Branch Deputy Chief
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: 28
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Deputy chief of branch
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: Assist Branch Chief in development and management of all Japan and Okinawa-based operations against USSR and Soviet Embassy, Tokyo.

(Use additional pages if required)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XII — CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (Including stepchildren and adopted children) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.	2	2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.	3

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX M	SEX F	CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
Harriette D. Richardson	Wife	1928		X	USA	Same as mine
Pamela A. Richardson	Daughter	1950		X	"	"
Michelle D. Richardson	"	1953		X	"	"

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

DATE COMPLETED	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
7 August 1956	[signature]

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PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

37833

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply write "not applicable." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.
2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? YES (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

A. FULL NAME Mr. (Use No Initials) JACQUES (First) GABRIEL (Middle) RICHARDSON (Last)

Telephone: Office: NOT APPLICABLE Ext. Home: HO-7983

PRESENT ADDRESS 2908 ST. PAUL ST (St. & No.) - BALTIMORE (City), MD (State), USA (Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS 2908 ST. PAUL ST (St. & No.) - BALTIMORE (City), MD (State), USA (Country)

B. NICKNAME JACK WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? NONE

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? NOT APPLICABLE

HOW LONG? ______ IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS ______ (Where?) (By What Authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH 20 JAN 1924 PLACE OF BIRTH BALTIMORE (City), MD (State), USA (Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP USA (Country) BY BIRTH? YES BY MARRIAGE? ______

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE # NOT APPLICABLE ISSUED ______ (Date) BY ______ (Court)

AT ______ (City) ______ (State) ______ (Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? NO (Yes or No) ______ (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? ______ TO ______ ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? ______ (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS NOT APPLICABLE

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? NO GIVE PARTICULARS ______

FORM NO. 30-1 APR 1949

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? N/A

PORT OF ENTRY? ________ ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? ________

LAST U.S. VISA ________ (Number, Type, Place of Issue, Date of Issue)

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 24 SEX MALE HEIGHT 5'9½" WEIGHT 140

EYES BROWN HAIR BROWN COMPLEXION DARK SCARS FOREHEAD

BUILD SLENDER OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES NONE

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE YES MARRIED ________ DIVORCED ________ WIDOWED ________

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR SEPARATION, DIVORCE OR ANNULMENT ________

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE — INCLUDE ANNULMENTS — USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE NOT APPLICABLE (First, Middle, Maiden, Last)

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE ________

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE ________ (St. & No., City, State, Country)

LIVING OR DECEASED ________ DATE OF DECEASE ________ CAUSE ________

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS ________ (St. & No., City, State, Country)

DATE OF BIRTH ________ PLACE OF BIRTH ________ (City, State, Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ________

CITIZENSHIP ________ WHEN ACQUIRED? ________ WHERE? ________ (City, State, Country)

OCCUPATION ________ LAST EMPLOYER ________

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS ________ (St. & No., City, State, Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM ________ (Date) TO ________ (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE ________

COUNTRY ________ DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T. SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN ________

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents)

1. NAME NOT APPLICABLE RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. & No. / City / State / Country)

2. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. & No. / City / State / Country)

3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. & No. / City / State / Country)

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME JOHN (First) BENJAMIN (Middle) RICHARDSON (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED LIVING DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR, LAST, ADDRESS 2906 ST. PAUL ST. (St. & No.), BALTIMORE-18 (City) - MD (State) - USA (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 21 NOV 1893 PLACE OF BIRTH CENTREVILLE (City), MARYLAND (State), USA (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY N/A

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? BIRTH WHERE? ______ (City / State / Country)

OCCUPATION AUTO DEALER LAST EMPLOYER EAST END AUTO CO- BALTIMORE

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS 6505 PULASKI HWY (St. & No.), BALTIMORE (City), MD (State), USA (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM 1915 (Date) TO 1919 (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE ARMY AVIATION

COUNTRY USA, GT. BRITAIN DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.

NONE

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME ADRIENNE (First) MARGUERITE (Middle) BIT (Last) RICHARDSON

LIVING OR DECEASED DECEASED DATE OF DECEASE 5 DEC 1947 CAUSE CANCER

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 3103 MILFORD AV (St. & No.), BALTIMORE (City), MD (State), USA (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 14 AUG 1900 PLACE OF BIRTH ROMANS, DRÔME, FRANCE

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? 1921 (?) WHERE? BALTO (City), MD (State), USA (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NOV. 1919 - NEW YORK

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OCCUPATION MILLINERY BUYER LAST EMPLOYER EMPORIUM WORLD MILL'Y CO.

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS UNKNOWN, CHICAGO, ILL, USA
St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM NONE TO ______ BRANCH OF SERVICE ______

COUNTRY ______ DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.

NONE

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters)

DL 73452

1. FULL NAME HENRI ADRIEN RICHARDSON AGE 23
First Middle Last

PRESENT ADDRESS 5724 SIMMONS AV, BALTIMORE, MD, USA - USA
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

2. FULL NAME ______ AGE ______
First Middle Last

PRESENT ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

3. FULL NAME ______ AGE ______
First Middle Last

PRESENT ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

4. FULL NAME ______ AGE ______
First Middle Last

PRESENT ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

5. FULL NAME ______ AGE ______
First Middle Last

PRESENT ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME NOT APPLICABLE
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED ______ DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH ______ PLACE OF BIRTH ______

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ WHEN ACQUIRED? ______ WHERE? ______
City State Country

OCCUPATION ______ LAST EMPLOYER ______

14-00000

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME NOT APPLICABLE
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED ______ DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH ______ PLACE OF BIRTH ______

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ WHEN ACQUIRED? ______ WHERE? ______
City State Country

OCCUPATION ______ LAST EMPLOYER ______

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. NAME HENRY BIT RELATIONSHIP GREAT-UNCLE AGE 65(?)

CITIZENSHIP FRENCH ADDRESS 27 RUE EDITH CAVELL, NICE FRANCE
St. & No. City State Country

2. NAME CHARLES GRANDGERARD RELATIONSHIP SECOND COUSIN AGE 55(?)

CITIZENSHIP USA ADDRESS % OTIS ELEVATORS, BUENOS AIRES ARGENTINA
St. & No. City State Country

3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 11 RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U.S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.

1. NAME CMDR. ROBT LEE CLARK RELATIONSHIP COUSIN AGE 30

CITIZENSHIP USA ADDRESS N.O.B., NORFOLK, VIRGINIA
St. & No. City State

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______

2. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______

3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______

DS #63

SEC. 12. EDUCATION

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL McDONOGH SCH ADDRESS BALTIMORE, MD, USA PIKESVILLE, MD, USA (City, State, Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1930-34-37 GRADUATE? YES

HIGH SCHOOL LOYOLA HIGH, MONTREAL H. ADDRESS MONTREAL, QUE, CANADA (City, State, Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1937-1940 GRADUATE? YES

COLLEGE SIR GEO WILLIAMS COLL. ADDRESS MONTREAL, QUE, CANADA (City, State, Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1940-1942 DEGREE NONE

COLLEGE U OF MICHIGAN ADDRESS ANN ARBOR, MICH, USA (City, State, Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1945 (see P13) DEGREE B.A.

SEC. 13. MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOV'T SERVICE — U.S. OR FOREIGN

USA (Country) ARMY (Service) 1/LT (Rank) FEB 1943-OCT 1945 (Dates of Service)

GHQ FEC-TOKYO, JAPAN (Last Station) 0-937200 (Serial No.) HONORABLE (Type of Discharge)

REMARKS: WHILE ENLISTED, SERIAL WAS 31316266

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER 5-A ADDRESS HARTFORD, CONN.

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON

SEC. 14. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST.

FROM 15 AUG 45 TO 30 SEP 48

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY DEPT / ARMY

ADDRESS CCD-GHQ-FEC APO 500 POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO, USA (St. & No., City, State, Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS CIVIL CENSORSHIP NAME OF SUPERVISOR KURT SPAULDING

(MILITARY) TITLE OF JOB LIAISON OFFICER SALARY $ 251 PER MONTH

YOUR DUTIES INTELLIGENCE ANALYST; REPORTS COORDINATOR + WRITER

REASONS FOR LEAVING RETURN TO USA FOR SEPARATION FROM ARMY

FROM 1 APR 45 TO 15 AUG 45

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY DEPT / ARMY

14-00000

ADDRESS CCD-GHQ-FEC APO 500 POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO USA
(St. & No. / City / State / Country)

(MILITARY) KIND OF BUSINESS CIVIL CENSORSHIP NAME OF SUPERVISOR VINCENT MERCOLA

TITLE OF JOB DEPUTY CHIEF, NEWS AGENCY SALARY $ 251 PER MONTH

YOUR DUTIES Asst chief of principal Allied press censorship bureau in Japan.

REASONS FOR LEAVING CENSORSHIP SECTION ELIMINATED

FROM 1 NOV 46 TO 31 MAR 48

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY DEPT/ARMY

ADDRESS CCD-GHQ-FEC APO 309 - POSTMASTER - SAN FRANCISCO USA
(St. & No. / City / State / Country)

(MILITARY) KIND OF BUSINESS CIVIL CENSORSHIP NAME OF SUPERVISOR ROBT. SPAULDING

TITLE OF JOB CHIEF, CENSORSHIP SUB-STA SALARY $ 221 PER MONTH

YOUR DUTIES Operated field censorship surveillance detachment

REASONS FOR LEAVING TRANSFERRED TO HQ IN TOKYO

FROM 15 MAR 46 TO 15 AUG 46

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY DEPT/ARMY

ADDRESS ARMY LANGUAGE SCHOOL (FT. SNELLING, MINN, USA) PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY, CAL, USA
(St. & No. / City / State / County)

(MILITARY) KIND OF BUSINESS CIVIL AFFAIRS TNG NAME OF SUPERVISOR YUTAKA MUNAKATA

TITLE OF JOB RESEARCH EDITOR SALARY $ ARMY PER SGT.

YOUR DUTIES REVISED ARMY MANUALS, PREPARED CIVIL AFFAIRS COURSES.

REASONS FOR LEAVING COMMISSIONED; TRANSFERRED TO JAPAN

FROM NOV 1941 TO JUL 1947

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY T. EATON CO, LTD.

ADDRESS ST. CATHERINE ST, MONTREAL, QUE, CANADA
(St. & No. / City / State / Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS DEPT. STORE NAME OF SUPERVISOR E.T. CRAYDON

TITLE OF JOB PHOTOGRAPHIC SALESMAN SALARY $ 30 PER WEEK

YOUR DUTIES SOLD CAMERAS AND PHOTO SUPPLIES

REASONS FOR LEAVING WAS PART-TIME JOB ACCEPTED WHILE IN COLLEGE

14-00000

8

SEC. 15. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS:

NOT APPLICABLE

SEC. 16. GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES — IN THE U.S. — WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY — (GIVE RESIDENCE AND BUSINESS ADDRESSES WHERE POSSIBLE.)

	Name		Street and Number	City	State
1.	CAPT. GORDON WALLACE	BUS. ADD.	AIS-PRESIDIO	MONTEREY	CAL.
		RES. ADD.	2160 COOLEY	PALO ALTO	CAL.
2.	MR. GEORGE MOORE	BUS. ADD.	U/CALIFORNIA	BERKELEY	CAL.
		RES. ADD.	571 NORTH,	OAKLAND,	CAL.
3.	MR. JOHN CHEATHAM	BUS. ADD.	117 E. PATRICK	FREDERICK,	MD.
		RES. ADD.	101 E. CHURCH	FREDERICK,	MD.
4.	MR. T. G. DRISCOLL	BUS. ADD.	1351 K ST. NW	WASH.	DC.
		RES. ADD.	705 S. ROYAL	ALEXANDRIA	VA.
5.	MR. R. H. KUNZMAN	BUS. ADD.	U.P. BUREAU	DES MOINES	IOWA
		RES. ADD.		UNK	

SEC. 17. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES — NOT REFERENCES, SUPERVISORS OR EMPLOYERS — (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

	Name		Street and Number	City	State
1.	MR. GEORGE FINNEY	BUS. ADD.	DEPT/AF	WASHINGTON	DC.
		RES. ADD.	2310 VALLEY DR.	ALEXANDRIA	VA.
2.	DR. MORRIS CRANE	BUS. ADD.	BALTIMORE AV.	PHILADELPHIA	PA.
		RES. ADD.			
3.	MR. BRADFORD COOLIDGE	BUS. ADD.	DEPT/STATE	WASHINGTON	DC
		RES. ADD.			
4.	MISS FLORENCE HIDNERT	BUS. ADD.		NONE	
		RES. ADD.	71 ARNOLDALE	WETHERSFIELD,	CONN.
5.	MR. ANTHONY SAS	BUS. ADD.		UNK	
		RES. ADD.	303 E. 33rd	BALTIMORE,	MD.

SEC. 18. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U.S. — (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

	Name		Street and Number	City	State
1.	MR. FRANK DUCHARME	BUS. ADD.	TRAVELERS' INS.	HARTFORD,	CONN.
		RES. ADD.	26 LILLEY	W. HARTFORD	CONN.
2.	MR. JAMES KNOX	BUS. ADD.	G. FOX CO.	HARTFORD,	CONN.
		RES. ADD.		UNK	
3.	MRS. LOUIS FRANKLIN	BUS. ADD.	ALBERT STEIGER	HARTFORD,	CONN.
		RES. ADD.		UNK	

SEC. 19. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? YES IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS BALTIMORE NATIONAL BANK, HIGHLANDTOWN BRANCH, BALTIMORE, MD.

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? NO GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT:

D. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES — IN THE U.S.

1. NAME LEE'S INC ADDRESS 3421 EASTERN AV, BALTIMORE, MD.
2. NAME MONTGOMERY WARD ADDRESS 2411 AV OAKLAND 16, CAL.
3. NAME ADDRESS

SEC. 20. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

From	To	St. No.	City	State	Country
1933	1937	3110 PRESSTMAN ST	BALTIMORE	MD	USA
1937	1939	4561 HARVARD AV	MONTREAL	QUE	CANADA
1939	1942	1461 MOUNTAIN ST	MONTREAL	QUE	CANADA
1942	1942	26 LILLEY RD	W. HARTFORD	CONN	USA
1942	1942	MILITARY SERVICE			
1948	PRESENT	2905 ST. PAUL ST	BALTIMORE	MD	USA

SEC. 21. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

	From	To	City or Section	Country	Purpose
A.	JUN 1927	SEP 1927	PARIS	FRANCE	VISIT
	JUL 1934	JUL 1934	NIAGARA PENINSULA	CANADA	VISIT
	SEP 1937	JUL 1942	MONTREAL	CANADA	RESIDENCE

FROM OCT 1944 TO JAN 1945 NORTHERN EUROPE (City or Section) (Country) WAR SERVICE (Purpose)

FROM SEP 1946 TO OCT 1948 TOKYO, SENDAI (City or Section) JAPAN (Country) MIL OCCUPATION (Purpose)

FROM ______ TO ______ ______ (City or Section) ______ (Country) ______ (Purpose)

B. LAST U.S. PASSPORT—NUMBER, DATE, AND PLACE OF ISSUE: UNKNOWN

HOW MANY OTHER U.S. PASSPORTS HAVE YOU HAD? NONE GIVE APPROXIMATE

DATES: ______

PASSPORTS OF OTHER NATIONS: ______

SEC. 22. CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

✓ 1. AMERICAN VETERANS COMMITTEE (MEMBER AT LARGE) (Name and Chapter) (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: NOV 1945 – JAN 1948

2. RESERVE OFFICERS ASS'N (Name and Chapter) (St. & No.) WASHINGTON (City) DC (State) USA (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: OCT 1948 – PRESENT

3. ______ (Name and Chapter) (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______

4. ______ (Name and Chapter) (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______

5. ______ (Name and Chapter) (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______

6. ______ (Name and Chapter) (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______

7. ______ (Name and Chapter) (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______

SEC. 23. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT" "FAIR" OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE JAPANESE SPEAK FLUENT READ FAIR WRITE FAIR

LANGUAGE FRENCH SPEAK FLUENT READ FLUENT WRITE FLUENT

LANGUAGE ______ SPEAK ______ READ ______ WRITE ______

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU: INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH:

SWIMMING, SKIING, HORSEMANSHIP, FOOTBALL - GOOD.
BASEBALL, ICE HOCKEY, LACROSSE, VOLLEYBALL, BADMINTON - FAIR,
PHOTOGRAPHIC PROCESSES - STRONG AMATEUR INTEREST.

C. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION?

HAVE AN ABILITY TO WRITE, EITHER REPORTORIAL OR EDITORIAL, WHICH MIGHT BE SUITABLE FOR RESEARCH OR SPECIAL REPORTS WRITING.

D. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1939:

NONE OTHER THAN DEPT OF ARMY FOR COMMISSION AS OFFICER.

E. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIV, WAR DEPT, + FBI CONDUCTED LOYALTY CHECK SOMETIME BETWEEN FEB 1947 AND JUN 1947.

SEC. 24. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OR, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES? NO

IF "YES", EXPLAIN: ________

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? YES IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? OCCASIONAL WINES AND LIQUOR

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE: NO

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

NO

SEC. 25. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME JOHN B. RICHARDSON RELATIONSHIP FATHER

ADDRESS 2908 ST. PAUL ST, BALTIMORE MD USA
(St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 26. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

NO

SEC. 27. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA (City and State) DATE 25 NOV 1948

Henriette C. Driscoll (Witness) — Jacques G. Richardson (Signature of Applicant)

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

14. - I HAVE NEVER HELD A FULL-TIME CIVILIAN JOB, SINCE I ENTERED THE ARMY DIRECTLY FROM COLLEGE.

19. - I HAVE NEVER BOUGHT ANYTHING ON CREDIT. THEREFORE, I HAVE LISTED THREE CONCERNS WITH WHICH I HAVE TRANSACTED NORMAL BUSINESS.

12. - I ACQUIRED SUFFICIENT CREDITS FROM THE ARMY JAPANESE SCHOOL AT THE U OF MICHIGAN TO RECEIVE A B.A. DEGREE, IN ABSENTIA, WHILE STILL ON ACTIVE SERVICE.

FROM SEP 1942 TO DEC 1942 I COMPLETED ONE SEMESTER AT TRINITY COLLEGE, HARTFORD, CONN.

Jacques G. Richardson

14-00000

Note: information contained herein is supplemental.

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply write "not applicable." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? ______ (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

A. FULL NAME ~~Miss~~ Mr. ~~Mrs.~~ (Use No Initials) JACQUES (First) GABRIEL (Middle) RICHARDSON (Last)

Telephone: Office: VE-4810 Ext. 13 Home: ______

PRESENT ADDRESS ______ (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS ______ (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

B. NICKNAME ______ WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? ______

______ UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? ______

HOW LONG? ______ IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS ______

______ (Where?) (By What Authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH ______ PLACE OF BIRTH ______ (City) (State) (Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP ______ (Country) BY BIRTH? ______ BY MARRIAGE? ______

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE # ______ ISSUED ______ (Date) BY ______ (Court)

AT ______ (City) (State) (Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? ______ (Yes or No) (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? ______ TO ______ ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? ______ (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS ______

______

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ______ GIVE PARTICULARS:

______

FORM NO. 38-1
SEP 1948

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? ______

PORT OF ENTRY? ______ ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? ______

LAST U.S. VISA ______ (Number) (Type) (Place of Issue) (Date of Issue)

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE ______ SEX ______ HEIGHT ______ WEIGHT ______

EYES ______ HAIR ______ COMPLEXION ______ SCARS ______

BUILD ______ OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES ______

X SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE ______ MARRIED ✓ DIVORCED ______ WIDOWED ______

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS ______

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE — INCLUDE ANNULMENTS — USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE HARRIETTE McCLURE DRISCOLL RICHARDSON (First) (Middle) (Maiden) (Last)

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE ALEXANDRIA, VA; 25 JUN 1949

~~HIS (OR~~ HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE 705 S. ROYAL ST., ALEXANDRIA VA. (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

LIVING OR DECEASED LIVING DATE OF DECEASE — CAUSE —

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 1619 DOOLITTLE RD. ESSEX, MD. (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 19 JUN 28 PLACE OF BIRTH MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. (City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY —

CITIZENSHIP U.S. WHEN ACQUIRED? — WHERE? — (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION HOUSEWIFE LAST EMPLOYER —

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS — (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM — (Date) TO — (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE —

COUNTRY — DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T. SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN ______

OCCUPATION ______ LAST EMPLOYER ______

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM ______ TO ______ BRANCH OF SERVICE ______

COUNTRY ______ DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.

______

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters)

1. FULL NAME ______ First Middle Last AGE ______
   PRESENT ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country Citizenship
2. FULL NAME ______ First Middle Last AGE ______
   PRESENT ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country Citizenship
3. FULL NAME ______ First Middle Last AGE ______
   PRESENT ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country Citizenship
4. FULL NAME ______ First Middle Last AGE ______
   PRESENT ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country Citizenship
5. FULL NAME ______ First Middle Last AGE ______
   PRESENT ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

× SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME THEODORE (First) GOTZIAN (Middle) DRISCOLL (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED LIVING DATE OF DECEASE — CAUSE —

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 705 S. ROYAL ST, ALEXANDRIA, VA. (St. & No. City State Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 14 OCT 92 PLACE OF BIRTH ST. PAUL, MINN.

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY —

______

CITIZENSHIP US WHEN ACQUIRED? — WHERE? — (City State Country)

OCCUPATION PUBLIC ADMINISTRATOR LAST EMPLOYER COUNCIL OF STATE GOVTS., 1737 "K" ST, NW, WASH DC.

X SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME HARRIETTE BELL CASWELL DRISCOLL
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED LIVING DATE OF DECEASE — CAUSE —

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 705 S. ROYAL ST, ALEXANDRIA, VA
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH 13 APR 00 PLACE OF BIRTH MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY —

CITIZENSHIP — WHEN ACQUIRED? — WHERE? —
City State Country

OCCUPATION HOUSEWIFE LAST EMPLOYER —

X SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. NAME NONE, other than mine RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country

2. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country

3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country

X SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U.S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.

1. NAME NONE, other than mine RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______

2. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______

3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______

SEC. 24. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED, OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES?

IF "YES", EXPLAIN: ______

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? ______ IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? ______

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE: ______

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

______

SEC. 25. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME MRS. J. G. RICHARDSON RELATIONSHIP WIFE

ADDRESS 1619 DOOLITTLE ROAD, ESSEX, MD.
St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 26. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

______

X SEC. 27. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT Baltimore, Maryland (City and State) DATE Oct 18 49

Sylvia F. Chaillou (Witness) Jacques G. Richardson (Signature of Applicant)

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

14. Since August 29, 1949, I have been employed as Administrative Assistant to the Director of Planning, Housing Authority of Baltimore City, at the salary range of $3,100 - $3,900.

MILITARY RECORD AND REPORT OF SEPARATION
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

RICHARDSON, JACQUES G.
0 937 200
1ST LT
INF
ORC
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE *
27 OCT 48
SEPARATION CENTER, FORT LAWTON, WASHINGTON
2908 NORTH ST. PAUL STREET, BALTIMORE 18, MARYLAND
20 JAN 24
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND
SEE 9
BROWN
BROWN
5'10"
145
0
X
X
X
STUDENT, COLLEGE X-02

MILITARY HISTORY

X
5 A
HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT
1625 RICKENBACKER ROAD, ESSEX 21, MARYLAND
27 JUN 46
(PRESS) CENSORSHIP OFFICER 9335
NONE
WW II VICTORY MEDAL; OCCUPATION, JAPAN
NONE
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE LANGUAGE SCHOOL, FT SNELLING, MINN.

Date of departure	Destination	Date of arrival
12 SEP 46	JAPAN	25 SEP 46
9 OCT 48	USA	23 OCT 48

RR 1-1

0 2 19 2 1 12 8 1 5

INSURANCE NOTICE

X X 31 OCT 48 30 NOV 48 6.50 X

*SECTION, GENERAL STAFF
LAPEL BUTTON ISSUED

Jacques G. Richardson
ALVIN A BARNETT
CAPT USAF
Alvin A Barnett

Army of the United States

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that

JACQUES G. RICHARDSON 0 937 200 1ST LT
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS FAR EAST COMMAND, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

honorably served in active Federal Service in the Army of the United States from

27 JUN 46 *to* 27 OCT 48

Given at SEPARATION CENTER, FORT LAWTON, WASHINGTON

on the 27 *day of* OCTOBER *19*48

Thomas B Hammond
THOMAS B HAMMOND
MAJOR AGD

14-00000

ENLISTED RECORD AND REPORT OF SEPARATION
HONORABLE DISCHARGE

Army of the United States

Honorable Discharge

This is to certify that

Army of the United States

is hereby Honorably Discharged from the military service of the United States of America.

This certificate is awarded as a testimonial of Honest and Faithful Service to this country.

Given at

Date

14-00000

Copy   Copy

STANDARD FORM 57—NOV. 1947
U S CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

INSTRUCTIONS: In order to prevent delay in consideration of your application, answer every question on this form clearly and completely. Type-write or print in INK. In applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination, read the examination announcement carefully and follow all directions. If you are applying for a WRITTEN examination, follow the instructions on the admission card regarding disposition of this application. If you are applying for an UNWRITTEN examination, mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

APPLICATION NO. / ANNOUNCEMENT

1. NAME OF EXAMINATION OR KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR: CIG

2. OPTION(S) (if mentioned in examination announcement):

3. PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT APPLIED FOR (City and State): As required.

4. DATE OF THIS APPLICATION:

5. Mr. (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last): JACQUES GABRIEL RICHARDSON

6. (A) STREET AND NUMBER OR R. D. NUMBER: 1620 Rickenbacker Road, Mars Est.

(B) CITY OR POST OFFICE (including postal zone) AND STATE: Essex 21, Maryland

7. LEGAL OR VOTING RESIDENCE (State): Maryland

8. (A) OFFICE PHONE: (B) HOME PHONE:

9. DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year): January 20, 1924

10. ☐ MARRIED ☒ SINGLE

11. PLACE OF BIRTH (city and State; if born outside U. S., name city and country): Baltimore, Maryland

12. ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

13. (A) HEIGHT WITHOUT SHOES: 5 FEET 10 INCHES (B) WEIGHT: 145 POUNDS

14. (A) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO

(B) IF SO, GIVE LAST GRADE AND DATE OF LAST CHANGE IN GRADE: Second Lt., 16 July 1946

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ APPOR. ☐ NON-APPOR.	MATERIAL ☐ SUBMITTED ☐ RETURNED	ENTERED REGISTER
NOTATIONS:	APP. REVIEW: APPROVED:	

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 POINTS (TENT.)	
			☐ 10 POINTS	
			☐ WIFE OR WIDOW	
			☐ DISAL.	
			☐ BEING INVESTIGATED	
INITIALS AND DATE				

15. (A) WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ 3,750 PER YEAR
You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary.

(B) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT SHORT-TERM APPOINTMENT IF OFFERED, FOR: ☐ 1 TO 3 MONTHS ☐ 3 TO 6 MONTHS ☒ 6 TO 12 MONTHS

NOTE. Acceptance or refusal of a temporary short-term appointment will not affect your opportunity to obtain a probational appointment.

(C) IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY: ☐ OCCASIONALLY ☒ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY

(D) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED: ☒ IN WASHINGTON, D. C. ☒ ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES ☒ OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

(E) IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, GIVE ACCEPTABLE LOCATIONS:

16. EXPERIENCE. It is important for you to furnish all information requested below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to give you full credit in determining your qualifications. Use a separate block for each position. Start with your present position and work back, explaining clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Experience gained more than 15 years ago which is not pertinent to the work for which you are applying may be summarized in one or more of the blocks. If your duties changed materially while working for the same employer, use a separate block to describe each position. You may include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare, or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Military experience should be described in the spaces below in its proper sequence.

(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 5 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.

(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present" Position.

① PRESENT POSITION

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM — TO PRESENT TIME	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR PRESENT POSITION	CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal Service)	SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING, $ PER; PRESENT, $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State):

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR:

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division):

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.):

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU:

REASON FOR DESIRING TO CHANGE EMPLOYMENT:

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK:

WAR DEPARTMENT

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

14-00000

15. CONTINUED

② DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM Nov.1941 TO Jul 1942

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Salesman*

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ 25 PER wk; FINAL $ 30 PER wk

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Montreal, Quebec

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Mr. Fred T. Clayton

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): T.Eaton Co. Ltd. Montreal

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Retail Department Store

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: None

REASON FOR LEAVING: Return to USA

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK: Salesman of all types photographic materials and equipment; demonstrator, all types black-and-white and color motion picture equipment.

③ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM Oct. 1940 TO Jun 1941

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Photographic technician*

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ 20 PER wk; FINAL $ 25 PER wk

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Montreal, Quebec

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Mr. Harry Jacoby

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): Jacoby Photographers, Crescent St, Montreal

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Portrait photographers

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: None

REASON FOR LEAVING: Desire of more interesting work.

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK: Darkroom apprentice, copier, equipment maintenance.

④ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM: TO:

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION:

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ PER; FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State):

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR:

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division):

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.):

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU:

REASON FOR LEAVING:

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK:

*Please Note: The two positions listed were part-time jobs only, while the applicant was a college student. I have never applied for, nor held, a full-time civilian position.

16—63040-1

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(5) DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM: TO: | EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION | CLASSIFIED GRADE (if Federal service) | SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ PER; FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State) | NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division) | KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU | REASON FOR LEAVING

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 59) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

17. MILITARY TRAINING. In the space below, describe any training received in the Armed Services (not already listed under Item 16) that would assist appointing officers in placing you most effectively. Indicate actual amount of training received, such as hours per week. Detailed information regarding any special service schools you attended is especially important. (Extra pages may be used to give full descriptions.)

DATES FROM	DATES TO	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION OF TRAINING
Jan.45	Dec.45	Ann Arbor, Michigan AIJLC, U. of Michigan	Japanese language, customs, sociology, how and why of Japan's history and economic aggression; Written Japanese.
			(Continued)

18. EDUCATION. (Circle highest grade completed): 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 (12)

MARK (X) THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF: ☐ ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ☐ JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL ☒ SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL

(A) GIVE NAME AND LOCATION OF LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED: High School of Montreal

(B) SUBJECTS STUDIED IN HIGH SCHOOL WHICH APPLY TO POSITION DESIRED: English, French, physics, history.

(C) NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	MAJOR AND SPECIALTY	DATES ATTENDED FROM	TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	NIGHT	DEGREES CONFERRED TITLE	DATE	SEMESTER HOURS CREDIT
Sir Geo Williams College	Fren	Sep 40	May 42	2				66
Trinity College, Conn.	Fren	Sep 42	Dec 42	½				12
U. Michigan, Ann Arbor	Jap	Jan 45	Dec 45	1		BA	Feb 47	45

(D) LIST YOUR CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS
French	15
English	12
Japanese	24

LIST YOUR CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS | SEMESTER HOURS

(E) OTHER TRAINING, SUCH AS VOCATIONAL, BUSINESS, STUDY COURSES GIVEN THROUGH THE ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE (show name and location of school) OR "IN-SERVICE TRAINING" IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT

School	SUBJECTS STUDIED	DATES ATTENDED FROM	TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	NIGHT
USAFI	Journalism	Apr 47	Pres		

19. INDICATE YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Language	READING EXC.	GOOD	FAIR	SPEAKING EXC.	GOOD	FAIR	UNDERSTANDING EXC.	GOOD	FAIR
Japanese		x		x				x	
French	x			x			x		

20. IF YOU HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN ANY FOREIGN COUNTRIES, INDICATE (1) NAMES OF COUNTRIES (2) DATES AND LENGTH OF TIME SPENT THERE, AND (3) REASON OR PURPOSE (e. g., military service, business, education, recreation)

France: 3 mos, 1927; 3 mos. 1944
Canada: 5 yrs, 1937-1942 Japan 1 yr

21. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE, SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT-WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY-PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

All cine equipt; teletypes; short-wave-receivers & transmitters.

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING ..... SHORTHAND .....

22. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)?

☐ YES ☒ NO GIVE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE:

FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR):

LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR):

23. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS:
(1) YOUR MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (do not submit copies unless requested)
(2) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(3) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(4) MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL OR SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES, ETC.
(5) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED.

Public relations as interpreter in ETO and Japan. Censor and review-editor of Japanese press, radio and motion-picture fields.

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24. REFERENCES: List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16 (EXPERIENCE):

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete current address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1. Col. Kai E. Rasmussen	(Washington 25 DC) Diplomatic Sec, Dep Dept, GS	Mil Attache
2. Mr. Yutaka Munakata	Presidio of Monterey, Academic Sec, MISLS, Calif.	Instructor
3. Lt. L.B. McNeil	1928 McKinley Ave, Honolulu, T.H.	CIC

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
25. MAY INQUIRY BE MADE OF YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYER REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER, QUALIFICATIONS, ETC.?	X	
26. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF, OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
27. ARE YOU NOW, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U. S. A., OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION?		X
28. ARE YOU NOW, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF A FASCIST ORGANIZATION?		X
29. ARE YOU NOW, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR OF AN ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OR OF SEEKING TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS? *If your answer to question 27, 28, or 29 above is "Yes," state in Item 39 the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups, or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities therein.*		X
30. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 39 below. Give in each case (1) the date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X
31. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 39 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		X
32. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN BARRED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 39.*		/
33. HAVE YOU ANY PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39 so that consideration can be given to your physical fitness for the job.*	X	
34. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39.*		X
35. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39.*		X
36. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? *If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 39 for EACH such relative (1) full name, (2) present address; (3) relationship; (4) Department or Agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment.*		X

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLAIMING VETERAN PREFERENCE

A. If you are claiming preference as a PEACETIME VETERAN who has been awarded a campaign badge or service ribbon, or as a DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIDOW OF A WAR OR CAMPAIGN VETERAN, attach Veteran Preference Claim, CSC Form 14, together with proof specified therein.

B. If you are a WAR-TIME VETERAN not claiming disability preference, you should NOT submit your discharge with this application. Preference will be tentatively credited to you and if appointed, you will be required to submit to the appointing officer prior to entry on duty, official evidence of separation from active service in the armed forces of the United States in time of war.

	YES	NO
37. (A) WERE YOU EVER IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING TIME OF WAR?	X	
(B) IS THE WORD "HONORABLE" OR THE WORD "SATISFACTORY" USED IN YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION PAPERS TO SHOW THE TYPE OF YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION?	—	
(C) WAS SERVICE PERFORMED ON AN ACTIVE FULL-TIME BASIS, WITH FULL MILITARY PAY AND ALLOWANCES?	X	

(D) DATE OF ENTRY OR ENTRIES INTO SERVICE	DATE OF SEPARATION OR SEPARATIONS
15 Feb 1943	Present
BRANCH OF SERVICE (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, etc.)	SERIAL NO. (If none, give grade or rating at time of separation).
Army	31216266; 0-927200

	YES	NO
38. (A) IF YOU SERVED IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING PEACETIME ONLY, DID YOU PARTICIPATE IN A CAMPAIGN OR EXPEDITION AND RECEIVE A CAMPAIGN BADGE OR SERVICE RIBBON?		X
(B) ARE YOU A DISABLED VETERAN? *If so, and you have not listed your disability in answer to Item 33, explain in Item 39 below.*		X
(C) ARE YOU A VETERAN'S WIDOW WHO HAS NOT REMARRIED?		
(D) ARE YOU THE WIFE OF A VETERAN WHO HAS A SERVICE-CONNECTED DISABILITY WHICH DISQUALIFIES HIM FOR CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENT?		

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 37 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on .... 19.....

Agency: .... Title: ....

39. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (Indicate item numbers to which answers apply)

ITEM NO.		ITEM NO.	
33	Hernia, inguinal - repairable.		

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

Before signing this application check back over it to make sure that you have answered ALL questions correctly.

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

False statement on this application is punishable by Law (U. S. Code, Title 18, Section 80).

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT ....

(Sign your name in INK (one given name, initial or initials, and surname). If female, prefix Miss or Mrs. and if married use your own given name as "Mrs. Mary L. Doe")

JACQUES GABRIEL RICHARDSON

17.MILITARY TRAINING(continued)

Rating received at end of this training:Tec 4
Duty assignment or rating after this training:Assignment to MISLS.
Dates of duty assignment:Jan 1946 to Aug.1946

Second Special Service School attended: MISLS,Fort Snelling,Minn.
Location: Fort Snelling, 11, Minnesota
Dates Attended: Jan 1946 To:Aug.1946
Rating received at end of this training:Second Lieutenant
What were you taught in Second Special Service School? Order of battle, military terms of the Japanese armed forces.
Civil affairs, military administration of occupied areas, propaganda writing.
Duty assignment after this training: Student; translator: instructor.
What did you do during this duty assignment? Translated newspaper articles, ordinances, SCAP directives,-etc. flown from Japan. Made instructor's guides for civil affairs courses.

SECRET

Date: 13 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Personnel Security Division/Office of Security

SUBJECT : Richardson, [illegible] (P): Your Number 37833

1. In compliance with paragraph four (4) of your latest memorandum, subject as above, clearance to cover the following proposed change in Subject's status and/or use is hereby requested:

Ops Officer	Position Title	Ops Officer
GS-15	Grade	GS-15
DDP/SR Foreign Field Western European Area Paris, France	Orgn Designation	DDP/WE Paris Station External Ops Station
Paris, France	Headquarters	Paris, France

2. Changes other than specified above:

3. The proposed effective date of this change is: 13 October 1963.

Joseph B. Ragan
JOSEPH B. RAGAN
Chief, Contract Personnel Division

Date 18 OCT 1963

Security Approval has been granted for the use contemplated by this request

Chief, Personnel Security Division

SECRET

SECRET
(When filled in)

DATE: 31 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

ATTENTION : Staff Agents Branch

FROM : Chief, Personnel Security Division

SUBJECT : [redacted] #37833

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 24 July 1962 in which a covert security clearance was requested to permit Subject's use as a Staff Agent, GS-14, by DDP/SR in the capacity of Operations Officer at Paris, France.

2. This is to advise that a covert security clearance is granted for the use of the Subject, as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1, above.

3. If your office should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

4. This clearance becomes invalid in the event that Subject's services are not utilized within six months of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

W. A. Osborne

SECRET
(When filled in)

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT - (Appendix I)

Listed below are names of organizations identified by the Attorney General, under his responsibility pursuant to Executive Order 9835, dated 21 March 1947, to list the names of each foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons which he, after appropriate investigation and determination, designates as Totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive, or as having adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

Each applicant must review the following list of organizations for certification purposes, and signature on the last page.

Abraham Lincoln School, Chicago, Illinois
American Association for Reconstruction in Yugoslavia, Inc.
American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born
American Committee for Yugoslav Relief, Inc.
The American Council for a Democratic Greece, formerly known as the Greek American Council; Greek American Committee for National Unity
American Croatian Congress
American League Against War and Fascism
American League for Peace and Democracy, successor to American League Against War and Fascism and predecessor of American Peace Mobilization
American Patriots, Inc.
American Peace Mobilization
American Polish Labor Council
American Russian Institute of San Francisco
American Slav Congress
American Youth Congress
American Youth for Democracy
Armenian Progressive League of America
Association of German Nationals (Reichsdeutsche Vereinigung)
Ausland-Organization der NSDAP, Overseas Branch of Nazi Party
Black Dragon Society
California Labor School, Inc., 216 Market Street, San Francisco, California
Central Council of American Women of Croatian Descent, also known as Central Council of American Croatian Women, National Council of Croatian Women
Central Japanese Association (Beikoku Chuo Nipponjin Kai)
Central Japanese Association of Southern California
The Central Organization of the German-American National Alliance (Deutsche-Amerikanische Einheitsfront)
The Citizens Protective League
Civil Rights Congress and its affiliated organizations and branches.

The Columbians
Communist Party, U.S.A., formerly Communist Political Association, and its affiliates and committees, including:

- Citizens Committee of the Upper West Side (New York City)
- Committee to Aid the Fighting South
- Dennis Defense Committee
- Labor Research Association, Inc.
- Southern Negro Youth Congress
- United May Day Committee
- United Negro and Allied Veterans of America

Congress of American Revolutionary Writers
Congress of American Women
Connecticut State Youth Conference
Council on African Affairs
Council for Pan-American Democracy
Dai Nippon Butoku Kai (Military Virtue Society of Japan or Military Art Society of Japan)
Dante Alighieri Society
Federation of Italian War Veterans in the U.S.A., Inc. (Associazione Nazionale Combattenti Italiani, Federazione degli Stati Uniti d' America)
Friends of the New Germany (Freunde des Neuen Deutschlands)
Friends of the Soviet Union and its successor American Council on Soviet Relations, both predecessors of the National Council of American Soviet Friendship
George Washington Carver School, New York City
German-American Bund (Amerikadeutscher Volksbund)
The German-American Republican League
German-American Vocational League (Deutsche-Amerikanische Berufsgemeinschaft)
Heimuska Kai, also known as Hokubei Heieki Gimusha Kai, Zaibel Nihonjin, Heiyaku Gimusha Kai, and Zaibei Heimusha Kai (Japanese Residing in America Military Conscripts Association)
Hinode Kai (Imperial Japanese Reservists)
Hinomaru Kai (Rising Sun Flag Society - a group of Japanese War Veterans)
Hokubei Zaigo Shoke Dan (North American Reserve Officers Association)
Hollywood Writers Mobilization for Defense
Hungarian-American Council for Democracy
International Labor Defense
International Workers Order, including People's Radio Foundation, Inc.
Japanese Association of America
Japanese Overseas Central Society (Kaigai Dobo Chuo Kai)

Japanese Overseas Convention, Tokyo, Japan, 1940
Japanese Protective Association (Recruiting Organization)
Jefferson School of Social Science, New York City
Jewish Peoples Committee
Jikyoku Iin Kai (Current Affairs Association)
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee
Kibei Seinen Kai (Association of U. S. Citizens of Japanese Ancestry who have returned to America after studying in Japan)
Ku Klux Klan
Kyffhaeuser, also known as Kyffhaeuser League (Kyffhaeuser Bund), Kyffhaeuser Fellowship (Kyffhaeuser Kameradschaft)
Kyffhaeuser War Relief (Kyffhaeuser Kriegshilfswerk)
League of American Writers
Lictor Society (Italian Black Shirts)
Macedonian-American People's League
Mario Morgantini Circle
Michigan Civil Rights Federation
Nanka Teikoku Gunyudan (Imperial Military Friends Group or Southern California War Veterans)
National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners
National Committee to Win the Peace
National Council of American-Soviet Friendship
National Council of Americans of Croatian Descent
National Federation for Constitutional Liberties
National Negro Congress
Nature Friends of America (since 1935)
Negro Labor Victory Committee
New Committee for Publications
Nichibei Kogyo Kaisha (The Great Fujii Theatre)
Northwest Japanese Association
Ohio School of Social Sciences
The Peace Movement of Ethiopia
Peoples Educational Association (Incorporated under name Los Angeles Educational Association, Inc.), also known as Peoples Educational Center, Peoples University, People's School
People's Institute of Applied Religion
Philadelphia School of Social Science and Art
Photo League (New York City)
Proletarian Party of America
Protestant War Veterans of the U.S., Inc.
Revolutionary Workers League
Sakura Kai (Patriotic Society, or Cherry Association - composed of veterans of Russo-Japanese War)
Samuel Adams School, Boston, Massachusetts
School of Jewish Studies, New York City
Seattle Labor School, Seattle, Washington
Serbian Vidovdan Council
Shinto Temples

Silver Shirt Legion of America
Slovenian-American National Council
Socialist Workers Party, including American Committee for European Workers' Relief
Sokoku Kai (Fatherland Society)
Suiko Sha (Reserve Officers Association Los Angeles)
Tom Paine School of Social Science, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Tom Paine School of Westchester, New York
United Committee of South Slavic Americans
United Harlem Tenants and Consumers Organization
Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade
Walt Whitman School of Social Science, Newark, New Jersey
Washington Book Shop Association
Washington Committee for Democratic Action
Wisconsin Conference on Social Legislation
Workers Alliance
Workers Party, including Socialist Youth League
Young Communist League

I certify that I have read the names of the above-listed organizations, and that I am not, nor have I been, a member of; that I have not contributed to, received literature from, or attended meetings of any organization listed, except as indicated and explained below:

(Organization)	(Dates of Membership)

Remarks:

SIGNED AT Washington, D.C. (City and State) DATE 11 January 1949

Kenneth W. Doyle (Witness) Jacques L. Richardson (Signature)

I.D.R. (Address)

FORM NO. 38-1A
AUG 1948

SECRET

SECURITY APPROVAL

XXXXXXXXXXXX

To : XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Deputy Personnel Officer Date: 10 June 1949

From : Chief of Inspection and Security Number: 37833

Subject: RICHARDSON, Jacques Gabriel

1. Note "X" below:

[X] Security approval is granted subject for access to classified information contingent upon the receipt of derogatory information at some future date.

[ ] Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of paragraph 4, Administrative Instruction 10-2, which provides for a temporary appointment pending the completion of full security investigation.

[X] Unless the applicant enters upon duty within 60 days from above date this approval becomes invalid.

2. Your memorandum dated 14 March 1949 stated Subject is an applicant for OPC.

HC 17 July 50

ERVAL P. GEISS
Chief, Personnel Security Division

Branch notified 14 June cd

XXXXXXXXXXXX

SECRET

FORM NO. 38-101
MAY 1949

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: HIDALGO, B.A.
OP FILE

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: PERSONAL MATERIAL & SENSITIVE OPS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
9-1?-78	8/9/78	DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

14-00000

Personal - Post agency activity

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 26 FEBRUARY 1970

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 027630

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): HIDALGO, B[illegible] N., JR.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (DISABILITY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT DISABILITY SYSTEM

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 28 YEAR 70

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: X

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 0235 0620

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): [illegible]

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH BRANCH 2 PANAMA SECTION

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1318

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D.

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 12 5

17 SALARY OR RATE: $15,173

18 REMARKS

SUBJECT HAS SIGNED WAIVER FOR SICK AND Excess ANNUAL LEAVE ACCUMULATING AFTER 28 FEBRUARY 1970.

Not Recommended for Agency Reserve Program due to Health [illegible] for B. Dulanky WH/PSS

1 - FINANCE

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: HENRY L. BERTHOLD, C/WH/PERS — DATE SIGNED: 26 Feb 70

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [signature] — DATE SIGNED: 27 Feb 70

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 45 — 20 EMPLOY CODE: 10 — 21 OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC, ALPHABETIC) — 22 STATION CODE — 23 INTEGREE CODE — 24 HQTRS CODE — 25 DATE OF BIRTH: 05 27 19 — 26 DATE OF GRADE — 27 DATE OF LEI

28 NTE EXPIRES — 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE — 30 RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—CRGN, 3—FICA, 4—NONE) — 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE — 32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA — EOD DATA — 33 SECURITY REQ NO — 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT) — 36 SERV COMP DATE — 37 LONG COMP DATE — 38 CAREER CATEGORY — 39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE (0—WAIVER, 1—YES) — 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YEARS, 3—BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YEARS) — 42 LEAVE CAT CODE — 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA — 44 STATE TAX DATA

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [illegible] — 46 C.P. APPROVAL: [signature] — DATE APPROVED: 3/4/70

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

EMPLOYEE NOTICE OF RESIGNATION

I RESIGN EFFECTIVE ______________ (Date) FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON

MAR 2 10 23 AM '70

MY LAST WORKING DAY WILL BE —	DATE SIGNED	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

FORWARD COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING SALARY CHECKS AND BONDS, TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Zip Code)*

403 [illegible] Rock Rd.
Rockville, Maryland 20851

INSTRUCTIONS

Items 1 thru 7, and Items 9 thru 18a — The initiating office should fill in each of the referenced items. Items 3 thru 7 and 9 thru 18 require information which pertains *only* to the action requested, and NOT to the current status of the employee unless specific items remain unchanged.

Item 5 — "Category of Employment" should show one of the following entries:

Regular	Summer	WAE
Part Time	Detail Out	Consultant
Temporary	Detail In	Military
Temporary-Part Time		

Item 9 — "Organizational Designations" should show *all* levels of organization pertinent to identifying the location of the position:

FIRST LINE: Major Component *(Director, Deputy Director, etc.)*
Office, Major Staff, etc.
Foreign Field or U.S. Field *(if pertinent)*
Division or Staff *(subordinate to first line)*
Branch
Section
Unit

Items 11 and 15 — "Position Title" and "Occupational Series" should be the standard abbreviated title and corresponding occupational series in Handbook of Official Occupational Titles and Codes for the duties actually to be performed by the employee. If different from the title and series of the position occupied as shown on the most current edition of the Position Control Register or Form 261, Staffing Complement Change Authorization, explain under Item 18—Remarks.

Item 18b — Signature should be that of the official authorized to approve for the Career Service to which the employee belongs. If more than one Career Service is involved, *the gaining Career Service should approve* and the other Career Service should concur in Item 18, Remarks.

ROUTING— The original only of this form will be forwarded to the Office of Personnel *through* the appropriate Career Service official(s). In the case of requests specified in HB 20-800-1, which require advance approval of or notification to the Office of Security or the Office of Finance, one copy only will be sent to the Office(s) concerned.

SECRET

14-00000

MEDICAL

14-00000

2 5 JUL 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Balmes N. Hidalgo, Jr.

SUBJECT : Exceptional Service Emblem

1. Your request for consideration to receive the Exceptional Service Emblem has been reviewed by this office to determine your eligibility for the award. With considerable regret, I must concur in the assessment that the injuries you suffered in the line of duty do not fall under the special criteria governing award of the Exceptional Service Emblem. Hazardous duties, in the meaning of the governing regulation, relate to duties performed in areas in which internal strife, civil disturbances or hostile action by armed forces or persons unfriendly to the United States were present at the time the injury was incurred, or, relate to duties performed in an assignment defined as hazardous due to unusual geographic or other natural conditions.

2. You may be sure that this decision has been based upon thoughtful deliberation. Please accept my personal thanks for a job well done under difficult conditions.

Robert S. Wattles

Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - C/WH/Pers
1 - OPF/Hidalgo
1 - D/Pers
2 - BSD/HMAB

S E C R E T

24 June 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Balmes N. Hidalgo

VIA : WH/RMO

SUBJECT : Records Officer Appointment

1. In accordance with a request received from your component, you are hereby appointed a Records Officer in the Clandestine Services. Your functions are described, in summary, in CSI 70-1, Para. 4.d. You have also participated in a training course in which these functions were reviewed in some detail.

2. The essence of your appointment is that you now occupy a position of trust in which you are expected to draw on your knowledge and experience to exercise responsible and sound judgment in building and maintaining a professionally useful records system in the Clandestine Services. You are, at the same time, expected to train and guide others within your component in these respects.

3. A copy of this memorandum will be placed in your official personnel folder.

EDWARD A. MARELIUS
DDP Records Management Officer

cc: Personnel File of Addressee

S E C R E T

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SENSITIVE OPERATIONAL

1968

SECRET

(When Filled In)

G 38

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 10 August 1966

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 027630

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): HIDALGO, [illegible] N., JR.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 DAY 14 YEAR 66

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: X V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 7235-0620

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE:

12. POSITION NUMBER:

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:

16. GRADE AND STEP: 12

17. SALARY OR RATE: $

18. REMARKS:

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED OF YOUR RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS ACTION TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF HR 20-50. SUCH APPEAL MUST BE RECEIVED IN THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR WITHIN 30 CALENDAR DAYS FROM THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS ACTION.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL | DATE SIGNED | 18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER | DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE | 20 EMPLOY CODE | 21 OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC, ALPHABETIC) | 22 STATION CODE | 23 INTEGREE CODE | 24 HOOTRS CODE | 25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.) | 26 DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.) | 27 DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.) | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30 RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—FICA, 3—NONE) CODE 2 | 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO, DA, YR) | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY REQ NO | 34 SEX

35 VET. PREFERENCE (CODE: 0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT) | 36 SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR) | 37 LONG. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR) | 38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP; CODE) | 39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE; 0—WAIVED, 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE) | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (CODE: 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS); 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) | 42 LEAVE CAT CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44 STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 8/16/66

46 O.P. APPROVAL: See memo signed by D/Pers date: 26 JUL 1966

DATE APPROVED:

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 (EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION)

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 10 DECEMBER 1965

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 027630
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): HIDALGO, BALMES N.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH DEC DAY 19 YEAR 65
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X | V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6235 - 0620
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH BRANCH 2 PANAMA SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (GS-12)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1318
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 10,987
18. REMARKS:

FROM: WH/C/MIAMI OPS BR/FI SECTION/5235 - 1162/1145/WASHINGTON, D. C.

Recorded by CSPD

1 - FINANCE

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ROBERT D. CASHMAN C/WH/PERSONNEL

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [signature]

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 37 | 20 EMPLOY CODE: 11 | 21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC: 5730 ALPHABETIC: WH | 22 STATION CODE: 2573 | 23 INTEGREE CODE | 24 ROUTES CODE | 25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR | 26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR | 27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30 RETIREMENT DATA 1-CSC 3-FICA 5-NONE CODE | 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY REQ NO | 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT | 36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR | 37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR | 38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE | 39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0-WAIVED 1-YES HEALTH INS CODE | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS) | 42 LEAVE CAT CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS | 44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION

46 C.P. APPROVAL: [signature]

DATE APPROVED: 12/15/65

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF LONGEVITY COMPUTATION DATE

X	VOUCHERED
	UNVOUCHERED

NAME (Last, First, Middle): HIDALGO B. N. Jr

SERIAL NUMBER: 027630

OFFICE (and division): DDP/WH

		LONGEVITY COMPUTATION DATE
	ORIGINAL	02-11-52
X	CORRECTION	

THIS DATE: 12-13-65

SIGNATURE (Office of Personnel): [signature]

FORM 11-58 171a

CONFIDENTIAL (4)

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 23 October 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 0?7030
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [illegible], Jr.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 DAY 1 YEAR 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4235-1162
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP
Special Affairs Staff
Counter-Intelligence Staff
Operations Section

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0377
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 (1)
17. SALARY OR RATE: $10,250

18. REMARKS
From: DDP/SAS/CS/SS Pos.3 - Pos 436

10/28/64

Security [illegible]

Ley 11/2/64

Recorded by CSPD

1 of Security

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: [signature] [illegible], C/A/Pers.
DATE SIGNED: 10/29/64
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: A. Burg
DATE SIGNED: 10-30-64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOURS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH	26 DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF LEI
37	10	49150	SAS	75623		1	05 27 19		

28 NTE EXPIRES	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX
		1-CSC 3-FICA 5-NONE					

35 VET PREFERENCE	36 SERV COMP DATE	37 LONG COMP DATE	38 CAREER CATEGORY	39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT			CAR RESV PROV TEMP	0-WAIVED 1-YES	

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA	44 STATE TAX DATA
0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)		FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO	FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: Sup Dir Spec [signature] 11/2/64
46. O.P. APPROVAL: A. Burg
DATE APPROVED: 10-30-64

FORM 8-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

Field	Entry
Date prepared	9 April 1964
1. Serial number	027632
2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	HIDALGO, B. N. Jr.
3. Nature of personnel action	EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT (Sick Leave)
4. Effective date requested	04 26 64
5. Category of employment	REGULAR
6. Funds	X V to V
7. Cost center no. chargeable	4232-1000-1000
8. Legal authority (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. Organizational designations	DDP Special Affairs Staff CS/SS Development Complement
10. Location of official station	Washington, D.C.
11. Position title	OPS OFFICER
12. Position number	7797
13. Career service designation	D
14. Classification schedule (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. Occupational series	0136.01
16. Grade and step	12 (1)
17. Salary or rate	$9980.

Recorded by CSPD

18. REMARKS

*For ~~medical reasons. Not to exceed one year.~~

For duration of period that the individual is on sick leave; not to exceed one year.

1 cy Payroll;
1 cy Security

18A. Signature of requesting official	Date signed	18B. Signature of career service approving officer	Date signed
ORRELL C. DAWSON, DD/S/Pers	9 April 64	[signature]	13 Apr 64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 Action code	20 Employ code	21 Office coding numeric	Alphabetic	22 Station code	23 Integree code	24 Hooters code	25 Date of birth	26 Date of grade	27 Date of LEI
13	10	49497	SAS	75613		1	05 27 19	12 22 63	12 22 63

28 RTE expires	29 Special reference	30 Retirement data code	31 Separation data code	32 Correction cancellation data	EOD DATA	33 Security req. no	34 Sex
		1				00000	M

35 Vet preference	36 Serv comp date	37 Long comp date	38 Career category	39 FEGLI	Health ins. code	40 Social security no
0	12 46	12 22 63	R	1		

41 Previous government service data code	42 Leave cat code	43 Federal tax data: form executed	Code	No tax exemptions	44 State tax data
1	4		0	0	

45 Position control certification	46 O P approval	Date approved
4/27/64	[signature]	13 Apr 64

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 April 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 02?630
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 04 DAY 2? YEAR 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / X CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4132-2001-1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/Special Affairs Staff
U. S. Field
Forward Operations Station - JMWAVE
CI Section

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: JMWAVE

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0??1
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 (1)
17. SALARY OR RATE: $?0?0

18. REMARKS

Recorded by CSD

1 cy Security
1 cy Payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ORVILLE C. DIXON, WH/SA/Pers. — DATE SIGNED: 9 April 64
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER — DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. HOOTRS CODE: 2
25. DATE OF BIRTH: ?5 27 19
26. DATE OF GRADE
27. DATE OF LEI
28. NTE EXPIRES
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—FICA, 3—NONE) CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO, DA, YR)
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE (CODE; 0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT)
36. SERV. COMP. DATE
37. LONG COMP. DATE
38. CAREER CATEGORY
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YEARS, 3—BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)
44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [signature] 4/27/64
46. O P APPROVAL: [signature]
DATE APPROVED: 28 April 64

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
HIDALGO, BALMES N.	self	60-264

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 30 May 1960. Broken left foot.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF REPRESENTATIVE
	B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-58 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4-21-35)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 18 April 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: [illegible]
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: 04 | 28 | 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / X CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3132-2001-1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/Special Affairs Staff
U. S. Field
Forward Operations Station - JMWAVE
CI Section

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: JMWAVE

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0732
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 (4)
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 8840

18. REMARKS:

P-358

Recorded by CSPD

1 cy Security

19. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Louis W. Armstrong — LOUIS W. ARMSTRONG, C/SAS/Pers.
DATE SIGNED: 18 Apr 63
19A. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: D. McCollin
DATE SIGNED: 11-4-63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACT. CN CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING	22. STAT. CN CODE	23. ... CODE	24. ... CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
13	10	61770 SAS	99495		2	5-27-19	3-17-59	9-2-62

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA	31. SEPARATE CN DATA CODE	32. CORRECT/CANCEL	EOD DATA	33. SECUR. REQ. NO.	34. SEX
		1				27680	M

35. VET. PREFERENCE	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG. COMP. DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
2	07 16 ...	...	2	1	X

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	44. STATE TAX DATA
1	8	1 / 0	

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: W. Kearney 4/22/63
46. ... APPROVAL: Joseph B. Bazzi
DATE APPROVED: 18 Apr 63

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

GROUP 1 — Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

XAF

DATE PREPARED: 18 April 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 027630

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): HIDALGO, [illegible] N., Jr.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RESIGNATION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 04 DAY 27 YEAR 63

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3232-1000-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP
Special Affairs Staff
FI/CI Branch

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0682

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 (4)

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 8840

18. REMARKS

Recorded by CSPD

1 cy Security

19. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Louis W. Armstrong
LOUIS W. ARMSTRONG, C/SAS/Exec.
DATE SIGNED: 18 Apr 63

19a. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER
DATE SIGNED: 19 Apr 63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
25. 1
26. 05 - 17 - 19

FOR DATA

43. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 4/22/63

44. O.P. APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 19 Apr 63

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

RZR: 25 APR 63

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE)
027630	HIDALGO B N JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
RESIGNATION	04 27 63	REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	X	CF TO V		CF TO CF	3232 1000 1000	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	0682	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	11 4	8840

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 11 December 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)
027630	[redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH DAY YEAR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
PROMOTION	1 2 63	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
	CF TO V	X CF TO CF	4132-2001-1000	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP Special Affairs Staff U. S. Field Forward Operations Station - JMWAVE CI Section	JMWAVE

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER (D)	0731	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	12 (1)	9475

18. REMARKS

CSPD

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
ORVILLE C. DAWSON, C/SAS/Pers.	12/11/63		12/16/63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOYEE CODE	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. ...	25. ...	26. ...	27. DATE OF ...
22	10	49730 / SAS	09090		2	12 17 62	12 22 63	2 23 63

EOD DATA

43. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	44. C.P. APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED

FORM 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: [illegible]

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 027630
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [illegible], Allen [illegible], Jr.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: [illegible]
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 | DAY 20 | YEAR 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: [illegible]

6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: [illegible]
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP
Task Force W
FI-CI Branch

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0792
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $[illegible]

18. REMARKS
From: DDP/WH/[illegible] Trang 1

Recorded By CSPD

CONCURRENCE: [signature]
(Phillip C. [illegible], WH/Pers.Off.)

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: [signature] — DATE SIGNED: 6 Nov 62
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [signature] — DATE SIGNED: [illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOSTORY CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	61300	TFW			1	5 27 19		

28. RTE EXPIRES | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 = CSC, 3 = FICA, 5 = NONE) | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 = NONE, 1 = 5 PT, 2 = 10 PT) | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE | 37. LONG. COMP. DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR/RESV, PROV/TEMP) | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 = WAIVED, 1 = YES) | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS); 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)) | 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [signature] Kearney 11/19/62
46. O.P. APPROVAL: [signature]
DATE APPROVED:

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152

SECRET (4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 4 January 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)
027630	HIDALGO, BALMES H. JR.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (Month/Day/Year)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	1 / 2 / 62	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X V TO V	CF TO V	V TO CF	CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
	X				2235 1000 1000	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP WH SECTION A PLANS & OPERATIONS STAFF	WASHINGTON, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	BR-641	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	11 3	$8,080

18. REMARKS

FROM: DDP/WH/4/FI-CI/#681

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
P. C. BOWERS C/WH/Personnel		[signature]	

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING (Numeric / Alphabetic)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. SOURCE CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
					1	05 27 19		

28. NTE EXPIRES | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE | 37. LONG. COMP. DATE | 38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 12 MOS; 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 12 MOS) | 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44. STATE TAX DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. O.P. APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
1/16/62 [initials]	[signature]	

FORM 8-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 8 August 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)
027630	HIDALGO, B. N., Jr.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT (And Transfer to Vouchered Funds)	Month 8 Day 20 Year 61	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
			X		2635-5000-8021	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/WH [illegible] Branch 4 PI-CI Sec.	Washington, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	12A. PCB CONTROL NO.	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER (D)	0681		D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS (12)	0136.01	11 (3)	$ 8,080

18. REMARKS

From: DDP/WH, Br. 4, #0626

3

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER
Herbert V. Juul HERBERT V. JUUL, Ch/WH/4/Pers.	[signature]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

20. ACTION CODE	21. EMPLOY. CODE	OFFICE CODE NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HQS. FLD.	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
16	16	64452	WH	75013		1	05 27 19		

EOD DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: T. Kearney 08/1/61

46. O.P. APPROVAL: [signature]

FORM 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth (Mo. Da. Yr.)	4. Vet. Pref. Code	5. Sex	6. CS-FOD (Mo. Da. Yr.)
	HIDALGO, BALMES N., JR.	05 27 19	1	M 1	

7. SCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1 No-2) Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. (Mo. Da. Yr.)	11. FEGLI (Yes-1 No-2) Code	12. LCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	13. (Yes-1 No-2) Code
	1					

2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS/OTR OPERATIONS SCHOOL COVERT TRAINING		WASH., D. C.	

16. Dept.-Field Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
1	INSTRUCTOR OPERATIONS	1014	GS	1711.50

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade (Mo. Da. Yr.)	25. PSI Due (Mo. Da. Yr.)	26. Appropriation Number
11 2	$ 7270	D	03 17 59	03 17 61	0175-2533

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date (Mo. Da. Yr.)	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	17	06 26 60	REGULAR	01	

3A

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH 4	4107	WASH., D. C.	

33. Dept.-Field Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
1	OPS OFFICER	BA-626	GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade (Mo. Da. Yr.)	42. PSI Due (Mo. Da. Yr.)	43. Appropriation Number
11 2	$ 7270	D			0135 1000 1000

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): P. C. BOWERS WH/PERSONNEL OFFICER

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ex.): JOHN WASHINKO X8242

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): Elmer R. Wingrove 17 June 60 — ELMER R. WINGROVE PERSONNEL OFFICER

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board	C K Cook	6-21-60	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control	CK	6-23-60	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	W. [illegible]	6-23-60

Remarks

2 copies to Security. 1 Loss Notice. 6/24/60 6/21/60 6-22-60

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1152 (4)

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED Mo	Da	Yr
5	20	59

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date of Birth Mo	Da	Yr	4. Vet. Pref.	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD
	HIDALGO, Balmes N., Jr.	5	27	19		M	

7. SCD	8. CSC Retmt.	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav.	11. FEGLI	12. LCD	13. Mil. Serv. Credit
				1		

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP/WH Branch III Central America Section		Washington, D. C.	

16. Dept.-Field	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
D	Area Ops Officer	0486	GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade	25. PSI Due	26. Appropriation Number
11 1	$ 7,030	D	03 17 58	09 20 59	8-3500-20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
Reassignment + Transfer to Confidential Funds	03	06 14 59	Regular	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS/OTR Operations School Covert Training	1172	Washington, D. C.	75003

33. Dept.-Field	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
D Code 3	Instructor Operations	1014	GS	1711.50

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade	42. PSI Due	43. Appropriation Number
11 1	$ 7,030	D			9-7500-30-018

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): Mr. Glen Moorhouse, C/OS

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): Mr. Elmer R. Wingrove, x-3078

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): MATTHEW BAIRD, Director of Training

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board	[signature]	June 59	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control	CP	11 JUN 1959	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	C. Powell	11 JUN 1959

Remarks

One copy forwarded to UNVOUCHERED Payroll. Two copies forwarded to Security.

Recorded by CSPD

FORM 12-57 1152a (USE PREVIOUS EDITION)

SECRET

Security Approval ... 6/17/59

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	DATE OF BIRTH	CASE OR CLAIM NUMBER
HIDALGO, Balmes	Unk	58-112

There is on file in the Casualty Affairs Branch, Benefits and Casualty Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 1 Oct 57.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BCD REPRESENTATIVE
24 Sept 58	[signature]

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM NO. 1 SEP 56 1076 (14-21)

14-00000

SECRET

Classify According To Content.

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

E-2266   2/12/58

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth (Mo Da Yr)	4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD (Mo Da Yr)
12782	MR. BALMES N. HIDALGO, JR.	5 27 19	1	M	2 17 58

7. SCD (Mo Da Yr)	8. CSC Retmt (Yes-1 No-2) Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. (Mo Da Yr)	11. FEGLI (Yes-1 No-2) Code	12. LCD (Mo Da Yr)	13. (Yes-1 No-2) Code
7 16 46	1	50 USCA 403 J	3 13 58	1		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

3/17/58

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code

16. Dept.- Field (Dept - Usfld - Frgn -) Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade (Mo Da Yr)	25. PSI Due (Mo Da Yr)	26. Appropriation Number
	$				

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date (Mo Da Yr)	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
Excepted Appointment	13	3 17 58	Regular	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP/WH Branch III Central America Section	4613	Washington, D.C.	

33. Dept.- Field (Dept - Usfld x Frgn -) Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	Area Ops Officer	# BA-486-11	GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade (Mo Da Yr)	42. PSI Due (Mo Da Yr)	43. Appropriation Number
11-3	$ 6390	D	2 17 58	9 12 59	8-3500-20

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): P.C. BOWERS WH Personnel Officer

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): JOHN WASHINKO X 8242

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title):

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board	[signature]	3/17/58	D. Placement	[signature]	3/14/58
B. Pos. Control	[signature]	3/17/58	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	Robert E. Shea	18 MAR 1958

Remarks

Subject is presently engaged as a Contract Employee with the WH Division.
\# For slotting purposes Only.

Approved for SSP program — [signature] SSA Pers

FORM 5-57 1152a

SECRET

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52

SECRET

UNVOUCHERED

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
Mr. Balmes N. HIDALGO, Jr.	27 May 1919		8 July 55

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
Excepted Appointment

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED:

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	I. O. (FI) BAF-277
	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-11, $6390.00 p.a. OK
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH Panama City, Panama
	11. HEADQUARTERS	
[ ] FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	[x] FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Subject is presently a contract employee with Project HYPOTHESIS.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title) [signature] C/WH

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension) P. C. Bowers, x3692

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL

SD:D 6/26

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: TO: 6-3525-56-051	Yes		[ ] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	[initials]	3 Aug 55	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[initials]	7-20	
E.			

F. APPROVED BY Robert A. Stone, Jr. 7/28 SECRET

10—67339-6

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I) COD: 16 Jul 1976

1. PERS. SERIAL NO.: 027630

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): HIDALGO, B. N., Jr.

3. SEX: M

4. DATE OF BIRTH: 27 May 1919

5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE: 18 Feb 1952

6. MARITAL STATUS: Remarried

7. DEPENDENT(S) (Exclude employee): 2

YEAR(S) OF BIRTH: 1914 1892

8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S): NA Puerto Rico NA

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS

MEMBERSHIP: Mar 1961

OTHER STATUS:

10. LAST MED. APPT.: Jul 1967

QUAL. FOR: Dept Only

EVAL. FOR: TDY O/S

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS

NONE SERVICE: X

GRADE:

ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT.

RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT.

TO BE DEFERRED CAT.

RETIRED

12. ASSESSMENT DATE: None

13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE: Feb 1958

14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE: None

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1940-43 Military Service, US Army, Cpl - Infantry
1944-45 Jersey City Quartermaster Depot, Jersey City, NJ - Inspector
1945-47 Francis H. Leggett Co (Food Wholesaler), NYC - Correspondence Clerk
1946-49 Dept of Justice, FBI, NYC - Contract Agent on a Penetration Project
1948-50 Colonial Trust Co (Bank), NYC - Collections Clerk
1950-51 American Trust Co (Bank), NYC - Collections Clerk
1951-52 Dept of Defense, New York QM Procurement Agency, NYC - Inspector

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION High School Graduate

1945-46 New York University - Foreign Trade, Business Law

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)

Portuguese - R Interm; W, P, S, U None (Oct 1959); T None - May 1958
Spanish - R High; W Interm; P, S, U Native (Nov 1959); Translate, Interpret - May 1958

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1958 Comm Party Org & Ops
1958 CI Famil
1958 Info Rptng, Rpts&Rqmts
1958 Operations
1958 Intel Orient
1959 Picks & Locks
1959 Audio Surveil Mgmt
1966 Undetermined Entry (Cert)

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
	Feb 1952 - Mar 1958, Contract Employee for DDP/WH/Project HYPOTHESIS					Panama
Mar 1958	Area Ops Off	0136.01	11	D	DDP/WH-III/Central America	Hq
	Jan - Feb 1959, TDY Mexico and Guatemala					
Jun 1959	Instructor (Ops)	1711.50	11	D	OTR/Ops School/Covert Trng	Hq
Jun 1960	Ops Off	0136.01	11	D	DDP/WH-4	"
Aug 1961	" "	0136.01	11	D	DDP/WH-4/FI-CI Sec	"
Jan 1962	" "	0136.01	11	D	DDP/WH/Plans & Ops Stf/Sec A	"
Apr 1963	" "	0136.01	11	D	DDP/SAS/US Fld/Forward Ops Sta	JMWAVE
Dec 1963	" "	0136.01	12	D	" " " " " "	"
Apr 1964	" "	0136.01	12	D	DDP/SAS/CS/CS Dev Comp	Hq
Nov 1964	" "	0136.01	12	D	DDP/SAS/CI Staff/Ops	"
May 1965	" "	0136.01	12	D	DDP/WH/C/Spcl Ops Br	"
Dec 1965	" "	0136.01	12	D	DDP/WH-2/Panama	

20. DATE REVIEWED: 22 Jun 1966

21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY: [illegible]/obs

22. ITEMS 1-16 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE: 9 Feb 1960

FORM 1200 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

PROFILE

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO.	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)
022630	

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
HIDALGO, B. N., Jr.	27 May 1919

23. SUMMARIES OF EVALUATIVE REPORTS FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS



24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Appreciation 1968 from TSD/AP/CAS for the postal intercept exemplars which are invaluable to that office.

27. DATE REVIEWED	28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY
23 Jun 1969	hms/obs

FORM NO. 1 FEB 57 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1200 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE. SECRET PROFILE (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 027630

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Hidalgo Balmes N.	05/27/19	M	GS-12	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Officer	DDP/WH/2	HQS

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY / CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C) / SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL / XX ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR / REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE / SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
31 January 1969	1 January 1968 - 31 December 1968

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Panama Desk Case Officer for Panama City Station FI operations. Prepares cables and dispatches to Panama City and other Stations and internal Headquarters correspondence.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Conducts required coordination with other offices within the agency.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Supervises and/or maintains files and regulates indexing relating to his cases.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: P

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Hidalgo is a man of unusual background even in our unusual organization. This background undoubtedly affords him qualifications for our work, but nevertheless, on the professional level he suffers from disadvantages as well--overcoming some but not others. He is not well-educated in a formal sense, and in our world of words is not adequately equipped to prepare finished written correspondence. He has difficulty in organizing his work systematically, thus at times, giving an impression that the preparation has not been thorough--which might not really have been true.

On the other hand, Mr. Hidalgo has the advantage of native fluency in Spanish and an obvious understanding of the Latin thinking process and culture. He is broadly experienced in operations, not only as a case officer but as an actual agent himself, having served four years as a Bureau penetration of the CPUSA. He is operationally imaginative and unquestionably possesses the ingenuity and courage to translate ideas into action. In this respect, however, his efforts must be channeled and selectivity exercised. On the Panama Desk this officer provides the valuable service of operational history and continuity; he served six years in the Station and has been on the desk for three.

Continued

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
9 Jan 1969	[signature]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
4		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
9 January 1969	C/WH/2/P	Thomas Doolittle [signature]

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Mr. Hidalgo is an experienced and well qualified operations officer, and it is indeed unfortunate that there are medical problems which do not allow him to be assigned overseas. Since Mr. Hidalgo cannot be assigned overseas, I too endorse his desire to be assigned to OTR or to another assignment of his choice.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
9 JAN 1969	C/WH/2	Edwin M. Terrell [signature]

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SECTION C Continued

Hidalgo, Balmes N.

Mr. Hidalgo is a gregarious uncomplicated person, generally pleasant, and generous in his instincts--but not entirely without his quixotic side--and one whose natural Latin emotionality has been intensified by a life of experiences outside the norm, e.g. years as a CP penetration, air crashes, war wounds, etc.

This officer is aware that his intellectual background and medical debilities are obstructions to his advance. Understandably, he has developed outside interests, apparently as compensation. Expectedly, his attitudes at times so reflect.

In sum, Mr. Hidalgo serves a satisfactory function on the Panama Desk and no doubt could continue to perform so indefinitely, but in view of his limitations in a desk-bound situation and the medical restrictions, both of which will continue to inhibit his advance in his present component, this supervisor endorses Mr. Hidalgo's desire to be considered for transfer to another component, namely OTR (specifically covert training), where his attributes would likely come more directly into play. He has the operational experience, competency in a foreign language, an outgoing personality, and experience in lecturing and teaching.* Finally, regardless of the shortcomings reflected in this evaluation, the grading officer finds much to admire in Mr. Hidalgo personally.

*Should a suitable opening in that field be unavailable, it is felt there would be merit also in considering Mr. Hidalgo's other stated interests, i.e., the technical interrogation section of the Office of Security or OO Contacts Division.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 027630

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
HIDALGO, Balmes N., Jr.	27 May 1919	M	GS-12	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Officer	DDP/WH/2	Headquarters

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT	10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
X CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY	INITIAL / REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)	X ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):	SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
	[illegible handwriting] 12-66

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Responsible for all FI/CI Projects for the Desk	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Initiates, prepares and coordinates all operational communications to the field on FI/CI matters	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Prepares project renewals, studies and papers on FI/CI matters	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Translates Spanish language material for the Branch	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Coordinates FI/CI matters for the Desk with other Hqs components	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6: Occasionally handles visiting indigenous assets	S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

31 MAR 1967

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

SECRET

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Comment by Mr. Tsikerdanos, previous supervisor: 1 Feb '67

Mr. Hidalgo is a very capable case officer who is more suited to a field position. He is adept at handling indigenous personnel and has a keen operational mind. He is good at grasping operational leads but is not a capable writer. He has trouble expressing himself on paper. His Spanish language capability is a decided asset to the Branch. A longstanding illness has limited his effectiveness at the Desk. He is cost conscious and has no supervisory responsibilities.

Comments by Present Supervisor:

I concur in the above estimate of Mr. Hidalgo's operational capabilities. During the months (Oct 1966 - March 1967) I have worked with Mr. Hidalgo I have not found his health to be a factor in his performance of his duties.

Ken Knaus

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
10 March 67	[signature] Hidalgo

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
11	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
9 MAR 1967 / 9 MAR 1967	Formerly C/WH/2/P Present C/WH/2/P	Ernest J. Tsikerdanos [signature] Ken Knaus [signature]

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Mr. Hidalgo's health caused him to be absent from his duties several times during the first part of 1966 but these absences were for a limited period. From my observation, his health has not presented a serious problem to the performance of his duties.

Several times during the absence of Mr. Tsikerdanos in the year 1966 Mr. Hidalgo was the acting desk officer. His performance was most satisfactory, and his supervision of the other desk employees, albeit for a limited period, was fully satisfactory.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
MAR 67	C/WH/2	Edwin M. Terrell [signature]

SECRET

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 027630

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
[illegible], Talmos [illegible], Jr.	27 [illegible] 1919	[illegible]	GS-12	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
C/S Officer	DDP/[illegible]/C	Headquarters

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: X CAREER; RESERVE; TEMPORARY; CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C); SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL; X ANNUAL; SPECIAL (Specify):; REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR; X REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 16 [illegible] - 30 November 1965

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Headquarters desk officer responsible for the support of Miami Station CI/CE activities and operations.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Advisor to various components of the WH and WE Divisions on Cuban operations with specific reference to the Cuban Security Intelligence Service, organization, modus operandi and personnel.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Briefing representatives of foreign liaison services and selected agents visiting in Washington on the Cuban Security and Intelligence Services and his ~~own unique experience in the Communist Party.~~	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Translator/interpreter: Served as consultant to WH Division on Cuban Spanish.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

4 JAN 1966

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Hidalgo is an able intelligence officer, devoted to his profession and selfless in his desire to be of service to the Government. Although he has suffered ill health in recent years, he was insistent that he be among the first to be sent to the Dominican Republic when the crisis occurred.

An intense person, Mr. Hidalgo is industrious, works well under pressure and sets high standards for his performance. Because he is intent on getting things done, he is occasionally hasty in judgment and in written presentation of the results of his research and conclusions. He is perceptive, quickly accepts suggestions and offers counter-proposals with cogent argument. Mr. Hidalgo was not in a supervisory capacity. He was cost conscious; always endeavoring to be conservative where possible.

He is an effective and cooperative member of an office, ready to assume responsibility and to help his colleagues. Thanks to his unique experience on the Cuban target, he has wide knowledge of the Cuban problem and is, in fact, an expert on the Cuban Security and Intelligence Services.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
9 December 1965	[signature]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
8 months		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
9 December 1965	C/WH/C/MO/FI-CI	Susan L. Darling [signature]

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with the supervisor's assessment of Mr. Hidalgo with the exception to the statement that Subject works well under pressure. He is indeed an intense person and under great pressure, his involvement affects his performance; and even more important, it has a very bad effect on his health. With this consideration noted, the undersigned thinks very highly of Mr. Hidalgo and would be pleased to be associated with him again.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
9 December 1965	C/WH/C/MO	Walter T. Cini [signature]

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I)

1. PERS. SERIAL NO.		EOD: 16 Jul 1946		
27630				

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	3. SEX	4. DATE OF BIRTH	5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE
[illegible], [illegible] [illegible], Jr.	M	May 1919	17 Mar 1958

6. MARITAL STATUS	7. DEPENDENTS (Excluded employee)	NO.	YEAR(S) OF BIRTH	8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S)
Married		3	1927 1945 1950	NA Puerto Rico NA

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS	MEMBERSHIP	OTHER STATUS	10. LAST MED. RPT. QUAL. FOR	EVAL. FOR
		Pending	Sep 1962 Dept Only	TDY O/S

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS	NONE SERVICE	GRADE	ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT. I	RELEASE TO MIL. RES. CAT. II	TO BE DEFERRED CAT. III	RETIRED
	X					

12. ASSESSMENT DATE	13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE	14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE
None	Feb 1958	None

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1940-43 Military Service, US Army, Cpl - Infantry
1944-45 Jersey City Quartermaster Depot, Jersey City, NJ - Inspector
1945-47 Francis H. Leggitt Co (Food Wholesaler), NYC - Correspondence Clerk
1946-49 Dept of Justice, FBI, NYC - Contract Agent on a Penetration Project
1948-50 Colonial Trust Co (Bank), NYC - Collections Clerk
1950-51 American Trust Co(Bank), NYC - Collections Clerk
1951 Dept of Defense, New York QM Procurement Agency, NYC - Inspector

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

1945-46 New York University - Foreign Trade, Business Law

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)

Portuguese - R Interm; W, P, S, U Zero (Oct 1959); T None - May 1958
Spanish - R High; W Interm; P, S, U Native (Nov 1959); Translate, Interpret - May 1958

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1958 Comm Party Org & Ops
1958 CI Famil
1958 Info Rptng,Rpts&Rqmts
1958 Operations
1958 Intel Orient
1959 Picks & Locks
1959 Audio Surveil Mgmt

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
	Feb 1952 - Mar 1958, Contract Employee for DDP/WH/Project HYPOTHESIS					Panama
Mar 1958	Area Ops Off	0136.01	11	D	DDP/WH-III/Central America	Hq
	Jan - Feb 1959, TDY Mexico and Guatemala					
Jun 1959	Instructor(Ops)	1711.50	11	D	OTR/Ops School/Covert Trng	Hq
Jun 1960	Ops Off	0136.01	11	D	DDP/WH-4	"
Aug 1961	" "	0136.01	11	D	DDP/WH-4/FI-CI Sec	"
Jan 1962	" "	0136.01	11	D	DDP/WH/Plans & Ops Stf/Sec A	"
Apr 1963	" "	0136.01	11	D	DDP/SAS/US Fld/Forward Ops Sta	JMWAVE

20. DATE REVIEWED	21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY	22. ITEMS 1-18 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE
24 Oct 1963	OP/POD/O[illegible]/hms/rwh	9 Feb 1960

FORM 1200 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET PROFILE

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO.	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)
27630	

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
HIDALGO, Balmes Nieves, Jr.	May 1919

23.



24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

27. DATE REVIEWED	28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY
	OP/POD/CAB

FORM NO. 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1060 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE. SECRET PROFILE (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 027630

SECTION A — GENERAL

Field	Entry
1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	HIDALGO, BALMES
2. DATE OF BIRTH	27 May 1919
3. SEX	M
4. GRADE	GS-11
5. SD	D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	Ops Officer
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	DDP WH P&O SEC A.
8. CURRENT STATION	
9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT	CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY / CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C) / SPECIAL (Specify):
10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT	INITIAL / X ANNUAL / SPECIAL (Specify): / REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR / REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	30 October 1962
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)	17 Jan 62 - 30 Sep 62

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
No. 1: Responsible for initiation and development of WH Division durable assets program.	P
No. 2: Collate and maintain files on espionage laws of LA countries.	P
No. 3: Served as interpreter and translator for Division LA contacts.	P
No. 4: Coordinated with Branch 1 of WHD on FI and CI matters.	P
No. 5: Gives lectures as guest instructor to students attending School of International Communism.	S
No. 6:	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: P

FORM 6-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

Group 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Hidalgo joined WH/PO/A in November 1961 and took up those responsibilities listed above. However, Mr. Hidalgo's performance of duties was interrupted on two occasions by serious illness, 9-27 March and 15 April-31 May 1962. He was twice hospitalized. From 25 June-9 August 1962, Mr. Hidalgo was on TDY for WH/3 as escort officer for Latin American trainees. Although beset by health and other personal problems, Mr. Hidalgo seized upon each new assignment with his customary energy. He proved particularly adept in working as interpreter and escort officer for Latin American trainees, and demonstrated high interest and proven competence in counterintelligence work. His excellent memory and quick perception were distinct assets in these undertakings.

It is recommended, however, that Mr. Hidalgo's next assignment not carry responsibility for submission of finished papers or staff studies, but be one entailing duties commensurate with his ability to work effectively with indigenous personnel and to pursue CI leads through records investigation.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
18 Sept 62	[signature]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
18 September 1962	C/WH/PO/A	CLARK W. SIMMONS [signature]

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I have had insufficient personal contact with Subject to make any meaningful comments.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
13 September 1962	C/WH/OPS	VERNET L. GRESHAM [signature]

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 027630

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE
HIDALGO Balmes N., Jr.	27 May 1919	Male	GS-11

5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT
D	Operations Officer	DDP/WH, Br. 4, D.C.

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS: NOT ELIGIBLE / MEMBER / DEFERRED / PENDING / DECLINED / DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL / X ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR / REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE / SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 October 1961

11. REPORTING PERIOD: From Oct60 To 30Sep61

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Hqs. C.O. for 3 major CI/FI Projects-at one time comprising 301 Agents. Originates operational traffic, Support traffic and maintains records and files.	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Hqs. C.O. for 8 unilateral independent Agents, including originating operational and Support traffic, and maintaining proper records and files.	4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Interviewing, briefing and debriefing Spanish only speaking Agents and contacts for all operational Sections of the Branch.	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Responsible for spotting, interviewing and recruiting of Cuban students in the U. S. for return to Cuba for operational purposes.	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5:	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee.

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS					X		
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — **NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE**

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Mr. Hidalgo has done a fine job during the reporting period, while assigned to the CI Section of the Branch when it was in its most active period of buildup and operations. The manner in which he accepted any assignment is unusual and he was often working under pressure. During the period, he was on several temporary duty trips in connection with operational activities, which he completed very well.

He has a talent for getting along with and understanding Latin Americans, and with his fluent Spanish language capability, he has performed in a commendable manner. While Mr. Hidalgo has never shunned responsibility, his assignment did entail the delegation of extensive responsibility. It is the feeling of the Rating Officer that he should be given the opportunity for greater responsibility, and training, which will qualify him for a supervisory role. After that, he should be qualified in all respects for promotion to GS-12.

SECTION F — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
11	Subject hospitalized.

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

	EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS		REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
	OTHER (Specify):		

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
20 March 62	D/Chief, WH/4/CI	Robert W. Andrews (signed) Robert W. Andrews

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

X	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
	I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
21 March 1962	C/WH/4/CI	Clark W. Simmons (signed) CLARK W. SIMMONS

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP	DATE: 14 Se tember 1966
TO: (Check) [X] CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION; [ ] CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For Action); [X] CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION WH	SUBJECT: Hidalgo, Balmes N., Jr.
ATTN: Mr. Hannah	
REF: Form 1322 dated 9 September 1966	FILE NO. 9927
OFFICIAL COVER DISCONTINUED: Joint Operations Group	ID CARD NO: 1140 (Returned)
	EMPLOYEE NO.

[X] Unblock Records: (OP Memo 20-800-11)

Effective EOD

[X] Submit Form 642 To Change Limitation Category. (HB 20-800-2 to be redesignated HHB 20-7)

[X] Return All Official Documentation To CCS.

1-PSD/OS

SECRET

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP	DATE: 9 April 1964
TO: (Check) X CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION; CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT, SAS	ESTABLISHED FOR: HIDALGO, Balmes N., Jr.
ATTN: Mr. Dawson	FILE NO.: K-7412
REF: Request for Cover, 9 April 1964	ID CARD NO.:
MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED: US Army Element, Joint Operations Group	NA

[X] BLOCK RECORDS:
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ____________.

X bX CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE EOD.

[ ] SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

[ ] ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

[ ] SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

[ ] SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

[ ] REMARKS:

'S MEMO MUST REMAIN
OP OF FILE

[ ] COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Franklin
CD/sll CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCS

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP	DATE 23 April 1963
TO: (Check) [X] CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION; [ ] CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT SAS	ESTABLISHED FOR HIDALGO, Balmes N., Jr.
ATTN: Mr. Durham	FILE NO. K-7412
REF: Verbal request for cover	ID CARD NO.
MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED: US Army Element, Joint Operations Group	

[X] BLOCK RECORDS:
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ____________.

b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE ____ EOD ____________.

[ ] SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

[ ] ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

[ ] SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

[ ] SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

[ ] REMARKS:

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

[ ] COPY TO CPD/OP

James R. Franklin

CD/pp CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCS

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS. 1-PSD/OS. 1-ADPD/COMPT

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF CANCELLATION OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 9 March 1962

TO: (Check)
- [X] CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION
- [ ] CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT - WH Div

SUBJECT: HIDALGO, BALMES N. JR.

ATTN: WH/SS 1405 Barton Hall

REF: Your request of 1322 dated: undated

FILE NO.: K-7412

MILITARY COVER DISCONTINUED: US Army Element, Joint Operations Group

ID CARD NO.: 832

[X] UNBLOCK RECORDS: (OP memo 20-800-11)

EFFECTIVE 27 October 1960

[ ] SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HD 20-800-2)

[ ] RETURN ALL MILITARY DOCUMENTATION.

[ ] REMARKS:

THIS [illegible] REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

[ ] COPY TO CPD/OP

39165

Robert E. Young

EDF CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCG

DISTRIBUTION: 1-SS/DS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-WRD Compt

FORM 12-61 1551a

SECRET

(13-20-43)

14-00000

S E C R E T

7 March 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

THROUGH : Personnel Security Division
Office of Security

SUBJECT : Balmes N. HIDALGO, Jr., Contract Employee

1. Cover arrangements have been completed for the above named subject.

2. Effective immediately, it is requested that your records be properly (blocked) (XXXXXXXXX) to (deny) (XXXXXXXXXX) subject's current Agency employment by an external inquirer. **Subject is to be converted to Staff Employee status within the next few days.**

3. This memorandum confirms an oral request of **7 March 1958.**

Edward J. Barton
for JOSEPH K. ADAMS
Chief, Official Cover & Liaison, CCD

cc: PSD/CS
EN

S E C R E T

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT:

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR	STEP	NEW SALARY
HIDALGO, B. N., JR.	027630	51 350	V	12	5	$16,034

1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - INITIAL(S)	HIDALGO, B. N. JR.
2. APPOINTMENT DATA	Entered on duty: F.T. / P.T.
3. TOTAL SERVICE FOR LEAVE (as of date of separation)	Years / Months / Days; ☐ More than 15 years
4. DATE AND NATURE OF SEPARATION	RETIREMENT-DISABILITY-UNDER CIA RET AND DIS SYSTEM EFF 2/28/70
Subject to Sec. 203(d) 1951 Leave Act	Yes ☐ No ☐
Ceased to be subject to Sec. 203(d) on ___ Annual Leave Bal ___	

SUMMARY OF ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE (HOURS)

	Annual	Sick
5. Balance from prior leave year ended 1/10 19 70	46	8
6. Current leave year accrual through 2/21 19 70	24	12
7. Total	70	20
8. Reduction in credits, if any (current year)		
9. Total leave taken	4	20
10. Balance	66	-0-

11. Total hours paid in lump sum: 66 hrs
12. Salary rate(s): $15,173.00
13. Lump sum leave dates: From 0830 3/02/70 to 3/11/70 1030 (Hours)

26. Certified correct by: [signature] (Signature) 3/13/70 (Date)
for Chief Payroll (Title) 143-2585 (Telephone)

SUMMARY OF HOME LEAVE (DAYS)

14. Date arrival abroad for HL purposes
15. Current balance as of ___ 19 ___
16. 12 month accrual rate
17. Dates leave used, prior 24 months
18. Monthly accrual date
19. Calendar days credit for next accrual date
20. Date basic service period completed

MILITARY LEAVE

21. Dates during current calendar yr ___ to ___
22. Dates during preceding calendar yr ___ to ___

ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY

LWOP or AWOL or Furlough Suspension (Hours)

23. During leave year in which separated
24. During step-increase waiting period which began on 12/15/68
25. During 12-month HL accrual period (dates)

REMARKS

SCD 7/16/46

Standard Form 1150
November 1965
1150-106

RECORD OF LEAVE DATA TRANSFERRED

U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM SUPPLEMENTS 296-31 AND 990-2

14-00000

5-21-70

70-1271

70-1556

3 1 MAR 1970

Mr. Balmes N. Hidalgo, Jr.
403 Silver Rock Road
Rockville, Maryland 20851

Dear Mr. Hidalgo:

As you bring to a close more than twenty years of service to your country, I want to join your friends and co-workers in wishing you well and hoping that you find the years ahead filled with enjoyment and satisfaction.

It takes the conscientious efforts of many people to do the important work of this Agency. You leave with the knowledge that you have personally contributed to our success in carrying out our mission. Your faithful and loyal support has measured up to the high ideals and traditions of the Federal service.

May I express to you my appreciation and extend my best wishes for the years ahead.

Sincerely,

/s/ Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - C/EAB/OS
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

Originator: ______________________
Director of Personnel

Concur: ______________________
C/EAB/OS

OP/RAD/ROB/PJSeidel:jat/3257 (5 March 1970)

14-00000

8 SEP 1970

Mr. Balmes N. Hidalgo, Jr.
403 Silver Rock Road
Rockville, Maryland 20851

Dear Mr. Hidalgo:

It is the practice of the Organization to follow up with former employees six months after their retirement. We hope by such inquiry to obtain information on what our retirees are doing and where they are located, invite suggestions for improving the retirement program and to learn if the Organization might be of some assistance on any post-retirement matters.

We should like very much to hear from you on the above points and on any other topics you think would be useful to us.

For your convenience in replying, we have enclosed a sheet somewhat akin to a form on which we have listed those standard items of information we'd like to have on every retiree. The remainder of the sheet, including the reverse side, is for your comments and suggestions. We shall be most appreciative of your fullest response to this inquiry.

Thank you very much for your cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

Carroll A. Duchay
Personnel Officer

Enclosures:
Questionnaire
Return Envelope

Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - OPF
1 - RAD Subject's File

OP/RAD/EFAB/MLShobe:dag (31 Aug 70)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DSJ: 4 MAR 70

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
027630	HIDALGO, B K JR

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4 EFFECTIVE DATE	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
RETIREMENT-DISABILITY-UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	02 28 70	REGULAR

6 FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
					0235 0830 0000	P.L. 88-643 SECT. 231

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/WH BRANCH 2 PANAMA SECTION	WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE	12 POSITION NUMBER	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	1312	D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE AND STEP	17 SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	12 5	15173

18 REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26 DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF LEI
45	10					05 27 1.		

28 NTE EXPIRES	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA (1 CSC, 2 CIA, 3 FICA, 5 NONE)	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction / Cancellation Data	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX
			E000				

35 VET PREFERENCE (0 NONE, 1-5 PT, 2-10 PT)	36 SERV COMP DATE	37 LONG COMP DATE	38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP)	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 WAIVER, 1 YES; HEALTH INS CODE)	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44 STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

R. S. WATTLES

POSTED
03-05-70 jbc

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg 10-67 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

BBG

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

BSJ, 4 MAR 70

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
027630	HIDALGO B N JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
RETIREMENT-DISABILITY-UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	02 28 70	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	0235 0620 0000	P.L. 88-643 SECT. 231

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	1319	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	12 5	15173

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

14-00000

*PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 202 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED OCTOBER 1962.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
HIDALGO B N JR	027630	51 350	V	GS 12 5	$15,173

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
027630	HIDALGO B N JR	51 350	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ
GS 12	4	$13,392	12/18/66	GS 12	5	$13,798	12/15/68		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: [signature] DATE: 10 October 68

☑ NO EXCESS LWOP

☑ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☑ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS — AUDIT: E. S. WRICE

FORM 7-65 560 E Use previous editions. PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 215 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
HIDALGO B N JR	027630	51 350	V	GS 12 4	$12,607	$13,392

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
HIDALGO B N JR	027630	51 350	V	GS 12 4	$12,064	$12,607

14-00000

c/wH/2 G 30

1 Serial No.	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
027630	HIDALGO B N JR	51 390 V	

5 Old Salary Rate				6 New Salary Rate				7 Type Action		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 12	3	$11,685	12/19/65	GS 12	4	$12,064	12/18/66			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ NO EXCESS LWOP
/ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
027630	HIDALGO B N JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	14 60	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
X					0620	PL 2643 SECT. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP WH	WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
		2	

18. REMARKS YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED OF YOUR RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS ACTION TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF HR 20-50. SUCH APPEAL MUST BE RECEIVED IN THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR WITHIN 30 CALENDAR DAYS FROM THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS ACTION.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE | 20 Employee Code | 21 OFFICE CODING | 22 STATION CODE | 23 INTEGREE CODE | 24 Category | 25 DATE OF BIRTH | 26 DATE OF GRADE | 27 DATE OF LEI

28 NTE EXPIRES | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30 RETIREMENT DATA | 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE | 36 SERV. COMP. DATE | 37 LONG COMP DATE | 38 CAREER CATEGORY | 39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA | 42 LEAVE CAT CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44 | STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

027630

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET (When Filled In)

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
HIDALGO [illegible] JR	027630	51 350	V	GS 12 3	$[illegible],355	$11,685

G33

Serial No.	Name	Cost Center Number	LWOP Hours
027630	HIDALGO [illegible] JR	51 500	

OLD SALARY RATE				NEW SALARY RATE				TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PI	[illegible]	ADJ
GS 12	2	$10,927	12/20/64	GS 12	3	$11,355	12/1 /65			

NO EXCESS LWOP
IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS — AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

SIGNATURE E. D. ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

14-00000

JH: 17 DEC 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
027630	HIDALGO B N JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	12 19 65	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
X	6235 0620 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/WH BRANCH 2 PANAMA SECTION	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	1318	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	12 3	11355

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC)	(ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Headrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	51350	WH	75013		1	05 27 19		

28. NTE EXPIRES | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ NO | 34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE | 36. SERV COMP DATE | 37. LONG COMP DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA | 42. LEAVE CAT | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
HIDALGO R N JR	027630	51 500	V	GS 12 2	$10,605	$10,987

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS 05/27/65

1 SERIAL NUMBER	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
027630	HIDALGO B N JR

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4 EFFECTIVE DATE	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	05 31 65	

6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	5235 1162 0000	

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/WH DIVISION WH C MIAMI OPS BR FI SEC	WASH., D. C.

11 POSITION TITLE	12 POSITION NUMBER	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	1145	D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE AND STEP	17 SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	12	

18 REMARKS

POSTED
6-9-65

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B 1-63 MFG 1-63 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

3CF

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
027630	HIDALGO B N JR	49 997 43F	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 12	1	$10,250	12/22/63	GS 12	2	$10,605	12/20/64			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS   AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE   DATE

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

MHC: 2 NOV 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1 SERIAL NUMBER	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
027630	HIDALGO B N JR

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR)	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	11 02 64	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V / CF TO V	V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
X			5235 1162 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/SAS COUNTERINTELLIGENCE STAFF OPERATIONS SECTION	WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12 POSITION NUMBER	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	0887	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	12 1	10250

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF LEI
37	10	49150	SAS	75013		1	05 27 19		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 4 - NONE) CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 NONE, 1 5 PT, 2 10 PT)	36 SERV COMP DATE	37. LONG COMP DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA	44 STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: DEV COMP 2

E.D.ECHOLS

POSTED 11/02/64

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,6[illegible]	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

14-00000

RZP: 22 APR 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OAF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
027530	HIDALGO E N JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
CAREER PROVISIONAL EXCEPTED APPT	04 1 26 4	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V / CF TO V	V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	X			4232 1000 1000	50 USC 403

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/SAS CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	2327	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
CS	0136.01	12 1	9980

18. REMARKS
OTHER

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC)	21. OFFICE CODING (ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
13	12	42327	SAS	25013		1	05 27	2 22 3	12 22 3

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA		33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
		1 CSC / 2 FICA / 3 NONE — CODE 1			EOD DATA	00000	M

35. VET PREFERENCE	36. SERV COMP DATE	37. LONG COMP DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
0	07 1	03 17 59	P	1	

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA		44. STATE TAX DATA
1	2	0	0	

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
4.29.64 [illegible]

[illegible]

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

28 APR 1964

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SCR: 28 APR 64

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
027230	Hidalgo, B.H. Jr

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
RESIGNATION	04 25 64	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	CF TO V	X CF TO CF	4132 2001 1000	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/SAS US FIELD FORWARD OPERATIONS STATION-JMWAVE CI SECTION	JMWAVE

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	0731	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	12 1	9980

18. REMARKS

FOLDED ON
29 Apr 64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
45	10					05 27 19		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE)	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
			1800031				

35. VET. PREFERENCE	36. SERV COMP DATE	37. LONG COMP DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FOLDED
4-29-64 41

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

28 APR 1964

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

5/25

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
[redacted] Hidalgo, B. H. Jr.	027630	49 730	CF	GS 12 1	$ 9,475	$ 9,980

POSTED ON OF-4b

8 ... 1964

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

200: 20 DEC 63

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
027636	[redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
PROMOTION	12 22 63	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
				X	4132 2001 1000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP SPECIAL AFFAIRS STAFF U. S. FIELD FORWARD OPERATIONS STATION-JMWAVE CI SECTION	JMWAVE

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS. OFFICER	0731	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	12 1	9475

18. REMARKS

3C Disc

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC)	(ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
22	10	40730	SAS	33340		2	05 27 19	12 22 63	12 22 63

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX
		1 CSC 2 FICA 3 NONE					

35. VET PREFERENCE	36. SERV COMP DATE	37. LONG COMP DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

12/27/63

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET 20 DEC 1963

(When Filled In)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LLG: 25 APRIL 63

OAB

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 027630
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): [redacted] Hargis, [illegible]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT CAREER PROVISIONAL
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 04 DA. 28 YR. 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / X CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3132 2001 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP SPECIAL AFFAIRS STAFF
U. S. FIELD
FORWARD OPERATIONS STATION-JMWAVE
CI SECTION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: JMWAVE

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0732
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 8840

18. REMARKS

POSTED ON [illegible] 6 MAY 1963

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING Numeric	Alphabetic	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
13	10	61730	SAS	99939		2	05 27 19	03 17 58	09 16 62

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX
		1				27630	M1

35 VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES)	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
0	07 16 46	03 17 58	P	1		

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE
1	8		0	0				

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED 5/6/63 WK

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET 25 APR 1963

(When Filled In)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RZR: 25 APR 63

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
027630	HIDALCO D N JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
RESIGNATION	04 27 63	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V / CF TO V	V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
X			3232 1000 1000	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/SPECIAL AFFAIRS STAFF FI/CI BRANCH	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	0592	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	11 4	8340

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Nature Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
45	10					05 27 19		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE)	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA		33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
			1ED0031		EOD DATA		

35. VET PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV COMP. DATE	37. LONG COMP DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	44. STATE TAX DATA
0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS		FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMP / STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
05/01 3 JK

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

ABM: 20 NOV 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1 SERIAL NUMBER	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
027630	HICALGO B N JR

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	11 20 62	REGULAR

6 FUNDS	7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
X V TO V	3232 1000 1000	50 USC 403 J

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP TASK FORCE "W" FI-CI BRANCH	WASH., D. C.

11 POSITION TITLE	12 POSITION NUMBER	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	0682	D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE AND STEP	17 SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	11 4	8840

18 REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH	26 DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF LEI
37	10	61300	TFW	75013		1	05 27 19		

28 NTE EXPIRES | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30 RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) | 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY REQ NO | 34 SEX

35 VET. PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT) | 36 SERV COMP DATE | 37 LONG COMP DATE | 38 CAREER CATEGORY | 39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES) | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS) | 42 LEAVE CAT CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44 STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED 12/11/62 JK

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FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

14-00000

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956 , SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
HIDALGO B N JR	027630	64075	V	11 4	$ 8340	11 4	$ 8840

235-1000

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

1 Serial No	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
027630	HIDALGO B N JR	64 075 V 1	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 11	3	$ 8,080	03/19/61	GS 11	4	$ 8,340	09/16/62			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ ✓ / NO EXCESS LWOP / / EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS JMG AUDITED BY

Form 1961 560

14-00000

AES: 17 JAN 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
027630	HIDALGO B N JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	01 17 62	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	X				2235 1000 1000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP WH PLANS & OPERATIONS STAFF SECTION A	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	0641	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	11 3	8080

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	64075	WH	75013		1	05 27 19		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 CSC, 3 FICA, 5 NONE)	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE	36. SERV COMP DATE	37. LONG COMP DATE	38. MIL SERV CREDIT/LCD	39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

1/18/62 gm

Form 1150 841 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

14-00000

ARE: 18 AUG 1961

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Field	Entry
1. SERIAL NUMBER	027630
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	HIDALGO B N JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	08 20 61
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	X CF TO V
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	2635 5000 6021
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP WH BRANCH 4 FI CI SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE	OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER	0681
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP	11 3
17. SALARY OR RATE	8060
18. REMARKS	

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employee Code	21. OFFICE CODING (Numerical)	(Alphabetical)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Health Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
16	10	64450	WH	75013		1	05 27 19		

28. NTE EXPIRES — 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE — 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE; CODE) — 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE — 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO DA YR) — EOD DATA — 33. SECURITY REQ NO — 34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE (CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT) — 36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR) — 37. LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR) — 38. MIL SERV. CREDIT/LCD (1 - YES, 2 - NO) — 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE; 0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE) — 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)) — 42. LEAVE CAT CODE — 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED: 1 - YES, 2 - NO; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) — 44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED: 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

08/21/61 WK

Form 6-60 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
327630	HIDALGO B N JR	DDP/WH 3A UV	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 11	2	$ 7,820	09/20/59	11	3	$ 8,030	03/19/61			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ X / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

E.D. ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

SECRET

14-00000

43

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ADPD 05/21/64

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
827630	HIDALGO R N JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
CONV. TO CAREER EMPLOYEE STATUS	03 17 61	

6. FUNDS				7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
X	V TO V		V TO U	4232 1990 1000	
	U TO V		U TO U		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/SAS	

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
		D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
D	HIDALGO B N JR	527630	46 17	GS-11 2	$ 7,270	$ 7,820

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

AES: 24 JUNE 1960

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth (Mo. Da. Yr.)	4. Vet. Pref. Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD (Mo. Da. Yr.)
527630	HIDALGO B N JR	05 27 19	1	M 1	03 17 58

7. SCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	8. CSC Retmt. Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidavit (Mo. Da. Yr.)	11. FEGLI Code	12. LCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	13. Code
07 16 46	1	50 USCA 403 J			03 17 58	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OTR OPERATIONS SCHOOL COVERT TRAINING	1172	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept. Field Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
3	INSTRUCTOR OPERS	1014	GS	1711.50

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade (Mo. Da. Yr.)	25. PSI Due (Mo. Da. Yr.)	26. Appropriation Number
11 2	$ 7270	D	03 17 58	09 20 59	9 7500 30 018

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date (Mo. Da. Yr.)	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	57	06 26 60	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH 4	4617	WASH., D.C.	75013

33. Dept. Field Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
1	OPS OFFICER	0626	GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade (Mo. Da. Yr.)	42. PSI Due (Mo. Da. Yr.)	43. Appropriation Number
11 2	$ 7270	D	03 17 58	03 19 61	0135 1000 1000

44. Remarks

06-27-60 WK

FORM NO. 1150a 1 MAR 59

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
527630	HIDALGO B H JR	DDS/TRNG 21	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA	YR	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA	YR
GS 11	1	$ 7,030	03	17	58	GS 11	2	$ 7,270	09	20	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE [X] NO EXCESS LWOP [ ] EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

[ ] IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

[ ] IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE

GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO	DA	YR

13. REMARKS

U 756

14. AUTHENTICATION

CF

[handwritten initials and dates] 9/2/59 9/6/59

C. M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560a 1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

14-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

JEC:12 JUNE 59

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth (Mo. Da. Yr.)	4. Vet. Pref (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code	5. Sex	6. CSC/EOD (Mo. Da. Yr.)
527630	HIDALGO B N JR	05 27 19	1	M 1	03 17 58

7. SCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	8. CSC Retmt (Yes-1 No-2) Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. (Mo. Da. Yr.)	11. FEGLI (Yes-1 No-2) Code	12. LCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	13. (Yes-1 No-2) Code
07 16 46	1	50 USCA 403J		1	03 17 58	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH 1P1 CENTRAL AMERICA SECTION	4613	WASH., D.C.	75013

16. Dept.-Field (Dept-1 USfld-3 Frgn-5) Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
2	AREA OPS OF	0486	GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade (Mo. Da. Yr.)	25. PSI Due (Mo. Da. Yr.)	26. Appropriation Number
11 1	$ 7030	D	03 17 58	09 20 59	8 3500 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date (Mo. Da. Yr.)	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS	05	06 14 59	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OTR OPERATIONS SCHOOL COVERT TRAINING	1172	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept.-Field (Dept-1 USfld-3 Frgn-5) Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
3	INSTRUCTOR OPERS	1914	GS	1711.50

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade (Mo. Da. Yr.)	42. PSI Due (Mo. Da. Yr.)	43. Appropriation Number
11 1	$ 7030	D	03 17 58	09 20 59	9 7500 20 018

44. Remarks

POSTED
CP

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1150a

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE
12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI
DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
HIDALGO B N JR	127630	GS-11-1	$ 6,390	$ 7,030

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

LVL 16 MAY 58

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth (Mo. Da. Yr.)	4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt.-1, 10 Pt.-2) Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD (Mo. Da. Yr.)
127630	BALMES N. HIDALGO, JR. / HIDALGO B N JR	05 27 19	1	M 1	03 17 58

7. SCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No-2) Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt Affidav. (Mo. Da. Yr.)	11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code	12. LCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	13. (Yes-1, No-2) Code
07 16 46	1	50 USCA 403 J	03 13 58	1	03 17 58	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code

16. Dept. - Field (Dept. - 2, USfld - 4, Frgn - 6) Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade (Mo. Da. Yr.)	25. PSI Due (Mo. Da. Yr.)	26. Appropriation Number
	$				

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date (Mo. Da. Yr.)	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT CORRECTION*	13	03 17 58	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH / BRANCH III / CENTRAL AMERICA SECTION	4613	WASH., D.C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field (Dept. - 2, USfld - 4, Frgn - 6) Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
2	AREA OPS OF	0486	GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade (Mo. Da. Yr.)	42. PSI Due (Mo. Da. Yr.)	43. Appropriation Number
11 1	$ 6390	0	03 17 58	03 20 59	9 3500 20

44. Remarks

*THIS ACTION CORRECTS SF 1150 EFF 17 MAR 58, ITEM #2, THE NAME, WHICH READ BALMES N. HIDALGO TO READ BALMES N. HIDALGO, JR.

FORM NO. 1150 1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

LVL 17 MAR 58

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2)	Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
127630	BALMES N. HIDALGO / HIDALGO BALMES N	05	27	19	1		M 1	03	17	58

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Yes-1 No-2	Code
07	16	46		1	50 USCA 403 J	03	13	58		1	03	17	58		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code

16. Dept.-Field (Dept-2, USfld-4, Frgn-6)	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
	$								

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT	13	03	17	58	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH III CENTRAL AMERICA SECTION	4613	WASH., D.C.	75013

33. Dept.-Field (Dept-2, USfld-4, Frgn-6)	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	2	AREA OPS OF	0486	GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
11 1	$ 6390	D	03	17	58	09	20	59	8 3500 20

44. Remarks

POSTED
7 MAY 1958

FORM NO. 1150 1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

FITNESS RPTS

1966 - 1969

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 027630

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
[illegible], [illegible] [illegible], Jr.	27 [illegible] 1919		GS-12	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Officer	DDP/ [illegible]/C	Headquarters

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

- X CAREER
- RESERVE
- TEMPORARY
- CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

- INITIAL
- X ANNUAL
- REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- X REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 15 March - 31 October 1965

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
- P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
- S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Headquarters desk officer responsible for the support of Miami Station CI/CE activities and operations.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Advisor to various components of the WH and WE Divisions on Cuban operations with specific reference to the Cuban Security Intelligence Service, organization, modus operandi and personnel.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Briefing representatives of foreign liaison services and selected agents visiting in Washington on the Cuban Security and Intelligence Services and his ~~own unique experience in the Communist Party.~~	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Translator/interpreter: Served as consultant to WH Division on Cuban Spanish.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5:	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

4 JAN 1966

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Hidalgo is an able intelligence officer, devoted to his profession and selfless in his desire to be of service to the Government. Although he has suffered ill health in recent years, he was insistent that he be among the first to be sent to the Dominican Republic when the crisis occurred.

An intense person, Mr. Hidalgo is industrious, works well under pressure and sets high standards for his performance. Because he is intent on getting things done, he is occasionally hasty in judgment and in written presentation of the results of his research and conclusions. He is perceptive, quickly accepts suggestions and offers counter-proposals with cogent argument. Mr. Hidalgo was not in a supervisory capacity. He was cost conscious; always endeavoring to be conservative where possible.

He is an effective and cooperative member of an office, ready to assume responsibility and to help his colleagues. Thanks to his unique experience on the Cuban target, he has wide knowledge of the Cuban problem and is, in fact, an expert on the Cuban Security and Intelligence Services.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
9 December 1965	[signature]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
8 months		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
9 December 1965	C/WH/C/MO/FI-CI	Susan L. Darling [signature]

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with the supervisor's assessment of Mr. Hidalgo with [redacted] exception to the statement that Subject works well under pressure. He is indeed an intense person and, under great pressure, his involvement affects his performance; and even more important, it has a very bad effect on his health. With this consideration noted, the undersigned thinks very highly of Mr. Hidalgo and would be pleased to be associated with him again.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
9 December 1965	C/WH/C/MO	Walter T. Cini [signature]

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 027630

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
HIDALGO, Balmes N.	27 May 1919	M	12	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Officer	DDP/SAS	Washington

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT	10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY	INITIAL / REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)	XX ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):	SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
31 January 1965	9 April 1964--15 March 1965

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Participated (with other WH/SA/CI officers) in the handling and debriefing of a defected intelligence officer housed in the Headquarters area.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Served as Headquarters desk case officer for several counterintelligence operations--prepared cables, dispatches, and memoranda pertaining to these operations.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Assisted in translations and preparation of operational documents in Spanish (s/w messages, cover letters, owvl messages, etc.).	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Served as case officer for a counterintelligence operation (the agent was located in New York City) which included the debriefing, assessing, training, and dispatching of the agent to a denied area (Cuba).	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5:	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

29 MAR 1965

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Hidalgo's fluent knowledge of Cuban Spanish, his previous experience in DD/P Cuban operations, and his broad knowledge of Cuba (people, geography, customs, etc.) made him a particularly useful and versatile operations officer during his assignment in the WH/SA counterintelligence operations section. As indicated in Section B (specific duties) he performed a wide variety of duties.

Mr. Hidalgo approached and performed his assignments with enthusiasm, keeness, dedication, and promptness. He displayed a partioular talent for conducting debriefings, and it was in this type activity that he performed best. He also writes well which added to his debriefing capability as well as to his performance as a Headquarters desk operations officer in writing cables, dispatches, memoranda, etc. Mr. Hidalgo is cost conscious and effective in the use of space, equipment and funds. He does not hold a supervisory position.

Mr. Hidalgo performed most of his duties with a minimum of supervision. In a few instances, however, he had a tendency (in his eagerness and desire to get the job done well) to become impatient with the slow and deliberate pace of progress which is sometimes necessary in operational activities. In these few instances, Mr. Hidalgo's work required supervision by a senior operations officer.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
23 March 65	[signature]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
11 Months		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
23 March 1965	WH/SA/CI/COPS	Richard Tansing

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Mr. Hidalgo is a sound operations officer with native fluency in Spanish. His impatience is with administrative delays rather than with operational problems which he understands fully and handles well. He has had problems with his health but these largely have been overcome and in the past 9 months have not impeded his operational usefulness. As of the date of this fitness report, he appears fully capable of handling any CI or FI operation assigned to him.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
23 III 65	C WH/SA CI (WH/C/SP)	Harold F. Swenson

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 027630

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
[redacted]	27 May 1919	Male	GS-11	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
OPS OFFICER	DDP/S.A.S.	JMWAVE

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY / CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C) / SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL / REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR / ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE / XX SPECIAL (Specify): Promotion

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 6 May 1963 to 5 September 1963

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: To effect security screenings of PBRUMEN refugees arriving in the JMWAVE area from PBRUMEN in joint collaboration with ODENVY representatives.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: To interrogate PBRUMEN security suspects, surfaced by the above screenings and other means, in conjunction with representatives of the KUJUMP interrogation center [redacted]	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: To supervise the interrogation efforts of three KUJUMP interrogators connected with the JMWAVE/KUJUMP KUDESK debriefing program.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: To prepare and present to his immediate supervisor completed interrogation reports.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5:	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

POSTED ON

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

27 SEP 1963

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

SEP 26 2 07 PM '63

The person being rated is a conscientious devoted individual who has demonstrated an extraordinary ability to get along with his co-workers and other ODYOKE representatives with whom he is collaborating. He receives his assignments cheerfully and with enthusiasm and approaches all of his tasks with great zeal. He devotes an inordinate amount of his own personal time to his duties in an effort to achieve perfection and sets very high standards for his own performance. The person being rated speaks native Spanish and is able to accomplish all of his interrogations in Spanish. This ability is a great asset to him in his work and redounds in benefits to the KUDESK effort of the Station.

The person being rated is an accomplished interrogator and thus receives very little guidance in his work. His ability to trap security suspects in contradictions is unique and is paying dividends in the WAVE KUDESK field of endeavor. He has shown mature judgment in the handling of complex security cases, balance in appraising the interrogation results and in recommending disposal action, and proficiency in the preparation of his interrogation reports. He is currently supervising the interrogation activities of three KUJUMP interrogators [redacted] and has shown an ability in establishing personal rapport with these interrogators and proficiency in drecting their activities. It is recommended from the standpoint of his career development that after the completion of his current assignment, the person being rated be moved into an assignment involving the handling of agents in the KUDESK field of effort.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
4 months	At time preparation this report employee was on TDY Hqs and leave. Will be shown him upon return.	
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
4 September 1963	Chief, CI Branch, JMWAVE	/s/ Neil T. PICKWORTH (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Subject is a hard working, dedicated, productive intelligence officer who has completely mastered those basic tools of the trade which are needed in CI activities. Subject has and uses native Spanish language fluency. Subject's performance during the period covered by this fitness report warrants an overall evaluation of "Strong." As a result, it is believed that Subject is a well-qualified journeyman who has earned a promotion to the grade of GS-12. Subject is strongly recommended for promotion to the grade of GS-12. Subject has additional growth potential as an intelligence officer. Subject's activities come to the attention of the Reviewing Officer on a bi-weekly basis.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
18 September 1963	Chief of Station, JMWAVE	/s/ Andrew K. REUTEMAN (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 027630

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
HIDALGO, BALMES	27 May 1919	M	GS-11	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Officer	DDP WH P&O SEC A.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY / CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C) / SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL / REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR / X ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE / SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 October 1962

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 17 Jan 62 - 30 Sep 62

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- **W - Weak** — Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- **A - Adequate** — Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
- **P - Proficient** — Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
- **S - Strong** — Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- **O - Outstanding** — Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING LETTER
NO. 1: Responsible for initiation and development of WH Division durable assets program.	P
NO. 2: Collate and maintain files on espionage laws of LA countries.	P
NO. 3: Served as interpreter and translator for Division LA contacts.	P
NO. 4: Coordinated with Branch 1 of WHD on FI and CI matters.	P
NO. 5: Gives lectures as guest instructor to students attending School of International Communism.	S
NO. 6:	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: P

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Hidalgo joined WH/PO/A in November 1961 and took up those responsibilities listed above. However, Mr. Hidalgo's performance of duties was interrupted on two occasions by serious illness, 9-27 March and 15 April-31 May 1962. He was twice hospitalized. From 25 June-9 August 1962, Mr. Hidalgo was on TDY for WH/3 as escort officer for Latin American trainees. Although beset by health and other personal problems, Mr. Hidalgo seized upon each new assignment with his customary energy. He proved particularly adept in working as interpreter and escort officer for Latin American trainees, and demonstrated high interest and proven competence in counterintelligence work. His excellent memory and quick perception were distinct assets in these undertakings.

It is recommended, however, that Mr. Hidalgo's next assignment not carry responsibility for submission of finished papers or staff studies, but be one entailing duties commensurate with his ability to work effectively with indigenous personnel and to pursue CI leads through records investigation.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
18 Sept 62	[signature]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
18 September 1962	C/WH/PO/A	CLARK H. SIMMONS [signature]

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I have had insufficient personal contact with Subject to make any meaningful comments.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
13 September 1962	C/WH/OPS	VERNE L. GRESHAM [signature]

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CERTIFICATION OF SEPARATING EMPLOYEE	Name (Last-First-Middle) Hidalgo, Balmes

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD - ATTACH TO OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of the following forms and/or information concerning my separation from CIA as indicated by check mark:

✓	1. Standard Form 8 (Notice to Federal Employee about Unemployment Compensation).
✓	2. Standard Form 55 (Notice of Conversion Privilege, Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance). N/A
	3. Standard Form 56 (Agency Certification of Insurance Status, Federal Employers' Group Life Insurance Act of 1954).
✓	4. Standard Form 2802 (Application for Refund of Retirement Deductions). Medical Disability
✓	5. Form 2595 (Authorization for Disposition of Paychecks). NO CHANGE
	6. Applicable to returnee (resignee from overseas assignment). I have been advised of my right to have a medical examination before my separation from this Agency and of the importance of such a medical check to my health and well-being. ☐ Appointment arranged with Office of Medical Services. ☐ Appointment for Office of Medical Services examination declined.
	7. I have been informed of "conflict of interests" policy of the Agency and foresee no problem in this regard concerning my new employment.
	8. Form 71 (Application for Leave).
	9. CSC Pamphlet 51 (Re-employment Rights of Federal Employees Performing Armed Forces Duty).
	10. Instructions for returning to duty from Extended Leave or Active Military Service.

Signature of Employee	Date Signed
[signature]	Feb 27, 1970
Address (Street, City, State, Zip Code) 403 Silver Rock Rd Rockville Md 20851	Correspondence ☑ Overt ☐ Covert

or c/o Veronica Hidalgo x6646

SECRET

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle): HIDALGO JrBalmes Nieves

DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year): May 27 1919

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 123 05 9966

Employee Serial Number 27630

EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY

LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance — [X] (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance — [ ] (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance — [ ] (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB," THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print) [signature]

DATE 13 February 1963

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 20 3 30 PM '68

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

SECRET

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1968
(For use only until April 14, 1968)
176-101

STANDARD FORM 61
REVISED MARCH 1955
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
F. P. M. CHAPTER A8

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Department or agency) (Bureau or division) WASHINGTON, D.C. (Place of employment)

I, BALMES HIDALGO JR., do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I knowingly a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the constitutional form of the Government of the United States, or which seeks by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) that I will not so advocate, nor will I knowingly become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government or any agency thereof.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not participating in any strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, and I will not so participate while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof. I do not and will not assert the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof. I do further swear (or affirm) that I am not knowingly a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof and I will not, while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, knowingly become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not, nor has anyone acting in my behalf, given, transferred, promised or paid any consideration for or in expectation or hope of receiving assistance in securing such appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

17 Mar 58 (Date of entrance on duty) — [signature] (Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 13 th day of March A. D. 1958,

at Washington, (City) D.C. (State)

[SEAL] — [signature] (Signature of officer)

Appointment Clerk (Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

16—58180-8

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DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Admitted unfavorable information about such matters as arrests or discharges will be considered together with the favorable information in your record in determining your present fitness for Federal employment. However, a false statement or dishonest answer to any question may be grounds for dismissal after appointment and is punishable by law.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (street and number, city and State): c/o 4615 [illegible] Place NW - Wash 16, D. C.

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH: 27 May 1919 — (B) PLACE OF BIRTH (city and State or city and foreign country): Habana, Cuba

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, PLEASE NOTIFY: Louise Hidalgo — (B) RELATIONSHIP: wife — (C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE: — (D) TELEPHONE NO.:

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☒ NO
If so, for each such relative fill in the blank below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 12.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (Give street number, if any)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED	SINGLE (Check one)
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. (A) ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, OR (B) AS A NATIVE OF AMERICAN SAMOA DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA?	✓	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 12.*	/	
7. DO YOU RECEIVE OR HAVE YOU APPLIED FOR AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 12.*	[illegible]	✓
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED, CHARGED, OR HELD BY FEDERAL, STATE, OR OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES FOR ANY VIOLATION OF ANY FEDERAL LAW, STATE LAW, COUNTY OR MUNICIPAL LAW, REGULATION OR ORDINANCE? DO NOT INCLUDE TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED. ALL OTHER CHARGES MUST BE INCLUDED EVEN IF THEY WERE DISMISSED. *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 12 for each case, (1) approximate date, (2) charge, (3) place, (4) action taken.*		/
9. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU BEEN BARRED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 12.*		/

INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
10. (A) HAVE YOU EVER FILED A WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE ACT?		✓
(B) IF YOU HAVE FILED SUCH A WAIVER, HAS IT BEEN CANCELED OR REVOKED?		✓
11. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT: A. HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED FROM EMPLOYMENT BECAUSE: (1) YOUR CONDUCT WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		/
(2) YOUR WORK WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		/
B. HAVE YOU RESIGNED AFTER OFFICIAL NOTIFICATION THAT: (1) YOUR CONDUCT WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		/
(2) YOUR WORK WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		/
C. HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED FROM THE ARMED SERVICES UNDER OTHER THAN HONORABLE CONDITIONS? *If your answer to A, B, or C is "Yes," give details in Item 12 as clearly as you can remember, including the name and address of employer, approximate date, and reasons in each case.*		/

12. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (Indicate item numbers to which answers apply.)

ITEM NO.		ITEM NO.	
			HAS LEAVE [illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER.—You must determine that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations, and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, any record of recent discharge or arrest, age, citizenship, and members of family. Also, to establish the identity of the appointee, you should particularly check (1) his signature and handwriting against the application and/or other pertinent papers and (2) his physical appearance against the medical certificate.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information, however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
027630	Hidalgo, Balmes N. Jr.	05/27/19

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City State Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From To)	GRADUATE
La Salle Academy	NYC NY	1938-1940	[X] YES [ ] NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM-TO	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1.	NY University	Comm Law	IMP-EXP	1943-45	NO		
	UNIV of MD	Fire engineering		1968	No Credit Course		
2.	Mont Jr College	Real Estate Procedures		1968	No Credit Course		

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
Suburban Hospital	Emergency Room procedures	~~XXXXXXXX~~ 1968		3(?)

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.	Non-Com leadership school		1947		?
2.					

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single Married Widowed Separated Divorced Annulled Remarried) SPECIFY: MARRIED

2. NAME OF SPOUSE	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Maiden)
	HIDALGO	Veronica	Waylonis	Waylonis

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City State Country)
23 May 14	DuBois, Pa, USA

5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER
Admin Asst	CIA

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED
US	N/A	Birth

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

	NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1	[ ] ADD [X] DELETE	Daughter	1945 NYC NY	US	Arlington, Va
2	[ ] ADD [X] DELETE	Daughter	1950 NYC NY	US	Alexandria Va
	ADD	Mother	1892 SPAIN	US	Rockville Md

FORM 444n 2-68 SECRET (4-31)

(H [illegible])

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Havana Cuba	Language, customs, people	1919-35		X			X
Rep of Panama	" " "	1952-58		X	X		X
El Salvador, Mexico	" " "	various		X	X		X
Guatemala, Puerto Rico	" " "	various		X	X		X
Hawaii	" " "			X	X		X

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM) 2. SHORTHAND (WPM) 3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify)

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED

Extremely capable in First Aid (advanced) and teaching of same. Firefighting procedures.
Elementary knowledge of Real Estate Procedures.

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☒ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION: N/A
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS: N/A
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON: N/A

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG: ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD
NONE

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE: N/A
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK: N/A
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION: N/A
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY: ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☒ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT: N/A
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED: N/A

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	RESIDENT / AGENCY-SPONSORED
Non-Com leadership school	same	????	

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State Country)	FROM	TO
American Red Cross	Silver Spring Md	1964	present
Rockville Fire Dept and OTHERS	(presently Rockville, Md)	1958	present
International Rescue & 1st Aid Assoc	worldwide	1956(?)	present
Montgomery Board of Realtors (ASSOCIATE member)(Permanency pending)		1958	present

SECTION X — REMARKS

I am a bit hazy on the dates.

DATE: 19 Dec 68

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: [signature]

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

(When Filled In)

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY (CHECK (X)): RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Cuba	Area and people/Lan.	1919-1924	Family	X		X	X
Panama	Area and people/Lan	1952-58	XXXX	X	X	X	X
Dom Rep	Area and People/Lan	1965			X		X
Salvador&Guat & Mexi	" " " "	1961-2-3			X		X

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM) 2. SHORTHAND (WPM) 3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM

☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED

Quite proficient in photography - Safety and Fire engineering - First Aid including the Instruction of First Aid& Hospital Coppsman duties. SOME Real Estate knowledge.

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION: See age.
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG: NONE

☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE: N/A
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK: N/A
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION: N/A
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY: ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY(active) ☐ STANDBY(inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☒ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT: N/A
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED: N/A

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
Non-Com leadership school	Infantry	1943	N/A / N/A

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
1. Rockville Fire Dept & others	Rockville Md & others	1958	present
2. Red Cross as Emeregncy transport and First Aid Instructor as well as Md Corpsman		1964	"
Associate member Mont Realtors		1968	"
3. Int Assoc Rescue & First Aid		1964	"

SECTION X — REMARKS

Re Section IV: Both daughters now married.
Re Section III: This is second marraige.
Re Real Estate training: This still in active stage. Plans are to supplement my work and eventually change to it on full time basis.

DATE: 25 Nov 68

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: [signature]

SECRET

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(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444i, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted; enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not. Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
027630	Hidalgo, Balmes N.	05/27/19

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
La Salle Acedemy	NYCity NY	1938-40	[X] YES [ ] NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1.	New York Universtity	Comm Law	Import-Export procedures	1943/45	NO		
2.							

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
University of Md. College of Engineering	Fire Service extension	Jan 66	Aug66	8

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1	Montgomery Junior College Rockville Md Campus	Real Estate procedures	Oct 1968		1
2	Suburban Hospital Bethesda, Md	Emergency Medical Aid/ Maryland State Corpsman	Jan-May	1968	5

ALSO FIRST AID INSTRUCTORS [illegible] — 441 hours

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single Married Widowed Separated Divorced Annulled Remarried) SPECIFY: Married

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) HIDALGO (First) Verenica (Middle) W. (Maiden) (WAYLONIS)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State Country)
May 29 1914	DuBois, Pa., USA

5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER
Admin Asst	C.I.A.

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED
US	N/A	Birth

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

	NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1.	[ ] ADD [X] DELETE	Daughter	NYC NY - Feb 23/50	US	Alexandria Va
2.	[ ] ADD [X] DELETE	Daughter	NYC NY - Jan 6/45	US	Arlington Va

FORM 2-69 444n

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LLC

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP. SER. NO.	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	3. SEX	4. DATE OF BIRTH	5. SCHEDULE GRADE/STEP
027530	HIDALGO B N JR	M	05/27/19	GS -12-04

6. SD	7. POSITION TITLE	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT	9. LOCATION (Country-City)
D	OPS OFFICER	WH	WASH., D.C.

SECTION II — AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
~~PERU~~ PANAMA	PCS-VV	52/05/12	57/12/30
WESTERN HEMISPHERE	TDY-CC	59/01/29	59/02/08
WESTERN HEMISPHERE	TDY-CC	61/02/01	61/03/01
WESTERN HEMISPHERE	TDY-CC	61/04/19	61/06/19
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY-CC	63/12/01	63/12/18
WESTERN HEMISPHERE	PCS-CC	~~60~~/04/01	~~68~~/05/01
		63/04/01	64/04/01
WESTERN HEMISPHERE	TDY-CC	65/7/11 Two weeks	~~65/7/11~~

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED 25 APR 1968
DATE: INITIALS:

SECTION III — EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
	NO COLLEGE DEGREE ON RECORD		
NONE	Two years - Commercial Law, Import Export Procedure	NYU	1943-45

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SECTION III EDUCATION (Cont'd)

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED From-To	GRADUATE
La Salle Academy	NYC NY	1938-40	☒ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM - TO	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO SEM / QTR HRS (Specify)
1	NYU - NYC NY	Commer. LAW	Export laws	Sept 43 to ? 45	No		???
2							
3							
4							

5 IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1					
2					
3					

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1					
2					
3					
4					
5					

AGENCY-SPONSORED EDUCATION

Specify which, if any, of the education shown in Section III was Agency sponsored

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1	Full Ops course		Dur., 1958		9
2	Management Course		1966		one week
3					
4					
5					

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(When Filled In)

SECTION VII

MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1 ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT? ☐ YES ☒ NO	2 SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION ???
3 LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS N/A	4 IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON N/A

MILITARY SERVICE RECORD (Active Duty Only)

1 MILITARY ORGANIZATION (Army, Navy, etc. - specify)	2 BRANCH OR CORPS	3 DATES OF SERVICE (extended active duty) FROM	TO
Army	Infantry	Oct 1940	Sept 1943

4 STATUS (Regular, Reserve, etc. - specify)	5 RANK, GRADE OR RATE (at separation, if pos. service)	6 SERIAL, SERVICE OR FILE NUMBER
Federalized National Guard	Cpl.	20249766

7 CHECK TYPE OF SEPARATION
☒ HONORABLE DISCHARGE
☐ RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY
☐ RETIREMENT FOR AGE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY
☒ RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY
☐ UNDUE HARDSHIPS
☐ OTHER (Specify)

8 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES (Give the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)

Infentryman; Crypographic section; driver.

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG: None
☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1 CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE	2 DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK	3 EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION

4 CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES (Give the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)

6 IF YOU ARE CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO A RESERVE OR NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING UNIT, IDENTIFY THE UNIT AND ITS ADDRESS

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Active Duty, Reserve Status or as Civilian)

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
1.				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
2.				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
3.				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
4.				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
5.				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED

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(When Filled In)

SECTION IV — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X): RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Cuba	Language-Area knowledge	1919-1924	———	X			
Panama	" " "	1952-58		X			X
Puerto Rico	" " "	various			X		X
Guatemala	" " "	various			X		X
El Salvador	" " "	various			X		X
Mexico	" " "	various			X		X
Dom Rep	" Limited area knowledge	1965					X
Germany	" " "	1963					X
Scotland	" " "	1963					X

SECTION V — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM): 40
2. SHORTHAND (WPM):
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM: ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY
4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (comptometer, mimeograph, card punch, etc.)

Various

SECTION VI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH

First Aid Instructor. Very active currently.
Fire Fighting and safety practices, University of Maryland. Active currently.
Sky Diving - 10 jumps during 1962 - done since.

2. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4, SECTION V, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF RADIO TRANSMITTERS (indicate CW speed sending & receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, EDP AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

3. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, PHYSICIAN, ETC? ☒ YES ☐ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 3 ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATION AND THE ISSUING STATE, MUNICIPALITY, ETC. (Provide license registry number if known)

First Aid Instructor - National Red Cross - 1963

5. FIRST LICENSE, CERTIFICATE (year of issue): 1963

6. LATEST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue):

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (do NOT submit copies unless requested). INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (non-fiction or scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IX — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:	MARRIED		
2. NAME OF SPOUSE	Last: HIDALGO	First: Veronica	Middle / Maiden: WAYLONIS
3. DATE OF BIRTH: May 23 1914	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): DuBois, Pa., USA.		
5. OCCUPATION: Administrative Asst	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER: CIA		
7. CITIZENSHIP: US	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES): None	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: N/A	

SECTION X — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
Frances R. Hidalgo	daughter	Feb 23 1950 NYC NY	US	Alexandria, Va
Balmes N. Hidalgo Sr.	father	Dec 15 1890 Puerto Rico	US	NYC NY
Rose Hidalgo	mother	Jan 12 1892 Spain	US	NYC NY

SECTION XI — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
American Red Cross Civil Defense team	Montgomery Cty, Md.	1964	present
Franconia Volunteer Fire Department	Franconia, Va	1958	1963
Rockville Volunteer Fire Department	Rockville, Md.	1964	present
International Rescue and First Aid Association		1967	present

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
9 Feb 1968	[signature]

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO. (1-6)				2. I.D NO.
3. NAME (7-24)		4. COMPONENT	5. GRADE	6. DATE OF BIRTH
7. LANGUAGE	8. CODE (25-27)	9. DATE OF TEST		10. ANNIVERSARY DATE (28-33)

11. TEST PURPOSE	12. TEST SCORES					13. ELIGIBILITY (39)	
AWARD / SKILL	READING (34)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)	AWARDABLE (A / M)	NOT AWARDABLE

14. I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR AWARD		15. TYPE OF AWARD				
SIGNATURE	DATE	A-M	E-I-H	C	R-W-S	D-V

16. AMOUNT OF AWARD	$	17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE — OBLIGATION REF. NO. / SIGNATURE
18. FEDERAL TAX DEDUCTION	$	
19. STATE/DC TAX DEDUCTION	$	20. CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO. / DATE
21. NET AMOUNT OF AWARD	$	22. EMPLOYEE PAYROLL NO.
23. FORWARD CHECK TO		24. ALLOTMENT OF ASSIGNMENT
		25. CHECK NO. / DATE

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LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO. (1-6)				2. I.D NO.
3. NAME (7-24)		4. COMPONENT	5. GRADE	6. DATE OF BIRTH
7. LANGUAGE	8. CODE (25-27)	9. DATE OF TEST		10. ANNIVERSARY DATE (28-33)

11. TEST PURPOSE	12. TEST SCORES					13. ELIGIBILITY (39)	
AWARD / SKILL	READING (34)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)	AWARDABLE (A / M)	NOT AWARDABLE

14. I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR AWARD		15. TYPE OF AWARD				
SIGNATURE	DATE	A-M	E-I-H	C	R-W-S	D-V

16. AMOUNT OF AWARD	$	17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE — OBLIGATION REF. NO. / SIGNATURE
18. FEDERAL TAX DEDUCTION	$	
19. STATE/DC TAX DEDUCTION	$	20. CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO. / DATE
21. NET AMOUNT OF AWARD	$	22. EMPLOYEE PAYROLL NO.
23. FORWARD CHECK TO		24. ALLOTMENT OF ASSIGNMENT
		25. CHECK NO. / DATE

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(1-6) 127 630	LANGUAGE DATA RECORD

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30) MONTH	DAY	YEAR
Hidalgo, Balmes Nieves JR	May	27	1912

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39) MONTH	DAY	YEAR	5.
Spanish 720	May	9	1958	☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

(1.) I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

(1.) I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

(1.) MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

CONTINUATION OF PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

(1.) I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

(1.) I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING – CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III—EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

~~2.~~ I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

(3.) BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

4. NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV—CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED	SIGNATURE
9 May 1958	[signature]
(46) C	(47) A

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(When Filled In)

(1-6)	
127630	**LANGUAGE DATA RECORD**

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME (*Last-First-Middle*) (7-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30) MONTH	DAY	YEAR
Hidalgo, Balmes Nieves JR	May	27	1919

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39) MONTH	DAY	YEAR	5.
Portuguese 630	May	9	1958	☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
$\textcircled{3}$ I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE; USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
$\textcircled{5}$ I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.
2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.
3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
$\cancel{\textcircled{4}}$ MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND. B
$\textcircled{5}$ I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

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CONTINUATION OF PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.
2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.
3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.
4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.
$\textcircled{5}$ I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.
2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.
3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.
$\textcircled{4}$ I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.
5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III—EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.
2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.
3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.
$\textcircled{4}$ NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV—CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. (C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED	SIGNATURE
9 May 1958	[signature]
(46)	(47)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY APPROVAL

DATE : 17 April 1964

YOUR REFERENCE: 18658 DDP/SAS

CASE NO. : 65077

TO : Director of Personnel

ATTN :

SUBJECT : HIDALGO, Balmes Nieves, Jr.

1. This is to inform you that Subject has been approved for the appointment specified in your request under the provisions of Headquarters Regulations 10-3 and 20-5 including access to classified information through TOP SECRET as required in the performance of duties.

2. Unless arrangements are made within 60 days for entrance on duty within 120 days, this approval becomes invalid.

3. As part of the entrance on duty processing:

[ ] A personal interview in the Office of Security must be arranged.

[XXXX] A personal interview is not necessary.

[ ] Please advise Chief, Clearance Branch, extension 5620 when Subject enters on duty.

4. This is a conversion case.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

W. A. Osborne

W. A. Osborne
Chief, Personnel Security Division

FORM 10-63 1173 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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(When Filled In)

STAFF AGENT CLEARANCE

DATE : 22 April 1963

YOUR REFERENCE: Memorandum of 19 April 1963

CASE NO. : #65077

TO : Chief, Contract Personnel Division

ATTN. : Staff Agents Branch

SUBJECT : [redacted] Hedrige, R. N. Jr.

1. This is to advise that a security clearance is granted for the employment of the Subject as a Staff Agent, GS-11, by DDP/SAS in the capacity of Operations Officer under Project JMWAVE.

2. If your office should desire at a later date to change the status or use of the Subject, a request to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

3. Unless arrangements are made within 60 days for entrance on duty within 120 days, this Approval becomes invalid.

4. As a part of entrance on duty processing:

☐ A personal interview in the Office of Security must be arranged by your office.

☒ A personal interview is not necessary.

☐

W. A. Osborne

W. A. Osborne
CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OS
jms

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

SECURITY APPROVAL

DATE : 10 March 1958

YOUR REFERENCE:

CASE NO. : 65077

TO : Director of Personnel

FROM : Director of Security

SUBJECT : HIDALGO, Balmes Nieves

1. This is to inform you of security approval of the subject person as follows:

[X] Subject has been approved for the appointment specified in your request under the provisions of Regulations 10-210 and 20-730 including access to classified information through Top Secret as required in the performance of his duties.

[ ] Subject has been approved for appointment under the authority of Paragraph 4(d) of Regulation 10-210, and under Regulation 20-730 including access to classified information through Top Secret as required in the performance of his duties.

2. Unless arrangements are made within 60 days for entrance on duty within 120 days, this approval becomes invalid.

3. As part of the entrance on duty processing:

[X] A personal interview in the Office of Security must be arranged.

[ ] A personal interview is not necessary.

[X] This clearance is issued in advance of receipt of a SF-377. Subject will be assigned to the WH Division.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

W M Knott

W. M. Knott
Chief, Personnel Security Division

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

Name:	Balmes N. HIDALGO, Jr.
Grade:	GS-11
Service Designation:	DI
Date and Place of Birth:	27 May 1919 Havana, Cuba
Marital Status:	Married
Education and Career Outside the Agency:	1945-46 New York University - No degree (2 yrs) Nov 45-Dec 49 FBI, Eastern part of United States - Undercover Agent
Languages:	Spanish - Fluent Portuguese & French - Fair
Military Duty:	27 Mar 39-27 Sep 1943 New York National Guard (Federalized Oct 40) U.S. Army
CIA Experience:	18 Feb 52 Ex Appt., Contract Employee, GS-9, DDP/WH/ HYPOTHESIS, Panama City, Panama 1 Feb 56 Promotion, Contract Employee, GS-11, DDP/WH, HYPOTHESIS, Panama City, Panama
CIA Training:	Covert training

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(When Filled In)

INSTRUCTIONS: COMPLETE IN DUPLICATE. THE DATA RECORDED ON THIS FORM IS ESSENTIAL IN DETERMINING TRAVEL EXPENSES ALLOWABLE IN CONNECTION WITH LEAVE AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE, OVERSEAS DUTY, RETURN TO RESIDENCE UPON SEPARATION, AND FOR PROVIDING CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY INFORMATION REQUIRED IN THE EVENT OF AN EMPLOYEE EMERGENCY. THE ORIGINAL OF THIS FORM WILL BE FILED IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) HIDALGO JR (First) BALMES (Middle) NIEVES

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN APPOINTED: D.C.

LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad):

PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE: D.C.

2. MARITAL STATUS

CHECK (X) ONE: [ ] SINGLE [✓] MARRIED [ ] SEPARATED [ ] DIVORCED [ ] WIDOWED [ ] ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, INDICATE PLACE OF MARRIAGE: BELZONI MISS. USA — DATE OF MARRIAGE: 9 APR 1943

IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE: — DATE OF DECREE:

IF WIDOWED, INDICATE PLACE SPOUSE DIED: — DATE SPOUSE DIED:

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S): —

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	TELEPHONE NUMBER	
LOUISE HIDALGO			
NAMES OF CHILDREN	**ADDRESS**	**SEX**	**AGE**
LUZ MARIA		F	13
FRANCES REBECCA		F	9
NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian)	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NUMBER**	
BALMES N HIDALGO			
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian)	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NUMBER**	
ROSE HIDALGO			

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE AGENCY FOR EMERGENCY PURPOSES? WIFE

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle): HIDALGO, LOUISE — RELATIONSHIP: WIFE

HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): — HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER:

BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: — BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION:

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? [✓] YES [ ] NO

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF? [✓] YES [ ] NO

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? [✓] YES [ ] NO

THE PERSONS NAMED IN ITEM 3 ABOVE MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 7 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

INDICATE ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS: GREENWICH SAVINGS BANK

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

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(When Filled In)

5. (CONTINUED)

IN WHOSE NAME(S) ARE THE ACCOUNTS LISTED?

Balmes N. Hidalgo Jr. +/or Luisa Hidalgo

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? [ ] YES [✓] NO. IF "YES", WHERE IS DOCUMENT LOCATED?

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? [ ] YES [✓] NO. IF "YES", WHO POSSESSES THE POWER OF ATTORNEY?

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

Do NOT NOTIFY OTHER PERSONS IN ITEM 3 OF EMERGENCY UNLESS WIFE IS NOT AVAILABLE.

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
		[illegible signature]

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STANDARD FORM 144
JANUARY 1952
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAPTERS L1 AND R1

STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL AND MILITARY SERVICE

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used in determining creditable service for *leave purposes* and retention credits for *reduction in force*. The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through IV.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*): HIDALGO JR, BALMES NIEVES

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 27 MAY 1919

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENTS (*Do not include military service*).

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TO— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
US ARMY DEPT OF DEFENSE QUARTERMASTER Corp	51	1	12		Present		

4. LIST PERIODS OF SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TO— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	DISCHARGE (*Hon. or dishon.?*)
US ARMY INF	1939	MAR	27	43	SEPT	21	HONORABLE

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☑ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (*LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar*)	FROM— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TO— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TOTAL YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☑ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

7. ARE YOU:
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☑ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☑ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☑ NO

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.
I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

_______________ (DATE)　　Balmes N. Hidalgo (SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 13th day of Mar (MONTH) 1958 at Washington, D.C. (CITY) (STATE)

SEAL　　Betty A. Bussard

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. CSC STATUS (*For permanent employees only*) ☐ YES ☐ NO

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY
7	2	6
4	5	25

12. TOTAL SERVICE: 11 8 1

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*)

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

(OVER)

PART III.—DETERMINING CREDITABLE SERVICE AND SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE FOR LEAVE PURPOSES

	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS
TOTAL SERVICE (*Item 12*)			
NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Item 13*)			
CREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes*)			
ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE (*Present agency*)	58	3	17
LESS CREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes*)	11	8	1
SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE (*Leave purposes*)	46	7	16

PART IV.—DETERMINING CREDITABLE SERVICE AND SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE FOR REDUCTION IN FORCE PURPOSES

(To be completed only in those cases when the amount of creditable service for reduction in force purposes differs from the amount creditable for leave purposes)

	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS
TOTAL SERVICE (*Item 12*)			
NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Item 14*)			
CREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes*)			
ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE (*Present agency*)			
LESS CREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes*)			
SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE (*RIF purposes*) (*Enter as the "service computation date" on the employee's "Service Record Card," SF-7*)			

REMARKS:

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PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "N.A." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? YES

Sec. I. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

1. FULL NAME Mr. [illegible] Flores [illegible] N/A N/A

PRESENT ADDRESS 30 Avenue D New York City 9, New York USA

PERMANENT ADDRESS 30 Avenue D New York City 9, New York USA

2. NICKNAME [illegible] WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? [illegible]

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? See Attached sheet marked Section I

HOW LONG? [illegible] years IF A LEGAL CHANGE GIVE PARTICULARS

N/A N/A

DATE OF BIRTH 27 May 1919 PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible] Cuba

PRESENT CITIZENSHIP [illegible] BY BIRTH [illegible]

NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO. N/A [illegible] N/A [illegible] N/A

N/A

HAVE YOU EVER APPLIED FOR NATURALIZATION? No N/A

[illegible] N/A N/A [illegible] No

N/A

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CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS [illegible]

NAME [illegible] RELATIONSHIP [illegible] AGE [illegible]

CITIZENSHIP American [illegible] New York, New York, USA

NAME [illegible] RELATIONSHIP [illegible] AGE 19 [illegible]

CITIZENSHIP American [illegible] New York, New York, USA

NAME [illegible] RELATIONSHIP Wife AGE 24

CITIZENSHIP American [illegible] USA

[illegible]

[illegible] N/A [illegible] N/A

[illegible] New York, New York [illegible] USA

DATE OF BIRTH Dec 1890 [illegible]

[illegible]

CITIZENSHIP American [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] New York, New York, USA

[illegible] N/A [illegible] N/A [illegible] N/A

[illegible] N/A

N/A

[illegible]

[illegible] N/A [illegible] N/A

[illegible]

SEC. [illegible] BROTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
(Last) (First) (Middle)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE N/A CAUSE N/A

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS Box 662 Leland Mississippi USA

DATE OF BIRTH 11 Dec 1929 PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible], Mississippi, USA

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY N/A

CITIZENSHIP American WHEN ACQUIRED Birth WHERE [illegible], Miss., USA

OCCUPATION [illegible] EMPLOYER Leland City [illegible]

SEC. [illegible] RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

See Attached Sheet Marked Sec. [illegible]

NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS

NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS

NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS

SEC. [illegible] RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U.S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

[illegible]

[illegible]

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ACTIVE U.S. OR FOREIGN MILITARY SERVICE

USA Army Infantry Pvt. 1945/1945

Camp Hale, Colorado 202/9786 Honorable

REMARKS: Could not pass physical to return overseas

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER N/A ADDRESS N/A

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON N/A

[illegible] N/A

CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST. [illegible] (See attached also)

From 14 Jan 1951 To Present CLASSIFICATION GRADE IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE GS-7

EMPLOYER (NAME OF AGENCY) [illegible]

ADDRESS 111 East [illegible] St., New York, N.Y., USA

KIND OF BUSINESS [illegible] NAME OF SUPERVISOR [illegible]

TITLE OF JOB [illegible] SALARY [illegible]

[illegible] N/A

[illegible]

GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

ARE YOU NOW, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF [illegible] TRADE OR PROFESSIONAL [illegible]

[illegible] N/A

[illegible] N/A [illegible] N/A

GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN THIS APPLICATION SUCH AS:
(A) YOUR MOST IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS [illegible]
(B) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(C) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(D) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

N/A

HAVE YOU A PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? IF ANSWER IS "YES," EXPLAIN:

[illegible]

DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS:

No

[illegible] FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES [illegible] KNOW YOU [illegible]

[illegible]

10. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES. NOT REFERENCES, RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS OR EMPLOYERS. (Give [illegible])

[illegible]

National City Bank

RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

FROM [illegible] TO Present

[illegible]

RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

FROM [illegible] TO [illegible]

FROM

FROM

FROM

FROM

CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

See Attached under Sec. [illegible]

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

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DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: [illegible]

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: [illegible]

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: [illegible]

MISCELLANEOUS

DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED, OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED, ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES?

[illegible]

DO YOU USE OR HAVE YOU USED INTOXICANTS? [illegible]

EXTENT: [illegible]

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE:

[illegible]

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT MARTIALED? [illegible] GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

[illegible]

[illegible] WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF [illegible] THE INVESTIGATION.

[illegible] State of [illegible] 1964

[illegible]

[illegible] PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME Jacalyn Rahlio [illegible] Wife

ADDRESS 10 Ave. B [illegible] New York [illegible] USA

[illegible] YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NO, ANSWER "NO."

In 1964, [illegible] reported [illegible]

[illegible] 17 [illegible] 24 and 25 [illegible]

[illegible] (Trends [illegible] FBI [illegible])

FBI [illegible] were omitted.

[illegible] I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

[illegible] Oslo [illegible] 1971

[illegible], Jr. [illegible] Rahlio

[illegible]

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES. THE SAME [illegible] EACH SUCH PAGE.

Section 10:

May be reached at or through Mariano Nieves Hidalgo at 1411 Paris St. San Juan, Puerto Rico.			
	Mariano Nieves Hidalgo	Uncle	Puerto Rico
	Jorge Nieves Hidalgo	Uncle	Puerto Rico
	Rina Nieves Hidalgo	Aunt	Puerto Rico
	[illegible] Nieves Hidalgo	Aunt (by marriage to Mariano Nieves Hidalgo)	Puerto Rico
	Joseph Nieves Hidalgo	Cousin	Puerto Rico
	Gilbert Nieves Hidalgo	Cousin	Puerto Rico
	[illegible] Hidalgo	Cousin [illegible]	Puerto Rico
	[illegible]	Cousin [illegible]	Puerto Rico
	[illegible]	Cousin	Puerto Rico
	[illegible]	Cousin	Puerto Rico
	[illegible]	Cousin	Puerto Rico
	[illegible]	Cousin [illegible]	[illegible]
	[illegible]	Cousin [illegible]	[illegible]
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
	[illegible] Villa	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible] Villa	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible] Villa	[illegible]	
	[illegible] Villa	[illegible]	

[illegible]

[illegible]

In 1946, October, I was approached by certain functionaries of the Communist Party [illegible] persons urged [illegible] to join the Communist Party. Finally in November of 1946, I arranged an interview with Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

These happenings all took place in New York City, New York.

The FBI asked me if I would be willing to join the Communist Party and report all activities regularly. I thought the matter over and upon the next visit of the Party functionaries I agreed to be recruited into the Communist Party. I rose in the Party ranks to become Section Press Director, among other responsibilities held.

[illegible] friends, associates and relatives. This included my wife. [illegible] not legally.

It was not until three years later, in early 1949, that [illegible] my wife of my membership in the Communist Party, and [illegible] connected with the FBI [illegible] 1949, testified in the trial of the 11 Communist leaders in New York City [illegible] my wife [illegible] relatives and friends and [illegible]

[illegible]

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "NA." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? ________ (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

Telephone: Office NA Ext. NA Home NA

A. FULL NAME (Use No Initials) ~~Mrs.~~ Mr. ~~Miss~~ Balmes (First) Nieves (Middle) Hidalgo, Jr. (Last)

PRESENT ADDRESS House number 60, 94th St. East, Panama, Republic of Panama (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

B. NICKNAME "Barney" "Bal" WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? See remarks UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? See remarks

HOW LONG? See remarks IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS No (Where?) (By what authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH 27 May 1919 PLACE OF BIRTH Havana, Cuba (City) (State) (Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP U. S. (Country) BY BIRTH? NA BY MARRIAGE? NA

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO. NA ISSUED NA (Date) BY NA (Court)

AT See remarks (City) (State) (Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? No (Yes or No) (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? NA TO NA ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? NA (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS NA

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? No GIVE PARTICULARS:

NA

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? March 1924

PORT OF ENTRY? NYC, NY ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? U. S.

LAST U. S. VISA None (Number) (Type) (Place of Issue) (Date of Issue)

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 38 SEX Male HEIGHT 5' 9" WEIGHT 145

EYES Brown HAIR Dark Brown COMPLEXION Dark SCARS Appendix and under chin

BUILD slight OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES Mole, Upper left lip.

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE ___ MARRIED X DIVORCED ___ WIDOWED ___

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS ___

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE—INCLUDING ANNULMENTS—USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE Annie (First) Louise (Middle) Beier (Maiden) Hidalgo (Last)

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE Belzoni, Mississippi - 9 April 1943

XXXXXX HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE Rt. 2, Box 76, (St. and Number) Belzoni, (City) Mississippi, (State) USA (Country)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS Same as applicant (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 15 May 1927 PLACE OF BIRTH Morgan City, (City) Mississippi, (State) USA (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP US WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? USA (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION File Clerk LAST EMPLOYER Classified

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS Classified (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM NA (Date) TO NA (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE NA

COUNTRY NA DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

NA

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents):

1. NAME Luz Maria Hidalgo RELATIONSHIP Daughter AGE 12
   CITIZENSHIP U. S. ADDRESS Same as applicant (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
2. NAME Frances Rebecca Hidalgo RELATIONSHIP Daughter AGE 7
   CITIZENSHIP U. S. ADDRESS Same as applicant (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
3. NAME ____ RELATIONSHIP ____ AGE ____
   CITIZENSHIP ____ ADDRESS ____ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

(also dependent)

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Balmes (First) Nieves (Middle) Hidalgo (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS Same as applicant (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH December1890 PLACE OF BIRTH Aguadilla, Puerto Rico (City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY 1923 (March) NYC, NY

CITIZENSHIP U. S. WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? Puerto Rico (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Retired LAST EMPLOYER Do not remember

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS None (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM NA (Date) TO NA (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE NA

COUNTRY NA DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

NA

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Frances (First) Rosario (Middle) Hidalgo (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS Same as applicant (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan. 1892 PLACE OF BIRTH Oviedo, Spain

CITIZENSHIP U. S. WHEN ACQUIRED? Marriage 1917 WHERE? Havana, Cuba (City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY March 1924, NYC, NY, USA

OCCUPATION Retired LAST EMPLOYER Leonid De Losoinskis

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS 48 St. NYC, NY
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM NA TO NA BRANCH OF SERVICE NA

COUNTRY NA DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

NA

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters):

NA

1. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE

PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

2. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE

PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

3. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE

PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

4. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE

PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

5. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE

PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Henry B. Beier
(First) (Middle) (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 210 California Avenue, Leland, Mississippi, USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 1895 PLACE OF BIRTH USA

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP US WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? USA
(City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Laborer LAST EMPLOYER Unknown

16—67858-1

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Erma (First) Rebecca (Middle) Peior (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 210 California Avenue (St. and Number), Leland (City), Mississippi (State), USA (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 1893 PLACE OF BIRTH USA

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP U. S. WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? U.S.A. (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Housewife LAST EMPLOYER NA

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

See remarks

1. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
   CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
2. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
   CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
   CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U. S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

NONE

1. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
   CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______
2. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
   CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______
3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
   CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______

16—63858-4

SEC. 12. POSITION DATA

A. KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR .... See covering dispatch reference

B. WHAT IS THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ 5390.00 P/A
(You Will Not Be Considered For Any Position With A Lower Entrance Salary.)

C. IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY: OCCASIONALLY .... Yes

FREQUENTLY .... , CONSTANTLY X

D. CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED: IN WASHINGTON, D. C. X

ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES .... X , OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES X

E. IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, SPECIFY LOCATIONS:

SEC. 13. EDUCATION

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL St. Thomas Apostle ADDRESS NYC (City) NY (State) USA (Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1926-1934 GRADUATE? Yes

HIGH SCHOOL La Salle Academy ADDRESS 2nd St. and 2nd Avenue (City) NYC, NY (State) USA (Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1936-1940 GRADUATE? Yes

COLLEGE NY University ADDRESS Washington Square, NYC, (City) NY, (State) USA (Country)

MAJOR AND SPECIALTY Foreign Trade and Business Law YEARS COMPLETED Two (Night School)

DATES ATTENDED 1944-1945 DEGREE No

COLLEGE .... ADDRESS .... (City) .... (State) .... (Country)

MAJOR AND SPECIALTY .... YEARS COMPLETED ....

DATES ATTENDED .... DEGREE ....

CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS ....

CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS ....

SEC. 14. ACTIVE U. S. OR FOREIGN MILITARY SERVICE

U. S. (Country) Army (Service) Cpl. (Rank) 1940-1943 (Dates of Service)

Camp Hale, Colorado (Last Station) 202 49766 (Serial Number) Honorable (Type of Discharge)

REMARKS: None

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER ... ADDRESS Do not remember

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON NA

INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS NA

SEC. 15. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST. (List all civilian employment by a foreign government, regardless of dates.)

FROM Feb. 1952 TO Present CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) GS-11

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY See covering dispatch reference

ADDRESS See covering dispatch reference (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS U. S. Govt. NAME OF SUPERVISOR See covering dispatch

TITLE OF JOB See covering dispatch SALARY $ 6390.00 PER annum

YOUR DUTIES See covering dispatch reference

REASONS FOR LEAVING

FROM January 1951 TO February 1952 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) GS-7

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY NY QM Procurement Agency

ADDRESS 111 East 16th Street NYC, NY, USA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS U. S. Govt. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Do not remember

TITLE OF JOB Inspector SALARY $3825.00 PER annum

YOUR DUTIES Inspecting material being purchased by U. S. Govt. specifically the U. S. Army.

REASONS FOR LEAVING To obtain present position.

FROM July 1950 TO January 1951 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) NA

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY American Trust Company

ADDRESS Wall Street, New York City, NY, USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Banking NAME OF SUPERVISOR Do not remember

TITLE OF JOB Collections clerk SALARY $50.00 PER week

YOUR DUTIES Export banking clerical work

REASONS FOR LEAVING Left for higher paying work

FROM January 1948 TO May 1950 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) NA

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Colonial Trust Company

ADDRESS 6th Avenue and 45th Street, NYC, NY, USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Banking NAME OF SUPERVISOR Do not remember

TITLE OF JOB Collections clerk SALARY $50.00 PER week

YOUR DUTIES Export banking clerical work.

REASONS FOR LEAVING Promised promotion failed to materialize.

FROM August 1945 TO September 1947 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) NA

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Francis H. Leggett Inc.

ADDRESS 28th Street and 12th Avenue, NYC, NY, USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Wholesale Grocery house. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Do not remember

TITLE OF JOB Correspondence clerk SALARY $ 57.00 PER week

YOUR DUTIES Export correspondence clerical duties.

REASONS FOR LEAVING Dissatisfied with type of work.

SEC. 16. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS:

No

SEC. 17. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT," "FAIR," OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE Spanish SPEAK Fluent READ Fluent WRITE Fluent

LANGUAGE Portuguese SPEAK Slight READ Fair WRITE Slight

LANGUAGE ______ SPEAK ______ READ ______ WRITE ______

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU: INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH:

Judo - Have attained "yellow belt" rank
Photography - Very good degree of proficiency
Bowling - Fair degree of proficiency
Philately - Fair degree of proficiency
Fishing (no comment)

C. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION?

Yes, See covering dispatch reference.

D. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE, SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT-WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES:

All photographic devices.

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING 30 SHORTHAND 0

16—62555-1

E. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION, SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, ETC.

IF YES, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE .... No. ....

FIRST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR) .... LATEST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR) ....

F. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS:

(1) YOUR MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (DO NOT SUBMIT COPIES UNLESS REQUESTED)
(2) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(3) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(4) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

NA

G. HAVE YOU A PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? IF ANSWER IS "YES," EXPLAIN:

Yes. I must wear glasses continually.

H. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS:

No

SEC. 18. GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES—IN THE U. S.—WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

	Name		Street and Number	City	State
1.	Edward Lee Anderson	BUS. ADD.	See Dispatch	reference.	
		RES. ADD.			
2.	Willard Galbraith	BUS. ADD.	" "	"	
		RES. ADD.			
3.	Homer Neal	BUS. ADD.	" "	"	
		RES. ADD.			
4.	Andres Rivera	BUS. ADD.	" "	"	
		RES. ADD.			
5.	Joseph Sancho	BUS. ADD.	" "	"	
		RES. ADD.			

SEC. 19. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES—NOT REFERENCES, RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS, OR EMPLOYERS—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

See remarks

	Name		Street and Number	City	State
1.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			
2.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			
3.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			
4.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			
5.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			

SEC. 20. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U. S.—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

See remarks

	Name		Street and Number	City	State
1.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			
2.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			
3.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			

SEC. 21. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? Yes IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS Greenwich Savings Bank. 36th St. and Broadway and 6th Avenue. NYC, NY.

10—23830-1

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? No
GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT:

D. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES—IN THE U. S.

1. NAME ______ ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State)
2. NAME None ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State)
3. NAME ______ ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State)

SEC. 22. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

FROM	TO	(St. and number)	(City)	(State)	(Country)
April 1952	Present		Panama	Republic of Panama	
1949	1952	20 Ave. D,	NYC,	NY,	USA
1944	1948	200 West 82nd St.,	NYC,	NY,	USA

SEC. 23 RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

	FROM	TO	(City or section)	(Country)	(Purpose)
A.	1919	1924	Havana, Cuba	Country of birth	
	1942	1943	Pacific area	US Army	
	1952	Present	Republic of Panama		Work

SEC. 24. CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

1. None (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

2. (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

3. (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

4. .... (Name and Chapter) (St. and Numbe.) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ....

5. .... (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ....

6. .... (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ....

7. .... (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ....

SEC. 25. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED, ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES?

IF "YES," EXPLAIN: NO (See remarks)

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? Yes IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? Beer with meals.

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE:

No

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

No

E. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1940:

Department of Defense

Present Organization

F. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

Federal Bureau of Investigation - 1946

This Organization - 1951

SEC. 26. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME Annie Louise Hidalgo RELATIONSHIP wife

ADDRESS Same as applicant (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 27. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

No

SEC. 28. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT Ft. Amador, Canal Zone (City and State) DATE 19 July 1957

(Witness) (Signature of Applicant)

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-42653-1

Section 1A - While an undercover agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigations from 1946 to 1949 I used the name of Bernard Harris to members of the Communist Party of the United States. This information is already on file in this organization.

Section 1D - I became an American citizen at birth through the citizenship of my father. This information is already on file in this organization.

Section 3B - My wife is employed by this organization.

Section 10 - I have many relatives in Spain and Cuba but do not correspond with them and so do not know names, addresses or present status.

Section 18 - All persons mentioned in this section are employees of this organization.

Sections 19 and 20 - Not having lived in the USA for over five years I have lost all contact with old friends, neighbors, etc. I do not know their addresses, status, etc., at this time.

Section 25 - My past connections with any subversive groups and the reasons for such connections is already on file in the files of this organization.

RECORD OF

PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT

SERVICE RETURNED TO

FEDERAL RECORDS CENTER IN

ST. LOUIS, MO.

DATE July 1971

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

SECRET

CRABANAC, Terence S.

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: HUNT, E. HOWARD (CONTRACT

INCLUSIVE DATES: 6 January 1965 - 3 Dec 1970

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: O/P

ROOM: 5E13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
2/28/78	2/28/78	DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
3/15/78	3/15/78	DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway

TS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SECRET

14-00000

Contract Service – Terence S Crahinac (P)

Date	Action	Comp	GS Grade
4 July 65	~~Former Staff Employee~~ Hired as a Contract Employee with Civil Service Retirement, LPAs and PSIs.	$19,880	GS-15/7
10 Oct 65	LPI	20,595	GS-15/7
3 July 66	LPI	21,192	GS-15/7
17 Sept 66	Contract Terminated	21,192	GS-15/7

Converted to Staff Employee Status

SECRET

8 DEC 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Finance

THROUGH : Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Engagement of E. Howard Hunt as Independent Contractor Under Memorandum of Oral Contract

1. Effective 2 November 1970, subject was retained under oral contract to write a citation concerning an employee of CIA for a fee of $250.00. The completed citation was delivered to and accepted by CIA on 23 November 1970.

2. Subject is a former CIA Staff Employee who retired effective 30 April 1970.

3. Subject is to be paid his fee of $250.00 under Fin Account Number 1176-0041. At Mr. Hunt's request, payment is to be made in the form of two sterile checks, one in the amount of $200.00 payable to the Public Service Aid Society, and the second in the amount of $50.00 payable to the Educational Aid Fund. Please forward both checks to Mr. Ben DeFelice, 5E-67 Headquarters.

4. No other commitments have been made to subject.

[signature]
Approving Officer
Office of Personnel

APPROVED:

/s/ [illegible]

Chief, Contract Personnel Division

8 DEC 1970

Date

Thr

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

1 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: [redacted] Terence S. CRABANAC

[redacted] on instructions of the Deputy Director for Plans, and with approvals from the DCI and the DDCI, was converted to contract employment and assigned to Spain for a special undertaking in behalf of the DD/P. He left for Spain in July 1965 and returned to the U.S. in June 1966 having completed his assignment successfully. If an evaluative comment is needed to cover his work during this period of time he should be rated as "strong".

Thomas H. Karamessines
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

Orig & 1 - Director of Personnel
via C/EUR
1 - ADD/P

14-00000

SECRET

3 October 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, TRB

SUBJECT : Verification of Contract Service for [redacted]

1. The following is a record of subject's contract service with the Agency:

Date	Action	Compensation
4 July 1965	Contract Employee	$19,880 per annum
10 October 1965	Salary Increase	$20,595 per annum
3 July 1966	Salary Increase	$21,192 per annum
17 September 1966	Contract Terminated	$21,192 per annum

2. All of above service is creditable for both leave and Civil Service Retirement purposes.

Dow H. Luetscher
Chief, Contract Personnel Division

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
2 - CPD

SECRET

SECRET

26 SEP 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

ATTENTION : Paul R. Wilson

SUBJECT : Verification of Contract Service
[redacted] CRHEANAC, Lawrence S.

In order to establish the salary, LCD and to compute the SCD for both leave and retirement purposes, it is necessary to verify the contract service and salary of [redacted], DOB 9 October 1918, who claims employment with this Agency in a contract status from 4 July 1965 to 17 September 1966.

Lowell P. Moore
Lowell P. Moore
Deputy Chief, Transactions & Records Branch

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

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This is to advise that effective 17 September 1966 I will resign from employment with the United States Government as provided in the contractual agreement effective 4 July 1965. It is understood that my status as a Staff Employee will be effective 18 September 1966, the day following my resignation as a Contract Employee.

Terence S. CRABANAC

APPROVED:

b/

European Contract Approving Officer   Date

APPROVED:
/s/ Dow H. Luetscher
Special Contracting Officer

REVIEWED:
/s/ Dow H. Luetscher

SECRET

14 July 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Terence S. CRABANAC (P)

The ADDP requested the writer to personally bring CRABANAC's file to him for review this date. I was informed by Mr. Karamessines that Subject has now returned to headquarters for reassignment and will not be returning to Madrid, as his duties have been fulfilled there.

When the DDP decides CRABANAC's next assignment, ADDP will inform us of such and action desired. CRABANAC's travel accounting was given to C/E/B&F for preparation and processing of the voucher for Subject's return travel.

Charles J. Francis
AC/E/SS

CFrancis/cls: 14 Jul 66

SECRET

8 NOV 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT: Request for Exception to Provision of FR 45-10b — Terence S. CRABANAC (P)

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation in paragraph 4 for the approval of the Deputy Director for Support.

2. Terence S. CRABANAC (P) is a Contract Employee assigned to the Madrid area in Spain in a sensitive assignment since his conversion from a Staff Employee on 4 July 1965. CRABANAC was a GS-15, step 7 ($19,880.00 per annum) and he is being paid at the same rate in his present contract status. His contract provides that he will be entitled to a living quarters allowance in conformance with regulations of this organization applicable to its appointed personnel.

3. The basic living quarters allowance for Class II officers in Madrid is $2,900 per annum. The house which CRABANAC has located, with a one year lease from 15 November 1965 to 14 November 1966, has an annual rent of $6,600.00 excluding utilities. Therefore, for rent alone, he will be $1,960.00 per year over the 160 percent maximum allowed under the provisions of FR 45-10b. On a 75/25 percent sharing basis of the 60 percent over the quarters allowance, he would be out of pocket $2,395.00.

4. Due to the operational sensitivity of CRABANAC's assignment, his request for relief on his housing costs was handled by Mr. Thomas Karamessines, ADDP. On 15 September 1965, Mr. Karamessines, ADDP, approved his being reimbursed on a 75/25 percent basis for the excess allowable costs up to, but not to exceed, 60 percent above his quarters allowance. This authorization was included in a letter to CRABANAC from Mr. Karamessines. It is requested that the Deputy Director

for Support authorize the 75/25 percent sharing of the excess allowable costs up to 60 percent above his quarters allowance.

/S/

Edward Ryan
Acting Chief
Western Europe Division

Recommendation in paragraph 4
is authorized:

Charles H. Davis
Deputy Director for Support

9 NOV 1965
Date

DDP/WE/SS:DavisB.Powell/aj/6189 (8Nov65)

Distribution:
Orig. - C/WE
2 - SSA-DD/S
1 - C/WE/SS
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1 - WE/PT
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1 - WE/S

SECRET

Chief, Western Europe Division - 18 October 1965

ATT : Support Staff

Compensation and Tax Division
Office of Finance

Duty Status Reports-Terence S. CRABANAC, Employee Number 179080

Reference : FHB 20-1000-1, paragraph 5.

1. To date there is no record of receipt of Forms 764, Duty Status Reports, for Terence S. CRABANAC since his EOD 4 July 1965. These reports are required in order to maintain his leave account in accordance with the terms of paragraph 6(e) of his contract and to preclude action to withhold pay in accordance with requirements of the referenced handbook.

2. It is requested that this office be advised as to the reason for the delay in the submission of these Duty Status Reports.

LUCILE F. TWOGOOD
Chief,
Contract Employees Accounts Section
Agent Payroll Branch

TO: Compensation and Tax Division
Office of Finance

ATTENTION: Lucile F. Twogood

FROM: Chief of Support, WE Division

Per conversation with Mr. Thomas Karamessines, ADDP, there will be no Duty Status Reports (Form 764) submitted on Terence S. CRABANAC. This should be used as the authority to continue his pay without these reports.

Davis B. Powell
Chief of Support
WE Division

SECRET

October 18, 1965

Dear Howard,

Your insurance representative has passed along some information concerning reimbursement to you by means of deposits to your bank account. So that you will understand the reason and the source of deposits which show up on your bank statement, here is the run-down for the present:

Amount of Deposit	Approx Date of Deposit	Reason for Payment
$ 5.00	Sep 9	Settlement of claim for son Howard (settlement sheet enclosed)
$216.06	Oct 7	Settlement of following claims: You..........$ 47.68 Lisa.......... 112.88 Kevan......... 24.50 Howard........ 31.00 $ 216.06 (Four settlement sheets are enclosed.)
$505.75	Oct 7	Settlement of following claims: Lisa..........$ 112.49 Kevan......... 63.75 Kevan......... 189.74 Lisa.......... 139.77 $ 505.75 (Four settlement sheets are enclosed.)
$ 60.00	To be made Nov 4	Refund of advance premium payments made on your life insurance policy which you cancelled.

I am also forwarding herewith some bills and receipts which your insurance representative has returned with appropriate notations on each. I believe you will want to retain these for possible future use.

Sincerely,

John

4 October 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division,
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : Terence S. CRABANAC (P), Contract Employee
Request for Contract Amendment

1. It is requested that Subject's contract, which was effective 4 July 1965, be amended with respect to living quarters allowances so as to authorize reimbursement for 75% of the excess allowable costs up to, but not in excess of, 60% of the standardized quarters allowance.

2. The proposal for this 75%/25% sharing basis, in lieu of the standard 50%/50% basis, has been reviewed and approved by Mr. Thomas H. Karamessines.

Davis B. Powell
Davis B. Powell
Chief, WE Support Staff

15 September 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Thomas H. Karamessines

SUBJECT : Madrid Housing

1. The following is a listing of the GS-13 and above staff employees and their quarters costs as of April 1965:

Grade & No. of Dependents	Allowance	Cost	Cost to Individual
(COS)GS-16 (3)	$2,900	$4,236	All cost paid
GS-15 (1)	2,900	3,132	$116
GS-15 (0)	2,000	1,800	0
GS-14 (5)	2,900	2,796	0
GS-14 (5)	2,900	3,840	450
GS-13 (3)	2,000	2,280	140
GS-13 (3)	2,000	2,472	236
GS-13 (5)	2,000	2,544	272

2. Mr. Hunt's quarters allowance is $2,900. Using the same formula as applied to the other staff employees at the Station, the following would be the figures:

$2,900 + 60% ($1,740) = $4,640

On a 50/50 percent sharing basis of the 60 percent, he would be out-of-pocket $870 if his costs were $4,640.

On a 75/25 percent sharing basis of the 60 percent, he would be out-of-pocket $435, if his costs were $4,640.

3. I would recommend he be authorized the 75/25 percent sharing basis of the allowable excess costs up to, but not to exceed, 60 percent above his quarters allowance.

Davis B. Powell
Davis B. Powell
Chief
WE Support

4640
-435
4205

SECRET

3 September 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : General - Terrence S. CRABANAC - Supplement
Specific - Paragraph Entitled "Offset"

REFERENCE : A. OGC Opinion 65-2476a, dated 12 August 1965

B. Our Memo, dated 8 July 1965, Same Subject

1. This office herein recommends an ammendment to CRABANAC's Supplement dated 4 July 1965, to delete paragraph 7. entitled "Offset."

2. This office acknowledges the OGC opinion, Reference A, which determined CRABANAC may retain without Agency salary offset any future royalties earned as a result of his literary efforts based on the fact cover does not include role of a writer.

3. As Subject's cover "activities" have been officially clarified as being only a light one of a retired Foreign Service Officer for which the Agency will be making all entitlement payments and actually he will receive no funds from any cover, this paragraph, which is misleading, has no meaning in Subject's contract and it is hereby recommended that it be deleted from CRABANAC's Supplement.

4. Further, in future cases when a cover is so light that Subject will not be receiving funds from cover it is recommended that no "Offset" paragraph be included in Supplements or Contracts.

WILLIAM R. CAULFIELD
Chief, Covert Claims Branch

Attachment
Ref. A and B

no action taken on this memo.

SECRET

OGC 65-2476a

12 AUG 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Terence S. CRABANAC - Retention of Royalties by a Contract Employee

1. You have requested the opinion of this Office in regard to the retention of future royalties which might be earned by Terence S. CRABANAC as a result of his literary efforts. We believe that he is entitled to retain such royalties without an offset against his Agency salary.

2. We have been advised by Mr. Gene Stevens, WE/Support, that CRABANAC's cover does not include the role of a writer; CRABANAC's cover for status will only be a light one of a retired Foreign Service Officer. Therefore, paragraph 7 of his contract dated 4 July 1965 may remain as written. Royalties from the fictional works that he writes as a profitable hobby will not be emoluments received from or through his "cover activities."

Norman D. Block
NORMAN D. BLOCK
Office of General Counsel

cc: Chief, Covert Claims Branch
Mr. Gene Stevens, WE/Support

3 AUG 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR : Office of General Counsel

ATTENTION : Norman Block

SUBJECT : Terence S. Crabanac -- Retention of Royalties by a Contract Employee

1. Reference is made to the telephone conversation of 26 July 1965 between yourself and Rogers C. Brooks of this Office wherein background information relating to the assignment of Terence S. Crabanac was discussed.

2. Subject will apparently develop a cover as a writer, a field wherein he has an already demonstrated talent based upon several publications. The objective of the cover is to provide a basis of attribution for some of his income. At the time of the preparation of Mr. Crabanac's contract, the specific detail of his cover was unknown.

3. Request your opinion in regard to the retention of possible royalties earned by Crabanac as a result of his literary efforts or whether such income should be properly offset.

Joseph B. Ragan
Chief, Contract Personnel Division

Attachments.

OP/CPD: RCBrooks/cw: 2 August 1965

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SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	C/WE/Support	15 July	
2			
3	WE/AT - Stevens		
4	Re Seeing Mr. Coleman		
5	concerning P.O. Box		
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Assume you wish to add this to your file. As previously stated there is no reason for him to have a transportation allowance. If you are in touch with [illegible], pls have him see me. I want him to get a post office box - over

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
C/WE/S	14 July

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FORM NO. 237 2-61 Use previous editions (40)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1961 O-587282

14-00000

from Security to which he can send his financial accounts. This will reduce contact with station.

CRABANAC

8 July 1965

FINANCIAL BRIEFING REPORT

DATE : 7 July 1965 STATUS: Contract Employee

SUBJECT : Terence CRABANAC COVER : Non-Official - Writer

DESTINATION: Madrid Spain

DEPENDENTS : Wife and four children 14 12 11 and 21 mos.

Subject was advised that this briefing was being held to review with him the official financial business and personal aspects created as a result of his assignment. He was told that a report of the briefing would be prepared and that a copy would be forwarded to the KUBARK office responsible for his administration.

Subject is proceeding abroad as a retired OD CID officer who is now pursuing a career as a writer.

Subject had read his Contract. The persons present at the briefing were Subject and wife Division Budget and Fiscal Officer, payroll representative, and the undersigned Certifying Officer.

The payroll representative briefed Subject regarding his compensation. Headquarters payrolled allowances, tax withholding and deductions. proposed Foreign Duty Data Sheet was used and an official copy will be sent to the office administering Subject upon receipt of a notification Subject has arrived in place. The Tax Committee representative had briefed Subject as to the procedure by which he will fulfill his Federal tax reporting requirements - see below Section III entitled "Taxes." All questions raised by Subject during the briefing were answered to his apparent satisfaction. There were two points which were to reviewed further by WE. they were:

a. Review of Supplement relative to quarters allowance being payrolled and non-accountable.
b. Determination of authorization and amount of a Transportation Allowance.

Plans call for Subject to establish through Monetary Division an operational bank account. This fund will serve his operational needs while in Madrid as he is to have no (or limited) contact with the Station. Highpoints of the briefing are discussed below:

I. Funding and Accounting

A. Headquarters

(1) Will payroll Subject's compensation (and allowances) authorized deductions. (Specify allowances as applicable)

(2) Will advance PCS travel funds and audit accounting which is to be submitted by Subject when accounting complete.

(3) Will advance funds and receive accountings for operational fund. His first accounting will be upon moving into permanent quarters, and initially quarterly thereafter, unless activity warrants more frequent accounting period.

B. Station

Will provide only emergency support as needed.

C. Cover

(1) Subject has no ligitimate cover from which through agreement with KUBARK he would receive payments.

(2) Paragraph 7 entitled OFFSET is in question with contracting office as to what is intended as Subject's only income from cover activities appear to be income from his writings. Subject is under impression income from writings not to be refundable.

no problem. Subj will have no cover income from writing. In event he should at some future time receive cover income from other source, it would be offset.

II. Terms of Contract and Additional Items

(11) Allowances -

Subject was informed that allowances were subject to fluctuation as a result of Standardized or KUBARK regulations changes.

(11a.) Subject was advised to notify Headquarters of changes in his family status as such changes would effect allowances being payrolled where rates are determined by Subject's family status.

(12) Receipts

Subject was advised that a receipt is required where practicable or a certification in lieu of receipt should be submitted for all reimburseable expenses in the amount of $15.00 or more.

(20) Travel

Subject was briefed in general regarding reimburseable incidental expenses and travel entitlements in regard to his proposed itinerary. Among the points covered were the following:

A. Per Diem rates applicable to Subject's proposed itinerary

B. Excess baggage provisions when economy/tourist flights are used

C. Use of less than first class air travel accomodations

D. Use of American airlines

(30) Effects Shipment
Subject was briefed in general regarding his KUBARK authorizations as follows:

A. The combined shipping and storage of household effects is limited to 13,500 pounds net for Subject.
B. Full shipment is authorized.
C. Subject was advised the total of the amount of the effects stored and shipped shall not exceed the limitations for shipment and storage set forth as 13,500 pounds net.

(31) Unaccompanied Baggage
300 pounds net per traveller which may be used as follows:
When entire journey is by surface transportation the 300 pound authorization is to be shipped by surface transportation, or can be included with household effects shipment.

(33) FOREIGN CUSTOM DUTIES
As Subject is under non-official cover he may be required to pay foreign import duty so this regulatory authorization was discussed.

(43) Transportation Allowance
Subject will be taking his personal car and reported he will be authorized a Transportation Allowance not yet determined by Division. The Allowance is to be paid monthly by Headquarters.

(51) Temporary Lodging Allowance
Subject was advised he would be entitled to this allowance and he was briefed as to its provisions as outlined in the Standardized Regulations.

(53) Permanent Personal Quarters
Subject was advised that his quarters would be administered in accordance with FR 45-10b, and then the provisions of this Regulation were explained to him. However, Division B&F Officer intends to review this point for possible contract amendment in providing a quarters allowance at maximum Standardized rate and to be non-accountable.

(60) **Leave**

(61a) Subject was informed of his leave balances as of 3 July 1965: A/L 374 hours and S/L 633 hours.

(63) Leave Benefits
Subject was informed of accruals, use, and carry-over for annual (360 hours) and sick leave while overseas. Also, he was informed Headquarters forwards leave balances to the field annually.

(71) Insurance
Subject was informed that costs incurred for insurance protection of baggage, effects, car and their shipment are considered personal and are not reimburseable by KUBARK.

(74) Education and Educational Travel Allowances
These regulatory provisions were discussed as the ages of Subject's children indicate his elligibility. All official employees are required to send children to U. S. Military school, Subject's allowances will be equal to that authorized for other WE non-official personnel in area.

(81) Operational Expenses
Subject was briefed in general terms regarding advances, control, safekeeping, accounting, receipts, and other supporting authoritative documentation.

(82) Operational Entertainment
A thorough briefing was given Subject regarding this topic in accordance with current regulations.

(84) Other Operational Considerations
An operational bank account is being opened through the Monetary Division to house an operational advance - amount yet undetermined. Subject was advised not to co-mingle personal funds with operational funds. Subject will submit his first accounting upon occupying permanent quarters and initially quarterly thereafter. From this account TLA and Educational allowance payments will be made and reported.

III. Taxes
Subject was advised he should file overtly only. Subject's W-2 is to be forwarded by pouch and his tax return is to be returned by pouch for mailing in U. S.

IV. Banking Arrangements
A. Subject has provided Headquarters with his bank account for use as his stateside allottee.

B. An operational bank account is to be established.

WILLIAM R. CAULFIELD
Chief, Covert Claims Branch

Distribution:
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1 - C&L
1 - Registry
1 - Payroll
1 - WE/Division

SECRET

8 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division, O/P

SUBJECT : general - Terence S. CRABANAC - Supplement
specific - Paragraph Entitled "OFFSET"

1. This office has a question as to the intent of including paragraph (7.) entitled "OFFSET" as appears in the Contract for Terence S. CRABANAC. The paragraph in question reads as follows:

> 7. OFFSET
> Emoluments (including benefits in kind) received from or through your cover activities are the property of the U.S. Government. Procedurally, such emoluments will be offset against amounts due you under this agreement and are acknowledged to be payment by the Government hereunder and for Federal income tax purposes. If cover emoluments exceed those due you under this contract, you will dispose of the excess amount in conformance with Governmental instructions.

2. Subject reportedly is proceeding abroad under the cover of a retired Foreign Service Officer and in pursuit of his ambitions as a writer, Subject will receive all his contractual benefits through the Agency, there is no cover company, so therefore the only apparent emoluments to be received from or through his cover activities would be earnings received from articles, stories, or books written by him. Please inform this office if its interpretation is correct. If not, we would appreciate your interpretation and reasoning relative to the statement "Emoluments received from or through your cover activities are the property of the U.S. Government."

WILLIAM R. CAULFIELD
Chief, Covert Claims Branch

SECRET

Mr. Terence S. Crabanac

Dear Mr. Crabanac: :

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you as a Contract Employee for the use of your services and the performance of duties of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the use of your services and the performance of specified confidential duties you will be compensated in an amount calculated at the rate of $19,880 per annum. In addition, you are herein authorized legislative salary adjustments, within-grade promotions and, if applicable, a post differential in substantial conformance with rules and regulations applicable to Government appointed employees. Payments will be made as requested by you in writing in an approved manner. Taxes will be withheld therefrom and submitted by this organization.

2. Allowances. You will be entitled to: (a) Living quarters allowances in conformance with regulations of this organization applicable to its appointed personnel. In the event you are furnished quarters by the Government you will not be entitled to the living quarters allowances herein indicated.

(b) Cost-of-living allowances in conformance with applicable regulations of this organization including, but not limited to, a post allowance, a transfer allowance and a home service transfer allowance.

3. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for travel and transportation expenses for you, your dependents, your household effects and your personal automobile to and from your permanent post of assignment, and for you alone for authorized operational travel. In addition, you will be entitled to storage of such household and personal effects as are not shipped, in conformance with applicable Government regulations. You may be entitled to per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of all travel performed hereunder and, when authorized, for you alone while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized, and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable Government regulations.

4. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses including, but not limited to, entertainment and the purchase of information, as specifically approved by the Government. Such funds will be subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable Government regulations.

5. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

6. <u>Benefits.</u> (a) You will be entitled to death and disability benefits equal to those authorized under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, as amended. Claims by you, your heirs, or legal representatives under this paragraph will be processed by this organization in accordance with its procedures in such manner as not to impair security.

(b) You will be entitled to the continuance of pay and allowances in a manner similar to that set forth in the Missing Persons Act (50 U.S.C.A., App. 1001-1015).

(c) You will be entitled to sick, annual and home leave (including travel expenses incident thereto) equal to and subject to the same rules and regulations applicable to Government appointed employees. Annual leave may only be taken at times and places approved in advance by appropriate Government representatives. All accrued but unused leave credited to your former account as an appointed employee of this organization will be transferred to the leave account established for you hereunder.

(d) As a Government employee under contract converted from staff status without a break in service, it is required that you continue to make contributions to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. Such contributions (presently six and one/half per cent (6-1/2%)) will be deducted by the Government from the basic compensation due you hereunder, i.e., presently $19,880 per annum.

(e) You are herein authorized to apply for enrollment in a health insurance program for certain selected Contract Employees of this organization, subject to all the terms and conditions of that program. If accepted, this organization is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder. Your financial contribution will be effected either by payroll deduction or by direct remittance at periodic intervals to be established by this organization.

(f) (1) This organization is authorized to pay the cost of necessary hospitalization and related travel expenses for illness or injury incurred by a United States citizen full-time Contract Employee in the line of duty while abroad.

(2) This organization may pay certain necessary costs of hospitalization and related travel expenses for illness or injury incurred by the dependents of a United States citizen full-time Contract Employee permanently assigned abroad, while they are located abroad.

It is understood and agreed that the eligibility and extent of the participation by you and your dependents in the above medical programs will be in conformance with the rules, regulations and policies of this organization in effect at the time an illness or injury is incurred, that all claims will be submitted only to this organization and that adjudication of such claims by this organization shall be final and conclusive.

7. <u>Offset.</u> Emoluments (including benefits in kind) received from or through your cover activities are the property of the U. S. Government. Procedurally, such emoluments will be offset against amounts due you under this agreement and are acknowledged to be payment by the Government hereunder and for Federal income tax purposes. If cover emoluments exceed those due you under this contract, you will dispose of the excess amount in conformance with Governmental instructions.

8. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

9. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

10. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

11. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

12. Term. This contract is effective as of 4 July 1965, and shall continue thereafter for a period of two (2) years unless sooner terminated:

(a) Upon sixty (60) days' actual notice by either party hereto, or

(b) Upon actual notice to you in the event the results of an initially required medical examination are determined by this organization to be unsatisfactory, or

(c) Without prior notice by the Government, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be extended upon notice from the Government. In the event of voluntary termination on your part or termination for cause by the Government prior to the expiration of this agreement or any renewal thereof, you will not be entitled to return travel expenses to the United States. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY DHL
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

/S/

WITNESS: /S/

APPROVED: /S/

14-00000

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.

CASE OFFICER: Gene Stevens
DIVISION: WE/PI
TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 7157
DATE: 24 June 1965

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS (See HR 20-44, HR 20-41, HR 20-7, HR 20-53, and HR 20-620-1, HR 20-1000-1 and or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel.)

All Benefits Normally Applicable To Staff Personnel Except FEGLI.

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check): [X] PROPOSED [ ] ESTABLISHED

48. TYPE (Check): [ ] PROPRIETARY [ ] SUBSIDIZED [ ] CULTURAL [ ] EDUCATIONAL [ ] COMMERCIAL [ ] MILITARY [ ] TOURIST [X] OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS
[ ] YES [ ] NO [ ] COMPLETE [ ] PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)
[X] TOTAL [ ] PARTIAL [ ] NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION: DAYS ___ MONTHS 2 YEARS ___

52. EFFECTIVE DATE: 4 July 1965

53. RENEWABLE: [X] YES [ ] NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE (Number of days): 60 days

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION: [X] YES [ ] NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION (CI, PI, PP, other)

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Intel Officer

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

59. EDUCATION (Check Highest Level Attained)
[ ] GRADE SCHOOL [ ] HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE [ ] TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE
[ ] BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE [ ] COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE
[ ] COLLEGE (No degree) [ ] COLLEGE DEGREE [ ] POST GRADUATE [ ] MA [ ] PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY (Check Appropriate Degree Competency)

LANGUAGE	SPEAK FLUENT	SPEAK AVERAGE	SPEAK POOR	WRITE FLUENT	WRITE AVERAGE	WRITE POOR	READ FLUENT	READ AVERAGE	READ POOR

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

SECTION XV — EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CIA

63. GIVE INCLUSIVE DATES, POSITION TITLE OR TYPE WORK, SALARY AND REASON FOR LEAVING

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (Use other side if necessary)

[ ] OVER

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OPERATING OFFICIAL	DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER
24 June 65	[signature]	[illegible]	[signature]

14-00000

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

INSTRUCTIONS: Use HR 20-33 and HR 20-1000-1 for guidance. Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and TWO copies for preparation of contract.

CASE OFFICER: Gene Stevens
DIVISION: WH/FT
TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 7157
DATE: 2 June 1965

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME [X] PSEUDO [ ] TRUE: Terence S. CRABANAC
2A. PROJECT:
2B. PERMANENT STATION: Madrid, Spain
3. ALLOTMENT NO.: 6136-1342
3A. FUNDS: [ ] V [X] VV
4. SLOT NO.:
5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES: #23-501
6. INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY PRIOR TO THIS CONTRACT [X] YES [ ] NO (If yes, describe and include dates and salary.) Staff Employee November 1949 - July 1965 Terminal Salary GS-15 step 7, $1_,_80 per annum
7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date): Type A Granted 23 June 65
7A. MEDICAL CLEARANCE: [ ] OBTAINED [X] INITIATED [ ] NOT REQ'D.
8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" [X] YES [ ] NO
9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT [ ] YES [X] NO
10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): Contract Employee

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.
12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN [ ] YES [ ] NO
13. AGE: 46
14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): Oct. 9, 1918
15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Largo, Florida
16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Bethesda, Maryland
17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate): [ ] SINGLE [X] MARRIED [ ] WIDOWED [ ] ANNULLED [ ] SEPARATED [ ] DIVORCED
18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:

Wife - 45
Dau - 14
Dau - 12
Son - 11
Son - 21 Mos.

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY [ ] YES [X] NO RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE: No
21. VETERAN: Yes
22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat):
23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: -----
24. RANK OR GRADE: --------
25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE [ ] YES [X] NO
26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA [ ] YES [ ] NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY: $19,880 per annum
28. POST DIFFERENTIAL: none
29. COVER (Breakdown, if any): none
30. FEDERAL TAX WITHHOLDING: COVER [ ] YES [ ] NO; CIA [X] YES [ ] NO

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS: yes
32. POST: yes
33. OTHER: Cost-of-living, Education, TLA
34. COVER (Breakdown, if any): none

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES [X] PCS [ ] DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL [ ] FOREIGN OPERATIONAL
36. WITH DEPENDENTS [X] YES [ ] NO
37. HHE TO BE SHIPPED [X] YES [ ] NO
37A. HHE TO BE STORED [ ] YES [ ] NO
38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED [X] YES [ ] NO
39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL [X] YES [ ] NO
40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH

Wife - U. S. - 45 - April 1, 1920
Dau - U. S. - 14 - March 9, 1951
Dau - U. S. - 12 - November 27, 1952
Son - U.S. - 11 - March 22, 1954
Son - U.S. - 21 mos. - September 1, 1963

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH [X] CIA REGULATIONS [ ] COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION: yes, when authorized
43. ENTERTAINMENT: yes, when authorized
44. OTHER:

6 January 1965

SECRET

MEMORANDUM TO: Benefits & Services Division

SUBJECT : Cause of Illness - E. Howard Hunt

1. Having been requested to give an opinion regarding the origins of the duodenal ulcer for which I was hospitalized October 12-15, 1964, I believe it to have resulted from three years of work frustration and professional dissatisfactions occasioned by (a) Agency failure to assign me to an appropriate post abroad following my participation in Project JMATE, and (b) the passive, non-challenging nature of the domestic work I was given.

2. I should point out that before joining Project JMATE in May, 1960, I requested in writing, and was granted by responsible senior officials, commitment to return me to an appropriate assignment abroad upon the termination of JMATE. Despite continuing verbal assurances in the ensuing three years I was not sent abroad. Instead, I was retained in domestic duties which I felt were inconsistent with the heavier responsibilities discharged by me during a long and active operational career abroad.

3. The T/O position I have been occupying - Chief of Covert Action for DO Division - is the equivalent of my 1953-54 assignment as Chief of Covert Action for SE Division. Organizationally I am where I was 11-12 years ago, but with a smaller staff and many fewer responsibilities.

4. To me this represented a professional dead-end, without hope of promotion or foreign assignment, a situation which preoccupied my mind and in due course found physical reflection in duodenal hemorrhage.

5. For the record, the foregoing information is not volunteered, but provided in response to an official request.

HOWARD HUNT

SECRET

14-00000

7 December 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. E. Howard Hunt

SUBJECT : B&C Claim

1. Returned herewith is CA-1 (in duplicate) and CA-2 (in duplicate) which you completed in connection with your recent illness.

2. The Benefits and Services Division has requested the following information:

a. Statement of medical history - Form 89 attached for this purpose.

b. Full statement from physician, or physicians, including nature of illness, treatment, prognosis and statement as to what he thinks may be the cause.

c. Statement from you, describing in full, what you think the contributing cause may be.

Virginia C. Lynch
DD/Personnel

Attachments - A/S

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

TO: (Check)	CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION	DATE
	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action)	ESTABLISHED FOR
ATTN:		FILE NO.
REF:		ID CARD NO.
MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED		EMPLOYEE NO.

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☐ **Block Records:**
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. Temporarily for ______ days, effective ______________________.

b. Continuing, effective ______________________.

☐ **Submit Form 642 to change limitation category.**
(HHB 20-7)

☐ **Ascertain that Army W-2 being issued.**
(HB 20-661-1)

☐ **Submit Form 1322 for any change affecting this cover.**
(R 240-250)

☐ **Submit Form 1323 for transferring cover responsibility.**
(R 240-250)

☐ **Remarks:**

☐ **Cover History**

James H. Franklin

CHIEF, MILITARY COVER [illegible]

DISTRIBUTION: Copy 1-POD, Copy 2-Operating Component, Copy 3-OS D/OS, Copy 4-OL TELSVC, Copy 5-PSD OS, Copy 6-File.

FORM 6-64 1551 [illegible]

SECRET

(13-20-43)

14-00000

MEMORANDUM FOR ATTACHMENT TO CA-2 Filed by E. Howard Hunt

My first knowledge of Mr. Hunt's illness was on the morning of 12 October when his office informed me that he became ill and was taken to the hospital with a "bleeding ulcer". He has been on sick leave since that date.

Thos. P. Schreyer
Executive Officer

14-00000

[illegible]

C. W. W[illegible] M.D.
DIRECTOR

[illegible]
DEPARTMENT OF RADIOLOGY
D[illegible] C[illegible] AND [illegible]

PATIENT [illegible]
PHYSICIAN [illegible]
EXAMINATION [illegible]

Upper [illegible].

[illegible] M.D.

[illegible]/[illegible]

CHART COPY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Personnel File:

Thomas B. CASASIN (J. Richardson)

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

CASASIN, Thomas B.

1R

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 0037033
2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): [illegible]
PREPARED: 08/23/74

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CONTRACT TERMINATION (03JMH71)
4 EFFECTIVE DATE: 06 | 26 | 74
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER ASSOCIATE (F)

6 FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | X | CF TO CF
7 FAN AND NSCA: 4136-4292
8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO DIRECTORATE / EUROPEAN DIVISION / UNSAVANT
*
10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE

11 POSITION TITLE: OPERATIONS OFFICER
12 POSITION NUMBER:
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): [illegible]
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16 GRADE AND STEP: 15 0
17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 36000 DOG: 020363 LEI: 052872

18 REMARKS

- - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - -

BIRTH DATE: 24 SEX: M MARITAL ST: DIV NO. DEPENDENTS: 01
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: 112049 FED SERVICE COMP: 030744
TYPE RETIREMENT: [illegible] HOSPITALIZATION: F PLAN:
FEGLI: YES PREV. GOVT SERV: 4 SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: [illegible] A/L [illegible] 8 S/L IND: 4

- - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - -

EFF DATE: 051572 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 051572
REFERRING OFFICER: [illegible] REFR ORG: EUR PHONE: 7503

- - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - -

TAX STATUS: Y FED EXMP: STATE EXMP: STATE:
TRAVEL: [illegible] [illegible] EXMPL: Y HOUSING: A POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: [illegible] [illegible] Y OFFSET CLAUSE: Y SID GOVT: Y
[illegible] Y [illegible] N ALLOWANCE COMM: N EDUCATION:
[illegible] N [illegible] TAX [illegible] N OTHER ALLOWNS: N SEPARATION:

[illegible] PRECEDED BY AN ASTERISK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

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14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)			
	CASASIN THOMAS B			PREPARED: 08/11/72
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION		4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
INITIAL ENTRY		05 15 72	CAREER AGENT (S)	
6 FUNDS	V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / X CF TO CF	7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
		3136-1231		
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS		10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION		
DDP DIRECTORATE EUROPEAN DIVISION		PARIS, FRANCE		
11 POSITION TITLE		12 POSITION NUMBER	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	
OPS OFFICER				
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB etc.)	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE AND STEP	17 SALARY OR RATE	
(FULL TIME) GS	0136.01	15 0	$ 33260	DOG: 020363 LEI: 052872

18 REMARKS

--------- STATUS INFORMATION ---------

BIRTH DATE: 24 SEX: M MARITAL ST: DIV NO. DEPENDENTS: 01
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: FED SERVICE COMP: 030744
TYPE RETIREMENT: CIA R-D HOSPITILIZATION: F PLAN:
FEGLI: YES PREV. GOVT SERV: 4 SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A A/L IND: 6 S/L IND: 4

---------- CONTRACT INFORMATION ----------

EFF DATE: 051572 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 051572
REFERRING OFFICER: EUR PERS REFR ORG: EUR PHONE: 6913

------- ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES -------

TAX STAFF: Y	FED EXMP:	STATE EXMP:	STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI	OPS EXPNSE: Y	HOUSING: A	POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 4	DIFFERENTIAL: Y	OFFSET CLAUSE: Y	STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y	PREMIUM PAY : N	ALLOWANCE COMM: N	EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: N	OTH TAX ENTL: N	OTHER ALLOWNS : N	SEPARATION:

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

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GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 003762
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): CASASIN THOMAS E
PREPARED: 10/15/73

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: LEGISLATIVE PAY ADJUSTMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: 10 14 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER ASSOCIATE (S)

6. FUNDS: V TO V / C TO V / V TO C / C TO C
7. FAN AND NSCA: 4136-424
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
OPS DIRECTORATE
EUROPEAN DIVISION
UNSAVANT

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (FULL TIME) GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 0
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 36000 DOG: 020363 LEI: 052873

18. REMARKS

- - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE: 24 SEX: M MARITAL ST: DIV NO. DEPENDENTS: 01
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: 112067 FED SERVICE COMP: 030744
TYPE RETIREMENT: CIA R-D HOSPITILIZATION: F PLAN:
FEGLI: YES PREV. GOVT SERV: 4 SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A S/B CODE: 6 S/L IND: 4

- - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 051572 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 051572
REFERRING OFFICER: EUR PERS REFR ORG: EUR PHONE: 7503

- - - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: Y FED EXMP: STATE EXMP: STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI OPS EXPNSE: Y HOUSING: A POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 4 DIFFERENTIAL: Y OFFSET CLAUSE: Y STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y PREMIUM PAY: N ALLOWANCE COMP: N EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: N OTH TAX EXEMPT: N OTHER ALLOWNS: N SEPARATION:

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERISK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

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NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	
[illegible]	[illegible]	PREPARED: [illegible]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	[illegible]	CAREER ASSOCIATE (SI)

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
				X	[illegible]	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
[illegible] DIRECTORATE [illegible] DIVISION [illegible]	PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
[illegible]		

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
(FULL TIME) [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] 34571 [illegible]

18. REMARKS

- - - - - - - - - [illegible] - - - - - - - - - -
[illegible] 24 SEX: [illegible] MARITAL ST: DIV NO. DEPENDENTS: 01
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: [illegible] FED SERVICE COMP: [illegible]
TYP RETIREMENT: CIA [illegible] HOSPITALIZATION: F PLAN:
FEGLI: YES PREV. GOVT SERV: [illegible] SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A A/L [illegible] S/L [illegible]
- - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 051572 EXPIRATION DATE: [illegible] DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 051572
REPORTING OFFICER: [illegible] PHONE: [illegible]
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - -
[illegible] STAFF: Y FED EXMP: STATE EXMP: STATE:
[illegible] [illegible] EXPENSE: Y [illegible] POST/EQUAL:
[illegible] 4 DIFFERENTIAL: Y [illegible] CLAUS: Y [illegible]: Y
[illegible] PAY: Y PREMIUM PAY: [illegible] CLEARANCE COMP: [illegible] EDUCATION:
STEP [illegible] [illegible] TAX [illegible] OTHER ALLOWNS: [illegible] SEPARATION:

[illegible]

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

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(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	
003783	CASASIN THOMAS B	PREPARED: 01/15/73

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
MISCELLANEOUS CHANGE	01 12 73	CAREER AGENT (S)

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO C	C TO V	X C TO C	7. FAN AND FISCA	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
					2131-4252	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP DIRECTORATE NON-OFFICIAL COVER ACT DIV	PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER		

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
(FULL TIME) GS	0136.01	15 0	$ 34571 DOG: 020303 LEI: 052872

18. REMARKS

--------- STATUS INFORMATION ---------

BIRTH DATE: 24 SEX: M MARITAL ST: DIV NO. DEPENDENTS: 01

CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP:*112049 FED SERVICE COMP: 030744

TYPE RETIREMENT: CIA R-E HOSPITILIZATION: F PLAN:

FEGLI: YES PREV. GOVT SERV: 4 SAL. TASK LIMIT:

PAY BASIS: A A/L IND: 8 S/L IND: 4

--------- CONTRACT INFORMATION ---------

EFF DATE: 051572 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 051572

REFERRING OFFICER: NOCAD PERS REFR ORG: NOCA PHONE: 5050

--------- ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES ---------

TAX STAFF: Y FED EXMP: STATE EXMP: STATE:

TRAVEL: CHI OPS EXPNSE: Y HOUSING: A POST/EQUAL:

HOME LEAVE: 4 DIFFERENTIAL: Y OFFSET CLAUSE: Y STD GOVT: Y

LEGISL PAY: Y PREMIUM PAY : N ALLOWANCE COMP: N EDUCATION:

STEP INCRS: N OTH TAX ENTL: N OTHER ALLOWNS : N SEPARATION:

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERICK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

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(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 0037833
2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): CASASIN THCMAS B
FNLP/MED:01/15/73

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: LEGISLATIVE PAY ADJUSTMENT
4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 01 C7 73
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER AGENT (S)

6 FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / X CF TO CF
7 FAN AND NSCA: 3131-4292
8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
LDP DIRECTCRATE
ACA-CFFICIAL COVER ACT DIV

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE

11 POSITION TITLE: CPS CFFICER
12 POSITION NUMBER:
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (FULL TIME) GS
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: C136.01
16 GRADE AND STEP: 15 0
17 SALARY OR RATE: $* 34971 DCG: 020363 EDD: C52872

18 REMARKS

- - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

EIRTH DATE: 24 SEX: M MARITAL ST: DIV NC. DEPENDENTS: 01
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LCNGEVITY CCMP: FED SERVICE CCMP: C30744
TYPE RETIREMENT: CIA R-C HCSPITILIZATION: F PLAN:
FEGLI: YES PREV. GCVT SERV: 4 SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY EASIS: A A/L IND: 8 S/L IND: 4

- - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - -

EFF DATE: 051572 EXPIRATICN DATE: INDEFN DATE CRIG CONTRACT: C51572
REFERRING OFFICER: NCCAC PERS REFR CRG: NCCA PHCNE: 5050

- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLCWANCES - - - - - - - - - -

TAX STAFF: Y FED EXMP: STATE EXMP: STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI CPS EXPNSE: Y HCUSING: A PCST/EQUAL:
HCME LEAVE: 4 DIFFERENTIAL: Y CFFSET CLAUSE: Y STC GCVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y PREMIUM PAY : N ALLCWANCE CCMM: N EDUCATICN:
STEP INCRS: N CTH TAX ENTL: N CTHER ALLCWAS : N SEPARATICN:

NCTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERICK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150 8 72 MFG 9 72 Use Previous Edition (4-51)

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 002762
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): CASASIN THOMAS B

PREPARED: 11/03/72

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: MISCELLANEOUS CHANGE
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: 11 01 72
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER AGENT (S)

6. FUNDS: V TO V | V TO C | C TO V | X C TO C
7. FAN AND NSCA: 3131-4292
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP DIRECTORATE NON-OFFICIAL COVER ACT DIV
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (FULL TIME) GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 0
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 33260

DOG: 020363
LEI: 052872

18. REMARKS

- - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - -

BIRTH DATE: 24 SEX: M MARITAL ST: DIV NO. DEPENDENTS: 01
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: FED SERVICE COMP: 030744
TYPE RETIREMENT: CIA R+D HOSPITILIZATION: F PLAN:
FEGLI: YES PREV. GOVT SERV: 4 SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A A/L IND: 5 S/L IND: 4

- - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - -

EFF DATE: 051572 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 051572
REFERRING OFFICER: NCAD PERS REFER ORG: NOCA PHONE: 5050

- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -

TAX STAFF: Y	FED EXMP:	STATE EXMP:	STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI	OPS EXPNSE: Y	HOUSING: A	POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 4	DIFFERENTIAL: Y	OFFSET CLAUSE: Y	STD GOVT: Y
LOGICAL PAY: Y	PREMIUM PAY: N	ALLOWANCE COMP: N	EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: N	OTH TAX ENTL: N	OTHER ALLOWNS: N	SEPARATION:

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERICK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

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(4-51)

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(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
0037833	CASASIN THOMAS B PREPARED:09/29/72

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	09 20 72	CAREER AGENT (S)

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO C	C TO V	C TO C	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
				X	*3131-4292	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
*DDP DIRECTORATE *NON-OFFICIAL COVER ACT DIV	PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER		

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
(FULL TIME) GS	0136.01	15 0	$ 33260 DOG: 020363 LEI: 052872

18. REMARKS

- - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE: 24 SEX: M MARITAL ST: DIV NO. DEPENDENTS: 01
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: FED SERVICE COMP: 030744
TYPE RETIREMENT: CIA R-D HOSPITILIZATION: F PLAN:
FEGLI: YES PREV. GOVT SERV: 4 SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A A/L IND: 8 S/L IND: 4
- - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 051572 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 051572
REFERRING OFFICER:*NOCAD PERS REFR ORG:*NOCA PHONE:*5050
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: Y FED EXMP: STATE EXMP: STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI OPS EXPNSE: Y HOUSING: A POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 4 DIFFERENTIAL: Y OFFSET CLAUSE: Y STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y PREMIUM PAY : N ALLOWANCE COMM: N EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: N OTH TAX ENTL: N OTHER ALLOWNS : N SEPARATION:

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7-66 MFG 2 72

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GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

78-02869R
Box 5

/437 SECRET FRP: . . . .

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CONF: IP/DP-11 INFO: FILE, RF, (13/P)

78 0582111 PAGE 001
TOT: 190843Z APR 78 WASHINGT 208255

S E C R E T
DEFERRED TELEPOUCH 190843Z WASHINGTON 208255
TO: PARIS.

FROM: E/F/S INFO E/D/PERS, E/D/HF, OP/CPD, CCS/CSB, OED/NOC

SUBJECT: ADMIN BCHAWK WOGAME - THOMAS B. CASASIN (P)

1. ACCORDING TO MOC ON THOMAS B. CASASIN, RTACTION OBLIGATION TO REIMBURSE CASASIN FOR COST OF SHIPPING UP TO ONE THOUSAND (1000) POUNDS OF HHE FROM FRANCE TO WODUAL, EXPIRED AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1977. ALL OTHER COMMITMENTS, INCLUDING EXTENSION OF CASASIN'S SERVICES UNDER MOC, EXPIRED 31 DEC 77 ALSO.

2. FYI: UNSAVANT PROJECT FOR CASASIN WAS TERMINATED AT END OF FY 76 REPEAT FY 76. PROJECT FILE BEING CLOSED AS ALL ASPECTS OF THIS CASE TERMIN ATD.

3. FILE: 029-006-252/2; 201-0933259. E2 IMPDET.>
ORIG: E/F/S (SANDY DELONG X9487 14 APR 78); COORD: C/E/D/PERS (DUTER), E/D/BF (YOW), OP/CPD (BROOKS), CCS/CSB (FOR INFO), OED/NOC (FOR INFO); REL: C/E/F (HORNSTEIN). CL BY 061308.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENT

DATE 2[illegible] 1975

TO: OFFICE OF FINANCE

VIA: CHIEF, EUR AND CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION

FROM: CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER, PARIS

SUBJECT: ENGAGEMENT OF [illegible] as (Independent Contractor) (Contract Employee)

1. TERM AND ACTIVITY CHARGE - Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under Activity [illegible], effective 1 July 1975 XXXXXXXXXXX until obligation is XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX completed but not to exceed 31 December 1977.

2. SECURITY APPROVAL - The appropriate security approval for subject's use has been obtained. Type (former Career Associate) dated ________.

3. CITIZENSHIP - Subject (is) (is not) a WODUAL Citizen.

4. COMPENSATION - Subject will be paid nothing per ____ in ________ currency. Describe any other compensation in the nature of bonus commitments, gifts, loans, currency conversions or other ________

5. TAXES - Explain method of collection when appropriate FLAT RATE.
(N/A, FR 20-18d applies, to be determined by Headquarters)

6. QUARTERS AND/OR SUBSISTENCE - Quarters Allowance N/A per ________.

Subsistence Allowance ________ per ________.

7. OPERATIONAL EXPENSES - N/A

a. Travel expenses (will) (will not) be reimbursed. Fixed Payment ________. Regular Accountings ________. Allowance of ________ per ________.

b. Other operational expenses (will) (will not) be reimbursed.
Type Expense ________; Method of Accounting ________.
Type Expense ________; Method of Accounting ________.
Type Expense ________; Method of Accounting ________.

8. OTHER COMMITMENTS - *Describe [illegible] will reimburse CASASIN for costs of shipment of up to 1000 (one thousand) pounds of [illegible] at the conclusion of cover employment from Paris, France to [illegible]. (Scheduled for 31 May 1977)

9. CONTINGENT OBLIGATIONS - (Not promised Subject but may have to be met) *Describe ________

NO COMMITMENTS OTHER THAN THOSE DESCRIBED ABOVE HAVE BEEN MADE TO SUBJECT.

SIGNED: [signature]
Case Officer

REVIEWED: [signature]
Special Contracting Officer
1/3/76

APPROVED: [signature]
Field Contracting Officer

*Certain special benefits or commitments require prior Headquarters approval i.e., leave, retirement, death, disability, missing in action, resettlement, escrow accounts, citizenship assistance, emergency assistance, bonus payments, and other unusual items.

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1 - Station Finance
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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DD/Pers/SP 23 FEB 1976		
2			
3	AD/Pers 1976	25 FEB	1976
4	C/CPD		
5			
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks: Recommend AD/Pers approval (albeit retroactively) of the attached request from the Chief, EUR Division to extend the MOC for Thomas B. CASASIN (P) as an independent contractor without compensation beginning 1 July 1975. The only benefit payable under the MOC will be a taxable payment for the shipment in 1977 of 1,000 lbs., of personal effects from Paris to the United States.

Subject, now age 52, retired under CIARDS 28 June 1974 as a GS-15 (Step 10) career associate. On 24 June 1974, D/Pers approved a request to engage him as an independent contractor for a one-year period beginning 1 July 1974 at an annual fee of $8,000.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
C/CPD, 5 E 67, Hqtrs 7841	23 Feb 76

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FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions (40)

14-00000

SECRET

76-0561

76-376

29 JAN 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

VIA: Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: Chief, European Division

SUBJECT: Request for Extension of the Services of Thomas B. CASASIN (P), Retired Annuitant, under a Memorandum of Oral Commitment

1. Action Requested: Your approval is requested to extend the services of Thomas B. CASASIN (P) under a Memorandum of Oral Commitment for the period 1 July 1975 to 31 December 1977. The only compensation to CASASIN would be money equivalent to shipment costs for a maximum of 1,000 pounds of personal effects from Paris, France, to the United States. Since CASASIN is an Independent Contractor, the amount of money given CASASIN will be considered taxable income for tax year 1977.

2. Basic Data and Background: CASASIN, born 20 January 1924, has been employed by the Agency since 1949. Twelve years of this period were spent as a Staff Employee, seven of which were at Headquarters and five years, 1955-1960, were spent in Tokyo. In 1962 CASASIN was assigned to Paris under nonofficial cover as a Staff Agent. In 1972 he was converted to Career Associate status to coincide with his cover employment with UNESCO, a position he attained on his own initiative. CASASIN retired as a GS-15, Step 10, on 30 June 1974 and with proper Headquarters approvals was utilized by Paris Station as an Independent Contractor, effective 1 July 1974. His compensation was in accordance with the 90 percent provision of HR 20-13 a(1) (c) (1).

3. Staff Position: Due to his growing employment involvement at UNESCO, CASASIN requested, and the Paris Station agreed, not to renew his written Independent Contract, due for renewal 1 July 1975. However, since CASASIN is willing to meet informally

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CL BY 057567

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with the Station, the Station requests a Memorandum of Oral Commitment to be effective for the period CASASIN remains in UNESCO's employ, which is expected to terminate in 1977. CASASIN's experience as an Operations Officer and, specifically, experience and operational contacts derived through his present employment position in Paris are sufficiently valued by the Paris Station to request the continuation of CASASIN's services under a Memorandum of Oral Commitment.

4. Recommendation: Your approval is requested to continue CASASIN's services under a Memorandum of Oral Commitment for the period 1 July 1975 to 31 December 1977 with total compensation being money equivalent to the cost of shipping a maximum of 1,000 pounds of personal effects from Paris, France, to the United States.

William W. Wells
Chief, European Division

CONCUR:

Deputy Director for Operations — Date: 17 Feb 1976

APPROVED:

Director of Personnel — Date: 25 FEB

DISAPPROVED:

Director of Personnel — Date

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

THROUGH : Career Management Group, Contract Personnel Branch

SUBJECT : Thomas B. CASASIN (P) Termination of contract

This is to advise you that Thomas B. CASASIN'S (P) contract expired 30 June 1975. It is requested that CASASIN'S contract be terminated effective that date.

Gerald K. Hughes, Jr.
Chief, Personnel Section
European Division

APPROVED:
/s/ ... W. Sandman
Special Contracting Officer

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CL BY 027164

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CONFIDENTIAL

28 JUN 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT : Request for Voluntary Retirement -
~~Mr. Jacques C. Richardson~~
Casasin, Thomas B.

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval in paragraph 3.

2. The employee named above has applied for voluntary retirement under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50h.

Grade: GS-15 Equiv. Position	Career Associate
Career Service	Operations
Office/Division	Europe Division
Date Requested for Retirement	28 June 1974
Age at that Date	50
Years of Creditable Service	30
Years of Agency Service	24
Years of Qualifying Service	19

3. The applicant's Career Service and the CIA Retirement Board recommended that the request be approved. I endorse these recommendations.

B. DeFelice
for Director of Personnel

4. The recommendation contained in paragraph 3 is approved:

/s/ Harold L. Brownman

Deputy Director for Management and Services

Date

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3589 (4-74)

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CERTIFICATION BY THOMAS B. CASASIN
CAREER ASSOCIATE, AS TO EXPENDITURES OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ALLOWANCE

I certify that the Administrative Allowance payments made to me in accordance with the provisions of the Addendum to the Agency contract dated 5 August 1972 and any amendments and extensions thereto have, to the best of my knowledge and belief, been used substantially for the purpose for which provided and have not accrued to my personal advantage or enrichment.

[illegible] SIGNED
Date Thomas B. Casasin

E2IMPDET
CL by: 063837

14-00000

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CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE-TIME GROUP | CITE | MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF 162304Z DIRECTOR 696231

CONF: EUR 4 INFO: FILE CMG/NOC 3 CMG/MS CCS 2 DISSEM BY: 83

TO: PARIS.

WODEEP ADMIN

REFS: A. PARIS 56954 | IN 578647 |

B. OFAT-1377, 29 MAY 74

NEED TO KNOW DATE WHEN CASASIN WILL CONCLUDE UNCAIRD EMPLOYMENT. SECTION I (C) NOC STATUS REPORT FORWARDED REF B STATES HE ON THREE-YEAR EXTENSION CONTRACT WITH UNCAIRD TO END JUNE 1977. PLS ADVISE. E2 IMPDET.

C/EUR/PERS Stephen C. Ertz

CMG/NOC GEORGE MARLING (PHONE)

E/NOC E Sullivan

E/BF P. Yew

DATE: 16 MAY 75
ORIG: BARBARA GENTILE
UNIT: E/F/S
EXT: 9487

C/E/SS — RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AC/E/F — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

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ACTION #

T 011629 EIA530 PAGE 01-01 IN 578647

TOR:131043Z MAY 75 PARI 56954

S E C R E T 131003Z MAY 75 STAFF

CITE PARIS 56954

TO: DIRECTOR.

WODEEP ADMIN

1. THOMAS B. CASASIN HAS GIVEN NOTICE THAT HE DOES NOT INTEND TO RENEW HIS CONTRACT WHICH TERMINATES 30 JUNE 1975. HE CITES HIS GROWING INVOLVEMENT AT UNCAIRD AS THE REASON.

2. HE HAS AGREED TO FUTURE MEETINGS WITH STATION OFFICERS ON AN INFORMAL BASIS. FOR HIS CONTINUING COOPERATION HE ASKS ONLY THAT HIS ENTITLEMENT FOR SHIPMENT OF HEE TO THE U.S. BE KEP OPEN UNTILHE CONCLUDES HIS UNCAIRD EMPLOYMENT. STATION WILL WRITE A MOC COVERING THIS CONTINGENCY. PLEASE ADVISE YOUR CONCURRENCE.

E-2 IMPDET

SECRET

SECRET

DATE: 20 May 1975

CTC NO. 210

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

ATTENTION : Chief, Compensation and Tax Division

THROUGH : Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Tax Assessment for Thomas S. CAS[illegible]

1. A flat rate percentage covert tax assessment of this individual's gross taxable Agency entitlements has been approved as indicated below. This rate is to be applied to the individual's gross taxable earnings.

Assessment Rate (Percentage)	Effective Date	Tax Year
Twenty-three and seven-tenths (23.7) per cent	1 May 1975	

2. This is a revised assessment.

3. Other payroll factors pertinent to this tax assessment action are as follows:

[signature]
[illegible] S. POWELL
Executive Secretary
Covert Tax Board

CONTRACT APPROVAL:
/s/ Charles W. Sandman — 22 May 1975

Chief, Contract Personnel Division — Date

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SECRET

DATE: [illegible] December 1974

CTC NO. 210

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

ATTENTION : Chief, Compensation and Tax Division

THROUGH : Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Tax Assessment for Thomas B. CASASIN (P)

1. A flat rate percentage covert tax assessment of this individual's gross taxable Agency entitlements has been approved as indicated below. This rate is to be applied to the individual's gross taxable earnings.

Assessment Rate (Percentage)	Effective Date	Tax Year
Twelve and nine-tenths (12.9)	1 December 1974	1975

2. This is a revised assessment.

3. Other payroll factors pertinent to this tax assessment action are as follows:

[signature]
GEORGE S. TORELL
Executive Secretary
Covert Tax Board

CONTRACT APPROVAL:

/s/ Rogers C. Brooke
Chief, Contract Personnel Division

26 DEC 1974
Date

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OFAT-1492
6 Aug 74

CONFIDENTIAL

FITNESS REPORT	NOTE: Supervisor or Reviewing Official may assign a higher classification if CONFIDENTIAL is not adequate for the report when completed.

SECTION A. GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER	2. NAME (last, first, middle)	3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. SEX	5. GRADE	6. SD
128609	CASASIN, Thomas B. (P)	20 Jun 24	M	GS-15	D

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	9. CURRENT STATION
Career Associate - Ops Officer	DDO/EUR	Paris

10. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		CAREER PROVISIONAL		RESERVE
	CONTRACT		SPECIAL		TEMPORARY

11. TYPE OF REPORT

	ANNUAL		21-MONTH		30-MONTH	X	REASSIGNMENT		SPECIAL

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From-to)	13. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
1 January 74-30 June 74	

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory — Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

M—Marginal — Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.

P—Proficient — Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.

S—Strong — Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O—Outstanding — Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 SEE ATTACHED MEMORANDUM IN LIEU.	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	

FORM 3-73 45N

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(4)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT : Thomas B. CASASIN

PERIOD COVERED: January - June 1974

Although I have been the Station case officer for Subject only since January 1974, I have been acquainted with his performance for the Station for the past 5 1/2 years through my assignment in the French Branch at Headquarters and, for the past 2 1/2 years, as the Station officer responsible for UNCAIRD operations. I have always considered CASASIN to be a highly skilled, experienced senior case officer thoroughly devoted to the work of BKHERALD. He is becoming increasingly effective in his present cover position at UNCAIRD, operating against both Soviet and PRC targets, and I am delighted that he has agreed to continue his cooperation with the Station as a field agent following his retirement from BKHERALD effective 30 June 1974. CASASIN can look back with pride over his years of service with BKHERALD but he can also look forward to additional years of highly useful, productive work for Paris Station.

CASASIN's attitude can best be summed up by a comment on my first operational meeting with him following his official retirement. He instinctively went immediately to a discussion of operations, not of retirement. I am confident that CASASIN will continue to be a highly motivated, effective asset of Paris Station, and I wish him well.

John H. Kenney
Operations Officer

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SECTION D

The attached Memorandum in Lieu of a Fitness Report should be read in conjunction with the NOC Status Report on Subject for the period ending 31 March 1974; these reports overlap somewhat in the period covered. As has been indicated by both Russell N. SKOGSBERG, who prepared Section I, and George T. HEMSLEY, who prepared Section III of the NOC Status Report, Subject is an impressive officer who has developed superb cover for himself but who has been only reasonably effective in identifying, developing and turning over useful access agents to the Station. While endorsing the general thrust of the Memorandum in Lieu of a Fitness Report, the undersigned also feels that Subject should bring a sharper focus to bear on developing in-depth relationships with those persons who have the potential of becoming quality access agents to priority targets. Subject meets and knows many people in his milieu, including Soviets; he reports in considerable volume on these contacts. We encourage him to concentrate on a few of these contacts and to plumb them to their depths. The undersigned joins SKOGSBERG in wishing Subject well and in paying recognition to his motivation and his attitude.

Subject's Specific Duties remained essentially as described in his previous Fitness Report (for the period 1 January - 31 December 1973). I would rate him on these Specific Duties as he was previously rated.

/s/ Oleg Selsky

Operations Officer

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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FITNESS REPORT - FIELD TRANSMITTAL

SPECIAL NOTE

Fitness Reports must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information and methods of operation, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of specific duties may be reported in Section B. However, the nature, source, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the description of specific duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases, general statements of specific duties will be included in Section B indicating the level of responsibility.

INSTRUCTIONS

The following items of the Fitness Report will NOT be completed by field personnel.

SECTION A, items 2, 3, 7, and 8.

SECTION D, items 1, 2, and 3 (*Only in respect to "Typed or Printed Name and Signature"*)

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS FITNESS REPORT	DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE (*in pseudonym*)
including Section D.	6 Aug 74	[signature] Thomas B. CASASIN

2. I CERTIFY THAT, EXCEPT FOR ITEMS OMITTED UNDER THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL ITEMS APPEARING ON THE ATTACHED FITNESS REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS OR REGULATIONS.

DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR (*in pseudonym*)
	Edwin E. Haviine [signature] for Russell N. SKOGSBERG

DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (*in pseudonym*)
	Edward J. HEROSIAN [signature]

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(04-47)

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SECRET

DATE: 22 July 1974

CTC NO. 110

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

ATTENTION : Chief, Compensation and Tax Division

THROUGH : Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Tax Assessment for Thomas B. CASASIN

1. A flat rate percentage covert tax assessment of this individual's gross taxable Agency entitlements has been approved as indicated below. This rate is to be applied to the individual's gross taxable earnings.

Assessment Rate (Percentage)	Effective Date	Tax Year
Eighteen and seven-tenths (18.7)	23 June 1974	1974

2. This is a revised assessment.

3. Other payroll factors pertinent to this tax assessment action are as follows:

Executive Secretary
Covert Tax Board

CONTRACT APPROVAL:

/s/ Charles W. Sandman
Chief, Contract Personnel Division

25 JUL 1974
Date

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S E C R E T 201107Z SEP 74 STAFF

CITE PARIS 51247 (HEMSLEY ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR,

ADMIN PERS

REF: DIRECTOR 599151

EDWIN E. HAURONIC WITNESSED SIGNING OF CASASIN'S CONTRACT. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

THROUGH : CMG/CP

SUBJECT : Inclusion of HHE shipment in contract for Independent Contractor, Thomas B. CASASIN (P)

1. It is requested that the new contract for Thomas B. CASASIN (P) include shipment of HHE for him and his dependents and POV as well as storage of household effects.

2. CASASIN retired from the Agency 28 June 1974, and by regulation is entitled to movement of HHE up to one year. An extension of an additional six months can be requested, but beyond that CASASIN would not be covered.

3. EUR has been granted approval to hire CASASIN under a Paris Station project. His cover job contract has been approved until May 1977, at which time he plans to return to the United States.

4. Therefore, EUR recommends his contract include the benefits of shipment of HHE, POV, and storage of goods to his place of legal residence upon the successful completion of his services.

George W. Owens
Chief, Personnel Section
European Division

CONCUR:

CMG/CP

19 JUL 1974
Date

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 033769

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
CCS/CSB GH-43 Hqs.	5029	CSB 74-254
		DATE: 27 June 1974

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. OP/CPD 5E-69 Hqs.				This individual is being retained as an independent contractor after retirement. Geo. P.
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

CSB 74-254

26 June 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Retirement Affairs Division

SUBJECT: Mr. Jacques G. Richardson

1. This is to advise you that Mr. Richardson will be placed under the covert annuity plan administered by the Cover and Commercial Staff effective upon his retirement in June 1974. He has also been placed under the Combined Group Investments (C.G.I.) plan for hospitalization insurance.

2. All future correspondence with Mr. Richardson will be handled through the Cover and Commercial Staff.

GEORGE S. POWELL
Chief
Cover Support Branch
Cover & Commercial Staff

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 063851

SECRET

14-00000

Jacques Richardson

Sal. 36000

90% 32 400

Annuit 22-24 K.

8000 is
within 90% rule

Age 50

[illegible]

14-00000

Thomas B. CASASIN GS-15^10

22,332 annuity per annum

36,000	current salary GS-15^10
3600	less 10%
32,400	
22 332	less annuity
10,068	

Annuity figure from Bill Madigan, ROB,
27 Jan 74
CMcL

SECRET

[illegible] 74-3323

26 JUN 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Request for Approval to Utilize Thomas B. CASASIN (P) as an Independent Contractor

REFERENCE : DD/P 6-1818, 2 May 1966

1. Action Requested: The European Division requests approval to utilize Thomas B. CASASIN (P) as an Independent Contractor subject to the terms regarding employment of annuitants as set forth in the reference. CASASIN has just opted for retirement under the Agency Retirement Program effective 28 June 1974.

2. Basic Data or Background: CASASIN, born 20 January 1924, has been employed by the Agency since 1949. He held several positions in Headquarters and from February 1955 until October 1960 served in Tokyo. Until his departure for Paris he served as a Branch Chief in the then SR Division. In 1962 CASASIN was assigned to Paris under non-official cover as a Staff Agent to work on the Soviet target. He remained a Staff Agent until his conversion to Career Associate status in 1972.

3. Staff Position: In 1972, with Paris Station approval, CASASIN on his own initiative obtained an editorial position with IDENTITY. This cover job affords him the unique opportunity to establish and maintain contact and access to a variety of target personalities. Despite a heavy cover load, he has been able to make useful operational contributions

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 055747

SECRET

to the overall Station effort against the Soviet Bloc and more recently, the PRC target. His current appointment with IDENTITY has recently been extended until 31 May 1977. We would like to continue to utilize CASASIN's professional talents and his natural sustained access to priority targets in IDENTITY. CASASIN will retire at the GS-15 step 10 level. In accordance with Agency regulations CASASIN's proposed gross annual contract salary of $8,000 plus his annuity will not exceed ninety percent of his salary at the time of retirement.

4. Recommendation: It is requested that approval be granted to employ Thomas B. CASASIN (P) as an Independent Contractor.

A Roosevelt

Archibald B. Roosevelt, Jr.
Chief, European Division

CONCUR:

William E Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations — Date 27 July 1974

APPROVED:

Wm Janney
Director of Personnel — Date 27 June 74

DISAPPROVED:

Director of Personnel — Date

7 AUG 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

THROUGH : CMG/CP

SUBJECT : Termination of Contract for Thomas B. CASASIN (P)

This is to inform you that Career Associate Thomas B. CASASIN (P) retired from the Agency on 28 June 1974. His contract is terminated effective as of that date.

George W. Owens
George W. Owens
Chief, Personnel Section
European Division

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Adse.

APPROVED:
/s/ Charles W. Sandman
Special Contracting [illegible]

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 033769

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Finance

FROM : Administrative Allowance Committee

SUBJECT : Fixed Allowance Amendment for

Career Associate, Thomas B. CASASIN

1. Effective 28 April 1974, to offset dollar appreciation, the fixed allowance for Subject is revised by substituting the figure $13,741 for the figure $14,981.

2. All other provisions of the current Allowance Committee Addendum remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY [signature]

APPROVED:

[signature]

for Allowance Committee

E2 IMPDET
CL by: 063837

14-00000

SECRET

AMENDMENT TO ALLOWANCE COMMITTEE ADDENDUM
For Career Associate, Thomas B. CASASIN

Mr. Thomas B. Casasin

Mr. Casasin

Effective the day following your departure from Paris, France for home leave, paragraph (A) entitled "Fixed Allowances" of your current Allowance Committee Addendum (as amended) is hereby (further) amended:

1) By substituting the figure $6,877 for the figure $13,741; and

2) By extending the period covered through the day prior to your PCS return to Paris, France following home leave.

All other provisions of your Allowance Committee Addendum (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

____
Allowance Committee

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 0[illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

DATE: 14 November 1973

CTC NO. 210

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

ATTENTION : Chief, Compensation and Tax Division

THROUGH : Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Tax assessment for Thomas B. CASASIN (P)

1. A flat rate percentage covert tax assessment of this individual's gross taxable Agency entitlements has been approved as indicated below. An acknowledged Letter of Tax Instruction ______ forwarded. The ______ advised of this assessment. This rate is to be applied to the individual's gross taxable earnings.

Assessment Rate (Percentage)	Effective Date	Tax Year
Twenty-eight and seven-tenths (28.7)	9 December 1973	1974

2. This is a revised assessment.

3. Other payroll factors pertinent to this tax assessment action are as follows:

GEORGE S. POWELL
Executive Secretary
Covert Tax Board

CONTRACT APPROVAL:

/s/ Charles W. Sandman
Chief, Contract Personnel Division

16 NOV 1973
Date

DISTRIBUTION: Orig - Addressee; 1 Copy - CPD; 1 Copy - CCS/CSB; 1 Copy - CHRONO; 1 Copy - CCS/RR.

FORM 11-72 2643 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

2 - CPD Copy

OUTGOI[illegible] MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE TIME GROUP | SITE | MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF 112330Z DIRECTOR 465807

CONF: EUR8 INFO: FILE OF2 CI/OPS/INTL4 CCS2

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 47

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILED #

TO: PARIS.

ADMIN FINANCE WODEEP

1. REQUEST THOMAS B. CASASIN FORWARD HQS ASAP COPIES OF HIS COVER PAY STATEMENTS FOR FEB & MARCH 73.

2. LATEST COVER PAY STATEMENTS INDICATE INCREASE ALLOWANCE OF $260.67 PER MONTH MADE IN FEB OR MARCH 73. COVER PAY OFFSET 1 FEB 73 THRU 15 SEPT 73 WAS $12,631.28. ANALYSIS BASED ON COVER PAY STATEMENTS IN HAND HQS FOR APRIL, MAY & JUNE 73 EXTENDED THRU 15 SEPT 73 INDICATES OFFSET SHOULD HAVE BEEN $14,307.57, WHICH RESULTS IN REFUND DUE FROM CASASIN OF $1,676.29. NET PAY DUE NOW $787.87 PER PAY PERIOD. ALL NET PAY DUE CASASIN WILL BE WITHHELD UNTIL REFUND DUE - $1,676.29 IS LIQUIDATED.

3. IF PROPOSED METHOD OF REFUND REPAYMENT CITED PARA 2 ABOVE UNACCEPTABLE TO CASASIN, PLEASE ADVISE. E2 IMPDET.H

DATE: 11 OCT 73
ORIG: J. A. PAVLICK
UNIT: E/BF
EXT: 86657

OF/C&TD/D. LAWREY/TELECOORD

C/E/SS — RELEASING OFFICER | C/E/F — COORDINATING OFFICERS | E/BF — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Finance

FROM : Administrative Allowance Committee

SUBJECT : Fixed Allowance Amendment for
Career Associate, Thomas B. CASASIN

1. Effective 1 July 1973, to offset dollar depreciation, the fixed allowance for Subject is revised by substituting the figure $14,981 for the figure $13,494.

2. All other provisions of the current Allowance Committee Addendum remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY Kenneth C. Rushworth
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

Heather W. Balnicio
for Allowance Committee

SECRET

E2IMPDET
CL by: 026715

SECRET

27 June 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Finance

FROM : EUR/Contract Personnel

SUBJECT : Changes in Financial Analysis Number
Personal Services of Thomas B. CASASIN (P)
OBJECT CLASS: ____________

It is requested that the cost of personal services for subject Career Agent ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ be changed, effective the pay period beginning 1 July 1973 from Financial Analysis Number 3131-4292 to 4136-4292 (UNSAVANT)

EUR DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER

APPROVED:
Special Contracting Officer

SECRET

SECRET

[illegible] TRANSMITTAL - FITNESS REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS

The following items of the Fitness Report will NOT be completed by field personnel preparing the report for transmittal to Headquarters:

SECTION A, Items 1, 6, and 7

SECTION D, Items 1, 2, and 3 (Only in respect to "Typed or Printed Name and Signature")

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS FITNESS REPORT	DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE (In pseudonym)
		Thomas B. CASASIN

2. I CERTIFY THAT, EXCEPT FOR ITEMS OMITTED UNDER THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL ITEMS APPEARING ON THE ATTACHED FITNESS REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS OR REGULATIONS

DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR (In pseudonym)
	Reginald M. GUNION

DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (In pseudonym)
31 January 73	Joseph H. RILANDER

SPECIAL NOTE

Fitness Reports must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information and methods of operation, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of specific duties may be reported in Section B. However, the nature, source, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the position titles and description of specific duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases, general statements of specific duties will be included in Section B indicating the level of responsibility.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
CASASIN, Thomas B.	20 Jan 24	M	CS-15	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
		Paris

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT			10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT	
X CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY	INITIAL	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			X ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):			SPECIAL (Specify):	

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
28 February 1973	1 February - 31 December 1972

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- **U-Unsatisfactory** — Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- **M-Marginal** — Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
- **P-Proficient** — Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
- **S-Strong** — Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- **O-Outstanding** — Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Maintenance of effective NOC status and functioning as a WOMACE officer in this situation	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Maintains direct long-term contact with CKPOLAR personnel and exploits these contacts for operational objectives.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Provides spotting reports on wide range of contacts and follows up with additional meetings when individual is of special interest to Station	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Responds to Station requirement for information on individuals or organizations	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Operational reporting	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

FORM 7-00 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During the period covered by this report, subject began a new job in an upper-level, executive capacity with an international organization. He obtained this job without BKHERALD assistance and the salary offsets approximately 60% of the total cost of this activity. This cover job was possible because of subject's extensive, solid background in scientific journalism and his French fluency. His cover is impeccable because he is capable of a first class, professional performance on this job and he was selected for the job solely on his professional qualifications in competition with other highly-qualified persons.

A solid cover situation is useful only to the extent that it serves as a base for BKHERALD activities. Despite a full time job and unwitting superiors and co-workers, Subject has done a full time job for BKHERALD. He has maintained an intensive dialogue with one Soviet official, frequent contact with others, and he is developing additional Soviet contacts in his cover organization. He has also established initial contacts with Chinese officials and has laid the foundation, through the cover organization, to develop and maintain direct and long-term contact with certain of these targets. He has been effective and ingenious in devising direct access to this difficult target and to others having access.

Subject devotes about 50% of his operational effort to the Soviet and Chinese targets. His operational reporting reflects these priorities and it is timely,

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. **BY EMPLOYEE**

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. **BY SUPERVISOR**

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
		/s/ Joseph I. Saltsman

3. **BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

During the period under review, this NOC moved into a highly sensitive but potentially very valuable new cover situation, in which he has infinitely greater access to Soviet and Chinese targets. The NOC is also superbly equipped to handle this new position, by virtue of previous experience, linguistic competence and substantive knowledge of the field of endeavor. He should, in our judgment, do a first-class job, both for the cover employer, and for the Organization as well.

With respect to the specific duties set forth in the first section of this report, this reviewer would not have rated specific duty number two at the "O"

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
		/s/ Hugh R. Montgomery

SECRET

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

complete and literate. Despite his relative isolation as a NOC, he is well aware of priority objectives, concentrates his efforts in these areas and does not waste time on operationally marginal activities.

As is normal in a NOC situation, subject has no supervisory duties with BKHERALD personnel but his cover job provides supervisory responsibility. Subject is meticulous in presentation of financial accountings and his operational expenses are modest. There are no administrative problems related to this project.

SECTION D (cont'd) REVIEWING OFFICIAL

level; in point of fact, it would, in the writer's opinion, merit a solid "S", but no more. Recognizing that such ratings are perforce subjective, and that the rating officer has a closer, almost daily experience factor, nonetheless, the reviewer simply does not believe that the written record of the NOC's accomplishments on the specific targets will support an "O" rating at this time. Even accepting the limitations which the cover situation imposes upon the NOC, he has still not performed in a manner which would correspond to the literal definition of "O".

Other than this divergency, the reviewer shares the laudatory comments set forth in the narrative on this NOC. He is all the things the rater has stated and more: highly intelligent, versatile, linguistically extremely well qualified, and professionally experienced in his cover role. He has begun very well to utilize this new cover position on the Organization's behalf, and it is quite accurate to note that the NOC landed this particular plum (in terms of competition for the cover vacancy) solely on the basis of his own demonstrated talents in the cover context.

In sum, this is an experienced, effective NOC, whose new cover affords him an expanded natural access to a host of the Station's primary targets; he has begun to exploit this access in a sound, logical fashion, and the period ahead should further document the utility of his key situation to our operational programs. In fairness to all concerned, it is simply too early in this new position to attempt a definitive judgment of the depth of access which can be derived from it.

Comments by Chief, EUR France:

Although concurring with an overall rating of "S", I consider the "O" ratings for specific duties numbers one and two to be somewhat high and I recommend an "S" for both. Casasin certainly has maintained his cover and we anticipate he will be able to preserve it in his new job. He has just begun to initiate contacts with Soviet personnel of operational interest and it remains to be seen how effectively Casasin can exploit this situation.

Frederick A. Allner, Jr.
C/E/F

SECRET

ATTACHMENT - FITNESS REPORT - Thomas B. CASASIN (P)

NOCAD/MB REVIEWING OFFICER COMMENTS:

Whether Specific Duty No. 1 is rated "O" (as by the Station rater and reviewer) or "S" (as by the EUR Division reviewer), the fact remains that CASASIN is melding his overt life and operational activity against a primary Station target with a degree of success not often achieved by Agency officers.

CASASIN's response to requirements based in NOCAD administrative and managerial responsibilities has been prompt and efficient; in this additional specific duty we rate his performance "Strong".

In view of his initiative and competence in a demanding and sensitive NOC assignment, NOCAD agrees with CASASIN's overall performance rating of "Strong".

/s/ Charles J. Beckman

Charles J. Beckman
Chief, NOCAD/Management Branch

10 APR 1973
Date

SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Finance

FROM : Administrative Allowance Committee

SUBJECT : Fixed Allowance Amendment for

~~Career Associate, Thomas B. CASASIN~~

1. Effective 14 February 1973, to offset dollar depreciation, the fixed allowance for Subject is revised by substituting the figure $13,494 for the figure $12,234. ( )

2. All other provisions of the current Allowance Committee Addendum remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY [signature]
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

[signature]
Allowance Committee

SECRET

E2IMPDET
CLby 026715

MEMORANDUM FOR: Official Personnel File

SUBJECT : Richardson, Jacques F.

CASASIN, T. B.

1. Studies in Intelligence is the Agency's quarterly professional journal. It publishes a wide variety of unique material—historical, analytical, technical, etc. —on all aspects of intelligence both as a profession and as a function of national security and foreign policy. Employees whose writings are accepted for publication make a valuable contribution to the Agency's work which ought to be reflected in their official files.

2. Accordingly, the Board of Editors wishes to record the fact that Studies in Intelligence has published the following material submitted by Mr. Richardson:

Article: "What to Do with Defectors" - Vol. V, No. 4 (Fall 1961)

Letter to the Editor - Vol. IX, No. 4 (Fall 1965)

Hugh T. Cunningham
HUGH T. CUNNINGHAM
Chairman, Board of Editors
Studies in Intelligence

Distribution:
0 - Subject's Official File
1 - NOCAD/Pers

14-00000

Thomas B. Casasin

Date	Action	Compensation	Grade
15 MAY 72	Career Agent	33,260	GS-15/
7 JAN 73	LPI	34,971	GS-15

SECRET

AMENDMENT TO ALLOWANCE COMMITTEE ADDENDUM
For Career Agent, Thomas B. CASASIN

Mr. Thomas B. Casasin

Dear Mr. Casasin:

Effective 7 September 1972, paragraph (A) entitled "Fixed Allowance" of your Allowance Committee Addendum dated 18 April 1972, is amended by substituting the figure $12,234 for the figure $11,769 to reflect your total HHE storage cost.

All other provisions of your Allowance Committee Addendum remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SIG...

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

18 DEC

____
Allowance Committee

Note: CASASIN was converted from Staff Agent to Career Agent status, effective 15 May 1972. The conversion does not affect any provisions of his Allowance Committee Addendum dated 18 April 1972.

E2IMPDET
CLby 027015

SECRET

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE: FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only, if SA)	DATE (from item 5-D)	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true)	DATE (from item 5-2)
Thomas B. Casasin	26 Sept 73	David E. Murphy	3 Oct 73

DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS	DISPATCH NUMBER	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE
20 Oct 73	OFAT 4785	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH	2. SERVICE DESIGN	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION: TITLE AND GRADE	4. STATION OR BASE	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER
20 Jan 24	CS	ACO, Car Assoc, GS15	Paris	UNCAI.D

6a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD	6b. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE	6c. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ	6d. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE
10 Sep 62 3 Apr 72	o/a 15 May 1974	o/a 25 May 1974	same

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

1 daughter, aged 20 (already actually back at her university)

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

My two-year contract with UNCAIPD ends officially 14 May 1974; it is, theoretically, renewable.

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (see special note on transmittal form). (also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8)

Have continued my spotting and assessment functions, mainly of MKHAR.H and TAPRUM individuals on a selected basis but of third and fourth nationals as well. Have concentrated on two particular PKHARCH targets, while assuming new cover responsibilities and managing a fairly large-scale, authentic cover property in the field of mass communication. Have also responded to Station investigative needs in fields other than my own, and have maintained a continuing relationship with a high-level, well placed PKHA[illegible] political-technical management personality. Have also developed a minor, yet well-placed [illegible] personality in the field of technical innovation and management.

Have arranged to travel to various venues of technical and scientific meetings for appropriate coverages of personalities or substance, as the case required.

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

I believe that there is none indicated at the present time, especially in view of the time and schedule demanded by my cover functions.

14-00000

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

11a. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

I think that in view of the difficulty of obtaining, through legitimate means, the kind of cover assignment I have at the present time, I should stay where I am.

Having said that, Headquarters may wish to give consideration to my moving to a position analogous to the one I have in another organization which is comparable in access and covenant to what we know to be the case in UNCAIRD.

I would like, at any rate, to be able to continue to use the French language operationally.

11b. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 (*for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice*) IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

[2] EXTEND TOUR 6 to 12 MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO Oct 74 - Apr 75 (DATE)

[ ] BE ASSIGNED TO HDQTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY. INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE. 1ST CHOICE [illegible] 2ND CHOICE [illegible] 3RD CHOICE [illegible]

[3] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION; INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIAL STATION. 1ST CHOICE Geneva 2ND CHOICE Brussels 3RD CHOICE Black Africa

[1] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Station recommends approval of extension. If CASASIN retains present, excellent cover with international organization, it is a natural for coverage of primary targets.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

Hqs approves home leave in April 1974 and new tour.

DATE 19 April [illegible] TITLE Personnel Off SIGNATURE Marjorie Galey

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:

Home leave in April 1974 followed by a new tour.

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. [illegible] DATED: 13 [illegible] 197[illegible]

CABLE NO. ____ DATED: ____

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: ____ (SIGNATURE) DATE: ____

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

OFAT-1110
19 Feb 74

FITNESS REPORT

NOTE: Supervisor or Reviewing Official may assign a higher classification if CONFIDENTIAL is not adequate for the report when completed.

SECTION A. GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER	2. NAME (last, first, middle)	3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. SEX	5. GRADE	6. SD
128609	CASASIN, Thomas B.	20 Jan 23	M	GS-15	D

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	8. OFF. DIV. OR BR. OF ASSIGNMENT	9. CURRENT STATION
Career Associate	DDO/EUR	Paris

10. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: X CAREER; CAREER PROVISIONAL; RESERVE; CONTRACT; SPECIAL; TEMPORARY

11. TYPE OF REPORT: X ANNUAL; 21-MONTH; 30-MONTH; REASSIGNMENT; SPECIAL

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From-to): 1 Jan 73-31 Dec 73

13. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 28 February 1974

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

M—Marginal Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.

P—Proficient Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.

S—Strong Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O—Outstanding Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Maintenance of effective NOC status and functioning as a WOMACE officer in this situation.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Exploits his natural access to Soviet personnel for operational needs.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Exploits his wide range of contacts inside and outside his cover organization for operational purposes.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Makes imaginative use of cover position to meet Chinese officials at international conferences.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Operational reporting.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

FORM 3-73 45N

CONFIDENTIAL

E-2, IMPDET CL BY 007622

(4)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During the period covered by this report, Subject has settled into his new cover job as an upper-level executive in an international organization. This salary offsets approximately 40% of the cost of maintaining this NOC in Paris. His cover is, however, excellent for other than financial reasons: Subject's experience and skills are such that he is admirably qualified to perform the job and is doing outstanding work in the eyes of his peers and supervisors, all of whom are unwitting. More importantly, it places him in a situation where he has normal, daily contact with numerous Soviet officials and by skillful use of his cover job he concocts logical reasons for contacting Chinese officials to whom he does not have natural access. In addition to direct contact to target individuals, Subject uses his position to spot and assess co-workers having access to Station targets.

The area of Subject's performance most in need of strengthening is follow-up development of operational targets. His cover situation is somewhat unique for an NOC in that it puts him in daily contact with his priority target group: Soviet officials and other potential agents having direct access to Soviet officials. This access is not fully exploited. He should make a concerted effort to expand social and/or business contacts with the four or five Soviet officials who work in close proximity to him and to seek out and assess eight or ten third

//continued//

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
15 Feb 74	/s/ Thomas B. CASASIN

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
	Operations Officer	/s/ Oleg N. Selsky for Joe Irl Saltsman

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with the supervisor's letter ratings and with the substance of his narrative comments. Put as simply as possible, Subject has done an outstanding job in establishing superb access cover; it now remains for him and the Station to exploit it operationally. On the basis of his ability during the reporting period to establish meaningful relationships with target Soviets or to spot and assess leads to potential agents who can, Subject's retention is this assignment would not be justified in terms of costs. The 40% rebate does make this effort entirely defensible, however, but Subject should understand that we expect more concrete results now that his cover position has been solidified.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
12 Feb 74	Deputy Chief of Station	/s/ John W. Berg

SECTION C - Narrative Comments (continued)

country nationals who work in the same offices as these Soviet officials. The objective is more first hand reporting by Subject on Soviet officials and assessment reports on several of his co-workers who can be selected and recruited (based on his assessment reports) by other case officers to serve as access agents to Soviet officials.

Despite long service as an NOC, Subject's knowledge of and responsiveness to Organization priorities and requirements has not weakened. He concentrates on priority targets and his operational reporting is complete, on target and highly literate.

As is normal in an NOC position, Subject has no supervisory duties over Organization personnel although his cover job does include supervisory responsibilities. Subject is meticulous in his presentation of financial accountings and his operational expenses are modest. There are no administrative problems related to this project.

CONFIDENTIAL

FITNESS REPORT - FIELD TRANSMITTAL

10 Jan 74

SPECIAL NOTE

Fitness Reports must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information and methods of operation, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of specific duties may be reported in Section B. However, the nature, source, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the description of specific duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases, general statements of specific duties will be included in Section B indicating the level of responsibility.

INSTRUCTIONS

The following items of the Fitness Report will NOT be completed by field personnel.

SECTION A, items 2, 3, 7, and 8

SECTION D, items 1, 2, and 3 (*Only in respect to "Typed or Printed Name and Signature"*)

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS FITNESS REPORT	DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE (in pseudonym)
	15 II 74	Thomas B. Casasin Thomas B. CASASIN

2. I CERTIFY THAT, EXCEPT FOR ITEMS OMITTED UNDER THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL ITEMS APPEARING ON THE ATTACHED FITNESS REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS OR REGULATIONS.

DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR (in pseudonym)
	Reginald M. GUNION [signature] for

DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (in pseudonym)
12 Feb 74	George T. HEMSLEY [signature]

FORM 3-73 45A OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

(04-47)

SECRET

1 August 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Transactions & Records Branch

FROM : Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : [redacted] CASASIN, T B.

Contact C/CPD prior to servicing any request for verification of Agency service.

/s/ Dow H. Luetscher

Dow H. Luetscher
Chief
Contract Personnel Division

NOTE: Subject converted from Staff Agent status to Career Agent status effective 15 May 1972; this should be placed in his terminated Staff Agent file.

SECRET

GROUP I - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

SECRET

1 August 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Insurance Branch/BSD/OP

This is to advise that Thomas B. CASASIN (P), has been employed under an Agency personal services contract effective 15 May 1972. The contract authorizes participation in Civil Service Retirement, FEGLI and Federal Health Insurance.

Subject's contract is the administrative responsibility of DDP/EUR.

/s/ Dow H. Luetscher

Dow H. Luetscher
Chief
Contract Personnel Division

Former Staffer (Stf Agnt)

SECRET
GROUP 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
CASASIN Thomas B.	20 Jan 24	M	GS-15	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Officer	DDP/EUR/F	Paris

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: X CAREER; RESERVE; TEMPORARY; CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C); SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL; REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR; X ANNUAL; REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE; SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
31 March 1972	1 April 71 - 31 March 1972

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Maintenance of effective NOC status and functioning as a WOMACE officer in this situation.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Maintains direct contact with MHHARSH personnel.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Provides spotting reports on wide range of contacts and follows up with additional meetings when individual is of special interest to Station.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Responds to Station requirement for information on individuals or organizations.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Operational reporting.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

10 APR 1972

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

FORM 7-68 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Reviewed by OP/SPD/PPB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During the period covered by this report subject's job with a scientific publication was terminated for economy reasons. He has now, by his own efforts and with no BKTRUST help, obtained a similar position (as of mid-March the contract has not been signed but it is almost certain that he has the job) with an international organization. The job is at a professional level with a salary that will offset approximately 40% of the total cost of this activity. His French fluency and background in scientific journalism were instrumental in obtaining this job. Subject's operational security is good and all indications are that his cover security is superb.

Despite a full time cover job, and completely unwitting employer, subject has maintained a high output for BKTRUST. He has maintained frequent and meaningful contact with two MHHARSH nationals in Paris and with an MHHARSH couple in another European city. The flow of spotting reports is equal in number and quality to those produced when his cover work was less demanding. One person spotted and assessed by subject was successfully recruited by an "inside" case officer. Subject's cover situation precludes the possibility of his recruiting.

/continued/

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
	/s/ Thomas B. CASASIN

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
24 March 1972	Ops Officer	/s/ Joe IRL Saltzman

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See Attached Sheet.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
27 March 1972	DCOS	/s/ Hugh Montgomery

SECRET

SECTION C NARRATIVE (continued)

It has been noted in past fitness reports that subject was weak in long-range, operational development of a target. The ease and probable success of an extended development is a function of the personalities involved. During this reporting period subject has conducted a sustained development of an MHHARSHER despite their different ages and divergent personalities thus demonstrating improvement in this area.

It some times appears that subject's reporting could be more precise and more closely attundd to BKTRUST objectives. This is probably the result of time limitations, and the NOC officer's knowledge of BKTRUST needs is lessened by his relative isolation.

As is normal in a NOC situation, subject has no supervisory duties with BKTRUST personnel. His cover job provided supervisory responsibility. Subject is meticulous in presentation of financial accountings and his operational expenses are modest.

Section 3 - Comments by Reviewing Official

The career of this NOC officer has reached a crucial juncture; if, as we currently anticipate, he succeeds in landing the position for which he appears to have the inside track, he will gain access to an institution and its employees which could prove to be invaluable. His new function will permit the widest possible access to a variety of targets, and with careful guidance, his utility as a spotter and assessor should improve very substantially.

The report notes that this officer has conducted a lengthy dialogue with an MHHARSH target; it is quite accurate that our NOC has handled himself well in a situation where disparity in age and background renders the relationship somewhat incongruous. Nonetheless, accuracy requires that we record that the NOC's interlocutor has obviously not maintained this ongoing relationship solely for altruistic motives, and has, in point of fact, on one occasion suggested that the NOC might wish to "help" him in the preparation of restricted distribution reports on the local situation, even though the particular topic was in itself totally innocuous. For these reasons we continue to monitor this relationship with great care, particularly since we simply cannot assess its longer range viability and the direction it is likely to take.

In sum, the NOC has done the best he could under somewhat trying circumstances, exacerbated by the severe economic problems of his erstwhile employer, which led to the NOC's being separated from that position at the end of last year. Through his own efforts, the NOC learned of the vacancy for which he has applied, and by assiduous and discriminating manipulation of his extensive connections on the local scene, has managed to maneuver himself into becoming the leading candidate for the post. If he is accepted for this position, his value to the Organization will unquestionably increase by a quantum leap, and we are consequently optimistic concerning his future ability to make an impressive contribution to Organizational goals on the local scene.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 13-1

ORIG: Tom Roberts
UNIT: 9235
EXT: E/F/X
DATE: 1 June 1972

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION: INDEX / NO INDEX / RETURN TO ____ BRANCH / FILE RID / FILE IN CS FILE NO.

BY: 43 PER ____ #

CONF: C/EUR 5 INFO: FILE, VR, DDP, C/CCS 2, C/NOCAD 2, C/CSPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

S E C R E T 5 JUN 72 23 10z CITE DIRECTOR 274972

TO PARIS

RYBAT ADMIN PERS TOPSY WODEEP WOGAME

REF: DIRECTOR 271979

1. HQ INSTRUCTED CASASIN THAT IF UNCAIRD RAISES WITH HIM QUESTION OF FRC "NO RECORD" RESPONSE TO UNCAIRD QUERY RE HIS FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT, HE SHOULD REFER UNCAIRD TO IDEN. CASASIN SHOULD SAY HE CONSULTED IDEN ON RECENT VISIT RE HIS ACCRUED SERVICE CREDITS WITH VIEW TO WITHDRAWING THEIR CASH VALUE SINCE HE DOES NOT INTEND REENTER U.S. GOVT SERVICE. CASASIN SHOULD SAY IDEN CHECKED AND ACKNOWLEDGED CASASIN'S PREVIOUS SERVICE AND CAN VERIFY SAME TO UNCAIRD.

2. ADVISE HDQ IF CASSASIN USES ABOVE AND IDEN WILL BE ALERTED.

3. NO FILE.

END OF MESSAGE

E/COV ____

NOC/CS ____

CCS/CSB ____

C/EUR/SS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AC/E/F
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

14-00000

TOM ROBERTS
E/F/X
5295
25 MAY 1972

SECRET

SECRET

251972 23 03z

CITE DIRECTOR 271979

PARIS

RYBAT ADMIN PERS TOPSY UODEEP UOGAME

REF: PARIS 27951 (IN 597183)

1. UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION CASASIN HAS BEEN CANCELLED.

2. ALSO TAKING MEASURES BACKSTOP PRIOR EMPLOYMENT. BUT REGRET IT NOT POSSIBLE BACKSTOP WITH FEDERAL RECORDS CENTER. IF UNCAIRD QUERIES FRC ITS RESPONSE WILL BE "NO RECORD."

3. IF UNCAIRD QUERIES SKOGSBERG DELEGATION RE FRC RESPONSE, PRESUME SKOGSBERG CAN ARRANGE REPLY THAT "FRC IN ERROR" BECAUSE CSC INVESTIGATION CONSISTENT CASASIN'S CURRICULUM VITAE.

4. NO FILE.

END OF MESSAGE

E/COV ED WILT (IN DRAFT)

OS/OSD/SAB LARRY MILLS (TELECORD)

WOC/CS BILL BROWN (TELECORD)

C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AC/E/F
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

ORIG: ROBERT JARMAN
UNIT: C/E/S
EXT:
DATE: 5 APRIL 1972

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 16-2

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 48 PER
CONF: EUR6 INFO: FILE, VR. NCIAD3, OP2, CCS2,

INDEX / NO INDEX / RETURN TO ___ BRANCH / FILE RID
FILE IN CS FILE NO.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

TO PARIS

252752

ADMIN TOPSY WODEEP

1. FOLLOWING IS STATUS REPORT ON TALKS WITH CASASIN RE CONVERSION TO CAREER AGENT:

A. PROCESSING FOR CONVERSION DISCUSSED AT LENGTH WITH CASASIN AND HE AGREEABLE TO TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT, WHICH NOW IN PROCESS. CONTRACT WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN RECEIVED.

B. IN ORDER CONVERT CASASIN TO CAREER AGENT IT NECESSARY ~~TO~~ ALLOW HIM RETAIN PORTION OF COVER SALARY IN LIEU OF 10% LOSS OF STAFF STATUS PAY AND TO MOVE HIM FROM GS-15/8 TO 15/10 LEVEL. ABOVE WILL BE SPELLED OUT FULLY IN CONTRACT.

C. CASASIN WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO WODEEP UPON DATE OF HIS ACCEPTANCE BY UNCAIRD.

2. SHOULD CASASIN NOT BE ACCEPTED BY UNCAIRD, HQS RECOMMENDATION, SUBJECT TO STATION CONCURRENCE, WOULD BE FOR CASASIN TO REMAIN PARIS AS STAFF AGENT FOR RELATIVELY BRIEF PERIOD TO COMPLETE CURRENT OPS ASSIGNMENTS. FOLLOWING THIS PERIOD CASASIN WOULD BE ~~RETURNED HQS FOR REASSIGNMENT~~. REQUEST STATION COMMENT.

-CONT-

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

14-00000

ORIG: ROBERT JARMAN
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ______ PER ______ #

INDEX NO INDEX RETURN TO ______ BRANCH FILE RID

FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: INFO: FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET PAGE TWO CITE DIRECTOR 252758

3. IF CASASIN ACCEPTED BY UNCAIRD, WODECOP WOULD LIKE CASASIN TDY HQS AREA FOR ADDITIONAL TWO OR THREE DAYS TRAINING. CASASIN PLANS RETURN WOCORK FOR DAUGHTER'S GRADUATION FIRST WEEK JUNE. THIS WOULD ~~[illegible]~~ PRESENT BEST OPPORTUNITY COVER-WISE FOR CASASIN TDY HQS AREA.

END OF MESSAGE

E/F/X
E/PERS
E/COV
NOCAD/CADRE J. KINSCHI (TELECOORD)
DC/NOCAD
C/E/SS
E/COPS
C/E/F

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

SECRET

Attachment #1

Item 44. Operational Expenses

Reimbursement for payment of fringe benefit programs of cover organization (including retirement, health, and life insurance) when it is determined by the Agency that membership therein is necessary for cover and/or security.

Attachment #2

Item 50. Offset of Income

In accordance with HN 20-129(2b), CASASIN will initially be permitted to retain $1449 of his cover income without offset. Upon successful completion of three years service under this contract, the offset will be further reduced by $551, which totals $2000.

14-00000

[illegible] PERSONNEL PROFILE (PART [illegible])

Name	Date of Birth	Date of Entry on Duty
[illegible], [illegible] B. (P)	Jan 1921	29 Nov 1949

Marital Status	Dependents		
Married	[illegible] 1923 1950 [illegible]		

Career Status	Membership	Other Status	Career Designation	Career Field	Qual. for
	Jul 1954		Jul 1962	FCS C/S	FCS C/S

Current Reserve Status	Service	Grade	Active Duty	Release	Date Retired
	X				

Assessment Date	Professional Test Date	Language Test Date
None	None	None

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1943-48 Military Service, US Army, 1st Lt. - Civil Censorship Officer, Japanese Translator & Instructor, Liaison Officer
1949 [illegible] Publishing Co, [illegible], [illegible] - County Editor of weekly paper
1949 [illegible] Housing Authority, [illegible] - Administrative Officer

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

1942 Trinity College, Conn - French
[illegible]-42 Sir George Williams College, Montreal, Canada - French
1945 Univ of Michigan, Army Lang [illegible] - (1947), Oriental Civilization, Japanese
1951-52 Georgetown Univ Graduate School - International Relations

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)

French - R, P, S, U, [illegible] W, Inter(Feb 1962), Trans & Interp Aug 1957
Japanese - P, S, U, Inter(Mar 1962); R, W, Elem; Trans & Interp Aug 1957

18. AGENCY-SPONSORED TRAINING

1949-50	UTCA	1954	[illegible] Ops	1962	Intel Tech
1950	Intel Orient	1954	[illegible] Surv Mgmt	1962	Tech Writer's Inst
1950	Ops	1954	Oper Audio Surv Equip	1962	French
1950	Ops Famil	1954	Flaps & Seals		
		1963	Cland Serv Review		

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 14 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

Effective Date	Position Title & Occupat. Code	Grade	SD	Organization & Organ. Title (If any)	Location
Nov 1949	I.O. [illegible]	7		[illegible] SE/[illegible]LICT	HQ
Oct 1950	" " [illegible]	9		[illegible]	"
Apr 1951	" " [illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible] Ch, FE Br	"
[illegible]	Ops Off [illegible]	[illegible]		" " " "	"
[illegible]	" [illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible] Ch, FE Br	"
Feb [illegible]	Area Ops Off [illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible] FE Br	"
Jan 1955	" " " [illegible]	14	DI	[illegible] Area	Cairo
Oct 1960	Ops Off [illegible]	14	D	[illegible]/Ch, Br 6	Hq
Sep 1962	" " 0136.01	14	D	DDP/[illegible]/NE Area	Paris
Feb 1963	" " 0136.01	15	D	" " " "	"
Oct 1963	" " 0136.01	15	D	DDP/NE/Internal Ops	"
Mar 1964	" " 0136.01	15	D	DDP/NE/Internal Ops	"
Feb 1967	" " 0136.01	15	D	DDP/EUR/FF/CenReg	"

20. Date Reviewed	21. Profile Reviewed by	22. Items 1-18 Reviewed & Verified by Employee
20 Apr 19[illegible]	[illegible]	No

FORM 1200 [illegible] SECRET PROFILE

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

DATE 29 MAY 72

TO : James Jones | 4B-1 | Hqs

FROM: Office of Medical Services

SUBJ: Interim Medical Disposition

This is to advise that the medical processing of Thomas VOLTAINE is incomplete awaiting receipt of supplemental medical information or completion of corrective medical action. Final medical disposition will be issued when this matter is resolved.

Glenn V 6322

FORM 7-69 2997 CONFIDENTIAL GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification (4-20)

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

INSTRUCTIONS: (See HR 20-53 and HR 20-1000-1 for guidance. Complete all items, inserting "N.A." when items are not applicable. Forward original and two copies for preparation of contract.)

CASE OFFICER: Robert E. Jarman
DIVISION: EUR/F
TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 9269
DATE: 27 March 1972

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME: [X] PSEUDO [ ] TRUE — Thomas B. CASASIN
2A. PROJECT: ~~NOCAP/Cadre~~
2B. PERMANENT STATION: ~~Paris~~
3. ALLOTMENT NO.: 2131-0115
3A. FUNDS: [ ] V [X] U
4. SLOT NO.:
5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYMS OR ALIASES:
6. INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY PRIOR TO THIS CONTRACT. [XX] YES [ ] NO (If yes, describe and include dates and salary.) — Bio attached
7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date): In process
7A. MEDICAL CLEARANCE: [ ] OBTAINED [X] INITIATED [ ] NOT REQ'D.
8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" [XX] YES [ ] NO
9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT [ ] YES [X] NO
10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): Career agent

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: USA
12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN [ ] YES [ ] NO
13. AGE: 48
14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): January 20, 1924
15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Alexandria, Va.
16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Paris, France
17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate): [ ] SINGLE [ ] MARRIED [ ] WIDOWED [ ] ANNULLED [ ] SEPARATED [XX] DIVORCED
18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE: Daughter - 18
19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY [ ] YES [XX] NO — RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE: No
21. VETERAN: Yes
22. IF RETIRED AS AN OFFICER CHECK ONE: [ ] RETIRED REGULAR [ ] RETIRED RESERVIST
23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: U.S. Army
24. RANK OR GRADE: 1st Lt.
25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE: [ ] YES [XX] NO
26. DRAFT DEFERMENT TO BE OBTAINED BY CIA: [ ] YES [ ] NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY: GS-15/10 $33,260
28. POST DIFFERENTIAL: NA
29. COVER (Breakdown, if any): UNESCO
30. FEDERAL TAXES: [ ] GOV'T TAX DOCUMENTATION - BY AGENCY; [ ] TAX DOCUMENTATION BY ESTABLISHED COVER; [X] AGENCY TAX COMMITTEE CASE

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO U.S. CITIZENS AND RESIDENT ALIENS)

31. QUARTERS: Yes
32. POST: Yes
33. OTHER: all standard allowances
34. COVER (Breakdown, if any): To be determined

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES: [XX] PCS [XX] DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL [XX] FOREIGN OPERATIONAL
36. WITH DEPENDENTS: [XX] YES [ ] NO
37. HHE TO BE SHIPPED: [XX] YES [ ] NO
37A. HHE TO BE STORED: [X] YES [ ] NO
38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED: [X] YES [ ] NO
39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL: [X] YES [ ] NO
40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH:

DAUGHTER - USA - 18 - 5 September 1953

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH [XX] CIA REGULATIONS [ ] COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION: Yes
43. ENTERTAINMENT: Yes
44. OTHER: See Att. #1
45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH [X] CIA REGULATIONS [ ] COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

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CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

NOTE SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.

CASE OFFICER: Robert E. Jarman
DIVISION: EUR/F
TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 9269
DATE: 27 March 1972

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS (See HR 20-44, HR 20-41, HR 20-7, HR 20-53, and HR 20-620-1, HR 20-1000-1 and/or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel.)

All normal benefits for career agent. Reimbursement for foreign taxes.

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check): XX PROPOSED / ESTABLISHED
48. TYPE (Check): PROPRIETARY / SUBSIDIZED / X CULTURAL / X EDUCATIONAL / COMMERCIAL / OFFICIAL / TOURIST / OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS
☐ YES XX NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)
☐ TOTAL XX PARTIAL ☐ NONE See Att. #2

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION: Indef. DAYS / MONTHS / YEARS
52. EFFECTIVE DATE:
53. RENEWABLE: XX YES ☐ NO
54. TERMINATION NOTICE (Number of days): 90
55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION: XX YES ☐ NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION

Operations Officer

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Spotting, assessment and recruitment of potential operational assets for the Paris Station.

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Subject has been associated with CIA for over 20 years as an operations officer.

59. EDUCATION (Check Highest Level Attained): GRADE SCHOOL / HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE / TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE / BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE / COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE / COLLEGE (No degree) / COLLEGE DEGREE / X POST GRADUATE / MA / PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY (Check Appropriate Degree Competency)

LANGUAGE	SPEAK Fluent	SPEAK Average	SPEAK Poor	WRITE Fluent	WRITE Average	WRITE Poor	READ Fluent	READ Average	READ Poor
French	XX			XX			XXX		
Japanese		XX			XX			XX	

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: U.S.

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

Japan, Canada, France

SECTION XV — EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CIA

63. GIVE INCLUSIVE DATES, POSITION TITLE OR TYPE WORK, SALARY AND REASON FOR LEAVING

Guide Publishing Company, Baltimore, Md. - County Editor - 1949
Baltimore Housing Authority, Md. - Admin Officer - 1949

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (Use other side if necessary)

Authorize advance shipment of HHE presently stored in Paris to U.S.A. for combining with present HHE in U.S. storage.

☐ OVER

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OPERATING OFFICIAL	DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER
March 27, 1972	Frederick A. Cillmer [signature]	[illegible] 1972	[signature]

SECRET

Mr. Thomas B. Casasin

Dear Mr. Casasin:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you as an Independent Contractor to render professional services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Fee. For professional services rendered hereunder, you will be paid a fee calculated at the rate of $8,000 per annum. Payments will be made as requested by you in writing in a manner acceptable to the Government.

2. Taxes. As an Independent Contractor, monies paid you under paragraph one (1) above constitute taxable income for Federal tax purposes and you must satisfy your Federal tax liability thereon. Such income may be paid you by or through a cover facility. Because of cover, operational and security considerations, the Tax Board or this organization is authorized to make certain determinations and establish procedures (including tax withholdings) which will result in the full satisfaction of your Federal income and Social Security tax obligations. It is specifically understood and agreed that such determinations and procedures, whether oral or written, constitute an integral part of this contract and are legally incorporated herein by reference.

3. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for travel and transportation expenses for you and your dependents to and from your permanent post of assignment and for you alone for authorized operational travel. In addition, you will be entitled to storage of such household and personal effects as are not shipped in conformance with applicable organization policies and procedures. You may be entitled to per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of all travel performed hereunder and when authorized for you alone while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. Upon your satisfactory completion of services hereunder, you will be authorized transportation expenses for you, your dependents and your household and personal effects to your recorded permanent place of legal residence in the United States. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized and expenses incurred herewith are subject to payment and accounting in substantial compliance with Government regulations or your cover facility, whichever is directed by the Government.

4. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses including, but not limited to, entertainment and the purchase of information, as specifically approved by the Government. Such funds will be subject to payment and accounting in substantial compliance with applicable Government regulations.

5. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

6. Execution of Documents. If, during your utilization hereunder, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by this organization to evidence this relationship.

2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

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SECRET

7. Status. Your legal status under this agreement is that of an Independent Contractor. Nothing contained herein shall be construed as implying the creation of an employee-employer relationship.

8. Requirements. Requirements levied upon you by this organization hereunder are a part of this contract provided they are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

9. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or negotiated benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

10. Secrecy. By virtue of personal knowledge acquired during this and any previous association, you will become privy to employees, associates, plans, programs, methods and the like of this organization, in particular, and the U. S. Intelligence Community, in general. As a direct consequence of this knowledge, you agree to keep forever secret all classified information so obtained; to refrain from presenting a paper, writing for publication; making a speech through any media or forum, or other public statement on the subject of intelligence, factual or fictional, without prior authorization by the Government. Violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws of the U. S. and other applicable laws and regulations.

11. Term. This contract is effective as of 1 July 1974, and shall continue thereafter for a period of one (1) year unless sooner terminated upon fifteen (15) days' actual notice by either party hereto. Termination or expiration of this agreement will not release you from the provisions of paragraph ten (10) above and any secrecy oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY /s/ Charles W. Sandman
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

Thomas B. Casasin
Thomas B. Casasin

WITNESS:

APPROVED:

RCB/jH
28 June 74

SECRET

Mr. Thomas B. Casasin

Dear Mr. Casasin:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you for your services as a Career Agent under the following terms and conditions:

1. Status. Your status is that of a Government employee under contract and, as such, your rights and benefits are governed by the provisions of this agreement. It is specifically understood that you are not entitled to rights and benefits pertaining to appointed staff status, except as provided herein.

2. Cover. In the performance of your services hereunder, you will act under cover suitable to conceal your relationship with the Government. It is expressly understood and agreed that any and all documents which you may execute in the course of such cover employment are subordinate to this agreement and any contradiction of terms which may in any way amplify, extend or restrict your rights and/or obligations hereunder shall be resolved by this agreement which shall always be dominant.

3. Compensation. In full consideration for your services as a Career Agent, and subject to the provisions set forth in paragraph four (4) below, you are guaranteed payment of a basic salary of $33,260 per annum, the equivalent of a GS-15/10. In addition, you are herein authorized legislative salary adjustments and a post differential in substantial conformance with rules and regulations applicable to Government appointed personnel. Your Federal Tax liability, benefits, retirement and the like shall be based upon said basic salary.

4. Disposition of Cover Emoluments.

(a) Earned Cover Income.

(1) Earned cover income is herein defined as income (including benefits in kind) received by you from your cover activities, which income does not have as its source the Government (this organization) or for which reimbursement from the Government has not nor will be sought by the cover activity.

(2) Earned cover income in an amount initially computed at the rate of $1449 per annum may be retained by you in addition to your basic contractual salary for the first three consecutive years of successful service hereunder; thereafter, at the rate of $2000 per annum.

(3) Earned cover income in excess of that set out in subparagraph two (2) above will be offset and thereby reduce your basic contractual salary by a like amount.

(4) You will initially report to this organization, upon assumption of cover status and thereafter on an annual basis, your rate of cover compensation. Any changes during the year will also be reported. This organization will pay your basic contractual salary (initially $33,260) until such time as reports indicate cover income in excess of that set out in sub-paragraph two (2) above. You will thereafter be paid at your full rate of compensation less anticipated earned cover income based on the last report. Adjustments, if any, will be made following receipt of the yearend report. Failure to timely submit reports may result in a delay or suspension of contractual payments due you hereunder.

(b) Other Cover Emoluments. With the exception of earned cover income, emoluments (including benefits in kind) received from or through your cover activities are the property of the Government and will be disposed of at such times and in such a manner as the Government may prescribe.

5. Taxes. (a) As an employee of the Government, you must satisfy your Federal tax liability on the taxable income paid to you under paragraph three (3) above. Such income may be paid you by or through a cover facility. Because of cover, operational and security considerations, the Tax Committee of this organization is authorized to make certain determinations and establish procedures which will result in the full satisfaction of your Federal income tax liability on said income. It is specifically understood and agreed that such determinations and procedures, whether oral or written, constitute an integral part of this contract and are legally incorporated herein by reference.

(b) You will not be required to bear the expense of foreign taxes on income paid or guaranteed you by the Government under paragraph three (3) above. You will be reimbursed for such foreign taxes paid by you, consistent with your cover.

6. Allowances. You will be entitled to: (a) Living quarters allowances in conformance with regulations of this organization applicable to its appointed personnel. In the event you are furnished quarters by your cover facility or the Government you will not be entitled to the living quarters allowances herein indicated.

(b) Cost-of-living allowances in conformance with applicable regulations of this organization including, but not limited to, a post allowance or, if applicable, an equalization allowance in lieu thereof, a supplementary post allowance, a transfer allowance, a home service transfer allowance and a separation allowance.

SECRET

7. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for travel and transportation expenses for you, your dependents, your household effects and your personal automobile to and from your permanent post of assignment, and for you alone for authorized operational travel. In addition, you will be entitled to storage of such household and personal effects as are not shipped in conformance with applicable Government regulations. You will also be authorized shipment of household effects, presently stored in Paris, France, for combination with such household effects as are presently in storage within continental United States. You may be entitled to per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of all travel performed hereunder and, when authorized, for you alone while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized, and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable Government regulations or according to the established policies of your cover facility, whichever is directed by the Government.

8. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses including but not limited to payment of fringe benefit program costs, of your cover organization (including retirement, health and life insurance) when it is determined by this organization that membership therein is necessary for cover and/or security, also entertainment and the purchase of information, as specifically approved by the Government. Such funds will be subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable Government regulations or according to the established policies of your cover facility, whichever is directed by the Government.

9. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government or your cover facility to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

10. Benefits. (a) By virtue of your employment relationship with the Government hereunder, you are entitled to coverage under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, as amended. Claims by you, your heirs, or legal representatives under this paragraph will be processed by this organization in accordance with its procedures in such manner as not to impair security.

(b) You will be entitled to sick, annual, and home leave (including travel expenses incident thereto) equal to and subject to the same rules and regulations applicable to Government-appointed employees. Annual leave may only be taken at times and places approved in advance by appropriate representatives of the Government or cover officials. All accrued but unused leave credited to your account under previous employment with the United States Government will be transferred to the leave account established for you under this agreement.

(c) You will be entitled to the continuance of pay and allowances in a manner similar to that set forth in the Missing Persons Act.

(d) Your participation in the Retirement and Disability System of this Organization is preserved by virtue of your transfer without a break in service from a position of employment wherein qualification for such status was achieved. Contributions into the Retirement and Disability Fund will be deducted from the basic compensation due you hereunder.

(e) You are herein authorized continued coverage under the Federal Employees' Health Benefits Act. This organization is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder. Your financial contribution will be effected either by payroll deduction or by direct remittance at periodic intervals to be established by this organization.

(f) You are herein authorized continued coverage under the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act unless you have previously executed a written waiver of said coverage. This organization is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder. Your financial contribution will be effected either by payroll deduction or by direct remittance at periodic intervals to be established by this organization.

(g) (1) This organization is authorized to pay the cost of necessary hospitalization and related travel expenses for illness or injury incurred by a United States citizen full-time Contract Employee in the line of duty while abroad.

(2) This organization may pay certain necessary costs of hospitalization and related travel expenses for illness or injury incurred by the dependents of a United States citizen full-time Contract Employee permanently assigned abroad, while they are located abroad.

It is understood and agreed that the eligibility and extent of the participation by you and your dependents in the above medical programs will be in conformance with the rules, regulations, and policies of this organization in effect at the time an illness or injury is incurred, that all claims will be submitted only to this organization and that adjudication of such claims by this organization shall be final and conclusive.

(h) You will be entitled to claim reimbursement for loss of personal property pursuant to applicable Government regulations.

11. Offset. Emoluments (including benefits in kind) received from or through your cover activities are the property of the U. S. Government. Procedurally, such emoluments will be offset against amounts due you under this agreement and are acknowledged to be payment by the Government hereunder and for federal income tax purposes. If cover emoluments exceed those due you under this contract, you will dispose of the excess amount in conformance with governmental instructions.

SECRET

12. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

13. Secrecy. (a) You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all classified information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws of the United States and other applicable laws and regulations.

(b) In the event you marry or remarry during the term of this contract, you agree to advise this organization at least one hundred twenty (120) days in advance of such contemplated marriage, or otherwise as soon as known, and to furnish such personal history data on your prospective spouse as may be required by this organization. You understand and agree that should this organization determine that your marriage would limit or otherwise impair your usefulness to the Government, this contract may be terminated.

14. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

15. Reassignments. During your period of service under this agreement, it may be necessary for this organization to terminate an assignment for reasons beyond your control. In such event, you will be given every consideration for other assignments appropriate to Career Agents.

16. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government. Specifically, you herein acknowledge that this organization makes no commitment, either express or implied, that appointed employment status will be offered you at the conclusion of or during your period of contractual service.

17. Term. This contract is effective as of 15 Mar 1972 and shall continue thereafter for an indefinite period unless sooner terminated:

(a) Upon ninety (90) days' actual notice by either party hereto,

(b) Upon actual notice to you in the event the results of an initially required medical examination are determined by this organization to be unsatisfactory, or

(c) Without prior notice by the Government, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

/s/ [illegible]

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

Thomas B. Casasin

WITNESS:

APPROVED:

RCB/dhc
4/5/72

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
	CASASIN THOMAS B PREPARED: 05/11/72

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
INITIAL ENTRY	05 15 72	CAREER AGENT (S)

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	5136-1231	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP DIRECTORATE EUROPEAN DIVISION	PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER		

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
(FULL TIME) GS	0136.01	15 0	$ 33260 DOG: 020363 LEI: 052672

18. REMARKS

- - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE: 24 SEX: M MARITAL ST: DIV NO. DEPENDENTS: 01
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: FED SERVICE COMP: 030744
TYPE RETIREMENT: CIA R-D HOSPITILIZATION: F PLAN:
FEGLI: YES PREV. GOVT SERV: 4 SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A A/L IND: 6 S/L IND: 4
- - - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 051572 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 051572
REFERRING OFFICER: EUR PERS REFR ORG: EUR PHONE: 6913
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: Y FED EXMP: STATE EXMP: STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI OPS EXPNSE: Y HOUSING: A POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 4 DIFFERENTIAL: Y OFFSET CLAUSE: Y STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y PREMIUM PAY: N ALLOWANCE COMM: N EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: N OTH TAX EXIL: N OTHER ALLOWNS: N SEPARATION:

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

file

Form 1150B Use Previous Edition
7-66 MFG 2 72

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BBG: 01 JUN 71

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCB

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE)
008102	CASASIN THOMAS B

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
EXTENSION OF PRA NTE: 24 FEBRUARY 1973	02 23 71	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
			X		1136 1231 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/EUR FOREIGN FIELD FRENCH AREA PARIS STATION PARIS ANNEX	PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	C663	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	15 7	29099

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EOD: 17 AUG 70

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
008102	CASASIN THOMAS B

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
EXTENSION OF PRA NTE: 24 FEBRUARY 1971	07 20 70	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
			X		1136 1231 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/EUR FOREIGN FIELD FRENCH AREA PARIS STATION PARIS ANNEX	PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	0688	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	15 7	27463

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51) (When Filled In)

14-00000

10 MAR 69

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)		
006102	CASASIN THOMAS B		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
EXTENSION OF PRA NTE: 24 FEB. 1970	02 25 69	REGULAR	
6. FUNDS: V TO V / CF TO V (X) / V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
	8136 1231 0000	50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION		
DDP EUR FOREIGN FIELD CENTRAL REGION PARIS STATION ANNEX, PARIS	PARIS, FRANCE		
11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION	
OPS OFFICER	1663	D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	15 7	23734

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51) (When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCB

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
006162	CASASIN THOMAS B

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	02 26 67	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
				X	7136 1231 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/EUR FOREIGN FIELD CENTRAL REGION PARIS STATION ANNEX, PARIS	PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	0663	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	15 6	20585

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

17 APR 68

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NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCB

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
006102	CASASIN THOMAS B

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	04 10 68	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	6136 1231 0000	SECTION 203 P.L. 88-643

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/WE FOREIGN FIELD PARIS STATION INTERNAL OPERATIONS SECTION	PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	0885	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	15 5	19415

18. REMARKS

EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION.

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

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GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-81)

(When Filled In)

WE

SECRET

AMENDMENT TO

SUPPLEMENT TO STAFF AGENT PERSONNEL ACTION

FOR THOMAS B. CASASIN

Mr. Thomas B. Casasin

Dear Mr. Casasin:

Reference is made to your Staff Agent Supplement, effective 5 August 1962.

Effective 27 September 1965, all reference to income is deleted from that supplement and the following provision is substituted:

Taxes. As an appointed employee of the Government you must satisfy your Federal income tax liability on taxable income paid to you. Such income may be paid you by or through a cover facility. Because of cover, operational and security considerations the Tax Committee of this organization is authorized to make certain determinations and establish procedures which will result in the full satisfaction of your Federal income tax liability on income directly received as a result of your Federal employment. Such determinations and procedures constitute an integral part of your Staff Agent administration.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________

Personnel Officer

Copy Pouched to field
TMA Y52637
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SECRET

Chief, EUROPEAN Division

Chief of Station, PARIS

O ADMIN PERS TOBSY WODEEP — Thomas B. CASASIN

REF: PARIS 27vol, 27 April 1972

As reported in reference, CASASIN begins his UNCAIRD job on 5 June 1972. Forwarded USC are a Curriculum Vitae which he prepared for UNCAIRD and a completed form required for an LNLUTE security clearance.

Reginald M. GUNION

Attachment:
1. As stated, USC

Distribution:
2 C/EUR w/att USC
1 - [illegible]

CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OEPA-95019

DATE: 4 May 1972

MAY 8 1972

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

14-00000

UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION — ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES POUR L'ÉDUCATION, LA SCIENCE ET LA CULTURE

CURRICULUM VITAE

Please complete this form in English or French. It is in your own interest that your answers are complete, accurate, and clearly presented. They should be typed or printed on the form; only if additional space is required for certain items should separate sheets of the same size be used, with clear reference to relevant numbers.

Veuillez remplir ce formulaire en anglais ou en français. Il est de votre propre intérêt que vos réponses soient complètes, précises et claires. Elles doivent être tapées à la machine ou libellées très lisiblement; n'utiliser que l'espace prévu, ne l'employer que pour donner les renseignements demandés; en cas d'absolue nécessité, utiliser des feuilles supplémentaires de même format, avec indication précise du paragraphe.

1. Family name (Surname) - Nom de famille: RICHARDSON
First names - Prénoms: Jacques Gabriel
Maiden name - Nom de jeune fille:

2. Permanent address - Domicile permanent: 5 villa Madrid, 92 Neuilly, France
Telephone: 722 99-90

3. Mailing address - Adresse postale (If different from above) (Si elle diffère de la précédente):
Telephone:

4. A) Date of birth - Date de naissance: day/jour 20, month/mois I, year/année 1924
B) Country and place of birth - Pays et lieu de naissance: USA, Baltimore, Maryland
C) Sex - Sexe: M
D) Marital status - État civil: Divorced

5. A) Citizenship at birth - Nationalité à la naissance: USA
B) Present citizenship (since) - Nationalité actuelle (depuis): USA
C) Have you taken any official steps towards changing your present nationality? Avez-vous entrepris des démarches officielles aux fins de changer votre nationalité actuelle? No

6. Give the following information about persons fully dependent upon you for financial support.
Donnez les renseignements suivants sur les personnes qui sont, financièrement, entièrement à votre charge.

Name of dependant / Nom de la personne à charge	Date of birth / Date de naissance	Relationship / Degré de parenté	Name of dependant / Nom de la personne à charge	Date of birth / Date de naissance	Relationship / Degré de parenté
Pamela A. Richardson	19 IX 50	Daughter			
Michelle Richardson	5 IX 53	Daughter			

7. List any of your relatives employed by the United Nations or its Specialized Agencies.
Donnez les noms de ceux de vos parents qui sont employés par les Nations Unies ou une des Institutions spécialisées.

Name - Nom	Relationship / Degré de parenté	Name of international organization / Nom de l'organisation internationale

8. Would you object to serving in any regions of the world? If so, indicate which. Avez-vous des objections à travailler dans certaines parties du monde? Dans l'affirmative, indiquez lesquelles. No

9. Would you accept employment for ... / Accepteriez-vous un emploi d'une durée de ...

Up to 6 months / moins de 6 mois	No
6 months to 1 year / 6 mois à un an	No
more than 1 year / plus d'un an	Yes

10. How much notice would you require to report for work? Dans quel délai pourriez-vous entrer en fonctions? One month

11. If employed, you will be required to pass a medical examination. Have you any disabilities which might limit your prospective field of work or preclude your undertaking any necessary travel by air?
En cas d'engagement un examen médical est nécessoire. Avez-vous une infirmité quelconque susceptible de restreindre vos activités professionnelles ou de vous interdire tout voyage par avion que vous pourriez être appelé à effectuer? No

12. For what type of work or for which specific post do you wish to be considered? - Quel genre d'emploi ou quel poste précis vous intéresse? Scientific-technical publications

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13. EDUCATION - ETUDES - List in chronological order the educational establishments you have attended from the age of 14, including in service training courses having lead to the granting of diplomas.

Enumérez, en suivant l'ordre chronologique, les établissements d'enseignement que vous avez fréquentés depuis l'âge de 14 ans. Mentionnez également les stages de perfectionnement ayant abouti à l'obtention d'un diplôme.

Name, place and country / Nom, adresse et pays		Years attended / Années d'études From / de	To / à	Degrees, diplomas, etc. (in original language) and main subjects / Diplômes, titres (titre original) indiquer matières principales	Date obtained / Date d'obtention
A) Secondary, Technical, Professional, etc. / Secondaire, Technique, Apprentissage, etc.					
High School of Montreal, Canada			Jun 40	Diploma	1940
B) University or equivalent University establishment					
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor	USA		Feb 47	BA	1947
Georgetown University, Washington	USA	1951-2		None	
Rensselaer Polytechnic, Troy, NY	USA		Jun 62	Certificate	1962
(Technical Writers Institute)					

14. List professional societies to which you belong and your activities in public or international affairs.

Enumérez les associations professionnelles dont vous êtes membre; vos activités politiques et internationales

International Council for the Advancement of Science Writing, Founding Member; British Interplanetary Society, Fellow; Society of Technical Publishers and Writers, Senior Member; International Science Writers Association, Member; The Glaciological Society, Member; Association des Journalistes Scientifiques, Membre Associé; and others

15. List, but do not attach, your significant publications. Include publisher and date and place of publication.

Enumérez, sans les joindre, tous travaux importants que vous avez publiés. Indiquez le nom de l'éditeur, le lieu et la date de publication.

Numerous articles, Science and Technology, Space/Aeronautics, Electro-Technology, 1965-9; numerous articles, Science Journal, 1969-70; numerous articles, book reviews, Atomes and La Recherche, 1969-present; numerous articles, Innovation and Search, 1969-present; Journal of Medical Engineering & Electronics, 1969; numerous articles in Nature "News and Views," 1970-present; articles in Purchasing and Heating Industry, 1965-9; editorial work for Unesco Impact, 1970; planned June 1971 issue on chemistry of Unesco Courier; article on American oceanology in Sciences & Avenir, August 1970, and others

16. LANGUAGES / LANGUES

A) Mother tongue : / Langue maternelle : English

B) Other languages / Autres langues — Ability to / Aptitude à

	Speak / Parler: Excellent	Good	Fair	Slight	Write / Rédiger: Excellent	Good	Fair	Slight	Read / Lire: Excellent	Good	Fair	Slight	Understand / Comprendre: Excellent	Good	Fair	Slight
French	X				X				X				X			
Japanese			X				X				X			X		
Spanish				X				X		X				X		
Italian				X				X		X				X		

C) In which languages are you able to teach ? Dans quelles langues pouvez-vous enseigner ?

English and French

17. CLERICAL SKILLS - STENO-DACTYLOGRAPHIE

Indicate speeds in words per minute, after verification on non-commercial texts. Indiquez les vitesses en mots-minute après vérification des vitesses sur textes non-commerciaux.

Languages - Langues		Shorthand / Sténo	Typing / Dactylo
English	anglais		
French	français		
Spanish	espagnol		
(Other - autre)			

18. MECHANICAL SKILLS - MECANOGRAPHIE

List any special skills you possess and office machines you can use

Enumérez vos compétences techniques et les machines de bureau que vous avez appris à manier.

Can use all office equipment, including some IBM and ICL computers (2, 2.5, and 3d generations)

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11. EMPLOYMENT RECORD. ANTÉCÉDENTS PROFESSIONNELS	Starting with your present position list in reverse order every employment occurring at least the past ten years. Énumérez, en commençant par le plus récent, tous les emplois que vous avez exercés au cours des dix dernières années au moins.

A. PRESENT POSITION - POSTE ACTUEL

Dates of employment - Durée d'emploi: From / De: October 1 1970 — To / A: Present / Ce jour	Description of your duties (underline the main points); include number and type of subordinates. Décrivez vos fonctions, en soulignant les principales; indiquez également le nombre et les fonctions des personnes sous vos ordres.
Annual salary - Traitement annuel: Starting / De début: 78,000F — Present / Actuel: 85,150F	Directeur-adjoint of firm publishing monthly scientific magazine and providing scientific and technical consulting services; deputy to president, helping him manage two enterprises specializing in the processing of specialized information and the talent which handles it.
Exact title of your position and place of work - Titre exact de votre poste et lieux d'activité: Directeur Adjoint, Paris	Directly responsible for sales, sales promotion, advertising, and public relations functions; supervise accountancy and purchasing functions, and relations with other publishers.
Name of employer - Nom de l'employeur: Société d'Editions Scientifiques; Science Information	Handle the inception of all foreign relations, and deal directly with international organizations (OECD, Unesco, etc)
Type of work - Genre d'activité: Scientific publishers, consultants	
Name and title of your immediate supervisor - Nom et titre de votre supérieur direct: M. Choukiewicz, Président	
Reason for wishing to leave - Pourquoi désirez-vous changer d'emploi? Would like to have my week-ends free	

B. PREVIOUS POSITION - POSTE ANTÉRIEUR

Dates of employment - Durée d'emploi: From / De: January 1 1969 — To / A: Present (concurr')	Description of your duties (underline the main points); include number and type of subordinates. Décrivez vos fonctions, en soulignant les principales; indiquez également le nombre et les fonctions des personnes sous vos ordres.
Annual salary - Traitement annuel: Starting / De début: $5,000 plus comm. — Final / A la fin: $9,000 plus comm.	Responsible from the outset for creating editorial and promotional resources and services outside North America, mainly in Europe, of new firm specializing in continuing education for technical management. This includes the publishing and editing (based in New York) of three periodicals: Innovation, Search, and a monthly newsletter. All are concerned with the art of management in a continually changing social environment.
Exact title of your position and place of work - Titre exact de votre poste et lieux d'activité: European Director — Paris	Find authors; write my own article material; work with firms and individuals as well as government units desiring the
Name of employer - Nom de l'employeur: Technology Communication, Inc	
Type of work - Genre d'activité: Managing overseas publishing co.	
Name and title of your immediate supervisor - Nom et titre de votre supérieur direct: F. Park, Executive Director	
Reason for leaving - Cause de départ: Would prefer to remain as consultant	

C. PREVIOUS POSITION - POSTE ANTÉRIEUR

Dates of employment - Durée d'emploi: From / De: February 1968 — To / A: June 1969	Describe your duties (underline the main points); include number and type of subordinates. Décrivez vos fonctions, en soulignant les principales; indiquez également le nombre et les fonctions des personnes sous vos ordres.
Annual salary - Traitement annuel: Starting / De début: $19,500 + profit — Final / A la fin: $21,000 + prof	As head of correspondents, planned, directed and supervised work assignments of a dozen correspondents reporting to the overseas editorial bureau of a major trade press organization, which during this period was merged by purchase with the Chilners Publishing Company
Exact title of your position and place of work - Titre exact de votre poste et lieux d'activité: Chief Correspondent, Europe	
Name of employer - Nom de l'employeur: Conover-Mast Publications, Inc	
Type of work - Genre d'activité: Applied technology periodical press	
Name and title of your immediate supervisor - Nom et titre de votre supérieur direct: H. Conover, President	
Reason for leaving - Cause de départ: Tired of routine; wanted new challenges	

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B. PREVIOUS POSITION - POSTE ANTERIEUR	Description of your duties (describe the main points) - Description de vos fonctions
Dates of employment - Durée d'emploi: From / De: May 1962 To / A: February 1968	Established, planned, directed and managed activities of overseas editorial bureau of medium-sized publishing firm specializing in the applied sciences, industrial management methods and technology, and marketing methods magazines.
Annual salary - Traitement annuel: Starting / De début: $10,000 + profits; Final / A la fin: $19,000 + profits	
Exact title of your position and place of work - Titre exact de votre poste et lieu d'activité (London, Paris): European Editorial Representative	
Name of employer - Nom de l'employeur: Conover-Mast Publications, Inc	
Type of work - Genre d'activité: Specialized periodical press	
Name and title of your immediate supervisor - Nom et titre de votre supérieur direct: L. Hagerty, Exec Vice Pres (deceased)	
Reason for leaving - Cause de départ: Promotion	

C. If applicable, give here a brief resumé of employment(s) held before those covered above.
Si vous le jugez utile, résumez ici vos divers emplois antérieurs.

1960-2 Free-lance technical editor, various publishing houses, New York
1960-2 Supervising Technical Editor, Scientific Group, Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army
1955-60 Supervising Foreign Affairs Specialist, Mutual Defense Assistance Program, at Tokyo, Japan
1950-4 Regional Editor, International Press Section, US Information Agency
1949 Reporter, then associate editor, weekly newspaper chain, Baltimore

20. REFERENCES: List three persons not related to you by blood or marriage, who are familiar with your character and qualifications. Do not repeat names listed in item 19.

RÉFÉRENCES: Indiquez trois personnes (parents et alliés exclus) pouvant donner sur vous des renseignements d'ordre moral et professionnel. Ne répétez pas de noms déjà cités dans la case 19.

Name - Nom	Full address - Adresse complète	Profession
Prof AIGRAIN Pierre	DGRST, Ministère de la Recherche Industrielle et Scientifique, Paris	Civil Servant
Mr VICHNEY Nicholas	Science Editor, LE MONDE, rue des Italiens Paris	Journalist
Prof THUILLIER Pierre	University of Paris, Nanterre Campus, Paris	Educator

21. Have you any objection to our making enquiries of your present employer?
Voyez-vous quelque inconvénient à ce que nous prenions des renseignements auprès de votre employeur actuel? ☐ yes / oui ☒ no / non

22. State briefly any other relevant facts. Include information regarding any residence or travel outside the country of which you are a citizen.
Donnez brièvement tout autre renseignement offrant à votre candidature. Donnez également des précisions sur la période de résidence ou voyages à l'étranger.

Foreign residence: Canada 1937-42; UK, France, Belgium, Germany, 1944-5 (military service); Japan, 1946-8 (military service), 1955-60; France, 1962-present

23. I certify that the statements made by me in answer to the foregoing questions are true and complete. I understand that wilful misrepresentation renders me liable to dismissal, if employed.

Je certifie que les réponses que j'ai faites aux questions ci-dessus sont complètes et exactes. Je reconnais qu'en donnant sciemment une indication inexacte, je me rendrais passible de renvoi immédiat, au cas où je serais engagé.

Signature [signature] Date November 30, 1971

N.B.

You may be requested to supply documentary evidence in support of the above statements. Do not, however, send any such evidence unless asked to do so by Unesco.

Receipt of this form is not ordinarily acknowledged but your application will be carefully examined and Unesco will, if need be, get into touch with you.

Applications for employment are not normally retained by Unesco for more than two years after receipt.

Il pourra vous être demandé de fournir des pièces justificatives à l'appui des déclarations faites ci-dessus. Ces pièces ne devront être envoyées qu'à la demande expresse de l'Unesco.

Il n'est pas coutume d'accuser réception de ce formulaire, votre demande sera néanmoins examinée attentivement et, le cas échéant, l'Unesco se mettra en rapport avec vous.

En règle générale, l'Unesco ne conserve pas les demandes d'emploi plus de deux ans après réception.

IDENTIFICATION AND PERSONNEL DATA FOR EMPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES CITIZEN

INSTRUCTIONS.—Prepare in quadruplicate. All sections must be completed. Write "None" when applicable. Type or print answers. If space not adequate for complete answers continue under item 23, and attach a supplemental sheet to this form if necessary. All addresses must show street number, street, city, and State.

1. NAME (Last, first, middle): RICHARDSON, Jacques G.

2. OTHER NAMES USED (Maiden name, names by former marriages, former names changed legally or otherwise, aliases, nicknames, etc. Specify which, and show dates used):

3. PRESENT ADDRESS AND LENGTH OF RESIDENCE THERE: 5 villa Madrid, 92 Neuilly, France — 3 years

5. DESCRIPTION (Check one): ☒ Male ☐ Female

HEIGHT	WEIGHT	COLOR EYES	COLOR HAIR
178 cm	72 kg	Brown	Black

6. MARITAL STATUS (Check which): ☐ Single ☐ Married ☐ Separated ☒ Divorced ☐ Widow(er)

7. BIRTH DATE: Day 20 — Month Jan — Year 24

8. BIRTHPLACE (City, county, State, and country): Baltimore, Maryland

4. DATES AND PLACES OF RESIDENCE (Go back 15 years. Continue under item 23 on other side if necessary.)

FROM	TO	NUMBER AND STREET	CITY	STATE
June 1969	Present	5 villa Madrid	92 Neuilly	France
Sept 1962	June 1969	9 villa Madrid	92 Neuilly	France
Sept 1960	Aug 1962	312 Lamond Place	Alexandria Va 22314	
[illegible] 1958	June [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible], Tokyo, Japan	
Feb 1955	June 19[illegible]	2-chome [illegible], Setagaya-ku, Tokyo, Japan		

9. UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP — INDICATE WHETHER:

(A) BY BIRTH ☐	(C) NATURALIZATION ☐
(B) DERIVATIVE ☐	PETITION NO.
DATE	DATE
CERTIFICATE NO	CERTIFICATE NO
PLACE	PLACE

10. SOCIAL SECURITY NO. 042 20 5339

11. MILITARY SERVICE (Past or present)

SERIAL NO.	BRANCH	FROM (Yr.)	TO (Yr.)	TYPE OF DISCH.
31316265	Army	1943	1946	Hon
0 937200	Army	1946	1948	Hon

12. EDUCATION (All schools above elementary)

NAME OF SCHOOL	ADDRESS	FROM (Year)	TO (Year)	DEGREES
[illegible] School of Montreal	University St, Montreal		1940	Dipl
University of Michigan	Ann Arbor		1947-X	BA
Georgetown University	Washington DC	1951	1952	---
Rensselaer Polytechnic	Troy NY		1962	Certif

S/c att. 2 to OFPA-98019 CS COPY DEFERRED

15. EMPLOYMENT (List ALL employment dates starting with your present employment. Show ALL dates and addresses when unemployed. Give name under which employed if different from name now used.)

FROM	TO	NAME OF EMPLOYER (Firm or agency) AND NAME OF SUPERVISOR	TYPE OF WORK	ADDRESS	REASON FOR LEAVING
[illegible]	Present	Sté d'Editions Scient Mr M. Chodkiewicz	Publishing	Paris France	To accept Unesco appt
1960	Present	Technology Communic'n Mr F. P. Park	Publishing	New York NY	ditto
1962	1969	Conover-Mast Public'ns Mr H. Conover, Jr	Publishing	New York NY	To join Technology Comm'n
1960	1962	Army Office of Ch of Staff; Col H. P. Garrity	R&D reports	Washington DC	To re-enter priv industry
1955	1960	Tokyo CM Center Col J. H. Stewart	Industrial surveys	Tokyo Japan	Contract expiration
1950	1954	USIA (IPS) Mr Mundy	Govt info services	Washington DC	To accept o'seas asgmt
1949	1949	Housing Authority, Baltimore; Mr Kilburn	Public housing authority	Baltimore Md	To accept better job
1948	1949	Guide Publications Inc Dr Kobre	Publishing	Baltimore Md	To accept better job

16. FOREIGN COUNTRIES VISITED (SINCE 1930) *(Exclusive of military service)*

COUNTRY	DATE LEFT USA	DATE RETURNED USA	PURPOSE
Western Europe	1944	1945	Military service
Japan	1946	1948	ditto
Japan-Korea	1950	1953	USIA activities
Japan	1955	1960	Civil service
Western Europe	1960	1960	Tourism
France, western Europe	1962	1972	Business, tourism

15. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U.S.A., OR ANY COMMUNIST OR FASCIST ORGANIZATION?

(ANSWER "YES" OR "NO")

16. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF ANY FOREIGN OR DOMESTIC ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH IS TOTALITARIAN, FASCIST, COMMUNIST OR SUBVERSIVE, OR WHICH HAS ADOPTED OR SHOWS A POLICY ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OR WHICH SEEKS TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?

No

(ANSWER "YES" OR "NO")

17. IF YOUR ANSWER TO QUESTION 15 OR 16 ABOVE IS "YES," STATE THE NAMES OF ALL SUCH ORGANIZATIONS, ASSOCIATIONS, MOVEMENTS, GROUPS, OR COMBINATIONS OF PERSONS, DATES OF MEMBERSHIP, AND OFFICES HELD. IN QUESTION 21 OR ON A SEPARATE SHEET TO BE ATTACHED TO AND MADE A PART OF THIS FORM, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON YOUR ACTIVITIES THEREIN AND MAKE ANY EXPLANATION YOU DESIRE REGARDING YOUR MEMBERSHIP OR ACTIVITIES

NAME	ADDRESS	FROM	TO	OFFICE HELD

18. MEMBERSHIP IN OTHER ORGANIZATIONS (*List all organizations in which you are now a member or have been a member, except those which show religious or political affiliations.*)

NAME	ADDRESS	TYPE	FROM	TO	OFFICE HELD
British Interplanetary Soc	London	Professional	1955	present	Fellow
Soc of Tech Communication	Washington	"	1968	present	Sen Member
Intl Science Writers Assn	London	"	1965	present	Member
American Club	Paris	Social	1962	present	Member

19. RELATIVES (*Parents, spouse, divorced spouse, children, brothers, and sisters, living or dead. Name of spouse should include maiden name and any other names by previous marriage. If person is dead, so state under "address" and enter other information as of time of death.*)

RELATION	NAME IN FULL	YEAR OF BIRTH	ADDRESS	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	PRESENT CITIZENSHIP
Daughter	Pamela A. Richardson	1950	5 villa Madrid 92 Neuilly France	USA	USA
Daughter	Michelle D. Richardson	1953	5 villa Madrid 92 Neuilly France	USA	USA

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20. REFERENCES (Name three persons, not relatives or employers, who are well acquainted with you.)

NAME	ADDRESS	YEARS KNOWN
[illegible], Jr	[illegible] Road, [illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible] P. Freedman	420 East 23 Street (6C) New York NY 10010	29
Col Gordon Wallace	5[illegible] Moreland Circle Prescott AZ 86301	29

21. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, TAKEN INTO CUSTODY, HELD FOR INVESTIGATION OR QUESTIONING, OR CHARGED BY ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY? (*You may omit: (1) Traffic violations for which you paid a fine of $30 or less, and (2) anything that happened before your 16th birthday. All other incidents must be included, even though they were dismissed or you merely forfeited collateral.*)

______ (ANSWER "YES" OR "NO")

22. WHILE IN THE MILITARY SERVICE WERE YOU EVER ARRESTED FOR AN OFFENSE WHICH RESULTED IN A TRIAL BY DECK COURT OR BY SUMMARY, SPECIAL, OR GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL?

______ (ANSWER "YES" OR "NO")

IF YOUR ANSWER TO 21 OR 22 IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS IN ITEM 23, SHOWING FOR EACH INCIDENT: (1) DATE, (2) CHARGE, (3) PLACE, (4) LAW ENFORCING AUTHORITY OR TYPE OF COURT OR COURT-MARTIAL, AND (5) ACTION TAKEN.

23. SPACE FOR CONTINUING ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS (*Show item numbers to which answers apply. Attach a separate sheet if there is not enough space here.*)

CERTIFICATION

NOTE: ***The original copy must be signed by the person named in item 1 on this form.***

I certify that the above information is correct and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

May 1 1972
(DATE)

[signature]
SIGNATURE (Sign original only)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
CASASIN, Thomas B.	20 Jan 24	M	GS-13	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Off	DDP/EUR	Paris

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: X CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY / CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C) / SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL / X REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR / X ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE / SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
31 May 1971	1 April 1970 to 31 March 1971

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- **U–Unsatisfactory** — Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- **M–Marginal** — Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
- **P–Proficient** — Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
- **S–Strong** — Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- **O–Outstanding** — Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Gained full-time employment as a senior executive of a foreign scientific publication for the purpose of further developing access to Station targets and appreciably lowering the overall cost of the operations in which he is involved.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Uses his cover to gain access to MHHARSH personnel and spot leads on eventual access and support-type assets directed against the local MHHARSH and TPFAST targets.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Develops and assesses MHHARSH officials with whom he has made contact as well as access prospects to the local MHHARSH and TPFAST targets.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Responds to various Station requirements including investigative work.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Reports on the above activities.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

FORM 7-66 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During the period under review, Subject managed to gain full-time employment as a senior executive of an HBSPRITE government subsidized scientific publication at a time of economic slowdown when jobs were not easy to get. He did this without help from Headquarters or the Station. Such an achievement is a tribute to Subject's fluency in French, his ability to write, his general scientific know-how and his good buisness sense. Over half of his salary therefore is now paid by this company. In converting to full-time employment, a major adjustment, Subject's contribution to the Station operations in the MHHARSH and TPFAST fields against which he is targetted temporarily decreased somewhat. Subject continued, however, to maintain contact with three local MHHARSH officials and initiated contact with three others. He also continued to search for new leads to personalities in the priority areas assigned to him. Subject has the capability to call on local scientists or technicians of just about any nationality with the possible exception of TPFAST citizens. He has used this near-unique potential well.

Subject has had occasional difficulty switching from "professional" or intellectual subjects in his development of MHHARSH personalities or access prospects to more down-to-earth interests necessary —con't—

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT.	
DATE: 9 June 1971	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: /s/ Thomas B. CASASIN	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 18 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Handling Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: /s/ Francis S. Sherry
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The Station submitted comments on Subject officer recently in OFPT-16549 (8 April 1971), to which we should add that Subject has, largely on his own merits, acquired a solid and potentially highly useful cover employment. However, this new employment will demand a very substantial amount of time and energy from Subject, and the unanswerable question at the moment relates to his availability for Organizational tasks. We shall need additional time and careful working with this officer to determine the answer, since the fiscal outlay from the Organization to support his continued stay in Paris is still quite

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
24 May 1971	COS	/s/ Hugh Montgomery

SECRET

FITNESS REPORT

Section C (continued)

to the development of human relations. His forte is therefore more in the field of spotting and making operational contacts than in that of more than short-range operational development. Subject's operational situation makes it impossible for him to attempt recruitments. Thus, his very real achievements are not by essence of the spectacular variety.

Subject's reporting has been satisfactory and continue to be copious. He could, however, further improve the selectivity of the leads provided the Station and make more of an effort to "digest" the information contained in his reports.

Although Subject has, at present, no supervisory function, he has repeatedly requested such a responsibility. He is careful with operational expenses and has exercised good security.

During the period under review, additional efforts have been made to make full use of Subject's potential and integrate him further in the work of the station component with which he works. He is a particularly valuable asset for the Station programs directed against the local MHHARSH and TPFAST targets.

Section D (continued)

substantial. In a word, is it worth it? We do not yet know, although our initial impressions are favorable.

On the fitness report itself, this rater would have preferred an "S" rating for specific duty number one; Subject may ultimately deserve an "O", but it does not seem warranted at the present time. Moreover, I believe the overall rating would more properly have been in the higher range of the "P" category, rather than "S", but it is of course a subjective judgment of the rating officer, who is more intimately and directly involved with Subject on a frequent basis.

In sum, the cover is superb, and only time will reveal to what extent the cover requirements permit a full measure on behalf of the Organization. We are following this aspect closely and will be commenting upon it subsequently as we gain experience and knowledge.

14-00000

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
[illegible]	20 Jan 1924	M	GS-15	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
[illegible]	[illegible]	Paris

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT			10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT	
X CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY	INITIAL	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			X ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):			SPECIAL (Specify):	

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
	1 April 1969 - 31 March 1970

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory: Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

M—Marginal: Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.

P—Proficient: Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.

S—Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O—Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Established and maintains a legitimate S&T publishing representation for the purpose of developing natural access to Station targets.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Uses his cover to develop leads on eventual access or support type assets to be used by the Station against the local MHMARSH target.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Responds to various Station requirements including investigative work.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Initiates contact with selected local MHMARSH targets and undertakes to develop sufficient rapport with them to provide operational assessments.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	-
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	Rating Letter
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

14-00000

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

The comments of the rating officer are limited to the period from October 1969 to March 1970 during which he worked with Subject. The previous rating officer has added his comments to allow coverage of the total indicated period from April 1969 to March 1970. During this period Subject was integrated in a new team assigned to the local S&T and Commercial MHMARSH target. Subject's recent activity has been very productive indeed. Subject used the excellent potential given to him by his cover to skillfully spot and assess access agent candidates. As Subject's operational situation in Paris precludes making recruitment, the most promising of these candidates was placed in contact with a Station officer during social events Subject organized. At the same time, Subject continued his efforts to develop personal relationship with several MHMARSHers. The beginning of personal, as opposed to purely professional, relations with a major MHMARSH target enabled him to obtain insight into the target's beliefs and personality which was the best the Station had to date. Subject also managed to establish contact with two other MHMARSH representatives of interest. This, in one case, required almost six months to accomplish via a combination of patience, skill and determination. Subject is an experienced officer. He is cost conscious and practices good security. The Station has no other asset with the necessary scientific and editorial know-how, fluent French and local knowledge to replace Subject. In view of this and the recent progress made by Subject in response to very specific requirements and his willingness to try to establish personal and, hopefully, social relations with access prospects and MHMARSH targets, the Station recently recommended that he be extended in Paris. At the same time, the Station recommended that Subject's cover be reinforced by full-time employment with Subject's current [illegible] part-time employer.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
	[illegible] Officer	/s/ Francis Cherry

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

As previous Station correspondence and fitness reports will reflect, this officer has been the subject of varying evaluations and projections in recent years. In fairness to him, however, it is equally true that an officer under non-official cover reflects, in the level and quality of his performance, the amount and type of guidance, direction and push he receives from the responsible inside case officer. Making allowances for these variables, this officer's past record has not been impressive; however, it is also correct to note that he has improved substantially during the latter part of the period under review, and that if the Station can work out some fiscal arrangement which will reduce the heavy financial input

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
19 May 1970	[illegible]	/s/ Hugh Montgomery

Section D3 continued

from the Organization, his continued presence at this Station definitely appears to be warranted for a sufficient period to reach more definite conclusions concerning the level of sustained performance over a somewhat longer period than that reflected by this report.

On balance, we are pleased that this officer has responded so well to greater case officer direction and that he has undertaken somewhat more aggressive efforts to expand his range of contacts in immediate proximity to the primary Station targets. This officer does bring many talents to bear on his operational activity: he has absolutely fluent French, a solid and exploitable cover, and a vast range of contacts in the local community. Nonetheless, it will require additional time to explore these contacts in depth, select those which appear to be operationally viable, and pursue them actively either to the point of recruitment by another officer or elimination from further development, for whatever reason.

In sum, in spite of the recognized and commendable improvement in this officer's performance during the period under review, the reviewer submits that the letter grade for specific duties 2 and 4 would more properly have been a "P", and that the overall rating, at this point, would more accurately be set at a level between "P" and "S", probably closer to the former than the latter.

This reviewing comment has been read by the officers who prepared the Fitness Report.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
CASASIN, Thomas B	20 Jan 1924	M	GS-15	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Officer	DDP/EUR/France	Paris

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: X CAREER; RESERVE; TEMPORARY; CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C); SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL; X ANNUAL; SPECIAL (Specify):; REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR; REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 October 1968 - 31 March 1969

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak — Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate — Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient — Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong — Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding — Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Establishes and maintains a legitimate S&T publishing representation for the purpose of developing natural access to Station targets.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Develops cover pretexts to meet WOLADY and third national of operational interest in the S&T community.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Responds to Station ad-hoc requirements on the local internal target.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Develops potential agent prospects in the S&T community to the point where they can be recommended as Station agent candidates.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5:	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

FORM 8-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

During this reporting period subject had very markedly increased the tempo of his activities and contacts. Many agent prospects have been screened and contacts were established with people of interest to several elements of the Station. Subject is particularly thorough and outstanding on specific investigations where he utilized cover in a skillful and imaginative way. He has improved in terms of people development but in this respect he is still best with people in a professionally related context rather than a contrived social context. As mentioned in the previous report subject's cover assignment does not allow him to make recruitments. Subject has a high degree of cost consciousness and does not exorcise any supervisory responsibilities.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
11 June 1969	/s/ Thomas B. CASASIN

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
5 June 1969	Ops Officer	/s/ Murat Natirboff

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I do not concur in this rating. I would have given the employee STRONG in the performance of his cover responsibilities, that is to say in the manner in which he has created and expanded his cover. I would have restricted myself to PROFICIENT, however, in assessing his exploitation of that cover for operational purposes. For a fuller treatment of this staff agent's performance, suggest that reference be made to the NOC Status Report, submitted 26 May 1969, via OFPA-89925.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
23 JUNE 1969	Chief of Station	/s/ David kE. Murphy

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
CASASIN Thomas B.	20 Jan 1924	M	GS-15	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Officer	DDP/EUR/France	Paris

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY / CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C) / SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL / REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR / XXXX ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE / SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to): 1 April 1967 - ~~31 March 1968~~ 2 Dec 68

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak — Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate — Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient — Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong — Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding — Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Establishes and maintains a legitimate S&T publishing representation for the purpose of developing natural access to Station targets.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Develops cover pretexts to meet WOLADY and third national of operational interest in the S&T community.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Responds to Station ad-hoc requirements on the local internal target.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Develops potential agent prospects in the S&T community to the point where they can be recommended as Station agent candidates.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Since the last reporting period Subject's efforts were directed by the Station toward the spotting, developing and assessing WOLADY S&T agent candidates in terms of recruitment and inclusion in the Station's S&T spotting network.

Subject has done thorough and at times imaginative spade work in this field despite the fact that the mission was not as successful as anticipated. Recent progress however would indicate that the next reporting period would be more productive.

Subject continues to respond to ad-hoc specific assignments in an exemplary manner.

Because of the nature of his cover assignment Subject is not authorized to make recruitments.

Subject has a high degree of cost consciousness. He does not exercise any supervisory responsibilities under his cover assignment.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
24 Oct. 1968	/s/ Thomas B. CASASIN

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
2[illegible] Oct. 196[illegible]	Ops Officer	/s/ Murat Natirboff

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See attached.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
	Chief ofStation	/s/ David E. Murphy

SECRET

3. It is difficult to place in the proper perspective the contribution of this senior staff agent to Paris Station operations. On the one hand, Subject has established superb cover in the scientific and technical field which should have afforded him virtually unlimited access to persons of interest to us, both Soviet and potential access agents. In evaluating the manner in which the employee set up and managed this cover, I would tend to agree with his comments to the fitness report on the [illegible] demands on him although these comments are somewhat overdrawn.

The principal difficulty has been the time it has taken to relate the cover potential to the specific operational requirements of the Station. We have not received from CASASIN as leads and assessment reports to persons of operational interest in the S&T field as we think he could have produced. It may be that the earlier listing of the project (viewed as a regional undertaking) contributed to this.

Recently we have noted significant improvement in that we have received responses to requests we have made for assessment and development of potential access agents within a cover context. We hope, therefore, that this last year of CASASIN's stay will be the most productive ever. It is unfortunate that the cover must end because of the cover company's decisions over which we had no control.

/s/ David E. Murphy

SECRET

ADDENDUM, Form 45 (Fitness Report), for period March 67-March 68.

Section D

As the individual being rated, I would like to add some remarks to those prepared by the rating officer.

The assignment I have includes managerial responsibilities which (a) are essential to the continued existence and security of the cover mechanism as a vehicle for operational exploitation, and (b) are not necessarily visible to those "on the inside."

In the case of (a), I must engage in a constant orchestration of the cover and the facilities it offers. This means maintaining a managerial equilibrium to insure that cover work will not become, of itself, so demanding that it negates the cover's utility to the CS. In effect, the top officers and middle managers of the cover corporation [who are not cleared and witting] have to be satisfied that their demands are met (or cannot be), or else manipulated in order to neutralize or reject their demands. After all, the cover position is to them a legitimate, normal, workaday post in their firm. What work is done at their bidding, it follows, must be accomplished according to the high standards of thoroughness and accuracy which they have set.

In the case of (b) -- which derives from (a) -- and can prove to be so demanding that the needs of the CS could no longer be served, the incumbent is required to manage a span of human contacts at several levels in order to preserve his cover position and enhance its value to the CS. This means planning, directing and managing the work of multinational, multicultural teams of technical correspondents, as well as meetings and negotiations to improve the [cover firm's] relations with similarly widespread individuals at the levels of editor-in-chief, publisher, corporate vice-president, president, and chairman of the board. These levels are scattered not only through industry, but have their analogs as well in government, higher education, and professional societies.

Having previously managed both a CS base and the principal denied-areas operating component of a major field Station, I can report quite honestly that my present managerial responsibilities exceed the former -- despite the apparent lack of "supervisory responsibilities" in my present position.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
CASASIN, Thomas B. (SA)	20 Jan 24	M	GS-15	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Officer	DDP/EUR/France	Paris

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY / CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C) / SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL / XXX ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR / REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE / SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1966 - 31 March 1967

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- **W - Weak** — Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- **A - Adequate** — Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
- **P - Proficient** — Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
- **S - Strong** — Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- **O - Outstanding** — Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Establishes and maintains a legitimate S&T publishing representation for the purpose of developing natural access to Soviet S&T personnel.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Develops cover pretexts to meet, assess, and recommend as agent candidates WOLADY and Third Nationals in the HEPAIRY S&T community.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Contacts and develops local Soviet Bloc personnel.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Develops cover pretexts to attend selected scientific conferences.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Responds to local Station adhoc operational requirements.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject continues to maintain a secure effective cover mechanism. In this reporting period the whole thrust and objectives of this cover facility have been changed from pursuit of targets designated by Headquarters at international conferences to pursuit of the local Soviet presence. This has caused a major readjustment and Subject is now beginning to produce the type of leads that help the Station achieve its local operational objectives.

Subject continues to show a well organised methodical approach to his cover and operational tasks.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
9 August 1967	Ops Officer	/s/[illegible]

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I rarely see the written product of this employee's efforts and know little of his work except as I am informed of it by his supervisor in the Station. I have the impression, however, that the employee is responding to his supervisor's guidance and is not by any means simply drifting along paths indicated by his cover work, which can be a temptation when an employee has, as is true in this case, rather limited contact with his colleagues who work under official cover on the same target. I thus concur in the evaluation on the basis of limited knowledge.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
9 August 1967	Ops Officer	/s/Robert E. Owen

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
CASASIN Thomas B.	20 Jan. 1924	M	15	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Officer	DDP/WE/French	Paris

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY / CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C) / SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL / X REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR / X ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE / SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1964 - 2 June 1965

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- **W - Weak**: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counselling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- **A - Adequate**: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
- **P - Proficient**: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
- **S - Strong**: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- **O - Outstanding**: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Contact, cultivation and assessment of, and collection of biographic and operational intelligence on Soviet scientific and technical targets, and on other Soviets and other nationalities to whom he has access through his cover.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Spotting and assessment of potential operational assets to be used against the targets specified under Specific Duty No. 1.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Execution of operational assignments as directed by Hqs and field stations concerned, whether of a KUTUBE, KUDOVE or KUDESK nature.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Preparation or acquisition of cover firm written material as operational information to increase his access and flexibility in furtherance of Specific Duties Nos. 1 through 3.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Planning, directing and managing overseas bureau of cover firm, with emphasis on exploitation of the cover to meet operational requirements.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: O

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

During the reporting period this employee as a staff agent has continued the solidification of his cover and the expansion of his operational activity within his cover to a point where he represents as deeply buried a staff officer as can be found in anyone with his past organizational background. From the point of view of the host country authorities he appears to be completely legitimate. From the more important point of view of his targets, he also apparently has been accepted, and not through a lack of opportunity for scrutiny, for what he claims to be. He thus represents for KUBARK an asset who has not only solid status and access cover, but also the demonstrated capability for exploiting his cover for specific and aggressive operational undertakings.

As has been stated in past fitness reports, his present capability directly and openly to approach operational targets through the vehicle of his cover is the result of his own efforts, in which he has devoted a tremendous amount of work not only to establish and enhance the foundations of the cover, which requires a considerable amount of work for the cover company, but to devise and exploit ways and means by which the cover activity may be applied directly to operational tasks and programs. In addition to operational activity in his country of assignment, he has also been used in Hqs-directed activity in other countries, usually involving direct contact with target individuals, and in addition he has contributed greatly to the acquisition of operational information for the use of Hqs components in their overall approach to Soviet scientific and technical targets.

It would be difficult to fault this employee with respect to energy, professional skills, and mental capacity. He is a keen student of his operational environment and very skillful in analyzing the possibilities it offers for application toward operational objectives. He shows considerable resourcefulness in devising logical and credible

(continued)

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
1 June 1965	/s/ Thomas B. Casasin

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
1 June 1965	Ops Officer	/s/ James M. Flint

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Since the Reviewing Officer in the field has not indicated his views on this Fitness Report, I would like to make a comment of my own. Without wishing to detract from anything the Supervisor has said about Subject's performance, I feel obliged to note that the ratings given him in this report are higher than those given, for example, to any Branch Chief in this Division, and, as such, are inconsistent with the grading pattern of the Division as a whole.

2 June 1965 Chief, External Ops /s/ Robert E. Owen Reviewing Officer

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
24 June 65	DC/WE	Edward Ryan

SECRET

approaches to operational problems and personalities, and expends considerable effort in maintaining a level of specialized knowledge sufficient to backstop his cover and to ensure the maximum exploitation of his contacts with target organizations and individuals. His command of spoken, written, and technical French is excellent.

From the point of view of supervision, this employee in his present position requires guidance only insofar as to identify specific targets and for him to protect himself in situations where he does not have, by virtue of his not having access to official files, specialized information. ~~Otherwise,~~ he requires no supervision other than the periodic provision of policy and operational directives.

This employee has always been conscious and punctillious in his preparation of operational and administrative reports, including financial accountings, and his reporting in general, despite the burdens imposed by the necessity for minimizing the risks inherent in the lack of access to classified storage, leaves nothing to be desired.

Other than the funds for operational activities, this employee currently has no responsibility for the programming and use of personnel, space, equipment, and funds.

With respect to dedication to his job, this employee has practically speaking single-handedly built his present cover/operational position despite a number of negative factors inherent to his situation such as relative isolation, meager opportunity for contact with his professional group, and expensive area of assignment, and an exposed cover situation where the necessity for living cover is compounded by the necessity of avoiding mistakes which might jeopardize cover. His dedication to and enthusiasm for accepting the challenge ofthis assignment, and his willingness to continue on in it, deserve particular mention, particularly since he would perhaps justifiably feel that his present assignment may leave him outside the mainstream of competitive organization progression.

This employee's health and family situations leave nothing to be desired, as his proven mobility in the execution of operational assignments attests.

It should further be noted that with respect to the problem endemic to deep-cover assignments of allocation of time between cover work and operational activity, this employee comes very close to the happy norm of making cover work complement operational work, and making operational work contribute where possible to the enhancement of cover.

While this employee's assignment to date has essentially been a one-man show, it is recommended that serious consideration be given to expanding the operational complex which he has created in order to capitalize on his experience, the work he has put in to date, and his own management capabilities.

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*(Section B) - No special recognition of Subject's "Outstanding" overall performance is being requested at this time.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
CASASIN Thomas B.	20 Jan 1924	M	GS-15	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops. Officer	DDP/WE/France	Paris

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT	10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY	INITIAL / REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)	X ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):	SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
31 May 1964	1 April 1963 - 31 March 1964

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- **W - Weak** Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- **A - Adequate** Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
- **P - Proficient** Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
- **S - Strong** Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- **O - Outstanding** Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Finding, cultivating unwittingly and assessing new target personalities among Soviet scientists, engineers and other technical specialists.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Continuing the assessment and unwitting development of established targets in the same category.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Development of similar leads on target personalities from other denied areas; making recruitments outside base country.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Development and assessment of technical personalities of interest to Station's internal (domestic) programs.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Managing and directing cover company's foreign bureau and its assets to strengthen own cover and diversify access for KUTUBE, KUWOLF and KUDESK purposes.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6: Researching, writing and editing own and others' material published by cover company to strengthen cover and diversify access for KUDOVE operational purposes.	O

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

This employee combines the relatively rare combination of a senior and broadly experienced intelligence officer under working cover providing both long-term status in his country of residence (and in Europe in general) and access for a variety of operational functions, including spotting, assessing, contact with Soviet bloc nationals of specific interest, investigative measures, assessment in depth of ostensibly cover-company hired persons, and attendance at a broad range of national and international specialized meetings. Development of the capability operationally to exploit his cover has been the achievement of the employee himself. In so doing he has at the same time achieved genuine acceptance by his cover company associates (most of whom are unwitting) and his colleagues in his cover profession and related professions.

In undertaking operational tasks this employee has consistently shown initiative imagination, security consciousness, and application of both operational and substantive background to the problem at hand. He has put a conscious effort into improving his already excellent command of the French language, and his grasp of a variety of specialized scientific and technical fields has been achieved basically as a result of his own efforts.

His management of operational reporting, finances, and the administrative problems connected with his cover status has been exemplary.

It should be noted that during the reporting period, this employee has not had the benefit at all times of specific pinpointed operational direction. As of the end of the reporting period, Headquarters assumed control of his activities against specific Soviet targets on a Europe-wide basis.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
25 May 1964	/s/ Thomas B. CASASIN

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
Eighteen		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
25 May 1964	Ops. Officer	/s/ James Flint

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
25 May 1964	Ops. Officer	/s/ Robert E. Owen

SECRET

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (true)	DATE (from item 5-1)	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true)	DATE (from item 5-2)
Thomas H. CASASIN	9 Dec 1963	Jason Flint	27 Dec 1963
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:			DATE

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH	2. GRADE	3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE AND GRADE	7A. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD
25 Jan 1924	GS-15	Operations Officer, GS-15	10 September 1962
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION (if known)		5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE	7B. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM FIELD: September 1965
6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR: Paris, None			7C. EXPECTED DATE OF ARRIVAL AT HEADQUARTERS PCS

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY (see special note on Transmittal Form):

Staff agent assigned to a major overseas station, exploiting the cover provided by a major firm of technical periodical publishers. I take my instructions from a section chief within the station, and report in writing on the progress of my cover development and its operational application.

For operational reasons, I develop and assess operational leads in the FI, CI and CA areas, principally against denied area targets. I also handle local investigations and such cases as the station determines will fit into my cover, or which I can otherwise handle in alias. I travel to other field stations to handle such tasks as they request or Hq directs. I handle all cover tasks as they appear.

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

I would like to continue to serve essentially in the same scapacity as described above, although I would like eventually to add more supervisory and managerial functions to my responsibilities. I would like to expand the operating base provided by the cover organization by taking one several journeyman case officers to work with me against both denied area and host country targets, and to make the cover facility and the access it provides of more versatile use to both the station and to KUDOVE as a whole.

My second choice would be to return to Hq, and use the knowledge and experience I have gained in my present job to (1) select staff personnel who will be placed in non-official cover, (2) select the cover mechanisms proper, (3) train our personnel for the proper discharge of their total responsibilities while serving under such cover.

B. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION (refer to catalog of courses, if available):

The completion of work toward a master's or doctor's degree in the physical or life sciences, or in the management/administration of the sciences and their personnel.

SECRET

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT (continued)

C. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 (for 1st, 2nd and 3rd choice) IN THE BOXES BELOW:

[1] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION, after a one-year extension of my present tour

[2] BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE ASSIGNMENT IN HEADQUARTERS, INDICATE CHOICE OF COMPONENT:

1ST. CHOICE OTR 2ND. CHOICE Cover Group 3RD. CHOICE Office/Personnel

[3] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION, BASED ON QUALIFICATIONS:

1ST. CHOICE Geneva 2ND. CHOICE Brussels 3RD. CHOICE New Zealand/Canada

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS?

INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS 25

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

Wife, will be 37 in 1965; two daughters, 15 and 12 in 1965

11A. INDICATE ANY CHANGE IN YOUR PERSONAL OR FAMILY SITUATION WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT

Next post should have high school facilities teaching in French or in English.

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. S-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Chief, External concurs in subject's wish for one year extension and return for second tour after home leave in the fall of 1965. However, subject's wish as expressed in 9.A. of having case officers working under him is not feasible at this time.

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. S-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE CAREER SERVICE OFFICER OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMPONENT TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Recommend Home Leave and return for another tour.

SR Concurs.

16. NAME OF CAREER SERVICE OFFICER OR PERSONNEL OFFICER	SIGNATURE
DATE 6 February 1964	G.K. Hogannam (signed) G.K. Hogannam (SCD)

FOR USE OF CAREER SERVICE

17. EMPLOYEE [X] HAS [ ] HAS NOT BEEN NOTIFIED OF PLANNED REASSIGNMENT	18. REFERENCE DISPATCH NO. OFPS-7775 CABLE NO.
19. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME Dwight M. Collingsford	20. SIGNATURE /S/
21. TITLE Secy, CS Career Panel	22. DATE 26 Feb 64

23. COMMENTS Approved extension of present tour to Sep 1965, home leave and second tour.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

CASASIN

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 037367

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
[redacted]	20 Jan 1924	M	GS-15	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Officer	DDP/SR	Paris

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY / CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C) / SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL / REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR / X ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE / SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 May 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 10 September 1962 - 31 March 1963

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- **W - Weak**: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- **A - Adequate**: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
- **P - Proficient**: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
- **S - Strong**: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- **O - Outstanding**: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Establishment and maintenance of cover as a genuine working member of his profession.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Spotting and assessing persons of operational interest to Paris Station and to other stations.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Investigating of organizations and phenomena of operational interest to the Station.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Collection of positive and operational information using his cover for entree.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5:	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

See attached sheet.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 15 May 1963	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [illegible]	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 6½ months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 15 May 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR [illegible] Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ James Flint
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL See attached sheet		
DATE 20 May 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL OPS Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Edward Ryan

SECRET

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

The assignment of this employee to the field under non-official cover was designed to compensate for the loss of an employee in an official cover slot which was cut from the Station's ODACID allotment of personnel positions.

During the reporting period this employee has accomplished with success the convincing establishment of his cover in a complex milieu, and has been accepted as legitimate by his professional colleagues, the persons whom he meets under cover, and the French authorities. It should be noted that his ability to assume his cover has been largely the result of his own efforts over a period of years to acquire and maintain a familiarity with the general scientific field.

During the reporting period he has developed a wide circle of contacts in the scientific and journalistic fields and applies a long background in a variety of assignments in KUDOVE to the determination and assessment of operational potential among these contacts. At the same time his cover organization, in which only four persons are witting of his actual status, has shown itself to be more than satisfied with his performance of his cover duties.

This employee requires a minimum of detailed operational supervision; it is necessary in specific cases only to indicate the operational or informational objectives.

From the point of view of administrative support, his attention to detail and meticulousness reduce the problems of his support by the Station to a minimum.

This employee uses the French language continuously, and his facility is such as to permit him to handle himself excellently in a broad range of complex technical subjects. He has in addition undertaken specialized French language training to develop this capability further. His operational reporting is excellent both with regard to clarity and pertinence.

In the immediate future he will be assigned case work, for the most part in fields where it will complement, and be complemented by, his independent operational activities and cover work.

6 August 1962

Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report

Subject: [redacted]

My last statements concerning the performance of [redacted] should be extended to cover the remainder of his service as Chief of SR/6. He departed headquarters for a field assignment 31 July 1962.

QUENTIN C. JOHNSON
Chief of Operations and Plans
SR Division

CONCUR: signed HOWARD J. OSBORN
HOWARD J. OSBORN
Chief, SR Division

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Recorded by CSID

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE
[redacted]	20 January 1924	M	GS-14

5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT
D	Branch Chief	OC/SR/6

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS			9. TYPE OF REPORT		
NOT ELIGIBLE	MEMBER	DEFERRED	INITIAL	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR	
PENDING	DECLINED	DENIED	X ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE	

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	11. REPORTING PERIOD	SPECIAL (Specify)
	From July 1960 To October 61	

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
NO. 1 Supervises large functional branch of thirty-seven staff and fifteen contract personnel.	5	NO. 4 Conducts liaison with various components of the Agency and with other agencies.	6
NO. 2 Plans and programs for operations support, including initiation of new support activities.	5	NO. 5 Prepares and presents briefings.	6
NO. 3 Supervises preparation of, and sometimes personally prepares, special studies both on own initiative and on request.	5	NO. 6 Supervises maintenance of SR Division records on Soviet defectors, supports exploitation of defectors and participates in their resettlement.	5

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-59 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Mr. [redacted] has a good knowledge of Soviet matters and generally is very well informed. He continually demonstrates much initiative and a high degree of productivity. He is stimulating to his associates, businesslike and delegates work easily. He appears very self-confident and he is dynamic.

Mr. [redacted] supervises a very large and key branch engaged in a wide variety of activities, a difficult job which he does well.

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
9 November 1961	[redacted]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
Twelve	

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

	EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS		REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
	OTHER (Specify):		

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
9 November 1961	SR/Chief of Plans and Operations	QUENTIN E. JOHNSON

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

X	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
	I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
21 NOV 1961	Chief, SR Division	JOHN M. MAURY

SECRET

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (true)	DATE (from item 8-1)	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true)	DATE (from item 8-2)
[redacted]	9/15/59	John Baker	

NAME AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:		DATE
	Andrew L. Busby	6/30/60

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH	2. GRADE	3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE
20 January 1924	GS-14	Operations Officer

4. SERVICE DESIGNATION (if known)	5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE
DI	Tokyo, Japan

6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR	7. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE
	15 June 1960

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY (see special note on Transmittal Form):

Chief of Major External Geographic Branch (USSR-European Satellites) of large overseas station (Tokyo). As such, am responsible to Station Deputy for Operations.

Direct, manage, supervise and train 25 persons, including operations and project personnel under non-official cover, under State, Army, and Air Force cover. Personnel are divided functionally within FI, PP, and CI sections.

Initiate and launch new FI, PP and CI operations using best available independent assets as well as assets available through foreign (Japanese) liaison. Manage and exploit perennial operations; observe progress or deterioration of activities to insure that marginal and non-productive activities are terminated. Am case officer on my own operations, too.

Maintain liaison with other US agencies. Provide operational support to other Far East stations needing specialized aid as USSR-East European operations emerge and develop.

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

I would like a challenging assignment overseas, again, as my first preference: I am especially interested in developing across-the-board FI-PP-CI programs "from scratch," with particular reference to building up long-term FI-CI programs and assets. I am not unduly particular as to area, but of course would prefer an area in which English or French is the lingua franca.

My next choice would be to go to an area whose language I do not know — but could learn — and which meets the requirements of the challenge stated in the first paragraph, above.

My next choice would be to return to Japan, where I could use my Japanese knowledge.

My next choice would be an assignment to a special training course at the national intelligence level.

My last choice would be reassignment directly to Headquarters.

I would especially enjoy an assignment in which I can combine on-the-job training of other personnel with the direction and management of their operational programs.

B. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION (refer to catalog of courses, if available):

Clandestine Services Review
State Senior Officers' Course
Appropriate additional language training
Outside advanced graduate work in international relations.

FORM NO. 202
1 SEP 54

SECRET

SECRET

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT (continued)

C. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 (for 1st, 2nd and 3rd choice) IN THE BOXES BELOW:

[ ] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION [ ] BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY

[ ] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION

WITH RESPECT TO A POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE YOUR 1ST, 2ND AND 3RD CHOICE FOR GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION:

1ST CHOICE: Western Europe
2ND CHOICE: Eastern Europe, Africa, or Near East
3RD CHOICE: Latin America, Southeast Asia

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS?
10 weeks, including possible TDY INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS 60

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

Wife: Harriette, 32
Daughters: Pamela, 10; Michelle, 7

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 5-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 5-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE SUPERVISOR AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE DIVISION TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

To be assigned as Chief, SR/6

16. NAME OF SUPERVISOR	SIGNATURE:
Andrew L. Busby	
TITLE: Chief, SR/Personnel	DATE: 30 June 1960

17. REMARKS (additional comment)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

Cremin

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE
[redacted]	20 Jan 1924	M	GS-14

5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT
DI		FE/Tokyo Sta/SR

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS: NOT ELIGIBLE / MEMBER / DEFERRED / PENDING / DECLINED / DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL / X ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR / X REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE / SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

11. REPORTING PERIOD From 1 Apr 59 - 24 June 60

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
No. 1: Chief, Soviet Branch, responsible for activities of 24 staff and 8 contract employees	6	No. 4: Case officer	5/6
No. 2: Responsible for station SR planning, budgeting, and operating activities	6	No. 5:	
No. 3: Representing the station at varied levels in all SR matters	6	No. 6:	

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — **NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE**

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

In most respects, this officer is one of the best I have known in this agency. He has a broad and deep knowledge of his target area, as well as of his "host" country; an excellent and proven degree of operational "know-how"; the ability to write and speak lucidly and effectively and with apparent ease; and a very high degree of motivation and devotion to duty. He can be expected to continue his dynamic and imaginative pursuit of a most difficult target. It is my opinion that this officer has great potential and is ready for increased responsibilities which would involve the promotion for which he has been recommended. As for training, a good managerial course might help to bring into even sharper focus his many talents.

This report has been prepared in accordance with F E Division standards which recognize the principle of rating the individual against the group. Thus an 'average' rating reflects an entirely satisfactory performance.

SECTION F — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
23 June 1960	[redacted] on transmittal

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

	EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS		REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
	OTHER (Specify):		

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
23 June 1960		[handwritten name] signed on ~~[illegible]~~ transmittal

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

✓	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
	I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
	COS, Tokyo	John Baker/s/ on transmittal

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

Vacation

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE
[redacted]	20 January 1924	M	GS-14

5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT
		SR, Tokyo, Japan

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS						9. TYPE OF REPORT			
	NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER		DEFERRED		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED	X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	11. REPORTING PERIOD	SPECIAL (Specify)
31 May 1959	10 Apr 58 - 31 Mar 59	

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
NO. 1: Supervises and directs operational branch of some 17 persons	5	NO. 4: Case officer	6
NO. 2: Conducts operational liaison with local intelligence and security services.	6	NO. 5:	
NO. 3: Conducts liaison with U.S. military and civilian intelligence services	6	NO. 6:	

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Subject continues as one of the most capable, professional and hard working of the branch chiefs in the Station. Working against a tough denied area problem, he demonstrates imagination, drive, excellent area background and knowledge, and a high degree of productivity. He definitely has the potential for an even more responsible position.

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
27 April 1959	signed on transmittal

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
22	

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

[ ]	EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS	[ ]	REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
[ ]	OTHER (Specify):		

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
27 April 1959	DC Tokyo Statirn	William Nelson signed on transmittal

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

X	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
	I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
27 April 1959	C/Tokyo Station	John E. Baker signed on transmittal

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
RICHARDSON JACQUES	20 Jan 1924	M	DI

5. OFFICE/DIVISION BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
FE, TOKYO, JAPAN	Area Ops Officer

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-14		1 October 1957 - 9 April 1958

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): [ ] INITIAL [ ] ANNUAL [ ] REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [ ] REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [X] SPECIAL (Specify) Promotion

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT [X] HAS [ ] HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
27 May 1958	William F. Nelson	

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN PREPARED UNDER CRITERIA [illegible] AT THIS STATION AND IN CONSONANCE WITH [illegible] STANDARDS IN ORDER TO MAKE FITNESS [illegible] AS [illegible] AND [illegible] AS POSSIBLE

[ ] CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
27 May 1958	John F. Baker	

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5/6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	*HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE*	*CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS*
GIVING LECTURES	*DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS*	*PREPARES SUMMARIES*
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	*ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS*	*TRANSLATES GERMAN*
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	*MANAGES FILES*	*DEBRIEFING SOURCES*
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	*OPERATES RADIO*	*KEEPS BOOKS*
TYPING	*COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES*	*DRIVES TRUCK*
TAKING DICTATION	*WRITES REGULATIONS*	*MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING*
SUPERVISING	*PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE*	*EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA*

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

Specific Duty	Rating Number	Specific Duty	Rating Number
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 As branch chief directs and plans operations of denied area branch.	5/6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts liaison with other U.S. agencies	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts operational liaison with local security services.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Develops and handles agents	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject is an exceedingly well-equipped operations officer. He is mature, intelligent, has a thorough background in operations in his area and the ability to grow in his job. His operational planning and execution is usually impeccable. He has the loyalty of his subordinates and the respect of his equals and supervisors. He is particularly effective in dealing in the liaison field where his good sense and disinterest in "fighting the problem" produces a maximum of cooperation and good will. If he has any minor fault as a supervisor, it is not in impatience with his subordinates, as reflected in previous evaluations, but in an occasional unwillingness to say no to them.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER. Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR. This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
RICHARDSON JACQUES	20 Jan 1924	M	DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: FS, TOKYO, JAPAN	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Area Ops Officer		

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-14		1 October 1957 - 9 April 1958

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): INITIAL [ ] ANNUAL [ ] REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [ ] REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [ ] SPECIAL (Specify) [x] Promotion

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
27 May 1958	William E. Nelson	

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
27 May 1958	John E. Baker	

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? [x] Yes [ ] No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATE IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	2	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION
10 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

His potential for advancement is excellent. He has the right blend of operational know-how and supervisory talent to undertake positions of wider scope than he now holds. Although his advancement has been rapid for his age, his maturity, poise and common sense almost completely eliminate age as a factor in his potential for a more senior job.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Subject deserves at sometime within the next year or two the opportunity to broaden his experience either by command of a small station or advancement to a more responsible job in a large one.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

None

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
- X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
- 1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
- 2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
- 3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
- 4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
- 5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	5	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	5	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	5	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS		30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SR FILE

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8. of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
RICHARDSON Jacques	20 Jan. 1924	M	DI

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
Tokyo Station PEDWOOD	Area Operations Officer

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-14		1 October 1956 to 30 September 1957

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

	INITIAL	X	REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify)		

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT [ ] HAS [ ] HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:
Completed at Headquarters; subject not available

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
16 Oct. 1957	Edward Marelius	Chief SOV Branch Japan Station

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

[ ] CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the Supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
23 OCT 57	Lloyd GEORGE	COS, Tokyo

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY, OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	*HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE*	*CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS*
GIVING LECTURES	*DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS*	*PREPARES SUMMARIES*
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	*ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS*	*TRANSLATES GERMAN*
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	*MANAGES FILES*	*DEBRIEFING SOURCES*
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	*OPERATES RADIO*	*KEEPS BOOKS*
TYPING	*COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES*	*DRIVES TRUCK*
TAKING DICTATION	*WRITES REGULATIONS*	*MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING*
SUPERVISING	*PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE*	*EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA*

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB.
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NUMBER
Deputy to Branch Chief	5	Supervising	4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	**RATING NUMBER**	**SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5**	**RATING NUMBER**
Conducts Foreign Liaison	6	Prepares correspondence and reports and handles administrative routine	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	**RATING NUMBER**	**SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6**	**RATING NUMBER**
Prepares and Manages Projects	4	Developes and handles Agents	5

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject has excellent natural equipment for employment in this organization in terms of his intelligence and natural apptitudes. Additionally, he brings a great deal of area knowledge and language ability to his present assignment. During the period covered by this report he has displayed great industry and devotion to duty in a variety of circumstances and achieved notable results in prodcction and in the creation of both short and long-term assets for his unit. On the debit side I would say that he is somewhat too businesslike in many personal situations to the point of being almost humourless. This, however, is a quality which he does not permit to intrude upon the necessities of his operational work although it often shows in office relationships.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? [ ] YES [X] NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FI[illegible]ESS REPORT (Part II) POTE[illegible]IAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
RICHARDSON Jacques	20 Jan. 1924	M	DI

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
Tokyo Station [illegible]	Area Operations Officer

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-14		1 October 1956 to 30 September 1957

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): [ ] INITIAL [X] ANNUAL [ ] REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [ ] REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [ ] SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
23 OCT 57	Lloyd GEORGE [signature]	COS, Tokyo

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
16 Oct 1957	Edward [signature]	Chief SOV Branch Japan

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: **7**

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? [ ] Yes [ ] No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
2		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
3		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Spec[illegible])

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

15

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Subject is well suited for this business and the business for him. He should progress steadily to positions of great responsibility.

SECTION H.	FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Normal refresher a/o preparatory training as required.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

No limiting factors or personal circumstances known to the rater

SECTION I.	DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
- X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
- 1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
- 2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
- 3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
- 4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
- 5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
X	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	[illegible]	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER. Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR. This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
RICHARDSON JACQUES	20 Jan. 1924	M	DI

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
Japan Station (REDWOOD)	Area Operations Officer

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-14		1 October 1955 to 30 September 1956

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): INITIAL [ ] ANNUAL [X] REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [ ] REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [ ] SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT [X] HAS [ ] HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER HAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify)
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
15 November 1956	EDWARD MARELIUS	Chief, Soviet Branch

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

[ ] CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
21 November 1956	W. LLOYD GEORGE	Chief of Operations

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE	CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
GIVING LECTURES	DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS	PREPARES SUMMARIES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS	TRANSLATES GERMAN
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	MANAGES FILES	DEBRIEFING SOURCES
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	OPERATES RADIO	KEEPS BOOKS
TYPING	COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES	DRIVES TRUCK
TAKING DICTATION	WRITES REGULATIONS	MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
SUPERVISING	PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE	EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NUMBER
No. 1: Deputy to Branch Chief	5	No. 4: Supervising	4
No. 2: Conducts Foreign Liaison	6	No. 5: Prepares correspondence and reports	6
No. 3: Prepares and manages projects	4	No. 6: Handles admin routine	4

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject has really superb natural equipment for work in this Organization in terms of mental capacity, psychological bent and affinity for the things and people he comes against. He tops this off with industry and language ability among other natural aptitudes. On the debit side and measured against the best, he is a bit shy of humor and personal understanding in some situations, qualities which mitigate more against acceptability than job competence.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE.. BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? [X] YES [ ] NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

Subject is an all around performer capable of a primary, in place of his present secondary, responsibility.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
RICHARDSON JACQUES	20 Jan. 1924	M	DI

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
Japan Station (REDWOOD)	Area Operations Officer

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-14		1 October 1955 to 30 September 1956

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): INITIAL [ ] ; ANNUAL [X] ; REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [ ] ; REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [ ] ; SPECIAL (Specify) [ ]

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
15 November 1956	EDWARD MARELIUS	CHIEF, Soviet Branch

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
21 November 1956	W. LLOYD GEORGE	Chief of Operations

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: **7**

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? [XX] Yes [ ] No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
2		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
3		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

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(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NO. OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

Six

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Subject has a high all around potential. With respect to supervision, below, he tends to support subordinates from his own energy rather more than to bring them along the hard way, and a normal tendency to avoid the categorical "no" - both tendencies easily correctable.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Routine refresher training as appropriate.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

All normal. No limiting factors.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
- X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
- 1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
- 2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
- 3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
- 4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
- 5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
X	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

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(When Filled In)

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY	1. DATE OF BIRTH	2. SEX	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION
Jacques Richardson	20 Jan. 1924	M	DI

4. GRADE	5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current)
GS-14	USSR Base, Tokyo

6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT	7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
30 September 1955	17 February - 30 September 1955

SECTION II (To be completed by field supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION
Chief, USSR Base, Tokyo	19 February 1955

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency)

A. As Chief of Operating Base:
1. Manage and direct all operations against target area, and monitor products.
2. Supervise system of development and exploitation of operational leads.
3. Supervise proper administration and support of operations, including finances.
4. Conduct or supervise effective liaison with other CIA elements, with other Government agencies abroad and, when appropriate, with representative of other governments.

B. As Senior SR Division Officer in Area:
1. Consult with or advise other CIA and non-CIA units on target area, government, and IS characteristics.
2. Make available to other CIA and non-CIA units area specialists, as required.

SECTION III (To be completed at headquarters only)

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER (True)	2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD (True)
Carleton B. Swift	W. Lloyd George

3. THIS REPORT [X] WAS [ ] WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.

4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS.	5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES
7 Nov. 1955	Phyllis M. Landrum

DO COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTE USE ONLY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	CATEGORIES													
	NOT OB-SERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES: A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.													X	
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.												X		
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.											X			
4. HAS INITIATIVE.												X		
5. UNEMOTIONAL.												X		
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.														X
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.													X	
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.												X		
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.											X			
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.												X		
11. CALM.													X	
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.											X			
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.												X		
14. GETS THINGS DONE.													X	
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.														X
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.												X		
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.													X	
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.												X		
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.													X	
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.												X		
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.													X	
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.												X		
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.													X	
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.												X		
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.													X	

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(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES. A "SPARK PLUG".
29. TOUGH MINDED.
30. OBSERVANT.
31. CAPABLE.
32. CLEAR THINKING.
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.
36. DELIBERATE.
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.
43. HAS DRIVE.
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.
45. VERSATILE.
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Capable operations officer with broad understanding of Soviet problems.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT A SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? [XXX] NO [ ] YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

- [ ] 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
- [ ] 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
- [ ] 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
- [ ] 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
- [ ] 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
- [XXX] 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? [XXX] NO [ ] YES. IF YES, WHAT?

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

- [ ] 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
- [ ] 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS ORGANIZATION AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
- [ ] 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS..WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
- [ ] 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
- [ ] 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- [XXX] 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- [ ] 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

- [ ] 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
- [ ] 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
- [ ] 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
- [XXX] 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- [ ] 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- [ ] 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

- [ ] 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
- [ ] 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
- [ ] 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
- [ ] 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- [ ] 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
- [ ] 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
- [XXX] 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	2. GRADE	3. POSITION TITLE
Richardson	Jacques	NMI	GS-13	Area Ops. Officer CD-FI

4. OFFICE	STAFF OR DIVISION	BRANCH	DEPTL. / FIELD	IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION
DDP	SR	SR/5		

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 18 July 1953 To 17 July 1954

6. TYPE OF REPORT: Initial / Annual [X] / Special / Reassignment / Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

18 July 53 - 31 Jan 54

a. Manage and direct the activities of an overseas operating branch.
b. Assist the division chief of operations in the planning of new and continued oper'ns.
c. Assist the division chief in personnel programming in support of branch and field station activities.

1 Feb 54 - 17 Jul 54

a. Establish new domestic activities branch.
b. Develop and manage operational program of this branch, insuring (1) continuity of treatment by qualified personnel, (2) processing of intelligence requirements, and (3) expeditious movement of finished intelligence.
c. Multilateral liaison with other elements of CIA, the Government, and foreign IS.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD:

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
Counterespionage (OTR)	Washington	3 weeks	22 January 1954

(In addition to the duties indicated in §7 above, I also give a 3-hour lecture at the CE course (advanced phase) approximately every six weeks.)

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED? I am primarily interested in a foreign assignment where I could apply the various espionage and CE techniques it has been my responsibility to manage and plan for in recent years.

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).
My work at headquarters has become somewhat narrowing in that I am losing language abilities and opportunity for direct contact with foreigners.

10.

9 July 1954 — DATE

[signature] — SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Richardson is a superior officer in the performance of his duties. He is efficient, precise, and energetic, and brings considerable imagination and foresight to the operational problems confronting him. His concept of staff organization and responsibility is of a high caliber. In handling personnel, he is perceptive and serious, and his judgment and motivation are of the highest quality.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

22. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

This officer has been outstanding as a staff officer. He is unusually talented in his balancing of jurisdictional equities. This ability reflects a broad competence, however, and should not be construed so as to limit his future duties.

23. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

This officer's devotion to his duties and professional convictions sometimes inclines him toward inflexible declarations of position. This fault, a minor one in officers of considerable potential, will be corrected by increased responsibility and experience.

24. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

This officer is prepared for promotion and for increased responsibilities in command or staff duties.

25. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Richardson is presently well placed. See below.

26. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

Tradecraft training and a field assignment. Both are planned in the next six months.

27. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

28. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

29 July 54 — DATE

Peer de Silva — SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

29. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

21 July '54 — DATE

[signature] — SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	2. GRADE	3. POSITION TITLE
RICHARDSON	Jacques	D.	GS-15	Sup. Intell. Off. (Chief)

4. OFFICE	STAFF OR DIVISION	BRANCH	DEPT'L / FIELD	IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION
DDP	SR	SR 5 PS Br.	[X] FIELD	

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT	6. TYPE OF REPORT
From -13-53 To 9-14-53	[ ] Initial [ ] Annual [ ] Special [ ] Reassignment [X] Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

a. Supervise and manage a foreign geographic branch; this includes a total of 51 authorised personnel at Hq and in the field stations. b. Direct and coordinate all project development. c. Detect and explore potential operational leads. d. Coordinate intra-division activities with appropriate branches, inter-division activities with appropriate divisions, senior staffs, and elements outside DD/P and CIA. e. Determine the suitability of new personnel, continued employment and rotation of incumbent personnel, and make available incumbent personnel on loan basis to other divisions etc. f. Apportion the operational and administrative workloads within the branch sections and desks, and their personnel. g. Adapt changing field situations and problems to the organisation and operation of the branch, making the branch best serve the needs of the field stations. h. Review continuously all requirements imposed on the branch, and transmit them clearly to the field.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
None (I was overseas part of the time covered by this report).			

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED? I am principally interested in the building and successful operation of American intelligence abroad, both in theory and in practice.

I remark/CAN MAKE HERE ... (QUALIFICATIONS, ABILITIES, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS) The only remark I can make here is the one I stated in the previous report: the administrative responsibilities of a branch chief do not enable him to be a purely operational individual. If it were possible to carry less of an administrative load, I would enjoy devoting all of my time to the refinement of the intelligence process and its techniques in my area of concern.

10.

22 October 1953	
DATE	SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

During this period Mr. Richardson was promoted from Deputy Branch Chief to Branch Chief, in recognition of his extremely good performance. Not enough time has elapsed to be able to evaluate him fully on all aspects of his new position. However, his handling of the Branch has been unusually good from a management point of view and there is every reason to believe that in the planning and direction of operational activities the same high standard will prevail.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

He is a good organizer and a good leader. He is methodical and thorough in his planning and supervision of substantive activities, while at the same time he maintains close and sympathetic relations with his subordinates. His knowledge of them and of their personalities and problems is outstanding.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

He should continue to develop his knowledge of operations and operational procedures.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

He is well equipped to advance through increasing levels of responsibility.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Well placed at present.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

Assignment to a field position in the not-too-distant future.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

26 October 1953 — DATE

[signature] — SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

26 October 1953 — DATE

[signature] — SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) RICHARDSON, (First) Jacques (Middle) G.
2. GRADE GS-12
3. POSITION TITLE I.O. (Dep. Chief)
4. OFFICE DDP — STAFF OR DIVISION SR — BRANCH SR-5 Far East — [X] DEPT'L [ ] FIELD — IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION
5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 2-18-52 To 2-18-53
6. TYPE OF REPORT [ ] Initial [X] Annual [ ] Special [ ] Reassignment [ ] Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.
Assist the Branch Chief in management of the Branch and its overseas stations (3); at present, I act as Branch Chief about 25%-30% of the year. Supervise the planning and preparation for approval of all basic plans, programs, and projects. This involves thorough discussion with each of seven (7) desk chiefs of the purposes and procedures for accomplishing any single mission under any given project, including target analysis (whether FI or PP), preparation of intelligence annexes, logistic and fiscal requirements, specific personnel needs, etc. Am responsible for working directly with the Division's Intelligence Branch for control of requirements, ops intelligence, and reports. Am responsible for maintaining liaison with appropriate staffs and other Divisions who must coordinate any action or document. Assist or direct, as required, specific mission planning at overseas stations on TDY. Supervise preparation of all periodic reports; interview candidate empl's.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
International Politics, 102	Graduate School Georgetown University, Washington.	4 months: 3 hours' credit	5 June 1952

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?
I am primarily interested in the conception, planning, and operational management of FI and PP activities, and ops policy and control.
IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).
This differs from my present assignment essentially in that a Branch Chief or his Deputy becomes so involved in administrative detail that he cannot always give his undivided attention to project management and agent handling problems. Otherwise, I feel that my background and experience qualify me for the functions I aspire to perform.

10.
7 February 1953 — DATE
[signature] — SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE. As Deputy Branch Chief, Mr. Richardson has performed his duties, taken as a whole, in a superior manner. His timely and efficient preparation of intelligence annexes, logistic and fiscal requirements and reports has been particularly outstanding. During three to four months of the past year, Mr. Richardson has acted as Branch Chief. The review of Branch operations under Mr. Richardson's direction, during the writer's absence, indicated his complete competence in supervising Branch activities. His supervision of the planning and preparation for approval of basic plans and projects of the seven (7) desk chiefs has been superior. Mr. Richardson also participated in the planning and dispatch of a difficult operational mission, acting in the capacity of Senior Case Officer. On this mission his liaison with representatives of one of the Military Services was conducted in a manner which enhanced cooperation between that S ice and this Agency.

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

Mr. Richardson's performance was noticeably outstanding with respect to his thorough knowledge of every activity of the Branch. He was in position to assume direction of Branch activities at any time. He also kept himself thoroughly briefed on Division policies and planning in order to give timely instruction and guidance to the Branch overseas stations.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

Mr. Richardson has a very thorough background in two (2) languages, French and Japanese. He would benefit substantially by learning the Russian language. He is meticulous with respect to his attention to details, sometimes to the point of concealing the broader picture from his view. It would be well for Mr. Richardson to direct his attention to the broad scope of Branch activities rather than to concentrate on its details.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

Mr. Richardson is fully qualified to assume the duties of the chief SR Division representative at a field station. In order to assume this responsibility in the most efficient manner, it is recommended that Mr. Richardson serve a minimum period of time of approximately six (6) months as the assistant to the present chief of the field station.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Mr. Richardson could serve effectively in a staff function for either FI or PP activities. This does not mean, however, that his present duties are not better suited to his qualifications.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

Mr. Richardson has already been recommended for overseas assignment in the Far East during the past year. He has area knowledge and command of the Japanese language, having served in Japan previously with the United States Army. His duties at Headquarters have been so pressing that his departure for overseas assignment is being delayed until an adequate replacement may be trained.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

March 31 1953 — DATE

George Weisz [signature] — SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in Item 20.)

March 30 1953 — DATE

[signature] — SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

GS-15
WE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

20 April 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Thomas B. CASASIN (SA)

THROUGH : Chief of Station, Paris

SUBJECT : Notification of Designation as a Participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System

REFERENCE : Book Dispatch 5096, dated 12 August 1965

Recent correspondence on the above subject informed you that I had determined that you met the criteria specified in the applicable regulation for designation as a participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System. On the basis of this determination and your recently executed election to remain in the System, your designation as a participant was made effective 10 April 1966.

Richard B. Egan

RICHARD B. EGAN

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(SA) 28 February 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Thomas B. CASASIN

THROUGH : Chief of Station, Paris

SUBJECT : Designation as a Participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System

REFERENCE : Book Dispatch 5096 dated 12 August 1965

1. Based on a review of your record and the recommendations of the Head of your Career Service and of the Organization Retirement Board, I have determined that you meet the criteria for designation as a participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System.

2. The regulation governing this retirement system provides that "Any participant who has completed fifteen years of service with the Organization and whose career at that time is adjudged by the Director of Personnel to be qualifying for the system may elect to remain a participant in the system for the duration of his employment by the Organization and such election shall not be subject to review or approval by the Director." Since you have already completed fifteen years of service with the Organization, your right to this election vests upon your designation as a participant and must be exercised immediately.

3. If you should elect not to remain a participant in the system, you will be continued under the Civil Service Retirement System. Once your election has been made, you do not have the privilege of changing it at some later date.

4. It is requested that you indicate your election by checking in the appropriate box and signing below. The original of this memorandum should be returned to Headquarters as soon as possible.

Richard B. Egan
RICHARD B. EGAN

Exercise of option of participant with fifteen years of service:

☐ I elect to remain in the Organization Retirement and Disability System for the duration of my employment by the Organization.

☐ I elect NOT to remain a participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System for the duration of my employment by the Organization.

Signature

Date

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO (1-6)	2. LD NO.
[illegible]	8707

3. NAME (7-24) LAST FIRST MIDDLE	4. OFFICE OR DIVISION	5. LANGUAGE	6. LANG. CODE (25-27)
Richardson, Jacques G.	[illegible]	French	[illegible]

7. DATE OF TEST 46-51	8. ANNIVERSARY DATE	9. GRADE	10. DATE OF BIRTH
Feb. 14, 1962	Feb. 14, 1963	14	Jan. 20, 1924

11. REASON FOR TAKING TEST		12. TEST SCORES				
		READING (34)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)
X	APPLY FOR AWARD	H	I	H	H	H
	ESTABLISH SKILL LEVEL					

13. ELIGIBILITY (39)		14. TYPE OF AWARD			
X	A	ACHIEVEMENT (A)	ELEMENTARY (E)	READING (R) SPEAKING (S)	BASED ON TRAINING THAT WAS
	M	MAINTENANCE (M)	INTERMEDIATE (I) HIGH (H)	COMPREHENSIVE (C)	DIRECTED (D) OR VOLUNTARY (V)
	NA	A	I-H	R	V

15. INELIGIBLE (REASON)

16 I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR A PROFICIENCY AWARD OF $ 100.00 (40-45)

SIGNATURE

DATE

17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REF. NO.

CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.

SIGNATURE

REMARKS

FORM 5-60 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(10-45)

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(When Filled In)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO. (1-6)	2. LD NO.
06102	0787

3. NAME (7-24) LAST FIRST MIDDLE	4. OFFICE OR DIVISION	5. LANGUAGE	6. LANG. CODE (25-27)
Richardson, Jacques G.	[illegible]	Japanese	370

7. DATE OF TEST 46-51	8. ANNIVERSARY DATE	9. GRADE	10. DATE OF BIRTH
Nov. 5, 1962	Aug. 6, 1962	14	Jan. 30, 1926

11. REASON FOR TAKING TEST
- APPLY FOR AWARD
- ESTABLISH SKILL LEVEL

12. TEST SCORES

READING (24)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)
-	-	I	I	I

13. ELIGIBILITY (39)
- A
- M
- NA

14. TYPE OF AWARD

ACHIEVEMENT (A)	ELEMENTARY (E)	READING (R) SPEAKING (S)	BASED ON TRAINING THAT WAS
MAINTENANCE (M)	INTERMEDIATE (I) HIGH (H)	COMPREHENSIVE (C)	DIRECTED (D) OR VOLUNTARY (V)

15. INELIGIBLE (REASON)

Award disapproved by CS Board

16. I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR A PROFICIENCY AWARD OF $ (40-45)

SIGNATURE | DATE

17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REF. NO. | CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.

SIGNATURE

REMARKS

FORM 5-60 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(10-45)

TLO COPY

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

TRAINING REPORT

French Basic Reading, Speaking, Writing-II
100 hours, part-time, 9 Apr 62 - 15 Jun 62 — 4 students

Student: Harriette D. Richardson (Dependent) (wife of Jacques Richardson - SR) — Year of Birth: 1928

EOD Date: — Grade: — Office: —

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS - Instructor: W. Ray Rackley

This is the second phase in a three-phase basic sequence of 30 weeks, each phase lasting 10 weeks.

The general aim of this course is to provide a thorough grounding for the student who has previously had either a reading course in French or an insufficient introduction to the language. The major objectives of this phase of the course are to develop an ability: (1) to distinguish and pronounce satisfactorily all the sounds of the language; (2) to use effectively a modest stock of French sentences and expressions; (3) to comprehend normal-speed spoken French in a variety of everyday non-technical situations; (4) to begin to read and write basic French, applying the spoken vocabulary and grammatical material previously learned.

Classes are held 2 hours per day, 5 days a week, requiring a minimum of 10 hours of preparation per week. To receive the maximum benefit from this course each student should plan to devote at least two-thirds of the class preparation time doing drill in the language laboratory.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

Student progress is evaluated primarily on oral recitation in the form of drills and free conversation based on memorized material. In addition, several tests are given during the course. This student's rating is indicated by the asterisk.

Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Excellent	Incomplete
	3	1*	

Mrs. Richardson was definitely a superior student. Her pronunciation was excellent and she had a solid command of the structure of French. She was somewhat hesitant in new language situations, but she more than made up for this through diligent and profitable laboratory and home preparation.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: /s/ W. RAY RACKLEY
Chief Instructor

26 July 1962
Date

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF TRAINING AT NON-CIA FACILITY
(Forward original and 2)

DATE:

TO: Director of Training
ATTN: Registrar
THRU: Training Officer, SR Division

FROM: J. G. Richardson
CSR 6 (DD/P)
5218
I-5098

1. INSTITUTION ATTENDED: Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

2. DATES OF TRAINING: 10-16 June 1962

3. DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAM (Include list of courses and a copy of grades received)

Technical Writers' Institute; certificate awarded

Purpose: to provide a forum where technical writers from industry and government can meet to discuss and practice writing techniques under the supervision of experienced teachers. Many of the instructors have worked closely with industry as consultants on special writing problems and trainin courses for technical writing. All of them have published in the field of technical writing.

4. YOUR OPINION OF THE PROGRAM (Explain strengths and weaknesses)

This was an excellent combination of classroom presentations and writing laboratories. Almost all guest speakers had a useful message to deliver. The writing encouraged is of the tight-language, pure English variety, in the three categories of informative, directive, and persuasive writing. The schedule was full, although I believe it could have been fuller. The five 2-hour workshops should be expanded to three-hour sessions. The contact with representatives of industry was especially useful for cross-fertilization purposes.

5. EXPLAIN TRAINING OBJECTIVES AND WHETHER THEY WERE MET

Four our purposes, the training objectives were (a) to see that our writing techniques in the reporting field compare favorably with those in industry, (b) to meet and become known by persons throughout the nation in the technical writing field, and (c) to learn new techniques in the field of communicating technical, scientific and engineering concepts, processes, and general information. All three objectives were met. I recommend that officers from SR/Reports and SR/Requirements-Targets, as well as analysts from SR 6, be permitted the opportunity to attend this same institute in future years. It is well worth the effort.

6. I CERTIFY THAT I ATTENDED THE TRAINING PROGRAM DESCRIBED ABOVE.

18 JUN ...

J. G. R...
Jacques G. Richardson (SIGNATURE)

NOTE: The original will be forwarded to the Office of Personnel for inclusion in your official f... er, 2 copies will be for OTR us...

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO. (1-6)	2. I.D. NO.
[illegible]	[illegible]

3. NAME (7-24) LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE	4. OFFICE OR DIVISION	5. LANGUAGE	6. LANG. CODE (25-27)
[illegible], Jacques G.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

7. DATE OF TEST 46-51	8. ANNIVERSARY DATE	9. GRADE	10. DATE OF BIRTH
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Jan. 20, 19[illegible]

11. REASON FOR TAKING TEST
- APPLY FOR AWARD
- ESTABLISH SKILL LEVEL

12. TEST SCORES

READING (34)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)
I	I	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

13. ELIGIBILITY (39)
- A
- X M
- NA

14. TYPE OF AWARD

ACHIEVEMENT (A) / MAINTENANCE (M)	ELEMENTARY (E) / INTERMEDIATE (I) / HIGH (H)	READING (R) SPEAKING (S) COMPREHENSIVE (C)	BASED ON TRAINING THAT WAS DIRECTED (D) OR VOLUNTARY (V)
[illegible]	[illegible]		

15. INELIGIBLE (REASON)

16. I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR A PROFICIENCY AWARD OF $ [illegible] (40-45)
SIGNATURE
DATE

17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE
OBLIGATION REF. NO.
CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.
SIGNATURE

REMARKS
*3 yrs. Main. (2 yrs. & old scale, 1 yr. & new scale)

FORM 5-60 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(10-45)

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO. (1-6)	2. I.D. NO.
[illegible]	[illegible]

3. NAME (7-24) LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE	4. OFFICE OR DIVISION	5. LANGUAGE	6. LANG. CODE (25-27)
Richardson, Jacques G.	[illegible]	Japanese	[illegible]

7. DATE OF TEST 46-51	8. ANNIVERSARY DATE	9. GRADE	10. DATE OF BIRTH
Dec. [illegible], 1960	Aug. 6, 19[illegible]	14	Jan. 20, 19[illegible]

11. REASON FOR TAKING TEST
- APPLY FOR AWARD
- ESTABLISH SKILL LEVEL

12. TEST SCORES

READING (34)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)
-	-	I	I	[illegible]

13. ELIGIBILITY (39)
- A
- XX M
- NA

14. TYPE OF AWARD

ACHIEVEMENT (A) / MAINTENANCE (M)	ELEMENTARY (E) / INTERMEDIATE (I) / HIGH (H)	READING (R) SPEAKING (S) COMPREHENSIVE (C)	BASED ON TRAINING THAT WAS DIRECTED (D) OR VOLUNTARY (V)
[illegible]	I	[illegible]	

15. INELIGIBLE (REASON)

16. I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR A PROFICIENCY AWARD OF $ [illegible] (40-45)
SIGNATURE
DATE

17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE
OBLIGATION REF. NO.
CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.
SIGNATURE

REMARKS
*3 yrs. Main. (2 yrs. & old scale, 1 yr. & new scale)

FORM 5-60 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(10-45)

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CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

TRAINING REPORT

MANAGEMENT COURSE NO. 64

40 hours, part-time | 18 students

Student: Jacques Richardson | Year of birth: 1924

EOD Date: September 1956 | Grade: 14 | Office: SR

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS

The Management Course is designed to familiarize senior line and staff managers with both the theory and the practical problems of management in CIA. The underlying assumption of the course is that management development is a process of growth on the job. The course, however, enables the participants to examine their job activities in an environment where, guided by the instructors, they can critically examine their own actions, exchange ideas with managers from other components, and develop an understanding of the complex relationships that exist among the people, the pattern of organization, and the purposes of the Agency. The course approaches the problems of management in the Agency by discussing the formal and informal structures, concepts of leadership and communication, the problems of personnel management, and theories of planning and controlling. These subjects are related as closely as possible to the activities of the class members.

The content of the course is developed through lectures, case and group discussions, filmed presentations, and problem-solving exercises.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance only. No attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: [signature] Chief Instructor | 20 February 1961 Date

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

Clandestine Services Review No. 31
60 hours, full-time 28 November - 9 December 1960 43 students

Student: **Jacques G. Richardson** Year of birth: **1924**

EOD Date: **November 1949** Grade: **GS-14** Office: **DDP/SR/6**

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS

This course aims to develop in the Clandestine Services officers, and others, recently returned from the field an up-to-date awareness of the role of CIA in the United States intelligence community, the relations of the DD/I area with the CS and the support available from the offices of the DD/S. Recently this course has been designated as an alternate prerequisite for CIA officers nominated for certain external training.

The course is presented by lectures given by CIA officials who are directly responsible for the missions, functions, programs, and services discussed. Each lecture is usually followed by a short question period. Approximately 10 per cent of the students' time is scheduled for reading pertinent up-to-date regulations and background summaries.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance only; no attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in the course. This student was conscientious and regular in attendance.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: [signature] Chief Instructor — 21 December 1960 Date

S-E-C-R-E-T

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TSS EVALUATION

NAME RICHARDSON, James O. Div. SR/5

SUBJECT Flaps & Seals - Basic Familiarization

DATES TRAINED FROM 2 TO 3 December 1954

EVALUATION:

Did good work. Appears to have a good understanding of the basic principles involved. His attitude inclass reflected his interest in the work.

Note: This course is only for familiarization. It does not qualify student to engage in the opening of mail.

[signature]

Please return three copies of this form to TSS/TD.

Distribution:
1 - TLO
1 - OTR/Registrar
1 - TSS/TD files

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TSS EVALUATION

NAME Jack Richardson Div. SR

SUBJECT Audio

DATES TRAINED FROM 29 Nov. 1954 TO 3 Dec. 1954

EVALUATION: Although lacking a background in electronics, Mr. Richardson was able to grasp the instructions given and correctly interpret it. I feel that Mr. Richardson would be able to correctly evaluate audio opportunities and to equip and direct such an operation with the exception of the telephone tap. Mr. Richardson is not qualified to perform maintenance on the equipment.

CARL S. MCCREFIELD

Please return three copies of this form to TSS/TD.

Distribution:
1 - TLO
1 - OTR/Registrar
1 - TSS/TD files

SECRET

CSR/AD
T.A. Parrott
O. de Silva
J. Smith
April 15. 1954

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING EVALUATION

Counterespionage Course No. 20

RICHARDSON, Jacques G.	Male	4-22 January 1954
Name	Sex	Dates of Course

20 Jan. 1924	10 June 1949	GS-13	DD/P/SR-5 /FE/
Date of Birth	EOD	Grade or Rank	Office

Chief of geographic branch.
Projected Assignment or Present Position

The Counterespionage Course is a specialized course of three weeks' duration designed to expose the student to CE principles and practices and to indoctrinate him therein. The course is conducted on a seminar, round-table basis. Emphasis is placed on student participation during staff and guest lectures. Ample time is allotted for reading the extensive material provided.

Each student is required, starting mid-way in the second week, to give a presentation before the class. This hour-long presentation is based on a problem assignment given the student by the staff. Exception is made where students have the field or headquarters experience in CE or a related field; such a student is permitted to give a one-hour lecture based on specific experience. The "canned" problems are selected to test students' ability to do CE research, collate, make logical analyses, and present ideas effectively to a seminar group.

This evaluation is based primarily on the student presentation, and to a lesser degree on participation in seminar discussions when conducted by the staff.

S-E-C-R-E-T

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RICHARDSON, Jacques G.

1. Mr. Richardson ranked first in a strong group. He applied himself effectively throughout the course. His seminar contributions aided materially. He drew freely on a sound operational background and was by all odds the top student.

2. Student Presentation: Mr. Richardson presented a case with which he was familiar from his own experience. It was a first-rate performance. The material was very well organized and crisply presented. So effective in fact, that Mr. Richardson will be called upon to give the same discussion in subsequent CE courses.

3. In my opinion Mr. Richardson is fully qualified to act as senior CE officer.

Chief Instructor, CE Course

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

TRAINING EVALUATION

1. The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it. Although he may within his discretion show it to other members of his staff, the report should never be shown to the student whom it concerns.

2. The report summarizes the findings, observations, and opinions of the various instructors during the course listed only, with no reference to other facts or findings about the student. More complete data is available in the files of the Training Division and may be examined after contacting the Records and Scheduling Officer.

STUDENT'S NAME: RICHARDSON [redacted]

DATE OF REPORT: 2 May 1950

TRAINING COURSE: Advanced Operations V

DIVISION: OPC/FBD GRADE: GS-7

TRAINING PERIOD: 27 March - 21 April 1950

PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT: Ass't Pol. Warfare Officer.

1. PERFORMANCE RECORD. The following grades show the achievement of the student in class problems and examinations. The total possible score is broken down to indicate the relative weighting of various factors. The overall adjectival rating is based on the following scale: 0 to 59% Unsatisfactory; 60 to 79% Satisfactory; 80 to 89% Excellent; 90 to 100% Superior.

			Possible Score	Achieved Score
FACTS	(1)	Comprehension of mission of OSO	(40)	30
	(2)	Comprehension of mission of OPC	(40)	30
	(3)	Comprehension of operational procedures	(25)	16
	(4)	Comprehension of operational policy	(25)	16
	(5)	USSR and Communism (clandestine aspects)	(20)	15
SKILLS	(6)	Evaluation of operational data	(30)	24
	(7)	Operational planning	(30)	24
	(8)	Operational mechanics	(30)	23
	(9)	Personality analysis	(30)	21
	(10)	Personality manipulation	(30)	16
		TOTAL	(300)	215

Overall adjectival rating . . . . . . Satisfactory (72%)

2. TRAIT CHARACTERISTICS RECORD. The following indicates the various personality traits as observed by the instructors during the training period. The observations include the student's participation and conduct in training as well as his reactions to various problems and situations. A scale of 0 to 10 is used, 0 indicating that the trait has not been observed, the lower numbers indicating below average, and the higher indicating above average.

		Rating
(1)	Ability to get along and work with people	5
(2)	Ability to grasp instructions	6
(3)	Enthusiasm and interest in work	6
(4)	Industriousness	7
(5)	Practical intelligence	5
(6)	Astuteness	5
(7)	Adaptability	5
(8)	Effectiveness	5
(9)	Stability	5
(10)	Initiative	5
(11)	Imagination	5
(12)	Ability to handle and direct people	4

3. COMMENT. (To be used only in cases of outstanding strengths or weaknesses)

[signature]
CHIEF INSTRUCTOR

APPROVED: ______________
CHIEF, STS

REVIEWED: ______________
CHIEF, TRD

Dist: COS
COP
CAU
Files

FORM NO. 51-38
JAN 1950

SECRET

SECRET

TRAINING EVALUATION

1. The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it. Although he may, within his discretion, show it to other members of his staff, the report should never be shown to the student whom it concerns.

2. The report summarizes the findings, observations and opinions of the various instructors during the course listed only, with no reference to other facts or findings about the student. More complete data is available in the files of the Training Division and may be examined after contacting the Records and Scheduling Officer.

STUDENT'S NAME: Richardson

DATE OF REPORT: 10 April 1950

TRAINING COURSE: Operations

DIVISION: OPC/FBD GRADE: 7

TRAINING PERIOD: 20 February - 17 March 1950

PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT: Ass't Pol. Warfare Officer

1. PERFORMANCE RECORD. The following grades show the achievement of the student in class problems and examinations. The total possible score is broken down to indicate the relative weighting of various factors. The overall adjectival rating is based on the following scale: 0 to 59% Unsatisfactory; 60 to 79% Satisfactory; 80 to 89% Excellent; 90 to 100% Superior.

	Possible Score	Achieved Score
(1) Comprehension of basic principles of clandestine operations	(40)	28
(2) Use of tradecraft (ability to apply principles of clandestine operations)	(50)	32
(3) Ability to evaluate operational data	(20)	15
(4) Ability to use operational data	(20)	14
(5) Planning	(30)	19
(6) Personality analysis	(20)	17
(7) Personality manipulation	(50)	42
(8) Adaptability to operational emergencies	(30)	21
(9) Attention to detail	(20)	14
(10) Organization and presentation of written operational material	(20)	16
TOTAL	(300)	218

Overall adjectival rating: Satisfactory (73%)

2. TRAIT CHARACTERISTICS RECORD. The following indicates the various personality traits as observed by the instructors during the training period. The observations include the student's participation and conduct in training as well as his reactions to various problems and situations. A scale of 0 to 10 is used, 0 indicating that the trait was not been observed, the lower numbers indicating below average, and the higher indicating above average.

	Rating
(1) Ability to get along and work with people	7
(2) Ability to grasp instructions	6
(3) Enthusiasm and interest in work	6
(4) Industriousness	5
(5) Practical intelligence	6
(6) Astuteness	5
(7) Adaptability	6
(8) Effectiveness	6
(9) Stability	6
(10) Initiative	5
(11) Imagination	6
(12) Ability to handle and direct people	7

3. COMMENTS. (To be used only in cases of outstanding strengths or weaknesses)

____
CHIEF INSTRUCTOR

APPROVED. _______________
Chief, STS

REVIEWED. _______________
Chief, TRD

FORM NO. 51-66
JAN 1950

SECRET

SECRET

TRAINING EVALUATION

1. The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it. Although he may within his discretion show it to other members of his staff, the report should never be shown to the student whom it concerns.

2. The report summarizes the findings, observations, and opinions of the various instructors during the course listed only, with no reference to other facts or findings about the student. More complete data is available in the files of the Training Division and may be examined after contacting the Records and Scheduling Officer.

STUDENT'S NAME: RICHARDSON [redacted]

DATE OF REPORT: 10 February 1950

TRAINING COURSE: Staff Orientation V

DIVISION: OPC/FBD GRADE: GS-7

TRAINING PERIOD: 9 January - 3 February 1950

PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT: Assistant Political Warfare Officer

1. PERFORMANCE RECORD. The following grades show the achievement of the student in class problems and examinations. The total possible score is broken down to indicate the relative weighting of various factors. The overall adjectival rating is based on the following scale: 0 to 59% Unsatisfactory; 60 to 79% Satisfactory; 80 to 89% Excellent; 90 to 100% Superior.

	Problems	Possible Score	Achieved Score
(1)	Reporting of Information	(30)	20
(2)	Message Writing	(5)	4
(3)	Interviews: Procurement of Information	(25)	14
(4)	Interviews: Personality Handling	(25)	16
(5)	Mapping and Sketching	(30)	26
(6)	Observation and Description	(30)	25
	Objective Tests		
(7)	Intelligence Tools and Objectives	(25)	18
(8)	Reporting Mechanics	(20)	15
(9)	CIA Security Regulations	(10)	9
(10)	USSR and Communism	(50)	31
	TOTAL	(250)	178

Overall adjectival rating .... Satisfactory

2. TRAIT CHARACTERISTICS RECORD. The following indicates the various personality traits as observed by the instructors during the training period. The observations include the student's participation and conduct in training as well as his reactions to various problems and situations. A scale of 0 to 10 is used, 0 indicating that the trait was not been observed, the lower numbers indicating below average, the higher indicating above average.

	Trait	Rating
(1)	Ability to get along and work with people	6
(2)	Ability to grasp instructions	5
(3)	Enthusiasm and interest in work	7
(4)	Industriousness	7
(5)	Practical intelligence	7
(6)	Astuteness	7
(7)	Adaptability	5
(8)	Effectiveness	7
(9)	Stability	8
(10)	Initiative	6
(11)	Imagination	0
(12)	Ability to handle and direct people	6

3. COMMENT. (To be used only in cases of outstanding strengths and weaknesses.)

R B Shaffer
CHIEF INSTRUCTOR

APPROVED. John Gray
CHIEF, STB

REVIEWED. W K Peers
CHIEF, TRD

FORM NO. 51-67
JAN 1950

SECRET

AMENDMENT TO ALLOWANCE COMMITTEE ADDENDUM
For Staff Agent, (Thomas B. CASASIN)

Mr. Thomas B. Casasin

Dear Mr. Casasin:

Effective 25 May 1970, your current Allowance Committee Addendum, as amended, is further amended by substituting the following for sub-paragraph (B) entitled "Other Allowance Entitlements":

(B) One-Time Payment. You are herein authorized a one-time, non-taxable Agency payment of $235 in lieu of your entitlement to reimbursement for the round-trip educational travel of your daughter from Paris to Norton, Massachusetts, and return to Paris. Payment of this amount will be by deposit to your bank account. This payment and the fixed allowances as set out in sub-paragraph (A) above are in lieu of your Agency overseas allowance entitlements except that upon your return to a domestic permanent post of assignment you will be entitled to a home service transfer allowance in conformance with applicable Agency regulations.

All other provisions of your Allowance Addendum, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

____
Allowance Committee

14-00000

SECRET

ADDENDUM TO STAFF AGENT SUPPLEMENT
For Thomas B. CASASIN, Effective 5 August 1962

Mr. Thomas B. Casasin

Dear Mr. Casasin:

The Agency Allowance Committee is authorized to modify the entitlements of a Staff Agent for cover, operational or security reasons. Based upon that authority, on 7 June 1966, the Committee made the following determinations which will apply to your Agency overseas assignment in Paris, France under non-official cover. These determinations supersede and modify any provisions of your present Staff Agent Supplement which conflict therewith:

(a) Fixed Allowance. Effective the day of your return to Paris you are herein authorized a non-accountable, non-taxable fixed allowance calculated at the rate of $7,580 for the following year, i.e., for a one year period. If required, advances may be granted by an Agency authorizing official. This fixed allowance is in lieu of your Agency overseas allowance entitlements except that upon your return to a domestic permanent post of assignment you will be entitled to a home service transfer allowance in conformance with applicable Agency regulations. Agency fixed allowances are also in lieu of entitlements to (1) reimbursement for the overseas operational use of your POV and common carriers in and around Paris and (2) storage of your HHE. Quarters will not be furnished you by the Government or by your cover facility during the period covered by these fixed allowances.

(b) Exemption from Offset. During this one year period of your overseas assignment, you are herein authorized to retain, without offset, the housing and cost-of-living allowances of your cover facility.

(c) Requirement of Certification. You agree to certify, when requested, that payments made to you as set forth herein have been expended for the purpose for which made and have not accrued to your personal advantage or enrichment. You will repay any amount for which you cannot provide such a certification. You understand that you are not required to make financial accountings for amounts received under (a) above.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ________________________

APPROVED:

____
Allowance Committee

ACKNOWLEDGED:

____
Thomas B. Casasin

Supplement to Staff Agent Personnel Action

For Thomas B. Casasin Effective 5 AUG 1972

Mr. Thomas B. Casasin

Dear Mr. Casasin,

In view of your contemplated cover assignment, you have been designated a Staff Agent. The purpose of this Supplement is to call your attention to exisiting policies which are particularly material to you while you are so designated and to set forth certain rights and obligations incident to your status as an appointed employee.

1. Payroll Administration. As indicated in your Staff Agent Personnel Action, your present salary and grade are $13,510 and GS-11/6, respectively, and you are entitled to receive the salary, allowances and other benefits applicable thereto, however, certain procedural variations will be followed to preserve the security of your cover position.

(a) The gross emoluments that you receive from your cover activities will be retained by you as an offset against the gross emoluments due you from this organization. If, except as provided in paragraph 4 below, your cover emoluments ever exceed those due you as a Staff Agent, the overage is to be remitted to this organization on a monthly basis, unless a different period is specified.

(b) Your Federal income taxes will be withheld and reported in conformance with HR 20-33 or any subsequent regulations or procedures promulgated by this organization. For your information, this organization shall withhold from the gross payments due you Federal income taxes in an amount which, when added to the income taxes withheld by your cover facility, will equal the tax withholdings normally made from your gross taxable compensation with this organization. If there is no differential or if it is insufficient, you will be required to make tax remittances in conformance with HB 20-661-1. Also, that issuance together with R 30-720 covers the procedures to be followed in order to receive reimbursement for foreign income taxes imposed upon you.

(c) This organization will deduct from the gross payments due you an amount equivalent to six and one half per cent (6 1/2%) of your gross salary for contribution to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. This amount will be deducted from the differential due you by this organization. If there is no differential or if it is insufficient, you will be required to make direct remittance to this organization in satisfaction of the required contributions.

(d) If permanent quarters are not furnished, your quarters allowance will be granted at the maximum rate established for your post of assignment, family status and grade. No accounting for this allowance will be required.

If your position requires that you make contribution to the Social Security Fund, such contributions will be at your expense. However, involuntary contributions for cover facility programs, such as insurance and retirement, may be considered items of expense to this organization, and in

such case any monies you receive as a result of your participation in such programs must be returned to this organization. Whether participation in a particular cover facility program is involuntary will be determined by this organization.

2. Nonofficial Cover Premium Pay. You are hereby authorized Nonofficial Cover Premium Pay in conformance with applicable organizational issuances. For your information currently this premium pay is ten per cent of your base salary, represents additional taxable compensation to you and is applicable for that period of time you are assigned under non-official cover.

3. Equalization Allowance. You are hereby authorized an equalization allowance in accordance with applicable organization issuances.

4. Travel Expenses. You will be entitled to travel, transportation and storage in conformance with the regulations of this organization. HR 20-2c provides that travel expenses of integrated personnel will be allowed in accordance with the regulations of their cover organizations or HR 22, whichever allows the greater amount.

5. Travel Penalties. You herein agree that your assignment abroad will be for a minimum of ________________ from the date of your arrival at your permanent post of duty, unless such assignment shall be sooner terminated by the Government for its convenience. Your violation of such agreement may result in regulatory travel penalties. HR 22-6 provides that if the agreement is violated during the first year of duty abroad, expenditures for travel and transportation to the post, including per diem while at headquarters and storage of effects, shall be reimbursed by the employee. If the agreement is violated after the first year of duty, but before the completion of the minimum tour agreed to above, return travel at Government expense shall not be allowed.

AGREED: ____________________

6. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this Supplement and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ____________________________
Personnel Officer

14-00000

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

CASE OFFICER: [illegible] | DIVISION: SR

INSTRUCTIONS: Use R 20-1000 and HR 20-1002-1 for guidance. Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and TWO copies [illegible]

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: For Contract Info | DATE: 9 July 19[illegible]

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME (PSEUDO / TRUE)	2A. PROJECT	3. ALLOTMENT NO.	4. SLOT NO.
XX Pseudo — Thomas B. CASASIN	NA	325-[illegible]-1000	2[illegible]
	2B. PERMANENT STATION: Paris, France	3A. FUNDS: X	

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES: James H. Kamicott (P), John F. Reynolds, John R. Williams, John F. Martin (A)

6. INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY PRIOR TO THIS CONTRACT. [X] YES [ ] NO (If yes, describe and include dates and salary.) Staff Employee since 1959

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date): SI

7A. MEDICAL CLEARANCE: [XX] OBTAINED [ ] INITIATED [ ] NOT REQ'D.

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" [XX] YES [ ] NO

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT [X] YES [ ] NO

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): Staff Agent

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.

12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN [ ] YES [ ] NO

13. AGE: 38

14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): January 20, 1924

15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Alexandria, Virginia

16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Alexandria, Virginia

17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate): [XX] SINGLE [ ] MARRIED [ ] WIDOWED [ ] ANNULLED [ ] SEPARATED [ ] DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:
Three - Wife, age 34
Daughter, age 8
Daughter, Age 11

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY. [ ] YES [XX] NO RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE: NA

21. VETERAN: Yes

22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat)

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: U. S. Army

24. RANK OR GRADE

25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE [ ] YES [XX] NO

26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA: NA [ ] YES [ ] NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY / 28. POST DIFFERENTIAL: Pay entitlements equating to GS-14 (step 5) including premium pay

29. COVER (Breakdown, if any)

30. FEDERAL TAX WITHHOLDING: COVER [X] YES [ ] NO; CIA [X] YES [ ] NO

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS / 32. POST: In accordance with regulations

33. OTHER

34. COVER (Breakdown, if any)

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES: [XX] PCS [ ] DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL [ ] FOREIGN OPERATIONAL

36. WITH DEPENDENTS: [XX] YES [ ] NO

37. HHE TO BE SHIPPED: [XX] YES [ ] NO

37A. HHE TO BE STORED: [XX] YES [ ] NO

38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED: [XXX] YES [ ] NO

39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL: [XX] YES [ ] NO

40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH
Wife, U. S. Citizen, age 34, DOB 13 June 1928
Daughter, U. S. Citizen, age 8, DOB 5 September 1953
Daughter, U. S. Citizen, age 11, DOB September 1950

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH [XX] CIA REGULATIONS [X] COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION: As authorized

43. ENTERTAINMENT: As authorized

44. OTHER: As authorized

45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH [X] CIA REGULATIONS [ ] COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.

CASE OFFICER: [illegible] | DIVISION: [illegible]
TELEPHONE EXTENSION: For contract data call [illegible] | DATE: 9 July 1962

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS (See R 20-615, R 20-620, R 20-670, R 20-1000, and HB 20-620-1, HB 20-1000-1 and/or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel.)

All Staff Employee benefits

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check): PROPOSED ☐ ESTABLISHED ☒

48. TYPE (Check): PROPRIETARY ☐ SUBSIDIZED ☐ CULTURAL ☐ EDUCATIONAL ☐ COMMERCIAL ☒ MILITARY ☐ TRANSIT ☐ OTHER ☐

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS
NA ☒ YES ☐ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)
☒ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☐ NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION: DAYS | MONTHS | YEARS
52. EFFECTIVE DATE
53. RENEWABLE: ☒ YES ☐ NO
54. TERMINATION NOTICE (Number of days)
55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION: ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION (CI, FI, PP, other)

FI and CA

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Handling and supervision of field agents already recruited.
Spotting, assessment and development of agent candidates or projects.
Recruitment of agent candidates outside France when necessary.
Clandestine support of own and other station operations.

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Photographic equipment salesman
Newspaper assistant ~~XXXXX~~ editor
Assistant to planning division of housing authority of a major city
Operations Officer for past 12 years

59. EDUCATION (Check Highest Level Attained)

☐ GRADE SCHOOL	☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐ TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE			
☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE				
☐ COLLEGE (No degree)	☒ COLLEGE DEGREE	☐ POST GRADUATE	☐ MA	☐ PHD	

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY (Check Appropriate Degree Competency)

LANGUAGE	SPEAK FLUENT	SPEAK AVERAGE	SPEAK POOR	WRITE FLUENT	WRITE AVERAGE	WRITE POOR	READ FLUENT	READ AVERAGE	READ POOR
French		X			X			X	
Japanese		X				X		X	
Spanish									X

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: USA

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

Canada, Japan, Western Europe thru residence, study and travel

SECTION XV — EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CIA

63. GIVE INCLUSIVE DATES, POSITION TITLE OR TYPE WORK, SALARY AND REASON FOR LEAVING

Newspaper assistant editor - $2,100
Assistant to planning division of housing authority $3,100

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (Use other side if necessary)

☐ OVER

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OPERATING OFFICIAL	DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER
	JOHN [illegible]		[illegible]

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 3 April 1968

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): RICHARDSON, Jacques G. (Dependents)

3. POSITION TITLE: Staff Agent

4. GRADE: GS-15

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/EUR

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 6913

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

- [ ] PRE-EMPLOYMENT
- [ ] ENTRANCE ON DUTY
- [ ] TDY STANDBY
- [ ] SPECIAL TRAINING
- [ ] ANNUAL
- [ ] RETURN TO DUTY
- [ ] FITNESS FOR DUTY
- [ ] MEDICAL RETIREMENT
- [ ] HDQS/TDY
- [XXX] OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT Home leave & return to Station
  - ETD: October 1967
  - STATION: Paris, France
  - TDY OR PCS: PCS
  - TYPE OF COVER: Non-official
  - NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY: three
  - NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 93) ATTACHED: 3
- [ ] RETURN FROM OVERSEAS
  - ETA:
  - STATION:
  - NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

- [XXX] YES
- [ ] NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: George W. Owens E/PERS

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 4-D-01

EXT.: 6913

10. COMMENTS

Medical statements from a private physician is attached.

MEDICALLY QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED OS PCS

SPERRY PRESTON

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE: 69 21 74

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (20)

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, European Division

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Paris

SUBJECT: Admin/Personnel/Medical
Dependents of Thomas B. CASASIN — Staff Agent

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: OFPS-10932

CASASIN's dependents took physical examinations at the American Hospital in Paris on 20 February. Since, because of his cover there could be no LNHARP connection, CASASIN's dependents made arrangements for their physicals as private citizens, on the pretense that they required statements that they were in good health in order to obtain insurance. Obviously, forms 88 were not prepared; the attached certificates of good health and freedom from contagious disease are all that is normally given to private individuals in France. We hope they suffice.

DENISE H. ZEHNGRAFF

Attachment - U/S/C via TNP
As Stated Above

Distribution:
3-Chief, Eur-Div w/att usc-tnp

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OFPT-13339	11 March 1968
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

Chief of Station, Paris

Chief, EUR
Administrative/Personnel/Medical
Dependents of Thomas B. CASASIN

The Office of Medical Services has advised that Thomas B. CASASIN's dependents did not take physical examinations prior to their PCS return to Paris. So that CASASIN's dependents may be fully covered under the Overseas Medical Program, it is essential that arrangements be made for their physicals to be taken in the field and the results forwarded to Headquarters as soon as possible.

Daniel J. LHURIGAN

DISTRIBUTION:
3-COS, Paris

20 OCT 1967

OFPS- 10932

SECRET

1-E/REG
1-E/PERS
1-OMS
1-E/F

E/Pers GWOWENS mm 6913

OMS

C/E/F

14-00000



SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (until filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP SER NO	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	3. SEX	4. DATE OF BIRTH	5. SCHEDULE/GRADE/STEP
006102	CASASIN THOMAS B (P)	M	01/20/24	GS-15-06

6. SD	7. POSITION TITLE	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT	9. LOCATION (Country, City)
D	OPS OFFICER	WE	PARIS, FRANCE

SECTION II — AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
JAPAN	TDY-60	50/07/01	50/09/01
US PACIFIC POSSESSIONS	TDY-60	52/07/01	52/10/01
ASIA AREA	TDY-60	53/06/01	53/07/01
JAPAN	PCS-VV	55/02/17	60/06/24

SECTION III — EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
BACH	LINGUISTICS, GENERAL	MICH UNIV	45

FORM 1-67 444J (4-51)

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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(When Filled In)

Complete in duplicate. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. The original of this form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
RICHARDSON,	JACQUES	G.	042-20-5339

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY APPOINTED	LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad)
ESSEX, MARYLAND	ALEXANDRIA, VA.
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE	**HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE**
ALEXANDRIA, VA.	ALEXANDRIA, VA

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

SINGLE	MARRIED	SEPARATED	DIVORCED	WIDOWED	ANNULLED
	✓				

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE	DATE OF MARRIAGE
ALEXANDRIA, VA.	25 JUN 49
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE	**DATE OF DECREE**
—	—
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED	**DATE SPOUSE DIED**
—	—

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)
—

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	TELEPHONE NO.	
HARRIETTE D.	312 LAMOND PL, ALEX, VA.	KI 9 1037	
NAMES OF CHILDREN	**ADDRESS**	**SEX**	**DATE OF BIRTH**
PAMELA A.	SAME	F	19 SEP 50
MICHELLE D.	"	F	5 SEP 53
NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian)	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NO.**	
JOHN B. RICHARDSON	2748 WYMAN PKY, BALTO, MD	PE 5-5240	
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian)	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NO.**	
DECEASED			

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY. NONE

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (~~Mr., Mrs., Miss~~) (Last-First-Middle)	RELATIONSHIP
THEODORE G. DRISCOLL	MOTHER-IN-LAW
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	**HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER**
722 S. ROYAL ST, ALEX, VA.	TE 6-8506
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE	**BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION**
WHARTON-POTTER, N. FAIRFAX ST, ALEX., VA.	KI 9-4330

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.)	YES	
CONOVER-MAST PUBL'NS INC. 205 E. 42 ST, NEW YORK 17, N.Y.	NO	✓
IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.)	YES	✓
	NO	
DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.)	YES	
	NO	✓

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. If such notification is not desirable because of health or other reasons, please so state in item 6 on the reverse side of this form.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

CLARENDON TRUST CO., ARLINGTON 10, VA.
JACQUES G. RICHARDSON } JOINT
HARRIETTE D. RICHARDSON

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☐ YES ☑ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?
☑ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☑ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)
WIFE HAS IN POSSESSION

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
Washington, D.C.	31 July 62	Jacques G. Richardson

CONFIDENTIAL

 SEPARATE COVER ATT:

BIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET

NAME: RICHARDSON, Jacques Gabriel DOB: 20 January 1924

GRADE: GS-14 Date of Grade 16 January 1955

MARITAL STATUS: Married DEPENDENTS: Wife
Daug - age 11
Daug - age 8

CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

EDUCATION:

1940-42	Sir George Williams College, Canada - French
1942	Trinity College, Conn. - French (½ year)
1945	Univ of Michigan - BA (1947), Oriental Civilization, Japanese
1951-52	Georgetown Univ. - International Relations

PRIOR ORGANIZATIONAL EMPLOYMENT:

1940-41	Jacoby Photographers, Montreal, Canada - Photo Tech (part-time).
1941-42	T. Eaton Co., Ltd (dept store), Montreal, Canada - Salesman (part-time).
1943-48	Military Service, U. S. Army, 1st Lt.(1946-48, G-2 Japan).
1949	Guide Publishing Co., Baltimore, Md., County Editor of weekly newspaper (4 months).
1949	Housing Authority of Baltimore City, Md., - Planning Admin. officer (6 months).
1955-56	Seikei Univ., Tokyo, Japan - Current Affairs English Seminar Leader (part-time).

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY:

French - Reading and Writing - Elementary; Speaking - Native (Oct 1960).
Japanese - Reading andSpeaking - Elementary; Writing - Intermediate.

MILITARY RESERVE STATUS: NONE

ORGANIZATIONAL TRAINING:

1950	Basic Intel	1954	Counterespionage
1950	Staff Orient	1954	Audio Surv Mgmt
1950	Ops	1954	Ops Audio Surv Eq
1950	Adv Ops	1954	Flaps and Seals
1950	Intel Orient	1960	Intel Rptg Tech
1950	Ops Famil	1960	Cland Serv Review
1950	UTGA	1961	Mgmt Course
1951	Documentation	1961	IBM Program. Orient. Course

 SEPARATE COVER ATT:

BIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET

RICHARDSON, Jacques Gabriel

ORGANIZATIONAL EMPLOYMENT:

Nov 1949	I.O., GS-7, OPC/OPS St/FBD Area III, Hqs
Oct 1950	I.O., GS-9, OPC/FE-3/Ch, Soviet Desk, Hqs
Apr 1951	I.O., GS-11, OPC/FE/Dep Ch, FE-3, Hqs
Jan 1952	Ops Off, GS-12, OSO/SR/Dep Ch, SR-5, Hqs
	June - Oct 1952, TDY Hawaii, Alaska & Pearl Harbor
	June - Jul 1953, TDY Japan and Korea
Jul 1953	I.O., GS-13, KUDOVE/SR/Ch, SR-5, Hqs
Jan 1954	Area Ops Off, GS-13, KUDOVE/SR/COPs/Ch, Spec Def Rec Proj, Hqs
Feb 1955	Area Ops Off, GS-14, KUDOVE/SR/FE/Japan/Ch, USSR Base, Tokyo
	Oct - Nov 1955, TDY Hong Kong, Thailand, Malaya and Burma
Mar 1956	Area Ops Off, GS-14, KUDOVE/SR/Tokyo Sta/Dep Ch, Sov Br, Tokyo
	Nov - Dec 1956, TDY Hong Kong and Australia
Oct 1957	Area Ops Off, GS-14, KUDOVE/SR/Tokyo Sta/Ch, Ops Br, Tokyo
Oct 1960	Ops Off, GS-14, KUDOVE/SR/Ch, Branch 6, Hqs

PERSONNEL EVALUATION:

Fitness Report, 10 April 1958 - 31 March 1959 "Subject continues as one of the most capable, professional and hard working of the branch chiefs in the station. Working against a tough denied area problem, he demonstrates imagination, drive, excellent area background and knowledge, and a high degree of productivity. He definitely has the potential for an even more responsible position." Fitness Report, 1 April 1959 - 24 June 1960 "In most respects, this officer is one of the best I have known in this agency. He has a broad and deep knowledge of his target area, as well as of his 'host country'; an excellent and proven degree of operational 'know-how'; the ability to write and speak lucidly and effectively and with apparent ease; and a very high degree of motivation and devotion to duty." Fitness Report, July 1960 - October 1961 "Subject supervises a very large and key branch engaged in a wide variety of activities, a difficult job which he does well."

14-00000

SR/SS

1 February 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Central Cover Group/Non-official Cover

VIA : SR/SS

SUBJECT : Cover requirements for Thomas B. CASASIN (P)

1. Information keyed to your format "Nonofficial Cover Request for Individual" is transmitted herewith.

2. SR would like to have a durable, permanent cover established for Thomas B. CASASIN as quickly as possible. CASASIN is presently a staff employee in Headquarters. He will be available to develop and undertake cover preparations as soon as Cover Group has completed the necessary arrangements.

3. It will be convenient for CASASIN to discuss cover plans and preparations with you whenever you wish. Miss Ruth Paul (ext. 3839) will serve as Headquarters case officer and will be pleased to provide any supplementary information you may require.

John Gerry
Chief, SR/2

Attachment:
As stated in Para 1, 2 cy

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO. (1-6)			2. ID NO.
[illegible]			[illegible]
3. NAME (7-24) LAST FIRST MIDDLE	4. OFFICE OR DIVISION	5. LANGUAGE	6. LANG. CODE (25-27)
Richardson, Jacques G.	[illegible]	Japanese	379
7. DATE OF TEST (46-51)	8. ANNIVERSARY DATE	9. GRADE	10. DATE OF BIRTH
Mar. 5, 1960	Mar. 5, 1963	15	Jan. 20, 19[illegible]

11. REASON FOR TAKING TEST	
[illegible]	APPLY FOR AWARD
	ESTABLISH SKILL LEVEL

12. TEST SCORES				
READING (34)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)
-	-	-	I	I

13. ELIGIBILITY (39)	
	A
[illegible]	M
	NA

14. TYPE OF AWARD			
ACHIEVEMENT (A) MAINTENANCE (M)	ELEMENTARY (E) INTERMEDIATE (I) HIGH (H)	READING (R) SPEAKING (S) COMPREHENSIVE (C)	BASED ON TRAINING THAT WAS DIRECTED (D) OR VOLUNTARY (V)
M	I		

15. INELIGIBLE (REASON)

16. I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR A PROFICIENCY AWARD OF $ 100.00 (40-45)

SIGNATURE

DATE

17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REF. NO.

CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.

SIGNATURE

REMARKS

FORM 5-60 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(10-45)

TLO COPY

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mary
E/Pers.

DATE: 3 October 1967

FROM : Registrar/OMS

SUBJECT: Richardson, Jacques G.

Subject has been evaluated by OMS and found to be qualified for proposed assignment.

DONALD W. FARLEY
ASSISTANT REGISTRAR

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mary
E/Pers.

DATE: 3 October 1967

FROM : Registrar/OMS

SUBJECT: Dependents of Richardson, Jacques

No medical disposition. Dependents will be evaluated when physicals are received.

DONALD W. FARLEY
ASSISTANT REGISTRAR

14-00000

SECRET

[illegible] September 1960
File No. [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, [illegible]

ATTENTION : Security Officer

SUBJECT : [illegible]
Establishment of Official Cover Backstop

REFERENCE : Form 1322, dated 9 September 1960.

1. In compliance with above reference, official cover backstopping which utilizes the [illegible]

has been established for the above-named individual. All information concerning this cover arrangement is available in the Official Cover and Liaison Section, CCD.

2. It is requested that OCL/CCD be notified when this cover arrangement is no longer required. Any changes in the Subject's Headquarters status should be coordinated with this office for the determination of need for continued documentation and cover.

3. Subject has been issued Unit ID Card No. [illegible] for domestic use only. In accordance with arrangements made with Offices of Security and Personnel, the above documentation will be picked up by a CPB representative for any individual making a PCS move from Headquarters or an overseas TDY trip. In the case of the PCS traveler, CPB will return this documentation to OCL/CCD for disposition. For the TDY traveler, this documentation will be retained by CPB and returned to the TDY traveler upon completion of the trip. In the event of a resignation from the Agency, OCL/CCD will obtain the documentation from the employee at the time of the employee's debriefing conference.

/S/ PAUL P. STEWART

JOSEPH M. ADAMS
Chief, Official Cover & Liaison, CCD

cc: Personnel Security Division,
Office of Security

FORM 9-60 1554 SECRET (9-11)

SECRET

A. General Information

(1) Thomas B. CASASIN (P). Aliases: John F. Reynolds, John R. Williams, John F. Martin, Mr. Black, John J. Kennedy, Lt. Col. Williams, Mr. Robbins, John Raincy, Mr. Richards, Mr. Roberts. Cover development has not been previously requested.

(2) Staff employee, GS-14, Step 5; total compensation under cover should be publicly within range of current actual compensation.

(3) Employee: fully cleared; wife previously had CSA for contract work in Japan, not overtly affiliated with CIA (cover was Army). Spouse is aware of employee's status.

(4) Medical status OK

(5) Employee has had psychological assessment and technical interviews. Results presumably satisfactory.

(6) Current cover: industrial liaison officer, Army Scientific Liaison and Advisory Group. Previous cover (Nov 1954-Sep 1960): supervising foreign affairs specialist, Detachment 1, Army Property Disposal Sales Agency, APO 94, San Francisco. Earlier cover (Nov 1949-Nov 1954): editor, International Press Section, USIA, in Washington. All were backstopped.

(7) New cover can be assumed at any time.

(8) Proposed departure date overseas is roughly summer 1962, but is flexible.

(9) SR/Support and SR/COA funds will be available to support any operational expenses and financial commitments made to the cover organization.

B. Biographic Information

(1) DPOB: 20 January 1924, Baltimore, Maryland. Male, caucasian. Married, two children (girls, 8 and 11). Current address is 312 Lamond Place, Alexandria, Virginia. Previous address was 344-C 3 chome Harajuku, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo, Japan.

(2) Adult dependent to accompany is wife, who resides with employee, and on whom bio data is available in the Office of Security. Both minor daughters would accompany overseas.

(3) Education: BA, U of Michigan; graduate work in international relations at Georgetown University.

(4) Professional experience: part-time work during college years as apprentice and journeyman photo technician; part-time work as photo equipment salesman; newspaper assistant editor, about $2,100 per annum; assistant to chief, planning division of housing authority of major city, $3,100 per annum; employed since then by CIA, pay range of $3,800 to $13,250 per annum.

(5) Outside interests: photography, including own processing; writing, editing non-fiction and some fiction; gardening and do-it-yourself wood and metal working; interest in mechanics and electricity; interest in organization, management, and administrative planning; member, British Interplanetary Society; former associate member, American Astronautical Society; former member, Japan Rocket Society. Interested in sports cars and other high quality automobiles and trucks. Skiing, swimming, horseback riding, hiking, camping, alpinism.

(6) Objective personality evaluation: An exceedingly well-equipped operations officer, combining an excellent knowledge of the target area and of the base country with proven operational know-how and a mature, dynamic, self-confident personality. Has a great facility to express himself in writing and orally. Very effective in dealing with people on various levels, poised and businesslike.

(7) Financial status: almost wholly dependent upon job income. Outstanding debt is mortgage on house (about $20,500).

(8) Previous foreign residence: Canada, 5 years; Japan, 8 years. Tourism and official travel (including war service) for shorter periods to the UK, France, Belgium, The Netherlands, West Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Austria, Denmark, Japan, Korea, Okinawa, Hong Kong, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, British North Borneo, Australia, and the Philippines.

(9) Speaks French and Japanese (tested in both).

C. Security Considerations

(1) Employed by CIA 12 years and two months. Security approval is TOP SECRET dated 10 June 1949.

(2) Employee will know specifically of CIA interest.

(3) Employee has had normal staff employee access to CIA buildings.

(4) Identification of CIA connection to others: a few close friends and neighbors are aware that employee has worked for CIA since spring 1961 on detailed basis from Pentagon. Employee has been exposed to foreign intelligence services, but always under alias, and in all cases but one for short, one-time purposes. Exception: the Japanese, who know employee as John Reynolds. Turned up once in a Japanese police report as a

SECRET

possible intelligence-connected person after having been accosted by a Japanese policeman in a CIA safehouse which had evidently been compromised without Station's knowledge. Government claimed no knowledge of employee's intelligence connections. Employee has one close acquaintance in proposed area of assignment who knows of employee's true connections. Acquaintance is former staffer, discreet, and who wants to protect his own reputation and status locally.

(6) There are no other known problems bearing on security.

(7) Employee has used overseas cover designations and Headquarters' "Army Scientific Liaison and Advisory Group" and USIA for cover backstopping for non-operational purposes.

(8) After the forthcoming tour, it is hoped that the employee will be able to continue in a non-official cover capacity, or convert to the most appropriate official cover dictated by operational and administrative planning needs.

(9) This is a request for permanent cover.

(10) Theodore G. Driscoll, 722 S. Royal Street, Alexandria, Virginia. Father-in-law of employee. He is not witting of Subject's CIA employment.

(11) Insurance: WALPA and "Eisenhower" payroll-deducted insurance. Have personal policy with Massachusetts Mutual, taken out while under Army cover. Wife is beneficiary in all cases.

(12) No Selective Service or reserve status or responsibility.

D. Operational Information

(1) Type of Operation

FI-CA management of large group of agents earlier recruited by others for REDWOOD purposes, including termination of marginal assets.

Spotting, assessment, and reporting potential new recruits.

Recruitment of agent-candidates outside the country of assignment when necessary.

Clandestine support and communications of own and others' operations.

Other tasks set out by Station, within cover and time-available capability.

(2) Location

Paris, France. Alternates: Brussels, Belgium; Luxembourg; Geneva, Switzerland.

(3) Employee should be relatively free to travel on short trips to nearby countries of Western and Middle Europe. Times and intervals will probably be dictated by the Paris Station.

(4) Special groups the employee should be able to contact

Although it is not essential, it would be desirable if the employee's cover permitted him to initiate and maintain contacts in the scientific, technological, commercial and engineering fields.

(5) Income directly attributable to cover should be in the range of $10,000 per annum, with supplementary income attributable to commissions, retainers, piece work fees, personal resources, etc.

(6) Employee should be able to devote upward of 30 hours per week to operational duties.

(7) Communications channels desired

Communications will be (a) directly with Station; (b) indirectly with Station via dead-drop, S/W, accommodation addresses, cut-outs, or any combination of these, or (c) in unusual circumstances via Headquarters or third country points. It is not desired that the cover facility provide an operational communication channel.

(8) Cover Suggestions

Suitable covers might include: technical publication representative, correspondent, or editor; book or manuscript agent or publisher's representative; corporation, service, or management consultant's representative; prestige or representational agent for large firm, service, institute, or association. The cover vis-a-vis the target is less important than the status afforded by the cover to the eyes of the host government, i.e., a reason for being there.

DISPATCH

SECRET

OSMA-12,641

TO: Chief of Station, Buenos Aires
INFO: Chief, WE
Chief, WH

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 201-6145

FROM: Acting Chief of Station, Madrid

DATE: 25 August 1961

SUBJECT: Counter Espionage
Luis TEDESCHI, aka Luis TEDECHI

RE: "ABR" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCES: OIBN-18463, 29 May 1961

On receipt of reference, Madrid Station traces were run on the Subject with negative results. Traces were also requested of the QUANTUM service and on 21 August 1961 they informed us that they had no record of the Subject in their files. In this case the QUANTUM service also carried out traces in the QUOTA files for KUBARK.

ANTHONY B. FELDRAKE

24 August 1961

Distribution:
2 - Buenos Aires
2 - C/WE
2 - C/WH

CS COPY

201-289247

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

ABM/mat

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

CONTINUED

PAGE NO

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. OIRA-28390

TO: Chief of Station, Buenos Aires
INFO: Chief, WE Attn: Chief, WE/4
Chief, WH

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 201-6145

FROM: Chief of Station, Rome

DATE: 13 July 1961

SUBJECT: Counter Espionage
Luis T[illegible] (Possibly Luis T[illegible])

RE "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

OIRW-18463, 29 May 1961

File checks conducted on Subject through Police Liaison are negative.

[illegible] K. [illegible]

Distribution:
2-Buenos Aires
1-WE/4
1-WH

201-289247
~~201-6145~~

FORM 10-57 (40) 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

CONTINUED

PAGE NO

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
SECRET	OSBA-1924

TO: Chief, WE (Attention AUDESK).
INFO: Chief of Station, Madrid

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 201-6145

FROM: Chief of Base, Barcelona CES.

DATE: 13 June 1961

SUBJECT: Counter Espionage
Luis TEDESCHI, possibly Luis TEDECHI

RE. "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: For your information

REFERENCE(S): OIRW-18463

There are no base file or QUOTA traces on Subject in Barcelona.

Elaine B. Friedwald
Elaine B. Friedwald

13 June 1961

Distribution:
3 - Headquarters
2 - Madrid
2 - Files

CS COPY

201-289247
~~201-6145~~

FORM 10-57 53 (HQ) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

CONTINUED | PAGE NO.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING: X — NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chiefs of Station, Rome, Madrid; COB, Barcelona

INFO: Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

FROM: Chief, WE

SUBJECT: Counter Espionage
Luis TEDESCHI, possibly Luis TEDECHI

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES: See paragraph 3

1. A source who has given highly reliable information in the past, and whom we have no reason to question, has stated that during 1943 one Luis TEDESCHI was either being considered for recruitment by/or was actually working for the RIS. According to the source, he was known to have been active as a member of the Spanish Communist Party. The address used by TEDESCHI during early 1943 was Pichincha 969, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

2. The Buenos Aires Station has determined that a Luis TEDESCHI, born 2 February 1918, is listed in local police files as living at El Dorador 3150, telephone 58-3717. Further investigation is being conducted there. Unfortunately, Headquarters does not have the date and place of birth of Subject of paragraph 1. The source has indicated that Subject was probably born in Italy and may have been active in the Spanish Civil War 1936-39. This, of course, could explain his involvement in the Spanish Communist Party.

3. It is requested that Rome, Barcelona, and Madrid check Station and Base files for any traces of Subject. Liaison and police contacts may be approached for any information available in their files.

4. Please address replies in this matter "Attention KUDESK."

GERALD B. HUTTARD

Distribution:
2 - Rome
1 - Barcelona
1 - Madrid
1 - Buenos Aires

RECLASSIFIED
RI/Files

DATE TYPED: 29 May 1961
DATE DISPATCHED: 12 JUN 1961

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OIEW-18463

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: ~~201-6145~~ 201-289247

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

ROUTING / INITIAL
RI/FI

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WE/X	John D. Walker	sjs	2528

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WE/4	31/5	[signature]
C/WE/5	31/May	Thomas H. Thiele
C/CI/SID	1 June	Oscar H. Sells

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WE/X		John D. Walker

SECRET

DRAFT

7 February 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/Project

SUBJECT: Luis TEDESCHI

1. This office is extremely interested in obtaining all available information on one Luis TEDESCHI, who was reported to be residing at Pichincha 969, Buenos Aires, Argentina in the early part of 1943, at which time he allegedly was of interest to the RIS. The attached document refers to a Luis TEDESCHI residing at this address in 1942 and to an individual by the name of TEDESCHI who had resided at Estados Unidos 0366 in 1942. Apparently the information as shown on the attached document was obtained through mail intercepts.

2. We would appreciate having you tell us if you know of any way we might locate the intercepts referred to and possibly any other intercepts directed to TEDESCHI while the U.S. Office of Censorship was in operation.

BIRCH D. O'NEAL
Chief, CI/SIG

Attachment: 1

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
2 - CI/SIG

CI/SIG/EAGEgerter:jm

DRAFT

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

INFO:

FROM: Chief, WH

SUBJECT: Counter Intelligence/Luis TEDEDCHI (Correct spelling believed to be TEDESCHI)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES:
See Paras. 3 and 4
HABA-9016 of 4 November 1960

1. Headquarters regrets that it has been unable to learn the date and place of birth of the Luis TEDESCHI who, according to a usually reliable source, was being considered for recruitment in 1943 by the RIS, or was actually working for the RIS. As stated in HABW-6515, our source reported that the address used by TEDESCHI during the early part of 1943 was Pichincha 969, Buenos Aires.

2. Collateral information on Luis TEDESCHI of Pichincha 969, Buenos Aires, has been found in a 1942 document which appears to have been based on censorship reports. This document indicates that TEDESCHI's address, as given above, was a cover address for a UDE (Union Democratica Espanola) manifesto sent from Cuba. Also one TEDESCHI, Estados Unido 3366, Buenos Aires, was given as a cover address in a secret writing message. A copy of the pertinent portions of this document is attached.

3. It is hoped that a unilateral surveillance on the Luis TEDEDCHI living at El Domador 3150, Buenos Aires, if instituted as the station planned, will be fruitful. Headquarters will be extremely interested in any further information on this individual you may be able to develop, as it is possible that he may be linked with Communist and/or RIS activities in Cuba as well as being used locally by the RIS.

4. As KUDESK is currently handling this case, it is requested that the slug REDWOOD not be used.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

Attachment: 1

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee, with one attachment

1 - WH/2, no att.
1 - RID for 201-289247, 1 att.
3 - CI/SIG, 1 att.

DATE TYPED: 6 February 1961
DATE DISPATCHED: 10 FEB 1961

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HABW-6669

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-289247

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
CI/SIG	A. G. Egerter	jm	2621

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C.CI/SIG	7 Feb 61	Birch D. O'Neal
C.WH/2		[signature]

ROUTING: RI/AN; RI/T; CI/SIG

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
WH		Chief, WH/J. C. King

14-00000

Attachment to #ABW-6669

MJ-2 Sep 36

S/4612

N/T SECRET

FROM : No name, HAVANA, CUBA.

TO : SR. LUIS TEDESCHI, PICHINCHA 959, BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINE.

28th July to 14th August 1942 : Spanish

6134

[illegible] AND CONDITIONS IN SPAIN : [illegible] BY COMMUNISTS [illegible] INTERVIEWS WITH PERSONS FROM SPAIN.

This cover contains Reports Nos. 550 - 3, 565 - 8 and 571, compiled from interviews with persons who have recently left Spain, and describe the attitude of the Spanish people to the war and their Government, the extent of German penetration in Spain and of Spanish aid to the Axis, the activities and standing of political parties of the Right and Left in Spain, and general living conditions in the country. This group of reports contains opinions of both Communist and Falangist sympathisers.

PREVIOUS RECORDS:

5860

TRI.10001/42, TRI.11003/42, TRI.24567, and TRI.14201/42 cover groups of reports on the same subject.

S/4555 covers a group of reports on the Spanish political scene, possibly from the same source as the above, which may be VICENTE URIBE, the Communist leader, whose headquarters are in CUBA. See also BER.14567/42, BER.14974/42, BER.19252/42.

Addressee, LUIS TEDESCHI, is shown by TRI.15328/42 to be a cover address for a U.D.E. (UNION DEMOCRATICA ESPANOLA) Manifesto sent from Cuba. He may also be the TEDESCHI, ESTADOS UNIDOS 3566, who is given as a cover address in the s.w message in TRI.14725/42 (secret).

Att to HABW-6669

201-[illegible]

14-00000

MICROFILMED
FEB 23 1961
DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE

DISPATCH

SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HABA-9016

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 201-6145

DATE: 4 November 1960

TO: Chief, WHD
INFO: Chief, SRD

FROM: Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT: REDWOOD/IMPROVE
Luis *TEDEDCHI 201-6145

ACTION REQUIRED: See Paragraph 2

REFERENCE(S): HABW-6515

RE 433 — (CHECK "X" ONE)
XX MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

1. In view of the fact that Subject dispatch presented a possible lead to an RIS agent, it was decided to do a unilateral check on TEDEDCHI rather than refer the matter to liaison. As a result of investigations undertaken by BIPALA-1, the Station learned that:

Luis TEDEDCHI

Is listed in the Buenos Aires police files as living at El Dorador 3150, with telephone number 58-3717, and has no record of police offences. This individual was born on 2 February 1918.

2. If possible, it is requested that Headquarters attempt to confirm the above date of birth with the source of reference. The Station plans to institute a unilateral surveillance on Subject, and will keep Headquarters informed of pertinent developments.

Carlton G. RECART

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD
1 - Chief, SRD
1 - Chrono
1 - File: 201-6145

BCHeighan/okb

Lee to WHD

INDEX F
Index - F
201-289247

CS COPY

End-1

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

CONTINUED

PAGE NO. 1 of 1

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT General-Counter Espionage
Specific-Luis TEDESCHI*

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
See Para. 2

1. A source who has given extremely reliable information in the past, has stated that, during 1943, one Luis TEDESCHI was either being considered for recruitment by the RIS or was actually working for the RIS. TEDESCHI was known to have been an active member of the Spanish Communist Party. The address used by TEDESCHI during the early part of 1943 was Pichincha 969, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

2. Our source was unable to provide further information on TEDESCHI and Headquarters' files contain no pertinent identifiable information on him. It is requested that you check all available records including any appropriate local services for any information on TEDESCHI that may be available.

Oliver G. Galbond
OLIVER G. GALBOND

DATE TYPED: 12 Oct. '60
DATE DISPATCHED: 17 OCT 1960

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HABA - 6515

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: ~~200-6-145~~ 201-289247

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

(3)

ROUTING | INITIAL

Distribution:
~~Buenos Aires - 2~~
WH/2 - 1
CI/SIG - 2
~~RID for 200-6-145 - 1~~

RI/FI

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
CI/SI	AEGEgerter	jrm	2356

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C, CI/SIG	13 Oct 60	Birch D. O'Neal
	14 Oct	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH	12 Oct. '60	Chief, WH/J. C. KING

5 October 1960

SUBJECT: Luis TEDESCHI

1. A Source, who has given extremely reliable information in the past, stated that, during 1943, Subject was either being considered for recruitment by the RIS or was actually working for the RIS.

2. Subject is known to have been an active member of the Spanish Communist Party. The address used by Subject during the early part of 1943 was Pichincha 969, Buenos Aires.

3. It is requested that Latin American, as well as Spanish and Portuguese stations be asked to check available local services for any possible traces on Subject.

#75

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION ROUTING SHEET

TO	BRANCH	ROOM & BLDG.	PHONE
Anne Egerter	CI/SIG	1408 J	2621

REQUEST NO.	REQUEST DATE	SUBJECT
21	12 Jan 61	Fedichi

THESE REPRODUCTIONS ARE OF A PERMANENT QUALITY AND ANY INDIVIDUAL DOCUMENT, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, MAY BE INCLUDED IN A 201, SUBJECT OR PROJECT FILE. REMAINING MATERIAL MUST BE DESTROYED AS SOON AS THE IMMEDIATE PURPOSE HAS BEEN SATISFIED. P.R.

FORM 1259

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations (see separate sheet) should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

ACCESSION NO

DATE RECEIVED IN S.A.

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1					
2					
3 Driner					
4 Olden					
5					
6 Spain FBW		21/4	22 Apr.		
7					
Laddy	2211				
10					
11					
12					Index - file
13 FBI RLG	2212	26/4	28/4		
14					

MAR 25 1948

SECRET

14-00000

DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE
MICROFILMED: 1P

SECRET

SERIES NO THH-344
FILE NO. 30-33

OFFICE OF ORIGIN: [illegible], DC

REPORT MADE AT	DATE	PERIOD COVERED	MADE BY
HABANA, CUBA	16 Mar 48	15 Jan-15 Mar 1948	Clarence D. Lloyd

STATUS ?

SUBJECT

GENERAL : Communist Matters

SPECIFIC : Spanish Communist Party

REFERENCE : THH-W-258, THH-377, THH-330

SOURCE : A - LA files; B-ALMCRATIC.

SYNOPSIS

Addresses used by Spanish Communist Party in 1943, as reported in Source A files, set forth. References in Source A files to persons who might be identical with some of those listed, or investigations of whom might lead to identification of individuals listed, in THH-W-258 also submitted as background material that is being used as a basis for investigations of Spanish Communist Party in Cuba.

ADMINISTRATIVE ADDENDUM:

To date no definite information has been received that would link any of the individuals reported herein to those named in reference THH-W-258. It is realized that this information is quite vague and is not conclusive in any way, but it is hoped that, by using it as a basis for our investigations, more concrete details regarding the Party's present activities in Cuba, as well as identification of individuals named in reference, can be obtained. Copies of this report are being furnished to our field stations in Mexico and Buenos Aires inasmuch as addresses used by the Party in 1943 include several in those countries.

REGISTRY COPY

EVALUATION : C-3

DISTRIBUTION : Wash. (3)✓
Mexico (1)
Buenos Aires (1)
Files (2)
No other distr.

SECRET

APPROVED BY [signature]
WDS

9-1-1-5-83

14-00000

SECRET Series No. THM-344
16 March 1948

SUBJECT: Spanish Communist Party

1. Investigations are being conducted in attempts to identify individuals named in material concerning Spanish Communist Party transmitted to us in [illegible]. Review of Source A files has revealed only scattered information which is being used as a basis for the investigations and this preliminary data is set forth below:

2. In March 1947 Source A outlined in some detail the Spanish Communist reporting system in the Western Hemisphere. The addresses known to be used by the Party at that time were stated to be as follows:

a. Buenos Aires

José [illegible]
Costa Rica 4653
Buenos Aires

Emilio [illegible]
Calle Cordoba 2244
Tercero D
Buenos Aires

Juan [illegible]
Calle Rocina 1854
Buenos Aires

Roberto CANINI
Inclan 4235
Buenos Aires

Jaime [illegible]
Rivadavia 5704 (7° piso)
Buenos Aires

Luis [illegible]
Pichincha 969
Buenos Aires

Luis [illegible]
Estados Unidos 2366
Buenos Aires.

b. Mexico

Ana [illegible]
Calle Pino 32 Depto 9
Mexico, D.F.

A. SANCHEZ
Morales 77
Mexico, D.F.

Antonio [illegible] GARCIA
Avenida Egidod 37
Mexico, D.F.

Antonio [illegible]
Zaragosa 67, Apt. 27
Mexico, D.F.

B. RODRIGUEZ
Morales 77
Mexico, D.F.

SECRET 200-4-5-73

c. Cuba

Caridad DIAZ
Calle Nueva del Pilar 2
altos del café
Habana, Cuba

Manuel [illegible]
San Lázaro [illegible]368 altos
Habana, Cuba

Juan José [illegible]
Casa de la Cultura
Paseo del Prado 210 altos
Habana, Cuba

Cesareo [illegible]
Luis Estevez y Serraga
Santos Suarez (bodega)
Habana, Cuba

Alexandro [illegible]
Calle Lawton, entre Tejar y Pacito
Habana, Cuba.

d. Jack STRONG
c/o W.L.P.
832 Broadway, 9th flr.
NewYork, New York

Benigno RODRIGUEZ
c/o Francisco Ganivet
51 Cleveland Square
London W. 2, England.

Dolores [illegible]
Moscow, Russia.

3. Enclosure to TKH-W-258, report on expenses, cites payments to:

a. "Daughter of Eduardo" - $7 in Mar and Apr; $17 in May.

Source A reported that:

(1) On 21 Sep 45 one EDUARDO ORTEGA Y GASSET, a Spanish political exile, spoke at a meeting at the Casa de la Cultura, Cuban Communist front organization, lauding the success of a convention held 14-16 Sep 45 by the COMITE CONTINENTAL PRO REPUBLICA ESPANOLA.

(2) On 1 Mar 46 EDUARDO MARTINEZ CANTRALLES, representing the Association of Cuban ex-combatants of the Spanish Republic, spoke at a demonstration in front of the Spanish Legation in Cuba held as a result of the execution of ten leftist underground workers in Spain.

b. "Son of Esteban" - $11 each month. From Source A it is learned that:

201-4-5-88

14-00000

(1) [illegible] VEGA (nationality not given) was named Secretary General of the [illegible] HISPANO CUBANA PRO [illegible], Spanish Communist Group.

(2) [illegible] (nationality not given) was the representative in Cuba of the [illegible] of Spain.

c. "[illegible]" - 178 in Mar; 1 in Apr. There is only one reference which might vaguely be considered to have any bearing on this item.

(1) SANTIAGO [illegible] (aka Santiago [illegible]) a [illegible], arrived in Cuba in 1940. From that time until [illegible] he lived in Santiago de Cuba when he came to Habana to assist Francisco (Pancho) GARCIA GONZALEZ in work "of an intelligence nature" for the Spanish front group, Casa de la Cultura.

d. "JOAQUIN" - 179 in Mar; 150 in Apr. Source A reported:

(1) [illegible] was acting in 1946 as first Vice President of COMITE HISPANO CUBANO PRO REPUBLICANO ESPANOLA in Ciego de Avila, Cuba.

(2) JOAQUIN LORENZO was a sailor on the vessel RIO NEUQUEN in 1942 and was acting as a courier to Habana for the Spanish Communist Party. This information, it was stated, was obtained from secret writings between one "PALACIOS" in Buenos Aires and one "GUILLERMO" in Habana.

Source B advises that according to official Cuban records, the vessel RIO NEUQUEN of Argentine Registry has arrived at Cuba only once since 1942. That was 19 April 1943. There is no record of the vessel having been here any time in 1942. The crew list of the RIO NEUQUEN does not carry the name of Joaquin LORENZO nor any name similar thereto.

e. "[illegible]" - a seaman, who usually makes trips to Cuba, and two comrades who are anti-com.

"PANCHO" - Summary Jan-Mar 47. "To PANCHO Jan-Feb $315.55.

(1) In March 1947 it was reported by source A that Francisco (PANCHO) GARCIA GONZALEZ (see 3c(1)) had traveled in 1942 and 1943 from Cuba to Portugal

xo-4-5-88

and returned; that he was an intelligence agent working for the Spanish Communists in Cuba and was in liaison contact with the Soviet Legation here. He was at that time reported to be utilizing the services of a courier named [illegible] between Cuba and France.

One [illegible], Cuban who fought with the Republican army in the Spanish war and was with the American merchant marine during World War II was reported as possibly the same. However, it was pointed out that this individual is supposed to be anti-communist. In March 1947 he was employed on a vessel (unnamed) between Philadelphia and Colombia but he also came to Habana often. There is no further report in Source A files concerning identification of this individual.

(2) See also 3d(2) above.

f. "Expenses for Documentation of [illegible] - $17.04 in May. [illegible]" Source A reports:

(1) FELICITA [illegible] (probably Cuban though nationality not given) attended the national PSP training school. Was president of Socialist Committee of the first district of Camagüey Cuba.

(2) LUIS [illegible] (nationality not given) represented JUVENTUD S[illegible] UNIFICADA DE ESPAÑA in 1945 and was a member of the JUVENTUD SECCION of Casa de la Cultura.

g. "What They Send Us From Cuba On the Organization There". One of the family members is the daughter of a mourned member...Engineer [illegible] who died here"

(1) María GARCIA IZQUIERDO was elected in January 1945 Secretary of Feminine Section of the JUVENTUD COMBATIENTES ESPAÑOLA DE CUBA.

4. Others mentioned in reference THH-W-258 - MARIA ANGELES, ANGELITA, CONCHITA, EULALIO, VICTOR, HUERTA - cannot be identified in any way with persons named in Source A files.

201-4-5-55

5. In addition to the information outlined above, there have been gleaned some details regarding lesser known Spanish Communist groups and individuals. These are not included herein since the meager information available on them--which dates back two-four years--or the mere submission of the names can serve little or no purpose at this time. In view of Mexico reports TMM-377 and TMM-336 concerning Carlos DIEZ [illegible] no inquiry regarding him is being made here.

200-1-5-88

14-00000

VIA: Air (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. OTTA-38

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WE

DATE: 12 March 1954

FROM : Acting Chief, Trieste Substation

INFO: Senior Rep., Rome

SUBJECT: GENERAL— INTEL

SPECIFIC— Summary of Reports Submitted by Lt. Col William Washington

REF: TRIE 2175

Attached hereto is a summary of reports relative to possible disturbances in Trieste which was prepared by G2/TRUST for the meeting described in reference.

James B. Blevins

Enclosure: 1 G2 report

6 March 1954

Distribution:
3 - Headquarters w/encl
2 - Rome w/encl

INDEX

ENCL

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

CLASSIFICATION

RI COPY

77-7-12-265

VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. OITA-38

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE

DATE: ~~12 March 1954~~

FROM : Acting Chief, Trieste Substation

INFO: Senior Rep., Rome

SUBJECT: GENERAL— [illegible]

SPECIFIC— Summary of Reports Submitted by Lt. Col. William Washington

REF: [illegible] 2175

Attached hereto is a summary of reports relative to possible disturbances in Trieste which was prepared by G2/[illegible] for the meeting described in reference.

James B. Blevins

Enclosure: 1 G2 report

6 March 1954

Distribution:
3 - Headquarters w/encl
2 - Rome w/encl

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28 A

CLASSIFICATION

COPY

77-7-12-265

Encl to 01TA-38
12 Mar 57

[illegible]

1. [illegible] Rept No. [illegible] dtd 28 Dec 53. [illegible]

In late Jan 54 the action squads of the [illegible] will be reorganized on a new system [illegible] in any eventual demonstration [illegible] 54. [illegible] more than 6[illegible] [illegible] will come from the northern provinces of Italy particularly from the [illegible] and [illegible] areas. These youths will be used to [illegible] travelers and representatives. They will live in private [illegible]. [illegible] contact with the [illegible] will be [illegible], [illegible], Ida, who does not believe that the police are acquainted with his activities in the [illegible] [illegible].

2. [illegible] (1) dtd 2 Jan 54. [illegible]

[illegible], [illegible] is presently [illegible] [illegible] anti-allied propaganda [illegible] Trieste. [illegible] is believed to have [illegible] this [illegible] anti-allied propaganda [illegible] of [illegible] office in [illegible], ([illegible] one of [illegible] ("[illegible]"). The propaganda material will be collected in Italy by one of the [illegible] [illegible] to a friend of [illegible], [illegible]. [illegible] are being made with [illegible] [illegible], for the use of his [illegible] in the [illegible] area, in which to store the material for distribution.

3. CIC Rept No. [illegible] dtd 12 Jan 54. [illegible]

The [illegible] is making plans to have thousands of leaflets printed for the [illegible] and 20th of [illegible]. The leaflets will be [illegible] in nature and will appeal to the population to [illegible] the two dates. The leaflets will be printed by the [illegible], Trieste, and are to be distributed throughout the streets of Trieste a [illegible] before the two mentioned dates. [illegible]

4. CIC Rept No. [illegible] dtd 15 Jan 54. [illegible]

[illegible], Salvatore, recently returned from [illegible], was [illegible] safe passage to [illegible] if necessary to evade police arrest. [illegible] was also promised financial assistance from a [illegible] businessman, whose identity is presently unknown. [illegible] has avowed to avenge the deaths of the six Trieste [illegible] killed during the November riots. He has notified his group that they must strike a decisive blow on [illegible] by dynamiting the Yugoslav Delegation building in Trieste and also the British and American Headquarters in Trieste. [illegible] is presently approaching Trieste merchants and businessmen in the hope of obtaining financial assistance for his ventures. It is known that a certain member of his group is in possession of arms and explosives intended to be used by [illegible].

[illegible] 01TA-38 CONFIDENTIAL [illegible]

77-7-12 265

CONFIDENTIAL

5. [illegible] (4) dtd [illegible] Jan. [illegible]

A [illegible] of [illegible] met on [illegible] Jan to discuss [illegible], alvatore' trip to [illegible] on [illegible] Jan. [illegible] he would [illegible] demonstration on [illegible]. It was decided to [illegible] in small lottles [illegible] quantities, [illegible] against the police. [illegible], [illegible] of the "[illegible]" [illegible] in the [illegible] Theater building, [illegible] stored there. [illegible] reports 4 and 5 do not coincide, although they apparently concern the same subject.

6. [illegible] (5) dtd 22 Jan. [illegible]

[illegible] meeting of the [illegible] said that it was inadvisable to [illegible] demonstrations [illegible] students to concentrate their efforts on [illegible]. [illegible] promised that that he would authorize such demonstrations on that day.

According to the source, [illegible] group [illegible] leaders and those of [illegible] being formed under the [illegible]. This group, which is considered [illegible] group, consists of action squads of [illegible] persons and will [illegible] under one leader each. The source also [illegible] that this group is [illegible] formed with [illegible] knowledge, although he is [illegible] to evade as much responsibility as possible.

The source also added that the following action squad leaders meet daily in [illegible] and [illegible] to discuss their program. They are quoted to have said that [illegible] will [illegible] their day of [illegible] against the police.

[illegible], [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible], [illegible]
[illegible], [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible], [illegible]

7. [illegible] dtd 25 Jan. [illegible]

The [illegible] intends to use violence in an attempt to [illegible] all local Yugoslav [illegible]. A [illegible] member of the [illegible] is stated to have said that the future policy of the party is to be one of violence.

8. [illegible] 5 C-2755 dtd 3 [illegible]. Eval [illegible]-3

[illegible], noted Italian nationalist, stated that to the best of his knowledge there were no plans on the part of Italian groups or parties [illegible]

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Trieste to [illegible] demonstrations on [illegible]. [illegible] that [illegible] would, no doubt, [illegible] to [illegible] on [illegible] at the [illegible] spots where the [illegible] riot victims were [illegible]. [illegible] predicted that the [illegible] would [illegible] peaceful and [illegible] only of [illegible] duration, [illegible] the police attempted to interfere.

9. [illegible] [illegible] dtd [illegible]

[illegible], Carlo [illegible], [illegible] of the Trieste [illegible] are the [illegible] who [illegible] [illegible] on [illegible]. They are planning to have [illegible] in the [illegible] future for distribution throughout the city. [illegible] that the [illegible] would participate in future [illegible] only in conjunction with the other Italian political parties in Trieste.

[illegible], [illegible], [illegible] in the Italian parliament, who were [illegible] in the [illegible] at [illegible] Trieste, have written to several Trieste [illegible] that they [illegible] to visit [illegible] sometime in March. [illegible] stated that he will oppose their [illegible] to Trieste because their appearance would [illegible].

10. [illegible] dtd [illegible]

[illegible], Salvatore, who is active in forming the "[illegible] Shirts" action squads, has requested permission to use the [illegible] in Trieste as a meeting place for the members of the squads. The [illegible] will discuss his request at their next meeting. It is believed that permission will be granted to [illegible].

11. [illegible] (15) dtd 23 [illegible]

In a conversation with Lt Col [illegible], the following information was supplied:

a. Leading members of the Committee for the Defense of Italianity in Trieste and Istria are discussing the possibility of patriotic processions to be organized in Trieste on 20 Mar.

b. No definite plans have been made as yet to stage demonstrations on that date, but the "Committee" is in favor of supporting student processions.

c. It was not excluded, during these discussions, that the presence of civilian police may be taken as a challenge and will turn eventual processions into disturbances.

d. [illegible] informed source that he intends to [illegible] on 16 Mar to avoid a repetition of the unfortunate [illegible].

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12. [illegible] Feb. [illegible]

[illegible] stated that there is no danger of the [illegible] or other Italian [illegible] on 20 [illegible]. [illegible] that it had [illegible] to [illegible] to [illegible] to prepare [illegible] on 20 [illegible]. [illegible] that [illegible] was not a [illegible] had to have nothing to do with him.

[illegible] also [illegible] that another [illegible] who should be closely watched [illegible]. He said that the [illegible] will have nothing to do with [illegible].

13. [illegible] and 22 [illegible]

[illegible] of [illegible] activities, to [illegible] of Italy, to [illegible] and to [illegible] the [illegible] occurred on [illegible].

This group was founded by [illegible], Salvatore. A certain [illegible], Francesco [illegible] a very active [illegible] with [illegible]. At present this group is discussing:

a. [illegible] on 20 [illegible].
b. A hand grenade attack on the Yugoslav [illegible] Mission Headquarters.

CONFIDENTIAL

17-7-[illegible]-265

14-00000

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. STTA-3769

Security Information
Secret Control
US Officials Only
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE

DATE: 5 February 1954

FROM : Chief of Mission, Trieste

INFO: Senior Representative, Rome

SUBJECT: GENERAL— MSI/INTEL

SPECIFIC— MSI Activities and Plans for 20 March 1954

REF: TRIE 2669; STTA-3697, dated 14 January 1954

1. The following information was obtained from 580/C/309(5), dated 22 January 1954, a report of the Trieste Security Office (British Field Security Service) made available by CEOFAL. Source is PILMEN (Evaluation is F). Date of information is 19 January 1954.

2. Riccardo GEFTER-WONDRICH presided at an MSI meeting held on Via Rismondo. Approximately thirty persons were present. GEFTER-WONDRICH told the students of "Giovane Italia" that it was inadvisable to demonstrate against the sentences imposed on students who participated in the November riots. Instead, he invited them to concentrate their efforts and attention on preparations for 20 March, promising that he would authorize student demonstrations on that date.

3. It is rumored that a new clandestine organization, composed of approximately 260 youths who are members of the MSI and other parties, is being formed under Bruno MARSETTI (TSO Comment: Bruno MARSETTI is possibly identical with Salvatore MARSETTI.) This organization consists of action squads of twenty to twenty-five men, each squad being under one leader. MARSETTI was expected to return from Rome during the weekend of 23-24 January with arms and funds for this organization. In the opinion of source, these arms and funds are supplied by prominent Masons in Rome and Milan. Source stated that the organization is being formed with the knowledge of GEFTER-WONDRICH, although the latter attempts to evade any responsibility therefor.

4. The action squad leaders meet daily in different locations to discuss progress. At the present time they have no headquarters. Their principal task appears to be the formation of plans for demonstrations on 20 March. They state that 20 March will be their day of revenge against police. The following persons are leaders of action squads:

Constantino DE MARCO
Aurelio D'ALESSIO
Pasquale BUONAIUTO
Orazio BOCCOLO
SANNA (fnu), brother of Duilio SANNA
Natale ZERA

RI COPY

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CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

12-240

5. The following data is from TSO/O/309(4), dated 19 January 1954. Source is PILSEN. Date of information is 18 January 1954. The following MSI members met in the Buffet Gallopin, in Piazza Goldoni:

Constantino DE MARCO
Aurelio D'ALESSIO
Pasquale BUONAIUTO
Orazio BOSCOLO (armed with pistol)
SANNA (fnu) (armed with pistol)
Natale ERA

Subjects discussed MARSETTI's trip to Rome. MARSETTI had left for Rome on 16 January, arriving on 18 January, and had telephoned Trieste that he would "bring back the goods." The meeting also discussed plans for demonstrations on 20 March. It was decided to use acid in small bottles in limited quantities against the police.

6. Dr. TEDESCHI (fnu), manager of the Ridotto in the Rossetti Theater, keeps MSI arms stored there.

Michael L. Rosemont
Michael L. Rosemont

30 January 1954

Distribution:
3 - Headquarters
2 - Rome

SECRET CONTROL
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"SECURITY INFORMATION"

43-7-24-1170

14-00000

WS-L-28265
29 Aug 52

Date of Information July 1952.

E/ 2272 2-4-2

Country: ITALY

Subject: The S.T.I.M. Machine Tool Factory, MILAN.

Remarks:

Source: Believed reliable, based on documentary evidence.

43-7-21-4/0

I T A L Y

Economic

The S.[illegible] Machine Tool Factory, MILAN.

Location.

1. The firm, which designs machinery for construction in other factories, has its technical offices in Viale Monza 66 and its sales department in Via T. Prisco. 3, MILAN.

Personalities.

2. The manager is Dr. GOSSE[illegible], a German and former manager of a German machine tool factory. He is assisted by Ing. [illegible]SCH and by other technicians.

Production.

3. The firm designs and/or produces on a sub-contracting basis the following types of machines :-

Machine tools for the manufacture of micron bearing balls, steel bearing balls, cylindrical roller bearings, conical roller bearings, cages for ball bearings, external and internal rings for ball bearings, sewing needles, bicycle accessories, fount for typewriters, eccentric presses for hot and cold stamping, sandpapering machines, special grinders, oscillating grinders, selectors, rotary rolling mills, control instruments, pneumatic hammers, splining machines, rectifiers, presses, drilling machines, and polishing machines.

Patents.

4. With the exception of some very small items, the machines designed by the firm are not covered by patents.

Destination of Output.

5. The firm's products are sold on the home market.

N.Y.-Si Op. 38

S/4618

NOT SECRET

6734

FROM : No name, HAVANA, CUBA.

TO : SR. LUIS TEDESCHI, PICHINCHA 969, BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINE.

28th July to 14th August 1942 : Spanish

OPINION AND CONDITIONS IN SPAIN : REPORTS COMPILED BY COMMUNISTS FROM INTERVIEWS WITH PASSENGERS FROM SPAIN.

This cover contains Reports Nos. 350 - 3, 355 - 8 and 371, compiled from interviews with persons who have recently left Spain, and describe the attitude of the Spanish people to the war and to their Government, the extent of German penetration in Spain and of Spanish aid to the Axis, the activities and standing of political parties of the Right and Left in Spain, and general living conditions in the country. This group of reports contains opinions of both Communist and Falangist sympathisers.

PREVIOUS RECORDS:

5860

TRI.10901/42, TRI.11663/42, TRI.24527, and TRI.14201/42 cover groups of reports on the same subject.

S/4555 covers a group of reports on the Spanish political scene, possibly from the same source as the above, which may be VICENTE URIBE, the Communist leader, whose headquarters are in CUBA. See also BER.14867/42, BER.14974/42, BER.19252/42.

Addressee, LUIS TEDESCHI, is shown by TRI.13528/42 to be a cover address for a U.D.E. (UNION DEMOCRATICA ESPANOLA) Manifesto sent from Cuba. He may also be the TEDESCHI, ESTADOS UNIDOS 8566, who is given as a cover address in the s.w message in TRI.14725/42 (secret).

REPORT No.350

Results of our first conversation with a young man from TORREL VEGA, SANTANDER, about 28 years old. At the beginning of the war he was in the army in MOROCCO and spent the whole war in Franco's army. He comes from a family of small garage-owners. Neither he nor any of his family have belonged to any political party or syndicate although his sympathies have always been on the left.

SPANISH ATTITUDE TO THE REGIME AND THE WAR. — He says that the immense majority of the Spanish people is against Franco and the Falange, workers, peasants, employees, bourgeois, big and small and a large proportion of the soldiers and the Requetes. He says that everyone hopes for the victory of the Allies. In it there is a blind trust, especially when the U.S. entered the war as the U.S. and England are the most powerful countries in the world, especially with the assistance of Russia. Only the Falangists desire and plan for the victory of Hitler, even though "there are many Falangists too who take a very black view of him". He says the majority of people sympathise with England. They have complete faith in the victory of the Democracies. There are supporters of the USSR, but the immense majority, according to our informant, do not like "communism" and prefer Democracy. He is obviously rather muddled by the Falangist propaganda against the U.S.S.R. He says that the entrance of the U.S.S.R. into the war gave rise to happiness all over the world, although there had been a great deal of confusion before, through the "Treaty of Aid between Russia and Germany." But this confusion disappeared with German aggression against the U.S.S.R. He says that the German defeats on the Russian front raised morale and renewed everyone's confidence in victory. Hitler's admission in his speech of how much they had suffered in Russia in winter, and that they were on the edge of catastrophe, produced great joy among the people. He says that the entry of the U.S. into the war caused a very good impression, and increased people's confidence in victory although Pearl Harbour caused some demoralisation. He says that no one wishes Spain to enter the war, except the Falangists. Franco does not wish it

himself, and desires neutrality but since those who command are Serrano Suner and the Falangists, Franco has no choice but to do what Hitler orders him, and there is serious danger of war for Spain. He says that the Anglo-Soviet and the Soviet-American pact are known through the Falangist press which has spoken of them. They made a very good impression on the people. Asked if he knew that the said pact stipulated that after the victory nations would have freedom to decide their destinies without foreign interference, he says yes, the press published it. About the Second Front he says that everyone thinks of it, and is hoping for it to open if possible through Spain. That the day they disembark, all the people will rise. Asked what the people would do in case of a landing in France, he said that his opinion was that if that happened the Spanish people would rise, even though the invasion was not on their coasts. The agreement about the Second Front is also known. He says the people who are most fervent supporters of the Nazis are Serrano Suner, Primero de Rivera, and a certain Count whose name he does not know. He often says that he knows nothing of politics, because he only read the sports news in the papers and did not want to know anything about the Falange. He says that there are many preparations for war; they are making fortifications on the coasts of Galicia and placing a considerable amount of artillery there. He says that the political force of the Falange and the syndicates is "artificial"; everyone hates them. The people belong to the syndicate because they can't help it, but they do not pay their dues or take them seriously. Discontent has even reached the ranks of the Falange. Many clerks, students, and people who joined it thinking they "were going to steal the music" are now very discontented, and do not pay their dues, and when they are threatened with being expelled they say that is what they are waiting for, for the Falange to play at "fisticuffs". There are many officers in the army who are not in agreement with the Falange or the idea that Spain is to go to war. The most violent opposition comes from Queipo de Llano and Yague. No one knows where Queipo is going and Yague is thought to be in exile in the Prov. of Pontevedra. Both were cashiered, Queipo for protesting against food leaving for Germany and Yague because in a speech at Zaragoza, he said - "we do desire a great and free Spain, but without any Blue Shirts, Red Shirts, or prisoners."

All the sergeants say that they are very discontented, because they earn 5 pts. which keeps them very short and of the soldiers he says-"in a word they are hungry, many years in barracks, and then the danger that they might be sent to war". He says that they are well-uniformed, just as well as before the war. They have dismissed the 1941 Draft. He thinks that there was very little sympathy for the Division Azul and the people laughed at those who volunteered. 40% were forced to go, others went because they were hungry, and there were 8 o/o volunteers. He says that survivors came back in a state of panic, there was a lack of food and equipment, several of them mutilated themselves in order to escape from this inferno. All say that the Russians are very well-armed and fight with great courage.

HELP TO THE NAZIS. — He says that his opinion is that a great deal of food is taken to Germany, although he can give no details, but if there is no food and olive oil in Spain where is it? He says that in Torrelavega the "Fabrica Continental" is working at high pressure, making tyre covers, while in Spain transport is held up for want of them.

THE CHURCH. — He says that it is not true that in the Church there are anti-German and Anti-Falangist groups. The supporters of the Regime are the Falange, the Germans and the Clergy, in that order. The Church wishes for the triumph of Germany, in spite of her anti-Catholic policy because they believe that in that case they will be able to preserve their position of influence. He says that English and Russian news can be heard although it is very difficult and is forbidden although there is no watch or inspection. He says that everybody is against the Falange and submissione to Germany, including the monarchists and the rich on whom the Falangists impose large fines for racketeering. Many of the monarchists, bourgeois etc. are on the side of England. Democracy is considered as a possible substitute for the Regime. A democratic Republic like there was before the war. A Regime of peace and work. Speaking of the solution of the present situation, he says that they want a regime of peace and not a revolution. Then he contradicts himself by saying that it will not be achieved by peaceful means. He says that this would be the best but that the deaths, the betrayals, the crimes must be avenged.

The people are very united and there are not the old differences between the parties of the Frente Popular. The policy of National Union is unknown, he has heard no one speak of it.

DETAILS OF THE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE — He says that he thinks that secret organisations function, especially in Bilbao and he says particularly "It is a city of brave men". He says that notices painted on the walls are often seen there. He only remembers one "Less Franco, more white bread". Asked if the notices were signed by any party he says no, because it would give away the people who had done it. He says that he knows, because he was told, that in Bilbao there were illegal pamphlets and even a newspaper in circulation, but he does not know their content. He thinks that there must have been a clandestine press, but as he was never an idealist the people who did these things would not trust him, and as he is out of everything he does not know any details". He says he thinks that the people working in Bilbao are nationalists and communists, especially the latter. That a few months ago two Italian submarines, badly damaged by English planes, came into Santander. Two hundred persons were arrested for discussing this, and many people thought that the second front had already begun. He gives no more details. He says that Serrano Suner was the object of an attack in Madrid when he met Arrese, and when the latter tried to protect Suner he was seriously wounded and had to undergo a critical operation. Asked if he thought there was sabotage etc., he says no - the disorganisation of the train services is due to all the employees being new and not knowing their business.

GUERILLEROS -- He says that "El Carinoso" was working in Santander and "The Railwaymen" too; that "El Carinoso" came from Liergnes and had his headquarters in Santander. That he was recently killed through quarrels and imbroglios caused by his girlfriend who was from the J.C. and had another lover, and it was he who was arrested at the same time as El Carinoso. It was he who informed against them all. Many people love the Guerilleros, although there are many people who help them through fear, as for example a relation of his from whom they took his only pig, but in general the Guerilleros behave excellently. "El Carinoso" was once in Barcelona, where he went in a cab to get his teeth fixed. El Carinoso was not a politician but took to the mountains in order to avenge the death of his cousin who was assassinated by the Falange. That they often, like the guerilleros of Asturias, disguised themselves as Civil Guard, went down to the villages, and arrested the Falangists. But where there are ~~xxx~~ most Guerilleros, and the most active, is in Asturias. Six months ago, about three hundred guerilleros were ready to embark on the coast in order to leave Spain. But there was a quarrel and a terrific fight between these guerilleros and the forces of authority, with many dead, and after that they retreated to the mountains. He says that the politicians ~~xxxxxxxx~~ who are most popular are Prieto and Asana. Some speeches of Prieto's have been circulated through Bilbao, but he does not know what they say. There is also in circulation an article, reproduced from an English paper, reprinted by an employee in the Real Comp. Asturiana, de Inz. Republicana. The article refers to the powers and resources of the Allies and their chances of victory. He says he does not know of any activity of the communists, that this is obviously the activity of other people who are not communists; that for example the man who reprinted the article and those who read it were all on the Republican Left, and if there is any communist activity it is so camouflaged that no one knows who is the author. He says that during the crossing they were detained by the English in Bermuda and in Baltimore by the Americans. That the English made a short examination, they did not interrogate them in front of everybody and left them the letters they carried. In Baltimore they were interrogated one by one and were asked about fortifications, food, if they sent it to Germany, etc. When our informant said he had been in Franco's army up to the war they asked him why he did not desert to the Republican army.

SOLIDARITY. — He says there is no organisation for solidarity, that this only exists between groups of friends who have a relation or acquaintance in prison. They are not allowed to visit the prisoners more than once a week. He says that the killing still goes on, and that in Vog, a few days before he left, a lieutenant of the Civil Guard was shot for having gone for a walk along "at his own risk".

REPORT No.351

MARIA RODRIGUEZ, about 29 years old. Comes from a comfortably-off peasant family in the Province of Orense. She is very sluggish and at every question repeats that she does not know and that women do not understand many thin s. She had only a little more than an hour to spare as she was busy in the evening and had to leave for the interior in the morning.

WAR — She says that she was surprised when she arrived in Havana as she thinks there is more enthusiasm in Spain than here and more confidence in an American victory. The peasants "like everyone else" would like the "American" to win, even those on the Right are sure the Germans will lose. She cannot explain the nature of Franco's assistance to Hitler, she says only that "as it was the Germans who won, Spain owes them more than it has". She cannot be explicit, either, about the dangers of war, but she says that Franco's soldiers, the young men in general, and as a concrete instance a brother of hers who served five years in Franco's army, says that they will go up into the mountain and shoot before going again to the war. About the Division Azul she knows only that when it was first formed a volunteer left from her district. He was an outlaw who had committed crimes and she says that he went through fear of the consequences. The people do not like the Blue Division. They were not asked for anything for the "volunteers".

FUTURE PROSPECTS — She insists that there is great confidence that it will soon change. So much so that a Republican who was hidden for years and afterwards discovered told her to tell her husband "Do not leave beacuse things will soon change" The village has a hundred inhabitants, and she says that they all hope it will change; but from what we can gather this confidence is based entirely on an Allied victory. She says that if the English opened a second front in Spain the people would revolt, but she says she has heard no opinions on this point. The people speak without fear. She relates that the Falangists tried to take a pistol from her father and that he hid it. They threatened him, they took him in a car telling ~~[illegible]~~ him that they were going to knock his head off, but the old man remained firm, telling them to do what they liked. They did not do anything to him nor did they get the pistol. As an example of solidarity against the Falange the old man said he had sold the pistol to a man who was going to America. They told him to prove it, the old brought as witnesses two peasants who lived more than a league away, without having agreed on a story first, but being quite convinced that the peasants when they saw the Falangists, if only for the sake of contradicting them, would say that what he said was true. A little later they sent him a notice for a Falangist meeting and he refused to go. She does not know if the other peasants did.

ARMY — She knows that a short time ago they dismissed the 36 (1936) Draft. Her husband was on service in Orense and deserted and went to Cuba. Immediately the Captain of the Company and a lieutenant went to his house to make inquiries. His brother told them "In his circumstances I do not know what I would have done", and the captain and the lieutenant went away saying - "He is right".

PEASANTS. — As we have already said, she belongs to a family which is comfortably off, they have several labourers in their employ. She says that the day labourers, and the farmer are equally against the Government and the Germans. To illustrate the situation she says that the daily wage is 20 pts. without food, ~~and 5 with food. They all prefer the 5 and food,~~ because otherwise they have nothing to eat. The peasants are very discontented, and show it openly to the Falangist officials when they come to inspect the harvest and when they fix the prices, saying - "They have no right to do it, it is an abuse", but it appears that it goes no further then this. They have not requisitioned anything but they force them to sell to the official buyers who issue permits to authorised buyers. These individuals take the produce to large shops and amass real fortunes. A quintal of potatoes, they have to sell at 30 pts. and they are sold afterwards by the dealers at the standard rate of four or five ptas the kilo, that is to say at a 800% profit, to private people who require them. And if the peasants take their produce to the market they have to sell it at the standard rate to the dealers. No peasant takes any rye to the market, they prefer to run the risk of selling it to private peo le. This is the only way in which they can

get other products. They have imposed a new tax; they have to pay 15 centimes for each vinestock. They have given up the "one-dish meal" and they are not forced to contribute to Auxilio Social. She says that the Government does not know what is going on in the country. They distribute the sulphate, not according to the number of vineyards, not even according to the number of inhabitants, so that her district which is wine country, gets less sulphate than the next one and produces very little wine, although it has more inhabitants. A kilo of sulphate is worth 39 ptas. - before it was worth 50 centimes. She says that they were taking a few things to America and they made them pay in Pielato, in Orense, and in Vigo, and if they had passed through more provinces they would have had to pay again.

REPORT No.352

Information volunteered by three Galician peasants, not members of political parties. They remained throughout the war in Franquist territory, although only one of them fought in the army. Very backward politically, anti-Franquist, and more anti-Falangist. With the exception of one who was in Asturias as a soldier, the others never left their village which is a hamlet in Galicia.

SPANISH ATTITUDE TO THE WAR AGAINST HITLER. — The majority of the Spanish people with the exception of the very rich and the Falangists are against Franco and the Falange. They explain that Falangists see what is coming to them through the crimes they have committed, and they are the people who really wish for a German victory, with the object of saving their skins, and the money they have stolen from the people. In Spain, in general, no one wants the war, since they are exhausted, according to our informants, except for the Falangists. It is said that Franco is a partisan of neutrality, and daily visits the British Ambassador at his private residence and has interviews with him. In spite of this they say there is a danger of Spain being pushed into the war against her will, because in Spain the Germans are the masters. All the world believes that the Allies will be the victors except the Falange. Before the attack on Russia many people were demoralised by the German advances and began to "think them invincible". When Russia entered the war, enthusiasm and confidence in Hitler's defeat increased enormously, but that was especially when the Russian victories began.

They say: - I do not know what would have happeded to us but for Russia; the Nazis would be masters of the world. They also say that the Nazi army will not stand another winter of war, that they have suffered such losses that the next Russian winter offensive will defeat them although there is no talk of a Second Front. They are sure that the Democracies will win the war. They admire the resistance of the U.S.S.R. They say that Germany has already lost the war as a consequence of the losses suffered in Russia. The entrance of the U.S. into the war contributed to increase the already existing confidence in victory. They do not know of the Anglo-Soviet and Soviet-American agreements, nor the agreement about the second front. One of our informants asked us what "0 Hitler 1942"* meant and when we told him he said that they also said it in Spain, because in order to achieve it it was necessary to open a second front. They think that if there was a landing in France the people would rise. They also say that there are rumours that they land in Galicia and in this case the whole of Galicia would revolt to help the Allies. The same thing would happen in any part of Spain.

The "DIVISION AZUL" is hated by the majority of the people. They say that the majority have been forced to volunteer, and explain how the recruiting is done. Anyone who does not want to go and fight Communism, take a step forward. Some enlisted because of the desperate situation they were in. Some enlisted, too, bec because they were stalwart Falangists. When the recruits left the province a great many people went to see them off, calling them "sons of bitches" and insulting their mothers. When one contingent of "Volunteers" came back from the Russian front at Irun they had to leave the train because the people were stoning them. Many people ~~xxxxxx~~ came back maimed and with frostbite. They tell terrible stories about the Germans and the horrors of the war. They say the Russians are very brave and fight with great courage. That they have large supplies of ammunition, and that things on the Russian front are not like the papers said they were. They said that the food on the Russian front was very scarce and bad. It was sent to them from Spain and they suffered many hardships. They all wished to return to Spain as soon as possible; they repented of having enlisted.

*"Zero hour for Hitler in 1942".

HELP GIVEN BY THE FRANQUIST REGIME AND THE FALANGE TO HITLER. — Now and then they send reinforcements to the Division Azul, in groups of a thousand or one thousand five hundred. They say that in order to replace the casualties and those who return crippled. Even the Falangists themselves say - "the Russian front is a very serious matter". Those who are recruited to replace losses in Russia are recruited by force, by the process already mentioned. All airmen have to serve some months on the Eastern Front as "training". They say that lately they were training about 150 pilots to send them to Russia. The war factories are working at high pressure. The Germans are directing the erection of an aerodrome in the province of Lugo. In Galicia very few Germans are to be seen. Military instruction is obligatory for boys and youths in the "Frente de la Juventud". They also train youths from 15 onwards to serve in aviation. A friend of the informants told them that there passed daily through a city in the North fifty cars loaded with war material in the direction of the French frontier. German submarines refuel at Redondela and Vigo. H. says that English aeroplanes often make reconnaissance flights over the harbours of Galicia. They describe Serrano Suner as the most subservient to the Nazis and in general to the Falangists who have crimes behind them or who have become rich through robbing the people.

Those who go to work in Germany are those workers who have no work, or even if they have any live in the greatest poverty. They believe that by going to Germany they will be able to solve their economic situation and that of their families. The groups sent are not very large, according to our informants, at least in Galicia. This is understandable because the Germans prefer specialists. According to our informants, three workmen came back from Germany who say that in Germany the situation is terrible. They hardly eat, there is great poverty. They have the impression that Germany will not resist long in consequence of the situation there is in the country. They also say that a group of Spanish workmen were thrown out of the country because "they caused trouble".

FRICTION BETWEEN THE RULING CLASSES — He does not know of any dissension in the army except the case of Yague and Queipo, and gives data which is already known. The soldiers in general are against the entry of Spain into the war....They live in very bad conditions, badly fed, badly clothed and ill-treated by the officers, especially by the recently recruited Falangists. They all wish to be demobilised as soon as possible. They have demobilised the '39 draft. By their conversation we observe that the soldiers from the "national" and the "Red" zones receive different treatment. In Galicia there are many soldiers from Cataluna who have already spent several years in the army. They do not make it difficult for youths of military age to leave Spain; they cited their own cases. One of them is 18, the other 24 years old.

THE PEOPLE'S RESISTANCE TO THE WAR AND THE FRANQUIST REGIME — They say that there is no resistance there at all, because no one can act, and passivity is the opinion and state of mind of the people. When we insist they say there have been various train smashes and some derailments which they think were due to sabotage as well as to the defective material. Everybody knows the British and Soviet war communiques and they are discussed in private conversation. Some people take them down in shorthand and later circulate them. He says that in Vigo there is a secret transmitting station, but it was discovered by the police and all those connected with it shot. They were said to belong to the republican Left ("Izquierda Republicana") and among those shot there was one doctor and other intellectuals. He does not know any more details. Women complain loudly in queues of the shortage of foodstuffs. He knows because the rumour went round there that Prieto made a speech in the White House before Roosevelt, and that Roosevelt embraced him saying that the Americas were behind the Spaniards. This speech too is circulating in clandestine copies, but he never could see one. He says that there is no organised political activity because this is impossible. He tells several jokes which are going the rounds, and quotes this one: - "Recently they made a film called "We Thieves are Honest Men". Beneath the announcement of this film in Vigo, someone wrote "The Caudillo's Own Words"." He says the press give most space to the English War communiques and the U.S. war news bulletins.

WHAT IS THE ATTITUDE OF THE PEOPLE TOWARDS NATIONAL UNION. — Talking of Unity they say textually "There, there are no parties, there are only anti-franquists, and all the differences between sections of the Popular Front have disappeared.

Lister is known and has a following in Galicia. The politicians with most prestige are Prieto and Azana and Negrin, although Negrin is the most hated by the Falangists".

FUTURE PROSPECTS. — He thinks of the Republic as the Regime to substitute for Fascism, but without a revolution, and he immediately adds that the Republic will come because when the Germans are at their weakest the whole people will revolt and avenge the crimes of the Falangists. The people's blood rises when they see those who assassinated their relations dressed up in blue shirts. The Falange consists only of professional assassins and robbers. Those who wear the shirt can be recognised by their faces. Those who joined the Falange at first now do not want to know anything about it, and do not want anyone to wear the shirt. There is friction between Requetes and Falangists. The people hate the Requetes less than the Falangists. They say that the schools teach only militarism and religion. There are many little boys who can hardly read, but who can speak of military operations with maps, artillery and aviation. A teacher who was dismissed and came back to his post, told our informants that the Ministry constantly sent them bo.ks of military tactics, so that they could teach them to the children. The summer camps for children consist of sending boys to camp and teaching them drill.

GENERAL SITUATION OF THE PEOPLE. — They spoke of the terrible poverty endured by the people, and the high price of food; wages have hardly been raised in comparison with those paid under the Republic. The Committees of Supply get hold of agricultural products and only leave a small quantity per person for the whole year's supply. Already in their village the Falange had listed the crop although they had not yet requisitioned it, which they had already done in other parts of Galicia. Falangists speculate in foodstuffs, selling them at high prices and so get rich. He says that in Vigo a large quantity of rice went bad and had to be thrown into the sea because they would not sell it to the people at lower prices. The rationing is quite inadequate. They were a whole year without seeing olive oil. Naturally on the Black Market it could be bought at 50 pts and more. In a year they only had bread twice. A very small meal in a restaurant costs 16 pts. Two courses and dessert 25 pts. One of them was charged 75 pts. for eating and sleeping in a pension in Vigo one day. A pair of shoes costs 25 pts., a poor suit 500, a dozen eggs 18 or more pts. The people hate the Committees of Supply used by the Falangists to make themselves rich. They say that there is the greatest immorality in all official organisations and everyone steals.

In the prisons there are still many people. They treat the prisoners very badly. In the prison of Oviedo, which has a capacity for 600 there are more than 3.500 prisoners. There are batallions of forced labour (workers they call them); they grant some people conditional liberty but they send them to districts where they know no one and where they die of hunger.

Generally these three young men have great confidence in the victory over Hitler, and say Germany may break up this very year.

REPORT No.353

Information volunteered by an ex-Consular official of the Cuban Government in Spain, who arrived on the "Marques de Comillas" on the 25 th of July 1942. The subject is a person of quite good economic position. He is the son of Spaniards and owns some properties in Asturias. He went as Consul to ——— after Franco's troops had taken possession of it. A man of moderate views, politically of the persuasion that was regnant there at the moment, he honestly believed, doubtless as a result of Falangist propaganda in America, that "Franquist Spain was a paradise". Later he had the opportunity of experiencing what Franquism represented, and still represents for Spain, and owing to his honourable behaviour as Consul he was often insulted and was even threatened with expulsion. He was closely connected with officials of the Fascist Regime and with Falangists in high positions. His term of office, to use his own expression, was more successful through his friends than owing to his position.

SITUATION OF THE FRANQUIST REGIME — 90% of the Spanish people are against the Franquist regime. He says that to assess accurately the solution desired by this ninety percent is very difficult. Some wish, specifically, for the restoration of the Republic, but he maintains that what everyone is longing for is a change in the Regime, something to relieve the really chaotic situation in which the Spanish people find themselves. (He did not know life under the Republic, and therefore when he talked with people they always underlined the enormous difference there was between that life and life under the present regime). The Falangist unity they boast of is a myth. Division in the Franquist Camp grows daily. The Falangists write lampoons in the streets and so do the Requetes, but their slogans are contradictory. The Falangists accuse the rest — of being cure and traitors to the doctrine of the Falange. For example, he talked to a Falangist lieutenant — the man came from Cuba to fight at Franco's side — in the cafe "El Gato Negro" in Madrid, a few days before embarking. He seemed to be ashamed of the present situation in Spain. He excused himself by repeating the Falangist tag that the Falange had been betrayed. (This must refer to the Monarchists, Requetes, and other reactionaries). The Falangists are aware of the present situation in Spain. Perhaps that is the reason why they are seeking a solution which will preserve their class privileges. In his own phrase — the Franquist regime hangs from a very thin thread, which must snap very soon. (Perhaps this is not only the view of our informant, but also of some military and civil leaders with whom he was closely connected). For this reason, he says, they have tried to give the impression of a change, taking advantage of the "Camara Corporativa", and, if it is true, with the restoration of a Falangist-Monarchy.

ON THE MONARCHY. — There is, he says, no public activity with this goal. There does not exist what we might call psychological receptivity for this measure; but undoubtedly negotiations in this direction are being carried on by high officials of the Franquist Regime. He was in Madrid on the 22 - 23 June 1942, at the time of the visit of Don Juan. His visit was not given any publicity, but there were widespread police precautions. The streets nearest to the palace were closed to the public and a strict watch was kept. There were also arrests of suspicious persons, those who had been in prison etc. But the press gave no sign. The presence of Don Juan was public property. The people seemed completely indifferent. The monarchists displayed no activity either. Perhaps, he added, they took precautionary measures with some people characterised by their adhesion to the Monarchy. His impression is that if the monarchy were restored in Spain it would be in alliance with the Falangists, but the people would still have the impression that the situation had changed. He maintained that there would be the semblance of a coup d'etat, apparently directed against the Falange, but Franco would remain head of the army. If so, things would, fundamentally, remain as they are; that is, the Spanish State would still be entirely subordinated to Hitler, and without changing the policy of "partiality" they now maintain, to one of "neutrality" in the war. They would take this step, in his opinion, only in the last resort, if faced with a second front in Europe, and on the approach of Hitler's defeat, which would, naturally have an immediate repercussion on the countries subject to the Nazis in Europe.

ON THE COMPLETE SUBSERVIENCY OF THE FRANQUIST REGIME TO HITLER. — In Spain the Falangists do not speak of their position of "Neutrality" in the war but of "partiality". This is their attempt to justify the help they give to the Axis. There are German submarine refuelling stations in Vigo, Redondela, and on the Galician coast. This is public property, but every now and then the press publishes a complete denial that Axis submarines refuel in Spain. These denials are very frequent but they do not give much proof. Those who can see tanker-launches carrying on this work laugh at these ridiculous denials. Also on more than one occasion German submarines have been repaired in Spanish dockyards. In Galicia it is quite impossible to get a pot of jam. All the production, which is enormous, goes to the Germans. There are places on the frontier, through which trains pass with produce for Hitler. There are fortifications and artillery on the coasts of Galicia, where the Germans are in command. There are also new aerodromes, some already finished and some under construction by German technicians. They fear an Allied invasion in Galicia. Hitler is assisted not only with food and primary materials, but also with men.

There is continuous propaganda for the sending of volunteers as workers to Germany. Unwilling contingents of soldiers have left for the Blue Division.

THE DIVISION AZUL was a Falangist manoeuvre to give political importance to some Falangist leaders. The manoeuvre turned out very badly. This Division is the most unpopular innovation of the Falange. Our informant talked with 11 survivors of the division, who had returned from the Russian front on account of their wounds. One of them was 18 when he left as a volunteer, without the consent of his family. He asked if he would return to the front again and he answered categorically "My eyes have been opened. I will never return". They all speak of the bad food they are given - mainly vitamin pills and pots of jam. They speak of the courage and fighting spirit of the Russian army, but above all of the contempt with which the Germans treated them. They regarded them as inferior beings and they also said that when they paid compliments to the German women, a Spanish custom, they answered them disdainfully as if they despised them. There were cases of self-mutilation in the ranks of the Blue Division. At any rate their panic was obvious, and they refused to return. Everybody speaks ill of the Division Azul.

Its commander Munos Grande, is the most despised of soldiers. Countless jokes about this division circulate in Spain. Our informant knows several, but cites the following as an example which came from the Club Benevente-Arniches etc. "El Gato Negro" in Madrid. Munos Grande sent a telegram to the political address of the Blue Division at the front - this was the address; F.E.T. URSS M.G. The telegram arrived and no one could decipher it, but finally a soldier said - "This is quite clear", and read the following words - "We were all deceived. Serrano Suner is the only one responsible. Many thanks". ("Fuimos enganados todos. Unico responsable S.Suner. Muchas gracias").

ON THE DANGER OF WAR FOR SPAIN AT HITLER'S SIDE. — His impression is that Spain wi] will continue to assist Hitler as she is doing now but that she will not enter the war. Some of the Generals are in disagreement with the present policy - among them Varela, Aranda, Yague, Queipo etc. Among the soldiers the feeling against the Fascist Regime is very marked. They complain of bad food, treatment, clothes.... too much time spent on marches etc. Queipo, on his return from Italy was rude to Serrano Suner and struck him for which he was sent back to Italy. General Aranda spent a month at Gijon and talked to our informant. They had an interview. Our informant has a real admiration for Aranda, who, he says, is a gentleman. He says that Aranda appeared to be Leftist. Among his remarks he remembers the following words. "We Spaniards are robbers. We are, and we have been for some time. If you walk through the Castellana of Madrid you will see the sumptuous palaces owned by Wexler(?) and Primo de Rivera, etc. built wi with the blood of the Cuban people and the poor Spaniards who went to defend the Spanish colonies. The colonies were lost but the military leaders, whose duty it was to defend them, enriched themselves. Now it is the same thing over again. We made a revolution in order to bring progress to Spain but we have spilt blood in torrents uselessly. The result was not worth the expense of so much blood and so much repression".

In his conversation, although he said nothing against the Germans, he showed contempt for the Falangists who are enriching themselves; he showed particular fear of the treatment meted out to the soldiers in barracks. His impression is that it was a result of the seriousness of the situation through which the Franquist regime was passing and fear of what the outcome might be. He said nothing about the state of the war, and whether he was a partisan of England. In the conversation he had with the General it is possible that there was another aspect, which through discretion he did not repeat.

HUNGER SITUATION. — The situation has become noticeably worse during the last months. For several months already the rationing has been practically nil. The rich buy everything on the Black Market. Our informant, with his wife and five children spent from 9.600 to 10.000 a month on food alone. He says that during the year his expenditure on food - he does not drink nor smoke - was 120.000 pesetas. Of course he had a special clothes budget - 600 pesetas for a suit and 180 to 200 for a pair of shoes. When asked how the workers live who earn 10 to 15 pts. salary or perhaps less, he says very badly. They do not eat, and adds that besides they cannot earn more. If the workers and the people in general had a greater purchasing power, life would be impossible in Spain as they

would also buy on the Black Market and no one would eat. Therefore the privileged classes can eat, and they can only do it if they have a fortune. They accuse the Falangist leaders and the Government of racketeering on the Black Market. Immense fortunes have been made in a night. "They go tobed poor and wake up millionaires" This is the only explanation of the fact that one is allowed two packets of tobacco at 0.90 per person per week, and in the Compania Arrenditaria de Tobacos, which is a state monopoly, one person can buy from 100 to 10,000 packets of the 0.90 at 7.50 a packet. He also relates the following instance. Petrol is scarce in Spain. A litre costs 15. pts. Cars frequently stop in the streets for lack of it. He cites a case which happened in the street of Gijon. A distinguished military personage had no petrol He saw a tank-convoy of Campsa pass and asked the chauffeur for a few litres, and when he refused, he ordered them to give it to him, as a superior officer. The chauffeur refused again, and in a panic explained that he could not do it because he was not carrying petrol but olive oil, without being able to explain which military leader or leaders it was destined for, although he knew it was to be sold/contraband.
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<u>SITUATION OF THE PRISONERS.</u> — He cannot calculate the number of prisoners there are actually at the moment although he asserts that it is at any rate enormous. By reason of his position he has visited prisons and fortresses, and is terrified at the terrible treatment in the "Comisarias" Civil Guard barracks etc. On more than one occasion he says he has saved more than one Republican from certain death. The prison that he knows is the Coto at Gijon. It is at the moment completely full. The treatment is inhuman. They do not give the prisoners a cell number but allocate them only a square meter for sleeping, standing etc. That is to say that when a prisoner arrives he is given a metre of ground. Nor do they give them a mess. Lately they agreed to give them a peseta daily for maintenance. He does not understand why there are not more deaths, as with one peseta a day in the prison canteen one can only buy bread. They took the miners who were prisoners to camps so that they could work in the mines. They gave them 50 cts. day wages for bachelors and a peseta for a wife and 50 cts. for each child, to the married ones. They keep them working ten and twelve hours daily in the mine. The number of shootings has diminished. It is imputed to the fact that "almost all must have been tried".

<u>THE CLERGY</u> — He says that the clergy have never intervened in politics from the pulpit as much as they do now, sometimes inveighing against the Franquist Government, and at other times, naturally, defending the policy of the Falange. Numbers of the priests and monks continually expound their view on the political regime and the points on which they differ from it. As a characteristic example he relates that about two months ago in Gijon there was a house used provisionally as the Church of San Jose, which was destroyed during the war. A priest, professor at Salamanca, gave five lectures. In these lectures he spoke almost exclusively on political questions, and attacked the Franquist Government for their method of supply and distributing the foodstuffs among the people, saying that what was wanted was more rationing and less Franquist regulations. He also advocated the necessity of a pardon for all condemned people and other things that our informant does not remember. 500 people went to the first lecture, but ~~in~~ the second one, when they heard what the subject was, was attended by literally all Gijon.

<u>RECONSTRUCTION.</u> — Reconstruction is only done as a matter of private enterprise by proprietors and churches. In Madrid, the Montana barracks, the prison, the workers districts, damaged by the bombardments, remain as they are. Nothing has been rebuilt. The Arguellos district has been partly rebuilt. Every owner has taken-in-hand his own property. The Franquist reconstruction policy is a myth. The people mock at it and make jokes, among them the following - In Gijon they ~~[illegible]~~ erected a building marked "Reconstruction Office"; in the hallway there were two doors, one marked "for partial destruction" and the other "for total destruction". So a well-known Asturian who was visiting the office about his house which had been partially destroyed went into that department. Once inside, there were two more doors - "for those who have some resources, and for those who have not". He went through the first door, there was another room with two doors - "for those who are Falangists, and for those who are not". He went through the second door and found himself in the street.

FACTS ABOUT RESISTANCE. — In Spain acts of sabotage are carried out on the railways, factories, etc., although he cannot decide whether these are organised actions decreed by illegal organisations of Spanish Republicans or are spontaneous acts of workers who are enemies of the Falangist regime. He does not know any concrete instance of the activity of the workers organisations, C.P.S. etc., but when he was in Madrid on the 22nd and 23rd of last June, there was a film on called "We Thieves are Honest Men". There were thousands of lampoons done on that, some very clever and suggestive which were scattered throughout Madrid. According to our informant, one day the lampoons appeared printed in the same type lettering as the poster, with the following - "words of the Caudillo, from a recent speech". For this reason there were arrests and a number of beatings in Madrid. He also saw how the people had lost their fear. In the Gran Via in Madrid a man cried out that he was not only red but communist, and he could not endure this any more. Apparently the people told him to be silent but he did not take any notice. The R.A.F. bombardment of Cologne, which was known in Spain from the English broadcasts, was celebrated almost all over Spain by the people who stayed up much later than the usual time in the streets, drinking in bars, etc. He says that even the police took part as they are largely Anglophile.

GUERILLEROS — He says that there are many in Asturias; there is a state of war. There are Moors and the 'Tercio'. The guerilleros appear occasionally in the villages and avenge the deaths of anti-Fascists who have been murdered by the Falange. They take food and clothes. Once his car was stopped by a group of them in the street of Llanes. They were dressed as Falangists. When he showed his papers as Consul of Cuba and proved he was not the previous consul Pena, a known Falangist, they saluted him and said - "Long live the people of Cuba". He says that although they behaved correctly he was rather afraid. He knows that a short time ago the guerilleros of Campocaso had fight with the Civil Guard and killed several people, among them some well known Falangists in the district. It appears that the Guerilleros are magnificently armed.

FUTURE PROSPECTS. — He believes firmly that Hitler will be defeated this year. He has great faith in the people of Spain and France, etc. Nazi-dominated Europe will arise, since this life cannot continues "even one winter more". He is confident that the U.S.S.R. will not be defeated; on the contrary the Soviet battlefronts will be the end of Hitlerism. He believes that England and the U.S., in opening a second front, will count on the help of peoples oppressed by the Nazis, in France or in Spain, and things will move rapidly. The Spanish people are waiting for the invasion of the Allies in order to take arms in the streets against their rulers. The Spaniards trust in the Allies and hope that the Second Front will not be long delayed. Soviet and English broadcasts are listened to; they follow the progress of the war. They hate the Germans and the Italians. Those who before supported Franco are now his enemies and partisans of the defeat of Hitler. The Spanish people hope to escape from this situation by the defeat of Hitler and trust in the Restoration of the Republic.

Cuba. — 28.7.42.

REPORT No.355

ANGEL MARTINEZ, 26 years old, is a student from Bilbao. He is not a consistent Fascist or anti-Fascist either, as his opinions are rather confused.

SPANISH ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE WAR. — He says that no one speaks of the war because they take the view that Spain will not enter it. All the world thinks that Germany will lose the war because her enemies are very strong. He says that nothing is said about the second front. About the Blue Division he says that the people are against those who went to Russia, chiefly because they think them mad. He talked to a friend of his who came back from Russia, who was thoroughly glad to be back. He said that our entire war was child's play compared with this one and the way the Russians fight. He says that some Leftists were in the Division through hunger, and some were Falangist adventurers, and in spite of its being said that all are volunteers it is obvious that many were forced into it. He says that in the Gibraltar demonstration, there were

only four Falangists, "who do not know what war means".

In general he pretends to be slow and tries to get out of the questions with trifling answers. We think it is because he feels constrained by a Falangist who is with him. He declares that he is against Serrano Suner, but he says he is quite favourable to Franco because he promulgates laws which favour the people and is a partisan of neutrality besides. When we give him examples, especially that of the Blue Divison, to show him what Franco's neutrality amounts to, he maintains that they are all volunteers. He says they are always speaking in favour both of Germany and the Allies, because Franco wishes to stand well with both sides. He says that when the state of "non-belligerence" was established the people were content because before that they were afraid of being involved in the war. This fear, he says , is not so strong now. When asked what he would do if he were in Spain and the Spanish people were involved in the war he answered - "Iwould go to the mountains or spend a bullet on the first officer who tried to force me". He says that many Spaniards would do the same if Spain were forced into the war, because it would be so terrible.

SUPPORT GIVEN BY THE FRANQUIST REGIME TO HITLER. — He does not know the proporations of this assistance but he says that volunteers continue to leave for the front. In the same way he thinks that if the Germans did not take provisions from Spain all the needs of the country would be supplied. With this idea he complains against the Germans and against Serrano Suner above all. Falangists in uniform are now only seen in parades.

WORKERS FOR GERMANY — He says that a few months ago they sent a great quantity of workers to Germany. They were almost all Galicians, and very few from Bilbao. A little later they were returned because "they were being deceived", "getting into difficulties". When he was asked to be more precise he said that when they got to Germany they asked to be returned to Spain, and so they did with almost all of them.

TERROR — He says there are no persecutions or executions. When the execution of Larrinaga was mentioned he said that the people had no knowledge of these crimes. About the refugees he says that the people talk of their returning to Spain when the war is over.

FRICTION — On this point, without being questioned, he says that the Requetes and Falangists cannot meet, because when the two parties were amalgamated the Requetes were pushed into the background, and that is the reason they prefer the monarchy. On this point he says that he has heard nothing about the restoration nor about the differences between certain leading factions in the army.

RESISTANCE. — At first he said that no one speaks about the war or any other problems because the people are afraid. But afterwards he said that people remember the Republic and how well they lived then. He does not report any example of resistance to the war. He says that the Nationalists have a lot of influence, but not so other parties, among them ours. Prieto has no influence either. In general it is obvious that he is ignorant of many things or does not dare to speak of them.

UNITY — All the anti-Fascists are united, but he gives no details.

FUTURE PROSPECTS — When the war ends with the victory of the Allies Franco will fall, and he thinks that the Republic will return. He thinks it will happen soon because the situation is unbearable, although "there is no need to think of Revolution" He says that if the Germans invaded Spain the people would rise. As we said, he is studying for his bachelors degree. His matriculation costs, including the price of books, about 500 pts; before it used to cost 200. He says that studying has become very difficult. He says that all students belong to the S.E.U. although it is not obligatory, but they are coerced, and they join in order to be in a good position.

ON CONDITIONS OF LIFE — He explains that in the rationing they allow a K. of potatoes per person a week, a quarter litre of olive oil, 200 gr. of vegetables etc. No one can live on that except those who have a lot of money; the rest go

hungry. The workers, who are paid the same salary as before, cannot afford to deal on the Black Market and he says that there have been cases at Altos Hornos where workers have fallen dead from hunger at work. This causes discontent although it is not openly expressed. Now they have appointed wardens in the factories in Bilbao, and the workers receive larger rations. Here he is contradicting himself, because sometimes he says that these wardens were demanded by the workmen (which would be a demonstration of resistance) and sometimes he says that the directors asked for them. He says that in spite of everything he cannot understand why when food production is on the increase the workers are so badly fed. Later he says that they watch them closely and force them to work without ceasing. He relates (although we know no details) that the middle class does not feel the pinch like the workers.

POPULAR ORGANISATIONS. — They exist just as they did before. He cites the Club Andauchu which organises excursions. These organisations are not controlled by the Falange. Young people are as gay as before, and dance and go to the mountains.

ARMY — He refers above all the discontent of the families because their sons have to spend four years in the army. He says that they demonstrate their discontent and that they all want to be demobilised. But this open discontent is confined, he says later, to private conversation.

REPORT No.356.

Card

LUIS FERNANDEZ - a Mexican student, who has always lived in Gijon, Spain. His family is comfortably off and he is going to Mexico to join his father as he lived on what his father sent him in dollars and when this was forbidden he decided to leave Spain. He is an ardent Falangist. He is ignorant of all problems of the working and middle class. He only associated with people who were very well off, and especially with Falangist students. He is very cultured.

He says that he was in Gijon at the beginning of the war and remained there till now; as he was a Mexican he was molested by neither party.

HUNGER — He roundly asserts that there is no hunger, only a scarcity of certain articles. That with rationing "there is not enough for one mouthful" but that he never felt the want of food. That the olive oil ration is 1/8 of a litre every 15 days, and so on for all other commodities. That the rationing of bread (black bread, since white can only be got on the Black Market) is arranged in three categories, and for that there are three classes of cards - poor, middleclass, and rich. That the ration of the poor is larger, as they have less money for buying on the Black Market. That at Belmonte, Asturias, the rations are double what they are in Gijon. That rationing is different in each province, and even in different places in the same province. He says that no one is interested in politics, that everyone's daily preoccupation is food. He says that "it used to make him laugh to see well-to-do old people who in all their conversations spoke of nothing but the price of beans and bread etc." When he was asked for facts he says that it is obvious that the poor (by which he means the workers) who earn 10 or 12 pts. cannot buy anything contraband and live on their rations, which causes them to suffer somewhat from hunger and be very discontented. He says that the hunger is caused by the war and the blockade, because as soon as the Spanish war was over there was abundance of everything and free exchange, and as soon as the European war began there was scarcity and rationing. He also says at the same time that the cause of the scarcity is that the Government has bought thousands and thousands of tons of food in case the situation gets any worse. That this is good policy of the "Generalissimo's" and that the Falange is doing a lot of propaganda, saying that it is much better to keep the food now, when a lot is coming from Argentine and the U.S., than to eat it now and then if the situation gets worse, have nothing. That the people who are "good stuff" accept it, but most people protest and complain. He says that another cause of hunger are the Provisions Committees, which, like those of Gijon, are composed of bandits who sell as contraband the articles they are supposed to divide among the population.

ENTRANCE INTO THE WAR — He says that Spain will not enter the war, that this is the opinion of everybody. That all approve the foreign policy of the Government,

which is very intelligent, as it knows how to maintain a balance in the situation and remain neutral. He says that the Spaniards are very favourable to Germany because they could have penetrated into Spain and taken Gibraltar, thus closing the Mediterranean to the English, but that it is "a German idea that one must be pleasant". After arguing a little with him I said that Germany might not have invaded Spain because she was not interested in dispersing her troops, considering that she needs them all for fighting against Russia. Later he confessed that all the Spaniards would fight against the Germans in case they invade Spain because the Spaniards are very fond of their independence, and would fight anyone who wished to enter Spain. The Spanish Government is a partisan of neutrality and the immense majority of the Falange think that Spain should send volunteers to Russia but "not enter the war" because they do not know that many thousands of Spaniards would be killed.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE WAR. — He says that in Spain much petrol has been stored and that new tanks are under construction. He says that this too "is being kept for the bad times", and in case anyone tries to invade Spain the '39, '40 and '42 drafts are mobilised. The '41 draft has been sent home. The '42 draft was called up with a three months' delay. They spend two years in military service. There is also a pre-military service for Youth Organisations. This is not obligatory but it is counted as time spent in the service and for that reason every one does it.

INVASION — He says that there are no Germans in Spain. He has seen none and so on. If there are any they are disguised as peasants. He is not certain that they are making fortifications in the north of Spain. Gijon is in fact defended by two ships, one of them a "sulta-tacos" and if there was an English invasion there "they would be the masters".

HELP TO THE NAZIS. — He says that it is not a fact there are more factories in the north of Spain which were not there before, and they do not work for the Germans. That the Germans say in their propaganda that they mean to suspend armament manufacture, because they have enough. That Germany is selling a quantity of war material to Turkey, which is a proof that they have no need of it, therefore armaments are not manufactured in Spain nor exported. But he takes the opposite view, that Spain receives material from Germany; there are frequent consignments, mostly tanks. What Spain does send, not, "as some say because the Germans take it", but because the Government gives it very willingly, is food. Every day many loaded open cars leave Spain and the people talk of it and are discontented, but those are only those who "think with their stomachs".

DESPATCH OF WORKERS. — He cannot be accurate about the quantity but many thousands have gone, all volunteers. He says it is quite natural for a man with no food or job to go there where they eat well and can send money home and because all the "poor" are like that. That is the reason they "go as volunteers and are glad to better their position".

DIVISION AZUL — 40,000 went, all volunteers, among them some quite well-known people and distinguished Falangists. The number of volunteers was so great that they had to close the lists and there are many thousands still waiting for their turn to go when they send reinforcements. In April 3,000 who had been r relieved came home, that they were all very happy. He had many friends who had gone and others who were ready to leave Our informant asked them if they had had many losses but the legionaries said that this was a lie, they had had very few deaths. There had been many wounded, to the point that not one of them had not been wounded at least once. All those who come home have been wounded. They say that it is very cold but they stand it very well and are much congratulated by the Germans. They wear the German uniform and the red cap. They say they behaved marvellously in Russia and gave the Russians a beating. That the Russians are brave, that is why they attack them from behind, but that they do not know how to fight and do not have good officers, although they have an abundance of material. "They attack in mass formation and do not care about their losses, so that very few reach the trenches." That men of the division always fought in a numerical superiority of ten to one and caused the Russians many losses. They were congratulated by the Nazis and often appeared in the German war communiques. That on occasions they established a salient on a river and resisted for more than ten days, that as they fought they sang and sang and that many Spaniards

had been decorated with the iron cross. Our informant thinks that they have more losses than they confess to (all those he spoke with were Falangist students), and that in the casualty lists published only the names of the most important are given. In Spain everyone admires the courage of the Legionaries and praises them twice as much as the Germans do. He insists that they are all volunteers, and says in his own words - "a few idealists and the rest, the immense majority, because they were in a bad condition in Spain and could get not work or food. They went into the Div. Azul in order to earn a good living because they are paid at the German rate and a war bonus, plus an allowance and large indemnity in case of death". Besides, if they are brave they can desert, when they go on leave they have millions of pts. in their pockets and can "put on airs and pose as heroes in their uniforms and their iron crosses in Spain". He says that although the lists are closed, there are thousands who are ready to leave at a day's notice, and that he "knows several." They said they celebrated Christmas very happily in February as they sent them tobacco and food from Spain.

He says that in Spain there is a lot of talk about the war, although no one bothers about politics at all now, and only about food. There are all sorts of parties, partisans of the Allies and the Germans, and among his friends the people are mostly partisans of the Germans; he also thinks the majority of Spaniards are on the side of the Germans and among the 150 in his university hall only two were partisans of Democracy and they had fierce arguments in loud voices until the director came. The partisans of the Nazis maintained that anyone who wanted England to win was not a Spaniard because if the Democracies win Prieto will come back and all the Reds of the Republic, and there will be a government of Leftists and in this fashion they attack the defenders of England. The students say - "we are very fond of Germany, because she helps us to be free of communism and is now defending us against it." He says that this appeals to many people who also hate communism.

SECOND FRONT. — He says that no one believes it will be established. The Germans cannot invade England, nor can the English invade Europe. All Spaniards would unite to defend themselves from the English. They would do the same if the Germans invaded Spain.

ON THE WAR.— He said that the Spanish idea was that it would last five or six years and that when they were all exhausted there would be an armistice or negotiated peace. This is the opinion of the people on the Right and the Falangists; he does not know the views of the rest. Franco said in a speech - "If the Russians make a breach and arrive at Berlin, he will send two million men to fight communism". They do not attack the Republicans much, but blame the Russian agents and the Communists for all that is happening in Spain. He says that in Hendaye there are hundreds of aeroplanes and many fields full of tanks. The Germans have war material on the frontier in fantastic quantities. He thinks that is in order to be in a position to assist either France or Spain if it were necessary.

FRICTION — He says that there are no disagreements between the Requetes, Falangists or Catholics; they are all united, and if there were any friction there are no scenes or quarrels because the "Generalissimo" would shoot them.

FRENTE DE LA JUVENTUD. — He says that it was a failure, that at the beginning many people were excited by the propaganda, then they got tired and practically the Youth Front does not exist.

STUDENTS. — ~~These are all~~ ~~xxxx~~ very happy to be members of the S.E.U. because they avoid military service. The S.E.U. is obligatory. The only corps they have to belong to is the University Militia. In summer they go to camps where they have military instruction and are commanded by students who are officers with some officers from the Army.

RESISTANCE OF THE PEOPLE — There is none at all. In Spain there is a totalitarian Government favourable to the Germans. In totalitarian countries there are no protests or any resistance because anyone who resisted would be shot. There are discontented people but they are silent, they do not speak because they cannot. I have seen no inscription on the walls of Gijon, the only thing there are a few robbers, the so-called Guerilleros, who rob, kill

and assassinate. Three months ago at the Puerto de Somiedo, they machine-gunned a bus with travellers in it and the Civil Guard retreated. They are assisted by the discontented peasants and their families. If they came to Franco, with their hands free of blood, he would pardon them".

TERROR — At the beginning they shot many people, especially to pay off personal scores. Now it is done through the tribunals. It is a fact that shooting continues, but only for those condemned to death.

FUTURE PROSPECTS — Perhaps the end of the war will solve all these problems. The Governments of Spain will impose peace, law and order as soon as the war is over.

RESTORATION OF THE MONARCHY. — All a lie; all respectable people support Franco and the disagreements there are between the parties do not constitute a problem.

DISAGREEMENTS IN THE ARMY — He says there are none. Quelpo was sent outside Spain diplomatically, as a drunkard and a rascal, as all the army is with Franco and Hitler, who have saved Spain and Europe from Communism.

RECONSTRUCTION — He says there is a lot being done in the way of reconstruction. In Gijon they have built hundreds of new houses and the town is very much changed. The people who have money are afraid it will lose its value, daily, and either build or use the money for business. 4.8.42.

REPORT No.357

JOSE PAGOS, a peasant, resident in Cuba for 11 years, returned to Spain in 1940. At that time he was a Franquist. He is very backward and extremely suspicious. At first he refused to speak, especially when he was told that he must talk to a journalist. He knows very little, since he lived in a small village in the district of Estrado and only left it to embark. He often says that he knows nothing, and can only give information about his village that is not political. Is a moderate anti-Falangist, and continues to defend Franco, of whom he has a high opinion, in many instances. The first thing he asserts is that in Spain there is not so much hunger as they say here. There is a scarcity caused by the war but it is just the same as it is everywhere, those with money eat and those without go hungry. It is not true that they requisition the peasants' crops, at least in the part of Spain he knows. He says that everyone says in Spain that they control the crops, and even if they force them to sell at the standard rate they leave the peasants enough to eat. It is obvious that everyone makes fun of the order and hides the produce "but it is not that they requisition them, but that the Government controls produce and they have to sell it at fixed rates." He says that he has a brother in the army and the soldiers are very well fed. The food is well prepared but rather scarce. In Estrada they get the ~~xxxxx~~ two regulation loaves just as before the war, but in Coruna bread is scarcer in the barracks. What everybody wants is for the war to end, anyhow, what is wanted is peace and tranquillity. When asked about the second front he says everyone is hoping for the English to* come and give orders in his house but when the people are so anxious they want something to happen to change the situation and see if it improves". On further questioning he confesses that 90% of the population are against Franco - not on his own account but on account of the hunger and misery there is.

There is no repression. People are only executed legally, through the tribunals.

He says that no one wishes Spain to enter the war, and Franco, "if he could, would have been on the other side already, but as he has the Germans on the frontier he cannot do it". The rich and the monarchists are discontented, and there are many people who were deceived and do not like the present regime.

Asked whether the people support the Germans or the Allies, he says - some on each side. A little later he says everybody hates the Germans and is afraid of their encroachments except the Falangists.

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THE DIVISION AZUL, he says was voluntary, at least "the papers say so although I do not know". (His most frequent phrase is "the papers say so but nobody knows"). He asserts that there were many volunteers and one went from the municipal government of Estrada, his village; he was the assistant to a high official. He does not know anything about the survivors. He gives the address of a Cuban who arrived in the "Comillas" with an amputated foot, a volunteer in the Blue Division. (The father of the legionary, when questioned at the port, said he was lame through an accident). He confirms the stories about Queipo and Yague, In Vigo he heard the following story - The Governor of Burgos was imprisoned for black marketeering and a son of his, a lieutenant in the army, went to Madrid to see Serrano Suner, who refused to see him and told him to see his secretary; the lieutenant refused and was referred to the Aide-de-Camp. The Aide-de-Camp unfortunately asked him what he wanted and the Governor's son said - "I wanted to put two bullets in S. Suner, but as I can't I'll put them in you instead"; he shot him and left him dead.

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A cow is worth 3.000 pts. The Civil Guard turn a blind eye to the contraband sales of the peasants because it suits them.

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ATTITUDE OF THE SPANIARDS TO THE WAR AGAINST HITLER. — He says that in Spain there are two parties, one which supports the Germans and wishes for their triumph and the other which sympathises and hopes for the victory of the Allies. In the first class S. Suner stands out, it includes all the Falange, some generals, and the middle class, government employees etc. The other class includes the majority of Requêtes, the rich whose money is in London, the workers, and all the poor in general. He says that in Spain it is only permitted to speak in favour of the Germans, and that the partisans of the Allies speak only ~~in secret and among trusted friends~~. With the passage of time, owing to the German campaign in Russia, which the Falangists said would end in a week, there is growing a loss of confidence in the German triumph, both among the partisans of the Allies, who were dispirited at the beginning of the Russian campaign, and among the supporters of Germany themselves. He says that in Spain, except for a couple of Falangist fools, no ~~one wants the war, not even the army chiefs, much less the soldiers.~~ He really thinks that if they gave the order to march, no one would protest, but he does not insist on what would definitely happen. The German defeats in Russia, which are considered very important in Spain, have greatly contributed to raise the morale of the enemies of the Falange, who are now resisting it openly. (He refers to the Requetes and in ~~general~~ general to the partisans of England who are very numerous). The entry of the U.S. into the war was not considered very important, because German propaganda, which is very widespread, says that the submarines sank all the ships which came to Europe and that there was very little use in producing a quantity of war material if it never reaches Europe. He adds that the people realised that the Germans were

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exaggerating, since in the Russian Campaign they said that the Russians were defeated already and nevertheless months passed and the war went on. Our informant did not know the existence of the Anglo-Soviet and Soviet-American pacts, although he heard some agreement spoken of, but he never knew exactly what it was. There was a lot of talk about the second front, and it is thought it will be in France. When asked what, in the event of the English landing in Spain, the attitude of the people would be, he says he thinks the Requetes would unite with them. When I told him I thought they had sent a brother of mine to the Div. Azul. he made a face as if they had sent him to the devil. "I am sorry, because those who go to Russia in general do not return, and those who do come back are crippled for life". He says that to the Div. Azul was joined by the unfortunates who are, with their families, dying of hunger, and adventurers and robbers; some too because they were soldiers already and did not dare say no because they would have cut their throats if they had. He says that in the beginning a group of 40 left Santander and a few months ago ten came home, armless, legless or tubercular, the rest died of it. One of them, a captain, and tubercular, told some of his family and friends that all the German propaganda on the Russian war was an absolute lie. That the Russians never retreated until they were killed or received an order to retreat. That it is a lie to say that they have no leaders, and similarly that they have no material. He knew better than anybody what the war in Russia had already cost the Germans.

During the winter they had lost millions of men and a great deal of material. It was terifying what went on there. He says that those who come back from Russia are forbidden to speak of what they see there and therefore it is impossible to get more details. However they tell their friends in confidence.

ASSISTANCE GIVEN BY THE FRANCO-FALANGIST REGIME TO HITLER. — The reinforcements they send to the Div. Azul grow less each time. No one wants to go because the stories of the survivors are gradually passed round. He adds that the Germans pay them very highly. They give them 3.000 pts. just for crossing the frontier. A few months ago a few left Santander to concentrate in San Sebastian. It is there that they train. While before, they made propaganda out of those who were going to Russia, and saw them off at the Station, now it is done secretly.

All foodstuffs are sent to Germany, that is why there is famine in Spain. "I wish you could see all the things they send. Imagine that one can't get olive oil, which used to be so abundant in Spain". They say that in Bilbao and in Reinosa (?) and other places the factories work for the Germans. According to him there are no German soldiers in Spain, only technicians. Germans in civilian clothes are particularly common. He added that the Germans spend millions on propaganda and there are many newspapers, reviews, pamphlets etc. which are distributed gratis. The people, as a result of so much propaganda, do not know what to think on some points. They say - "If what the Germans say of Russia is true that country is doomed to disappear; there is nothing but savagery there". He says that some German propaganda postcards show Roosevelt and Churchill dressed as prostitutes, and Stalin in the middle embracing them. The people do not like this kind of propaganda. As for the German infiltration into the country, he limits himself to saying that they are the masters in Spain. He gives no data. He says that the Falange is very much weakened, that only timeservers and those who do business, thanks to the positions they occupy in it, are its supporters. Whereas, when it began, everybody wished to be Falangists, now no one takes any notice, and some people are careful to conceal the fact that they are Falangists. They say that the Requetes appear very upset. They were the ones who fought hardest in the war and now the Falangists are taking advantage of the victory. He says they do not give positions to the Requetes, and when the Falangists control the syndicates they do not give them work either. There is a great deal of discontent among the Requetes, and they have already begun to speak openly against the Falangists and those whom they blame for the present situation in Spain. They accuse them of being robbers. He says that they have printed broadsheets about the Falange, which they scatter on the streets and stick on walls at night. He adds that the syndicates have many members, because membership is obligatory, but if it were not so no one would belong. They oblige the young men to enter the "Frente [illegible] de la Juventud", although many are already losing their fear, and

do not join, or, if they make them members against their will, do not pay the dues. Referring to the despatch of workers to Germany, he says the numbers were high because they offered them a good salary and food as well, but he has the impression that they were deceived, like the members of the Div. Azul. He does not know any more details.

FRICTION BETWEEN THE RULING CLASS IN SPAIN. — In the army there is a group h headed by Yague and Queipo, who are opposed to Spain enterin; the war, and the Germans and Italians controlling Spain. He says that in conjunction with the Requetes and other individuals in the army, they were preparing a coup against Franco, and principally against S. Suner, who is the worst hated of all, but it was found out and no one knows what happed/to Yague and Queipo. General Espinosa de los Monteros also had something to do with it, but he does not know exactly what his part was. Referring to Yague, he says that he was dismissed from the Air Ministry when he made a speech in favour of releasing the prisoners. Queipo refused to allow the Italians to have any olive oil. The situation of the soldiers is very bad. They hardly eat at all, and are very badly clothed. It is pitiful to see them. They all wish to be demobilised as soon as possible. The '39 draft has been demobilised and he thinks the first reserve of the '40 draft as well. He thinks it is because they cannot keep them in barracks for want of food.

THE PEOPLE'S RESISTANCE TO THE WAR AND THE REGIME — According to our informant the state of mind of the people is one of extreme hostility towards the present state of affairs, although it is not obviously shown. The Reds are in hiding. He says that the only people who are openly fighting against the Falange and the Regime in power are the Requetes. That besides the pamphlets we have referred to above, there often appear on the walls, lampoons and posters against the Falange. He remembers one which said more or less - "Famine and Theft, that is the Falange". There appeared another very like it, but he does not know what it said because they rubbed it out at once. He says the Requetes also accused the Falangists of being cowardly assassins who are only useful for doing mass assassinations ("dar Paseos").

The people take a sympathetic view of these actions of the Requetes. In the queues people xxxxxxxxx speak against the Government and the Falange. There are many prisoners. When the "nationalists" first entered Santander they killed people in thousands. The Falangists held many "paseos". They went on killing, only less than at first. The prisoners died of their harsh treatment, many were tubercular. He does not know if they give them organised assistance. Probably relations and friends. He does not know of any activity of the party, or the J.S.U. The Reds are very carefully watched. The only ones who do anything are the Requetes. In general our informant does not know any of our organisations because he was very young when the war began. The only thing he says is "the Falangists are like those they used to call the F.A.I. They go to a house, steal, take a man, take him and shoot him, and then it is finished". We could not get any information about the Union Nacional, although he gives the impression that he does not know anything about it.

He has no ideas on the future prospects. He thinks that this depends on England; there is talk that the Requetes wish to set up a King who is not a Bourbon. He does not know anything/the restoration of Don Juan. The Falangists are enemies of the Monarchy and the people do not worry much about this problem. Referring to the attack on S. Suner; Espinosa de los Monteros, Ambassador in Berlin, had on one of his visits to Madrid, a violent quarrel with Suner and in consequence resigned. He reports that then he was appointed Captain General of the Sixth Region, Burgos, and on taking over the post he made a speech in which he attacked the Falange. He reports that as a consequence he was violently dismissed. A few days later a son of the general who is a lieutenant in the army, shot at S. Suner several times, he thinks in Madrid. Arrese was wounded in consequence. The press said nothing about it. They published a notice that the Secretary of the Party was undergoing an abdominal operation.

The Italian submarine which entered Santander was damaged in the Caribbean. A few miles from Santander, and in full view of everybody, it was attacked very near the coast by two English aeroplanes which all but sank it. He says it entered harbour, listing over on one side. The English aeroplanes were not able to finish the sinking because German pursuit planes forced them to retire. When asked where the (German) planes came from he said Irun. (He gives

the impression that he does not know really where their base was).

30.7.42.

REPORT 371

A young Basque 24 or 25 years old. By profession a metal-worker. Up to the beginning of the war he was working with an uncle in Zaragoza. He remained in the battle zone throughout the whole war and was mobilised in Franco's army. Is a Basque nationalist, like almost all his family. Although a workman by profession he always worked with his relations, almost always as foreman, or at least as manager. He has no political point of view nor are his class feelings very developed. He has never belonged to any syndicate. After the war was over he worked in Bilbao in a wire factory where there were about a thousand workmen. He finally left work in order to devote himself to the Black Market because, acording to him, it was impossible to live on what he was paid at the factory. He lived in Nationalist circles, they were the only ones with which he was connected. For this reason his report is rather incomplete, and in some cases lacks objectivity. He is rather reserved.

ATTITUDE OF THE SPANIARDS TOWARDS THE ANTI-HITLER WAR. — In the graphic words of the informant, 90% of Spaniards are partisans of England. The workers, peasants, petit-bourgeois, capitalists, and some of the clergy, (later he told us the majority of the Basque cures) are on the side of England, although in a passive way, and against Germany and the Falange.

The general opinion which is expressed in conversations between groups of friends, and lately also in the street, is that the defeat of Germany is inevitable, due, according to our informant, to the fact that the Allies have more economic resources and more primary materials. It is thought that the United States will be a very important factor in the realisation of victory. Also the defeats suffered by Germany on the Eastern front contribute to stressing this opinion.

In Spain everyone is tired of the war, and no one wishes Spain to take part in it. There people are in a real panic on this score. Our informant thinks that if Franco should decide to fight, in view of the terrorist nature of the Regime, the people would have to obey. Later in another conversation he said that there were people who, in that case, would hide in the mountains.

The defeats suffered by Germany on the Eastern front were well known there and contributed to increase the people's confidence. He says that they said there that, in spite of their resistance, it was obvious that the Russians were not sufficiently prepared to face a power like Germany.

The entry of the United States into the war was received with joy by the people who interpreted it as an event destined to shorten the war, of which they are all very tired over there.

The Ratification of the Anglo-Russian Pact and the American-Russian agreement is known there, although the range and content of the pact and the agreement were not known. He says that the Falangist press; only said that these nations had promised not to make a separate peace.

He does not know the agreement about the second front, although this subject is very often spoken of, with the idea that it would be the final blow to Germany. Over there they think that the opening of the Second Front will result in the rising of the French people, perhaps the Spanish people too. With this idea in mind the people often discuss possible landing places. It is thought that ~~this will take place in France,~~ although some say it might also happen in Spain. The opening of the second front would be received with joy by all.

The attitude of the people to the "Division Azul" is frankly hostile. It has no sympathy from the people, even from the very moment the recruiting was begun. He says that in the beginning a few volunteers gave their names, mainly Falangists who wished to earn merit in order to improve their position in Spain. Others went because their position in Spain was desperate and they thought it might improve if they left it. Some, who were in the army, found themselves in the position of not being able to refuse, because if they had they would have got into trouble. But they all went in the belief that they would see the war from a distance, and that they were really being sent as a symbolic deputation for the Moscow parade. He says the press made propaganda, asserting that the Spanish soldier could fight in all climates, as they had shown at Teruel. He

says that when the names of the first casualties arrived, the people were glad and said "that will teach them to interfere in what does not concern them". The survivors came back disillusioned. They repent of having gone. The majority of them come back ill or crippled. He adds that the war in Russia is worse than the Press reports.it; the Spanish war was child's play compared with it. The Falangists are more reserved and make no public criticisms like the others but among their friends they also say that it was terrible. They went into action in fact just before the Russian counter-offensive began, and received the full brunt. They had many losses through bullets and the cold. Some of those who came back crippled have German iron crosses for which they get a pension, our informant does not know the amount, from the German government.

SUPPORT GIVEN BY THE FRANQUIST REGIME AND THE FALANGE TO HITLER. — Our informant does not know in what quantity they send reinforcements to the Blue Division. He thinks that there is some exaggeration on this point on the part of the Falangist Press which tries in this way to encourage enthusiasm among the young men. He knows that the place they report to and train is San Sebastian, and that from there they leave for the front. He thinks that they are still sending people, but they are only "reliefs" for those who come home. He adds that those who go to the Division Azul today, with very few exceptions, do it against their will. They get the majority of those who go from the barracks. He says that many workmen went to Germany on account of the lack of food and work. He does not know how many but he thinks a fair quantity. He says that the people take these things calmly generally, because they cannot do anything against them. He only heard that in Irun there had been some scene with the Blue Division or with the workers who were going to Germany but he gives no actual details, saying that it is dangerous to try and know too much.

In Spain the most fervent supporters of the Nazis are - Suner, Munos Grande, Moscardo and other generals, and especially the "idealist" Falangists, or those who committed injustices or profiteered and are afraid of "the tables being turned".

He says that the Falange is only the shadow of what it was during the war. That at the beginning many people joined it for safety's sake, but now it is a dead thing that no one takes any notice of. The same happened with the "Flechas", "Frente de la Juventud" etc. The syndicates have many members, because membership is obligatory in order to get work. The workers would not join them if they could help it. He says that all the directors are Falangist bureaucrats who take advantage of their position to steal all they can. He cites as an example the fact that employers are obliged to pay something as a contribution to the subsidy allocated to workmen with large families, but he says that the Falangists do not pay it to anybody, but spend it themselves. For these and other similar reasons there is a lot of discontent among the employers.

Our informant says that they are still sending large quantities of food to Germany, also iron and other materials. The people know that if there is famine in Spain it is because of the Germans and the "Black Marketeers"

Asked about the production of the metal factories in Bilbao, he says that they are working at pressure, but he does not know if it is war material. He knows that pig-iron is being sent to France, he imagines it is intended for Germany. Iron ore is also sent to France by sea.

FRICTION AMONG THE RULING CLASSES. — He knows that in the army there is a surge of feeling against the Falange, but he says that it has no outside repercussions. The only incident known there was the case of Yague and Queipo de Llano. In general there is a great feeling against the Falange among the soldiers. The consequence is that they make life impossible for Falangists in the army.

He says that the majority of the Basque Priests are enemies of Germany, of the Falange and of Franco. They are very indignant about the executions of nationalist priests carried out by Franco. Even today there are many of them in prisons. He says that the priests devote voluntary masses to praying that Spain may not enter the war.

He says that other members of the clergy, although they are opposed to the Catholic persecutions in Germany and Poland, support Franco because they believe that only with his help can they preserve their positions.

He adds that the richest and most influential people there do not wish to hold official posts because they feel that there will be a change in Spain and they do not wish to have the responsibility of the crimes committed by others. Official posts are occupied by a series of bandits.

Hatred for the Falange is general in the majority of social classes. He says that even those who belonged to the Falange before, young students, employees or just rich people, do not wish to have anything to do with it now, and say that the Falange is going to the dogs.

He adds that in general everybody hopes that the triumph of England will cause a change of government in Spain and so they confine themselves to waiting although there is talk of a possible coup d'etat by the soldiers.

RESISTANCE OF THE PEOPLE AGAINST ENTERING THE WAR AND AGAINST THE FRANQUIST REGIME — The people wish to see the situation change as soon as possible, but they believe that the solution must come from outside. According to our informant, there is no thought of fighting against the regime. He says that the workers in the factory in which he worked spoke openly against the regime but he does not know that there was any activity. (Given the character of the informant we may suppose that even if there was he would take pains to ignore it). From time to time the women rioted in the queues; at first they shut them up, now they say nothing. He asserts that every day the people speak more openly against the regime. The contribution to "Auxilio Social" was obligatory before but now no one pays. When the young ladies of "Auxilio Social" beg for subscriptions in the streets and ask the reason for refusal, some people answer - "because I do not wish to".

He says that when Franco was at Bilbao the people remained in their houses and he was received only by four "chats bottes" in the offices of the Falange. At the end of Franco's speech not a soul applauded. Then some Falangist young ladies said, half in tears, "what we must do is buy a machine gun and shoot them all".

Assistance to the prisoners, according to our informant is given by relations and friends. There is no organised assistance, but he proceeds to tell us that certainly there have been collections sometimes in the factory in favour of the prisoners, but "by groups of friends". He does not know of the activity of any organisation, as such. The nationalists, according to him (he is a nationalist) are the ones who have some organisation.

They distributed there a speech made by Aguirre in America. One of the Prieto's was also in circulation. He has no news of the other organisations although he admits that if they have any organisation they would not go and tell him about it.

When he is asked about the activity of the different organisations of which the Frente Popular is composed, and the attitude of the militant party members of these organisations, he asserts categorically that there the people are completely united, and there is now no talk of socialists, anarchists, communists, republicans etc. All treat each other as comrades, and help each other as far as they can. In Spain, according to our informant, there are only now enemies of Franco and the Falange, who maintain a strict unity among themselves; they discuss the progress of the war together, comment on the situation etc. He says that the people wish for unity, regret the disunion there was before in Spain and the quarrels between different parties and anti-fascist organisations.

He did not know of the shooting of Larra or Diegues. The execution of Larra impressed him very much and he said that in order to do what Larra had done one would need plenty of guts.

FUTURE PROSPECTS — He repeats again that they believe in Spain that the triumph of England will cause a change in the situation. (We must point out that for some time there have been currents in the Basque nationalism which have been seeking for a "solution" of their national problem with the assistance of England, transforming the "Pais Basque" into an English protectorate or Dominion or something like that, and even during the Spanish war there were individuals who thought that at the critical moment the Basques would receive help from the English)

Our informant told us at the beginning that there people spoke only in favour of England, but after considerable circumlocution he confessed that the workers also sympathised very much with the Soviet Union, although conversations in this direction were much more restrained. He added that the people were quite well informed about the course of events as they listen daily to the bulletins of Radio London, and some also listen to those of Radio Moscow.

The people in general are in favour of a solution on the basis of the Republic. Others are afraid that the fall of Franco will result in a revolution "worse than the other" and for this reason they are more hesitant. Those individuals are specially the rich. If they believed that the Republic would be established without bloodshed they would be in complete agreement with it.

In Spain they believe that Hitler may be defeated in 1942, especially if the Second Front is started. They also say that Russia is bearing the brunt of the fight.

Speculation about a monarchist restoration has neither delighted or depressed the people. The possibility does not arouse much interest.

The people, who, according to our informant, have most prestige in Euskadi (Basque national territory) are Aguirre and Prieto, especially the former.

As regards conditions of material life he assures us that they are terrible and that is the fundamental reason why all the people have turned against Franco. There is much talk of "no home without bread or a roof", but that does not improve the situation.

All business is controlled by the "Black Marketeers" of the Falange who, sheltered behind the Committees of Supply, requisition the crops from the peasants at the standard rate, and instead of selling them to the people at the standard rate they reduce rationing to almost nothing in order to compel the people to buy articles on the Black Market, at a price which will give them the profits. He says that these who have no money to buy things contraband (and they are the majority since salaries have hardly been increased at all in comparison with pre-war standards) die of hunger. He gives prices which correspond with those for other regions of Spain".

NOTE: the military and naval information contained in these reports has been extracted and supplied to the S.O.I. Trinidad, and the Military Adviser, Imperial Censorship, Trinidad, under the reference numbers S.E./S.O.I.1, and S.E./M.A.1 respectively.

T/9.9.42.
Copies to London, New York, Bermuda & Jamaica.

[illegible]

S E C R E T

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TEDESCHI, LUIS
201-0289247 — 379-001-002
SEX M — DBD-76473
04 SEP 44
CIT ARGE — FBI
P8

LETTER DROP
CONNECTED W/OR MENTIONED IN PALACIOS-NUNEZ CASE /INVOLVING SPAN COMMUNIST NETWORK, PRINCIPALLY IN LATIN AMER/ SEE PALACIOS-NUNEZ CASE INDEX FOR VOLUME /S/ AND PAGE /S/

DATE 15 OCT 74 — 09190912

201-289247

S E C R E T — E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

For Betty

Bob Tarr

1943 addresses.
Under same name

(1) Estados Unidos 2366
Buenos Aires

(2) Pichincha 969
Buenos Aires.

Collateral information –

On original no additional –

29 AUG 1975

See if field can furnish any additional background info – (TC)

201-

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FI IMPDET
CL BY 05-979

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FIELD PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO: HEADQUARTERS, RI

DATE: 9 December 1960

FROM: Ann Egerter, CI/SIG, 1408 J (x2621)

ACTION: ✓ OPEN | AMEND | CLOSE

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: Cryptonym or pseudonym will be entered in Headquarters.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

SENSITIVE | ✓ NON-SENSITIVE

201 NO.: 289247

SOURCE DOCUMENT: HABW-6515-12 oct 60

NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title): TEDESCHI, Luis

SEX: ✓ M

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title)

PHOTO	BIRTH DATE	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH	OTHER IDENTIFICATION
YES ✓ NO	? ? ?	?	?	CM 5B

OCCUPATION/POSITION:

OCC/POS. CODE:

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM	PSEUDONYM

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE	ACTION DESK	2ND COUNTRY INTEREST	3RD COUNTRY INTEREST
Argentina 004	~~CI/SIG~~ 731	~~WH/2~~	

COMMENTS: cit.: ?

- c 1943 was an active member of the Spanish Communist Party.
- Address 1943: Pichincha 969, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
- Suspected Soviet agent dept rptd. 1943

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201- 289247

PERMANENT CHARGE: ✓ YES | NO

RESTRICTED FILE: YES | ✓ NO

SIGNATURE: Ann Egerter

FORM 10-57 831a

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DBC 41305

FBI doc.
1 Feb. 1972 (NY)
RE: Jim Beynon
Bufile: NY 100-175210
DBD 31051

FBI doc.
26 Dec. 1968 (Seatlle)
RE: Boris Mikhaylovich Orekhov
DBC 39101

FBI doc.
22 April 1963 (Detroit)
RE: The United States Festival Committee, Inc.
Bufile: 100-436225
DBA 39107

FBI doc.
24 Jan. 1969 (NY)
RE: Boris Mikhaylovich Orekhov, Galina Sergeyevna Orekhova
DBC-41307

FBI doc.
24 June 1966 (Wash.)
RE; Communist Party, United STates of America; International Relations
Bufile: 100-3-81
DBB 51452

FBI doc.
28 Feb. 1974 (NY)
RE: World Peace Council
DBD 69841

FBI cable
11 Oct 1974 (NY)
RE: Communist Party, USA, International Relations
DBD 81515

FBI doc. 18
18 Oct. 1974 (Chicago)
RE: World Peace Council
Bufile: 100-41972
DBD 82108

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18 Oct. 1974 (Chicago)
RE: World Peace Council
Bufile: 100-41972
DBD 82108

FBI doc.
20 Aug. 1975 (NY)

RE: International Conference of Solidarity with the Independence of Puerto Rico, Havana, Cuba, September, 1975
DBD 90674

FBI doc.
26 April 1961 (Detroit)
RE: Michele Allison Winter
Field office file: 100-21782
DBA 1530

FBI doc.
16 Feb. 1971 (NY)
RE: Communist Party, USA, International Relations
Bufile: 100-3-81
DBD 5593

FBI doc.
2 Feb. 1971 (NY)
RE: Communist Party, USA, INternational Relations
Bufile: 100-3-81
DBD 4464

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DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
FBI/DBD-97891	06 JUL 76	201-0289246			

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SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

WINTER, HELEN
201-0289246
SEX F

200-004-208/04
DPD-69841
28 FEB 74
FBI
PS

MBR U.S. DELEGATION TO WORLD CONGRESS OF PEACE FORCES, MOSCOW, USSR, 25-31 OCT 73, SPONSORED BY WPC.

DATE 27 MAR 74 09086070

201-289246

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

14-00000

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

WINTER, HELEN
201-0289246
SEX M

100-009-022
DBD-90674
20 AUG 75
FBI
P2

FROM THE POLITICAL COMMISSION OF THE CP-USA
MBR DELEGATION U.S. SUPPORT COMM. FOR THE INDEPENDENCE CONF IN SOLIDARITY W/THE INDEPENDENCE OF PUERTO RICO

DATE 12 SEP 75 09327216

201-0289246

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

WINTER, HELEN
201-0289246
SEX F

201-0850469
OBD-75231
31 MAY 74
FBI

SECY OF INTERNATL AFFAIRS CPUSA INQUIRES RE SONDRA SANDY PATRINOS IF SHE INTERESTED IN THE TRIP TO MONGOLIA

DATE 27 JUN 74 09136546

201-289246

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

WINTER, HELEN
201-0289246 — 100-004-123
SEX F — DBD-74602
13 JUN 74
FBI

MBR OF POLITICAL COMMITTEE AND CHAIRMAN OF THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE CPUSA.
MBR OF A DELEGATION FROM CP USA WHO VISITED MOSCOW TO ENGAGE IN DISCUSSION W/LEADERSHIP CPSU DURING PERIOD 4-10 MAY 74

DATE 23 JUL 74 — 09144083

201-0289246

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

WINTER, HELEN
201-0289246
SEX F

200-004-208/04
DBD-32108
18 OCT 74
FBI
P2

DISCUSSED QUESTION OF CHIL AND USA GOVM INVOLVEMENT

DATE 22 NOV 74 09210285

201-289246

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

WINTER, HELEN
201-0289246 — 201-0006887
SEX F — DBD-78208
06 SEP 74
CIT USA — FBI

SCHEDULED TO DEPART FR NY 01 MAY 74 DESTINED FOR MOSCOW VIA AEROFLOT TOGETHER WITH FERN AND HENRY WINSTON /201-0006887/ AND JAMES JACKSON /201-0011793/

DATE 04 NOV 74 — 09199669

201-289246

SECRET — E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

WINTER, HELEN
201-0289246
SEX F

201-0133419
DBD-81515
10 OCT 74
FBI

OBSERVED ENTERING PREMISES OF POLD UN MISSION NYC. MBRS OF CPUSA

DATE 24 OCT 74 09195351

201-289246

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

X-REF. SHEET S-E-C-R-E-T DATE 26/10/74

X-REF.	SYMB. NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DOC. FILED IN
201-0289246	DBD -80203	26 SEP 74	201-0006887

THE ABOVE DOCUMENT(S) ARE CROSS REFERENCED
TO THE 201 FILE CITED UNDER LEFT MARGIN.
FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING THE LOCATION OF
THE FILE CONTAINING THE RECORD COPY DOCUMENT,
CALL FILES SECTION, EXTENSION 4127.

S-E-C-R-E-T E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

FILE IN 201-0289246

FBI document
10 May 1974 (NY)
Subject: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449

FBI document
18 July 1974 (NY)
Subject: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449

FBI document
15 May 1974 (NY)
Subject: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449

FBI document
19 Nov. 1973 (NY)
Subject: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449

FBI document
22 Aug. 1973 (NY)
Subject: Tour of Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics by Representatives of Central Committee, Communist Party, USA, July 13 - Aug. 12, 1973

FBI document
30 March 1973 (NY)
Subject: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449

FBI document
23 March 1973 (NY)
Subject: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449

FBI document
10 January 1973 (NY)
Subject: Gus Hall, aka/ Helen Mary Winter, aka
Bufiles: 61-8077 and 100-423449

FBI document
20 December 1972
Subject: Gus Hall, aka; Helen Mary Winter, aka
Bufile: 61-8077 and 100-0423499

FBI document
15 June 1972 (NY)
Subject: Helen Winter
Bufile: 100-423449

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION					
DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION		
SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

WINTER, HELEN
201-289246
SEX F DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
MET WITH JIM BEYNON, CANADA, NOV 71

100-004-124
DBD -31051
01 FEB 72
FBI

R 7202281340

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201- 289246

FORM 867 8-66 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WINTER, HELEN
201-289246 200-004-324
SEX M DOB ? DBD -04464
02 FEB 71
CIT ? FBI
OCC ?
CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA LITERATURE COMMISSION
VENEZUELA TO ATTENDED THE IV PARTY CONGRESS

R 7102160350

FILE IN 201-289246

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WINTER, HELEN
201-289246
SEX F DOB ?

200-004-324
DBD -05593
16 FEB 71
FBI

CIT ?
OCC ?
HAD DEPARTED USA 21 JAN 71 FOR VENEZUELA TO ATTEND THE IV PARTY CONGRESS AS DELEGATES OF CP USA

R 7103030740

FILE IN 201-289246

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

FBI Doc.
17 Sept. 1970 (Wash.)
RE;Communist Party, USA Contacts with Communist Parties of Venezuela, Colombia, and Peru
(NOFORN, NO DISSEM ABROAD)
DBC-93754

FBI Doc.
14 May 1970 (Wash.)
RE: Contacts Between Communist Party, USA and Communist Party of Venezuela
DBC 82704

FBI Doc.
24 June 19X669 (NY)
RE: Helen Winter
Bufile: 100-423449)
DBC 54933

FBI doc.
20 May 1969 (NY)
RE: Helen Winter
Bufile : 100-423449
DBC 52075

FBI&doc&

14-00000

FBI doc.
10 Jan. 69 (NY)
RE: Carl Winter, Helen Winter
DBC 39844

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WINTER, HELEN
201-289246 201-760835
SEX F DOB ? DBC -41305
27 JAN 69
CIT ? FBI
OCC ?
HAD RETURNED FROM A TRIP AND ARRIVED FOR
WORK AT COMMUNIST PARTY, UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA /CP, USA/ HEADQUARTERS ON JAN 27,
69

R 6902051315

FILE IN 201-289246

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

C1150

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WINTER, HELEN
201-289246 — 201-752914
SEX F DOB ? — DBC -41307
24 JAN 69
CIT ? — FBI
OCC ? — P4
SEC ORGANIZATION COMMISSION, CP, USA.
MBR NATIONAL COMMITTEE, CP USA ON TRIP
7 DEC 68 TO CONNECTICUT W/HUSBAND CARL
WINTER /201-760835/, B. M. OREKHOV
/201-752914/ AND WIFE GALINA SERGEYEVNA

R 6902061627

FILE IN 201-289246

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. — SECRET — (7-60)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

C:/5.0

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WINTER, HELEN
201-289246
SEX M DOB ?

CIT USA
OCC ?
SECRETARY OF THE ORGANIZATION COMMISSION, CPUSA, ALSO A MBR OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE, CPUSA
IN CONTACT WITH BORIS M. OREKHOV, 201-752914

201-752914
DBC -39101
26 DEC 68
FBI

R 5901141020

FILE IN 201-289246

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-60)

FBI doc.
18 April 1967 (Wash.)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: (SC) 100-423449
DBB 77957

FBI doc.
8 Nov. 1960
RE: Helen Mary Winter
DBF 62099

FBI doc.
26 July 1967 (NY)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 88376

FBI doc.
2 June 1967 (NY)
RE; Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 81991

FBI doc.
23 May 1967 (Seattle)
RE: Helen Mary Winter

Bufile: Field Office 100-17363
DBB 81995

FBI doc.
27 April 1967 (NY)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 78966

FBI doc.
18 April 1967 (NY)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 78724

FBI doc
18 Jan. 1967 (NY)

RE? Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77690

KENT

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WINTER, HELEN
201-285246
SEX F DOB ?

100-004-121
DBB -51452
24 JUN 66
FBI

CIT USA
OCC ?
< USA, NEW YORK, NEW YORK
COMMUNIST PARTY FUNCTIONARY WHO WORKS IN
NATIONAL OFFICE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK.

R 6607180197

FILE IN 201-289246

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WINTER, HELEN
201-289246
SEX F DOB ?

CIT USA
OCC CP OFFICIAL
< USA
ELECTED TO NATL COMM CPUSA DEC 59 IN
CHARGE OF CP SCHOOL IN MARXIST TRAINING
IN NEW YORI CITY, MAR 66.

201-762338
DBB -51958
20 JUN 66
FBI
P2

R 6607122280

FILE IN 201-289246

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

FBI doc.
6 July 1966 (Seattle)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Field office file: SE 100-17363
DBB 77913

FBI doc
21 Jan. 1966 (NY)
RE; Helen Mary Winter

Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77914

FBI doc.
26 Oct. 1965 (NY)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77915
)

FBI doc.
30 July 1965 (NY)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77916

FBI doc.
5 May 1965 (NY)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77917

FBI doc.
12 Feb. 1965 (NY)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77918

FBI doc.
20 Nov. 1964 (Detroit)
RE: Helen Mary Winter, nee Wagenknecht
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77919

FBI doc.
2C August 1964 (Detroit)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77920

FBI doc.
25 Feb. 1964 (Detroit)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77921

FBI doc.
17 May 1962 (Detroit)
RE: Comgress of Canadian Women,Information Concerning
DBA 10048

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
THE UNITED STATES FESTIVAL COMMITTEE, INCORPORATED (EIGHTH WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL	2. RI FILE NO. 200 004 236 01
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. IBA -39107 — 4. DATE 22 APR 63
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM — 8. DATE OF INFO. — 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST — 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN — 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.
201-289246	

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WINTER, HELEN (201-289246)
DE T-2 ADVISED DURING SEPTEMBER, 1962, THAT ON SEPTEMBER 15, 1962, CARL AND HELEN WINTER HELD A BUFFET SUPPER OPENHOUSE AT THEIR RESIDENCE, 9556 BURNETT, DETROIT, IN HONOR OF THEIR DAUGHTER, MICHELE WINTER, UPON HER RETURN FROM THE EIGHTH WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL.
DE T-3 ADVISED ON MARCH 18, 1963, THAT CARL WINTER WAS THE STATE CHAIRMAN OF THE MDCP
DE T-1, ON MARCH 20, 1963, ADVISED THAT HELEN WINTER WAS CURRENT MEMBER OF THE YOUTH CLUB OF THE MDCP.
DE T-2 STATED THAT AT THE OPENHOUSE MICHELE WINTER GAVE A TALK AND TOLD OF VISITING SOCIALIST CITIES, SCHOOLS, FACTORIES, HOUSING, AND TRANSPORTATION. SHE TOLD OF VISITING LENINGRAD, VOLGAGRAD, MOSCOW, AND EAST GERMANY.
MICHELE EXHIBITED SOUVENIRS WHICH SHE BROUGHT BACK, AMONG THEM THE RED FLAG AND THE EAST GERMAN FLAG. MICHELE SAID SHE HAD MOST OF HER SOUVENIRS SENT BACK FROM THE COUNTRIES FROM WHERE SHE ACQUIRED THEM AND CARRIED HER LITERATURE IN THE BOTTOM OF HER BAG, WHICH HAD A SHOULDER STRAP. SHE SAID THIS WAY SHE HAD NO TROUBLE WITH CUSTOMS AND IMPORT AUTHORITIES IN THE DIFFERENT COUNTRIES.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-289246

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

FBI doc.
30 Nov. 1961 (Detroit)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBF 96370

FBI doc.
24 Aug. 1961 (Detroit)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77922

FBI doc.
21 June 1961 (Detroit)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBF 81488

[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION			
MICHELE ALLISON WINTER	2. RI FILE NO.	100	004	134
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. DBA -01530		4. DATE 26 APR 61	
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION	
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN		11. DATE	

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.
201-289246	

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WINTER, HELEN (201-289246)
SUBJ. WAS BORN 6/25/24. AT LOS ANGELES, CALIF., RESIDES AT 9556 BURNETTE, DETROIT. SUBJ.'S PARENTS ARE CARL AND HELEN WINTER, BOTH MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE. CP, USA. INFORMANT ADVISED DURING 4/61, THAT SUBJ. IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE CP. SUBJ. WAS REPORTED AS AN ASSOCIATE EDITOR OF "NEW HORIZONS". SUBJ. ATTENDED CLASSES IN MARXISM INSTRUCTED BY CP MEMBERS. SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES SET FORTH. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS CONTACTED DURING 4/61, COULD FURNISH NO ADDITIONAL SUBVERSIVE INFORMATION. SUBJ. IS A FRESHMAN AT WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY, DETROIT.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-289246

FBI doc.
24 Jan. 1961 (Detroit)
RE: Helen Mary Winter, nee Wagenknecht, et al.
DBF 67557

FBI doc.
6 Sept. 1960 (Detroit)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77923

FBI doc.
3 June 1960 (Detroit)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-Q423449
DBB&ZZ924 DBB 77924

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: Consult the 201 Control System Reference Manual before completing this form. Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

TO : RID/201 Section

FROM:

DATE

1. ACTION: OPEN ✓ AMEND CLOSE

ROOM NO. PHONE

CHECK 2-4 FOR 201 REQUEST. DO NOT CHECK FOR IDN.

2. EXCLUDE TRUE NAME FROM MACHINE LIST: YES NO

3. RESTRICTED: YES ✓ NO

4. PERMANENT CHARGE: YES NO

5. 201 NO.

IDN NO.

6. SOURCE DOCUMENT

DATE

7. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)

8. SEX: M F

9. PHOTO: YES NO

NAME VARIANT

10. TYPE	(Last) (First) (Middle)

VARIATIONS IN BIO. DATA

11. DATE OF BIRTH: D M Y

12. COUNTRY OF BIRTH

13. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH

14. COUNTRY OF LOCATION

CODE

15. CITIZENSHIP

16. AFFILIATION CODE P B PATTERN ONLY

17. ADDITIONAL CODES - P B PATTERN ONLY

63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

18. ORGANIZATIONAL OR GROUP AFFILIATION (Clear text)

19. ORG/GROUP CODE

20. OCCUPATION/POSITION (Clear text)

21. OCC/POS ABBREVIATION

22. ACTION DESK

23. CODE

24. SECONDARY DESK

25. CODE

26. CRYPTONYM

27. PSEUDONYM

28. COMMENTS

Wife of Carl Winter, head of the Michigan District of the Communist Party, USA,

29. SIGNATURE

30. IDN-

201-

FORM 6-60 831 TEST OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(38)

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: 201-289249

Vol. II

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
8 Dec. 78	8 Dec. 78	Betsy Wolf	Betsy Wolf

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

14-00000

FBI Doc.
29 Sept. 1962 (Wash.)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
DBA-23746

SECRET

To: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

From: Deputy Director (Plans)

Subject: Semen Spiridon [illegible], also known as
Semen [illegible]
Internal Security - Russia

1. Reference is made to your letter dated 12 July 1962, entitled as above, to our CSCI-3/772,735, dated 25 September 1962, and to your file number 105-93295.

2. Information from our representative in Paris indicates that one Joseph [illegible], born 10 May 1911, [illegible], USSR, possibly a Soviet citizen, living at La [illegible], France, and a Russian refugee, was listed by the French Ministry of Interior as potentially dangerous during the visit of Nikita Khrushchev to France from 15-30 March 1960. Approximately two thousand other individuals were also listed.

3. An official French liaison service reported on 9 November 1962, that Josef [illegible] (sic) had not attracted their attention. Our representative advises that this is tantamount to a "no trace" reply.

CSCI 3/773,830

SR/CI/RED - L. Lyon 4 Dec 1962
Distribution:
Orig and 1 addressee
1 C/CI
1 CI/Liaison
1 CI/R&A
1 SR/CI/P/dl
~~1 RID (201-257249)~~
1 WE/3
1 CI/OG/SS
1 Comeback
1 SR/CI/RED

Based on OFPA-68186, 20 Nov 1962

SECRET

CS COPY

201-257249

14-00000

FBI doc.
29 Nov. 1962 (PHiladelphia)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
Bufile: 105-93295
DBA 28575

FBI doc.
08 20 November 1962
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
DBA 28182

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING: MARKED FOR INDEXING; XXXXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED; ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING; ABSTRACT; MICROFILM

TO: Chief, SR

INFO: Chief, WE; Chief, FE; Chief of Station, Vienna

FROM: Chief of Station, Paris

SUBJECT: REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE, Jozef KOZAK

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: None; for information only.

REFERENCES: A. OFPW-34223, 25 September 1962
B. OFPA-67615, 16 October 1962 (not sent Vienna.)

In their Memorandum No. D-5054 dated 9 November 1962, UNBOUND informed us that Subject had not attracted UNBOUND's attention. This is tantamount to a "no trace" reply.

Robert G. LAMPRELL

Distribution:
2 - SR
2 - WE
2 - FE
2 - Vienna

201-289249

DATE TYPED: 16 Nov 62

DATE DISPATCHED: 20 Nov 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OFPA-63186

CS COPY

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-289249

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
XXXXX	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, SR

INFO.
Chief, WE
Chief, EE

FROM
Chief of Station, Paris

SUBJECT: REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE
Josef *KOZAK

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACTION: None; FYI only.

REFERENCE: OFPW-34223 of 25 September 1962

1. According to Paris Station files:

Joseph KOSAK aka KOZAK
DPOB: 10 May 1901, Szndoriben, USSR
Possibly a Soviet citizen
ADDRESS: La Seine, France
Russian Refugee

was listed by French Ministry of Interior as potentially dangerous during the visit of Nikita KHRUSHCHEV to France, 15 - 30 March 1960. Approximately two thousand other individuals were also listed (SOURCE: OFP-8178 of 27 April 1960, page 35).

2. Since Paris Station has terminated AEDOGMA/1, it will not be possible to obtain further information on Subject from him.

3. We are querying UNBOUND for information on Subject.

Robert G. LAMPRELL

Distribution:
3 - SR
2 - WE
2 - EE

INDEX X

CS COPY

201-289249

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
10 Oct 62	OCT 1 5 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OFPA- 67615

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-289249

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / ABSTRACT / MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Paris, COS, Vienna

INFO:

FROM: Chief SR, via Chief, WE and Chief, EE

SUBJECT: REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE
Semen Spiridon POHORILYJ aka Semen POHORILIW (201-289249) and Jozef KOZAK aka Osyp KOZAK

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See below

1. Attached for your information is an FBI report on an interview with Andrij DIDKOWSKYJ, contact of Semen POHORILYJ and correspondent of Antin HYKYPORUK.

2. The FBI has requested any information available in our files or through KUBARK sources concerning KOZAK's current activities and contacts with the Soviets. The information on KOZAK in the last paragraph on page 3 and the top of page 4 of the attachment, is the latest information we have on KOZAK. This same information was received from Paris in CFPA-55817 of 7 December 1960 and gave KOZAK's address as 26 rue Caston Jaillon, Vesines Chalette, Loiret.

3. To Paris: We would appreciate any information available on KOZAK's current activities and contacts. You may query liaison.

4. To Vienna: The interview with DIDKOWSKYJ contains a statement that KOZAK left the camp in Salzburg for France with HYKYPORUK in 1948 or 1949. Other information indicates that KOZAK came to France in 1946 from Munich. We would appreciate your checking Station and liaison files for any information on KOZAK, including biographic data and the date of his departure for France (or Munich). Please send a copy of your reply to Paris.

Doris M. Killgo

Paul K. Stockwood

201-289249

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - Paris w/a
2 - Vienna w/a

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 10 Sept. 1962
DATE DISPATCHED: 25 SEP 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OFPW-34223

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-289249

CLASSIFICATION: CS COPY

ROUTING AND INITIALS
1 - SR/CI/RED
RID/ - EE/A
2 - WE/3
RID/
RID/RC
RID/FI
SA/10/62 5027
DESTROY

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
SR/CI/RED	L. Lyon	tb	6991

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
SR/CI/RED	13 Sept 62	[signature]
SR/2	18 Sept 62	[signature]
EE/A	18 Sept	[signature]
CI/OPS/SS	20	J. Evans
WE/3		R. Ove

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WE/3	24 Sept	Robert E. Owen

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

CS COPY

DISPATCH

SECRET

25 SEP 1962

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, (Plans)

SUBJECT: Semen Spiridon [illegible], also known as
Semen [illegible]
Internal Security - Russia

1. Reference is made to your letter dated 12 July 1962, entitled as above, and to your file number 105-[illegible].

2. The files of this Agency contain no additional information on Josef [illegible], also known as [illegible]. We are querying our sources abroad for any information available on [illegible] and his current activities and contacts with the Soviets. You will be advised of the results of our inquiries.

CSCI-3/772,723

SR/CI/RED/L.Lyman 13 September 1962

Distribution:
Addressee - Orig. & 1
1 - C/CI
1 - CI/Liaison
1 - CI/R&A
1 - SR/CI/P/41
1 - RID (201-289249)
1 - WH/3
1 - EE/A
1 - CI/OO/SS
1 - Comeback
1 - SR/CI/RED

201-289249
ABSTRACT / INDEX
DATE 13 Sep 62

Coord. with

CS COPY

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FBI doc.
24 Aug. 1962 (Philadelphia)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
Bufile: 105-93295
DBA 20582

SEE FBI64066

(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO

TO ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. SR/CI/RED	5C45			
2. ~~Trudy~~ ~~Lugo~~				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.		8 Aug 65	13 44	
17. RID/FI				

The report provides bio data on Krivenko & Burchart. The investigation indicates there is no point of contact between these persons and Pokarelin—

See DBA-23746, 11-10-62 for some info

9 Aug 65 10 41

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	X
	INDEX	

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE): 201-289249

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE: 3 Aug 62

DOCUMENT NUMBER: EAVA 30210

FORM 12-59 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: EAVA-30210

TO: Chief of Station, Paris

INFO: Chief, SR; Chief, EE; Chief, WE

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 201-289249; 29-6-106/3

FROM: Chief of Station, Austria

DATE: 3 August 1962

SUBJECT: [illegible]/[illegible]/[illegible]/1
Semen POHORILIY -

RE: "43" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
X INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: For your information.

REFERENCE(S)

A. EGMW-10664, 23 May 1961
B. EASA-5566, 24 November 1961

In accordance with a recent request from ODENVY, we queried our liaison in regard to Subject and his contacts in Austria. A copy of their reply, which has been passed directly to ODENVY in Bern, is attached for your information.

Christine R. Kerbe

ATTACHMENT: h/w
Liaison Reply dated 24 July 1962 (in German)

Distribution:
2 - COS, Paris w/Att.
2 - Chief, EE w/o Att.
1 - Chief, SR w/Att.
1 - Chief, WE w/o Att.

31 July 1962

CS COPY

1 encl. H/W

201-289249

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION

CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

ATTACHMENT TO EAVA-30210

Subject
Betr.: POHORILYI Semen Spiridow,
BURCHART Vera,
Dr. KRIWENKO Gregor

Bezug: Do. Anfrage
Pipely to Crudino

Dr. Gregor KRIWENKO (Arzt, 3.12.1900 in Kiew/UdSSR geb., seit 1955 durch Einbürgerung österr. StA., Kremsmünster 80, Oberösterr., wh.) war seinerzeit in der Ukraine als Arzt tätig und kam im Jahre 1943 mit seiner Gattin Maria geb. Kurotschina und seinen beiden Kindern als Flüchtling nach Österreich. Von 1943 bis 1945 war er als Arzt im Krankenhaus Ried i. I., später im Allgemeinen Krankenhaus in Linz und dann bis 1952 als Flüchtlingsarzt im ehemaligen Flüchtlingslager Ried i. I. angestellt. Seit 1952 geht er keiner geregelten Arbeit mehr nach. Als Befürsorgter übt er noch fallweise stillschweigend geduldet die Heilpraxis aus. Im übrigen betätigt er sich als Organist und Chordirigent in der griechisch-orthod. Kirche in Salzburg. Seine Gattin, die seinerzeit in der Ukraine angeblich Sängerin war, ist gleichfalls musikalisch tätig. Der Sohn Dr. KRIWENKOS studiert Sprachen, die Tochter ist kränklich und steht in keinem Arbeitsverhältnis. Ein Bruder Dr. KRIWENKOS ist angeblich noch in der UdSSR als Arzt angestellt.

Dr. KRIWENKO lebt mit seiner Familie in sehr bescheidenen Verhältnissen, ist sehr religiös eingestellt und als Antikommunist bekannt. Die ganze Familie genießt einen guten Ruf.

Veronika (Vera) BURCHART geb. Chermilewski (17.2.1901 in BAR/Ukraine geb., seit 1957 durch Einbürgerung österr.StA., Untereitzing 32, Bez. Ried i.I./Oberösterr., wh.) kam mit ihrem Gatten Wilhelm BURCHART (26.4.1887 in Jedenier/Ukr. geb.)

3 aug 62 SECRET CS COPY

ENCL #1 TO EAVA 30210 201-289249

gleichfalls im Jahre 1943 als Flüchtling von der Ukraine nach Österreich. Wilhelm BURCHART war in der Ukraine Fabriksdirektor. 1961 verstarb er in Ried i.I. Veronika BURCHART erhält eine Rente. Sie tritt in keiner Weise nachteilig in Erscheinung.

Die bisherigen Erhebungen erbrachten keine Anhaltspunkte dafür, daß die Vorgenannten Verbindung zu dem in Philadelphia lebenden Semen Spiridow KOHORILYI haben. Sollten die weiteren Erhebungen in dieser Hinsicht Positives erbringen, wird der do. Stelle davon Mitteilung gemacht werden.

24.7.1962

14-00000

FBI doc.
12 July 1962 (Wash.)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj, aka
Bufile: (E) 105-93295
DBA 13988

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Paris

INFO

FROM
Chief SR, via Chief WE

SUBJECT
REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE
Semen Spiridon POHORILYJ

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACTION: None, FYI

Attached for your information is a copy of an ODENVY report dated 20 April 1962, on an interview with Subject on 13 April 1962.

Doris M. Killgo

Mortimer F. Bingham

Distribution:
3 COS Pairs w/att

201-289249

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 16 May 1962
DATE DISPATCHED: 25 MAY 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OFPW-33472

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-289249

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN - RID	CKS
RID/MIS - 1 - SR/CI/RED - WE/3	
~~RID/PS~~	
~~RID/FI~~	
SR/CI/RED	
~~DESTROY~~	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
SR/CI/RED	LLyon	aes	6991

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/SR/CI/RED	6/5	[signature]
C/SR/2		[signature]
FI/SPOG	22 May	[signature]

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WE/3	24 May	Robert E. Owen

FORM 9-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED.

DISPATCH

SECRET

162

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Semen Spiridon POHORILYJ also known as Semen POHORILIW
Internal Security - Russia

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 5 February 1962 regarding the Subject and to your file number 105-93295 (E).

2. An interview of Subject by your Bureau, under the conditions outlined in the reference, would not adversely affect any of this Agency's sources or operations. We would appreciate any information you may obtain from Subject on his contacts and associates abroad.

CSCI-3/769,591

SR/CI/RED/LLyon:aoh - 23 February 1962

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/CI
1 - CI/Liaison
1 - CI/R&A
1 - SR/CI/P/dl
1 - SR/CI/RED
1 - Comeback
1 - RI/Files (201-289249

Reference: DBA-396, 5 February 1962

SECRET

CS COPY

201-289249

FBI doc.
20 April 1962 (Philadelphia)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
Bufile: 105-93295
DBA 7408

FBI doc.
5 Feb. 1962 (Wash.)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj, aka
Bufile: 105-93295 (E)

19 JAN 1962

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Semen Spiridon POHORILYJ also known as Semen POHORILIW and Andrij DIDKOWSKYJ also known as DIALKAWSKY (fnu)
Internal Security - Russia

1. Reference is made to previous correspondence from this office regarding the Subjects and to your file number 105-93295.

2. The files of this Agency contain no identifiable information on Andrij DIDKOWSKYJ of 731 North Seventh Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. We have not checked our sources abroad and will not do so unless this action is specifically requested by you.

3. A sensitive Austrian source provided the following information on Semen Spiridon POHORILYJ on 31 October 1961:

> "Semen POHORILYI - born 2 February 1910 in Czerkassy/Kiev, married, teacher, Ukrainian citizen, resided at the refugee camp in Siezenheim, Salzburg, from 13 July 1950 to 23 August 1950. Prior to 13 July 1950 he lived at the Hellbrunn refugee camp in Salzburg. According to police records Subject left Salzburg for the United States on 23 August 1950."

4. Additional information from the same sensitive source, in the form of a photographic copy of the official police registration card and a negative of an identification photograph of Subject, both dated 7 November 1947, reveals that

> "Semen PHORILYJ - born 2 February 1910 in Przemysl, is a Polish citizen, married, teacher, 178 cm tall, gray eyes, blond hair, oval face, no prominent or identifying features."

201-289249

A copy of the photograph is attached for your information. The date on the registration card presumably indicates the date on which Subject was first officially registered by the Salzburg police.

CSCI-3/769,019

Attachment - As stated

SR/CI/RED/LLyon:afo - 15 January 1962

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee, w/att.
1 - C/CI, w/o att.
1 - CI/LSN, w/o att.
1 - CI/R&A, w/o att.
1 - SR/CI/P/dl, w/o att.
1 - SR/CI/RED, w/o att.
1 - EE/A, w/o att.
1 - Comeback, w/o att.
1 - RI/Files, w/o att. (201-289249)

Reference - DBF-96946, 21 December 1961

Based on EASA-05566, 24 November 1961

14-00000

THIS BLANK FORM IS CLASSIFIED: SECRET

RESPONSE TO GREEN LIST REQUEST Nº 100092

DATE OF REQUEST 5 Jan 62

1. SUBJECT (NAME, IN ROMAN LETTERS AND IN NORMAL ORDER)

DIDKOWSKYJ, Andrij

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLINGS, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.

DIALNAWSKY

3. BIRTH DATE

30 Nov 1890,

4. BIRTH PLACE

Didkowitsche, Ukraine

5. CITIZENSHIP

U.S. in 1958

6. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION

Retired - lives at 631 North 7th St. Philadelphia Pa.

7. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION

Laborer

REQUEST FROM

NAME OF ORIGINATING OFFICER L. Lyon

OFFICE DESIGNATOR SR/CI/RED

ROOM, BUILDING 1501 J

EXTENSION 8251

14. WAS CONTINUING SEARCH REQUESTED? X YES ___ NO

15. TYPE OF REQUEST

X FIRST TIME SUBMITTED

___ ADDITIONAL DATA

___ OTHER

16. INTEREST IN SUBJECT

X ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY

___ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE

___ OTHER

17. INFORMATION REQUIRED

All information

8. MILITARY SERVICE

SERVICE ARM, COUNTRY	SPECIALTY	LOCATION	DATES

9. PAST OCCUPATIONS

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
1904 to 1920 resided in Russia. 1920 to 1943 " in Poland 1943 to 1951 Salzburg, Austria 1951 to Sept. 1958 - Philadelphia		

10. DESCRIPTION

(HEIGHT)	(WEIGHT)	(EYES)	(HAIR)	(RACE)	(OTHER)
6'1"	170	Brown	Black-grey	White	

11. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)

Wira Sergel, born 1897 in the Ukraine. Resides at Kostopol, Ukraine.

12. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, AND ASSOCIATES

13. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION, ETC) ATTACH EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY. SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI-10-7

FORM 11-58 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (9)

SECRET

L. Lyon

11 January 1962
DATE

M: FI/D

A. [ ] SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. [ ] A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. [ ] WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. [X] FI/D HAS NO XXXXXXX INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF A CONTINUING SEARCH WAS REQUESTED IN SECTION 14, INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. [ ] THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

TE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

N THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION ICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

IEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO GER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S ILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

FI/D

DATE

M:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: 201-289249
Vol. I

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
8 Dec. 78	8 Dec. 78	Betsy Wolf	Betsy Wolf

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

201-289249

14-00000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECRET
(When Filled In)

23 JAN 1975
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on [illegible] (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ Should be closed. (If this category applies, affix Records Officer stamp.)

☐ Unwitting collaborator. OI Code A7.
Explanation: ____________

☐ Witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ Potential witting collaborator; date opened: ____________
OI Code A2.

☐ Former witting collaborator (relationship terminated).
OI Code A3.

☐ Potential witting collaborator never contacted. OI Code A4.

☒ Counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☐ All others. OI Code A6.

Signed Gran Lassiter (name) IA (title) SE/X/AF (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed [initials] (initials) 30 JAN 1975 (date)

This document is a permanent part of this file. 201-289249 Vol I & II

201 to files

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECRET
(When Filled In)

E2 IMPDET CL BY 061475

14-00000

FBI doc
21 Dec 61 (Wash)
Re - Semen Spiridon Pohoriliy
Bufile - 105-93295
DBF - 96946

FBI doc.
30 Nov. 1961 (Buffalo)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
Bufile: 105-93295
DBF-95895

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: FAGA-5566

TO: Chief of Station, Austria

INFO: C/EE, C/SR, C/WE, COS/Paris, CAMOG, COS/Germany

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 201-289249
27-6-106/3

FROM: Chief of Base, Salzburg

DATE: 24 November 1961

SUBJECT: REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/AEDICMA-1
Semen POHORILIW

MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY: XX

ACTION REQUIRED: Vienna, please make appropriate number of prints from attached negative.

REFERENCES:

a. EGMA-10664, 23 May 1961
b. FAVA-28253, 19 July 1961 (not to Germany or Paris)
c. FAGA-5459, 7 August 1961 "
d. FAVA-28594, 4 October 1961 "

1. References b., c. and d. contain Vienna's instructions to Salzburg regarding identifying Subject; our initial reply stating there was no information in COS files; and Vienna's permission to run unilateral police traces through GREYTIGY-1, respectively.

2. GREYTIGY-1's initial report (received on 31 October 1961) states that

> Semen POHORILYI - born 2 February 1910 in Cherkassy/Kiev, married, teacher, Ukrainian citizen, resided at the refugee camp in Siezenheim, Salzburg, from 13 July 1950 to 23 August 1950. Prior to 13 July 1950 he lived at the Hellbrunn refugee camp in Salzburg. According to police records Subject left Salzburg for the United States on 23 August 1950.

3. Additional information in the form of a photographic copy of the official police registration card and a negative of an identification photograph of Subject, both dated 7 November 1947 reveals that

> Semen POHORILYJ - born 2 February 1910 in Przemysl, is a Polish citizen, married, teacher, 178 cm tall, gray eyes, blond hair, oval face, no prominent or identifying features.

The date on the registration card presumably indicates the date on which Subject was first officially registered by the Salzburg police.

4. We are returning to Vienna the photograph sent us under reference b. for their retention. We have also attached the identification negative noted in the preceding paragraph. Would Vienna please make prints for SR and Paris and attach them to their copies of this dispatch.

MAXWELL E. UTTERIDGE

Attachments: H/W

Distribution:
2 - Vienna w/photo & negative
2 - EE w/o Att.
2 - SR w/photo
~~2 - WE w/o Att.~~
2 - Paris w/photo
2 - CAMOG w/o Att.
2 - COS/G " "

CS COPY

FORM 10-57 53 — USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

CONTINUED

201-289249

14-00000

Att to EASA 5566
To: Chief SR
from Chief, ob Base, Salzburg

201-289249
24 Nov 61

FBI doc.
24 Oct. 1961 (Wash.)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj, aka
Bufile: 105-93295

DBF-92203

FBI doc.
18 Oct. 1961 (Philadelphia)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
Bufile: 105-93295

DBF 92487

SECRET

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Semen Spiridon POHORILYJ also known as Semen POHORILIW
Internal Security - R

1. Reference is made to previous correspondence from this office regarding the Subject and to your file number 105-?3295.

2. An official French liaison source reported in early September 1961 that Antin NYCZPORUK received a letter with the return address: (fnu) DIALHAWSKY, 63/N. 7 SA. (sic) Philadelphia 23, Pa. The address was also received from an official U.S. source as 13/N 7 SA. but this is believed to be a typographical error. It has not been possible to verify the address as the envelope was not photographed but was passed routinely from the post office to NYCZPORUK. The letter was not tested for secret writing.

3. The files of this Agency contain no identifiable information on DIALHAWSKY. It is possible the address should be 631 North Seventh Street, Philadelphia, which is the one used by POHORILIW. According to information from your Bureau, this is the home of Dymto WASYLASZUK, Secretary of the Ukrainian Workingmen's Association and the residence may be used for meetings of that organization.

4. We would appreciate any information in your files on DIALHAWSKY.

CSCI-3/767,673

SR/CI/RED:LLyons:CH - 11 Oct 61

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/CI
1 - CI/R&A
1 - CI/liaison
1 - SR/CI/P/DL
1 - RI/files (201-289249)
1 - Comeback
1 - SR/CI/RED

SECRET

CS COPY

201-289249

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. EAVA-28594
TO Chief of Base, Salzburg		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO 201-289249
INFO Chief, EE; Chief, SR		29-6-106/3
FROM Chief of Station, Austria		DATE 4 October 1961
SUBJECT REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/AEDOGMA-1 Semen POHORILIW		RE. "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE) MARKED FOR INDEXING; X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED		INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

EASA-5495 dated 7 August 1961

1. The IRO files, we understand, have been moved to Germany (International Tracing Service) or are in the process of moving. This makes such a check inadvisable, if not impossible.

2. A GREPPIGY-1 check would not be objectionable even though he, in turn, makes a police check.

MATTHEW H. CHUBB

2 October 1961

Distribution:
2 - COB, Salzburg
1 - Chief, EE
1 - Chief, SR
1 - 201-289249
1 - Registry

cc d EE/A r fo.

201-289249

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 201-289249

SECRET

ROUTING

DATE: 407 27 SEP 61

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: PARIS

ACTION: SR 6

INFO: CI, CI/OPS, FI, WE 4, S/C 2, CI/IC 2

RE Filing (check one): No CS Record Value. Destroy. [ ] RI file this copy as indicated [X] Branch copy filed as indicated [ ]

RE Indexing (check one): Marked [ ] None required [X]

SEP 27 1818Z 61

74-6-63/3

ROUTINE

IN 36157

DIR CITE PARI 7037

REDWOOD LCIMPROVE

REF DIR 11938 (OUT 97023)*

ADDRESS GIVEN IN PARI 6667 (IN 26062) AS RECD FROM UNBOUND. BELIEVE HQS ASSUMPTION REF CORRECT. ADDRESS ALSO RECD FROM ODOPAL AS 13/N 7 SA BUT THIS BELIEVED TYPO ERROR. IMPOSSIBLE VERIFY AS UNBOUND DID NOT PHOTO ENVELOPE WHICH PASSED ROUTINELY FROM P.O. TO NYCZPORUK.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *NO TRACES DIALNAWSKY.

RI COPY

ROUTING [illegible]
RI/AN
RI/FI
DESTROY
RI/FI

FORM 1389a

SECRET

Copy No.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
SECRET	EGMA-56218

TO: Chief, SR

INFO: Chief of Station, Germany
Chief, EE

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 201-289249
29-6-106/3
PP: CE-1643

FROM: Chief, Munich Operations Group

DATE: 21 September 1961

SUBJECT: CAMOG/REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/Operations
Identification of Picture

RE "43" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: None

REFERENCE(S):

EGMW-10664, 23 May 1961

Both AETRAPEZE and AEMERCURY-2 were shown the picture forwarded with the reference. Neither recognized the picture as being of anyone they had ever seen.

HADLEY B. ALLENSWORTH

APPROVED
HOWARD E. TAPHORN

Distribution:
2 - SR
1 - EE
2 - COS/G

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

CONTINUED

PAGE NO. 1

CS COPY

201-289249

201-289249

ORIG : LOUISE LYON
UNIT : SR/CI/RED 1534
EXT : 8251
DATE : 14 SEPTEMBER 1961

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : PARIS
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: SR 6
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, WE 4, S/C 2

RI Filing (check one): No CS Record Value. Destroy. RI file this copy as indicated. Branch copy filed as indicated. RI Indexing (check one): Marked ☐ Name required ☑

Signature:

5 SEP 61 17 38 z

74-6-63/3

DEFERRED SIG CEN

X ROUTINE

OUT97023

TO PARI INFO CITE DIR 11988

REDWOOD LCIMPROVE

REF: PARI 6667 (IN 26002)*

1. NO HQS TRACES. ASSUME ADDRESS IS 631 NORTH SEVENTH STREET, PHILADELPHIA ALSO USED BY POHORILIA. ADVISE. ACCORDING ODENVY THIS HOME OF DYMTRO WASYLASZUK, SECRETARY UKRAINIAN WORKINGMENS ASSOCIATION AND MAY BE USED FOR MEETINGS THIS FRATERNAL ORG. HQS OPINION ADDRESS MAY ALSO BE USED BY UKRAINIAN MEMBERS UWA.

2. WILL ADVISE ODENVY WHEN CORRECT ADDRESS RECEIVED FROM PARI.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *Requested traces on DIALIAWSKY, Philadelphia, correspondent of Antin NYCZPORUK, Suspect RIS.

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	
RI/TY	
DESTROY	
BNFL	

C/SR/2

William Dykes
D/OME
RELEASING OFFICER

WE/3
COORDINATING OFFICERS

SR/CI/RED
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

201-289249

SECRET

DATE : 008 8 SEP 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION : SR 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1 SR/1 Red	4
2	5
3	6

SEP 9 0256Z 61

74-6-63/3

ROUTINE

IN 26002

DIR CITE PARI 6667

REDWOOD LCIMPROVE

REF PARI 2329 (IN 40964)*

UNBOUND SURVEILLANCE ANTIN NYCZPORUK REVEALED RECEIPT LETTER WITH RETURN ADDRESS: DIALNAWSKY, 63/N.7 SA. PHILADELPHIA 23 PA. REQUEST TRACES.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *CABLE PRE-DATES CS FILES. COPY MAY BE SEEN IN SIGNAL CENTER ARCHIVES.

Reply sent 15 Sep 61
Out 97023 (Dir 11988)

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	
RI/TY	
DESTROY	
RI/FI	

FORM 1329

SECRET

14-00000

FBI doc.
21 Aug. 1961 (Philadelphia)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
Bufile: 105-93295
DBF 86583

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: EASA-5495

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 201-289249; 29-6-156/3

TO: Chief of Station, Austria

INFO: Chief, EE; Chief, SR

FROM: Chief of Base, Salzburg

DATE: 7 August 1961

SUBJECT: REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/AEDOGMA-1 Semen P[illegible]

RE "43 3 — (CHECK "X" ONE)
- MARKED FOR INDEXING
- XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: Pls indicate what further action we may take.

REFERENCE(S): EAVA-28253, 19 July 1961

We passed on your request concerning Subject to the local chief of USFP. He checked his files and found no traces. He suggested that the old IRO files might have something. Checks of these files are normally done by a local investigator of USFP. We request permission to bury Subject's name in a short list of names which the local investigator would then be asked to check in the old IRO files. Also, please indicate whether we should try to check this out through CHEF[illegible]-1, who presumably would check with the Salzburg police.

Sladen E. Whisong

Distribution:
2 - Vienna
2 - EE
2 - SR

CS COPY

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

CONTINUED

PAGE NO. 1

201-289249

14-00000

SECRET

2 August 1961

C-61-1144

MEMORANDUM FOR: SR/2/CE
Attention: R. I. Perkins

SUBJECT: Photo Identification
Semen POHORILYJ

The photograph of Semen POHORILYJ was shown to Reino HAYHANEN,* who stated he did not recognize the subject. The photograph is attached.

J. M. Evans
J. M. EVANS
C/CI/OPS/SCVSAT

Enclosure:
Photograph

* on 31 July 1961

SECRET

14-00000

610511

201-289249

FBI doc.
22 June 1961 (Philadelphia)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
Bufile: 105-93295
DBF 80925

FBI&&o&&

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: EAVA-23253

TO: Chief of Base, Salzburg

INFO: Chief, SR; Chief, EE

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 201-289249; 29-5-106/3

FROM: Chief of Station, Vienna

DATE: 19 July 1961

SUBJECT: REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/AEDOGMA/1

RE "433" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
- MARKED FOR INDEXING
- XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: See below

REFERENCE(S): EGMW-10664, dated 23 May 1961 201-289249

Chief of Base, Salzburg is requested to check USEP and any other appropriate files on Subject of reference (a copy of which is herewith attached for Salzburg). The principal object of this exercise is to determine whether the person shown in the attached photograph is identical with Subject. As a minimum please ascertain the addresses at which Subject lived in Salzburg from 1945 to 1950. Depending on what you find, we can then devise some unilateral method of confirming the identity of the attached photo.

Lee J. Farmer

13 July 1961

Attachments:
- A) Copy EGMW-10664, h/w
- B) Photo USC

Distribution:
- 2 - Salzburg, w/atts.
- ✓2 - SR, wo/atts.
- 2 - EE, wo/atts.
- 1 - Reg., wo/atts.
- 1 - File

LJF/ejn

201-289249

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

CONTINUED

PAGE NO

14-00000

SECRET

COPY

LIAISON UNBOUND

OPFA 59215
13 June 1961

contact reports

UNBOUND 11and JENTONS - weekly meeting 9 June 1961

Antin NYCZYPORUK

4. Gave him poop on Antin NYCZYPORUK, It wastoo late in the AM to get hold of UNBOUND 27 oranyone who would be in on the working level and hesaid he would take it up with them in the afternoon and that we could then get together and discuss means of action.

SECRET

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Semen POMERILIW

1. Representatives of the FBI Laboratory have been previously briefed on the KEMPOTE TEST which we believed had been used when working on the POMERILIW letter and which established the presence of SW on the letter.

2. We have now been advised by a field representative that a modified version of this process was actually used and it is possible that the SW is detectable by this version of the test, but not by the regular test of which your Bureau has the details.

3. It should be noted that our work on known systems revealed two cases exhibiting the same type of fleeting detection as was noted on the POMERILIW letter. This, of course, does not mean that the POMERILIW letter is written in one of these systems, but merely that fleeting detections can occasionally be expected with this variation of the KEMPOTE TEST.

4. Agency headquarters laboratory has not completed a comparison of the original and modified KEMPOTE procedures so as to confirm the finding of our field laboratory that the modified test is more sensitive. It is being provided to your Bureau at this time, however, since it is a technique which has been used successfully in a current case.

CSCI-3/765,739

Attachment: KEMPOTE TEST (Modified)

cc: TSD - Dr. Colin Reid (w/o attachment)

CI/Liaison/JARoman/nfr (2 June 61)
Distribution: Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - TSD
1 - SR/Rita Perkins
1 - RI
1 - CI
1 - CI/R&A

[illegible] 1961

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

[illegible]: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Senor FORTRILEM

201-289249

1. Representatives of the FBI Laboratory have been previously briefed on the K[illegible] TEST which we believed had been used when working on the FORTRILEM letter and which established the presence of SW on the letter.

2. We have now been advised by a field representative that a modified version of this process was actually used and it is possible that the SW is detectable by this version of the test, but not by the regular test of which your Bureau has the details.

3. It should be noted that our work on known systems revealed two cases exhibiting the same type of fleeting detection as was noted on the FORTRILEM letter. This, of course, does not mean that the FORTRILEM letter is written in one of these systems, but merely that fleeting detections can occasionally be expected with this variation of the K[illegible] TEST.

4. Agency headquarters laboratory has not completed a comparison of the original and modified K[illegible] procedures so as to confirm the finding of our field laboratory that the modified test is more sensitive. It is being provided to your Bureau at this time, however, since it is a technique which has been used successfully in a current case.

CSCI-3/765,739

Attachment: K[illegible] TEST (Modified)

cc: TSD - Dr. Colin Reid (w/o attachment)

CI/Liaison/JARoman/mfr (2 June 61)
Distribution: Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - TSD
1 - SR/Rita Perkins
1 - RI
1 - CI
1 - CI/[illegible]

CS COPY

201-289249

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: OPFA- 58988

TO: Chief, WE
INFO: Attention: Chief, SR

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 201-289129
29-6-106/3

FROM: Chief of Station, Paris

DATE: 2 JUN 1961

SUBJECT: REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/AEDOGMA

RE "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
- MARKED FOR INDEXING
- X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: For Your Information

REFERENCES: OFPW 30647, 19 May 1961

1. AEDOGMA was shown the photograph attached to Reference and said he did not recognize the face.

2. AEDOGMA stated that he knew no one other than NYCZPORUK in contact with POHORILIN, when the subject was raised later, in another context.

WALLACE H. HAVEDON

1 June 1961
Distribution:
3-SR
2-WE

Crbm ee se Cl(ed/s

fil 201

when VIER + HQS reply - notify Bureau of results

USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

14-00000

201-289249
CC 24-6-10612

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: RITA PERKINS
UNIT: SR/2/CE
EXT: 2080
DATE: 23 MAY 1961 1672

ROUTING

1	SR/2	4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: PARIS
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: SR 6
INFO: CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, WE 4, S/C 2

29 MAY 61 22 54z

DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

OUT 60803

TO PARI INFO CITE DIR 42528 42528

REDWOOD AEDOGMA UNBOUND

RE: PARI 4365 (IN 34016)*

1. ODENVY HAS NO OBJECTION STA INFORMING UNBOUND POHORILIW CASE PROVIDING POHORILIW NOT IDEN BY NAME.

2. PLS FORWARD FOR HQS PASSAGE ODENVY ANY UNBOUND INFO PBPRIME ASPECTS CASE.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: POHORILIW US RESIDENT WHO SENT LETTER CONTAINING S/W TO ANTIN NYCZYPORUK IN PARIS.

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/	MK
RI/	
DESTROY	
RI/FI	

SR/SI
CI/OG/SS
WE/3
COORDINATING OFFICERS

CWE/X
RELEASING OFFICER

CSR/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

DISPATCH | SECRET | [illegible]-10684

TO: Chief, Munich Operations Base; COS, Vienna
INFO: Chief of Station, Germany; Chief of Station, Paris

201-289249
29-6-106/3

FROM: Chief, SR

SUBJECT: REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/AEDOGMA/1

ACTION REQUIRED: Show photograph to appropriate sources

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

1. Attached is a photograph of Semen POHORILIW, which we would like shown, without name, to appropriate unilateral sources for possible identification.

2. FYI: POHORILIW's name appears as the sender of a letter containing secret writing to Antin NYCZYPORUK in Paris, France. The letter was sent in care of Dmytro GNYP, another Ukrainian resident of Paris. GNYP, in November 1960, asked AEDOGMA/1 to deliver the letter to NYCZYPORUK who was confined to a mental sanitarium near Paris. GNYP told AEDOGMA/1 that he (GNYP) and NYCZYPORUK had been involved with Vasiliy HYAKOSHKO (Soviet assigned to UNESCO and the case officer of the arrested emigre Grigoriy [illegible]), and therefore GNYP feared coming to the attention of the French police by delivering the letters to NYCZYPORUK. MKTOPAZ analysis revealed the presence of the s/w in the letter from POHORILIW, but failed in attempts to develop the s/w. CODSWY and Paris Station are now investigating this case; therefore, in your reply please send an information copy to Paris.

3. The following is biographic information on Semen POHORILIW.

a. dob: 2 February 1910
b. pob: Czerkasy, Ukraine
c. parents: Spiridon and Alexandra nee [illegible] POHORILYJ
d. education: seven years elementary school and one year teachers' school
e. residence: USSR 1924 to 1943
Poland 1943 and 1944
Czechoslovakia 1944 and 1945
Salzburg, Austria 1945 to July 1950
United States July 1950 to present
f. physical description: c. 1951, 5'10", 175 pounds, gray eyes and fair complexion.

23 MAY 1961

Attachment:
Photo herewith

Pamela D. Chalifoux
PAMELA D. CHALIFOUX

16 May 1961

Distribution:
2 - MOB, w/att.
2 - COS, Vienna, w/ATT
2 - COS, Paris
2 - COS, Germany

1 - SR/3
1 - EE/G
1 - WE/3
1 - EE/A
2 - SR/2/CE
1 - 201-289249
1 - 29-6-106/3

CS COPY

SR/2/CE/Rita Perkins

FORM 10-57 53b USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET | CONTINUED | PAGE NO

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Semen Spiridon POHORILYJ aka POHORILIW
Internal Security - R

1. Reference is made to memorandum from this office, CSCI-3/764,636 of 24 April 1961, and to your memorandum of 3 May 1961, file number 105-93295.

2. As reported in referenced CSCI memorandum, a letter purportedly from Subject was tested for secret writing. Secret writing was seen by one technician and its presence confirmed by another technician. However, the message had disappeared before a third technician could observe it. The technician who tested the letter has said that only one line of hand-printed secret writing was distinctly visible. There were traces of S/W on other parts of the letter but this was very indistinct. The cover letter was in longhand. The disappearance of the writing did not permit photography or recording of any part of the S/W message.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

Signed: James R. Hunt, Jr.

JAMES ANGLETON

CSCI-3/765,321

Distribution:
Orig &1 - Addressee
2 - SR/2/CE
1 - CI/OG/SS
~~1~~ 201-289249
1 - C/CI
1 - SR/RISB/DL (dummy copy)
1 - CI/Liaison (dummy copy)
1 - CI/R&A (dummy copy)

SR/2/CE/Rita Perkins:bbh 19 May 1961

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING

	ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief of Station, Paris

INFO:

FROM: Chief, SR via Chief, WE

SUBJECT: REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/AEDOGMA

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Show attached photo to AEDOGMA/1

Reference: OFPW-30103, 17 March 1961

1. In answer to our request of ODENVY to compare the handwriting of Semen POHORILIW with that attributed to him in the letter to Antin HYCZYPORUK, ODENVY has informed us that at this time they do not have sufficient specimens of POHORILIW's handwriting to reach any conclusion.

2. ODENVY has furnished us with the attached photograph of Semen POHORILIW. We suggest that this photograph, unidentified, be shown to AEDOGMA/1 for possible recognition. We are sending this photograph to MOB, also, for showing to appropriate sources.

for SHELBY K. LIPMOTT

MORTIMER F. BINGHAM

Attachment: h/w
Photograph

Distribution:
3 - COS, Paris (w/att.)

CC [illegible] 29-6-106/3

DATE TYPED: 12 May 61

DATE DISPATCHED: 19 MAY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OFPW-30647

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-289129 ~~29-6-106/3~~

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

2 - WE/3
2 - SR/2/CE
1 - 201-289129
1 - 29-6-106/3

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
SR/2/CE	Rita Perkins	bbh	2080

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CSR/2	15/5/61	JOHN GERRY
WE/3		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER
CWE/3		

SR/2/CE

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

14-00000

[illegible], Semen Photo [illegible]

[illegible] shown c. [illegible] May [illegible] - [illegible] negative

14-00000

FBI doc.
11 May 1961 (Wash.)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj, aka
Bufile: 105-93295
DBF 76343

FBI doc.
3 May 1961 (Wash.)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj, aka
Bufile: 105-93295
DBF 75098

FBI doc.
21 April 1961 (Philadelphia)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
Bufile: 105-93295
DBF 75201

SECRET

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Semen POHORILIW
Internal Security - R

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 28 February 1961 on Subject.

2. We plan to discuss with French liaison the receipt by Dmytro GNYP and Antin NYCZYPORUK of the letter containing secret writing from Subject, who will be identified to the French only as a resident of the United States. We believe such a discussion is desirable in view of its pertinence to the current investigation of the intelligence activities of Vasiliy MYAKUSHKO (member of the Soviet delegation to UNESCO from April 1957 to August 1960). If such a discussion would adversely affect your interest in POHORILIW, please advise us as soon as possible.

CSCI-3/765,058

SR/2/CE/Rita Perkins:bbh 20 April 1961

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - CI/R&A
1 - CI/Liaison
1 - CI/OG/SOV
1 - 201-289249
1 - 29-6-106/3
1 - SR/RISB/DL
2 - SR/2/CE

SECRET

CS COPY

14-00000

FILE No 201-284249

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :	255 11 APR 61
TO :	DIRECTOR
FROM :	PARIS
ACTION :	SR 6
INFO :	CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, WE 4, S/C 2, CI/OA

RE Filing (check one): No CS Record Value. Destroy. / RI file this copy as indicated / Branch copy filed as indicated
RE Indexing (check one): Marked / None required
Signature:

ROUTING
1 S/C 2 | 4
2 | 5
3 | 6

APR 11 1329Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 34016

DIR CITE PARI 4355

IN34016

REDWOOD AEDOGMA UNBOUND

REF: DIR 33187 (OUT 91903) *

1. STA WISHED EXPLORE TELLING UNBOUND THAT GNYP AND NYCZYPORUK HAD RECEIVED S/W MAIL FROM UNNAMED SOURCE IN PBPRIME. SINCE UNBOUND STILL INTERESTED MYAKUSHKO CONTACTS, MIGHT PROFITABLY PUT MAIL COVER ON G AND N

2. STA THEREFORE ASKED ODENVY REP OPINION WHETHER ODENVY HQS INVESTIGATION OF POHORILIW WOULD BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED IF ABOVE INFO RE G AND N GIVEN TO UNBOUND.

3. ODENVY REP STATES HE CABLED QUERY TO HIS HQS RE ABOVE.

RE REF:

A. "PBPRIME ANGLE REFERS TO INVESTIGATION OF POHORILIW WHICH IS ASPECT OF CASE MOST DIRECTLY TOUCHING ODYOKE INTEREST.

FORM 1389 Use Previous Editions

SECRET

FILE No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

RE Filing (check one).
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature:

IN 34016 PARI 4365

B. MADE NO REF "LIVE LETTER DROP".

C. LOOSELY REFERRED TO KUBARK'S "PENETRATION OF CORRESPONDENCE CHANNEL". THIS INACCURATE AND MAY HAVE BEEN TAKEN MEAN WE INTERCEPTED MORE THAN ONE LETTER IN POHORILIW-NYCZYPORUK CORRESPONDENCE. ODENVY REP AWARE OF SECOND LETTER (FROM USSR TO N WHICH NOT FOUND CONTAIN S/W) INTERCEPTED BY AEDOGMA, BUT DID NOT MENTION IN HIS CABLE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *ODENVY REQUESTED CLARIFICATION FOLL POINTS.

A. WHAT MEANT BY WORD ANGLE IN STA QUERY WHETHER DISCUSSION CASE UNBOUND WOULD INTERFERE WITH PBPRIME ANGLE.

B. STA ALLUSION LIVE LETTER DROP PBPRIME.

FORM 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG: RPerkins
UNIT: SR/2/CE
EXT: 8757 1565
DATE: 3 April 1961

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

TO: PARIS

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SR 6

INFO: CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, WE 4, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE: DEFERRED 4 APR 61 19 59z; ROUTINE X; PRIORITY; OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

SIG CEN

INITIALS

OUT 91903

~~OUT 91903~~

TO PARI INFO CITE DIR 33187

33187

REDWOOD AEDOGMA

RE DIR 26906 (OUT 77202) *
OFPW 30103

1. ODENVY ASKS FOR CLARIFICATION FOLL POINTS CONFUSION ARISING FROM ODENVY PARI REPORT MEETING WITH STA ON POHORILIN CASE:

A. WHAT MEANT BY WORD ANGLE IN STA QUERY WHETHER DISCUSSION CASE WITH UNBOUND WOULD INTERFERE WITH PBPRIME ANGLE;

B. STA ALLUSION LIVE LETTER DROP PBPRIME;

C. REF TO MORE THAN ONE LETTER.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *RECOMMEND NO ACTION PARI THIS TIME. (RE POSSIBLE REPATRIATION NYCYPORUK).

SR/SI
CI/OG/SOV (Smith in draft)
WE/3
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WE/ [signature]
RELEASING OFFICER

CSR/2 [signature]
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

Copy No.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

25 APR 1961

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Semen POHORILIW - Internal Security R

FROM:

SR/2/CE/Rita Perkins x 8757

NO. CSCI-3/764,636

DATE 29 March 1961

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CSR/2/CE		29/3		
2. CSR/2		29/3		
3.				
4. SR/RISB/DL	MAR 1961	30/3		
5. SR/COP/SI	MAR 1961	MAR 1961		
6.				
7. CI/OG/SOV		3	e	7 to 9A — In view of FBI investigation of Subject believe FBI should have this info. This is case on which I sent you memo re SW handling.
8. C/CI/OG		4 apr	✓	
9. DC/CI CI/Liaison	4 APR 1961	10 APR 1961		
10. C/CI/SEV DC/CI	11 APR 1961	21 APR 1961	e	Evans — Let me see info on this.
11. RID/AN	24 APR 1961			enclosed
12. ~~RID/MIS~~				
13. RI/FI				ABSTRACT ☒ INDEX
14.				DATE 24 APR 1961
15.				

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 O-

24 APR 1961

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Semen POHORILIW 201-289249
Internal Security - R

1. Reference is made to the following correspondence:

a. Bureau report of 14 February 1961, made at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and Subject as above;

b. Memorandum from Deputy Director (Plans), Subject as above, dated 9 January 1961, and numbered CSCI - 3/763,211;

c. CIA Teletype, Subject as above, dated 16 November 1960;

d. CIA Teletype, Subject as above, dated 17 February 1961.

2. We would appreciate being informed whether or not you have had an opportunity to compare the hand writing of Semen POHORILIW and that of the letter bearing his name and address, which we sent to you with reference 1.b..

3. In a review of our files we note that the lack of elaboration in our earlier correspondence might cause your Bureau some difficulty. Our statement in reference 1.c. that the POHORILIW letter bore indications of secret writing was based on the findings of our technical staff. One of our technicians applied a test that permitted him to see writing which, although it was not legible, could be seen to be other than that of the overt text. This writing remained visible long enough for another technician

201-289249

to confirm its presence. There have been reports that our source is considered by the Soviets to be American controlled. Thus it was considered that, if this letter were a Soviet intelligence communication, it was likely the Soviets would consider the operation compromised when our source's possession of the letter was reported. For this reason, we decided it was best to forge a copy of the POHORILIW letter and make every attempt to develop any secret writing it contained. Unfortunately, we were unable to do so, and the original letter was destroyed in the process. As we reported in reference 1.d. on 8 or 9 January 1961 our source delivered to Antin HYCZYPORUK the forged copy of the POHORILIW letter. To date there has been no report of any reaction to HYCZYPORUK's receipt of the forgery.

CSCI-3/764,636

SR/2/CE/Rita Perkins:bbh   29 March 1961

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - CI/R&A
1 - CI/Liaison
1 - C/CI
1 - RID/FI
1 - SR/RISB/DL
2 - SR/2/CE

14-00000

DISPATCH

S-E-C-R-E-T-

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO

Chief of Station, Paris

INFO

FROM

Chief, SR via Chief, WE

SUBJECT

REDWOOD/AEDOGMA - Semen POHORILIW

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference: DIR 26906

1. ODENVY has informed us that neither the release of Antin NYCZYPORUK from the mental sanitarium nor his repatriation would affect their investigation of Semen POHORILIW.

2. ODURGE files contained following information on Subject: He was born 2 February 1910 at Czerkasy, Ukraine. His parents, now deceased, were Spiridon and Aleksandra nee IWCZENKO. Subject attended elementary school for seven years and teachers' school for one year. He resided in the USSR 1924 to 1943; in Poland, 1943 and 1944; in Czechoslovakia, 1944 and 1945; and in Salzburg, Austria, from March 1945 to July 1950. His last residence in Salzburg was at Camp Hellbrunn. In July 1950 he was granted a visa to the United States as a displaced person. At that time he stated his destination in the United States was the home of Pawlo KLYMENKO in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He entered the United States in September, 1960. In July 1951 he filed a Declaration of Intention to become a United States citizen. At that time he was residing at 933 North 7th Street, Philadelphia, and was employed as a polisher. His physical description in 1951 was 5'10", 175 pounds, blond hair, gray eyes and fair complexion.

3. According to ODENVY in January 1961 Subject was residing at 931 North 7th Street, Philadelphia, in a home owned by Daytro WASYLASZUK and Paraska OLEKSIUK. WASYLASZUK is a member of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian Workers Association.

SR/63

SHELBY K. LIPKOTT

MORTIMER F. BINGHAM

Distribution:
3 - COS, Paris

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
13 March 61	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OFPW-30103

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 29-6-106/3; 201-289249

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
SR/2/CE	Rita Perkins	bbh	8757

2 - RI
2 - WE/3
2 - SR/2/CE

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CSR/2		JOHN GERRY
WE/3		
CI/OG/SOV		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
CWE/3		201-289249

CS 19-29-6-106/3

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

COPY

14-00000

FBI doc.
28 Feb. 1961 (Wash.)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
DBF 69970

FBI doc.

14-00000

749

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

NO.

ORIG: RITA PERKINS
UNIT: SR/2/CE
EXT: 8757
DATE: 21 E FEBRUARY 1961

TO: PARIS

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SR 6

INFO: CI, CI/OPS, FI, TSD 4, WE 4, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one): No CS Record Value. Destroy. RI file this copy as indicated. Branch copy filed as indicated
RE Indexing (check one): Marked ☐ None required

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DEFERRED 24 FEB 61 23 24z

X ROUTINE

SIG CEN

PRIORITY

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

INITIALS

OUT 77202

OUT 77202

TO PARI INFO CITE DIR 26905

PARI

REDWOOD LCIMPROVE AEDOGMA 1

RE: PARI 3664 (IN 46263)*

~~ODENVY SENT REF INFO AND ASKED IF RELEASE AND OR REPATRIATION HYCZYPORUK WOULD AFFECT POSORILIV CASE.~~ ODENVY INTERIM REPLY NON COMMITTAL BECAUSE DELAY THEIR INVESTIGATION. THUS RECOMMEND NO ACTION PARI THIS TIME.

END OF MESSAGE

* CS COMMENT: REF ASKED IF HQS DESIRED ANY PARI ACTION RE POSSIBLE REPATRIATION HYCZYPORUK.

RI COPY

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	
RI/FI	
RI/FI	

CI/OA/SI

SR/SI

WE/3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

CWB

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

FORM 4-58 1389a

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG: RITA PERKINS 633
UNIT: SR/2/CE
EXT: 8757 633
DATE: 17 FEBRUARY 1961

TO: FBI

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SR 6

INFO: CI, CI/OPS, WE 4, S/C 2

ROUTING: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

DEFERRED 17 FEB 61 22 11z

ROUTINE X

PRIORITY

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

SIG CEN

INITIALS

OUT 74849

FBI INFO CITE DIR

SUBJECT: POHORILIW

REF: CSCI 3/763,811

1. LETTER DELIVERED NYCZYPORUK 8 OR 9 JAN. NYCZYPORUK READ LETTER IMMEDIATELY AND GAVE NO INDICATION HE SAW ANYTHING WRONG.

2. NYCZYPORUK TOLD OUR SOURCE DOCTORS CONSIDER HIM COMPLETELY CURED AND ALL HE NEEDS IS AN ASSURED DOMICILE IN PARIS TO BE RELEASED. ANOTHER SOURCE REPORTED ONYP AVERS NYCZYPORUK WILL REPATRIATE FOLLOWING HIS RELEASE.

3. WE DO NOT PLAN INTERFERE IN RELEASE AND/OR REPATRIATION OF NYCZYPORUK UNLESS IT AFFECTS YOUR INVESTIGATION POHORILIW. PLS ADVISE SOONEST.

END OF MESSAGE

ROUTING / RI/AN / FILE / R/I

CI/OG/SOV/SAT
SR/SI
WE/3

CI

COORDINATING OFFICERS

CSR/2 201-289249

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

FORM 1389 (35)

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 16 FEB 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION : SR 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, TSD 4, WE 4, S/C 2

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

FEB 16 1533Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 46263

DIR CITE PARI 3664

REDWOOD LCIMPROVE AEDOGMA 1

REF DIR 15201 (out 50208)*

1. AEDOGMA/1 DELIVERED LETTER 8-9 JANUARY. NYCZYPORUK OPENED AND READ IMMEDIATELY, GAVE NO INDICATION HE SAW ANYTHING WRONG.

2. N'S DOCTORS CONSIDER HIM COMPLETELY CURED. N TOLD DOGMA HE ONLY NEEDS ASSURED DOMICILE PARI FOR RELEASE. HOWEVER GNYP INFORMED BYDNIK THAT N WILL REPATRIATE WHEN RELEASED.

3. IN LIGHT POSSIBLE N REMOVAL, ANY ACTION DESIRED PARI?

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED DETAILS RE THE DELIVERY OF A LETTER TO NYCZYPORUK WHICH DEFINETLY CONTAINED S/W.

POHORILIW SEMEN

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/FI	MK
RI/FI	✓
DESTROY	
RI/FI	

SECRET

Copy No.

14-00000

FBI doc.
14 Feb. 1961 (Philadelphia)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj,aka
DBF 69574

FBI&doc.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: OPPA- 56927

TO: Chief, WE
INFO: Attention: Chief, SR

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 29-6-106/3

FROM: Chief of Station, Paris

DATE: 8 FEB 1961

SUBJECT: REDWOOD LCIMPROVE AEDOGMA
Transmittal of UMWEAVE TRACES

RE (CHECK "X" ONE)
- X MARKED FOR INDEXING
- NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: For Your Information

REFERENCE(S): DIR 15201, 7 December 1961

Transmitted herewith are the UMWEAVE traces for Dmitrio *CHYP and Antin *NYKYPORUK as requested in reference.

Leona N. Costerman

7 February 1961

Attached Herewith:
2 UMWEAVE traces

Distribution:
3-SR with 2 copies each attachment
2-WE with 1 copy each attachment

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

SECRET

7 February 1961

Dmitrio *GNYP, born 13 October 1898 at WASNICZU, Hungary - child of Wassile and JAZWINSKA Paraska, Ukrainian refugee, has lived for about the past twenty years at 211 rue de Beroy, Paris 12eme.

He has been employed, since 1945, as night watchman for the "Societe de Transports de Vehicules Automobiles", 60 rue St. Ferdinand, Paris 17eme.

His monthly salary is about 60,000 old francs.

From his first marriage, he had two sons, Baseli (36 years old) who lives in Pdand and Lvitomir (34 years old) who lives in the USA.

From his second marriage with Martha MASLY, born 9 September 1903 in LWOW Poland, he had a third son Jean, born 22 May 1940 in Paris (12th arrondiesment) who chose a French nationality.

During the German occupation, GNYP who has been in France since 1925 went to work in Germany as a volunteer for the organization TODT. Returning to France in 1943 he worked until the Liberation as a chauffeur for the "Legion SPEER" at Enghien Les Bains.

In 1944, with the liberation, he was arrested and interned at Fresnes for collaboration, but this detention was not followed by condemnation.

In the milieux of Ukrainian refugees he is considered as an opportunist.

SECRET

7 February 1961

Antin *NYKYPORUK, born the first of January 1912 in Karkow (Ukraine), bachelor, has most recently lived at 86 rue de Montreuil-arrived in France in 1950.

He first of all was a manual laborer, and then an electrician.

Bothered with mental troubles, he has been interned since 1954 in various psychiatric hospitals.

His last stay was in 1959 at Villejuif.

Since his departure, his activity and sources of income have not been known because his unemployment payment has been refused by the "Bureau de la Main d'Oeuvre".

His ordinary resident's card has lapsed since 16 August 1960 and he is ~~actually~~ at present violating the law for Foreigners.

It is a question of a violent individual when he has his mental crises.

On several occasions the police have intervened to control him before interment.

SECRET

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Semen POHORILIW
Internal Security - R

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 22 November 1960 on Subject.

2. There have been no new developments in France on this matter. Our source has been given a facsimile of the POHORILIW letter, but there has been no report on its delivery to Antin HYCZPORUK (see attachment).

3. We have received the following biographic information:

a. Dmytro GHYP was born on 13 October 1898 at Wasyczyn Rohatyn, Western Ukraine. He is married and the father of two sons, one of whom repatriated to the Ukraine in 1948 and the other of whom lives in France and is a member of the Ukrainian nationalist organization - Spilka Ukrainskoji Molodi (The Union of Ukrainian Youth in France). GHYP's education consists of four years of elementary schooling in the Ukraine. In 1918 he served as a non-commissioned officer in the Ukrainian Army in a formation called the Sitschowi Strilci. GHYP emigrated to France in 1925. He has been a member of two Ukrainian communist organizations in France; in 1927 he joined the Soyuz Ukrainskych Hromadian u Franciji (Union of Ukrainian Citizens in France), and from 1945 to 1947 he was a member of the Batkivtschyna (Homeland). His address for the past two years has been 211 Rue de Bercy, Paris XIIeme.

CS COPY

copies filed in
29-6-106/3
201-277417

201-289249

b. Antin NYCZYPORUK (according to GHYP his true name is NYKYPORETZ) was born about 1910. He is married and had a wife and two children in Noginsk. Prior to 1944 he was a professor of Ukrainian and West European Literature at a pedagogical institute in Kiev. NYCZYPORUK left the USSR in 1944; from 1945 to 1948 he was in an International Refugee Organization camp in Salzburg, Austria; he has resided in France since 1948.

4. The following details on GHYP's and NYCZYPORUK's involvement with Soviet intelligence were obtained by our source from GHYP and other Ukrainian emigres in France. During the period 1958 to 1960 GHYP and Vasiliy MYAKUSHO, Third Secretary of the Soviet Delegation to UNESCO, frequently visited with each other at the Soviet Embassy and at GHYP's apartment on 211 Rue de Bercy. At the end of 1959 GHYP introduced NYCZYPORUK to MYAKUSHKO. MYAKUSHKO asked NYCZYPORUK to contribute literary articles to Soviet publications; it is not known whether NYCZYPORUK wrote any such articles. Early in 1960 NYCZYPORUK developed a persecution complex and was confined to a sanitarium for a short period. GHYP, fearing that NYCZYPORUK might expose the GHYP-MYAKUSHKO relationship, provided NYCZYPORUK with free board and lodging in his apartment and with spending money. MYAKUSHKO dropped NYCZYPORUK as soon as the latter's mental condition became obvious. In May 1960 the Soviet Embassy advised NYCZYPORUK to repatriate to the USSR as soon as possible, and offered to help locate his family in the USSR. (As you already know, in October 1960 the Soviets sent NYCZYPORUK a letter reporting his family was not in Noginsk. See attachment.)

5. There is a rumor in the Ukrainian emigre colony in Paris that NYCZYPORUK has been a Soviet agent since about 1949. This is based on his close relationship with Josef (aka Osyp) KOZAK since 1949. KOZAK moved to France from Munich in 1946. Until his expulsion in 1950 he was quite active in the Organization of Ukrainian Nationals/Bandera (OUN/B) in France. He was ousted from the OUN/B because of his excessive curiosity about OUN/B members and their relatives in the USSR. Subsequently it was learned that KOZAK was in contact with the Soviet Embassy in France. KOZAK is presently residing at 26 rue Gaston Jaillon, Vesines Chalette, Loiret.

CSCI-3/763,211

Attachment - Copy of two letters

SR/2/CE/RPerkins:bbh 27 December 1960

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - CI/Liaison
1 - CI/OG/SOV
~~1 - C/CI~~
1 - CI/R&A

1 - 29-6-106/3
1 - 201-289249
1 - 201-277417
1 - SR/2/CE

Based on: OFPA-55524
OFPA-55817

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: OFPA- 55817

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 29-6-104/3

TO: Chief, WE Attention: Chief, SR

INFO

FROM: Chief of Station, Paris

DATE: 7 DEC 1960

SUBJECT: [illegible] A [illegible]
Jozef (aka Osyp) *KOZAK

RE 43 3 — (CHECK "X" ONE)

X MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: For information

REFERENCE(S)

1. KOZAK, a friend of Antin *[illegible] (see O[illegible]A-55524, 23 November 1960), is a West Ukrainian of about 50 years of age. He arrived in Paris just after World War II and was engaged as the A [illegible]/S operative in France, since he had been involved in this activity in Munich until 1946. As an intelligent man, gymnasium graduate, and student of political economy at the University of Nancy, KOZAK was able to learn all A [illegible] secrets.

2. KOZAK came into contact with Antin [illegible] in 1949 and they became fast friends. Ivan [illegible] is convinced that [illegible] was already then a Soviet agent and made contact with KOZAK on [illegible] instructions. When [illegible] and others noticed that KOZAK frequently made critical remarks about A [illegible] activity, displayed excessive curiosity about various A [illegible] members and their relations in the [illegible], they became suspicious of him. He was removed from his job and strictly isolated from A [illegible] activity in 1950. Then the suspicions were borne out when it was learned that KOZAK had contact with the Soviet Embassy. He has subsequently maintained his contact with [illegible].

3. KOZAK is now living at 26 rue Gaston Jaillon, Vesines Chalette, Loiret, where there is a rather large Ukrainian colony.

Wallace N. HAVEDON

6 December 1960

Distribution:

- 3 - SR
- 2 - WE

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION

CONTINUED

PAGE NO

14-00000

104-10106-10013

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG: RITA PERKINS
UNIT: SR/2/CE
EXT: 8757
DATE: 5 DECEMBER 1960

ROUTING

1	2	4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: PARIS

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SR 6

INFO: CI, CI/OPS, FI, TSD 4, EE 4, WE 4, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE: DEFERRED — 6 DEC 60 23 39z
XX ROUTINE
PRIORITY — INITIALS
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE — INITIALS

OUT50208

OUT 50208

TO PARI — INFO — CITE DIR 15201

15201

LCIMPROVE AEDOGMA

RE: PARI 2579 (IN 49970) *

1. ODENVY REPORTS NO FILE INFO GNYP NYCZYPORUK AND POHORILIW. ODENVY INVESTIGATING POHORILIW AND REQUESTS ANY DETAILS WE CAN DEVELOP.

2. ONLY ACTION FOR PARI NOW REPORT DETAILS DELIVERY LETTER TO NYCZYPORUK AND UNWEAVE NAME TRACES.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *SINCE EGTA 15927 REPORTS SW DEFINITELY PRESENT PHILADELPHIA LETTER, REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS FURTHER PARI ACTION IF ANY.

WE/3 ____
C/WE [signature] — SR/COP/CE [signature] — C/SR/2 [signature]

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER — SECRET — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

498

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 30 NOV 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION : SR 6

INFO : ~~TSD 4~~, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DEC 2 1958Z 60
ACTION CHANGE

ROUTINE

IN 49970A PARI 2579

TO INFO CITE

LCIMPROVE AEDOGMA

CS COMMENT: ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM TSD TO SR BY DR REID TSD EXT 2922 IN COORDINATION WITH RITA PERKINS, SR DIV EXT 8757.

S-E-C-R-E-T

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 349 30 NOV 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION : TSD 4*

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, EE 4, SR 4, WE 4, S/C 2

ROUTING

1	2	4	
2	3	5	
3		6	

NOV 30 1750Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 49970

DIR CITE PARI 2579

LCIMPROVE AEDOGMA

REF A. EGTA 15927

B. PARI 2453 (IN 45709)**

C. FRAN 7388 (IN 45202)

1. FACSIMILE PASSED TO DOGMA FOR DELIVERY ADDRESSEE.

2. SINCE REF A REPORTS SW DEFINITELY PRESENT PHILADELPHIA LETTER, REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS FURTHER PARI ACTION IF ANY.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENTS: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR AQUATIC USED.

**STATED NO FURTHER TESTING REQUIRED. REQUESTED POUCH ALL LETTERS PARI.

SINGLE COPY

SECRET

14-00000

FBI doc.
22 Nov. 1960 (Wash.)
RE: Semen Pohoriliw
DBF 63039

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: EGTA 15927

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.:

TO: Chief of Station, Paris
Attn: James B. WINTERHALTER
INFO: Chief, EE Chief, WE, Chief, SR
~~Chief, KURIOT~~

FROM: ~~Chief of Station, Germany~~

DATE: 23 Nov 60

SUBJECT: AQUATIC / REDWOOD / Operational
Transmittal of SW examination Report

ACTION REQUIRED:

REFERENCES:

A. OFPA 55220, 4 Nov 60
B. EGTA 15911, 8 Nov 60
C. PARI 2329, 10 Nov 60
D. DIR 11442, 15 Nov 60
E. OFPA 55359, 15 Nov 60
F. PARI 2426, 18 Nov 60

Transmitted herewith as EAPCK attachment number one is a report on the laboratory work done on letters mentioned in the references above.

Elmer E. Hukeed

Elmer E. HUKEED

Attachment: 1
EAPCK Report

Approved: Joseph Q. Klemack
Joseph Q. KLEMACK

Distribution:
3 - Chief of Station, Paris, w/att
~~1 - Chief, SR, w/att~~
1 - Chief, WE, w/att
1 - Chief, EE, wo/att
2 - Chief, KURIOT, w/att

COPY

FORM 53b
USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

CONTINUED

Attachment to EGTA-15927
dated 22 November 1960

SUBJECT: Report on Testing of Letters for SW

REFS: (1) OFPA-55220, 4 November 1960
(2) EGTA-15911, 8 November 1960
(3) FRAN 7328

1. The purpose of this report is summarize the laboratory work done on two letters transmitted to us originally as attachments to Reference #1. For identification purposes in this report we shall refer to the letter postmarked in Philadelphia as Letter #1 and the one postmarked in the USSR as Letter #2.

2. In order to facilitate a better understanding of the results some interpretative data on the tests performed is included.

3. Because of the requirement that the letters be left in good condition to permit their delivery to the addressee, the initial examination consisted of the customary visual and U.V. inspection (including long wave and short wave), and the so-called KEMPOTE test. This latter test has only recently been introduced and constitutes the most formidable test known to us against SW. It was by means of this test that the presence of SW in Letter #1 became apparent. In the application of this test a portion of the SW is actually physically lifted from the item being tested and subsequently through a process involving both chemical and physical reactions, the SW is made visible. The degree of visibility varies from completely negative results to completely legible ones. According to the technician who performed this test the results obtained with Letter #1 were not quite legible, but definite enough to permit checking to establish that they were not due to the visible ink of the letter. The time interval during which this particular detection is observable lasts but a few minutes which the technician used to verify that he was detecting SW and not visible text. By the time he called in his two colleagues the reaction had progressed to the point that only one of these technicians was able to observe the SW. Thus the operator and one other technician saw the SW.

4. At this point the letters were returned to Paris with Reference #2 which reported "definite traces of SW" in Letter #1.

5. Before giving an account of the work done during the second phase of the investigation (i.e., after the letters were returned to the laboratory for development) it should be pointed out that the KEMPOTE test, though an extremely effective test for the detection of SW, does not identify the system involved. Complete development of the secret message under these circumstances would have been almost impossible. The only alternative available to the chemist, and the one he followed in this particular case, is to proceed with a series of chemical tests applied directly to the document under investigation. These tests are applied in sequence, one after the other, each requiring for its execution that a portion of the page be sacrificed. It is therefore important that those tests affording the greatest probability of developing the SW be applied first; thus if and when, a test is found capable of developing the ink, the remainder of the page (i.e., the portion not affected by previous chemical applications) is treated with it.

SECRET
KAPOK

Page 2 of Attachment to
[illegible]-15927 [illegible]
22 [illegible] 19[illegible]

SUBJECT: Report on Testing of Letters for SW

6. In testing Letter #1, the chemist chose to apply first those tests known to be effective in developing known RIS inks. (There are, however, RIS inks for which we have no known developer). After such tests were exhausted without yielding any detection the chemist proceeded with the application of other tests. In all a total of 30 different chemical tests were applied. No additional ones were used only because no more area was left on the letter to apply them.

7. None of these tests yielded even a trace of SW. These results appear to contradict the report initially sent with Reference #2. They should not be so interpreted. We still believe that Letter #1 contained SW, our failure to develop it notwithstanding.

8. As previously reported, Letter #2 was not treated, for reasons given in Reference #3. A facsimile of Letter #1 was made before undertaking its chemical treatment. The facsimile was check by a competent linguist and authentication specialist and found satisfactory.

9. FYI: Any information concerning the [illegible] test, including its existence, is considered extremely sensitive and should be so treated.

Elmer E. Hukeed

Elmer E. HUKEED

14-00000

TO : Chief of Station, PARIS — OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE — 29-6-106/3

INFO : Chief, KURIOT; Chief, EE; Chief, WE; Chief, SR

FROM : Chief of Station, GERMANY — 20 November 1960

SUBJECT : /AQUATIC/LCIMPROVE/AEDOGMA
Transmittal of Letters

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCES:

A.	DIR 11442	D.	OFPA-55369	G.	PARI 2330
B.	FRAN 7364	E.	PARI 2426	H.	EGTA-15911
C.	FRAN 7388	F.	PARI 2329	I.	OFPA-55220

Enclosed herewith as Attachment #1 is an envelope containing the two letters of reference "i". A full report on the examination of these letters will follow.

Elmer E. Hukeed
Elmer E. HUKEED

ATTACHMENT:
1 - Envelope Containing
Two Letters

APPROVED: Joseph Q. Klenack
Joseph Q. KLENACK

DISTRIBUTION:

3 - COS, Paris, w/attachment
1 - Chief, KURIOT, w/o attachment
1 - Chief, EE, w/o attachment
1 - Chief, WE, w/o attachment
1 - Chief, SR, w/o attachment

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

FORM 10-57 53b (40) — USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE. — CLASSIFICATION SECRET — CONTINUED — PAGE NO.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 339 19 NOV 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : TSD 4*

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, EE 4, SR 4, WE 4, S/C 2

ROUTING: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

NOV 19 2226Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 45202

PRITY PARI INFO DIR CITE FRAN 7368

REF A. PARI 2426 (IN 44558)**

B. OFPA 55359

C. EGTA 15911

1. ALL ATTEMPTS DEVELOP SW UNSUCCESSFUL ON PHILDELPHIA POSTMARKED LETTER. FACSIMILE MADE.

2. LETTER POSTMARKED USSR NOT TREATED AS NO TRACE SW FOUND PER REF C. ALSO WOULD INVOLVE REPRODUCING LETTER HEAD. ADVISE IF DESIRE FURTHER SW TESTING.

3. WILL RETURN FACSIMILE PHILDELPHIA ORIGINAL USSR NEXT POUCH.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR AQUATIC USED.

**REFERENCE RYBAT.

SINGLE COPY

SECRET

273

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 18 NOV 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : TSD 4

INFO : EE 4, SR 4, WE 4, S/C 2, CI, CI/OPS, FI

CE

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

NOV 18 1844Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 44579

OPIM PARI INFO DIR CITE FRAN 7364

AQUATIC REDWOOD

RE OFPA 55369

LETTERS WILL BE DESTROYED IN DEVELOPMENT. WITHHOLDING ACTION PENDING YOUR ADVICE.

END OF MESSAGE

SINGLE COPY

SECRET

Copy No.

266

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 18 NOV 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION : C/TSD 2 (TSD ISSUED TEMPO COPY AT 1345 18 NOV 60)

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/SR 3, C/WE 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

1	2	4	
2	3	5	
3		6	

NOV 18 1821Z 60

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 44558

OPIM, FRAN INFO OPIM DIR CITE PARI 2426

RYBAT AQUATIC LCIMPROVE AEDOGMA

REF A. FRAN 7664*

B. DIR 11442 (OUT 92118)

1. REQUEST MKTOPAZ ATTEMPT MAKE FACSMILE OF OVERT TEXT OF LETTER FOR DELIVERY TO ADDRESSEE. PROCEED DEVELOP ORIGINAL EVEN IF FACSIMILE NOT POSSIBLE OR NOT FULLY SATISFACTORY. CABLE ALL RESULTS OPIM BEFORE POUCHING FACSIMILE.

2. DIR: AGREE COMMENTS REF B. IF NO SW, BELIEVE GOOD CHANCE REASONABLE FACSIMILE WILL PASS CURSORY INSPECTION ADDRESSEE AND PROTECT AEDOGMA. IF SW PRESENT WILL HOLD OFF DELIVERY PENDING HQS ADVICE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *NO RECORD IN CABLE SECRETARIAT AS OF 1400 18 NOV 60.

SINGLE

SECRET

SECRET OFPA- 55369

COS, Germany MKTOPAZ
Chief, SR
Chief, WE
Chief, EE

29-6-106/3

16 NOV 1960

Chief of Station, Paris

AQUATIC REDWOOD Operational

XX

See Below

A. DIR 11442, 15 November 1960
B. EGTA 15911, 8 November 1960

Forwarded herewith are reference B letters for development as per reference A. It is requested that every effort be made to expedite this matter and to have letters back to Paris by return pouch if possible. Please cable progress.

Wallace M. Havedon

15 November 1960

Attached herewith:
2 letters as attached in reference B
Distribution:
2-C/MKTOPAZ Germany
2-C/SR
2-C/WE
2-C/EE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG: RITA PERKINS
UNIT: SR/2/CE
EXT: 8757
DATE: 15 NOVEMBER 1960

TO: FBI
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: SR 6
INFO: CI, CI/OPS, FI, TSD 4, WE 4, S/C 2

ROUTING: 1 2; 2 2; 3; 4; 5; 6

DEFERRED
X ROUTINE
PRIORITY
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

OUT 92770

TO FBI INFO CITE DIR

SEMEN POBORILIW

1. USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE IN PARIS, FRANCE, REPORTED EARLY NOV 60 THAT DMYTRO GNYP ASKED SOURCE TO DELIVER TWO LETTERS TO ANTIN NYCZYPORUK, WAS NYKYPRZUK AND NYKPORETS, WHO CONFINED MENTAL SANITARIUM NEAR PARIS. GNYP TOLD SOURCE MADE REQUEST BECAUSE BOTH GNYP AND NYCZYPORUK HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH VASILIY MYAKUSHKO, RIS OFFICER WITH UNESCO, WHO WAS CASE OFFICER GRIGORIY DEMYDCZUK UKRAINIAN EMIGRE ARRESTED BY FRENCH AUG 60, SEE YOUR MEMO 12 SEP 60.

2. OUR FIELD OFFICE EXAMINED LETTERS AND FOUND ONE LETTER FROM NOGINSK USSR ADVISING NYCZYPORUK HIS WIFE AND DAUGHTER NOT IN NOGINSK, NO EVIDENCE SECRET WRITING. OTHER LETTER FROM SEMEN POBORILIW OF 613 N 7TH ST. PHILADELPHIA 25 BORE INDICATIONS SECRET WRITING. IF SOURCE ABLE RETAIN LETTER FIELD OFFICE WILL REPRODUCE AND ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP SECRET WRITING.

CONTINUED

5/L 631

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER   S-E-C-R-E-T   AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

TO:

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

PRECEDENCE: DEFERRED / ROUTINE / PRIORITY (INITIALS) / OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE (INITIALS)

Page 2

DIR OUT 92770

TO FBI INFO CITE DIR

3. WE HAVE NO INFORMATION IN OUR FILES ON SEMEN POHORILIW AND ANTIN HYCZYPORUK. DMYTRO GNYP REPORTED IN 1958 MEMBER UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX PARISH COUNCIL IN PARIS. OUR SOURCE MET HYCZYPORUK IN REFUGEE CAMP CA 1945, AND CHARACTERIZES HIM AS BRILLIANT BUT MENTALLY UNBALANCED PROFESSOR UKRAINIAN LITERATURE. SOURCE HEARD RUMORS HYCZYPORUK NEVER HELD REGULAR JOB BUT RECEIVED MONEY FROM SOVIET EMBASSY PARIS, ALSO HAD AGREED MYAKUSHKO ORDER TO RETURN TO USSR ON CONDITION SOVIETS LOCATE HIS FAMILY IN NOGINSK.

4. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION YOU MAY HAVE REGARDING ABOVE PERSONS.

END OF MESSAGE

SR/COP/CE [signature]
WE/3 [signature]
CI/OG/SOV/SAT - draft S.MILER
CI/LG
TSD - by phone Dr. REID

CI J. Roman
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

CSR/2 [signature]
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

RITA PERKINS
SR/2/CE 706
8757
DATE: 14 November 1960

SECRET

ROUTING

1	2	4	
2	3/2	5	
3		6	

TO: PARIS FRANKFURT
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/SR 4
INFO: COP, C/CI, C/CI/OPS, C/FI, C/TSD 2, C/EE 2, C/WE 5, S/C 2

DEFERRED 23 05 Z
ROUTINE CABLE
PRIORITY
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

OUT92118
92118

TO PRITY PARI FRAN   INFO   CITE DIR 11442

RYBAT IMMEDIATE HANDLING

REDWOOD AQUATIC LCIMPROVE AEDOGMA

REFS: A. PARI 2329 (IN 40?964)*
B. PARI 2330 (IN 40?966)

HQS OPINION PRIME CONCERN DETERMINING WHETHER IDEN 1 REF B INVOLVED RIS. RECOMMEND MKTOPAZ DEVELOP IF THEY CAN, IF NOT PLS STATE DEGREE CERTAINTY PRESENCE SW. DEPENDING RESULTS, INCLINED BUY TIME WITH REF A PARA 4C, ALTHOUGH BELIEVE RIS WILL CONSIDER OP COMPROMISED WHEN AND IF REPORTED LETTERS WERE IN AEDOGMA/1 POSSESSION. WILL ALERT ODENVY HERE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *STATED (EGTA 15911) LETTER IN WHICH MKTOPAZ SUSPECTS SW CONTENT POSTMARKED PHILADELPHIA 6 SEPT FROM IDEN 1 TO IDEN 2 IN CARE OF IDEN 3.

CI/OPS
SINGLE COPY

SR/COP/CE
WE/3
TSD
C/WE   CSR/2
COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER   SECRET   AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

421

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 10 NOV 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION : C/SR 4

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/CI/OPS, C/FI, C/TSD 2, C/EE 2, C/WE 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

1	2	4	B
2	3/2	5	
3		6	

NOV 10 2132Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 40966

DESENSITIZED

DIR INFO FRAN FROB CITE PARI 2333

KYBAT IMMEDIATE HANDLING

REDWOOD AQUATIC LCIMPROVE AEDOGMA

REF PARI 2329 (IN 40964)

IDEN 1: PROF SEMEN POHORILIW 613 N. 7TH ST PHILADELPHIA 25

IDEN 2: ANTIN NYCZYPORUK, AKA NYKYPRCZUK AKA NYKYPORETS

IDEN 3: DMYTRO GNYP 211 RUE DE BERCY PARI XII

NO STA TRACES FOR ABOVE.

END OF MESSAGE

SLU 631

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

419

DATE : 10 NOV 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION : C/SR 4

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/CI/OPS, C/FI, C/TSD 2, C/EE 2, C/WE 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

1	2	4	3
2	3/2	5	
3	C	6	

NOV 10 2131Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 40964

DIR INFO FRAN FROB CITE PARI 2329

RYBAT IMMEDIATE HANDLING

REDWOOD AQUATIC LCIMPROVE AEDOGMA

REF A. CFPA 55220 (not coded)

B. EGTA 15911 (not coded)

1. REF B LETTER IN WHICH HKTOPAZ SUSPECTS SW CONTENT POSTMARKED PHILADELPHIA 6 SEPT FROM IDEN 1 (Semen Pohoriliv) TO IDEN 2 (Andrii Nyczyporuk) CARE OF IDEN 3 (Dmytro Mnyp). OVERT CONTENT IN UKRANIAN APPARENTLY INNOCUOUS.

2. FYI: IDEN 2 (Nyczyporuk) BRILLIANT BUT MENTALLY UNBALANCED PROFESSOR UKRANIAN LITERATURE. AEDOGMA/1 MET IN REFUGEE CAMPS CA 1945. FREQUENTLY HEARD RUMORS HE NEVER HELD REGULAR JOB BUT HAD MONEY ALLEGEDLY PROVIDED BY SOV EMB. IN PARI PUT IN CONTACT WITH VISILIY MYAKUSHKO BY IDEN 3 (Mnyp). IN MAY, IDEN 2 (Nyczyporuk) ADVISED BY MYAKUSHKO REPATRIATE USSR IMMEDIATELY. IDEN 2 (Nyczyporuk) AGREED ON CONDITION SOV EMB LOCATE HIS

SECRET

FAMILY IN NOGINSK, USSR. OTHER REF B LETTER FROM NOGINSK GORSOVET

ADVISING IDEN 2 HIS WIFE AND DAUGHTER NOT IN NOGINSK.

3. IDEN 2 CURRENTLY IN UNKNOWN MENTAL SANATORIUM NEAR PARI. IDEN 3 RELUCTANT PERSONALLY DELIVER TWO LETTERS TO IDEN 2 SINCE BOTH HAD HAD CONTACT WITH NYAKUSHKO, WHO DISAPPEARED AFTER DEMYDCZUK ARREST, REQUESTED AEDOGMA/1 TO VISIT IDEN 3, LEARN ADDRESS SANATORIUM, THEN DELIVER. AEDOGMA/1 CAN DELAY AS LONG AS NECESSARY UNDER PRETEXT LETTERS ALREADY OLD, HE BUSY SETTLING IN NEW APARTMENT.

4. STA SEES FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVES:

A. AEDOGMA/1 DELIVER LETTERS NOW, TRUST RIS NOT LEARN HE COVERTLY OPENED.

B. DEVELOP FOR SW AT HQS OR FRAN, THEN HAVE AEDOGMA/1 INFER IDENS 1 AND 2 HE HAD NO TIME MAKE TRIP TO SANATORIUM, SIMPLY DROPPED IN MAIL BOX. RIS THEN MIGHT ASSUME UNBOUND INTERCEPTED BECAUSE OF KNOWN INTEREST IN NYAKUSHKO CONTACTS.

C. POSSIBLY REPRODUCE LETTER WITH OR WITHOUT SW.

5. PLEASE ADVISE ASAP.

END OF MESSAGE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET PRIORITY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: EGTA-15911

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO

TO : Chief of Station, PARIS Attn: James B. WINTER-HALTER

INFO : Chief, EE; Chief, WE; Chief, SR; Chief, KURIOT

FROM : Chief of Station, GERMANY

DATE: 8 November 1960

SUBJECT : AQUATIC/REDWOOD/Operational Examination of Letters for Secret Writing

RE "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
- MARKED FOR INDEXING
- NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

OFPA-55220 dated 4 November 1960

1. The letters transmitted with the above reference have been covertly tested for the presence of secret writing.

2. The letter postmarked from USSR revealed no evidence of secret writing. The letter postmarked Philadelphia had definite traces of secret writing, however, because of the nature of the requirements no attempt was made to develop or identify the secret writing.

3. The letters are herewith returned, sealed, for integration in the mails for sending to the addressee.

Elmer E. Hubbard, Jr.

Jacob R. OVERBURY

Attachment:

1 - Envelope Containing Letters

APPROVED: Teaster for Joseph Q. KLEMACK

DISTRIBUTION:

3 - Chief of Station, PARIS, w/attachment
1 - Chief, EE, w/o attachment
1 - Chief, WE, w/o attachment
1 - Chief, SR, w/o attachment
1 - Chief, KURIOT, w/o attachment

201-289249

FORM 10-57 (40) 53b USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: priority SECRET

CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: OFPA-55220
TO: Chief MKTOPAZ Germany INFO: Chief, WE and Chief, SR		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: None
FROM: Chief of Station, Paris		DATE
SUBJECT: General: AQUATIC/REDWOOD/Operational Specific: Testing letters for possible secret writing		RE "433" — (CHECK "X" ONE) MARKED FOR INDEXING X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED: See below		INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
REFERENCE(S)		

1. KURIOT/Paris requests that the attached letters be examined for secret writing. These letters have been opened by a REDWOOD agent and photographed by the Paris Station. It is possible that these letters contain SW and SW traps.

2. MKTOPAZ technicians should keep in mind that these letters have to be ~~XXXXXXXX~~ returned in the 9 ~~XXXXX~~ November pouch. [illegible] letters have to be integrated in the mail system and sent to the addressee without his knowledge that these letters have been tampered with, on the eleventh or twelfth November. If the work cannot possibly be done the letters should be sealed and returned untested.

James B. Winterhalter

4 November 1960

Attached Herewith:
2-letters for Frankfurt only

Distribution:
3-Germany
2-SR
~~2-WE~~ 39/0750

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

14-00000

Сочи. Домик Н. А. Островского

Куда France/ Франция

Paris XII

211 rue de Bergy

Кому M-r Спур Dmytro

Pon. Nykyporuk Antin

Адрес отправителя СССР

г. Ногинск Московской обл.

Горисполком ...823

23 Sept 60

Encl #2 to OFPA 55524

201-277417

Р. С. Ф. С. Р.

ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ КОМИТЕТ

НОГИНСКОГО ГОРОДСКОГО СОВЕТА ДЕПУТАТОВ ТРУДЯЩИХСЯ

Адрес: г. Ногинск, улица III Интернационала, дом 57, тел. 2-20

исх-825 «8» сентября 1960

Исполком Ногинского городского Совета депутатов трудящихся сообщает, что [illegible]КИПОРЕЦ Агриппина Семеновна в городе Ногинске не проживает.

ПРЕДСЕДАТЕЛЬ ИСПОЛКОМА ГОРСОВЕТА

/В.ПЛЕШЕВ/

14-00000

S.Po.
631 N. 7th St
phila. 23, pa.
U.S.A.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.
SEP 6
5:30 PM
1960

VIA AIR MAIL

Mr Gnyp Dmytro (Pour Antin)
211, Rue de Bersy
Paris XIIe

FRANCE.

F 6.IX.60

Дорогий Антоне!

Зажурив ти мене своїм станом. Що сталося, що ти знову попав на той чортячий курорт? Чи знову хтось поміг у тому ділі, чи ти з кимсь посварився, чи що воно там сталося?

Зрозуміла річ, що нема що питати як там є у тому будинку. А все-ж, як ти себе, будучи здоровою людиною, почуваєш, як там [illegible], поводяться? Які є можливості та надії на вихід з чортополоху? В якому стані є тепер твоє здоров'я? Хто та як може тобі помогти?

В цей лист укладаю тобі один зелений на покриття витрати.

Оця знову мене нога дуже турбує. Хоч уже є трохи краще, але рани, що були появилися, ще не погоїлися. Операцій уже багато мав, але біди цілком ніяк не можу позбутися. Як буде дал…

Напиши мені. Літо тут
цього року для Філадельфії було
добре, холодніше ... [illegible] ...
раз на ...-50 років. Вже й
осінь надійшла. Тут вона
холодна не буває. Холодний
в січні та лютім, а з. [illegible]
ця мені.

Як будеш мати можливість
напиши пару слів.

З найкращими побажан-
нями мені Семен

encl #2 to OFPA-33524 201-277417

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OG/SOV/SAT

From: SR/2/CE/Rita L. Perkins

Subject: Outline Communication re POHORILIW Case

1. OFPA 55220, 4 November 1960
   Request to MKTOPAZ to analyze letters

2. EGTA 15911, 8 November 1960
   MKTOPAZ reply that POHORILIW letter bore definite traces of S/w.

3. PARI 2339, 10 November 1960
   PARI STA informed Hqs of AEDOGMA/1 receipt of letters, relay to MKTOPAZ, latter's reply, and asked for guidance

4. OUT 92770, 16 November 1960
   INFO PARI 2339 relayed to FBI; long delay in informing FBI because cable came in on Thurs evening and not given to c/o until 14 Nov. Dr. REED consulted 14 Nov re the wording "definite traces" and advised could not elaborate until MKTOPAZ report came in.

5. OUT 92118, 14 November 1960 To Pari
   Stated HQS opinion prime concern was to determine if POHORILIW involved RIS and directed PARI to return letters to MKTOPAZ and that the latter attempt to develop the S/W.

6. OFPA 55369, 16 November 1960
   PARI returned letters to MKTOPAZ per para 5 above.

8. ~~7.~~ PARI 2426, 18 November 1960
   Refed 6 above; directed MKTOPAZ to make foreged copy of POHORILIW letter and then attempt develop S/W

7. ~~8.~~ FRAN 7364, 18 November 1960
   MKTOPAZ reminds PARI letters will be destroyed in development attempts Holding action till Pari advises.

9. FRAN 7388, 19 Nobember 1960
   MKTOPAZ reports efforts to develop S/W failed.

10. EGTA 15915, 20 November 1960
    MKTOPAZ returned letters to PARI; full report on examination will follow.

11. EGTA 15927, 22 November 1960
    MKTOPAZ report in full. My copy does not indicate date arrived in HQS, but believe c. 1 December; at this time in telephone communication with DR. REED who advised S/W detection made by new sensitive method, that FBI lab aware of this method, and he would be responsible for relaying this info to FBI.

12. DBF 63039, 22 November 1960
Made reference to our teletype; said had no info persons involved; investigating POHORILIW, desired any further info we cld develop.

13. PARI 2579, 30 November 1960
Letters given to AEDOGMA/1 to deliver to NYKZYPORUK; and since POHORILIW letter bore definite S/W trace asked for further guidance

14. OUT 50208, 6 December 1960
Relayed para 12 ODENVY reply; and advised only PARI action for time to report delivery letters to NYCZYPORUK and UNWEAVE traces.

15. OFPA 55817, 7 December 1960
Relayed additional info on NYCZYPORUK - his relationship with Jozef KOZAK.

16. OFPA 55524, December 1960
Transmitted to HQS facsimiles of letters involved, and bio on ONYP and NYCZYPORUK.

17. CSCI 3/763,211, 9 January 1961
relayed info and letters cited para 15 and 16 to FBI

18. PARI 3664, 16 February 1961
Informed HQS letters delivered to NYCZYPORUK 8 or 9 January 61; and that N evidenced no reaction when opened letters; N said considered cured by Doctors and only needs assured domicile to be released; also ONYP rumor that N intends to repatriate when released. PARI Sta aksed for guidance.

19. OUT 74849, 17 February 1961
relayed para 18 to FBI and asked if any action PARI would abet their investigation POHORILIW.

20. Mrs. ROMAN telephoned interim reply to Perkins 20 or 21 February that FBI investigation delayed by incorrect address; unfortunately para 3 cable gave address as 613 N 7th whereas letter stated 631 N 7th, cf. para 16 and 17.

21. Mrs. ROMAN telephoned Perkins 27 February 1961 and reported FBI did not have report on S/w aspects. Perkins called Dr. REED and was told that this info had been passed to William Magee, Chief of FBI lab about 1 December 1960 and that Dr. REED in speaking to Mr. Magee had cited our teletype OUT 92770 and the name POHORILIW; further he would call Mr. Magee and remind him of same.

22. I believe Mr. Magee and Dr. REED spoke on the matter 28 February (I was absent from office on 28 Feb and 1 Mar) but I spoke to Dr. Reed on 2 March 1961 and he assured me now remembered matter.

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Files 29 January 1964

M. D. Stevens

THE LEE HARVEY OSWALD CASE #351164

1. According to a newspaper column of "Allen and Scott" in the Chicago American of 6 December 1963, on the OSWALD Case, Abram CHAYES, Legal Officer of the State Department, was one of two persons immediately responsible for OSWALD's being permitted to return to the United States from the Soviet Union in June 1962. The other individual named was Llewellyn THOMPSON, the then Ambassador to Russia. Another said to have been involved in the handling of OSWALD's case was Samuel WISE, Counsel of the American Embassy in Moscow.

2. Abram CHAYES, #352234, who as of 16 February 1961 was described as "the new Counsel in State", was granted security approval for liaison contact with J. Foster COLLINS (in the office of the Chief of the Covert Action Staff) on 6 March 1961. The request for CHAYES' clearance was a 'Blanket' request to permit discussion with him of NSC 5412/2 matters on a need-to-know basis.

3. In September 1961 there was a White House namecheck request on CHAYES' wife Antonia (Toni) Leigh CHAYES, nee: HANDLER.

4. In March 1962, CHAYES was granted a renewal of his liaison contact clearance with C/CA on a continuing basis. This time his contact was Archibald ROOSEVELT, Jr.

5. On 10 February 1962, HUMAN EVENTS reported as follows with reference to CHAYES:

"SOFT ON COMMUNISM: Representative Francis E. Walter (D.-Pa.), Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, has scored the new State Department regulations on passports, claiming they would allow Reds denied passports to 'rifle freely the confidential files of the FBI, the CIA and other investigative agencies.' The man behind the new regulations, which Walter claims violate the Internal Security Act of 1950, is reportedly State's chief legal officer, Abram Chayes. Chayes, a Kennedy appointee, is an ex-Harvard professor who was Chester Bowles' top legal adviser when Bowles was Governor of Connecticut. Walter has introduced legislation to remedy the new passport regulations."

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6. Samuel WISE, "Counsel in the American Embassy in Moscow" who is referred to above, may well be Samuel Griffin WISE Jr., 77574, ID & OS, who apparently was once a contract employee on AEACTIVE. [The State Department reviewed WISE's file on 2 June 1954; and as of September 1962 a Samuel G. WISE was Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow. At that time WISE advised in a cable to the State Department that it appeared that Bruce Frederick DAVIS, 352257, who defected from the United States Army in Germany on 13 August 1960, had not expatriated himself. DAVIS' case is very similar to that of OSWALD; and he, like OSWALD, lived in the Soviet Union for two years after his defection and prior to making application for return to the United States.]

7. WISE was an applicant for CIA employment in early 1953 and was security approved subject to polygraph on 11 August 1953. He did not enter on duty and in September 1953 the office which had been interested in him was "no longer interested". On 13 November 1953, WISE was granted a CSA to permit his use as a contract employee on AEACTIVE in New York City. His CSA was cancelled on 25 March 1958.

8. WISE was named as a friend of William Orville MUNSELL, 61693-DL, during an investigation of the latter for possible CIA employment in 1952. WISE, according to MUNSELL's landlady and social acquaintance in Washington, D.C. during the period of about a year which ended in April 1952, was the only person she knew by name with whom MUNSELL was friendly. According to the informant, WISE was a student at Columbia University whose address was 423 Furnald Hall. MUNSELL was Security disapproved for CIA employment in June 1952 because of his close association on a professional and social basis, while attending Denver University from 1946 to 1951, with persons of questionable loyality. In November 1954, MUNSELL was of interest to project FJALIVE with reference to assignment to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; however, the interested office withdrew their request on him, after Security advised of the derogatory information regarding him.

9. WISE from 1951 to 1954 attended Scarsdale High School in Scarsdale, New York, which was attacked by a Citizens Group, which alleged Communist influence in the school system. He had several questionable associates in addition to MUNSELL.

M. D. Stevens

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1 October 1968

CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS IN THE CASE OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO

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1 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

FROM : Deputy Chief, Security Research Staff

SUBJECT : NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich

1. In accordance with the request of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, attached is a summary with conclusions concerning the bona fides of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. Sub-conclusions are contained in the summary concerning several major areas which were given primary consideration in the matter of the bona fides of NOSENKO.

2. Included in this summary are comments concerning conclusions in the previous summary and an annex containing remarks on three separate subjects related to the NOSENKO case.

3. In brief, the conclusion of this summary is that NOSENKO is the person he claims to be, that he held his claimed positions in the KGB during 1953 - January 1964, that NOSENKO was not dispatched by the KGB, and that his previous lies and exaggerations are not actually of material significance at this time.

Bruce L. Solie

Attachment:
Summary

BLS:ko

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

G. Is There Evidence of a Political or Any Other Type Objective Which Could Justify a Dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB With Permission to Speak Freely to CIA Concerning His Knowledge of the KGB and Without NOSENKO Being Given a Specific Mission or Missions?

H. Is There Any Evidence That the Contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 With CIA Were Known to the KGB Prior to His Defection or That NOSENKO Was Ever Briefed by the KGB Relative to His Behavior or KGB Objectives During These Contacts or After His Defection?

IV. Comments Concerning Previous Conclusions in Regard to NOSENKO

A. NOSENKO Did Not Serve in the Naval RU in Any of the Capacities or at the Places and Times He Claimed

B. NOSENKO Did Not Enter the KGB in the Manner or at the Time He Claimed

C. NOSENKO Did Not Serve in the American Embassy Section Throughout the 1953 - 1955 Period as He Claimed

D. During the Period 1955 - 1960, He Was Neither a Senior Case Officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department American-British Commonwealth Section

E. NOSENKO Was Neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section nor a Senior Officer or Supervisor in the Section During the Period 1961 - 1962 (sic)

F. NOSENKO's Claims, That in 1962 He was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and Was Thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, Are Not Credible

G. NOSENKO Has no Valid Claim to Certainty That the KGB Recruited No American Embassy Personnel Between 1953 and His Defection in 1964

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V. Annex

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I. INTRODUCTION

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INTRODUCTION

The following summary and analysis is not intended to be all inclusive, that is to contain a specific comment on all organizational, operational, personality and case type information furnished by Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. To attempt to do so would be repetitious and confusing to the reader and would not be of material benefit in the formation of logical conclusions concerning the rather limited areas of primary concern.

This summary will not contain a detailed psychological assessment of NOSENKO nor will it contain a recitation of the numerous theories which have been promulgated in the past concerning varying aspects of the NOSENKO case. This summary will be primarily directed toward the question of whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB, whether his claimed KGB career is relatively plausible and whether he has since late October 1967 been cooperative in a reassessment of the entire case for or against NOSENKO. NOSENKO has admitted certain lies and exaggerations in the past but claims that these were of a personal nature, intended to enhance his own importance

but not to mislead this Agency in any material matters of an operational or policy nature.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding of the phrase "bona fides" as considered in this summary, NOSENKO will be judged primarily on whether he voluntarily defected to this Agency without KGB knowledge, and whether his 1962 and early 1964 contacts with representatives of this Agency were known to the KGB. Motivation and certain other pertinent aspects will be considered, but his admitted previous errors, lies and exaggerations will not per se warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO is not a "bona fide" defector.

There is not an accurate standard or scale of measurement against which information concerning NOSENKO can be balanced or correlated to determine if he is or is not a dispatched KGB officer. For purposes of this analysis and summary, an arbitrary list of areas considered pertinent has been compiled. Readers may differ in regard to whether this arbitrary standard is a completely accurate standard, but it is felt that the information from NOSENKO and information from other sources derived through independent investigation will permit the reader to assess the information in toto against any standard he considers appropriate.

The previous summary on NOSENKO entitled, "The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector," has been considered in

the preparation of this summary. It will be commented on in part and this summary will include conclusions correlated with the seven primary conclusions set forth on page 358 of the above summary. Remarks concerning certain errors, inconsistencies, omissions and unsupported conclusions in the previous summary in regard to specific cases or sub-areas will be included in this summary. However, this summary will not include a point-by-point comparison of all areas of agreement or disagreement with information contained in the previous summary.

A positive decision in regard to NOSENKO based on all available information should be made in the immediate future. There are no known sources currently available to provide new positive information concerning NOSENKO and his bona fides. It is recognized that there is always a possibility in the future a new source or sources will be able to furnish additional information in regard to NOSENKO. However, this possibility is exceedingly tenuous and it is felt there is sufficient information available on which to base a conclusion in the NOSENKO matter.

II. SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CASE

SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967

SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CASE

SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967

Since 30 October 1967, interviews with Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO have been conducted by one individual not previously known personally to NOSENKO but who has been aware of the NOSENKO case since June 1962.

Interviews have been detailed and very extensive in scope, have been recorded and transcribed, and have covered the entire life and career of NOSENKO without regard to whether a particular aspect had been covered during previous interview or interviews.

NOSENKO, although naturally apprehensive during the first few interviews, has been cooperative, has developed a relaxed attitude, and the interviewer has noted no significant reluctance to discuss any aspect of his life, career, or activities. On occasion NOSENKO has indicated a reluctance to make positive statements in certain areas previously considered at a minimum extremely controversial. This reluctance was understandable and when it became apparent to NOSENKO that the

interviewer would not dispute or disparage his statements without adequate reason, this reluctance on the part of NOSENKO, in the opinion of the interviewer, totally disappeared.

During the interviewing period, particularly in the first six months, NOSENKO materially assisted the interviewer by preparing approximately sixty memoranda on such diverse subjects as his life, motivation for defection, individual cases, notes which he furnished to CIA in 1964, KGB organization, and KGB officer and agent personalities. As an example of the scope of this work by NOSENKO, four of the memoranda included remarks concerning approximately [875] KGB officers, [100] KGB agents, 35 GRU officers, and [400] other Soviet nationals. These lists were alphabetically arranged and the above indicated cooperation of NOSENKO has materially assisted in the organization and evaluation of information furnished by him during current interviews.

Copies of transcripts of interviews with NOSENKO and related memoranda have been disseminated to the FBI and the CI Staff. Special Agent Elbert Turner and Special Agent James Wooten of the Washington Field Office/FBI in particular have given great assistance in research and compilation of new or additional information and the FBI has interviewed or reinterviewed a number of United States citizens concerning whom NOSENKO has furnished pertinent information.

In addition, three professionals from the SB Division have reviewed the current information and assisted in the retrieval of previous information from NOSENKO and collation of current information with previous information. The latter is a tremendous task because of the volume of material; the number of individual cases involved; and the extensive information in regard to KGB personalities, procedures, organizational structure and activities.

The SB Division also provided the services of an expert translator to translate the tapes of the 1965 interrogation of NOSENKO by Petr DERYABIN and one of the previously mentioned three professionals completed a new translation of the 1962 interviews with NOSENKO. In addition, transcriptions of certain other particularly pertinent previous interviews of NOSENKO have been completed by the Office of Security.

Approximately 7000 pages of transcripts and related material have been compiled and disseminated since late October 1967. Comments concerning the value of the information contained in the above material are contained in another section of this summary. As of the present time, a complete analysis is not possible since a considerable portion of the material has not been fully processed. In the preparation of this summary all areas of major significance have been examined. Because of the voluminous information, all analytical and collation work has not been completed; but it is not considered that, based on all

available information, the remaining work will materially affect the conclusions drawn in this summary.

The polygraph interview of NOSENKO was initiated on 2 August and concluded on 6 August 1968. Approximately sixty questions of a pertinent nature were included in the polygraph interview. No problems were encountered during the polygraph interview and no additional testing of NOSENKO is anticipated. Attached is a copy of the self-explanatory report on the results of the polygraph interview.

Interviews with NOSENKO have continued since the polygraph interview on a temporarily reduced scale in order to permit a review of previous information and preparation of this summary. There is no doubt that future interviews with NOSENKO will reveal information of intelligence value, but information developed thus far will permit a decision in the case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO.

Attachment:
12 Aug 68 Polygraph Rpt

TO : Chief, Security Research Staff 12 August 1968

FROM : Interrogation Research Division

SUBJECT : Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO IRD # 67491

IDENTIFYING DATA

Subject is a 40 year old former KGB Staffer who defected to the U.S. in 1964 in Geneva.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Bruce L. Solie of the Security Research Staff has been debriefing and interrogating Subject since October 1967 in order to resolve the issue whether Subject was a dispatched agent of the KGB. He has conducted a vast amount of research and checking with sources in an effort to establish the veracity of Subject's statements.

PURPOSE

The primary purpose of the polygraph test was to determine:

1. Whether Subject was a dispatched Agent of the KGB;

2. Whether Subject had intentionally given Mr. Solie any false information.

PROCEDURE

Subject was given a polygraph examination on 2 August 1968 at a safesite in the vicinity of Washington, D.C. The examination was conducted in the English language. Subject's comprehension and the ability to express himself in English was completely adequate for purposes of polygraph testing. Subject was completely cooperative in all respects. Subject displayed no evasiveness and appeared to be completely frank whenever he was questioned or gave information on a topic.

The following relevant questions were asked during the first test:

Is your true name Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO? Yes.

Were you born in the year 1927? Yes.

Besides the Americans, did you tell anyone else about your intention to defect? No.

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Page 2

Did you ever tell anyone in the KGB about your contact with American Intelligence? No.

Were you given instructions by the KGB to get in contact with American Intelligence? No.

Were you told by the KGB to defect in order to carry out an Intelligence mission? No.

The following relevant questions were asked during the second test:

Did the KGB actually send a communication for your recall to the USSR on the day of your defection? No.

Were you acquainted with CHEREPANOV? Yes.

Did you actually travel to Gorkiy in November 1963 to hunt for CHEREPANOV? Yes.

Are you deliberately withholding from us any information about the KGB recruitment of Americans? No.

Does the KGB have METKA and NEPTUNE 80? Yes.

Were you the responsible Case Officer for John Abidian in 1960-61? Yes.

Do you know the true name of ANDREY or SASHA? No.

Did you ever have tuberculosis? Yes.

The following relevant questions were asked on test three:

Did you serve in Navy Intelligence from 1951 to 1953? Yes.

Was [SHUBIN] 06 in the USSR during the period 1957 to 1959? Yes.

To the best of your knowledge, were you in the Seventh Department at this time? Yes.

Did you telephone the GRU about [SHUBIN] 06 at this time? Yes.

To the best of your knowledge, was POPOV compromised because of the letter Mr. Winters mailed? Yes.

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To the best of your knowledge, was P[illegible]OVSKIY exposed to the KGB because of the mass surveillance on the British Embassy? Yes.

Was there any misleading information in the notes you brought out from the Soviet Union? No.

Did you intentionally exaggerate your personal association with GRIBANOV? No.

Are you hiding any adverse information about your background? No.

Subject's polygraph test reflected no significant responses indicative of deception regarding the relevant questions asked. No further polygraph tests were administered on this date because the examiner did not want to run the risk of fatigue setting in and thus possibly causing adrenalin exhaustion.

Polygraph testing was resumed on 6 August 1968. The following relevant questions were asked on test four:

Did you join the KGB in March 1953? Yes.

Were you a KGB officer from 1953 to 1964? Yes.

Were you a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department? Yes.

Were you only a Captain at this time? Yes.

Were you an officer in the U.S. Embassy Section from March 1953 to May 1955? Yes.

In 1958 and 1959 were you the Deputy Chief of the American-British-Canadian Section in the Seventh Department? Yes.

From January 1960 to December 1961 were you the Deputy to the Chief of the First Section of the First Department? Yes.

From January to July 1962 were you the Chief of the First Section of the Seventh Department? Yes.

Were you an officer in the First Section, First Department, SCD, at the time of the Stalingrad operation against Benson, Mule and Stroud? Yes.

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The following relevant questions were asked on test five:

Since 1953 do you know of any other KGB recruitments in the American Embassy besides ANDREY and HOWARD? No.

Did the KGB know about the notes you brought out? No.

Have you told us the complete truth about your KGB career? Yes.

Did you intentionally exaggerate your personal involvement in cases in 1962 and 1964 in order to mislead us? No.

Did you intentionally give us any false operational information? No.

Did GRIBANOV offer you the position of Deputy Chief of the First Department? Yes.

Was an order actually prepared promoting you to Deputy to the Chief of the First Department? Yes.

In early 1960 did GRIBANOV tell you that your primary responsibility was to work against American Code Clerks? Yes.

Other than you mentioned, are you hiding any other reasons for your defection? No.

Are you deliberately withholding any information on any foreigners recruited by the KGB? No.

The following relevant questions were asked on test six:

Did you enter the KGB through the influence of General BOGDAN KOBULOV? Yes.

Did you succeed BAKHVALOV as Deputy Chief of the First Section? Yes.

Did GRYAZNOV succeed you as Deputy Chief of the First Section? Yes.

Were the CHEREPANOV papers passed to the Americans with KGB knowledge? No.

To [illegible] knowledge was there any misleading information in the CHE[illegible]NOV papers? No.

Did you ever personally meet GOLITSYN? No.

Was there a cable sent to Geneva for you to assist ARTAMEV in the BELITSKIY case? Yes.

Did you personally make an approach to [06 KEYSERS] at the Moscow Airport? Yes.

The following relevant questions were asked on test seven:

Did you actually review the KGB file on OSWALD? Yes.

Did LEE HARVEY OSWALD receive any KGB training or assignments? No.

Were there any microphones installed in the North Wing of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow? No.

Was the review of microphone reports one of your duties in 1960-61? Yes.

Are you withholding any information known to you concerning KGB microphones or electronic activity against the U.S. Embassy? No.

Before your official transfer to the Seventh Department did you read the surveillance report on the visit of ABIDIAN to PUSHKIN street? Yes.

Did you personally conduct a certain investigation of SHAKOV in 1962 in Geneva? Yes.

Was the rank of Lieutenant Colonel on your travel document to GORKIY only a mistake by KASHPEROV? Yes.

The following relevant questions were asked on test eight:

While in the U.S. Embassy Section did you obtain a typewriter for BORODIN for the preparation of a letter to Edward Ellis SMITH? Yes.

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Did you read the official report of KOSOLAPOV on his contact with [illegible] on a train from Helsinki to Moscow? Yes.

Are you intentionally withholding any information concerning KGB knowledge of CIA personnel in Moscow? No.

Is there any possibility that the KGB would dispatch an officer to defect to the Americans? No.

Subject's polygraph test of 6 August likewise reflected no indications of deception.

CONCLUSION

Based solely on the overall analysis of Subject's polygraph tests, it is the opinion of the undersigned that the Subject has been substantially truthful in answering the relevant questions asked.

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III. ANALYTICAL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE BONA FIDES OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO

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ANALYTICAL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE BONA FIDES OF

YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO

As indicated in the introduction to this summary, information in regard to Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO will be considered against an arbitrary but realistic list of areas considered pertinent to the question of whether NOSENKO voluntarily defected to this Agency without KGB knowledge, and whether his 1962 and early 1964 contacts with representatives of this Agency were known to the KGB.

It was noted that motivation and certain other pertinent aspects would also be considered but that his admitted previous lies and exaggerations would not per se warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO is not a "bona fide defector."

The following is a list of the areas considered pertinent and which are being given specific consideration. Attached is a separate section containing remarks in regard to the designated areas of A - H.

A. Is NOSENKO identical to the person whom he claims to be?

B. Is the claimed KGB career of NOSENKO plausible?

C. Has NOSENKO given an acceptable explanation of his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962 and for his defection in 1964?

D. Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organization reasonably commensurate with his claimed KGB career?

E. Can the information furnished by NOSENKO be considered in toto as having resulted in material damage to the KGB and/or has the information furnished by NOSENKO been of significant benefit to Western Intelligence?

F. Is there evidence of KGB deception or "give away" in information furnished by NOSENKO which would warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB?

G. Is there evidence of a political or any other type objective which could justify a dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB with permission to speak freely to CIA concerning his knowledge of the KGB and without NOSENKO being given a specific mission or missions?

SECRET

H. Is there any evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his defection or that NOSENKO was ever briefed by the KGB relative to his behavior or KGB objectives during these contacts or after his defection?

SECRET

A. IS NOSENKO IDENTICAL TO THE PERSON WHOM HE CLAIMS TO BE?

A. Is NOSENKO identical to the person whom he claims to be?

During interviews NOSENKO has furnished detailed information in regard to his family, his activities as a youth, the schools he attended, associates of his father and mother, and his own associates. The period under consideration in this section is the period preceding his entry into the First Department, Second Chief Directorate, MVD, in mid-March 1953.

Information furnished by NOSENKO concerning his father and mother and his early life, together with other information such as a comparison of photographs of NOSENKO and a photograph of his father and confirmed travel of his mother to Western Europe in 1956 with Madame KOSYGINA, conclusively establish that he is Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, the son of Ivan Isidorovich NOSENKO, the Minister of Shipbuilding in the USSR prior to his death in 1956. This is also satisfactorily supported by personal-type information furnished by NOSENKO concerning other associates of his father and mother.

Since, as indicated above, there is considered to be no doubt that Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO is the son of the former Minister of Shipbuilding, a detailed study of his life prior to 1945 (age 18) is of

little or no value in assessing the bona fides or non-bona fides of NOSENKO. An expose of his youthful indiscretions, of which he has admitted a number, is of no import in a discussion of whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB. Obtaining any collateral first-hand information in regard to NOSENKO before 1945 would be of negligible value, but there actually is supporting information from Nikolay ARTAMONOV, a defector from the Soviet Navy, concerning the claimed attendance by NOSENKO at a military-naval preparatory school in Leningrad.

NOSENKO, during current interviews, has stated that he graduated from the Institute of International Relations in 1950 and had attended the Institute since 1945. He has explained that he should have graduated in 1949 since it was a four-year course, but failed the final examination in Marxism and therefore was required to attend the Institute for a longer period of time and again take his final examinations.

Based on information furnished by NOSENKO concerning co-students and the Institute, there is no reason to doubt that he actually attended and graduated from the Institute of International Relations in 1950. The previous controversy in this matter was complicated by NOSENKO who, in 1964 after his defection, stated in a biography that he had graduated from the Institute in 1949. Actually this statement

by NOSENKO in 1964 resulted in conflicting information since NOSENKO on 9 June 1962 during his first contact with CIA had stated that he "completed the Institute of International Relations in 1950." NOSENKO has given the explanation that he changed the date of his graduation to 1949 because he did not wish to admit that he had failed to graduate in 1949. NOSENKO explained that this change in his date of graduation caused him to pre-date his actual entry into Navy Intelligence to 1950 instead of 1951 and his actual entry into the KGB from 1953 to 1952.

The above action by NOSENKO is included in what NOSENKO has characterized as his "stupid blunders." The latter is a rather apt characterization of his now admitted lies and exaggerations but is not evidence that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. It is evidence of a certain personality trait of NOSENKO who has in the past by his own admission tended to enhance his importance and astuteness by graphically portraying his personal participation in KGB activities concerning which he had knowledge but did not personally participate.

The claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence during March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas has been seriously questioned in the past. Specific comments on this period of

time are contained in a separate section of this summary, but it is considered that the recent interviews of NOSENKO satisfactorily substantiate his claimed service in Navy Intelligence during March 1951 to early 1953.

Attached is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum completed by NOSENKO on 31 October 1967. This is a biographical statement concerning his life and KGB career. No effort has been made to correct grammatical errors or spelling since to do so would be in conflict with the manner in which current interviews were conducted; namely, to give NOSENKO an opportunity to recount his life and activities to permit a re-examination of the entire case. The comprehension and fluency of NOSENKO in the English language was adequate for interview purposes in October 1967 and both have materially improved since that time.

Interviews of and memoranda prepared by NOSENKO since 31 October 1967 have not indicated any material discrepancies with the statements of NOSENKO in the attached memorandum. One change that has been made by NOSENKO is that he now dates his transfer from the First Department, Second Chief Directorate (SCD), KGB, to the Seventh Department, SCD, as occurring in the latter part of May 1955 rather than June - July 1955 as indicated in the attached statement. NOSENKO also now dates the period in which an unsatisfactory "characterization"

(personnel evaluation) was prepared on NOSENKO in March - April 1955 rather than May - June 1955. Since the unsatisfactory personnel report was directly related to his transfer to the Seventh Department, neither of the above changes are considered to be of a significant nature. An effort has been made during current interviews to differentiate between errors due to faulty memory and discrepancies indicative of deception by NOSENKO.

Attachment:
31 Oct 67 Memo

Operational Memo # N-2

SUBJECT: NOSENKO, Yuri Ivanovich

The following is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum furnished by Subject on 31 October 1967, following a request on 30 October 1967:

I, NOSENKO, George, was born 30 October 1927 in the city Nicolaev, Ukraine.

My family: the father - NOSENKO, Ivan, b. 1902, was working at the shipbuilding plant and studied at the shipbuilding institute, which he finished in 1928; the mother - NOSENKO, Tamara (nee MARKOVSKI), b. 1908, a housewife; the brother - NOSENKO, Vladimir, b. 1944, a student.

In September 1934 I began to study in the school (0 class) but studied a short period of time because in October with the mother went in Leningrad where the father was working at the shipbuilding plant, "Sudsmech" from summer 1934. In Nicolaev I was living at the Street Nicolski 7. All relatives of my family were living also in Nicolaev.

In Leningrad I was living with parents in three places till 1938: at the Street Stachek (1934 - summer 1935), St. Canal of Griboedov, 154 (1935-1938), St. M. Gorky (short period in 1938). From 1935 till

1938 I studied at the schools, which were close to my places of living. In 1938 the father began to work in Moscow and soon I with the mother went to live in Moscow in the end of this year.

In Moscow we were living at the St. Serafimovich, 2. Here I was continuing to study at the school 585 (St. B. Polianka). In 1941 I finished 6th class and went with parents to rest to the south (Sochi) but soon began the war and we returned in Moscow.

In October 1941 I with my mother went in the evacuation in Cheliabinsk (Ural), where I finished 7th class in spring 1942. In Cheliabinsk I lived in the poselok ChTZ, being there I tried to run to the front with my playfellow BUSKO, but we were caught and returned home. In 1942 (summer) I went with the mother in city Gorki and in July-August we returned in Moscow.

In August I entered in the Moscowite military-navy special school, which was evacuated in Kuibyshev, where I finished 8th class in summer 1943 and after that I arrived on a leave in Moscow. This school must be evacuated from Kuibyshev in Achinsk (Siberia) and I did not want to go there. With the help of father I was accepted in the Baku's military-navy preparatory school and in August went in Baku, where I was studying at the second course (9th class). In this school I twice tried to be sent as a volunteer to the front but failed. Soon

after that I run with a friend (RADCHENKO) home in Moscow (January 1944). In Moscow I studied at the courses (Russian word), finished 9th class and was accepted again in the military-navy preparatory school, which was located in Leningrad. In August of 1944 I went in Leningrad.

All cadets of this school were sent to forest (about 200 km. from Leningrad) to prepare wood for winter, where we have been two months. In November I wounded by chance the left hand and was put in the navy hospital. When I was in the hospital I decided not to return in the school but to finish 10th class in Leningrad about what I have written a letter to my father asking his help and agreement with such my decision. With the help of the father's friends I quited with the school and entered in the shipbuilding college on the second course in January 1945 and studied there till the end of May. The WWII finished and I decided to return to Moscow. The director of the shipbuilding college had given me a document that I studied in this college at the second course and finished this course (though I was not passing exams). In Leningrad I was living in the hostel of this college (St. Tolmachev).

In May 1945 I arrived in Moscow and was living with parents (St. Granovski, 3).

In summer 1945 there was created the institute of the international relations in Moscow and in July I entered in this institute.

In July my father went in Germany with the group of engineers and he took me (I received a temporary rank of a senior lieutenant, documents and a uniform).

In 1945-1950 I studied at the institute. In 1946 I acquainted with a girl - Shishkov FLAVIA, student of the medicine institute. I was in close relations with this girl, because of the pregnancy I married her and she made an abort. My parents were against the marriage and we did not live together and we soon divorced. In the end of 1946 I was acquainted with Telegin AUGUSTINE and was going to marry her, received a flat in 1947 (St. Mira - former 1st Uecyehckad, 162/174). In November her father, General TELEGIN, was arrested, but I married her. The marriage was not successful. I foundout about her close relations with the brother, and the child-girl was born with pathological changes. I was not the father of this child. After that I broke with her and we were living separately (end of 1948 - beginning 1949).

In spring 1950 before state exams in the institute was working the commission, which was dealing with future works of the students of my 5th course. I expressed a wish to work in any military organization

and soon I was invited to visit personnel department of MGB (Ministry of State Security). But MGB did not accept me. After that with the help of the father I began to deal with the personnel department of the intelligence of the ministry of military navy concerning my future work.

Passing state exams I failed Marxism-Leninism and with a group of fails I was passing state exams once more. In October 1950 I finished the institute and received a diploma.

I was accepted in the navy intelligence in the 13 of March 1951 and in March 17 went by a train to Soviet Harbour (intelligence of 7th Fleet, as an interpreter of the information department). Before going to the Far East I began my divorce with the former wife.

At the end of April 1952 I went on a leave in Moscow. Immediately after returning in Moscow I had a blood cough out. In the middle of May I went to a tuberculous sanatorium not far from Moscow. In July I finished my treatment and returned in Moscow. Because of the health I could not return back to the Far East and the personnel department of the navy intelligence sent me to Baltic Sea (as a senior interpreter of the navy intelligence point of the intelligence of 4th Fleet - in Sovietsk, Kaliningrad's district).

When I studied at the institute I as all the students received a rank of junior lieutenant of administrative service after finishing the

second course in 1947. In 1951 the ministry of navy had given me also the rank of junior lieutenant when I was accepted in the navy intelligence. In September-October 1952 I received a rank of lieutenant.

In Sovietsk the work was not interested and for me it was nothing to do. Besides this the climate was not good for my health and I decided to change the job. With this purpose before new year at the end of 1952 I took a leave and went to Moscow. January 1 I was with my parents at the evening party at the cottage of General MGB KOBULOV, whom I did not know before, but I knew his son-in-law Vahrushev Vasili - a former student and my friend. I told him about my job and that now I was thinking about change of the job. KOBULOV was speaking with me on this theme and propose we work and his help in MGB, but nothing more definite was said about my work. This month I reported to the head of the personnel department of the navy intelligence KALOSHIN about my decision and that I will be working in MGB.

In the end of January I went again in the tuberculous sanatorium, where I was in 1952. In the days of funeral of STALIN I has come to Moscow and visited the ministry where my father was working. There I have seen General KOBULOV who has come to the father and he said that he would settle my question concerning my job. After several days in the middle of March I have received a telephone call from MVD to

come to KOBULOV. There I have spent about two hours in the reception room of KOBULOV, but he was too busy and his assistant SAVITSKI sent me to the Deputy of the Chief of the Second Directory SHUBNIAKOV, who told me that there was signed an order and I was accepted in the 1 department of 2 chief directory as a case officer. SHUBNIAKOV invited the deputy of the chief of 1 department GORBATENKO (who was acting as the chief of 1 Department because the chief of the department KOSLOV, Anatoli, was appointed to the special department of extraordinarily affairs (investigation)). SHUBNIAKOV and GORBATENKO said to me that I would be working in the 1 section of the department. Then I with GORBATENKO went to the 1 department, was acquainted with the chief of section KOSLOV, Veniamin. KOSLOV told me that I will be working against the American correspondents, showed me room, my desk and acquainted with the officers, who were working in this room: KUTIREV, RACOVSKI, GROMOV and TORMOSOV. The last officer must give files on the correspondents and agents. I was said to come next day and began to work.

When I was resting in the tuberculous sanatorium I acquainted with KOJEVNIKOV, Ludmila, a student of the Moscowite University, and in June 1953 we married. Before it I was living with my parents at St. Gorky, 9, but after marriage was living with the wife at

St. Serafimovich, 2 (the flat of her parents). In 1955 I received a flat at St. Narodnya, 13, where was living with my family.

In 1954 I contracted a disease (gonorrhea) and on the advice of the friend IVANOV went to medic point at St. Negliunya. Doctors asked to show a document, I had with me only MVD certificate and an operative passport and showed them the passport. Doctors had given me a treatment, after that twice they made tests and asked to come once more, but I did not come. They wanted to see once more and sent a letter to the place of work, which was written in the passport. The plant with MVD found out about it. The deputy of the chief, SHUBNIAKOV, was speaking with me. I had written my explanation, and punished by the chief of the 2 directory, FEDOTOV - 15 days of arrest. The komsomol's organization also punished me. I received a strict reprimand and was freed of the head of komsomol's organization of the 2 chief director.

I was a member of komsomol's organization from October 1943. In the end of 1954 before leaving komsomol (because of age) the komsomol organization of KGB took off this strict reprimand.

In 1955 on all officers of the 2 chief directory were written characterizations (May-June). In my characterization was written that I did not appropriate to the 1 department 2 chief directory. In June-July I was appointed to the 7 department 2 chief directory as a case

officer of 2 section. This section was new created (the work against tourists). The chief of 7 department - PERFILIEV, the chief of the 2 section - GUSKOV.

In 1956 I was accepted as a candidate in the Communist Party, soon received a rank of a senior lieutenant and got a promotion - a senior case officer.

In 1957 I was accepted in the Party as a member.

In August 1956 my father died.

In 1957 or 1958 I was promoted a deputy chief of 2 section. In 7th department I was working till 1960 and in January 1960 was sent to work as a deputy chief of the 1 section in the 1 department 2 chief directory (chief of the 1 department, KLIPIN, Vlad., chief of the 1 section - KOVSHUK).

My family was consist of the wife and two daughters: Oksana, born in 1954, and Tamara, born in 1958. Oksana was ill (bronchial asthma) from 1957 and almost every year till 1963 2-3 months was in hospitals. In 1960 I was thinking about change (temporary) place of living and there was a possibility to go to work in 2 departments KGB in Lvov and Odessa. But there was another question if I go from Moscow I would lose the flat in Moscow. At this time the chief of the section of 2 department, PIATROVSKI, proposed to me to go to work in Ethiopia

(counter-intelligence work among Soviet specialists in Ethiopia). The chief of 2 chief directory agreed and the question was almost decided but in the last moment the personnel department of KGB did not agree. The reasons were the case of 1954 (illness and use of the passport for "cover) and a checking in the place of my living (some of agents report that drink and on this base have quarrels with the wife).

I was working in the 1 department till 1962. In January 1962 I was appointed again in the 7 department as the chief of the 1 section (work against tourists from the USA and Canada).

In December 1959 I got a rank of a captain.

When I began to work in the 7 department I knew that soon I must be promoted a deputy chief of the department, when would free a place - the deputy chief of department BALDIN was preparing to go to work in eastern Germany.

In July 1962 I was appointed the deputy chief of 7 department (the chief of the department was CHELNOKOV) and here I was working till January 18, 1964.

During my work in MVD-KGB I did not study in any school, only in 1953-1954 was visiting courses of foreign languages of MVD-KGB at St. Kiselni.

Five times I was sent abroad: In 1957 I was in England with a sport delegation; in 1958 was again in England with a sport delegation; in 1960 I was in Cuba with a delegation of specialists of nickel industry; in 1961 I was sent in Bulgaria with the aim to help to 1 department 2 directory MVD; in 1962 I was in Switzerland - the conference of dis-armament.

Working in MVD-KGB every year I had leaves for rest. In 1953 with the wife I was resting in the tuberculous sanatorium. In 1954 I was with the family at the cottage. In 1955 I was resting at the cottage. In March 1956 I was resting with the wife in Karlovi Vary, Czechoslovakia. In 1957 I was in Leningrad two weeks with the wife and then rested at the cottage. In 1958 I was resting at the cottage. In 1959 I with the wife rested in Sochi. In January-February 1960 I rested with the wife in Kislovodsk. In 1961 - August - I rested with the wife and daughters in Nicolaev. In October 1962 I rested with the wife in Sochi. In July 1963 I rested with the wife and daughters in Anapa.

B. IS THE CLAIMED KGB CAREER OF NOSENKO PLAUSIBLE?

B. Is the claimed KGB career of NOSENKO plausible? In the past the theory has been advanced that NOSENKO was never an officer in the KGB. Information of a detailed nature from NOSENKO concerning the KGB, particularly the Second Chief Directorate, has been so extensive as to invalidate any contention that he was not a KGB officer.

It is considered that NOSENKO was a KGB officer in the claimed Departments during the claimed periods of time and served in the claimed positions in each Department. It is interesting to note that NOSENKO has not materially varied in his statements in regard to the above since his original contact in June 1962 (with the exception of his change to 1952 as date of his entry into the KGB and then later reverting to the date given in 1962). There have been some variations in dates of a minor nature, as indicated elsewhere in this summary, but these are of month or day of transfer from one Department to another and not considered critical or evidence of deception. NOSENKO has admitted previously giving false information in regard to rank and medals, but his basic story concerning

his KGB career today is not significantly different from the fragmentary version he gave in June 1962.

Basically the following is now considered to have been the KGB career of NOSENKO:

Mid-March 1953 - late May 1955, First Section, First Department, SCD

Late May 1955 - December 1959 (1958 - December 1959 - Deputy Chief of Section) Seventh Department, SCD

January 1960 - December 1961, Deputy Chief of Section, First Section, First Department, SCD

January 1962 - July 1962, Chief of First Section, Seventh Department, SCD

July 1962 - January 1964, Deputy Chief of Seventh Department, SCD

(NOTE: The term Deputy Chief is being used throughout this summary, but the better terminology probably is "Deputy to Chief." The position of "Deputy Chief" in United States Government parlance, including CIA, is not synonymous with the term "Deputy Chief" as used

in Soviet organizations and more specifically in the KGB. As an example, a Chief of Department in the KGB or the Chief of a Residentura abroad may have 2, 3 or even 4 deputies, one of whom is given the title of First Deputy. This particular deputy acts in the absence of the Chief of Department and in general has supervisory functions over all the Department sections. The exception to the latter is when the Chief of Department retains direct supervision over what he may consider the most important section. Other deputies have supervisory functions only over designated sections or organizational components.)

During current interviews and in prepared memoranda, NOSENKO has furnished detailed information which it is considered substantiates his claimed positions in the KGB. Detailed remarks on these topics are contained in separate sections of this summary.

It is realized that GOLITSYN, although confirming that NOSENKO was a KGB officer in both the First Department and Seventh Department, SCD, has stated that NOSENKO remained in the First Department until circa 1958 and that NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, in 1960. It is impossible to correlate this information with the above indicated opinion that NOSENKO left the First Department in late May 1955 and was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, in 1960, nor is an adequate explanation of these variances available

at this time. On the other hand, it is not reasonable that NOSENKO would lay claim to the title of Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, if this were not true when he clearly knew of the visits of GOLITSYN to the First Section in 1960 - 1961 and of his conferences with officers closely associated with NOSENKO at that time.

NOSENKO has also mentioned a number of officers of the SCD or former officers of the SCD who transferred to the FCD with whom he was personally acquainted and who were also known to GOLITSYN. A number of these officers were officers from whom GOLITSYN has stated he obtained certain information or through whom he became aware of certain activities including Vladislav M. KOVSHUK, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV, Vladimir Ivanovich PETROV, Yuriy I. GUK, Vladimir A. CHURANOV, Yevgeniy GROMAKOVSKIY and Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV.

The statement of NOSENKO that although he had heard of GOLITSYN he had never personally met GOLITSYN, stands in conflict with the statements of GOLITSYN that he, GOLITSYN, had met and talked with NOSENKO in the SCD in the late 1950's. The description of GOLITSYN of this meeting is that of a casual encounter in the halls rather than a specific office visit. In light of this, the absence of any reason why NOSENKO from his point of view should remember such an encounter and the absence of any reason for NOSENKO to lie on this

issue, it is eminently reasonable to conclude that the encounter took place but that NOSENKO simply has no recollection of it. There is no reason to attach significance to this lapse of memory.

The previous opinion that NOSENKO did not hold the claimed position of Deputy Chief, First Section, First Department, during 1960 - 1961 has had the most merit in the controversy over his statements relative to his KGB career. This particular aspect will be covered in detail in another section, but of note at this time is the controversy over what duties the position of Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD, KGB, entails or does not entail. It is a fruitless exercise to attempt to judge whether NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the First Section in 1960 - 1961 on the basis of whether his knowledge of the total activities of the First Section was commensurate with the knowledge of a Deputy Branch Chief in CIA in regard to the activities of the entire Branch.

Whether NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD, KGB, must be judged on the basis of what were the duties of a Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD and in particular what were his duties in the particular assignment. The organizational structure of the KGB may or may not have some similarities to the organizational structure of CIA, but any similarities are surely not such as to permit a judgment

as to whether NOSENKO held a certain claimed position on the basis of a comparison of his activities and responsibilities with that inherent in a somewhat similar position in CIA.

One of the most important differences between United States agencies or organizations, including CIA, and the bureaucratic structure of agencies or organizations in the USSR, including the KGB, is the salary structure. Pay of a KGB officer is based on military rank and on actual position held with an additional percentage increase for longevity and language qualification. Actual position held is important from a monetary viewpoint in addition to the prestige. As an example, the difference in monthly salary between a captain and a major is twenty rubles and the difference in salary between a Senior Case Officer and a Deputy Chief of Section is also twenty rubles. An increase in military rank alone has limited pay advantages, as for example a Lieutenant Colonel who is only a Senior Case Officer receives less pay than a major who holds the position of Chief of Section.

During current interviews, an effort has been made to obtain from NOSENKO statements concerning his responsibilities in the various claimed positions. The judgment on whether he held or did not hold the various claimed positions, in view of the absence of any factual

supporting or refuting information, has necessarily been based to a considerable degree on the logic of the statements made by NOSENKO. Admittedly this is not the most satisfactory way of resolving the questions, but it is the only method possible at this time.

SECRET

C. HAS NOSENKO GIVEN AN ACCEPTABLE EXPLANATION OF HIS MOTIVATION IN CONTACTING CIA IN 1962 AND FOR HIS DEFECTION IN 1964?

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C. Has NOSENKO given an acceptable explanation of his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962 and for his defection in 1964? Of the eight listed categories which are being given specific consideration in the matter of the bona fides of NOSENKO, this category is probably the most difficult in which to present a logical position with factual support. There are too many intangible aspects involved and although motivation is an important factor, full resolution of the motivation problem is not a paramount factor in deciding whether NOSENKO is or is not a dispatched agent. NOSENKO could have contacted this Agency in 1962 and defected in 1964 without KGB knowledge and yet even at this late date have failed to disclose some important events of a personal nature which actually were important ingredients in his ultimate decision. Defectors are humans and have at least the normal reluctance to admit unfavorable information which they consider of a personal nature.

On 31 October 1967 NOSENKO, following a request, furnished a handwritten memorandum on the topic of his motivation, a typed copy of which is attached. The memorandum, although not grammatically correct, is quite understandable and is worthy of review. The tenor of the memorandum is one of increasing disillusionment with the Soviet regime.

NOSENKO and others of his generation have lived in a Soviet society throughout their entire lives. The environment is an important factor of influence in the life of an individual and true disillusionment is at best usually a gradual process in which many factors, some recognized and some not recognized by the individual, have played a role in varying degrees.

NOSENKO, until 1955 and possibly until the death of his father in August 1956, could be compared to the profligate son of wealthy parents in the United States who finally graduates from college and obtains employment perhaps in the firm of his father without actually earning any of the luxuries he has enjoyed. The father of NOSENKO was not only wealthy by Soviet standards but also held a high government position. The influence of his father and the name of his father undoubtedly was an important if not the most important factor in NOSENKO even being permitted to enter the Naval RU and the KGB even though NOSENKO is particularly reluctant to admit, perhaps even to himself, that this was the primary reason.

The above should not be construed as any reflection on the actual intelligence of NOSENKO, but rather as an explanation of how NOSENKO could have even entered the Naval RU and KGB. His

performance in both prior to 1956 by his own admission was such that he probably would have been summarily terminated if he had not been the son of the capable, respected Minister of Shipbuilding.

If a certain amount of speculation is permitted, the disillusionment of NOSENKO, who lost many personal advantages following the death of his father including a personal automobile, may have actually started soon after the death of his father. That NOSENKO is undisciplined is supported by his admissions relative to his life in the USSR and his behavior both in 1962 in Geneva and for a period of time after his defection in 1964. NOSENKO was addicted to women, liquor, and the material things which can be purchased with money or obtained through influence.

A question has been previously raised regarding his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962, particularly his statement that he needed money and would sell "two pieces of information." NOSENKO has stated that he wanted to make a contact with the Americans, that he was not emotionally ready to defect, but that he subconsciously believed that if he made a contact he would be making an ultimate commitment from which he could no longer retreat.

NOSENKO has stated that he gave considerable thought to the best way to contact the Americans so that he would be believed and not rejected and came to the conclusion that he would offer to sell some information. NOSENKO stated that he thought if he approached the Americans stating he was a "KGB counterintelligence officer who wanted to give information," he would not have been believed and would have been peremptorily rejected. NOSENKO stated he had difficulty deciding how much money to ask for and how to make the approach, but finally decided to do it through [David MARK] whom the KGB considered was with American Intelligence.

The above statements by NOSENKO are not in conflict with the record. NOSENKO did offer to sell "two pieces of information," almost immediately gave more information, made no significant demands for money, and in fact his price for "two pieces of information" was ridiculously low by American standards. NOSENKO has during current interviews stated, as he first stated in 1962, that he had spent excessive amounts of money in one or two riotous evenings. However, NOSENKO has during current interviews stated that he could have covered his expenditures by other means without receiving any money from the Americans.

NOSENKO has stated that the night before his departure from Geneva to the USSR he gave serious thought to defection but was not emotionally adapted to defect at that time. Following his return to the Soviet Union, NOSENKO, during a period of time, made his final decision to defect at the first opportunity, realizing that it meant leaving his wife, children, and other members of his family in the USSR.

Some aspects of the motivation of NOSENKO are obscure and will probably so remain. It would be preferable if an exact detailed chronology of all the factors involved could be prepared or if even certain obvious factors could be accurately delineated. These are both impossible at this time and probably at any time in the future. What is important at this time is a decision as to whether the motivation of NOSENKO was based on personal reasons with no implications of KGB dispatch. It is considered that the explanation of NOSENKO concerning his motivation is acceptable and that his statement that no one except the Americans was aware of his contacts with the Americans in 1962 or his intent to defect in 1964 is supported by other information of a collateral nature. (See Section III, H.)

Attachment:
Typed cpy Memo from NOSENKO

Operational Memo # N-4

SUBJECT: NOSENKO, Yuri Ivanovich

The following is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum furnished by Subject on 1 November 1967, following a request on 31 October 1967:

What were the motif and the reasons which have led me to the decision to breake with the Soviet Russia? The only definite is an understanding of the situation in the Soviet Russia, the knowledge of the methods of the communist regime, the knowledge of the real foreign and interior policies of the Soviet government and the faith in the rightness of the free world.

It was not a decision which was accepted or could be accepted in a month or a year. This decision was slowly growing in me. I think that the beginning was in the studentship.

Living with my parents and being in the circles of the parent's and my acquaintances I knew more then there was written in newspapers and periodics and that was propagandized by radio and TV. Working in the Far East and later being in trips in different regions and cities of Russia I found out much better the life and conditions of the life of the people of the Soviet Russia.

When I worked 11 years in MVD-KGB I understood and found out very many things, details and the real deal of the existing regime, about methods of the work of MGB-MVD-KGB and about their doings, about hundreds of thousands of the people of Russia who were (and still are) considered "politically" dangerous and around whom was (and still is) going an active work of all organs KGB.

At the same time when I was several times abroad I have seen personally the so-called "decay" at the West. I have seen in reality how is living people.

Several times when I was abroad I was thinking about staying at the West and not returning in Russia, but only one thing was keeping me -- my family.

In 1962 in Switzerland I made the acquaintance with the Americans. From my part "the sell of the information" was a real show. I was thinking that they would not believe me otherwise. In that period of the time there was going a big struggle in me to stay abroad or to return home till the last days of living in Geneva and even when I was returning home in Vienna.

In 1962-1963 I decided definitely that I did not want and could not live more in the Soviet Russia. In this period of time I have done all my best to go as soon as possible abroad.

It was not easy to make this decision, it was very difficult to leave the family for ever.

And now in spite of everything I do not regret.

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D. IS THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO TO CIA CONCERNING KGB OPERATIONS, PERSONALITIES, AND ORGANIZATION REASONABLY COMMENSURATE WITH HIS CLAIMED KGB CAREER?

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D. Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organization reasonably commensurate with his claimed KGB career? The conclusion is that the information furnished by NOSENKO concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organization is more than reasonably commensurate with his claimed career in the KGB from mid-March 1953 to his defection in early February 1964.

In reaching the above conclusion, consideration has been given to his claimed departmental assignments and claimed positions in each department. Certain allowance has been made for faulty memory with consideration being given to whether there is any indication of deception or whether the failure to recall a particular item of interest can logically be attributed to the vagaries of the human mind. There is, of course, no accurate standard of measurement which would permit a positive determination as to whether inability to recall certain details or events is actually due to the fact that the human mind cannot recall all past events or could be attributed to willful deception.

An effort has been made to determine if there are any particular patterns or areas where NOSENKO has indicated he did not recall specific matters or certain details, and no pattern or specific areas have been noted. NOSENKO, in fact, has an unusually good memory as evidenced by the extensive information furnished by NOSENKO purely from recollection. In addition, there has been no material reluctance on the part of NOSENKO to discuss his entire life, KGB officers he has known, KGB organization and procedures, or other topics of interest.

NOSENKO has furnished considerable detail concerning KGB officers whom he has known at various periods in his entire KGB career. He has been very consistent in information furnished and has frequently added certain details which he recalled at a later date.

Certain remarks will be made in another section in regard to the volume and scope of information furnished by NOSENKO. This information is not selective, but is an excellent indicator that NOSENKO was assigned to the First Department and Seventh Department, SCD, during the claimed periods of time and held the claimed positions. Consideration has been given to his various claimed KGB assignments in evaluating the information furnished in an effort to assess whether his indicated knowledge was commensurate with his claimed position during

a particular period of time or suggested the possibility that he did not occupy the position which he claimed to have held.

It is considered that information furnished by NOSENKO supports his claimed positions in the SCD. It has not been possible to substantially confirm through collateral sources that NOSENKO served in his claimed positions. Neither has it been possible to obtain from other sources an applicable description of the duties or responsibilities of an individual holding any of the positions NOSENKO claimed to have held after 1958. It is felt there can be no question that NOSENKO served in the capacities of junior case officer, case officer, and senior case officer during 1953 - 1957. As regards the duties and responsibilities of a Deputy Chief of Section, Chief of Section, and Deputy Chief of Department, and whether NOSENKO held these various claimed positions, a considerable amount of personal judgment has been necessary. This personal judgment has been made in as judicial a manner as possible, with full knowledge that any opinion in regard to the above is largely dependent upon information from NOSENKO.

NOSENKO has compiled detailed diagrams of the actual offices he claims to have occupied and surrounding offices during the four primary periods of time: 1953 - 1955, 1955 - 1959, 1960 - 1961, and 1962 - 1963. He has prepared specific memoranda concerning his co-officers

and other personnel, and changes of personnel, as well as diagrams of the offices of the Chief and Deputy Chiefs of the SCD during 1956 - 1964. This material is internally consistent. Furthermore NOSENKO could not possibly have known that this detailed information could not immediately be checked for accuracy, at least in part, with a source or another officer who has defected since mid-1964. If these diagrams and memoranda were not relatively correct, NOSENKO, who is quite astute in matters of counterintelligence, would hardly have voluntarily prepared the material in such detail. This type of information is peculiarly adaptable for analysis by a knowledgeable source or by another defector and could, if not relatively correct, permit a rather positive conclusion that NOSENKO was lying or fabricating information.

NOSENKO has furnished quite specific information on KGB operations during the 1953 - 1955, 1955 - 1959, 1960 - 1961, and 1962 - 1963 periods of time. As might be expected, his specific knowledge is less for the 1953 - 1955 period; but his own personal situation and attitude until 1955 - 1956, which are mentioned elsewhere, should be given consideration. In any event, he has furnished adequate information so that his claimed assignment during 1953 - 1955 is considered sufficiently substantiated even though his actual job performance undoubtedly deserved a low rating.

The knowledge of NOSENKO concerning cases, KGB operations, and other officers can consistently be related to his claimed department and position assignment during the 1953 to January 1964 period. The scope of his knowledge of his own department when considered in toto is broader after 1957 than before, which is compatible with his claim of increased responsibilities. His knowledge of the work of other departments of the SCD from the late 1950's on is also more extensive, which is also a further indication that NOSENKO actually held the claimed positions during this period of time.

E. CAN THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO BE CONSIDERED IN TOTO AS HAVING RESULTED IN MATERIAL DAMAGE TO THE KGB AND/OR HAS THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO BEEN OF SIGNIFICANT BENEFIT TO WESTERN INTELLIGENCE?

SECRET

E. Can the information furnished by NOSENKO be considered in toto as having resulted in material damage to the KGB and/or has the information furnished by NOSENKO been of significant benefit to Western Intelligence? The conclusion in regard to both of the above questions is affirmative, even though it is realized that ultimate loss to the KGB and ultimate benefit to Western Intelligence are both partly of an intangible nature and not susceptible to accurate measurement.

NOSENKO has, as previously indicated, furnished voluminous information during current and previous interviews. An accurate total of specific cases is not possible at this time and would at best be only an interesting figure, the actual significance of which would be marginal. Practically every interview with NOSENKO, even at present, reveals information of counterintelligence interest and it is expected that this production can continue for a considerable period of time. This should not be construed as an indication that NOSENKO is intentionally withholding information, but rather that stimulation of his memory through normal questions and discussions has been and can continue to be productive.

NOSENKO has furnished information concerning perhaps [2,000] 08 KGB officers and [300] 08 KGB agents or operative contacts (here the terms agents or operative contacts are used to refer to Soviet nationals), mainly in the Second Chief Directorate or internal KGB organizations. However, he has identified approximately [250] 08 former or current First Chief Directorate officers and there is a considerable exchange of officers between the FCD and SCD. In addition, numerous officers of the SCD and other internal KGB organizations travel abroad with delegations, tourist groups, and as visitors to various major exhibitions such as World's Fairs. It is impossible at this time to estimate the number of KGB officers identified by NOSENKO who have been outside the Soviet Bloc since his defection or who will be out sometime in the future.

There has been very little attempted exploitation of information furnished by NOSENKO concerning other KGB officers and, therefore, the possible value of this information to United States Intelligence cannot be estimated nor can the potential damage to the KGB be estimated.

Disclosure of information concerning certain KGB officers would be a necessary part of any dispatch of a KGB agent or officer to the West either for purposes of contact with Western Intelligence for a

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limited period of time or for the placing of the individual in a defector status. However, identification of KGB officers or agents to Western Intelligence is necessarily a matter of concern to the KGB and the exposure of the identities of approximately [2,000] 08 KGB officers and [several 08 hundred] KGB agents could not be considered of negligible importance.

Obtaining specific information in regard to KGB officers or KGB assets is important to United States Intelligence and a considerable amount of manpower and money is spent on this activity. Even acknowledging that it is much more difficult for CIA to obtain this type of information about the KGB, which operates in a closed society, than it is for the KGB to obtain the identity of CIA employees, it is believed doubtful any reader of this summary would consider that the identification of [2,000] 08 CIA employees and [several 08 hundred] agent assets to the KGB would be any less than a very serious compromise of valuable information.

Prior to the defection of NOSENKO, little was known of the organization of the SCD or other internal KGB organizations. The information provided by NOSENKO concerning both has been detailed and extensive. That this information is of value to the United States Intelligence community is hardly subject to dispute, although analysts

can differ as to the weight which should be given to the value of this type of information.

NOSENKO has furnished information concerning SCD, KGB, recruitments of United States citizens and foreign nationals covering the period of 1953 through 1963. This should not be interpreted as a statement that NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to all SCD recruitments, even of Americans, during this period. His information based on personal knowledge is in general limited to the First Department and Seventh Department. He has furnished information concerning cases of several other departments in the SCD and some FCD cases, but this information was in general acquired indirectly from social or business conversations with other KGB officers.

NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a number of cases which were previously known to United States Intelligence. While the value of such information cannot be considered high, the additional details which NOSENKO has provided in a number of cases cannot be dismissed as being of no value to Western Intelligence, even if the information cannot be regarded as damaging to the KGB. Furthermore, inasmuch as there is no reason to question his sourcing of information already known, there is no basis for suspicion of NOSENKO for his having provided such information.

NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a number of recruitments by the KGB of non-Bloc nationals who were known by Western Intelligence to be pro-Communist or even connected with Communist organizations. The identification as a recruited KGB agent of an individual previously known to be pro-Communist is of considerable value to Western Intelligence and may be considered to have resulted in some damage to the KGB. Admittedly, the potential to the KGB of an agent who is known as pro-Communist is less than that of a "politically clean" individual. However, "pro-Communist" or even "Communist" are not synonymous with "recruited KGB agent."

NOSENKO has furnished additional information on cases in which there was some previous but limited information. In a number of these instances the additional information from NOSENKO has permitted identification of the individuals of interest and the closing of an "Unknown Subject" case. In such instances the information from NOSENKO must be considered valuable to Western Intelligence since the incomplete information known previously would in many cases not have permitted ultimate identification of the individual of interest. This category of cases must be considered as having resulted in damage to the KGB and in benefit to Western Intelligence.

NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a number of individuals, both American and non-Bloc foreign, who were recruited by the KGB and concerning whom Western Intelligence had no significant information. It is recognized that certain of these cases mentioned by NOSENKO, particularly in the tourist category, would probably never have actually materialized as productive KGB agents. This could be for various reasons including later refusal to cooperate, later geographical inaccessibility to the KGB, or not being either at the time of SCD recruitment or later in a position to furnish information of interest to the KGB. In this regard, NOSENKO has stated that at least until 1962 there was a definite tendency in the Seventh Department to make a "recruitment" as a statistic for the end-of-year report even though it was apparent the agent at the time had no potential and that it was highly unlikely there would be a potential in the future.

NOSENKO has furnished information on or leads to a number of cases, primarily third nationals but some American, in which he has been unable to furnish sufficient details to permit identification at this time. In certain instances it is believed that an identification will be possible after additional research and investigation. Until an identification is made, the value of any particular lead to Western Intelligence cannot be estimated, but that there may be a potential value

cannot be ignored. As an example of this category, NOSENKO has furnished a lead, still under investigation, to an unidentified agent, probably not an American, who in 1962 was in a position to remove the "NATO Emergency Codes," deliver the codes to the KGB for photographing, and then successfully replace the codes. Because the agent is as yet unidentified, his current access to information affecting the security of the United States cannot be gauged.

In all, the information from NOSENKO in the category of cases where Western Intelligence did not previously have significant information must be considered on balance as having resulted in material damage to the KGB and of significant benefit to Western Intelligence.

Quantity alone of CI or FI information from a KGB defector is not a standard on which to judge bona fides. The question is whether the amount of his information is reasonably commensurate with his claimed positions in the KGB. This question as regards NOSENKO has been examined, with affirmative findings, in another section of this paper.

A few examples from the above cited categories of information furnished by NOSENKO are listed below. These cases are given as illustrations and are not necessarily listed in order of importance.

The case of Robert Lee JOHNSON and the related case of James Allen MINTKENBAUGH have been covered in the previous summary. It can be considered that both were exposed as a result of a lead from NOSENKO which led to suspicions of JOHNSON.

Another American case is that of [Herbert HOWARD, a USIA] 06, 08 employee who spent considerable time in the USSR in 1962 - 1963. NOSENKO identified [Herbert HOWARD] 06 as having been recruited by the First Section, First Department, SCD, in 1962 and was positive that [HOWARD] 06 furnished valuable information to the KGB. When interviewed in 1964, [HOWARD] 06 did not admit he had been recruited, but suspicion of [HOWARD] 06 was great enough so that his contract with [USIA] 29 was not renewed.

If indeed [HOWARD] 06 was recruited by the KGB, it is impossible to determine how much information would have been compromised by [HOWARD] 06; while in the USSR, he did have certain access to the United States Embassy. There is good reason to believe that if [HOWARD] 06 was recruited, it was he who was responsible for the compromise of a potentially valuable Soviet walk-in with whom CIA was attempting to establish contact using [HOWARD] 06 as intermediary.

NOSENKO in 1964 furnished information in regard to a "ZHARI" (apparently a KGB code name, although NOSENKO thought it was a true

name). He identified "ZHARI" (phonetic) as an American code clerk who defected to the USSR in 1961. An internal assumption was made based on the original lead information from NOSENKO that "ZHARI" was Victor Norris HAMILTON, aka Fouad Mitri HINDALY, a former NSA employee who defected to the USSR in 1962, and the information from NOSENKO was never disseminated or investigated.

Prior to the surfacing of John Discoe SMITH by the Soviets in the fall of 1967, [illegible] information concerning KGB knowledge of American code clerks was being investigated; and John Discoe SMITH was a leading suspect. After the surfacing of SMITH by the Soviets, it became apparent that SMITH, rather than HAMILTON, was identical to "ZHARI." Investigation disclosed that no definite information could be established in regard to the actual whereabouts of SMITH after circa mid-1960. It cannot be positively stated that appropriate investigation in 1964 of the "ZHARI" lead would have led to the identification of John Discoe SMITH as "ZHARI." However, such identification would have been of considerable interest to the Department of State and CIA, and could very well have permitted certain action which would have at least lessened the propaganda effect of the surprise announcement by the Soviets in the fall of 1967.

NOSENKO, in June 1962, furnished information from which William VASSALL could be quickly identified. GOLITSYN, in late 1960 - early 1961, had furnished information concerning a Soviet penetration of the British Government on the basis of which the British

Services had compiled a list of twenty suspects, including VASSALL. Even though it may be presumed that investigation of the twenty suspects would ultimately have resulted in a determination that VASSALL was the agent on whom GOLITSYN had furnished certain information, the information from NOSENKO in June 1962 resulted in the earlier termination by the British Services of a still valuable productive KGB agent.

Although not the case of a KGB agent, the matter of the microphones in the United States Embassy should also be mentioned. GOLITSYN, following his defection in December 1961, furnished certain information in regard to microphones in the United States Embassy (Chancery). Since in fact the microphones were connected to central cables, location of one microphone would logically have led to the exposure of the entire set of microphones. However, appropriate action was not taken on this information and the KGB would have been aware that no action was taken prior to June 1962 when NOSENKO first contacted CIA.

If NOSENKO is a dispatched KGB agent, it is not clear why the KGB would attract specific attention to a system of microphones which must have still had some value as of June 1962. A presumption may be made that if NOSENKO was a dispatched agent, the KGB had, as of 1962, an advanced system of monitoring devices which rendered the above microphone system obsolete. However, no concrete evidence of such an advanced system is available and it should be noted that it

was not until circa April 1964 that any effective action was taken to locate and remove the microphone system on which GOLITSYN had given a lead in late [illegible] 1961 - [illegible] January 1962.

A few general [illegible] in [illegible] the CI information furnished by NOSENKO would be appropriate in this particular section. As regards leads furnished by NOSENKO [illegible] American cases, most of these leads have been mentioned in the previous summary. Current interviews with NOSENKO have resulted in approximately seventeen new American leads which are being examined by the FBI. The interviews have also resulted in more specific information in regard to a number of cases previously mentioned by NOSENKO, thus permitting additional development of these cases by the FBI.

NOSENKO has provided leads to over 100 third-country KGB agents. Geographically these leads are wide in scope, including nationals of such countries as Indonesia, Austria, Uruguay, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Australia, Japan, Mexico, Italy, and a number of other countries.

Included in the more important of these agent or other leads are leads to high levels of government and intelligence to code clerks, to access agents for American targets, to actual or possible illegal

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support assets. Also included are foreign correspondents, representatives of foreign tourist firms, and foreign tourists.

A summary of the foreign leads arbitrarily defined as of major significance shows nineteen leads highly placed or formerly highly placed in their own government, four code clerks, eight cases involving definite American interest, and four access agents to Americans. It also shows nine instances of clandestine KGB activity against foreign missions in Moscow, including actual KGB clandestine access into certain Western Embassies (but not the British or American Embassies).

NOSENKO has also furnished leads to certain FCD foreign national agents, his information on several being derived during his three months in Geneva in 1962.

It is impossible to give an exact evaluation of the significance of the foreign leads furnished by NOSENKO. That they are of significant value to Western Intelligence and damaging to the KGB is hardly subject to dispute. This evaluation must be given even though there are numerous foreign leads which have not been adequately exploited at this time.

As a final note, the implied conclusion in the previous summary is accepted that the failure of NOSENKO to provide usable positive

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intelligence information is not a significant factor in a determination of his bona fides. The qualification should, however, be added that it is not felt that NOSENKO has, as of this time, been fully debriefed in many areas of positive intelligence interest.

SECRET

F. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF KGB DECEPTION OR "GIVE AWAY" IN INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO WHICH WOULD WARRANT A CONCLUSION THAT NOSENKO WAS DISPATCHED BY THE KGB?

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SECRET

F. Is there evidence of KGB deception or "give away" in information furnished by NOSENKO which would warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB? The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO was not dispatched by the KGB. In reaching this conclusion, a full examination of the above question has been both a necessary and integral part.

It is inherent that the volume of information furnished by NOSENKO is only one of the factors which should be given consideration in arriving at a conclusion that NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB. If NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, the KGB would have surely been willing to sacrifice certain information of value to the KGB in order to support the bona fides of NOSENKO. However, if NOSENKO was dispatched, it must have been to accomplish or further a KGB purpose or mission, the nature of which has been and continues to be unknown.

An examination of the circumstances under which NOSENKO first contacted CIA in Geneva in 1962 and his behavior during these contacts is particularly pertinent since during this period of time NOSENKO would have surely been under direct KGB control if there are any implications of KGB dispatch in the NOSENKO case.

NOSENKO has stated that his original approach to "sell two pieces of information" was his own idea as to what was most likely to be successful. NOSENKO has stated that he wanted to make a contact with the Americans, was not psychologically adapted to defect at the time, and felt that if he merely stated that he was a "KGB counter-intelligence officer who wanted to give information," he very possibly would be rejected. It should be noted that NOSENKO even during his first contact did not limit his remarks to the "two pieces of information" and began to talk quite freely on other matters.

If NOSENKO was dispatched, it is felt that he, during his 1962 contacts, would have been very carefully briefed and that his remarks or statements would have not been of a nature which could cause any suspicion in regard to the bona fides of NOSENKO. Instead, a current review of his statements and remarks during his five contacts in 1962 indicate that his many errors, exaggerations, and actual lies were quite likely typical of a braggadocio element in the personality of NOSENKO and may also have been evidence supporting the statement by NOSENKO that he usually had a few drinks of liquor before each contact in Geneva.

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NOSENKO, during his five contacts in Geneva, made many statements which in retrospect were impossible, and the investigation of which could only have raised certain questions concerning NOSENKO. The following is a list of the more obvious areas in which NOSENKO made gross exaggerations or made incorrect or impossible statements.

(a) NOSENKO claimed he personally was with Oleg M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the SCD, during the recruitment pitch to [James STORSBERG]. (This was a lie and an interview with [STORSBERG] with display of photograph would have disclosed that NOSENKO did not participate.)

(b) NOSENKO was involved in the recruitment approach to Russell LANGELLE. (This was a lie and LANGELLE was available for interview.)

(c) NOSENKO said he recruited [LUNT (Horace LUNT)] in Bulgaria. (Actually NOSENKO never met [LUNT].)

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(d) NOSENKO claimed personal contact with [Edmund 06 STEVENS] who, according to NOSENKO, had been recruited by the KGB. (NOSENKO actually had never personally met [STEVENS] 06 and only had seen [STEVENS] 06 once at a distance.)

(e) NOSENKO dated the recruitment of "ANDREY" in Moscow as 1949-1950. At the same time he furnished information that "ANDREY" (who is considered identical to Dayle Wallis SMITH) was in Moscow during a part of the time that Roy RHODES, also a recruited agent, was assigned to Moscow, 1951-1953. "ANDREY" (SMITH) was actually in Moscow 1952-1954.

(f) NOSENKO said he, GRIBANOV, and another officer met Edward Ellis SMITH. (NOSENKO has since stated he did not meet SMITH and that his only role was obtaining a foreign typewriter and paper for a KGB agent involved in the SMITH operation.)

(g) NOSENKO in a number of instances spoke in the first person, saying "We did this," or "We did that," in reference to a particular KGB activity in which he now admits

he was not involved but had some knowledge. (If NOSENKO was under KGB control in 1962, both he and the KGB should have known that these indicated exaggerations would eventually lead to a question concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO.)

In 1962-1963 a number of similarities were noted between information furnished by NOSENKO and information which had been furnished by GOLITSYN prior to June 1962. These similarities were quite striking and gave rise to certain suspicions of NOSENKO because he provided information which the KGB would presumably have considered already compromised as a result of the defection of GOLITSYN. Certain of the similarities at the time could only be explained in terms of NOSENKO being a dispatched agent. The following are some examples of the similarities noted.

(a) Both furnished information in regard to [Johan PREISFREUND]. 06

(b) Both furnished information in regard to a [military code clerk case (James STORSBERG)]. 08, 06

(c) Both furnished information in regard to a trip of Vladislav KOVSHUK, under an assumed name, to the United States. (GOLITSYN was sure it was connected with a reactivation of an agent formerly in

Moscow, or a recruitment of an American formerly with the United States Embassy in Moscow; and NOSENKO related it directly to the "ANDREY" case, giving the assumed name which KOVSHUK used.)

(d) Both furnished information in regard to microphones in the United States Embassy in Moscow.

(e) Both furnished information in regard to 06 [Edmund STEVENS] and 06 [Isaac Henry SHAPIRO].

The above list is not complete nor does it indicate the actual differences in the amount of information furnished on any particular topic by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO. To cite the above in detail in this summary is believed unnecessary since the only point of real interest is whether the fact that NOSENKO was aware of certain events, cases, or situations of which GOLITSYN was also aware raises a legitimate question concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO.

The above area of concern has been thoroughly examined and it is considered that the fact that NOSENKO furnished some information on certain cases or situations previously mentioned in lesser or greater detail by GOLITSYN cannot logically be construed as evidence

that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. NOSENKO has during current interviews satisfactorily sourced his information in almost every instance. In a few instances he has said he did not recall how he learned of a particular piece of information but these apparent lapses of memory were not large in number and are considered to be in no way suspicious.

The general area in which there was a similarity between information furnished by GOLITSYN in late 1961 - early 1962 and information furnished by NOSENKO in June 1962 and which would have been the most significant insofar as the security of the United States Government was or is concerned related to certain activities centering around or in the First Department, SCD.

It is the conclusion of this summary that NOSENKO was an officer of the First Section, First Department, SCD, during 1953-1955 and was Deputy Chief of the same section in 1960 - 1961. Therefore, the fact that NOSENKO furnished information concerning certain cases or situations in the First Department and the fact that GOLITSYN furnished information concerning the same case or situation is not unusual or necessarily suspicious. NOSENKO has stated that GOLITSYN

knew and was in contact with other officers of the First Section and GOLITSYN has attributed his knowledge of certain cases or activities of the First Department, SCD, primarily to his association with certain officers in the First Department, SCD.

It is recognized that there are certain conflicts in information furnished by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO and at this time it is not possible to satisfactorily correlate certain information from GOLITSYN with information from NOSENKO. Pages 162 - 163 of the previous summary refer to information from GOLITSYN which is characterized as "Information about KGB Operations Against Embassy Code Clerks in 1960 - 1961." The references are to information from GOLITSYN based on remarks by Gennadiy Ivanovich GRYAZNOV and Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV of the First Section, First Department, SCD, and an officer of the Second Section, First Department, SCD.

NOSENKO has stated that he was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, SCD, during 1960 - 1961, that his primary responsibility was work against code clerks at the United States Embassy in Moscow, and that both KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV were engaged in the same work and under his supervision. The statement by GOLITSYN

that NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief of the First Section in 1960 has been noted and commented on in another section of this summary.

GOLITSYN has furnished certain information which he received from officers of the First Section, First Department, SCD. In each instance where this information, which was fragmentary, could not be immediately correlated with information from NOSENKO, it was previously considered to be evidential of deception or lying on the part of NOSENKO. This position, however, failed to allow for the possibility that the discrepancies between the two sources were, at least in certain instances, more apparent than real.

In certain instances it has now been possible to correlate fragmentary information from GOLITSYN with information from NOSENKO, making it evident that in these instances the differences could not be construed as in any way reflecting against NOSENKO. The four examples cited below represent two probable correlations, (a) and (b); one possible correlation, (c); and one instance where no correlation is possible at this time, (d):

(a) GOLITSYN furnished information which he received in April-May 1960 from Gennadiy GRYAZNOV that an attempt had been made by the KGB to recruit an

American female employee of the American Embassy in Moscow through a male Soviet friend, but that the attempt had failed. GOLITSYN also furnished information that the woman had left Moscow by the time he learned of the information but that the Soviets hoped she would return to Moscow so that further work could be undertaken to effect her recruitment. He did not recall the name of the secretary, but did recall that it was [a long and "German sounding"] name. 08

NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a recruitment attempt against [Collette SCHWARZENBACH,] 06 who it is considered is identical to the "American secretary" referred to by GOLITSYN. However [SCHWARZENBACH was not a female secretary in the American Embassy, but had been employed as a secretary to the wife of Ambassador BOHLEN during 1955 - 1956 and from 1958 - 1959 was employed as a correspondent by the United Press in Moscow]. 06, 08 The recruitment attempt against [SCHWARZENBACH] 06 according to NOSENKO, occurred in 1959 and was an operation of the First Section, First Department, SCD.

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(b) Page 163 of the previous summary contains information that GOLITSYN also learned from GRYAZNOV in the spring of 1960 that GRYAZNOV had developed an operation against an American Embassy military code clerk in which the KGB was "99 per cent sure" that the target would be recruited. This is believed to undoubtedly be a reference to the case of [06] James STORSBERG who was actually the subject of a recruitment approach in 1961.

There is considered to be a good possibility that GOLITSYN actually learned of the above information from GRYAZNOV in early January 1961 when he was again in Moscow rather than during the spring of 1960 when GOLITSYN was preparing for his assignment to Helsinki, Finland. This theory is supported by information on page 163 of the previous summary that GOLITSYN has stated he learned in January 1961 from Vladislav M. KOVSHUK (Chief of the First Section) that [06] Johan PREISFREUND had recently been used in the successful recruitment of an American employee of the Embassy. [06] Johan PREISFREUND was used in the [06] STORSBERG operation, according to NOSENKO, and NOSENKO was also

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aware that GOLITSYN had a conversation with KOVSHUK about [PREISFREUND] since GOLITSYN wanted to use [PREISFREUND] in Helsinki. NOSENKO has stated he was not present during the above conversation. It is very possible that KOVSHUK exaggerated a little in his conversation with GOLITSYN in the matter of why GOLITSYN could not use [PREISFREUND] as an agent.

NOSENKO has furnished extensive information in regard to the [James STORSBERG] case and with due consideration to the accuracy and recollection of GOLITSYN, there does not appear to be an adequate basis for questioning the bona fides of NOSENKO on the basis of the differences between the reporting by GOLITSYN of information he received from GRYAZNOV concerning what is considered to have been the [James STORSBERG] case and detailed information furnished by NOSENKO concerning the [James STORSBERG] case. The exact date of the recruitment attempt against [STORSBERG] has not been positively established, but it is considered to have occurred before early May 1961 and probably in the March-April 1961 period. The statement by [James]

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06 [STORSBERG] that it occurred in October 1961 is completely unacceptable and is even contradicted by other statements by 06 [STORSBERG] himself.

(c) Page 163 of the previous summary contains information from GOLITSYN which he had received from GRYAZNOV in April or May 1960 that an American employee of the Embassy in Moscow was either recruited or prepared for recruitment on the basis of a homosexual compromise beginning in 1959 and concluding in 1960. The previous summary also states that according to GOLITSYN, the KGB had photographed the American in various homosexual acts, but SHELEPIN, who had just become Chairman of the KGB, was at the time stressing ideological rather than blackmail recruitments. SHELEPIN did not exclude future use of the photographs which the KGB would hold in reserve.

NOSENKO has furnished information concerning the homosexual compromise of 06 [Robert BARRETT], who was a guide at the United States Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, and with whom "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY", two homosexual

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agents of NOSENKO, became acquainted. Work against the United States Exhibition was the responsibility of the Ninth Department, SCD, but various Departments were participating under the direction of the Ninth Department.

One of the above homosexual agents succeeded in involving [BARRETT] 06 in homosexual activities which were photographed by the KGB but, according to NOSENKO, although the photographs were of a good quality, the KGB was unable to use the photographs in 1959 because of a general ban by the Central Committee on the recruitment of the United States Exhibition guides due to the planned visit of President EISENHOWER to the Soviet Union.

NOSENKO also stated that the compromising material and information on [BARRETT] 06 was later given to the First Department and that [BARRETT] 06 was recruited by the Second Section, First Department when he returned with another Exhibition in 1961, and that he, NOSENKO, was not involved in the recruitment operation. [BARRETT] 06, following his return

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to the United States in January 1962, confessed to the FBI that he had been recruited in 1961 on the basis of compromising photographs which had been taken during his 1959 trip to Moscow.

Although it cannot be established at this time, it is possible that the information furnished by GOLITSYN which he had received from GRYAZNOV actually refers to the [Robert BARRETT] case. It should be noted that [Robert BARRETT] could not actually be characterized as an "American employee of the Embassy in Moscow."

(d) Page 162 of the previous summary contains information from GOLITSYN that in the spring of 1960 when he visited the First Section, First Department, SCD, he learned from GRYAZNOV that GRYAZNOV had as an agent an Embassy code clerk who was scheduled to be transferred to Helsinki. GRYAZNOV indicated to GOLITSYN that the code clerk had already furnished the KGB with some information, that he was

considered by the KGB to be a "real" agent and that if the transfer of the code clerk materialized, GOLITSYN might have the code clerk as an agent in Helsinki.

NOSENKO has furnished no information which can be correlated in any way with the above information from GOLITSYN, but neither has the information from GOLITSYN resulted in an identification despite the considerable investigation which has been conducted in the matter. Although this is considered to be a valid lead, it need not necessarily refer to a code clerk who was in the United States Embassy in Moscow during 1960 - 1961. It is also possible that the previous remark by GOLITSYN concerning the above "code clerk" who might be transferred to Helsinki as well as his cited remarks in a-c could be clarified or at least additional information obtained if a specific reinterview on these matters was possible.

The trip of Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, Finland in November 1960 should be mentioned in any comparison of information from NOSENKO with information from GOLITSYN. This conflict is

considered by the KGB to be a "real" agent and that if the transfer of the code clerk materialized, GOLITSYN might have the code clerk as an agent in Helsinki.

NOSENKO has furnished no information which can be correlated in any way with the above information from GOLITSYN, but neither has the information from GOLITSYN resulted in an identification despite the considerable investigation which has been conducted in the matter. Although this is considered to be a valid lead, it need not necessarily refer to a code clerk who was in the United States Embassy in Moscow during 1960 - 1961. It is also possible that the previous remark by GOLITSYN concerning the above "code clerk" who might be transferred to Helsinki as well as his cited remarks in a-c could be clarified or at least additional information obtained if a specific reinterview on these matters was possible.

The trip of Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, Finland in November 1960 should be mentioned in any comparison of information from NOSENKO with information from GOLITSYN. This conflict is

also mentioned in another section pertaining to the 1960-1961 career of NOSENKO. GOLITSYN stated that KOSOLAPOV came to Helsinki to accompany an American Embassy code clerk on the train to Moscow and that KOSOLAPOV planned to strike up an acquaintance with the code clerk which could be continued in Moscow.

The American Embassy code clerk referred to above was undoubtedly [John GARLAND] and the train manifest lists [John GARLAND] and Viktor KOLOSOV (Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV) as passengers on the same train from Helsinki to Moscow. NOSENKO is aware of the identity of [John GARLAND] but claims no knowledge of the above trip of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, although being well aware of a previous trip.

NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief of the First Section specifically charged with work against code clerks, should have been aware of the November 1960 trip of KOSOLAPOV to and from Helsinki. His lack of knowledge may or may not be explainable in terms of his other activities such as his trip to Cuba in November-December 1960 but it cannot be interpreted as evidence NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB since, if he had been, the KGB should have briefed NOSENKO on the trip of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki in November 1960, as this was an event the KGB knew GOLITSYN was aware of.

A theory which has previously been given consideration and warranted full consideration was that if NOSENKO was dispatched, his mission was to confuse leads furnished to American Intelligence and/or to denigrate the value of information furnished by GOLITSYN. In connection with this theory, it should be noted that NOSENKO during current interviews has not made any remarks which could in any way be construed as derogatory to GOLITSYN. In addition, NOSENKO does not claim to have any detailed knowledge of the FCD and frequently, when some topic peculiar to the FCD has been broached with NOSENKO, his immediate reply has been to the effect that "I didn't work in the FCD," or "You should ask GOLITSYN about that."

In connection with any consideration of whether the contact of NOSENKO with CIA in Geneva in June 1962 could have been initiated by the KGB as a result of the defection of GOLITSYN, the timing of certain events should be noted. GOLITSYN defected on 15 December 1961. NOSENKO departed from Moscow in March 1962 for Geneva, Switzerland, where he remained until 15 June 1962.

It is felt that it would have been practically impossible if not impossible for KGB officials to complete an assessment of the actual or potential damage which could result from the defection of GOLITSYN,

select NOSENKO as the individual who would be dispatched to counteract the possible damage, and appropriately brief NOSENKO prior to his departure for Geneva in March 1962. Therefore, if NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, it would appear that plans for this would have predated the defection of GOLITSYN and that any GOLITSYN aspect could only be a related aspect and not the basis for the original plan to dispatch NOSENKO. In addition, if NOSENKO was dispatched, it would hardly seem necessary for the KGB to send NOSENKO to Geneva two and one-half months before his first contact with CIA.

The theory has also been considered that NOSENKO could have been dispatched to confuse and divert American Intelligence and thus to protect an important KGB penetration or penetrations of the United States Government, particularly CIA. This is a theory which should and has been given full consideration, but it is not possible to factually substantiate or refute this theory in the absence of specific information that high-level KGB penetrations do or do not exist.

Actually, as regards NOSENKO, the primary area which should be given consideration in the above matter is if all the information from NOSENKO is accepted, what effect would or could it have on the efforts

of American counter-intelligence to determine the identity of and take appropriate action against KGB penetrations of the United States Government. The only answer to this question seems to be that there would be little consolation or assurance to American intelligence even if every statement by NOSENKO was accepted at face value.

The only specific area in which NOSENKO could be even considered to claim full knowledge is the United States Embassy in Moscow. In this area his statements could be construed as assurance that there were no recruitments of American personnel in the United States Embassy in Moscow from 1953-December 1963 with the exception of "ANDREY" (Dayle Wallis SMITH) and [Herbert HOWARD]. The basis for this expressed opinion of NOSENKO is considered elsewhere in this summary and analysts may differ as to whether a recruitment could have occurred of which NOSENKO did not have knowledge, assuming that his statements are made in good faith. It should be noted, however, that at this time there is no specific information which is in direct conflict with the expressed opinion of NOSENKO.

NOSENKO, as previously mentioned, has never claimed any particular knowledge of FCD activities. In addition, he does not claim to be aware of all recruitments of Americans by the SCD. As an

example, he has made it clear that his knowledge of SCD activities against members of delegations, foreign businessmen, foreign students, and individuals in the USSR on the invitation of a Soviet organization or a component of the Soviet Government is extremely limited and at best mainly of a collateral nature.

NOSENKO does not even claim any detailed knowledge of activities of the Second Section (Active Line) of the First Department, SCD, nor does he claim to know all of the cases of which the Chief of the Seventh Department was aware. The latter is specifically supported by certain notes brought out by NOSENKO which are short references to a number of Seventh Department cases which are identified only by the KGB code name. These notes, according to NOSENKO, were made when he had an opportunity to review a notebook held by the Chief of the Seventh Department and constitute the only knowledge NOSENKO had of these particular cases.

G. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF A POLITICAL OR ANY OTHER TYPE OBJECTIVE WHICH COULD JUSTIFY A DISPATCH OF NOSENKO BY THE KGB WITH PERMISSION TO SPEAK FREELY TO CIA CONCERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE KGB AND WITHOUT NOSENKO BEING GIVEN A SPECIFIC MISSION OR MISSIONS?

G. Is there evidence of a political or any other type objective which could justify a dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB with permission to speak freely to CIA concerning his knowledge of the KGB and without NOSENKO being given a specific mission or missions? The above possibility has been given consideration even though the ultimate ramifications are practically incalculable. The conclusion is that as regards NOSENKO, with the single exception detailed below, there is no evidence of a political or other type objective which could be considered of sufficient importance by the KGB to warrant the dispatch of a KGB officer with the knowledge of NOSENKO to speak freely with CIA without his being given a specific mission or missions by the KGB.

It is accepted that the Soviet leadership would be entirely capable of instructing the KGB to dispatch a staff officer for permanent defection to United States authorities with no specific intelligence mission and no limitations on the KGB intelligence information he might reveal providing that such act would, in the estimate of the leadership, result in a net political gain for the USSR. For such a possibility to be seriously entertained by the Soviets, however, it would have to involve an issue of major importance to the Soviet leadership and presumably would have to

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be considered by them as the only or at least the best means of achieving the desired end and of having a very high probability of success.

The only area touched upon in any way by NOSENKO which might meet the above requirements is the assassination of President Kennedy: the involvement of Lee Harvey Oswald in the assassination and his association with the Soviet Union. Given (a) speculation obtaining at the time that there was Soviet involvement in the assassination, (b) the premise that in fact there was no Soviet involvement, and (c) a hypothesis that the Soviet leadership was deeply concerned lest erroneous conclusions be drawn which could lead to irreversable actions, it is conceivable that the Soviet leadership might have been prepared to take extreme steps to convince United States authorities of their non-involvement in the assassination. (The passage to the United States Government of the allegedly complete Soviet consular file on OSWALD was, in itself, an unprecedented act.)

The NOSENKO case warrants examination in the above regard in light of the fact that among the information NOSENKO provided was "inside" KGB information on OSWALD: information which purportedly

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revealed the substance of the content of the KGB files on OSWALD. This information clearly indicated that there was no KGB relationship with OSWALD, that the KGB had no operational interest in OSWALD, and that as a matter of fact OSWALD had presented the KGB with a continuing series of problems.

Upon examination, however, NOSENKO does not meet the requirements premised above for serious Soviet consideration of a free KGB defection. The following reasons render this unacceptable:

a. The chronology, in itself, presents virtually impossible problems for such a theses, viz. NOSENKO's initial approach to CIA in June 1962, 17 months prior to the assassination of President Kennedy.

b. While the information from NOSENKO on OSWALD is interesting and pertinent, it is not, in nature, scope, and content, sufficiently convincing for United States authorities to reasonably be expected to conclude that it represented unequivocal proof of Soviet non-involvement.

c. It is implausible not to assume that the Soviets would assume that United States authorities, in any examination of the possibility of a Soviet (KGB) hand in the assassination, would presume

extremely narrow Soviet compartmentation in such an operation -- a compartmentation which would exclude knowledgeability by any KGB officer other than very senior persons and an individual or group of action individuals specifically concerned with matters of this nature. The KGB career of NOSENKO would not permit even serious consideration that NOSENKO could have logically been fitted into the above very limited category.

It is accordingly concluded that the possibility of a politically motivated free dispatch can in the case of NOSENKO be satisfactorily eliminated.

The possibility has also been considered that the KGB might have theorized that by dispatching an agent, in this case an officer, with numerous leads to non-valuable or non-current KGB agents or cases, the facilities of the United States Intelligence community would be practically neutralized for an extended period of time. This could only be based on an assumption that the United States Intelligence community would involve a major portion of its personnel and efforts in the investigation and resolution of cases which had little or no current or potential value to the KGB. The above possibility cannot be arbitrarily eliminated without full consideration. It is not believed that

NOSENKO in the absence of any evidence that he had any KGB mission or missions to fulfill comes within the above category, particularly since an overall assessment of his information leads to the conclusion that full exploitation of his information would be quite damaging to the KGB.

Consideration of the above possibility must also include an evaluation of the deterrent effect on the prospects of future recruitments by the KGB caused by legal action taken against individuals exposed by information from the dispatched agent or officer. The deterrent effect on others of the conviction and sentencing of persons who have committed a crime or crimes has long been a part of the legal theory of why persons who commit a crime should be imprisoned or punished.

The deterrent effect on others of the trials and convictions of William VASSALL, Robert Lee JOHNSON and James Allen MINTKENBAUGH should not be underestimated. The KGB also could not have known that information furnished by NOSENKO would not result in the trial and conviction of other KGB agents or recruitments concerning whom NOSENKO had some knowledge.

H. IS THERE ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE CONTACTS OF NOSENKO IN 1962 OR IN 1964 WITH CIA WERE KNOWN TO THE KGB PRIOR TO HIS DEFECTION OR THAT NOSENKO WAS EVER BRIEFED BY THE KGB RELATIVE TO HIS BEHAVIOR OR KGB OBJECTIVES DURING THESE CONTACTS OR AFTER HIS DEFECTION?

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H. Is there any evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his defection or that NOSENKO was ever briefed by the KGB relative to his behavior or KGB objectives during these contacts or after his defection? The conclusion is that there is no evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his defection and that NOSENKO was never briefed in any manner by the KGB.

The basis for the above conclusion is substantially contained in previous sections. It is being treated here as a separate area of interest since it is a sufficiently important area as to warrant individual consideration.

It is recognized that since positive factual confirmation such as the KGB file on NOSENKO is not available, any conclusion concerning whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB can only be based on the full review of available information from NOSENKO, collateral sources, independent investigation and the opinion of the individual analyst concerning the significance or non-significance of each item of available information.

The conclusion that the contacts of NOSENKO with CIA in 1962 and 1964 prior to his defection were not known to the KGB is

necessarily based in part on a judgment as to whether any of his activities or information logically warrant a substantial suspicion that they were or could be in any part the result of KGB direction or control. One of the particular areas considered was his apparent behavior during his contacts with CIA in June 1962 and the conclusion was that it was incomprehensible that he could have been under KGB control at that time.

Consideration has been given to the possibility that his 1962 contacts with CIA were not known to the KGB, but became known to the KGB later and NOSENKO was doubled by the KGB. It was concluded that there was no basis for or information which would warrant serious consideration of the above possibility aside from the separate conclusion that the KGB would be very unlikely to reward a traitor in KGB eyes by sending him again to Geneva where he would be quite free to defect.

Worthy of comment in this section is the fact that NOSENKO, during his 1962 contacts, expressed considerable concern over his personal security, requesting that knowledge concerning his identity be kept to an absolute minimum, that no communications be sent to the

United States Embassy in Moscow concerning his contact with CIA and that he did not wish to be contacted and would not recognize any attempted contact within the Soviet Union. NOSENKO also furnished information as to the reason for his concern that no information regarding his contact with CIA become known in the United States Embassy in Moscow and the dangers to NOSENKO in any contact or attempted contact with NOSENKO in the USSR.

It is recognized that the above indicated concern of NOSENKO about his personal security is not substantial evidence that NOSENKO was not under KGB control; however, it is evidence that NOSENKO was not in any way encouraging clandestine contact of NOSENKO within the USSR, which very likely would have been an aim of the KGB if NOSENKO was under KGB control.

The material which NOSENKO furnished to CIA in 1964 has been carefully reviewed to determine if there is any evidence that the KGB participated in any way in the assembling of this rather unique collection of material. None of the material appears to have been of an accountable type and, on the contrary, it appears that NOSENKO could have furnished all of the material to CIA and returned to the Soviet Union without the KGB ever at a later date becoming aware that the material was actually missing. The latter statement even includes the travel document which authorized the trip of NOSENKO to Gorkiy in December 1963.

The trip in December 1963, according to NOSENKO, was to participate in the search for Aleksandr CHEREPANOV. According to NOSENKO, this particular document was not accountable in that it was only necessary to turn it in when requesting reimbursement for travel expenses. NOSENKO stated that he had not claimed the rather small amount of money to which he was entitled and has also admitted that he really brought the document along because it gave him the indicated rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

NOSENKO has completely retracted his claim to having had the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, stating that even as a Deputy Chief of Department he was only a Captain although he was entitled to and expected to receive the rank of Major in early 1964. NOSENKO has stated that giving him the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the above document was the error of KASHPEROV, the officer on duty in the SCD on Sunday, and that practically all Deputy Chiefs of Department in the SCD had at least the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

The above explanation by NOSENKO may well be considered by readers with at least a degree of skepticism. However, if NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, it would seem that he could have been provided with something a little more substantial to document his claim of the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. In addition, it would seem that the KGB

could have provided NOSENKO with some type of document which would support at least one of his claimed positions in the SCD, KGB. Even the Cherepanov Papers do not in any way support the claim of NOSENKO that he was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, SCD, in 1960 - 1961, nor do they even support the claim of NOSENKO that there was such a position in the First Section in 1960 - 1961 or even in 1958 or 1959.

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IV. COMMENTS CONCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS IN REGARD TO NOSENKO

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COMMENTS CONCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS IN REGARD TO NOSENKO

Attached is a verbatim copy of pages 357 - 360 of the "Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector" which contains seven (A - G) primary conclusions concerning the claimed Naval RU (Navy Intelligence) and KGB career of NOSENKO. These conclusions or findings are independently treated in separate attachments.

With the exception of "G," the conclusions in this summary are in direct conflict with the above conclusions and are basically that NOSENKO served in the Naval RU from March 1951 to early 1953, was a KGB officer from March 1953 until his defection in February 1964, and held his claimed positions in the *KGB during the March 1953 - February 1964 period.

* For purposes of clarity, the term KGB is used to refer to the Committee for State Security and predecessor organizations unless otherwise indicated.

Attachment:
Cpy Pgs 357-360 of "Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector"

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PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS RE NOSENKO
AS CONTAINED ON PAGES 357 - 360 OF
"THE EXAMINATION OF THE BONA FIDES OF A KGB DEFECTOR"

The following is a quote of the previous conclusions in the case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. (The specific conclusions have been given the designation of A - G for purposes of easier correlation with other sections of this summary.)

"SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES"

"NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in successively senior positions of authority from which he derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB operations against Americans in the Soviet Union in the period 1953-1963. To substantiate his claim, he provides an impressive array of information about KGB personnel, organization and operations which, to the extent that it has been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including intelligence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's claims. According to some of these sources, NOSENKO was a senior KGB officer who occupied a series of sensitive positions, who

enjoyed considerable authority and trust despite personal shortcomings, and whose defection, 'the greatest loss ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence', paralyzed the work of [redacted] KGB [redacted] Legal Residency, and justified the formulation of plans to assassinate him."

"The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known facts and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects the test to which his accounts were put: whether his accounts are internally coherent and consistent with known fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has from occupying the KGB positions he claims to have held. In short, is he what he says he is, according to his own accounts?"

"This examination had led to the following findings, arrived at independently:

A. NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the capacities or at the places and times he claimed.

B. NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time he claimed.

C. NOSENKO did not serve in the American Embassy Section throughout the 1953-1955 period as he claimed.

D. During the period 1955-1960, he was neither a senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department American-British Commonwealth Section.

E. NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section nor a senior officer or supervisor in the Section during the period 1961-1962. (sic)

F. NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible.

G. NOSENKO has no valid claim to certainty that the KGB recruited no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and his defection in 1964.

These findings differ somewhat with respect to degree of probability or certitude, but they reflect the preponderance of available evidence in each instance."

"The above judgments, if correct, rebut presumptive evidence of NOSENKO's bona fides. The contradictions in NOSENKO's accounts of his life and KGB service are so extensive as to make his claims as a whole unacceptable. While truth and fact in this case frequently

cannot be established with certainty, it is evident that truth and fact are not what NOSENKO relates. By almost any test, virtually any of NOSENKO's above claims are impugned by fact or probability, or contradicted or retracted in his own statements. NOSENKO is not what he claims to be, and thus he is not a bona fide defector."

"Given the conclusion that NOSENKO is not a bona fide defector, it is necessary to attempt to determine his true motives for contacting American Intelligence and for providing the information he has given. Here, it must be recognized that the evidence, largely consisting of NOSENKO's own assertions, does not permit unequivocal conclusions. Nevertheless, the question cannot be ignored. The character of the information NOSENKO has conveyed, the fact that some of his false claims have been corroborated by Soviet officials, and the necessity to make decisions about NOSENKO's future all require that at least a provisional judgment be made."

"Of the reasonable explanations advanced for NOSENKO's misrepresentations, the chief ones are that he is a swindler posing as a former KGB officer for reasons of personal advantage; that he suffers from a deranged personality or unbalanced mind; that he has greatly exaggerated his actual rank, status and access in the KGB, for simply personal reasons; or, finally, that he is a dispatched KGB agent."

"The first two possibilities are easily dismissed. That NOSENKO is not simply a swindler who falsely claims for personal advantage to have been a KGB officer is evident, we believe, from the confirmed details of KGB organization, personnel and operations which he has provided and which could only derive from within the KGB itself."

"Second, as noted in the text, extensive psychiatric and psychological examination by qualified specialists rule out the possibility that NOSENKO's actions and testimony are the product of a deranged personality or unbalanced mind."

"It is somewhat more plausible that NOSENKO is a KGB officer who served in at least some of the components for some or all of the time periods that he claims, but who greatly exaggerated his positions, rank and access to information, and invented some matters outright, to achieve greater status with American Intelligence. This explanation, however, fails to accommodate the fact that several KGB officers have asserted that NOSENKO did in fact hold senior positions in the KGB. Also, NOSENKO's assertions with respect to his rank, GRIBANOV's patronage, the recall telegram, and the like, cannot be just a product of his own invention, since these were the subject of comment by other sources."

"Because none of the above explanations is consistent with the data developed in interrogations and investigations, we are left with the hypothesis that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. While this explanation does not reconcile all the anomalies, none of them renders it untenable."

"In the absence of further revelations by NOSENKO, or other persuasive evidence to the contrary, CIA finds that the evidence establishes a presumption that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, and believes that prudence requires that he be regarded as still responsive to KGB control, and that his information should be assessed accordingly."

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A. NOSENKO DID NOT SERVE IN THE NAVAL RU

IN ANY OF THE CAPACITIES OR AT THE PLACES AND

TIMES HE CLAIMED

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

A. NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the capacities or at the places and times he claimed. (Previous conclusion)

The above is conclusion "A" in the previous summary in regard to NOSENKO. The current conclusion is that the claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence (Naval RU) during March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas is adequately substantiated and should be accepted.

The interrogations of NOSENKO prior to 1967 were complicated by NOSENKO changing the date of his graduation from the Institute of International Relations from 1950 to 1949 because he did not wish to admit that he had failed to graduate in 1949 with the majority of his class. However, previous efforts of NOSENKO to revert to his original 1962 statement that he graduated in 1950 were not accepted and an unwarranted significance was given to the 1949 - early 1953 period of time.

It is considered that NOSENKO has adequately explained his "stupid blunders" as they relate to the above and to certain other personal matters and that his claimed service in Navy Intelligence from March

1951 to early 1953 both in the Far East and the Baltic area is fully acceptable. It is not considered necessary to comment concerning all of the remarks in the previous summary regarding the claimed Naval RU service of NOSENKO as reflected on pages 49-59 and remarks will, for purposes of brevity, be limited in scope.

The statement is made in the previous summary that "The sole Headquarters RU officer NOSENKO identified was the Personnel Chief, Colonel KALOSHIN. He identified no ranking officers in either the Baltic or Far East Intelligence Staffs. Some 30 GRU officers he did identify, by his own admission, NOSENKO knew not from his Naval RU service, but through social acquaintance, later, in Moscow, or through his visits to Geneva."

Attached is a copy of a handwritten memorandum voluntarily prepared by NOSENKO in late 1967 containing the names of a number of GRU personnel of whom he had some knowledge. The attached was not prepared as the result of any inquiry concerning his claimed Naval RU service, but was only a small part of the material prepared by NOSENKO at this time. The entire material included remarks by NOSENKO regarding approximately 08 875 KGB officers, 08 100 KGB agents, 35 GRU officers and 08 400 other Soviet nationals.

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It is interesting to note that the attached list contains the names of approximately 20 GRU officers whom NOSENKO relates to the early 1950's period. In addition, NOSENKO has, during current interviews and in other memoranda, furnished the names of additional Navy Intelligence personnel whom he knew in the 1951 - early 1953 period.

Page 52 of the above summary and other related pages question whether NOSENKO ever served in the Baltic area with Naval Intelligence and even question his geographical knowledge of the area. Attached is a copy of a handwritten memorandum with certain diagrams prepared by NOSENKO on 21 February 1968 concerning his assignment with Navy Intelligence in the Far East and the Baltic area. The memorandum was completed by NOSENKO without any reference material and a review of his diagrams indicates they are quite accurate.

NOSENKO had previously stated that his service in the Baltic area was at Sovetsk Primorskiy and during current interviews recalled that the former name of the place, an almost deserted fishermen's village, was Fishausen. The previous designation given by NOSENKO for this place as having the mail address of Sovetsk Primorskiy had caused the conclusion that his alleged place of assignment was non-existent. A further check in the matter would have disclosed that the place was not nonexistent, that it is currently known as Primorsk and that the former German name of the fishing village was Fischhausen.

The previous summary also stated that despite his claimed active commissioned service in the Navy, NOSENKO knew nothing of Soviet Navy tradition, doctrines, or organization of procedures. It should be noted that there is a considerable difference between being a member of the Naval RU and being an actual member of the Soviet Navy. The situation could be compared to a career civilian employee of the Office of Naval Intelligence and a line officer in the United States Navy.

Attachments:
List of GRU Personnel as Prepared by NOSENKO
Diagrams and comments as Prepared by NOSENKO

..okrenov Leonid - till 1952 or 1953 a deputy of chief of navy intelligence (on agents), then a chief of navy intelligence, later he was a deputy of chief of GRU (Serov Ivan and Ivashutin). I heard he was a navy attache in the USA.

~~or Bolshakov~~

2. Bespalov - a major, code-clerk of the navy intelligence of 7 fleet in Soviet Harbour's region in 1951-1952.

3. Bogdanovskiy - a deputy of chief of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet (on agents) in 1951-1952.

4. Bulakh - an officer of the navy intelligence point of intelligence of the 4 Fleet in Sovietsk, Kaliningrad's district in 1952.

5. Chikin - in 1950's a colonel, worked in the department of foreign affairs of the ministry of defence.

6. Chuvil'skiy - a colonel, in 1950's worked in the department of foreign affairs of the ministry of defence.

7. Demchenko (Petz) - an officer of navy intelligence point of intelligence of 4 Fleet in Sovietsk, Kaliningrad's district.

8. Denisenko - in 1962-1964 a military attache of soviet embassy in Bern.

9. Bol'shakov Yuri - an officer of GRU (colonel), was in the USA, works under cover of press-agency „News".

10. Bulganin Lev N. - in 1950's worked in GRU.

11. Ivliyev - an officer of GRU in 1950's. (or Iyevlev).

12. Keloshin - a colonel, in 1950-1953 a chief of personnel department of the navy intelligence.

13. Kononyuk - in 1950 finished the institute of international relations, in 1951 taken in the navy intelligence and sent to work in Berlin (knows ...

14-00000

14. Kipalkin - a general, in 1940s was a deputy of chief the Military diplomatic academy. He has two sons: Kipalkin Sergey - finished this academy in 1950, works in GRU, worked in Italy and in France, his wife - a daughter of Marshal Timoshenko - Olga (finished the institute of foreign trade); Kipalkin Victor - in 1940s studied as a student in the USA, also works in GRU.

15. Kabalinov Vladimir - a major, a senior officer of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1950-52.

16. Khabarov - in 1950-52 a deputy of chief of navy radio detachment of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet.

17. Khaytor S.S. - a deputy of chief (on information) of navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1950-52.

18. Kon'kov - a deputy of chief of navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1951-52.

19. Kozlovskiy - in 1950s an officer of department of foreign affairs of the ministry of defence.

20. Molchanov - an officer of GRU (in 1950s)

21. Orekhov Gennadi - in 1951-52 an administrative officer of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet.

22. Pogodin Boris - a chief of the secretariate of navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1950-1952, knows a japanese language.

23. Rezantsev - a commander of navy intelligence point of the intelligence of 4 Fleet in Sovietsk, Kaliningrad's district in 1952.

24. Shalin - a general, in 1940s was a chief of the Military diplomatic academy; later was a chief of GRU.

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25. Shaposhnikov Igor' - a general, works in GRU; his father was a marshal USSR

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26. Mel'nikov Sergey – a chief of navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1950-52.

27. Namgaladze – a general, a chief of navy intelligence at Black sea, 1950-52

28. Sergeyev – an engineer-[illegible], a senior officer of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1950-52 (earlier he worked in Turkey).

29. Juslovich – in 1950-52 a commander of navy radio detachment of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet.

30. Grishchenov – an officer of GRU, worked in the USA, last years in India, from where was recalled.

31. Tishkin (or-ov) – a rear-admiral, in 1950-52 a deputy chief of the navy intelligence of the ministry of military navy.

32. Vasilevskiy Yuri – works in GRU, son of a marshal of USSR.

33. Voronkov Al'bert – an officer of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1952.

34. Vorontsov Mikhail – a vice-admiral, a former chief of navy intelligence (1950-51) ~~[illegible] a doctor of [illegible] fleet, works in port Leningrad, an archives agent of [illegible]~~.

35. Yershov – an officer of personnel of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1950-52, knows a chinese language.

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The 12 of March, 1951 was signed an order about my appointment as an interpreter of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in Soviet harbour, Primorskiy district, where I have gone by a train and arrived in the place of my appointment in the end of March. (I went from Moscow to Khabarovsk, where changed a train to Komsomolsk-on-Amur, then crossed the river and from station Pirana went to Soviet harbour (station Pyatisotka).



The intelligence of 7 Fleet was located in bay Postovaya, here were also Political directory of 7 Fleet, submarine's and destroyer's bases. The headquarters of 7 Fleet was located in settlement Zhildorbat. The commander-in-chief of 7 Fleet was admiral Baykov Ivan I., a chief of staff – vice-admiral Kasatonov.

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The chief of navy intelligence of 7 Fleet was captain of 1 rank Mel'nikov Sergey K., his deputies – captain of 2 rank Bogdanovskiy

(agents department), captain of 1 rank Khaytov-Somen S. (information department), captain of 1 rank Kevkov (navy intelligence), colonel Burchenko (a commissar).

I was working in the information department. Officers Kabalinov, Efimov were working in this department. Other officers of the intelligence were lieutenant-colonel Sergeyev, lieutenant-Voronkov Albert, major Ershov, captains Orekhov, Rodionov, Pogodin, Bespalov and 3-4 more officers. There were also sergeants and privates.

In the end of April, 1952 I flew in Moscow (stopping for 1-2 days in Khabarovsk) for a leave.

In June-July 1952 a personnel department of the chief directory of navy intelligence (a chief - colonel Kaloshin) was deciding a question about my transference because of illness. And I was appointed in the navy intelligence point of navy intelligence of 4 Fleet in Sovietsk (located before a peninsula to Baltiysk - former Pillau), where I arrived in August, 1952. (Kaliningrad's district - former Prussia).

Soviet is a little sity-village, a former german village of fishermen, it seems had a name Fishhausen.



Sovitsk - a demolished little town, here there were a navy intelligence point and 1-2 others military detachments (building battalion).

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Baltiysk was a base and headquarters of 4 Fleet.

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The commander-in-chief of 4 Fleet was admiral Golovko A. G. The chief of my navy intelligence point was captain of 2 rank Ryzgantsev. There were officers: Vinogradov, Bulakh, Zemchenko and others with sergeants and privates.

Before my arrival (2 days) this navy intelligence point was transferred from east Germany in Soviet. If in Germany the work of the point was connected with agent's work, now there was another task — a preparation of agent-observation post in a case of new war (3-4 persons each post). — an absolutely monkey business.

In the end of December I took a leave reasoning it with my illness, but having in mind a transference in another place.

In mid of March, 1953 I began to work in 2 chief directory of KGB (former MGB).

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B. NOSENKO DID NOT ENTER THE KGB IN THE MANNER OR AT THE TIME HE CLAIMED

B. NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time claimed. (Previous conclusion)

The above is conclusion "B" in the previous summary in regard to NOSENKO. The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO entered the then Second Chief Directorate, MVD, in mid-March 1953 and that his entry was not only facilitated by but due to the influence of General Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV.

Previous statements by NOSENKO and changes relative to date of entry into the KGB have been mentioned in another section of the summary and will not be repeated here. His statements during current interviews that he entered on duty in mid-March 1953 as a case officer in the First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, MVD, are considered adequately substantiated and should be accepted.

The conclusion of the previous summary (pages 61-74) that NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time claimed was primarily based on conflicting statements by NOSENKO as to when he entered the KGB (MVD). In 1962 NOSENKO said March 1953 and in 1965 NOSENKO again said March 1953, soon after the death of STALIN.

in 1964, NOSENKO had given two dates in 1952 as his time of entry into the KGB in an effort not to admit that he had failed to graduate from the Institute of International Relations in 1949.

The previous summary gave considerable weight to the statements of NOSENKO indicating that he did not enter the KGB (MVD) under what are considered normal KGB procedures. Proper allowances were not given for position of the father of NOSENKO, the Minister of Shipbuilding, and the influence of General KOBULOV. An analyst can either accept or reject the statement of NOSENKO that he entered the KGB (MVD) through the influence of General KOBULOV; but, if the statement is accepted, then the failure of NOSENKO to be required to follow normal KGB procedures should also be accepted. A Communist society or a Soviet Intelligence organization is not and could not be immune to influence by a high official. General KOBULOV as of mid-March 1953 was First Deputy to BERIYA, the Minister of the then MVD.

The previous summary raises several points concerning the eligibility of NOSENKO for the KGB (MVD). It points out on page 67 that other than his undistinguished period of service with the Naval RU, he was no more eligible for a KGB appointment in 1953 than he was at the time of his previous rejection in 1950. This statement is not controvertible and is fully accepted with the qualification that in 1950 NOSENKO

was not sponsored by any person of influence as was the case in 1953 with General KOBULOV who in mid-March 1953 was the First Deputy to BERIYA.

The previous summary also states that according to KGB defectors familiar with the standards in force at the time, no candidate was accepted who had ever had tuberculosis. This is a flat statement which it is doubtful any defector or series of defectors could fully substantiate; namely, that it never happened. Until and unless it is medically proven that NOSENKO did not have tuberculosis, it is accepted that he did have tuberculosis in 1952 and was at a sanitarium -- rest place in Kubinka. It is also accepted that he was an officer in the KGB after mid-March 1953. The influence of KOBULOV could undoubtedly have permitted NOSENKO to enter the KGB even though he previously had tuberculosis, but the flat statement that no candidate was accepted who had ever had tuberculosis is not and cannot be sufficiently substantiated.

The previous summary contained a number of additional remarks and conclusions intended to show that NOSENKO was not eligible for and therefore could not have entered the KGB (MVD). Comments concerning these will be brief since there is considered to be no adequate basis at this time on which to contend that NOSENKO did not enter the KGB (MVD) as an officer in mid-March 1953. A comment was made that

NOSENKO did not take a physical examination in connection with his processing for KGB entry, and that such a medical examination was a routine and mandatory part of the processing of a KGB candidate. This statement makes no allowance for the influence of General KOBULOV; but, in addition, does not consider the fact that the Naval RU dossier on NOSENKO was available to the KGB (MVD).

The previous summary also failed to note that the MVD would have had independent information in regard to NOSENKO since the MVD would have conducted any necessary inquiry in connection with the entry of NOSENKO into the Naval RU. As of 1953, the MVD undoubtedly also had a dossier on the father of NOSENKO since this was still the STALIN era.

The summary also states that NOSENKO did not complete the necessary lengthy Anketa before entry into the KGB (MVD) and did not speak to any personnel officers or visit the personnel office. It would seem that the influence of General KOBULOV could have permitted the elimination of most if not all of the necessity of complying with normal procedures, but NOSENKO has during interviews stated that he completed the Anketa while sitting at his desk after entry into the KGB (MVD).

Page 70 of the previous summary states that NOSENKO did not know the designation of his own Directorate either at the time he allegedly

entered on duty or during his first year of KGB service. While NOSENKO has claimed that the designation of his Directorate at the time he entered the KGB (MVD) in mid-March 1953 was the Second Chief Directorate and that it subsequently was redesignated the First Chief Directorate, DERYABIN has stated this reversal of designations occurred in March 1953.

STALIN died in early March 1953 and that same month the MVD and the MGB were merged under the name MVD with BERIYA as Minister. BERIYA held this position until his arrest in early June 1953. BERIYA was succeeded by KRUGLOV, who held office for less than a year. Yuriy RASTVOROV was recently queried concerning the date of the reversal of the designation of the FCD and SCD and places it as the end of April or early May 1953. GOLITSYN has indicated that the change occurred "soon after the advent of BERIYA as head of the MVD in April 1953." In the light of our inability to fix the effective date of the reversal of the designations of the SCD and the FCD, it is unreasonable to impugn NOSENKO on his statement as to the designation of his Directorate at the time of his entry into the KGB (MVD).

There is a disagreement between NOSENKO and others as to who was responsible for the reversal of designations of the FCD and the SCD. NOSENKO is of the opinion that it occurred under KRUGLOV, which is

in conflict with the statements of DERYABIN, RASTVOROV and GOLITSYN, all of whom maintain that BERIYA was responsible for the changes. As for the issue of who was responsible for the reversal of designations, it would appear that NOSENKO is in error. However, the fact that he was a new junior officer and that this was a period of upheaval in the KGB (MVD) effectively eliminates any significance in this issue.

NOSENKO is criticized in the previous summary for not knowing the location of the Chief Directorate of the Militia or the history of the KI (Committee of Information). NOSENKO has stated that he had no contacts with either office during 1953-1955 and there is no adequate reason to disbelieve this statement. He is not aware of when the KI ceased to exist (1951 given in the summary, but other information indicates the KI continued to exist in a nominal capacity until the mid-1950's), but care should be used in stating what NOSENKO should know if he held a certain position. Readers of this summary may wish to reflect on their own memory concerning the location and their knowledge of Agency facilities at any given period of time or when Agency components or related organizations were organized or ceased to exist.

The point has also been made that any career of NOSENKO in the KGB should have ended or he should have at least encountered difficulty when his benefactor General KOBULOV, together with the brother of General KOBULOV, was arrested with the BERIYA group in early June 1953. NOSENKO has during current interviews stated that he encountered no difficulties but is aware that the KOBULOV connection was discussed by an officer from the Personnel Directory with an official of the First Department. Under other circumstances NOSENKO would very possibly have encountered difficulty; but, it should be noted that the father of NOSENKO retained his position, that NOSENKO only met General KOBULOV through his father, and that NOSENKO has stated that although his father knew General KOBULOV, his father could in no way be considered a member of the BERIYA group.

C. NOSENKO DID NOT SERVE IN THE AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION THROUGHOUT THE 1953 - 1955 PERIOD AS HE CLAIMED

C. NOSENKO did not serve in the American Embassy Section throughout the 1953 - 1955 period as he claimed. (Previous conclusion)

The above is conclusion "C" in the previous summary. The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO was an officer of the First Section (American Embassy Section), First Department, from mid-March 1953 to late May 1955 when he was transferred to the Seventh Department, SCD.

This period of time has been covered in detail with NOSENKO during current interviews. The conclusion is that NOSENKO was an officer in the First Section but was not a very effective officer and that both his work and behavior were decidedly influenced by the fact that he was the son of the Minister of Shipbuilding. NOSENKO is reluctant to admit that he was other than slightly lackadaisical in his work during this period of time, but is not hesitant to admit that his personal behavior was such as to cause him to be removed as Secretary to the Komsomol unit in 1954 and to cause an unsatisfactory "characterization"

to be prepared in early 1955 which necessitated a decision as to whether he would be fired from the KGB or transferred to some other component.

The influence of his family is quite apparent in the above since his father was advised of his difficulties in 1954 by an official of the KGB and his mother interceded on his behalf in 1955 with the Chief of SCD. The result in 1955 was that NOSENKO was transferred to the Seventh Department and not fired from the KGB.

The question has been raised as to how NOSENKO could remain in the KGB when after 1954 he was not a member of the Komsomol and was not eligible to become a candidate for the Communist Party. This is a valid question but a plausible explanation is again the fact that he was the son of the then Minister of Shipbuilding.

NOSENKO has stated during previous and current interviews that following his entry into the KGB and until circa mid-1954 he was responsible for work against American correspondents in Moscow. He has not claimed that he had any successes and has stated that the work with newspaper correspondents already recruited was being handled by other officers. NOSENKO has explained that during this time he was a "new officer," indicating he could hardly have been expected to act as an experienced officer. His knowledge of correspondents in Moscow during this period of time, together with his knowledge of other KGB officers and his

information concerning his own agents is believed of sufficient weight to accept the statement of NOSENKO that work against American correspondents was his assignment from mid-March 1953 to mid-1954.

From circa mid-1954 until his transfer to the Seventh Department in late May 1955, NOSENKO claims and has claimed he was an officer of the First Section with the responsibility of work against the Military Attaches (Army) at the United States Embassy in Moscow. It is considered, based on his knowledge of the various Military Attache personnel and other collateral information furnished by NOSENKO, that NOSENKO was an officer of the First Section during the mid-1954 - late May 1955 period of time, that his primary work was against members of the Office of the Military Attache, but that the quality of his work undoubtedly left much to be desired.

In circa mid-1954, NOSENKO was removed as Secretary of the Komsomol unit and by early 1955 his performance was such that at least certain officials in the First Department desired his removal from the First Department, if not the KGB. Under these circumstances, NOSENKO could be criticized as having been a very poor if not undesirable KGB officer, but his knowledge of the First Section during this period of time and his knowledge of the members of the Office of

the Military Attache supports the claim of NOSENKO that he was an officer of the First Section with the indicated assignment as related by him.

NOSENKO has stated that the work against the Military Attaches was not primarily directed toward development of recruitment possibilities, but was directed toward control of the Military Attaches on trips in order to prevent observation of sensitive areas, sensitive sites or sensitive activities in the USSR. This attitude by the KGB would appear to be completely plausible and NOSENKO noted as exceptional in this regard the recruitment attempt against Captain Walter MULE. NOSENKO explained this exception as retaliation for approaches to Soviets in the United States in that period.

NOSENKO has been criticized because he did not know all the details concerning the Military Attaches which it was considered he should have known if he had the specific responsibility for work against the Military Attaches during the indicated period of time. It is submitted that this may be evidence of his failure to satisfactorily fulfill his

assigned functions, but makes no allowance for the uncertain personal status of NOSENKO whose actual future in the KGB was in jeopardy after mid-1954.

NOSENKO has previously indicated and still indicates a definite lack of knowledge concerning his assigned targets during approximately March - May 1955. This, according to NOSENKO, was when an unsatisfactory "characterization" was being prepared on NOSENKO, a decision was being made on his case, and a period of time in which he went on a "big drunk" which culminated in his spending about 40 days under hospital care because of the possibility of recurrence of his previous tuberculosis.

Pages 84 - 87 of the previous summary suggest that NOSENKO had not furnished sufficient details about his alleged agent network for use against the Military Attaches. It is considered that NOSENKO in current interviews has furnished adequate acceptable details, and as an example furnished specific information concerning "[illegible]LODINA and "RAKETA" (page 85). It would appear that there was no intent by NOSENKO to withhold information concerning these individuals, but rather that he was never asked to amplify his previous casual reference to these individuals.

The effectiveness or non-effectiveness of NOSENKO during his assignment to the First Section, First Department, from mid-March 1953 to late May 1955 can have little pertinency in the question of the bona fides of NOSENKO if it is accepted that he actually was an officer in the First Section during this period of time. It is felt that information furnished by NOSENKO in current interviews and in previous interviews is of sufficient scope and detail that his claimed service as an officer in the First Section during this period of time is completely acceptable.

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D. DURING THE PERIOD 1955 - 1960, HE WAS NEITHER A SENIOR CASE OFFICER IN, NOR DEPUTY CHIEF OF, THE SEVENTH DEPARTMENT AMERICAN-BRITISH COMMONWEALTH SECTION

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D. During the period of 1955 - 1960, NOSENKO was neither a senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department, American-British Commonwealth Section. (Previous conclusion)

The above is conclusion "D" in the previous summary. The current conclusion is that NOSENKO was an officer in the Seventh Department, SCD, from late May 1955 to December 1959 and was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, Seventh Department from 1958 to December 1959.

During current interviews, NOSENKO has furnished extensive information concerning his own activities in the Seventh Department during the 1955-1959 period. Interviews of persons who were the subject of KGB interest collaterally confirm that NOSENKO was personally involved in certain claimed activities during 1955 to December 1959. These activities include among others the recruitment of [Richard BURGI] 06 in June 1956, contact with [Sir Allen LANE] 06 and [Arthur BIRSE] 06 in the summer of 1957, the recruitment of [Gisella HARRIS] 06 in 1958, the recruitment of [George DREW] 06 in the spring of 1959, the recruitment of

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[William Stanley WILBY] in June 1959, the recruitment of [David TAYLOR] in the summer of 1959, the recruitment of [Gerard MERTENS] in July - August 1959, and the recruitment of [Arsene FRIPPEL] in 1959. The foregoing is not a complete list of all cases in which NOSENKO claims personal involvement, but is representative of cases in which his alleged participation has been confirmed by interviews with the individual who was the KGB target.

[Sir Allen LANE, Arthur BIRSE, William Stanley WILBY], and [David TAYLOR] were [British] citizens and the other above-named individuals were [United States] citizens. This would seem to substantiate the claim of NOSENKO that during 1955 - December 1959 he was an officer engaged in KGB operations against American-British Commonwealth tourists in the USSR.

In addition, NOSENKO has furnished specific information about an operation against [Martin MALIA], an American tourist who was in the Soviet Union from approximately September 1955 to December 1955. [MALIA] has not been interviewed and will not be interviewed, so at this time no particular 1955 case in which NOSENKO claims involvement or personal knowledge has been substantiated by interview of the individual involved.

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NOSENKO has furnished information on the travel of certain United States Government officials, including Congressional representatives to the USSR in 1955 - 1956; and the trip of Supreme Court Justice William O. DOUGLAS in 1955 which, when considered with the previously mentioned specifics, adequately substantiate his claimed service in the Seventh Department and work against American-British Commonwealth tourists during the late May 1955 - December 1959 period.

NOSENKO has stressed that when he transferred to the Seventh Department, the Tourist Section had just been established and an agent network was not available for operations against American and British tourists. This seems quite logical since the influx of tourists into the USSR was just in a formative stage.

NOSENKO has spoken in detail about an agent network he developed after 1955 which primarily consisted of Intourist personnel and two homosexual agents, "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY" (KGB code names), whose extensive use in KGB operations has been confirmed by interviews with individuals who were the subject of homosexual compromise operations.

The previous summary contained remarks on pages 101 - 150 in regard to the claimed 1955 - 1959 Seventh Department service of NOSENKO. To comment on all the aspects mentioned in those fifty

pages would be repetitious and in many instances superfluous. It is considered that even if the statements were accepted in toto, there would still not be an adequate basis for a conclusion that NOSENKO was not an officer in the claimed positions in the Seventh Department during the period of late May 1955 - December 1959. Nor is it conceded that, if all the sub-conclusions and the interpretations of various areas of information were accepted without qualification, there is any evidence that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. However, there are certain assumptions and interpretations which appeared in the previous summary which are particularly worthy of comment and which are considered erroneous or require additional clarification.

On page 145 it is stated that the evidence suggests that NOSENKO was an English-speaking specialist in sexual entrapment, not a counter-intelligence officer responsible for the identification of foreign agents among tourists or for the development, recruitment, and exploitation of agents for the KGB. The Second Chief Directorate, KGB, and the MVD have used homosexual and heterosexual compromise in numerous known (and presumably unknown) successful recruitments and recruitment attempts. This activity has not been limited to the Seventh Department, SCD; and the innuendo that NOSENKO was "only an English-speaking specialist in sexual entrapment" and not a KGB officer, when

considered with the detailed information NOSENKO has provided on Seventh Department personnel, activities, procedures, and topics of a similar nature is not considered to have any foundation in fact.

Page 145 of the above summary lists eleven operations which were Seventh Department cases prior to 1960 and which were included in the notes furnished to CIA in 1964 by NOSENKO. The named operations were those against [Bernard PECHTER, Patrick PRESSMAN, John RUFE, Gerald SEVERN, Sofia SHATTAUER, (fnu) KARLOV, Norman FISK, Ralph MATLAW] Marvin KANTOR, [Michael GINSBURG, and William TARASKA]. The criticism made in regard to the above eleven cases was that NOSENKO could not describe the individual operations other than to say that he had recorded the name of the target and such details as he could acquire when he reviewed the activities of the Seventh Department in 1962 following his return from the First Department.

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The notes brought out by NOSENKO are considered in another section of this summary, but it should be noted here that a full review of all of the notes of NOSENKO currently available indicates that his statements as to how and why he obtained the information in the notes are completely plausible. A detailed explanation of the notes furnished by NOSENKO would almost necessitate a separate listing of the approximately 150 cases or names mentioned in the notes.

During current interviews, NOSENKO furnished specific information on certain of the above eleven cases, including [William TARASKA, Bernard PECHTER, Michael GINSBURG and John RUFE]. 06, 06, 06, 06, 06 It should also be noted that certain of the cases such as Marvin KANTOR and [William TARASKA] 06 were cases in which the tourist was visiting relatives in the Soviet Union and that NOSENKO has given a satisfactory explanation of how he learned of the KANTOR case. NOSENKO has, in discussing his duties as Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, also explained that if a tourist indicated that he intended to visit relatives in the USSR, the case automatically was assigned to a group of officers in the Section who reported directly to the Chief of Section and were not under the supervision of NOSENKO.

NOSENKO has stated that he noted the names of three of the individuals when retiring the files of "GRIGORIY" and "SHMELEV," two homosexual agents of NOSENKO previously mentioned. NOSENKO has explained that "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY" had the assignment of identifying American travelers with homosexual tendencies, that they had contact with numerous Americans, and that they had homosexual activity with individuals on whom they reported but on whom no overt action was taken by the Seventh Department. In some cases the individual

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was not considered a worthwhile target and in others the information was just maintained for possible use at a later date if the individual returned to the USSR.

06 NOSENKO has also explained how he learned of the [Patrick PRESSMAN] and [Gerald SEVERN] cases; and, the listing of the [Sofia SHATTAUER] case in connection with the 1955 - 1959 period is in complete error since page 427 of the previous summary contains information from NOSENKO on her recruitment in 1962. During current interviews the notes which NOSENKO brought out in 1964 have been discussed in detail with NOSENKO. He has given a detailed explanation of the material which he brought out and his explanation of all aspects is very convincing.

The previous summary (page 144) suggested that the involvement of NOSENKO in certain cases being handled by other Sections in the Seventh Department or by the KGB Directorate of Moscow was unusual. An examination of the cited cases does not indicate that his participation was unusual, but rather that his explanation of why he was involved is logical and normal. No consideration was previously given to the English language capability of NOSENKO or the fact that his own homosexual agents were used in two of the four cited cases.

The summary also noted that there was a question concerning whether [Gisella HARRIS] was necessarily a Seventh Department case.

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This question seems quite superfluous since [HA...] was in the USSR on a tourist visa and "real" tourists are the responsibility of the Seventh Department. Departmental responsibility within the SCD for an individual traveling in the USSR is decided on the basis of how the individual is traveling; i.e., whether on a tourist visa, as a member of a delegation, as the invitee of an organization in the USSR, as a former diplomat stationed in Moscow, as a diplomat not previously stationed in Moscow, as a member of the Cultural Exchange program, as a student attending a university in the USSR, etc. There are also various other factors which affect the determination of which Department or organizational component of the SCD has the responsibility for a tourist case. These factors include whether the individual is already suspected of foreign intelligence connections and whether the individual is a businessman. In addition, certain actual tourists in the USSR may never become the responsibility of the SCD if the individual is of specific interest to the FCD.

On pages 148 - 149, NOSENKO is criticized for not knowing at least some of the substance of the information furnished by George BLAKE in regard to the CIA-MI-6 program of utilizing tourist agents in the USSR. This criticism completely ignored the fact that NOSENKO made several references in 1962 to the KGB having such information

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although he did then and still suspects that William VASSALL was the source. The references by NOSENKO to the KGB having such information were not developed in 1962 or later interrogations, and it was not until current interviews that it was established that NOSENKO had actually seen excerpts of information passed by George BLAKE. According to NOSENKO, the information which was obviously only partial was furnished to the FCD by the SCD and could only have come from an agent.

The previous summary (page 149) also notes that in 1961 CIA acquired a lengthy Top Secret study on the subject of the use of tourists by American Intelligence for espionage and operational support in the Soviet Union (document was furnished by GOLITSYN following his defection in December 1961). It was noted that the summary contained references to certain 1958 - 1959 tourists whom the KGB counter-intelligence identified as American agents and noted that NOSENKO claimed he was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section in this period of time and that he claimed the KGB identified no American Intelligence agents during this period of time. What later is described as a claim by NOSENKO is neither an accurate reflection of what NOSENKO said prior to 1967 or has said since 1967.

NOSENKO has never claimed to know all activities against American travelers in the Soviet Union during 1958 - 1959. Many of these travelers would have been the responsibility of a section in the Seventh Department, other than the American-British Commonwealth Section, or another Department in the SCD. NOSENKO was quite aware that certain of the American tourists in 1958 - 1959 were acting suspiciously from a KGB point of view.

NOSENKO has stated he was aware that a document which the Seventh Department had prepared and furnished to the FCD in an effort to obtain further assistance from the FCD in the work against tourists had been compromised by GOLITSYN. NOSENKO stated he was not in the Seventh Department when the document was prepared and did not review the document until after the defection of GOLITSYN and following advice from the FCD to the Seventh Department, SCD, that the document had been compromised. The document furnished by GOLITSYN has never been reviewed with NOSENKO to determine if it contained additional information not in the document which he was aware had been prepared by the Seventh Department for the FCD.

NOSENKO has been impugned on his apparent unfamiliarity with a number of cases cited as examples in the document furnished by GOLITSYN. In current interviews, however, the description of NOSENKO

concerning the distribution of responsibilities within the SCD for various categories of foreign visitors to the USSR provides a logical explanation for his unfamiliarity. Previous problems in this regard appear to have stemmed from a misconception of the meaning of the term "tourist" as used by the KGB. This general term has a specific meaning in the Second Chief Directorate; namely, a "tourist" is a foreigner travelling to the USSR on a tourist visa. Such a person was the responsibility of the Tourist Section of the Seventh Department. A large number of travelers to the USSR, including businessmen, persons travelling on invitation of a Soviet organization, students attending a university, etc., are not tourists in the KGB concept and would not be the responsibility of the Tourist Section of the Seventh Department.

The only unresolved problem considered of any significance in regard to the 1955 - 1959 period is the account by NOSENKO of the presence of American citizen John SHUBIN in the USSR as a tourist in the late 1950's. The previous summary pointed out that, since John SHUBIN did not have a valid United States passport between 1940 and June 1961, it was impossible for him to have been a tourist under true name in the USSR and, therefore, a target of the Seventh Department, as NOSENKO claims. Although several avenues of possibly fruitful investigation have not yet been fully explored, there is no

assurance that this anomaly will ever be explained. All that justifiably can be said at the present time is that, even if the story of NOSENKO is inaccurate, there is no evidential reason why such inaccuracy should be interpreted as indicative of deception or dispatch, or for that matter as indicative that he was not Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department in 1958 - 1959; neither would such an inaccuracy reflect on his claimed service in 1962 - 1963 in the Seventh Department.

E. NOSENKO WAS NEITHER DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION NOR A SENIOR OFFICER OR SUPERVISOR IN THE SECTION DURING THE PERIOD 1961 - 1962 (sic)

E. NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section nor a senior officer or supervisor in the Section during the period of 1961 - 1962 (sic). (Previous conclusion)

It is the conclusion of this summary that NOSENKO held the position of Deputy Chief, First Section (American Embassy Section), SCD, from January 1960 - December 1961.

The claim of NOSENKO that he held the above position in 1960 - 1961 has been the most difficult claimed position of NOSENKO to satisfactorily resolve and accept. Acceptance or nonacceptance of his claim to have held this particular position is a critical factor in a decision as to whether the remainder of his claimed KGB career is valid. It is believed reasonable to presume that if NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, Seventh Department, prior to December 1959 in the absence of any indication that he was demoted, he should have been at least a Deputy Chief of Section during 1960 - 1961.

Position in the SCD, KGB, and throughout the KGB is important from a monetary point of view as well as a prestige point of view. If

NOSENKO was only in the First Section as a Senior Case Officer in 1960 - 1961, this would have been a demotion in position with resultant loss of both money and prestige. For this reason alone, his failure to have held the position of Deputy Chief in 1960 - 1961 would raise considerable doubt as to whether he held his claimed position prior to 1960, as well as whether he held his claimed positions in 1962 - 1963.

It is apparent that the knowledge of NOSENKO concerning all aspects of activity in the First Section, First Department, during 1960 - 1961 is incomplete when judged by what are considered the normal responsibilities of a Deputy Chief in CIA. During current interviews, an effort was made to determine what the responsibilities of NOSENKO actually were in 1960 - 1961 and whether his statements in this area were impossible or could be accepted as not negating his claim to have been Deputy Chief, First Section.

According to NOSENKO, in the early 1960's there were only approximately fifteen Deputy Chiefs of Section in the entire SCD and in certain departments none of the sections had a Deputy Chief of Section. In addition, transfer of a Deputy Chief of Section was not always followed by a replacement in kind, according to NOSENKO who stated that he was not replaced by another Deputy Chief when he transferred to the First Section, First Department.

According to NOSENKO, there was not a job description for a Deputy Chief of Section and the duties of the particular Deputy Chief were in actuality what the Chief of Department and Chief of Section decided would be his assigned duties.

The previous summary drew attention to an apparent conflict between early statements of NOSENKO that he replaced no one when he entered on duty in the First Section, First Department, and his subsequent claim that he replaced Mikhail BAKHVALOV as Deputy Chief in the First Section. Along with this he had first credited KOVSHUK and various other officers in the Section with previous responsibility for certain matters which were assigned to him upon his arrival there, then later stated that BAKHVALOV had been responsible for these matters. The previous summary noted that interrogation had never resolved these contradictions.

In the light of the present clearer picture of the nature of a Deputy Chief of Section, the statements of NOSENKO on BAKHVALOV and on the issue of who he, NOSENKO, did or did not replace are not contradictory. There is no reason to question that BAKHVALOV, with whom NOSENKO, incidentally, did not overlap, was a Deputy Chief of Section in the First Section before NOSENKO, and that he was responsible for certain areas which later fell to NOSENKO. On the other

hand, according to NOSENKO, the principal reason for his being assigned to the First Section was to concentrate on a new area of emphasis (code clerks). There could of course have been no specific predecessor for a substantively new area. Therefore, in one sense BAKHVALOV was the predecessor of NOSENKO and in another sense he was not. The interpretation of the various statements of NOSENKO on this issue as being in conflict appears to be the result of confusion on this point by all concerned.

According to NOSENKO, at the time of his transfer to the First Section, First Department, in early 1960, he had not been told and for a short period thereafter was not told what his actual duties would be. KOVSHUK, Chief of the First Section, wanted to assign NOSENKO to supervise the work against Service Attaches at the United States Embassy. NOSENKO felt that the proposed assignment by KOVSHUK was intended to keep NOSENKO occupied with nonproductive work since KGB policy for work against the Service Attaches was primarily one of control on trips and not active work towards possible recruitment.

After a short period of time, NOSENKO was informed by GRIBANOV that he, NOSENKO, had been transferred to supervise the work against code clerks (also code machine mechanics) at the United States Embassy. GRIBANOV defined this work as being of the greatest

importance, and the recruitment of code clerks as a priority aim of the KGB. KLYPIN, who was Chief of the First Department, later repeated the above and a group consisting of NOSENKO, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV and Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV was formed with NOSENKO responsible for supervision of the work. GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV were not new KGB officers, but instead were experienced officers although both as Senior Case Officers were of lesser rank than NOSENKO. NOSENKO does not claim that he had to train either officer or to minutely scrutinize every action or proposed action of GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO does claim he was responsible for supervision over their work.

According to NOSENKO, GRIBANOV emphasized that work against code clerks was to be his primary work in the First Section and that it would take precedence over any other activity. Other than work against code clerks, NOSENKO has generally defined his responsibilities as follows:

(a) Responsibility for file of (work against) John ABIDIAN, Security Officer at United States Embassy.

(b) Responsibility for preliminary review of reports from OTU (KGB technical unit) of "take" from microphones in the United States Embassy.

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(c) Responsibility for maintenance of the physical security file on the United States Embassy.

(d) Acting in place of Vladislav KOVSHUK, Chief, First Section, when KOVSHUK was absent.

As can be seen from the above, the responsibilities of NOSENKO, by his definition, which are borne out by specific information furnished by NOSENKO, would not coincide with the normal responsibilities of a Deputy Chief of Branch or Section in CIA. An analyst can either accept or reject the theory that there is necessarily an equation between the responsibilities of a Deputy Chief in CIA and the KGB, but if the analyst accepts the theory, he must offer some supporting evidence on this point.

Pages 151 - 261 of the previous summary contained comments and conclusions and sub-conclusions in regard to the claimed service of NOSENKO as Deputy Chief of First Section, First Department, 1960 - 1961. The previous primary conclusion was that he was neither Deputy Chief of the First (American Embassy) Section nor a supervisor in that section. The conclusion of this summary is that he was Deputy Chief and had supervisory responsibilities for work against code clerks. The matter of the responsibility of NOSENKO for work against code clerks will be considered later. Comments will first be made on the responsibilities listed in (a) - (d) above.

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Pages 205 - 222 of the previous summary contain a detailed basis for the previous conclusion that NOSENKO was not the KGB case officer for John ABIDIAN. The current conclusion is that he was the responsible case officer for ABIDIAN. Whether or not his work against ABIDIAN compared favorably with what is considered to be the MO of a responsible CIA case officer is immaterial; what is material is whether NOSENKO reasonably fulfilled the requirements of the KGB for work against the particular target, John ABIDIAN. It is felt that the answer to this is that NOSENKO did.

According to NOSENKO, the work against ABIDIAN was in the direction of determining if ABIDIAN would lead the KGB to "another POPOV," and no consideration was given to active agent work against ABIDIAN for possible recruitment. This explanation by NOSENKO appears reasonable and logical and his knowledge of ABIDIAN and his description of his work against ABIDIAN should be considered only within that framework.

Admittedly NOSENKO was unaware of a considerable amount of details regarding the background of ABIDIAN, but on the other hand if the statements of NOSENKO are accepted that the only aim of the KGB was to see if coverage of ABIDIAN would lead to "another POPOV," it follows that such personalia information on ABIDIAN would have had

little material value for the SCD. The FCD had advised the SCD prior to the arrival of ABIDIAN in the USSR that ABIDIAN was considered to be "American Intelligence," and in addition ABIDIAN assumed the Security Officer position formerly held by Russell A. LANGELLE, who was known by the KGB to be CIA. No investigation by the SCD was necessary to determine if ABIDIAN was "American Intelligence" or not.

The previous summary, pages 213 - 216, contains some quite specific statements relative to ABIDIAN and a Soviet maid, a KGB operational contact according to NOSENKO, which are erroneous. This invalidates one of the bases for the previous conclusion that NOSENKO was not the responsible case officer for ABIDIAN.

NOSENKO had previously stated that in circa October 1960 he prepared an operational plan on ABIDIAN which included continuation of the placing of Metka on the clothing and effects of ABIDIAN by his maid who is mentioned above, Tatyana FEDOROVICH. The statement is made in the summary that this could not be true because FEDOROVICH did not work part time for ABIDIAN until at least July 1961. ABIDIAN has recently been reinterviewed concerning the above and the results invalidate the previous conclusion that FEDOROVICH could not have treated the clothing and effects of ABIDIAN with Metka prior to July 1961.

ABIDIAN has now stated that he arrived in Moscow in March 1960 with the intention that he would not employ a Soviet maid. Approximately three months later his close association began with Myra KEMMER, a Department of State employee; this association continued until she left Moscow in mid-1961. KEMMER had Tatyana FEDOROVICH as a maid and through mutual agreement with KEMMER, FEDOROVICH became the part-time maid for ABIDIAN beginning sometime in the fall of 1960. From that time on FEDOROVICH, according to ABIDIAN, had uncontrolled access to his living quarters since she had a key to permit entry for cleaning purposes.

ABIDIAN did not mail any operational letters within the Soviet Union until after March 1961 and therefore in view of the above, there is no reason to contradict the statement of NOSENKO that the three operational letters intercepted by the KGB and mailed by ABIDIAN all showed evidence of Metka. It is interesting to note that NOSENKO in June 1962 warned CIA about the KGB use of Metka for spotting internal letter mailings by United States Embassy personnel.

when mailed?

ABIDIAN, according to NOSENKO, was the subject of a 24-hour surveillance with the Seventh Directorate assigning a specific surveillance brigade to cover ABIDIAN. The actual surveillance of ABIDIAN was the responsibility of the Seventh Directorate which submitted reports to the

First Section, First Department. NOSENKO, as the responsible case officer for ABIDIAN, was expected to review these reports and give any appropriate guidance or direction to the Seventh Directorate, but under the KGB organization he would not participate in the surveillance activities of the Seventh Directorate. NOSENKO stated that had surveillance or agent information disclosed any personal weaknesses of ABIDIAN, the KGB would have attempted to exploit them. No personal weaknesses were disclosed, according to NOSENKO, and the pattern of coverage to see if ABIDIAN would lead the KGB to "another POPOV" remained unchanged.

Pages 210 - 212 of the previous summary notes that NOSENKO was unaware of countries visited by ABIDIAN during trips outside the USSR and that no effort was made by NOSENKO through the FCD to find out such information. According to the previous summary, NOSENKO stated that the FCD "would not accept" such a request for "operational action against an American diplomat coming from Moscow." The surveillance which would have been required on the part of the FCD to achieve any sort of reasonable coverage of ABIDIAN abroad would certainly have placed a severe burden on the FCD. Further, NOSENKO contends that the results which might reasonably be expected would be of little or no practical value to the SCD.

Pages 216 - 221 of the previous summary contain a summary on the matter of the Pushkin Street deaddrop site which John ABIDIAN visited on 30 December 1961. It should be noted that a current review of the 1964 - 1966 interrogations of NOSENKO on this matter indicates they were unable to clarify the matter and did much to confuse the issue.

Current interviews, as indicated above, have not fully resolved the problems, but have assisted in at least minimizing the areas of conflict or confusion. It is apparent that NOSENKO was not in the First Section, First Department, for any material period of time after 30 December 1961. It is also clear that he either read the surveillance report on the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street deaddrop site or was fully briefed on the details of the visit. NOSENKO insists that he read the surveillance report at the time or shortly after the event. There is no reason to question his assertion that he read the report since his accurate knowledge of the route of ABIDIAN and his actions in connection with the visit support this claim. However, his consistent inability on his own to approximate the date of the visit or relate it to his change of assignments raises a question regarding when he actually read the report.

NOSENKO claims that the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street deaddrop area led to the KGB setting up a stationary surveillance post

near the site which was maintained for three months and that he was informed on a daily basis of the results of this stake out (always negative). To take this statement literally would raise a further problem since, in addition to his transfer from the First Department to the Seventh Department as of early January 1962, NOSENKO went to Geneva in mid-March 1962.

It is conceivable that, as he himself now maintains, he was kept advised of developments or nondevelopments following the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street building by Veniamin KOZLOV, a Chief of Department in the Seventh Directorate who had been known to NOSENKO since 1953, or Vladislav KOVSHUK or Gennadiy GRYAZNOV, Chief and Deputy Chief respectively of the First Section, First Department. Even so, however, his failure to call our attention to this matter in June 1962 would seem to require explanation, especially in view of the fact that he did warn us about the danger of operational letter mailings by ABIDIAN -- a warning which would appear clearly to have been derived from KGB coverage of the activities of ABIDIAN in the spring-summer of 1961.

It is to be noted that during the June 1962 meetings NOSENKO was not specifically asked for any additional information regarding any known or suspected intelligence activities of ABIDIAN. Beyond

this, NOSENKO himself has stated that it did not occur to him to tell us because the stake out had long since been dropped, it had revealed nothing suspicious on the part of ABIDIAN or anyone else, and therefore he had regarded it as insignificant.

This is not implausible. Another possible explanation, however, derived from the already noted inability of NOSENKO to pin down a date for the visit, is that he learned of the stationary surveillance post if not of the visit itself after his meetings with us in June 1962. It should be noted in this context that with the public exposure of the PENKOVSKIY case in the fall of 1962, the Pushkin Street deaddrop undoubtedly became the subject of widespread interest within the KGB.

That NOSENKO is at a minimum still confused about the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street deaddrop and its consequences is clear from the record. While it is entirely possible that NOSENKO has consciously exaggerated his involvement with the visit and its aftermath, it is also possible that the evident distortions of his accounts of the affair derive from honest confusion.

Current interviews and a check of the tapes of previous interviews leave no doubt that NOSENKO was aware of the visits of ABIDIAN to the upper Gorkiy Street area circa March 1961. These visits by ABIDIAN were for cover purposes and preceded his start of operational

letter mailing. NOSENKO consistently relates, and has furnished drawings which substantiate, that visits of ABIDIAN to a commission shop, a next-door art shop, and a local post office in the area were known to and considered suspicious by the KGB. The entrance to the art shop, according to NOSENKO, was so situated as to be an ideal place for picking up or placing a deaddrop, and a mobile surveillance was placed on the art shop for a period of time following the visit of ABIDIAN. Official records confirm the visits of ABIDIAN at the time and to the buildings described by NOSENKO.

Pages 216 - 220 of the previous summary contain no reference to the specific statements of NOSENKO relative to KGB interest in the visits of ABIDIAN to the upper Gorkiy Street area. It is also clear from a review of certain transcripts of previous interrogations that no differentiation was made concerning his statements relative to KGB coverage of the activities of ABIDIAN in the upper Gorkiy Street area circa March 1961 and his statements concerning his knowledge of the Pushkin Street deaddrop site after the visit of ABIDIAN to that site (30 December 1961).

It is impossible at this time to state that a detailed debriefing of NOSENKO concerning ABIDIAN prior to hostile interrogation would have permitted the clarification of all issues including the above, but

there is no doubt that the hostile interrogation has confused matters to the point where complete clarification appears impossible. In any event, one thing is clear -- since he may well have transferred out of the First Section, First Department, by 31 December 1961 and most certainly had transferred by early January 1962, the fact that NOSENKO has supplied confused information regarding the Pushkin Street affair cannot be used to impugn his claim to having been case officer for ABIDIAN from early 1960 until late 1961. Furthermore, the fact that NOSENKO is not able to properly date the visit of ABIDIAN to Pushkin Street, is in no way indicative of KGB dispatch. If dispatched, NOSENKO presumably would have had the date right.

In regard to (b), the responsibility of NOSENKO for preliminary review of reports from OTU (Technical Unit of KGB) of "take" from microphones in the United States Embassy, the previous conclusion was that his claim that he personally reviewed the KGB monitoring reports was not sustained.

It is not felt that the previous conclusion made sufficient allowance for the explanation of NOSENKO of what the responsibility actually entailed. Information from microphones in the United States Embassy, according to NOSENKO, was handled very specially. Telephone intercepts were given to a designated officer for distribution to the appropriate case officer, but microphone reports, to prevent wide dissemination even within the First Section, were brought daily to the Deputy Chief or in his absence to the Chief and then were distributed to the individual responsible

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case officer. In this way, according to NOSENKO, no one below the rank of Deputy Chief was aware of the total microphone "take" from the United States Embassy as received by the section.

As regards political type information, and according to NOSENKO this was considered the most important by the KGB and OTU, NOSENKO had no responsibility for review or ultimate dissemination of the information to the Chief, SCD, the Chairman, KGB, or the Central Committee since this was the responsibility of a unit in the office of the Chief, SCD.

NOSENKO has also stated that the output from certain of the working microphones was "dying" and that OTU in addition to having reception difficulties was also having difficulty obtaining a sufficient number of qualified monitor-translators. As a result, according to NOSENKO, OTU was not providing complete verbatim transcripts from most microphones, but actually was reporting only those portions which OTU considered pertinent. Despite the fact that full transcripts of all conversations in areas covered by active microphones would have been of interest to responsible officers of the First Section, OTU, according to NOSENKO, did not provide full transcripts and when asked to provide more gave the routine answer of, "we could do so if we had more personnel." According to NOSENKO, the tapes were maintained at OTU and could not be furnished to the First Section. An officer of the

First Section could listen to a particular tape but he had to go to OTU to do so and as a result this was done very infrequently.

It is believed that any presumption that the KGB recovered or transcribed all conversations even in the thirteen areas listed by NOSENKO as having active microphones is not reasonable or even realistic. It is also unrealistic to presume that any conversation conducted within reasonable distance of an active microphone was not compromised to the KGB. The latter is a factor to be considered in any damage assessment; it is not an appropriate basis for a presumption that NOSENKO had to have been aware of this or this just because someone had a conversation in one of the rooms in which there was an active microphone and NOSENKO has claimed he reviewed the "take" from microphones in the United States Embassy.

It is apparent that there are a number of imponderable factors to be considered such as whether the conversation could be picked up by the microphone, whether the monitor could recover sufficient portions of the conversation to understand the gist of what was being said, and even if he did, whether he would consider it of sufficient importance or interest to include in his report in verbatim or in summary form.

In regard to (c), the claim of NOSENKO that he was responsible for maintenance of the physical security file on the United States Embassy,

it is not considered that there is an adequate basis for questioning this claim.

The previous summary contained a conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he was custodian of the Embassy security file was an invention. The basis for this conclusion was not then adequate and current interviews with NOSENKO have further indicated that his claim on this point should be accepted.

In regard to (d), the claim of NOSENKO that he acted in place of KOVSHUK, the Chief of First Section, when KOVSHUK was absent, it is considered that this claim is acceptable providing it is not converted into a presumption that therefore NOSENKO knew everything that KOVSHUK knew.

NOSENKO claims that he was not responsible for the direct supervision of approximately two-thirds of the officers in the First Section. These officers normally reported directly to KOVSHUK and would only report to NOSENKO when KOVSHUK was absent. As an example of this, NOSENKO has shown a lack of detailed knowledge of the work against diplomatic personnel in the United States Embassy. He has stated he is sure he would have known of anything "important" such as a recruitment or attempted recruitment, but he does not claim to have reviewed all the reports of the various officers of the First

Section. His recognition of the names of individuals at the United States Embassy in 1960 - 1961 and even their assignments seems adequate.

The previous criticism that NOSENKO knew only the names of most agents or operative contacts who were part of the KGB network among the indigenous employees of the American Embassy, did not recognize their photographs, and did not give sufficient details concerning their specific activities is considered to be an unwarranted criticism. NOSENKO indicates that in general the handling of agents in the First Section was the responsibility of individual case officers.

It is also apparent that the philosophy in the KGB was to maintain a single handler-agent relationship as much as possible, and that responsibility for an agent would not be transferred merely because the agent had access to a target who was the responsibility of a case officer other than the handler of the agent. This apparent philosophy is of particular interest in connection with NOSENKO, who even though he was the case officer responsible for ABIDIAN and together with KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV worked actively against code clerks, did not have an agent network which he specifically handled. Mere use of an agent for reporting on or a specific activity against a particular target was normally

not an adequate reason to transfer responsibility for the agent and it appears the KGB considers that the continuation of an established handler-agent relationship has considerable merit.

NOSENKO, as previously indicated, has stated that he had the responsibility for work against code clerks at the United States Embassy during 1960 - 1961. Except for the period of time that he claims responsibility for supervision of work against the Service Attaches in early 1960, he was, according to NOSENKO, responsible for supervision of the work of Vadim A. KOSOLAPOV, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV, Vladimir DEMKIN and Yevgeniy GROMAKOVSKIY.

GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV worked only against code clerks and therefore were supervised solely by NOSENKO, whereas DEMKIN and GROMAKOVSKIY, who handled indigenous agents in American House, came under the supervision of NOSENKO only in those cases where these agents were directed against code clerks.

It is quite clear that the knowledge of NOSENKO concerning the code clerks, code machine mechanics and pouch clerks who, according to NOSENKO, were included in his targets in 1960 - 1961, was much greater than his knowledge of any other category of American employees at the United States Embassy during this period except for ABIDIAN.

The following comments are concerned with several specific cases in which, according to NOSENKO, there was an approach by the KGB, interesting information was developed, or in which at least a considerable amount of specific work was carried out by NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV.

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The first case, [James STORSBERG], is covered on pages 166 - 177 of the previous summary. Little additional comment is considered necessary on this case since there does not appear to be any adequate reason to question the general story of NOSENKO in regard to the KGB effort against [STORSBERG] 06

It is recognized and mentioned elsewhere that NOSENKO in 1962 exaggerated his personal involvement in the case, particularly in placing himself as present with GRIBANOV when the recruitment pitch was made to [STORSBERG] 06. NOSENKO has retracted this particular claim, but there is no reason to doubt that he was engaged for approximately a year in the planning and activities which preceded the unsuccessful approach to [STORSBERG] 06.

An issue was previously made over the timing of the approach to [STORSBERG] 06 since [STORSBERG] 06 dated this as October 1961, NOSENKO has indicated about June 1961, and information from GOLITSYN, based on remarks by KOVSHUK to him, had been interpreted as indicating the

approach occurred at the "end of 1960."

NOSENKO, during current interviews, has given an acceptable account of the [STORSBERG] case. He has stated that he cannot precisely date the approach to [STORSBERG] but that it occurred before the approach at the Moscow airport to [James KEYSERS] (June 1?, 1961) because otherwise no action would have been taken against [KEYSERS].

When recently reinterviewed, [STORSBERG] continued to maintain that the approach occurred in October 1961, but the internal evidence in his description of collateral events makes it clear that the approach had to have taken place considerably earlier.

[Joseph MORONE] another code clerk at the United States Embassy, who will be the subject of further discussion below, has been interviewed on the basis of statements by [STORSBERG] that [MORONE] was present in American House the night of the approach. Analysis of the statements of [MORONE] clearly indicates that the events [STORSBERG] describes could not have taken place later than the period February to early May 1961.

The best estimate possible at this time is that the approach to [STORSBERG] occurred in March - April 1961, which is quite compatible with the approximate dating of the approach by NOSENKO. In the face of this approximation of the date of the approach to [STORSBERG] it is

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believed reasonable to assume that the remarks of KOVSHUK to GOLITSYN in January 1961, as related by GOLITSYN concerning a successful operation against a [military code clerk] 08 in Moscow at the end of 1960, referred to [STORSBERG] 06 and that KOVSHUK either was referring to a compromise phase of the operation rather than the actual approach, or was prematurely claiming anticipated success.

Pages 178 - 181 of the previous summary contain information in regard to the attempted defection operation against [James KEYSERS] 06. As of this time, it is considered that there are no discrepancies between record information and information from NOSENKO which in any way reflect against NOSENKO. [KEYSERS] 06 did not recognize a photograph of NOSENKO as the Soviet who made a fast approach to him at the airport, but this does not provide a valid reason to disbelieve the statement of NOSENKO that it was he who tried to talk to [KEYSERS] 06.

There are certain statements relative to the [KEYSERS] 06 case as set forth in the previous summary which require specific comment.

(a) The statement is made that no KGB officer directly connected with the case could regard [KEYSERS] 06 as the replacement for [STORSBERG] 06. In fact, [KEYSERS] 06 actually was being trained by [STORSBERG] 06 as a substitute, not a replacement, even though his primary assignment

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was not that of a code clerk. NOSENKO has during current interviews related how he received the impression from the OTU reports of conversations picked up by the microphone in the Military code room at the United States Embassy that [KEYSERS] either was not a code clerk or had been away from code work for a considerable period of time. In any event, the impression of NOSENKO was that [STORSBERG] was having a difficult time explaining the particular work to [KEYSERS]. The observations of NOSENKO are of interest since [KEYSERS] actually had not been a code clerk but, as noted, was being trained by [STORSBERG] so that he could act as a substitute. Under the circumstances, it is considered quite logical that the KGB would assume at the time that [KEYSERS] was to be the eventual replacement of [STORSBERG].

(b) The previous summary stated that, "prior to his departure from Moscow, [KEYSERS] acknowledged to his supervisors [Colonel URBAN] his homosexual tendencies and he admitted involvement in three homosexual incidents, all at the American House" (page 179).

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Contrary to this assertion, a review of the official memorandum, dated 16 June 1961, of [Colonel 06 URBAN] reflects that [KEYSERS] 06 was not informed by 06 [URBAN] of the "allegations of homosexuality in order not to aggravate the possibility of a rash act by him while within the Soviet Union."

(c) On page 236 of the previous summary, the statement is made that, "In the single case in which he /NOSENKO/ asserted that he relied on information procured from microphones ([KEYSERS] 06 failure to report receipt of the defection invitation) he was in error."

While the official record shows that [KEYSERS] 06 did indeed report receipt of the defection letter to [Colonel 06 URBAN] in the office of [Colonel URBAN] 06, it should be noted that this occurred less than one hour before [KEYSERS] 06 left the Embassy for the airport. NOSENKO has stated that in the absence of information to the contrary from microphone and telephone taps, the KGB had concluded that [KEYSERS] 06 had not reported receipt of the defection letter and therefore had decided to approach [KEYSERS] 06 at the airport. In view of the short time between [KEYSERS] 06 report of receipt

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of the letter and his departure from Moscow, it would have been remarkable if the KGB had learned this information in time to call off the airport approach. The account of NOSENKO in the [KEYSERS] 06 matter therefore is considered completely credible.

Pages 181 - 184 of the previous summary contain information in regard to [Matthew ZUJUS] 06, who succeeded [James STORSBERG] 06 having arrived in Moscow in September 1961. GRYAZNOV was the responsible case officer for [ZUJUS] 06 according to NOSENKO.

The previous summary states (page 183) that [ZUJUS] 06, during a routine debriefing, confirmed an Embassy report that in the summer of 1962 he had been intimate with an Austrian woman, "LILLIAN," who visited the American House with someone from the United Arab Republic. "LILLIAN" was interviewed by the American House manager and she claimed to be from Vienna but traveling with her employer, a Czech. Further inquiry revealed that no Austrian passport had been issued to "LILLIAN," and she was later asked for her passport. "LILLIAN" replied that she had forgotten it, then left, and did not return.

The previous summary stated that the above incident had been described by NOSENKO but in connection with attempts to entrap Joseph [MORONE] 06 in 1960, not [ZUJUS] 06 in 1962.

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Page 194 of the previous summary relates information from NOSENKO that GRYAZNOV went to East Berlin in early 1960 to obtain two German women who could be used against the residents of American House. During current interviews, this matter has been again covered with NOSENKO. According to NOSENKO, GRYAZNOV arranged for these two women, agents of the Berlin KGB Residentura, to visit Moscow under false documentation, one as a West German and the other as an Austrian. NOSENKO further identified the "West German" agent, "HANNA," as having the cover of a journalist, and stated he believed "HANNA" had met [06 MORONE] at American House. In a recent interview, [06 MORONE] confirmed that in early 1961 he had met a West German girl at American House who claimed to be a journalist. The statements of [06 MORONE] therefore appear to substantiate the report of NOSENKO.

Concerning the agent documented as an Austrian, NOSENKO reported that she was queried about her passport at American House and as a result the KGB returned her to East Germany without further attempts to use her at American House. NOSENKO places this incident in the same time period as the "HANNA" case; i.e., 1960 - 1961. He has never suggested any connection with [06 ZUJUS], nor is there reason to assume that he could be referring to the experience of [06 ZUJUS] since this took place in the summer of 1962, after NOSENKO had left the American Embassy Section.

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It was the conclusion of the previous summary that NOSENKO did not know enough about [ZUJUS] 06 or his background to have exercised any supervision in the development of [ZUJUS] 06. Granted that NOSENKO did not know many details regarding [ZUJUS] 06 the fact is that NOSENKO left the First Section, First Department, at the end of 1961 at which time any supervisory functions of NOSENKO terminated. [ZUJUS] 06, who did not arrive in Moscow until September 1961, remained in Moscow until January 1963. NOSENKO could hardly be held responsible for knowing anything about [ZUJUS] 06 after 1 January 1962.

Pages 165 - 169 of the previous summary contain a synopsis of previous information from NOSENKO in regard to [Paul JENNER] 06. Basically, NOSENKO had reported that when the KGB learned that [Paul JENNER] 06 who was thought to be a code clerk, was coming to Moscow through Helsinki, a plan was made to send Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki to travel on the same train as [JENNER] 06 to Moscow. A female agent of GRYAZNOV was to be placed on this train at Vyborg after the train entered the USSR. The female agent was to become acquainted with [JENNER] 06 as a part of a future operation against [JENNER] 06 in Moscow, and KOSOLAPOV was also to become acquainted with [JENNER] 06.

NOSENKO has stated that the operation was successful, that both KOSOLAPOV and the female agent made the acquaintance of [JENNER] 06

and that he, NOSENKO, read the report submitted by KOSOLAPOV on the trip from Helsinki to Moscow.

06 [JENNER] after arriving in Moscow, reported that he was approached on the train from Helsinki by two young Russians, "a boy and a girl, probably university students," who struck up a conversation. According to 06 [JENNER] they both said that they might see 06 [JENNER] in Moscow. About three months later 06 [JENNER] reported being approached again by the same girl, this time at the Moscow airport where he had gone on courier business. There was a short conversation and she gave 06 [JENNER] a phone number, insisting that he call her. The woman also advised 06 [JENNER] not to mention the conversation to anyone. NOSENKO has stated that in an effort to follow up the initial train acquaintance, the KGB had arranged for the female agent to encounter 06 [JENNER] at the Moscow railroad station or airport when he went alone to meet couriers.

Insofar as is known, 06 [JENNER] has never been shown a photograph of KOSOLAPOV. Although KOSOLAPOV was approximately 34 years of age in 1960, his photograph and remarks by NOSENKO indicate that in appearance he was much younger and that he could have passed as a university student.

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During current interviews, NOSENKO has repeated the same general story as regards [06 Paul JENNER] he still insists that KOSOLAPOV was on the same train with [06 JENNER] from Helsinki. Collateral information raises difficulties here, however: Finnish train manifests indicate that [06 JENNER] was the only Moscow-bound passenger on the [08 31] March 1960 train from Finland to Moscow, and that one Viktor KOLOSSOV (a name NOSENKO has identified as an alias used by KOSOLAPOV) was on the 2 April 1960 train to Moscow.

The above obvious discrepancy has not been and cannot be clarified with available information. KOSOLAPOV (KOLOSSOV) was either on the same train as [06 JENNER] or he was not. Train manifests indicate that KOSOLAPOV was not. Nevertheless, the "boy and girl, probably university students" who, according to [06 JENNER], struck up a conversation with him on the train would appear clearly to be part of the operational effort described by NOSENKO, particularly in view of the later approach of this same girl to [06 JENNER] at the airport. There is no reason to question that this girl was the female agent of GRYAZNOV. In view of the conflict between the train manifest and statements by NOSENKO, however, it is not clear who the "boy student" was: whether this somehow was KOSOLAPOV. or whether it may have been some other person entirely.

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It is not accepted that the train manifests are incontrovertible evidence that KOSOLAPOV could not have been on the same train as [JENNER]. Neither is it accepted that the train manifests are in error. There is just not a satisfactory answer for the indicated discrepancy between the train manifests and the statement of NOSENKO that KOSOLAPOV and [JENNER] were on the same train. If indeed KOSOLAPOV did not travel with [JENNER], this does not establish anything more than that NOSENKO is wrong; it is evidence that he does not know something he, as the supervisor of KOSOLAPOV, should have known according to his own statements.

Pages 190 - 192 contain a summary of previous information in regard to the [John GARLAND] case. [GARLAND] was identified by NOSENKO as a code clerk whom the KGB was studying, but on whom no derogatory information was developed. NOSENKO provided practically no details in regard to [GARLAND] other than to identify him as a code clerk.

GOLITSYN has reported on an incident which it is considered relates to the trip of [GARLAND] from Helsinki to Moscow on 16 November 1960. GOLITSYN reported that in November 1960 the Helsinki KGB Residency received a cable from Moscow advising that an American code clerk would be arriving in Helsinki en route to Moscow and that

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the responsible SCD case officer, KOSOLAPOV, would be sent to Helsinki under alias to strike up an acquaintance with the code clerk which the SCD hoped to continue in Moscow. GOLITSYN talked to KOSOLAPOV in Helsinki at that time, and the Residency procured for KOSOLAPOV a place in the compartment of the American on the train from Helsinki to Moscow.

The previous summary also stated GOLITSYN had advised that later in Helsinki he inquired of another SCD officer "from the Embassy Section" (First Section, SCD) about the case on which he had helped KOSOLAPOV. According to GOLITSYN, the officer refused to discuss the case and he, GOLITSYN, concluded from this reaction that it must have resulted in a successful recruitment.

It has been determined that GOLITSYN, in an interview with the FBI on 20 March 1962, referred to the above "SCD officer from the Embassy Section" as (fnu) ZENKIN of the American Department. GOLITSYN also stated that the officer was in Helsinki under the alias of SERGEEV (SERGEYEV), but was unable to furnish a first name and patronymic for SERGEYEV. GOLITSYN referred to (fnu) ZENKIN as being from the American Department, SCD.

It is considered that there is no doubt that the (fnu) ZENKIN referred to by GOLITSYN is the individual of the same last name

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concerning whom NOSENKO has furnished information. NOSENKO has identified ZENKIN (whose first name he does not recall but possibly is Yuriy) as an officer of the Second Section, First Department, SCD. According to NOSENKO, one group of the Second Section both before and after 1960 - 1961 was engaged in "operative games" against American Intelligence and that ZENKIN was a member of this group. NOSENKO has advised that ZENKIN traveled abroad in connection with activities of the Second Section, but that he had no specific knowledge regarding the activities of ZENKIN on these trips. NOSENKO has furnished some fragmentary information which he learned in regard to ZENKIN and when the full name of SERGEYEV (ZENKIN) together with his photograph is obtained, this fragmentary information from NOSENKO may prove quite useful.

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As regards the KOSOLAPOV-[GARLAND] matter and the opinion expressed by GOLITSYN based on the refusal of ZENKIN to discuss the case (06 [GARLAND]) that it must have resulted in a successful recruitment, there appears to be an inadequate basis for this presumption. According to NOSENKO, and there is no reason to disbelieve NOSENKO on this point, ZENKIN was in the Second Section, not the First Section, in 1960 - 1961. He was not Chief of the Section, but only a Senior Case

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Officer. Since KOSOLAPOV was an officer of the First Section and the work against [GARLAND] 06 was the responsibility of the First Section, it does not appear that ZENKIN would necessarily have known of any developments in the KOSOLAPOV-[GARLAND] 06 matter.

The Finnish train manifest of 16 November 1960 for the Helsinki to Moscow train lists [John GARLAND] 06 and Viktor KOLOSSOV (alias of KOSOLAPOV) as passengers. [GARLAND] 06, when interviewed in 1962 following the lead from GOLITSYN, denied having met any Soviet with the physical description of KOSOLAPOV on the Helsinki-to-Moscow trip, and denied ever being approached by Soviet Intelligence. Later interviews by the FBI and a polygraph interview did not indicate that he had ever met KOSOLAPOV or that he had ever knowingly been contacted by any foreign intelligence agent.

It is accepted that KOSOLAPOV went from Moscow to Helsinki in November 1960, that he talked with GOLITSYN there, and that he was on the same train as [GARLAND] 06 from Helsinki to Moscow. It is also accepted that NOSENKO is unaware that KOSOLAPOV made a trip to Helsinki in November 1960.

Travel for an SCD officer outside the USSR or Bloc countries requires high-level approval, according to NOSENKO. It does not

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matter that the individual has previously traveled on a similar mission, each trip must have specific high-level approval. The red tape which thus must inevitably have been involved in preparation for such a trip further supports the assumption that NOSENKO should have known about the KOSOLAPOV-[GARLAND] 06 trip.

The position taken by NOSENKO on this point is that he accepts the statement by the interviewer that KOSOLAPOV made such a trip, but he says that he, NOSENKO, simply does not know anything about it. He adds only that had anything significant developed in the study of [GARLAND] 06, he would have been aware of it.

NOSENKO, as supervisor of the group working against code clerks, should have known of any trip of KOSOLAPOV to Finland in 1960 or 1961. NOSENKO himself was out of Moscow on a trip to Cuba from 15 November 1960 to circa 17 December 1960. The possibility exists that this could have accounted for his lack of knowledge of the trip of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki and return to Moscow on 16 November 1960. However, NOSENKO has not attempted to use his Cuban trip as a possible explanation for not knowing of the November KOSOLAPOV trip.

As with the [JENNER] 06-KOSOLAPOV case, it is not possible at this time to resolve the discrepancies pertaining to the [GARLAND] 06-KOSOLAPOV trip. The fact that NOSENKO denies any knowledge of

this operational activity of KOSOLAPOV is another apparent instance, as in the [JENNER] case, of his not knowing something he, by his own statements, should have known.

Viewed in the context of the total knowledge of NOSENKO of operations against code clerks, however, neither the problems in the [JENNER] case nor those in the [GARLAND] case, singly or combined, in any way represent conclusive evidence that NOSENKO was not supervisor of KOSOLAPOV or that he was not responsible for the code clerk operations described by NOSENKO. This statement, however, was not substantiated in the previous summary.

Pages 193 - 199 of the previous summary contain an account of KGB activity against code clerk [Joseph MORONE] from various sources, including NOSENKO. NOSENKO first mentioned the case in 1962.

According to NOSENKO, the responsible case officer for work against [MORONE] was KOSOLAPOV. When it was learned that [MORONE] and an Embassy colleague, a Marine guard by the name of [BEGGS] were planning a vacation trip to Warsaw, arrangements were made with the UB (the Polish Security Service) for a female Polish agent to come to Moscow and travel from there to Warsaw on the same train as [MORONE] and [BEGGS]. The intent was for the agent, either on the train or subsequently in Warsaw, to meet and compromise [MORONE] sexually. She

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successfully accomplished this, but due to certain problems in KGB-UB liaison relations, it was not possible for the KGB to exploit this directly.

The previous summary stated that with respect to the female UB agent, there was persuasive evidence that neither NOSENKO nor KOSOLAPOV played the roles in the [MORONE] 06 case described by NOSENKO. That summary cited the travel of NOSENKO to Cuba and of KOSOLAPOV to Finland at approximately the same time as the [MORONE] 06 trip to Warsaw as evidence of the impossibility of NOSENKO and KOSOLAPOV being involved personally in this part of the [MORONE] 06 case.

NOSENKO has stated that KOSOLAPOV met the Polish female agent and made the arrangements to place her on the train to Warsaw. [MORONE] 06 and [BEGGS] 06 departed Moscow on 12 November 1960. It is not known when KOSOLAPOV left Moscow for Helsinki, but he was on the 16 November 1960 train manifest as departing Helsinki for Moscow. NOSENKO departed Moscow on 15 November 1960 for Cuba. The activities described by NOSENKO are therefore possible within the known time frame.

It is clear that NOSENKO in 1962 exaggerated his personal role in the [MORONE] 06 case, particularly when he stated that he, NOSENKO, placed the female agent on the train. NOSENKO now clearly states that

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KOSOLAPOV was the only KGB officer in contact with the Polish agent. NOSENKO previously stated that a KGB technician who was on the train from Moscow to Warsaw reported back to NOSENKO the day after the train arrived in Warsaw. Later NOSENKO said that instead of talking to the technician personally, he may have read the report of the technician after he returned from Cuba.

The activities described by NOSENKO with regard to this matter are accordingly possible within the known time frame. It is not considered that the retractions NOSENKO has made from his original statements on this operation are of sufficient significance to materially discredit him.

Page 198 of the previous summary contains the statement that [MORONE] when interviewed, denied having been intimate with Svetlana IVANOVA, a KGB agent employed at the American House. NOSENKO had stated that IVANOVA was instructed to report everything she saw or heard concerning [MORONE] (page 194). The summary, however, cited a number of reports that [MORONE] had been intimate with IVANOVA and with Ella UMANETS, also a KGB agent employed at the American House, and commented that NOSENKO therefore was apparently unaware of the sexual involvement of [MORONE] with "IVANOVA's friends."

NOSENKO, during current interviews, has indicated awareness of at least some involvement of IVANOVA with [MORONE] 06. He has furnished information on a developing operation against Marine guard [GARCIA (Anthony A. GARCIA)] 06 based on the involvement of [GARCIA] 06 with IVANOVA. He has also stated that the possibility was considered of using IVANOVA against [MORONE] 06 to obtain compromising photographs. This plan was seriously affected when it was learned from the militiaman/KGB guard at the United States Embassy that IVANOVA, her girl friend, [MORONE] 06 and a Marine guard, possibly [GARCIA] 06, had been "in the city," then returned to the "flat" of one of the Marines where the girls spent the night. This apparently placed the reliability of IVANOVA in question in the eyes of the First Section.

According to the previous summary, NOSENKO stated that Pietro CECCHI, Italian cook at the American Embassy and agent of KOSOLAPOV, reported on Americans at the Embassy, but NOSENKO recalled nothing specific that CECCHI had reported about [MORONE] 06. The summary also states that [MORONE] 06 was said by other American Embassy employees to be a close friend of CECCHI and that [MORONE] 06 had admitted black market money exchanges with CECCHI.

During current interviews, NOSENKO has stated that CECCHI furnished "pieces" of information concerning [MORONE] 06, but he, NOSENKO,

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knew of no black market involvement of [MORONE] with CECCHI. NOSENKO has also indicated that the KGB sometimes suspected, and on occasion actually became aware that various agents did not fully report everything of interest to the KGB. The KGB of course was aware that CECCHI was involved in the black market. However, whether he reported to the KGB everything he did and with whom is open to question; viz., the [Maurice ZWANG] 06 case below.

The comment was made in the previous summary that NOSENKO was unaware that [MORONE] 06 met some Soviet females in the spring of 1961 at the apartment of Sarwat el SHAZLY, an Egyptian-national KGB agent of the Sixth Department who was also reporting on Americans, and was intimate with one in this apartment.

A review of official records indicates that [MORONE] 06 did report having met some Soviet girls at the apartment of Sarwat, but there is no indication that he admitted or that anyone else has reported that he was intimate with any of them. The conclusion of the previous summary in this regard was based on a misinterpretation. Accordingly, since there is no reason to believe that any compromise incident took place in the Sarwat apartment, the story of NOSENKO on this matter is considered completely acceptable.

A few comments are appropriate concerning remarks in the previous summary on pages 199 - 204. Comments were made there concerning [five code clerks, Maurice ZWANG, John TAYLOR, Frank DAY, Robert DWELLY and Joseph GAFFEY], and although it is not specifically stated, the suggestion is apparent that the reporting of NOSENKO on these cases was considered evidence that NOSENKO was not supervisor of all KGB operations against code clerks. The following observations may assist in placing these cases in their proper perspective:

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(a) [Maurice ZWANG - ZWANG] was identified by NOSENKO as a code clerk who was actively "worked on" during 1960 - 1961. The previous summary suggested that the knowledge of NOSENKO regarding KGB activity against [ZWANG] was inadequate. First, reporting of NOSENKO on [ZWANG] contained no reference to the relationship of [ZWANG] with his maid, whom NOSENKO in another case has identified as a KGB agent. Although [ZWANG] denied sexual relations with his maid, he did admit to some intimacies with her in her apartment. During polygraph examination [ZWANG] reacted when he

responded in the negative to a question regarding sexual relations with his maid. The failure of NOSENKO to report on this relationship can be ascribed to ignorance, but also can be plausibly explained by faulty memory on his part or failure on the part of the maid to report details of this relationship to the KGB.

Second, NOSENKO had not reported that [ZWANG] 06 was involved in the currency operations of Pietro CECCHI. (A fact that previous summary implied he should have known from KGB agent CECCHI.) From the record, however, it appears that the dealings of [ZWANG] 06 were not directly with CECCHI, but rather through other Embassy employees, making it plausible that CECCHI was either unaware of the involvement of [ZWANG] 06 or, as NOSENKO himself stated he suspected, CECCHI did not report all details of his currency operations to his KGB handler.

(b) [John TAYLOR] 06 - NOSENKO identified [TAYLOR] 06 as [a State Department code clerk] 08 and target of KOSOLAPOV. The KGB was aware of the involvement of [TAYLOR] 06 with his Soviet maid, but no attempt was made to recruit [TAYLOR] 06 before his departure in early 1961 since to do so might

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endanger the plans for a recruitment approach to [06] James STORSBERG who had been under development for almost a year and was considered more valuable.

The implication of the previous summary that the explanation given by NOSENKO was subject to question failed to take into account the fact that although STORSBERG [06] was not approached until after the departure of TAYLOR, [06] the operation against [06] STORSBERG was underway before [06] TAYLOR became involved with his maid. Further, it is apparent that the KGB did not abandon interest in TAYLOR [06] since he was approached at a later date outside the USSR on the basis of his previous affair with his maid in Moscow.

(c) [06] Frank DAY - NOSENKO identified [06] Frank DAY as [08] a State Department code clerk who was the target of either KOSOLAPOV or GRYAZNOV. According to NOSENKO, nothing "interesting" was learned about [06] DAY and no operational measures were taken against [06] DAY. The previous summary noted that in July 1961, [06] DAY traveled to the Caucasus with his friend and former overt CIA employee, [08, 06] Agricultural Attache G. Stanley BROWN. It was also stated that the two were under surveillance by five persons

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at all times on the above trip, that they found a "repairman" in their hotel room when they unexpectedly returned, and that on another occasion an "attractive and available Soviet female" was believed to have been planted in their train compartment.

According to NOSENKO, surveillance and any other local coverage of any employee at the United States Embassy who travels in the USSR is the responsibility of the local KGB organization, not the SCD. It would appear that the local organization was trying to do a thorough job on [DAY] 06 and [BROWN] 06 but it apparently was nonproductive. It does not seem justifiable to expect that NOSENKO should have recalled a trip which produced no results.

(d) [Robert DWELLY] 06 - NOSENKO has related in considerable detail the efforts of NOSENKO, GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV to involve [Robert DWELLY, a code clerk] 06, 08 in Moscow from April 1959 - July 1960, in a homosexual compromise operation. According to NOSENKO, a homosexual agent of GRYAZNOV was of the opinion [DWELLY] 06 was a homosexual.

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There is no reason to doubt the statement of NOSENKO concerning KGB efforts to determine when and where [DWELLY] 06 was going "into the city" (Moscow) so that a homosexual compromise situation could be arranged. There were no specific developments from their efforts, according to NOSENKO.

[DWELLY] 06 has categorically denied being a homosexual; NOSENKO has not said he was, but only that the homosexual agent of GRYAZNOV assessed [DWELLY] 06 as a homosexual. There does not appear to be any reason to consider the statements of NOSENKO about [DWELLY] 06 as reflecting adversely on NOSENKO.

(e) [Joseph GAFFEY] 06 - NOSENKO has identified [Joseph GAFFEY] 06 as a [code clerk] 08. The previous summary noted that NOSENKO had stated the KGB had tried to lure [GAFFEY] 06 into downtown Moscow, using Svetlana IVANOVA, an agent of DEMKIN in the American House.

By way of comment, the previous summary stated that [GAFFEY] 06 arrived in Moscow in September 1961 and that [Fred KADERA] 06 had reported that [GAFFEY] 06 had told him he had been intimate with a Russian girl at the American

House. It was further noted that [GAFFEY] 06 was recalled from Moscow in the summer of 1962 because of drunkenness and during interview had admitted being intimate with IVANOVA at the American House and at her apartment and that she had claimed pregnancy.

As to whether the above information raises a question concerning NOSENKO, the following factors should be considered:

(1) NOSENKO has stated that during the latter part of December 1961 he was part time in the First Department and part time in the Seventh Department, and that he reported full time to the Seventh Department after New Years Day 1962.

(2) In addition to the information previously mentioned as furnished by [GAFFEY] 06 during interview, [GAFFEY] 06 also stated that he was first intimate with IVANOVA in his room on 27 December 1961 and was also intimate with her later on three occasions at her apartment. According to [GAFFEY] 06, IVANOVA told him of her pregnancy about 1 May

1962, which is approximately four months after NOSENKO has stated he transferred to the Seventh Department.

The matter of review by NOSENKO of OTU reports from microphone coverage on the United States Embassy has previously been mentioned in this summary. Pages 226 - 236 of the previous summary contained a detailed account of information from NOSENKO on the matter of microphones, countermeasures taken by the Americans in 1964, and damage estimates prepared by the Americans. The previous conclusion was that his information did not sustain his claim to have been Deputy Chief, First Section, or his claim that he personally reviewed the KGB microphone monitoring reports. Comments have been made in this summary in regard to this previous conclusion.

A few remarks, it is believed, will assist in a fuller understanding of the microphone matter. In the material brought out by NOSENKO in 1964, there was a single sheet of paper containing on one side handwritten notes which NOSENKO identified as a list of the active microphones (those which were being monitored) in the United States Embassy. This list is given on page 227 of the previous summary and need not be repeated here. The acquisition of this list by NOSENKO was characterized in the previous summary as singular and it was stated that NOSENKO

has never plausibly explained the circumstances which prompted his retention of the list until 1964, when he produced it for CIA in Geneva.

During current interviews, the matter of the above list has been covered in considerably greater detail with NOSENKO than had been done before. His explanation, both of the circumstances which led to his acquiring the list as well as of his still having it in his possession at the time of his defection, is considered plausible, contrary to the judgment of the previous summary.

NOSENKO has stated that in 1960 - 1961 Vladimir I. PETROV, Chief of the Second Section, First Department, desired some "points" for use against targets of his section. NOSENKO uses the term "point" not as meaning just a microphone, but as referring to an OTU sub-unit which includes microphones as well as the necessary monitors and translators to cover the microphone and translate the "take." The targets of PETROV were primarily Americans and, therefore, there was a transcription-translation problem.

According to NOSENKO, most of the available "points" were assigned to the First Section to cover microphones in the United States Embassy. The Chief of the First Department, Vladimir A. KLYPIN, held a meeting attended by KLYPIN, Chief of the First Section Vladislav KOVSHUK, Vladimir I. PETROV, and NOSENKO, the purpose of which

was to discuss the possibility of temporarily discontinuing certain Embassy "points" controlled by the First Section, and permitting PETROV to use these "points" against targets of his section.

According to NOSENKO, PETROV brought to the meeting a list of names of certain targets to which he wished to give technical coverage. During the meeting, KOVSHUK apparently took a piece of paper which PETROV had and wrote on it a list of active microphones in the United States Embassy and residences. When the meeting ended, NOSENKO had this paper and he took it back to his office.

Contained on the reverse side of the paper were the following names in Russian: [LUBIN, SMITH, Will BURTIN] 06,06,06 and [Sipe BURTIN] 06. The name A. A. MIKHAYLOV was listed next to the name of [LUBIN] 06 and the name of Y. E. CHERNETSEV was listed next to the name of [SMITH] 06. NOSENKO has explained that [LUBIN, SMITH, Will BURTIN] 06,06,06 and [Sipe BURTIN] 06 were among the targets of PETROV; and MIKHAYLOV and CHERNETSEV were officers of the Second Section.

NOSENKO stated he knew nothing more about the four non-Soviet names except that they were targets of PETROV. NOSENKO stated that he could not be positive of the date of the meeting other than that it occurred while KLYPIN was Chief of the First Department. (According to NOSENKO, KLYPIN was succeeded by Sergey M. FEDOSEYEV as

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Chief of the First Department in circa mid-1961.) Research in regard to the four non-Soviet names leaves no doubt that [06] LUBIN is George LUBIN and that [06, 06] Will BURTIN and Sipe BURTIN are correct names, with [06, 08] Sipe being the wife of Will BURTIN. All three are American citizens who were in the USSR circa June 1961. [06] SMITH, at this time, has still not been identified.

In view of the above, it has been possible to deduce the date of the meeting called by KLYPIN as circa June 1961.

According to NOSENKO, the piece of paper described above was placed by NOSENKO with other notes he kept between the pages of a bound volume which NOSENKO calls a "working copy." This, according to NOSENKO, was an accountable, registered notebook issued to all officers in which they were supposed to write all their notes, destroying any other notes.

According to NOSENKO, he, like many other officers, did not completely follow regulations and the tendency was to frequently put loose notes in the notebook so that the notebook often acted as a file rather than being used in the way required by regulations. NOSENKO has stated that when he left the First Section he took various notes with him to the Seventh Department; these included notes he had drafted concerning certain First Section activities for use in briefing FEDOSEYEV

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when FEDOSEYEV succeeded KLYPIN, and notes he had prepared for lectures to the Seventh Directorate. According to NOSENKO, he did not intentionally take the particular paper pertaining to microphones; it was just in the group of notes he took along when he went to the Seventh Department.

In consideration of the above explanation by NOSENKO, it should be noted that he also brought with him in 1964 his notes for the briefing of FEDOSEYEV and certain notes he [illegible]ly had also prepared while in the First Section; e.g., his notes [illegible] lecture to the Seventh Directorate in regard to a "mass surveillance" on the American Embassy.

By including a section (pages 236 - 239) on the knowledge of NOSENKO of the KGB cryptologic attack on United States Embassy communications, the previous summary implies that there is some reason to question his information on this subject.

NOSENKO has asserted that the KGB had never succeeded in reading enciphered communications of the Service Attaches; however, he said that the Eighth Directorate (the unit of the KGB responsible for communications intercept and cryptologic analysis) was reading some United States Embassy traffic. While it is open to question to what extent knowledge of successes of the Eighth Directorate would be known

to anyone in the First Section of the First Department, within the scope plausibly available to NOSENKO in his claimed position, there is no reason to question his statement.

In the previous summary (pages 240 - 248), the failures or successes of NOSENKO in identifying CIA officers are noted. With the exception of ABIDIAN, NOSENKO does not claim to have been the responsible case officer for any of the listed CIA officers. According to his claim, NOSENKO should have been aware that William N. MORELL was CIA, but he has never identified MORELL as CIA. Surely KOVSHUK knew MORELL was CIA but why NOSENKO is not aware MORELL was CIA is not known. It has already been established, however, that NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief, was not aware of all of the activities of KOVSHUK.

As regards some of the other listed individuals, a few remarks are appropriate.

(a) NOSENKO has never indicated any knowledge Paul GARBLER was CIA, and yet GARBLER was surely known to the FCD as a CIA employee before going to Moscow. It is presumed that the FCD furnished the SCD at least basic information that Paul GARBLER was "American Intelligence." GARBLER, however, did not

arrive in Moscow until November 1961, only a month before NOSENKO left the First Section for the Seventh Department.

(b) The previous summary stated that according to NOSENKO the KGB did not suspect that [Eugene 03 MAHONEY] was a CIA officer, yet he was a CIA officer. It was also stated that [MAHONEY] 03 reported the presence of intensive KGB surveillance while in Moscow from October 1960 to September 1961. The "intensive KGB surveillance" is based on statements of [MAHONEY] 03 and may possibly be more a reflection of his personal concern over surveillance rather than what was actually happening.

(c) [Steve WASHENKO] 03 was correctly identified by NOSENKO as CIA. William HORBALY was CIA and identified by NOSENKO as suspected of being a CIA officer or cooptee.

(d) Lewis BOWDEN, who was not CIA, was, according to NOSENKO, suspected of being a CIA officer.

George Payne WINTERS, Jr., has stated that KOVSHUK warned WINTERS that BOWDEN was the "FBI officer" in the Embassy. The Cherepanov Papers indicate

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that the KGB had reasons to consider the activities of BOWDEN with suspicion.

It is not believed that the listed failures of NOSENKO to identify CIA officers are of particular significance in establishing that he was or was not Deputy Chief of the First Section. There are too many unknown factors which would need to be considered. Despite our assumptions as to what the KGB knows, it is possible that (a) the KGB did not know of the CIA affiliation of these people, (b) the information known to the KGB was not available at the First Section, First Department, level, or (c) information available to the Chief of the First Section or to a specific case officer was of no official concern to NOSENKO and was not made available to him. The last of these possibilities is suggested in spite of claims by NOSENKO that he had to have known whatever was known in the Section regarding CIA identifications; a propensity on the part of NOSENKO to exaggerate the area of his own knowledgeability has been seen elsewhere in this case.

Pages 252 - 258 of the previous summary contain a report of the 1960 trip of NOSENKO to Cuba and his 1961 trip to Bulgaria. With regard to the Cuba trip, there is collateral evidence of his travel as described by NOSENKO, and there is no substantive reason to doubt his account of his activities on this trip. The statement was made in

the previous summary that the travel of NOSENKO to Cuba in 1960 damaged his claim that he was supervising operations against Embassy code clerks at the time. To accept the validity of this judgment is to say that no supervisor in the SCD would be permitted to make a trip abroad unrelated to his supervisory function, a judgment for which there is no supporting evidence.

As regards the trip of NOSENKO to Bulgaria in 1961, for which there is no collateral information, the previous summary concluded that his account of the trip was untrue and argued that such a trip to Bulgaria, if it did take place, at a time when he claimed the operation against [STORSBERG] was reaching a climax and his subordinates were "apparently planning to exploit [KEYSERS'] newly-discovered vulnerability," it would indicate that the presence of NOSENKO in Moscow was dispensable. There was, however, no evidence that NOSENKO did not travel to Bulgaria and only highly speculative reasoning as to why his account of the purpose of the trip was untrue.

As to the [STORSBERG] case, while it cannot at present be proved that the recruitment pitch took place before NOSENKO left for Bulgaria, it can be stated, on the basis of reporting from [MORONE], that it had to have taken place before the time NOSENKO returned from Bulgaria. Since no serious question has ever been raised concerning the presence

of NOSENKO in Moscow at the time this pitch was made, it would appear that NOSENKO was comparatively free to go to Bulgaria because this phase of the [STORSBERG] operation had been completed.

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As to the [KEYSERS] case, there is no apparent problem since it is clear that the approach to [KEYSERS] took place after NOSENKO returned from Bulgaria, and furthermore that the KGB probably did not become aware that [KEYSERS] was a homosexual, and therefore potentially vulnerable, until just before the pitch was made.

In short, there is no reason to believe that the accounts by NOSENKO of his trips to Cuba and to Bulgaria are not essentially true, or that if they are true they necessarily reflect on his claim to having been supervisor of code clerk operations.

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F. NOSENKO's CLAIMS, THAT IN 1962 HE WAS CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN-BRITISH COMMONWEALTH SECTION AND WAS THEREAFTER A DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE SEVENTH DEPARTMENT, ARE NOT CREDIBLE

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F. NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible. (Previous conclusion)

The conclusion of this summary is that NOSENKO was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section (First Section) from January 1962 to July 1962 and that he was a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department thereafter.

NOSENKO has stated that, although he was offered the position of a Deputy Chief of the First Department, SCD, by Oleg M. GRIBANOV, Chief, SCD, and although an order had been prepared and was in the Personnel Directorate, he declined the proffered position.

According to NOSENKO, he knew that Sergey Mikhaylovich FEDOSEYEV, the Chief of the First Department, did not want NOSENKO as a Deputy Chief, but instead wanted to promote Vladislav KOVSHUK, then Chief of the First Section, to the position. FEDOSEYEV was

willing to promote NOSENKO to the position of Chief, First Section. However, GRIBANOV did not wish to promote KOVSHUK and NOSENKO considered that under the circumstances it would be better for him to return to the Seventh Department rather than to become a Deputy to FEDOSEYEV who wanted KOVSHUK as a Deputy.

Vladimir Dmitriyevich CHELNOKOV had offered NOSENKO the position of Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department, pending the reassignment of BALDIN to Germany at which time NOSENKO would become a Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, replacing BALDIN. The above explanation of NOSENKO seems plausible and credible and indicates that GRIBANOV, the Chief of the SCD, for reasons best known to GRIBANOV, was assisting NOSENKO in his career in the KGB.

This section actually covers two periods in the claimed career of NOSENKO; namely, January - July 1962 as Chief of the First Section, and July 1962 - January 1964 as a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. Since NOSENKO was in Geneva, Switzerland, from March to June 1962, he actually cannot be seriously faulted for not having detailed knowledge of the activities of the First Section during January - July 1962. The previous summary (pages 268 - 291) contains remarks in regard to the January - July 1962 period, including the period of March - June 1962 when he was in Geneva. Four specific tourist cases

are discussed in the previous summary: the cases of [Wallace Everett JOHNSON, William Carroll JONES, Natalie BIENSTOCK, and Horst BRAUNS]. Apparent conflicts between information from NOSENKO and information derived from subsequent interviews with these individuals were cited as evidence impugning NOSENKO. It is not believed that the previous comments concerning these cases constitute any substantial evidence that NOSENKO did not hold the claimed position of Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department, during January - July 1962. That there were KGB operations against [JOHNSON, JONES, BIENSTOCK and BRAUNS] has been confirmed through interviews by the FBI of all four individuals.

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A few additional remarks in regard to the above four cases are warranted, not because it is considered that there are any substantial discrepancies between what NOSENKO has said and what each individual stated when interviewed, but because they may provide additional clarification.

In the [Wallace Everett JOHNSON] case, it was previously noted that [JOHNSON] arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961 and that the KGB operation against him occurred on 5 January 1962. The summary suggested that the short lapse of time indicated that the homosexual tendencies of [JOHNSON] were known to the KGB prior to his arrival, contrary to the statements of NOSENKO. NOSENKO during current interviews

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has stated that the KGB learned of the homosexual tendencies of JOHNSON "by chance" soon after his arrival. "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY," two homosexual agents of NOSENKO, were at the time operating out of a room at the Metropol Hotel where JOHNSON stayed. They met JOHNSON there and reported his apparent homosexual tendencies.

In regard to the William Carroll JONES case, NOSENKO during current interviews has furnished additional information on the KGB operation against JONES, including the woman Ludmila BUGAYEVA who was recruited as an agent to work against JONES and was used in another case. The other details furnished by NOSENKO concerning the JONES case are compatible with his claim to having been Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department.

In regard to the Natalie BIENSTOCK case, NOSENKO did not claim to have been the responsible case officer but was able to provide enough specific information concerning the case to bring about a confession when she was interviewed by the FBI. That he did not know all the details concerning the BIENSTOCK case could be explained by his claim to have been Chief of Section and not the case officer directly involved with the case.

In regard to the Horst BRAUNS case, in the previous summary the criticism was levied that NOSENKO did not know why BRAUNS visited the USSR and was not able to identify any Soviet citizens whom BRAUNS met in the USSR. It was also stated that NOSENKO had explained that

the Seventh Department was not concerned with foreigners visiting relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet expatriates. NOSENKO, according to the previous summary, was aware that BRAUNS was a former Soviet citizen and the summary stated that his plan to visit relatives was information available to the KGB through his visa application.

In regard to the statement that the Seventh Department was not concerned with foreigners visiting relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet expatriates, this is not in agreement with current information from NOSENKO.* Cases of "true" tourists, which were normally the responsibility of the Seventh Department, could become the responsibility of another department or KGB component where Soviet relatives were involved. However, if the case was not taken over or assigned by higher authority to another department or component, it was and remained the responsibility of the Seventh Department. The fact that BRAUNS was a former Soviet citizen could very well have made BRAUNS of interest to the Second Section, First Department, or a direction in the Service of the SCD. However, in the absence of an actual reassignment by higher authority, the case would remain the responsibility of the Seventh Department since BRAUNS was visiting the Soviet Union on a tourist visa. The previous summary also indicated that BRAUNS listed on his visa application that he planned to visit relatives in Leningrad. BRAUNS had a

* By 1962 there had been a large reorganization in the SCD and in the Seventh Department. The situation was not the same as in 1959.

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relative or relatives in Leningrad. Although [BRAUNS] when interviewed by the FBI, mentioned a number of items of which the KGB was aware concerning his background and occupation from his visa application, there is no specific reference in these interviews indicating his statement of purpose in visiting the USSR.

Pages 282 - 286 of the previous summary reviews remarks by NOSENKO on the Boris BELITSKIY case and states that his claimed role in the case was not plausible. There are several specific points made in the summary which imply that NOSENKO was lying about his knowledge of the case. There is adequate reason to believe that NOSENKO exaggerated his own 1962 role in that NOSENKO now states he was to give assistance to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV in the handling of BELITSKIY in Geneva in 1962 and not to supervise ARTEMOV.

The more important aspect and the primary one is the difference in what NOSENKO specifically reported about the BELITSKIY case and information from the actual CIA record of the case. There are major differences and without going into all the details of the case which is very involved, an effort has been made toward determining whether these apparent differences necessarily indicate that NOSENKO was or is lying or whether there is a possibility he is relating the actual KGB version of the case.

NOSENKO has stated that BELITSKIY was a KGB agent whom American Intelligence recruited in London in 1960 or 1961 and that the

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KGB purpose in running the operation was to lure American Intelligence into meeting BELITSKIY inside the USSR. The previous summary stated that NOSENKO did not know when the BELITSKIY operation started (Brussels, Belgium, 1958), did not know the nature of the British involvement, did not know the operational details and contact arrangements BELITSKIY had with CIA, and did not know BELITSKIY's pattern of activity in Moscow or Geneva.

NOSENKO during current interviews has indicated an awareness that the KGB (Second Section, First Department) had been trying to use BELITSKIY against the British. However, he still has dated the recruitment of BELITSKIY as 1960-1961 in London and still states that the primary purpose of the KGB was to involve American Intelligence in contacts with BELITSKIY within the USSR. The latter was considered completely inconsistent with the fact that BELITSKIY was recruited in Brussels, Belgium, in 1958; that three letters had been mailed to BELITSKIY in the USSR in 1959 and early 1960; and that BELITSKIY had an accommodation address for contact outside the USSR.

There are at this time sufficient unresolved questions in the BELITSKIY case to preclude any conclusion that the apparent discrepancies between the statements by NOSENKO on the BELITSKIY case and the actual record are a reflection against NOSENKO. On

the other hand, there is some reason to believe NOSENKO has furnished the actual KGB version of the BELITSKIY case and that the KGB, at least as of 1962, did not know the true story of the relationship of BELITSKIY with CIA. There is a distinct possibility the KGB believed the BELITSKIY recruitment occurred in 1961 in London and BELITSKIY did not then nor has he since admitted to the KGB his association with CIA actually started in 1958 in Brussels, Belgium. As a possible reason why BELITSKIY would have told the KGB in 1961 a partial story of his contact with American Intelligence, some at present unknown event may have occurred in 1961 which caused BELITSKIY to believe his security was endangered and as a result he told the KGB of certain events in London in 1961, relating these events as being the original approach to BELITSKIY by CIA.

The following are certain of the points which suggest the KGB actually considered that BELITSKIY was recruited by CIA in London in 1961 and that BELITSKIY may have never told the KGB of the developments in his case prior to 1961:

(a) BELITSKIY was in London in April 1960 at which time he was in contact with a British citizen who was also reporting to MI-5. This individual reported information received from BELITSKIY which may have been a lead to

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George BLAKE. (It seems highly unlikely the KGB would ever have directed BELITSKIY to furnish information which may have been a lead to George BLAKE, or at least could have caused the employees of the unit in which BLAKE was employed from June 1959 to August 1960 to come under suspicion as having passed information to Soviet Intelligence.)

(b) NOSENKO has stated that BELITSKIY, after he went to Geneva in 1962, managed to reinitiate contact with CIA rather quickly because he met a girl he had previously known whom he was sure was an American Intelligence agent and that she must have reported his presence in Geneva to American Intelligence. (If the BELITSKIY case had been controlled by the KGB from its inception in 1958, the KGB would have known of the internal mailings to BELITSKIY and the fact that BELITSKIY had a cover address outside the Soviet Union through which to initiate contact. However, if BELITSKIY did not tell the KGB anything about his contacts with CIA prior to 1961 and then gave only a partial story of what happened in London in 1961, BELITSKIY would not have told the KGB of the internal mailings to BELITSKIY in the USSR or the fact that he long had a cover address outside the USSR. BELITSKIY therefore

would not have told the KGB how he actually made contact with American Intelligence in Geneva in 1962, but very well could have told the KGB he had seen a particular woman whom he had previously known, he was sure she worked for American Intelligence and it was through this woman American Intelligence became aware BELITSKIY was in Geneva.)

(c) BELITSKIY in 1962 in Geneva agreed to meet within the USSR an individual representing CIA. However, his agreement was only under certain stipulated conditions, the most interesting of which was that the individual must be unwitting of the true nature of the relationship of BELITSKIY with CIA. In addition, any message to BELITSKIY or any individual who met BELITSKIY must make no reference to any previous meeting of BELITSKIY with CIA.

The above conditions are quite explainable if BELITSKIY had not been under KGB control between 1958 and 1961 and in 1961 gave the KGB only a partial story of the 1961 events in London.

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As previously indicated, the conclusion is there are a sufficient number of unresolved questions in the BELITSKIY case so that discrepancies between information from NOSENKO and the actual record in the BELITSKIY case cannot at present be considered as a reflection against NOSENKO, and there is a distinct possibility the KGB actually did not know the true facts of the BELITSKIY case.

The previous summary noted on page 106 that Nataliya SHULGINA was an Intourist interpreter recruited by NOSENKO in 1955. It also noted that NOSENKO had stated Boris BELITSKIY "reported to the KGB that CIA had warned BELITSKIY against SHULGINA." The previous summary stated BELITSKIY reported to CIA that SHULGINA was a KGB agent and "CIA did not warn BELITSKIY."

There appears to be no doubt at this time that the statement by NOSENKO that BELITSKIY reported the "CIA had warned BELITSKIY against SHULGINA," is a reasonably accurate description of what actually happened in May 1962 during Agency contacts with BELITSKIY in Geneva. The record reflects that BELITSKIY stated SHULGINA had confidentially told him of her status as a KGB agent, stating she had been doubled by the KGB after having been forcibly recruited by American Intelligence while previously in Paris, France.

It was determined there was no collateral information which would indicate that the statement by SHULGINA had any factual basis and BELITSKIY was warned SHULGINA may have been acting on behalf of the KGB in stating to BELITSKIY she had been "forcibly recruited by American Intelligence" at a previous date. It was also suggested to BELITSKIY that he should go to the KGB as a loyal Soviet citizen and report the apparent indiscretion of SHULGINA.

Pages 282 - 286 of the previous summary, in connection with the BELITSKIY case, made reference to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV. It was stated that ARTEMOV had been involved with a series of American tourist agents in the Soviet Union and although NOSENKO was allegedly familiar with ARTEMOV, he was unaware of the involvement of ARTEMOV with American tourist agents in 1958 - 1959. The summary noted this was during a period when NOSENKO claimed to have been Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department. Although not specifically stated, the above suggested ARTEMOV was actually in the Seventh Department in 1958 - 1959 and that NOSENKO was not even aware ARTEMOV was in the Seventh Department. NOSENKO has consistently stated that ARTEMOV was assigned to the First Section, First Department, from the time he entered into the KGB in approximately 1957.

A closer examination of the cases described in the previous summary as "CIA American tourist agents," reveals there is no conflict in the involvement of ARTEMOV in these cases and the statement by NOSENKO that ARTEMOV was with the First Section, First Department. As an example, one of the cases is the case of [Edward McGOWAN.] 06 NOSENKO has furnished information concerning this case, stating it was originally a Seventh Department case and that after the mailing of a letter by the individual in Minsk, the case was immediately taken over by the First Department. There is adequate reason to believe ARTEMOV only became involved after the case was transferred to the First Department.

Another of the cases involved the contact of ARTEMOV with [a CIA officer who was under Department of State cover in Helsinki, Finland,] 08,24,14-1 and visited the USSR on a tourist visa. Such an individual would under no circumstances be considered a true tourist or the responsibility of the Seventh Department, particularly since apparently the individual was even traveling under a diplomatic passport. It is assumed the individual was of interest to the First Chief Directorate and if the First Chief Directorate required or desired support from the SCD, it would normally request the First Department for such assistance and it is extremely unlikely that the FCD would request the Seventh Department for assistance in a case involving an American diplomat.

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Pages 332 - 333 of the previous summary contain the basis for the previous conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he was a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1963 was not credible. It is considered that a detailed rebuttal is not necessary since this conclusion was apparently based on inadequate information. During current interviews, NOSENKO has furnished details concerning his duties and other aspects of his claimed position which substantiate his claim to having been a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1964.

An example in support of the statement that the previous conclusion was based on inadequate information is the matter of the written notes which NOSENKO brought out and furnished to CIA in early 1964. The description of these notes on page 319 of the previous summary is inadequate, inaccurate, and misleading. Prior to current interviews, an effort had not been made to obtain from NOSENKO a detailed explanation of his notes or of how he obtained the information in the notes.

During current interviews, NOSENKO has given detailed information concerning all aspects of his notes. This information supports his claimed position of Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department and includes collateral support to his claim of being Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, in 1960 - 1961.

Primarily the notes of NOSENKO can be categorized as follows:

(a) Short case summaries by the Chiefs of the First Section, Second Section and Sixth Section, Seventh Department. NOSENKO has stated that he was in 1962 - 1963 responsible for supervision over these Sections and that Filip Denisovich BOBKOV, Deputy Chief, SCD, who supervised the Seventh Department, requested a list of all recruited agents of the Seventh Department. According to NOSENKO, the order from BOBKOV was to only retain the files (cases) of agents in tourist firms and that the files of other recruited agents should be sent to the FCD or Archives. NOSENKO has stated that he in turn levied on the Chiefs of the three Sections the requirement of BOBKOV, but also expanded the request to include all 1960 - 1962 cases, not excluding previous cases or cases which had already been given to the FCD. The notes of NOSENKO included handwritten reports from the Chief or Acting Chief of each Section on recruited agents, with information varying from agent to agent and even including some human errors.

Many of the above cases had previously been transferred to the FCD, but the remarks of NOSENKO about their

inclusion support his statement that he had expanded the original request from BOBKOV so that he would have some "pieces of information to give CIA."

(b) Notes by NOSENKO on other cases which he learned of during the 1962 - 1963 period. Certain of the notes were made from a review of a notebook kept by the Chief, Seventh Department, to which NOSENKO had access on at least two occasions. Most of his notes were not detailed but were sufficient to refresh the memory of NOSENKO at a later date and yet were somewhat innocuous to maintain before his defection.

(c) Notes for lectures to officers of the Seventh Directorate prepared while with the First Department, 1960 - 1961, and the Seventh Department, 1962 - 1963.

(d) Draft report for the briefing of the new Chief, First Department, in the latter part of 1961.

(e) One of three copies of an unregistered report prepared by the Chief, Seventh Department, and two Deputy Chiefs, including NOSENKO. This was a briefing paper for use by the Chief (CHELNOKOV) in an appearance before the Collegium of the KGB which was reviewing the activities of the Seventh

Department. According to NOSENKO, the prepared report was never typed as a formal document.

The view has been set forth that NOSENKO took undue risk in carrying written notes with him out of the Soviet Union. An examination of this material suggests that NOSENKO was using extreme care in collecting material and was not attempting to obtain documents, the possession of which might be incriminating or which if he had brought out would have been immediately missed. Instead, he collected a considerable amount of valuable information which he could bring out with little or no fear that a search of his effects in the KGB after his departure for Geneva would disclose that certain material was missing. None of the material was registered and all could have previously been destroyed by NOSENKO.

The previous summary stated that NOSENKO brought three KGB documents to Geneva. These were typed papers but none was registered or actually accountable. The reference to three documents was to:

(a) The draft report for the briefing of the Collegium which has been mentioned previously.

(b) A typed two-page report on several cases. Actually a Chief of Section had typed his notes on cases instead of submitting in handwriting as the others did.

(c) A second copy of a summary on a KGB agent. NOSENKO stated that there were two copies in the file kept by the Ch·ef which he reviewed and that he kept one. Of interest is the fact that the copy was not a registered document and did not contain the usual information as to number of copies typed.

G. NOSENKO HAS NO VALID CLAIM TO CERTAINTY THAT THE KGB RECRUITED NO AMERICAN EMBASSY PERSONNEL BETWEEN 1953 AND HIS DEFECTION IN 1964

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G. NOSENKO has no valid claim to certainty that the KGB recruited no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and his defection in 1964. (Previous conclusion)

The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO is of the opinion that there were no KGB recruitments of United States Embassy personnel in Moscow between 1953 and December 1963 with the exception of "ANDREY" (Dayle Wallis SMITH) and Herbert HOWARD who actually was a USIA employee but did work part of the time in the Embassy.

The question here is whether or not the expressed opinion of NOSENKO is sufficiently based on actual knowledge so that this opinion can be accepted as absolute evidence that there were no other KGB recruitments of Embassy personnel during this period of time. The only logical conclusion is that the opinion of NOSENKO cannot be accepted as absolute fact and, therefore, there is a possibility that a recruitment could have occurred and NOSENKO not be aware in any way of the recruitment. This should in no way be interpreted as a suggestion that NOSENKO could be lying, but rather that an unbiased observer without personal knowledge could and should be hesitant to accept the expressed opinion of NOSENKO in this particular area.

The actual basis for the stated opinion of NOSENKO should be examined and can be cited as follows.

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(a) During March 1953-late May 1955 NOSENKO was a case officer in the First Section, First Department, SCD. NOSENKO does not claim that he would have known the details concerning any recruitments (other than "ANDREY") in this period, but states if there had been he would have heard "something."

(b) During late May 1955 to December 1959 NOSENKO was in the Seventh Department, not the First Department, but continued to have contact with certain officers in the First Section, First Department. NOSENKO is of the opinion that if there had been a recruitment in the United States Embassy during this period he would have heard "something" even though he would probably have learned few details.

(c) During the January 1960-December 1961 period NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, and he has made the categorical statement that there were no recruitments by the KGB of United States Embassy personnel during this period of time. He has also stated that if there had been any recruitments during the 1953-1959 period he is sure he would, during 1960-1961, have heard or learned some details of the case or cases. There is merit to this contention by

NOSENKO since the Chief of Section was Vladislav KOVSHUK who had been an officer of the First Department since 1953, actually working in the First Section except for the periods of time that he was in the United States to reactivate "ANDREY" in 1957-1958 and a period of time that he was Deputy Chief of the First Department.

(d) During 1962-1963 NOSENKO was again in the Seventh Department. However, he continued to maintain contact with certain officers of the First Section, First Department: in particular, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV, who succeeded NOSENKO as Deputy Chief of the First Section, then became Chief of Section, and in the latter part of 1963 became a Deputy Chief of the First Department.

According to NOSENKO his relationship with GRYAZNOV was sufficiently close during 1962-1963 that he is sure GRYAZNOV would have furnished NOSENKO some information in regard to any successful recruitments of United States Embassy personnel. NOSENKO pointed out that he learned of the existence of the [Herbert HOWARD] 06 case from GRYAZNOV in 1962, although it was not until 1963 that NOSENKO heard the name. NOSENKO actually

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learned of the name when the First Section, First Department, needed the services of the Seventh Department (Third Section) in obtaining a room in a certain hotel for the Soviet girl friend of [HOWARD]. 06

In general the above constitutes the basis for the stated opinion of NOSENKO that "ANDREY" and [Herbert HOWARD] 06 were the only successful KGB recruitments during 1953 - December 1963. It should be noted that there are no other identified KGB recruitments during this period of time which would specifically refute the opinion of NOSENKO. However, in view of the cited actual basis for the opinion of NOSENKO, acceptance of the opinion of NOSENKO as being an honest opinion should not be converted into a statement that it is absolute proof that another recruitment could not have occurred. NOSENKO may be completely correct in his opinion, but since NOSENKO was only in the First Department 1953 - 1955 and 1960 - 1961 his opinion that he would have heard "something" about a recruitment in 1955 - 1959 or 1962 - 1963 cannot be accepted as infallible.

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V. ANNEX

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
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ANNEX

The previous summary contained an Annex "A" and an Annex "B" covering pages 316 - 435. Limited comments concerning Annex "A," Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO, and Annex "B," Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text, are attached. In addition, there is an Annex "C" to this summary which is entitled, "The Cherepanov Papers."

Attachments:
Annex A
Annex B
Annex C

ANNEX B - SUMMARIES OF CASES NOT EXAMINED IN TEXT

ANNEX B

SUMMARIES OF CASES NOT EXAMINED IN TEXT

Pages 399 - 435 of the previous summary contain summaries on the cases of [49] 08 Americans who, according to information from NOSENKO, were of KGB interest, were approached by the KGB, or were actually recruited by the KGB. It was stated that these cases did not clearly relate to the specific KGB positions held at particular times by NOSENKO and thus could not be usefully employed in examining his claimed KGB service. The sourcing of these cases has been explored in detail during the current interviews with NOSENKO, and it is now possible to establish a certain relationship between these cases and certain claimed positions of NOSENKO in the KGB.

It is the conclusion of this summary that any group of [49] 08 cases, as well as all other cases concerning which NOSENKO has furnished information, must be fully considered, not necessarily for the importance or unimportance of the information, but to determine how NOSENKO claimed to have learned of the case and whether his statements concerning each identified case are supported by collateral information. These factors are important in assessing the overall validity of information from NOSENKO as well as being supporting evidence of his claimed positions in the KGB.

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To comment specifically on each of the [49] cases would require a very lengthy paper. Current interviews have developed pertinent additional information from NOSENKO in approximately [40] of the [49] cases. Of even more significance is the fact that NOSENKO has logically sourced his information in all except perhaps [four] cases. The indicated inability of NOSENKO to completely source all [49] of the cases is not considered significant, particularly since his having knowledge of all the cases is quite compatible with his claimed positions in the KGB. In addition, criticism of NOSENKO for not being able to source all of his information would be unreasonable since it makes no allowance for normal lapses of memory or failure to recall something which was insignificant at the time it occurred.

Without citing in detail any of the [49] cases, the ways in which NOSENKO learned of a number of the cases are considered important since there is a direct relationship to his claimed positions in the KGB during 1960 - January 1964, specifically the position of Deputy Chief, First Section, First Department, 1960 - 1961; Chief, First Section, Seventh Department, January - July 1962; and as Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, July 1962 - January 1964. Certain examples of the above are as follows:

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(a) NOSENKO learned of a number of the Seventh Department cases which had occurred in 1960 - 1961, as well as several 1956 - 1959 cases from notes prepared by the Chief or Acting Chief of the First Section, Second Section and Sixth Section in 1963. These notes were prepared at the request of NOSENKO who as a Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, was responsible for supervision of these three sections; and the request was actually an expansion of the original request from BOBKOV, Deputy Chief of the SCD, for information on recruitments of the Seventh Department. NOSENKO brought with him in 1964 the notes prepared by the Chief or Acting Chief of the First Section, Second Section and Sixth Section and his knowledge of many of the cases which had occurred prior to 1962, particularly 1960 - 1961, was limited to information contained in the notes. From these notes, NOSENKO had prepared his report to BOBKOV eliminating those which were not applicable to the request.

(b) NOSENKO learned of several 1962 - 1963 cases of the First Section, First Department, from Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV who succeeded NOSENKO as Deputy Chief,

First Section, First Department. This information was furnished to NOSENKO primarily because of his friendship with GRYAZNOV and not as the result of mutual operations. However, NOSENKO learned of certain of the cases or was furnished additional details as a result of a request from the Seventh Department to the First Section, First Department, for assistance or vice versa.

Certain of the [49] 08 cases listed were cases of the Seventh Department prior to 1960 or in 1962 - 1963 when NOSENKO was in the Seventh Department. Certain of the cases were cases in which the First Section, First Department, was involved prior to 1960 or 1960 - 1961. The knowledge of NOSENKO concerning these two groups of cases does not materially support his claimed positions in the First Department and Seventh Department, but does support his claimed assignment to the Seventh Department prior to 1960 and in 1962 - 1963, and his claimed assignment to the First Department in 1960 - 1961.

It is difficult to specifically comment concerning these [49] 08 cases since they do not fall into one or two specific categories. Instead, they constitute a rather motley group of cases remaining after completion of the detailed sections of the previous summary. Included are First Department and Seventh Department cases covering a period of approximately five and one-half years. It should be noted, however, that the

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explanation of NOSENKO concerning his knowledge of the [49] cases is both plausible and compatible with his claimed positions in the First Department and Seventh Department during 1960 - January 1964.

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ANNEX C - THE CHEREPANOV PAPERS

ANNEX C

THE CHEREPANOV PAPERS

Pages 309 - 316 of the previous summary contain a description of the Cherepanov Papers, and how Aleksandr Nikolayevich CHEREPANOV passed a package of documents to an American tourist in Moscow in early November 1963. The conclusion, however, was that the assertions of NOSENKO with respect to the CHEREPANOV case were not material to the claim of NOSENKO that he was Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, in late 1963.

The definite relationship of the Cherepanov Papers to the bona fides of NOSENKO cannot be ignored and must be given specific consideration. If CHEREPANOV was under KGB control when he passed the papers to the American tourist, or if the papers contain "deception information," the bona fides of NOSENKO are subject to very serious question.

NOSENKO had personal knowledge of CHEREPANOV who was, according to NOSENKO, an officer in the First Section, First Department,

during 1960 - mid-1961 when he was forced into retirement from the KGB. During the above period of time, NOSENKO claims to have been Deputy Chief, First Section, although he does not claim to have had a direct supervisory responsibility over CHEREPANOV except in the absence of the Chief of Section, Vladislav KOVSHUK. NOSENKO also claims to have participated in the hunt for CHEREPANOV in December 1963.

Consideration has previously been given to the theory that the Cherepanov Papers were passed to Americans by the KGB through CHEREPANOV to support the bona fides of NOSENKO. This theory seems to have little credibility since the papers contain no information which would even support the claim of NOSENKO that he was in the First Section, First Department, 1960 - 1961. The papers also contain no information which would indicate there was even a Deputy Chief of the First Section during 1958 - 1960.

Statements by NOSENKO are emphatic that CHEREPANOV was not under KGB control, that he passed the papers which it later developed he had taken from the First Section prior to his retirement because he was disgruntled with his treatment by the KGB, and that the action by CHEREPANOV caused consternation in the KGB.

There is no collateral evidence which contradicts any of the statements by NOSENKO about CHEREPANOV. Further, there is

nothing in either the form or substance of the papers which provides a basis for suspicion as to their authenticity. In addition, the form and substance of the papers are in keeping with the description by NOSENKO of the day-to-day operation of the First Section, First Department.

During current interviews, the CHEREPANOV case has been covered in detail with NOSENKO. The Cherepanov Papers, which were originally shown to NOSENKO in 1964 after his defection, have also been covered in detail on a separate item-by-item basis. Although NOSENKO does not claim to have specifically seen any particular item prior to 1964, his statements in regard to the various handwritings, types of notes, and draft memoranda leave no doubt that NOSENKO was very familiar with personnel in the First Section, First Department, and with First Department procedures.

Certain additional research has been conducted in regard to the papers and a detailed analysis will be prepared at a later date. It should be noted that a considerable amount of personal judgment has been necessary in making an assessment of the Cherepanov Papers since there are no exemplars with which to compare any of the material. However, based on information developed thus far, and there is no reason to believe additional work will alter the conclusion, there is not an adequate basis for an opinion that CHEREPANOV was under KGB control, that the Cherepanov Papers contain "deceptive information,"

or that the papers were other than the collection of material by a disgruntled employee which he very carefully selected or accumulated, the removal of which would only have constituted a minimal risk to CHEREPANOV.

The entire Cherepanov Papers have been reviewed to determine if there is any information which could be considered "deceptive information" either by direct statement or implication. Two possible areas have been noted and given full consideration. These areas are:

(a) There is no specific information that there were any recruitments by the KGB of American personnel in the United States Embassy during 1958 - 1960, nor is there any information suggesting the KGB had an American source or American agent in the Embassy during that period of time.

(b) Petr S. POPOV, a GRU officer who had been an extremely valuable CIA source from 1953 on, was, according to the papers, exposed to the KGB in January 1959 as a result of a letter mailing by George Payne WINTERS, Jr. WINTERS was a CIA employee under [Department of State cover] assigned to the Embassy in Moscow. The letter, which was to POPOV, was obtained by the KGB after mailing by WINTERS and was a direct result of KGB surveillance of WINTERS.

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In regard to (a), the papers are only a rather minute part of the total papers prepared in the First Section during 1958 - 1960. The lack of any information in these papers which directly or indirectly indicates that the KGB made a recruitment of an American in the Embassy or had an American source in the Embassy during the 1958 - 1960 period is only a matter for consideration. It is not conclusive proof that a recruitment was not made or that an American source did not exist. The papers do not contain a positive statement on either matter.

In regard to (b), the quite specific information in the papers that Petr S. POPOV was uncovered by the KGB as a result of KGB surveillance on George Payne WINTERS, Jr., who mailed a letter to POPOV in January 1959, this information should be considered as possibly information of a deceptive nature unless an adequate explanation can be made for its presence in the papers. POPOV was recalled to Moscow from East Germany in November 1958 ostensibly for TDY. The circumstances under which he was recalled and collateral information have given adequate grounds for a belief that by November 1958 POPOV was suspected by the KGB of cooperating with Western Intelligence or that the KGB may even have been sure POPOV had been cooperating with United States Intelligence.

It may be presumed that any lead to the KGB in regard to POPOV or the fact that United States Intelligence, more specifically

CIA, had a source in the GRU would have come from an agent or source of the FCD, KGB, not the SCD. It can also be presumed that a source or agent of the FCD in a position to furnish a lead to a penetration of the GRU by Western Intelligence would be carefully protected even within the KGB. The possibility of course exists that a lead from George BLAKE, an FCD agent, resulted in the exposure of POPOV to the KGB, but it is not established that it did nor is there any reason to believe the FCD could not or did not have another agent or agents who furnished information to the KGB pertinent to development of the case against POPOV.

The primary question, however, as regards the Cherepanov Papers is whether, even if it is presumed the KGB obtained information from an FCD source or agent which led to suspicion of POPOV or identification of POPOV, this would be incompatible with information in the papers and could only lead to the conclusion that the papers contain "deceptive information."

The conclusion in regard to the above is that the fact the papers attribute the exposure of POPOV to the KGB to surveillance on WINTERS when he mailed the letter to POPOV in January 1959 is not incompatible with the distinct possibility that the KGB had previously obtained information from an FCD agent or agents which actually led to suspicion in regard to POPOV or actual identification of POPOV.

If information was received from an important FCD agent such as George BLAKE or through another valuable FCD agent which led to KGB suspicion of POPOV prior to his return to Moscow in November 1958, it is highly unlikely such information would receive wide distribution within the KGB, either in the FCD or the SCD. It is also possible the limited group within the KGB who would be aware that the KGB had received information leading to suspicion of POPOV from a valuable agent would be very interested in attributing the exposure of POPOV to the fortuitous mailing of the letter to POPOV by WINTERS. The possibility should be considered that prior to the retrieval by the KGB of the letter to POPOV there was only a deep suspicion of POPOV but that the letter completely solidified the case against POPOV.

Consideration has been given to the possibility that CHEREPANOV was under KGB control when he passed the papers to the American tourist and that it was done by the KGB with the hope of involving CIA in a KGB-controlled operation within the USSR. In that event, the papers passed by CHEREPANOV would most likely be genuine since this would have been the initial step in what the KGB hoped would become a successful operation.

The above theory has been rejected since there are a number of factors which militate against it. These factors include the fact that

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the latest information in the papers was at least three years old, which would indicate CHEREPANOV had no current access and there was no indication CHEREPANOV was interested in a future contact.

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(Very possibly Igor Alekseyevich ZENKIN, but is now considered also identical to Igor Alekseyevich SERGEYEV, Igor Alekseyevich SUKHOV and very possibly Igor A. SMIRNOV.)

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1. Attached are the following pages of the Top Secret study entitled, The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector - Yuriy I. NOSENKO, dated February 1968 (copy 10). Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier for your review.

2. We have deleted certain portions of these pages containing information which bears on the security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.

3. We request return of the study (copy 10), Annex A and Attachment when your review has been completed.

Attachment: Pages vi, vii, 20, 46, 47, 49, 50, 266, 277, 278
281, 294, 295, 297, 313, 324, 325, 326, 336 and
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CONTENTS

Soviet Officials' Statements About NOSENKO

The portrait of NOSENKO which emerges from Soviet officials' statements about him since his defection coincides markedly with NOSENKO's self-description. According to the comments of Soviet officials, principally intelligence officers most likely to be speaking authoritatively, defector NOSENKO was the son of the deceased Minister, he served over a decade in the KGB, his personal shortcomings were overcome through the patronage of KGB General GRIBANOV, and in connection with operations against Americans he occupied positions of progressively greater trust and responsibility, ultimately becoming Deputy Chief of the largest department in the key Second (Counterintelligence) Chief Directorate. According to these sources, his defection wrought severe damage "for years to come" to the KGB because of his knowledge of KGB operations against American targets, and his treachery prompted the expulsion and disgrace of numerous senior KGB personnel, the recall of many others from abroad, the virtual suspension of KGB operations in the United States, and extraordinary plans to assassinate him.

These statements are related in chronological order in Annex A.

Baku), where he finished the Eighth Class in spring, 1943. In a second version [more probable since entry to the Moscow Special Naval School required prior completion of the Seventh Class] NOSENKO said that when the war broke out he and his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where he completed the Seventh Class in summer of 1942. They returned to Moscow afterwards, and NOSENKO was then enrolled in the Moscow Special Naval School (then in Kuybyshev) where he completed the Eighth Class in 1943; in the fall of 1943 NOSENKO was enrolled in the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School (then in Baku).

After just six months in Baku, without completing the Ninth Class, NOSENKO ran away from school and returned to Moscow.

Comment: NOSENKO has asserted variously that he ran away and fought on the front at Tuapse, and that he had finished the Tenth Class in Baku and then spent the period 1943-1945 at the Frunze Higher Naval School, the equivalent of Annapolis. He has retracted both assertions.

NOSENKO completed the Ninth Class in June 1944 at the Moscow Mining Institute, and when the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School returned to Leningrad from Baku, he resumed his studies there. Early in 1945, however, NOSENKO received a gunshot wound in the hand, and after being hospitalized for a month, he left the Naval school.

Comment: NOSENKO has claimed both that he was shot by a jealous naval officer whom he then protected by stating that the wound was self-inflicted, and that he actually did accidently shoot himself. [a sensitive source] quoted [a KGB officer] to the effect that NOSENKO shot himself to avoid being sent to the front while attending a naval college in 1942.

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

Comment: (Continued)
After NOSENKO's defection was publicized, Soviet Naval defector ARTAMONOV volunteered to CIA that he had known the son of the Minister NOSENKO in the naval school in Leningrad from 1944 to 1946.

NOSENKO completed the Tenth Class at the Leningrad Ship-building Tekhnikum in June 1945, and he successfully passed the necessary examinations to qualify him for entrance to the Moscow Institute of International Relations that summer.

Birth to 1945: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO is virtually the sole source of information on his early life. However, this portion of his claimed biography is consistent with the NOSENKO family's whereabouts as publicized in press accounts at the time of his father's death in 1956, and with the existence of the schools he claims to have attended.

Allowing for exaggerated claims of boyhood heroics (fighting at the front, attending the Frunze Academy, and formal induction in and discharge from the Navy), all of which NOSENKO has retracted under interrogation, NOSENKO's claimed identity as the son of Minister Ivan I. NOSENKO and the substance of his claims about his life until 1945 are accepted as true.

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

NOSENKO has said at various times that the Institute course was of four years' duration and that he entered the Naval RU on graduation in 1949; that it was four years' duration and that because he failed a state examination he was graduated later, in 1950; that it was of five years' duration and he graduated in 1950, on schedule; and that it was of five years' duration but he failed an examination which delayed his graduation for three months.

Comment: See p.367 for report that NOSENKO joined the KGB upon graduation from the Institute in 1947. The duration of the Institute course and the date of NOSENKO's completion are material to the plausibility of his claimed Naval RU service, which he said followed almost immediately upon his departure from the Institute.

Naval RU Service (ca. 1951 - ca. 1953)

NOSENKO claims that upon completion of his studies at the Institute of International Relations he entered the Naval RU, serving in the Far East and then in a Baltic post, finally successfully "transferring" to the KGB through the intervention of his father's friend, KGB General KOBULOV. A sensitive source [redacted] is the sole source also asserting that NOSENKO served in the RU. According to [redacted] this source, NOSENKO attended the Military-Diplomatic Academy and then served in the RU Information Department for about a year before securing a transfer to the KGB through his father's influence. NOSENKO denies having attended the Military-Diplomatic Academy and has never claimed service in the RU Information (Reports) Department, although he had on occasion claimed to have held Reports assignments.

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

A sensitive source [redacted] has quoted two KGB officers [redacted] respectively, as stating NOSENKO joined the KGB in 1947 or 1949.

The significance of NOSENKO's RU service is the fact that he claims it launched his intelligence career and served as the means through which he secured appointment to the KGB after once having been rejected. The two or more years he claimed to have served in the RU represent a significant period of his adult life for which he should have no difficulty accounting. Finally, the date of his actual transfer from the Naval RU to the KGB is critical to determining the time from which his claims about KGB service can be judged credible.

NOSENKO volunteered extensive comment on his Naval RU service at his first meetings with CIA in 1962. After his 1964 defection, it was the topic on which he made one of his initial retractions and his first admission that he had earlier made a false claim. The subject of his Naval RU service was consequently prominent in interrogations in 1964, 1965 and 1966. However, throughout these interrogations, challenges of his assertions about his RU service prompted adjustments in his claimed date of graduation from the Institute or claimed date of entry into the KGB, just as challenges on those latter topics prompted amended statements with respect to his RU service. The extent of the still-unreconciled discrepancies and contradictions in NOSENKO's various accounts is best perceived in comparison of his statements made in 1962, 1964, 1965 and 1966.

NOSENKO's Information-1962

NOSENKO finished the Institute of International Relations in 1950 and immediately reported for duty with the RU. [He did not amplify how he drew such an assignment.] In September 1950 he was offered assignments in Leningrad, Moscow, and in the Far East, and he chose the Far East "so no one would think he would take advantage of his father's position". He was assigned to a radio signals interception unit in Sovetskaya Gavan' (on the Soviet coast opposite Sakhalin), where he collected Order of Battle information by monitoring the communications of American units operating in

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

FRIPPEL was a weak agent: "he was afraid and gave practically nothing." NOSENKO said that although he had recruited him, "honestly speaking, FRIPPEL was not an agent." The KGB nevertheless hoped that FRIPPEL would be reassigned to Moscow at some future date. (See p.137 for details of the FRIPPEL case.)

Comment: FRIPPEL agrees with NOSENKO that they met twice in the USSR in 1963. However, FRIPPEL asserts he also met NOSENKO in Odessa in February 1962, which NOSENKO flatly denies. FRIPPEL is known to have planned to travel to the Soviet Union at that time, and there is no apparent reason why he would make a false claim on this matter. According to [redacted] a sensitive source, FRIPPEL, who is now in New York City, is a current target of the [redacted] Soviet intelligence service.

Johannes PREISFREUND

The KGB considered PREISFREUND compromised to American Intelligence after GOLITSYN's defection (in December 1961) and thus unsuitable for further use against Americans at the Embassy in Moscow. For this reason, NOSENKO was told to take PREISFREUND with him when he transferred to the Seventh Department. As the agent spoke only Finnish and Russian, however, he was of no use against English-speaking tourists. NOSENKO met with PREISFREUND on the latter's visits to Moscow in 1962, but did not use him in any operations.

Comment: PREISFREUND asserts that he was no longer a KGB agent after the STORSBERG operation (see p.175) and that although he saw NOSENKO on his frequent return visits to Moscow, it was only because NOSENKO sought a companion for wenching and drinking.

who was [erroneously] considered to be a CIA officer. SHAKHOV "maybe" had some contact with MARK in 1960 or 1961, but NOSENKO did not know the substance of it. A counter-intelligence officer of the First Chief Directorate, S.M. GOLUBEV, had once been on a delegation with SHAKHOV and he had noted "little details". While SHAKHOV was in the United States, earlier, he had been terminated [as an agent] by KGB officers who had submitted a report stating that SHAKHOV liked life in the Unites States, American products, and money. In that KGB report he was depicted as "not good" and 'not wanting to work as an agent".

NOSENKO stated that SHAKHOV had served with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the United States and that during that service he acted as an agent-recruiter for the KGB. SHAKHOV was permitted to travel abroad even though suspected of being an American agent, because he belonged to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and "the KGB could do nothing about his trips abroad'. "There was no proof, only suspicions, and furthermore, SHAKHOV was a member of the personal staff of the head of the Soviet delegation, S.K. Tsarapkin." According to NOSENKO, SHAKHOV was not and never had been a KGB officer.

Comment: SHAKHOV has served in and visited the United States since 1942, when he was assigned to the Soviet Consulate General in New York. He attended the 1945 Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, and he had attended a number of sessions of the UN General Assembly. Most recently SHAKHOV was assigned to the U.S. in 1963 as a member of the Soviet Mission to the UN. KGB officer RASTVOROV identified him as an MVD [KGB] officer whom he is certain he saw at MVD Headquarters in Moscow, a sensitive source [redacted] identified him as "an employee of the KGB": and KGB defectors PETROV and DERYABIN have reported that from a photograph, SHAKHOV's face "was familiar". An FBI source, however, in 1964 said that SHAKHOV was a "pure diplomat" and that to his knowledge, SHAKHOV had engaged in no Soviet intelligence activity until that time.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO described the various ways he had tested suspicions of SHAKHOV in Geneva. He gave SHAKHOV disinformation and then watched for an indication that he passed it on to his American contacts. SHAKHOV was told to perform countersurveillance tasks during a meeting by NOSENKO with an imaginary agent, while other KGB officers checked for signs that SHAKHOV had forewarned the Americans about the meeting. Finally NOSENKO revealed to SHAKHOV the location of a KGB dead drop and checked five days later to see whether the specially prepared materials emplaced had been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO's conclusion was that SHAKHOV was absolutely free of suspicion, and it was his intention to report this finding when he returned to KGB Headquarters from Geneva.

Comment: Currently in the United States, SHAKHOV is still "under suspicion", according to [illegible] a sensitive source.

Security Escort Officer for Soviet Disarmament Delegation

NOSENKO said that he was the sole KGB officer with the 94-man Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference and as such he was responsible for the security and behavior of the entire delegation. [KGB officers I.S. MAYOROV and M.S. TSYMBAL came with the delegation to Geneva, but they had left Geneva before NOSENKO made the foregoing statement to CIA.] To assist him in carrying out his security functions, NOSENKO had the services of a number of coopted informants of the KGB who were serving in the delegation. [NOSENKO has never reported what, if any, security checks he ran on the delegates in his charge, or what, if any, information his informants provided him.]

NOSENKO has never been precise about how he spent his days and nights in Geneva, but he has indicated that he disposed of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little to do. He explained in 1962 that he could come and go as he pleased because Ambassador Zorin knew who he was, as did most of the delegation. No one paid him any attention. It was known that he was not really a Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer, and he could absent himself from conference meetings at any time.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Yu.I. GUK

Implying that their friendship was of long standing, NOSENKO related in 1962 that he and GUK were together nearly every day in Geneva, where they went out to chat and have a few drinks. As a consequence, NOSENKO was granted access to the residency and was able to elicit information about some of GUK's operations in Geneva. He described his "big, big friend" GUK as the Deputy Legal Resident in Geneva and the only "strong officer" in the residency.

Comment: In 1964 NOSENKO attributed his gaining access to the residency in 1962 to TSYMBAL, not to GUK. According to several sources (see Annex A), because of his friendship with NOSENKO, GUK was dismissed from the KGB.

M.S. TSYMBAL

In 1962 NOSENKO reported TSYMBAL's presence in Geneva and identified him as Chief of the Illegals Directorate of the KGB First Chief Directorate. He alluded to having spoken with him, but placed no particular emphasis on their relationship.

In 1964 NOSENKO claimed that he had been dealing with TSYMBAL since 1960 or 1961, when he was looking for some candidates for recruitment and came across some whose background would have made them suitable for the Special [Illegals] Directorate. NOSENKO met TSYMBAL in Moscow in the KGB Headquarters and TSYMBAL had asked him several times to transfer to the First Chief Directorate and suggested that he might be assigned to the United States. In Geneva, he and TSYMBAL had dinner together several times a week, sometimes accompanied by KISLOV and sometimes alone. It was TSYMBAL's influence, NOSENKO said, which secured NOSENKO access to the residency in 1962 and established the precedent from which he was granted access in 1964.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-1964)

NOSENKO's Information

SLESINGER came under suspicion by the KGB First Chief Directorate because of his business transactions with a number of Soviets who visited his store and in whom he seemed to show more than casual interest. The First Chief Directorate was of the opinion that SLESINGER was trying to become closely acquainted with some Soviets, to study them. SLESINGER had visited the Soviet Union several times. Learning SLESINGER planned another trip to the USSR, the KGB suspected that "he might make some contacts or do something interesting" while visiting the Soviet Union. The KGB wanted to resolve its suspicions that SLESINGER was possibly an agent or operational contact of the FBI. The KGB had a file on SLESINGER, and a senior case officer in the American Section of the Seventh Department, Yu. M. DVORKIN, was the responsible case officer. An agent of the Seventh Department who was director of a photographic shop in Moscow was instructed to become friendly with SLESINGER while the latter was visiting the Soviet Union, and the two men later exchanged correspondence. SLESINGER went to Odessa to visit relatives, and DVORKIN directed the Odessa KGB to "surround" him with agents who could watch his behavior. If there had been any indication of intelligence activities, the KGB would have attempted to recruit SLESINGER, but since no evidence was developed, no approach was made. SLESINGER had travelled to the Soviet Union before, several times.

Comment: A sensitive source [redacted] had reported to the FBI that the KGB suspected SLESINGER to be an FBI "plant" and that KGB officer [redacted] "might be trying to develop SLESINGER to act as a courier or in some other agent capacity."

NOSENKO's information was substantially correct. Alfred Lazarevich SLESINGER, reported to the FBI in July 1962 of his June 1962 visit to Moscow and Odessa. In Odessa SLESINGER was contacted by a Soviet official who exhibited "intimate knowledge" of his business in New York City and had asked whether SLESINGER had "ever been bothered by the FBI."

Comment: (Continued)
In 1966 SLESINGER reported to the FBI that he was in touch with a Moscow photographic shop proprietor, and he described evidence of KGB interest in him during his visit to Odessa in 1962. Previous to visiting the Soviet Union in 1962, SLESINGER had been in contact with a number of Soviet officials from the United Nations.

NOSENKO was not specific in describing how he learned of SLESINGER, who may represent a First Chief Directorate case.

KOTEN's Arrest and the KGB Agent [redacted]

NOSENKO was asked in Geneva in 1964 whether he was involved in the arrest of an American tourist in the USSR in the fall of 1963. Almost at once, NOSENKO identified the case as that of Bernard KOTEN, a guide for Afton Tours in New York City (and hence an employee of Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, see above) who had been arrested on homosexual charges in Kiev. NOSENKO said that KOTEN was involved with an American agent of the KGB Scientific and Technical (S&T) Directorate. NOSENKO did not know the agent's name, but from the description he provided he is believed identical with [redacted] a KGB S&T agent identified earlier on the basis of a May 1962 report from [redacted] a sensitive source.

NOSENKO's Information

KOTEN was a longtime member of the American Communist Party and a frequent visitor after the Second World War to the Soviet Union, where he had extensive contacts among dissident literary figures and other Soviet citizens, particularly among Russian Jews. [NOSENKO explained in another context that the KGB is wary of foreigners' contacts with Soviet Jews because the Israeli Intelligence Service has frequently inspired such contacts.] Because of these many suspicious contacts, both the KGB First and Second Directorates had concluded that KOTEN might be a "provocation agent" planted in or recruited from the ranks of the Communist Party in the United States.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO's Information

SHUBIN was a native of California of Russian extraction, a Russian speaker, and a university professor in New York City. SHUBIN, who had visited the Soviet Union twice before, visited the Soviet Union in 1958 or 1959, while NOSENKO was serving his first tour of duty in the Seventh Department. At that time, SHUBIN was the target of Seventh Department case officer A.A. VETLITSKIY, NOSENKO heard later that SHUBIN was placed under surveillance, and when the KGB surveillance observed SHUBIN as a passenger in a Ministry of Defense automobile, the GRU was asked about the American. "They very furtively said that they were interested in him," from which the KGB concluded that SHUBIN was a GRU agent.

In 1962 (sic) NOSENKO was reviewing a list of foreign visitors to the Soviet Union and he noted SHUBIN's name and recalled his earlier identification as a GRU agent. NOSENKO himself telephoned GRU General SOKOLOV's office and informed SOKOLOV of SHUBIN's presence (or, according to another version, SOKOLOV's office was advised by others). SOKOLOV's office eventually apologized for having failed earlier to notify the KGB of the GRU's interest in SHUBIN.

Comment: Earlier, [a sensitive source] identified a [redacted] agent apparently identical with SHUBIN and FBI sources reported SHUBIN's travel to the USSR in summer 1961 and in September 1963.

SHUBIN had no valid U.S. passport between 1940 and June 1961; if he visited the Soviet Union during that period it was not as an American tourist under his true name. Consequently, he could not then have been the tourist target of the Seventh Department case officer, as NOSENKO claimed. If NOSENKO erred, and actually was referring to SHUBIN's visit in 1961, there is a further contradiction: NOSENKO could not have noticed his name while reviewing tourist lists in the Seventh Department, because he claims he was in the American Department at the time.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO went to Gorkiy on the fourth day after CHERE-PANOV's disappearance. The area was covered with very deep woods, "where a person could lose himself for life". On the seventh day CHEREPANOV was located and arrested in Baku, where he was on his way to the Iranian border.

A special plane was immediately sent to Baku, carrying S.M. FEDOSEYEV and several other American Department officers. They brought CHEREPANOV immediately back to Moscow, interrogating him on the plane. He immediately confessed to having given the documents to the Americans. When asked why, he said he was "angry at the KGB, very angry", and besides, he thought he might ask the Americans for some money in return for the documents. He confessed that on 4 November he had passed the documents to an American tourist who was a librarian interested in Russian books. He said he had given the documents to the American in the entrance hallway in the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the building in which the Ministry of Foreign Trade was also housed.

Because CHEREPANOV had eluded the KGB between the two fixed surveillance posts which had been established, the Second Chief Directorate suffered considerable criticism for not putting CHEREPANOV under full, round-the-clock surveillance. CHEREPANOV himself, however, told the KGB that if he had detected his surveillants he would have written to the government and newspapers a letter of protest against "such an indignity, such persecution", and then would have committed suicide, leaving the KGB without proof of his guilt.

Comment: Other sources, including [redacted] sensitive sources, have also reported various aspects of the CHEREPANOV incident.
NOSENKO's assertions with respect to the CHEREPANOV case, however, are not material to his claim that he was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department at the time.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

The Recall Telegram

NOSENKO's Information

On 3 February 1964, NOSENKO claimed, he visited the KGB Legal Residency once during the morning before he met with CIA and again that evening after 1800; there were at those times no KGB telegrams concerning him. On the morning of 4 February he again stopped in at the Residency, but there were again no such messages for him. Later in the morning of 4 February, however, after attending a session of the Disarmament Conference, he returned to the Residency and found that a telegram from KGB Headquarters had arrived, instructing him to return to Moscow immediately to participate in the KGB conference on tourism. After relating the substance of the telegram, NOSENKO defected and was thenceforth in CIA custody.

Comment: Special Intelligence does not confirm NOSENKO's assertion regarding the existence of the recall telegram. According to Special Intelligence, there were enciphered communications from Moscow to the Soviet Mission in Geneva earlier and later, but there was none from 1815 on 3 February until 1730 on 4 February, several hours after NOSENKO was in custody of CIA.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO's Eventual Retraction Regarding Recall Telegram

NOSENKO maintained throughout his interrogations in 1964 and 1965 that there was the recall telegram and that it prompted his defection. In October 1966, however, while being questioned again, NOSENKO stated that there had been no telegram recalling him to Moscow from Geneva, and he signed the following statement:

> "On 4 February 1964, I told my CIA contact in Geneva that a telegram from Headquarters in Moscow had been received in the KGB Residency in Geneva recalling me immediately to Moscow. I said at the time that this telegram said that I was recalled to participate in a conference to plan KGB activity against tourists for the 1964 season. I maintained this story as fact throughout subsequent interviews and interrogations by American authorities in 1964 and 1965. No such telegram ever existed. No telegram was received in Geneva. I admit that the story was a lie. I myself invented this telegram in order to hasten my defection. I was nervous and afraid that my contacts with American Intelligence might be noticed."

Knowledge of Other Seventh Department Operations

The notes NOSENKO brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964 (see p.319) included brief reference to thirteen other KGB operations conducted against what NOSENKO described as tourists during the 1962-1963 period. For reasons cited in the description of these operations in Annex B, these operations are not material to NOSENKO's claim to service in 1962-1963 as either Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section or as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

Operational Activities - July 1962-January 1964: Summary

To substantiate his claims to having served as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department during this period, NOSENKO describes KGB involvement in the recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY, the arrests of KOTEN and BARGHOORN, and the investigations of SLESINGER, OSWALD, and of former KGB officer CHEREPANOV, his discovery that SHUBIN was a GRU agent, and his assignment to Geneva. Even if NOSENKO learned of the operations as he described and they were as he described (there are substantial reasons why they might have been conducted by KGB elements other than the Seventh Department), they are atypical with respect to NOSENKO's own description of Seventh Department operations. They do not accurately characterize, as NOSENKO claims, KGB counterintelligence operations against tourists, and thus do not substantiate his Seventh Department service. NOSENKO's explanations for his assignment to Geneva in 1964 are no more plausible than for his earlier assignment there in 1962. NOSENKO has asserted that he was not a lieutenant colonel as the temporary duty authorization indicated, but a captain, a rank incongruous with a Deputy Chief of Department and one from which he presumably would have been promoted as he assumed the senior KGB positions which he claimed to have held. [illegible]

KGB Counterintelligence Operations
Among American Tourists
1962-1963

Because of his position as a Deputy Chief, then First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed awareness of what the KGB posture was with respect to

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Other Sources - 1964 and 1965

As indicated in Annex A, [redacted] a sensitive source reported several items of information he stated he obtained from various KGB colleagues. According to these reports, GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB as a consequence of NOSENKO's defection, it was rumored that GRIBANOV was to be fired because he had been NOSENKO's friend and patron, that GRIBANOV was held responsible for the defection of his protege, that GRIBANOV had approved NOSENKO's assignment to Geneva in 1964 despite knowledge of facts making NOSENKO ineligible, that GRIBANOV was a long-time friend of NOSENKO's father, that NOSENKO had been a deputy to a Department Chief despite his junior rank because of GRIBANOV's influence, and that GRIBANOV was dismissed from the KGB and Party because he willfully withheld information about NOSENKO's procuring women for parties which he and the General arranged.

NOSENKO's Information - Post 1964

Immediately following his defection NOSENKO continued to refer to this special and personal relationship, which touched on nearly every aspect of NOSENKO's KGB service. Under interrogation, however, NOSENKO could not sustain this claim. The extent NOSENKO's statements were retracted or contradicted with respect to GRIBANOV or contradicted by other evidence, is seen from the following examples excerpted from the earlier chronological examination: GRIBANOV wrote the very best fitness report on NOSENKO that could be given (Retracted. GRIBANOV wrote none of NOSENKO's fitness reports); NOSENKO and GRIBANOV carroused together with women provided by NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO recalled only two occasions, and could relate only one in any detail.); recruited Edward SMITH (see p. 37) together with NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO played no active role in SMITH recruitment attempt and was not in Embassy Section at time.); NOSENKO accompanied GRIBANOV to diplomatic receptions in 1961 at which the latter learned that French Ambassador DeJean was GRIBANOV's agent (Retracted. NOSENKO accompanied

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES

NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in successively senior positions of authority from which he derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB operations against Americans in the Soviet Union in the period 1953-1963. To substantiate his claim, he provides an impressive array of information about KGB personnel, organization and operations which, to the extent that it has been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including intelligence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's claims. According to some of these sources, NOSENKO was a senior KGB officer who occupied a series of sensitive positions, who enjoyed considerable authority and trust despite personal shortcomings, and whose defection, "the greatest loss ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence", paralyzed the work of [redacted] KGB [redacted]

The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known facts and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects the test to which his accounts were put: whether his accounts are internally coherent and consistent with known fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has from occupying the KGB positions he claims to have held. In short, is he what he says he is, according to his own accounts?

1. Attached is Annex A of the Top Secret study entitled, The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector - Yuriy I. NOSENKO dated February 1968 (copy 10). Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier for your review.

2. Certain portions of Annex A of this study are deleted since it contains information which bears on the security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.

3. We request return of the study (copy 10) and Annex A when your review has been completed.

Attachment: As Stated Above

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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Annex A

Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO

4 February 1964

NOSENKO defected in Geneva.

6 February 1964

The Chief of the Soviet Disarmament Delegation notified the Soviet Ambassador in Bern shortly before noon that NOSENKO had disappeared, correctly placing the date as 4 February. They speculated privately between themselves that he might have been "poisoned" or injured in an automobile accident.

8 February 1964

An official spokesman of the Soviet Mission in Geneva reported to the Swiss police that NOSENKO, an "expert temporarily assigned to Geneva", had been missing for four days.

9 February 1964

Evening news broadcasts in Geneva carried reports attributed to both Soviet and Swiss sources that NOSENKO had disappeared.

10 February 1964

The Swiss press quoted unidentified Soviet sources as saying it was presumed that NOSENKO had defected.

(Annex A)

10 February 1964 (continued)

A U.S. Department of State press release was issued identifying NOSENKO as KGB officer and acknowledging his request for political asylum in the United States.

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] Because of his long tenure in the KGB, NOSENKO would have a great deal of important information which he could impart to intelligence agencies of other countries. Certainly, he would be acquainted with many KGB employees and could identify them. He also would be intimately acquainted with a large number of Soviet agents working inside the USSR against American and British nationals.

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] The bulk of NOSENKO's knowledge concerning KGB activities would revolve around the intelligence operations of the KGB in Moscow and also KGB personalities working in Headquarters. NOSENKO was also undoubtedly familiar with all KGB personalities in Geneva and certainly knew some KGB personalities in other countries.

Comment: NOSENKO identified a number of KGB officers in Geneva; he asserted that some others, known by CIA to be connected with the KGB, were not.

(Annex A)

10 February 1964 (continued)

According to a sensitive source [redacted] NOSENKO was affiliated with the KGB for approximately sixteen years, since about 1947, and was an employee of the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow. His father, now dead, was a Deputy to the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and also Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry. There is a shipyard named after NOSENKO's father in the Ukraine.

Comment: NOSENKO claims to have served in the GRU until 1953, when he entered the KGB.

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] several KGB officers It appeared quite certain to [redacted] that NOSENKO had the rank of lieutenant colonel in the KGB.

Comment: NOSENKO was at the time claiming to have been a KGB lieutenant colonel.

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] from KGB officers [redacted] The photograph which appeared in U.S. newspapers is not that of NOSENKO. One KGB officer [redacted] worked with NOSENKO for several years in KGB Headquarters; he described NOSENKO as a person who likes to be fashionably dressed at all times and is fond of women, by nature a friendly individual and generally well-liked by his fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the Second Chief Directorate.

(Annex A)

10 February 1964 (continued)

Comment: [redacted] [redacted]. The photograph accompanying American and Swiss press accounts of NOSENKO's defection was by error not that of NOSENKO but of Vladimir SHUSTOV, whom [redacted] a sensitive source and NOSENKO both identified as a "clean" Soviet diplomat at the Geneva Disarmament Conference.

Noting the publicity accompanying the defection of KGB officer NOSENKO in Switzerland, GOLITSYN recalled that NOSENKO had been a Second Chief Directorate officer working against American citizens.

Comment: Routinely, GOLITSYN had reviewed in March 1962 (before NOSENKO contacted CIA) a list of Soviet delegates to the Disarmament Conference. NOSENKO's name, which was on the list, did not at that time prompt any comment from GOLITSYN.

11 February 1964

Ambassador DOBRYNIN informally notified the Department of State that a Soviet note would be delivered later to ask how NOSENKO had left Switzerland, to request his release, and to demand an immediate interview with him.

12 February 1964

S.K. TSARAPKIN, the head of the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference, read a statement at a press conference in which he strongly condemned the Swiss authorities for permitting NOSENKO's "kidnapping" and for hindering efforts to locate him. TSARAPKIN demanded that immediate steps be taken to return NOSENKO to Soviet custody.

(Annex A)

12 February 1964 (continued)

At simultaneous press conferences in Bern and Geneva, the Swiss rejected these accusations of non-cooperation and noted the Soviet delay in advising the police of NOSENKO's disappearance and Soviet failure to cooperate with Swiss authorities in locating NOSENKO.

The Soviet note earlier promised by DOBRYNIN was delivered to the State Department. A noncommittal reply was given to Soviet queries concerning the requested interview and the means of NOSENKO's departure from Switzerland.

The Swiss Embassy asked for a meeting with NOSENKO in order to obtain assurance that the defection had been voluntary. Arrangements were made to have NOSENKO meet with Swiss and Soviet representatives in Washington as soon as possible.

NOSENKO arrived in Washington at 2130 hours.

12-13 February 1964

[illegible]

14 February 1964

In Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO read to Ambassador KOHLER a statement deploring the "evasive" reply of the State Department to Soviet inquiries in Washington and terming the whole event of NOSENKO's disappearance a

(Annex A)

14 February 1964 (continued)

"gross provocation by American Intelligence organs". GROMYKO repeated the demand for NOSENKO's immediate release from American custody.

The Counselor of the Swiss Embassy interviewed NOSENKO at the Washington offices of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. The Soviet confrontation immediately afterwards was handled by Minister Counselor G.M. KORNIENKO, and Third Secretary V.F. ISAKOV, a recent arrival in Washington. NOSENKO told both the Swiss and the Soviets that he had defected of his own free will after careful consideration and that he had no desire to return to the Soviet Union. In response to KORNIENKO's questions, he specifically renounced his status and rights as a Soviet citizen.

18 February 1964

Feliks KOVALEV, a Soviet diplomat in Buenos Aires, told a CIA agent that he had attended the Institute of International Relations with NOSENKO. According to KOVALEV, NOSENKO had twice married, had a good family background, was the son of a Minister in the Government, was notorious for his "adventurous" nature, and "famous for his character".

[illegible]

[illegible]

Top Secret

(Annex A)

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TS No. 197124

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According to a sensitive source, NOSENKO had been in the Second Chief Directorate for about 14 years and was acquainted with almost all of the employees of this directorate. He was aware of the structure of the KGB and knows many personnel of the First Chief Directorate. NOSENKO, as Deputy to the Chief of the Seventh Department, had in his possession a telephone directory which listed the names of some 10,000 KGB employees in Moscow. Only Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Departments had these phone books. A KGB officer expressed the opinion that "NOSENKO is much more valuable to the FBI and CIA than was Oleg PENKOVSKIY because of the fact that he knows so much about the methods of work of the First and Second Directorates of the KGB and is familiar with so many individuals in the KGB both in Moscow and abroad. a KGB officer said that PENKOVSKIY was able to furnish American and British Intelligence with a lot of information concerning defense secrets of the Soviet Union, but NOSENKO is much more knowledgeable in intelligence and counterintelligence operations of the KGB."

Comment: NOSENKO has never commented on the KGB telephone book referred to above.

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TS No. 197124

Top Secret

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] in a response to a question whether NOSENKO actually defected or whether the defection might be a KGB "trick", the source replied that from his own knowledge of this matter, he was convinced that NOSENKO's defection was not a "trick" by the KGB.

22 February 1964

According to a sensitive source from conversations with various unnamed KGB officers: NOSENKO worked against personnel stationed at the American Embassy in Moscow, and with his help agents were developed among these Americans. It is assumed by the KGB that he is familiar with the number and location of microphones in the Embassy.

Comment: Although NOSENKO knew that there were microphones in three general locations in the Embassy, his specific information regarding the number and location of microphones was limited to that contained in a written list brought to Geneva in 1964, a list which he claimed no one in the KGB knew he had.

24 February 1964

Women claiming to be the wife and mother of NOSENKO visited the American Embassy in Moscow for the first time, expressing disbelief that he had voluntarily betrayed his family and country and requesting a personal meeting with him.

(Annex A)

24 February 1964 (continued)

Comment: NOSENKO confirmed their identities as his wife and mother on the basis of physical descriptions. On only one previous occasion have members of a defector's family called on a foreign embassy in Moscow. Following the defection of Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV in England in 1963, his wife appeared at the British Embassy to make inquiries about him.

[redacted]

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] KUROCHKIN (fnu), a KGB S&T officer scheduled for assignment to Washington, will not be sent as he is "well-known" to NOSENKO. In the course of his duties in Moscow, KUROCHKIN had very often visited the department where NOSENKO worked and, as a result, NOSENKO is "more than casually acquainted with him".

Comment: NOSENKO has never identified KUROCHKIN nor referred to the name.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Annex A)

February 1964

Nikolay ARTAMONOV, who defected from the Soviet Navy in the late 1950's, noted the publicity accompanying NOSENKO's defection. He volunteered to CIA that he attended a naval preparatory school with the son of Minister NOSENKO in 1944-1946.

Comment: ARTAMONOV's description of the school and of the dates involved differs from those claimdd by NOSENKO.

KGB officer Vladimir TULAYEV mentioned NOSENKO to a CIA double agent in Vienna. TULAYEV said that NOSENKO, whom he knew well, came from a wonderful family, loved his wife and children, and earned a good salary. (TULAYEV later said on another occasion that he had friends who knew NOSENKO well.)

Comment: NOSENKO never identified TULAYEV by name or photograph. When asked, NOSENKO denied knowing him.

Top Secret

February-March 1964

According to a sensitive source:

A KGB commission was in the process of studying "the scale of loss" [caused by NOSENKO's defection] to the USSR. The commission was very large, formed from different departments of the KGB. The study (sic) was made "because it is supposed that NOSENKO had access to many rocket matters, to many nuclear matters, to many strategical objects of the country...many details about life of the leaders of the country, in the government...that he knew very much about internal relations between the people working in the KGB, that he had many close friends among them and [spent] days and nights together with them. The whole history of his life was studied step by step very carefully."

TS No. 197124

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Top Secret

6 March 1964

According to a sensitive source, (from conversations with various unnamed KGB officers : NOSENKO knows many of the chiefs and deputies of the KGB directorates and departments at KGB Headquarters in Moscow. In KGB Headquarters there are four separate dining rooms for personnel who work there; one such dining room is reserved for chiefs and deputies of departments. Because of this fact, NOSENKO has a vast knowledge of the hierarchy of the KGB.

Comment: NOSENKO never referred to the dining rooms until the January-March 1965 interrogations, when he volunteered that he had eaten occasionally in the "chiefs' dining room".

Top Secret

TS No. 197124
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(Annex A)

23 March 1964

The two women claiming to be the wife and mother of NOSENKO made the last of five visits to the Embassy in Moscow. NOSENKO's wife had explained that she required some definite statement in writing from her husband so that she could plan for her own future and that of the NOSENKO children.

(Annex A)

27 March 1964

According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from various unnamed KGB officers [redacted] certain [redacted]: There seems to be unanimous opinion among [redacted] KGB chiefs [redacted] that NOSENKO...could do the KGB a tremendous amount of harm. NOSENKO in his position as a deputy chief in one of the departments of the Second Chief Directorate would have been entitled to have one personnel directory of approximately 30 pages setting for the identities of all of the supervisory officials in KGB Headquarters. NOSENKO would also have had a 200-page directory listing by name and telephone number all the rank-and-file employees working in Moscow. The opinion was expressed by some [redacted] KGB "chiefs" [redacted] that if NOSENKO were merely able to make these two directories available to American Intelligence, the KGB would be severely damaged for the present and for several years to come.

Comment: NOSENKO has never referred to the KGB directories described.

31 March 1964

KGB officers I.I. PETUKHOV nad P.P. BORISOV in Canada told their agent George Herman SPRECHER to cease all intelligence activity for a year, to destroy any incriminating materials in his possession as well as to supply the Soviets with passport photographs so that "escape" documents could be prepared for himself and his family. SPRECHER asked whether the action had any connection with NOSENKO's recently publicized defection, but the KGB officers denied it, asserting NOSENKO "was just a secretary".

(Annex A)

31 March 1964 (continued)

Comment: When PETUKHOV recontacted SPRECHER in February 1965, PETUKHOV acknowledged that NOSENKO had in fact been the cause of KGB concern, that he had had some connection with NOSENKO, and NOSENKO may have known something of what the KGB was doing in Canada.
NOSENKO described a KGB Illegal, whose name was unknown to him, who apparently is identical to SPRECHER.

March 1964

According to a sensitive source who [redacted], was briefed in his office in KGB Headquarters by a Second Chief Directorate officer of the American Department: Personnel of that Department, in which NOSENKO had served until his defection, were so shocked at the event that they would not mention it at all.

Comment: In this and other contexts a sensitive source [redacted] has stated or implied that NOSENKO served in the American Department in 1963-1964. NOSENKO asserts he left the American Department in January 1962 and served in the Seventh Department until his defection.

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(Annex A)

April-May 1964

KGB officer G.N. VLASOV, case officer of Robert Lee JOHNSON in Paris, began to meet JOHNSON on the street rather than in various restaurants as had been their habit. At one of their final meetings before JOHNSON returned to the United States, VLASOV told JOHNSON that a Soviet Intelligence officer had defected to the Americans in Geneva, and that extreme caution must therefore be exercised in JOHNSON's contacts with the KGB. VLASOV said that the defector could not identify JOHNSON but that JOHNSON should dispose of everything he had which might link him to Soviet espionage activities. (See p 24 for a summary of the JOHNSON case.)

May 1964: According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from unidentified sources, presumably from KGB officers [redacted]): Two commissions have been established by the CPSU for the purposes: (a) to determine why KGB employees such as DERYABIN, GOLITSYN, and NOSENKO defected while serving abroad, and (b) to attempt to eliminate the "weak" employees and improve the efficiency of the KGB.

(Annex A)

20 May 1964
According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer
[redacted]: The KGB was lucky that the Americans found only 40 microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Actually, about 200 microphones were concealed by the Soviets in the Embassy. NOSENKO was responsible for furnishing information to the Americans which resulted in the microphones being found. NOSENKO knew only the general location of the 40 microphones which were found and does not have any knowledge of the remaining ones.

12 June 1964

Professor John M. THOMPSON reported at the American Embassy in Moscow that an unnamed Soviet official with whom he was acquainted told him that NOSENKO was a profligate with two wives and many debts and is considered in Moscow to be someone they are well rid of.

22 June 1964
According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from various unnamed KGB officers [redacted]): The consensus among some KGB employees [redacted] is that in the future the KGB will be feeling sharply the effects of NOSENKO's escape to American Intelligence. NOSENKO is considered to be vastly more important than either GOLITSYN or DERYABIN. This opinion appears to be based on several factors: First, NOSENKO worked against personnel stationed at the American Embassy in Moscow and with his help agents were developed among these Americans. Second, it is assumed by KGB personnel that because of his closeness to

22 June 1964 (continued)

the American Embassy in the past, NOSENKO would also be familiar with the number of microphones which had been installed in the Embassy by the KGB and the locations of these microphones. Third, as a Deputy Chief of a department, NOSENKO would normally have had access to a telephone directory listing all personnel in all directorates of the KGB in Moscow. Another factor, which is a formidable one in the minds of other KGB employees, is that NOSENKO travelled in a rather influential circle of friends in Moscow who were high in the Soviet Government. All these comments were cited as reasons for NOSENKO being an "important catch" for American Intelligence, but no one in the KGB really knows exactly how much information NOSENKO had concerning the KGB.

29 June 1964

GOLITSYN (from personal acquaintance): NOSENKO, the son of the former Minister of Shipbuilding, was a KGB officer who had worked in the American Department and the Seventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate. GOLITSYN, while on his own First Chief Directorate business, met NOSENKO two or three times in the American Embassy Section in 1953, and had seen him occasionally at work during 1958 and 1959. When GOLITSYN asked him where he was working in 1959, NOSENKO replied that he was assigned to the Seventh Department. NOSENKO served in the American Embassy Section from 1953 until 1957 or 1958, and was specifically responsible for KGB coverage of American military personnel in Moscow during 1953. For the remainder of his service in the Embassy Section until 1957 or 1958, NOSENKO may have had the same responsibilities or may have been working against other Embassy personnel or correspondents, but he was definitely in the American Department during the entire period. In 1957 or 1958 NOSENKO was transferred to the Seventh Department, and was a senior case officer there as of 1959. NOSENKO did not work in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate American Department at any time during 1960; GOLITSYN visited the Embassy Section on at least three occasions from early 1960 to early 1961, and would have known if NOSENKO had been in the Section, particularly if NOSENKO had been Deputy Chief. G.I. GRYAZNOV was acting as assistant of the Chief of the Section during this period.

Top Secret

(Annex A)

29 June 1964 (continued)

Comment: NOSENKO claims he left the Embassy Section in 1955 and was assigned to the Seventh Department until 1960, when he returned to the Embassy Section as Deputy Chief. NOSENKO did not identify GOLITSYN's photograph and had denied since defection that he has ever met or even seen him.

June 1964

According to a sensitive source [redacted] "Just after" NOSENKO's defection V.S. MEDVEDEV from the Exits Commission of the CPSU Central Committee travelled to Geneva to speak to the Soviets stationed there and to Soviet delegates to the Disarmament Conference. MEDVEDEV underscored the seriousness of the defection and urged greater vigilance against such acts. The defection caused the recall of Nina Ivanovna YEREMEYEVA, a KGB secretary in Geneva. It was rumored that some sixty Soviet officials stationed abroad would be transferred from their assignment as a consequence of the NOSENKO affair. V.A. POCHANKIN, a KGB officer with the permanent Soviet Mission in Geneva, speculated that he had been completely exposed by NOSENKO and would therefore have to return to Moscow. Yu. I. GUK who was known [redacted] to [redacted] Source had been discharged from the KGB because he had recommended NOSENKO's travel to Geneva. According to one rumor, the chief of the Department in which NOSENKO had been employed, would also lose his job.

Comment: MEDVEDEV, a KGB officer formerly stationed in New York City, was said by [redacted] by a sensitive source to be one of those from the CPSU Central Committee who conducted interviews with KGB personnel going abroad. [redacted] Another sensitive source identified MEDVEDEV,

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Top Secret

June 1964 (continued)

Comment: (Continued)
[redacted] a Counselor of the Soviet Mission at the United Nations, as the Communist Party organizer and possibly a member of the KGB, but said that MEDVEDEV's role is not important and that he worked mainly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
POCHANKIN, who NOSENKO had identified as a KGB officer, was still in Geneva in December 1966.

29 July 1964

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] (from unnamed sources, presumably KGB officers [redacted] [redacted]): An investigating commission of the CPSU Central Committee checking into the circumstances surrounding NOSENKO's defection has thus far been responsible for the expulsion from the KGB of 15 Second Chief Directorate employees. These include GRIBANOV, who was also expelled from the CPSU and was stripped of his rank of lieutenant general. GRIBANOV has been given a very small pension, like an ordinary Soviet citizen. This drastic action was taken since the primary responsibility for the defection was placed on GRIBANOV. It was realized that, in addition to being Chief of the Second Chief Directorate at the time of the defection, GRIBANOV was a personal friend of NOSENKO and had more or less treated NOSENKO as a protege and had taken many steps to further NOSENKO's career within the KGB. It was felt that GRIBANOV should have been aware of NOSENKO's plans to defect. Three of GRIBANOV's deputies were also expelled from the KGB, one of whom was a Major General BANNIK [BANNIKOV]. Of the 11 other Second Chief Directorate employees expelled, some were found to have been personal friends of NOSENKO and some of them were found to have confided to NOSENKO details of operations in which they were working. S.M. GOLUBEV, a KGB officer stationed in Washington, would be leaving for Moscow because the investigating commission had determined that Yu. I. GUK, a mutual friend of NOSENKO and GOLUBEV told NOSENKO that GOLUBEV had been assigned to the Washington Legal Residency. GOLUBEV had himself worked with NOSENKO in KGB

(Annex A)

29 July 1964 (continued)

Headquarters sometime in the past, but subsequently NOSENKO and GOLUBEV were given different assignments within the KGB and thereafter did not associate with one another in the course of their daily activities.

Comment: NOSENKO retracted in 1965 his earlier claims that GRIBANOV had been instrumental in his advancement and assignments. NOSENKO identified by name and photograph GOLUBEV, whom he had known personally since 1959, but NOSENKO said he had never worked with him at KGB Headquarters since GOLUBEV had always been in the First Chief Directorate. GOLUBEV left for the USSR on 28 August 1964.

July-August 1964

According to a sensitive source:

[redacted]: The first information [redacted] about NOSENKO was [redacted] from KGB Headquarters which reported the conclusions of the commission which had been appointed to prepare the damage report on NOSENKO's defection. The letter, which was very brief, said that "the loss was very great and some new forms of work should be created to be efficient in the future". The Legal Residency had not before received any "reports or commentaries on NOSENKO's escape".

(Annex A)

November 1964

Asked while visiting the United States if the Russian people had been told of the ABEL-POWERS exchange, Soviet mathematician R.V. GAMKRELIDZE replied to an American acquaintance that they had not been told officially but they knew about it since there was "quite a grapevine" in Moscow. It was in this way, GAMKRELIDZE stated, that he learned of the NOSENKO defection and of its significance. According to the "grapevine", the defection was very damaging to Soviet Intelligence in that NOSENKO was the Chief of the American Section, and he knew the identities of all Soviet agents in the United States.

(Annex A)

November 1964 (continued)

Comment: GAMKRELIDZE is suspected of having connections with Soviet Intelligence because of his statements, actions, and unusual freedom of solitary movement while on visits to the United States. GAMKRELIDZE rebuffed a CIA recruitment attempt in 1964, but added that he "welcomed the opportunity to meet with an American Intelligence officer...to compare the Soviet Intelligence officers he had met with their American counterparts". During that 1964 meeting GAMKRELIDZE again raised the subject of NOSENKO, describing him as "obviously a traitor to his country".

December 1964

Nikolay RESHETNYAK, NOSENKO's a [redacted] source roommate in Geneva at the time of his defection, told [redacted] that he had been interrogated by the KGB in connection with NOSENKO's defection, and that he had later attended the Moscow trial in which NOSENKO was sentenced to death in absentia. RESHETNYAK reported to [redacted] source the dismissal of large numbers of KGB officers, including GRIBANOV and GUK. From what RESHETNYAK said, [redacted] source thought the KGB might go so far

(Annex A)

December 1964 (continued)

as to send someone to the United States to locate and kill NOSENKO. ([redacted] later identified RESHETNYAK as a KGB officer.)
Source

Comment: NOSENKO identified RESHETNYAK as a Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer on the staff of the Disarmament Delegation.

29 January 1965
According to a sensitive source
[redacted] (from conversations with unrecalled KGB officers [redacted]: It is common knowledge among KGB employees that GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB and CPSU and is now on pension, partial rather than full, as a result of the NOSENKO defection. When NOSENKO was being considered for assignment to Geneva (in 1964), a summary statement of his activities was prepared in the Second Chief Directorate and sent to GRIBANOV. This summary contained considerable "compromising information" concerning NOSENKO; if acted upon properly, it would have removed him from consideration for this trip. GRIBANOV read the summary material, ran a line through all of it, and added the notation: "Send him to Geneva." The general feeling is that GRIBANOV was willing to overlook a lot of NOSENKO's deficiencies because of GRIBANOV's long-time friendship with NOSENKO's father.

Comment: NOSENKO originally asserted that GRIBANOV was responsible for sending him to Geneva in 1964, but after retracting his claim that GRIBANOV had played any special role in his assignments, he asserted that BANNIKOV approved the 1964 trip. NOSENKO denies that his father and GRIBANOV were acquainted.

(Annex A)

8 February 1965
According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer [redacted] [redacted]: Prior to NOSENKO's defection he was Deputy to the Chief of a department in the Second Chief Directorate. While working in the Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate in Moscow, [redacted] [the KGB officer] on three separate occasions participated in conferences between "important people" of the Second Chief Directorate and the Seventh Directorate. NOSENKO was present at all of these. Although NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief he held only the rank of captain in the KGB. [redacted] [the KGB officer] attributed this (the disparity between job and rank) to the influence which GRIBANOV exerted on the behalf of NOSENKO.

Comment: NOSENKO has never identified [redacted] [the KGB officer]. NOSENKO always claimed that he had been a lieutenant colonel in the KGB until October 1966, when he retracted that claim and asserted that he had been only a captain.

According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer [redacted]: GRIBANOV has been dismissed from the KGB, expelled from the CPSU, and is presently living on a small pension. His dismissal occurred immediately after NOSENKO's defection. In addition, not less than 50 other people were dismissed, many of whom were close friends of GRIBANOV. Most of these were from the First and Second Chief Directorates, with the majority from the Second Chief Directorate. The present Acting Chief of the Second Chief Directorate is a Major General BANNIK, whose appointment has not yet been approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU. One of his deputies is a Major General (F.A.) SHCHERBAK.

(Annex A)

8 February 1965 (continued)

Comment: GRIBANOV was reported in operational contact with a senior Western diplomat until late autumn 1964 (almost a year after NOSENKO's defection), when he turned over that contact to another KGB officer.

9 February 1965

According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer [redacted] [redacted]: The amount of damage caused by NOSENKO's defection is "unpredictable". NOSENKO knew few employees of the First Chief Directorate working abroad, but knew many such employees serving in KGB Headquarters by virtue of seeing them in the dining room which is reserved for chiefs and deputy chiefs of KGB departments.

Early June 1965

According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from conversations with KGB officers [redacted] [redacted]: Major General BANNIKOV is currently temporary Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, having replaced GRIBANOV who was expelled from the KGB because he supported NOSENKO in his career. GRIBANOV is working in a small city outside Moscow as the chief of security at an unimportant military plant and is now a "nothing".

(Annex A)

15 July 1965
According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer [redacted] who attended the Moscow meeting described): A meeting of all First Chief Directorate personnel at KGB Headquarters was held on 15 July 1965. The meeting was devoted to the circumstances of the expulsion of the Chief of the Second (British) Department of the First Chief Directorate, Ye. A. TARABRIN, about three and a half months earlier. I.A. BELOV and other officers also attended the meeting. According to official statements made at the meeting, after the defection of NOSENKO the KGB conducted an extensive investigation to determine which employees knew him and the nature of their relationship. During this TARABRIN was questioned; he said he knew NOSENKO, but only casually and only because of limited contacts within the KGB. The investigation determined, however, that TARABRIN attended several parties at which NOSENKO was present. Girls invited by NOSENKO were also there. [a sensitive source] described one such party. Thereafter, TARABRIN was afforded a hearing and was accussed of willfully concealing vital information. As a result he was expelled from the KGB and the CPSU and was deprived of all pension rights.

Comment: NOSENKO had most recently asserted that he met GRIBANOV socially only three times during his KGB service, and on each occasion TARABRIN was present. NOSENKO said he twice provided girls for GRIBANOV and TARABRIN, once in October or November 1963 in circumstances similar to those referred to. NOSENKO said that TARABRIN was Chief of the British Department from 1958 to 1963, when he became Deputy Chief of "Service No. 2", the reorganized Counterintelligence Department of the First Chief Directorate.

(Annex A)

Summer 1965 According to a sensitive source [redacted]): As a result of NOSENKO's defection, many KGB officers were punished, expelled from the Party, and from the KGB. These included KGB Chairman SEROV, and Second Chief Directorate Chief GRIBANOV had been expelled from the Party and from the KGB. GRIBANOV had been especially friendly with NOSENKO, had given him many privileges, and they were "buddies and night buddies".

Comment: SEMICHASTNYY, not SEROV, was KGB Chairman in 1965. SEROV became head of the GRU in 1958.

Winter 1965-1966
Source, a [redacted] self-professed former KGB Second Chief Directorate agent (from KGB officer V.G. SVIRIN, a colleague of her husband at the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKKNR) in 1960-1962. [redacted] Source said that SVIRIN was later head of a KGB unit conducting operations against the American Embassy in Moscow):

NOSENKO's father was a Minister or General and his mother was Jewish and "always involved in some blackmarketeering". NOSENKO was not a KGB officer but a "civilian" connected somehow with the KGB. When NOSENKO defected, everyone said he was detestable. NOSENKO told the Americans about the microphones and things (sic) in the Embassy.

(Annex A)

Winter 1965-1966 (continued)

Comment: [redacted] Source's allegation is the single report from any source describing NOSENKO as other than a KGB officer.

March 1966
According to a sensitive source,
[redacted] (from unidentified sources in Moscow): NOSENKO, who was not personally known to [redacted] Source, was an important boss in the KGB. When NOSENKO was a young man, he was in the GRU Military Academy and was then sent to the GRU Information Department for a short time; in all, perhaps for a year. NOSENKO had been a very undisciplined person while in the GRU and "not very good". He was to have been discharged from the GRU; however, his father, who was a very influential person in the Ministry of Shipbuilding, was able to get NOSENKO transferred to the KGB. It was the opinion of persons to whom [redacted] Source talked that NOSENKO had given very, very good information to the U.S. after his defection and that NOSENKO had had great access to KGB information which included all means of KGB coverage of people in Moscow, microphone systems in the embassies, etc. Based on NOSENKO's information the American Embassy found many of the microphones.

March 1966 (continued)

Comment: NOSENKO has claimed that he rejected an offer to attend the Military Diplomatic Academy (which he, like [redacted], called the GRU Military Academy), by choice accepting assignment to the Far East on entry to the GRU in 1951. At the time, the Military Diplomatic Academy was a four-year course; if NOSENKO did attend the school, he could not have served as he claimed in the GRU. [redacted] is the sole source (besides NOSENKO) who alleged NOSENKO served in the GRU.

Source

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(Annex A)

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(Annex A)

Mid-1966

Yuriy Dmitriyevich KOROLEV, a Soviet journalist, visited Paris and spoke with representatives of the French magazine Paris Match. KOROLEV indicated that he would like to serve as a stringer for the French journal and proposed that he begin with a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent". As KOROLEV spoke only broken French and English, the magazine staff did not seriously pursue the matter at that time.

Comment: KOROLEV is believed identical with Yuriy KOROLEV who, as of 1964, was employed part-time for the United Press International Moscow correspondent, Henry SHAPIRO, whom both NOSENKO and GOLITSYN have identified as an agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. KOROLEV has travelled previously to Brussels as a correspondent for the Soviet publication Sputnik, and to Japan and the United States as a correspondent for Novosti, the Soviet news Agency. The offer by an official Soviet press representative of information on a "Soviet secret agent", which turned out to refer to NOSENKO, is without precedent.

October 1966

Soviet journalist Yu. D. KOROLEV returned to Paris with an interpreter to renew his offer to Paris Match editors to provide a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent". The story was to concern NOSENKO's family and their

(Annex A)

October 1966 (continued)

life in Moscow since NOSENKO's defection. A short background statement KOROLEV provided Paris Match editors stated: "NOSENKO, about 36-38, an officer of the Soviet Secret Police organization, defected to the USA without his family about two years ago and asked for political asylum in the U.S.: it was granted to him. This was the most serious defeat of the Soviet Security organs as NOSENKO occupied important positions in espionage and counterespionage departments and also was closely acquainted with the country's leading families and homes. NOSENKO's family consists of a wife, 35, two daughters, 10 and 12, a mother and a younger brother. The family is not prosecuted (sic) but feel very badly about the incident [the defection]. Very soon the wife will apply to the International Lawyers Organization for a divorce and compensation. It is possible that this case will be given much publicity. His wife has not heard from him since he defected, but it is obvious that he is still in the USA." KOROLEV displayed a photo spread showing NOSENKO's wife and family going about their daily affairs in Moscow, and indicated that additional photographs of NOSENKO's family could be obtained and that interviews with them and with others knowing NOSENKO could be arranged for a Paris Match correspondent.

Comment: A divorce from a defector from the Soviet Union, who is legally considered to be an enemy of the state, is granted automatically upon the wife's request.

28 January 1967

According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from personal knowledge): Referring to his own knowledge of KGB organization, [redacted] said if NOSENKO heard his explanation, he would call [redacted] a child, since NOSENKO knew these matters better than [redacted] because he had served at KGB Headquarters longer.

Source

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(Annex A)

February 1967
According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from unidentified GRU sources in Moscow): NOSENKO worked only in KU Information Department of the GRU, and only for about five or six months, after which he went to the KGB.

May 1967
According to a sensitive source [redacted] The KGB assumes that NOSENKO divulged the whole system of surveillance of Americans. He worked on it, knew all about it and exposed the whole system of work. He knew all the posts, the sources (few words unclear) he knew all the surveillance groups and knew surveillants by sight.

According to a sensitive source [redacted]: When NOSENKO worked in the GRU Information Department he worked only in the Center (Headquarters) in Moscow. He worked badly there, and received bad efficiency reports, as a result of which he had arguments. Then with his father's help he went to the KGB.

5 June 1967
According to a sensitive source [redacted]: There had been some KGB suspicions of Pavel Fedorovich SHAKHOV while he was in Geneva, because he had allegedly had many American contacts which he had not reported, and NOSENKO was sent to Geneva to investigate him. Rezident KULEBYAKIN is still suspicious of SHAKHOV.

Comment: NOSENKO claims he was sent to Geneva in 1962 to investigate SHAKHOV.

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FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: CASE OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO: (835 PAGE STUDY · (VOL. I) PAGES 1-84 (PARTS I, II, III & IV)

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I. INTRODUCTION

This review presents the facts and observations which bear on the bona fides of the Soviet defector Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO.

The highlights of NOSENKO's biography, as he has given it to CIA, are as follows: He was born 30 October 1927, the first son of Ivan Isidorovich NOSENKO, shipyard worker who in 1939 was to become Soviet Minister of Shipbuilding. After graduating in 1951 from the Institute of International Relations in Moscow, where he specialized in international law and the English language, NOSENKO entered the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Soviet Navy, serving first as a translator assigned to the intelligence staff of the Seventh (Far Eastern) Fleet and then as a senior translator and political officer at an intelligence unit of the Fourth (Baltic) Fleet. In mid-March 1953, immediately following STALIN's death, NOSENKO left the Naval GRU to become a junior case officer in the KGB. He was assigned to the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, from 1953 to mid-1955. During this period he was initially responsible for operational activity surrounding American journalists in Moscow and later for operations against U.S. Army Attaches at the Embassy. When transferred to the newly organized Tourist Department of the Second Chief Directorate in 1955, NOSENKO had as his targets visitors to the Soviet Union from the United States and the countries of the British Commonwealth. Having handled a number of successful tourist operations, NOSENKO in 1958 was promoted to Deputy Chief of the section responsible for operations against American, British, and Canadian nationals. Eighteen months later NOSENKO returned to the U.S. Embassy Section as its Deputy Chief. Between January 1960 and January 1962 he was second-in-charge of all KGB activities against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and personally supervised operations against the Embassy Security Officer, the Second Chief Directorate's most important counterintelligence target at the time, and against American code clerks, collectively the Directorate's most important recruitment targets. At the ~~end of~~ December 1961 NOSENKO again was transferred to the Tourist Department, this time as Chief of the American-British-Canadian Section. Six months later he was made Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, and in mid-1963 he became its First Deputy Chief.

From the time he first contacted CIA in Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO's status has been under examination. Only now, three years following his defection in February 1964, is a definitive study of the bona fides question possible: the voluminous and diverse reports by NOSENKO, coupled with collateral information, required that much time for assimilation, correlation, investigation, and evaluation. NOSENKO's own testimony, interspersed with representative subsidiary cases stemming from or related to his reports, constitutes a large part of the evidence. This review also draws upon statements and actions by other Soviets, collations with materials from other sources, and opinions by specialists of various kinds. These factual elements are presented without comment or interpretation, except in the penultimate section of the review where the evidence on the bona fides of NOSENKO is evaluated and analyzed.

This review is presented in the following format:

Part II: A summary of developments in the NOSENKO case from 1962 to the present, including his clandestine meetings with CIA, his defection, and the subsequent debriefings and interrogations.

Part III: A discussion of the operational circumstances of NOSENKO's 1962 contact with CIA and his defection two years later. Included is discussion of CIA's information concerning NOSENKO prior to his first contact in Geneva, NOSENKO's explanation of the reasons for his presence in Geneva in 1962 and 1964, NOSENKO's motivations first for establishing clandestine contact with American Intelligence and later for defecting to the United States, NOSENKO's pattern of activity in Geneva in 1962 and 1964, and the reactions of the Soviets, both official and unofficial, to the defection.

Part IV: The non-KGB aspects of NOSENKO's life, both before and after he joined Soviet State Security Service, as he described them and as others have reported them.

Part V: The positions and responsibilities of NOSENKO in the KGB, the operations with which he was associated, his travels abroad, the awards and promotions which he received, and other Soviet sources' statements on these points.

Part VI: NOSENKO's production, especially in counterintelligence matters not discussed in the preceding section. Key cases are discussed in detail and other leads are summarized.

Part VII: Specialists' assessments of NOSENKO: by the CIA graphologist who studied his handwriting; by the CIA psychologist and psychiatrist who examined him; by the former KGB officer Peter DERYABIN; by the CIA case officers who handled him; and by the CIA polygraph operator who tested him.

Part VIII: Interpretation of the evidence and conclusions about the bona fides of NOSENKO.

Part IX: The implications of the conclusions in Part VIII for certain other sources.

There are several sources currently or formerly associated with the Soviet Intelligence services who are repeatedly referred to in this review. They include the following:

- Anatoliy Mikhailovich GOLITSYN, a KGB officer who defected in Helsinki to U.S. authorities on 15 December 1961.

sensitive source

- [redacted]

- [redacted]

sensitive source

TOP SECRET

- Aleksandr Nikolayevich CHEREPANOV, a KGB officer whose case is reviewed in Part VI.D.7.c.

source

- former [illegible] agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate.

All pertinent material received by CIA prior to 15 January 1967 has been taken into account in this review of NOSENKO's <u>bona fides</u>.

II. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

A. Introduction

From the CIA side, the NOSENKO case can be divided into three periods: the first Geneva phase of June 1962, the second Geneva phase of January-February 1964, and the post-defection handling of NOSENKO from February 1964 to date. The rest of Part II is separated into these three periods accordingly.

B. First Geneva Phase (June 1962)

The NOSENKO case opened on 5 June 1962 in the corridors of the Palais des Nations in Geneva during the United Nations Disarmament Conference. A then-unidentified Soviet, known to him by sight from conference meetings, approached U.S. Foreign Service Officer David MARK with the suggestion that they get together for a talk the following day. In the late afternoon of 6 June, the same Soviet motioned MARK aside and said that he would like to talk to him privately as soon as possible. He told MARK that he was "not going to pump him for information, but simply wanted to tell him some things." A luncheon meeting was arranged for 9 June, although the Soviet clearly preferred an earlier date. MARK advised CIA of the appointment, explaining that he thought the approach so unusual that it might be an offer of cooperation or defection. He said he believed the Soviet to be Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, a member of the Soviet delegation to the arms talks.

At the 9 June luncheon with MARK, NOSENKO told MARK that he, NOSENKO, was a KGB counterintelligence officer sent to Geneva to ensure the security of the Soviet delegation. He knew that MARK had previously served in Moscow and believed he was connected with American Intelligence.* He needed approximately 900 Swiss francs immediately to cover KGB operational funds which he squandered on liquor and a prostitute in Geneva, and he offered for this amount to sell two pieces of information to American Intelligence. The first of these was the identity of a former U.S. Embassy employee in Moscow who was a KGB agent and, as of 1962, was "near ciphers" in the Washington area; the second was the identity of a Soviet in Moscow who, although ostensibly a CIA agent, was actually planted on American Intelligence. Although NOSENKO at first told MARK that he would stop at the sale of these two items, he later stated: "I know you won't let me alone now." At another point NOSENKO said: "I will not work in Moscow, but I come out about once a year." NOSENKO also gave MARK a brief chronological account of his personal and professional past. MARK explained that although he was not an intelligence officer, he could place NOSENKO in contact with the Intelligence Chief in Geneva later that same day.

MARK introduced NOSENKO to a CIA officer at 2000 hours that evening, and a three-hour meeting followed at a CIA safehouse in Geneva. Describing himself as a KGB Major experienced in operations against the American Embassy in Moscow and against tourists and other travellers to the Soviet Union, NOSENKO told the CIA

* Another Soviet source, [redacted] has also reported that the KGB suspected MARK to be an American Intelligence officer; although he has never served in CIA, MARK did engage in a number of operational support activities on behalf of CIA while stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

officer of his financial difficulties and repeated his offer to sell two items of information. He said that the need for money was his immediate motive for contacting CIA, although in the ensuing discussion he said also that he was dissatisfied with the Communist regime in the Soviet Union. NOSENKO emphasized, nevertheless, that he had no intention of becoming an American agent--this was to be a one-time transaction, and after that he would have no further contact with CIA.

Despite this original reticence, NOSENKO supplied considerable biographic information on himself and also discussed in general terms certain additional KGB operations as well as KGB organization and operational methods in Moscow. He understood, as he had told MARK earlier in the day, that CIA would want more information than the two items which he originally offered, and he agreed to meet again two days later.

NOSENKO met CIA representatives four more times in Geneva in June 1962, always in the same safehouse. With the second meeting on 11 June, his initial reservations disappeared almost entirely. He answered most questions put to him on KGB organization and operations, most of his information being concerned with the Second Chief Directorate, responsible for counterintelligence and security within the USSR. NOSENKO seemed to be what he claimed to be: a KGB officer in a sensitive position with knowledge of important KGB operations.

NOSENKO returned to Moscow on 15 June, having promised to do everything within the limits imposed by personal security considerations to collect information of interest; the areas of CIA interest had been outlined to him. The only restrictions he placed on his cooperation were his absolute refusal to permit operational contact with him inside the USSR and his request that no mention of his collaboration be made in correspondence to Moscow. He promised to notify CIA, via an address he was given, when he came to the West again.

C. Second Geneva Phase (January-February 1964)

NOSENKO accompanied the Soviet delegation to a later session of the Disarmament Conference (one having gone by in the interim without his participation), arriving in Geneva on 19 January 1964. The next day he sent a cable to his CIA accommodation address announcing his presence. At the first of the new series of meetings on 23 January he announced that he had decided to defect to the United States citing as reasons his continuing disaffection with the Soviet regime and the fact that he probably would not have further opportunities to travel to the West in the foreseeable future. Although he implied that he wanted to defect as soon as possible, he agreed to remain in place in Geneva for at least two or three weeks while arrangements for his reception were being made in Washington. NOSENKO had brought a large amount of new information, much of it in scribbled notes, on KGB operational activity collected in the 18 months since his last meeting with CIA. Twelve more meetings were held in a Geneva safehouse over the next twelve days, varying in length from one and a half to six hours.

D. Post-Defection Handling (February 1964-Present)

On 4 February, four days before the date tentatively selected for NOSENKO's defection, he reported that a cable had been received from KGB Headquarters ordering his immediate return to participate in a KGB conference on foreign tourism to

the Soviet Union.* Exfiltration plans were then implemented, and NOSENKO was driven across the border to Germany that same night. Debriefings resumed in a Frankfurt safehouse. The decision was reached on 11 February to bring NOSENKO to the United States, and in the early evening of 12 February he and his CIA escorts arrived in Washington via commercial aircraft, thence to a safehouse in the Washington area.

At the request of the Swiss and Soviet Governments, NOSENKO met on 14 February with representatives of their respective Washington Embassies in the offices of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. He told both that he had defected of his own free will after careful consideration and that he had no desire to return to the Soviet Union. In answer to the questions of the Soviet representatives, he orally renounced his status and rights as a citizen of the USSR.

CIA completed its initial debriefings of NOSENKO on 18 February, and on 24 February he was introduced to representatives of the FBI for questioning. At about the same time, there was a marked decline in NOSENKO's discipline: He became evasive and uncooperative, refusing to answer some of the questions of his debriefers, both CIA and FBI; his nightlife in Washington and nearby cities was punctuated by drinking bouts, crude behavior, and disputes with his security escort. He explained these actions by saying that he was under great tension as a result of his defection, abandonment of his wife and children, and the disgrace that he had brought to his family name. It was against this background that CIA acceded to NOSENKO's demand for a vacation. On 12 March, therefore, NOSENKO left Washington with a CIA case officer and two CIA security guards for a two-week vacation in Hawaii. There his behavior deteriorated still further: He drank heavily and almost constantly; he engaged in sexual acts with a number of prostitutes; he was loud and crude in public places; and he spent money extravagently ($800 on one prostitute) and conspicuously (a $100 bill for a restaurant tip).

During NOSENKO's absence, consultations were held with the FBI concerning steps to be taken to restrict his movements and activities. Both agencies feared that his behavior would bring about unwanted attention and publicity, perhaps police arrest, and that doubts about his bona fides, which were becoming known to a widening group of people in the U.S. Government, might be inadvertently revealed to NOSENKO himself. The FBI on 1 April said it would "not interpose objection" to the CIA plan to limit NOSENKO's freedom of movement. The Acting Attorney General, the Department of State, and the White House were also notified of the CIA plan at this time.

In the morning of 4 April NOSENKO was driven to another safehouse in a Washington suburb, ostensibly only for a polygraph examination. At the safehouse NOSENKO was given a routine polygraph examination, lasting over three hours; he

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* See Parts III E and III F for further discussions of this cable.

"reacted significantly" to questions concerning his intentions in defecting to the United States and other related matters.* He was then told that he would remain at this safehouse, which thenceforward was his regular place of residence. Since this time NOSENKO has had contacts with CIA personnel only, has been under full-time guard, and has not been permitted access to news media.

Detailed interrogation of NOSENKO was begun on 4 April 1964 in order to obtain information which he had been reluctant to give in debriefings, and to clarify contradictions in what he had already reported. This phase of the interrogations was terminated on 24 April 1964.

Despite the searching nature of the questions and the implicit and explicit doubts of his veracity, NOSENKO proved himself willing to answer, or to try to answer, questions put to him. Because much more information pertinent to the question of his bona fides had to be obtained, a new phase of interrogation was begun in mid-May 1964. Different interrogators were introduced and questioning was resumed in a neutral, non-hostile manner. The period of neutral questioning continued until mid-November 1964.

After further consultations with the FBI, a new round of hostile interrogations began on 26 January 1965. NOSENKO was questioned for a total of about 140 hours by individual interrogators and by interrogation teams consisting of two or three men, and he was directly challenged on many of his previous reports. He admitted that certain of his earlier statements had been incorrect, and that he could not explain contradictions in his testimony. Nevertheless, NOSENKO maintained he had been basically truthful, and that he had come to the United States solely for the reasons he had originally given. This interrogation was broken off on 5 March 1965.

Questioning of NOSENKO during the summer and autumn of 1964 and the interrogations of January and February 1965 concentrated on the period of his claimed service in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, from January 1960 to January 1962. Among the reasons for selecting this particular period were the comparatively large amount of collateral information available against which NOSENKO's statements could be checked; the importance of the U.S. Embassy and its personnel as the outstanding KGB Second Chief Directorate targets; their importance from the standpoint of American security; and the extent of NOSENKO's knowledge about the activities of the U.S. Embassy Section, in his capacity as its Deputy Chief.

In keeping with Soviet practice, CIA asked NOSENKO in February 1965 to sign a series of interrogation reports, so-called "protocols," most of which concern the period of his claimed service in the American Department. These were written by the CIA interrogators, and they were designed to incorporate

* See Part VII.C. for a further discussion of the polygraph tests.

NOSENKO's exact statements and meaning on various specific subjects. The protocols were in no way presented to NOSENKO as documentary portions of a "confession," but rather as distilled and final statements of what he did and did not know concerning particular topics. NOSENKO was asked to read each page of each protocol carefully and to sign his name at the bottom to indicate that he understood and agreed with its contents; he was allowed the use of a dictionary and was permitted to ask any questions and make any changes that he wished. (Amendments were entered by the interrogators and were initialed by NOSENKO.) NOSENKO was asked, after reading each page and after completing the entire protocol, whether he understood what was written there and whether there were any more changes he wished to make. He was then asked to sign and date the statement, "I have read and understood this report and certify it as correct," at the end of the final page. With one exception, which will be noted later, he did so calmly and without objections, although on one or two of them he remarked that his statements were presented in such a manner as to make them look foolish; although invited to do so, he was not able to suggest any changes of fact or presentation which would make them more accurate. Commenting on the use of interrogation reports, NOSENKO said on 4 March 1965: "My life story is absolutely correct. Anything I have signed is absolutely correct. I absolutely understand what I am doing when I am signing any paper. This is an official document, and I fully understand what I'm doing when I sign it as being absolutely correct."

In May 1965 a CIA psychologist questioned NOSENKO in detail on his life from birth until 1953, when he said he entered the KGB, in an attempt to gain additional insights into his character and personality.

Further questioning was conducted from 26 July until 13 August 1965 with the participation of Peter DERYABIN, a former KGB officer. These interrogations, the first to be held in Russian, were for the purpose of using DERYABIN's first-hand experience in the KGB to obtain a clearer understanding of NOSENKO's personal and professional background.

There were no further debriefings or interrogations until 18 October 1966. On this date NOSENKO was polygraphed on the case of Lee Harvey OSWALD.

During the period 19-25 October 1966, NOSENKO was questioned for seven days on specific aspects of selected topics ranging from his identity to his involvement in and knowledge of specific KGB operations. Questioning was in both Russian and English.

III. OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES

A. Earlier Information on NOSENKO in Geneva

NOSENKO's name first came to the attention of CIA in October 1960 when he applied at the American Embassy in Moscow for a visa to enter the United States as a member of an automotive delegation. The following month CIA obtained copies of his passport photograph at two separate points on his TDY route to Cuba. There was no indication of intelligence affiliation, and when NOSENKO arrived under true name with the Soviet delegation in Geneva in March 1962, he was accorded no more than the interest routinely given by Western intelligence services to Soviets travelling abroad.* After arriving in Switzerland, however, but before establishing contact with CIA, NOSENKO was involved in at least two incidents which brought him to the special notice of the British, Swiss, American, and possibly the West German services.

The first of these occurred in April 1962. At a cocktail party in Geneva, NOSENKO met a female secretary employed by the British Foreign Office. He saw her several days later in the corridors of the Palais des Nations and asked her to have dinner with him, and a date was made for several evenings later. According to the secretary's later account as reported by her superiors: "They talked about Marxism, the Chinese, Yugoslavia, and love; NOSENKO was obviously smitten with her, became verbally amorous, and told her that he would like to take her off to a desert island." The girl felt that NOSENKO probably was not interested in her for intelligence purposes, but seemed to be genuinely attracted by her. From her conversations with NOSENKO she was able to report that "he had been in submarines during the war and, according to himself, had risen to the rank of Commander. He was a member of the Communist Party. His father was in the Ministry of Shipping. He himself had served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1948 and 1949 and had apparently visited England but had not been stationed there." NOSENKO also told her that he was acquainted with [redacted] of the [redacted] publishing house in London.** When NOSENKO became too persistent in his attentions, the secretary reported the contact to her superiors, was withdrawn immediately from Switzerland, and later resigned from the Foreign Office.

This same incident also brought NOSENKO to the attention of the Swiss service, which later reported it to CIA, without details, as an attempt on NOSENKO's part to recruit the girl.

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*Although NOSENKO was described in reports (held by CIA) concerning recruitment approaches to Americans in Moscow prior to his first arrival in Geneva, there was no basis in these reports to identify the Soviet described as NOSENKO. The name NOSENKO did not appear in these earlier reports.

**[redacted] was one of NOSENKO's targets during a 1957 trip to the Soviet Union. NOSENKO used the alias NIKOLAYEV in his contacts with [redacted] and, in CIA debriefings, gave this as the reason he was forced to use the name NIKOLAYEV in the two trips he made to London in 1957 and 1959. The secretary knew NOSENKO by true name. (See Parts V.D.3.d. and V.E.8. for discussion of [redacted])

According to this report, "after a time it became evident that NOSENKO's interest in her was not only sexual, but also in information to which she had access in the course of her duties." A [redacted] official in Geneva told CIA that NOSENKO had definitely tried to recruit the secretary and that he attempted to obtain "disarmament secrets" from her.

At his second meeting with CIA on 11 June 1962, NOSENKO described the same incident, in the context of reporting a possible KGB penetration of British counterintelligence: "I decided to try to take this English girl to bed. And this had nothing to do with work. No, it was simply (sex)...And Yurka [Yuriy GUK, First Chief Directorate officer in Geneva] said to me: 'Listen, Yura. Be careful, because we have people even in British counterintelligence.'" NOSENKO described the incident as follows:

> "After I had been here a week or two there was a reception for members of the delegation and at it I saw a certain English girl. Then RUSK gave a reception and she was there again. I came to the reception, she saw me, and I went up to her. She said that it was very nice to make my acquaintance, and that's all. M.S. ROGOV (TSYMBAL) was there. He said to me: 'Yura, it looks to me like you are going to bed with that girl.' I answered: 'What do you mean, Mikhail Stepanovich? She just interests me.' I had already decided to try to get her in bed...But, listen further. After this she used to go to the Disarmament Conferences. Well, to make it short, I asked this girl for a date. She is Scottish, Scottish, not English, and works in an office here. We agreed to meet at a restaurant. I asked my friends which restaurant here is the best, where there isn't a crowd. We went to the restaurant and sat there all evening--all alone. There were just the two of us. The restaurant is under the ground and is called 'Day and Night' in Russian, 'Jour et Nuit.' We sat there and then she asked me where we could meet again. A day later we met again. Again in the restaurant and then we took a walk. She got me bothered and then gave me the brush-off. I called her once. She wasn't at home. I called again. Again she was out. I called a third time. She wasn't there. She thought that I was an intelligence officer and that I was interested in her for this reason. This, honestly, wasn't so. I had only one thing in mind. She was quite a woman...But the English girl felt that she was being developed. I met three times with her. Three times we were at the restaurant and she told them [her superiors] this. She knew that I am Russian. She told them this and they [NOSENKO whistled, apparently signifying that they terminated the relationship] at once. She knew from the very beginning that I am Russian, from the very beginning. In short, I told her a lot of things--well, you know--so to get her into bed. Well, we were walking on the quay and I said to her: 'How about going up to your place?' she answered: 'I can't.' 'Why?' I said, 'I'll take off my shoes and come on tiptoe.' She answered: 'Is it possible for me to come to you?' I said: 'You can't come to my place. There would be a knock on the door at once. The Swiss would tell the Americans and that would be the end. I can't do this.' So all I could do was have her next to the parapet. But the English felt--and nothing was heard about this, but

she is no longer here. She got into trouble and I fee sorry for her because maybe they have fired her. Because they--the Foreign Office--keep only... Speaking honestly, as a human being, I am concerned that they might fire her. Because there was nothing more to it than this one thing."

The second event bringing NOSENKO to special notice occurred at about the same time that NOSENKO established contact with CIA and may, in fact, have been the incident which he said drove him to contact David MARK. On 15 June 1962 (ten days after NOSENKO approached MARK) [redacted] the permanent representative of [redacted] in Geneva, told his host at luncheon, American Ambassador TUBBY, that two girls from the Ba-Ta-Clan Club, a strip-tease bar in Geneva, had come to the [redacted] consulate apparently seeking visas. The girls had told of two Soviets, one about 30 and the other about 40, who had visited the club recently (no date was provided by [redacted]. According to the girls, [redacted] said, the two Soviets had attempted to pass themselves off as Americans and had spent "hundreds" of francs drinking at the club. The name which [redacted] gave Ambassador TUBBY for one of these Soviets "sounded like TISENKOV." From their descriptions, the two Soviets were almost certainly NOSENKO and his friend A.K. KISLOV.* At his first meeting with CIA NOSENKO said that a week and a half earlier he spent 1500 Swiss francs in a single night of drinking and women with KISLOV. The necessity of repaying this money, taken from KGB operational funds, was the immediate cause of his contact with CIA, according to NOSENKO.

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*See Part III.D. for further information on KISLOV.

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B. Reasons for NOSENKO's Presence in Geneva (1962 and 1964)

1. TDY in 1962

When NOSENKO arrived in Geneva for the first time on 10 March 1962, he was listed officially as a Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs "expert" with the Delegation to the disarmament talks. Early during his second meeting with CIA on 11 June 1962, NOSENKO was asked to explain precisely why he had been sent out to Geneva. He replied as follows: "Right now, I came to provide counterintelligence support to the Disarmament Delegation... There is a special [KGB] department for delegations, a special one, recently created. And the chief of this department is simultaneously a deputy chief of the [Second Chief] Directorate. He is both chief of the department and deputy chief of the directorate so that there will be a person who can be held responsible if anything happens. Understand? The chief of the directorate [O.M. GRIBANOV] hated to sign all sorts of recommendations and so on, when someone can run off in Belgium or wherever he may be. This happened more than once, and he was summoned before the [CPSU] Central Committee. Therefore, he decided to create a new position. The person holding it is simultaneously chief of the department and deputy chief of the directorate and personally signs off on all matters concerning exits [from the USSR]. This was in order to avoid being called on the carpet...so that blame would fall not on the chief of the directorate, but on his deputy, who is in charge of this department and who signed off...

"This department," NOSENKO continued, "is concerned with departures abroad, that is, it checks all Soviet citizens who intend to travel abroad, both alone and as members of delegations. Since GOLITSYN [defected] in Finland, we have an order that no delegation is to be let out without an operational worker, not a single delegation... With me it happened as follows: I was not planning to go. They told me: 'You are going.' I said: 'I can't. I have a section. I have 15 people there, all operating people. Am I supposed to dump them? What can I do?' 'No, you are going,' was the reply. 'And what did the chief order?' I asked. The chief [NOSENKO was referring to GRIBANOV when he spoke of the "chief".] said: 'GROMYKO is going this time, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is going, and somebody on an appropriate level must go with him. Not a case officer, not a senior case officer, not a deputy, but the chief of a section, or the deputy chief of a department, or a department chief.' Well, I was the most junior section chief. I was called in to my chief, my immediate chief, who is concerned with the Seventh Department. They had told him that it would be for a month and on this basis he gave me permission. And I have been here since 10 March."

Later during this second meeting NOSENKO volunteered that in addition to his security officer functions in Geneva, he had a special assignment to check on P.F. SHAKHOV, a senior advisor to the Soviet Delegation.* SHAKHOV had been noted in contact

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*CIA records show that SHAKHOV has served in and visited the United States on numerous occasions since 1942, when he was assigned at the Soviet Consulate General in New York. He

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with David MARK, believed by the KGB to be a CIA officer, NOSENKO reported, and on this basis the KGB suspected that SHAKHOV might be an American agent. NOSENKO described the various ways he had tested these suspicions in Geneva. He first gave SHAKHOV disinformation and looked for indications that he passed it on to American contacts. Next, SHAKHOV was told to perform countersurveillance tasks during a meeting by NOSENKO with an imaginary agent, while other KGB officers checked for signs that SHAKHOV had forewarned the Americans about the meeting. Finally, NOSENKO revealed to SHAKHOV the location of a KGB "dead drop" and checked back five days later to see whether the specially prepared materials which had been placed in it had been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO's conclusion from all this, he told CIA, was that SHAKHOV was absolutely free of suspicion, and it was his intention to report this finding when he returned to KGB Headquarters.

On later occasions NOSENKO reported that SHAKHOV had previously served with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the United States and that during this period he acted as an agent-recruiter for the KGB. In 1966 NOSENKO named one person whom SHAKHOV had spotted and developed in the United States, [redacted] [redacted] SHAKHOV, according to NOSENKO, was not and never had been a KGB officer. Asked why SHAKHOV was permitted to travel abroad when he was suspected of being an American agent, NOSENKO explained that since SHAKHOV belonged to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the KGB could do nothing about his trips abroad. "There was no proof, only suspicions," and furthermore, SHAKHOV was a member of the personal staff of the head of the Soviet Delegation, S.K. TSARAPKIN.

NOSENKO was questioned again about his 1962 assignment to Geneva during the February 1965 interrogations. His answers were incorporated in a "protocol" which NOSENKO certified as being correct on 26 February 1965. The protocol states: "GRIBANOV had nothing at all to do with my assignment to Geneva in 1962. I think that the fitness report written about me for this trip was signed by [F.D.] BOBKOV, since he was the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate who supervised the Seventh [Tourist] Department. I did not personally discuss this trip with GRIBANOV before my departure from Moscow. My candidacy for this assignment was supported by [S.G.] BANNIKOV, the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, who supervised the work of the Eleventh [Soviet Delegations] Department which had the investigative file on SHAKHOV. BANNIKOV was concerned with the question of who should go as case officer on

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attended the 1945 Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, the 1955 Paris Summit Conference, and many disarmament conferences over the years, and he has attended a number of sessions of the UN General Assembly. Most recently SHAKHOV arrived in New York as a member of the Soviet Mission to the UN in 1963. The Soviet defectors PETROV and DERYABIN have reported that SHAKHOV's face is familiar to them; RASTVOROV identified him as an MVD officer whom he is certain he saw at MVD Headquarters in Moscow; and [redacted] identified him as an "employee of the KGB." [redacted], however, [redacted] said that SHAKHOV is "clean, a 'pure diplomat'" and that, to his knowledge, SHAKHOV was not engaged in any Soviet intelligence activity at that time.

sensi[tive] sou[rce]

sensitive source

*For further particulars on [redacted] see Part VI.D.6.

[illegible]

this trip because SHAKHOV, who was suspected of possibly being a Western agent, was to be in the delegation. When the Eleventh Department was looking for a case officer to make this trip they wanted to have a chief of section because of the seriousness of the SHAKHOV case. When they asked in the Seventh Department [V.D.] CHELNOKOV agreed that I should take the assignment. There was no background or neighborhood investigation conducted on me in connection with my being approved for this trip.* My assignment was approved by the Eleventh Department, by the Personnel Office of the Second Chief Directorate, by the Central Personnel Office of the KGB and by the Central Committee of the CPSU."

NOSENKO was asked why he had been selected to make this trip immediately after assuming the duties of the Chief of the American Tourist Section, on the eve of the tourist season, and at a time when he had no deputy. He explained that it was not thought that the assignment would last so long, and CHELNOKOV, his superior and friend, had decided to let him go as a "treat."

During interrogations of October 1966 NOSENKO was questioned further about his 1962 assignment to Geneva as a security officer. He said that in this capacity he would necessarily know the identity of all other KGB officers serving with the Soviet Disarmament Delegation in Geneva. There were only, besides himself, the KGB First Chief Directorate officers M.S. TSYMBAL and I.S. MAYOROV. (CIA, however, has tentatively identified three other delegation members as KGB staff officers: A.K. KISLOV, observed in Washington and in Moscow in what appears to have been KGB operational activity; V.G. FILATOV, who served as an alternate handler in the KGB operation with the NATO officer Georges PAQUES; and Oleg GRINEVSKIY, a member of the permanent Soviet Delegation who handled a [redacted] double agent during this same conference.) NOSENKO included GRINEVSKIY in the list of his own agents in Geneva in 1962 and said that, in Moscow, GRINEVSKIY was handled by an officer of the Intelligentsia and Correspondents Department of the Second Chief Directorate. KISLOV, according to NOSENKO, was an operational contact in Moscow of the Austria-Germany-Scandanavia Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate and was used in operations against the West German Embassy there. NOSENKO also said that KISLOV had been a KGB operational contact during his earlier tour in the United States but was neither then nor later a KGB officer. He characterized FILATOV as a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official and stated that he is "definitely not an intelligence officer."

NOSENKO was also requestioned during these interrogations on his investigation of SHAKHOV. After saying on the morning of 19 October 1966 that he had been personally told by the

* NOSENKO has said that in 1960 he was turned down for a permanent assignment to Ethiopia because of his excessive drinking. (See Part V.E.4.a)

Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate that the SHAKHOV investigation was the main reason for his assignment to Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO later in the day stated: "My main task was to check the security of the delegation, plus SHAKHOV. You can't separate these tasks."

In this questioning NOSENKO described the basis for the suspicions of SHAKHOV, the lack of results from earlier investigations, and his own preparation for this assignment. He said that as a representative of the Soviet Delegations Department of the Second Chief Directorate, M.G. SITNIKOV had conducted investigations of SHAKHOV in Geneva in 1961, but SITNIKOV was unable to resolve the questions concerning him. Because of the failure of these early efforts, the KGB decided to send "a senior guy" to the Disarmament talks in 1962, and NOSENKO was chosen "to finish things up." Before leaving Moscow in March 1962, NOSENKO therefore discussed the SHAKHOV case with SITNIKOV and with one (fnu) LYALIN, the Soviet Delegations Department officer in charge of the SHAKHOV case; he also read various materials on the case, including an investigative plan drawn up by LYALIN. NOSENKO's description of these preparations provided the basis for the questioning which followed:

Question: Why was SHAKHOV under suspicion in June 1962?

NOSENKO: He was working with different delegations at different conferences and, being in Geneva, it was noticed that there was something which can be described as a connection with David MARK, who was considered a CIA officer.* Also, little, little, little things before.

Question: When did SHAKHOV and MARK first meet? How did it begin?

NOSENKO: In '60 or '61 there was a contact with MARK. I don't remember who reported it. The report was maybe from SITNIKOV in Geneva. MARK was known to the Second Chief Directorate as the Rezident [CIA Chief of Station] in Moscow. After Moscow he went to Geneva, and it was considered he must be the Rezident in Geneva. All the KGB officers going there were told to pay attention to him.

Question: What about the report?

NOSENKO: Maybe the officers saw the two going to the toilet. Maybe there was a contact. The file said "maybe." I was sent to Geneva to carry

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*As stated earlier, MARK was not a CIA officer in Moscow, although he did perform certain clandestine tasks for CIA. He had no CIA missions in Geneva in 1962. Within the context of discussion of NOSENKO's security officer duties during October 1966, NOSENKO was asked to name any CIA officers he knew to be present in Geneva during the 1962 disarmament talks. MARK was the only one he cited.

out measures to check... There were many little, little things. MARK maybe turned his head a certain way when SHAKHOV was talking. [S.M.] GOLUBEV, formerly of the Fourteenth [Counterintelligence] Department, was in the Soviet Delegation with SHAKHOV.* He noticed little details. When the officers in the United States decided to terminate SHAKHOV [as an agent], they wrote a report on him which said he was liking life in the U.S.--American products, money. He was pictured as not good and, in addition, he was not wanting to work as an agent.

2. The 1964 TDY

NOSENKO's 1964 trip to Geneva, commencing on 19 January, was also in the capacity of security officer with the Soviet Disarmament Delegation. He said he was the only security officer for the group, which consisted of about 25 persons, and again he was officially listed as an "expert." NOSENKO reported that he had three or four agents within the delegation and an equal number of operational contacts. The only person whom he was instructed to watch in particular was A.A. TKACHEV, an interpreter, who had travelled to Austria in 1960 and 1961 and who, the KGB had noted, was in the habit of going about by himself. Other than this, according to NOSENKO, his responsibilities were general in nature.

NOSENKO explained during the February 1965 interrogations how he was selected for this TDY. The protocol he signed on 26 February 1965 states: "GRIBANOV had absolutely nothing to do with my assignment to Geneva in 1964. The fitness report on me for this trip was signed by [F.D.] BOBKOV. For the 1964 trip no decision of approval of the Central Committee of the CPSU was required for me or for any other members of the delegation who had been approved for the 1962 trip. It was my own personal wish to make this trip in 1964 and I had discussed the question with [V.D.] CHELNOKOV even in 1963 and had received his agreement. I had also talked about this with [M.V.] KHLOBUSTOV and [G.] PANCHENKO [both of the Soviet Delegations Department]. After it had been decided that I would go, in about the beginning of January 1964, [N.T.] ZHARIKOV, the Chief of the Department, suggested that a case officer might not be required with this delegation. KHLOBUSTROV, PANCHENKO, and [A.G.] KOVALENKO [Chief of the Tourist Department and NOSENKO's immediate supervisor] supported me for the assignment as a personal favor to me." With regard to GRIBANOV's knowledge of his assignment to Geneva this second time, NOSENKO said that he feared that if GRIBANOV learned about the TDY he would have said, "What, again?" and would not have permitted him to go. It was for this reason that NOSENKO did not discuss the trip with GRIBANOV, he said, and he did not believe that GRIBANOV, in fact, knew anything about it.

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*GOLUBEV was also identified by [redacted] sensitive source as a First Chief Directorate counterintelligence officer. According to [redacted] he was one of several KGB officers forced to leave the United States in 1964 because he was well known to NOSENKO. There is no record in CIA files that GOLUBEV has ever been to Switzerland.

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C. Motivations and Intentions of NOSENKO

1. Introduction

NOSENKO has not indicated that his professional status in the KGB, his standard of living in the Soviet Union, or his family life prompted him to volunteer to American Intelligence in 1962 and to defect to the United States in 1964. He initially told CIA that he had been unusually successful during his ten-year career as a KGB counterintelligence officer; his closest friends and the people whom he admired most were members of the KGB; he enjoyed his work. The NOSENKO family held a high social position, and their economic situation was "luxurious by Soviet standards." NOSENKO described his family life as close and harmonious. He spoke with fondness and pride about his two daughters, of his wife's tolerance and understanding, of the companionship she gave him. He expressed love and a sense of responsibility for his widowed mother, who heavily depended upon him after the death of his father in 1956. The elder NOSENKO won his son's admiration for having worked his way up from an apprentice pipefitter in a shipyard to the position of Soviet Minister of Shipbuilding. The NOSENKO name is honored in the home town of Nikolayevsk, where the shipyard has been renamed for the former minister and where a statue of him has been erected in the town square. By his own account, NOSENKO thus had had a rewarding home life and a successful and enjoyable career in the KGB.

2. Collaboration in 1962

At the outset in 1962, NOSENKO said he wanted to limit his reports to two items of information. Before the first meeting with CIA was over, he went beyond these two items to give details on the KGB Second Chief Directorate and other operations, and he offered to meet again. (Four more meetings ensued in 1962, with NOSENKO providing additional information on the KGB.) He would not defect, NOSENKO said, unless his personal safety was endangered by the KGB. Motivations in coming to American Intelligence, according to NOSENKO, were his financial emergency in Geneva and his disaffection for the Soviet regime.

a. Readiness to Report to CIA

During his 9 June meeting with David MARK, NOSENKO said he realized, even before talking to representatives of American Intelligence, that they would not be satisfied with the two items of information alone--he expected them to insist on more. He was introduced by MARK to a CIA case officer later the same day, and at the start of the meeting, the following dialogue took place:

NOSENKO:	You see, I am not planning to be your agent... and don't think that I am going to work with you in Moscow. No. No...
Case Officer:	As you have said, I am an intelligence officer as are you. And I think that we will understand one another.
NOSENKO:	You want to place our relationship on an agent basis.

TOP SECRET

Case Officer: Of course.

NOSENKO: Never in my life I will go in contact [with CIA] in Moscow or the USSR, never in my life. I also know about Langelle and POPOV;* I know this matter. When it was abroad it was fine, but when you decided to meet him in Moscow... You want more than I came with the intention of saying. You want to change this to a long-term relationship. Understand me. I am now the chief of a section. Before my departure [from Moscow] a decision was being reached--and I have just spoken with my wife in Moscow--I am supposed to become the deputy chief of a department. Do you understand what this is?

Case Officer: Why are you telling me this?

NOSENKO: Because I wanted to come [to CIA] only for a business deal, to give you these two cases, to receive money for this, and that's all. Goodbye. Perhaps, sometime, when I come abroad, we will meet one another and perhaps I will give you something. God knows. But I don't want to do this now. I don't want to and I am not prepared within myself for this... I am giving two interesting cases. The most interesting ones. I say to you honestly, the two most interesting ones. In the first of them ["ANDREY"**], I took no part. In the second [BELITSKIY***] I took part, even here.

Case Officer: I want you to understand that these two matters that you spoke to Mr. MARK about are of great importance to us. But I don't have to tell you that. You know that. But we are not going to play like children. You know perfectly well that it is worth every franc... What I want to tell you is this: of course I will ask you more, and of course I want to know as much as you know. If you refuse to answer, that's your business.

NOSENKO: I will tell what I am able to tell. What I know, I will tell. Of course, you yourself understand that there are things concerning our internal system that I cannot report to you. You yourself understand this.

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*The compromise of the CIA source in the GRU, P.S. POPOV, is discussed in Part VI.D.7.a.

**The case of "ANDREY," the KGB cryptonym for the agent Dayle SMITH, is discussed in Part VI.D.3.b.

***BELITSKIY, a KGB-controlled double agent, is discussed in Part VI.D.6

When the CIA officer said that he understood NOSENKO had been in the KGB since shortly after the war, NOSENKO, without further prompting, gave a detailed statement of his own personal past and his professional career. In this statement he described his education, his service in the GRU, his entry into the KGB and generally the functions and operating techniques of the various components of the KGB Second Chief Directorate in which he had served, along with the inclusive dates of his service in each. This account was very similar to that given MARK earlier in the day. Still without prompting, he discussed several specific KGB operations against Americans inside the Soviet Union, one involving the recruitment of a Yale University professor on the basis of homosexual compromise and the other an unsuccessful attempt to recruit an American code clerk. NOSENKO said he was personally involved in both cases.*

The question of his further assistance was then raised again: The CIA officer asked NOSENKO to tell more about the Yale professor, but NOSENKO demurred, stressing that the agreement involved only two pieces of information and ignoring the fact that he had already given considerably more:

NOSENKO: I have told you enough for this day, and I will tell you only these two cases which I wanted to tell you, and it is enough for this day.

Case Officer: How do you imagine that this is enough? You know that we work much the same way.

NOSENKO: Yes.

Case Officer: You know what interests us, of course.

NOSENKO: I know it. Today I gave only two things. Let's meet one another [again].

Case Officer: Good. But let me say this: What you tell me is your business. I am not going to try to bring any pressure at all...There is no argument about it. I am not going to say: 'Please see us in Moscow.' I don't want to see you in Moscow because it's too difficult. It is completely impossible. That's it. No more on that subject.

NOSENKO: I said to David [MARK] before meeting you that I don't want to meet anyone anymore, not anyone.

Case Officer: All right. Agreed.

NOSENKO: In another place. I don't know whether I will come back here in a month or not...I personally don't want to, either, because my wife will be moaning at home. But I am afraid they will make me come, because I know the delegation. I know

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*Richard BURGI and Joseph MORONE; see Parts V.D.4.b. and V.E.3.c., respectively. NOSENKO did not supply the names at this time.

the circumstances. They may make me come
In that case we can meet.

Case Officer: You know that I would not bring any pressure. That's something we understand because we are both in this business. You and I are in the same business, so you can't--

NOSENKO: Let me interrupt. Why are we bargaining so now? So that I will say something more to you. I said: 'Let's meet again.' Maybe I will tell [more]. Now I will give you only these two items because we have made a deal. I will tell you about these two cases. Let's meet again, if you insist. I understand that you want more. Well, I will think a bit about what I know.

Case Officer: That's all right.

NOSENKO: We can meet when I am abroad perhaps...You must understand me. This has not come to me simply. I had time tb think for a long time. I thought for a long time. You see, it's very difficult for me, very difficult for me. And after I go it will also be very difficult for me.

Case Officer: But you knew that when you came. Why did you come to us? Why to the American rezidentura [CIA Station] and not to the British?

NOSENKO: I came here because you are strong, strong... You don't have to explain to me. I know what makes me go. I told you it is hard for me. I still need to think. That's all. But I can no longer take a step back because the step forward has already been taken. I won't refuse if we meet before my departure. If you like, on Monday, on Tuesday, any day. Monday is better for me. Not Sunday, because I have to be there with my own [people].

This exchange was followed by a lengthy description of the two leads which NOSENKO had come to sell, the BELITSKIY and the "ANDREY" cases.

As NOSENKO was about to leave this first meeting, his case officer asked when they might meet again. NOSENKO suggested that they meet two days later, on Monday, around noontime as it would be easier for him to get away unnoticed at lunchtime. He then said that the case officer was probably trying to get everything down on tape and asked that this be stopped because of the risk to his security resulting from such a permanent record of their conversations. NOSENKO said: "I will not tell you anything particularly interesting. But I can tell you something. But not today. I can tell how LANGELLE blew POPOV--not LANGELLE, but because of whom and why we found him--for your future use, so that you will know how to operate. But LANGELLE was not guilty. It was not LANGELLE who was guilty. Another person was responsible for the compromise. Next time."

or of the degree of this cooperation was never raise aga n. At the very start of the second meeting, on 11 June, he said: "I am tortured all the time by a single thought. Everything now depends upon you, only on you. The slightest careless move by your people and it will be the end of me." Although he sometimes voiced moral compunctions, from this point on NOSENKO expressed his primary personal concern as being his own security vis-a-vis the KGB.

b. Attitude Toward Defection

While willing to meet with CIA representatives during future trips outside the Soviet Union, which he estimated would occur about once a year, NOSENKO in 1962 refused to consider defection except in circumstances where his personal security would be endangered. His devotion to his wife and children and the probability that the KGB would take reprisals against them if he fled were, he said, the primary considerations behind this refusal. (Without elaborating on the reasons, NOSENKO said on another occasion that he would not want to leave the USSR even on a permanent KGB assignment and accompanied by his family.) Other considerations included his widowed mother's dependence on him and his love of Russia and the Russian people, as opposed to the regime. For these reasons, NOSENKO said, he could not defect as PETROV, GOLITSYN, and KHOKLOV had done.

c. Motivation

NOSENKO told David MARK on 9 June 1962 that he wanted to contact American Intelligence because he was in trouble over the loss of KGB operational funds, for which he had to account prior to his imminent departure for the Soviet Union. His KGB career would be ruined if he was caught misusing this money, NOSENKO added, and because he had nowhere else to turn, he was willing to sell two items of information to MARK. The amount needed to cover the loss was 900 Swiss francs, or about $210, and this was the price asked for the information.

NOSENKO's statements of motivation to his CIA case officers during subsequent meetings are given below:

9 June 1962: In his first meeting with a CIA officer NOSENKO asked whether MARK had relayed the reasons why he wanted to meet with American Intelligence. He then very briefly repeated what he had told MARK concerning the loss of his operational funds. The case officer remarked that there must be something more to it, upon which NOSENKO said that this was not, in fact, his main motivation: "I have been working in this business for a long time and I know what I am doing. I have heard more than is written [in the newspapers]. A reorganization has been started in the USSR. In short, they have begun to do away with the ministries and the sovnarkhozy. But this is premature. Right now our agriculture is falling apart at the seams and our industry is at the point of collapse because this reorganization, this innovation, is too early. And this is not just me, a young man, talking. I mingle with ministers, with my father's friends, and I hear what they are saying. And how much does a worker earn? 600-800 rubles in old money, now 60-80. And he doesn't sense any improvement [in his position] within the total population. These are empty words only. We have exceeded the United States in per capita production of butter and milk. But how can it be said that we have surpassed you when they are

now raising the prices for butter? You know, you feel this internal resentment (nadlom), and you feel that some big mistakes have been permitted, that management as a whole is somehow off on the wrong track. Also, look at the serious situation in Czechoslovakia now, in Germany--in the GDR. It is very serious. In Poland they have just had a poor harvest. Everywhere there they have had floods. These rains are also very serious. It means that the system, the whole socialist system cannot [cope?--one word on the tape cannot be distinguished here]. Do you understand what is wrong? Faith in the future is being lost. Why have I told you this? Because under other circumstances perhaps I would not have come to this. So this is the reason for what has happened to me. This is perhaps the incident that drove me into contact with you. It all somehow grew within me. God knows."

11 June 1962: During the second meeting, NOSENKO himself raised the issue of motivation. His case officer had just said that CIA would respect his wishes in connection with a particular request when NOSENKO said: "Speaking of respect, how can there be respect? I don't even respect myself for what I have done. But, but, take the press bulletin, the communique of the Summit Conference in Moscow on various questions. Again lies, lies, lies, to show that we have had great successes. I can't see them [the successes]. No, excuse me, I know somewhat more than the rank and file Soviet man because I work under this system. I can see what is being done and what is not being done. Lies, more lies. This was my mood. I say, 'How much is it possible to deceive the people, the Soviet people? How far can you go?' Our people are very poor. It is somewhat difficult to arouse a people such as this. If we stir ourselves up we will know how to stand up for ourselves. But I feel for my people. How often can you say that things will be good; how often can you say that we have achieved big successes? Where are they? Show me them. I can see no trace of them. This is what I say...that there is resentment in my soul. Do you understand? A terrible resentment. I love my country. You may say that this is nothing. But I tell you that I cannot act like GOLITSYN, like KHOKLOV, like PETROV, because I want to be there. I want to be with my family. That's all. But I feel that not only the government is making mistakes. I feel that there are faults throughout the entire system of socialism. What I mean is that things are bad in Czechoslovakia, things are bad in Poland, things are bad with KADAR [in Hungary], they are starving in China. This means that there are great mistakes. Well, that's all. What did you want to ask me, please?"

At the close of this meeting, NOSENKO stressed that money was unimportant as a motive for a continuing relationship: "My name must not be used anywhere, even in your offices. Understand? It would be the end of me. I am not afraid of this. The devil with them. Because I have had such a life. I lost my father, everything. Why do I say this? I did not come to you simply because I needed money. I don't need it. I came because I am resentful inside. Do you understand this internal resentment? I do not believe in what is being done. I do not believe in this. Listen to me. Let me speak honestly. Have I not had the chance to live as a person should? My father was a big man. He had a dacha and a state-owned automobile. I have my own Volga [automobile]. My mother was given a dacha for life. It's luxurious. Her apartment is enormous--150 square meters. For America this is nothing, but for Moscow this is enormous. We

always had a lot of money, especially during the war. A salary of 15,000 or 20,000-plus--25,000. There was much money. She is a rich woman. She has paintings by Ayvazovskiy, Makovskiy. Even if she had insufficient money, she could always sell her possessions. What do I want to say? That I've never wanted for money. Never...As I said, perhaps the thing which drove me to you was not money, but this great, great resentment."

14 June 1962: The subject of motivation was not discussed during the third and fourth meetings with NOSENKO. As he was about to leave the Geneva safehouse after the fifth and final session, however, NOSENKO again touched on the economic inequities existing inside the Soviet Union and raised a new reason for cooperating with CIA, his basic sympathy for the American people. NOSENKO said that he realized that the reason he had given for coming to us, his need for money, was "not good." Before he and his case officers parted, NOSENKO said, he wanted to emphasize "without attempting to justify himself" that he had "always felt a certain sympathy toward the American people." He explained that it was not the technical progress of the United States which attracted him, nor was it the high standard of living of the American people. It was rather the openness and directness with which the Americans whom he had met and seen handled themselves. As examples he cited his American targets in Moscow and Secretary of State Dean RUSK, whom he had seen in Geneva.

Although NOSENKO did mention the difficult economic situation in the USSR on a few other occasions, he did not relate these remarks specifically to his motives for volunteering to CIA. The above excerpts are representative of his total statement on motivation during the 1962 meetings.

3. Decision to Defect (January 1964)

On arrival for his first meeting with CIA during the second Geneva phase, on 24 January 1964, NOSENKO said that after long and careful consideration since the 1962 meeting series, he had decided to defect. He once again criticized the Communist regime along the same lines as during earlier meetings, but his immediate motivation seemed to have nothing to do with this. NOSENKO explained that he had recently been promoted to the position of First Deputy Chief of the Seventh (Tourist) Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, and that because of the stature and responsibilities of his new job, there would be few opportunities, if any, for him to visit the West in the future. Therefore, he had decided to seize the opportunity at hand and to flee to the United States at once, leaving his family behind. He foresaw no possibility of his wife and children being permitted to leave the USSR for the "next twenty years." NOSENKO told CIA that "the hardest thing is to part with my family." He had, however, carefully considered their fate as the close relatives of a defector, and he knew that, because of his mother's position in Soviet society, no harm would come to them.

Whereas NOSENKO declared his intent to defect immediately, the CIA case officers at this first meeting in 1964 persuaded him to remain in place for at least two or three weeks on the grounds that, first, CIA would benefit much from this, and second, arrangements for his transfer to and reception in the United States would have to be coordinated in advance with CIA Headquarters.

During this first meeting NOSENKO made no monetary request of CIA and asked only for reasonable assurance of a secure future in the United States. In this connection, he said, he would prefer to act as a CIA consultant, particularly on counterintelligence matters because he was a specialist in this field; he would be able to give CIA leads and assistance in spotting and recruiting other Soviets.

The next five meetings with NOSENKO were devoted exclusively to debriefings on the activities of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. Although his impending defection was mentioned, his reasons for taking this step were not discussed. In the meantime, NOSENKO's first CIA handler flew to Washington for discussions regarding the defection and, on his return, told NOSENKO that the CIA leadership had asked why, specifically, NOSENKO had decided to come to the United States at that time. The answer was that NOSENKO, "after coming back and seeing that there was no more chance to come to the West, or little more chance," felt that this was his one opportunity to come and make his life with the Americans. Therefore, he was going to seize the opportunity while he had it. Asked about this, NOSENKO confirmed that this was his reason, and added: "I may never have another chance, and in addition, I've had sufficient time since our last meeting here in Geneva [1962] to weigh everything and to consider everything." Later in this same meeting, NOSENKO again mentioned his lack of interest in money and his feelings about deserting his family: "I understand [that it will be difficult to adjust to a new life in America] and know that for some time I will be sick within. And I know that a certain period of time must elapse before this can heal. I even spoke to you bluntly about my [financial] security. I am absolutely unmercenary and have never had any appreciation for money or wealth...My most difficult and sorest spot of all is my family. This is the most basic and most difficult spot of all. And I know perfectly well that I must go through an illness over this. For this the only and the best doctor is time. I don't expect to have a new family there. Of course, I don't know--but at least I'm speaking from the way I feel now. I have a strong liking for children--not only for my own, but for all children and, losing my own, I am fully conscious how I must suffer through this. In time I will get used to it. I know one can get used to almost anything."

At this meeting, NOSENKO agreed to remain in place for approximately another week, and the tentative date of 8 February was selected for the defection.

NOSENKO's motives for the defection were not mentioned for five more meetings. Then, on 4 February 1964, he telephoned the Geneva safehouse to say he wanted to defect at once. Arriving shortly thereafter, he announced that he had been ordered to return to Moscow the following day and, therefore, had to leave Switzerland before morning. He stated his reasons formally in an asylum request, written at the time:

> "This decision was made by me, not now, at the moment I write this request, but several years ago. Having worked for many years in the KGB and knowing more than the average Soviet citizen about the policy of the Soviet government, about the direction which this government has chosen to take, and about the law and order in the USSR, I have come to the decision that

live in this country and work for the welfare of this government."

4. <u>The Letter of July 1964</u>

The most complete explanation given by NOSENKO of his motives for first contacting CIA and later defecting to the United States is contained in a letter to his CIA case officer in July 1964. He described this letter as "an exposition of all those reasons and root causes which led to the decision to leave the Soviet Union" and further explained that "everything put down here is lacking in a whole series of lesser details which to a greater or lesser degree played their role." Nevertheless, he said, he had tried in this letter "to set down the main things to show how, when, and why the decision was born, grew, and hardened within me to completely alter the course of my life." This letter is presented below in its entirety. Most of the biographical and operational details mentioned in the letter are covered separately in other parts of this paper.

> "1. My life, my childhood and youth passed in very comfortable circumstances since the position of my father gave us the opportunity to live without lacking for anything. And the only difficult periods of my life (before the death of my father) were: study in the naval schools in Kuybyshev, Baku and Leningrad; and the beginning of my working life, the period in the Far East (1950-1952). The opportunity to be always well-dressed, to have a sufficient amount of money, to have my own car, to be able to use the car given me by my family and also my father's car, the opportunity to travel to the South and to vacation in the best sanitariums, <u>dachas</u>, and so forth; all this unquestionably left its mark on me and became something of a habit. After the death of my father, my successful progress in my work gave me a higher salary, and although I did not have all that which I had while my father was alive, still I did not experience any serious difficulties. But already I wanted to live still better.
>
> "2. Up to 1953, over the course of my entire life--at school, in the Institute, at work, at home in the family--it was always pounded into my head that STALIN was a great genius, that he was good, keen, etc., and the thought never occurred to me to question his words or his deeds because everything that he said, and everything he did, were completely axiomatic. The arrests and trials only involved traitors and it was considered and explained that the people who suffered innocently, especially in 1937 and 1938, suffered only because at the head of the NKVD in 1937, 1938, was the betrayor of the people YEZHOV. Not even the shadow of doubt fell on the name of STALIN. Soon after STALIN's death in 1953 I read a certain document given me by my father. This was a secret letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the 'case of the doctors;' it was not addressed to all communists but only to members and candidate members of the Central Committee. I was deeply shaken by this letter which described in detail how these people,

important specialists in the field of medicine, were brought to such a condition that they condemned themselves; that is, they confessed to things which had never happened, to things which they had never done. They were simply forced to give the evidence which was needed by the investigators. The secret letters on the cult of STALIN and much that I heard in the KGB about the reign of STALIN, all this left its mark and forced me to think deeply about the real truth and to look at everything more critically. Already I no longer had faith in all those ideas which for years had been pressed into my head.

"3. The new leaders (KHRUSHCHEV and Company) used the same methods but already diluted with the water of democracy, with playing up to the people and attempts to convince them that a new era would arise, a new and better life, and that now the Party was always going to concern itself with the welfare of the people. In fact, it was a struggle for power and the use of all means in this struggle, even microphones (they listened to the conversations of BERIYA and his friends; later they listened to the conversations of MOLOTOV, MALENKOV, KAGANOVICH, and others). KHRUSHCHEV's endless blabbing about successes, when in fact they didn't exist, the figures about how the USSR had passed the USA in the production of butter and milk, when in the stores they were available only infrequently. The endless promises of a better life when in fact nothing of the sort is taking place. All this similarly forced me to reevaluate not only the events which were taking place in the country, but already the entire ideology of the Party, its external and internal course.

"4. The events in Novocherkassk where about 20,000 to 25,000 people rose up and the way in which this popular indignation was suppressed by troops with many casualties. This also made a deep impression on me. When I was resting in the summer of 1961 in Nikolayev, from my relatives--my father's brothers--I understood well the real relation of the workers both to the leadership and to the Party as a whole. At the same time I saw how the workers really lived, how they eat, what they have and what they can buy with their wages.

"5. I heard a great deal from my father about the domestic policies of KHRUSHCHEV in regard to the development and the course of construction in industry, about his complete illiteracy in engineering technology and industrial economics, about incorrect decisions in regard to many industries, and this was not only the opinion of my father, but also of other important leaders in various fields of industry (MALYSHEV, VANNIKOV, AKOPOV, and others). But no one dared to open his mouth and when in December 1955 my father tried, as an engineer, to prove that a certain decision would be incorrect, he received such a rebuff from KHRUSHCHEV that he was profoundly shaken and in the opinion of my mother this brought him to his illness in 1956 and his death in August 1956.

"6. The events in Germany and especially in Hungary showed with absolute clarity the bankruptcy of communist ideology. What was especially important for me was the fact that in these countries it was a protest not of individuals or groups, but of the entire people who could no longer endure a regime imposed on them by force. Here it is necessary to emphasize that the life of the people in these countries was much better than that of the people in the USSR (I saw for myself how people live in Czechoslovakia, in Germany, and beyond any doubt they live better than the entire people of the Soviet Union).

"7. The split of the international communist movement became for me a clear fact and confirmed my opinion that the theory of communism is a theory built on sand and that it is practiced according to the needs of the leadership of the Party at a given stage of life and that in reality full material welfare would never be enjoyed by the people but only by the leadership and the Party and the government.

"8. Working in the KGB I came to understand much and became conscious of the contradiction between the internal and external course of the USSR. Such questions as disarmament, the ban on atomic weapons, the position of the USSR in the United Nations--all these are used only in the interest of propaganda and as a screen for carrying out of the policies needed by the communist party. (I was myself present at the negotiations in Geneva and saw the 'politics' of the Soviet delegation.)

"9. My trips abroad opened my eyes wide to the true reality. With my own eyes, I saw how people live, how much they earn, how they can dress and live on their wages, and I paid special attention to the life of ordinary people and not to that of scientists, engineers, etc. And all the propaganda about the enormous armies of unemployed in the countries of the West, about the 'heavy exploitation', and the 'unbelievably difficult life' flew immediately out of my head. And that which I met with in my work, the sending of Soviet citizens abroad--who gets sent where and how, etc.--this finally debunked this propaganda. Many of my acquaintances--GUK, CHURANOV and others--think back with great pleasure about life abroad.

"10. I entered the KOMSOMOL completely without thinking about it. The time came, the right age, and I became a Komsomolnik like all the others. It was different in regards to the Party: I joined the Party in 1956 after the death of STALIN and while I was working in the KGB and already at that time there was a lack of faith and indecisiveness in me. My father continually insisted on this, saying that without the Party I would never move ahead and would not have success in life. But I myself understood and saw that I would not be able to work in the KGB unless I was a member of the Party. And if I worked somewhere else, I would truly never move ahead in my career

unless I entered the Party. But from the very beginning of my entry into the Party, I deeply hated all the Party talmudism and dogmatism. All the Party meetings were literally a torture. Especially when I became the deputy chief of the section, the chief of the section, and the deputy chief of the department, because then I had to speak at these meetings. Because this meant to lie, to twist my soul, and to attempt to show myself as deeply dedicated to the Party and its course.

"11. In 1960 my oldest girl's asthmatic attacks became worse. The question of a change of climate was raised. At that time the SCD needed to send an officer to Ethiopia for two to three years to conduct counterintelligence work among the Soviet specialists there. It cost me a great deal of effort to personally talk GRIBANOV into letting me go. The Party and work references had been confirmed, all the questionnaries were already filled out, the photos had been submitted; that is, all the formalities had been accomplished. But at the very last moment the Central Personnel of the KGB began to protest against my going with my family to Ethiopia. The reason for this was that from the house check made at my place of residence they received information that I sometimes came home in a drunken condition and on this ground had quarrels with my wife. A tour abroad with my family was necessary because of the health of my daughter (since 1963 the illness has become better) and also it would have been advantageous from the financial point of view. From this time on I understood that Personnel would not let me go abroad with my family.

"12. Knowing many officers in the FCD, I began to understand that being sent abroad is entirely determined, not by knowledge, experience in work and success, but only by the absolute 'cleanliness' of the person's autobiography and complete assurance as to his limitless dedication to the Party and the government. But not only being sent abroad but the assignment of personnel in the First and Second Chief Directorates and the entire KGB depends on the reasons indicated by me and also on good relations with the leadership and good connections with workers in Central Personnel.

"13. I lived about 11 years with my wife and our life was not a hell. It is true that there were quarrels and basically they boiled down to the fact that she took an extremely unfavorable attitude towards my delays at work and also when I would be delayed with some of my friends and acquaintances after work and would come home with a few drinks under my belt. Of course, I loved and love my children and only the fact that they are taken care of financially until they grow up and have received an education to some extent consoled me in taking the decision to leave the USSR. What do I have in mind when I speak of financial security? After the death of my father, the family received a large monetary allowance, plus the money

that my mother had saved and valuable property, etc. My mother many times offered to divide all this in three parts: for me, my brother, and for her, but I suggested that we not do this before her death. And, of course, my mother will not leave my children without attention, and my share of the property and the money will be given to my children.

"14. If the defections of PETROV, RASTVOROV and DERYABIN passed without evoking any particular thoughts, the defection to the United States of GOLITSYN, whom I had heard of as an intelligent person and a capable officer, undoubtedly caused me to think very deeply. Because to act thus, it is necessary to have not only boldness and decisiveness, but also great strength of will. And already I put to myself the question, will I be able to act thus in view of the dissatisfactions and disillusionments which had accumulated inside of me?

"15. Being in Geneva in 1962, not long before my departure I myself of my own desire entered into contact with you. The reason for this was the loss of money received by me for operational expenses. I would have been unable to accumulate such a sum of money before my departure and there was nobody to borrow from (at this time GUK was himself in financial difficulty and at the same time he was already preparing for his return home). To tell the truth about the loss of the money would have meant that it would be necessary to explain where and in what circumstances it had been lost. This would have risked expulsion from the KGB and a serious reprimand from the Party. Not to tell the truth, to think up some sort of a story--they wouldn't believe, and worst of all, they might think that I had appropriated the money, that is, stolen it. And this would be for me the worst of all and I would, of course, in such event have told the truth.

"16. To tell the truth, it was only after my return home from Geneva in 1962 that I gradually, not immediately, began fully to realize all the seriousness of my contact with you and its full meaning. And although I did not give you any promises or assurances about our continued contact in the future, I understood that you sooner or later would set yourself the task of continuing our contact. And here it was that weighing up all the reasons and causes which I have indicated above that in 1962 I took for myself the decision to leave the USSR at the first opportunity and that I started to work towards being sent on a trip abroad.

"17. Of course, I wanted to come abroad with some sort of 'baggage', that is, with materials which could be useful and necessary for you. In this entire period up to January 1964 I tried to collect information which would be of the maximum value for you. My assignment to the position of deputy chief of the Seventh Department in July 1962 gave me a greater opportunity than before. But at the same time this assignment almost

excluded the possibility of a trip abroad and it was only with great difficulty that I was able to got away for the trip in January 1964. It was necessary to convince CHELNOKOV and then to ask CHELNOKOV to convince BOBKOV and in 1963 to convince KOVALENKO. In this I advanced many reasons: that I had not spent all the money (in foreign currency); that the medicine which I bought for my daughter had proven very successful and that I needed to buy some more medicine to carry out one more series of treatments; that this trip would not be a long one and that since I was already the deputy chief of the Department I would not be able to travel abroad any more and so, therefore, this trip would probably be my last. Of course, all this was said at convenient moments and outside of work. Things were easier with the Eleventh Department (which deals with trips abroad) because I was on good terms with PENCHENKO who covered Switzerland, besides which when I came back from Geneva in 1962 I had brought him a number of presents.

"18. The publication in 1963 by the foreign press of the VASSALL case put me on my guard since in the newspaper Times it said outright that the English learned about him thanks to the Americans who learned about VASSALL in the spring of 1962. Fortunately, the leadership of the FCD, as I learned from GUK, CHURANOV, and TARABRIN, came to the conclusion that here the Americans had been helped by GOLITSYN. But at the same time the FCD was not completely sure of this. But the publication in the American press of Alsop's articles on the CIA alarmed me extremely. This article in one spot said plainly that as far as is known the KGB does not have any sources in the CIA while at the same time the CIA has penetrated the KGB. From this moment, I do not conceal this fact, I began to feel afraid that the KGB would somehow learn of my contact with you. This article deeply 'interested' the KGB.

"19. During the closed trial of PENKOVSKIY I got a pass in the Second Department and went in order to look at him myself. For sometimes it is enough to simply look at a man, to see how he holds himself and to hear how he speaks in order to form some sort of an initial opinion of him. Personally, I liked how PENKOVSKIY held himself at the trial; I liked his appearance and I understood that everything which had been said in the KGB about him and the sort of person they were trying to make him out to be (that he was morally degraded, that he had descended and sunk into a swamp) that all this was nonsense, bluff, and chatter. And PENKOVSKIY, the same as GOLITSYN, gave me a feeling of greater confidence in the correctness of the decision taken by me to leave the Soviet Union.

26 July 1964 Signed: Yu. NOSENKO"

D. NOSENKO's Activities in Geneva

1. Introduction

The extent to which NOSENKO made himself available for meetings with CIA in Geneva in 1962 and 1964 is reviewed here in connection with his statements about the KGB duties assigned to him for these trips, his visits to the KGB Legal Residency, and his personal association with other Soviets. Although NOSENKO was not precise about how he spent his days and nights in Geneva, he did indicate that he was his own boss, disposed of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little to do. At the first meeting with CIA in 1962 he accounted for his freedom of movement by saying: "I can come and go as I please at any time. (Ambassador) ZORIN knows who I am, almost the entire delegation knows who I am, because I don't need to pretend. Nobody pays any attention to me. They know that I am not a Ministry of Foreign Affairs man (at the conference sessions). I sit, listen, leaf through some papers. For this reason I can leave the conference at any time, or I do not come at all, and no one will say a word to me." CIA made no attempt to place NOSENKO under surveillance in 1962 and 1964, and there is no evidence from other sources confirming or disproving NOSENKO's statements about his activities while away from the CIA safehouse.

2. Official Duties in Geneva

In 1962 NOSENKO said he was the sole KGB officer in the 94-man Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference and as such he was responsible for the security and behavior of the entire delegation.* To assist him in carrying out these security officer functions, NOSENKO had the services of a number of coopted informants of the KGB who were serving in the delegation. In addition, NOSENKO had the specific mission of checking on suspicions attached to one of the delegation members, P. F. SHAKHOV,** but by the time he established contact with CIA, he said, this assignment had already been completed.

In 1964, NOSENKO said his only operational task then was to handle the general security responsibilities for the Soviet delegation, as he had done in 1962. There was no specific mission such as the one concerning SHAKHOV in 1962.

NOSENKO has described his investigations of SHAKHOV, but he has never indicated either that he conducted security checks of other delegation members in 1962 and 1964, or that he received any security-type information (except on SHAKHOV) from the KGB cooptees who were supposed to be reporting to him. Likewise, NOSENKO has not said that he prepared communications for KGB Headquarters regarding his clandestine assignments in Geneva.

3. Visits to the KGB Legal Residency

Virtually every day, NOSENKO told CIA in 1962, he went to the KGB Legal Residency in Geneva, and if he stayed away for more than a day or two, the Legal Resident, S. I. GAVRICHEV, would invariably ask NOSENKO where he had been keeping himself.

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* I.S. MAYOROV and M.S. TSYMBAL also arrived with the delegation in March 1962 but had left Geneva by the time NOSENKO contacted CIA.

** SHAKHOV is discussed further in Part III.3.1.

GAVRICHEV, according to NOSENKO, treated him with deference, and shortly after his arrival in Geneva in March 1962, NOSENKO gave a lecture on counterintelligence to the assembled members of the Legal Residency. This lecture was given at GAVRICHEV's request, although it was only after some hesitation on the part of the Legal Resident that all of his subordinates were brought together to hear NOSENKO. (In return for helping the Legal Residency to perform counter-surveillance on several occasions, NOSENKO said, he was sometimes allowed by GAVRICHEV to have the use of an operational car and driver to go shopping and carry out other private errands.)

Similarly, in 1964, NOSENKO said he was making nearly daily visits to the Legal Residency. During the 1964 meetings NOSENKO stated that it was his close relationship with M.S. TSYMBAL* which made it possible for him to have visited the Geneva Legal Residency so frequently, both in 1962 and 1964. "According to the strict rules," NOSENKO told CIA, "an officer in a status such as mine should not even go to the Residency. In this case it is only because I am deputy chief of a department and GAVRICHEV knows my position perfectly well (it is not lower than his), and because I have such a sympathetic personal relationship with TSYMBAL." He then went on to say that TSYMBAL "sort of escorted me to the Residency. They could have simply said: 'You are here on a mission, we have our own mission, and we have nothing in common.'" But, NOSENKO indicated, this was not the case, thanks to TSYMBAL's intervention.

4. Association with TSYMBAL

At the second meeting with CIA in 1962 NOSENKO volunteered information on TSYMBAL's KGB background and his current missions in Geneva, then alluded to his having spoken with TSYMBAL in Geneva but without placing any particular emphasis on this relationship.

In 1964, however, NOSENKO claimed that their relationship was close, explained that it was TSYMBAL (again in Geneva at the same time) who gained NOSENKO's admission to the Legal Residency, and said that he had twice gone to see TSYMBAL off on train trips, once on 24 January when TSYMBAL went to Bern and again on 28 January when TSYMBAL left Lausanne for Rome. NOSENKO told CIA he had been dealing with TSYMBAL since 1960 or 1961. At that time "We were looking over some candidates for recruitment and came across some whose background would have made them suitable for the Special (Illegals) Directorate...Then when we came (here) in 1962 for the Disarmament Conference, I got to know him a little better - more from the human side. He seemed to take a liking to me for some reason. We had met in Moscow before, of course, but just in the hall or in the dining room. He used to say: 'Stop in and see me,' and I would answer: 'Well, it's kind of awkward for me to hang around the Special Directorate - what am I supposed to be doing here?' He would say: 'Oh, comeon, stop in.' But I

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* TSYMBAL appeared in Geneva under the last-name alias "ROGOV" and was identified by NOSENKO as Chief of the Illegals Directorate, KGB First Chief Directorate. Since 1956, TSYMBAL was known by CIA to be the true name for ROGOV, and GOLITSYN reported in 1961 that TSYMBAL was Chief of the European Department, KGB First Chief Directorate.

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didn't." NOSENKO also said that TSYMBAL had asked him several times to transfer to the First Chief Directorate and had suggested that he might be assigned to the United States. In fact, NOSENKO added, he had got into some difficulty with O. M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, by virtue of TSYMBAL's efforts in 1962 to have NOSENKO transferred and his leaving the impression with GRIBANOV that NOSENKO (who was still in Geneva) had agreed to this action.

Questioned in April 1964 about his association with TSYMBAL, NOSENKO stated that he met TSYMBAL for the first time several days before their departure for Geneva. Besides saying again that he saw TSYMBAL almost daily at the Legal Residency and that TSYMBAL's assistance enabled him to enter the Legal Residency, NOSENKO reported that in 1962 he went out with TSYMBAL several times a week to eat lunch or dinner; sometimes they were joined by I. S. MAYOROV,* sometimes by A. K. KISLOV (see next section), and sometimes the two ate alone. During the 1966 interrogations, NOSENKO said that, while he had seen TSYMBAL on a daily basis in 1962, he saw him only twice in 1964: once when TSYMBAL travelled to Geneva from Bern for one or two days and later when NOSENKO saw TSYMBAL off for Rome from Lausanne.

5. Association with Other Soviets

NOSENKO said in 1962 that the other Soviets he saw most often were A. K. KISLOV and Yu. I. GUK.** KISLOV, with NOSENKO was one of the four members of the Soviet delegation staying at the Hotel Ariane in Geneva, and was said to be head of the American Section of TASS and a genuine correspondent.*** During the 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKO reported that KISLOV was not a KGB officer and made no reference of his having any affiliation with the KGB. NOSENKO did say, however, that he had arranged for KISLOV's name to be given the KGB double agent B. Ye. BELITSKIY**** to use as a notional source of information on Soviet disarmament policy; BELITSKIY was to pass this information to his CIA contacts. NOSENKO made numerous references to drinking and carousing with KISLOV, specifically with regard to a night in early June - when NOSENKO was robbed of or squandered his operational funds, which brought him to CIA - and on the night of 10 June 1962 when NOSENKO squandered 2000 Swiss francs (the money CIA had given him) on wine and women.***** In giving NOSENKO the money to defray these personal expenses, the CIA handlers expressed to him their concern over the dangers to his security arising from KISLOV's knowledge of this inexplicable source of income. NOSENKO replied that there was no need to be concerned since KISLOV was "too drunk to know what is going on," and in any event he constituted no threat.

* MAYOROV, according to NOSENKO, was visiting Geneva in order to have operational meetings with agents.

** Both KISLOV and GUK are mentioned in the discussion of the "ANDREY" case (see Part VI.D.3.b.). GUK was also a friend of GOLITSYN, who reported extensively on GUK's career in the KGB including his service in the United States.

*** In October 1966 NOSENKO named all the Soviets living at the Ariane, without mentioning KISLOV.

**** The BELITSKIY case is discussed in greater length in Part VI.D.6.

*****See Parts II.B. and II.C.2.c.

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In 1964 NOSENKO confirmed that he had spent much time with KISLOV in Geneva two years before and that they had become very friendly. For the first time, NOSENKO reported that KISLOV had been a KGB operational contact while in the United States, that he had been introduced to KISLOV by a KGB officer in Moscow prior to his departure for Geneva in 1962 in order to be able to exploit him during the Geneva Conference, and that after returning from Geneva KISLOV had been recruited as a KGB agent on the basis of a favorable report NOSENKO had prepared.

Often during the 1962 meetings NOSENKO spoke of his "big, big friend" GUK, whom he described as the Deputy Legal Resident in Geneva and the only "strong officer" in the KGB Legal Residency. He implied that his friendship with GUK, a former member of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, was of longstanding. NOSENKO related that he and GUK were together nearly every day in Geneva. They often went out together to chat and have a few drinks, and as a consequence, NOSENKO was able to elicit information about some of GUK's operations there. In 1964 NOSENKO told CIA he found it difficult to obtain information on the activities of the Geneva Legal Residency because he no longer had a good friend there like GUK, who had been reassigned to KGB Headquarters. When questioned later in 1964 about his relationship with GUK, NOSENKO said he had come to know GUK well only during his 1962 TDY in Geneva.

6. Availability for Meetings with CIA

In speaking to David MARK on 6 June 1962, NOSENKO expressed displeasure over MARK's insistence on deferring their luncheon (at which NOSENKO sought contact with American Intelligence) until three days later. When the first meeting with CIA did take place on 9 June 1962, NOSENKO stayed for three hours, and it was at his suggestion that another meeting was scheduled for 11 June. This second meeting in 1962 lasted seven hours. NOSENKO remained in Geneva until 15 June, and in the interim he met CIA officers three more times for over seven hours altogether. He offered to meet again on the day of his departure, but this proposal was rejected as needlessly endangering his security.

From the first 1964 meeting on 23 January to his defection on 4 February, NOSENKO was met a total of 13 times, the sessions lasting for five or six hours. He was able to come to the CIA safehouse every day but one, and this opportunity was skipped at the request of the CIA handlers. By mutual consent, most of the meetings started in the afternoon, but on two occasions NOSENKO arrived as early as 0930 hours; several meetings went on until past midnight. NOSENKO appeared to be totally at the disposal of CIA, to be the master of his time, and to have no other demands for his attention except for the visits to the KGB Legal Residency, "looking in" on an occasional session of the Disarmament Conference, and attendance at a reception.

E. Timing of Defection

After telling CIA on 24 January 1964 of his decision to defect, NOSENKO at the same meeting concurred when CIA gave operational and administrative reasons for him to stay in place until the middle of February. During the week that followed, the date of the defection was moved up to 8 February in accordance with NOSENKO's wishes and with his reports indicating that less information of value would be forthcoming than CIA had at first thought. On 4 February, however, NOSENKO reported that he was being recalled to Moscow for a conference on foreign tourism in the USSR, and he therefore placed himself in CIA custody on that date.* Details on the timing of NOSENKO's defection are given in the following paragraphs.

At the 24 January meeting the CIA case officers agreed in principle with NOSENKO's decision to defect. NOSENKO felt that it would be best for him to disappear from Geneva without a trace, leaving all his personal possessions behind; he assumed that CIA could exfiltrate him from Switzerland to the United States. He wanted to carry out this plan as soon as possible, but the CIA officers encouraged him--and NOSENKO agreed--to remain in place for at least three weeks more. The reasons given NOSENKO for this request were:

- The desire to get information on the local KGB Legal Residency and the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference while he still had access to this information;

- The value of having NOSENKO present when O.M. GRIBANOV made a visit to Geneva about 7 February a visit known to CIA only through NOSENKO;**

- The potential value to be derived from NOSENKO's in place spotting of CIA recruitment targets among the Soviet representation in Geneva;

- The necessity of making arrangements, acceptable to NOSENKO, for his defection and resettlement.

The events which followed NOSENKO's agreement to remain in place for a short time longer are chronicled below:

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* The report of NOSENKO's recall to Moscow for the conference on tourism is discussed further in Part III.F.

** GRIBANOV was in 1964 the Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate and, according to NOSENKO and other sources, the sponsor of NOSENKO's rapid rise in State Security. Several [redacted] sources, have reported that GRIBANOV was fired from the KGB as a result of NOSENKO's defection (Part III.I.). NOSENKO's relationship with GRIBANOV is discussed in Part V.H.

26 January 1964: In a three-and-a-half hour meeting, NOSENKO emphasized that although he agreed that it was necessary and useful for him to remain in place until the GRIBANOV visit to Geneva, he wanted to defect as soon as possible thereafter.

28 January 1964: NOSENKO reported that GRIBANOV might not be coming to Geneva after all, for KGB Chairman SEMICHASTNYY was apparently reluctant to permit him to travel beyond Vienna. NOSENKO said that he would probably have definite information on GRIBANOV's trip by the end of the week.

30 January 1964: At the seventh meeting of the series, NOSENKO said that there now appeared to be little likelihood that GRIBANOV would visit Geneva or Paris.* Therefore, he wanted to defect right away. As reasons he cited the emotional strain of any further delay and the fact that he and his case officers were wasting their time working against the local KGB Legal Residency, which had no worthwhile or promising targets. He also felt that nothing of value could be obtained from the Soviet delegation because "TSARAPKIN himself doesn't know what he will say until he is told by Moscow the day before." The CIA handlers, however, delayed the defection for one week by obtaining NOSENKO's agreement to assist in an audio operation: CIA proposed to install listening devices in the offices of the KGB Legal Residency, and NOSENKO said he would check certain physical aspects of the delegation buildings. As the best time for the defection, he suggested Saturday morning, 8 February, because he probably would not be missed until the following Monday. This date was tentatively scheduled, and NOSENKO again repeated his desire simply to "disappear without a trace." He also asked about exfiltration plans.

31 January 1964: NOSENKO reported the results of his reconnaissance of the KGB Legal Residency in connection with the proposed audio operation, which would involve microphone transmitters operating on a carrier current. He told CIA he had accidentally overheard in the Residency that the building used its own batteries and generator, and therefore the scheme would not work. He repeated his willingness to remain in place until the arrival of the CHEREPANOV Papers**, which he was told were enroute from Washington. He explained that he had felt pressure at the previous meeting because of an imminent move by the delegation from its hotel to the Soviet villa outside Geneva; at the villa his disappearance would be noticed more quickly. This move, he had now learned, had been postponed pending the arrival of a housekeeping officer from Moscow.

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* From 3 to 10 February 1964 GRIBANOV was in Paris, where he was seen on the street with a Soviet identified by NOSENKO as a KGB counterintelligence officer. There is no evidence that he visited Switzerland.

** See Part VI.D.7.c for further details on CHEREPANOV.

1 February 1964: At NOSENKO's request, it was firmly agreed that the defection would take place in the morning of 8 February. NOSENKO said that he assumed that exfiltration would be by automobile to West Germany and thence by plane to the United States.* His case officers confirmed that this was correct.

3 February 1964: NOSENKO reviewed the CHEREPANOV materials. The defection was still scheduled for Saturday, 8 February.

4 February 1964: NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safehouse from his hotel room in the early afternoon and said: "I want to come now and not go back." After arriving he explained that when he dropped by the KGB Legal Residency following the morning session of the Disarmament Conference, he read a cable ordering him to return to Moscow immediately to prepare for a KGB conference on foreign tourism in the Soviet Union.** The residency was arranging for a ticket for NOSENKO to fly to Moscow via Paris the following day, and a replacement was being readied to assume NOSENKO's duties as security officer for the Soviet Delegation in Geneva; he was not told who the replacement would be. Before he had left for Geneva in January, NOSENKO then related, the Soviet Government had been deliberating the question of expanding foreign tourism in the USSR and had agreed to open a number of new cities and tourist itineraries in this connection. SEMICHASTNYY had now decided that it was time to call a conference to discuss new "tactics and strategies" for handling the increased number of tourists expected. Since NOSENKO had been placed in charge of the entire conference, he was directed to leave at once to prepare a basic report on the KGB handling of tourists; the report would be read to the conference either by himself or by someone from the leadership of the KGB or the Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO explained that he was the only one who could do this job as Lt. Col. A.G. KOVALENKO, the KGB Headquarters Department senior officer, was a relatively new man in this line of operations, having been there only four or five years, perhaps less. NOSENKO also told CIA that "by great coincidence" he had learned, just before the cable arrived, he was being moved to the Soviet villa on the morning of 5 February. He had arranged for a Soviet chauffeur to bring a car around at 0930 hours the next morning for the move. His absence would be noted at that time, and therefore "the main thing is to cross the Swiss border before morning." NOSENKO felt, however, that there would be considerable confusion among the Soviets in Geneva for a time following his disappearance, and that there would be no real concern until the evening. To foster Soviet uncertainty he had left his clothing lying around his hotel room and had brought no personal effects to the CIA safehouse. NOSENKO estimated the first Soviet queries to Swiss

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* [illegible]

** See Part III.F.

authorities would probably be made late on 5 February or early on the 6th.

NOSENKO was driven to Frankfurt the night of 4 February and remained in a safehouse there until 11 February, when press publicity about the defection and Soviet demands for an immediate interview with NOSENKO prompted the Director of Central Intelligence to order that he be brought to Washington as soon as possible. He arrived in the evening of 12 February.

F. The Recall Telegram

On arriving at the safehouse at 1515 on 4 February 1964 NOSENKO related that on the preceding day, 3 February, he had been to the KGB Legal Residency during the day and again in the evening. (He had met with CIA from 1200 to 1800 hours on 3 February.) He related that as of that time "everything was quiet and peaceful," and he received four personal letters from Moscow. NOSENKO said that on the morning of 4 February he had again stopped in at the Residency, but "nothing was going on." Later in the morning, however, after attending a session of the Disarmament Conference, NOSENKO learned that the coded telegram described above had arrived from Moscow ordering him to return immediately to Moscow to participate in the KGB conference on tourism.

[illegible]

Special intelligence indicates, however, that no cable traffic at all was sent from Moscow to Geneva from the late afternoon of 3 February 1964 until the morning of 5 February, the day after the defection. (Two priority cables of unusual length, 247 and 207 groups, were transmitted to Geneva at 1901 and 1915 hours Greenwich time on 3 February; there was no traffic on 4 February; and the next message passed was a routine cable originated by Moscow at 0755 hours on 5 February.)

On 26 October 1966, while being questioned about the circumstances of his defection, NOSENKO was asked about this telegram which recalled him to Moscow. NOSENKO said that there was no such telegram, and that he had invented it in order to defect as soon as possible because he was nervous and afraid his contacts with American Intelligence in Geneva might be noticed by Soviet authorities. After detailed questioning on this point, NOSENKO voluntarily signed a statement with the following wording.

"On 4 February 1964, I told my CIA contact in Geneva that a telegram from KGB Headquarters in Moscow

had been received in the KGB Residency in Geneva recalling me immediately to Moscow. I said at the time that this telegram said that I was recalled to participate in a conference to plan KGB activity against tourists for the 1964 season. I maintained this story as fact throughout subsequent interviews and interrogations by American authorities in 1964 and 1965. No such telegram ever existed. No telegram was received in Geneva. I admit that the story was a lie. I myself invented this telegram in order to hasten my defection. I was nervous and afraid that my contacts with American Intelligence might be noticed."

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G. Soviet Official Reactions

The Chief of the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference notified the Soviet Ambassador in Bern shortly before noon on 6 February 1964 that NOSENKO had disappeared, correctly placing the date as 4 February; they speculated that he might have been "poisoned" or injured in a car accident.* Two more days passed without Soviet authorities making any additional public or private statements on the subject. Later events showing Soviet official reactions to NOSENKO's defection are presented below in chronological order:

8 February: A Soviet spokesman in Geneva reported to Swiss police that NOSENKO, an "expert" temporarily assigned to Geneva, had been missing for four days.

9 February: Evening news broadcasts in Geneva carried reports attributed to both Soviet and Swiss sources that NOSENKO had disappeared.

10 February: Unidentified Soviet sources were quoted in the press as having said it was presumed that he had defected.

A U. S. Department of State press release was issued identifying NOSENKO as a KGB officer and acknowledging his request for political asylum in the United States.

11 February: The Department of State was advised informally by Ambassador DOBRYNIN in Washington that a Soviet note to be delivered later would ask how NOSENKO had left Switzerland, request his release, and demand an immediate interview with him.

12 February: S. K. TSARAPKIN, the head of the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference, read a statement at a press conference in which he strongly condemned the Swiss authorities for permitting NOSENKO's "kidnapping" and for hindering efforts to locate him. TSARAPKIN demanded that immediate steps be taken to return NOSENKO to Soviet custody.

At simultaneous press conferences in Bern and Geneva, the Swiss rejected these accusations of non-cooperation and noted the Soviet delay in advising the police of NOSENKO's disappearance and Soviet failure to cooperate with Swiss authorities in locating NOSENKO.

The Soviet note predicted by DOBRYNIN was delivered to the State Department, and a noncommittal reply was given to

* Apparently no effort was made to notify Moscow immediately. Special intelligence shows that no cable traffic was passed from Geneva to Moscow from 1630 hours on 3 February until 1900 hours on 7 February: at 1915 hours on the 7th, the Geneva Residency transmitted a short top priority cable to Moscow. Likewise, after one routine cable on 4 February, the Bern Residency sent no traffic to Moscow on 5 February. Seven cables, at least four of which were of routine precedence, were sent to Moscow on 6 February; thereafter there was no traffic from Bern to Moscow until the early morning of 10 February.

Soviet queries concerning the requested interview and the means of NOSENKO's departure from Switzerland.

The Swiss Embassy asked for a meeting with NOSENKO in order to obtain assurance that the defection had been voluntary. Arrangements were made to have NOSENKO meet with Swiss and Soviet representatives in Washington as soon as possible.

(NOSENKO arrived in Washington at 2130 hours this same evening.)

13 February: NOSENKO said he had no objection to talking to the Swiss, but he would see the Soviets only if necessary.

14 February: In Moscow, Ambassador KOHLER was summoned to the office of Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO, who read him a statement deploring the "evasive" reply of the State Department to Soviet inquiries in Washington and terming the whole event of NOSENKO's disappearance a "gross provocation by American Intelligance organs." GROMYKO repeated the demand for NOSENKO's immediate release from American custody.

The Counselor of the Swiss Embassy, Jean-Louis NATURAL, interviewed NOSENKO at the Washington offices of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service late in the afternoon. The Soviet confrontation immediately afterwards was handled by Minister Counselor G. M. KORNIENKO, second to Ambassador DOBRYNIN at the Soviet Embassy, and Third Secretary V. F. ISAKOV, a recent arrival in Washington. (ISAKOV had been a member of the Soviet Delegation to the 1962 Disarmament Conference in Geneva, where NOSENKO said he had first met him.) NOSENKO told both the Swiss and the Soviets that he had defected of his own free will after careful consideration and that he had no desire to return to the Soviet Union. In response to KORNIENKO's questions, he specifically renounced his status and rights as a Soviet citizen.

H. Reactions of NOSENKO's Family

Two women who said they were the mother and wife of NOSENKO called at the American Embassy in Moscow on five occasions between 24 February and 23 March 1964,* and NOSENKO, who on the basis of physical descriptions confirmed their identities, said he had no doubt that the KGB had directed them to do this in order to pressure him to return. The women expressed disbelief that NOSENKO had voluntarily betrayed his family and his country. They sought a personal meeting with him in the United States or anywhere else, submitted letters for him, and returned to the Embassy to ask whether he had replied; the younger Mrs. NOSENKO explained that she required some definite statement in writing from her husband so that she could plan her own future and that of the NOSENKO children.

NOSENKO proposed to respond to his family's letters by writing two of his own, one which would be intended for KGB consumption and the other for his wife alone. The first of these would state NOSENKO's irrevocable decision to remain in the United States and to sever all ties with his family and homeland. The second letter would be read by Mrs. NOSENKO in the Embassy, left there, and not reported to the KGB; in it he would express hope for a reunion, ask her to wait for him, and tell her to indicate her willingness to join him in the West by writing either "yes" or "no" on the letter itself. Although NOSNEKO prepared both letters, only the first was sent to his wife; it was mailed from Washington to the NOSENKO home in Moscow on 7 April 1964.

From March 1964 nothing was heard from NOSENKO's relatives until mid-1966, when Yuriy Dmitriyevich KOROLEV,** a Soviet journalist, visited Paris and spoke with representatives of the French magazine Paris Match. KOROLEV indicated that he would

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* Only once before had members of a defector's family called at a foreign embassy in Moscow. Following the defection of Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV in England in September 1963, his wife appeared at the British Embassy to make inquiries about him. KROTKOV, an admitted agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, is believed by MI-5 and CIA to remain under KGB control.

** CIA records show that KOROLEV was employed at the Soviet Pavilion of the Brussels World's Fair in 1958 as a photo-correspondent for the Soviet publication Sputnik. He visited Japan in 1963 and the United States in February-March 1965, at the invitation of Life magazine, as a photographer for Novosti, a Soviet news agency. On the latter trip he was to be accompanied by Feliks Avramovich ROSENTAL, an interpreter but no record of ROSENTAL's arrival is available. KOROLEV is believed to be identical with Yuriy KOROLEV who, as of 1964, was employed part-time for the United Press International correspondent in Moscow, Henry SHAPIRO. Both NOSENKO and GOLITSYN have identified SHAPIRO as an agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate (see Part V.C.).

like to serve as a stringer for the French journal and proposed that he begin with a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent." As KOROLEV spoke only broken French and English, the magazine staff did not seriously pursue the matter at that time.

On 10 October 1966, however, KOROLEV again appeared at the Paris Match offices, this time with one Feliks ROSENTAL who acted as his interpreter. He displayed a photo spread showing NOSENKO's wife and family going about their daily affairs in Moscow, and he submitted a one-page document in English which gave a short account of NOSENKO's background. The document said in part: "NOSENKO's family consists of a wife, 35, two daughters, 10 and 12, a mother and a younger brother. The family is not prosecuted (sic) but feel very badly about the incident (the defection). Very soon the wife will apply to the International Lawyers Organization for a divorce and compensation. It is possible that this case will be given much publicity. His wife has not heard from him since he defected, but it is obvious that he is still in the USA." The document, which was in no way represented as coming from a Soviet Government source, also said that additional photographs of NOSENKO's family in Moscow could be obtained and that an interview with the family and with others knowing NOSENKO could be arranged for a Paris Match correspondent.*

* According to information available to CIA, a divorce from a defector from the Soviet Union, who is legally considered to be an enemy of the state, is granted automatically upon the wife's request. There is no known precedent for either Soviet-inspired publicity or divorce difficulties in any previous Soviet defection.

Photographs submitted to PARIS MATCH (See Part III.H.)

Subject (circa 1963)

Subject's wife, elder daughter and younger daughter (circa 1965)



Photograph of Subject from passport used for temporary assignments to England in 1957 and 1958 (see Part V.D.8)

Photograph of Subject from passport used on assignment to Geneva in 1964 (see Part III.B.2)



Subject (February 1964)

Subject's father, the Minister of Shipbuilding (1953)

I. Repercussions Within the KGB

1. [redacted] sensitive source

sensitive source

According to [redacted], it was the "unanimous opinion" of the KGB leadership and of KGB officers [redacted] that "NOSENKO could do a tremendous amount of harm to the KGB," and that this damage would be severe for "several years to come." As a direct result, [redacted] new regulations were promulgated to increase KGB operational security in Moscow and abroad.

In addition, the defection brought about the dismissal from the KGB of persons close to NOSENKO and the recall of many officers abroad -- [redacted] -- known to and presumably compromised by NOSENKO.*

Five months after NOSENKO disappeared from Geneva, in July 1964, [redacted] said that 15 KGB officers had already been fired. Among them were GRIBANOV** and a number of his deputies

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*

** See Part V.H. regarding NOSENKO's relationship with GRIBANOV.

sensitive source

including one General BANNIK.* Since NOSENKO was GRIBANOV's personal friend and protege, [redacted] stated it had been decided that GRIBANOV should have been aware of NOSENKO's plans and was therefore ultimately responsible. [redacted] reported further [redacted] that GRIBANOV had been dismissed from the KGB and the Communist Party immediately after the defection, adding that GRIBANOV had personally authorized NOSENKO's 1964 trip to Geneva, despite the fact that he had received a summary statement of NOSENKO's capabilities and activities which contained enough "compromising material" to prevent such a trip under normal conditions.** [redacted] reported having learned that GRIBANOV was the chief of security at a military plant outside Moscow and is considered a "nothing."*** Others dismissed from the KGB included GUK and Ye.A. TARABRIN, Chief of the British Department, First Chief Directorate.****

sensitive source

* [redacted]

** According to NOSENKO in 1965, it was BANNIKOV who supported his candidacy for the 1964 trip to Geneva; as far as he knew, NOSENKO said, GRIBANOV was not involved. Earlier, however, NOSENKO stated that his 1964 trip had been approved by GRIBANOV.

*** Reportedly GRIBANOV continued an operational contact with a Western Ambassador in Moscow until as recently as the autumn of 1964. This is a type of activity in which GRIBANOV was often engaged while serving as Chief of the Second Chief Directorate.

**** In 1962 NOSENKO told CIA: "GRIBANOV and I are very friendly socially and we have often caroused together unofficially... He is very friendly and we often go out drinking together." Under interrogation in April 1964 NOSENKO was asked specifically whether he had ever gone out socially with GRIBANOV after working hours. He replied that he had done so on one occasion and that TARABRIN was present at the time. In February 1965 NOSENKO was asked the same question and this time answered that he had seen GRIBANOV three times socially, most recently in October or November 1963; TARABRIN, he said, was the only other person present on these three occasions; all three outings began as drinking parties in Moscow restaurants and the latter two ended at the homes of girls NOSENKO had been asked to procure. Although [redacted] indicated that TARABRIN was Chief of the British Department at the time he was fired, NOSENKO said he had held this position only until 1963, when he became Deputy Chief of the newly established Service No. 2 (Counterintelligence) of the First Chief Directorate.

2. [redacted] source

At the time of NOSENKO's defection, [redacted] told CIA in 1964, he was in training for an illegals assignment in the West, but these plans were cancelled partly because of the NOSENKO case and partly for other reasons not specified to [redacted] One of his handlers informed [redacted] that the NOSENKO matter was very serious, that the KGB was on a "major alert" as a result, and that all missions had been halted to make readjustments.

3. [redacted] source

In Geneva at the time of NOSENKO's defection, [redacted] reported to CIA that just afterwards V.S.MEDVEDEV from the Exits Commission of the CPSU Central Committee* travelled to Geneva to speak to the Soviets stationed there and to Soviet delegates to the Disarmament Conference. MEDVEDEV underscored the seriousness of the defection and urged greater vigilance against such acts. [redacted] also reported that the defection caused the recall of Nina Ivanovna YEFREMEYEVA, a KGB secretary in Geneva, and among the Soviets there it was rumored that some 60 Soviet officials then stationed abroad would be transferred from their assignments in consequence of the NOSENKO affair. V.A. POCHANKIN, a KGB officer with the permanent Soviet representation in Geneva, speculated to [redacted] that he had been completely exposed by NOSENKO and therefore would have to return to Moscow. Y.I. GUK , said [redacted], who had known and reported on GUK for years, was discharged from the KGB because he had recommended NOSENKO's travel to Geneva, and according to one rumor, the chief of the department where NOSENKO had been employed would lose his job. (This would be A.G.KOVALENKO who, according to NOSENKO, was Chief of the Tourist Department at the time of the defection.)

* MEDVEDEV, a KGB officer formerly stationed in New York City, was said [redacted] to be one of those from the CPSU Central Committee who conduct interviews with KGB personnel going abroad. [redacted] identified MEDVEDEV, then a Counselor at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, as the Communist Party organizer and possibly a member of the KGB, "but his role is not important and he works mainly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs."

4. KGB Handlers of Agents

A reflection of NOSENKO's defection was seen in KGB's handling of [redacted], the subject of a lead received from NOSENKO and [redacted] double agent.* [redacted] on 31 March 1964, was questioned by two of the KGB officers about possible surveillance and was asked to provide passport photographs so that "escape" documents could be supplied to him and his family. At this same meeting, the KGB officers announced that [redacted] was being put on reserve status for an unspecified period and told him that this decision had been made about two months earlier (i.e., about the time of NOSENKO's defection). At the next meeting in November 1964, the Soviet handlers admitted to [redacted] that they had "some connection" with NOSENKO. Although NOSENKO probably could not identify [redacted] as a KGB agent, they said, there was a possibility that he knew "what we [the KGB] are doing in Canada."

Also, in Paris, Sergeant Robert JOHNSON was told of NOSENKO's defection by his KGB case officer and was instructed to destroy anything which could identify him with Soviet Intelligence. Although the Soviet told JOHNSON that there was nothing to worry about, he was evidently disturbed by the defection, JOHNSON said.**

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* See Part VI.D.5.c. for full details of the [redacted]

** See Part VI.D.3.c. for a discussion of the JOHNSON case.

IV. NON-KGB ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S LIFE

A. Introduction

The biography of NOSENKO is built largely upon his own statements to CIA, but certain portions of it have been substantiated (as well as contradicted) by other Soviet sources. Given first below is the NOSENKO autobiography for the period preceeding his entry into the KGB, then follows a summary of his statements about his non-professional life since becoming a KGB officer, and finally there is presented a review of what other sources have said on these subjects. A separate section of this paper, Part V, discusses NOSENKO's career in the KGB.

B. NOSENKO's Pre-KGB Autobiography

Although several other sources have since NOSENKO's defection furnished fragmentary information concerning NOSENKO's early personal history, NOSENKO himself has, of course, been the principal source on this topic. He volunteered information during the 1962 meetings, during debriefings in early 1964, and under interrogation in April 1964, in 1965, and in 1966. These various accounts are arranged in separate columns in the following table, and they are organized chronologically from NOSENKO's birth to his alleged entry into the KGB. The first column in the table contains statements which NOSENKO made during the June 1962 meetings in Geneva; these were taken from the transcripts of the meetings and, for the most part, are in NOSENKO's own words. The column headed "1964," derived from the April 1964 interrogation, reflects a number of changes in his story before and during that interrogation. Most of the information given in the "1965" column was taken from discussions with NOSENKO, mainly on his early years, by a CIA psychologist in May of that year; however, material from the February 1965 interrogation and from DERYABIN's interrogation in July and August has also been included when it was not covered in the psychologist's questioning and when NOSENKO signed protocols certifying his statements to be correct. The "April 1966" column is comprised of remarks by NOSENKO in a signed autobiography submitted to CIA at that time. The final column presents the results of the October 1966 interrogation as they pertain to NOSENKO's early life. From column to column appear inconsistencies and contradictions with regard to dates and locations furnished by NOSENKO, although in 1964, again in 1965, and most recently in October 1966 NOSENKO has said that he was "now" telling the truth. The table shows where he has admitted having previously lied about certain events and where he seems to have forgotten his earlier statements to CIA about the occurrence of other events affecting his life.

This tabulation of NOSENKO's autobiography concludes in Part V.A., in which are quoted the various dates and circumstances concerning his entry into the KGB which NOSENKO has given in 1962, 1964, 1965, and 1966.

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
"I was born in Nikolayev, my father worked as a senior mechanic at a plant and took evening courses. Then he graduated from the Nikolayev Shipbuilding Institute."	Born 30 October 1927 in Nikolayev, Ukraine, USSR, where he lived with family until 1934.	Born 1927 in Nikolayev where father was a student at the Shipbuilding Institute. Father from simple peasant background, while mother's parents were nobility. (May)	"I, NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich, was born 30 October 1927 in Nikolayev, an oblast center in the Ukrainian Republic of Soviet Russia."	Born 1927 in Nikolayev, the son of Ivan Isidorovich NOSENKO and Tamara Georgievna NOSENKO.
	In 1934, at age six, entered the "zero" (nulevoy) class, equivalent to kindergarten, in Nikolayev.	Entered the "zero" class in Nikolayev in September 1934, two months before his seventh birthday. (May)	"In September 1934, in Nikolayev, I entered the 'zero' class. My father was already in Leningrad, where he was working at the Sudomekh Shipyard."	
"My father was sent to Leningrad, to the Sudomekh plant, a small plant in Leningrad. He was at the plant for half a year and then became director. This was 1936-1937. Then he was sent to the Baltic Shipyard in Leningrad as Chief Engineer. He was there less than a year."	Moved to Leningrad in 1935, where father was first appointed chief engineer and later director of Sudomekh. Lived at several addresses and attended several schools. [Note: Soviet press stated elder NOSENKO was chief engineer of "several enterprises" in Leningrad during	Moved to Leningrad, probably in spring of 1935. Attended three years of school there, completing First Class in 1935-36, Second Class in 1936-37, and Third Class in 1937-38. (May)	"Shortly thereafter he [father] found an apartment and, interrupting my studies, I travelled to Leningrad with my mother. I did not begin studies in the First Class until September 1935 as there were no 'zero' classes in the Leningrad schools. I finished the Third Class in Leningrad in 1938."	Lived in Leningrad from 1935 to 1938.

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	1935-1937; became director of Baltic Shipyard in 1938.]			
"In 1938 my father was assigned to Moscow as Deputy Peoples' Commissar. I was only a little boy. In 1939 he was appointed Peoples' Commissar, later Minister, of the Shipbuilding Industry and remained such until his death in 1956."	NOSENKO's father was appointed First Deputy to the Peoples' Commissar of the Shipbuilding Industry and then became Commissar. Family returned to Moscow and NOSENKO entered 10-year school located on Ulitsa Bol'shaya Polyanka. [Note: Soviet press reported that I.I. NOSENKO became Deputy Commissar in 1939 and Commissar in 1940.]	In 1938 the elder NOSENKO was named First Deputy to the Peoples' Commissar of Shipbuilding and the family returned to Moscow. NOSENKO entered a school on Bol'shaya Polyanka. He completed the Fourth Class in 1938-1939 and the fifth class in 1939-1940. (May)	"In 1938 my father was summoned to Moscow and he began to work in the Peoples' Commissariat of the Shipbuilding Industry. Having finished the Third Class, I moved to Moscow with my mother at the end of the summer."	
	Completed the Sixth Class at School No. 585. Went to Sochi with parents for vacation and was there when war broke out. Returned to Moscow the next day.	NOSENKO finished the Sixth Class at the 10-year school on Bol'shaya Polyanka during the 1940-1941 academic year. Then he travelled on vacation to Sochi, where the family stayed at a "rest home" of the Council Ministers. Learned of war's outbreak on the radio while there	"In 1941 I completed the Sixth Class at the 585th middle school and went to Sochi for a vacation with my father and mother. On 21 June, during our vacation in the south, the war began and for this reason my parents and I returned to Moscow the next day."	

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June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
		and returned to Moscow the next day by train. (May)		
	Enrolled in Moscow Special Naval School, but studies did not begin in Moscow because of the war and immediate plans to evacuate the school. In September 1941 NOSENKO spent one week digging trenches with a group from the school, and on 10 October he travelled with the rest of the school to Kuybyshev. There he began his studies in the Seventh Class.	Enrolled in the Moscow Special Naval School which was evacuated to Kuybyshev, attended the 1941-42 school year in Kuybyshev. (May)	"In October 1941 my mother and I were evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where I completed the Seventh Class in June 1942." [Note: NOSENKO here added a year to his life which he had not mentioned earlier. To accommodate this change he subtracted a year from the time he spent at the Naval Preparatory School in Baku. See below.]	**Went to Chelyabinsk from Moscow in 1941, after the start of the war.**
"I studied first in a school of the Navy. There I sailed aboard boats and cutters." [No date given.]	In June 1942 completed the Seventh Class at the Moscow Special Naval School in Kuybyshev. Returned to Moscow in July with about three other boys from the school. Prevailed on father to allow transfer to "real military school" and enrolled in the Leningrad	In summer 1942 returned from Kuybyshev to Moscow on leave. While there somehow learned that Special Naval School to be moved from Kuybyshev to Achinsk, Siberia. Did not want to go so far away from home, so enrolled in Leningrad Naval Prep School, Baku. Spent	"I completed the Seventh Class in Chelyabinsk. In the beginning of the summer of 1942 I moved from Chelyabinsk to Gor'kiy and soon after this returned to Moscow. In Moscow I was accepted in the Special Naval School which in August 1942 was evacuated to Kuybyshev. There	**Was in Gor'kiy for a time in the summer of 1942.**

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	Naval Preparatory School which had been evacuated from Leningrad to Baku. Spent summer vacation at home in Moscow with parents.	summer with parents in Moscow. (May)	I entered the Eighth Class."	
	After 3 1/2 months in Moscow, left by train for Baku with a group of about 30 other students in October. The trip lasted 14 days. Route not recalled. Arriving in Baku joined Prep School and spent about a month in "quarantine." Then assigned to the Ninth Training Company, in the Third Course, equivalent to the Eighth Class. [Note: The Moscow-Rostov railroad line was cut by the Germans by this time. The only possible route at this time would have been a long and circuitous one via Tashkent]	Went to Baku by train in October. Trip took two weeks. Spent first four to six months in Baku in "quarantine," which was similar to American bootcamp. Enrolled in the First Course, equivalent to the Eighth Class. (May)	[In Kuybyshev; see above entry.]	

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	Took military oath. [Note: NOSENKO was 15 years old at this time, by law too young to take oath. This point stressed in April 1964 interrogations.]	Took military oath at end of "quarantine" period. Oath administered to make boys feel a part of service although too young. Oath taken between 15th and 16th birthdays, i.e., after October 1942 and before November 1943. NOSENKO certain he celebrated 15th birthday in Baku in 1942. (May)	[Studying in Kuybyshev. See above entries.]	
	Completed Third Course (Eighth Class) in June 1943. Took no vacation but spent summer working at the school in Baku. In September 1943 began new school year in the Second Course, equivalent to Ninth Class.	Completed First Course in June and spent summer of 1943 at school. Entered Second Course at the Naval Prep School in Baku in September 1943. (May)	[Completed Eighth Class in Kuybyshev.] "During the summer of 1943 I returned to Moscow on vacation. The Special Naval School was to be evacuated from Kuybyshev to Achinsk and therefore, not wanting to go to Achinsk, I enrolled in the Naval Preparatory School in Baku.	"I took the military oath in Baku. I was 15 years old at the time. This was in 1943." [No month given.]
	Along with 15 or 20 classmates, NOSENKO submitted a collective letter asking to be sent	Since 1942 NOSENKO had had an "obsession" about getting into the war. Students from	"While at the Naval Prep School in Baku, in October 1943, I joined the KOMSOMOL."	

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	to the front because they had heard that students at the Frunze Higher Naval School had gone. Request caused an uproar and investigations. Permission denied.	the Frunze Higher School had gone to the front in 1942 and some of the older boys at the Prep School went in early 1943. Fired up, NOSENKO and about eight others filed a petition to be allowed to fight. (May)		
	Joined KOMSOMOL.		[See above entry.]	
inning of 1944)				
	In January, together with classmate Yura RADCHENKO, NOSENKO went to the city military commissariat in Baku to inquire about joining a Marine detachment. They were turned down and thereupon ran away from the Naval Prep School. Travelling by boxcar, the two went to Stantsiya Lazarevskaya via Tbilisi and from there walked to Tuapse in search of the mili-	After receiving a scolding from school authorities for having submitted the petition, NOSENKO and several other boys began to plot to run away to the front. When the time came in early 1944 only one other boy, RADCHENKO, would accompany him. The two slipped out of school, made their way to the railway station, and found a freight train heading toward Tuapse. On arriving in Tuapse they were arrested almost immediately	"I studied in Baku only for half the school year because I ran away from school, home to Moscow, in the beginning of 1944!"	The story about going to or toward the front was a lie, NOSENKO said.

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DATE	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
		tary front. Arriving in Tuapse, they were arrested and were then returned to Baku under guard. In Baku, they managed to escape again before being returned to the Prep School. After hiding a few days at the home of a girlfriend, NOSENKO and RADCHENKO travelled to Moscow by train, using forged documentation obtained by a friend in the Naval Prep School. They were arrested at the Moscow Railroad Station by military police who had been alerted by authorities in Baku. NOSENKO's father bailed him out. [Note: Previous accounts varied widely. NOSENKO originally said he had participated in the battle for Novorossiysk with his entire class from the "Frunze Higher Naval School." This battle actually took place in September 1942. On a later occasion, NOSENKO	at the station, several days later they were returned to Baku where they managed to escape. They then travelled to Moscow using false documents and were arrested at the train station on arrival. (May)		

TOP SECRET

June 1962	1965	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	said that he and RADCHENKO saw combat near Tuapse.]			
	Took Ninth Class exams after studying as an "external student" at the Gorniy Institute in Moscow. Passed these and through father's influence was transferred back to the Naval Prep School, which had just moved back to Leningrad from Baku. Travelled to Leningrad to join his class in September.	Did not want to return to Baku as ashamed to face classmates after failure to get to front. Remained at home and attended adult education courses at Gorniy Institute and had special tutors in math and Russian grammar. Finished Ninth Class in spring or summer and travelled in fall to Leningrad to rejoin class in Prep School. (May)	"In Moscow I finished the Ninth Class as an external student at Gorniy Institute and at the end of the summer of 1944... was enrolled in the Naval School in Leningrad and travelled there in the month of August."	
	Studies did not start at once. NOSENKO and others lived in Narva and worked in the woods.	Arriving in Leningrad NOSENKO was assigned to a group made up of stragglers and was sent to the forest near Leningrad to cut wood for the winter supply at the school. Conditions were terrible--the work was hard and the weather was cold, damp, and miserable. (May)		

TOP SECRET

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	Studies in Tenth Class of Naval Preparatory School commenced in November 1944.	About three or four days before the boys were to return to Leningrad a car was sent for NOSENKO. He returned to Leningrad to stay in the Hotel Astoria with his father who was visiting with a delegation. After this he went back to school, sometime in November. (May)		
	At the end of April 1945, NOSENKO was shot in the hand at a party by a jealous young officer and was hospitalized. In the ensuing investigation he protected the real culprit by pretending that he had shot himself accidentally while cleaning a gun. He never saw the officer again.	Sometime in February or March, a female acquaintance of an unknown Navy officer began to flirt with NOSENKO. The officer became angry, drew his gun and shot NOSENKO through the hand. The officer was apologetic, and NOSENKO promised not to report the incident. The wound grew worse, however, and NOSENKO was forced to enter the hospital. He told the doctor that he had accidentally shot himself with a souvenir gun. He was hospitalized for about three weeks. (May)	"In the beginning of 1945 I accidentally shot myself through the hand and spent about a month recuperating in the Navy hospital."	NOSENKO shot himself through the hand. This was absolutely accidental and was not an attempt to avoid military duty. [Note: NOSENKO made this statement in response to a direct question. The question was based on a report from [illegible] source [illegible] that NOSENKO shot himself to avoid being sent to the front while attending a "naval college in Leningrad in 1942."]

DATE	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
May-June 1944	"I finished the Naval School, then was in the Navy. I fought," (boyeval--presumably in World War II). "In 1945 I was demobilized."	While in the hospital, NOSENKO applied for release from military service. This was assisted by father's friends. After release from the hospital he did not want to return to school. He called his father and then spent a week with friends of the family in Leningrad before getting a room in a dormitory at the Leningrad Shipbuilding Tekhnikum. Despite failure to return to the Naval Prep School, NOSENKO was credited with satisfactory completion of the school year (Tenth Class). In June he passed the exams for the Second Course at the Shipbuilding Tekhnikum. He then went to the District Military Commissariat and was demobilized. He received his military reserve registration and a certificate of satisfactory completion of	In the hospital NOSENKO decided he could not return to school as he was ashamed of the type of girls he had been with the night of the accident and could not stand the thought of being made an example of by the school KOMSOMOL organization. He left the hospital in civilian clothes and stayed with a friend of his father. He obtained a statement that he had attended the Naval Prep School, which was just a report of his courses and an average of his marks up to that time. As the son of a minister it was then easy for him to enter the Shipbuilding Tekhnikum where, with special tutoring, he was able to complete the Tenth Class in the summer. (May)	"After this [hand shooting] incident I did not want to go back to the school and began to study at the Shipbuilding Tekhnikum in Leningrad, in the Second Course, in order to complete the Tenth Class. In May or June 1945, with the help of the Director of the Tekhnikum, I received documentation certifying that I had completed the Second Course which made it possible for me to enter the Institute [of International Relations] and I returned to my parents in Moscow."	

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TE	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
		ten year's schooling. [Note: A biographical statement was drawn up on the basis of NOSENKO's statements in January-February 1964 and approved by NOSENKO as correct in February 1964. This statement said that he completed his 10-year education at the Baku school in the spring of 1943 and thereby became eligible to enter a higher educational institution. From 1943 to 1945, the statement continued, NOSENKO attended the Frunze Higher Naval School (a counterpart of Annapolis). After three years there, he decided to leave the Navy, was demobilized and entered the Institute of International Relations. In October 1966, NOSENKO said he had lied about attending Frunze Academy.]			
ly 94	"After the war I went to study at the Institute of International Relations...In 1945 I was demobilized.	NOSENKO decided he did not want to study further at the Shipbuilding Tekhnikum and returned to Moscow where he	NOSENKO decided he would like a career in the foreign service and returned to Moscow, where he passed the entrance	"In July 1945 I entered the Institute of International Relations."	

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	passed the entrance examinations for the Institute of International Relations (IIR). The exam consisted only of a composition, dictation, and an interview.	exams for the IIR. (May)		
	Travelled to Germany with his father who was leading a delegation. For the purpose of the trip only, NOSENKO was issued a uniform and documents showing him to be a senior lieutenant. When he returned to Moscow he continued to pass himself off as an officer who had seen combat in the war and eventually got into trouble at the institute because of this. Began studies in Faculty of International Law and English language in September.	Travelled to East Germany in August 1945 with father's delegation. Given temporary commission as senior lieutenant for the trip. Continued to wear uniform on return, even to classes at the institute. Entered institute on return from Germany and chose to specialize in English language and U.S. area studies for reasons he could not recall. (May)		

DATE	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
June 1946		Completed first year at Institute of International Relations.			
eptember 1946		Began second year at IIR.			
June 1947		Completed second year at IIR. Commissioned junior lieutenant in Reserves.	With help of temporary documents used for the trip to Germany, NOSENKO managed to exempt himself from compulsory military training during his first two years at IIR. When it was found that his claims of active duty were false, he was commissioned a junior lieutenant in the Reserves along with his classmates. (May)		In 1947 commissioned a junior lieutenant in the reserves. Did not undergo any military training. After completing second year at the Institute, began to do military translations to avoid military service.
eptember 1947		Began third year at IIR.	In third year at IIR NOSENKO began to specialize in International law. (May)		
Late 1947	[NOSENKO was talk- about his present wife.] "This is my second wife. I was married before... I cannot say that I	While studying at the IIR NOSENKO was dating Augustina Konstantinovna TELEGINA, the daughter of a lieutenant general.	"I was a friend and companion of TELEGINA for some months before her father was arrested in connection with STALIN's campaign	"While I was studying at the Institute, at the end of 1947, I married Augustina Konstantinovna TELEGINA, who was born in 1929"	

	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	loved her a great deal,...The war had just ended. I wanted peace. I wanted a quiet corner. I wanted someone to look after me...and so we became acquainted. We saw each other for about two weeks. Let's get married. I married her. That's all." [Note: NOSENKO did not date this marriage other than to imply it was right after the war; it is included here to place it in the context of later statements.]	TELEGIN was arrested by STALIN, and NOSENKO married Augustina soon afterwards, in about November 1947.	against associates of Marshall ZHUKOV. However, we never planned to marry. After the arrest, however, I decided to marry her in order to show my strength of character. I cannot remember the date of the marriage, which was my first. I think that it happened in 1947, but do not know what season or how long after the arrest of TELEGIN." (Interrogation Protocol Signed in February 1965.)		
18	"One Monday...at 10 o'clock [I came home early from work]. Suddenly I heard--I approached on tietoe--What is this? In my bed, who is lying with my wife? Her older brother. Well, I slammed the door, left, and did not go back. Never went back. That was all.	Broke off marriage after several months when he found his wife in flagrante delicto with her brother. The two were separated, but not divorced, at this time. [Note: As with other dates connected with the TELEGINA marriage, NOSENKO has been imprecise here: in	"One morning--I cannot remember the date or season, but it was in the first half of 1948--I came early and unexpected from my studies at the Institute of Internation Relations to the apartment of my wife's mother, where I sometimes met my wife, and surprised her in sexual inter-	"I lived with my first wife until 1949."	

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
Bye bye...Well, you can imagine my horror." [Note: Portions of the tape of this conversation are unreadable. It is clearly implied that this scene took place at NOSENKO's own home.]	April 1964 he said on another occasion that he found his wife with her brother sometime prior to June 1947.]	course with her brother. I walked out without comment. The next day I returned to our apartment where my wife and I continued to live together, although our relationship was strained. I stayed with her because she was pregnant at the time." (Protocol signed February 1965.)		
	Completed third year at IIR.			
"A child was born who might have been mine and who might not have been mine. God knows. There was still no child when I left. Well, I helped out. I sent money. That's all. But I didn't see either her or the child." [Note: NOSENKO provided no date for the above.]		Girl with hare lip and cleft palate born to TELEGINA. NOSENKO decided deformity was due to her incestuous relationship with her brother. Subsequently gave his wife a little money to help support the child, but never considered it his. Marriage cooled still further, but NOSNEKO continued to live in the apartment. (May)		

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June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	Began fourth year at IIR.			
	Completed fourth year at IIR.			
	Successfully defended his thesis on the subject of "Diplomatic Immunity."			
	Completed English language studies.	NOSENKO was through with courses at the Institute in January 1950 and had already defended his thesis on "Diplomatic Immunity." The last half-year at the Institute was relatively free because the students were given time to prepare for the state exams which were required for graduation. (May)		
	In March or April 1950 NOSENKO was interviewed by the assignments commission of the IIR and was tentatively assigned to the GRU. In May 1950 he went to the	Before taking his final state exams, NOSENKO went before the placement board. Here they talked about his possible assignments and although no definite decision was reached	"In the spring of 1950 before the beginning of the state examinations a personnel placement commission was created at the Institute and I declared to it my	The Placement Commission sent NOSENKO to the MGB where he was told he was not a suitable candidate. The reason was for "little things. I was drunk several times, only an average student, etc."

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	GRU Personnel Department for an interview with Colonel KALOSHIN on the instructions of the chief of the "secret unit" at the IIR.	it was suggested he go into the Navy. After this, but before the state exams, NOSENKO visited a special section of the Navy Ministry to give them special documents for a security check. Although it was not stated, NOSENKO believed he was slated for Navy Intelligence. (May)	wish to work in some sort of military organization. Soon thereafter the chief of the Institute's special section gave me a telephone number and told me to call it. The number was K-6...and I realized that the MGB was interested in me since these numbers belonged to the MGB. I called the number and was told to come to the MGB... the conversation [at the MGB] concerned my biography and my knowledge of the English language.. Nothing was said about where it was intended for me to work....Later the chief of the Institute's special section told me my qualifications were not suitable for the MGB."	**NOSENKO said he did not mention this earlier because his interrogators would not have believed that the MGB first turned him down and they later accepted him in 1953.**

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	Took state exams for completion of the Institute. Passed three of them but flunked Marxism-Leninism. Advised GRU and was told to call back when he had his IIR diploma. He was allowed to take the Navy physical exam, which lasted three days.	After failing the state exam NOSENKO had someone in his father's office call the GRU to see what he should do. It turned out that the security check would take a long time and NOSENKO was told to check back after he had passed the exam. (May)	"During the summer of 1950, while the state exams were underway, I began to process for entry into the Navy GRU. My processing took place through Colonel KALOSHIN, the Chief of the GRU Personnel Department. Up until March 1951 I repeatedly visited the Ministry of the Navy... I filled out questionaires in duplicate, wrote two autobiographies and submitted copies of my diploma." [Note: NOSENKO in his 1966 autobiography did not mention having failed the exam in Marxism-Leninism.]	
"I finished the Institute of International Relations in 1950, after this I worked in the GRU of the Navy."	Passed exams on second try and received diploma of completion of IIR. Contacted Colonel KALOSHIN of GRU Personnel. Submitted	NOSENKO checked back with GRU Personnel after passing his exams. (May)	"I submitted copies of my diploma to GRU Personnel." [See above entry.] NOSENKO processing for GRU entry.	

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	diploma, transcript of grades, and other necessary papers. [Note: Previously in 1964 NOSENKO stated that he graduated from the IIR, which at that time was a four-year course, in mid-1949 and "just loafed around" for a year. He later changed the completion date to late 1949 or early 1950. Then he changed this to say that he failed exams in 1949 and had been forced to wait an entire year before he could retake them in 1950. Finally he gave the version above.]			
"When they offered me [assignments in] Moscow, Leningrad and the Far East I took the Far East so that nobody could say that Yuriy NOSENKO took advan-	Entered on active duty with the Navy on 17-19 September 1950, when he received orders transferring him from a junior lieutenant in the Reserves to a junior	In the autumn of 1950 received orders transferring him from the Reserve to active duty. Offered a choice of duty posts, NOSENKO chose to go to the Far East "in order to prove he	[See above entries.] Still processing for GRU entry.	

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
tage of his father's position."	lieutenant on active duty. Received orders to the Intelligence Staff of the Seventh Far East Fleet. [Note: In an earlier version, NOSENKO said he entered the GRU in 1949, having finished the Institute of International Relations the same year.]	was now ready to make a man of himself...in the country God forgot." (May)		
"I worked in the field of information in the Far East, in the city of Sovetskaya Gavan...in the field of information--radio intercept, etc. All your movements, when you moved vessels to Chemul'po, Korea, the Korean operation...we knew all the ships there because you talked on the air. You transmitted. We knew each division, its name, its number, everything...	On approximately 1 October 1950 NOSENKO left Moscow by train for the Far East. The trip to Bukhta Postovaya (near Sovetskaya Gavan), where his unit was stationed, took nine or ten days. Assigned to work in the Information Section under Captain Second Rank KHAYTOV. Duties included translations from American Naval literature and making summaries of American Navy OB in	Arriving at his duty station NOSENKO was assigned to the Information Section. He liked the work and did a good job despite the rigorous conditions. During his service here he received special mention as an outstanding officer. There were 300 to 350 intercept operators there. NOSENKO and other officers analyzed the take as well as information received from Sakhalin and Vladivostok. (May)	[See above entries.] Still processing for GRU entry.	

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
and we reported this to Moscow. I don't know what was done with this information after this. So, we were concerned with information."	Far East. There was a unit involved in radio intercept of American Naval targets in Korean area, but NOSENKO was not personally concerned with this work.			
	Promoted to the rank of lieutenant.	After about seven months in the Far East, NOSENKO was promoted to lieutenant. This was April 1951. Normally one is promoted from junior lieutenant to lieutenant only after a year's service in grade. This can be reduced to six months in the Far East. (May)	"On 12 March 1951 two orders were issued by the Naval Ministry; one concerning my enlistment in the Navy and the other assigning me as a translator to the Intelligence Unit of the Seventh Fleet (Military Unit 70176). The following day at KALOSHIN's instructions I reported to the Moscow City Military Commission where I was issued my passport and my <u>voyenyy bilet</u>. The Commission also issued me temporary duty orders and travel documents. On 16 or 17 March I left Moscow for my duty post. I arrived at Bukhta Postovaya at the end of March and	"I lied when I said I started in the GRU in 1950. It was really March 1951." [Note: No effort was made to obtain a reason for this lie or to question NOSENKO on its implications for his earlier statements about promotions, etc.] "I was on active duty in Sovetskaya Gavan--Bukhta Postovaya from 1951 to 1953."

DATE	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
				began work in the Information Department of the Intelligence Unit of the Seventh Fleet.	
End of 1951		NOSENKO involved in apprentice work in the Agent-Intelligence Section at Bukhta Postovaya. This involved going out to sea on subchasers to pick up and drop off, and conducting meetings with agents from Hokkaido and Sakhalin. NOSENKO did not actually meet agents, but was merely along to learn how they were picked up at sea.			
January-February 1952		Filed action by mail to divorce TELEGINA in Moscow court and published intention notice in a local Sovetskaya Gavan newspaper in January or February.	NOSENKO was planning to divorce his wife before he left Moscow but did not start proceedings because he was afraid she would bring charges against him in the KOMSOMOL. Sometime in late 1951 or early 1952 he published his notice		

DATE	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
			of intent in a local newspaper and forwarded the necessary papers to Moscow. (May)		
April 1952		Left Bukhta Postovaya and returned to Moscow on leave. Arrived at the end of April and reported to KALOSHIN. Requested transfer from the Far East.	On 1 May 1952 NOSENKO's father was to observe his 50th birthday. NOSENKO's two-year tour in the Far East would not be up until October or November 1952, and he was not entitled to any leave until it was ended. However, his section chief was very understanding and arranged for him to leave in April so that he could be in Moscow for the birthday celebration. NOSENKO flew to Khabarovsk where he had a "two-day drunken orgy" with another Naval officer. He then continued on to Moscow in time for the May Day and birthday celebrations. The next day he reported to the Navy Ministry and was told to re-	"At the end of April 1952 I left Sovetskaya Gavan on leave, arriving in Moscow on 28 April."	

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June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
"I worked in the ar East until 1952, hen suddenly I fell ill. In the Far East. It was this way. Then I arrived in Moscow, I went to the doctor. They began to x-ray me. Clear lungs, absolutely. They examined me one day, two days, three days. Clear, absolutely clear. Then by accident, right under my collarbone, a small, small, little spot was found and it turned out to be on a blood vessel. It turned out to be at a very early stage. At that time they had just discovered streptomycin and I was confined at the Hertzen Sanitorium near Moscow. I was there for two months. I felt fine but they	NOSENKO was on leave during May and June 1952 and lived during this time at the home of his parents at No. 4 Ulitsa Gor'kogo in Moscow. He received one month leave for his 1951 service in the Far East and the other for his 1952 service there. [Note: NOSENKO did not mention having had tuberculosis during any interrogations or statements in 1964. According to his 1966 statements, he spent only one year, March 1951 to April 1952, in the Far East.]	turn at the end of his leave for reassignment. (May) NOSENKO was on leave during May and June. No decision had been reached with regard to whether he would return to Sovetskaya Gavan or not and he was "at the disposal" of the Naval Ministry during this period. After the leave, NOSENKO waited another month until his assignment was decided upon. (May) [Note: NOSENKO did not mention having been hospitalized in this period.]	"While on leave I became ill with tuberculosis and spent almost two months in a sanitorium near Moscow." [Note: In another statement, written a week earlier, NOSENKO said that in Sovetskaya Gavan "drunkeness and the severe conditions had their effect on my health and led to an outbreak of tuberculosis in May 1952."]	NOSENKO confirmed that he was at the Herzen Sanitorium during this period and said that as a result of his illness he was "coughing up a half a glass of blood at a time." His treatment consisted of shots of streptomycin.

DATE	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	gave me shots of streptomycin every hour for two months and stopped this disease at once. After this I had check-ups for five years, was carried on their books until 1957. It was nothing."				
Mid-1952	"They offered me the opportunity to study in the Military-Diplomatic Academy. I went and took a look at the courses they had to offer--Marxism, Philosophy, History, and so on. Well, what did I need this for? I already knew this. I said: 'No, I won't go.'"		During the summer of 1952 NOSENKO was offered assignments to the Military-Diplomatic Academy, to a special Navy espionage school, and to Germany, but turned all of them down for various reasons. He rejected the opportunity to attend the Military-Diplomatic Academy because he had already had 96 per cent of the courses in the Institute. (May)		NOSENKO was offered an opportunity to attend the Military-Diplomatic Academy, but did not want to go. Besides, he failed the physical examinations for entrance when sugar was discovered in his faeces. NOSENKO drank too much.
July-August 1952	"After my illness and after the Far East I received orders to the Baltic. On the Baltic there is a city which was formerly	Following his regular leave NOSENKO was ordered by the Navy to proceed to Berlin and Rostok, but refused to go	NOSENKO received orders to Sovetsk and arrived there in late August or early September 1952. In Sovetsk NOSENKO was assigned a political	"During the month of July the Personnel Department of the GRU reached a decision concerning the place of my	NOSENKO was shown a map of Kaliningradskaya Oblast showing Primorsk to be where he said Sovetsk should be located. NOSENKO continued to

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
the German city of Pillau and is now called Primorsk." There NOSENKO was involved in the formation of "agent-observation posts." Suitable candidates were selected from among the crews of ships. They were then formed into groups of three men each and were trained in radio-operation, demolition, etc. After this the groups split up and their members went their separate ways. In case of war the groups were to be reformed and sent behind enemy lines on sabotage and intelligence missions. [Note: The former German city of Pillau is now called Baltiysk, not Primorsk; the latter is a small village nearby.]	when he learned that the Naval Intelligence Points (MRP's) in Germany were closing down and that his final assignment was not definite. He then took more leave (unauthorized) until about 29 July when he left for Baltiysk and reported for duty to the Intelligence Staff of the Fourth Baltic Fleet. He was assigned to a Naval Intelligence Point being set up in Sovetsk, a small town near Baltiysk. There he prepared area training materials for and carried supplies to agents, but did not actually deal with or train them directly. [Note: Previously during the April 1964 interrogations NOSENKO said that he had received training near Moscow and was then sent to Rostok and Sassnitz before	officer's job and helped train sailors for wartime agent missions. His main task was to prepare the training plan for the sailors, to instruct them in subjects such as "The Foreign Policy of the USSR," and generally to see to their needs. (May)	further assignment and I was ordered to the Naval Intelligence Point of the Fourth Baltic Fleet Intelligence Unit in Sovetsk, Kaliningradskaya Oblast. Sovetsk is located before you go out on the spit of land where Baltiysk (Pillau) stands. I arrived in Sovetsk in August 1952 and began to work in the Naval Intelligence Unit as a senior translator. Shortly before my arrival the Intelligence Point had been moved from Rostok, in Germany, to Sovetsk. [Note: It was clear from NOSENKO's earlier descriptions that the "Sovetsk" which NOSENKO described is, in fact, Primorsk, a small village on the coast. The only place called Sovetsk in Kaliningradskaya Oblast	say that he was assigned to Sovetsk in the summer of 1952. He was asked why, as a son of a minister and as a patient under treatment for tuberculosis, he was not assigned to the Black Sea or somewhere else with a healthy climate. NOSENKO explained that there were no positions available "elsewhere."

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	going to Baltiysk/Sovetsk. He then said this was a lie and gave the version above. The reason for the lie, NOSENKO said, was that he knew we "wouldn't believe the truth"--that he had successfully refused the assignment to Germany.]		is about 40 kilometers inland, and NOSENKO himself had said in 1962 that he served in Primorsk.]	
No date given for divorce.	In mid-August or September 1952 NOSENKO returned to Moscow from the Baltic for 7 to 10 days to complete divorce proceedings he had initiated in the Far East. This was not counted as leave, but as official business. He then returned to Sovetsk.	"Sometime after my return to Moscow from Sovetskaya Gavan, I carried through with my intention to divorce. My divorce was noted in my Officer's Booklet and nowhere else. I turned this document in to the KGB Personnel office when I began my KGB service and since then have had no record of the divorce. I continued to pay alimony to Augustina TELEGINA (one quarter of my salary) until I left the USSR in		

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
		1964. She kept the name NOSENKO even after she remarried." [Note: This is placed here for comparison with his 1964 statement.]*		
[See next entry.]	NOSENKO did not like his work in Sovetsk [sic] and wanted to return to Moscow to arrange for a transfer. He asked for annual leave which the unit commander refused to give him as he had none due. NOSENKO thereupon went to Admiral GOLOVKO in Baltiysk and with his help obtained leave because of the elder NOSENKO's influential position. NOSENKO then returned to Moscow shortly before New Year's.	NOSENKO disliked his job as a political officer and was disdainful of the low educational level of those he was called upon to train, as well as of the "whole stupid" program. He remained in Sovetsk only until December 1952, when he obtained leave to spend the holidays with his parents in Moscow. (May)	"I remained in Sovetsk a short time and returned to Moscow at the end of the year [1952] with the aim of changing my place of work... While in Sovetsk I received the rank of lieutenant of the Administrative Service." [Note: See 1965 entry for the spring of 1951.]	
"In the beginning of 1953 I came to Moscow [from Primorsk]. This was '53, in the beginning.	"I arrived back in Moscow in December 1952, just before New Year's. I had vacation for the month of Janu-	In January NOSENKO and his parents went to visit the family of General KOBULOV at KOBULOV's dacha in Usov. NO-	"On 1 January 1953 my parents and I were guests at the dacha of KOBULOV who at that time was working in GUSIMZ in East Ber-	

*: NOSENKO was divorced from TELEGINA during his leave before going to Sovetsk (May and June 1952).

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June 1962	-964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
in January. Well I came on leave to Moscow. I was there at my father's dacha, near Moscow. KOBULOV came to visit us at the dacha...a conversation started. He asked: 'What are you doing?' I answered: 'I am working in the GRU...I came home on leave.' KOBULOV asked: 'How do you like your work?' I said: 'Speaking frankly, I don't." 'Well,' he said, 'you better come work with us....Look, drop in to see me for a minute sometime.' KOBULOV was First Deputy to BERIA and a great friend of my father's."	ary. At the end of January, at the end of my vacation I went back to GRU Personnel and saw KALOSHIN...I told him I did not like my job, all that typing, and he said: 'Well, wait a while. Look around.' I was at the disposal of the Personnel Department all of February. I had no work at all. And since I was not working, I did not get any pay for this month. During this vacation I was living with my father and mother on Gor'kiy Street."	SENKO and KOBULOV discussed NOSENKO's dissatisfaction with his Sovetsk assignment and KOBULOV suggested the possibility of NOSENKO getting into State Security work. (May)	lin with the WISMUTH company. This was the first time I met KOBULOV. I don't remember how the conversation came around to me, but I told KOBULOV about my work in the Naval GRU and my desire to change my place of work. He promised to find me a place in the MGB, but this promise was empty conversation."	
y- 53 ed	"After the New Year I went to this sanitorium, Kubinka, 75 or 78 kilometers from Moscow, and I was there January	"I met my [second] wife [Lyudmila KOZHEVNIKOVA] for the first time at the Herzen "House of Rest," one of the	"From the end of January to the middle of March I was under treatment at the sanitorium near Moscow where I had been	

TOP SECRET

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	and part of February. After that I was home." [Note: This statement was made on 8 April. As no attempt was made to reconcile it with the previous entry, made on 6 April, and because NOSENKO offered no explanation, both are included here.]	"Houses of Rest" of the Council of Ministers. I was resting there for several days. She was there too. It's about 65-70 kilometers from Moscow, not far from Kubinka. I was waiting for my status to be resolved...I didn't want to stay alone at the dacha [his father's]. She was studying philology in the third course at Moscow State University. She had been seriously ill with tuberculosis when she was 17 and still required treatments." (Interrogation, 12 February 1965) [Note: NOSENKO's explanation of his presence at the "House of Rest" was given in response to the specific question: "What were you doing there?"]*	during the summer of 1952. Here I became acquainted with my second wife, Lyudmila Yulianovna KOZHEVNIKOVA.	

TOP SECRET

ay 1965 NOSENKO said: "I met my wife in a House of Rest. I had been at Sosno in January but didn't like it. I tried Dyatkino and met her.

: See June 1942 entry: Red Star, on 14 January 1967, reported that seven "special naval schools" were established in 1940 in Leningrad, Moscow, Vladivostok, Gorkiy, Kiev, Odessa, and Baku. There is no indication that any of

C. Personal Affairs Since Entering the KGB

1. Family Life

The Soviet internal passport which NOSENKO carried to Geneva in 1964 confirms his claim that he married Lyudmila KOZHEVNIKOVA on 27 June 1953. (They married approximately six months after he says he first met her at a sanatorium or "rest home" outside Moscow and about three months after he says he joined the KGB.) Immediately after their marriage the couple moved into the home of NOSENKO's new in-laws at Ulitsa Serafimovich 2, Moscow, where they lived until obtaining their own apartment on Narodnaya Ulitsa in January 1955.* KOZHEVNIKOVA's father is Yulian Nikolayevich KOZHEVNIKOV, a metallurgical engineer by training, who held the position of First Deputy Chairman of the State Scientific Research Committee (GKKNIR) of the RSFSR at the time of NOSENKO's defection.**

NOSENKO said that he has two daughters by this second marriage. According to his passport, the eldest of these, Oksana, was born on 21 August 1954 and the other, Tamara, on 13 July 1958.*** NOSENKO in 1962 displayed to his CIA handlers a photograph of the two girls and their mother and made a particular point of noting the close physical resemblance between

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* On 23 April 1964 NOSENKO was questioned on the various apartments he occupied in Moscow. He said that, from the time of his marriage to TELEGINA until his departure for his first GRU post in the Far East, he lived in an apartment on Meshchanskaya Ulitsa. He gave up this apartment, he said, in 1950, when his Navy orders came through. Having made this statement, NOSENKO was then asked why the 1951 Moscow telephone directory still listed him at the Meshchanskaya Ulitsa address. He replied that he could not explain but that he was considered to have vacated the house in 1950. (He later said he moved to the Far East in 1951 - see Section IV.B.) NOSENKO then said that the previous tenant at Narodnaya Ulitsa 13 had been one Nikita ISHCHENKO. Although the phone then in the apartment was switched to NOSENKO's name for billing purposes, NOSENKO never bothered to have the change entered in the Moscow phone book; he said that this would have required a visit to a downtown office, the filling out of numerous forms, etc.; besides he added, he did not use the telephone anyway. Therefore, NOSENKO said, from 1955 until his defection in 1964, the telephone in his apartment was listed under the name of ISHCHENKO. He has repeated this story during subsequent questionings. The 1961 Moscow phone directory carries no listing for NOSENKO; it does list ISHCHENKO but gives his address as Krasnokholmskaya Naberezhnaya, not Narodnaya Ulitsa.

** The GKKNIR of the RSFSR is now the GNTK. PENKOVSKIY worked under cover in the GKKNIR of the USSR.

*** NOSENKO has also given his second daughter's year of birth as 1957. In 1962 he told CIA that the older daughter was then studying in the first class at school; in 1965, however, he said she began school in the fall of 1962.

Oksana and himself. He said that he and his wife refer to her as his "double" (kopiya). His wife, in a letter after the defection, referred to Oksana as NOSENKO's kopiya.

NOSENKO's father, the Shipbuilding Minister, died of stomach cancer in August 1956, three years after NOSENKO says he entered the KGB Second Chief Directorate. The period of time surrounding his father's death was, according to NOSENKO, a turning point in his personal and professional life. It was then that he "found himself" after an irresponsible past, drinking and wenching, and indifference to his work.

2. Venereal Disease

The incident which NOSENKO has most often cited as an example of his irresponsibility in the period prior to 1956 involved his illegal use of KGB alias documents to cover treatment for a case of gonorrhea he contracted in 1954, at the time his wife was pregnant with their first child. The CIA psychologist who questioned NOSENKO in May 1966 submitted the following summary of NOSENKO's statements about this incident, which are about as given earlier (during the April 1964 interrogation):

"A girl friend he had known in Leningrad since 1945 came to visit relatives in Moscow in 1954. She called him, and he spent some time with her. She was not a prostitute, and he had slept with her before, so he thought nothing of it. Later he developed what he feared was a venereal disease. Since his wife was pregnant, he was safe both from discovery and the danger of infecting her. He searched frantically around Moscow for a private doctor who treated such diseases, but could not find one. Some of his friends at the office suggested a central clinic that would require no documents. He went here but when confronted with a request for documents, had the choice of showing his KGB certificate or using a false passport he had for business. He tried to talk the doctor into letting him go home to get his documents, but the doctor said he would have to be accompanied by a member of the militia; otherwise he might not come back. He was required to take treatment of a communicable disease. He was forced to give the false document. He came back for treatment about three times and was ordered to report back in two weeks for a final check. They also demanded the name of the girl, but he claimed he had only just met her and did not know who she was. He forgot to go back and a nurse visited the safehouse about two times and left a note for him to report. However, he did not go to the safehouse so knew nothing of the note. In the false passport was a listing of where the named person worked, a fictitious factory. As the result of the clinic inquiries, the request for information got into the hands of the section which made the documents. NOSENKO was called before the deputy chief of the Directorate and severely criticized. He explained what had happened and was given five days of house arrest. However, the chief of his section had also gotten word of the infraction and sentenced him to fifteen days of house arrest without even talking to him. He told his wife he was going on a trip and moved into the administrative room near the office to serve his term. In the meantime, the Secretary of the KGB Party

Committee called NOSENKO's father on the phone and told him the whole story. NOSENKO's father never told either NOSENKO's wife or mother of the incident, but did chide NOSENKO about it. The incident was brought before the Komsomol and discussed. A written reprimand for immoral conduct-unauthorized use of official documents was placed in his record. This was also a final warning meaning that any other infraction would result in expulsion. He made the statement that he had been punished for this incident many times. He could not immediately apply for party membership; the incident was brought up repeatedly in Komsomol meetings and even in party meetings (after he was accepted) as a horrible example; and it kept him from being promoted from Senior Lieutenant to Captain. (The Deputy-Director who gave him five days was a member of the promotion commission.)"

Although there have been slight changes and contradictions in NOSENKO's numerous accounts of this story (the house arrest was variously reported as 5, 10, and 15 days) it remained basically consistent until the October 1966 interrogations when he said for the first time that he contracted gonorrhea from the girl in Leningrad in 1945 rather than 1954. In 1954, he said, he again was infected, this time by a prostitute whom he picked up in the vicinity of the Leningrad Railroad Station in Moscow. When the KGB required that he reveal the source, NOSENKO said, he ascribed the latter case to the original girl from Leningrad. During the October 1966 interrogations NOSENKO also told CIA for the first time that he had had venereal disease on two other occasions while studying at the Institute of International Affairs.

He later began to "feel more a part of the KGB," and as a junior KGB case officer, he personally recruited Richard BURGI in the first successful recruitment operation carried out by the newly-created Tourist Department of the Second Chief Directorate.* "And in 1956," NOSENKO said in 1964, "before my father's death, I was made a candidate for membership in the Communist Party and, exactly 15 days later, was assigned the rank of Senior Case Officer. I developed a pride in myself, (a feeling) that I can do things. You know how it is. When a person feels that he can, that he has some support, then he works much better. He has more initiative and so forth."

3. Affiliation with Communist Party Organs

NOSENKO said that his formal participation in Communist Party activities began in late 1943 or early 1944 when he joined the Komsomol at the Naval Preparatory School in Baku. This step was a casual one, and he has said that he took it without much thought, mainly because all his friends were

* See Part V.D.4.b. for a description of the BURGI recruitment operation. Until 1966 NOSENKO claimed to CIA that he had received an award for his participation in this operation. In the October 1966 interrogations he retracted this and said that he never received any KGB award for the BURGI or any other operation.

joining. When NOSENKO entered the KGB in the spring of 1953, he transferred routinely to the Komsomol organization there and became Secretary of the Komsomol Organization of the Second Chief Directorate. This was a small organization consisting, NOSENKO thought, of about 17 KGB employees; he remained its secretary until June or July 1954, when he got into the trouble over illegal use of operational documents. According to NOSENKO, "Immediately after this incident the Bureau of the Komsomol was gathered, and I was immediately removed from the position of Secretary." A week later, a "strict reprimand" was entered in NOSENKO's Komsomol records.

In October 1954, on the eve of his 27th birthday, NOSENKO was forced out of the Komsomol for over-age.* At that time, the "strict reprimand" he had received several months earlier was remitted on NOSENKO's petition, and he was permitted to leave the organization with a clean record. He was not permitted to join the Communist Party immediately, however. NOSENKO described the situation on 15 April 1964 as follows: "Now I had to prove myself. Not being a candidate for Party membership, I asked them for assignments to show my eagerness, to prove myself. I also asked the Party Organization of the Second Chief Directorate for some 'public service' (obshchestvenniy) assignments. I collected newspapers." For a year, NOSENKO "made good" by running errands and performing other such tasks, until it was decided that he was suitable for Party membership. He applied in January 1956 and was accepted as a candidate member of the Party in June the same year; full membership was granted in 1957. For over a year, from October 1954 until January 1956, NOSENKO said, he had the distinction of being the only employee of the KGB who was neither a Komsomol nor a Party member or applicant.

4. Statements to Others by NOSENKO

Before giving CIA the foregoing details, NOSENKO had talked about himself to several non-Soviets, including persons involved in cases which are reviewed in other portions of this paper. NOSENKO informed the recruitment target Horst BRAUNS that he had two daughters.** He advised Ivan Ivanovich PREISFREUND, a Finnish citizen used in the recruitment approach to a U.S. Army sergeant in Moscow, that he was married, his father was dead but his mother was living, he had served in the Navy, and he had two children. PREISFREUND met the "little girls" and later reported to CIA that, although NOSENKO was a "woman-chaser," he loved his daughters very much.*** With one KGB agent in particular, Arsene FRIPPEL, NOSENKO was especially forthcoming: he told FRIPPEL of his

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* According to the Statutes (Ustav) of the Komsomol in effect in 1954, the maximum age for a Komsomol member at that time was 25. On this basis, NOSENKO should have been excluded in October 1953, upon reaching his 26th birthday. When this was explained to NOSENKO by DERYABIN in July 1965, NOSENKO replied that he was certain he left the Komsomol in 1954 upon reaching the age of 27, that he was sure the maximum age was 26 at that time, and that no special exceptions were made in his case.

** See Part V.F.9.

***PREISFREUND is discussed in detail in Part V.E.4.a.

service in the Soviet Navy; he dwelt at length on his father's work in the Soviet shipbuilding industry; and while using the alias "NIKOLAYEV" with FRIPPEL, he mentioned that his father had been employed in the town of Nikolayev. On one occasion NOSENKO and his wife dined at FRIPPEL's home.* NOSENKO told his recruitment target George DREW in April 1959 that he had two daughters.

D. Soviets' Statements About NOSENKO

Portions of the NOSENKO autobiography have been supported and other portions contradicted by the statements of several Soviets following the defection. The Soviets' remarks dealing with NOSENKO's KGB career are reviewed in Part V.I., but with reference to other aspects of the background of NOSENKO:

- Letters to NOSENKO in Geneva from his wife (who later went to the U.S. Embassy after his defection) include a reference to one of the daughters as his "double" and two other personal letters in his possession at the time of his defection, Yu. I. GUK and G. I. DUCHKOV, referred to visits to NOSENKO's wife and children.

- A KGB officer in Vienna, Vladimir TULAYEV, told a CIA double agent that NOSENKO, whom he knew well, came from a wonderful family, loved his wife and children, and earned a good salary. TULAYEV later told the agent that he had "friends who knew NOSENKO well."**

- A Soviet diplomat in Buenos Aires, Feliks KOVALEV, said to a CIA agent that NOSENKO had twice married, had a good family background, was the son of a Minister in the government, was notorious for his "adventurous" nature, and was "famous for his character."

- The Soviet Navy defector Nikolay ARTAMONOV said he attended a naval preparatory school with NOSENKO in 1944 to 1946. (ARTAMONOV's description of the school and of the dates involved, however, differs from NOSENKO's.)

sensitive source

- [redacted] reported NOSENKO is the son of a former Soviet Government Minister, attended naval college, shot himself to avoid going to the front with the rest of his class, was graduated from the Institute in 1950, and contracted venereal disease in 1950 but through his father's influence avoided damage to his career. [redacted] sensitive source [redacted] from conversations with fellow officers [redacted] He has indicated that he does not know NOSENKO.

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* FRIPPEL is discussed more fully in Part V.D.5.

** In October 1966 NOSENKO failed to identify TULAYEV either by name or photograph and said he didn't know him.

sensitive source
- [redacted] said that when NOSENKO was a young man, he attended the GRU Military-Diplomatic Academy and then spent a short time, perhaps a year, in the Information Department at GRU Headquarters. NOSENKO had been a "very undisciplined person" while in the GRU and "not very good," [redacted] continued, and he was discharged from the GRU. However, his father, an "influential person in the Ministry of Shipbuilding," was able to get NOSENKO transferred to the KGB. [redacted] said he did not know NOSENKO personally, but learned this information from "various persons" (unnamed) in Moscow.

- The thumbnail biography of NOSENKO which KOROLEV and ROSENTAL submitted to the editors of Paris Match in October 1966 (see Part III.H.) stated that NOSENKO was "closely acquainted with the country's leaders, families, and homes" and that his "father who died several years ago was an important official in the Party and state organs." The document went on to say that "NOSENKO's family consists of a wife, 35, two daughters, 10 and 12, mother and a brother (younger)." KOROLEV and ROSENTAL also provided photographs purporting to be of NOSENKO's wife and daughters.

source
- [redacted] said she heard from her KGB friend V. G. SVIRIN that NOSENKO's father was a Minister or a General of Ukrainian origin and that his mother was Jewish and "was always involved in some blackmarketeering." She also said that she heard NOSENKO was a "civilian," not a KGB officer, but was connected somehow with the KGB. (She could not explain this connection other than to say that all Soviets permitted to meet foreigners are either officers or "relatives" of the KGB.)

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: CASE OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO (835 PAGE STUDY) VOL. II PAGES 85 THRU 348 (PART V)

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: SE

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: ONGOING OPERATIONS MATERIAL

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
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15 May 78		Ken Klein	[signature]
5 Sept 78		Johanna Smith	Johanna Smith

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NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER

A. Introduction

During his 11 or 12 years' service in the KGB Second Chief Directorate, NOSENKO said, he rose from case officer to deputy chief of a department and from lieutenant to lieutenant colonel (or, as he has stated more recently, only to the rank of captain). An English speaker, he had specialized in operations against American targets in the USSR as he steadily advanced to higher positions in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department (from entry on duty with the KGB in 1952 or 1953 until 1955, and from January 1960 to January 1962) and in the Tourist Department (from June 1955 to January 1960, and from January 1962 until the defection). His duties took him to England in 1957 and 1958, Cuba in 1960, and Bulgaria in 1961 as well as to Switzerland in 1962 and 1964; also, NOSENKO made numerous trips within the USSR in connection with operations, inspections, and conferences. Commendations, twice accompanied by bonuses, were awarded to him by the KGB Chairman in 1956, 1959, and 1961 and by the head of the Second Chief Directorate in 1957 and 1958; he was one of 70 Second Chief Directorate officers awarded the Order of the Red Star in 1962; and in the same year he received a medal for completing ten years of "irreproachable service."* Thus, according to NOSENKO, his defection ended a promising career marked by promotions, responsible positions, extensive travel, and many honors.

NOSENKO has discussed a large number of KGB operations, including some in which he had a personal role, either as a participant or as a supervisor, and others conducted by other KGB personnel in the First and Second Chief Directorate about which he learned through his professional and personal contacts. Those in which he played a personal role are covered in this part of the paper. All are included in Part VI. The text of the paper distinguishes the information from collateral sources and investigations from the details which NOSENKO has provided on the same topics.

* NOSENKO has admitted recently, however, that he never got any awards at all in the KGB.

B. Entry into the KGB

NOSENKO has provided a wide range of dates for his entry on duty with the KGB and has offered disparate descriptions of the circumstances and procedures involved in his becoming a KGB staff officer. His statements on these two topics are presented under separate headings below.

1. Date of Entry

A range of dates between early 1952 and 2 April 1953 has been given by NOSENKO as the time when he entered on duty with the KGB, but he has been most consistent in placing his entry in the month of March 1953.* In summary, he has said the beginning of 1952 (statement of 31 January 1964), May 1952 with no day (statement of February 1964), 5 or 7 September 1952 (statement of 6 April 1964), March 1953 with no day (statements of 9 June 1962, 24 April 1966 and 27 October 1966), 12 or 15 or 17 March 1953 (statement of 8 April 1964), 13 or 15 March 1953 (statement of 26 July 1965), and 2 April 1953 (statement of 17 April 1966). When last questioned about this subject, on 27 October 1966, NOSENKO acknowledged that he had lied when he had earlier reported his entry as occurring in 1952. His statements about the entry date are arranged in chronological order below.

9 June 1962 (first CIA meeting with NOSENKO): "In the beginning of 1953 I came to Moscow /from duty with the GRU in Primorsk/. This was 1953, in the beginning, in January. Well, I came on leave to Moscow. I was staying at my father's dacha there... I was then in the Navy GRU. So I came to Moscow on leave and, while I was home near Moscow at my father's dacha, /General Bogdan Zakharovich/ KOBULOV** dropped in on us. A conversation simply began. He said: 'What are you doing?' I said: 'I'm working in GRU. I worked in the Far East and now I'm working in the Baltic. I came here on leave.' KOBULOV said: 'How do you like the work?' I replied: 'Well, speaking honestly, I don't like the work.' 'Well,' he said, 'You better come to work with us. Where do you want to go? Into intelligence or counter-intelligence?'... I did not want to go into intelligence. I

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* Several of NOSENKO's remarks about his date of entry into the KGB were made during CIA questioning about how and when he first learned of the KGB agent "ANDREY"; the lead to "ANDREY" was one of the two pieces of information which NOSENKO offered to sell when he approached CIA in 1962 (see Part II.B.); the "ANDREY" case is discussed at greater length in Part VI.D.3.b.

** Other sources have reported that KOBULOV was expelled from the State Security apparatus in 1946 and that he did not return to a position of authority until a few days after Lavrentiy BERIYA became MGB-MVD Minister on 9 or 10 March 1953. As of 1952, KOBULOV was working in East Germany for both Wismut A.G., a uranium ore-mining concern, and for the Soviet contingent to the Allied Control Commission. KOBULOV was arrested at the same time as BERIYA, along with others in the KGB. See Part V.B.2. for further references to KOBULOV.

consider that only people who have seven, even ten years' experience in counterintelligence work should be sent to intelligence. After this, let them go into positive intelligence. Then they know how counterintelligence operates... Well, when KOBULOV asked me where I wanted to work, I answered: 'It is better, of course, to go into counterintelligence.' 'Well,' he said, 'Good. Look, drop in to see me for a minute sometime.' This was simple conversation. Nothing official. A week later I got a telephone call. They were calling from Personnel and told me to stop by. I went. 'Come into this room,' /they told me/, 'it's not necessary to fill out a questionnaire (anketa). We have already obtained your personal file from the GRU. Go directly to the central entrance. A pass has already been issued for you; the pass is already there. Go to the Secretariat of Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV.' Well, I went. KOBULOV had been summoned somewhere high up in the government, and his assistant received me. 'How about working in the American Department?' he /the assistant/ asked. 'Well, good. Go there right now.' Well, I went to the Second Directorate... His /KOBULOV's/ assistant sent me directly to the Second Directorate, the American Department, the First Section, working with American correspondents...in '53, in March, in March '53. STALIN had just died."*

*STALIN died on 5 March 1953.

31 January 1964: Yuriy Ivanovich GUK was reassigned from the KGB Second Chief Directorate "in something like 1952," NOSENKO said, "exactly just about the time when I came from the GRU to the KGB. He was already gone by that time."*

February 1964: After his defection on 4 February 1964, NOSENKO prepared an official statement about his biography. He said that he had entered the KGB in 1952, and he shifted the dates of most of the events during the 1945-1955 period one year backwards from the version given in 1962. This was discussed with NOSENKO, and he repeated the new dates; he then studied and approved an official statement on his biography (for the Intelligence Community) which contained the new dates, including his claim that he entered on duty with the KGB in about May 1952.

6 April 1964: Confronted with the above inconsistencies, NOSENKO said that he returned to Moscow in August 1952 and during the same month had a conversation with KGB personnel about getting a job. The interview continued with the following dialogue:

Question: You came (to Moscow) in January?

NOSENKO: No, it wasn't January, it was the second part of 1952. Yes, before that I was in the GRU... Maybe - if I tell you 7 - 7 September - maybe it was 5, I don't know.

Question: ...What date did you enter on duty with KGB?

NOSENKO: I don't remember.

Question: Early September 1952?

NOSENKO: Early September 1952, yes... I came and the first few days was sitting in a room with KUTYREV, RAKOVSKIY, and GROBOV, in Room 615. Yes, it was 7 September when I had joined... 7 or 5... And so the first few weeks I had been reading cases, studying forms; I worked like that (during) December, January, February... No, it was March, yes, after STALIN's death, after the reorganization. And at the end of March I was transferred to the attaches cases...**

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* This would place the entry date some time at the beginning of 1952, for the KGB defector GOLITSYN has reported that GUK was transferred from the Second Chief Directorate in January 1952.

** NOSENKO later settled on June or July 1954 as the time of this transfer. Part V.C. covers the period when, according to NOSENKO, he was engaged in operations against the U.S. military attaches in Moscow.

8 April 1964: The interrogator pointed out to NOSENKO that he had on different occasions dated his entry into the KGB as January 1952, March 1953, and in September 1952. The questioning continued:

Question: Which is the truth?

NOSENKO: After the death of STALIN, in March 1953. Why did I say it /the other dates/? You see, I finished the Institute in 1949. Then I defended my diploma, and then came the State exams. I passed all the exams except one - "Foundations of Marxism-Leninism," the philosophy. And I had to take all the examinations over again. All of them. I took four, passed three, flunked one. Just the same, all four had to be taken over again. For that reason I graduated, or I received the diploma from the Institute in 1950, although officially I graduated in 1949. This is an unpleasant thing and I did not want to mention it. And right after that I was sent to the GRU.* The rest is just as I told you, word-for-word. This was the only thing. And then, after I said it, I did not want to correct it. To twist around again. And the mistake I made was about my work in the KGB. It was not 1952, of course, but 1953... It was 12 or 17 or 15 March. KOBULOV accepted me right away. STALIN was still not dead and I was already accepted. March 1953, about the 15th, about 15 March 1953.

26 July 1965: "At the end of 1952 I came to Moscow from Sovetsk in Primorskiy Kray, near Baltiysk. I had worked in the Naval Intelligence Point (MRP) there. My aim in coming to Moscow was to get out of this work in the MRP. I couldn't stand that work. I couldn't stand that work... I arrived in Moscow at the end of 1952, December... I don't remember exactly the date of the order appointing me an officer in the KGB. It was 13 or 15 March 1953."

17 April 1966 (letter to CIA case officer): "From August 1952 until 1953 I worked at the Intelligence Point of the Naval Intelligence of the 4th Fleet in Sovetsk, where I received the rank of lieutenant of the Administrative Service. From 2 April 1953 until 4 February 1964 I worked in the Second Chief Directorate of the MGB-KGB."

24 April 1966 (signed autobiographical statement): "In the middle of March /1953/ KOBULOV's assistant, Colonel SAVITSKIY called me at home and told me to come to see KOBULOV... I worked in the First Section, First /American/ Department from the middle of March 1953 until July 1955."

27 October 1966: NOSENKO reaffirmed that he entered the KGB in mid-March 1953. He said that he had lied when he earlier said that he had joined the KGB in 1952, and that he knew he was lying at the times he made these statements. Asked why he had lied, he replied: "There was no sense." NOSENKO then went on to explain that because he was only an average student and because he was a heavy drinker, he had been found unsuitable

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* Since April 1966, NOSENKO has said he joined the GRU in 1951, a year later.

by the KGB entry commission when he first applied in 1950. Therefore, NOSENKO continued, he had been trying to conceal this fact from CIA by moving events back a year, for he thought CIA would not have believed him if he reported that he was first rejected by the KGB and was later accepted.

2. Circumstances and Procedures of Entry

Although NOSENKO has consistently associated his entry into the KGB with his discussions with General KOBULOV,* he has been inconsistent concerning the content of their conversation, when it occurred, its relationship in time to other events (see Part IV.B.), and where it took place, at his father's dacha or at KOBULOV's dacha. Also, whereas NOSENKO said in 1962 that there were virtually no administrative formalities prerequisite to his entry, he recalled in 1964 that he had had conversations with various KGB personnel officers and (at home) had completed a KGB questionnaire and a biographic form. NOSENKO was questioned at length on these points during 1964 and 1965. As a result, he provided lengthy descriptions of his various interviews at KGB Headquarters and of the questionnaire and other documents he completed. In April 1966, however, NOSENKO reverted to his original statement of 1962: There were no interviews with KGB personnel officers, and he implied that he had filled out no official forms. His various statements are presented in chronological order below.

9 June 1962: "KOBULOV was at our dacha. Well, he is a great friend of my father. He was First Deputy to BERIYA, and my father was Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry... A conversation simply began. He said: 'What are you doing?' I said: 'I'm working in GRU. I worked in the Far East and now I'm working on the Baltic. I came here on leave.' KOBULOV said: 'How do you like the work?' I replied: 'Well, speaking honestly, I don't like the work.' 'Well,' he said, 'You better come to work with us. Where do you want to go? Into intelligence or counter-intelligence?'... I did not want to go into intelligence. I consider that only people who have seven, even ten years' experience in counterintelligence work should be sent to intelligence. After this, let them go into positive intelligence. Then they know how counterintelligence operates...Well, when KOBULOV asked me where I wanted to work, I answered: 'It is better, of course, to go into counterintelligence.' 'Well,' he said, 'Good. Look, drop in to see me for a minute sometime.' This was simple conversation. Nothing official. A week later I got a telephone call. They were calling from Personnel and told me to stop by. I went. 'Come into this room,' /they told me/, 'it's not necessary to fill out a questionnaire (anketa). We have already obtained your personal file from the GRU. Go directly to the central entrance. A pass has already been issued for you; the pass is already there. Go to the Secretariat of Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV.' Well, I went. KOBULOV had been summoned somewhere high up in the government, and his assistant received me. 'How about working in the American Department?' he /the assistant/ asked. 'Well, good. Go there right now.' Well, I went to the Second Directorate... His /KOBULOV's/ assistant sent me directly to the Second Directorate, the American Department, the First Section, working with American correspondents."

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* See Part V.B.1. for further references to KOBULOV.

8 April 1964: "It was February [1953]. KOBULOV was in February - in Moscow. He was our friend. He said: 'O.K., George. I'll help you if you want, with the KGB.' I remember exactly. Yes. It was in February. I saw him at the cottage... By this time I had been in Moscow six weeks... KOBULOV was in February. He went to see my father at the Ministry. It was the end of the day. It was late and my father invited him to come along to the summer home. It happened to be a Saturday. KOBULOV's wife stayed in Germany. He was just here for a short TDY.* My father invited him to spend Saturday night and Sunday at the dacha... On Sunday we were playing billiards and KOBULOV asked me what I was doing. I told him 'nothing,' that I was at the disposal of the [GRU] Personnel Department. I said: 'I don't want to go back to Baltiysk, to the Baltic Sea, because I don't like the work there. I'm not doing anything there. I get no satisfaction from the work.' He said: 'Well, you should be utilized somehow... Do you want me to call the KGB Personnel - them look you over?' I told him: 'All right.' He called, and he must have given our number to them, our home phone. I was called subsequently by the Personnel Department of the KGB. In February. They told me to come see them at House No. 12. They had a pass for me... So I went. Picked up my pass and went... [NOSENKO next gives a description of his route to the KGB building, his receipt of a pass, and his visit to the Central KGB Personnel Office.] They talked to me. This man - I don't know who or what he was - asked where I worked before and all that. He said: 'O.K. We'll request your file from GRU. We will check you out and will let you know whether or not we will take you.' That's all." NOSENKO was asked whether he completed any forms or questionnaires. "No. Not there. They gave me three copies of forms to take home. There were so many questions. About my parents, my education, my residences, addresses. I filled all this out... Finally I completed all three copies and called them. I was told that this time I would not need a pass, that I should just go to the entrance, and the person [the personnel officer] would come down and take the papers from me. I went, brought the papers, and he took them from me, and also three copies of my handwritten autobiography... Then I was called by the personnel people once more. And at that time another officer talked to me, and this time I knew who was talking to me, because I was told to go to talk to ROZHENKO [first name unknown, later identified as a Section Chief in the Personnel Department]. This was in March... Just as soon as STALIN died, KOBULOV came back from Germany immediately. He must have been summoned by BERIYA or someone. And so, in just a few days - evidently he did not forget - I got a call. It was Bogdan Zakharovich's assistant. He told me to go to the central entrance, that I didn't need a pass. I remember it as if it just happened. I went in the uniform of a lieutenant, but with a civilian overcoat. This was, maybe, the 10th of March... I sat down [in KOBULOV's office]. I thought it would be for five minutes. I waited there almost two hours. The assistant came out a few times and told me that Bogdan Zakharovich is very, very busy, but that he would give me an escort. Some senior lieutenant came up to me and told me to follow him... We went up to the sixth floor of the old building. I remember it as though it just happened. I sat there about five or seven minutes. Then I was told to go in. I announced myself. He said: 'Yes, I know. Sit down. My name is SHUBNYAKOV, Fedor Grigoryevich.' He told me he was the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate and that they had talked things over and decided. He said that they wanted to offer me a position in counterintelligence, in the First Department, the American

* NOSENKO had been told by his interrogator shortly before that KOBULOV had been stationed in Germany and not in Moscow.

Department... Then he asked /A. M./ GORBATENKO to come in. He was filling in for the Chief of the First Department... He took me to his office... Well, they decided to put me in the First /U. S. Embassy/ Section and called Yevgeniy KOZLOV, the Chief of the Section. He came in and said: 'Well, hello, Yuriy Ivanovich. I heard of you. Well, if you're finished with him, I'll take him along with me and show him around.' He took me and talked to me for a while and then told me to report... Either the 12th or the 17th. I don't remember."

15 April 1964: NOSENKO again described the KGB questionnaire and autobiographic forms he had filled out at home and recalled that he had also signed a secrecy agreement in the personnel office. He also remembered that he had made several additional phone calls to the KGB personnel office and described his second visit there to talk to ROZHENKO: "At the end of February I was told again to stop in the Pass Office and pick up a pass and go to the same floor, but another room. They told me I would have to talk to ROZHENKO today. He was a Chief of Section, of the Personnel Section. So we had a talk. It was the same thing again. He said: 'Tell me about yourself.' But he just wanted to look me over. And after that they said: 'All right, we have not gotten all your documents yet from your /military/ district. So wait.'"

26 April 1965: NOSENKO recounted his conversation with KOBULOV, saying that it took place at KOBULOV's dacha in Usov, where he and his parents were visiting in January 1953. NOSENKO continued: "I was called at my family's dacha in February. They said it was State Security calling and that I was to report. I did this on the next day. Probably I then reported to House No. 12. As officer talked to me about my education, service, and so on. Biographic questions. Then he gave me a blank for my autobiography and a four to six-page anketa (biographic form). I filled these out at home. The next day I called in and was told to come to the Eighth Entry. The officer came down, and I gave him the forms and photographs of myself. They said they would call me. I did nothing from January to March. January was leave. In February and March I was at GRU Personnel's disposal." After STALIN's funeral NOSENKO was summoned to KOBULOV's office. His assistant, SAVITSKIY, told NOSENKO to wait. After more than an hour had passed, SAVITSKIY sent him to SHUBNYAKOV's office. There he learned that he would be assigned to the U.S. Embassy Section and was introduced to the Chief of the American Department, GORBATENKO. The official order appointing NOSENKO was issued the same day, the 13th or 15th of March 1953.

24 April 1966 (signed autobiographical statement: Again NOSENKO said that he had spoken with KOBULOV at the KOBULOV dacha and set the date at 1 January 1953. The document continued as follows: "I saw KOBULOV for the second and last time on the day of STALIN's funeral in my father's office in the Ministry of Shipbuilding in March 1953. I had come from the sanitorium to Moscow and dropped in to see my father at work. In his office I ran into KOBULOV as they were gathering to go to the Dom Soyuzov for the funeral. KOBULOV said he would concern himself with the question of my entry into the KGB. The same day I returned to the sanitorium, and several days later, having completed my treatment, I returned to Moscow. In the middle of March, KOBULOV's assistant, Colonel SAVITSKIY,

called me at home and told me to come see KOBULOV. KOBULOV didn't see me and SAVITSKIY directed me to the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, Colonel SHUBNYAKOV... SHUBNYAKOV told me that an order had been signed appointing me a case officer in the First Section of the First Department, Second Chief Directorate. SHUBNYAKOV called the Chief of the First Department, Lieutenant Colonel GORBATENKO, and introduced me. Then I went to the First Department and was introduced to the Deputy Chief of the First Department and the Chief of the First Section, KOZLOV. KOZLOV said I would take over the cases of Senior Case Officer, Captain /Anatoliy/ TORMOZOV and suggested that I begin work the same day. I was accepted for work in the MVD in precisely this way. It is necessary to note that none of the workers of the MVD Personnel Administration spoke to me, either before or after the signing of the order assigning me to the Second Chief Directorate of the MVD."

C. To June 1955 (American Department)

1. Introduction

Depending upon which date he has given for entering the KGB, NOSENKO's first assignment in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, working on American correspondents living in Moscow, lasted for about six to eighteen months. From that job, he said, he moved in 1954 to operations against U.S. Military Attaches assigned to the Moscow Embassy, remaining in the same section until being transferred in June 1955. His activities, as NOSENKO described them, and pertinent collateral information on his targets while he was in the U.S. Embassy Section are reviewed below.

2. Operations Against Correspondents

On the day of his acceptance into the KGB, NOSENKO was taken directly to the offices of the U.S. Embassy Section. There he met the section chief, V.A. KOZLOV, who told NOSENKO that he would take over the work of the departing case officer, Captain Anatoliy TORMOZOV, in operations against American correspondents in Moscow.

a. KGB Files on SHAPIRO, GILMORE, SALISBURY and WHITNEY

When NOSENKO reported for work the following day, according to statements made on 8 April 1964, he found a desk in Room 615. "There were three other guys sitting there. At first I was running traces, and at the same time I was reading the files on journalists... I think there were seven files in all, and I didn't see any other." NOSENKO listed these files as those on Henry SHAPIRO, Eddy GILMORE (as well as one on GILMORE's wife SEREBRYAKOVA and her sister CHERNYSHEVA), Harrison SALISBURY and Thomas WHITNEY.*

During the 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKO identified SHAPIRO as an "old agent of ours." He said that WHITNEY "worked for us while he was in Moscow and gave us some material, but he refused to work for us when he left the country and would not contact us in the United States." GILMORE, NOSENKO said, was an active recruitment target in 1953 and 1954, but NOSENKO did not know whether he was recruited. Likewise, he did not know the status of SALISBURY as of 1953.

NOSENKO stressed that the files he was given to read during the early period of his KGB service were developmental files (delo formulyar) rather than the operational files of the agents. The developmental files were less sensitive, and from them "you would never be able to figure out whether he [the subject of the file] is an agent or not." NOSENKO explained that, once a person becomes an agent, another file is set up, and these agent

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* NOSENKO made clear that he was not the case officer responsible for the more important correspondents: "KOZLOV himself was working with them, the chief of the section himself--with SHAPIRO, with SHAPIRO's wife. I also know that KOZLOV was working with WHITNEY and with [Andrew J.] STEIGER... For each of these persons there was an operational file which I did not see." According to NOSENKO, he was in no way involved with STEIGER and Edmund STEVENS, both of whom were American correspondents recruited as agents by the KGB.

files were held by the chief of the section, KOZLOV. NOSENKO stated that he read the files on these seven persons "slowly and made some extracts for myself in my personal log--such things as notations of their dates of arrival, things I could not remember." He was also given the files on the agents surrounding these correspondents, their drivers, maids, and cooks.

b. Agents Reporting on Correspondents

NOSENKO said he was responsible for handling the agents who were reporting on SHAPIRO, WHITNEY, SALISBURY and the GILMOREs and met with them regularly to learn whether "anything was new, who did SHAPIRO meet, what might be interesting in his behavior, what might be suspicious in his behavior, who he is contacting, etc." He then reported to KOZLOV and would sometimes prepare a written report of his conversations with the agents. Asked to describe these meetings, NOSENKO replied: "Let us take the same case of SHAPIRO. I would meet drivers about three times a month or even two times. At the meeting I would ask the driver what was new in SHAPIRO's behavior since our last meeting, whether SHAPIRO had suspicious contacts with foreigners, about his meetings with Russians, were they conducted openly or, perhaps, was SHAPIRO walking behind the person he met. And then the man [agent] would begin his report. Of course, if he spots anything suspicious he calls immediately, and I would see him the next morning. Otherwise, I would tell him at the meeting that I would see him again in about ten days or in two weeks, but if there was something interesting he should call immediately. It was the same with the maid and the cook. Upon returning to the office I would have to report to KOZLOV about my meetings, either orally or in writing. If, for example, [V.M.] KOVSHUK [also of the U.S. Embassy Section] had a meeting with his agents, he too had to report immediately to KOZLOV or as soon as convenient to both. If the meetings were taking place late in the day and lasted until midnight or later and there were no written materials submitted at the meeting, I could go home and then report the next morning."

KOZLOV accompanied NOSENKO to meetings with the various agents surrounding the correspondents. "At first he was teaching me. Then he would go in cases when something interesting would begin to develop, even when it hadn't yet begun to develop but when there may have been a hint in a case of some other case officer."

NOSENKO's agent network consisted mainly of domestic and clerical personnel in contact with the correspondents and their families. Asked to describe them, he said on 15 April 1964: "My first agent was a woman agent, a cook, who was working at GILMORE's place. She also worked at the Associated Press later. Her codename was 'AGLODINA', a funny one. My second agent was a chauffeur whose codename, I think, was 'SERGEY'. I think he was driving WHITNEY. Then I also had SHAPIRO's chauffeur, a funny little fellow. In other words, charwomen, chauffeurs, this was my agentura [agent network]." Although NOSENKO was able to give a breakdown of this network in terms of the number and type of agents targetted against particular individuals, he had forgotten their true names and could not provide detailed personality information on any of them. He explained: "I don't remember now. They all passed by like a river because they were turned over often." NOSENKO did recall that it was he who selected and handled the agent who was placed in SHAPIRO's office as a secretary; this agent had earlier worked in the offices of Moscow News, an English-language newspaper published in Moscow.

He first identified GILMORE's cook, "AGLODINA," as Yelena S. KOSIENKO in the fall of 1965, while reviewing a list of Soviets employed by Americans in Moscow. He told CIA at that time that he had taken over KOSIENKO from TORMOZOV upon entering the U.S. Embassy Section in 1953, and that she subsequently worked for and reported on GILMORE's successor, Richard KASISCHKE. NOSENKO said that KOSIENKO "never provided any interesting information."

NOSENKO estimated that he was responsible for handling 10 to 12 agents in operations against the correspondents. This, he said, was a normal load, although more experienced case officers might have as many as 15. In April 1964 NOSENKO broke his agentura down as follows:

Target	Agents
Eddie GILMORE	Two agents, the cook and the driver; one operational contact, a part-time cleaning girl; and a girlfriend of GILMORE's sister-in-law, who reported on the sister-in-law and GILMORE's wife.
Thomas WHITNEY	One agent, his driver.
Henry SHAPIRO	Three agents, SHAPIRO's secretary and his cahuffeur, plus an old woman who was a relative of SHAPIRO's wife and lived with the SHAPIROs in Moscow. (The secretary and chauffeur later worked for Kenneth BRODNEY and reported on him to NOSENKO; BRODNEY temporarily took SHAPIRO's place in Moscow.)
Harrison SALISBURY	Two agents, SALISBURY's driver, "SERGEY" and a part-time cleaning girl.

NOSENKO classified two other of his agents as "neutral," in that they did not have specific targets on whom to report. The first of these was the director of MOSGRAN, a Russian-language training program for foreigners in Moscow. His cryptonym was "RAKETA," but NOSENKO could not recall his true name. The second, "VOLODINK," was a female teacher in this same program who instructed some of the correspondents, including BRODNEY, and Embassy employees in their homes; he could not recall the true name of "VOLODINK." When NOSENKO was relieved of his responsibility for the correspondents in 1954, he turned over all of his agents to other case officers in the U.S. Embassy Section with the exception of "RAKETA" and "VOLODINK," whom he continued to handle in his work with military attaches.

c. Information from Other Sources

SHAPIRO was identified as a KGB agent by GOLITSYN in 1961, before the lead was received from NOSENKO, and he had previously been suspected as such on the basis of his long stay in Moscow, his unusually good access to Soviet information sources, and his marriage to a Soviet national. SHAPIRO was mentioned as a KGB

agent by a cryptonym (known to NOSENKO and confirmed by GOLITSYN) appearing in the CHEREPANOV papers.*

The KGB defector Nikolay KHOKLOV had earlier identified the Polish-born wife of WHITNEY as a KGB agent, an allegation which she denied, and it had been long assumed that WHITNEY too had reached some sort of accommodation with the KGB because of this fact and because of the long duration of his tour as a correspondent in Moscow.

GILMORE also had been suspected by CIA before NOSENKO's information was received. He served in Moscow for 12 years, from 1941 to 1953, and is married to a Soviet national.

SALISBURY served two short tours, of about one year each, in Moscow during the 1950's. During the second of these, he became enamored with the Pole who was to become WHITNEY's wife (see above) and was during this period a subject of criticism by other American correspondents in Moscow for his pro-Soviet articles. When WHITNEY married the Pole shortly after STALIN's death, SALISBURY returned to the United States and his articles took on an anti-Soviet tone.

NOSENKO claimed no involvement with the other two American correspondents whom he identified as KGB agents, STEVENS and STEIGER, both the subjects of a considerable amount of derogatory information in CIA files. They are discussed in Part VI.D.2. under the heading of NOSENKO's American leads.

3. Operations Against Military Attache Personnel

Some time in the first half of 1954 NOSENKO was relieved of his responsibilities for the correspondent cases, and from then until his transfer from the American Department he handled KGB Second Chief Directorate operations against the officer personnel of the U.S. Military Attache's office. NOSENKO's account of the turnover of the correspondent files to his successor and of the acceptance of the attache files is presented below.

- 8 April 1964: "I took over the Military Attache cases from Nikolay KHRENOV... When I was leaving in 1955, I turned the attache files over to Valeriy BUDYLDIN."

- 10 April 1964: "I made a mistake... I said I accepted the cases from KHRENOV when I was taking on the Military Attache work. This is not right. KHRENOV was not working in the First (U.S. Embassy) Section; he was working in the First (American) Department. I took over the cases from--let's see, there was ZHUKOV and Vladimir Aleksandrovich CHURANOV, and here was my table (desk), and I accepted the cases from Pavel Fedorovich PANKRATOV. This was in the beginning of 1954."

- 15 April 1964: NOSENKO said that he thought he turned over the correspondent files to F.V. KISLITSYN (who returned to the USSR from Australia in May 1954). NOSENKO asked when the PETROV's defected in Australia; he explained that he was

* See Part V.D.7.c. for a detailed discussion of the CHEREPANOV Papers.

not sure about KISLITSYN and could have given them to another **officer.** "If KISLITSYN came [back from Australia] in 1953, then **it was to KISLITSYN.** Otherwise, it was someone else."

- **18 June 1964:** "KISLITSYN came into the First Section in **1954** and I gave him the files on American correspondents. BUDYL-**DIN** also joined the section this year and took the files on the **Army** Attache and his assistants from PANKRATOV. BUDYLDIN left later that year and turned those files over to me... Yuriy LEONTIYEV joined the section in 1955, and I gave him the files on the Army Attache and his assistants."

NOSENKO has also been indefinite as to the date he assumed responsibilities for the attaches. As noted above, he said on 10 April 1964 that he received the files in the beginning of 1954. He had earlier said that he worked on the correspondents "only about six months." If the date of March 1953, which he most often gave for his entry into the KGB, is correct this would place the turnover in the fall of 1953. On other occasions he has said specifically that he turned over the correspondent cases and began work against the attaches in January 1954, on still others that this occurred in May 1954. In February 1965, NOSENKO said that he could not remember when he changed assignments.

a. <u>Agents Reporting on Military Attaches</u>

Asked in April 1964 to describe the agent network (agentura) at his disposal in operations against U.S. Military Attaches during this period which began in 1954, NOSENKO replied: "There were two maids, a cook, drivers*... about ten persons, plus the agent 'SERVIZNIY' and the one with the code name 'DMITRIYEV'... These additional two agents, about 12 or 13 agents altogether." With one exception, this network remained constant until NOSENKO transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section in mid-1955. He met each agent about once a week, except for the chauffeurs who were met three times a month in a safehouse or on the street. According to NOSENKO, this network was "just a supporting agentura, which very seldom was worthwhile," the main source of information on the Military Attaches being the microphones in their offices.**

Newly added to the network while NOSENKO held this position was a maid inserted to report on Army Attache Earl L. MICKELSON and his successor, Fillmore K. MEARNS. Her name, NOSENKO thought, was NOVIKOVA. She was an English-speaking university graduate but "hid her knowledge of English in order to overhear conversations or read letters without taking them outside."

Besides NOVIKOVA, NOSENKO named one other maid who was his agent, Mariya NEVEROVA, code name "SHVEDOVA," and she was targetted against the Assistant Army Attache, Ira RICHARDS. He described NEVEROVA as a "little, old, thin woman," from whom he never obtained anything of interest. They met in a safehouse on Kuznetskiy Most.

Of the KGB agents among the chauffeurs, NOSENKO identified Nikolay SHNYRYEV, who was used by various of the attaches. "He reported where they went, what they said, whether they took notes or photographs, whether they had unusual packages with them, and so on."

When viewing photographs in September 1964, NOSENKO identified Vladislav VOROBYEV as the agent "SERVIZNIY." He had been working in the Embassy since its establishment, starting first as a messenger boy and, in NOSENKO's time, performing clerical tasks. VOROBYEV had no direct connection with the Military Attaches, and NOSENKO said he himself did not know why he had been given VOROBYEV to handle in 1954. The main function of this agent was delivering to NOSENKO copies of the unclassified telephone listings of the Embassy, issued monthly.

"DMITRIYEV's" true name may have been Dmitriy KUKOLEV: NOSENKO saw this name on a 1962 phone list and thought, but was not sure, that this was his agent. An electrician who worked on the Embassy's electrical wiring systems and elevator, "DMITRIYEV" reported to NOSENKO on antenna wires and

* The Military Attaches used a pool of five drivers at random, NOSENKO said. Apart from the permanent driver for the senior attache, none were targetted against individual members of the attache office.

** See Part V.E.3.g. on electronic operations against the U.S. Embassy.

other wires he had observed in the Embassy as well as on the security measures on the top floors. Like VOROBYEV, "DMITRIYEV" had no direct connection with the Military Attaches.

In September 1964 NOSENKO was shown a series of 260 biographic cards on Soviet citizens employed by the American Embassy in Moscow. Each card contained a photograph of the person involved and short biographic notes, including his name and job in the Embassy. The first time he went through these cards, NOSENKO was permitted to see only the photographs; NOSENKO did not identify the photographs of SHNYRYEV and KUKOLEV but said that the face of VOROBYEV was familiar, adding that he thought his name was VOROBYEV. When shown the biographic information on SHNYRYEV and KUKOLEV, he identified each of them as his agents during the 1954-1955 period in the American Department and equated them to the cryptonyms given previously. In the case of SHNYRYEV, when shown the biographic information, which listed SHNYRYEV as "chauffeur for the Military Attache," NOSENKO exclaimed: "Oh my God, this is my own agent." He later said it was a good photograph of SHNYRYEV.

b. <u>NOSENKO's Targets</u>

As the Second Chief Directorate case officer responsible for operations against American Military (Army) Attaches stationed in Moscow,* his main task was not to recruit them but rather was to prevent the attaches from collecting intelligence. He has used this statement about his main task (identical with that of other U.S. Embassy Section officers working against the Army and Navy Attaches) to support his claim that no U.S. Armed Forces Attaches were recruited by the KGB from 1953 until his defection in 1964. He has also said that this is one reason he knows relatively little about the personal backgrounds of his various targets during this period--the emphasis was on surveillance instead of development for recruitment purposes. Asked in February 1965 to list the Army Attache personnel for whom he was directly responsible during 1954 and 1955, NOSENKO gave the following names: "MICKELSON, MEARNS, RICHARDS, FELCHLIN, BENSON, MULE, STROUD, and CARDELLA."** His knowledge of the activities of these targets and of KGB action against them, coupled with information from other sources, is discussed in the following paragraphs.

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*Naval Attaches were handled by ZHUKOV during this period, NOSENKO said, while Air Attaches were initially handled by CHURANOV. When CHURANOV left the section in early 1954, he turned over the Air Attache files to PANKRATOV, who turned them over later in the year to KHRENOV.

**This is the order given by NOSENKO. The list comprises two generations of Army Attaches in Moscow and is neither in alphabetical order nor in terms of date of service in Moscow. It is, however, in descending order of rank from Colonel MICKELSON through Captain MULE to Chief Warrant Officer CARDELLA. Questioned about these officers in a different context, NOSENKO indicated knowledge of their ranks. Not mentioned by NOSENKO was George VAN LAETHEM, Assistant Army Attache in Moscow from August 1951 to August 1953 (prior to the time when NOSENKO said he was responsible for work against the military attache office). VAN LAETHEM returned to Moscow in 1955, however, and was attached to the Army Attache staff again from 19 March to 19 May 1955, during which time NOSENKO claimed he was still responsible for this group.

(i) MICKELSON

NOSENKO has identified Earl L. MICKELSON as a colonel and the Military Attache in Moscow during 1954 and 1955. PANKRATOV was the case officer originally handling MICKELSON, and the case was turned over to NOSENKO in 1954. When asked about agents who might have been working against MICKELSON, NOSENKO said that there was one cook, a KGB operational contact whose name he did not recall, and MICKELSON's maid, whose name NOSENKO believed was NOVIKOVA; the cook and NOVIKOVA went to work for MICKELSON after NOSENKO had left the U.S. Embassy Section. In addition to these two, the only other source reporting on MICKELSON was his chauffeur, whose name NOSENKO also did not remember. NOSENKO said that the KGB learned nothing interesting about MICKELSON from concealed microphones, telephone taps, or surveillance, and that no operational approach or recruitment was attempted. There was, in fact, no interesting or derogatory information on MICKELSON from any source.

According to information in CIA files, MICKELSON was involved in at least two incidents inside the Soviet Union which NOSENKO has not reported. In May 1954 he was arrested in Tbilisi on the (false) charge of having photographed a bridge, but he persuaded the Militia not to press charges. In August 1954 MICKELSON was arrested again for illegal photographs south of KHARKOV; on this occasion he was held for two hours before being released.

(ii) MEARNS

NOSENKO identified Fillmore K. MEARNS as MICKELSON's replacement and said that he was the responsible case officer. There were two agents and one operational contact working against MEARNS. Of these, NOSENKO could recall the name only of NOVIKOVA, the same maid who reported earlier on MICKELSON. Besides being told to attempt to overhear MICKELSON's conversations NOVIKOVA was instructed to search his clothing and to copy any notes she might find, but she never overheard or found anything of interest to the KGB. NOSENKO recalled that MEARNS' personal effects were searched by the KGB while they were being shipped to Moscow from the United States, and that all his service records had been discovered and photographed.* NOSENKO described MEARNS as being more "active" in Moscow than MICKELSON had been and said that information from concealed microphones showed him to have a strong character. Nothing of interest concerning him was received from these microphones or from telephone taps.

CIA has no derogatory or otherwise significant information on MEARNS, who replaced MICKELSON.

(iii) RICHARDS

NOSENKO identified Ira B. RICHARDS as a lieutenant colonel who served as the Assistant Army Attache in Moscow. NOSENKO said that he was the case officer working against

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*NOSENKO has told this same story about MICKELSON.

RICHARDS. The one agent reporting on RICHARDS whom NOSENKO could name was the maid Mariya NEVEROVA, KGB cryptonym "SHVEDOVA," but she had never provided any worthwhile information about RICHARDS. In addition, some Soviet drivers reported on RICHARDS, but nothing useful was obtained from them.

According to CIA records, RICHARDS served in Moscow from July 1954 to July 1956. There was a microphone in the office which he shared first with MICKELSON and later with MEARNS. RICHARDS confirmed that Mariya NEVEROVA was his maid and described her as a "mousy" woman who had a heart attack during the period she was employed by him. (This incident was not recalled by NOSENKO.) For about four months of his Moscow tour, RICHARDS took Russian-language lessons from Ludmila GROMAKOVA in his apartment. During these lessons, RICHARDS often discussed labor conditions and wages in the United States and, on one occasion, had her record her speech on his tape recorder. GROMAKOVA was pregnant and unmarried at the time. (NOSENKO has named GROMAKOVA as a KGB agent in another context but has not mentioned her contacts with RICHARDS.)* RICHARDS identified one "Volodya" (i.e., first name Vladimir) as his principal driver. About 62 years old in 1954, Volodya was the son of a rich jeweler in Moscow during the Revolution. Volodya himself was well educated and, on one occasion while picnicking outside Moscow, he spoke intelligently with RICHARDS about the Revolution, propaganda, and news media. (NOSENKO did not know of Volodya.) Further details from RICHARDS are given in the following section on FELCHLIN.

(iv) FELCHLIN

NOSENKO identified Howard L. FELCHLIN as a lieutenant colonel who served as Assistant Army Attache in Moscow and stated that he was FELCHLIN's case officer. FELCHLIN was in the Soviet Union during 1954 and part of 1955, until being declared persona non grata. NOSENKO did not recall the names of any agents specifically targetted against FELCHLIN, although he thought FELCHLIN must have had a maid and she would have been a KGB agent. Additionally, NOSENKO said, the Assistant Military Attaches shared a pool of cars and drivers, and these were his agents. Unable to recall the precise date of FELCHLIN's expulsion, NOSENKO related it to some event regarding Soviets stationed in the United States for which the Soviet Government decided to reply in kind. NOSENKO was imprecise as to the pretext used to expel FELCHLIN, but said the action was based on information which had been accumulated from a number of sources and incidents. For example, FELCHLIN had been caught taking some photographs and a report had been written; along with other similar indications of FELCHLIN's activities and reports of agents in contact with FELCHLIN, the report was filed away for possible future use. NOSENKO was questioned further on FELCHLIN during the February 1965 interrogations. He said then that FELCHLIN alone had been declared persona non grata, and that no other attaches had been involved. NOSENKO

* See Part V.E.3.d., which discusses coverage of John ABIDIAN, to whom she also taught Russian.

explained his having but few details concerning this action by the fact that it took place after NOSENKO had transferred from the American Department to the Tourist Department in June 1955. NOSENKO knew nothing of FELCHLIN's background.

Other sources have reported that FELCHLIN visited the USSR as a merchant seaman and a diplomatic courier before arriving in July 1953 as Army Attache. He served in the latter capacity for one year, until July 1954, when he was asked to leave the country. (He had previously served in Austria and West Germany and had been in official contact with known GRU officers at both posts, as well as in the United States.) During his entire tour in Moscow he was the subject of intensive KGB interest. Shortly after his arrival, in September 1953, FELCHLIN, with fellow Assistant Army Attache Martin J. MANHOFF, and two Air Force attaches took a train trip to Siberia, the first such trip permitted American attaches in many years. Six months later, on 25 March 1954, the Soviet newspaper Trud carried an article saying that FELCHLIN and his companions had lost some of their "spy documents" on the train. FELCHLIN said this charge was false. On another occasion, while travelling with a British Military Attache, FELCHLIN returned to his train compartment to find a scantily clad Soviet female in his bunk. (NOSENKO recalls neither of these incidents.) In June 1954, while in the company of Lieutenant Colonel F.J. YEAGER, an Assistant Army Attache, FELCHLIN was arrested in Kiev by a Soviet Army officer for photographing a military target. (NOSENKO has never mentioned YEAGER's name; when told the name and asked for an identification, NOSENKO said that he had heard it and that he thought YEAGER was the Air Force Attache.) A large crowd gathered and, after some jostling, FELCHLIN and YEAGER were taken to a Militia station where they were ordered to sign a confession. They were held eleven hours, and their arrest caused the American ambassador to deliver a strong protest note. FELCHLIN was told on 3 July 1954 that he had 48 hours to get out of the Soviet Union. No specific charges were mentioned. Major Walter A. McKINNEY, the U.S. Air Attache and one of FELCHLIN's travelling companions at the time the "spy notes" were allegedly lost, was declared *persona non grata* at the same time.*

Queried concerning SHNYRYEV, RICHARDS and FELCHLIN immediately recognized his photograph and name as one of the general chauffeurs assigned to the Office of the Military Attache at the Moscow Embassy; RICHARDS was taken on his first trip outside Moscow by SHNYRYEV. He remarked that the

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* Ambassador BOHLEN successfully insisted, against initial Soviet refusal, that his personal plane be allowed into the USSR to fly FELCHLIN and McKINNEY out. In February 1965 NOSENKO was asked to describe the unusual circumstances under which FELCHLIN left. NOSENKO said he could not, inasmuch as he was no longer in the American Department at the time. Told that the expulsion took place in 1954, NOSENKO said this was not the correct date.

attaches referred to SHNYRYEV as either "Nikolay Perviy" (Nicholas the First) or "Nikolay Vtoroy" (Nicholas the Second) to distinguish him from the other chauffeur with the same name. FELCHLIN said that SHNYRYEV drove primarily for the Military Attache himself, but sometimes drove for the Assistant Military Attaches, and he remembered that SHNYRYEV was not well, suffered from war wounds, and had continuing chest or lung trouble. (Asked whether SHNYRYEV had any medical problem, NOSENKO said he was not aware of any.)

FELCHLIN said his maid Dora FEDOROVA (not specifically named by NOSENKO) was in her 50's. When she spoke with FELCHLIN about a job, she asked for about 120 rubles a month, which seemed excessive, so FELCHLIN offered 80. FEDOROVA refused and left. Two days later she returned and accepted. She spoke little English. Other maids came to the back door of FELCHLIN's apartment to "chat" with her, and suspecting that they were reporting to FEDOROVA, FELCHLIN teased her about it. FEDOROVA's previous employer at the Embassy gave her full name to columnist Drew PEARSON with a statement that she was one of the chief spies and the local "boss" of the Embassy network. PEARSON printed the allegation. In the summer of 1953 or 1954, according to FELCHLIN, the maid approached FELCHLIN with the article, waved it in his face, and accused him of being PEARSON's source. (NOSENKO did not recognize FEDOROVA's name and did not recall hearing or reading of this incident.)

(v) BENSON

NOSENKO identified his target John S. BENSON as a major and Assistant Army Attache in Moscow. He did not recall the names of any agents working against BENSON but said that BENSON was with MULE and STROUD (see below) in Stalingrad in 1955 when all three were caught by the KGB with electronic "spying" devices. They were declared persona non grata. The KGB had no other derogatory information on BENSON from any other source.

(vi) STROUD

NOSENKO identified William R. STROUD as a captain and an Assistant Army Attache. The only agents working against him were the Military Attaches' drivers. From concealed microphones, the KGB Second Chief Directorate learned before STROUD's arrival in Moscow that he was an expert in the use of electronic spying apparatus. He was with BENSON and MULE in Stalingrad and was declared persona non grata along with them (see below). Other than this, NOSENKO said, the KGB knew nothing unusual or interesting about STROUD from any source.

CIA files show that STROUD was, with BENSON and MULE, the victim of the Soviets' seizure of technical equipment in Stalingrad and was declared persona non grata on 7 May 1955. On 31 January 1955 he travelled to Kharkov from Moscow with First Secretary Frank SISCOE to interview an American defector living there. (According to NOSENKO, SISCOE was suspected by the KGB of being a CIA officer; SISCOE was, in fact, a CIA cooptee.)

(vii) MULE

NOSENKO identified Walter MULE as an Assistant Army Attache and said that he was the case officer responsible for him. NOSENKO described an operational approach to MULE, in which he himself participated: In 1953 or 1954 there had been several defection approaches to Soviets in the United States on the basis of money and the promise of a new life. After the KGB Second Chief Directorate decided to try the same measures, MULE was selected because he was only a captain despite his lengthy service in the Army and because material from concealed microphones indicated that he was often disparaged by the other attaches. When MULE received letters from home, he threw them in the trash, and the maids turned these over to the KGB; from this mail it was understood that MULE did not have a house in the United States but lived with his family in a trailer. The father of two children, MULE had sent his wife from Moscow to Germeny for an abortion, as a third child would have imposed too great an economic burden. On the basis of all this the KGB appointed N.M. BORODIN, a recruiter of the American Department, to attempt to defect MULE. Together with BORODIN, KOVSHUK, and L.A. LEBEDEV (from the Second Chief Directorate's special technical section) NOSENKO travelled to Leningrad for the operation. LEBEDEV installed a clock containing a concealed camera as well as microphones in MULE's hotel room, and BORODIN entered the room to await MULE's return. When MULE started to enter the room, he caught sight of BORODIN and tried to back out, but NOSENKO and KOVSHUK closed the door from the hall and prevented his escape.* BORODIN reviewed for MULE the facts the KGB had accumulated about his lack of success in the Army, the disdain of his fellow attaches, and his shortage of money and then offered him a job as a "consultant." BORODIN had either $5,000 or $10,000 in an envelope to encourage MULE to accept. According to NOSENKO, MULE refused outright, telling BORODIN to get out, that he would not talk to him, and that he was a captain in the American Army.

CIA files show that MULE reported this incident. He said that he was locked in his hotel room and subjected to a recruitment attempt by an MVD agent calling himself Jack SIEGAL, who offered him $10,000 for "work" on a long-range basis.. SIEGAL emphasized that MULE would not be required to procure documents from the Embassy, and according to MULE, SIEGAL was aware of facts concerning MULE's personal life that could have been obtained only from listening devices in MULE's apartment or office. SIEGAL left after about 20 minutes, having warned MULE not to report the incident. MULE was unable to identify NOSENKO's photograph.

(viii) PNG of BENSON, MULE, and STROUD

After NOSENKO had been transferred to the Tourist Department in 1955, BENSON, MULE and STROUD were the targets of a KGB operation which resulted in all three men being

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*Precisely the same role was played by NOSENKO in the recruitment approach to James STORSBERG, according to NOSENKO. (See Part V.E.3.c.ii.)

declared persona non grata. NOSENKO gave the following account of this incident: For some time the Second Chief Directorate had been trying to acquire a small, convenient piece of electronic equipment which American Intelligence officers were known to be using during their travels inside the Soviet Union. As early as the beginning of 1954, the American Department had been given authorization from the Central Committee of the Communist Party to steal this equipment from the Americans, provided that the success of such an operation was assured. Before his transfer to the Tourist Department in 1955, NOSENKO himself had helped to develop plans for the operation and had even arranged an abortive attempt to steal the equipment from an attache at a railroad station outside Moscow. While BENSON, MULE, and STROUD were on one of their trips (after NOSENKO's transfer) it was learned that they had the equipment with them, and the KGB decided to take it from them in Stalingrad. To carry out the operation, Lieutenant General P.V. FEDOTOV, then Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, and A.M. GORBATENKO, Chief of the American Department, flew with other personnel from the American Department to Stalingrad. The hotel rooms of BENSON, STROUD and MULE were watched constantly from a visual observation post, and it was noted that they never ate in the hotel restaurant but always in their rooms. It was also noted that the apparatus was placed under a pillow before they began to eat. While they were seated at the table having dinner, therefore, the KGB officers suddenly entered the room and seized the equipment. In order to partially cover the illegality of this act, it was decided to make a show of expelling BENSON, MULE and STROUD from the Soviet Union, and this was done via the persona non grata action.

According to information from other sources, the equipment was seized from BENSON, MULE, and STROUD on 5 May 1955, and the three were declared persona non grata on 7 May (a month before NOSENKO claimed to have transferred to the Tourist Department).* When the 7 May date was given to NOSENKO during the February 1965 interrogations, he replied that the operation was handled at a higher level, that he did not directly participate in it, but that he had been involved in the earlier planning to seize the equipment. It was pointed out to him that he had always said he was in the Tourist Department at the time of this operation, and that he had consistently said that he transferred from the American to the Tourist Department in June 1955. NOSENKO shrugged, but offered no comment.

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*The [illegible] source Kaarlo R. TUOMI, who served in the United States as a GRU Illegal from 1958 to 1963, reported to CIA in 1964 that while working as a KGB informant in Kirov in the early 1950's, he was targetted against three U.S. Military Attaches travelling on a train. TUOMI believed that he might have contributed information leading to the three Americans (as he later read in the Soviet press) being declared persona non grata. It would appear that TUOMI's targets were BENSON, MULE, and STROUD.

(ix) CARDELLA

NOSENKO said that in 1954 and 1955 there was an administrative officer in the Embassy by the name of James CARDELLA. The KGB had no interesting or unusual information concerning CARDELLA from any source, and NOSENKO could say nothing more about him.

CIA files show that Chief Warrant Officer CARDELLA served in Moscow from September 1953 until June 1955. Other than the fact that a microphone was discovered in CARDELLA's Moscow Embassy office in 1964, no significant collateral information concerning him is available.

(x) VAN LAETHEM

NOSENKO identified George VAN LAETHEM as an Assistant Air Attache at the U.S. Embassy against whom an operation was attempted in 1953 or 1954. He said that during this period a Russian actress, Alla LARIONOVA, was placed on a train going from Berlin to Moscow with the mission of striking up an acquaintance with VAN LAETHEM which could be followed up in Moscow. She succeeded in meeting him and gave him her address and telephone number. Although she was certain that she would hear from him, he never did call her in Moscow. NOSENKO said that he had heard about this from P.F. PANKRATOV, the case officer handling LARIONOVA. He added that CHURANOV was the case officer responsible for VAN LAETHEM, as he was for all members of the Air Attache's office at that time. NOSENKO knew of no other interest or activity concerning VAN LAETHEM.

CIA records show that VAN LAETHEM was not an Assistant Air Attache but an Assistant Army Attache, serving in Moscow from March 1951 to March 1953.* As cryptographic security officer and officer in charge of the Embassy code room, he had supervisory responsibility for the military code clerks and mechanics, including Dayle SMITH, and he was on fairly close personal terms with Sergeant Roy RHODES until the latter's departure from Moscow in January 1953; VAN LAETHEM's duties also carried responsibility for sensitive electronic activities in the Embassy.** He was again in Moscow from 19 March to 19 May 1955 (at a time when NOSENKO claims to have been the KGB case officer for U.S. Army Attaches). Although this trip was always intended to be only a TDY, it was represented to the Soviets as a PCS Assistant Army Attache assignment because of the extremely sensitive nature of his business there. He was project officer for the entire electronics program at the Embassy, and went to Moscow to review the operations including the planned use of the new electronic equipment which was seized from BENSON, MULE, and STROUD in Stalingrad in May 1955 (see above).

* Although VAN LAETHEM completed his two-year tour in Moscow in March 1953, just at the time NOSENKO said he entered the KGB, he was succeeded in his post by Walter MULE, for whom NOSENKO has claimed full responsibility. Thus, the fact of his position as Assistant Army Attache and MULE's predecessor would presumably be available to NOSENKO.

** Each time NOSENKO gave CIA the story of the recruitment of "ANDREY" in the June 1962 meetings, he related it to Roy RHODES. Each reference to Roy RHODES was followed by a statement that it was through RHODES that the KGB learned of the existence of special electronic equipment in the U.S. Embassy. RHODES had no access to such information.

D. June 1955 to January 1960 (Tourist Department)

1. Introduction

By his account NOSENKO served in the American-Canadian-British Section of the Tourist Department,* KGB Second Chief Directorate, from June 1955 (shortly after the department was created to operate with and against foreign travellers in the USSR) until his transfer to another department in that directorate in January 1960. He was a case officer until appointed Deputy Chief of the Section about June 1958. In statements made prior to April 1966, NOSENKO claimed to have been twice promoted during this four and one-half year period--to captain in July 1956 and to major in August or September 1959--but in a signed statement of April 1966 he said he remained a captain from 1956 until his defection.

NOSENKO has described his personal and direct participation in the section's activities as consisting of:

-Recruitment of two Soviet nationals as homosexual agents,** with NOSENKO their handler from the outset until they were dropped in 1962 or 1963.

-Recruitment and handling of Soviets as agents targetted against American tourists; their number varied from eight to 14 and many were employed by Inturist.

-Operations involving 14 foreigners who visited the USSR for various lengths of time.

-Recruitment and handling of the American Express Company representative in Moscow, whom NOSENKO continued to meet following his reassignment in January 1960.

-Decision in October 1959 that Lee Harvey OSWALD was of no operational interest to the KGB, and subsequent participation in the KGB investigation of OSWALD's activities in the USSR.

Each of these categories is discussed separately below.

2. Soviet Homosexual Agents

Because he had been seen meeting a foreigner in a public lavatory in Moscow, NOSENKO said, the KGB concluded that A.I. VOLKOV might be a homosexual and hence of some operational value. The KGB therefore mounted an operation which verified this possibility in 1957: A homosexual agent of the Moscow Criminal Investigations Department provoked VOLKOV into a compromising situation. Then VOLKOV, who had previously been a KGB agent but was at this time deactivated, was called to KGB Headquarters where, after NOSENKO interrogated him, he admitted his homosexuality and agreed to

*These components are also known as the First Section and Seventh Department, respectively.

**This term refers to agents whose homosexuality is exploited by the KGB against certain male targets.

NOSENKO's proposal to work for the KGB among homosexuals. VOLKOV helped NOSENKO the following year to recruit a homosexual acquaintance, Aleksey (patronymic not recalled) YEFREMOV. The two agents subsequently worked as a team against foreigners under NOSENKO's direction; in addition to specific targets, they had the general assignment of associating with foreign visitors in Moscow for the purpose of spotting possible homosexuals. NOSENKO described on 12 June 1962 his use of these agents: "Although I am a chief of section there I have all sorts of agents. I have a good agent apparatus. I have beautiful girls, beautiful girls, whom I can use as I like--anything you want. I have homosexuals, pederasts, and, in particular, I have one special pair. I am afraid they are known to both you and the British. I permitted this pair to work in general [without specific assignments]. I send them out to look on their own. I give them money and tell them to go out. 'Stroll about. Here are theater tickets. Look around, but only Americans. Look for American pederasts.' They are a couple, that is, they love each other. They are able to do anything desired, either active or passive, anything. They call me at night: 'Yuriy Ivanovich. There is a mister so-and-so here. He wants to go to bed with us.'' I say: 'Well, let him. We'll talk about it tomorrow.' So the next day they go to a special hotel room. We make photographs. Then we think about what he represents. Is he worth it? Then, as Chief, I recommend that he be recruited or not--depending on his position, what he can give, what he can tell. If he can give something, I say: 'Well, let's have a go [igrat']. After this, I speak to these boys: 'Well, go to bed with him again, one or both of you, as you wish. Do whatever is wanted.' All this is seen [observed by the KGB]. The [hotel] administrator enters. 'What are you doing?' The administrator calls the Militia. An akt is drawn up. 'Well, you are a foreigner. This is not our business. We don't know what to do with you.' Then the Chief arrives: 'What's up. Aha, I see.' Well, then a conversation begins: 'Listen, what shall we do? Pederasty is punishable by three to five years and now, on the basis of recent legislation, by up to eight. Understand, if your friends find out that you are a pederast--and how can they help but find out?..."

When NOSENKO moved from the Tourist Department to the Second Chief Directorate's American Department in January 1960, he took VOLKOV and YEFREMOV with him. They were never used against targets in the U.S. Embassy, but, NOSENKO said, the Tourist Department "used to call me on homosexual prospects." VOLKOV and YEFREMOV continued as active KGB agents until some time in 1960 or 1961, after which they could not be used further since they had become too well known, and NOSENKO finally retired their files to KGB archives in 1962 or 1963. The last operation in which these two agents participated was during January 1962.

During interrogation on these agents, NOSENKO has been unable to tell where they lived in Moscow, their family situation, or other such details. He said that he never met either in a safehouse (always on the street) and never met either of them alone, without the other being present.

NOSENKO has described eleven KGB approaches to Americans based on compromising evidence obtained with the assistance of VOLKOV and/or YEFREMOV and several other cases in which Americans were suspected of being homosexuals on the basis of the evaluation of these two. Additionally, CIA records indicate that at least six Americans, not reported on by NOSENKO, have had contacts with one or both of these agents in Moscow. Of these six, three were CIA agents, one a U.S. graduate student, another a psychiatrist visiting Soviet institutions, and the last Charles W. THAYER, the well-known diplomat and author. With one or possibly two exceptions, all the contacts of VOLKOV and YEFREMOV reported by NOSENKO or other sources took place during the period from April to November 1959. The known exception was the KGB approach to W.E. JOHNSON in January 1962;* the possible exception was the contact with the American psychiatrist, which took place in 1959 or early 1960 but cannot be dated precisely. Finally, NOSENKO has described the contacts between VOLKOV, YEFREMOV, and the American Robert BARRETT in the summer of 1959 but does not know of their contacts in the summer of 1961, shortly before BARRETT was approached on the basis of compromising information obtained in 1959.**

3. Other Soviet Agents

The Tourist Department, just established when NOSENKO was transferred to it in mid-1955, had no agent network for operations against American and British tourists. Consequently, NOSENKO said, he and the other case officers had to "start from the beginning."

As a first step, NOSENKO was introduced by a fellow officer to a number of "trusted persons" in Inturist; these were not agents, he explained, but "just persons known to the KGB so that a KGB man could approach one of them with questions about somebody or something." NOSENKO began to collect information on these individuals and others with the aim of formalizing their recruitment; by the end of 1955, he estimated, he had a network of about eight agents, all of them Inturist interpreters. During the following four years, the number of agents whom NOSENKO handled varied: Agents would be transferred from one case officer to another, some would leave Inturist, and "things were sort of changing all the time, back and forth." In 1956, NOSENKO said, he had about ten agents, in 1957 there were about 12, in 1958 about eight, and at the end of 1959 (when he was preparing to return to the American Department) he had approximately 12 to 14. NOSENKO has provided information on five of these agents, all of whom he says he recruited from within Inturist during 1955. These were:

-Larissa SOBOROVA: An Inturist interpreter and one of the first Inturist agents recruited by NOSENKO. SOBOROVA was NOSENKO's agent until 1959 (when she married and retired) and reported to him on all foreigners with whom she worked as an interpreter. She worked with NOSENKO in the operation

*See Part V.F.4

**See Part V.D.4.m.

against [redacted] in the summer of 1957.* NOSENKO reported specifically on her possible sexual involvement with two other tourists, one American and the other British, during 1957-1959. NOSENKO mentioned at one point that he "even told Larissa about his last name."

- Vladimir MUROMTSEV: KGB cryptonym "LEBEDEV," recruited in 1955. (NOSENKO has also said that MUROMTSEV had been a Second Chief Directorate agent "since 1958.") MUROMTSEV was called into the Army in about 1959 and was sent to some Soviet Air Force academy in Central Asia, where he worked as an interpreter for Syrian students studying there. During this period, his file was held by the local KGB in Central Asia. Later he returned to Moscow and was reactivated by the Second Chief Directorate.

- Nikolay ROGOV: KGB cryptonym "Ozero," recruited in 1955. ROGOV had formerly been a "confidential contact" of the KGB. He worked in the central office of Inturist which assigned interpreters to British and American citizens visiting the Soviet Union.

- Natalya SHULGINA: Recruited by NOSENKO in 1955, an Inturist interpreter. Shown SHULGINA's photograph on 6 February 1964, NOSENKO failed to recognize it; when he was given her name, however, he said that this was a Second Chief Directorate agent on whom Boris BELITSKIY had reported to CIA.** NOSENKO's only other statement on SHULGINA was made on 17 April 1964, when discussing the agents he acquired in 1955. He said: "So, for example, I had this SOBOROVA, then I had MUROMTSEV. I recruited him. Who else? Natalya SHULGINA, KUNGAROVA. Well, anyway, during this short period, during 1955 until the end of '55, I had about eight people, all of them translators from Inturist." NOSENKO therefore said he handled SHULGINA and implied that he recruited her. (Information from other sources indicates that SHULGINA worked for two years as secretary/interpreter for the NBC correspondent in Moscow, Irving R. LEVINE, who arrived in the Soviet Union in July 1955. Although there is no evidence that SHULGINA was directly involved, the KGB attempted to recruit LEVINE in November 1955. She has travelled abroad twice, the first time to Paris in 1956 and the second time as an interpreter at the Brussels Fair in the summer of 1958. As NOSENKO indicated, BELITSKIY reported on SHULGINA, who he said was a close friend. BELITSKIY said that she was directly involved, probably as the principal, in a sexual entrapment operation, in the recruitment of a member of the British Parliament. BELITSKIY reported to CIA on SHULGINA in October 1962; NOSENKO said his last connection with the BELITSKIY case was in Geneva in the spring of 1962.)

- Tamara KUNGAROVA: Inturist interpreter recruited in 1955 (according to NOSENKO's statement in April 1964 - see above on SHULGINA). In October 1964, NOSENKO said she was transferred as an agent to the Tourist Department by the British

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* [redacted] are discussed in Part V.D.4.d.

**NOSENKO reported in 1962 that the KGB controlled BELITSKIY, a source of CIA (see Part VI.D.6.).

Commonwealth Department in 1957 or the beginning of 1958. In 1957 or 1959 she was involved in a sexual compromise operation against an American professor, which did not reach the point of a recruitment approach. Between 1957 or 1958 and 1960 she was working against an American tourist named Philip NIELSEN who was suspected of connection with CIA and who was under study for recruitment by the KGB.* KUNGAROVA later married NIELSEN and the two lived in England. The KGB was still interested in NIELSEN at the time NOSENKO left the Tourist Department, but NOSENKO believed there was no recruitment. Mrs. NIELSEN died in 1965.

Besides those in Inturist, NOSENKO has named several other agents whom he recruited or was given while in the Tourist Department. These included the following:

-Aleksey A. DMITRIYEV: KGB cryptonym "TOMO," a candidate member of the Academy of Sciences USSR and a specialist on Japan and Thailand. DMITRIYEV speaks Japanese and English and worked at the Japanese exhibition in Moscow. NOSENKO did not indicate how DMITRIYEV was used operationally or how he was connected with the American-Canadian-British target.

-(fnu) IVANOV: A lawyer employed by the Institute of Foreign Trade in Moscow. NOSENKO did not personally recruit this agent. IVANOV moved to Moscow from the Baltic area and his previous handlers there notified the Center, suggesting that the agent might be of use in the capital. NOSENKO contacted IVANOV and later turned him over to the British Commonwealth Department of the Second Chief Directorate which, NOSENKO believed, "planted him in the British Trade Mission or something like that."

-Marina RYTOVA: KGB cryptonym "KRYMOVA," born about 1923 or 1924 and educated at the Military Institute of Foreign Languages, a special school which also had Communist students from foreign countries. There she studied military subjects as well as foreign languages. She speaks English and Greek well. NOSENKO could not recall who recruited her, but she was turned over to him by I.A. KONSTANTINOV, a Tourist Department case officer, in 1956 or 1957. At that time she was working as an interpreter at the Russian Permanent Exhibit in Moscow and continued in this job until about 1960, when she became an instructor in the Greek language school of the Institute of International Relations. She reported to NOSENKO any information which she obtained on foreign delegates or foreign tourists who visited the Exhibit in Moscow. As she was often invited by the Ministry of Agriculture to interpret during meetings between Soviet officials and delegates from America, England,, and Greece, she also reported this information to NOSENKO. RYTOVA served several times as an interpreter for KHRUSHCHEV and once participated in a conversation he had with Iowa farmer GARST. In 1959 or 1960 she was sent as interpreter with a small delegation which visited GARST's farm in the United States and was used by the KGB Legal Residency in Washington,

*NIELSEN was, in fact, in contact with CIA at the time (see Part VI.D.2.).

D.C., to report on observations enroute and while there. RYTOVA is married to a man who works in one of the military offices in Moscow and is a captain or a major. They have one daughter, approximately 14 years old.

-Yevgeniya ("Jane") DANKO: KGB cryptonym "OKSANA." She worked in the American Express Company office in Moscow for Arsens FRIPPEL and later for FRIPPEL's successor, Michael JELISAVCIC.* DANKO was handled by I.A. KONSTANTINOV from about 1955 to 1957 and was then turned over to NOSENKO. She reported on JELISAVCIC, who was not approached, according to NOSENKO.

4. Operations with Foreign Visitors

NOSENKO said he participated in 14 operations with foreign visitors to the USSR while a member of the American-Canadian Section of the Tourist Department. Nine of these operations resulted in recruitments (excluding one who later was recruited by another element of the KGB, but including another whom NOSENKO classified as a borderline case). Of the remaining five operations which did not end with a recruitment, no approach was contemplated by the KGB in one case, one target rejected NOSENKO's proposal, the KGB was unable to obtain compromising material for an approach to a third, and for political reasons the KGB decided against approaching the final two.

Although the information from NOSENKO on the timing of these operations does not always agree with that from other sources, these cases can be grouped chronologically as follows: 1955 - one; 1956 - one; 1957 - three; 1958 - two; and 1959 - seven. The operations in 1955, 1956 and, with one exception, 1959 were homosexual provocations. The recruitment of Arsene FRIPPEL in 1959 was based on heterosexual compromise.

These fourteen operations are summarized briefly below in the approximate order in which the cases began. For each case, NOSENKO's information is followed by a summary of the results of CIA investigations. The description of the BURGI case is more detailed than the others, for reasons indicated in the text.

a. Attempted Entrapment of MALIA (1955)

NOSENKO's Information: Martin MALIA, a graduate student, spent about four months in the USSR in 1955 and was suspected of having connections with American Intelligence. Toward the end of his stay, while under surveillance, MALIA was observed in contact with a Soviet citizen believed to be a homosexual. The Soviet was detained by the KGB, and NOSENKO eventually obtained a confession that he had had homosexual relations with MALIA. After NOSENKO had arranged for the Soviet to introduce MALIA to a KGB homosexual agent, the latter enticed MALIA to a specially equipped hotel room in Moscow; NOSENKO was on the scene (but not directly in touch with MALIA) when the introductions were made in a

*See Part V.D.5. for further details on FRIPPEL and JELISAVCIC.

Moscow restaurant, and from an observation point in a neighboring hotel room he watched the KGB agent and MALIA having relations. With MALIA insisting on the lights being turned off, however, it was impossible to obtain compromising photographs (the KGB did not yet have infra-red photographic equipment, NOSENKO said) and therefore no recruitment approach was made to MALIA. During this and a later trip to Moscow in 1961, MALIA was "very cautious," and the KGB never again succeeded in exploiting MALIA's homosexuality for a recruitment approach.

Investigation Results: MALIA, a U.S. Navy intelligence officer during World War II, has visited the Soviet Union in 1955 and twice in 1962. While buying books for the Library of Congress and several universities in 1955, MALIA travelled over 10,000 miles throughout the USSR, which was sufficiently unusual at the time to attract press publicity. In 1955 and 1962 he had contacts with dissident Soviet citizens and clandestinely brought to the West literature for publishing abroad. In December 1963 MALIA was the subject of an attack in the Soviet press which charged that during 1962 he had "spent his time in Moscow looking for dissension in the ranks of young intellectuals at drunken debauches." MALIA had been in periodic contact with CIA in recent years; in the spring of 1963 he claimed to have had no involvements with blackmarketeers, homosexuals, or females inside the Soviet Union at any time. He made a similar statement to [illegible] in October 1963. MALIA has not been interviewed in connection with NOSENKO's information about him.

b. Recruitment of BURGI (1956)

NOSENKO's Information: At the first meeting in 1962 and despite his stated fear for his own security and his determination to discuss only the two leads he wished to sell CIA, NOSENKO described his recruitment of Yale Professor Richard BURGI on the basis of a homosexual provocation operation which began in Moscow and culminated with an approach in Kiev in June 1956. NOSENKO reported that he received a letter of commendation (blagodarnost') and a bonus of one month's pay for this recruitment, but in 1966 he retracted this claim. The BURGI case was the first operation in which NOSENKO had direct contact with a foreign target of the KGB, and NOSENKO said he counted it as a turning point in his personal and professional life: It was with this successful operation, NOSENKO stated, that he "began to grow" from a spoiled playboy into a responsible and effective counterintelligence officer. The BURGI operation was the first recruitment carried out by the Tourist Department after it was created in 1955, according to NOSENKO. In 1964 NOSENKO reported for the first time that his superior, A.S. KOZLOV, Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, had also taken part in this operation, but that he, NOSENKO, was the responsible case officer. In August 1965, when asked who had recruited BURGI, NOSENKO replied: "KOZLOV and NOSENKO." Asked who recruited him first, NOSENKO said: "KOZLOV, naturally. He was the Deputy Chief of the Department. The collection of the materials [in preparation for the approach] was in the hands of Case Officer NOSENKO." Because of the personal and general significance ascribed to this operation by NOSENKO, it is discussed in detail here:

In August 1965 NOSENKO reported that at the time of BURGI's arrival in the USSR, his file contained a copy of his visa application (anketa), "maybe" an excerpt from a cable sent by the Soviet Embassy in the United States saying that a visa had been granted, a routine note from Inturist giving BURGI's anticipated date of arrival and his itinerary inside the Soviet Union, and the results of traces of the general KGB Archives and of the First Chief Directorate Archives. NOSENKO himself ran the traces, which proved to be negative; there was no information on record concerning BURGI, and since no other names were mentioned in the material available on BURGI, no other traces were made. The KGB interest in BURGI derived exclusively from the fact that he was a professor of Slavic studies and therefore had contact with students who might some day work for the U.S. State Department, American Intelligence, and other target organizations. NOSENKO did not recall who first suggested an attempt to recruit him.

When BURGI arrived in the Soviet Union, he came in contact with a number of KGB agents, and their reports were placed in the unofficial file maintained by NOSENKO.* NOSENKO could not recall in 1965 how many such agents there may have been, their names, or what they might have reported concerning BURGI. (BURGI had an Inturist interpreter but NOSENKO did not know whether he was a KGB agent.) From some source, name forgotten by NOSENKO, the KGB obtained indications that BURGI was a homosexual, and it was decided to try to obtain the grounds for recruitment by homosexual compromise. NOSENKO therefore approached Yu.A. LOPUKHOV, an officer of the British Department who handled the homosexual agent Viktor BELANOVSKIY, and asked permission to use his agent in setting up the compromise. After permission had been received to mount an operation on this basis, LOPUKHOV and NOSENKO met with BELANOVSKIY and instructed him to make BURGI's acquaintance in a hotel dining room. The compromise proceeded according to plan: BELANOVSKIY met BURGI, the fact of mutual homosexuality was recognized, and BURGI was invited to BELANOVSKIY's hotel room where homosexual acts took place and photographs were made. NOSENKO was in the adjoining room and directed the compromise. He did not meet BURGI at this point, however.

As the result of NOSENKO's special request, the compromising photographs were ready by the following day. A report of the compromise and a request for permission to attempt recruitment were then submitted to NOSENKO's superiors. The request came back with the approving signatures of O.M. GRIBANOV and A.S. FEKLISOV, the Chief of the American Department of the First Chief Directorate, which had expressed interest in using BURGI in the United States. BURGI's itinerary called for him to fly from Moscow to Kiev a short while after this episode and, having called the Kiev KGB with instructions, NOSENKO and KOZLOV flew there the day before to prepare the operation. BURGI arrived the next morning and was met at the airport by (fnu) KHODAKOVSKIY, an officer of the Second Directorate in Kiev who operated under Inturist

*NOSENKO explained that no official files were kept on tourists until 1960--only "collections of materials."

cover. NOSENKO was unable to recall how the car was acquired, whether it was a KGB or Inturist vehicle, who the driver was, whether he was in the employ of the local KGB, or other details.

In accordance with the operational plan, the local KGB officer told BURGI enroute to the city that all the hotels in Kiev were full at the moment because of various conferences, but that Inturist had arranged for him to stay for about a day in a private apartment in the center of town; he would be moved to a hotel as soon as possible. When the car arrived at the apartment building on Kreshchatik Ulitsa in Kiev, NOSENKO, KOZLOV, V.S. PETRENKO, a local KGB officer, and (fnu) KASTYKAITE, a woman housekeeper, were waiting for them. NOSENKO could not remember how or whether he introduced himself to BURGI. The recruitment conversation, he said, was handled by "KOZLOV-NOSENKO," but NOSENKO had forgotten by 1965 who said what: "I don't remember what I talked about and I don't remember what KOZLOV talked about. Many things were discussed. It started with how he liked his stay in the Soviet Union... Then we slowly proceeded to say how unfortunate it was that information had been received about his conduct in Moscow. We told him that his homosexual activities were known, that this was punishable under Soviet law according to article so-and-so of the criminal code, etc., that he was not a diplomat, had no diplomatic immunity, that he could be taken to court according to the Soviet law... Well, he was scared, confused, upset, and felt uncomfortable. Then we slowly proceeded to say that all that could be smoothed out, but, you understand, the basis was prepared for the man to say: 'All right, I agree to help.'... We showed him the pictures. He was embarrassed of course--he was naked. Then we prepared the basis: 'You have a noble task. You teach; you have students; the students might become future specialists on Russia or might work as diplomats, etc., but many of these students could be used by intelligence. They might be sent somewhere with special tasks. Maybe you will tell us who among the students is preparing for government service, how they are distributed, etc.'... During the first conversation everything was made completely clear... He was not at all willing to help or work for Soviet Intelligence. He was told that he must understand that in this case 'helping Soviet Intelligence' was a very broad term. I remember that I told him: 'Understand, nobody is going to ask you that you help our friends over there, or me, if I should be there, or that you do anything bad or conduct any kind of subversive activities, that you organize explosions or murder.' After the Soviet Union, he was supposed to go to Italy, to visit the Russicum of the Vatican, and here KOZLOV grabbed the subject and began to ask questions about this school. He told us a bit about the Russicum and we asked him to write about it and he wrote down some names of the professors who teach Russian subjects..." According to NOSENKO, the discussion lasted about five hours; at its end, BURGI signed a short statement that he agreed "to assist the organs of Soviet Intelligence." NOSENKO first said that it was he who took this statement from BURGI but later said he could not remember whether he or KOZLOV did this. BURGI was then taken to a hotel.

This was the first time NOSENKO met BURGI. Following the recruitment, he moved into the same hotel, a floor above BURGI, and for the remainder of BURGI's stay in Kiev became his constant companion and guide. An attempt was made "to smooth out all the dirty business that had been brought up during the recruitment talk." NOSENKO took BURGI to an old cathedral in Kiev; with KOZLOV and PETRENKO they visited a kolkhoz and the writer SHEVCHENKO's grave in nearby Kaniv. The subject of homosexuality was not raised again. From Kiev, BURGI went directly to the West, without returning to Moscow. Before the approach, NOSENKO had visited the American Department of the First Chief Directorate and had arranged with its chief, FEKLISOV, for a recontact plan in New York City should BURGI be recruited. Before he left BURGI was briefed on these arrangements, which called for a first meeting in the New York Public Library. BURGI was given a recognition signal and a KGB cryptonym, but the latter was not discussed with him.

About five days after returning to Moscow, NOSENKO turned over all his materials on the BURGI operation to the First Chief Directorate. Somewhat later Sergey GUSKOV, Chief of the American-Canadian-British Tourist Section, KOZLOV, and NOSENKO visited FEKLISOV in the First Chief Directorate and expressed an interest in further developments in the case. FEKLISOV told them that BURGI had arrived for his first meeting, but the KGB had not established contact; the first meeting in New York City took place the second or third time BURGI appeared and the New York Legal Residency continued to meet with him until the Revolution in Hungary in late 1956. NOSENKO later heard from someone in the American Department, First Chief Directorate that the case was closed. For their roles in this first recruitment of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO said in 1965, he and KOZLOV received letters of commendation and bonuses of one month's pay by order of KGB Chairman SEROV; PETRENKO was given a letter of commendation and half a month's salary; and even RASTYKAITE, the housekeeper, got a commendation. In October 1966, however, NOSENKO said his only KGB award was for his longevity of service.

Investigation Results: BURGI was first interviewed on 22 November 1957 concerning his recruitment by the KGB. [illegible]

[illegible]

* In August 1965, NOSENKO denied meeting [illegible] in Moscow.

[illegible]

BURSI then continued to describe the remainder of his stay in Kiev (generally agreeing with NOSENKO's account).

[illegible]

c. Approach to [redacted] (1957)

NOSENKO's information: NOSENKO made an unsuccessful recruitment approach in 1957 to [redacted], [redacted] on the basis of [redacted] interest in continuing his commercial activities in the USSR. Originally the responsible case officer had been A.I. VERENIKIN of the Sixth Section of the Tourist Department; this section was then responsible for operations against foreign seamen. Since VERENIKIN spoke no German and [redacted] was known to speak English, NOSENKO was selected to make the approach because he "knew English a little." When asked why a German-speaking KGB case officer was not used, NOSENKO answered: "The higher-ups said 'go work on this case,' and that was all." After being rebuffed by [redacted] NOSENKO saw him several more times during the 1957 visit to Moscow, but when NOSENKO attempted to renew contact upon [redacted] return to the Soviet Union in 1958, the latter refused to see him.

Investigation Results: [redacted] was interviewed by CIA on 19 July 1965, and, while generally uncooperative, described a "mild approach" in Moscow during 1956 or 1957 which may be the one described by NOSENKO. (He was not questioned on the identities of the Soviets involved.)

[redacted] continues to have extensive business contacts with Soviet commercial representatives in West Germany and was recently reported to have negotiated a sizable shipping contract with the Soviet Union shortly after a visit to the USSR. His principal contact at [redacted]

d. [illegible]

[illegible]

e. Recruitment of (fnu) [redacted] (1957)

NOSENKO's Information: In 1957 or 1958 [redacted] visited the Soviet Union and an attempt was made to recruit him. A Second Chief Directorate officer, N.A. ARKHIPOV, made [redacted] acquaintance and handled the entire operation against him, but NOSENKO himself played a role. It had somehow been determined that [redacted] had a fondness for girls. NOSENKO therefore presented himself to him, using the name "SMIRNOV" or "SERGEYEV" and posing as a painter, and told [redacted] that he could find women for him. A party was arranged, with a KGB agent as [redacted]

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*See Part V.D.8 for more discussion of this point.

**This incident is described more fully in Part III.A.

date and a Second Chief Directorate secretary as NOSENKO's. Late in the evening NOSENKO and his date excused themselves, and had sexual relations with the female agent. Photographs of the scene were taken by the KGB. When NOSENKO and saw one another the next day, announced that he had some articles, cameras and the like, that he want to sell on the black market. NOSENKO offered to arrange the sale and took to a dingy section of Moscow. As they arrived before a small house, NOSENKO asked to give him the things to be sold. At this moment a KGB officer posing as a militiaman approached and arrested the two for blackmarketeering. At the Militia station, was recruited by K.N. DUBAS, then Chief of the Tourist Department, under threat of imprisonment. (It was DUBAS who had had the photographs taken the previous evening.) There was no further contact with after he left the USSR, however, because on his return to Oslo he published an article in which he described his experiences, "but not all of them."

Investigation Results:

f. Recruitment of HARRIS (1958)

NOSENKO's Information: NOSENKO in 1958 recruited Gisella HARRIS, an employee of the American Express Company in Salt Lake City, based on her romantic and sexual involvement with a Soviet citizen. The Soviet told HARRIS that he was in trouble with Soviet authorities and persuaded her to accompany him to the police. HARRIS agreed to meet and cooperate with the Soviets if they established contact with her in Salt Lake City, but the case was turned over to the First Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO was unaware of any further contact with her.

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g. Compromise of KRAFT (1958)

NOSENKO's Information: Virgil KRAFT, a clergyman from the Chicago area, visited the Soviet Union as a tourist in 1957 or 1958, and NOSENKO was assigned to be the responsible case officer. During an earlier trip to the USSR, the KGB had learned, KRAFT had been intimate with a Soviet woman. NOSENKO arranged for her to come to Moscow from Kiev, where she was living in 1957 or 1958, in order to compromise KRAFT. Although his wife was accompanying him in Moscow, KRAFT and the Soviet woman were intimate in the latter's room in the Grand Hotel. NOSENKO was present at the time supervising the operation. Photographs were taken. Then militiamen broke into the room, finding KRAFT and the woman in the nude; a recruitment approach was then made by DUBAS, the Chief of the Tourist Department. (NOSENKO had been the case officer and had handled the operation thus far, but he took no part in the confrontation or recruitment approach "because DUBAS wanted it for himself.") Although the recruitment was not firm, KRAFT and DUBAS "had an agreement" that nothing would be done about the compromise if KRAFT did not criticize the Soviet Union in lectures about his trip there which he was to give in the United States. DUBAS again contacted KRAFT when he came to Moscow in 1963, and after this his file was turned over to the First Chief Directorate. NOSENKO recalled that the First Chief Directorate "said that KRAFT was not in a good region of the United States. And also it smelled like he had spoken of the approach made to him." Therefore, NOSENKO concluded, he probably had not been contacted in the United States.

Investigation Results: [illegible]

h. Recruitment of DREW (1959)

NOSENKO's Information: George DREW, an American who visited the Soviet Union in the spring of 1959, had originally been the responsibility of V.M. IVANOV, a case officer of the section dealing with American and Canadian tourists. By chance, however, DREW became involved with NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV (see Part V.D.2), and they reported this to NOSENKO, then the deputy chief of the section. NOSENKO and IVANOV discussed the case with DUBAS and possibly GUSKOV, the section chief, and NOSENKO flew alone to Leningrad to make the approach. (IVANOV was not considered to be sufficiently experienced and his English was not good.) NOSENKO arranged for DREW to be compromised in a Leningrad hotel room with a homosexual agent of the local KGB handled by a Leningrad officer, (fnu) PERELETOV. Using the name "Mr. SERGEYEV," NOSENKO

alone recruited DREW in an office of the hotel. The KGB First Chief Directorate was interested in DREW's recruitment because he might be able to spot other homosexuals, possibly some in the U.S. Government.

Investigation Results: [illegible]

i. Recruitment of [illegible] (1959)

NOSENKO's Information: In June or possibly July 1959 NOSENKO personally recruited a [illegible] subject*, [illegible] in a room of the Hotel Astoria in Leningrad after [illegible] had been compromised by NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV (see Part V.D.2.). The case was then turned over to Ye. A. TARABRIN, at that time Chief of the British Department of the First Chief Directorate. NOSENKO furnished no more information on this case and did not know its current status, but he believed the KGB has not been in contact with [illegible] subsequently.

Investigation Results: [illegible]

j. Recruitment of [illegible] (1959)

NOSENKO's Information: By himself NOSENKO recruited [illegible] in the Nova Moskovskaya (now the Bucharest) Hotel in Moscow in July 1959, after [illegible] had been compromised by either VOLKOV or YEFREMOV, his homosexual agents (see Part V.D.2.). [illegible] is a [illegible] citizen and his case was also turned over to TARABRIN.

Investigation Results: [illegible]

k. Recruitment of [illegible] (1959)

NOSENKO's Information: NOSENKO personally and alone recruited the Moscow representative of [illegible]

* NOSENKO explained his involvement with British nationals by saying that, after 1958, the Tourist Department had two geographic sections, one dealing with U.S. and UK citizens and the other with tourists from other countries. NOSENKO was involved in the first of these, "so they assigned them to me."

[illegible]

[redacted] whose name NOSENKO did not recall, at the Hotel Metropol in Moscow during the summer of 1959, possibly in August. The approach was based on homosexual compromise involving NOSENKO's agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV (see Part V.D.2.).

Investigation Results: [redacted]

1. Recruitment of MERTENS (1959)

NOSENKO's information: When Gerat MERTENS visited the Soviet Union in July or August 1959, NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV, as part of their general assignment to become acquainted with homosexuals (see Part V.D.2.), accidentally met MERTENS in Moscow and reported their suspicions to NOSENKO. NOSENKO wrote a report of this contact and requested authority to take compromising photographs in preparation for a recruitment approach, and DUBAS, his chief, then assigned the case to him. (MERTENS had previously been the responsibility of A.A. VELITSKIY, another case officer.) Photographs were taken of homosexual relations between VOLKOV and MERTENS on two separate occasions in Moscow. When MERTENS later travelled to Uzhgorod he was "arrested" by KGB officers (posing as militiamen) while he was engaged in relations with a homosexual agent of operational contact from Odessa. NOSENKO arranged by phone to bring this homosexual to Uzhgorod; he did not recall his name, but supplied CIA with a physical description. (NOSENKO could give no background on the agent and when asked why not, said he "wasn't interested.") MERTENS was then brought before NOSENKO, who recruited him during a session lasting approximately five hours. NOSENKO later travelled with MERTENS when he visited Lvov and Minsk before leaving the USSR. NOSENKO said that he had used the name "George" with MERTENS, but he could not recall what last name he had given him.

Investigation Results: [redacted]

* NOSENKO explained that the Tourist Department in 1959 had a section dealing with commercial representatives, which was responsible for the [redacted] man, but had asked NOSENKO's section for help. "They said they didn't have any agents or anything and didn't know what to do. So somebody said, 'Well look, why don't you ask the chief of the section? He's a specialist on homosexuals and can arrange everything for you.' So I wound up handling the case, and TARABRIN (of the First Chief Directorate) said I should report to him." In this passage NOSENKO seemed to be referring to himself, although he said he was deputy chief of the section; the chief of the section at that time, M.A. LEONOV, is not known to have participated in operations stemming from the homosexuality of the prospective agents.

m. Compromise of BARRETT (1959)

NOSENKO's Information: Robert BARRETT, a guide at the U.S. Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, had become friendly with the homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV (see Part V.D.2.), whom he met at the fairground. Although BARRETT was not a homosexual, VOLKOV succeeded--after a long period of development--in involving him in homosexual acts, which were photographed by KGB personnel from an adjoining hotel room. As case officer for VOLKOV and YEFREMOV, NOSENKO was responsible for arranging the compromise, was present when the photographs were taken, and has described the occasion in detail. There had been much complaining among the photographic technicians because of the amount of time they were forced to spend waiting for VOLKOV to succeed in his mission, and NOSENKO recalled that he "had to provide them with drinks and treat them well" because "they were a big help" to him in this operation. The photographs were good, but the KGB was unable to use them in 1959 because of a general ban placed by SHELEPIN on the recruitment of U.S. Exhibition guides due to the possible repercussions on KHRUSHCHEV's planned visit to the United States.* (NOSENKO reported, however, that BARRETT was recruited on the basis of the 1959 photography when he returned with another exhibition in 1961. This recruitment was carried out by another component of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO had nothing to do with it.**)

Investigation Results:

* See the discussion of the WILLERFORD case, below, for additional information on SHELEPIN's prohibition.

** In 1961, shortly before his recruitment, BARRETT had ostensibly accidental contact with VOLKOV and YEFREMOV in Moscow. NOSENKO has not mentioned this.

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n. Compromise of WILLERFORD

NOSENKO's Information: Frederick WILLERFORD was BARRETT's roommate during the 1959 exhibition in Moscow. Initially he was a target of the local KGB organization for the city of Moscow, which believed WILLERFORD to be an FBI agent and had been collecting materials on him. At the same time and, without knowing of the interest of the local organization, VOLKOV and YEFREMOV had made WILLERFORD's acquaintance, and NOSENKO had arranged for compromising photographs of WILLERFORD and YEFREMOV in a Moscow hotel room. NOSENKO watched WILLERFORD and YEFREMOV through a two-way mirror and was able to describe the scene in detail. It was only after this compromising material had been obtained that NOSENKO learned of the local KGB's interest in WILLERFORD. NOSENKO's department and the local KGB unit then made a joint request for operational approval to approach WILLERFORD, but permission was refused because of the general ban on recruitment approaches at this time. The case file was retained by the Moscow KGB organization, and NOSENKO did not know whether WILLERFORD has been approached subsequently.

Investigation Results: [illegible]

Note: There is a similarity between NOSENKO's description of the ban on recruitment approaches in 1959, which prevented the Tourist Department from taking advantage of its compromising photography of BARRETT and WILLERFORD, and information provided by the earlier defector, GOLITSYN. GOLITSYN reported that an American employed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, possibly a code clerk, was prepared for recruitment on the basis of homosexual compromise during 1959 and 1960. According to information he said he learned from U.S. Embassy Section case officer, G.I. GRYAZNOV, the KGB had photographs of the American in various stages of a homosexual act, and there was no question about the recruitment being achieved: "The only question was to where." At the time, however, SHELEPIN had just become Chairman of the KGB and was stressing ideological rather than blackmail recruitments. He was shown these particular photographs but decided that an approach on their basis would be too crude and that another way should be found. Although SHELEPIN did not exclude the use of these photographs some time in the future, according to GOLITSYN, he had reservations against using them at that time for fear of the propaganda repercussions if the attempt should fail and be exposed publicly. GOLITSYN did not know whether the recruitment was subsequently carried out. The essential differences between this account and that of NOSENKO are that GOLITSYN implied the ban was in effect at least into 1960 and that GOLITSYN appeared to be speaking of a general prohibition,

whereas NOSENKO related the ban specifically and only to the U.S. Exhibition at Sokolniki Park which ended on 4 September 1959.*

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* In speaking of the 1959 U.S. Exhibition at Sokolniki Park, Moscow, [redacted] told [redacted] that both the KGB and the GRU launched an all-out effort to recruit Americans employed at the Exhibition. All officers at GRU Headquarters were assigned to this task, and some were used by the KGB in an attempt to compromise the Americans; V.A. GRUSHA (identified by NOSENKO as a KGB officer specializing in American operations of the First Chief Directorate) directed many of these KGB activities in which GRU personnel were involved. As a result of this endeavor, "more than one American" was recruited, and [redacted] indicated that the technique of compromise--such as "bed pictures"--was employed. When questioned on this subject [redacted] [redacted] reported that to handle the Exhibition, the CPSU Central Committee issued a special directive to form a committee headed by the KGB (GRUSHA was in charge of one section of this committee) and to which the GRU [redacted] contributed personnel. Its purposes were two-fold: protective, that is, to prevent propaganda, to disrupt presentations, and to conduct counterintelligence; and to recruit. [redacted] and that the GRU did not recruit any Americans at the Exhibition. [redacted]

5. The FRIPPEL Case (1959-1963)

As a member of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO in 1959 personally took part in the recruitment of the American Express Company representative in Moscow, Arsene FRIPPEL. He continued to be one of this agent's two KGB handlers after transferring to the American Department in 1960, and FRIPPEL was asked to report on the U.S. Embassy as well as on two Embassy officials in particular. FRIPPEL left the Moscow job in 1961 but returned on trips to the USSR in 1962 and 1963, when NOSENKO met him. The only recruited American whom NOSENKO ever handled as a reporting source, FRIPPEL [illegible] The accounts of this operation by NOSENKO and FRIPPEL differ in several details, but both agree that FRIPPEL provided the KGB with no significant information. These two versions are presented separately below.

a. NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO first mentioned FRIPPEL during the third meeting in Geneva in 1962 while discussing KGB successes in Moscow: "There was another agent [KGB cryptonym] 'ARTUR.' He was not a correspondent. He knew me as George, Yuriy Ivanovich, and my last name as NIKOLAYEV. He was a permanent representative, not in the Embassy, but of the American Express Company in Moscow. FRIPPEL. Arthur FRIPPEL. But he also has the cryptonym 'ARTUR.' He liked drinking, always drank. He was also strongly attracted to women. I provided him with beautiful women... Well, we decided to have a talk with him. Why? What could he give? He now works in the American Express Company [main office in New York City]. A new department has now been organized for the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Democracies. And he is chief of the department... He is no longer in Moscow, but he was here two and a half or three years. We hope that he will return. We are waiting for him to come back. We know that the company wants to send him again, because he knows the Russian language very well. He is, in fact, an emigre, this FRIPPEL. And he also did a good and intelligent job of establishing relations with Inturist. He had very good relationships with ANKUDINOV, the Chairman of Inturist, and with other people, both the chiefs and the low-level workers... But, why was FRIPPEL recruited? I was interested in knowing precisely by whom, by name, and how approaches were being made to our delegations [in the United States], i.e., I was interested in him from the point of view of counterintelligence, not intelligence. What kinds of approaches are taking place to our people in America and by whom? This is what interested us. But he didn't know anything. He couldn't say anything. He provided only superficial information, nothing more."

NOSENKO was then asked whether FRIPPEL would not have been useful for coverage of Americans visiting the Soviet Union. He replied that the KGB had already had great success in this by other means and launched into a long description of the methods of covering foreign tourists in the USSR.

NOSENKO was present in the adjoining room when FRIPPEL was compromised by a Soviet female agent, Klara Konstantinovna GORBACHEVA. NOSENKO described the compromising scene in detail as well as the attempt by a KGB technician to take motion pictures of these activities through a two-way mirror, and the confrontation with the militiamen who broke into the room.

After returning to Geneva in 1964 and during subsequent debriefings and interrogations, NOSENKO made the following additional statements concerning the FRIPPEL case:

- Although he had personally recruited FRIPPEL, he did not do so alone; Col. V.D. CHELNOKOV, Deputy Chief (and later Chief) of the Tourist Department, was present; he and NOSENKO "carried out the recruitment together" in early September 1959. NOSENKO was, however, FRIPPEL's case officer.

- NOSENKO attributed his involvement in the FRIPPEL recruitment to the following: "In 1958, after 1958, when I became the Deputy Chief of the section, my area of activity was narrowed down. I didn't handle all the tourists at that time. I worked as the Deputy Chief of the section and I had my own little area--for example, the permanent representative of the American Express Company, and besides that I began to collect all the material on all American tourist firms which have anything to do with Inturist and who send tourists to the USSR."

- FRIPPEL never provided any information of value to Soviet tourist operations.

- When NOSENKO began to work in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department in 1960, he took FRIPPEL with him because FRIPPEL was acquainted with some Americans at the Embassy. NOSENKO was asked to question FRIPPEL about the U.S. Embassy and such Embassy officers as George WINTERS and Lewis W. BOWDEN, but FRIPPEL never told NOSENKO anything along this line.*

- FRIPPEL provided no interesting information during NOSENKO's two meetings with him in 1962 and 1963, when FRIPPEL returned to the Soviet Union as a tour guide.

- NOSENKO met "pretty steadily" with FRIPPEL during the period to January 1961, and once NOSENKO and his wife, in company with CHELNOKOV and his wife, had dinner at FRIPPEL's home, where they met Mrs. FRIPPEL. Odette FRIPPEL was unaware of her husband's status as a KGB agent, and therefore NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV used Inturist cover for their acquaintance with FRIPPEL. Although unusual for KGB Second Chief Directorate case officers to visit agents in their homes with wives present, NOSENKO explained that he went because he "was invited," and CHELNOKOV went "because he was also involved in the recruitment."

- First as Deputy Chief of a section of the Tourist Department and later as Deputy Chief and Acting Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, NOSENKO continued to meet with FRIPPEL in Moscow hotels and restaurants. Throughout this period, he was almost invariably accompanied by CHELNOKOV: "Perhaps one time I met with FRIPPEL alone, otherwise it was always with

* See Part V.E.3. regarding NOSENKO's duties in the U.S. Embassy Section.

CHELNOKOV." Usually NOSENKO would arrange these meetings with FRIPPEL at CHELNOKOV's request and the two continued to meet with FRIPPEL, despite his lack of production, because they "kept hoping he would give something." In a different context, but speaking of CHELNOKOV, NOSENKO explained: "You see, never mind if you are a chief or a deputy chief of a department, you must have one, two, or three agents. GRIBANOV insists, so that you don't forget how to work. The Chiefs of the [Second Chief] Directorate do not demand that they have 12 or 13 agents, but they must have two or three. They will have important agents or those in leading positions."

- NOSENKO continued to act as FRIPPEL's case officer after FRIPPEL had left the Soviet Union and NOSENKO had been transferred and promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department. He met twice with FRIPPEL during this latter period when FRIPPEL visited the Soviet Union as a guide with groups of foreign visitors. Both of these meetings were handled by NOSENKO alone, without CHELNOKOV.

- The first meeting took place in the summer of 1962, after NOSENKO had returned to Moscow from Geneva. FRIPPEL had arrived in the Soviet Union as a guide for some American journalists. (NOSENKO was unable to give the composition of the journalist group or to recall where they stayed in Moscow and where else they travelled in the Soviet Union.) NOSENKO contacted him in Moscow to learn what questions the newsmen intended to ask KHRUSHCHEV during a scheduled interview; subsequently NOSENKO acknowledged that standard practice required visiting journalists to submit their intended questions for KHRUSHCHEV in writing to Soviet authorities prior to interviews. After the interview, he recontacted FRIPPEL to learn the reaction of the journalists to their talk with the Soviet leader. NOSENKO could not recall their specific reaction to the KHRUSHCHEV interview but did remember that they were "satisfied." Another reason for contacting FRIPPEL, NOSENKO added in a later discussion, was to learn whether any of the journalists might have joined the group at the last moment in the United States, which might suggest intelligence connections on their part.*

- NOSENKO met FRIPPEL alone for the second and last time during March 1963. Since FRIPPEL was a guide for tourists aboard the ship "Olympia," which stopped for a day in Yalta and Odessa, NOSENKO flew to Odessa from Moscow and accosted FRIPPEL in the lobby of the hotel where the tourists were having dinner. Finally able to get away

* NOSENKO had earlier said on several occasions that one of the things KGB sources in foreign tourist companies abroad were instructed to report to the KGB was any last-minute additions to a tour group to the USSR; this might signify intelligence affiliation.

from his group, FRIPPEL called on NOSENKO in the latter's hotel room, and the two drank and talked. NOSENKO had given FRIPPEL a bottle of vodka as a gift, and FRIPPEL said he wanted to give NOSENKO some whiskey in return. They drove in NOSENKO's car to the port, where NOSENKO waited in the car while FRIPPEL went aboard for the whiskey. (He had invited NOSENKO to visit the ship but could not obtain a pass for him.) When FRIPPEL returned. he brought another American, so NOSENKO had to invent for himself a suitable cover (Inturist) on the spot. The three returned to the hotel and drank some more, everyone getting drunk. During this contact, FRIPPEL reported "nothing of importance," and his most interesting news was that he might again be reassigned to Moscow in December 1963 as the American Express Company representative.*

- On 3 February 1964, while reviewing the CHEREPANOV papers** in Geneva, NOSENKO was asked about the following passage which appeared in the KGB operational plan against BOWDEN, dated February 1960 and signed by V.A. KUSKOV of the U.S. Embassy Section: "He [BOWDEN] showed himself to be an indiscreet person... Ironically, one day as though by chance, he [BOWDEN] blurted out to our agent SHMEPOVA [the fact of] "ARTUR's" affiliation with American Intelligence."*** NOSENKO confirmed that the "ARTUR" of the CHEREPANOV papers was FRIPPEL, but he said he "could not say" whether FRIPPEL had any affiliation with American Intelligence.

* NOSENKO said he later read a report that FRIPPEL had been reassigned, and it was therefore unlikely that his agent would return to Moscow; this report was submitted by V.V. KOSTYRYA (alias VLADIMIROV), a member of the KGB Legal Residency and overtly an Inturist employee in New York City, who was a former Second Chief Directorate colleague of NOSENKO.

** The CHEREPANOV Papers are discussed in detail in Part VI.D.7.c.

*** There is no other report of BOWDEN making such a remark and no basis for it. Although never contacted by or associated with CIA in any way, FRIPPEL during 1960 was under consideration for operational use in Moscow, and in this connection background inquiries about him were submitted to the FBI. [illegible]

While in the Soviet Union in August 1962 and shortly before his recruitment on homosexual grounds (see Part VI.D.2.), the American Spencer ROBERTS was approached on the beach at Sochi by a young Soviet male. ROBERTS and the Soviet, who spoke French, soon became friends, and the Soviet told ROBERTS that he had been used as an agent in several operations against French-speaking foreigners in the USSR. One of these was FRIPPEL, the Soviet said, adding that FRIPPEL was suspected by the KGB of being an American Intelligence agent. NOSENKO, who has provided much detail on the ROBERTS case, did not mention the unidentified Soviet in this context or while discussing FRIPPEL.

– [illegible] interrogation [illegible] 1964 [illegible] referring to his [illegible] refusal [illegible] with CIA inside the Soviet Union, NOSENKO [illegible] for the first time that "if you had [illegible], you could have made [illegible] in Moscow. [illegible] sent [illegible] to my apartment. It was possible, even [illegible] tourists."*

b. FRIPPEL's Information

FRIPPEL, who uses the nickname "[illegible]," was the American Express Company representative in Moscow from 7 April 1959 to 3 January 1961. [illegible]

* See Part III.[illegible]., which describes NOSENKO's emphatic refusal during the 1962 meetings to have any contacts with CIA inside the Soviet Union. During the October 1966 interrogations, NOSENKO said that in 1962 he had "absolutely no idea" concerning the possibility of CIA using FRIPPEL as an intermediary for contact inside the Soviet Union.

* FRIPPEL also had social contact with NOSENKO's target John ABIDIAN (see Part V.E.3.d.). NOSENKO said they did not know one another. There is no indication that FRIPPEL was questioned on these contacts by NOSENKO and/or CHELNOKOV.

** In February 1965 NOSENKO denied that this meeting took place. Department of State records show that in November 1961 FRIPPEL applied for a new passport indicating that he intended to depart the United States in February 1962 aboard the "Olympia" for a cruise which would visit the Soviet Union.

* KOSENKO said it was "impossible" that he should have to request permission to board the vessel.

** In February 1965, KOSENKO did not recall having told FRIPPEL these details of his life and said that, if he had done so, it was while he was drunk.

6. Lee Harvey OSWALD (1959-60 and 1963)

As in the FRIPPEL case, NOSENKO was involved with Lee Harvey OSWALD during both periods of his assignment to the Tourist Department of the Second Chief Directorate (1955-1960 and 1962-1964).* While Deputy Chief of the American-British-Canadian Tourist Section, NOSENKO had a direct hand in the decision in October 1959 that OSWALD was of no operational interest to the KGB and should be returned immediately to the United States. Before President Kennedy's assassination in November 1963, when NOSENKO was again in the Tourist Department as its Deputy Chief, he was present at the time the KGB Second Chief Directorate learned of OSWALD's application to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City to re-enter the USSR. After the assassination, he also played a role in the KGB investigations of OSWALD's activities during residence in the Soviet Union from October 1959 until June 1962.

Collateral information relating to OSWALD's stay in the Soviet Union, and particularly concerning any connections he may have had with Soviet Intelligence, is meager and indirect. It derives almost entirely from indications of primary interest by the KGB (among all Soviet Government organs) in every defector to the USSR, and from inferences which may be drawn from certain entries in OSWALD's "Historical Diary" and certain statements made by his wife, Marina, during interviews on behalf of the Warren Commission. After President Kennedy's death, the Soviet Government provided the United States with official documents and letters pertaining to OSWALD's defection to the USSR, his suicide attempt, his marriage, and other events inside the Soviet Union. This information from the Soviet Government generally agrees with the information from NOSENKO. The materials furnished by the Soviet Government make no mention of any Soviet Intelligence interest, or lack thereof, in OSWALD.

In this sense NOSENKO's information is unique: It was and remains the only such information available on the 32 months of OSWALD's life in the USSR.** NOSENKO's access to

* For continuity of presentation, both periods of NOSENKO's alleged involvement, 1959-1960 and 1963, are discussed in this part of the paper.
** Independent sources, however, reported on visits by OSWALD to the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City between 29 September and 3 October 1963 and on his (apparently overt) contact with a KGB officer under Consular cover at the Soviet Embassy there. NOSENKO originally said he knew nothing of any such contact. In October 1966 he revised this to say that OSWALD did not have contact with the KGB in Mexico City. NOSENKO explained that he had been sitting in the office of Tourist Department Chief, K.N. DUBAS, when a cable arrived at Moscow Headquarters from the KGB legal Residency in Mexico. The cable, which NOSENKO said he did not personally see, reported that OSWALD had visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City requesting permission to return to the USSR and that he had dealt with Soviet Foreign Ministry personnel only.

information on KGB involvement with OSWALD in 1959, at the time of OSWALD's request to remain in the USSR, derives exclusively from the claimed fact that he, NOSENKO, was Deputy Chief of the KGB Section" dealing with American tourists at that time. He said he knew of later developments because of his position as Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department from mid-1962 until 1964. The central theme of NOSENKO's information, as given to CIA and the FBI, is that the KGB determined as early as 16 October 1959, when OSWALD made his first declaration of intent to remain in the USSR, that he was "not normal" and thereupon "washed its hands" of him entirely. According to NOSENKO, the KGB had no operational interest in OSWALD and made no attempt to recruit or even to debrief him during the time he spent in Moscow and Minsk or during his trip to Mexico shortly before killing the President.

a. Statements to the FBI

** OSWALD attempted to renounce his U.S. citizenship at the American Embassy on 31 October, three days after leaving the hospital. From his diary, the Warren Commission concluded he received permission to reside in the Soviet Union on a year-to-year basis about 4 January 1960, approximately the time he moved to Minsk.

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* NOSENKO later told CIA on one occasion that he "only skimmed the file" and on another that he had it in his possession about 20 minutes. In October 1966 he again said that he read the file and that while doing so he saw a picture of OSWALD for the first time. NOSENKO added that he never met OSWALD personally.

** In October 1966 NOSENKO said he learned that OSWALD was a poor shot from V.V.KRIVOSHEY, a fellow KGB officer who had been told this while visiting Minsk.

b. Statements to CIA

On the basis of the FBI interviews of NOSENKO and the similar information which he had previously provided CIA, further debriefings were conducted by CIA on 3 and 27 July 1964. New and explanatory information received during these debriefings is presented below.

(i) KGB Interest in OSWALD

Until OSWALD mentioned to the Inturist guide his desire to remain in the Soviet Union, he was treated routinely by the KGB. When OSWALD made his request, this was reported immediately to the Tourist Department, and it was from this moment that the KGB began to pay attention to him. All available materials on him were thereupon collected and examined--the visa application, Inturist reports, interpreters' reports, reports from hotel agents, and the results of a check of KGB Archives. KRUPNOV interviewed the interpreter to whom OSWALD had stated his desire. Although the KGB considered it possible that OSWALD might be an American agent, the KGB did nothing to investigate this possibility as "this would be done after the person is allowed to stay in the Soviet Union." Surveillance of OSWALD was not increased after his request, and OSWALD was not interviewed by the KGB in an attempt to establish his intentions. There was no attempt to debrief OSWALD because "he was not an interesting person and wasn't normal." OSWALD was never questioned on his past nor asked to write an autobiography.** From the

* NOSENKO provided details on this point to CIA (see below) and made a similar statement when asked in 1964 why KGB agent Tamara KUNGAROVA had been permitted to marry an American (her own developmental target) and then emigrate to England; See Part V.D.3.
** When he appeared at the U.S. Embassy to renounce his citizenship on 31 October 1959, OSWALD told the counsellor officer that he had been a radar operator in the Marine Corps and had told a Soviet official that he would give the Soviets any information concerning the Marines and radar which he possessed.

materials and reports immediately available it was decided that something was not quite normal about OSWALD, and the KGB therefore had Inturist tell him that he would have to leave the USSR when his visa expired. OSWALD's suicide attempt supported the Tourist Department's feeling that it had been right in deciding to refuse OSWALD's request for citizenship, particularly as the hospital also reported that he was not normal, and the Tourist Department decided: "We will do nothing; we don't want to know him." Inturist was subsequently told: "'There is no KGB interest in him. Do what you want'... The KGB thought that he was of no interest for the country or for the KGB, that he was not normal, and that he should leave the country." The Tourist Department and the KGB in general thereupon "washed their hands" of this matter.

There was never any operational use of OSWALD nor was there anything in OSWALD's file to indicate that the KGB attempted to debrief him on his past service in the U.S. Marine Corps or other matters; this was because "he is a very little person and also it is felt that he is not normal, so the KGB is afraid to do this with him."* The GRU was not informed of OSWALD's defection. Neither was any attempt made to exploit OSWALD for propaganda purposes in Moscow or in Minsk. In short, there was no intelligence interest or contact with OSWALD after the initial assessment of abnormality.

(ii) KGB Interest in Marina OSWALD

The KGB had no knowledge or interest in Marina (nee PRUSAKOVA) until she and OSWALD applied for permission to register marriage. In fact the KGB did not know that she was a friend of OSWALD until this point, for there was no surveillance on OSWALD to show that he knew her. When the KGB learned of their relationship, checks were made of the Archives of the Minsk KGB as well as neighborhood checks and checks at her place of employment. The people where she lived and worked and went to school considered her a simple girl, not very clever, only fair in her studies, not an active member of the KOMSOMOL. She was a simple "philistine," an uncultured girl more interested in gossip than in anything important. The KGB never considered recruiting her as an informant on OSWALD "because it was considered dangerous to recruit a wife to report on her husband." Nor was it considered to recruit her for use after she arrived in the United States, "because she would tell him and also she would probably tell the Americans, based on the assessment of the type of person she was."

(iii) OSWALD's Marriage and Departure from the USSR

NOSENKO was asked why there were so few difficulties in the way of Marina's marriage to a foreigner and her departure from the Soviet Union. He replied: "The Soviet law allows any Soviet citizen to marry a foreigner. It was

* NOSENKO subsequently defined this KGB reservation about OSWALD as fear of becoming involved with an unstable person.

easy in this case because OSWALD was already living and working in the Soviet Union. It would be more difficult, of course, with tourists or others who are in the Soviet Union only for a short period and want to marry Soviet citizens."* Asked whether it is not unusually difficult for Soviet citizens to leave the Soviet Union, NOSENKO explained: "In this case it was easier because Marina was already married to a foreigner." NOSENKO was next asked what office or level of the Government or Party must make the final decision regarding Marina's marriage to OSWALD. He described the procedure as follows: "They would come to the Regional Registration Office to apply to register their marriage. [There] they will be told that they will have to wait a week or two while they think it over to be sure they want to get married. During this period the necessary checks are conducted. The Regional Office would call the Militia, and the Militia would call the Minsk KGB. The Minsk KGB said that it is all right for them to get married--that the KGB has no objection. But it is the law that allows them to be married. There are no formal approvals necessary."

Concerning the decision to permit the couple to leave the USSR, NOSENKO said on 3 July 1964 that the decision would be made on the local level, in Minsk, and that there is no need to check in Moscow. On 27 July 1964 he corrected this statement to say that, while local authorities make the decision, it must be approved in Moscow by, he thought, the MInistry for the Preservation of Public Order (MOOP).

(iv) OSWALD's Visit to Soviet Embassy in Mexico

Asked whether he had any information on OSWALD's visit to Mexico in September 1963, NOSENKO said that he knew only that OSWALD had applied at the Soviet Embassy there to come to the Soviet Union. The Mexico City Legal Residency of the KGB reported his visit to Headquarters by cable, requesting information; this was the first that the KGB First Chief Directorate had heard of OSWALD. M.I. TURALIN, Deputy Chief of Service Number Two (KGB counterintelligence abroad), thereupon phoned V.K. ALEKSEYEV, Chief of the Sixth Section of the Tourist Department, whom TURALIN knew personally, to learn whether any information was available. NOSENKO believed that ALEKSEYEV then came to V.D. CHELNOKOV or A.G. KOVALENKO to ask about OSWALD, and NOSENKO thought that he himself was present at the time. ALEKSEYEV was given the background on OSWALD, including his suicide attempt and the fact that he was not considered normal, and was told to advise the First Chief Directorate that OSWALD should not be permitted to re-enter the Soviet Union. ALEKSEYEV then telephoned TURALIN to relay this message. NOSENKO did not know to whom OSWALD had spoken at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, and he knew

* By the time OSWALD applied for permission to marry, he had already written the American Embassy in Moscow, through Soviet mails, of his desire to return to the United States. The letter, dated 5 February 1961, was mailed from Minsk and was received by the Embassy in Moscow on 13 February. The OSWALDs were married on 30 April 1961.

of no contacts between OSWALD and Cubans or representatives of the Cuban Government there or elsewhere.

(v) NOSENKO's Comments on Possible KGB Involvement in the Assassination

When first discussing the OSWALD case with NOSENKO on 23 January 1964, a CIA case officer commented: "It is a very unfortunate thing that these prior events occurred in the Soviet Union." (NOSENKO apparently misunderstood the case officer's intent, which was not to imply that the KGB was behind the assassination, but only that the fact of OSWALD's "defection" placed the USSR under probably unfounded suspicion.) NOSENKO's immediate response to this remark was: "That is not correct. This is putting a false color to it. I am your friend. I am completely with you, and I will continue to work with you and against the Soviet Union in all respects. But the truth should always remain the truth. No matter how I may hate anyone, I cannot speak against my convictions, and since I know this case I could unhesitantly sign off to the fact that the Soviet Union cannot be tied into this in any way. I say this because I know they were frightened of this man [OSWALD] and that everything should have been said to him or that he should have been in any way worked on, in any was [by the KGB] --God forbid!... I know this because I sat on this matter for several days after the tragic matter occurred to the President. To investigate in detail if anything had been done, particularly by the local authorities, that is, by the local KGB in Belorussia..., I had to make a complete investigation and even sent several workers down there to investigate--not trusting official papers. Even without specific orders I had to make a complete investigation on my end of things because this is a serious matter when the head of a government is assassinated... If you want to know, it would be a greater advantage to the Soviet Union if the President were still Kennedy because he was a personage who was a realist and looked at many things in the eye boldly... In the history of any intelligence service there have been assassinations of one kind or another. I can say this: That in our organization, not even speaking of myself, many persons were shocked by the assassination--to think that this should happen in the twentieth century and in, of all places, the most powerful government in the world."

7. Supervisory Responsibilities and Knowledge of Tourist Operations

a. Information from NOSENKO

In June 1958 there was a reorganization within the Tourist Department of the Second Chief Directorate. The Second Section, which had theretofore concerned itself with operational activity against foreign tourists from all countries, was broken down into separate sections; one section dealt with tourists from the United States, Canada, and Great Britain, the other with tourists from Europe, Latin America, and all other countries. NOSENKO said that he was promoted at this time to the position of Deputy Chief of the first of these new sections.

NOSENKO's involvement in at least one major case, Lee Harvey OSWALD, stems entirely from his having held this position. It is also on this basis that he was able to claim awareness of all recruitments from among American tourists from mid-1958 until he returned to the American Department at the beginning of 1960. His knowledge about recruitments is based additionally, he said, on the fact that some time between May and October 1959, during the tourist season, he was ordered by Ye. S. KIRPICHNIKOV, GRIBANOV's secretary, to gather facts for GRIBANOV concerning the use of tourist cover by foreign intelligence organizations during the period from 1955 through 1958. NOSENKO gathered this material from earlier annual reports of the Tourist Department and by talking with various case officers in the department.*

On the basis of his general and supervisory experience in the Tourist Department as well as his research for this paper, NOSENKO had the following to say about Tourist Department operations prior to 1960 (taken from the protocol he signed on this subject on 25 February 1965):

> "Operations against tourists were developing slowly during this period and very little was known by the KGB about the use of tourism by American Intelligence at the time I wrote the report in 1959. No agents were definitely uncovered among American tourists during the years 1958 or 1959 and, until 1960, no tourists were 'caught in the act' of mailing letters, servicing deaddrops or contacting agents, except one whose name I remember as McGUIRE. I do

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* Questioned on this paper in February 1965, NOSENKO said he did not remember whether he discussed it with GRIBANOV, nor could he recall any examples of the material he included in it, what the paper said about CIA tourist operations, or what other U.S. Intelligence organizations were using tourism as an operational cover in this period. He did remember, however, that it incorporated statistical data on the growth of foreign tourism.

not know any details concerning the operational activity which led to the discovery of McGUIRE's letter mailing.*

"I know of no case in which an American tourist was definitely uncovered as an agent of American Intelligence and thereafter approached for recruitment by the KGB during this period.

"I do not know of any such American tourists who were CIA agents, and who were recruited by the KGB during this period.

"In addition to McGUIRE, the Seventh Department developed suspicions concerning a number of tourists, but didn't learn of any specific intelligence connections. Some were taking pictures, others were disseminating literature. Although various operational measures were taken against them, including vyemka (covert baggage search) and the use of KGB agents, none of these tourists received real operational development."

b. KGB Knowledge from George BLAKE

During the first week of June 1959, a three-day meeting was held in London, England, between representatives of CIA and the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, commonly referred to as MI-6) on the subject of "legal-travel" intelligence operations against the USSR. At the conclusion of this meeting there was drawn up a 19 page document summarizing what had been discussed at the meetings. This summary spelled out CIA operational doctrine pertaining to tourist operations, including agent-spotting techniques, criteria for agent selection, agent assessment, agent training, and tasks to be carried out by tourist agents during the coming (1959) tourist season. It stressed CIA's reliance on tourists for the spotting, recontacting, assessing, and communicating with clandestine assets in the Soviet Union. A copy of the document as well, presumably, as other British documents relating to the joint meetings was given to George BLAKE, who has admitted having made a photographic copy which he passed to the KGB. He gave the KGB this information in the summer of 1959.

* One Robert Alan McGUIRE, a former staff employee of CIA, travelled to the Soviet Union as a tourist during April and May 1958. Although he was debriefed on his return, he had no connection with CIA in preparation for this trip and mailed no letters for CIA inside the USSR. While in the Soviet Union, McGUIRE was approached on numerous occasions by Soviets seeking blackmarket deals, American girls, and assistance in defecting to the Americans. While en route to Leningrad, his brief case was overtly searched by a customs employee, who confiscated a Radio Liberation script. McGUIRE reported that he was compelled to sign a document which stated that the script had been confiscated, but the reasons for the action were left blank. NOSENKO, who has reported none of these details, appears to have confused McGUIRE with Edward McGOWAN, a CIA agent who mailed a letter in Minsk in August 1958 and was detected doing so by the KGB; NOSENKO said McGUIRE mailed a letter in Minsk in 1959.

A second joint meeting on this same subject took place in Washington, D.C., from 20 to 23 April 1960, and BLAKE [illegible] mitted providing the KGB with a copy of the 21-page summary of the sessions.*

c. GOLITSYN's Tourist Document

When he defected to CIA in December 1961, GOLITSYN brought with him a top secret KGB document dealing with the use by American Intelligence of tourists for espionage inside the Soviet Union and with KGB countermeasures.** This study relied heavily upon the two documents supplied to the KGB by BLAKE, and although it purports to be a study of American tourist operations during 1960, it cites as examples many cases which occurred in earlier years. In these examples, the American agents detected by the KGB are named and their operational roles accurately described. (As noted above, NOSENKO said that McGUIRE/McGOWAN was the only American definitely determined to have intelligence connections prior to 1960.) Cited below are excerpts from the GOLITSYN document, along with additional information from CIA records and investigations.

The document states: "McGOWAN, Edward, born 1935, passing himself off as a post-graduate student of Harvard University, in Moscow, after a thorough check [for surveillance] sent an espionage letter containing secret writing. Further investigation of McGOWAN showed that he specialized for a long period of time on Russian and Polish questions at the Russian Research Center of Harvard University, which is a branch of CIA. He came to the USSR at the expense of ROCKEFELLER and MORGAN, who are financing the so-called 'Research' work on Russia."

* This occurred at a time that NOSENKO claims to have been in the American Department. During the 1962 meetings in Geneva, when NOSENKO said he was Chief of the American Tourist Section, he was asked about BLAKE. He replied only that BLAKE had been "an agent of the British Department of the Second Chief Directorate" and that he was not nearly as valuable as the Canadian Ambassador [illegible] or "the other Englishman" (VASSALL). At the time of his defection, NOSENKO said he was First Deputy Chief of the entire Tourist Department. Asked about BLAKE after his defection, NOSENKO replied: "Who's BLAKE?" During the February 1965 interrogations, NOSENKO was first asked whether the KGB had received any significant information concerning the use of tourism as operational cover by CIA during 1960 and 1961, when he was in the American Department, and was then asked specifically whether the KGB obtained documentary information on this subject from an agent source. He replied "no" to both questions.

** This document was transmitted from KGB Headquarters in Moscow to the KGB Legal Residency in Helsinki on 7 April 1961. In content it is similar to the general description of the document which NOSENKO said he himself wrote. NOSENKO said in 1964 that he knew GOLITSYN had passed CIA this report and that it had been written in the Tourist Department.

During his trip to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1958, McGOWAN mailed in Minsk an operational letter containing secret writing. In the CIA debriefing upon his return to the United States, McGOWAN described a number of incidents in the USSR. On 20 August 1958, for example, while staying at the Metropol Hotel in Moscow, McGOWAN met Alan BALLARD* and Gertrude SAMUALS, fellow Americans, and the three of them were photographed by a surveillance team when leaving the hotel. Within several days of his arrival in Moscow, McGOWAN found he was incompatible with his female Inturist interpreter/guide and succeeded in having her replaced. His new guide was V.L. ARTEMOV, who assured that McGOWAN had female companionship for the remainder of his visit.**

The document from GOLITSYN also states: "SIMARD, Lionel, born in 1939, a college instructor, expressed an abnormal interest towards military literature of the USSR; he made contact with Soviet citizens and attempted to slip into the area of shipbuilding factories in Leningrad. Later it was recorded that this 'pedagogue', while in Moscow, sent espionage letters containing secret writing. The letter contained the coordinates of a deaddrop for an American agent."

SIMARD went to the USSR as a CIA agent in August 1959, and he believed that he was under complete KGB coverage while there. He was in and out of Moscow four times during his trip, and each time he was assigned hotel rooms known to contain various KGB observation equipment. On one occasion SIMARD was introduced to and went out to dinner with Svetlana N. IVANOVA, who attempted to cultivate him.*** The characterization of his activities in the GOLITSYN document is correct. NOSENKO has not mentioned SIMARD.

Another part of the document supplied by GOLITSYN says: "An American, Whitmore GRAY, born 1932, an assistant professor at Michigan University, sent three espionage letters containing secret writing, while in Kiev. In Stalingrad he was detained while he was photographing a military factory."

GRAY arrived in Kiev on 3 November 1959 after having been trained by CIA in countersurveillance and briefed on his letter-mailing mission and other assignments in the Soviet Union. Between midnight that night and one o'clock the next morning he mailed four operational letters. No surveillance was noted during the

* NOSENKO reported on a 1959 trip to the Soviet Union by BALLARD, but said he was not aware of earlier ones.

** This is the same ARTEMOV identified by NOSENKO as a fellow case officer in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department and as the man with whom he worked on the BELITSKIY case in Geneva in 1962. ARTEMOV appeared again in operations against American tourists in 1959 when he was assigned as Inturist guide/interpreter for a group of Americans which included a CIA officer. On one occasion, when this officer returned unexpectedly to his hotel from the theater to which ARTEMOV had escorted him, he caught ARTEMOV searching his hotel room. NOSENKO has not mentioned these contacts of ARTEMOV, which took place at the time he said he was Deputy Chief of the section dealing with American tourists. In October 1966, in answer to a specific question, NOSENKO stated that ARTEMOV never had any connection with the American Section of the Tourist Department.

*** NOSENKO has identified IVANOVA as an agent of the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, but has not described her earlier activities against tourists.

mailings, but GRAY detected surveillance daily thereafter until he left Kiev and later in Yalta. He was approached on 17 November in Baku by an attractive woman who persistently offered her services despite his refusal, and on 18 November by a girl in Tbilisi who occupied a seat next to his in a theater and made similar overtures. GRAY was also approached by blackmarketeers and by purportedly disaffected young men. On 13 November he was arrested in Stalingrad while photographing industrial installations and was released after interrogation and confiscation of his film. NOSENKO made no references to GRAY.

The KGB document elsewhere states: "A guide of a tourist group, John Milton FRANCIS, born 1934, an instructor of Russian at a college of Yale University, when in Odessa with a group of tourists--American students--separated himself from the group and travelled through the city alone. In a notebook which was lost by him, notes and sketches were found which pointed to the fact that he utilized his trip for the purpose of selecting suitable places for the placing of deaddrops, or for checking those deaddrops which were earlier selected by American agents. In Moscow he selected routes which were used to check and dis-discover the existence of surveillance, utilizing passable backyards and following skillful methods. At the present time FRANCIS is the chief interpreter of the State Department, servicing Soviet delegations in the USA."

FRANCIS did have such a mission in 1958 and brought back a notebook with sketches of the sites he selected. He did not mention losing his notebook. In 1954 and 1955 FRANCIS was in frequent contact with V.V. KRIVOSHEY in Berlin; KRIVOSHEY, who served there until the late 1950's, has been identified as a KGB First Chief Directorate officer who later became an officer in the Correspondents Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate.* FRANCIS was also a student of Richard BURGI at Yale in 1956, the year that NOSENKO was involved in BURGI's recruitment (see Part V.D.4.b.). NOSENKO has not mentioned the FRANCIS case and did not recognize his name.

Besides these and other examples in the document GOLITSYN gave CIA, there are indications of KGB awareness of the clandestine activities of many other CIA contacts who travelled to the Soviet Union as tourists during the period from 1955 to 1960.

* KRIVOSHEY was a participant in the Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON case to which NOSENKO provided the lead (see Part VI.D.3.c.).

8. TDY's to London (1957 and 1958)

NOSENKO reported that his first official travel outside the Soviet Union occurred in the fall of [illegible] when he was selected to accompany a group of athletes who had been invited to visit London. As he explained on 6 April 1964, it is necessary for a security officer to accompany any such delegation, and the Eleventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate, responsible for recruiting Second Chief Directorate officers for this purpose, telephoned K.[illegible] DUBAS, Chief of the Tourist Department, to request an officer who spoke English. DUBAS asked NOSENKO whether he wanted to make the trip. NOSENKO replied: "Why not? I have never been abroad yet." NOSENKO consequently travelled to London, using the alias Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV and posing as "the deputy chief" of the delegation. He was specifically instructed to observe one member of the delegation, a woman named MYARIMYAYE, whose father had been killed in a Soviet prison and whose political reliability was uncertain. Additionally, he had the general task of watching all members of the delegation for possibly suspicious contacts with foreigners. The delegation consisted of approximately 50 persons and to help him in carrying out these duties, NOSENKO was assigned three or four agents and several operational contacts among the delegation members. He was the only staff security officer making this trip.

The second trip to London took place a year later, in the fall of 1958, again as a security watchdog. This time he accompanied a delegation of 11 or 12 boxers, and again he used the alias NIKOLAYEV and the cover position of deputy chief of the delegation. NOSENKO was the only security officer with the delegation, and he had two agents and two operational contacts among the boxers. His assignment was general; nobody in particular was kept under observation, and the KGB had no derogatory information concerning any members of the delegation.

NOSENKO has associated his use of the NIKOLAYEV alias in London with the use of the same name with the British subjects [illegible] and [illegible] (see Part V.D.4.d.) shortly before the first of these two trips. On 17 April 1964 NOSENKO explained this situation as follows: "With [illegible] I used the name NIKOLAYEV, Yuriy Ivanovich, a representative of the Ministry of Culture. And then when the question was raised of sending me in 1957 with the delegation to England, I was forced to go there as NIKOLAYEV. I was forced to. And again under the cover of the Ministry of Culture. Because [of this] I went as the assistant head of the delegation, representing the Ministry of Culture. I didn't go under my own name because it was decided that when these people [illegible] came back to England, they would tell who they were with [report their contacts in the USSR]. They would probably question [illegible] especially as one who used to work in intelligence. [illegible] would say: 'There was this man from the Ministry of Culture, NIKOLAYEV. He was with us all the time, even went to Leningrad with us.' So they would say: 'How does he look [what does he look like]?' He would say: 'He looked so-and-so.' So,

of course, I would go there the same year. I'd go there, and they would look at me and say: 'How come this man--his name is NOSENKO, and yet he is very similar to the one described by [illegible].' That was why it was decided I have to go again under the name NIKOLAYEV. Just a matter of conspiracy. Since I already became known as NIKOLAYEV to the Britishers, this would be noticeable."

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E. January 1960 to January 1962 (American Department)

1. Introduction

NOSENKO claims to have served as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, from sometime in January 1960 until the first days of January 1962.* This section, in his words, was working against "the most important counterintelligence target in the Soviet Union," the permanent American representation in Moscow. It regarded every American stationed there as a possible spy and, simultaneously, as a target for eventual compromise and recruitment.

The functions of the U.S. Embassy Section were described by NOSENKO as being, first, to control all contacts by Embassy personnel with Soviet citizens; second, to evaluate information collected from all possible sources on American Embassy employees; and third, to use this information as a basis for planning and carrying out recruitment approaches. The Americans' personalities, jobs, personal relationships, weaknesses, daily routines, security precautions, contacts with Soviet citizens, and the major and minor scandals in their Moscow lives formed the basis for this work. To gather such information, the section's officers directed and debriefed large numbers of agents and informants, including the indigenous employees of the Embassy, Soviet citizens moving in Embassy social circles, and third-country nationals with American contacts; the officers also assigned tasks to and assimilated the reports from the numerous surveillance teams at their disposal, and they read and tried to exploit materials from telephone taps and microphones placed in the offices and homes of the Americans. Each officer had a limited number of American targets and attempted to become thoroughly familiar with each: annually, they submitted detailed operational plans to exploit the knowledge they had gained of their target. During 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO said, special emphasis was placed within the section on "identifying intelligence officers at the Embassy and active development of them, the acquisition of ciphers, and the detailed and painstaking study of code clerks, creating the conditions on the basis of which they can be recruited."

As Deputy Chief of this section, NOSENKO has said, he had access to all information concerning its activities: "Nothing was hidden" from him. On this basis, he expressed certainty that in 1960 and 1961 the KGB did not recruit any Americans associated with the Embassy, that no Americans assigned to the Embassy were being handled in Moscow as KGB agents in this period, and that, in fact, the KGB had recruited no American Embassy personnel since "ANDREY."** From continuing friendships with his fellow-officers of 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO has also claimed certainty that there were no KGB recruitments from the time he left the section in January 1962 until the January 1964 trip to Geneva.

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* In debriefing and interrogating NOSENKO, CIA placed particular emphasis on his activities during the period January 1960 to January 1962, since this information was of special importance to U.S. Government security.

** See Part VI.D.3.b. for a discussion of the case of the KGB agent "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH), whose recruitment has been variously dated by NOSENKO between the years 1949 and 1953.

Meanwhile, no one replaced NOSENKO as Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department's American Section because (as he explained on 29 January 1965) the Tourist Department, which had earlier operated against members of delegations and various other categories of foreign visitors, was being reorganized in January 1960 for work against tourists alone and the Deputy Chief slot was eliminated.* With the exception of A. A. DMITRIYEV, Marina RYTOVA, and the homosexuals YEFREMOV and VOLKOV, NOSENKO turned over all of his agents to another officer in the section named TIMOFEYEV. NOSENKO said on 29 January 1965 that he had two separate files on his agent Arsene FRIPPEL, a developmental file and an operational file, and that he turned the former over to TIMOFEYEV and the latter to V. D. CHELNOKOV, Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department. During later interrogations, however, NOSENKO has said that he continued to handle FRIPPEL while in the U.S. Embassy Section and was the case officer during FRIPPEL's visits to the Soviet Union in 1962 and 1963.**

2. NOSENKO's Transfer to the U.S. Embassy Section

In December 1959, while serving as Deputy Chief of the American-British-Canadian Section of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO learned from K. N. DUBAS, the department Chief, of plans to transfer him to the U.S. Embassy Section as Deputy Chief. NOSENKO said he was opposed to the move and wanted to remain in the Tourist Department: "I was used to it there and wanted to continue. I wanted to stay in the Tourist Department. This /the transfer/ was no promotion. Here I was the Deputy Chief of section and would be the same there. But, of course, its more important there. The American Department is, of course, the most important. But here I was working against American tourists. This is also important. Furthermore, I showed /had proven/ myself there in '55, '56, '57, '58, and '59 and was considered to be not a bad case officer. And here, in the American Department, I must show /prove/ myself with new people." NOSENKO therefore asked DUBAS in December 1959 to "please fight for me to stay." DUBAS later told NOSENKO that he had twice spoken to Second Chief Directorate Chief O. M. GRIBANOV on his behalf, but to no avail. In January 1960 the official orders transferring NOSENKO were issued.

On the day NOSENKO reported to V. A. KLYPIN, Chief of the American Department, to begin his new job, he was told to report to GRIBANOV's office. To GRIBANOV NOSENKO again expressed misgivings about the change of assignment. GRIBANOV replied that DUBAS had spoken to him about this but that he, GRIBANOV, "had his own plans and that was all." GRIBANOV told NOSENKO that

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* There was no change in the functions of NOSENKO's section, however; as before, it continued to be responsible for operations against tourists from the United States, England, and Canada.

** FRIPPEL has reported that NOSENKO continued to meet him until he left the Soviet Union in January 1961 and again when he returned as a guide to tourist groups twice in 1962 and once again in 1963; see Part V.D.5.

he thought NOSENKO could bring "fresh air" to the U.S. Embassy Section's operations and that he was to pay particular attention to operations against American code clerks, the "number one target."* Neither GRIBANOV nor KLYPIN told NOSENKO why he had been selected for this position or who had recommended him for it.

NOSENKO was asked on 17 April 1964 whom he had relieved upon reporting for duty in the U.S. Embassy Section. He replied: "Nobody." He was then asked to identify the persons from whom he had assumed certain of his duties as Deputy Chief of the section (these are discussed in detail below). NOSENKO said that he took the responsibility for maintaining the section file on the security of the U.S. Embassy from the Chief of the section, V. M. KOVSHUK.** Regarding his responsibility as case officer for the Security Officer of the Embassy, NOSENKO explained that because former Security Officer Russell LANGELLE had been declared persona non grata in October 1959 and because his successor John ABIDIAN was not to arrive until March 1960, no one in the section had this responsibility when he, NOSENKO, arrived in January 1960. Asked who had been LANGELLE's case officer, NOSENKO replied: "LANGELLE was handled by several people - by /A.S./ MALYUGIN, then after that by /V.A./ KUSKOV, then by KOVSHUK, then

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* In late December 1961, GOLITSYN also commented on this subject to his CIA handling officer: "The task of strengthening of work against the Americans has been a standing requirement, both in the past and most particularly at this time. This work was particularly intensified after the appointment of SHELEPIN to the KGB... In 1960, it was recommended in the KGB to intensify the work against the Americans at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and against American colonies in other countries... This question of intensifying work against the Americans was up before the Collegium of the KGB. Thereafter, there was a directive from SHELEPIN regarding the intensification of work against the American cipher-clerks."

**There is an apparent contradiction between NOSENKO's designation of KOVSHUK as Chief of the First (U.S. Embassy) Section in 1960 and information earlier supplied by GOLITSYN. GOLITSYN told CIA of a conversation he had with KOVSHUK in January 1961 in Moscow (see Part V.E.3.c.2. concerning a recruitment approach to the American code clerk James STORSBERG) but at that time described KOVSHUK only as an American Department officer, without indicating his position. The only time that GOLITSYN has given a position for KOVSHUK was in the context of questioning concerning KHRUSHCHEV's "Secret Speech" denouncing STALIN in 1956; GOLITSYN said that at this time KOVSHUK was Chief of the American Department (sic) of the Second Chief Directorate. On 16 February 1962 GOLITSYN identified Vladimir PETROV as Chief of the "section concerned with the American Embassy of the American Department of the Second Directorate" in 1960. NOSENKO had identified PETROV as Chief of the Second Section of the American Department, which was concerned with the penetration of U.S. intelligence operations inside the Soviet Union.

rPIN. Yes. LANGELLE was before my time." Two months later, on 24 June 1964, NOSENKO stated: "In 1959 and possibly in 1958, Mikhail Fedorovich BAKHVALOV was the Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section. I replaced him in this position in 1960 and he went to the Fifth (Eastern Countries) Department as Deputy Chief."* On 8 September 1964 NOSENKO volunteered for the first time that BAKHVALOV, as Deputy Chief of the section, had been the case officer for LANGELLE. Under interrogation in early 1965, NOSENKO added that BAKHVALOV had also been responsible for maintaining the file on the security of the U.S. Embassy. At this time he explained his earlier statement by saying that BAKHVALOV had left the section before his arrival and had given the file to KOVSHUK to hold for his successor. The file continued to be charged officially to BAKHVALOV, however, even though he was no longer in the section, and NOSENKO arranged for the official change of custody shortly after reporting for duty (see Part V.E. 3.f.). NOSENKO said further, in January 1965, that BAKHVALOV had shared responsibility for supervising code clerk operations with KOVSHUK before NOSENKO arrived to assume these duties himself. NOSENKO had been given a number of opportunities prior to 24 June 1964 to identify BAKHVALOV as his predecessor, but he did not do so. These are summarized below:

25 January 1964: In a discussion of the Fifth (Eastern Countries) Department of the Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO said: "The Chief of this department is Colonel Artem DAVIDYAN. He is an Armenian. His Deputy is Colonel Mikhail BAKHVALOV."

27 February 1964: NOSENKO was shown a photograph of V.A. ALEKSEYEV, a Soviet who was in Japan from July to September 1961 as a member of a trade delegation. NOSENKO immediately recognized the face as that of the Deputy Chief of the Fifth Department of the Second Chief Directorate. He said that he did not know this person's last name, but that his first name and patronymic were Mikhail Fedorovich. When shown the last name ALEKSEYEV, NOSENKO recognized it as an alias, but provided no further information concerning his true identity or earlier service in the American Department.

10 June 1964: NOSENKO was asked to list in writing the names of KGB officers who had received various awards for their service. He wrote: "The following got either the Order of the Military Red Banner or the Order of the Red Star, I'm not sure which: Mikhail BAKHVALOV, Deputy Chief of a section in an unremembered department of the Second Chief Directorate."

18 June 1964: NOSENKO was asked to list all the officers who had been assigned to the American Department for each year since he joined the KGB. He named the chiefs and deputies of the U.S. Embassy Section from 1953 through 1956. When he came to 1957, however, he said that he could not provide accurate information as to which officers were assigned to the section for that year through 1959 (he was

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* With reference to the Fifth Department, NOSENKO has furnished only one other item of information: he reported that in 1958, or as late as the fall of 1959, the Israeli Section was transferred to this department after having been a component of the American Department.

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allegedly in the Tourist Department in this period) and could not describe their functions. On this basis NOSENKO was then asked to list the officers who had joined the section between 1956 and January 1960, when NOSENKO said he had returned. He provided 14 names, but BAKHVALOV's was not among them. Asked to name the officers who had left the section in the same period, he named five, again omitting BAKHVALOV.

3. Duties and Knowledgeability

a. Introduction

Shortly after reporting for duty in the U.S. Embassy Section and following his short discussion with GRIBANOV, NOSENKO met with Department Chief KLYPIN and Section Chief KOVSHUK to discuss his responsibilities and functions in the section. Repeating what GRIBANOV had already said, KLYPIN stressed that NOSENKO's most important single responsibility in the section would be supervision of all KGB operational activity against American military and State Department code clerks stationed in Moscow. As for the other Americans at the Embassy, KLYPIN suggested a division of labor under which KOVSHUK would be responsible for supervising operations against State Department personnel and NOSENKO would supervise work against the Army, Air Force, and Naval attaches and their assistants.* NOSENKO was also made responsible for maintaining certain files in the section. On 19 February 1965 NOSENKO signed an interrogation protocol which he agreed contained a listing of his principal responsibilities during 1960 and 1961. It read in part:

> "During the entire period in the First [U.S. Embassy] Section, First [American] Department in 1960 and 1961 my position was Deputy Chief of Section. My responsibilities were the following:
>
> -General Deputy to the Chief of the First Section, Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOVSHUK, and Acting Chief of Section in his absence.
>
> -Immediate supervisor for the operational work against American code clerks. In this capacity I closely guided the work of case officers Gennadiy GRYAZNOV and Vadim KOSOLAPOV.
>
> -Case officer for U.S. Embassy Security Officer, John ABIDIAN.
>
> -For about the first six months of 1960, supervisor of the work against the offices of the U.S. Military, Naval, and Air Attaches.
>
> -I maintained the file on American Embassy security.
>
> -I maintained the log books for the reports sent to the First [U.S. Embassy] Section by the Operational Technical Directorate, KGB, based on the information obtained from all the microphones installed in the American Embassy. I read all the reports and gave the pertinent reports to the appropriate case officers in the Section. In my absence this work was done by KOVSHUK or GRYAZNOV.**

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*NOSENKO mentioned his responsibility for supervising attache operations for the first time in 1965. These functions are discussed below.

**The final sentence was added at NOSENKO's request at the time the protocol was signed.

-During this period I was the agent handler for agents 'SHMELEV', 'GRIGORIY', 'PROKHOR', 'ARTUR' and 'SARDAR'.*

"Throughout this entire period I sat in room 618 of KGB Headquarters at House Number 2, Dzhershinskiy Square, Moscow. GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV shared this office with me throughout most of this period."

b. Functions as General Deputy and Acting Chief of Section

(1) Access

Since his defection NOSENKO has maintained under repeated interrogation that as general deputy to KOVSHUK, with the responsibility of taking over in KOVSHUK's absence, he had access to all information on the section's activities and was obliged to keep current on this information. On this basis he has been able to assure his questioners that the KGB was completely unsuccessful in its attempts to recruit Americans assigned to the Embassy in these two years. NOSENKO has also said at various times that his access to section files and his discussions with section officers made it certain that there were also no successes from 1953 to 1960 and from January 1962 to January 1964. His statements on this subject during the February 1965 were distilled in a protocol which NOSENKO signed on 20 February (quoted in full):

"1. As the only Deputy to the Chief of the American Embassy Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, KGB, Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOVSHUK, from January 1960 to January 1962, one of my functions was to serve as KOVSHUK's general deputy and to assume the rights and responsibilities of Chief of the Section during KOVSHUK's absence. In order to perform this function I had the right and the obligation of knowing the details about every important activity of the section against the American Embassy and its personnel. No activity of this nature was withheld from me.

"2. As Deputy Chief of the Section I know definitely that no U.S. officials serving in the Embassy were agents of the KGB or reporting unofficially in any way to the KGB during my service in the Section. There were no approaches or recruitments made by the Section during the period January 1960 to January 1962 against personnel of the American Embassy, including personnel of the State Department, the offices of the Military Attaches (Army, Navy, and Air), the Department of Agriculture and USIA, including Marine guards, Army sergeants, State Department code clerks and Army code clerks except against STORSBERG and KEYSERS, both unsuccessful approaches.

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*VOLKOV, YEFREMOV, Johan PREISFREUND, FRIPPEL, and [redacted] [redacted] respectively, who are discussed in other parts of this paper. At other times NOSENKO has named additional agents he handled in this period; they are discussed below.

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"3. There were no approaches or recruitments made against any employees of the United States Government who were assigned to the American Embassy on temporary duty during this period. I have read and understood this report and certify it as correct."

(ii) Duties

On 29 January 1965, NOSENKO was questioned concerning his supervisory duties as Deputy Chief of the section, particularly his function of supervising activity against code clerks. The transcript of this discussion is quoted here:

Question: To which of the major responsibilities you have mentioned did you have to devote the most time?

Answer: I don't know.

Q: What was the most important?

A: Everything was important.

Q: Whom did you supervise in the American Embassy Section?

A: GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, [Vladimir] DEMKIN, and later [Yevgeniy] GROMAKOVSKIY who worked with DEMKIN. Then there was [N.A.] GAVRILENKO, [I.Ya.] KURILENKO, and BELOGLAZOV working with the Attaches.

Q: They were all in the First Section?

A: Yes.

Q: What were their responsibilities?

A: GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV had all the code clerks. DEMKIN was charged with all persons living in America House, except code clerks. GROMAKOVSKIY helped him. GAVRILENKO had the Air Force Attaches and [their] assistants, and also he had the plane of the Ambassador. He must think about watching the pilots who were living in a hotel. KURILENKO--Army Attache and assistants; BELOGLAZOV--Navy Attache, assistants, and Marines.

Q: What is your understanding of the meaning of the word "supervisor"?

A: Personally to be at the head, to direct.

Q: So, in your responsibilities of supervising all the work against all the code clerks, this meant that you were the head of this work, that you were directing this work, that you were participating in discussions concerning this work, and in these discussions you were talking about what measures were necessary.

(Interrupting.) When necessary, because there are little questions which the case officer must decide himself. When it was necessary.

Q: And participating personally when necessary?

A: Yes.

Q: What sort of case officer questions were you answering?

A: All kinds. If I couldn't answer them, if my authority isn't enough for this, it is necessary to discuss them with KOVSHUK. I was discussing with KOVSHUK, with KLYPIN, with [KLYPIN's successor as Chief of the American Department, S.M.] FEDOSEYEV. Several times, not once, we were discussing questions with GRIBANOV. Also, concerning measures, concerning future steps. When it was necessary.

Q: What other duties did you have as a supervisor?

A: I told you. When it was necessary I was going to agent meetings with case officers. When it was necessary. Or, besides, I met personally with "PROKHOR" [PREISFREUND] or [illegible] "PROKHOR" was working against STORSBERG, "SARDAR" against ZUJUS. I was working myself with them.

Q: You personally worked agents "PROKHOR" and "SARDAR"?

A: Yes.

Q: When did you find it necessary to go to an agent meeting with a case officer?

A: Well, for example, DEMKIN would come to me and say: "You know Ella [UMANETS, an agent in America House]. Ella said that MORONE had looked at her and was smiling." This is just an [hypothetical] example....Okay, I am going with him, hearing Ella myself, [to learn] what happened, [whether] it is possible to make something or not.

Q: You met Ella and talked with her?

A: Yes, with DEMKIN. Very, very difficult to say, why and how we are going. When it was necessary to go.

Q: As a rule did you try to make it a practice to visit the agents of the section who were working against the American target?

A: Yes, I am telling you. There was such an agent, Inga [VARLAMOVA]. GRYAZNOV was meeting with her. It might be necessary to go to meet her. But, we knew how Inga was afraid of intelligence. And, you see, they don't like it when a new case officer appears. But, maybe, for the sake of the file,

it was necessary to go, to hear her. Not because you do not believe GRYAZNOV. No. But, you see, to hear from the source [emphasized], directly, what is going on, and how it is going on, to get a feeling. Because the source will tell the case officer, then the case officer will tell you. Maybe sometimes he will not give you every detail, every intonation. But in some cases, it is necessary to feel this. But, of course, it depends on the agent, on the target, whether you will go or not go. It's very difficult, again, to say.

Q: Could you say that you met 50 per cent of the section's agents?

A: No, I can't say.

Q: Fifty per cent or 75 per cent?

A: I can't answer you.

Q: What about your functions as a supervisor in regard to safehouses, to "K.K.'s" and "Ya.K.'s".*

A: Oh. I myself had a file on my flat, a yavochnaya kvartira, which I brought from the Seventh [Tourist Department]. It was my own. GRYAZNOV had his own yavochnaya kvartira. KOSOLAPOV had also his own yavochnaya kvartira. And not one of us had a conspirative apartment.

Q: And you took the "Ya.K." from...

A: (Interrupting.) Which I had from the Seventh. And, by the way, when I was leaving the First [American] Department, I took this file again to the Seventh.

Q: And not one of you had a conspirative flat.

A: No, because the section had only--how many?-- [P.I.] MASSYA had one conspirative. [V.P.] FEDYANIN had one conspirative, and then there was one conspirative flat, where, in fact, an agent was living. In the First Section there were three or four conspirative flats.

Q: But among you, GRYAZNOV, and KOSOLAPOV there was none?

A: Only "Ya.K.'s".

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*A "K.K." (konspirativnaya kvartira--conspiratorial apartment) is defined by NOSENKO as a safehouse or apartment owned and maintained by the KGB. A "Ya.K." (yavochnaya kvartira--meeting apartment) is an apartment occupied by a tenant who is perhaps subsidized by the KGB and absents himself when there is a need to use the apartment for meetings or other activities. The "K.K." is used for more sensitive operational purposes, he said.

Q: Who kept a record of these three?

A: The case officers.

Q: Where was your "Ya.K."?

A: Vorovskogo Street.

Q: And where was GRYAZNOV's?

A: GRYAZNOV's was on Kachalogo Street.

Q: And KOSOLAPOV's?

A: Don't remember. Don't remember. (Pause.) It was in the vicinity of the Suvorovskiy Boulevard. KOSOLAPOV's or DEMKIN's. In the region of Arbat Square. KOSOLAPOV's or DEMKIN's. KOSOLAPOV's. DEMKIN's I don't remember.

Q: And you didn't have any responsibility for supervising the activity that went on at these flats?

A: I don't understand.

Q: Was there some central control of the use of the "Ya.K.'s"?

A: What kind of control?

Q: Who would be using them, when they would be using them, under what conditions?

A: No. The case officer who was working with it decides how to use this flat or how not to use it, et cetera, et cetera. Besides that, very often we were using rooms in hotels.

Q: So GRYAZNOV would take any of his operational activity to his "Ya.K."?

A: He would also meet with his agents, with his operational contacts in hotel rooms. KOSOLAPOV was meeting his agents in his own "Ya.K."; NOSENKO was meeting his agents or operational contacts in his own "Ya.K.".

Q: Could GRYAZNOV or KOSOLAPOV ever use these "Ya.K.'s" without your knowing about it?

A: Of course. It's their own flat.

Q: But you're supervising their work?

A: Must I keep them like a little, little child? No, no. They don't have to report to me: "Today I go to meet my agent at my flat."

Q: They can use them whenever they like without checking with you as supervisor?

A: Of course, of course. They are meeting their own agents.

Q: You have no idea who they are meeting, or when they are meeting them?

A: When they are meeting an active development agent, they tell me afterwards. They are telling "this, this, this, this" and I am answering "this, this, this." But usually they are going to meet maids or they don't have to report. There is nothing active and there is....The file is going on.

Q: What about operational vehicles? Automobiles?

A: You see, we had one automobile for the whole department. Besides this, we could apply, when necessary, to the officer on duty for the Second Chief Directorate and he would give a car, because he has a number of cars at his disposal.

Q: Approximately how much of your time did you spend supervising GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV?

A: I can't say.

Q: Was it the most important function?

A: Yes, it was important. All work in the First Section was important. This was the most important. But one day I could devote the whole day to code clerks, the next day maybe half the day, maybe two hours in the day. The rest of the day I will be absent. I will be meeting with KLYPIN, or I will be having a meeting with surveillance, or I will be at another place. The third day, again, maybe the whole day, maybe part of it. No, I can't tell you. It depends on the situation.

(iii) Additional Duties in KOVSHUK's Absence

As Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, one of NOSENKO's responsibilities was to serve as Acting Chief when KOVSHUK was absent from the office. NOSENKO recalled that he fulfilled this function during KOVSHUK's two 30-day leave periods in 1960 and 1961, but he did not remember when this leave occurred in those years. He also served as Acting Chief for about a month in the summer of 1960 when KOVSHUK was in the KGB hospital with heart trouble and for a week or two some time in 1961 when KOVSHUK was ill again. NOSENKO was unable to recall any operational or inspection trips that KOVSHUK made in 1960 or 1961, and the only other specific time that he could remember KOVSHUK being absent was for several days in connection with preparations for President Eisenhower's planned visit to the Soviet Union in 1960.

NOSENKO's description of his duties in KOVSHUK's absence was summarized in a protocol which he signed on 3 March 1965:

"I do not remember any particularly important operational decisions I made as Acting Chief of Section, nor any unusual things that happened during

these times. The only specific responsibility KOVSHUK had which I handled in his absence was to report to the Chief of the First Department about all mail going out of the First Section. I did not meet any of KOVSHUK's agents during his absences because there was no necessity to do so. His only Russian agent whom I remember was Ilya GLAZUNOV [KGB cryptonym "VRUBEL"], whom he transferred to FEDYANIN in 1960, I think. The only other agent of KOVSHUK's whom I remember was the correspondent Edmund STEVENS.* The only thing that was different for me as Acting Chief of the Section was that I had to go every day to see the Chief of the Department.

c. Supervisor of all Code Clerk Operations

(i) Introduction

Among the numerous KGB activities against American code clerks in Moscow which NOSENKO has discussed are five operations wherein the KGB intended or effected approaches for recruitment/defection purposes. According to NOSENKO, none was successful. The five major cases are reviewed separately below, one of them in the context of duty trips abroad by NOSENKO's subordinate KOSOLAPOV.**

NOSENKO said that, upon assuming responsibility for supervising operations against American code clerks, he found a very "difficult situation." Prior to the assignment of KOSOLAPOV to the U.S. Embassy Section in late 1959, all operations against code clerks had been handled by A.S. MALYUGIN, but during MALYUGIN's two years of effort there had been no operational approaches and no successes. When

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*The Edmund STEVENS case is discussed in Part V.C.2.

**GOLITSYN on 20 March 1962 identified KOSOLAPOV's photograph as that of a veteran KGB officer with whom he was personally acquainted. GOLITSYN said that KOSOLAPOV had entered the KGB in about 1952 and had served for two or three years as a member of the First [American] Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate under United Nations cover in New York City; subsequently he had worked for two or three years in the First Chief Directorate at KGB Headquarters. According to GOLITSYN, the bachelor KOSOLAPOV was transferred to the KGB Second Chief Directorate some time prior to 1960 in line with a KGB policy for only married men to be sent abroad. As of 1960, GOLITSYN said, KOSOLAPOV was working against code clerks stationed in the American Embassy in Moscow. He added that KOSOLAPOV speaks excellent English. Prior to GOLITSYN's identification, CIA had no indication of intelligence activity on KOSOLAPOV's part. Between February 1953 and April 1955 he was assigned to the United Nations Secretariat Translation Unit as a translator; in August 1958 he had been an interpreter at the Geneva Conference on Nuclear Test Detection; in September 1959 he accompanied KHRUSHCHEV on his trip to the United States (see Part V.E.3.d. which describes the role of NOSENKO's target John ABIDIAN in connection with the KHRUSHCHEV trip). KOSOLAPOV's English is flawless.

NOSENKO took over there were no active developmental operations against code clerks underway, and the only agents or operational contacts being used against them were poorly educated maids and waitresses, none of whom had accomplished anything of importance. No foreign agents were being used in operations against coderoom personnel, and at the time NOSENKO had no agents of his own in America House, or in the Embassy, who could be used in these operations.

In January or February of 1960 GRYAZNOV* was assigned to the U.S. Embassy Section as a second assistant to NOSENKO in his code clerk activities. From this point on, NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV, and GRYAZNOV shared the same KGB Headquarters office (Room 614). There all KGB files on American code clerks, as well as the files on agents available for work against them, were stored in one large safe, accessible to all three officers. NOSENKO supervised all of the section's work along these lines, and no provocations, compromises, recruitment attempts, or recruitments could have been planned or carried out without his prior knowledge and agreement

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*GOLITSYN first named GRYAZNOV as a case officer of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate, on 31 December 1961. He said at that time that he had been personally acquainted with GRYAZNOV since 1945 and that, as of the spring of 1960, GRYAZNOV was "working only against code clerks of the American Embassy in Moscow." GRYAZNOV had travelled to the United States at some time in the past, GOLITSYN added. [illegible] On 5 June 1962 GOLITSYN told CIA that he had been a classmate of GRYAZNOV during 1945 and 1946 at the "SMERSH" counterintelligence school in Moscow; he described GRYAZNOV as a specialist in operations against American code clerks, saying that GRYAZNOV was "very experienced" and had had "some successes." As an example, he told of having spoken to GRYAZNOV in the spring of 1960 while he, GOLITSYN, was visiting the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department in connection with his forthcoming assignment as a First Chief Directorate counterintelligence officer in Helsinki. GOLITSYN had complained to GRYAZNOV that the KGB had no U.S. assets in Helsinki at the time, and to CIA he quoted GRYAZNOV as replying: "Maybe we will help you." According to GOLITSYN, GRYAZNOV went on to explain that he was handling an agent, a code clerk in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, who was about to be transferred, perhaps to Helsinki; he told GOLITSYN that the KGB had received information from this American code clerk and classified him as a "real agent." NOSENKO has not mentioned such an agent (who has yet to be identified) and has denied that the KGB had any agents in the U.S. Embassy at this time. GOLITSYN identified a photograph of G.I. LAPIN, who travelled with the Moiseyev Dance troup to the United States and Canada in 1958, as being identical with GRYAZNOV. CIA had no prior indication of intelligence activities by GRYAZNOV, under the alias LAPIN, and had no traces on GRYAZNOV in true name.

when he was in Moscow. If NOSENKO went away on a trip, he said, he would have been told about any such activity upon his return.

When NOSENKO took over responsibility for operations against code clerks, he read available files on targets and agents, discussed the situation with MALYGIN, DEMKIN (the U.S. Embassy Section case officer responsible for the residents of America House), GRYAZNOV, and KOSOLAPOV, and reported his findings and recommendations to his superiors, KOVSHUK and KLYPIN. Several changes were made as a result. In introducing a new program for the work of the section, NOSENKO suggested the use of third-country nationals (not American and not Soviet) for agent work against code clerks; in line with this suggestion, he personally recruited a [redacted] military officer, [redacted] (cryptonym "SARDAR"), and directed him against the America House. (After his first few visits, [redacted] was specifically targetted against military code clerk Matthew ZUJUS.) Another such agent directly handled by NOSENKO was the Finnish businessman Johan PREISFREUND, who figured in the case of the military code clerk James STORSBERG. NOSENKO also suggested initiating activity against code clerks prior to their arrival in the USSR and specifically proposed that operational measures be undertaken or that operational possibilities be studied in Helsinki, the city through which most of the code clerks passed on their way to Moscow.

Finally, according to NOSENKO, none of the operations against code clerks was successful during the two years he spent as Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section, nor did the KGB have any success between January 1962 and January 1964, when NOSENKO left Moscow for Geneva. He stated that GRYAZNOV would have told him if any successful approaches had taken place during this latter period.

(ii) Approach to STORSBERG

From the start of his association with CIA, NOSENKO has emphasized that the primary mission of the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960 and 1961, during his incumbency as Deputy Chief of Section, was the recruitment of an American military cryptographer. He has explained the special stress placed on this requirement (vis-a-vis the recruitment of State Department code clerks) by saying that, while the KGB had broken certain U.S. State Department cipher systems and could read enciphered messages up to and including those classified "secret," there had been no such success with American military ciphers, which remained secure in this period. NOSENKO also has asserted repeatedly that the KGB had not been able to recruit any American code clerk, either State Department or military, during the years since the recruitment of "ANDREY" in 1953.*

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*See Part VI.D.3.b., which discusses the "ANDREY" case.

On the several operations against military code clerks which NOSENKO has described and in which he has claimed a personal role, his greatest detail and emphasis has been given to the case of James Harry STORSBERG. In 1962 NOSENKO said that, in line with GRIBANOV's instructions that he pay particular attention to code clerk operations, he devoted most of his time for almost a year to the STORSBERG operation, and played a personal role in the unsuccessful KGB approach; he described in the first person his conversation with STORSBERG. During the 1964 to 1966 period, NOSENKO denied not only that he had personally participated in this way but also that he had ever claimed to have done; he continued to say, however, that he supervised the operation from beginning to end. According to NOSENKO, this operation got under way with the recruitment of a third-national agent (Johan PREISFREUND, a Finn) some time in the first half of 1960. The specific aim in using this agent was to involve STORSBERG in compromising activities, which would then form the basis for the approach. The operation dragged on through 1960 and until the spring, summer, or autumn of 1961; at this time N.S. SKVORTSOV, a KGB officer, was introduced in the guise of a wealthy French businessman to continue the development of compromising information. PREISFREUND was then withdrawn from the operation. Several weeks later STORSBERG was approached, principally on the basis of his financial need, but he rejected the KGB bid and the operation was over. NOSENKO was certain that STORSBERG had not reported the approach and said that the KGB would use this fact as an additional element of pressure should STORSBERG again be posted outside the United States. NOSENKO also knew that GOLITSYN had reported to CIA concerning KGB modus operandi in this case as well as PREISFREUND's part in it.

GOLITSYN in early 1962 had, in fact, told CIA about PREISFREUND having been used by the KGB in an operation against an American stationed in Moscow. Contrary to NOSENKO's information, he said that this American had been approached--and recruited--by the KGB at the end of 1960.

A second item from GOLITSYN may also relate to the STORSBERG operation: GOLITSYN told of learning in the spring of 1960 that the KGB had developed a military code clerk in Moscow to the point that recruitment was virtually assured. According to U.S. Army records, only two military code clerks were stationed there at that time, STORSBERG and his superior William S. HURLEY, the military communications officer who additionally performed cryptographic duties. NOSENKO has said that there was no KGB operation against HURLEY, and HURLEY has reported no approach.

In addition to the detailed information given by NOSENKO on this case, the FBI and Army Intelligence have interviewed STORSBERG (who confirmed NOSENKO's account and denied recruitment) and CIA has talked to the KGB agent PREISFREUND (who also generally confirmed the information given by NOSENKO but did not know the outcome of the case). The results of these interviews, together with information from GOLITSYN and from other sources, are summarized in this order below.

January 1960:	STORSBERG arrived in Moscow (this date was supplied by the interrogator and was accepted by NOSENKO as accurate, which it is).
Early 1960:	PREISFREUND was recruited by KOVSHUK. (This was consistent with earlier statements, and NOSENKO had always said he first met PREISFREUND a week or so after his recruitment. On 21 October 1966, however, NOSENKO said that he and PREISFREUND first met "in the middle of 1960, in the summer of 1960." He subsequently stayed with the general date "mid-1960.")
Summer 1960:	PREISFREUND first supplied a woman to STORSBERG.
Early 1961:	Compromising photographs of STORSBERG and a Soviet female were first obtained at the Hotel Peking in Moscow.
About May 1961:	PREISFREUND was withdrawn from the operation and SKVORTSOV, alias MICHAUD, was introduced. (NOSENKO dated this by saying it was about three weeks before the approach to STORSBERG.)
June 1961:	Unsuccessful KGB approach to STORSBERG in the Leningrad Hotel, Moscow. (Earlier on 20 October 1966 NOSENKO had said that the approach was made "a month or a month and a half before STORSBERG left Moscow." Told that STORSBERG was reassigned in November 1961, NOSENKO said that the approach was in "June 1961, i.e., five months before STORSBERG's departure date. STORSBERG has reported that the approach was in October 1961; see below.)

NOSENKO was questioned further on the STORSBERG case later in the October 1966 interrogations. He asserted on 21 October that he had first met PREISFREUND in the summer of 1960 and that he continued to meet with him in his case officer capacity after the unsuccessful approach to STORSBERG. He saw PREISFREUND most recently, he said, in Moscow during 1963. NOSENKO also explained how PREISFREUND first came to know his true name: Initially NOSENKO was introduced to PREISFREUND only by first name and patronymic, Yuriy Ivanovich; on one occasion, however, NOSENKO was visiting PREISFREUND's hotel room in Moscow and "lost his KGB certificate" there. Thereafter PREISFREUND knew him as NOSENKO. On 25 October 1966, NOSENKO repeated his earlier statements that the STORSBERG case was the only one in which PREISFREUND participated, although he may have reported casually on other Americans he met during his visits to America House. For the first time he specifically named GRYAZNOV as the case officer holding the operational file on STORSBERG. He continued to maintain that he, NOSENKO, supervised the operation against STORSBERG.

(C) Information [illegible]

STORSBERG did not [illegible] until he was interviewed by [illegible]

STORSBERG was interviewed by the F[illegible] on 14 and 18 September 1964 in connection with [illegible]. (He had not been identified on the basis of [illegible] information.)

** Official records, indicate that [illegible] was transferred from Moscow to Lisbon, Portugal, in August 1961. If these records are correct, STORSBERG could not have seen MORONE with MICHAUD on this night in October 1961.

* This is in reference to NOSENKO's statement that PREISFREUND involved STORSBERG in speculation which PREISFRUEND also claimed; see also GOLITSYN's second lead, discussed below.

(c) Information from PREISFREUND

CIA initially interviewed PREISFREUND on 8 July 1965 in Helsinki. (NOSENKO himself had suggested that PREISFREUND would confirm his story of the STORSBERG case.) During this first meeting with him, PREISFREUND correctly identified photographs of KOVSHUK, NOSENKO, and STORSBERG. He maintained, however, that his relationship with KOVSHUK and NOSENKO was strictly on a business level, that he had never had anything to do with the KGB, and that he did not know what the initials "KGB" stand for. Toward the end of this meeting, PREISFREUND allowed that he may have been unwittingly involved in some activity against STORSBERG and agreed to tell the "entire truth" the following day.

On 9 July 1965 PREISFREUND described how he had been caught in a blackmarket operation in Moscow and was, on this basis, recruited by KOVSHUK "either at the end of 1959 or early 1960." Several weeks later, he said, he was approached by NOSENKO who explained that KOVSHUK was unavailable and that the KGB wanted him, PREISFREUND, to arrange an introduction between STORSBERG and a Soviet female, Irina, the daughter of a Soviet general.* PREISFREUND then left Moscow, and when he returned about two months later, he took STORSBERG to the Peking Restaurant, where the introduction was effected. PREISFREUND, STORSBERG, Irina, and another girl then went to PREISFREUND's hotel, where STORSBERG and Irina were intimate.

PREISFREUND said on 10 July 1965 that he was fairly certain his recruitment took place in early 1960, probably in March or April. At the time KOVSHUK had refused to explain what the KGB wanted him to do; he said only that they would talk about it later but assured PREISFREUND that he would not be asked to undertake anything detrimental to Finnish interests; nor did KOVSHUK establish any means of communications with PREISFREUND, telling him only that the KGB would know where to find him. PREISFREUND subsequently visited the USSR on several occasions, but no contacts were made. Just as he was beginning to believe that the affair had been forgotten, NOSENKO contacted him at his room in the Berlin Hotel in Moscow. Asked to explain his earlier statement that NOSENKO first met with him two weeks after the recruitment, PREISFREUND said he could not remember exactly how long it was, but that it was definitely on another trip to Moscow and that it was probably several months later.

PREISFREUND was asked how he had first met STORSBERG. He first replied that it had been at America House and recalled that NOSENKO had simply told him to go there and "find Jim;" it was only with some difficulty that he finally managed to strike up an acquaintance at the bar. On second thought, PREISFREUND said, he may have first met STORSBERG at the sauna in the Finnish Embassy in Moscow through a mutual Finnish acquaintance. Throughout this initial period, NOSENKO and KOVSHUK made repeated promises that once the introduction of STORSBERG to the Soviet female had been accomplished, there would be no more demands made of PREISFREUND by the KGB. PREISFREUND added:

* According to NOSENKO, this was Irina LEBEDOVSKAYA, an agent of the U.S. Embassy Section who was handled by A.V. SUNTSOV.

"Both NOSENKO and KOVSHUK used to make all sorts of promises to me about helping me out in my business and so on, but they never did a damn thing for me. On the contrary. The only promise they kept was that I would not be asked to do anything except the STORSBERG job. But, as for the rest of it, they didn't help me at all."

PREISFREUND was eventually successful, he said, in introducing STORSBERG to Irina as NOSENKO wished and the three of them returned to PREISFREUND's hotel room on a summer evening. PREISFREUND slept in the hotel corridor while STORSBERG and Irina shared his bed. He told his CIA interviewers on 10 July 1965 that at one point during the evening he caught a glimpse of NOSENKO in the corridor wearing a rubber apron and from this deduced that NOSENKO had been taking surreptitious photographs of STORSBERG and Irina together.* On orders from NOSENKO and KOVSHUK, it was the last time he saw STORSBERG.**

Toward the end of the 10 July 1965 meeting PREISFREUND said that about six months elapsed between his recruitment and the beginning of his involvement with STORSBERG. "The job," he said, "dragged out a long time." He reaffirmed that this was the only operation in which he participated and that he had told to the best of his ability all he knew of it. He admitted that he was a heavy drinker and said that for this reason he could not be sure about his dates. PREISFREUND added that he would not have forgotten, however, if he had performed other services for the KGB.

PREISFREUND was shown GOLITSYN's photograph and remarked: "Was he here [in Finland]? I don't know him." Shown the photograph during a later meeting, he said that he had once invited a large group of Soviets to go fishing with him in Finland and that this person may have been among them. When given the name KLIMOV, which GOLITSYN used in Finland in 1960 and 1961, and told that it was an alias, PREISFREUND asked whether KLIMOV had signed visas. He was told this was correct and was asked for the true name. PREISFREUND replied: "GOLUB? Yes?"

At the close of the 10 July 1965 meeting, PREISFREUND mentioned to his interviewers that he was planning to travel to Leningrad by automobile with his family for about five days, beginning on or about 23 July. He said that he had learned from his business contacts in Moscow and from hotel personnel there that the Soviet authorities suspected him of complicity in NOSENKO's defection and was therefore apprehensive of the forthcoming trip.*** He said that he was particularly concerned about

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* NOSENKO has not mentioned this.

** PREISFREUND could not date this occasion precisely; he said it was probably before the time he accidentally caused a fire in a Moscow hotel, which was in 1961. [redacted]

*** An official [redacted] liaison service has advised CIA that in discussions with V. Ya. CHEKALOV, the Chief of the KGB Ninth (Guards) Directorate [redacted], a representative of that service was asked by CHEKALOV for whom PREISFREUND was working during his frequent visits to the Soviet Union. CHEKALOV told the representative of the [redacted] liaison [redacted] service that PREISFREUND is considered to be an agent of American Intelligence.

what his response should be if the KGB accused him of confessing to American Intelligence and asked his interviewers to brief him in this regard. During the final CIA meeting on 13 July 1965 PREISFREUND said that he had decided that the situation was too dangerous; he would not be going to the USSR after all. Reliable information shows, however, that he did go to the Soviet Union several days later, returning to Helsinki on 24 July 1965.

(d) Information from GOLITSYN

GOLITSYN, who had served the KGB most recently as a counter-intelligence officer in Helsinki during 1960 and 1961, reported separately two possibly related leads to operations against American personnel assigned to the United States Embassy in Moscow. One of these was a developmental operation against a military code clerk which the KGB felt was almost certain of success, the other a recruitment approach to an Embassy employee which GOLITSYN was told had been successful. GOLITSYN learned these two items of information from different KGB Second Chief Directorate officers at different times.

GOLITSYN provided the first of these leads on 23 December 1961, when he reported information he said he learned during conversations with his personal friend GRYAZNOV at KGB Headquarters in Moscow some time between April and July 1960.* At that time GOLITSYN was visiting the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate in connection with his preparations for assignment in Helsinki as a First Chief Directorate counter-intelligence officer. GRYAZNOV told GOLITSYN that he, GRYAZNOV, had personally prepared an operation involving an American military code clerk to the point that the KGB was "99 per cent sure" that the recruitment approach to this code clerk would be successful. GOLITSYN subsequently narrowed the time of his conversation with GRYAZNOV down to "April or May 1960" and quoted GRYAZNOV as saying that the KGB "is certain that the recruitment is prepared and will be successful." GOLITSYN also said that the recruitment plan for this operation "evidently involved a woman," but could provide no further details. During these same talks, according to GOLITSYN, GRYAZNOV said that although the KGB had earlier recruited U.S. Department of State code clerks in Moscow, this would be the first recruitment of a code clerk in the office of the American Military Attache since the establishment of the Second Chief Directorate's American Department (in the 1940's).

GOLITSYN reported on the second operation on 26 February 1962, while discussing the KGB agent PREISFREUND. GOLITSYN said that he first met PREISFREUND when the latter went to the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki in connection with an application for travel to the USSR. On several later occasions, GOLITSYN said, the two men had drinks together in Helsinki cafes. According to GOLITSYN, PREISFREUND had been used in the recruitment in Moscow of at least one American who "could have been a code clerk or a diplomat." He also knew that the recruitment had been accomplished "in 1960, at the end of 1960" and that PREISFREUND, having met the target at America House in Moscow, had helped to set up the target for the recruitment approach by involving him in speculatory activities and by arranging his introduction to various KGB female agents. GOLITSYN thought that PREISFREUND had dropped out of the case after "he had helped to create the circumstances" and had not taken a direct part in

* According to NOSENKO, he himself was GRYAZNOV's superior at this time. NOSENKO did not recall visits by GOLITSYN to the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960.

the approach, which was made by KGB officers. During an interview by the FBI on 18 June 1962, GOLITSYN [redacted]

This second lead, GOLITSYN said, stemmed from his conversations with KOVSHUK whom he said was the "assistant" (chief) of the American Department,* while GOLITSYN was temporarily in Moscow during "December 1960."** GOLITSYN related that he had visited the American Department to request permission to use PREISFREUND operationally in Helsinki. This request was refused with the explanation: "You see, he (PREISFREUND) helped us in one recruitment now, and it is necessary to be careful for about six months

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* GOLITSYN could mean either Pomoshchik (assistant) or Zamestitel' (deputy). The CHEREPANOV papers show that KOVSHUK was Deputy Chief of the Department as late as 1959. NOSENKO said that, as a result of a drinking incident, KOVSHUK was demoted from Deputy Chief of the American Department to Chief of its American Embassy Section in 1959 and held this position until early 1962. GOLITSYN said he had known KOVSHUK for about ten years and characterized him as a capable officer with about 15 years of KGB experience, at least ten of them in the American Department, Second Chief Directorate. In about 1956, according to GOLITSYN, KOVSHUK was handling KGB agent Henry SHAPIRO. CIA records show that in addition, KOVSHUK was involved in the Moscow and Washington phases of the "ANDREY" case (he was identified by Dayle SMITH; see Part VI.D.3.b.) and in the development in Moscow of CIA officer George WINTERS (who identified his photograph; see Part VI.D.7.c.). According to NOSENKO, KOVSHUK took personal part in the recruitments of Roy RHODES and Dayle SMITH, in the approach to Army Attache Walter MULE, code clerk Louis MANNHEIM, State Department Officer Richard HARMSTONE, and code clerk James STORSBERG, and in the interrogations of CIA officers Russell LANGELLE and Richard JACOB.

**GOLITSYN's passport and travel records held by CIA confirm that GOLITSYN travelled only twice to the Soviet Union after his arrival in Helsinki on 20 July 1960. The first of these trips was on 19 January 1961, when he flew directly from Helsinki to Moscow; he returned to Helsinki by rail a week later, on 28 January. GOLITSYN's second trip to the Soviet Union was from 9 to 15 April 1961, when he appears to have spent all or most of this period in Leningrad. A Finnish national, whom GOLITSYN had been developing in Helsinki, has reported that he met with GOLITSYN in Leningrad on a daily basis from 10 through 13 April 1961. Moreover, GOLITSYN has never mentioned being in Moscow during this time. Since GOLITSYN remained in Helsinki from April until December 1961, when he defected, it appears that he erred by one month in reporting the date of his conversations in the American Department and that he learned of the second lead some time during the week of 19 January 1961. This is the same conversation of which NOSENKO spoke several times in 1962 and subsequently (see above). NOSENKO has always maintained that he was out of Moscow on leave at the time of GOLITSYN's visit and that this was in the summer of 1961. When he was told in February 1965 that GOLITSYN was in Moscow in January 1961, NOSENKO replied that CIA was either wrong or was attempting to deceive him. NOSENKO declined to change his story of the summer leave.

(e) Information from other Sources

Information available to CIA indicates that the Attaches of the three U.S. military services represented in Moscow shared a single cryptographic center as of 1960 and 1961 and that, except for overlapping assignments during periods of turnover, there was normally only one military code clerk assigned to the Embassy at any particular time. This military code clerk was responsible for enciphering and deciphering the traffic of all three military services. In practice, at least one other member of the Attache staff in Moscow has held a cryptographic clearance and has been trained and has performed the function of back-up for the military code clerk during periods of the latter's absence from the Moscow Embassy or inability to perform his functions for other reasons.

STORSBERG was the only military code clerk assigned to the Moscow Embassy from February 1960, when his predecessor, Everett HOBSON, was reassigned, until September 1961, when his successor, Mathew ZUJUS, arrived. STORSBERG himself arrived in Moscow in January 1960 and departed in November 1961.

During the period of STORSBERG's tour in Moscow, back-up cryptographic duties were performed by the Military Communications Officer, CWO-2 HURLEY. HURLEY performed these duties on a number of occasions, including the night of the approach to STORSBERG, and he could be loosely termed a code clerk.* Additionally, he performed repair work on the cryptographic machines and directed certain other sensitive activities at the Embassy. HURLEY's tour in Moscow began shortly before STORSBERG's, in December 1959, and he served there until June or July 1962.

The only other person performing official functions in the military code room during the 1960-1961 period was James KEYSERS, who arrived in Moscow on 22 December 1960 and was assigned to the office of the Air Force Medical Officer. As a concurrent secondary assignment, KEYSERS worked as a clerk-typist in the office of the Air Attache. From February until mid-April 1961, as a collateral duty, KEYSERS worked in the joint military code room where he was in training to serve as back-up cryptographer. He was relieved of this duty in April 1961 for reasons of low

* Although NOSENKO has distinguished between STORSBERG's function as "military code clerk" and HURLEY's duties as "military code machine mechanic," he said on one occasion that he considered both to be within the general category of "military code clerks." NOSENKO reported that there was no KGB operation against HURLEY.

aptitude and lack of interest; in June 1961 he was removed from Moscow because of reported homosexual activities.*

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* NOSENKO has described an operation against KEYSERS (see below), but because of the date of KEYSERS' arrival in Moscow, he must be ruled out as a candidate for the first of GOLITSYN's two leads discussed above. On the basis of available information, it appears that the subject of this lead must have been either STORSBERG or HURLEY, the only two "military code clerks" in Moscow in the spring of 1960. The subject of GOLITSYN's second lead could have been STORSBERG, HURLEY, or, in fact, anyone else at the Embassy, although GOLITSYN suggested that he might be a code clerk and might be a military man. By his statement that there was no KGB operation against HURLEY, together with his description of the operation against STORSBERG beginning in the spring of 1960 and his (and PREISFREUND's) assertion that PREISFREUND took part in only one operation for the KGB--that against STORSBERG--NOSENKO has said in effect that both of GOLITSYN's leads were to the STORSBERG operation, which ended in failure. This conflicts with GOLITSYN's report that PREISFREUND was involved in a successful recruitment operation in late 1960. There are also inconsistencies between the NOSENKO and GOLITSYN leads as regards the progress of the operation. GOLITSYN reported that recruitment of a code clerk was "99 per cent" assured in May-June 1960, whereas NOSENKO and PREISFREUND describe an operation which, at best, was just becoming active at that time. GOLITSYN, in reporting his second lead, said that the operation in which PREISFREUND participated culminated "in late 1960;" NOSENKO reported that the only operation in which PREISFREUND took part ended in an unsuccessful approach to STORSBERG in "mid-1961" or, on other occasions, in "autumn 1961."

(iii) TDY's by KOSOLAPOV on Code Clerk Cases

(a) Introduction

According to NOSENKO, the U.S. Embassy Section officer KOSOLAPOV travelled only once to Helsinki, and KOSOLAPOV at that time succeeded in his mission of accompanying--together with a KGB female agent--a suspected American code clerk, Paul Francis JENNER, by train to Moscow. (The KGB later learned that JENNER was not a code clerk but a pouch clerk who also met couriers at the Moscow airport, NOSENKO said, and this KGB identification of JENNER's specialty is confirmed by U.S. Department of State files.) The report by NOSENKO on KOSOLAPOV is contradicted by two sources, travel records available to CIA and the KGB defector GOLITSYN.

Statements made by JENNER in 1960 and 1962 parallel those of NOSENKO in 1964 and 1965 to the extent that two young Soviets, a man and a woman, did converse with him on the train, and later JENNER did encounter the same woman at a Moscow airport. Nevertheless, travel records contradict NOSENKO's statement that KOSOLAPOV was the Soviet male aboard the train with JENNER on the 24-hour journey.

Although NOSENKO insisted that KOSOLAPOV was on a single TDY to Finland, in early 1960, travel records show that KOSOLAPOV (under a different identity) went to Helsinki in both the spring and fall of 1960. Travel records on the second Helsinki TDY by KOSOLAPOV, on which NOSENKO has not reported, are borne out by GOLITSYN. GOLITSYN said that KOSOLAPOV, in order to lay the groundwork for a future relationship in Moscow, accompanied a U.S. Embassy code clerk by train from Helsinki about November 1960, or perhaps as late as the beginning of 1961. Again on the basis of travel records, it has been determined that on 16 November 1960 KOSOLAPOV was a fellow passenger of an American code clerk named John W. GARLAND on the daily train from Helsinki to Moscow.

The following discussion of the TDY's of KOSOLAPOV is divided into three parts: KOSOLAPOV's false identity for travel, the early 1960 TDY, and the November 1960 TDY. Each part incorporates the information from all sources, including NOSENKO.

(b) False Identity for Travel

Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV was born in Perm' on 19 February 1928. According to travel records, one Viktor Dmitriyevich KOLOSOV, born in Perm' on 19 March 1927, was in Finland from 31 March to 2 April 1960, in Finland from 12 to 16 November 1960, and in Denmark from 25 October to 1 November 1961.* In July 1965, Johan PREISFREUND (see Part V.E.3.c.ii. on STORSBERG operation) identified for CIA a photograph of KOLOSOV as that of a KGB officer named Vadim (last name unknown) who approached him in Moscow

* NOSENKO reported that KOSOLAPOV travelled to Copenhagen in 1961 to recontact the YOUNGERs, an American man and wife who were arrested for espionage and recruited by the KGB while touring the USSR in 1961 (see Part VI.D.2.).

in the fall of 1964 to ask whether he knew anything about NOSENKO's defection. Shown KOLOSOV's photograph in October 1966, NOSENKO immediately identified him as KOSOLAPOV.

NOSENKO told the FBI [illegible] Subsequently CIA prepared a protocol, which NOSENKO read and signed, corroborating its accuracy. This protocol reads:

"I do not know about this trip of KOSOLAPOV's to Helsinki in November 1960. I do not know that he accompanied a code clerk back to Moscow at that time.

"I was KOSOLAPOV's direct supervisor from January 1960 to January 1962 and would have to know and approve any operational travel by KOSOLAPOV outside the USSR. In the case of his trip in March 1960 to Helsinki to accompany Paul JENNER, I talked with him about it, and then approved after he wrote it, the cable to the Helsinki residentura (Legal Residency) informing them of his mission, and of course received his report after the trip.

"Normally, I would know about and approve this trip in advance. If I were away at the time, normally I would have heard about the trip upon my return. However, I don't remember anything about this trip either before or after KOSOLAPOV's trip to Helsinki. If there were further developments in this case, I certainly would have known about them."*

(c) The Early 1960 TDY (JENNER Case)

NOSENKO first mentioned a TDY by KOSOLAPOV in an interview by the FBI. [illegible]

* NOSENKO reminded his interviewer that he had travelled to Cuba in November 1960. He was told that CIA travel records show that he transitted Amsterdam on a direct flight to Cuba from Moscow on 15 November 1960, three days after KOSOLAPOV arrived in Helsinki. NOSENKO was then asked if he would have learned of the trip in any case, whether or not he was in Moscow, and he stated that he would have.

** [illegible]

NOSENKO was interrogated by CIA on the JENNER case on 15 February 1965. On the basis of this interrogation, a protocol was drawn up in question-and-answer form, incorporating NOSENKO's responses, and on 19 February 1965, NOSENKO signed the protocol, attesting to its accuracy. The following is taken from this signed statement:

Question: Did you supervise the work against JENNER?

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: Did you read the file on JENNER?

NOSENKO: I don't remember.

Question: Did you read reports on JENNER?

NOSENKO: Yes, I read materials on JENNER, everything which came into the section on JENNER and the other code clerks.

Question: Did you ever see JENNER personally?

NOSENKO: Yes. We had his *anketa* [visa application].

Question: What was the operational plan on JENNER?

NOSENKO: Before his arrival we had only the *anketa*, nothing more. He was listed as secretary/archivist,* and there was a date on this *anketa* which was the date he was due to cross the Finnish border--the middle of the month, the 15th. It was the beginning of 1960, not long after I had arrived in the First Department. We decided to create an active operation. We knew the date, and we thought he was to

* The position of secretary/archivist at the U.S. Embassy in in Moscow was usually occupied by a code clerk, but as previously stated, this was not true in JENNER's case.

be a code clerk. We wanted to send KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki with the mission of returning with JENNER on the same train, during which time KOSOLAPOV was to study his behavior. JENNER was young and so was KOSOLAPOV.

Question: How old was JENNER at the time?

NOSENKO: I don't know. We sent GRYAZNOV's agent, a ballerina, to Vyborg as part of this operation. I think her first name is Yeva, but I don't remember her last name; her code name was "SOLISTKA"... She was placed on the train in Vyborg as if she had been visiting someone there and was returning to Moscow. The main idea was to place an agent near JENNER before he even arrived in Moscow. We wrote a proposal to the Chairman of the KGB giving the reasons for doing this. We explained that we had usually only one year in which to work. The agent "SOLISTKA" met JENNER and spoke with him. KOSOLAPOV also became acquainted with JENNER and spoke with him, but I can't say that they were all speaking together at one time. She gave JENNER a telephone number.

Question: A KGB telephone number?

NOSENKO: Of course not; it was her own telephone number, but he didn't call her. We then noticed that he wasn't working in the code room but in the mail room. O.K., that was interesting too. We waited one or two months for the call to come, but nothing happened. When JENNER once went to the railroad station or airport alone to meet the couriers, we sent her with GRYAZNOV by car in an attempt to have them meet again. JENNER saw her but did not approach [her]. Instead, he turned in the other direction. Only later did we learn that he is a very quiet person. There was nothing else on JENNER at all except a suspicion that he may have been a homosexual, but there was no proof. He was like a child.

Question: How much time did you have between the time of the anketa's arrival and the time of JENNER's arrival?

NOSENKO: A month, plenty of time to prepare.

Question: A month?

NOSENKO: Well, approximately a month. The usual approval from the Central Committee was necessary so that KOSOLAPOV could go abroad.

Question: Who wrote this?

NOSENKO: I prepared the kharakteristika [official form] on KOSOLAPOV for this TDY and gave it to the Personnel Office.

Question: Whose idea was it for this Helsinki operation against JENNER?

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NOSENKO: It was the idea of the group.

Question: Did you advise KOSOLAPOV on what his role was to be before he left--what he was to do?

NOSENKO: I was discussing this case with GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV, and maybe we discussed it with KOVSHUK on the day before KOSOLAPOV left.

Question: Was "SOLISTKA" an experienced agent?

NOSENKO: She had been working before 1960, but I don't know for how long.

Question: Who handled her before GRYAZNOV?

NOSENKO: I don't know.

Question: How did you coordinate this trip of KOSOLAPOV's with other units, for example, with the [KGB] First Chief Directorate (FCD)?

NOSENKO: KOSOLAPOV wrote a cable saying that he was coming for two or three days.

Question: Did you approve this cable?

NOSENKO: I didn't sign it, but I read it, and then we took it to KLYPIN for his signature. Once it was signed, KOSOLAPOV took it to the Second [European] Department, FCD.

Question: What cover did KOSOLAPOV use for this trip?

NOSENKO: I don't remember.

Question: What name did KOSOLAPOV use?

NOSENKO: I don't remember if he used his own name or another.

Question: What other correspondence was there?

NOSENKO: Correspondence?

Question: What other cables or letters were sent to or received from the Helsinki Rezidentura [Legal Residency of the KGB] concerning this operation, KOSOLAPOV's trip?

NOSENKO: Only this cable, nothing else. KOSOLAPOV was to discuss with the Rezidentura the possibility of obtaining their help in Helsinki with the work against code clerks, to see what agents they had, or to study the situation, the possibilities. We wanted to use agents against the code clerks in hotels and restaurants, to use girls...

Question: With whom was KOSOLAPOV to speak in Helsinki?

NOSENKO: He spoke with the Resident and the Deputy Resident. He discussed this question with them and they said they would see about it, but we were told that the Residency has more important questions.

Question: What was more important than the work against code clerks?

NOSENKO: They didn't tell us.

Question: Well, wasn't there some sign, some hint as to what was so important?

NOSENKO: Code clerks in Helsinki would be more important for them; this is the work of the FCD.

Question: How did KOSOLAPOV know how to find JENNER, to recognize him and make contact?

NOSENKO: KOSOLAPOV had his photograph, knew his name, and with the help of the Residency, I think, they found out at the railroad station who was going on the train. Then they bought a ticket on the same train for KOSOLAPOV. We knew JENNER must cross on the 15th.

Question: When did KOSOLAPOV leave for his trip to Helsinki?

NOSENKO: I don't know.

Question: When did he return?

NOSENKO: I don't know, don't remember.

Question: How long was KOSOLAPOV gone in all?

NOSENKO: About one week, not more than one week counting travel time.

Question: How did KOSOLAPOV travel to Helsinki?

NOSENKO: By train, both ways.

Question: Was he alone on the way down or did someone go with him?

NOSENKO: He was alone.

Question: How did you arrange for "SOLISTKA" to board the right train?

NOSENKO: GRYAZNOV sent "SOLISTKA" alone to Vyborg and had the local KGB officers there meet her and place her on the correct train. They knew the date and would establish the fact that KOSOLAPOV was on that train before placing her aboard...

Also on 15 February 1965 NOSENKO made the following additional statement not included in the protocol: "The agent was 'SOLISTKA.' She was GRYAZNOV's agent even before 1960. GRYAZNOV briefed her for the mission... KOSOLAPOV wrote a report on

his trip. Nothing unusual or interesting in it. 'SOLISTKA' also gave a report to GRYAZNOV, but there was nothing there, either."

NOSENKO was questioned on 20 October 1966 about his responsibility for and knowledgeability of KGB operations against American code clerks. He was required to give only brief answers, without discussion, to specific questions. The CIA questions and his answers were as follows:

Question: Did you supervise all code clerk operations in 1960 and 1961?

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: Were GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV your subordinates during this period?

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: How many times did KOSOLAPOV travel to Helsinki in order to travel to Moscow on the train with American code clerks?

NOSENKO: I know of one.

Question: When was that? Which one?

NOSENKO: Don't remember. 15 March or April 1960.

Question: Which code clerk?

NOSENKO: It wasn't a code clerk. When he arrived it was found that he worked with the mail. He came as a secretary/archivist and the First [U.S. Embassy] Section thought he is a code clerk. Found out later that he worked on the mail.

Question: JENNER?

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: Do you know of any others?

NOSENKO: No. What do you mean?

Question: Only one?

NOSENKO: Only one--JENNER.

Question: Was the operation successful?

NOSENKO: No it wasn't successful. But it was interesting. It was the first try to send an officer to Helsinki.

Question: When did it happen?

NOSENKO: First part of 1960. I think approximately 15 March or April.

Question: Other than the trip to meet JENNER, did KOSOLAPOV make other trips abroad?

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NOSENKO: He went to Copenhagen to meet this couple [the YOUNGERs] and was in the United States at one of the General Assemblies. That's all. That was in the '50's. No others.

Question: Did KOSOLAPOV personally meet JENNER?

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: Did you read his report of this meeting?

NOSENKO: Yes.

When on 26 October 1966 NOSENKO was shown the KOLOSOV photograph for the first time, the following discussion ensued:

Question: Do you know the person in this photograph, number 17 [Viktor Dmitriyevich KOLOSOV, employee of Vneshtorg, born 19 March 1927 in Perm, USSR]?

NOSENKO: KOSOLAPOV, Vadim KOSOLAPOV, the former case officer of First Chief Directorate, First Department. From '59, the end of '59, case officer of the First Department, Second Chief Directorate.

Question: We have information that a Viktor--

NOSENKO: (interrupts) Vadim Viktorovich.

Question: Anything else you want to say about the name?

NOSENKO: KOSOLAPOV.

Question: Concerning his travel to Helsinki by train in March of 1960 under cover of Vneshtorg, does that mean anything to you?

NOSENKO: I was telling you that there was trip when he was returning with Paul JENNER.

Question: JENNER, the code clerk?

NOSENKO: He was secretary/archivist, but he wasn't working as a code clerk. He was working with mail.

Question: Well, according to official records he arrived in Helsinki by train from Moscow.

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: On the 31st of March 1960.

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: And he went to meet JENNER, to come back on the train with him. Right?

NOSENKO: I was thinking and I'm not sure. '60 or '61. I'm not sure. '60 or '61. I'm not sure. I'm not sure '60 or '61. I was telling '60, but I'm not sure. Anyway, I cannot tell exactly. I know he was in Helsinki, that he was going to Helsinki.

SECRET

Finnish Travel Manifests for 31 March and 2 April 1960 (See Part V.E.3.c.iii)

[illegible] Junalla [illegible] Vainikkalan [illegible]

	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1	Jenner, Paul Francis	arkist.eht[illegible]	[illegible].[illegible]7.23	U S A:n	U S A - Mosk. /Y	
2						
3						
4						
5						
6						
7				Passintarkastaja:	[signature]	
8				V.t.[illegible]	[illegible]	
9						
10						
11						
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22						

31 March 1960

[illegible] Junalla [illegible] Vainikkalan [illegible]

	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1	[illegible], [illegible] Vilhelm	[illegible]	19.04.23	[illegible]	[illegible]-Afganistan/Y	
2	[illegible], Sofia	konttoristi	[illegible]	Kreikan	[illegible]-Mosk./Y	[illegible]
3	Kolesov, Viktor	[illegible] virkailija	19.03.27	N:liiton	Hki. - Mosk.	[illegible]/Mosk.
4	[illegible]:			[illegible]:		
5	Korhonen, Jouko Aarre [illegible] V	työmies	26.11.24	Joensuu	Joensuu-Mosk. alue	[illegible] viis.
6	[illegible], Kirsti [illegible] V	[illegible]	24.07.23	Jyväskylä	Jyväskylä-[illegible]	(15pv.viis.)
7	[illegible], Tyyne Kyllikki V	rouva	03.09.21	"	"	"
8	[illegible], [illegible] Helena V Vak	"	23.07.22	Lahti		
9	[illegible], Aare Viljam V Vak	opettaja	12.07.28	"	Lahti-Zaporoje	(15pv.viis.)
10	[illegible], Toivo Erkki V Vak	var.hoit.	27.03.22	"		
11	[illegible], Erkki Olavi V Vak	kirv.mies	09.08.29	"		
12	[illegible], Otto Allan V	toimittaja	[illegible].12.17	Helsinki		
13	[illegible], Antti V	liitt.siht.	12.04.28	"		
14	[illegible], Unto Mattias V	[illegible] siht.	13.12.16	[illegible]	Hki. - Mosk.	(15pv.viis.)
15	Järvinen, Aarne Juhani V [illegible]	varastomies	[illegible].01.34	Toijala		
16	[illegible], Judith Josefina V	[illegible] apul.	03.03.18	Helsinki		
17						
18						
19				Passintarkastaja:	[signature]	
20				V.t.[illegible]	[illegible]	
21						
22						

2 April 1960

SECRET

TOP SECRET

Question: It's 1960. He made a trip in 1960, in March, to Helsinki by train using this name, KOLOSOV, and using this cover, Vneshtorg, and we also have a report from official Finnish sources that he left Helsinki by train on 2 April 1960 and went to Moscow.

NOSENKO: I don't remember the dates. Don't remember. Must be 15 March or 1 April, 15 March or 1 April.

Question: No, he didn't arrive until 31 March. We have the official record on his travel. We have his photo here, which you just saw.

NOSENKO: On the visa certificate, anketa, with this picture of Paul JENNER, it was said that he must come; we knew that he must come 1 April or 15 March, or something of this kind.

Question: But we have the official records showing KOLOSOV's, or KOSOLAPOV's, arrival on 31 March.

NOSENKO: I cannot give you any details. All I have said, everything what I knew. If you need something on KOSOLAPOV, I will try to remember.

Question: The interesting thing is KOLOSOV, or KOSOLAPOV, left Helsinki on 2 April. JENNER, Paul JENNER, according to the same official sources, left Helsinki by train to go to Moscow on the 31st. Two days before.

NOSENKO: They were going in one train.

Question: They weren't even on the same train.

NOSENKO: Here, please, they were going in one train.

Question: KOSOLAPOV remained in Helsinki.

NOSENKO: (interrupts) KOSOLAPOV in one even carriage, in one even carriage with Paul JENNER. Then...

Question: (interrupts) How do you know this for sure?

NOSENKO: I was reading his report after his coming. I was reading also the agent's report of the female agent who was put in this carriage, in this carriage in this train, and at the station Vyborg, the first Soviet station, Vyborg, where she was taken by GRYAZNOV, and was put in the same carriage, and she was acquainted with JENNER. And later, it was a try, as I was telling, to show her to JENNER, but JENNER didn't want to have a contact with her. That's all. It was finished... And she was acquainted with him and was speaking with JENNER, and KOSOLAPOV himself was speaking with JENNER... I was reading KOSOLAPOV's otchet [official account] about his [trip].

Question: That's quite possible. It's quite possible that they gave you a report to read concerning this. But it is a fact that official records show that the two men were not on the same train. They were two days apart.

NOSENKO: No (whispered).

Question: JENNER left on the 31st.

NOSENKO: I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. Maybe this is a mistake of Finnish officials. I don't know, but he was on the same train and he was returning from Helsinki with Paul JENNER. The same train, the same carriage.

The remaining information on KOSOLAPOV's TDY in early 1960 comes from other sources:

- After arriving in Moscow on 1 April 1960, JENNER reported that he was approached on the train from Helsinki by two young Russians, "a boy and a girl, probably university students."* The two Russians struck up a conversation and were soon baiting him on the question of racial discrimination in the United States. They said that they might see JENNER in Moscow. About three months later, on 29 June, JENNER was performing his normal duty of escorting Embassy couriers to Sheremetevo Airport when he was again approached by the Russian girl, Yuli, who acted surprised to see him and asked him to go outside to talk. Yuli explained that she was waiting to say goodbye to a friend who was leaving on a flight to Irkutsk (JENNER had seen the Irkutsk flight depart a half hour earlier) and told JENNER that her male companion on the train trip to Moscow, Yura, had returned to his studies in Vyborg. Interspersed with Yuli's questions concerning JENNER's impressions and personal activities in Moscow were others about how often he came to the airport and how he liked his job at the Embassy. When JENNER said he must leave, she gave him her telephone number in Moscow and insisted that he call her.** She advised JENNER that "it would be better if you did not mention our conversation to anyone."

- Besides information about his Soviet companions on the Moscow journey, JENNER also told U.S. Department of State security officials about sexual advances made by his first maid in Moscow and about provocative clothing worn by his second maid. (NOSENKO has not indicated that either of these two women was a KGB agent, but has said in another context that all maids of American code clerks were KGB agents or informants.)

- CIA investigations showed that I. Ye. SERGEYEV, a KGB officer and the Soviet Consul in Helsinki, contacted the police chief there on 31 March 1960 to ask his assistance in locating an American named Paul F. JENNER who was due to arrive in Helsinki the day before.*** SERGEYEV explained that he had some "business" with JENNER, but he

* KOSOLAPOV was 32 years of age at the time.

** NOSENKO has mentioned several times that GRYAZNOV's agent "SOLISTKA" gave JENNER her telephone number.

***GOLITSYN identified the Helsinki police chief as a Soviet Intelligence agent from "about 1945 on."

did not specify its nature. Reportedly this was the first time that SERGEYEV had made such a request of the police chief.*

- CIA travel records show that JENNER arrived in Helsinki en route to Moscow on 30 March 1960 and departed by train the following day. KOSOLAPOV arrived in Helsinki the same day that JENNER left, 31 March 1960, and remained there until 2 April 1960 when he too departed for Moscow by train. The Finnish train manifest for 31 March 1960 indicates that there was only one passenger aboard the daily train leaving Helsinki for Moscow on this date, Paul JENNER, listed as a U.S. citizen and secretary/archivist. The manifest for 2 April 1960 carries the name Viktor KOLOSSOV (KOSOLAPOV) and shows that no American citizens were aboard.

(d) The November 1960 TDY (GARLAND Case)

Apart from denying that it ever took place, NOSENKO has said nothing about a trip to Helsinki by KOSOLAPOV in November 1960, but GOLITSYN said such a trip occurred and related it to an incipient KGB operation against an American code clerk.

GOLITSYN was not posted to the KGB Legal Residency in Helsinki until July 1960, i.e., after KOSOLAPOV's first trip to Helsinki, under the KOLOSOV alias. He has reported that at "about the end of 1960, about November or possibly by the beginning of 1961," the KGB Second Chief Directorate sent a telegram to the Helsinki Legal Residency. The telegram advised that an American code clerk would arrive in Helsinki in transit to Moscow; the responsible case officer would be KOSOLAPOV, who was being sent to Helsinki under an alias and under Vneshtorg cover; KOSOLAPOV was to strike up an acquaintance to be continued with the American in Moscow.

The following extracts are from the transcript of GOLITSYN's further remarks on this subject in early 1962:

Question: You say that around November 1960 KOSOLAPOV came to Finland?

GOLITSYN: Came to Finland.

Question: He came under cover?

GOLITSYN: Yes.

Question: Under a new identity? With an alias?

GOLITSYN: Yes, as an employee of Trade Union (Vneshtorg). But, of course, there may be some different dates. Maybe November. I suppose [believe] it was the end of 1960 or it can be the beginning of 1961. And he waiting for some days, a week or so.

Question: In Helsinki?

* A similar request to the police chief was made by SERGEYEV with regard to GARLAND (see below).

SECRET

Finnish Travel Manifest for 16 November 1960
(See Part V.E.3.c.iii)

Luettelo matkustajista, jotka Junalla (kulkuneuvo) saapuivat Suomeen / lähtivät Suomesta Vainikkalan (paikkakunta) kautta / 196

	Suku- ja etunimet	Ammatti tai arvo	Syntymäaika	Kansalaisuus	Määränpää	Osoite Suomessa
1	Nouravieva, Nonna ✓	sos.min.	dipl.	N:liiton	N:liitto	Lähetystö, Hki.
2	Parve, Ralf	kirjailija	1919	"	Eesti	"
3	Morosov, Alexandre	dipl.kur.	dipl.	"	N:liitto/N-S	F,Kauttakulku
4	Otcharovski, Alexandre	"	"	"	"	"
5	Gavrilova, Maria	rouva	1922	"	N:liitto	-
6	Kolesov, Viktor	virkailija	19.03.27	"	"	-
7	Agadjanov, Kamil	"	1922	"	"	-
8	Akulinine, Petr	sirkustait.	1913	"	"	-
9	Lair, Jean Baptiste	dipl.kur.	17.08.07	Ranskan	"	Kauttakulku.
10	Garland, John Jr.	sihteeri	22.03.33	USA:n	"	"
11	Brenhard, Henry Charles	tsto siht.	dipl.	Suomen	"	Ulkoasiainministeriö.
12	Rantalainen, Antu Ilmari	kirvesmies	14.11.19	"	"	Kulmak. 2.H.85, Hki.
13	Oksanen, Frans Oskar	sähk.asent	25.05.00	"	"	4.Linja,20.B.39, Hki.
14	Immonen, Heikki Juhani ✓	lainop.kand	21.01.30	"	"	Kivaltorink.23.C, Hki.
15						
16						
17						
18						
19						
20						
21						
22						

Passintarkastaja:
V.t.ylikonst. [signature]
E. Saukkonen

SECRET

TOP SECRET

GOLITSYN: Yes. Maybe four days. Then we knew that the American Embassy took a ticket for him [the American target] for the train... And KOSOLAPOV took a ticket in the same compartment. And before the departure we knew exactly from the guide [conductor] of that train that it's the same person--[I'm not certain whether he was a] code clerk or not a code clerk*--but his name, his real name. It was listed. And I was at the railroad station at that time. I went to see off the delegation, the Soviet delegation.**

Question: See them off?

GOLITSYN: Yes, the delegation. And I asked him, KOSOLAPOV: "Who is this person? I suppose [he is an] American?" I suppose [believe] he said: "He's a fat man, a young fat man."

Question: The American?

GOLITSYN: Yes. And I suppose [believe KOSOLAPOV said] bespectacled.*** And KOSOLAPOV and these persons were smiling and looked through the window before departure.

Question: In the compartment? The train compartment?

GOLITSYN: Yes, and then this other person visited Helsinki from KOSOLAPOV's division [the U.S. Embassy Section, American Department, Second Chief Directorate].****

Question: When was this?

GOLITSYN: It was in summer or maybe September or so of 1961. And I asked him. I reminded him about his case...

Question: Who was this? Do you remember?

GOLITSYN: I don't remember because he changed his name. I know him but I... And I asked him how is that case that I helped KOSOLAPOV with? And he did not want to discuss it. That's why I came to the conclusion that this case was a success. Otherwise he would have told [me]. And I am not sure but I can try to recognize this person in pictures.

Question: You think that you could?

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* When he first gave this lead, GOLITSYN identified the American as a code clerk.

** GOLITSYN was not asked details of this delegation. There were eight Soviets, including KOSOLAPOV, on this train.

*** KOSOLAPOV's description does not fit John GARLAND; it is, however, a fairly accurate characterization of Paul JENNER.

**** NOSENKO has not mentioned this TDY, and the KGB officer remains unidentified.

<u>GOLITSYN</u>: Yes, probably. He reminds me a little of one of my friends.

<u>Question</u>: He looks a little like your friend?

<u>GOLITSYN</u>: Yes.

<u>Question</u>: Which one? KOSOLAPOV?

<u>GOLITSYN</u>: No, no. This American

The Finnish railroad manifest lists the passengers travelling from Helsinki to Moscow on 16 November 1960. KOSOLAPOV was one of eight Soviets aboard the train, and John W. GARLAND was the only American. GARLAND, by his own statement, arrived in Helsinki on 14 November 1960; he was travelling to Moscow to assume the duties of supervisor of the State Department code room in the U.S. Embassy.

As he had with regard to JENNER (see above), SERGEYEV of the KGB Legal Residency in Helsinki asked the local police chief (and KGB agent, according to GOLITSYN) on 11 November 1960 for help in locating GARLAND, an American who would arrive there on 14 November.

GARLAND was first interviewed by John ABIDIAN, the Embassy Security Officer in Moscow in connection with the GOLITSYN lead on 17 June 1962. In this interview GARLAND denied having met any Soviet of KOSOLAPOV's physical description during the Helsinki-to-Moscow train trip and also denied having ever been approached by Soviet Intelligence. On 30 July 1963 GARLAND was interviewed by the FBI [redacted]

NOSENKO on 28 January 1964 identified 20 Americans employed by the U.S. Embassy in Moscow who were of interest to the KGB because they were suspect intelligence officers or agents, or because they fell into some other category of interest to the KGB. He gave a short statement concerning each of these 20 persons. One of them was GARLAND, about whom NOSENKO said: "code clerk, but nothing doing." NOSENKO was asked on 2 September 1964 to review this list for the purpose of supplying any additional information he might have concerning the individuals named. NOSENKO stated: "As with all code clerks, they were studying him (GARLAND) in order to gather enough material to make a recruitment. The case officer was KOSOLAPOV. I don't remember the names or descriptions of any agents, and I didn't hear of any derogatory information. As far as I know, there was no operational approach and no recruitment." Although he could not recall whether he had read the KGB file on GARLAND or not, NOSENKO on 15 February 1965 said he thought that he must have read current materials concerning GARLAND as they came into the U.S. Embassy Section. NOSENKO also said that there was no operational plan drawn up for GARLAND because the KGB had no derogatory information whatsoever concerning him. NOSENKO has not provided additional information concerning GARLAND, whom he had presumably never seen, and was unable

to recall any background information concerning GARLAND or any details on his travels and acquaintances while stationed in Moscow.

In the context of discussion of KOLOSOV/KOSOLAPOV's travels to Helsinki, NOSENKO's interrogator pointed out on 26 October 1966 that CIA was aware of a second trip there which NOSENKO had not reported. The following is a transcript of this portion of the discussion on that date:

Question: Well, we started to look for other trips by KOSOLAPOV, or KOLOSOV, and we did run across another trip, again by KOLOSOV, using the same alias.

NOSENKO: To Copenhagen?

Question: No. This was a trip to Helsinki.

NOSENKO: Oh. I don't know. Maybe after, after '61 maybe. I don't know--'62, '63, I don't know.

Question: No, this was in 1960. When you say you were in the First [U.S. Embassy] Section, First [American] Department, Second Chief Directorate. He was on the train, according to official records, on 16 November 1960, going from Helsinki to Moscow.

NOSENKO: I know about one, he has took trip, when he was returning from Helsinki with Paul JENNER.

Question: We looked at everybody else, all the other records concerning this train trip to see who was on the train with KOSOLAPOV or KOLOSOV. KOLOSOV was the name he used.

NOSENKO: Yes?

Question: We found there was one American on that train with KOLOSOV going from Helsinki to Moscow.

NOSENKO: Yes? And his name? If it is not secret, if you can say, of course?

Question: One of your targets, an American code clerk.

NOSENKO: He was, I know, going from Helsinki, only with Paul JENNER.

Question: You don't know this man's name?

NOSENKO: (silence)

Question: Well, we checked further and we found out that GOLITSYN had told us about a trip.

NOSENKO: When he was returning from Helsinki with Paul JENNER? GOLITSYN was then out, yes?*

* GOLITSYN arrived in Helsinki in July 1960, over four months after JENNER passed through Finland en route to Moscow.

Question: GOLITSYN told us that KOSOLAPOV was travelling to Helsinki to meet a code clerk in November 1960. You understand what I'm telling you?

NOSENKO: Yes, I understand. And KOSOLAPOV must tell him about the code clerk, but we found out that Paul JENNER is not a code clerk when he began to work at the Embassy.

Question: This is not Paul JENNER. This is a different time of year--

NOSENKO: (interrupts) When he began to work in Embassy.

Question: This is not March 1960. This is November 1960. A different time. It's the same year, but a different time.

NOSENKO: I know only about his trip when he was returning with Paul JENNER.

Question: Well, how do you explain that this man, who's supposed to be under your supervision in the Embassy Section, is aboard this train with this American code clerk, one of your targets, in November 1960?

NOSENKO: I know only about one trip [by] KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, when he was returning with Paul JENNER, about whom he was thinking also that he was a code clerk. Yes.

Question: KOSOLAPOV or KOLOSOV was not on the same train with JENNER. We have the names; we have the facts; we have the official records. We also have GOLITSYN's information about November 1960. GOLITSYN went with KOSOLAPOV to the train station to see him off.

NOSENKO: He must. He was working as a case officer of counter-intelligence, of the Fourteenth Department. Of course he must, of course he must. And KOSOLAPOV must speak with him.

Question: KOSOLAPOV spoke with GOLITSYN, and KOSOLAPOV rode with this American code clerk from Helsinki on the train back to Moscow. But GOLITSYN was not in Helsinki when JENNER was there. It wasn't JENNER.

NOSENKO: With Paul JENNER I know, but I don't know of anybody else... You are giving me such a big bluff. I don't know, I don't know, I don't know.

Question: It's no bluff. Do you have any idea who this other code clerk was?

NOSENKO: No. There wasn't such a one.

Question: Well, I'll tell you who it was... Did you ever hear the name GARLAND?

NOSENKO: Yes, I heard GARLAND. And there wasn't any approach made to GARLAND. There wasn't any attempt to recruit him. There was a study of him, yes, but there wasn't recruitment or something else...

(iv) KGB-Polish UB Activities Against MORONE

(a) Introduction

In 1961 CIA learned from a Polish source who furnished much reliable and sensitive information that, with the assistance of its Polish counterpart, the Office of Security (UB), the KGB in November 1960 began using a female agent against Joseph MORONE, a U.S. Department of State code clerk assigned to the American Embassy in Moscow in August 1960. The woman accompanied MORONE on a train trip from Moscow, became intimate with him in Warsaw, returned to Moscow twice in February 1961, and there had sexual relations with him. The compromising scenes of MORONE and the Polish UB agent were photographed. This information on the KGB operation was received by CIA soon after the woman's second visit to Moscow. On the basis of this report, MORONE was interviewed and polygraphed in Oslo in May 1961, and he was transferred to Lisbon from Moscow in August 1961.

NOSENKO gave a few details on the same case, without mentioning the name of the KGB target, during the 1962 meetings in Geneva. In 1964 and 1965 he furnished more particulars on the MORONE case, identifying three KGB agents (besides the Polish female) who participated in the operation. NOSENKO, however, said that two of them added no information of use to the KGB against MORONE, and that he was unable to remember what the third agent reported: statements by other sources indicate that regarding MORONE all three agents could have acquired information of operational potential for the KGB. NOSENKO has not reported, as have other sources, that a fourth KGB agent named Ella UMANETS was in contact with MORONE, or that the KGB officer SKVORTSOV--posing as MICHAUD--was with MORONE at America House on at least one occasion, the night when STORSBERG says he was approached by the KGB (see above). NOSENKO has confused the MORONE case with another by saying that a fifth KGB agent was directed against MORONE, whereas she was apparently directed against the American code clerk ZUJUS (see below). The sensitive source of the original report on MORONE stated that a KGB officer "VOLODYA" (Vladimir, last name unknown) personally met the Polish female agent when she arrived in Moscow, and NOSENKO said that the KGB officer was his subordinate KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO at first claimed a KGB photographic technician supporting the case reported to him, but he retracted this remark after CIA showed him that travel records on NOSENKO made it impossible for the technician to have spoken to him as he described. According to NOSENKO, MORONE was reassigned from Moscow before the KGB could take further steps against the code clerk, and he speculates MORONE's transfer was prompted by American authorities' concern over his relationship with one of the KGB female agents.

(b) NOSENKO's Information

At his first meeting with CIA on 9 June 1962 NOSENKO made a passing reference to an operation in which he had placed a female agent of the Polish service in contact with an American from the Moscow Embassy while the latter was visiting Warsaw. Later, NOSENKO said, he brought the same female to Moscow in order to obtain further compromising materials on this American.

Asked on 11 June 1962 whether he had had foreign agents working against the U.S. Embassy, NOSENKO described his having introduced the idea of using such agents to develop Americans afraid of contacts with Russian girls. He said that he himself had several of these third-national agents, that he sometimes would ask the German and Polish services to supply him with agents, and that it was unnecessary for him to explain their intended use in operations against Americans. NOSENKO then gave an example: "Listen, the sergeants [enlisted men] who lived in America House had a custom--it was too far to go to America, so where did they go to rest [on leave]? To Finland or Poland. Why Poland? Because they can find women there, the rate of exchange is good, and so on. What do we do? We planted a female Polish agent [on an American] in Poland. Then she comes to Moscow. We arranged a chance meeting, and things developed. Once two guys, a Marine guard and a code clerk went to Warsaw. They were on leave for a week and a half. We knew when they would be going. I made an immediate phone call to Warsaw. 'Give me a woman,' I said. 'Get a good whore for me there, a pretty one but not one who strikes the eye particularly.' Well, they sent me such a girl. And I placed this Polish agent on the same train, in the same car, even in the same compartment. The train left. One of the Americans, the one in whom we were particularly interested, the code clerk, wanted the girl and there, in the compartment, they went to bed together while the other American slept. I told the Poles in Warsaw to give the girl an apartment and to get photographs. They arranged an apartment and he came there. Everything was O.K. After a week and a half he returned to Moscow. We did not rush things. A month passed. Two months. Let's not rush, I said. A half a year went by. I insisted that nothing further may be done any earlier. Then I said, 'All right, let's give him this girl, this Pole.' She arrived [in Moscow] and they met one another. I created the conditions: we created the conditions. They slept with one another once, twice. A [Soviet] girlfriend showed up. The same thing. And he also began to sleep with the girlfriend. The Pole left and he was with this Russian, and she was our agent. You see, first the boys are afraid of Russians. But [we gave him] a Pole and then transferred him to a Russian."

NOSENKO stated on 1 February 1964: "I remember we were working on one of the members of the guard of the American Embassy, who was going to Warsaw for a good time, for a few days' relaxation.* We wrote to our advisors [KGB officers attached to the Polish UB] to do everything possible--to get a pretty Polish girl for the fellow and to photograph any intimate scenes. The Poles introduced the guard to the girl, they did have intimate relations, but they gave us photographs without any intimate scenes. Just how they are sitting together, how he is kissing her--that's all. Well, we got these photographs and some time went by and then we asked that the Poles send us this Polish girl so that she could meet him in Moscow. They

* The guard referred to is Frank BEGGS, a marine enlisted man who accompanied MORONE to Warsaw. The facts, however, seem to relate to MORONE, who has described his encounter with the Polish girl and her subsequent recontact in Moscow. BEGGS has also reported (see below) that MORONE met a Polish girl on the train to Warsaw and that she later contacted him in Moscow; BEGGS has denied that he, himself, was contacted by any such girl in the Soviet Union after the trip to Warsaw with MORONE.

sent her. [illegible] and [illegible] asked her, during the conv[illegible]ation [illegible] reached the ultimate in intima[illegible]y. [illegible] They said they were surprised [illegible] she had reported that this relationship [illegible]. You see, the Poles had not told [illegible] the film which they gave us had been cut [illegible]. I remember we called the Poles a few [illegible] friends! They were doing this under instructions [illegible] with-hold things. [illegible] At any rate [illegible] developed any further."

[illegible]

* NOSENKO has also mentioned a prohibition on recruitment attempts during the 1959 Sokolniki exhibition because of the need to avoid incidents affecting U.S.-Soviet relationships. GOLITSYN told CIA of such a prohibition placed on the use of homosexual compromise material against a U.S. Embassy employee in 1960 because of the impending visit of President EISENHOWER to the Soviet Union. As a result of the U-2 incident on 1 May 1960, this visit never took place, and U.S.-Soviet relations deteriorated. Throughout the rest of 1960 and most of 1961 they remained very strained, and Soviet pressures and hard lines culminated in the Berlin crisis and wall-building in Berlin in August of 1961.

NOSENKO further reported to CIA that the KGB case officer working against MORONE was NOSENKO's subordinate and specialist in code clerk operations, KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO read the file on MORONE and saw his visa photograph, but he never saw him in person and so could not provide a physical description. NOSENKO had discussed the MORONE case with KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV on a number of occasions.

NOSENKO said that the KGB agents working on MORONE were:

- Svetlana IVANOVA, a maid or waitress at America House who reported to DEMKIN, the case officer responsible for Americans living there, on everything she saw or heard concerning MORONE. KOSOLAPOV visited her several times with DEMKIN to discuss MORONE, and NOSENKO himself met her once or twice in one of the two safe apartments that DEMKIN had at his disposal. NOSENKO did not recall any specific information on MORONE which was interesting or useful from this source.

- [redacted] an Egyptian employed at the Egyptian Embassy who was an agent of the Sixth (Underdeveloped Countries) Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. [redacted] visited America House and met MORONE, but he did not report anything of value that NOSENKO remembered.

- One of two East German females imported for use against the inhabitants of America House. In early 1960 GRYAZNOV went to East Berlin to obtain two German women who could be used for this purpose. The first of these was Hanna, blonde, documented as a West German travelling to Moscow. NOSENKO never met her but instructed PREISFREUND (see the STORSBERG case) to take her to America House and leave her on her own. Hanna went several times to America House in 1961, but NOSENKO can recall nothing that she may have reported on MORONE. The other East German girl was documented as an Austrian. NOSENKO never met her but recalled that she was asked for her documents at America House on her first or second visit there. She replied that she had left them at her hotel, left America House, and never returned. NOSENKO did not remember the time when this incident occurred, beyond the fact that he was still in the U.S. Embassy Section and that ABIDIAN was the Embassy security officer at the time.*

- [redacted], an Italian [redacted] at the American Embassy and KOSOLAPOV's agent, reported everything he heard or saw about Americans to KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO recalled nothing specific that [redacted] had said about MORONE.

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* CIA has no information concerning such an incident in 1960-1961, but the circumstances described by NOSENKO seem to apply to those surrounding a relationship between a woman named Lillian (last name not known) and the military code clerk ZUJUS. These details are given in Part V.E.3.c.(v). In any event, the incident involving Lillian occurred after the date when NOSENKO says he was transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section. At the time, Hugh MONTGOMERY rather than ABIDIAN was the Embassy Security Officer.

From one of these agents, or possibly in some other manner, the KGB learned that MORONE was planning to go on leave to Warsaw. NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV, and GRYAZNOV thereupon decided to employ a Polish female agent in an attempt to compromise him. KOSOLAPOV wrote the draft of the operational plan for the attempt, which was approved by GRIBANOV after some editing by NOSENKO and KOVSHUK, chief of the section. KOSOLAPOV next met with a Polish UB counterintelligence officer in KGB Headquarters to discuss the plan. The Pole was told that the target was a U.S. Embassy employee, but not that he was a code clerk; this fact was deliberately kept from the Poles.

As a result of this meeting, a Polish girl was obtained by the Polish UB and sent to Moscow by train. Upon her arrival she was met by KOSOLAPOV, who took her to a Moscow hotel, where he gave her instructions concerning her role in the operation. The girl was told to meet MORONE on the train, flirt with him, have him fall in love with her, continue the association, and study him. She was to tell him that she had been in Moscow as a guest of her uncle, a member of the Polish Trade Representation in Moscow, and that she could meet him again on her next visit.

Arrangements were made with the KGB Operational Technical Directorate for a technician to be placed on the train in the compartment next to that of MORONE and BEGGS and for audio and visual (but not photographic) coverage.

NOSENKO did not recall when MORONE and BEGGS left Moscow. The Polish agent did, however, succeed in making MORONE's acquaintance, and the technician from the Operational Technical Directorate reported back to NOSENKO the day after the train reached Warsaw.* The technician told NOSENKO the girl had engaged in sexual intercourse during the trip. The technician also reported that the tape recordings obtained were of poor quality.

Because the KGB still lacked compromising materials, KOSOLAPOV prepared a paper requesting that the girl again be brought to Moscow and permission to acquire compromising photography during her visit. The requests were approved by higher KGB authority. When the girl arrived, KOSOLAPOV met her alone and took her to the Hotel Peking, to a specially equipped room. The girl called MORONE at America House, and MORONE subsequently visited her in the hotel room two or three times, during which photographs were taken. These were placed in the KGB's file on MORONE. He did not fall in love with the girl, as the KGB had hoped, and she had no further contacts with him.

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* CIA travel records show that NOSENKO transitted Amsterdam on 15 November 1960 on a through flight from Moscow to Cuba. [redacted] NOSENKO returned from Cuba approximately 14 December 1960. When told this, NOSENKO stated that instead of talking to the technician himself, he may have read the report and seen the film strips after his return.

Although the KGB had the compromising photography, it was felt that there were insufficient materials for a recruitment approach to MORONE. The KGB wanted to trap him in the apartment of a Soviet woman, to catch him in something that is definitely prohibited. For this purpose, Svetlana IVANOVA (see above) was supposed to lure MORONE into the city, but before anything further could be done, the Americans ordered MORONE out of Moscow before the end of his tour, possibly because they were concerned about his association with IVANOVA. Therefore, NOSENKO said, the KGB made no operational approach to MORONE and no recruitment of him.

(c) Information from Other Sources

A sensitive Polish source reported in 1961 that on 8 November 1960 a Polish female, an experienced English-speaking agent of the Polish UB, arrived in Moscow where she was met by a KGB case officer named "VOLODYA." She stayed at the Hotel Warsaw in Moscow. The KGB case officer, apparently from the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, on 10 November 1960 pointed MORONE out to this agent at a railroad station in Moscow. Under KGB instructions, the Polish female met MORONE on the train to Warsaw, where intimacies began. In Warsaw on 12 November 1960 she was quite friendly with MORONE, but pursuant to instructions, she refused all overtures to engage in intimacies. The next day she took MORONE to a Polish UB safehouse suitably prepared for clandestine photography, and revealing photographs of an intimate nature were taken of MORONE and herself. The female agent again travelled to Moscow on 5 February 1961 and stayed at the Peking Hotel. Further compromising photographs were taken of her and MORONE on this trip. The female agent travelled to Moscow a third time and on 12 and 13 February 1961 more photographs were taken of her and MORONE.

GOLITSYN was questioned on the basis of this lead on 16 February 1962:

Question: Do you know anyone in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate who worked against the American Embassy and used the name "VOLODYA?"

GOLITSYN: Yes, I know CHURANOV. He worked at one time against the U.S. Embassy. Later he worked against the British Embassy and later he was sent to Denmark.

Question: When was he sent? Do you know?

GOLITSYN: It was in '57 until probably '60... I suppose that he will continue to work now in the First Chief Directorate. He transferred there from the Second...

Question: Do you know anyone who used the name "VOLODYA" in the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow in the fall of 1960?

GOLITSYN: There is another person. It is [Vladimir Ivanovich] PETROV. He is the employee of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate who works against the American Embassy. He evidently knows English. ...and he worked in the American Department. I know him and I met him in 1960. He was Chief of the American Section, the Embassy Section...

Question: Well, in VOLODYA, I'm interested in a KGB case officer who would be working against American code clerks in the fall of 1960.

GOLITSYN: Yes he [PETROV] is the chief of this section. That is why. He is the Chief o. this section where GRYAZNOV works. [GOLITSYN had earlier identified GRYAZNOV as a code clerk specialist in the U.S. Embassy Section.]

Question: And GRYAZNOV is under him?

GOLITSYN: Yes, he was an assistant at one time, but is not [now], and then there was the reorganization and he became a little "liquidated" [downgraded in position].

In an October 1962 interview, following his withdrawal from Moscow, MORONE stated that he had travelled with Frank BEGGS to Warsaw on 12 November 1960. On the train he saw a Polish girl outside their compartment and asked her what languages she spoke. Later she entered his compartment, and when he tried to engage in sexual relations with her, she slapped his face. A day or two after they arrived in Warsaw, the girl contacted him at his hotel, and he went to her room where they had sexual relations. According to MORONE, he had sexual relations with at least two other women while in Warsaw. He and BEGGS returned to Moscow without incident. On 6 February 1961 the Polish girl from the train called him at America House, and the following day he visited her in her room at the Peking Hotel, where they had several drinks and sexual relations. On this occasion or earlier the girl told him that she had an uncle in Moscow. MORONE had denied being approached or recruited by Soviet Intelligence, a statement which was supported by a polygraph examination administered in 1961. (Further details on this interview of MORONE are inserted in a later paragraph containing information from MORONE's associates in Moscow.)

The Marine guard BEGGS has confirmed MORONE's account in general, with the exception that he has stated that the two travelled to Warsaw on 13 November 1960 and that, after meeting the Polish girl on the train, MORONE and she got into the lower bunk in their train compartment. They arrived in Warsaw on 14 November and returned the 20th. BEGGS had heard from MORONE that the latter had been recontacted by the Polish girl in Moscow in February 1961.

The U.S. military code clerk STORSBERG has reported that MORONE was acquainted with "Michel MICHAUD" (SKVORTSOV), who laid some groundwork for the KGB approach to STORSBERG in the fall of 1961. When interviewed by the FBI [illegible]

* In February 1965 NOSENKO said that SKVORTSOV undoubtedly met other Americans on his visits to America House, but he did not remember who they were. He added that the KGB would not be interested in SKVORTSOV's contacts with other code clerks because "we told him not to squander his forces, to concentrate on Jim [STORSBERG]. Jim was his target."

MORONE's fellow code clerks and residents of America House have described him as a heavy drinker, a heavy gambler, and a ladies' man. Various reports indicate that MORONE was involved in a currency-speculation ring operated by [illegible] the KGB agent mentioned by NOSENKO, and MORONE has confirmed that, on at least one occasion, [illegible] arranged the introduction of MORONE and other code clerks to Soviet females. MORONE had relations with one of them in [illegible]'s apartment in the spring of 1961. MORONE was also said to be a close friend of the Embassy [illegible] identified by NOSENKO as an agent of KOSOLAPOV, but not mentioned by him in connection with the MORONE operation. (MORONE admitted that along with other Americans, he made it a common practice to purchase rubles illegally from [illegible] One report states that [illegible] asked a Marine guard to deliver blackmarket rubles to MORONE in the State Department code room, a restricted area to which [illegible] had no access. A number of reports indicate that MORONE was sexually intimate with Svetlana IVANOVA, DEMKIN's agent, and with Ella UMANETS, another KGB agent at America House identified by NOSENKO but not mentioned by him in connection with MORONE. (MORONE denies having had relations with IVANOVA but said that he told his friends that he had been intimate with her. He said, however, that he knew both IVANOVA and UMANETS well and that he had once asked IVANOVA to arrange dates for him and another code clerk with two Russian females. IVANOVA did, and sexual relations ensued. MORONE has also admitted sexual relations with a number of women from various Western embassies in Moscow.)

(v) Developmental Operation Against ZUJUS

(a) Introduction*

NOSENKO reported that he personally recruited and handled [redacted] the "main agent" in the KGB developmental operation against U.S. Army Sergeant Matthew Peter ZUJUS, although GRYAZNOV was the officer responsible for the ZUJUS case. [redacted] military officer posted to Moscow for training, was used only in this operation, but NOSENKO continued to meet him even after transferring from the U.S. Embassy Section to the Tourist Department. While being interrogated in February 1965, NOSENKO said that [redacted] could vouch for his *bona fides*, and he suggested that CIA approach [redacted] for this purpose.*

ZUJUS arrived in Moscow in September 1961 to assume the military code clerk duties of STORSBERG (see above), and he remained there until January 1963. After initially confusing ZUJUS with James KEYSERS**, NOSENKO first described the KGB operation against him in February 1964. According to NOSENKO, neither [redacted] nor any other source supplied significant information to the KGB, and the KGB therefore did not attempt to recruit ZUJUS. Claiming not to know the names of KGB agents besides [redacted] who participated in the operation, NOSENKO nevertheless in other contexts has mentioned two female agents who reportedly associated with ZUJUS. One is Ella UMANETS, the other an East German woman posing as an Austrian. NOSENKO indicated the latter was in contact with MORONE (see above), whereas it is clear that ZUJUS was the American code clerk who met this woman. The date that she and ZUJUS were together, however, falls during the summer of 1962 when, NOSENKO said, he was no longer engaged in operations against the U.S. Embassy.

(b) Information from NOSENKO

The first reference by NOSENKO to the ZUJUS case was made on 2 February 1964:

NOSENKO: With respect to ZUJUS, I'll tell you exactly what we tried to do with him because I spotted this in some notes. This mistake [confusion of KEYSERS and ZUJUS] made me so mad. I completely forgot about ZUJUS until I saw my little note. In 1961 I recruited a Syrian who was from Damascus. [redacted] He used to go to the America Club, and he became acquainted with ZUJUS. The reason why they had something in common was that sometime earlier ZUJUS had been stationed in Lebanon and the Syrian himself was from Damascus, which is a relatively short distance away... Here is his name. He wrote it out himself. It is [redacted], and he wrote out his own address

** The KEYSERS case is discussed in the next part of this paper.

here [on one of the notes NOSENKO brought with him to the meeting]. We did not work with him, and we retired the case to Archives, and did not turn him over to anyone. Here is his address. The street is [illegible]... I worked with him myself at the [illegible] 1961 and the beginning of 1962. And when I was leaving Moscow to come here for the Disarmament Conference in 1962 I turned him over for contact to GRYAZNOV. I said goodbye to him and he was scheduled to leave the USSR permanently in April, back to Syria.

Question: What did you do against ZUJUS?

NOSENKO: Nothing at all. He [illegible] was merely studying and devloping him. During the conversation [at Americn House] they even spoke of how nice it would be to have some Lebanese vodka, and we specially had some shipped in from the [KGB Legal] Residency [in Beirut], and the Syrian brought it to ZUJUS saying it had come from his friends. ZUJUS by character is a very quiet, unexcitable, calm person... Nothing disturbs him.

Question: Why didn't you turn [illegible] over to the First Chief Directorate?

NOSENKO: There was no reason for this because he was a [illegible]. If we were to turn him over to anyone it would have been to the GRU. But we decided to hell with it and put the case into our Archives.

Question: Did [illegible] know ZUJUS when you recruited him?

NOSENKO: No, he didn't hardly know anyone--even by name. So we showed him photographs, and when he said that he had met ZUJUS, then we directed him to develop ZUJUS and not to pay attention to anyone else... If you want to approach him you can use my name, simply Yuriy Ivanovich.

NOSENKO then proposed a false-flag recruitment of [illegible] whereby a CIA representative would approach [illegible] saying that he was from the KGB. A year later NOSENKO told CIA that if CIA talked to [illegible] the latter would be able to vouch for NOSENKO's bona fides.

Speaking of his own agents on 20 April 1964, NOSENKO said: [illegible]...I took with me, even though I had transferred to the Seventh [Tourist] Department [in January 1962]. But it had been decided that no one else knew him from the First [American] Department; it would have taken some time before anyone would get used to him. But he was already working in the development of ZUJUS. So they [the First Department] said that they were asking me to continue meeting with him, and they were counting on my cooperation. They also promised to speak to CHELNOKOV [Chief of the Seventh Department] so that I would not have to stop [illegible] meetings with ZUJUS."

When reviewing lists of employees of the U.S. Embassy between 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO on 19 September 1964 identified ZUJUS as STORSBERG's replacement and said that the case officer working against him was GRYAZNOV. He said that his (NOSENKO's) agent [illegible] was working against ZUJUS, but that he did not know the names of other agents involved, nor of any unusual or interesting information concerning him, although he had read the Second Chief Directorate file on ZUJUS. There was no information on ZUJUS from KGB microphones, telephone taps, or surveillance. The KGB, NOSENKO stated, did not make an operational approach to ZUJUS and did not recruit him.

NOSENKO reported on 2 February 1965 that he himself had supervised GRYAZNOV's handling of the operation and personally handled the main agent, [illegible]. NOSENKO read all current reports on ZUJUS as they came into the U.S. Embassy Section, and he discussed the case with GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, DEMKIN (the case officer responsible for the America House) and his superiors. GRYAZNOV wrote the operational plan on ZUJUS, which called for thorough development by [illegible] in order to learn everything possible about him, and eventually to introduce an agent to ZUJUS through [illegible]. [illegible] was to invite ZUJUS to a restaurant in March or April 1962, and a "friend" was to be introduced to ZUJUS at that time. This had not been accomplished as of NOSENKO's departure for Geneva in 1962.

Progress was slow because ZUJUS was quiet and reserved and often stayed alone, even in America House, plus the fact that although [illegible] and ZUJUS were acquainted, they did not become good friends. On the days [illegible] was to visit America House, NOSENKO met him in hotels or restaurants (never in safehouses). This was once every week or two, depending on [illegible]. They would meet again the following day; [illegible] would report on which Americans were drinking heavily and which were caressing the girls from foreign embassies in Moscow. Although [illegible] went to America House once or twice a month and drank there with ZUJUS, he reported little of interest. The KGB learned something about ZUJUS's family in the United States, the details of which NOSENKO did not recall; NOSENKO was sure, however, that there was nothing unusual or interesting about ZUJUS's family background. NOSENKO stated that the KGB was not aware of any vices or vulnerabilities that ZUJUS may have had. There was no recruitment and no approach by the KGB--if there had been, even after NOSENKO left the U.S. Embassy Section, his friend GRYAZNOV would have told him about it.

(c) Information from Other Sources

In connection with a security investigation at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, ZUJUS prepared a statement in January 1963 which acknowledged his having had sexual relations with only one woman in Moscow, an employee of the Finnish Embassy. During a routine debriefing by U.S. Army authorities later in 1963, however, ZUJUS said that he had once had sexual relations with a girl who said she was an Austrian. The U.S. Embassy Security Officer reported in the summer of 1962 that ZUJUS had been intimate with an Austrian woman, Lillian (last name unknown), who had gone to America House with someone

from the United Arab Republic and had returned alone a few days later, when she was picked up by ZUJUS. Since ZUJUS was a cryptographer, the manager of America House decided to interview the woman. She told him that she was from Vienna and was travelling with her employer, a Czech. The manager then reported to the Security Officer, who learned from the Austrian Embassy that no passport had been issued to this woman. The Security Officer went to America House, and asked Lillian for her passport; she replied that she had forgotten it, and she then left saying she was going to her hotel for the passport. She never returned to America House.*

The U.S. Army report of its debriefing of ZUJUS states [illegible]

ZUJUS was interviewed by a CIA representative in November 1965. Asked whether he had met any nationals of Near Eastern countries while in Moscow, ZUJUS named among others a person from Beirut who had been in Damascus or a person from Damascus who had been in Beirut--he could not remember which. ZUJUS said that he had been acting as doorman at America House when this person entered, and that the two "shot the breeze" for about 15 minutes. ZUJUS could not recall what they had talked about, but their conversation apparently did not interest the visitor, because he left after a short while and went to the bar. ZUJUS may have seen the man on several other occasions, but he could supply no additional information. ZUJUS did not recall that this person gave him Lebanese vodka, but did say he favored this beverage. ZUJUS said that he did not know this man's name or why he was in Moscow, and he could provide no physical description.

ZUJUS said that, as manager of the America club, he had frequent dealings with Ella UMANETS (a long-time agent named by NOSENKO). ZUJUS often used her as an interpreter in his dealings with other Soviet employees of America House and was able to provide a considerable amount of background information concerning her. He repeated his earlier statements that he had never been approached or recruited by Soviet Intelligence.

FBI investigations indicate [illegible]

* See also NOSENKO's account of the KGB using one of two East German women, who represented themselves as Austrians, at America House in an operation against MORONE.

(vi) Approach to KEYSERS

(a) Introduction

U.S. Army Specialist Fifth Class James KEYSERS began his tour in Moscow on 20 December 1960 as an assistant to the Embassy Medical Officer, Donald C. MARTIN, an Air Force captain; as an additional duty he was assigned administrative functions in the office of the Air Attache. For a short period in early 1961 KEYSERS was trained to perform back-up cryptographic duties under James STORSBERG in the military code room, but he was relieved of this in April 1961 because of low aptitude, laziness, and lack of interest. Because of his admitted homosexual tendencies, coupled with his attitude and behavior, KEYSERS was removed from Moscow by his American superiors in June 1961. The decision to transfer him was made on 13 June, and KEYSERS was informed of it the following day; approximately two hours before leaving America House for the airport on 16 June, KEYSERS received a letter from the KGB suggesting that he defect. This was followed by an approach to him at the Moscow airport.

NOSENKO has claimed that he was the KGB officer who spoke to KEYSERS on this occasion and has said that this incident was his only face-to-face contact with an American target during his 1960-1961 period of service in the U.S. Embassy Section (excepting the alleged brief encounter with STORSBERG--See above). NOSENKO has confused the KEYSERS and ZUJUS cases, but corrected this error prior to defecting. In most particulars NOSENKO's account of the case matches the details from KEYSERS and other sources. However, whereas NOSENKO stated (without indicating how the KGB obtained its information) that the KGB knew KEYSERS had not told American authorities of having received the letter, KEYSERS did so before leaving Moscow; this conversation took place in an Embassy room where a KGB microphone was then located.

(b) Information from NOSENKO

NOSENKO first spoke of the case, without naming KEYSERS, on 12 June 1962: "Now I remember. He came to Moscow, to the Embassy. He was to replace the military cipher clerk [STORSBERG].[a] We sensed at once [that he was a homosexual]. Well, everything was thrown at him. I stayed with this case constantly. I didn't spend time on anything else. We chased him all over Moscow but were late. We were in an operational car. It happened like this. When there was traffic, you couldn't get through. Whether we went up the left side or on the sidewalk where people were walking, in the opposite direction, no matter. Therefore we were late, late [i.e., could not catch him at anything]. But such

[a] Although KEYSERS trained in Moscow to assume back-up cryptographic duties, he was not STORSBERG's replacement; Mathew ZUJUS, who arrived in September 1961, was. KEYSERS was assigned to Moscow as a replacement for Staff Sergeant J.C. BRADLEY, who had earlier been returned from Moscow for reasons of homosexuality.

things happen. But we were not mistaken about this fellow. He proved to be a homosexual. He sold himself, so to say. The American ice ballet (Ice Capades tour) arrived. There were many such fellows (homosexuals) with it, and he was extremely drunk, and was embracing and kissing a man. The Americans also saw this. And decided not to... I thought, what to do? Let's write him a letter, in real English, on an English typewriter. We'll send this letter to his room. We knew that he was supposed to leave today, today. And we wrote it: 'Listen, they know about you. You have been caught. It will go very badly for you back there. Come on. Stay here. We are waiting for your answer.' Well, as is customary, you had someone accompany him. The Assistant Military Attache escorted him. I don't remember who right now. Perhaps it was NIXON, NIELSON, a lieutenant colonel. What was his name?* He accompanied him to Finland and then returned by plane. Well, there was no answer from him to this letter. And it was already the last moment, and suddenly--'Listen, they are taking you away, wait, they know who you are, what you are, it's all over. If that's the way it is, stay here.' No answer. What to do? Here's what happened: We got into a car. They (KGB surveillance) had reported that he and the Assistant Military Attache had pulled out from Kropotkinskaya Naberezhnaya (America House) for the airport to take the plane. So we put on all speed to get there first. We got there first, in order to have got to him. No. It was WILSON." The interview then continued: NOSENKO was asked who had accompanied KEYSERS to the airport. He replied:

"Yes, Lt. Col. WILSON, I believe. He didn't leave him for a moment at the airport. I am turning around here, walking there. There is coffee there and cognac. He didn't leave him. I must separate them. O.K. So I said 'What about their documents? Make some pretext to separate them.' They were separated for two minutes. I approached him and said: 'Hello, hello, what about the letter? You think about it?' He said something to the Assistant Military Attache, that 'they tried to approach me.' So he was in Moscow in all only three or four months. He gave himself away you see. If this ice ballet had not come we would have worked on him. At the start we did not know who he was or what he was, i.e., we knew that he came to replace the military code clerk, on whom we had spent much time." NOSENKO then moved on to a description of the STORSBERG operation without naming KEYSERS.

After describing the recruitment approach to STORSBERG, NOSENKO reported on 24 January 1964: "Then his replacement came. It was ZUJUS.** We began to study him carefully and it appears that both ourselves and the Americans, primarily in the person of the Security Officer, discovered that he

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* This officer's name is MASON.

** See NOSENKO's statements on 28 January and 2 February 1964 (below). ZUJUS did in fact replace STORSBERG, who completed his Moscow tour in November 1961, five months after KEYSERS was removed from Moscow.

was a homosexual. It appears that there was some visiting ballet troupe in which some of the male members were homosexuals. He met them in the America House and his behavior towards them was reported to the American Security Officer and at the same time our agent had reported him to us. We wanted to mount an operation against him but the Americans had already decided to give him up. All we could do was to have a letter delivered to him; the letter warned him that he was being sent out because he was a homosexual and that he would get into consequent trouble, and an offer was made to him to stay in the USSR. He did not answer the letter and it was just prior to his actual departure. He was escorted to the airport by two officers of the Military Attache's office. At the airport--I even went there with a group of assistants to see if we could get a few words to him to change his mind. He left his group for a moment to get a drink of water. When I made this offer to him that he would not regret it if he stayed, that he would receive great benefits, he panicked and ran back to his group and shortly thereafter he flew off. If he were not spotted by you possibly we would have been able to get at him."

While reviewing a list of personnel assigned to the American Embassy in Moscow in 1963, NOSENKO said on 28 January 1964: "Matthew ZUJUS--how come? That man can't be in Moscow. That's the homosexual code clerk I told you about, [the] homosexual who was urgently sent back to the States with military guards. How come he is back in 1963? In August 1963? He couldn't be there. It is impossible" He was asked whether he was sure of his facts, and NOSENKO answered: "Yes, this must be the same man, but this must be an error in your document. He just cannot be in Moscow."

NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safehouse on 2 February 1964 and said that he wanted to come right over as he had something important to say. The meeting with CIA opened as follows: "I was thinking last night and I realized that I have made a mistake and it bothered me, so I wanted to be sure to call it to your attention today. Remember when I told you we were working on Jim STORSBERG, the code clerk, and after that a replacement came for him? And I said that we wanted to get a hold of him because he was a homosexual? It was not ZUJUS, but it was KEYSERS. In other words, everything I said about ZUJUS applies to KEYSERS."

"I don't remember having any face-to-face encounters [with Americans] except when KEYSERS was leaving," NOSENKO stated on 17 April 1964. "When he was being taken to the airport we decided, 'Why not try, in case he's alone; why not approach him and ask him if he wants to stay?' And sure enough he stood there with these two officers and then he walked into the restaurant alone... So I immediately approached him right there in the restaurant. "I don't remember what his name was--I think it was Jim.) So I said" 'Jim, did you think about staying perhaps? Because you know what will happen to you when you return. Say, please.' He looked at me and turned around and without saying a word he went into the waiting room and started talking rapidly with the officers."

When questioned on the KEYSERS approach in February 1965, NOSENKO added no new details except that, at the time of the approach, he understood KEYSERS had not reported the KGB letter to his superiors at the American Embassy; he said that there was no information to this effect from the microphones or telephone taps in the U.S. Embassy.

(c) Information from Other Sources

In Moscow prior to his removal and in subsequent debriefings, KEYSERS admitted homosexual tendencies and his involvement in three homosexual incidents during his tour in Moscow, all at America House; one of these was an approach to a Marine security guard in March 196[illegible], which was rebuffed, and the two others were homosexual acts with members of the Ice Capades troupe visiting Moscow in May 196[illegible]. He denied that he ever made any public display of his homosexuality but said he could not be sure that someone had not entered his room at America House while he and a homosexual partner may have been asleep following [illegible] homosexual relations.

During a detailed debriefing in West Germany on 26 June 1961 KEYSERS related the incidents leading up to the approach made at [illegible] in [illegible] as he was leaving the Soviet Union. [illegible]

* Microphones were subsequently found in Colonel [illegible]'s office and in the office of the Minister Counsellor. NOSENKO has reported that both were being monitored on a simultaneous basis in 1961.

** This is not an accurate description of NOSENKO who was 34 years old at the time, is several inches taller, and is not rotund.

A memorandum sent by [illegible], the [illegible] Security Officer, to Colonel URBAN, the Army Attache, [illegible] indicates that KEYSERS' behavior had been a [illegible] of [illegible] for some months prior to his removal from [illegible]:

[illegible]

In a report to U.S. Army authorities on the date of KEYSERS' removal, Colonel URBAN [illegible] follows: [illegible]

[illegible]

* See Part V.E.3.g., referring to Colonel [illegible]'s statement on security losses as a result of KGB microphones in this office.

NOTE: Part VI.D.2., a tabulation of NOSENKO's leads involving American cases, includes several operations against U.S. code clerks for which he was the supervisor; their names are Frank DAY, Robert DWELLY, Joseph GAFFEY, John TAYLOR, and Maurice ZWANG.

d. NOSENKO's Responsibility for Coverage of ABIDIAN

(i) Introduction

John V. ABIDIAN served as the U.S. Embassy Security Officer in Moscow from 2 March 1960 until February 1962, approximately the same period as NOSENKO's claimed service in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate. During his Moscow tour, ABIDIAN was coopted by CIA to perform a number of operational tasks, including clandestine letter mailings to several CIA agents inside the Soviet Union and servicing a dead drop to be used only for receiving two special types of communications* from the source in the GRU, Colonel O.V. PENKOVSKIY.

During his 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKO mentioned ABIDIAN on several occasions, identifying him as the Embassy Security Officer and as a CIA officer. In 1962 he described ABIDIAN's ~~letter-mailing activities, and he said he was himself concerned~~ (zanimat'sya) with ABIDIAN. After recontacting CIA in Geneva in January 1964 NOSENKO divulged that he had been the KGB case officer responsible for coverage of ABIDIAN in Moscow; for the first time he described then a visit made by ABIDIAN to the PENKOVSKIY dead drop site.

The discussion below is divided into three parts: NOSENKO's case officer responsibilities and the information he learned about ABIDIAN, NOSENKO's knowledge of clandestine letter mailings by ABIDIAN, and NOSENKO's statements on ABIDIAN and the Pushkin Street dead drop.

(ii) Duties as Case Officer

On 17 April 1964 when asked to describe his transfer from the Tourist Department to the American Department in January 1960, NOSENKO said that when he reported for duty and was interviewed by V. A. KLYPIN, Chief of the American Department, and V.M. KOVSHUK, Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, he was told that as one of his duties he would be the case officer in charge of ABIDIAN, whose arrival in Moscow was expected in the near future. NOSENKO was the only KGB officer responsible for coverage of and activities against ABIDIAN and, NOSENKO said, ABIDIAN was the only American target for whom he, personally, was officially accountable while in the U.S. Embassy Section.

NOSENKO was questioned in detail concerning ABIDIAN for six days in January and February 1965. He produced the information in the following paragraphs at that time.

When NOSENKO began to work in the U.S. Embassy Section, ABIDIAN had not yet arrived in Moscow. The section, however, already had received some information on him, and this was given to NOSENKO by KOVSHUK. Among this material was ABIDIAN's visa

* One type was early-warning information, the other notification of his forthcoming absence from Moscow. Otherwise, as of this time, PENKOVSKIY submitted information in Moscow via contacts with the British Embassy and the British businessman Greville WYNNE. The PENKOVSKIY case is discussed at greater length in Part VI.D.7.b.

application, the negative results of checks of KGB Headquarters files, and a report prepared by the American Department of the First Chief Directorate. According to this report, based on correspondence from the KGB Legal Residencies in the United States, ABIDIAN had served as a Department of State Security Officer concerned with the personal safety of Premier KHRUSHCHEV when he visited the United States in 1959; from the way ABIDIAN had acted at that time, the Legal Residencies concluded he was an intelligence officer, probably with CIA.* NOSENKO remarked that the report, combined with the fact that ABIDIAN was replacing the known CIA officer Russell LANGELLE as Security Officer, made ABIDIAN one of the most important counterintelligence targets of the U.S. Embassy Section and therefore of the entire Second Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO personally opened the KGB file on ABIDIAN and later assigned him the cryptonym "ARSEN," since this cryptonym had been used by personnel of the Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate, KGB Second Chief Directorate, who were working against him.

NOSENKO was unsuccessful in his attempts to learn more about the life and career of ABIDIAN. He visited the Chief of the American Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate, but this unit had no information in addition to that already included in the original information report. NOSENKO requested that the KGB Legal Residencies in the United States be asked for further details, but they were never received. For these reasons, NOSENKO said that he did not know and never obtained details about ABIDIAN's education and study abroad, date of entry into the Department of State, promotions, personal rank, previous foreign assignments, military service, or status as Foreign Service Reserve, Staff or Officer (FSR, FSS, FSO).**

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* CIA records indicate that ABIDIAN studied in Paris in 1949-50 and then secured employment with the Department of State as a clerk/typist. He remained in Paris until 1954. After special training at the CIC school at Fort Holabird and the Secret Service School, ABIDIAN served from 1956 until leaving for Moscow in 1960 as a special agent in the State Department's Office of Security. A large part of his work in this period was arranging the security of and accompanying foreign dignitaries visiting the United States. These included the visits of Soviet Foreign Minister SHEPILOV in November 1956, MIKOYAN in the spring of 1959, and KHRUSHCHEV at the end of 1959. These duties undoubtedly brought ABIDIAN into contact with a large number of KGB officers stationed in New York and Washington. One of the members of the KHRUSHCHEV entourage was KOSOLAPOV who, according to NOSENKO, joined the U.S. Embassy Section in late 1959 and, as of January 1960, became NOSENKO's subordinate in operations against American code clerks.

**NOSENKO was unaware of the meaning of the initials FSR, FSS, and FSO. When asked whether he had checked the Department of State <u>Biographic Register</u> for information on ABIDIAN's background, he replied that this publication is not available in the U.S. Embassy Section. He subsequently recalled that the Chief of the Section, KOVSHUK, did have a copy dated about 1956, which was of no use in gathering information on ABIDIAN.

Because ABIDIAN was considered to be a CIA officer, he was made a "special target" of surveillance from the date of his arrival. He was always under 24-hour surveillance by at least two and often three KGB teams, so that at any hour a team was available to cover him if he left the U.S. Embassy. The only time this intensity of coverage might have been reduced, NOSENKO said, was during a period of about one and one-half months in 1961, when surveillance of the Embassy was generally reduced in order to allow increased coverage of British targets.* As the responsible case officer, NOSENKO directed the surveillance of ABIDIAN and evaluated the operational possibilities offered by pertinent information in the surveillance reports.

Prior to ABIDIAN's arrival in Moscow, the decision was reached not to work aggressively against him with agent contacts or provocateurs unless he first demonstrated some personal vulnerability, NOSENKO stated. It was considered better to concentrate on surveillance coverage in the hope that, as LANGELLE's successor, he might lead to another POPOV.** Therefore, no operational plan was written on ABIDIAN until about October 1960. This plan, which NOSENKO wrote, called for no direct action but did specify that:

- ABIDIAN's maid, Tatyana FEDOROVICH, an operational contact of the U.S. Embassy Section, was to continue to apply <u>metka</u> to ABIDIAN's clothing and NEPTUNE-80 to his shoes.*** (She put <u>metka</u> on ABIDIAN's clothing approximately every 14 to 21 days throughout the time she was employed by ABIDIAN.) The only item of operational interest from her during this period was evidence that ABIDIAN was having intimate relations with a female employee at the embassy. FEDOROVICH was unable to find personal mail or personal papers in ABIDIAN's apartment.

- [illegible] KOSOLAPOV's agent, was to try to cultivate ABIDIAN and report whatever he learned concerning him. [illegible] never obtained significant information on ABIDIAN's personal life. ABIDIAN, NOSENKO said, was developing [illegible] as an informant on American personnel at the Embassy, but NOSENKO did not recall any specific report of his to ABIDIAN that would have been of interest to the U.S. Embassy Section. NOSENKO told CIA in 1962

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* In another context NOSENKO said that KGB surveillance of British targets in 1961 led to the discovery of PENKOVSKIY.

** The POPOV case is discussed in Part VI.D.7.a.

***<u>Metka</u> and NEPTUNE-80 are surveillance techniques described by NOSENKO. The former, a "thief powder" applied to clothing, leaves a trace on anything with which it comes into contact; its use in detecting clandestine letter mailings is described in greater detail below. NEPTUNE-80, a substance applied to a target's shoes, leaves a trace on the ground wherever he walks and permits the KGB to carry out surveillance long after the target has travelled a particular route. Dogs are used to follow the target's trail.

that ABIDIAN had recruited [redacted] for an unspecified intelligence mission in France shortly before [redacted] left the Soviet Union in December 1960 and that the KGB's U.S. Embassy Section thereupon turned the case over to the KGB First Chief Directorate.*

- Two Embassy chauffeurs were to apply NEPTUNE-80 to the floorboards and foot pedals of ABIDIAN's car if necessary.

- All other agents and operational contacts of the section were to be instructed to report every detail about ABIDIAN (see below).

- Surveillance teams were to be instructed to check all places where ABIDIAN might be mailing letters.

- Coverage of ABIDIAN's mail was to be continued.

Apart from those specified by the operational plan, the only two KGB agents or operational contacts who met ABIDIAN were Lyudmila GROMOKOVA and "KAMO" (KGB cryptonym, name not remembered by NOSENKO). GROMOKOVA, a language instructor for U.S. Embassy personnel, was a KGB agent handled by the U.S. Embassy Section officer N.A. GAVRILENKO. ABIDIAN took "only several" Russian language lessons from GROMOKOVA and NOSENKO did not know whether these were private or class lessons. He did not learn anything of operational significance from GROMOKOVA's contacts with ABIDIAN, and there was no regular reporting from her.** "KAMO" was an agent of the Moscow City KGB organization who accidentally met ABIDIAN at the

* [redacted] claimed he concocted this story for the KGB in order to extricate himself when the KGB attempted to recruit him shortly before his departure from Moscow.

** NOSENKO first identified GROMOKOVA as a KGB agent when viewing Embassy employee lists on 28 August 1964. The list on which her name appeared indicated she was a Russian language teacher, and NOSENKO said she was handled by N.A. GAVRILENKO during 1960 and 1961. NOSENKO was later shown GROMOKOVA's photograph and failed to recognize it; when told her name, however, he again said she was GAVRILENKO's agent and that she was valuable because she had a good education and was able to provide personality sketches on her students. He did not associate her with ABIDIAN until he was told by his interrogators in February 1965 that ABIDIAN had been one of her students. NOSENKO then made the above statement concerning these lessons. ABIDIAN reported that he took regular language lessons from GROMOKOVA, normally three one-half hour lessons a week, beginning shortly after his arrival in Moscow and continuing until his departure. The first few lessons were with a group of other Embassy personnel, and then ABIDIAN switched to private lessons for the remainder of his tour in the Soviet Union. In reporting his contacts with GROMOKOVA, ABIDIAN said he refused to be drawn into talking about his Embassy responsibilities during Russian language conversation but kept the topic limited to his past personal life, travel, education, his fiancee, and his trips on which he saw his fiancee. ABIDIAN also reported that on 23 June 1960 GROMOKOVA attempted to persuade him to pass a letter to departing personnel officer Mary GORINHA for forwarding to Jean LIEBERMAN, a former student. When ABIDIAN refused, saying that this is against Soviet law, GROMOKOVA tore up the letter.

Baku Restaurant. When informed that ABIDIAN gave "KAMO" his telephone number, NOSENKO recommended that 'KAMO" try to develop a relationship with ABIDIAN. After arguing that this was against the policy of taking no aggressive or provocative action against ABIDIAN, KOVSHUK and KLYPIN finally agreed, and "KAMO" phoned ABIDIAN twice on KGB instructions. ABIDIAN, however, refused to meet him, and no further action was taken.*

NOSENKO did not know the room number of ABIDIAN's office in the Embassy or on what floor it was located, but said that he could check the room number if necessary since he had a copy of the Embassy telephone list published monthly with the office room number of each American employee. ABIDIAN's office was in the "Zone of Security" (i.e., secure office areas). A report from some agent, whose name NOSENKO did not recall, indicated that there was a sign on ABIDIAN's office door which said "Security Office." NOSENKO did not know and said he was unable to determine whether ABIDIAN had a secretary. No dictation or conversation was heard from ABIDIAN's office because no KGB microphone was there, and NOSENKO said that he did not remember any specific interesting or important information about ABIDIAN from other microphones in the Embassy.**

NOSENKO did not know the location of ABIDIAN's apartment in the Embassy building, nor how it was furnished. He said that he did not consider data of this nature to be operationally significant unless the target had shown vulnerabilities or was under active development.

Aware that ABIDIAN travelled from the USSR two or three times while stationed in Moscow, NOSENKO did not know to which countries he went or the time of year when the trips were made.*** Such information, he stated, would have been of interest to him as ABIDIAN's case officer since, like LANGELLE's earlier trips abroad, ABIDIAN's trips were presumed to be for operational purposes. There was, however, no possibility for the KGB to find out where ABIDIAN had gone;**** even if the U.S. Embassy Section did establish where ABIDIAN would travel, nothing could be done

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* See below for ABIDIAN's account of a similar incident involving a Soviet he met while on a trip to Armenia.

** In 1960-61 the Security Officer occupied a room where an inoperative microphone was discovered in 1964.

*** ABIDIAN made at least three trips abroad during his two years in Moscow. In August 1960 he took personal leave to visit his fiancee, a French girl, in the south of France and met with a CIA officer while there. In February 1961 he flew on the Ambassador's plane to Paris for meetings with CIA and then took personal leave to visit his fiancee. In September 1961, at CIA request, ABIDIAN again flew to France and to New York City and Washington for briefings connected with the handling of PENKOVSKIY in Moscow.

**** When CIA interrogators suggested that the KGB could have photographed ABIDIAN's passport on his return to Moscow, NOSENKO replied that the Second Chief Directorate does not photograph passports of foreign diplomats entering the Soviet Union. While this procedure would not be impossible, NOSENKO added, it was not considered so important as to justify the special effort involved.

about it because the foreign Legal Residencies of the KGB First Chief Directorate would not accept a request for operational action against an American diplomat coming from Moscow.

In February 1965 NOSENKO was asked a number of times whether he knew of any occasions on which ABIDIAN took trips in the Soviet Union outside of Moscow. He replied each time that he knew of no such trips and that if ABIDIAN had made such a trip or trips he would have known of them and would remember them as it would have been his responsibility as case officer to take certain actions. Among the latter he listed:

- Receiving notification of ABIDIAN's request to travel from the UPDK (the Soviet Government organization which provides services to the diplomatic community in Moscow).

- Notifying the UPDK of KGB approval for the trip.

- Notifying appropriate local KGB offices on ABIDIAN's itinerary and giving them instructions for surveillance and other operational activity if desired.

- Receiving, reading, and filing all surveillance reports and reports of other operational activity carried out by local KGB units.

NOSENKO was certain that he took none of these steps. He stated further that even if he were absent when such a request for travel was made, he would have seen all documents upon his return and that he did not remember seeing such documents in ABIDIAN's file.

NOSENKO's interrogators then told NOSENKO that ABIDIAN travelled out of Moscow from 5 to 9 October 1960.* Thereupon NOSENKO stated that he specifically recalled having been on leave in October 1960. He said that he could not recall exactly the dates of this leave (which he had not mentioned before), but he did remember that he was away exactly 30 days since he stayed at a dacha near Moscow and therefore was not allowed any travel time. NOSENKO said further that he also remembered that he had

* ABIDIAN made a trip with Paul A. SMITH, the Embassy's Publications Procurement Officer, to Armenia between 5 and 9 October 1960. (ABIDIAN is of Armenian origin, and speaks the Armenian language with a high degree of proficiency.) While there ABIDIAN visited with various churchmen and their parishioners and an Armenian who had repatriated from Greece in 1946. They attended a service in Echmiadzin celebrating the anniversary of the accession of the Katolikos VAZGEN I, and ABIDIAN also visited some relatives of his in or near the city of Yerevan. After returning to Moscow, an Armenian whom ABIDIAN had met on this trip tried to contact ABIDIAN at the Embassy, but ABIDIAN refused to see him. When NOSENKO was told that on 7 October 1960 ABIDIAN attended a service celebrating the fifth anniversary of the Armenian Katolikos, VAZGEN I, NOSENKO recalled that ABIDIAN had gone to Echmiadzin and that an agent had reported a contact with him there. This agent, NOSENKO recalled, was a priest or a monk, and the report concerned only his conversation with ABIDIAN; the agent had no further contact with him. NOSENKO said that this was his sole recollection concerning ABIDIAN's trip, and that he remembered no other details.

left the Soviet Union for Cuba two or three, but not more than five, days after his return from leave; he could not recall the date of his departure for Cuba *

Except for the American woman with whom ABIDIAN was thought to have been intimate, NOSENKO could not name ABIDIAN's close American friends in Moscow or his close friends and professional contacts with foreigners there.

NOSENKO received and read transcripts of all telephone calls that ABIDIAN made or received at his office and apartment via the Moscow city telephone system. He did not remember the names or nationalities of people whom ABIDIAN called or who called ABIDIAN because there was nothing of interest in these conversations. NOSENKO did not learn anything from telephone transcripts about ABIDIAN's relationship with any foreigner in Moscow.

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* NOSENKO departed Moscow for Cuba on 15 November 1960 and therefore, by his own statement, would have been back from leave by 10 November at the earliest (five days before departure). It was pointed out to NOSENKO that, in this case, his 30 days of leave could have begun no earlier than 10 October and that he must therefore have been on duty on 5 October 1960 when ABIDIAN left Moscow. In October 1966, however, when the subject of his leaves again came up in interrogation, he volunteered that he had lied in February 1965 when he said he had taken this leave. He said he had no reason for this lie other than he had claimed to be on leave "in conditions of interrogation when lies and truths were all a porridge." He told CIA again for the first time that his 1960 leave was taken in January of that year, immediately after joining the U.S. Embassy Section. Additional details on this January leave period are given below, in discussion of NOSENKO's claimed responsibility for operations against U.S. military attaches in 1960.

(iii) ABIDIAN's Letter Mailings

During the 1962 meetings in Geneva, NOSENKO reported KGB knowledge of one type of operational task performed by ABIDIAN in Moscow in addition to his recruitment of [illegible] (see above). This task, NOSENKO said, involved mailing at least three clandestine letters, in each case to KGB double agents.

According to NOSENKO on 11 June 1962, the KGB detected all the letters mailed by ABIDIAN; he said that this was achieved through the use of metka: "Stop mailing letters from the Embassy, by Embassy employees. After LANGELLE you didn't mail letters for a year and a half, and then you began again. ABIDIAN mailed several.* ABIDIAN, John ABIDIAN the Embassy Security Officer. Listen, we have this cold /i.e. complete coverage of clandestine mailings/. We have a machine, and the machine finds the letters which are mailed. Without surveillance. The machine itself. This is a big, big secret. Here's how it works. They enter your room - you live in Moscow, work and even live in the Embassy. They /Soviet maids/ clean up the room and simply pour a powder or apply it with a rag /to your clothes/. A rag, even like a handkerchief. There is no smell. They put it in the pockets where you might put a letter. And there is a special little machine at a station in Moscow... All letters which are mailed in Moscow pass through this machine, under a fotoapparat /literally a camera; NOSENKO probably means some sort of light-sensitive device/. We now have 12 /machines/ and hope to have 100 in Moscow. And all the letters pass through the apparatus and the machine itself selects the letter which was mailed by you or him. Do you understand? The machine itself finds it... This is how it was with the letters that ABIDIAN mailed. We had them all because this machine gave them /to us/. I even would phone surveillance and say: 'He's out walking around. ABIDIAN is out walking around, checking, checking.' I would say: 'Drop him. But give me all the letters today.' The machine determines whether there is a special letter there."

Three days later, at NOSENKO's fifth and final meeting with CIA in 1962, he was asked whether he knew to whom these letters were addressed. NOSENKO replied: "To whom did ABIDIAN mail letters? First he mailed a letter to a guy in Odessa. Then ABIDIAN mailed one to still someone else. He mailed two or three letters. One letter was to the Baltic area. The same kind, that is we had planted this man on you. I think it was to Riga, to our double agent. And still, I think, two or three other letters, also to double agents.** But we

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* NOSENKO's information is substantially correct. LANGELLE was declared persona non grata in connection with the arrest of CIA agent POPOV in October 1959. Two letters were mailed, one on 9 December 1959 and the other on 22 February 1960 (one of which was to an agent now known to have been under KGB control at the time); no more letters were mailed until 1 April 1961, when John ABIDIAN mailed one, again to a KGB-controlled agent. LANGELLE's arrest, however, was not the cause of this break in letter-mailings; the suspension resulted from other considerations.

**In 1961 ABIDIAN mailed three operational letters for CIA, one to an agent in [illegible] on 1 April, the second to an agent in [illegible] on 2 July, and the third to a [illegible] agent on 1 September.

didn't uncover any agents on the basis of letters he mailed. There weren't any. I was concerned with ABIDIAN; therefore I know. I can't tell you anything about the agent in the Baltic area because he was handled by the Second Section of the American Department, the 'Active Line' - penetration."*

NOSENKO has described in greater detail how ABIDIAN was detected mailing the letter to Odessa. While discussing personnel assigned to the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate, he said on 24 June 1964: "I first saw Aleksey Konstantinovich SUMIN in the Second Section in 1960, although I heard that he was there in 1959... He is considered a specialist on working against letters containing secret writing... SUMIN sees all the letters mailed by Americans, even the American tourists. The letters are caught either by surveillance or by use of metka. There are several types of metka with different colors, and one type will be used on American Embassy personnel, another type on British Embassy personnel, and another type for tourists.** The same type is not always used against the same group. They are switched around. An example is in 1961 when ABIDIAN mailed a letter to an agent in Odessa. This was a 'game' /igra - double agent operation/. The agent was 'ARKHANGELSKIY' /KGB cryptonym/ I think. ABIDIAN used to park his car and walk around, visiting many shops on Gorkiy Street. He went to one commission shop where there was a large mirror in the shop window, and he would check for surveillance. He was even followed to a post office and one of the surveillance men got in there ahead of him, but he didn't do anything. Then

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* NOSENKO has explained that the so-called "Active Line" Section of the American Department was concerned with the penetration of U.S. Intelligence, primarily by serving up KGB-controlled agents for recruitment.

** CIA has conducted a series of tests designed to determine whether a substance such as metka was being used as a KGB control device. For the purpose of these tests, articles of clothing worn by members of the U.S. Embassy and those of other selected Western embassies were sent back to CIA Headquarters. The clothing in each case had been sent to Soviet dry-cleaning establishments or had been permitted to hang unattended in unrestricted areas of the Embassy or in the apartments of Embassy employees. Special filter paper was applied to these articles of clothing. The same paper was applied in Moscow to desk tops, safe drawers, and the like. The paper was then subjected to ultra-violet, chemical, and microscopic analysis as well as to examination for traces of radioactivity. Results have been consistently negative with a single exception. One test, on one item of clothing, produced a sharply positive reaction. This article of clothing belonged to a third national diplomat who was a CIA operational support agent in Moscow; he was also the only person known to CIA to have been a victim of radioactive isotope tagging in connection with an operational task (not letter-mailing) which he had performed for CIA. There were no positive reactions for this agent's clothing in subsequent tests.

he walked by a post box on the street and was checking it. Two or three times he was followed by this post box but the surveillance never saw him mail a letter. Still the KGB would remove the contents of the letter box and send it in. On the second or third time SUMIN found the letter he mailed with metka. He had also mailed a cover letter to his parents. Of course, SUMIN also knew the address of the agent since it was a 'game'."

Under interrogation in January 1965 NOSENKO described how metka had been applied to ABIDIAN's clothing by his maid and how, in particular this led to the discovery of the letters ABIDIAN mailed to the agent ARKHANGELSKIY in Odessa and to his parents in the United States. The following is taken from the protocol of these interrogations which NOSENKO signed as being accurate on 4 March 1965:

"ABIDIAN's maid in Moscow was Tatyana FEDOROVICH. ~~She was an operational contact reporting to ARTEMOV.~~ She started to work for ABIDIAN a few months after his arrival, perhaps three months but no longer than six months after his arrival. I met her shortly after she began to work for ABIDIAN in order to get acquainted with her, in order to evaluate her and give her general instructions about her work for ABIDIAN. I do not know the exact date of this meeting but it was before the fall of 1960. I wrote the operational plan on ABIDIAN in circa October 1960. At this time FEDOROVICH was already working for ABIDIAN. This operational plan stated that FEDOROVICH would continue to put metka regularly on ABIDIAN's clothing.

"FEDOROVICH put metka on ABIDIAN's clothing during the entire period that she worked for him. She did this every two or three weeks except for a few times when she was sick or on leave. No one else had access to ABIDIAN's apartment and therefore no other person had the possibility of putting metka on his clothing.

"I have said that ABIDIAN mailed an operational letter to the KGB double agent 'ARKHANGELSKIY'. He mailed it at the mailbox on Tverskaya Yamskaya where he had gone several times earlier. Surveillance did not see ABIDIAN mail the letter but the mailbox was controlled and the letter to 'ARKHANGELSKIY' was found, along with a letter to ABIDIAN's parents. Both of these letters had metka on them, as I was told by SUMIN. I cannot remember the date that ABIDIAN mailed this letter except that it was sometime in 1961."*

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* In a CIA interview on 8 December 1964, ABIDIAN identified a photograph of Tatyana FEDOROVICH as a maid who worked for Marion ALBAMONTE and Myra KEMMER, Embassy secretaries, until KEMMER departed Moscow in approximately July 1961. Thereafter FEDOROVICH worked part-time for ALBAMONTE and part-time for ABIDIAN. ABIDIAN explained that he had no maid at all for the "first year or so" of his Moscow tour and that FEDOROVICH was the only maid he employed there. When ABIDIAN left Moscow, she began to work for the Embassy

(continuation of footnote from preceding page)

code clerk John GARLAND (Part V.E.3.c.i.). CIA records show that ABIDIAN mailed the first of his clandestine letters on 1 April 1961 and his second, the one to "ARKHANGELSKIY", on 2 July 1961. If ABIDIAN's recollection is correct (a review of Embassy phone lists shows that KEMMER was in Moscow in June 1961, but was not there in August of that year), it appears that FEDOROVICH could not have been responsible for the metka which, NOSENKO said, led to discovery of the first of these letters; also, it is possible that she was not employed by ABIDIAN at the time the letter to "ARKHANGELSKIY" was mailed. ABIDIAN's third clandestine letter was mailed on 1 September 1961, apparently after FEDOROVICH came to work for him. When NOSENKO was told in January 1965 that FEDOROVICH could not have been applying metka regularly to ABIDIAN's clothing at the time of the "ARKHANGELSKIY" letter-mailing, he repeated that no one but FEDOROVICH had the possibility of doing so and that he was sure she had. When his interrogators suggested that FEDOROVICH may have occasionally cleaned ABIDIAN's apartment on an informal basis before being formerly hired as his maid, NOSENKO said that this was possibly the case. (CIA does not know whether this was so or not, but ABIDIAN gave his interviewer the impression in December 1964 that he did his own housekeeping until hiring FEDOROVICH.)

v) ABIDIAN's Servicing of the Pushkin Street Dead Drop

In 1964 NOSENKO told CIA for the first time that KGB surveillance had observed a visit by ABIDIAN to a probable dead drop on Pushkin Street in Moscow at the end of 1960. This dead drop figured prominently in the PENKOVSKIY case.

NOSENKO's first remarks on this subject were made on 20 April 1964: "I left /the U.S. Embassy Section/ in 1962. There was an interesting move. This address where JACOBS* was caught in the PENKOVSKIY case - the same address was visited by ABIDIAN in 1960, or at the beginning of 1961. And at that time I went there together with /V. A./ KOZLOV, the Chief of the Surveillance Directorate. /M. G./ MATVEYEV /Deputy Chief of the American Department/ also went there with us. We went to that address several times, at Pushkin Street. It was very interesting, this radiator and everything, but the only thing we did there was to place an observation post there, and that post was there for about three months after ABIDIAN's visit... That was in 1960, 1961... They watched for three months. The surveillance teams had to be occupied there for 24 hours every day. I was there then /in the U.S. Embassy Section for the entire time that surveillance was watching the Pushkin Street site/... At the beginning I came there two or three times. I came there with MATVEYEV once, twice with KOVSHUK; we came there with Venyamin KOZLOV... But no one appeared here and so they were not writing anything /meaning that the Surveillance Directorate was not submitting written reports/. No one appeared. That's why, only orally, KOZLOV was saying 'nothing.' A week passed - 'nothing.' the next week passed - 'nothing'... I shall tell you why /I didn't mention this to you in June 1962/. Because I had occasions where there were many such places, and they were watched for nothing. And it would just pass away and in a month it would be forgotten... So we waited a month, two, three. Nothing. So they let it go at that and had forgotten. Of course, the surveillance team had it all recorded, but we had forgotten about that in the First /American/ Department... In 1962, I was in the Seventh /Tourist/ Department. I transferred in January 1962."

On the basis of information supplied by NOSENKO during April 1964, he was questioned during January and February 1965 on ABIDIAN's visit to Pushkin Street. The following, which is consistent with and somewhat more detailed than earlier statements not recorded here, is taken from these 1965 interrogations:

- In 1961, while NOSENKO was the responsible case officer, the KGB followed ABIDIAN from the U.S. Embassy to a residential building on Pushkin Street in Moscow. A stationary surveillance post at the Embassy saw ABIDIAN leave with the Publications Procurement Officer of the Embassy in a chauffeured automobile, rather than in the car he normally used. The surveillance team assigned specifically to ABIDIAN thereupon followed the car to a bookstore. Both Americans entered the bookstore, but

* Richard JACOB, a CIA officer, was apprehended while servicing the Pushkin Street dead drop on 2 November 1962.

shortly thereafter ABIDIAN left alone. He walked around the corner and entered a residential building next to a meat market on Pushkin Street. ABIDIAN emerged after a few seconds. The surveillance team saw him go in but did not follow him. This unusual incident was reported by the surveillance team to the KGB Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate, and the building was inspected that same day by the Chief of the First Department of the Surveillance Directorate, KOZLOV, together with the Deputy Chief of the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, MATVEYEV. Taking into account the character of the building and its inhabitants, the duration and circumstances of ABIDIAN's visit, and the suitability of the hallway - particularly the radiator in it - for use as a dead drop site, it was decided by the leadership of the Second Chief Directorate and the Surveillance Directorate that a stationary surveillance post should immediately be set up to cover this location. Because of the short time available, it was not possible to place this post inside the building, so it was set up across the street. In addition, the radiator was checked daily to see if anything, such as a magnetic container, had been concealed behind it. This stationary post was maintained around the clock for 30 days, after which it was maintained from 0800 until midnight for another two months. If a package or magnetic container had been found behind the radiator, which was checked every morning, it was planned to attach to it very thin wires to trigger a signal should someone remove the package. At the same time a member of the surveillance team would be stationed on the landing of the staircase in this building, out of sight from the hallway below. During the three months that the post was maintained, nothing was found concealed behind the radiator, nor were any suspicious persons seen entering or leaving the building. The post was then discontinued, but the address was placed on a list of suspicious places inspected daily by the Surveillance Directorate. The true significance of this location became known to the KGB only later, after the arrest of PENKOVSKIY in 1962.

- NOSENKO first heard of ABIDIAN's visit to the suspected dead drop site on the day it occurred. He was sitting in KOVSHUK's office when he received a telephone call from MATVEYEV telling him of the incident. Although NOSENKO was ABIDIAN's case officer and KOVSHUK was Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, the decision to place the stationary surveillance post on this location was made at a higher level; neither of them was involved in it or in the later decision to discontinue the post. NOSENKO himself visited the building on Pushkin Street the following day or the day after, but he remained only a few minutes and did not recall any details of the hallway, except that there was a radiator there.

- As ABIDIAN's case officer, NOSENKO recalled receiving the surveillance report of his visit to the Pushkin Street building and placing this report in ABIDIAN's file. (This is the case file which NOSENKO

turned over to his successor, GRYAZNOV, about 28-28 December 1961, just before he transferred to the Tourist Department.)

- NOSENKO received no written reports on the results of the stationary surveillance post, but he did discuss this matter with KOZLOV on an almost daily basis during the first month of surveillance, periodically after that. These discussions took place either by telephone, or when KOZLOV was visiting NOSENKO's office, or when NOSENKO visited KOZLOV's office in KGB Headquarters. From KOZLOV or perhaps someone else, NOSENKO learned that the post had been discontinued after 90 days. On the basis of these conversations with KOZLOV, NOSENKO knew that nothing of interest occurred during the period of the stationary surveillance.

- NOSENKO was in the U.S. Embassy Section during all the period that the stationary surveillance post was watching the Pushkin Street site and was there when he heard from KOZLOV that the post had been replaced by periodic inspections.

- NOSENKO did not report this incident of surveillance on the Pushkin Street dead drop site to his CIA contacts in Geneva in June 1962 because the post had already been discontinued by this time without anything unusual or suspicious having been noted. Therefore he thought that this incident would not be particularly interesting to the CIA.

CIA records show that ABIDIAN visited the Pushkin Street dead drop site only once, on 30 December 1961, a year later than NOSENKO says, in response to an apparent signal from PENKOVSKIY. The sequence of events was as follows: On 27 December 1961, following receipt of what seemed to be the prearranged signal from PENKOVSKIY that the drop had been loaded, Air Force Captain Alexis DAVISON drove from his apartment to the U.S. Embassy to alert ABIDIAN. At about 2100 hours the same night, ABIDIAN left in his own car for Spasso House, the Ambassador's residence where a dance was in progress, to tell the CIA Chief of Station, Paul GARBLER, about the signal. ABIDIAN and GARBLER left Spasso House with the other guests at about 0200 on 28 December in ABIDIAN's car and drove past the telephone pole where, as part of his "drop loaded" signal, PENKOVSKIY was to leave a mark. Later in the morning of 28 December, ABIDIAN, again in his own car drove from the Embassy to DAVIDSON's apartment, where he first checked the telephone pole visually from the window and then walked by it for a closer examination. Although it was not certain that the telephone calls received on 27 December had, in fact, been a signal from PENKOVSKIY and although no supplementary mark was found on the telephone pole, a decision was reached to check the drop. Therefore, at 1115 on 30 December 1961, ABIDIAN with Julian F. MacDONALD, an Embassy Economics Officer, left the Embassy in an official car with a Soviet driver and proceeded to a bookstore on the corner of Pushkin Street. At 1130 ABIDIAN entered the building where the drop site was located, determined that the drop was empty, and left one minute later. The pair then returned to the Embassy.

These facts were outlined to NOSENKO during the February 1965 interrogations. It was pointed out that, by his own most

recent account, NOSENKO had transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section to the Tourist Department about 28 December 1961 and that his participation in a Tourist Department approach to American citizen W. E. JOHNSON on 5 January 1962 had been confirmed by JOHNSON himself. Therefore, NOSENKO was told, much of what he had told CIA about his own role in the Pushkin Street affair became untenable. NOSENKO's response to this observation is described in Part V.F.3., which discusses NOSENKO's approach to JOHNSON.

Also during the February 1965 interrogations NOSENKO refused to sign the page of a protocol which read as follows:

> "I have been told by my interrogators that ABIDIAN's only visit to the Pushkin Street site took place on 30 December 1961. Therefore, I was told that:
>
> a. I could not have placed the surveillance report in ABIDIAN's case file because I had already turned over the file to GRYAZNOV.
>
> b. I could not have received reports about the stationary surveillance while still ABIDIAN's case officer, since I was already in the Seventh Department in January 1962.
>
> c. The three month period in which the surveillance post was watching the Pushkin Street site did not expire until 30 March 1962 - more than two weeks after I left for Geneva.
>
> Thus I could not have known in June 1962 that the surveillance of the dead drop site had failed to produce results or that it had been discontinued."

Although he acknowledged having reported to CIA on his involvement with ABIDIAN as summarized in the protocol, NOSENKO said the way in which the protocol was prepared made him "look silly." On no other occasion has NOSENKO refused to sign protocols dealing with other subjects.

NOSENKO was questioned further during October 1966 concerning ABIDIAN's visit to Pushkin Street. NOSENKO reaffirmed that ABIDIAN was under special surveillance coverage throughout his Moscow tour and that this surveillance detected his travel from the U.S. Embassy to Pushkin Street and back; he would date this only as "sometime in 1961." NOSENKO was asked whether KGB surveillance had detected any unusual movements by ABIDIAN during the period just preceeding his visit to the PENKOVSKIY drop site (a reference to his movements on 27 and 28 December 1961 as described above). He replied that he knew definitely that surveillance had reported nothing unusual and added that ABIDIAN had not succeeded in losing the KGB surveillance at any time during this period.

On 20 October 1966 NOSENKO was asked why, in his opinion, ABIDIAN had gone to Pushkin Street at the time he did. In response, he told CIA for the first time that in about 1960 an

American tourist or delegation member had gone to the Pushkin Street address and that it was the "opinion of the Second Chief Directorate" that this American had selected it as a dead drop site,* it was thought that ABIDIAN went there merely to check the suitability of the proposed site.

When he was asked on 20 October 1966 whether he had visited the Pushkin Street address several days after ABIDIAN had been seen there, as he had earlier said, NOSENKO replied: "I don't remember. I do not want to say that I visited the dead drop. I don't remember now whether I visited it or not. It seems to me that I visited it, but I don't remember. It seems that I visited it with KOZLOV, but I cannot say 'yes,' and I cannot say 'no.'"

As previously indicated, NOSENKO said that on the same day ABIDIAN was observed on Pushkin Street (i.e., on 30 December 1961) the Chief of the KGB Surveillance Directorate, KOZLOV, inspected the Pushkin Street building. The FBI had reported, however, that KOZLOV was on TDY in the United States from 15 November 1961 until leaving New York City on 30 December 1961, travelling via France. The timing of ABIDIAN's visit to Pushkin Street, at 0330 hours New York City (Eastern Standard) time, would appear to preclude the possibility of KOZLOV's having gone to the dead drop site on the day NOSENKO said he did.

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* The Pushkin Street dead drop site was proposed by PENKOVSKIY himself in the August 1960 letter by which he initially contacted CIA. The only known visits by Americans to this address and the only ones connected with its use as a dead drop location occurred on 12 November and 4 December 1960, when CIA officer Eugene MAHONEY checked the address from the outside, and on 21 January 1961, when MAHONEY returned and entered the building to check the precise dead drop location. See Part V.E.3.f. for a discussion of NOSENKO's knowledge of MAHONEY.

e. Supervisor of Activities Against American Service Attaches

At the beginning of the interrogation session on 29 January 1965, NOSENKO was asked to list the duties he assumed upon reporting to the U.S. Embassy Section in January 1960. As he had on a number of earlier occasions, NOSENKO replied that he was given responsibility for the supervision of code clerk operations, was made the KGB case officer for American Security Officer John ABIDIAN who was to arrive in the near future, and was charged with the Second Chief Directorate file on the security of the U.S. Embassy and his section's file on the materials from microphones in various Embassy offices. Later in this same session NOSENKO recalled--and told CIA for the first time--that he was also given the duty of supervising activities against officers assigned to the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force Attache offices. The pertinent portion of the 29 January 1965 interrogation was as follows:

Question: Who briefed you or gave you instructions on what was expected of you in the Section?

NOSENKO: I was speaking with GRIBANOV and KLYPIN.

Question: What did KLYPIN say?

NOSENKO: That "you are Deputy Chief of Section, but I consider that you must also pay special attention to code clerks. We must study them and make an approach to one of them. It's necessary to work on this." KOVSHUK was in KLYPIN's office and I remember also that he raised the question: "O.K. He will supervise this kind of work, but maybe he can also take the military. All three attaches." Well, KLYPIN did not say yes and did not say no. I couldn't say anything because I had not begun; I didn't know how much work this would involve. I couldn't say. And, you see, KLYPIN said: "Let's try it a short period of time." It was that way. It was decided that I will supervise the code clerks and then the three attaches. And KOVSHUK took the diplomats and a whole pile of work. But, of course, in the absence of KOVSHUK I must take everything and in my absence, KOVSHUK must take everything. But later, 1,2,3 -- I don't remember dates -- later I was not supervising the military attaches but concentrated only on code clerks.

Question: Later you were not supervising military attaches, but only code clerks?

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: What do you mean you were supervising military attaches?

NOSENKO: What does it mean? If the case officers of the three attaches have any questions or any papers to report to the Chief of Section, they go to

me, not to KOVSHUK. They were deciding all questions with me. This is what supervising the work on these three attaches means. They were deciding all questions with me. For example, the case officers who were working against diplomats -- KUSKOV, ARTEMOV, FEDYANIN, CHEREPANOV -- they were reporting any questions, any papers, to KOVSHUK. You see, there was such a division [of labor].

Question: Am I correct that by military attaches you mean Army, Navy, and Air Force?

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: Attaches and their assistants?

NOSENKO: Yes, yes, yes.

Question: And enlisted personnel?

NOSENKO: DEMKIN was handling enlisted personnel, and he was also coming in to me for advice.

Question: Roughly how long did you have the responsibilities for the attaches?

NOSENKO: (pause) I don't remember. Several months.

Question: By several, you mean...?

NOSENKO: Five or six.

Question: And why was this responsibility removed from you?

NOSENKO: I didn't have time. No time. No time. You see, besides this, which is simple to explain, there were too many other questions which...

Question: What occupied most of your time?

NOSENKO: Day-to-day matters. An order from the Chief of Department to study and develop this question, then this question, then this question. Then something to prepare for GRIBANOV, then something to prepare for KLYPIN, for his report, then something to prepare for myself...

Question: To which of the major responsibilities you have mentioned did you devote the most time?

NOSENKO: I don't know.

Question: What was most important?

NOSENKO: They were all important.

Question: Can you tell me where you were spending most of your time to cause the removal of your responsibility for military attaches?

NOSENKO: No. I can't tell you.

Question: Who was given the responsibility for military attaches?

NOSENKO: Just a moment. I think he was... I don't remember how, or what date, when there appeared in the First [American] Department a Deputy Chief of Department. It was either before I came, or it was in January, or it was a little bit later.

Question: Who was this?

NOSENKO: ALESHIN.* And his job was such -- it was a new one -- supervision of work against military intelligence officers, not only Americans, but of other departments also, the First, the Second, the Third, the Fourth, the Fifth. Coordination of the whole work against all military intelligence officers. And that's why, later, KLYPIN and KOVSHUK said: "Well, why are you supervising this? Let ALESHIN do it. You are the Deputy of the Chief." It was not only because of the lack of time. Also it wasn't convenient to the case officers. They were reporting to me. Then ALESHIN would invite them in and they would have to report the same thing to him.

Question: Who were you supervising?

NOSENKO: ...GAVRILENKO had the Air Force attaches and assistants; KURILENKO had the Army Attache and assistants; and BELOGLAZOV the Naval Attache, assistants and marines.**

During interrogations on 20 October 1966, NOSENKO changed his earlier statement that the only operational file he held in the U.S. Embassy Section was that on ABIDIAN. At the same time, he described a leave period that he had not mentioned earlier. NOSENKO said: "When I began to work [in the U.S. Embassy Section], after a month or so, I took the files on the Naval Attaches. And

* NOSENKO had mentioned this earlier. On 18 June 1964 he was asked to list the names and functions of U.S. Embassy Section officers in 1960. He said: "In 1960 the Chief of the First Department was KLYPIN. MATVEYEV was still there as First Deputy. The Second Deputy was Yevgeniy Nikolayevich ALESHIN. He was given the special assignment of coordinating the activities of the Second Chief Directorate against all foreign military intelligence activity but was assigned to the First Department... In the First Section, KOVSHUK was the Chief and I was the Deputy Chief. In addition to general functions, I had the responsibility for supervising the work against code clerks and the Embassy Security Officer."

** In June 1964 NOSENKO explained that Nikolay DRANOV was responsible for the Naval Attache's office in January when NOSENKO arrived, but he was transferred and his duties were taken over by BELOGLAZOV who had been working with him against this target.

then after two months I gave them to BELOGLAZOV. I immediately went on vacation after I came.* After two weeks I went on leave for a month. I took over the files either before or after the leave."** NOSENKO was asked why he had assumed responsibility only for the Naval Attaches and replied: It was decided by KOVSHUK. I should take only the Navy while I was getting acquainted with the section. At the same time, the case officer DRANOV was retiring and he handled only Naval officers. I didn't take the Army or Air Force."

NOSENKO was asked again on 25 October 1966 why he was responsible only for the Naval Attaches during early 1960. He answered: "I took the files only on the Navy, but I was working on all of them."

* In other contexts NOSENKO has always equated custody of a file with case officer responsibilities. Therefore, he seems to have indicated here that for the approximately two months when these files were in his name, he was officially the KGB case officer charged with the American Naval Attaches.

** During a subsequent interrogation session, NOSENKO was asked to describe the leaves he took during 1960 and 1961. He repeated that he took a month's leave immediately upon joining the U.S. Embassy Section, "part of January and part of February" 1960; He had gone, he said, to the Caucasus with his wife and mother. He then added: "You want me to say I was not telling the truth in February [1965] when I said I was on leave before I went to Cuba [in November 1960]. I know this." (See Part V.E.3.d., which describes this November 1960 leave and its relationship to NOSENKO's responsibilities as case officer for John ABIDIAN.)

f. Knowledge of the Target

(i) Introduction

His position and duties as Deputy Chief and sometimes Acting Chief gave NOSENKO access to, and required him to know, the extent of the U.S. Embassy Section's knowledge of its target. He has therefore been questioned at length by CIA about the locations and occupants of the Embassy offices as well as about the Embassy personnel whom the KGB had identified as CIA officers. The information from NOSENKO on these two topics is presented below.

(ii) Physical Premises

NOSENKO has said that his knowledge of the physical layout of the Embassy derives both from his general supervisory function during 1960 and 1961 and from his responsibilities as the officially registered custodian of the KGB's file on the security of the Embassy. According to NOSENKO, he received the latter from his chief, KOVSHUK, when he arrived in the section in January 1960; shortly thereafter he arranged by a phone call to the Secretariat of the Second Chief Directorate to have custody transferred officially to his name from that of M.F. BAKHVALOV, his predecessor as Deputy Chief of Section. NOSENKO explained that BAKHVALOV had already left the section by this time but that, under KGB procedures, it was permissible for an officer to remain official custodian of a file belonging to the U.S. Embassy Section, even after leaving the American Department, so long as he remained in the Second Chief Directorate. Until he turned this file over to GRYAZNOV approximately during the period 25 to 28 December 1961, no one else had access to it other than KOVSHUK, Chief of the section, and GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV, who shared the office and safe where this file was kept.

NOSENKO stated in February 1965 that he had never studied the contents, nor had he paid any special attention to this file. Since he would necessarily have been in a position to know, NOSENKO also said he is certain that no operational analysis or planning by himself or others was done on the basis of this file during his two years in the section. The file consisted of two volumes, one for the old building on Mokhovaya Street and the second--about one inch thick--concerning the new Embassy building on Chaykovskiy Street, which was occupied in 1953. It was used only for reference purposes, for the KGB had concluded that it was impossible for a Soviet citizen to penetrate the secure areas of the Embassy because of the security precautions in effect. Apart from these file-custodial duties, NOSENKO was generally interested in the floor plans of the Embassy by virtue of his position as Deputy Chief of the section. NOSENKO's knowledge of the Embassy premises is reflected in the CIA debriefing of February 1965, and these statements are given in the next paragraphs.

"All KGB employees who went into the secure areas ("Zone of Security") of the Embassy on the seventh through tenth floors*

* The seventh floor is not one of the secure areas; the eighth, ninth, and tenth are.

were carefully questioned on what they saw, because these areas were of special interest to the KGB. NOSENKO knew no KGB employees who entered the secure areas during 1960 or 1961 and had no personal contact with any of them. He did not remember any information that such KGB employees ever reported to the KGB, except that Dmitriy I. KUKOLEV, an electrician whom he personally handled in 1954-1955, had observed antenna wiring in the attic; the details or significance of the wiring were unknown to NOSENKO as of 1965.

NOSENKO personally placed some reports by KGB agents in the Embassy security file while he had custody of it. None of the information, he said, was interesting, important, or useful enough for him to remember, and he could not name the agent sources of the KGB. In another context and at another time, however, NOSENKO said he had received a report from some agent (name unknown) that there was a sign "Security Office" on the office door of John V. ABIDIAN, the Embassy Security Officer.*

NOSENKO did not study the Embassy security procedures in detail and did not remember where the classified trash was burned. He said that nothing could be done with this information operationally, because the trash was always burned by a U.S. sergeant or a Marine guard accompanied by an officer.**

The Embassy office or floor where any section was located or any individual worked during the years 1960 and 1961 was not remembered by NOSENKO. This reply was also given when he was asked about the rooms and floors for the offices of the ambassador, the political officers, ABIDIAN, and the code clerks.*** NOSENKO said that he either knew these locations at the time he was Deputy Chief of the section or could have found them in the in the monthly Embassy phone lists; the KGB received these regularly from agent sources, and the lists gave office numbers and phone numbers.****

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* There never has been such a sign; NOSENKO's responsibility for the KGB coverage of ABIDIAN is discussed in Part V.E.3.d. All Soviets who enter the top three floors of the Embassy have a marine escort.

** A check with two former Embassy security officers indicates that there has never been such a regulation. The trash is burned by the marine on duty who "invariably does it alone." One of the security officers questioned said: "I can think of no reason why the Soviets would think this to be the case, since whatever collateral information they have on it would point to the truth."

*** Part V.E.3.c. reviews NOSENKO's knowledge of and participation in KGB operations against U.S. code clerks.

**** The telephone lists give only phone numbers, not office numbers. They do, however, provide apartment numbers.

In 1960 a "metallic chamber" (acoustical room) arrived at the Embassy for President Eisenhower's use and for secret conversations. NOSENKO was not certain where it was located or whether it was ever used, but he heard from an unknown source that in 1960-1961 meetings were held in a secure room in the "Zone of Security." He did not know any of the technical details of this room.

The KGB accomplished only one theft of classified material in any form from the U.S. Embassy during 1960 and 1961. A charwoman (name or cryptonym not recalled), who worked as an agent for the KGB officer Viktor BELOG-LAZOV, stole a bag of papers from the office of the Naval Attaches. Most of the papers were torn or crumpled. They included a draft of a report of the Naval Attaches' sighting of ships and factories while on a trip to Leningrad. Since this report was of only routine interest to the KGB, NOSENKO said, he was unable to recall any other details of the theft, including the date, except that the charwoman was granted a cash award.

(iii) CIA Personnel Under Embassy Cover

According to NOSENKO, the Americans at the U.S. Embassy of greatest counterintelligence interest to the KGB section were the identified CIA officers. When questioned on 2 September 1964 concerning his knowledge of intelligence personnel assigned to the Embassy in 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO stated that the KGB immediately listed any officer associated with the offices of U.S. Armed Forces Attaches as a member of American Military Intelligence and any diplomat as "suspect American Intelligence," the latter notation always meaning CIA. One of the tasks of the section was to determine which of these diplomats was the CIA "Resident" (KGB nomenclature for Chief of Station), which were CIA case officers, and which were the CIA agents or cooptees. The KGB knew that code clerks would not be used to fulfill intelligence missions and that the same probably held true for the Ambassador and the Marine guards. NOSENKO on 25 February 1965 signed a protocol which included his statement that, as Deputy Chief and occasional Acting Chief of the section, he would "necessarily know whom the KGB knew or suspected to be a CIA officer in the Embassy."

NOSENKO has been shown lists of the names of all American personnel assigned to the embassy during 1960 and 1961 and on a number of occasions has been asked to select those known or suspected by the KGB to be CIA officers. The persons he so identified, together with his comments concerning them were:

-Boris KLOSSON: Considered to be the CIA "Resident" in Moscow during this period. NOSENKO did not know why KLOSSON was considered as such but said: "Every officer in the First [U.S. Embassy] Section thought he was the Resident." KLOSSON may have taken David MARK's job, NOSENKO said, and MARK had been suspected of being the CIA Resident on the basis of his behavior under KGB surveillance and of his letter mailing.* NOSENKO did

* MARK was a CIA cooptee while in Moscow, not a CIA officer; see Part II.B.

not recall the names of KGB agents working specifically against KLOSSON and never read any agent or surveillance report indicating that KLOSSON was engaged in clandestine activity. NOSENKO did not know KLOSSON's position in the Embassy, where he had been previously stationed, what trips he took inside the Soviet Union, where he lived in Moscow, about KLOSSON's wife or whether he had children with him in Moscow, anything about his personal life, the names of close American friends and his Soviet contacts. "I didn't read the file" on KLOSSON, NOSENKO said on 3 February 1965. The responsible KGB officer, A.M. MIKHAYLOV, "was reading [the file]. I can't tell you why [we believed KLOSSON was the CIA Resident]. There was opinion--his previous position, attitude. Little, little details. I don't remember."*

-John ABIDIAN: Considered to be a CIA officer on the basis of his conduct as a U.S. Department of State security officer in connection with Premier KHRUSHCHEV's 1959 visit to the United States and because he replaced known CIA officer Russell LANGELLE in Moscow. Surveillance established the fact that he mailed operational letters and visited a possible dead drop site in Moscow (see Part V.E.3.d.).

-George WINTERS: Known to be a CIA officer and was given special attention because of his operational activity in the POPOV case.** WINTERS was in personal contact with KOVSHUK, who used the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as cover. The KGB case officer responsible for covering WINTERS was V.A. KUSKOV.

-Steve WASHENKO: Known to be a CIA officer. As far as NOSENKO was aware, the KGB identified WASHENKO as a CIA officer on the basis of his mailing one or two letters to KGB-controlled double agents in the Baltic area. In addition, from a KGB microphone he was overheard dictating an intelligence report shortly after he returned from a trip in the USSR.

Lewis BOWDEN: Suspected of being a CIA officer, but NOSENKO could not recall the reasons why.*** KOVSHUK, under Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover, was in contact with BOWDEN.

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* See below; William MORELL was identified by KLOSSON to the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs as a CIA officer before MORELL arrived in Moscow.

** The case of GRU Lieutenant Colonel POPOV is discussed in Part VI.D.7.a.; further KGB information on WINTERS is reviewed in Part VI.D.7.c.

*** The CHEREPANOV document, which sets forth a KGB plan for operations against BOWDEN, lists several reasons why he was believed to be an FBI representative in the Embassy. NOSENKO, when reading this document in Geneva in February 1964, concurred in this opinion; he referred to BOWDEN as FBI on later occasions also. See Part VI.D.7.c. on CHEREPANOV.

- Richard FUNKHOUSER: Suspected of being a CIA officer because he is a specialist on the Soviet Union, particularly economics. NOSENKO did not remember the names of any agents working against FUNKHOUSER nor any derogatory information concerning him.

- William HORBALY: Suspected of being a CIA case officer* because the KGB heard him, by means of microphones in the Embassy, discussing a report he had written, or dictating it, about his observations on a trip he had taken in the Soviet Union. NOSENKO said that he did not know the names of agents working against HORBALY or whether the agents obtained derogatory information concerning him. As far as NOSENKO knew, there had been no operational approach to or recruitment of HORBALY.

Of the seven U.S. Embassy officers designated by NOSENKO as known or suspected CIA personnel, three--WINTERS, WASHENKO, and HORBALY--were in fact CIA officers. When HORBALY was first assigned to Moscow, however, he was detached from overt employment as an economic analyst in CIA. In January 1962 he severed his connections with CIA to become a full member of the Foreign Agricultural Service of the Department of Agriculture. When HORBALY first arrived in Moscow he openly discussed the fact that he had come to the Embassy from CIA. While in Moscow he had no connection with or knowledge of CIA clandestine activities. WASHENKO was similarly detached from overt employment as an economic analyst with CIA when he was assigned to Moscow, but was coopted by CIA for limited operational support activity, chiefly mailing agent letters. After his return from Moscow he reverted to his overt CIA employment. John ABIDIAN was a State Department officer coopted by CIA; although not a CIA staff employee, he was for all intents the CIA "Resident" in Moscow from February 1960 until November 1961. The remaining three--KLOSSON, BOWDEN and FUNKHOUSER--had no affiliation with CIA.

During the time NOSENKO said he belonged to the American Embassy Section there were stationed in Moscow two CIA officers, Eugene P. MAHONEY and Paul GARBLER, whose status as such was subsequently found to have been known to the KGB before their arrival in the Soviet Union. In addition, one officer (William MORELL) was openly identified as a CIA employee to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs before arriving in Moscow. Furthermore, Francis STEVENS (see Page 374) reported having been asked by one of the two KGB officers trying to recruit him whether MORELL was a CIA employee; when STEVENS replied that he did not know, the KGB officer stated: "He openly says he does." Another officer (G. Stanley BROWN), an overt CIA employee, had transferred to the U.S. Department of Agriculture shortly before being assigned to the Embassy. The latter two were not engaged in clandestine activities in Moscow on behalf of CIA, but the first two CIA officers were.

NOSENKO indicated that he did not know about the intelligence affiliation of any of these four persons:

- NOSENKO was shown a photograph of MAHONEY, whom he did not recognize. He was then given MAHONEY's name, which he recognized as being that of an employee of the Administrative Section of the Embassy. NOSENKO

* Earlier NOSENKO had said the KGB classified HORBALY as a CIA cooptee.

said that, other than this, he did not know anything about MAHONEY--his previous career, his knowledge of the Russian language, when he arrived in Moscow, when he departed, where he lived, his activities there, or evidence that he was an intelligence officer. "It wasn't known he was a CIA officer," NOSENKO said on 3 February 1965. "If there was evidence I would have known. But there was none." NOSENKO was told that MAHONEY's CIA status had been revealed to the KGB by a KGB penetration of British intelligence [George BLAKE]. He replied that he was certain that the U.S. Embassy Section's file on MAHONEY contained no information from such a source concerning MAHONEY, and that had there been such information available, he would have been a special target and would have been handled by one of the best officers in the section. NOSENKO added that he could not understand why this information about MAHONEY was not given to the section by the KGB First Chief Directorate.

- NOSENKO identified Paul GARBLER as a naval officer who worked in the office of the Naval Attache and the case officer working against him as BELOGLAZOV. He said that he could provide no other details on GARBLER. NOSENKO specifically said that he did not know the names of any agents working against GARBLER, that he knew of no unusual or interesting information concerning GARBLER contained from concealed microphones, telephone taps, or surveillance, and that he did not know whether he had read GARBLER's file or other "materials" concerning him.

- NOSENKO did not identify William MORELL as a CIA officer.* Nor did he know that while MORELL was in the Soviet Union, he was under direct cultivation by NOSENKO's superior, KOVSHUK, and by K.N. SMIRNOV, a case officer of the KGB First Chief Directorate.

- NOSENKO did not recognize the name of G. Stanley BROWN. As shown on a list which NOSENKO brought to CIA, BROWN shared an office with HORBALY, whom NOSENKO said was a suspected CIA officer; in this office was a KGB microphone with good reception but insignificant production, according to NOSENKO.** Reportedly BROWN and another member of the Embassy staff were under constant surveillance during a trip within the USSR during 1961, and in the same year he travelled to Leningrad with WINTERS, correctly identified by NOSENKO as a CIA officer.

CIA records show that, as a staff officer, MAHONEY served in Frankfurt during 1955 and 1956 and was connected with a joint CIA/MI-6 project which handled the NTS, a Russian emigre organization. His work brought him into liaison in true name with both MI-6 and the French Service; he was known to NTS personnel by his true first name only.

* See first footnote, Page 243.

** An operative microphone was found in this office in 1964. In discussing the microphones in the Embassy, NOSENKO said that in late 1960 or early 1961 the U.S. Embassy Section had decided to withdraw the requirement for continuous monitoring of the microphones in HORBALY's and BROWN's office so that this monitoring post could be used on targets of higher priority. See also Part [illegible].

MAHONEY arrived in Moscow on 4 October 1960 as the Assistant General Services Officer at the U.S. Embassy. His specific CIA mission there was to support the handling of PENKOVSKIY inside the Soviet Union. MAHONEY lived in America House. From the start of his tour he was active in his attempts to familiarize himself with Moscow and he frequently toured various areas of the city on foot. In checking locations connected with the PENKOVSKIY case, MAHONEY went to the Pushkin Street dead drop location on two occasions during November and December 1960, and he made a thorough examination of the dead drop itself as well as of its related signal site on 21 January 1961. Throughout, MAHONEY was subjected to intensive KGB surveillance. In a report dated 25 October 1960, ABIDIAN commented on this as follows: "I find this type of coverage (five surveillants on a recent trip to the barber shop) completely out of character with that which is usually given a new arrival of similar rank. My only inference is that the KGB has at least strong suspicions of MAHONEY's primary role [CIA officer]. As for surveillance on myself, it continues to be occasional and extremely discreet."

George BLAKE, the KGB penetration of MI-6, was arrested in London on 14 April 1961. In his confession he said that he had passed the KGB a master list of the names of persons connected with the joint U.S.-British project with which MAHONEY had been connnected in Frankfurt, as well as other materials on this project. On this basis, MAHONEY was relieved shortly thereafter of further duties connected with support of the PENKOVSKIY operation; he was withdrawn from Moscow in September 1961, less than a year after his arrival.

CIA records indicate that GARBLER was detailed to CIA by the Navy in April 1952 and served CIA under Naval cover in Berlin from January 1953 until July 1955. In the fall of 1955, he resigned his naval commission, and in May 1956 he was assigned as a CIA officer to the U.S. Embassy in Stockholm. GARBLER served there until August 1959 in the cover position of Second Secretary and Political Officer (FSR). On 3 June 1961, he returned to active duty with the Navy, and on 31 August 1961 his appointment was announced as Assistant Naval Attache to Moscow, with the rank of Commander. In September 1961 his official biographic data was forwarded to the office of the Soviet Naval Attache in Washington, who had requested this information, and the same month GARBLER made an official call at the Soviet Embassy. GARBLER arrived in Moscow on 29 November 1961. He was the CIA Chief of Station there.

Prior to his affiliation with CIA, GARBLER served in Korea and there was acquainted with George BLAKE. In April 1960 GARBLER was a participant in joint CIA-MI-6 discussions in Washington on the question of tourist operations into the Soviet Union (see Part V.D.8); BLAKE, who had access to information on the agenda and participants for these talks, admitted after his arrest in 1961 that he had photographed the minutes of this meeting and had passed them to his Soviet handlers. On this basis CIA presumed that GARBLER was identified to the KGB prior to arriving in Moscow at the

end of 1961. (BLAKE was arrested the previous April.) He was definitely identified as such in an article carried in the Soviet Government newspaper Izvestiya in October 1963. This article, entitled "A Cruel Lesson," was allegedly written by Arthur HAMAN, an Estonian who defected to the West in 1955 and returned to the Soviet Union in 1963; in it HAMAN attempted to expose how "the U.S. Secret Service, riding roughshod over Swedish sovereignty, recruits agents for subversion and espionage against the Soviet Union and other countries...making active use of the official U.S. missions in Stockholm, newsmen, tourists..." HAMAN named GARBLER as having been involved in this work. This article, which appeared at about the same time as the arrest of WENNERSTROM, described a number of fabricated activities of CIA in Sweden and, in fact, GARBLER had no connection with HAMAN or with anything which HAMAN describes.*

GARBLER's part in ABIDIAN's visit to the PENKOVSKIY dead drop site on Pushkin Street is discussed in Part V.E.3.d.

* See Page 394 for other KGB operational use of HAMAN.

g. Electronic Operations Against the U.S. Embassy

(i) Introduction

NOSENKO had three basic pieces of information on KGB audio and other electronic operations against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow: The presence of microphones in the chancery building, the absence of audio-technical devices in the north wing of the Embassy, and the existence of a beam which monitors and jams transmissions from the Embassy. These are discussed separately below. Except for knowing that a resonant cavity (wireless) microphone had been found in the American Ambassador's residence in 1953, NOSENKO said he was unaware of audio surveillance devices and techniques (other than the chancery microphones) in use against the Embassy, nor did he know of any material produced by such measures. NOSENKO told CIA on 14 May 1964 that, to the best of his knowledge, there were no wireless microphones (i.e., carrier transmitters and radio transmitters) in the Embassy.* His information on KGB electronic operations against this target dated mainly from the period when he was Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, in 1960-1961 and derives from his special responsibilities in this period; from his 1953-1955 service in the American Department, NOSENKO said, he learned only that audio installations existed.

(ii) Microphones in the Chancery

Frequently described by NOSENKO as his most important information, the microphones in the chancery building were first mentioned by him during the 1962 meetings in Geneva. In these and subsequent debriefings NOSENKO reported in detail on the ways in which he acquired this information, on the number and locations of the microphones, the quality of reception, and the value of production. He has not given the date when the microphones became operative, but presumed (in agreement with the KGB defector GOLITSYN) that they were installed prior to 1953, when the chancery was occupied by U.S. Government representatives.** Of the 16 microphones listed by NOSENKO, he has stressed the importance of the one in the office of the Minister Counsellor, the existence of which was earlier reported by GOLITSYN and subsequently confirmed by technical investigations. In 1962 NOSENKO said that the audibility of the nine-year-old

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*NOSENKO stated that the KGB knew the identity of American counter-audio technicians and therefore turned off the microphones whenever any of them arrived at the Embassy. Since a microphone-and-wire system cannot be turned off, this remark suggests either that there was an external power source for the microphones, which NOSENKO has not mentioned, or that NOSENKO himself did not have rudimentary knowledge of such matters.

**The investigations by American technicians leave no doubt that the microphone-and-wire system would have had to be in place at the time of occupancy.

system varied from very clear to zero; he said in 1964 that the quality was deteriorating and that "in a year or two they [the microphones] will be completely inoperative."* Although the microphones produced a great deal of political intelligence, NOSENKO said, he found nothing worthwhile for use against U.S. code clerks or others of operational interest to him.** All pertinent details from NOSENKO and other sources on the microphone system in the chancery building is presented in the following portions of this paper.

(a) NOSENKO's Sources

Nearly all of NOSENKO's knowledge about the microphone system in the chancery building was, he said, derived from two circumstances: First, his responsibility as Deputy Chief of the KGB's U.S. Embassy Section, for receiving and disseminating transcripts of conversations there; and second, a special meeting which he attended in his dual capacity as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section and custodian of the microphone information. Additional information was obtained by NOSENKO in 1962 and 1963 from G.I. GRYAZNOV, his former subordinate and his successor as Deputy Chief of the Section. In several discussions with GRYAZNOV during this period NOSENKO learned that some of the microphones were dead while others had become less efficient since NOSENKO's reassignment to the Tourist Department in January 1962. NOSENKO's statements concerning his major sources of information on the microphones are presented in chronological order below.

"We are listening to everything the military attaches say in Moscow, the Military, Navy and Air Force Attaches," NOSENKO said on 11 June 1962. "All the reports go through me. I read them....Only a limited group of people read these reports. They are all in the First Department of the Second Chief Directorate. Who are they? The Chief of the Department (we don't give them to his deputies), the Chief of the [U.S. Embassy] Section, and I--altogether three people. Sometimes we report to GRIBANOV things we consider important. We conceal the fact that we are listening to the Americans from our workers in other departments, from the English Department, from the French Department....We are listening to the three attaches and the Minister Counsellor. Don't even send coded cables about me (to Moscow). If you do it will be the end of me....Only three people know that we are listening to you. Even within the Second Chief Directorate it is a tremendous secret that we are listening to you."

NOSENKO was asked on 12 June 1962 about the form in which he received the audio intercept reports and whether these reports were delivered to his office. He answered: "No. Here's how it is done. We have a special unit concerned

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*Tests of the KGB equipment by the American technicians later in 1964 resulted in recordings of high intelligibility in certain instances.

**Vulnerability data on Americans in Moscow could be obtained from the microphone system, according to the damage report by the Security Committee of the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) and according to the views of the U.S. Army Attache whose office in the Embassy was the site of a microphone.

with this function which is called the Second Special Department. It is a part of the Operational Technical Directorate [OTU]. The Special Department has several sections within it. Take, for example, the section under Colonel [N.Ya.] KUZMIN. He has the entire English line, everything. He has young girls and boys there who have an excellent command of English. They all sit in a room with special equipment and listen continuously. Besides this, everything goes on tape and later they transcribe it. They listen to it two or three times so as to get every word.... [They prepare the materials.] The materials from the American Embassy used to come to me...and I decided what to keep and what not to keep. Why? A summary report would come to me with the notation that the information in it was Top Secret or Confidential. This was all nonsense, but I was required to return the report within two days' time. So, I would read through the materials to see what was useful and what was not. It's not all suitable. And I would underline this [the significant items] with a pencil. No, [I was wrong]. The report first went to the Chief of department and then I underlined with a pencil what was necessary and gave it back to them [the Second Special Department, OTU]. They collected it. I signed a receipt that I had received it from them and they gave me a receipt when I returned it. And then they gave me extracts. From these extracts alone one cannot tell where the material came from, but from the report one realizes that the Americans are being listened to. It is necessary to have these extracts to place in the files. We have a file on each person working in the Embassy, the so-called delo-formulyar [developmental file]. We keep one on every Embassy employee."

During the second of the 1964 series of meetings in Geneva, on 24 January, NOSENKO took a number of notes from his wallet. Pointing to one of them, he said: "This piece of paper was kept in my operational file and it represents the statistics for the years 1960-1961, listing those microphones which are actively used in monitoring conversations in the U.S. Embassy." This list named eleven offices and apartments in the chancery which contained microphones. When asked whether he had copied the list from records or had drawn it up from memory, NOSENKO explained that it came from an operational review of what "listening points we had in the U.S. Embassy."

A detailed explanation of his acquisition of the written list was supplied by NOSENKO on 14 May 1964:

Question: How did this list come into your hands? What caused you to write it?

NOSENKO: I came to KLYPIN [Chief of the American Department] with my working notebook. KOVSHUK [Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section in the Department] was writing and he put the list on my book. KOVSHUK said this one [microphone] is working well, this one badly, and so on.

Question: What was the date of this? What year and month?

NOSENKO: Oh, I don't remember, 1960...maybe the beginning of 1961.

Question: At the end of 1960 or the beginning of 1961 you and KOVSHUK met in KLYPIN's office?

NOSENKO: Yes. Or maybe it was at a meeting. It is difficult to say. Maybe we went to report to KOVSHUK in his room or maybe KOVSHUK was writing in KLYPIN's study room. I don't remember.

NOSENKO then described the purpose of the meeting: To discuss the possibility of releasing monitor positions from some of the chancery microphones and of assigning these released positions to Vladimir [patronymic unknown] PETROV, Chief of the American Department's section for work against American tourists and delegates suspected of being connected with American Intelligence; PETROV had earlier requested English-language monitoring positions from the Chief of the English-Language Section of the OTU's Second Special Department but had been told that all such interpreters were already engaged on priority targets. At the meeting KOVSHUK and KLYPIN reviewed the microphone coverage of the chancery to decide which rooms offered information of little value and which monitoring positions could be released to PETROV. KOVSHUK drew up a list of the Embassy offices and apartments then being covered on a full-time basis and indicated those of lesser importance. At the end of the meeting, KOVSHUK gave the list to NOSENKO, who retained it in his safe until bringing it to CIA in 1964. NOSENKO has added nothing further on the locations of microphones in the chancery building, and much of his information concerning the quality and value of the production by these microphones came from this meeting.

Since his defection, NOSENKO has spoken further on his responsibilities in connection with the daily transcripts received from the Second Special Department. He said on 14 May 1964: "All the materials after they were read and signed were returned to the Second [Special] Department of the Operational Technical Directorate. Some of the material from this was put in the individual file, but anyone who read it would never know where it came from. He wouldn't know that it came from mikes....KOVSHUK and I read all of this. From this we gave information to those who needed it, depending on their interest. If there was something interesting, it was given to KLYPIN to read. If KLYPIN saw something interesting he could take it and give it to GRIBANOV. Tatyana GRISHNYAT [from the Second Special Department] came by car with this material. She went to KLYPIN. Sometimes she left them with me."

A protocol signed by NOSENKO in 1965 states: "One of my duties as Deputy Chief, First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, was to receive, review, and give to appropriate case officers the production from microphones in the American Embassy on a daily basis. I also maintained the control book (journal) for these transcripts. These transcripts were prepared by the Operational Technical Directorate of the KGB. Every day a female worker of the OTU brought me the transcripts of conversations in the Embassy from the previous day. I regularly returned all of the original transcripts to this female worker; they were usually in my possession for one day. In my absence this duty was performed by [my superior] KOVSHUK or [my subordinate] GRYAZNOV."

(b) Number and Locations of Microphones

The information from NOSENKO on the number and locations of the KGB microphones in the chancery building in the U.S. Embassy is separated from that furnished by other sources.

NOSENKO's Information

11 June 1962: [NOSENKO has just been assured that none of the information he had given CIA would be used without first consulting with him.] "Well, because you are such good guys, I will give you even more. Have the Minister Counsellor stop dictating to himself in his office.... Listen, move the Minister Counsellor from his present office to the north wing of the Embassy [where NOSENKO said there were no listening devices; see below]. We are not listening to the Ambassador. But move the Minister Counsellor.... And we are listening to all your military attaches there. All of them--the Military Attache, the Naval Attache, the Air Force Attache....We have four or five points [from which we are getting intercepts]. We hear the Minister Counsellor, all three attaches--that's four points--and the fifth is where one of the State Department employees sits. And yes, there's another, a sixth point. We are listening to the Agricultural Attache. [C. Stanley] BROWN is working there now and someone else, a young man [William HORBALY]. So, we are listening to these six points. This is our biggest secret. Only a few people know this. I was Deputy Chief of the section and received this information. I decided what to give the Chief of Department and what not to give him. Do you understand? This is to say nothing about the other departments and the [U.S.] Embassy Section itself."

12 June 1962: "We lost the microphone in the private residence of the Ambassador. This was not THOMPSON, but the one before him. BOHLEN was there then. We once had something there, but you found the [Great] Seal where it was located. But in the Embassy itself, in the Ambassador's office, we have nothing. The one we hear now is [Minister Counsellor] FREERS. Bill FREERS, in particular, walks around his office and dictates. All this is recorded. Well, this is important material."

14 June 1962: "When I was Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section I received reports on the microphone material daily. If there was something important in it, I reported to the Chief of the department. The rest KOVSHUK and I read and then distributed to the workers the parts that concerned them. Well, the workers who were operating against the three attaches knew about this [microphone] equipment.... Nothing was received from the code room. These machines were working and there were no conversations. He was sitting alone and there was nothing. [NOSENKO is evidently describing the military code room.]....There is a point there from which we hear the Agricultural Attache. But there in nothing there. They talk about what interests them in the field of agriculture. Nothing interesting."

24 January 1964: The late 1960/early 1961 list which NOSENKO brought to CIA (see above) showed that the following offices and apartments in the chancery contained microphones:

"Office of the Minister Counsellor, FREERS;
"Office of the Naval Attache, HOUGHTON;
"Office of the Military Attache, URBAN;
"Office of the Air Attache, NEILSEN;
"Office of the Assistant Air Attache, WINDSOR;
"Office of the Assistant Air Attaches, SENIO and SACHANEN;
"Office of the Assistant Military Attaches MASON, REITZ and WILSON;
"Office of the Political Officer, GLEYSTEEN;
"Office of Agricultural Attaches, HORBALY and BROWN;
"Military Code Room;
"State Department Code Room and Teletype Office;
"Apartments of FREERS, HOUGHTON, URBAN and NEILSEN;
"Eighth Floor Bar (Marines)"

Altogether, sixteen spaces are listed, but of these NOSENKO said that the microphone in one (the Marine bar) had never worked and that nothing of importance was learned from the microphones in the four Embassy apartments. This leaves eleven; when presenting the list to CIA, NOSENKO said that while he was in the U.S. Embassy Section, "there were a total of eleven listening posts." (In discussing the late 1960 or early 1961 meeting at which KOVSHUK and KLYPIN received the microphone coverage, NOSENKO said on 14 May 1964 that it was decided to release the microphone positions in the GLEYSTEEN office, the HORBALY-BROWN office, the State Department code room and the teletype office. This would leave a total of eight 'listening posts.'")

14 May 1964: Questioned on the total number of microphones in the U.S. Embassy, NOSENKO said that "many" were installed in the chancery building before the Americans moved in, but that he did not know how many were installed in all, how many were in any one of the rooms included in KOVSHUK's list, or where they were located in specific rooms. He did recall that most of the microphones were placed in the outside wall, the wall nearest Chaykovskiy Street, as most of the offices faced this street and the placement of the microphones near the outer wall would make it more difficult for American technicians to find them if they examined only the inner walls.

January 1965: NOSENKO volunteered that there were no fixed microphones in America House, the residence of enlisted men at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. He said that there was discussion during 1960 and 1961 of using the KGB agents employed there to place temporary audio devices for one or two days at a time in the rooms of the Americans as well as in the Embassy garage. These plans were vetoed, however, because such devices are too easily found. For the same reason, NOSENKO said, there was no attempt made in this period to place temporary devices in Spasso House (the Ambassador's residence) or in the apartments of such Embassy officers as John ABIDIAN. The KGB was "afraid that they will be detected and that there will be a scandal."

Information from Other Sources

In 1956 a sensitive source holding a senior position in the KGB submitted a written report to the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow with the cautionary remark: "Do not speak about this information in the rooms of the American Embassy." The report itself contains a portion reading as follows: "Because all rooms in the American Embassy in Moscow are being monitored by the KGB, I strongly ask that there be no conversations and discussions concerning this information in the American Embassy. The flap involving the American direction-finding specialists* in Stalingrad during the summer of 1955 was organized by the KGB because conversations were overheard in the rooms of the American Embassy. As you know, as a result of this flap, the KGB seized valuable direction-finding equipment from the American intelligence officers. The KGB did not possess this type of valuable equipment, and it would have been necessary for Soviet technicians to work and experiment for a long time in order to acquire such valuable equipment. The listening devices are so skillfully installed in the walls, floors, and ceilings of the rooms of the American Embassy that it is impossible to find them, even with special-purpose instruments."

GOLITSYN, who defected in late 1961, reported the existence of a microphone in the office of the Minister Counsellor and said that many more had been installed in the chancery prior to 1953. (GOLITSYN was debriefed in early 1962 and his information on this subject was disseminated within the U.S. Government approximately two weeks before NOSENKO's initial contact with CIA.) GOLITSYN said he had learned of the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office when by chance he happened to see a particular document in an office at KGB Headquarters. According to GOLITSYN, during one of his visits to the American Department in 1960** he heard and saw

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*This is a reference to the arrest of U.S. Military Attaches BENSON, MULE, and STROUD and the seizure of sensitive electronic equipment they had with them in Stalingrad in the summer of 1955. NOSENKO reported that the KGB seizure of this equipment was based on information obtained from microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. See Part V.C.3.b.(viii).

**GOLITSYN has reported that he visited the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department on a number of occasions in the spring of 1960 as part of his preparation for assignment to Helsinki in July of that year; he has also said that he returned on temporary assignment to Moscow and again consulted with U.S. Embassy Section officers in December 1960. With regard to the latter visits, however, GOLITSYN's passport and CIA travel records indicate that he was in Moscow on temporary duty for two weeks in January 1961 and that he is therefore a month off in his estimate of when these visits took place. On this basis it appears that by his statement that this incident occurred in 1960 (he has not been more specific), he could have been referring to either his visits to the American Department in the spring of 1960 or his visits in January 1961.

that a report or reports concerning the results of audio-surveillance in the U.S. Embassy had been misplaced. While GOLITSYN was in the office, the Chief of the American Department ordered all personnel present to search for these papers, and all the KGB officers searched again through their files, without success. GOLITSYN noted a large number of reports with red stripes across their covers, indicating that they were the property of the Operational Technical Directorate. The only office in the U.S. Embassy that GOLITSYN recalled being mentioned in connection with this search was that of the Minister Counsellor.*

No technical investigations were undertaken as a result of GOLITSYN's information, and so it was largely on the basis of NOSENKO's reports that American technicians inspected the chancery building for the presence of microphones in the spring of 1964. The results have been described in the damage report submitted by the USIB Security Committee on 7 October 1964: "On 23 April 1964, a low-impedance dynamic microphone and associated seven-inch probe tube were discovered in the wall behind a radiator in Room 1008 of the Chancery of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The cable to this microphone was traced to a major cable run which lay several inches under the outside surface of the east face of the Chancery. This major cable run consisted of a single twenty (20) pair and a single thirty (30) pair, lead-sheathed audio cable which ran along the east face of the Chancery to the roof area of the North Annex of the Embassy. At this point, these cables were spliced into a one hundred and one (101) pair cable along with two ten (10) pair cables.... A number of vertical cables were found to run from the ten, twenty, and thirty pair cables to the various microphone installations. Fifty (50) microphones have been positively identified.** Two (2) microphones not physically located

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*On 28 January 1965 NOSENKO volunteered an account of the loss of one of the intercept reports which the U.S. Embassy Section had received from the Second Special Department of the Operational Technical Directorate "in 1960 or 1961." This document, according to NOSENKO, was "one of the reports with [Minister Counsellor] FREERS dictating"; as a result of its loss, "the month of December, the whole month, the U.S. Embassy Section was in a turmoil" searching for the document. The month-long search and investigation was unsuccessful, however, and, in the end, the case was closed with the conclusion that the document had probably been burned inadvertently, without a record of destruction having been drawn up. In this account NOSENKO appears to date the incident in December 1960, which approximates GOLITSYN's second series of visits to the U.S. Embassy Section (and duplicated GOLITSYN's erroneous estimate of when these visits took place). NOSENKO has never reported that GOLITSYN was present in the offices of the U.S. Embassy Section during the search for this document and, in fact, has denied that GOLITSYN visited the section either in the spring of 1960 or in late 1960 or January 1961. The only visit by GOLITSYN to the U.S. Embassy Section reported by NOSENKO was one in the spring or summer of 1961, at which time NOSENKO claims to have been on leave; GOLITSYN was not in Moscow at the time.

**Four more were subsequently located, for a total of 54.

can reasonably be presumed to be in apartment 6J based on the symmetry of the known installations. The microphones located were situated so that all microphones and probes were behind radiators. The microphone system discovered covered every outside room on floors six through ten, with the exception of those offices with doors entering onto balconies and when exterior building constructions were adjacent to outside wall sections bearing radiators."

The first microphone found was in Room 1008, in what is now the Army Finance office and which in 1960-1961 was the office of the Military Attache, where NOSENKO reported a microphone to be. All other microphones were ultimately traced from this discovery. There were microphones in all rooms identified by NOSENKO, and in others besides. Two of the latter were inoperative when found--one in the Ambassador's office where NOSENKO said no conversations were being heard in 1960-1961 and the other in the Security Office where NOSENKO said there was none. The damage report concluded that all the microphones were installed before the U.S. Government took possession of the chancery building in 1953.

(c) Receptivity and Audibility of Microphones

NOSENKO made the following evaluations of the quality of intercept received from the chancery microphone installations:

11 June 1962: "They are dying, the microphones, and we cannot do anything about it, because we can't get into the Embassy [to make new installations]. In that respect your Embassy and the British Embassy are the only ones we can't get into."

14 June 1962: "The most interesting materials, of course, are from the...[Note: one or two words on the tape are unintelligible here; from earlier and subsequent remarks, particularly one on 24 January 1964 (see below), it is clear that NOSENKO is speaking of the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office.] And I tell you honestly that it is becoming increasingly difficult to work with this. The shayba [microphone], as we call them, is fading and only two or three people are able to make out what is being said. That is, the tape sounds as if somewhere far, far away, somewhere in the cellar, someone is speaking in a whisper. It is very difficult to hear, very difficult when it is fading. But, what can you do? They tell us categorically and directly--KUZMIN, the Chief of the section of the Second Special Department responsible for this, tells us that soon we will not have anything there. There are a great number of microphones there, but they don't work. I know that there are about 20 microphones there that don't work. They have all gone deaf."

24 January 1964: "Now, we also listened to the code room and the teletype office, but we could never get anything out of the teletype office because of interference [probably speaking of machine noise]. From this point [pointing at the list, but not stating which microphone he was speaking about] the reception became progressively weaker until it finally stopped: evidently it wore out. Yes, there was another point in the bar on the 8th floor. This one never worked even though it was installed. Thus, out of the eleven points, nine were working...[NOSENKO then referred to information he learned in 1962 and 1963, after leaving the U.S. Embassy Section.] GRYAZNOV said that the equipment is deteriorating and they are only getting snatches of conversation and that in a year or two they will be completely inoperative. GRIBANOV is insisting on getting to [recruiting] code clerks at all costs."

31 January 1964: "Here in HORBALY's and BROWN's room [office of the Agricultural Attaches], there is no acoustical [sic] and nothing comes from here. I'll come back to this, but they complained that they're not getting anything. [These microphones were installed] when this building was being built. It wasn't later after you had moved into the building, but when the building was under construction...[NOSENKO was asked whether more or fewer than nine microphones are now currently active.] It couldn't be more, anyhow."

14 May 1964: Very interesting information was heard from Minister Counsellor FREERS' office, NOSENKO said, "but for the last years, even in 1960 and 1961, it was very

difficult to hear. I was sitting with [S.G.] DMITRIYEV [Deputy Chief of the English-language Section of the Second Special Department] and they told me how difficult it was. The mike was dying. Only very experienced interpreters were sitting on this. They listened 10, 15, even 20 times to the same place [on the tape]....[After 1961] GRYAZNOV was telling me that they were getting almost nothing from this point. [He said this] in 1962, 1963. I was thinking you had given a command [had cautioned FREERS]. We were getting almost nothing. I heard this from GRYAZNOV several times in 1963. The mikes were working not bad at all in 1960 and 1961 in the attache rooms--Navy, Air Force.... I don't know [how reception was in 1962]. I know only that GRYAZNOV was telling me in 1962 and 1963 that they were getting little, little, and almost nothing. He said we are losing everything. We have no materials. We have little, little pieces, but nothing...in general [from all of the microphones]." NOSENKO then speculated that one reason for this was the fact that the Americans in the Embassy were not saying anything significant, but he said he did not know this to be the case. Speaking of the microphone in GLEYSTEEN's office, he said: "There was something heard. In 1960 and 1961 it was working I remember. Reception was good but there was no secret information. The mike in HORBALY's room was good in 1960 and 1961....1960 and 1961--good reception." According to NOSENKO, reception was good from the State Department code and teletype room "only always the sounds of [teletype] machines. In 1960 and 1961--machines only....Reception was good when conversation came through. I don't know [about reception in 1962 and 1963]....Reception was good [from the military code room] in 1960 and 1961."

On-site tests made by American technicians after the 1964 discoveries determined that the following microphones in the chancery (the occupants listed are those as of December 1960) were inoperative or unintelligible, but the USIB damage report emphasized that it had not been possible to determine how long these microphones had been inoperative:

- one microphone in the apartment of the senior Naval Attache;
- three microphones in the apartment of the senior Air Attache;
- one microphone in the apartment of the Economic Counsellor;
- the microphone in the office of the Publications Procurement Officer;
- the microphone in the Marine bar;
- the microphone in the Internal Affairs office
- the microphone in the Ambassador's office;
- the microphone in the office of the Security Officer;
- the microphone in the office of the Chief of Chancery;
- the microphone in the office of the Air Attache;
- the microphone in the office of the Assistant Air Attache;
- the microphone in the office of the Assistant Naval Attaches;
- the microphone in the Navy administrative office;
- the microphone in the Air Force administrative office.

This list includes the office of the Ambassador (from which NOSENKO said no intercepts were being received in 1960 and

1961) and the office of the Security Officer (where NOSENKO has said no microphone was installed).* On-site recordings made from twelve selected microphones in 1964 indicate that the microphone in the office occupied by the Minister Counsellor in 1960 was capable of producing tapes of "high intelligibility" as of 1964. The 1964 tests of the microphones in the military and State Department code rooms in the office of the Naval Attache also produced recordings of high intelligibility. As pointed out below, however, the possible production by the code room microphones would have been sharply reduced by the installation of acoustical rooms during 1962.

*As noted in Part VI.D.3.e., NOSENKO reported that the U.S. Embassy officer Richard HARMSTONE did not report his having been approached by the KGB for recruitment in May 1959. HARMSTONE did, in fact, report the approach, and the report was made in the office of the Security Officer.

(d) Amount, Type, and Value of Production

Evaluations of the quality of production have been given by NOSENKO as well as U.S. authorities concerned with the microphones in the chancery building.

NOSENKO's Statements

11 June 1962: "Well, perhaps, there would be some kind of fitness report [kharakteristika]. Sometimes there the Counsellor, FREERS, who was there before McSWEENEY, dictated something; he said that so-and-so has such-and-such weaknesses. We had not known that. We are listening to your military attaches there. We know where they intend to travel, what they want to find out. We know what machinery and what targets interest them--always....They chatter sometimes. Some of the things they say are surprising [from the point of view of security]. They discuss, among other things, where to go, what to see, what to take with them--electronic equipment or not. And we are hunting for this electronic equipment and now have permission, if we are absolutely certain that one of your people is taking electronic apparatus with him on an intelligence trip outside Moscow, to take it, to steal it. We now have authorization to take any necessary steps to steal it. Because you now have improved your equipment. We stole some equipment in Stalingrad in 1955, but now you have better apparatus....What do we do [when we know the attaches are taking special equipment]? Well, they are getting ready to go and we hear that such-and-such data interests them. We give them disinformation; we make them think, for example, that there are rockets there. And there's absolutely nothing there, understand? Absolutely nothing. We make it appear on the radio [by spurious transmissions] that there are rockets there; we even have patrols standing there and everything....They talk about interesting things, but never in my life have I heard a conversation about agent operations, not once."

12 June 1962: [Speaking again about coverage of the U.S. Service Attaches] "They say: 'Today, let's go to such-and-such a place.' They go to the military attache, the two assistants, and say: 'This region is interesting. They have something there.' We know it at once. I personally telephone surveillance at once and tell the Chief of the department to come at once. He arrives and I say: 'Throw in three, four, five brigades [surveillance teams].' We work almost openly against the attaches....FREERS, Bill FREERS, in particular, walks around in his office and dictates. All this is recorded. Well, this is very important material. We do not know the cipher, but he dictates Top Secret and Confidential cables [in the clear]. We receive the clear text and decide at once whether there is anything serious there or not. If we decide that this must be reported to the [KGB] Chairman immediately, GRIBANOV may call him right away."

24 January 1964: "Now, we also listened to the code room and the teletype office, but we could never get anything because of interference [teletype machine noise]....We didn't get much out of the [military] code room; we could hear [the code clerk James] STORSBERG swearing on occasion, and then he would mention a group of numbers.* This was, of course,

*See Part V.E.3.c. on the STORSBERG case.

all recorded, and we turned it over at once to the Eighth Directorate, dealing with coding and decoding."

14 May 1964: Discussing the list drawn up by KOVSHUK and the decision to withdraw U.S. Embassy Section requirements for full-time monitoring of certain microphones, NOSENKO quoted KOVSHUK: "We are getting information from the rooms of the attaches, the Counsellor, and the Agricultural Attache. The flats [Embassy apartments]--no; the bar--nothing. Of course, I know it is necessary to keep the room of the code clerks in spite of the fact that there is seldom anything received except several numbers. The code clerk is saying aloud several numbers. But the flats you can take, not permanently, but temporarily." NOSENKO then continued: "KOVSHUK said to give them these flats....But you see, nothing was going on in these flats. They weren't speaking or were talking about steak and eggs. There was nothing of interest from an operating standpoint. Sometimes we heard there would be guests. Okay. There is a possibility to hear something. In this case we would call DMITRIYEV [English-language Section of Second Special Department] and say: 'This evening, this day, this flat. Maybe we will get something.' The mikes were working not bad at all in 1960 and 1961 in the attache rooms--Naval, Air Force. When the man was alone we heard nothing. But when two or three men were sitting in the rooms, the assistants, we heard. For example, when they returned from a trip and discussed what they had seen or when they were preparing for a trip.... But we heard nothing about agents."

Later on this occasion the following diagogue took place:

NOSENKO: GRYAZNOV was telling me in 1962 and 1963 that they were getting little, little, almost nothing. He said we are losing everything. We have no materials. We have little, little pieces, but nothing.

Question: Was he talking about the Military Attaches?

NOSENKO: In general. I think they were speaking very little. God knows. Then, you see, we were thinking they were taking new measures. GRYAZNOV, FEDOSEYEV, and KOVSHUK considered that there was a room-in-a-room--a room [acoustic] for the meeting.

Question: When did you first hear about the room-inside-the-room?

NOSENKO: First it was known when, I think, Eisenhower was going to come.* In 1960 or 1961 we had information that the Embassy had such a chamber made out

*President Eisenhower's trip to the USSR was scheduled for the summer of 1960 but was cancelled over the U-2 incident on 2 May 1960.

of steel....In 1960 and 1961 the mike in GLEY-STEEN's office was working, I remember. Reception was good, but there was no secret information. I don't know [about reception from this mike in 1962].

Question: What about GRYAZNOV's statement [concerning diminishing production of the Embassy microphones]?

NOSENKO: This was only one common phrase. He didn't tell which room. I think he was speaking about the group...

Question: How was production from the mikes in HORBALY's office?

NOSENKO: Not good, but we did get something which made us suspect he was connected with intelligence. HORBALY.

Question: What about the code room and teletype office?

NOSENKO: At State, yes. Only always the sounds of machines in 1960 and 1961. Machines only. Three times during these two years maybe somebody said one phrase or one of the guys said several numbers.

Question: What about the military [code] area?

NOSENKO: The reception was good. He [STORSBERG] seldom spoke. Sometimes he repeated numbers to himself. And sometimes a mechanic of code machines came to him, a military guy, a sergeant [William HURLEY, an Army Warrant Officer]. They said two or three phrases. "Did you check this?" "Yes." "This side good." Et cetera.

Question: In all this time that you read all this material, there must have been something that impressed you as extremely valuable.

NOSENKO: Extremely valuable--nothing. A little was interesting from FREERS' room. It was given to the special group of GRIBANOV. They were writing special information to the [KGB] Chairman to the [CPSU] Central Committee. There were political questions, for example.

26 January 1965: The following is taken from an interrogation protocol signed by NOSENKO: "I regularly reviewed all of the transcripts from microphones in the American Embassy for a period of approximately two years, from January 1960 to January 1962. The following is the only information which I can remember as being important, interesting or operationally useful to the KGB:

a. From the microphone in the office of the Minister Counsellor, FREERS, I remember that he occasionally dictated cables about the Embassy's evaluation of certain declarations or acts of the Soviet Government and advised the State Department on positions for negotiations with the USSR. This information

was of such importance that special reports were written to the Central Committee of the CPSU. However, I cannot remember any specific incidents or events which these cables reported nor any specific evaluations or recommendations made in these cables.

b. Also from the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office, I remember that he dictated fitness reports (kharakteristiki) on about twelve officers in the Embassy. I cannot remember who any of these officers were or any details from the reports. There was nothing in these reports which was interesting or useful to the KGB.

c. From the microphone in the Military Attache's office I remember that the Military Attaches regularly discussed plans for trips within the USSR and the targets that they wanted to cover. They also discussed the results of these trips after their return. However, I cannot remember any information about specific trips planned by specific Military Attache personnel or any specific targets that they planned to cover or any specific results from any trip. I do not remember any specific operational activity taken by the organs of the KGB against Military Attaches on trips within the USSR which was based on information obtained from this microphone. There was no interesting, important, or useful information about the personal or professional lives or about the vulnerabilities of anyone in the Military Attache's office (Army, Navy, and Air) obtained from this microphone.

d. I remember that from the microphones in the State Department code room occasionally a code clerk would read numbers. These numbers were only of interest to the Eighth Directorate (Communications and Cryptology) of the KGB. I do not remember any conversations from this microphone. There was no information from this microphone on any of the code clerks which was interesting, important, or useful to the U.S. Embassy Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, KGB.

During the approximately two years in which I daily reviewed the production from all the microphones in the American Embassy I do not remember any information on any American in the Embassy which was interesting, important, or useful to me as the Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section except the points noted in the above paragraphs."

28 January 1965: "In 1960 and 1961 I don't remember any report from the mikes about agents. Never. Nothing about work with agents or work with contacts. But FREERS or WALMSLEY [Minister Counsellor 1954-1956] were dictating interesting opinions of the Embassy concerning the political situation and this material was looked at by the information group and then they were preparing special reports for KHRUSHCHEV."

Evaluation by Others

Theodore F. HOFFMAN, Army Attache in Moscow from May 1959 to May 1961, has been interviewed concerning the microphone discoveries. (In the spring of 1961, Colonel HOFFMAN was succeeded by Colonel URBAN as Army Attache.) While in Moscow, Colonel HOFFMAN occupied room 1008, where the first microphone was found and his statements below relate to matters presumed to be of general and specific interest to the U.S. Embassy Section during the period when NOSENKO claims to have been its Deputy Chief.*

"James H. STORSBERG [military code clerk] was dating a foreign national, I believe a secretary in the British Embassy, name not recalled. On one or two occasions, he was needed either to decode or to encode for dispatching a message and was not available. He would be off with his girl friends, and we couldn't find him. He was verbally reprimanded in my office in regard to the two incidents of absenteeism.

"M/Sgt. Peter BINDER [manager of America House] and I discussed frequently the administrative problems encountered in his operation of the America House. We also discussed the importance of his keeping me informed of the conditions, personality problems, drinking habits, and any other incident of importance that might occur in the America House or the America House club. All discussions were conducted in my office.

"In May or June 1961, James C. KEYSERS [military code clerk] was found to have allowed one or more male members of...a U.S. ice review entertainment group touring the Bloc countries to spend the night in his room at America House. He was suspected of homosexual activities, and he admitted to me being a participant in homosexual activities. I believe these admissions and my entire discussion with KEYSERS took place in room 9, identified now as the shielded code room, located on the ninth floor of the Embassy. I gave SAVAGE [his enlisted administrative assistant] verbal instructions in my office to immediately prepare the necessary paper work for removing KEYSERS from the station and instructed him to inform ACSI by cable as to the details of the incident.

"I remember...a discussion I held with the U.S. Air Attache in his office [where a KGB microphone was located] concerning homosexual activities on the part of two of the Air Force enlisted personnel on station... The discussion in his office concerned the administrative procedures necessary in removing the individuals from Station.

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*Apart from his general duties as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, NOSENKO bore special responsibilities for each of the persons mentioned by Colonel HOFFMAN: He supervised the KGB officers operating against code clerks and the residents of America House, and he personally participated in approaches to the two code clerks named, STORSBERG and KEYSERS. The STORSBERG and KEYSERS cases are discussed in Part V.B.3.c.

[Summing up] "To be perfectly frank, I would assume that...some of our modus operandi, some of our targets, some of the results, and all of our personal weaknesses were compromised. This is not a very definite answer; however, it is the best estimate I can make."

In its general introduction, the USIB damage report states: "Although there has been no observable indication that the Soviets have acted in any manner to the detriment of the United States based upon information considered possibly compromised, it must be concluded that due to the extensive period of penetration, the cumulative effect has resulted in serious damage to the United States. The Soviets have gained considerable knowledge as to the effectiveness of United States operations within the Soviet Union, particularly the military attache collection program. Soviet knowledge of U.S. emphasis upon certain intelligence collection areas has made it possible for them to identify priority intelligence and probable Soviet targets and thereby permitted them to implement specific counteractions. The Soviets over the years must have amassed considerable information concerning the personal habits, problems, attitudes and weaknesses of personnel assigned to the Embassy which can be used by them for purposes of exploitation at any time of their choosing in the future."

The following extract from the USIB damage report concerns the declining value of the production from the microphones in 1962 and 1963.*

"The security practices and procedures appear to have followed a pattern from April 1953 to May 1960, at which time the first plastic room was installed. A change occurred in the work habits in that the more senior State Department officers utilized the plastic room for sensitive discussions and dictation. The room could accommodate only a limited portion of the Embassy classified discussions and accordingly, a number of classified discussions were held outside this secure area. In the April 1953-May 1960 period it was an accepted practice for the Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission to discuss openly in their offices routine classified operations of the Embassy and to dictate classified documents and telegrams....In September 1962, the second acoustic room was erected for the typing section for the handling of sensitive classified material. From December 1963 to date it was indicated that no classified telegrams have been dictated

*As previously indicated, NOSENKO said that in 1962 and 1963 he learned there was almost no production from the Embassy microphones. One reason was the natural decline in efficiency of equipment installed ten years previously; the KGB believed that other reasons were the installation of acoustic rooms in the Embassy and tightened security procedures.

outside of the acoustic rooms....The military attaches reported that most cables were drafted in longhand or typed by the originator and then turned over to the code clerks for transmission. In certain instances cables were dictated in the offices. There were many discussions in the offices relating to official duties, office routine, proposed travel, personal observations and normal office talk not specifically in themselves considered classified. From 1953 to 1959, sensitive classified matters were discussed in whispers or to the accompaniment of external noises, such as radios and--street noises....In 1959 a secure inner room was constructed in the attache section and has since been utilized for classified discussions and debriefings...."

(iii) Microphones in the North Wing

According to NOSENKO, no microphones or other audio devices were installed in the north wing (as distinct from the chancery) of the U.S. Embassy prior to its occupancy in 1962. (For this reason, NOSENKO advised CIA in 1962 to transfer its sensitive offices gradually--to protect NOSENKO's security--from the chancery to the north wing at the Embassy.) He has commented several times on this subject, and these remarks are presented below.

11 June 1962: "The Embassy is now located on Chaykovskiy Street. When they decided to give the north wing to the Embassy, I wrote an entire report about it. SHELEPIN was still there then [as KGB Chairman. I proposed that] equipment be installed in the walls, gave the justification for this, etc. SHELEPIN wrote: 'Is it worth it?' At the time there was an improvement in mutual relations (between the Soviet Union and the United States). SHELEPIN was a good lad, but feared that...and before this you found 18 or 20 microphones in the new building in Warsaw.* SHELEPIN wrote: 'Is it worth it? We now have good relations with America. It isn't worth it.' He didn't want complications. And then time was lost. Two or three months passed and we again wanted to try it. SHELEPIN also wanted to, but it was already too late. ABIDIAN was going there all the time, the Security Officer. It was already too late because this can be done only while the building is being built. When the windows and doors have been begun it is already too late... The north wing was almost ready. We don't have anything there. So, you should move the Minister Counsellor there. Move him to the north wing from his present office... Don't do it at once. Do it slowly. Don't hurry; don't be in a hurry. Have him say that he doesn't like this room and wants to move there... We hear all the military attaches--the Military Attache, the Naval Attache, and the Air Force Attache--in Moscow. Everything is recorded. But again, don't do anything at once. Don't make any (sudden) changes. Quietly transfer one and then another there (to the north wing), the attache himself and his assistants... You must be very, very clever and very, very foxy... Gradually, gradually move them to the north wing of the building, to the north wing, in which we have absolutely nothing and won't have anything."

31 January 1964: "When the construction of this right (north) wing had begun, when you started the right wing, the new addition to the building, there was a plan to install as many (microphones) as possible--thirty, forty--stick them everywhere. It really wasn't important how many of them would really work. The Committee (KGB) Chairman at that time was SHELEPIN. He didn't go for this. Whether it was the flap with the Poles that happened just before that* or whether it was something else or whether it was the international situation, they were afraid that this may be uncovered. But then, later, when the building was finished, and when you were finishing or putting up the addition yourself, at that point it was too late to put these things in. It was impossible to do it."

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* NOSENKO is referring to the discovery in June of 1960 of 19 microphones in the new U.S. Embassy in Warsaw.

After being told by CIA on 31 January 1965 that a lead cable had been found in the north wing, NOSENKO said: "I personally can assure you that nothing was done in that right wing. Nothing, absolutely nothing. There was nothing done there, so it must have been something else."

No extensive counter-audio checks have yet been carried out in the north wing of the U.S. Embassy, and no wired microphones have been found there. Investigation of the microphones in the main section of the Embassy led, however, to the discovery of other Soviet technical equipment installed in the north wing. The USIB damage report stated: "Three coaxial cables were discovered running parallel to the one-hundred-and-one pair audio cable from the North Annex roof area to the basement of the North Annex...[All three cables were severed by American technicians in 1964.] The cable runs were as follows:

"1. The first coaxial cable...terminated under six inches of reinforced concrete in the North Annex attic. The center conductor was connected to the lead sheath of the 20-pair and of the 30 pair cable which in turn come from the east face of the chancery. The shield of the coaxial cable was unconnected.

"2. The second coaxial cable...followed the same path as the first coaxial cable. The shield was unterminated. The center conductor was terminated in an insulated metal grill. The grill is located in the upper crust of the North Annex attic floor with the long dimension in juxtaposition to the old common wall between the Chancery and the North Annex. The long dimension is normal to the street in front of the Embassy. The grill is made of one centimeter steel reinforcing rods spot welded into a mesh of 15 cm. (5.9 inches). The overall dimensions of the grill are 14'4" by 4'7". The coaxial cable was connected to one corner of the grill....The grill is located as close as possible to the old common wall and is about thirty feet below the State Department code room. The grill 'points' in the general direction of the code room as the plane of the grill is parallel to the plane of the ground.

"3. The third coaxial cable ran along the approximate path of the other coaxial cables to the block of reinforced concrete that contains the grill mentioned above. This coaxial cable terminated in a four-inch piece of fine Lits wire. The shield of the coaxial cable was unterminated..."

The damage report added: "The coaxial cables appear to be of recent installation probably prior to Russian evacuation of the North Annex. The outer shields of all the coaxial cables were carefully insulated."

The coaxial cables and their terminations were evaluated as follows in the damage report: "All tests that have been performed indicate that the grill work and the lead sheaths [of] the cables 20 and 30 pairs were used as antennas.... No function has been determined for the third coaxial cable which terminated in a short piece of Lits wire....The location

of the grill in such close proximity to the State Department Code Room indicated that an operation was directed against that area....The lead sheath may have had other uses. The possible uses that have been suggested are listed below. The most likely use is as an antenna although the other possibilities have not been completely discarded.

"a. Antenna for collection effort directed against code room.

"b. Antenna for use in connection with some other surveillance device or technique.

"c. An alarm system to 'protect' the microphone system.

"d. Part of a hum removal system connected with the microphone installation.

"e. Not in use."

(iv) Monitoring/Jamming Beam

NOSENKO was questioned on 31 January 1964 about the so-called "Moscow Signal." (This is an "S" band signal that has been directed against the top floors--the "secure area"--of the U.S. Embassy since the early 1950's from an apartment building located about 200 feet away. Detailed investigation of the signal has been underway since October 1962, but its exact nature and purpose have not yet been established. Although there is some speculation that the signal is meant for harassment purposes only, the view now generally accepted by U.S. technicians is that it has some intelligence-collection function. No change in the signal has been noted since the discovery and the cutting of the cables referred to in the preceding section.) The interview went as follows:

NOSENKO: There is a beam, there is a ray which works against the Embassy. I know.

Question: Do you know what it is?

NOSENKO: No, I don't. But I know that they work and they put things in, and they listen and they do something, and they...

Question: (Interrupting.) Is it successful, is it working?

NOSENKO: Yes, they keep working all the time. Perhaps periodically, but it's working. Yes, there is something in the back of the Embassy on this Chaykovskiy Street, and there is something in front of the Embassy, too.

Question: And it is for listening in?

NOSENKO: No, it's in order to deprive you of working with stationary equipment.

Question: What do you mean--so that our receivers wouldn't operate properly?

NOSENKO: Look, I'm not a specialist. I don't know the details. I know only that the work is being done in this particular area, in this particular direction. But what they do, I don't really know.

Question: But this is not for the purpose of obtaining information?

NOSENKO: Let's say you go on the air. So we find out whether you're listening in on some of our communications or something like this.

Question: To what extent would you in your [American] Department, in your [U.S. Embassy] Section, know about these technical aspects? Would you have to know it? Would you know the details of these things?

NOSENKO: No. No. This is something that the members of the [KGB] Eighth Directorate [responsible for communications and ciphers] should concern themselves with, the ones who work in OTU. This doesn't concern us in the American Department, in the U.S. Embassy Section.

Questioned again later, NOSENKO said that the signal was used to jam U.S. equipment working in the Embassy building. It was this system, he said, which had determined that the Americans had intercepted some GRU agent radio communications. The beam was designed "both to monitor and to jam" transmissions from the Embassy. NOSENKO repeated that "not being a specialist" he was ignorant of the technical nature of the job, or any further details.

Because NOSENKO's true name and photographs had been submitted to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in connection with this visa request, NOSENKO added, it was henceforth necessary for him to use his true name for all travel abroad.

c. The Cuba TDY (1960)

In November 1960, after and as a result of the cancellation of his planned trip to the United States, NOSENKO travelled with a delegation of nickel industry experts to Cuba. He first mentioned this trip on 11 June 1962, during his second meeting with CIA. His account of his activities was given in answer to the question of whether he had ever visited Germany: "I have been in Germany. Yes, yes. I was in Cuba in '61. Well, as NIKOLAYEV. I was there a month and a half. This was when your Embassy was there and we wanted to prepare*... Well, I looked it over to see what kind of people you had working there. They asked me to prepare, so to speak, an accounting on how things were going. I arrived there and asked how they were working against you, just on you. Everyone there is working for you. One, two, three, five days went by... I had unlimited funds, any amount. I could go to any restaurant, any show. So that's how it was with me. The fellows reported: 'He [an American] is there.' My mission was to get a general picture. Not for one, two, or three days, but for a month or two, to provide an opinion... I worked pretty cleverly on them. He [the American] would go to a restaurant. They would say to me: 'He is at such-and-such a restaurant and can be observed there.' I would go and observe him in the mirror or somehow. I am sitting in the restaurant, drinking, and that's all. But I would watch him to see how he behaves, etc., etc. That is, I would begin to feel if he has the mark of an intelligence officer. ...But this was not enough for me. I would go again and again. I would see that, yes, he is an intelligence officer... We were asked to share our experiences with them [the Cubans]. They didn't know a thing... They had turned all intelligence work over to the Communist Party. The Communist Party complicates it."

In the final minutes of NOSENKO's last meeting with CIA in 1962 the subject of his trip to Cuba came up again; NOSENKO recalled that he had used the name NOSENKO for his trip to Cuba and that his function there was that of security officer.

Question: When did you travel to Cuba?

NOSENKO: 1960, November and December 1960.

Question: Under the name NIKOLAYEV?

NOSENKO: No, as NOSENKO, NOSENKO, NOSENKO. I will explain how this happened. I was supposed to go to America, sometime in November, with a group from Gosplan, automotive specialists, etc. Data had already been submitted for coordination and, in particular, my name had been given to the American Embassy there [Moscow]. But the American Embassy announced that this delegation could be accepted, but a little later. And my passport had already been issued. My passport had already been signed authorizing travel abroad, but it was a service passport, not a diplomatic one. And at this moment a delegation was supposed to

* The U.S. Embassy in Havana was officially closed on 3 January 1961.

Her job was simply to inform us in case something interesting happens and somebody interesting comes to the library, but practically nobody ever went to the library. Then, what could she tell us about these sergeants that were taking Russian lessons, that she was supposed to be reporting on? In the first place, they were lazy bums. They would go to a lesson once and then miss the next two and then perhaps go again, and again miss one or two." In September 1964 NOSENKO added that LEVINA had never been targetted against any particular individual and had never provided any interesting reports on her American contacts. At the end of 1960 or in the beginning of 1961, NOSENKO said, she was released from the Embassy by Paul SMITH, possibly because she was a little deaf and one had to speak loudly to her to be understood.* NOSENKO turned LEVINA over to another officer before he returned to the Tourist Department, and later the British Department was planning to use her in either the British or Canadian Embassies.

* CIA records show that LEVINA was employed at the Embassy as a librarian from January 1958 through January 1962, when she was released. Paul SMITH was Second Secretary of the Embassy in charge of the Cultural Affairs Section and Publications Procurement Officer from May 1959 until approximately September 1961, when he left Moscow.

4. Overseas Assignments

a. Attempt to Obtain Assignment in Ethiopia (1960)

During the first half of 1960, NOSENKO said, he applied for a permanent overseas assignment to Ethiopia because doctors had prescribed a change of climate for his daughter Oksana's asthma. O.M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, approved his request, but then the KGB Personnel Department turned it down when a file review revealed potentially dangerous character weaknesses.

NOSENKO described this matter on 14 April 1964 as follows: "Gennadiy GRYAZNOV came to the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate in 1958. Before 1956 he was studying in the Higher School of the KGB and when he finished the school in 1956 he was assigned to the KGB Personnel Department, and then he came to the American Department in 1958. So GRYAZNOV had very good connections in the Personnel Department. So in 1960, when I wanted to leave, to go abroad on permanent assignment I said to GRIBANOV: 'Let me go for two years to Ethiopia.' When the Personnel Department refused to let me go, I decided I'd just have to know what was there in my personal file. I had to learn what it was that was causing all this. By that time GRYAZNOV was in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate and happened to be the head of the Party Organization of the entire directorate, and he at one time had worked in the Personnel Office himself. He said: 'Give me this thing and I'll see what I can find out about it.' So he went to the Personnel Department and through his friend there got my personal file. Then he gave me a call and said to come over. I went to his office and he locked the door. Of course, he couldn't give me this file, couldn't let me hold it in my hands so to speak. So he read this case to me, this 1954 case to me, about the woman and so forth,* and then said that at that time they made an investigation of my previous residence. And they found out that while I was studying at the Institute [of International Affairs] and was living on Pervaya Meschanskaya Street, all sorts of girls visited me; different girls, a new girl would visit me almost every week. This was in my file. Then this case that took place in 1954. And then in 1960--and, incidentally, GRIBANOV mentioned this to me also--the file said that I was drinking quite a bit, and for this reason I had many fights with my wife. And that was all that appeared in my file. Nothing else, whatsoever, besides these things that I just mentioned."

b. U.S. Visa Application (1960)

NOSENKO's true name appeared with 11 others on a 20 October 1960 request to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow for visas for members of a Soviet automotive exchange delegation which was scheduled

* NOSENKO is referring to the incident he says took place in 1954 when he used KGB alias documentation to conceal his true identity while seeking treatment for venereal disease. See Part IV.B.

to visit the United States in mid-November 1960.* NOSENKO was listed as an engineer employed by the State Scientific-Technical Committee (GNTK). After defecting, NOSENKO told CIA that he had been scheduled to accompany this delegation as a security officer but that the delegation's visit to the United States had been postponed at the last moment. He therefore did not travel to this country.

He further explained, on 17 April 1964, why his visa application had been submitted in true name and under a different cover: "In 1957 and 1958 I went to London as NIKOLAYEV representing the Ministry of Culture. Then in 1959 I didn't go anywhere. Then when this question came up of my going to the States in 1960, I said: 'I'm not going. I've been going under the Ministry of Culture [cover] and with sports delegations. This has to be changed somehow at this point.' So we thought about it and finally somebody said: 'Look, how about this? Perhaps [you can use] this committee of RUDNEV's [GNTK].' So I said: 'Well, it's up to you. You decide.' By that time my passport was ready, but the Americans and the Soviets hadn't come to an agreement yet. It was decided that this delegation would go to the U.S. in 1961." NOSENKO was then asked why he could not have used the NIKOLAYEV name for his trip to the United States. He replied: "Sure, I could have gone as NIKOLAYEV, but I just didn't want to. Because, look, it was known to us that the British and American Intelligence exchange information on people they suspect of being KGB, and that the British, of course, had probably watched me when I was in England [in 1957 and 1958] and probably there it was noticed that here's this man under the cover of Ministry of Culture. He's not a sportsman. It kind of looks suspicious. Then he goes to the Soviet Embassy. Also suspicious. So then I have to go to the States. And if I go as NIKOLAYEV I couldn't use--in that case I couldn't use the same cover of Ministry of Culture because of the type of the delegation. I'd have to use a different cover. So I'd go there and they'd say: 'Aha, here's NIKOLAYEV under different cover now.' But if I go as NOSENKO, the British never heard the name. Nobody knows the name. Everything would be O.K." NOSENKO was then asked why he could not have travelled under some other alias. He answered: "That's the way it was decided. I guess so as not to get all mixed up they decided to send me as NOSENKO anyway. It's up to the people who are in charge of these operations. They are the ones who decide."**

* This visa application was submitted approximately six months after the KGB rejected his request for PCS assignment to Ethiopia.

** With regard to his trips to England in 1957 and 1958, NOSENKO said that he had been forced to use the name NIKOLAYEV because this was the name he had used with British citizens [redacted] [redacted] when they visited the Soviet Union in the summer of 1957; he could not, he said, have shown up in England with another name as [redacted] [redacted] upon their return from the USSR (see Part V.D.4.d.). This apparently was not a consideration when selecting a name for the U.S. visa application, for NOSENKO had used the name SERGEYEV in his approach to American George DREW in 1959 (Part V.D.4.h.) and the name PETERSON when he recruited Professor Gerard MERTENS, also in 1959 (Part V.D.4.l.). NOSENKO was in contact with Arsene FRIPPEL under the name NIKOLAYEV during this period. NOSENKO and other sources have said that the KGB suspected that FRIPPEL was an American agent (see Part V.D.5.).

Because NOSENKO's true name and photographs had been submitted to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in connection with this visa request, NOSENKO added, it was henceforth necessary for him to use his true name for all travel abroad.

c. The Cuba TDY (1960)

In November 1960, after and as a result of the cancellation of his planned trip to the United States, NOSENKO travelled with a delegation of nickel industry experts to Cuba. He first mentioned this trip on 11 June 1962, during his second meeting with CIA. His account of his activities was given in answer to the question of whether he had ever visited Germany: "I have been in Germany. Yes, yes. I was in Cuba in '61. Well, as NIKOLAYEV. I was there a month and a half. This was when your Embassy was there and we wanted to prepare*... Well, I looked it over to see what kind of people you had working there. They asked me to prepare, so to speak, an accounting on how things were going. I arrived there and asked how they were working against you, just on you. Everyone there is working for you. One, two, three, five days went by... I had unlimited funds, any amount. I could go to any restaurant, any show. So that's how it was with me. The fellows reported: 'He [an American] is there.' My mission was to get a general picture. Not for one, two, or three days, but for a month or two, to provide an opinion... I worked pretty cleverly on them. He [the American] would go to a restaurant. They would say to me: 'He is at such-and-such a restaurant and can be observed there.' I would go and observe him in the mirror or somehow. I am sitting in the restaurant, drinking, and that's all. But I would watch him to see how he behaves, etc., etc. That is, I would begin to feel if he has the mark of an intelligence officer. ...But this was not enough for me. I would go again and again. I would see that, yes, he is an intelligence officer... We were asked to share our experiences with them [the Cubans]. They didn't know a thing... They had turned all intelligence work over to the Communist Party. The Communist Party complicates it."

In the final minutes of NOSENKO's last meeting with CIA in 1962 the subject of his trip to Cuba came up again; NOSENKO recalled that he had used the name NOSENKO for his trip to Cuba and that his function there was that of security officer.

Question: When did you travel to Cuba?

NOSENKO: 1960, November and December 1960.

Question: Under the name NIKOLAYEV?

NOSENKO: No, as NOSENKO, NOSENKO, NOSENKO. I will explain how this happened. I was supposed to go to America, sometime in November, with a group from Gosplan, automotive specialists, etc. Data had already been submitted for coordination and, in particular, my name had been given to the American Embassy there [Moscow]. But the American Embassy announced that this delegation could be accepted, but a little later. And my passport had already been issued. My passport had already been signed authorizing travel abroad, but it was a service passport, not a diplomatic one. And at this moment a delegation was supposed to

* The U.S. Embassy in Havana was officially closed on 3 January 1961.

go to Cuba. GRIBANOV's deputy [S.G.] BANNIKOV, said that a worker [KGB officer] should be sent. But they decided not to send a worker to Cuba. "Why bother?" [they said]. "Is Cuba worth it?" Suddenly there was a phone call from the Central Committee [of the Communist Party]. Someone from the Central Committee said: "No, there is a directive that one of our workers must go nevertheless." And only two days remained before the departure of the delegation. Who could they send?

Question: The first person they come across.

NOSENKO: Those who have passports. I had a passport. I was ready. And they decided: "Get going immediately." We flew through msterdam, through Geneva. We spent a night in Amsterdam and then made a short stop in Geneva, then the Azores, Santa Maria Island, then we were supposed to fly to Curacao. But we had a headwind and the pilots were evidently afraid that we wouldn't have enough fuel. So the plane went out of its way and made a landing on the island of Barbados. This was not a Soviet plane, but KLM. We flew to Amsterdam on a TU-104 and then went by KLM. Then from Curacao we flew to Aruba. We also spent a night in Aruba, an interesting island; the water and natural surroundings are beautiful. From Aruba we flew through Kingston, through Jamaica, and then to Cuba. And we flew the same route back, but we did not spend the night in Curacao. From Curacao we landed in Caracas for about 40 minutes, and through Parararibo--Dutch Guiana--across the ocean, some island or another there, and from there again Lisbon, Geneva, and Amsterdam. But here the entire delegation flew [to Moscow] after a day or two and I took a train through West Germany [to East Berlin].

All of NOSENKO's accounts since contacting CIA in 1964 have been generally consistent with that given on 14 June 1962. His story has been as follows: In the latter part of 1960, at the same time as he was preparing for his intended trip to the United States, a special delegation of nickel industry experts from Gosplan, the Soviet State Planning Commission, was preparing for departure to Cuba. The delegation was a routine one, consisting mostly of engineers from various sections of the Soviet Union, and since there was no one under any sort of suspicion, the Eleventh (Soviet Travellers Abroad) Department of the Second Chief Directorate had decided that it would not be necessary to include a security officer. Two days prior to the departure of the group, however, the Central Committee of the Communist Party decided that a Second Chief Directorate case officer must go along. Because of the short time remaining before the scheduled departure of the delegation, the Eleventh Department protested that it would be impossible to find a suitable person and get all the necessary papers ready in time. At this point, A.I. KUZNETSOV of the Eleventh Department said: "Just a minute. We have a man who has his passport all ready. His passport has been formalized. NOSENKO. He was supposed to go to the States... and his foreign passport has been issued and signed. Why don't you take him?" NOSENKO's statement continued: "So somebody said: 'How about a visa?' And KUZNETSOV

says 'Never mind. The Cubans will give him an entry visa.' And then I had to get a transit visa because we were flying through Amsterdam. And this whole thing was taken care of in two days. The Cubans gave their visa immediately and The Netherlands issued their visa also right away."

NOSENKO has reported that his functions with this delegation were purely of a security nature. He flew with the delegation to Cuba in October or November and spent about a month and a half there. During this time he accompanied the delegation everywhere it went: "I was with the delegation. They go to a plant--I go with them to the plant. I was with them all the time. They went to different plants, to watch the production. They met with some representatives of the so-called Institute of Agrarian Reform. They would meet with these people and they would have many discussions about how to increase production." NOSENKO's cover assignment was deputy chief of the delegation and shortly before departing Moscow he was introduced to the other members as such. He had one agent within the delegation and developed several "confidential contacts" during the trip, which turned out to be entirely uneventful and, for NOSENKO, somewhat long and dull. He explained that he would not have accepted the assignment had he known how long the trip was to be, and that he had really wanted to go only to the United States.

On his return trip to Moscow, NOSENKO was given a special mission. As he was leaving from Havana Airport, the KGB Legal Resident in Cuba, A.I. ALEKSEYEV, handed him a package with instructions to deliver it to Moscow. NOSENKO did not know the contents of the package until he arrived in Amsterdam en route home. There the wrappings became loose (it was bound only by thin string) and NOSENKO took the opportunity to determine that it contained copies of "letters between MIKOYAN and KHRUSHCHEV concerning the prices of sugar" and drafts of agreements between the Soviet Union and East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. Arriving with his delegation at the airport in Amsterdam, NOSENKO was told that a message had been received from the Central Committee of the Communist Party instructing that the package was to be delivered "urgently" to Che GUEVARA, who was touring the Satellite countries and was then in Berlin. While the delegation continued on to Moscow, NOSENKO therefore was driven to the Soviet Embassy in The Hague, and in the late evening of his second day in The Netherlands he left by train for East Berlin. When he arrived, however, he found that GUEVARA had left Berlin for Hungary. NOSENKO refused to go any further. The package was delivered to GUEVARA's deputy in Berlin, and NOSENKO then returned to Moscow.

CIA travel records show that NOSENKO, listed as a mineral engineer, transitted Amsterdam en route to Cuba on 15 November 1960; and that he transitted Caracas from Amsterdam on 17 November 1960; and that on 19 November 1960 he went through Caracas en route to Havana.* Our records also show that NOSENKO again arrived in Amsterdam en route to Moscow from Havana on 13 December 1960 and that he left for Moscow on 15 December. There is no record that he travelled to Berlin.**

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* CIA obtained a photocopy of NOSENKO's passport while he was passing through Amsterdam and again through Caracas.

** It appears possible that his name was not removed from the original passenger manifest for the 15 December flight to Moscow and that his train trip to East Berlin went unnoticed.

d. The Bulgaria TDY and the LUNT Case

In the spring of 1961, four months after returning from Cuba, NOSENKO was sent on temporary assignment for about a month to Sofia, the only trip he took in other than a security "watchdog" capacity. According to NOSENKO, it happened this way: "I think I first heard that I was going to Bulgaria, a week or so before I left, from S.I. YEGOROV, Chief of the section having contact with the counterintelligence representatives of the Countries of the Peoples' Democracies in Moscow... He said: 'You must go to Bulgaria. GRIBANOV has decided.' He asked, 'Do you know about this?' and I said 'No.' He said: 'KLYPIN [Chief of the American Department] must tell you.' But this was the first I had heard about it. YEGOROV said that the Minister of the Bulgarian MVR had requested the Chairman of the KGB to send an officer from the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate to Bulgaria for consultation with the American Department, Second Directorate of the MVR of Bulgaria. After one or two days KLYPIN told me about it. He repeated the same thing and after about one and a half weeks I flew to Sofia." The discussion continued as follows:

Question: What plans were made for this trip in Moscow before you left? What briefings or discussions were held concerning what you were to do in Sofia?

NOSENKO: I was told: "You are going for consultations. There are KGB advisors there. They will discuss it with you." No one was speaking with me about my trip.

Question: What discussions did you have with your department chief, KLYPIN, about what you were to do on this trip?

NOSENKO: Nothing. He told me: "You will go. You will see what they are doing. You will tell them how to work."

Question: Did you have any meetings or discussions with the representatives of the Bulgarian MVR in Moscow before you left?

NOSENKO: No.

Question: What discussions did you have with YEGOROV or his section about what you were going to do in Sofia?

NOSENKO: YEGOROV said: "You will go. You will tell us what they are doing."

Question: Before you left Moscow for Sofia did you know anything about the size of the American Department of the Bulgarian MVR?

NOSENKO: No. Nothing.

Question: Did you know the names of any of the officers of the American Department of the Bulgarian MVR?

NOSENKO: No.

Question: Did you know what any of their particular problems were?

NOSENKO: No. Nothing.

Question: Did you know just what was the area of responsibility of the American Department of the Bulgarian MVR?

NOSENKO: No. Nothing.

NOSENKO flew from Moscow in early April 1961 and was met at the airport in Sofia by A.S. KOZLOV, a former Second Chief Directorate officer whom he had known in Moscow.* The following morning he was picked up in an official vehicle and was taken to KOZLOV's office in the Bulgarian MVR building, not far away. NOSENKO asked KOZLOV what was expected of him and was told that "they want to know about how to work against the American Legation. He said he wanted me to tell them everything about how to work, right from letter 'A.'" NOSENKO was then introduced to the Chief KGB advisor in Sofia, Mikhail YEGOROV, and to the Chief of the MVR's American Department, after which he was assigned an office in the MVR building. During the ensuing weeks he discussed both general matters and particular cases with individual Bulgarian officers working against the American target. On one occasion he lectured interested MVR officers on the principles of operations against foreign military personnel in Moscow, and on another he visited an MVR surveillance post opposite the American Legation. He discussed KGB methods of operations against foreign tourists. He also addressed the entire American Department for about five hours and told them "what is necessary, what to pay attention to, how to work." At the end of his visit, some time in mid-May, NOSENKO conferred with the First Deputy Minister of the MVR about what had been accomplished and his recommendations for improving operations against Americans.

As an outgrowth of his TDY to Bulgaria, NOSENKO has provided one lead to a case in which he said he took personal part. About two weeks after arriving in Bulgaria, around the end of April 1961, NOSENKO was going over lists of foreigners who were scheduled to visit Bulgaria in the near future, and he came across the name Horace G. LUNT. NOSENKO recalled that a man named LUNT who was a Slavic linguist had been reported to him in 1958 or 1959 by one of his homosexual agents, VOLKOV or YEFREMOV, as a possible homosexual. He asked the Bulgarians whether this man was a specialist in Slavic languages. When the Bulgarian officers replied in the affirmative, NOSENKO decided to check his recollection against KGB records and an immediate phone call was placed to Moscow, asking for traces.

* NOSENKO had earlier reported that KOZLOV had served as the Chief of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate, until 1953 and that, until about two years before going to Bulgaria as a counterintelligence advisor, he had been Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department. For the two years immediately prior to his Bulgarian assignment, he had been Secretary of the Party Organization of the Second Chief Directorate and was relieved of all other duties. Asked why KOZLOV was unable to "advise" the Bulgarians in this instance, NOSENKO said that he was too busy advising on higher levels and that he had been away from the work for a number of years.

A reply was received almost at once: "Yes. This is the same LUNT who was in Moscow. Homosexual." NOSENKO told CIA that the KGB had never done anything with its knowledge of LUNT's homosexual proclivities and that the Bulgarian MVR had not previously known of them.

NOSENKO's description of what happened next is as follows: "KOZLOV and the Chief of the American Department were very interested. KOZLOV said: 'George [NOSENKO], you must help them. They never recruited an American.' I said that I would do what I could. The three of us went to see General DUMKOV, the Chief of the Second Directorate, Bulgarian MVR. I asked them if they had a homosexual agent. They checked and said they had one who is an operational contact. O.K., I said, acquaint them, prepare a flat, make the pictures. This is the first stage. I also told them, of course, to find out how long he had been there, why, who his acquaintances were, etc. Then we went to YEGOROV, the senior Soviet advisor, and KOZLOV called GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV, I later found out, was in a meeting with the department chiefs of the Second Chief Directorate and was not in a good mood. Why, I don't know. He didn't understand what KOZLOV was saying. GRIBANOV thought that I, myself, wanted to make the approach to LUNT. KOZLOV got confused on the phone. GRIBANOV asked to speak to me. I took the phone. 'What are you doing?' he said. 'You are not at home, you are abroad. You were sent only for consultations, but you are living as if you were at home.' I said: 'O.K., O.K. I wasn't going to do anything.' He hung up. I told KOZLOV that even if the Bulgarians were to ask me, I could not do it myself. YEGOROV became upset. He thought our position was bad because the Bulgarians were asking. 'What they ask, I will tell,' I said, 'but I am not leaving the office to go any place or do anything. I can only advise them on how to make the record entries after he is caught. I can dictate the questions to be asked. But the approach and recruitment I cannot do myself.'

"The Bulgarians never said anything to me about active participation, but they didn't know what to do. I told them to get two agents. Maybe LUNT wouldn't like the first one. The Bulgarians reported that LUNT wouldn't be there long. I told them that if they wanted to take pictures and make a pitch later, that's one thing. But if they wanted to do it all in one step, that is another. I told them they should consider the time element... The Chief of the American Department, KOVACHEV, and the chief of the section dealing with tourists and American delegations were to make the recruitment. The approach was made at the end of April, I think."

NOSENKO went on to say: "I was in the office during the approach. I told them I would not leave. 'If you need my advice,' I said, 'come to me.' KOZLOV and I were sitting in his office. It was the end of April, I think, and the next day I went on holiday. I don't know where or how they approached LUNT. I only advised them that after the first conversation with him they would know if he would be willing to cooperate. I said they should have an apartment ready... not far from Sofia. I told them that if he agreed, they should change the place right away. Take him some place nice to finish the conversation. That's what I suggested."

The outcome was not known to NOSENKO, for he said: "I didn't read any report of the results, and I didn't ask to see one. I took a neutral position. They said everything was O.K. The next day LUNT was to meet KOVACHEV and the section chief. I went on a little trip, the May holidays, part of 30 April, 1, 2, and 3 May. When I returned they said everything was O.K. and that he [LUNT] had left. I asked them what they had decided for the future, a contact in the United States or not. They said they decided against it because he was to come to Bulgaria in 1962 or 1963 for a Slavic conference."

This account, which NOSENKO gave on 6 October 1964, differs somewhat from what he had said earlier, on 11 June 1962, during his second meeting with CIA. NOSENKO claimed then that he personally participated in the recruitment of LUNT against GRIBANOV's wishes: "They sent me in '61 to Bulgaria. The Minister of Internal Affairs there asked for a specialist to help them. I went to help. An [American] professor arrived, a very prominent specialist on the Slavic countries... They [the Bulgarians] had never tried [to recruit] an American. 'Let's try,' I said. The Soviet advisor in Bulgaria telephoned GRIBANOV and reported that NOSENKO had decided that it is possible to get this American. GRIBANOV was in a conference at the time. GRIBANOV said: "Where the hell's NOSENKO? Let me talk to him... What the hell are you doing? I sent you only as an advisor.' Then he hung up. What could I do? The Bulgarians had already made all preparations... I was embarrassed, but what could I do? I left the office of the advisor and they were waiting for me... I decided to go ahead. I was sure that it would work. I felt that it could be done, that this American could be firmly recruited... I spit on everything and went ahead with the Bulgarians. I told them to grab him. If it will be difficult for you, tell me and I myself can recruit him. Well, they began and I came there. He [NOSENKO is speaking of himself] was under the guise of a Bulgarian and spoke in English, although my English was poor... I said: 'You are a pederast.' He also proved himself to be a homosexual there [in Bulgaria]... 'Well, what will society think of you, those whose know you?' Well, what did this person decide? He agreed."

The first time NOSENKO said that he had not participated directly in this operation was on 2 February 1964, while still in Geneva. He volunteered the following: "In Bulgaria in April and May 1961, although I did not personally participate in this, I went there, and I helped them there with the whole process of recruitment of this professor. I helped the Bulgarians with what to do and how. He was the professor of philology, LUNT."

NOSENKO has also varied on the timing of the operation against LUNT. In the account quoted above, he said that the approach was made the day before he left on his May Day holiday. On 24 April 1964 he said: "I remember that it was at the very beginning of May that this name came up. And we got the information from Moscow the same day, telling us it was the same LUNT. I went on a trip the 1st, 2nd, 3rd of May. That is the 30th of April, 1st and 2nd of May, and the 3rd of May in the morning I was back. So it was in the very beginning after the night of the trip. And Moscow was called right away,

given all the data, and they called back right away and said: 'Yes, this is the same LUNT who was in Moscow...' As soon as this was established, the next day the Bulgarians planted this homosexual on him. They planted this man either next to him or in the restaurant and, well, he met LUNT and they got together and decided to meet with each other the same day or the next day. This was all done very rapidly."

According to Professor LUNT, the approach actually took place on 5 May 1961, following a visit to Moscow where he had contacted an official in the U.S. Embassy. He travelled on 9 May directly from Sofia to Yugoslavia, where he at once reported the incident to U.S. Ambassador George KENNAN, an academic acquaintance. LUNT told the Ambassador, and later CIA, that he had visited Sofia on one earlier occasion, from 8 to 28 November 1960. During this first trip he became involved with one Georgi Velev ALEKSIEV, with whom he engaged in homosexual relations on at least five separate occasions and to whom he gave U.S. travellers checks, which ALEKSIEV intended to sell on the black market. On one occasion during the first visit ALEKSIEV was recognized and stopped by the Bulgarian civil police while walking on the street with LUNT. After leaving Bulgaria in November 1960, LUNT received two letters from ALEKSIEV and prior to his next visit, on 25 April 1961, LUNT wrote ALEKSIEV saying he would be returning.

5. Transfer to the Tourist Department in January 1962

In the autumn of 1961 a decision was reached, on the basis of NOSENKO's own request, to return him to the Tourist Department. GRIBANOV had originally wanted to promote NOSENKO from the position of Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section to the post of Deputy Chief of the American Department; NOSENKO's superior and friend KOVSHUK had long had his eye on this job, however, and was the personal choice of the Chief of the American Department for it. (In fact, NOSENKO said, KOVSHUK had once held the job, losing it in 1959 because of some misbehavior.) NOSENKO did not want to be placed in the difficult situation which his own promotion to this post would have created. NOSENKO described his transfer in the February 1965 interrogations. The following is from a protocol signed on 26 February 1965:

> "The decision for me to return to the Seventh [Tourist] Department in January 1962 was actually made in about September or October 1961. GRIBANOV planned to appoint me Deputy Chief of the First [American] Department, but the new Chief of the First Department, FEDOSEYEV, wanted KOVSHUK to take this position. Since I did not want to be placed in this position by GRIBANOV's order against the wishes of FEDOSEYEV, I went to GRIBANOV and requested that I be transferred back to the Seventh Department, in any position. I had already spoken to [V.D.] CHELNOKOV, who was then Chief of the Seventh Department, about this matter and he had suggested that I go to GRIBANOV and ask to be returned to the Seventh Department as Chief of the First [American-British-Canadian] Section with the understanding that I would be appointed Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department as soon as this position would be vacated by [B.A.] BALDIN [who was retiring in July 1962]. ...GRIBANOV did not tell me his reasons... for wanting to appoint me Deputy Chief of the First Department in late 1961 or for appointing me Section Chief and later Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department in 1962. He did not discuss with me my personal qualifications for each of these positions."

Aware of his impending transfer NOSENKO took the opportunity during December 1961 to spend several hours each day in the Tourist Department. There he talked with Department Chief CHELNOKOV, familiarized himself with certain files of the American Tourist Section, and discussed current operations and operational possibilities with the officers assigned to this section. The formal order for the transfer was signed by GRIBANOV on 24 or 25 December 1961 and NOSENKO officially signed over the ABIDIAN case file and the U.S. Embassy security file to his successor as Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section, G.I. GRYAZNOV, within the next few days.* As he had when he transferred from the Tourist to the American Department in 1960, NOSENKO said, he took his active agents and his safehouse on Vorovskiy Street with him when he returned to the Tourist Department in 1962.

* These specific dates were arrived at under interrogation in February 1965. On all earlier occasions NOSENKO had said that he was transferred in January 1962 (or some later date); he said in February 1965 that he was "officially" transferred at the end of December and reported to his new position at the beginning of January (see below).

F. January 1962 to January 1964 (Tourist Department)

1. Date of Transfer

NOSENKO has given different dates for the time when he left the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department to become Chief of the American-British-Canadian Section of the Tourist Department. During the Geneva meetings of 1962 he said on different occasions that this occurred in January 1962 and in February 1962; in 1964 he timed the transfer as falling between 15 and 20 January 1962; and in February 1965 NOSENKO gave the date as 2 or 3 January 1962. He has also reported that he was in the U.S. Embassy Section for three months after John ABIDIAN serviced the Pushkin Street dead drop (on 30 December 1961, thus placing NOSENKO in the U.S. Embassy Section until late March 1962) and that he had transferred to the Tourist Department by the time GOLITSYN defected (which NOSENKO placed in mid-January 1962 but which actually occurred in mid-December 1961).* W.E. JOHNSON, the target of a Tourist Department operation** confirmed that NOSENKO approached him in Moscow on 5 January 1962.

In February 1965 NOSENKO said he recalled that the correct date of his approach to JOHNSON was on 5 January 1962. The CIA interviewer then reminded NOSENKO that he had earlier described on several occasions his visit to the dead drop site on Pushkin Street and his receipt of reports from the surveillance post for three months afterwards; during all of this period, NOSENKO had said, he was in the U.S. Embassy Section of the First Department. NOSENKO was told that CIA records show that ABIDIAN made only one visit to this dead drop site, on 30 December 1961, six days before the approach to JOHNSON. He answered only that he might have been confused, but despite any contradictions the "facts" (his emphasis) were the important thing, not any correlation of dates.

2. Functions and Activities

As Chief of the American-British-Canadian Section of the Tourist Department (hereafter in Part V.F. referred to as the American Tourist Section) from January to July 1962, NOSENKO said, he was responsible for planning and coordinating all KGB activities against such tourists in the USSR as well as for supervising the operational work of 15 subordinate case officers. He had no deputy. NOSENKO told CIA that he required several months at the beginning of 1962 "to get the feel of things"; "there were no accomplishments" on his part in the initial period on this new job, and plans for handling the influx of American tourists during the forthcoming 1962 season consisted of studying files and continuing to work against the tourists as in the past. NOSENKO was asked in February 1965

* Statements by NOSENKO about GOLITSYN are reviewed in Part VI.E., and ABIDIAN's servicing of the Pushkin Street dead drop is discussed in Part V.E.3.d.

** See Part V.F.4. for details on this operation.

whether, in his first several months in the Tourist Department, he had originated any new methods for operations against American tourists. He replied that during this period he had proposed a study of representatives of foreign tourist firms in Moscow with an eye toward the KGB attempting to recruit them.* This suggestion, NOSENKO said, had been accepted.

In March 1965, NOSENKO was asked what new knowledge concerning the use of tourism for espionage purposes by foreign intelligence organizations had been acquired by the KGB during his two-year absence from the Tourist Department. He replied that the KGB had noted an increase in automobile tourism and that American Intelligence had increased its use of multinational tourist groups. NOSENKO was then asked what new information concerning the use of tourism as a cover for espionage activity had been obtained by the KGB from any agent source during this period. NOSENKO answered that he neither knew of any such new information nor had he heard of such an agent.**

NOSENKO has said that, in line with the wishes of the Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, O.M. GRIBANOV, he was promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the entire Tourist Department in July 1962, immediately after his return from Geneva. A year later he was made First Deputy Chief of the Department, a promotion which involved only a change in title as there was no Second Deputy Chief at the time. Apart from saying he was V.D. CHELNOKOV's second-in-command from July 1962 to January 1964 and as such general supervisor of all KGB tourist operations, NOSENKO has not detailed the functions attached to this position; NOSENKO has not been questioned specifically concerning these duties.

NOSENKO's first operational activity after transferring to the American Tourist Section was supervision of a homosexual approach to W.E. JOHNSON on 5 January 1962. Additionally, during the 1962-64 period in the Tourist Department NOSENKO took part in the recruitment approach to Horst BRAUNS, in the interrogation of Yale University Professor Frederick BARGHOORN, and in the arrest of the American tour guide Bernard KOTEN. For a short time in 1963 he handled the KGB agent Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, owner of a tourist agency in New York City*** and a Russian language bookstore in Chicago, Illinois. By virtue of his

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* NOSENKO said at another time that he made the same proposal in 1958-59, forming the basis of the FRIPPEL operation (see Part V.D.5.).

** See Part V.D.7.b., which discusses the KGB agent George BLAKE, a staff officer of MI-6, who confessed after his arrest in April 1961 that he had passed to his Soviet handlers the complete minutes of joint meetings held by CIA and MI-6 in London in June 1959 and in Washington during April 1960. These meetings were held to coordinate the American and British programs for legal travel operations, mainly with tourists, into the Soviet Union. Part V.D.7.c. describes a top secret KGB document on Western tourist operations in the Soviet Union which was prepared in 1961 in the Tourist Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. This document, which the defector GOLITSYN gave CIA, quoted verbatim certain portions of the minutes given to the KGB by BLAKE.

*** KOTEN was frequently employed as a tour guide to the USSR by this tourist agency.

supervisory position in the Tourist Department NOSENKO also became involved with John SHUBIN, a GRU agent. (These six cases - JOHNSON, BRAUNS, BARGHOORN, KOTEN, SVENCHANSKIY, and SHUBIN - are discussed below.) NOSENKO reported that his planned role in the approach to Natalie BIENSTOCK (see Part VI.D.2.) was prevented by his preparations to leave for Geneva in March 1962. Finally, NOSENKO said he participated in the KGB investigation of Lee Harvey OSWALD after President KENNEDY's assassination in November 1963 (see Part V.D.6.).

NOSENKO has indicated that his own operational work in 1962 to 1964 was limited to those cases cited above because of the considerable amount of time spent on temporary duty assignments outside Moscow during these two years. In mid-February 1962, soon after assuming the duties of Chief of the American Tourist Section, he began to prepare for his first trip to Geneva, which lasted from 14 March until 15 June 1962 (see Part III.B.). NOSENKO estimated that he had spent a total of six months outside Moscow in 1963 on temporary assignments. These included a two-day trip to Odessa to meet FRIPPEL, an inspection tour of the Leningrad KGB organization, a five-day trip to Leningrad for a conference on border control, a week-long trip to Alma-Ata for a conference on tourist travel with KGB representatives from the Soviet Central Asian republics, and an eight- or ten-day inspection trip to the Caucasus as a member of a team headed by GRIBANOV. NOSENKO said he travelled to Gorkiy Oblast on 16-17 December 1963 to assist in the search for CHEREPANOV, who had passed top secret documents to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow (see Part VI.D.7.c.).

3. NOSENKO's Agents

When NOSENKO returned to the Tourist Department in the first days of 1962, he took with him the agents whom he had been handling as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section. These agents are listed below with a summary of NOSENKO's comments concerning their use in 1962 and 1963.*

a. Arsene FRIPPEL:

FRIPPEL had been reassigned from Moscow in early 1961, but NOSENKO continued to be the Second Chief Directorate case officer in charge of any future KGB contacts with him. (FRIPPEL had no KGB contacts in New York City.) Describing FRIPPEL's past service for the KGB on 15 June 1962, five months after he said he transferred to the Tourist Department, NOSENKO said: "FRIPPEL was afraid and gave practically nothing... He was a weak agent... I recruited him but, speaking honestly, he was not an agent." Nevertheless, NOSENKO said, the KGB hoped that FRIPPEL would be reassigned to the USSR at some future date. When FRIPPEL returned twice to the Soviet Union in 1963, NOSENKO met with him, once in Odessa and once in Moscow,

* The only other agent whom NOSENKO handled during this period was the American Alexander SVENCHANSKIY. (See Part V.F.6.).

but FRIPPEL provided nothing useful on these occasions.* Whereas NOSENKO had normally met FRIPPEL in the company of CHELNOKOV during FRIPPEL's Moscow tour, he went alone to the two 1963 meetings.

b. Johan PREISFREUND:

After GOLITSYN's defection, NOSENKO said, the KGB considered PREISFREUND compromised to American Intelligence and therefore ineligible for further use against Americans at the Embassy in Moscow. For this reason NOSENKO was told by the U.S. Embassy Section to continue to handle PREISFREUND while serving in the Tourist Department, but as PREISFREUND spoke only Finnish and Russian, he was of no use against English-speaking tourists. Although NOSENKO met with PREISFREUND on the latter's visits to Moscow in 1962 and 1963, this agent was not used operationally.

c. VOLKOV and YEFREMOV:

NOSENKO's two homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV took part in the entrapment approach to W.E. JOHNSON several days after NOSENKO returned to the Tourist Department. This was their first operational activity since 1959, for they had not been used in any homosexual operations while NOSENKO was in the U.S. Embassy Section. It was, according to NOSENKO, the last time they were engaged in KGB activity. At the end of 1962 or the beginning of 1963 they were terminated, and their files were sent by NOSENKO to KGB archives. NOSENKO explained that VOLKOV and YEFREMOV had become too well known for their operational activities to be of further use to the Second Chief Directorate.

d. [illegible]

When NOSENKO was transferred to the Tourist Department, he was instructed by the American Department Chief, S.M. FEDOSEYEV, and V.M. KOVSHUK, Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, to continue to handle [illegible] studying in Moscow. NOSENKO had personally recruited [illegible] and had used him in the development of U.S. military code clerk Matthew ZUJUS (see Part V.E.3.c.) in 1961, an operation which was still underway at the time of NOSENKO's transfer. NOSENKO continued to meet [illegible] during the first months of 1962, and he recalled that in February or March of that year he instructed [illegible] to attempt to arrange a social meeting with ZUJUS in a Moscow restaurant so that another KGB agent could be introduced to the KGB target. This meeting had not taken place by March 1962, when NOSENKO left for Geneva. Just before leaving Moscow, around 12 March 1962, NOSENKO turned [illegible] over to G.I. GRYAZNOV, according to NOSENKO, then the Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section. [illegible] was scheduled to finish his studies in Moscow in May 1962, and NOSENKO believed he left at that time to return to Syria.

* FRIPPEL reported a meeting with NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV in Odessa in early 1962, and the records of the State Department Passport Office indicate that FRIPPEL intended to visit the USSR at that time. NOSENKO said there was no such meeting. See Part V.D.5.

e. Marina RYTOVA:

Marina RYTOVA was turned over to NOSENKO by I.A. KONSTANTINOV of the Tourist Department in 1956 or 1957. At that time she was working as an interpreter at the Russian Permanent Exhibition in Moscow. In 1960 or 1961 she became an instructor of the Greek language at the Institute of International Relations, and some time in 1962 she got a job at the school of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Thereafter she ceased all agent work. NOSENKO was officially registered as her case officer until his defection in 1964. He did not indicate that RYTOVA took part in any operations from January 1962 until she began work for the Central Committee.

4. Approach to W.E. JOHNSON

a. NOSENKO's Information:

NOSENKO first referred to his approach to the American tourist Wallace Everett JOHNSON on 11 June 1962. He did not name JOHNSON at this time: "In January of this year I recruited /an American/. I cannot remember his name. He is from California, a Baptist, a young guy, healthy, somewhat fat, and he turned out to be a homosexual.* He loved men. I have an agent network capable of anything and, in particular, although I head a section there, I have a good agent apparatus, i.e., I have beautiful girls... and I have young pederasts, homosexuals. In particular, I have one special pair /VOLKOV and YEFREMOV/ - I'm afraid that they are known to you and the English... Here is what happened. He gave me a signature. I told him: 'Write it yourself.' So he typed it on a typewriter. I said: 'No, I don't want it typed. Write it out longhand.'... He had a very reactionary attitude toward the Soviet Union. His attitude was such that he insulted us terribly. He visited Baptist groups, churches and... insulted us, Russia, and the government horribly. He sent letters, and we read them all - awful letters, i.e., the government is lousy and everything here is poor. I said to him: 'Write, damn it, that the best country /in the world/ is the Soviet Union, that the best government is the Soviet Government. Write, write.' In general he did everything /I asked/ but then, right away, he ran to the Embassy and told everything. This was in January of this year /1962/. He told everything. I know that he told. But he gave me his signature that he would help the Soviet security organs, etc. I know this. I was there. I decided to go to the hotel where he was staying. I sat down and waited. Surveillance was on the job. 'Tell me when he comes,' /I ordered/. I sat down. 'He has come,' /the surveillance team reported/. 'Where is he?' /I asked/. 'In his room,' /they said/. 'We'll wait,' /I replied/. They reported that he had gone to eat in the restaurant and I went there at once. He was sitting alone. I approached him: 'Hello, how are you?' I didn't say anything to him. I knew that he had told everything in the Embassy. /I said:/ 'How are you? How about our connection in the States? And our work in the States? What do you think about it?' I said to him: 'Will you work? Can you give us something important or not?' He answered: 'I have nothing.' I said: 'And if I

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* Other sources, personal acquaintances of JOHNSON, have reported JOHNSON's having homosexual tendencies.

make it public that you are a pederast, what will happen then?' 'No,' he said, 'I will do anything you want.' But I couldn't tell him that I knew that he had reported everything. I said: 'Listen, brother, I don't believe you. You are a bad person.' We decided that we couldn't do anything with him. 'Go home, damn you,' I said. 'But if you write one insulting article about Russia I will find you, even in the U.S.' He is a Baptist and writes articles, a bright guy. And I left. He pushed aside his food and ran to a pay telephone and called /the Embassy/: 'This afternoon in a restaurant George was frightening me.' We know he called the Embassy. We heard everything."

NOSENKO's first reference to JOHNSON in 1964 was at a meeting on 2 February, when he produced a note bearing that name and the date 5 January 1962. "Here I have a name jotted down, Everett Wallace /sic/ JOHNSON," NOSENKO said. "The date was 5 January 1962, but what took place I have absolutely no recollection. I don't think it was a recruitment, but it was some sort of contact, or he was being studied or worked on, or something like that. But I remember nothing."

NOSENKO next mentioned his approach to JOHNSON on 17 April 1964. Although not immediately recalling JOHNSON's name, he eventually remembered that "it was something like JOHNSON, JOHNSTON, or something that starts with a 'J'" and that he was a Baptist from the California coast. NOSENKO placed the operation sometime in the summer of 1962, after his return to Moscow from Geneva, because he also remembered wearing "just a coat, no overcoat at the time." JOHNSON, who had come to the Soviet Union as a tourist, was known to be a socialist, and on this basis the KGB Second Chief Directorate considered him as a recruitment target. When the Second Chief Directorate checked whether the KGB First Chief Directorate would have any use for JOHNSON as an agent, however, it learned there was no interest in JOHNSON: He had no access to important information, and he lived too far from the KGB Legal Residencies in the United States for convenient contact.

Several days later KGB surveillance observed JOHNSON mailing some letters in Moscow. When read by the KGB they were found to be "so bitter toward the Soviet Union, angry, critical, that they /the KGB/ decided something had to be done" to stop him from writing letters and making anti-Soviet statements on his return to the United States. At about the same time there was some sign that JOHNSON was a homosexual, and it was decided to entrap him on this basis. The sole reason was to halt JOHNSON's criticism of the USSR - no recruitment was attempted, because neither the First nor the Second Chief Directorates had any use for him as an agent and because the KGB had determined that he probably would not accept a recruitment proposal anyway. NOSENKO did not know why he was selected to make the approach to JOHNSON, except that "BOBKOV said I should go." (F. D. BOBKOV, a Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, supervised the activities of the Tourist Department.) NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV were selected to compromise JOHNSON.*

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* In 1962 NOSENKO implied that the KGB received its first indication of JOHNSON's homosexuality from one or both these agents.

JOHNSON became acquainted with VOLKOV and YEFREMOV at the Metropol Hotel. They told JOHNSON that they had recently arrived in Moscow and invited JOHNSON to visit their hotel room. JOHNSON agreed because "they understood each other right away. They knew they were the same (i.e., homosexuals) and so he came, and when they were engaged in their business, our people walked in on them under the disguise of the hotel administrator and one militiaman." Photographs of the incident had been taken, but these had not been developed at the time of this, the first confrontation of JOHNSON. A report describing the circumstances (an akt) was prepared, and JOHNSON was then transferred to another room. By this time, NOSENKO had arrived at the hotel from his office, and he went into the room where JOHNSON was waiting in accordance with KGB orders. NOSENKO discussed the situation with JOHNSON, then asked him to type and sign a statement that he would "not say anything derogatory about the Soviet Union." JOHNSON did as he was told.

The following day, after the incriminating photographs had been developed, NOSENKO approached JOHNSON in the cafe of the Metropol Hotel and asked him whether he intended to keep his promise. When JOHNSON said that he planned to do so, NOSENKO presented him with an envelope containing copies of the photographs and said that they would be leaked to the foreign press if JOHNSON were to break his promise. The KGB later learned that JOHNSON had visited (or phoned, according to a later version) the U.S. Embassy and assumed that he had reported the approach. NOSENKO did not recall what name, if any, he had used during this operation.

Questioned further on 24 April 1964, NOSENKO said that, upon his arrival at the hotel immediately after the compromise, the militiaman described the incident to him in JOHNSON's presence. Addressing JOHNSON, NOSENKO had said: "How come? How could you do such a thing? What are we going to do now? After all, this is punishable by court and... people are given from five to eitht years for such relations. It used to be three to five, not it's from five to eight." Frightened by this, JOHNSON had written and signed his promise not to denigrate the Soviet Union in the future.

NOSENKO was asked whether the KGB would mount such an operation against any foreigner who wrote uncomplimentary letters and articles about the USSR. He replied: "They don't jump on everyone, and not everyone writes this way. And not everything that is written this way gets into their hands. In this case there was a coincidence. There was something we could hit him on. For instance, if the fact that he is a homosexual didn't come to our attention, they would probably just say: 'All right, to hell with him. We have to get rid of him. Let's see that his trip is cut off.'"

While discussing the approach to JOHNSON on 30 January 1965, the following dialogue took place:

NOSENKO: This (the approach) took place in the summertime of '62 or '63.

Question: In your notes, you have the date 5 January 1962.

NOSENKO: No, it doesn't concern JOHNSON at all. I remember it was summer; I think it was '63.

course, because we haven't seen him yet. But even that first signal is very helpful. So if he goes on a Soviet plane, they will start watching him from the time the flight starts. Now, as soon as he crosses the border, he will be watched by the border guards; he will be watched the entire route of his travel. This is a very important business, because the main task in regard to tourists is to uncover within the general flow of tourists those persons who are of interest from the operational point of view... Let's just say that this person is processing a group of American tourists who are going to the Soviet Union, and, when the processing is almost finished, another person is added to the group. Nobody knows this person in the group... but he was added at the last minute. So this is an indication. This is what he /the agent/ was taught to pay attention to when he was being trained in Moscow... Now, if some official government agency makes a request that a man be sent to the Soviet Union as a tourist, this immediately arouses suspicion, of course... In such things he has been trained... He comes to Moscow once or twice a year. You know, such a little Jewish fellow - an emigre from Russia - in the past, you know, scared of everything. The last time he came he told us: 'You know, I'm thinking about it all the time,' he says. So they asked him: 'Are you afraid? Why are you shaking?' He says, 'Well, I'm not afraid; I'm not shaking. But why should I be caught like an idiot...' His pseudonym is 'ANOD' and his last name is SVENCHANSKIY. Well, I'll give you all this later."

NOSENKO told CIA on 14 February 1964 that SVENCHANSKIY was recruited in 1961 and that in 1963 he, NOSENKO, had taken over the handling of this agent from Tourist Department case officer Ye. N. NOSKOV.* SVENCHANSKIY had sent the KGB many open code messages such as those described above, and a number of these messages have been considered to have been of definite operational interest. NOSENKO identified SVENCHANSKIY as the president of "Afton Tours" in New York City and the owner of a Russian-language bookstore in Chicago.

There was some concern on the part of the KGB at the time of the recruitment in 1960 or 1961, NOSENKO reported on 1 March 1965, because SVENCHANSKIY had had contacts with AMTORG in New York City. The KGB suspected he was an FBI agent, but in contacting SVENCHANSKIY in 1960 or 1961, NOSKOV decided that this was not so and therefore recruited him. (Asked how it was determined that SVENCHANSKIY was not an FBI agent, NOSENKO replied: "NOSKOV felt it;" he had no further explanation.) The recruitment was based mainly on an agreement that Inturist would send more business to SVENCHANSKIY if he cooperated. NOSENKO also said SVENCHANSKIY had been arrested for black-marketeering, but he did not elaborate on this statement. NOSENKO took over the case from NOSKOV in September 1963, and his name was entered in the single-volume file of SVENCHANSKIY as the handling officer as of that date. Together with NOSKOV, NOSENKO subsequently had two meetings with SVENCHANSKIY when the latter travelled to the Soviet Union, one in September and one towards the end of 1963.

b. Information from Other Sources:

CIA records reflect that Alexander SVENCHANSKIY was born on 6 March 1909 in Theodosia, Russia. He immigrated to the United States in 1923 and became a naturalized citizen on his

* At this time, NOSENKO has stated, he (NOSENKO) was First Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department.

father's papers in 1929. His earliest employers were the "All-Russian Textile Syndicate" from February 1928 to March 1931, by AMTORG in New York City from April 1932 to May 1942, and by the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission in Washington from May 1942 until December 1942. During the Second World War, SVENCHANSKIY served in the U.S. Army Air Force as "official translator" at the White Horse Air Base in Alaska, where he had frequent contacts with members of Soviet aircraft crews. From October 1946 until December 1952, when he was dismissed for refusing to answer questions by the McCarran Committee concerning alleged subversive activity, SVENCHANSKIY was employed at United Nations Headquarters as a radio officer, broadcasting to the USSR. As of early 1965, SVENCHANSKIY was listed as president of Afton Tours, Inc., New York City, and president of Cross World Books and Periodicals, Chicago. Afton Tours is a branch of the Package Express and Travel Agency, which is a registered agent of Inturist. Cross World Books and Periodicals was registered in 1961 as an agent of Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, the Soviet Foreign Trade Administration dealing with the distribution and sale of Russian-language books, periodicals, films, and visual aids. SVENCHANSKIY has made numerous trips to the USSR, including one in August and September 1963.

Allegations of SVENCHANSKIY's Communist sympathies and probable Soviet espionage activities date back to his U.S. Air Force service in Alaska, [illegible] of his strong pro-Soviet bias and suspiciously close contacts with Soviets. In August 1950 Harry GOLD, then in prison as an admitted Soviet agent, linked SVENCHANSKIY to the Soviet espionage network in the United States.* GOLD stated that in March 1942 SVENCHANSKIY, under the name of SWAN, had been instrumental in introducing his "co-conspirator" Abraham BROTHMAN to "another AMTORG man to engage in industrial espionage." A CIA report of 14 November 1950 cites a "tested source" (a Czech national employed at the United Nations) as stating: "I believe that Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, employed in the Radio Section of the Russian Division of the United Nations, is a Communist and possibly a Communist agent." [illegible] Identified as a Soviet agent by Elizabeth BENTLEY, KAZAKEVICH has since emigrated to the Soviet Union; he was identified as an agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate by GOLITSYN and by NOSENKO. Virtually all the individuals with whom SVENCHANSKIY has entered into business arrangements since leaving the United Nations have or had connections with the U.S. Communist Party or with the Soviet Intelligence Services. His business dealings have also brought him into frequent contact with Soviet officials in this country, including a number of identified intelligence officers (two of them reported on by NOSENKO).

* The 21 October 1953 edition of the New York Times carried the story of GOLD's testimony under the headline "Ex-U.N. Aide linked to Spy Ring by Gold;" the Times reported that GOLD had executed an affidavit to this effect the week before.

An FBI report [redacted] 1964 [redacted]
SVENCHANSKIY [redacted]

7. KOTEN's Arrest and the KGB Agent [redacted]

a. Information from NOSENKO

NOSENKO was asked in Geneva on 26 January 1964 whether he had been involved in the arrest of an American tourist in the USSR in the fall of 1963. Almost at once, NOSENKO recognized this as the case of Bernard KOTEN, a guide for Afton Tours in New York City (and hence an employee of Alexander SVENCHANSKIY - see below) who had been apprehended on homosexual charges in Kiev. NOSENKO explained that, while he had not personally participated in the arrest and had never met KOTEN, he had supervised the case from KGB Headquarters and "the case was reported to me."

NOSENKO said that KOTEN had long been a member of the American Communist Party and was a frequent visitor to the Soviet Union after World War II. On these trips he had a large number of contacts with dissident literary figures and with Soviet citizens in general, particularly among Russian Jews.** Because of these many suspicious contacts, both the KGB First and the Second Chief Directorates had come to the conclusion that KOTEN might well be a provocation agent planted in or recruited from the ranks of the Communist Party of the United States. Moreover, on the eve of KOTEN's 1963 trip, the Tourist Department learned from V.B. BARKOVSKIY of the First Chief Directorate's Scientific and Technical (S&T) Directorate that KOTEN was carrying with him the address of relatives of an important [redacted] agent of the KGB's [redacted] Legal Residency, and that KOTEN intended to visit them while in the USSR. NOSENKO said he did not know the name of this agent [redacted]

This agent was a naturalized American citizen, about 40 to 45 years old, an engineer born in Russia, who was employed in an "interesting industrial company or technical organization in the New York City area." For some time he had been working

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* CIA told NOSENKO of this information about SOKOLOW in March 1965. He recalled that a woman named Sonya worked for SVENCHANSKIY but said that "we considered that he (SVENCHANSKIY) was doing it (spotting the tourists)." NOSENKO did not know of any Soviet Intelligence ties to SOKOLOW.

** NOSENKO has explained in another context that the Second Chief Directorate is wary of foreign contacts with Soviet Jews because the Israeli Intelligence Service has frequently sponsored such contacts.

actively for the [redacted] Legal Residency and had provided the KGB with "good, solid information" with "very valuable material for technical intelligence;" at the same time the agent had been asking to be repatriated to the USSR, to become a Soviet citizen, but the KGB had been putting him off in order to continue to exploit his access. Since the amount and quality of the agent's production had recently deteriorated, the KGB decided to accede to his request for repatriation. Now, however, the agent declined, saying that "he was not ready to go just yet. First he was practically begging to come to the Soviet Union and now he was balking." This by itself appeared suspicious to the KGB, but in addition, it was about this time that the agent came into contact with KOTEN. NOSENKO learned from BARKOVSKIY that KOTEN "used to go to some bookstore that sells Soviet literature and through a saleslady in this story whom KOTEN knows, he became acquainted with the agent. who also used to go to this store. After that, he used to meet with the agent without the saleslady."

On the basis of these incidents the First Chief Directorate suspected that KOTEN had been directed specifically to this store in order to meet and "work on" the agent and that, having learned that the agent had relatives "in Stantsiya Loo, about 17 kilometers from Sochi..., he had evidently received the assignment (to visit the relatives) from American Intelligence. Evidently they had gotten on the trail of this agent and were checking on him." The KGB also had suspicions concerning the relatives, former kulaks who were still well-off financially. It was known to the KGB, for example, that the agent had written his sister in Stantsiya Loo that he wanted to return to the Soviet Union, and she had replied: "Is there any sense in your coming here?"

KOTEN arrived in Moscow and then travelled to Sochi. From there he sent a telegram to the agent's sister and her husband in Stantsiya Loo, asking them to come to Sochi to see him. When they arrived at KOTEN's hotel, however, the hotel administrator told them that KOTEN was on an excursion and refused to allow a meeting. KOTEN then took it upon himself to travel to Stantsiya Loo where he eventually contacted and spoke to the relatives. In the course of this meeting KOTEN took photographs of the sister and her husband and recorded a message from the sister to the agent on a tape recorder he had brought along. From this the KGB deduced that "U.S. Intelligence wants to get documentary data" and it therefore decided to "try to get hold of KOTEN."

There had already been some indication during KOTEN's earlier trips to the USSR that he was a homosexual, but the KGB had taken no action because KOTEN was believed to be a loyal Communist Party member. With these recent developments, the situation had now changed. Although NOSENKO's superiors were absent from KGB Headquarters at the time, immediate action was required. NOSENKO consequently "took the whole thing on myself because everybody got excited. Everybody said: 'Let's go. American Intelligence is active, none of our bosses are here, the situation is right, the decision must be made right now.'" By this time KOTEN had travelled to Tbilisi, and there a homosexual KGB agent managed to entice him into relations in a public park. These were suitably documented, and he was then picked up by the local Militia. (In the absence of his

superiors and fearing the possible repercussions, NOSENKO had insisted that the alleged acts take place in a public place, and that the KGB not participate in KOTEN's apprehension.) After questioning by the Militia, KOTEN was permitted to continue his itinerary to Kiev, where he was scheduled to stay for two days before leaving the USSR

Meanwhile, the First Chief Directorate, which was growing increasingly concerned that the [illegible] agent of the [illegible] Residency would be apprehended by the FBI, wanted to get him out of the United States before this happened. To "establish the true purpose" of KOTEN's presence in the USSR and whether he was an American agent, as well as to hold him until the [illegible] agent had arrived safely in the USSR (as NOSENKO told the FBI on 24 February 1964), it was requested that KOTEN be detained in the Soviet Union. The decision was made to arrest him at once on the basis of the compromising materials obtained in Tbilisi. Following the arrest by the Kiev Militia, KOTEN was turned over to the KGB for interrogation; the purpose, NOSENKO said, was to "break him," to secure the admission that he was an American Intelligence agent. At the same time [illegible] the [illegible] agent had failed to keep a number of scheduled meetings with his KGB case officer, and the Legal Residency feared that something had gone wrong. He did eventually appear, however, and NOSENKO has described the subsequent meetings as follows: "They asked him: 'Are you going to leave the States?' He said: 'Well, I don't know. I have to think about it some more.' So we said: 'No, you have to leave or else we will wash our hands of the whole affair.' So he said: 'You know, I was thinking of leaving with my wife, but my wife does not want to leave.' To make a long story short, they spent three meetings trying to talk him into leaving, and he kept hesitating. He didn't seem to want to leave, so then they told him: 'Look, we are breaking off contact with you. If you decide to go, you know how to do it. You are to go from the United States to some place in Europe and go to the Soviet Embassy there. They will give us a signal and the visa will be issued to you. But as far as we're concerned, we're breaking contact with you.'"

After this, according to NOSENKO, the KGB released KOTEN when the American Communist Party and other organizations strongly protested his arrest and imprisonment.

b. <u>Information from Other Sources Concerning KOTEN</u>

At the time of his arrest KOTEN was an instructor of Russian at New York University, director of the Library for Intercultural Studies, and a regular contributor to the *New World Review* and the magazine *Jewish Life*. Both the Library for Intercultural Studies and *Jewish Life* have been designated "Communist fronts" by the House Committee on Un-American Activities; the *New World Review* has been cited as a propaganda organ of the Soviet Government. KOTEN has said that, despite his arrest and imprisonment in the USSR, he hopes to return there in the future and that he "still loved the Russian people and believed in the basic humanitarianism of the Soviet Government."

Regarding the arrest, the *New York Times* on 29 August 1963 carried an article under the headline "U.S. Guide Missing

After Soviet Trip:" the article stated that "an American tour of the Soviet Union ended today (28 August) at Kiev with the apparent arrest of the New York guide identified as Bernard L. Koten of Afton Tours." A second article datelined 29 August, Moscow, reported that "an official of the Soviet Inturist travel organization said today that Bernard L. Koten... had been arrested on charges of homosexual activities with a Soviet citizen. He said that Mr. Koten... was arrested in Kiev Tuesday night (27 August) and was being held in Tiflis (Tbilisi)... where the alleged offense took place." A third Times article, filed in Moscow on 28 September 1963, stated that KOTEN, who had been arrested on 26 August, had been released on 28 September and was enroute to Vienna; the article also noted that "officials of Inturist reported Mr. Koten's release, but declined to comment on the reasons and circumstances of his arrest."

Several of KOTEN's friends have also commented on his arrest:

- Isadore Gibby NEEDLEMAN, a New York lawyer, self-avowed Marxist, and allegedly a Soviet espionage agent in the past, was reported by an FBI source [illegible]

- Eda GLASER, a "close associate of KOTEN" and the office manager of the Four Continents Book Store, a Soviet book outlet in New York, termed the entire incident as "fantastic" and a "fabrication." [illegible]

- SVENCHANSKIY, who returned to the United States from Moscow while KOTEN was still being held, stated that the morals charge against him was true but he (SVENCHANSKIY) had been assured that the matter would be cleared up and that KOTEN would be released.

FBI sources reported that KOTEN later made the following remarks concerning his arrest and imprisonment:

[illegible]

[illegible]. After his release, [illegible] told that he could return to the Soviet Union [illegible] In fact, he could have returned [illegible] to do so. The [illegible] and the mistake had been [illegible].

8. Arrest of BARGHOORN

a. Information from NOSENKO

At the first of the 1964 meetings in Geneva NOSENKO described the provocation and arrest of Yale University Professor Frederick BARGHOORN in late 1963; he was questioned further on this case on 3 February 1964 and again while waiting in Frankfurt to leave for the United States. NOSENKO's most comprehensive statement, from which the following paragraphs were largely drawn, was made on 9 June 1964.* On this last occasion NOSENKO said that the purpose of the KGB operation against BARGHOORN was to retaliate for persona non grata action taken against three Soviets in New York City in the case of John W. BUTENKO and to secure a hostage in exchange for a fourth Soviet in the BUTENKO case who was jailed. In Geneva, however, NOSENKO maintained that the operation against BARGHOORN "was to discourage future arrests such as that of IVANOV [the jailed Soviet], not because of any special importance of IVANOV himself."

NOSENKO said that in 1963 four KGB First Chief Directorate officers assigned to the New York Legal Residency were caught in operational activity in the United States. Of the four, three had diplomatic immunity, but one was a chauffeur and had only a service passport. The three Soviet diplomats were held three or four hours by the American authorities and then released. IVANOV, the chauffeur, was arrested since he did not have diplomatic immunity.**

GRIBANOV, Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, learned of this arrest probably the next day and was directed by KGB Chairman SEMICHASTNYY to take "necessary measures." GRIBANOV thereupon called to his office NOSENKO; A.G. KOVALENKO, Chief of the Tourist Department; and G.I. GRYAZNOV and Ye.M. RASHCHEPOV, both Deputy Chiefs from the American Department. After explaining the arrest, GRIBANOV asked what information the Second Chief Directorate had on any American--U.S. Embassy employee or tourist--that could

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*The detail of NOSENKO's information on the BARGHOORN case reflects both the extent of the CIA debriefings and the depth of his knowledge of this case. He did, in fact, furnish much of this information during his first 1964 meeting with CIA. NOSENKO was also able to describe at length BARGHOORN's professional background, which gave rise to KGB suspicions of intelligence affiliation, and he provided the general outlines of other operational activity centering around BARGHOORN during his 1963 trip to the Soviet Union.

**Three Soviets were arrested in Englewood, N.J., on 30 October 1963 during a clandestine meeting with the KGB agent, BUTENKO, an American engineer. Two of the Soviets, G.A. PAVLOV and Yu.A. ROMASHIN, were members of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations; they claimed diplomatic immunity and were released; a few days later they were declared persona non grata along with a third Soviet, V.I. OLENEV, who was named in the charges by the U.S. Government, but was not arrested. Another Soviet citizen, I.A. IVANOV, a driver for AMTORG, did not have diplomatic immunity and was jailed. All have been identified as KGB officers [redacted]

serve as material for an arrest. RASHCHEPOV and GRYAZNOV said that at that very moment there were three or four American military attaches in Rostov and that, in the opinion of the American Department, these officers might be carrying electronic apparatus. It was known that they had cameras, that they had been taking photographs, and that they had been observed taking notes. If permitted, they could be arrested in Rostov before they took the return plane to Moscow. GRIBANOV wanted to know what other possibilities existed and instructed the two representatives of the American Department to write a report on this. He also told them to request permission to arrest and search the military attaches.

GRIBANOV then asked what pertinent information was held by the Tourist Department. He was told that there were relatively few American tourists in the Soviet Union at that time;* these included BARGHOORN, who was mentioned to GRIBANOV along with one other (name not recalled). NOSENKO and KOVALENKO reported, however, that the KGB had no "strong" materials against them. They were ordered to make an immediate study of the situation and to report back to GRIBANOV as soon as possible.

Returning to the Tourist Department, NOSENKO and KOVALENKO gathered the entire American Tourist Section in their office. In a general discussion, it was decided that BARGHOORN was the only American on whom the KGB had anything worth consideration. All the materials on BARGHOORN were gathered together, and NOSENKO and KOVALENKO took them to GRIBANOV, explaining that he was the only possibility. GRIBANOV read all the materials and was pleased with them; he was sure that BARGHOORN was connected with American Intelligence. He then asked what could be done. NOSENKO and KOVALENKO reported that BARGHOORN was then in Tbilisi and that, in fact, Ye.N. NOSKOV (case officer, American Tourist Section) was in Tbilisi with a woman doctor from the KGB Operational Technical Directorate for the purpose of working against BARGHOORN; the doctor had some special item which had been used to make BARGHOORN so violently sick to his stomach that he had to be hospitalized. While he was in the hospital, a careful search had been made of his belongings, but nothing of operational interest had been found. In addition, a KGB agent was placed in BARGHOORN's room as a patient; he made anti-Soviet statements and offered BARGHOORN "materials," but BARGHOORN did not rise to the bait. At the time of this meeting with GRIBANOV, BARGHOORN was scheduled to fly from Tbilisi to Moscow the following morning, and the KGB knew from a phone tap that he had an appointment with Theodore ORCHARD of the British Embassy at the Hotel Metropol the following evening.

It was GRIBANOV who raised the possibility of giving "materials" to BARGHOORN in Moscow. NOSENKO said that this would be a provocation, but GRIBANOV replied that this made no difference to him. He instructed NOSENKO and KOVALENKO

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*On another occasion, NOSENKO estimated their number at "about 60."

to locate an agent who could be used to pass the damaging materials to BARGHOORN and told them to write a summary of BARGHOORN's background with a proposal that the Second Chief Directorate arrest him "when he obtains materials which are of interest to American Intelligence." This was to be sent in letter form to SEMICHASTNYY over GRIBANOV's signature; the letter was not to indicate how BARGHOORN was to receive the materials (i.e., the fact of provocation was not to be mentioned).

GRIBANOV took a one-page letter on BARGHOORN, along with a similar letter from GRYAZNOV and RASHCHEPOV concerning the military attaches, to SEMICHASTNYY. While the four--NOSENKO, KOVALENKO, GRYAZNOV and KOVALENKO--were waiting in GRIBANOV's office for his return, GRYAZNOV received a telephone call from the local KGB organization in Rostov informing him that the military attaches were in the air on their way back to Moscow. Shortly thereafter, GRIBANOV returned with the news that the Chairman of the KGB had approved the arrests of the military attaches as well as BARGHOORN. (KHRUSHCHEV was absent from Moscow at the time, but SEMICHASTNYY had called BREZHNEV and secured his approval.*)

When GRIBANOV learned from GRYAZNOV that the military attaches were already on their way back to Moscow, he became furious and sent GRYAZNOV out "to do the job or die." Meanwhile, arrangements were made with the "Department D" (the KGB element responsible for disinformation, subordinate to the First Chief Directorate) to provide some materials on rockets which could be passed to BARGHOORN. While these were being picked up, NOSENKO and KOVALENKO returned to their office to plan the provocation.

BARGHOORN was placed under immediate surveillance upon his arrival in Moscow. At 1810 hours a radio message was received from one of the surveillance cars that BARGHOORN had gone to the U.S. Embassy, and it was decided that the agent (name not recalled, aged 25 to 30 years) would be placed in contact with him as soon as he came out. The KGB knew BARGHOORN had an appointment with ORCHARD of the British Embassy at 1900 hours, but at 1900 hours a report was received that BARGHOORN had left the U.S. Embassy in the American Ambassador's car. He was alone but for the Soviet driver. Nothing could be done while BARGHOORN was in the moving car. A check on ORCHARD established that he was in the downstairs hall of the hotel waiting. It was therefore decided to approach BARGHOORN when he left the car at the hotel.

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*NOSENKO placed these events on the day before BARGHOORN returned to Moscow from Tbilisi and on the day before BARGHOORN was arrested. As indicated below, BARGHOORN returned from Alma-Ata to Moscow on 25 October 1963 and was arrested on 31 October 1963, six days later. CIA records show that on 30 October, the day before the arrest, KHRUSHCHEV greeted Laotian Premier SOUVANNA Phouma on his arrival in Moscow and later in the day attended a luncheon in his honor. On 31 October, the day of the arrest, KHRUSHCHEV and SOUVANNA attended a performance of Swan Lake in Moscow. BREZHNEV was not seen in Moscow from 29 October until 2 November 1963.

No sooner had BARGHOORN stepped out of the car than the agent approached. "You are an American?" the agent asked. "Yes." "Please take it," the agent said. The agent put the packet containing the materials on rocketry in BARGHOORN's inside coat pocket and then ran off.

BARGHOORN had taken only one or two steps when he was seized by NOSKOV and Petr POPTSOV, another case officer of the American Tourist Section, and told he was under arrest. A surveillance car pulled up. BARGHOORN was placed in the car, handcuffed (on GRIBANOV's orders, because the Soviets arrested in the United States had received similar treatment) and driven to the 50th Section of the Militia, where a room had been prepared.

L.I. YEFREMOV and K.G. KRUPNOV from the American Tourist Section were waiting at the Militia station, KRUPNOV to interrogate BARGHOORN and YEFREMOV to be the interpreter. When BARGHOORN was brought into the station, an "incident report" form was filled out, and a resolution was prepared requesting permission to hold him 48 hours. Between 0200 and 0300 hours BARGHOORN was taken to the KGB inner prison. At 0400 hours the Tourist Department case officers were released with instructions to report for duty at 0930 hours. NOSENKO and the others went home.

KRUPNOV began the questioning in Russian at 1000 hours the next day. Although BARGHOORN speaks good Russian, YEFREMOV remained in case he would be needed to interpret. NOSENKO entered the room several times during these sessions. (Although NOSENKO did not want to reveal his face to BARGHOORN because he knew BARGHOORN would be released, GRIBANOV had told KOVALENKO that NOSENKO should be there when they reached the point where BARGHOORN was to tell how he obtained the damaging materials.) The first sessions concentrated on general matters, such as BARGHOORN's life history.*

After one and one half hours of questioning, BARGHOORN agreed that the materials were on him when he was arrested, but he maintained that they had been placed on his person. He said that he thought they were "newspapers or something," that he did not know what they were. The closed package was then opened and shown to BARGHOORN; it contained about 20 to 25 pages of information on missiles. "BARGHOORN was not, of course, given a close look" at the materials.

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*In October 1966, NOSENKO stated his certainty that he had been present on the day after the arrest. At this interrogation NOSENKO said KRUPNOV questioned BARGHOORN "concerning personal background, employment, etc." Then NOSENKO asked BARGHOORN whether he had had the incriminating materials on his person at the time of his arrest. When BARGHOORN admitted this, NOSENKO left. As noted below, BARGHOORN reported that the materials were not discussed at this particular interrogation.

The CIA interviewer then read to him the report which fixed the date of the approach as 5 January 1962, the date contained in NOSENKO's notes, and indicated that NOSENKO used the name NIKOLAYEV (see below). Acknowledging that "maybe" he had used the name Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV with JOHNSON, NOSENKO said: "I don't know why I made this mistake with the dates. I think it (the approach) was the first or second day that I was in the Seventh (Tourist) Department. I saw myself that he had (homosexual) intercourse... Your date is absolutely right, but this reminded me that it was soon after I had come in the Seventh (Tourist) Department. Is this important?"

Question: How long had you been in the Seventh Department?

NOSENKO: Now I remember that it was immediately - one or two days. I know I returned in January 1962. I knew I would be going to the Seventh (Department) already in December. I was visiting the Seventh already then. I had not too many papers to turn over to the First (American Department), and now I remember that I moved to the Seventh <u>immediately</u> (NOSENKO's emphasis) after 1 January 1962.

b. <u>Information from JOHNSON</u>:

JOHNSON reported to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow on 5 January 1962 that he experienced an "incident with Soviet plainclothesmen in the Hotel Metropol earlier that day." JOHNSON, who arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961, told the consular officer that "he was dining alone in the Hotel Metropol restaurant the evening of 4 January when he was joined at his table by a Soviet citizen who identified himself as a doctor from Riga. (This was NOSENKO's homosexual agent VOLKOV.) According to JOHNSON, little conversation transpired because the Riga 'doctor' spoke English poorly. Before JOHNSON left, however, the 'doctor' said he would like to chat with him and knew a student who spoke English well. JOHNSON then agreed to come by the 'doctor's' room at the Metropol at 10:00 a.m. the next day. JOHNSON said that he dropped by the 'doctor's' room about 10:00 the morning of January 5. Soon after he entered, the 'doctor' and his 'student' friend (NOSENKO's homosexual agent YEFREMOV) began to make homosexual advances to him. He stated that he protested and was rising to leave when two plainclothesmen suddenly appeared in the room and announced that all were under arrest. JOHNSON was then taken to another room where he was asked to sign a statement in Russian... He signed this statement and was taken to a man in a third room who identified himself as the Chief of Police, Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLOV.* The police chief first told him that Soviet law had been violated and that he, JOHNSON, could be imprisoned for three, five, or perhaps even eight years. After proceeding in this vein for

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* NOSENKO frequently used the operational pseudonym Yuriv Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV. He has said that he was normally called Georgiy, a variation of Yuriy, by family and friends in Moscow.

a few minutes, the police chief remarked that it was in his power to dismiss the whole affair, provided JOHNSON would do him a favor. The favor turned out to be a signed commitment that he would not speak ill of the Soviet Union when he returned to the United States."

In the afternoon of 8 January, JOHNSON called the Embassy to say that he had been recontacted by the Chief of Police, who reminded him of his pledge and showed him four pictures. JOHNSON said: "I don't know where they got them, but they were dillies." During the interviews by the FBI [illegible] 1965, JOHNSON repeated substantially the same story, continuing to deny that he had actually been compromised. In addition to letters to his parents, JOHNSON said he wrote to about 20 other people, mostly "minister friends" abroad; apparently he did not tell the FBI of their content. Shown pictures of VOLKOV and NOSENKO on 13 May 1965, JOHNSON said he had seen VOLKOV "somewhere" and suggested that the photograph of NOSENKO was that of a younger man whom he had seen in Djakarta in 1962-1963.

5. Attempt to Recruit BRAUNS

a. Information from NOSENKO:

NOSENKO made the following statement on 2 February 1964: "In 1962 some U.S. citizen by the name of Horst BRAUNS came to the Soviet Union. I mentioned him to you in 1962 but at that time could not recall his name.* We tried to recruit him but did not succeed. He lived somewhere in Leningrad, and in 1942 he went back with the German troops to Germany. And he served in the German Army, and after the war he changed his name and went to the USA and became a U.S. citizen. He is either a skilled mechanic or a worker. His real name is different.- it is Russian - because he changed his name when he was in Germany."

NOSENKO went into the operation against BRAUNS in greater detail on 17 April 1964: "This was /K.G./ KRUPNOV's case. This fellow was a Russian and lived prior to the war in Leningrad. In 1942 he was in Tikhvin, near Leningrad, when the Germans came, and when the Germans were retreating they took him along and some other people, local people, and so he found himself in Germany. Now, in Germany, as he told his story, he was kept in various prison camps and when the war was over he worked in West Germany and then, in 1956 or 1957 or 1958 - I don't remember /which year/ - he came to the United States and settled down. Why we became interested in this fellow... /NOSENKO thought his name was something like 'BRUNKS' or 'BRONX'/ is because he came from Russia. So, according to Soviet law, he never lost his Soviet citizenship... Leaving with the Germans is interpreted as treason, as being a traitor of your country. So there was something to talk to him about. Besides, KRUPNOV found out either in the Information Section or some other section /of the KGB First Chief Directorate/ that the man is working in some very interesting company that makes computers or adding machines or some other instruments. But when I talked to him he already left the company. He wasn't working with this company any more.

* BRAUNS did not arrive in Moscow until after NOSENKO had returned to the Soviet Union from Geneva in 1962, according to travel records.

"They called him to Inturist. They gave him a room in the Inturist /Hotel/. Then KRUPNOV transferred him from the Inturist to another hotel, put him in a room in the hotel, and started talking to him. Then he left him in his room and called us up - said that he needed help, that he can't do anything with the man. I thought that he would be able to handle him all by himself, so I said to KOVSHUK:* 'I'm sorry. I thought he'd be able to handle it. He tells me that he doesn't seem to get anywhere, so I guess I'd have to go help him.' I got there and I see that the man is scared stiff. He doesn't talk about anything, doesn't want to listen to any of these reasons. He was told that, after all, he is a traitor to his country, that he went with the Germans... This fellow was a coward, a real coward, so he gave his consent, he agreed to help us.

"The next day he went to Leningrad. So I felt that this agreement wasn't very firm, reliable. So the next day KRUPNOV and I went to see CHELNOKOV /Chief of the Tourist Department/. And I told him: 'I feel that this agreement of his is quite shaky. I'm not sure about it. So are we to follow through? If we decide to do so, then we'll have to go to Leningrad. So KRUPNOV went and called the man, and the man refused to talk to him. So then I was told to go. So I went /to Leningrad/ and... I went to his hotel room. He locked the door, and he wouldn't let me in. The only thing, fortunately for us, the lock in the door wasn't a very good one, so we called a locksmith, and he found a key that opened the door. So we entered the room, and we started talking to him. The fellow was terribly scared, he was shaking, so it was quite obvious that he would never work for us. So we finally decided: 'Look, it's okay. We don't want anything from you. Go ahead, leave. Goodbye.' And that was all; that was the end of it. I don't know whether it was BROCKS or BRONX or some name like that which he used in the States, but his true name was IVANOV."

In February 1965 NOSENKO said he had forgotten how he came to be involved in the BRAUNS case. He also said that he did not know why BRAUNS had visited the Soviet Union, and that he could not name any Soviet citizens with whom BRAUNS was in contact in Moscow.

b. Information from BRAUNS

Interviewed by the FBI [redacted]

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* NOSENKO is apparently in error. At this time, he has reported, V.M. KOVSHUK was not in the Tourist Department but in the American Department. He may mean V.D. CHELNOKOV, Chief of the Tourist Department.

6. The SVENCHANSKIY Case

a. Information from NOSENKO:

NOSENKO provided the lead to Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, KGB cryptonym "ZNOD," on [illegible] January 1964 in the course of discussions of KGB use of foreign travel bureau personnel to spot tourists of possible operational interest. "Well, here's an example: One of our agents is the director of a small tourist agency," NOSENKO said, "He takes the tourist's application form which has a photograph, and if he suspects the tourist of having ties to American Intelligence, he will move the photo slightly, for example. Further, on the fifth line, where it says 'nationality,' he can make a small pinprick. And at the end, where the stamp of the tourist agency is placed, he can make a checkmark with a pencil. That's all. He indicates an agent to us... but why he/the tourist/ is suspected we don't know yet, of

Following BARGHOORN's admission, another resolution was drawn up by KRUPNOV and signed by KRUPNOV, KOVALENKO, and GRIBANOV. NOSENKO and KRUPNOV then took it to the office of the Chief Prosecutor where the incident report, the first interrogation, and the first and second resolutions were reported to (fnu) MISHUTIN (or MISHUSTIN), the First Deputy to the Chief Prosecutor. GRIBANOV further directed that all materials on BARGHOORN, including information from KGB Archives, be given to the Department of Prosecution of the KGB so that they could begin the legal proceedings against BARGHOORN. After this, all interrogations were conducted by this department; KRUPNOV was dropped from the case, but YEFREMOV continued to act as interpreter.

b. Information from BARGHOORN

BARGHOORN, who had made five earlier trips to the Soviet Union since 1956, arrived there on 2 October 1963. The purpose of his visit, as stated in his visa application, was to gather information for a book on how effectively the Soviet Union was operating as a result of its political education and political system. His itinerary took him to Leningrad from 2 to 7 October, to Moscow from 7 to 10 October, Tbilisi from 10 to 17 October, and short visits to Tashkent, Bukhara, Samarkand, and Alma-Ata from 17 to 25 October. He flew from Alma-Ata to Moscow on 25 October and was scheduled to leave for Warsaw on 31 October. On the latter date he was arrested and held by the KGB until 16 November when, at President Kennedy's intervention, he was released and left the Soviet Union. BARGHOORN had no intelligence mission.

Upon his return to the United States, BARGHOORN was debriefed by the U.S. Department of State and by CIA. His information indicated a high degree of KGB operational interest in him throughout the trip, including encounters with at least five probable KGB agents during his first week there: an attractive waitress who invited him to "do the town," a disenchanted intellectual in Leningrad, an attractive unattached girl who sat next to him on the flight from Moscow to Tbilisi, and two young Armenians whom he met his first day in Tbilisi.* The two Armenians were instrumental in the drugging described by NOSENKO. At dinner in his hotel on the day he arrived in Tbilisi, BARGHOORN met a young man claiming to be a student at the Leningrad Music Conservatory. They left the hotel for a walk and ran into a friend of the student, a second young Armenian, and the three of them went to a cafe for coffee. None was available,

*Questioned about this in February 1965, NOSENKO said that BARGHOORN, as a suspected American Intelligence agent, was of operational interest throughout the trip. He vaguely recalled the girl on the plane but either did not know or had forgotten details of any other specific activity. NOSENKO said that none of this activity was directly related to the provocation operation, which was based on a last-minute decision.

but the young student went to the kitchen "to arrange things," and shortly thereafter "three foul-tasting coffees" appeared. Within an hour, BARGHOORN was in the hospital, acutely ill. He was assigned to a room where there was another patient, and a woman doctor took care of his case. He was in the hospital for four days. During this period his clothes, notes, and other possessions were held by hospital authorities.

Upon his return to Moscow by air on 25 October, BARGHOORN checked into the Metropol Hotel. The next six days were occupied by sightseeing and appointments connected with his research. In the late afternoon of 31 October he called on friends at the U.S. Embassy for cocktails, and at 1910, already 10 minutes late, he left in the Ambassador's car for a dinner appointment (prearranged by telephone) at the Metropol with Theodore ORCHARD, a British diplomat.

BARGHOORN's account of the subsequent events closely parallels NOSENKO's. Having been handed the incriminating materials, he was arrested, handcuffed, and taken to Militia Station No. 58, where he was questioned briefly by a uniformed Militia officer. The KGB was called. Within 30 minutes a KGB captain (BARGHOORN thought his name might have been GORBUNSKIY) arrived and began to question him, assisted by an interpreter named YEFREMOV.* All question were asked in Russian, and BARGHOORN answered most of them in English. The package of materials was opened and contained, according to BARGHOORN, 13 or 14 photographs of rockets. This session lasted until about midnight and centered around BARGHOORN's possession of the photographs and his "intelligence mission." He was then taken to the Lyubyanka prison.

Interrogations were conducted the next morning by the original KGB officer together with his "chief," whom BARGHOORN subsequently identified by photograph as NOSENKO. The questioning concerned BARGHOORN's biography, and nothing was asked about the compromising materials. The following day the case was turned over to a KGB colonel identified as (fnu) PETRENKO, and BARGHOORN did not see NOSENKO or the other KGB officer again. At this and subsequent sessions, BARGHOORN was questioned further concerning the circumstances of his arrest. BARGHOORN described NOSENKO as "clever and quick-witted" and as giving "the impression that he was not a dedicated careerist, but opportunistic and adaptive; he seemed not to care about what he was doing, but doing a good job nevertheless."

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*Asked why YEFREMOV used his true name during the interrogations, NOSENKO said this was necessary for legal reasons, that he had to sign documents connected with the interrogations. BARGHOORN confirmed that YEFREMOV had participated throughout the entire series of interrogations and had signed interrogation reports attesting to the accuracy of translation.

hn Andrew SHUBIN

ohn Andrew SHUBIN and his year of birth
es which NOSENKO brought to the 1964
in Geneva. NOSENKO identified SHUBIN as a
of Russian extraction, a Russian speaker,
rofessor in New York City. According to
rsonally involved in SHUBIN's fourth trip
62 or 1963. SHUBIN had become known to
gent during his third visit to the Soviet

fessor of economics at New York Univer-
viously known to the FBI [redacted]

[redacted] The following paragraphs
rmation from NOSENKO and other sources on

ormation

been imprecise in dating SHUBIN's third
t Union.* He said on 25 January 1964 that
cow some time during the period 1959 to
1 1964 NOSENKO said he was unsure of the
t by SHUBIN but thought it occurred in
any event, prior to 1960 and while he was
tour of duty (June 1955 to January 1960)
t Department. NOSENKO indicated on 26 June
LITSKIY was the case officer in the Tourist
sible for SHUBIN, and since at another time
VELITSKIY transferred from the department
would appear that he was placing the date
trip as some time before the transfer.

rted that SHUBIN was placed under surveil-
during the third trip. He has offered
as to why: On 25 January 1964 NOSENKO
as that SHUBIN had visited the Soviet
e;** on 2 February 1964 he explained the
illance as having been founded on the KGB's

ing for this trip, as variously given by
nflict with the fact that SHUBIN had no
rt between 1940 and 12 June 1961, according
xplanation for this discrepancy, however,
BIN went to the USSR without valid docu-

IN's own admission about having gone to
, there is no other evidence of his travel
ion prior to 1961.

14-00000

d. Information from Other Sources

The CIS defector in Geneva, [illegible], supplied the lead which enabled the FBI [illegible]

[illegible] FBI interviews [illegible]

SHUBIN, whose father was a native of Russia, was born in Los Angeles on 20 February 1915. [illegible]

After receiving [illegible] the NOSENKO information of 1964, the FBI interviewed SHUBIN [illegible]

10. BOLSHAKOV, Robert Kennedy, and the Cuban Missile Crisis

a. Introduction

NOSENKO volunteered at his second meeting with CIA in January 1964 that G.N. BOLSHAKOV was his "old friend" and that he was a colonel in the GRU. On 26 January, 1 February, and 19 August 1964 he again raised BOLSHAKOV's name, emphasizing that he was a GRU officer and a "good friend." In the 1 February interview, after displaying an initial reluctance to discuss with CIA such a "sensitive" subject, he provided a number of details on BOLSHAKOV's alleged relationship in 1962 with the then Attorney General, Robert Kennedy. His information on this subject, he said, derived from his friendship with BOLSHAKOV in Moscow, where BOLSHAKOV was reassigned (in December 1962 following a tour in Washington as Novosti correspondent and editor of the magazine USSR). NOSENKO claimed a personal role in this affair, in that he personally proposed to the KGB leadership that the KGB take over BOLSHAKOV's former (GRU) contact with Robert Kennedy.

NOSENKO claimed that an information channel of communication between BOLSHAKOV and the Attorney General had developed at Kennedy's initiative. He described in detail the circumstances of their introduction at a social function by a journalist (whom he did not name). He said that he "thought" that the Kennedys knew that BOLSHAKOV was a "military intelligence officer," and he implied that they regarded these private conversations with BOLSHAKOV as a useful instrument of diplomacy. According to NOSENKO, the KGB knew that CIA was not aware of this relationship--it was "obvious" that Robert Kennedy wanted it that way. NOSENKO claimed that after BOLSHAKOV left the United States "during the Cuban missile crisis,"* no one took over his role as a confidential channel to the White House. After the assassination of the President, NOSENKO continued, the Kennedy family tried to reestablish the relationship through their close friend, the artist William WALTON, during the latter's visit to Moscow in December 1963. NOSENKO reported that he had urged that the KGB try to take over the Robert Kennedy operation from the GRU and that he had proposed two plans which would have enabled this to take place, the second involving WALTON. Neither came to fruition, however. Referring to the Cuban missile crisis, NOSENKO said that the GRU had "played dirty" with BOLSHAKOV by forcing him to "tell Robert" that there were no offensive missiles in Cuba whereas there actually were such weapons there.

According to other sources, BOLSHAKOV left Washington for Moscow on 3 August 1962 and returned on 2 October 1962. On 23 August, about the time that CIA was reporting urgently to the President that "something new and different" was going on with respect to Soviet aid to Cuba, Ambassador DOBRYNIN assured Theodore SORENSEN (Special Counsel to the President) that the United States had no need to fear Soviet

*The Cuban missile crisis occurred during October 1962, and as indicated above, BOLSHAKOV was not reassigned from Washington until two months afterward.

activity in Cuba. On 4 September DOBRYNIN gave Robert Kennedy "an unusual personal message from KHRUSHCHEV for the President": KHRUSHCHEV pledged that he would not stir up any incidents before the upcoming U.S. elections. On the same day, the President stated publicly that the United States had no proof of a Soviet offensive missile capability in Cuba. Also on the same day, the Soviet Union sent a harsh note to the U.S. Government concerning the (unintentional) violation of Soviet airspace by an American U-2 plane on 30 August; the note threatened "appropriate retaliatory measures" against U-2 bases should such incidents be repeated. The following day (5 September) U-2 flights over Cuba were temporarily suspended, and they did not resume until 14 October. On 6 September DOBRYNIN again told SORENSEN that the Soviets had "done nothing new" in Cuba and gave his assurances that all their steps "were defensive in nature and did not represent any threat to...the United States." On 13 October DOBRYNIN informed Chester BOWLES (a Special Representative and Advisor to the President) that the USSR would never send offensive weapons to Cuba. Similar assurances were given by KHRUSHCHEV to U.S. Ambassador KOHLER in Moscow on 16 October (the same day that the President was shown the U-2 photographs which revealed the presence of offensive missiles) and by Foreign Minister GROMYKO to President Kennedy in person on 18 October.

Also on 18 October, the FBI reported, [redacted] Two days later BOLSHAKOV told Washington correspondents Joseph ALSOP and Charles BARTLETT that the Soviets had no offensive weapons in Cuba, and said he had been instructed by KHRUSHCHEV and MIKOYAN on 1 October (the day before his departure from Moscow) to inform President Kennedy of this fact. CIA has no indication that BOLSHAKOV delivered this message to the President, or even directly to the Attorney General, or that, prior to his meeting with BEGLOV in New York City, he made any remarks about Soviet weapons in Cuba. [redacted] There is no report of BOLSHAKOV's having played any role in the Cuban missile crisis beyond making these remarks to ALSOP and BARTLETT. Discussions at the White House, State Department, and Defense Department about the crisis culminated in the decision to impose a blockade on Cuba; this decision was announced by President Kennedy over nationwide television and radio on 22 October 1962. Soviet overtures for a peaceful settlement of the situation were initiated on 26 October by the KGB Legal Resident in Washington, A.S. FEKLISOV,** in contacts with the American journalist John SCALI. FEKLISOV's proposals were along the same lines as those received

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*BEGLOV came to the United States to attend the "Third Unofficial US-USSR Conference of Public Figures," held at Andover, Massachusetts, from 21 to 27 October 1962. Also present at this conference was Boris BELITSKIY, identified by NOSENKO four months earlier as a KGB-controlled source of CIA (see Part VI.D.6.). BELITSKIY indicated at that time that BEGLOV might be affiliated with the KGB.

**FEKLISOV, who served in Washington under the alias FOMIN, was the author of one of the documents among the CHEREPANOV papers (see Part VI.D.7.c.).

at the White House late that night in a secret letter from KHRUSHCHEV. At a farewell party for BOLSHAKOV in December 1962, Presidential Press Secretary Pierre SALINGER asked BOLSHAKOV who would "do his work." BOLSHAKOV replied that no one would do precisely the same job, but that if SALINGER had "anything special to say," he might contact A.I. ZINCHUK.*

b. Soviet Sources During the Crisis

NOSENKO has not indicated that BOLSHAKOV had an information-collection role during the Cuban missile crisis. As for Soviet sources at this time, NOSENKO stated on several occasions in 1964, in different contexts, that the KGB "had not had luck in getting intelligence from high places in the U.S. Government" in October 1962. On more than one occasion he said that the KGB agent "SASHA"** was unable to furnish any information of value in this regard. He said this on 25 February 1964 and again while being questioned about "SASHA" on 4 August 1964. On the latter date NOSENKO said: "During the Cuban missile crisis the [KGB] First Chief Directorate, the Intelligence, couldn't tell what the U.S. will do. KHRUSHCHEV*** was not satisfied with the work of the Intelligence. No agents were producing information on this." NOSENKO continued by saying that "SASHA" reported nothing to the KGB during the Cuban missile crisis. In fact, "he couldn't know anything. I heard that this was very tightly held information. There were just a few people around President Kennedy who knew the plans, and they were sworn to keep it secret."

[illegible]

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*ZINCHUK was identified by DERYABIN by name and photograph in October 1954 as a KGB staff officer. NOSENKO has said that ZINCHUK was a KGB cooptee rather than a staff officer.

**For a discussion of the "SASHA" case, see Part VI.D.3.d.

***Speaking before the Supreme Soviet on 12 December 1962, KHRUSHCHEV said that the decision to negotiate with the United States for a peaceful settlement of the Cuban situation had been influenced by "information from our Cuban comrades and other [unspecified] sources." This information had been received, KHRUSHCHEV stated, on the morning of 27 October 1962 (Moscow time). As previously indicated, however, KHRUSHCHEV's secret and conciliatory letter to the President was received at the White House on the night of 26 October 1962.

c. NOSENKO's Statements on BOLSHAKOV

NOSENKO repeatedly emphasized BOLSHAKOV's GRU affiliation and the fact that the KGB was in no way involved in this channel to the U.S. Government via Robert Kennedy. He first volunteered BOLSHAKOV's name during a discussion of the use of Novosti as a cover organization for Soviet Intelligence officers. "Yuriy BOLSHAKOV of the GRU also sits there," he said. "He is a colonel and a friend of mine." Two days later, out of context with the preceding discussion, he introduced the name again: "Then there is this BOLSHAKOV. He is from GRU who was in the United States." NOSENKO then commented that this was "a very interesting case" and added: "We shall talk about it later." When his case officer thereupon turned to another topic, NOSENKO immediately interrupted to say: "I know BOLSHAKOV very well. He is my old friend...I met him through Yuriy GUK...[who]was with him in the United States...and we are now very good friends. He calls me up and consults me for advice..." On 1 February 1964 NOSENKO said he thought the Kennedy family knew BOLSHAKOV to be a military intelligence officer; "yet for some reason they chose him" as a channel between the U.S. and Soviet Governments. BOLSHAKOV, NOSENKO added, "reported directly" to the Chief of the GRU concerning his exchanges with Robert Kennedy.

NOSENKO said BOLSHAKOV was introduced to Robert Kennedy by an American journalist (unnamed) at a reception in the United States. The journalist invited BOLSHAKOV to go for a walk, and as they strolled "down an alley," there was a man sitting on a bench directly ahead of them. "The journalist said: 'Listen, George [BOLSHAKOV], are you acquainted with Robert Kennedy, the brother of the President and the Chief of the Department of Justice?' BOLSHAKOV said: 'No. Of course, I have heard of him.' 'Would you like me to introduce you?' 'Of course,' BOLSHAKOV said, 'please do.' He led him to the man on the bench. There was this feeling that all this had been pre-arranged."

This contact "was at the personal desire of Bob Kennedy... BOLSHAKOV was called in for this. As you know, the whole idea of this contact was to pass information to Kennedy from KHRUSHCHEV and from Kennedy to KHRUSHCHEV....It happened to be BOLSHAKOV, but it was not BOLSHAKOV who sought to have the meeting....Then the relationship grew. BOLSHAKOV was a visitor in Robert Kennedy's house. They would first talk about ordinary things, and then the conversation turned to other matters...Robert Kennedy did not say: 'Please tell KHRUSHCHEV so-and-so.' He would say: 'You know, some of these problems seem insolvable.' And BOLSHAKOV would say: 'And you know, at home they think this and that way...' without actually saying that this was coming from KHRUSHCHEV. But, of course, this was clear without explanations. It was an exchange of views on important political questions of the moment. He was like an intermediate point..." NOSENKO commented that he personally thought that it was a "case of mutual 'feelers' being sent out by both sides--exploring some given current political situation."

After BOLSHAKOV left Washington, NOSENKO stated, no one replaced him as a channel to the U.S. Government. Asked whether ZINCHUK could have taken over upon BOLSHAKOV's

departure, NOSENKO said: "Oh, no. There is no contact like there was before. It was broken at the time BOLSHAKOV left. ZINCHUK was an agent or a cooptee....No, there is no such contact since BOLSHAKOV left. He passes no more messages."

Referring to the Kennedy-BOLSHAKOV contacts, NOSENKO told CIA on 26 January 1964: "You have shown considerable interest in him [BOLSHAKOV], even after his return to the Soviet Union...because all this was done by by-passing CIA." He said on 1 February 1964: "It was pretty obvious that this relationship between BOLSHAKOV and Robert Kennedy had nothing to do with CIA, and CIA was not witting of it. It was at the personal desire of Bob Kennedy." The KGB determined that CIA was unaware of the exchange between Kennedy and BOLSHAKOV, NOSENKO reported, because when BOLSHAKOV was subsequently invited to a reception at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, two CIA officers--Kenneth A. KERST and Malcolm A. TOON*--tried to elicit information from him about his relationship with President Kennedy. "The most important thing" they had tried to find out, according to NOSENKO, was whether the President and BOLSHAKOV had met personally. Although BOLSHAKOV did not admit the fact to them, he did have one meeting with President Kennedy--"he was brought in a car...and was taken through a back door into the White House," NOSENKO said.

NOSENKO reported that William WALTON visited Moscow in December 1963 and at that time went to BOLSHAKOV, whom he had previously met at the home of Robert Kennedy. Part of their conversations, he continued, related to Robert Kennedy's future political plans: "WALTON said that Bobby...did not expect at present to become a candidate for the vice presidency. He was, perhaps, according to WALTON, thinking of running for Governor of Massachusetts..." NOSENKO said he felt that there were "some feelers sent out on the part of WALTON--not exactly questions, but just a passing of opinion. WALTON was trying to sound them out, but I think that everything was left without an answer....My personal opinion was that these things were told to WALTON so that he could pass them on as, so to speak, Bobby's plans for the future." Another topic covered in the WALTON-BOLSHAKOV discussions, NOSENKO added, was the assassination of President Kennedy.** "As I remember, it was WALTON's opinion--and his opinion reflected the opinion of the Kennedy family--that there was no Russian involvement in the murder of the President. No suspicion at all."

NOSENKO proposed two plans whereby the KGB could take over the GRU's channel to President Kennedy. Under the first of these plans, the Soviet Minister of Justice would personally invite the Attorney General to come to the Soviet Union. There the KGB would "set him up in private living quarters, give him everything he wants...so that he would be

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*Neither KERST, who NOSENKO said was suspected by the KGB of being the CIA Chief of Station in Moscow, nor TOON was affiliated with CIA in any way.

**See also Part V.D.6. on NOSENKO's information concerning Lee Harvey OSWALD.

pleased....Not to make an agent or cooptee out of him, but just to promote a rapprochement." In addition, on the basis of what BOLSHAKOV had told NOSENKO about Robert Kennedy's interest in a Soviet ballerina, this plan called for the two to be brought together, and the ballerina, who "is quite free in her behavior with the opposite sex," would do "everything necessary for the State." Before NOSENKO's superiors could make a decision on this plan, the President was assassinated and the matter was dropped. NOSENKO conceived his second plan during WALTON's trip to Moscow in December 1963: "BOLSHAKOV told me that he was going to meet WALTON, and asked me whether we had an interest in it....I told the chiefs about it and said: 'Let's utilize WALTON ourselves. Why should we let the GRU use him?'" NOSENKO suggested that the KGB "tell BOLSHAKOV that we are working on WALTON--that this is a Number One target as far as we are concerned. BOLSHAKOV will do anything we ask him." However, "the boss said: 'Well, you know, it will worsen relations between the KGB and the GRU. As long as they are working on it, let them do it.'"

NOSENKO indicated that if the KGB had actually assumed authority for the operation in Moscow from the GRU, as he had proposed, the KGB Legal Residency in Washington would have then taken over, and "someone new" probably would have been sent from KGB Headquarters to develop the association. This KGB officer would have been "someone with a broader outlook who could carry himself well in social contacts."

d. Information from [illegible]

In addition to NOSENKO, one other Soviet source had identified BOLSHAKOV as a GRU officer. [illegible] reported that another member of the GRU Legal Residency [illegible] had "recently" turned over to BOLSHAKOV an informant who was an American correspondent based in Washington. This journalist, [illegible] had accompanied Vice President Nixon to the USSR in July 1959 and while there had agreed to cooperate by "furnishing political information." BOLSHAKOV was to "concentrate all of his efforts on this one contact."*

FBI [illegible]

SECRET

СССР

КОМИТЕТ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ при СОВЕТЕ МИНИСТРОВ СССР

"15" декабря 1963 г.

Командировочное удостоверение № 11933

Выдано подполковнику Носенко Юрию Ивановичу

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по "30" декабря 1963 г.

Основание: распоряжение нач. Главного Управления

Действительно по предъявлении удостоверения личности № НК-2541[illegible]

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Комитета Государственной Безопасности при Совете Министров СССР

ОТМЕТКИ О ПРЕБЫВАНИИ В ПУНКТАХ КОМАНДИРОВКИ

[illegible handwritten entries]

ОТМЕТКИ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ [illegible] КОМИТЕТА ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ при СОВЕТЕ МИНИСТРОВ СССР

Убыл из Москвы "__" ______ 196_ г.

Прибыл в Москву "__" ______ 196_ г.

Нач. сек. [illegible]

Печать

ФИНО КОМИТЕТА ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ при СОВЕТЕ МИНИСТРОВ СССР

Выдано:

Аванс на расход по командировке в сумме

Руб.

Перевозочные требования №№ 005864, 005870

Талоны на плацкарту №№

Ст. бухгалтер

Front

Reverse

Temporary Duty Authorization
December 1963

SECRET

TOP SECRET

Committee for State Security
Under the Council of Ministers
USSR

15 December 1963

Issued to: Lieutenant Colonel NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich
For duty to: UKGB of Gor'kaya Oblast'
Length of temporary assignment: 15 days
through: 30 December 1963
Authorization: directive of Chief of a Chief Directorate

Effective on presentation of identity document No.: NK-2513

Chief s./GRIBANOV of Directorate of Department

Committee for State Security under the Council of Ministers, USSR

Front

NOTATIONS OF PRESENCE IN PLACES OF TEMPORARY DUTY

"Arrived in city of Gor'kiy 16 December 1963"

"Arrived in city of Shakhun'ye 17 XII 1963
Did not use free quarters"

s./Chief of Shakhun'ye Chief Militia Section, Militia Major ____(illegible)

"Departed Shakhun'ye 17/XII-63
Did not use free quarters"

s./Chief of Shakhun'ye Chief Militia Section, Militia Major ____(Illegible)

"Left Gor'kiy 17 December 1963
Did not use free quarters"

s./____(illegible)

Reverse (endorsements only)

TDY authorization for Lieutenant Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO in connection with the search for CHEREPANOV

G. NOSENKO's KGB Promotions and Awards

1. Rank

NOSENKO has been questioned at length concerning his progress through the KGB ranks, from lieutenant to lieutenant colonel. He has volunteered additional information on this subject himself. His various statements follow in chronological order.

11 June 1962: "As a Chief of Section, I now receive 2,500 [rubles per month], plus 700 for my rank, for major, plus pay for longevity. I receive more than 4000, i.e., 450-470-480 [rubles per month] in new money. This is enough for me...I am now a major but I should receive lieutenant colonel soon. I have already completed my time in grade. We have a system of time in grade. From major to lieutenant colonel it is necessary to have four years... My time in grade was up in December, in December of last year [1961]."

23 January 1964: At the first of his 1964 meetings with CIA in Geneva NOSENKO had in his possession the temporary duty authorization which he said he had been issued in December 1963 to travel from Moscow to Gorkiy Oblast in connection with the search for CHEREPANOV.* This official KGB paper had been signed by O.M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, and authorized "Lieutenant Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO to visit the local KGB organization in Gorkiy Oblast on official business between 15 and 30 December 1963." It bore official stamps of arrival and departure in December 1963, as attested by officials in the town of Shakhunya.

10 February 1964: In Frankfurt, while awaiting exfiltration to the United States, NOSENKO was asked to review a biographic statement which had been prepared by his case officers on the basis of statements he had made during the 1962 and 1964 meetings in Geneva. NOSENKO went over the biography carefully, noted several changes, and then stated that it was correct. The biography included the information that NOSENKO had served in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department as a senior lieutenant from 1952 [sic] to 1955, that he was promoted to captain in 1956, to major in 1959, and to lieutenant colonel in November 1963, shortly before leaving Moscow for Geneva.

8 April 1964: NOSENKO was questioned about the date when he became a senior lieutenant, and he replied: "I think in the end of '53 or the beginning of '54 I got the senior lieutenant."

Question: That's less than a year after you entered the service [KGB].

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*See Part VI.D.7.c. for a description of this search and of NOSENKO's claimed part in it.

NOSENKO: Well, I had the GRU service. That counts two years, as military service, of course. It was considered as a continuance of military service.

Question: So you got it when? At the end of 1953?

NOSENKO: At the end of '53 or beginning of '54. Then I got captain in 1956.

Question: When in 1956?

NOSENKO: I don't remember. You see, they are not given exactly in February or in March. Sometimes the scheduled time passes before they give it. So, '56--Captain, '59--Major, and '63--...

16 June 1964: Asked to list in chronological order the date of his promotions within the KGB from the date of entry, NOSENKO stated: "I began in the GRU as a junior lieutenant. While in the GRU I became a lieutenant, and I entered the KGB with this rank in 1953. Not long after I entered the KGB I became a senior lieutenant, but I don't know the month. It was still 1953. In 1956 I was promoted to the rank of captain. I don't know the month. I became a major in 1959. I don't know the month. In October 1963 I was made a lieutenant colonel....Personnel called me on the telephone and said I had been promoted. Later I was told that GRIBANOV wanted to see me. I went to his office, but, of course, I didn't let him know that I already knew that I had been promoted. He gave me his congratulations. You never see the attestation. It goes into your official file."

26 January 1965: While discussing his role as case officer for U.S. Embassy Security Officer John ABIDIAN, NOSENKO volunteered out of context that he had never officially been a major. He explained this situation as follows: Having been promoted to the rank of senior lieutenant in April 1953, he became eligible for the rank of captain in 1956. When this time came, however, he was not promoted because a senior KGB official held against him his illegal use of KGB documents to cover treatment for gonorrhea in 1954. NOSENKO therefore remained a senior lieutenant until 1959, when he would have been eligible for promotion to the rank of major had he received his captaincy on schedule. Although GRIBANOV had promised NOSENKO that he would be promoted directly from senior lieutenant to major, skipping the rank of captain, an administrative error was made by the KGB Personnel Office, and NOSENKO found when the orders were issued that he had instead been promoted only to captain. Instead of rectifying this mistake, GRIBANOV persuaded NOSENKO that it would be to his advantage to remain a captain until he became eligible for promotion to lieutenant colonel in 1963. NOSENKO therefore was a captain from September or October 1959 until October 1963 when, as promised by GRIBANOV, he was promoted

directly to the rank of lieutenant colonel. In this manner it turned out that he never officially held the rank of major.*

10 August 1965: Under questioning by DERYABIN, NOSENKO repeated the chronology of his promotions given on 26 January 1965. He again explained that he was put up for captain in 1956, but this time said that the promotion had been blocked on the grounds that he should be made to wait because of shortcomings in his work. Asked why he had told CIA that he had been a major during the 1962 meetings and again in the biography prepared in Frankfurt, NOSENKO replied that he thought the true story would not be believed.

17 April 1966: In a voluntary statement, NOSENKO wrote the following: "In March 1951, with the rank of junior lieutenant, I started service in Naval Intelligence of the Seventh Fleet in Sovetskaya Gavan....From August 1952 until 1953, I worked at the intelligence base of the Naval Intelligence of the Fourth Fleet in Sovetsk, where I received the rank of lieutenant of the Administrative Service....In 1958 I received the rank of senior lieutenant [in the KGB], in December 1959 the rank of captain, and at the end of 1963 I was recommended for the rank of major. I have never held the rank of lieutenant colonel and the travel order which you know of, with the rank of lieutenant colonel, was filled out erroneously.**

19 April 1966: In a new version of his autobiography, NOSENKO included the following statement: "in July 1956 I became a candidate member of the CPSU, soon after which I received a promotion at work: I became a senior case officer and was given the rank of senior lieutenant. In August 1957 I was accepted into the CPSU, and during the second half of 1958 was appointed Deputy Chief of the Second Section, Seventh Department. On 29 December 1959 I was promoted to the rank of captain.

26 October 1966: "I lied when I said I was a lieutenant colonel in 1964. I was only a captain." Asked why he had said in 1962 that he was then a major, NOSENKO replied: "There was no conversation about rank in 1962. About my position, I said I was in the Tourist Department. That's all."

To summarize what NOSENKO has said about his ranks while serving in the KGB: He became a senior lieutenant in 1952, April 1953, 1954, or 1956; a captain in 1956 or September/October/December 1959; a major in December 1958 or 1959; and a lieutenant colonel in October/November 1963. (The latter claim was verified by the official KGB document listing him as a lieutenant colonel as of December 1963.) On the other hand, NOSENKO has indicated that his highest rank in the KGB was captain, and that he never advanced to a majority or a lieutenant colonelcy.

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*At about this time, in early 1965, [redacted] NOSENKO was only a captain and had advanced to his senior KGB position because of his close relationship with GRIBANOV. [redacted] shortly after NOSENKO's defection, [redacted] reported having received information from fellow KGB officers which made it "appear quite certain" that NOSENKO was a lieutenant colonel.

**See above; NOSENKO was referring to the TDY authorization issued for the CHEREPANOV search in December 1963.

2. Awards and Decorations

Not long after reestablishing contact with CIA in January 1964, NOSENKO mentioned that he had received the Order of Lenin "shortly after the 1962 meetings" in Geneva as a reward for the ideas which he had developed to "enlarge the experience and improve the quality" of KGB Second Chief Directorate staff personnel in Moscow.* During the first series of interrogations, NOSENKO on 6 April 1964 claimed that he was awarded the Order of Lenin in 1963 for his work in the Tourist Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, after receiving the Order of the Red Banner in 1962 for his performances while in the American Department.

The following discussion of the subject took place on 6 April 1964:

NOSENKO: Yes, I received a big gold medal.

Question: It was the Order of Lenin?

NOSENKO: It was at first the Order of the Red Banner--the Red Star, I mean. In '63 I received the Order of Lenin. In '63.

Question: What for?

NOSENKO: GRIBANOV decided that whoever is working a long period in the Second Chief Directorate--[V.D.] CHELNOKOV got one, [A.G.] KOVALENKO got one--many, many [received the Order of Lenin].**

Question: You received the Order of Lenin for this brilliant service?

NOSENKO: No. For working in the Seventh [Tourist] Department, which is considered good.

Question: What is good? Were there recruitments? What recruitments?

NOSENKO: You must know that the main task of the Seventh Department is not recruitments. The main task is countering the intelligence activities of the opposition.

Question: So, the Chief and the Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department got the Order of Lenin?

NOSENKO: Yes.

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*NOSENKO has described the Order of Lenin as the highest decoration for which a KGB officer can be eligible.

**In June 1964 NOSENKO said that the only Second Chief Directorate officer whom he knew to have received this award was V.A. CHURANOV, Chief of the British Embassy Section, who recruited William John VASSALL (see PART VI.D.5.b.). On the same general topic, NOSENKO asked his CIA case officer whether he, the CIA officer, had received a medal for his part in the 1962 meetings with NOSENKO. He asked this in January 1964 in Geneva.

Question: CHELNOKOV and KOVALENKO?

NOSENKO: Yes. And CHURANOV got and I got and--who else? [S.M.] FEDOSEYEV got and [V.M.] KOVSHUK also got the Order, the second time. The first time he got it several years ago, and this was the second time.

Question: When did you get the Order of the Red Star?

NOSENKO: Red Star I got--I don't know for what.

Question: But then one year later they gave you another one, because this [Order of the Red Star] wasn't enough?

NOSENKO: Because the awards are given out--now, wait one moment; up until 1961, if there were any awards for the Chekists [KGB personnel] it was very rare, and they were only awarded for a specific thing. Such as CHURANOV, for instance. He was rewarded for a specific deed [the recruitment of VASSALL]. But in 1962, 1963--these first years--whether it was the idea of the Party to encourage the workers, they decided to let SAKHAROVSKIY [Chief of the KGB First Chief Directorate] declare his medals and GRIBANOV to declare his medals. They get together with their deputies and decide to whom they will give them. They don't say to whom--they say, for instance: 'One order to your department; you decide who should have it.' Like that. Then we would get together, I CHELNOKOV, KOVALENKO, and we decided [who would get one]. In our department, [V.I.] YAKOVLEV got a medal. Who else got a medal? In 1962, I got one, and then LEONOV who was Chief of the Second Section--he got the Order of the Red Star. We decided on these individuals. As far as we ourselves were concerned, that decision was made by GRIBANOV and his deputy.

Question: Did the Seventh Department catch any spies?

NOSENKO: Well, as I have already told you, there was this Italian fellow [illegible]. This was considered a good case because the First Department later--the Seventh Department was only involved at the time of the arrest--began meeting with him.

Question: So you got the Order [of the Red Banner] in 1962 because of your work in the Tourist Department?

NOSENKO: I think in 1962 GRIBANOV gave it to me not for the Seventh Department, but for my work in the First [American] Department in 1960, 1961.

Question: You think so?

NOSENKO: I think so.

Question: The Order just came, without any explanation?

NOSENKO: It was just done at the order of the Chairman.

Question: And the Order of Lenin was the same?

NOSENKO: The same. Well, the way it says, "For work well done for the organs of the KGB" there is no indication exactly what it is for.

NOSENKO admitted on 8 April 1964: "In 1964 [in Geneva] I told a lie about the Order of Lenin. Why? It was a boast." NOSENKO then explained what he said to be the true circumstances and gave the reason for which he was to have received this decoration. GRIBANOV, NOSENKO stated, had promised in 1963 that NOSENKO, CHELNOKOV, and KOVALENKO would get the Order of Lenin: "He said: 'I am submitting your names for the Order of Lenin for creating the TsOPS [Central Operational Communications System of the Second Chief Directorate], for this new thing you have tried to create in tourist work.' But December [1963] had gone by. I left [for Geneva] and nothing happened."*

NOSENKO was asked on 15 April 1964 to list the dates, reasons, and types of awards, decorations, and bonuses he had received during his KGB career, as well as to indicate from whom he had received each of these. His reply was as follows: "I received nothing in 1953, 1954, and 1955. In 1956 I received a commendation and one month's pay. SEROV, the Chairman of the KGB, awarded me this for the recruitment of Richard BURGI [see Part V.D.4.b.] while I was working in the Seventh [Tourist] Department of the Second Chief Directorate. It was signed by the Chairman, and GRIBANOV told me about it. As usual, this Order of the Chairman of the KGB was circulated, and I and all case officers saw my name listed. There is no certificate or anything. Personnel just makes a note in your official file that on a certain date you received the commendation from the Chairman of the KGB.

"From 1956 on, I received something almost every year, but it was nothing special. Perhaps it was the KGB anniversary or May Day or Army Day. In 1957 or 1958, I got something from GRIBANOV. Maybe it was the 40th anniversary of the Soviet Army. I don't remember. It was given to me and a group of people in the hall [auditorium] between the third and fourth floors [of the KGB Headquarters building]. PERFILYEV, Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, made the presentation.

"In 1959 I received a commendation and one month's pay from SHELEPIN, Chairman of the KGB, for several recruitments, among them the professor from Tennessee [MERTENS], DREW, FRIPPEL, and three British people. There were six in

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*NOSENKO later reverted to his original statement, which related the award to his efforts to "inspire" the work of the Tourist Department.

all; three Americans and three British. I can't remember the British names just now.*

"In 1960 I got a commendation from GRIBANOV for good work in general. A lot of officers got this. In 1961 I received the Order of the Red Star. With a group of case officers I got this for general good work in the Second Chief Directorate. KOVALENKO and KOVSHUK got this too. IVASHUTIN gave it to me (made the presentation). Personnel makes a note in your official file, but you can take the medal and the little certificate that goes with it and either keep it at home or in your study room (office).**

"In 1962 I got a commendation from GRIBANOV for general good work. I also received the Unblemished Service Award for ten years' service. They counted this from October 1950, when I joined the GRU, and they were late by two years in giving it to me. This is not unusual. SHCHERBAK, Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, gave it to me in the

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* See Parts V.D.4.1.and h., Part V.D.5., and Parts V.D.4.i., j., and k., respectively, for descriptions of these recruitment operations and NOSENKO's role in them. NOSENKO also said during interrogation by DERYABIN on 10 August 1965 that, in 1959, his name was submitted for the Order of the Red Banner in connection with these recruitments, but that he did not get it, probably because he was transferred to the First Department at that time (January 1960). NOSENKO has described the Order of the Red Banner as the third highest award a KGB officer may receive. Asked what KGB officers had received this award, NOSENKO said on 10 June 1964 that GRIBANOV, SAKHAROVSKIY, and several other high-ranking KGB officers were awarded it for the important role they played in smashing the Hungarian Revolution in 1956.

** On 15 April 1964 NOSENKO had said that he received the Order of the Red Star, along with a group of other Second Chief Directorate officers, at the end of December 1962. He recalled this because they were planning the presentation for the anniversary of the KGB on 20 December, but the presentation was delayed and was not made until the end of the month. NOSENKO and about 70 other officers of the Second Chief Directorate, including KOVSHUK and G.I. GRYAZNOV, received the award "simply for achievements, for good results in work." NOSENKO told DERYABIN in August 1965 that the order accompanying his award had read: "For exceptional performance of mission." When asked what mission was involved, NOSENKO replied that the award was just for good work in general.

hall along with a certificate.* In 1963 I received a commendation from GRIBANOV for general good work. Also, GRIBANOV told me that I, along with some others, was to receive the Order of Lenin on 20 December 1963, the KGB anniversary date, but I left for Geneva.**I was to receive it for arousing [inspiring] the Seventh Department."

NOSENKO said on 26 October 1966 that he never received any KGB award or decoration for his operational work. The only awards he received during his KGB career, he said, were a Red Army anniversary medal and the award for satisfactory completion of ten years of service.

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*NOSENKO's wording here reflects earlier intensive questioning concerning the ten-year service medal. NOSENKO said on 15 April 1964: "In 1962 I had ten years of service in the KGB and got a medal for unblemished service. It is usually given for ten years and to KGB men only....That was in 1962. I had ten years of service then." When it was pointed out that, according to his most recent statement, he had joined the KGB in March 1953 and therefore would have had only nine years of service in 1962, NOSENKO said he did not understand why but that he was certain that he had been given the medal after his return from Geneva in 1962. (The 1962 date is consistent with NOSENKO's earlier statements that he joined the KGB in 1952.) The following day, 17 April 1964, NOSENKO said that he remembered why he had received the medal in 1962 rather than 1963; this medal, he recalled, is awarded to servicemen as well as KGB officers, and prior military service is taken into account in computing the service time for the latter. NOSENKO had entered the GRU in 1950 and therefore should have received the ten-year medal in 1960. Because of a mix-up in the KGB Personnel Department he did not receive it until 1962.

**NOSENKO arrived in Geneva on 19 January 1964.

H. NOSENKO's Relationship with GRIBANOV

1. Information from NOSENKO

a. Summary

From the time of his first meetings with CIA in 1962, NOSENKO maintained that he had a close personal and professional relationship with Major General O.M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO has described recruitment approaches in which he and GRIBANOV took part together, conversations they had on operational matters, the role which GRIBANOV played in his rank promotions and receipt of various awards, and his afterhours carousing with GRIBANOV and First Chief Directorate counterintelligence officer Ye.A. TARABRIN. NOSENKO has also frequently mentioned the role which GRIBANOV played in his, NOSENKO's, professional advancement within the KGB: GRIBANOV was wholly responsible, against NOSENKO's wishes, for his appointment to the position of Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department in January 1960; later, when NOSENKO rejected his offer to make him Deputy Chief of the entire American Department, GRIBANOV arranged his return to the Tourist Department as Chief of the American Tourist Section and his later appointment as Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department.

NOSENKO's remarks concerning his direct involvement with GRIBANOV in operations against Americans are included in other parts of this paper. Among them are his early statements on the approach to code clerk James STORSBERG (Part V.E.3.c.), his 1962 account of the arrest and attempt to recruit CIA officer Russell LANGELLE (Part VI.D.7.a.), and his early reports on the attempt to recruit CIA officer Edward Ellis SMITH (Part VI.D.2.). In all three cases NOSENKO subsequently denied having played the role he originally attributed to himself and denied having had personal contact with the Americans involved. NOSENKO has also altered his original accounts to say that he received no awards or decoration for operational activity and that he had not received the promotions he claimed.

b. Details

The statements of NOSENKO given below concern primarily his personal relationship with GRIBANOV and how GRIBANOV assisted his rapid rise within the organization of the Second Chief Directorate.

12 June 1962: "Oleg Mikhaylovich GRIBANOV is a great guy. A real pal. We, so to say, used to meet one another illegally and had women together... GRIBANOV wrote a fitness report on me. It was the very best that can be given, brilliant. GRIBANOV wrote the very best fitness report on me. He had an excellent regard for me, excellent... I am supposed to become Deputy Chief of [the Tourist] Department. I believe that GRIBANOV is promoting young people, new people, who already have experience, good experience, who have made recruitments. I know two or three [of the people he is moving ahead]. I personally have about 12 recruitments, four or five of them were British and the rest Americans. He [GRIBANOV] has his eye on me in particular, and the question of my advancement is right now under consideration... I will be Deputy Chief of Department. You must give thought to the

fact that I have been talking with you. You can ruin everything. I have a career. I have bright prospects. My boss GRIBANOV, my highest boss, has a very high degree of respect for me. He sometimes bawls me out and I-- Well, I make it look like this is unpleasant for me. But, in fact, it is a pleasant thing because, inside, I am glad he is bawling me out and not someone else. I know that if he bawls me out he has a high regard for me. He sometimes calls me personally [to his office] and says: 'You come with me. I have to meet an ambassador.' I go with him. We arrive and have the conversation. He is there all night. He comes out and says: 'Well, where shall we go for a drink?' I know beforehand [that he will say this] and everything is ready at the Aragvi Restaurant. We go there. 'Well, what shall we drink!' [GRIBANOV says]. I answer: 'Well, Oleg Mikhailovich, cognac, of course! He is the highest chief. 'I don't drink cognac. I'll have vodka,' I say. 'Well, we'll have vodka then,' [GRIBANOV says]..." One of NOSENKO's CIA handlers suggested at this point that GRIBANOV seemed to treat NOSENKO as an older brother would. NOSENKO replied: "That's his attitude toward me."

23 April 1964

Question: Did you ever go to GRIBANOV's house?

NOSENKO: I never went in the house. I have driven to it.

Question: Did he ever come to your house?

NOSENKO: No.

Question: Were you ever out at night with him, after work? If so, how, under what circumstances?

NOSENKO: After work? Yes, once.

Question: Who else was there?

NOSENKO: TARABRIN.

Question: What was the occasion?

NOSENKO: No specific reason. GRIBANOV called me at midnight. I could hear that he was already drinking; he asked me how long it would take me to get dressed and come down to the Praga Restaurant, first private room. Afterwards we wanted to go somewhere else to finish the evening... GRIBANOV was sloppy drunk, lay down to rest, he needed a couple of hours of sleep. I drove him and TARABRIN home, got him there at 6:00 a.m., gave him some pills to help him.

Question: When did you first personally meet GRIBANOV?

NOSENKO: I might have seen him in 1953 or 1954, but I did not have a chance to speak to him then. Once I was in two group operational discussions (about 15 people present) about work against Military Attaches in 1954; that was the first time I ever spoke to him.

Question: When did you first have any personal conversation with him?

NOSENKO: I don't remember. He gathered groups of people. Maybe I was with him with KOZLOV and others in Tourist Department [i.e., between 1955 and 1960].

Question: When did you develop a personal relationship with him?

NOSENKO: It is difficult to say how it got started. I was still working in the Seventh Department. It was in 1958, or maybe 1957. KOZLOV suddenly called me and said I should immediately report to GRIBANOV. I did, and GRIBANOV said I should quickly be ready to go to a reception with him at the Indian Embassy, with him and Vera [Ivanovna] ANDREYEVA.

Question: Why you?

NOSENKO: I don't know... (pause) Oh, yes, this is the story. this is it, this is why he started favoring me. Earlier, some time in 1953, I knew some girls, Nina on Pokrovskiy Boulevard and her girlfriend, Rina GUDKOVA, friends of [Yu.I.] GUK and [V.M.] KOVSHUK and [V.A.] CHURANOV. CHURANOV was a friend of TARABRIN, who was a friend of GRIBANOV. Through TARABRIN he got acquainted with these girls, and TARABRIN brought them to GRIBANOV's dacha one night. The girls were talkative and told me all about it, and said they'd told CHURANOV. I told CHURANOV who warned me not to mention it. I never did, and GRIBANOV learned about this and liked it; he remarked once: "You are not a gossiper..."

Question: How did he find out that you knew and didn't tell anyone?

NOSENKO: I don't know, but he did.

Question: Who wrote your fitness reports?

NOSENKO: My last one was written by [V.D.] CHELNOKOV. The one before that by [V.A.] KLYPIN, in the First Department. Before that in the Seventh Department it was written by [K.N.] DUBAS, before him by [V.A.] KOZLOV, then [S.V.] PERFILYEV and before then, in the First Department, by [A.M.] GORBATENKO.

Question: Did GRIBANOV ever write a fitness report on you?

NOSENKO: He may not have actually written them, but he signed them, those reports written in connection with promotions to higher jobs or for trips abroad, or general reviews of personnel.

<u>15 February 1965</u> (from a protocol signed 20 February 1965): "Before I joined the KGB in 1953 I had never heard the name of Oleg Mikhaylovich GRIBANOV and knew nothing about him. As [F.G.] SHUBNYAKOV, rather than GRIBANOV, was the Deputy Director of the Second Chief Directorate responsible for supervising the activities of the First Department of the Directorate, where I worked,

it may have been several months after I began my KGB service that GRIBANOV first came to my attention. I don't know when I first saw GRIBANOV but it may have been approximately 1953 at a meeting before May Day or the 7 November holiday. I would not necessarily remember this as I frequently met much more important people, who were friends of my father, and seeing GRIBANOV wouldn't have been particularly important to me. Sometimes during 1954 and 1955, it was necessary to obtain the signature of a Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate on a cable that I had written and, if SHUBNYAKOV was absent at the time, I would take it to GRIBANOV for approval. Though I was only a junior case officer at the time, I would take the cable, after it had been approved by the Chief of Section and the Chief of Department, directly to GRIBANOV, who would simply sign it with no discussion. I do not remember how many times I took cables to GRIBANOV nor do I remember the contents of any specific one of them. The first meeting with GRIBANOV that I specifically remember was in the summer of 1956. I think it was in June. I had returned from Kiev with KOZLOV and, after writing a spravka on BURGI, PERFILYEV, KOZLOV, and I went to see GRIBANOV. KOZLOV didn't introduce me to GRIBANOV at that time, but GRIBANOV knew that I was NOSENKO because the plan for the BURGI operation said that I would participate and because PERFILYEV had made an appointment for the three of us to speak to GRIBANOV at this time. The meeting lasted about 30 or 40 minutes. GRIBANOV read the report on BURGI's recruitment and asked some questions. KOZLOV answered some of these and I answered others. Other than asking what Ukrainians took part in the operation, I can recall none of GRIBANOV's questions nor do I remember any of the conversation which took place at this meeting. When we were through, KOZLOV and I left while PERFILYEV remained with GRIBANOV. Perhaps the first time I was alone with GRIBANOV was in 1958 when I attended a reception given by the Indian Embassy at the Sovetskaya Hotel in Moscow. Usually [A.V.] SUNTSOV accompanied GRIBANOV on such occasions, but he was sick at the time. I don't know why SUNTSOV usually went with GRIBANOV, why I was selected to go, or what I was supposed to do at the reception. I think GRIBANOV called the Seventh Department and asked whom he could use, but I don't know why he picked me. GRIBANOV told me that, at the reception, I was to refer to him as Aleksey Mikhaylovich GORBUNOV. I was to introduce myself as Yuriy Ivanovich and if anybody asked, would use the last name NIKOLAYEV. Vera ANDREYEVA, who went with us, used the name Vera Ivanovna. After work, I went home to change my clothes and we went in GRIBANOV's car from the KGB to the Hotel Sovetskaya. GRIBANOV sat in front with the driver and I sat in back with Vera ANDREYEVA. I cannot say how many times I have seen GRIBANOV altogether. From 1959 on I saw him more frequently. Sometimes, GRIBANOV would call meetings of chiefs of sections and their deputies and I would take part in these. I had begun to call GRIBANOV by his first name and patronymic in 1958, when I was Deputy Chief of the First Section of the Seventh Department, but at these meetings I called him 'Comrade General.' In 1959 I also went to GRIBANOV's office alone in connection with the FRIPPEL case and, sometime between May and October 1959, took him a report that I had prepared concerning the use of tourist cover by foreign intelligence organizations."

23-24 February 1965 (from a protocol signed 26 February): "GRIBANOV was never in my own office, my home, my parents home or my parent's dacha. My father never knew him. I was never in GRIBANOV's home or his dacha. I was never in any KGB operational apartment with GRIBANOV. I never introduced any of my

own agents to GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV knew about agents [redacted] [redacted] and 'ARTUR' (FRIPPEL), but I never specifically discussed them with GRIBANOV. I did discuss with GRIBANOV the agent 'PROKHOR' (PREISFREUND). On three occasions I have been with GRIBANOV in social circumstances. On all three occasions TARABRIN was also present. After two of these occasions, we had parties with girls. I don't remember when the first time was, but the last time was in September or October 1963. On this occasion they called me at home late at night and asked me to join them at the Prague Restaurant. I arranged for female companionship and this party lasted until early morning.* It was at this party that I gave GRIBANOV some pills I had for hangovers. I had brought a supply of these back from Geneva in 1962. A few days after this party [GRIBANOV's secretary Ye.S.] KIRPICHNIKOV came to my office with a note from GRIBANOV asking me for some more of these pills. This is the note I gave to my CIA case officers in 1964.** I have ridden in GRIBANOV's cars perhaps four or five times, once when I went with him to an Indian Embassy reception in 1958, perhaps two or three times to meetings with SUSLOV and two or three times in connection with the drinking parties with GRIBANOV and TARABRIN. GRIBANOV played absolutely no part in my entry into the KGB. I think he could not have played any personal part in my assignment to the First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate in 1953 since at that time GRIBANOV was Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate supervising the Second Department and not the First Department. I do not know who made the decision to transfer me from the First Department to the Seventh Department in 1955, but I did not have any personal contact or conversation with GRIBANOV concerning this decision. I do not know if GRIBANOV played any personal part in my appointment as Deputy Chief of Section in the Seventh Department in 1958. I do not remember just who was responsible for my appointment to this position. I did not personally discuss this appointment with GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV decided at the end of 1959 that I would be appointed Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, and this appointment took place sometime in January 1960. DUBAS, the Chief of the Seventh Department in 1959, told me that GRIBANOV planned to appoint me to this position and that he had spoken to GRIBANOV two or three times about it, but had been unable to get GRIBANOV to change his plans. I spoke to GRIBANOV myself about this matter once or twice. GRIBANOV did not tell me who had recommended me for this new position and did not tell me any reason for my having been selected. GRIBANOV did tell me that my appointment was a part of his personal plan to raise to more senior positions a number of younger officers, including myself and Aleksey SUNTSOV. The decision for me to return to the Seventh Department in January 1962 was actually made in about September or October 1961. GRIBANOV planned to appoint me Deputy Chief of the First Department, but the new Chief of the First Department, FEDOSEYEV, wanted KOVSHUK to take this position. Since I did not

* See below for a more detailed version of this affair.

** When NOSENKO arrived in Geneva in 1964 he was carrying a note addressed: "Personal to NOSENKO, Yu.I." In translation the note read in full: "Yu.I., get me please some more tablets like the one you gave me once. [signed] GRIBANOV."

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want to be placed in this position by GRIBANOV's order against the wishes of FEDOSEYEV, I went to GRIBANOV and requested that I be transferred back to the Seventh Department, in any position. I had already spoken to CHELNOKOV, who was then Chief of the Seventh Department, about this matter, and he had suggested that I go to GRIBANOV and ask to be returned to the Seventh Department. GRIBANOV finally agreed that I should return to the Seventh Department as Chief of the First Section with the understanding that I would be appointed Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department as soon as this position would be vacated by [B.A.] BALDIN. In July 1962 I was appointed Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. This decision was made by CHELNOKOV and GRIBANOV in accordance with the intention stated by GRIBANOV at the end of 1961 that I should be appointed to this position as soon as possible. I had no further personal discussions with GRIBANOV about this appointment at this time. In 1963 CHELNOKOV [GRIBANOV's Deputy, F.D.] BOBKOV, and GRIBANOV decided that I should be named First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. They did not discuss this with me beforehand and no order was issued about this appointment. I was simply told that from that time I would be considered as First Deputy Chief of the Department. At this time I was, in fact, the only Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, since KOROBOV did not come to the Seventh Department until about November or December 1963. GRIBANOV did not tell me his reasons for appointing me Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department in January 1960, for wanting to appoint me Deputy Chief of the First Department in late 1961, or for appointing me Section Chief and later Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department in 1962. He did not discuss with me my personal qualifications for each of these positions. GRIBANOV had nothing at all to do with my assignment to Geneva in 1962. I think that the kharakteristika written about me for this trip was signed by BOBKOV, since he was the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate who supervised the Seventh Department. I did not personally discuss this trip with GRIBANOV before my departure from Moscow. My candidacy for this assignment was supported by BANNIKOV, the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate who supervised the work of the Eleventh Department which had the investigative file on SHAKOV. BANNIKOV was concerned with the question of who would go as case officer on this trip because SHAKOV, who was suspected of possibly being a Western agent, was to be in the delegation. There was no background or neighborhood investigation conducted on me in connection with my being approved for this trip. My assignment was approved by the Eleventh Department, by the Personnel Office of the Second Chief Directorate, by the Central Personnel Office of the KGB and by the Central Committee of the CPSU. GRIBANOV had absolutely nothing to do with my assignment to Geneva in 1964. The kharakteristika on me for this trip was signed by BOBKOV. For the 1964 trip no decision of approval of the Central Committee of the CPSU was required for me or for any of the other members of the delegation who had been approved for the 1962 trip. KHLOBUSTOV, PANCHENKO, and KOVALENKO supported me for the assignment as a personal favor to me. I did not discuss my 1964 trip to Geneva with GRIBANOV prior to my departure. In fact, I was even afraid that GRIBANOV would find out that I was going and would object to my making this second trip."

23 February 1965: NOSENKO commented further on his social encounters with GRIBANOV and TARABRIN. The following, which was not included in the protocol quoted above, is taken from case officer notes.

Question: Tell me about the occasions when you were with GRIBANOV and TARABRIN.

NOSENKO: Three times--drinking in cafes. Twice afterwards there were girls. The most recent time was in September or October 1963. I don't remember the first time. In 1963 I received a call from TARABRIN at home. Then GRIBANOV got on the phone and told me to take his car and come join them at the Praga Restaurant. I didn't take his car because I didn't want to call the duty officer. I took a cab and went to the Praga. They were sitting there and drinking in a private room. I joined them. They were drinking champagne, but I took cognac. TARABRIN suggested girls about 1230 and GRIBANOV made me go to the office to get my notebook. I called one girl I knew--her and her sister. When I got back to the restaurant it was closed with only GRIBANOV and TARABRIN still there. We went to the girls' (apartment). They weren't prostitutes exactly. I knew her before.

Question: Is this why GRIBANOV called you to the restaurant (i.e., to provide girls)?

NOSENKO: I think so. It was the second time I had participated in this. This last time GRIBANOV told the girl his name. The girl works in the Archives of the First Chief Directorate. At that time of night I wasn't able to reach anyone else. Her name is Galina Mikhaylovna. Her mother works in the Central Committee. I don't remember her last name. GRIBANOV was drinking and she told him that she had quarreled with ZAYTSEV, the Chief of the First Chief Directorate Archives. GRIBANOV told her that he would give her a job and told me to arrange for a job in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate for her. Galina's flat is in the building inhabited by Central Committee workers on Kutuzovskiy Prospekt. GRIBANOV's driver drove him home at 0600 and he was in the office by 0830.

3 March 1965: Speaking of the damage his disclosures must have caused the KGB, NOSENKO said: "I believe they will punish people in the Second Chief Directorate [SCD]... Even GRIBANOV... He was personally responsible, as head of the SCD, for pushing me ahead."

Question: What sort of punishment?

NOSENKO: Even firing.

Question: Do you think any others would be punished, or even fired?

NOSENKO: Maybe KOVALENKO, BOBKOV, and people in the Eleventh Department. Many others, too.

Later in the same session the interrogator returned to this subject. The following is a transcript of the discussion:

Question: You said you think GRIBANOV might be fired. Yet, there is nothing in the protocol you signed [see above] about your relations with GRIBANOV which would seem to make him personally responsible for you. Is there something else, something you haven't told me?

NOSENKO: No.

Question: Why then do you think GRIBANOV would be fired?

NOSENKO: (no answer)

Question: (repeats)

NOSENKO: Don't know.

Question: Well, what is your opinion at least?

NOSENKO: Nothing, nothing. Let's not discuss this.

Question: Why not?

NOSENKO: It's simply my opinion, that's all. I don't know why.

Question: Well, what is your opinion?

NOSENKO: He was responsible for my becoming Deputy Chief of Department.

Question: But you had already gotten ahead before; you said he didn't help you become Deputy Chief of Section in 1958.

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: Did you ever hear any gossip about his help to you?

NOSENKO: It was said in the SCD that he helped me become Chief of Section and Deputy Chief of Department.

Question: Why would BOBKOV be punished?

NOSENKO: He was my supervisor, and in '61 he was Secretary of the KGB Party Organization.

Question: Would others in the Party Organization be punished?

NOSENKO: Yes, also in the Party Organization of the Seventh Department and of the SCD.

Question: Would BANNIKOV be punished?

NOSENKO: No. He did nothing, just supported my candidature for Geneva.

Question: Would KOVSHUK be punished?

NOSENKO: Of course they would speak with KOVSHUK, GUK, GRYAZNOV, who talked to me.

Question: How about the First Chief Lirectorate and the Seventh Directorate?

NOSENKO: No. I wasn't close to them, except GUK.

Question: How about First Chief Directorate residencies abroad?

NOSENKO: [S.I.] GAVRICHEV might be recalled from Geneva.

Question: You must be withholding something about your relationship with GRIBANOV.

NOSENKO: No, I was telling you I visited his office. He told me: 'I found out you're drinking too much.' I said no, not especially. He said: 'Stop this drinking with KOVSHUK. It's not good for you.'

Question: But this couldn't harm GRIBANOV's position now.

NOSENKO: They would review my file, and find that it contained the report about the woman in '54,* the fact that I was turned down for assignment to Ethiopia, drinking, scandals--GRIBANOV knew about this, but he approved my appointment (to Deputy Chief of Department) anyway.

Question: Why did he promote you?

NOSENKO GRIBANOV thought I was a young, active guy. Six recruitments--oh, they weren't much, but it sounds great for the First Department, which was having no success with Americans in the Embassy.

Question: But why make you Deputy Chief of Department?

NOSENKO: He thought I was a tough guy, good case officer. In '59 I saw him often and was involved in a lot of operations which were reported to him.

Question: But it was not then, but in 1961, when he made you Deputy Chief of Department.

NOSENKO: (shrugs)

Question: Who would officially approve a Deputy Chief of Department?

NOSENKO: Must be higher than a Department Chief--bec :se GRIBANOV signed. They could get him for hıs, especially those who are against GRIBANOV.

Question: Who?

NOSENKO: Well, IVANOV, who wanted to get promoted to Deputy Chief of Department in 59-60 but didn't. He was in an inspection group of the Collegium, checking the Seventh Department.

* Presumably this is a reference to NOSENKO's contracting venereal disease (see Part IV.C.2.).

Question: But GRIBANOV must have approved all the other Deputy Department Chiefs, too. Would the same happen if one of them defected?

NOSENKO: Well, if it was from the Second Department, for example, no, because GRIBANOV wasn't personally supervising it. It would be someone else's proposal. In my case it was his own initiative.

Question: Was anyone in the First Chief Directorate punished as a result of GOLITSYN's defection?

NOSENKO: No, absolutely not.

2. Information from [redacted]

As indicated in Part III.I., a number of sources have reported that GRIBANOV and other KGB officers were discharged from the KGB in the wake of NOSENKO's defection.* [redacted]

According to sensitive source, [redacted] 15 KGB officers had already been dismissed from the KGB because of the defection, and that GRIBANOV and three of his deputies were included in this number. One of the deputies was named "BANNIK" (BANNIKOV). GRIBANOV's guilt was said to rest in the facts that, as Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, he had been ultimately responsible for NOSENKO's flight; that NOSENKO was his personal friend and protege; and that, therefore, he should have been aware of NOSENKO's intention to defect.

According to sensitive source, [redacted] when NOSENKO was being considered for inclusion in the Soviet delegation to go to Geneva, a summary statement of NOSENKO's activities and capabilities was prepared by employees of the Second Chief Directorate and was sent to GRIBANOV... [redacted] said he understood this summary contained considerable 'compromising' information regarding NOSENKO and, if acted on properly, would have removed NOSENKO from future consideration for the trip to Geneva. [redacted] Sensitive source stated, however, that he understood from conversations with other KGB employees, whom he could not recall specifically by name, that GRIBANOV read the summary material, ran a line through all of it,

* In addition, a Western Ambassador with whom GRIBANOV was in operational contact in Moscow has stated that GRIBANOV disappeared from the scene sometime in mid-1965 and was replaced by another KGB handler. (He has also indicated that GRIBANOV disappeared about the time of KHRUSHCHEV's downfall in October 1964.)

and put the notation on the summary, 'Send him to Geneva.' [redacted] the general feeling among KGB personnel that GRIBANOV was willing to overlook a lot of deficiencies about NOSENKO because of GRIBANOV's long-time friendship with NOSENKO's father."

According to sensitive source, [redacted]

[redacted] GRIBANOV's dismissal took place immediately after NOSENKO's defection in February 1964 and no less than 50 other officers, most of them from the Second Chief Directorate and many of them close friends of GRIBANOV, had been fired subsequently. [redacted] prior to NOSENKO's defection, NOSENKO had been the deputy to a Department Chief in the Second Chief Directorate but that he held only the rank of captain in the KGB. [redacted] attributed NOSENKO's high position to the influence which GRIBANOV exerted on his behalf. [redacted] rather than being fired, Major General "BANNIK" (BANNIKOV) had been appointed Acting Chief of the Second Chief Directorate in GRIBANOV's stead.*

[redacted] after the defection of NOSENKO, the KGB conducted an extensive investigation of personnel in KGB Headquarters to find out which KGB officers knew him. One of these questioned was TARABRIN, who said he was acquainted with NOSENKO, but that their relationship was only casual and was limited to occasional official contacts within the KGB. Subsequent investigation determined, however, that TARABRIN and GRIBANOV were close friends socially and had attended several parties which NOSENKO had arranged and attended. Girls provided by NOSENKO were at these parties.** As a result of his willful concealment of this information, TARABRIN, like GRIBANOV, was discharged from the KGB and dismissed from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

* [redacted] BANNIKOV was the Acting Chief of the Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO, as noted above, said that BANNIKOV would not be punished as a result of his defection. NOSENKO also said that it was BANNIKOV who sponsored NOSENKO's 1964 trip to Geneva and that GRIBANOV had nothing to do with it or the 1962 trip.

** These evidently were the parties described by NOSENKO (see above). [redacted] at the time of his removal from the KGB, TARABRIN was the Chief of the British Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate. NOSENKO said that TARABRIN held this post until 1963, at which time he was promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the newly established "Service Number Two" (counterintelligence) of the First Chief Directorate.

I. Confirmation from Other Sources

1. Introduction

Since NOSENKO's defection several Soviet sources and defectors have provided information supporting NOSENKO's claims of having held certain positions in the KGB at certain times. [illegible] a Soviet scientist with suspected intelligence connections who was approached by CIA, Soviet case officers for an [illegible] double agent (a NOSENKO lead), and the KGB officer handling Robert Lee JOHNSON (also a NOSENKO lead), a Soviet journalist who contacted the magazine Paris Match with a proposal to write an article on NOSENKO, and two defectors. Some of these sources had supported NOSENKO directly by reporting that he was a Second Chief Directorate officer in the various positions he says he was. Others have offered indirect support by confirming NOSENKO's knowledge of particular pieces of information or confirming the validity of information which NOSENKO said he learned while in particular KGB jobs. As will be noted, the information from one source sometimes contradicts that learned from another or from NOSENKO himself.

2. [illegible]

[illegible] has corroborated NOSENKO's story indirectly by his descriptions of the repercussions of the defection within the KGB (particularly the firing of GRIBANOV) [illegible] and by his statements concerning the probable effect that the defection would have on KGB operations. [illegible] reported at various times that NOSENKO is "more valuable than PENKOVSKIY," that he is "vastly more important than DERYABIN or GOLITSYN," that the KGB "will not be able to operate normally for two years," that it is the "unanimous opinion" of [illegible] "NOSENKO could do tremendous harm to the KGB," and that this damage would be severe "for several years to come".

[illegible] has also given indirect support to NOSENKO's statement that he was Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section.* [illegible] NOSENKO as a "chief" had access to details on KGB activities against the U.S. Embassy, and [illegible] the loss suffered by the KGB as a result of NOSENKO's knowledge of the microphones installed in the Embassy. (NOSENKO has said that this information was available to him only because he was Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section. [illegible] reported that NOSENKO's position as a "chief" in the Second Chief Directorate gave him access to the names and backgrounds

* [illegible] however, is not known to have stated specifically that NOSENKO was a senior official in the American Embassy Section of the American Department in 1960 and 1961.

of many KGB officers in the USSR and abroad (see Part III.I.) and to sensitive information on KGB organization, operations, and method.. This status [redacted] made available to NOSENKO a "30-page personnel roster ... and a 200-page phone list from Moscow Headquarters of the KGB."*

[redacted] supported ... of the operational leads supplied by NOSENKO. [redacted] The agent was John RUPE, named by NOSENKO as a person recruited in Leningrad in January 1962 on homosexual grounds; this information NOSENKO said he learned as Chief of the American Tourist Section of the Tourist Department. [redacted] Further examples of [redacted] supporting NOSENKO in this way are reviewed elsewhere in this paper [redacted] and the CHEREPANOV incident in Part VI.D.7.c).

[redacted] also offered specific although ... con-firmation of NOSENKO's claimed positions in the ... [redacted] that from the very beginning of his employment by the KGB NOSENKO worked in the Second Directorate. [redacted] he once worked against personnel of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow; later he was assigned to work against U.S. journalists in Moscow. During his last years with the KGB, he was assigned to the task of working against American and

* NOSENKO has never mentioned these documents.

European tourists in Moscow. His last [redacted], [redacted], was that of Deputy to the Chief of the Seventh Department, Second Chief Directorate (Tourists). [redacted] NOSENKO secured this relatively [high] position because of help he received from Lieutenant General GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Directorate. [redacted] throughout NOSENKO's career GRIBANOV had always helped him and saw that he was promoted..."

With regard to NOSENKO's KGB rank, [redacted] "it appeared quite certain that NOSENKO had the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the KGB." [redacted] reported having learned from [redacted] KGB officer [redacted] that NOSENKO was in fact only a captain.**

[redacted] was asked if he feels that NOSENKO has actually defected or whether he feels that this might be a 'trick' by the KGB. He [redacted] replied that from his own knowledge of this matter, he is convinced that NOSENKO's defection is not a 'trick' by the KGB."

3. [redacted] sensitive source

[redacted] said that "he had heard about NOSENKO from various persons in Moscow. He said he had never known NOSENKO personally. He said NOSENKO was an important boss in the KGB. He said he did not know what directorate or department NOSENKO had been in. [redacted] continued that when NOSENKO was a young man he was in the GRU Military Academy*** and then [was] sent to the Information Department of the GRU for a short time; in all,

** Until January 1965 NOSENKO maintained that he had progressed through the KGB ranks in normal sequence, from lieutenant to lieutenant colonel. On 26 January 1965, however, he said that because of administrative confusion and GRIBANOV's advice he had skipped the rank of major and had moved directly from captain to lieutenant colonel in late 1963. In April 1966 NOSENKO told CIA that he had never held the rank of lieutenant colonel and was really only a captain (see Part V.G.1.).

*** The Military-Diplomatic Academy is the strategic intelligence school of the GRU. Although NOSENKO said he attended various naval-type schools before joining the GRU, he insisted that he was never enrolled in a formal intelligence course of any training establishment of the Soviet Navy. He claimed to have turned down an offer to attend the Military Diplomatic Academy (which he called the GRU Military Academy) because it offered too many political courses that he had already taken. See Part IV.B.

perhaps a year. [redacted] NOSENKO had been a very undisciplined person while in the GRU and 'not very good.' He was to have been discharged from the GRU, however, his father, who was a very influential person in the Ministry of Shipbuilding, was able to get NOSENKO transferred to the KGB. [redacted] It was the opinion of the persons from whom he heard the information about NOSENKO that NOSENKO had given very, very good information to the U.S. after his defection and that NOSENKO had had great access to KGB information which included all means of KGB coverage of people in Moscow, microphone systems in the embassies, etc. [redacted] the U.S. Embassy had found many of the microphones based on NOSENKO information."*

[redacted] confirmed operational information which NOSENKO has reported [redacted] SHUBIN was the only GRU agent named by NOSENKO who sourced his knowledge of SHUBIN to an incident which occurred about 1959, while NOSENKO said he was in the Tourist Department.**

4. [redacted]

*As indicated in Part V.E.3.g., the final sentence is largely but not entirely correct.

**See Part V.F.8.

5. [redacted]

[redacted] at the time of the defection, NOSENKO was rooming in Geneva with Nikolay RESHETNYAK, a representative of the International Organizations Branch of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. RESHETNYAK told [redacted] that NOSENKO often left his quarters without saying where he was going, but it was assumed that NOSENKO was "Intelligence" and had some mission to accomplish.** [redacted] RESHETNYAK had been interrogated by the KGB in connection with the NOSENKO defection. RESHETNYAK also told [redacted] that he had attended the Moscow trial of NOSENKO, held in absentia, at which NOSENKO was found guilty of treason and was sentenced to death. [redacted] thought the KGB might go so far as to send someone to the United States to locate and kill NOSENKO. Finally, he has reported on the dismissal of large numbers of KGB officers, including GRIBANOV and Yuriy GUK, and other repercussions within the KGB of NOSENKO's defection (see Part III.I.4.)

6. GAMKRELIDZE

NOSENKO's service in the American Department was confirmed in the fall of 1964 by the Soviet mathematician R.V. GAMKRELIDZE.*** At that time an American scientist brought up with GAMKRELIDZE the subject of the ABEL-POWERS exchange****

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* See Part VI.D.7.c.

** NOSENKO identified RESHETNYAK as a Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer on the staff of the Disarmament Delegation. Asked on 24 January 1964 whether RESHETNYAK might be suspicious of his absences for meetings with CIA, NOSENKO replied: "He thinks I'm KGB...so of course there's no problem if I come back late." [redacted] reported that RESHETNYAK had been dismissed from the KGB as a result of the defection of NOSENKO. CIA has no other reports of RESHETNYAK having served in the KGB.

*** GAMKRELIDZE is suspected of having connections with Soviet Intelligence because of his statements and actions, as well as his unusual freedom of movement, often alone, while on visits to the United States. When approached by a CIA representative with a recruitment proposal in 1964, GAMKRELIDZE declined but added that he "welcomed the opportunity to meet with an American Intelligence officer... since this enabled him to compare the Soviet Intelligence officers he has met with their American counterparts." During this meeting, GAMKRELIDZE raised the subject of NOSENKO again, describing him as "obviously a traitor to his country."

**** The exchange of the KGB Illegal Rudolf Ivanovich ABEL for Francis Gary POWERS, the U-2 pilot, took place in February 1962.

and asked whether the Russian people had been told about it. GAMKRELIDZE replied that they had not been told officially but knew it had taken place since there was "quite a grapevine" in Moscow. As an example, he said that it was in this way that he had heard about the NOSENKO defection and its significance. Expanding, GAMKRELIDZE stated that the "grapevine" indicated that the defection "was very damaging to Soviet Intelligence in that NOSENKO was the Chief of the American Section, and he knew the identities of all Soviet agents in the United States."

7. GOLITSYN

The defector GOLITSYN is the only source of information on NOSENKO's KGB career who claims to have been personally acquainted with him. GOLITSYN said that he met NOSENKO for the first time in 1953 when visiting the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate on business, and that he saw and spoke with NOSENKO on a number of occasions subsequently, most recently in 1959. This first-hand information from GOLITSYN, however, is not always consistent either internally or in comparison with that supplied by NOSENKO.

CIA has no record that GOLITSYN, prior to the publicity attending NOSENKO's defection, ever mentioned him by name or in connection with the KGB Second Chief Directorate. On 19 March 1962, prior to NOSENKO's first contact with CIA, GOLITSYN was shown NOSENKO's name among those of other Soviets in Geneva fo the Disarmament Conference. He failed to comment on it.

On 26 June 1962, after CIA's initial meetings with NOSENKO and because of the large overlap of NOSENKO's information and contacts with GOLITSYN's, one of the CIA case officers who had met NOSENKO in Geneva met with GOLITSYN to obtain his comments on some of the NOSENKO material. GOLITSYN was told that CIA had received in Switzerland an anonymous letter which reported certain information from within the KGB; the CIA official stated to GOLITSYN that the information so closely overlapped his own reporting, including prominent mention of GOLITSYN's friends GUK, KOVSHUK, and CHURANOV, that the possibility of disinformation was suspected, perhaps in relation to GOLITSYN's own defection. Ten major items from NOSENKO were discussed with GOLITSYN, all pertaining to Second Chief Directorate operations, and a list of 15 names was shown him, identified as names of Second Chief Directorate personnel whom the letter writer had named. Among these names was (fnu) NOSENKO, and GOLITSYN indicated he had previously reported on him; CIA records, however, show that GOLITSYN had reported only on one Aleksandr Fedoseyevich NOSENKO, who had been a KGB officer in Japan when RASTVOROV defected to the U.S. in 1954. GOLITSYN made no further comments on these names, except to say that one identified as KGB had left that organization in 1961 for the MVD. GOLITSYN said that in general, lacking the full details necessary for an assessment, he could say that there were serious signs of disinformation in what he had seen; he wanted to see the full information on the case. Subsequently GOLITSYN made numerous demands for this information, complaining to Attorney General Robert KENNEDY and senior CIA officials because his request had not been granted.

On 10 February 1964 NOSENKO's defection from the Soviet Disarmament delegation in Geneva, Switzerland, was publicized, including his KGB affiliation. When GOLITSYN heard this news he immediately recalled the June 1962 "letter" in Switzerland and linked NOSENKO to it; he thereupon stated that he recalled NOSENKO as a member of the Second Chief Directorate working against American citizens.

GOLITSYN on 11 February 1964 raised the possibility of his participation in efforts to "break" NOSENKO, and at this time he was given some background on the case and an indication of CIA's

reservations about NOSENKO's bona fides. Over the next several months GOLITSYN was provided with material from the 1962 and 1964 meetings with NOSENKO in Switzerland, and at his request was supplied with all the available biographic data to assist him in analyzing the KGB operation. On 29 June 1964, GOLITSYN was interviewed in detail on the subject of NOSENKO. He confirmed NOSENKO's identity as the son of the former Minister of Shipbuilding and said that he was a KGB officer who had worked in the American Department and the Tourist Department of the KGB's Second Chief Directorate. He was shown a photograph of NOSENKO (not buried in a photo spread, but singly) and he said that the photograph depicted NOSENKO. GOLITSYN said he knew this because he was personally acquainted with NOSENKO, having met him two or three times in the U.S. Embassy Section while there on KGB First Chief Directorate business in 1953. He had also seen NOSENKO occasionally at work during 1958 and 1959, and when GOLITSYN asked him where he was working in 1959, NOSENKO told him that he was in the Tourist Department. Finally, GOLITSYN said, he and NOSENKO knew one another through their mutual friendships with Yu. I. GUK, V.A. CHURANOV, and Ye.G. KASHCHEYEV.* According to GOLITSYN, NOSENKO served in the U.S. Embassy Section from 1953 until 1957 or 1958 and was specifically responsible for KGB coverage of American military personnel in Moscow during the first year of this period. For the remainder of his service in the U.S. Embassy Section, until 1957 or 1958, GOLITSYN said, NOSENKO may have had these same responsibilities or he may have been working against other Embassy personnel or correspondents. He was definitely in the American Department during this entire period. In 1957 or 1958, NOSENKO transferred to the Tourist Department and was a senior case officer there as of 1959.** GOLITSYN was certain that NOSENKO did not work in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate at any time during 1960. This he said he knew because he had visited the U.S. Embassy Section on at least three occasions during the early part of 1960 and again in about December 1960 (sic, actually January 1961).*** GOLITSYN said that he knew in detail who was in the section, and that he would have known if NOSENKO had been there, particularly if he were the Deputy Chief.****

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* NOSENKO, on the other hand, failed to identify GOLITSYN's photograph and has consistently denied ever seeing or meeting him. After the defection, NOSENKO was asked what he knew of GOLITSYN. He immediately gave a detailed account of an incident which GOLITSYN himself had previously reported to CIA: GOLITSYN and KASHCHEYEV in 1951 or 1952 had written a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party proposing a reorganization and redirection of First Chief Directorate intelligence activities; as a result of this letter GOLITSYN and KASHCHEYEV had been received by MALENKOV and STALIN, and their proposals were accepted. This was NOSENKO's first mention of KASHCHEYEV, but he added at this time that he was personally acquainted with him, had seen him periodically at KGB Headquarters, sometimes had a drink with him after work, and had once entertained KASHCHEYEV at his dacha in 1953 or 1954. GOLITSYN saw NOSENKO's reply to his question prior to making the above statement, and NOSENKO's claims of friendships with Yu.I. GUK and V.A. CHURANOV were included in the file GOLITSYN studied.

(Footnotes continued on next page.)

(Continuation of footnotes from preceding page.)

** This chronology differs from that provided by NOSENKO and described previously: According to NOSENKO, he served in the American Department to mid-1955, in the Tourist Department from 1955 until January 1960, in the American Department during 1960 and 1961, and again in the Tourist Department from 1962 until his defection. NOSENKO's confirmed 1956 operation against BURGI and his 1957 operations against [illegible] and Gisella HARRIS tend to confirm his connection with tourist operations in 1956 and 1957.

*** GOLITSYN had spoken as early as December 1961 of these visits to the U.S. Embassy Section.

****GOLITSYN had earlier reported that G.I. GRYAZNOV was acting as the assistant of the chief of section at this time. He has never identified the Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section nor indicated that such a position was on the table of organization.

8. [redacted]

[redacted], a self-professed former KGB Second Chief Directorate agent, told U.S. authorities [redacted] [redacted], that she did not think NOSENKO was a KGB officer. At the same time, however, [redacted] [redacted] said she knew that NOSENKO had told the Americans about the microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The following is from the transcript of her remarks:

Question: Do you know anything about NOSENKO, the one who defected in Geneva?

[redacted]: I didn't have any real information. I heard some gossip, and the gossip was that he is the son of a general, that his mother is Jewish, and that his mother was always involved in some blackmarketing, that his father had great concern over the family. This is, you know, idle talk. I don't really know--it was just gossip.

Question: Would you say that this idle talk was among KGB people or--

[redacted]: You know, I didn't know many KGB people. It was only Mr. SVIRIN.*

Question: But he told you about this?

[redacted]: He didn't tell me, he told [redacted] husband], ah--you know, they like to think they are all-powerful, that this man of course will be exterminated one day. They always repeat it. Well, somebody committed suicide. The old defector, that GUZENKO, I think. Yes--I read in the paper.

Question: But what were you saying about this Geneva NOSENKO? His mother is Jewish, his father was a general. What was his father in?

[redacted]: I really don't know.

Question: Were there others who suffered as a result of this?

[redacted]: I really don't know. I never heard. I never knew that defector. I never knew. He wasn't a KGB person.

Question: I beg your pardon?

[redacted]: He wasn't a KGB person, NOSENKO.

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* V.G. SVIRIN was said by [redacted] to have been a KGB officer under cover of the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKKNR) during the period of her husband's employment (1960-1962) there and later head of a unit conducting operations against the U.S. Embassy. He maintained a friendly association with [redacted] and her husband to the date of her defection. According to NOSENKO, SVIRIN was a KGB officer who participated in the PENKOVSKIY investigation (see Part VI.D.7.b.).

Question: The fellow from Geneva?

[redacted] No. He wasn't a KGB person.

Question: No? What was he?

[redacted]: He was a civilian, I think.

Question: You never heard anything about his family, his friends?

[redacted] No.

Question: But you say he was not a KGB person?

[redacted] I say I will tell you one thing: They don't have much gossip on these things. It is never safe. So gossip isn't popular. Besides, each of them have their own grudge, sort of department, and he knows very little except gossip, very little gossip from outside. And so, for instance, maybe Mr. SVIRIN wasn't in a position to know about this person straight, so he repeated the tiny scraps he heard.

Question: And that was only that he had a Jewish mother and a general for a father, but nothing about him.

[redacted]: Nothing... I don't know. Everybody was saying that he was detestable, when he ran away. He tipped Americans... He tipped the Americans about the microphones and things in the Embassy.

Question: In the Embassy in Moscow?

[redacted] In Moscow, yes.

Question; But yet, he was not a KGB person?

[redacted] But you know every Russian who is allowed to see foreigners is connected [in some way with the KGB]. You know, a KGB person is considered to be a person who works at this place, as an officer, and everybody else involved is somehow related to the KGB but not KGB persons themselves.

During a later debriefing by CIA, [redacted] clarified her sourcing of this information. All of it except that concerning the microphones in the U.S. Embassy came from SVIRIN when he visited the [redacted]. The information that NOSENKO had compromised the KGB microphone system to the Americans was also received from SVIRIN during another social visit [redacted]. On this occasion SVIRIN remarked to [redacted] that NOSENKO had done considerable damage to the Soviets by revealing the fact of the microphones to U.S. authorities.

9. Case Officer for Robert Lee JOHNSON*

In an [illegible] debriefing [redacted]

10. Case Officers for [redacted]

[redacted]
double agent [redacted]

11. Soviet Journalist KOROLEV

In October 1966, Yu.D. KOROLEV, who said he was a Soviet journalist, offered to write a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent" for the French magazine Paris Match.*** The story was to concern NOSENKO's family and their life in Moscow since NOSENKO's defection. A short background statement on NOSENKO which KOROLEV handed Paris Match editors stated in part: "NOSENKO, about 36-38, an officer of the Soviet Secret Police organization, defected to the USA without his family about two years ago and asked for political asylum in the U.S.; it was

* The JOHNSON lead from NOSENKO is discussed in detail in Part VI.D.3.c.

[redacted] NOSENKO provided information on [redacted] (see Part VI.D.5.c.).

*** See Part III.H. for more details concerning KOROLEV's offer to Paris Match.

granted to him. That was the most serious defeat of the Soviet Security organs as NOSENKO occupied important positions in espionage and counterespionage departments and also was closely acquainted with the country's leading families and homes."

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: CASE OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO (835 PAGE STUDY) VOL. II PAGES 603 - 835

INCLUSIVE DATES: PART VII, VIII, IX

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: SE

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: CONTAINS OPERATIONAL MATERIAL

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VII. SPECIALISTS' ASSESSMENTS OF NOSENKO

A. Opinions on Intelligence and Personality

1. Graphological Analysis

Three pages of penciled notes and jottings in Russian made by NOSENKO during an early debriefing session were submitted on 25 March 1964 to CIA handwriting analysts, together with a number of questions posed by the CIA officers handling NOSENKO. The graphologists were told only that the writer was a Russian male aged 36, that he had a university-level education, and that he was an intelligence officer by profession. Their report, which was qualified due to limitations on the amount of NOSENKO's handwriting specimens submitted to them, is quoted below.



2. Reports by Psychologist

a. Psychological Testing Results

A CIA psychologist interviewed NOSENKO and administered a series of psychological tests on 9 July 1964. The psychologist's report, including answers to questions raised by the CIA handlers of NOSENKO is quoted in the following paragraphs.

"**Emotional Balance and General Stability:** NOSENKO appears to

"**Social Relations and Inter-Personal Effectiveness:** NOSENKO

"Relations and Loyal-y to His Parents: It is apparent

"Ideological Makeup and Loyalty to His Country: To a

*Psychopathic Personality Structure: Many volumes have been

b. Alternative Psychological Explanations



c. Psychological Interrogation:

For fourteen days between 3 and 21 May 1965, the same CIA psychologist interviewed NOSENKO on his entire early history, from birth until about 1953, when he said he entered the KGB. The main purposes were to collect additional information on this period,* to gain further psychological insights into NOSENKO's personality, and to find possible ways of obtaining a truthful account. Although conducted under the physical conditions of interrogation, the questioning was relaxed and followed no rigid outline. There were relatively few changes of story from previous versions; at the same time, however, NOSENKO described in detail some incidents which he has subsequently admitted to be untrue. An extract from the psychologist's report of these interrogations is given below.

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* A comparison of information obtained during this series of interrogations with information given earlier and later by NOSENKO can be found in Part IV.

3. <u>Report by Psychiatrist</u>

During the year April 1964-April 1965 NOSENKO was under the medical care of a CIA psychiatrist who visited NOSENKO at regular intervals, usually weekly, to examine him physically and to listen to any comments NOSENKO might have about himself and his situation. The psychiatrist familiarized himself with available materials on NOSENKO, particularly with reports of his behavior in the months immediately following the defection. A report which he submitted on 20 December 1964 is given below.

~~TOP SECRET~~



B. Views of Intelligence Personnel

1. Statement by DERYABIN

a. Introduction

Former KGB officer Peter Sergeyevich DERYABIN has followed closely the entire course of CIA's investigation of NOSENKO and his information. He took part in the interrogations of NOSENKO in April 1964, January-February 1965, and October 1966 as an observer and consultant, and he personally questioned NOSENKO during July and August 1965 concerning certain aspects of his personal past and early KGB career. On the basis of his direct, personal knowledge of conditions within the Soviet Union and of KGB organization and procedures prior to his defection in February 1954, supplemented by continuing study of later information from a variety of sources, DERYABIN is of the opinion that much of what NOSENKO has said about himself and the KGB is purposefully false or distorted. Although DERYABIN has been able to offer authoritative comment on many aspects of NOSENKO's story, the following section of this paper is limited to his remarks concerning NOSENKO's entry into the KGB (then MVD) and his Communist Party affiliation, both of which fall into the period when DERYABIN was active as a KGB (then MVD) staff officer. DERYABIN personally interrogated NOSENKO on these topics in the summer of 1965. Since DERYABIN was a personnel officer of the KGB (then MGB and MVD) in Moscow, with long experience in Communist Party activities, at the time NOSENKO claims to have entered the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, he is particularly qualified to comment on these aspects of NOSENKO's story.

DERYABIN, as a Soviet Army officer, was graduated in 1945 from the higher counterintelligence school of Smersh (counterintelligence with the Soviet Armed Forces). Following this he worked in Naval Smersh in Moscow and in March 1947 began to work in the MGB as a case officer in the Central Personnel Directorate. Shortly afterwards, when his superior was appointed Deputy Chief of the Chief Guards Directorate for Personnel, DERYABIN transferred with him to the Guards Directorate. He served as a Guards Directorate personnel officer until May 1952, rising through the ranks from case officer to the position of Chief of Section. One of his responsibilities was the approval of personnel for service in various units of the Guards Directorate, and he was also in charge of supervising personnel and security matters concerning one of the Directorate's surveillance sub-sections.

After requesting a change from personnel to operational duties, DERYABIN was transferred in May 1952 to the Austro-German Department of the MGB Foreign Intelligence Directorate. Until December 1952 he served as the Deputy Chief of a sub-section in the Counterintelligence Sektor (desk) of the Austro-German Department. He was then appointed Deputy Chief of the Intelligence Sektor of the same department, a position he held until March 1953. From March until September 1953, DERYABIN was the Deputy Chief of the section in MGB Headquarters which was responsible for the security of Soviets stationed in Austria and Germany. In September 1953 he was transferred to Vienna, where he became Deputy Chief of the section in the MVD Legal Residency responsible for the security of Soviets in Austria. He defected to American authorities on 15 February 1954.

DERYABIN joined the Komsomol in 1936 and remained a member until 1940, when he became a candidate member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; he became a full Party member in August 1941. During his Party career he held a number of responsible posts. Before the war, when DERYABIN was a teacher in Altay Kray, he was the secretary of a local Komsomol unit and simultaneously served as a member of the Komsomol Plenum in the rayon where he lived. From October 1940 until November 1941 he was Secretary of the Komsomol Committee of the 107th Engineer Battalion of the Red Army and from June 1945 until April 1946 held the same position in the Komsomol Committee of the Naval Smersh. This was the unit which had particular responsibility for counterintelligence work within the Naval GRU, which NOSENKO said he joined in 1951. In the MGB DERYABIN was a member of the Party Committee of the Personnel Section of the Guards Directorate and, after his transfer, was elected Secretary of the Party Bureau of the Austro-German Department of the Foreign Intelligence Directorate. He held this post from January 1953 until his transfer to Austria in September 1953.

b. DERYABIN's Comments

The following statements by DERYABIN are based on his questioning of NOSENKO between 26 July and 13 August 1965. The questions asked and the statements attributed to NOSENKO (referred to as Subject) were during this period. Although the Soviet State Security Service did not become known as the KGB until March 1954, this term is used for convenience sake, except where the specific organization of the MGB or MVD is under discussion. DERYABIN's comments follow:

"NOSENKO's Acceptance into State Security*

"Taking NOSENKO's own statements at face value, it is highly improbable that a person such as he has described himself to be would be acceptable for a position as a staff officer in State Security. The following factors are important in this regard:

a. It was the policy of State Security to avoid hiring the children of high government officials.

b. Until STALIN's death in March 1953, KOBULOV, the man who supposedly helped NOSENKO gain entrance into the service, had no influence inside the MGB apparatus. From about 1948 until 9 or 10 March 1953, KOBULOV had no office inside the MGB or the MVD buildings. I know personally that in these years KOBULOV worked in Germany as Deputy Chief of the GUSIMZ (Chief Directorate of Soviet Properties Abroad)** which was once directly under the Council of Ministers and later under the Ministry of Foreign Trade. The office was located on Chkalova Street, near the Kurskiy Railroad Station (three blocks from my former apartment).

* See also Part V.B.

** WISMUT A.G. in Germany was subordinate to GUSIMZ; for a further discussion of KOBULOV's role in helping NOSENKO join the KGB, see Part V.B.

c. It was physically impossible at the time for NOSENKO to be recommended for and accepted into State Security, as he has told us, all in one month, March 1953. (If one accepts his earlier version that he had his talk with KOBULOV in January or February, his account is similarly impossible because KOBULOV was not then in State Security.) It would normally have taken a much longer time, but in addition to this it was a period of reorganization and the personnel staff was not actively conducting their work at that time, and permanent staff officers were not sure that they would retain their positions.

d. In March 1953 NOSENKO was already twenty-five and a half years old and only a member of the Komsomol. He had no recommendation for Party membership and could not become a member for a full year because of his transfer from one service (GRU) to another. It is impossible that State Security would accept him knowing in advance that on his birthday he would be twenty-six years old and without either Komsomol or Party membership. Even for the son of a Minister, the Secretary of the Komsomol Committee of the KGB would have to talk with the Personnel Office and would not give a recommendation for his acceptance, especially for the Internal Counterintelligence (Second Chief) Directorate. In the case of a son of a Minister and one who is recommended by KOBULOV, the secretary would request from NOSENKO a recommendation for Party membership from the members of the Communist Party where NOSENKO used to work, in this case the GRU. In this way the secretary of the Komsomol would be sure himself that NOSENKO would become a candidate member of the Communist Party during the next year.

"However, even accepting that despite these obstacles and contradictions the KGB would have accepted him, one must also remember (according to NOSENKO's own statements) that NOSENKO's file contained the following negative points.* They are serious factors and certain of them alone would be enough to cause the rejection; the totality makes it difficult to believe that at a time of crisis in the State Security organs anyone would take the responsibility of accepting him:

a. Subject was already married and divorced before entry into State Security.

b. He had been married to General TELEGIN's daughter and TELEGIN had been arrested by State Security and was in jail the day that Subject entered State Security.

c. NOSENKO said that there was a file on NOSENKO's father in which compromising material was collected on Subject's family. NOSENKO agreed that one piece of information that would have been in this file was the fact that his maternal grandfather died in a Soviet prison while under sentence as a counter-revolutionary.

d. The social status background in the life of Subject's mother was nobility.

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* See also Part IV.B.

e. The shooting incident in Leningrad during World War II and his desertion from the Naval School in Baku would have played a very negative role in any consideration of his acceptance into State Security.

f. Subject never completed high school in the normal fashion.

g. Subject was a poor student at the Institute of International Relations.

h. It should be added that the KGB would definitely know that NOSENKO was involved in an automobile accident in 1947 and was interrogated by the Militia (traffic court), found guilty, and fined. This would definitely play a negative role in NOSENKO's admission to the KGB.

i. NOSENKO would never be allowed to enter the KGB having just recovered from tuberculosis.* In fact, there was a rule at that time that no person who ever had tuberculosis (even twenty years earlier) would be permitted to work in the KGB.

"In addition, after acceptance, the fact that KOBULOV was a personal friend of Subject's father, as he has told us, would have been noted in the file and would have played a negative role in permitting Subject to continue to work in State Security after KOBULOV's arrest in June 1953.

"I asked Subject how he answered some of the questions in the anketa (entry questionnaire), particularly the questions on his former wife, her relatives, and on his mother's ancestry.** I then asked Subject how it was, taking into account his mother's aristocratic ancestry, the fact that her father died in jail, the Trotskyite allegations against Subject's father, the fact that Subject's former father-in-law (TELEGIN) was still in jail, and the fact that Subject was present when TELEGIN's apartment was searched--that he had been accepted into the KGB, particularly in 1953 during the confusion and changes after the death of STALIN. Subject admitted that the question was logical, and said that he could only assume that the influence of KOBULOV and the important and influential position of his own father outweighed these negative factors. He also cited his GRU experience in this connection.

"I then asked Subject how he had reported his second marriage to the KGB. He replied that before the marriage he had mentioned

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* NOSENKO first mentioned having had tuberculosis during the June 1962 meetings, when he described it as a minor case but said he was under out-patient treatment until 1958. He next mentioned his illness in 1966, describing how he sometimes coughed up a "glass of blood" at a time. Although DERYABIN's questioning covered this part of NOSENKO's life in detail, there was no mention of tuberculosis in July and August 1965. DERYABIN's comment is based on the 1966 information but is included here for purposes of context.

**The anketa and DERYABIN's questioning on this subject are discussed further below.

it briefly to GORBATENKO, and that he had unofficially run a name check on his prospective bride (which was 'clean'), and that after the marriage he had filled out another anketa in which he included all the required data on his wife and her relatives. After considerable prompting, Subject said that he had indicated that she and her parents had been in France, but that he had concealed the fact that her grandmother had been in German-occupied territory during the war. (He admitted that the KGB would have learned this in a routine check, however.) I then reviewed for Subject the negative security factors mentioned above, adding the arrest of KOBULOV, the fact that his new wife and her parents had been abroad, the fact that her grandmother was in German-occupied territory, the fact that Subject was now over-age for the Komsomol but not yet a Party member or candidate, and the fact that Subject received a 15-day sentence for misuse of cover documents and incurring venereal disease, and asked if he didn't think that his personnel file had been reviewed in 1954, and if so, what grounds there could have been for retaining him in the KGB. Subject said that he thought that his file probably was reviewed but that again the influence of his father had saved him. Subject added that another important factor was probably his language qualification and particularly his higher education. I pointed out to Subject that if his second wife and her parents had been abroad it was impossible that her name check could have been negative. He admitted it was illogical, but insisted that this was so.

"<u>NOSENKO's Knowledge of KGB, 1953-54</u>

"<u>Entry Date into KGB</u>: NOSENKO was reminded that he had previously given varying dates for his entry on duty in the KGB. He replied that he did not remember the exact date, but he was sure that it was in the middle of March 1953 - perhaps 13 or 15 March (15 March 1953 was a Sunday). He would give no explanation for why he previously claimed to have entered the KGB in 1952.* In fact it would be very unusual for a KGB officer to forget his exact entry-on-duty date to the very day because it is used to compute length of service and must be entered on various forms from time to time.

"<u>Numerical Designation of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Directorates in 1953</u>: Asked to describe what directorates existed in the MVD while BERIYA was Minister (March-June 1953), NOSENKO named the First Chief Directorate (FCD) and the Second Chief Directorate (SCD) which he said were the intelligence and counterintelligence directorates respectively. Asked if he were sure, NOSENKO said he was positive, and that the only change that took place was that later, under KRUGLOV, for a few months only, the FCD became the SCD, and vice versa. NOSENKO stuck to this even when told he was wrong; he did not say he did not know or did not remember, perhaps realizing that he could not claim not to remember what directorate he served in. (Actually, the change in numerical designations was instituted by BERIYA right after STALIN's death in March 1953 and persisted until the KGB was organized in March 1954. Thus, NOSENKO does not know what the correct designation of his own directorate was at the time that he allegedly entered on duty with Soviet State Security and for the entire first year of his alleged service there.

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* NOSENKO on other occasions has given various reasons why he told CIA that he joined the KGB in 1952. See Part V.B.

"MVD Leadership, 1953-54: Asked to name the chiefs of the directorates and separate departments of the MVD under BERIYA and KRUGLOV, NOSENKO named nine out of 28. He was unable to name the Chief of the Intelligence Directorate, saying that he remembered only SAKHAROVSKIY (PANYUSHKIN was chief until 1955). Asked to name KRUGLOV's deputies, NOSENKO named only ROMASHKOV and SEROV, and was ignorant of such prominent deputies as LUNEV and SHATALIN. Told that a Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU was one of KRUGLOV's deputies at this time (SHATALIN), NOSENKO flatly denied that this was possible.

"Organization of KGB: NOSENKO did not know when the KGB was organized (March 1954). He said that it was in early 1955 or late 1954. Told that he was a year off and asked to think it over, NOSENKO insisted that he was right.

"Processing Procedures for Employment with KGB: NOSENKO's story about how he was processed for employment with the KGB in 1953 is inconsistent with the procedures used at that time. He does not know many of the things that he should know about entrance procedures; he is wrong about many of the things that he claims to remember. The disparities are so great that they cannot be explained (as NOSENKO attempts to do) by the claim that KOBULOV's recommendation resulted in a simplified entrance procedure for NOSENKO.

"The most important document filled out by prospective employees of Soviet State Security is a detailed personal history questionnaire, called in Russian Anketa spetsialnogo naznacheniya sotrudnika KGB. This exhaustive questionnaire is 16 pages long, and filling it out is an experience that one is not likely to forget. A background investigation is run on the basis of this questionnaire, which itself becomes a permanent and prominent feature of the employee's personnel file. NOSENKO remembers filling out a questionnaire, but does not know its designation. He asserts that it was only 4-6 pages long. He asserts that he filled it out at home, and submitted it in two copies shortly before entering on duty. Actually, this questionnaire was required in one copy only, and was never permitted to be taken home since it was a classified document (even when not filled in).*

"NOSENKO insists that he did not have to take a medical examination prior to entering the KGB. This is not possible. Such an examination was a routine and mandatory part of the processing. I cannot think of any instance in which it would be waived.**

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* DERYABIN's views are based on NOSENKO's statements in August 1965. In his original biographical statement (1962), NOSENKO said that no anketa was required. He implied as much in his most recent statement in April 1966, after being questioned by DERYABIN. This statement is given in Part V.B.

**See remarks above concerning NOSENKO's alleged treatment for tuberculosis from 1952 to 1958.

"NOSENKO's description of the secrecy agreement that he signed when entering on duty with the KGB is completely unlike the agreement that was in use at that time for staff employees. It may be significant that NOSENKO's description of the secrecy agreement he recalls signing resembles the secrecy agreements that were taken from agents.

"NOSENKO insists that he did not fill out any other forms, questionnaires, or papers when entering the KGB. Actually, there were a number of other routine forms that had to be filled out by applicants and new employees.

"Location of ROZHENKO's Office: NOSENKO says that all his entry processing was handled by a personnel officer named ROZHENKO and his staff. He asserts that ROZHENKO's office, which NOSENKO visited several times in early 1953, was located on the 6th floor, 8th entry, Building No. 12, Dzerzhinskiy Street. In fact, neither ROZHENKO nor any officers or units of the Personnel Department were located in the 8th entry. They were all (including ROZHENKO) located on the 6th and 7th floors of the 7th entry of Building No. 12.*

"Rank Pay: Asked about his salary when he first started to work in the KGB, NOSENKO said he got a basic salary of 1700 rubles as a case officer, 500 rubles for his rank of lieutenant, plus secrecy, language, and longevity pay. He insisted that this was correct, even when told that KGB officers were no longer being paid for rank in March 1953, and said that although he remembered that there was one year--1954--when they were not paid for rank, he was sure that when he first entered on duty he received this pay. Salary for rank was taken away from State Security officers in September 1952 and was not restored until April 1954.

"Promotion to Senior Lieutenant: In giving the chronology of his promotion to various military ranks, NOSENKO claimed to have been promoted to senior lieutenant in April 1953, shortly after joining the KGB. Told that this was impossible, and that no one in the KGB was promoted at this time, NOSENKO replied that he couldn't say about anyone else but he was sure that he had received his promotion at that time. In fact, this is impossible: all promotions in the KGB were frozen from the time BERIYA took over as minister (March 1953) until late 1953.

"Visitor's Pass Procedures: In talking about his first visit to the KGB to process for employment, NOSENKO was unable to recall the procedures employed by the KGB Pass Office in issuing visitor's passes. Specifically, he maintained that the name of the interviewer was not indicated on the pass. In fact, the name of the interviewer did appear on the pass and the interviewer had full responsibility for the visitor while he was on KGB premises. While it is understandable that NOSENKO might have forgotten the details involved if he had only visited there a few times more than ten years ago, if he worked at KGB Headquarters for over ten years as a staff officer and particularly as a supervisor he would have frequent occasion to admit visitors, and thus should know visitor's pass procedures quite well.

*NOSENKO has since said that he spoke to no personnel officers prior to acceptance by the KGB or afterwards, thereby indicating that his statements to DERYABIN were untrue. See Part V.B.

"Unescorted Entry into KGB Building with Visitor's Pass: In describing his first day at work, NOSENKO said that he went from the Pass Office, where he obtained a visitor's pass, to the 4th entry of the Building No. 2, where his pass was checked by the guards, and then went unescorted to KOBULOV's office on the third floor. Challenged on this point, he said he was sure that it was possible to enter without an escort. In fact, it was absolutely impossible to go through any entry of Building No. 2 without escort if you did not have a properly stamped KGB (MVD) identity document (see below).

"KGB Identity Document: NOSENKO was asked to describe the KGB identity document that he received when he first entered the KGB. He was then asked if there was anything unusual in connection with this document at that time. He replied that he knew of nothing unusual. He was then reminded that after STALIN's death and again after BERIYA's arrest it was necessary to have special stamps placed in the identity documents to validate them. Without the right stamp it was impossible to enter the KGB building. NOSENKO was ignorant of this and was unable to recall anything about it despite a number of hints and leading questions. Actually, during the period of upheaval following STALIN's death and again after BERIYA's arrest, all KGB identity documents were temporarily withdrawn in order to have special validation stamps placed in them, and it was literally impossible to get in the KGB buildings if one did not have the right stamp. This was the subject of numerous anecdotes at the time and is hard to believe that an officer who served in the KGB at the time could have forgotten it completely.

"Gastronom: Asked to describe the sign in front of the KGB Club, NOSENKO said that he did not remember any sign (there was one in 1953) but mentioned that there was a Gastronom (food store) next to the KGB Club. Asked when the Gastronom was opened, he said firmly that it was already there when he started to work in the KGB. In fact, this Gastronom was definitely not there as of 1954. It was opened sometime between 1955 and 1957, as Moscow directories show. The KGB Club is in entry No. 1 of Building No. 12, Dzerzhinskiy Square, and NOSENKO would have had to pass it every day he went to work.

"Chief Directorate of Militia: Asked where the Chief Directorate of Militia of the USSR was located in 1953-54, NOSENKO replied that he did not know, and knew only that later it was located on Ulitsa Ogareva. Actually, in 1953-54 it was located next to the main KGB building at Dzerzhinskiy No. 2. A staff officer in the counterintelligence directorate would have frequent occasion to deal with the Chief Directorate of Militia.

"K.I. (Committee of Information): Asked where the Intelligence Directorate of the MVD was located in 1953, NOSENKO replied that it was scattered between Dzerzhinskiy No. 2, the Agricultural Exhibition, the K.I. building, and Kiselniy Pereulok. This is a confused and incorrect answer. Asked for clarification, NOSENKO said that he had never visited either the K.I. or the First Chief Directorate building at the Agricultural Exhibition. Thus, NOSENKO seems to be unaware that the K.I. has not existed since 1951, and that the K.I. building and the building at the Agricultural Exhibition were one and the same place.

TOP SECRET

"NOSENKO's Claim to Have Been a Komsomol Secretary in the Second Chief Directorate, KGB

"NOSENKO claimed to have become a member of the Komsomol Organization (K/O) of the KGB when he entered on duty in March 1953, to have been elected as Secretary of Komsomol Organization of the Second Chief Directorate in the fall of 1953, and to have served in that capacity until the fall of 1954, when he was removed because he used operational-alias documents in obtaining treatment for a venereal disease he had incurred. He claims to have been excluded from the Komsomol, without prejudice, when he attained his 27th birthday in October 1954.

"Asked to describe how he transferred from the Komsomol Organization of the Naval Intelligence Post in the Baltic to the Komsomol Organization of the KGB, NOSENKO gave an entirely incorrect description of this procedure, both as regards deregistration from the K/O in the Baltic, and registration with the K/O in the KGB. He stated that he was issued a new Komsomol registration card by the KGB K/O, without reference to the previous K/O in the Baltic; this is impossible.

"NOSENKO gave an incorrect account of how a K/O secretary is elected, stating that he was elected at a meeting of the K/O. In fact, the K/O meeting can only select the K/O committee, which will convene separately to elect the Secretary.

"NOSENKO could not describe the duties of a K/O secretary in a specific manner.

"NOSENKO did not know who was the secretary of the overall KGB K/O. The secretary of the SCD K/O would be directly subordinate to him and would deal with him frequently.

"NOSENKO was unable to describe his dealings with the KGB K/O or the identities or responsibilities of the people with whom he dealt there.

"NOSENKO insisted that in 1953-54, the maximum age for a Komsomol member was 27. In actual fact, the maximum age was 26 (it was raised later). This point is important, both because NOSENKO should know exactly if he had served as a K/O secretary, and also because it refutes his story that he was excluded from the Komsomol for over-age in 1954.

"NOSENKO maintained that all the members of his K/O paid dues in the amount of 2 percent of their monthly salaries. This is incorrect, as monthly Komsomol dues were calculated on a sliding scale determined by wage group: at that time, Komsomol members earning up to 500 rubles monthly paid 0.5 percent; those earning 500 to 1500 rubles paid 1 percent, and those earning over 1500 rubles paid 1.5 percent. The K/O secretary collects the dues, and must know the right amount.

"NOSENKO did not know whether or not a Komsomol Congress took place while he was K/O secretary, saying that they took place every year. In actual fact, the 12th Komsomol Congress which convened in March 1954 was the first since 1948; at this 12th Congress a number of changes were made in the Komsomol Rules (Ustav). As secretary of a K/O NOSENKO would have been involved

in a good deal of preparatory work for this Congress, which was a big event in the life of every Komsomol worker at the time, and could not be forgotten."

Although DERYABIN's direct knowledge of the KGB ended in 1954, his detailed information of KGB procedures has been updated by his more recent examination of reports from other sources. With regard to what NOSENKO has said about KGB procedures, DERYABIN stated: "Asked to describe how he conducted name checks on a Soviet citizen and on a new arrival to the American Embassy in 1953-54, NOSENKO gave a superficial description of how such checks were done. However, he resisted every attempt to get him to describe this process in detail, and he made several blunders which show that he never actually ran such a check himself. For example, he did not know where the records of all Soviet citizens who have been tried are kept, and he attempted to improvise an answer (completely wrong) that they would check with the Militia about this. NOSENKO correctly said that Archives were located on Kirov Street, but he was completely unable to stretch his limited knowledge to provide a description of how these various repositories were actually checked. NOSENKO was also asked to describe in detail how he ran such a check on a Soviet citizen in the 1956-59 period. Here again he was in difficulty and refused even to try. He did not even know the everyday term Spetsproverka, which means a check for clearance.

"It was particularly interesting that he did not feel able to dispute my challenges of his information, even though he undoubtedly knows that I do not have first-hand knowledge of procedures in this period. I even tested this on one occasion by asking NOSENKO the difference between the 1st Spets Otdel (Special Department - KGB cards and files) and the Operativno-Uchetniy Otdel (Operational Reports Department - the functional name for the 1st Special Department). He answered that the 1st Special Department holds the files on Soviet criminal cases while the Operational Reports Department is for political and espionage cases. It seems he invented this answer on the spot. In addition, it is wrong that political and security cards are separate from criminal ones in the 1st Special Department. They were in my time and must still be combined in one card file.

"NOSENKO states that he knows nothing about the files of the First Chief Directorate. It is unbelievable that in ten years of service in the Second Chief Directorate NOSENKO never saw a First Chief Directorate file; how else would he be able to check information on foreigners, especially on American Embassy personnel? The first stage in such a check is an inquiry to the First Chief Directorate and a check of any files they may have on the subject. According to his own account, NOSENKO should have been doing this type of thing the whole of his ten years of service, without regard to whether he was assigned to the American Department or the Tourist Department."

2. Remarks by CIA Handlers

a. Introduction

Five CIA case officers who worked directly with NOSENKO have recorded their personal observations on his behavior and actions. The principal case officer, the first CIA representative to meet NOSENKO in 1962, participated in all of the meetings and interrogations (either personally or monitoring from off-stage) since then; he is a senior officer with 17 years of operational experience, including extensive agent handling and dealings with more than 10 officers of Soviet and Satellite Intelligence and Security Services who were defectors or agents in place; he has also had desk or supervisory responsibilities connected with at least 20 other such sources. A second case officer, who participated in the meetings in Geneva in 1964 and in all subsequent phases of the operation, has spent the 16 years of his career solely in Soviet operations and has handled several Soviet sources in place, as well as defectors. Three other officers, who began to work with NOSENKO after his arrival in the United States and conducted the bulk of both the debriefing and the hostile interrogations, have spent most of their careers in Soviet counterintelligence operations; among them, they command an extensive knowledge of the Soviet Intelligence Services, and they have had a variety of agent- and defector-handling experience.

NOSENKO was talked to and questioned in several types of circumstances:

- In five tightly organized meetings in 1962 in Geneva with limited time available for each of a wide range of topics, none of which could be ignored but none of which could be covered in detail.

- In concentrated but somewhat longer meetings in place in Geneva in January-February 1964, with the knowledge by all participants that items not adequately covered then could be dealt with after the defection.

- In routine debriefing sessions after his defection, first in a Frankfurt safehouse, then in a safehouse in the Washington area, where a special effort was made not to put pressure on NOSENKO or express doubts about his statements.

- Under detailed hostile interrogation (especially April 1964 and January-March 1965).

- In extended, detailed debriefing sessions which NOSENKO could not evade (May-November 1964, May 1965, July-August 1965, and October 1966).

Thus there were opportunities to note his performance and reactions under varied degrees of stress and control.

The features of NOSENKO's conduct, manner, and techniques discussed below are confined to those which were clearly and consistently observed by all of the officers involved.

b. NOSENKO's Conduct in Meetings

NOSENKO in brief, superficial, uncritical debriefings (of the sort which characterized the 1962 and 1964 Geneva meetings and the debriefings prior to 4 April 1964) was reasonably convincing in his manner. For example, on the basis of the hurried sessions of June 1962 in Geneva, which did not allow time for systematic or detailed questioning, the CIA case officer in commenting on NOSENKO's conduct mentioned "the ease of his manner, the sureness of his knowledge of matters which he should have known, and the amount of checkable information he provided." NOSENKO seemed to that case officer to be "under little or no restraint as to the amount and nature of what he told us" and "made a convincing and good personal impression: a vigorous, temperamental and vital man." Similarly, nothing in NOSENKO's manner caused doubts on the part of the FBI representatives who took NOSENKO's reports in February, March, and early April 1964.

It became apparent, however, when the cases NOSENKO had mentioned briefly in early meetings were taken up in detail in leisurely debriefings after the defection, that he could not add facts consistent with what he had said before. He was unable to recall related incidents or additional circumstances which did not come to mind in the first telling, despite being aided by questioning from different angles or in different contexts. The same results were obtained in exhausting his store of operational leads (with a half dozen exceptions) and his information on KGB procedures, installations, and operational methods: Having once reported on these general topics, NOSENKO could offer nothing more when debriefed again, regardless of the method of questioning tried. Repeatedly he used the same stories to illustrate his points; new stories did not emerge. In a period of nine months, NOSENKO was drained of information on his personal and professional experiences and knowledge. Never before had the CIA case officers encountered a defector who was totally debriefed.

A technique NOSENKO has frequently used to explain his inability to supply details and to forestall further questioning has been to claim poor memory. "Different people have different types of memories," he has said on many occasions, or on others: "I have told what I remember." The case officers who have handled NOSENKO agree, on the other hand, that he has an excellent memory, although perhaps a peculiar one: NOSENKO did not always recall most easily those events which had occurred most recently, or those incidents which were most closely related to him. He was able, for example, to remember detailed information on the penetration of the Courier Transfer Station in Paris and to give a long, detailed, and ordered account of the compromise of PENKOVSKIY, in neither of which he claimed any personal role; he has been able to name hundreds of KGB officers, to give the dates on which many of them transferred from one component of the Second Chief Directorate to another, and to describe their responsibilities at particular times. Yet NOSENKO forgot where he himself served in the GRU; he could not consistently discribe the circumstances of his divorce; he failed to provide a consistent date for his entry into the KGB and for his transfer from the American Department to the Tourist Department in 1962. Likewise, NOSENKO remembered details of KGB operations which, like the "ANDREY" case in 1953, took place in the relatively distant past, but he could not recall the travels, friends, and activities of his own target John V. ABIDIAN or details of operations against many American code clerks in 1960 and 1961.

These limitations of knowledge and quirks of memory were evident not only during meetings when NOSENKO was being debriefed. They were also apparent in the interrogations which supplanted the debriefings.

c. NOSENKO's Behavior Under Interrogation

(i) Introduction

In the many and long interrogation sessions there emerged habits of behavior noticeable to each of the CIA officers present. These characteristics of NOSENKO were his manner of recounting events and his evasiveness, improvisations, and other defensive techniques. They are reviewed below.

(ii) Manner of Recounting Events

Typical of NOSENKO's performance in the interrogations were the following points:

- Talking about operations he supervised and about his personal role in the KGB Headquarters aspects of other operations, NOSENKO habitually used the passive voice ("it was decided") or indicated that he was not alone in these activities ("there was no accounting on who was working on any code clerk case--it was GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, NOSENKO, and also working was KLYPIN, GRIBANOV," or "We made the decision--I and KOVSHUK and GRYAZNOV," or "I and GRYAZNOV discussed this with him.") When asked where a particular conversation took place, he rarely located it in his own office ("I was in KOVSHUK's office when KOSLOV called him about the trip" or "I was in KLYPIN's office and he was talking to KOVSHUK").

- At the other extreme from being impersonal, NOSENKO sometimes quoted conversations in which he took part ("I then said," "he said to me," etc.), but it was in just such matters that NOSENKO most often contradicted himself (e.g.. his relationship with GRIBANOV and his part in the recruitment approach to the American code clerk James STORSBERG).

- In repeating certain stories (the CHEREPANOV case and the provocation against Professor Frederick BARGHOORN are examples) NOSENKO gave them in precisely the same order, without addition or omission. In relating the PENKOVSKIY story, which he stressed he learned "little by little" from several different sources, he presented the facts each time in nearly identical order. Asked for more details on these cases, he invariably insisted--often with irritation--that he knew nothing more and if he did, he would have reported it. Other factors contributed to the impression that in such instances NOSENKO had delivered his information by rote: Statements like "I don't remember what I told you before" when queried again on a particular case; detachment and a lack of emotion when describing the compromise of Soviets who, like himself, had cooperated with American Intelligence: POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, and CHEREPANOV; an inability to correlate dates and events in different operations which he said he was handling (such as conflicts in the timing of his approach to W.E. JOHNSON and in the date he gave for John V. ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street dead drop, and conflict between the dates of his participation in the MORONE case and his travel to Cuba).

- NOSENKO, with a few exceptions (notably the compromise of PENKOVSKIY and the ABIDIAN visit to the dead drop site), could not supply specific or approximate dates for operational activities during the period of his service in the U.S. Embassy Section. Beyond recourse to the phrase "1960, 1961," he refused to estimate the dates or to associate these activities with the time of the year or events in his personal life.

(iii) Evasion, Improvisation, and Other Defenses

In the debriefings before the interrogations, NOSENKO avoided questions and topics not of his own choosing, saying that he would give full details "later," when systematic debriefing began. When the question or topic came up anew in a later debriefing, he would plead fatigue or boredom and propose: "This morning we drink; tomorrow we work." Prior to 4 April 1964 he provided only accounts of operations selected by himself; it was only after 4 April 1964 that he could be constrained to reply to detailed questioning on other matters.

From that point on, other evasive tactics became familiar to his interrogators. He would try to change the subject or to shift from the specific event to a generalized account of how such things were done in principle. He would claim bad memory on grounds that, for example, operations against U.S. Embassy personnel were hopeless and useless anyway. He would dismiss the details or the entire operation as unimportant (for example, the microphones in the U.S. Embassy). He would set out reasons for his ignorance of things he admittedly should have known (his own "poor performance," preoccupation with other matters, inattention to duty, absence from the KGB while on vacation, lack of time to master details because he was a supervisor). Unable to name or talk about KGB indigenous agents working against Americans, including those in operations under his supervision, NOSENKO disparaged the quality of such agents ("they never reported anything of interest on anyone"); he cited their low educational level and their inferior status as servants and employees as one reason none of them could give the KGB operationally useful information. In fact, the record of many indicated previous employment which would demand at least the equivalent of a college degree or certificate from a technical institute. Numerous maids were former school teachers, one was formerly a chemist.

When evasion failed, it seemed to the interrogators that NOSENKO improvised his answers. Some of these evident improvisations led him into unacceptable statements or positions. To use his responses to the questioning on John V. ABIDIAN as an example: Not knowing about ABIDIAN's car, he said the KGB could not get at it. (In fact, the car was held by Soviet customs for two weeks, and later NOSENKO himself spoke about the way the KGB used Embassy chauffeurs for access to cars.) Not knowing of ABIDIAN's trips out of the USSR, he claimed that the KGB had no way to find out where Embassy officers went when they made trips out of the country. (In fact, ABIDIAN had told his language teacher each time and she, as NOSENKO said, was a KGB agent; also, ABIDIAN arranged his trips by long-distance phone from Moscow to his destination abroad, and the KGB can cover such calls.) Not knowing of ABIDIAN's trip within the USSR, he spoke of a vacation which he latter admitted to be false. Asked why he did not know personal

data on ABIDIAN from the State Department Biographic Register, he said "only the First Chief Directorate" uses it; when the interrogator pursued the point, NOSENKO said he remembered that KOVSHUK did have a copy in his office, "but an old one, 1956, which didn't list ABIDIAN." Under pressure about ABIDIAN's visit to Pushkin Street, NOSENKO said the KGB thought that ABIDIAN may not have entered the building on Pushkin Street; yet he had earlier given extensive details about how the KGB had analyzed the precise number of seconds ABIDIAN had been inside, to determine where the drop, if any, might be. As another example, when he was initially asked about George BLAKE, the KGB agent in MI-6, the context of the question was a discussion of Second Chief Directorate operations. NOSENKO labeled it as such and said it "was not as important as VASSALL." Later, when the name was mentioned again, he asked: "Who's BLAKE?"

On other occasions, when his self-contradictions were pointed out or when he admitted ignorance of matters he acknowledge he should have known, NOSENKO would fall back upon one of the following lines of defense:

- "What I know I tell you; what I remember I tell you," or "I don't know," "I can't explain," -- or a shrug.

- The details, even if confused or contradictory, are not important. What is important is the "whole" or entirety of the facts, their importance and their "reality." It is this that American Intelligence should evaluate, not details.

- He must be genuine because otherwise "how could I have been working with 'SARDAR' and 'PROKHOR'?" (Johan PREISFREUND whose KGB cryptonym was "PROKHOR," did confirm NOSENKO's role.) "How else could I tell you about STORSBERG?" "The KGB would not use a staffer as a provocateur," nor would the KGB supply information on "live cases" such as the Paris case (JOHNSON) and VASSALL, and reveal the names of its officers abroad.

- If American Intelligence checked his story "fully," it would learn that despite all this confusion, he was genuine. He repeatedly urged that his interrogators check via an independent penetration of the KGB--there it would verify that his name is registered as the case officer who opened, held and turned over the ABIDIAN file and thus that he was a KGB officer.*

NOSENKO referred to this method of corroborating him at least 20 times during the interrogations of January-March 1965. He said on 1 February 1965 that "maybe the day will come when you have a source to check and you will find out" (that he was ABIDIAN's case officer). Later in the same interrogation session, he added: "I see how poor and miserable I'm looking with regard to ABIDIAN's file, but anyone who can check in [KGB] Archives will see." On 9 February he said, "I greatly wish that you will have as soon as possible an agent in the KGB. It is simple to look at the

* [illegible] was the only such source at the time.

file on ABIDIAN. On the first page is written that 'I, NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich, opened this file'." On 16 February he said: "Time will show I am what I say." On 3 March he referred nine times within one hour to a check via such a source. He repeatedly stated that "time will show" that he is not a provocateur. At one point he engaged in the following dialogue with his interrogators:

NOSENKO: I'm telling you that, if you check, you'll find that I'm right.

INTERROGATOR: We're not disputing that you worked for the KGB. We're disputing that you held the positions you say you held in the KGB.

NOSENKO: That's what I'm saying. If you could check you would find that I was only in these two departments and only in these positions...

(later in the session)

NOSENKO: I can't tell you anything more. I can't prove anything. Maybe the future will show.

INTERROGATOR: What can the future show?

NOSENKO: I don't know. But from what I understand the checking has not gone very far. Maybe you can check further... I mean, if you have any possibility now, I mean by chance, have anyone in the KGB or out of the KGB, with any of my acquaintances, friends.

INTERROGATOR: You mean our acquaintances, don't you?

NOSENKO: Yes, but maybe your acquaintances can check with someone, because anyone in the KGB should know that, yes, there was a NOSENKO.

INTERROGATOR: Should we ask someone like VAKHRUSHEV or SUSLOV?

NOSENKO: No, of course not, because I gave you their names. Check someone else, not known to me, so you can be sure.

d. Additional Observations

(i) Inquisitiveness About CIA

NOSENKO's questions about CIA and its activities seemed to his interrogators to be beyond the interest or curiosity expected of Soviet Intelligence defectors. Frequently he asked, even while discussing his own KGB responsibilities: "You tell me about a case, and I will remember details." Other examples of NOSENKO's inquisitiveness include the following:

- When shown the CIA publication "Checklist of Soviet Officials Abroad" during the 1964 meetings in Geneva, NOSENKO made inquiries about what organization prepared it and to what part of the U.S. Government that organization is subordinate.

- In January 1964, entirely out of context, he asked whether GOLITSYN had reported to CIA that Finnish President KEKKONEN was a KGB agent. (He was not able to explain in later questioning why he had not informed CIA about the case before he made the foregoing inquiry.)

- NOSENKO asked precisely how American Intelligence collection in the USSR is directed and coordinated. The CIA case officer responded: "What was that question?" NOSENKO thereupon said: "It was not a question--just general interest." When the case officer urged him to repeat the question, he refused to talk about it and diverted the conversation to other matters.

- He asked where CIA secretaries resided in the Washington area.

- NOSENKO tried to find out the grades of the CIA officers in contact with him.

- NOSENKO inquired in early 1964 whether the CIA officer who met him in Geneva two years earlier had received a medal for that phase of the operation.

(ii) Acceptance of Contrary Information from Other Sources

Under interrogation, even when accused of lying, NOSENKO rarely challenged the validity of CIA's information nor claimed superior knowledge. The only facts he challenged strongly were incontestably true, such as the date of GOLITSYN's defection, the date of ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street dead drop, KOSOLAPOV's travel separate from JENNER, and KOSOLAPOV's November 1960 trip to Helsinki. It seemed at all times that he accepted that CIA knew more than he did on topics including conditions in the USSR and cases and people for whom he claimed direct responsibility. He never challenged DERYABIN's statements about KGB procedures, although aware that his own information was more recent.

(e) Discussions with NOSENKO on His Own Performance

After admitting his inability to respond to questions about operations in which he said he participated, NOSENKO sometimes gave a general appraisal of his own performance. He would admit that it was "impossible to have such memory breaks" and agree that his response was neither reasonable nor acceptable ("In your place I wouldn't believe it either," or on another occasion, "It will look bad to your boss"). Admitting that the questions were fair, logical, and clearly put, he acknowledged at least a dozen times during the January-March 1965 interrogation that his performance under questioning was bad and unacceptable.

He also admitted that most of the leads he had passed were largely useless. Out of the 150 or so he said he had provided, he stated that the great majority were "no good," unimportant, or people with whom the KGB had not worked ("Maybe 'ANDREY' became not interesting to KGB, changed jobs, and was not so important any more"; "some of the agents recruited by the Seventh Department weren't meeting the KGB"; etc.) He consistently estimated, however, that there were about 20 to 25 "good" leads.

C. Polygraph Testing

1. Test in April 1964

Shortly after his defection, NOSENKO agreed to undergo a polygraph examination which the CIA handlers had told him was a routine part of his defector processing. He was informed on 3 April 1964 that the test would be administered the following morning, and that it was therefore advisable for him to get a good night's rest and to refrain from alcoholic beverages. NOSENKO drank heavily on the night of 3 April, did not enter his bedroom until 0300 hours on 4 April, and following breakfast at 0730 hours on 4 April consumed several gin-and-tonics. Subsequently, when NOSENKO thought he was not being observed, he was seen to remove his hand from his lips hurriedly.*

Following a medical examination by a physician who noted that NOSENKO had been drinking, he was introduced to the CIA polygraph operator. An experienced interrogator, fluent in the Russian language, this polygraph operator conducted the test in Russian from 1045 to 1515 hours on 4 April. His report is quoted below.

"The question of Subject's (NOSENKO's) willingness to participate in the polygraph test was one of minor consideration, since he had, on previous occasions, agreed that he would take the test. However, whether Subject would continue with the polygraph testing if confronted with attempted deception after an initial test run, was one of the considered problems. Consequently, in order to preclude the possibility of Subject's terminating the test prior to its completion, it was decided that a minor deviation from the accepted polygraph technique would be used during the polygraph testing; specifically, to insure that a polygraphic record of Subject's reactions to all the pertinent questions be obtained prior to challenging him on any significant polygraphic deception indications his charts might reflect... This plan was followed throughout the polygraph interview...

* On 18 May 1964 a report was received on the chemical analysis of six types of tablets which had been taken from NOSENKO's personal effects. In this report, a CIA chemical expert made the following remarks based on chemical, microscopic, and instrumental analysis including the use of X-ray: "Sample No. 4238 consisted of three (3) gray tablets wrapped in a piece of paper with the name 'Phenomin' written in Russian. Microscopic analysis of these tablets established the presence of a small amount of dl-amphetamine sulfate, a large amount of lactose, and a small amount of corn starch; dl-amphetamine is a sympathomimetic agent employed mainly as a central nervous system stimulant. The effect of taking amphetamine as a drug in conjunction with a polygraph test could exaggerate deception responses especially for a weak reactor. No phenothiazine (a tranquilizer) which is the active ingredient in 'Phenomin' was present in these tablets. The tablets do not appear to be of U.S. manufacture. ...As a result of the above examinations it was established that none of the items submitted are of the barbiturate family. Although either sulfaguanidine (Sample No. 4242) or aspirin (Sample No. 4240) could be used (and indeed have been used) as secret ink, they are also normal medicinals which a traveler might carry, and there is nothing in the formulation of the tablets to suggest

"Although the Subject had used both alcohol and some unknown drug prior to testing, there is no question, based both on analysis of Subject's polygraph charts as well as personal observation during the interview, that Subject has attempted deliberate deception in the specific pertinent areas which are mentioned below in this report.

"It is [my] conclusion that Subject is not a bona fide defector, but is a dispatched agent sent by Soviet Intelligence for a specific mission or missions.

"According to the plan, the different phases involving various pertinent areas were covered with Subject polygraphically. Challenge of Subject's reactions was indirect and 'soft.' On no occasion did Subject even attempt to volunteer any explanation of the possible causes for his polygraph reactions. He continually denied and refused to admit that there was anything to any of the questions which were asked of him. When the final test questions were completed and a record was obtained of all of Subject's polygraphic responses, the nature of the challenge and probing was changed.

"Subject was told that he was lying to numerous pertinent questions and was accused of being a dispatched agent. Subject's only explanation to [my] direct accusation was that he could not be a dispatched agent because of the amount of information he had volunteered to American Intelligence.

"Subject, who before and throughout testing reflected complete self-control and composure, now exhibited a completely different picture. His composure was non-existent, his eyes watered, and his hands trembled. Prior to being confronted with [my] opinion that Subject was a dispatched agent, when Subject was asked on one of the last test runs (a) if he were sent to penetrate American Intelligence and (b) if Subject received instructions from KGB on how to attempt to beat the polygraph, his answers were given in a voice that actually trembled...

"Listed below are all of the questions asked of Subject.

"Series #1:

Were you born in the Soviet Union? Yes. (No reaction)

Were you born in the city of Nikolayev? Yes. (No reaction)

Were you born on 30 October 1927? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you deliberately give any kind of misinformation when you told us your autobiography? No. (Reaction)

Is NOSENKO the surname which you had at time of birth? Yes. (Reaction)

Are you concerned about the fact that the polygraph test may discover that you are hiding the truth from me? No. (No reaction)

Was your father the Minister of Shipbuidling? Yes. (No reaction)

Were you a member of the Communist Party before 1956? No. (No reaction)
(Subject stated that he applied for candidacy to the Communist Party in 1956, and in mid-1957 was accepted as a member.)

Did you deliberately give any misinformation about your work and service in the KGB? No. (No reaction)

Besides your children, is there anything in your life on the basis of which someone may blackmail you? No. (No reaction)
(Subject stated that his love for his children was the only thing that is of any consequence which the Soviets might use for blackmail purposes. However, Subject said he was not worried, because regardless of threats against the welfare of his children, he would not allow himself to be blackmailed or controlled.)

Have you ever engaged in any homosexual activity? No. (Reaction)

Did you give deliberate misinformation about your education? No. (No reaction)

Did you ever commit a major crime? No. (No reaction)

Did you give deliberate misinformation about your military service? No. (No reaction)

"Series #2:

Did you establish contact with American Intelligence in Geneva in 1962? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you establish contact with American Intelligence in Geneva in January 1964? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you voluntarily defect to the Americans? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you ask for the right of political asylum from the Americans? Yes. (No reaction)

Were you sent to the Americans by the organs of Soviet Intelligence (with a special mission)? No. (Reaction)

Do you have a sincere desire to fight against the KGB and all other punitive organs of the Soviet Union? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you establish contact with American Intelligence on orders of the KGB? No. (Reaction)

Did anyone know of your intention to defect to the Americans? No. (No reaction)

Does the KGB have a pre-arranged signal for establishing contact with you in America? No. (Reaction)

Do you have a pre-arranged signal for establishing contact with Soviet Intelligence? No. (No reaction)

Do you have a concrete plan to return to the Soviet Union sometime in the future? No. (Reaction)

Are you performing a special mission for Soviet Intelligence in connection with your defection? No. (Reaction)

Are you deliberately hiding penetrations made by Soviet agents into American Intelligence about which you are aware? No. (Reaction)

Are you witting of other recruitments made by Soviet Intelligence of American Embassy personnel which occurred after RHODES and 'ANDREY'? No. (No reaction)

Are you an agent of the KGB or other Soviet Intelligence organs? No. (No reaction)

Was there any pre-arranged signal included in the letters you wrote to your wife (since your defection)? No. (No reaction)

Series #3:

Did you defect to the Americans in 1964? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans in Geneva? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans with the assignment of uncovering plans of American Intelligence against USSR? No. (Reaction)

• Did you defect to the Americans with the assignment to find out more about the structure and methods of operation of American Intelligence? No. (Reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans with the aim of penetrating American Intelligence? No. (Reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans because you were dissatisfied with the Soviet system? Yes. (Reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans with the aim of discrediting Soviet officers of the KGB who defected earlier? No. (No reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans with the aim of giving misinformation about Soviet agents' penetration of American Intelligence? No. (No reaction)

Series #4:

Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your trip to Geneva in 1962? No. (No reaction)

Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your trip to Geneva in 1964? No. (No reaction)

Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your trip to Cuba in 1960? No. (Reaction)

Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your trip to London in 1957? No. (No reaction)

Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your trip to London in 1958? No. (No reaction)

Did you personally participate in the search for CHEREPANOV in December 1963? Yes. (Reaction)

Is it true that KOVSHUK visited the United States in 1957? Yes. (Reaction)

Did GRIBANOV visit Switzerland in 1962? No. (No reaction)

To your knowledge, did GRIBANOV visit Switzerland in 1964? No. (No reaction)

Was GUK in Switzerland in 1964? Yes. (No reaction)

"Series #5:

Did you work for Soviet Intelligence in 1962? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you work for Soviet Intelligence in 1964? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you tell us the truth about Lee Harvey OSWALD? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you tell us the truth about Yuri KROTKOV? Yes. (Reaction)

Were the CHEREPANOV papers especially prepared and passed to the Americans by the KGB? No. (Reaction)

Is it true that Soviet Intelligence has an agent, whose name is unknown to you, among the American representatives in Paris? Yes. (Reaction)

Did you bring with you personal identity documents which were fabricated by KGB? No. (Reaction)

Did you give truthful information about the structure of the First and Second Chief Directorates of the KGB? Yes. (No reaction)

Are you misinforming American Intelligence according to a specially developed KGB plan? No. (No reaction)

Is it true that AGAYANTS is the Chief of Department D (Disinformation)? Yes. (Reaction)

To your knowledge, was FEDOSEYEV the Chief of the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate in 1963 and 1964? Yes. (Reaction)

TOP SECRET

*Series #6:

Did you drink more than you told me? No. (Reaction) (Subject admitted to having only one gin and tonic prior to testing.)

Did you know that American Intelligence uses the polygraph? Yes. (No reaction)

Did anyone in the Soviet Union explain to you anything about American Intelligence's use of the polygraph. No. (No reaction)

Did anyone in the KGB explain anything about the polygraph to you? No. (No reaction)

During the last twenty-four hours, did you take any medicine or pills? No. (Reaction)

Did you receive instructions from the KGB on how to attempt to beat the polygraph? No. (Reaction)

Were you ever hypnotized by anyone? No. (No reaction)

Did you bring any types of medicine or pills with you (from abroad or from the Soviet Union)? No. (Reaction)

Do you have any pills or medicine about which you have not told me? No. (Reaction)

"Although Subject later admitted that he had two types of pills with him which he brought from Moscow and which [were] in his portfolio, he declined to admit that he had had more liquor than he told [me], that he had received specific instructions about the polygraph from the KGB, or that he had taken any type of pills during the last twenty-four hours."

2. Test in October 1966 on Lee Harvey OSWALD

a. Introduction

CIA conducted a polygraph examination of NOSENKO on 18 October 1966 on the subject of Lee Harvey OSWALD.*

Since the previous polygraph test in April 1964, NOSENKO had been under close security guard, his movements restricted, and in the interim had been interrogated in detail and accused of bad faith in dealing with U.S. Government authorities. NOSENKO had not been interviewed by CIA during the six months prior to October 1966. He had had no access to alcohol or drugs, his food consumption had been normal, and his sleep had been adequate.

NOSENKO was given no advance notice of the polygraph examination. Upon entering the room where it was to take place, he immediately recognized the officer present as the person who administered the first CIA polygraph test two and one-half years earlier. NOSENKO correctly said that they had first met on 4 April 1964.

In the pre-test interview, questions on the OSWALD case were put to NOSENKO in Russian, his answers (also in Russian) were recorded, the operation of the machine was explained, and clarifications of the questions and his answers were made. The three series of questions pertaining to the OSWALD case are given below in their entirety, and they are followed by the conclusions of the polygraph expert.

b. Results

"Series No. 1

1. Was Lee Harvey OSWALD ever in the Soviet Union?

   Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

2. Was OSWALD in the Soviet Union from 1959 to 1961?

   Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

3. Did you receive special instructions about what to tell the Americans about the OSWALD case?

   Answer: No. (Reaction)

4. Did you personally meet OSWALD?

   Answer: No. (No reaction)

5. Was OSWALD recruited by KGB as an agent?

   Answer: No. (No reaction)

6. Were you glad that President Kennedy was killed?

   Answer: No. (Reaction)

7. Other than what you told me, did you actively participate in the OSWALD case prior to 1963?

   Answer: No. (No reaction)

* See Part V.D.6. for details on OSWALD

8. Did you see a photograph of OSWALD in 1963?

   Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

9. Was Marina PRUSAKOVA an agent of KGB?

   Answer: No. (No reaction)

9a. Before her marriage to OSWALD?

   Answer: No. (Reaction)

9b. After her marriage to OSWALD?

   Answer: No. (No reaction)

10. Did you personally meet Marina PRUSAKOVA?

   Answer: No. (No reaction)

11. Did OSWALD have any kind of contact with the 13th Otdel of the First Chief Directorate?

   Answer: No. (No reaction)

12. Did KGB prepare OSWALD for committing assassinations?

   Answer: No. (No reaction)

13. Was OSWALD prepared (trained) by KGB to kill President Kennedy?

   Answer: No. (No reaction)

24.* Did you hear of OSWALD (case) prior to President Kennedy's assassination?

   Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

"Subject's (NOSENKO's) most significant reactions on this test series were to questions 3 and 24--other reactions of a lesser significance were evident to questions 6, 8, 9a, and 10.

"<u>Series No. 2</u>

20. Is the name OSWALD familiar to you?

   Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

21. Did you ever read the OSWALD case?

   Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

22. Was this the full and official KGB case on OSWALD?

   Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

23. Did you give us any kind of information about OSWALD?

   Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

*Before the beginning of the examination, the polygraph operator

24. Did you hear of the OSWALD (case) prior to President Kennedy's assassination?

    Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

24a. Did you hear of the OSWALD (case) only after President Kennedy's death?

    Answer: Instead of the usual yes or no answer, Subject answered: 'Before and after.' When the question was repeated, he again answered: 'Before and after.' Only when the question was asked a third time on a subsequent test did he answer 'No.' (Reaction) (Subject reacted when he answered 'Before and after,' and when he answered 'No."

25. Did the KGB consider OSWALD abnormal?

    Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

26. As far as you know, did Marina OSWALD know about her husband's plan to kill President Kennedy?

    Answer: No. (No reaction)

27. To your knowledge did OSWALD talk with a KGB officer in Mexico?

    Answer: No. (No reaction)

28. Did OSWALD return to the United States in 1961?

    Answer: Yes. (No reaction) Subject's reaction to this question was inconsistent when he answered 'Yes,' hence the (No reaction) notation. However, it is noteworthy that Subject did not attempt to correct the date of OSWALD's departure to the U.S.; OSWALD returned to the U.S. in June 1962 and not in 1961.

29. Is your contact with the OSWALD case part of your legend (cover story)?

    Answer: No. (Reaction)

30. Did you really take part in the OSWALD case in 1959?

    Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

"Subject's most significant reactions were to questions 22, 24, 24a, 29 and 30.

"Series No. 3

16. Did you personally order RASTRUSIN, in 1959, to collect material on OSWALD?

    Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

13. Did you personally talk on the V. Ch. with Minsk about the OSWALD case in 1963?

    Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

17. Were you instructed on the OSWALD case by one of the KGB operational officers?

    Answer: No. (Reaction)

17a. Did the KGB instruct you to tell us OSWALD was a bad shot?

    Answer: No. (No reaction)

18. Do you know definitely that OSWALD was not of operational interest to KGB?

    Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

18c. Did KGB give the OSWALDs any kind of help in their departure from the Soviet Union?

    Answer: No. (No reaction)

3a. Did you receive special instructions from the KGB about what to tell the Americans about OSWALD?

    Answer: No. (Reaction)

"Subject's reactions to the questions so indicated were about equal in consistency and significance.

"On the basis of an analysis of the polygraph charts obtained during Subject's polygraph interrogation and testing during the 18 October 1966 session, it is [my] opinion that:

a. Subject was not personally or actually involved in the OSWALD case from 1959 to 1961 while OSWALD was in the Soviet Union.

b. Subject heard of OSWALD only after Kennedy's assassination; however, he was not an active participant in 1963 as he indicates, but was probably briefed on the case by a KGB officer.

c. Subject received special instructions (from the KGB) about the OSWALD case and what to tell American authorities about it."

VIII. NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Introduction

It is standard procedure to assess the bona fides of each intelligence and counterintelligence source, and special care is required in assessing sources of information relevant to the security of the United States.

One difficulty in doing so with a Soviet source is that Soviet realities, particularly in the KGB, are imperfectly known: Except where independent information is available, it is risky to say and impossible to prove what the Soviets--most notably the KGB--would or would not do in any given situation, or what any given KGB officer should or should not know. Independent information, voluminous in quantity although never comprehensive and entirely current, nevertheless has been assimilated from the reports of the several KGB staff officers who have defected, from the KGB agents who have confessed, and from the Western services which have investigated KGB activities. There is, therefore, a base of reliable knowledge upon which to predicate an assessment of a source reporting on the KGB, even one who principally covers a KGB component (in this instance the Second Chief Directorate) upon which there previously had been relatively little inside information. Moreover, in the absence of direct evidence from other sources, it would be arbitrarily confining if an assumption were not made that certain KGB standards are at least comparable to those of Western services. Such prior knowledge and, to a limited extent, such an assumption are factors in the assessment of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO that is submitted here.

A much more prominent factor in this assessment, however, is NOSENKO's own testimony. CIA has exhaustively debriefed and interrogated NOSENKO, his leads were checked, his information was studied, and a large body of facts pertinent to his bona fides was thus assembled. These details, as well as direct evidence from other sources and the views of specialists affiliated with CIA, have been presented in Part III. through Part VII. of this paper.

The basic questions with regard to the bona fides of NOSENKO are the following:

- Is there reason to question the general accuracy and completeness of NOSENKO's accounts of his situation and motivations in contacting CIA and later defecting, his personal life, military service, positions in the KGB, personal participation in KGB operations, knowledgeability about KGB activities and the way he learned of them, and his associations with KGB personnel?

- If there are grounds for doubting the general accuracy and completeness of these accounts, then what are the explanations for NOSENKO's actions, for the nature of the information he has provided, and for other Soviet sources having authenticated his personal life and KGB career?

In assessing the bona fides of NOSENKO, the classic method has been used: evaluating his production and sourcing, examining his autobiography, and appraising him and the circumstances of this operation. These points, with the conclusions drawn from each, are reviewed below. The discussion continues with a survey of the sources who have corroborated NOSENKO's background and status, and this is followed by argumentations on the various hypotheses which could explain NOSENKO as a source. The final portion is a summary of conclusions about NOSENKO's bona fides.

B. Evaluation of Production

1. Introduction

What a Soviet source reports is one factor in assessing his good faith. Rarely, however, can it be conclusive: Even a genuine and conscientious source may be poorly informed or misinformed; he may be hampered by forgetfulness, mental shortcomings, or lack of education; his reporting may be incomplete because he is not available long enough to permit amplification and clarification of his information. On the other hand, a Soviet-controlled agent who is planted on the opposition may be supplied with useful, voluminous, and accurate information.

There are several standards which may be applied to the assessment of a source's production. Each of them is qualified; none is likely to be conclusive by itself; and all of them together may not permit a definite conclusion, although they do contribute to a broader assessment of bona fides. The standards are:

First, how does the information equate, in terms of completeness, accuracy, and detail, with the source's claimed or proven position and access to information? (In this, one judges the internal consistency of the source's reporting and also compares it with information from other sources and from investigations.)

Second, does the information harm the opposition? (This point is risky to judge, for a genuine source may simply not know anything harmful to his country. Also, information which seems harmful to the USSR may not actually be such in Soviet eyes; for example, the loss of an apparently valuable agent could be mitigated by the KGB's possession of better or comparable assets still unexposed.)

Third, is the information important or useful to us? (This point may in some cases be irrelevant, for information useful to us may not harm the opposition, and the apparent usefulness of information may not balance against the time and effort required to process and investigate it.)

These standards have been applied in evaluating the production of NOSENKO on the topics discussed below.

NOSENKO's production is exclusively in the field of counterintelligence information. As described in Part VI.A., he did not have any useful positive intelligence. This does not necessarily affect the question of his bona fides, however, for NOSENKO claims to have been a KGB internal counterintelligence officer. From a comparative standpoint, not one of the previous KGB officers who defected to Western services has produced significant military, economic, or scientific information on the USSR, and only a few have supplied political information (usually concerned with the personalities and relationships in the ruling group of the Communist Party). Therefore, nothing of positive intelligence consequence is expected of NOSENKO, although some question might be raised about his inability to report on the leadership of the Soviet regime in view of his father's position and NOSENKO's continuing contacts with the leadership after his father's death. The failure of NOSENKO to respond to questionnaires along positive intelligence lines is not considered unusual.

NOSENKO's counterintelligence production includes all of his information on the Soviet intelligence and security organs:

- their structure, functions, methods, and procedures;

- their officers and their agents of Soviet citizenship;

- their operational activities inside and outside the USSR.

For the most part this portion of the paper (as in Part VIII.C. through Part VIII.F.) follows a format in which the evidence is summarized, the facts interpreted, and conclusions presented.

2. <u>KGB Organization, Personalities, Methods</u>

Ability to discuss the structure of his service in general and at least some of its components in particular is an absolutely minimal requirement for anyone who claims to have been employed within that service. At the same time, current information on the organization of an intelligence service is of classic interest to opposing intelligence and security services. Organizational changes are indicators of policy and planning trends in the service; short of a penetration of the service's leadership, such changes are perhaps the most reliable reflection of changes in operational emphasis and tactics.

Had NOSENKO's information on the organization of the KGB been novel in this sense, it would have been of considerable value, while the exposure of this information--although perhaps not a major loss to the Soviets--would nonetheless have been against the KGB's best interests. NOSENKO's reports on the organization of the KGB in 1964 (Pages 352-358) agree with and are a logical extension of that framework of KGB organization newly revealed by the 1961 sources, but this weighs neither for nor against him as the source: In the absence of contradictory information, he cannot be subject to criticism or to suspicion because his reports show no redirection of the thrust of the KGB. Furthermore, NOSENKO's statements indicating that there have been no major changes in the years between the 1959 reorganization and 1964 are acceptable in the light of available information from other sources. The information which NOSENKO provided on the KGB's organization therefore neither supports nor discredits his <u>bona fides</u>.

NOSENKO's information on some 1,000 Soviets connected with intelligence and security activities is an impressive achievement of memory. These identifications, however, must be evaluated according to the damage inflicted upon the Soviets by his exposure of these personalities. In this respect, the discussion must concern new identifications, for intelligence personalities previously exposed could not be damaged any further by a repetition of their compromise. This discussion must be further restricted to new identifications of staff personnel, because the entire Soviet population is available to the KGB for occasional use as it sees fit, with the loyalty and discretion of the individual as the only limiting factors; to learn that a Soviet employed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow is an agent reporting to the KGB is to learn nothing that has not already been taken for granted, and besides, no action on such information can be taken. Finally, the new identifications also

must be among persons who are identifiable and accessible, or the information is useless to Western services and is no loss to the Soviets. On this basis, only KGB First Chief Directorate as well as GRU identifications merit inclusion in this evaluation, since these are the officers who normally appear abroad and participate in agent operations. Although KGB Second Chief Directorate personnel have in the past transferred to the First Chief Directorate, this is not a predictable event and cannot be considered in discussion of current damage.

NOSENKO identified 165 First Chief Directorate personnel, but only 149 could be located in CIA files (i.e., were identifiable by name); the remaining 16 names from NOSENKO were valueless as they were untraceable. Of the 149, there were 37 who were not known or suspected as intelligence officers prior to the receipt of NOSENKO's information. Of 37, there were 24 who either resided abroad at the time of NOSENKO's defection or were sent abroad since that time.* Assuming that NOSENKO was correct in his identifications of all 24 members of the KGB who were accessible,** it cannot be said that the number is so large that the damage to KGB agent operations was substantial. None of NOSENKO's unique GRU identifications were abroad at the time of his defection or have been since. These personality identifications hence do not serve as evidence of NOSENKO's <u>bona fides</u>. At the same time, his inability to do further measurable harm to the KGB in this regard cannot be held against him, either, for he has claimed service only in the Second Chief Directorate throughout his career and so cannot be expected to know a high percentage of the First Chief Directorate complement. Therefore, NOSENKO's intelligence personality identifications do not constitute a factor in finding for or against his <u>bona fides</u>.

NOSENKO has been the source of many interesting details and examples of KGB <u>modus operandi</u> (Pages 359-360), but while useful for illustrative purposes and valuable because of the fact that the material was easily collatable for study purposes, none of the methods described could be considered new and revealing, and their exposure in any event would not prevent their continued use in the future. NOSENKO's discussion of the only double agent case in which he claimed to have played a role, however, demonstrates his lack of knowledge of the principles and purposes of such an operation. This case, BELITSKIY, is a subject of separate

* Of these 24, ten were identified by sensitive sources [redacted] as KGB [redacted] and thereafter, and two became prominently active in insecure KGB operations shortly after NOSENKO identified them.

**Other evidence has contradicted statements by NOSENKO to the effect that certain Soviets were not affiliated with the KGB; in Geneva, for example, where he had daily access to the KGB Legal Residency for months and claimed nearly complete knowledge of KGB personnel, he named 15 of a KGB staff which he said totalled at the most 18; CIA identifications of KGB officers in Geneva on the basis of other sources, investigations and analysis totalled at least double this number and probably triple, as many as 55 of the approximately 120 Soviets stationed there (a proportion which is consistent with other areas and defectors' estimates). NOSENKO was not entirely accurate concerning even KGB officers on his own delegation in Geneva, as noted on Pages 12 and 13. Therefore, the accuracy of NOSENKO's original identifications, positive or negative, cannot be accepted without question.

discussion below. This subject, too, must be considered neutral evidence in the bona fides assessment.

NOSENKO has shown himself to be both uninformed and inaccurate in his answers to questions on KGB Headquarters staff procedures (Page 360 and Pages 619-624). He has been unable to contribute any new information, although there has been no detailed reporting on the subject since 1954. (GOLITSYN in 1962 provided some new material on procedures but was never comprehensively debriefed on the topic.) Thus, information on the more up-to-date forms, co-ordination requirements, mechanization of records and tracing mechanisms, etc., could have been a singular contribution to our knowledge; NOSENKO could not describe anything of this sort. When he replied to questions about such matters for the period covering his entry into the KGB, on which previous reporting is available in detail, he answered incorrectly on numerous points. NOSENKO's tendency to improvise when he did not know the correct answer or when he had forgotten has been characterized by a CIA psychologist as the behavior of a pathological liar saving face in a tight psychological situation. When he could not produce a correct answer in this area of reporting, NOSENKO may have improvised because he is a liar or because he is concealing an ignorance based on not having been a KGB Headquarters officer.

3. Operational Leads

a. Introduction

Consideration of NOSENKO's operational leads must take into account the KGB positions and personal associations (with attendant access to information) which NOSENKO has claimed for himself. He indicated that the breadth of his knowledge about KGB agent operations and development cases increased as he rose from case officer in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1953-1955 and in the American Tourist Section in 1955-1958 to become Deputy Chief of the latter section in 1958-1959, Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960-1961, and finally Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department from 1962 until his defection. Simultaneously he established lasting contacts with his KGB colleagues so that, for example, even after leaving the U.S. Embassy Section for the second time, in December 1961, NOSENKO kept abreast of its most important activities. On these grounds NOSENKO presented himself as an authoritative source, one who could detail the successes and failures of the KGB in recruiting Westerners--especially Americans--in the USSR over the years from 1953 through 1963. Repeatedly NOSENKO asserted that his leads to KGB agents constituted proof of his bona fides.

b. Operations Involving Americans

NOSENKO drew a picture of the recruitment scene in Moscow showing that:

- Since the "ANDREY" case of the early 1950's* the KGB recruited no Americans on the U.S. Embassy staff, succeeding only in recruiting one contract employee who was in Moscow on TDY. NOSENKO reported on recruitment approaches to six American officials stationed in Moscow, all of whom

* NOSENKO placed the recruitment date prior to his entry into the KGB in early 1953, but Dayle W. SMITH (KGB cryptonym "ANDREY") said he became a KGB agent in November or December 1953.

refused to collaborate with the KGB. He discussed 14 development cases which never culminated in recruitment approaches to these U.S. Government employees in Moscow, and he named 11 officials at the Moscow Embassy who were investigated by the KGB. These operations, NOSENKO asserted, comprised the total KGB activity against Embassy personnel with the exception of the technical penetrations (see Part VIII.B.4.).

- Seven American correspondents in Moscow had been recruited by the KGB, four of them known to NOSENKO from the years 1953-1954 when he was working against U.S. newspapermen. Another two were under development by the KGB during that period.

- The American Express Company representative in Moscow, Arsene FRIPPEL, had become a KGB agent in 1959; NOSENKO was the case officer.

- The number of American visitors recruited by the KGB in 1962-1963 was 14, and if there had been others, NOSENKO would have known about them in light of his senior position in the Tourist Department during that period. Moreover, for the years before 1962, NOSENKO provided leads to 19 other American tourists whom the KGB recruited, plus one who was serving the GRU when he came to Moscow. NOSENKO also described 18 development cases and nine investigations in which the targets were American tourists.

As for KGB operations outside the Soviet Union, NOSENKO gave leads to four recruited Americans about whom he learned through conversations with KGB associates: a U.S. intelligence officer having the KGB cryptonym "SASHA" (still unidentified), a penetration of Orly Courier Transfer Station (identified as Sergeant Robert Lee JOHNSON), and two agents in Geneva (names not given and as yet not positively identified). NOSENKO learned of the KGB agent status of Horace G. LUNT, an American professor, because he took part in LUNT's recruitment while on TDY in Sofia, and of the [redacted] Legal Residency agent [redacted] because of the connection between [redacted] and Bernard KOTEN, an American tourist with whose case NOSENKO was personally involved. In addition, NOSENKO described two development cases with U.S. citizens. From his knowledge of the "SASHA" operation, NOSENKO also knew that the KGB had no agent sources able to supply information concerning the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962.

(i) <u>Completeness, Accuracy, Detail and Consistency of Reporting</u>

If he occupied the various KGB positions as claimed, if his access were as broad as he said it was, NOSENKO has provided a comprehensive review of KGB operations involving Americans in the USSR.

Other information, however, contradicts NOSENKO's assurances that he reported on all major cases involving Americans working at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow:

- GOLITSYN's reports indicate that a U.S. military code clerk was recruited in 1960, and other factors point toward this person being James STORSBERG or possibly William HURLEY (Pages 166-182). NOSENKO, the supervisor of operations against Embassy code clerks in 1960-1961, stated that

STORSBERG rejected the recruitment approach, and when interviewed on the basis of the NOSENKO lead, STORSBERG confirmed this. Both agree the approach was made in the latter part of 1961.

- GOLITSYN's reports cover six other operations (Pages 595-598) which NOSENKO has not mentioned: The KGB's recruitment of a female employee at the Embassy in 1957, the presence of a code clerk in the Embassy in 1960 who was a KGB agent, an unsuccessful recruitment approach to a female secretary at the Embassy prior to July 1960, the KGB plan to complete the recruitment of an American diplomat following his reassignment from Moscow in 1959, the KGB's recruitment of or planned recruitment approach to a U.S. Embassy employee (possibly a code clerk) prior to April/May 1960, and a KGB officer's trip to Helsinki to accompany an Embassy code clerk travelling by train to Moscow. (There is documentary evidence to support the accuracy of GOLITSYN's statements about the last of these cases; see below.)

On the basis of available information, NOSENKO cannot be faulted on the completeness of his reporting about American tourists recruited, approached, and under development by the KGB, but he could cite only one instance of KGB investigations uncovering tourists dispatched to the USSR by American Intelligence (Pages 145-150).* He knew nothing concerning two documents of CIA origin which described "legal travel" operations, one discussing forthcoming tasks of American agents in the tourist season of 1959, a year in which NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section. These documents were placed in the hands of the KGB by George BLAKE of MI-6 in July 1959 (before the end of the tourist season) and in 1960; NOSENKO was not familiar with any aspects of the KGB operation with BLAKE. That the Tourist Department was aware of U.S. Intelligence sending agents under tourist cover to the Soviet Union in the years when NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section is demonstrable by four cases of 1958 and 1959 cited in a KGB document supplied by GOLITSYN. NOSENKO, although having no information on KGB countermeasures against American tourists in 1958 and 1959, knew that the document had been passed to CIA by GOLITSYN and that it had been written in the Tourist Department. Where NOSENKO's reporting on American tourist cases is checkable, therefore, it has been found to be incomplete.

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* NOSENKO reported that of nine other tourists investigated by the KGB, eight were suspected of having current connections with American Intelligence. The KGB was correct with regard to Thomas BARTHELEMY and Robert CHRISTNER, who were on CIA missions, and Alfred SLESINGER, an FBI informant who nevertheless had no American Intelligence mission when he visited the USSR in 1961 and 1962. Frederick BARGHOORN, arrested in the USSR in 1963, had been affiliated with U.S. military intelligence many years before, and Ray GARTHOFF had severed his association with CIA as an overt employee before he went to Moscow in 1963. Concerning the rest reportedly suspected by the KGB--Donald ALBINGER, Bernard KOTEN, and Gabriel REINER--none was associated with American Intelligence in any way.

TOP SECRET

NOSENKO's reporting on individual cases wherein he was a personal participant or supervisor is not, with few exceptions, contradicted by information available from other sources. Nearly all of his statements have proven accurate when they could be compared with collateral information: In fact, the Americans whom he cited did visit or live in the Soviet Union, and many of them are known to have been of operational interest to the KGB, as NOSENKO said. The exceptions to his general accuracy of reporting, however, are of major importance in themselves and in reference to his claimed positions in the U.S. Embassy Section during 1960-1961:*

NOSENKO	Collateral
U.S. Embassy Security Officer John V. ABIDIAN, for whom NOSENKO was the responsible KGB officer, visited the Pushkin Street dead drop site in 1960 or at the beginning of 1961. Later that same day KOZLOV, Chief of the KGB Surveillance Directorate, went to the scene.	CIA records on the PENKOVSKIY case, in which the Pushkin Street dead drop was used, show that ABIDIAN visited the site only once, on 30 December 1961 at 1130 hours. KOZLOV left New York City on the same day, travelling via France, at the completion of a TDY in the United States. (Pages 231-235; this subject is discussed at greater length in Part VIII.B.6.)
KOSOLAPOV, NOSENKO's direct subordinate, made but one TDY to Helsinki in the 1960-1961 period; NOSENKO would have known about if not approved other TDY's in these years when he was Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section.	Travel records show that KOSOLAPOV was twice in Helsinki during 1960, in March-April and again in November. (Pages 186-200).
Returning from his single TDY to Helsinki, KOSOLAPOV was abroad the same train as his target, the American military code clerk Paul JENNER; as supervisor of all operations against code clerks at the U.S. Embassy, NOSENKO was familiar with the details of all such major activities.	Travel records show that JENNER and KOSOLAPOV travelled on separate days. (Pages 186-200)
The KGB knew that the U.S. military code clerk James KEYSERS, whom NOSENKO personally contacted in an effort to persuade him to defect, did not report the earlier recruitment approach by the KGB.	KEYSERS reported the recruitment approach immediately after it occurred, and the report was submitted in an Embassy room later found to have a concealed microphone. (NOSENKO stated that he was a customer for microphone intercepts at the time and that this microphone was monitored on a continuous basis by KGB personnel.) (Pages 213-219)

* An example of NOSENKO's inaccuracy on events during his later service in the Tourist Department related to his accounts on the arrest of American Professor Frederick BARGHOORN: According to NOSENKO, the approval for this KGB action in which he had a personal part was obtained from BREZHNEV in KHRUSHCHEV's absence from Moscow, and the arrest was made a few hours later; BARGHOORN was arrested on 31 October 1963, and on that day and the day before KHRUSHCHEV made public appearances in Moscow. (BREZHNEV was not seen in Moscow between 29 October and 2 November

In addition, a number of Americans--e.g., Walter RASK, Adam BROCHES, Henry APISSON, Herbert HOWARD, Vasiliy VOLKOV, William WALLACE, Thomas Whitney, and Stanley ZIRING--denied having been recruited by the KGB, as NOSENKO said they had been.

The only noteworthy internal inconsistencies in NOSENKO's reporting on KGB operations involving Americans appear in the HARMSTONE case, where he has given conflicting information on the KGB's ability to obtain photographic evidence of his homosexuality, and in his advice on how to identify "ANDREY"--that he was the only witness to testify in Roy RHODES' trial and that he did not testify at Roy RHODES' trial but was only interviewed in the pre-trial investigation once. Part VIII.D. covers the extent of his knowledge about American cases in which he took part personally or as a supervisor. Regarding others to which his official positions did not give him access, NOSENKO has indicated that it was his personal contact with KGB colleagues which enabled him to report on nine recruitments (Herbert HOWARD, Sam JAFFE, the KGB agent in France, the YOUNGER couple, "SASHA", and two unnamed agents in Geneva); three development cases (George VAN LAETHEM, Attorney General Robert KENNEDY, and Stephen HOFFMAN); three unsuccessful recruitment approaches (Richard HARMSTONE, Peter BINDER, and Collette SCHWARZENBACH); and three investigations (Thomas BARTHELEMY, Lewis BOWDEN, and George WINTERS). NOSENKO's alleged associates in the KGB thus gave him the names of four recruited agents and sufficient details for one more to be identified by subsequent investigation, JOHNSON. All of the NOSENKO leads to developmental operations, unsuccessful recruitment approaches, and investigations have been identified.

(ii) Damage to the Soviets

Three criteria can be used in assessing the harm to Soviet interests caused by NOSENKO's operational leads to Americans:

First, the originality of his information on recruited agents and unsuccessful recruitment approaches;

Second, the agents' access to classified information at the time he reported on them; and

Third, the possibility of identifying them on the basis of the details provided or in combination with details received from other sources.

There is no reason to believe that NOSENKO's information on 22 Americans under investigation while in the USSR could have damaged the KGB, especially since all of them had left the Soviet Union before the NOSENKO leads were received (Pages 402-410). In another category, NOSENKO's leads to 35 Americans under development (Pages 379-397), there is no means for evaluating their importance to the KGB because it is impossible to estimate with confidence the likelihood of the KGB recruiting some or any of these targets; vulnerability and assessment data, when coupled with spasmodic or even continuing KGB access to the target, would be no guarantee that he is recruitable. Nevertheless, following the criteria listed above, NOSENKO's statements on KGB operational interest stemming from their homosexuality did bring about the recall of Robert ARMSTRONG and Stephen HOFFMAN from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

NOSENKO was the first source to report on the KGB recruitments of 22 tourists (none with access to classified materials and on 11 of whom there was previous derogatory information); four correspondents (one said by NOSENKO to have become inactive and on two of whom there was previous derogatory information); the American Express Company representative in Moscow; a contract employee of USIA who had earlier declared his intent to marry a Soviet national; and two agents whose names were not known to NOSENKO but who were identifiable. The latter two agents were:

- Dayle W. SMITH (KGB cryptonym "ANDREY"), a cipher machine mechanic at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow recruited in 1953. Despite NOSENKO's statement that "ANDREY" was currently supplying valuable information in June 1962, SMITH lost his access to classified information through retirement from the U.S. Army on 30 November 1961, or about six months before NOSENKO first reported on him (Pages 413-426).

- U.S. Army Sergeant Robert Lee JOHNSON, who with his wife Hedwig began collaborating with the KGB in 1952 and who made James MINTKENBAUGH an agent of the KGB in 1953 (Pages 427-462). Hedwig JOHNSON discontinued her role in the operation in 1953, although thereafter remaining knowledgeable of the KGB activities of her husband and MINTKENBAUGH; according to MINTKENBAUGH, who lost access to classified information in 1954, he had no direct contact with the KGB after the late summer or early autumn of 1963 (about three to five months before NOSENKO first gave the lead on JOHNSON); JOHNSON was still on active duty with the U.S. Army and in contact with the KGB when NOSENKO reported in January 1964 about the existence of this agent.

Thus from a total of 30 original and identifiable leads, only one agent had access to classified information as of the date when NOSENKO's reporting on him began. By the criteria given in the preceeding paragraph, the single operational lead from NOSENKO which could have damaged Soviet interests was that which uncovered JOHNSON.

It is debatable, however, whether the JOHNSON lead constituted a serious loss to the KGB. In the first place, if JOHNSON can be believed, he gave the Soviets but one classified document while in charge of the "Classified Control Center" at Camp Des Loges between August 1963 and May 1964. His KGB case officer later told him, JOHNSON said, that the information he could provide was not worth the risk involved and that no future attempts of this sort should be made. JOHNSON also stated that he felt his espionage work at Camp Des Loges had not been very profitable for the Soviets, adding that his case officer had shown disinterest in his proposal to obtain for the KGB a top secret document he (JOHNSON) thought of greater importance than any other to which he had access. (NOSENKO indicated that JOHNSON lost his access in the spring of 1963, while at the Orly Courier Transfer Station.) In the second place, as the KGB knew, the behavior of Hedwig JOHNSON, a mental case, was unpredictable. Finally, the JOHNSON couple and MINTKENBAUGH repeatedly disregarded the KGB's instructions to compartment their activities and to observe other routine security precautions. The KGB seems to have avoided full exploitation of JOHNSON in the latter stages of the operation, to have been concerned over Hedwig's mental condition as early as 1962, and to have regarded the

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threesome as difficult handling problems. Given these apparent factors, the NOSENKO lead may have been considered expendable by the KGB, without long-lasting adverse effect on the fulfillment of its overall intelligence requirements.

NOSENKO was the first source to identify James STORSBERG, a U.S. military code clerk stationed at the Moscow Embassy, as a target who had rejected the KGB's recruitment offer (Pages 165-185). The information was received from NOSENKO after STORSBERG was discharged from the U.S. Army, and when interviewed on the basis of this information, STORSBERG generally confirmed NOSENKO's reporting on the case. GOLITSYN had earlier reported on what may have been the same KGB operation, but GOLITSYN believed the military code clerk had been recruited; from what GOLITSYN had previously told CIA and from later investigations, it seems possible that the KGB recruited either STORSBERG or William HURLEY (who NOSENKO said was not recruited or approached by the KGB). If it is assumed that STORSBERG was not recruited in the approach described by NOSENKO and in the operation discussed by GOLITSYN, the KGB suffered no loss in the American services learning of this case. If it is assumed on the other hand that STORSBERG or HURLEY was recruited, the reporting by NOSENKO assisted the KGB--not the American services--by deflecting security investigations from a recruited agent of the KGB.

(iii) Importance or Usefulness

The American leads from NOSENKO enabled U.S. security authorities to:

- Confirm previous information on the recruitments of 13 tourists and three correspondents;

- Verify previous derogatory information on 11 tourists, two correspondents, and perhaps one military code clerk, STORSBERG;

- Remove two homosexuals from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow; and

- Identify 32 KGB agents including Hedwig JOHNSON and MINTKENBAUGH.*

One or possibly two of these 32 agents (SMITH and possibly HOWARD) in the past had been in a position to pass classified information to the KGB, and a third (JOHNSON) had current access to classified information and current contact with the KGB; the two homosexuals at the Moscow Embassy (ARMSTRONG and HOFFMAN) presumably also had access to classified information. From the standpoint of protecting the security of the U.S. Government, NOSENKO brought to an end the JOHNSON operation and the KGB's potential for recruiting ARMSTRONG and HOFFMAN.

Against this product of NOSENKO's reporting must be balanced the amounts of money and manpower that were needed for U.S. security authorities to exhaust and investigate NOSENKO's information on 49 recruitments, 35 developmental targets, seven unsuccessful recruitment approaches, and 33 investigations by the KGB--a total of 113 operational leads. CIA carried the burden of the debriefing and interrogation of NOSENKO on these cases, but the investigative

* Among these 32 agents were many whom the KGB had not recontacted after their return to the United States from the Soviet Union, others who had broken contact with the KGB, some who were known

work in the United States was accomplished mostly by other agencies. It would seem, however, that the JOHNSON operation was the only NOSENKO lead to be important or useful.

(iv) Remarks

Judged by his major inaccuracies and by the demonstrable incompleteness in some of his reporting, NOSENKO is not an authoritative or reliable source of information on operations against Americans by the U.S. Embassy Section and the American Tourist Section. Proven untrustworthy in other categories of operational leads, there is no reason to accept at face value NOSENKO's statement that SMITH was the only Moscow Embassy employee working with the KGB from 1953 through 1963; indeed, evidence to the contrary exists. The same may be true regarding American tourists and correspondents in Moscow, i.e., other recruitments not mentioned by NOSENKO could have occurred. Furthermore, with the questionable exception of the JOHNSON case, the KGB lost nothing of great value in consequence of NOSENKO's leads but gained an advantage by occupying the attention and facilities of American security authorities.

It is therefore concluded that NOSENKO has withhold information on recruitments of Americans in Moscow, or he is unable to provide a comprehensive review of such activities because he did not hold the claimed positions in the U.S. Embassy and American Tourist Sections. Either explanation forces strong reservations about the bona fides of NOSENKO as a genuine source, and these reservations are reinforced by the relative costs to the KGB and U.S. security authorities of the NOSENKO leads. By itself, this evaluation of his production on American cases suggests the possibility that the KGB dispatched NOSENKO to report to CIA, and that the KGB did so for the purpose of misleading the U.S. security services.

c. Operations Involving Other Westerners

(i) Introduction

As already indicated, NOSENKO's principal knowledgeability of KGB operations is related to Americans in the Soviet Union. With the exception of one German and one Norwegian tourist case, his only other personal participation in third-national (i.e., non-American) operations stems from his association with the section of the Tourist Department concerned with United Kingdom and Canadian, as well as American, tourists. Where he has commented on sources for the rest of his third-national leads, he indicated his knowledge was acquired either through conversations with other officers or through his position as Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department in 1962-1963. Thus he made no claim for completeness of his coverage, nor necessarily for absolute accuracy and full details on any one case. No attempt will be made here, therefore, to compare his information with other sources, except in terms of whether NOSENKO's reporting harmed the Soviets and assisted American security.

(ii) Discussion

Of the 90 third-national recruitment leads (Pages 474-502), 22 have not yet been positively identified. These cannot be evaluated at all except to point out that only two of them are potentially significant, the NATO penetration in Belgium in 1962 (which may be the same as a lead from another source) and a code clerk in the West German Embassy in Moscow in 1961. Without knowing the status of these two operations at the time NOSENKO told CIA about them, it is not possible to measure the value to us or the damage to the Soviet Union through the compromise of these cases.

Of the remaining 68 known or possible agents who have been identified, 35 were unique leads when NOSENKO provided them. No conclusive investigation results have yet been obtained on 30 of these, but the majority were said by NOSENKO to be travel agency employees (guides, bus drivers, etc.). Five of the 30 held positions of trust in their respective governments; these five leads are discussed below in terms of potential value to U.S. security and potential damage to the KGB. Of the five who have been interviewed on the basis of the NOSENKO information, four denied being recruited by the KGB, including [redacted] (the only one of those interviewed holding a government position), discussed below. Reporting on the one remaining lead, a Dutch woman, is unclear and inconclusive--she admitted only to having been questioned while in the USSR.

Among the 35 new leads from NOSENKO, a total of five had positions of trust, with known or presumed access to sensitive information, in their respective governments:

- [redacted]: NOSENKO said in 1962 that the KGB was working on him when he was [redacted] [redacted] in Moscow, but he did not know whether [redacted] was recruited or not. [redacted] [redacted] in 1963 he told CIA of his contacts in Moscow with Soviets whom he suspected of being intelligence officers, and in 1964 he reported a social visit in Vienna by General GORBUNOV (an operational alias of GRIBANOV), whom

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he had known in Moscow. He has not been interviewed directly on the basis of the NOSENKO lead, nor has he reported a recruitment approach.

- [redacted]: French [redacted]

- [redacted] NOSENKO reported that [redacted] is either an agent or a "solid contact" of the KGB. [redacted] Indian

- [redacted] NOSENKO has identified him as a KGB agent, with no further information. Stationed at the Indian Embassy in Moscow from 1957 to 1961, [redacted] there is no derogatory information on him in CIA files.

- Indonesian [redacted] in Moscow: In 1962 NOSENKO reported that prior to 1960 or 1961 the KGB recruited the Indonesian [redacted] Although NOSENKO had spelled out the name in 1962, in 1964 he could recall no such case but thought this must have been a mistake for the case of [redacted] who had been the [redacted] that time. Aside from the fact that conditions in Indonesia precluded CIA's passing this lead to the Indonesian service for investigation, Indonesia's position until 1966 was that of a semi-satellite of the Communist Bloc, and revelation of such a recruitment in the prevailing situation would have been of no value to the United States nor harm to the Soviet Union.

Thus of the third-national leads originating with NOSENKO, five might be considered to be important because of their position in government. In two cases ([redacted]) he was not able to say whether there was a recruitment, however, while a third (assuming that there was no further confusion on NOSENKO's part) cannot be considered an important lead because of the Communist bias of the Indonesian Government. [redacted] position as an agent or contact loses significance in view of his previously reported support of a powerful leftist political figure. The possible importance of the [redacted] lead cannot be assessed without investigation results.

The William VASSALL case (Pages 503-507) was the one third-national lead which NOSENKO himself considered most important. He invariably included this lead when talking about the importance of his reporting. The British security services neverthe-

less were well on their way to identifying the source of the Admiralty documents identified by GOLITSYN, having narrowed their list of suspects to 20 (including VASSALL) by 11 June 1962. When they received the fragment of NOSENKO information which focused on the British Embassy in Moscow, the number was reduced to VASSALL and one other. Although the NOSENKO information apparently confirmed the already solid suspicions of VASSALL, there is reason to believe that the identification would have been accomplished without this information. The lead was therefore not new or exclusive information, and NOSENKO himself admitted in 1964 that he knew that GOLITSYN had known of the case from the latter's work in the Information (Reports) Department.

Of the identified third-nationals whom NOSENKO said were being targetted or investigated by the KGB, none held positions of significance, with the sole exception of the then member of the British Parliament, [redacted] whose personal life and career the Soviets subsequently attempted--with considerable success--to destroy through a campaign of scandal.

(iii) Remarks

On the basis of the above examination, NOSENKO's information on KGB operations against third-nationals cannot be considered a positive factor in the assessment of his bona fides. As a possible negative factor in consideration of his bona fides, the insignificance of NOSENKO's reporting on third-national leads must be measured against the criteria of his claimed access and contrary evidence. In the case of foreign tourists his leads show--and he himself has commented--that such recruitments were of no particular value; assuming that NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, he should be able to make such a statement without challenge. To date no independent evidence of foreign tourist recruitments has emerged which contradicts him. Operations against other Western embassies in Moscow are a slightly different matter. NOSENKO's information, or lack thereof, cannot be evaluated on the basis of completeness because he has made no claim to full access to such information or to positions which would have given him better access. Except for those he said he was informed of in connection with possible use against U.S. Embassy targets, he has usually sourced such third-national leads as he did have to particularly close relations with the responsible case officer. It would not be valid to argue that he a source of one lead should have told him of others, or that he should have had more close friends in the KGB. Thus on all applicable criteria, the NOSENKO leads to operations against third-nationals must be excluded as a factor weighing for or against his bona fides.

4. Technical Operations Against the U.S. Embassy

a. Discussion

In reporting on KGB microphones in the U.S. Embassy (Pages 248-269), NOSENKO said in 1962 that there were at that time "four or five points," later adding a sixth, from which conversations were heard. They included the offices of the Minister Counselor, the Military Attache, the Naval Attache, the Air Attache, one (unidentified) "State Department employee," and the Agricultural Attache. He also referred to a non-productive microphone in the code room but did not count this as one of the points. NOSENKO did not supply details of the information which the KGB obtained from any of these microphones except to make general allusions to the importance of the materials from those in the offices of the Minister Counselor and the Military Attache. He stressed that the existence of these microphones was the KGB's "biggest secret" and that only a very few people knew of them. In 1964 NOSENKO gave more details and provided a written list of the offices where microphones were actively monitored in 1960 and 1961.

NOSENKO's information on the microphones would appear, on the basis of the findings of the sweep team in 1964, to be generally accurate. Where NOSENKO reported there was no production but microphones were found audible, the discrepancy could be explained by KGB technical failure to receive the intercepts after they left the point at which the sweepers tested; where NOSENKO reported materials were obtained (such as from the Air Attache's office) and the sweepers found the microphone inaudible, it could be conjectured that the microphone died between early 1962 and the date of the sweep in 1964. However, NOSENKO's reporting did not harm the Soviets, because GOLITSYN knew and had reported on one specific microphone, and another earlier (and probably compromised) source had also reported that the microphones were there. The microphone known to GOLITSYN, when located and traced back to the point where its wires left the building, would lead to the uncovering of all the other microphones, as in fact happened with the find in Room 1008 (Page 256).

NOSENKO was unable to expand on his microphone information after his defection. Questioned repeatedly for details of the operation or examples of the product of those microphones, he gave almost no operational details* and could supply only the same three generalized examples of their product which he had already given in 1962: the unproductivity of the code room microphone;

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* One of the few concrete incidents which NOSENKO recounted connected to the microphone operation (with the exception of the North Wing planning, see below) was the loss of a document reporting the product from one of the microphones; GOLITSYN had already told the same story (Page 255). GOLITSYN said he was present during the search for this document and it was under these circumstances that he learned specifically that there was a microphone in the office of the Minister Counselor. NOSENKO in 1962 stressed that this microphone was the most important in the Embassy.

the Minister Counselor's dictation, including fitness reports which NOSENKO said were of operational interest to the KGB but could not say how many of them there were or whom they concerned; and the Military Attache's planning of trips which permitted the KGB to seize equipment in Stalingrad in 1955. Of these three examples given by an officer who said he culled all the microphone materials for two years, one concerned a non-operating and therefore useless microphone, the second concerned a microphone (in the Minister Counselor's office) already reported by a previous defector, and the third concerned a well known incident which took place years earlier (and which NOSENKO should have planned and helped conduct, according to his claimed position in 1955; NOSENKO said he played no such role).*

In 1964 NOSENKO brought to CIA a sheet of paper which he said was in KOVSHUK's handwriting and which had been obtained in 1960 or 1961 during a conference (Pages 250-251). This, he said then, was how he knew of the exact locations of all the actively

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* A comparison between NOSENKO's third example and a 1956 message from a sensitive source who is believed to have been compromised to the KGB after that message (but before 1962) reveals similarities which may not be coincidental.

- NOSENKO (11 June 1962; see Page 260): "We are listening to your Military Attaches there. We know where they intend to travel, what they want to find out. We know what machinery and what targets interest them... Some of the things they say are surprising. They discuss, among other things, where to go, what to see, what to take with them - electric equipment or not. And we are hunting for this electronic equipment and now have permission, if we are absolutely certain that one of your people is taking electronic apparatus with him on an intelligence trip outside Moscow, to take, to steal it. We now have authorization to take any necessary steps to steal it. Because you now have improved your equipment. We stole some equipment in Stalingrad in 1955..."

- Sensitive source, 1956 (see Page 254): "... All rooms are being monitored by the KGB... The 'flap' involving the American direction - finding specialists in Stalingrad in the summer of 1955 was organized by the KGB because conversations were overheard in the rooms of the American Embassy. As you know, as a result of this flap, the KGB seized valuable direction-finding equipment from the American Intelligence officers..."

It is possible that both NOSENKO and the sensitive source were reporting a well-known event, because GOLITSYN reported in 1962 that the 1955 Stalingrad incident was written up in KGB training materials as an example of Second Chief Directorate work. The training version may have included the role of the microphone information (although GOLITSYN did not report that it did), which may thus have come naturally to the attention of NOSENKO and the sensitive source. However, this would call into question NOSENKO's allegation of direct access to all of the microphone product.

monitored and productive "points" in 1960-1961. NOSENKO was not able to explain why he would need this list to know the locations of the microphones when he had been daily receiving, selecting, and distributing the product of all of them for two years. Similarly, it was never clear why NOSENKO did not remember in 1962 that there were eleven points--as the list showed--rather than the four-to-six NOSENKO reported on in 1962.

NOSENKO's account of how the product from the microphones was distributed and exploited would inevitably mean that all KGB case officers who had served in the U.S. Embassy Section since the microphones were installed would know of their existence--despite any effort to paraphrase and disguise the product as "agent reports." NOSENKO nonetheless maintained in 1962 that "it is a tremendous secret that we are listening to you," and that the microphones were known to so few that any countermeasures the Americans might take on the basis of NOSENKO's statements could reflect dangerously on him as the source.*

Accepting at face value NOSENKO's claimed lack of aptitude and interest in technical matters, and therefore his inability to provide specific technical details concerning electronic operations against the American Embassy, it is still noteworthy that:

- NOSENKO did not know the purpose of the so-called "Moscow beam," sometimes saying it was to jam Embassy communications and at other times that it was used to monitor them.

- Although he claimed to have personally participated in the planning for the installation of audio devices in the North Wing of the Embassy, he did not know of the existence or the purpose of the coaxial cables and grill found there by American technicians in 1964. (NOSENKO insisted that there were no audio devices installed in the North Wing at the time of its renovation for occupancy by Americans.)

- NOSENKO knew nothing of the general lines of research and development to substitute for or improve the fading microphone coverage of the U.S. Embassy.

These three points relate to aspects of the KGB's audio-technical attack on the U.S. Embassy in which the reporting of a source in NOSENKO's claimed position, no matter what his technical aptitude, could have been detrimental to Soviet interests.

* Both GOLITSYN and the 1956 source cited on Page 254 were First Chief Directorate officers. That they both knew of the microphones suggests that NOSENKO exaggerated the sensitivity of the microphone operation, which had moreover always been assumed by the Embassy to be active.

b. Remarks

NOSENKO's sourcing of his information on electronic operations against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow was unclear and unlikely. His knowledge of the location and production of these microphones, as well as the existence, nature, and purpose of other electronic operations directed against the Embassy, was not commensurate with his alleged position in the U.S. Embassy Section and his particular responsibility for audio operations. Significantly, the essential element of the information which NOSENKO did report, the existence of the microphone in the Minister Counselor's office, would presumably have been considered by the KGB to have been compromised six months earlier, with the defection of GOLITSYN. Discovery of this microphone, as an outgrowth of action on GOLITSYN's information, would have led to all the others. Thus the Embassy microphones must have been considered by the KGB to have been compromised before NOSENKO first spoke of them in 1962. Added to this is the fact (supported by NOSENKO himself) that the efficiency of the Embassy microphone installation as a whole had seriously diminished by late 1961 or early 1962 due to, first, normal deterioration of equipment and wiring and, second, the installation of secure rooms and the implementation of more stringent security precautions at the Embassy. For these reasons and in the absence of any information concerning other forms of electronic attack against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, it cannot be considered that the information provided by NOSENKO in 1962 and 1964 was harmful to the interests of the KGB nor helpful to American authorities. NOSENKO's denial of any installations in the north wing, in the light of the later discovery there of coaxial cables, the purpose of which appears serious and is as yet unclarified, and in the light of NOSENKO's specific claim to have been responsible for the operational planning for the north wing at the time it was being prepared for American occupancy, would appear to be purposeful deception.

5. The BELITSKIY Case

a. Introduction

NOSENKO reported to CIA in June 1962 (as one of the two items he wanted to sell) that one of its agents, the Soviet interpreter BELITSKIY, was in fact a KGB double agent who had been planted on CIA (Pages 517-529). NOSENKO said that this was a case run by the Second ("Active Line") Section, but that he personally had a role in the management of the case in May 1962 in Geneva. NOSENKO was able to give certain inside information on this case; for example, he knew the nicknames used by the CIA case officers with the agent.

b. Discussion

NOSENKO's information, at least in its general outlines, was correct. CIA had been running BELITSKIY as an agent, and the CIA case officers (alias "Bob" and "Henry," the latter from Washington as NOSENKO said) had just completed a series of meetings with BELITSKIY in Geneva. Important aspects of his information were inaccurate: BELITSKIY had been recruited a year before NOSENKO's date of 1959, and in Brussels, not London. Also, NOSENKO's claim that this was a Second Chief Directorate operation aimed at enticing CIA into meetings in the USSR was not borne out by the history of the case or by BELITSKIY's conduct, although it cannot be excluded that this was a long-term objective which the KGB still sought without appearing to. NOSENKO's account of the case thus is not as accurate as could be expected if his own role in it had been as claimed.

NOSENKO's description of his own involvement is not consistent with observed Soviet practice or with operational logic. NOSENKO said in both 1962 and 1964 that he had had orders to supervise the handling of this case in Geneva in the spring of 1962. The reason was that the case officer for BELITSKIY in Geneva (ARTEMEV) was young and inexperienced and had not even worked on the BELITSKIY case before. NOSENKO was saying in effect--with the authority of direct knowledge and official responsibility--that BELITSKIY, a prominent Soviet citizen having personal contacts with well placed members of the Soviet Government, a man who had been under the ostensible control of a hostile intelligence service (CIA) for four years, was sent by the KGB to Geneva for the purpose of recontacting CIA, with prepared information, but that the KGB did not send with him the responsible case officer or any member of the section responsible for the operation. Instead, the KGB turned over the responsibility to a young and inexperienced KGB officer who happened to be in Geneva to protect the security of a delegation and who had had no prior connection with the BELITSKIY case nor even local knowledge of Geneva conditions; then, after BELITSKIY was already in Geneva, the KGB had cabled instructions that NOSENKO, who had no need to know of the case and had learned of it only unofficially from conversations in 1960-1961 with the Section Chief responsible, who had no experience or training in handling double agent operations, and who was similarly in Geneva

by chance with delegation security functions, should guide the other "less experienced" case officer.* As NOSENKO showed under questioning, he did not know the contents of any of the positive intelligence BELITSKIY was to pass to CIA as disinformation; he did not know BELITSKIY's Moscow or Geneva pattern of movement or contacts; he did not know in detail how or when the operation started; he did not know the nature of degree of British involvement, nor the operational details and contact arrangements. NOSENKO said that BELITSKIY had been placed on a Geneva delegation in the hope that CIA might be able to "find" and recontact him.**

c. Remarks

The circumstances above not only cast doubt on NOSENKO's version of the case and his own access but also suggest that NOSENKO did not have a theoretical appreciation of how double agents are handled. The examples he gave of his "guidance" to ARTEMEV are few in number. NOSENKO also stated in 1964 that he had arranged the actual introduction to BELITSKIY of KISLOV, the TASS man, to provide for BELITSKIY's need of a notional subsource for some of his disinformation; NOSENKO by October 1966 had apparently forgotten this event, for he stated unequivocally that KISLOV had had no connection whatever with the BELITSKIY case. NOSENKO claimed to have met BELITSKIY, but did not recognize his photo when shown it in 1966.

Did NOSENKO's report to CIA on the BELITSKIY case harm the KGB? It was useful to CIA, since despite frequently expressed doubts of BELITSKIY's bona fides, CIA was handling the operation as if it were genuine (but not intending to go to the extent of exposing to BELITSKIY CIA assets inside the USSR). (The KGB is

* NOSENKO has reported that he handled only one American agent (FRIPPEL); he had practically no knowledge of CIA nor even vicarious exposure to the substance of any other double agent operations. ARTEMEV had had extended contact with a CIA tourist agent as early as August 1958, a role in other operations against American tourists in 1959--including clandestine search (see Page 148), and continuous American Department service since then. NOSENKO did not know of the 1958-1959 operational activities of ARTEMEV, although they fell in the operational area NOSENKO claimed to have supervised at the time as Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section.

** NOSENKO was seemingly unaware that BELITSKIY had contact arrangements which would presumably guarantee recontact.

aware, as Soviet Bloc counterintelligence guidance demonstrates, of the dangers inherent in having disinformation recognized as such.) The meetings in Geneva in May 1962 would have made it clear to the KGB that CIA had no intentions of meeting BELITSKIY inside the USSR, and, in KGB eyes, the case may have reached the point of diminishing returns. It is perhaps significant that NOSENKO did not contact CIA and report on the BELITSKIY case until 10 days after BELITSKIY's series of meetings with CIA in Geneva had been completed, which would have given the KGB time for final appraisal of the operation's potential.

NOSENKO's account of his own role in this operation appears to have been false, and nothing in the available evidence would preclude Soviet sacrifice of this already tired operation. Since NOSENKO provided some inside details of a sensitive KGB operation which could have been known to only a few, it is difficult to find any other explanation of NOSENKO's access to this information except that the KGB briefed him about it.

6. KGB Investigations*

a. Compromise of POPOV

(i) Introduction

Fixing the date and cause of the compromise of POPOV, the CIA penetration source in the GRU (Pages 530-534) could affect the evaluation of NOSENKO's production. If what NOSENKO has said is basically true, his story of POPOV's compromise (which has also been reported by other sources) is not particularly important and has not harmed the KGB nor measurably assisted CIA: The KGB assumes an awareness by CIA that it conducts surveillance of U.S. Embassy personnel, especially those having known or suspected American Intelligence connections (as with LANGELLE and WINTERS). If NOSENKO on the other hand has been incomplete or inaccurate in his statements about the compromise of POPOV, then his claims to knowledgeability on this subject must be questioned.

(ii) Discussion

The information from NOSENKO and other sources on the POPOV compromise may be collated and summarized in tabular form:

Cause	Date Implied	Source
KGB surveillance of WINTERS	21 January 1959	NOSENKO**
KGB surveillance of WINTERS	21 January 1959	CHEREPANOV document
KGB intercept of WINTERS letter	21 January 1959	POPOV message of 18 September 1959***
KGB surveillance of U.S. Embassy officer	none	[redacted] sensitive source
KGB surveillance of LANGELLE	4 January 1959	GOLITSYN, from the KGB orientation paper on the POPOV case *****
KGB agent	prior to 23 November 1957	GOLITSYN******

* Under this heading, only the compromises of POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, and CHEREPANOV are considered; there is insufficient collateral material available for an evaluation of NOSENKO's information on Vladimir KAZAN-KOMAREK (pages 569-570) and Alfred SLESINGER (Pages 571-575).

** NOSENKO reported that the KGB observed WINTERS mailing a letter which, upon being checked, was found to be addressed to POPOV; he has contradicted himself about whether the KGB applied metka to this letter.

***POPOV is believed to have been under KGB control in composing this letter.

(Footnotes continued on next page.)

The only other evidence available is analytical. POPOV was transferred to the Illegals handling unit in Berlin on 28 June 1957, an assignment of high sensitivity. Until mid-August he handled five Illegals, thereafter only one, TAIROVA, in October 1957. Following home leave from 12 December 1957 to 19 January 1958, he was again transferred, this time to a position where Illegals and productive GRU sources of intelligence were not exposed to him. Between March and November 1958 there were signs of a KGB investigation of the Illegals handling unit where POPOV formerly served, and he was recalled to Moscow in November of that year. These facts can be interpreted as follows:

- POPOV's status as a CIA source was not compromised before his transfer to the Illegals handling unit.

- POPOV's status was compromised before his recall to Moscow in November 1958, probably before his reassignment from the Illegals handling unit in January 1958, and possibly some time earlier. The latter possibility is apparent from the Soviets' knowledge that the TAIROVA couple was under surveillance in December 1957 (and until March 1958); it is also noteworthy that, after having met five Illegals in less than one and one-half months prior to 13 August 1957, POPOV subsequently was involved personally with only one other, TAIROVA, in October 1957.

- The KGB, realizing that POPOV was a CIA source, chose to keep him in Berlin until November 1958 in order to investigate the possibility of his operating in conjunction with other CIA sources.

This line of reasoning, if accepted, would confirm GOLITSYN's information that a KGB agent compromised POPOV prior to the arrival of ZHUKOV in Berlin, an arrival date falling some time before 23 November 1957.

(Footnotes from preceeding page.)

*****Since such orientation papers are written for general circulation within the KGB, it is doubtful that KGB security practices would permit their contents to reveal sensitive information; other sources have indicated that orientation papers sometimes are sanitized; this particular paper, however, reportedly did state that the KGB learned from an agent in about 1957 (GOLITSYN's estimate) that American Intelligence had a source which had provided GRU information.

******This date, which is consistent with that cited in the final sentence of the preceeding footnote, was derived from the time when POPOV reported the presence of the KGB officer ZHUKOV in Berlin; according to GOLITSYN, ZHUKOV was sent to Berlin after POPOV had been identified by a KGB agent as being a source of CIA.

(iii) Remarks

The completeness and accuracy of NOSENKO's information on the compromise of POPOV, supported as it is by [illegible] and the CHEREPANOV document and POPOV's message but contradicted by GOLITSYN and analytical evidence, cannot be finally evaluated. Only with resolution of the bona fides of NOSENKO can a judgment be made on this part of his production.

b. Compromise of PENKOVSKIY*

(i) Introduction

Because his direct responsibility for coverage of ABIDIAN is an essential element in NOSENKO's story of his 1960-1961 career, because he insists that the KGB had no idea of U.S. involvement in the PENKOVSKIY case until Richard JACOB went to the Pushkin Street dead drop on 2 November 1962, and because he is adamant on the point that the KGB until almost the end of the PENKOVSKIY case knew of no connection between PENKOVSKIY and the Pushkin Street site which ABIDIAN visited, NOSENKO's story of the compromise of PENKOVSKIY appears to bear directly on the question of NOSENKO's bona fides. Each of the various versions of the compromise of PENKOVSKIY must be examined and compared with NOSENKO's story and with the established facts.**

(ii) Discussion

[redacted] sources agree on the cause, and two on the timing. NOSENKO, [redacted], and the "official KGB report" attribute the compromise to the fact that surveillance detected a meeting between Mrs. CHISHOLM and the Soviet whom the KGB later identified as PENKOVSKIY. NOSENKO dated this as around November or December 1961, the official report stated this occurred on 30 December 1961, and [redacted] did not give a date.

[redacted] gave the cause as surveillance, but of Greville WYNNE and PENKOVSKIY rather than Mrs. CHISHOLM, and stated that the compromise dated from May 1962. [redacted] gave two different accounts, one that PENKOVSKIY was investigated for reasons unrelated to any suspicions of espionage and was thereby found out as a spy, the other that his excessive spending and sale of foreign merchandise led to an investigation which resulted in detection of his espionage activities. She placed the timing of the first version in 1961, without citing the time of year; in the second, she associated the timing with a warning against association with PENKOVSKIY which she and her husband received in about November 1961. [redacted] Since

* See Pages 535-547 for discussion of this case.

**It does not seem unusual for several sources to have reported on the compromise of PENKOVSKIY: Presumably this was the subject of widespread discussion within the two Soviet services, for it was covered in the Soviet press and in at least one "official report" disseminated by the KGB. Although their differing situations within the Soviet services could partially explain the differing versions that these sources have given, some of them nevertheless have claimed either direct knowledge of the compromise or specially informed sub-sources. Therefore the discrepancies among the reporting of NOSENKO on the PENKOVSKIY compromise, the accounts by other sources, and the facts on the handling of the case by CIA and MI-6 are pertinent to the question of NOSENKO's bona fides.

14-00000

DATE 4/12/94

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THE DOCUMENT OR PAGE(S) LISTED BELOW WAS/WERE MISSING DURING THE DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY THE HISTORICAL REVIEW GROUP, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE.

DOCUMENT NO. ____________ DATED: ____________

OR

PAGE(S) 667

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FOLDER NO. 2

PENKOVSKIY that he had visited the site after he chose it in 1960, although it is possible, especially as he had not been informed of ABIDIAN having been sent to check on a possible signal from him about the dead drop. sensitive source

[redacted] however, makes it clear that the ABIDIAN visit was not the first observed activity at Pushkin Street to stir KGB investigative interest in the site. As the report states, when massive surveillance of U.S. Embassy targets detected an American visiting this address the first time, he was not followed inside by surveillants, but on the second occasion he was followed closely and the surveillant observed that he was kneeling down apparently tying his shoe.* [redacted] went on to say that, although this was not very unusual, it was sufficient to arouse suspicion in view of the fact that this American had been observed visiting the same address on two occasions for no apparent reason. There is no question about the fact that ABIDIAN visited the Pushkin Street drop site on one occasion only, and that was on 30 December 1961. The reference to this as a second visit to this address by an American from the Embassy is a clear indication that the KGB had surveilled the first such visit, which was made by the CIA officer MAHONEY** in January 1961, and not by ABIDIAN. Thus where [redacted] erred by indicating one American went to Pushkin Street twice, the KGB must have known that MAHONEY went there first, in January 1961 and ABIDIAN went there next, on 30 December 1961. [redacted] said that the 24-hour fixed surveillance resulted from the second visit, and because of it PENKOVSKIY was subsequently observed to enter the vestibule of this address but did not visit anyone there. It was determined that no one living at that address knew PENKOVSKIY and he became a target of KGB suspicion and investigation.

The rest of the [redacted] story is completely in disagreement with the facts of the case and does not warrant discussion here. It must be noted, nonetheless, that this is the only instance among all the versions which places the compromise on the American side of the case, and the only one which makes a direct connection between the Pushkin Street dead drop and the KGB detection of PENKOVSKIY. (All others attribute the compromise to surveillance of British Embassy personnel, and NOSENKO claimed that the KGB was unaware of American Intelligence participation until the operation was terminated.) It is also in direct conflict with NOSENKO, who had no knowledge of any U.S. Embassy official visiting the Pushkin Street site prior to ABIDIAN. In this regard, NOSENKO insisted that the date of ABIDIAN's visit

* ABIDIAN reported that a woman entered the vestibule behind him while he was in there, and he knelt down pretending to tie his shoelaces until she proceeded past him and on up the stairs.

**NOSENKO was not aware that MAHONEY had been identified to the KGB as a CIA officer well before MAHONEY's October 1960 arrival in Moscow.

was the end of 1960 or the very beginning of 1961, whereas in fact MAHONEY's visit was in January 1961. Despite the errors relating to loadings and unloadings of deaddrops at the Pushkin Street location after the second (ABIDIAN) visit there, this story from [redacted] establishes KGB knowledge of MAHONEY's casing of Pushkin Street.

Greville WYNNE's testimony concerning his interrogations by the KGB also introduced elements contradicting the versions of NOSENKO, [redacted] and [redacted]. As indicated in discussion of NOSENKO's story of the [redacted] conversation with DULACKI (Pages 536-538), the KGB was convinced that PENKOVSKIY's question about his girlfriend "ZEP" was an important allusion and they demanded that WYNNE explain it. WYNNE either had forgotten the name or had never known it, and he was unable to tell the KGB who "ZEP" was. The fact that the KGB had a recording of this 27 May 1961 conversation shows also that the KGB was at least suspicious of the relationship before that conversation took place and must have then become aware of the conspiratorial aspect of the PENKOVSKIY-WYNNE relationship by virtue of the cryptic nature of that conversation. The additional fact that the KGB surveilled WYNNE to the apartment of an unidentified officer of British Intelligence on the same day the "ZEP" conversation between WYNNE and PENKOVSKIY was monitored is evidence that both WYNNE and PENKOVSKIY were under strong suspicion of espionage as of that day, if not earlier. Nor could those suspicions have been explained away by the fact that PENKOVSKIY and WYNNE had legitimate cover reasons for contact, in view of the content of their conversation--there was nothing in their overt relationship which required secrecy or even caution in conversation.

The indication from [redacted] that the KGB was aware of MAHONEY's visit to the inside vestibule of the Pushkin Street site in January 1961 is not only missing from all other versions, but conspicuously so from NOSENKO's story; he claimed to know everything the KGB knew about this American dead drop site, because of ABIDIAN's visit there. NOSENKO on one occasion said that he thought an American tourist (not a U.S. Embassy officer) might have visited the site a year or two earlier than ABIDIAN.

(iii) Remarks

NOSENKO did not know or did not report to CIA that the only other American who had visited the Pushkin Street dead drop area was MAHONEY. This fact suggests that either NOSENKO was deliberately withholding from CIA information of vital importance in the PENKOVSKIY compromise, or he was unaware of the KGB's possession of this information, despite his claimed position in the U.S. Embassy Section and responsibility for coverage of ABIDIAN. The fact that his story on the PENKOVSKIY compromise, like the "official report" of the KGB, does not show the seriousness of the evidence in the KGB's possession as of 27 May 1961 additionally points to his withholding of information on the subject of the timing of PENKOVSKIY's compromise, which was definitely no later than this date. If NOSENKO was deliberately withholding information on this subject and lying about the PENKOVSKIY compromise, then he is not a bona fide defector. If he is unaware of the information which the KGB has in its possession, then he was not in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960 or 1961 as claimed, and hence his bona fides would be disproven.

c. Compromise of CHEREPANOV

(i) Introduction

NOSENKO's stories on the compromises of POPOV and PENKOVSKIY were examined for their accuracy as to timing and cause. In the case of CHEREPANOV (Pages 548-568), there is no question about when the so-called CHEREPANOV papers were passed, nor how the KGB openly learned of the U.S. Embassy's possession of the papers. The chief question is the authenticity of the documents themselves, with the subsidiary implications, if they are not authentic, that the passage of the papers was instigated by the KGB, and that there could have been neither a compromise of nor a search for CHEREPANOV, as described by NOSENKO and attested to by his travel authorization (see also Part VIII.D.8.).

(ii) The Operational Plan in Draft

Examination of one draft document--the operational plan against the CIA officer WINTERS--reveals the following points related to form:

- Although only a draft, the title of the case officer, the designation of his office, the title of his supervisor as approving authority, and the designation of his office component as well as the title of the confirming authority (the head of the department) are spelled out in full, even including the subordination of the KGB to the Council of Ministers of the USSR. KGB practice, as reported by other sources and as logic would dictate, does not require that this be done, cumbersome as these designations are, and the typist routinely fills them in as the official copy is typed from the draft.

- Although only a draft, this document has been signed by KOVSHUK as being approved, which is against common sense and KGB practice. NOSENKO himself noted this discrepancy, asking himself aloud why KOVSHUK had done this.

- Although only a draft, the name of the target of the plan appears several times, but earlier KGB defectors have stated and NOSENKO himself has confirmed that the name is left out of drafts so the typist in the typing pool will not know the identity of the subject of the report; a blank line is used wherever the name is to appear to be filled in by hand by the case officer after the document comes back from the typist.

- On the basis of references to LANGELLE and POPOV, this plan (which is not dated) would have to have been drafted sometime after October 1959. WINTERS by this time had been in Moscow since August 1958, had been detected in operational letter-mailing, and had been associating with KGB officers, etc. Neither this

operational plan nor any other of the drafts included in the CHEREPANOV package cited a KGB cryptonym for him, and he is always referred to in true name, but this is contrary to the usage in the other operational plans in the package. It is also contrary to KGB practice, as described by NOSENKO and other sources.

- The draft cited several technical aids to be used in the clandestine study of WINTERS. It not only gives the KGB cryptonym of metka and "Neptun-80" for two of these techniques, but immediately thereafter explains for what purpose each one of them is used. In the other operational plans from CHEREPANOV, and in conformance with the established KGB practice of inserting cryptonyms for such devices, these preparations are not only not described, but the blank line typed by the typist has been filled in by hand after typing.

In addition to the above points of form, this same document contains statements which run counter to rigid KGB practice and which are internally contradictory, especially noteworthy in an approved draft. One of the objectives announced in the plan is to investigate two Soviet citizens who were detected in contact with WINTERS in Moscow; one of the two is identified parenthetically as having gone abroad. This document, if genuine, would be an admission on the part of the case officer, and an approval thereof by his supervisor, that a Soviet citizen who had been observed in contact with an identified officer of American Intelligence had been cleared by the KGB for travel abroad before the nature of that contact had been satisfactorily determined by the KGB. This is in contradiction to all available information concerning KGB travel clearances, which are denied on the basis of unauthorized contacts between Soviet citizens and foreigners in the Soviet Union, not to mention Western Intelligence officers. The draft, which consists of only three paragraphs, can be summarized briefly by paragraph to demonstrate the internal contradictions:

- To establish the nature of WINTERS' intelligence activities in the USSR, six special tasks will be carried out, including round-the-clock surveillance, metka, "Neptun-80," hidden microphones, other audio-devices, and investigation of already identified Soviet citizens.

- Because he already been identified as an intelligence operator, and he has a hostile attitude toward the USSR, there is no basis for recruitment; therefore the actions outlined in the first paragraph will not be carried out because they might alarm him and cause him to leave the USSR prematurely.

- Despite the statements of the second paragraph, which indicate that recruitment is out of the question and which precludes putting into effect the measures outlined in the first paragraph, this third paragraph sets forth the expectation that just before WINTERS' scheduled departure and depending on further accumulation of materials on WINTERS and the prevailing political climate at the time, an opportunity is likely to arise which will permit testing the possibility of recruiting him.

If the WINTERS operation plan were a draft like the others in this collection, the above conflicting and confusing paragraphs might be explained as variations jotted down as possible approaches to presenting a plan for the future, as yet undecided in direction. This document, however, is the one which--to NOSENKO's puzzlement--had been approved and signed in draft by KOVSHUK, as Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate. The preparing case officer, KUSKOV, had furthermore indicated to the typing pool that it was to be typed in one copy, which gives the document the appearance of a draft which had been or was about to be made a matter of official KGB record.

The foregoing review of errors, contradictions, and disregard for security considerations in preparation constitutes evidence that this is not a genuine KGB draft document.

(iii) The Summary on LANGELLE

A second document, a handwritten note in what NOSENKO identified as CHEREPANOV's own handwriting, also is pertinent to the authenticity of the papers and of NOSENKO's account on CHEREPANOV. This is a short summary of the operational activity of the CIA officer LANGELLE, covering the compromise of POPOV. The document says in part: "In January 1959 a letter with secret writing mailed by a co-worker of the Embassy of the USA in Moscow, WINTERS, was intercepted and was addressed to a Soviet citizen, POPOV, a worker of the General Staff of the Soviet Army. According to the contents of the letter, it was clearly established that POPOV was an American agent..."

This coincides precisely with NOSENKO's account of POPOV's compromise (see Pages 532 and 663). Unlike GOLITSYN's recollection of the official report which he read, there is no reference in this document to the report of about 1957 from an agent source that there was a leak of GRU information; nor is there reference to the indication that the KGB knew that LANGELLE had been posted to Moscow in order to handle a special agent, for this reason placing LANGELLE under heavy surveillance. If both of these items were in the official report which GOLITSYN read, their omission from the summary report in what purports to be CHEREPANOV's handwriting is noteworthy, particularly since CHEREPANOV was supposed to have been in the same office (room) as the case officer working against LANGELLE during the time the LANGELLE/POPOV operation was investigated by the KGB. The latter position should lend authority to CHEREPANOV's version of the compromise and termination of the case; yet GOLITSYN--informed only from the official, and presumably sanitized, account--had more detail, as well as conflicting information, on the same case. While it is reasonable that a sanitized case summary would conceal an agent source of a lead by imputing the discovery to surveillance, it seems less likely, and indeed unnecessary, to conceal a detection via surveillance by imputing it to an agent source. In thus supporting NOSENKO and others as to the cause of POPOV's compromise, and contradicting GOLITSYN (who is supported by other evidence accumulated independently), this document too appears to be a KGB fabrication.

The authenticity of another passage in the same document is likewise open to question. This is the description of LANGELLE's two visits to Lenin Hills, which the documents stated were for

the purposes of casing a drop site and putting down the dead drop, respectively. The document further stated that the dead drop had been put down for REPNIKOV, an agent of American Intelligence who had recently been arrested by the Moscow KGB. Two errors of fact in this passage belie KGB practice as known from many sources:

- There is no reason to doubt that the KGB observed LANGELLE on the two occasions of his visits to Lenin Hills, both times to case a proposed dead drop site. Both sites involved staircases, but they were two different staircases in the same general area of the Lenin Hills park. Since it is a fact that LANGELLE did not put down a dead drop on either occasion, KGB surveillance could not have seen him do so. If the KGB had reason to suspect that he had done so, but could not locate it (since it was not there), the KGB would feel the necessity--even more than in the case of ABIDIAN and the Pushkin Street drop--to put 24-hour surveillance on the area for a reasonable length of time, in order to apprehend the agent for whom it was intended. The dead drop was not actually put down until 7 June 1958 (during twilight), ten days after the second casing. Assuming the KGB had not stopped its coverage of the area after only ten days, the CIA agent who did put down the dead drop must have been observed doing this. CHEREPANOV's note thus erred by attributing to LANGELLE an action which the KGB knew he had not taken and which the KGB almost certainly knew someone else had taken.

- At the time the dead drop was put down, it had not been designated for any agent, REPNIKOV included. It was a contingency dead drop, to be activated at some time in the future as necessary; the agent for whom it might have been designated could conceivably not even be recruited until long after the dead drop was loaded. REPNIKOV, identified in the document as the person intended to unload it, was not a recruited agent of American Intelligence either at the time of the drop-loading or at any time thereafter; neither was any dead drop contemplated for him in the event that he might be recruited. Nothing that was in the drop could have suggested REPNIKOV as the intended recipient. Again, CHEREPANOV's note erroneously and groundlessly assigned the dead drop to REPNIKOV whereas in fact this dead drop was unassigned by CIA.

If this document were or purported to be the official version of the activities of LANGELLE, in typed or printed form, these errors in fact could be interpreted as intentional and part of the sanitization, or part of an effort to make the KGB investigative work look better than it was. As it is a handwritten copy, supposedly in the writing of the person who intended to give the document to the U.S. Government and harm the KGB, and since CHEREPANOV supposedly would have had access to the true facts, the absence of some comment further indicates that the document was intentionally inaccurate and incomplete.

(iv) Remarks

That at least two of the documents were not authentic is evidence that the CHEREPANOV papers were designed by the KGB for American Intelligence consumption.

There is no sensitive information contained in any of the documents; that is, they are not worth the risk of stealing either in helping the West or damaging the KGB. It is further questionable how CHEREPANOV was able to steal drafts destined for destruction which are dated August 1958, March 1959, and so on, if he had not acquired his motivation of bitterness against the KGB until 1961, as indicated by NOSENKO and other sources. It is also possible to question numerous other aspects of the CHEREPANOV case, some dating from the earliest known history of the man and others more recent. This seems unnecessary in view of the analysis of the WINTERS document and the LANGELLE summary.

It follows that the CHEREPANOV incident was a provocative plan of the KGB. NOSENKO's story about CHEREPANOV, a mutually confirming source on KGB affairs, must be interpreted as an indication that he has deliberately lied in reporting on the CHEREPANOV case and his part in the investigation, now shown to have been spurious. He has also lied in attesting to the validity of the CHEREPANOV documents and thereby to the validity of his own information on the same topics which those documents also covered.

C. Evaluation of Sourcing

1. Introduction

NOSENKO was able to provide logical and plausible sourcing for most of his American leads, through his claimed professional assignments. Among his foreign leads, those to which he had no plausible direct access have been variously sourced to hearsay from case officer friends (as with VASSALL, from his friend CHURANOV) and involvement in peripheral activities (such as his TDY to the city of Vladimir after the [illegible] had been spotted as a homosexual during a visit there). Question-able sourcing by NOSENKO has occurred in his statements on his one double agent case, four American cases and three involving foreigners. They are reviewed below because they include the most important leads NOSENKO has provided.

2. Discussion

There are two KGB Second Chief Directorate operations in-volving Americans which NOSENKO has sourced inconsistently or falsely.

He demonstrated uncertainty in his knowledge of the facts of the "ANDREY" case (Pages 413-426) by making vague allusions to having heard of it in "bits and pieces" from a number of case officers involved in the case at different times; his first know-ledge of it, he said, was due to his own employment in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1953-1955, "although I worked there quite a bit later. But it was known." (In 1962 he repeatedly dated the recruitment as "1949-50.") Dayle SMITH, identified as "ANDREY", fixed his recruitment date around December 1953, and he did not leave Moscow until April 1954. Since SMITH was directly sub-ordinate to the office of the Army Attache, which was responsible for the Embassy's code room, NOSENKO as case officer for the Army Attaches had a logical reason for knowing more than he claimed about the case, including the agent's name. MULE, who succeeded VAN LAETHEM as cryptographic security officer and SMITH's super-visor, was supposed to be one of NOSENKO's more active cases at this time. It is clear from NOSENKO's inability to claim direct knowledge of the case that he was not aware of these facts.

In the case of Edward Ellis SMITH (Pages 468-469), the U.S. Embassy Security Officer from 1954 to 1956, NOSENKO's ignorance of the objective facts of the case led him into statements con-cerning his own knowledge of the case which cannot be true. In 1962 he claimed to have played a significant role in the attempt to recruit SMITH, but he admitted after the defection that these claims were exaggerations designed to make him look better than he was at the time. He said the case officer was KOVSHUK, and GRIBANOV was personally running the operation, but that in a sense he did play a role: he was assigned to a phone watch in support of surveillance during the final phase of the case. Once again it is clear that he did not know the dates of SMITH's assignment to Moscow (1954 to 1956) nor did he know that the operation he has described took place between 1 and 5 June 1956, and that SMITH was recalled from Moscow on 8 June 1956. This is a full year after NOSENKO said he transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section.

NOSENKO claimed to have had a direct role as the supervising case officer in the BELITSKIY case in its 1962 Geneva phase. As a first-hand source, however, he was wrong about the origins of the operation and ignorant of the content and the operational planning of the 1962 meetings he was supposedly supervising. In this instance, as in the Edward SMITH case, NOSENKO's information is inadequate for his sourcing.

NOSENKO provided leads to nine KGB operations which had originated with the First Chief Directorate. Six of these he claimed to have learned about through his friend in that Directorate, GUK, who was personally involved in most of these operations.* Of the other three, two--the Paris agent (JOHNSON) and the Brussels/NATO case--he said he picked up in bits and pieces from technicians of the Second Chief Directorate's Special Section who had assisted in them. For both of the latter operations, numerous coincidences were alleged by NOSENKO to have enabled him to obtain the fragmentary information from his sub-sources, and he was never able to clarify what parts he learned from which of the four technicians he named as sub-sources.

In describing his acquisition of information on the ninth case, "SASHA," NOSENKO has contradicted himself: He first said he had learned about "SASHA" from SHALYAPIN, providing lengthy and involved explanations of how he became acquainted with SHALYAPIN at the time of the latter's retirement from the KGB in 1962. Later, under interrogation, NOSENKO did not recall his statements that SHALYAPIN was the original source of the "SASHA" story, first attributing it to others and later saying that he could not remember when and from whom he first heard it, but SHALYAPIN and others had talked about it. This was despite the fact that by the time he heard of "SASHA" he had already met and agreed to cooperate with CIA; furthermore, when asked if "SASHA" was an important lead, he agreed that it was a serious matter. Except for this one occasion he had consistently failed to appreciate the significance of such a lead, indicating that it was not considered important in the KGB.

Also casting doubt on his sourcing of "SASHA" is the fact that, in his first reference to "SASHA" and the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, NOSENKO said he had learned of this item from SHALYAPIN, whereas later he said it was not from SHALYAPIN (but he could not identify another source from whom he had heard this detail).

Regarding NOSENKO's leads to other Westerners, the case of the [redacted] "illegal" in Canada--[redacted] the RCMP's [redacted] [redacted]--is paradoxical as to sourcing. NOSENKO first said his friend GUK had told him of the case unofficially, GUK having been involved in the operation in Moscow. When asked why GUK should be involved in a Canadian case in 1963 when he was supposedly working in the First Chief Directorate's American Department against American targets, NOSENKO retracted his initial statement and said that GUK somehow got in contact with him, not as a KGB officer but simply as an acquaintance. Despite the non-official nature of GUK's relationship as thus implied by NOSENKO, GUK was able to tell him all the operational details concerning [redacted] except his name. This case has an odd

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*Although he had met GUK many years before, NOSENKO indicated that they did not become friends until his visit to Geneva in 1962, and only then did GUK begin to reveal operational details to him.

aspect which NOSENKO failed to see: He said that this man had come to Moscow on a Soviet visa issued on a separate piece of paper, rather than entered in the man's passport, so that there would not be a permanent record of his travel to the USSR. This implies, and [redacted] confirmed, that he travelled under his true name to Moscow. [redacted] furthermore confirmed that he had gone as a tourist, entering the USSR on a Soviet tourist ship. In view of the First Chief Directorate's operational jurisdiction in this otherwise normal tourist, there was an obvious necessity for coordination between the First Chief Directorate's American Department and the Second Chief Directorate's Tourist Department, to prevent any slippage (such as NOSENKO described in the SHUBIN case, when the GRU failed to coordinate with the KGB). Yes despite logical professional need-to-know on NOSENKO's part, he first made his own knowledge unofficial, and then his subsource's knowledge unofficial as well.

NOSENKO was unable to explain how he had learned of the case of [redacted] French [redacted] When pressed for a subsource, he claimed that he had attended a reception at the Indian Embassy in 1958 or 1959 with GRIBANOV, and when GRIBANOV told him to take a glass of wine to [redacted] he understood somehow that [redacted] was an agent of GRIBANOV's.

His sourcing for the case of the French businessman, [redacted] (Page 484), is not unlike that of [redacted] He said he had known that there was a French businessman who was an agent. On one occasion when NOSENKO was duty officer for the Second Chief Directorate a call for GRIBANOV came in and he asked who was calling. When he was told it was [redacted] then he knew somehow that this was GRIBANOV's agent.

3. Remarks

NOSENKO's errors concerning "ANDREY" (particularly his early insistence that "ANDREY" had left Moscow years before NOSENKO entered the KGB) make it impossible that NOSENKO could have learned of the case in the way he later said he did.

NOSENKO's accounts of how he learned of the "Paris agent" are vague and vary with each telling; they also depend heavily on coincidence. It is noteworthy too that he claimed to have been told of this one operation by no less than four individuals, whereas the rest of what he learned of First Chief Directorate operations in eleven years of KGB service came from only two other individuals. Furthermore, his knowledge of "SASHA" stemmed from elaborate and apparently contrived sourcing which he himself was unable to reconstruct when pressed for exact details. NOSENKO's inability to give any clear and consistent account of how he heard of either the "Paris agent" or "SASHA" must be judged in the light of the fact that he first heard of both cases only just after promising to collect such information for CIA. Because these were among the most important and the most fortuitous items he ever picked up, it could reasonably be expected that he would remember how he did so, especially since only a little over a year elapsed until his next meeting with CIA.

NOSENKO's sourcing for the [redacted] and [redacted] leads seems illogical and fabricated. It also appears that NOSENKO has given an inaccurate version of the way in which he would have learned of [redacted] (not an Illegal as NOSENKO indicated, but an agent).

D. Examination of NOSENKO's Intelligence Career

1. Introduction

What follows is an examination of NOSENKO's accounts of his Soviet Intelligence career, beginning with the years 1951 and 1952, in the naval GRU and continuing with his 11 years in the U.S. Embassy Section and the Tourist Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO's naval service opens the discussion primarily because, according to his story, it provided a springboard for his entrance into the KGB in 1953 with the rank of lieutenant.

The discussion of each period in his career has two central topics: First, NOSENKO's own description of his positions, responsibilities, and access; and second, an assessment of this description from the point of view of internal consistency, accuracy, and the commensurability of his knowledge, operational activities, and performance with his claimed senior and responsible posts with the KGB and his rise to these posts. This assessment is based on a comparison of the information supplied by NOSENKO with collateral information from a variety of overt, official, defector, and clandestine sources.

NOSENKO's accounts of the various periods in his career are, of course, cumulative in that his claimed positions and activities during one stage necessarily affect those of succeeding periods. Insofar as possible, each period is evaluated within itself and independently of conclusions earlier reached.

2. Naval GRU Service

a. Introduction

NOSENKO's accounts* of his naval GRU service (Pages 64-77) have been reviewed for their internal consistency and credibility, and examined for accuracy against information from other sources.

b. Discussion

Briefly, the outlines of NOSENKO's account of his military service are about as follows:

- He studied for the equivalent of 7th, 8th, 9th and part of 10th school years in naval schools in Kuibyshev, Baku and Leningrad. This would normally have nothing to do with military service, except that NOSENKO says he took the military oath at the Baku School in the fall of 1943, at the age of 16. (According to available collateral information, the oath--formal entry into the military forces--was at no time given before the age of 17, and never for purposes of "show" or "morale" as NOSENKO claimed it was here.) He claims to have deserted this school after taking the oath. Also, he shot himself in the hand only about two months after starting anew later the same year in the naval school in Leningrad and never finished school properly.

- He was commissioned in the "reserves" in 1947 after completing his second year at the Institute of International Relations in Moscow. However, he cannot remember what branch of the service he was in, except that it was not the navy. He avoided active military duty thereafter by voluntarily doing military translations at the Institute. While at the Institute he contracted venereal disease at least twice and this went on his record.

- In the spring of 1950, he was assigned to the Navy by a mandate commission at the Institute. However, he failed one of his examinations ("Marxism-Leninism") upon completion of the Institute of International Relations later in 1950 which delayed his diploma--and hence entry into the service--until successful re-examination later that year. (At about the same time, he was considered and turned down by the KGB [then MGB] because of his school record, drunkenness, and other bad marks in his record.)

- He was processed for entry into the naval GRU in 1950. He said he visited the GRU personnel office several times for interviews and to fill out questionnaires and write his personal history in connection with the required security check. He was accepted into naval GRU despite a record which showed desertion, self-inflicted wound in

* There is no single account of this period of NOSENKO's life which can be examined because NOSENKO has altered the circumstances and dates importantly from one telling to the next.

wartime, drunkenness, venereal disease, still-valid marriage to a State criminal's daughter, rejection for MGB employment, and a bad academic record including failure of a course in Marxism-Leninism just at this time.

- He was called to active duty as a senior lieutenant on 12 March 1951, and without any indoctrination or training, he departed four or five days later in civilian clothes for his first duty station, Sovietskaya Gavan' in the Soviet Far East. NOSENKO claims to have chosen this post, considered generally to be the least desirable of all naval assignments, on his own initiative, to prove to his father that he was a man. (The above was his account in 1966, in all earlier accounts he said he went to the Soviet Far East in the fall of 1950, and in fact said that he had two months' leave in 1952, one for each of two years there. However, according to the 1966 account, his service there lasted only one year.)

- In Sovetskaya Gavan' NOSENKO's job was to extract information from American publications reporting naval developments. Asked in April 1964 for any personal account of his own work, NOSENKO was able to think of only "four or five trips" on small ships to the coast of Sakhalin,* and three to Hokkaido, to drop or pick up agents. His own role, he said, was as a trainee; he was taken along only "to learn how it was done;" he himself never trained or dispatched any agents, nor did he know the identities or missions of any others. He also could not describe the ships he had travelled on. Questioned on the location of Sovetskaya Gavan' in 1965, NOSENKO insisted that this city is located in Primorskiy Kray, although it is actually located in Khabarovskiy Kray.**

- NOSENKO said he returned on routine leave (or, according to other accounts, because of having contracted tuberculosis) in April 1952. He then spent two months either in his parents' Moscow home or, according to other accounts, in a sanitorium near Moscow under treatment for tuberculosis. He said he was coughing up "half a glass of blood at a time." (X-rays and medical examinations from February 1964 have detected no indications that NOSENKO ever suffered from tuberculosis.)

- At this time, the summer of 1952, NOSENKO said he was offered in Moscow an opportunity to attend the GRU strategic intelligence school, the Military-Diplomatic Academy, but turned it down because he had already studied most of the course matter in the Institute of International Affairs; besides, NOSENKO said in October 1966, he failed the physical examination when sugar was discovered in his faeces.

- NOSENKO was then transferred--without returning to the Far East--to the Intelligence Staff of the Baltic Fleet at Baltiysk. He invented a story in 1964 about going there

* In October 1966 NOSENKO was asked whether he had ever been to Sakhalin; his answer was no.

** This is the equivalent of being stationed for a year in Portland, Oregon and thinking oneself in California.

via Naval Intelligence Points in Berlin, Rostock, and Sassnitz, but then said this was a lie he told because he felt his interrogators would not believe him if he had said he successfully turned down an assignment to these points, then closing down, and had travelled directly to Baltiysk. (As pointed out to NOSENKO, the assignment to the cold, damp Baltic climate of a recent TB-sufferer appears unthinkable, particularly when that person is a Government Minister's son; he acknowledged this but said, "There were no other positions available.")

- He could not remember the name of the place he served near Baltiysk. He had named it as Primorsk in 1962 (which fitted his description of its size and location) but from 1964 on insisted it was Sovetsk. There is no such village in the area, but there is in the region a well-known city by that name (the former Tilsit) far inland and far away. He did not know (as contemporary Soviet maps show) that a rail line went to Baltiysk from Primorsk.

- In the Baltiysk area, he claimed in 1962, he had trained agent teams to be sent behind enemy lines in time of war. Under interrogation in 1964 he changed his description of his functions, saying he merely prepared training materials and delivered supplies, never having direct contact with or knowledge of the agent work. His service there was limited to about six months, since he said he left there at the beginning of 1953. He either had had one or two leaves from there, depending on which telling is accepted: In 1964 NOSENKO said that in August or September 1952 he was given a special leave from his duties in Sovetsk to travel to Moscow in order to formalize his divorce from his first wife; in April 1966 he wrote that he was divorced during his leave before going to Sovetsk.

- NOSENKO said he returned to Moscow on his own initiative and against the wishes of his commanding officer at the end of 1952 and began steps to get out of the GRU. He has told conflicting stories of where he stayed and in what leave status. It was during this period, he said, that his conversation with KOBULOV led him to shift to the KGB.

- In April 1966 NOSENKO wrote that he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant of the Administrative Services while stationed in Sovetsk. In earlier accounts he said that he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant while stationed in the Soviet Far East.

c. Remarks

The notes above on NOSENKO's career do not treat most of the changes of story, contradictions, corrections, or inaccuracies in NOSENKO's accounts: Variations of dates may be attributable to faulty memory, changes in the story might have resulted from his own elaborations and exaggerations, and inaccuracies might be explained by his inattention or indifference to detail. If all the details were to be considered, the story would become even more confused.

Certain general aspects stand out, however:

(1) If his story of his personal life is true [redacted] , NOSENKO would, according to all available information, not have been accepted into the naval GRU, one of the particularly sensitive parts of the navy. Either the life history is false, or the GRU officer service is, or both.

(2) The story is vague, unsubstantial, and contradictory; no substance has been added to the base outlines of the story despite frequent questioning. One might expec of an educated or reasonably intelligent person some recollection of military service completed 10 years earlier--the locations where he served, whether he did or did not have TB, how and when he entered or transferred from one place to another, and what he did or what he experienced.

(3) NOSENKO's knowledge of military procedures, of the navy, and of the units with which he served is practically non-existent. He has provided no reason whatever to make one believe that he actually was a naval officer.

(4) The functions he claims to have fulfilled involved no direct involvement or personal responsibilities: They sound like the bare outlines of a legend, not like real life or personal experience.

That this period is fictitious is supported by the findings of the psychologist (Pages 605-611).

NOSENKO's description of his naval GRU service cannot be accepted as true. On the basis of his statements, it appears moreover that he was never a naval officer, nor an officer of any other regular military service.

Since NOSENKO claims that his GRU status and service provided him the platform for a transfer into the KGB (without such formalities as medical examination, personnel interviews or questionnaires), this conclusion is relevant to his claim of KGB staff status from 1952 or 1953.

3. Entry into the KGB

a. Eligibility

The previous section discussed NOSENKO's eligibility for admission to the naval GRU and concluded with the remark that, on the basis of what NOSENKO has told CIA about his earlier life, he could not have been accepted for service in Naval Intelligence. According to information available to CIA from several knowledgeable sources, the KGB has more stringent entry requirements than any other Soviet organization. The candidate's family background, personal conduct. and Party or Komsomol record must be impeccable. NOSENKO would have American Intelligence believe that in his case the KGB--specifically the officers responsible for signing their names to the approval--accepted a person whose record showed (as noted on pages 679-680 above) desertion from the armed forces, self-inflicted wound in wartime, drunkenness, venereal disease, previous marriage to the daughter of a state criminal, a bad academic record including failure of a course in Marxism-Leninism, and a prior rejection by the KGB itself. The only change since the earlier rejection had been, according to NOSENKO, two years of undistinguished military service in the Naval GRU.

Moreover, during this naval duty NOSENKO said he had contracted tuberculosis, for which he was still under treatment at the time he entered the State Security Service. NOSENKO has indicated on separate occasions that his illness was a matter of record with the GRU, and that the reason he did not have to take a physical examination for entry into the KGB was the availability of GRU records. According to DERYABIN, however, KGB regulations at that time would have precluded admission to KGB ranks if there was a recent history of tuberculosis even though already arrested.

b. Date of Entry

NOSENKO has given a variety of dates for his entry on duty with the KGB and has provided several reasons for his changes of story (Pages 86-89). During his first meeting with CIA, when NOSENKO gave a brief personal and professional autobiography, he said that he had joined the KGB in February or March 1953. In 1964, however, first while still attached to the Soviet Disarmament Delegation and later when reviewing and signing a biographic history prepared by CIA on the basis of his own account, NOSENKO set this date back a year, to early 1952. During the interrogations of April 1964, after naming several other dates, NOSENKO returned to the original one, March 1953, and has remained with this version since that time. NOSENKO has given two different reasons for this change of dates (which, he said in October 1966, was conscious deception). In the April 1964 interrogations, he explained that he had failed his examination in Marxism-Leninism at the Institute of International Affairs, which forced him to take all his exams over again and delayed his career: This was "unpleasant," NOSENKO said, and he was attempting to conceal it from CIA. In the October 1966 interrogations, NOSENKO gave a new and different reason. He described how he had been rejected for employment by State Security while at the Institute and was trying to cover up for this because he thought CIA would not believe that he had first been rejected and then, later, accepted by the KGB.

NOSENKO's change of story took place in 1964 while still in the relatively relaxed circumstances of an operational meeting in Geneva; he came back to his original account only during the April 1964 interrogations. NOSENKO's explanations of why he revised the story have been inconsistent and have forced him into

further inconsistencies. Because of this and, in the absence of any pressure of any kind (including any apparent psychological pressure) to lie about his date of entry, the most logical explanation for this change is that NOSENKO forgot in early 1964 either when he joined the KGB and/or what he had told CIA in 1962. DERYABIN has commented on the significance which the date of entry holds for a KGB officer. He expressed the opinion that it would be unusual for a KGB officer to forget this date.

NOSENKO was questioned at length by DERYABIN (Pages 616-619) concerning the timing of his entry on duty with the KGB. As a result of this interrogation it was determined that NOSENKO was unaware that at the time he said he joined the KGB, the present First Chief Directorate was designated the Second Chief Directorate and vice versa. Therefore, NOSENKO would have joined a component entitled the First Chief Directorate in March 1953, not the Second Chief Directorate as he says. NOSENKO did not know or had forgotten various other facts, including the date that the MVD was redesignated the KGB, and misstated the locations and existence of various buildings and offices in the vicinity of the KGB Headquarters building in early 1953.

In June 1962 NOSENKO said several times, in different meetings, that the KGB agent "ANDREY" (Pages 413-414) had been recruited and had left Moscow before he, NOSENKO, entered the KGB. He estimated the date as 1949-1950. NOSENKO knew that "ANDREY" was associated in Moscow with RHODES and when told that RHODES was there from 1951 to 1953, admitted that the date he gave might be wrong. NOSENKO continued to say, however, that "ANDREY" was recruited before he (NOSENKO) became a KGB officer, and later reverted again to his estimate that "ANDREY" was recruited in 1949-1950. When he returned to Geneva in 1964, NOSENKO changed this story and said that during his 1953-1955 tour in the U.S. Embassy Section he saw cipher specialist SELEZNOV, who had come there to consult on the then-active "ANDREY" case. NOSENKO was unable to explain how he could have been sure in 1962 that the "ANDREY" case was before his time, when he said in 1964 that this was not so. Dayle SMITH confessed that he was recruited by the KGB in late 1953, and records show that he left Moscow in early 1954.

c. Circumstances of Entry

NOSENKO has consistently related his entrance into the KGB to discussions he had with General KOBULOV in early 1953 in Moscow, after returning from the Baltic. However, he has changed the date of these discussions with KOBULOV virtually every time he has told this story. In June 1962, NOSENKO said he talked with KOBULOV at the NOSENKO dacha while on leave in March 1953; during the April 1964 interrogations he changed the date to February 1953; in April 1965 NOSENKO said he spoke to KOBULOV at the KOBULOV dacha in January 1953 while on leave and that he lived at home and was at the "disposal of GRU personnel" during February and March. Finally, in April 1966, NOSENKO said he first spoke to KOBULOV at KOBULOV's dacha on New Years Day 1953, that he was subsequently "resting" at a sanitorium connected with his tuberculosis of the year before, and that he spoke again to KOBULOV on the day of STALIN's funeral, while home for a few days from the sanitorium. It was at this second encounter with KOBULOV that the latter promised to concern himself with NOSENKO's entry into the KGB.

In 1962 NOSENKO described the simple procedure by which he entered the KGB, volunteering that there was no need to fill out a questionnaire (anketa) as the KGB already had his files from the GRU. In April 1964 when asked if he had not been required to fill out any questionnaires or other documents, NOSENKO described the anketa and other forms he completed (saying he took them home to do so) and his various interviews with KGB personnel officers. He was interrogated in detail on these claims by DERYABIN in 1965, to whom he gave descriptions, albeit inaccurate, of the various forms and of his visits to KGB Personnel. In 1966 NOSENKO wrote in his autobiography that there were no talks with KGB Personnel before or after his acceptance and implied that there were no forms to fill out.

d. Remarks

According to all of NOSENKO's stories, his GRU service was the springboard for his acceptance into the KGB. He met KOBULOV while home in Moscow from Primorsk/Sovetsk, he entered the KGB as a lieutenant since this was his naval rank, his admission according to the early version was facilitated by the availability of his GRU personnel file; yet CIA has concluded that NOSENKO was never a GRU officer and it appears highly improbable that he was ever in Primorsk under any circumstances.

On the basis of generally available information concerning Soviet realities at the time of NOSENKO's claimed entry into the KGB, supported by the expert testimony of DERYABIN (who was in the KGB, then MVD, in Moscow at the time and had been himself a KGB personnel officer until less than a year earlier), a person with the background NOSENKO has given could not be accepted into the KGB in the manner he claims. His health alone would seem to have precluded this, but in addition, NOSENKO described a series of incidents in his life equally likely to cause rejection. NOSENKO's mistakes, changes of story, and apparent fabrications add to the unlikelihood of his account.

It is concluded that, as in the case of NOSENKO's GRU service, either NOSENKO and those who have supported aspects of his story have seriously distorted his past life, or he did not enter the KGB.

4. Initial Service in the U.S. Embassy Section

a. Introduction

NOSENKO claims to have served in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate, during the period from his entry on duty with the KGB until June 1955. His targets during these two years were at first American correspondents in Moscow and later American Army Attaches at the Embassy.

NOSENKO sought to avoid discussion of his own or other KGB activity during this period and on occasion he has tried to dismiss the whole period as "not relevant" and "of no consequence." NOSENKO has repeatedly said that he "found himself" only after his initial service in the U.S. Embassy Section. (He variously dated his self-discovery as occurring in 1955, when he transferred to the Tourist Department; in June 1956, in connection with his participation in and award for the BURGI case; and after August 1956, when the death of his father forced him to pull himself together.) Before this, NOSENKO said, he was a wastrel and "did not pay attention to the work."

b. Work Against American Correspondents

NOSENKO exempted himself from reporting details of KGB work against any specific American correspondent in Moscow in 1953-1954 (Pages 93-96) by saying that, as a new, very junior employee he had no access to operational files and did not participate personally in the handling of any of the correspondents. Although able to identify four correspondents in Moscow who were then recruited KGB agents, NOSENKO learned this information either in conversations with his superior KOZLOV or at some point and in some undefined way after he no longer was working against these targets. NOSENKO's early months in the job were spent reading personality (not operational) files on a number of the correspondents in Moscow (none of which indicated the individual's developmental or agent status) and familiarizing himself with KGB methods. Later NOSENKO was assigned the "agent network" of drivers, clerical personnel, and domestics surrounding four of the correspondents (two of whom were recruited KGB agents at the time); he met with them periodically to determine whether they had developed any important information. Even here, however, NOSENKO appears to have been given very little responsibility: His superior KOZLOV often went along to the meetings with NOSENKO, first to show him how to handle the agents and afterward whenever something interesting would begin to develop. In fact, according to NOSENKO, KOZLOV would accompany him to meetings with these Soviet citizens-agents even when there was a "hint" that something of interest might develop. NOSENKO has been able to identify some of these agents, but for all but a few he recalled neither their names nor personalia concerning them.

c. Work Against Army Attaches

Regarding NOSENKO's work against American Army Attaches, he claimed a specific area of KGB responsibility, one for which he alone was accountable and one about which something was previously known from U.S. records. Only 20 months at the longest, it is

the last period in which NOSENKO had no supervisory responsibility to divert his attention from personal operational duties.

NOSENKO could not remember when he took over responsibility for the Army Attaches, and he named two other KGB officers before settling upon BUDYLDIN as the person from whom he received the Attaches' files. When belittling his earlier responsibilities for correspondents, he has said several times that he had been in that job "only about six months." Assuming that NOSENKO entered the KGB in the middle of March 1953, this would date his transfer to work against the Attaches in the fall of that year. In discussing this transfer itself, however, NOSENKO has consistently said that it took place in 1954. Asked when in 1954, NOSENKO has variously replied "at the beginning of 1954," January 1954, and May 1954. Under interrogation in early 1965, NOSENKO refused to estimate when he took over this responsibility. He has always said that he turned over these duties and transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section in June 1955, when the Tourist Department was established within the Second Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO has said in different contexts that as the American Department case officer responsible for operations against the U.S. Army Attaches he received and was responsible for assimilating the product of a wide variety of sources on the individuals who were his targets. He has mentioned information received from the KGB First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate; the Archives of the MGB/MVD/KGB; microphones which were emplaced about a year before NOSENKO entered the American Department*; a network of Soviet chauffeurs, cooks, language instructors, and other agents in the Embassy who together provided little useful information; permanent and roving surveillance patrols outside the Embassy; fixed observation posts next to, across from and near the Embassy; advance notification of intent to travel by the Attaches and their itineraries; and reports from outside Moscow, including surveillance, agent networks, the Militia, and the military. The point of collecting and assimilating this information, NOSENKO said, was to be able to know what the Attaches were doing in Moscow and thereby to control their intelligence collection activities. Far less important was the goal of recruiting Military Attaches; NOSENKO knew of only several instances when this was attempted, and all of these efforts failed.

The KGB's principal interest in control rather than recruitment has been NOSENKO's explanation for knowing little about the backgrounds and personal lives of his targets--such information, he stated, simply was not pertinent to the primary mission of

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*On some occasions NOSENKO has said that the microphones in the Army Attache offices were his most valuable source of information on his targets of 1954-1955; at other times he has said that he knew nothing of these microphones until he reentered the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960; and at still other times he claimed to have known only of their existence during 1953-1955 but not where any were located.

control.* He has also used this explanation to support his claim that there were no recruitments of military attaches during this period.

An exception, wherein the KGB did carefully compile a great deal of vulnerability data on an Army Attache, was described by NOSENKO in connection with the approach to Walter MULE (Page 104). On the basis of these explanations, NOSENKO's knowledge of the official and unofficial activities of his alleged targets in this period deserves attention.

NOSENKO knew almost nothing about the personal backgrounds and families of the eight members of the Army Attache Office whom he identified as his targets (Pages 99-106). Although he was able to identify each by rank and position in the Embassy--sometimes inaccurately--and in a few cases to describe certain of their operational activities, he was unaware of or had forgotten such facts as:

- Colonel Earl L. MICKELSON, the Army Attache in 1954 and 1955, was arrested twice by the Militia outside of Moscow in 1954.

- Assistant Army Attache Ira RICHARDS was a language student of GROMOKOVA (identified by NOSENKO as a KGB agent); by RICHARDS' account she sought to elicit biographic data from him during the lessons.

- William STROUD, the Assistant Army Attache, travelled to Kharkov in May 1955 to interivew an American defector. (NOSENKO has identified Frank SISCOE, who accompanied STROUD, as a suspected CIA officer; he was coopted by CIA.)

NOSENKO, furthermore, was ignorant of important events, known independently to CIA, which were within the sphere of what he claimed was his direct, personal responsibility:

- NOSENKO claimed direct personal responsibility for the file of and operational activity against Lieutenant Colonel Howard FELCHLIN (Pages 101-103). He claimed to be receiving agent information on him but could not recall the names or cryptonyms of any such agents. (He said, for example: "I think FELCHLIN must have had a maid, and she would have been a KGB agent.") NOSENKO described FELCHLIN as by far the most aggressive of his targets and hence the object of special interest; yet he did not know or remember

* NOSENKO himself, when giving the reason why he did not know more details about the U.S. Embassy Section's targets while he was its Deputy Chief in 1960-1961, said that as a supervisor he was too busy overseeing subordinates; hence, NOSENKO continued, he could not be expected to remember as many such details as would be possible had he been a case officer working daily with only four or five files. In another context, NOSENKO explained why he was unable to supply the details of planning and organizing operations against tourists in the period 1955-1959; he contrasted operations against tourists, who often came and went in a matter of a few days, to the work against the Military Attaches and diplomats stationed in Moscow on permanent assignments, who could be studied systematically and slowly.

anything about FELCHLIN's background, presumably well documented by the KGB because FELCHLIN had been to the USSR in two different capacities, merchant seaman and diplomatic courier, prior to arriving in Moscow as the Assistant Army Attache; also FELCHLIN had had prior official association with GRU officers in Austria, Germany, and the United States, and he continued to be in liaison with one of them in Moscow. NOSENKO could recall nothing about FELCHLIN's intelligence activities in the USSR or his trips about the country, or what had been done about them by the KGB. In speaking of FELCHLIN's expulsion from the Soviet Union, NOSENKO reported the KGB file noted that FELCHLIN had been caught taking photographs on some occasion, but he did not know that FELCHLIN in June 1954 was arrested in Kiev with another Assistant Army Attache, F.J. YEAGER. (Erroneously identified by NOSENKO as an Air Force Attache, YEAGER likewise should have been NOSENKO's target.) NOSENKO also did not know that FELCHLIN, with another Army Attache and two Air Force Attaches, in September 1953 had made an unprecedented train trip throughout Siberia and that six months later, at the end of March 1954, had been the subject of a newspaper article which charged that they had lost "spy documents" on the train. NOSENKO was unable to provide a date for FELCHLIN's expulsion from the Soviet Union, and he knew nothing of the unusual circumstances of FELCHLIN's departure from Moscow; he insisted that nobody else was declared persona non grata along with FELCHLIN. In fact, FELCHLIN was expelled along with Air Force Major Walter McKINNEY, and the Soviets refused to permit the two to leave Moscow aboard the Ambassador's personal plane until Ambassador BOHLEN himself protested. Confronted by his lack of knowledge of the persona non grata action, NOSENKO said that he could not be expected to know the details because this incident occurred after he transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section to the Tourist Department in June 1955. NOSENKO was then told the recorded date of the expulsion, 3 July 1954, and he replied that this was not true.

- Discrepancies appeared in NOSENKO's account of one of the best known incidents in the history of KGB operations against the American officials in the Soviet Union, the subject of reports by GOLITSYN and other CIA sources and the subject of training materials. This was the seizure of sensitive technical collection equipment on 5 May 1955 in Stalingrad from three Assistant Military Attaches from the U.S. Embassy--Major John S. BENSON, Captain STROUD, and Captain MULE--and their expulsion from the Soviet Union two days later. NOSENKO claimed direct responsibility for KGB work against these officers (Pages 103-105); he described an earlier attempt to defect MULE, his own plans for seizing this equipment at a railroad station outside Moscow, and his role in developing plans for the successful operation in Stalingrad. When NOSENKO was pressed under interrogation to give the entire story of the equipment seizure and the persona non grata action, he said that the operation was carried out after he was in the Tourist Department and therefore he knew no more about it. When told that the operation took place at least a month before his alleged transfer, NOSENKO could offer no explanation for his lack of knowledge.

- NOSENKO identified George VAN LAETHEM as an Assistant Air Attache in 1953 or 1954; he was a target of another U.S. Embassy Section officer, and an unsuccessful KGB development operation was carried out against him. NOSENKO did not know that VAN LAETHEM was actually an Assistant Army Attache, who left Moscow in March 1953 and was succeeded by NOSENKO's own target Walter MULE (see above). What NOSENKO additionally did not know is that in Moscow VAN LAETHEM was the Attache cryptographic security officer, the superior of Dayle SMITH (the subject of NOSENKO's "ANDREY" lead--see below) and a friend of the motor pool sergeant Roy RHODES, a KGB agent. NOSENKO furthermore did not know that on 19 March 1955, again as an Army Attache, and only two years after being transferred from Moscow, VAN LAETHEM was again sent to Moscow, ostensibly on a PCS assignment but actually on temporary duty. During this latter assignment, when NOSENKO by his own account should have been responsible for him, VAN LAETHEM was in Moscow to review the entire electronics program at the Embassy. (VAN LAETHEM's second tour in Moscow involved the planned use of the electronic equipment which was seized in Stalingrad while VAN LAETHEM was still in Moscow.)

d. Additional Reporting

His information on two other operations involving Americans was said by NOSENKO to stem from his 1953-1955 service in the U.S. Embassy Section. One was the recruitment of the military cipher machine mechanic having the KGB cryptonym "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH, see Pages 413-426 and further comments in Part VIII.B.3. and VIII.C.). NOSENKO in 1962 was sure not only that this recruitment took place before he joined the KGB but that "ANDREY" had left the USSR by then as well: he repeatedly estimated "ANDREY's" recruitment date as "1949-1950." At all times he has claimed certainty that "ANDREY" was the last KGB recruitment in the Embassy until the time of NOSENKO's defection in January 1964. In 1964, however, NOSENKO changed his story and said "ANDREY" was active while NOSENKO was in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1954-1955. The other operation was an unsuccessful recruitment approach to the U.S. Embassy Security Officer Edward Ellis SMITH (see Pages 468-469 and further comments in Part VIII.B.3. and VIII.C. above) at a meeting with the KGB arranged through letters which had been sent to SMITH. This occurred in 1954 or 1955, NOSENKO said, and in support of the recruitment approach, he handled the surveillance phone-watch. SMITH admitted to U.S. authorities having received four letters from the KGB between 2 and 5 June 1956 (a year after NOSENKO dated his departure from the U.S. Embassy Section), but he denied having had any personal meetings with KGB officers.

e. Remarks

NOSENKO's accounts of the 1953-1955 period are confused, contradictory, and, when compared with collateral information, incomplete and inaccurate. He has been inconsistent in dating his shift of responsibilities within the U.S. Embassy Section, in dating his departure from the Section (viz., the timing of the Stalingrad incident and the approach to SMITH), and in dating his first knowledge of the microphones in the Embassy. Having

few new details of importance on the American correspondents, NOSENKO has proven unreliable regarding his work against Army Attaches: He misidentified two (YEAGER and VAN LAETHEM), he claimed to have almost no information on the backgrounds and activities of the others; and he lacked even the most important details on security affairs involving the majority of his eight alleged targets. In addition, NOSENKO has told CIA almost nothing about the work of his colleagues in the U.S. Embassy Section.

The statements by NOSENKO about this period therefore hold so little substance and the manner of his reporting was so unconvincing, that his claim to have been an officer of the U.S. Embassy Section in the years 1953-1955 cannot be true.

5. Tourist Department (June 1955 to January 1960)

a. Introduction

NOSENKO's activities from June 1955 to January 1960, his first period of alleged service with the American-British-Canadian Section of Tourist Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, are described in Pages 107-151. For the purposes of the following discussion, it is convenient to divide this period into two parts. The first of these covers the years from June 1955 to June 1958, when NOSENKO said he was a staff case officer, handling and recruiting agents and planning and managing operational activity. The second part covers NOSENKO's service from June 1958 to the beginning of 1960 as Deputy Chief of this section. Apart from his personal involvement in a number of recruitment operations in the latter period, it is this service which provides a basis for NOSENKO to claim awareness of all important arrests of spies and recruitments from among American tourists visiting the Soviet Union; it is also this service as Deputy Chief of Section which NOSENKO cites as a basis for his involvement in the case of Lee Harvey OSWALD inside the Soviet Union.

b. The Early Period (1955 to 1958)

(i) General

According to NOSENKO's story, he was among the first case officers in the Tourist Department. He arrived there just as the Department was being formed and took part with other officers assigned in the acquisition of an agent network from within Inturist, in the establishment of facilities and methods, and in generally "getting things going." Several months later he participated in what he says was his first operation against an American tourist. This was NOSENKO's behind-the-scenes (and hence unconfirmed) organization of an unseccussful attempt to compromise Martin MALIA (Pages 112-113). NOSENKO's next case (the first operation in which his participation is confirmed) took place a year later, in June 1956, when he assisted in the homosexual entrapment and recruitment of Richard BURGI (Pages 113-120). This recruitment, which occurred close in time to the Minister NOSENKO's death, was by NOSENKO's account a turning point in his personal and professional life. With it, NOSENKO began to acquire a sense of self-confidence and responsibility and began to "grow" from a wastrel into an effective and successful KGB officer. As a result of this operation, the first successful recruitment in the then short history of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO first came into personal contact with General GRIBANOV. According to all accounts prior to October 1966, when he retracted the claim, NOSENKO received the first of a series of KGB awards for operational performance because of the BURGI case--a letter of commendation. Within a month of this operation, NOSENKO said, he was promoted from the rank of lieutenant to captain, his last promotion prior to defecting eight years later.

NOSENKO's direct operational activity in the next two years, before his appointment as Deputy Chief of the Section, was described by NOSENKO as follows: Sometime in 1957 he was involved in the attempted recruitment of the German businessman [redacted] (Pages 120-121); after surrounding him with agents, NOSENKO

personally spoke to him. NOSENKO explained his (unconfirmed) participation in this case, which was not among the responsibilities of his section, by saying there was no KGB officer available who spoke German but [redacted] was known to speak "a little English," a language in which NOSENKO had fair fluency. In 1957 NOSENKO was also involved in the sexual and blackmarket entrapment of [redacted] Norwegian journalist (again, not a target of NOSENKO's section, being neither American, British or Canadian); NOSENKO has not explained how he came to be involved in this operation, but he said his role was that of involving [redacted] with women and blackmarketeers so that another officer, ARKHIPOV, could recruit him. [redacted] has not identified NOSENKO, but reported on an individual whose role corresponds to the one NOSENKO claimed as his own (Pages 121-122). NOSENKO's third operation in 1957 was really not an operation at all. He was assigned to accompany the British [redacted] and the latter's interpreter [redacted] on a tour of Soviet publishing houses (Page 121). NOSENKO said his purpose was only to watch [redacted] a suspected intelligence agent or officer. His presence was confirmed by [redacted] who recognized NOSENKO's photograph.

This is the sum of NOSENKO's reported, sometimes verified, operational role during the three years preceding his promotion in June 1958 to the position of Deputy Chief of the American-Canadian-British Tourist Section, hereafter referred to as the American Tourist Section.

The only case of the June 1955-June 1958 period resulting in agent contacts abroad, and the one to which NOSENKO ascribed the greatest importance, was the recruitment of BURGI. For this reason, the BURGI operation is discussed in detail below, with particular attention being given to those aspects of the case which reflect upon NOSENKO's own personal role.

(ii) The BURGI Case

NOSENKO's statements of this operation generally agreed with that BURGI provided to the FBI in 1957. The part NOSENKO played in the case, both in his brief initial presence with the two homosexuals in the Moscow restaurant on the evening of BURGI's compromise (20 June 1956) and in the Kiev events (23-28 June 1956) would appear to be one normally taken by a KGB staff officer. The identities of the other two KGB participants in the Kiev recruitment, KOZLOV and PETRENKO, seem clearly established. There were discrepancies between NOSENKO's and BURGI's versions, but most of these could stem from NOSENKO's faulty memory nine years after the events. (Such discrepancies include NOSENKO's failure to remember his first Moscow meetings with BURGI; the identity, role, or even existence of the person "Anatoliy" whom BURGI says introduced him to NOSENKO and participated in the homosexual compromise; whether NOSENKO was at the Kiev airport to meet BURGI; the location of NOSENKO's bedroom in the Kiev Hotel as compared to BURGI's; NOSENKO's reference to BURGI's "interpreter" when in fact BURGI neither had nor needed one; and NOSENKO's failure to remember the unusual circumstances of BURGI's departure from Kiev.) Other contradictions and omissions in NOSENKO's reporting relate to matters of greater operational consequence:

- NOSENKO was unable to say when or how the KGB first learned that BURGI was a homosexual, nor could he remember who first proposed an operation against him.

- NOSENKO gave a confused and evasive account of his dealings with the First Chief Directorate on this case.

- NOSENKO insisted that there was no official file on BURGI, and that none was opened as a result of this operation. The initiative for the operation came, he said, from the Second Chief Directorate, and when NOSENKO traced BURGI in the First Chief Directorate, there was no information on him there.* The KGB's only information on BURGI at the time of the compromise came from BURGI's visa application (which showed him to be a professor of Russian) and a few agent reports from the preceding days in Moscow. BURGI, on the other hand, reported that during the recruitment KOZLOV, the senior Soviet present, showed knowledge of the names of BURGI's sister, mother and father and knew the sister's occupation; details of BURGI's background, work, and military service, BURGI's relations with the Russicum in Rome, which BURGI said he had never mentioned in the USSR; and BURGI's acquaintance in the U.S. with Alexander KERENSKY.

NOSENKO cited "his" recruitment of BURGI in Kiev in 1956 as one of the main reasons for his rapid rise in the KGB. BURGI's story of the recruitment, as reported to the FBI, definitely establishes NOSENKO's role as having been subordinate to that of KOZLOV--it was KOZLOV, not NOSENKO, who made the recruitment.

* DERYABIN interrogated NOSENKO on this case. NOSENKO's answers to such detailed questions as how the traces were done, how the travel to Kiev was arranged, details concerning the personnel involved, the contents of the file, and other mechanics of the case, betrayed an almost total lack of memory.

c. Promotion to Deputy Chief of Section

NOSENKO said that in June 1958, when the unit that had formerly handled tourists from all countries was reorganized into two sections, he was promoted from the rank of senior case officer to that of Deputy Chief of the newly created American Tourist Section. NOSENKO said that this section was the most important in the Tourist Department, and that he did not know why he, in particular, had been chosen its Deputy Chief but was certain that GRIBANOV had no voice in the decision.

d. Knowledge of Section's Staff and Agent Personnel

NOSENKO has named with clarity and consistency the other officers of the American Tourist Section during this period. The Soviet agents of his section whom NOSENKO has identified were mostly his own; he said that the agents were constantly shifted from case officer to case officer and hence it was "difficult to say just who handled which agents." NOSENKO said he had approximately eight Soviet agents in 1958 and about 12 or 14 in 1959, most of them employed by Inturist (Pages 109-112). With the exception of the two homosexuals, YEFREMOV and VOLKOV discussed separately below, NOSENKO cannot supply personal data on his own agents or remember specific jobs they did for the KGB.

e. Knowledge of Section's Activities

As of June 1958, according to NOSENKO, the work of the section of which he was deputy chief was "just getting going." Its mission was, first of all, to detect Western Intelligence officers and agents among the increasing flow of tourists visiting the Soviet Union; only secondarily was the section directed toward the recruitment of KGB agents from among these tourists. In his new position NOSENKO was responsible for supervising other officers in the section in efforts along these lines. Because of this and because at GRIBANOV's request he personally reviewed KGB information on the use of tourist cover by Western intelligence services and KGB counteraction through 1958 (Pages 145-146), NOSENKO made a number of statements concerning these subjects during the 1955-1959 period.

CIA started its so-called "legal traveler" program in 1955 and by 1958 was deeply committed to such operations. Now there is firm collateral information on what the KGB knew of this operational program. In view of NOSENKO's duties in the American Tourist Section and the section's prime mission, he should have knowledge of agent compromises during 1958 and 1959. Moreover, thanks to collateral holdings, what NOSENKO did and did not know can be compared with information from other sources. These facts are reviewed below.

(i) BLAKE

A valuable source of information for the KGB in its planning for the operational activity of its Tourist Department in the late 1950's and early 1960's was the Englishman, George BLAKE (Pages 146-147). BLAKE has confessed that in the summer of 1959 he passed the KGB a 19-page summary of the results of a three-day meeting during the first week of June 1959, between representatives of CIA and MI-6; these sessions were on the subject of "legal travel" intelligence operations against the USSR. This

summary spelled out in detail the complete CIA operational doctrine pertaining to tourist-type operations and stressed CIA's reliance on tourist agents for the spotting, recontacting, assessment, and communications support of internal assets.

While NOSENKO has displayed some familiarity with CIA modus operandi in the field of tourist operations, he has never mentioned that the KGB was in possession of documentary reporting which described these methods in full detail. NOSENKO does not appear to be aware of who BLAKE was, much less of his importance to the KGB. NOSENKO never volunteered the name of BLAKE in his debriefings, and when specifically asked in 1962 about BLAKE, the KGB agent in British Intelligence, he said that he had read the dossier and that BLAKE had been "an agent of the Second (British) Department (of the Second Chief Directorate) who was not nearly as valuable as the [redacted] [redacted] or the other Englishman" (VASSALL). By 1964 he could not recall any such agent of the British Department. When the name BLAKE was mentioned, he asked: "Who's BLAKE?"

BLAKE had, in addition, passed to the KGB a photocopy of a 21-page summary report of a second, follow-up conference between CIA and MI-6 on "legal travel" operations which was held in Washington from 20 to 25 April 1960. NOSENKO, although not in the Tourist Department at the time the latter report was received by the KGB, said that he reviewed all important materials of the American Tourist Section when he became its Chief in January 1962. Asked whether the Tourist Department had received documentary information from any agent source while NOSENKO was away from the department in the years 1960-1961, he replied that none had and that he knew of no agent who could have provided such documentary information.

(ii) GOLITSYN Document

NOSENKO in 1964 reported knowing that GOLITSYN at the time of his defection in December 1961 took with him an official top secret KGB document concerning Western Intelligence operational activity in the field of tourism (Pages 147-149). He did not mention this fact in the June 1962 meetings. Although NOSENKO also stated that this document had been prepared by the Tourist Department, he has not been able to describe the document in detail and specifically did not mention that this particular document was in large part based, as subsequent analysis has shown, upon the above-mentioned reports submitted to the KGB by George BLAKE.

(iii) Tourist Agents

NOSENKO asserted that the KGB detected no agents among American tourists during the years 1958 or 1959, and that no tourists had been caught in the act of mailing letters, servicing dead drops, or contacting agents, except one in 1959 whose name, NOSENKO said, was MacGUIRE (actually McGOWAN in 1958). NOSENKO signed a statement attesting to these facts.

The KGB document supplied by GOLITSYN, however, refers to a number of cases of American tourists who were found by the KGB to be engaged in intelligence collection or intelligence support activities. In addition to McGOWAN, the GOLITSYN document cited the cases of SIMARD, GRAY and FRANCIS, all of them CIA agents detected by the KGB in 1958 and 1959. These years coincide with the time when NOSENKO claims to have been Deputy Chief of the section which was responsible for monitoring and uncovering activities of this sort, but NOSENKO has never mentioned them. Furthermore, the annual reports of the section which NOSENKO would have helped to write, by virtue of his claimed position as Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section, presumably included all of these cases.

f. NOSENKO's Tourist Paper

NOSENKO was questioned at length on the review of Western tourist operations which he claimed to have written for GRIBANOV. He said he gathered the material for this study from earlier annual reports of the Tourist Department and by talking with various case officers, then took the study to GRIBANOV's office. NOSENKO could not remember whether he discussed his findings with GRIBANOV, could not give any examples of the information which he included in the report (other than statistical information on the increase in foreign tourism), could not recall what the report said about CIA tourist operations (other than there appeared to be increased use of tourists travelling by automobile), and did not know what other American Intelligence services were sending agents into the Soviet Union under tourist cover during these years. On the basis of his research for this report and his own experience, NOSENKO said he knew that KGB operations against tourists had been developing slowly and that, at the time the report was written during the tourist season of 1959, the KGB knew little about the use of tourism by the American services.

BLAKE's confession that he passed documentary information on this subject to the KGB, but more particularly the intensity of KGB operations against tourists at this time as reflected in the GOLITSYN document and other reports indicate, that this statement by NOSENKO must be erroneous.

g. The OSWALD Case

According to NOSENKO's account of his direct involvement in the case of Lee Harvey OSWALD (Pages 136-144), his participation seemed to stem solely from his supervisory role as Deputy Chief of the American Section. In this capacity, NOSENKO said, he was the one who made the decision that OSWALD was "not normal" and of no interest to the KGB. On other occasions NOSENKO has reported that he made this decision together with his subordinate KRUPNOV, or that "they decided," or "it was decided." NOSENKO's information on the handling of OSWALD in 1959 is unique, and there is no collateral information against which it can be reliably measured. The results of the polygraph examination in October 1966, however, indicated that NOSENKO lied in having said that he was personally connected with any aspect of the OSWALD case and that he had heard of OSWALD before the assassination of President Kennedy. The polygraph results also indicated that the KGB gave NOSENKO special instructions on the OSWALD case and what he should tell U.S. authorities about it.

h. NOSENKO's Operational Activities (1958-1959)

(i) General

NOSENKO appeared in one operation shortly after being promoted to the position of Deputy Chief, the recruitment of the American woman HARRIS in September 1958 on the basis of her romantic involvement with a Soviet male. HARRIS tentatively identified NOSENKO's photograph as that of one of two Soviets who approached her in Moscow and said that, of the two, he was "definitely the man in charge." She denied having had further contacts with the KGB after leaving the Soviet Union. In 1958, NOSENKO said, he also supervised the sexual entrapment of [redacted] but did not become personally involved in the approach, which was made by his superior DUBAS. Some time during this year, NOSENKO said, he recruited the second of his pair of homosexual agents, YEFREMOV. Beginning in the srping of 1959 he used the two in a series of successful recruitment approaches to [redacted] [redacted], [redacted] [redacted] and [redacted]. (In the case of [redacted], who as a commercial representative [redacted] in Moscow, was not the responsibility of NOSENKO's section, NOSENKO was asked to make the approach because he was a "specialist" in this type of operation.) In 1959 NOSENKO also used these agents in operations against two American guides at the Sokolniki Exhibit, BARRETT and WILLERFORD. Finally, NOSENKO said, in 1959 he accomplished the recruitment of the American Express Company representative in Moscow, FRIPPEL, on the basis of sexual compromise.

(ii) The Homosexuals YEFREMOV and VOLKOV

There is a preponderance of homosexual recruitment operations in NOSENKO's account of his KGB career. He has referred to several homosexual agents with whom he has worked on specific recruitment-entrapment operations, but said that he himself was never their official case officer. They include "LUCH," "STROYEV," "NIKOLAYEV," "SIBIRYAK" and KOSHKIN. He has remembered only a few of their names and has supplied no personality information about them. He identified only VOLKOV and YEFREMOV as his own agents.

NOSENKO claimed to have re-recruited VOLKOV, a former agent (cryptonym "SHMELEV") and recruited YEFREMOV (cryptonym "GRIGORIY") and to have been their sole case officer from the beginning of their KGB careers in 1957-1958 until they were deactivated in 1963 because they became too well known. He met them frequently, directing them in at least a dozen entrapment operations or other homosexual encounters. NOSENKO took them with him when he transferred to the American Department in 1960 (but used them in no operations during 1960 and 1961) and back again in early 1962 to the Tourist Department (where they were used only once, immediately after his return). He gave a relatively clear account of the recruitment (Pages 107-108), but:

- He has never been able to remember YEFREMOV's patronym.

- He does not know the home address, general area of Moscow residence, family circumstances, job details, or other basic information about either of them.

- He said that during the five or six years he handled them, he never was at their homes, never met them in a safehouse (only on the street), and never met either of them alone without the other's presence.

- He did not know about VOLKOV's and YEFREMOV's encounters with and development of one Dutch and five other Americans, independently known to CIA. Of the Americans, three were CIA agents and a fourth was the well-known American diplomat and author Charles W. THAYER.

- He told about VOLKOV's and YEFREMOV's compromise of Robert BARRETT in 1959 (Page 126) but did not know that they had met BARRETT again in 1961, shortly before BARRETT was recruited on the basis of the 1959 compromise.

- He did not know details of why or how VOLKOV and YEFREMOV first came into contact with their most recent target, W.E. JOHNSON, nor how they set up the compromise which led to NOSENKO's entry as a "police official" under the name Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV (Pages 289-293).

(iii) Homosexual Entrapment Operations

During 1959 NOSENKO said he made recruitment approaches to five U.S. and British citizens on the basis of homosexual entrapment operations involving the agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV. All five approaches were successful, and the four Westerners who have now been identified have, in turn, identified NOSENKO in one way or another as the recruiting officer. With the exception of the FRIPPEL case and the homosexual compromise of BARRETT and WILLERFORD (which did not result in approaches during NOSENKO's tour in the American Tourist Section), these were the only operations in which NOSENKO took part in 1959 and they represented, in fact, the only recruitments by the section during this year, NOSENKO said. He claimed repeatedly in 1962, 1964, and 1965 that at the end of 1959 he received a commendation from the KGB Chairman for his recruitment of the five homosexuals and FRIPPEL (discussed separately below). In October 1966, he admitted that this claim was untrue.

In discussing the [illegible] case (Pages 123-124) NOSENKO had forgotten details which, from his confirmed participation, he certainly once knew. He said that (as with the [illegible] case--see below) another case officer (IVANOV) had the file materials on the target before he did. NOSENKO stated that his agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV reported to NOSENKO in Moscow on [illegible] homosexuality and then "IVANOV and I and possibly GUSKOV, the Section Chief, reported this to DUBAS," Chief of the Tourist Department. NOSENKO could not remember the arrangements for taking the pictures, nor in what Moscow hotel the photography took place. When [illegible] went to Leningrad, NOSENKO was sent there to approach him, flying alone (as in the [illegible] case). All Leningrad arrangements were made by the local KGB. Asked why he was assigned to the case, NOSENKO replied: "I was told to go." Asked why IVANOV could not handle it, he answered: "He was not considered capable," his English was "not bad but he didn't have enough operational experience." NOSENKO did not remember who wrote the request for permission to make the

approach ("Maybe I did, or maybe I dictated it to IVANOV") or whether [redacted] was staying in the hotel where the Leningrad compromise and approach took place. He named the Leningrad case officer, PERELETOV, but said that he, NOSENKO, made the recruitment [redacted] said another man was present.

NOSENKO's account in general matches [redacted] statements on this approach (Pages 125-126). The discrepancies, as well as the omissions in the former's statements and his uncertainty of the facts, may be attributable to faulty memory on the part of NOSENKO. Although NOSENKO was at this time Deputy Section Chief, when asked to explain his own selection as recruiting officer, he said that he did not know why "they" chose him and, when pressed as to who selected him, said "DUBAS, I think." When asked why the case officer VETLITSKIY, who originally had the materials on [redacted] could not do the job, he answered: "I don't know." NOSENKO claims that he himself arranged the transfer of a KGB "agent or operational contact" (he did not remember which) to Uzhgorod from Odessa for this case, and said he did this only by phone calls, with nothing written. He gave a physical description but had no other knowledge of this agent, neither name nor code name nor job nor background nor KGB status ("I wasn't interested"). The agent, he said, travelled alone; NOSENKO did not arrange to receive him in Uzhgorod because the local KGB took care of everything. NOSENKO met him only once, and then in the company of a case officer of the Uzhgorod KGB, whose name or other data he has also forgotten. NOSENKO said he did not report to Moscow about progress and plans on the case from Uzhgorod or other stops in this operation, nor obtain permission to travel alone with the agent to Lvov and Minsk after the recruitment; the local KGB's in Uzhgorod, Lvov, and Minsk did that, he said. NOSENKO could not describe KGB arrangements and support in Lvov and Minsk, where he said "the only thing I needed was a car from the airport to the city." [redacted] said they travelled by train.) Likewise, NOSENKO was unable to describe the KGB procedures for clearance, tracing, reporting and other management of this operation.

(iv) The Agent FRIPPEL

FRIPPEL (Pages 129-135) is the only American citizen with whom NOSENKO ever had more than fleeting operational contact in his whole KGB career and is the only foreign agent he claims to have run for more than two meetings at any time in his career (with the exception of [redacted], Pages 201-212, and "PROKHOR," Pages 173-181). The American Express Company representative in Moscow, FRIPPEL was not recruited so that he could report on American tourists visiting the Soviet Union, or on official and unofficial Americans living there, but in hopes of learning about approaches being made to members of Soviet delegations visiting the United States. With a wealth of reporting assets in Moscow, NOSENKO said, the KGB did not need him there. When FRIPPEL was reassigned to New York City, however, there were no plans to contact him through the local KGB Legal Residency. FRIPPEL is identified by KGB cryptonym in the CHEREPANOV papers as a suspected American Intelligence agent. That FRIPPEL was considered such by the KGB is confirmed by statements of a self-admitted KGB agent in contact with the American tourist ROBERTS in 1962.

NOSENKO said FRIPPEL was his agent and said, repeatedly: "I recruited him myself." In 1962 no other KGB officer was mentioned by NOSENKO, who quoted from a number of his conversations with FRIPPEL. In 1964 NOSENKO said he and CHELNOKOV "had carried out the recruitment together," but NOSENKO was the case officer. According to FRIPPEL's account, CHELNOKOV was the senior officer in the recruitment and in the later meetings.

NOSENKO never met FRIPPEL alone while FRIPPEL was stationed in Moscow. The only times he ever did so were later, he said, when FRIPPEL returned to the USSR, and these consisted of a brief visit to FRIPPEL's hotel room during FRIPPEL's visit to Moscow in the summer of 1962 and a short meeting in Odessa where FRIPPEL was on a cruise in February 1963. (Both of these meetings took place after NOSENKO, in his 1962 contacts with CIA, had exposed FRIPPEL as a KGB agent.) According to FRIPPEL, in the February 1963 meeting. NOSENKO phoned someone to ask whether he could accept FRIPPEL's invitation to board the ship; the answer was evidently no. NOSENKO denied this, insisting that there was no one in Odessa superior to him, and as a Deputy Department Chief, he would not have to ask anyone anyway.

NOSENKO, CHELNOKOV, and their wives dined at FRIPPEL's house in Moscow some time after FRIPPEL's recruitment. NOSENKO acknowledged this to have been a most unusual procedure and could name no parallel in KGB agent handling. Asked why it happened, he said: "Because he invited me," and when asked why CHELNOKOV and his wife went along, NOSENKO said: "Because he was also involved in the recruitment."

NOSENKO said he retained operational control of FRIPPEL, then still Moscow representative of a tourist firm, when NOSENKO shifted in June 1960 from the Tourist Department to the American Department. Later NOSENKO also maintained responsibility for contact during FRIPPEL's visits to the USSR after FRIPPEL's PCS departure from Moscow in January 1961 and after his own return to the Tourist Department. According to FRIPPEL, who saw no sign of change in NOSENKO's reponsibilities during his relationship with him, he recalled meeting CHELNOKOV (who had stayed in the Tourist Department) alone, without NOSENKO, probably in 1960.

FRIPPEL said he was queried by NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV only once concerning U.S. Embassy personalities, specifically on BOWDEN and WINTERS. NOSENKO, who claimed case officer responsibility for Embassy Security Officer ABIDIAN in 1960-1961 as well as for FRIPPEL said the two did not know each other; in fact, they met socially several times. NOSENKO could recall nothing which FRIPPEL ever reported to or did for the KGB, dismissing the subject on several occasions with: "He never gave anything of value." The only question NOSENKO posed when he came to FRIPPEL in August 1962, FRIPPEL said, was whether the agent knew what the newspaper editors he was escorting were going to ask KHRUSHCHEV in an interview. According to FRIPPEL, in the February 1963 meeting NOSENKO posed no questions and merely made polite conversation until FRIPPEL excused himself.

During the early 1965 interrogations, NOSENKO volunteered: "If you had been clever you could have made me work inside the USSR; you could have contacted me through FRIPPEL..." NOSENKO was asked in October 1966 whether he had expected or hoped CIA would attempt to establish contact with him inside the USSR through FRIPPEL. He strongly denied this.

i. Remarks

NOSENKO claims to have participated directly or indirectly in every recruitment operation with American tourists in the years 1955-1959. His presence in KGB operations during this period has sometimes been confirmed, but not always did these cases involve tourists of the three nationalities--American, British, and Canadian--for which NOSENKO said his section was responsible:

Years	Name	Nationality	Status in USSR	Confirmed
1955	MALIA	American	Tourist	No
1956	BURGI	American	Tourist	Yes
1957	[redacted]	German	Commercial/Tourist	No
	[redacted]	British	Tourists (under investigation)	Yes
	[redacted]	Norwegian	Quasi-official visitor	No
1958	HARRIS	American	Tourist	Yes
	KRAFT	American	Tourist	No
1959	DREW	American	Tourist	Yes
	[redacted]	British	Tourist	No
	[redacted]	British	Tourist	No
	[redacted]	British	Resident	Yes
	MERTENS	American	Tourist	Yes
	BARRETT	American	Temporary Resident	No
	WILLERFORD	American	Temporary Resident	No
	FRIPPEL (to 1963)	American	Resident, later tourist	Yes

This tabulation of 15 cases shows a higher number of operations involving American (six) and British (three) tourists than any other category, but it nevertheless intermingles citizens of other nationalities and having different status in the USSR. FRIPPEL and [redacted] were neither tourists nor (according to them and NOSENKO) used against tourists; [redacted] were from continental Europe; BARRETT and WILLERFORD worked in Moscow for several months. The tabulation also shows that, according to NOSENKO, his operational work was considerably more intensive in the time after he became Deputy Chief of the section than before, when as a senior case officer his administrative responsibilities presumably would have been far less demanding.

Although NOSENKO's participation in five cases of the American Tourist Section is confirmed, his acknowledged role in five others of different varieties--with corroboration by other sources in two of them--raises doubts about whether he belonged to that section as a senior officer. The doubts are strengthened

by the nature of his information about the four individual cases reviewed at length above:

- In the BURGI case NOSENKO did not have knowledge of the extensive background information on the recruitment target which the KGB possessed at the time of the approach; or of other significant details in what NOSENKO described as an operation of greatest importance to the American Tourist Section and to himself personally. In addition, NOSENKO has admitted lying about his having received an award for his role in the recruitment of BURGI.

- Regarding the DREW case, NOSENKO said he was chosen for the approach (made on the basis of homosexuality) because the regular case officer lacked operational experience. By April 1959, however, the KGB had arranged "hundreds" of homosexual compromises in the USSR, NOSENKO reported in another context. His earlier personal experience with Western targets had been limited to a secondary role in the BURGI case and a principal role in the HARRIS case, the latter not an approach on homosexual grounds. It is difficult to comprehend how NOSENKO would have qualified for the task whereas the case officer IVANOV would not.

- There are gaps in NOSENKO's information about a number of significant aspects in the [illegible] case, including staff planning and management of the operation, operational support arrangements, and on personnel of the outlying KGB units involved. NOSENKO was unable to explain why he was selected to make the approach to [illegible]

- CHELNOKOV was the senior case officer for FRIPPEL. NOSENKO never met this agent alone while he resided in Moscow as the American Express Company representative, and NOSENKO reportedly acted on a supervisor's instructions at their later meeting in Odessa. Despite his occupation and his entree into the American community in Moscow, FRIPPEL reportedly was not exploited by the KGB against tourists or U.S. Government employees but was targetted to report on matters to which he had no access; hence there seems to have been no logical reason for the FRIPPEL case to have been transferred from the American Tourist Section to the U.S. Embassy Section and back again. Although available information verifies the continuity of NOSENKO as FRIPPEL's handler, it cannot be considered firm evidence of NOSENKO having been an officer in either of these sections and in fact might be interpreted as evidence that he was not.

Similarly, while familiar with some but not all of the operational activities of the homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV, NOSENKO failed to support his claim to being their American Tourist Section case officer; he has been unable to provide rudimentary background information of these two individuals, who allegedly were prominent in operations of the section. NOSENKO's statement that he retired the files of VOLKOV and

YEFREMOV because they were too well known is incompatible with his other reporting to the effect that neither took part in an operation between 1959 and early 1962.

In further reference to NOSENKO's claims to having been the case officer in these various operations, he has been unable to recount in any detail KGB staff procedures involved in these operations, such as name-tracing, coordinating with other components, obtaining approvals for action, etc. Finally, of his alleged 54 months of service in the American Tourist Section, NOSENKO's described activity against foreigners accounts for only about three months; if the bulk of his time was spent with recruiting or handling Soviet-citizen agents, he might be expected to remember something about some of them. He can barely remember names (and only a few), has given confused accounts of their recruitment, remembers nothing about any of their specific operations or activities for the KGB, and knew no personality background data on any of them.

Even if it were assumed that NOSENKO was a case officer of the American Tourist Section, his claim to the position of Deputy Chief cannot be substantiated. He himself could not explain his appointment to the job. He did not know about the CIA "legal travel" operations compromised to the KGB in 1958 and 1959 when he was allegedly in a supervisory capacity. NOSENKO knew nothing about the documents on such operations which BLAKE gave the KGB and which can be presumed to have been of the utmost interest to the American Tourist Section, among all KGB Headquarters elements. These documents offered material that could have proven valuable to the preparation of NOSENKO's own paper on Western tourist operations; they were used in the genuine KGB paper written by the Tourist Department and passed to CIA by GOLITSYN. As with his status as a case officer in the American Tourist Section, NOSENKO the Deputy Chief could not describe how data on tourists was received, general and specific plans laid, events discussed, decisions made, and leads channeled.

The foregoing paragraphs suggest the conclusion that NOSENKO was not a senior case officer or the Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section. While the methods of the Tourist Department are not independently known in detail, it is conceivable that what NOSENKO did on behalf of the KGB (not necessarily the American Tourist Section) could have been accomplished by a principal agent. These conclusions do not cast doubt about the facts presented by NOSENKO on the KGB investigations in the OSWALD case but merely rule out the possibility of NOSENKO's having been involved with this case in any way prior to the assassination of President Kennedy.

6. U.S. Embassy Section (1960-1961)

a. Introduction

From January 1960 until January 1962 NOSENKO claims to have been Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, under KOVSHUK. This period (described in Pages 152-285) is the most significant in NOSENKO's account of his KGB career for a number of reasons:

- The section is the specific unit working against the U.S. Embassy, by NOSENKO's own statements the KGB's most important counterintelligence target in the USSR. Its operations (characterized on Page 152) directly affect American security. The section has the two-fold purpose of knowing of and controlling all access of Embassy personnel to Soviet citizens and of collecting, assimilating, evaluating, and using information from all possible sources to recruit Americans stationed in Moscow.

- NOSENKO's position as Deputy Chief of this section provided him his access to most of the major counterintelligence information he has reported, including recruitments of foreign embassy officials and microphone operations against the U.S. Embassy. Most important, it provided NOSENKO with his authority for stating that there were no successful recruitments of or agents among official Americans in Moscow for this two-year period, or for a time both before and after. (This is the same point made by indirection in the CHEREPANOV papers; yet this view is contradicted by information from GOLITSYN. Although the latter did not serve in the U.S. Embassy Section, he knew members of it and gave leads to KGB operational interest in and possible recruitments of official Americans in the Moscow Embassy during this period. Some of these appear to be related to information items NOSENKO has provided.)

- The apparent importance of NOSENKO's information on this period contrasts sharply with that from other periods. His accounts of recruitments in the tourist field covering the five years prior to this assignment and the two years following have been checked thoroughly and not one of them represents a penetration of any government; none has access to classified information; most were inactive, suspect, or already known to Western counterintelligence organs.

sensitive source

- NOSENKO's work against the U.S. Embassy is confirmed by [illegible] and less directly by other Soviet sourced reporting to CIA and the FBI. It is denied by GOLITSYN. (GOLITSYN has said that NOSENKO was not in the section during these years.)

b. Entry into the Section

NOSENKO has given a detailed account of how he came to be transferred into the U.S. Embassy Section, but he has never given a precise date, usually saying "January 1960" or "at the beginning of 1960."

As described on Pages 153-154, the shift was made at GRIBANOV's insistence and against NOSENKO's own personal wishes. GRIBANOV told NOSENKO during a personal interview, at which NOSENKO voiced his objections, that the transfer was part of his (GRIBANOV's) plans and was primarily to put new life into operations against American code clerks, the primary target of the Second Chief Directorate. GRIBANOV did not tell him why he, instead of another, had been selected for this job, although NOSENKO had the impression it was because of his achievements in the Tourist Department (see Part VIII.D.5.). NOSENKO's transfer could not have been a result of his close personal relationship with GRIBANOV or because his father was a friend of GRIBANOV's: NOSENKO has admitted that he exaggerated the closeness of his relationship with the Chief of the Second Chief Directorate and most recently (February 1965) said that he had few personal contacts with him outside of work; NOSENKO has also said that his father never met GRIBANOV.

NOSENKO initially said that he relieved nobody on coming into the section. He eventually recalled, however, that BAKHVALOV was his predecessor but left the section before he (NOSENKO) arrived. NOSENKO's confusion on this point, his description of how he assumed custody of certain files from BAKHVALOV although the latter had transferred to another department, and the opportunities NOSENKO had to name BAKHVALOV as his predecessor before he eventually did so are described on Pages 154-156.

c. Functions as Deputy Chief

In NOSENKO's view the transfer to become Deputy Chief of the section from the same position in another section was definitely an important promotion: He now became second-in-charge of the most important operational section of the entire Second Chief Directorate. As KOVSHUK's deputy, NOSENKO had the right and obligation to be aware of all activities in order to exercise his general supervisory functions and so as to be prepared to become the Acting Chief of the section when necessary.

NOSENKO said that consequently nothing was hidden from him for the two years 1960 and 1961. He claimed to have had complete knowledge of the U.S. Embassy Section's activities during the relatively recent years of 1960 and 1961 and to know of all significant operational successes achieved in the years before and after this period. He has also said he has told CIA all he knows of these activities. It was on this basis that he was able to say in 1965: "Tell Mr. McCone that there were no recruitments. I was there."

When NOSENKO reported for duty, he and KOVSHUK agreed on a division of supervisory duties within the section. KOVSHUK was, in addition to his over-all responsibility for

the section's operations, to supervise in particular operational activity against American diplomatic personnel assigned to the U.S. Embassy. NOSENKO had been specifically instructed by GRIBANOV and American Department Chief KLYPIN to concentrate his efforts on the supervision of operations against the most important American recruitment target, the code clerks at the Embassy, with the aim of revitalizing these activities and making recruitments. (NOSENKO said there had been none since the early 1950's.) According to the agreed-upon division of labor, NOSENKO also assumed case officer responsibility for John ABIDIAN, the Embassy Security officer (identified by NOSENKO as a CIA officer, but actually a CIA cooptee). Additionally, he was responsible for maintaining the section's file on factors pertaining to the physical security of the Embassy and for receiving and disseminating materials from the microphones concealed in various U.S. Embassy offices. These were functions held, NOSENKO said, by his predecessor BAKHVALOV and were turned over by NOSENKO at the end of 1961 to his successor GRYAZNOV: Apart from these duties, which apparently were routinely assumed by the Deputy Chief, NOSENKO supervised, during the early part of 1960 (as NOSENKO first said in 1965), the work of the officers responsible for operations against the American Armed Forces Attaches in Moscow; in October 1966, NOSENKO reported that he was personally responsible during this period for the operational activity against Naval and Marine officers in the Naval Attache's office.

d. Knowledgeability as Deputy and Acting Chief

As deputy to KOVSHUK, NOSENKO said, he was aware of all the operations being conducted by the section during this two-year period; by his own statement, nothing was kept from him. There were in these two years a total of over three months when KOVSHUK was ill or on leave, and at these times NOSENKO was acting chief of the section. In the latter capacity, NOSENKO was responsible for supervising the administrative work and operational activity of the entire section and, in particular, assumed KOVSHUK's work in directing operations against diplomatic personnel assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Therefore, pertinent to his claims are the facts presented in the following paragraphs.

NOSENKO could not remember any operational decisions that he made as acting chief, or any specific or unusual occurrences during these times. In answer to a question, NOSENKO said that the only specific responsibility of KOVSHUK's which he handled in the Chief's absence was reporting to the Chief of the First Department about all correspondence going out of the U.S. Embassy Section.

NOSENKO did not meet any of KOVSHUK's agents during his absences. He could not remember any of KOVSHUK's agents, except GLAZUNOV (whom NOSENKO said in April 1964 was his own agent and later said was "KOVSHUK's and FEDYANIN's") and the American correspondent STEVENS (about whom NOSENKO had reported in connection with his responsibilities in 1953-55). NOSENKO also said that in 1960 KOVSHUK recruited PREISFREUND, although earlier he had reported that he (NOSENKO) had done this. (Regardless of who the recruiter might have been, KOVSHUK attended NOSENKO's meetings with PREISFREUND.)

NOSENKO knew that his immediate supervisor KOVSHUK had personal contact, under Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover, with some U.S. Embassy officers and was aware that one of these had been WINTERS. He knew no details of KOVSHUK's contacts with WINTERS, nor that his own friend KISLOV, as well as his friend and frequent source of operational information LOPUKHOV, were also in touch with WINTERS. He could not remember who else KOVSHUK knew, or what KOVSHUK was doing with them, or why. NOSENKO knew neither that William MORRELL (declared to the Soviet Government as a CIA officer) belonged to CIA nor that KOVSHUK, who was aware of this fact, was in personal contact with MORELL.

Unlike KOVSHUK, ARTEMEV, KOSOLAPOV, BORODIN, BIRYUKOV, KRIVOSHEY and many other Second Chief Directorate officers, NOSENKO never had any direct contact, even for cultivation or assessment, with any American officials, either stationed in the Embassy or visiting the USSR. However, his English had been proven good enough to qualify him particularly for tourist recruitments and his operational flair had been tested. (It was this which caused him to be picked for the DREW, [illegible] and other approaches and the only reason why he, an English speaker, would have been specially selected to work on the German [illegible] who spoke "some English.")

DERYABIN and other defectors from the KGB have stated that the deputy chief of a section working against a foreign embassy in Moscow would be responsible for approving and retaining monthly schedules for the planned use of safehouses by the section; that he would discuss agent meeting schedules with individual case officers and approve and retain a list of planned agent meetings for each case officer on an individual basis; and that he would approve the acquisition of new agents and new safehouses and their transfer from one operation to another. By contrast, NOSENKO first did not list these functions among his responsibilities and later denied that he had them. NOSENKO did not understand the question when asked whether he had any responsibility for supervising the use of safehouses in Moscow (Page 162) and said that as the agents and the safehouses belonged to the case officers, they could use them when and how they liked without informing anyone; only when they were meeting an active development agent was it necessary to report to NOSENKO and this only after the meeting. NOSENKO said that, while he was Deputy Chief of the section, three or four subordinate officers had safe apartments, but he did not remember the location of any of them. Neither NOSENKO nor his subordinates GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV had such apartments, instead using less secure "meeting apartments" (which are used in the absence of the full-time occupant). NOSENKO was able to locate his own "meeting apartment" (which he said he brought with him when he transferred from the Tourist Department and later took back with him to the Tourist Department) by street and could do the same for GRYAZNOV's. He was not sure of the location of the apartment used by KOSOLAPOV.

e. Knowledgeability of U.S. Embassy Physical Security

According to NOSENKO, he maintained the file on physical security at the U.S. Embassy, and it contained detailed floor plans and photographs of the installation. NOSENKO was unable to give the location or the floor of the office of any single individual or component of the Embassy, including those of the Ambassador, or his own targets (ABIDIAN, the military code room, and the State Department communications room). NOSENKO said that all important Embassy offices were located in the "zone of security," which he has variously reported as the "seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth floors," or "seventh and up," or the "top four floors." NOSENKO did not remember how many floors there are in the Embassy, nor was he even sure how many floors were included in the restricted area. (The restricted area in fact consists of the top three floors, the eighth, ninth, and tenth.)

f. Knowledgeability about American Intelligence Personnel

NOSENKO said that not only the deputy chief but every officer in the section could identify the known and suspected American Intelligence personnel in the Embassy. Nevertheless, he himself did not know about three CIA officers (MAHONEY, MORELL, and GARBLER) whom the KGB had definitely identified as such before their assignments to Moscow in 1960-1961. For example, MORELL, whose overt CIA affiliation was officially announced by the Embassy to the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, was under direct and active cultivation by KOVSHUK and the KGB First Chief Directorate officer K.N. SMIRNOV in 1960-1961; NOSENKO knew nothing about this (although asked leading questions and given hints) and did not identify MORELL as a CIA officer. Four of the seven officers whom he said the KGB suspected to be CIA had never had any such affiliation. He could not give any information at all on the person he said the KGB considered to be the CIA chief in Moscow, KLOSSON, either on his Moscow activity and contacts or on the extent and results of KGB coverage, or on his personal situation and background. He could not explain why KLOSSON was considered to be the CIA chief, but said that "every officer thought he was."

g. Knowledgeability of KGB Code Clerk Operations

As his main task, the prime reason he was moved into the U.S. Embassy Section, NOSENKO alleged, was to supervise the operational work against American code clerks. In this capacity he closely guided the work of case officers GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV.* NOSENKO shared an office with his two subordinates, and the three were within sight and hearing of

*According to GOLITSYN, who knew both men well, GRYAZNOV was "a very experienced" case officer with some success; he had spent about the last five years of his 16 years in the KGB in the American Department and was a specialist in code clerk operations. GOLITSYN said that KOSOLAPOV had about ten years' KGB experience and, like GRYAZNOV, was specializing against code clerks in 1960.

one another and used a single safe, which contained files on the American code clerks and the agents involved with them. NOSENKO said that he carefully directed the work of GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV during these two years, discussing their cases with them, taking part in operational planning, and approving or disapproving all operational measures. NOSENKO originally asserted that he had also read and studied all the files kept on the American code clerks; under questioning on individual cases, however, he retracted these statements and said that he may have skimmed some of the files, that he did not study any of them, but that in any event he read all the current incoming materials on the code clerks from microphones, agents, and the like and then routed them to the case officer concerned.

CIA has two types of information against which the reports from NOSENKO can be compared. The first consists of the detailed debriefings of code clerks returning from Moscow, administered routinely by the Department of State and the military services; it also includes the special debriefings and interrogations of the Department of State, the FBI, and CIA as a follow-up to KGB operational activity which has become known from various sources. On this basis, CIA has accumulated a considerable amount of collateral information on the activities of the U.S. Embassy Section involving United States code clerks during the period NOSENKO said he was its Deputy Chief. The second type of information is the reporting on KGB operations by GOLITSYN who, from contacts with U.S. Embassy Section officers in Moscow and Helsinki, was able to provide several leads to what he said were recruited American code clerks. GOLITSYN's information thereby directly contradicts NOSENKO's statement that the KGB had no successes in its code clerk recruitment operations from the early 1950's to the end of 1963, and none of the subjects of GOLITSYN's leads have been positively identified. Some of GOLITSYN's information has been generally substantiated by other sources. In one case, this confirmation has come from NOSENKO himself, whose information on the STORSBERG operation, on the agent PREISFREUND's role in it, and on GOLITSYN's knowledge of KGB use of PREISFREUND presents an explanation of one and possibly two of GOLITSYN's leads.* Another of GOLITSYN's leads, that concerning an operational trip by KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki in order to establish contact with a code clerk, is confirmed by documentary evidence that KOSOLAPOV did in fact travel on the Helsinki-Moscow train with an American code clerk at the time and under the cover GOLITSYN reported. NOSENKO denied that such a trip was made by KOSOLAPOV.

NOSENKO has been questioned in detail about each of the code clerks serving in Moscow during 1960 and 1961. His information concerning KGB activities involving five of these Americans (STORSBERG, JENNER, MORONE, ZUJUS, and KEYSERS) and

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*As discussed below, there are important differences in the accounts of GOLITSYN and NOSENKO, particularly regarding the outcome of this operation.

his lack of information concerning a sixth (GARLAND) is discussed in detail in Pages 166 through 219. NOSENKO's information on a number of other cases, less important in his opinion, is described in the tabulation of American case leads given on Pages 364-410. Certain of these cases are further examined below to determine whether NOSENKO's knowledge equates with details which the deputy and acting chief of the U.S. Embassy Section could reasonably be expected to know and retain.

(i) The STORSBERG Case

The operation against STORSBERG (Pages 166-185) was, NOSENKO said, the most important case he had as supervisor of code clerk operations. The KGB, while able to break certain State Department ciphers, had had no success with military cryptographic systems, and therefore NOSENKO "dropped everything for a year" to involve himself with the development of James STORSBERG, the military code clerk at the U.S. Embassy. The following facts are pertinent to an evaluation of NOSENKO's story of this case.

NOSENKO originally raised the STORSBERG case indirectly at his first meeting with CIA on 9 June 1962. He told how GOLITSYN, during a visit to the American Department in 1960, at a time NOSENKO was on leave, had requested permission to use a U.S. Embassy Section agent, a Finn, in his own operations in Helsinki. During his discussions in the American Department, GOLITSYN learned that this Finnish agent was being used in operations against Embassy employees living in America House. NOSENKO said that the KGB realized that GOLITSYN had passed this information on to the Americans following his defection, for the regulations governing visits to America House by third nationals had been tightened. At this meeting NOSENKO did not name the Finnish agent or specify his involvement in any particular operational activity nor did he date the visit by GOLITSYN.

Later in the 1962 meetings NOSENKO gave a detailed summary of the Finnish agent's involvement in the unsuccessful recruitment attempt against an American military code clerk. NOSENKO, without naming the Finn or the American, said that he personally conducted the recruitment confrontation with GRIBANOV present. These early accounts were full of quotes of what NOSENKO said to the American and vice versa, descriptions of the American's reaction to the confrontation, and statements of NOSENKO's admiration for the American despite his refusal to work. Following his defection, NOSENKO recounted the case in even greater detail, in fact, in more detail than he gave for any other case. He identified the Finn as PREISFREUND and the American as STORSBERG and described and referred to the case whenever possible (over 50 times). When asked for details of other code clerk cases, for example, he repeatedly diverted to discussion of the STORSBERG case to illustrate how the KGB operated against code clerks in general.

After defecting NOSENKO denied that he personally confronted STORSBERG. He said that his personal role was limited to directing STORSBERG into the hotel room where the approach was made; after first saying that he had never claimed any other role, he admitted that he may have been "painting"

himself (exaggerating) in his descriptions of 1962. This admission came only after the tape of NOSENKO's 1962 statements had been played to him and he had successively said that (a) it was not his voice, (b) he was drunk in 1962, (c) the CIA case officer in Geneva had made him nervous, and (d) CIA probably spliced various pieces of tape together to make this false one. Still, NOSENKO said, he directed the entire operation from beginning to end, and it was his most important case. Interrogated further concerning his role in the STORSBERG operation in October 1966, NOSENKO said that he had never read the KGB file on STORSBERG, which was held by GRYAZNOV.

GOLITSYN, as NOSENKO reported, did visit the American Department, did request permission to use PREISFREUND operationally in Helsinki, and did report this to CIA in late 1961 following his defection. GOLITSYN also reported that, in denying his request, KOVSHUK told him that PREISFREUND had recently been used in the successful recruitment of an American Embassy employee, possibly a military man and possibly a code clerk or diplomat; therefore, KOVSHUK said, PREISFREUND could not be used for six months or so in other operations, for otherwise the Americans might become suspicious. NOSENKO has not reported these details, but has said only that GOLITSYN was instructed to drop interest in PREISFREUND because PREISFREUND belonged to the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO volunteered at his first meeting with CIA that he was on leave outside of Moscow on the occasion of GOLITSYN's visit to the American Department. Since defecting he has insisted with absolute certainty that this visit took place in the late spring or early summer of 1961 and has described his leave, where he went and with whom. GOLITSYN's passport and CIA travel data show that GOLITSYN was on TDY in Moscow in January 1961.* Told this, NOSENKO said that it is untrue, that he recalled being told of GOLITSYN's visit after his return from leave in July 1961, and that he was certain that he (NOSENKO) was in Moscow in January 1961.

NOSENKO has indirectly confirmed that the operation of which GOLITSYN learned during this visit to the American Department was the operation against STORSBERG. He did so by his assertion that PREISFREUND, his own agent, was used in only one operation, that against STORSBERG. Thus, as to the outcome of this operation, there is a conflict between NOSENKO's information and that earlier provided by GOLITSYN. There is also a conflict between NOSENKO's statements that the recruitment approach took place some time after May 1961 (NOSENKO's dates have varied from June to October 1961, STORSBERG said it was in October 1961) and GOLITSYN's statement that this approach had already been made in January 1961 when he learned of it.

GOLITSYN provided a second lead which NOSENKO appears to confirm and which may be related to the STORSBERG case. GOLITSYN said that during a visit to the American Department

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*GOLITSYN has based his assertion that NOSENKO was not in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960 and 1961 partly on this visit.

in the spring of 1960,* he learned from GRYAZNOV that he (GRYAZNOV) had developed an operation against an American military code clerk to the point that the KGB was "99 per cent" certain that a recruitment approach to this code clerk would be successful. GOLITSYN said that GRYAZNOV told him that this would be the first recruitment of a military code clerk (as contrasted to a State Department code clerk) in the history of the American Department. There were only two persons meeting this criterion who were in Moscow at the time GOLITSYN placed this visit, STORSBERG and HURLEY; the superior of STORSBERG, HURLEY performed back-up cryptographic duties in STORSBERG's absence. If NOSENKO's report that there was no development of or approach to HURLEY can be accepted, this lead from GOLITSYN would apply to STORSBERG rather than HURLEY. There is a conflict between NOSENKO's information on the STORSBERG case and this second GOLITSYN lead in that GOLITSYN described an operation which was in its final stages in the spring of 1960, whereas NOSENKO (as well as STORSBERG) asserted that the STORSBERG operation was just under way at this time and was long and drawn-out.

(ii) <u>The JENNER Case</u>

Apart from the STORSBERG operation, NOSENKO has been able to supply the greatest amount of detail concerning the operation (also unsuccessful) against the State Department pouch clerk Paul JENNER (Pages 186-196). This case developed as a result of an idea originated by NOSENKO himself shortly after he arrived in the U.S. Embassy Section. Because of the inaccessibility of American code clerks to the KGB in Moscow, it was NOSENKO's plan to send a KGB officer to Helsinki in order to strike up an acquaintance with a code clerk entering the Soviet Union aboard the Helsinki-Moscow train. The first (and last) time this was attempted, NOSENKO related, was in March 1960, when the KGB learned that JENNER, listed as a "secretary-archivist" and thus assumed by the KGB to be a code clerk, was scheduled to transit Helsinki en route to his assignment at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Under NOSENKO's supervision KOSOLAPOV therefore travelled to Helsinki and boarded the same train as JENNER. Additionally, GRYAZNOV took a KGB female agent to the town of Vyborg, on the Finno-Soviet border, and placed her on the same train. Both KOSOLAPOV and the female agent met and spoke with JENNER en route to Moscow, and the girl gave him her telephone number, asking him to call her. After JENNER's arrival in Moscow, both KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV submitted written reports to NOSENKO describing the contacts on the train. Although the KGB later found out that JENNER was only a pouch clerk, not a cryptographer, he was considered of interest and when JENNER failed to telephone the female agent, the two were brought together in a "chance meeting" at the Moscow airport. JENNER would have no part of the agent's invitations, however, and the operation therefore went no further.

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*When NOSENKO was told of the GOLITSYN visit in May or June 1960, he denied that it took place, saying that he necessarily would know if it had.

JENNER reported to the Security Officer at the U.S. Embassy upon his arrival that he had been contacted by two Soviet students from Vyborg, a young man and a woman, on the Helsinki-Moscow train. He also reported having been given a telephone number by the girl and later reported having been recontacted by her at the Moscow airport.

CIA has documentary evidence, in the form of official Finnish train manifests, that JENNER travelled from Helsinki to Moscow by train on 31 March 1960. This document shows that JENNER travelled alone and no Soviets were aboard when the train left Helsinki. CIA also has an official travel manifest showing that KOSOLAPOV, using the name KOLOSOV, travelled from Helsinki to Moscow by rail on 2 April 1960, two days later, and that no Americans travelled on this train with him. NOSENKO identified KOLOSOV's photograph as that of his subordinate KOSOLAPOV. (NOSENKO earlier said that he did not know whether KOSOLAPOV used an alias for this trip, what that alias might have been, or whether KOSOLAPOV had an alias passport; he agreed that he would have had to authorize such a passport.) When he was told of CIA evidence that KOSOLAPOV did not travel on the same train as JENNER and therefore could not have met and talked with him as NOSENKO had reported, NOSENKO refused to believe it; he insisted that he had read the reports of both KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV, and that the events were exactly as he described them.

(iii) The GARLAND Case

GOLITSYN told CIA after his defection that while he was stationed in Helsinki, probably in November--not March--1960, KOSOLAPOV travelled to Finland under alias and commercial cover in order to make the acquaintance of an American code clerk on the Helsinki-Moscow train. KOSOLAPOV's arrival had been announced by a cable from KGB Headquarters to the Helsinki Legal Residency. According to GOLITSYN, the Legal Residency learned which train this American was to board and succeeded in placing KOSOLAPOV in the same compartment with him. GOLITSYN saw KOSOLAPOV board the train with this American. Later, when another American Department officer visited Helsinki, GOLITSYN asked him how KOSOLAPOV's operation with the code clerk had gone; from the officer's refusal to answer, GOLITSYN assumed that it had been a success.

CIA travel records show that KOSOLAPOV made a second trip to Helsinki in November 1960, again under the KOLOSOV alias. Finnish railroad manifests show that KOSOLAPOV left Helsinki by train on 16 November 1960 and that one of his travelling companions on this train was GARLAND, who was en route to Moscow to assume his duties as chief of the State Department code room at the American Embassy (Page 198). There were no other Americans on this train.

Told that KOSOLAPOV had made a trip to Helsinki in November 1960 and had travelled to Moscow on the same train as an American code clerk, one of his own targets, NOSENKO said that this could not be. He agreed that, as in the case of KOSOLAPOV's trip to meet JENNER, he would necessarily have been involved in the planning of such a second trip and would have had to approve arrangements and correspondence in connection with it. Even if such a trip took place when NOSENKO was out of Moscow, he said, the details of it would

have been known to him upon his return, and he would not have forgotten about the trip. (In fact, CIA travel records show that KOSOLAPOV arrived in Helsinki on 12 November 1960 and that NOSENKO left Moscow for Amsterdam, en route to Cuba, on 15 November.) NOSENKO has not changed his position that there was no such trip.

(iv) The MORONE Case

Like the STORSBERG operation, the MORONE case was mentioned at NOSENKO's first meeting with CIA; he cited it as an example of a technique which NOSENKO introduced for using third nationals to obtain access to American code clerks who were reluctant to establish contacts with Soviet citizens. According to NOSENKO's most recent version, given in early 1965, the KGB learned that MORONE and a Marine Guard (BEGGS) planned to travel to Warsaw on leave. KOSOLAPOV thereupon drew up an operational plan, edited by NOSENKO and KOVSHUK and approved by GRIBANOV, proposing that a female agent of the Polish UB be introduced to MORONE on the Moscow to Warsaw train for the purpose of obtaining compromising materials. KOSOLAPOV arranged with Polish liaison officials in Moscow to have such an agent sent to Moscow, met her when she arrived, and briefed her on the operation. She was then placed on MORONE's train together with a KGB technician whose task it was to obtain tape recordings of the compromise. Events went according to plan: MORONE met the girl and was intimate with her on the train, but when the technician reported to NOSENKO the day after the train arrived in Warsaw, he said that the tape recordings were of low quality and unsuitable for their intended purpose. In a further attempt to acquire compromising material on MORONE, KOSOLAPOV later brought the UB agent to Moscow, and on this occasion photographs were obtained of their intimacies in a Moscow hotel room. Still, the KGB felt, there was not enough blackmail material to ensure recruitment, and it was further planned to have the America House maid IVANOVA attempt to lure MORONE to a room in Moscow where truly compromising photographs of intimacies with a Soviet citizen could be obtained. Possibly because they noticed MORONE's interest in IVANOVA, NOSENKO said, the Americans ordered MORONE out of Moscow before further steps could be taken.

Although NOSENKO provided a considerable amount of detail on MORONE's trip to Warsaw, there were numerous variations in his different accounts. In 1962 he said that he had handled the entire operation himself, including telephoning Warsaw with the request for the girl; he also said that the UB obtained compromising photographs in Warsaw and that several months later the female agent was brought to Moscow expressly for the purpose of introducing MORONE to a Soviet girlfriend. This, NOSENKO said, was successful and MORONE was soon having intercourse with a KGB agent. While still in place in Geneva on 1 February 1964 NOSENKO gave a different version: "We," he said, arranged for the girl by a dispatch pouched to the KGB advisor in Warsaw; moreover, the Poles, who had obtained compromising photographs in Warsaw, sent the KGB only pictures of the two kissing, keeping the best ones for themselves, and this is why she had to be brought to Moscow. NOSENKO told the FBI later in February 1964 that compromising photographs had been obtained in Warsaw but no recruitment was attempted because KHRUSHCHEV had

given instructions that no actions were to be taken which might embarrass then existing good relations with the United States. When in February 1965 it was pointed out that MORONE arrived in Warsaw on 14 December 1960 and that NOSENKO left for Cuba on 15 November 1960, NOSENKO revised his story of receiving the personal report of the technician to say that he had perhaps read the technician's report after returning from Cuba in December 1960.

CIA learned of the MORONE train trip and subsequent involvement with the UB agent in 1961 from a Polish source who had provided much sensitive and reliable information previously. The Polish source submitted a considerable amount of detail including the date of the operation (which NOSENKO did not recall) and the fact that the Polish agent was handled in Moscow by a KGB officer named "Volodya." It was on the basis of this report that MORONE was withdrawn from Moscow in May 1961.

In accounts given since his defection, NOSENKO has consistently named KOSOLAPOV as MORONE's case officer. KOSOLAPOV drafted the plan for the operation on the train, discussed it with NOSENKO and KOVSHUK, met with a UB official in Moscow to arrange for the agent, met the agent on her arrival, and briefed her on her assignment. NOSENKO has not been asked and has not volunteered who specifically placed the agent on the train. Records show, however, that MORONE left Moscow on 13 November 1960, arriving in Warsaw on the 14th; from 12 to 16 November 1960, KOSOLAPOV is confirmed to have been in Helsinki, apparently in connection with an operation involving the American code clerk GARLAND (see above). It is also noted that travel records show that NOSENKO, the officer supervising this (as well, presumably, as KOSOLAPOV's trip to Helsinki), left Moscow on 15 November 1960 with a delegation going to Cuba.

NOSENKO has been questioned concerning the KGB agents in contact with MORONE and what was learned from them. He reported that an Egyptian agent visited America House, met MORONE there, but did not report anything of interest concerning him. NOSENKO also mentioned IVANOVA, a maid at America House, who knew MORONE and whom the KGB wanted to use to lure MORONE into a compromising situation (see above). NOSENKO said that he, himself, had met with IVANOVA several times to discuss MORONE, but that he could not recall anything specific of interest or use that she reported concerning

him. Another agent who may have reported on MORONE, NOSENKO said, was an East German girl sent to America House to pose as an Austrian; NOSENKO was not sure what she might have reported or when this was, other than it occurred when he was working against MORONE and that it was during ABIDIAN's tour in Moscow, for he had come to America House to question the girl.

Various reports indicate that MORONE was involved in illegal currency speculation with the Egyptian agent and that on at least one occasion the Egyptian introduced MORONE to a Soviet female, with whom MORONE was intimate. NOSENKO did not know that MORONE was also involved in illegal currency dealings with [illegible] whom NOSENKO has identified as KOSOLAPOV's agent and who, he said, was involved with and reporting on NOSENKO's target ABIDIAN. NOSENKO did not know that IVANOVA once introduced MORONE to a Soviet female, with whom MORONE was intimate; additionally MORONE was reported by a number of his co-residents at America House to have been intimate with IVANOVA herself (which MORONE denied). Some of these same Americans reported also that MORONE was intimate with UMANETS, another KGB agent identified by NOSENKO; MORONE himself said he knew UMANETS "well." Finally, the incident involving the East German girl posing as an Austrian involved the code clerk ZUJUS, not MORONE, and took place after NOSENKO claims to have been transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section; she was interviewed by ABIDIAN's successor, MONTGOMERY.

(v) The KEYSERS Case

The approach to KEYSERS is the only time during his service in the U.S. Embassy Section that NOSENKO claims to have had direct contact with an American stationed in Moscow. (NOSENKO said on one occasion that this was the only face-to-face encounter he could recall; and, on another, that it was possible that STORSBERG--the only other possibility--may not have seen him on the night he was approached in the Moscow hotel.) KEYSERS therefore is the only independent American source who could confirm that NOSENKO was involved in operations against American Embassy personnel in 1960 or 1961. NOSENKO himself pointed out, however, that this contact was of very short duration, and that it was possible that KEYSERS would not recognize him. This was the case: KEYSERS failed to identify NOSENKO's photograph and described the officer who approached him as a man considerably older, shorter, and probably of a much heavier build than NOSENKO was. Although NOSENKO was able to provide a description of this incident, he did not know much about the overall KGB case against KEYSERS and a number of discrepancies have been noted.

In 1962 NOSENKO first reported the approach to KEYSERS, without naming him, but saying he was the successor to STORSBERG. Since defecting in 1964, NOSENKO has continued to identify him as STORSBERG's replacement. In fact, KEYSERS was sent to Moscow as an assistant to the Embassy medical officer; he also worked in the office of the Air Attache as a collateral duty and for a short while in 1961 was under training in the military code room as a "back-up" cryptographer for STORSBERG. STORSBERG's replacement in Moscow was ZUJUS.

On 24 and 28 January 1964, before the defection, NOSENKO incorrectly named ZUJUS, who he said was STORSBERG's replacement, as the target of this operation. On 2 February 1964 NOSENKO called a special meeting with his CIA handlers to correct this mistake. He said that, in fact, KEYSERS was STORSBERG's replacement, and the approach had been made to him. (Thus NOSENKO had forgotten the name of the one American Embassy official he ever approached.)

In February 1965 NOSENKO said that the KGB believed that KEYSERS did not report the receipt of the defection letter and that there was no indication that he had from microphones or telephone coverage of the U.S. Embassy. In fact, KEYSERS reported the letter at once in the office of the Military Attache, where a microphone was discovered in 1964. NOSENKO had earlier said that this particular microphone was being monitored around the clock by the KGB. (KEYSERS' homosexuality and drinking problems had also been discussed widely in Embassy offices. NOSENKO was unaware of these discussions.)

NOSENKO did not know correctly where or how the KGB delivered to KEYSERS the letter which preceded the airport approach which NOSENKO claimed to have made.

(vi) Other Code Clerk Cases

Frank DAY: NOSENKO identified DAY as a State Department code clerk and the target of either KOSOLAPOV or GRYAZNOV. As with all other code clerks, NOSENKO was asked whether he knew of any interesting information about DAY, whether he knew of any of DAY's friends in Moscow, or of his travels inside and outside the Soviet Union, etc. NOSENKO answered "no" to all these questions. He said that the KGB had no derogatory information on DAY, was unaware of any vulnerabilities he might have had, and that no operational measures were taken against him. Records show that DAY was in Moscow from May 1960 to October 1961. In July 1961 he travelled to the Caucasus with his friend, the U.S. Agricultural Attache BROWN, formerly an overt CIA employee. DAY later reported that the two were under surveillance by five persons at all times on this trip, that on one occasion they found four "repairmen" in their hotel room upon returning unexpectedly ahead of schedule, and that another time during this trip an "attractive and available Soviet female" was placed in their train compartment.

John TAYLOR: NOSENKO said TAYLOR was a State Department code clerk and the target of KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO did not know of TAYLOR's previous service abroad or of any background information the KGB might have had about him. He described an operation against TAYLOR which centered around his intimacy with a Russian maid (a KGB agent) and his sympathy towards the Soviet Union and its people. No compromising photographs were obtained of TAYLOR and the maid, however, and no approach was made to him, possibly because the KGB did not want to jeopardize the more important STORSBERG case by creating a "flap." According to TAYLOR, he was intimate with his maid from about September 1960 until the beginning of 1961. On one occasion they were intimate in a "friend's apartment" in Moscow. NOSENKO did not know that the maid told TAYLOR she was pregnant or that TAYLOR offered

her money for an abortion. TAYLOR left Moscow in February 1961, whereas the approach to STORSBERG was reported by NOSENKO and STORSBERG to have occurred four to eight months afterward.

Maurice ZWANG: NOSENKO identified ZWANG as a State Department code clerk who was "actively worked on" during the 1960-1961 period. An Egyptian agent, whose name NOSENKO did not recall, introduced ZWANG to a female KGB agent in an attempt to obtain compromising photographs, but the agent did not like ZWANG and refused to have intercourse with him. At the time NOSENKO left the U.S. Embassy Section in January 1962, there was no further activity surrounding ZWANG. The KGB had no agents in contact with him, and there was no vulnerability data concerning him. When ZWANG was interviewed by the State Department after returning from his Moscow assignment, a polygraph examination indicated that ZWANG had had intercourse with his Russian maid, elsewhere identified by NOSENKO as a KGB agent; ZWANG admitted visiting the maid's apartment several times but denied intimacies. In March or April 1961, an Egyptian introduced ZWANG to another Soviet female; ZWANG also admitted visiting her apartment on several occasions, but again denied having had intercourse with her. ZWANG was reported by various other Americans stationed in Moscow to have been active in currency speculation and blackmarketeering with the Egyptian and [illegible] and agent of KOSOLAPOV according to NOSENKO. NOSENKO was unaware of this.

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h. Responsibility for and Knowledge of ABIDIAN

NOSENKO said that, as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, he was directly responsible, as case officer, for all coverage of the Embassy Security Officer John V. ABIDIAN. This was NOSENKO's only individual target responsibility, and no KGB officer shared it with him. NOSENKO said that he opened the KGB file on ABIDIAN before ABIDIAN's arrival in Moscow in early 1960, and that he turned this file over officially to his successor, GRYAZNOV, when transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section at the end of 1961. It was NOSENKO who wrote the KGB plan for operations against ABIDIAN in about October 1960. ABIDIAN, according to NOSENKO, was considered by the KGB to be a CIA officer and, as LANGELLE's successor, was also considered to be the most important counterintelligence target in the Embassy. ABIDIAN was thus made a special target of surveillance from the day of his arrival in the USSR; this meant he was always under surveillance by several teams of the KGB Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate. The intensive coverage of ABIDIAN included mail censorship, telephone taps, and agent reporting; it was instituted, NOSENKO said, "in the hope that he might lead the KGB to another POPOV." ABIDIAN was detected, NOSENKO continued, in three letter-mailings--all to agents already under KGB control. He was seen to enter a suspected dead drop site on Pushkin Street, the significance of which did not become known to the KGB until later, when it was learned that this site was to be used by PENKOVSKIY. In the hostile interrogations of early 1965, NOSENKO agreed that he was the single person in the KGB responsible for knowing everything possible about ABIDIAN.

NOSENKO said he knew nothing about ABIDIAN's personal background, his education, his studies in France, his military service, his date of entry into the State Department, his State Department rank, his previous foreign assignments with the State Department, or his status as a Foreign Service Reserve, Staff, or Officer status (FSR, FSS, FSO). NOSENKO said he tried to learn these things, but the information was unavailable in the Second Chief Directorate or in KGB Central files, and although he requested information from the First Chief Directorate, nothing was received. The only information the KGB had on ABIDIAN, insofar as NOSENKO knew, was that contained in ABIDIAN's visa request and in a report from one of the Legal Residencies in the United States; the report provided a basis for believing him to be a CIA officer.

NOSENKO was unaware of the meaning of the initials FSR, FSS, and FSO. When asked whether he had checked the Department of State Biographic Register for information on ABIDIAN's background, he replied that this document was not available to the U.S. Embassy Section; he subsequently recalled that there was an old copy of the Biographic Register "from about 1956" in KOVSHUK's office, but that it contained no information on ABIDIAN.

NOSENKO reported that one of the reasons ABIDIAN was considered a CIA officer was his behavior while serving as a Department of State Security Officer with KHRUSHCHEV's delegation when the latter visited the United States in

1959. NOSENKO never mentioned that KOSOLAPOV, who he said was his immediate subordinate and shared NOSENKO's office in KGB Headquarters, was a member of this same delegation.

NOSENKO did not know where ABIDIAN's office was located in the U.S. Embassy. He said he did not know and was unable to find out who ABIDIAN's secretary was. He reported that some agent told the KGB that ABIDIAN had a sign on the door of his office which said "Security Officer." There was no such sign.

NOSENKO did not know where ABIDIAN's apartment was located. He did not know its contents and said that the KGB was not interested in this. He did not know whether ABIDIAN changed apartments in Moscow, which he did.

NOSENKO identified GROMAKOVA, an Embassy language teacher, as a KGB agent who was valuable because she was intelligent and was able to provide personality sketches on her students based on classroom discussions. He never associated ABIDIAN with GROMAKOVA. When told that ABIDIAN had taken language lessons from her, NOSENKO recalled that ABIDIAN took "several" lessons from GROMAKOVA at the beginning of his tour but discontinued; she reported nothing of significance and there was no regular reporting from her on ABIDIAN. ABIDIAN, however, reported that he took regular, private Russian lessons from GROMAKOVA throughout his tour in Moscow and that they discussed in class his past personal life, travel, education, fiancee, and his trips abroad to see his fiancee.

NOSENKO knew that ABIDIAN travelled out of the USSR two or three times, but had no idea when these trips took place or what countries ABIDIAN visited. NOSENKO said that, as ABIDIAN's predecessor LANGELLE was known to have travelled outside the USSR for operational reasons in connection with the POPOV case, it would have been of interest to learn where ABIDIAN had gone, but the KGB had no way of finding this out. (Note in the previous paragraph that GROMAKOVA knew.) When NOSENKO's interrogator pointed out the possibility of photographing ABIDIAN's passport upon his return to the USSR, NOSENKO replied that the KGB does not photograph the passports of foreign diplomats entering the Soviet Union.

NOSENKO said that ABIDIAN made no trips outside Moscow within the USSR and explained that, as case officer, he would necessarily have been aware of any such trip as he would have had to handle all arrangements for surveillance during it. When NOSENKO was told that ABIDIAN travelled to Soviet Armenia in October 1960, NOSENKO said for the first time that he was on leave in that month. NOSENKO admitted in October 1966 that he knew nothing of ABIDIAN's trip.

NOSENKO said that he did not know who were ABIDIAN's close American friends in Moscow or his friends and professional contacts among foreigners there.

NOSENKO said at the end of the January-February 1965 interrogations concerning ABIDIAN that the reason he knew so little about ABIDIAN was because he was "working badly" as ABIDIAN's case officer. The reason for his poor work, he

said, was that he had to concentrate on supervising the work against code clerks and therefore had very little time left for ABIDIAN (see above concerning code clerks).

In 1962 NOSENKO correctly described all of the three clandestine letter mailings carried out by ABIDIAN in Moscow at CIA request (Pages 226-230). He also provided accurate information on CIA letter-mailings in general, pointing out that none at all were mailed for a year and a half after the arrest of LANGELLE in October 1959. (No letters were mailed from 22 February 1960 until 1 April 1961, when ABIDIAN mailed his first one.) NOSENKO explained that the KGB completely controlled this activity through the use of metka, a thief powder applied to the clothing of foreigners in the USSR; a trace is left on anything coming into contact with treated areas, and this can be detected by special machines through which all mail passes. Despite the fact that all of ABIDIAN's letters were mailed to KGB double agents and would therefore have been detected anyway, it was metka, NOSENKO said, which in each case led to their initial identification. After his defection NOSENKO described how the metka had been applied to ABIDIAN's clothing (and hence to the letters) by the agent FEDOROVICH, who began working as ABIDIAN's maid several months after ABIDIAN arrived in Moscow in March 1960. NOSENKO insisted under interrogation that FEDOROVICH was the only agent who had access to ABIDIAN's apartment, that he, NOSENKO, had personally briefed her on the application of metka, and that he was sure that ABIDIAN's letters were detected by means of metka. From a CIA debriefing of ABIDIAN, however, it appears that FEDOROVICH did not begin working as ABIDIAN's maid until some time in July 1961, whereas ABIDIAN mailed his first letter in Moscow on 1 April 1961 and his second letter on 2 July 1961. ABIDIAN's third letter was mailed on 1 September 1961, after FEDOROVICH began to work for him.

i. <u>Reporting on ABIDIAN's Visit to the Pushkin Street Dead Drop</u>

NOSENKO's account of the visit by ABIDIAN to the PENKOVSKIY dead drop site on Pushkin Street in Moscow is described in detail on Pages 231-235. In summary, NOSENKO reported that at the end of 1960 or early 1961 KGB surveillance followed ABIDIAN from the U.S. Embassy to Pushkin Street, where ABIDIAN was noted to enter a residential building. Upon examination it was decided that this was a likely dead drop site, and a stationary surveillance post was assigned to watch it. After three months, since nothing suspicious had been noted, this post was removed. The true significance of the location did not become known to the KGB until after the arrest of PENKOVSKIY in 1962. NOSENKO said he was still in the U.S. Embassy Section and was ABIDIAN's case officer when this event took place. He heard of it while sitting in KOVSHUK's office on the day it happened, visited the site the following day with V. KOZLOV (Chief of the American Department of the KGB Surveillance Directorate), placed the original surveillance report in ABIDIAN's file, and discussed the results of the stationary post with KOZLOV on an almost daily basis during the first month and periodically thereafter until the post was removed. It was KOZLOV who told NOSENKO that after three months the stationary

surveillance had been discontinued. NOSENKO did not tell CIA about this incident in 1962, he said, because he knew that the watch had been discontinued and that nothing suspicious had been noted; therefore, he thought the incident would not have been of interest to American Intelligence.

NOSENKO has stressed that ABIDIAN was under special surveillance by at least two surveillance teams at all times and that, on the day he visited Pushkin Street, ABIDIAN was under continuous watch from the moment he left the Embassy. NOSENKO has been able to give a detailed description of ABIDIAN's movement to the dead drop site.

Despite the special surveillance coverage of ABIDIAN, NOSENKO said, he was unaware of any unusual movements by ABIDIAN during the days immediately preceding his visit to Pushkin Street. NOSENKO said that he knew definitely that surveillance had reported nothing unusual during this period and that he was sure ABIDIAN had not eluded the surveillance at any time during it. According to CIA records, three days before ABIDIAN went to Pushkin Street in response to indications that the dead drop had been loaded, ABIDIAN left the U.S. Embassy in his private car for Spaso House at about nine o'clock in the evening; at about two o'clock the next morning he and [GARBLER] (CIA Chief of Station) went in ABIDIAN's car to check the telephone pole for the signal PENKOVSKIY was to leave as part of his signal that the drop had been loaded. Two days before ABIDIAN went to Pushkin Street he drove his car to the apartment of Air Force Captain DAVISON; he again checked the telephone pole from a window in the apartment and then walked by it on foot. NOSENKO identified GARBLER as a U.S. naval officer but not as a CIA employee (see above).

Asked why, in his opinion, ABIDIAN went to Pushkin Street at the time he did, NOSENKO replied that in about 1960 an American tourist or delegation member had gone to this address. It was the "opinion of the Second Chief Directorate" that this American had selected the site as a dead drop location, and that ABIDIAN went there merely to check the suitability of the site for this purpose. In fact, ABIDIAN went to Pushkin Street in response to what appeared to be a prearranged telephone signal from PENKOVSKIY signalling that he had loaded the dead drop there. It has been confirmed that PENKOVSKIY did not give this signal and, because of the circumstances and type of signal given, the possibility of coincidence has been ruled out. CIA has therefore concluded that the signal came from the KGB.

The Pushkin Street dead drop site was proposed by PENKOVSKIY himself in the August 1960 letter through which he initially contacted CIA. There is no record that a "tourist or delegation member" visited this address. The only known visits by Americans to the building on Pushkin Street--the only ones having any connection with its use as a dead drop location--occurred on 12 November and 4 December 1960 when the CIA officer MAHONEY checked the address from outside, and on 21 January 1961 when MAHONEY entered the building and checked the specific location of the dead drop. MAHONEY is known to have been identified to the KGB as a CIA officer before arriving in Moscow and was the target of heavy surveillance throughout his tour. (NOSENKO did not know about MAHONEY or his CIA status.)

NOSENKO's date of "late 1960 or early 1961" is incorrect, almost exactly by a year. NOSENKO said he turned ABIDIAN's file over to GRYAZNOV about 28 December 1961. ABIDIAN checked the Pushkin Street dead drop on 30 December 1961. NOSENKO has described his participation in an approach to the American tourist W.E. JOHNSON as happening "right after returning to the Tourist Department in 1962." Because NOSENKO's participation in this case was confirmed by JOHNSON, and because the approach to JOHNSON took place on 5 January 1962 (he reported it to the U.S. Embassy at once), it can be said with certainty that NOSENKO's entire story of his own participation in the surveillance of the Pushkin Street dead drop site is false. NOSENKO: (a) could not have visited the dead drop site with KOZLOV (who in any event was not in Moscow at the time); (b) could not have placed the original surveillance report in ABIDIAN's file, which GRYAZNOV held as of 28 December 1961; (c) could not have received almost daily reports from KOZLOV for about a month and periodic reports thereafter; and (d) could not have neglected to tell CIA of ABIDIAN's visit to the drop in 1962 on grounds that the surveillance of Pushkin Street had been discontinued after three months without anything suspicious being noted. (NOSENKO was in Geneva on 15 March 1962, only two and a half months after ABIDIAN checked the dead drop.)

NOSENKO has refused to admit that he lied about his part in this incident. The page containing the contradictions listed in the preceding paragraph was the only page of a "protocol" which NOSENKO refused to sign during the hostile interrogations of early 1965. In October 1966, when he was again asked whether he went to the Pushkin Street dead drop site with KOZLOV, NOSENKO said that he could not remember whether he had gone there at all.

j. Responsibility of Supervising Military Attache Operations

On 29 January 1965 NOSENKO told his interrogator that for the first five or six months of 1960, immediately after transferring to the U.S. Embassy Section and as part of his responsibilities as its Deputy Chief, he supervised Second Chief Directorate activities against American service attaches in Moscow. By this he meant, NOSENKO said, that when GAVRILENKO (the case officer for Air Force Attaches), KURILENKO (Army Attaches), or BELOGLAZOV (Naval Attaches and Marines) had any questions or reports to submit, they would come to him rather than to KOVSHUK, the Chief of the section, After about six months he was relieved of this duty because his other duties did not allow sufficient time for this function and because it was considered more suitable that ALESHIN, recently assigned to the American Department as Deputy Chief, be given this responsibility.

NOSENKO had previously been questioned in detail on his responsibilities in the U.S. Embassy Section, and had never before mentioned this one. NOSENKO told CIA in June 1964 that when he reported for duty in the U.S. Embassy Section in January 1960, DRANOV was the responsible case officer for the Naval Attaches and Marines. Soon after his own arrival, NOSENKO said, DRANOV was transferred from the section and his responsibilities were taken over by BELOGLAZOV, who had earlier been assisting DRANOV against these targets.

NOSENKO said on 20 October 1966 that immediately upon, or at the latest a few weeks after, arriving in the U.S. Embassy Section, he went on leave for a month. Either immediately before or right after this leave KOVSHUK told him that he would be responsible for activities against the Naval Attaches. DRANOV was retiring and gave NOSENKO the files on Naval and Marine personnel. This was NOSENKO's first mention either of the leave period in early 1960 or of having had case officer responsibilities for personnel of the Naval Attache's office in Moscow. (At the same time he said that he had lied about going on leave in November 1960.)

NOSENKO was reminded on 25 October 1966 that he had said in 1965 that in 1960 he was supervisor of operations against all U.S. service attache personnel. NOSENKO replied: "I took the files only on the Navy, but I was working on [supervising] all of them."

NOSENKO has never volunteered details of specific operational activity he handled as the case officer for U.S. Naval Attaches or supervisor of operations against all attaches in early 1960. He said that Marine Colonel DULACKI's contact with (or attempt to recruit) the Indonesian KGB agent [redacted] which he has described in detail (see Page 488) took place after he was relieved of these functions.

k. TDY to Bulgaria and the LUNT Case

In the spring of 1961, NOSENKO said, four months after returning from Cuba, he was told unexpectedly that in about a week's time he would leave for Bulgaria to consult with the American Department of the Bulgarian MVR concerning operations against the American Legation in Sofia (Pages 279-283). NOSENKO flew to Sofia in early April 1961, where he was met by A.S. KOZLOV, an advisor there and a former employee of the Second Chief Directorate whom NOSENKO had known at KGB Headquarters. NOSENKO remained in Bulgaria until about the middle of May. While there he discussed both general matters and particular cases with the Bulgarians, gave several lectures on operations against American installations and personnel as well as against tourists, and finally directed the successful homosexual operation against the American Professor LUNT.

Aside from being told that he would be advising the Bulgarian service on operations against Americans at the Legation in Sofia, NOSENKO apparently received no preparation for this trip. He said in answer to specific questions that nobody told him what he was supposed to discuss with the Bulgarians, that he did not meet with the Bulgarian liaison representatives in Moscow before leaving, and that he knew nothing of the organization, personnel, area of responsibility, or problems of the American Department of the Bulgarian service before arriving in Sofia.

NOSENKO was selected for this mission despite the fact that he was extremely busy with his duties in the U.S. Embassy Section (see above discussion of his responsibilities for code clerks, ABIDIAN, and the military attaches) and despite the fact that KOZLOV was permanently assigned as an advisor in Sofia. NOSENKO described KOZLOV in another context as a "very experienced officer" and has said that KOZLOV was Chief of the American Department until 1953 and then from June 1955 until sometime in 1958 was Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, Second Chief Directorate. (KOZLOV, assisted by NOSENKO, had recruited BURGI in June 1956.) Asked why KOZLOV could not have advised the Bulgarians, NOSENKO said that he was too busy advising on higher levels and had been away from active operations in Moscow too long.

NOSENKO gave only a general description of his duties as an advisor on operations against the American Legation. On the other hand, he accidentally became involved in a homosexual entrapment operation against an American tourist who was visiting Bulgaria, and he has described this operation in considerable detail. (NOSENKO's previous speciality was tourist operations, particularly those involving homosexual compromise.)

NOSENKO's story about his role in the LUNT case changed greatly between 1962 and 1964. During the first meeting series he described in detail how he set the operation up and what he said to LUNT when he personally confronted the American with the evidence. Since defecting in 1964, however, NOSENKO has said that he took no personal part in the approach itself, that he remained in his office, and that he merely advised how to set it up. (A comparison of his account and that of LUNT indicates that he was not on the scene at the time.)

NOSENKO said that the Bulgarian service became aware of LUNT's homosexual tendencies only after he saw LUNT's name or heard it mentioned; he recognized the name as that of a professor who had been assessed as a homosexual when earlier visiting Moscow, and traces with the KGB Second Chief Directorate confirmed that this was the same man. In statements made to U.S. authorities after the approach, LUNT said he had had homosexual relations at least five different times with a Bulgarian during an earlier trip to Sofia. LUNT gave this Bulgarian travellers' checks, which the latter planned to sell on the blackmarket, was on one occasion stopped on the street with him by a Bulgarian civil policeman, and corresponded with him in the interim between his first visit and the one during which the approach took place. LUNT had written the Bulgarian homosexual that he was returning to Sofia before arriving on the second occasion.

The U.S. Visa and the Cuba TDY

NOSENKO said that in October 1960 he was assigned to accompany a delegation of automotive specialists on a visit to the United States but that when this trip was cancelled, he went on TDY to Cuba (Pages 274-278). After he had completed arrangements for his passport and had submitted his true name to the U.S. Embassy for a visa, the Soviets were informed by U.S. authorities that the delegation could not then be accepted in the United States. At about the same time, a delegation of nickel industry experts was being readied for departure to Cuba. At first, NOSENKO explained, it was not considered necessary for a security officer to accompany this delegation to a friendly country, but at the last moment, two days before the delegation was scheduled to leave Moscow, the Central Committee of the Communist Party demanded that such an officer go along. Because there was no time to do otherwise, NOSENKO was chosen for this job since he already had a valid passport and authorization to travel abroad. Visa arrangements were made for the transit countries and NOSENKO left with the delegation, returning to Moscow in mid- or late December 1960.

NOSENKO's U.S. visa request submitted to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow on 29 October 1960 was his first use of this name in connection with travel abroad. (He travelled to England in 1957 and 1958 as NIKOLAYEV, NOSENKO said, because he had used this name with British citizens [illegible] in the Soviet Union; as [illegible] was suspected of being an intelligence officer, NOSENKO was exposed under this identity. He applied for U.S. entry under true name, however, despite the fact that he had also used the NIKOLAYEV name with Americans; one of them was FRIPPEL who, according to the CHEREPANOV papers and one other source, was suspected by the KGB to be an American intelligence agent. NOSENKO further explained that he could not use the name NIKOLAYEV because the automotive delegation cover he planned to use in the United States conflicted with the sports/cultural cover he had used in Great Britain, and the KGB feared that this would be noticed when the American and British services exchanged notes. The proposed automotive cover, however, conflicts in the same way with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover NOSENKO used, again under true name, in Geneva in 1962.

NOSENKO said that the decision to send him to Cuba was made two days before the delegation left Moscow because a security officer was required and he happened to have a passport and authorization to travel. The delegation left Moscow on 15 November 1960, and therefore this decision was reached on 13 November or thereabouts. NOSENKO, who had been transferred to the U.S. Embassy Section in order to supervise and revitalize operations against code clerks, the Section's most important recruitment target, consequently left Moscow on the day that MORONE also departed by train for Warsaw and at a time that his subordinate KOSOLAPOV was in Helsinki (12-16 November 1960), apparently in connection with an operation against John GARLAND.

NOSENKO has given widely divergent accounts of the purpose of his assignment to Cuba. In 1962 he related in detail how he had been sent to investigate how the Cuban intelligence service was operating against Americans stationed in Havana, particularly intelligence officers, and described what he did to fulfill this mission. Since 1964, however, NOSENKO has claimed merely to have been the security officer with the delegation.

1. Personal Handling of Agents

When NOSENKO transferred from the Tourist Department to the American Department, he took along a number of the agents he had used in tourist operations with him: YEFREMOV and VOLKOV, FRIPPEL, DMITRIYEV, and RYTOVA. During this period he also handled LEVINA, a librarian and language teacher at the U.S. Embassy who was turned over to him by U.S. Embassy Section case officer MASSYA in 1960; and PREISFREUND and [illegible] who were used in code clerk operations. These agents and NOSENKO's handling of them are discussed below.

(i) YEFREMOV and VOLKOV

NOSENKO continued to meet with these two homosexual agents during his two years as Deputy Chief of the section. He did not use them in any way, however, according to his account. The only contact of the two known to CIA was a meeting in 1961 with BARRETT. In 1959, while in Moscow and a CIA agent, BARRETT was compromised by YEFREMOV and VOLKOV; in 1961, shortly after an apparently chance meeting with them, BARRETT was recruited by the KGB on the basis of the materials obtained in 1959. NOSENKO described the compromise of BARRETT in 1959 and knew that he had been recruited in 1961. He did not know of BARRETT's contacts with YEFREMOV and VOLKOV in 1961.

(ii) FRIPPEL

NOSENKO said he continued to handle FRIPPEL during the 1960-1961 period, despite the fact that he never provided anything of value, because he and CHELNOKOV (the Chief of the Tourist Department who was always present at these meetings) "kept hoping he would give something." FRIPPEL left the Soviet Union in January 1961, but NOSENKO continued to be registered as his case officer.

(iii) DMITRIYEV

DMITRIYEV, a specialist on Japan and Thailand who spoke Japanese and English, had been NOSENKO's agent during the 1955-1960 period. DMITRIYEV was then employed by the Japanese Exhibition in Moscow, and NOSENKO did not indicate how he was used in tourist operations. NOSENKO did not describe any operational use of him in 1960 or 1961.

(iv) RYTOVA

RYTOVA was NOSENKO's agent in the Tourist Department after 1956 or 1957, at which time she was employed at the Russian Permanent Exhibit in Moscow. An English speaker, she reported any interesting information concerning visitors to the exhibition. NOSENKO has not referred to any KGB operations in Moscow in which she participated during his service there.

(v) LEVINA

LEVINA worked as a language teacher and librarian at the American Embassy and NOSENKO handled her because she had a number of code clerks in her language classes. He

met with LEVINA a number of times, but she never reported anything interesting and was never used directly in operations involving the Americans. She was fired from the Embassy at the end of 1960 or early 1951.

(vi) Johan PREISFREUND

As described in Pages 173-181 and discussed above, PREISFREUND was, NOSENKO said, recruited by KOVSHUK in 1960 and was handled by NOSENKO in the operation against James STORSBERG. Both NOSENKO and PREISFREUND said that this was the only operation in which he took part. NOSENKO suggested to CIA that PREISFREUND would be able to attest to his description of this case, and CIA interviewed PREISFREUND in Helsinki and Stockholm during the summer of 1965. PREISFREUND's account generally agreed with NOSENKO's and he was able to supply a considerable amount of personality and background information concerning his former case officer. From PREISFREUND's manner during these interviews, the nature of his responses and statements, and his actions after the interviews were completed, there was no reasonable doubt that he remained under KGB control while meeting the CIA representatives.

(vii) [redacted]

[redacted] (KGB cryptonym "SARDAR") was recruited by NOSENKO in 1961. A Syrian [redacted] in Moscow, [redacted] was first targetted against America House in General, but was then used only in the development operation against ZUJUS, the successor to James STORSBERG as military code clerk in Moscow. [redacted] met and developed ZUJUS, but nothing had come of the operation at the time NOSENKO transferred from the American Department. No other use was made of this agent and there was no approach to ZUJUS. NOSENKO first suggested that CIA attempt a "false flag" recruitment of [redacted] using his (NOSENKO's) name for this purpose; he provided CIA with [redacted] in Damascus so that contact could be established. Later NOSENKO said that [redacted] like PREISFREUND, could verify NOSENKO's position as his handler in the ZUJUS operation (Pages 209-212). CIA interviewed ZUJUS, who vaguely recalled having met [redacted], did not recall his name and denied that his relationship with [redacted] was as close as NOSENKO reported.

m. Transfer to the Tourist Department

Some time in the fall of 1961, NOSENKO said, he heard of GRIBANOV's decision to promote him to the position of Deputy Chief of the entire American Department. NOSENKO, however, knew that his chief and friend KOVSHUK wanted the job and that FEDOSEYEV (Chief of the Department) also favored KOVSHUK for this position. Realizing that his own appointment would therefore place him in a difficult position and wishing to avoid this, NOSENKO spoke to the Chief of the Tourist Department, CHELNOKOV, about returning there. At CHELNOKOV's suggestion, NOSENKO went to GRIBANOV with the request to be returned to the Tourist Department as Chief of the American Tourist Section, with the understanding that he would be made Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department upon the retirement of the incumbent, BALDIN, in July 1962. To this GRIBANOV agreed. NOSENKO said that GRIBANOV did not discuss with him his reasons for wanting to appoint him Deputy Chief of the American Department or for appointing him Chief of the American Tourist Section, nor did he discuss with NOSENKO his personal requirements for these positions. On one occasion, in early 1965, NOSENKO said that it was because GRIBANOV "thought I was a tough guy, a good case officer. In 1959 I saw him often and was involved in a lot of questions which were reported to him." According to his most recent version, NOSENKO was officially transferred from the American Department at the end of December 1961 and reported for duty in the Tourist Department on about 3 January 1962.

KOVSHUK, who was also a candidate for the job as Deputy Chief of the American Department, had earlier held this position, according to NOSENKO and GOLITSYN. He had been personally involved in many of the more significant American Department operations during the previous decade. These included the recruitments of RHODES and SMITH (the latter one of NOSENKO's most important leads, according to NOSENKO); the handling of SHAPIRO; the attempts to recruit STORSBERG, HARMSTONE, and MANNHEIM; the development of the CIA officer WINTERS; and the interrogation of LANGELLE in connection with the POPOV arrest.

By contrast, GRIBANOV's original candidate for the job, NOSENKO, was present when KOZLOV recruited BURGI, and himself recruited HARRIS and five homosexual tourists who visited the Soviet Union in 1959. Furthermore, NOSENKO's performance as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, as he admitted under interrogation, was "not good."

NOSENKO has given many contradictory dates for his transfer to the Tourist Department. In 1962 NOSENKO said at various times that this took place in January 1962 and in February 1962; in 1964 he timed the transfer as falling some time between 15 and 20 January 1962; and in February 1965 he arrived at the date of 2 or 3 January 1962, after it was pointed out that he appeared in the approach to W.E. JOHNSON on 5 January. (On this basis, he said that the official order was issued about 25 December 1961 and that he turned over his files to his successor GRYAZNOV several days later.) NOSENKO contradicted this latter estimate, however, by saying that he was in the U.S. Embassy Section for the entire period of the three-month surveillance of

the Pushkin Street dead drop, i.e., until late March 1962, and by his insistence that he had returned to the Tourist Department by the time GOLITSYN defected; he placed this on 15 January 1962 and refused to believe the correct date of 15 December 1961.

D. Remarks

For no single responsibility has NOSENKO substantiated his alleged service as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section in the years 1960-1961. His statements about the appointment to and transfer from this position have been inconsistent; his comparatively narrow experience and his acknowledged falsehoods about a personal relationship with the Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, GRIBANOV, dispel the likelihood that these personnel assignments were made in the way he claims. Repeatedly he has been contradictory about his activities during this two-year period, shifting his story to suit the occasion and ignoring how each succeeding version made all of his claims increasingly incredible. The limited extent of NOSENKO's information betrays a lack of familiarity with details on the duties, targets, and most of the operations which he has ascribed to himself; in a certain few instances, however, such as his description of ABIDIAN's route to the Pushkin Street dead drop, he has recounted events just as they are known from other sources to have occurred. Nevertheless, where collateral information has covered the few subjects on which he provided details, it has almost invariably contradicted him and showed him to be ignorant of significant facts. The reporting by NOSENKO thus was so superficial, so incomplete, and so demonstrably erroneous as to suggest without reservation that he never served as an officer in the U.S. Embassy Section, much less as its Deputy Chief. All available evidence, excluding that from certain Soviets who were CIA and FBI sources (see Parts VIII.H. and VII.I. below), combines to formulate this conclusion.

7. Tourist Department (1962-1964)

a. Introduction

NOSENKO agreed during the interrogations at the beginning of 1965 that he must have reported for duty as Chief of the American Tourist Section on about 3 January 1962.* In this job he was responsible for planning and supervising KGB activities against all tourists of American, British, and Canadian nationalities arriving in the USSR, and his duties also encompassed preparations for the coming tourist season (Pages 285-287).

In July 1962, in conformity with GRIBANOV's intentions, NOSENKO was promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the entire Tourist Department; it had a table of organization of close to 100 staff officers, was responsible for handling operations against all tourists to the Soviet Union, and maintained the facilities used in these operations. A year later NOSENKO received the title of First Deputy Chief of the Department, a "paper" promotion as there was no other deputy. During this period in the Tourist Department, in addition to his supervisory duties (concerning which he has not been questioned in detail), NOSENKO took personal part in approaches to several tourists, organized and directed the arrest of an American tourist on homosexual charges, and met with a number of agents. It was his senior supervisory position that involved him in two of the most widely publicized cases of this period, the arrest of BARGHOORN and the case of OSWALD.

b. Absences from Moscow

During his two years in the Tourist Department, NOSENKO was available to perform his assigned duties only part of the time. After arriving in the American Tourist Section and after the approach to JOHNSON on 5 January 1962, NOSENKO spent several weeks "getting the feel" of things by talking to case officers, reviewing reports of the section's activities during the previous two years, and discussing plans for the up-coming tourist season. In mid-February he began preparations for his assignment to Geneva with the Disarmament Delegation. NOSENKO has said that this involved discussions with the Eleventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate, responsible for arranging for security coverage of Soviet delegations going abroad, as well as with the case officers responsible for the investigation of suspected American agent SHAKHOV. NOSENKO said that he did this on a part-time basis in addition to his regular duties, but has noted in another context that these preparations required sufficient time to make it impossible for him to take a personal part in the recruitment of BIENSTOCK in February 1962. On 15 March 1962, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, remaining there with the delegation until 15 June, when he left Geneva by train to return to Moscow to reassume his duties as Chief of Section. (He said that he had no deputy chief in this position, and it is unclear who performed these functions in his absence.) Thus, according to NOSENKO's account, of the six months he was Chief

* This date was settled upon after he acknowledged that his approach to the American tourist W.E. JOHNSON must have occurred on 5 January, as CIA records show.

of the American Tourist Section, he was in Moscow only three months and for much of this time was involved in breaking in on his new job or in preparing for his temporary assignment abroad. NOSENKO said he had "no accomplishments" in this period.

In the fall of 1962, NOSENKO went on leave for a month in Sochi with his wife and mother. NOSENKO has estimated that six months of 1963 were spent on various temporary assignments in the Soviet Union outside of Moscow, plus a one-month's vacation in 1963. From 15 June 1962 to his arrival in Geneva on 19 January 1964, a period of 18 months, NOSENKO was absent from KGB Headquarters for eight months. Thus in the period 1962-63, holding supervisory positions, NOSENKO was absent or "reading in" for about 13 months, or about 50 percent of the time.

c. Personal Participation in Operations

NOSENKO had direct operational contact with three Americans during 1962 and 1963. Two of these (the approach to JOHNSON and the interrogation of BARGHOORN) were unusual in that they were provocations without any attempt to recruit the target; NOSENKO could name no other examples of such operations. In both cases, the victim of the provocation has verified NOSENKO's presence. The third case, the recruitment approach to BRAUNS, was unsuccessful. Additionally, NOSENKO supervised the homosexual compromise of KOTEN, who was closely tied in with [illegible] [illegible] sensitive source and related.

(1) The W.E. JOHNSON Provocation

JOHNSON (Pages 289-293), NOSENKO said, was in Moscow as a tourist in early January 1962 and was considered for recruitment, but a decision was made that he was not worth the effort as he had no access to classified materials and lived too far from the KGB Legal Residencies in Washington and New York City. (JOHNSON's home was in Texas.) Several days after this decision was made, postal intercepts showed that JOHNSON was writing abusive letters concerning the Soviet Union. They were "so bitter" and critical that the KGB decided that something had to be done to stop him. At about the same time the KGB received an indication that JOHNSON was a homosexual, and it was decided to entrap him on this basis and force him to promise not to write any more letters or criticize the USSR in articles when he returned to the United States. The compromise was effected by use of NOSENKO's homosexual agents, and NOSENKO was able to describe the confrontation scene, his second meeting with JOHNSON, and JOHNSON's frightened telephone call to the U.S. Embassy reporting that NOSENKO had recontacted him.

NOSENKO told CIA in June 1962 that he had taken part in this operation "in January." When he contacted CIA in Geneva in 1964 he had a scrap of paper on which was noted JOHNSON's name and the date "5 January 1962." This was the actual date of the approach, but NOSENKO insisted that the date bore no relationship to the name, and that the approach to JOHNSON took

place in the summer of 1962, a fact he recalled distinctly because he wore no overcoat. It was only when confronted with official U.S. records that NOSENKO agreed in early 1965 that the apprcach was in January and recalled that it was made immediately after NOSENKO returned to the Tourist Department.*

NOSENKO said that when JOHNSON first arrived in Moscow there was consideration of recruiting him, but that there was a decision against this as he was of little intelligence value. Then JOHNSON mailed insulting letters which were picked up through postal intecept. About the same time there were indications of homosexuality. Then the operation was mounted against him. This implies a very tight time schedule. JOHNSON arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961; NOSENKO said he reported for duty as Section Chief on 3 January 1962; JOHNSON reported his first contact with NOSENKO's homosexual agent VOLKOV the evening of 4 January; and the approach by NOSENKO was on 5 January.

Although NOSENKO implied in 1962 that his homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV were the ones who originally determined JOHNSON's homosexuality, he said in 1964 only that there were "signs." NOSENKO did not know what these indications were or where they came from. JOHNSON reported that he first met the agent VOLKOV on the evening of 4 January when the latter sat down at his restaurant table; on this same occasion VOLKOV invited JOHNSON to his hotel room the next day. The fact that VOLKOV joined JOHNSON uninvited and set him up for the approach without leaving the table suggests that there had, in fact, been signs of his homosexuality beforehand and that operational plans had been laid by this time.

NOSENKO has described the caution taken in other homosexual entrapment cases and has named several which were called off because of a risk of scandal. It is, therefore, unusual that the KGB would take this risk merely to force JOHNSON, an American and a Baptist minister, to stop writing insulting letters and articles.

NOSENKO did not know why he became involved in this operation the day after he reported for duty in the senior position of Section Chief. He said only that BOBKOV, a Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, told him to do it. During his talks with JOHNSON, NOSENKO introduced himself to JOHNSON as "Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV," (rendered by JOHNSON as NIKOLOV) the "Chief of Police."

(ii) The BARGHOORN Provocation-Arrest

The arrest of Professor BARGHOORN (Pages 304-309) took place at the end of October 1963, at the time NOSENKO said he was First Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department. NOSENKO has

* How NOSENKO's self-stated and confirmed participation in a Tourist Department operation on 5 January 1962 carries implications for his account of ABIDIAN's visit to the PENKOVSKIY dead drop is discussed above.

described in detail the selection of BARGHOORN as a hostage for IVANOV (the KGB officer arrested shortly before in New York City as a result of [illegible] the planning of the provocation, other KGB activities surrounding BARGHOORN which were not related to the provocation, BARGHOORN's arrest in Moscow, and the early stages of his interrogation. Except for some variation in dates, NOSENKO's accounts of BARGHOORN's movements and of the sequence of events in the provocation-arrest matched that of BARGHOORN. This case is in two ways similar to the approach to W.E. JOHNSON: It was an operation in which there was no thought of recruitment, and BARGHOORN was able to identify NOSENKO as a participant.

BARGHOORN reported that the day after his arrest he was questioned by the same officer who had interrogated him the evening before about the "compromising materials" which had been planted on him. With this officer on this one occasion was his "chief," whom BARGHOORN subsequently identified by photograph as NOSENKO. NOSENKO has said that he was told by the Chief of the Tourist Department that GRIBANOV wanted him (NOSENKO) present in the interrogation room at the time when BARGHOORN admitted that he had the compromising information in his possession at the time of arrest. NOSENKO did not know why his particular presence was needed or desired, but he complied despite the fact that he did not want to reveal his face to BARGHOORN as he knew BARGHOORN would be released. NOSENKO said that he stayed in the interrogation room only until the interrogating officer secured this admission and then he left. BARGHOORN has reported that NOSENKO attended one of the interrogation sessions, that this session covered only biographic and background matters, and that the compromising documents and his possession of them had been discussed the previous evening, right after his arrest.

In describing the planning of this provocation, NOSENKO told CIA that the suggestion to provide BARGHOORN came from GRIBANOV, who took the idea of arresting BARGHOORN to KGB Chairman SEMICHASTNYY, but did not divulge to him that it would be based on provocation. This was on the day before the arrest. SEMICHASTNYY agreed with the idea of the arrest and secured permission to carry it out from BREZHNEV, as KHRUSHCHEV was out of Moscow at the time. Reliable sources show, however, that KHRUSHCHEV was in Moscow on 30 October, the day when SEMICHASTNYY allegedly called BREZHNEV, and was also there on 31 October, the day of the arrest. BREZHNEV was not seen by Westerners in Moscow from 29 October until 2 November 1963.

(iii) The Approach to BRAUNS

NOSENKO said he personally approached the American tourist BRAUNS (Pages 293-295) shortly after returning to Moscow from Geneva in 1962. BRAUNS had lived in Leningrad until World War II, had left with the fleeing Germans, and had eventually settled in the United States, where he was a technician working at an "interesting company making computers, adding machines, or other instruments." NOSENKO had originally instructed his

subordinate KRUPNOV to handle the case, but KRUPNOV was not able to get anywhere with BRAUNS and in the middle of the approach called NOSENKO for help. NOSENKO went to the Moscow Hotel where KRUPNOV and BRAUNS were talking, and he eventually secured BRAUNS' agreement to cooperate, against threat of imprisonment for treason on the basis of his wartime flight from the Soviet Union. BRAUNS left Moscow the next day for Leningrad, and because NOSENKO felt the recruitment was "shaky," KRUPNOV was sent after him to consolidate the agreement. BRAUNS refused to see KRUPNOV however, so again NOSENKO went to help him. It was clear to NOSENKO, however, that BRAUNS was so frightened that he would never work for the KGB; NOSENKO thereupon decided to terminate the case, and BRAUNS was sent on his way.

NOSENKO could not recall his position at the time he approached BRAUNS, he did not know why BRAUNS had visited the Soviet Union, and he was unable to name any Soviet citizens with whom BRAUNS came into contact while in the USSR. BRAUNS, in fact, had spent almost a week in Moscow before the approach was made. During this time he spent his days with an Inturist tour and his evenings with an old girlfriend he had known before the war. She had been writing to BRAUNS in the United States for about a year, telling him of her unhappy marriage and impending divorce. BRAUNS had written her of his intention to visit the USSR, and she travelled specially from her home in Leningrad to Moscow to spend this time with him.

According to the account given by BRAUNS, the man (NOSENKO, according to NOSENKO) who joined him and his original interrogator in Moscow was the person who first approached him in Leningrad. This suggests, if correct, that it was NOSENKO who was sent there to consolidate the recruitment, not KRUPNOV. BRAUNS was unable to identify NOSENKO's photograph but explained that he was so frightened that he probably could not recognize anyone involved. Other aspects of his story therefore may be confused.

(iv) The Arrest of KOTEN

NOSENKO said he supervised the homosexual provocation and arrest of American tour guide KOTEN in 1963 and the developments in the case were reported to him (Pages 298-303); he was not in face-to-face contact with KOTEN. NOSENKO explained that KOTEN, a member of the CPUSA, had frequently visited the USSR since the war, had numerous suspicious contacts there, and was considered possibly to be a "plant" (presumably of the FBI) in the Communist Party. Prior to his arrival in 1963, [illegible] [illegible] Legal Residency reported that KOTEN was in contact with an important [illegible] agent in [illegible] that he was carrying the address of relatives of this agent with him on his trip, and that he intended to visit them. On this basis, it was considered that he might have the mission of investigating the [illegible] agent inside the USSR. [illegible] As it was suspected from earlier trips that KOTEN was a homosexual, the KGB planned to compromise him, arrest him, break him, and provide time for the [illegible] agent to make his escape from the United States. KOTEN was arrested, but the [illegible]

agent refused to leave the United States, and when the CPUSA protested the arrest of one of its members, KOTEN was released.

KOTEN was a long-time Communist, and there are no apparent reasons why the KGB should doubt his loyalty. His homosexuality was well-known to his acquaintances within the CPUSA, and at the time of his trip to the Soviet Union he was acting as a tour guide for the New York firm "Afton Tours," which is owned by SVENCHANSKIY. (NOSENKO said that SVENCHANSKIY, also a Communist, was his own agent at the time of KOTEN's arrest.)

NOSENKO was able to give a considerable amount of identifying data on the "important [illegible] agent" [illegible] This agent had been identified [illegible] a year before KOTEN's trip. [illegible]

The fact that KOTEN had been arrested on charges of homosexuality was leaked by Inturist to press services two days after the reported date of the arrest, resulting in wide publicity in Western newspapers. (The U.S. Embassy was not notified officially until two days later.) There was no apparent reason for this extremely unusual step by the KGB, which can be assumed to manipulate Inturist for operational support purposes.

After the CPUSA had protested the action, KOTEN was released from prison. He was told that the incident was a mistake which had been corrected, that he was free to go anywhere he wanted in the Soviet Union, and that he could return anytime. [illegible] the [illegible] agent, has since repatriated to the Soviet Union.

d. Agents Handled by NOSENKO

When NOSENKO transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section to the Tourist Department, he took with him the two homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV, PREISFREUND, [illegible] and RYTOVA (Pages 287-289). The homosexuals he used the day after his return, in the operation against W.E. JOHNSON. This was their first operational use since the fall of 1959; they were never used again before being terminated at the end of 1962 or early 1963, NOSENKO said, because they were "too well known." PREISFREUND was considered compromised to American Intelligence following the defection of GOLITSYN, so he also was never used again, although NOSENKO met him socially when PREISFREUND returned to Moscow on business trips as recently as 1963. During the first part of 1962, on instructions from KOVSHUK and the Chief of the American Department, NOSENKO continued to meet with [illegible], who was still involved in the development of ZUJUS, the American code clerk. NOSENKO last saw [illegible] before going to Geneva in March 1962; WEISS left the Soviet Union to return to Syria while NOSENKO was away. RYTOVA, NOSENKO said, had been his agent since 1956 or 1957. Some time in 1962 she moved from her position as an instructor of Greek at the Institute

of International Relations to a position in the school of the CPSU Central Committee and ceased agent work. Although she was inactive, NOSENKO continued to be registered as her case officer until 1964, when he defected.

(i) FRIPPEL

Having left his assignment in Moscow in early 1961, FRIPPEL (Pages 129-133 and Part VIII.D.5.) returned several times to the Soviet Union in 1962 and 1963. NOSENKO, who remained his case officer although FRIPPEL now lived and worked in New York City, met him each time. FRIPPEL said there were three such occasions, in February 1962 when he met once with NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV in Odessa, and two later times in Moscow and Odessa, when NOSENKO came alone. NOSENKO denied that he met FRIPPEL in Odessa in February 1962 with CHELNOKOV, but said that he met twice with him alone after returning to Moscow from Geneva. The first of these meetings was in the summer of 1962 when FRIPPEL was accompanying a group of American newspaper editors touring the Soviet Union. FRIPPEL said NOSENKO called briefly at his hotel room to enquire what questions the editors planned to ask KHRUSHCHEV during a planned interview. When FRIPPEL said he did not know, NOSENKO departed and FRIPPEL later reported that he did not see NOSENKO again on this trip. (NOSENKO said he called again after the interview to learn the "reactions" of the editors.) The second meeting was in Odessa, when FRIPPEL, visited the Soviet Union as a guide on a tour ship. According to FRIPPEL, it was on this occasion that NOSENKO apparently made a phone call to ask permission to go aboard FRIPPEL's ship, and it might have been at this meeting or the earlier one that NOSENKO told him something of his personal background. (FRIPPEL knew a considerable amount of information about NOSENKO's father and family.) NOSENKO denied the possibility that he would have to request permission to board the vessel and said that if he had told FRIPPEL anything about himself, it was when he was drunk. Both FRIPPEL and NOSENKO agreed that FRIPPEL provided no information of value during any of these meetings.

(ii) SVENCHANSKIY

NOSENKO has cited SVENCHANSKIY, KGB cryptonym "ANOD," as an example of the Second Chief Directorate's use of foreign travel agents to signal the KGB when an interesting tourist is about to visit the Soviet Union (Pages 295-298). SVENCHANSKIY was recruited for this purpose, NOSENKO said, in 1961 and used to send open-code signals to the Tourist Department by marking visa applications whenever he spotted anything significant. Some of SVENCHANSKIY's signals had been considered, NOSENKO said, "of definite operational interest." In September 1963, NOSENKO took the case over from the previous handling officer, NOSKOV, and his name was listed in SVENCHANSKIY's file as the responsible officer.

NOSENKO first said that he had read SVENCHANSKIY's file and then changed this to say that he had only skimmed it. He met twice with his new agent, once in September 1963 and once later in the year. On both occasions, NOSKOV was present.

NOSENKO said that at the time SVENCHANSKIY was recruited in 1961 that, because SVENCHANSKIY was known to have had contacts with AMTORG in New York, there was some suspicion that he might be an FBI agent. NOSENKO was unable to be more precise as to the basis for these suspicions and, when asked how NOSKOV had resolved them, was able to say only that NOSKOV "felt" that SVENCHANSKIY was not an American agent.

NOSENKO knew little about SVENCHANSKIY's background from the one-volume file kept on him in the Tourist Department: He did know that SVENCHANSKIY was recruited in 1961 on the promise of commercial favors, that he had at one time been detected in blackmarket transactions in the USSR, and that in addition to his travel agency, SVENCHANSKIY ran a Russian-language book-store in Chicago. FBI and CIA records show that SVENCHANSKIY has been employed by a series of registered Soviet Government organizations in the United States since the early 1930's, that he was released from his position as a United Nations radio officer broadcasting to the Soviet Union in 1952 when he failed to answer questions of the Senate Internal Security Committee concerning alleged subversive activity, and that both his travel agency and his book store are affiliated with registered Soviet agencies, Inturist and Mezhkniga. Allegations on file of SVENCHANSKIY's Communist sympathies and probable Soviet espionage activities date back to the Second World War. In August 1950, Harry GOLD linked SVENCHANSKIY to the Soviet espionage network in the United States during the war. The FBI has reported [illegible] was identified as having at one time been the confidential secretary of GOLOS, the "director of Soviet espionage in the United States." (NOSENKO knew that someone called Sonya worked for SVENCHANSKIY in New York, but said that she is not a KGB agent and was not the one who marked the visa applications.)

e. The OSWALD Investigation

As First Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO said, he was directly involved in the investigation of OSWALD's activities in Minsk which was ordered after the assassination of President KENNEDY (Pages 136-144 and Part VIII.D.5.). It is from his role at this time and his reading of the Minsk KGB file on OSWALD that NOSENKO derived his authority to state that the KGB "washed its hands of OSWALD" after his attempted suicide in the USSR, that there was no attempt to recruit either OSWALD or his wife, and that KGB interest in OSWALD while he lived in Minsk was restricted to passive observation.

f. The CHEREPANOV Investigation

Part VIII.B.6.c. contains a discussion of the CHEREPANOV case, in which NOSENKO claims to have been involved in November 1962 while Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department.

g. Remarks

Leaving aside NOSENKO's unsubstantiated claims to supervisory jobs in the Tourist Department in 1962-1963, when he indicated he was absent from KGB Headquarters nearly half of the time, his personal role in operations and investigations of the period appears artificial in some instances and implausible in others. NOSENKO's knowledge of the origins of the JOHNSON case is incomplete, the timing conflicts with other activities attributed to himself, the expressed purpose of the compromise in unique, and the outcome seems to have little consequence beyond enabling JOHNSON to confirm that NOSENKO appeared in it. Although BRAUNS may have been in a position to corroborate NOSENKO's appearance in that operation, he has not done so and his statements contradict NOSENKO on the part the latter played. So too do the statements of BARGHOORN, who recognized NOSENKO as a person who was seen briefly during the interrogation sessions; certain facts from other sources contradict NOSENKO on one important detail (KHRUSHCHEV's presence in Moscow) of the BARGHOORN arrest, explained as a retaliation-hostage action for events in [illegible] [illegible] NOSENKO's information on the Soviet arrest of the American Communist KOTEN seems simply to have confirmed earlier information [illegible]. NOSENKO's information on the background of the SVENCHANSKIY operation is fragmentary, lacking even the most important facts known from several, mainly overt, sources; his attendance at meetings with SVENCHANSKIY was confined to the two times when the original handler was also present. The position of NOSENKO in the FRIPPEL and OSWALD cases is discussed in Part VIII.D.5. In summary, NOSENKO's operational work was not commensurate with that of a Section Chief and Deputy Department Chief, nor with that of a case officer, regardless of rank. Where the participation of NOSENKO in Tourist Department activities has been or might be confirmed by other sources, it is therefore unproven that he was in a supervisory position in the KGB or that he was even a case officer.

E. Examination of Other Aspects of NOSENKO's Biography

1. KGB Awards and Ranks

a. Awards

At various times since contacting CIA in 1962, NOSENKO described a series of awards and decorations which he received over the years for his performance of duties in the Second Chief Directorate (Pages 319-321). He claimed to have received the Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Star, and the Order of the Red Banner; he said he received a special commendation from KGB Chairman SEROV for his role in the BURGI recruitment and the same award in 1959 for his recruitment of all of the American or British tourists recruited that year by the KGB (three British and three American homosexuals). NOSENKO told of a number of other commendations which he received--almost one a year--for his "general good work." In October 1966 NOSENKO said that he never received any awards for his KGB operational performance, only a medal for satisfactory completion of 10 years of KGB service and a Red Army anniversary medal.

b. Ranks

NOSENKO's descriptions of his various rank promotions follow a similar but more complicated pattern (Pages 322-326). He has given two separate sets of circumstances for his first promotion, from junior lieutenant to lieutenant. According to the first of these, the one NOSENKO adhered to during 1964 and 1965, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant while serving in the Far East with the naval GRU at the beginning of 1951. NOSENKO explained that the required time in grade is sometimes cut in half for officers serving at this undesirable post, and that this is why he was promoted after only six months of active duty. In 1966 NOSENKO said for the first time that he did not enter on active duty until March 1951 and that his promotion to lieutenant was in mid-1952, while stationed in Sovetsk, on the Baltic. In all his accounts, NOSENKO has said that he entered the KGB with the rank of lieutenant as this had been his rank in the naval GRU.*

During his first meetings with CIA in Geneva during 1962 NOSENKO claimed then to be a KGB major and said that he had already completed the necessary time in grade for a lieutenant colonelcy. NOSENKO gave an apparently accurate description of the structure of his salary as a major (so much for rank, so much for longevity, etc.) and pointed out that he was filling a position (Chief of Section) normally held by a lieutenant colonel. On contacting CIA again in 1964, NOSENKO claimed the rank of lieutenant colonel. He supported this claim with the TDY authorization issued for the CHEREPANOV search,** which

* See Part VIII.D.2. for a discussion of the likelihood that NOSENKO served in the naval GRU.

** See Part VIII.B.7.c. for an analysis of the CHEREPANOV case.

gave NOSENKO's rank as lieutenant colonel and was signed by GRIBANOV himself and testified to it by his signature on the "official biographical statement" prepared in Frankfurt.

The first major change in NOSENKO's story of his promotions came during the interrogations of January 1965 when he volunteered out of context and for no clear reason that he had never held the rank of major but rather, because of a series of administrative slip-ups and GRIBANOV's advice and help, had jumped directly from the rank of captain, which he received in 1956, to the rank of lieutenant colonel in late 1963. NOSENKO was later to claim that he had never said in 1962 that he was a major.*

In an unsolicited statement given to CIA in April 1966, NOSENKO wrote that he was only a captain and that the TDY authorization for the CHEREPANOV search had been filled out in error.

c. Remarks

NOSENKO's admissions regarding his awards and promotions directly affect his self-portraiture as a successful and rapidly rising KGB officer. They also have a bearing on one of the alleged reasons for this rise [redacted]; it was GRIBANOV's favoritism. NOSENKO almost invariably linked GRIBANOV's name to each of the awards he earlier claimed to have received. In most cases it was GRIBANOV who decided that NOSENKO should get a particular award; in the rest, it was GRIBANOV who physically presented the award to NOSENKO. The same is true of NOSENKO's account of his rank promotions: GRIBANOV, NOSENKO said, had promised him that he would be promoted directly from senior lieutenant to major in 1959; when the Personnel Department made a mistake and only promoted NOSENKO to captain, GRIBANOV advised him to accept this rank and promised that when he had completed sufficient time in grade for promotion to major, GRIBANOV would see to it that he was promoted directly to lieutenant colonel. This is what happened, NOSENKO said in 1965, and after he received his rank of lieutenant colonel, GRIBANOV called him in and congratulated him. On the basis of NOSENKO's admissions, there is additional reason to question his relationship with GRIBANOV.**

NOSENKO carried with him to Geneva, against KGB regulation and for no reason he could explain, an official KGB document listing him as a lieutenant colonel and signed by GRIBANOV himself as well as by two provincial authorities. This suggests strongly that the lie concerning NOSENKO's rank was not NOSENKO's alone. (If, in fact, as pointed out above, the CHEREPANOV papers were fabricated by the KGB, then there was no genuine search for CHEREPANOV and NOSENKO's document is also fabricated and not a mistake as NOSENKO claims.)

* This change of story coincided closely in time with a change in the information reported by [redacted]. Shortly after NOSENKO's defection [redacted] had said that remarks by his KGB associates made it appear that NOSENKO was a lieutenant colonel. [redacted] that NOSENKO was only a captain.

** NOSENKO's retractions and changes of story concerning his personal and operational relationship with GRIBANOV are discussed elsewhere (Pages 327-336).

2. Affiliation with Communist Party Organs

a. Introduction

NOSENKO drifted into the Komsomol, he said, in 1943 or 1944 without giving the step any thought whatsoever. All of his friends at the Baku school were joining, so NOSENKO did too. He remained an indifferent member of this Communist youth organization throughout his school and university years, in the GRU, and during his first year as a KGB officer. On arriving in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department in 1953, NOSENKO told CIA, he was appointed Secretary of the small Komsomol Organization of the Second Chief Directorate, a group of about 17 members.

b. Discussion

NOSENKO was questioned by DERYABIN on his duties as Komsomol Secretary (Pages 623) and, although able to give a superficial account of these functions, was found to be unaware of certain basic information which DERYABIN felt a person in this position should have. Thus, for example, NOSENKO provided a description of the system of levying dues on Komsomol members which was substantially incorrect and was unaware that a Komsomol Congress (the first in many years and therefore a major event) had been held during his claimed tenure as Secretary.

NOSENKO said that he held the position of Komosmol Organization Secretary until the late spring or early summer of 1954, when he got into trouble for having used official KGB alias documentation to conceal the fact that he received treatment for venereal disease contracted from a prostitute. Immediately after this incident, said NOSENKO, he was removed from his position and a "strict reprimand" was placed in his Komsomol file. Several months thereafter, on the eve of his 27th birthday, NOSENKO was forced out of the Komsomol because he was too old. For over a year, until January 1956 when NOSENKO was admitted as a candidate member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, he was the only officer in the KGB who was neither a Komsomol nor a Party member. NOSENKO's account of his expulsion from the Komsomol on reaching his 27th birthday is contradicted by the official Statutes of the Komsomol in effect at that time. These regulations stipulate a maximum age of 25 years and NOSENKO should therefore have been forced out at the end of October 1953, upon reaching his 26th birthday. This was explained to NOSENKO, who insisted that he remained a member until he became 27 years old and that no special exceptions were made in his case.

c. Remarks

The fact that NOSENKO is incorrect regarding the age limitation makes it doubtful that his account of the venereal disease incident and his removal from the Komsomol Secretaryship is true. The date which he gives to this incident is after that on which he should have been expelled from the Komsomol. (Additionally, NOSENKO's descriptions of the veneral disease incident, his use of false documents, and his subsequent punishment by the KGB and the Komsomol have been inconsistent; see Pages 80-81).

The evidence that NOSENKO lied about this particular aspect of his first tour in the U.S. Embassy Section further suggests that his entire account for this period of his career is fabricated (See Part VIII.D.3.).

3. Schooling

a. Introduction

There is relatively little reliable collateral information concerning NOSENKO's schooling up until 1950. Other than what he himself has reported, available information consists of overt press releases pertaining to the Minister NOSENKO's career (and giving his location at various times) and comments by one KGB officer and one defector. NOSENKO's own account, together with references to these other sources, is summarized below.

With the exception of minor variations in dates, attributable to memory, NOSENKO's story of his early years until the beginning of World War II, when he had just completed the sixth grade in Moscow, has been generally consistent in its various tellings. Moreover, his accounts of having studied in Leningrad and Moscow agree with information concerning the positions and movements of the elder NOSENKO during these years. In contrast, the period immediately following, during which NOSENKO allegedly received his early training in naval matters is characterized with frequent changes of story, contradictions, and admitted falsehood.

b. Discussion

In 1964 and 1965 NOSENKO recalled that he enrolled in the Moscow special naval school in the summer of 1941, immediately after the Germans attacked the Soviet Union, and was evacuated with the entire school from Moscow to Kuybyshev in September to begin studies in the seventh grade. (An article in the Soviet Army newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) on 14 January 1967 confirmed that seven special naval schools were established in the Soviet Union in April 1940. One of these was in Moscow. However, to be eligible for admission, one had to have completed the seventh grade. The article did not indicate that the Moscow school was evacuated.) In April 1966, NOSENKO remembered that he did not go to Kuybyshev at this time but rather had been evacuated to Chelyabinsk with his mother and entered the seventh grade of a regular school.

In keeping with his respective accounts, NOSENKO said in 1964 and 1965 that he returned from Kuybyshev in the summer of 1942 and secured admission to the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School, along with which he was evacuated by train to Baku in the fall of that year. In April 1966, after inserting the year spent at Chelyabinsk with his mother, NOSENKO moved all events up a year and wrote in his autobiography that he entered the Kuybyshev school in the fall of 1942 rather than the fall of 1941. NOSENKO also wrote at this time that he transferred to the Leningrad preparatory school and travelled to Baku in the fall of 1943, not 1942.*

* Describing the reasons for his transfer to the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School, NOSENKO explained that the Moscow special naval school was evacuated further to Achinsk in Siberia and that this was farther from home than he wished to go. The Red Star article mentioned above said that the special naval schools were all closed in 1943, however. The special school apparently therefore was not transferred further to Achinsk, but was shut down.

Again to accommodate the added year in Chelyabinsk, NOSENKO said in 1966 that he spent half a year (actually, according to the rest of the story, about three months) in Baku before running away from school back to Moscow in January 1944. In earlier accounts he said he was at the preparatory school there from October 1942 until January 1944. Earlier he had also given expansive and changing accounts of his escape from school to join the Soviet front against the Germans at Tuapse; now he admitted that this was a lie. By cutting the time he was in Baku from 15 months to about three, NOSENKO also admitted implicitly that his accounts of the basic training he received in the preparatory school, of the summer he spent working at the school rather than returning to Moscow on vacation, and of his "certainty" that he celebrated his 15th birthday in Baku were also false.

NOSENKO has been relatively consistent in recounting the events of 1944. In 1964, 1965 and again in 1966 he told of studying as an "external" student in Moscow to complete his ninth year of schooling and of rejoining his classmates from Baku when the naval preparatory school returned to Leningrad in the autumn of 1944. On several occasions during 1964 and 1965, NOSENKO described how he and his classmates spent October and November 1944 working in the woods near Leningrad before beginning their tenth grade studies late in the year; he omitted this account from his April 1966 autobiography.

NOSENKO's account of the next years is similarly marked with a number of inconsistencies and falsehoods. (In the latter category he has claimed and later admitted as untrue that he attended the Frunze Naval Academy from 1943 to 1944, that he was on active military duty until being demobilized in 1945, and that he was shot in the hand by a jealous young naval officer in 1945.) According to the account given under interrogation in April 1964, NOSENKO was shot in the hand at a party in the end of April 1945, was hospitalized, resigned from the preparatory school, and received a certificate of satisfactory completion of the tenth grade, although he had been in school only since November 1944. In 1965 and 1966 NOSENKO said, respectively, that he was shot by a naval officer in February or March 1945 and that he shot himself in "early" 1945; since the 1964 interrogations he has claimed only that he received a statement of the courses he had attended at the preparatory school and that he completed the tenth grade at the Shipbuilding Tekhnikum in Leningrad.

The earliest collateral information specifically concerning NOSENKO's educational background appears to relate to the general period described above. [illegible]
[illegible]
the Soviet Navy defector ARTAMONOV said he attended a naval preparatory school with NOSENKO during the period 1944 to 1946. ARTAMONOV, after NOSENKO's defection was publicized, said he had known a son of the Minister NOSENKO in the naval school in Leningrad from 1944 to 1946. He was then shown a picture of NOSENKO and confirmed this was the man. However, according to NOSENKO's statements, NOSENKO would have been about two

classes behind ARTAMONOV, and would have been at the school for only about two months. It is conceivable that the presence of the son of the Minister of Shipbuilding would be widely known in the school and later remembered, but so would that son's self-inflicted wound and disappearance, which ARTAMONOV has not mentioned. It is unlikely, moreover, that ARTAMONOV could (20 years later) reliably recognize a photo of a person who had been there such a short time and not in ARTAMONOV's class. (NOSENKO claims not to have known ARTAMONOV nor to recognize the name.)

In all accounts, including his 1962 statements, NOSENKO has said that he entered the Institute of International Relations in Moscow in 1945. His descriptions of courses, events and friends are as vague and unsubstantial as his accounts of his earlier schooling. He has given various dates for his graduation and has explained that he did so to cover up the fact that he failed his final examination in the subject of "Marxism-Leninism," of which he was ashamed. NOSENKO most recently claimed that he received his diploma in the end of the summer of 1950. [illegible]

c. Remarks

NOSENKO's own admissions, as well as the small amount of collateral information available, make it clear that much of his account of his education has been false. The reasons for this are not at all clear and perhaps, in fact, there is no logical explanation. The CIA psychologist who tested and questioned NOSENKO about his youth suggested that, under conditions of interrogation, he may lie for no other reason other than his need to save face. This view is an accurate description of NOSENKO's behavior when questioned in detail on this and other aspects of his pre-KGB life; it is not so with regard to questioning on his intelligence career. Nor does the psychologist's view appear to explain why NOSENKO forgot or was unwilling to tell CIA about an entire year of his life, particularly such a significant one, after consistently and apparently accurately (judging from the Soviet press accounts of the Minister's activities) describing the years preceding it. It is not apparent why NOSENKO originally volunteered the story of his travel to Baku in the fall of 1942, when this was untrue, or why he said that the Moscow Special Naval School was evacuated to Achinsk in 1943, when he must be aware that the school was closed, if he was there.*

* The possibility that NOSENKO is not the person he claims to be (and with a completely false life history, or one lived by someone else) has been examined carefully, but no clear conclusion can be drawn on the basis of available evidence.

F. Appraisals of NOSENKO, his Motivation, and Other Operational Circumstances

1. Introduction

Appraisals of NOSENKO the man and of his motivations must be founded, as with any source, on factors which are often immeasureable, but fewer reservations need be attached to an appraisal of the other circumstances affecting the course of events in Geneva in 1962 and 1964. These operational circumstances can be analyzed and evaluated in much the same manner as were NOSENKO's production, sourcing, and biography for they are tangible pieces of evidence. In the next portions of this paper are presented these appraisals, which draw chiefly upon Pages 603-641 (for NOSENKO the man), Pages 20-29 (for his motivations), and Pages 11-19 and 30-43 (for the operational circumstances).

2. NOSENKO

The CIA specialists who assessed NOSENKO found him to be of above-average intelligence, one of them saying that "his effective intelligence is more cleverness than intellectuality, more shrewdness than efficiency." He is capable of good memory and, as illustrated by his repeating certain facts in the same sequence, capable of what appears to be good memorization of details. On the other hand, there were numerous internal contradictions in NOSENKO's recountings of various events, he himself claimed an odd or poor memory, and he was the exceptional defector by having been totally debriefed within a relatively short period.

Parts VIII.D. and VIII.E. discuss NOSENKO's truthfulness with reference to his Soviet Intelligence and personal backgrounds. Here may be added other observations by the CIA specialists: NOSENKO can exercise deception cleverly, he improvised and was evasive under interrogation, and he has a "remarkable" disregard for the truth where it serves his purposes. The results of the polygraph examination were that NOSENKO "attempted deliberate deception."

The gaps and errors in NOSENKO's testimony therefore do not seem attributable to low intelligence or to consistently poor memory, but to a conscious attempt to mislead American Intelligence. Independently, then, this conclusion raises the questions of whether NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB and if so, why he was chosen. Regarding the latter point, it is noted that a CIA psychiatrist observed: "This man is capable of playing a role and playing it effectively," and that a CIA psychologist stated: "From a distance NOSENKO looks very good [to his KGB superiors] as a possible penetration agent, but close up he leaves much to be desired." It was "close up," in the CIA debriefings and interrogations, that NOSENKO displayed an inability to explain the gaps and errors in his reporting.

3. Motivation

Part of one's motivation for such a drastic act as treason or defection may not be wholly conscious, and there may be underlying causes which any source might not want or be able to admit even to himself. Thus, what NOSENKO said about motivation need not be taken at face value, and for this reason the whole question of his motivation must remain a minor weight in the overall assessment of bona fides.

NOSENKO has tried to present a meaningful explanation and has changed or adjusted his story to this end. He initially insisted that he had no ideological motives but simply wanted to "make a deal" in order to get out of trouble; yet this claim is open to question: The amount of operational money which NOSENKO needed to replace was hardly enough to have driven him to treason, especially since there were friends in Geneva like GUK and KISLOV who might have helped him make up his loss. Furthermore, only two days after CIA had rescued him with the funds, NOSENKO spent the CIA money in another drunken debauchery (with the same companion) and came back needing more. The discrepancy between the degree of the need and the seriousness of of the act was so evident that the CIA case officer commented to NOSENKO at the outset that there must be some deeper explanation for his act. Thereupon NOSENKO added new reasons: His distaste for certain aspects of the regime, his resentment of KHRUSHCHEV, and his liking for Americans.

By his defection in 1964 NOSENKO changed the course of his life, although he had said in 1962, forcefully and unequivocally, that he would never do so unless in acute danger. In 1964 he could give no coherent explanation for the change of heart and in October 1966 he denied, for the first time, that he had said in 1962 that he would not defect. His only motivation was that, having risen to the level of Deputy Department Chief, he would not get to travel abroad any more. (This contradicts NOSENKO's 1962 statements: anticipating imminent promotion to Deputy Department Chief, he said that he would leave the USSR at least once a year in the future.) For no visible reason NOSENKO seems to have abandoned a purportedly successful and promising career, an undisturbed family life and children of whom he was fond, cast shame on his father's memory and his remaining relatives, and departed forever from his own country.

His own unease concerning his motivation evidently continued until, in 1965, he wrote one cohesive explanation. No part of this statement was ever borne out by his conduct, attitudes, remarks or reactions. He appeared, whenever his reactions seemed spontaneous, to dislike the United States, to have no interest in it politically, culturally, or scenically, and to preserve a preference for the USSR. A CIA graphologist commented on NOSENKO's "strong emotional ties to his traditional background," while a CIA psychologist reported: "Emotionally he has not defected in spite of his attempt to intellectually rationalize that he has." The psychologist also said that it is "almost impossible to determine his true loyalties and true beliefs."

4. Operational Circumstances

a. Presence in Geneva (1962)

When he came to Geneva in mid-March 1962, NOSENKO was a newly appointed Section Chief in the KGB Second Chief Directorate, having held this position for two months. He himself acknowledged to CIA that it appeared strange for the KGB to send a new Section Chief on an extended trip abroad unconnected with his own work. His reasons for being in Geneva have varied and to some degree contradict one another: The Disarmament Conference was not expected to last more than "a few weeks," but NOSENKO did not begin his work against SHAKHOV (one of the main reasons for his being there) until six weeks after arrival; GRIBANOV played a role in his TDY, but NOSENKO later denied this; there were in 1962 "new rules" requiring a staff officer to accompany a Soviet delegation, but in 1965 NOSENKO said he did not remember such regulations. He was permitted to go to Geneva in 1962 and 1964, as well as to Cuba in 1960 and England in 1957 and 1958, under no supervision or restraint despite his claim to a record so bad that he was not cleared by the KGB for permanent posting to Ethiopia in 1960.

b. Presence in Geneva (1964)

NOSENKO said on one occasion that GRIBANOV was one of those who allowed him to come to Geneva in January 1964, as a personal favor;* he later not only denied this but said in 1965 that GRIBANOV knew nothing about the TDY. He reported the 1964 TDY might, because of his new position, be his last trip to the West, hence the "favor" of his superiors to permit him this last trip; in 1962 NOSENKO said he had the assurance that as Deputy Department Chief (which he knew he was about to become) he would in the future come to the West at least once a year. Also, NOSENKO could not explain why a First Deputy Department Chief, if allowed out of the USSR as a "treat," would go abroad for a conference which could be expected to last many weeks, probably months. This question is compounded by the fact that NOSENKO would be needed in Moscow: He said that a KGB conference to plan the handling of the tourist season was to be held at about this time, and he stuck to this story even after admitting that the telegram recalling him for this Moscow conference was an invention (see below).

c. Access to KGB Residency and Availability to CIA

NOSENKO in 1962 routinely visited the KGB Legal Residency in Geneva every weekday morning, although he claimed that he had no reason and that it is normally forbidden (as other sources have confirmed).** When asked how and why he

sensitive source

*[illegible] cited GRIBANOV's personal authorization of NOSENKO's trip in the face of derogatory information as one cause of GRIBANOV's dismissal.

**NOSENKO said he did not visit the KGB Legal Residency in London more than once during his visits there in a similar capacity in 1957 and 1958, nor during his trip to Cuba in 1960.

did so in Geneva, NOSENKO has given different answers at different times. His stories of simply "dropping in and hanging around" for lack of anything better to do are unacceptable in terms of known or likely Soviet practice. His explanation that it was due to TSYMBAL's auspices or or intervention were contradicted by: First, his own confused accounts of his relationship with TSYMBAL; and second, his own statements at other times that it was GUK who was primarily responsible for NOSENKO's visits to the Residency.

NOSENKO had a full day free for meetings on 11 June 1962, although thereafter he limited meeting times to shorter and shorter periods until his departure. This seemed natural at the time since he would presumably have his own responsibilities and would need to be seen by his Soviet colleagues in his proper surroundings. However, in 1964 he seemed not to have any official responsibilities or any calls on his time: He was willing to spend all his time in meetings with CIA. Although this could be explained by the fact that he planned to defect anyway, it nevertheless would have involved unnecessary risks to a genuine source about to become a defector. He showed no concern at the time, but later (in 1966), he said that he had been in fact afraid; it was for this reason that he invented the Moscow recall telegram, in order to hasten his defection and put an end to his fears of getting caught. It is, of course, impossible to make conclusive judgments on Soviet practice, but one would expect, if NOSENKO were not engaged in security duties, that he would be required to participate for cover reasons in more of the Soviet delegation's official activity. He said that any absence could be explained as "security duties," since everyone on the Soviet Delegation knew or suspected that he was a KGB officer. This unconcern for the suspicions of other Soviets conforms neither with observed Soviet practice nor with reports from other sources that Soviet intelligence and security officers under cover go to some pains to hide their true affiliation.

NOSENKO explained the contrast between his freedom and availability in 1964 and his limited free time in 1962 by the fact that in 1964 he had no personal friends in Geneva; in 1962 both GUK and KISLOV expected to see him in his free time. (This story does not explain his ability in 1964 to get away during conference working hours; neither GUK nor KISLOV affected this in 1962.)

d. Timing of 1962 Contact

NOSENKO had been in Geneva for three months in 1962 when the incident which brought him to CIA occurred; it was only two weeks before his departure. He came to David MARK only 10 days before leaving. This had the effect of limiting CIA's time with him. NOSENKO's contact came only about 10 days after CIA had completed, in the same city, a series of meetings with BELITSKIY, a Soviet interpreter who had been recruited and handled as an agent by CIA during earlier visits to the West. NOSENKO, as one of the two primary items he wanted to "sell" revealed that BELITSKIY had been under KGB control from the outset (Page 517).

e. Willingness to Meet CIA

Although in 1962 NOSENKO claimed that he wanted to sell only two specific items for the money he had lost, and then disappear, there were indications from the outset that he expected and planned to come back for further meetings with CIA. At this first meeting he called attention to certain information in his possession about POPOV, hinting that he would tell it later; even as he protested his unwillingness to continue meeting with CIA, he was giving ample details about himself which would inevitably have compromised him to CIA and forced his future collaboration. Before he finally agreed to return for more meetings, he said: "Maybe I'll meet you again Monday" (two days after the first meeting). NOSENKO refused, despite repeated inducements, to meet on the intervening Sunday. In fact, when he did return on Monday, he said that he had spent Sunday with friends, drinking and "discussing recent USSR foreign policy moves and speeches by KHRUSHCHEV."

f. The Recall Telegram

NOSENKO's confession that he fabricated the story of his having been urgently recalled to Moscow by a telegram [illegible] leaves only two possible interpretations:

- There was a telegram, but NOSENKO's mind has slipped and he is no longer able to distinguish between fact and fancy. This, however, is not borne out by his general conduct nor his performance under interrogation in 1966.

- There was, in fact, no telegram. (This is borne out by Special Intelligence.) Thus, the invention was [illegible] not NOSENKO's but the KGB's; the KGB briefed NOSENKO to report to CIA that a telegram was sent; and NOSENKO made an error in later admitting that it was not.

g. Remarks

The operational circumstances so far reviewed point out the facts that:

- NOSENKO was inconsistent if not contradictory in stating his reasons for being in Geneva in 1962 and 1964;

- He had unusual access to the KGB Legal Residency and an availability for meeting CIA that seemed to impinge upon his security;

- He was willing to return to meetings with CIA although having at first said that there were but two items of information for sale;

- He was "in place" as a CIA source for the last six of his 100 or so days in Geneva in 1962, thus restricting the amount of time he could provide continuing reporting on the local Legal Residency; and

- After 12 days in the same status in 1964, he forced the defection by the KGB recall telegram, which appears to have been a fabrication.

Taken together, these facts suggest the possibilities that the KGB sent NOSENKO to Geneva on both occasions for the purpose of contacting CIA, that the KGB wanted the opportunity to gauge CIA's reactions to the walk-in in 1962 and to the defection plans in 1964, and that the KGB guid d NOSENKO after contact was established in both years.

A further examination of the operational circumstances in Geneva lends credence to these possibilities. During the 1962 meetings, NOSENKO would frequently answer CIA questions by saying: "I will have to think about that tonight," or "I will have some time tonight to jot down and prepare a good answer for you," or "I don't want to give you an answer to that right off--I am afraid to mislead you." He would return to a later meeting with the information, after having visited the Legal Residency. In 1964 there were other examples of what may have been backstage guidance by the KGB:

-He called for an urgent special meeting to correct something he had said in an earlier meeting. Initially NOSENKO had named ZUJUS instead of KEYSERS as the U.S. Embassy code clerk whom he had personally approached in 1961. This seemed remarkably urgent and important to him at the time, and in retrospect this case gains special importance: It was the only time he claimed to have had direct contact with a U.S. Embassy staff employee during his alleged tour in the American Department in 1960-1961. If he could not remember this one name, it might call his entire story into question. It is hard to find another explanation; had he simply made a careless mistake, with his cus-t omary indifference to names and dates, NOSENKO would be unlikely to mull over what he had said at the meeting nor to bother about correcting a minor misstatement. Much less would he feel compelled to call an emergency meeting to do so.

-He came to meetings with "chance" items picked up at the Legal Residency, each of which would require quick action and the commitment of assets on the part of CIA in Geneva. Also, NOSENKO originally said in January 1964 that he wanted to defect right away, but various steps taken or planned by his CIA handlers kept him in place for a time. Each step, however, was quickly negated--usually at the next meeting--by some information NOSENKO had picked up by chance.

-He asked, out of context and without any explanation, whether GOLITSYN had told CIA that the President of Finland was a Soviet agent, and later could not coherently explain where he had heard this, why he had not told CIA about it in 1962, and why he had asked.

In addition, the Soviet reactions to the defection were unprecedented and contrasted sharply with, for example, the Soviets' avoidance of publicity concerning GOLITSYN's defec-t ion in 1961. The post-defection actions by the Soviet Government created publicity which had the superficial effect of underlining NOSENKO's authenticity, establishing him as a public figure, confirming that he had a family, and verifying that his defection was of alarming consequence. These

reactions seem purposeful in light of the approach in Paris in 1966 of a Soviet photographer to Paris Match; the photographer passed photographs of NOSENKO's wife and children as part of a proposed story to dramatize the abandoned family of a "top Soviet intelligence officer" whose defection had caused the "biggest blow ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence." There is no independent press in the USSR, no Soviet journalist is allowed to publish as he pleases, and the Soviet Government in the past has shown no predisposition to dramatize defections from its most secret agency. The photographer can only be presumed to have been acting on KGB instructions.

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G. Sources Supporting NOSENKO

1. Introduction

The preceding portions of Part VIII. present an analysis of the NOSENKO case without giving detailed consideration to information about him from [redacted] Soviets reporting to CIA and the FBI. Because their evidence generally runs counter to the results of the foregoing analysis, it is reviewed here separately so that the concentrated examination of NOSENKO would not be diverted by asides as to the authenticity and reliability of these Soviets. As indicated below, the CIA and FBI sources who have directly supported NOSENKO's intelligence background are [redacted] sensitive sources [redacted] and the defectors [redacted] and GOLITSYN. None except GOLITSYN claimed to know [illegible] personally or to have worked with him, and NOSENKO contradicted GOLITSYN by saying they had never met. Some of them, as well as CHEREPANOV, supported NOSENKO indirectly through overlapping information on specific KGB operations, but this aspect of their reporting is reviewed in Part IX.

2. Corroboration of NOSENKO's Intelligence Career

The statements of [redacted] the sources confirm that NOSENKO was a KGB officer with access to sensitive information:

sensitive source

- [redacted] said NOSENKO was a KGB lieutenant colonel (later changed to captain), a friend and protege of the head of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, GRIBANOV, who approved NOSENKO's (1964) TDY to Geneva. [redacted] NOSENKO was a KGB "chief," with access to details on KGB operations against the U.S. Embassy, and was most recently Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department. He also stated that NOSENKO, with his information on U.S. Embassy microphones and KGB operations involving correspondents and tourists, was "more valuable [to American intelligence] than PENKOVSKIY." NOSENKO "could do tremendous harm to the KGB," [redacted] and moreover, the KGB "will not be able to operate normally for two years" (i.e., until 1966). He described the repercussions in the KGB caused by NOSENKO's defection: new KGB regulations to increase security, the dismissal of many KGB officers including GRIBANOV and the recall of many others [redacted] Asked [redacted] whether NOSENKO could be a "trick," i.e., a KGB provocateur, [redacted] expressed the conviction that NOSENKO was not. [redacted]

[redacted] sensitive source

[redacted] stated that NOSENKO had attended the GRU's Military-Diplomatic Academy (NOSENKO has indicated he declined the opportunity to enroll in this strategic intelligence school in the early 1950's.) Afterwards, [redacted] NOSENKO served in the GRU and then entered

source
- According to NOSENKO was in "Intelli-
gence." His defection brought about the recall of a
KGB secretary from Geneva, the rumored transfer of some
60 Soviet officials from assignments abroad, and the
dismissal of KGB personnel including NOSENKO's friend
GUK, who had recommended the TDY to Geneva. In addi-
tion, reported, immediately after the de-
fection a representative of the Exits Commission of
the CPSU Central Committee went to Geneva to speak to
the Soviet Government employees there.
said that NOSENKO had been tried in absentia in Moscow
for treason and sentenced to death (see Pages 46 and
342).

- GOLITSYN failed to comment when shown NOSENKO's
name in 1962, and there is no record of his ever having
mentioned NOSENKO prior to the Western press announce-
ment of the defection in 1964, even though he had named
people known to him in the American Department of the
KGB Second Chief Directorate. (Shortly after defecting
GOLITSYN said that he had visited this Department in
1960 and at the turn of the year 1960-1961.) After
NOSENKO defected, GOLITSYN was given a summary of
NOSENKO's biography. Thereupon GOLITSYN reported that
NOSENKO was a KGB officer whom he first met in 1953 and
last saw in 1959. From 1953 to 1957 or 1958, GOLITSYN
stated, NOSENKO was in the U.S. Embassy Section of the
American Department, responsible for coverage of U.S.
military personnel and later either for others in the Mos-
cow Embassy or for correspondents. As of 1959, GOLITSYN
said, NOSENKO was a senior officer in the Tourist Department;
as of 1960, he was definitely not in the American Depart-
ment. GOLITSYN added that GUK, CHURANOV, and KASHCHEYEV
were friends in the KGB whom he shared with NOSENKO (see
Pages 343-344).

Source
Soviet source, , indicated she had
been told by her KGB friend SVIRIN that NOSENKO was a
"civilian"; he had nevertheless provided information on
microphones in the U.S. Embassy and had caused "considerable
damage." also have cor-
roborated certain non-Intelligence aspects of NOSENKO's
background.

3. Remarks

Source,
aside, the Soviet sources have certified
that NOSENKO was a senior KGB officer, and all asserted or
implied that he had access to information valuable to Ameri-
can Intelligence--the microphones in the U.S. Embassy being
one item in common.

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[redacted]. Most of them have described the serious repercussions of NOSENKO's defection. The possibilities with regard to the accuracy of these sources' reporting are:

First, they are correct. If so, the foregoing analysis is in error, they are valid sources, and NOSENKO is what he claims to be: a genuine defector whose previous positions in the KGB enabled him to divulge all important details on operations against Westerners, mainly Americans.

Second, they are misinformed. If so, the foregoing analysis is correct, they may be valid sources, and NOSENKO has always been under KGB control. For this to be true, it would have been necessary for the KGB to dispatch NOSENKO with only a highly restricted number of KGB personnel (including GRIBANOV) aware of the actual circumstances of the operation. The KGB, at the same time, would have propagated within and outside of the Soviet Intelligence Services the fiction that NOSENKO was an actual but disloyal KGB officer and would have supported this fabrication in various ways [redacted] the rumor spreading about the severity of the loss of NOSENKO, etc.).

Third, they have been purposefully misleading American Intelligence for their own or KGB purposes. If so, the foregoing analysis is correct, and some or all of them have participated in a KGB conspiracy to support the bona fides of NOSENKO, a KGB-controlled source.

These possibilities are discussed further in Part IX.

H. Alternative Explanations

1. Introduction

Parts VIII.B. through VIII.F. have discussed the inaccuracies, self-admitted contradictions, inconsistencies, and incompleteness of NOSENKO's reporting about himself and the KGB. Collectively, these important flaws in the story of and by NOSENKO make it necessary to choose an explanation for his actions and the nature of his information. There are three alternatives:

First, NOSENKO was a KGB officer but (a) has a faulty or selective memory, has embellished or boasted, or his reporting has been influenced by a combination thereof; or (b) he is insane.

Second, NOSENKO lied about himself in order to save face.

Third, NOSENKO has misrepresented himself, either on his own or at the instigation of the KGB.

Each of these mutually exclusive alternatives is discussed below.

2. First Alternative

According to one postulate, NOSENKO was an officer in the KGB but has a faulty memory, has a selective memory, and/or has embellished or boasted:

a. Faulty Memory

NOSENKO himself has repeatedly appealed for understanding that "different people have different memories" and that his own is "funny," and this is supported by his forgetfulness and errors concerning events he is known independently to have lived through, such as the BURGI and [redacted] cases. But it cannot be said that he is, in general, "very bad with names," because he has almost total recall of names and positions of hundreds of KGB officers in the American and Tourist Departments. He has a good memory for faces and rarely failed to recognize photographs of people he claimed to know. He remembered consistently details about certain operations (the compromise and investigation of PENKOVSKIY, the surveillance of ABIDIAN to Pushkin Street, the JENNER case, the arrest of BARGHOORN, and the search for CHEREPANOV, to cite a few examples). NOSENKO was precisely accurate in his recollection of most of his dealings with CIA personnel from June 1962 onward.

b. Selective Memory

Although having a selective memory is probably true of nearly everyone, a CIA psychologist has described NOSENKO as a psychopath who would register each passing event only in relation to its effect on himself at that moment. This would inevitably make him indifferent to the characteristics of other people, for example, and to the sequence in which events transpired; the aspects important to him might not appear so to a more objective observer. Such a person would

suppress unpleasant memories and would have no real appreciation of or respect for an "objective truth." His reporting, like his perception and his memory, might therefore seem distorted. He might recount events according to his mood of the moment. Thus, for example, if real attachments to family or friends is impossible for a psychopath, there would be an explanation as to why NOSENKO cannot easily remember his childrens' birthdays, why in 1962 (or 1965) he appears to have lied--or been indifferent to the truth--about his older daughter's schooling, and why he cannot recall when he first married. In theory this hypothesis can explain any aberration, since it involves the unknowable. In its most extreme form, by describing NOSENKO as one unable to discriminate between fact and fancy, it would encompass and explain away the facts that his story is obviously untrue and contradictory in major ways; that his account of his personal and professional life and his rendition of the information he knows are so vague and unsubstantial; that he cannot (and/or does not care to) remember or recount how he did the things he did. Most important, it would dismiss any conclusions based on NOSENKO's testimony since nothing NOSENKO said could be taken seriously. This hypothesis, however, is unsupportable because of several factors.

First, NOSENKO claims--and other sources confirm--that he quickly rose to high supervisory responsibility in a counterintelligence organization which is known to require attention to detail. He would have risen in the KGB while overcoming the black marks in his file: scandal, indiscipline, negative background factors, and bad Party record. NOSENKO admits that his performance was not good; he was inattentive and inactive and almost none of his operational activity was carried out unaccompanied. That his rise resulted from his father's influence or GRIBANOV's is untenable, for his father died in 1956 and GRIBANOV's patronage (itself open to the strongest doubt) would not and could not be dispensed upon such a mental case. Mental aberration to the degree which would explain his poor performance under CIA interrogation would necessarily have hindered his performance of KGB duties, denied him special privileges, and and hence cost him the career which NOSENKO has claimed for himself.

A second factor negating this hypothesis of a psychopathic personality is that such a person could be induced to recall certain details with the help of discussion, questioning, and reminders, whereas NOSENKO's vague and hazy reports seem to represent the absolute limits of his memory or knowledge. Years of questioning have not succeeded in dredging up any new details or incidents. Even when reminded, he could not recall, for example, one of KOSOLAPOV's TDYs to Helsinki, the details of the seizure of electronic equipment from the U.S. Army Attaches at Stalingrad, the correct date of GOLITSYN's defection, or the presence of KHRUSHCHEV in Moscow at the time of the decision to arrest BARGHOORN.

Another factor is the impossibility of applying this hypothesis to the totality of NOSENKO's reporting. If the hypothesis holds that some things are important to him and others are not, and that he therefore remembers the former and forgets the latter, it is refuted by the inability to

find a category of information about himself which he consistently remembered nor any that he consistently forgot. If what is important is his own direct experiences, for example, it is odd that he recalled the operations of others better than his own; he remembered the names of hundreds of KGB officers, but could not recall names of his own agents and people involved in his own career; he could recount details of the PENKOVSKIY investigation, in which he did not participate, but not of the discovery of American spies among tourists, such as McGOWAN, for which he was responsible; he remembered details of the 1955 MALIA case in which he did not meet the target personally but forgot details of the 1961 KEYSERS case in which he did. If it is the importance to him of recruitment operations against U.S. Embassy employees which permitted him to recall some details of the STORSBERG and MULE operations, it is not important enough to help him recall some of the other details which were equally pertinent to him personally; and it is not selective memory which made him forget almost every detail about CIA personnel in Moscow and KGB action against them. If it is said that his parental family is important to him (hence his memory of his father's funeral and the names of his uncles and aunts), it is odd that he cannot recall details about his childhood. If drinking with important people is meaningful to him, it would explain why he remembers one GRIBANOV evening with sharp clarity, but it does not explain why he cannot remember the other two times, not even in what season of the year or in what restaurant they took place.

Finally, with reference to the "selective memory" hypothesis, it is precisely in matters NOSENKO said he remembers best and which he told most confidently that the majority of inexplicable contradictions arise. Nothing could shake him from his claim to have been directly responsible for ABIDIAN or on his story of the Pushkin Street dead drop, among numerous examples.

c. Embellishment

The third possibility is that he has simply embellished and boasted, while underlying his story is a core of truth somewhere near what he has reported. NOSENKO has, after all, admitted many "white lies" and boasts ("painting" himself, as he called it). Also, in the interrogations there were repeated signs that he was fabricating and improvising, often in ways which led him into more contradictions and further admissions of white lies. Perhaps then, according to this hypothesis, he simply invented, on his own, various aspects of his career. Perhaps he dated his entry into the KGB earlier to make himself seem more experienced, and invented his service in the American Department to make himself more interesting to American Intelligence. Perhaps he was only a principal agent, not a staff officer, but learned enough from his operations and from his handlers to think he could pose as one. This hypothesis would certainly explain many of the dubious aspects: the story of his career, his lack of information on KGB staff procedures, his ignorance of major KGB events and sources, the degree of his relationship with GRIBANOV, etc. This theory, however, founders on a number of points:

-The validity of the information he has provided. To get such information he would have to be a KGB staff officer, must have worked in both the American and Tourist Departments as he says he did, and must have been a fairly senior officer with broad responsibilities (in view of the number of Tourist Department operations revealed by name in his 1964 notes). To name a few other examples from among hundreds possible:

(a) NOSENKO not only knew the identity of a KGB double agent against CIA, BELITSKIY, but gave checkable details from inside the case, including the names by which the CIA case officers identified themselves to the double agent;

(b) NOSENKO was able to report, with almost complete accuracy, that CIA ceased clandestine letter-mailings inside the Soviet Union for over a year after the arrest of Russell LANGELLE in late 1959;

(c) He identified several Americans recruited or approached by the KGB in operations in which he said he did not directly participate, including "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH), Sergeant Robert JOHNSON, and Henry SHAPIRO;

(d) NOSENKO knew inside information on Americans at the Embassy in Moscow, including operational activities of John ABIDIAN, (WINTERS) mailing of a letter to POPOV, the homosexuality of two diplomatic officers, etc; and

(e) He knew certain details of the story of Aleksandr CHEREPANOV which would not have been available outside the KGB staff.

Thus there would not be any great need nor much room for embellishment.

-The confirmations of others. He appeared before BARGHOORN and other KGB targets as a "chief," and sensitive source's [redacted] subsources confirmed NOSENKO's unusual importance: that he was a Deputy Department Chief in the KGB, that his defection was a severe blow to Soviet Intelligence, that he was more important than PENKOVSKIY, and so on. A Soviet journalist told Paris Match that NOSENKO's defection was the greatest loss ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence. [redacted]

Two sources reported the recall to Moscow of many KGB staffers as a result of the defection, and these officers did indeed return to the Soviet Union.

Thus any embellishment must concern only minor details such as his rank, which he has already admitted.

d. Combination of Above

Another possibility might be that NOSENKO's poor performance was due to a combination of bad memory, psychopathologically selective memory, and embellishment. While this theory is intrinsically more logical and might correct and round off some obvious weaknesses in any one of the

individual theories, it cannot explain the counterarguments discussed under component parts above.

e. <u>Insanity</u>

It might be postulated that NOSENKO went insane and that this was the cause not only of his seemingly unmotivated contact with CIA in 1962 but of shortcomings in his story. However, NOSENKO thereafter handled senior KGB functions well enough to be promoted and to be permitted abroad in 1964; he has been examined periodically by a CIA psychologist and a CIA psychiatrist; he has been in contact over considerable periods of time and under varying degrees of stress with experienced CIA and FBI personnel; he has maintained his equilibrium under difficult circumstances. None of the foregoing results in an indication of insanity and there are countless other arguments which would invalidate this hypothesis.

3. <u>Second Alternative</u>

It has also been postulated that NOSENKO is a psychopath, is what he says he is, but that for psychological reasons and while under interrogation, he did not want to tell what he knew. By this line of reasoning, NOSENKO has lied for no other reason than to save face; by dwelling on the inconsistencies in NOSENKO's statements, the interrogator merely caused more inconsistencies or else received the false answers that NOSENKO did not know or did not remember the facts. Under interrogation, however, NOSENKO recalled and repeated what he had previously said in the less inhibiting atmosphere of the relaxed debriefings prior to 4 April 1964. This alternative explanation thus does not account for the factual contradictions in NOSENKO's reporting before the interrogations, such as the errors in dates, in sourcing on the "ANDREY" case, in details about the Pushkin Street dead drop, etc. It also fails to account for NOSENKO's retractions about his rank as lieutenant colonel, in the face of the KGB TDY travel authorization which shows him to be a lieutenant colonel, and about the telegram recalling him to KGB Headquarters in January 1964. [redacted] The suggestion that NOSENKO lied to save face consequently can be dismissed.

4. <u>Third Alternative</u>

The only other postulate is that NOSENKO is not what he claims to be, in which case his misrepresentation was done either on his own or as part of a KGB operation.

If he is misrepresenting himself on his own, there are (even in theory) only two possibilities: He is merely exaggerating (discussed above, under the "First Alternative") or he is a fabricator. He cannot be a fabricator, however, since the Soviets have certified him in many ways; including his diplomatic status at the Geneva Conference, Soviet official protests and Soviet Embassy confrontation in Washington, Soviet officials' remarks in various areas of the world, and reports from [redacted] other sources on his KGB status and importance. sensitive source and

There remains the possibility that NOSENKO has misrepresented himself and is a witting part of a KGB operation. This hypothesis could accommodate the argument that the KGB would not dispatch a KGB staff officer as a double agent against a hostile service because, whether or not the argument is valid, NOSENKO (as indicated in Part VIII.D. above) has not proven his claim to having served as an officer of the KGB. If he has been and is now under KGB control, it would appear that he was being built up for years to look like an officer and was shown to Westerners in certain recruitment operations.* This could explain NOSENKO's revelations to FRIPPEL and others about his family and background; the otherwise pointless W.E. JOHNSON case, and NOSENKO's appearance in the BARGHOORN interrogation. It could explain NOSENKO's uneven memory and performance under detailed questioning: Much of what he should have known by personal experience could have been merely memorized as part of his KGB briefing. Nothing in NOSENKO's production (see Part VIII.B. above) would preclude his being a KGB-dispatched agent. That he was a KGB-dispatched agent was the conclusion independently arrived at by the CIA specialist who administered a polygraph examination to NOSENKO in April 1964.

4. Remarks

The first alternative above has been rejected while the possibility that NOSENKO on his own misrepresented himself is unacceptable. The remaining possibility is that NOSENKO has been manipulated by the KGB in an operation directed against American Intelligence.

* His American Department service in 1960-1961 was not supported by any such "show" appearances--he did not insist on the truth of his claim to participation in the KEYSERS case, which, moreover KEYSERS could not confirm; PREISFREUND is an unreliable witness; and [redacted] is not accessible to interview.

I. Summary of Conclusions

CIA has considered every major aspect of the NOSENKO case for the purpose of reaching a definitive conclusion about the bona fides of this man who says he is a KGB officer-defector collaborating with American Intelligence.

As this point-by-point analysis has demonstrated, there is no reason to accept any of NOSENKO's claims to a career as an officer in Soviet Intelligence, to authority concerning the range and degree of KGB operational successes in the USSR (particularly with U.S. officials and private citizens), to accurate knowledge regarding major security cases in that country, or to cooperation with American Intelligence.

It would be sufficient proof of his mala fides to verify that NOSENKO lied about a single segment of his career in the KGB. He cannot have been truthful in saying that he was the Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, in 1960-1961 and a Deputy Chief in the Tourist Department of the same directorate from 1962 until his defection. Numerous indications make it doubtful that NOSENKO, as he contended, belonged to the naval GRU in 1951-1952, to the U.S. Embassy Section in 1953-1955, and to the American Tourist Section in 1955-1959. He was unable to support his alleged staff officer status in the KGB, providing incomplete and inaccurate information on his sub-sources and on such topics as Headquarters staff procedures while making illogical statements on modus operandi. Neither a supervisor nor, probably, a case officer, it remains dubious but possible that he was a KGB principal agent whose speciality in the past was compromising Western homosexuals. Whatever the capacity in which NOSENKO served, it was not in the KGB ranks, holding the KGB titles, or with the KGB honors he has ascribed to himself, and this fact is enough to prove the falsity of his claims to being a genuine defector.

There is no question, however, that NOSENKO has had the benefit of inside information from the KGB. He has said so, other sources have said so, the Soviet Government's reactions to the defection implied as much, and his reports contain details which could have come only from the KGB. He was introduced into several operations, the first as early as 1953, in a position appearing "senior" to known KGB staff officers. He has provided data on organization, personnel, and methods complementing and supplementing that from others affiliated with the KGB. Purposefully misleading about himself, NOSENKO has also been deceitful in discussing the compromises of CHEREPANOV, PENKOVSKIY, and perhaps POPOV, although here his reporting often correlates with that from several [redacted] Analysis shows that -- NOSENKO and others to the contrary -- CHEREPANOV was a KGB provocateur, PENKOVSKIY was detected at the latest in early 1961 not 1962, and POPOV was probably uncovered earlier than January 1959 because of a KGB agent rather than surveillance. NOSENKO thus has not merely misrepresented himself but has practiced deception under KGB guidance. Appraisals of NOSENKO's performance under interrogation, his alleged motivation, and the operational circumstances support this view.

[margin note: sensitive sources]

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Furthermore, it is the only acceptable explanation, among the alternatives, for what has transpired since contact with CIA began in 1962.

CIA's conclusion about the bona fides of NOSENKO is unequivocal: He is a dispatched agent controlled by the KGB.

Part IX contains a discussion of the implications of the foregoing conclusion for the Soviet sources who, [illegible] have corroborated the bona fides of NOSENKO.

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IX. EXPLANATIONS FOR OTHER SOURCES

A. Introduction

sensitive sources

The conclusion that NOSENKO did not serve in the KGB positions he claimed contradicts information reported to CIA and the FBI by two categories of Soviet Intelligence sources: (1) the defector GOLITSYN and (2) [redacted]. These sources, all of whom have claimed to be collaborating honestly with American Intelligence, stated or implied that NOSENKO held senior positions in the KGB Second Chief Directorate.** If the conclusion of this study of NOSENKO's bona fides is accurate, none of the [redacted] sources can be correct, and they must therefore be either misinformed about NOSENKO or purposefully misleading.

In assessing whether and how [redacted] sensitive sources could have been innocently misinformed about NOSENKO after he defected, it is necessary to consider the ways in which the KGB might have created and supported a legend for a counterfeit KGB officer-defector like NOSENKO. The KGB might have accomplished this by the following means:

- NOSENKO's legend would have required the KGB to brief him in depth on numerous cases and various targets which he would be free to discuss with CIA. The KGB would also have to familiarize him with KGB staff organizational structure and procedures,*** and KGB officers prominent in his story (e.g., GUK, KOVSHUK, TSYMBAL, GRIBANOV) so that he could not only recognize their photographs but also lend reality to his remarks about them. NOSENKO would also have to visit KGB installations and other areas which appeared in his legend.

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* Sources whose reporting tended to support NOSENKO but who have not been members of the Soviet Intelligence Services are eliminated from detailed consideration here because their connections with NOSENKO are less direct than the sources with service in the KGB and GRU. [redacted] has never been a Soviet Intelligence officer, and his support for NOSENKO has been relatively limited. However, he reported on repercussions in Geneva caused by NOSENKO's defection and like NOSENKO, he said that the KGB suspected the U.S. State Department official David MARK of belonging to CIA. He has also reported on certain personalities prominent in NOSENKO's reporting, including Yu. I. GUK and V.V. VAKRUSHEV. Source

** Although all of them supported NOSENKO by confirming his KGB status, there is nevertheless a distinct difference between GOLITSYN's opinion about him and the statements by the other sources. GOLITSYN believed NOSENKO to be a KGB-dispatched agent, while the rest indicated that he was a genuine defector.

***That these preparations were imperfect, or at least that NOSENKO imperfectly mastered his briefing, was shown in his performance under interrogation.

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- Another phase of the preparations would have been NOSENKO's actual and demonstrable participation in operations, seemingly as a KGB officer. Presumably this would be done so that Westerners (e.g., BARGHOORN, FRIPPEL, and W.E. JOHNSON) could certify that they had seen NOSENKO in some such role.*

- The KGB presumably would have restricted the number of its officers aware of some or all of the operational plan; it would nonetheless be faced with the problem of how public knowledge of NOSENKO's defection might affect others in the service. KGB officers abroad uninformed of the operational plan might be indiscreet with foreigners, in meeting Western double agents, or before microphones in their homes and offices, making such remarks as "I never heard of this man NOSENKO" or speculating close to the mark. Thus the KGB might have tried to support the bona fides of NOSENKO [redacted] by the spreading of false rumors about his authenticity (this on the part of the limited few aware of the facts of the case), by recalling KGB officers from the posts in the West (ostensibly because they were known to NOSENKO), by announcing the wholesale dismissal of those responsible including GRIBANOV (although in fact they may have routinely retired or may have been removed from the main stream of KGB Headquarters activities), and by making general announcements within the KGB about the "loss" incurred by the defection [redacted]. Furthermore, since it is common Soviet practice to make a bad example of defectors, such announcements might be expected to denigrate NOSENKO as a "bad character" with venereal disease, an odd Party record, self-inflicted wound, etc., in his background. The KGB might also have taken pains to support NOSENKO further by having Western Intelligence sources, notably double agents recognized by the KGB to be such, told of the seriousness of the defection.

sensitive sources

It is within this possible framework that one might judge whether the reports of [redacted] concerning NOSENKO were unwitting repetitions of widely disseminated misinformation, or whether their reports constituted purposeful passage of KGB disinformation.

Their direct and indirect support of NOSENKO's bona fides, as well as the statements by GOLITSYN, are presented and evaluated in the next sections below, together with presentations and appraisals of their information on topics of reporting in common with NOSENKO's. Certain reports by [redacted]

Source

* It is noteworthy that such participation was limited to Tourist Department operations. NOSENKO did not claim physical participation in any contacts with American Embassy officials during the periods 1953-55 or 1960-61, except for MULE and STORSBERG (where his claimed role was uncheckable since it involved only holding a door) and KEYZERS (which KEYZERS did not confirm and on which NOSENKO did not insist, admitting that he doubted KEYZERS would remember or recognize him.

[redacted] sources are also considered because they overlap NOSENKO's to some extent, although by saying he was a civilian, [redacted] contradicted his claim to KGB staff officer status. A number of general correlations between the NOSENKO case and the [redacted] sensitive sources operations are then reviewed. The final section of Part IX is a summary of conclusions about the relationship between the NOSENKO case and the reporting about him by GOLITSYN, [redacted] [redacted] sensitive sources

c.

B. [illegible]

1. [illegible]

[illegible] At
[illegible] 1962 and 1964 [illegible]
[illegible] was shown [illegible] list of
names of Soviet delegat[illegible] the 1962 session of the Disarmament
Conference in Geneva. [illegible]'s name was on the list but GOLITSYN
gave no indication that he recognized the name.

On [illegible] June 1962, after CIA's initial meetings with NOSENKO
and because of the large overlap of NOSENKO's information and con-
tacts with GOLITSYN's, one of the CIA case officers who had met
NOSENKO in Geneva met with GOLITSYN to obtain his comments on some
of the NOSENKO material. GOLITSYN was told that CIA had received
in Switzerland an anonymous letter which reported certain informa-
tion from within the KGB. The CIA officer stated to GOLITSYN that
[illegible] overlapped his own [illegible], including
[illegible] GOLITSYN's friends [illegible], and [illegible],
[illegible] of [illegible] was [illegible], perhaps in
[illegible] items from NOSENKO
[illegible] Second Chief
[illegible] was shown him,
[illegible] personnel whom the
[illegible] NOSENKO, and
[illegible] CIA records,
[illegible] one Aleksandr
[illegible] NOSENKO, who [illegible] Japan when
[illegible] further
[illegible] identified as KGB
[illegible] GOLITSYN said
[illegible] organization in 1961 for the [illegible]. [illegible] for an assess-
[illegible] general, [illegible] the full details necessary [illegible] of disinformation
ment, he could say that there were [illegible] information on the
in what he had seen; he wanted to see the full [illegible]
case. It was not given to him.

On 10 February 1964 NOSENKO's defection from the Soviet Dis-
armament delegation in Geneva, Switzerland was publicized, includ-
ing his KGB affiliation. When GOLITSYN heard this news he immedi-
ately recalled the June 1962 "letter" from Switzerland and linked
NOSENKO to it; he thereupon stated that he recalled NOSENKO as a
member of the Second Chief Directorate working against American
citizens.

On 11 February 1964 GOLITSYN raised the possibility of his
participation in interrogations of NOSENKO, and at this time he
was given some background on the case and an indication of CIA's
reservations about NOSENKO's bona fides. Over the next several
months GOLITSYN was provided with material from the 1962 and 1964
meetings with NOSENKO in Switzerland, and at his request was
supplied with all the available biographic data of NOSENKO to
assist him in analyzing the operation. On 29 June 1964, GOLITSYN
was interviewed in detail on the subject of NOSENKO. He confirmed
NOSENKO's identity as the son of the former Minister of Ship-
building and said that he was a KGB officer who had worked in the
American Department and the Tourist Department of the KGB's Second
Chief Directorate. He was shown a photograph of NOSENKO (not
buried in a photo spread, but singly) and he identified it as a
photograph of the man he knew. At this time he gave the information
about NOSENKO which is summarized below.

The NOSENKO case has not been discussed with GOLITSYN since the 29 June 1964 interview; thus he has not been questioned further on the circumstances which led to the encounters with NOSENKO described by him, nor have the results of subsequent detailed reinterrogations of NOSENKO - discussed at length in the foregoing sections of this paper - been made available to him for review, analysis, or comment.

2. Resume and Discussion of Information*

American Department - 1953

NOSENKO has said that he entered the KGB in March 1953** and was first assigned to the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department of what is now the Second Chief Directorate, KGB. He stated that his duties from his entry until sometime in 1954, perhaps about June, were to work on files of American correspondents on permanent assignment to Moscow and to meet with the Soviet citizens who were agents or informants reporting on the correspondents to the KGB.

GOLITSYN stated that he met NOSENKO in the American Department of the Internal Counterintelligence Directorate*** a couple of times in 1953 when he, GOLITSYN, was there on other matters. GOLITSYN had earlier identified his own job between December 1952 and April 1953 as Chief of the American Sector, Counterintelligence (Ninth) Department, Foreign Directorate, under the Chief Intelligence Directorate (formed in December 1952 and reorganized in April 1953). From April 1953 until his departure

* The relationship between the reporting by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO on specific operations is shown on Pages 594-595, with comments thereon appearing on Pages 647-659, while in this section are a discussion and an evaluation of what GOLITSYN said about NOSENKO's assignments in the Second Chief Directorate (see Pages 343-344).

** Among the various dates given by NOSENKO for this entry, March 1953 has been given more often than others and is more consistent with the rest of NOSENKO's story.

*** This is now designated the KGB Second Chief Directorate.

for Vienna in October 1953 GOLITSYN was Deputy Chief of the Emigre Sector, Counterintelligence Department, Foreign Intelligence Department, Foreign Intelligence Directorate. GOLITSYN has not indicated the nature of his responsibilities in either of these positions which would have necessitated his visiting the American Department of the Internal Counterintelligence Directorate, although certain activities of common interest with the latter would appear logical. NOSENKO's description of his alleged duties with correspondents, however, did not encompass his having official contacts with representatives of any component of the Counterintelligence Department of the Foreign Directorate. According to NOSENKO's description of the location of his claimed office in the American Department, and his description of the duties of the co-workers he said shared it with him, chance contacts there with such a representative would have been precluded. Even by NOSENKO's account, then, an encounter between GOLITSYN and himself could not have been in the course of interdepartmental liaison between their respective units, nor could it have occurred in NOSENKO's office. GOLITSYN's lack of reporting on KGB operations against American correspondents (other than his conversation with KOVSHUK in 1956 or 1957 about Henry SHAPIRO) is further evidence that his business in the American Department was unrelated to NOSENKO's claimed activities at that time, and GOLITSYN's own statement on the 1953 encounters implied that his meetings with NOSENKO were accidental. Fleeting as their contacts would therefore have been, it could have led GOLITSYN to make the unfounded assumption that NOSENKO was a member of the staff within the American Department.

<u>American Department/Tourist Department - 1955-1960</u>

NOSENKO stated that he transferred from the American Department to the Tourist Department in June 1955, and remained in the Tourist Department until 1960, becoming a deputy chief of section there in 1958.

GOLITSYN, however, insisted that NOSENKO remained in the American Department until at least 1957, or possibly as late as 1958. GOLITSYN added that the KGB would not be aware that he knew

NOSENKO's true position in the American Department in 1957 or 1958. GOLITSYN did not indicate how he acquired his knowledge on this nor why the KGB subsequently would have been unable to determine that he had. If his access to this information was indeed that remote (as GOLITSYN's assignment in 1957 and 1958 would indicate - see below), it is readily apparent that it could likewise be somewhat garbled. GOLITSYN was unable to explain the fact that NOSENKO's physical presence in exclusively Tourist Department cases had been positively established through photo identifications made by several of the individuals involved, who met NOSENKO as early as 1956.

From 1955 to 1959 (the same years when NOSENKO claimed to have been in the Tourist Department) GOLITSYN was enrolled in the KGB Higher School. He was detached from the school, in the period January-March 1959, in order to gather material for his thesis. At that time GOLITSYN spent just under two months in the Tourist Department,* but GOLITSYN's work did not involve him in any day-to-day operational activities of this department. He has reported having "occasionally" met NOSENKO in 1959; although he did not specify that it was at precisely this time, it seems probable that it would have been. GOLITSYN said that he asked NOSENKO in 1959 where he was working and NOSENKO told him the Tourist Department. Again it appears from this that his encounters must have been brief, superficial, and not work-related, hence insufficient for GOLITSYN to arrive independently at a well-founded conclusion as to NOSENKO's actual status and function with the Tourist Department.

*In describing his own and others' responsibilities in the Tourist Department, NOSENKO has made no reference to this unit having a formal or regular relationship with the KGB school or to students from the school having been detached to the department.

Information Not Available to GOLITSYN

The detailed interrogations of NOSENKO concerning his claims to KGB positions between 1953 and 1964, did not take place until many months after GOLITSYN made his statements, and they were based upon all collateral information known relating to each phase. None of the results of these interrogations was made available to GOLITSYN, so he was not aware of the countless points on which NOSENKO contradicted known facts and revealed his ignorance of activities which were carried out by the KGB during his alleged tenure in these departments.

3. Comments on GOLITSYN

Several factors influence the evaluation of GOLITSYN's statements on NOSENKO:

- First, as stated in Part VIII.I., it is concluded that NOSENKO did not serve in the KGB positions he claimed. GOLITSYN's testimony verified this conclusion insofar as NOSENKO's claims about service in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department in 1960-1961 are concerned. Moreover, in 1962 GOLITSYN concluded that the KGB "letter-writer" (actually NOSENKO) was under KGB control in submitting information to American Intelligence. At issue, therefore, is the evidence from GOLITSYN to the effect that NOSENKO was an officer in the American Department (until 1957 or 1958, whereas NOSENKO said he was reassigned from the department in 1955) and in the Tourist Department subsequently.

- Second, GOLITSYN made no comment about or identification of NOSENKO prior to the public announcement of the latter's defection, despite many previous opportunities to do so (e.g., in discussions of GUK, CHURANOV, and KASHCHEYEV) and despite GOLITSYN's proven excellence of memory for names and tasks of KGB personnel. GOLITSYN gave little detail on the circumstances of his encounters with NOSENKO, and he has not been questioned further about them. Nevertheless, as indicated in the foregoing remarks on the circumstances in which the two men could have met, it seems apparent that any contact would have been brief, infrequent, casual, extra-official, and [illegible]

The following discussion considers GOLITSYN's information about NOSENKO in conjunction with NOSENKO's denial about having been in contact with GOLITSYN.* Possible explanations for GOLITSYN's having referred to their encounters but having misidentified NOSENKO's positions in the KGB are: First, GOLITSYN could have erred; second, GOLITSYN could have lied for personal reasons; and third, GOLITSYN could have lied at the direction of the KGB because he (like NOSENKO) is under KGB control. To examine each of these points separately:

- GOLITSYN could have erred. Apart from the denial by NOSENKO, who is an unreliable source, there is no evidence to refute GOLITSYN's statement that he and NOSENKO met in the American Department in 1953 and in the Tourist Department in 1958 or 1959. (The conclusions in Part VIII.I. about NOSENKO's <u>bona fides</u> do not rule out the possibility that he was physically present on occasion on the premises of the two departments in these years, although not in the capacities that he has claimed.) The nature of their encounters, however, could have been such that GOLITSYN erred in assuming - because NOSENKO was seen on or near the premises of the two departments, and because NOSENKO told GOLITSYN in 1958 or 1959 that he was in the Tourist Department - that NOSENKO was therefore an officer of these specific elements of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. Thus, if GOLITSYN met NOSENKO as he said, he mistakenly identified NOSENKO as being a member of the staffs of the American and Tourist Departments at these times.

- GOLITSYN could have lied for personal reasons. He may have believed that to say he met NOSENKO or to say he knew

* There is insufficient information available to reach a conclusion about, or even speculate on, why NOSENKO was so certain GOLITSYN's defection occurred in January 1962, as contrasted with the fact that it took place on 15 December 1961.

NOSENKO's positions in the KGB would add authenticity to his earlier evaluation of the NOSENKO information of 1962, to his contradictions of NOSENKO's statements concerning service in the U.S. Embassy Section and the operations of that section, and to his contention that the KGB would try to counteract his (GOLITSYN's) information by spreading purportedly authoritative but purposefully misleading reports on the same subject matter. In summary, GOLITSYN's intention in lying about NOSENKO could simply have been to add greater credibility to his expressed opinion that NOSENKO was a KGB provocateur.

- GOLITSYN could have lied at the direction of the KGB, an explanation that is examined here for the sake of completeness and not because CIA has any reason to believe GOLITSYN is under KGB control. This explanation would mean that GOLITSYN, although offering partial confirmation for NOSENKO's claims, directly attacked the bona fides of another KGB-dispatched agent of allegedly comparable rank and knowledgeability. Acting under KGB instructions, GOLITSYN would have sought to undermine NOSENKO's acceptability, regardless of the fact that NOSENKO said he was providing reliable and comprehensive information about KGB operations against American officials and tourists in the USSR. At the same time, NOSENKO was not giving an account of their relationship that was consistent with GOLITSYN's, by implication NOSENKO was distorting or diluting the earlier reports of GOLITSYN on KGB operations in the Soviet Union, and NOSENKO was seeking to gain acceptance by CIA equal to that experienced by GOLITSYN. According to this hypothesis, two sources under KGB control - each striving for acceptance - deliberately gave conflicting stories of their relationship, and each tried to undermine the bona fides of the other, GOLITSYN explictly and NOSENKO by implication. This explanation is so illogical, as well as so detrimental to the KGB, that it must be rejected from serious consideration.

The choice thus seems to lie between the first two explanations for GOLITSYN's misidentification of NOSENKO, one an understandable error of assumption drawn from their few chance encounters, the other a misguided attempt that had no sinister goals. In either case, GOLITSYN's testimony does not contribute to a determination of the status of NOSENKO within the KGB as of the years prior to 1960.

There are two explanations for NOSENKO's denial about having met GOLITSYN. One explanation is that they were never in personal contact, the KGB was aware of this fact, and - unprepared for GOLITSYN's statements to the contrary - the KGB briefed NOSENKO accordingly. If in this particular instance NOSENKO told the truth and (as discussed above) GOLITSYN did not, no additional or different conclusion can be drawn about the bona fides of NOSENKO and his claims of service in the KGB. The second explanation is that, as GOLITSYN said, these encounters did take place in 1953 and again in 1958 or 1959, but because of their casual and fleeting nature, NOSENKO (unlike GOLITSYN) has not remembered them.

2. Resume of Information*

According to GOLITSYN, he personally met NOSENKO two or three times in 1953, while visiting the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, a component of the internal security directorate, and again in 1958 and 1959. On the other hand, NOSENKO was unable to identify GOLITSYN's photograph and he denied ever having seen him. GOLITSYN said that GUK, CHURANOV, and KASHCHEYEV were friends of NOSENKO as well as of GOLITSYN. (NOSENKO claimed to be on friendly terms with each of these three KGB officers; he acknowledged, however, that his acquaintance with GUK had been merely casual until NOSENKO's three-month TDY to Geneva in 1962, which made them the best of friends.) From 1953 to 1957 or 1958, GOLITSYN said, NOSENKO was a case officer in the U.S. Embassy Section, then transferred to the Tourist Department, where he was a senior case officer in 1959. GOLITSYN stated unequivocally that NOSENKO was not a Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section or otherwise serving in that section or in the American Department as of the time he (GOLITSYN) consulted with various officers there in April-June 1960 and January 1961.** GOLITSYN spoke there with officers whom NOSENKO claims as close colleagues, including KOVSHUK and GRYAZNOV, and would doubtless have known if NOSENKO were supervising or otherwise involved in code clerk operations. In summary, GOLITSYN corroborated some of NOSENKO's alleged assignment in the KGB Second Chief Directorate but not all of them, while NOSENKO contradicted GOLITSYN by saying that the two men had never met.

3. Comments on GOLITSYN

From December 1952 until April 1953 GOLITSYN was Chief of the American Desk, Counterintelligence Department, Foreign Directorate, KGB (then MGB), and for most of the period from January to March 1959 he was on TDY training assignments to the Second Chief Directorate. In the first job at least GOLITSYN presumably would have had regular dealings with the U.S. Embassy Section, and perhaps also in the second he would have been in contact with the Tourist Department, in which NOSENKO claimed to have been then serving. Despite this, and despite his proven excellence of memory for the names and tasks of KGB personnel, GOLITSYN never mentioned NOSENKO in debriefings during the years 1962 and 1963, nor commented on his name on the two occasions when it was shown to him, although he had numerous opportunities to mention him in connection with the names of CHURANOV, KASHCHEYEV, and GUK.

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* The relationship between the reporting by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO on specific operations is shown on Pages 594-595, with comments thereon appearing on Pages 647-659, while in the section which follows below are a discussion and an evaluation of what GOLITSYN said about NOSENKO's assignments in the Second Chief Directorate, as described on Pages 343-344.

**As stated in Part VIII.1., however, it is not credible that NOSENKO served in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1953-55 or in 1960-1962.

There would appear to be no reason why NOSENKO, if he had ever met GOLITSYN, should not have said so to American Intelligence representatives.* To have done so would have given NOSENKO concrete support for his claims of KGB staff service, which he knew to be in question. On the contrary, however, NOSENKO consistently denied any contact and manufactured a demonstrably false story to explain his own absence during GOLITSYN's admitted visit to the section in which NOSENKO claims to have served in January 1961. (See Page 183, second footnote.)

On the other hand, GOLITSYN's claim must be measured against the background and circumstances of his statements. In the absence of any comments about or identification of NOSENKO by GOLITSYN prior to the public announcement of his defection from the KGB, and in view of the amount of information made available to him from NOSENKO materials prior to his making any statements about his alleged acquaintance with him, GOLITSYN's "identification" of NOSENKO as a KGB staff officer known to him personally cannot be considered as spontaneous or uncontaminated information.

The weight of independent evidence against NOSENKO's alleged service in those positions which GOLITSYN corroborated, combined with the conflict between GOLITSYN's and NOSENKO's testimony about their personal acquaintanceship, makes it impossible to accept GOLITSYN's verification of NOSENKO's claimed KGB status during any stage of the latter's career.

*It is not likely that he would forget it. Direct relationship with or knowledge of a defector would be interesting and important to remaining KGB officers; even if temporarily forgotten, post-defection reminiscences would almost certainly bring back memories of such recent and direct contacts as GOLITSYN relates.

2. NOSENKO's Background and Career

Date of Information	Source	Information Reported by
10 February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 12 February 1964)	[redacted]	NOSENKO was affiliated with the KGB for approximately 16 years, since about 1947, and was an employee of the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow. His father, now dead, was a Deputy to the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and also Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry. There is a shipyard named after NOSENKO's father in the Ukraine.
10 February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 12 February 1964)	[redacted]	The photograph which appeared in U.S. newspapers is not that of NOSENKO.** [redacted] worked with NOSENKO for several years in KGB Headquarters; he described NOSENKO as a person who likes to be fashionably dressed at all times and is fond of women, by nature a friendly individual and generally well-liked by his fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the Second Chief Directorate.
10 February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 12 February 1964)	[redacted]	"It appeared quite certain [redacted] that NOSENKO had the rank of lieutenant colonel in the KGB."
19 February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 20 February 1964)	[redacted]	[redacted]

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[redacted] ... identified by [redacted] as a "clean" Soviet diplomat at

** ... of Vladimir ...

(Reported to the FBI on 20 February 1964)

was asked whether he felt NOSENKO actually defected or whether he felt the defection might be a "trick" by the KGB. replied that from his own knowledge of this matter, he was convinced that NOSENKO's defection was not a "trick" by the KGB.

(Reported to the FBI on 22 February 1964)

NOSENKO worked against personnel stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and with his help agents were developed among these Americans. It is assumed by the KGB that he is familiar with the number and location of microphones in the U.S. Embassy.

(Reported to CIA by the FBI on 8 February 1965)

Prior to NOSENKO's defection he was Deputy to the Chief of a department in the Second Chief Directorate. While working in the Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate in Moscow on three separate occasions participated in conferences between "important people" of the Second Chief Directorate and the Seventh Directorate. NOSENKO was present at all of these." Although NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief he held only the rank of captain in the KGB, attributed this (the disparity between job and rank) to the influence which GRIBANOV exerted on the behalf of NOSENKO.

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10 February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 12 February 1964)

10 February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 12 February 1964)

10 February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 25 February)

Because of his long tenure in the KGB, NOSENKO would have a great deal of important information which he could impart to intelligence agencies of other countries. Certainly, he would be acquainted with many KGB employees and could identify them. He also would be intimately acquainted with a large number of Soviet agents working inside the USSR against American and British nationals.

The bulk of NOSENKO's knowledge concerning KGB activities would revolve around the intelligence operations of the KGB in Moscow and also KGB personalities working in Headquarters. NOSENKO was also undoubtedly familiar with all KGB personalities in Geneva* and certainly knew some KGB personalities in other countries.

[illegible] NOSENKO had been in the Second Chief Directorate for about 14 years and was acquainted with almost all of the employees of this directorate. He was aware of the structure of the KGB and knows many personnel of the First Chief Directorate. [illegible] NOSENKO, as Deputy to the Chief of the Tourist Department, had in his possession a telephone directory which listed the names of some 10,000 KGB employees in Moscow. Only Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Departments had these phone books.** [illegible] expressed the opinion that "NOSENKO

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is much more valuable to the FBI and CIA than was Oleg PENKOVSKIY because of the fact that he knows so much about the methods of work of the First and Second Directorates of the KGB and is familiar with so many individuals in the KGB both in Moscow and abroad. [redacted] that PENKOVSKIY was able to furnish American and British Intelligence with a lot of information concerning defense secrets of the Soviet Union, but NOSENKO is much more knowledgeable in intelligence and counterintelligence operations of the KGB."

(Reported to the FBI on 9 March 1964)

NOSENKO knows many of the chiefs and deputies of the KGB directorates and departments at KGB Headquarters in Moscow. In KGB Headquarters there are four separate dining rooms for personnel who work there; one such dining room is reserved for chiefs and deputies of departments. Because of this fact, NOSENKO has a vast knowledge of the hierarchy of the KGB.*

21 March 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 23 March 1964)

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* NOSENKO volunteered for the first time during the January-March 1965 interrogations that he had eaten occasionally in the "chiefs' dining room." He had not mentioned this dining room earlier.

(Reported to the FBI on 27 March 1964)

"There seems to be unanimous opinion among the [redacted] KGB chiefs [redacted] that NOSENKO... could do the KGB a tremendous amount of harm." NOSENKO in his position as a deputy chief in one of the departments of the Second Chief Directorate would have been entitled to have one personnel directory of approximately 30 pages setting forth the identities of all of the supervisory officials in KGB Headquarters. NOSENKO would also have had a 200-page directory listing by name and telephone number all the rank-and-file employees working in Moscow. The opinion was expressed by some [redacted] KGB "chiefs" [redacted] that if NOSENKO were merely able to make these two directories available to American Intelligence, the KGB would be severely damaged for the present and for several years to come.*

20 May 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 21 May 1964)

The KGB was lucky that the Americans found only 40 microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Actually, about 200 microphones were concealed by the Soviets in the Embassy. [redacted] feels quite sure that NOSENKO was responsible for furnishing information to the Americans which resulted in the microphones being found. It was his opinion that NOSENKO knew only the general location of the 40 microphones which were found and does not have any knowledge of the remaining ones.

Reported to CIA by the FBI on 11 June 1964)

* See above; NOSENKO did not mention these directories.

(Reported to the FBI on 22 June 1964)

The general consensus among KGB employees [redacted] is that in the future the KGB will be feeling sharply the effects of NOSENKO's escape to American Intelligence. NOSENKO is considered to be vastly more important than either GOLITSYN or DERYABIN. This opinion appears to be based on several factors: First, NOSENKO worked against personnel stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and with his help agents were developed among these Americans. Second, it is assumed by KGB personnel that because of his closeness to the U.S. Embassy in the past, NOSENKO would also be familiar with the number of microphones which had been installed in the Embassy by the KGB and the locations of these microphones. Third, as a Deputy Chief of a department, NOSENKO would normally have had access to a telephone directory listing all personnel in all directorates of the KGB in Moscow. Another factor, which is a formidable one in the minds of other KGB employees, is that NOSENKO travelled in a rather influential circle of friends in Moscow who were high in the Soviet Government. [redacted] these comments cited as reasons for NOSENKO being an "important catch" for American Intelligence, but [redacted] no one in the KGB really knows exactly how much information NOSENKO had concerning the KGB.

(Reported to CIA by the FBI on 8 February 1965)

The amount of damage caused by NOSENKO's defection is "unpredictable." NOSENKO knew few employees of the First Chief Directorate working abroad, but knew many such employees serving in KGB Headquarters by virtue of seeing them in the dining room which is reserved for chiefs and deputy chiefs of KGB departments.

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4. Repercussions of NOSENKO's Defection

19 February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 20 February 1964)

[illegible] February 1964 [illegible]

[illegible] February 1964 (Ro-[illegible]

[illegible] February 1964 [illegible] to the FBI on 2[illegible] February 1964)

[illegible] KUROCHKIN, a KGB S&T officer scheduled for assignment to Washington, will not be [illegible] be "well known" to NOSENKO. In the course of his duties in Moscow, KUROCHKIN had very often visited the Department where NOSENKO worked and [illegible] result, NOSENKO is "more than casually acquainted" with him.***

***NOSENKO provided no information concerning KUROCHKIN [illegible]

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(Reported to FBI on 28 February 1964)

(Reported to the FBI [illegible] March 196[illegible])

(Reported to the FBI [illegible] March 1964)

[illegible] the Depart[illegible] [illegible]ions

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20 March 1964 (Reported to the FBI on [illegible] March 1964)

[illegible]orted to [illegible] 9 June [illegible]

2[illegible] March 1964 (Reported to the FBI on [illegible] 1964)

[illegible] 1964 (Reported to the FBI on [illegible] April 1964)

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(Reported to the FBI on 5 May 1964)

[illegible]

Reported [illegible] the FBI on [illegible]

(Int Report [illegible] 29 July 1[illegible])

Two commissions have been established by the CPSU for the purposes: (a) to determine why KGB employees such as DERYABIN, GOLITSYN, and NOSENKO defected while serving abroad; and (b) to attempt to eliminate "weak" KGB employees and improve the efficiency of the KGB.

An investigating commission of the CPSU Central Committee checking into the circumstances surrounding NOSENKO's defection has thus far been responsible for the expulsion from the KGB of 15 Second Chief Directorate employees. These include GRIBANOV, who was also expelled from the CPSU and was stripped of his rank of lieutenant general. GRIBANOV has been given a very small pension, like an ordinary Soviet citizen. This drastic action was taken since the primary responsibility for the defection was placed on GRIBANOV. It was realized that, in addition to being Chief of the Second Chief Directorate at

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the time of the defection, GRIBANOV was a personal friend of NOSENKO and had more or less treated NOSENKO as a protege and had taken many steps to further NOSENKO's career within the KGB.* It was felt that GRIBANOV should have been aware of NOSENKO's plans to defect. [redacted] Three of GRIBANOV's deputies were also expelled from the KGB, one of whom was a Major General BANNIK[redacted] Of the 11 other Second Chief Directorate employees expelled, some were found to have been personal friends of NOSENKO and some of them were found to have confided to NOSENKO details of operations in which they were working. [redacted] S.M. GOLUBEV, a KGB officer stationed in Washington, would be leaving for Moscow because the investigating commission had determined that GUK, a mutual friend of NOSENKO and GOLUBEV told NOSENKO that GOLUBEV had been assigned to the Washington Legal Residency. GOLUBEV had himself worked with NOSENKO in KGB Headquarters sometime in the past, but subsequently NOSENKO and GOLUBEV were given different assignments within the KGB and thereafter did not associate with one another in the course of their daily activities.[redacted]

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* See Pages 327-336 in which NOSENKO's description of his relationship with GRIBANOV is discussed.

*** NOSENKO identified GOLUBEV by name and photograph as a First Chief Directorate counterintelligence officer, who had served in New York City under United Nations cover in 1960 and 1961. NOSENKO said that he first met GOLUBEV in 1959 and knew nothing of his earlier career. Because GOLUBEV had at one point been assigned to Geneva with the Soviet Disarmament Delegation, NOSENKO went to him in 1962 for a briefing on Foreign Ministry personnel in the delegation before his own assignment to Geneva. NOSENKO said he last saw GOLUBEV in KGB Headquarters in 1963. At that time GOLUBEV was assigned to the New York Direction of the Counterintelligence Department of the First Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO said that GOLUBEV had been in this Department as long as he had known him.

(Reported to CIA by the FBI on 29 January 1965)

It is common knowledge among KGB employees that GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB and CPSU and is now on pension, partial rather than full, as a result of the NOSENKO defection. When NOSENKO was being considered for assignment to Geneva (in 1964), a summary statement of his activities was prepared in the Second Chief Directorate and sent to GRIBANOV. This summary contained considerable "compromising information" concerning NOSENKO; if acted upon properly, it would have removed him from consideration for this trip. GRIBANOV read the summary material, ran a line through all of it, and added the notation: "Send him to Geneva." The general feeling is that GRIBANOV was willing to overlook a lot of NOSENKO's deficiencies because of GRIBANOV's long-time friendship with NOSENKO's father.*

(Reported to CIA by the FBI on 8 February 1965)

GRIBANOV has been dismissed from the KGB, expelled from the CPSU, and is presently living on a small pension. His dismissal occurred immediately after NOSENKO's defection.** In addition, not less than 50 other people were dismissed, many of whom were close friends of GRIBANOV. Most of these were from the First and Second Chief Directorates, with the majority from the Second Chief Directorate. The present Acting Chief of the Second Chief Directorate is a Major General BANNIK, whose appointment has not yet been approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU. One of his deputies is a Major General (F.A.) SHCHERBAK.

* NOSENKO said that his father and GRIBANOV were not acquainted.

** GRIBANOV was reportedly in operational contact with a senior Western diplomat in Moscow as recently as late autumn of 1964. At that time he turned his contact over to another KGB officer.

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Early June 1965 (Reported to CIA by the FBI on 29 June 1965)

Major General BANNIKOV is currently temporary Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, having replaced GRIBANOV who was expelled from the KGB because he supported NOSENKO in his career.* GRIBANOV is working in a small city outside Moscow as the chief of security at an important military plant and is now a "nothing."

(Reported to CIA by the FBI on 30 September 1965)

After the defection of NOSENKO the KGB conducted an extensive investigation to determine which employees knew him and the nature of their relationship. During this TAPABRIN was questioned; he said he knew NOSENKO, but only casually and only because of limited contacts within the KGB. The investigation determined, however, that TARABRIN and GRIBANOV were friends socially and that TARABRIN attended several parties at which NOSENKO was present. Girls invited by NOSENKO were also there. [redacted] described one such party. Thereafter, TARABRIN was afforded a hearing and was accused on willfully concealing vital information. As a result he was expelled from the KGB and the CPSU and was deprived of all pension rights.***

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* NOSENKO said that it was BANNIKOV who authorized his 1964 trip to Geneva, during which he defected, and that to the best of his knowledge, GRIBANOV did not know that he (NOSENKO) was making this trip. Nevertheless, NOSENKO said that he thought that GRIBANOV might be fired from the KGB as a result of his defection because "he was responsible for pushing me ahead." NOSENKO said that BANNIKOV would not be punished because he had done nothing other than support him as a candidate for the 1964 Geneva assignment (see Pages 333-334).

** NOSENKO reported that TARABRIN was Chief of the British Department from 1958 to 1963, at which time he became Deputy Chief or "Service No. 2," the reorganized Counterintelligence Department of the First Chief Directorate.

*** NOSENKO said he saw GRIBANOV three times socially during his KGB career: on each occasion TARABRIN was present. NOSENKO reported that he provided girls for GRIBANOV and TARABRIN at parties in 1962 and 1963, but not in 1961. He could not recall any details of the 1962 party (e.g., who the girls were, where they went, what they did, etc.). He was, however, able to describe the 1963 party, which took place in October or November, in considerable detail [redacted]

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According to [illegible] records, the sequence of events leading up to NOSENKO's confrontation with the Soviets was as follows:

- On the morning of 11 February 1964 the Soviet Embassy delivered a note to the U.S. State Department requesting an immediate interview with NOSENKO, but no reply was given.

- In the early morning of [illegible] February NOSENKO arrived in the United States.

- On 12 February NOSENKO's agreement to meet the Soviets was obtained, and initial arrangements as to the timing and place of the confrontation were discussed with him and within the U.S. Government.

- Final arrangements were agreed upon during the morning of 1[illegible] February, the Soviets were then notified, and the confrontation took place late in the afternoon of the same day.

6. [illegible]

a. [illegible]

(1) [illegible]

b. The Compromise of PENKOVSKIY

(i) Introduction

[redacted] and NOSENKO agree on only one aspect of the PENKOVSKIY compromise (see Part VIII.B.6.b.): They both attribute the initial compromise to KGB surveillance. Although [redacted] report agrees with NOSENKO that the KGB learned of American participation in the operation only after PENKOVSKIY was arrested, [redacted] subsequent reports contradict this by tying the compromise directly to surveillance of U.S. Embassy personnel visiting the Pushkin Street dead drop site. [redacted] story of the events stemming from the compromise of the dead drop site is at odds both with the facts of the case and with all other reporting by Soviet sources of CIA and the FBI.

(ii) Discussion

[redacted]). [redacted] report of [redacted] 1962--the month after the KGB terminated the operation--indicated that the KGB had been aware of PENKOVSKIY's involvement with Americans, and specifically with the CIA officer JACOB, for about two and one half months prior to the arrests. This statement is inaccurate concerning JACOB, who was a last-minute substitute for the servicing of the Pushkin Street dead drop on 2 November 1962 and who never before had personally participated in the operation. [redacted] statements otherwise agree with NOSENKO's subsequent report and the "official report" regarding KGB ignorance of the role of American Intelligence in the PENKOVSKIY case.

[redacted] report on the case, however, is contradictory to his first report and to the other sources: He said in [redacted] 1963 that surveillance of U.S. Embassy targets detected a visit to the Pushkin Street site by an American, and that the resulting 24-hour surveillance of the site caught PENKOVSKIY visiting the same location, whereupon he was arrested and confessed. CIA, however, has no evidence besides the statements by [redacted] that PENKOVSKIY ever went to the Pushkin Street site after it was visited by CIA personnel.

In [redacted] 1963 [redacted] reported at greater length about the role of Pushkin Street in PENKOVSKIY's compromise. At this time he explained that the American had visited Pushkin Street not once but twice; surveillance had observed him on both occasions when he went inside the entrance, but followed him inside only on the second visit. The surveillant who entered the building reported that the American appeared to be tying his shoe; although this was not unusual in itself, [redacted] continued, the fact that it was the second visit to the same address for no visible purpose caused suspicion, and as a result the KGB installed a closed circuit TV camera to provide 24-hour coverage of the site. PENKOVSKIY was observed checking it (see preceding paragraph); an American was observed loading a dead drop behind a lobby heating unit (radiator); the KGB tagged the dead drop material with a radioactive substance; PENKOVSKIY was observed unloading the dead drop and proceeding to his office where he secreted the

material in a concealment area in his desk; the KGB also continued in surveillance of the dead drop site, observed PENKOVSKIY load the dead drop, and seized an American (JACOB) who came to unload it. PENKOVSKIY was then confronted with photographic evidence of the loadings and unloadings and could offer no defense. This report is the only indication from a Soviet source that the KGB had surveilled the two visits to the Pushkin Street site made by U.S. Embassy officers; while [redacted] report stated that one American visited the site twice, in fact two different Americans visited the site once each, MAHONEY on 21 January 1961 and ABIDIAN on 30 December 1961.

(iii) [redacted]

(iv) Remarks

The Pushkin Street dead drop was never used for communication to PENKOVSKIY, and in fact was loaded only once, when the KGB did so and activated it on 2 November 1962, thereby apprehending JACOB. Moreover, the first visit to Pushkin Street, in January 1961, predated any personal contact between PENKOVSKIY and Western Intelligence, either American or British. Thus, [redacted] report on Americans visiting there is only partially accurate, and the use of these "surveilled" visits as an explanation for how the KGB detected PENKOVSKIY is unsupportable. In reporting incorrectly on this matter, [redacted] could have erred merely because his sub-sources (one unnamed, the other apparently [redacted] despite the conflict in reporting about his position) repeated erroneous information in his presence.

[redacted] nevertheless is the only source to reveal that the KGB was aware of the Pushkin Street dead drop as early as 21 January 1961, when MAHONEY went to the site. [redacted] therefore has detracted from the bona fides of NOSENKO by showing KGB awareness of a CIA officer having gone to the dead drop site 11 months before ABIDIAN's visit there, and even before PENKOVSKIY finally succeeded in establishing personal contact with Western intelligence services. It was the ABIDIAN visit, NOSENKO said, which first aroused KGB interest in the site at Pushkin Street.

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D. [redacted]

1. Introduction

While in general terms corroborating NOSENKO's claims to service in both the GRU and the KGB, [redacted] has supplied some details which are incompatible with the statements by NOSENKO on his intelligence career. Although not as prolific a reporter on NOSENKO as [redacted] has had several topics in common with NOSENKO: POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, CHEREPANOV, SHUBIN, SLESINGER, and the contacts between the GRU officer BOLSHAKOV and Attorney General Robert KENNEDY in 1962. When compared with NOSENKO's information, the reports by [redacted] on the case of POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, and CHEREPANOV are interlocking:

- [redacted] and NOSENKO agree that POPOV was compromised after his return to Moscow from East Berlin in November 1958 and in consequence of KGB surveillance.

- CHEREPANOV and NOSENKO likewise agree about POPOV's compromise.

- [redacted] concurred with NOSENKO by indicating that CHEREPANOV was a genuine source of American Intelligence, and this statement by [redacted]

- [redacted] learned some of his details on the compromise of PENKOVSKIY, and [redacted] and NOSENKO have indicated that this compromise resulted from KGB surveillance of PENKOVSKIY's British contacts in Moscow.

Presented below are [redacted]'s remarks about NOSENKO, followed by a review of the topics common to these two sources.

2. Statements on NOSENKO

When discussing NOSENKO for the first time, [redacted] said on [redacted] that they were not personally acquainted, but that "various persons" in Moscow (whom he did not identify) had spoken to him about NOSENKO. The statements by [redacted] and NOSENKO on the latter's background are compared in the following tabulation:

[redacted]	NOSENKO
As a young man, NOSENKO attended the GRU's Military-Diplomatic Academy (MDA) and then was in the GRU Information Department--in all, perhaps a year of service in the GRU.*	NOSENKO said his entire service in the GRU, in the years 1950-1953, consisted of duty in the Naval GRU, first in the Far East and then in the Baltic.**

* Until the late 1950's, the course at the MDA, the strategic intelligence school of the GRU, lasted for four years; more recently, the course has been of three years' duration.

**During the 1950-1953 period and before, the Naval GRU was separate from the rest of the GRU.

[redacted]	NOSENKO
A "very undisciplined person" while in the GRU and "not very good," NOSENKO was to have been discharged from the GRU.	NOSENKO's statements about himself during the 1950-1953 period appear to agree with the evaluation, but he has said nothing about facing discharge by the Naval GRU.
NOSENKO's father, "a very influential person in the Ministry of Shipbuilding," was able to get NOSENKO transferred to the KGB.	His transfer from the Naval GRU to the KGB in 1953, NOSENKO said, was at the initiative of KGB General KOBULOV, a friend of his father; the elder NOSENKO was Minister of Shipbuilding.
NOSENKO was "an important boss" in the KGB (directorate or department unknown).	According to NOSENKO, his most recent KGB title prior to defecting was Deputy Chief, Tourist Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate.

[redacted] stated that NOSENKO gave "very, very good information" to the United States, having had "great access" to KGB information which included "all means of KGB coverage of people in Moscow, microphone systems in the embassies, etc." The U.S. Embassy, [redacted] continued, had found microphones on the basis of information that NOSENKO had provided.

3. Parallels with NOSENKO's Reporting

a. The CHEREPANOV Case

(i) Summary

One of the two ways in which [redacted] has corroborated NOSENKO on the authenticity of CHEREPANOV as a genuine source of American Intelligence was to cite information he had learned from [redacted] CHEREPANOV had formerly served in the KGB; CHEREPANOV gave some papers to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, which returned them to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA); the MFA turned the papers over to the KGB, which traced them by analysis to CHEREPANOV; meanwhile, CHEREPANOV had tried to flee the USSR, but he was captured near the Turkish border and executed. In every major respect, therefore [redacted] agrees with NOSENKO's version of the case. When asked whether the CHEREPANOV incident might have been "a trick" by the KGB to embarrass the U.S. Embassy, [redacted] replied that it was definitely not.

The second way in which [redacted] has certified that CHEREPANOV was a genuine source is indirect. Like NOSENKO ~~and one~~ of the CHEREPANOV documents, [redacted] had indicated that KGB surveillance of a U.S. Embassy officer brought about the compromise of POPOV.

(ii) Remarks

As stated in Part VIII.B.6., the CHEREPANOV incident was a KGB provocation against the U.S. Embassy, but it is conceivable that statements suggesting the contrary could have been made [redacted]

[redacted] agreement with both CHEREPANOV and NOSENKO on the cause of POPOV's compromise, however, appears to be based on [redacted] direct involvement, and does not appear to be attributable to sub-sources having provided him with erroneous information; this is discussed further below.

b. The Compromise of PENKOVSKIY

[redacted] dates on the compromise of PENKOVSKIY are at variance with NOSENKO's and they disagree on whether the KGB knew American Intelligence to be involved in this operation before JACOB of CIA was apprehended at the Pushkin Street dead drop on 2 November 1962. Both sources stated, however, that surveillance led to the detection of PENKOVSKIY, although again they differ on the person with whom PENKOVSKIY was first seen by the KGB: [redacted] said this individual was the British businessman WYNNE, while NOSENKO said it was the Englishwoman Mrs. CHISHOLM.

According to [redacted] PENKOVSKIY had been working openly with WYNNE, explaining that he was trying to develop WYNNE, and the KGB learned of their meetings through surveillance.* CIA records show that WYNNE met PENKOVSKIY in Moscow during April-May 1961, May-June 1961, August 1961, and June-July 1962. [redacted] report that PENKOVSKIY came under suspicion in May 1962 therefore is not consistent with his statement about KGB surveillance of the WYNNE-PENKOVSKIY meetings, nor does this report coincide with the evidence from WYNNE himself that the KGB was sufficiently suspicious of their meetings to record a conversation they had had [redacted] 1961 (one year earlier than in the [redacted] version). NOSENKO dated the PENKOVSKIY compromise at a month or two after he was first seen, but at the time not identified, in contact with Mrs. CHISHOLM in November or December 1961.

Whereas NOSENKO said the KGB was unaware of the participation of American Intelligence in the PENKOVSKIY operation until JACOB was detained, [redacted] reported that while PENKOVSKIY was at a reception in Moscow, he was observed making contact with an American in a lavatory. [redacted] did not date this event, but CIA records show that it was on 27 August 1962. [redacted] added that the KGB "invented" the incident at Pushkin Street on 2 November 1962, the month after PENKOVSKIY's arrest, in order to catch the American unloading the dead drop.**

PENKOVSKIY was not personally known to him, [redacted] stated. [redacted] no other sub-sources were named.

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* The same statement was made by NOSENKO and in the official KGB document on PENKOVSKIY's compromise.

**This is obviously true, although the date of PENKOVSKIY's arrest may have been more than a month before.

c. The Compromise of POPOV

(i) Introduction

Of all the sources available to American Intelligence, [redacted] is the best placed to report on the compromise of POPOV: [redacted] information agrees with that provided by NOSENKO and CHEREPANOV, as well as that in the 18 September 1959 message from POPOV to CIA (believed to have been dictated by the KGB). These four sources have indicated that the compromise resulted from KGB surveillance of a U.S. Embassy official following the recall of POPOV in November 1958. [redacted] however, has not precisely dated the incident (dated by inference by the others at 21 January 1959), has associated it with an American Intelligence dead drop for POPOV (whereas the others have said it was CIA's mailing of a letter to POPOV), and has not named the CIA officer involved (George WINTERS).* The evidence from [redacted] like that from NOSENKO, CHEREPANOV, and the POPOV message, conflicts with that from GOLITSYN whose statements on the compromise of POPOV are supported by analysis of events in 1957 and 1958 on which POPOV reported (see Pages 663-665).

(ii) Details

[redacted] reported [redacted] on the POPOV compromise. POPOV's correspondence with his Austrian girlfriend [redacted] appears to have been the prelude to the POPOV compromise; POPOV, said [redacted] had made a "very serious mistake" by using an accommodation address supplied by American Intelligence to receive mail from a girlfriend in Austria.** "In some fashion" this came to the attention of the Austrian police, [redacted] and it was determined that she had been sending mail to a Soviet officer in Berlin. The Austrian police notified the Soviets, and eventually POPOV was confronted by the chief of his GRU component in Berlin.*** GRU Headquarters was notified, POPOV was recalled

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* In his first reference to POPOV's compromise [redacted] that POPOV made the mistake of providing information traceable to himself. No sub-source for this remark was given [redacted] and since then [redacted] has not resolved the discrepancy between this version and the other one treated at length here.

** CIA did not supply POPOV with an accommodation address, but he did secretly correspond with KOCHANEK.

*** [redacted] went to the Austrian police on 25 August 1958 with information that included the identification of POPOV as a Soviet Intelligence officer. POPOV's superior confronted him on 4 November 1958 about KOCHANEK and received from him an admission to having had some correspondence with her concerning his search for operational leads; the superior told POPOV that the Soviets believed "she was working for someone" and that "possibly she is the cause" of the Berlin unit's operational difficulties. POPOV was recalled to Moscow on 17 November 1958 ostensibly for a week's TDY to discuss the case of an American whom he was developing under CIA aegis. He did not return to Berlin.

to Moscow to explain the situation, and when he was unable to do so, the facts were turned over to the KGB for full-scale investigation. [redacted] it not been for POPOV's correspondence with an Austrian woman, "they would never have caught him," and that POPOV was "arrested because of a connection with a girl;" also, [redacted] at the end of 1959 POPOV was recalled to Moscow "for something" - [redacted] KGB While the foregoing KGB investigation was in progress, the KGB routinely placed under surveillance a U.S. Embassy official in Moscow. This person was observed renting a boat in Gorkiy Park, going to the vicinity of a new bridge near the Moscow Stadium, and there taking photographs of the bridge and surrounding area. Its suspicions aroused, the KGB covered this area and observed POPOV unloading a dead drop. He was arrested, doubled, and "operated" against American Intelligence for a year and one-half.* Eventually, the KGB put in motion a plan to attempt to compromise the American official who was meeting POPOV. The KGB photographed a meeting in a Moscow restaurant, then arrested the official and showed him pictures of his meeting with POPOV and of POPOV unloading the dead drop at the bridge. After the American refused to work for the KGB, he was released and declared persona non grata.**

[redacted] CIA questioned [redacted] on POPOV's compromise. He said at this time that he had heard POPOV was apprehended through a dead drop. POPOV "apparently was under suspicion there in Berlin, and when they (presumably the GRU) recalled him to Moscow, they wondered who his future contacts would be, and they were told the following: 'KGB workers place American Embassy employees under surveillance.' They observed an American at the staircase... and they found a dead drop under the staircase. So they established coverage of the dead drop and observed POPOV come and unload the drop. They made a report, and after this POPOV was under surveillance... Then he was called in and told thus-and-so. They showed him photographs. They told him he was going to work for them to expose his contacts. He agreed to it..."***

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* Since POPOV returned to Moscow in November 1958 and LANGELLE was arrested the following October, he could not have been doubled against CIA for more than eleven months.

** Starting on 4 January 1959, POPOV had a series of six brush contacts in Moscow with the CIA officer Russell LANGELLE of the U.S. Embassy, culminating in the detention and interview of LANGELLE by the KGB on 16 October 1959.

***As previously stated, no Moscow dead drops were used by CIA in the POPOV operation, but LANGELLE did survey the possibilities for dead drops to be used in other operations. One of these was located in Lenin Hills, an area of Moscow not far from the new bridge near Moscow Stadium, and it was situated beneath a staircase; [redacted] LANGELLE visited the area of the dead drop site on 24 and 28 May 1958, but the dead drop was loaded by a CIA legal travel agent (on 7 June 1958) rather than by LANGELLE. The CHEREPANOV document, discussed on Pages 563-564, stated, in the course of reviewing LANGELLE's operational activities in Moscow, that this dead drop was for use with an agent named REPNIKOV; in fact, it was not intended for the REPNIKOV case.

(iii) Sub-sourcing by [redacted]

In [redacted] that he had learned these details about the compromise of POPOV from a conversation [redacted] who conducted some of the investigation of POPOV because at the time he was a [redacted]. The same sub-source was cited by [redacted] information he supplied CIA in [redacted]

(iv) Remarks

[redacted] reported, inaccurately, that American Intelligence gave POPOV an accommodation address in Berlin, that a dead drop was used in the Moscow phase of the operation, and that the KGB doubled POPOV for a year and one-half before terminating the case. Each of these incorrect items came to [redacted] since [redacted] participated in the investigation of POPOV, presumably he would have recognized them to be untrue. One explanation for the inaccuracies might be that [redacted] precisely what he had been told, but [redacted] deliberately misinformed him. There is, however, no evident reason why [redacted] would have done this. Another explanation might be that [redacted] misunderstood his sub-source, or in relaying the information to [redacted] garbled the details. This would mean that [redacted] was less than fully attentive to details on a personal acquaintance who had gained notoriety, details which he was told at a time when he was in a position comparable to POPOV's: in contact with American Intelligence. [redacted] None of these explanations seems entirely satisfactory, and the answer may lie elsewhere.

[redacted] has been inconsistent about the degree of suspicion surrounding POPOV when he was recalled to Moscow in November 1958 in connection with his correspondence with [redacted]. On one hand, in 1962 [redacted] indicated that the KGB surveillance of the U.S. Embassy officer was coincidental with the separate investigation of POPOV's relationship with this Austrian woman. On the other hand, in [redacted] implied that as a result of the suspicion of POPOV in Berlin, there was interest in POPOV's future contacts in Moscow, an interest which would be covered by the KGB's surveillance of U.S. Embassy employees.

*However, in another version [redacted] said that as soon as the Illegals reported their compromise in January 1958, POPOV immediately fell under suspicion. The conflict between [redacted] statements has not been resolved.

d. SHUBIN, SLESINGER, and BOLSHAKOV

In three instances [redacted] 1964 NOSENKO confirmed reports made by [redacted] the identification of SHUBIN as a GRU agent, the Soviets' suspicions that SLESINGER was in contact with the FBI, and the status of BOLSHAKOV as a GRU officer.*

SHUBIN was previously known to have been associated with two GRU Illegals in the United States during the 1940's, but independent of NOSENKO and [redacted] there is no verification of his having more recently been an agent of the GRU. [redacted] FBI.

BOLSHAKOV, the only claimed mutual acquaintance of [redacted] and NOSENKO, has not been named as a GRU officer by any other source, nor has he been observed in meetings with GRU agents. Both [redacted] and NOSENKO spoke of BOLSHAKOV's having met Attorney General Robert KENNEDY in 1962. NOSENKO added that, in initiating the contact, the Attorney General knew BOLSHAKOV to be a "military intelligence officer," but this report has not been corroborated.**

4. Comments on [redacted]

[redacted] confirmation that NOSENKO is a genuine KGB officer-defector is comprised of hearsay evidence. and hence the conclusion that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB would not necessarily bring [redacted] bona fides into question: much would depend upon [redacted] sub-sources, as yet unidentified.

[redacted] and NOSENKO are mutually supporting on the compromise of POPOV, a man [redacted], and both have authenticated [redacted] the validity of a CHEREPANOV document which concerned the POPOV compromise and which was prepared by the KGB for transmittal to American Intelligence. In addition, [redacted] and NOSENKO support one another about the PENKOVSKIY compromise, about the contact between BOLSHAKOV [redacted] and Robert KENNEDY, and about SHUBIN and [redacted]. Their information on BOLSHAKOV and SHUBIN is unique; on SLESINGER it is corroborated by actions taken by the KGB, as reported by SLESINGER; on POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, and CHEREPANOV it is confirmed by KGB controlled sources.

With the exception of his details on POPOV, [redacted]s reporting on NOSENKO and on common topics can be explained, individually, by misinformation [redacted] received and innocently passed along. These items taken together, however, in the light [redacted] statements on the compromise of POPOV (which conflict with GOLITSYN's reporting and analytical evidence) are indications that [redacted] is controlled by the KGB.

**If Robert KENNEDY indeed knew BOLSHAKOV to be a GRU officer, the question remains as to how NOSENKO was aware of the fact, since [redacted] was the only source to have made this identification before the time when KENNEDY and BOLSHAKOV met.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

sensitive source

F. [redacted]

1. Introduction

[redacted] counterintelligence production has been extremely limited. For the most part she has provided only superficial reports, generally only in response to questioning and frequently citing her own lack of access to information of value. Her professed personal involvement in, and dramatic accounts of, certain situations on which NOSENKO's reporting is demonstrably false is therefore noteworthy in the context of her total performance. [redacted]'s reporting on NOSENKO, despite vagueness and contradictions, has the net effect of supporting his bona fides and affirming the importance of the information he has reported. Her accounts of the CHEREPANOV case emphasized the depth of his treason and the retribution of the KGB--themes which dominate the NOSENKO account [redacted] Her reports on the compromise of PENKOVSKIY, while differing markedly from NOSENKO's in basis, scope, and detail, confirmed almost to the month NOSENKO's dating of the compromise. Her confessed participation as an agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, despite her repeated claims to know nothing of importance concerning its operations, has placed her in NOSENKO's milieu, and the KGB officers who figured in her reporting are (with two exceptions) personalities who have previously been identified as KGB officers only by NOSENKO.

2. NOSENKO's Background and Career

[redacted] has claimed no first-hand or authoritative knowledge of NOSENKO, reporting at various times that she had heard gossip, had heard about him from her KGB friend SVIRIN (who she believed only "knew about" NOSENKO, i.e. did not know him personally), or had heard about him from "someone from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not SVIRIN." She has reported fragments on NOSENKO's background: his father's position, his mother's ethnic background, and NOSENKO's non-KGB status. She initially said that NOSENKO's father was a general, later said she was not sure of that, and still later amended her description to "general or minister," adding that he was Ukrainian - thus approaching an accurate statement only after several conversations about him. Her consistent statement that NOSENKO's mother was Jewish and involved in black market activities has not been elsewhere reported, and her statement that NOSENKO was a civilian, rather than a KGB officer, contradicts his own account and that of other sources who have confirmed his KGB status. [redacted] sourcing of her limited information on NOSENKO to her KGB friend SVIRIN nevertheless demonstrates at least potential access to some information about NOSENKO. (SVIRIN was identified by NOSENKO as an officer of the Third Section of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate, since 1963, and before that of the Third Department of the Directorate of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, where he participated in and received an award for his part in the investigation of PENKOVSKIY.)

3. NOSENKO's Knowledge - Damage to the KGB

[redacted] has mentioned NOSENKO's disclosures to the Americans concerning the microphones in the U.S. Embassy - her only reference to information he might have provided - on each occasion when she has discussed NOSENKO. She once attributed to SVIRIN the remark in October 1966 that NOSENKO had done considerable harm to the Soviet Union by revealing this information, thus (and specifically only in this context) underscoring the importance of NOSENKO's information. (NOSENKO himself has characterized this information as the most important he has provided.) The context in which she has discussed NOSENKO has been the general one of defectors from the Soviet Union; she has repeatedly emphasized that the Soviets attempt to convince all Soviet citizens that "anybody who defects will find his grave by the hand of KGB people" [redacted] with reference to NOSENKO, she once quoted SVIRIN as having said that NOSENKO, too, would one day be exterminated, thus clearly implying that NOSENKO was a genuine defector.

4. Parallels with NOSENKO's Reporting

a. The CHEREPANOV Case

[redacted]'s account of CHEREPANOV's disaffection, treason, arrest, and execution confirms in general outline and in emphasis that of NOSENKO. [redacted] claims direct knowledge of the case through her own and [redacted] husband's personal friendship with CHEREPANOV and his wife. [redacted] described her husband, in fact, as the only friend of CHEREPANOV who remained faithful enough after CHEREPANOV's downfall to call on CHEREPANOV's widow, whose address [redacted] knew. This direct knowledge is comparable to that of NOSENKO and [redacted]

She introduced her account of the CHEREPANOV case, as in her discussions of NOSENKO, by references to the determination and effectiveness of the KGB in apprehending and executing those who were "running away"; she offered CHEREPANOV as an example of a Soviet traitor who had been caught and executed. Her account of the details, however, differs sharply from that of NOSENKO (and others). Her identification of CHEREPANOV as a classmate of her husband at the GRU's Military Diplomatic Academy (MDA) from 1956 to 1959 is unique among the sources who have reported on CHEREPANOV. For the period during which [redacted] said CHEREPANOV attended the MDA, NOSENKO has made no specific statements concerning CHEREPANOV's career; he has said only that at some unspecified date after CHEREPANOV's return from Belgrade (elsewhere reported as mid-1956) and before early 1960 CHEREPANOV had been assigned to the U.S. Embassy Section, American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate. [redacted] also stated, however, that after his graduation from the MDA in 1959, CHEREPANOV "finally" obtained a job in the Ministry of Foreign Trade, suggesting that he had no intervening assignment. Where NOSENKO has failed to establish a clear motive for CHEREPANOV's having collected KGB documents during his assignment to the U.S. Embassy Section for later transmittal to the Americans, [redacted] has described his increasing bitterness from the date of his entering the MDA in 1956. She was not sure that he had been a KGB officer; she neither mentioned nor did her account allow for his assignment to the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960-1961 (as stated by

by NOSENKO); and she described the documents which he turned over to the Americans as having come from the Ministry of Foreign Trade. She stated, therefore, rather than demonstrated, the point that "these were such important documents, important enough that...he was shot."

During her second account of the CHEREPANOV affair, [redacted] sourced her information differently and added first-hand details which she had previously disclaimed having. She said that "In two days this man was arrested...In two months he was shot." This is also at variance with NOSENKO's account of a KGB investigation of up to 20 or 25 days, followed by the KGB officer's visit to CHEREPANOV on 8 December 1963, CHEREPANOV's flight, and a seven-day search for him before his arrest.

b. The Compromise of PENKOVSKIY

Closely conforming in this respect to NOSENKO's account of PENKOVSKIY's compromise, [redacted] placed the date of initial suspicion of PENKOVSKIY at about October or November 1961. Her statements of the basis for this suspicion, however, differ completely from the reasons advanced by NOSENKO (and other sources). Her account is vague, in consonance with her claimed lack of any first-hand contemporary knowledge of the investigation leading to his arrest, and is colored by her expressed personal dislike for PENKOVSKIY the man and by the professional misfortunes of her husband which resulted from PENKOVSKIY's arrest. [redacted] cited her KGB friend SVIRIN as the source of some of her information, as the source of the indirect warning to her husband to stay away from PENKOVSKIY, and as someone who knew about PENKOVSKIY's trial and had been somehow associated with the investigation - thus confirming NOSENKO on SVIRIN's participation in the PENKOVSKIY investigation.

c. Reports on KGB Personnel

[redacted] has named relatively few KGB officers who have figured in her career as a KGB agent or about whom she could report any substance. Of her KGB handlers:

- CIA has been unable to identify one, Gennadiy Fedorovich, whose last name she did not know, her handler while she worked at the Embassy of Nepal in 1964. NOSENKO has not referred to operations against this Embassy.

- Two KGB handlers were assigned to [redacted] in Leningrad - V. I. DEMIDOV and Georgiy PCHELIN. Both of these officers had previously been identified by NOSENKO as officers of the Leningrad KGB and have not been identified by any other source. They were two of the total of four Leningrad KGB officers named by NOSENKO.

- Her KGB handler while she was employed by a Canadian correspondent in Moscow was Vladimir Ivanovich KOSTYRYA. Only NOSENKO has identified KOSTYRYA as the KGB officer who had been in the United States under the name Vladimir Viktorovich VLADIMIROV; NOSENKO considered this, as he said in 1965, his most important identification among KGB personnel. [redacted] KOSTYRYA was in the U.S. under Intourist cover; [redacted] relationship with him was not related to her earlier Intourist work, however, but her connection with a foreign correspondent, which was KOSTYRYA's responsibility after his return to Moscow.

Of the four other KGB officers on whom [redacted] has reported in any depth, three were previously identified by NOSENKO and only by NOSENKO:

- V.G. SVIRIN, her KGB friend, is a ubiquitous figure in much of her reporting on other subjects and in her account of her personal life, as well as her primary candidate for a Western recruitment approach. SVIRIN had previously been identified by NOSENKO as a KGB officer of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate, previously involved in the PENKOVSKIY investigation (both of which assignments [redacted] has confirmed).

- In connection with SVIRIN, [redacted] recounted an incident in which a KGB officer whom she described in derogatory terms, Valentin MUZEYNIK, had narrowly escaped dismissal as a result of a drunken brawl with a militiaman. MUZEYNIK had not only survived, however, but continued to bear a higher KGB rank than his former friend, colleague, and subordinate, SVIRIN. NOSENKO said MUZEYNIK was an officer of the Directorate of the KGB Second Chief Directorate.

- Vadim BIRYUKOV was identified by [redacted] as the KGB officer under Novosti cover assigned to report on the interview in August 1966 of [redacted] NOSENKO had previously given information concerning BIRYUKOV, a KGB officer of the Tenth Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, targetted against foreign correspondents.

5. Remarks

There is confusion in [redacted]'s sub-sourcing for her information on NOSENKO and inconsistency in her statements that, on one hand, he was a civilian but on the other, he was aware of microphones in the U.S. Embassy. These facts indicate that if she was briefed by the KGB to report to American Intelligence on NOSENKO, [redacted] was inadequately prepared. Otherwise, however, [redacted] has personally supported the bona fides of NOSENKO by offering direct confirmation of the bona fides of CHEREPANOV, by corroborating NOSENKO's details on the PENKOVSKIY compromise, and by verifying his identification of KGB Second Chief Directorate personalities.

Note: Aside from her support of NOSENKO and CHEREPANOV, there are many aspects of the [redacted] case which independently led CIA and other Western services to conclude that she is a KGB-dispatched agent. Some of these aspects are as follows:

- The circumstances of her claimed relationship with the KGB contradict KGB practice as known from other sources.

- [redacted] description of her husband's recall from Stockholm and his punishment for having previously worked as a GRU colleague of PENKOVSKIY in the GKNNR fit neither the treatment of other GRU officers whom PENKOVSKIY also identified nor the logic of the situation: Her husband was sent to Stockholm after PENKOVSKIY was uncovered and even after he was arrested. (That the brief

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assignment in Stockholm may have been a KGB-organized prelude to the defection of [redacted] is also suggested by the fact that the one operational contact her husband is known to have had there was a Western double agent, and [redacted] was able to provide identifying data on this agent.)

- Nearly all of [redacted]'s identifications of Soviet Intelligence personalities were previously known.

- She has given conflicting accounts of her motivation for defecting, of her relationship with her husband, and of her associations with KGB personnel.

- Against the background of the claimed difficulties in which she and her husband found themselves, it seems unlikely that [redacted] would have been permitted to leave the USSR.

- There are oddities in her relationship with the Canadian correspondent who employed her in the USSR and who was her alleged KGB target, as well as in her conduct in the West and in her husband's situation and behavior since the defection.

G. General Correlat[illegible]

1. Qual[illegible]

a. Intro[illegible]

In examining the [illegible] intelligence source, it is necessary to evaluate the [illegible] to Soviet illegals and to [illegible] NOSENKO's identifiable and original leads [illegible] VILLA[illegible], should [illegible] that with one exception--the [illegible] complex--he did not identify current penetrations of the U.S. Government. Considering the conclusion [illegible] NOSENKO, the assumption can be made that the KGB found it feasible to sacrifice the JOHNSON-MINTKENBAUGH operation. The reasons may have lain in the circumstances that the operation was under threat of compromise because of [illegible] security [illegible] the agents posed difficult handling problems, MINTKENBAUGH had no current access, and JOHNSON had not been exploited for some time before the NOSENKO lead was received. The rest of NOSENKO's identifiable leads to recruited Americans involved agents who had been previously compromised, who were inactive, or who had already lost their access to classified information.

[illegible]

b. [illegible]

[illegible]

sensitive sources

sensitive sources....

sensitive sources

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] CIA with [illegible] activities inside [illegible] and GOLITSYN in 19[illegible] operations of this kind. What information was available came mainly from the reports [illegible] who became involved with the KGB during visits to the Soviet Union. [illegible] detailed information on [illegible] counterintelligence methods, particularly surveillance techniques, and [illegible] less detailed information on the organization and operations of the [illegible] Directorate were unique [illegible] in early 1961. This information was [illegible] following his defection at the end of 19[illegible] organizational [illegible] identified a sizeable number of internal [illegible] provided leads to specific [illegible] activities.

[illegible] Western Intelligence [illegible] and agent sources with connections [illegible] with KGB internal counterintelligence. [illegible] the most important of these [illegible]

[illegible]

* A Polish [illegible] staff officer [illegible] GOLENIEWSKI was also a KGB agent within the [illegible]

Other techniques on which various sources have confirmed one another include the following:

[redacted] reported [redacted] that the surveillance equipment used by the KGB Surveillance Directorate includes special paint invisible to the naked eye but visible through use of a special device. It is used in conjunction with helicopters, closed circuit television at bridges, tunnels, etc. A similar technique was described by GOLENIEWSKI.

- NOSENKO, [redacted] and the CHEREPANOV papers have described a special chemical compound sensitive to dogs but not to humans (NEPTUNE 80), which is used in surveillance.*

[redacted] reported [redacted] that microphones and transmitters are installed in American automobiles in the Soviet Union by personnel of the KGB Surveillance Directorate. GOLENIEWSKI earlier provided many details on this technique.

- [redacted] the KGB had developed a transmitter using paper-thin batteries so shaped that they can fit in the shoulder pads of a man's suit. They also can be concealed in the thick covers of menus. Thus concealed, they are used in Moscow by the KGB to listen to conversations between foreign diplomats, particularly at the Hotel Metropol and the Hotel National. Such miniaturized devices have also been described by GOLENIEWSKI, GOLITSYN, NOSENKO, [redacted] [redacted] and the CHEREPANOV papers. Inter alia, NOSENKO and the CHEREPANOV papers gave the KGB cryptonym as "NEPTUNE".

- NOSENKO and [redacted] have reported the KGB technique of switching telephone calls intended for the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to a KGB installation, where they are intercepted by a Soviet posing as an American.

Where the bulk of NOSENKO's reporting on KGB operations was concerned with those of the Second Chief Directorate, this has been true with only two of the other sources named here. [redacted] [redacted] and [redacted], however, have also given details on specific KGB internal counterintelligence activities in addition to their statements on the compromise of CIA assets within the USSR (a topic of reporting by [redacted] and CHEREPANOV as well). The information from [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] is summarized below.

[redacted] - has been able to provide details of KGB Second Chief Directorate activity. He reported the KGB's discovery of an American employed at the Sokolniki Exhibition in Moscow in

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* The existence and feasibility of such a substance has not been verified.

clandestine contact with an unidentified Soviet female. (This contact is not identified with any CIA operation at the Exhibition in 1959.) He spoke of the KGB's knowledge of an American Intelligence deaddrop under a bench in the area of the Agricultural Exhibition. He said that the KGB controlled all U.S. agent contacts in Moscow, including one with an old man in his 60's (NOSENKO reported on an individual who may be identical with this agent).

[illegible] and [illegible] claimed to have fulfilled functions which NOSENKO and others have described as standard procedure in operations against foreigners and Soviets inside the Soviet Union. [illegible] said she was a Second Chief Directorate agent targetted against the Nepalese Embassy in Moscow and later against the Canadian correspondent who employed her [illegible]

c. Remarks

As previously indicated, it was only after the defections of the genuine sources GOLITSYN and G[illegible] in 1961 that American Intelligence began to receive voluminous and mutually corroborative information from others on the activities of the KGB Second Chief and Surveillance Directorates. The timing of this information therefore appears to be significant in addition to the overlap of specific details. The fact that so many of these sources, even including [illegible] provided KGB Second Chief Directorate information may reflect a centralized KGB decision to emphasize or sacrifice it.

sensitive source(s)

H. Evaluation

The conclusion that NOSENKO is on a KGB mission could carry damaging implications for the American Intelligence sources who have supported his bona fides. Unless their statements on NOSENKO can be convincingly explained as innocent repetition of misinformation spread by the KGB within the Soviet services, these sources might be concluded to have been deliberately misleading either as promotors of their own personal interests or as parties to a KGB conspiracy.

Regarding GOLITSYN, the opinion of CIA is that he purposefully gave false support for NOSENKO in an attempt to make his opinions more authoritative. This is not a satisfactory explanation for the remarks on NOSENKO by [redacted] however, there seem to be no personal interests which their support of NOSENKO's bona fides might have served. The choice thus seems to lie between these three officers being genuine sources of American intelligence but unwitting channels of KGB misinformation and, on the other hand, one or more of them being in league with the KGB.

The possibility that [redacted] are under KGB control was tested further in the context of the NOSENKO operation by reviewing parallels in their reporting and his, and general correlations that appear from one case to another. At the same time, the NOSENKO-[redacted] connections were shown for comparative purposes. Here nothing was found that would eliminate [redacted] from consideration as possibly being KGB provocation agents.

This examination against the conclusion that NOSENKO is under KGB control, has brought the bona fides of [redacted] [redacted] into serious question. If NOSENKO is a dispatched agent of the KGB, these other sources seem also to be.

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: PRQ Part I - Alfonso Dibildox Torres

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached herewith is PRQ Part I on Subject. Provisional Operational Approval is requested, along with 201 number. Subject's cryptonym, assigned 15 October 1963 by the Station, follows under separate cover.

Willard C. Curtis

Distribution:
3 - WHD, w/att. h/w and u/s/c
2 - Files

SECRET

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-22488	13 November 1963
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: LIENVOY-8

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. As a result of the recent review done of the LIFEAT and LIENVOY Project, it came to Headquarters attention that LIENVOY-8, who was believed to have been terminated, was still covered by the LIENVOY Project.

2. According to HMMA-14676, LIENVOY-8 was the cause of a security problem for LIENVOY in February 1960 when he requested release from LIENVOY and a transfer to his parent organization, the General Staff of the Presidency. LIENVOY-8 was described as a "sour" nationalist who disapproved of ODYOKE's sharing of the LIENVOY take.

3. Headquarters now notes that LIENVOY-8's clearance has never been cancelled and there is no Agent Service Record or termination report in his file. LIENVOY-8 was included in the LIENVOY Project renewal request for the 1961/62 project year, but not for the 1962/63 year. The field project renewal request for the 1963/64 year included him again.

4. It is requested that the Station inform Headquarters of the present status of LIENVOY-8 (201-118406). If he has been terminated, please forward an Agent Service Record. If he is still being used, please provide a current analysis of his reliability and comments on any security probelms present in light of his actions and reputation in 1960.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City

31 Oct 63

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-12027	23 October 1963
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-118406

ORIGINATING

DDP 1-122

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Related Mission Directive for Mexico

1. Attached is the revised Related Mission Directive for Mexico.

2. Your approval is requested.

J. C. King
Chief, WH Division

CONCUR:

Chief, DDP/PG

Chief, FI

Chief, CA

Chief, CI

APPROVED:

Deputy Director (Plans)

3 JUN 1961

Date Approved

24 January 1961

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - WHD
1 - PG
1 - CA
1 - CI
1 - SR
1 - FI/Plans
1 - FI/INT
1 - RI

3 COPY

RELATED MISSION DIRECTIVE FOR MEXICO

I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

A. National Policy. The long-range national policy objectives of the U.S. Government toward Mexico are to reduce to an ineffectual level the influence of international Communism, to encourage democratic government, and to keep the Mexican government friendly and favorably inclined toward U. S. policies. Further guidance is given in the current OCB Regional Operations Plan for Latin America.

B. Operational Emphasis. The Station's primary emphasis will continue to be placed on clandestine collection operations and covert action operations against the Sino-Soviet bloc, Cuban, and Communist elements in Mexico.

C. Changes in the RMD. This basic policy instruction for activities in Mexico has been revised in light of the Station's last Annual Assessment of Progress Report and to reflect more accurately operational conditions, capabilities and direction. In view of the importance and threat presented by Communist Cuba to U. S. interests in latin America, coverage of Cuban revolutionary activities in Mexico has been made a specific requirement under Priority A. Priority B objectives and tasks include refinements of desired efforts and also provide for covert action operations against Cuban targets in Mexico. The former task for production of motion pictures and their distribution has been deleted, as it is no longer a valid requirement; two former tasks pertaining to the possible use of foreign diplomats have been combined; a task to develop young potential political leaders (ZREAGER) has been added. Two previous Priority C objectives have been eliminated, as there is no established Mexican intelligence service, and the Station regularly reports on activities of the security services. Coverage of Chinese Communists has been raised to Priority B coincident with the elimination of the former Priority C section.

D. Contingency Reporting. In addition to the specific objectives set forth in Section II, the Station will from time to time be called on to attempt to satisfy Intelligence

Guides and Intelligence Directives, but it is expected that these requirements be satisfied utilizing existing assets. Of particular interest on a continuing basis is information on: (a) any indications that Mexico may be used as a base for clandestine activity directed against the U. S. (CI Book Messages 83 and 115); (b) activities of non-bloc intelligence services, especially those that are potentially harmful to U. S. interests; (c) the plotting of revolutionary groups according to their current importance in attempts to overthrow the regimes of their respective Latin American countries; (d) the current alignment and activities of political forces with the potential for assuming control of the Mexican Government; (e) U. S. Communists residing in Mexico; and (f) the Spanish Communist group.

It will be noted that certain previous contingency reporting requirements have been amended as follows: The former levy for reporting on the stability of the Mexican Government has been changed to a more realistic and meaningful statement as reflected by (d) above. This modification is appropriate, as political changes in Mexico are most likely to occur within the framework of constitutionality. The previous charge for reporting on secret shipments of strategic materials from Mexico to bloc countries is no longer specifically required and has been deleted.

II. OBJECTIVES

PRIORITY A

1. Obtain information on Sino-Soviet bloc plans and activities in Mexico, including those of bloc intelligence services.

   a. Continue and, where possible, increase physical and technical surveillance of bloc installations and residences.

   b. Through controlled agent assets, identify and monitor the activities of bloc personnel; if conditions warrant, attempt recruitment or defection of bloc personnel.

c. Continue CI operations against bloc intelligence personnel.

2. Seek to reduce and, if possible, eliminate Communist and leftist control or influence in key governmental and non-governmental organizations, political parties, mass media outlets, and other elements that influence public or official opinion and policies.

   a. Develop political action penetration agents in key functional groups, such as students, teachers and organized labor, in order to disrupt and reduce their capacity for carrying out action harmful to U. S. objectives and interests.

   b. Expose and discredit illegal or subversive Sino-Soviet bloc activities and representatives in Mexico, as well as the activities and personnel of international and local Communist front organizations.

   c. Identify, discredit, and if possible eliminate Communists and pro-Communists from strategic positions in government, educational institutions, state-controlled industrial and agricultural enterprises, labor unions, and student organizations.

   d. Provide support and give guidance to individuals and organizations that can be induced to produce and disseminate anti-Communist, pro-Free World propaganda via radio, television, newspapers, or other media, and carry out political action operations against Communist or other anti-U. S. elements.

   e. Identify, develop, and utilize important non-Communist political, business or civic leaders to carry out propaganda, economic or political actions against Communist influence and induce them to support views coinciding with U. S. Government policy interests.

   f. Continue to support and guide anti-Communist youth and student organizations, publications or agents, and when necessary, develop additional assets in key schools in Mexico City and selected provinces.

g. Develop and support covert press assets on the staffs of influential newspapers.

h. Develop access to individuals and organizations in the labor field and support non-Communist leaders and groups in key unions.

3. Obtain information on the organizational structure, key personnel, financing, covert plans and activities of the Communist Party of Mexico (PCM), Communist front organizations and groups, especially the Partido Popular Socialista (PPS), and non-Communist and/or anti-U. S. groups that may be susceptible to exploitation by International Communism.

a. Exploit and extend existing penetrations in the PCM and the PPS.

b. Maintain penetrations of the PCM and seek to penetrate the anti-ENCINA wing of the PCM.

c. Develop and, if conditions warrant, recruit a key source in the Workers' University capable of monitoring cultural contacts between the University and bloc diplomatic installations.

d. Continue to monitor the activities of selected Communist-influenced labor unions and front groups through the penetration in the PPS; if conditions warrant, make selected recruitments in the unions or groups.

4. Continue to obtain information on Cuban Revolutionary activities in Mexico and support U. S. Government efforts against the CASTRO regime.

a. Continue to conduct penetration operations of Cuban Embassy and induce defections of Cuban diplomats.

b. Recruit agents in Mexico for operational use in Cuba.

c. Secure support of high Mexican Government officials for the conduct of operations against Cuba.

d. Continue to provide operational support for activities

directed against the CASTRO regime in Cuba.

e. Utilize propaganda media, political action assets, and other covert means to combat the influence of Cuban revolutionary ideologies in Mexico.

PRIORITY B

1. Combat ultra-nationalistic and anti-U. S. activities in Mexico, and propagandize the dangers of Communism.

   a. Utilize existing media and political action assets to combat anti-U. S. propaganda or activities.

   b. Utilize existing media and political action assets to prevent or negate collaboration between ultra-nationalists and Communists.

   c. Utilize media and political action assets to prevent or negate the socio-economic and cultural penetration plans or activities of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

   d. Spot and develop for future covert collaboration young local figures who show potential for political leadership and who may be influenced to become generally favorable to U. S. interests.

2. Obtain information on the secret intentions and activities of the Mexican Government in foreign affairs, particularly toward the U. S., the Sino-Soviet bloc, and Cuba.

   a. Continue to develop and influence high level contacts in the Mexican Government, particularly the Office of the President and the Foreign Ministry.

3. Collect information on the Sino-Soviet bloc.

   a. Continue penetration of airline and steamship offices and official government agencies to obtain advance information on travellers.

   b. Recruit or obtain the willing collaboration of selected travellers to bloc countries, especially those who will remain in bloc countries for an extended period and who may be on scientific missions.

14-00000

c. Recruit third nationals and Latin American diplomats to be assigned or transferred to bloc countries.

d. Obtain communications intelligence on bloc diplomatic traffic.

4. Obtain information on the Chinese Communists in Mexico.

a. Spot, assess and recruit or develop sources in the Chinese community.

b. Exploit the Gobernacion files on Chinese living in Mexico and effect penetration of the SHACP.

ANNEX B

THE 201 SYSTEM

Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated.

2. THE 201 SYSTEM

The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. *The 201 Number:* a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual.

b. *The 201 Dossier:* the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects.

c. *The Master 201 Record:* a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

d. *Main Index Master 201 Reference:* this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated.

15 November 1974



Information About Subject

1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
6. Occupation Code
7. Text

Document Reference Data Group

8. 201 Number
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
11. Record Date (year only)
12. Reference

ISC Control Information

13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number

e. *OI Code:* a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations.

A component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.

The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service.

f. *201 Machine Lists:* produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist.

3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER

a. *General*

The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISC. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on

persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISC for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. *Requesting a 201 File Opening*

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.

4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures.

Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:

a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples.

c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

l. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.

5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.

a. *Purging*

Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:

(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. *Maintenance Procedures*

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201

dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISC/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).

Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
		DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. IP/Files GC-52				(For guidance see CSHB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.)
2.				
3.				Volume(s) #____ of ____ volume(s)
4.				of 201-______________.
5.				
6.				☐ Restricted Dossier (Attach Form 2021 to Dossier)
7.				
8.				☐ Non-Restricted Dossier
9.				
10.				For Split Charge Dossiers:
11.				All documents prior to ______ (date)
12.				forwarded to IP/Files. All
13.				documents after ______ (date)
14.				retained at ________ desk.
15.				

FORM 610E ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY

TO:

This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited below has been transferred to you by:

Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files, Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.

[illegible]	FILE NO.	DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DATE OF TRANSFER	[illegible]	[illegible]

2977

CONFIDENTIAL

The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component.

7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TO	DATE	INITIALS	FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE
IP/FI GC-52 TUBE DT-6			
IP/DCU GC-40 TUBE BT-4			

ACTION DESK: 1. To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not necessary).
2. To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature necessary).

FILE NUMBER: ______

SECTION A
RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 73-23) ______
RESTRICTED BY: ______ (Name)
COMPONENT: ______ Date: ______

SECTION B
REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY) ______ R.O. No. ______
COMPONENT: ______ Date: ______

FORM 2021 CONFIDENTIAL

b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files.

8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES

The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION

A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.

a. *Standard Listings*

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest

Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are:

(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.

FUL A CHINA SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY
201 SURNAME ALPHA LIST
01 OCT 1973

NAME	TYPE NAME	DOB DAY/MO/YR	BIRTHPLACE CTRY CITY	OCC.	CIT.	201	OI-1	OI-2	ACT. CTRY	LOC. CITY	INT. CTRY
CHEN, SHU I. /7115/1361/5339/		17JUL15	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0165401					
CHEN, SHOU I /7115/1363/[illegible]				DIPT		0[illegible]450			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1363/[illegible]	A	26JAN15				0179653			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU-JEN /[illegible]/1108/0938		90	CHIN,AMOY						CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU [illegible]		04JAN19	CHIN, FUKIEN, PROV.	BUSP	CCOM?	0[illegible]3751			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU-[illegible] /7108/1363/[illegible]		21OCT08	CHIN, MANCHURIA, PORT ARTH		CHIN?	0234629			CHIN	CUBA	
CHEN, SHOU SHIH /7115/1169/031	A	12NOV22	CHIN, HUNAN		CHAT	0174620			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU-[illegible]		1[illegible]AUG45	CHIN		CHAT	0[illegible]59796			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-HSIUNG /7115/[illegible]		C41	CHIN, CANTON	DIPT	CCOM	0925140			CHIN	MALY	
CHEN, SHOU [illegible] /0701/1363/1097		02SEP26	CHIN, LIAONING PRO.	ENGR	CHAT	0037255			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU-[illegible] /7115/1134/[illegible]		12JAN19	CHIN, PEKING		CHIN?	0113415			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHOU-[illegible]		0[illegible]	CHIN, CANTON		CCOM?	C091433			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-[illegible]	A	1[illegible]OCT19	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV	PROF	CHIN?	0340249			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU-CHIN /7115/2[illegible]/0930		02JUL30	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.		CHIN?	0352634			CHIN	MALY	
CHEN, SHU CHING /7115/3210/122		19	CHIN,HUAN YANG IS	ARMY	CHAT	0329378			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-CHUAN /7115/[illegible]/2		NOV30	HK		CHIN?	0124534			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU [illegible] /7115/2[illegible]/2797	A	C1NC22	CHIN,PEILIU	TSEA	CHAT	0797335			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU [illegible]	B				CHIN?	0703223			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU [illegible] /7115/2[illegible]/3125/		08JUL14	CHIN,KWANGTUNG			0[illegible]577			CHIN	ETHI	
CHEN, SHU HSIANG /7115/[illegible]/76		19	CHIN,FUKIEN		CHIN?	0179671			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-HSIUNG /7115/2[illegible]/7		23FEB07	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0014759			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU HSI[illegible] /7115/2[illegible]/4133		05MAY14	CHIN,FOOCHOW		CCOM?	0[illegible]3195			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-[illegible]		30[illegible]26			CHIN?	0179422			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-I /7115/2[illegible]/5093/	A	06FEB16	CHIN, HOPEI	DIPT	CCOM	0223161			CHIN	CEY	
CHEN, SHU [illegible] /7115/2[illegible]/2710		27[illegible]23	CHIN,PANG CHENG	DIPT	CHAT	0239156			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU LAN	B		CHIN	PROF	CHIN?	0179573			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIANG /7115/0947/039		C10C21	CHIN		CCOM	0221972			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIN /7115/2579/2651/		25NOV20-	CHIN,FENGSHAN	DIPT	CHIN?	0221162			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-LING /7108/[illegible]/019		01JUL2[illegible]	CHIN, KIANGSU		CHIN?	0179626			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-[illegible]	A	23SEP20	CHIN, HSIAO-HSIEN, KIANGSU	MILA	CCOM	0[illegible]54[illegible]			CHIN	LAOS	
CHEN, SHU [illegible] /7115/2[illegible]/0599/		15APR30	CHIN,CHEKIANG		CHAT	00[illegible]			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU-[illegible] /7115/[illegible]/0202/		1[illegible]DEC19	CHIN, KIANGTUNG PROV.	CPMD	CHIN?	0179625			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-[illegible] /7115/2[illegible]/2773/	A	10DEC26	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHAT?	0052638			CHIN	MALY	
CHEN, SHU-SHAN /7115/2579/C51		27JAN25	CHIN, FUKIEN PROV		CHIN?	0385119			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-TE /7115/[illegible]/1795/		21DEC37	CHIN, SHANGHAI		CHIN?	0103749			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU TEH /[illegible]/	V	27MAR20	CHIN, CHENG SHU	GEOL	CHIN?	0763916			CHIN	[illegible]	
CHEN, SHU TING /7115/0667/6639		C10CT5	CHIN,HANG CHOW			0013931			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU TSU /7115/2[illegible]/2737/		1[illegible]APR17	CHIN		CHIN?	0133929			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/0667/0327/	A	02FEB36		FIN	CCOM	0767642			CHIN	UK	
CHEN, SHU-[illegible] /7115/2855/1631		11NOV06	CHIN, KWANGTUNG			0151329			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-YIN	V	05APR17	CHIN,PEIPING		CCOM?	0393176			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU YIN /7115/2[illegible]/5391/		15JUN36	CHIN,FANG CHEN EN		CHIN?	0107336			CHIN	CHIN	UK
CHEN, SHU-YIN /7115/2[illegible]/[illegible]/		09OCT33	CHIN, HENG YANG HSIEN, HUN	ARMY	CHIN?	0179626			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-[illegible]		17FEB39	CHIN, CHEKIANG	INT	CHAT	0367524			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-[illegible]		21NOV21	CHIN, SHANGHAI		CCOM	0111610			CHIN	[illegible]	
CHEN, SHU [illegible] /7115/2579/3942/	V	04SEP29	CHIN, SZECHWAN		CHIN?	0154010			CHIN		
					CHIN?	0164758			CHIN	TAIW	

SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY
E2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible] PAGE [illegible]

All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions *must be* destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.

b. *Non-Standard Listings*

Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:

(1) Country of location

(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)

(3) Citizenship

(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)

(5) Occupation.

These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAF covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords:

(a) Surname

(b) Given name

(c) Date of birth

(d) Country of birth

(e) Citizenship

(f) OI code

(g) Location

Sorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice.

c. *Scheduled Listings*

Standard and non-standard listings printed semiannually.

d. *Special Listings*

Unscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements.

e. *Request for Listings*

All requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer.

15 November 1974

AUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS

Note: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people.

1. *Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)*
   a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above.
   b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches.
   c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (GID).

   (Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.)

2. *British Commonwealth*
   a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services.
   b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS).
   c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given.
   d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP-SS).

3. *Cuba*

   Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI).

4. *Israel*
   a. All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/ISR should be indicated as the originating office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest.
   b. Military attaches.
   c. Assistant military attaches.
   d. Identified intelligence officers.

5. *North Vietnam*

All diplomats and NFLSV (PRG) officials stationed abroad.

6. *USSR*

a. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office.

b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna.

c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.

d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning.

70-1-1
CSHB ~~43-1-1~~
CHAPTER III

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

ANNEX B

PERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS

1. A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number.

2. The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or functional area of interest.

3. It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations up-to-date listings containing information under the control

Rcs by Annex B to Ch III to CSHB 70-1-1 dated 1 Apr 67

of the Cuban desk on the dramatis personae. In addition to 201 personalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying data of persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be of tangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data other than that given in the listing itself.

4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system, identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is not yet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbers of the following type but in the same series:

IDN-123457

These are relabeled "201" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are carried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings, where they are identified by the letter "I" in the "Type of Name" column. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers.

5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters, either upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatch is written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number for it may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file number in the dispatch form as follows:

Dispatch Symbol and No. XYZA-12345
Headquarters File No. 201-

6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon the request of stations or desks which are developing special identification programs within the 201 system. The field receives current notification of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index Card Service.

7. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system.

DDO INSTRUCTION
NO. 50-10

OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE OF CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF INDIVIDUALS

Rescission: CSI 50-10, 13 July 1970

1. GENERAL

a. Elemental in the conduct of clandestine operations is the use of human agents to accomplish the missions of the Operations Directorate. In general, it is DDO policy to select agent assets with primary regard to the agents' abilities, target access, and security, and with few restrictions as to their origins, professions or status as members of particular groups. The basic rule is that any consenting adult may be used by the Operations Directorate. There are, however, certain sensitive categories of individuals or groups whose operational use by the Operations Directorate is prohibited or in some way restricted for reasons not necessarily related to security considerations.

b. These prohibitions or restrictions stem from one of the following:

(1) The Agency has been directed by U.S. Governmental authority to restrict or avoid the operational use of a particular category of individuals.

(2) The Agency has entered into a special restrictive agreement with an organization, government, corporation, or official responsible for a category of individuals.

(3) The Director or the Deputy Director for Operations has imposed restrictions on the operational use of a certain category of individuals due to the extreme risk or sensitivity of such exploitation.

2. PURPOSE

The purpose of this instruction is to set forth the prohibitions and policy restrictions (as distinguished from security restrictions) which currently pertain to the operational use of various categories of individuals, together with the special approval procedures to be followed in certain cases. Where appropriate, reference has been made to another publication which provides more detailed guidance than has been attempted in this instruction. The special approval procedures set forth in this instruction do not supersede or alter in any way the requirements for covert approvals contained in DOI and DOI-F 10-5.

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3. DEFINITIONS

Within the context of this instruction, the definitions listed below will apply. Special note must be taken of the fact that the key term "operational use" employed throughout this instruction has been defined in the most succinct manner consistent with clarity. It has not been feasible, however, to cover in a definition the entire scope of possible variations in operational circumstances which may be encountered in DDO activities. The definition of "operational use" is intended to provide guidance for the majority of cases, and must be employed with responsible operational judgment. Issues involving a determination of "operational use" which cannot be resolved with reasonable assurance by the responsible operating components will be referred to the Deputy Director for Operations for decision.

a. *Operational Use*
Operational use is interpreted to mean the recruitment, utilization, or training of any individual or group for DDO purposes on either a witting or unwitting basis by or on the behalf of an element of the Operations Directorate. Utilization is made of an individual or group whenever that individual or group, responding to the direction or solicitation of a DDO element, provides information, performs services, provides cover, or supplies financial, material, or other support necessary for the accomplishment of DDO operational objectives either directly or indirectly, to or for an element of the Operations Directorate.

b. *DDO Element*
Any person or group who or which is responsible to, owned or controlled either directly or indirectly by the Operations Directorate. Included under this definition are employees or members of Agency proprietary mechanisms.

c. *Operational Contact*
Any association having as its purpose the initiation or furtherance of DDO operations.

4. RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE

a. Restrictions on the operational use of individuals or groups are of four types and cover twenty five separate categories as outlined below and as described in greater detail in paragraphs 5 through 8 of this instruction:

(1) *Operational Use is Prohibited* (see paragraph 5):

(a) Members and trainees of ACTION;

(b) Fulbright grantees;

(c) Officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom;
(d) Officials, employees, or grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations;
(e) Employees of U.S. private detective investigative agencies.

(2) *Operational Use Requires Special Extra-Agency Concurrence* (see paragraph 6): AND APPROVAL OF SA/ADDO.
(a) Employees of other U.S. Government agencies;
(b) DDO agents or assets in the United States;
(c) Agents and human sources of foreign intelligence registered by other U.S. agencies;
(d) Citizens (or persons documented as citizens) of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (including its overseas dependent territories) and New Zealand;
(e) Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands;
(f) Merchant seamen on ships of certain countries.

(3) *Operational Use Requires Special Approval by the DDO* (see paragraph 7):
(a) Publishers, producers, journalists or employees of public information media;
(b) CARE employees;
(c) Individuals engaged in public relations activities;
(d) Officials, representatives, or employees of Communist countries in the United States;
(e) Foreign delegates or employees of the United Nations assigned in the U.S. and U.S. citizen delegates or employees wherever assigned;
(f) Staff members or officials of Red Cross societies;
(g) Officials of the Vatican State;
(h) U.S. Government-funded professors, lecturers, students or grantees;
(i) Members of educational or private voluntary organizations;
(j) Officials or employees of the African-American Institute;
(k) Volunteers to America.

(4) *Operational Use Requires Approval by Chief of Area Division* (see paragraph 8):
(a) Citizens or alien residents of the U.S. in denied areas;
(b) Non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of United Nations organizations not assigned in the U.S.;
(c) Members of the academic community.

b. Operational use of an individual who comes under more than one type of restriction will be controlled by the highest type of restriction applicable in his particular case.

5. OPERATIONAL USE PROHIBITED

a. *Members and Trainees of ACTION*

(1) It is Agency policy that members and trainees of ACTION will not be used in any capacity, with or without remuneration, by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction. (The term "members of ACTION" will be understood to mean anyone employed by or associated with ACTION except trainees.)

(2) It is Agency policy that former members of ACTION may be employed or used by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction only in accordance with the following:

(a) Except as stated in (b) below, a former member of ACTION may be employed or used operationally by any element of the Agency only if a period of five full years has elapsed since his separation from ACTION.

(b) An Agency-controlled organization may hire a former member of ACTION, but only for duties related to the overt purposes of such organization, if a period of at least twenty-four months has elapsed since his separation from ACTION.

(c) The employment or use of a former member of ACTION under the provisions of subparagraph (a) or (b) above must have the specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations.

(3) Former trainees whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas are subject to the rules governing employment or use of former members of ACTION (subparagraph (2) above). Former trainees who did not serve at any time as members of ACTION and whose ACTION service did not include duty or training overseas may be employed or used operationally by DDO elements provided the specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations is obtained.

(4) A former member or trainee of ACTION whose employment or use is permitted by subparagraph (2) or (3) above may not be assigned to or used in a country for which he had been trained or to which he had been assigned while with ACTION.

(5) Information may be received by the Domestic Collection Division from private corporations and other organizations employing former ACTION personnel, notwithstanding the fact that the information may originate with former ACTION personnel. However, any direct briefing or debriefing of or contact with former members or trainees of ACTION is subject to the following:

(a) The specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations must be obtained.

(b) If the individual is a former member of ACTION, or a former trainee whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas, five years must have elapsed since his separation from ACTION.

If contact with a former ACTION member or a former trainee whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas should be unavoidable during the required five year waiting period, the Deputy Director for Operations may request an exception from the Director of Central Intelligence. Among the possible reasons for such unavoidable contact would be the designation of a former member or trainee as the liaison officer to the Domestic Collection Division.

b. *Fulbright Grantees*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of individuals who are receiving U.S. Government support under certain provisions (see below) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, as amended, commonly known as the Fulbright-Hays Act. Falling under this prohibition are teachers, research scholars, lecturers and students (including student artists and student musicians) who have been selected to receive scholarships or grants by the Board of Foreign Scholarships appointed by the President of the United States. Operational use of such individuals is prohibited only during the period when they are participating in the educational and cultural exchange program. This prohibition specifically does not apply to the several other categories of grantees supported by other provisions of the Fulbright-Hays Act such as artists, athletes, leaders, specialists or participants at international trade fairs or expositions who do not come under the aegis of the President's Board of Foreign Scholarships (see 7.j., below).

c. *Officials or Employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of the officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom. Contacts with such individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in their cover capacities must be limited to their cover assignments.

d. *Officials, Employees, or Grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of grantees of the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation or the Carnegie Foundation or of other persons actively participating in programs which are wholly sponsored and controlled by any of these foundations. Additionally, there will be no operational use made of the officials or employees of these organizations. In general, however, there is no restriction on nonoperational contacts or consultations with such individuals.

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e. *Employees of U.S Private Detective Investigative Agencies*
DDO policy prohibits the operational use either in the United States or overseas of the employees of any U.S.-owned or -controlled private detective investigative agency. This policy does not apply to operational use of employees of organizations which are engaged strictly in commercial or credit investigations.

6. EXTRA-AGENCY CONCURRENCE REQUIRED

a. *Employees of Other U.S. Government Agencies*
Approval for the operational use of staff or contract (including foreign) employees of other U.S. Government agencies will be granted only in cases where the employee's parent agency in Washington has been notified of and has approved of the intended operational use in accordance with the provisions of DOI 10-5.

b. *DDO Agents or Assets in the United States*
In accordance with the agreement existing between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this Agency, the restrictions listed below apply to the operational activity of the Operations Directorate conducted in the United States. Coordination with the FBI of appropriate information on DDO operational activities in the United States is the responsibility of the Chief, Liaison Group, Operations Staff.

(1) All investigations by this Agency of foreign officials in the United States require the prior concurrence of the FBI. In this context, the term "investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aimed at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; "investigation" does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by Agency officials in discharging their cover functions.

(2) Any approach in the United States by a DDO element for recruitment of any foreign official or of any visitor from a Communist country requires the prior concurrence of the FBI.

(3) Any planned meeting in the United States for assessment and social development between a DDO element and a foreign official of known or presumed interest to the FBI or between a DDO element and an official or visitor from a Communist country requires that prior notification be provided to the FBI.

(4) Whenever domestic DDO operations involve matters pertaining to the national security of the United States, appropriate identification of persons engaged in the operations in the United States will be

provided to the FBI. In accordance with this policy, the following categories of DDO assets will be identified to the FBI: DDO personnel, agents of the Operations Directorate who are either U.S. citizens or alien residents, and foreign agents of the Operations Directorate recruited abroad who come to the United States for operational purposes.

c. *Agents and Human Sources of Foreign Intelligence Registered by Other U.S. Agencies*
The Interagency Source Register (ISR) has been established at headquarters to provide for United States Intelligence Board (USIB) agencies a centralized record of agents and human sources of foreign intelligence. A principal purpose of the ISR is to register primacy of interest and prevent multiple recruitment or unintentional duplicate operational use of such agents and human sources. It is USIB policy that no individual registered in the ISR by one USIB agency will be used for operational purposes by any other USIB agency without the specific prior approval of the agency having primacy of interest. If a DDO element desires to arrange the transfer or joint operational use of a registered individual, the ISR will contact the agency having primacy of interest to determine whether there is a willingness to discuss this matter.

d. *Citizens (or Persons Documented as Citizens) of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (including its Overseas Dependent Territories) and New Zealand*

(1) The operational use of citizens of the above-named countries (including the overseas dependencies of the United Kingdom) is restricted by agreements with the intelligence or security authorities of such countries, which require the prior approval of the appropriate liaison authority. Such approval will be obtained at the earliest feasible stage of development through the European Division (in the case of citizens of Canada or the United Kingdom), or through the East Asia Division (in the case of Australian or New Zealand citizens).

(2) The above restriction also governs the use of false documentation representing DDO staff or agent personnel as citizens of the above-named countries. Approval for the use of such documentation will be sought through the same channels as stated in subparagraph (1) above.

(3) Authority to make operational use of the persons or documentation described in the above subparagraphs without obtaining the prior approval of the liaison authority concerned may be granted only by the Deputy Director for Operations or by the Director.

e. *Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands*
The operational use of any citizen of Norway, West Germany or The Netherlands is, under certain conditions, contingent on prior approval of the national intelligence service concerned. These countries are particularly sensitive in cases involving the operational use of their citizens who are merchant seamen and who are serving on ships carrying their flags. Each case involving the proposed operational use of a citizen of one of these countries will be reviewed by the Chief of the European Division in the light of the agreements existing between this Agency and the national intelligence service concerned. After weighing all of the equities, the Chief of the European Division will decide whether approval is required from the national intelligence service concerned. When required, approvals for the operational use of such individuals will be obtained from the appropriate national intelligence services by the European Division.

f. *Merchant Seamen on Ships of Certain Countries*
The operational use of merchant seamen, regardless of their citizenship, who are serving on ships carrying the flags of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (or its overseas dependencies), New Zealand, Norway, West Germany or The Netherlands is, under certain conditions, subject to provisions of the agreements existing between this Agency and the national intelligence service concerned. Each case involving the proposed operational use of such a merchant seaman will be reviewed by the Chief of the European Division or the Chief of the East Asia Division, as appropriate, in the light of the pertinent interservice agreements. After weighing all of the equities, the Chief of the European Division or the Chief of the East Asia Division will determine the course of action to be taken with regard to the national intelligence service concerned.

7. APPROVAL BY THE DDO REQUIRED

Approval by the Deputy Director for Operations for the operational use of any individual who falls into one of the categories described in this paragraph will be requested by memorandum. The individual's covert approval status will be described in the memorandum to the Deputy Director for Operations, together with a concise explanation of the intended operational use. (In connection with this paragraph, contacts by the Domestic Collection Division with individuals or firms do not require approval by the Deputy Director for Operations provided they constitute merely briefing or debriefing for the purpose of obtaining information acquired by an individual or representative of a firm in the course of his normal activities. If, however, in any case the contact is on behalf of another element of the Operations

Directorate or another agency; or if an individual or firm will be requested to perform an operational task or to deviate from his or its normal pattern of activity; or if the activity, even though consistent with the individual's or firm's normal pattern of activity, will take place because requested or funded by the Domestic Collection Division; that case will be subject to the requirement for approval by the Deputy Director for Operations.)

a. *Publishers, Producers, Journalists, or Employees of Public Information Media* (see DOI 240-6)

(1) Operational use of publishers or producers of public information media requires prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations whenever there is danger that such activity might serve in any way to influence U.S. public opinion. Such activities include but are not limited to the publishing of books, newspapers, or magazines, the making of films, the production of TV or radio programs or the issuance in the United States of any public opinion influencing information media. The operational use abroad of publishers or producers of public information media for non-U.S. audiences does not require approval by the Deputy Director for Operations even though such activities may have some unintended and unsolicited fallout in the United States.

(2) Approval by the Deputy Director for Operations is also required prior to the operational use of journalists, newspaper, TV, radio, or news service correspondents or stringers, and employees of news media including TV and radio stations, whenever the individual is a U.S. citizen or when the news medium involved is under U.S. ownership or control.

b. *CARE Employees*

It is DDO policy to avoid operational use of employees of the CARE organization including indigenous employees. Exceptional individual cases involving priority operational objectives will be considered on their merits. Prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations will be required in all cases.

c. Individuals Engaged in Public Relations Activities (see DOI 50-18)

Individuals engaged in public relations activities which in any way have or seek to have an influence on public opinions in the United States are considered to be in a separate sensitive category. In view of the peculiar aspects of public relations activity, including the special requirements of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, approval by the Deputy Director for Operations is required prior to the operational use in a public relations capacity of any individual who is engaged in public relations activities and who is located in or operating into the United States.

d. *Officials, Representatives, or Employees of Communist Countries in the United States* (see DOI 60-11)
Prior approval of the Director or the Deputy Director for Operations is required for operational contact in the United States with or operational use of officials, representatives, or employees of the USSR, its satellite countries, Communist China, or any other country under Communist control. If, while in the United States, such individual is to be investigated, approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational purposes, the prior concurrence of the FBI will also be required in accordance with paragraph 6.b., above.

e. *Delegates or Employees of the United States* [handwritten: Nations]
It is DDO policy that the operational use of delegates or employees of the United Nations, including those of its various main organs and of its related intergovernmental agencies, is of such sensitivity as to require special consideration by the Deputy Director for Operations. In especially worthwhile cases wherein operational use of a particular UN individual is deemed essential for the accomplishment of the DDO mission, approval may be obtained. In each case involving a non-U.S. citizen assigned in the U.S. or a U.S. citizen wherever assigned, the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations will be required. (See paragraph 8.b. regarding use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees not assigned in the U.S.) If, while in the United States, the UN individual is to be investigated, approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational purposes, the prior concurrence of the FBI may also be required as outlined in paragraph 6.b., above.

f. *Staff Members or Officials of Red Cross Societies*
The operational use of staff members or officials of the International Red Cross or its affiliated national Red Cross, Red Crescent, or other equivalent societies requires special consideration and prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations. DDO elements should make every effort to avoid the operational use of staff members or officials of Red Cross societies. However, when especially high priority objectives are at stake and alternative agent assets are not available, approval for the use of such individuals may be granted by the Deputy Director for Operations.

g. *Officials of the Vatican State*
Operational contact with officials of the Vatican State will be made only with the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Operational use of Vatican officials will be contingent on prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations.

h. *U.S. Government Funded Professors, Lecturers, Students or Grantees*
U.S. or foreign professors, lecturers or students and other persons participating in U.S. Government-sponsored academic, cultural, athletic or other

exchange programs (except certain Fulbright grantees—see paragraph 5.b., above) are considered to be in a separate sensitive category. Operational use of such individuals while they are actively participating in an exchange program funded by the U.S. Government requires special consideration and approval by the Deputy Director for Operations prior to such use. In certain especially worthwhile cases wherein the operational use of a particular U.S. Government supported exchangee is considered essential to the accomplishment of the DDO mission, the Deputy Director for Operations may grant approval. Memoranda requesting such approval will be forwarded through the Chief, Foreign Resources Division. In such cases the Deputy Director for Operations will determine whether or not to seek the concurrence of the U.S. Government sponsor.

i. *Members of Educational or Private Voluntary Organizations*

(1) It is U.S. Government policy that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations. This policy applies to all foreign as well as domestic activities of such organizations. In compliance with the above proscription, DDO policy requires the most careful scrutiny of all cases involving operational contact with U.S. educational or private voluntary organizations including trade and professional organizations. The operational use of any employee, staff member or official of such an organization requires prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations. The Deputy Director for Operations will determine whether or not to seek extra-Agency approval for the conduct of such operations.

(2) Operational use including covert funding abroad of foreign-based international voluntary organizations and the personnel thereof is permitted even if the organization is also funded by U.S. private voluntary organizations.

j. *Officials or Employees of the African-American Institute*

Operational use of the officials or employees of the African-American Institute requires prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Contacts with such individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in their cover capacities will not involve operational matters until the approval of the Deputy Director for Operations has been secured.

k. *Volunteers to America*

Operational use of or operational contact with members of Volunteers to America while they are on assignment in the United States will not be made without the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Volunteers to America are participants in programs established by various foreign countries in collaboration with the Department of State as a

counterpart to the U.S. Peace Corps. Such volunteers are sent to the U.S. for a period of service in schools and community development programs. The name of the organization may vary by country.

8. OPERATIONAL USE REQUIRES APPROVAL BY CHIEF OF AREA DIVISION

Operational use of any individual in the categories listed in this paragraph is considered of such sensitivity as to require special consideration and approval by the appropriate Area Division Chief. This authority may not be delegated. The request for approval will be by memorandum in which the individual's covert approval status will be described, together with a concise explanation of the intended operational use.

a. *Citizens or Alien Residents of the U.S. Used in Denied Areas* (see DOI 50-19)
The operational use in denied areas of U.S. citizens, or of aliens who have been admitted for permanent residence or have resided for a prolonged period in the U.S., requires the prior approval of the Chief of the Area Division under whose jurisdiction the intended use is to take place.

b. *Non-U.S. Citizen Delegates or Employees of the United Nations not Assigned in the U.S.*
The operational use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of the United Nations who are not assigned in the U.S. requires the prior approval of the Chief of the Area Division under whose jurisdiction the intended use is to take place.

c. *Members of the Academic Community*

(1) Within the context of this instruction a member of the academic community is defined as: any student, faculty member, administrative officer or staff official of a college, university or similar institution of higher learning including their associated research centers. Persons associated with institutions such as police or military training centers (except the four college-level military service academies) or undergoing specialized technical training with business or commercial firms are not considered to be members of the academic community.

(2) Operational use of members of the academic community, especially those cases wherein an individual is to be made witting of Agency interest, will be on a highly selective basis. Each case will be examined to ascertain its essentiality to the DDO mission in terms of the price of possible disclosure, and to ensure that proper security procedures can be observed. When it has been determined that the operational use of a member of the academic community as defined above is

operationally feasible and without suitable alternative, prior approval in the following cases will be obtained as indicated below:

(a) Any U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community and who is associated in any way with any U.S. or foreign college, university or similar institution of higher learning;

(b) Any non-U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community and who is associated in any way with any U.S.-owned or U.S.-affiliated college, university or similar institution of higher learning which is located either in the United States or abroad.

If the individual is located in the United States, approval will be requested by memorandum to the Chief, Foreign Resources Division. The memorandum will include a statement that the individual is, or is not, a DCD asset or contact, and in the event he is will include the concurrence of the Chief, Domestic Collection Division. If the individual is located outside the United States, approval will be requested by memorandum to the Chief of the Area Division who has jurisdiction over the area concerned. Operational use of foreign members of the academic community who are not associated in any way with U.S.-owned or U.S.-affiliated institutions of higher learning is also considered sensitive. The operational use of such individuals also requires the approval of the Chief of the Area Division. In any case involving a well known person or having special security implications, the Division Chief to whom the request is referred under the above provisions will consult with the DDO and obtain the latter's approval.

DDO Approval

(3) The provisions of paragraph (2) do not apply to Domestic Collection Division contacts with members of the academic community, but such contacts are subject to the following requirements:

(a) If a member of the academic community would be asked to perform an operational task or to alter his normal pattern of activity in order to serve Agency purposes, prior approval of the Chief, Domestic Collection Division is required. Additionally, if such an individual will be in a foreign area, the concurrence of the Chief of the Area Division concerned will be obtained.

(b) Prior concurrence will be obtained from the appropriate Area Division Chief if an individual is to be utilized in a politically sensitive area where his presence or activities could potentially embarrass the interests of the U.S. Government.

(c) The requirements of paragraph 8.a. apply if a citizen or alien resident of the United States would be used in a denied area.

(4) At the end of each calendar year, Chiefs of Divisions will submit a report to the Deputy Director for Operations (via Chief, Foreign Resources Division) on the number of individuals recruited from the

academic community during that year. This audit will permit the DDO to keep abreast of major quantitative changes in the number of potentially sensitive operational cases in each Division.

(5) It should be noted that the provisions of this paragraph do not apply to DDO employees who wish to study or teach privately. Approval for such activity will be obtained in accordance with the provisions of HR 10-7.

9. INDIVIDUAL CHANGES OF STATUS OR CATEGORY

When an individual undergoes a change of status which places him in one of the restricted categories described above, or transfers him from one category to another, his operational use or continued operational use is contingent upon approval or reapproval as prescribed for his new status.

10. INTERPRETATION OR MODIFICATION OF RESTRICTIONS

Certain of the policy restrictions described in this instruction are subject to interpretation, extension or modification by the Deputy Director for Operations depending on the conditions and the atmosphere for DDO operations at any particular time. Especially when dealing on the edges of policy rulings and within the guidelines set forth herein, particular heed should be paid to the price of disclosure, including careful consideration of the sensitivities of the individuals involved. When there is any doubt concerning the application of these restrictions, guidance should be obtained from the Deputy Director for Operations.

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) House Select Committee on Assassinations Request for Information on 201 Criteria (S)

FROM: C/ISS 1D4124

EXTENSION | NO. FEB 28 4 50 PM '78

DATE: 28 February 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. O/SA/DO/O			[initials]	1 to 3: attached is the response to OLC 78-0070/19, 23 Feb 1978. The attached regulations answer all of the questions posed. Please note the classification SECRET. We assume that HSCA Staff will review here. [initials]
2.				
3. OLC attn: Pat Carpenter			[initials] 3/1	
4.				
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FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

OLC 78 0070/[illegible]

DO/ISS 78-098

28 February 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: O/SA/DO/O
Attention: Mr. Shepanek

FROM: William F. Donnelly
Chief, Information Services Staff

SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations
Request for Information on 201 Criteria (S)

REFERENCE: OLC 78-0070/19, 23 February 1978

1. (S) With reference to the conversation of 27 February between Mr. Shepanek and Mr. Cleffi of ISS, attached are copies of DOHB 70-1-1, 15 November 1974, and an earlier version, CSHB 43-1-1 dated 15 February 1960. A close study of the list of questions submitted by the HSCA Staff has led us to conclude that the most complete and effective way to respond would be by inviting the Staff to review our regulation governing the criteria for opening, maintaining, controlling and closing 201 files by the Operations Directorate. A careful reading of the regulation provides an answer to every question posed by the Staff.

2. (S) The earlier version of the regulation is included to reflect the situation as it existed in the period of their primary concern (1958-1964). The later version provides an expansion, clarification and refinement of the earlier versions.

William F. Donnelly
William F. Donnelly

SECRET

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ANNEX B

THE 201 SYSTEM

Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated.

2. THE 201 SYSTEM

The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. *The 201 Number:* a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual.

b. *The 201 Dossier:* the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects.

c. *The Master 201 Record:* a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

d. *Main Index Master 201 Reference:* this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated.

15 November 1974



0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON
SEX M DOB 12 APR 26
CIT GERM
REF AACD-12345, 20 JUN 53
POB GERM, BERLIN
OCC PHARMACIST
OCC CODE CHEM
201-0032671*
TYPE NAME T
OI CODES AA XX
RCD DATE 53
SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH 29 OCTOBER.
30 NOV 70
00833555

Information About Subject

1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
6. Occupation Code
7. Text

Document Reference Data Group

8. 201 Number
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
11. Record Date (year only)
12. Reference

ISC Control Information

13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number

e. *OI Code:* a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations.

A component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.

The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service.

f. *201 Machine Lists:* produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist.

3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER

a. *General*

The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISG. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on

persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. *Requesting a 201 File Opening*

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.

4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures.

Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:

a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples.

c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

l. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.

5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.

a. *Purging*

Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:

(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. *Maintenance Procedures*

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201

dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISC/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).

Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below.

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS

No.	To	Comments
1.	IP/Files GC-52	(For guidance see CSHB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.)
2.		
3.		Volume(s) #____ of ____ volume(s) of 201-____________.
4.		
5.		
6.		☐ Restricted Dossier (Attach Form 2021 to Dossier)
7.		
8.		☐ Non-Restricted Dossier
9.		
10.		For Split Charge Dossiers:
11.		All documents prior to ______ (date)
12.		forwarded to IP/Files. All
13.		documents after ______ (date)
14.		retained at ________ desk.
15.		

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6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY

TO: NAME	BADGE	COMPONENT	ROOM	BLDG	EXT.

This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited below has been transferred to you by:

NAME ____ BADGE ____ COMPONENT ____ EXT. ____

Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files, Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.

SUBJECT OF REQUEST	FILE NO.	DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DATE OF TRANSFER	CHARGE FROM OR ITEM	REG. NO.

FORM 2977 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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CL BY: 007622

The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component.

7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TO	DATE	INITIALS	
IP/FI GC-52 TUBE DT-6			FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE
IP/DCU GC-40 TUBE BT-A			

ACTION DESK: 1. To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not necessary).
2. To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature necessary).

FILE NUMBER

SECTION A
RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 70-28) ______
RESTRICTED BY: ______
(Name)
COMPONENT: ______ Date: ______

SECTION B
REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY) ______ R.O. No. ______
COMPONENT: ______ Date: ______

FORM 2021
CONFIDENTIAL

b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files.

8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES

The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION

A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.

a. *Standard Listings*

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest

Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are:

(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.

[illegible] & CHINA SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY
201 SURNAME ALPHA LIST
[illegible] 1973

NAME	TYPE NAME	DOB DA/MO/YR	BIRTHPLACE CTRY CITY	OCC.	CIT.	201	OI-1	OI-2	ACT. CTRY	LOC. CTRY	INT. CTRY
CHEN, SHU I. /7115/1343/[illegible]		[illegible]	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHINT	0165401			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU I /7115/1343/[illegible]				DIPT		0233950			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU I. /7115/1343/[illegible]	A	24JAN11				0178653			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-JEN /[illegible]		90	CHIN,AMOY	BUSP	CCOMT	C0[illegible]3751			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHIH-PEI		04JAN19	CHIN, FUKIEN, PROV.		CHINT	0234429			CHIN	CUBA	
CHEN, SHUN-[illegible] /7100/1343/609		21OCT08	CHIN, [illegible], PORT ARTH		CNAT	0174620			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU SHIH /7115/1129/031	A	12NOV22	CHIN, HONAN		CNAT	0759776			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-[illegible]		[illegible]	CHIN	DIPT	CCOM	0925390			CHIN	MALT	
CHEN, SHIH-HSING /7115/1107/1		C41	CHIN, CANTON	ENGR	CNAT	0812155			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU [illegible] /0701/1343/1097		[illegible]	CHIN, LIAONING PRO		CHINT	0133415			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHIH-[illegible] /7115/1134/455		12JAN18	CHIN, PEKING		CCOMT	C091433			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-[illegible]		[illegible]	CHIN, CANTON	PROF	CHINT	0060299			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHIH-[illegible]	A	19DEC19	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV		[illegible]	C352636			CHIN	[illegible]	
CHEN, SHU-CHIH /7115/[illegible]/0930		02AUG30	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.	ARMY	CNAT	0324328			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU [illegible] /7115/3210/122		10	CHIN,HSIAN YANG IS		CHINT	0124[illegible]38			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU-[illegible] /7119/[illegible]		[illegible]39	HK	[illegible]	CNAT	0797115			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU [illegible] /7115/[illegible]	A	C1DC22	CHIN,PEILIU		CHINT	0299223			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU [illegible]	A					[illegible]			CHIN	[illegible]	
CHEN, SHU [illegible] /7115/[illegible]		[illegible]	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHINT	0179621			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU [illegible] /7115/[illegible]		19	CHIN,FUKIEN		CHINT	0054[illegible]			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-[illegible] /7115/[illegible]		23FEB07	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CCOMT	0[illegible]3195			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU [illegible] /7115/[illegible]/0133		[illegible]	CHIN,FOOCHOW		CHINT	0179422			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-[illegible]		[illegible]		DIPT	CCOM	0223161			CHIN	[illegible]	
CHEN, SHU-[illegible] /7115/[illegible]	A	[illegible]	CHIN, HOPEI	DIPT	CNAT	0[illegible]			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU [illegible] /7115/[illegible]/2710		[illegible]	CHIN,[illegible] CHENG	PROF	CHINT	0176[illegible]			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU [illegible]	R		CHIN		CCOM	0221972			CHIN	[illegible]	
CHEN, SHU [illegible] /7115/[illegible]		C[illegible]C21	CHIN	DIPT	CHINT	0221162			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU [illegible] /7115/[illegible]		[illegible]20	CHIN,[illegible]		CHINT	0179426			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-[illegible] /7103/[illegible]/010		01[illegible]	CHIN, KIANGSU	[illegible]	CCOM	[illegible]			CHIN	[illegible]	
CHEN, SHU-[illegible]	A	[illegible]20	CHIN, HSIAN-HSIEN, KIANGSU		CNAT	0[illegible]			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU [illegible] /7115/[illegible]		15[illegible]10	CHIN,[illegible]	[illegible]	CHINT	0179425			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-[illegible] /7115/[illegible]		[illegible]C19	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.		[illegible]	0052639			CHIN	[illegible]	
CHEN, SHU-[illegible] /7115/[illegible]	A	[illegible]C26	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHINT	0385119			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-[illegible] /7115/[illegible]/091		[illegible]25	CHIN, FUKIEN PROV		CHINT	013[illegible]			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-[illegible] /7115/[illegible]		[illegible]C37	CHIN, SHANGHAI	GEOL	CHINT	0763[illegible]16			CHIN	[illegible]	
CHEN, SHU [illegible]	V	[illegible]20	CHIN, [illegible]			0013931			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU [illegible] /7115/[illegible]		C1[illegible]C75	CHIN,[illegible]		CHINT	0153129			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU [illegible] /7115/[illegible]		[illegible]17	CHIN	FIN	CCOM	0767[illegible]			CHIN	UK	
CHEN, SHU [illegible] /7115/[illegible]	A	[illegible]20				0191[illegible]			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-[illegible] /7115/2[illegible]/1631		[illegible]06	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CCOMT	0[illegible]196			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-[illegible]	V	[illegible]17	CHIN,PEIPING		CHINT	0107336			CHIN	CHIN	[illegible]
CHEN, SHU [illegible] /7115/[illegible]		15[illegible]	CHIN,[illegible] CHEN [illegible]		CHINT	0179426			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-[illegible] /7115/[illegible]		[illegible]	CHIN, HENG YANG HSIEN, HUN	ARMY	CNAT	0[illegible]			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-[illegible]		[illegible]39	CHIN, CHEKIANG	INT	CCOM	0[illegible]			CHIN	[illegible]	
CHEN, SHU-[illegible]		21[illegible]21	CHIN, SHANGHAI		CHINT	0[illegible]			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU [illegible] /7115/2[illegible]	V	[illegible]	CHIN, SZECHWAN		CHINT	0144758			CHIN	TAIW	

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All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions *must be* destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.

b. *Non-Standard Listings*

Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:

(1) Country of location

(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)

(3) Citizenship

(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)

(5) Occupation.

These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAF covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords:

(a) Surname

(b) Given name

(c) Date of birth

(d) Country of birth

(e) Citizenship

(f) OI code

(g) Location

Sorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice.

c. *Scheduled Listings*

Standard and non-standard listings printed semiannually.

d. *Special Listings*

Unscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements.

e. *Request for Listings*

All requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer.

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
Attachment 2

15 November 1974

AUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS

Note: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people.

1. *Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)*

   a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above.

   b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches.

   c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (GID).

   (Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.)

2. *British Commonwealth*

   a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services.

   b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS).

   c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given.

   d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP-SS).

3. *Cuba*

   Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI).

4. *Israel*

   a. All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/ISR should be indicated as the originating office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest.

   b. Military attaches.

   c. Assistant military attaches.

   d. Identified intelligence officers.

5. *North Vietnam*

All diplomats and NFLSV (PRG) officials stationed abroad.

6. *USSR*

a. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office.

b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna.

c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.

d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning.

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70-1-1
CSHB ~~43-1-1~~
CHAPTER III

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

ANNEX B

PERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS

1. A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number.

2. The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or functional area of interest.

3. It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations up-to-date listings containing information under the control

Rscn by Annex B to Chap III to CSHB 70-1-1 dtd 1 Oct 61

of the Cuban desk on the dramatis personae. In addition to 201 personalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying data of persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be of tangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data other than that given in the listing itself.

4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system, identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is not yet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbers of the following type but in the same series:

IDN-123457

These are relabeled "201" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are carried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings, where they are identified by the letter "I" in the "Type of Name" column. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers.

5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters, either upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatch is written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number for it may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file number in the dispatch form as follows:

Dispatch Symbol and No. XYZA-12345
Headquarters File No. 201-

6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon the request of stations or desks which are developing special identification programs within the 201 system. The field receives current notification of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index Card Service.

7. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system.

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Rafael Trujillo, the Dominican dictator, was assassinated at about ten p.m. on the night of 30 May 1961. It was Trujillo's custom to visit one of his mistresses at his ranch at San Cristobal about once a week. On most of his travels he rode in a Chrysler with bullet-proof glass and with security guards riding in accompanying cars. He departed from this practice on his periodic trips to San Cristobal and substituted a highly stereotyped pattern of action: after his nightly walk, he dismissed his companions; changed into a khaki uniform; and set out for San Cristobal in an unescorted 1957 Chevrolet, always driven by the same chauffeur.

On the night of the slaying, the Chevrolet was intercepted on a four-lane highway on the outskirts of Ciudad Trujillo by eight armed assassins in three cars. Trujillo was killed by gunfire, and his body was removed from the scene by the assassins. Trujillo's chauffeur was seriously wounded, was left behind by the assassins, and survived. All of the assassins escaped from the scene. One was never caught and was eventually granted amnesty. Two were killed while resisting arrest. The others ... were arrested, confessed, and were later executed before coming to trial. About eight or nine others, who were in on or knew of the plot but did not participate in the actual assassination, were killed while in custody, while resisting arrest, or by suicide to avoid arrest and torture.

(Note: We use the term "plotters" to refer to all of those involved in this attempt to overthrow Trujillo. "Assassins" refers to the small group that actually did the killing.)

There were reports in Ciudad Trujillo at the time that the U.S. Consulate had been in some way involved with the plotters. Eventually, after the surviving plotters were granted amnesty, many of the details came out. Norman Gall, a reporter with the San Juan Star, wrote an article that appeared in The New Republic issue of 13 April 1963. Excerpts follow:

> The assassination of the Dominican Republic's Rafael L. Trujillo was carried out with assistance from the US Central Intelligence Agency. Arms for the May 30, 1961 slaying of the 69-year-old dictator on a lonely stretch of highway near his capital were smuggled by the CIA into the country at the request of the assassins.
>
> The CIA began shipping arms to the Dominican Republic in late 1960, following a series of talks between US Consul Henry Dearborn, Chief Political Officer John Barfield of the US Consulate, and Luis Amiama Tio. Also involved in the plot was Antonio Imbert, who had been Governor of Porto Plata province.
>
> As Trujillo's political and financial problems deepened, talks continued between Dearbon, Barfield and leaders of the anti-Trujillo conspiracy. Toward the end of 1960, contact was established between Amiama and a CIA agent who . . . was named Plato Cox.
>
> The key link between the assassins and the CIA in the arms shipments was a long-time American civilian resident of Ciudad Trujillo, Lorenzo Berry, otherwise known as "Wimpy," who operated a supermarket in a fashionable neighborhood where Trujillo also lived. "Wimpy" was put under brief arrest after the killing but was later allowed to leave the country.
>
> The weapons were imported in small parts, to be assembled later by the plotters, among the routine grocery shipments for the supermarket arriving regularly in the capital's port. The

gun parts entered the Republic in specially-marked food cans, which were later turned over to the conspirators.

Plans for the intended assassination were worked out during the same period in which the abortive assault on Cuba was being prepared. However, when the CIA-organized April 17, 1961, invasion at the Bay of Pigs failed and world attention was focused on Washington's complicity in that operation, a postponement of the attempt on Trujillo's life was ordered because of the embarrassment another such failure might cause the United States. But the order to hold up came too late. The needed weapons were already in the hands of the conspirators, who refused appeals by Dearborn and Barfield to delay the assassination. They insisted on moving at the first opportunity. This came on May 30, when Trujillo and his chauffeur drove out into the country in an unescorted 1957 Chevrolet for a rendezvous at a San Cristobal estate, La Fundacion, with Trujillo's 20-year-old mistress, Mona Sanchez.

It can be reported on excellent authority that close associates of the slain dictator knew of the US role within a few days following the killing.

Dearborn, Barfield and Berry had meanwhile been rushed out of the Dominican Republic by US officials. . . . . . Since the ouster of the Trujillos, Berry ("Wimpy") has returned to operate his handsomely appointed supermarket, where he greets customers with calm and courtesy, as if Trujillo had never lived.

We interviewed Richard Bissell (then DD/P), J. C. King (then Chief, WH Division), and J. D. Esterline (then Chief of Operations, WH Division). King recalls the Agency's role as being limited to monitoring internal plotting against the Trujillo regime "but not pushing or instigating." Esterline, like King, recalls that the Agency was not directly involved in coup plotting. He described the

furnishing of weapons as a symbol--something that would constitute tangible evidence of U.S. support. Bissell remembers the Agency role as being somewhat more positive than that described by King and Esterline. He viewed the Agency's role as one of giving support to an indigenous group whose intended actions were in the U.S. interest. He described the affair as "a fairly normal operation involving meetings, discussions, and formal approvals." We do not have firm information as to whether or not any of the weapons supplied by CIA were actually used in the assassination of Trujillo. Both Esterline and King believe they were not. Bissell, however, has a vague impression that one of them was.

The Agency officers most immediately involved with the plotters are now widely scattered. Lear Reed, who was chief of station until October 1960, is now retired. Robert Owen, who was chief of station at the time of the assassination, is in Paris. Charles Cookson, the station's operations officer, is in Brazil. Isabel Cintron, the station's administrative assistant who was used as a communications link and in the passing of the arms, resigned in 1964 and is believed to be living in Puerto Rico. Ned Holman, the headquarters branch chief, is in Guatemala City. We elected not to call back any of these people for interviews. While they might be able

to furnish minor details that are missing from the written records, we think it unlikely that they would be able to add significantly to the quite complete record that appears in the EMDEED operational files.

Agency activities aimed at replacing the Trujillo regime were assigned the cryptonym EMDEED. One segment of EMDEED was known as EMSLEW, the cryptonym for the operation to remove Trujillo by violent action. We have reviewed the voluminous EMDEED files. Most of this account is drawn from them. Many of the more significant documents were not put into the EMDEED files but were kept in a private file by J. C. King. He made that file available to us. We also have studied another particularly useful document. The Dominican Military Intelligence Service (SIM) officer put in charge of the investigation of the Trujillo assassination was a navy lieutenant named Ortiz. The Dominican Republic assigned him to its embassy in Ottawa in November 1961 when the Trujillo family's attempt to regain power failed. The New York field office of the FBI held extensive interviews with him from 6 April through 10 May 1962. The result was a massively-detailed, 182-page report on the plot and on the assassination as reconstructed by the SIM from its interrogations of the persons it apprehended.

(the [illegible] operational files)
From the records, ~~we can trace the origins and the course of~~ U.S. policy with respect to the overthrow of Trujillo. We also can ascertain from the files the nature and the extent of U.S. support of the plotters, including the passing to them of weapons out of the U.S. Consulate in Ciudad Trujillo. What we cannot discover from the files, despite quite massive documentation, is how the coup group was organized. The best single account we find, and it is not wholly accurate, is in a book by Robert Crassweller.* The main flaw in the story is its failure to identify the individuals with whom the U.S. Government was actually working. Excerpts follow:

> The plot was organized on the basis of two groups of conspirators linked together by a liaison that later proved too fragile to bear the stresses laid upon it. Each group had its purpose and its separate personnel.
>
> The function of the Action Group was to assassinate Trujillo and immediately present proof of its succes, in the form of Trujillo's corpse, to the second group, the Political Group. The latter would then launch a coup, taking over the machinery of the government and the Armed Forces.
>
> The Action Group consisted of eight men. It appears to have been organized originally by General Antonio Imbert Barreras and Salvador Estrella. . . . . . They were joined by Lieut. Amado Garcia Guerrero, a member of the military corps attached to Trujillo in the National Palace; Antonio de la Maza, the brother of Octavio de la Maza, who had been killed by the government because of his involvement in the

* Robert D. Crassweller, Trujillo: The Life and Times of a Caribbean Dictator (New York: MacMillan Co., 1966)

Galindez case; Huascar Tejeda; Roberto Pastoriza; and Pedro Livio Cedeno. The eighth member, Manuel Caceres Tunti, was in Moca on the night of the 30th and saw none of the action.

The Political Group had a less distinct membership. It included Luis Amiama Tio, Modesto Diaz, General Juan Tomas Diaz, and several others. At the very top it had the support of General Roman Fernandez, Secretary of State for the Armed Forces, and his brother Bibin. . . . . .

The over-all authority appears to have centered principally in General Diaz, probably the only one who had sufficient prestige to command authority. . . . . .

The Action Group would remain in daily readiness. When information in the Palace indicated that Trujillo was going to drive to Estancia Fundacion . . . Garcia Guerrero in the Palace would inform the others by personal message. . . . . .

The expected message from Garcia Guerrero in the Palace came to the patient plotters at seven o'clock on the evening of May 30. They were not fully prepared and coordinated at this moment, but the emotional and impetuous de la Maza threatened to act by himself if the others lagged. In any event, the plan went into execution. . . . . . Each of them had his revolver or pistol, and de la Maza also had his own sawed-off shotgun and two M-1 semiautomatic rifles. . . . . .

The conspiracy began to come apart within an hour. Never very professionally contrived, the plot was hastened prematurely to its culmination by the impatience of de la Maza, and it was now afflicted with bad luck and ineptitude. Immediately after the assassination, the men of the Action Group were unable to reach General Roman. . . . . .

The Political Group of the conspiracy never took up its planned role. The Action Group scattered, leaving a trail as wide as a boulevard. Trujillo's body was left in the trunk of de la Maza's car, parked in the garage of General Tomas Diaz, where the police found it in a few hours. The conspirators were all hunted down very quickly, except for Amiama and Imbert, who managed to conceal themselves for months until the danger had passed.

The FBI report of its interviews of Ortiz, the SIM investigator, gives an excellent account of why the plot fell apart after the assassination took place. One of the assassins, Pedro Livio Cedeno, was seriously wounded (probably by fire from his own companions). All of the assassins assembled at General Diaz' house after the killing. One of them called a friend, Dr. Robert Reid Cabral, to treat Livio. Dr. Reid found him so badly injured that surgery would be required. Reid and two of the assassins took Livio to a hospital. While in delirium he mumbled the names "de la Maza" and "Juan Tomas." The police immediately picked up two brothers of Antonio de la Maza. Neither was personally involved in the plot, but both knew the details and the names of most of the assassins. General Diaz, Antonio de la Maza, and Lieut. Garcia Guerrero were killed resisting arrest. Amiama and Imbert went into hiding and survived. The rest were caught and interrogated followingtorture. All confessed.

The confessions led to identification of persons who were in or on the fringes of the Political Group: General Roman and his brother, Amiama Tio, General Garcia Urbaez, General Guarionex Estrella, Tomas Baez Diaz, Modesto Diaz, and Miguel Angel Baez Diaz. Lorenzo Berry (Wimpy) was identified as a communications link between the plotters and the U.S. Consulate. However, the SIM did not

discover the identities of the political plotters with whom the Consulate was actually working, because neither of the men who might have known the identities were available for interrogation. Amiami Tio escaped and General Diaz was killed.

Although the identities and the intention of the Action Group were fairly widely known to persons not actually members of it, there appears to have been excellent compartmentation between the Political and the Action Groups--perhaps too much compartmentation. The assassination itself was well planned. General Diaz was in over-all charge of the operation, but de la Maza was the one who did all of the work. He took three cars to a local garage and had the engines rebuilt so that the cars could reach speeds of 120 mph. He had possession of the weapons from the U.S. Consulate, plus several of his own. He and the other participants took the cars to the site selected for the killing and conducted dry runs each night. Everything was ready and the assassins were lying in wait for Trujillo on the night of 23 May. At the last minute he decided not to go to San Cristobal because he wasn't feeling too well. The assassins continued their dry runs each evening. After the assassination was carried out, essentially as it had been planned, the coup that was to follow failed--in part because of bad luck, in part because of poor planning, and in part because of too much compartmentation.

General Roman, who was to take over the government after Trujillo's death, was not told that the assassination was to be attempted on May 30th. After the slaying, General Diaz tried to telephone General Roman but could not reach him. Diaz then took the car with Trujillo's body still in its trunk and drove to Roman's house. He saw so many soldiers in the vicinity that he gave up and returned home, leaving the car in the driveway with the body still in the trunk, where it was later found by the police.

What had happened was this: Former general and former head of the SIM, Arturo Espaillat, happened to chance upon the scene while the assassination was taking place. He was out for a drive with his wife dnd was passed by a car that he recognized as Trujillo's. He stopped at a drive-in restaurant and almost immediately heard shooting ahead, which he suspected involved Trujillo. He drove to the scene, saw what was happening, turned around, and sped back into town. He stopped at a military installation and gave the alarm and then drove to the home of General Roman to alert him. He and Roman then returned to the scene of the assassination, arriving simultaneously with the police. The police found Trujillo's chauffeur, who was wounded but still alive. Roman and Espaillat then went to the hospital to try to question the chauffeur. Thus, General Diaz could not reach General Roman to inform Roman that

Trujillo had been killed and that it was time for Roman to make his move to take over the government. Roman knew only that there had been a shooting involving Trujillo and that Trujillo was missing. He did not know whether General Diaz' group was involved in it or not. He was reluctant to move until he was sure that Trujillo was dead. By the time Roman concluded that Trujillo must be dead, it was too late for him to act; Hector Trujillo and Johnny Abbes had already taken charge. Roman did make a couple of feeble tries at engineering a take over, but it is apparent that he had no real advance plan nor any appreciable chances of succeeding.

The assassination itself and the plotting preceding it took place against a background of international activity in opposition to the Trujillo regime, with both the OAS and the U.S. taking clear-cut stands. These are some of the highlights:

a. A briefing paper prepared in WH Division for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 1960 states that a revolt was planned for December 1959 in the Dominican Republic but was delayed pending receipt of arms from Venezuela. The plot was discovered and was rolled up in January. Venezuela brought charges in the OAS that the Dominican Republic was "in flagrant violation of human rights, freedom, and democracy" following the mass arrests in the Dominican Republic in January 1960. A committee of the

OAS assigned to investigate the charges reported on 8 June 1960 that the Dominican government was guilty as charged.

b. A near-miss assassination attempt against President Betancourt on 24 June 1960 killed two in his entourage and injured him and several others. The Venezuelan government announced after capture of most of the assassins that the Dominican government was responsible for the attempt on Betancourt's life and took its case to the OAS. On 20 August, the OAS voted sanctions against the Dominican Republic. Under Secretary of State Dillon, testifying before the House Agriculture Committee on 24 August in support of a request by President Eisenhower for a cut in the Dominican Republic's sugar quota, is reported as having said that it was hoped that economic sanctions would result in the downfall of Trujillo's dictatorship and its replacement by a moderate and free regime. The United States severed diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic on 26 August 1960, although consular relations were continued.

As a further prelude to a chronological review of operation EMDEED/EMBLEW, we think it would be useful to identify the people involved, especially since officers of the Department of State played a very prominent role.

Washington - Department of State

Roy R. Rubottom	Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Frank Devine	Special Assistant to Rubottom
John C. Hill	Special Assistant to Rubottom

Washington - CIA

J. C. King	Chief, WH Division
Ned Holman	Chief, Branch III, WH Division

Ciudad Trujillo - Department of State

Joseph S. Farland	Ambassador until 28 June 1960. It is pertinent to note that King and Esterline attribute U.S. and CIA involvement

with the plotters in the Dominican Republic to Ambassador Farland. They describe him as a former FBI employee who considered himself quite a clandestine operator. Esterline, who later served under him in Panama, called him "a wild man who bugged the Agency to support a move to assassinate Trujillo." He had direct dealings with a number of the key plotters.

Henry Dearborn	Counsellor of Embassy until 26 August 1960 and Consul General thereafter. He used the code name DELTA in correspondence with the plotters.
John D. Barfield	Second Secretary until 26 August 1960 and a consular officer thereafter. CIA cryptonym: EMDAZE-1

Ciudad Trujillo - CIA

Lear Reed	Chief of Station until October 1960
Robert Owen	Chief of Station from 20 January until 4 June 1961. Code name used with the plotters: GALGO
Charles Cookson	Operations Officer
Isabel Cintron	Administrative Assistant

Key Dominican Plotters

Dr. Jordi Brossa	Code names: SWORD and EL CHICO
Juan Vicini	Code Names: Mr. X, ABC, and YAGUATE
Luis Baquero	Code name: SOCRATES

S. Thomas Stocker	An American in the Dominican Republic with whom the station had had an earlier unhappy experience. The consulate preferred to have nothing to do with him, but the Dominican plotters brought him in as a cutout to the consulate. He took delivery from Lorenzo Berry of three carbines passed to Berry from the U.S. Consulate for use by the plotters. He held them for a few days and then gave them back when Berry insisted they be returned. Berry then passed them to one of the assassins.
Dr. Severo Cabral	Code names: HECTOR and PLUTARCO
Jose Francisco Tapia	
Aulio Brea	
Andres Freitas	Code name: ANDY
Luis Amiama Tio	
Jose Rene Roman	
Juan Tomas Diaz	Code name: CRISTOBAL
Donald Reid Cabral	Code name: CIBAO
Lorenzo D. Berry	"Wimpy" - Berry is a U.S. citizen who owed Wimpy's Supermarket in Ciudad Trujillo. He was the main communications link between the plotters and the U.S. Consulate. The weapons furnished the plotters were actually passed to Berry.
Flerida Berry	Wimpy's wife - a Dominican citizen of Syrian extraction. She appears to have been even more active in the plot than her husband. It was she who had the contacts with the Dominicans involved.

Most communications between the Dominican plotters and the U.S. Consulate were by means of written notes. Mrs. Berry received the notes from or passed them to either the Consul General's secretary or the CIA Station's administrative assistant.

Two documents provide a useful point of departure, from an historical point of view. One is a semi-official letter from Ambassador Farland in the Dominican Republic to Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom. The other document is an internal CIA staff paper revealing the relatively passive role that had been played by CIA prior to 1960.

16 November 1959

Ambassador Farland wrote an "Official-Informal" memorandum to Rubottom reporting that "the underground is more active today than ever in the history of the Trujillo regime." He described the principal opposition group as being about 2,000 strong. He said:

> ". . . within this group there is growing militant anti-American feeling based on the premise that the United States should actively aid the Dominican revolutionary (sic) for the overthrow of the Trujillo regime. Discussions I have heard on this subject show an appalling lack of understanding of the position of the United States and its adopted doctrine of non-intervention. . . . . . This group is in possession of clandestine broadcasting equipment which will go into operation when the strike is made. CAS has been informed and joins with me in suggesting that you pass this information to J. C. King."

15 February 1960

A CIA staff paper, addressed to Chief, WH Division, discusses a plan for improving intelligence coverage of the Dominican Republic in the event of Trujillo's removal from power. The objectives stated in the paper were to ensure orderly transition in the event Trujillo abdicated or was deposed and to prevent a takeover by Castro-type forces. The following excerpt reveals the level of CIA activity in the Dominican Republic prior to that time:

> "The COS Ciudad Trujillo conducts no covert operations; however, his official contacts with Generalissimo Trujillo and with the Chief of the Dominican Security Services has enabled him on occasion to assess the attitudes and reactions of the Trujillo government to internal opposition activities and to criticisms of and activities directed against the Dominican government by exiles and other American governments unfriendly to the Dominican regime."

10 March 1960

This is the date of the first draft that appears in Agency files of a plan to persuade Trujillo to retire. The originator of the draft is not shown, but it was to be forwarded to President Eisenhower from General Edwin Clark, a friend of the President from their years of military service. The plan was for Clark to approach Trujillo, with whom he had been on good terms in the past, and attempt to persuade Trujillo to retire. It was to be pointed out that there was

no one who could succeed him, and that to protect his family and to preserve his image as El Benefactor, he should step down and allow asylum to be arranged for him. His family would have the wealth already outside the Dominican Republic, and the fortune inside would be placed in trust, to be administered by internationally-known personages for the benefit of the Dominican people.

This proposition received high-level attention in Washington, including that of President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Herter, and Allen Dulles. In approving Clark's approach to Trujillo, the President specified that Clark should travel as a representative of the State Department, rather than as a personal emissary of the President. General Clark traveled to the Dominican Republic and met with Trujillo on 27 March. By the time of the meeting it appears that it had been decided that the plan would be presented as merely that of private citizen Clark, and that was what was done. The station thought it likely that Trujillo recognized the official U.S. Government hand in the proposal. Of course, nothing came of the meeting.

22 March 1960

Ambassador Farland, in a TOP SECRET memorandum to Rubottom, forwarded a plan of a Dominican group plotting Trujillo's overthrow

bearing the code name "Operation Lancet." It was basically a proposal for a course of political action reinforced by the threat of being backed by muscle. The operation was to begin with the arrival of a "special U.S. confidential envoy" who would tell Trujillo to leave the country. "He tells it plainly and decisively; he will give him 12 or 18 hours to do it." It would be made clear that if Trujillo refused, a border incident would be contrived, which would be followed by "collective intervention." Assuming Trujillo's acceptance of the ultimatum, the plan then outlined steps for transition to an operating representative government. The army would be reduced in size. A caretaker government would prepare for free elections. Ambassador Farland forwarded the plan with these comments of his own to Rubottom:

> " . . . this segment of the dissidents is psychologically conditioned to a point where it will take any step except the ultimate, and for the execution of the latter they expect United States assistance. . . . .
>
> "Dick, I think the time has come for certain agencies of our Government, without attribution, to establish and implement a definite constructive program to influence the course of events in the Dominican Republic. My conversations with the Secretary and Allen Dulles emphasized the problems and the possibilities of this type of approach. . . . . "

<u>30 March & 7 April 1960</u>

The Special Group considered actions that might be taken in the

event of a flare-up in the Dominican Republic. On 30 March, fearing that Cuba might be involved, there was talk of evacuating U.S. civilians from Guantanamo. There was also discussion of the possibility of sealing off the land entrance to the Dominican Republic from Haiti and of the problem of providing asylum for Trujillo. On 7 April, there was further talk of sealing off the country if Trujillo fell, and an appraisal was made of the chances of his leaving willingly:

> " . . . it is evident that Trujillo will not consider making any arrangements for orderly succession to himself, but that he will either hang on to the bitter end or flee the country on short notice, a la Batista."

9 April 1960

State sent a cable to Farland through CIA channels, from which the following is an extract:

> "Could you, if so instructed, make appropriate arrangements within next few weeks with appropriate civil and military dissident elements to take over the GODR? You would be authorized to indicate to them that as soon as they had seized power they should immediately request United States recognition, and ask for United States military assistance under Article Three of the Rio Treaty in the event of actual or threatened Castro-sponsored invasions or of threatened insurrection incited by pro-Castro or pro-Communist elements within or outside Dominican Republic . . .
>
> "What, if any, aid would be essential to dissident elements prior to takeover . . . . . "

"FYI wish to emphasize strongly that above is for contingency planning purposes only and in no way indicates higher authority at present contemplates such action. . . . . "

11 April 1960

Farland cabled his reply through CIA channels, in part as follows:

"Under instruction, it would be possible for me to make arrangements with appropriate civilian dissidents whose leaders are known to me including names their selectees for top governmental positions, and with one military dissident, a general, who is expecting an exchange of passwords for purpose secret discussions. . . . .

"Regardless of . . . seething unrest which exists, indications reflect Dominican dissidents, who are admittedly poorly armed, loosely organized and lack working liaison with military dissidents, will find it difficult to effect take-over of GODR without existence one or more or combination of following developments (which we summarize below):

(1) Clandestine arms shipments, with sabotage materiel.

(2) An invasion to serve as a signal to the populace.

(3) Implementation of the dissidents' "Operation Lancet."

(4) Advance psychological conditioning by radio.

(5) "Incapacitation or assassination of Trujillo."

(6) A careful step-by-step plan for the period preceding the coup and for the period following it.

Farland stated a need for "minimum but key cooperation" from Dominican military dissidents. He added:

"One of the greatest contributions U.S. could make to dissidents would be to let them know we are prepared to assist

them; transmission of armament and sabotage material . . . could fully substantiate this cooperation. . . . . . "

9 May 1960

A memorandum addressed to Chief, WH Division, and signed by P.E. Oberst, Chief, WH/CA, reports steps taken or recommended for improving CIA's capabilities in the Dominican Republic. The paper refers to the need for covert action assets, principally to obstruct infiltration of Communists or Fidelistas. Among things recommended were: placement of a junior officer in the embassy; assignment of a full-time officer to the headquarters desk for the covert action program; authorization to use Jose Figueres in third country operations; development of a contingency PM plan in the event Trujillo fell and hostile forces attempted to seize power, and establishment of a "U.S. Committee for Democracy in the Dominican Republic."

A memorandum written of a debriefing of Ambassador Farland reads, in part, as follows:

> "The dissidents need guns and ammunition from the United States. In particular they need a small number of high-powered rifles with telescopic lenses. The Ambassador said that he saw no problem in the purchase and delivery clandestinely of the arms to the dissidents. But he said, of course, this raises the question of whether the U.S. Government wants to engage in this activity.
>
> "Col. King said that this of course is a policy decision. He said that CIA could deliver the arms if this is the group we want to support.

(Comment: Farland was in Washington for consultations. Although he is listed as having served as Ambassador until 28 June 1960, it appears that he did not actually return to duty in Ciudad Trujillo. His successor, Vinton Chapin, was nominated 13 June, but he never took the post.)

3 June 1960

Farland met with Nelson H. Smith, the Dominican desk officer in WH Division. They compared lists of dissidents to see if the names CIA had were those with whom Farland had been dealing. Farland said, "Those are the boys all right." Smith's memorandum of the meeting includes this comment:

> "Farland then told me that the underground opposition are planning to assassinate Trujillo. He said that it is planned to use a powerful bomb which could be planted along the route of Trujillo's nightly walk and could be detonated by a remote-control firing device. He intimated that this plan is pretty well along and could be executed at any time."

Undated Working Paper (filed between papers dated 25 May and 13 June)

The author is not identified nor is there any indication that the proposal was approved. Its objective was stated thus: "To precipitate the downfall of the Trujillo regime by 1 August or as soon as possible thereafter." It proposed that the U.S. become a prime motive force against the Trujillo regime. "In the event Trujillo

refused to abdicate, consideration should be given to other covert or overt actions designed to effect his removal from the scene." A deadline of 1 July was proposed for completing arrangements.

17 June 1960

Henry Dearborn, who was in charge in the Ambassador's absence, queried State through CIA channels, asking for confirmation on certain points for a meeting he was having with a dissident leader, Dr. Jordi Brossa. He stated his understanding of the U.S. position as follows:

a. The U.S. is not prepared to take overt action against the Trujillo government while it is in full control.

b. The U.S. is prepared to assist the opposition clandestinely to develop effective forces to accomplish Trujillo's overthrow.

c. Assistance must continue to be channeled covertly until such time as the dissidents establish a provisional government which controls a substantial section of the Dominican Republic.

20 June 1960

Dearborn, again through CIA channels, asked Rubottom and Farland if he could make the same statements concerning U.S. policy in a meeting with Juan Vicini, another dissident leader. Farland replied in the affirmative.

28 June 1960

Dearborn cabled the results of his first meeting with Juan Vicini. He said that Vicini felt that the time to concentrate on, for planning purposes, was the period extending through the "incapacitation" of Trujillo; too much planning for what would follow risked exposure. Dearborn said that he agreed.

Also on 28 June (although the first written record we find is a summary memorandum prepared on 18 October), Rubottom told J.C. King that the Government of the United States was prepared to participate in the overthrow of the Trujillo regime to the following extent: "to provide a small number of sniper rifles or other devices for the removal of key Trujillo people from the scene. . . . . ." Rubottom added that the U.S. Government was not prepared, at this time, to send arms, equipment, or paramilitary experts to assist the undergound to accomplish a revolt.

29 June 1960

Dearborn cabled the results of his meeting with Dr. Brossa. He said that Brossa had recommended a temporary standdown on "action toward incapacitation of Trujillo" while determining Venezuela's reaction to the Trujillo assassination plot against Betancourt.

Dearborn reported that the dissidents had a capability for picking up arms at sea and for caching in nearby caves. He also described an airdrop site.

1 July 1960

A memorandum addressed to the Acting DCI recommended approval for the delivering of weapons to the Dominican dissidents.

> "It is proposed to procure and deliver to underground opposition forces in the Dominican Republic 12 sterile U.S. rifles, Model 1903 (Springfield), with telescopic sights, together with five hundred rounds of ammunition for same. . . . . . It is planned to deliver these weapons by air through DPD facilities provided arrangements can be worked out with the opposition for their reception. If they cannot be delivered by air, plans are currently being studied in the CA staff for delivery by sea.
>
> "Approval for delivery of these arms has been given by Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottom, who requests that the arms be placed in the hands of the opposition at the earliest possible moment.

The memorandum was signed by Rudy Gomez for Chief, WH Division; was concurred in by Richard Helms as Acting DD/P; and was approved by C. P. Cabell on 2 July 1960 as Acting DCI.

Dearborn was informed by cable of plans to airdrop twelve 30.03 Springfields, with ammunition, and with sights "fixed and sighted." The cable asked for the coordinates of a suitable drop site and for a four-man reception team with flashlights. The cable

added that, "If air drop delivery not possible, Hqs now studying means of effecting delivery by sea if deemed more practicable."

8 July 1960

Headquarters cabled Dearborn, in part:

> " . . . imperative learn from /Juan Vicini/ and/or /Dr. Jordi Brossa/ what plans and capabilities are to be employed simultaneously with action to incapacitate Trujillo and what is needed in way of material support for implementation of plan of action. Of particular importance is info re extent of military participation in preparations. In spite of /Vicini/ apparent lack of knowledge of opposition organization, most logical that he is actively collaborating with a group that must have some plan and capability for action which will assure stable interim government after removal of Trujillo. . . . . . In your opinion are /Vicini/ and /Brossa/ members of same group or if not could the two groups be merged? . . . . . "

8 September 1960

The Special Group discussed a letter drafted by the Department of State for delivery to Trujillo (copy in CIA files dated 6 September) proposing that he step down. The DCI (Mr. Dulles) doubted the wisdom of putting such a proposal in writing. He preferred a personal approach. The Group concluded that a personal approach would be best and discussed William Pawley as a candidate for the job.

18 October 1960

Chief, WH Division, prepared a memorandum summarizing approvals

obtained for action in support of the Dominican internal opposition. The text states that the summary was "provided in response to your verbal request on 13 October 1960 . . . " This is the memorandum to which reference is made earlier under the entry for 28 June 1960.

29 December 1960

The minutes of the Special Group meeting of this date read, in part:

> "Bissel gave the broad outlines of a two-pronged plan for proceeding with certain limited covert activities directed against the Trujillo regime. He emphasized that although support would be given to the Figueres group there is no intention of establishing a paramilitary force as such . . . . . He also emphasized that the proposed actions would not of themselves bring about the desired result in the near future, lacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself.
>
> " . . . . . It was noted that Mr. Pawley feels that overt intervention in the Dominican Republic should be mounted simultaneously with the Cuban operations. . . . . . it was agreed that the plan is worth beginning at this time no matter what the eventual decision on overt intervention may be."

(Comment: We find nothing in the files identifiable with such a "plan." We found no other reference to any specific plan of about this date.)

12 January 1961

The following is an excerpt from the minutes of a meeting of the

Special Group on this date:

"Mr. Merchant explained the feeling of the Department of State that limited supplies of small arms and other material should be made available for dissidents inside the Dominican Republic. Mr. Parrott said that we believe this can be managed securely by CIA, and that the plan would call for final transportation into the group being provided by the dissidents themselves. The Group approved the project."

19 January 1961

Cable from headquarters:

"For Dearborn: FYI and use as you consider adviseable, authority has been given Hqs for delivery to internal front of limited supply of small arms and other material on condition that introduction of material into DomRep be effected by Doms. . . . . . Above coordinated with State."

24 January 1961

Memorandum for the record of a discussion of Project EMDEED by members of the CA Staff and of WH Division:

"It was confirmed (from Mr. Parrott by phone) that the Special Group now has approved that a 'limited supply' of small arms and related equipment may be provided covertly to the Dominican resistance elements with whom we have been dealing. This was additional to the Special Group's approval on 29 December 1960 of our Operational Proposal."

(Comment: As noted in the entry for 29 December, we know none of the specifics of this Operational Proposal.)

31 January 1961

"Official-Informal" letter from Dearborn to Devine in State Department:

"With regard to the delivery of exotic equipment, my friends were of course delighted that such a decision had been made. I hope that it will not be necessary to play down too long the question of actual delivery since they are eager and expectant and too great tardiness on our part would only lead them to question our sincerity."

6 February 1961

Cable from headquarters:

"1. Realize details not now available but Hqs would appreciate /dissidents'/ reaction to offer of armed assistance to include /dissidents'/ current plan . . .

"2. Also request /Robert Owen's/ initial assessment /dissidents'/ capability carry out plan of action once limited armed assistance provided."

10 February 1961

The station cabled its reply:

"No solid reaction except joy as of 9 Feb.

"Initial assessment is /Brossa and Vicini/ could not carry out plan. But with access /Dr. Severo Cabral/ he now approaching point when will better be able evaluate group potential for action. We some weeks away from being able make solid preliminary assessment.

"Suggest KUBARK consider sending in each pouch one small

size high fire power weapon so at least gesture in right direction can be made if we all thrown out. Ammo could come later."

14 February 1961

At the Special Group meeting of this date, Mr. Bundy:

" . . . asked that a memorandum be prepared for higher authority on the subject of what plans can be made for a successor government to Trujillo."

(Comment: We did not find a copy of such a memorandum in CIA files.)

15 February 1961

Ned Holman, the headquarters branch chief, met with Juan Vicini and Donald Reid Cabral in New York City. Excerpts from his memorandum record of the meeting follow:

" . . . . . Vicini played down somewhat the necessity for delivery of arms, although he did say that it is desireable and should be a part of the planning. He said that members of the opposition could, if they wanted to, obtain small quanitities of arms from Army contacts . . . but that any arms so obtained would have to be used very quickly before their loss is discovered. For this reason, he said it would be desireable to have arms delivered by us that could be stored for use at any moment desired.

"Vicini said that the object of obtaining this kind of help anyway is the elimination of Trujillo and instead of using arms or grenades he began to speak of more exotic materiels and methods . . . a powerful bomb that could be planted along the route of Trujillo's evening walk and could be detonated from a nearby

electronic device . . . (or) . . . the possibility of poisoning the dictator's food or of putting poison capsules in bottles of certain medicines that the dictator is known to take regularly. . . . . .

"A less exotic and more practical plan that they put forward was one that they said had already been planned at one time before. They said that when the dictator leaves his office for his home there are three automobiles in his procession with the dictator himself in the first automobile and the bodyguards in the following two. The idea that has been discussed internally is for several trucks to block the progress of these cars at a given intersection at which time young men who belong to the action groups would leap out of the trucks with fire arms and grenades to finish off the dictator."

4 March 1961

Headquarters pouched to the station a copy of Holman's memorandum of his meeting with Vicini and Reid. On 4 March, the chief of station cabled his assessment of the plan to intercept Trujillo's entourage and kill him with guns and grenades:

"Vicini idea . . . almost certain fail if applied. That type attack is precisely what bodyguards appear best qualified cope with. Their defense pattern and displacement vehicles plus police practice detour traffic blocks away from entourage make Vicini idea fatally childish in Owen's view."

(Comment: The assassination was actually carried out through a variation of this scheme. The assassins detected and took advantage of a stereotyped pattern in Trujillo's movements in which he rode at night, unescorted, on little traveled highways.)

The station cabled headquarters on 4 March:

" . . . if opportunity support pro-US group not to be lost, believe . . . imperative make sure arms with ammo ready for immediate entry DomRep . . . if necessary at air drop sites . . . "

5 March 1961

As a follow-up to that cable, the station cabled a communication from Dr. Severo Cabral: "We have in our hands chance to speedup events. Everything is being planned perfectly. Results may be assured as much as human fallibility permits. . . . . . "

7 March 1961

Headquarters cabled the field, in part:

"Existing authorization precludes introduction arms into Dom Rep by U.S. personnel. Order prepare contingency plans for possible alternate delivery method, request station determine additional drop zones and confirm those mentioned . . . . . Request type and quantity arms desired. . . . . . "

8 March 1961

Cable from the station:

"Brossa told Dearborn on 7 March that Dr. Severo Cabral and group plan try kill Trujillo by [intercepting his car] at point near [Wimpy's Supermarket]. Date not set and obviously depends on Trujillo travel . . . Severo Cabral not aware Brossa has told us but interesting that Charge' Papal Nunciatura also aware plot exists but possibly not of personnel involved."

8 March 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"Hqs deeply interested plan . . . and request urgently additional details in order make plans timely assistance. Uncertainty of plans, timing and chances of success precludes Hqs seeking commitment for such speicific assistance as that requested . . . . ."

13 March 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"Following elicited from EMOTH-8 (Andres Freitas): Freitas speaks for Amiama Tio group which includes military members . . . in six brigade Hqs and which have capability, at appropriate time, of taking over military garrisons with arms already at hand, and appointing military/civilian junta in control provisional govt. . . . . . Request following station action with respect Amiama Tio group: A. Identify military membership; B. Assess capabilities as claimed; C. Indicate if assets can be coordinated with overall effort. Hqs places special emphasis on identifying military membership Amiama Tio group. This important for vetting as well as enable assess realistically chances successful takeover."

15 March 1961

Cable from the station:

"Lorenzo (Wimpy) Berry asked [a consulate employee] for small supply fragmentation grenades 'for use in next week or so.' By note, the chief of station checked back with Wimpy and learned the dissident group must do EMSLEW [kill Trujillo] this month or drop it as number of fringe persons with loose mouths are apparently aware renewal plan . . . . . Wimpy asked for five 45 mm (sic) rapid fire weapons or similar, 1,500 rounds ammo for

came, . . . 50 fragmentation grenades, . . . ten 64mm tank rockets. . . . ."

16 March 1961

Headquarters cabled its reply:

"Hqs exploring possibilities for arms delivery and will advise ASAP. Meanwhile, request you clarify soonest: Is Berry making request on own initiative or is he speaking for Dr. Severo Cabral? . . . . . "

17 March 1961

Cable from the station:

"For issue to several /of the dissident group/ Consul General Dearborn requests three 38 caliber Smith and Wesson Special pistols or similar and three small boxes cartridges. If sending ammo complicates problem, advise and we will try get from Marines.

"Chief of Station reiterates suggestion /to send in each pouch one small size high fire power weapon/ as Dearborn increasingly concerned lest momentum which group has now for /assassination/ decline result lack tangible or too slow action on arms by the U.S. Government. Also security these people increasingly of direct interest US Government which each day more involved in /the operation/. Loss of one of key people thru capture could lead revelation details ODYOKE/EMBEED activity. Thus preferable we give them some chance defend themselves against SIM."

18 March 1961

Chief of Station Robert Owen met for the first time with Dr. Severo Cabral. He cabled the results:

"His group [assassination] plan now this: Group knows identity Trujillo's mistress in capital. He visits her once week or once in two weeks. Goes her apartment incognito and lightly guarded. Group apprently has someone in building who can alert them to visit. Dressed as army officers, small group will go to entrance, distract guard with pretext, dispatch him or them in silence, enter apartment and try do [assassination], possibly including mistress, in silence.

"To do they need five M-3 or comparable machine guns and 1500 rounds ammo for personal defense in event firefight. Will use quiet weapons for basic job. . . . . . Severo Cabral's final position was U.S. Government get items here soonest via pouch or similar means. Evident he actually worried that delivery by other means would compromise entire project. Obvious he can count on only one group both receive arms and do [assassination].

"Dr. Severo Cabral expects and willing risk chaos for period of undetermined length after [assassination] mainly because for security reasons his group cannot approach military and hope to get decisive agreement support before [assassination].

20 March 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"Regret no authorization exists to suspend pouch regulations against shipment of arms . . . Will deliver to the group's representatives outside the Dominican Republic if this feasible. Coordinated with State Department."

22 March 1961

The station replied, in part:

" . . . we realize permission does not now exist but Chief of Station knows that he at last two posts received pistols via pouch for worthy purposes, so it can be done. Judging from ref, WH not prepared take this step. If this unalterably so then

please continue try get authorization for air drop of . . . arms . . . or import arms by [other] means. Completely negative plea for arms, whatever delivery method, will end cooperation Severo Cabral and probably by [Wimpy and Mrs. Berry]. *

25 March 1961

The above excerpt is the most significant point in the cable, but the excerpt does not fully reveal the contentious tone of the cable. On 25 March, Headquarters, in a cable released by the DD/P (Bissell) undertook to set Owen straight. The cable gives a fairly complete statement of U.S. policy and objectives and of Owen's responsibilities. It is summarized here. We support a program to replace the Trujillo regime; we wish to avoid precipitate action if planning is not well organized, as appears to be the case; machine guns and ammunition will be supplied to demonstrate good will to the dissidents; the requested revolvers are being pouched. Headquarters is planning with State against the eventuality of sudden action by the dissidents that might result in the forming of a new government. "If above clarifies Hqs position, Owen should proceed accordingly. In event major points remain unclear, State Department preparing orders permit return for consultations."

(Comment: We do not know whether Owen replied to this cable or not. We do not find a reply in the files. Owen did go to headquarters for consultations about 5 April, but we cannot

* It is apparent from the EMDEED operational files that no arms were ever air-dropped or delivered by sea.

establish that the trip was a direct result of this cable. There is some evidence that suggests that the trip may have been in connection with a request from the dissidents for submachine guns.)

26 March 1961

Cable from the station:

"For Dr. Severo Cabral request permission pass three semi-automatic M-1 carbines 30 caliber and supply ammo which available consulate from departed naval personnel. Would need from Hqs nine 30 cartridge magazines for weapons. Request prompted by Severo Cabral note 25 March which says he cannot hold group together beyond April 15 without arms delivery. . . . . ."

(Comment: It may be helpful to interrupt the chronology at this point. As we will later explain, these carbines were actually passed to the dissidents. They were in the hands of Antonio de la Maza, who worked out the details of the assassination and was the lead figure in carrying it out. They almost certainly were taken to the scene of the slaying by the assassins. We have no evidence that any of them were actually fired during the shooting. The little evidence we have suggests that they were not actually used. These three carbines are the weapons referred to by various sources as having been passed to the plotters by CIA. We find no evidence of any other weapons having been passed.)

27 March 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"FYI, ref hardware [the three pistols the station asked be pouched] makes fairly sizeable package if lumped single shipment. Request soonest COS estimate of risk involved sending one package; or whether split shipment preferable."

(Comment: We find no indication in the files that these revolvers were ever actually pouched. We suspect they were not, because the request for them was overtaken by subsequent events.)

29 March 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

" . . . Hqs inclined to favor passing Severo Cabral ref carbines and ammo. Are carbines carried on local installation inventory, thus requiring paper work which may blow CIA's ultimate use? How does station propose to pass weapons in secure manner order avoid other ODACID installation employees becoming witting they being made available to Dominicans? Require Consul General Dearborn's concurrence. . Advise. . . . . . Pouching . . . nine magazines . . . "

31 March 1961

The station replied:

"No inventory problem. No paper work to show CIA in act in anyway. Plan file off serial numbers. Will handle packaging after hours. Only consulate person who knows disposition is Dearborn. Delivery to Wimpy Berry by the station's female administrative assistant or other CIA officer depending on what steps seems best here. Dearborn concurred in request and in this message. We cannot emphasize enough that we must make gesture of

good will to Severo Cabral now. These items are not what he asked for but they are an investment in operational continuity. The security risk in his having these items is no greater than his having similar items delivery which done by more complicated and less secure cache or drop."

Headquarters cable to the station:

"[Passing the three carbines] approved. Advise Hqs when passing of this equipment completed.

(Comment: This cable was released by the DD/P (Bissell).)

7 April 1961

Cable from the station:

"[The pouch forwarding magazines for the three carbines] contained 15-bullet magazines rather than 30-bullet magazines as requested. Pls expedite pouching 9 latter type M-1 carbine magazines."

9 April 1961

Cable from the station:

"[The station's female administrative assistant] passed [the three carbines] to [Wimpy Berry] April 7. No complications."

(Comment: The files do not contain an account of how the carbines were actually passed. As we will later see, headquarters subsequently pouched submachine guns for passing to the dissidents. Headquarters asked for the station's plan for securely passing the submachine guns to the dissidents. The station replied: "Propose use essentially same technique as that for [the three carbines].

[The station's female administrative assistant] driving own car will go to local supermarket [Wimpy Berry's] for usual Saturday morning purchases. Then to consulate to get mail. Will get assist from Chief of Station in loading package or packages into car trunk with groceries. [Station operations officer] will then accompany to administrative assistant's apartment, help take groceries in. If no danger signal given by operations officer, [Wimpy Berry] will arrive in personal car, pick up items from operations officer at partially concealed entrance to administrative assistant's apartment and promptly leave. Cover for his visit will be commercial delivery.")

7 April 1961

Chief, WH Division, submitted to Chief, RI, a memorandum requesting waiver of pouch restriction on pouching weapons. "The above request is submitted for the following reason: Station Ciudad Trujillo has requested that Headquarters provide four M3 machine guns and 240 rounds of ammunition on a priority basis for issuance to a small action group to be used for self protection."

(Comment: The entry for 18 March 1961 refers to a request for submachine guns, but there was no follow-up on it from the station. This pouch waiver request was submitted while the chief of station was

at headquarters for consultations. It is probable that he made the plea in person. As will be seen later, the submachine guns (the so-called "grease guns" of World War II) were pouched but approval was never given the station to pass them to the plotters.)

12 April 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"Equipment for Severo Cabral [submachine guns] which subject of Chief of Station conversations Hqs being pouched . . . 14 April. Prior to passing equipment, advise Hqs what scheme of delivery proposed."

(Comment: The delivery scheme is explained in comment on the 9 April entry.)

13 April 1961

An extract from a note sent to Consul General Dearborn from Juan Vicini:

"The three Leica cameras, model M-1 [the three carbines], with their accessories, should be in the proper hands in a day or two. . . . . . With the small amount of equipment which they are receiving they can only take action at a few specific places and therefore the probabilities are considerably reduced and the time factor considerably extended accordingly. With the rest of the equipment (four Leicas, model M-3) [the submachine guns] the possible places of action are multiplied and the lost time greatly reduced."

14 April 1961

Extract from a note from SOCRATES [Luis Baquero] to DELTA

[Consul General Dearborn]:

"The three Leica cameras and accessories are in the hands of the ones that will take the pictures. They need more cameras in order to do a better and faster job. We hope that the memo we sent two days ago might help in Wash. in this regard."

17 April 1961

Note from YAGUATE [Juan Vicini] and SOCRATES [Luis Baquero] to DELTA [Dearborn]:

"The last word, up to the minute in the matter of cameras: CRISTOBAL [General Juan Tomas Diaz] says that with the 3 Leica cameras already delivered it is impossible to do the photographic job. He needs to have the rest of the equipment (the 4 M-3 Leicas) before he undertakes the job. The ones already delivered he sees them as good complementary equipment (defensive) but he needs the others for the aggressive part of the job. It is my belief that the ones already delivered have served a psychological purpose also: the men involved have always been in doubt the good faith of your people in Wash. Their feeling was that in several months all they have obtained were promises. Now they see that you actually mean business. So, now, all they are doing is waiting for the heavy cameras."

17 April 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

" . . . . . most important [the submachine guns] not/repeat not be passed to Severo Cabral without additional Hqs approval. Please advise when equipment received and proposed scheme and timing of delivery."

20 April 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"[Submachine guns] should be held in station custody till further notice and not repeat not be passed to [Wimpy Berry]. This Hqs decision based on judgment that filling vacuum created by [assassination] now bigger question than ever view unsettled conditions in Caribbean area.

"Request station provide foll info soonest: (a) Have [the three carbines] been delivered to Severo Cabral? (b) Details on an alternate plan to deliver [submachine guns] which would involve ground caching."

(Comment: It might be noted that this cable was sent just three days after the failure of the landing at the Bay of Pigs.)

20 April 1961

Note to DELTA [Dearborn] from YAGUATE and SOCRATES:

"The officers that were to do the photographic job are not only disappointed but really angry at the refusal of the delivery of the other Leicas. They have decided to give up the plan and disperse, because they cannot take any more risks for nothing."

20 April 1961

Cable from the station:

"[Submachine guns] here 19 April with no entry problems whatsoever. Excellent basic wrapping means station's plan can be simplified even more. The administrative assistant, the operations officer, and the chief of station can share delivery direct to drop. Request Hqs advise when we may begin."

(Comment: The precise nature of this "excellent basic wrapping" is not further clarified in the file. Norman Gall, writing in The New Republic, said that the weapons were shipped to Wimpy Berry in food cans. This sounds to us as if the sub-machine guns were packed in food containers for pouching. If so, we wonder how Gall learned of this. We can state with fair confidence that these submachine guns were never passed out of the consulate. As late as the very day of the assassination, Bob Owen sent a cable protesting the policy that forbade his passing them. This sounds as if there must have been a leak from the consulate--from one of the very few who knew of the submachine guns. We cannot confirm that the submachine guns were actually packaged in food containers for pouching. TSD has no record of having done so. Jake Esterline has a faint recollection of food containers, but not in connection with pouching.)

21 April 1961

Cable from headquarters to the station:

> "/Submachine guns/ should be held in station custody till further notice and not repeat not be passed to /Wimpy Berry/.

22 April 1961

The station replied to headquarters' query of 20 April regarding disposition of the three carbines:

> " . . . . . /Wimpy Berry/ has given /the three carbines/ to intermediary who holding until Severo Cabral picks up . . . . . "

(Comment: This "intermediary" appears to have been Thomas Stocker. The significance of this and the security problem it posed will become apparent from one of the later entries for 31 May.)

25 April 1961

Cable from the station:

"Foll from Dearborn: 'I believe political consequence of not delivering [submachine guns] so serious I plan go Washington within next few days for discussion with Department and CAS Hqs!"

26 April 1961

Cable from the station:

"[Wimpy Berry] told Chief of Station . . . Antonio de la Maza plans try assassination between 29 April and 2 May. Severo Cabral possibly not yet aware plan. No solid info other members assassination effort but General Juan Tomas Diaz probably will aid. Will use the three carbines plus whatever else can get. De la Maza asks Berry add the submachine guns if possible . . . . ."

30 April 1961

Cable from the station:

"Following from Dearborn: April 28 Lorenzo Berry as emissary Juan Vicini and Severo Cabral called on me with foll info: . . . main mission Berry was plead with me release submachine guns they believe in Dom Rep and under my control. Action group has 3 carbines, 4 to 6 12-gauge shotguns with 120 rounds and some small arms. . . . . . Action entails roadside ambush near San Cristobal

and few additional weapons could be important. . . . . . I replied I had no submachine guns under my control and that any U.S. controlled items which might be in Dom Rep could only be released on specific authorization from Washington. I pointed out that since the three carbines were made available Cuban incident had occurred and hoped group could understand this is period of study and assessment. . . . . . "

2 May 1961

Cable from the station:

" . . . . . suggest Hqs review decision not pass submachine guns. Determination of group to go ahead with possibly inadequate means could spell end best pro-US force now working toward the overthrow of the Trujillo regime."

2 May 1961

Draft cable prepared at headquarters:

" . . . . . Since it appears that EMOTH group has committed itself to action with or without additional support, coupled with fact that the carbines already made available to them for personal defense; station authorized pass submachine guns to Berry for their additional protection on their proposed endeavor. . . . . . "

(Comment: This cable was never sent. It was authenticated by Ray Herbert for J. C. King, and Richard Bissell coordinated on it. It was forwarded to the DDCI for release. General Cabell attached a handwritten buck-slip: "Return to: Chief, W.H. Div., unacted upon.")

4 May 1961

The Director, at a meeting of the Special Group, reported a new anti-Trujillo plot, saying that we never knew if one of these would work or not.

5 May 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"Regret delay but release [of the submachine guns] awaits high level State Department decision."

8 May 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"State Department has disapproved passing [submachine guns].

16 May 1961

Cable from the station:

"For Achilles and Coerr from Dearborn: Thomas Stocker called on me night May 15. Stated he emissary from action group which plans execute action against Trujillo night May 16. Stocker's mission was urgently request me to furnish group with few machine guns which it understood US agents have in Dom Rep . . . . . "

(Comment: There is an unsigned and almost incomprehensible memorandum in the EMDEED files. It is dated 17 May 1961 and concerns a meeting with Mrs. Flerida Berry. The transmittal dispatch makes

it clear that the author was Isabel Cintron, the station's administrative assistant. This is our interpretation of what Miss Cintron was trying to say: Sometime during the second week of May, Wimpy Berry asked Thomas Stocker to return the three carbines Berry had given Stocker for the plotters. Stocker at first refused but finally agreed. /Presumably Berry then passed them to Antonio de la Maza./ On 15 May, Stocker again saw Berry at the supermarket, said he had the carbines back in his possession, and his group planned to carry out the assassination the following night. The group that was to do the job was not the group that Berry had been working with on behalf of the consulate. SOCRATES (Luis Baquero) arrived at the supermarket while Stocker was still with Wimpy. After Stocker left, Mrs. Berry asked Baquero if he had given the Carbines back to Stocker. Baquero said he was certain not, although he and the man who had the carbines and was to do the job did not know each other's identities. While Mrs. Berry was talking with Baquero, the man to whom Berry had last given the weapons /presumably Antonio de la Maza/ arrived at the supermarket. Mrs. Berry asked him if he had returned the carbines to Stocker. He replied that he had not that that, if she wanted confirmation, she could look in the trunk of his car where he always carried them.)

18 May 1961

There was discussion at a Special Group meeting of planning with respect to the Dominican Republic. Chester Bowles said he thought that an internal State planning paper outlining an ambitious paramilitary plan (and alleging Special Group approval) exceeded the Special Group's action. Mr. Parrott's notes supported that impression. The following is an excerpt from the minutes:

> "General Cabell noted that the internal dissidents were pressing for the release to them of certain small arms now in U.S. hands in the Dominican Republic. He inquired whether the feeling of the Group remained that these arms should not be passed. The members showed no inclination to take a contrary position at this time." *

25 May 1961

The agenda of the Special Group meeting for this date proposed discussion of "further guidance to Dearborn re contacts with dissidents." The minutes of the meeting, however, make no mention of the subject.

27 May 1961

The station cabled:

> "Department from Dearborn: 'May 26 I had long talk with Andreas Freitas. . . . . . Freitas made no request for arms which indicates group has accepted fact it must do with what it has.

* The small arms to which General Cabell referred were the submachine guns, which were pouched to the station but were never passed to the dissidents.

His only statement on this subject was that group has arms but is somewhat concerned whether enough.

"He stated action group planning overthrow Trujillo for past 3 weeks and representing anti-communist pro-democratic elements of which he member remains on brink final performance and determined as ever. Said he could give me no date because action depends when Trujillo follows awaited pattern which not known in advance. Group has arrangement for being informed sufficiently in advance to get into assigned positions once signal given. He asked if United States prepared assist pro-United States Dominicans quickly if they succeed overthrow Trujillo.

"I replied . . . speed with which assistance could be given would be increased considerably if we could have prior info on such subjects as timing, plans for action, personalities involved and identity of proposed junta. . . . . . He replied participants were not prepared give their names until afterward and could not give time for reasons stated earlier. . . . . .

"Re timing Freitas stressed event could happen any day and could in fact have happened 3 times in last 2 weeks except that necessary juxtaposition of forces did not materialize."

29 May 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"For Dearborn from State . . . . . We must not run risk of U.S. association with political assassination, since U.S. as matter of general policy cannot condone assassination. This last principal is overriding and must prevail in doubtful situation. . . . . . You must request and receive further specific instruction for any specific covert activity. At the present time we are unable to transfer arms to dissidents. . . . ."

(Comment: Both Dearborn and the chief of station sent cables commenting on this guidance cable. Their cables were filed

in Ciudad Trujillo on 30 May but were not received in Washington until the early morning hours of 31 May--about eight hours after the assassination took place. Excerpts follow.)

31 May 1961

Cable from the station:

"State from Dearborn . . . . . If attempt is made by U.S. friends assassinate Trujillo there will be accusations against us and best we can do is see there is no proof. Greatest danger point is Thomas Stocker. He was given small number arms by dissident agent to hold several days and has told several persons dissidents obtained these items from consulate. Stocker told me same and I have informed him this cannot be true or I would know and when he requested me supply arms through him for dissidents I told him this impossible. . . . . . "

Cable from chief of station:

"Assume [the 29 May policy cable from State to Dearborn] is final word on present policy on which CIA work here must be based. This for practical purposes retreat from previous policy. However Hqs aware extent to which U.S. Government already associated with assassination. If we are to at least try 'cover up tracks,' CIA personnel directly involved in assassination preparation must be withdrawn now. . . . . . If assassination tried and not successful, immediate evacuation of the chief of station, the operations officer, and the administrative assistant mandatory. . . . . . "

31 May 1961

Received in Headquarters Signal Center at 0341 hours, Washington time:

FLASH SECRET CRITIC CIA CIUDAD TRUJILLO NUMBER 1. APPR 2. SOURCE DISSIDENT IN DIRECT TOUCH WITH DISSIDENT ACTION GROUP (C). SOURCE AT 2330 HOURS LOCAL TIME 30 MAY RECEIVED PREARRANGED SIGNAL WHICH MEANT TRUJILLO KILLED BY ASSASSINATION SAME NIGHT. AMERICAN CONSULATE PERSONNEL ENCOUNTERED ROADBLOCKS ON CIUDAD TRUJILLO RIO HAINA SUPER HIGHWAY AT ABOUT 0030 HOURS LOCAL TIME 31 MAY. INDIVIDUALS FORMING BLOCKS APPEARED HASTILY ORGANIZED MILITIA ONLY FEW OF WHOM ARMED WITH FIREARMS OTHERS WITH MACHETES. NO CONFIRMATION TRUJILLO ASSASSINATION AS OF 0100 MAY 31. FILED 0600Z. [0200 Washington time]

(Comment: The station's follow-up operational cable identified the source of Critic No. 1 as Lorenzo (Wimpy) Berry, who gave the information in person to Consul General Dearborn and Chief of Station Owen at the consulate. At about 0100 hours, Dominican time, Andres Freitas telephoned Dearborn "to ask cryptically whether we had the news." Freitas said he would add details when he had them.)

3 June 1961

Memorandum for the record signed by J. D. Esterline, in part:

"The evening of 2 June, it was decided to immediately move out of the Dominican Republic the Station Chief Owen, and Case Officer Cookson. It was also decided that Administrative Assistant Isabel Cintron should not return to Trujillo. Accordingly, an operational immediate cable was sent to the station the afternoon of 2 June issuing appropriate instructions."

9 June 1961

Memorandum for the record signed by J. C. King, subject: "High-Level Meeting on Dominican Crisis"--in part:

"The meeting was held at 1800 hours on 5 June 1961 in Room 7514 of the Department of State. Among those present were Vice President Lyndon Johnson, Secretary McNamara, General Lemnitzer, Under Secretary Bowles, Deputy Under Secretary Alexis Johnson, Mr. Ed Murrow, Chief, USIA, Mr. Arthur Schlesinger, Mr. Richard Goodwin, Mr. Ted Achilles, Mr. Wim Coerr, Mr. Morales Carrion and Mr. Jameson.

"Vice President Lyndon Johnson referred to another message from Consul General Dearborn which was in an alarmist tone as to the possibility of implicating the United States in the delivery of arms to the dissidents. The Vice President then asked what was the timing and authority on the delivery of arms."

(Comment: The message to which Vice President Johnson referred is not in the EMDEED operational files. We did not find a copy in a search of Cable Secretariat archives. Jake Esterline, who appears to have ridden herd on post-assassination planning, does not recall having heard of Vice President Johnson's

query. The record suggests that he knew of it but does not now remember. There is an unsigned memorandum in the EMDEED file dated 6 June 1961 (the day after the meeting at State), subject: "ODACID Views on Passage of Arms to Dominican Dissidents." The memorandum summarizes State Department-Consulate involvement in having weapons furnished to the dissidents. The routing and record sheet attached to the memorandum shows it was originated by John Poulter, WH3/DR&H, and was forwarded to C/OPS/WH (Esterline). Esterline initialed the routing and record sheet and returned the memorandum to Poulter. This suggests to us that J. C. King, upon returning from the meeting at State, asked Esterline to have a summary pulled together.

J. C. King remembers the meeting at which the Vice President asked about the delivery of arms. He does not now recall the specific query. Re-reading his memorandum record of the meeting leads him to believe that the Vice President's question was directed to one of the State representatives. He feels that, if it had been directed to CIA, he would have made mention of that fact in his record of the meeting.

A memorandum for the record prepared by J. C. King of a White House meeting on the Dominican crisis on 7 June 1961 makes no mention of U.S. involvement in passing weapons to the assassins. The meeting was chaired by the President, and Vice President Johnson was present.

The preceding, quite detailed, and almost wholly documentary account of U.S. Government involvement with persons plotting the overthrow of Trujillo carries through the actual assassination. Early in the report we explained why the coup that was to follow the assassination never took place. Another essential part of the story is the roll-up of the assassination group and the discovery of U.S. involvement with them. The consulate cabled through CIA channels on 9 December 1961 that the 7 December issue of the Dominican newspaper La Nacion carried a story

> ". . . based on Huascar Tejeda Pimentel's statement to Judge of Instruction that Wimpy (Lorenzo A. Berry) provided the caliber 30 M-1 Garand automatic carbines used to kill Trujillo."

Wimpy's involvement with the plotters, including passing weapons from the U.S. consulate to them, became known to the Dominican Military Intelligence Service (SIM) as early as 3 June from its interrogations of the captured assassins. The following summary is drawn from the FBI's report of its interviews of Ortiz, the SIM officer who headed the investigation of the assassination.

Immediately after the slaying, all of the assassins assembled at the house of General Juan Tomas Diaz. Dr. Robert Reid Cabral was called to treat the most seriously wounded assassin. Dr. Reid was the cousin of Donald Reid Cabral, one of the key political plotters, but appears not to have been in on the plot himself. Since Dr. Reid

in being called as a physician learned the identities of the assassins, General Diaz said he could not allow Dr. Reid to go free. General Diaz forced Dr. Reid to furnish refuge in Reid's house for four of the assassins (General Diaz, Antonio de la Maza, Salvador Estrella, and Roberto Pastoriza). The other assassins went their separate ways.

Within hours after entering Dr. Reid's house, General Diaz and his three companions began to panic. (It might be noted here that the assassins were so sure that the coup would follow and they would all be national heroes that they had made absolutely know plans for hiding or escape.) De la Maza called for Mrs. Reid and ordered Dr. Reid out of the room. De la Maza thereupon raped Mrs. Reid in the presence of his companions. Pastoriza and Estrella were highly incensed over the rape. Pastoriza left the house soon after a near-fight and a drawn-weapons confrontation. Estrella left after a few hours. Diaz and de la Maza left later and were killed in a gunfight while resisting arrest. Both Pastoriza and Estrella were captured, tortured, and confessed. The following are excerpts from the FBI's report of its interviews with Ortiz, the SIM investigator.

> ". . . after Pastoriza left General Juan Tomas Diaz composed a telegram addressed to President Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela, which said, 'We who have killed Trujillo urgently need your help in order to flee the country. Signed General Juan Tomas Diaz.'

Diaz requested Dr. Reid to take this telegram to 'Wimpy,' an American who owned a supermarket in Ciudad Trujillo, and to tell 'Wimpy' to take the telegram immediately to the American Consul and to ask the Consul to code the telegram and send it through the proper channels to Betancourt.

"Reid refused to take the telegram on the basis that he had already implicated himself greatly in the plot through no fault of his own and stated that he thought Diaz was trying to have him killed by asking him to take this telegram to 'Wimpy.' With that de la Maza became so incensed that he punched Reid and pushed him around and even went so far as to hold his revolver against the head of Reid's young son. Reid then said that the plotters could kill the entire Reid family if they wished but that he would not deliver the telegram to 'Wimpy.'

"Estrella was asked to furnish what he knew concerning 'Wimpy's' alleged connection with the conspiracy. Estrella related that 'Wimpy' is the one who facilitated the obtaining of the shotgun and the automatic rifle for de la Maza and General Diaz. He was asked if 'Wimpy' knew the purpose for which these weapons were secured and Estrella replied that 'Wimpy' was aware of the purpose. Estrella further related that 'Wimpy' works for the FBI, the State Department, or some other agency of the U.S. Government.

"Estrella was asked to explain how he knew 'Wimpy' was connected with the Americans and he replied that he had heard from the other conspirators that 'Wimpy' was the intermediary between the American Consulate and the conspirators. Estrella stated that 'Wimpy' was a friend of General Diaz, Antonio de la Maza and Luis Amiama Tio, and that 'Wimpy' had been the intermediary through the American Consulate when these three discussed their proposed coup with American authorities.

" . . . the source mentioned that during the interrogation of the conspirators who mentioned that United States officials were involved, they were all asked to identify the United States officials, but none of the conspirators were able to identify these officials by name and mentioned only that they were high functionaries of the United States Department of State. The only name of any American official which was disclosed during

these interrogations was the name of American Consul Hill in connection with the telegram that General Diaz wanted to send to Betancourt.

". . . the source noted that the telegram never reached Consul Hill because Diaz tore it up after the incident in Dr. Reid's house.

"(. . . the source commented that the interrogators themselves did not believe at this time that the U.S. Department of State was in any way involved with the plot. They thought the disclosures concerning the alleged involvement . . . was simply a method by which Amiama induced General Roman to give his approval to the plot. . . . . . it was the interrogators opinion at that time that if the North Americans had been involved in this plot, the plot would have been much better organized and the coup would have succeeded.)

" . . . by the latter part of June 1961, the investigation had pretty well established the identities of all the individuals involved in the plot, many of whom had been arrested and interrogated. The only ones not accounted for were Luis Amiama Tio and Antonio Imbert Barreras. As previously related, General Juan Tomas Diaz, Antonio de la Maza, and Lieutenant Amado Garcia Guerrero were killed when resisting arrest. (At this point the source related that if General Diaz, Lieut. Garcia, de la Maza, Amiama, and Imbert had been captured, and made to talk, it is certain that many many more prisoners would have been taken.)

"As far as the source is aware, the only individuals who were arrested as a result of the assassination of Trujillo, who were brought before the courts were Tavares and General Roman. As far as the source is aware, no other individual arrested in connection with this plot was brought before any Dominican court. 'Wimpy,' the North American, was to have been brought before a court to be deported; however, Ramfis ordered that he was not to be molested in any way and as far as the source is aware, no action was taken against 'Wimpy.'"

"Wimpy" Berry, his wife, and their children were allowed to leave the Dominican Republic. They went to Florida and subsequently visited Washington. While in Washington, Berry was given $2,000 for "expenses" by CIA. After amnesty was granted the plotters in December 1961, the Berrys returned to Santo Domingo and resumed operating their supermarket. They, especially Mrs. Berry, continued to involve themselves in political intrigues. They were staunch supporters of the conservative Antonio Imbert/Wessin y Wessin faction and were involved in the actions that led to the overthrows of the governments headed by Juan Bosch and later by Donald Reid Cabral.

To recap:

a. Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom told J. C. King on 28 June 1960 that the U.S. Government was prepared to participate in the overthrow of the Trujillo regime to the extent of providing a small number of sniper rifles for the removal of key Trujillo people from the scene. General Cabell, as Acting DCI, on 1 July 1960 approved delivering 12 Springfield rifles to the Dominican dissidents by air drop or by sea. The rifles were never delivered.

b. On 10 February 1961 the chief of station cabled a suggestion that one small-size, high-fire-power weapon be forwarded in each pouch. This suggestion was not acted upon.

c. On 17 March 1961, the chief of station cabled a request of Consul General Dearbon for the pouching of three 38 caliber Smith and Wesson Special pistols for delivery to key members of the dissident group. Headquarters was preparing to pouch the pistols but apparently did not do so. There is no indication in the EMDEED operational files that the pistols were actually pouched. The request for pistols appears to have been overtaken by a subsequent request for submachine guns.

d. On 26 March 1961 the station cabled a request for permission to pass three semi-automatic M-1 carbines plus ammunition to Dr. Severo Cabral. The carbines and ammunition were in the consulate, having been left by departed naval personnel. The station requested that headquarters pouch magazines. Headquarters approved passing the carbines and ammunition and pouched the magazines. The cable authorizing passing the carbines was released by the DD/P (Bissell). The station said it would file off the carbines' serial numbers. The station cabled that the carbines were passed to "Wimpy" Berry by the station's female administrative assistant on 7 April 1961. Berry, at the request of the dissidents, gave the carbines to S. Thomas Stocker for temporary safekeeping. Berry later recovered the carbines from Stocker and gave them to Antonio de la Maza, who reportedly kept

them in the trunk of his automobile. It is probable that at least one of the carbines was taken to the scene of the assassination by de la Maza, but we have no evidence that it was actually used in the shooting. Ortiz, the SIM investigator, told the FBI that the assassins who were apprehended and interrogated spoke only of the firing of a sawed-off shotgun, revolvers, and pistols.

e. While at headquarters for consultations in early April 1961, Chief of Station Robert Owen evidently prevailed upon headquarters to pouch four M-3 submachine guns and ammunition to the station. The submachine guns were pouched and arrived at the station on 19 April 1961. Headquarters cabled the station on 17 April that the submachine guns were not to be passed to the dissidents without additional headquarters approval. Despite repeated pleas from the Chief of Station and from the Consul General, Washington continued to refuse authorization to pass them. We think it is safe to conclude that the submachine guns were never passed to the dissidents.

A final, and rather sorry, footnote: We do not know the motivations of men such as Jordi Brossa, Juan Vicini, Severo Cabral, Amiama Tio, and Antonio Imbert. The SIM interrogations of the plotters it captured revealed that they were not greatly motivated by a desire

to live in a free and democratic republic. Most of them were seeking vengeance or personal gain. General Roman, who was to have taken over and form an interim government, admitted that he had had no intention of permitting free elections. He had planned to establish himself as the new Dominican "strongman" replacing Trujillo. General Juan Tomas Diaz was bitter over having been publicly disgraced by Trujillo and then cashiered from the army. Antonio de la Maza also had a personal grudge. His brother, Octavio, had been killed by the Trujillos to conceal his and their participation in the slaying of Gerald Murphy in the Galindez case. Most of the others also had personal reasons for wishing Trujillo dead.

AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

SECRET KAPOK
CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH NO. HKH-A-1025
(201-168881)
(23-88/2-139) Local

TO : Chief, WHD

FROM : Chief of Station, Habana

DATE: 7 November 1957

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Administrative
SPECIFIC— Arthur G. VAIVADA

1. Attached herewith is a memorandum prepared by the Subject, dated 29 October 1957, calling the attention of Headquarters to the fact that his assignment in Habana terminates in June 1958 and setting out his wishes as to reassignment thereafter.

2. While Vaivada did not include it in his memorandum, in recent conversations with the case officer he has expressed considerable interest in the possibility of being assigned under unofficial cover to Spain, saying that both he and his wife would welcome such an assignment. The Subject has also said in those conversations that he would not take it amiss if an opportunity for reassignment outside of the Central America-Caribbean area were to become open to him at any time prior to June 1958.

3. In the opinion of the Station, Vaivada has done a very good job here, having been confronted with and overcome a number of difficult problems and situations during his tour of over three years in Habana. The Station is happy to recommend that his request for reassignment be given every consideration.

James R. Palinger
James R. Palinger

Attachments:
Memorandum of Reassignment (4 copies)

Distribution:
4 - Washington w/att.
2 - Files w/att.

4 November 1957

JRP/mfm

201-168881

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

SECRET KAPOK
CLASSIFICATION

14-00000

Havana, Cuba
29 October 1957

SUBJECT: Reassignment - Arthur G. Vaivada

TO : Headquarters Desk

THROUGH: Chief of Station, Havana, Cuba

1. While at Headquarters in the early part of May 1957, it was verbally agreed that I return to Cuba for about one year, security permitting.

2. While my operational work in Cuba from August 1954 until February 1957 was concentrated on communist targets in the University of Habana, it should be pointed out that my duties during that period also involved many contacts with subversive oppositionist elements. When governmental persecution increased during February 1957, two of my key agents were lost, one of them by governmental assassination, so that I was obliged to leave Cuba temporarily pending clarification of the security factors involved. During my three months' absence in PEPRIME the local situation deteriorated; and after my return my position was less favorable than it had been as a newcomer since I had lost assets but had retained the cumulative security hazards of three years of cultivation and recruitment efforts. The University was, and still is, closed. Our communist penetration efforts are continuously harrassed by official persecution of the target group.

3. Since by June 1958 I shall have spent four years in Cuba, I believe it appropriate to submit this letter at this time requesting that Headquarters begin to study the possibilities for reassignment about June 1958, or prior to that date if necessary. As to future assignments, I have no reservations or special requests. I am willing and prepared to travel to any area consistent with my qualifications. Generally speaking, and for obvious security reasons, I am interested in getting out of the Central America-Caribbean area if possible. It may be recalled that I was denied an Argentine visa in 1953, for purely technical reasons. This situation may be changed, and I would not be opposed to a tour in Argentina, Chile, or any of the South American republics. In this matter, the nature of the new project or assignment would take precedence with me over personal preferences as to particular area of assignment.

DESENSITIZED
PER CSN 43-28

Att to HKHA 4025
7 NOV 57

201-168881

4. Regarding my cover status: I entered Cuba in 1954 under student cover (Pan American Foundation Scholarship), and as it became increasingly more difficult to maintain owing to student disturbances, I completed a course in the writing of free-lance fiction and am thrice published. This writing has been used as a realistic, stop-gap cover, even after I was provided with a notional business cover (Public Surveys Institute) by Headquarters. I understand that journalism is considered a weak and time-worn cover; yet if it is worked at, and financially managed through a PEPRIME checking account, it not only satisfies local SS probes but it does not have the inherent disadvantages involved in setting up a full-fledged business cover. I set this out as a possible suggestion to Headquarters, but have no insistence as to journalistic over business cover. The notional business cover provided me has proved satisfactory in a limited sense thus far, and even utilized as cover for action occasionally, but I would be uncertain about introducing it in a less "Americanized" country than Cuba.

Arthur G. Vaivada

Arthur G. Vaivada

DE

FEB 1 1958

201-168881

SECRET

25 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Central Cover Staff

ATTENTION : Charlie Danish

SUBJECT : Ross CROZIER

REFERENCE : SAS Memorandum Dated 14 May 1963

1. Referenced memorandum requested the Subject be provided with military cover while assigned in the Headquarters area for operational and credit purposes in the performance of his duties with SAS. It is understood that your office was reluctant to issue the Subject the necessary military cover because he was physically located in a DODS office which was under commercial cover.

2. As indicated verbally on 24 June 1963, SAS will move the Subject out of the DODS area on 26 June. SAS has also requested suitable office or apartment space through the Office of Logistics from which the Subject will operate in the future. Until this property is acquired, the Subject will perform his duties from his home. Consequently, it is requested that immediate attention be given to providing the Subject with the necessary military cover. Refer any questions to G. A. LADNER, Jr., SAS/Security, ext. 5909.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, SAS

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - SAS/Security

SAS/Security:GALadner:ftk - 25 June 1963

SECRET

201-168881

14-00000

19 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Central Cover Staff
Room 1-B-24 Headquarters Building

SUBJECT : Request for Domestic Cover
Mr. Ross Lester Crozier

REFERENCE : Form 1322, forwarded to your Office,
14 May 1963

1. It is requested that this Office be advised as to the disposition of our request dated 14 May 1963 for providing Mr. Ross Lester Crozier appropriate Domestic Cover.

2. Since security requirements prohibit Mr. Crozier from being located in the Headquarters Building, he has been provided an office in the DODS Area. Subject needs "Cover" as soon as possible, for credit purposes, employment, etc.

3. Your prompt attention to this matter would be appreicated.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

cc: DODS

DDP/SAS/PERSONNEL/J. ALBERT HOESER/kct (19 June 63)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - DODS
1 - SAS/Personnel

SECRET

201-168881

SECRET

REQUEST FOR DOMESTIC COVER LIST ENTRY OR CHANGE

SUBMIT THIS FORM IN TRIPLICATE. ENCLOSED IN SEALED ENVELOPE

TO : Central Cover Staff

THROUGH:

SUBJECT: Mr. Ross Lester Crozier (True Name)

DATE: 14 May 1963

ENTRY	CHANGE
Inclusion of subject on the Domestic Cover List is requested for the reason noted below. When notified that cover has been established, subject will be specifically authorized and instructed to conceal his Agency affiliation.	Subject is currently included on the Domestic Cover List. For the reason noted below, it is requested that ☐ this employee be removed from the Domestic Cover List. ☐ the following change be made:

REASON

Request subject be provided Military Cover (Army) while assigned in Headquarters Area for operational and credit purposes in performance of his duties with SAS.

Note: Subject was formerly under commercial cover at JMWAVE prior to January 1963.

COVER (Complete only for new entries)

TYPE COVER IN USE		
IF NO COVER IN USE	TYPE SUGGESTED (Specify whether official or non-official)	
	JUSTIFICATION, IF NON-OFFICIAL COVER SUGGESTED	

APPROVED BY CENTRAL COVER DIVISION	REQUESTING OFFICIAL
SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE ORVILLE C. DAWSON
DATE	TITLE Chief, SAS/Personnel

201-168881

FORM 7-56 1322 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DD/P PERSONNEL DATA SHEET

NAME: CROZIER, Ross

AGE:
DOB: 20 June 1922

DATE: 8 April 1963

STATION HQS.
AND DUTIES:

DD/P UNIT:

PRIMARY CAREER DESIGNATION: CAREER AGENT

PRESENT GRADE: GS-12
PROPOSED GRADE: NA
CIA TRAINING:

PRESENT T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE: NA NA

PROPOSED T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE: NA NA

EDUCATION:

Wife: Costa Rican citizen, DOB: 15 Mar 1913
Son : DOB: 4 Sept 1949 - U.S. Citizen
DAU : DOB: 24 June 1951 - U.S. Citizen

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY:
Spanish (Fluent - writing/reading/speaking)

ASSESSED: DATE: TYPE OF POSITION: RESULTS:

EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO CIA (excluding SSU-OSS):
U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force, Tech Sgt. (1940-1945: Intelligence NCO) & (April 46 - Apr 49)
Leading man labor, $12.36 per day, US Naval Air Station, Coco Solo, Canal Zone;
(Jan. 1946 - April 1946).

SUMMARY OF CIA-SSU-OSS ASSIGNMENTS INCLUDING PREVIOUS GRADES AND DATES:
Contract and career agent since June 1949 - Intelligence assignments in Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Cuba; (Foreign Intelligence with some Psychological Warfare and Paramilitary) FI mission with Castro's forces in Sierr Maestra (April 58). Mexico City Jan 59 to May 1960; assigned to WH 4 PA-PROP from June 60 to Oct 61; Assigned PCS JMWAVE Oct 61 to Jan 1963. (Case Officer on student project involving propaganda and area intelligence collection & network operation; CO on press placement and press collection project).

RECOMMENDED BY:

CONCURRENCES:

RECOMMENDATION OF CAREER SERVICE BOARD:

201-168851

14-00000

SECRET

TRAVEL ORDER

X TDY	
PCS	
INVITATIONAL	

OFFICE TRAVEL ORDER NO. SAS-473-63

SERVICE TRAVEL ORDER NO.

NAME: Mr. Ross L. Crozier

OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

OFFICE PHONE: 6576

GRADE: Career Agent

YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRAVEL AND INCUR NECESSARY EXPENSES IN ACCORDANCE WITH REGULATIONS. THIS TRAVEL OR CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION, IF SO DESIGNATED, IS MADE FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE.

ITINERARY, MODE OF TRAVEL AND PURPOSE

From Washington, D. C. to NYC for approximately three (3) days TDY and return.

MODE: Air tourist/ce
PURPOSE: Operational contacts

TRAVEL DURATION BEGIN c/a	END	PER DIEM ALLOWANCE DOMESTIC	FOREIGN MAXIMUM	OTHER (See below)	AUTOMOBILE ALLOWANCE CENTS PER MI. NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER	CENTS PER MI. AS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO GOV'T.
19 Mar 63	22 Mar 63	$ 16.00				

ALLOWANCES AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS WITH REASONS

DEPENDENT TRAVEL AUTHORIZED

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	RELATIONSHIP

ACCOMPANY TRAVELER
FOLLOW WITHIN 6 MONTHS
ADVANCE RETURN

PROCURE TRANSPORTATION BY: TRANSPORTATION REQUEST / CASH OR OTHER

DISPOSITION OF EFFECTS AUTHORIZATION: SHIPMENT / NONTEMPORARY STORAGE / SHIPMENT POA AUTHORIZED

EXCESS BAGGAGE AUTHORIZED: ACCOMPANIED LBS. AND MODE / UNACCOMPANIED LBS. AND MODE

ADVANCE OF FUNDS REQUESTED: X YES $100.00 ACCOUNTING DUE DATE / NO

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL: $100.00

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO.: 473-63

CHARGE COST CENTER NO.: 3132-1000-1000

DATE | SIGNATURE OF B & F OFFICER

COORDINATION

SIGNATURE	TITLE & COMPONENT	DATE

REQUESTING OFFICIAL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: VINCENT J. HEYMAN, Chief — COMPONENT: SAS/Support

SIGNATURE | DATE

AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: DESMOND FITZGERALD, Chief — COMPONENT: SAS

SIGNATURE | DATE

FORM 8-59 540 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. MFG. 8-62

SECRET

March '63
201-168881

(28-40)

14-00000

13 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division
Chief, Staff Agent Accounts Section

THROUGH : Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Reassignment of Career Agent - Harold R. NOEMAYR

This is to advise you that Career Agent Harold R. NOEMAYR was reassigned PCS from JMWAVE to the Washington, D. C. area on 21 January 1963.

HOWARD J. [illegible]
Chief, SAS/Support

DDP/SAS/Personnel/John H. Martin/kct (13 Mar 63)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/CPD
1 - SAS/Pers

201-168851

X

INDEX: YES [ ] NO [X] 201-241813
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID [X] RET. TO BRANCH [ ]
DESTROY [ ] SIG.

201-261813

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET 46

ROUTING
1 SR/CI/A 4
2 5
3 6

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION: SR 6
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, RI/AN, WH 7, RF 2

INDEXED AND CONTROL COPIES MATCHED

20 July 63

SECRET 200017Z

IN 83496

DIR CITE MEXI 5444

REDWOOD LCIMPROVE

C/S COMMENT: *DID NOT DESIRE COLD STREET APPROACH TO BAKULIN

REF DIR 45798

1. SINCE REF STATION HAS TRIED SPOT CANDIDATES FOR PLAUSIBLE ACCESS VALENTIN VASILYEVICH BAKULIN WHOSE OVERT ACTIVITY IS PRINCIPALLY THAT OF SUPPLYING PROPAGANDA FILMS TO INTERESTED LOCAL GROUPS.

2. SOURCE SEYMOUR D. TRINNICH, POSSIBLE ACCESS ASSET IS ARTURO CARRILLO ESPARZA DPOB 3 JULY 1940 MEXICO CITY. CARRILLO IS GRADUATE STUDENT UNAM FACULTY SCIENCES, COMPLETING DOCTORATE THEORETICAL PHYSICS, IS MEMBER OF COMMITTEE WHICH OPERATES CINE CLUB, APPEARS SPEAK AUTHORITATIVELY RE FINANCING AND FILM PROCUREMENT. CLUB HAS GOTTEN FILMS IN PAST FROM SOVEMB. (REQUEST HQS TRACES AND INITIATION POA. HAVE NO LOCAL TRACES.)

3. REQUEST TRACES ALSO ON CARRILLO'S GIRL FRIEND CYNTHIA CHLEBICKI, U.S. NATIONAL, UNAM MASTER'S DEGREE STUDENT, GRADUATE OF UNIV ILLINOIS, HOME ADDRESS 11 EAST 151 ST, HARVEY, ILL. (NO MEXI TRACES.)

4. INDEX.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

FORM 4-63 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. RI COPY SECRET RI COPY

REPORT COVER SHEET | CONFIDENTIAL CONTROLLED DISSEM | UFG-
JMWAVE | | 23 January 1963

agency staff employee

CL-PV

ASSET

Source: Paras. 1-4: [redacted] from [redacted] former Panamanian Charge in Habana, presently in Miami who was approached by [redacted] of the Inter-American Affairs Commission. [redacted] works with [redacted], Panama employee; and it is said that the [redacted] have been quite successful in shipping medicines to Cuba including shipments to prisoners in Cuban jails.

Paras. 5 and 6: [redacted] (ASSET) on or about 20 September, [redacted] (ASSET) obtained the information because it was addressed to [redacted] of Miami, who is related to [redacted] who is a very good friend of [redacted] (ASSET).

Also attached under cover of this report are the following items of information of potential interest:

a. Bulletin No. 2 of the National Medical Association in the Frente Interna Anti-Comunista fr[om] [redacted] (ASSET). It is not known how [redacted] received this information. It is believed that this information dates to about June or July 1962.

Attachments: H/W
Misc. Medical Info.

1 - Headquarters w/att & atts. h/w
1 - OO/C
1 - File

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

SECRET

b. Copy of a letter signed by Cmdte Rene VALLEJO for the Executive Council of the National Institute of Surgery of the Ministry of Health, dated 6 June addressed to Regino BOTTI, President of JUCEPLAN requesting an approval for the expenditure of $20,000.00 for the purchase of raw color film from Czechoslovakia. This film to be used at the national Universities and in Cuban scientific institutions. Received from [redacted] ASSET about mid-July from an unidentified correspondent.

c. ASSET [redacted] debriefing of Antonio TOLEDO Zamora (A12 829 419) who was in the third year at the Medical School, University of Habana. Report dated 21 August.

d. Translation of a commentary by Virgilio PEAIO Nunez, leader of the Cuban medical class Habana on 18 August 1962. It was submitted in translated form by [redacted] ASSET on 26 August. Though this appears to be an interesting commentary there does not appear to be anything new or startling in the information.

e. Listing of medical and professional personnel in Habana which was received through the [redacted] CRYPT diplomatic pouch. Pouch turned over to [redacted] CRYPT for duplication. [redacted] ASSET provided translations. Envelope had return address Colegio Teresiano Calle 17 No. 1054 Vedado, Habana. Addressed to Eduardo ROCO, PO Box 1495. No WAVE traces ROCO. Source of this information is not known. It is believed that the names under this attachment should be indexed for the Field. No indication of meaning of A, C and B, but believe they stand for A- Anti-Communist, B- Neutral and C- Communist.

201-002237

FROM: CABLE

ACTION

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. 48405
Date Received SA

To	Room No.	Date Received	Date Forwarded	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. Dr 3		16 Sep		RD	
2. Mr MacAuley WH/CUBA				MCQ	Verbal approval from Mr Oden, CI/OA on 11 Sept. 1957 - Written request for OA amendment submitted to CI/OA same date MCQ.
3. WH BB				Mr Rastetter read this	
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10. Cable desk					

Paul:
Please draft cable to station and coordinate with Dick Rastetter :

"Hqs. has no objection use subject to contact Amourette B. ~~Due present situation Amourette-A, suggest station use [illegible] discretion in contacting Amourette-10 if~~ such is felt ~~necessary to maintain latter's interest.~~ ~~Suggest~~ AGL contacts be kept ~~to~~ minimum during "cooling off period" until replacement arrives.

Rastetter edited above MCQ
12 Sept

Each comment should be number[ed]
A line should be drawn across she[et]
Officer designations should be use[d]
Each officer should initial (check
Action desired or action taken sho[uld]
Routing sheet should always be re[turned]
For officer designations see separa[te]

SECRET

FORM NO. 51-19 JAN 1947

201-168881

14-00000

FROM: CABLE

ACTION

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. 48405
Date Received SA

To	Room No.	Date Received	Date Forwarded	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. 2r 3		10 Sept			
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3. WH/BB				Mr Rastetter read this	
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10. Cable desk					

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Rastetter edited above MCQ
12 Sept

SECRET

FORM NO. 51-19 JAN 1947

201-168881

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 116 BD/MK/BM
10 SEPT 1957

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING 1 2 3 4 5 6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI/RI 2, PP 2, PP/OPS, S/C 2

VAIVADA, AR. G.

SEP 10 15 40 57
RECD CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 48405

TO DIR INFO CITE HAVA 016

RE: HAVA 014 (IN 48222)*

RE PARA 3 REF REQUEST APPROVAL USE ARTHUR G. VAIVADA AS CONTACT AMOURETTE B, AMOURETTE 10 IF NECESSARY, AND OTHER KUCAGE ASSETS AT STATION DISCRETION PENDING REPLACEMENT GALLEGOS. WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH HIS KUTUBE DUTIES.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: STATION COULD PROVIDE CONTACT FOR AMOURETTE-B AND POSSIBLY A ON INTERIM BASIS.

ABSTRACT INDEX

DATE 10 SEPT

CS COPY

SECRET

 Copy No. 57

10 SEP 57

201-168881

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-W-2362

201-32723

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief of Station, Habana 29 JUL 57 09 12

FROM Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL Operational
SPECIFIC Arthur G. VAIVADA

References: HKH-W-2268, 22 May 1957

Action Required: For Subject's Information

Subject's contract dated 1 August 1954 was recently amended to read as follows:

"Effective 14 May 1957, said contract, as amended, is further amended by deleting in its entirety Paragraph 1 (b) and substituting in lieu thereof the following:

'1 (b) Additional compensation calculated at the rate of $5,135 per annum.'

All other terms and conditions of the original contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect."

17 July 1957

Distribution:
3 - Habana
1 - RI
1 - WH/III/Cuba/Chrono
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - Subject

for J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

WH/III/Cuba/HCMacAuley/fs

for J. C. KING, C/WHD (Releasing officer)

(Coordinating officer)

R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III (Authenticating officer)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-168881

FORM NO. 51-29 AUG 1949

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: Air Pouch
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TRS-A-347

KAPOK
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Branch T DATE: 20 May 1949

FROM : Chief of Station, San José, Costa Rica

SUBJECT: GENERAL- OPERATIONS
SPECIFIC- Request for Project Authorization

REFERENCE: TZP-W-411

1. Authorization is hereby requested for the project described below, which we plan to initiate on 1 June 1949. In view of the comment contained in paragraph 2 of referenced communication, we are assuming that commencement of this project on a simple exploratory basis has already been approved by headquarters. No further commitments, other than those described below, will be made.

A. Objectives

(1) Cutout services, as suggested by headquarters, in an effort to test Subject's abilities.

(2) As a basic and continuing assignment to permit and encourage development of Subject's best local contacts as well as in the hope of filling a long-felt need in our operational pattern, he will be assigned to the general topic of labor; specifically, communist penetration of local non-communist labor groups and theoretical developments which are of interest regardless of group designation.

(3) Subject appears to be genuinely interested and to possess an unusual appreciation for operational ways and means, which is seldom encountered. For this reason, none of his assignments will be exclusive, and he will be encouraged to follow up such leads and opportunities as arise in the course of his daily occupations regardless of any objective and target assignments.

KAPOK
CLASSIFICATION

B. Targets

(1) Subject will commence by serving as cutout for Hugger, who has always held out great promise but never been properly developed or directed.

(2) In the labor field, the principal and only target at the moment is the only labor federation, the Rerum Novarum.

(3) Subject will represent our only contact among the student groups and certain allied "intellectual" societies. Any activity in this category showing promise may subsequently become an assigned target.

C. Cryptonym and Essential Data on Personnel

The designation "Hydropathic", heretofore applied to subject individual, is hereby discarded. He will hereafter be designated by San Jose Station Symbol No. 26. For essential data on personnel, see TZP-A-365, Part I and II.

D. Control and Contact

Judging by Subject's background data and his already demonstrated cooperative attitude, we do not feel that control and direction of his activities will be any problem. Contact, owing to the nature of this project, will be frequent and carried out in any convenient manner, generally in one or the other of our respective homes.

E. Cover

Subject had planned to and has established himself in Costa Rica for entirely personal reasons, prior to any contact with this office. He has a Costa Rican wife, attends the university, and lives a perfectly normal life which any assignments from us will not disrupt. Our only anticipated problem is that of routine contacts between Subject and the Chief of Station. That matter will be handled with care and discretion.

F. Cost

Subject has agreed to serve for a salary equivalent to $50.00 per month, to be paid in colones. To offset this expense we plan to dispense with the services of Hucklebone who is presently receiving $400.00 per month.

G. Timing and other Factors

Our preliminary interviews with Subject lead us to believe that he will be the interested and reliable American cutout for which this station has long felt a need. His greatest virtue in this respect appears to be an understanding of operational methods and an appreciation of relative values with respect to information. It is hoped to make this a permanent project, but our plans and our arrangements with Subject are considered to be probationary, dependent entirely upon his development and future usefulness.

Elmer C. Mercer

14-00000

TZPA 365/01

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR POUCH
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. ~~TZP-A-365 Part II~~ /01

SECRET KAPOK
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Acting Chief, FBT

DATE: 24 November 1948

FROM : Chief of Station, Panama City, Panama.

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operations.
SPECIFIC- Operational Data - HYDROPATHIC PART II

1. The subject of TZP-A-365 Part I is HYDROPATHIC.

2. Subject is best qualified to serve as a cutout in handling informants. He has had experience along these lines in cultivating and collecting information from the following individuals:

Government Oppositionists:

Dr. José PEZET
Lic. Angel VEGA Mendez
Eng. Luis A. CRUZ
Prof. Luis MATIAS

Government Supporters:

Lic. Demetrio MARTINEZ
Lic. Alberto SAMSALLO
Lic. Generoso SELCUS

As a result of the recent meeting between Elmer C. MERCER and Grover J. WARING, Subject has been recruited for the specific task of acting as a cutout in handling HYDROCYST I, who can be handled more profitably if trasferred to the control of MERCER's station. Subject to Home Office approval, no definite commitments have been made in this case.

3. Subject has a working knowledge of the following subjects:

a. Protocol
b. Liaison methods pertaining to intelligence in Latin American countries and inter-departmental liaison within our own government.
c. Communications systems. Subject transmits and receives about 12 - 16 words per minute in Morse code.
d. The political structure of Latin American governments.

Index D X

SECRET KAPOK
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

201-168881

e. Subversive potential and leading subversive personalities of most Latin American countries.

f. Subject is trained in the use of firearms, jungle warfare, and has studied and worked with maps and charts, and is acquainted with surveillance and evasion procedures.

g. His primary activity after his arrival in the new area may of itself be useful. However, it is doubtful if this man will be able to devote any large portion of his time to our work until such time as he is thoroughly oriented.

4. Subject is best qualified to procure information in Latin American countries, particularly Panama and Costa Rica.

MANNER OF OPERATION

5. After he has established himself, Subject is interested in traveling in Argentina, Chile and Brazil.

6. He is willing to travel for us and subject to Home Office approval, it is planned to introduce HYDROPATHIC to HYDROCYST who will, in turn, introduce HYDROPATHIC to HYDROCYST I and, if approved, to HYDROCYST II. For the sake of cover, this is to be done on the basis that HYDROCYST and HYDROPATHIC are lodge brothers. HYDROPATHIC will join that organization in order to build up the cover. (Paragraph 8, TZP-A-365 Part I).

7. The number of people that will work for Subject is undetermined. Tentatively we have in mind HYDROCYST I and HYDROCYST II and, if he recruits them, the subjects underlined in red in Paragraph 16 of TZP-A-365 Part I. It might be well to start collecting biographic data on the latter three individuals at this time.

8. Subject is employed by another agency, but that employment will be terminated in the near future.

9. Subject has been recruited on an Embassy Intelligence Officer basis. It is possible that he knows the ultimate destination of any information he may submit.

10. As presently planned, HYDROCYST and HYDROPATHIC will be acquainted with each other. The turnover could be effected without these agents meeting, but then it would be more difficult to build up the lodge cover story. It would even be possible for HYDROPATHIC to communicate with HYDROCYST since both have a knowledge of Morse Code. However, it is believed that future information from HYDROCYST I will not have its primary value in this area.

11. Subject will be briefed to communicate by letter-drop. Here again, a lodge connection might be used as this is the present system which HYDROCYST I employs in forwarding communications to HYDROCYST.

12. Subject will be briefed to report in writing and to require his sub-agents to do so wherever possible.

13. Subject cannot be expected to devote any major portion of his time to our work until he has built up his cover and is oriented in his new surroundings. Although fluent in the language, he will probably encounter a good deal of new terminology.

14. Subject has entered into a tentative oral contract to perform services for us for a salary of $50.00 per month. This can be made into a written contract at any time.

15. Subject's tentative continuing project is outlined in paragraph 2 above.

16. Subject should be capable of initiating his own projects.

PAYMENT

17. Starting in February 1949, it will be necessary to pay subject $50.00 U.S. dollars per month as indicated in paragraph 14 above.

18. Subject has been told that if his services prove satisfactory, he can expect an increase in salary. No specific amount was discussed.

19. It is contemplated that this station may be required to pay certain travel expenses for Subject. If done, this will be charged against Project Development.

20. No cost of purchase of information is involved at this time.

21. Subject's superiors regard this man as highly dependable. He has had considerable experience in writing reports and has remarked that his two principal criticisms of intelligence reporting as he has observed it in this area is that the reporting is inclined to be sensational rather than factual and that most people have nothing to report other than that which the opposition is willing that they receive. He should have a fair concept of security. However, general security in this area is very lax and he may have subconscious bad habits.

22. In view of his background, Subject should only be good in semi-covert work.

23. If this man is kept under cover he might eventually effect a penetration of scholastic or parlor-pink circles. It is presumed that this would be on a low level.

24. This individual could easily be recruited for a full-time job with our organization. However, it is believed that more is to be gained by starting him off in this manner, perhaps giving him periodic schooling and gradually increasing his activities and responsibilities.

CS COPY

Grover J. Waring

Distribution: Wash - 2
Sanj - 1
Files - 1

SECRET

201-168881

14-00000

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 32

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION C/WH6 ☐ RID COPY

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UNIT WH TIME 1610 BY

INFO FILE VR, DCI, D/DCI, DCI(?), DDP, ADDP, EX-DIR, CS/DO, CS/RF, C/CA2, C/CI, C/FI2, C/CPSER, C/DO4, C/DO/H3

SECRET 291900Z

IMMEDIATE DIR CITE MEXI 4885

RYBAT

REF MEXI 4865 (IN 61382)*

29 SEP 65 IN 62264

*In the station's judgement, neither GOM nor VLT will wish to push this further.

1. NIGHT 28 SEPTEMBER LIFTER-3 SAID VLT CALLED MEETING NATIONAL DIRECTORATE SEPT 21, AT WHICH LIMOLD-1 PRESENT, AND TOLD GROUP PLANNED CALL PRESS CONFERENCE SEPT 23 TO MAKE EXPOSURE RE ODYOKE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES MEXI.

2. SEPT 25 VLT SPOKE BRIEFLY TO NUMBER OFFICIALS AT UOM ABOUT PRESS RELEASE AND SAID THAT TO GAIN MAXIMUM IMPACT HE ADDED CHARGE THAT L-1 AND RACIEL HERNANDEZ WERE THREATENED. ON QUESTIONING BY L-8, VLT SAID NO NEW ATTEMPTS MADE AGAINST PPS PEOPLE BUT BELIEVES SOME ODYOKE AGENCY HAS POSSIBLY ONE MEMBER NATIONAL DIRECTORATE OR PROBABLY ONE CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER WORKING FOR IT, BUT ADDED THIS TYPE OF THING DIFFICULT UNCOVER AND PROVE.

3. L-8 HAS TALKED TO ADRIANA SEVERAL TIMES SINCE EXPOSURE AND SHE SAYS PPS HAS NO PROOF OF CHARGES, AND NO EVIDENCE, DOCUMENTARY OR OTHERWISE, WHICH NOT PUBLISHED IN PRESS. THERE STILL NO EVIDENCE L-1 HAS REPORTED MOST RECENT APPROACH, AND NO EVIDENCE

SECRET

File
Lombardo T
201
201-161881

HERNANDEZ HAS REPORTED MORE THAN FIRST MEETING AND FIRST TELEPHONE CALL TO PPS.

4. L-8 HAS TALKED TO HERNANDEZ SEVERAL TIMES SINCE PRESS RELEASE, AND LATTER ANGRY WITH VLT WHO FAILED CONSULT HIM BEFORE PRESS CONFERENCE. HERNANDEZ SAID VLT HAD PROMISED MATTER WOULD BE DROPPED AND NO PUBLICITY WOULD BE GIVEN APPROACH. HERNANDEZ NOW FEARS ODYOKE AGENCY WHICH APPROACHED HIM WILL HAVE HIM FIRED FROM HIS TWO JOBS, AND REALIZES PPS IN NO POSITION HELP HIM.

5. L-8 BELIEVES VLT MADE EXPOSURE THIS TIME IN EFFORT MAKE SOME FAVORABLE PROPAGANDA AT EXPENSE PBPRIME, KNOWING THAT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF LATTER HAVE BEEN "EXPOSED" IN NUMBER PLACES RECENTLY. ALSO, VLT VERY POSSIBLY TRYING OFFSET EXPECTED ADVERSE CRITICISM AS RESULT CHIHUAHUA INCIDENT 23 SEPT IN WHICH SOME UGOCM (PPS) PEOPLE INVOLVED. ACCORDING L-8, PPS AND VLT FEEL GOM NOT INTERESTED PPS CHARGES AND WILL NOT SERIOUSLY INVESTIGATE IF IN FACT ANY EFFORT MADE AT ALL. VLT PLANS SPEECH IN CONGRESS ON 5 OCT, AND ALTHOUGH ADRIANA SAID SPEECH WILL DEAL PRIMARILY WITH ECONOMIC MATTERS, L-8 FEELS CERTAIN VLT WILL DISCUSS ODYOKE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES MEXI.

6. PRESS MORNING 29 SEPT CARRIED ARTICLE ON INTERVIEW LUIS

ECHEVARRIA MINISTER OF GOBERNACION HAD

WITH NUMBER REPORTERS 28 SEPT. ECHEVARRIA SAID VLT GAVE HIM

DECLARATION 25 SEPT REGARDING SUPPOSED ACTS EXPIONAGE AND BRIBERY INVOLVING TWO OFFICIALS PPS. ECHEVARRIA SAID IN VIEW FACT ONE OF TWO PERSONS ACCUSED BY PPS IS FOREIGNER (TORELLI), GOBERNACION HAD INITIATED AN INVESTIGATION, BUT THAT FACTS PRESENTED BY PPS DO NOT CONSTITUTE EXPIONAGE, SINCE NEITHER PPS OFFICIAL INVOLVED IS PUBLIC OFFICIAL OR FUNCTIONARY. ADDED THAT IF FACTS CAN BE PROVEN IT MAY BE THAT THEY COULD BE CHARGED WITH THREATENING PHYSICAL HARM TO PPS OFFICIALS AND THEIR FAMILIES.

7. BENADUM TALKED TO LITEMPO-1 28 SEPT RE VLT CHARGES. LITEMPO-1 APPEARED NOT AT ALL CONCERNED, SAID VLT HAS MAKE SOME KIND OF SPECTULAR CHARGES PERIODICALLY IN ORDER PROVE TO PPS RANK AND FILE HE HAS NOT JOINED PRI, AND INDICATED GOM PLANS DO NOTHING ABOUT CHARGES. BENADUM PLANS MENTION TO LITEMPO-4 AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY.

8. LIJERSEY-5 TOLD GERENDE 28 SEPT HE HAD NOT SEEN LIJERSEY-1 SINCE TURN OVER TO CASE OFFICER IN 1957. L-5 DOES NOT KNOW LIHOLD-1 AND BELIEVES LIJERSEY-1, IF QUESTIONED, WOULD DENY ANY INTEL CONNECTIONS AND NOT REVEAL NAMES OTHER KUBARK PEOPLE THEN KNOWN TO HIM.

SECRET

8 2

VIEW ABOVE DO NOT PLAN HAVE L/5 SEE L/1.

S E C R E T

IN 62264

PAGE 4

CFN 4385 4865 28 LIFTER-8 VLT 21 LIMOLD-1 23 RE ODYOKE
25 VLT UOM L-1 RACIEL HERNANDEZ L-8 VLT NO NEW PPS ODYOKE L-8
ADRIANA PPS NO PROOF NO EVIDENCE NOT PUBLISHED NO EVIDENCE L-1
NO EVIDENCE HERNANDEZ PPS L-8 HERNANDEZ VLT HERNANDEZ VLT NO
PUBLICITY HERNANDEZ ODYOKE PPS NO POSITION L-8 VLT VLT CHIHUAHUA
23 UGOCM PPS L-8 PPS VLT GOM NOT INTERESTED PPS
NOT SERIOUSLY VLT 5 OCT ADRIANA L-8 VLT ODYOKE 29 LUIS ECHEVARRIA
GOBERNACION 28 ECHEVARRIA VLT 25 SEPT PPS ECHEVARRIA PPS TORELLI
GOBERNACION PPS NOT CONSTITUTE PPS PPS BENADUM LITEMPO-1 28 RE
VLT LITEMPO-1 NOT AT VLT PPS NOT JOINED PRI GOM BENADUM LITEMPO-4
LIJERSEY-5 GERENDE 28 NOT SEEN LIJERSEY-1 1957 L-5 NOT KNOW
LIMOLD-1 LIJERSEY-1 NOT REVEAL KUBARK NOT PLAN L/5 L/1
B

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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FROM Mexico City

ACTION WH8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE, VR, P./A11, CA2, CA/PROP, & logs. CI/IC2

S E C R E T 2122052

DIR CITE MEXI 4832

REF A MEXI 4830 (IN 59248) ✱

B DIR 38518

1. NOTE STATE TELEGRAM 693 OF 24 SEPT INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH ASSOCIATES MENTIONED IN APPARENT FOLLOW UP EL DIA ARTICLE REF B. FULL TEXT VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO PRESS CONFERENCE BEING POUCHED.

2. INDEX.

S E C R E T ✱ RE MORNING PRESS CARRIED PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO

CFN 4832 4830 38518 693 24 SEP REF B VICENTE [illegible] TOLEDANO BEING POUCHED.

BT

RI 201-168881

File Ross Crozier ✱ 201-168881

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

STATEMENT of EARNINGS and DEDUCTIONS

NAME	ROLL	NUMBER	PAY PERIOD DATE	ALLOTMENT	STA. NO.
NOEMAYR HAROLD R	15	857575	10/27 - 11/23	1322001100	000

	EARNINGS	DESCRIPTION
54*	961.92	REG SALARY
55*	1883.76	LSL

	DEDUCTIONS	DESCRIPTION
30*	62.52	RETMT
41*	1778.86	FED TAX 1
42*	1294.72-	FED TAX 2
69*	9.27	936HOSP 9

LEGEND of ACTION CODES

1. Promotions
2. Periodic Step Increase
3. Field Allotment
4. Salary Differential
5. Leave Without Pay
6. Hospital, Insurance, Credit Union
7. Overpayment
8. Tax Deduction Change
9. Allowances

RESIGN. EFF 11/25/63
HEREWITH PJ THRU 11/25/63 + 376 hrs T/L @ 5.01 PER HR

EMPLOYEE NAME:
NOEMAYR HAROLD R

SECRET

EFFECTIVE DATE (DAY MO. YR)	CO. DE	EFFECTIVE DATE (DAY MO. YR)	CO. DE	ADDL. COMP.	FROM EMPLOYEE	than Normal Salary	
2845.68	555.93				2269.75	2269.75	TOTALS
					NET PAY	PD. at HDQTS.	

FORM 11-58 1315 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

201-168881

4 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Termination of Contract - Ross L. Crozier

201-168881

1. Attached is the original of Form 1689, Clearance Sheet for Termination of Contract Personnel, for retention in your file. A copy has been forwarded to the Office of Security for their records.

2. Also attached is Mr. Crozier's letter of resignation. In accordance with the provision of his contract providing for a ninety day notice, the resignation becomes effective close of business 28 November 1963.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

Attachments:
Form 1689 h/w
Letter of Resignation

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 Addressee w/att
1 - Comp Tax Accts Br
1 - CCS
1 - Outplacement Branch

201-168881

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

TO: (Check)	CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION
X	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT
ATTN:	
REF:	
MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED	
DATE	
ESTABLISHED FOR	
FILE NO.	
ID CARD NO.	

☐ BLOCK RECORDS: [illegible]
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR _____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ______________.

X b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE ______________.

☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

☐ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS: Cover History: 1953 - Jul 54 - NOC, [illegible]; Aug 54 - Feb 57 - NOC, overseas; May 57 - Sept 60 - NOC, CONUS; Sept 60 - Aug 61 - NOC, CONUS; Sept 61 - Jan 63 - NOC, CONUS; Jan 63 - Jul 63 - DAC, Hdqs.

Subject will use above information for backstopping and use for commercial use only. Should he ever have need to apply for a governmental position, he will contact this office and will ignore above information and use CIA from ~~Mex~~ 1953 on.

Bldg address not known.

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Franklin
CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCS

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

27 September 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Central Cover Staff

ATTENTION : Mr. Charles Danish

SUBJECT : Termination of Contract Personnel - Ross L. Crozier

1. Mr. Ross L. Crozier, a Career Agent assigned to Special Affairs Staff, has tendered his resignation from the Agency. In accordance with the terms of his contract, he gave 90 days notice making his termination effective close of business 28 November 1963.

2. Subject's employment history was established by Mr. Biladeau of the Central Cover Staff in conjunction with the Outplacement Branch of the Personnel Operations Division. Mr. Crozier was advised that he should indicate employment by CIA from his EOD date (1 June 1949) through the above termination date when applying for a position with another Government Agency. If seeking employment with private business, however, he was to utilize the employment history provided him by the Outplacement Branch.

3. It is requested that Central Cover Staff's records be noted accordingly. Contract Personnel Division should be requested to refer all inquiries concerning Crozier's employment to the Outplacement Branch of the Personnel Operations Division, effective immediately. The Outplacement Branch will acknowledge Agency employment when the inquiry comes from a Government source, and will deny Agency affiliation to all other inquirers

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

TERMINATION SECRECY OATH

I, Ross L. Crozier, am about to terminate my association with the Organization. I realize that, by virtue of my duties with the Organization, I have been the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of our country. I am aware that the unauthorized disclosure of such information is prohibited by the espionage laws of our government which specifically requires the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Accordingly, I SOLEMNLY SWEAR, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF DURESS, AS FOLLOWS:

1. I will never divulge, publish, or reveal by writing, word, conduct, or otherwise, any information relating to the national defense and security and particularly information of this nature relating to intelligence sources, methods, personnel, fiscal data, or security measures to anyone, including, but not limited to, any future governmental or private employer, private citizen, or government employee or official without the express written consent of the Chief of the Organization or his authorized representative.

2. I have been invited to submit in writing any monetary claims I may have against the Organization or our government which may in any way necessitate the disclosure of information described herein. I have been advised that any such claims will receive full legal consideration. In the event, however, that I am not satisfied with the decisions of the Organization concerning any present or future claims I may submit, I will not take any other action to obtain satisfaction without prior written notice to the Organization, and then only in accordance with such legal and security advice as the Organization will promptly furnish me.

3. I do not have any documents or materials in my possession, classified or unclassified, which are the property of, or in custodial responsibility of the Organization, having come into my possession as a result of my duties with the Organization or otherwise.

4. During my exit processing and during my period of employment with the Organization I have been given an opportunity to report all information about the Organization, its personnel, and its operations which I consider should receive official cognizance. Hence, I am not aware of any information which it is my duty, in the national interest, to disclose to the Organization, nor am I aware of any violations or breaches of security which I have not officially reported, except as set forth on the reverse side of this sheet or on other attachments.

30 Aug. 63

201-168881

FORM 1-58 1379

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

5. I have been advised that, in the event I am called upon by the properly constituted authorities to testify or provide information which I am pledged hereby not to disclose, I will notify the Organization immediately; I will also advise said authorities of my secrecy commitments to our government and will request that my right or need to testify be established before I am required to do so.

6. I am aware of the provisions and penalties of the espionage laws of our government and am fully aware that any violation on my part of certain matters sworn to by me under this oath may subject me to prosecution under the terms of these laws, and that violation of other portions of this oath are subject to appropriate action, including such dissemination of the violation as the circumstances warrant.

I have read and understand the contents of this oath and voluntarily affix my signature hereto with the full knowledge that this oath was executed for the mutual benefit of myself and our government, and that it will be retained in the files of the Organization for its future use or for reference by me at any time in the future that I may be requested or ordered to testify or disclose any of the matters included within the scope of this oath.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and seal this 30th day of August 1963.

Ross L. Crozier (SEAL)
Signature

Witnessed by me this 30th day of Aug. 1963
at Wash DC

George A. Ladner
Signature

SECRET

14-00000

30 August 1963

Washington 25, D.C.

DIRECTOR,
Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington 25, D.C.

I hereby tender my resignation from the Central Intelligence Agency as a Career Agent. In accordance with the termination clause in my contract, request that all salary be continued for a period of 90 days from this date. I understand that my services are to be available to the Agency during the period of 90 days.

Ross L. Crozier

Ross L. Crozier

1607 S. 26th St
Arlington 6, Va.

201-168881

SECRET

CLEARANCE SHEET FOR TERMINATION OF CONTRACT PERSONNEL

DATE

THIS FORM MUST BE LISTED AND SUBMITTED IN DUPLICATE

PERSONAL DATA

NAME (Last, First, Middle - true or pseudonym)	OFFICE AND BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
Crozier, Ross L.	Special Affairs Staff
LOCAL ADDRESS	PERMANENT ADDRESS
Apt. 9 1607 So 28th St Arlington Va	Same
PERMANENT STATION OR BASE	POSITION OR FUNCTIONAL TITLE
Washington D.C.	Ops Officer

CONTRACT DATA

DATE CONTRACT EFFECTIVE	DATE CONTRACT LAST RENEWED	DATE CONTRACT EXPIRES	DATE OF CONTRACT TERMINATION
1 June 1957	original contract indefinite term	contract for indefinite term	28 November 1963

REASON FOR CONTRACT TERMINATION

RESIGNATION

INTERNAL STAFF OR DIVISION CLEARANCES (Add or delete as applicable)

COMPONENT	CLEARED BY	DATE	REMARKS
FINANCE	[illegible initials]	8/30/63	
LOGISTICS	[illegible]	[illegible]	
PERSONNEL	DCB	8/30/63	

CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER — CLEARED BY (Signature): Charles Francis — DATE: 30 Aug 63

SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWING OFFICES

(OFFICES NOT REQUIRING INTERVIEW WILL SO INDICATE)

OFFICE	SCHEDULE DATE	SCHEDULE TIME	SCHEDULE LOCATION	INTERVIEWING OFFICIAL
CENTRAL COVER DIVISION			Already briefed No interview nec.	CLEARED BY (Signature): [illegible signature] DATE: 23 Sep '63
OFFICE OF SECURITY SSD				CLEARED BY (Signature): DATE:
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL CPD				CLEARED BY (Signature): [illegible signature] DATE: Aug 30, 1963

REMARKS (Please initial)

201-168881.

STAFF OR DIVISION AND BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	SIGNATURE OF STAFF OR DIVISION RESPONSIBLE OFFICER	DATE
SAS/EOB	SAS/CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER	

FORM 6-60 1669

SECRET

(8)

Ross L. Crozier
Resume

Al:

12 July 1963

On qualifications - there just aren't any in the civilian or industrial category - The university work in Economic Sciences was real, not cover, but interrupted before I got the degree (5 years). However, I specialized in Economic Theory, which when considered that I studied in three Latin American Universities (Costa Rica, Guatemala and Cuba) does give me some qualification as a "Latin American Consultant".

The classification as "Research Analyst" is cover except for that part of which the "Latin American" background could be utilized.

Although I have had no business experience in an administrative or executive capacity, I am sure that I could qualify in that work, especially if it were in connection with Latin America or utilizing my Spanish language ability.

As you can see by the above, unfortunately there is no commercial "counterpart" for the type of work I have been doing for 15 years or more. My feeling is that we should consult the "local outplacement" man first, on the possibility that there is a local opportunity, but the opportunities in the Latin American field whill be greater.

(In addition to the above, I might add that I have performed best in "operations" work"- which involves planning, direction and coordination.)

R

201-168551

14-00000

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY - Ross L. Crozier
331-12-9652

10 July 1963

Organization/Location	Dates	Title/Position
60th FA Bn., Ft. Bragg, N.C.	29 Aug 40-8 Sep 41	Survey Operator
USAF, C.Z. and IBT	9 Sep 41-6 Jul 45	Intelligence NCO
USAF, Canal Zone	18 Apr 46-18 Apr 49	Intelligence NCO
University of Costa Rica Economic & Social Sciences	15 May 49-15 July 53	Student/G.I. Bill
University of Costa Rica Department of Geology	1 Aug 52-1 Nov 52	Adm Asst/Photography
Studio Indiana (Photography) San Jose, Costa Rica	1 Nov 52-1 Jul 53	Owner/Mngr.
Commercial Photography - Guatemala City, Guatemala	1 Jan 54-1 May 54	Photographer/Indep.
Pan American Foundation, University of Florida, Gainesville, Fla. Scholarship Grant to Cuba. (Director: Curt Wilgus)	1 Sep 54-1 Sep 56	Student/School of Economic Sciences, University of Havana.
Public Surveys Institute, 1511 Bryant St., Dallas, Texas In Havana: Feb 57 - Apr 58 In Mexico: June 58 - Apr 60	1 Feb 57-31 Aug 60	Research Analyst & Latin American Consultant.
Clarence A. DePew & Sons, 230 Park Ave., N.Y.C. Branch Office, Coral Gables, Fla.	1 Sep 60-1Sep 61	Research Analyst & Latin American Consultant.
Zenith Technical Enterprises, Inc Bldg 25, Coral Reef Drive, Miami 56, Fla. Empl Id No. 59-0938096	1 Sep 61-15 Jan 63	Research Analyst & Latin American Consultant.
U.S. Army Element, Joint Operations Group 7753 The Pentagon, Wash 25, D.C. Tel. OXford 7-7510 (Code 11)	15 Jan 63-To date.	Latin American Consultant.

Employment History:

Organization	From	To	Title/Position
60th FA Bn, Ft. Bragg, NC	29 Aug 40	8 Sep 41	Survey Operator
USAF, Canal Zone-Burma IBT	9 Sep 41	6 Jul 45	Intelligence NCO
USAF, Canal Zone	18 Apr 46	18 Apr 49	Intelligence NCO
Central Intelligence Agency 2430 E Street, Washington 25, D.C.	1 June 49	1 June 57	Contract Agent
Central Intelligence Agency 2430 E Street, Washington 25, D.C.	1 June 57	To Present	Career Agent.

PERSONAL INFORMATION

VOL. V of V

14-00000

PERSONAL INFORMATION

VOL. V of V

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 201-52514

429 SE/DJB/

DATE 8 APRIL 1958

SECRET

429

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MEXICO

ACTION WH 5

INFO FI, FI/OPS 2, S/C 2

RE Filing action: Branch copy 201-32723

APR 10 08 22 58

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 14180

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 1364

SUBJ: 201-52514

1. RE VAIVADA COVER, ROBERT S BENJAMIN WILLING IN PRINCIPLE ASSIST IN PROCURING WORK PAPERS AND COVERING ANY FRIEND NAUMAN. AS HQS INFORMED, EXPECT BENJAMIN WILL BE SATISFIED NOMINAL SUM COMPENSATE ADDITIONAL EXPENSES.

2. BENJAMIN TOLD NOTHING EXCEPT WOULD APPRECIATE HIS MAKING PLACE FOR A FRIEND. NO COMMITMENT OR OBLIGATION OF ANY KIND.

3. LEAVE DECISION TO HQS. IN EVENT ANY INTEREST WOULD PERHAPS BE WISE HAVE VAIVADA COME MEET AND TALK WITH BENJAMIN.

201-32723

END OF MESSAGE

RI COPY

MICROFILMED

DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

10 April 58

201-162881

SECRET

B-201-52514

FORM 2-58 1389

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMMW-6430

201-32723

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE 11 JUN 1958

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - Harold R. NOEMAYER

ROSS L. CROZIER

REFERENCE: HMMW-6420, June 1958 (50-6-67/1)

ACTION REQUESTED: None. For Your Information.

Forwarded herewith is a copy of Subject's PRQ, Part II. Subject's Covert Security Approval was amended on 3 June 1958 to permit Subject's use in Mexico.

J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

4 June 1958

Attachment:
As described above. (HAPOK)

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City (w/attachment)
1 - WH/Mailroom (w/o attachment)
1 - WH/3/Mexico/Chrono (w/o attachment)
1 - RI " "
1 - Subject " "

WH/III/Mexico/LSulc:mpm

AN	RI
AB	
IN	
PS	
DX	
DES	RFD
FI	

201-168881
X
HMMW 6430
11 JUN 58

COORDINATED BY PHONE:

S.O./MR. WEHKING

CS COPY

(Releasing officer) (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

for J. C. KING, C/WHD

R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29 JUN 1949

201-168881
201-32723

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-14169
TO : Chief, WH Division		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-32723
INFO		
FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City		DATE 27 November 1959
SUBJECT Operational/Harold R. NOEMAYR		(CHECK ONE) MARKED FOR INDEXING
		X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED Advise ETA of NOEMAYR's replacement so that NOEMAYR can make departure plans.		INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCES:

HMMA-13726, 11 September 1959

1. The Station would appreciate any information which Headquarters can provide concerning an ETD for Harold R. NOEMAYR and his family and an ETA for NOEMAYR's replacement. NOEMAYR's tentative ETD of 1 January 1960 is only slightly more than one month away and he has visas to obtain in addition to other departure preparations.

2. NOEMAYR was instructed by the Station to proceed with the necessary correspondence with Mexican, Costa Rican, Cuban, and Panamanian authorities for the required police certificates for his wife since she is not a citizen of PBPRIME and is applying for an Immigrant Visa. He has already received the necessary documents from Costa Rica and Cuba and expects to obtain the Mexican certificate within the next two days. No reply from Panama has been received as yet although it should arrive shortly. As soon as the Panamanian clearance and that from Mexico is obtained, NOEMAYR will submit all papers to the local ODACID installation and request the necessary documentation for the travel of himself and his family. As Headquarters is aware, the Immigrant Visa for NOEMAYR's wife will be valid only so long as she travels within four months of the date issued.

3. An early reply to this dispatch would be appreciated.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

LJS/mvr

25 November 1959

Distribution:
- 3 - Hqs
- 2 - Files

CS COPY

201-168881

201-32723

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. [illegible]-048

201-32723

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 17 JUN 1958

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - Harold R. NOEMAYER

ROSS L. CROZIER

Action Requested: Please Notify Subject

Reference is made to Subject's contract effective 1 June 1957.

Effective 1 June 1957, said contract is amended by adding after sub-paragraph (b) of Paragraph four (4), entitled "Allowances," the following:

"(c) You will be entitled to an educational allowance in conformance with and at the rates prescribed in applicable Government regulations."

All other terms and conditions of the contract remain in full force and effect.

J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

COPY

AN
AB
FB
PS
BE
DES HFD
FI

201-168881
X
4448
17 JUN 58

9 June 1958

WH/3/Mexico/[illegible]

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - RI

CS COPY

(Releasing officer) for J. C. KING, C/WHD

(Coordinating officer)

(Authenticating officer) [illegible] /III

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-168881
201-32723

FORM NO. 51-29 JUN 1949

14-00000

VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TRSA-974

TO : Chief, Foreign Division T

DATE: 10 July 1951

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Administrative

SPECIFIC— Ross Lester CROZIER

Ref: TRSA-925 - 18-6-3-66

Attached herewith are the fingerprints and samples of handwriting of subject to be attached to the reference.

Eugene T. Roday

Encl: 2

AN
AB
IN
FS
SX
RI/FI

CS COPY

IR COPY

201-168881
X
TRSA 974
10 JUL 51
201-168881
18-6-3-66

2 Encl.

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

ALIEN

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

Name ~~xxxxxxx~~ Crozier (Surname) Ross (First) Lester (Middle) Classification ....

(PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT PLAINLY)

Nationality USA Color White Sex M Reference ....

RIGHT HAND

1. Thumb	2. Index finger	3. Middle finger	4. Ring finger	5. Little finger

LEFT HAND

6. Thumb	7. Index finger	8. Middle finger	9. Ring finger	10. Little finger



Impressions taken by: Eugene T. Perry (Signature of official taking prints)

Date impressions taken July 2, 1951

Note amputations

Ross L. Crozier
~~xxxxx~~'s signature.

FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY — Left hand | Left thumb | Right thumb | FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY — Right hand



PLEASE DO NOT FOLD THIS CARD

10—16306

Encl 1 to 7RSA 9-74

CS COPY

201-165881

14-00000

This is a sample of my handwriting.

Este es un ensayo de mi letra.

Ross L. Crozier

Encl 2 to TRSA 974

201-168 881

~~18-6-3-68~~

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: ~~AIR~~ (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. TRS-W-275

SECRET DESENSITIZED
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, San Jose

DATE: ~~21 December 1948~~

FROM : Acting Chief, Foreign Branch T

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operations
SPECIFIC- Project Hydropathic

REF: TZP-A-365, Part I

The attached document is forwarded to your station for examination in connection with the development of Project Hydropathic. You are directed to forward this document to Panama City when it has served its purpose.

A. Rodriguez
A. Rodriguez

Attach.

BP:jcr

COPY

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-28

201-168881
X
TRS W 275
DATE 21 DEC 48

R. A. MacMillan
RELEASING OFFICER
OP-BA

CS COPY
COORDINATING OFFICER

HARRY A. REAL
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-168881

FORM NO. 51-29
APR 1947

(709)

14-00000

OFFICIAL - DISPATCH

VIA: SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. ~~TGS-~~ 643

CLASSIFICATION: DESENSITIZED

DATE: MAY 25 1951

TO : Chief of Station, San Jose

FROM : Chief, Foreign Division T

DESENSITIZED

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operational

SPECIFIC- HUMANOID - HUMANIST

Gen. ops

REF: TGS-~~W~~-633

1. A review of the compromise of the technical surveillance and the part played in it by HUMANIST indicates that HUMANOID may have been compromised by the former's confession. While you indicate that HUMANIST did not know HUMANOID's name, and could not have given it to the police, it is quite probable that he may have told them that an American other than yourself took part in the operation.

2. It would be natural for HUMANIST to attempt to minimize the extent of his confession in his report to you, and he may possibly have given the police identifying data and a description of HUMANOID. Because of these factors, headquarters feels that HUMANOID should be isolated from all operations for a period of approximately six months, in order to avoid the possibility that the authorities may suspect him of taking part in intelligence activities. It is believed that this period of inactivity will protect HUMANOID and assist him in the preservation of his cover.

3. You are authorized to continue his salary for the period during which he will perform no work for you.

4. It is requested that you turn over all operations which HUMANOID is currently handling to another agent (or agents) as soon as practicable. If you are unable to do this, you may suspend the operations in which HUMANOID has been active, until such time as HUMANOID can again resume his work for us. You are also authorized to pay the agent (or agents) whose work is suspended during this period.

RELEASING OFFICER: [signature]

COORDINATING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER: [signature]

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET CS COPY

201-161781

DESENSITIZED

FORM NO. 51-28 JUN 1949

14-00000

SECRET

-2-

DESENSITIZED

5. If the opportunity should present itself, it would be appreciated if you would question HU[illegible]AMIST as to the nature of the interrogation which he underwent at the hands of the police, with the object of finding out whether he told them at any time that there was a third individual involved in the technical surveillance.

Wm M Wheeler Jr
WM. M. [illegible] JR.
T J Flores
By T. J. Flores

TJF:jr

BG

RECEIVED

SECRET

DESENSITIZED

per CSN 43-28

201-168881

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch) DISPATCH NO. HKH-A-3314

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD DATE 17 January 1957

FROM : Chief of Station, Habana

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Administrative
SPECIFIC - Arthur G. VAIVADA

Reference: HAVA 755

1. Discussions of the whole problem of VAIVADA's early TDY to Headquarters were held between the agent, the field case officer, and the Chief of Station on 13 and 14 January, as a result of which it became clear that, unless Headquarters has a compelling reason to the contrary, it would be advisable that the contemplated TDY be postponed until about the end of VAIVADA's current contract year, i.e., the period of July-August 1957.

2. A number of important personal problems dispose VIAVADA to accept the delay in acquiring staff status that would accrue from such a postponement. His wife is sufficiently ill at this time from a form of nervous colitis as to recommend that she not travel now. His children would have to lose a semester of their schooling since the current semester began on 7 January. Moreover as he and family have resided in tropical areas for a number of years, VAIVADA would have to make a rather large financial outlay to purchase needed winter clothing for himself and his family which does not seem justified for a period as short as two months. Owing to several routine but time-consuming inquiries being made by the local ODACID in connection with his wife's visa application, there is no guarantee that VAIVADA would be able to depart Cuba before February 1957.

3. On the operational side, in spite of the original Station request that VAIVADA's travel be expedited, advantages now of delaying his TDY outweigh the disadvantages, from the Station's point of view. Most important of these is that two promising sources currently under development by the Station, namely AMPHODARCH-6 and AMPHODARCH-10, were originally contacted by VAIVADA and he has since been the person working most closely with them. To substitute him with a relatively untrained cut-out at this point in their development is not desirable. On the basis of the original proposed timing of his trip the Station has however proceeded with firm plans to transfer handling of two other sources, AMPHODARCH-1 and AMBIVALENT-5, to a reliable PBPRIME cut-out. This plan can be initiated whether VAIVADA departs now or later, and provides the ideal opportunity to take two low-level sources off VAIVADA's hands thereby freeing the latter to undertake new

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-168881

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

RI COPY

development of specific student Communist and Youth targets the Station has already lined up. Both these sources have passed through an initial period of training and have fully demonstrated their reliability and ability to continue to perform effectively via a cut-out. In handling a half-dozen sources, as VAIVADA has been doing, he reached the limits of reasonable span of control and has not had the time to give to such new developmental work which is his forte and upon which it would be most desirable to have him concentrate rather than upon the mere routine handling of relatively tested sources.

4. Delaying VAIVADA's TDY as proposed herein would place VAIVADA at Headquarters at or about the end of his current contract year, where he would be immediately available for personal consultation regarding his future assignment whether or not it is decided that he return to Habana or sent to a new post. In this connection the Station wishes parenthetically to point out its definite interest in having VAIVADA reassigned to Habana for at least one additional year if possible, and to note that VAIVADA has expressed a personal desire to that effect.

5. Regardless of the decision as to timing of his travel, VAIVADA is proceeding to change his residence. He will try to obtain a suitable house possessing a telephone, something he has lacked heretofore, thereby carrying through plans previously reported to Headquarters in paragraph 6 of HKH-A-3144.

6. Therefore, unless there exist truly urgent reasons for VAIVADA's travel to Headquarters prior to about July 1957, it is recommended that his trip be postponed until that time.

James R. Palinger
James R. Palinger

Distribution:
3 - Washington
2 - Files

16 January 1957

JRP/dnt

201-168881
2917

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-A-2726

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE 7 June 1956

FROM: Chief of Station, Habana

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Administrative
SPECIFIC - Arthur G. VAIVADA - Contract Amendment

REF: HKH-W-1710, 28 May 1956.

Forwarded is the original of the Contract Amendment transmitted under reference dispatch, signed by Arthur G. Vaivada. One copy of this Amendment is being retained in Station files.

James R. Palinger
James R. Palinger

Attachment:
1-Amendment

Distribution:
3 Wash w/att.
2 Files w/att.

5 June 1956

JRP/rrd

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

201-168881

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

28 Jan
30 Jan

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST		
2. NAME (Last, First, Middle) CROZIER, ROSS L.	3. POSITION TITLE	4. GRADE
5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH TFW/		6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

- [ ] PRE-EMPLOYMENT
- [ ] ENTRANCE ON DUTY
- [ ] TDY STANDBY
- [ ] SPECIAL TRAINING
- [ ] ANNUAL
- [ ] RETURN TO DUTY
- [ ] FITNESS FOR DUTY
- [ ] MEDICAL RETIREMENT
- [ ] HDQS/TDY
- [ ] OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD
STATION
TDY OR PCS
TYPE OF COVER
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED

- [XXX] RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA	
STATION	WH
NO. OF DEP.'S	

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

- [ ] YES
- [ ] NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE	L. Armstrong C/TFW/PeR
ROOM NO. & BUILDING GH 5608 Hdqts.	EXT. 6577

10. COMMENTS

#26513
6 Mar. 63
201-168881

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

QUALIFIED FOR CURRENT DUTIES

DATE	SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF
6 MAR 1963	S. H. Durston

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

2-259 to PS 23 Jan 63

14-00000

I ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF $500.00 (CASH) FROM Louis W. ARMSTRONG.

REPRESENTING AN ADVANCE AGAINST SALARY DUE FOR THE PAY PERIOD

1/20-2/16/63.

PAYEE: HAROLD R. NOEMAYR

/S/
Signature

15 FEB 63

File

201-168551

14 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

SUBJECT : Harold R. HOEMAYR, Career Agent - Request for Advance Against Earned Salary

REFERENCE : HR 30-410, dated 20 May 1955

1. Subject has recently transferred to Headquarters PCS from JMWAVE. He is presently arranging to move into new quarters on 1 March 1963 and is short of funds to effect this transaction.

2. It is therefore requested that HOEMAYR be advanced $500.00 against earned salary totalling approximately $895.00 due him for the pay period ending 16 February 1963.

HOWARD J. PRESTON
Chief,
Special Affairs Staff/Support

cc: SAS/Pers

201-161881

SECRET

FI D TRANSMITTAL - FITNESS REPOR

INSTRUCTIONS

The following items of the Fitness Report will NOT be completed by field personnel preparing the report for transmitted to Headquarters:

SECTION A, Items 1, 6, and 7

SECTION D, items 1, 2, and 3 *(Only in respect to "Typed or Printed Name and Signature")*

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS FITNESS REPORT	DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE (In pseudonym)
	15 January 1963	Harold R. NOEMAYR

2. I CERTIFY THAT, EXCEPT FOR ITEMS OMITTED UNDER THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL ITEMS APPEARING ON THE ATTACHED FITNESS REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS OR REGULATIONS

DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR (In pseudonym)
15 January 1963	Robert K. TROUCHARD
DATE FEB 12 1963	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (In pseudonym) Andrew K. REUTEMAN

SPECIAL NOTE

Fitness Reports must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information and methods of operation, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of specific duties may be reported in Section B. However, the nature, source, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the position titles and description of specific duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases, general statements of specific duties will be included in Section B indicating the level of responsibility.

FORM 4-62 45a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET (4)

201-168551

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, SAS

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
GYROSE/FINAN - 1962 Covert Earning Statement - Harold R. NOEMAYR

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
REFERENCE: UFGS-2585, dated 18 January 1963

Forwarded herewith is 1962 Covert Earning Statement for Harold R. NOEMAYR. Subject departed JMWAVE 16 January and arrived at Headquarters 21 January 1963.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment:
Earning Statement,.H/W

Distribution:
3 - Chief, SAS, w/att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
29 Jan. 1963

DATE DISPATCHED
JAN 31 1963

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGT-3987

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-165551

SECRET 22 Jan 63

TRAVEL ORDER

TDY / PCS / INVITATIONAL	OFFICE TRAVEL ORDER NO. 17W-335-63
NAME: Harold R. [illegible] (P)	SERVICE TRAVEL ORDER NO.
OFFICIAL STATION: Miami, Florida	OFFICE PHONE: [illegible]
GRADE: Career Agent	

YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRAVEL AND INCUR NECESSARY EXPENSES IN ACCORDANCE WITH REGULATIONS. THIS TRAVEL OR CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION, IF SO DESIGNATED, IS MADE FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE.

ITINERARY, MODE OF TRAVEL AND PURPOSE

Miami, Fla. to Washington, D. C.

PURPOSE: PCS per DIR 05[illegible]17
MODE: Air tourist/POT/CC

TRAVEL DURATION BEGIN	END	PER DIEM ALLOWANCE DOMESTIC	FOREIGN MAXIMUM	OTHER (See below)	AUTOMOBILE ALLOWANCE CENTS PER MI. NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER	CENTS PER MI. AS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO GOV'T.
16 Jan 63	Arr. Hqrs	$ 1[illegible].00				.12

ALLOWANCES AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS WITH REASONS

Authorized 3½ days travel time with full per diem for subject only.
Travel and costs in excess of direct route chargeable to traveler.

DEPENDENT TRAVEL AUTHORIZED

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	RELATIONSHIP
~~Argentina de los Angeles Cordero~~	~~15/3/1[illegible]~~	~~Wife~~
~~Jose Arnulfo~~	~~13~~	~~Son~~
~~Lillian Caridad~~	~~11~~	~~Dau~~

ACCOMPANY TRAVELER / FOLLOW WITHIN 6 MONTHS / ADVANCE RETURN

PROCURE TRANSPORTATION BY: TRANSPORTATION REQUEST / CASH OR OTHER

DISPOSITION OF EFFECTS AUTHORIZATION: SHIPMENT / NONTEMPORARY STORAGE / SHIPMENT POA AUTHORIZED

EXCESS BAGGAGE AUTHORIZED: ACCOMPANIED LBS. AND MODE / UNACCOMPANIED LBS. AND MODE

ADVANCE OF FUNDS REQUESTED: YES / NO / ACCOUNTING DUE DATE

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL: $600.00

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO.: 335-63

CHARGE COST CENTER NO.: 3133-2001-1000

DATE | SIGNATURE OF B & F OFFICER: [illegible]

COORDINATION

SIGNATURE	TITLE & COMPONENT	DATE

REQUESTING OFFICIAL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE	COMPONENT
EDWARD J. PRESTON	C/TFW/SUPPORT
SIGNATURE	DATE

AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE	COMPONENT
WILLIAM K. HARVEY	CHIEF/TFW
SIGNATURE	DATE

FORM 5-60 540 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. MFG. 6-62

SECRET

22 Jan. 63
201-168881

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)
STATEMENT of EARNINGS and DEDUCTIONS

NAME	ROLL	NUMBER	PAY PERIOD DATE	ALLOTMENT	STA. NO.
NOEMAYR HAROLD R	15	857575	01/20 - 2/16	13220011000	000

	EARNINGS	DESCRIPTION
04	801.60	REG SALARY
18*	324.77	OT - HOL

	DEDUCTIONS	DESCRIPTION
30	52.10	RETMT
42*	24.94	FED TAX 2
42*	58.46	FED TAX 2
42	116.20	FED TAX 2
69	6.18	624HOSP 9

LEGEND of ACTION CODES

1. Promotions
2. Periodic Step Increase
3. Field Allotment
4. Salary Differential
5. Leave Without Pay
6. Hospital, Insurance, Credit Union
7. Overpayment
8. Tax Deduction Change

Rel to Hq 1/21/63 Cover term 1/15/63
Due Refund of 138.54 for CREI offset
Accrual for P/p 1/2-1963 108.08 plus 113.60 Paid by Voucher 1/15/63
Prem. Pay Paid From 9/16/62 - 1/15/63

EMPLOYEE NAME:
NOEMAYR HAROLD R

SECRET

REFUNDS DUE FROM EMPLOYEE

* ASTERISK Denotes other than Normal Salary

1126.37	257.88	24.94-	893.43	893.43	TOTALS
			NET PAY	PD. at HDQTS.	

Less 500.00 Advance
$393.43

FORM 11-58 1315 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(30)

201-165881

SECRET

18 JAN 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

VIA : Chief, Contract Personnel Division/OP

SUBJECT : Qualification for Premium Pay

REFERENCES : (A) Memorandum to ADCI from General Counsel, dated 29 May 1962. Subject: Delegation of Authority (OGC 62-1131)

(B) Memorandum to DD/S from Chief, Task Force W, dated 17 August 1962. Subject: Application of Housing Allowance and Premium Pay to Certain JMWAVE Contract Personnel

1. This is to certify that Harold R. NOEMAYR, a Career Agent, assigned PCS to the geographic area of JMWAVE and JMBAR, qualifies for premium payment according to the authorization contained in the referenced memorandums. This certification is based upon the following conditions of subject's employment during his PCS assignment.

(a) Subject's hours of duty cannot be controlled administratively.

(b) In order to satisfactorily discharge his duties, subject is required to perform substantial amounts of irregular, unscheduled, overtime duty, and duty at night and on holidays.

(1) A substantial amount of irregular, unscheduled, overtime duty means an average of at least six hours of such overtime duty a week.

(2) The irregular, unscheduled, overtime duty is a continual requirement, generally averaging more than once a week.

201-165881

SECRET

(3) Night and holiday duty will be performed from time to time.

(e) Subject is responsible for recognizing, without supervision, circumstances which require him to remain on duty.

2. The effective date for this premium payment will be the beginning of the first pay period following 4 September 1962.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

APPROVED:

_______________________________ ______________
Director of Personnel Date

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, JMWAVE X

Chief, Task Force W
GYROSE/Personnel
Premium Pay for Certain Contract Employees

1. Headquarters has, or is now in the process of, amending the contracts for the following personnel to provide for Premium Pay in lieu of overtime:

BLAIHAUSE, Russell J.
CONNER, Richard E.
DELLAROCCO, Peter V.
GLAVASCO, Philip D.
HEARD, Bruce E.
LAURENKUS, Marvin A.
STARKWOOD, Kenneth A.
STUART, Jennifer A.
TARTARILLO, John K.
TARDINA, Jacob C.
YERKES, Leonard W.
CADICK, Irving G.
MOEZAYE, Harold R.
DEVOCHO, Irving G.
SLONAR, Henry J.

2. When Peter J. DIGERVERO is converted from a contract agent to a contract employee status, his contract will also provide Premium Pay.

3. It is requested that JMWAVE review the above list to determine its completeness as it pertains to headquarters type contracts and advise if there are any discrepancies and/or omissions.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
3 - COS, JMWAVE

13 Nov. 1962 15 NOV 1962

UFGS - 2255

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

TFW/Personnel James Durham sam 6576

1 - TFW/Personnel
1 - TFW/Registry
1 - Chief, TFW

C/TFW/Pers. Louis W. Armstrong

ORIG : JAMES DURHAM:amm
UNIT : TFW/PERSONNEL
EXT : 6576
DATE : 13 NOVEMBER 1962 1672

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

TO : JMWAVE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : TFW 10

INFO : DDP, OP 2, S/C 2

DEFERRED

X ROUTINE

OUT97865

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 48601

GYROSE

REF: WAVE 1148 (IN 15729)

ALL CONTRACTS NOW BEING AMENDED WITH EXCEPTION PETER J. DIGERVENO. WILL AUTHORIZE PREMIUM PAY DIGERVENO UPON CONVERSION CONTRACT EMPLOYEE STATUS.

END OF MESSAGE

TFW COMMENT: Request advise.

201-168871

HOWARD J. PRESTON
C/TFW/SUPPORT

LOUIS W. ARMSTRONG
C/TFW/PERSONNEL

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

SECRET

13 November 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Application of Premium Pay for Certain Contract Personnel

It is requested that the contracts for the following named Contract Employees and Career Agents be amended to include, in the applicable paragraph, the following provision:

"You are herein authorized Premium Pay in lieu of overtime in conformance with and subject to the policies of this organization."

BLAIMAUSE, Russell J.
DELLAROCCO, Peter V.
GLAVASCO, Phillip D.
BEARD, Bruce R.
STUART, Jennifer A.
TARTARILLO, John K.
TARYDINA, Jacob C.
CADICK, Irving G.
~~HOLMAYR, Harold R.~~
DEVOGNO, Irving C.
SLOMAN, Henry J.
LAURENKUS, Harvin A.
STACKROOD, Kenneth A.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

APPROVED:

Director of Personnel

Date

DDP/TFW/Personnel/JDurham/kct (5575)

201-168881

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/TFW
1 - TFW/Personnel

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

23 Oct 62
201-165881

CONFIDENTIAL

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1960-

1. Agency and organizational designation: DDP/TFW

2. Payroll period | 3. Block No. | 4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate): NOEMAYER, Harold R. (F) CAREER AGENT

6. Grade and salary: $10,105

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.	HEALTH BENEFITS		NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks:

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

11. Appropriation(s)

12. Prepared by: jlv 23 Oct 62

13. Audited by

[X] Periodic step-increase [ ] Pay adjustment [ ] Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
14Oct62	16 Apr 61	$10,105	$10,420	[signature] (Signature or other authentication) Date:

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods). Period(s).

[X] No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP.

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
[ ] In pay status at end of waiting period.
[ ] In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126b
6 GAO 8000 1126-308

CONFIDENTIAL

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP—DISBURSING OFFICER'S COPY

DISPATCH

PROCESSING

TO
FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT [illegible]/Personnel
Assessment Reports

ACTION REQUIRED: REFERENCES

References: A. UFGT-1813, dtd 18 April 1962
B. UFGS-1711, dtd 17 August 1962

1. Attached is the material forwarded by Reference B on IRVIN C. CADICK, IRVING C. DEVUONO, and HAROLD R. NOEMAYR.

2. Biographic information on the three individuals has been reviewed and, as far as is known, is correct. It is assumed that another assessment would not be required on CADICK and DEVUONO inasmuch as fitness reports were forwarded by Reference A. Assessments of NOEMAYR is attached.

END OF DISPATCH

Forms to Mrs Dunn at Collins

15 OCT 1962

Enclosures: Biographic info h/w

Distribution
3 - Chief, TFW w/encls.

DATE TYPED: 4 Oct 62
DATE DISPATCHED: 8 Oct 62

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGT - 2956

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-168881

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SECRET

25 September 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Application of Housing Allowance for Certain Contract Personnel

It is requested that the contracts for the following named Contract Employees and Career Agents be amended to include, in the applicable paragraph, the provision: -> effective 1 September 1962

"You are herein authorized housing assistance in conformance with and subject to the policies of this organization."

CADICK, Irving G. (Career Agent)
DEVUONO, Irving C. (Career Agent)
HORVATH, Harold R. (Career Agent)
GLAVASCO, Philip D. (Contract Employee)
HEARD, Bruce R. (Contract Employee)

HOWARD J. PRESTON
Chief, TFW/Support

DDP/TFW/Personnel:JEMARTIN:jtr (25 September 1962)

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - TFW/Personnel

Memo approved by C.P.D., M. Sutcliffe, 1 Sep. 62.

201-161881

SECRET

ORIG: LOUIS W. ARMSTRONG
UNIT: TFW/PERSONNEL
EXT: 6576
DATE: 12 SEPTEMBER 1962 1548

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING 1 2 3 4 5 6

12 SEP 62 18 19z

TO: JMWAVE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: TFW 10
INFO: DDP, CI/OA, OP, S/C 2

SIG CEN
DEFERRED
X ROUTINE
OUT75621

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 35588

GYROSE

REF: WAVE 8436 (IN 19838)

1. POLICY TO APPLY STAFF HOUSING ALLOWANCE TO CERTAIN CONTRACT PERSONNEL APPROVED. NECESSARY CONTRACT AMENDMENTS BEING PREPARED HQS FOR HOEMAYER, CADICK, GLAVASCO, DEVUONO, [illegible] AND HEARD. NO RETROACTIVE PROVISIONS IN APPROVAL. WILL REQUEST 1 SEPT EFFECTIVE DATED. POLICY DOES NOT APPLY TO CONTRACT AGENTS. DIGERVENO AND SLOMAN IN LATTER CATEGORY.

2. HQS WILL PROCEED CHANGE DIGERVENO TO CONTRACT EMPLOYEE. CAREER AGENT STATUS FOR SLOMAN WILL BE REQUESTED UPON RECEIPT WAVE RECOMMENDATION. BOTH NEW CONTRACTS TO INCLUDE HOUSING PROVISION.

END OF MESSAGE

TFW COMMENT: Pls advise.

HOWARD J. PRESTON
C/TFW/SUPPORT

LOUIS W. ARMSTRONG
C/TFW/PERSONNEL

201-161781

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

13-9

SECRET

 Copy No.

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: ~~AIR~~ (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. ~~TZP-W-~~ 411

SECRET / DESENSITIZED
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Panama City and San Jose

FROM : Acting Chief, Foreign Branch T

DATE: ~~21 December 1948~~

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operations
SPECIFIC- Project Hydropathic

REF: TZP-A-365, Parts I and II

1. The proposal that the Panama Station activate an agent project in conjunction with San Jose has been studied by this headquarters and elicits the following comment. It is felt that nothing can be gained from a cumbersome joint operation of this project that cannot be obtained from a simple agent project controlled exclusively by the San Jose Station. If San Jose wishes to avail itself of these two men as an independent project, that station is authorized to proceed with its preliminary planning for submission to this headquarters for final approval.

2. In the event San Jose decides to use Hydropathic, that station is directed to become more familiar with his capabilities before entering into a formal agreement re tasks and salary. His practical experience and educational background are not outstanding and the mere fact that he has had duty with the U. S. Army in an intelligence capacity in no sense automatically qualifies him for our work. It is suggested that the San Jose Station initiate its relations with Hydropathic by using him as a cutout in an endeavor to test his abilities. If his value is proved and his Costa Rican associations appear to be in a position to give him high-level intelligence information, then come to a formal agreement with regard to his future work in an intelligence gathering capacity. The San Jose Station is directed to give him no encouragement at this time with respect to a later full-time position with this organization.

3. In summary Hydrocyst is to sever his formal connection with Hydrocyst I and is to have no knowledge of Hydropathic with regard to the latter's work for Mercer. Details on the procedure to be followed in Hydropathic's relation with Hydrocyst I are the responsibility of the San Jose Station and are to be submitted to this headquarters for final approval before any formal commitments are made. The Panama Station is directed to forward to San Jose all the documents in its files that are considered pertinent to the development of this project.

AN NHC
AB X
~~II~~
~~IC~~
~~IT~~
~~DB~~
PI
RID/FIP

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICER — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

DESENSITIZED

US COPY
SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

21 Dec 48
201-168881

FORM NO. 51-29 Per CSIL 43-23
APR 1947 (700)

 TZP W-411

4. Attachment to TZP-A-365, Part I, is being forwarded to San Jose in order to provide Mercer with a sample of Hydropathic's work. The San Jose Station is directed to return this document to Panama City when the content of the report has served its purpose.

A. Rodriguez
ARodriguez

PP:jcr

BG

FEB 1 5 71

C. [illegible]
RELEASING OFFICER
OPERA

Harry A. Real
HARRY A. REAL
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

201-168881

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. HKH-A-1905

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Habana

DATE: 16 OCT 56 15 38 Z

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Administrative
SPECIFIC- Arthur O. VAIVADA; Proposal to Grant Staff Status

Reference: HKH-A-2577 201-32723

Action Required: Pouch Views on Proposal Contained Herein

1. Headquarters looks favorably upon referenced proposal to grant staff status to Arthur O. VAIVADA. It has been determined however that such status is virtually out of the question for subject so long as his wife remains an alien. It has been further determined that the wife can acquire U.S. citizenship within a span of 45 days if she so desires and is willing to come to the U.S. for that period of time, most of which would have to be spent in the Headquarters area. There are certain other basic requirements such as a fair knowledge of English and an ability to pass routine citizenship exams. None is believed to pose any problem in this case however.

2. Headquarters recognizes that the proposed travel and related expenses might work certain hardships on VAIVADA and his family. In order to partially offset these, we are prepared to bring VAIVADA to Headquarters for TDY-training to coincide with his wife's stay in the U.S.

3. If the foregoing proposal meets with the approval of the Station, VAIVADA, and the latter's wife, Headquarters should be advised as to preferable dates for implementation of same. We would also like to have recommendations re: further training of VAIVADA at Headquarters. Any objections to the plan, as outlined above, should likewise be communicated to Headquarters at an early date.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

9 October 1956

201-168881

Distribution: 3 - Habana, 1 - RI/D&P,
1 - WH/III/Cuba, 1 - WH/Mailroom,

WH/III/Cuba/JBholand:gp

RELEASING OFFICER
J. C. KING, C/WH

COORDINATING OFFICER

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
J. BRADY, AC/WH/III

FORM NO. 51-28
JUN 1949

201-32723

DISPATCH

SECRET

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

Chief, Task Force W

Personnel

Information about Career Agents

ACTION REQUIRED: As Indicated

Transmitted herewith are sets of forms concerning the biographic data and request for assessment in the cases of the three Career Agents stationed in JMWAVE, Irving G. CADICK, Irving C. DEVUONO and Harold R. NORMAYR. Please have those forms reviewed for accuracy in the biographic section and have the appropriate supervisor complete the assessment portion. Stanley R. ZAMKA should prepare the assessment for CADICK and DEVUONO and Robert K. TROURHARD should prepare the one for NORMAYR. It is requested that these forms be returned to Headquarters as soon as possible.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment:
Career Agent Forms, herewith

Distribution:
3 - COS, JMWAVE, w/encl. a/s

1 - TFW/Personnel
1 - TFW/Registry
1 - Chief, TFW

DATE TYPED: 17 August 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HFCW-171?

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-168881

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
TFW/Personnel	John Martin	ASM	6575

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/TFW/Pers.		Louis V. Armstrong

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING		
		PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
TO Chief, Task Force W			MARKED FOR INDEXING	
		X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
INFO.			ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE			ABSTRACT	
			MICROFILM	

SUBJECT GYROSE
Housing Allowance for Contract Personnel

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

1. JMWAVE has reviewed the status of contract personnel assigned to this station and has related the circumstances of their assignment to that of staff agents with respect to the application of the station housing allowance. Certain of these contract personnel are not indigenous to this area, have been transferred or assigned to JMWAVE from other areas on the same indefinite basis as staff agents, and suffer the same inconvenInces and uncertainties as staff agents which were recognized in the Headquarters approved housing policy. The rationale for granting some degree of financial relief under these circumstances, in the form of a housing allowance, is considered equally applicable to these individuals. Based on JMWAVE initial survey of the status of contract personnel the station requests that Headquarters approve extension of the housing allowance to the following individuals:

HAROLD R. NOEMAYER	PHILIP D. GLAVASCO
PETER J. DIGERVENO	IRVING C. DEVUONO
HENRY J. SLOMAN	ALICE P. JENRETTE
IRVING G. CADICK	

2. Upon approval JMWAVE will forward to Headquarters copies of the proposed amended contracts and will pay and administer the allowance in the same manner as is now applicable to staff agents.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
3- Chief, TFW

Att USC

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
	30 June 1962	
	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	
	UFGT-2270	
CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 201-168871	

SECRET

MEMORANDUM TO: Chairman, CS Agent Panel

SUBJECT : Career Agents of TFW

REFERENCE : Memorandum to Chief, Task Force W from Chairman, CS Agent Panel, dated 6 June 1962, Subject: Information About Career Agents

Per your request contained in reference memorandum the following information is supplied on career agents assigned to Task Force W:

a. MOEMAYR, Harold R., GS-12, $9,475 (JMWAVE)

b. CADICK, Irving O., GS-15, $13,750 (JMWAVE)

c. DEVUONO, Irving C., GS-13, $11,155 (JMWAVE)

William K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - Personnel
3 - Subject Files

201-168871

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

Noemap

PROJECT ACTION

LIEDCE

TYPE OF ACTION			
	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION	WH
	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION	Mexico City
	RENEWAL FY 196	BRANCH: 3	DESK: Mexico
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER	John G. Heyn
X	TERMINATION	ROOM NO.: 1009 / BUILDING: Barton Hall	EXTENSION: 2555/3162

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISION

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (And signature)	DATE	COPY NO.	MEMORANDUM ATTACHED YES	NO	DATE
C/WH/3/Mexico	John G. Heyn					
C/WH/3	Ned P. Holman					
WH/BAF	Robert D. Carter					
WH/PO/A	Clarke W. Simmons					

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (And signature)	DATE	COPY NO.	YES	NO	DATE

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	TO	TOTAL AMOUNT	FY	AMOUNT
		$	196	$
			196	$

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
J. C. King, Chief, WH Division		10 Jan. 62

FORM 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

1. It is requested that the LIEDGE Project be terminated effective 1 January 1962. The present project will not expire until 30 April 1962.

2. Effective 1 January 1962 all expenses and obligations under this Project will be picked up by WH/4, allotment #2335-5452-1000. This has been coordinated with WH/4/Personnel, Mr. Juul.

3. Harold R. NOEMAYR (p), Career Agent, was transferred PCS to WAVE on 20 October 1961. WH/4 anticipates an indefinite need for his services and his transfer has been cleared with Mr. Armstrong of the Agent Service Panel.

4. This Project was merely a support mechanism for NOEMAYR and did not provide positive or CE information. NOEMAYR has performed valuable services for KUBARK with WH Division since 1948.

5. There are no cover or security problems involved in this project termination action since this is only an administrative measure transferring NOEMAYR from Project LIEDGE to WH/4. The Office of Security and CCG have been notified by WH/3 of this action. WH/4 is notifying the Agent Service Panel.

Distribution:
1 - LIEDGE/Dev & Plans
1 - VMP
1 - WH/4/Juul
1 - NOEMAYR/201

SECRET

1 Jan. 62

14-00000

SECRET

21 December 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security
4-E-60 Headquarters Building

ATTN : Chief, PSD, Clearance Branch
3-E-44 Headquarters Building

VIA : WH/4/Security

SUBJECT : Assignment of Harold HORMAYR to JMWAVE

1. This is to advise you that Harold M. HORMAYR, Career Agent, was assigned PCS to JMWAVE, a domestic base on 20 October 1961. Subject will be utilized as an Ops Officer in PA-Prop activities in support of Project JMATE.

2. Your concurrence in the assignment of HORMAYR to JMWAVE is requested.

J. C. KING
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

CONCURRENCE:

Director of Security

Note: This information was supplied to SA Panel per memorandum dated 15 September 1961 to the Career Agent Panel.

DDP/WH/4/Personnel:JAHOESER:jtr (21 December 1961)

201-168881

SECRET

SECRET

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/WHD
1 - C/WH/SS
1 - WH/4/Exec
1 - C/WH/4/SS
1 - C/WH/4/Security
1 - SA Panel
1 - WH/4/Personnel

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

1 December 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Investigative Division
Attn: Chief, SED, Office of Security

SUBJECT : S-8644
#215482

Effective 1 January 1962 the file on Subject will be transferred to WH/4/Personnel, ext. 8350.

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Subject
1 - Chrono

SECRET

201-168881

SECRET

1 December 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Investigative Division
Attn: Chief, SED, Office of Security

SUBJECT : Harold R. NOEMAYR
S-9546
#112569

1. Effective 1 January 1962, Harold R. NOEMAYR, Career Agent, will be transferred to WH/4/Personnel, ext. 8350. He was transferred PCS to WAVE on 20 October 1961.

2. He will be paid out of their funds. The LIEDGE Project is being terminated.

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - NOEMAYR 201/Clearances
1 - Outgoing memo chrono

SECRET

201-168881

SECRET

30 November 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Cover Division

SUBJECT : Harold R. NOEMAYR

1. Harold R. NOEMAYR, Career Agent, was transferred PCS to WAVE on 20 October 1961. WH/3 is terminating the LIEDGE Project which has been supporting him.

2. Effective 1 January 1962, any questions concerning NOEMAYR should be directed to Mr. Juul, WH/4/Personnel, 1905 Quarters Eye, ext. 8350.

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Subject - NOEMAYR 201/Cover
1 - Chrono

SECRET

201-168551

30 November 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Harold R. NOEMAYR (ps)

1. Effective 1 January 1962 Harold R. NOEMAYR is being transferred to WH/4/Personnel, Mr. Juul, 1905 Quarters Eye, ext. 8350. He was transferred PCS to WAVE on 20 October 1961.

2. The LIEDGE Project is being terminated and starting on 1 January 1962 he will be paid from allotment #2335-5452-1000.

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - NOEMAYR/201 - Contract
1 - Outgoing memo chrono

201-168881

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief of Base, JMWAVE

INFO.

FROM: Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: JMZIP ADMIN/FINANCE
Transportation and Temporary Storage of HHE (Domestic PCS Move)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: UFOT 910, dated 28 October 1961

1. Reimbursement for the temporary storage of effects applicable to a domestic PCS movement is authorized from the date of the employee's departure. The maximum storage period is sixty (60) days. Harold R. NOEMAYR and William D. WENMEAD were assigned PCS to JMWAVE on 20 August 1961. Therefore, the initial reimbursement date for storage of effects is 20 August 1961. Unfortunately charges prior to 20 August will have to be borne by the individuals since regulations do not permit storage of effects during periods when an employee is absent from his domestic post of assignment.

2. Paragraph two (2) of the reference requested advice regarding reimbursement for shipment of effects between domestic PCS points using the following instruments:

a. POA - Upon evidence of a proper weight certificate, reimbursement for the transportation of 543 pounds from Washington to Miami (1104 miles) is the product of the applicable commuted rate, i.e., $19.40 (999 pounds or less) multiplied by the net hundred weight transported which is 5.43, giving a total of $105.33.

b. Rental of Trailer - If a proper weight certificate was not obtained at the time the effects were hauled between domestic PCS points, three (3) estimates must be obtained as to the weight of the effects. Reimbursement will be at the commuted rate and this includes the trailer rent (receipt is submitted).

c. Employee Rents and Drives a Truck - The same formula as given in the rental of a trailer is applicable. A weight certificate (or three estimates) along with the rental receipt must be submitted. Reimbursement is at the commuted rate.

(Continued on Page 2)

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 6 Nov. 1961

DATE DISPATCHED: 15 NOV 1961

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGS - 681

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-168881

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief of Base, JMWAVE

INFO:

FROM: Chief, WHD

SUBJECT:

PAGE 2

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

3. Interpretation of the "Commuted Rate Table" citing examples was requested in paragraph three of the reference:

a. Shipment of 4,000 lbs. of HHE from Washington, D. C. to Miami (1,111 miles) — $12.00 rate is used. In this instance the mileage is more than 1100 miles (Column "A" of Table No. 3); therefore, any mileage in excess of 1100 miles up to and including 1150 miles, the rate in Column E ($12.00) is used for shipment of 4,000 lbs. and up.

b. Minimum rates—(1) Three hundred fifty pounds billed at 500 pounds: reimbursement at the applicable rate for shipment of 500 pounds is authorized. If billing is less than for 500 pounds, reimbursement is applicable thereto.

(2) Shipment of 850 pounds HHE from Rockville, Maryland, to Miami and billed for 1,000 pounds: reimbursement - since the net weight (850 lbs.) exceeds the number of pounds shown in Column E (774 lbs. - breakpoint in lbs. for 1150 miles), the applicable rate is that shown in Column D ($15.00 for 1150 miles), and the applicable rate is the minimum hundredweight of that Column (D), instead of the actual weight (850 lbs.) of the HHE transported.

(3) The 1,000 pound minimum weight allowance for shipment to or from Fishers Island, New York is for additional allowance only and does not apply to shipment of effects from Rockville, Maryland to Miami.

4. We hope that the above has helped to clarify the transportation and storage of HHE in connection with a domestic PCS movement.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - COB, JMWAVE

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 6 Nov 1961

DATE DISPATCHED: 15 NOV 1961

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGS - 681

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SECRET

TRAVEL ORDER

TDY	
PCS	X
INVITATIONAL	

OFFICE TRAVEL ORDER NO.: WH-A-1024-62

SERVICE TRAVEL ORDER NO.:

NAME: Harold R. NOEMAYER (P)

OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

OFFICE PHONE:

GRADE: Contract Employee

YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRAVEL AND INCUR NECESSARY EXPENSES IN ACCORDANCE WITH REGULATIONS. THIS TRAVEL OR CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION, IF SO DESIGNATED, IS MADE FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE.

ITINERARY, MODE OF TRAVEL AND PURPOSE

Travel from Washington, D. C. to Miami for PCS.

Mode: None,

TRAVEL DURATION BEGIN	TRAVEL DURATION END	PER DIEM ALLOWANCE DOMESTIC	FOREIGN MAXIMUM	FOREIGN OTHER (See below)	AUTOMOBILE ALLOWANCE CENTS PER MI. NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER	CENTS PER MI. AS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO GOV'T.
20 Aug.	20 Aug. 61	$				

ALLOWANCES AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS WITH REASONS

Note: Subject picked up in the field from TDY status for PCS.

DEPENDENT TRAVEL AUTHORIZED

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	RELATIONSHIP

ACCOMPANY TRAVELER / FOLLOW WITHIN 6 MONTHS / ADVANCE RETURN

PROCURE TRANSPORTATION BY: TRANSPORTATION REQUEST / CASH OR OTHER

DISPOSITION OF EFFECTS AUTHORIZATION: SHIPMENT / NONTEMPORARY STORAGE / SHIPMENT POA AUTHORIZED

EXCESS BAGGAGE AUTHORIZED: ACCOMPANIED — LBS. AND MODE / UNACCOMPANIED — LBS. AND MODE

ADVANCE OF FUNDS REQUESTED: YES / NO — ACCOUNTING DUE DATE

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL: None

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO.: 2535-5000-8021

CHARGE COST CENTER NO.: 7-1024

DATE: 1 Nov. SIGNATURE OF B & F OFFICER: P. J. Maggi [signature]

COORDINATION

SIGNATURE	TITLE & COMPONENT	DATE
[signature]	CCG	13 Nov

REQUESTING OFFICIAL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: Fred F. Cyrus — COMPONENT: C/WH/4/SS

SIGNATURE: Fred F. Cyrus [signature] — DATE: 6 Nov 1961

AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: Raford W. Herbert — COMPONENT: DC/WHD

SIGNATURE: JC King [signature] — DATE: 11-7-61

FORM 3-59 540 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING
TO: Chief, WHD		MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
		ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE		ABSTRACT
		MICROFILM

SUBJECT: JMATE/ADMIN - Transportation and Temporary Storage of HHE

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action Required: As stated

Reference: HR 22-11c(1)

1. Please advise for what period reimbursement is allowable in each of the following instances of temporary storage of HHE which preceded the individual's actual PCS assignments to JMWAVE on 20 August 1961:

Harold R. NOEMAYR - In anticipation of being assigned PCS to JMWAVE NOEMAYR placed his HHE in temporary storage in Alexandria, Virginia on approximately 1 July 1961 from whence they were shipped to Miami on 22 September 1961. The date of the personnel action assigning NOEMAYR PCS JMWAVE is unknown. The date of his PCS travel order is unknown.

William D. WENHEAD - In anticipation of being assigned PCS JMWAVE WENHEAD placed his HHE in transit storage in Washington, D. C. on 27 July 1961 from whence they were shipped to Miami on 24 August 1961. The date of the personnel action assigning WENHEAD PCS JMWAVE is unknown. His PCS travel order approval date is illegible.

2. Cases have arisen which are not specifically covered by regulation. Please advise what reimbursement is allowable under HR 22-11a(3)b and attachment 2 in each of the following circumstances:

A. Employee on PCS transfer from Washington, D. C. to Miami carried 543 pounds of effects in his POV. A proper weight certificate was obtained. There was no cost to employee.

B. Employee rents a trailer on which his HHE are hauled between domestic PCS points incident to his PCS transfer. Cost to employee was only for trailer rent.

C. Employee rents and drives a truck containing his HHE between domestic PCS points incident to his PCS transfer. Cost to employee is truck rental only.

Continued

Distribution:
3 - WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 25 Oct 61

DATE DISPATCHED: OCT 28 1961

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGT-910

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-168881

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

14-00000

TO: Chief, WHD SUBJ: Transportation and Temporary Storage of HHE UFGT-910

3. A question has been raised on how to interpret the rate tables in attachment 2 to HR 22-11. For example, the mileage from Washington, D. C. to Miami, Florida is 1,111 miles. In shipping 4,000 pounds of effects between these points is the employee entitled to reimbursement at the rate of $11.70 or $12.00 per hundred weight? In addition, reimbursements where minimum weight allowances occur are not clear. We assume that in the case where 350 pounds is billed as 500 the employee is entitled to payment for 50 hundredweight at the applicable rate. However, in the case of a shipment from Rockville, Maryland to Miami where 850 pounds shipped is billed as 1,000 pounds what reimbursement is in order? HR 22-11, attachment 2, mentions a 1,000 pound minimum only in regard to Fishers Island, New York.

4. Your early reply will be appreciated.

END OF DISPATCH

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE	396 20 SEP 61
TO	DIRECTOR
FROM	JMWAVE
ACTION	BELL 10
INFO	WH 5, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2	SUPPORT	5	
3		6	

SEP 20 1619Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 32174

DIR CITE WAVE 7985

JMZIP ADMIN

REF A DIR 87859 (out 87489)

B DIR 87791 (out 88844)

C WAVE 7658 (IN 17386) *

IN VIEW FACT MESSRS DEAN, CROZIER IN TEMPORARY QUARTERS W/O HHE AT TIME DESIGNATION PCS 20 AUGUST, REQUEST AUTHORITY TERMINATE PER DIEM ABOVE INDIVIDUALS ON DATE ARRIVAL HHE BUT NOT BEYOND 20 SEPTEMBER 1961.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *RE EXTENT PER DIEM REDUCTIONS.

201-168881

SECRET

 Copy No.

SECRET

15 September 1961

MEMORANDUM TO: Career Agent Panel

SUBJECT : Assignment of Harold R. Noemyer

Approval is requested for the PCS assignment of Noemyer to JMWAVE, a domestic base. Subject will be utilized as an Ops Officer in PA/Propaganda activities in support of Project JMATE. It is anticipated that Noemyer will receive a cover salary (offset) during the period of this assignment. Such offset would not exceed his net Agency compensation.

/S/ Raford W. Herbert

J. C. KING
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/WHD
1 - C/WH/Ops
1 - C/WH/4
1 - WH/4/PA/Prop
1 - WH/4/Personnel

WH/4/Personnel:RFGILLS:jtr (15 September 1961)

201-161881

SECRET

14-00000

1524

ORIG : RICHARD F. GILLS:jtr
UNIT : WH/4/PERSONNEL
EXT : 4031
DATE : 8 SEPTEMBER 1961

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : JMWAVE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : BELL 10
INFO : WH 5, S/C 2

1 SEP 61 15 43z

SIG CEN
DEFERRED
XX ROUTINE

OUT95185

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 10966

JMZIP ADMIN

Ross L. Crozier

[redacted] WILL BE ASSIGNED WAVE PCS. IF NECESSARY RETURN HQS FOR PROCESSING HE SHOULD BE SCHEDULED WITH STAFFERS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/4/SUPPORT Fred F. Gills
WH/4/PA-PROP JSD
C/WH/SUPPORT

201-168881

For J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

R. K. DAVIS
C/WH/4
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

SECRET

28 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Amendment of Contract, case of Harold R. NOEMAYER

It is requested that the Contract for Subject, as amended, be further amended to discontinue that portion of the "Compensation" section which states "You will receive additional compensation, amounting to $80.00 per month, effective 8 January 1961, in lieu of payment of the regular overtime rates for irregular, unscheduled and frequent overtime, for the duration of this assignment". It is requested that this discontinuance be effected C.O.B. 10 June 1961.

HERBERT V. JUUL
Chief, WH/4/Personnel

APPROVED:

FRED F. CYRUS
Chief, WH/4/Support

SECRET

201-168881

14-00000

SECRET

File
Cy with Htr.
7/x/61

Mr. Harold R. Noemayr

Dear Mr. Noemayr:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 June 1957, as amended.

Effective close of business 10 June 1961, that portion of Paragraph two (2) entitled "Compensation" which pertains to the authorization of additional compensation in the amount of $80 per month is deleted in its entirety.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY______________________
Contracting Officer

SECRET

201-168881

14-00000

ORIG : JOHN H. MARTIN
UNIT : WH/4/PERSONNEL
EXT : 8350
DATE : 6 JUNE 1961 1594

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING 06-07

TO : JMWAVE

FROM : ~~DIRECTOR~~ BELL

CONF: BELL 15

INFO : WH 4, BELL S/C

JUN 6 1704Z 61

DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

OUT 9792

TO WAVE INFO CITE ~~DIR~~ BELL 0891

JMZIP ADMIN

REF: WAVE 6491 (IN 2592) *

PREMIUM PAY FOR SUBJ REF WILL BE DEPOSITED HIS BANK BETWEEN 23 - 27 JUNE IN AMOUNT $343.36 NET, COVERING PERIOD 8 JAN THRU 10 JUNE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: * REQUESTED ADVISE MR. ROSS CROZIER RE PREMIUM PAY.

C/WH/4/FIN

WILLIAM E. EISEMANN
C/WH/4/SUPPORT

HERBERT V. JUUL
C/WH/4/PERSONNEL

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

201-168881

14-00000

579

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 1 JUN 61

TO : BELL

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : BELL 15

INFO : COP, ADDP/A, WH 4, BELL S/C

ROUTING

1 SUPPORT | 4
2 | 5
3 | 6

JUN 1 2128Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 2592

TO BELL INFO CITE WAVE 6491

JMZIP ADMIN FINANCE

RE WAVE 5287 (IN 1907)*

ADVISED DATE PREMIUM PAY TO BE PAID MR ROSS CROZIER.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT:* REQUESTED CONTRACT BE AMENDED TO PROVIDE FOR PREMIUM PAY.

6 Jun 61: Per conversation with Joe Hudson, SAAS, he had recd. The Amendment to C's contract for Premium Pay and the check should be deposited in C's bank around (or between) 23-27 June - total is for $8343.36 net.

John — Maybe he wants to know which payday will bring the windfall? Herb

John the ans.

Subj / Wave

201-168881

S-E-C-R-E-T

Copy No.

SECRET

4 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Amendment of Contract, case of Harold R. BOEMAYER

It is requested that the Contract for Subject, as amended, be further amended to reflect the following addition: "Compensation". "You will receive additional compensation, amounting to $80.00 per month, effective 8 January 1961, in lieu of payment of the regular overtime rates for irregular, unscheduled and frequent overtime, for the duration of this assignment."

HERBERT V. JUUL
Chief, WH/4/Personnel

APPROVED

Chief, WH/4/Support

SECRET

201-168581

X

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

SUPPORT

DATE : 322 2 MAY 61

TO : BELL

FROM : WAVE

ACTION : BELL 15

INFO : COP, ADDP/A, WH, BELL S/C

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAY 2 1433Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 1136

BELL CITE WAVE 5979

JMZIP

HAROLD R. NOEMAYR ARRIVING HQS 2 MAY ON EAL 648 FOR CONSULTATION. WILL CALL CHOADEN ON ARRIVAL.

END OF MESSAGE

201-161881

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

192

06-45 ROUTING

ORIG: ERVIN W. SCHMIDT
UNIT: DC/WH/4/SUPPORT
EXT: 8712
DATE: 6 APRIL 1961

TO: JMWAVE
FROM: XXXXXXXX JMBELL
CONF: BELL 15
INFO: COP, ADDP/A, WH 3, BELL S/C

DEFERRED
XX ROUTINE

OUT 5112
5113

TO WAVE INFO CITE XX BELL 3968
3968

JMZIP ADMIN

REF: WAVE 5287 (IN 1907)*

PER REF REQUEST CONTRACT WILL BE AMENDED TO ADD $80 MONTHLY EFFECTIVE 8 JANUARY FOR DURATION THIS ASSIGNMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Request Neumayer's contract be amended effective 8 January 1961 to provide for premium pay.

201-168881

WILLIAM E. EISEMANN
CHIEF, WH/4/SUPPORT
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/4/PERSONNEL
COORDINATING OFFICERS

ERVIN W. SCHMIDT
DC/WH/4/Support
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 866 06APR61

TO : BELL

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : BELL 15

INFO : COP, ADDP/A, WH 3, BELL S/C

ROUTING

1		4
2		5
3		6

6APR61 0112Z

ROUTINE

IN 1907

BELL CITE WAVE 5287

JMZIP ADMIN

REF A WAVE ~~4968~~ 4698 (IN 03224)*

B UFGS 0284

C UFGS 0285

1. IN REPLY PARA 3 REF B:

3A. YES

3B. YES

3C. WAVE HAS NO OTHER CONTRACT TYPES THIS GRADE RANGE

~~3E.~~ 3D. YES

2. [redacted] Ross L. Crozier's UNSCHEDULED, IRREGULAR DUTY FAR EXCEEDS MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS STATED REF C. HE HAS BEEN SO QUALIFIED SINCE BEFORE INCEPTION PREMIUM PAY ARRANGEMENT AND WILL SO CONTINUE THROUGH OPS CLIMAX SAME AS WAVE STAFF EMPLOYEES.

3. REQUEST HIS CONTRACT BE AMENDED EFFECTIVE 8 JAN 1961 TO PROVIDE FOR PREMIUM PAY.

END OF MESSAGE

*C/S COMMENT: ~~MONEY, OIL ADDITIVE, AND LOADED CLAMS INFILTRATED~~ VIA OPN CAROL. — wrong ref. fin

201-168991

SECRET

Copy No.

SECRET
(EVEN WHEN BLANK)

No. SD 38055 B

DATE 3 April 1961

I DO HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IN MY ~~RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,~~ OP CONTACTS ONLY I WILL USE THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURE WHERE REQUIRED:

(SIGNATURE) Roger T. Fox

Roger T. FOX
(NAME, PRINTED OR TYPEWRITTEN)

RIGHT THUMB PRINT

NOEMAYER

WITNESS: Oliver H. Corbuton

SECRET

201-168551

SECRET
(EVEN WHEN BLANK)

Nº SD 38055 A

DATE 3 April 1961

I DO HEREBY DECLARE THAT MY TRUE AND LEGAL SIGNATURE IS:

(SIGNATURE) Ross L. Crozier

ROSS L. CROZIER
(NAME, PRINTED OR TYPEWRITTEN)

RIGHT THUMB PRINT

WITNESS: Oliver H. Corlton

SECRET

201-168851

Personnel

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING	ACTION
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	ABSTRACT
	MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Base, JMWAVE

INFO:

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: CROZIER, Ross (Premium Pay)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF WAVE 4698 (IN 4338) dated 21 March 1961.

1. The contract of Ross Crozier with amendments has been reviewed. It is noted that the terms set forth a rate of GS-12 as full compensation and no provision is indicated permitting additional pay. Overtime does not apply above GS-10 and premium pay has not to date been applied to contract types.

2. The approval of premium pay is based on CSC Regulations, Section 25.261 which permits such pay to full-time employees subjected to substantial amounts of irregular, unscheduled overtime, night and holiday duty. Consequently certifications were received from supervisors at Headquarters attesting to those eligible and in the field all staffers were processed for this in GS-11 and above (not to exceed the top of a GS-15) on the knowledge of the various assignments subjecting our employees to these qualified conditions.

3. Since processing is an administrative exercise of effecting a personnel action to add to his salary and thereafter assure that he is taken off this entitlement as soon as he is no longer entitled to it, it is not intended to do this for short periods. Except in the initial cases effective 1 February 1961, this pay becomes effective the beginning of the first pay period after he enters this type duty and is taken off the end of the pay period when he is no longer subjected to such duty. On contract types, it is suggested, therefore, that overall aspects be considered such as:

a. Is his duty and salary similar to a staffer receiving this entitlement?

b. Is the period of time proposed for the duty 30 days or longer?

CONTINUED

External Distribution:
2 - Addressee

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
23 March 61	29 MAR 61

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: [illegible] - [illegible]

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-168891

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

Internal Distribution:
1 - WH/4/Support
1 - WH/4/Registry

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/4/Support	E.W.Schmidt	vlm	8712

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/4/PERS	3/27/61	[signature]
C/WH/4/PEX		
C/WH/4/OPS		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
		[signature]

c. Does suggesting application to this case indicate that this should be done on all other contract types in this grade area and

d. Does the current and proposed duty entitle him to this additional pay?

Upon review of this additional information, if you feel an equivalent compensation should be effected, the case will be considered for possible amendment for approval by the contract officer of our organization. Additional details concerning personnel entitlements are being forwarded under separate cover.

END OF MESSAGE

14-00000

22 March 61
201-168881

CONFIDENTIAL

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954-320030

1. Agency and organizational designations: D. /WH

2. Payroll period | 3. Block No. | 4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate): NOEMAYER, HAROLD R. (P) CAREER AGENT

6. Grade and salary: $9,215

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F.I.C.A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks:

11. Appropriation(s)

12. Prepared by: jlv 22 March 61

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
...pr61	18Oct59	$9,215	$9,475	(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods): Part-d(s)

☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP.

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126b—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
October 26, 1954, General Regulations No. 102

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — DISBURSING OFFICER'S COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

620

DATE : 21 MAR 61

TO : BELL

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : BELL 15

INFO : COP, ADDP/A, WH 3, BELL S/C

ROUTING

1		4
2	SUPPORT	5
3		6

MAR 21 2004Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 4338

TO BELL INFO CITE WAVE 4698

JMZIP ADMIN

REQUEST MR ROSS CROZIER'S CONTRACT BE AMENDED TO INCLUDE PAYMENT FOR PROJECT PREMIUM ALLOWANCE. ADVISE WHEN PAYMENTS TO BEGIN.

END OF MESSAGE

John
Ans. by dispatch 3/23/61
Ely

John –
Pls see me! (Mr Schmitt is preparing a reply!)
Herb

201-168881

S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 201-168881

SECRET

DATE : 463 17 MAR 61

TO : BELL

APPROVAL WORK RECORD

FROM : WAVE

ACTION : TSD 2

#112569

WH/3/M

MAR 17 1610Z 61

INFO : COP, ADDP/A, BELL 15, WH 3, BELL S/C

ROUTINE

IN 3826

BELL CITE WAVE 4534

JMZIP AQUATIC

1. PLS REGISTER ALIAS ROGER T. FOX FOR PSEUDO HAROLD R. NOYMAYR.

2. SUBJ KNOWN AS FOX TO OPS CONTACTS. DOCS BEING ISSUED IN NAME FOX.

END OF MESSAGE

File

201-168881

SECRET

Copy No.

SECRET

A-4

File

Mr. Harold R. Noemayr

Dear Mr. Noemayr:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 June 1957, as amended.

Effective 8 January 1961, and to continue for the duration of your current assignment, paragraph two (2) of subject contract, entitled "Compensation" is amended to authorize additional compensation in the amount of $80.00 per month in recognition and compensation of the irregular, unscheduled and frequent requirement of hours of duty over and above the regular and daily schedule.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY /S/
Contracting Officer

SECRET

3 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Termination of Contract - Harold R. NOEMAYR

It is requested that the contract for Career Agent Harold R. NOEMAYR, as amended, effective 1 June 1957, be terminated upon close of business 30 September 1963. Subject was advised of this termination on 1 July 1963, and the 90 days actual notice required by para. 15 (a) of the contract expires on 30 September 1963.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

DDP/SAS/PERSONNEL/John H. Martin/kct (3 July 63)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - SAS/Personnel

SECRET

201-168551

4-00000

Hoemeyer

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE

ESTABLISHED FOR

TO: (Check)

CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION

X CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT SAS

ATTN:

FILE NO.

REF:

ID CARD NO.

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED

[ ] BLOCK RECORDS:
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR _____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ______________________.

X b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE ______________________.

[NA] SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

[X] ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

[X] SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

[X] SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

[ ] REMARKS:

201-168851

[ ] COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Franklin

CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCG

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMO FOR THE STUDENT FILE

11 February 1958

FROM: Rufus A. Horn, Jr.

This folder contains information on the 41 American students that went from the Moscow Youth Festival to China. The information was prepared for FE-2 CE working purposes. The material has not been carded, ~~and the material~~ is non-record, and should be destroyed sometime before 1 January 1959.

Rufus A. Horn, Jr.

DISTRIBUTION:
1- for student file

CONFIDENTIAL

CS COPY

200-8-14

22 OCT 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FE-2 CE

SUBJECT: File-check Results of the American Students in China

1. Cursory file-checks have been conducted on the American students that went from the Moscow Youth Festival to China and the results are attached hereto.

2. The file-checks are by no means complete, for they were conducted only for the purpose of determining the subject's political doctrines.

Rufus A. Horn

Attachment: As stated above

Distribution:
1 - ~~Chief, FE-2 CE w/attachment~~ student file
1 - IO Div. w/attachment
~~2 - Originator w/attachment~~

14-00000

SECRET

1

American Student in China

ALHANOTE, Louis

File Check Results

Residence - Brooklyn, New York

Passport No. 618189 issued 3/5/57

MIS-CAED to All NAMES:

1. Louis Alhanote, in 1954, visited the Soviet and Polish United Nations Delegation, in New York City. As of 1950, the subject was a subscriber to the "Daily Worker". In August 1952, the subject was a signer of the Nominating Petition that was circulated in behalf of Communist leader Simon W. Gerson, Representative in Congress, Thirteenth Congressional District, New York City. In 1949, the subject made application for membership into the Young Progressives of America. In 1951, a play "Longitude 49" was put on by the New Playwrighters, Inc., at the Czechoslovak House, New York City, the subject was a participant in this play. The subject, in 1955, was a member of the Labor Youth League of New York City. (DFB-88463, 20 August 1957.)



(over)

ALHONOTE, Louis

SECRET

2. Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. He had the following to say about Louis Alhonote:

"Louis ALHONOTE, from Brooklyn, was mentally ill and had been told by a doctor that he was paranoic. Once in a meeting of the American group when one of the other members disagreed with him, he dashed a glass cup against the wall. On a second such occasion, he threw a glass cup at Jake ROSEN, which caused Rosen to have three stitches in his chin and five in his biceps.. This second incident was hushed up only with difficulty because the Chinese authorities learned of it when a doctor was called."

SECRET

American Student in China

AVEDISIAN, Sahag
[illegible] USA Photo ATTACHED
Residence - Pawtucket, R.I.
Passport No. 472013 issued 4/24/57

File Check Results

~~[illegible] went from the [illegible] !~~
~~[illegible] 1957 [illegible]~~

1. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport stated that the subject was non-Communist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow).

2. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-88603.

3. OO-B-3093654 (FLEETWOOD [illegible]) comes from Avedisian. It is almost worthless. (Rec'd from O.O. [illegible])

4. WFB 95178, 6 Dec 57, is a report on Sahag Avedisian ([illegible]). He refused to answer most some of the FBI questions, said he was not a communist, and explained his going to Moscow largely chance.

5. Dan O'Connell, a member of the group, had the following to say about the subject: "... not well educated; not intelligent enough to form own opinions but at end of trip did stick up for the Communist system; not believed to have had much association with Communist movement before this trip." DFB-97144, 23 January 1958.

([illegible])

AVEDISIAN, Sahag

SECRET

SECRET

6 Sahay Avidisian said he was not a Communist and never had been, when questioned by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, on 21 November 1957. (New York Times, 22 November 1957)

AVEDISIAN, Sahag

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

American Student in China

BELFRAGE, Sally D.O.B - 4 Oct. 1936 File Check Results
ex. USA, Photo Attached
Residence - London/New York, New York
Passport No. 9728 issued 1/20/56

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was a Left Winger. (IO Div.)

2. Sally M. Belfrage, born on 4 October 1936, is the daughter of Cedric Hinning Belfrage. Cedric was or is the editor of the publication, "National Guardian," with offices located at 17 Murray Street, New York City. He was reported to be a Communist Party member in England; served as a Soviet spy in 1942 or 1943, while he was attached to British Intelligence in New York City; he and his wife admitted being Communists in 1937 or 1938; he held a Communist Party membership card in Hollywood, California, in 1937 or 1938; he has been a close associate of Soviet agents and known Communists and Communist sympathizers in the United States and in Europe, since 1937; he has attended and spoken at numerous Communist Party front organization functions; he has made pro-Russian statements and disparaging remarks about the United States. (DFB-26627, 11 May 1953)

3. Sally Belfrage's father, Cedric Belfrage, is a British subject who was deported from the United States and now resides at 16 Talbot Square, London, England. (DFB-90733, 27 September 1957)

4. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-88476.

(over)

SECRET BELFRAGE, Sally

5. Sally Belfrage's father, Cedric Belfrage, is a British-born magazine writer who was deported from the United States in 1955, and is now writing from Communist China. Komsomol Pravda on 10 September 1957 reprinted part of an article by Belfrage from the magazine Chinese Youth. The article echoed the Peiping line by charging the United States with holding dozens of Chinese students and refusing them visas except for Formosa.



BELFRAGE, Sally

American Student in China

BLOCK, Morris D.O.B - 30 March 1920 P.O.B. New York, New York CIT - U.S.A. Photo Attached

File Check Results

Residence - New York
Passport No. 921617 issued 4/12/56

1. The IO Division's informants that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was a Left Winger. (IO Div.)

2. A report dated 29 October 1956, indicated that M. BLOCK, 1718 Grand Avenue, New York City, had indicated a desire to travel to Czechoslovakia. It was not known whether or not he had actually filed for a satellite visa. (DFB-73259, 19 November 1956, p. 4.)

3. Morris BLOCK, residing at 421 7th Avenue, New York, New York, was listed as a reference by Grigory Lvovich SCHIFRIN on his visa application in 1954. SCHIFRIN was reported to have been linked with narcotic and diamond smuggling in 1946. (FJYA-5693, 22 March 1954.)

4. Morris S. BLOCH of 421 Seventh Avenue, New York City had known Rachel BEILIN since 1935 according to a report dated 11 August 1953. Rachel BEILIN was believed to have formerly engaged in trafficking drugs in Shanghai and been involved in Russian espionage. As of August 1953, Rachel BEILIN was residing with her husband Alexander, at 1566 Macombs Road, Bronx, New York. (DFB-29039, 20 August 1953.)

5. Morris BLOCK, born 30 March 1920, New York, New York, was among those on a list of persons denied security clearances pursuant to Executive Order 10173 as amended, dated 12 October 1953.

6. It has been reported that a certain Morris BLOCK, born 30 March 1920 at New York, and his wife, Mollie BLOCK, aged 37, United States Nationals, arrived on 16 April 1949 at Southampton from New York en route to Gdynia in the Polish S. S. Batory. Their destination was believed to be Warsaw. According to a reliable informant, who travelled

with them from New York, BLOCK and his wife endeavoured to get permission to hold a public meeting on board during the crossing, but when this was refused they contented themselves by holding a small meeting in the Tourist lounge on the morning of 9 April. In the course of this meeting both BLOCK and his wife spoke very disparagingly of the Atlantic Pact and from the tone of their remarks, the informant gained the impression that they were Communists. (WELA-2326, 9 May 1949 and OSDB-16157.)



(over)

BLOCK, Morris

14-00000

SECRET

7. Morris Block invoked the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination when he was asked if he was a Communist by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, on 21 November 1957. (New York Times, 22 November 1957)

SECRET

BLOCK, Morris

SECRET

American Student in China

BLOKSBERG, Harry D.O.B - 6 June 1937 OCC. - Apprentice tool maker File Check Results
CIT - USA.
Residence - Trenton, New Jersey Photo Attached
Passport No. 454479 issued 4/15/57

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was a Left Winger. (IO Div.)

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was instrumental in applying pressure to make the Americans, that did not give up their passports at the Chinese frontier, give their passports to the Chinese in Peking. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 September 1957, from Moscow.)

3. Harry Irving Bloksberg, born 6 June 1937, resides in Newark, New Jersey and is employed as an apprentice tool maker. His parents, Gabriel and Bertha Bloksberg, were described as Communist Party members. The subject is a member of the Labor Youth League (LYL) which is a Communist organization. He attended Camp Midvale, which is owned and operated by the Metropolitan Recreation Association (MRA), on occasions during 1955. In 1956, the subject was named to a committee that was organized to make plans for the Communist MRA Youth Group. (DFB-86649, 16 July 1957.)

(over)

SECRET

4. Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. He had the following to say about Harry Bloksberg:

"Harry BLOKSBERG's father pleaded the 5th Amendment in 1954 and was subsequently thrown out of a hearing for causing a disturbance. Harry apparently took some pride in this, as he carried with him a clipping about the incident which he read to members of the group." (Foreign Service Dispatch, Hong Kong, number 289, 14 October 1957.)



(over)

BLOKSBERG, Harry

5. Harry Bloksberg invoked the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination when he was asked if he was a Communist by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, on 21 November 1957. (New York Times, 22 November 1957)

American Student in China

BRONSTEIN, Eugene
CIT - USA
Residence - New York   Photo Attached
Passport No. A-757784 issued 6/28/56

File Check Results

1. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-88603.

2. Dan O'Connell, a member of the group, had the following to say about the subject: "...; came to Moscow by himself; not believed to have had previous Communist affiliation; at end of trip appeared to be sympathetic toward the Communist movement." DFB-97144, 23 January 1958.



BRONSTEIN, Eugene

American Student in China

CARAWAN, Guy Hughes, Jr. File Check Results

CIT- U.S.A. Photo Attached

Residence - Los Angeles

Passport No. 43499 issued 5/8/56

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was of questionable character. (IO Div.)

2. The AP correspondent in Moscow reported that the subject and Peggy Suger would return to the U.S.S.R. for an estensive folk-singing tour. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 September 1957, from Moscow.)

3. Guy Carawan, Jr. was the sponsor of a program entitled "Call to National Student Conference for Academic Freedom of Equality and Peace, University of Wisconsin, April 25, 26, and 27, 1952". The subject and his wife, Noel attended camp festivals that were sponsored by the Jewish Young Fraternalists in 1954. The camp festivals were held on property that belongs to the International Workers Order. The subject attended an affair that was given by Peoples Songs in Los Angeles, on 18 February 1950. Peoples Songs is an organization that was organized and directed by the Los Angeles County Communist Party. On 8 November 1954, Peoples Artists, Inc. a Communist front organization, gave a farewell party for the subject. Guy Carawan signed a petition that was addressed to Chief Justice Vinson requesting that the U.S. Supreme Court consider the cases concerning the "Hollywood 10". (DFB-88500, 20 August 1957.)

4. Guy Carawan attended a party at the home of Bart and Edna Van der Schelling on the night of 28 August 1953. The persons in attendance were members of the American Communist group in Mexico City. Carawan was described as the son of wealthy parents who has been working at a Quaker encampment some place near Mexico City. Carawan has now decided to dedicate his life to "singing the folk songs of the common people". (DFB-88501, 20 August 1957.)

(over)

SECRET

GUY HUGHES CARAWAN, Jr
4/17/56

SECRET CARAWAN, Guy Hughes, Jr.

American Student in China

CARAWAN, Noel Oliver
CIT - U.S.A.
Residence - Los Angeles
Passport No. 43500 issued 5/8/56

Photo Attached File Check Results

1. Subject's full name was reported to be Noel Oliver CARAWAN. (DFB-88814, 21 August 1957.)

2. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was of questionable character. (IO Div.)

3. For derogatory information on the subject and her husband Guy Hughes Carawan, Jr., see the report entitled "CARAWAN, Guy Hughes, Jr.".

CARAWAN, Noel

SECRET

9
FJZW-2233/1
10 Mar. 58

American Student in China

D.O.B - 24 Sept. 1930
P.O.B - Philadelphia, PENN.

COHEN, Robert Carl, File Check Results
CIT - U.S.A
Residence - Los Angeles

Photo Attached

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was anti-Communist. (IO Div.)

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist and had also refused to surrender his passport at the Chinese frontier, but, succumbed to pressure in Peking. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 September 1957, from Moscow.)

3. Robert Carl Cohen was born 24 September 1930, at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. In 1947, the subject was reported to be residing in Los Angeles, California. In 1946, the subject was assigned to the Walt Whitman Club of the American Youth for Democracy. The subject's father is Isadore Cohen. An Isadore Cohen, not otherwise identified, was in April 1951, a member of the Los Angeles County Communist Party and the President of Lodge 251 of the International Workers Order. (DFB-89875, 12 September 1957.)

4. The IO Division, in a cable to Tokyo and Hong Kong, stated that Robert Cohen and Orville Schmidt were probably the most reliable members of the students that were visiting China. (DIR-35428, OUT-89863, 13 September 1957.)

CASIC DOCUMENT FILED IN 200-8-14

(over)

201			
AN		~~PS~~	
		FI	~~DESTROY~~
ABSTRACT	X	INDEX	

CS COPY

COHEN, Robert Carl
201-197821
10 Mar. 58

SECRET

5. Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. He had the following to say about Robert Cohen:

"Robert COHEN was sending reports of the group's travels to NBC; O'Connell said that he planned to write NBC a letter telling them what a poor choice they had made. O'Connell described Cohen as intelligent but over-bearing, and probably the most unpopular member of the group. He admitted that he had been a pimp in San Francisco, and was rather proud of the fact that in 1939 -- at the age of 9 -- he had been stoned while marching in a May Day parade. Steve Tyler told O'Connell that Cohen had been residing in Paris and that he known there as a "violent left-winger". O'Connell could not understand the fact that Cohen at some previous time had been in the Army in security work for the Signal Corps at Fort Monmouth." (Foreign Service Dispatch, Hong Kong, number 289, 14 October 1957.)

6. Robert Cohen departed Pari Air France midnight 1 Dec for Idlewild arriving morning 2 Dec. Concerned about procedure at Idlewild re passports. Attempting to arrange to be met by sufficient people to forestall a passport incident. (Pari 0169, IN 40350), 28 Nov '57)

ROBERT CARL COHEN
11/1/55

COHEN, Robert Carl

201-197821

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
COHEN, Robert Carl		2. RI FILE NO. 201-197821		
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. FJZW-2233	4. DATE 10 Mar. 58	
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST [illegible]	6. DATE PROCESSED 8 - JUN 1965	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE	

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO. 201-197821

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

Doc. removed and reprocessed for 201-197821 (COHEN, Robert Carl).

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET

American Student in China

COLLINS, Judy

CIT-U.S.A.

Residence - San Francisco

Passport No. 270636 issued 1/9/57

File Check Results

Photo Attached

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was of questionable character. (IO Div.)

2. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-86248.

3. Ron O'Connell, a member of the group, had the following to say about the subject: "...; didn't appear to be very familiar with Communism; associated with the pro-Communist element on the trip; very naive and not a good thinker; seemed very impressed by the trip and by the Communist system." DFB-97144, 23 Jan 58.

COLLINS, Judy

(over)

American Student in China

DANIELS, Ben
CIT- U.S.A.
Residence - Los Angeles
Passport No. 518654 issued 6/12/57

Photo Attached

File Check Results

1. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

2. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-88603.



(over)

DANIELS, Ben

3. Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. He had the following to say about Ben Daniels:

"Ben DANIELS, who exited China through Burma, took many photographs on the tour (see ALUSLO Hong Kong telegram to DNI, 11 October 1957)." (Foreign Service Dispatch, Hong Kong, number 289, 14 October 1957)

4. Dan O'Connell, a member of the group, had the following to say about the subject: "...at the end of the trip (he) was sticking up for the Communist system; physically weak and does not have a strong will power." OFB-97144, 23 Jan 58.

American Student in China

FIDERER, Jerry
DOB - 4 April 1933
POB - New York, New York
File Check Results
CIT - U.S.A.
Residence - Brooklyn, New York
Passport No. 20123 issued 4/26/56
Photo Attached

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Macao Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was a Left Winger. (IO Div.)

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject is far left. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 September 1957, from Moscow.)

3. The meeting of the Young Progressives of America that was scheduled to meet on 5 March 1953, did not take place due to the fact that only a few people attended; of the few that attended was one Gerald L. Fiderer. (DFB-65050, 19 June 1956.)

4. Gerald Lionel Fiderer, who resided at Brooklyn, New York, was not inducted into the United States Army on 27 November 1956, because he had a schizophrenic personality. (DFB-75071, 26 December 1956.)

5. Gerald Lionel Fiderer was born 4 April 1933 at New York, New York. In 1953, he was reported to have had "recurring emotional difficulties". He has been registered and publicly known as the General Secretary of the Labor Youth League (LYL) Chapter at the University of Wisconsin since 1955, and has been present at all public meetings of the LYL Chapter that has been held in Madison since September 1955. He was also reported as being present at an organizing committee meeting of the Young Progressives of America that was held in Madison in March 1953. The subject, (apparently as of 1956), as the vice-president of the LYL at the University of Wisconsin, participated in a public debate on behalf of the LYL on 19 April 1956, in Madison, in which he defended Marxism, criticized the "War Economy" of the United States, claimed that the elections in East Germany "are free", and claimed that reports on the recent Communist Party Congress in the U.S.S.R. were distorted in the United States newspapers. (DFB-70056, 20 September 1956.)

FIDERER, Jerry

6. Gerald Lionel Federer was dropped from the rolls of the University of Wisconsin because of poor grades in his classes. The subject was in contact with Sigmund Eisenscher the State Chairman of the Communist Party in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The subject apparently returned to New York on 1 July 1956. (DFB-71805, 24 October 1956.)

(over)



FIDERER, Jerry

7. Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. He had the following to say about Jerry Fiderer:

"Jerry FIDERER, a chemist, is definitely a Marxist thinker, but possibly not a Communist Party member." (Foreign Service Dispatch, Hong Kong, number 289, 14 October 1957.)

SECRET

American Student in China

GOLDSTEIN, Ninel

File Check Results

CIT - U.S.A.

Residence - Brooklyn, New York

Passport No. 69190 issued 5/23/56

Photo Attached

Ninel E. Goldstein visited the Tass News Agency, New York City on 20 March 1955. The subject resided at 2670 Colby Court, Brooklyn, New York. She allegedly belongs to a Communist Party Youth Group in New York City. Her father, Alfredo Henley, was identified as a Communist Party member; her stepmother, Lillian Henley, was employed at the Soviet Embassy in 1954; her aunt and uncle, Ruth and Harry Fisher, were employed with the Tass News Agency, in New York City, and her uncle, Zol Tan Deak, was described as a recognized Communist. (DFB-88449, 15 August 1957.)

GOLDSTEIN, Ninel

SECRET

SECRET

American Student in China

H GOODMAN, Faye — File Check Results

CIT-USA
Residence - New York — Photo Attached
Passport No. 473652 issued 4/23/57

1. No pertinent information was available on the subject.

2. Dan O'Connell, a member of the group, had the following to say about the subject: "...; pro-Communist; appeared to come from a poor working family and indicated her parents believed communism was the answer for the working class." OFB-97144, 23 January 1958.

GOODMAN, Faye

SECRET

SECRET

American Student in China

GRAB, Fred Photo Attached **File Check Results**

CIT- U.S.A.

~~Residence - Vienna~~ (formerly) now Alexandria, Virginia
Passport No. 73458 issued 5/24/56

1. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

2. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-88472.

3. Don O'Connell, a member of the groups, had the following to say about the subject: "...; possibly a socialist; don't think he [illegible] believed in Communism but did believe socialism would be the answer to all problems;..." DFB-9714[illegible]

FREDERICK D. GRAB
5/9/56

GRAB, Fred

SECRET

American Student in China

GRANT, Joanne
CIT- USA
Residence - New York
Passport No. 473761 issued 4/24/57

File Check Results

Photo Attached

1. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist and had also refused to surrender her passport at the Chinese frontier, but, succumbed to pressure in Peking. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

2. The Peking CHINA YOUTH NEWS carried in its 5 October 1957, issue an article by Joanne Grant, giving her impression of her visit to China. She had the following to say in her article:

"You can see the future through the Chinese people. You can obtain a firm conviction that China will continuously advance forward. As a western visitor, nothing impressed me more than the great power of this country. Every person in New China is very modest but has great pride; they are united, have self-respect, and respect each other. No one can overlook China's advance; it is to be regretted that many people do not have the opportunity to observe it personally. I like Shanghai very much, because from the way Shanghai has changed I can really understand New China. In the old Shanghai, except for the Chinese, everyone had special privileges. However, everything has changed greatly. I am of the opinion that from this, one can see the miracles which have begun in this great country."

3. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-88603.

14-00000

SECRET

4. Joanne Grant has written for "Rights," a pamphlet sponsored by the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee (ECLC). The subject was among those invited to the ECLC "Bill of Rights" dinner that was given on 15 December 1954. In October 1953, she contacted the American Committee For Protection of Foreign Born and in October 1956, the subject's name and address was in possession of the Socialist Workers Party. (DFB-92684, 23 October 1957)

SECRET

GRANT, Joanne

SECRET

American Student in China

GREENBERG, Sheila
CIT - U.S.A.
Residence - New York
Passport No. 98843 issued 6/11/56

File Check Results

Photo Attached

1. RI has a 201 file on the subject, however, there is no material in the file.

(over)

SHEILA GREENBERG
5/11/56

GREENBERG, Sheila

SECRET

SECRET

2. Sheila Greenberg invoked the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination when she was asked if she was a Communist by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, on 21 November 1957. (New York Times, 22 November 1957)

3. Alex O'Connell, a member of the group, had the following to say about the subject: "...; definitely pro-Communist." OFB-97144, 23 January 1958.

SECRET

SECRET

American Student in China

HAMILTON, Betty | **File Check Results**

CIT - U.S.A
~~Residence - New York~~
Passport No. 184522 issued 9/11/56 Photo Attached.

1. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist and had also refused to surrender her passport at the Chinese frontier, but, succumbed to pressure in Peking. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

2. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-886031.

3. [illegible] O'Connell, a member of the group, had the following to say about the subject: "...; described as a liberal; sold on the Communist system during the trip; believed most of the things she heard; however, appeared that she would never actively work for ~~the~~ Communism in the U.S." DFB 97144, 23 January 1958.

American Student in China

HOCKMAN, Sam
CIT- U.S.A.
Residence - New York
Passport No. 746706 issued 1/30/57

File Check Results

Photo Attached

1. Shelby TUCKER, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was the most effective anti-Communist in the group and that he had also refused to surrender his passport at the Chinese frontier, but, succumbed to pressure in Peking. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 September 1957 from Moscow.)

2. The FBI in answer to a file check request, from the State Department regarding some of the individuals that attended the Moscow Youth Festival, replied that their records failed to disclose any indentifiable data of a subversive nature concerning Samuel E. Hockman of Trenton, New Jersey. (DFB-88829, 21 August 1957.)

3. S. Hockman was an assistant to the director of the Jewish Legion, of 21 Hyde Park Street, London, W. Z. The Jewish Legion was reported to be a subversive organization. (WEL-3908, 26 Feb 48.)

4. S. Hochman departed Pari Air France midnight 1 Dec. for Idlewild arriving morning 2 Dec. Concerned about procedure at Idlewild re passports. Attempting arrangements to be met by sufficient people to forestall a passport incident. Fears contempt Congress charge, says he will not plead fifth amendment but will refuse to give information on other China travelers. (Pari 0169, (IN 40350), 28 Nov '57)

SAMUEL EDWARD HOCHMAN
8/1/55

HOCKMAN, Sam

14-00000

SECRET

American Student in China

HOLLISTER, David
CIT-U.S.A.
~~Residence - New York.~~
Passport No. 211858 issued 5/2/56

Photo AHAchGD

File Check Results

1. David Manship Hollister, residing in New York City, was rejected from military service on 18 September 1951, because of a schizoid personality. Records dated September 1951, indicated that the subject had received professional care for dementia praecox in 1950 and 1951, and that the subject had admitted heterosexual and homosexual experiences until about March 1951. In 1952, the subject was registered with the American Labor Party. The subject's mother, Ruth Manship Hollyster, reportedly was a member of the Los Angeles Communist Party. In 1947 and 1948, the subject was a member of the Harvard Youth for Democracy. The subject was also believed to be a secret member of the Communist Party in 1947. (DFB-86787, 18 July 1957.)

2. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-86248.

HOLLISTER, David

SECRET

14-00000

American Student in China

HOXSEY, Dean Cornelius — File Check Results

CIT-U.S.A

Residence - Los Angeles

Passport No. 619885 issued 7/19/57 — Photo Attached

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival were of the opinion that the subject was a Left Winger. (IO Div.)

2. Dean Hoxsey who originally applied for permission to remain in the U.S.S.R. now states that he is eager to remain in China after his interview with the American expatriates WILLS and WHITE in Peking. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that WILLS was thinking of returning to the US and that WHITE was completely brainwashed. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 September 1957, from Moscow.)

3. Dean Hoxsey was recruited into the Communist Party in May 1944, and was assigned to the East Los Angeles Communist Party Club. In August 1949, the subject advised a representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in Los Angeles, California, that he had been reared in a home which was one of Communist influence, as his father, Lowell Hoxsey, had for many years been a member of the Socialist Party and in the 1930's had joined the Communist Party. (DFB-88557, 21 August 1957.)

HOXSEY, DEAN CORNELIUS JULY, 1957

HOXSEY, Dean Cornelius

American Student in China

HYMAN, Elaine

File Check Results

CIT-USA
Residence - Brooklyn

Photo Attached

Passport No. 136094 issued 7/12/56

Elaine Hyman, of 1240 Union Street, Brooklyn, New York, was believed to be on the Teenage Labor Youth League State Board, in August 1953. In 1944, Fay Hyman and William Hyman, parents of the subject, were members of the Communist Party, Thomas Jefferson Group, 11th A. D., Kings County, Brooklyn, New York. William Hyman, father of the subject, was a delegate for the Communist Party, 11th A. D., to the United Labor and People's Conference for May Day, that was held in New York City, on 26 March 1949. (DFB-88471, 20 August 1957.)



HYMAN, Elaine

14-00000

SECRET

American Student in China

A KIDDER, Noel Arthur — File Check Results

CIT-U.S.A. — Photo Attached

Residence - Los Angeles
Passport No. 113046 issued 6/30/56

1. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject is a Communist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

2. Noel Arthur Kidder, during an interview with a representative of the Counter Intelligence Corps, U. S. Army, in April 1956, stated that he would refuse to sign a Loyalty Oath if he were inducted into the armed services. Kidder attended functions that were sponsored by the Los Angeles Committee for the Protection of Foreign Born in 1956. He attended meetings of the Los Angeles County Labor Youth League (LYL) in 1956 and 1957. He was elected Vice President of the Los Angeles County LYL in January 1957. He attended the California State LYL Conference that was held in February 1957. In December 1956 he was reported to have stated that a violent class struggle and a revolution were certain to occur. A subscription to the "Daily People's World" was maintained in the name of Kidder in November 1956. (DFB-81948, 24 April 57)

3. Noel Arthur Kidder is married to Susan Toya Pollock. (DFB-83271, 15 May 57)

NOEL KIDDER
6/13/56

KIDDER, Noel Arthur

American Student in China

KIDDER, Susan Pollock — File Check Results

CIT-U.S.A. — Photo Attached

Residence - Los Angeles
Passport No. 126723 issued 7/3/56

1. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject is a Communist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

2. Sue Pollock, of 1700 Abermarle Road, Brooklyn, N. Y., was mentioned as being one of Gustave Gilbert's contacts. (No further information was given as to who Gilbert was or what was meant by Sue being a contact). (DFB-14187, 13 Dec 51)

3. For derogatory information on the subject and her husband, Noel Arthur Kidder, see the report entitled "KIDDER Noel Arthur."

SUSAN POLLOCK KIDDER
6/13/56

KIDDER, Susan Pollock

SECRET

American Student in China

KUZNITZ, Elaine
CIT - U.S.A.
Residence - Los Angeles
Passport No. 135646 issued 7/12/56

Photo Attached

File Check Results

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was of questionable character. (IO Division)

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject is a probable Communist. (State Department Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 September 1957, from Moscow.)

3. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: IFB-86248.

ELAINE KUSNITZ
6-21-56

KUZNITZ, Elaine

SECRET

American Student in China

LANDAU, Nina
CIT.-U.S.A.
Residence - New York
Passport No. 488104 issued 6/7/57

Photo Attached

File Check Results

As of October 1956, Nina Serrano Landau and her husband, Saul Landau, were students at the University of Wisconsin. Mr. and Mrs. Landau have been active in the Student Peace Center at the University of Wisconsin. This organization was registered at the University as being a social-action type of organization which was affiliated with the American Friends Service Committee. In its 1957 registration, the Student Peace Center listed Nina Landau as secretary. In 1955, Saul Landau attended two public meetings that were sponsored by the Labor Youth League at the University of Wisconsin. Saul Landau was identified as having visited the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., in March 1956. (DFB-88459, 20 August 1957.)

LANDAU, Nina

14-00000

SECRET

American Student in China

LANE, Dick
CIT-USA
Residence - Los Angeles
Passport No. 908260 issued 4/6/56

Photo Attached

File Check Results

1. The SR Division briefed the subject prior to his attendance at the Moscow Festival. (DFB-89325, 30 August 1957.)

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist. (State Department Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 September 1957, from Moscow.)

3. The following documents pertain to the subject, however, efforts to locate the documents have been unsuccessful: 201-193201, DFB-86248, and DFB-88603.

RICHARD RENO LANE
3/26/56

LANE, Dick

SECRET

SECRET

American Student in China

MARCH, William James — D.O.B - 8 May 1939 — P.O.B - Chicago, Illinois — File Check Results

CIT - U.S.A.

Residence - Los Angeles
Passport No. 218671 issued 10/8/56 — Photo Attached

1. William James MARCH was born on 8 May 1939 in Chicago, Illinois. His parents are Herbert MARCH and Jane V. MARCH. The subject attended a meeting of the Labor Youth League (LYL) in 1955, as a prospective member. In February and March 1957, he attended a meeting of the Los Angeles County LYL, and was also in attendance at a California State LYL Conference. Subject's mother was a member of the Central Section, Moranda Smith Division, Los Angeles County Communist Party in October 1955. (DFB-88466, 20 Aug. 1957)

2. Information has been received that William James March left New York 8 June 1957, for Europe to attend the Youth Festival in Moscow during July and August, 1957. March's parents were listed as father Herbert MARCH, with aliases Herbert Fink and Harry Martin; and mother Jane V. March. (DFB-86867, 19 July 1957)

3. William James March was issued Los Angeles Series Passport #218671 on 10/8/56. In his application for this passport, the subject stated he intended to depart from the United States on 12/5/56 for a proposed length of stay abroad of two months in order to visit France, Italy and West Germany for the purpose of visiting relatives and seeing Italy. Subject answered "no" to questions "Are you now a member of the Communist Party?" and "Have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?" (DFB-87370, 27 July 1957)

WILLIAM J. MARCH
10-4-56

MARCH, William James

SECRET

American Student in China

MATTOX, Virginia Lee (Ginger)
C I I - U.S.A.

File Check Results

Residence - San Francisco Photo Attached
Passport No. A-758615 issued 7/12/56

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was of questionable character. (IO Div.)

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

3. Virginia Lee Mattox was born on 10 October 1937, at Los Angeles, California. On the subject's application for a passport she stated that she was not a member of the Commnist Party and she had never been member of the Party. (DFB-85650, 28 June 57)

4. In November 1955, Virginia Mattox attended a meeting of the California Labor Youth League (LYL) State Board meeting that was held in Los Angeles, California. In 1955, Ginger Mattox was the chairman of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Teen-Age Club of the San Francisco County LYL. On 16 April 1956, Virginia Mattox attended a lecture on the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that was given by William Schneiderman the Chairman of the 13th District Communist Party of the U. S. A. (DFB-82103, 26 April 1957)



MATTOX, Virginia Lee

American Student in China

McKENNA, (Rev.) Warren occ. - Theologian File Check Results

CIT-USA

Residence - Boston Photo Attached
Passport No. 11791, issued 5/27/57

1. The IO Division's informants that attended the Moscow Festival were of the opinion that the subject was a Left Winger. (IO Div.)

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was instrumental in applying pressure to make the Americans (that did not give up their passports at the Chinese frontier) give their passports to the Chinese in Peking. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513, 10 Sept. 57, from Moscow)

3. The Reverend Warren H. McKENNA of St. John's Church, Roxbury, Mass., was identified as an active participant in a picket line sponsored by the Communist Party during the strike at the Bethlehem Steel Company, Boston, in Oct. 1947. (DFB-28536, 30 July 53)

4. The name of Rev. Warren H. McKENNA was among those on a list contained in an article entitled "Penalties for Thinking Alarm U. S. Liberals." in the Daily Worker for 30 Oct. 1949. This article set forth that since the eleven Communist leaders had been found guilty, a great number of American church leaders had spoken out against the verdict of guilty. (DFB-889, 19 Jan. 1950, page 126)

5. Subject reportedly accepted position as Assistant at a Church in Dalston, London, England and is expected to remain there two years. Informants advised that one Warren McKENNA, was a sponsor of the National Conference of American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born, December 1954 and December 1955; name appeared on card at Pittsburgh Civil Rights Congress, February, 1956; subject attended the meeting of the Civil Liberties Committee of Massachusetts in May 1955; the subject's name appeared on the mailing list of the Southern Conference Educational Fund in August 1954. Informants reported no current activity on the part of the subject. (DFB-63999, 30 April 1956.)

/ SECRET

6. One Warren McKENNA was on a list of delegates to the Second World Peace Congress that was held in Warsaw from 16 to 23 November 1950. (WDCA-890, 80-54896, 11 Jan. 1951)

7. A reliable informant in the Boston area furnished a copy of the first issue of a new publication entitled "Our Common Concern," dated October 1950, published by Workers of the Common Life, at Roxbury, Massachusetts. The editors and publishers of this publication are Reverend Warren H. McKENNA and Reverend Robert MUIR, both associated with the Massachusetts Action Committee for Peace. The instant issue of this publication features the Stockholm Peace Pledge and the address which Reverend Joseph FLETCHER of Cambridge, Massachusetts, gave at the Winter Stadium at Ostrava, Czechoslovakia, on 18 August 1950, this speech also favored the Stockholm Peace Pledge. (IFB-6285, 22 Nov. 1950)

8. The Boston Globe, a Boston newspaper, on 5 November 1948, carried an article entitled "Boston Group Plans Welcome for 'Red Dean'". This article furnished information that a group of prominent Bostonians had joined into a special "Committee of Welcome" for the Very Reverend Hewlett JOHNSON, British Dean of Canterbury Cathedral, who was to visit at Boston after being refused a visa to enter the country the previous year.

The article continues, "Known as the 'Red Dean,' Dr. HEWLETT will speak at Jordan Hall, Gainsborough St., November 16 at 8 p.m." The article quoted Reverend Warren H. McKENNA, the Minister of St. John's Episcopal Church, at Roxbury, Massachusetts, as saying, "Dean HEWLETT was refused a visa by the State Department in 1947, because his invitation came from the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship. The State Department later recanted and permitted the visa." (IFB-14689, 5 Jan. 1952, enc. 2)

9. Reverend Warren McKENNA, a delegate to the 2nd World Peace Congress in Warsaw, Poland, in November 1950, testified that Irma C. OTTO attended that Congress, presumably a delegate from some other groups, and that he and Mrs. OTTO had the same committee participation, which he described as "the commission to define aggression." This same witness testified that upon their return from Warsaw, Poland, both he and Mrs. OTTO spoke at a meeting sponsored by the Minute Women for Peace.

As of April 1955, Irma C. OTTO resided at 140 Huron Ave., Cambridge, Mass. c/o Flo LUSCOMB who has been identified by informant as a "Concealed Communist". Subject appeared before the N. H. Commission Investigating

McKENNA, Rev. Warren

SECRET

SECRET

Communism and Subversive Activities in N.H. and testified on 1/6/54 and 2/1/54 that she was not and had not been a member of the Communist Party. She refused to give further information on the ground of privilege against self-incrimination. Informant identified subject as a former member of the Mass. Minute Women for Peace. Another informant reported subject spoke as the New England Representative of the American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born at the National Legislative Conference of this organization that was held in Washington, D. C. on 27-28 March 1955. Another informant identified subject as being in attendance at a meeting of the Chicago Women for Peace that was held on 12/6/54. (IFB-55296, 29 July 1955)

10. See 16 Jan 57 memo to Chief, Contact Division, D.O. from Boston office, on the Kennan's lecture on interviews with Womey & Fatean.

11. Interviews screwed

McKENNA,
WARREN HENRY
(OCT 1950)

MCKENNA, Rev. Warren

(over)

SECRET

12. Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American Youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. He had the following to say about McKenna:

"Reverend Warren McKENNA, a 39-year-old Anglican minister, has spent the last year or so in London. He has a socialist viewpoint, but is neither a clear nor a fast thinker. O'Connell commented that he sometimes had too much to drink and may have said some things he otherwise might not have." (Foreign Service Dispatch, Hong Kong, number 289, 14 October 1957.)

McKENNA, Rev. Warren

SECRET

SECRET

American Student in China

H MESCOLI, Sandra *Florence*

C. IT - U.S.A.

Residence - Los Angeles

File Check Results

Photo ATTACHED

1. No Record in RI.

2. Mescoli, as of December, 1957, was traveling in Europe after attending the Youth Festival in Moscow and the trip to China. She attended Labor Youth League meetings in 1956 and 1957. She attended the May Day rally that was held in Los Angeles, California, on 1 May 1957. (OFB-96419, 3 January 1958, in RI 201-146407)

3. Dan O'Connell, a member of the group, had the following to say about the subject: "... not too well informed on Communism but did ~~support~~ the Communist system." OFB-97144, 23 Jan 58.

MESCOLLI, Sandra

SECRET

American Student in China

MOYER, Larry (Eli Larry) File Check Results

C.I.T.-U.S.A Photo Attached

Residence - New York

Passport No. 922674 issued 4/13/56

1. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

2. Larry Moyer, a reported Communist Party member, attended a meeting on 6 January 1950, at the Independent Progressive Party (IPP) Headquarters at San Diego. The meeting was held by the members of the IPP Housing Committee for the purpose of making plans for their participation in the public Rent De-Control Meeting that was to be sponsored by the City of San Diego on 25 January 1950. (DFB-23641, 9 January 1953)

3. The regular meeting of the Communist Party Morgan Hull Club was held at the home of Eli Larry Moyer on the evening of 14 March 1948. (This meeting was probably held in San Diego, California.) Eli Larry Moyer, a Communist Party member was among the members of the Independent Progressive Party that maintained a picket line at the entrance to the Chamber of Commerce Auditorium, in September 1948, when the California Un-American Activities Committee Hearings were being held. (DFB-19758, 22 July 52)

(over)

SECRET

MOYER, Larry (Eli Larry)

SECRET

4. Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. He had the following to say about Larry Moyer:

"Larry MOYER, age 32, was reporting on the trip for United Press. O'Connell was Moyer's roommate in Moscow, and had learned of many of Moyer's past experiences before O'Connell had indicated where he stood politically. Moyer had been a pimp in Hawaii in 1941, working through the photograph shops where a serviceman could get his picture taken with a hula girl. He had also been afriend of Ada B. Jackson, whom O'Connell described as "a well-known pink in New York"; Moyer had known her through American Labor Party meetings there. O'Connell said that Moyer was crude, but by no means stupid." (Foreign Service Dispatch, Hong Kong, number 289, 14 October 1957.)

MOYER, Larry (Eli Larry)

American Student in China

NOWICKI, Lorraine (Genevieve) D.O.B - 7 Oct. 1932 File Check Results
CIT - U.S.A P.O.B - Poland
Residence - Detroit
Passport No. 117018 issued 6/22/56

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was of questionable character. (IO Div.)

2. Genevive Loraine Nowacki was residing at Hamtramck, Michigan and was employed by the "Glos Ludowy" (People's Voice) a Communist-line Polish-English language weekly newspaper. She attended meetings sponsored by the Civil Rights Congress in 1951, and the Convention of the Progressive Party at Chicago in 1952. She attended local and national functions of the "Glos Ludowy" in 1952. She served as Recording Secretary of the Youth Committee to Elect Peace Candidates in 1952, and was campaign manager for Ben Kocel who was an active member of the Communist Party in 1951, and the Progressive Party candidate for Michigan State Senator in the November 1952 elections. The subject represented the American Committee for Protection of the Foreign Born at the "Glos Ludowy" National Press Conference in Cleveland, Ohio in 1952. She was a member of the Civil Liberties Committee at the University of Michigan in 1952, and the International Workers Order in 1950. The subject was elected to the temporary Executive Committee of the newly formed Youth Club, Communist Party, U. S. A. District 7, on 4 December 1956, and was described that date as a member of the East Side Section of the Communist Party, District 7. Subject was the Chairman of the meeting of the Youth Club, Communist Party, District 7, on 11 December 1956. The subject has or is also connected with the Michigan Committee to Secure Justice in the Rosenberg Case, Michigan Artists Bureau, Civil Liberties Committee, Michigan Youth Committee for Peace, Freedom of Press Association of Michigan, American Slav Congress, and the National Negro Labor Council. (DFB-79256, 14 March 1957)

3. Genevive Loraine Nowacki was born on 7 October 1932, in Poland and in 1956, she was residing in Detroit, Michigan with her father and

SECRET

mother. Genevive's mother Stella who was born in Poland and naturalized at Detroit, Michigan travelled to Poland in 1956, and returned to the United States in that same year. Stella was a member of the International Workers Order, Lodge No. 3503, and was in good standing. Stella was also reported to have attended many receptions with the representatives of the Polish Embassy. (DFB-67777, 13 August 1956)

4. Miss Lorraine Nowacki was the Campaign Manager for Ben Kocel, the candidate for membership in the State Legislative representation of Michigan. Lorraine and Ben obtained over 1,800 signatures within less than 5 hours under the Progressive Party's petition demanding that the City Council in Detroit extend the rent control. (DFB-27456, 15 June 53)

5. [illegible]
DFB-95643, 14 Dec 57, contains info on Nowicki's Communist connections, with her visits to USSR and China. Nothing of use for our interest in Americans imprisoned in China

GENEVIEVE NOWACKI
May 1956

NOWICKI, Lorraine (Genevieve

SECRET

American Student in China

O'CONNELL, Dan (Daniel Myles)
CIT- U.S.A
Residence - Chicago, Illinois
Passport No. 594311 issued 6/25/57

File Check Results

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was anti-Communist. (IO Div.)

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist and had also refused to surrender his passport at the Chinese frontier, but, succumbed to pressure in Peking. (State Department Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 September 1957 from Moscow.)

3. Dan O'Connell was listed as the Publicity Director of the United States Youth Festival Committee, as of May 1957. (DFB-84120, 16 May 1957.)

4. [illegible] HK telegram No. 604, 7 Oct 57, says O'Connell says he is [illegible] Youth Festival group [illegible] Communist China.

(over)

O'CONNELL, Dan (Daniel Myles)

SECRET

5. Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. O'Connell said he saw Father Wagner in prison in Shanghai; he did not provide the Consulate General with more information about Father Wagner than appeared in the press. He was quite cooperative with the Consulate General (he turned over his passport) and was most anti-Communist in public and private statements. He described the greater part of the American group which attended the October 1 celebrations in Peiping as being politically and morally corrupt, and stated that only three members of the group, including himself, made any effort to defend the U.S. against Chinese Communist critics. The shortness of O'Connell's stay in Hong Kong prevented spending much time with him, but he stated that he would be happy to answer further questions after he returns to Chicago. (Foreign Service Dispatch, Hong Kong, number 289, 14 October 1957.)

6. O'Connell is a KUJUMP informant. (See 10 January 58 item from KUJUMP, filed in CIA-connected Americans [illegible] in China)

7. WFB-95135, 9 [illegible] 57, is a report on Daniel Myles O'Connell. O'Connell said that John Rosen & Bob Williamson was the leaders of the American delegation, & that the Reverend Warren McKenna was the leader of the group that went to China, that he (O'Connell) & Steve Tyler were the only members of the China group that [illegible] the USD

O'CONNELL Dan (Daniel Myles)

American Student in China

ROSEN, Jake
CIT- USA.
Residence - New York

File Check Results

Photo ATTACHED

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was a Left Winger. (IO Div.)

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was instrumental in applying pressure to make the Americans, that did not give up their passports at the Chinese frontier, give their passports to the Chinese in Peking. Tucker also feels that the subject is a most dangerous leftist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

3. On 15 November 1951, it was reported that Jack and Mildred Rosen, indicated to be members of the Chicago Branch of the Socialist Workers Party, resided at 1839 Touhy Avenue, Chicago. (DFB-16666, 24 March 1952)

4. In March 1948, it was reported that Jack Rosen, who was residing at 314 Harbor Road, Hunters Point Housing Project, San Francisco, and a part-time employee at Sonotone, Inc., 450 Sutter Street, San Francisco, and a student at Stanford University, was a member of the Theodore Dreiser Club of the Communist Party. At a meeting of the Professional Section functionaries on 19 March 1948, and in a discussion by those present on the responsibility of a Communist Party member in the event of war between the United States and Soviet Russia, Rosen, a member of the club, stated, "I would be drafted like any other individual and then do what I could." This same Jack Rosen was on a list of Communist Party members or reported sympathizers known to possess or who have been issued licenses for the operation of radiotelegraph, radiotelephone or amateur "ham" apparatus; who have received radio training; or who have been or now are employed in allied fields where their employment, talent, or knowledge could be utilized for clandestine radio communications. (DFB-5016, 14 August 1950)

(over)

SECRET

5. Jacob Rosen was a member of "The Campus" and the "Marxist Discussion Club," both organizations are student groups at the City College of New York, where Rosen was in attendance as a student. (DFB-90299, 19 Sept 57)

6. The "New York Times" issue of 30 July 1957, contained an article by "Max Frankel," regarding the World Youth Festival then in session at Moscow, USSR, which stated in part - "Jacob Rosen, 636 West 174th Street, Manhattan, a junior at City College went without sleep to keep things moving. He carried the United States flag at yesterday's opening, dipping it in salute to Nikita S. Khrushchev and other Soviet dignitaries, at the Lenin Stadium."

JACOB ROSEN
5/11/56

ROSEN, Jake

SECRET

7. Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. He had the following to say about Jake Rosen:

"Jake ROSEN, one of the organizers of the group is "solidly leftist". His father had been a labor leader in New York." (Foreign Service Dispatch, Hong Kong, number 289, 14 October 1957.)

CHINA VISITOR APPLIES

Passport Seized, Youth Moves to Re-enter City College

One of the forty-two young Americans who ignored a State Department ban to travel in Communist China will seek to re-enter City College next semester.

The student, Jacob Rosen, returned to New York last week and his passport was seized by immigration officials. He said yesterday that he had taken a six-month leave of absence from City College to attend a youth festival in Moscow and to travel in Europe. Mr. Rosen, a 19-year-old junior, went to China following the festival and visited relatives in Israel before returning home.

Dr. Buell G. Gallagher, president of the college, said he expected Mr. Rosen to have "no difficulty" in being readmitted.

8. Interviews SCKUALD.

9. DFB- 95661, 26 Nov 57, contains info on Rosen's Communist connections and visits to the USSR and China. He was the organizer of the group. He helped prepare the report that said Disney & Freedom looked well (Moyer objected to this). Several members of the group considered Rosen as a Communist or acting for the Russians (those members are Moyer, O'Connell, Tucker, Coppedge, & Mumford).

American Student in China

H SCHMIDT, Orville

CIT-USA

Residence - Marion, South D.

File Check Results

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was anti-Communist. (IO Div.)

2. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-88603.

SECRET

American Student in China

SCHWARTZ, Larry

File Check Results

CIT - U.S.A

Residence - Utica, Michigan

Passport No. 920030 issued 4/12/56. Photo Attached

The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was anti-Communist. (IO Div.)



over

SECRET

SCHWARTZ, Larry

SECRET

2. Lawrence Schwartz, who recently arrived in Hong Kong, from his tour in Communist China, had the following to say about his observations of Communist China: "Communism is run by fanatics. What they are trying to do cannot be done. People cannot submit to long periods of regimentation. Regimentation is frightening. In the states I visited, it was entirely out of hand." (New York Times, 21 Nov. 57)

SCHWARTZ, Larry

SECRET

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* Dr Lockard

UNCLASSIFIED

32
Action

P
Info

RMR

INR
EUR
FE
IES
SCA
PPT
IRC

CIA

Control: 12435
Rec'd: November 21, 1957
8:30 p.m.

FROM: Hong Kong

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 865, November 21

SENT DEPARTMENT 865, REPEATED INFORMATION KOBE 2, YOKOHAMA 3.

Lawrence Schwartz, member Youth Festival group, aboard PRESIDENT CLEVELAND due Honolulu December 3. Presence Hong Kong unknown until after departure.

DRUMRIGHT

UMT/1

UNCLASSIFIED

SCHWARTZ, Lawrence

American Student in China

SEEGER, Peggy (Margaret) File Check Results
CIT - U.S.A
Residence - Los Angeles, California Photo Attached
Passport No. 729373 issued 7/11/55

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was of questionable character. (IO Div.)

2. The AP correspondent in Moscow reported that the subject and Guy CARAWAN would return to the U.S.S.R. for an extensive folk-singing tour. (State Department Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 September 1957, from Moscow.)

3. There is no pertinent file information concerning Margaret SEEBER however, the following information is furnished for your information.

Charles Louis SEEGER, Jr. and Ruth Crawford SEEGER, parents of subject reside at 7 West Kirke Street, Chevy Chase 15, Maryland.

A report dated May 1952 states that Charles SEEGER was a member of the Communist Party in approximately 1936 and 1937. Ruth Crawford SEEGER was reported to have been friendly or acquainted with serious individuals during the 1940's who were Communist Party members, some of whom were also identified as being involved in a Soviet espionage ring which operated in Washington, D. C. and New York during the early 1940's.

Charles SEEGER admitted Communist Party membership from 1936 to 1939 in a discussion group of the Communist Party. He stated that the group payed no dues and had no membership cards. He also admitted that he joined a similar Communist Party discussion group consisting of three people in the latter part of 1941 and early 1942. This group, according to SEEGER met very irregularly and he ceased association with the Communist Party about 1943. He denied membership in the Communist Party at the time he was interviewed in August 1953.

SECRET

Margaret SEEGER's half brother Peter SEEGER is reported to have been a member of the Communist Party in 1945.

Peter SEEGER is reported to have been one of the organizers of People's Songs, Inc. in 1946. He served as editor, executive chairman, and national director prior to the dissolution of the company in 1949. People's Songs, Inc. was cited as a Communist front which was incorporated January 31, 1946, by the California Committee on Un-American Activities in its 1948 report.

Peter SEEGER is also reported to have been a member of the WEAVERS, a musical quartet who entertained at "Closed meetings" of Communist Party functionaries and have appeared before numerous pro-Communist and Communist-front groups. (ONHW-4402, 20 February 1956 from various FBI reports.)

Peggy Seeger ... SCKWAB



MARGARET SEEGER
12/13/55

SEEGER, Peggy (Margaret)

SECRET

American Student in China

TUCKER, Shelby Jr. (James) — File Check Results

CIT-U.S.A

Residence - ~~Pass Christian, Miss.~~ Photo Attached

Passport No. 615485 issued 3/29/57

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was anti-Communist. (IO Div.)

2. Shelby Tucker appeared at the American Embassy in Moscow, on 9 September 1957, and was interviewed in regards to his trip to China. (Interviewers name not given) The interviewer stated that he was convinced from his talk with Tucker, both before the festival and now, that he was a sincere and loyal if misguided American and that his refusal to give up his passport to the Chinese was not a trick. (State Dept. Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

3. The FBI in answer to a file-check request, from the State Department regarding some of the individuals that attended the Moscow Youth Festival, replied that their records failed to disclose any identifiable data of a subversive nature concerning James T. Tucker, Jr. (DFB-88829, 21 August 57)



TUCKER, Shelby, Jr. (James)

AIR POUCH
PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL
(Security Classification)

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE
770.46/10-?7

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : American Embassy LONDON 808 DESP. NO.
015

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON. October 8, 1957 DATE

REF : Embtel 1887

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION SCA-2	INFO	DEPT. RM/R-2 EUR-5 OLI-8 FE-4 P/IT-2
	REC'D 10/9		OTHER CIA-12 USIA-10

SUBJECT: Embassy De-briefing of Shelby Tucker, American Student Who Visited Communist China

Mr. Shelby Tucker, an American student at Oxford University, visited Communist China in company with several other students at the conclusion of the Moscow Youth Festival. After his arrival in Peking he was requested by the Chinese Communist authorities to surrender his passport. Mr. Tucker refused to do this and as a result was deported from China into the Soviet Union. He returned to London on September 12 and during his discussions with the Embassy volunteered to prepare a statement of his impressions of Communist China based on his notes. This statement is transmitted as enclosure one.

Shortly after Mr. Tucker arrived in London he was approached by Life magazine for his story, which it is understood he sold to the editors for a sum of $500.00. A copy of this story, which was written by a Life staff writer based on Mr. Tucker's remarks is transmitted as enclosure two. The Embassy understands that Life magazine is not now planning to publish this story.

There is transmitted as enclosure three a copy of Mr. Tucker's affidavit regarding the use of his passport in Communist China. This affidavit has already been transmitted to the Department under separate cover in connection with Mr. Tucker's passport difficulties but is included here for the Department's convenience.

It was the impression of the de-briefing officers that Mr. Tucker was sincere in his desire to furnish information which might be of use to the United States Government. Unfortunately, however, Mr. Tucker seems to have very little background in Chinese affairs and his observations, both written and oral, appear to contain little significant political or economic information.

/Mr. Tucker

POL/P-RHKostarick
REPORTER

CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION COPY
Retain in divisional files or destroy in accordance with security regulations.

THE ABOVE INSTRUCTION APPLIES TO THE DEPARTMENT ONLY.

TUCKER, Shelby

Mr. Tucker took a number of photographs during his stay in China. One print of each will be forwarded to the Department under separate cover when they have been received by the Embassy.

For the Ambassador:

Rockwood H. Foster
Second Secretary of Embassy

Approved:

Edwin W. Martin
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosures:

1. Statement of impressions of Communist China
2. Life magazine story
3. Mr. Tucker's affidavit

cc: Taipei, Hong Kong

SECRET

American Student in China

H TYLER, Patty (Patricia) File Check Results

CIT-USA

Residence - New York

Passport No. 1 issued 6/12/56

Photo ATTACHED

1. No Record RI.

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

3. See Steve Tyler.

4. McConnell told O.O. that Mrs. Tyler interviewed [illegible] & said he had recently had all of his teeth removed & didn't look well, & that he was too outspoken against the Chinese. (By phone 14 January 58)

PATRICIA GROLL TYLER
6/12/56

TYLER, Patty (Patricia)

14-00000

SECRET

American Student in China

H TYLER, Steve
CIT - U.S.A
Residence - New York
Passport No. 17 issued 10/22/56 Photo Attached

File Check Results

1. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow.)

(over)

STEPHEN TYLER
10/22/56

TYLER, Steve

SECRET

2. Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. He had the following to say about the Tylers:

"Steve and Patty TYLER (ref. Consulate General telegram to Department 560, repeated Moscow 8, Prague 1, of September 27, 1957) have been traveling in Europe for about a year and a half. Steve is 23. Neither are college graduates. O'Connell felt that Patty was the smarter of the two, but that both were quite sound in their thinking, and he was convinced of their anti-Communist sentiments. O'Connell said that both of Steve's parents had been in some sort of trouble for leftist or Communist activity in the U.S., and that Steve feared that this would unwarrantably be held against him in spite of his violent reaction against his upbringing. O'Connell said that he had never known a case where the views of father and son were father apart." (Foreign Service Dispatch Hong Kong, number 289, 14 October 1957.)

3. Stephen Tyler's father, Leonard, of 265 Parkside Ave., was a member of the Parkside Club, Communist Party, and in the Parkside Club, he was Press Director and member of the Executive Committee. Stephen's mother, Evelyn, was in April 1949 a member of the State Committee of the American Labor Party. (PFO-94348, 19 Nov 57)

SECRET

TYLER, Steve

SECRET

American Student in China

WILLIAMSON, Bob (Robert Dawson) D.O.B - 14 MAY 1938
P.O.B - CLEVELAND Ohio File Check Results

CIT - USA

Residence - New York

Photo Attached

Passport No. 502806 issued 5/9/57

1. The IO Division's informants that attended the Moscow Festival were of the opinion that the subject was a Left Winger. (IO Div.)

2. On 11 Oct. 1955, Confidential Informant T-1, who has furnished reliable information in the past, reported he had received information that Robert WILLIAMSON, born 14 May 1938, a student from Cleveland, Ohio had arrived in Paris, France on 2 Sept. 1955 from Prague, Czechoslovakia. Informant said his information indicated this individual had been in Poland. He stated he was not sure, but in all probability this person was a member of a youth club that had met in Warsaw, Poland. (DFB-59303, 11 Jan. 1956, RI 200-4-25201-8)

(possibly subject's father)

3. WILLIAMSON, Bob - Represented the Communist League of Great Britain at the UEJF Congress at Lyon in April 1948. (French press, RI 20-4-10-100y8)

ROBERT DAWSCN WILLIAMSON,
5/1/57

(over)

WILLIAMSON, Bob (Robert Dawson)

SECRET

SECRET

4. Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. He had the following to say about Williamson:

"Earl (I believe O'Connell called him Bob) WILLIAMSON's father was deported from the U.S. for Communist activities and is now in London. (See Consulate General despatch No. 199 of September 17, 1957)." (Foreign Service Dispatch, Hong Kong, number 289, 14 October 1957.)

5. Interviewed SCHWALD

6. Dan O'Connell, a member of the group, had the following to say about the subject: "... very pro-Communist; definitely familiar with Communism; argued very convincingly for the Communist system and appeared sincere in his beliefs." DFB-97144, 23 January 1958.

WILLIAMSON, Bob (Robert Dawson)

SECRET

A

American Student in China

WILLIAMSON, Earl — File Check Results

@77-USA

Residence - Pleasant Hill, Calif. / London

Passport No. 577624 issued 6/10/57

Photo attached

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was of questionable character. (IO Div.)

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject is a most dangerous leftist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

3. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-86248.

5. Dan O'Connell, a member of the group, had the following to say about subject: "...very naive; definitely for the [illegible]." DFB-97144, 23 Jun 1958.



WILLIAMSON, Earl

14-00000

FBI doc
25 Nov. 57 (Boston)
Re: Richard James Medalie
Bufile - 100-426846
Boston Field Office - 100-32145

THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENT

BLOCK, MORRIS

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: BARNES, WINIFRED C.
DCD FILE 08 97 44

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFI
			NOT REVIEWED BY HSC

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

14-00000

F-8-97-44

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Miami Office

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE : 28 February 1967

TO : Director, Domestic Contact Service

SUBJECT: BARNES, Winfred Clark

FILE NO: 496 289 A-89744

1. Reference is made to your request for security checks on the subject person as a source of intelligence information.

2. This is to inform you that the necessary checks have been completed with the following results:

a. [X] No additional information has been obtained, except for such biographic information as indicated below or in the attachment.

b. [ ] Information has been received that Subject was investigated with favorable results in

c. [ ] Certain information has been received and appears in the attachment which your Division will wish to consider in determining the extent and level of your use of Subject.

3. It is to be noted that our checks were made on the basis of the identifying information you furnished or in an attachment to this memorandum. Should it be disclosed that this information is erroneous or that Subject is known by a different name, this Division should be notified immediately.

Steven L. Kuhn
STEVEN L. KUHN
Chief, Personnel Security Division

Attachment:
State Passport Report

APPROVED

FORM 6-65 1124a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(9-47)

CONFIDENTIAL

BARNES, Winfred Clark
#496 289

11 January 1967

On 4 January 1967 a passport file of Winfred Clark BARNES was reviewed at the Passport Office, Department of State. The following is a summary of the information contained therein:

Date of Birth: 1 May 1912 at Gatesville, Texas; verified by birth certificate

Father: Shaw Andrew BARNES; Date of Birth: 8 May 1882 at Kennedy, Texas; current residence not given.

Mother: Velma Elizabeth HARRIS; Date of Birth: 8 March 1888 at Thelma, Texas; current residence not given.

PASSPORT ISSUED: At Miami, Florida on 27 January 1966, #G755310, for a period of four weeks to visit Mexico, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Peru, Columbia, Venezuela, Argentina, and Brazil for the purpose of tourism.
Permanent address: 5350 Southwest 76th Street
Miami, Florida
Mailing address: International Petroleum Company, Ltd
396 Alhambra Circle
Coral Gables, Florida
Occupation: Director
Spouse: Lois Enquist BARNES; Date of Birth: 8 Marcy 1915 at New Haven, Connecticut; current residence not given; Wed: 17 February 1945; no information on whether or not marriage has been terminated.

PASSPORT ISSUED: At Miami, Florida on 27 February 1961, #B10831, for a period of varying from one day to three weeks to visit Bermuda, Bahamas, Jamica, Trinidad, British Guiana, Guadeloupe, Barbados and Suriname for the purpose of business.
RENEWED: At Miami, Florida on 12 May 1964, for a period of ten days to visit Peru, Columbia, and other South American countries for the purpose of business

SUBJECT's first passport was issued at Washington, D. C. on 21 February 1957, #328617, for a period of indefinite time, to visit Bermuda, Bahamas, Haiti, Trinidad, Jamica, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama, Nicaragua,

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#496 289

and Guatemala for the purpose of business
RENEWED: At Havana, Cuba on 2 separate occasions:
13 February 1959 and 5 June 1959, for a period of approximately two on both renewal forms, countries to visit and purpose of visit not given.

EAG/mch

APPROVED

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

DATE 6 December 1966

MEMORANDUM TO : Chief, MIAMI FIELD OFFICE

ATTENTION : GLEICHAUF

SUBJECT : Ad Hoc Clearance

REFERENCE :

A 89744

Re WINFRED CLARK BARNES, Security Division has granted ad hoc clearance thru "SECRET".

Security checks will be completed.

Virginia L. Thorne

VIRGINIA L. THORNE
Security Liaison Officer

SECURITY

cc:

VThorne:pat

SECURITY MESSAGE # 1150

GROUP I
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Miami (Gleichauf)

16 NOV 1966

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

14 November 1966

BIOGRAPHIC DATA A-89744 NO.

1. SUBJECT'S LAST NAME — FIRST NAME — MIDDLE NAME	3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
BARNES, Winfred Clark	1 May 1912, Gatesville, Texas
2. ALIASES	4. SEX / 5. CITIZENSHIP
A# ~~136283~~ REUSED	M / US

6. FULL NAME OF SPOUSE, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, CITIZENSHIP

7. RESIDENCES (Including No., and Street, Zone, R.F.D., etc.)

FROM	TO	COMPLETE ADDRESS
	Present	5350 Southwest 76th Street Miami, Florida

A# 136284

☐ CONTINUED

8. EMPLOYMENT

FROM	TO	NAME OF EMPLOYER	COMPLETE ADDRESS
1964	1966	Esso-Inter-America Inc. ✓	Coral Gables, Florida
1961	1964	International Petroleum Co.	Coral Gables, Florida
	1960	Esso Standard Oil S.A., Ltd	Coral Gables, Florida
	1959	Esso Standard Oil (Cuba Div)	
	1957	Esso Standard Oil, S.A.	Havana, Cuba
1927	1955	Humble Oil Company	

☐ CONTINUED

9. EDUCATION (High school, college, graduate work, etc.)

FROM	TO	NAME OF SCHOOL	DEGREE OR MAJOR
1925	1929	Pearsall High School Pearsall, Texas	
1930	1933	University of Texas Austin, Texas	
1955		University of Pittsburg (15 session)	

☐ CONTINUED

10. ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION, INCLUDING FULL NAME, CITIZENSHIP DATA ON PARENTS AND CHILDREN.

16 NOV 1966

☐ CONTINUED

FORM 1-63 150 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (4-43)

14-00009

A089744

MR. W. C. BARNES
WINFRED CLARK

5350 Southwest 76th Street
Miami, Florida

BUSINESS:

Subject is General Manager and in Cuba Division at:

S000049 - Esso Standard Oil SA, Havana, Cuba

Subject is now with:
DIRECTOR:
A136284 - Esso Inter-America Inc., Coral Gables, Florida

INACTIVE
DATE 14 AUG 1963
INITIALS BCS

ACTIVATED
DATE 12-13-66
INITIALS rl

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L   CE-8-97-44 Control

1 May 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Miami Office

SUBJECT: Executive Leadership Conferences on Public Affairs

1. On Friday, 28 April 1967, the business executives attending the Conferences for Business Executives on Federal Government Operations, conducted by The Brookings Institution, were briefed by ranking Agency officials.

2. I have attached for your information biographic information on the executives from your area who were present.

James R. Murphy
JAMES R. MURPHY
Director, Domestic Contact Service

Attachments: a/s

cc: Control w/atts

JRM:mg

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

A89744 winfred clark

WINFRED C. BARNES

Director
Esso Inter-America Inc.

Mr. Barnes attended the University of Texas.

He began his career with Humble Oil & Refining Company, where he held various marketing positions before serving in the U. S. Army from 1942 to 1946. He rejoined Humble as a District Sales Supervisor at Corpus Christi, Texas, and later held the positions of District Manager, Assistant Division Manager, and Marketing Manager in several of Humble's marketing areas. He transferred to Esso Standard Oil, S.A. in Havana as Marketing Manager in 19?7, and was General Manager - Cuba Division at the time of the loss of that operation in 1960. Upon his relocation in Coral Gables, Florida in 1960, he became Eastern Region Manager for Esso Standard Oil, S.A. Limited. Mr. Barnes joined International Petroleum Company, Ltd. as Marketing Coordinator in 1961 and was elected a Director of that company in 1964. Today he is a Director of Esso Inter-America Inc., with responsibility for petroleum marketing, public relations, government relations, and operations in the Caribbean and Chile.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	OO- B-3,168,138
SUBJECT	Attitude of Segundo Cevallos, Key Official of National Bank	DATE DISTR.	6 Oct 60
		NO. PAGES	One
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	Sep 60 and earlier		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Havana/Sep 60		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, graduate engineer, an official on the staff of a large oil company.

Source has had years of experience in company operations outside the US and has been located in Cuba for many years. [Source is normally available for reinterrogation should this report generate additional requirements.]

1. In Sep 60 I talked to an old friend who was president of one of the US-owned tire companies recently intervened by the Castro regime. My friend stated that he had recently contacted Segundo Cevallos, one of the top officials of the National Bank, in connection with obtaining approval for some of the company's US technicians to take their furniture and appliances out of Cuba. Cevallos said, "I don't want those technicians to leave. We need them." At this, the rubber company official stated that it was too late and that the technicians had already gone.

2. Cevallos then made the statement that he was very much concerned about the flight of technicians of all kinds from Cuba. He said that the revolution had been fought to give Cuba a more highly developed industry, but that the technicians were leaving and industry was being seriously effected.

3. Cevallos then said, "Something is wrong. The revolution has gotten off the track somewhere." He then added, "I have got to talk to 'Che' about this."

4. Cevallos is a man of about 60-63 years, and has a very important position, in that he is in charge of granting foreign exchange. My friend said that Cevallos is a very pleasant individual but seems to be a theorist, a professorial type who obviously has had little or no business experience. He has a background as a writer and philosopher, and apparently is extremely naive as evidenced by his comment that he would talk to "Che" Guevara about how the revolution had gotten off the track.

-end-

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC				

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	00-B-3,168,139
SUBJECT	Anti-Castro Attitude of ICP Personnel	DATE DISTR.	6 Oct 60
		NO. PAGES	Two
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	Sep 60 and earlier		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Havana/Sep 60 and earlier		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, graduate engineer, an official on the staff of a large oil company.

Source has had years of experience in company operations outside the US and has been located in Cuba for many years. [Source is normally available for reinterrogation should this report generate additional requirements.]

1. As of Sep 60 there appear to be some significant developments occurring among personnel of the staff of the Cuban Petroleum Institute. The Institute has commandeered a building of Esso Standard Oil SA for use as headquarters, and is currently engaged in mixing the personnel of all three intervened oil companies in the new headquarters.

2. The shuffling around of personnel has further lowered the morale of the petroleum industry employees, and I have been told that 95% are strongly in favor of the companies and against the Castro regime.

3. Since ICP established its new offices, indoctrination sessions of employees have been scheduled on a twice-a-week basis. The first session was held recently and was concerned with the "Colored Problem of the World". The gist of the remarks of the conference leader was that Cubans were of Spanish ethnic origin, and because of the close ties of Spaniards and the Moors for so many hundreds of years it had to be realized that all Cubans had colored blood, and should not make a distinction and should have no prejudices concerning people with colored blood.

4. The second indoctrination session was headed by an overt Communist from the Texas Company. He delivered the straight Party Line, anti-US, anti-imperialist, anti-monopoly, "The Soviet Union is the great hope of the world for peace", and only Communist ideology will survive, etc.

5. He also stated that, "The Declaration of Havana of Fidel Castro will be our doctrine," and said that it was desired to obtain the signatures of the whole population of Cuba to show that everyone was behind this doctrine. He then said in response to a question regarding what would happen to those who did not sign, "You are either for us or against us."

6. At this, one of the office girls who had been a strong Fidelista got up and remarked that such comments reminded her of the Batista days, and she strongly disapproved of any pressure tactics.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC			

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

7. One of the male office employees then stood and stated that he agreed heartily with her, and added that it was not the intent of the revolution to "get into this sort of business." He then asked, "Why are we getting all this Communist propaganda and why do we not hear anything about José Martí?" His comments were greeted with applause.

8. A third employee stood up and talked for 45 minutes. He really laid it on the line concerning the way the revolution had failed the people of Cuba, and had leaned far too much toward Communism. The conference leader did not interrupt and following the conclusion of the employee's remarks did not even answer. He merely said, "That is all", got up and walked out. However, the next scheduled indoctrination session was cancelled.

9. Although mixing the employees of the three companies was done deliberately to break up a feeling of trust among employees who knew each other, and to introduce a feeling of fear concerning strangers, there has been close cooperation on the technical level between employees of at least two refineries. For example, technicians at Esso and Shell recently collaborated in shutting down the refineries without real justification, allegedly because of Hurricane Donna. When the word got out that the refineries were shutting down, ICP officials rushed in and protested vigorously that there was no danger, and that the action should not be taken. The technicians then said, "Well, it is too late now," and they kept the refineries shut down for three full days. Both Shell and Esso technicians concerned enjoyed this minor act of sabotage hugely.

10. They also cooperated in dealying action when they were ordered to start the cat plant. LPG is needed badly, so the technicians decided to keep the unit shut down. ICP officials screamed that it was unnecessary and ordered them to start, but the technicians said that it was not practical because it was too difficult, and possibly dangerous, to stop and start the unit. They said that the shortage of catalysts made it impossible to figure on keeping the unit going, and so it was not the right thing to do to start it at all. Consequently they have been able to keep the cat units shut down completely since the storm.

11. One of the top Shell engineers who has participated in such actions is going to attempt to skip the country as a test, because many other technicians of the oil companies are desperate to flee Cuba and are trying to arrange ways and means to do so.

-end-

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	00-A-3,168,137
SUBJECT	Desire of Oil Industry Technicians to Flee Cuba/Effect on Production	DATE DISTR.	29 Sept 60
		NO. PAGES	Two
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	Sep 60 and earlier		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Havana/Sep 60 and earlier		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, graduate engineer, an official on the staff of a large oil company.

Source has had years of experience in company operations outside the US and has been located in Cuba for many years. [Source is normally available for reinterrogation should this report generate additional requirements.]

1. A real body-blow could be given the Castro regime if a few selected technicians in the oil refineries skipped the country. As an example, at the Esso refinery there are four technicians whose loss would have a very severe effect on the production of the refinery. These men are all young, extremely intelligent, well trained, and are completely loyal to the company. They have served immediately below the superintendent and the assistant superintendent. These four would be given immediate jobs in the US, because of their outstanding backgrounds, if they were able to get out of Cuba.

2. The top figure of the four is Leon Hequin Maya, who is a specialist in the Processing Department, one of the most important functions in the plant. This department's responsibilities deal with the physical processing of the product from crude to the finished material.

3. Hequin is 32 years old, married, no children, but expecting a child in Dec 60. He is a graduate of Auburn University, with a degree in chemical or mechanical engineering. He is a Cuban national, I believe of the Jewish faith. He is about 5'10", weighs about 160 lbs, has close cropped black hair, and is a very personable, intelligent young man. He is a very good leader, and was definitely one of the men on their way up in the company.

4. Hequin already has been branded a counterrevolutionary in an official Acta, and has been taken out of the plant and put into the office. Apparently the regime wanted to get him away from the production line for fear of possible sabotage, and also wanted to utilize his undoubted talent and knowledge of the industry in headquarters.

5. Hequin is extremely eager to get out of Cuba, but he does not have a police exit permit, and since he has been branded counterrevolutionary he is afraid he would not get his passport back if he presented it for a police permit.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

27 OCT 1960

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC			

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6. Another outstanding young man is Eequin's assistant, Jose Ramon Alvarez, about 31. He is a graduate of Auburn University and is a top flight engineer. Since Alvarez is single, he says that he will wait until the others get out of Cuba. He also wants to hang back to be able to do some sabotage before he makes his departure. He believes that he will be able to get out on his own.

7. A third top flight mechanical engineer, who is extremely eager to leave Cuba, is Santiago Pardo Suarez del Villar. He is about 35, a graduate of the University of Havana. Pardo is head of Maintenance and Construction, and is an extremely intelligent and capable engineer. He is about 5'8", weighs about 170 lbs, and has dark black ahair and a moustache.

8. The fourth is Raul Capote Ortiz, a graduate of Louisiana State University with the degree in chemical engineering. Capote is one of the top technicians in the Processing Department. He is married, but I do not know if he has any children.

-end-

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	00-B-3,164,609
SUBJECT	Operations of Refineries/Effect of Use of Soviet Crude Oil/Jet Fuel Production	DATE DISTR.	23 Aug 60
		NO. PAGES	Two
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	Aug 60 and earlier		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Havana/Aug 60 and earlier		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, graduate engineer, an official on the staff of a large oil company.

Source has had years of experience in company operations outside the US and has been located in Cuba for many years. [Source is normally available for reinterrogation should this report generate additional requirements.]

1. As of Aug 60 the three major refineries confiscated by the Castro regime are operating in fairly good shape. Their principal problem is that the Soviet crude being supplied is very light and they cannot run as much volume because gas pressure builds up. The Esso refinery, for example, has a capacity of 36 thousand bbls per day on heavy crude, but 26 thousand bbls per day is the best they have been able to do on the Soviet crude, and it has been running at a rate of only 20 thousand bbls per day since 20 Jul 60.

2. The Soviet crude available to date has been compatible with the refineries and will not damage them, but in addition to not being able to get as much volume, the refineries cannot get as much fuel oil because of light ends. This is true of all three major refineries.

3. The refineries were designed for 26 gravity crude which is fairly heavy. The Soviet crude is 33 gravity, and has caused an imbalance in that they are now producing more gasoline than is needed. As a consequence, Cuba is searching desperately for fuel oil. The USSR has said that it is not in a position to supply fuel oil and so Cuba has turned toward Mexico, even to the extent of attempting to arrange deals whereby they will trade gasoline for fuel oil.

4. The imbalance of gasoline is indicated by the fact that the Cabaiguán refinery was shut down recently because its gasoline storage was completely filled.

5. Cuba will reach a critical point about 1 Sep 60. The Esso refinery slowed down from 26 thousand bbls per day to 20 thousand bbls per day because it had only a 10-day supply of crude. The supply on hand was sufficient to last only until 14 Aug, but around 11 Aug the refinery was supposed to receive a shipment of 80 thousand barrels of crude. However, this is only enough to operate four days.

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L   19 SEP 1960

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STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC					

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	00-B-3,164,652
SUBJECT	Shortage of Lubricating Oil/ Operating Supplies for Refineries/ Ship Bunkerage	DATE DISTR.	23 Aug 60
		NO. PAGES	Two
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	Aug 60		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Havana/Aug 60		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, graduate engineer, an official on the staff of a large oil company.

Source has had years of experience in company operations outside the US and has been located in Cuba for many years. [Source is normally available for reinterrogation should this report generate additional requirements.]

1. As of Aug 60 there is a shortage of lubricating oil in Cuba which will become critical in a fairly short time. Great efforts have been made by the Castro regime to obtain lubricating oil from US suppliers, and a vessel, the Mar Caribe, has visited a number of US ports attempting to obtain the oil. However, it has been refused everywhere and had to return to Cuba in ballast. As of 10 Aug 60 it is loading molasses for delivery to Boston, and will then proceed to Montreal in an attempt to obtain lubricating oil.

2. A former Esso employee, Frank García, left Cuba on 2 Aug 60 for Mexico to try to obtain lubricating oil. He is going to visit the Mobile blending plant, PEMEX, and several others.

3. A US national Robt. Wallace, Tulsa, Okla. recently employed by ICP to attempt to arrange for the purchase of necessary supplies and spare parts for the oil industry has been traveling throughout the SW part of the US, also attempting to arrange for lubricating oil, but with no success. This individual is such an unsavory character that it is not beyond the bounds of probability that he might "go south" with the funds entrusted to him, which are considerable.

4. There are 20 principal types of lubricating oil needed for the total economy, and the actual status of supply of each is not known. They may be completely out of some and have six months supply of others. However, the general story is that there is a "one month supply" of lubricating oil available.

5. Lubricants for power plants, transportation, and communications are the primary concern. They are in critically short supply in diesel lubricants for engines and heavy equipment, and turbine oil for power plants.

6. There is no lubricating oil manufactured on the island although the Castro regime is trying to set up a plant. However, this is a long range project and takes a lot of time and money.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

7 SEP 1960

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC					

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	00-B-3,164,653
SUBJECT	Friction in New Management of Esso Refinery	DATE DISTR.	23 Aug 60
		NO. PAGES	One
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	Aug 60 and earlier		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Havana/Aug 60 and earlier		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, graduate engineer, an official on the staff of a large oil company.

Source has had years of experience in company operations outside the US and has been located in Cuba for many years. [Source is normally available for reinterrogation should this report generate additional requirements.]

1. On 1 Jul 60 the Castro regime intervened the Esso refinery in Cuba. The interventor appointed was Commander Olivio Pino, a career officer in the Cuban Navy. The number two man is (fnu) Guardia, about 35, a former marketing analyst in the office of the company. As of Aug 60 there is evidence of definite friction between Pino and Guardia.

2. Commander Pino is an intelligent, affable, and hospitable personality. He wears a business suit, and to the best of my knowledge has never worn a "barbudo" beard.

3. Guardia, on the other hand, is a real hard-core Communist, who feels that Pino is too soft and not revolutionary enough. Guardia wants to take a hard line toward the employees. He wants to cut salaries and "get things in line." Pino knows that such abrupt changes would result in a drastic drop in efficiency, and would alienate employees who are at least neutral at present.

4. There are indications that Pino recently told Guardia in effect to stay in the office and keep his mouth shut.

5. Pino is directly under Alfredo Gutiérrez of ICP, and both are friends and associates of Fidel Castro, not Raúl, or "Che" Guevara. If something happens to Fidel, both Pino and Gutiérrez would definitely be replaced quickly, because they are not the hard-boiled Party line type.

-end-

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L 7 SEP 1960

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC				

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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14-00000

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	00-A-3164654
SUBJECT	Leonel de Paula Arias, Oil Industry Procurement Agent (Biographic)	DATE DISTR.	17 Aug 60
		NO. PAGES	One
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	Aug 60 and earlier		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Havana/Aug 60 and earlier		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, graduate engineer, an official on the staff of a large oil company.

Source has had years of experience in company operations outside the US and has been located in Cuba for many years. [Source is normally available for reinterrogation should this report generate additional requirements.]

1. In Aug 60 the Castro regime sent two representatives to the US to attempt to obtain replacement parts and machinery for the oil industry. One of these men is Julio Caunedo, on the staff of ICP, and the second is Leonel de Paula Arias, a former employee of Esso Standard Oil SA.

2. De Paula is about 28-29 years old, 6'1", 180 lbs. He has black curly hair and fair skin. He is married and I believe has one child. He is a Roman Catholic; and has never been considered as having any left-wing inclinations.

3. De Paul speaks excellent English, and I believe studied in the US. He has a degree in engineering and worked three years with the Esso refinery, mainly in maintenance and construction. As of Jul 60 he was section head of the Refining Department, Purchasing and Warehousing.

4. The choice of de Paula to go to the US to obtain necessary supplies is sound because he is the man which the company would have chosen to do such a job if required. He has a reputation of being a good hard worker, intelligent and dependable. He has a pleasant personality and handles himself very well.

5. De Paula was considered one of the better men of the plant and could be classed as a key technician because of his knowledge, background, and ability, and it would definitely hurt the Castro regime if he fled Cuba. However, the opportunities for employment in the oil industry in Latin America are not good because there is considerable prejudice against Cubans on the part of other countries in which there are refining operations.

-end-

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6 SEP 1960

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

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STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC				

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: CROZIER, ROSS LESTER
C-25507

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: CI/OA

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
			REVIEWED BY HSCA

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

PERSONAL INFORMATION IN 25507 (CROZIER)

PERSONAL INFORMATION IN

25507 (CROZIER)

14-00000

C-82712 sister-in-law of Subject
C-82713 wife of Subject

These two cases are requests for CSA.

We are forwarding the original of this request to the office of Security, but since the husband of one of the subject's is under such DEEP COVER, we are setting up files and cards on those attached.

Files set up per Mr. Brewer's instructions to me on 26 Apr 60.

pst

Copy for Husbands file C-25507 made

SECRET

DATE: 15 April 1960
mc

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT: C# 25507
SO# 112569

THOMAS CARROLL, JR.
Chief, CI/OA

ATTACHMENTS (if any): Copy of WHD memo and PRQ part II.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE: 15 Apr 60

CASE NO.: C-25507

TO Processing Branch: TAKE ACTION INDICATED BELOW ON SUBJECT CASE
(Always check "Remarks" for limitations or details)

SET UP FOR POA: ☐ EXPEDITE S.O. INDICES ☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES

SET UP FOR: ☐ OA ☐ CSA ☐ PCSA ☐ STAFF TYPE "A" ☐ STAFF TYPE "B" ☐ PROP APP ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK

	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RI TRACES
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST OPERATIONAL & DIVISION TRACES
	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST FIELD TRACES
	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II
	CHECK FOR S.O. ☐ INDICES ☐ FBI INDICES		REQUEST ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC DATA
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
✓	FORWARD ~~ATTACHMENT~~ original TO SECURITY OFFICE w/PRQ II		REQUEST RESULTS STAFF "D" DOSSIER REVIEW
	PREPARE CANCELLATION FORM (See "Remarks" for Reason)		REQUEST RESULTS TECH INTERROGATION FROM: ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
	SEND TO RI/ARCHIVES		PREPARE MEMO RE "EXPIRED" POA
	PREPARE INDEX CARD FOR NAME(S) LISTED BELOW		PREPARE —— COPIES OF ATTACHED FOR USE AS BELOW
✓	FILE Copy WHD memo w/PRQ II		NOTICE: ☐ 1ST ☐ 2ND ☐ 3RD & FINAL
	TICKLE FOR:		OTHER

REMARKS:

[signature]

SIGNATURE

FORM 7-58 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(21)

14-00000

SECRET

12 April 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Office of Security

VIA : Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : Harold R. NOEMAYR (ps)
C-25507
#112569

1. It is requested that the CSA granted Harold R. NOEMAYR (ps), formerly called Arthur G. VAIVADA (ps), on 3 July 1957 for use in Cuba under Project AMPHODARCH and later amended to cover his use in Mexico under Project LIEDGE, be further amended to cover his PCS to Headquarters. His activity in or around the Washington, D.C. area will also be covered under the LIEDGE Project.

2. Attached is a new PRQ, Part II to cover his activity in the United States. NOEMAYR will continue to live under cover and will probably be reassigned overseas after a two year tour at Headquarters.

3. CSA's are being requested under separate cover on his wife and sister-in-law who are also living with him.

J. C. King
Chief, WHD

Note: Additional thermofax copy sent to S.O. per request of Evan Highley 8 July 60 [signature]

SECRET

SECRET

30 June 1959 par

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/III/Mexico - Larry Dale

SUBJECT: Ross Lester CROZIER

1. Reference is made to your request to this office dated 17 April 1958.

2. The reply to your request is contained in the attached memorandum from the Office of Security dated 29 June 1959.

Chief, CI/OA

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE. 30 June 59	CASE NO. C-25507

TO Processing Branch: TAKE ACTION INDICATED BELOW ON SUBJECT CASE
(Always check "Remarks" for limitations or details)

SET UP FOR POA: ☐ EXPEDITE S.O. INDICES ☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES

SET UP FOR:
☐ OA ☐ CSA ☐ PCSA ☐ STAFF TYPE "A" ☐ STAFF TYPE "B" ☐ PROP APP ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK

ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST RI TRACES
ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST OPERATIONAL & DIVISION TRACES
EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REQUEST FIELD TRACES
REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REQUEST ☐ PRO I ☐ PRO II
CHECK FOR S.O. ☐ INDICES ☐ FBI INDICES	REQUEST ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC DATA
✓ FORWARD ~~ATTACHMENT~~ copy of SO memo TO DIVISION (WH/III/Mexico)	REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE	REQUEST RESULTS STAFF "D" DOSSIER REVIEW
PREPARE CANCELLATION FORM (See "Remarks" for Reason)	REQUEST RESULTS TECH INTERROGATION FROM: ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
SEND TO RI/ARCHIVES	PREPARE MEMO RE "EXPIRED" POA
PREPARE INDEX CARD FOR NAME(S) LISTED BELOW	PREPARE —— COPIES OF ATTACHED FOR USE AS BELOW
✓ FILE Orig S.O. memo dtd 29 June 59	NOTICE: ☐ 1ST ☐ 2ND ☐ 3RD & FINAL
TICKLE FOR:	✓ OTHER

REMARKS:

T - 30 July 59
(Supplementary S.O. memo)

[signature]
SIGNATURE

FORM 7-58 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(21)

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

29 JUN 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT : C-25507
#112569

1. Reference is made to a memorandum dated 17 April 1958 from WH Division through CI/OA requesting that the Covert Security Approval granted on 3 July 1957 be amended to permit Subject's utilization as a career agent in Mexico City under Project LIEDGE.

This will confirm the verbal Covert Security Approval granted to Mr. Larry Sulc, WH Division on 3 June 1958 for the use described above.

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in Clandestine Services Instruction No. 10-5 and Clandestine Services Instruction - Field No. 10-5, a covert security approval is granted for the use of the Subject, as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1, above.

3. Subjects of covert security approvals are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

4. Your attention is called to the fact that a covert security approval does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-210. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for approval to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

5. This approval becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within six months of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

David E. Hanlon
for Robert H. Cunningham

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

29 May 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: AMPHODARCH/2
C-25507

1. On 23 April 1958 Mr. Lou Hamby of the Office of Security called in connection with the above designated case, specifically regarding the contingencies upon which the CSA dated 3 July 1957 was granted.

2. Mr. Hamby advised that the investigation of Subject has been completed and he has been given an LCFLUTTER, both with favorable results.

3. In view of the foregoing the restrictions (contingencies) in the 3 July 1957 approval are now removed. WH Division has been notified.

4. Jim Burton, Project Branch CI/OA, was given the above information also. He advised FI/Projects in order that further action could be taken in connection with the Project renewal.

John B. Brewer
CI/OA

CI/OA/JBB:rc

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE: 14 May 1958	CASE NO.: C-25507

TO: Processing Section

PLEASE TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTION ON THE CASE SET FORTH ABOVE.
(Always check "Remarks" below for limitations or details)

SET UP FOR:

POA WITH:

☐ EXPEDITE INDICES FOR ☐ EXPEDITE FBI CHECK FOR

SET UP FOR:

☐ OA ☐ CSA ☐ PCSA ☐ PROP APP ☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY ☐ COVERT NAME CHECK

	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RI TRACES
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST OPERATIONAL & DIV. TRACES
	INVESTIGATION STILL OUTSTANDING		REQUEST FIELD TRACES
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY		REQUEST ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC INFO
	NOTICE: ☐ 1ST ☐ 2ND ☐ 3RD & FINAL		REQUEST GREEN LIST
	PREPARE CANCELLATION FORM		FURNISH GREEN LIST INFORMATION
	SEND TO RI/ARCHIVES		REQUEST RESULTS OF TECH. INTERROGATION
	FILE		SEND "QUERY" MEMO TO DIVISION
	EXTEND POA FOR ____ DAYS UNTIL ________	✓	OTHER *(See Remarks)*

REMARKS:

Please prepare tickler for 5 June 1958.

James R. Burton
(SIGNATURE)

FORM NO. 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. 1 FEB 56

SECRET

(21)

14-00000

SECRET
CI/OA

COMMENTS:

14 May 1958

RE: Project LIEOGE
C-25507

1. Miss Emily Brockenbrough, FI/Projects, telephoned the writer to report that FI intends to hold up final processing of the subject project until a determination is reached by the Office of Security concerning the request for a Covert Security Approval authorizing the agent's assignment in Mexico City.

2. The writer agreed to advise FI/Projects when CI/OA receives a report from the Office of Security.

FI/Projects advised per above on 23 May 1958. JPB

DATE: 14 May 1958 BY: James P. Burton

SECRET

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

CI/OA PROJECT REVIEW FORM

Cryptonym........LIEDGE..............Division.....WH......Station..Mexico

Type of Project..Provide Mexico City Station with career agent to be used as C/O handling CP operations...

Case Officer...Louis Puckett........Room..2121 DH........Ext..2555......

New Project...X.......;Renewal of........year-old project...........;

Amendment............;Extension for.......months; termination.......

Project approval period from...1 May 1958...........to...30 April 1959.........

Recommendations:

1. CI/OA recommends approval on condition the agent Harold R. NOEMAYR receives, from the Office of Security, a Covert Security Approval for his new assignment in Mexico City and the results of his LCFLUTTER are satisfactorily resolved. Also, on condition that should the Office of Security request a clearance and LCFLUTTER on this agent's wife, a clearance is issued and LCFLUTTER results are satisfactorily resolved.

2. A new request for CSA for Subject's use in Mexico City was submitted to the Office of Security on 24 April 1958. When the Office of Security issued Subject's last CSA on 3 July 1957, they recommended that Subject be afforded a polygraph as soon as possible. Subject was given an LCFLUTTER a few days ago and although Subject ran clean the polygraph operator began getting some reaction, or hits, regarding the Subject's wife. There is some derogatory information in the Office of Security on what is believed to be the Subject's wife and sister-in-law.

3. The Office of Security has not reached a final decision regarding CSA and LCFLUTTER for Subject's wife. They have stated, however, that unless the wife can be cleared and LCFLUTTER results are clean, it is doubtful whether a new clearance would be issued for the career agent.

Date of Evaluation.....29 April 1958.....

Maurice S. Brady
CI/OA Reviewing Officer

Distribution:
1 - FI/Projects
1 - CI/OA Project file
1 - C 25507

....
Chief, CI/OA

S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 4/29/58	CASE NO. 25507

TO: Processing Section

PLEASE TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTION ON THE CASE SET FORTH ABOVE.
(Always check "Remarks" below for limitations or details)

SET UP FOR:
POA WITH:
☐ EXPEDITE INDICES FOR ☐ EXPEDITE FBI CHECK FOR

SET UP FOR:
☐ OA ☐ CSA ☐ PCSA ☐ PROP APP ☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY ☐ COVERT NAME CHECK

ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST RI TRACES
ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST OPERATIONAL & DIV. TRACES
INVESTIGATION STILL OUTSTANDING	REQUEST FIELD TRACES
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II
✓ FORWARD ~~ATTACHMENT~~ orig of TO SECURITY	REQUEST ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC INFO
NOTICE: ☐ 1ST ☐ 2ND ☐ 3RD & FINAL	REQUEST GREEN LIST
PREPARE CANCELLATION FORM	FURNISH GREEN LIST INFORMATION
SEND TO RI/ARCHIVES	REQUEST RESULTS OF TECH. INTERROGATION
✓ FILE copy attach memo.	SEND "QUERY" MEMO TO DIVISION
EXTEND POA FOR ____ DAYS UNTIL ____	OTHER (See Remarks)

REMARKS:

orig of WH/III memo forwarded to Security 24 April 1958. [initials]

[signature]
(SIGNATURE)

FORM NO. 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 FEB 56

SECRET (21)

14-00000

SECRET

17 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Office of Security

VIA : Chief, CI/OA

FROM : C/WHD

SUBJECT : Harold R. NOEMAYR (ps)
C-25507
#112565

It is requested that the CEA granted Harold R. NOEMAYR (ps), formerly called Arthur O. VAIVADA (ps), on 3 July 1957 for use in Cuba under Project AMPHODARCH, be amended to permit his use in Mexico City. NOEMAYR will be transferred PCS to Mexico City in May 1958 where he will be carried under Project LIFIXE which is being prepared for submission to FI/Projects for approval. Attached is a new PRQ Part II which covers our proposed use of NOEMAYR in Mexico.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

APR 23 3 27 PM '58

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

/PRQ/

PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER:

1. If feasible, subject should fill in Part I of PRQ in his own hand.
2. Part II of PRQ is classified, must be filled in by the Case Officer and is not to be shown to subject.
3. Headquarters will not be able to provide an Operational Clearance unless it receives answers to all questions on page 1 of Part I (items 1 to 12), and to all questions of Part II (items 35 to 58).
4. In emergency these answers, keyed to items 1 to 12 by number, and with summary of Part II, may be cabled to Headquarters, followed promptly by pouch with complete data.
5. Fully completed PRQ must be sent to Headquarters as soon as possible, two copies of Part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and one copy of Part II.
6. Data acquired later must be sent to Headquarters in PRQ format on a continuing basis.
7. All pages of both parts will bear the PRQ number, composed of (a) Station symbol (b) PRQ (c) number assigned consecutively by the field station; e.g. PGA/PRQ/10.

36. **Cryptonym** Harold R. NOEMAYER (p) - (formerly Arthur G. VAIVADA)

37. **How, when and where was subject first contacted or developed?**
Subject was first recruited in Panama as HYDROPATHIC in November 1948 and transferred to Costa Rica in approved HUMANOID project. Subsequently was transferred to BIRADIAL project, PBSUCCESS and in 1954 to AMPHODARCH project (Cuba) with which he is currently identified. His transfer to and activity in Mexico will be covered by Project LIEDGE.

38. **Could subject be turned over quickly and in a secure manner to someone else for handling?** Yes **To whom?** Record over the past years shows that subject has easily been turned over to different projects and case officers.

39. **Best estimate of subject's motivation**
Subject is motivated by his interest in intelligence work, desire to advance in the organization as a career, its remuneration and as loyal U. S. citizen.

FORM NO. 51-65B
MAY 1950

40. **With what agencies and files has subject's name been checked? When? Result? What else has been done to verify biographical information furnished by subject?**

Checked upon recruitment in Panama in 1949 and subsequently upon transfer to other projects.

41. **What control exists over subject at present? How can it be increased?**
Subject is controlled through dependence on salary, loyalty because of American heritage, past Army and Agency service, and a desire for a career in intelligence work.

42. **For what service does he think he is working? What does he think becomes of his information?**

KUBARK

43. **Explain fully subject's past or present connection with any intelligence service.**
While in the US Army and U.S.A.F. from 1940 - 1945 and again from 1946 - 1949, Subject was concerned with intelligence.

44. **What type of information has subject furnished? What type is he best qualified by education and experience to furnish? Give evaluation of information received.**

None except through agents which he handles.

45. **If subject's duties are to be other than intelligence gathering, explain.**

It is anticipated Subject will be an outside case officer for the Mexico City Station, handling Communist and Marxist party operations. Subject will also act as a spotter and recruiter.

46. **Has he been given special training as an agent? Explain.**

Subject received intelligence training by the Army. He was given covert training by KUBARK from 5 October through 25 November 1953, and again from 25 March 1957 through 7 May 1957. Additional training will be given him at Headquarters from 21 April through 23 May 1958.

47. **How and from whom does he obtain information?**

His principal function will be that of handling and spotting agents.

48. **Is it proposed to pay subject a regular salary? If so, amount per week, month, etc. Explain any other methods of payment, such as exchange commodities.**

As per his contract, Subject receives the regular salary of a GS-12, plus allowances, with provisions for normal step increases.

49. **Have any promises or commitments whatsoever (not covered elsewhere in this form) been made to subject? Explain.**

No. See contract signed by Subject as a Career Agent.

50. **Are subject's language abilities and other characteristics such that he could pass as a native of a country or region other than his own? Explain.**

He has native fluency in Spanish. For this reason he might pass as a long-time resident and possibly even as a national of certain Central American-Caribbean countries, although he has obvious foreign physical characteristics.

51. What is subject's social standing? Aristocracy, upper middle class, lower middle class, peasantry, etc.?

Middle class

52. What are subject's personal habits? Liquor, drugs, gambling, mistresses or lovers?

Believed to be normal in all respects.

53. Evaluation of subject's character, reliability, security.

All noted excellent

54. With what other foreign power would subject be most likely to collaborate because of his ideology, obligation, etc.? Explain.

None.

55. What special abilities, talents, or qualifications are possessed by subject which would conceivably be of value for other operations in the future?

Subject can send and receive morse code.

56. Attach samples of subject's signature and handwriting in all languages known to him, also a recent, dated photograph, and fingerprints.

Previously submitted.

57. How was information in Part I obtained?

From Subject personally.

58. Other miscellaneous operational data and comments.

Case officer

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

APPROVAL REQUEST

DATE: 11 April 1958

PROJECT:

TO : Deputy Director of Security
ATT. : Mr. Rice 2613 I bldg
FROM : Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT : C: C-25507
NO.: 112569

1. TYPE OF REQUEST: POA | OA | XX CSA | PROP. A. | CoC

2. METHOD OF HANDLING: EXPEDITE | ROUTINE

3. INDICES RESULTS REQUESTED BY

4. FBI CHECK REQUESTED
BY (Date)

5. AREA OF SUBJECT'S ASSIGNMENT
For briefing by CI/ICD and WH/III/Mexico representatives in safehouse.

6. USE OF SUBJECT

7. INVESTIGATION NOT TO REVEAL INTEREST OF: U. S. GOVERNMENT | CIA | SEE REMARKS

8. COVER SUGGESTED FOR INVESTIGATION: OFFICIAL | COMMERCIAL | OTHER:

9. RESULTS OF TRACES
FIELD TRACES
RI TRACES
GREEN LIST INITIATED: YES | NO

10. ATTACHMENTS: PRQ-PART I | OTHER: memo

12. REMARKS

[signature]

INITIALS

FORM NO. 693 1 JUN 58 REPLACES FORM 59-60 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(9)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 11 Apr 58	CASE NO. C-25507

TO: Processing Section

PLEASE TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTION ON THE CASE SET FORTH ABOVE.
(Always check "Remarks" below for limitations or details)

SET UP FOR:

POA WITH:

☐ EXPEDITE INDICES FOR ☐ EXPEDITE FBI CHECK FOR

SET UP FOR:

☐ OA ☑ CSA ☐ PCSA ☐ PROP APP ☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY ☐ COVERT NAME CHECK

ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST RI TRACES
ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST OPERATIONAL & DIV. TRACES
INVESTIGATION STILL OUTSTANDING	REQUEST FIELD TRACES
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY	REQUEST ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC INFO
NOTICE: ☐ 1ST ☐ 2ND ☐ 3RD & FINAL	REQUEST GREEN LIST
PREPARE CANCELLATION FORM	FURNISH GREEN LIST INFORMATION
SEND TO RI/ARCHIVES	REQUEST RESULTS OF TECH. INTERROGATION
FILE	SEND "QUERY" MEMO TO DIVISION
EXTEND POA FOR ____ DAYS UNTIL ____	✓ OTHER (See Remarks)

REMARKS:

Use: For briefing by CI/ICD and WH/III Mexico representatives in safehouse.

[signature]
(SIGNATURE)

FORM NO. 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. 1 FEB 58 SECRET (21)

14-00000

11 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, Safehouse Branch, Office of Logistics

THROUGH : Chief, Central Cover Branch, DD/P

REQUESTING OFFICE: WH/III/Mexico

CASE OFFICER : Louis D. Puckett, Ext. 2555, 3162

PROJECT : OCA, Mexico City Station Allotment No. 8-3570-83-599

REFERENCE : R 45-1025, 25 June 1956

Type of safehouse requested: Office

Location and Environment: Washington, D. C. - Business area

Maximum Price Range: $50/week

Occupancy from: 21 April 1958 To: 23 May 1958

Intended Use: Safehouse will be occupied by one (1) career agent and personnel from the CI Staff and WH/III/Mexico. The agent will live elsewhere, not in the safehouse. The agent is a U. S. citizen, 36 years old. Sensitive material will be in the safehouse during the day. None will be left overnight. A tape recorder for play back will be used there during the day and will be stored overnight.

Cover Arrangement: Subject is a U. S. citizen - his cover is that of employee of Public Surveys Institute, (a notional polling firm) in Dallas, Texas. During a recent operational trip he took photographs which have appeared in the New York Times and the New York Daily Mirror. He has in the past sold news stories and fiction. His family will live at Presidential Gardens Apartments, Alexandria, Virginia, during the agent's stay in the Washington area.

R. E. Dahlgren
Chief, WH/III

Funds are available:

I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE
OBLIGATION REFERENCE No. 733
CHARGE TO ALLOTMENT No. 8/3570-83-599

AUTHORIZING OFFICER

SECRET
CI/OA

COMMENTS:

A Meeting in Security office was held with the following present.

C. Rice — Security SSD
B. Pearson - Security SSD
C. Phelan - Polygraph group
M. Reynolds - WH Div
H. MacAuly - WH Div -
W. Odum - CI Staff

Purpose of the meeting to discuss polygraph program for subject

S.O. will work out details for WH and Subject will probably be brought to Miami for the poly-

Questions re Subject
1) I&R has a file on Subject
2) Question re wife

DATE: 9 Dec 1959 BY: [signature]

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/III - Willard Galbraith, Chief 15 Jul 57

FROM: CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT: CROZIER, Ross Lester

1. Your request dated 26 Feb 56 for approval to use the Subject has been processed by the Office of Security.

2. The results of this action are transmitted herewith.

Thomas Carroll, Jr.

Attachment:
so memo 3 Jul 57. ac

Distribution:
1 Addressee
1 File

MICROFILMED
DEC 6 1957

SECRET

FORM NO. 388 REPLACES FORM 38-46
JUN 55 WHICH IS OBSOLETE. (47)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 11 July 57	CASE NO. C-25507

TO: Processing Section

PLEASE TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTION ON THE CASE SET FORTH ABOVE.
(Always check "Remarks" below for limitations or details)

SET UP FOR:
POA WITH:
☐ EXPEDITE INDICES FOR ☐ EXPEDITE FBI CHECK FOR

SET UP FOR:
☐ OA ☐ CSA ☐ PCSA ☐ PROP APP ☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY ☐ COVERT NAME CHECK

	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RI TRACES
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST OPERATIONAL & DIV. TRACES
	INVESTIGATION STILL OUTSTANDING		REQUEST FIELD TRACES
✓	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION 1 Gy Death S.O. [illegible]		REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY		REQUEST ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC INFO
	NOTICE: ☐ 1ST ☐ 2ND ☐ 3RD & FINAL		REQUEST GREEN LIST
	PREPARE CANCELLATION FORM.		FURNISH GREEN LIST INFORMATION
	SEND TO RI/ARCHIVES		REQUEST RESULTS OF TECH. INTERROGATION
	FILE		SEND "QUERY" MEMO TO DIVISION
	EXTEND POA FOR ____ DAYS UNTIL ____	✓	OTHER (See Remarks)

REMARKS:

Send to Chief WH/III
(Eyes only)

[signature]
(SIGNATURE)

FORM NO. 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 FEB 56 (21)

SECRET

14-00000

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA

DATE: 3 JUL 1957

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT: C-25507
#112569

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 28 February 1957 wherein a covert security approval was requested to enable the Subject's conversion from contract agent to career agent status for use as principal agent for Project AMPHODARCH in Cuba under non-official cover. Reference is also made to our memorandum of 2 April 1957 in which a provisional covert security clearance was granted for the above use.

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in the Director's Memorandum of 14 February 1949 entitled, "Security and Operational Clearances," a covert security clearance is granted for the use of the Subject, as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1, above.

3. This clearance is contingent upon the following:

a. The receipt by this office of full overseas traces and such actual overseas investigation as is possible on Subject and on his wife and her family.

b. that Subject be afforded a polygraph interrogation as soon as possible and that the verbatum results be promptly furnished to this office. The Office of Security will be happy to assist in arranging this interrogation.

4. Subjects of covert security clearances are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

5. Your attention is called to the fact that a covert security clearance does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-210. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for clearance to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

SECRET

3 JUL 1957

6. This clearance becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within 60 days of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Fred Hall for
Robert H. Cunningham

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA

DATE: 3 JUL 1957

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT: C-25507 Crozier, Ross Lester
#112569

1. Concurrent with this memorandum a covert security clearance is being issued to enable the Subject's conversion from contract agent to career agent for use as principal agent for Project AMPHGMARCH in Cuba under non-official cover.

2. This is to advise that information has been received from a confidential source of the Office of Security concerning Argentina CORDERO Calderon and her sister, Counsuelo, who are believed to be the Subject's wife and sister-in-law respectively. According to a December 1944 report, the above individuals were described as Costa Rican citizens then in Panama under suspicion and members of the Russian Ballet team of Pedro and Lidia CHUPRINE. Argentina is known to speak and understand German. She was formerly married to Pedro MARZAL, reportedly a German national and formerly on both British and U. S. Proclaimed List. She is reliably reported to have made pro-German remarks and is pro-German in her sympathies. It was further reported that both of the above individuals have at times attempted to secure information from members of the American Armed Forces.

3. In view of the above information, it is requested that current overseas traces and investigation be conducted on the Subject as well as on his wife and sister-in-law, Counsuelo, and other members of his wife's immediate family and that the results thereof be furnished this office.

4. The covert security clearance which is being issued in this case is made contingent upon the faovrable results of the requested overseas traces and investigation.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Robert H. Cunningham

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1[illegible] April 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/III/Cuba/McAuley

FROM: CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT: CROZIER, Ross Lester

1. Your request dated 20 February 1957 for approval to use the Subject has been processed by the Office of Security.

2. The results of this action are transmitted herewith.

Attachment:

so memo 2 April 1957/par

Distribution:
1 Addressee
1 File

Thomas Carroll, Jr.

SECRET

FORM NO. 388 REPLACES FORM 59-46
1 JUN 55 WHICH IS OBSOLETE. (47)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA

DATE: 2 APR 1957

FROM : Acting Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT: C-25507
#112569

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 28 February 1957, wherein a provisional covert security approval and a covert security approval were requested to enable the Subject's conversion to career agent status for use as Principal Agent for Project AMPHODARCH in Cuba, under non-official cover.

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in Clandestine Services Instruction No. 10-5 and Field Regulation 10-215, a provisional covert security approval is granted for the use of the Subject, as described in your request as set forth in paragraph #1, above.

3. It should be noted that the provisional covert security approval herein granted is based on limited investigative coverage and should not be in any way construed as a final security determination relative to a full covert security approval. Upon completion of additional investigation now pending, you will be appropriately advised as to our decision with regard to the issuance of a full covert security approval.

4. Subjects of provisional covert security approvals are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

5. Your attention is called to the fact that a provisional covert security approval does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-210. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for approval to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

6. This approval becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within 60 days of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Fred H. Hall
Fred H. Hall

SECRET

8 March 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Office of Security

VIA: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA (sp.)
C-25507

1. Reference is made to OS's verbal request of 7 March 1957, for additional information on Subject in connection with our request for a Provisional Covert Security Approval dated 26 February 1957.

2. Subject was born in De Kalb, Illinois, on 20 June 1922. He received his primary and high school education in De Kalb and entered the U. S. Army in 1940, later transferring to the U. S. Air Force. He served as an operations and intelligence specialist, first in the China-Burma theater and later in Panama. He was discharged from the service in 1945 with the grade of Technical Sergeant. After his discharge, he worked for a brief period as a laboratory technician in the Sterling (Illinois) Silica-Gel Corporation and then returned to the Panama Canal Zone to marry a Costa Rican girl in December 1945. For about four months he worked as a stevedore and labor foreman in the Canal Zone. In April 1946 he re-enlisted in the Air Force in the Canal Zone and was discharged three years later, in 1949.

3. Late in 1948 he was recruited by the Agency, and on 1 June 1949 became a CIA contract agent. Since that date, he has served as a contract agent with continuing high level performance, first in Costa Rica, later in Guatemala and Cuba. He is currently assigned to Cuba where he is utilized as Principal Agent of Project AMPHODARCH. Subject has worked principally and successfully so, on Communist Party penetration operations since his engagement with CIA, and his current work involves the handling of a net of agents providing coverage of Communist, leftist, revolutionary and other political activities at the University of Habana, and the student-youth circles in general in Cuba.

4. Subject has always proven to be loyal and trustworthy. In view of his outstanding record and strong overall qualifications, and his expressed desire for a career with CIA, it has been recommended he be converted from contract to career agent status. He was promoted recently to the equivalent of a GS-10 rating.

SO
3/18/57

SECRET

5. Subject's spouse, a Costa Rican citizen, has expressed desire to acquire U. S. citizenship, and has now made the necessary arrangements to accompany her husband to the U. S. for this purpose, when Subject returns for Covert training at Headquarters in the very near future.

6. Covert Security Approval, with an expedite Provisional Covert Security Approval, has been requested in connection with the recommendation to convert Subject from contract to staff status.

J. C. KING
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND (OR) NAME CHECK

DATE: 28 February 1957

TO : Deputy Director of Security
ATT: Mr. Rice 2613 I

FROM : Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

PROJECT:

PCSA requested by 15 March 1957.

SUBJECT : C C-25507
NO. #112569

1. TYPE OF REQUEST: PCSA & — POA | OA | X CSA | PROP. A. | CHC

2. METHOD OF HANDLING: EXPEDITE | ROUTINE

3. INDICES RESULTS REQUESTED BY

4. FBI CHECK REQUESTED — BY (Date)

5. AREA OF SUBJECT'S ASSIGNMENT
(WH/III/Cuba)

6. USE OF SUBJECT
see remarks

7. INVESTIGATION NOT TO REVEAL INTEREST OF: U. S. GOVERNMENT | CIA | SEE REMARKS

8. COVER SUGGESTED FOR INVESTIGATION: OFFICIAL | COMMERCIAL | OTHER:

9. RESULTS OF TRACES

FIELD TRACES
NDI

RI TRACES
NDI

GREEN LIST INITIATED: YES | NO

10. ATTACHMENTS: PRQ-PART I | X OTHER: PHS

12. REMARKS

6. Subject has served CIA in a contract capacity since 1949, with a continuous high level of performance. He is currently assigned to Cuba, where he is being utilized a the Principal Agent for Project AMPHODARCH. Project AMPHODARCH is an FI operation designed to provide information on political activities (including Communist) in university circles in Havana, Cuba. In view of his outstanding record and strong overall qualifications, and his expressed desire for a career with CIA, it has been recommended he be converted from contract to career agent status.

Thomas Carroll, Jr.
lms INITIALS

FORM NO. 693 1 APR 56 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (9)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE: 27 Feb. '57

CASE NO. 25507

TO: Processing Section

PLEASE TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTION ON THE CASE SET FORTH ABOVE.
(Always check "Remarks" below for limitations or details)

SET UP FOR:

POA WITH:

☐ EXPEDITE INDICES FOR ☐ EXPEDITE FBI CHECK FOR

SET UP FOR:

☐ OA ☐ CSA ☐ PCSA ☐ PROP APP ☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY ☐ COVERT NAME CHECK

	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RI TRACES
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST OPERATIONAL & DIV. TRACES
	INVESTIGATION STILL OUTSTANDING		REQUEST FIELD TRACES
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II
✓	FORWARD ~~ATTACHMENT~~ TO SECURITY originals PHS ~~+ 973~~ DDE: 27 Feb. '57		REQUEST ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC INFO
	NOTICE: ☐ 1ST ☐ 2ND ☐ 3RD & FINAL		REQUEST GREEN LIST
	PREPARE CANCELLATION FORM		FURNISH GREEN LIST INFORMATION
	SEND TO RI/ARCHIVES		REQUEST RESULTS OF TECH. INTERROGATION
~~✓~~	~~FILE carbon copies of PHS + 972~~		SEND "QUERY" MEMO TO DIVISION
	EXTEND POA FOR ____ DAYS UNTIL ____ DDE 27 Feb. '57		OTHER (See Remarks)

REMARKS:

~~Proc. Branch~~

~~[illegible]~~

BRM
(SIGNATURE)

FORM NO. 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 FEB 56

SECRET

(21)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL

DATE: 26 February 1957

PROJECT:

TO: CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

FROM: (Division) WH/III/CUBA

SUBJECT

TRUE NAME: Ross Lester CORZIER

CRYPTONYM OR PSEUDONYM: Arthur G. VAIVADA

CI/OA FILE NO.: C-25507

SO FILE NO.:

TYPE OF AGENT OR EMPLOYEE:

USE OF AGENT OR EMPLOYEE (Full details)

Subject has served CIA in a contract capacity since 1949, with a continuous high level of performance. He is currently assigned to Cuba, where he is being utilized as the Principal Agent for Project AMPHODARCH. Project AMPHODARCH is an FI operation designed to provide information on political activities (including Communist) in university circles in Havana, Cuba. In view of his outstanding record and strong overall qualifications, and his expressed desire for a career with CIA, it has been recommended he be converted from contract to career agent status.

TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

	PROVISIONAL APPROVAL	X	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL 15 March
	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	X	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL
	GOVERNMENT NAME CHECK		PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO field investigation)		OTHER:

PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

X	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IS ATTACHED IN TWO COPIES		PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN RECEIVED
X	PRQ II IS ATTACHED, IF OBTAINABLE		GREEN LIST CHECK HAS BEEN INITIATED

FIELD TRACES

X	REVEAL NO INFORMATION OF VALUE		WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN RECEIVED
	REVEAL INFORMATION AS ATTACHED		NOT INITIATED. NOT EXPECTED TO POSSESS RELEVANT INFO.

SUGGESTED INVESTIGATIVE COVER

	GOVERNMENT		ACADEMIC
	COMMERCIAL		OTHER:

RI TRACES				DIVISION TRACES			
X	RECORD (Not derogatory)		NO RECORD	X	RECORD (Not derogatory)		NO RECORD

INDICATE SPECIAL LIMITATIONS ON INVESTIGATION OR SPECIAL COVERAGE DESIRED

SUBJECT					
	IS	X	AWARE		UNAWARE OF CIA INTEREST
			AWARE		UNAWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST
			AWARE		UNAWARE OF IMPENDING INVESTIGATION
	HAS		BEEN		NOT BEEN BRIEFED ON A "COVER STORY"

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
Hugh J. MacAuley	2056 1021 Barton	W. Galbraith

SECRET

FORM NO. 772
1 SEP 55

(9)

14-00000

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "NA." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? Yes (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

A. FULL NAME (Use No Initials) ~~Mr.~~ Miss Mrs. Ross (First) Lester (Middle) Crozier (Last)

Telephone None; Office; Ext. None; Home

PRESENT ADDRESS 5th Street 655, Havana (Vedado) Cuba (Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS San Juan Tibas, San Jose, Costa Rica (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

B. NICKNAME None WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? None

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? NA

HOW LONG? NA IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS NA

NA NA

C. DATE OF BIRTH 20 June 1922 PLACE OF BIRTH DeKalb, Illinois USA (City) (State) (Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP US (Country) BY BIRTH? Yes BY MARRIAGE? NA

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO. NA ISSUED NA (Date) BY NA (Court)

AT NA (City) (State) (Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? No (Yes or No) NA (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? NA TO NA ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS NA

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? NA GIVE PARTICULARS: NA

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? NA

PORT OF ENTRY? NA ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? NA

LAST U. S. VISA NA (Number) (Type) (Place of Issue) (Date of Issue)

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 34 SEX M HEIGHT 6'2" WEIGHT 175

EYES Blue HAIR Brown COMPLEXION Ruddy SCARS None

BUILD Slender OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES Nose broken-to left

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE No MARRIED Yes DIVORCED No WIDOWED No

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

NA

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE—INCLUDING ANNULMENTS—USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE Argentina de los Angeles Cordero de Crozier (First) (Middle) (Maiden) (Last)

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE 17 Dec. 1945, Cristobal, Canal Zone

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE San Jose, Costa Rica (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 5th St., No. 655 Vedado, Habana, Cuba (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 15/3/18 PLACE OF BIRTH San Jose, Costa Rica (City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP Costa Rican WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? San Jose, C.R. (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Housewife LAST EMPLOYER None

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM NA (Date) TO NA (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE NA

COUNTRY NA DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

NA

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents):

1. NAME Ross Arnulfo Crozier RELATIONSHIP Son AGE 6½

CITIZENSHIP US ADDRESS 5th St., No. 655, Habana, Cuba
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

2. NAME Lillian Caridad Crozier RELATIONSHIP Daughter AGE 4½

CITIZENSHIP US ADDRESS 5th St., No. 655, Habana, Cuba
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

3. NAME NA RELATIONSHIP NA AGE

CITIZENSHIP NA ADDRESS
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Lester (First) Earl (Middle) Crozier (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS RR No. 1 (St. and Number) Tampico (City) Illinois (State) USA (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH Mar. 15 1900 PLACE OF BIRTH Palestine (City) Illinois (State) USA (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP US WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? above
(City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Truckdriver LAST EMPLOYER Self-employed

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS RR No. 1 (St. and Number) Tampico (City) Illinois (State) USA (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM 1917 (Date) TO 1919 (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE US Army

Theatre: France-Belgium DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

NA

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Elizabeth (First) Lorene (Middle) McKibben (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS RR No. 1 (St. and Number) Tampico (City) Illinois (State) USA (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH Sept. 1903 PLACE OF BIRTH La Moille, (City) Illinois (State) USA (Country)

CITIZENSHIP US WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? above
(City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

OCCUPATION Housewife LAST EMPLOYER Unknown

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS Unknown (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM NA TO NA BRANCH OF SERVICE NA

COUNTRY NA DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

None

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters):

1. FULL NAME James (First) Earl (Middle) Crozier (Last) AGE 27
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) Tampico, (City) Illinois (State) USA (Country) US (Citizenship)
2. FULL NAME Irma (First) Lilly (Middle) Crozier (Last) AGE 32
   PRESENT ADDRESS RR No. 1 (St. and Number) Tampico, (City) Illinois (State) USA (Country) US (Citizenship)
3. FULL NAME Blanche (First) Elaine (Middle) Crozier (Last) AGE 30
   PRESENT ADDRESS 1900 Canal St., (St. and Number) Rock Falls, (City) Illinois (State) USA (Country) US (Citizenship)
4. FULL NAME Norris (First) Edwin (Middle) Crozier (Last) AGE 24
   PRESENT ADDRESS 804½ 1st Ave., (St. and Number) Sterling, (City) Illinois (State) USA (Country) US (Citizenship)
5. FULL NAME NA (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Alberto (First) (Middle) Cordero Loizia (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Dec. DATE OF DECEASE Oct. 26, '43 CAUSE Cerebral Hem.

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS (St. and Number) San Jose, (City) Costa Rica (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 1894 PLACE OF BIRTH San Jose, Costa Rica

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

NA

CITIZENSHIP Costa Rican WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? Above (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Musician LAST EMPLOYER Unknown

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Dora (First) (Middle) Cordero Calderon (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS San Juan Tibas, San Jose, Costa Rica (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH Sept. 7, 1893 PLACE OF BIRTH San Jose, Costa Rica

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP Costa Rican WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? Above (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Housewife LAST EMPLOYER Unknown

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. NAME Norma Cordero de Gregor RELATIONSHIP sister-in-law AGE 24
   CITIZENSHIP Costa Rican ADDRESS Box 2655, Cristobal, C. Z. (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
2. NAME Isabel Cordero de Naranjo RELATIONSHIP sister-in-law AGE 27
   CITIZENSHIP Costa Rican ADDRESS Plaza Viquez, San Jose, Costa Rica (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
3. NAME Consuelo Cordero Calderon RELATIONSHIP sister-in-law AGE 29
   CITIZENSHIP Costa Rican ADDRESS San Juan Tibas, San Jose, Costa Rica (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U. S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT: NONE

1. NAME NA RELATIONSHIP NA AGE NA
   CITIZENSHIP NA ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) NA
2. NAME NA RELATIONSHIP NA AGE NA
   CITIZENSHIP NA ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) NA
3. NAME NA RELATIONSHIP NA AGE NA
   CITIZENSHIP NA ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) NA

SEC. 12. POSITION DATA

A. KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR: NA

B. WHAT IS THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ NA
(You Will Not Be Considered For Any Position With A Lower Entrance Salary.)

C. IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY: OCCASIONALLY Yes and also
FREQUENTLY when necessary., CONSTANTLY No

D. CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED: IN WASHINGTON, D. C. Yes
ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES Yes, OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES Yes

E. IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, SPECIFY LOCATIONS:
Preference for Latin America and Spain

SEC. 13. EDUCATION

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL Elwood ADDRESS DeKalb, Illinois, USA (City) (State) (Country)
DATES ATTENDED 1926-1934 GRADUATE? Yes

HIGH SCHOOL DeKalb Township ADDRESS DeKalb, Illinois USA (City) (State) (Country)
DATES ATTENDED 1935-1939 GRADUATE? Yes

COLLEGE University of Costa Rica ADDRESS San Jose, Costa Rica (City) (State) (Country)
MAJOR AND SPECIALTY Economics Economic Theory YEARS COMPLETED four
DATES ATTENDED 1949-1953 DEGREE Not yet

COLLEGE Univ. of San Carlos ADDRESS Guatemala City, Guatemala (City) (State) (Country)
MAJOR AND SPECIALTY Economics YEARS COMPLETED studies interrupted.
DATES ATTENDED 1954 Jan-May 1 DEGREE No

University of Habana—one year, 1954-55, Habana, Cuba
CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS
Political Economy, Principles of Administration, Sociology, General Mathematics, Economic History, Psychology, Statistics, Financial Math, Economic Doctrines, Labor Law, Credit-Money & Banking, Public Treasury,
~~CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS~~ Prices, Public Administration, Advanced Algebra, Biodemographic Statistics, Accounting I, Theory of Occupation (Employment) and Labor Unions and Coops.

SEC. 14. ACTIVE U. S. OR FOREIGN MILITARY SERVICE

(Country) (Service) (Rank) (Dates of Service)

Albrook Field, C. Z. (Last Station) 16001390 (Serial Number) Honorable (Type of Discharge)

REMARKS: None

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER None ADDRESS NA

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON NA

INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS None

SEC. 15. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST. (List all civilian employment by a foreign government, regardless of dates.)

FROM 1940 TO 1945 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) T/Sgt.

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY USA, USAF

ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS NA NAME OF SUPERVISOR NA

TITLE OF JOB NA SALARY $ NA PER NA

YOUR DUTIES Intelligence NCO—Assists in collection, evaluation, interpretation and distribution of information of enemy and counterintelligence activities and the safeguarding of military information.

REASONS FOR LEAVING ETS and termination of WW II.

FROM Jan 45-Aprl 46 TO CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) unknown

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY United States Naval Air Station

ADDRESS Coco Solo, Canal Zone (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Supply Station NAME OF SUPERVISOR Unknown

TITLE OF JOB Leadingman Labor SALARY $ 12.88 PER day

YOUR DUTIES Loading and unloading naval supply ships with native labor maintaining existent stocks in order, handling salvage and/or destruction of equipment.

REASONS FOR LEAVING Resigned to re-enlist in the USAF

(8)

FROM April 18, 1946 Apr. 18, 1949 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) T/Sgt.

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY USAF

ADDRESS Albrook Field, Canal Zone (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS NA NAME OF SUPERVISOR NA

TITLE OF JOB Intelligence NCO SALARY $ NA PER NA

YOUR DUTIES Chief of Section, Political Analysis, Caribbean Air Command. Organize and maintain files, study and prepare timely political analysis of Caribbean and South American republics.

REASONS FOR LEAVING ETS and to study Political Economy at the University of Costa Rica.

FROM Apr. 18, 1949 TO Mar. 1953 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) NA

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Free-lance photography and student.

ADDRESS San Jose, Costa Rica (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS part-time Photo. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Self-employed

TITLE OF JOB none SALARY $ Variable PER

YOUR DUTIES NA

REASONS FOR LEAVING Employed by following agency.....

FROM March 1953 TO June 1953 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) unknown

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Section of Geology, Ministry Agriculture, Costa Rican Government.

ADDRESS San Jose, Costa Rica (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS NA NAME OF SUPERVISOR Dr. Cesar Dondoli

TITLE OF JOB Photographer SALARY $ part time PER

YOUR DUTIES Design and direct a photographic laboratory for technical work in geology, both for the Costa Rican Government and the University of Costa Rica.

REASONS FOR LEAVING Termination of work—a temporary position

SEC. 16. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS:

No

SEC. 17. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT," "FAIR," OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE
English	Fluent	Fluent	Fluent
Spanish	Fluent	Fluent	Fair

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU: INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH:

Fishing, fresh water and sea. Sailboating, Hunting, Archery. Football in HS and USAF. Track, HS and USAF; High jump, broad jump and Discus; National record in Guatemala 1954 in Discus. Pistol (Expert). Chess. Jungle lore. Photography—freelance and commercial.

C. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION?

Particular position, no. In general, my study and experience has been almost entirely in Latin American areas, in their universities and government. In military service, I would naturally qualify for a position in political-economic intelligence. In civil service, this must be convertible to one or more departments, of which I have no knowledge as to particular positions. [illegible] any position that entails political-economic analysis in Latin American areas.

D. ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE, SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT-WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES:

Some experience in radio; send and receive 15-20 wpm Morse International, key and blinker. Operated motion picture projectors—Simplex 35mm and about all 16mm makes. Photo reproduction equipment, including laboratory microphotography.

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING 40 SHORTHAND No

E. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION, SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, ETC. NO

IF YES, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE NA

FIRST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR) NA LATEST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR) NA

F. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS:
(1) YOUR MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (DO NOT SUBMIT COPIES UNLESS REQUESTED)
(2) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(3) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(4) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

(1) All written work in political-economy was classified.

(2) None

(3) None

(4) None

G. HAVE YOU A PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? IF ANSWER IS "YES," EXPLAIN:

None

H. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS:

None

SEC. 18. GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES—IN THE U. S.—WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

	Name		Street and Number	City	State
1.	W/O Francis Williams	BUS. ADD.	Wright-Patterson AFB,	Dayton,	Ohio
		RES. ADD.	584 Access Rd.,	Dayton	Ohio
2.	Howard Mck Cowse	BUS. ADD.	Prospect at Little Neck Rd., Box 245		
		RES. ADD.	Centerport, LI, N. Y.		
3.	Donald Page	BUS. ADD.	Elgin Watch Co.,	Elgin,	Illinois
		RES. ADD.	525 S. Edison	Elgin	Illinois
4.	Col. C. J. Stattler	BUS. ADD.	Pentagon Bldg.		
		RES. ADD.	4550 Conn. Ave.,	Washington 8,	D. C.
5.	Edward A. Marelius	BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.	3333 Toronto St.,	Falls Church,	Va.

SEC. 19. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES—NOT REFERENCES, RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS, OR EMPLOYERS—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

	Name		Street and Number	City	State
1.	Wilford A. Pyle	BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.	12119 S. Hastings Dr.,	Norwalk,	Cal.
2.	Tom Oakland	BUS. ADD.	Hopewell Junction,		New York
		RES. ADD.			
3.	Milo Edwards	BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.	Box 63	Kingston	Illinois
4.	Joseph Perkovich	BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.	532 Grove St.	DeKalb	Illinois
5.	Guy Shifflet	BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.	RFD No. 3	Staunton	Va.

SEC. 20. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U. S.—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

	Name		Street and Number	City	State
1.	Helen Buchanan	BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.	3008 7th St.,	NW, Washington 11,	D.C.
2.	Maria Fama	BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.	3010 7th St.,	NW, Washington 11,	D.C.
3.	Others not recalled.	BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			

SEC. 21. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? Yes IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME NA

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS National City Bank of NY, Branch — Av. 23, No. 152, Havana, Cuba

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? No

GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT: NA

D. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES—IN THE U. S. All credit references are foreign since I have not lived in the US since 1940.

1. NAME ______ ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State)

2. NAME NA ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State)

3. NAME NA ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State)

SEC. 22. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

FROM	TO	(St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
Nov. 1955	Present	Calle 5 No. 655 Vedado Habana, Cuba
Apr. 1955	Nov. 1955	Calle 11 No. 1013 Vedado Habana, Cuba
Nov. 1954	Apr. 1955	Calle 16, No. 511 Vedado Habana, Cuba
Aug. 1954	Nov. 1954	Calle 3, No. 6A, Miramar, Habana, Cuba
May 1954	Aug. 1954	San Juan Tibas, San Jose, Costa Rica
Jan. 1954	May 1954	7th Ave. N. 9-04, Jocotanango, Guat. City.
Jul. 1953	Jan. 1954	5008 7th St. NW, Washington 11, D. C.
Apr. 1949	Jul. 1953	San Juan Tibas, San Jose, Costa Rica

(All prior residence was military service—back to 1940.)

SEC. 23. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

	FROM	TO	(City or section)	(Country)	(Purpose)
A.	Aug 40	Nov 41	Fort Bragg, N. C.		60th Field Art.
	Dec 41	Mar 44	Canal Zone, Panama		USAF
	Nov 44	June 45	India-Burma-China theatre.		USAF
	Dec 45	Apr 49	Albrook Field, C. Z.		USAF
	Apr 49	July 53	San Jose, Costa Rica		Student

SEC. 24. CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS
LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

1. Club Universitario, Av 3ra, Miramar, Habana, Cuba
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1954-55 academic year

2. Club Nautico de Marianao (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) Habana (City) Cuba (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: January 1956—current

3. NA (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

4. ______ NA
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______

5. ______ NA
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______

6. ______ NA
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______

7. ______ NA
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______

SEC. 25. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED, ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES? ______ NO

IF "YES," EXPLAIN: ______ NA

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? ______ Yes **IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT?** ______ Social - moderate

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE:

No

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

No

E. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1940:

None

F. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

Investigation (Loyalty check for security) in USAF 1944.

Again for USAF in 1946.

SEC. 26. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME Mrs. Argentina Crozier RELATIONSHIP Wife

ADDRESS Calle 5 No 655 Vedado, Habana, Cuba
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 27. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

No.

SEC. 28. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT Habana, Cuba DATE 24 July 1956
(City and State)

ROSS L. CROZIER

(Witness) (Signature of Applicant)

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—

Section 15 (Cont)

From June 53 to Dec. 53

Student. University of ____________, Washington, D. C.

Reasons for leaving: Termination of course.

From Jan 54 to May 54.

Student. University of San Carlos, Guatemala City, Guat.

Reasons for leaving: political disturbances.

From Jul 54 to present.

Student. University of Habana, School of Economic Sciences.

Section 23 (Cont)

From Jan 54 to May 54. Guatemala City, Guatemala. Student

From July 54 to present. Habana, Cuba Student.

S/ Ross L. Crozier

14-00000

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH

ATTENTION: Chief, WH/III

SUBJECT: Covert Training Request for Arthur G. VAIVADA

REFERENCE: Project AMPHODARCH

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 4 December 1956 requesting covert training for Arthur G. VAIVADA.

2. The CI Staff approves the training request subject to the comments and recommendations set forth in the attached memorandum prepared by CI/ICD under date of 20 December 1956.

James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

Attachment:
C/CI/ICD memo dtd 20 Dec. 56 - Subject; Comments and Recommendations on Proposed Covert Training of Arthur G. VAIVADA

CI/OA/JRBurton:re (27/12/56)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - PI/Training
1 - D/Training
1 - C/CI
1 - CI/R&A
2 - CI/OA

SECRET

SECRET

Date: **13 December 1956**

MEMORANDUM FOR: **CI/R&A**
CI/OPS

SUBJECT: **Request for Covert Training**
Project: AMPHODARCH (FI)
Pseudonym: Arthur G. VAIVADA

1. Attached are separate comments sheets for each CI Division listed above. Any comments you may have after reviewing the attached request for training, which was submitted by **WH/III/Cuba**, should be recorded on the comment sheet provided.

2. When you have indicated your comments on the sheet provided, send this by hand to the next person on the routing sheet.

3. Your comments will be consolidated into a memorandum to the **WH** Division over the signature of the Chief, CI Staff. This memorandum will be prepared by CI/OA. When this consolidated memorandum omits or contradicts one of your comments, CI/OA will so inform you.

4. If you feel that this request should receive further coordination within CI Staff, simply add the person's name or symbol to the routing sheet and forward, by hand. Routing outside of CI Staff can only be made by CI/OA.

Thomas Carroll Jr.
THOMAS CARROLL, JR.
Chief, CI/OA

Attachments:

C/RHA

Re: AMPHODARCH/Arthur G. VAIVADA

CI Staff notes that training for VAIVADA is scheduled to commence on the same date in the same city as the training scheduled for Colonel PEREZ and Lt. CASTANO of the Cuban BRAC. This situation seems inherently dangerous and unwarranted by the circumstances as known to CI Staff. Pending further justification CI Staff cannot concur in the training as requested, but would of course concur in the training for VAIVADA if the locale were shifted to another city such as New York.

(This is basically an operational or an operational security matter. CI/R&A/TRB therefore urges that CI/OPS/WH and CI/OA discuss the problem with the desk, and resolve it if possible. CI/R&A/TRB will of course defer to CI/OPS AND CI/OA in this matter.)

DATE: 14 Dec. 56 BY: [signature]

14-00000

COMMENTS:

C/I/OPS

CI/OPS/WH does not concur with the CI/R & A recommendations as set forth for the following reasons:

1. The security compromise would only stem from the two BRAC officers identifying the VAIVADA affiliation and training on behalf of this Agency. This appears extremely remote as the desk advised there is no indication that the BRAC officers know VAIVADA either by name or sight.

2. While VAIVADA is being trained, his wife will be attending citizenship classes in D.C. preparing for her citizenship examination before returning to Cuba. Consequently, it would be a financial drain for VAIVADA to stay in New York City and his wife in D.C. In addition, certain per diem costs would be incurred by the Case Officer traveling to New York City to monitor some of the OTR training.

3. The desk will instruct OTR of this joint training aspect and as a precautionary measure, request that training sites, hours, etc. do not overlap.

DATE: 1 Dec 1976 Robert L. Brown

CI/OA

AN OPERATIONAL APPROVAL WAS ISSUED FOR ARTHUR G. VAIVADA ON 19 JULY 1949; A NEW OPERATIONAL APPROVAL WAS ISSUED ON 22 JULY 1954. CI/OA CONCURS IN THE APPROVAL OF THE WH DIVISION TRAINING REQUEST DATED 4 DEC 1956.

DATE: 27 DEC. 56 BY: James R. Burton

SECRET

SECRET

20 December 1956

TO : C/CI/OA

FROM : C/CI/ICD

SUBJECT: : Comments and Recommendations on Proposed Covert Training of Arthur G. VAIVADA

REFERENCE: Covert Training Request for Arthur G. VAIVADA of 4 December 1956

1. Arthur G. VAIVADA has worked principally, and successfully so, on CP penetration operations since employment by the Agency. His current work involves the handling of a net of CP penetration agents and informants. ICD concurs in general with the projected training scheduled for subject but recommends that considerable emphasis specifically be placed on anti-CP penetration operations (i.e., principles and practices of penetration of the international Communist movement).

2. In addition, subject should also be given materials and briefings on Communism in his area of operations. It is suggested that he be given the following materials to study and discuss during the phase of training recommended above: "The Operational Pattern of International Communism in Latin America" (a paper prepared by CI/ICD) and "The Communist Movement of Cuba" (a paper prepared by Miss Anne Kendall). These materials may be borrowed either from CI/ICD/WH (Hein) or from WH/III/Cuba (Roland).

3. Should OTR contemplate presenting <u>in any form</u> any of the CP penetration case studies contained in FHB 52-865-4 ("The CP Penetration Program" - Issue No. 4) to subject during the training sessions, CI/ICD (Hein - extension 3919) should be consulted. Some of the material in FHB 52-865-4 directly concerns VAIVADA's previous operational work.

CI/ICD/GHein:gmh
(20 December 1956)

Distribution: Original & 1 - addressee
1 - Hein
1 - Chrono
1 - ICD/WH

SECRET

4 December 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

ATTENTION : Assistant Chief for Covert Training, OS/TR

FROM : Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : Request for Covert Training

Project: AMPHODARCH (FI)
Pseudonym: Arthur G. VAIVADA

1. Request initiated by WH/III/Cuba

2. Project Approval - Agent Clearance

a. Project AMPHODARCH last approved for renewal on 5 October 1956.

b. P/A VAIVADA has operational clearance dated 19 July 1949.

3. Agent Status

Contract (contemplate change to staff status in near future).

4. Agent Nationality

United States citizen (by birth).

5. Operations Officer

James B. Noland, known to student by true name. Office: 1021 Barton Hall, Extension 2056.

Alternate Operations Officer

Hugh O. MacAuley, known to student by true name. Office: 1021 Barton Hall, Extension 2056.

6. Training Date

Training to commence on 14 January for period of approximately six weeks.

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SECRET

7. Biographic Information

Subject was born in De Kalb, Illinois, on 20 June 1922. He received his primary and high school education in De Kalb and entered the U.S. Army in 1940, later transferring to the U.S. Air Force. He served as an operations and intelligence specialist, first in the China-Burma theatre and later in Panama. He was discharged from the service in 1945 with the grade of Technical Sergeant. After his discharge he worked for a brief period as a laboratory technician in the Sterling (Illinois) Silica-Gel corporation and then returned to the Panama Canal Zone to marry Argentina CORDERO C., a Costa Rican girl, in December 1945. For about four months he worked as a stevedore and labor foreman in the Canal Zone. In April 1946 he reenlisted in the Air Force in the Canal Zone and was discharged three years later, in 1949.

Late in 1948 he had been recruited by the Agency, and on 1 June 1949 he became a CIA contract agent. It was originally planned that he be used in Panama, but he was assigned instead to the HUMANOID Project in Costa Rica. While there, he successfully handled a high-level penetration of the Communist Party. In 1953 he was sent to Headquarters for training, and in 1954 he was assigned to PBSUCCESS for a brief period. In July 1954 he signed a new contract in Washington whereby he became the new principal agent of Project AMPHODARCH. He has been under student cover and has worked for his B.A. degree at the University of Habana.

Subject is happily married and is the father of two children. He is fluent in Spanish and is well qualified to continue work in his area of operations as shown by his past performance. He is also very versatile and has a wide range of outside interests, including sports, photography, outdoor life, and many others.

8. Previous Training

VAIVADA previously received covert training at Headquarters during the period 5 October through 25 November 1953, under the training alias of "VICKS." The training was of a comprehensive nature.

9. Project Objective - Area of Assignment

Objective of Project AMPHODARCH is to provide coverage of Communist, leftist, revolutionary and other political activities at the University of Habana, and the student-youth circles in general in Cuba.

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14-00000

10. Cover - Operational Duties

VAIVADA's present cover consists of being a graduate student at the University of Habana. Efforts are currently underway to obtain a new cover as representative in Habana of a well-known U.S. polling agency. Subject's duties are those of a P/A handling a rather large net of sub-agent informants in Cuban University-youth circles with emphasis on Communist and revolutionary matters. He reports directly to the Habana Station.

11. Training Cover

Consultation in connection with proposed new polling cover (see above) combined with vacation and acquisition of citizenship for wife (would explain time spent in Washington).

12. Availability for Training

Student will be available for training on a full-time basis.

13. Special Problems

No particular problems anticipated.

14. Subjects to be Covered

Refresher course in Clandestine Intelligence Operations.

15. Technical Training Requirements

Only those falling within prescribed Operations Course, if any.

16. Visits to Overt CIA Installations

None, past or present.

17. Special Attributes to be Evaluated

General suitability only. Subject's performance has been outstanding.

J. C. KING
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Approval ______

Senior Staff Training Officer

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : FI/STC/SPB DATE: 15 OCT 1954

FROM : Chief, Special Security Division

SUBJECT: C-25507
#112569

1. Reference is made to your request dated 21 July 1954 for a recommendation as to whether an Operational Clearance should be granted to permit the Subject's use as an Agent in Costa Rica under unindicated cover.

2. The attached information is furnished as an aid in determining whether or not the Subject should be used in the requested capacity.

3. In view of the fact that Subject has resided outside the United States since, at least, 1945 no field investigation was scheduled in this case.

4. This memorandum pertains only to this proposed assignment. It is requested that this office be informed of your decision in this case. The attached material should be returned to the writer in a sealed envelope marked "Eyes Only" when it has served its purpose.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Robert H. Cunningham

Robert H. Cunningham

OCT 15 9 12 AM '54

Attachment:
NCD dtd 28 September 1954

File
cc already

SECRET

SECRET

FI/STC/SPB

15 OCT 1954

Chief, Special Security Division

C-25507
#112569

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FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Robert H. Cunningham

Attachment:
MCD dtd 28 September 1954

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

COVERT NAME CHECK REPORT

OOC

DATE: 28 September 1954

SUBJECT: R. L. G. 112569 OC

In accordance with your request, a covert name check was conducted on Subject with results as indicated below:

AGENCY	RETURN	DATE
G-2	NR	8/28
ONI	NR	9/27
STATE (less Passport)	NR	8/24
FBI	NIO	8/27
CSC		
HCUA		
OSI		
PASSPORT	NA	9/21
I&N		

This data is property of the Security Office and should be returned when it has served its purpose. Its existence or contents must not be disclosed except to CIA Staff Officers directly concerned.

SECRET

FORM NO. 38-66
JUL 1950

14-00000

SECRET

PASSPORT FILE CHECK

DATE CHECKED 21 September 1954

INITIALS AND CASE NUMBER: P. L. #112569

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH : 29 June 1922 in Dekalb, Illinois
(Photostatic copy of birth certificate appears in the file)

PASSPORTS RECEIVED

DATE ISSUED	COUNTRIES	PURPOSE OF TRAVEL	POSITION AND ORGANIZATION
27 September 1945 #14394	Clon, Panama	Personal Business	Student

Amended 19 November 1946 to show occupation as S/Sgt. United States Air Force in Panama.

Renewed and amended the above passport at Panama City, Panama 29 January 1949 under orders from the United States Air Force (T Sgt. AF16001300) authorizing him 10 days leave of absence with permission to visit Republic of Panama and San Juan, Costa Rica. Subject registered at San Juan Tibas, Costa Rica on 3 March 1949 where he was for the purpose of study under the GI Bill of Rights.

14 August 1950 #180FS119	San Jose, Costa Rica (passport included son, Ross A. _______, born Costa Rica 4 September 49		Student

Amended the above passport 9 October 1951 at San Jose to include minor child Lillian CARIDAD, born Costa Rica 24 June 1951.

Renewed the above passport at San Jose, Costa Rica 17 August 1953.

~~ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:~~

2 July 1954 #9CFS11099	San Jose, Costa Rica	Leaving for United States for visit	Student

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: Address: (1945) 612 West 7th Street, Sterling Illinois.

SPOUSE: Married 17 December 1945 to Argentina CORDERO at Cristobal, CZ, who was born on 15 March 1919, who is not an American citizen.

PARENTS: Lester Earl _______, born Palestine, Illinois 15 March 1900 and Elizabeth Loraine McKIBBEN, born La Moille, Illinois, both of whom currently reside at Tampico, Illinois.

Subject's file indicated that he resided in Dekalb, Illinois from birth until 1940. From 1945 to 1949 he resided in Panama, from 1949 to date he had resided in Costa Rica.

WITNESS: (1945) Rose PERKOVICH, not related, 1322 Pleasant Street, Dekalb, Illinois.

SECRET

LFM:ph

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE

No. C-25507

TO: Chief, WH

Operational Clearance is granted for the use of Arthur G. VAIVADA as follows:

As requested in memorandum dated 19 July 1954

This clearance is for the specific use set forth above, and is based upon an appraisal of information currently available to this office. It must be borne in mind that this clearance is in no way to be construed as a guarantee of subject's bona fides, but merely reflects that derogatory information, if any, has been considered and evaluated for the instant purpose only.

Date JUL 22 1954 FI/STC/SPB

cr

SECRET

FORM NO. 59-47 PREVIOUS EDITIONS NOT TO BE USED
1 MAR 54

(8)

14-00000

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

CLEARANCE REQUEST

DATE 21 July 1954

TO : Chief, Special Security Division, I&SO
FROM : Chief, Staff C/SPB

Called [illegible] this date & advised [illegible] to disregard this request. New O.C. granted 22 July 54 on basis of previous record.

SUBJECT: NO. C ~~30904~~ *25507*

1. Character of Case: OC XXX CSC PROJ.
2. CIA indices check required in advance------------------------Yes--No--X
3. Project name: ~~XXX~~ AMPHODARCH
4. Proposed country of assignment: Costa Rica
5. Contemplated type of contract or employment agreement (see C.F.R. 14.1)
6. Scope and nature of use or activity: Agent
7. Subject's cover: Not cited.
8. Present whereabouts and occupation of Subject: SA
9. Suggested guide of I&S investigation: U.S. Govt.: ______ Commercial ______ Other: Credit checks.
10. Special coverage desired in investigation: Not cited.
11. Limitation, if any, on investigation: Not cited.
12. Subject aware of Agency interest------------------------Yes--No--X
13. Subject aware of pending investigation------------------------Yes--No--X
14. Subject briefed on "cover" story to be used in investigation----Yes--No--X
15. Probable investigative contacts informed of "cover" story subject will use: Yes----No----. If not, state reason.
16. Return attached PRQ Part I---------57's-------Biog. Data XXX with results of your action.
17. Certification having been made by the Chief of the interested Division that operational files and documents contain no pertinent information of an investigative or security nature other than that furnished to Staff C/SPB, such information forwarded to your office------------------Yes--X No---
18. Remarks: STC/SPB (has) (~~has not~~) been advised if Green List initiated

INITIALS

FORM NO. 59-60
FEB 1953

SECRET

(8)

SECRET

14 July, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: SPC/SPB

SUBJECT : OCR-_________-A/WHD/Branch III, Forwarding Part II, PRQ, on Arthur G. Vaixada (pseudonym)

REFERENCE : OCR-_________-B/WHD/Branch III, dated 14 July 1954, Forwarding Part I, PRQ.

Previous OC obtained in No. 68, dated 19 July 1949, for project HUMANOID.

No record of this in SPC/SPB.

1. Forwarded herewith is Part II, PRQ, on Arthur G. Vaixada

2. Operational....Security....Clearance is requested in order to employ Arthur G. Vaixada as (indicate: US, ~~or indigenous~~; witting ~~or unwitting~~; form and value of emoluments; FI ~~or PP~~; and ~~oral or~~ written contract.)

To receive a salary of $5060.00 annually, plus allowances.
To replace RIKON in project AMPHODARCH.

Robert D. Gahagen
for J. C. KING, Chief, WHD

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

14 July, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: STC/SPB

SUBJECT : OCR-________-B/WHD/Branch III, Forwarding Part I, PRQ, on Ross L. Crozier

1. Forwarded herewith is Part I, PRQ, on Ross L. Crozier

2. a. A Green List name check (Form 51-125) has been requested.

b. The Registry and WHD operational files have been checked and no information of investigative value or security interest was found on the subject.

c. Local Field Traces contain no derogatory information.

3. Part II, PRQ, is being forwarded under memorandum for STC/SPB OCR-________-A/WHD/Branch III, dated 14 July 1954

4. Additional comments (if any):

Robert D. Gahagan
for J. C. KING, Chief, WHD

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

TRS/PRQ/26

PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Instruction: 1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply, write "not applicable"
3. Attach blank pages if additional space is needed.

1. Full Name Ross (First) Lester (Middle) Crozier (Last)

2. Name in native script Ross L. Crozier

3. Name at birth (if different from 1.) Lester Ross Crozier

4. Aliases, nicknames, legal changes (State briefly time, reason and place of use.) Not applicable

5. a. Date of birth 20 June 1922 b. Place of birth DeKalb, Illinois

6. Present citizenship, race if appropriate U/S/ by birth

7. Nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities (if different from 6.) U.S. and no subsequent nationalities

8. Present residence (Owner, tenant, sub-tenant.) Owner of house and lot at Colima de Tibas, San Jose, Costa Rica.

9. Permanent address (if different from 8.)

10. Present occupation (full title, salary etc.) Matriculated as Student of Economic Sciences at University of Costa Rica, third year, under G/I/ bill Right Also practicing photography and planning to open small studio.

11. Naturalization of subject or of close relatives in the United States. (Give date and name in which certificate granted.)

Not applicable

12. Relatives, friends, correspondents in United States. (Explain relationship) Lester Earl Crozier, Elizabeth Lorene Crozier, Father and Mother. M/sgt Francis WILLIAMS, Friend. Colonel G/J/ Stattler, friend. F. Arthur Greger, friend.

18-6-3-60

13. Father - full name, occupation, present residence, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and subsequent nationalities.

Lester Earl Crozier, Trucking business, Sterling Illinois, born 1900 in Palestine Illinois, U/S/ citizen with no subsequent nationalities.

14. Mother - same information as 13.

Elizabth Lorene Crozier (Maiden name; McKibben) housewife, Sterling Illinois, 1903 at LaSalle, Illinois, U/S/ at birth with no subsequent nationality.

15. Wife (or husband) - full name, maiden name, date and place of birth, date and place of marriage, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence, divorce, annulment. (Give data for all previous marriages.)

Argentina de Crozier (Argentina Cordero Calderon) born 1918 at San Jose Costa Rica, married at Cristobal Canal Zone on 17 Dec 1945; Costa Rican at birth with no subsequent nationality, presently resides at Colima Tibas San Jose, Costa Rica; no previous marriages.

16. Children - full names, sex, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence.

Ross Arnulfo Crozier, male, born 4 sept 1949 at San Jose, C/R/ and registered as a U/S/ citizen with no subsequent nationality; residing at Colima de Tibas, San Jose.

17. Brothers and sisters - Same information as 16.

Norris Edwin Crozier, Male, 1933 DeKalb, Ill., U/S/, Sterling, Ill.
James R. Crozier, Male, 1930 Malta, Ill. U/S/ Somewhere in Corea with U/S/ Army.
[illegible]rma Lily Crozier, Female , 1924 Elgin, Ill. U.S. Sterling, Ill.
[illegible]uche Elaine Crozier, Female, 1927 DeKalb Ill. U/S/. Sterling, Ill.

14-00000

TRS /PRQ/ 26

18. Relatives in service of any government, names and positions held.

James Earl Crozier, Corporal, U/S/ Army in Corea.

19. List all official identity papers held with dates, numbers, place of issue and duration of validity.

U/S/ Passport, Issued San Jose, Costa Rica, Aug 14, 1950, # 180 (FS) 119
Cedula de Residencia, 100-37712, issued 6 April 1949. San Jose Costa Rica indefinite with annual renewal.

20. Religion - degree practiced, membership in religious orders

Catholic , Roman, practiced ocasionally.

21. Present and past political affiliations **; Not applicable.**

22. Travel outside country of present residence - country, dates,

purpose, people and firms visited **; With U/S/ Army, departed US in Nov 1941 and covered Panama, Puerto Rico, Ecuador, Costa Rica, then departed US in Nov 1944 and covered Australia, India, Burma, China, Iraque, Iran, Egypt, Morocco, Bermuda. Dep US in Nov 1945 to Panama as civilian to work US Navy at Coco Solo, then Dep C/Z/ in April 1949 for enrollment at U of CR, San Jose Costa Rica.**

23. Education - school, location, course, degree, dates
Graduated Grammer School at Five-points District School, Sycamore, Ill. 1937
Graduated High school DeKalb Illinois by virtue of recognition of credits attained thr ugh AF educational work and graduated actually in 1949.
Currently attending University of Costa Rica, third year, Economic Sciences.

24. Languages and dialects (Indicate proficiency as good, fair, poor.)

Language **English** Speak **Good** Read **Good** Understand **Good**

Language **Spanish** Speak **Good** Read **Good** Understand **Good**

Language ______ Speak ______ Read ______ Understand ______

TRS/PRQ/26

25. Military service - dates, country, unit, rank, duty, where services performed, decorations, when discharged, why. Give details if ever prisoner of war: U/S/ Army 1940 - 1941, Artillery, Private, North Carolina, dischged for entry in Air Forces. US Air Forces. 1941 - 1945, Intelligence Specialist, Panama, India-Burma theater. Dischgd termination of War. US Air Forces, 1946-1949, Technical Sergeant, Intelligence Specialist, Political analysis, dischgd - exp term of service.

26. Present and past membership in organizations (professional, social, political, etc.)

None.

27. Special skills, abilities, hobbies (radio, photography, etc.)

Photography.

28. Financial status - earnings, bank deposits, securities, property

Compensation from G/I/ bill of Rights: $120.00
Approx earnings from Photography : $ 40.00
Owner of house and lot valued at : $ 3,500.00
No current bank deposits.

29. Employment history - type of work, salary, dates, employers, addresses, reasons for leaving. Include employment by any government.

Summer vacation 1939-40 - Stapling machine op. -$50 week - California packing Corporation, DeKalb, Ill. Left for service with US army.
August 1940-45 - US Army and AF, Operations and I telligence Specialist - Technical Sergeant, 135 dollars month, dchgd exp term of service. -
August 1945 - Oct 45 - Laboratory Technician - Sterling Silica Gel Corp - $60 weekly - left due to strike complications.
Jan 1946 - April 1946 - Stevedore and Labor foreman - US Navy Coco Solo, CZ. approx 65 dollars weekly - left for entrance US Air Forces.
April 1946-April 1949 -US Air Forces, Albrook Air Base, CZ. Tech Sergeant, Intelligence Specialist, dischgd due to exp term of service.

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TRS /PRQ/ 26

29. (Continued)

30. Has subject done any writing? Give details including titles of books, articles, publishers, dates. None.

31. List persons living at same address, close associates, (individuals or groups,) correspondents at home and abroad.

Argentina de Crozier,

Correspondents: Mrs Jeannie Williams
m/sgt Francis Williams
Hq 2nd Air Force
Barksdale Air Force Base.
Sra Miguel Aguila
Panama City, R de P.

32. List five character references.

Lt. Col. C/J/ STATTLER, Washington, D/C/
T/Sgt. Francis J. Williams, Hq 2nd AF, Barksdale AFB, La.
Major Paul H. Harrison, Howard Field, C/Z/
Lt. Col. William R. Forbes, Howard Field, C/Z/
Mr. Edward Marelius, Washington, D.C.

33. Court record - court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals, denazification, etc.

Not applicable.

34. Description (Use American standards of measurement, if possible.)

Age	29	Posture	erect - good
Apparent age	30	Weight	165
Height	6' 1"	Teeth	perfect
Eyes	blue	Hair	brown
Face - shape		Scars	Appendectomy, varicose viens right leg.
Complexion	ruddy	Build	Slender
Sex	Male		

General appearance

Prominent features

Other identifying features

35. Other miscellaneous biographical data and comments.

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

/PRQ/

Part II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER:

1. If feasible, subject should fill in Part I of PRQ in his own hand.
2. Part II of PRQ is classified, must be filled in by the case officer and is not to be shown to subject.
3. Headquarters will not be able to provide an Operational Clearance unless it receives answers to all questions on page 1 of Part I (Items 1 to 12), and to all questions of Part II (Items 36 to 58).
4. In emergency these answers, keyed to Items 1 to 12 by number, and with summary of Part II, may be cabled to Headquarters, followed promptly by pouch with complete data.
5. Fully completed PRQ must be sent to Headquarters as soon as possible, two copies of Part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and one copy of Part II.
6. Data acquired later must be sent to Headquarters in PRQ format on a continuing basis.
7. All pages of both parts will bear the PRQ number, composed of (a) Station symbol (b) PRQ (c) number assigned consecutively by the field station; e.g. PGA/PRQ/10.

36. Cryptonym Arthur G. VAIVADA

37. How, when and where was subject first contacted or developed?
Subject was first recruited in Panama as HYDROPATH in November 1948 and transferred to Costa Rica in approved HUMANOID project. Subsequently was transferred to BIRADIAL project and PBSUCCESS.

38. Could subject be turned over quickly and in a secure manner to someone else for handling? Yes To whom? Above record over the past four years shows that subject has easily been turned over to different projects and case officers.

39. Best estimate of subject's motivation
Subject is motivated by his interest in intelligence work, desire to advance in the organization as a career, and its remuneration.

FORM NO. 51-95B
MAY 1950

SECRET

40. With what agencies and files has subject's name been checked? When? Result? What else has been done to verify biographical information furnished by subject?

Checked upon recruitment in Panama in 1949.
Has subsequently been check upon employment in other projects.

41. What control exists over subject at present? How can it be increased?

Subject is controlled through dependence on salary, loyalty because of American heritage, past Army and Agency service, and a desire for a career in intelligence work.

42. For what service does he think he is working? What does he think becomes of his information?

Subject if cognizant of the identity of this organization.

43. Explain fully subject's past or present connection with any intelligence service.

Subject previously in U.S. Army and Air Force Intelligence.

44. What type of information has subject furnished? What type is he best qualified by education and experience to furnish? Give evaluation of information received.

Subject has furnished information received from sub-agents on Communist Party activities and Central American revolutionary matters.

45. If subject's duties are to be other than intelligence gathering, explain.

None.

46. Has he been given special training as an agent? Explain.

U. S. Army Intelligence Training and Agency covert training from 5 October through 25 "ovember 1953.

47. How and from whom does he obtain information?

Previously worked a Principal Agent handling various sub-agents.

48. Is it proposed to pay subject a regular salary? If so, amount per week, month, etc. Explain any other methods of payment, such as exchange commodities.

Subject is to receive $5060.00 annually, plus allowances.

49. Have any promises or commitments whatsoever (not covered elsewhere in this form) been made to subject? Explain.

No.

50. Are subject's language abilities and other characteristics such that he could pass as a native of a country or region other than his own? Explain.

No.

51. What is subject's social standing? Aristocracy, upper middle class, lower middle class, peasantry, etc.? Upper middle class.

52. What are subject's personal habits? Liquor, drugs, gambling, mistresses or lovers? Social drinker but very moderately. No gambling or mistresses.

53. Evaluation of subject's character, reliability, security.
All noted excellent.

54. With what other foreign power would subject be most likely to collaborate because of his ideology, obligation, etc.? Explain.

None.

55. What special abilities, talents, or qualifications are possessed by subject which would conceivably be of value for other operations in the future?

Subject can send and receive Morse code.

56. Attach samples of subject's signature and handwriting in all languages known to him, also a recent, dated photograph, and fingerprints.

Previously submitted.

57. How was information in Part I obtained?

From subject personally.

SECRET

___/PRQ/___

58. Other miscellaneous operational data and comments.

Excellent work done in previous projects should ably qualify subject for use in project AMPHODARCH.

Case officer

14-00000

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : STC/SPB

DATE: 19 July 1954

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: Request for Operational Clearance for use of Arthur G. VAIVADA in Project AMPHODARCH

1. Reference is made to Operational Clearance No. C-25507, dated 28 April 1954, wherein the Subject was cleared for use in Project PBSUCCESS.

2. It is requested that Subject now be cleared for use in Project AMPHODARCH.

3. PRQ, Parts I & II have been submitted to your office, Green List Check No. 9467 was submitted to STD and this office was informed by phone on 16 July 1954 that no derogatory information on Subject was on record with STD.

for J. C. KING
C/WH

14-00000

SECRET

DATE: 9 July 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: STC/SPB

ATTENTION : Mr. Maurice Brady

SUBJECT : Cancellation of ~~XXXX~~ OC on (MHC) Ross Lester CROZIER Project PBSUCCESS

It is requested that ~~P.O. and~~ OC, # C-25507, dated 28 Apr 1954 and granted to (Name) Ross Lester CROZIER for purpose of utilization on project PBSUCCESS be cancelled.

F. P. HOLCOMB
Special Deputy, DD/P

Carbon returned to WH noting completion
~~action completed by STC/SPB~~
CM
JUL 20 1954

SECRET

14-00000

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : STC/SPB
Attention: Mr. Ogden

DATE: 25 May 1954

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: Request for Amendment of OPC - BIRADIAL C.25507

1. This division has been advised by the Guatemala City station that BIRADIAL (formerly HUMANOID) is currently being used as cutout in the ESCROW project.

2. BIRADIAL, whose pseudonym is Anthony G. VAIVADA, holds OPC for PBSUCCESS.

3. In accordance with the recommendation contained in Para. 6 (b), Memorandum of the Chief, Plans, FI, dated 7 May 1954, subject: Project Renewal ESCROW, it is requested that the OPC for this agent be amended to authorize his additional use as stated in Para. 1 above

Robert D. Gahagen
for J. C. KING

Copy of POC dated 28 Apr 54 was forwarded to Col Dreyfling in response to this memo. L. Salerno aware of this. [illegible] 9 June 54

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE

No. C-25507

TO: Chief, WH

Operational Clearance is granted for the use of Arthur G. VAIVADA as follows:

This clearance amends Subject's first name (Ps) from Anthony To Arthur.
Use however, remains as stated in clearance dated 28 April 1954.

As requested in memorandum dated 27 April 1954

This clearance is for the specific use set forth above, and is based upon an appraisal of information currently available to this office. It must be borne in mind that this clearance is in no way to be construed as a guarantee of subject's bona fides, but merely reflects that derogatory information, if any, has been considered and evaluated for the instant purpose only.

Date MAY 5 1954

FI/STC/SPB
TC/er

SECRET

FORM NO. 1 MAR 54 59-47 PREVIOUS EDITIONS NOT TO BE USED (8)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE

No. C-25507

TO: Chief, WH

Operational Clearance is granted for the use of ~~Antonio~~ ARthur G. VAIVADA as follows:

As requested in memo of 27 April 1954 this clearance supersedes that of 19 July 1949 and permits Subject's use under Project PBSUCCESS. Further, this clearance is so amended to allow for Subject's additional duties as cutout under Project ESCROW.

As requested in memorandum dated 27 April 1954

This clearance is for the specific use set forth above, and is based upon an appraisal of information currently available to this office. It must be borne in mind that this clearance is in no way to be construed as a guarantee of subject's bona fides, but merely reflects that derogatory information, if any, has been considered and evaluated for the instant purpose only.

Date APR 28 1954

FI/SIC/SPB
TC/cr

SECRET

FORM NO. 59-47 PREVIOUS EDITIONS NOT TO BE USED
1 MAR 54

14-00000

SECRET

27 April 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: STC/SPB

ATTENTION : Mr. Maurice Brady

SUBJECT : Clearance for Arthur G. VAIVADA (Ps) - PBSUCCESS

Confirming conversation on 26 April 1954 between Mr. Brady and Mr. Salerno, PBSUCCESS, it is requested that Operational Clearance No. 68, dated 19 July 1949, granted to Subject under Project BIRADIAL, now be amended and brought up to date for Subject's use on Project PBSUCCESS. In addition, it is further requested that the clearance issued be so amended as to also reflect Subject's additional duties as cutout on Project ESCROW.

for J. C. KING
CWH

SECRET

14-00000

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: WH/III

NO.

DATE 12 April 1954

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECD	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. RASBERRY		12 Apr 54		[illegible]	
2. DOERFLINGER		Apr 20	Apr 20	D	
3. ESTERLINE		20 Apr 54		E	3. There is no conflicts of interest here. PBSUCCESS is the primary interest and ESCROW is supporting PBSUCCESS. EDC
4. DAHLGREN			20 Apr	RND	
5. FI/STC/SPB	2607 L				
6. ATT: MR. BURTON	✓				
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

FORM NO. 51-10 1 NOV 53 PREVIOUS EDITIONS MAY BE USED SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : FI/STC/SPB
ATT : Mr. Burton
FROM : Chief, WHD

DATE: 12 April 1954

SUBJECT: Use of Contract Agent Anthony G. VAIVADA (P) as Cut-Out in ESCROW Project

1. The Guatemala Station has advised Headquarters that subject contract agent, who holds Provisional Operational Clearance for PBSUCCESS, is currently also being used as cut-out in the ESCROW Project.

2. Pursuant to telephone conversation this date between Mr. Burton and the WH desk officer concerned, it is requested that above reference Provisional Operational Clearance be amended to authorize the use of VAIVADA in the ESCROW project as indicated in paragraph 1 above.

J. C. King
J. C. KING
CWH

File
Hold for new request from WH Salinas for use in PBSUCCESS only or ...

(This memo brought to attention of Mr. Burton & Mr. Brady - 26 Apr. 54
CMH)

SECRET

14-00000

1. Mitchell Rasbery, WH Case Officer handling project ESCROW, was advised on this date that he should submit a request to STC/SPB to amend the operational clearance for agent BIRADIAL to provide for his use in project ESCROW. It should be noted that BIRADIAL is currently being used as a cut-out in this operation.

DATE: April 9, 1954 James R. Benton

SECRET

SECRET

9 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: STAFF C

ATTENTION: Mr. Thomas Ogden

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA (pseudo)

It is requested that the proper clearance be granted for the use of subject, now on Project BIRADIAL, on Project . SUCCESS. This will confirm telephone conversation between your office and WH/Personnel on 9 December 1953.

[signature]
for J. C. KING
C/WH

14 Dec.

Note: I talked to Virginia [illegible] on this and she stated that she would let [illegible] [illegible] on this. I requested a PRQ [illegible] so that I would know what the [illegible] was. [initials] 16 Dec.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

6 August 1953

MEMORANDUM TO: FILE

FROM: James R. Burton

SUBJECT: Project BIRADIAL

1. BIRADIAL (formerly HUMANOID) is the only agent involved in this operation at the present time. Additional agents are expected to be added at a later date.

2. The Case Officer reported that the agents other than BIRADIAL formerly used in the HUMANOID operation would be picked up by other operations in the Costa Rica area in the near future.

3. The Case Officer was instructed to report the change in BIRADIAL's cryptonym and use to SIC/SPB and also the changes for the other agents when their transfer to new projects has been accomplished.

4. SIC/SPB concurrence is subject to further review of operation after six months when Commo details will be known.

SECRET

File in ~~Humanist~~ Humanoid Folder

24 September 1951

38203

Chief, WHD
THRU: Chief, STC
STC/SPB

Project HUMANOID

1. From information made available to this office it appears that details concerning the exposure of the technical surveillance of Juan Bosch and subsequent arrests were not fully determined. It is believed probable that HUMANOID has been compromised with the Costa Rican authorities.

2. It is understood that, with the exception of the HUMANIST Project, HUMANOID is to continue inactive for an undetermined period. Any further contemplated use of HUMANOID should be coordinated with STC/SPB.

3. In view of his wife's and mother-in-law's Costa Rican background and apparent connections and associations with politically significant personalities, it is recommended HUMANOID discontinue using his home to reproduce material obtained in the HUMANIST Project.

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : STC/OCO DATE: 23 February 1951

FROM : Chief, FDT

SUBJECT: HUMANOID

The following answers are keyed to your questionnaire dated 5 February 1951 concerning HUMANOID:

a. Subject is an active agent.

b. He is used substantially the same as when clearance was issued.

c. Subject has not been used in connection with projects other than originally contemplated.

d. All information on subject's personal and operational security has been submitted.

e. The operation has been considered excellent. The only test of HUMANOID's security has been the test of evaluating his information, and the evaluation of his reliability by the Chief of Station.

f. There have been no operational or other changes in the status of this agent which have affected our evaluation of this agent.

WM. M. WHEELER, JR.

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

SOD 6 RID COPY OT 2140Z B

FILE VR, CS/DO, OT, C/DO, OPSER, WH/C 8

SECRET 072354Z CITE JMWAVE 1869 7 Jul 66 IN 52218

PRIORITY ISOLATION INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR, EGLIN

PBRUMEN KUROAR CHAPPIE RAMROD

REF A WAVE 0818 (IN 42001)

B WAVE 0746 NOT SENT EGLIN (IN 14906)

1. REQUEST TRAINING FOR SIX MAN LEADER GROUP SCHEDULED ARRIVE ISOLATION 11 JULY AS FOLLOWS: ISOTROPIC SAME GIVEN AMANCHORS LESS EMPHAIS UDT. ISOLATION STRESS LEADERSHIP TRAINING AND ROTATE LEADERSHIP ASSIGNMENTS IN FIELD EXERCISES ENCOMPASSING TRADECRAFT, CACHING, OBSERVATION AND REPORTING.ALL TRAINEES COMPLETED JMWAVE TRAINING AND HAVE OA'S AND RECENT LCFLUTTERS.

2. TRAINEES: 728520

AMLILAC/29 TA IGNACIO (TRAINED AT ISO/ISOT JULY 63)
AMLILAC/33 TA MANUEL (TRAINED AT ISO FEB 64) 741331
AMSKIRT/1 TA PABLO (TRAINED AT ISO JAN 65) 753409
AMHINT/56 TA FRANK (JMWAVE TRAINING ONLY) 332676
AMTRUNK/21 TA LUIS (JMWAVE TRAINING ONLY) 3[illegible]63
AMLUNT/2 TA FILIPE (JMWAVE TRAINING ONLY) 334081
AMPOLISH/1 TA SIMON (ISO/ISOT AUG 65) INTERPRETER C/O TO 285159

SECRET

BE ASSIGNED.

3. REQUEST AIRLIFT LEADER TEAM TO ISO NIGHT 11 JULY AND RETURN AMANCHOR GROUP ISO WAVE NIGHT 12 JULY.

SECRET

BT

S-E-C-R-E-T

ATTACHMENT #2

TRAINING REPORT

TEAM/GROUP: PBRUMEN II
(211 hours, full-time)

11 July - 13 August 1966
(Date)

Student: FRANK

COURSE OBJECTIVE AND CONTENT

This course is designed to train indigenous personnel in paramilitary resistance activities and intelligence collection operations in denied areas. Approximately 70% of the student's time is devoted to practical work and field exercises and 30% to the theoretical aspects essential for a logical understanding and application of training covered during the course.

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

* U - Unsatisfactory	Performance is so low in relation to requirements of the work as to be unequivocally below minimum standards.
W - Weak	Achieved minimum standards, but less than adequate (in terms of indigenous personnel participating in the program).
A - Adequate	Has achieved the basic level required. Satisfactory, characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	More than satisfactory. Has acquired a solid beginner's proficiency. This rating may be interpreted as representing "average" on our rating scale.
S - Strong	Exceptional proficiency, characterized by thoroughness, initiative, originality, and an exceptional student understanding and application of paramilitary resistance activities.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of other students doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

* Modification of the Office of Training standard rating scale at the specific request of JMWAVE.

S-E-C-R-E-T

FRANK

S-E-C-R-E-T

		HOURS	RATING
1.	MAP READING (ABILITY TO REPORT LOCATIONS USING GRID COORDINATES)	12	P
2.	NAUTICAL CHARTS	8	P
3.	WEAPONRY (U.S. & FOREIGN)	31	P
4.	CLANDESTINE MOVEMENT	-	-
5.	RESISTANCE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS	20	P
6.	AMBUSH TACTICS AND OPERATIONS	24	S
7.	RAID TACTICS AND OPERATIONS	24	P
8.	CACHING	20	P
9.	CLANDESTINE MOVEMENT LINES (E&E)	-	-
10.	OBSERVATION AND REPORTING TECHNIQUES	40	S
11.	LEADERSHIP TRAITS AND CAPABILITY	See Comments	
12.	OPERATIONAL PLANNING ABILITY	See Comments	
13.	SKETCHING	12	A
14.	SABOTAGE (SEE ATTACHED STB REPORT)	-	-
15.	TARGET PHOTOGRAPHY	-	-
16.	AIR RECEPTION ACTIVITIES	20	P

17. WEAPONS QUALIFICATION (TEST RESULTS ATTACHED)

Pistol	Non-Applicable
Rifle	Sharpshooter
SMG	Sharpshooter

OVERALL PERFORMANCE

RATING LETTER

P

Rating takes into account trainee's effectiveness, such as performance in operational skills, tactics, techniques, leadership, planning, teamwork, motivation and limitations.

S-E-C-R-E-T

The ratings above, and narrative comments hereunder, are derived from a synthesis of all evaluations submitted on each respective trainee by the instructor staff.

Overall performance ratings of all students in this class were as follows:

WEAK 0 ADEQUATE 0 PROFICIENT 6 STRONG 0 OUTSTANDING 0

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Over-all, FRANK was the most conscientious and hardest working student in his class. His serious attitude and fine performance warranted a highly proficient rating.

In preparation of plans, completion of written exercises, and execution of field problems, he demonstrated a high level of achievement.

During the Ambush Exercise, FRANK had a leadership role during which he adhered to a detailed plan, exerted good control over the team, and produced a very successful ambush operation.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

PREPARED BY:

Jerome W. Greiner
JEROME W. GREINER
Project Officer

APPROVED AND FORWARDED:

Joseph M. Hudacek
JOSEPH M. HUDACEK
Chief Instructor

8/30/66
Date

14-00000

FRANK - Frank was the hardest working student of the group. He consistently ap[illegible]ed himself to all phases of the [illegible]aining with equal and great diligence. However, his practical work, which took him a great deal of time to perform, was always a little sloppy. When Frank crimped detonators or threw improvised grenades, he was very shaky. However, he did not seem at all nervous about working with other hazardous material. He asked many pertinent questions which contributed to the group's training and always answered test questions correctly and in detail. He was cooperative and reacted well to correction. Some supervision was required since the staff instructors were concerned about his nervousness with detonators. His overall performance was rated as proficient.

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : W. WAINWRIGHT:tw
UNIT : SAS/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 18 JUNE 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

TO : ROME

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SAS 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, WE 4, S/C

19 JUN 63 15 57z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

TO ROME INFO CITE DIR 48198

KEYWAY PBRUMEN AMWHIP

REF: DIR 44488 (IN 55801)

1. REQUEST SMITHAM ASK AMWHIP FOR DATE HE SENT LETTER TO "THOMPSON'S FRIEND" IN PBRUMEN. ALSO REMIND HIM TO SAVE COPY OF LETTER FOR THOMPSON. IF AMWHIP AGREEABLE, OFFER SEND COPY TO THOMPSON VIA "SECURE CHANNELS".

2. FYI, LETTER IS ACTIVATION EFFORT TO RELUCTANT DRAGON AGENT NOW PBRUMEN, WHO MET PARIS BY THOMPSON AND WALLACE A. GROWERY LAST SUMMER. AGENT IS GOOD FRIEND AMWHIP WHO WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN ARRANGING CONTACT.

END OF MESSAGE

WE/4/S. Munger
WE/5

THOMAS THIELE
C/WE/INT
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM TYNG
AC/SAS/EOB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-252234

SECRET

DATE 21 January 1963

PREPARATION OF OUTGOING SW MESSAGES

TO: Bill Wainwright TFW/FI
(Field Units Use Pseudo) (Div. or Branch)

FROM: TSD/SWB
(Field Units Use Pseudo)

Transmitted herewith is an Outgoing SW Message prepared for:

AMLASH/1
(Cryptonym of Agent)

Message No.: #1

This message is located:

On the side of the paper that has the penciled "X" mark.

It is suggested that the cover letter be placed:

On the reverse side and at right angles to the penciled "X" side.

Make sure the penciled "X" is removed before mailing

William J. Murphy
(Field Units sign in Pseudo)

Form 60-1 (OUT) SECRET

MSJ 1. QUERIDO AMIGO. TU MSJ 1 CLARO PERO NO INCLUISTE DIRECCION SEGURA DE REMITENTE COMO PROMETISTE A JAIME EN PARIS. NO TE PREOCUPES DEL REMITENTE DE ESTA CARTA YA QUE NO ES CUBANO Y SE TRAJO LA CARTA A CUBA DE DONDE LA ENVIO DE UNA MANERA SEGURA. NECESITAS ALGO O TE PUEDO SERVIR EN ALGO? AVISAME ACERCA TU PRESENTE POSICION Y POSIBILIDAD DE REGRESAR AL SERVICIO MILITAR. SI NO REGRESARAS CUALES SON TUS FUTUROS PLANES? TODAVIA ESTAS EN HOSPITAL FAJARDO? POR FAVOR DAME INFORMACION CON MAS AMPLIOS DETALLES INCLUYENDO CUANDO OCURRIO, DONDE, CUANTO Y COMO Y DE QUIEN FUE OBTENIDA INFORMACION ETC. POR EJEMPLO EN MSJ 1 EN INFORME SOBRE CAMPO ENTRENAMIENTO DE GUERRILLAS DEBIAS HABER DADO NOMBRE, LOCALIDAD DE LA FINCA, POR EJEMPLO TERMINO MUNICIPAL, CAMINO O CAMINOS DONDE ESTA SITUADA, DISTANCIA DEL CAMINO Y PUEBLO MAS CERCANO, DE QUIEN Y COMO SE OBTUVO ESTA INFORMACION. PUEDES VENIR A MEXICO PARA UNA REUNION EN LOS PROXIMOS MESES? SI NO, QUIZAS OTRO PAIS QUE TU DESEES? TAMBIEN SELECCIONA E INFORMA EN DETALLE SOBRE LOS TRES ESCONDITES DISCUTIDOS EN PARIS. DOS PARA CARTAS Y UNO PARA PAQUETES PEQUENOS. POR FAVOR INFORMAME SOBRE LO SIGUIENTE LO ANTES POSIBLE: TIENEN LOS SOVIETICOS SUS PROPIAS CLINICAS MEDICAS EN CUBA? PUEDES CONFIRMAR RECIENTES INFORMES QUE GRAN NUMERO DE SOVIETICOS SE HAN ENFERMADO EN PROPORCIONES EPIDEMICAS? QUE FUE LA ENFERMEDAD? DONDE FUERON HOSPITALIZADOS? CUANTAS PERSONAS ESTUVIERON ENFERMAS? ERAN CIVILES, MILITARES O AMBOS? DONDE OCURRIO EPIDEMIA? PUEDES CONFIRMAR LLEGADA DE ENVIOS DE CARNE MALA PROCEDENTE DE LA UNION SOVIETICA? SI ESTO ES VERDAD QUE CAUSO QUE SE ECHARA A PERDER? CUANTA CARNE MALA HABIA? SOBRE ESTO TAMBIEN HAY INFORMES QUE MUCHO GANADO EN CUBA ESTA INFECTADO EN PROPORCIONES EPIDEMICAS CON FIEBRE AFTOSA REQUIRIENDO SU DESTRUCCION. SI ES VERDAD, DAME DETALLES INCLUYENDO EL NUMERO DE GANADO INFECTADO, ORIGEN DE ENFERMEDAD, AREAS DONDE SE HAN REGISTRADO INFECCIONES, MEDIDAS TOMADAS PARA CONTROLAR ENFERMEDAD. SE ESTA CONTROLANDO

14-00000

ENFERMEDAD EFECTIVAMENTE? HAY ALGUNA INDICACION QUE CARNE INFECTADA SE ESTA VENDIENDO AL PUBLICO? POR FAVOR RECUERDA CONTESTAR ESTA CARTA LO ANTES POSIBLE, INCLUYE CONTESTACIONES A TANTAS PREGUNTAS COMO SEA POSIBLE. MAS IMPORTANTE QUE ESTO ES TENER UNA DIRECCION A LA QUE PODAMOS ESCRIBIRTE Y DETALLES SOBRE ESCONDITES Y TUS FUTUROS PLANES. SI POR CUALQUIER RAZON NO DESEAS O NO PUEDES MANTENER CONTACTO REGULAR CONMIGO PARA AYUDAR EN NUESTROS ESFUERZOS PARA UNA LIBRE CUBA, O SI NO DESEAS TRABAJAR MAS CONMIGO, POR FAVOR AVISAME DE ESTO TAMBIEN Y YO CONSIDERARE NUESTRO ENLACE POR TERMINADO. ME GUSTARIA CONTINUAR TRABAJANDO CONTIGO PERO TENGO QUE RECORDARTE QUE SE REQUIERE REPORTAJE Y CORRESPONDENCIA FRECUENTE Y CONTINUA EN ORDEN DE OBTENER LA MAXIMA VENTAJA PARA LLEGAR A CUMPLIR NUESTROS OBJETIVOS MUTUOS. SALUDES Y UN ABRAZO DE TU AMIGO. JAIME. FIN.

PERSONAL INFORMATION
(3 documents)

Volume 3 of 5

14-00000

GROZDEA, Ion (Dr.) - (qv) 201-168880 RUMANIA

"Health Unions Federation" pres.; was elected to the RPR Standing Committee for the Defense of Peace accd. to "Scanteia".

Am; Leg. Press Review #1515
Brit. Leg. Press Review #2484
9 Dec., '52

CIA-P-99946

14-00000

Sent to RID/AN

23 Dec. 70

✓	HKHW-1847	4 Sept. 56	201-168881
✓	HKHW-1905	16 Oct. 56	201-168881
✓	HKHA-3115	3 Nov. 56	201-168881
✓	HKHA-3314	17 Jan. 57	201-168881
✓	HKHA-3418	21 Feb. 57	201-168881
✓	HKHA-3583	2 May 57	201-168881
✓	HKHW-2282	27 May 57	201-168881
✓	HKHW-2362	23 July 57	201-168881
✓	HKHW-2422	12 Sept. 57	201-168881
✓	HKHA-4025	8 Nov. 57	201-168881
✓	HKHW-5825	14 Jan. 58	201-168881
✓	HMMW-5826	16 Jan. 58	201-168881
✓	MEXI-1364	10 April 58	201-168881
✓	HMMW-6377	22 May 58	201-168881
	HAVA 16 (IN 48405)	10 Sept 57	"

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMMW-6377

201-32723

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 24 MAY 1958

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - Harold P. NOEMAYR (ps)

Reference: DIR 19152 dated 25 April 1958

Action Required: None.

Attached herewith for your information and records is a copy of the Letter of Cover Instructions signed by NOEMAYR on 16 May 1958.

J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

19 May 1958

Attachment:
1, (4 pages)

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City (w/o/1 att)
1 - WH/Mailroom (w/o/att)
1 - WH/III/Chrono (w/o/att)
2 - RI (w/o/1 att)

WH/III/Mexico/CZehrung:ngs

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RID/FIP

201	168	881
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HMMW	6377	
DATE 24 MAY 58		

RID/EDI
RECORDED

CS COPY

(Releasing officer) J. C. KING, C/WHD

(Coordinating officer)

(Authenticating officer) R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

201-168881

201-32723

COPY

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMMW-5825
201-32723

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

14 JAN 58 13 05

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - Ross Lester CROZIER

REF: HMMW-5826 (KAPOK)

1. Personal data on Subject is forwarded for station's information in connection with the proposal contained in reference, which is being pouched separately.

2. Ross Lester CROZIER was born on 20 June 1922 in De Kalb, Illinois, the oldest of five children in a middle class family which now resides in Sterling, Illinois. In December 1945 he married Argentina de los Angeles CORDERO Calderon, a Costa Rican citizen, born in San Juan, C.R., on 15 March 1918. They have two children: Ross Arnulfo, 8; and Lillian Caridad, 6. Subject and his family currently reside in Havana, Cuba.

3. Subject received primary and high school education in DeKalb and worked at odd jobs until 1940, when he entered the Armed Forces, serving first in the Army, then in the Air Corps. Between 1941 and 1945 he served as an Intelligence Specialist in the Panama Canal Zone and in the India-Burma Theater. Discharged at the end of the war, he worked briefly in Illinois, then returned to the Canal Zone at the end of 1945 and obtained civilian employment with the U.S. Navy. In April 1946 he re-enlisted in the Air Force and again served as an Intelligence Specialist until the expiration of his term of service in April 1949, at which time he was discharged with the rank of Technical Sergeant.

4. Upon discharge he went from the Panama Canal Zone to Costa Rica, where his wife's family resides, and from April 1949 to March 1953 he worked as a free lance photographer in San Juan. During this period he resumed his studies attending Economics courses at the University of Costa Rica. He returned to the United States during the latter part of 1953, resided in Washington, then for a few months attended the University of San Carlos in Guatemala City, until May 1954. Shortly after he transferred to the School of Economic Sciences of the University of Havana which he attended until 1957. Subject financed the first few years of his advanced education under the V.A. program. During his stay in Havana, Subject began

(Releasing officer) (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

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FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

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201-168881
201-168881
X
HMMW 5825
DATE 14 JAN 58

SECRET

RI COPY

HGMA-5825
201-52723
Page two

working on polling studies for the Public Surveys Institute of Dallas, Texas which employs him at present.

5. Subject is 6'1" tall, slender built, athletic (1954 Guatemala national record in discus, track, high and broad jump, etc); is a pistol expert; has some experience as a radio operator; is an accomplished photographer and has designed and directed a photographic laboratory in Costa Rica.

6. Subject speaks and reads Spanish fluently and except for his height and Anglo Saxon appearance could pass as a native of Latin American countries. Subject became a Catholic convert shortly after his marriage.

7. Subject's wife was educated at the Liceo de Senoritas in San Jose, C.R., and has travelled extensively. Her father was born in Cuba, attended the Spanish Military Academy and served in Spanish Morrocco. In 1933/34 he was involved in Cuban politics and was forced to take refuge in Costa Rica, where he resided until his death in 1939. Her mother, who resides with Subject's family, retains an interest in Costa Rican and Cuban political affairs but takes no active part in politics.

8. A copy of a 1948 photograph of Subject is attached. Further information is contained in reference, forwarded under separate pouch.

9. The information given above is based on a PRQ and a PHS compiled by Subject respectively in 1948 and 1956 and on observations made by KUBARK officers who have been acquainted with him.

for J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

6 January 1958

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - W /Mailroom
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - RI
1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/ASpera:jck

SECRET

RI COPY

COORDINATE WITH:

WH/Carib

WH/Personnel

for J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

201-168881

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. ~~HKH-W-1047~~

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

SEP 4 1956

TO : Chief of Station, Habana

DATE

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
GENERAL - Operational/KUCAGE
SPECIFIC - Arthur C. VAIVADA

Regarding clearance to discuss PP activities with the Station -

Reference: HKH-A-2897, dated 9 August 1956 201-32723

Action Required: None

Headquarters feels that in the situation outlined in reference and within the limitations set forth in reference, no additional operational clearance for Subject is necessary.

S K Short for
J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

28 August 1956

Distribution:
3 - Habana
1 - RI/D&P
1 - WH/III/Cuba
1 - WH/Mailroom

WH/III/Cuba/WKent:gp

201-168881

S K Short for
J. C. KING, C/WHD
(Releasing officer)

(Coordinating officer)

W. Galbraith
W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III
(Authenticating officer)

~~201-168881~~
HKH-W- 1047
DATE 4 SEPT 56
~~201-32723~~

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

CS COPY

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-A-2282

201-32723

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief of Station, Habana

FROM Chief, WHD

DATE 4 Jun 57 13 33 z

SUBJECT GENERAL Operational/KUTUBE
SPECIFIC Arthur G. VAIVADA

Action Requested: None

1. During his recent visit to Headquarters, Subject was asked by one of the Staff members if he would be interested in, and available for, recruitment approaches in various Latin American countries. Since Subject has a fine record in CP penetration work (i.e., his outstanding job in handling HUMANOID-3 operation in Costa Rica and his efforts in the CP penetration program in Cuba), it is believed that he would be an effective recruiter of possible CP defectors.

2. Subject stated that he was keenly interested in, and would like to engage in, such operations and would welcome the opportunity of being asked to hit a well-chosen target in any Spanish-speaking Latin American country.

3. The foregoing discussion with Subject was informal and without commitment on either side. However, the Station is being alerted to the possibility that Subject may be requested to perform such approaches at such time when worthwhile recruitment in-place CP targets are developed, or otherwise arise in other countries. Nevertheless, any such action originating at Headquarters or at any other Station, will of course be subject to Station Habana's consideration and approval beforehand, depending on his availability in reference to his work in Project AMPHORARCH, etc.

28 May 1957

Distribution:
3 - Habana
1 - RI
1 - WH/Mailroom

1-WH/Cuba/Chrono
1- Subject

CS COPY

John T. Flynn
J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

201-168881

John T. Flynn
J. C. KING, C/WHD
(Releasing officer)

Hugh C. MacAuley
WH/III/Cuba/HCMacAuley/fs
(Coordinating officer)

W. Galbraith
W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III
(Authenticating officer)

201-168881
HKH-A 2282
4 JUN 57

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

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14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-W-2282

201-32723

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE JUN 57 13 33 2

TO Chief of Station, Habana

FROM Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL Operational/KUTUBE
SPECIFIC Arthur G. VAIVADA

Action Requested: None

1. During his recent visit to Headquarters, Subject was asked by one of the Staff members if he would be interested in, and available for, recruitment approaches in various Latin American countries. Since Subject has a fine record in CP penetration work (i.e., his outstanding job in handling HUMANOID-3 operation in Costa Rica and his efforts in the CP penetration program in Cuba), it is believed that he would be an effective recruiter of possible CP defectors.

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28 May 1957

CS COPY

Distribution:
3 - Habana
1 - RI
1 - WH/Mailroom

1-WH/Cuba/Chrono
1- Subject

John T. Flynn
for J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

201-168881

John T. Flynn
for J. C. KING, C/WHD
(Releasing officer)

Hugh C. MacAuley
WH/III/Cuba/HCMacAuley/rs
(Coordinating officer)

W. Galbraith
W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III
(Authenticating officer)

201-168881
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HKH-W-2282
4 JUN 57

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

CS COPY

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMMW-5826

201-32723

SECRET KAPOK

CLASSIFICATION

DESENSITIZED KAPOK #599

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 16 JAN 1958

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - Proposed assignment of Arthur C. VAIVADA (P)

REF: HMMW-5825

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-28

ACTION REQUIRED: Station comments and/or concurrence.

1. Subject is identified in reference which also gives his personal data and is forwarded in a separate pouch. Paragraph 4 of that dispatch outlines the cover activities of Subject for the period 1949 to the present, during which he has been actually employed by KUBARK, first as a contract agent then, since May 1957, as a career agent. He currently receives a salary approximately equivalent to that of a GS-11.

2. Subject's current, extended tour with the Havana station comes to an end in May 1958; due to his operational experience and performance with KUBARK in Costa Rica, Guatemala and Havana, Subject appears to be a good prospect as a replacement for Floyd FONTANY in CP operations.

3. Originally scheduled to be used by KUBARK in Panama, Subject was instead assigned to Costa Rica in 1949 under the HUMANOID project. While the operational files of this project have not yet been reviewed by this desk, entries in his personal file show that while in Costa Rica he handled a successful high level penetration of the local party. At the end of 1953, after a period of training at Headquarters, he was assigned to PBSUCCESS where he apparently also performed creditably. In July 1954 he was re-assigned to the Havana station as the principal agent of project AMTHUNDARCH which involves the recruitment and handling of CP penetrations in that country. The AMTHUNDARCH and Subject's personal files have been reviewed by this desk; together with the training and the assessments of the case officers for whom he has worked, the files show that Subject is eminently qualified as a recruiter and agent handler in CP operations. The records show that Subject possesses a great deal of integrity, resourcefulness and intelligence: he was highly rated both by Headquarters training officers and throughout his operational work in the field. He is particularly evaluated highly as to judgment and common sense.

(Releasing officer) (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

SECRET KAPOK

CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29 AUG 1949

CS COPY

201-168881

VAIVADA

SECRET KAPOK DESENSITIZED

HMMA-5826
201-32723
KAPOK #599
Page two

4. Should his assignment to Mexico Station be agreed upon, cover possibilities can be considered in the fields of photography and athletic training which are among Subject's specialties. He lists himself as a "pistol expert" and a clarification of this term will be requested if, in the Station's opinion, it may enlarge cover possibilities, perhaps under LIMERICK. Subject's wife is still a Costa Rican citizen at present, while his two children are U.S. citizens.

5. Station's comments on this proposed assignment and possible cover suggestions will be welcome.

J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

7 January 1958

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - KAPOK/Chrono
1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/ASpera:jck

COORDINATE WITH:

WH/Carib

R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

WH/Personnel

J. C. KING, C/WHD

DESENSITIZED

RID/EDI RECEIVED FEB 25 1 04 PM '11

RID/EDI FORWARDED

SECRET DESENSITIZED

201-168881

049 HH/MCB/

DATE : 22 MAY 1958

(49

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

MAY 23 07 58 Z 58

ROUTINE

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 5

INFO : OP 2, S/C 2

IN 32413

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 1608

RE: MEXI 1468 (IN 22383)

DIR 11212 (OUT 51534)

PLEASE ADVISE ETA HAROLD R NOEMAYR.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

201-168881

Public Surveys Institute
General Polling Service

Albert E. Johnson
Executive Director

532 Fidelity Union Life Building
1511 Bryan Street
Dallas, Texas
Riverside 1-3674

LETTER HEAD STATIONARY USED BY THE
NOTIONAL COVER FIRM BACKSTOPPING
Harold R. NOOMAYR

RECEIVED FROM CCB/NC
ON 20 MAY 1958

201-168781

14-00000

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SCO (Mr. Lustecher)

DATE: 19 May 1958

FROM : Operations Division, Medical Staff

SUBJECT: Harold R. ROSMAYR (p)

Subject has been evaluated by the Medical Staff and found qualified for proposed overseas assignment.

James R. Fearon
James R. Fearon
Administrative Officer

MS/JRF:clp

Distribution:
Orig.- Addressee
1 - WE/3 (Puckett)
1 - MS

SECRET

201-168881

201-168881

14-00000

SECRET

C-1243 (Biladeau)
13 May 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

ATTENTION : WH/III/Mexico/Puckett

SUBJECT : Cover Story for Harold R. NOEMAYR (P)

1. Transmitted herewith is a copy of the cover story prepared for Harold R. Noemayr.

2. You are requested to review the cover story, as well as Noemayr's contract, to insure that the cover arrangements satisfy the requirements involved. If the cover story meets with your approval, please sign the copy of this memorandum in the space provided and return it to this office.

3. The copy of the cover story should be forwarded to the appropriate Chief of Station for retention in his files where it can be reviewed by Noemayr whenever necessary.

Thomas R. O'Range[signature]
JOHN G. SOUTHARD
CHIEF, CCB/NC

Attachment

SECRET

SECRET

Mr. Harold B. Hoemayr (P)
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Hoemayr:

Your Cover

1. Cover has been contrived for you with two notional organizations, Public Surveys Institute and Betwins Travel Folders.

2. Public Surveys Institute is a notional organization which is ostensibly engaged in conducting all types of polls to determine public reactions on matters of interest to its many clients. This organization is located at Suite 532 Fidelity Union Life Building, 1511 Bryan Street, Dallas, Texas, telephone: RIverside 1-3674. The Institute is directed by Albert E. Johnson, a fictitious individual.

3. The above address is in actuality that of a telephone answering service where all normal calls of inquiry are handled by unwitting personnel during the course of their regular duties. However, any call which requires special attention is referred to a cleared and witting individual who has contact with headquarters. This person is adequately prepared to acknowledge your relationship with your cover firm and also answer any inquiries concerning you or your cover organization.

4. In addition to the above arrangement, you also have a contract with another notional firm to submit photographs and reports which are to be utilized in the preparation of travel brochures. This firm is Betwins Travel Folders which is located at Room 2101, 50 East 42nd Street, New York, New York, Telephone: MUrray Hill 7-4473. Betwins is directed by Charles H. Betwin, a fictitious individual, and is engaged in the preparation of material for travel folders, brochures, package tours, etc.

5. The above address for Betwins is in actuality located in the office of a cleared attorney who is prepared to backstop both the cover firm and your association with Betwins Travel Folders. This person also has contact with headquarters.

6. You are engaged on a contract basis to provide photographs and reports relating to possible tours, places of interest, eating establishments, hotels, etc. This information is then edited by Betwins and sold to various clients who desire travel folders.

7. You also have legitimate cover in the form of your free lance photography and short story writing. The past publication of this work can be used as a supplement to your Betwin cover.

SECRET

SECRET

8. Your cover story for having been engaged by the Public Surveys Institute is as follows:

During a visit to the United States in May 1957, you became acquainted with Albert E. Johnson, the Director of Public Surveys Institute. Johnson indicated that he was interested in engaging the services of several people to organize and conduct polls in various Latin American areas.

Since you were already located in Cuba and had a knowledge of the language and customs, he expressed an interest in employing you in Cuba. As you felt this type of work would not conflict with your photographic efforts, you accepted the position effective May 1, 1957, in order to have an extra source of income.

Early in 1958, Johnson advised you that he had acquired several promising accounts who were interested in Mexico and he desired to transfer you to Mexico City since you had both experience and the necessary language qualification. You readily agreed to the transfer and planned to leave for Mexico during the latter part of May after a short vacation in the United States.

9. Your cover story for having been engaged by Betwins Travel Folders is as follows:

While visiting in the United States during April 1958 prior to your departure for Mexico, you became acquainted with Charles H. Betwin through Albert Johnson in New York. Betwin had seen some of your published work and expressed an interest in engaging your services on a part-time basis in Mexico. Since it meant an additional source of income as well as an opportunity to utilize your photographic talents, you readily accepted his offer. You were to photograph various places which were of interest to Betwin's clients and also forward information relating to prices, possible package tours, historical points of interest, etc.

<u>Documentation</u>

10. Correspondence reflecting your progress or difficulties encountered should be carried on between you and your cover firms. Such correspondence should be at intervals which would make your association with your cover firms appear to be the normal relationship of employer and employee.

SECRET

SECRET

Financial Arrangements

11. It is understood that there actually will be no disbursement of funds for salary or other purposes to you through your cover firm, and therefore, arrangements for salary payments are a matter of concern between you and your division case officer. However, precautions must be taken to insure that the arrangements made will not conflict with your cover story.

Taxes

12. Your income tax returns will be filed with the Internal Revenue Tax Unit stationed at headquarters in accordance with Agency FN 20-660-4.

Restrictions

13. Should you at any time feel the necessity for a modification of this cover arrangement, or supplementing the cover outside of the present arrangement, or if any problems arise affecting your cover, direct a routine communication to your cover firms outlining the need or situation and concurrently notify your case officer of the conditions so that he may check with headquarters. Subsequently, you will receive advice from your cover concerns as would be normal and also be provided with official compatible instructions from your case officer.

14. With regard to any persons desiring to apply for a position with either cover firm, you are instructed to state that to the best of your knowledge and belief, the firms are adequately staffed. However, in order the the matter may be treated casually, the inquirer may be told to submit his application to the New York or Texas address, which ever applies, where it will receive due consideration.

15. You understand that these cover facilities have been established through cleared cooperative individuals who are witting, but not actually a part of the Agency. These persons know that you are actually an employee of the Agency and, as such, an extremely high standard of conduct will be expected of you.

16. A copy of this cover story will be retained in the station files. You may refer to it when necessary.

____

DATE ________________________

SECRET

I certify that I have read and understand the above Letter of Cover Instructions regarding my cover and agree to comply with it in every respect.

____

DATE ______________________________

Distribution:
Orig.
cc: WH/III/Mexico/Puckett - 2114 B.H.

12 May 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

VIA: FI/OPS (Miss Paxton)

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA
Amendment of Contract

1. It is requested that Subject's contract effective 1 June 1957 be amended to include under Paragraph 4, Allowances, that Subject be entitled to the Educational Allowance for his children, effective from the initial date of the contract.

2. The above provision was inadvertently omitted from Subject's contract by the Area Desk, and since the Station notified Subject he was entitled to this allowance, it would be appreciated if this matter be corrected and the contract amended accordingly. The error came to the attention of the Area Desk when Subject's claim for educational allowance dated 18 April 1958, was turned down by Finance Division because of the aforementioned omission from the contract.

J. C. King
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
2 - Files

201-168881

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14-00000

025 ER/ER/cr'dm

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

DATE : 29 APRIL 1958

25

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI/OPS 2, S/C 2

APR 30 05 49 '58

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 22383

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 1468

RE: DIR 19152 (OUT 70226)*

1. CONCUR PARAS 2 AND 3 REF.

2. RECOMMEND USE JEREMY A TOLKING.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: * CONCERNED COVER SET UP BY HQS FOR THE TRAVEL OF NOEMAYR.

SECRET

201-168881

14-00000

582 MM/DJB/RJB

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : L. D. PUCKETT
UNIT : WHD
EXT : 2555
DATE : 25 APRIL 1958

582

ROUTING

APR 25 19 46Z 58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

	DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 70226

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI/OPS 2, S/C 2

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 19152

RE: A. DIR 16715 (OUT 64381)
B. MEXI 1446 (IN 20477)*
C. HMMW-5826

1. SUB REF C ASSIGNED NEW PSEUDO HAROLD R. NOEMAYR.

2. APPRECIATE REF B SUGGESTION. HOWEVER, HQS ARRANGING NOEMAYR BACKSTOPPED COVER AS REPRESENTATIVE NOTIONAL PUBLIC POLLING SERVICES FIRM IN DALLAS, WHICH NOEMAYR USED IN CUBA, AND PHOTOGRAPHER AND COLLECTOR OF TRAVEL DATA FOR NOTIONAL TRAVEL SERVICE FIRM IN NEW YORK WHICH SUPPLIES TRAVEL INFO FOR PACKAGE TOURS. ALSO, HE WILL CONTINUE SUBMIT ARTICLES TO BOYS LIFE MAGAZINE. BELIEVE ABOVE COVER WILL GIVE NOEMAYR GOOD FLEXIBILITY AND MOBILITY AND WILL ELIMINATE MEXI NEED ARRANGE LOCAL COVER.

3. NOEMAYR PLANS ETA MEXI END MAY AS TOURIST. WILL ARRANGE WORKING PAPERS THRU STATION RECOMMENDED MEXI LAW FIRM.

4. REQUEST MEXI CONCURRENCE PARAS 2, AND 3 ABOVE.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *STATION CONCURS JOURNALISTIC COVER.

COORDINATED IN DRAFT WITH: CI/ICD/WH/MR. ANDERSON

COORDINATED BY PHONE WITH: CCB/NC/MR. BILADEAU

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

NOEMAYR 201

201-168881

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482/RM/CG/

DATE : 24 APR 1958

482

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

APR 25 03 37 Z

CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS 2, S/C 2

IN 20477

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 1446

RE: DIR 16715 (OUT 64381 *)

1. MR JOSEPH RAVOTTO, DEPUTY PAO, WHO KNOWS BENJAMIN AS WELL AS ANY ONE IN EMBASSY STATES HE SOUND, RESPECTED NEWS PAPER MAN WITH GOOD MEXI SOCIAL AND OFFICIAL CONTACTS. OUR FILES, ODENVY AND BIOG SECTION EMB TRACES NEGATIVE.

2. STATION CONCURS JOURNALISTIC COVER.

3. IF HQS APPROVES STATION WILL HAVE TALK BENJAMIN IN ORDER FURNISH DETAILS RE REIMBURSEMENT, FLEXIBILITY, DURABILITY AND OTHER ASPECTS GOOD COVER. WOULD NOT MENTION ANY NAME OR TARGET.

4. IF BENJAMIN UNDER CONSIDERATION URGE VAIVADA BE PERMITTED MEET, EVALUATE AND AGREE COVER ACCEPTABLE. ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: * CONCERNED VAIVADA COVER.

SECRET

201-168881

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SECRET

24 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Commendation for Arthur G. VAIVADA

1. Arthur G. VAIVADA, a Career Agent, is hereby commended for his outstanding performance and devotion to duty in carrying out the assignment described below.

2. During the period 12 - 26 March 1958, VAIVADA, by working his way into the mountain stronghold of the Cuban rebel forces and winning their friendship, procured timely and valuable intelligence and operational information. While on this assignment, he worked under conditions of personal risk and hardship.

3. This memorandum is written to be included as a permanent record in Subject's personal file.

J C King

J. C. King
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

201-168851

SECRET

17 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Office of Security

VIA : Chief, CI/OA

FROM : C/WHD

SUBJECT : Harold R. HOEMAYR (ps)
C-25507
#112569

It is requested that the OA granted Harold R. HOEMAYR (ps), formerly called Arthur O. VAIVADA (ps), on 3 July 1957 for use in Cuba under Project AMPHORARCH, be amended to permit his use in Mexico City. HOEMAYR will be transferred PCS to Mexico City in May 1958 where he will be carried under Project LIEDGE which is being prepared for submission to FI/Projects for approval. Attached is a new PRQ Part II which covers our proposed use of HOEMAYR in Mexico.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/CI/OA
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - Mexico Chrono
1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/CZahrung:jck

201-168881

SECRET

16 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations, DD/P

VIA : Chief, Central Cover Branch

SUBJECT : Journalistic Cover for Harold R. [illegible] (ps)

1. Attached are the pertinent data pertaining to Subject's background as required by CSI 240-6.

2. It is requested that approval be granted for Subject's use of journalistic cover and that CCB/WC undertake the necessary arrangements to facilitate Subject's affiliation with appropriate news media.

J. C. KING
CHIEF
Western Hemisphere Division

CONCUR:

Chief, Central Cover Branch

APPROVED:

Chief of Operations, DD/P

SECRET

201-168881

(5) Outside interests, hobbies, etc: Athletics in general, outdoor life, photography, writing, jungle lore and chess.

(6) Objective personality evaluation: Subject is an astute, experienced and highly competent career agent. He possesses an attitude and a personality which are quite suitable for prolonged existence as a deep-cover asset. His personality is well suited for the many agent handling and management responsibilities that he will have in Mexico City.

(7) Agent's personal financial status: Solvent. He depends entirely on his salary.

(8) Previous foreign residence: Panama, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Cuba since 1940. Military service in the Far East from 1944-45.

(9) Area experience: Area experience as reflected in the foregoing information is extensive.

(10) Language qualifications: Subject has fluent Spanish and English.

C. Security Considerations

(1) Period of employment with CIA: June 1949 - present.

(2) Frequency of visits to CIA installations: Not applicable, since CIA contacts made in safehouses.

(3) Extent of knowledge of others of subject's CIA affiliation: His wife is aware that subject is engaged in intelligence activities, however, not necessarily for CIA. No other non-agency personnel are believed to be aware of subject's CIA status.

(4) Past intelligence connections: With U.S. Army and Air Force as indicated above.

(5) Use of CIA as credit reference: None

(6) Future plans for agent: Contemplate continuation in non-official cover status upon completion of current assignment.

(7) Emergency contact: Mrs. Lester E. Crosier, mother
1745 S. 26th St.
Omaha, 5, Neb.

(8) Personal insurance held and beneficiaries: None, except as provided for in his contract. His wife is his beneficiary.

(9) Incidents involving security in NOEHAIR's past employment with this Agency:

While there is no reason to believe that HOEMAYR has been exposed or compromised during his years of operating in Costa Rica, Guatemala or Cuba for CIA, the following incidents involving his security are set forth for your information:

a. HOEMAYR was forced to leave Guatemala prior to his scheduled departure when a Costa Rican source informed us that she had heard from high-level party sources that a "U.S. agent, specialist in Communist matters, had departed San Jose for Guatemala." This vague reference unfortunately coincided with subject's arrival in Guatemala.

b. In 1953 when subject was leaving Costa Rica, he made two cold approaches, one to a woman communist who was a leader in the Union de Mujeres. As subject left her home, the lady went immediately to Party headquarters and reported the incident. However, she was unable to describe HOEMAYR and so confused the approach story that it was useless to the Party and absolutely nothing ever came of the incident.

c. While in Cuba, HOEMAYR was working with a municipal committee youth communist who was a translator and did a story for HOEMAYR in Spanish. They met in each other's homes and HOEMAYR gave the Communist his business card (PSI). Sometime later, the Cuban military intelligence officer (SIM) picked up the Communist and searched his premises. Among other things, they found HOEMAYR's business card. When queried about this, the Communist simply told the officials he did translating for HOEMAYR. Nothing came of this incident and HOEMAYR could detect no surveillance of his person or his premises.

d. While the Cuban police will probably have HOEMAYR's name registered as having visited the Sierra Maestra region, the publication of his photographs and perhaps an article at a later date, should cover subject as a writer thereby minimizing any security hazard in this connection.

D. Operational Information

(1) Type of operation: FI. Subject will be an outside case officer for several station operations directed at the Mexican Communist and Marxist parties.

(2) Location: Mexico City and Guadalajara.

(3) Degree of mobility desired: Subject will spend most of his time in Mexico City but he should be free to travel to Guadalajara and other towns in Mexico.

(4) Special groups to be contacted: While subject will be concerned principally with the local Communist party, it is not necessary for him to have personal access to any special group.

(5) Approximate annual income to be attributed to cover: $10,000 (including allowances).

(6) Hours which must be devoted to operational duties: Subject should be able to devote at least 80% of his time to operational activity. His proposed cover will allow him a maximum of flexibility in arranging his cover and operational activity.

(7) Physical security requirements: No problems anticipated in this respect.

(8) Communications: Subject will utilize station communications facilities and will have regular contact with station personnel.

(9) Cover suggestions: In view of subject's previous journalistic experience, listed below, it is believed that it would be most appropriate for him to utilize cover connected with journalism. Probably the most advantageous arrangement would be for subject to become affiliated with one or two relatively small U.S. newspapers who do not currently have representatives in Mexico City. His contributions to such news media should be in the field of feature and human-interest stories, rather than of current events. His salary could, and probably should, be based on a stringer or piecemeal basis, rather than having a fixed income. Since subject is also a competent and experienced photographer, he could be expected to make photographic contributions to the newspapers or magazines he represents.

In addition to the above arrangements, it is suggested further that the notional cover (Public Surveys Institute, General Polling Service, Dallas, Texas) previously utilized by subject be continued. Subject maintains that he has developed a very sound and detailed cover based on this notional arrangement and that it would be very logical for him to use it in Mexico. Also, this additional cover arrangement would give subject another means of income together with added social flexibility and geographic mobility.

(10) Previous journalistic and writing experience:

NOEMAYR's formal journalistic training consists of a two-year correspondence course in fiction writing with the Palmer Institute of Authorship.

NOEMAYR has had three short stories published: "Old Saber Nose" in Boys Life, September 1956; "The Golden Discus," in

Boys Life, June 1958; and "Duelo a 300 Brazas," in Bohemia, a Havana magazine, on 9 September 1957. HOEMAYR has done quite a bit of photographic work. While working as a photographer and setting up a small studio in San Jose, Costa Rica, in 1952, he did some contract work for the Costa Rican Ministry of Agriculture. They were so pleased with his work that they hired him to set up their photographic laboratory in the Ministry. During this period he had some photographs published, mostly portrait work. Within the last month, HOEMAYR has had one photograph of Fidel CASTRO published under his by-line, in the New York Mirror and four similiar photographs have appeared in the New York Times. He expects that several more of his photographs on CASTRO and his revolutionaries will be published, if the news value of the movement continues.

HOEMAYR has several personal friends in the newspaper and journalistic fields. Among them are: Francis Smith, Fiction Editor of Boys Life; C. Gordon Fewey, Fiction Instructor, Palmer Institute of Authorship, Hollywood, California; CWO Francis Williams, technical writer, Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio; Andrew St. George, freelance writer and photographer who also works for Time-Life; Charles Schuman, staff writer and cameraman for UP; and Arthur Gregor, scientific writer, MIT and Nuclear Metals, Inc., Boston, Mass (married to his wife's sister).

14-00000

SECRET

DRAFT

Date: 16 April 1958

To: Honor Award Board

Through :

From: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Name: CROZIER, Ross L.

Position: Career Agent

Grade: GS-11

Office assigned to : WH/III

Station: Habana, Cuba

Legal Residence : Washington, D.C.

Citizenship : American, by birth

If any of the above items......

Recommended award: Intelligence Star and Certificate of Merit

Postumous: No.

Name of next of kin: Argentina de los Angeles Cordaro de Crozier

Relationship : wife

Address: Washington, D.C.

If previous recommendation were submitted...... Not applicable

---

Were you ~~witness~~ an eyewitness to the act? No

~~[illegible]~~

Personnel in immediate vicinity or.........

Not applicable

List any of the above persons.....

Not applicable

Condition under which act was persformed: 201-166881

Location: I. Sierra Maestra mountains, Cuba, 12-26 March 1958 Not applicable

II San Jose, Costa Rica, 1-2 May 1953 0400 AM.

14-00000

Prevailing geographic conditions and obsticles encountered:

The area in which Mr. Crozier undertook his mission is the Sierra Maestra mountains located in the Oriente Province, Cuba, where the Cuban rebel leader, Fidel Castro has been able to hide-out and survive the efforts of the Cuban Army to capture or kill him for over a year. The mountainous area is an extremely rough and wild terrain, primarily thickly vegetated with jungle growth. It is sparsely populated, and the only means of access are foot paths and mountain trails. The approaches to the area are heavily patrolled by Cuban Government troops who are on the alert to intercept all persons attempting to enter or leave the area.

Office, component, or station: Station, Habana, Cuba

Inclusive dates for which recommended: 12-26 March 1958

Assignment completed: Yes

Now in same or related assignment: No.

Achievement performed: x

I.

Towards the latter part of 1957, as a result of an increasing number of alarming reports concerning alleged Communist penetration and support of Fidel Castro's 26 of July Movement operating in the Sierra Maestra mountains, the Western Hemisphere Division became aware of the urgent need to mount an operation to acquire first-hand and reliable information and data on the Cuban rebel forces. In early January 1958, Mr. Crozier volunteered to undertake the precarious mission to contact Fidel Castro in his mountain retreat in the Sierra Maestras. He arranged for his free

SECRET

passage into the Sierras through contacts within the 26 of July Movement which the Station developed earlier. After the necessary arrangements, Mr. Crozier left La Habana on 5 April 1958 for Santiago de Cuba, from where he left for the Sierras under the escort of a rebel guide who conducted him safely through the Cuban Army lines. During the course of approximately twenty days' stay at the ~~mountain hideout~~ of Castro's headquarters, Mr. Crozier was exposed to many hardships and great personal risks. On 26 March 1958, Mr. Crozier accompanied Fidel Castro and a force of ~~xxxxx~~ 200 men on a dawn attack on the town of Manzanillo, where he broke off contact with the Cuban rebels and returned to his base in La Habana. Mr. Crozier successfully accomplished his mission by reporting considerable intelligence and operational ~~xxx~~ information of noteworthy value, together with an excellent photographic coverage of his trip.

These exploits ~~together with the achievement set forth below~~, clearly demonstrate ~~denotes~~ Mr. Crozier's adaptability in precarious situations, as well as a deep devotion to his work and to CIA.

II

On 1 May 1953, Mr. Crozier..........

(Copy attached report)

Leave space after Section II

On 1 May 1953, MR. CROZIER was in charge of an attempt to physically penetrate the home of Manuel MORA Valverde, President of the Costa Rican Communist Party for the purpose of obtaining documents which could be used to prove the Communist Party's control over the Partido Progresista Independiente, a front which had been organized to participate in the 1953 elections. The sub-agent who was to actually perform the penetration failed to appear and realizing the urgency of the operation, CROZIER voluntarily + on his own initiative made the penetration. At the time ~~sixtxxx~~ (0400) he entered the MORA house, the entire family was known to be sleeping in the rear part of the house. Working quietly and quickly under conditions of ~~considerable~~ great personal risk, Mr. CROZIER succeeded in carrying away approximately 85 percent of the legal PPI documentation and other records as well as a large amount of Communist Party documents such as minutes to meetings, code words, etc. A few days later a high level Party penetration reported that the PPI may have been eliminated from the electoral scene due to the almost impossible task of reconstructing the legally required records. However, the PPI was ~~xxxxxx~~ able to reconstruct the records and registered by the deadline of 26 May. According to the Station, "this operation provided the station with a bulk of compromising documents, seriously hampered PPI activities because of missing records, almost eliminated them from the scene, spread distrust, suspicion, and confusion among the Political Commission, and, because it was finally attributed to Figuerista ~~xxxxxx~~ elements, enraged the Communists against FIGUERES and destroyed any

SECRET

possibility of an agreement with or support for FIGUERES." (HRS-A-212). On 29 May a careful slection of the more compromising documents obtained by CROZIER's penetration was mailed to the head of the Legislative Commission investigating the Communist affiliations of the PPI. On ~~May~~ 5 June an additional batch of the documents were mailed. These papers were selected for their authenticity, i.e. carbon copies of letters previously sent to the Assembly by the PPI, in order to establish the validity of the documents. On 24 July 1953 the President of Costa Rica signed a bill outlawing the PPI. The participation of Mr. CROZIER in the campaign to prevent the PPI from becoming a legal party is considered to have been instrumental in its success.

14-00000

increasing reports concerning
communist influence and penetration

As a result of the WHD's need
to acquire first handed and
reliable information and data on
Fidel Castro and his rebel
forces operating in the Sierra
Maestra.

As a result of an increasing influx
of alarming reports concerning possible
Communist ~~influence~~ penetration
and support of Fidel CASTRO's
~~the~~ 26 July movement operating
in the Sierra Maestra, WHD became
aware of the need to mount an
operation to acquire first handed
and reliable information on the
rebel forces.

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

CASE OFFICER: L. D. Puckett
DIVISION: WH
INSTRUCTIONS: Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and one copy for preparation of contract.
TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 2555 or 3162
DATE: 16 April 1958

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME [X] PSEUDO [ ] TRUE — Harold E. NOEMAYR
2. PROJECT — LIEGE
3. ALLOTMENT NO.
4. SLOT NO.
5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES — Arthur G. VAIVADA
6. INDIVIDUAL IS PRESENTLY ENGAGED, OR HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY [X] YES [ ] NO (If yes, describe and include salary) — Career Agent GS-12 $7,570.00
7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date) — CSA 3 July 1957 (Amendment in process to include Mexico City)
8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" [X] YES [ ] NO
9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER CONTROLLED CONDITIONS I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT [ ] YES [ ] NO X
10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.) — Career Agent

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP — USA
12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN [ ] YES [ ] NO
13. AGE — 35
14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year) — 20 June 1922
15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country) — Omaha, Nebraska
16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country) — Alexandria, Virginia
17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate) [ ] SINGLE [X] MARRIED [ ] WIDOWED [ ] ANNULLED [ ] SEPARATED [ ] DIVORCED
18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP: — Three, wife and two children
19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY [ ] YES [X] NO RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE — No
21. VETERAN — Yes
22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat)
23. BRANCH OF SERVICE — Army - US Air Force
24. RANK OR GRADE — Tech Sgt
25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE [ ] YES [X] NO
26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA [ ] YES [ ] NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY — $7,570.00 p/a
28. POST DIFFERENTIAL — None
29. COVER (Breakdown, if any) — Income derived from cover will be turned in to Station
30. TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY COVER [ ] YES [X] NO

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS — 0.00 p/a
32. POST — None
33. OTHER — Temporary living allowance, if required, not to exceed additional $136.00; Educational (2 children) $504.0
34. T (Breakdown, if any) — None

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES [ ] PCS [ ] DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL FOREIGN OPERATIONAL
36. WITH DEPENDENTS [X] YES [ ] NO
37. HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS TO BE SHIPPED — Wash, D.C. to Mexico City [ ] NO
38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED [ ] YES [ ] NO
39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL [ ] YES [ ] NO
40. DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH

Wife, Costa Rican citizen, born 15 March 1918

Son, [redacted], born 4 September 1949 - US citizen

Daughter, [redacted], born 24 June 1951 - US citizen

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH [X] CIA REGULATIONS [ ] COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION
43. ENTERTAINMENT
44. OTHER — of travel in Mexico. Yes, as

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.

CASE OFFICER	DIVISION
L. D. Puckett	WHD
TELEPHONE EXTENSION	DATE
2555 or 3162	16 April 1958

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS (See Part XIV of Confidential Fund Regulations or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel. If medical benefits are requested, see R 15-230 or successor regulations.)

Annual leave
Sick leave
Death and disability benefits equal to those authorized under Federal Employees Compensation Act.
Missing Persons Act.
Civil Service Retirement
Regular Staff Employees medical benefits for employee and dependents as stated in R-15-230 (Subject will meet requirements when completes covert medical on 21 April 1958)

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check): [X] PROPOSED [ ] ESTABLISHED

48. TYPE (Check): [ ] PROPRIETARY [ ] SUBSIDIZED [ ] CULTURAL [ ] EDUCATIONAL [X] COMMERCIAL [ ] MILITARY [ ] TOURIST [X] OTHER Notional

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS: [ ] YES [X] NO [ ] COMPLETE [ ] PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.): [X] TOTAL [ ] PARTIAL [ ] NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION: DAYS ___ MONTHS ___ YEARS 2

52. EFFECTIVE DATE: 1 May 1958

53. RENEWABLE: [X] YES [ ] NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE (Number of days):)

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION: [X] YES [ ] NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION (PI, PP, other): PI

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Case officer for Communist Party operations in Mexico.

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Contract and career agent since June 1949.
Intelligence assignments in Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Cuba.

59. EDUCATION (Check Highest Level Attained): GRADE SCHOOL — HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE — TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE — BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE — COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE — COLLEGE No degree — COLLEGE DEGREE — POST GRADUATE — MA — PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY (Check Appropriate Degree Competency)

LANGUAGE	SPEAK	WRITE	READ
English	X (fluent)	X (fluent)	X (fluent)
Spanish	X (fluent)	X (fluent)	X (fluent)

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: USA

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

Extensive area knowledge of Central America and Caribbean areas. Has resided in Latin America since 1940.

SECTION XV — PRIOR EMPLOYMENT

63. JOB AND SALARY PRIOR TO SERVICE FOR CIA

194[illegible]
A[illegible]
Jan 1946[illegible]
Apr 1946-[illegible]

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (Use other side if necessary)

[ ] OVER

APPROVAL

65. TYPED NAME — SIGNATURE — ... — SIGNATURE OF SENIOR STAFF OFFICER

SECRET

15 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: S.O./Investigations and Support

SUBJECT : Mr. Charles Rico

SUBJECT : Harold E. [illegible] (p), formerly Arthur G. FAITADA (p), S.O. #112569, C-29537

1. Reference is made to the telephone conversation between Mr. Rico of S.O. and Mr. Sulo of WH/III/Mexico (x3162, x2555) concerning an LCFLUTTER examination of Subject. The time agreed upon for this examination was 0930 hours on 24 April 1958.

2. A conference will be held at 2611 I Building at 1500 hours 21 April between the desk case officer and Mr. Rico.

E. H. Dahlgren,
Chief, WH/III

WH/III/Mexico/ISulcings

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - WH/Mexico/Chrono
1-Subject

SECRET

201-168881

14-00000

FILE NO. 201-32723

ORIG : [illegible] 563
UNIT : WH/3/CARIBBEAN
EXT : 2056
DATE : 1 JULY 1958

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, S/C 2

RE [illegible] (check one)
No CS Record Value. Destroy.
RI file this copy as indicated ✓
Branch copy filed as indicated
RE Indexing (check one)
Marked ___ None required
Signature

JUL 1 21 10:30
[illegible] CABLE SECT.

DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
ROUTINE	X	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 95479

TO MEXI INFO HAVA CITE DIR 29303

REQUEST HAROLD R. NOEMAYR REPORT TO HQS IMMEDIATELY FOR CONSULTATION PRIOR TO APPROX TWO WEEKS TDY CUBA TO REESTABLISH CONTACT FIDEL CASTRO. ABOVE MISSION RELATED TO KIDNAPPING OF U. S. CITIZENS. CALL MR. ROBERT REYNOLDS ON ARRIVAL. ADVISE ETA.

END OF MESSAGE

RI COPY

WH/3

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	
RI/TY	
DESTROY	
RI/FI	

AN
AB
FI

201-32723

WH/3/MEXI

for J. C. KING, C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

21 JUL 58

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-168881

FORM 2-58 1389

Mr. Arthur G. Vaivada

Dear Mr. Vaivada:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 June 1957.

Effective 15 April 1958, said contract is amended by revising the first sentence of paragraph two (2) entitled "Compensation" to read as follows:

> " In full consideration for your services as a Career Agent, you will be compensated at the rate of $7570 per annum, GS-12. "

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

Arthur G. Vaivada
Arthur G. Vaivada

WITNESS: [signature]

APPROVED:

____

15 April 58

201-168881

SECRET

15 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

THROUGH: FI/OPS/Projects
Attention: Miss Paxton

SUBJECT: Arthur G. Vaivada - Amendment of Contract

1. It is requested that Arthur G. Vaivada's contract, effective 1 June 1957, be amended by deleting the first sentence of Paragraph 2 (Compensation) and substituting in lieu thereof the following:

"2. Compensation. In full consideration for your services as a Career Agent, you will be compensated at the rate of $7570 per annum, GS-12."

2. All other terms and conditions of the original contract remain in full force and effect.

J. C. King
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

SECRET

11 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI/Staff

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA - Request for Promotion

1. It is requested that Arthur G. Vaivada, a Career Agent, be promoted from GS-11 to grade GS-12 for his outstanding performance in carrying out a precarious mission in line with the objectives of Project AMPHODARCH, in which he is the Principal Agent.

2. In early January 1958, Vaivada volunteered to undertake a mission to contact Cuban rebel leader Fidel Castro Ruz in the Sierra Maestra mountains in south-eastern Cuba. He arranged for his free passage into the Sierras through contacts within the 26 July Movement which he and the Station developed earlier. After the necessary arrangements, Vaivada left La Habana on 5 April 1958 for Santiago de Cuba, from where he left for the Sierras under the escort of rebel guides. In the course of approximately twenty days' stay at the mountain hideout of Castro's headquarters, during which time he was exposed to many hardships and great personal risks, he accompanied Castro and a force of about 200 rebels on their dawn attack on the town of Manzanillo on 26 March 1958. At Manzanillo, Vaivada broke off contact with the Cuban rebels and returned to his base in Habana.

3. During his relatively short stay in the Sierra Maestra mountains, Vaivada was able to gather considerable intelligence and operational information of noteworthy value, together with an excellent photographic coverage of his trip.

4. This exploit is another achievement to be added to the impressive past performances of Arthur G. Vaivada, who has always shown a deep devotion to his work and to the Agency.

5. Vaivada was born on 20 June 1922, and has been with CIA since 1949. He has been a career agent since 1 June 1957, and was promoted to the grade of GS-11 on 1 June 1957. His tour of duty in Cuba was from August 1954 until 31 March 1958.

J. C. KING
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

Journalistic Background - AGV   14 April 1958.

1) Employment with dates: None (Free lance)

2) Three short stories: "Old Saber Nose" pub BOYS LIFE, Sept 1956
"The Golden Discus" pub BOYS LIFE, June 50.
"Duelo a 300 Brazas" pub BOHEMIA, Havana, Sept 9, 1957.

3) Contributions - Photo: While working as photographer and setting up a small studio in San Jose, Costa Rica in 1952, I did some contract work for the Costa Rican Ministry of agriculture. They were pleased enough with the results to employ me for purpose of setting their photo laboratory within the ministry. During this time I also had some photos published - but cannot recall where and when - mostly portrait work.
Currently, I have had one photo (CASTRO Rev) come out in NY Mirror and about four come out in New York Times. About five more will be published if the news value of this movement holds up.

4) Connections - persons known: Francis Smith, Fiction Editor BOYS LIFE. (Correspondence only for about three years now.)
G. Gordon Dewey, Fiction Instruction, Palmer Institute of Authorship, Hollywood 28, California.
CWO Francis Williams, Technical Writer, Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio.
Andrew St. George, Time-Life & Freelance writer and photographer.
Charles Schuman, staff writer and cameraman for UP, currently working out of Havana, Cuba.
Arthur Gregor, Scientific writer, MIT and Nuclear Metals, Inc., Boston, Mass. (Married to wife's sister).

Prepared by VAIVADA Tinsley

201-168851

14 April 1958.

5) Societies - Memberships: Completed a two year correspondence course in fiction writing - Palmer Institute of Authorship.

Member of the American Legion - Havana.

Assessment (sec)

a) Last assignment: Arrived Havana in August 1954 with a one-year scholarship at the University of Habana (Pan American Foundation, University of Florida at Gainesville). This cover adequately set up and well back stopped. I travelled to Gainesville, met the man (Curt Wilgus) on that end of the line and the only documentation necessary was a series of letters from the Foundation that indicated my efforts to obtain the scholarship and finally their grant. After arriving, however, and matriculating at the U of H, it became immediately obvious that the nature of my target was such that my presence within the university was more a handicap than an asset. After a few months at the university, I abandoned studies (it was becoming increasingly difficult anyway due to political disturbences) and turned to freelance photography and writing for my cover. For several months I had the photography on just enough of a paying basis that would satisfy any security surveillance.

Photography and writing was definitely superior to university as cover, since it then gave me the opportunity to work inconspicuously on penetrations within the university.

Concerning general security aspects of that assignment, there was that one incident with the threat to exposure coming out of the death of an amphodarch key agent and my proximity throughout the entire incident. However, there has never been any indication that I was exposed or compromised. The station in Cuba felt that if I could return and operate as free from surveillance as I did, that certainly Cuban security people did not have anything compromising on me.

b) Previous assignments: To the best of my knowledge, I have never been exposed or c ompromised during the years of operation in Costa Rica, Guatemala and Cuba. There was an incident which prompted an early departure from Guatemala for personal and operational security reasons - but again, there was never any further indication as to the validity of the warning. What occurred - the Costa Rican source MARY - apparently learned from high level party sources that "a US agent, specialist in communist matters, had departed San Jose for Guatemala" and of course, this vagery unfortunately coincided with my arrival at Guatemala. At any rate, I was doing very little at Guatemala and would have departed anyway in view of the deteriorating situation of June 1954.

Naturally, there are many intangibles involved with operating over long periods (almost/years in Cuba) in one place, and then travelling back and forth between areas of previous assignment (Costa Rica), and last but not least, cultivating communists in all these places. The question becomes, How ~~through~~ thorough are these people? Does a Cuban CP character communicate with a Guatemalan or Costa Rican along lines of security, of movement of Americans in these areas, and actual approaches made ? Probably not, at their best, the administration is hapnazard. A typical example: Once, in 1953, when I was leaving Costa Rica, I made a couple of cold approaches - one was with woman communist, a leader in the Union de Mujeres Carmen Liza. I walked away from her house - she evidently got a taxi right behind me - and she went straight to the headquarters and reported to Manuel Mora. But she couldn't describe me - had the story so confused (the approach story) as to render it useless to them, and absolutely nothing ever came of the incident. (By the same token, it would have been a different story in Cuba.)

Although, even in Cuba, there is not persistence or perseverance in investigations. I was working with a municipal committee youth communist - he is a translator and did a story for me in Spanish - and he was visiting my home (twice) while I went to his apartment about four times. I gave him my business card (Dallas Corporation) and some time later a SIM net picked him - searched his premises - and among other things, turned up my business card. He was queried on it and stated that he was simply translating for me. Now this boy is a known communist, although they could get nothing on him at this time - but such an incident/should have provoked at least a casual surveillance of me or my premises. Nothing came of this incident either - and the station down there would known.

Lastly, the mission up to the Sierra Maestra has security implifations. Not so much concerning communism, but its reasonable to assume that Cuban security people will come up with my name as having been up there. However, with the pictures published, perhaps an article later, there should be enough cover as a writer to neutralize any hazard there.

Past employment (with us)

a) Company or foundation: Scholarship from Panamerican Foundation at University of Florida at Gainesville, from July 1954 to June 1955.

Then the notional cover set up last year (May 1957) was the Public Surveys Institute, General Polling Service, 532 Fidelity Union Life Bldg., 1511 Bryan street, Dallas, Texas. This arranged so that any mail or telephone to the above corporation would confirm my company connections and could even be used as a credit reference if necessary. This arrangement was quite satisfactory.

b) The security aspects of the Dallas corporation were very good I believe. Since freelance writing at best is considered a weak cover, this corporation connection gave me a more solid standing with more serious creditors such as landlords, banks and the larger merchandizing houses. In addition to the above, this cover was utilized very conveniently in operational instances where a realistic approach story was needed. Communists were approached on the basis of a political polling - this could be narrowed right down to soliciting information on the communists party as a political party. Again, it was always nice to have a business card with adresses and telephone numbers that could be given as immediate reference to any type of security interrogation.

Estimate of journalistic capability:

While my contributions in fiction have been principally juvenile, my writing training has come largely over a period of years at reportorial writing. Since I have some experience as a photographer also, it is convenient to relate the two, and possibly my best field would be feature and article writing. However, while on the mission with the Castro revolutionary movement, I associated with various members of the press and had no difficulty whatsoever in passing as one of them. Given an adequate period for familiarization, I feel that I could just about move into any press or writing slot that did not require a great deal of copy or tight dealines.

AGV

14-00000

DESENSITIZED

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

mr. Dahlgren

DISPATCH NO. HKH-A-4306

Field File No. 23-8?/2-180

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DESENSITIZED

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 10 April 1958

FROM : Chief of Station, Habana

INFO: Chief of Base, Santiago de Cuba

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/Arthur G. VAIVADA

SPECIFIC— Commendation for Successful Completion of Mission to Sierra Maestra

Action Required: At Headquarters' Discretion

1. The writer wishes to commend Station and Base personnel whose work contributed to the successful preparation, mounting, and execution of the clandestine operation that recently placed a KUBARK Career Agent, Arthur G. VAIVADA, in the Sierra Maestra headquarters of Dr. Fidel CASTRO Ruz for sixteen days in March 1958. This mission resulted in acquisition by KUBARK of considerable important and timely information regarding the CASTRO revolutionary movement that was being urgently requested by customer agencies. In the writer's opinion the operation was a team effort. Giving credit to the staff personnel will in no way detract from the praiseworthy performance of VAIVADA himself.

2. With regard to VAIVADA the personal courage and professional ability as an intelligence officer demonstrated on this mission were of the highest order and should be highly commended. Headquarters is aware, as is the Station, that VAIVADA is desirous of acquiring staff agent status with KUBARK. The writer believes that his desires in this respect should be given consideration as part of any action taken in recognition of VAIVADA's services in the subject operation.

3. Station and Base personnel directly concerned with laying on this operation, arranging for proper briefing and support of VAIVADA, and recovering him securely when he left the Sierra Maestras, were Humphrey I. EBERWEIN, James R. PALINGER, and Nelson L. RAYNOCK.

Sherwood P. Rochon

Sherwood P. Rochon

RECLASSIFIED

RI/[illegible]	✓
RI/[illegible]	✓
201-168881	
RI/Files	

10 April 58
201-168881

Distribution:
3 - Washington
1 - Santiago de Cuba
2 - Files

DESENSITIZED

DESENSITIZED

SPR/gwn

9 April 1958

FORM NO. 51-28A MAR. 1949

HKH-A-4306

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

?? COPY

14-00000

ORIG : L. D. PUCKETT
UNIT : WHD 656
EXT : 2555
DATE : 9 APRIL 1958

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING: VAIVADA COVER

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI/OPS 2, S/C 2

DEFERRED	PRIORITY
X ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

OUT64381

TO MEXI | INFO | CITE DIR 16715

MEXI 1017 (IN 26340)*

1. DISCUSSIONS WITH ARTHUR G. VAIVADA INDICATE JOURNALISTIC COVER SUITABLE FOR MEXI ASSIGNMENT. THIS BASED HIS PUBLISHED FICTIONAL AND NEWS STORIES DURING PAST FEW YEARS AND PUBLISHED NEWS PHOTOS TAKEN DURING RECENT VISIT FIDEL CASTRO CAMP.

2. HQS CURRENTLY INVESTIGATING U.S. COVER ARRANGEMENTS. HOWEVER, TO INSURE CONSIDERATION ALL POSSIBILITIES, REQUEST STATION OPINION USE ROBERT SPIERS BENJAMIN (REQUEST CURRENT TRACES), WHO KNOWN TO NAUMAN.

3. REQUEST STATION CONCURRENCE VAIVADA USE JOURNALISTIC COVER.

END OF MESSAGE.

C/S COMMENT: *VAIVARDA ACCEPTABLE, SUGGESTED ARRIVE MEXI ON 1 MAY FOR ORIENTATION.

COORDINATION WITH:
WH/III/CARIBBEAN
DC/CI/ICD
CCB/NC/Mr. Lukoskie by phone

J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS
S-E-C-R-E-T

R. H. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

201-168881

SECRET

8 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: General: Training/Briefing of DDP Personnel

Specific: Briefing of Ross L. Crozier, who is scheduled to be the new undercover CP Officer for Station Mexico City.

1. In Havana, Cuba on 5 March 1958, I briefed Ross L. Crozier concerning:

a) his proposed new assignment in Mexico; and

b) Headquarters desire that he receive special briefings from CI/ICD prior to going to Mexico.

2. Crozier stated that he was very glad to receive the briefing because he had not had a clear picture of what the proposed assignment in Mexico involved. He was pleased to find out that it was a pure penetration assignment. He also responded enthusiastically to the idea of receiving Headquarters briefings prior to going to the Field. He stated that he would like to have a short leave in Costa Rica prior to receiving the Headquarters briefing.

3. On 2 April 1958 in Washington, D.C., the undersigned and Mr. E. L. Anderson, Chief, CI/ICD-WH, briefed Crozier further concerning the matter discussed above, reaffirming our keen interest in the assignment. Mr. Anderson pointed out to him that his (Crozier's) "partner" in Mexico City (the inside CP officer), was in Costa Rica

SECRET

201-168881

and that if securely feasible it would be a good idea for the two men to meet there. Mr. Crozier stated that he thought that it could be done readily and securely as he will contact the Embassy normally as an American citizen and he is well acquainted with COS, San Jose. One of the elements in our plan for intensification of the CPPP in Mexico is that these two very capable officers should get to know one another well in order to function smoothly and efficiently as a team.

4. Mr. Crosier stated that he plans to return to Washington, D.C., from his leave in Costa Rica during the approximate period 20-25 April 1958. Chief, CI/ICD-WH is handling arrangements for the briefing of Mr. Crozier.

Paul J. Burke
Deputy Chief, CI/ICD

cc: WH/Mexi

Activities of Fidel Castro's Rebel Forces in Cuba



The rebel leader's men set up a printing shop in upper Sierra Maestra in Oriente Province. They have three typewriters, a small press and mimeograph machine for pamphlets.



Mule train carries tanks of oxygen and acetylene for welding bombs, grenades and armor

8, 1958.

CONFLICT IN CUBA GAINS IN VIOLENCE

Army Reports Widespread Clashes—Thirty Rebels Listed as Captured

Special to The New York Times.

HAVANA, April 7—Fighting between Government troops and rebels under the command of Fidel Castro has intensified in Oriente Province in the last forty-eight hours, official sources said today.

A Cuban Army communiqué said seven rebels under the command of Raul Castro, a younger brother of the rebel chief, were killed in a clash in northern Oriente Province. The communiqué said thirty of the insurgent band were captured and the others were scattered and cut off from the main body of rebels in the Sierra Maestra.

This was the first announcement by the army of the capture of any rebels. It is believed here that the army has been following a policy of taking no prisoners.

Army Reports Plane Downed

Army headquarters also reported that troops had shot down a C-46 plane carrying arms and ammunition to the rebels. The announcement said the plane crashed and burned, killing the pilot and crewmen. Some unburned arms were found in the wreckage, the army said.

[A rebel announcement said insurgent forces had burned a disabled plane Friday near Manzanillo after it had landed with reinforcements and arms for Señor Castro's men, The Associated Press reported. The announcement did not say where the plane had come from.]

Another clash between Government troops and rebels occurred Sunday at Dos Palmas near Santiago de Cuba. The army asserted that a number of rebels had been killed or wounded and that seven jeeps

Continued on Page 3, Column 5

Dom L. Crosier

SECLUDED REBEL ARMS SHOP: In this enclosure in Cuba's Sierra Maestra, so remote that even mules cannot reach it, weapons are repaired for forces of Fidel Castro.

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Continued on Page 3, Column 5

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 1958.

Cohen

CONFLICT IN CUBA GAINS IN VIOLENCE

Continued From Page 1

and trucks, eleven rifles and some ammunition had been seized.

Skirmish in Majagua

Government forces also reported a skirmish in the Majagua district near San Luis, near Santiago de Cuba. The army said the troops killed two rebels and seized three jeeps and some arms and ammunition. One soldier was wounded.

Señor Castro declared "total war" on the Government of President Fulgencio Batista starting April 1. The rebel chief has said he would call a general revolutionary strike at the "opportune" moment. So far no strike has occurred.

President Batista told newsmen yesterday he was confident that his forces would defeat the rebels, but he conceded it could be a long struggle.

Meanwhile, rebel sources in Havana declared an announcement by army headquarters Saturday that a rebel band led by Señor Castro had been cut off from the Sierra Maestra was without foundation. These sources said that Señor Castro's officers had decided more than three months ago that he should not lead any guerrilla expeditions but should remain in his headquarters in the Sierra Maestra.

An official of the Consolidated Railway Company of Camaguey, which serves the eastern half of the island, also denied reports that the railroad's employes had gone out on strike. The official said the rebels had burned so many railway bridges in the eastern part of Camaguey Province that it was impossible to maintain train service.

In Havana, the police announced the arrest of eighteen youths accused of terrorism and attempts to provoke a general strike. Authorities said some of the youths were Communists and others were members of the Authentic organization headed by former President Carlos Prios Socarras.

Michigan Students Freed

HAVANA, April 7 (UP)—Two University of Michigan student newspaper men arrested because they were suspected of making contact with Cuban rebels were released today in Santiago de Cuba.

James Elsman and Barton Hathwaite, who had been picked up at their hotel yesterday by army intelligence officers, were freed when Park Fields Wollam, United States consul in Santiago, intervened.

The two youths, correspondents of The Michigan Daily, a student publication, had arrived in Santiago from Havana a few hours before their arrest.

Miami Newsman Arrested

MIAMI, April 7 (UP)—Television station WCKT reported today that Ben Silver, one of its newsmen, missing in Cuba since Saturday, had been reported under arrest at Santiago de Cuba.

Gene Strul, news director of the station, said the United States Embassy had found after an investigation that Mr. Silver was "safe." The embassy said he would be released and returned to Havana tomorrow.

Sam L. Cramer

SECLUDED REBEL ARMS SHOP: In this enclosure in Cuba's Sierra Maestra, so remote that even mules cannot reach it, weapons are repaired for forces of Fidel Castro.

201-165331

14-00000

SECRET

DD/P 3-8523

4 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations, DD/P

VIA : CCB/NC

SUBJECT : Sale of News Photographs by Arthur G. VAIVADA (ps)

1. It is requested that Arthur G. VAIVADA be granted permission to sell news photographs of Fidel CASTROS' Cuban Revolutionary Group to an appropriate United States news agency.

2. VAIVADA is a Career Agent who has very recently returned from a PCS assignment in Cuba. At the direction of the Western Hemisphere Division, VAIVADA spent the last three weeks of his Cuba assignment in the Sierra Maestra camp of Fidel CASTRO for the purpose of collecting current intelligence information on CASTRO's activities. As a result of his notional cover as a representative of a U. S. public opinion polling service, VAIVADA was able to take numerous photographs of current news interest. This Division considers the sale of these photographs as an integral part of the cover backstopping necessary to protect the identity of VAIVADA's actual Sponsor (CIA) from three U. S. news media correspondents who were with VAIVADA during his visit with CASTRO. Also, the sale of these photographs would supplement a future news media cover for VAIVADA in his forthcoming PCS assignment in Mexico City.

3. All money resulting from the sale of these photographs will be retained by the Agency.

for R. Gomez
J. C. KING
CHIEF
WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

CONCUR:

for Fred R. Youngblood
CHIEF, CCB/NC

APPROVED:

for T. M. Caramessine
COPS
4 April 1958

SECRET

201-168881

14-00000

187 SE/LSB/435

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

DATE : 31 MARCH 58

187

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : COP, CI, CI/OPS, S/C 2

MAR 31 21 10:52

PRIORITY

IN 13494

TO DIR INFO CITE HAVA 235

1. VAIVADA ARRIVING HQS EVENING 31 MARCH. WILL CONTACT CHAPRON.

2. ADVISING AMB PER DIR 12288 (OUT 54133)*APRIL 1 UNLESS ADVISED TO CONTRARY. RELEASED 311703Z.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: * VIEW SENSITIVITY AND POSSIBILITY LEAK TO PRESS BY EMBASSY, HQS PERFER NO MENTION VAIVADA MISSION UNTIL ITS COMPLETION.

SECRET

201-168881

14-00000

330 MRL/LSB

DATE : 27 MARCH 1958

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

MAR 27 22 18:50
REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 49228

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : S/C 2

TO DIR INFO CITE HAVA 232

RAYNOCK RECEIVED NOTE FROM VAIVADA 26 MAR. WILL LEAVE SIERRAS VIA MANZANILLO 28-31 MAR AND CALL RAYNOCK FROM THERE.

COMMENT. REBEL ACTIVITY MANZANILLO AREA MAY DELAY CONTACT.

271630Z.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

201-168851

057/ES/OT

DATE : 10 MARCH 1958

57

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

MAR 11 06 58Z 58

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 41341

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : COP, CI, CI/OPS, S/C 2

TO SACU INFO DIR CITE HAVA 189

ADVISE IMMEDIATELY WHEN YOU CAN CONFIRM VAIVADA HAS REACHED DESTINATION.-

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

201-168871

14-00000

706/JW/DB/GHS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : R. REYNOLDS
UNIT : WH/III/CARIBBEAN
EXT : 2056
DATE : 5 MARCH 1958

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

TO : HAVANA

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : FI/OPS 2, OP 2, S/C 2

MAR 5 23 00 58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT51534

TO HAVA INFO MEXI CITE DIR 11212

RE HAVA 179 (IN 38161)(NOT SENT MEXI) *
MEXI 1017 (IN 26340)(NOT SENT HAVA)

1. FOR HAVA: LEAVE APPROVED.

2. FOR MEXI: VAIVADA ETA MEXI IS 20 MAY.

END OF MESSAGE

*C/S COMMENT: VAIVADA REQUESTED 15-20 DAYS LEAVE COSTA RICA PRIOR ARRIVAL MEXI. PAPATE INTERVIEWED HIM 3 MARCH.

5 March 58
201-168881

WH/III/MEXICO
WH/Support
COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER



Photos teken by Arthur G. Vaivada at Hqs. of Fidel CASTRO's forces in Sierra Maestra, March 1958.

For 201 file.

201-168551

14-00000

14-00000

14-00000

14-00000

14-00000

FILE NO. 201-168881

663 ER/DB/MCB

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : R. REYNOLDS
UNIT : WH/III/CARIBBEAN
EXT : 2056
DATE : 27 FEBRUARY 1958

S-E-C-R-E-T

TO : HABANA

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI/OPS 2, S/C 2

BY 663
No CS Record value. Destroy.
RI file this copy as indicated ✓
Branch copy filed as indicated
RE Indexing (check one).
Marked ___ None required ✓
Signature: [signature]

ROUTING

	DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 99340

TO HAVA INFO CITE DIR 10195

RE DIR 06765 (OUT 91241) *

REQUEST REPLY

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *HQS DESIRED TO ASSIGN VALVADA PCS TO MEXI AS CP PENETRATION OPS CASE OFFICER UNDER UNOFFICIAL COVER AFTER COMPLETION CASTRO MISSION AND APPROX ONE MONTHS ORIENTATION AT HQS. QUERIED IF HE COULD COMPLETE MISSION AND MEET SCHEDULE.

RI COPY

Z

RI/Files

27 Feb. 58

[signature]
for J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

[signature]
R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

201-168881

505 BC/JM/LR

ORIG : H. O. MACAULEY
UNIT : WH/III
EXT : 2056
DATE : 10 FEBRUARY 1958

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

584 SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : HABANA
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : COP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS 2, PP 2, PP/OPS, S/C 2

	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT92831
92831

TO HAVA INFO CITE DIR 07387

REF: A. DIR 2147 (OUT 80587)
B. DIR 4551 (OUT 86187)

1. PROJECT AMPHODARCH AMENDED TO INCLUDE OBJECTIVES VAIVADA MISSION:

A. NAMES, BIOG AND BACKGROUND DATA AND POLITICAL ALIGNMENT TOP OFFICERS CASTRO STAFF.

B. STRENGTH, DEPLOYMENT, EQUIPMENT CASTRO ARMY.

C. EXTENT COMMIE PENETRATION CASTRO FORCES.

D. EXTENT COORDINATION AND SUPPORT FROM OTHER POLITICAL GROUPS, PARTICULARLY PSP.

E. GATHER OPS DATA FOR PLANTING FUTURE LONGTERM POLITICAL ACTION AGENT WITHIN CASTRO MOVEMENT TO DETECT AND COUNTERACT COMMIE PENETRATION.

2. PROJECT ALLOTMENT INCREASED $1000. APPROX COST MISSION ESTIMATED AS FOLLOWS: TRANSFER VAIVADA FAMILY SANJ $200; TRAVEL VAIVADA $200; STORAGE HHE AND CAR $600; MISC EMERGENCY OPS EXPENSE $1000. VAIVADA TO CONVERT SINGLE STATUS ALLOWANCE AND RECEIVE SEPARATION ALLOWANCE WHILE ON MISSION.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER SECRET AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

201-166881

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE : 10 FEBRUARY 1958

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

FEB 10 20 37 58

REC'D CABLE SECT.

PRECEDENCE	DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

PAGE 2

DIR 07387
OUT 92531

TO INFO CITE DIR

3. VAIVADA TO USE COVER REF B. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ HE IS NOT USE POLLING COVER FOR CURRENT OPERATION. POLLING COVER TO BE REVEALED ONLY IF QUESTIONED REGARDING PAST ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~. ACTIVITY. STATION TO PROVIDE ESCAPE AND EVASION PLAN USE EVENT NEED.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *HQS SUGGESTED BUCH BE ADVISED VAIVADA IS FREE LANCE WRITER WITH GOOD ODYOKE CONTACTS.

for J. C. KING, C/WH/
RELEASING OFFICER

FI/OPS
COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

J. B. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

14-00000

656 WH/DB/MCB

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : H. O. MACAULEY
UNIT : WH/III/CARIBBEAN
EXT : 2056 656
DATE : 5 FEBRUARY 1958

TO : HABANA
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI/OPS 2, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

FEB 5 23 18 58

REC'D CABLE SECT.

	DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT91241

OUT 91241

TO HAVA INFO MEXI CITE DIR C6765

REF DIR 2147 (OUT 80587)*

1. HQS DESIRES ASSIGN VAIVADA PCS MEXI AS CP PENETRATION OPS CASE OFFICER UNDER UNOFFICIAL COVER AFTER COMPLETION CASTRO MISSION AND APPROX ONE MONTH ORIENTATION HQS.

2. MEXI REQUESTS VAIVADAS ARRIVAL MEXI ONE MAY FOR FURTHER ORIENTATION AND OVERLAP PRIOR DEPARTURE PREDECESSOR FLOYD N. POSTANY.

3. APPROVAL REQUESTED PAR 2 REF EXPECTED SHORTLY. ADVISE WHETHER HE CAN COMPLETE MISSION AND MEET ABOVE SCHEDULE

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DIR C2147 HQS AGREED VAIVADA WELL QUALIFIED TO UNDERTAKE MISSION PROVIDED MORE SUITABLE COVER COULD BE ARRANGED.

Coordinated by phone with:
ED ANDERSON, CI/ICD
WH/III/MEXI

5 Feb. 58

201-167881

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

R. H. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

14-00000

010 ER/DB/WS/[illegible]0

DATE : 3 FEBRUARY 1958

SEC[illegible]ET

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : FI/OPS 2, OP 2, S/C 2

FEB 4 05 26:58

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 26340

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 1017

RE: DIR 02146 (OUT 80586*)

1. VAIVADA ACCEPTABLE.

2. SUGGEST ARRIVE MEXI ON 1 MAY FOR ORIENTATION PRIOR POSTANY DEPARTURE.

3. POUCHING SUGGESTIONS RE COVER.

END OF MESSAGE

S/C COMMENT: *REQUESTED COMMENTS RE ARTHUR G. VAIVADA AS REPLACEMENT FOR POSTANY.

SECRET

201-168881

14-00000

VIA: A-I-R
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-A-1192

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

(201-168-881)
Field File No. 23-88/2-147

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 30 January 1958

FROM : Chief of Station, Habana

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/KUTUBE

SPECIFIC— Arthur G. VAIVADA

Reference: HKH-W-2528, 6 January 1958

In reply to the query made in the referenced dispatch, VAIVADA has no objection to taking the LCFLUTTER test in June or as soon as he returns to Headquarters, and the Station sees no problem of morale or other nature for VAIVADA in the delay.

James R. Palinger

Distribution:
3 - Washinton
2 - Files

24 January 1958

JRP/mfm

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

CS COPY

201-168881 microfilmed

14-00000

657 WCJ/DB/MCB 55

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : R. REYNOLDS
UNIT : WH/III
EXT : 2056
DATE : 21 JANUARY 1958

TO : HABANA
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : COP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, PP 2, PP/OPS, S/C 2

ROUTING	
	4
2	5
3	6

22 22 39 58

PRECEDENCE		DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
	X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 86187

TO HAVA INFO CITE DIR 04551

RE: HAVA-133 (IN-18923)*

HQS CONCURS BUT SUGGEST BUCH BE ADVISED VAIVADA IS FREELANCE WRITER WITH "GOOD ODYOKE CONTACTS".

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: EBERWEIN THROUGH CLOSE CONTACT LUIS BUCH, KEY FIGURE IN 26 JULY MOVEMENT, CAN ESTABLISH BONA FIDES FOR VAIVADA MISSION.

21 Jan. 58
201-168881

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING, C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

January 20, 1958

MEMORANDUM

Arthur Vaivada

SUBJECT: Subject of our letter number 4025; Interest in Assignment in U. S.

Pollinger Sagger

1. In recent conversations with both JRP and RDS, Subject has broached the prospect of a possible assignment within the U. S. following completion of his Habana assignment. He says he would not want his statements re reassignment which were recently forwarded to Headquarters to be interpreted to mean that he is not interested in a U. S. tour. He says that he has been giving much thought to his future career, as well as to the needs of his family. He points out that he personally has now spent approximately 16 years, excepting vacations and short training periods, living and working outside the U. S., that his two children have never lived there, and that both he and his wife are concerned that too much time will elapse before they can provide their children with a period in the U. S. during their formative years.

2. It is the opinion of both RDS and JRP that Subject is at a point in his career development where a tour at Headquarters would be extremely beneficial. The Station lacks knowledge concerning the specific Headquarters jobs to which a person of Subject's status might be assigned; but it is our understanding that OTR sometimes employs these persons as instructors. We believe that a tour with OTR would not only remedy in great measure deficiencies in Subject's background caused by lack of Headquarters experience, but would at the same time afford OTR excellent instructor material.

3. In view of Subject's own interest in such an assignment, and our estimate of the potential value to him and to the Organization that would accrue from it, we recommend that Headquarters arrange such an assignment if at all possible.

4. In view of the likelihood of Subject's transfer in the near future, a prompt decision is requested.

201-168881

14-00000

361 MJ/JM/RAC

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 16 JANUARY 1958

SECRET

ROUTING

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : S/C 2

JAN 16 21 33 58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 18923

TO DIR INFO CITE HAVA 133

RE: DIR ~~01247~~ 02147 *

1. EBERWEIN THROUGH CLOSE CONTACT LUIS BUCH, KEY FIGURE IN 26 JULY MOVEMENT, CAN ESTABLISH BONA FIDES FOR VAIVADA MISSION. VAIVADA THINKS CHANCES SUCCESS WOULD BE GREATLY ENHANCED IF CASTRO BELIEVES HE IS UNOFFICIAL U.S. OBSERVER. STATION CONCURS AND SUGGESTS BUCH BE DISCREETLY INFORMED ANYTHING CASTRO TELLS VAIVADA WILL FIND ITS WAY TO U.S. GOVT CHANNELS. LIGHT FREELANCE WRITER COVER WILL THEN BE ADEQUATE.

2. REQUEST HQS APPROVAL PROCEED THIS BASIS UNLESS EVENTS ORIENTE FORCE DELAY.

161445Z

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: * APPARENTLY WRONG REFERENCE.

SECRET

201-168881

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : R. G. MACAULEY
UNIT : WH/III/CARIBBEAN
EXT : 2056
DATE : 7 JANUARY 1958

545

SECRET

ROUTING

JAN 8 19 47 z 58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

	DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	

TO : HABANA

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : COP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS 2, PP 2, PP/OPS, S/C 2

OUT 00537

TO HAVA INFO CITE DIR 02147

REF: HAVA-119 (IN 13410)*

1. HQS AGREES VAIVADA WELL QUALIFIED TO UNDERTAKE MISSION PROVIDED MORE SUITABLE COVER CAN BE ARRANGED. BELIEVE HIS FORMER COVER AS FREE LANCE WRITER WOULD BE MORE ADEQUATE FOR CONTACTING CASTRO. PROPOSED COVER REF COULD BE USED ONLY EVENT CAPTURE BY AUTHORITIES. DESIRE HE LEAVE ON MISSION NOT LATER END FEB. MEANWHILE VAIVADA CAN ARRANGE INTERVIEW FAUSTINO PEREZ.

2. PROJECT AMPHODARCH AMENDMENT UNDER PROCESS TO INCLUDE SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES AND COVERAGE TRANSFER FAMILY COSTA RICA AND DISPOSITION HHE AND AUTO. HQS WILL ADVISE APPROVAL.

3. VAIVADA'S NEXT ASSIGNMENT UNDER STUDY AND EXPECT DECISION PRIOR END FEB.

4. FREAPANE PCS HAVA UNLIKELY BEFORE ONE APRIL.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED HQS COMMENTS ON ASSIGNING ARTHUR G. VAIVADA TO VISIT CASTRO.

201-168881

for J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-A-2528

201-168-881

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief of Station, Habana

6 JAN 58 10 08

FROM Chief, WHD

SUBJECT { GENERAL Operational/KUTUBE
SPECIFIC Arthur G. VAIVADA

Reference: HKH-A-2380, 16 October 1957
HKH-A-3990, 24 October 1957

Action Required: As indicated in paragraph 1.

1. With reference to KUSODA's request that VAIVADA be given an LCFLUTTER test as soon as possible, we have taken the position that, inasmuch as he is to return to Headquarters in June, there is little point in incurring the added expense for a trip now. However, he should understand that his continued employment under his new contract is contingent upon satisfactory completion of such a test. This, of course is no different from the requirements made of any employee; there merely is a time lag in his case because of distance. KUSODA has agreed to the delay providing VAIVADA is so advised.

2. Although we do not expect any problem, if VAIVADA is disturbed over having something like this hanging fire, and you feel there is a real morale problem involved, we will go ahead with it now. Our action will be entirely dependent upon KOCHCA's evaluation of the degree of importance this has for VAIVADA.

18 December 1957

J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

Distribution:
3 - Habana
2 - RI
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - OS
1 - Chrono Carib.
1 - Subject.

WH/III/Caribbean/HOMacAuley/js

J. C. KING, C/WHD (Releasing officer)

OS/IRD (Coordinating officer)

R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III (Authenticating officer)

CS COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-168881
HKHW 2528
DATE 6 JAN 58

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

COPY

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : A. G. SPERA
UNIT : WHD
EXT : 2555
DATE : 6 JANUARY 1958

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, S/C 2, FI/OPS 2, CP 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy.
RI file this copy as indicated
Branch copy filed as indicated

RE Indexing (check one):
Marked / None required
Signature:

ROUTING
201-168881

JAN 8 14 47 '58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

PRECEDENCE	X	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
		ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT80586

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 02146

~~REF: HMMW 5825, HMMW 5826 (...)~~

HMMW 5825 AND HMMW 5826 FORWARD BIO AND OPS DATA RE ARTHUR G. VAIVADA CAREER AGENT WITH EXCELLENT COMMUNIST OPS RECORD IN COSTA RICA, GUATEMALA AND HAVANA STATIONS SINCE 1949. BEING CONSIDERED AS REPLACEMENT FOR POSTANY. NOW IN HAVANA COULD TRANSFER MEXI APRIL TO JUNE 58. PLEASE CABLE COMMENTS UPON RECEIPT DISPATCHES.

END OF MESSAGE.

RI COPY

DECLASSIFIED
RI/AN 2
RI/...
RI/Files

COORDINATE WITH:
WH/CARIB
WH/PERS

6 Jan. 58
201-168881

J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS
S-E-C-R-E-T

R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

14-00000

032 WCJ/BP/WCJ

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : Ø2 JANUARY 1958

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

JAN 3 ... 47 Z 58

RECD CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : COP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS 2, PP 2, PP/OPS, S/C 2

IN 13410

TO DIR INFO CITE HAVA 119

RE: DIR ØØ452 (OUT 76181) *

1. ARTHUR G VAIVADA BELIEVES CAN ARRANGE VISIT CASTRO THROUGH CASUAL CONTACT PROVINCIAL 26 JULY LEADER HE MET THROUGH AMOURETTE-9. COVER WOULD BE AS AMERICAN REP SURVEY CORP INTERESTED PENETRATING CENSORSHIP BARRIER TO LEARN EXTENT COMMIE PENETRATION OF MOVT. PROVINCIAL LEADER VOLUNTARILY ARRANGING VAIVADA INTERVIEW WITH FAUSTINO PEREZ (HKH 1535) HAVA NEXT TEN DAYS.

2. VIAVADA EAGER UNDERTAKE MISSION AND WELL QUALIFIED VIEW WARTIME TRAINING JUNGLE TECHNIQUES, KNOWLEDGE CUBA, LANGUAGE CAPABILITY AND CLANDESTINE EXPERIENCE. WOULD WANT SEND FAMILY COSTA RICA AND JOIN THEM AFTER COMPLETION TASK. THIS WOULD NECESSITATE FINDING NEW AMOURETTE-B CUT-OUT, BUT STATION CAN FIND TEMPORARY REPLACEMENT PENDING ARRIVAL FREAPANE.

3. VAIVADA WOULD NEED TWO-THREE WEEKS LAY ON CAREFUL ARRANGEMENTS AND PROBABLY COULD LEAVE FOR SIERRA END JAN. REQUEST HQS COMMENTS. RELEASED Ø221Ø5Z.

301-168881

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: * HQS ATTACHES SUFFICIENT IMPORTANCE CASTRO MOVEMENT JUSTIFY COVERAGE FROM SEVERAL ANGLES.

SECRET

VIA: A I R
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-A-3990

(201-168881)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 24 October 1957

FROM : Acting Chief of Station, Habana

SUBJECT: GENERAL—Operational

SPECIFIC—Arthur G. VAIVADA

Reference: HKH-W-2380, dated 16 October 1957

1. The Subject has no objection to submitting to an LCFLUTTER test at the convenience of Headquarters. This could be easily arranged here in the event an LCFLUTTER team is passing, or could pass, through Habana; on the other hand, VAIVADA could just as easily go to any designated place in Florida in order to take this test. It is understood that LCFLUTTER teams from time to time visit that state.

2. The Station will take such measures as are feasible to cover the activities of Subject and his wife while in Habana.

3. While the matter was not referred to in the reference, Subject's projected one-year tour of duty will end in June, 1958, at which time it is VAIVADA's desire to leave Cuba for a reassignment in another area in his present line of operational work and under similar unofficial cover conditions. A detailed dispatch on this subject will shortly be transmitted to Headquarters; it is referred to here so that the Headquarters desk may be alerted to the need for considering what assignments would be open to VAIVADA during the Spring or Summer of 1958.

James R. Palinger
James R. Palinger

Distribution:
3 - Washington
2 - Files

23 October 1957

JRP/mfm

FORM NO. 51-28 A
MAR. 1949

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

RI COPY

24 Oct. 57
201-168881

UNCLASSIFIED | CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY | CONFIDENTIAL | SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/Personnel

NO.

DATE: 5 December 1956

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/Pers Ofcr	6 Dec	6	pcB	
2. WH/Admin	5 Dec	5	HB	
3. WH/Personnel	6 Dec	6		
4. DI/CSP, 2050 "L" BLDG	7 Dec 56	7 Dec 56		
5. ~~Contract Pers Div Wing 2F, Curie Hall~~				
6. 2309 "L" CS/CSP	10 DEC 1956			
7. 1711-L	3 Jan 1957	9 Jan		7. for approval ~~[illegible] for proper routing [illegible] signs.~~
8. 2309-L ~~CS/CSP [illegible]~~				~~Please call [illegible]~~ [illegible] X4641
9. ~~Chief FI/Ops~~ 1711 L				7 to 10 + 11 - Chief FI Ops
10. WH Personnel	11 Jan	11	pcB	believes this man should
11. WH III/Cuba				be considered for Career Agent
12. WH/Pers				not Staff Agent Status. I
13.				have already discussed
14.				with Mr. Roland & therefore
15.				papers are returned herewith.

201-168881

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS — SECRET | CONFIDENTIAL | CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY | UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
Arthur G. VAIVADA (Pseudo)	20 June 1922		5 Dec 56

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
Excepted Appointment (Staff Agent)

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED:

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER			I.O. (FI) BAP- *
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY			GS-0136.51-11 $6390.00 p.a.
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS			DDP/WH Branch III Havana, Cuba Station Project AMPHODARCH
11. HEADQUARTERS			Havana, Cuba
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	[ ] FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL		[X] FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

* A memorandum has been forwarded to the Director of Personnel requesting that position BAF-409, San Jose, Costa Rica, be transferred to Havana, Cuba and upgraded to GS-12.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title) [signature]

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
J. KOFLANOVICH X-8242

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD-DI

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: TO:	Yes		[ ] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY

SECRET

SECRET

File

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.–Miss–Mrs.–One given name, initial(s), and surname)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
Arthur G. VAIVADA (Pseudo)	30 June 1922		5 Dec 56

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
Excepted Appointment (Staff Agent)

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED:

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

	FROM—	TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER		I.O. (FI) DAP-409 *
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY		GS-0136.51-11 $6390.00 p.a.
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS		DDP/WH Branch III Havana, Cuba Station Project AMPHODARCH
11. HEADQUARTERS		Havana, Cuba
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)
* A memorandum has been forwarded to the Director of Personnel requesting that position DAP-409, San Jose, Costa Rica, be transferred to Havana, Cuba and upgraded to GS-12.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
J. [illegible] X-6252

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE: NONE | WWII | OTHER | 5-PT. | 10-POINT DISAB. | OTHER — X

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW | VICE | I.A. | REAL. — SD-DI

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: TO:
18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES–NO): No
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Not Cancel in Havana

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY

201-168817

SECRET

10-57220-8

14-00000

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)	CASE OFFICER: James B. Noland	DIVISION: WH/III
NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.	TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 2971	DATE: 4 December 1956

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS (See Part XIV of Confidential Fund Regulations or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel. If medical benefits are requested, see R 15-230 or successor regulations.)

All benefits normally given to a CIA staff employee.

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check): [ ] PROPOSED [X] ESTABLISHED

48. TYPE (Check): [ ] PROPRIETARY [X] CULTURAL [ ] COMMERCIAL [ ] TECHNICAL [ ] SUBSIDIZED [ ] EDUCATIONAL [ ] MILITARY [ ] OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS: [ ] YES [X] NO [ ] COMPLETE [ ] PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.) [ ] TOTAL [X] PARTIAL [ ] NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION: DAYS ___ MONTHS ___ YEARS 2

52. EFFECTIVE DATE: Immediate

53. RENEWABLE: [X] YES [ ] NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE (Number of days): Thirty days

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION: [X] YES [ ] NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION (FI, PP, other): FI Operations

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Spotting and recruiting agents. Obtaining information as principal agent for comprehensive youth-student net, with emphasis on Communist and revolutionary matters.

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Army and Air Force intelligence. CIA Training. Other as indicated in Number 6, above.

59. EDUCATION (Check Highest Level Attained): [X] GRADE SCHOOL [X] HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE [ ] TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE [ ] BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE [ ] COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE [ ] COLLEGE (No degree) [X] COLLEGE DEGREE [ ] POST GRADUATE [ ] MA [ ] PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY (Check Appropriate Degree Competency)

LANGUAGE	SPEAK Fluent	SPEAK Average	SPEAK Poor	WRITE Fluent	WRITE Average	WRITE Poor	READ Fluent	READ Average	READ Poor
Spanish	x				x		x		

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: USA

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

Very good.

SECTION XV — PRIOR EMPLOYMENT

63. JOB AND SALARY PRIOR TO SERVICE FOR CIA

1940 - 1945: T/Sgt USA, USAF; Intelligence NCO
Jan 1945 - April 1946: Leading man labor, $12.88 per day, US Naval Air Station, Coco Solo, Canal Zone
April 1946 - April 1949: T/Sgt USAF, Intelligence NCO, Albrook Field, Canal Zone

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (Use other side if necessary)

Performance of Subject has been outstanding. He has proved particularly adept at spotting and recruiting of agents and his work has been highly praised by the COS, Habana. FI/Plans/Projects has stated of Subject that he "has obviously been a valuable, deep cover

[X] SIDE

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF DIVISION OFFICER	DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF SENIOR STAFF OFFICER
	J.K. Galbraith		

14-00000

6-8473
[illegible] 6-72

13 November 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI

SUBJECT : Request for Conversion of Arthur G. VAIVADA From Contract to Staff Status

REFERENCE : HKH-A-2577

1. Referenced dispatch from the field recommends the conversion of contract agent Arthur G. VAIVADA to staff status, and presents a strong case for such conversion. VAIVADA has served CIA in a contract capacity since 1949, with a continuous high level of performance; first in Costa Rica, later in Guatemala and Cuba. He is currently assigned to Cuba and is expected to remain there indefinitely. VAIVADA is 34 years old and was promoted recently to the equivalent of a GS-10 rating. His expressed career interests lie in continued employment by CIA, more especially in the area ofunofficial cover assignments, for which he is highly suited.

2. Unfortunately Subject's spouse (since 1945) is a Costa Rican citizen, a situation which complicates his proposed conversion somewhat. She has expressed a desire to acquire U.S. citizenship, however, and it has been determined that this can be arranged within the next several months, barring unforeseen developments. She will be required to spend most of this period in the U.S. and is currently making plans to do so.

3. In view of VAIVADA's outstanding record as a contract agent, his strong overall qualifications, and his expressed desire for a career with CIA, it is recommended that he be granted staff status at grade GS-11, contingent upon his wife's first becoming a U.S. citizen, and providing he can meet Security and other requirements. There is available in WH Division a staff position (BAF-409) to which VAIVADA can be assigned.

4. WH Division contemplates bringing VAIVADA to the U.S. for covert training in the near future.

5. Approval for the conversion of VAIVADA from contract to staff status, as indicated above, is hereby requested.

J. C. KING
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

20 September 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA; Staff Status

1. The undersigned discussed case this date with Mr. Myers (2709 "I"; telephone extension 2551-2552) and with Mr. Pennington (2044 "I") both of Security Division. Mr. Myers was shown the content of HKH-A-________(recommendation for staff status for VAIVADA) and apprised of the problem of Mrs. VAIVADA not being a U.S. citizen. Myers stated that, while cases like this were usually very difficult, he felt this particular one might be justified in view of VAIVADA's long and excellent record with the Agency and the relatively long time during which he has been married. Myers indicated that the procedure would be as follows:

> Presentation of a formal request for waiver on citizenship requirements for spouse and granting of staff status to Subject. The memorandum would be prepared for Personnel, would then go to Security, and subsequently, with recommendations of both, to Deputy Director, who would have the final decision in this case.

Myers was to discuss the matter further with other elements of Security and advise within the next several days as to what the next step should be.

It later developed that this would be extremely difficult; that it would be much more practicable to concentrate on

2. Considering the possibility that such a request might be turned down, the undersigned discussed with Pennington the procedures for acquisition of citizenship for Mrs. VAIVADA, and determined that this should be relatively simple. The requirements were: presence in the U.S. (vicinity of Washington) for approximately forty-five days with some additional time to acquire passport. So long as we have nothing that would make her inadmissable to the U.S., the basic requirements would be: ability to speak English and to pass a relatively simple test based on pamphlet which would be given to her for study. Security would presumably handle her case when she arrives in the States.

3. It has occurred to the undersigned that perhaps, if it is necessary for Mrs. VAIVADA to acquire citizenship, VAIVADA himself could be brought to the Washington vicinity for training purposes in order to facilitate the visit of his wife, expenses, etc. This would at the same time afford an opportunity to provide VAIVADA with formal Headquarters or PBPRIME training ~~of which he has had none to date.~~

SECRET

J. B. NOLAND 201-168771

SECRET

24 September 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : Proposed Staff Status for Arthur G. VAIVADA

REFERENCE : HKH-A-2577, 17 April 1956

1. Referenced dispatch from the field recommends the conversion of contract agent Arthur G. VAIVADA to staff status, and presents a good case for such conversion. VAIVADA has served CIA in a contract capacity since 1949 with a continuous high level of performance; first in Costa Rica, later in Guatemala and Cuba. He is 34 years old and was promoted recently to the equivalent of a grade GS-10. His expressed career interests lie in continued employment by CIA, more especially in the area of unofficial cover assignments, for which he is highly suited.

2. Unfortunately Subject's spouse (since 1945) is a Costa Rican citizen. Preliminary investigation at Headquarters has revealed that Subject's conversion to staff status is virtually out of the question so long as his wife remains an alien. It has also been determined, however, that the wife can acquire U.S. citizenship within a span of 45 days if she so desires and is willing to come to the U.S. for that period of time. This would remove the major stumbling block to acquisition of staff status for VAIVADA.

3. In view of VAIVADA's outstanding record as a contract agent, his strong overall qualifications and his expressed desire for a career with CIA, it is recommended that (a) VAIVADA's wife be encouraged to seek U.S. citizenship under the terms outlined above (b) VAIVADA be granted staff status, contingent upon his wife's first becoming a U.S. citizen, and providing he can meet all other requirements. C/WH/III has endorsed the recommendation for staff status and a suggestion by C/WH/Admin that BAF-409, a new position currently alloted to San Jose, be transferred to Habana to be filled by VAIVADA.

4. It is further recommended that WH Division consider bringing VAIVADA to the U.S. for covert training to coincide with his wife's stay (at Headquarters' convenience). This would facilitate acquisition of citizenship for the wife and at the same time afford VAIVADA a chance for additional Headquarters training. Subject previously received covert training at Headquarters from 5 October through 25 November 1953.

J. B. Noland

J. B. NOLAND, C/WH/III/Cuba

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

AIR

HKH-W-1868

17 SEP 1956

: Chief of Station, Habana

: Chief, WHD

- Administrative
- Arthur G. VAIVADA

REFERENCE: HKH-W-1819, 17 August 1956

Attached for your information and retention in Station files is a copy of the latest contract extension for Arthur G. VAIVADA.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

Attachment:
1 - as above

12 September 1956

Distribution:
3 - Habana, w/att.
1 - WH/III/Cuba/Chrono
1 - WH/III/Cuba/Subject
1 - WH/Mailroom

1 - RI/D&P

WH/III/Cuba/JBNolan:emcc

J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

SECRET

W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III

201-168881

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA A I R (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. ~~HKH-W-2380~~

SECRET CLASSIFICATION

(201-168881)

TO Chief of Station, Habana

DATE 16 Oct 57 11 07

FROM Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL Operational
SPECIFIC Arthur C. VALVADA

References: HRS-W- 1326 (not sent to Habana)
HRS-A, 3 September 1957

1. At the time the request was submitted to convert Subject from Contract Agent to Career Agent status, a provisional covert security clearance was granted for that purpose. KUSODA recently advised that a full covert security clearance had been granted for the use of Subject as Principal Agent, under-official cover, in Project AM[illegible]CH, in accordance with the provisions set forth in the memorandum of the Chief, KUBARK, dated 14 February 1949, entitled "Security and Operational Clearances."

2. At the same time, KUSODA requested the following action to be taken:

a. That full overseas traces and such actual overseas investigation as is possible be taken on Subject and his wife and her family; and,

b. That arrangements be made to have Subject affronted with a LCFLUTTER test as soon as feasible.

3. Headquarters has already initiated the action set forth in Para 2 (a) requesting full traces and investigation of Subject and his wife and her family in Panama City and San Jose. Todate only San Jose has replied with HRSA-2938, copy of which was sent to Habana. Station Habana is requested to take appropriate action to cover Subject's and his wife's activities during their residence in Habana, and inform Headquarters of the results.

4. With reference to KUSODA's request for a LCFLUTTER test on Subject, they have expressed their desire to have Subject tested in the field as soon as possible, or as soon as the appropriate arrangements can be made. KUSODA has indicated that they will be happy to assist in arranging this test.

(Releasing officer) (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

SECRET CLASSIFICATION

201-168881
HKHW 2380
DATE 16 OCT 57

FORM NO. 51-29 JUN 1949

SECRET

RI COPY

HKH-W-2380

However, Headquarters would appreciate receiving the Station's views and comments on the matter as quickly as possible so that KUSODA may be advised and can make the necessary planning.

5. The station is reminded that subjects of covert security clearances are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of KUBARK. Your attention is also called to the fact that a covert security clearance does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions KUBARK Regulation 10-210. Therefore, if the station should desire at a later date to change the status or use of Subject, a request for clearance to cover any proposed change should be submitted to Headquarters.

11 October 1957

J. C. King
J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

Distribution:
3 - Habana
2 - RI
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/III/Cuba/Chrono
1 - Subject

Hugh O MacAuley
WH/III/Cuba/HOMacAULEY/js

RI COPY

Charles E. Copple
for J. C. KING, C/WHD
(Releasing officer)

(Coordinating officer)

R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
(Authenticating officer)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL

DATE: 11 September 1957
PROJECT:

TO: CI/Operational Approval and Support Division
FROM: (Division) WH/BR-3/Cuba

SUBJECT	CI/OA FILE NO.	SO FILE NO.
TRUE NAME		
CRYPTONYM OR PSEUDONYM: Arthur G. VAIVADA (Sp.)	C-25507	

TYPE OF AGENT OR EMPLOYEE: Career agent

USE OF AGENT OR EMPLOYEE (Full details)

It is requested that Subject's OA be amended to allow the Station to use him as a contact between the Case Officer and Project AMOURETTE-B, and other PP assets at the Station's discretion, on a temporary basis until a permanent PP staff agent can be assigned to these duties. This temporary assignement will not interfere with Subject's regular FI duties.

Basis of the request: HAVA-016 (IN48405)

TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

	PROVISIONAL APPROVAL		PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL
	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL
	GOVERNMENT NAME CHECK		PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO field investigation)	X	OTHER: amendment of OA

PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IS ATTACHED IN TWO COPIES		PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN RECEIVED
	PRQ II IS ATTACHED, IF OBTAINABLE		GREEN LIST CHECK HAS BEEN INITIATED

FIELD TRACES

	REVEAL NO INFORMATION OF VALUE		WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN RECEIVED
	REVEAL INFORMATION AS ATTACHED		NOT INITIATED. NOT EXPECTED TO POSSESS RELEVANT INFO.

SUGGESTED INVESTIGATIVE COVER

	GOVERNMENT		ACADEMIC
	COMMERCIAL		OTHER:

RI TRACES		DIVISION TRACES	
RECORD	NO RECORD	RECORD	NO RECORD

INDICATE SPECIAL LIMITATIONS ON INVESTIGATION OR SPECIAL COVERAGE DESIRED

SUBJECT	IS	X	AWARE	UNAWARE OF CIA INTEREST
		X	AWARE	UNAWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST
			AWARE	UNAWARE OF INTENDED INVESTIGATION
	HAS		BEEN	NOT BEEN BRIEFED ON A "COVER STORY"

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
Hugh D. MacAuley, WH/3/Cuba	2056	J. Brady, AC/WH/BR-3

201-168181

FORM NO. 772
1 SEP 55

SECRET

(9)

14-00000

321 RLG/LB/RAC

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 26 AUGUST 57

AUG 26 20 47 Z 57

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : FI/OPS 2, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

IN 42938

TO DIR INFO CITE HAVA 999

RE: DIR 31708 (OUT 82423)

ADDRESS IS CALLE 6 NUMBER 311 ALTOS, ENTRE 15Y17, VEDADO, HAVA, CUBA. GROWERY ACTING.

END OF MESSAGE

Subject. Arturo G. VAIVADA -

Info passed to Cover Div.
1211 ALCOT Hall Wing B -
27 Aug 1957 MCG

201-168181

SECRET

14-00000

648 WCJ/DB/ws

ORIG : HO MACAULEY 64
UNIT : WH/III/CUBA
EXT : 2056
DATE : 20 AUGUST 1957

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

AUG 20 22 15 '57
REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : HAVA

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : FI/OPS 2, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE				
	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT82423

TO HAVA INFO CITE DIR 31708

REQUEST VAIVADA'S HOME AND OR MAILING ADDRESS FOR COVER PURPOSE.

END OF MESSAGE

201-168881

J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

J. BRADY, AC/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/III - Willard Galbraith, Chief 15 Jul 57

FROM: CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT: CROZIER, Ross Lester

1. Your request dated 26 Feb 56 for approval to use the Subject has been processed by the Office of Security.

2. The results of this action are transmitted herewith.

Attachment:

so memo 3 Jul 57. ac

Thomas Carroll, Jr.

Distribution:
1 Addressee
1 File

201-168881

SECRET

FORM NO. 388 REPLACES FORM 50-46
1 JUN 55 WHICH IS OBSOLETE. (47)

SECRET

3 JUL 1957

Chief, CI/OA

Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

C-25507
#112569

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 28 February 1957 wherein a covert security approval was requested to enable the Subject's conversion from contract agent to career agent status for use as principal agent for Project AMPHOBARCH in Cuba under non-official cover. Reference is also made to our memorandum of 2 April 1957 in which a provisional covert security clearance was granted for the above use.

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in the Director's Memorandum of 14 February 1949 entitled, "Security and Operational Clearances," a covert security clearance is granted for the use of the Subject, as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1, above.

3. This clearance is contingent upon the following:

a. The receipt by this office of full overseas traces and such actual overseas investigation as is possible on Subject and on his wife and her family.

b. that Subject be afforded a polygraph interrogation as soon as possible and that the verbatum results be promptly furnished to this office. The Office of Security will be happy to assist in arranging this interrogation.

4. Subjects of covert security clearances are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

5. Your attention is called to the fact that a covert security clearance does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-210. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for clearance to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

SECRET

9 JUL 1957

6. This clearance becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within 60 days of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Robert H. Cunningham

14-00000

SECRET

3 JUL 1957

Chief, CI/OA

Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

C-25507
#112569

1. Concurrent with this memorandum a covert security clearance is being issued to enable the Subject's conversion from contract agent to career agent for use as principal agent for Project AMPHODARCH in Cuba under non-official cover.

2. This is to advise that information has been received from a confidential source of the Office of Security concerning Argentina CORDERO Calderon and her sister, Counsuelo, who are believed to be the Subject's wife and sister-in-law respectively. According to a December 1944 report, the above individuals were described as Costa Rican citizens then in Panama under suspicion and members of the Russian Ballet team of Pedro and Lidia GHUPRINE. Argentina is known to speak and understand German. She was formerly married to Pedro MARZAL, reportedly a German national and formerly on both British and U. S. Proclaimed List. She is reliably reported to have made pro-German remarks and is pro-German in her sympathies. It was further reported that both of the above individuals have at times attempted to secure information from members of the American Armed Forces.

3. In view of the above information, it is requested that current overseas traces and investigation be conducted on the Subject as well as on his wife and sister-in-law, Counsuelo, and other members of his wife's immediate family and that the results thereof be furnished this office.

4. The covert security clearance which is being issued in this case is made contingent upon the faovrable results of the requested overseas traces and investigation.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Robert H. Cunningham

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
KURIOT TRAINING OF HUSKANAW AND HUMANOID-3	RI FILE NO.
	DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / DATE
	SOURCE CRYPTONYM / DATE OF INFO. / EVALUATION
ANALYST / DATE PROCESSED	DISSEMINATED IN / DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

KURIOT TRAINING FOR THE SUBJECT

FDI

201-168881

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ~~201-22881~~

FORM NO. 867 REPLACES FORM 867, 1 AUG 54
1 MAY 56 AND FORM 137 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET

20 June 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA (Ps.)

1. Subject's contract dated 1 August 1954 was amended to provide him with an additional compensation to cover quarters allowance for his family in Costa Rica from 21 February 1957, when he and his family were ordered to leave Habana for operational security reasons; and to cover the period Subject was on TDY for training purposes at Headquarters.

2. Subject returned to Habana with his wife on 14 May 1957, to resume his duties as Principal Agent of Project AMHODARCH. His children joined him in Habana from Costa Rica on 21 May 1957.

3. It is requested that Subject's Habana allowances, as set forth in his contract dated 1 August 1954, and subsequently amended, be reinstated for the period 14 to 31 May 1957. His new contract converting him to Career Agent status was effective on 1 June 1957.

J. C. KING
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

201-168881

X

14-00000

VIA: AIR (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-A-3675

201-032723

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 13 June 1957

FROM : Chief of Station, Habana

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Arthur G. VAIVADA

Reference: HKH-W-2268, 22 May 1957

1. Forwarded under separate cover is a copy of a Memo on Cover Status prepared by Subject as requested by Headquarters, outlining his estimate of the situation and including a draft statement for Headquarters' use in preparing the directive his cover firm will transmit to him.

2. Subject's Memo and outline appear adequate in the opinion of the Station; therefore Headquarters can proceed to prepare appropriate business letterheads and cards (described in paragraph 2 of the reference) and mail them to Subject.

James R. Palinger.

Attachment:
1 - Memo on Cover Status (single copy) U/S/C

Distribution:
3 - Washington w/att
2 - Files w/att

JRP/mfm

10 June 1957

RI COPY

FORM NO. 51-28 A
MAR. 1949

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-168881

14-00000

SECRET

La Habana, Cuba

June 10, 1957

Memo on Cover Status - Arthur G. Vaivada

1. Enclosed herewith is the outline of an idea in keeping with the nature of this notional cover plan of a temporary nature. Careful consideration has been given to a number of ideas, all of which were rejected because possible local conflicts. This idea is still general enough (and I hope convincing) to leave opportunity for changes and/or improvement at Headquarters. The idea, and the terminology, was gleaned from the pages of "Investment in Cuba", a July 1956 study published by the U.S. Department of Commerce.

2. As I understand this cover arrangement, the PSI should mail me a directive somewhat along the lines of the enclosed information. This should "hold us" for a couple of months, with possibly some queries from me occasionally. Then when our operational picture requires investigation in some particular field, PSI can be notified through the Station to request a survey or poll in that field.

3. On the basis of the enclosed "directive" (plus stationary and allied materials) I can consult a local lawyer as to the registration of this "Agency" and then advise PSI as to the legal requirement.

Arthur G. Vaivada

SECRET

SECRET

1. Public Surveys Institute of Dallas, Texas, has placed a US representative in Cuba for the purpose of conducting public surveys, by polling, which will provide the home office with the requisite data for periodic market analyses. These periodic reports will be made available upon subscription to US investment and/or distribution agencies, and will contain comprehensive studies of market potentials and limitations, including the role of government as affected by current political developments.

2. PSI of Dallas will first compile reports of broad scope, from which subscribers may select their fields of special interest and place thier orders accordingly. These initial reports will cover such factors as:

a) The three P's - Population and Purchasing Power.

b) Productive Opportunities.

c) Improved Distribution Patterns.

d) Factors Affecting Demand.

e) A Study of Marketing Areas.

f) General Estimate of the Economic Situation.

3. The PSI representative will not require an office installation or local employees during the initial studies, but will prepare these at his residence until special requests are forthcoming from subscribers. At that time, all materials and installations as well as employment will be of temporary contractual nature, entirely dependent upon the scope of the survey.

Arthur G. Vaivada

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, WH/3/FI
ATTN : Mr. James B. Noland

DATE: 10 June 1957

FROM : AC/OS/TR

SUBJECT: Training Report on Arthur G. VAIVADA, (P)
Training Alias: "VICKS"

1. Arthur G. VAIVADA was trained covertly by instructors of this office in Washington, D.C. from 25 March 1957 through 7 May 1957. The original Training Request form dated 4 December 1956 reveals the following information concerning his background, experience and proposed assignment:

"VAIVADA is thirty-four years of age, married and a U.S. citizen by birth. He attended high school in De Kalb, Illinois and entered the U.S. Army in 1940, later transferring to the U.S. Air Force. The trainee served as an operations and intelligence specialist, first in the China/Burma theatre and later in Panama. He was discharged from the service in 1945. Following his discharge, VAIVADA worked for a short period as a laboratory technician in the Sterling Silica-Gel Corporation, Illinois and then returned to the Panama Canal Zone to work as a stevedor and a labor foreman. He reenlisted in the U.S. Air Force in April 1946 and was honorably discharged in 1949. On 1 June 1949, VAIVADA became a contract agent for this Agency. He served in this capacity in Costa Rica, handling a high level penetration of the Communist Party until 1953. In July 1954, the trainee became principal agent of Project AMPHODARCH. He has been operating under a student cover, working for his A.B. degree at the University of Havana. It is planned that VAIVADA will return to Havana, Cuba under cover of a representative of a well known U.S. polling agency. He will perform the duties of principal agent, handling a large net of sub-agent informants in Cuban university youth circles to provide coverage of Communist, leftist, revolutionary and other political activities among these groups."

2. The instructors who participated in VAIVADA's training indicate that his overall performance was above average. He is a highly intelligent, practical and realistic young man possessing excellent judgment and common sense. His motivation is strong and his interest in clandestine activity as a profession appears to be genuine. VAIVADA should continue to develop as a skilled and competent agent.

3. For the purposes of the record, it should be noted that VAIVADA received prior Covert Training during October and November 1953. The present training was more in the nature of a refresher.

4. VAIVADA received instruction in the subjects set forth on the attached Training Evaluation Reports. In addition, certain supplementary reading, discussion material, case histories, books, films and "live" problems were also covered.

5. His training was conducted by Mr. Pisanko known as "Hank" and Mr. Toth known as "Frank." Their Training Evaluation Reports are attached.

A. F. Schermerhorn
AUGUSTUS F. SCHERMERHORN

Attachments: 2

14-00000

SECRET

TRAINING EVALUATION REPORT

DATE (Day, month, year): 9 May 1957

NAME OF STUDENT (Pseudonym): VAIVADA, Arthur G.

PERIOD COVERED: 25 March to 10 April 57 and 26 April to 7 May 1957

TRAINING ALIAS: "VICKS"

RATING DEFINITIONS

SUPERIOR .... An extremely outstanding performance.
EXCELLENT .... An outstanding performance, above average.
SATISFACTORY .... Requirements met without distinction.
POOR .... A deficient performance, below average.
FAILURE .... An extremely deficient performance.

TRAINING SUBJECTS	SUPERIOR	EXCELLENT	SATISFACTORY	POOR	FAILURE
1. Security					
2. Cover		X			
3. Observation & Description		X			
4. Interviewing					
5. Interrogation			X		
6. Surveillance			X		
7. Telephones & Mikes (Theory)		X			
8. General CI Methods			X		
9. Contacting			X		
10. Intrafield Communications					
11. Recruiting of Agents					
12. Training of Agents					
13. Agent Management & Control					
14. Double Agent Management & Control					
15. Reporting			X		
16. CE Operations		X			
17. Communist Theory			X		
18. Soviet IS		X			
19. Psychological Warfare		X			
20. Political Warfare					
21. Economic Warfare					
22. Sabotage					
23. Counter-sabotage					
24. Resistance Force Activities					
25. Guerrilla Warfare					
26. Evasion & Escape					
27. Weapons					
28. Demolitions					
29. Special Devices (R&D)					
30. Air Reception					
31. Sea Reception					
32. Map Reading					
33.					
34.					
35.					

The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it. Although he may within his discretion, show it to other members of his staff the report should never be shown to the student whom it concerns

FORM NO. 381 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. 1 OCT 55

SECRET

(17-38) OVER

SECRET

STUDENT EVALUATION

		RATINGS: ABOVE AVERAGE	AVERAGE	BELOW AVERAGE		NOT OBSERVED
1.	Security consciousness	X				
2.	Ability to work with and get along with others	X				
3.	Ability to follow instructions		X			
4.	Maturity of judgment and common sense	X				
5.	Initiative	X				
6.	Resourcefulness and independence of judgment	X				
7.	Tactfulness and sense of discretion		X			
8.	Cooperativeness	X				
9.	Sense of discipline		X			
10.	Imagination and creativeness	X				
11.	Amenability to constructive criticism	X				
12.	Attention to necessary details	X				
13.	Observant and careful in the collection of facts	X				
14.	Political sophistication and awareness	X				
15.	Interest and enthusiasm for proposed assignment	X				
16.	Motivation for clandestine activities	X				
17.	Ability to relate theory to practice	X				
18.						
19.						
20.						

STUDENT'S COMPARATIVE EVALUATION TO OTHERS TRAINED FOR IDENTICAL OR SIMILAR ASSIGNMENT

ABOVE AVERAGE	AVERAGE	BELOW AVERAGE
X		

INSTRUCTOR'S COMMENTS

VAIVADA is a reliable, stable individual possessing a quick, alert mind. He was mature, serious and purposeful in his approach to training. His interest and attention remained at a high level throughout the instruction. In general, VAIVADA has the background and the desire to perform in a professional manner. The trainee possesses the ability to apply himself completely. He recognizes his shortcomings and was completely amenable to constructive criticism. VAIVADA zealously tries to find solutions to pertinent questions and problems. He analyzes facts and details thoroughly. He wants to know his job and, in any given situation, tries to learn as much as possible.

During the training, VAIVADA showed no signs of restlessness with the more routine aspects of clandestine activity. He is practical minded, adept, serious, willing to "dig in and do the grubbing." The trainee learns quickly and shows excellent promise for progressive improvement within the field of covert work. He carries out instructions and assignments in an efficient manner. VAIVADA possesses a calm, tenacious attitude. It is felt that he will develop steadily as a skilled and competent operator. He should become an increasingly valuable asset to this organization. His overall performance was above average.

INSTRUCTOR

/s/ HENRY J. PISANKO

SECRET

TRAINING EVALUATION REPORT

DATE (Day, month, year)	26 April 1957
NAME OF STUDENT (Pseudonym)	VAIVADA, Arthur G.
TRAINING ALIAS	"VICKS"
PERIOD COVERED	11 April 1957 through 25 April 1957

RATING DEFINITIONS

SUPERIOR .... An extremely outstanding performance.
EXCELLENT .... An outstanding performance, above average.
SATISFACTORY .... Requirements met without distinction.
POOR .... A deficient performance, below average.
FAILURE .... An extremely deficient performance.

TRAINING SUBJECTS	SUPERIOR	EXCELLENT	SATISFACTORY	POOR	FAILURE
1. Security					
2. Cover					
3. Observation & Description					
4. Interviewing		X			
5. Interrogation		X			
6. Surveillance					
7. Telephones & Mikes (Theory)					
8. General CI Methods					
9. Contacting			X		
10. Intrafield Communications			X		
11. Recruiting of Agents		X			
12. Training of Agents		X			
13. Agent Management & Control		X			
14. Double Agent Management & Control					
15. Reporting					
16. CE Operations					
17. Communist Theory					
18. Soviet IS					
19. Psychological Warfare					
20. Political Warfare					
21. Economic Warfare					
22. Sabotage					
23. Counter-sabotage					
24. Resistance Force Activities					
25. Guerrilla Warfare					
26. Evasion & Escape					
27. Weapons					
28. Demolitions					
29. Special Devices (R&D)					
30. Air Reception					
31. Sea Reception					
32. Map Reading					
33.					
34.					
35.					

The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it ... his discretion ... the report should ... be shown to the student whom it concerns.

SECRET

STUDENT EVALUATION

		RATINGS: ABOVE AVERAGE	AVERAGE	BELOW AVERAGE		NOT OBSERVED
1.	Security consciousness	X				
2.	Ability to work with and get along with others					X
3.	Ability to follow instructions	X				
4.	Maturity of judgment and common sense	X				
5.	Initiative					X
6.	Resourcefulness and independence of judgment		X			
7.	Tactfulness and sense of discretion	X				
8.	Cooperativeness	X				
9.	Sense of discipline		X			
10.	Imagination and creativeness	X				
11.	Amenability to constructive criticism	X				
12.	Attention to necessary details		X			
13.	Observant and careful in the collection of facts		X			
14.	Political sophistication and awareness					X
15.	Interest and enthusiasm for proposed assignment	X				
16.	Motivation for clandestine activities	X				
17.	Ability to relate theory to practice	X				
18.						
19.						
20.						

STUDENT'S COMPARATIVE EVALUATION TO OTHERS TRAINED FOR IDENTICAL OR SIMILAR ASSIGNMENT

ABOVE AVERAGE	AVERAGE	BELOW AVERAGE
X		

INSTRUCTOR'S COMMENTS

Arthur G. VAIVADA impressed this instructor most favorably. The trainee is highly intelligent, practical and realistic. He possesses excellent judgment and common sense. VAIVADA is mature, well-balanced, resourceful and positive. He appears to be open-minded and objective, possessing a questioning mind and a strong sense of curiosity. VAIVADA approached training with a strong desire to add to his knowledge and to refine his own methods and techniques. He was highly receptive and amenable to constructive criticism. The trainee has a feeling for detail and is observant and careful in the collection of facts. It was necessary for VAIVADA to spend considerable time on administrative matters during the training. However, he completed all outside assignments punctually and completely.

VAIVADA's performance was excellent. He is above average in every aspect. His motivation is strong and his interest in clandestine activity as a profession appears to be genuine. If properly supervised, he should be a valuable asset to this organization. The trainee appears to be industrious, possessing initiative with leadership qualities.

INSTRUCTOR

/s/ FRANK A. TOTH

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

Project AMPHODARCH
WH
19 May 58

Mr. Arthur G. Vaivada

Dear Mr. Vaivada:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 June 1957.

Effective 1 June 1957, said contract is amended by adding after subparagraph (b) of Paragraph four (4), entitled "Allowances," the following:

"(c) You will be entitled to an educational allowance in conformance with and at the rates prescribed in applicable Government regulations."

All other terms and conditions of the contract remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY /S/
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

/s/

Field informed, HMMW 6448

201-168551

X

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14-00000

S

AIR SECRET HKH-A-3610

201-032723

Chief, WHD 29 May 1957

Chief of Station, Habana

Operational

Arthur G. VAIVADA

Reference: HKH-W-2268, dated 22 May 1957

1. Subject and his wife arrived in Habana on 14 May 1957 and have taken permanent quarters here; their children rejoined them the following weekend.

2. As outlined in the reference, and after conversation with VAIVADA himself, the national polling cover arrangement set up for the approximate three-month trial period appears adequate. At present Subject and the case officer are engaged in working out a suitable area or areas for his polling activities and will shortly notify Headquarters of the results.

3. There is being forwarded as a separate cover attachment an administrative memorandum from Subject, informing Headquarters that he established a bank account in Miami, Flórida, and his wishes respecting amounts of his salary and allowances to be deposited there following 1 June 1957. Subject's initial opening deposit in the Miami bank account was in the amount of $20.00; the "copy of check with true name and present balance" mentioned in the attached memorandum is being retained in Station files. It is requested that the Station be notified by cable of the amount of total salary and allowances to be paid direct to Subject each month in the field after 1 June.

James R. Palinger

Attachment:
1 - Administrative memorandum (single copy under separate cover)
3 - Self addressed bank envelopes U/S/C
Distribution:
v3 - Washington W/att U/S/C
2 - Files W/O Att

28 May 1957

JRP/mfm

SECRET

COPY

201-165881

SECRET

XAAZ 16934

22 May 1957

TO: Colonel J. Caldwell King,
Chief, WH Division
Attention: WH/Cuba

FROM: Chief, CI/ICD LM by [signature]

SUBJECT: General: CP Penetration Program

Specific: Informal discussion with Ross Lester Crozier, 9 May 1957, re his interest in, and availability for recruitment approaches in various Latin American countries.

1. On 9 May 1957, Mr. Paul J. Burke, Deputy Chief, CI/ICD, held Subject discussion with Mr. Crozier, whom he met outside of official quarters through the cooperation of Mr. Hugh MacAuley, WH/Cuba.

2. Mr. Crozier has a fine record in CP penetration work. He did an outstanding job in handling the HUMANOID-3 operation in Costa Rica over an extended period, and he has worked hard in the CP penetration program in Cuba since his arrival there.

3. It is believed that he would be an effective recruiter in various countries in Latin America.

4. He stated that he was keenly interested in, and would like to engage in, such operations, and would welcome being asked to hit a well-chosen target in any (Spanish-speaking) Latin American country.

5. Mr. Crozier stated that he expects to return to Cuba shortly. If, after three months, there is no indication that his security has been adversely affected by the recent assassination of one of his agents, he expects to be there about a year.

201-168881

SECRET

6. It is recommended that WH Division give consideration to employing Mr. Crozier as a recruiter when worthwhile recruitment-in-place CP targets are developed, or otherwise arise, in various Latin American countries. It is again made clear for the record that the foregoing discussion was informal and without commitment on either side.

cc: WH/CP (L. Sloan)

201-168881

/C

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-W-2268

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief of Station, Habana

DATE 22 May 57 11 14z

FROM Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL Operational
SPECIFIC Arthur G. VAIVADA

References: HAVA-891, 25 April 1957
HAVA-911, 7 May 1957
DIR-16802, 10 May 1957

1. Attached for your retention is a copy of Subject's new contract converting his status from that of Contract Agent - GS-10 to Career Agent - GS-11, to become effective 1 June 1957. Also attached is a copy of an amendment to his current contract, providing for the payment of storage of his household effects in Habana and quarters allowances for his family in San Jose, Costa Rica, for the period Subject was absent from his post. Subject read and signed the originals of both the amendment and new contract while at Headquarters.

2. Before Subject departed for the field, he was interviewed three times by one of the Headquarters staffs concerning his cover, and arrangements were made to fulfill the station's requirement for his return. However, since the polling cover originally planned for Subject could not be arranged at this time, a "notional" polling cover, adequately backstopped by a business mailing address and telephone number (being submitted under separate cover as Identity-A) was arranged as the alternative. Since Subject is returning to his post on a test basis, Headquarters feels that this notional cover is better than a more permanent arrangement would be; at least until it is more certain that Subject's stay will be permanent, thus avoiding any possible embarrassment vis-a-vis the employer company in the event Subject is forced to leave the country shortly after arrival. Furthermore, this notional cover will allow Subject almost complete freedom to pursue his other activity with very little time and effort necessary to maintain his cover. Appropriate business letterheads and cards to implement Subject's cover will be pouched to the Station as soon as Subject is able to survey the area and notify Headquarters of the type of polling activity he plans to use. He was instructed to select a polling activity not

(Releasing officer) (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

22 May 57
201-168881

SECRET

RI COPY

presently covered by another agency, so as to minimize the possibility of instigating inquiries about his employer by the competitors in the area. Should Subject remain at his post, and it is hoped he will, the cover originally planned can be arranged later if Subject or the Station feels that the present cover is not adequate enough; or, on the other hand, he can continue to use the present arrangement.

3. With respect to the payment of his salary and allowances, Subject was instructed to open a bank account here before he returned to the field. Headquarters requests he submit the name of the bank and the amount of his salary and allowances (preferably in round figures) he wishes to be paid by the Station. The balance will be paid monthly to his bank by Headquarters. Headquarters requires that this arrangement be set up to simplify and expedite his payments in the event of any changes in salary or allowances. Subject said he would give the information to the Station for transmittal to Headquarters.

4. It is regretted that Subject's wife was not able to become naturalized at this time, since she entered this country on a temporary visitor's visa, and it would have taken too long to change her status to that of a permanent resident and become naturalized. Since the conversion of Subject's status to that of a Career Agent was not affected by his wife's citizenship, it was suggested to Subject that he plan to have his wife become a citizen when he returns to this country in two years upon becoming eligible for statutory home leave.

5. Subject still has an outstanding travel voucher being processed at Headquarters, and the Station will be notified as soon as it is completed. Subject has been paid in full for his salary and allowances for the month of April 1957.

16 May 1957

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

Attachments:
Copy of Contract
Copy of Contract Amendment
Identity A under Sep. Cover Attach.

Distribution:
3 - Habana w/attach.
1 - RI w/o attach.
1 - WH/Mailroom w/o attach.
1 - WH/III/Cuba/Chrono w/o attach.
1 - Subject w/attach.

WH/III/Cuba/H.C.McAuley/fs

J. C. KING, C/WHD		W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III
(Releasing Officer)	(Coordinating Officer)	(Authenticating Officer)

RI COPY

SECRET

201-168881

14-00000

SECRET

RI COPY

Separate Cover Attachment to:
HKH-W-2268

IDENTITY A:

Public Surveys Institute
532 Union Fidelity Life Building
1511 Bryon Street
Dallas, Texas

Telephone: RIverside 1-3674

Contact: Mr. Albert E. JOHNSON

Distribution:
1 - Habana
1 - RI
1 - Cuba/Chrono

SECRET

RI COPY

201-168881

Mr. Arthur O. Vaivada

Dear Mr. Vaivada:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 August 1954, as amended.

Effective 14 May 1957, said contract, as amended, is further amended by deleting in its entirety Paragraph 1(b) and substituting in lieu thereof the following:

> "1(b) Additional compensation calculated at the rate of $5135 per annum."

All other terms and conditions of the original contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

____

14-00000

Date: 10 MAY 1957

Mr. Arthur G. Vaivada

Dear Mr. Vaivada:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 August 1954, as amended. Effective 31 MAY 1957, said contract, as amended, is hereby terminated by mutual consent of the parties thereto and in lieu thereof the following agreement is substituted:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you for your services as a Career Agent under the following terms and conditions:

1. Status. By virtue of your relationship with the United States Government in the performance of services under this agreement your legal status is that of a Government employee under contract. As such, you are entitled only to the rights, privileges and benefits stipulated herein. It is understood that you will act under cover suitable to disguise your relationship to the Government, but you will be subject to administrative and operational directions and control by the Government at all times.

2. Compensation. In full consideration for your services as a Career Agent, you will be compensated at the rate of $6390 per annum, GS-11. In addition, you will be entitled to within-grade promotions in a manner similar to the procedures prescribed for Government staff employees. In the event that the salary level of your indicated grade is altered by Federal legislation and adopted by the Government, the compensation authorized under this contract shall be altered accordingly. Payments will be made hereunder as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to the Government.

3. Taxes. (a) In the event taxes are not withheld by your cover facility or in the event your cover facility withholds taxes on only part of the compensation due you hereunder, the Government, in view of security considerations involved, will withhold Federal income taxes from all or the remainder of taxable monies due you under this contract in an amount equivalent to the United States income tax withholding schedule based upon your taxable income under this agreement and _____ present exemption(s). Sums so withheld by the Government will be paid over to the Internal Revenue Service. No Form W-2 will be issued you by the Government and you will be instructed as to the method to be followed in making timely filing of returns, estimates and payments in order to preserve security.

(b) If for cover considerations your tax payments exceed your true tax liability under this agreement, the Government will make appropriate reimbursements in conformance with applicable policies and procedures.

4. Allowances. (a) You will be entitled to living quarters allowances in conformance with and at the rates prescribed in the Standardized Regulations, (Government Civilians, Foreign Areas).

(b) In addition to the above payments, you will be entitled to an equalization allowance calculated at the rate of $2180 per annum. This allowance is in lieu of any present or future standardized post allowance established for your present permanent post of duty overseas, but is subject to the entitlement provisions applicable to standardized post allowances. It is understood and agreed that this allowance is predicated upon the comparative cost of living between Washington, D. C., and your overseas post, your unofficial cover, family status and basic compensation. Consequently, this allowance may be unilaterally adjusted or discontinued by the Government whenever warranted by a change in any of these factors. No accounting will be required for this allowance.

5. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for the following travel and transportation expenses:

(a) For you alone for authorized operational travel. In addition, you will be entitled to reimbursement in accordance with standardized Government rates for the authorized official use of your private automobile.

(b) Upon the satisfactory completion of each two (2) years of successful overseas service under this contract, you will be entitled to home leave travel expenses for you and your dependents from your permanent post of duty overseas to your place of recorded residence in the United States and return travel expenses to your permanent post of duty overseas; provided, however, that you have fulfilled any other requirements relating to home leave which are applicable to Government staff employees.

(c) Upon the successful completion of your services under this agreement, for you, your dependents, your household effects and your private automobile from your permanent post of assignment overseas to your place of residence in the United States.

You will be entitled to per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of all travel performed hereunder and, when authorized, for you alone while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable Government regulations.

6. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses includigg, but not limited to, entertainment and the purchase of information, as specifically approvdd by the Government. Such funds will be subject to accounting in compliance with Government regulations.

7. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

14-00000

8. Benefits. (a) You will be entitled to death and disability benefits equal to those authorized under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, as amended. Claims by you, your heirs, or legal representatives under this paragraph will be processed by the Government in accordance with its procedures in such manner as not to impair security.

(b) You will be entitled to continuance of pay and allowances in a manner similar to that set forth in the Missing Persons Act (50 U.S.C.A. App. 1001-1015).

(c) You will be entitled to sick and annual leave equal to and subject to the same rules and regulations applicable to Government staff employees. Such annual leave may only be taken at times and places approved in advance by appropriate representatives of the Government. All accrued but unused leave earned under your contract with the United States Government effective 1 August 1954, as amended, will be transferred to your leave account under this agreement in conformance with established crediting procedures.

(d) From the compensation paid you pursuant to this contract, there shall be deducted the appropriate rate percentage (presently 6 1/2%) for deposit and eventual crediting to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. If the conditions of your cover warrant or require that you make contributions to the Social Security fund, such contributions shall be at your expense.

9. Cover. It is anticipated that you will undertake certain cover employment in the course of your performance under this agreement. It is expressly understood and agreed that any and all documents which you may execute in the course of such cover employment are subordinate to this agreement and any contradiction in terms which may in any way amplify, extend or restrict your rights and/or obligations hereunder shall be resolved by this agreement which shall always be dominant.

10. Offset. Any and all compensation, allowances or other benefits (including benefits in kind) received from or through your cover activities will be used to offset amounts due you under this contract and will reduce accordingly the Government's direct payment obligation hereunder. Sums so offset are payment by the Government under this contract and for purposes of Federal income taxation. You will report every six (6) months during the term of this agreement all benefits received from or through your cover activities and, if such benefits exceed those due you under this contract, the report will be accompanied by said excess amount, which you hereby agree is the sole property of the Government. Failure to submit timely reports and, as appropriate, excess payments, may result in suspension of any payments due you hereunder. As an alternative to the above, the Government may at any time exercise its basic right to require payment over to it of the emoluments received by you from or through your cover activities which would otherwise be offset as described above. In such cases the Government will pay directly to you the emoluments called for by this contract.

11. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

12. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

13. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

14. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

15. Term. This contract is effective as of 1 JUN 1957, and shall continue thereafter for an indefinite period unless sooner terminated either:

(a) By ninety (90) days' actual notice by either party hereto, or

(b) Without prior notice by the Government, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

In the event of voluntary termination on your part or termination for cause by the Government you will not be entitled to the travel expenses set forth in paragraph five (5)(c) supra. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Arthur G. Valvada

WITNESS: ______________________

APPROVED:

____

10 May 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA

1. On this date the undersigned had a final meeting with Subject, at which time Subject was given a copy of his new contract to read and to acknowledge by signature the original copy. Subject had no questions concerning this document.

2. Mr. Biladou of Cover Division, was also present during the first part of this meeting, to advise Subject of the correct address of the cover firm he was to use as reference:

Public Surveys Institute
532 Union Fidelity Life Bldg.,
1511 Bryan Street,
Dallas, Texas

Phone: Riverside-1-3674

Mr. Albert E. JOHNSON

3. The address will give Subject the necessary backstopping in the event of any inquiries that might arise in the field concerning his employment. Subject was asked to ~~xxxxxx~~ survey the field upon his arrival in Habana and submit his views on the best type of polling activity for him, so that the proper business letterheads could be printed and sent down to him. He was also promised that he will receive business cards. These items are to ~~xxxx~~ be pouched to him through ~~the~~ Station channels.

4. Mr. Biladou also stated that he was preparing a memorandum concerning Subject's cover to be sent down to the station for Subject's acknowledgement and signature. This document will be coordinated with the Cuba Desk.

5. Subject was also paid his salary and allowances for the month of April 1957 in the amount of $ 639.72, for which he signed a receipt. 201-168881

14-00000

Subject was also instructed to open a bank account in Miami, Fla., so the Finance Division will be in a position to make payment adjustments without delay. Subject was instructed to advise Hqs as to the amount of allotment to be paid him by the station - preferably in a round figure.

Mica

039 BP/JM/EMW

Henry O. MacAuley

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : H. O. MAC AULEY
UNIT : WH/III/CUBA
EXT : 2056
DATE : 10 MAY 1957 639

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

MAY 10 21 01 '57
REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : HAVA
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : FI/OPS 2, FI/RI 2, OP 2, S/C 2

	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT54239

TO HAVA INFO CITE DIR 16802

REF: HAVA-891 (IN 35508)
HAVA-911 (IN 40651)

VAIVADA ETA 15 MAY. POLLING COVER PROVIDED.

END OF MESSAGE

10 May 57
201-168881

J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

378

JM/BP/RAC

DATE : 7 MAY 57

SECRET

ROUTING
1 | 4
2 | 5
3 | 6

MAY 7 22 10 57
REC'D CABLE SECT

TO : DIRECTOR

VAIVADA, ARTHUR G.

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : FI/RI 2, OP 2, /SC 2

ROUTINE

IN 40651

TO DIR INFO CITE HAVA 911

RE: HKHA 3583

CUTOUT AMANTELOPE BEGINS MONTHS LEAVE PBPRIME 24 MAY. DESIRABLE VAIVADA RETURN PRIOR THAT DATE. 071945Z.

END OF MESSAGE

201/168881
ABSTRACT X INDEX
DATE 04 JUN 1957

7 May 57
201-168881

SECRET

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14-00000

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SCO (Mr. Lustecher) DATE: 1 May 1957

FROM : Special Support Staff, Medical Staff

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA (p)

Subject has been evaluated by the Medical Staff and found qualified for proposed PCS overseas assignment.

Vincent J. Ford
Vincent J. Ford
Administrative Officer

MS/VJF:elp

Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee
1 - WH/3 (Noland)
1 - MS

SECRET

201-168881

14-00000

SECRET

CUBA

30 April 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Vaivada

1. During the morning of 30 April Mr. Millard of Cover telephoned regarding Subject, citing IN 35508. Mr. Millard said that he would be meeting with Vaivada at 1600 hours today and proposed providing him with a temporary rather than permanent cover with the new cover company which was being contemplated for long-range development. Mr. Millard's reasoning was that he did not wish to place Vaivada under the new company with the chance that the trial period approved for the Station might cause Vaivada to be pulled out from that cover in short order. Mr. Millard said that the temporary cover he intended offering Vaivada would be adequate.

2. I concurred with the above proposal.

W. GALBRAITH
C/WH/III

SECRET

201-168881

14-00000

FROM:

ACTION

CABLE

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. 35508
Date Received SA

To	Room No.	Date Received	Date Forwarded	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. Admin		25 Apr	25 Apr	Pw	
2. III				Mch	
3. Cuba/F1				MCa	VAIVADA -
4.					
5.					#2108
6.					30 April Mr. Millard and Mr. Billedon (cover) arranging notional Cobbing cover for V. until originally planned cover can be arranged -
7.					V in accord - Mr. B. making arrangements and will advise.
8.					
9.					
10. Cable desk					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in *To* column.
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
Officer designations should be used in *To* column.
Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
Action desired or action taken should be indicated in *Comments* column.
Routing sheet should always be returned to registry.
For officer designations see separate sheet.

SECRET

25 April 57
201-168181 ✓

FORM NO. JAN 1947 51-19

14-00000

426

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ROUTING

426 JM/JB/BJ

DATE: 24 APRIL 1957

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: HAVANA

ACTION: WH 5

INFO: CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI/OPS 2, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

VAIVADA, Arthur E.

APR 25 02 42 57

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 35508

TO DIR CITE HAVA 891

RE: DIR 13777 (OUT 98246)

1. STATION CONSIDERS VAIVADA CONTINUED ASSIGNMENT HAVA VERY DESIRABLE BUT DEPENDENT SECURE COVER ARRANGEMENT. SUGGEST HQS SET UP ADEQUATE COVER THEN HAVE VAIVADA COME HAVA TRIAL PERIOD TO DETERMINE ADVISABILITY CONTINUED ASSIGNMENT. RECOMMEND INDEPENDENT POLL TYPE COVER, ALREADY DISCUSSED.

2. STUDENT ACTIVITIES NOW MINIMAL OWING UNIVERSITY CLOSURE WITH NO PROBABLE OPENING PRIOR NEXT SCHOOL YEAR. HOWEVER FEEL VAIVADA, WITH FIRM COVER, COULD PERFORM VALUABLE SERVICE FOR STATION IN SUBVERSIVE AND COMMIE PENETRATIONS. 242000Z.

END OF MESSAGE

201-168581

ABSTRACT X INDEX

DATE 04 ... 1957

25 April 57

201-168581

S E C R E T

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

14-00000

ORIG : J. [illegible] NOLAND
UNIT : WH
EXT : 2971
DATE : 22 APRIL 1957

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

APR 22 21 48 '57
REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : HAVANA
VAIVADA, ARTHUR
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : FI/RI 2, OP 2, S/C 2

DEFERRED | PRIORITY | ROUTINE X | OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

OUT93246

TO HAVA INFO CITE DIR 13777

REF HAVA 824 (IN 14694)

HQS CONTEMPLATES RETURN VAIVADA CUBA EARLY MAY FOR TRIAL PERIOD SEVERAL MONTHS TO DETERMINE ADVISABILITY CONTINUING ASSIGNMENT THERE. CABLE STATION VIEWS.

END OF MESSAGE

See Hava - 871

23 april 57

201-168871
ABSTRACT X INDEX
DATE 04 JUN 1957

201-168871

J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS
S-E-C-R-E-T

W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

SECRET

18 April 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA

1. Arthur G. VAIVADA, Contract Agent, GS-10, assigned to Project AMTHODARCH in Habana, Cuba, was ordered by the station to leave Cuba for reasons of operational security following the killing of an indigenous member (AMTHODARCH-1) of his agent net by the Cuban authorities. Subject departed from Habana on 18 February 1957, and arrived in San Jose, Costa Rica, on or about 21 February 1957. He discontinued his residence in Habana, stored his household effects, and set up new quarters in San Jose for his family. He will maintain these quarters until about 6 May 1957, when he will be reassigned to Habana or PCS to another area. Subject, himself, is currently receiving training at Headquarters.

2. It is requested that authorization be granted to pay Subject quarters allowance to enable him to maintain residence for his family in Costa Rica for the time necessary to complete his training at Headquarters and be reassigned to the field.

J. C. KING
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Cuba Chrono
1 - VAIVADA File

WH/III/Cuba/HCMacAuley/fs

SECRET

201-168891

12 April 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Cover Division
Attention: Mr. Raymond Millard

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA, Cover Data

Attached, in accordance with the requirements of your division, are certain data concerning Arthur G. VAIVADA, a WH contract agent, for whom cover as a pollster is being sought.

J. C. KING
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Cuba Chrono
1 - VAIVADA File

Attachment:
As mentioned above

WH/III/Cuba/Chrono/JENoland/fs

201-168881

A. General Information on Agent

(1) Pseudonym and Previous Requests for Cover

Arthur G. VAIVADA. No previous request, although cover suggested herein has been under consideration for some time and has been discussed with representatives of Cover Division.

(2) Employment Status

Contract Agent, in process of conversion to career agent at GS-11; salary $6,390; quarters allowance $2,400; equalization allowance $2,120; and following benefits:
Retirement; sick and annual leave; home leave travel; Federal Employees Compensation and Missing Persons Acts.

(3) Clearance Status

Subject has regular Operational Approval and a Provisional Covert Security Approval pending receipt of full Covert Security Approval. No clearances on wife, who is only adult accompanying agent overseas.

(4) Medical Status

Check-up pending; believed to be in excellent physical condition, however.

(5) Assessment

As Contract Agent, has not been subjected to assessment.

(6) Current and Previous Covers

Cover since June 1949--Employment by Agency has been primarily that of University Student with part time photography work, and employment during one period with Costa Rican Ministry of Agriculture, as supplementary. In all instances Subject has lived cover, thus acquiring no particular backstopping.

(7) Availability for Assumption New Cover

15 May 1957

(8) Proposed Date of Departure for Overseas Post

Subject expects to return to overseas duty on or about 10 May 1957.

(9) Project Cryptonym

AMPHODARCH

B. Biographic Information on Agent

(1) Age, 34; Sex, Male; Religion, Catholic; Subject is married and has two small children.

(2) Wife— Argentina de los Angeles Cordero de Grozier—Born 15 March 1918, San Jose, Costa Rica; Married to Subject since 1945; Costa Rican citizen in process of obtaining U.S. citizenship. Additional biographic information available at country desk.

(3) Education

High School, DeKalb, Illinois
University—5 years undergraduate study at universities in San Jose, Costa Rica, Guatemala City, and Habana, Cuba.

(4) Past Employment

1940-1945	Intelligence NCO (Technical Sergeant U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force)
Jan. 1945-Apr. 46	Labor Foreman, U.S. Naval Air Station, Coco Solo, Canal Zone, Panama.
April 1946-Apr.49	Intelligence NCO (Technical Sergeant USAF) Chief of Section, Political Analysis, Caribbean Air Command.
April ~~1959~~ 1949-Mar.53	Freelance photography and University studies, San Jose, Costa Rica.
Mar. 1953-June 53	Photographer Ministry of Agriculture, San Jose, Costa Rica.

(5) Outside Interests, Hobbies, etc.

Athletics (general), outdoor life, photography, jungle lore, chess.

(6) Personality Evaluation

Subject is both energetic and forceful and seems to dedicate himself wholeheartedly to any venture which he undertakes. At the same time, he has a pleasing personality, is versatile, and adapts easily to most situations. He presents a good appearance, has somewhat of a "soldier of fortune" background(much of which acquired while working for CIA), and is a good conversationalist. It should be pointed out that in spite of the "soldier of fortune" tag, Subject is essentially a stable individual and devoted to his family. His work traits and his relations with those in CIA with whom he has come in contact, have been excellent.

(7) Personal Financial Status

Solvent; Owns home.

(8) Previous Foreign Residence

Panama, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Cuba since 1940 as indicated above. Military Service in Far East 1944-1945.

(9) Area Experience

Area experience,as reflected in foregoing information, is extensive.

(10) Language Qualifications

Subject is fluent in Spanish language, which is indigenous to area in which he is and will be operating.

C. Security Considerations

(1) Period of Employment with CIA

June 1949 to present

(2) Frequency of Visits to CIA Installations

Not applicable. No visits other than to safehouses.

(3) Extent Knowledge of CIA Affiliation

It must be presumed that wife is aware of intelligence nature of Subject's work, though not necessarily the CIA connection. No other non Agency personnel believed to be aware of CIA status.

(4) Past Intelligence Connections

With U.S. Army and Air Force as indicated above.

(5) Use of CIA Credit References

Not applicable

(6) Future plans for Agent

Contemplate continuation in non-official cover status upon completion of current assignment.

(7) Emergency Contact

In the process of being arranged.

(8) Agency-sponsored Insurance

No Agency-sponsored Insurance as of this writing. Extent of others not known, but believed adequate.

D. Operational Information

(1) Type of Information—Expected Duration of Assignment

FI; Duration of assignment indefinite, but at least two years. Operations from average to high. Sensitivity—no persons, other than Agency personnel and cover facility officials, will be made aware of CIA affiliation while under non-official cover.

(2) Location

Habana, Cuba

(3) Degree of Mobility Desired

Will spend most of time in capital (Habana). Should be free to travel al will throughout country, however.

(4) Special groups to be Contacted

From the operational standpoint, access to political circles is most desirable.

(5) Approximate Annual Income to Be Attributed to Cover Organization

$10,000 (including allowances)

(6) Hours Which Must Be Devoted to Operational Duties

Subject should be able to devote at least 50% of time to operational activity, although duties entailed in proposed cover will fit in very nicely with operational requirement.

(7) Physical Security Requirements

No particular problems anticipated in this respect.

(8) Communications

No special arrangements [illegible] required, as Subject will be in more or less regular contact with Station personnel.

(9) Cover Suggestions

A polling cover (employment as of representative of a large U.S. polling firm) has been suggested and seems highly appropriate in this case, as it would afford excellent mobility in addition to job backstopping. Mr. Ray Millard of Cover Division has been attempting for some time to arrange such a cover for Subject.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

10 April 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/111/Cuba/McAuley

FROM: CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT: CROZIER, Ross Lester

1. Your request dated 26 February 1956 for approval to use the Subject has been processed by the Office of Security.

2. The results of this action are transmitted herewith.

Attachment:

so memo 2 April 1957/par

Thomas Carroll, Jr.

Distribution:
1 Addressee
1 File

201-168881

SECRET

FORM NO. 388 REPLACES FORM 59-46
1 JUN 55 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

(47)

14-00000

475 ERB/RFL/JL

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

475

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

DATE : Ø5 APRIL 1957

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JOSE

ACTION: WH-5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

APR 6 07 27 '57

REC'D CABLE SECT.

PRIORITY

IN 27923

TO PRITY DIR INFO: HAVA CITE SANJ 2531

RE: A. DIR Ø3998 (OUT 79438)
B. HAVA 866 (IN 27345)

1. DOSSIER HAS NOT ARRIVED. VAIVADA AND WIFE HAVE DECIDED SHE WILL JOIN HIM ZRMETAL NOW USING TOURIST VISA. CHILDREN WILL REMAIN SANJ WITH RELATIVES.

2. PARA 2 REF A STATES NO CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT WIFE.

3. SHE ARRIVING ZRMETAL EAL FLIGHT 534 MORNING 8 APRIL. REQUESTS VAIVADA MEET. HAVE ADVANCED HER NO FUNDS.

END OF MESSAGE.

Hugh MacCauley
CL 6-2547

Hugh MacCauley was called to contact and notify Vaivada

201-168881

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

5 April 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

Subject: Arthur G. VAIVADA

Naturalization of Subject's wife

1. Mr. Jerry MANSETT, Alien Affairs Officer, Office of Security, Room 2503, I Bldg., X-2141, stated that the following requirements and procedure are necessary to submit Subject's wife's application for naturalization:

a. Memorandum from C/WHD to the Director of Security, Attention: Alien Affairs Officer, requesting that the application for naturalization be expedited so that Subject's wife may accompany him overseas on or about_____________

b. Application for Naturalization forms to be filled out in duplicate. They are NOT to be signed by the applicant.

c. 3 passport-size photographs.

d. 1 fingerprint card (Obtained at the Immigration Office in Room 313, Old Post Office Bldg., 12th and Penn. N.W.)

2. The above memo and documents are to be submitted to the Office of Security (OS). After a security check an appointment will be made for Subject's wife to appear for questionning and signing of application. Once this formality is done, the application is placed in the District Court for the final swearing in by the Judge (The swearings take place each 2nd Tuesday of the month).

3/ There will be a fee of $10.00.

4. VAIVADA can be one of the two witnesses required.

NCA.

201-168881

14-00000

234 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

434/ERD/RFL/CG

DATE : Ø4 APRIL 1957

SECRET

ROUTING

1 | 4
2 | 5
3 | 6

APR 5 03 30 57

REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

ROUTINE

IN 27345

TO SANJ INFO: DIR CITE HAVA 866

RE: SANJ 2523 (IN 26196)

CONSULATE ADVISES DOSSIER MRS ANGELA ARGENTINA IRIS CORDERO Y CALDERONA DE CROZIER FORWARDED SANJ VIA POUCH 21 MARCH.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

201-168881

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

014 WCJ/BP/WS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

DATE : Ø2 APRIL 1957

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JOSE

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

APR 3 05 26 :57

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 26196

TO DIR INFO: HAVA CITE SANJ 2523

REF SANJ 2495 (IN 18323)
HAVA 841 (IN 19663)

VISA FILE VAIVADA'S WIFE STILL NOT RECEIVED SANJ. LOCAL CONSUL CAN DO NOTHING PENDING RECEIPT FILE. CAN HQS ASSIST?

END OF MESSAGE

201-168881

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

2 APR 1957

Chief, CI/OA

Acting Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

C-25507
#112569

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 28 February 1957, wherein a provisional covert security approval and a covert security approval were requested to enable the Subject's conversion to career agent status for use as Principal Agent for Project AMPHODARCH in Cuba, under non-official cover.

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in Clandestine Services Instruction No. 10-5 and Field Regulation 10-215, a provisional covert security approval is granted for the use of the Subject, as described in your request as set forth in paragraph #1, above.

3. It should be noted that the provisional covert security approval herein granted is based on limited investigative coverage and should not be in any way construed as a final security determination relative to a full covert security approval. Upon completion of additional investigation now pending, you will be appropriately advised as to our decision with regard to the issuance of a full covert security approval.

4. Subjects of provisional covert security approvals are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

5. Your attention is called to the fact that a provisional covert security approval does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-210. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for approval to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

6. This approval becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within 60 days of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Fred H. Hall

201-168251

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

TRAVEL ORDER

OFFICIAL TRAVEL ORDER NO. [illegible]-57

ALLOTMENT ACCOUNT SYMBOL 7-[illegible]-011

NAME	OFFICE PHONE	GRADE AND SALARY
Arthur C. [illegible] (Ps)	2729	[illegible]-10 $5915

TITLE	OFFICIAL STATION
Contract Agent	Havana, Cuba

YOU ARE HEREBY AUTHORIZED TO TRAVEL AND INCUR NECESSARY EXPENSES IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS.

ITINERARY

Havana, Cuba to Washington, D. C. and return.

PURPOSE

TDY - Training for approximately 6 weeks.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS (INCLUDE APPROPRIATE JUSTIFICATION)

AUTHORIZED PER DIEM

COORDINATION, AS REQUIRED (TO BE EFFECTED BY ORIGINATING OFFICE)

☐ DD/P ☐ OTHER OPERATIONAL AREAS ☐ THEATER CLEARANCE (IF OBTAINABLE)

ADVANCE OF FUNDS IS AUTHORIZED.

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL $

TRAVEL TO BEGIN ON OR ABOUT	TERMINATING APPROXIMATELY
29 March 1957	8 May 1957

MODE OF TRAVEL (SPECIFY)

Common carrier and privately auto

ALLOWANCE FOR PRIVATELY OWNED AUTOMOBILE AS FOLLOWS IF APPLICABLE

☐ (A) CENTS PER MILE, NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER

XXX (B) ten CENTS PER MILE, AS BEING MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT

CERTIFICATION (BY PROCESSING BRANCH)

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY. SIGNED COPY ON FILE IN CENTRAL PROCESSING BRANCH. REVIEWED. NO CHANGE NECESSARY. AMENDED AS INDICATED.

SIGNATURE

☐ THE CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION INDICATED IS EFFECTED IN THE INTEREST OF THE GOVERNMENT AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE.

☐ IN CONNECTION WITH CHANGE OF STATION, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRANSPORT YOUR IMMEDIATE FAMILY, YOUR HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS, SUBJECT TO WEIGHT LIMITS, RESTRICTIONS AND PROVISIONS AS SET FORTH IN AGENCY REGULATIONS.

☐ TRAVEL TO FIRST POST OF DUTY ABROAD, INCLUDING EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS AND AUTOMOBILE IS AUTHORIZED.

☐ RETURN FROM POST OF DUTY ABROAD, INCLUDING EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS AND AUTOMOBILE, IS AUTHORIZED.

☐ DEPENDENTS TO TRAVEL WITH EMPLOYEE.

☐ DEPENDENTS TO TRAVEL WITHIN 6 MOS. OF EMPLOYEE.

☐ TEMPORARY DUTY.

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO.	CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.
	7-[illegible]-011
DATE	SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICER
2[illegible] March 57	J. [illegible]

TYPED NAME AND TITLE OF OFFICIAL AUTHORIZING TRAVEL	DATE	SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AUTHORIZING TRAVEL
C/WH J. C. KING	28 March 1957	

SECRET

FORM NO. 540 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
1 APR 56

(20-48)

14-00000

SOURCE -05

CONFIDENTIAL

28 MAR 1957

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

NAME: CROZIER, Ross Lester

BIRTH: 20 June 1922, DeKalb, Illinois

ADDRESS: Pres: 5th St. 655, Havana (Vedado) Cuba
Perm: San Juan Tibas, San Jose, Costa Rica

CITIZENSHIP: U.S.A.

MARITAL STATUS: Argentina de los Angeles Cordero de Crozier, b. 15/3/18, San Jose, Costa Rica, m. 17 Dec 1945, Cristobal, Canal Zone
Address: Same as subject

CHILDREN: Ross Arnulfo Crozier, b.c. 1949: Add: same as subject
Lillian Caridad Crozier, b.c. 1951 Add: Same as subject

PARENTS: Father: Lester Earl Crozier, b. 15 Mar 1900, Palestine, Ill.
Mother: Elizabeth Lorene McKibben, b. Sept 1903, La Moille, Ill.
Address: RR No. 1, Tampico, Ill.

BRO & SISTERS: James Earl Crozier, b.c. 1929, Add: Tampico, Ill.
Irma Lilly Crozier, b.c. 1924, Add: RR.1, Tampico, Ill.
Blanche Elaine Crozier, b.c. 1926, Add: 1900 Canal St., Rock Falls, Illinois
Norris Edwin Crozier, b.c. 1932. Add: 804½ 1st Ave., Sterling, Illinois

IN LAWS: Father: Alberto Cordero Loizia, b. 1894, San Jose, Costa Rica, Deceased
Mother: Dora Cordero Calderon, b. 7 Sept 1893, San Jose, Costa Rica, Add: San Juan Tibas, San Jose, Costa Rica
Sister: Norma Cordero de Gregor b.c. 1932, Add: Box 2655, Cristobal, C.Z.
Isabel Cordero de Naranjo, b.c. 1929. Add: Plaza Viquez, San Jose, Costa Rica
Consuelo Cordero Calderon, b.c. 1927. Add: San Juan Tibas, Sa n Jose, Costa Rica

EDUCATION: 1926-34: Elwood, DeKalb, Illinois
1935-39: DeKalb Township, DeKalb, Ill. (Grad)
1949-53: Univ. of Costa Rica, San Jose, Costa Rica
1-5/54: Univ. of San Carlos, Guatemala City, Guatemala
1954-Pres: Univ. of Habana, Habana, Cuba.

Deadline 29 April 1957

MILITARY: 1940-49: U.S. Air Force T/Sgt. Serial 16001300

RECHECK

CONFIDENTIAL

Previously Checked Aug 1954
Please bring that check up to date

28 March 57
201-168881

O.W.H.

15 APR 1957

28 ~~18~~ MAR 1957

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

NAME: CROZIER, Ross Lester

EMPLOYMENT:
1940-45: U.S. Air Force
1945-46: U.S. Naval Station, Coco Solo, Canal Zone
1946-49: U.S. Air Force
1949-53: Free lance photography and student, San Jose, Costa Rica
3-6/53: Section of Geology, Ministry Agriculture, Costa Rican Government, San Jose, Costa Rica (Dr. Cesar Dondoli)

TRAVEL:
1949-53: San Jose, Costa Rica
Jan-May 1954: Guatemala City, Guatemala
1954-Pres: Habana, Cuba

RESIDENCES:
4-11/55: Calle 11 No. 1013 Vedado, Habana, Cuba
1954-55: Calle 16, No. 511 Vedado, Habana, Cuba
8-11/54: Calle 3, No 6A, Miramar, Habana, Cuba
5-8/54: San Juan Tibas, San Jose, Costa Rica
1-5/54: 7th Ave., N. 9-04, Jocotanango, Guat. City
1953-54: 5008 7th St., NW., Wash. 11, D.C.
1949-53: San Juan Tibas, San Jose, Costa Rica
All prior residences was military service back to 1941

RECHECK

Previously Checked Aug 1954
Please bring [illegible]

201-168881

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA

Training and contact procedure for Subject was discussed with Mr. Schermahorn (Room 201-T-30, X-2778) on this date:

a) The training of Subject will last six weeks from 25 March through 6 May 1957.

b) Subject will use the code name "Mr. Vicks" throughout the training.

c) Contact procedure: Subject will call "Jim" on JA-7-9117 at 1:40 PM on 25 March 1957 (Monday). He will identify himself as "Mr. Vicks." He will be given instructions as to the place and time of pick-up to be taken to safe house. Subject will have identification card to be presented to instructor upon arrival at safe house.

d) In the event Subject has to be contacted during training period (i.e. wife's naturalization matters, etc.) the desk will contact Mr. Schermahorn's office (X-2778) the day before so arrangements may be made. Training Division will not release the phone numbers of their safe houses.

e) Subject will be in training full time during the six weeks' period and will be given assignments for homework to be done at night and over some week ends.

HCa —
H. O. MACAULEY
FI/OPS_-Cuban Desk

22 March 1957

SECRET

201-168881

186

186 HM/JB/BRB

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

DATE : 19 MARCH 1957

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JOSE

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : FI/RI 2, S/C 2

MAR 19 15 59z57

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 20033

TO OPIM HAVA INFO: DIR CITE: SANJ 2506

RE: DIR 07482 (OUT 86223)

1. REF ARRIVED 18 MARCH.
2. VAIVADA ARRIVING HAVA PANAM 506 MARCH 19. MEET.
3. HAVE ADVANCED HIM $400. ACCOUNTING TO BE MADE HAVA.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

201-168881

JM/BP/MR

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : J. B. NOLAND
UNIT : WH/III/CUBA 717
EXT : 2056
DATE : 13 MARCH 1957

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING
1 Subject | 4
2 | 5
3 | 6

TO : HABANA

REC'D CABLE SECT.

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

OUT 5483

VALVADA

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

TO: HAVA INFO: SANJ ROUTINE PRECEDENCE

REFERENCE: HAVA 833 CITE DIR 07107

NO OBJECTION PARA TWO. SUGGEST LENGTH STAY HAVA MIGHT BE CUT AND PUBLIC APPEARANCES MINIMIZED.

END OF MESSAGE

201-168881

J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

RLG/BP/J 481

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 14 MARCH 57

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JOSE

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

REC'D CABLE SECT.
IN 18323

ROUTINE

TO: HAVA INFO: DIR CITE: SANJ 2495

REF: HAVA 833 (IN 17296)
SANJ 2474 (IN 11647)

1. VISA FILE ON VAIVADA'S WIFE NOT YET RECEIVED HERE ALTHOUGH LOCAL CONSUL HAS MADE TWO OFFICIAL REQUESTS OF CONSULATE HAVA. VAIVADA DOES NOT WANT LEAVE WITHOUT HER AND WANTS HER ACQUIRE CITIZENSHIP FOR OWN PROTECTION IN FUTURE. STATION UNABLE PRESSURE LOCAL CONSULATE UNTIL FILE RECEIVED HERE.

2. VIEW ABOVE NOT FEASIBLE FOR VAIVADA LEAVE ON 18 MARCH. STATION HOPES WIFES VISA CASE WILL BE SETTLED BY 24 MARCH.

END OF MESSAGE

Answered 15 March

S-E-C-R-E-T

201-168881

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 18 MARCH 57

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : FI/RI 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

MAR 18 20 03:57 '57

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 19663

TO PRITY SANJ INFO DIR CITE HAVA 841

RE: DIR Ø7482 (OUT 86223)

1. CONSULATE ADVISES VAIVADA AS WIFE'S DOSSIER AIR POUCHED SANJ VIA WASH 8 MARCH. SHOULD HAVE ARRIVED BY NOW.

2. REQUEST SANJ ADVISE FLIGHT AND TIME ARRIVAL VAIVADA HAVA.

END OF MESSAGE

201-168881

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

C68

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

068—ES/DB/WCJ

DATE : 1Ø MARCH 57

Mar 11 ... 57

TO : DIRECTOR

REC'D CABLE SECT.

FROM : SAN JOSE

IN 16366

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: HAVA INFO: DIR CITE: SANJ 2491

RE: HAVA 826 (IN 15237)

1. VAIVADA ADVISES SO FAR HE KNOWS NO OTHER CONTACT KNOWS TELEPHONE NUMBER. HAS NEVER REVEALED NUMBER TO ANY ONE AND HAS NEVER WRITTEN IT.

2. RE GARAGE ADDRESS, ONLY KNOWS IT IS A "DIAMOND-T AGENCY GARAGE" LOCATED SOMEWHERE ON CALLE 2Ø DE OCTUBRE. SUGGESTS PR DUE BE REVIEWED FOR POSSIBLE PINPOINTING ADDRESS AND PHOTO.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

201-168871

8 March 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Office of Security

VIA: Chief, CI/CA

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA (sp.)
C-25507

1. Reference is made to OS's verbal request of 7 March 1957, for additional information on Subject in connection with our request for a Provisional Covert Security Approval dated 26 February 1957.

2. Subject was born in De Kalb, Illinois, on 20 June 1922. He received his primary and high school education in De Kalb and entered the U. S. Army in 1940, later transferring to the U. S. Air Force. He served as an operations and intelligence specialist, first in the China-Burma theater and later in Panama. He was discharged from the service in 1945 with the grade of Technical Sergeant. After his discharge, he worked for a brief period as a laboratory technician in the Sterling (Illinois) Silica-Gel Corporation and then returned to the Panama Canal Zone to marry a Costa Rican girl in December 1945. For about four months he worked as a stevedore and labor foreman in the Canal Zone. In April 1946 he re-enlisted in the Air Force in the Canal Zone and was discharged three years later, in 1949.

3. Late in 1948 he was recruited by the Agency, and on 1 June 1949 became a CIA contract agent. Since that date, he has served as a contract agent with continuing high level performance, first in Costa Rica, later in Guatemala and Cuba. He is currently assigned to Cuba where he is utilized as Principal Agent of Project AMTHUNDARCH. Subject has worked principally and successfully so, on Communist Party penetration operations since his engagement with CIA, and his current work involves the handling of a net of agents providing coverage of Communist, leftist, revolutionary and other political activities at the University of Habana, and the student-youth circles in general in Cuba.

4. Subject has always proven to be loyal and trustworthy. In view of his outstanding record and strong overall qualifications, and his expressed desire for a career with CIA, it has been recommended he be converted from contract to career agent status. He was promoted recently to the equivalent of a GS-10 rating.

201-168881

5. Subject's spouse, a Costa Rican citizen, has expressed desire to acquire U. S. citizenship, and has now made the necessary arrangements to accompany her husband to the U. S. for this purpose, when Subject returns for Covert training at Headquarters in the very near future.

6. Covert Security Approval, with an expedite Provisional Covert Security Approval, has been requested in connection with the recommendation to convert Subject from contract to staff status.

J. C. KING
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Cuba Chrono
1 - VAIVADA File

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

361/SE/DH/AFT

DATE : 07 MARCH 1957

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : SAN JOSE

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

REC'D CABLE SECT.

IN 15237

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: SANJ

CITE: HAVA 826

REQUEST SANJ CABLE VAIVADA REPLIES TO FOLLOWING: WHO AMONG HQS HAVA CONTACTS COULD ALSO KNOW TELEPHONE F-5019? GIVE DETAILED ADDRESS GARAGE WHERE JOAQUIN MARTINEZ VELASQUEZ, JS CONTACT, WORKS AND CAN BE REACHED.

END OF MESSAGE.

SECRET

201-168881

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

416 RLG/JM/BRB

DATE: 27 FEB 57 416

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: SAN JOSE

ACTION: WH 5

INFO: CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

Feb 27 23 47 '57

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 11647

TO DIR INFO: HAVA CITE SANJ 2474

REF DIR Ø3998 (OUT 79438)

1. VAIVADA PREFERS CAREER STATUS ALTHOUGH SOMEWHAT CONCERNED FUTURE JOB SECURITY. WANTS WIFE ACQUIRE CITIZENSHIP AND HAS ALREADY DISCUSSED IMMIGRATION VISA WITH LOCAL CONSUL WHO HAS CABLED HAVA CONSULATE FOR DOSSIER ON WIFE.

2. WILL TAKE WIFE WITH HIM TO ZRMETAL BUT WILL LEAVE TWO CHILDREN HERE WITH WIFE'S FAMILY. TENTATIVE ETD 23 MARCH.

3. TIME ELEMENT IN OBTAINING WIFE'S VISA ONLY PROBLEM PRESENT TIME. HHHW 2Ø92 NOT YET RECEIVED.

4. FOR HAVA. REQUEST AUTHORIZATION PAY VAIVADA SALARY FOR FEB. ADVISE AMOUNT DUE HIM. ALSO REQUEST YOU ATTEMPT EXPEDITE FORWARDING DOSSIER ON WIFE.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

201-168881

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

454 JB/JM/MR 454

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 27 FEB 57

FEB 28 ... 45 57

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JOSE

REC'D CABLE SECT.
IN 11760

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: HAVA INFO: DIR CITE: SANJ 2476

RE: HAVA 811 (IN 49266)
DIR 03998 (OUT 79438)
SANJ 2474 (IN 11647)

OPERATIONAL MEMO DATED 26 FEBRUARY, PREPARED BY VAIVADA BEING POUCHED HAVA AS SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO HRSA-2602.

END OF MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

201-168881

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL

DATE: 26 February 1957

PROJECT:

TO: CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

FROM: (Division) WH/III/CUBA

SUBJECT	CI/OA FILE NO.	SO FILE NO.
TRUE NAME	C-25507	
CRYPTONYM OR PSEUDONYM: Arthur G. VAIVADA		
TYPE OF AGENT OR EMPLOYEE		

USE OF AGENT OR EMPLOYEE (Full details)

Subject has served CIA in a contract capacity since 1949, with a continuous high level of performance. He is currently assigned to Cuba, where he is being utilized as the Principal Agent for Project AMPHODARCH. Project AMPHODARCH is an FI operation designed to provide information on political activities (including Communist) in university circles in Havana, Cuba. In view of his outstanding record and strong overall qualifications, and his expressed desire for a career with CIA, it has been recommended he be converted from contract to career agent status.

TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

	PROVISIONAL APPROVAL	—	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL
	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	X	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL
	GOVERNMENT NAME CHECK		PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO field investigation)		OTHER:

PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

X	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IS ATTACHED IN TWO COPIES		PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN RECEIVED
	PRQ II IS ATTACHED, IF OBTAINABLE		GREEN LIST CHECK HAS BEEN INITIATED

FIELD TRACES

X	REVEAL NO INFORMATION OF VALUE		WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN RECEIVED
	REVEAL INFORMATION AS ATTACHED		NOT INITIATED. NOT EXPECTED TO POSSESS RELEVANT INFO.

SUGGESTED INVESTIGATIVE COVER

	GOVERNMENT		ACADEMIC
	COMMERCIAL		OTHER:

RI TRACES				DIVISION TRACES			
X	RECORD (Not derogatory)		NO RECORD	X	RECORD (Not derogatory)		NO RECORD

INDICATE SPECIAL LIMITATIONS ON INVESTIGATION OR SPECIAL COVERAGE DESIRED

SUBJECT				
	IS	X	AWARE	UNAWARE OF CIA INTEREST
			AWARE	UNAWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST
			AWARE	UNAWARE OF IMPENDING INVESTIGATION
	HAS		BEEN	NOT BEEN BRIEFED ON A "COVER STORY"

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
Hugh O. MacAuley	2056 1021 Barton	W. Galbraith

201-168871

FORM NO. 772
1 SEP 55

SECRET

(9)

142

142 ED/BP/OBS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 23 FEBRUARY 1957

SECRET

ROUTING

FEB 23 04 47 z57

REC'D CABLE SECT

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JOSE

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : FI/RI 2, S/C 2

ROUTINE

IN 10068

TO HAVA INFO: DIR CITE SANJ 2471

RE: HAVA 803 (IN 48050)

22 FEB VAIVADA CONTACTED BURNETTE FOR WHO HE WORKED IN WSBURNT.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

201-168881

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

5

Mr. Arthur G. Vaivada

Dear Mr. Vaivada:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 August 1954, as amended.

Effective ______________________, said contract, as amended, is further amended by the addition of sub-paragraph (e) to paragraph three (3) entitled "Travel" which reads as follows:

"(e) For temporary storage of your household effects while you are temporarily absent from your initial permanent post of duty hereunder."

Effective 19 February 1957, said contract is further amended by deleting paragraph one (1) entitled "Compensation" in its entirety and substituting in lieu thereof the following:

"1. Compensation. In full consideration for the purchase of certain information and services, you will receive from the Government, payable in such an approved manner as you may direct in writing, the following:

(a) Compensation calculated at the rate of $5915 per annum; and

(b) Additional compensation for quarters procurement at San Jose, effective upon your arrival thereat in an amount calculated at the rate of $3000 per annum. As this additional compensation is based upon quarters costs at said post, it is subject to unilateral adjustment by the Government whenever warranted by a change in the factors affecting its initial establishment. Quarters will not be furnished you by the Government nor will you accept quarters provided by your cover facility without prior amendment of this agreement."

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY______________________
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

____

19 Feb 57

201-168771

14-00000

Copy
Subject

ORIG : J.B.NOLAND 611
UNIT : WH/III/CUBA
EXT : 2056
DATE : 18 FEBRUARY 1957

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 20 29 '57
REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : HAVANA INFO: SANJ

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/OA, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE				
	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 78042

TO HAVA INFO SANJ CITE DIR 03253

REF HAVA 801 (IN 47267)

VAIVADA SHOULD CONTACT MR WILLIAM CLYONS IN SANJ.

FYI FUTURE PLANS, VAIVADA TRAINING HQS COULD START

25 MARCH. INDICATE AT ONCE IF DESIRABLE

END OF MESSAGE

201-168881

D. C. MARELIUS, AC/WHD
for J.C.KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

 Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

188 RLG/JD/EMW 188

DATE : 18 FEB 57

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/OA, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

REC'D CABLE SECT.
IN 48050

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: SANJ INFO: DIR CITE: HAVA 803

REF HAVA 801 (IN 47267)

VAIVADA AND FAMILY ARRIVING SANJ 18 FEB. WILL CONTACT COS THEREAFTER.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

201-168881

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

301 HM/RFL/MR

DATE : 15 FEB 57

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/OA, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

REC'D CABLE SECT.

IN 47267

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR

CITE: HAVA 801

RE: HAVA 799 (IN 46908)

1. PRESS 15 FEB IDENTIFIES MAN FOUND SHOT TO DEATH AS AMPHODARCH 1.

2. AGENT KNEW ARTHUR G VAIVADA TRUE NAME AND RESIDENCE. DUE THIS AND AS PRECAUTION STATION ADVANCING VAIVADA AND FAMILY FUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE EMERGENCY TRAVEL THEIR HOME SANJ WHERE WILL STAY AT LEAST UNTIL CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES RESTORED CUBA. WILL ADVISE DEVELOPMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

201-168881

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA A I R (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-W-2092

201-32723

CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief of Station, Habana

DATE 8 FEB 57 15 00 z

FROM Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL Administrative
SPECIFIC Arthur G. VAIVADA

References: a. HKH-A-3314
b. HKH-W-1905
c. HKH-A-2577

Action Required: Notify Headquarters if Any Objection to Action Para. 3

1. Headquarters has no objection to the postponement of VAIVADA's training until the end of the current contract year (July-August 1957), and has cancelled immediate training arrangements accordingly. The Station should submit a new request several months prior to the desired new training dates.

2. There has been a change, meanwhile, in Headquarters thinking on the proposed conversion of VAIVADA to Staff status. Upon reviewing the case, the responsible Headquarters staff suggested that career agent status would be more appropriate and recommended that the requested personnel action be changed accordingly. The Staff pointed out that virtually all benefits which would accrue to VAIVADA under staff status are also obtainable as a career agent. These include Civil Service Retirement, Sick and Annual Leave, Home Leave Travel, Periodic Step Increases, and coverage under the Federal Employment Compensation and Missing Persons Acts. He would also be eligible for certain KUBARK insurance plans, subject to security and other special considerations. The one exception is that VAIVADA would remain on a contract basis, meaning that his job security would be somewhat less than that of staff personnel. His contract would be for an indefinite period, however, and his job security would closely approximate that of a staff agent.

3. In discussing VAIVADA's conversion, the reviewing staff also noted that VAIVADA would not necessarily be granted staff status, even though his wife were to become a U.S. citizen, and would definitely not qualify for same at this time. In view of this development and the generally favorable benefits accruing to a career agent, the Division has resubmitted its conversion request to provide for career rather than

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

8 Feb. 57
RI COPY
201-158881

SECRET

HKW-W-2092
Page Two

staff status, at Grade GS-11. It is felt that the career status provides most, if not all, of the benefits sought for VAIVADA in HKS-A-2577. It will now be unnecessary, moreover, for Mrs. VAIVADA to acquire U.S. citizenship, although Headquarters stands ready to facilitate acquisition of same if the VAIVADAs so desire.

4. Should there be any objection, on the part of the Station or VAIVADA, to this latest proposal, Headquarters would appreciate an early indication to that effect, in order that other arrangements might be made. It would appear at this time, however, that the proposed career status is the most favorable that VAIVADA could expect.

John T. Flynn
for J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

5 February 1957

Distribution:
3 - Habana
1 - RI
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/III/Cuba/Chrono
1 - Subject

WH/III/Cuba/JBNoland/jt

John T. Flynn
for J. C. KING, C/WHD
(Releasing Officer)

W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III
(Authenticating Officer)

RI COPY
201-168881
~~201-32733~~

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

INSTRUCTIONS: Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and one copy for preparation of contract.

CASE OFFICER: James B. Noland

DIVISION: WH/III

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 2056, 2971

DATE: 30 January 1957

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME: [X] PSEUDO [ ] TRUE — Arthur G. VAIVAIA
2. PROJECT: AMPHODARCH
3. ALLOTMENT NO.: 3517-014
4. SLOT NO.:
5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES: NA
6. INDIVIDUAL IS PRESENTLY ENGAGED, OR HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY [X] YES [ ] NO (If yes, describe and include salary) (CITE Subject first recruited in Panama as HYDROMATIC in November 1948; transferred to Costa Rica in HURASOID Project. Subsequently was transferred to BIRADIAL Project and PBPRIMES.
7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date): Operational Clearance - 19 July 1954
8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" [XX] YES [ ] NO
9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT [ ] YES [XX] NO
10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): Career Agent

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.
12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN [ ] YES [ ] NO
13. AGE: 34
14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): 20 June 1922
15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Sterling, Illinois
16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Habana, Cuba
17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate): [ ] SINGLE [XX] MARRIED [ ] WIDOWED [ ] ANNULLED [ ] SEPARATED [ ] DIVORCED
18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP: Three dependents: wife and two children
19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY [ ] YES [XX] NO RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE:
21. VETERAN: World War II
22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat):
23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: USA and USAF
24. RANK OR GRADE: T/Sgt.
25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE [ ] YES [XX] NO
26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA [ ] YES [ ] NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY: $6,390.00 GS-11
28. POST DIFFERENTIAL:
29. COVER (Breakdown, if any):
30. TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY COVER [ ] YES [ ] NO

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. $2,400.00 (non-taxable)
32. POST
33. OTHER: Equalization Allowance - $2,620.00 (non-taxable)
34. COVER (Breakdown, if any): NA

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES [XX] PCS [ ] DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL [ ] FOREIGN OPERATIONAL
36. WITH DEPENDENTS [XX] YES [ ] NO
37. HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS TO BE SHIPPED [XX] YES [ ] NO
38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED [XX] YES [ ] NO
39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL [XX] YES [ ] NO
40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH

Wife - Costa Rican (expects obtain U.S. citizenship in near future)
Born 15 March 1918 - 38 years of age. Married to Subject since 1945

Son - U.S. Citizen, 7 years of age.

Daughter - U.S. Citizen, 5 years of age.

20-167881 X

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH [XX] CIA REGULATIONS [ ] COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION: X
43. ENTERTAINMENT
44. OTHER: Normal operational expenses of field

SECRET

30 January 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI

SUBJECT : Request for Conversion of Arthur G. VAIVADA from Contract to Career Agent Status

REFERENCE : HKH-A-2577

1. Referenced dispatch from the field recommends the conversion of contract agent Arthur G. VAIVADA to staff status and presents a strong case for such conversion. Upon receiving a formal WHD request for such action, however, your Plans Staff suggested that career agent status would be more appropriate in this case, and further indicated that staff status for VAIVADA is virtually out of the question at this time. The request is being re-submitted, therefore, in revised form to provide for conversion to career rather than staff status.

2. VAIVADA has served CIA in a contract capacity since 1949, with a continuous high level of performance; first in Costa Rica, later in Guatemala and Cuba. He is currently assigned to Cuba and is expected to remain there indefinitely. VAIVADA is 34 years old and was promoted recently to the equivalent of a GS-10 rating. His expressed career interests lie in continued employment by CIA, more especially in the area of unofficial cover assignments, for which he is highly suited.

April 1956

3. In view of VAIVADA's outstanding record as a contract agent, his strong overall qualifications, and his expressed desire for a career with CIA, it is recommended that he be granted career agent status. A PHS and a new contract check list (in duplicate) are attached.

4. WH Division contemplates bringing VAIVADA to the U.S. for covert training during the latter part of 1957.

5. Approval for the conversion of VAIVADA from contract to career agent status, as indicated above, is hereby requested.

J. C. KING
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Attachments
PHS (2)
Contract Check List (2)

7 Feb 57

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)	CASE OFFICER: James B. Noland	DIVISION: WH/III
NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.	TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 2971, 2036	DATE: 30 January 1957

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS (See Part XIV of Confidential Fund Regulations or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel. If medical benefits are requested, see R 15-430 or successor regulations.)

FECA
Missing Persons
Retirement
CIA Sick and Annual Leave
Home Leave Travel
Periodic Step Increases

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check): [ ] PROPOSED [X] ESTABLISHED

48. TYPE (Check): [ ] PROPRIETARY [ ] SUBSIDIZED [X] CULTURAL [ ] EDUCATIONAL [ ] COMMERCIAL [ ] MILITARY [ ] TOURIST [ ] OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS: [ ] YES [XX] NO [ ] COMPLETE [ ] PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.) [XX] TOTAL [ ] PARTIAL [ ] NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION: Indefinite (DAYS / MONTHS / YEARS)

52. EFFECTIVE DATE: Immediate

53. RENEWABLE: [XX] YES [ ] NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE (Number of days): Ninety Days

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION: [XX] YES [ ] NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION (FI, PP, other): FI Operations

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Principal agent engaged in collection of positive intelligence and CE information.

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Army and Air Force Intelligence. CIA Training. Other as indicated in Number 6, above.

59. EDUCATION (Check Highest Level Attained): [X] GRADE SCHOOL [X] HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE [ ] TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE [ ] BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE [ ] COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE [ ] COLLEGE (No degree) [X] COLLEGE DEGREE [ ] POST GRADUATE [ ] MA [ ] PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY (Check Appropriate Degree Competency)

LANGUAGE	SPEAK: FLUENT	SPEAK: AVERAGE	SPEAK: POOR	WRITE: FLUENT	WRITE: AVERAGE	WRITE: POOR	READ: FLUENT	READ: AVERAGE	READ: POOR
Spanish	X				X		X		

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: U.S.A.

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

Very good.

SECTION XV — PRIOR EMPLOYMENT

63. JOB AND SALARY PRIOR TO SERVICE FOR CIA

1940-1945: T/Sgt. USA, USAF, Intelligence NCO.
Jan. 1945 - April 1946: Leading man labor, $12.88 per day, US Naval Air Station, Coco Solo, Canal Zone
April 1946 - April 1949: T/Sgt USAF, Intelligence NCO, Albrook Field, Canal Zone
April 1949 - Present: Contact agent.

X

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (Use other side if necessary)

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF DIVISION OFFICER	DATE
	H. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III	

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

204 FO/RFL/BRB

DATE: 15 JAN 57

JAN 15 1703Z 57

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: HAVANA

ACTION: WH 5

INFO: FI/RI 2, S/C 2

ROUTINE

IN 34563

TO DIR INFO CITE HAVA 755

REF: HAVA 745 (IN 32122)

REQUEST TRAINING BE POSTPONED INDEFINITELY. EXPLANATORY DISPATCH FOLLOWS.

END OF MESSAGE

201-168881

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

14-00000

353

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

353/DEF/RFL/CG

DATE : 08 JANUARY 57

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

IN 32122

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : FI/RI 2, CP 2, S/C 2

ROUTINE

PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR

CITE: HAVA 745

RE: HKHW 1984

DUE DELAY FINAL PROCESSING WIFES VISA VAIVADA UNABLE DEPART HAVA PRIOR 16 JAN. WILL ADVISE ETA. GROWERY ACTING.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

201-168881

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH

ATTENTION: Chief, WH/III

SUBJECT: Covert Training Request for Arthur G. VAIVADA

REFERENCE: Project AMPHCDARCH

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 4 December 1956 requesting covert training for Arthur G. VAIVADA.

2. The CI Staff approves the training request subject to the comments and recommendations set forth in the attached memorandum prepared by CI/ICD under date of 20 December 1956.

James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

Attachment:
C/CI/ICD memo dtd 20 Dec. 56 - Subject; Comments and Recommendations on Proposed Covert Training of Arthur G. VAIVADA

Mrs. Argentina C. Crozier A-11 937 507

Admitted to the U S. as an immigrant: March 12, 1960

Type: O-1 Port: SNA (San Ontónio, Tex.)

Date of Birth: March 15, 1915

Received FOREIGN ADDRESS AND OCCUPATION INDEX CARD (Budget Bureau No. 43-R390) and Dept of Justice ID card Form No. 1-151 - thru my home address at Longmont Colorado about ~~March~~ 12 April 1960.

Index Card filled and mailed on 19 April 1960.

201-168881

14-00000

RECIBO POR DINERO

22271 Universal

Nº 050

31 de January de 1951

RECIBI de Cash

la suma de Seven hundred fifty and no/100 colones

por Services rendered, month of January

(₡ 750.00)

Russ L. Cozier

27-14

27-14

27-14

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301-168881

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RECIBO POR DINERO

258499 Universal

Nº 009

30 de April de 1953

RECIBI de Cash

la suma de Eight hundred colones 00/100

por Services rendered, 16-30 April

(₡ 800.00)

Ross L. Crozier

in advance

201-168851

BIOGRAPHICAL: Consuelo Felicia CORDERO Calderon

From	To	Place	Employment	Employer	Address
1 Jan 57	20 May 57	San Jose, C.R.	Manicurist Salon BORDALLO	Uuan BORDALLO	62 entre Av 3 - 5
20 May	1 July 57	Havana, Cuba	Unemployed.		
2 July	13 April 58	San Jose, C.R.	Salon BORDALLO	Juan BORDALLO	62 entre Av 3 - 5
14 Apr 58	July 58	160 Main St. Quincy 69, Mass.	Unemployed.		
July 58	27 Dec 58	Mexico City	Salon Moderno	Esperanza HERRERA	Av Alvaro Obregon No 174
27 Dec 58	Mar 59	180 Main St. Quincy 69, Mass.	Unemployed.		
Mar 59	17 Mar 60	550 Riverside Dr. New York 27, N.Y.	Student at Wilfred Academy - 1657 Broadway 51st also employed at Glamour Cut, 353 E. 204 St., Bronx, N.Y. also employed at Ciro's Coffiure, Lexington Av 91st and 92nd. also employed at Jacques Beauty Salon, Inc. 160 West 55th Street, N.Y.		
21 Mar 60	to date	226 Burgess Ave Alexandria, Va.	Temporarily unemployed.		

Harold R. Noenage

DATES WERE TAKEN FROM PASSPORT TRAVEL

201-168271

14-00000

RECIBO POR DINERO

272271 Universal

Nº 069

30 de June de 1949

RECIBI de Cash

la suma de four hundred and no/100 colones

por services rendered, month of June

(₡ 400.00)

Ross L. Crozier

27-19-11

27-19-13

27-19-16

27-19-18

27-19-19

27-19-20

27-19-18

FILE IN 201- 168881

14-00000

ROSS L. CROZIER
Representative

PUBLIC SURVEYS INSTITUTE
GENERAL POLLING SERVICE
RIVERSIDE 1-3674

332 FIDELITY UNION LIFE BLDG.
1511 BRYAN STREET
DALLAS, TEXAS

See Subject's Cover file in Operations folder -

201-168881

SECRET
Security Information

MEMORANDUM TO: PLANS

FROM: WHD

SUBJECT: Project HUMANOID

Project HUMANOID is the most important single project of the San Jose Station, and the basis for all existing and contemplated OSO activities in the area. It is requested that the restrictions imposed upon project HUMANOID, as contained in TRS-W-635, copy attached, be lifted at this time, and the Chief of Station be authorized to direct the activities of HUMANOID into the following channels.

(a) Direct and close supervision of HUMANOID-3, the Station's penetration of the Vanguardia Popular, Costa Rican Communist Party, in order to utilize fully the agents potentialities. HUMANOID-3 is intelligent, has a wide knowledge of Communist activities, plans and personalities and is desirous of cooperating to the extent of his ability. After a thorough de-briefing of HUMANOID-3 by HUMANOID, in order to acquaint him, HUMANOID-3 with the Station's specific interests and requirements, plus the subsequent close supervision which will be exercised by HUMANOID, and the continuing close supervision of HUMANOID-3 by HUMANOID, it is felt that the station will then be in a position to provide intensive and adequate coverage of the objectives assigned to it in the San Jose SOI.

(b) Direct and close supervision of HUMANOID-4, the Station's penetration of the Women's Fronts affiliated with the Vanguardia Popular. It is felt that the former cut-out HUCKLEBONE, who handled HUMANOID-4 until 1 June 1949, was somewhat inept in his operational dealings, which possibly may account for what seems to be a lack of productivity in the HUMANOID-4 project. HUMANOID-4 has an intimate relationship with active CP members in Costa Rica, both on a low and high level, and possesses a definite potential for both independent reporting, and for spotting a likely individual to be used as a parallel to the HUMANOID-3 project. HUMANOID, who will now handle HUMANOID-4, is capable of directing this agents efforts into the proper channels, and capitalizing fully on the talents possessed by the individual. It is felt that this is another instance whereby HUMANOID, by working closely and directly with the individual can make a substantial contribution to the efforts of the San Jose Station.

(c) Direct and close supervision of HUMANOID-1 and HUMANOID-2, the mail intercept operations presently covering the General Post Office in San Jose. The information that HUMANOID-1 has access to is important and is of documentary reliability. His position is important to the operational structure of the station. HUMANOID-2 is

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201-168881

a very satisfactory type of agent. He displays a certain amount of initiative in voluntarily performing tasks not specifically requested by the Chief of Station through the cut-out HUMANOID. HUMANOID-2 has demonstrated the qualities of willingness, discretion, and cooperation.

(d) As to the principal agent of Project HUMANOID, the following observations are submitted, which will indicate unmistakeably the value of this project, and its contribution to the successful activities of the San Jose Station.

<u>Evaluation of services</u> - As the principal agent and station cut-out, HUMANOID is charged with the direction and guidance of HUMANOID-1; HUMANOID-2; HUMANOID-3; HUMANOID-4. His handling of these agents is carried out in a professional and efficient manner, and his personal comments and corrections on their reports, based on his long acquaintance with local personalities and conditions, are of considerable value. His attitude remains enthusiastic and willing.

<u>Evaluation of information</u> - The information produced by the agents being handled by HUMANOID is of great value to the station. In addition to his own production, this agents operations are well suited to checking on information received from other sources.

<u>COMMENTS</u> - Despite the fact that HUMANOID has been working under certain operational restrictions for a number of months, his value to the station continues to be of major importance. In addition to the tangible and measureable information produced by and through him, HUMANOID has proved to be the single most valuable source of background and orientation data for the Chief of Station. His knowledge of the history of Costa Rican communist activities and personalities, and his grasp of the various revolutionary movements and figures has been freely shared with the Chief of Station. These "briefing meetings" represent an intangible contribution to the over-all performance of the Station. HUMANOID is eager to expand his operations and upon the removal of present operational restrictions it is believed that he can be given further responsibilities, particularly in the recruiting of additional sub-agents. The station is presently interested in accomplishing a parallel penetration of the Communist Party of Costa Rica, in expanding routine investigative coverage and in developing additional sources on political movements. It is believed that HUMANOID can insure the success of these new ventures.

COSTA RICA

1. HUMANOID

A. Identifying data:

(a) Nationality: U.S. citizen, born 22 June 1922
(b) Education: High school and attending college in Costa Rica.
(c) Occupation: Sergeant in U.S. Air Force during World War II, and an agent of the Panama Station until early 1949
(d) Marital status: Married
(e) Time devoted to our work: Approximately 40%
(f) How contacted: By Chief of Station

B. Humanoid is a cutout for projects Hugger, Humankind 1 and 3, and Humanist-2. See attachments.

2. Production:

(a) Description of info produced: Communist penetration of labor groups and student groups.

(b) Statistics on reports received and disseminated:
July thru December 3 received 3 dissemed

(c) Headquarters evaluation of info received: B-2

3. Cost of Project: $89.05 per month. ND shows following payments

July	$34.42	October	$58.39
August	34.42	November	51.63
September	34.42	December	51.63 ?

4. Administration by headquarters:

(a) Operational clearance granted.

(b) Allotment sheet up to date.

5. General Evaluation:

Humanoid is considered an excellent agent in all respects. His value is more than commensurate with his salary.

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201-168881

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

/PRQ/

PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER:

1. If feasible, subject should fill in Part I of PRQ in his own hand.

2. Part II of PRQ is classified, must be filled in by the Case Officer and is not to be shown to subject.

3. Headquarters will not be able to provide an Operational Clearance unless it receives answers to all questions on page 1 of Part I (Items 1 to 12), and to all questions of Part II (Items 36 to 58).

4. In emergency these answers, keyed to items 1 to 12 by number, and with summary of Part II, may be cabled to Headquarters, followed promptly by pouch with complete data.

5. Fully completed PRQ must be sent to Headquarters as soon as possible, two copies of Part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and one copy of Part II.

6. Data acquired later must be sent to Headquarters in PRQ format on a continuing basis.

7. All pages of both parts will bear the PRQ number, composed of (a) Station symbol (b) PRQ (c) number assigned consecutively by the field station; e.g. PGA/PRQ/10.

36. Cryptonym Arthur G. VAIVADA

37. How, when and where was subject first contacted or developed?

Subject was first recruited in Panama as HYDROPATHIC in November 1948 and transferred to Costa Rica in approved HUMANOID project. Subsequently was transferred to BIRADIAL project, PBSUCCESS and in 1954 to AMPHODARCH project (Cuba) with which he is currently identified.

38. Could subject be turned over quickly and in a secure manner to someone else for handling? Yes To whom? Record over the past nine years shows that subject has easily been turned over to different projects and case officers.

39. Best estimate of subject's motivation

Subject is motivated by his interest in intelligence work, desire to advance in the organization as a career, its remuneration and as loyal U. S. citizen.

SECRET

FORM NO. 51-65B MAY 1950

201-168881

/PRO/

40. With what agencies and files has subject's name been checked? When? Result? What else has been done to verify biographical information furnished by subject?

Checked upon recruitment in Panama in 1949 and subsequently upon transfer to other projects.

41. What control exists over subject at present? How can it be increased?

Subject is controlled through dependence on salary, loyalty because of American heritage, past Army and Agency service, and a desire for a career in intelligence work.

42. For what service does he think he is working? What does he think becomes of his information?

Subject is cognizant of the identity of this organization.

43. Explain fully subject's past or present connection with any intelligence service.

Subject previously in U. S. Army and Air Force Intelligence.

44. What type of information has subject furnished? What type is he best qualified by education and experience to furnish? Give evaluation of information received.

Subject has furnished information received from sub-agents on Communist and revolutionary activities throughout the Central American-Caribbean area. Is now P/A in Cuban project with those primary objectives. Work to date has been outstanding. Has been particularly valuable in development and recruitment of new agents.

45. If subject's duties are to be other than intelligence gathering, explain.

Only those functions (Administrative-Operational) normally exercised by P/A.

46. Has he been given special training as an agent? Explain.

U. S. Army Intelligence Training and Agency covert training from 5 October through 25 November 1953. Additional covert training at Headquarters planned for April-May 1957.

47. How and from whom does he obtain information?

From indigenous student—youth elements, with whom he maintains contact and who in turn have entree to Cuban Communist and revolutionary circles.

48. Is it proposed to pay subject a regular salary? If so, amount per week, month, etc. Explain any other methods of payment, such as exchange commodities.

Subject is to receive $6,390 annually, plus allowances, with provisions for normal step increases, and promotion when justified.

49. Have any promises or commitments whatsoever (not covered elsewhere in this form) been made to subject? Explain.

No.

50. Are subject's language abilities and other characteristics such that he could pass as a native of a country or region other than his own? Explain.

Has native fluency in language and would at least pass as long-time resident and possibly even national of certain Central American-Caribbean countries, although has obviously foreign physical characteristics.

51. What is subject's social standing? Aristocracy, upper middle class, lower middle class, peasantry, etc.?

Upper Middle Class

52. What are subject's personal habits? Liquor, drugs, gambling, mistresses or lovers?

Believed to be normal in all respects.

53. Evaluation of subject's character, reliability, security.

All noted excellent.

54. With what other foreign power would subject be most likely to collaborate because of his ideology, obligation, etc.? Explain.

None

55. What special abilities, talents, or qualifications are possessed by subject which would conceivably be of value for other operations in the future?

Subject can send and receive Morse Code.

56. Attach samples of subject's signature and handwriting in all languages known to him, also a recent, dated photograph, and fingerprints.

Previously submitted.

57. How was information in Part I obtained?

From Subject personally.

58. Other miscellaneous operational data and comments.

Outstanding record led first to recommendation that subject be converted to staff status; following which it was determined that a career agent designation would be more appropriate in his case.

Case officer

SECRET

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH -- ROSS L. CROZIER

Ross L. CROZIER was born on 20 June 1922 in De Kalb, Illinois and is the eldest of five children of a respectable middle-class family. His parents and his two brothers and two sisters now reside in Sterling, Illinois. Crozier received his primary and high school education in De Kalb and entered the U.S. Army in 1940, later transferring to the Army Air Corps. He served as an operations and intelligence specialist, first in the China-India-Burma Theatre and later in Panama. Crozier was discharged from the service in August 1945, leaving with the grade of Technical Sergeant. After his discharge, Crozier worked about three months as a laboratory technician in the Sterling (Illinois) Silica-Gel Corporation and then returned to the Canal Zone to marry Argentina CORDERO C., a Costa Rican girl in December 1945. He then worked about four months as a stevedore. and labor foreman in the Canal Zone. In April 1946 he re-enlisted in the Air Force in the Canal Zone, from which he was discharged three years later in 1949 at his previous grade of Technical Sergeant.

Crozier became an Agency contract agent on 1 June 1949. He was originally scheduled to be used in Panama but was assigned to the HUMANOID Project in Costa Rica instead. While there he successfully handled a high level penetration of the Costa Rican Communist Party. In 1953 he was sent to Headquarters for training, and in 1954 he was assigned to PBSUCCESS for a brief period. In July 1954 he signed a new contract in Washington whereby he became the new principal

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agent of Project AMPHODARCH. He is under student cover and is actually working for his BA degree at the University of Habana, for which he has approximately 1 more year of academic work to complete.

Crozier has a healthy appearance and appears to be about (25) ? instead of 32 years of age. He is athletically inclined and has been, and is at present, interested in organizing and participating in intra-mural athletics. He is happily married and the father of two children. He possesses a great deal of integrity, honesty, intelligence, and resourcefulness. His chief hobby, aside from sports, is photography. He has made quite a study of picture-taking and has developed a portrait photo technique which he has found useful in his work and as an aid to obtaining extra spending money while going to school. The Chief of Habana Mission and WHD have a strong feeling that this man will perform his duties in a superior manner and will make AMPHODARCH a valuable and worthwhile project.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION	
		RI FILE NO.	
		DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.	DATE
		SOURCE CRYPTONYM / DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION
ANALYST MW	DATE PROCESSED 22 July 58	DISSEMINATED IN	DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION	
CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/CA FOLDER ON THE SUBJ

OF THIS 201 HELD UNDER CA 25507

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-168881

FORM NO. 867 REPLACES FORM 867, 1 AUG 54
1 MAY 56 AND FORM 137 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

RE-PUNCH

TO: RI/ANALYSIS SECTION — DATE: 04 APR 1960

ACTION: OPEN / AMEND / CLOSE

FROM: RID/20 — ROOM NO.: 1C14L — TELEPHONE: 8514

INSTRUCTIONS: *Form must be typed or printed in block letters.*

SECTION I: *List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.*

SECTION II: *List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.*

SECTION III: *To be completed in all cases.*

SECTION I

SENSITIVE / NON-SENSITIVE

201 NO.: 168881 — 1. SOURCE DOCUMENT:

NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title): CROZIER, ROSS LESTER — SEX 3.: X M / F

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2.	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title)

RECORD COPY

PHOTO 4.	BIRTH DATE 5.	COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6.	CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7.	OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8.
X YES / NO	CIRC 22	USA	ILLINOIS	1. / 2. / 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION: — OCC/POS. CODE 9.:

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM: — PSEUDONYM:

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10.	ACTION DESK 11.	2ND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.	3RD COUNTRY INTEREST 12A.
050	CSO		

COMMENTS: CIT: USA

CS COPY

201- 168881

PERMANENT CHARGE: YES / NO — RESTRICTED FILE: YES / NO — SIGNATURE: Corina de Alpers [signature]

FORM NO. 831 — 1 OCT 58 — USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (30)

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

14-00000

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

RE-PUNCH

WH/3M

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO: RI/ANALYSIS SECTION

DATE: 1/4/7?

FROM: WH/3M

ACTION: OPEN / AMEND / CLOSE

ROOM NO. 3 ? 10 ?H

TELEPHONE

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

SENSITIVE / NONSENSITIVE

201 NO. 163??? 1.

SOURCE DOCUMENT

NAME (Last) ROZIER (First) ?? (Middle) ? (Title)

SEX 3. M

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2. (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title)

RECORD COPY

PHOTO 4. YES / NO

BIRTH DATE 5.

COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6. USA

CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7. ILLINOIS

OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8. 1. 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION

OCC/POS. CODE 9.

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM

PSEUDONYM: ?????? HOLDER R

VAINVA?? ??????? (F.R???)

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10. MEX

ACTION DESK 11. WH/3M

SECOND COUNTRY INTEREST 12. CI

THIRD COUNTRY INTEREST 12a.

COMMENTS:

CIT: USA

201-32723

Closed 3 May 57

VERIFIED

CS COPY

PUNCHED

201-

PERMANENT CHARGE: YES / NO

RESTRICTED FILE: YES / NO

SIGNATURE: JHP

Form No. 1 Oct. 56 831 Use previous editions.

SECRET
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(38)

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO	DATE	ACTION
RI/ANALYSIS SECTION	3 May 1957	X OPEN / AMEND / CLOSE

FROM	ROOM NO.	TELEPHONE
RI/CO Amelia Superfisky	2301 L	3127

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

SENSITIVE	X NONSENSITIVE	201 NO. 1.	168881	SOURCE DOCUMENT

NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title)	SEX 3. M / F
CROZIER	Ross	L.		

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2.	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title)

RECORD COPY

PHOTO 4.	BIRTH DATE 5.	COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6.	CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7.	OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8.
YES / NO	D 6-0 M 6-8 Y 22	USA	Illinois	1. 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION	OCC/POS. CODE 9.

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM	PSEUDONYM
	Arthur G. VAIVADA

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10.	ACTION DESK 11.	SECOND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.	THIRD COUNTRY INTEREST 12a.
	WH/III/Cuba WH/3C4		

COMMENTS:

201- 168881

PERMANENT CHARGE	RESTRICTED FILE	SIGNATURE
YES / NO	X YES / NO	Amelia Superfisky

Form No. 831 Use previous editions. 1 Oct. 56 (38)

SECRET
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PUNCHED

OZIER, Ross L. 201-168881

SECRET

Vol. I of V

OFFICIAL CS FILE

(Undated - Dec. 51)

FORM 3-68 1505B

SECRET

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECRET
(When Filled In)

3 Feb 75
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on CROZIER (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

- [ ] Should be closed. (If this category applies, affix Records Officer stamp.)
- [ ] Unwitting collaborator. OI Code A7. Explanation: ________
- [ ] Witting collaborator. OI Code A1.
- [ ] Potential witting collaborator; date opened: ________ OI Code A2.
- [ ] Former witting collaborator (relationship terminated). OI Code A3.
- [ ] Potential witting collaborator never contacted. OI Code A4.
- [ ] Counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.
- [X] All others. OI Code A6.

Signed Roy Gilson (name) Ops Officer (title) LA/M/FI (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed NR (initials) 12 Feb 75 (date)

This document is a permanent part of this file. 201-168881

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECRET
(When Filled In)

E2 IMPDET CL BY 061475

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 1 OF 2

SECRET

STAFF 302024Z DIRECTOR 650063

CONF: INFO: FILE

DISSEM BY: 13

TO: LIMA, QUITO, GUAYAQUIL, SANTIAGO, BUENOS AIRES, MEXICO CITY

INFO PANTECH, DIRTECH, BANGTECH, TOKYTECH. Y

TAPPER/CO STARROYO TECHS Y

REF: DIRECTOR 618825 (BEING RELAYED MEXICO CITY) [*] Y

1. IN REFINEMENT OF REF REQUIREMENT QUERY WHETHER ADDRESSEES HAVE AN ASSET WHO IS ETHNIC CHINESE WITH LATIN AMERICA ORDINARY PASSPORT WHO COULD APPLY FOR A PRC TOURIST VISA. IF YES, PLEASE HAVE ASSET CONTACT PRC EMBASSY AND ASK IF THEY WOULD ISSUE TOURIST VISA AND HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE BEFORE ASSET COULD OBTAIN VISA. Y

2. WE ARE TRYING TO DETERMINE WHETHER PRC EMBASSY WILL ISSUE VISA FOR TOURIST PURPOSES TO SINGLETON TRAVELERS OF ETHNIC CHINESE ORIGIN WHO ARE NATIVE OR NATURALIZED LA CITIZENS WHO HAVE NO RELATIVES IN CHINA. Y

3. IF PER ABOVE AN APPROPRIATE ASSET CAN BE IDENTIFIED, WE WOULD CONSIDER REQUESTING STATION CONCERNED TO LAUNCH HIM ON A SIMPLE OPS SUPPORT MISSION TO PRC: I.E., TO COLLECT INFO ON PRC DOCUMENTATION CONTROL BASED ON SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO THE ASSET BEFORE LAUNCH. Y

DATE: 29 JANUARY 75
ORIG: JACK KOJIMOTO/YET
UNIT: CH/OCEA
EXT: 1730

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 039306

SECRET

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

DIRECTOR

650063

DISSEM BY: PER #

4. PLEASE ADVISE BY 14 FEBRUARY. E2, IMPDET.H

*REQUEST ADDRESSEE STATIONS NOTIFY HQS IN ADVANCE OF ANY UPCOMING TRIPS TO THE PRC BY ITS OVERSEAS CHINESE ASSETS.

COORD: OTS/AB - THOMAS KLINE (DRAFT)
AC/LA/M - R. U. STONE (DRAFT)
DC/LA/NW - J. HENNESSY (DRAFT)
(FOR) C/LA/SB - P. KITTREDGE (DRAFT)
DCEA/CH [signature]
LA/TRS - [signature]

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

[signature]
CHIEF, LA

[signature]
CEA

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY-

14-00000

SENT FOR MICROFILMING

Date 13 Dec 70

Corrective Microfilming

TRSA 347 20 May 49 201-162221

14-00000

SENT TO RID/AN
22 Dec 70

TZPW 411	8 Jan 49	201-168881
TRSW 225	27 Dec 48	" "
TRSA 935	11 May 51	" "
TRSW 643	28 May 51	" "
TRSA 974	10 July 51	" "
TZPA 365/01	4 Nov 48	" "

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

AIR   TPS-A- 698

DEC 7 1951

Chief of Station, San Jose

Acting Chief, WH

HUMANOID

RIFS: a. TPS-A-1094
b. TPS-W-685

1. Headquarters files have just been admirably augmented through the receipt of reference a., which to say the least, sheds considerable, much-needed light on this operation. This was a most welcome clarification of many of our questions concerning HUMANOID.

2. Upon his return to Headquarters, Dennis E. COPELAND reported your desire to have HUMANOID sign a new contract. It is suggested in this regard that you furnish as soon as possible any provisions which you wish to recommend for inclusion in the contract. Such recommendations will of course be in conformity with Sec. [illegible] of the Regulations governing contract agents, not career agents. It would be most advantageous to submit such a contract for consideration simultaneously with a request for renewal of the operation at the end of February 1952.

3. Relative to your question in paragraph 2 of reference a., at the present time, TPS-W-685 is the current approved version of the extent of HUMANOID's operational activities. It is firmly believed that these restrictions will be removed when, in February 1952, this operation will be considered for renewal by the Staff which imposed the curtailment. It is urged that in your quarterly review for the period ending 31 December 1951 you give Headquarters the benefit of another specific detailed report. At that time, we will also submit a request for increased salary for HUMANOID.

WM. H. WHEELER, JR.

By J. C. Bonnet

ACWH   R. W. RASTETTER

JCB:cb
5 December 1951

7 Dec. 51
201-168881

SECRET

VIA: Air (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

SECURITY INFORMATION DISPATCH NO. TRSA-1084

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD DATE: 19 November 1951

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— HUMANOID Project

Ref: TRSW-685, TRSA-1056, WASH 14671

1. TRSW-685, which advises that the expiration date of this project has been determined to be 29 February 1952, was received several days after the forwarding of TRSA-1056, which recommended that subject be considered for career agent status. Although TRSA-1056 furnished certain of the data requested by headquarters, the following additional information, queries and comments are set forth with a view to facilitating a final evaluation of the project.

2. Pursuant to the approval contained in TRSW-655, dated June 29, 1951, HUMANOID has been and is currently acting as cutout for HUMANIST-2, as well as for HUMANKIND-1 and HUMANKIND-3. It is therefore not clear whether paragraph 2.b. of TRSA-685 is to be interpreted as a new restriction on his activities which is to be placed into effect at this time. In other words, is headquarters' approval of the suggestions contained in TRSA-950 now withdrawn?

3. As discussed in TRSA-950, assistance was extended HUMANOID in setting up a photography and photocopy shop on the fringe of the downtown area. Funds formerly used for rental of a safehouse were applied instead as rental for his photo shop, with the purpose of providing a safe meeting place between HUMANOID and HUMANIST-2 and to provide a more accessible spot for the processing of HUMANKIND material. Early in July 1951, after two or three weeks experience with photostating HUMANKIND material at the studio demonstrated the unsuitability of the arrangement, HUMANOID resumed his photostatic work in his own home. The studio has continued to serve as a meeting place for HUMANIST-2. The following considerations entered into the decision to discontinue processing HUMANKIND-1 and 3 material at the photo studio: 1) The conspicuous nature of the equipment in a small shop; 2) the security risks caused by the presence in the studio of HUMANOID's local employee; and 3) the lack of any secure storage space for compromising material

201-168881

4. Since the dispatch of TRSA-1056, HUMANOID has been notified by his photographic assistant that the latter is resigning

CS copy filed in 18-6-3-77

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CLASSIFICATION

TRSA 1084
19 NOV 51
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to seek more remunerative employment at the end of this month. HUMANOID states that he is unable to devote sufficient time to the business to keep it going without an assistant and that it would be quite difficult to locate a competent workman at the salary level he can afford to pay. The above facts, plus unfavorable findings of a recent financial analysis of his business, have convinced HUMANOID to close the photograph shop at the end of November.

5. In connection with paragraph 2.d. of TRSW-685, which states that HUMANOID must discontinue using his home to reproduce the material obtained from HUMANKIND-1 and HUMANKIND-3, the following brief history of safehouse experience at this station is set forth. A review of the files and discussion with HUMANOID reveals that seven safehouses have been utilized to date:

a. An office room in the Panama Company building in San José from June, 1959, to November, 1949, used to process HUMANKIND material. Abandoned when it was learned the room was called the "FBI office upstairs" by other residents of the building.

b. An apartment in Bella Vista from November, 1949, to January, 1950, used to process HUMANKIND material. Abandoned because landlord lived next door and used common entrance.

c. One-half of a house in San Pedro, which had private entrance. Abandoned because the notorious Frank MARSHALL was neighbor. MARSHALL is enemy of the Communist Party and knew HUMANIST-2 by sight.

d. An apartment in Parque Morazán. After two months this was abandoned as neighbors began making inquiries concerning infrequency of visits to the house.

e. Apartment in Barrio Luján, for four months. This was abandoned as many Party members lived nearby and knew HUMANIST-2 by sight.

f. A house near the Sabana airport for seven months, used to process HUMANKIND material. Frequent vacancy of the premises caused speculation by neighbors and landlord.

g. Photographic studio as discussed above. In addition to stated reasons for closing above safehouses, two house breakings were suffered, and it was frequently feared that the reproduction equipment might be stolen when it became apparent that persons were seldom in the houses.

6. In view of headquarters intention to terminate this project, it is not deemed advisable at this time to install HUMANOID in a new safehouse to process HUMANKIND material. Accordingly, headquarters advice is requested as to whether HUMANOID may continue using his house for the next few months, or whether this operation should be suspended immediately, inasmuch as no suitable alternate cutout has been located to date.

7. In reply to your request for comment on the salary increase for HUMANOID recommended by the former Chief of Station, please be advised that the writer concurs in the recommendation. As indicated in TRSA-1056 and TRSA-999, this agent has been living on a very close financial margin and has been aware of the recommended raise for some months. It is conceivable that he has taken the raise possibility into consideration in his personal financial arrangements. In any event, should headquarters decide to terminate subject, it is recommended that several months salary be authorized as a termination bonus in order that there will be no likelihood of security considerations arising from subject's possibly over-extended financial position. This bonus payment is believed justified by subject's long tenure of service.

8. With regard to paragraph 3 of TRSW-685, there have been no changes in subject's cover and current modes of contact and communication from those set out in TRSA-950. HUMANIST-2 makes a weekly door-slot drop at night at the photographic studio, and a live meeting takes place at the studio approximately three nights a month, with safety-danger signals being utilized. In addition, HUMANOID meets once or so a month with HUGGER, either at her home or at the studio. HUMANKIND contacts remain the same. My contacts with HUMANOID have taken place at his home, in a park, in a local pension, at my home, and in coffee bars on a staggered schedule of about once a week.

9. With reference to WASH 14671, please be advised that absolutely no commitments have been made to subject, and, on the contrary, hints have been dropped to him of a possible curtailment of funds which might require discontinuing certain operations here. No difficulty is anticipated in terminating subject upon receipt of final instructions from headquarters.

10. With further reference to WASH 14671, your attention is respectfully invited to the following headquarters files which reflect opinions and evaluations of subject by other staff personnel:

TZPA-365 Part II "Subject's superiors regard this man as highly dependable."

TZPA-365 Part I "Subject's immediate superior is Lt. Col. Wm. R. FORBES, Director of Intelligence, CAIRC, who recommends subject highly."

TRSA-403 "Subject is considered to be extremely reliable and intelligent, which, combined with his past experience, qualify him for a wide range of assignments."

TRSA-588 "...services have been of considerable value to operations. The agents which he handles are the most productive of those now being used by this station, and his management of these informants has been excellent from both an information and security viewpoint."

TRSA-646 "...his integrity, discretion, and industry cannot be too highly commended, and we feel that he is eminently suited for staff or cover employment in any capacity deemed commensurate with his intellectual and other abilities."

TRSA-860 "...the services of this agent are extremely valuable to this station."

TRSA-999 "...the services of this agent continue to be extremely valuable..... In view of his importance to this station, his ability and his willingness to devote time to the work when needed, it is recommended that he be considered for a raise in pay..."

TRSA-641 "...his experience and ability is such that he could probably be of use to the organization anywhere in Latin America."

11. The above file history, plus approximately three months observation and direction of HUMANOID served as the basis for my recommendation of career agent status.

12. At the risk of laboring the point, and solely on the basis of information available here, it appears that HUMANOID has provided valuable service in the past, that he is currently an important factor in the operational structure of this station, and that he possesses certain potential for future use by the organization. In this connection, it is noted that headquarters inquired some time ago (TRSW-641) whether subject would be interested in working for the organization in another country. Although it is realized your interest in this possibility may no longer exist, for your information HUMANOID has stated that he would go to any other Latin American country, in any capacity, on short notice.

13. The instant dispatch is respectfully submitted for your information and in response to your queries. It is to be emphasized that headquarters desires with regard to modifying or terminating this project will be followed implicitly.

201-168881

James K. Russo

14-00000

Form No. 35-6
(Dec. 1947)

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET
"SECURITY INFORMATION"

PAGE No.

To: SAN JOSE

From: POLICY COORDINATION/ SPECIAL OPERATIONS

ROUTINE

8 NOV 51

Confirmation: WHD (1-2)

OUT 87290

Information: IR (3-4), AD/SO (5), OPS (6), PLANS (7), S/C (8-9-10), DDP (11)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

WASH 14671

TO: SANJFG

CITE: WASHFG

RE: TRSA-1056

MAKE NO COMMITMENTS RE FUTURE STATUS SUBJECT.AT PRESENT HAVE NO PLANS CONTACT HIM HERE.HQS FILES DO NOT REFLECT BASIS YOUR ENTHUSIASM SUBJECT'S USEFULNESS THIS AGENCY. HQS FAVORS CONTINUING PRESENT STATUS.

201-168881

V.L.GRESHAM
RELEASING OFFICER

JCB
ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS

R.W.RASTETER
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 2351Z 8 NOV 51

SECRET

COPY No. 1

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

2 November 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. RASTETTER AND MR. BONNET

FROM: Paul P. Paxton

SUBJECT: HUMANOID; Career Status

1. I do not feel that this man's position in the political and social life in Costa Rica lends itself to our need for a career agent in that area. His financial position negates his accessibility to high-level information, and our requirements for Costa Rica should not be satisfied through outright subsidization of an agent in order to place him in a position of influence. His wife's knowledge of his work for us is lamentable and her Costa Rican background with substantial local political ties should be sufficient reason to belay any further consideration on our part for increasing his knowledge of our operations. Admittedly, he has performed a satisfactory service for the San Jose station, but his efforts are not so vital that his termination, in the event he decides to sever connections with us because of his failure to achieve more permanent status, would be a permanent blow to our effectiveness there. With respect to his knowledge of future possibilities with us, we cannot be held responsible for unauthorized commitments that may have been made by the previous Chief of Station.

2. The current status of HUMANOID should be established in line with TRS - 685.

WH/PPP/ie
2 November 1951

201-168881

SECRET

Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. TRSA-1056

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 22 October 1951

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Humanoid

Ref: Field Memo 218

1. Serious consideration has been given to the suitability of Humanoid for career agent status, and in this connection, it is to be noted subject is partially aware of the possibilities of career agent status by virtue of a discussion with the former Chief of Station.

2. It appears that Humanoid fills the requirements set out in reference memorandum, as follows:

a. Humanoid.

b. His existing cover is well established and believed to be durable. He has been attending the local university for over two years; he built and owns his own home in Costa Rica; he is married to a Costa Rican and has two children born here; and he has a going business in the form of a photographic shop which provides an excuse for additional income.

c. SOI objectives assigned to Humanoid include supervised direction of Communist Party penetration (Humanist-2); supervised direction of Postal Intercept Project (Humankind); direct provision of information emanating from local university and intellectual circles of which subject is a member. Also, subject formerly directed attempted penetration of the Communist Party women's "front" group (Hugger).

d. It has been noted that subject's efficiency and productivity have been hampered by financial considerations in the past. He has had unusually heavy medical bills, and the rising cost of living in Costa Rica has presented economic problems in view of his modest income. It is felt that subject has valuable potential for expanding his operations under the status of career agent. With the removal or partial removal of economic pressure, subject would be able to devote additional time to the exploitation of numerous personal contacts in labor, government, religious, and political circles. He is

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CLASSIFICATION

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unusually adept at investigative technique, has the ability to balance risks involved against value of information to be obtained, and is thoroughly familiar with the geography and political trends in Costa Rica. To date, subject has confined his activities mostly to cutout and direction; however, it is believed that with additional freedom he could successfully engage in spotting, recruitment, general investigation, and independent reporting.

e. Subject has discussed his desire to send his wife and two children to his family in the United States late in October for a 60-day visit. He would then like to travel to the United States himself in late December for a brief visit with his parents in Illinois. This would be his first visit home in several years and would provide an excellent opportunity and cover for headquarters contact, either in Illinois or Washington, at which time formalities and necessary training could be accomplished. (NOTE: This planned trip of subject may temporarily interrupt contact with Humanist-2 and Humankind, as a suitable interim cutout has not yet been developed; but experience has shown that production from both sources practically dies out over the Christmas and New Year holidays in this country.

3. In connection with Paragraph e. above, it is to be noted that the travel plans of subject's wife have been complicated by advice from the Embassy Consular Section that the Immigration authorities at the port of entry into the United States may demand a $500.00 U.S. bond in substantiation of her intent to return to Costa Rica after the 60 days. This station is therefore considering advancing subject U.S. $500.00 in order to enable him to present the bond if it is demanded and to obviate the possibility of his spending several hundred dollars in travel money for his wife to a port of entry and return to Costa Rica if entry were denied. This money would not be used by subject for any other purpose and would be returned to station funds after successful entry of his wife into the United States.

4. In view of the fact that this Station has no basis for comparison with regard to possible salary figures which might be offered subject if career agent status is approved, no recommendation in this regard is being made. However, it is pointed out that subject has worked for the organization for almost four years, that his efficiency has been excellent, his grasp of intelligence requirements above average, his potential attractive, and that his present position in the operational structure of this Station is of major importance.

5. It is requested that this Station be advised if you are interested in considering subject for career agent status. If so, please advise whether contact will be had with subject while

he is in the United States. Also, will the government reimburse subject for travel expenditures for his trip. In view of the relatively short time remaining before his trip, it is requested that I be advised as soon as possible of pertinent details, such as length of time required for training, etc., in order that Humanoid may be briefed and in order that interim operational arrangements may be worked out.

6. It would be appreciated if a reply to the recommended salary increase of subject could be made available. (See TRSA-999 of July 1 and TRSA-1037 dated September 28, 1951.)

James K. Russo

18-6-3-74

VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH NO. TRSA-1037

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 28 September 1951

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Humanoid Project

1. In connection with a re-examination of the security factors of this Project, a pre-arranged visit to the home of Humanoid was made by the writer. As previously reported, subject has constructed a secret dark room under the floor of his house and processes the production from the Humankind Project in this work room. It is therefore necessary that certain compromising material is retained overnight by Humanoid, and, at present, this material is kept in a wooden desk with a cheap lock. Although Humanoid's personal security appears good at this time, the possibility of an unexpected house search or a pure case of house-breaking with theft as a motive cannot be overlooked, with resultant serious security considerations.

2. It is therefore requested that headquarters consider furnishing a small wall safe with a combination lock for installation in the above-mentioned dark room. It would be possible to sink the safe into the concrete wall, and even if complete concealment were not possible, the safety of the material would be greatly enhanced. Suitable safes are not available locally, but it is known that Remington Rand markets a small strong box with a combination lock (price about $20.00) which would be ideal.

3. I would appreciate receiving your opinion in this matter inasmuch as other measures must be taken in the event a safe cannot be made available.

4. Inasmuch as Humanoid is aware of the proposed salary raise recommended by the former Chief of Station in the Quarterly Report dated August 17, 1951, information as to the status of this recommendation is requested.

JKR
James K. Russo

COPY

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FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

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CLASSIFICATION

VIA: Air (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. TRSA-935

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 31 July 1951

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operations

SPECIFIC— Humanoid

Ref: Memorandum given writer by Zachary T. Cady in Panama

1. Humanoid advised that his mother-in-law, Sra. Dora Calderon de CORDERO, has no relationship with the family of former President Rafael Angel CALDERON Guardia. Humanoid advised that his mother-in-law was friendly with the CALDERON family years ago, but has had no contact with any of the family or the Calderonista Party since the revolution. This woman immigrated to Costa Rica as Dora INIKEN from Europe, and as it is customary for immigrants and illegitimate children to take upon themselves the name of the President, Dora INIKEN changed her name to CALDERON. Humanoid stated that she has no political connections whatsoever and is sympathetic to whatever administration is in power at the time. The information in the referenced memorandum was originally written by Humanoid three years ago and has no application to the present.

2. Regarding Humanoid's associates, Sr. and Sra. Miguel CORRALES, Humanoid stated that he has not seen CORRALES for over a year since CORRALES is in Guanacaste Province. It is true that CORRALES was a Figuerista during the revolution, but he is no longer sympathetic with FIGUERES.

3. Humanoid's intelligence activities are known to his wife, who has been of assistance to him in said activities on various occasions. However, Humanoid stated that his mother-in-law has no knowledge of these activities.

[signature]
Eugene T. Roddy

IR COPY

31 July 51
201-168881
18-6-3-70

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

16 July 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. THARP:

SUBJECT: a. HUMANOID
b. Technical Surveillance in Costa Rica

HUMANOID is an American agent used as a cut-out in several San Jose operations. He was employed in the technical surveillance on the home of Juan Bosch, as one of the two monitors. He also handles the photography incident to the HUMANKIND project, which work he performs in his own quarters. (This may now be performed away from his home, but until very recently it was done at home.)

HUMANOID's PHS shows the following points which Dave Wright may be able to clarify:

(see TZP-A-365, Part I)

1. His wife is related, through her mother, to the family of CALDERON. This might be a connection with the "Calederonistas" who are alleged to be the group of Costa Ricans responsible for mysterious bombings early this year.

2. Subject's mother-in-law, who resides with him, is described as follows: "strongly inclined to Sr. Calderon GUARDIA and Leo CORTES during their respective regimes in Costa Rica, and she is now (Oct 1948) enthusiastic about the Junta Government of Jose FIGUERES. However, she takes no active part in politics."

3. Other friends and associates of his wife are: Sr. and Sra. Miguel Corrales (San Juan Tibas Costa Rica). Miguel Corrales was a radio operator and intelligence operative for Jose FIGUERES during the Costa Rican Civil War in the spring of 1948.

Jose FIGUERES and Juan BOSCH were the target personalities of the technical surveillance. FIGUERES made the statement that "one of his boys told him all about the surveillance."

From the above circumstances, it appears possible that HUMANOID's intelligence activities are probably known to either his wife, his mother-in-law, or his friend, CORRALES, and that one of the three could have been the source through which the surveillance was blown. Would you discuss this informally with Dave Wright, please?

J. C. BONNET

201-168881

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VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. TRSA-972

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Division T

DATE: 9 July 1951

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

KAPOK DESENSITIZED

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operations

SPECIFIC— Project Humanoid

Ref: TRSA-925

Enclosed herewith is Part II - Operational Information - of the Personal Record Questionnaire for Project Humanoid.

Eugene T. Roddy

Encl: 1 in dupl

DESENSITIZED 7
per CSN 43-28

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CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

Part II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

TRS /PRQ/ 26

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER:

1. If feasible, subject should fill in Part I of PRQ in his own hand.
2. Part II of PRQ is classified, must be filled in by the Case Officer and is not to be shown to subject.
3. Headquarters will not be able to provide an Operational Clearance unless it receives answers to all questions on page 1 of Part I (Items 1 to 12), and to all questions of Part II (Items 36 to 58).
4. In emergency these answers, keyed to Items 1 to 12 by number, and with summary of Part II, may be cabled to Headquarters, followed promptly by pouch with complete data.
5. Fully completed PRQ must be sent to Headquarters as soon as possible, two copies of Part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and one copy of Part II.
6. Data acquired later must be sent to Headquarters in PRQ format on a continuing basis.
7. All pages of both parts will bear the PRQ number, composed of (a) Station symbol (b) PRQ (c) number assigned consecutively by the field station; e.g. PGA/PRQ/13.

36. Cryptonym Humanoid

37. How, when and where was subject first contacted or developed?

Subject was first recruited in Panama as Hydropathic in November 1948 and transferred to San José as approved Humanoid project, July 1949.

38. Could subject be turned over quickly and in a secure manner to someone else for handling? To whom?

Subject could be turned over quickly to any approved cutout, though at present he is himself acting as a cutout between Chief of Station and subagents.

39. Best estimate of subject's motivation

Subject motivated by his interest in intelligence work, desire to advance in the organization as a career, and its remuneration.

40. With what agencies and files has subject's name been checked? When? Result? What else has been done to verify biographical information furnished by subject?

Recruited and checked in Panama (see TZPA-365).

41. What control exists over subject at present? How can it be increased?
Subject can be controlled through dependence on salary, loyalty due to American heritage, past U.S. Army service, and desire for a career in this work--all are controlling factors, as well as his receipt of G.I. school benefits.

42. For what service does he think he is working? What does he think becomes of his information?

Subject is cognizant of identity of this organization.

43. Explain fully subject's past or present connection with any intelligence service.

Subject previously in U.S. Army Intelligence (see Part I, PRQ 26, No. 25)

44. What type of information has subject furnished? What type is he best qualified by education and experience to furnish? Give evaluation of information received.

Subject furnishes only information received as a cutout from subagents, Communist Party activities and Caribbean revolutionary matters.

45. If subject's duties are to be other than intelligence gathering, explain.

None

46. Has he been given special training as an agent? Explain.

U.S. Army Intelligence training.

47. How and from whom does he obtain information?

Subject acts as cutout for Humanist-2, Humankind-1, Humankind-3 and Hugger.

48. Is it proposed to pay subject a regular salary? If so, amount per week, month, etc. Explain any other methods of payment, such as exchange commodities.

Subject receives $,000 per month (approved TRSW-627)

49. Have any promises or commitments whatsoever (not covered elsewhere in this form) been made to subject? Explain.

No.

50. Are subject's language abilities and other characteristics such that he could pass as a native of a country or region other than his own? Explain.

No.

51. What is subject's social standing? Aristocracy, upper middle class, lower middle class, peasantry, etc.? Upper middle class.

52. What are subject's personal habits? Liquor, drugs, gambling, mistresses or lovers?

Social drinker, very moderately. No gambling or mistresses.

53. Evaluation of subject's character, reliability, security.

All noted excellent.

54. With what other foreign power would subject be most likely to collaborate because of his ideology, obligation, etc.? Explain.

None.

55. What special abilities, talents, or qualifications are possessed by subject which would conceivably be of value for other operations in the future?

Subject knows Morse code and can send and receive 16 words per minute at present, which rate can be quickly increased.

56. Attach samples of subject's signature and handwriting in all languages known to him, also a recent, dated photograph, and fingerprints.

Photos forwarded with Part I. Handwriting and fingerprints being pouched separately.

57. How was information in Part I obtained?

Subject submitted information personally.

58. Other miscellaneous operational data and comments.

None.

Case officer

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TRSA-999

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

CRYPTONYM: Humanoid

COUNTRY: Costa Rica

PERIOD: 31 March-1 July 1951.

OBJECTIVES AND TASKS: No change.

SALARY: Subject was raised from 750 colones per month to 1,000 colones per month, effective 1 March 1951.

EVALUATION OF SERVICES: Services of this agent continue to be extremely valuable as the principal cutout for three subagents. Subject also processes the information received, adding to it his own comments drawn from long personal acquaintance with local conditions. Subject maintains a good working relationship with subagents necessary for their continued trusted and unworried cooperation.

EVALUATION OF INFORMATION: The information procured by subject is valuable though very little is his own, but rather that of his subagents.

OTHER FACTORS: Reference is made to TRSA950 and TRSW-655 wherein subject's operations, as planned by this station and approved by headquarters, were set out. These operations have continued as outlined without incident or danger to the security of this agent or this station.

COMMENTS: Subject is devoting increasingly more time to the coverage of mail intercepts, their photostating, and enlarging coverage of same. The intelligence consciousness as well as the trust he has built up in Humanist-2 in reporting on top level Communist activities has taken time and has produced good results in effective coverage. In view of his importance to this station, his ability and his willingness to devote time to the work when needed, it is recommended that subject be considered for a raise in pay from 1,000 colones to 1,500. Subject is living frugally on his present salary and his G.I. subsistence. His wife has recently had another child which was followed by complications necessitating considerable hospital-

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July 51
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TRSA-999

COMMENTS: (Con'd)

ization. This raise is recommended since it will enable subject to devote a sufficient amount of time to this work without being harried over expenses which force him to look for additional outside work. At the present exchange rate $1,500 amounts to $200 per month.

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AIR

TGS-A- 605

JUN 29 1951

Chief of Station, San Jose

Chief, Foreign Division T

Operational
HERALDED - HEARST?

REF: TGS-A-730, TGS-W-613

1. A careful study has been made by the interested offices in headquarters of the referenced documents and other correspondence pertaining to the recent compromise of the technical surveillance. The course of action suggested and discussed by you under paragraph 2 of TGS-A-730 is concurred in by headquarters.

2. The recommendations contained in TGS-W-613, under paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 are hereby withdrawn.

3. Your headquarters has a continuing interest in this entire matter and would be pleased to receive any information as it is developed which would affect either adversely or otherwise the implementation of your suggested plan.

WM. H. WHEELER, JR.

By T. J. Barrett

TJB:jr

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STC

WM. H. WHEELER, JR.

201-168881

VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. TRSA-950

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Division T

DATE: 7 June 1951

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

RE: KAPOK

DESENSITIZED

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operations

SPECIFIC— Humanoid - Humanist

Ref: TRSW-643

1. Inquiry made of Humanist regarding the statements he made before the police during his interrogation reflects that he reportedly refused to testify before the police but made his deposition before the Procurador as to his part in the technical installation which implicated only the writer, and this only after he was told that Roddy had been identified. Humanist's testimony, as well as the line of questioning to which he was submitted, revealed the authorities' concern and their efforts to ascertain whether he had been engaged in or knew of any other similar installations on any other people. This he denied and maintained that the only installation was on Juan BOSCH. Humanist claims he made no mention of Humanoid, and he believes the police know nothing about him.

2. Humanist's claims also tally with the account of his confession as given writer by Manuel VENTURA, Presidential aide. Humanoid has been on the alert and has noted nothing of a suspicious nature which would indicate his activities being under observation or investigation. This matter of suspending his operations, as suggested by headquarters, was discussed by writer with Elmo R. Langtry during his recent visit in San José and the following suggestions are made for headquarters' consideration:

a. Humanoid at the present time is acting as cutout and chief agent for Humanist-2, Humankind-1, and Humankind-3. There is no other agent at the present time to whom these contacts can be given. It is believed that if these subagents are allowed a 6-months vacation, they will become practically worthless when picked up again and have to work for the money they have been receiving, aside from losing interim information and developments.

b. In an effort to establish a more secure, as well as a commercial, cover for Humanoid, this office has acceded to Humanoid's desire to set up a photography and photocopy shop in the downtown area, and has encouraged him in it by allowing funds paid for rental of a safehouse to be applied instead as rental for his photo shop. This provides Humanoid with a good cover in

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DESENSITIZED 7

per CSN 43-26

a business which he is enthusiastic about and is a more natural place for Humanist-2 to make unobserved contacts. It also supplies Humanoid with a more accessible spot and efficient means to photostat mail intercepts and return them to the post office in time instead of commuting back and forth from his home in the suburbs of San José.

c. Therefore, it is suggested that Humanoid's semi-weekly contacts with Humanist-2, instead of being cancelled, be changed to a weekly letterdrop, and a live contact once a month to take care of salary payments and briefing. This letterdrop can be effected by Humanist-2 passing by the photo shop at night and dropping his messages through the slot in the door usually used for after-hours delivery of films to be developed. The film drop will be into a padlocked box, accessible only to Humanoid.

d. Regarding Humanoid's contacts with Humankind-1 and Humankind-3, these are conducted in a thoroughly safe manner. Mail extracted from postal channels by them is deposited in an envelope and placed in a post office box. It is checked daily by Humanoid, and if anything is there, it is removed, photostated, and returned by him the same day. If anyone is noticed hanging around the post office boxes, Humanoid does not go near the box and returns later when the way is clear.

e. Another factor has arisen since the last dispatch which has made this post office operation more secure in that the Director of the Post Office is now beholden to Humanoid. In a recent legal squabble noted in the press which was raised by a local Communist complaining about the government confiscating his mail from abroad, the government desired to prove that this mail was Communist propaganda which they had a right to confiscate, and the President therefore requested the Director of the Post Office to furnish samples to prove this point. With this "heat" on him, the Director made a frantic appeal to Humanoid, who was able to procure these samples for him, which satisfied the President, and for which the Director was truly grateful. Therefore, no trouble is expected from this intercept operation as long as the present personnel are being used, and ample warning will be given Humanoid in advance of any change in the present attitude.

3. Since it is believed that there is more to be lost than gained by dropping contact with these agents, the above modifications of these contacts are respectfully submitted for headquarters' consideration and decision.

Eugene T. Roddy

Eugene T. Roddy

SECRET

Chief, STB 21 May 1951

Chief, FDT

HUMANOID Project

1. In accordance with conversations held between Chief, STC and FDT and with Mr. Johnston of your office, the following modifications and additional data concerning this project are set forth.

2. On 8 March 1951 a technical surveillance was installed on the residence of Juan BOSCH, a Caribbean revolutionary leader, utilizing the services of a telephone company employee, Marcos Aurelius Salazar, through HUMANIST. HUMANOID and HUMANIST carried on the monitoring in shifts, but at separated intervals. Shortly thereafter, it was noticed that some natives living nearby were unduly interested in the activities of the monitoring house, and, at the same time, mysterious bomb explosions were occurring in San Jose. HUMANIST learned that the police had received a report that unknown persons were spying on the airfield, which adjoined the monitoring post, and perhaps were manufacturing the bombs. The surveillance was discontinued and the equipment moved on 20 March.

3. It was deemed necessary to brief Salazar on a possible investigation and provide him with a suitable cover story. It is believed that Salazar became frightened, went to the police, and implicated HUMANIST, who was subsequently arrested. After three days, HUMANIST confessed and implicated the chief of station.

4. The chief of station, through his strong personal connections with the Vice President and other high officials, was able to convince the President this activity was not detrimental to the interests of Costa Rica and the whole affair was quashed. HUMANIST was released from jail and the chief of station continues to enjoy cordial and amicable relations with the Costa Rican officials concerned.

5. It is planned that the chief of station will be transferred in the near future, at which time HUMANIST will be terminated on the pretext that all operations are being discontinued. The only other current operation which HUMANIST knows anything about is HUMANIST-2, whom he was instrumental in recruiting in July 1949. He has had nothing to do with HUMANIST-2 since then and has never known who handles him or even if he is in contact with our station at the present time. It is believed that HUMANOID's true identity is unknown to him, and so far as he knows, HUMANOID was only helping on the one job, the technical surveillance.

SECRET

201-161881

SECRET

-2-

6. Although no evidence has been received from any source which would indicate HUMANOID has been compromised, the chief of station has been instructed, as a precautionary measure, to place HUMANOID on an inactive status for approximately six months. HUMANOID's salary will continue during this period, which is designed to permit further study and observation of all ramifications of this compromise as well as additional strengthening of HUMANOID's local cover. HUMANOID's responsibilities with regard to HUGGER, HUMANIST-2, and HUMANKIND will be transferred to another American cutout (possibly HUMBUG) or temporarily suspended, at the discretion of the station chief.

7. For discussion with the Chief, SPC and Mr. Johnston, it is recommended that the HUMANOID project be approved as attached hereto, with the understanding that its reactivation will be dependent upon favorable results of the six-month period of observation.

WM. L. [illegible], JR.

SECRET

14-00000

STC/OCO

SECRET

23 February 1951

Chief, FDT

HUMANOID

The following answers are keyed to your questionnaire dated 5 February 1951 concerning HUMANOID:

a. Subject is an active agent.

b. He is used substantially the same as when clearance was issued.

c. Subject has not been used in connection with projects other than originally contemplated.

d. All information on subject's personal and operational security has been submitted.

e. The operation has been considered excellent. The only test of HUMANOID's security has been the test of evaluating his information, and the evaluation of his reliability by the Chief of Station.

f. There have been no operational or other changes in the status of this agent which have affected our evaluation of this agent.

WM. H. WHEELER, JR.

SECRET

201-168871

SECRET

TRSA-860

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

CRYPTONYM: Humanoid

COUNTRY: Costa Rica PERIOD: 1 October-31 December 1950.

OBJECTIVES AND TASKS: No Change.

SALARY: $750 per month.

EVALUATION OF SERVICES: Services of this agent are extremely valuable to this station. Aside from cutout services in contacting subagents, he has been used on other miscellaneous investigations suitable to his capacity and has given freely of his time and effort

EVALUATION OF INFORMATION: The information furnished continues to be of great value to this station.

OTHER FACTORS: No change.

COMMENTS: As previously reported subject's plans to transfer to Panama have changed, and he is staying in Costa Rica to finish his schooling. Due to subject's services and the time he devotes in performing them, as well as plans at this station for making greater demands on his time, it is planned to recommend that subject's salary be increased from $750 to $1,000 per month.

SECRET 23 Feb. 51

201-168881

SECRET

CHIEF, STAFF "B" 19 February 1951

CHIEF, FDT

Project Outline---HUMANOID

1. To complete the attached field project outline, the following biographical information is submitted as required by paragraph 4:

HUMANOID was born in 1922 in DeKalb, Illinois, USA, where he attended high school from which he graduated in 1940. Subject joined the United States Air Force in which he had five years' experience in general Air Force intelligence work. Subject is presently living in San Jose, Costa Rica, where he has been attending school.

2. This project dates from June 1949 in Costa Rica but subject was an agent of our Panama station for about six months prior to his departure for Costa Rica.

3. Subject's reliability is considered excellent and his operational services are also considered excellent. The value of this project, including the sub-agents, is considered to be of great value to our Costa Rican mission.

4. HUMANOID, in addition to being a principal agent, is employed as a cut-out for HUMANIST-2, HUGGER, and HUMANKIND. Attached are field project outlines for HUMANIST-2 and HUMANKIND, which includes HUMANKIND-1 and -3. Technically, HUMANIST-2, HUMANKIND-1 and -3 are sub-agents and therefore not required to have field project outlines submitted. The original development, however, of these agents was on an individual project basis, and the cut-out HUMANOID was later developed.

5. In lieu of a field project outline for HUGGER, the following is submitted:

HUGGER is a Costa Rican by birth. She is private secretary in the main office of the United Fruit Company in San Jose, and is a secret agent of Guardia Civil of Costa Rica.

HUGGER has the objective and task of developing contacts among Vanguardia Popular members, particularly in the women's front.

While HUGGER's production is not great, it is valuable. Her pay is approximately $11.00 a month.

SECRET

201-168871

6. Since the Chief of Station has only direct contact with HUMANOID and not with the sub-agents, the project is considered as one project, the HUMANOID Project. For accounting purposes, however, the sub-agents are being handled as individual agents although under the control of the cut-out HUMANOID.

7. HUMANOID's salary if $28.00 a month and operating expenses are about $66.00 a month.

WM. H. WHEELER, JR.

Rem

SECRET

TO: Chief, FDT

5 February 1951

FROM: STC/CCO [signature]

SUBJECT: HUMANOID

1. STC records reflect that subject was approved for operational use under Operational Clearance # 68 dated 19 July 1949 XXXX

2. The clearance was based upon information available at that time. It is desired to maintain a continuing or periodic review of the security status of this person and the projects with which he has been or may be associated.

3. Your comments on the following points would be appreciated. In the event field correspondence is necessary to obtain this information please coordinate with STC/CCO.

a. Is subject still in an operational status? If not please indicate disposition.

b. Is subject being used in substantially the same manner as when clearance was issued? If not please explain.

c. Has subject been used in connection with projects other than originally contemplated?

d. Has any information been reported affecting subject's personal or operational security status?

e. Has the operation, including security tests of the agent, been satisfactory?

f. Has any information been developed in connection with this or other operations or have changes in existing conditions occurred which would affect your original evaluation of this agent?

SECRET

201-168581

14-00000

FORM NO. DEC. 1947 35-5

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

PAGE No.

FROM:	SAN JOSE	ROUTINE
TO:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	7 DEC 50
ACTION:	FDT (1-2-3)	IN 12657
INFORMATION:	ADSO (4-5), STA (6), STB (7), STC (8), IID (9), S/C (10-11-12)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

SANJ 678

TO: WASHF CITE: SANJ

RE: T R S A 756

Did not leave his Ja Humbug give

HUMANOID PLANNING PERMANENT TRANSFER TO PANAMA 1 FEBRUARY REQUEST HQS CONSIDER APPROVAL OF HUMBUG BY 1 JANUARY 1951 TO PERMIT SUFFICIENT OVERLAP FOR ORIENTATION IN DUTIES AND CONTACTS.

201-168881

TOR: 1611Z 7 DEC 50

SECRET

COPY No. 1

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

SECRET

TRSA-745

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

CRYPTONYM: Humanoid

COUNTRY: Costa Rica	PERIOD: 1 July to 30 Sept 1950.
OBJECTIVES AND TASKS:	As set forth in TRSA-564.
SALARY:	$750.per month.
EVALUATION OF SERVICES:	No change.
EVALUATION OF INFORMATION:	No. change.
OTHER FACTORS:	Subject is contact personally by Station Chief.
COMMENT:	Subject is contemplating moving to Panama approximately in April 1951, where he hopes to continue his schooling and work for this organization. He has had previous experience and contacts in Panama and can highly recommended for similar work there. A substitution for subject has been considered and is being processed.

30 Sept. 50

201-168881

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

TRSA-646

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

CRYPTONYM: Humanoid

COUNTRY: Costa Rica PERIOD: 1 April to 30 June 1950.

OBJECTIVES AND TASKS: Objectives, tasks, and targets are set forth in detail in TRSA-564.

SALARY: $750 per month.

EVALUATION OF SERVICES: Services have been of considerable value to operations. The agents which he handles are the most productive of those now being used by this station, and his management of these informants has been excellent, from both an information and a security standpoint.

EVALUATION OF INFORMATION: The information provided by the agents which subject handles, a great part of which is owing to his own industry and devotion in their development, is easily the most valuable produced by this station.

OTHER FACTORS: No comment.

COMMENTS: No changes are contemplated in subject's status. He is contemplating a move to Argentina some time within the next two years and hopes to continue his present employment in that country, and if possible to make a career of this business in any capacity he can obtain. His integrity, discretion, and industry cannot be too highly commended and we feel that he is eminently suited for staff or cover employment in any capacity deemed commensurate with his intellectual and other abilities.

SECRET

30 June 50

201-168881

AIR

SECRET

[illegible]-468

21-4-50

Chief of Station, San Jose

Chief, Foreign Division T

Operational Matters
[illegible]

REF: TGS-A-364
TGS-A-457

1. A review of the financial records on [illegible] shows that salary and expenses in the amount of [illegible]04.09 were charged to this allotment during the first six months of the current fiscal year. This reflects a rate of disbursements slightly in excess of that anticipated in the annual allotment of $1500.

2. Ordinarily it would not be necessary to change the allotment at this time but the pay increase for [illegible], effective 1 April 1950, will definitely increase the total disbursements for the fiscal year to a figure in excess of the $1500.

3. In view of this situation the allotment for [illegible] for the 1949-1950 fiscal year is being increased by the sum of $900. The total allotment previously set at $1500 is therefore increased to $2400.

4. Taking this action at this time will obviate the necessity of making a last minute adjustment at the end of the fiscal year.

WM. M. WHEELER, JR.

BY W.L.DEAN

WLD:jr

21 April 50

201-168877

STB

WM. M. WHEELER

SECRET

SECRET

TRSA-588

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

CRYPTONYM: Humanoid

COUNTRY: Costa Rica PERIOD: 1 January to 31 March 1950.

OBJECTIVES AND TASKS: Objectives, tasks, and targets are set forth in detail in TRSA-564.

SALARY: $500 per month during the quarter under consideration. $750 per month effective 1 April 1950.

EVALUATION OF SERVICES: Services have been of considerable value to operations. The agents which he handles are the most productive of those now being used by this station, and his management of these informants has been excellent, from both an information and a security standpoint.

EVALUATION OF INFORMATION: The information provided by the agents whom subject handles, a great part of which is owing to his own industry and devotion in their development, is easily the most valuable produced by this station.

OTHER FACTORS: No comment.

COMMENTS: No changes are contemplated in subject's status.

SECRET

31 March 50
201-168881

14-00000

VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. TRSA-564

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Division T

DATE: 31 March 1950

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operations

SPECIFIC— Project Humanoid

Ref: TRSW-447

1. In accordance with verbal agreement made by the Chief of Station in Washington and formalized in referenced memorandum, the monthly salary paid to Humanoid will be increased from the present $500 to $750.00 effective 1 April 1950.

2. A revised "Field Project Outline" applicable to Project Humanoid is submitted herewith, in accordance with GOI No. 2.

3. Possible existing confusion with regard to our charging of expenses of Project Humanoid and allied projects for which Humanoid supplies cutout services will be clarified in the near future as revised "Field Project Outlines" applicable to these latter projects are prepared and forwarded.

4. The attached "Field Project Outline" supercedes TRSA-347.

Elmer C. Mercer

Elmer C. Mercer

Encl: 1

Project running over allotment by 150.00
Increase in Humanoid Sal 11 Mo = 120.00
270.00

Increase allotment 300.00

IID COPY

31 March 50
201-168881

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

TRS-A-506

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

CRYPTONYM: Humanoid

COUNTRY: Costa Rica	PERIOD: 1 October to 31 December 1949.
OBJECTIVES AND TASKS	This agent provides cutout services in connection with the penetrations of Vanguardia Popular and also for the postal intercept project. In connection with the latter he does all of the technical reproduction work required. He also reports miscellaneous information which he obtains from his school and business contacts. Project dates from June 1949.
SALARY	$500 per month. Increased from $400 November 1949.
EVALUATION OF SERVICES	Services have been of considerable value to operations. The agents which he handles are the most productive of those now being used by this station, and his management of these informants has been good, from both an information and a security standpoint.
EVALUATION OF INFORMATION	The information provided by the informants of the subject has been valuable operationally and is considered generally reliable.
OTHER FACTORS	Contacts with the subject are made directly. He is now attempting to obtain a secure place in which to meet HUMANIST-2. Other informants handled by this agent are HUGGER, HUMANKIND-1, and HUMANKIND-3.
COMMENTS	No changes are contemplated in the manner of handling this agent.

SECRET

201-168871

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: Air
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TRSA-468

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Branch T

DATE: 1 November 1949

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

SUBJECT: GENERAL. Project Humanoid
SPECIFIC. Amendment to Contract

1. Effective 1 November 1949 the salary of the individual designated as Humanoid was increased $100.00 to a total of $500 per month. This action was taken in consideration of excellent services, not in time, but in quality, in the management and direction of Projects Humankind, Humanist-2, and Hugger.

Elmer C. Mercer
Elmer C. Mercer

REGISTRY COPY

14 Nov. 49

201-168881

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

TRS-A-449

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

CRYPTONYM: Humanoid

COUNTRY: Costa Rica PERIOD: 1 July to 30 September 1949

OBJECTIVES AND TASKS:
(1) Cutout services.
(2) Communist penetration of local labor organizations and/or student groups.
(3) Discretionary reporting and operational pursuit of any and all intelligence information coming his way by reason of his normal daily activities.

SALARY: $400 per month.

EVALUATION OF SERVICES:
(1) As Humankind cutout: Subject has continued to handle this delicate and time-consuming assignment in a completely satisfactory manner.
As Hugger cutout: Although Hugger still does not produce as we would like, it is not the fault of subject, who has devoted time and effort to his education and direction.
(2) Rather than employment or investigation of prospective informants developed by subject with regard to these objectives, we have assigned subject the handling and direction of Humanist-2. We have every reason to believe that he will do this satisfactorily, and based on the high-level information which we receive through this source, subject will be able to proceed more intelligently to the coverage of the topics assigned.
(3) Subject is proceeding slowly as directed by us, and attempting first of all to integrate the three projects with which he is charged.

EVALUATION OF INFORMATION:
Directly, subject has yet provided little information. That stemming from his projects, however, is among the most useful and valuable which we obtain.

OTHER FACTORS: None.

COMMENTS:
Subject is considered to be the most valuable employee we have at the present time from the point of view of actual present usefulness, as well as that of interest, industry, and comprehension of objectives.

14-00000

TRS-A-443

29 September 1949

Communist Organizers

REFERENCE: TRS-655, WASH 5590, TRS-W-377

Hugger

1. Every effort is being made to confirm with details - or deny - the information contained in TRS-655. The source of that report, as well as Hubbub, who is a personal friend of the original informant, have both been attempting for some time to extract more information from him. In addition, transfer of Humanist-2 to the management of Humanoid, which occurred this week, has provided us with an additional avenue of confirmation and Humanoid is making the matter his No. 1 priority job.

2. We expect to be able to cable our opinion of the truth or falsity of the original information within two weeks time, and if the story then appears to have some basis in fact, all our resources will be exploited for further details.

Original in Gen. Opera

CONFIDENTIAL

201-168881

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: Air Pouch
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TRS-A-429

KAPOK [illegible]
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Branch T DATE: 13 September 1949

FROM : Chief of Station, San José, Costa Rica

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operations
SPECIFIC- Specific Operational Changes

REFERENCE: TRS-A-396, TRS-A-385

1. Certain rearrangements involving three current projects of this office are being made in order to produce greater effectiveness and security. The projects involved are Humanoid, Humanist and Humankind.

2. The owner of the separate office used by Humanoid to process the material received through Project Humankind has requested that the space be vacated by 15 September 1949. His reasons are purely business and have nothing to do with our operations. On that date, therefore, our effects will be moved to a new locale, which is incidentally more desirable from the point of view of convenience and security. The new "safe-house" will cost $400.00 per month, an increase of $275.00 over that paid for the former office, and is to be charged to Project Humankind effective 15 September 1949.

3. To offset this increased cost but principally to provide adequate exploitation of Humanist-2, that individual will be turned over to Humanoid for direct handling prior to 1 October 1949. Humanist-1, whose sole function has been to contact Humanist-2 and who has received a salary of $250.00 per month, will be eliminated on 1 October 1949. This arrangement has been carefully planned and discussed with all concerned and can be made without security risk. It will provide intelligent, American control of our potentially most valuable agent, and eliminate the present cumbersome communication and contact arrangement.

4. No change will be made in present symbol designations.

DESENSITIZED ~~CS COPY~~
per CSN 43-28

Elmer C. Mercer

KAPOK DESENSITIZED
CLASSIFICATION

CS copy filed in 18-6-8/63

201-168771

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: Air Pouch
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TRS-A-403

KAPOK
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Branch T

DATE: 9 August 1949

FROM : Chief of Station, San José, Costa Rica

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operations
SPECIFIC- Operational Data, Project Humanoid

REFERENCE: TRS-A-347

The following operational data is forwarded in accordance with Field Memorandum No. 6 of September, 1947:

1. Humanoid.

2. Cutout services with a large amount of personal discretion permitted.

3. Subject is considered to be extremely reliable and intelligent, which, combined with his past experience, qualify him for a wide range of assignments.

4. San José, Costa Rica.

5. No.

6. He would, but at present is prevented from travelling by personal arrangements which it would be inconvenient for him to change.

7. All personnel are paid by us: Humankind-1, $100.00; Humankind-3, $100.00; Hugger, $100.00 (monthly).

8. No.

9. Yes.

10. Yes. Subject is charged with principal direction of Project Humankind and Project Hugger. Aside from this, he is charged with investigation and recruiting of information personnel as suggested by himself in accordance with his opportunities, but only after consultation with us.

KAPOK
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

11. By direct contact in a "safe house".

12. Material emanating from Project Humankind through Subject is photographic. Material from Project Hugger and from Subject himself is written.

13. Approximately 40%.

14. Written. Copy was forwarded as TRS-A-364.

15. The subject matter with which Subject is concerned under the arrangements noted under No. 10 above is that of communist activity in student and labor groups.

16. He works only as directed by us, but frequently suggests matters for his own consideration.

17. Subject is paid in colones at the rate of ¢400 per month.

18. After six months employment, approximately December, 1949, we expect to raise his salary to ¢500 per month.

19. Contact expenses in connection with Projects Hugger and Humankind are paid subject, and average ¢200 per month. Maintenance expenses and rent in connection with the "safe house" where he does his work average ¢125.00 per month.

20. We would, were such a contingency to occur. To date it has not.

21. (a) Superior (b) Superior

22. Semi-covert because of his nationality.

23. (A) High level.

Elmer C. Mercer

14-00000

SECRET

No. 68

OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE

TO: Chief, FBT (Att. Mrs. Geary)

Operational Clearance is hereby granted for the use of HUMANOID.

Limitations: As defined in TRS-A-376.

John C. Bonnet
JOHN C. BONNET
Acting Operational Clearance Officer
for Assistant Director, Special Operations

Date 7/19/49

Copy 1 of 2 copies.

301-168881

19 July 49

21 July

C I B notice attached

Field notified

WASH- 7509
out 8622

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

Operational Clearance Officer, OSO — 14 July 1949

Chief, FBT

Humanoid

1. It is requested that provisional operational clearance be granted for the use of Humanoid.

2. It is further requested that a covert investigation be made on subject.

RG:pbs

SECRET

JRJ-A-347

201-168551

SECRET TRS-A-376

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

CRYPTONYM: Humanoid

COUNTRY: Costa Rica PERIOD: 1 - 30 June 1949

OBJECTIVES AND TASKS:

(1).- Cutout services.
(2).- Communist penetration of local labor organizations and/or student groups.
(3).- Discretionary reporting and operational pursuit of any and all intelligence information coming his way by reason of his normal daily activities.

SALARY: (¢) ¢400 per month. (approx $240 per qtr.)

EVALUATION OF SERVICES:

(1). As Humankind cutout: Subject has proven exceptionally successful in the face of some unusual difficulties. He has, however, developed the contacts necessary under this heading on a personal friendly basis to the point where all are lending their enthusiastic cooperation.

As Hugger cutout: For the first time in the history of his employment with us, Hugger is submitting well-organized reports and beginning to appreciate our needs. His progress is directly attributable to the time and effort devoted to direction by Humanoid.

(2). Subject has been fully occupied during the short period covered herein and has made no progress with respect to this assignment.

(3). Subject has cultivated three potential sources in fields of probable interest to us. After further local investigation of their possibilities, headquarters will be consulted.

EVALUATION OF INFORMATION:

Directly, subject has provided no information. That stemming from the projects he is now supervising, however, is accurate and always valuable.

OTHER FACTORS: None.

COMMENTS:

In the immediate future, subject's cutout activities should settle into more or less of a routine, releasing his energies for development of other assignments.

SECRET

30 June 49
201-168851

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: Air Pouch
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TRS-A-364

SECRET DESENSITIZED KAPOK
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Branch T

DATE: 13 June 1949

FROM : Chief of Station, San José, Costa Rica

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operations
SPECIFIC- Project Humanoid

Reference: TRS-A-347

1. A copy of the contract signed by the individual principally concerned in subject project is attached. The signed original is retained in our files.

2. Pertinent operational date in accordance with Field Memorandum No. 6 dated 22 September 1947 will be forwarded when the operational routine has been established in more or less its final form and we are better able to judge the efficiency and value of the project.

Elmer C. Mercer
Elmer C. Mercer

Encl:
Copy of contract

13 June 49
201-168881
201-168881

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

SECRET DESENSITIZED KAPOK 7
CLASSIFICATION

14-00000

TRS-A-369

22 June 1949

2. Informant Hugger, formerly reporting through subject, has been transferred to the control of Humanoid (see TRS-A-347)

Origin Huckleberry
cc - Hugger

201-168881

14-00000

THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

USAF Personal History and security checks.

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: Air
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TRS-A-251

SECRET - [illegible]
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Branch T   DATE: 5 January 1949

FROM : Chief of Station, San José, Costa Rica

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operations
SPECIFIC- Project Hydropathic
Reference: TZP-A-365; TZP-W-411

1. This station intends to make the fullest possible use of Hydropathic, but it is not considered feasible to proceed with a formal request for project authorization until he has established himself in this area and we have made his acquaintance. Tentatively it is planned to use him in a cut-out capacity, meeting informants which we will provide, for an orientation period of indefinite duration. In this period it will be possible to evaluate Subject's capacity to play an integrated part in our operational set-up, and approval for our plans in this respect will then be requested.

2. Hydropathic will be contacted upon arrival and initial arrangements for his cut-out services forwarded to headquarters.

Elmer C. Mercer
Elmer C. Mercer

23-23
cc - Panama City

CS COPY

SECRET - [illegible]
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

201-168821
TRS A 251
DATE 5 JAN 49

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: Air
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TRS-A-250

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Panama City

DATE: 5 January 1949

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operations

SPECIFIC- Project Hydropathic

Reference: TZP-A-365, Part I

The attached document, having served its purpose, is returned to your station.

Your cooperation in the matter is greatly appreciated.

23-23
1 Encl. – TZPA-365 11 Oct 48
cc - Washington ✓
Filed in chronological order.

Elmer J. Mercer

REGISTRY COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

5 Jan. 49
201-168881 ✓

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TZP-A-402

SECRET - RFF

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Acting Chief, FBT

DATE: 31 December 1948.

FROM : Chief of Station, Panama City, Panama.

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operations
SPECIFIC- HYDROPATHIC

Ref: TZP-47-411

1. HYDROPATHIC is not a project (Memo to all Latin American Stations, dtd. 9 June 1947). It is a simple recruitment of an individual agent to be controlled exclusively by the San José Station. TZP-A-365 Part II suggested a manner in which he might establish contact with HYDROCYST I. Since HYDROCYST I is leaving Costa Rica temporarily, this is no longer a consideration.

2. All documents in our files have been forwarded to San José. This station has only contacted Subject twice and has told him nothing about our organization or any possibilities of any full time positions. If we can assist by arranging a contact between HYDROPATHIC and San José or in any other manner, we will be glad to do so. In the meantime, we will take no further action unless instructed to do so by the Home Office.

Grover J. Waring

Grover J. Waring.

Distribution:

Wash (2) ✓
Sanj (1)
Files (1)

DESENSITIZED

201 168881

TZ PA 402

DATE 31 DEC 48

CS COPY

SECRET - RFF

CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

/12/ SECRET 23 FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: C/LA-8 INFO: DDPD-D, VR, FILE, DDRECORD, C/CI-4, C/EPS/EG-2, C/EUR-6, C/LCG/ID, C/PCS, (25/P)

80 3951664 PAGE 001 TOT: 042052Z MAR 80 DIRECTOR 627924

S E C R E T
STAFF 042052Z DIRECTOR 627924
TO: PRIORITY MADRID.

WNINTEL RYBAT AKULE AMLASH

REF: MADRID 48679 3918232

1. DEPT OF STATE HAS SENT MESSAGE TO CONSULATE AUTHORIZING THE GRANTING OF VISAS TO AMLASH FAMILY, BUT HAS APPARENTLY ATTACHED A PROVISO - SO LONG AS CONSULAR OFFICER SATISFIED THAT THEY ARE BONA FIDE VISITORS AND NOT IMMIGRANTS.

2. OFFICER WHO DEBRIEFED AMLASH-1 IN MADRID ON 11 JANUARY IS EXPERIENCED AND SAVVY PROFESSIONAL. HE HAS BEEN INTERVIEWING REFUGEES FOR THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS AND HAS CONSISTENTLY PROVIDED ACCURATE ASSESSMENTS OF REFUGEE INTENTIONS AND MOTIVATIONS. AMLASH-1 TOLD THE DEBRIEFER THAT HE ONLY WANTED TO VISIT THE US AND THAT HE WANTS AND INTENDS TO SETTLE IN SPAIN, WHERE HE CAN MORE READILY SET UP A MEDICAL PRACTICE AND BE LESS NEWSWORTHY THAN WOULD BE THE CASE IN THE UNITED STATES. THE DEBRIEFER BELIEVES AMLASH-1 MEANT WHAT HE SAID.

2. FILE: 201-252234. RVW 4 MAR 00, DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.>
ORIG: ADC/LA/OPS (PALMER X-9011); AUTH: ADC/LA/OPS (PALMER); COORD: PCS/LGG/ID (CANTRELL); C/E/IB/S(STOVER); REL: C/E/IB (BERGER); CL BY 037029.

R.M.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

RECORD COPY

04MAR80
201-252234

/12/ SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: C/LA-8 INFO: DDPD-D, VR, FILE, ~~DORECORD~~, DDO-4, C/CI-4, C/EPS/EG-2, C/EUR-6, C/LCG/ID, C/PCS, C/PCS/LCG, C/PCS/PGLO, DDO/DO, (32/P)

80 3620398 PAGE 001
TOT: 022211Z JAN 80 DIRECTOR 583488

S E C R E T
STAFF 022211Z DIRECTOR 583488
TO: IMMEDIATE MADRID.

WNINTEL ~~RYBAT~~ AMLASH

1. LNERGO HAS ADVISED THAT AMLASH/1 (A/1)(IDEN A), CUBAN ASSET 1963-1965, ARRIVED MADRID 11 DEC 79 AND CONTACTED LNERGO SOURCE IN U.S. REQUESTING MEETING WITH KTACTION REPRESENTATIVE. ACCORDING LNERGO SOURCE A/1 HAS BEEN CONTACTED BY NUMERUUS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES SINCE ARRIVAL MADRID BUT HAS REFUSED GRANT INTERVIEW.

2. IDEN B TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED DEPART 7 JAN 80 FOR MADRID TO MEET AND DEBRIEF A/1 AND DETERMINE HIS FUTURE PLANS. LNERGO HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO PROVIDE BONA-FIDES AND CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS. WILL ADVISE WHEN RECEIVED.

3. PLS PROVIDE NAME AND TELEPHONE NUMBER IDEN B CAN USE TO CONTACT STATION ON ARRIVAL MADRID. REQUEST REPLY IMMEDIATE.

4. FILE: 201-252234. CADL RVW 2 JAN 2000 DRV D9C.3. ALL SECRET.>
ORIG: SA/C/LAD (STURBITTS, X-9127, GREEN-3215); COORD: DC/LACO; DC/LA/OPS; C/EUR/IB; AUTH: DC/LA; C/LA; REL: DC/EUR/S THOMPSON. CL BY 12180.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

Lacafey

RECORD COPY

02 JAN 79
201-252234

DISPATCH — SECRET

TO: Acting Chief of Station, Djakarta

INFO:

FROM: Chief, Far East Division

SUBJECT: Visit of Identities

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE : DBA-12821 (25 June 62)

1. OKENVY reports that they were advised by Identity A that his associate, Identity B would be visiting Djakarta in mid-July and that probably he (Identity A) would be summoned by General Jani in the near future to assist in procurement activities for the military.

2. Identity A expressed himself as being willing at the same time to serve ODYOKE without remuneration, on a confidential basis or otherwise, if his services can be of assistance.

3. Identity A has done some dickering with the local attache regarding aeronautical spare parts for which export permits have been difficult to obtain, claiming that he would have no difficulty in obtaining permits if the parts were purchased through his organization.

4. Identity A has also been in contact with another ODYOKE component since January 62 and therefore cannot be approached by KUBARK.

for CHESTER D. DAINOLD

Attachments:
Idens U.S.C. True Name Pouch — FORWARDED HEREWITH

Distribution:
2 — Djakarta

23 July 1962

RI Files 201-41581

201-41591

DATE TYPED: 23 July 62 — DATE DISPATCHED: 27 JUL 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: FHDW-5498

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: -41581

SECRET

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
FE/PIA/I	Dexter E. Kelpe.	jdk	5503

COORDINATING

ROUTING	INITIAL
FE/PIA	
RI	
RID/AN	RBH
RID/MIS	
FE/...	
RID/...	
FE/PIA	
DESTROY	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/FE	26/7/62	for Desmond FitzGerald

14-00000

SECRET

IDENTITIES U.S.C.

TRUE NAME POUCH Att. to

FHDW-5498

IDENTITY A I Irving Davidson, Public Relations, 1612 K St., N.W.

IDENTITY B Paul Pesik, formerly employed by the Indonesian Embassy, Washington.

FNDW - 5498
23 July 1962
Encl. #1

SECRET CS COPY

201-41581

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING: X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief of Station, Quito
Chief of Base, Guayaquil

INFO

FROM: Chief, WH

SUBJECT: Report of PBPRIME Citizen on Connections with Ecuadorean Government

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Please comment on Subject and his statements

other agency

1. The following paragraphs are quoted from an ODENVY report resulting from an interview with Identity. The addressees are requested to comment on the Subject's statements and to send to Headquarters information concerning the Subject's activities in Ecuador bearing on his statements.

A. On August 29, 1960, Identity was interviewed by ODENVY at his request. Identity related that he had just returned from a trip to Ecuador where he had been offered a job to represent that country as an agent in PBPRIME and he was seriously considering this offer. While in Ecuador, he had conferred with four individuals who he believed would run the new government which was to be sworn into office on August 31, 1960. These persons were identified as follows: Jaime Nebot Velasco, Minister of Development; Pedro J. Menendez Gilbert, Mayor of Guayaquil, Ecuador; Luis Noboa, an Ecuadorean businessman; and Enrique Ponce Luque, a Senator and partner of Noboa.

B. According to Identity, the new president of Ecuador, Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra, has been elected to that office for the fourth time and is an aged person. The above-listed individuals will control and operate the Government of Ecuador with the approval of Ibarra. As a result of his conferring with the above persons, Identity expressed the belief that Nebot will be the strong in the government. He described these individuals as patriotic with a sincere desire to better the plight of the common man in Ecuador. Identity stated that all of them are definitely pro-PBPRIME and Nebot said that all Identity has to do is tell him what PBPRIME

UNDER SEPARATE COVER

CONTINUED

Distribution:
2 - Quito
1 - Guayaquil

DATE TYPED: 5 Oct 1960
DATE DISPATCHED: 6 OCT 1960

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HOGW-2393

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 01-41581

~~FILE HELD BY~~

CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T

~~1 - RI (Subject)~~
~~1 - Registry~~

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	[initials]
RI/TY	[initials]
RI/FI	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1/E	HEMendenhall	sel	3847

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/1/E	5/10/60	ASWisniowski

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WH/1	5 OCT 1960	E. M. TERRELL

desires and the Ecuadorean Government will do its best to cooperate with PBPRIME.

C. Identity was also told that the Government of Ecuador has commenced negotiations with an electronics firm in Dallas, Texas, believed by Identity to be the Continental Electronics Company, for the construction of a 50,000 kilowatt radio station in Guayaquil. This station will be used to combat antigovernment propaganda beamed into Ecuador from Cuba. Nebot felt that PBPRIME could make use of this radio station. Identity told Nebot that he believed this could be arranged.

D. It is the opinion of Identity that this is a golden opportunity for PBPRIME to commence cooperation with a new government in a pro-PBPRIME country. He stated that the Ecuadorean Government would be most willing for KUBARK to utilize the above radio station; however, it would necessitate KUBARK's paying half of the expenses for its construction. Identity was advised that the information he had given ODENVY would be furnished to KUBARK pursuant to his request. He desired to be contacted within a period of ten days if KUBARK is interested in the information he had to offer. No further action concerning this matter will be undertaken by ODENVY.

2. ODENVY has previously reported at length on the Identity, a public relations counsel. Identity registered as a purchasing agent for various bureaus of the Republic of Nicaragua on 15 April 1955; on 22 July 1958, he registered as an agent of the Israeli Military Industries, which was controlled by the government of Israel.

3. The Identity appears to be an international businessman with special interest in Latin American Countries. He has previously frequently contacted PBPRIME agencies on subjects he thought appropriate to bring to their attention. A cursory check of his 201 file revealed no derogatory information. Further information can be supplied if the field so requests.

END OF DISPATCH

CS copy

DISPATCH

FPMA-5545

TO Chief of Station, Manila

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO 201-41581

FROM Chief, Far East Division

DATE OCT 16

SUBJECT I. IRVING DAVIDSON

RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE) MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED None

REFERENCE(S) FPMA-8470, 13 May 1958, Transmittal of MIRAVELIN Tap Transcripts

1. The information obtained in the name check of DAVIDSON reveals that Subject is an aggressive international businessman who would possibly participate in any business proposition for a commission; however, when negotiating with representatives of other countries, Subject usually protects himself by reporting the business proposition to a U.S. Government agency or official. The name check reveals that the relationship between Drew Pearson and MIRAVELIN may have resulted from Subject's personal contact with both men. The information re MIRAVELIN may have reached Pearson through Subject's office associates.

2. The following are the details of the check on Subject:

a. Subject, a U.S. citizen, born 19 January 1921, is married and maintains his residence and office in Washington, D.C. As reported by KUJUMP, 8 November 1955, Subject shared his office suite in the Wyatt Building with James Farriss, a former ODACID employee, and Jack Northam Anderson and Frederick G. Blumenthal, Washington representatives of PARADE magazine. Frederick G. Blumenthal is a former Drew Pearson leg-man while Anderson continues to work for Pearson.

b. An ODENVY report dated 6 November 1957, stated that Subject filed a registration statement, No. 886, 18 April 1955, with the Foreign Agents Registration Section, Department of Justice. Subject listed as his foreign principal President A. Somosa, Republic of Nicaragua. The nature and purpose of his representing the foreign principal was given as purchasing agent for various bureaus of the Republic of Nicaragua, including the military forces. He also stated that he dealt in general public relations and was self-employed. Another ODENVY report of 18 June 1957 stated that Subject listed his occupation as a Public Relations Counsel and Business Consultant in a report to a local credit bureau. The report indicated that Subject previously spent some time in Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic and is well acquainted with various business and government officials in the above-mentioned locations.

c. On several occasions in the past Subject volunteered information to various government agencies and offered his assistance to the U.S. Government. In an ODENVY report dated 15 September 1950, Subject advised that through a friend, Max Henriquez, who Subject claimed to be a representative for the Dominican Republic to the United Nations, Subject had become acquainted with Vincente Toledano, and was sufficiently close to him to obtain important information concerning activities of the Communist Party in Mexico. Subject offered his assistance to the U.S. Government in this matter. According to a KUJUMP report, submitted by the Office of International Trade, dated 1953, Subject furnished information regarding travel in 1950 between Mexico and the USSR and information on trans-shipments through Mexico.

COPY

201-41581

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION

X CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. FPMW-5545

A Memorandum of 8 November 1955, reported that Subject had approached a KUBARK representative on 30 September 1955, at which time he requested guidance and possible financial assistance for a proposed business arrangement with Peter MIHALJDEC, former Yugoslav Assistant Military Attache in Washington, and now Chief of the Foreign Division of PUTNIK, a travel and tourist agency. The proposed business partnership was for the purpose of opening a PUTNIK travel agency in New York City. Subject had not been interested in participating in the travel and tourist agency in New York City but had suggested to the Yugoslavs that he would act as their public relations expert and publicize Yugoslavia's tourist attractions throughout the U.S. Subject stated he had initially contacted KUBARK for the purpose of obtaining financial backing in exchange for any information that he might be able to obtain through his contacts with the Yugoslavs. Subject was informed by KUBARK representative that KUBARK would neither give him financial assistance nor influence in any way his personal decision in the matter.

d. Also the files reflect that Subject has had contacts with other purchasing agents for foreign countries: In MANA 2217, 19 March 1957, Subject and Isaac Cohen, Israeli purchasing agent in New York, visited Nicaragua ostensibly to discuss the purchase of Israeli corvettes by the Nicaraguan Government. An ODENVY report dated 31 March 1958, from a confidential source, stated one Sam Cummings, an international arms dealer, presently has a quantity of guns in bond in the "free trade zone", New York City, and Subject and James Farriss had been attempting to locate buyers for these guns. An ODENVY report dated 31 March 1958, stated that Abdul Rachman SURIOKUSUMO, Djakarta, Indonesia, connected with the Indonesian Police Force, had been in the U.S. in the early part of 1956 seeking arms for Indonesia. Due to U.S. regulations, he was unable to obtain arms. At this time Subject interested SURIOKUSUMO in purchasing arms from the Dominican Republic. According to source, Subject and SURIOKUSUMO made a trip to the Dominican Republic in June 1956 accompanied by a U.S. arms expert and Enrique Garcia, Jr. who had claimed to be a personal friend of Gen. Rafael L. Trujillo of the Dominican Republic and who is registered with the Foreign Agents Registration Section, listing his foreign principal as the Dominican Republic. It was reported in HMMA 0923, 6 August 1956, that Subject had written a letter to the U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua in which he stated the purpose of his recent trip and informed the Ambassador that "other reds" were attempting to undercut the arms price as quoted by the Dominican Republic. As reported in ODACID on 6 May 1958, Subject, as representative of the Government of Nicaragua, last year purchased 73 Staghound armored cars from Israel for the GON and also negotiated the subsequent sale of 30 of these vehicles to Cuba. Recently Subject approached U.S. officials in Nicaragua re disposal of 20 of these vehicles to the Guatamalan Government.

e. The only reference to MIRAVELIN reflected in this name check was a KUJUMP report dated 22 April 1957 which stated that a letter, found by a law enforcement officer in February 1957 among MIRAVELIN's personal effects, seemed to imply that a joint effort was being made by MIRAVELIN and the late Nicaraguan president SOMOZA to open a casino in Nicaragua. This letter dated 27 August 1956 was written on the letterhead of the Nicaraguan Government Agency, Suite 1224, Wyatt Building, Washington, D.C., I. Irving Davidson, U.S. representative, and stated: "Enclosed are Ex-Im bank particulars you asked for. Sam Waugh will cooperate with us 100%. Be sure that Pres. Somoza and only Pres. Somoza designates you 50% partner in the casino. You don't need any partner for the hotel end of the deal at all. You don't want one either. I am sure Pres. Somoza won't care about this. Don't hesitate to ask Somoza anything about anything. I already talked with him and told him that I hope that you would take over this project

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
		FPBW-5545

with your group and experience. I will then know that Nicaragua will have the nicest, best operated facility in the hemisphere. Give my best regards to Pres. Somoza when you see him. If you don't see him for any reason, you don't have a deal regardless what papers you see or whoever else you may meet. Somoza is a regular guy and our kind of people. He has also been helpful to our people on the other side. Your boy, Irv Davidson."

3. This information has not been cleared for passage to our liaison services.

for CHESTER D. DAINOLD

6 October 1958

Distribution:
- 3 - COS, Manila
- 1 - RI
- 1 - FE/PSH

COPY

201-41881

104-10216-10148 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING: ACTION — X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: TYPIC/Operational
Transmittal of Operational Plan for AMTRUNK VII

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Request Approval

References : A. UFGA-9312, AMTRUNK Op Plan, 1 June 1963
B. UFGA-10436, Amendment of AMTRUNK Op Plan, 21 July 1963
C. UFGA-10533, Op Plan AMTRUNK V, 31 Aug 1963
D. UFGA-12725, Op Plan AMTRUNK VI, 27 Nov 1963
E. UFGA-13138, Amendment to AMTRUNK VI Op Plan, 18 December 1963

Transmitted for approval herewith is the operational plan for AMTRUNK VII. The AMTRUNK team is scheduled for infiltration on 7 February and for exfiltration on 17 February. A five-man team with intermediate craft will be infiltrated into northern Matanzas Province from which point the team leader, AMICE-14, and AMTRUNK-13 will proceed into Havana to accomplish the [illegible] objectives of this operation. Approval is requested at the earliest possible time.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment:
Op Plan (3 cys) - H/W

Distribution:
3 - C/SAS w/atts.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 28 Jan 64

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-13707

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 19-6-84/1

OPERATIONAL PLAN KIBA

CRYPTONYM

AMTRUNK VII

2. REFERENCES

A. UFGA-9312, AMTRUNK Operational Plan, 1 June 1963

B. UFGA-10436, Amendment of AMTRUNK Operational Plan, 31 July 1963

C. UFGA-10933, Operational Plan - AMTRUNK V, 31 August 1963

D. UFGA-12725, Operational Plan - AMTRUNK VI, 27 November 1963

E. UFGA-13138, Amendment to AMTRUNK VI Operational Plan, 18 December 1963

3. BACKGROUND

Operation AMTRUNK III/IV which was mounted in August 1963 was successful in that the two principals of the team, AMICE-27 and AMICE-14, were able to contact and to recruit two principal agents and several other action agents to lay the groundwork for the MHAPRON objectives of the AMTRUNK operation. One of the two internal P/A's, AMTRUNK-9, was exfiltrated with the four-man AMTRUNK infiltration team for training and operational discussions in the JMWAVE area. In early September, AMTRUNK-9 was re-infiltrated into PBRUMEN in Operation AMTRUNK V, the same operation which exfiltrated AMFAUNAs -1, -3, -13 and -34. In late October AMICE-27 was separated from the clandestine part of the AMTRUNK operation. The original objectives of Operation AMTRUNK VI, postponed from December 1963 to January 1964, were to revitalize and re-direct the efforts of the two internal P/A's toward their primary task, i.e. to spot and recruit among high level figures who are dissatisfied with the Castro regime. In late December, the scope of this mission was altered by the receipt of a commercial telegram in open code from AMTRUNK-9 indicating that he was in grave danger and wished to be exfiltrated. The twin objectives of Operation AMTRUNK VI then became: first, to exfiltrate AMTRUNK-9 and, this accomplished, for AMICE-14 to proceed to Havana for his task of re-channelling AMTRUNK-10's responsibilities. The exfiltration of AMTRUNK-9, who brought with him his entire family consisting of wife, brother-in-law, and three small children, was accomplished on 9 January 1964. The unexpected presence of AMTRUNK-9's family, coupled with reports of increased vigilance in the infiltration area, forced AMICE-14 to exfiltrate the same night without attempting to accomplish the second part of his mission.

4. OBJECTIVES

A. To re-establish personal contact with AMTRUNK-10 and to secure his full cooperation in spotting dissidents within the higher levels of the military for the purpose of organizing a conspiracy against Fidel Castro.

B. To obtain from AMTRUNK-10 operational information on other MHAPRON recruitment targets.

C. To attempt the recruitment of FAR Captain and Cubana pilot Jose Alberto SEMIDEY Isalgue, a frequent personal pilot for Fidel and Raul Castro and an influential figure in civilian and military aviation.

D. Through the AMTRUNK ratline, to transport to Havana and cache a clandestine radio set for the future use of an infiltrated AMTRUNK radio operator. At the same time, to explore with AMTRUNK-10 and other internal contacts the possibility of safehousing and supporting a radio operator in Havana.

5. TASKS

A. The AMTRUNK Intermediate Craft will be towed by the KUBARK mother craft to the DRP at coordinates 221668, AMS Sheet 4085 IV (23° 14' 00" N and 80° 47' 00" W, H. O. 2624).

B. The AMTRUNK IC will then proceed to the vicinity of coordinates 133511, AMS 4085 III. At this point, AMICE-14 and/or AMTRUNK-7 will make contact with either Oscar DIAZ Jabiela-Garcia or his son Antonio DIAZ Torres in Casualidad (17654795, AMS 4085 III). These two individuals are knowledgable of the fact that the AMTRUNKs may return to the infiltration area although they do not know even the approximate date. Oscar DIAZ and his son Antonio are prepared to activate the ratline consisting of three different taxis, to move AMICE-14 and AMTRUNK-13 into the Havana area. AMTRUNK-7 and -16, the team guides, and AMAGREE-1, the radio operator, will remain with the IC in the mangroves in the vicinity of the infiltration area until the return of AMICE-14 and AMTRUNK-13.

C. Once in Havana, AMICE-14 and AMTRUNK-13 intend to split up and seek refuge in different safehouses. They will maintain contact with each other, however.

D. AMICE-14's primary task vis-a-vis AMTRUNK-10 is to cement the recruitment of AMTRUNK-10 and to obtain his full cooperation to work toward MHAPRON objectives. In addition, AMICE-14 will teach AMTRUNK-10 an OWVL system and leave a receiver with AMTRUNK-10. AMICE-14 also intends to give AMTRUNK-10 a review

in the principles of secret writing.

E. Secondary tasks to be accomplished with AMTRUNK-10 are:

(1) To debrief him on his activities since AMICE-14 recruited him in August 1963.

(2) To collect operational information on other possible recruitment targets

(3) To explore the possibilities of accommodating and supporting an infiltrated radio operator.

F. AMTRUNK-13 will attempt the recruitment of Jose Alberto SEMIDEY Isalgue, a close friend of AMTRUNK-13's for 18 years and a first cousin of AMICE-14. The following is a short biographical sketch of SEMIDEY:

forget about

Age 37-38 years old. Born in Matanzas, the son of Brig. Gen. Jose SEMIDEY, ex-Comptroller of the National Army and veteran of the Spanish-American War. SEMIDEY studied for one year at Purdue University, Indiana. He and AMTRUNK-13 graduated from the second class of ANACRA Pilot Training School in 1942. SEMIDEY flew for Expreso Aereo Inter-Americano and Cuba Aeropostal for about 11 years before he became Interventor or Administrator for the latter company after the Revolution. After Cuba Aeropostal was absorbed into Cubana, SEMIDEY held various positions of importance in Cubana. He also holds the rank of Captain in the Rebel Air Force and reportedly has made reconnaissance flights and black flights carrying arms and/or agents to and from other Latin American countries. SEMIDEY has a close friendship with Victor PINA Cardoso, the Director of Civil Aviation, and is reportedly close to Raul CASTRO for whom he is a frequent personal pilot. Because of the close former friendship between AMTRUNK-13 and SEMIDEY and because of reports from AMICE-14's family which indicate that SEMIDEY has become disenchanted with the Castro regime, both AMTRUNK-13 and AMICE-14 consider SEMIDEY a prime candidate for recruitment.

G. If SEMIDEY should be out of the country on a flying trip at the time of infiltration, AMTRUNK-13 will attempt to set up contact with Commandante Rene de los SANTOS Ponce, who is reportedly stationed in Las Villas Province with a unit of "Lucha Contra Bandidos", an anti-counterrevolutionary force. AMTRUNK-13 and de los SANTOS are friends from boyhood and, for a period of 6 or 7 years, de los SANTOS worked as an apprentice plumber for AMTRUNK-13's

forget that

father and lived in their home. AMTRUNK-13 and de los SANTOS also worked together in the 26th of July underground in Havana.

H. To return through the ratline to the infil/exfil area. Recognition signals will be established with AMTRUNK-7 and -16 and AMAGREE-1 who will be waiting with the IC in the mangroves in the vicinity of the lagoon at coordinates 129498, AMS 4085 III.

6. TIMETABLE

The scheduled date for the infiltration of the AMTRUNK team at the DRP is 2200 hours, 7 February 1964. The exfiltration of the five team members with the AMTRUNK IC and rendezvous with the mother craft at the DRP is 2355 hours, 17 February, with an alternate on 18 February. If exfiltration is not successful on either of these dates, the radio operator will be in contact with the base and contingent plans for exfiltration can be set up through this medium.

7. AMTRUNK PERSONNEL

A. See references for biographical information on AMICE-14 and AMTRUNK-7.

B. AMTRUNK-13

AMTRUNK-13 is a 42-year-old Cuban citizen who has been a commercial airline pilot for most of his life. He is a high school graduate. In early 1959, AMTRUNK-13 was named Interventor of "Aerovias Q", one of the major Cuban airlines. He defected in December 1960 while still in that post. He is a native of Havana who was active in the 26th of July underground in that city from early 1957. While later in exile in the United States, AMTRUNK-13 made two clandestine flights into the Sierra Maestras during the war against Batista, the last bringing Provisional President Manuel URRUTIA Lleo from Venezuela for his first meeting with Fidel Castro in December 1958.

C. AMAGREE-1, Radio Operator

AMAGREE-1 is a 33-year-old Cuban citizen who has two college degrees, in education and in journalism. He is native to the province in which the infil/exfil area is located. Until his departure from Cuba in August 1961, AMAGREE-1 was a municipal official in Matanzas Province and was active in the propaganda section of the 30th of November Movement. AMAGREE-1 began his association with KUBARK in April 1963 as a radio operator trainee. As in the case of AMTRUNK-13, this is his first operational mission.

D. AMTRUNK-16, Guide

AMTRUNK-16 is a 41-year-old single Cuban citizen who, as a commercial fisherman, lived and worked in the infil/exfil area all of his life. He participated in Operation AMTRUNK VI in December 1963 and his up-to-date knowledge of the infil/exfil areafrom which he fled in late October 1963, proved invaluable on this mission. While he was still in Cuba, AMTRUNK-16 was a trusted contact for the AMTRUNKs on both Operation III/IV and V.

8. COMMUNICATIONS

A. Primary.

RS-501 with special signal plan with continuous guard channel. This equipment will remain with the AMTRUNK IC and will not be carried into Havana.

B. Alternates.

(1) OWVL

AMICE-14 will carry a RR-44 receiver with appropriate signal plan on the trip into Havana.

(2) AMICE-14, AMTRUNK-13 and AMAGREE-1 will all have in their possession a S/W system with indicators, materials and accommodation addresses in the JMWAVE area.

C. Case Officer Challenge

To be used to determine whether or not the radio operator, AMAGREE-1, is being controlled by a hostile force. C/O: "Diganos si los barcos de patrulla estan equipados con radar y armas pesadas". ("Tell us if the patrol boats are equipped with radar and heavy armament"). Radio Operator, if free from hostile control, will reply: "En Cuba no hay culebras venenosas". (In Cuba there are no poisonous snakes). Any other response to this question which the radio operator might give would indicate hostile control.

9. COVER

The entire infil/exfiltration using the IC will be black. During the trip to Havana, AMICE-14 and AMTRUNK-13 will devise their own cover stories to fit the individual situation, All five agents will be provided with false documentation.

10. FINANCES

The team will carry P5,500.00 of which P1,500.00 will remain with the personnel in the IC. AMICE-14 and AMTRUNK-13 will each take P2,000.00 into Havana.

11. CONTROL

Control over the five members of the AMTRUNK team takes the form of providing or denying them the wherewithal, both financial and material, to engage in clandestine operations against the Castro regime.

12. COMMITMENTS

No commitments have been made to any member of the team other than a broad commitment to continue to pay their salaries in the event they are captured and to continue to provide support to their families for a reasonable period of time in the event of their death.

13. SECURITY

Both AMICE-14 and AMAGREE-1 have been granted OA's. The other three team members, AMTRUNK-7, -13 and -16, have been granted POA's. All five have been LCFLUTTERed.

14. TRAINING

A. AMICE-14

The earlier training of AMICE-14 has been supplemented with three additional weeks of tradecraft training and he has since received review training in weapons firing, maritime, OWVL and S/W.

B. AMTRUNK-13

Prior to dispatch of Operation AMTRUNK VII, AMTRUNK-13 will have received the following training:

(1) Three weeks of tradecraft training

(2) One week of maritime training

(3) One week of survival training

(4) One week of PM training accenting map and compass and weapons firing

(5) Three half-day sessions in S/W

C. AMAGREE-1

AMAGREE-1 has received the same training as AMTRUNK-13 above plus basic radio operator training which included the use of medium speed communications gear. AMAGREE-1, prior to dispatch time, will have received training in a special signal plan with continuous guard channel.

D. AMTRUNK-7

Since AMTRUNK-7's primary function on the AMTRUNK team is as a coastal guide, his formal training has been necessarily limited. He has received extensive maritime and weapons training and three days of instruction in basic tradecraft principles.

E. AMTRUNK-16

This agent's function on the AMTRUNK team is similar to that of AMTRUNK-7. He will have received PM and maritime training prior to dispatch.

15. DAMAGE REPORT

See Attachment A

16. EQUIPMENT LIST

See Attachment B

SECRET RYBAT ATTACHMENT A

DESENSITIZED

DAMAGE REPORT

A. The damage report for AMICE-14 and AMTRUNK-7 remains the same as was transmitted in Attachment A to Reference D with the addition of Rudolph W. SOSPINE as "Jack".

B. Safehouses and Training Areas Exposed to AMTRUNK-13:

Safehouse #216
Maritime Training Site
Firing Range
Survival Training Site

C. KUBARK Personnel Exposed to AMTRUNK-13:

Irving N. PEGGINS as	"Joe Webster"	
Reuben A. HANNULA as	"Fred Folsom"	
Rudolph W. SOSPINE as	"Jack"	
Andrew S. PARMERS as	"Angel Martin",	training instructor
Stuart V. KAPRIDNO as	"Dewey" ,	" "
Alton T. PIRNACK as	"Larry" ,	" "
Fletcher K. THENE as	"Harry" ,	" "
Paul V. MENDECINO as	"Ted" ,	" "
Wilfred R. KNEAFSY as	"Pete" ,	" "
Floyd H. RUSANOWSKI as	"Jack" ,	" "
Keith D. WINETT as	"Jim" ,	LCFLUTTER operator
Paul I. NAPOLILLI as	"Paul" ,	" "

D. Agent Personnel Exposed to AMTRUNK-13:

AMICE-27 by true name
AMICE-14 by true name
AMAGREE-1 as "Mario Ramirez"
AMAKA-1 as "Antonio Garcia"
AMTRUNK-7 as "Carlos Menendez"
AMTRUNK-8 as "Tomas Rodriguez"
AMTRUNK-9 as "Jose Lopez"
AMTRUNK-16 as "Juan Gonzalez"
AMPAL-1 as "Joe"
AMSKILL-1 by training alias
AMSWING-2 by training alias
Captain and Crew of "NEPTUNE"

E. Safehouses and Training Areas Exposed to AMAGREE-1

Safehouse #174
Safehouse #216
Maritime training site
Survival training site
Firing range

SECRET

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT

F. KUBARK Personnel Exposed to AMAGREE-1:

Irving N. PEGGINS as	"Joe Webster"	
Reuben A. HANNULA as	"Fred"	
Rudolph W. SOSPINE as	"Jack"	
Andrew S. PARMERS as	"Angel Martin"	, training instructor
Daniel V. GUSSOW as	"Bill"	, " "
Humphrey O. EDDERY as	"Ski"	, " "
Stuart V. KAPRIDNO as	"Dewey"	, " "
Alton T. PIRNACK as	"Larry"	, " "
Fletcher K. THENE as	"Harry"	, " "
Paul V. MENDECINO as	"Ted"	, " "
Wilfred R. KNEAFSY as	"Pete"	, " "
Floyd H. RUSANOWSKI as	"Jack"	, " "
Paul I. NAPOLILLI as	"Paul"	, LCFLUTTER operator

G. Agent Personnel Exposed to AMAGREE-1:

AMPANIC-14 as	"Enrique"	, training instructor
AMPAL-1 as	"Joe"	, " "
AMSKILL-1 by training alias		, training instructor
AMSWING-2 " " "		, " "
AMLABEL-1 as	"Terry"	,
AMTRUNK-7 as	"Carlos Menendez,	
AMTRUNK-8 as	"Tomas Rodriguez,	
AMTRUNK-9 as	"Jose Lopez"	
AMTRUNK-16 as	"Juan Gonzalez"	
AMSONIC-1 as	"Juan Sanchez"	
AMHINT-48 as	"Paco Gonzalez"	
AMLITAINT-1 by true name		
AMICE-14 " " "		
AMAKA-1 " " "		
Captain and Crew of "NEPTUNE"		

H. Safehouses and Training Areas Exposed to AMTRUNK-16:

Safehouse #104
Safehouse #216
Maritime Training Site
Firing Range

I. KUBARK Personnel Exposed to AMTRUNK-16:

Irving N. PEGGINS as	"Joe"	
Reuben A. HANNULA as	"Fred"	
Stuart V. KAPRIDNO as	"Dewey"	, training instructor
Alton T. PIRNACK as	"Larry"	, " "
Wilfred F. KNEAFSY as	"Pete"	, " "
Keith D. WINETT as	"Bill"	, LCFLUTTER operator

J. Agent Personnel Exposed to AMTRUNK-16:

AMICE-14 by true first name and training alias
AMTRUNK-7 by true name
AMTRUNK-8 by true name
AMTRUNK-9 as "Jose Lopez"
AMTRUNK-13 as "Maximo"
AMAGREE-1 as "Mario"
AMAKA-1 as "Antonio"
AMLABEL-1 as "Terry"
Captain and Crew of "NEPTUNE"

SECRET RYBAT ATTACHMENT B

EQUIPMENT LIST

Five-man infiltration team (2 infiltrees, 2 guides and radop)

A. Material to be Cached:

1 RT-48 Medium Speed Communications Gear

B. Personal Weapons and Equipment

1. 5 Belgian Browning 9 mm. Pistols
2. 2 M-3 SMGs
3. 2 FAL 7.62 Automatic Rifles
4. 200 Rounds 9 mm. Ammo
5. 400 Rounds 45 Cal Ammo
6. 300 Rounds 7.62 Ammo
7. 12 Magazines for 9 mm. Ammo
8. 10 Magazines for 45 Cal Ammo
9. 15 Magazines for 7.62 Ammo
10. 2 Sten Ammo Carriers
11. 2 BAR Ammo Carriers
12. 5 Pistol Belts
13. 5 Belt Holsters for 9 mm. Pistols
14. 5 Pr. Suspenders
15. 4 Canteens w/cup and cover
16. 1 Entrenching Tool
17. 1 Machete w/scabbard
18. 3 Trench or Bowie Knives w/scabbards
19. 1 Pr. Binoculars
20. 5 Silva Compasses

SECRET

21. 5 UDT-type Watches
22. 5 Plastic Waterproof Flashlights
23. 5 Backpacks
24. 20 Waterproof Bags
25. 5 Swiss Pocket Knives
26. 5 Zippo Lighters
27. 2 Metascopes
28. 5 Penlights
29. 10 Plastic or Rubber End Caps for 45 Cal SMG Magazines
30. 6 Hand Grenades

C. Rations

1. 12 Black Concentrated Rations
2. 20 C-Rations (1 box - 3 meals)
3. Assorted Cans Fruit, Meat, Beans, etc.
4. Assorted Packages Rice, Dry Beans, Coffee, etc.
5. 100 Bouillon Cubes
6. 6 Packages Tropical Chocolate Bars

D. Medical Supplies

1. 1 Corpsman's First Aid Kit with Morphine Syrettes and Codeine (in metal container)
2. 5 Individual First Aid Kits
3. 100 Coricidin Pills
4. 100 APC Tablets
5. 100 Water Purification Tablets
6. 100 Vitamin Tablets
7. 100 Acromycin Tablets

DESENSITIZED

E. Clothing

1. 5 Sets Fatigue Uniforms, HBT Shirts and Trousers
2. 5 Fatigue Caps
3. 5 Civilian Sport Shirts
4. 5 Prs Civilian Trousers
5. 5 Pr. Civilian Shoes
6. 5 Pr. Jump Boots
7. 5 Leather Belts
8. 15 T-Shirts
9. 15 Pr. Undershorts
10. 15 Pr. Socks
11. 5 Pr. Light Gloves
12. 5 Sets Foul Weather Rubber Uniforms
13. 5 Berets
14. 5 Green Ponchos
15. 5 Pr. Insulated Underwear
16. 5 Field Jackets

F. Communications Gear

1. 1 RR-44 Receiver (for OWVL)
2. 1 RS-501 w/Signal Plan (continuous guard channel)

G. Secret Writing Materials

1. 3 Sets S/W Materials with Extra Carbons and Extra Vials of Developer Pills

H. Intermediate Craft

1. 16' 7" Boston Whaler, "Currituck" Model, Painted Dark Green, Outfitted with Wide-Angle Towing Rig

2. 2 75 hp Commercial Outboards w/Tool Kit
3. 7 Fiberglass Outboard Fuel Tanks, Capacity 13 Gal. Each
   6 Horizontal Tanks, Size 11½ x 26½ x 12½"
   1 Vertical Tank, Size 13½ x 26½ x 10½"
4. 5 Flotation Cushions
5. 2 Air Mattresses
6. Extra Propellers and Drive, Shear and Cotter Pins for both Commercial Outboards
7. 5 Black UDT-type Life Preservers
8. 1 Fire Extinguisher (for Gasoline Fires)
9. 1 12-lb. Anchor
10. 2 Hoses for Transferring Fuel from One Tank to Another (or 3 feet of 3/4 inch Plastic Tubing)
11. 2 Oars, Length 10 feet
12. 2 Wooden Push Poles, Length 12 feet, Diameter 2½"
13. 1 Plastic Bailing Bucket, 1 foot deep
14. 2 5-Gallon Plastic Jerrycans (for water)
15. 8 Extra Spark Plugs (4 for each Commercial Outboard)
16. 3 Rolls, Non-Shiny Plastic Tape
17. 50 ft. ½ inch Nylon Rope
18. 200 ft. Parachute Cord
19. 1 Small Hammer
20. 1 Pr. Pliers
21. 1 Screwdriver
22. 1 Spark Plug Wrench
23. 2 Upright Poles, 3½ feet in Length, w/Oarlocks

24. 1 Ritchie Compass

25. 1 Sheet Camouflage Material, 20' x 10'

26. 1 RB 9.6

27. 1 HRT-7 Beacon

I. Maps

Maritime Charts

2 H.O. 1002

2 H.O. 2624

2 H.O. 0944

Series E723, 3-AMS, 1:50,000

2 ea. Sheets 4085 I 4085 IV

4085 II 4085 III

4084 I 4084 IV

J. Miscellaneous

1. Cleaning Gear for 9 mm Pistol, ~~M-3 SMG and FAL including~~ RIG Gun Grease

2. 200 ft. Parachute Cord

3. Box of Matches and Waterproof Containers for same

4. 12 Polyethylene Bags
   4--Large Enough to Contain FAL
   4--Large Enough to Contain Assembled M-3
   4 18" Size for Personal Documents, etc.

5. 2 Sheets Infra-Red Paper, 18" x 24"

6. 1 Dynalite

7. 14 Extra Flashlight Batteries

8. 4 Flashlight Bulbs

9. 8 Extra Penlight Batteries

10. 4 Packs Lighter Flints
11. 4 Cans Lighter Fluid
12. 1 Set Parallel Rulers
13. 1 Set Dividers
14. 2 Protractors, Metal
15. 2 Pocket Rulers, Metal
16. 1 Flat Mill File
17. 1 Pocket Carborundum Stone
18. 1 One-Burner Gas Stove--Butane Gas or Similar Type--w/Extra Cylinders of Gas
19. 1 Cooking Pot (at least 8" in Diameter)
20. 5 Knife-Fork-Spoon Sets
21. 2 Messkits
22. Box of Insect Repellent, 48 Small Plastic Bottles
23. 6 Cans Spray Paint, Black
24. 1 Can Saddle Soap
25. 1 Package of Sponges
26. Toilet Paper
27. Hand Soap and Detergent
28. Paper Plates
29. Plastic Spoons
30. Assorted Fishhooks and Line
31. 8 Burlap Bags
32. Assorted Empty Cardboard Boxes

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: C/TSD/EB

EXTENSION:

NO.:

DATE: 24 June 1964

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WH/SA/MOB/PM GH4408 Hdqrs.			[initials]	Bushnell 1.3 X phantom scopes are made in Japan - w/w distribution - are how English making
2. WH/SA/SO/NS			[initials]	
3. WH/SA/EOB/Wainwright			W	
4. Cotter				Ro2: 2 have [illegible] attached copy. This is for your attention.
5.				[illegible] seems like a tech job too. (W)
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

24 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/WH/SA/MOB/PM

SUBJECT : Improved Sight for 7.62 Belgium (FAL) Rifle

REFERENCE : a) Memo for the Rcd. dated 25 May 64, Subject: "FAL Silencer/Sights", from C/WH/SA/MOB/PM

1. In accordance with reference a) the following material is provided:

a) Three open rear sight hoods for the subject rifle.
b) Three copies of instructions for installing the sight and zeroing the rifle.
c) Three tool kits containing an adjustment screw driver and two files.
d) 400 rounds of improved underloaded ammunition with cream of wheat filler. (Boxes marked with red strip. These should be substituted for the rounds already delivered).

2. It must be understood that the limited time available would not permit more that cursory acceptance testing and the superiority of this sight over the standard unit has not been definitely established.

3. The scope and mount requested in reference a) proved to be an unfeasible development in the time available. A mount could not be devised which was interchangeable with any FAL without extensive modification to the weapon.

4. For additional information regarding this matter contact D. J. Hogan or D. R. Dunn on extension 3319.

WALTER L. ERHARDT
Chief
TSD/Engineering Branch

Attachments: As Stated

Distribution:
1 - Addressee
1 - TSD/SDB
1 - C/TSD
1 - EB-81J

SECRET

SNAP-ON SIGHT HOOD FOR

THE 7.62 BELGIUM (FAL) RIFLE

1. The sight hood snaps over the existing rear sight on the 7.62 Belgium (FAL) rifle. It is designed to raise the rear sight to compensate for the more curving trajectory of the under-loaded ammunition and is an open sight for increased night sighting capability.

2. The sight hood is oriented with the three screws facing the muzzle end of the rifle (See attached drawings). Press down on the hood until the ball detent snaps into the peep hole

3. The slot for the existing rear sight is made tight so that the hood will fit firmly in place. If it fails to fit, file the existing rear sight as necessary. If the sight fits the slot but is difficult to snap on and off, or is too loose, adjust the ball detent by turning the center set screw on the sight hood.

4. The weapon must be zeroed on a known distance firing range to determine the sight settings and proper sight picture for standard and underloaded ammunition when using the hood. The only adjustments possible are those already on the rifle. (That is, elevation control using the graduated ramp and windage control by adjustment of the two locking screws at the base of the existing rear sight dovetail.)

NOTE: It is very important to hold the rifle the same way each time so that the relation of the eye to the rear sight remains constant. The user must determine his own zero for each rifle and hood combination and maximum effective range for each ammunition type.

14-00000



FRONT VIEW



REAR VIEW

10 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Tests of Modified Sights for 7.62 Belgium (FAL) Rifle

REFERENCE: Memo for Rcd. dated 25 May 64, Subject FAL Silencers/ Sights, from C/WH/SA/MOB/PM

1. On 2 June 1964, Mr. Donald R. Dunn, TSD/EB and the undersigned went to Isolation to test a modified sight and a telescopic sight developed for the 7.62 Belgium (FAL) Rifle in answer to reference a). The tests were performed with the assistance of Mr. James Earb and Mr. Glen Winstead, Isolation.

2. The first tests were conducted with a Williams Peep sight modified to fit an aluminum block which was mounted in place of the standard FAL rear sight. The Williams sight has a larger diameter peep than the FAL sight and has a wider range of elevation settings as well as more positive control over both elevation and windage. The main purpose of the test was to establish a point of reference on the aluminum block to match the graduations on the Williams sight and allow the sight to be set visually for the desired range once the weapon was zeroed.

3. Firing commenced from 100 yards at a silhouette target using the hood of a jeep as a rest. Both underloaded and full load rounds were used. Light rain which gradually increased in intensity during the day served to complicate the procedure. The test results at ranges from 25 yds. to 130 yds. using the Williams sight are summarized in Attachment I. Exceedingly erratic results were obtained throughout the tests and one attempt to duplicate the 100 yd. zero resulted in a different setting later in the day.

4. A 2X scope of Japanese manufacture equipped with aluminum mounting rings front and rear to fit the rear gas port and rear sight mount respectively then tested. The scope was attached to the rifle with difficulty and attempts to zero it were frustrated by the inability to determine where the rifle was shooting. The mounting moved while attempting to adjust the elevation knob and it was determined that the mount could not be attached firmly enough to insure in retaining a proper zero. The test with the scope was aborted.

Lash - 1 File

SECRET

5. It is recommended that the scope and mount be discarded as unfeasible. The Williams sight is acceptable although the number of clicks per revolution of the knob should be reduced. Further testing of the underloaded ammunition should be conducted to determine the reasons for the erratic performance.

DANIEL J. HOGAN

cc: C/TSD
C/WH/SA/MCB/PM (Col Hicks)
Attachment: As Stated

DDP/TSD/EB/DJH/EC

C/TSD/SDB

ATTACHMENT I

2 June 1964

Williams Peep Sight

At 25 yds., reduced loads
Raise sight 60 clicks from bottom
Match ref. line to 4th line from top

At 50 yds., reduced loads
Raise sight 80 clicks from bottom
Match ref. line to 5th line from top

At 75yds., reduced loads
Raise sight 80 to 110 clicks from bottom
Ammunition performance very erratic, wide variance on target

At 100 yds., reduced loads
Raise sight 120 to 160 clicks
1st trial, 160 clicks, little variance
Match ref. line to 9th line from top
2nd trial 3 hrs. later, 120 clicks
Match ref. line to 7th line from top

At 150 yds., reduced loads
Raise sight 230 clicks (1 trial)
Match ref. line to 12.5 line from top

Could not mount telescopic sight properly. Began process of shooting in scope, found it moved.

At 100 yds., full loads
Raise sight 4 clicks from bottom

At 150 yds., full loads
Raise sight 8 clicks from bottom.

1. Intermittant rain throughout tests.
2. Cases with reduced loads were noted to be blackened at neck after firing. Suspected to be low pressures not causing sufficient case expansion to obtain proper seal. This can contribute to erratic performance. Recommend gas port be turned to off position to prevent action from opening and allowing gas leak. Also investigate soft annealing case necks.

SECRET

Original in Vital Documents file

T/N:	Rolando CUBELA Secades
POSITION:	Medical Doctor, Cmdte, Cuban Army / The Cardiovascular Department of Cmdte. Fajardo Hospital
LOCATION:	Havana.
COMMO:	S/W system, agent sending - #15136 carbon agent receiving - #56638 pills

ACC Address: agent sending

Srta. Maria Dolores GOMEZ
Apartado 12318, Madrid, Espana

Mr. Humphrey R. Boncavil
P.O. Box 892
General Post Office,
New York 1, New York
(this address is to be used only for rapid commo)

In Nov 1963 Paris Station agreed to following address with Subject: Parents-in-law of UNSNAFU/9 Paris, France. (When letter is received, UNSNAFU/9 will deliver letter to the Station via UNSNAFU/5)
20 Rue De La Glaciere, Paris 13
Agent signs letters "Ramon"

ACC. Addresses, agent receiving:

Ernestina ACOSTA Gonzalez (Ene" Subjects former secretary)
#526, Apartment 8
Esquina Calle 25 y H.
(top floor Apt, Tel: 303865)

Edf #526 Apto 8
Esquina Calle 25 y H.

(Emergency)
Virginia Secades (Subject's mother)
Calle 38 #122
Esquina Avenida Zoologico
Alturas de Vedado
Havana.

Letters to the ACOSTA address signed "Pepe" will contain S/W. Letters to the ACOSTA address signed "Luis" will be written on S/W carbon and indicate resupply of S/W material.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

NOTE: Subject can receive or send S/W messages out through the AMTRUNK/10 S/W system.

Emergency Commo: If contact cannot be made through above systems, Carlos TEPEDINO in N.Y.C. can probably arrange a means of contacting Subject.

C/O: Wainwright.

SECRET

201-252234

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG: WILLIAMS/blc
UNIT: /IOS
EXT:
DATE: AUGUST 64

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-252234

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

25 AUG 64 15 19z

SIG CEN

TO: PARIS

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: DC/WH/SA 3 INFO: DDP, VR

TO PARI INFO: CITE DIR 44517

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMLASH UNSNAFU

REF: PARI 5922 (IN 57147)*

NO IDEN HQS TRACES CANTO.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/SA/COMMENT: *Ref XX RYBAT.

AMLASH-1 file

201-252234

WH/SA/EOB W. Wainwright (by phone)

WH/SA/INT [signature]

WE/3 Roger Pierre (by phone)

[signature] for WILLIAM D. O'RYAN C/WE

for [signature] BRUCE B. CHEEVER DC/WH/SA

201-252234

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER 24-28

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET AMLASH-1

1 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Test of Open Sight Hood for 7.62mm Belgium (FAL) Rifle

REFERENCE: A) Memo for Rcd. dated 25 May 1964, Subject: FAL Silencers/Sights, from C/WH/SA/MOB/PM
B) Memo for Rcd. dated 10 June 1964, Subject: Tests of Modified Sights for 7.62 Belgium (FAL) Rifle

1. On 15 and 16 June 1964, the undersigned and Mr. Bob Ricker, TSD/SDB went to Isolation to test an open sight hood for the 7.62mm Belgium (FAL) Rifle developed in answer to Ref. A. The Modified Williams peep sight developed previously in answer to Ref. A and reported on in Ref. B. proved unsatisfactory to the requester. The snap-on sight hood was then developed on a quick reaction basis to be simpler to install and easier to use than the Williams sight. In addition some improved underloaded 7.62mm NATO rounds having soft. annealed cases and cream of wheat filler were tested for performance. These were developed in hopes of correcting the erratic ammunition performance noted in Ref. B.

2. The open sight hood snaps over the existing rear sight of the FAL rifle, and in theory makes shooting in poor light or at night easier. It can be used with either standard factory loads or the underloaded ammunition in conjunction with the muzzle attachment silencer. The notch on the rear sight hood is "U" shaped and raised to compensate for the more curving trajectory of the low velocity ammunition. The hood is easily detached making the conventional peep sight available any time it is desired.

3. The attached data sheet summarizes the test results. It was found that some familiarization was necessary to get used to the open sight. Under ideal conditions the sight was as easy to use as the peep sight although it was more difficult to maintain uniform vertical grouping. The relationship between the eye and rear sight was found to be very critical. As the tests proceeded a change was noted in the point of impact vs. point of aim which was thought to be due to a change in sight picture on the part of the undersigned.

4. The improved ammunition was found to be quite consistant in performance. The use of cream of wheat filler to tamp the powder charge against the primer was an attempt to get more even ignition with correspondingly improved accuracy. The expended cartridge cases were checked periodically and no evidence was found of the soft annealed cases not expanding properly. During the tests the rifle and ammunition combination instilled a degree of confidence in the undersigned not present in the previous tests.

SECRET

5. Tests were conducted in the evening to determine the degree of usefulness of the sight in poor light. In this respect a 22 Caliber Hi-Standard pistol with folding shoulder stock and Bushnell 1.3X Phantom scope was tested in comparison. The scope was equipped with yellow filters to brighten the sight picture for low light level use. It was the opinion of both test personnel that the scope was superior to either the peep sight or open sight for as long as their was some illumination on the silhouette targets. Once the light failed the scope was completely useless although the undersigned could still discern targets with the naked eye out to 50 yds. All actual shooting was done with the open sight and some difficulty was experienced in hitting the targets at ranges of 100 yds. or more even at dusk. The closer targets could be easily hit up until it became too dark to see them at all. A large rain cloud moving from behind the firing position gradually obscured all available light. For the final shooting at 25 yds. occasional lightning flashes gave only a vague awareness of the target location. At no time during the night trials was there any muzzle flash visible from the under loaded ammunition and muzzle silencer combination. The gas port which was in the off position during the daylight trials was turned on at night but no flash was visible at the breech. A fine white cloud of cream of wheat powder was visible in front of the muzzle at almost full darkness but could not be seen more than 30 feet away.

6. Listener trials were conducted the following day to determine how far away an alert listener could discern the mechanical noise of the mechanism and that of the round being fired. Mr. Ricker walked away downwind at an angle of 90 degrees to the line of fire and stopped to listen every 25 paces. The undersigned fired single rounds, (hand actuating the mechanism) each time Mr. Ricker stopped. At 325 paces, or roughly 275 yds., Mr. Ricker reported he could still hear the mechanism being actuated, the round being fired, and the bullet striking a concrete pillar 200 yds. downrange. However, he stated that he might not have noticed the sound at that range had he not been listening for it specifically.

7. One of the major causes for concern at the start of the tests was that the cream of wheat filler might clog the silencer and render it ineffective. A total of 200 rounds were fired with the silencer in place and the noise level did seem to be higher at the finish of the second day. (Round numbers 180 to 200 were the ones expended during the previously mentioned listener trials). Inspection of the silencer at a later date revealed considerable cream of wheat residue in the screening. Sound level measurements made in the AMF sound lab showed that while the total noise level was no higher, the duration was relatively longer. This would make the silencer seem louder to near by observers but not increase the range at which it could be heard. However, from a standpoint of the ability for a listener to discriminate a silencer being fired from random noise, the longer duration gives him a better chance to recognize what he hears.

14-00000

8. On 19 June 1964, the undersigned went to the warehouse at Franconia to try to fit the sight hood to other 7.65mm FAL rifles. It was suspected that the fit might be a problem when it would not fit over the rear sights of three FAL rifles at Isolation. Although it was later determined that the three rifles were of a different lot and may therefore have different tolerances on the rear sight casting, it was felt that further checking was necessary. Nine FAL rifles from the same lot as those obtained by WH/SA/MOB/PM were unpackaged and the sight hood tried on the rear sight. Of the nine, two were perfect fits and the other seven too thick for the hood to fit. This created a problem in that the sight hoods had to fit rifles which for operational reasons could not be measured before hand to determine the thickness of the rear sight blade. Providing adjustment in the slot of the sight hood would have complicated the fixture to the point where it could become operationally unsuitable. Therefore it was determined that the best solution was to provide several small files with the hoods. The peep sight on the rifles, a soft casting, was found to be quite easy to file. In most cases it would be necessary only to file several thousandths to obtain a proper fit. This procedure was explained to C/WH/SA/MOB/PM and he stated that it would be acceptable.

9. On 24 June 1964, three open sight hoods with accessories consisting of two files and a small screwdriver were turned over to C/WH/SA/MOB/PM. In addition, 400 rounds of improved underloaded ammunition with cream of wheat filler were provided as a replacement for the original 400 underloaded rounds.

10. On 29 June 1964, it was discovered that a scope was availabl for the 7.62mm Belgium (FAL) Rifle (Sniper Version) and in the Agency supply system. Steps are being taken to obtain a scope for evaluation. The results will be forwarded to C/WH/SA/MOB.

DANIEL J. HOGAN
TSD/EB

DDP/TSD/EB/DJH/EC

cc: C/TSD
C/WH/SA/MOB/PM

SECRET

STANDARD VELOCITY AMMUNITION, DAYLIGHT:

RANGE	RAMP SETTING	SIGHT TYPE	POINT OF IMPACT (RELATIVE TO POINT OF AIM)	EXTREME SPREAD	NO. OF ROUNDS
100 yds.	No. 2	Peep	On	6 [illegible]"	5
100 yds.	No. 2	Peep	On	5 [illegible]"	5
100 yds.	No. 2	Open Hood	24" high	4 [illegible]"	5
100 yds.	No. 2	Open Hood	26" high	4 [illegible]"	5

OVERLOADED AMMUNITION, OPEN SIGHT HOOD, DAYLIGHT:

RANGE	RAMP SETTING	POINT OF IMPACT (RELATIVE TO POINT OF AIM)	EXTREME SPREAD	HORIZONTAL SPREAD	VERTICAL SPREAD	NO. OF ROUNDS
25 yds.	No. 2	3" high	1 3/4"	--	--	5
25 yds.	No. 6	3" low	1 3/4"	--	--	5
50 yds.	No. 6	On	5"	--	--	5
75 yds.	No. 6	4" left, 4" low	--	2"	7"	5
100 yds.	Full Elevation	6" left, 8" low	9"	--	--	10
100 yds.	Full Elevation	On (Diff. Shooter)	--	5"	13"	5
100 yds.	Full Elevation	8" left, 8" low	--	6"	8"	10
125 yds.	No 2	8" left, 18" low	--	9½"	11	5
125 yds.	Full Elevation	On (Changed Sight Picture)	--	6"	10"	8 (2 missed target)
150 yds.	Full Elevation	On (Changed Sight Picture)	--	6"	18"	8 (2 missed target)
[illegible] yds.	Full Elevation	6" low (Changed Sight Picture)	--	8"	26"	10

UNDERLOADED AMMUNITION, OPEN SIGHT HOOD, DUSK:

RANGE	NO. OF ROUNDS	NO. OF HITS	HORIZONTAL SPREAD	VERTICAL SPREAD	REMARKS
200 yds.	10	6	15"	23"	Could see target more clearly through Peep sight but no rounds were fired.
[illegible] yds.	10	6	6"	6"	Could see target very clearly with 1.3X scope.

UNDERLOADED AMMUNITION, ALMOST FULL DARK, OPEN SIGHT HOOD:

RANGE	NO. OF ROUNDS	NO. OF HITS	HORIZONTAL SPREAD	VERTICAL SPREAD	REMARKS
75 yds.	10	9	9"	9"	Peep sight useless
25 yds.	10	10	14"	25"	Could see targets out to 200 yds. with filtered scope at start of firing, could not see at all w/scope at finish.

OVERLOADED AMMUNITION, OPEN SIGHT HOOD, FULL DARK:

RANGE	NO. OF ROUNDS	NO. OF HITS	REMARKS
25 yds.	10	5 (scattered)	Target in total darkness, rain cloud overhead, intermittant lightning flashes gave a vague awareness of target location.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM MADRID

ACTION WH/SA 8

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED TUBED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INFO VR, FILE,

S E C R E T 281046Z

DIR CITE MADR 2662 (GROWERY ACTING)

TYPIC AMLASH

REF DIR 73234

1. RE PARA 2 REF, CIS CONTACT IS LU. MANUEL CANTILLO TOIRAC, NEW SECOND SECRETARY CUBAN EMBASSY MADRID, WHO REPORTEDLY CONNECTED CUBAN SECURITY.

2. FYI AT STATION DIRECTION QUJAW 1 DEVELOPING CLOSE FRIENDSHIP WITH CANTILLO.

SECRET

AMLASH/1
X-Cantillo

28Dec IN 49756

Suarez de la Osa, Mario Silvestre

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING

TO: Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: ~~TYPIC/MHAPRON/AMTRUNK/Operational~~
AMTRUNK Progress Report for Period 1-30 November 1964

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
Action Required: FYI.

1. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

A. Preparations were underway in early November to dispatch AMTRUNK-13 to Madrid in mid-November to cement the recruitment of AMTRUNK-19. These plans fell through when the Madrid Station notified Headquarters and WAVE that their workload would not allow sufficient case officer time to handle AMTRUNK-13 in Madrid at this time. WAVE agreed to postpone AMTRUNK-13's trip to Madrid several weeks until Madrid Station's workload abated somewhat.

B. The prospects of finalizing the recruitment of AMTRUNK-19 increased however with the receipt at WAVE of another open letter from AMTRUNK-19, this one mailed from Mexico City in mid-November. In AMTRUNK-19's first letter, mailed from Montreal in mid-October, he suggested using a friend in Mexico City as a cut-out to initiate a channel of communications between himself and AMTRUNK-13. In his second letter, AMTRUNK-19 stated that he had made the necessary arrangements with his friend in Mexico. Although WAVE, Headquarters and MEXI traces on AMTRUNK-19's friend, IDEN A, were fragmentary, Mexico Station stated that IDEN A was well-known to one of its PBRUMEN assets who vouched for IDEN A's loyalties. WAVE intends to send an innocuous letter to AMTRUNK-19 in AMTRUNK-13's handwriting to keep the channel with A-19 alive. AMTRUNK-19 appears eager to see AMTRUNK-13 again and has stated in both letters that he has considerable information to discuss in detail. It is well realized that this open letter channel is far from ideal but it is hoped that in early January 1965 AMTRUNK-13 can re-contact AMTRUNK-19 and provide him with a system of S/W.

Attachment: USC
IDEN Sheet

LASH-1 file

Distribution:
3 - Addressee,
w/att. USC

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 10 Dec 64

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-19045

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 19-6-84/3-1

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-19045

as well as debrief him thoroughly and levy FI and MHAPRON requirements upon him.

C. In mid-November after the postponement of AMTRUNK-13's Madrid trip, preparations began to launch Operation AMTRUNK X in early December. This operation would attempt to re-organize the ratline to and from Havana and the AMTRUNK infil area for the future use of infiltrated MHAPRON recruiters and other agent assets as necessary. Secondary objectives are to bring into the infil area a cache of weapons and explosives for AMTRUNK-10/AMLASH-1 and to teach a system of S/W to one or more assets in the area. The team is to be composed of the same four individuals who participated in Operation AMTRUNK IX in October 1964: AMAGREE-1, Team Leader; AMAKA-1, Radio Operator; and AMTRUNK-16 and -20, Guides. It was decided to shelve the V-20 as the Intermediate Craft (IC) for this operation and substitute a 17' Johnson boat with twin 75 hp. outboard motors which could maneuver through shallower water and which could be more easily camouflaged. The basic reason for this decision was the fact that December through February are the low-water months in the AMTRUNK operational area. During this shallow water season, the heavier, wider V-20 can only be used in the deeper and more heavily-guarded infiltration canals.

D. Through the combined efforts of AMICE-14, the AMTRUNK P/A, and AMAGREE-1 and AMAKA-1, four radio operator candidates, to be trained for future use in PM operations, were recruited during the reporting period.

E. Recruiting for MHAPRON infiltration candidates continued during the reporting period. One prospective infiltree was recruited during the month of November and the case officer was active in assessing and debriefing two other candidates. It is hoped that by March 1965 one or more of these candidates will be trained and prepared for infiltration for clandestine MHAPRON recruiting. In large measure this will depend upon the success of Operation AMTRUNK X in re-organizing the ratline to and from Havana.

F. S/W Message No. 13 was sent to AMTRUNK-11 in response to his Message No. 15 in which he stated that both OWVL receivers were now in his possession. WAVE Message No. 13 to AMTRUNK-11 gave directions for the disposition of the OWVL receivers and the activation of OWVL contact with both AMTRUNK-11 and AMTRUNK-10.

2. INTELLIGENCE REPORTING

None

3. OPERATIONAL EXPENDITURES

Salaries:	AMICE-14	$400.00
	AMAGREE-1	300.00
	AMAKA-1	250.00
	AMTRUNK-13	300.00
	AMTRUNK-16	225.00
	AMTRUNK-20	200.00
		$1,675.00
Mileage (AMICE-14 and AMAGREE-1):		$202.40
Household Expenses:		61.97
GRAND TOTAL		$1,939.37

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CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-19045

4. **PROJECTED PLANS**

Primary tasks to be accomplished are the mounting of Operation AMTRUNK X in early December, the dispatching of AMTRUNK-13 to Madrid to finalize the recruitment of AMTRUNK-19, and the staging of another contingent of MHAPRON recruiters for infiltration in March 1965.

Andrew K. REUTEMAN

14-00000

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT
TO UFGA-19045

IDEN Sheet

IDEN A — Dr. Francisco BORGES
M. Escobedo No. 692-16
Mexico 5, D. F.

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM

ORIG: W. WAINWRIGHT/dl
UNIT: WH/C/FI/TC
EXT: 6153
DATE: 24/MARCH/1965

SECRET/RYBAT

TO: PARIS
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/WH/C 5 INFO: FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, C/WE 3, C/CI

TO PRITY PARI INFO CITE DIR

DESENSITIZED RYBAT PBRUMEN UNSNAFU AMLASH AMWHIP 95560

REF: PARI 9995 (IN 29053)*

1. DO NOT BELIEVE UNSNAFU/9 FIRING IN ITSELF A HAZARD TO AMLASH/1. HOWEVER, DO FEEL IT NECESSARY ATTEMPT DETERMINE BACKGROUND TO UNSNAFU/19 STATEMENT THAT U/9 WAS "DIRTY KUBARK AGENT", I.E. WAS THIS JUST HEATED UNCOMPLIMENTARY EPITHET OR WAS IT BASED ON DSE KNOWLEDGE MADE AVAILABLE TO U/19. IN EITHER CASE, BELIEVE IT MERITS RELAY TO AMLASH/1. SUGGEST FOLLOWING: WHEN AMWHIP/1 ARRIVES PARI IN NEAR FUTURE, ASK HIM ATTEMPT WITH GREAT CAUTION DETERMINE IMPLICATIONS U/19 ABOVE ACCUSATION. THEN HAVE HIM CALL HIS JEWELER FRIEND IN HAVANA, JOSE IGLESIAS, OSTENSIBLY ON BUSINESS MATTER AS COVER, AND RELAY PERTINENT DETAILS OF U/9 INCIDENT AS ROUTINE FRIENDLY GOSSIP. AMWHIP/1 SHOULD HAVE NO PROBLEM INSURING THAT MUTUAL FRIEND IGLESIAS WILL RELAY THE NEWS POSTHASTE TO AMLASH/1. BELIEVE THIS SECURE ENOUGH AND EMMINENTLY FASTER AND MORE CERTAIN THAN S/W LETTER.

2. IF AMWHIP/1 FEELS THIS METHOD UNSAFE AT THIS TIME FOR ANY REASON, ADVISE SOONEST. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

3. PLS KEEP HQS CURRENT ALL ASPECTS THIS MATTER.

END OF MESSAGE

CONT........

RELEASING OFFICER 24-20 COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET/RYBAT

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET/RYBAT

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

INDEX
NO INDEX
FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF. INFO

PAGE TWO

TO INFO. CITE DIR 95584

*WH/C/Comment: UNSNAFU/19 fired in row with UNSNAFU/9. Requested guidance.

C/WH/C/FI
WE/5/C D. Wright (telecon)
WE/3 R. Pierce (telecon)
WH/C/CHIEF C. Dalon

THOMAS F. THIELE
C/WE/INT

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET/RYBAT

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

MESSAGE FORM

ORIG: R. H. WEBSTER/dl
UNIT: DC/WH/C/FI
EXT: 6153
DATE: 25/JUNE/1965

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S E C R E T/RYBAT

ROUTING: 1 RC, SP; 2 CA-AA; 3 FI, 7 C; 4 RR, 8 D

05 26 Jun 65 13 09 z

SIG CEN

TO: ROME
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: DC/WH/C-5 INFO: VR FILE ADDP C/WE 3 C/CI C/FI 2

ROME INFO CITE DIR 23142

DESENSITIZED
RYBAT TYPIC AMLASH

REFS: A. DIR 22113
B. ROME 6642 (IN 98023)
C. ROME 6652 (IN 98586)

1. BACKGROUND THIS CASE TOO EXTENSIVE TO RELAY. HOWEVER, PLAN HAVE JOSEPH LANGOSCH, WHO BEING ASSIGNED FRAN AS PBRUMEN ~~REGIONAL REP~~ CASE OFFICER, VISIT ROME TO BRIEF PRESLAND, PROBABLY IN AUGUST.

2. NO DEFINITE EVIDENCE AMLASH COMPLEX PART OF DOUBLED OP BUT CERTAINLY AN INSECURE ONE. REF A WAS DESIGNED TO PRESENT CURRENT HQS THOUGHTS AND INTENTIONS ON OPERATION.

3. INVOLVEMENT AMWHIP/2 RELATIVELY MARGINAL AS HE APPEARS BE ON DAILY FRINGES OF MAIN GROUP ~~AND NOT~~ THOUGH PROBABLY PRIVY TO PLANS. HOWEVER, UNLESS ROME HAS SPECIFIC OPS PLANS INVOLVING HIM WHICH MUST BE IMPLEMENTED NEAR FUTURE, SUGGEST CONTACT WITH HIM BE MINIMIZED UNTIL LANGOSCH CAN PROVIDE BACKGROUND.

[Handwritten: Can't even tell Mr. Harlan properly Doesn't know that AMLASH-1 involved with Bob on Gov Robert]

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/FI
WE/4 S. Munger (by phone)

[Handwritten: AMLASH-1]

THOMAS F. THIELE
C/WE/INT
RELEASING OFFICER

25-34

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T/RYBAT

GROUP 1

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

(5)

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

15 February 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with AMLASH-1 in Paris, 31 January to 3 February 1965

1. AMLASH-1 returned from Rome to Paris on 31 Jan 1965 and was met for a very brief meeting the same night by ONTRICH in order to arrange a meeting for the following day. The following subjects were discussed at the two meetings on 1 and 2 February 1965:

a. The primary reason for again meeting AMLASH-1 before his planned return to Cuba was to brief him on the security implications involved in the infiltration and possible capture of Modesto Orlando Orozco Basulto AKA Bebo Orozco, who infiltrated into Cuba on 21 Dec 1964. Orozco, according to his wife, went to Cuba to rescue Jose Vasquez Merey and three others who were hiding in the home of a woman named Gloria Cabrera, who lived at No. 72 27th Street, between N & O, Apartment 3, Vedado, Havana. Orozco's capture, if he has been captured, presents an indirect threat to the security of AMLASH-1 and a more direct threat to the security of AMTRUNK-10 since Orozco in Jan 1964 exfiltrated through the rat line established by AMICE-14 (Miguelito). Upon his return to Cuba, AMLASH-1 will check the above with AMTRUNK-10; and, if Orozco is under the control of the security service, will decide and communicate with Miami whether AMLASH-1 and AMTRUNK-10 believe it necessary to exfiltrate AMTRUNK-10. AMLASH-1 was briefed to send a letter to UNSNAFU-9 to indicate whether Orozco has been arrested or whether he is still in hiding. If the letter to UNSNAFU-9 mentions a good and pleasant return trip, this will mean that Orozco is not under the control of the security service. If the letter talks about a long, tiring trip, this will indicate that Orozco has been arrested. AMLASH-1 was also requested to send a report on the above and any complications which have developed or may develop from Orozco's infiltration.

b. AMLASH-1 suggested that his nom de guerre "Charles," which we have been using for the past three years, be changed to "Gerardo."

c. AMLASH-1 was given a resupply of S/W developer pills and carbon. He planned to take the S/W material back with him to Havana. AMLASH-1 again reviewed with UNSNAFU-9 and reminded UNSNAFU-9 to turn over to his Paris case officer all letters regardless of how received from AMLASH-1 to either UNSNAFU-9 or letters that may be addressed to his parents-in-law. AMLASH-1 also agreed to send S/W out in letters addressed to Juan Ventura (AMWHIP-1's business partner) in Geneva or Rome. AMWHIP-1 was briefed to inform Ventura that any letters he received from AMLASH-1 should be immediately air mailed to AMWHIP-1 in New York. Since AMLASH-1 will probably find it necessary some time not to sign the letters to Ventura in his true name, AMWHIP-1 was also briefed to inform Ventura to forward to New York any letter received from Cuba addressed to him and signed by a person unknown to him. S/W letters to AMLASH-1 should continue to be addressed to Ernestina Acosta, Edf. No. 526, Apt. 8, Esquina Calles 25 y H. In an emergency a letter can also be sent to AMLASH-1's mother.

d. AMLASH-1 was again debriefed on the cache that had been put down for him in Matanzas. He repeated what he had previously reported and attempted to answer most of the questions in the WAVE cable. A cable on this subject was sent from Paris to Headquarters, info WAVE, on 2 Feb. AMLASH-1 was requested to send a message either through his channel or through AMTRUNK-10's S/W channel reporting how much of the radio equipment and other material had been recovered from the cache.

e. AMLASH-1 was asked if he knew of any individual in Cuba whom he could recruit and who could be inserted into the Cuban Intelligence Service with the idea of attempting to get the DGI to assign this man to Caracas, Venezuela. AMLASH-1 could think of only one possibility, an individual known as Gustavo Gonzalez. AMLASH-1 has full confidence in Gustavo and Gustavo has previously been approached on several occasions by Pinero to work for him. Upon his return to Cuba AMLASH-1 will check to find out if Gustavo can still get himself recruited by Pinero and then be sent on a mission abroad, hopefully to Caracas. (AMWHIP-1, who also knows Gustavo, will provide the background information upon his return to New York.)

f. AMLASH-1 reported on the upcoming FEU elections on 10 February 1965. AMLASH-1 stated that Crombet, the president of the Communist Youth, will become the new

president and that his man, Lazaro Mora, would be one of the vice-presidents. (A cable on this subject was sent to Headquarters from Paris.)

g. AMLASH-1 was requested to check with Fizzolo regarding the precautions being taken to prevent sabotage of the locomotives being shipped from France to Cuba; specifically, how carefully do they check the placement of the seals, are they special seals or regular load seals, are there going to be any additional checks once the locomotives reach Cuba, will they drain the oil and lubricants from the factory to the port, and do they run the locomotives under their own power or are they towed. AMLASH-1 agreed to attempt to develop answers to the above requirements and pass the information to his contact in the Paris Station. AMLASH-1 also agreed to attempt to find out and pass to the Paris Station through UNSNAFU-9 the names of the Cuban techs training at La Rochelle.

h. In a general discussion regarding the persons with whom AMLASH-1 had been in contact either personally or through letters, AMLASH-1 mentioned Alfredo Portela. AMLASH-1 stated he had received a letter from Portela and had in turn written to Portela. He considers Portela a friend which was the only reason for writing to him.

i. AMLASH-1 was debriefed on Cuban Intelligence Service personnel. A cable on this subject was sent from Paris to Headquarters.

j. A cable was sent from Paris to Headquarters suggesting WAVE send a S/W letter to AMTRUNK-10 stating: "Este tranquilo. Carlos regresa pronto."

k. AMLASH-1 was asked for information on the following persons:

(1) Samuel Gonzalez Rodriguez-Planes. AMLASH-1 reports he is a member of the Ameijeiras group and is a good and brave man.

(2) Antonio Lusson y Batlle, Chief of Operations of the General Staff of the Occidental Army. AMLASH-1 reports Lusson is an independent and rare type individual who keeps to himself and doesn't involve himself in political matters. AMLASH-1 has heard nothing bad about Lusson.

(3) Cmdte. Raul Diaz Arguelles, Chief of Artillery of the Occidental Army.

(4) Elpidio Baez Bigo. According to AMLASH-1, Baez is a trusted Fidelman.

(5) Luis Manuel Cantillo Toirac. Assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Madrid and one of the security people. He was formerly assigned to Brazil, is young and has for several years been with Pinero and the Cuban IS.

(6) Enrique Oltuski Osacki. Oltuski is a close friend of Faustino Perez and his stock with the regime rises or falls as does that of Faustino.

(7) Sergio Tolon. Code clerk in the Embassy in Paris. Tolon is staying in Paris at the request of Ambassador Carrillo.

l. Gastro enteritis, water pollution and unsanitary conditions. AMLASH-1 states there are no real problems, although the scarcity and lack of a balanced diet do cause some problems. The purification of water has been a problem which probably has been the cause of some of the sickness in the country.

m. AMLASH-1 did not believe that Aragones had invited him to fly back to Havana with him in order to get him back because of any serious security matter. AMLASH-1 did state that Aragones was concerned that AMLASH-1 may not return to Cuba. Since Aragones cleared AMLASH-1 for his trip abroad, he is in a way responsible that AMLASH-1 does not defect and returns to Cuba. AMLASH-1 feels Aragones does not want any problems with Fidel in case AMLASH-1 decides to stay out.

n. AMLASH-1 was unable to provide any information on the political developments in Cuba in mid-November and December since he had been out of the country since early November. AMLASH-1 was asked to check on the problems between the opposing factions in the Cuban leadership and explained the issues, the background and personalities involved.

o. Soviet advice or influence in political and economic matters creates resentment among the middle and higher level Cuban officials. Basically, the Soviets are not respected.

p. Rank of Cuban officials under Fidel in terms of their influence in making national policy. Raul is still the heir apparent to Fidel. Next to Raul is Che Guevara. After that, no other official, according to AMLASH-1, has any great influence in the making of Cuban national policy. President Dorticos' relationship with Fidel is good since he is a hard and serious worker, has good administrative ability and is able to work within the general outline laid down by Fidel. Raul Castro has some political influence and control in Oriente where he has placed his men in positions of influence, but only Fidel personally has any political influence in the rest of Cuba. Even within the military Fidel selects and appoints high army officers. Che Guevara is still strong in the economic field and has not suffered a decline in his influence and authority because of his earlier policy of industrialization. Guevara restricts himself to the economic field and plays a very small role in the political field. He is serious and very hard worker, one of the few, according to AMLASH-1, who has worked seven days a week without leave since the revolution. Emilio Aragones holds an important position as the organizational secretary of the PURS. He is the official who was always at the office of the National Directorate of the Party and has contact with all the officials in the regime. He plays an important coordinating role. Faure Chomon has been accused of organizing former 13th of March Revolutionary Directorate people, but, according to AMLASH-1, this probably based on the fact that Chomon always gives jobs in the ministry he heads to DR people. Because of this Chomon today controls to a large degree the Ministry of Transportation. Of all the ministries, the DR's stronghold is in the Ministry of Transportation. Other DR people who continue to hold important positions in the regime are Alberto Mora, Ambassador Carrillo and Jose Naranjo.

q. AMLASH-1 and AMWHIP-1 were unable to develop any specifics, but from their conversations with Ambassador Carrillo got the impression that Carrillo would prefer and welcome a transfer from the Embassy in Paris to the Embassy in Madrid.

r. According to Emilio Aragones, Anibal Escalante is being considered for a job outside Cuba. The job will probably be in the commercial/economic field, but a decision had not been made as of November 1964 as to location.

s. AMLASH-1 again reported that he feels Orlando Blanco, Consul of the Cuban Embassy in Bern, is approachable since he is unhappy with the Cuban regime. AMLASH-1 also feels that Enrique Rodriguez Loeches, Cuban Ambassador in Rabat, is approachable if approached and developed by the right person. Marina Garcia Gonzalez assigned to the commercial section of the Cuban Embassy in Rabat, AMLASH-1 feels is also approachable and feels money can be used as an inducement. Ambassador Carrillo, AMLASH-1 feels, if the proper person developed him, could probably be compromised with Fidel. He is a character and could easily be entangled according to AMLASH-1 in a compromising situation. Ambassador Carrillo is a close friend of Lucy Echevarria.

2. AMLASH-1 was also asked information on a long list of other requirements on Cuba. On many he was unable to provide information and cables were sent to Headquarters on the requirements on which he did provide information.

Nestor D. Sanchez
WH/SA/AMWORLD

cc: WH/SA/EOB
WH/SA/MOB

File:
AMLASH-1 201
Internal Op

[illegible]IAL

10 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

16

1. On 29 April 1963 Dorothe Matlack, Domestic Exploitation Section, ACSI, telephoned to the effect that a banker named Clemard Joseph Charles had left Haiti six days earlier and had just arrived in New York. A friend of Charles, named Joseph Dryer, 109 Lakewood Avenue, West Palm Beach, Florida, had written to General Delmar, former CG Antilles Command, recommending Charles as a man of great interest to the US government in view of the events in Haiti. Charles was described as President of the Banc Commerciale, Port au Prince, Haiti, who is in President Duvalier's favor. Mrs. Matlack mentioned that she had alerted Col. Sam Kail in Miami to contact Dryer in order to obtain more background information and an assessment on Charles.

2. On 1 May 63 Mrs. Matlack advised that Charles was staying at the Park Sheraton Hotel, New York, and that he had telephoned her since her name had been supplied to him by Dryer. Charles considered her to be his point of contact in Washington. According to Mrs. Matlack, Charles had appointments to see Vice President Johnson, Senator Keating, and Congressman Rogers (Florida). However, Charles was willing to talk to representatives of Mrs. Matlack's office. Mrs. Matlack stated that the Haitian Desk man in ACSI was ready to go to New York to talk to Charles and invited CIA to accompany him. Charles speaks very little English and a fluency in French was therefore required for the interview. Mrs. Matlack stated that she might be able to obtain a French linguist from First Army, Governor's Island, but he would not be an intelligence officer. It was decided that James Balog, New York Office, who has a knowledge of the French language would accompany the ACSI representative under Army cover. It was also arranged that Balog would meet the ACSI representative (Captain Rogers) at the Park Sheraton Hotel where Charles was staying.

3. On 2 May 63 Mrs. Matlack reported that Col. Kail had interviewed Mr. Dryer in West Palm Beach. Dryer had appointed Charles as Director of his bank in Haiti. Charles, according to Dryer, formerly had no political ambitions but in view of the current political situation in Haiti, Charles now thinks that he may some day be president. Dryer described Charles as well-connected, politically and financially, on both sides of the fence in Haiti. He is also a good friend of President Duvalier. Dryer had given Charles letters of introduction to Senator Keating and to other officials in Washington. Charles wanted to see President Kennedy and indeed had gone to the White House to arrange for an appointment. He was well received by the President's appointment secretary and invited to dinner that evening with the appointment

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

secretary. Through a misunderstanding, however, Charles did not attend the dinner but went to New York instead.

4. Charles is travelling, according to Dryer, with a Texas geologist named de Mohrenschildt. de Mohrenschildt is associated with Charles in a business venture in Haiti and is trying to arrange a meeting for Charles with Vice President Johnson.

5. On 3 May 63 Jim Balog telephoned to advise that he had had a five-hour session the previous day with Charles and that he had obtained both personality data and views by Charles on what the United States should do in the current Haitian situation. Balog advised that he was transmitting the information to Washington. Upon arrival, copies of the teletypes were transmitted to ACSI (Mrs. Matlack), WH Division, and the Latin America Branch.

6. On 6 May 63 Mayo Stuntz, Support Branch, advised that WH Division wished to speak to Charles and Balog was asked to arrange an appointment. Mrs. Matlack telephoned at approximately 1715 to advise that she had just received a telephone call from Mrs. de Mohrenschildt asking assistance in obtaining hotel reservations in Washington. Upon being told that we had no special means of obtaining reservations, Mrs. Matlack stated that she would check with the State Department Protocol Office to determine which hotels would admit negro guests. Mrs. Matlack finally made reservations at the Albon Towers. A check with Jim Balog revealed that he had arranged for Charles to meet the WH representative in the lobby of the Willard Hotel, Washington, D. C., at 12:00 noon on 7 May. Attempts to reach Mrs. Matlack that afternoon were unsuccessful. At 0830, 7 May, a call was made to Mrs. Matlack to confirm that Charles would be in Washington on that day and that arrangements had been made for a meeting with an Agency representative for 12:00 noon. Mrs. Matlack retorted that both Mrs. de Mohrenschildt and Charles had called her that previous evening to confirm a 12:00 luncheon appointment with her. Mrs. Matlack was concerned that CIA and Army should not be working at cross purposes. She had received authorization from ACSI to meet Charles at lunch and felt that it would not be politic for her to withdraw from her appointment since Army considered her the point of contact with Charles. Mayo Stuntz informed WH Division of the conflict and passed on the suggestion that the WH Division representative might meet Charles and Mrs. Matlack at noon and that Mrs. Matlack offered to withdraw shortly thereafter. The WH representative declined the offer and requested that a meeting later in the afternoon be arranged. Mrs. Matlack believed that due to conflicting instructions, she had been placed in the middle in the situation from which she could not graciously withdraw and requested that someone accompany her.

C[illegible]AL

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

7. I met Mrs. Matlack in the lobby of the Hotel Willard shortly before noon, and a few minutes later, Mr. Charles arrived, accompanied by Mr. and Mrs. de Mohrenschildt. We lunched in the restaurant in the hotel. Mr. de Mohrenschildt mentioned that he had been born in Batu, Russia, but during the Bolshevik Revolution had been taken to Poland as a small child. He had spent approximately 20 years in Poland prior to World War II and had served in the Polish Army. He also mentioned that he had been a member of an ICA Team to Yugoslavia in 1957 and while in Belgrade had met Gomulka who was visiting Belgrade at the time. He had spoken to Gomulka and was invited to visit Poland, which invitation he had accepted. His home is in Dallas, Texas. He has a PhD. in geology and has had some teaching experience. Mrs. de Mohrenschildt was born in Peking, China. Her father was Russian and her mother French, and she is now or has been a fashion designer. Mr. de Mohrenschildt mentioned that he has known Charles for sometime and that he is a partner with him in a sisal business in Haiti.

8. Both Charles and de Mohrenschildt were anxious to arrange meetings with government officials in Washington. I mentioned to Charles that a meeting had been arranged for him at 2:15 and that a Mr. Green would meet him in the lobby. At 1410 Mrs. Matlack, Mr. and Mrs. de Mohrenschildt and I departed and Charles remained in the lobby waiting for contact.

9. In the course of the luncheon conversation, Charles had mentioned to Mrs. Matlack that he desired to see a Mr. Wise, AID, to discuss US aid to Haiti. Later that afternoon Mrs. Matlack called to state that she had called the State Department to pass along Charles' request. Mr. Zagorski (State) had called her back to pass on the Haitian Desk man's extreme displeasure that anyone in the United States Government should be in official contact with Charles. The desk man considered Charles to be close to the Duvalier Government, to have been involved in several shady financial dealings, and in general, to be an undesirable character. Mrs. Matlack asked whether the Agency had any interest in Charles which would dictate further contact with Charles.

10. Maye Stuart checked with WH Division and determined that as a result of the meeting with Charles, the DD/P Haitian Desk had no further plans to contact him. I told Mrs. Matlack that our interest seemed to have been satisfied and that I believed we should disengage ourselves as gracefully as possible.

11. Wayne Nelson, DD/P Coordinator, called on 7 May to inquire concerning our involvement in the Charles case. He stated that ACSI had called him earlier that day to assure him that ACSI had no direct interest in Charles and that it was acting as an intermediary at the request of General Delmar who had passed the lead to General Fitch. ACSI was concerned that due to the mix up in appointments to see Charles, charges might later be made that ACSI had interferred or had obstructed CIA contact with Charles. I explained to Nelson what had happened and he later called back to state that ACSI was completely satisfied in the way the matter had been handled.

12. On 8 May Mrs. Matlack telephoned to advise that the Operational Branch of ACSI was discussing the Charles case with DD/P to determine future course of action. She was still somewhat concerned over her own position in the case since Charles considered her to be the focal point in Washington. I reiterated to her that the matter was one for either the State Department or the operational elements to handle and that we preferred to disengage ourselves. Mrs. Matlack mentioned that a dispatch had been received to the effect that a cousin of Charles was prominiently mentioned as a successor to Duvalier should the latter be overthrown. She was of the opinion that the US government should continue to "play ball" with Charles as a future asset in Haitian affairs.

A. F. CZAJKOWSKI

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ACTION NO. 078

S E C R E T 301720Z MAR 71 CITE MADRID 13428 (MADR)

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI 30 Mar 71 IN 269724

TYPIC QUANTUM

1. QUANTUM-57 PROVIDED STATION WITH NOTE DATED 6 OCTOBER 70 FROM LAZARO G U T I E R R E Z MENOYO, IN CUBAN PRISON, TO ADDRESSEE WHOSE IDENTITY Q-57 CHOSE NOT REVEAL. WRITER'S FATHER, DR. ZABALETA G U T I E R R E Z, WHO STILL CUBA, ARRANGED FOR NOTE TO BE SMUGGLED OUT CUBA. MAIN PURPOSE OF NOTE WAS TO ATTEMPT ESTABLISH REGULAR COMMUNICATIONS CHANNEL BETWEEN WRITER, VIA ADDRESSEE AND HIS FATHER, AND PEDRO M. DIAZ, 1251 NORTHWEST 30 STREET, MIAMI, FLORIDA.

2. ON BASIS ABOVE, GUTIERREZ APPEARS TO BE ELOY G U T I E R R E Z MENOYO (201-269349) ON WHOM FILE NO LONGER HELD AT STATION. PLEASE ADVISE IF ASSUMPTION CORRECT, INCLUDING TRACES ON DIAZ.

3. FILE 201-269349. GP-1

S E C R E T

[handwritten: 201-269349; no 201; FI]

SECRET

[handwritten: 30 Mar 71 — 201-269349]

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ACTION UNIT: WH 8 — INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR 6, FI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

ACTION NO. 751

SECRET 051617Z APR 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 10963
WMIM

MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

5 Apr 71 IN 304300

TYPIC QUANTUM

REF MADRID 13428 (IN 299724)

1. BELIEVE STATION ASSUMPTION CITED PARA 2 REF CORRECT.

2. AMOTS UNABLE IDENTIFY PEDRO M. DIAZ. STATION FILES CONTAIN CARD REFERENCE TO ONE PEDRO MANUEL DIAZ, CUBAN CITIZEN RESIDING 124 SW 18TH COURT, MIAMI, FLORIDA, WHO WAS MEMBER OF ISLE OF PINES ASSOCIATION IN EXILE. (DOI: JAN 63). THIS MAY BE DIAZ OF REF IN VIEW OF FACT THAT ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO AT ISLE OF PINES PRISON.

3. FILE 201-269349. GP-1

SECRET

AN RTZ
AB
IN
PS
BX
DES NPD
FI

CS COPY

SECRET

5 APR 71

201-269349

SECRET

For Subject's (201-269349) role in coordinated U. S. Army clandestine operation F/DC/15-63, please see 201-269895.

F: 201- 269349

SECRET

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 12 OCTOBER 1971

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: NOEL SALAS SANTOS

FBI FILE NO: 105-7548 (MIAMI)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 6 MAY 1971
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEWARK)

DATE: 26 FEBRUARY 1971
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: ANTONIO MATEU RODRIGUEZ
FBI FILE NO: 105-19301 (MIAMI)

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SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
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	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GUTIERREZ MENOYO, ELOY
201-269349
SEX M COB ?

019-005-046
323 -2071470
15 JUL 70

CIT ?
OCC ?
NOTED IN REPORT ON STATUS OF POLITICAL PRISONERS

R 7008191478

FILE IN 201-269349

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR 6, FI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

ACTION NO. 951

S E C R E T 051617Z APR 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 10963

MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC QUANTUM

5APR IN 304300

REF MADRID 13428 (IN 299724)

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3. FILE 201-269349. GP-1

S E C R E T

Diod Rept No- 5720-0009 71 5 Feb 71
reportedly suffering from [illegible] malnutrition & ill health.
[illegible] were reportedly moved during end Dec 70 to El Principe Prison from Guanajay Prison in Havana province

SECRET

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MAR 31 12 15 PM '71

ACTION UNIT WH8 — FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR6, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI

ACTION NO. 078

S E C R E T 301729Z MAR 71 CITE MADRID 13428

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

30 MAR 71 IN 289724

TYPIC QUANTUM

1. QUANTUM-57 PROVIDED STATION WITH NOTE DATED 6 OCTOBER 70 FROM LAZARO G U T I E R R E Z MENOYO, IN CUBAN PRISON, TO ADDRESSEE WHOSE IDENTITY Q-57 CHOSE NOT REVEAL. WRITER'S FATHER, DR. ZABALETA G U T I E R R E Z, WHO STILL CUBA, ARRANGED FOR NOTE TO BE SMUGGLED OUT CUBA. MAIN PURPOSE OF NOTE WAS TO ATTEMPT ESTABLISH REGULAR COMMUNICATIONS CHANNEL BETWEEN WRITER, VIA ADDRESSEE AND HIS FATHER, AND PEDRO M. DIAZ, 1251 NORTHWEST 30 STREET, MIAMI, FLORIDA.

2. ON BASIS ABOVE, GUTIERREZ APPEARS TO BE ELOY G U T I E R R E Z MENOYO (201-269349) ON WHOM FILE NO LONGER HELD AT STATION. PLEASE ADVISE IF ASSUMPTION CORRECT, INCLUDING TRACES ON DIAZ.

3. FILE 201-269349. GP-1

Requested CI traces 1 April 71.

S E C R E T

ACTION

SECRET

SECRET

ALBRIGHT KEN
WH/C/OP
EXT. 7144

GB-547
3038
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NAME CHECK AND CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

DATE: 2 April 71

RID CONTROL NO.: 00016 APR 5 71

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE	INITIALS
RID/INDEX	DT-5	1B4003	3 April 1971	
REQUESTER			5 April 71	
RID/FILES	DT-5	GC52		
REQUESTER				
RID/ANALYSIS	GT-4	GA50		
RID/INDEX	DT-5	1B4003		

01 APR 2 AM '71

CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS AND NOTES

Enter no. of references ordered ________

Cable request for traces.

Cubans only listed

C-2000

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME: DIAZ,

GIVEN NAMES: Pedro M.

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED:

201 NO. IF KNOWN:

AKA, ALIASES:

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (*Occupation, CP membership, U. S. affiliations, etc.*)

One Lazaro Gutierrez Menoyo, in prison in Cuba, is attempting to establish regular letter commo channel to DIAZ.

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE
M	?	Cuba (?)	Cuba	1251 NW 30 Street, Miami, Fla

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK

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- [x] ~~CARD~~ REFERENCES ATTACHED

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FORM 362 USE PREVIOUS

14-00000

DIAZ, PEDRO /SGT./

SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC POLICE AGENT
MBR OF THE NATL POLICE AND OF THE SERVICI
OF INTELEGENCIA REGIMENTAL /SIR/ WHO HAD
KNOWLEDGE OF COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN ORIENTE
PROV. [illegible]

019-002-001
HKSA-00050
04 JUN 56
SER 7
P1

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
IDENTIFIED IN A TEXT PREPARED BY SOC.
AS A MERCENARY AT THE PUNTA PRESIDENTE
BASE IN D. R. FOR SENE.

019-300-003
UBA -96854
27 JAN 65
F91
P4

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB 02 JUN 42
CUBA, MATANZAS PROV
CIT ?
OCC FISHERMAN
Δ USA, FLA, MIAMI
REF ISRM-13149, 27 SEP 63
AKA OF VERGARA DIAZ, HUMBERTO
SEP 63

201-735925.

*751

CS COPY ATTACHED
PLEASE RETURN PROMPTLY

201-4-173-414
HRA-2004

DIAZ, PEDRO

127941

14-00000

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX ? DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
OF INTEREST TO SUBJECT OF 201-816431

201-815655
DBC -55476
23 JUN 69

P4

Yes

SEE APERTURE CARDS ATTACHED

6907101034

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
AT MOSCOW STATE U
< USSR STUDYING IN USSR DURING 68-69 SCHOOL YR

200-006-226/03
EX -03327
05 DEC 68

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
Δ CUBA, HABANA PROVINCE, SAN JOSE DE LAS LAJAS
SUBJ DESCRIBED AS NEO-COMMUNIST.

019-004-134
UFGA-04561
27 JUN 62
•201-314230
P2

DIAZ, PEDRO /DP./

SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC GOVT OFFICIAL
DIV CHIEF OF THE MIN OF STATE DIV DE CONVENIOS, TRATADOS, CONVENCIONES Y REUNIONES'.
SUBJ'S NAME APPEARS IN MEMO 85, DATED 02 OCT 56.

019-002-004
HKHA-03063
18 OCT 56
SER 174

24

127964
CORR CARD

6501252586

SECRET

SECRET

DIAZ, Pedro Manuel

75-4-134-1
(HVC-613)

DIAZ, PEDRO MANUEL

75-6-4-522Y
HVCA-1579
ENCL. 1
PG. 25

DIAZ, Pedro Manuel

75-4-134-17
HVC 937

DIAZ, PEDRO MELITON
DOB ?

201-251144

CIT ?

@ OF DIAZ-LANDA, PEDRO MELITON, BORN 10 MAR 24
MATANZAS, CUBA. CIT CUBA
Δ EL SALVADOR
FORMER MEMBER OF BRAC
RECEIVED POLITICAL ASYLUM TO EL SALVADOR MAY 59

127989

14-00000

DIAZ, Pedro Martinez

4-4-5-491
(TABA-1611)

Martinez Diaz, Pedro

DIAZ, Pedro Maximo

75-4-11-2
(TVCA-
2
(P. 194

DIAZ, Pedro Manuel

DIAZ, PEDRO MANUEL

75-6-4-572
HVCA-1983
ATTACH.
PG. 476

127983

SECRET

DIAZ, Pedro

201-53613
(TAB-A-1685)
~~(TS# 92809)~~
(Page 3)

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127949

SECRET

14-00000

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB ?

019-004-107
HKS -01067
20 MAY 57
SER 57
P4

CIT CUBA
OCC ?

COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZER AND EMPLOYEE OF THE ROADS AND PUBLIC WORKS DEPT. OF VICTORIA DE LAS TUNAS, CUBA.

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB ?

200-004-078
TUM -01303
00 000 52
SER. 496

CIT ?
OCC ?

BUSINESSMAN. SPANIARD ACTIVE IN PROMOTING PEACE CONF. IN URUGUAY AUG 52.

CORR. CARD
DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB ?

019-002-000
HKSA-00016
21 NOV 55
SER 14

CIT CUBA
OCC POLICE AGENT

PLAIN CLOTHES NATL POLICE SGT ALLEGEDLY IN CHARGE OF THE DETAIL INVESTIGATIN ANTI BATISTA ACIVITIES. CHIEF OF BRAZ IN SANTIAGO NOD.

DIAZ PEDRO 201-161423*

BORN 07-06-04 CUBA GUANTANAMO

RES. CUBA OCCUPATION

THIS CARD FILED IN MAIN INDEX

127937

- ·AZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB C 05

019-004-134
UFGA-06655 E01
15 NOV 62
P2

CIT CUBA
OCC PUBLIC WORKS EMPLOYEE
Δ CUBA, MATANZAS, COLISEO, URRITIA SECTION.
SUBJ IDENTIFIED AS COMMUNIST IN COLISEO, DOI APR 62.

127940

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB ?

015-004-004
HCS -20189
00 JAN 53
CHILE
SER. 871

CIT ?
OCC ?
COMMIE EMPLOYED BY CHILEAN STATE RR.

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB ?

073-124-003
HUMW-00253 E02
CO JUL 53
SER. 22

CIT ?
OCC ?
IN URUGUAY. PRES. OF ATENSO IN MONTEVIDEO.

DIAZ, Pedro

IN 21177
Guat 646

Guat - 30 Mar 53

If this card is of value
Please Complete

Date of birth
Place of birth
Citizenship
Pers info

127940

SECRET

14-00000

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?

059-006-008
PRA-01641
00 DEC 52
SER. 1006

CORR. CARD

DIAZ, Pedro (Dr.)

73-6-2
TUR-
(p. 2)

If this card is of value
Please complete:

Date of birth:
Place of birth:
Citizenship:
Pert. info:

DIAZ, PEDRO

ALIAS OF DE BELLO PEDRESCHI,
CARLOS GUILLERMO

56-4-133
HZP-02140
4 JUN 57

CARD FILED

If this card is of value
Please complete:

Date of birth:
Place of birth:
Citizenship:
Pert. info:

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB C 07

CIT CUBA
OCC ?

019-500
UFG -00889
11 APR 62
P3

MEMBER DEFENSE COMMITTEE LOCATED AT CORNER OF PRIMERA AVENIDA AND CALLE 29, VERADERO, MATANZAS PROVINCE, CUBA

127944

0142915

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?

COMMIE PARTY MEMBERS REFERENCES TO THE FOLLOWING: PEDRO ORTEGA DIAZ /1947/, PEDRO J. DIAZ /1950/, PEDRO P. DIAZ /1949/, PEDRO OLIVER DIAZ /1950/.

004-006-004
TABW-01697
00 NOV 50
SER. 202

CORR. CARD

127943

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?

COMMIE PARTY ORGANIZER.

015-004-004
TCS -01307
00 000 51
CHILE
SER. 642

CORR. CARD

DIAZ, Pedro

aka Pico DIAZ

xref

If this card is of value
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127951

DIAZ, Pedro

37-6-4-28
EST 28
Encl 17
Page

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Date of birth
Place of birth
Citizenship
Pert. info.

THIS CARD FILED IN

127948

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 18 JANUARY 1971

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: ENRIQUE MUNEZ ALVAREZ

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (SAN JUAN)

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 152	ROUTING AND OR INITIALS
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ACTION UNIT WH8	INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, CI/OPS, FI,	
ACTION NO. 192		

S E C R E T 191325Z DEC 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 9322 19 DEC IN-22991

DIRECTOR

TYPIC

1. AMPALM-4 INFORMED STATION ON 11 DECEMBER THAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD BY CARLOS (SARAGAT), WHO IMPORTANT ALPHA 66 SUB-CHIEF, WHO LEARNED OF IT FROM ANDRES (NAZARIO) SARGENT, LEADER OF ALPHA 66 THAT ALPHA 66 HAD RECENTLY RECEIVED A LETTER FROM ELOY (GUTIERREZ) MENOYO WRITTEN FROM A CUBAN JAIL. SARAGAT TOLD AMPALM-4 THAT HE WANTED HIM TO LOOK AT THE LETTER AND ADVISE SARAGAT ON POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION. (APPARENTLY NAZARIO HAD ASKED SARAGAT FOR ADVISE.) AMPALM-4 EXPECTED TO SEE THE LETTER DURING WEEKEND 12-14 DECEMBER. HOWEVER, SARAGAT INFORMED AMPALM-4 THAT HE COULD NOT SHOW HIM THE LETTER AS ALPHA 66 HAD DECIDED TO LIMIT ITS READERSHIP.

2. ACCORDING TO SARAGAT, THE LETTER APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN WRITTEN BY GUTIERREZ, ALTHOUGH APPARENTLY MORE THAN ONE PERSON PARTICIPATED IN THE EDITING. GUTIERREZ PRESENTED THREE POINTS FOR ALPHA 66'S

201-355380 201-269349

19-300-3

SECRET

file: 201-269349

14-00000

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BY: AT: Z

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ACTION UNIT | INFO | FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

DEC 23 10 29 AM '70

FORWARDED RID/AN

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 9820 S E C R E T

CONSIDERATION REGARDING POSSIBLE EVENTS IN CUBA.

GUTIERREZ CONTINUED WITH OTHER POINTS CONCERNING THE PARTICIPATION OF OTHER EXILE GROUPS IN THESE EVENTS.

GUTIERREZ REQUESTED A RESPONSE TO HIS PLANS.

3. AMPALM-4 NOT ABLE LEARN MORE THAN INFORMATION PRESENTED PARAS 1 AND 2, ALTHOUGH HE STILL TRYING.

4. FILE: 19-300-3 AND 201-273453. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

201-269349

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5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GUTIERREZ MENOYO, ELOY
201-269349
SEX M DOB ?

201-354143
UFAA-01387A01
16 OCT 69
P2

CIT ?
OCC ?
CONNECTED WITH THE 2ND FRONT ESCOMBREY AND
MENTIONED IN THE DEBRIEFING OF SUBJ OF
201-354143

R 6910300820

FILE IN 201-269349

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

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DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GUTIERREZ-MENOYO, ELOY
201-269349
SEX M DOB ?

019-006-038/03
UFAA-01136
25 JUL 69

CIT ?
OCC ?
ATT 2 P1 AND 2. FORMER FAR MAJOR, CURRENTLY IN JAIL IN CUBA SINCE AN INFILTRATION MISSION FR MIAMI IN 66.

R 6908040524

FILE IN 201-269349

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 25 SEPTEMBER 1968

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: RAFAEL RAMON NUGUET DEL VALAS

FBI FILE NO: 105-10798 (MIAMI)

14-00000

INDEX: [X] YES [ ] NO ALL NAMES
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-269349
X-REF TO FILE NO. 201-321168
FILE RID [X] RET. TO BRANCH [ ]
DESTROY [ ] SIG.

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ACTION WH/COG 8

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH 8, EUR 8, C/OPS, CI/OA, FI

S E C R E T 271807Z CITE JMWAVE 9958 (LWAVE)

MICROFILMED DEC 4 7 1967 DOC. MICRO. SER.

27 OCT 67 IN 81447

MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

NFG

TYPIC OSM

1. ON 26 OCT AMCONCERT/1 REPORTED HE RECEIVED OPERATIONAL LEAD FROM TANYA SALAS DE GUITERREZ, WIFE ELOY (GUITERREZ) MENOYO (201-269349), FORMER HEAD SFNE (SECOND FRONT ESCAMBRAY, EXILE GROUP) WHO CAPTURED IN INFIL ATTEMPT CUBA APRIL 63 CLAIMS GLADYS (RODRIGUEZ) DE LA OBRA ARRIVED MADRID CIRCA 22 OCT ON IBERIA FLT FROM HABANA. RODRIGUEZ IS COUSIN RAMON (QUESADA) GOMEZ (201-321168) FORMER REBEL ARMY COMANDANTE WHO CAPTURED WITH MENOYO. AMCONCERT/1 SAYS QUESADA AND RODRIGUEZ CLOSELY CONNECTED WITH 13TH MARCH REVOLUTIONARY DIRECTORATE, INCLUDING THOSE WHO PRESENTLY HOLD GOVT AND ARMY POSITIONS.

2. NO JMWAVE TRACES RODRIGUEZ. FILE CHECK QUESADA SHOWS HE WAS 13TH MARCH MEMBER AND CLOSE FRIEND AMLASH/1 AND OTHER GOC OFFICIALS.

3. SUGGEST MADRID ATTEMPT LOCATE RODRIGUEZ AND DEBRIEF ON TARGETS OF INTEREST.

S E C R E T

SECRET

201-269349
27 Oct 1967

B-201-321168

SECRET
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DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GUEIERREZ MENOYO, ELOY
201-269349
SEX M DOB ?

019-006-122/03
UFGA-28030
20 JUL 67
P3

CIT ?
OCC PRISONER
SUBJECT WAS TRANSFERRED FROM ISLA DE PINOS
PRISON TO ~~LA CABANA PRISON IN OCT 66.~~
FFN ~~19-120-30-71/4~~

R 6708031283

FILE IN 201-269349

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

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(When Filled In)

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5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GUTIERREZ MENOYO, ELOY
201-269349 — 201-300086
SEX M DOB ? — MEXI-09677
29 DEC 66
CIT ? — P1
OCC ?
SNFE PLANS NEGOTIATE WITH GOC FOR EXCHANGE
HERNANDEZ ARMAS /201-301755/ FOR SUBJ, FORMER
HEAD SNFE AND NOW POLITICAL PRISONER CUBA.

R 6704210128

FILE IN 201-269349

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM D-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-60)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
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5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GUTIERREZ MENOYO, ELOY
201-269349
SEX M DOB ?

201-300086
MEXI-09163
08 NOV 66
P1

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
SUBJ IS FIRST ON JORGE ROBLEJO-LORIE 201-300086 PRISONER LIST IF NEGOTIATIONS FOR EXCHANGE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS FAIL. ROBLEJO ALTERNATE PLAN IS TO KIDNAP GUTIERREZ, WHO IS CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO MEXICO, AND HOLD HIM FOR RANSOM OF 70 PRISONERS IN CUBA.

UFGNCS R 6701121101

FILE IN 201-269349

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

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REGISTRATION REQUEST

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE	
ISRM NO.	3703
DATE	
201 NO.	

NAME: GUTIERREZ Menoyo, Eloy

ALIASES AND/OR SPELLING VARIATIONS:

DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP

PRESENT ADDRESS	OCCUPATION

PRESENT EMPLOYMENT:

TRAVEL:

ADDITIONAL PERTINENT IDENTIFYING DATA:

SUBJECT terminated w/o prejudice 4 May 66.

Gp 3

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In) CONFIDENTIAL

ISR LOG

FROM			SERVICE NO. SD 8831
INDEX		SECURITY	DATE
TO:	FROM:		DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
TO OO:	RESULTS	COVER	ISRM NO. / DATE
AREA DESK	OTHER		201-

COMMENTS:

FORM 11-63 1797 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL ~~SECRET~~

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 4 MARCH 1966

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (WASH., D.C.)

SUBJECT: ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO

14-00000

SECRET

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GUTIERREZ-MENOYO, ELOY
201-269349
SEX M DOB ?

201-791330
USMA-20300A01
29 OCT 65
P12

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
TOP COMMANDER IN SEGUNDO FRENTE DE
ESCAMBRAY AND ORGANIZATION AUTENTICA.
NOW IN A G-2 PRISON SINCE TAKING PART IN
SMALL INVASION IN MAY 65.

WAS 065-002-010/03
058

R 6706021137

FILE IN 201-269349

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 28 MAY 1965
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (SAN ANTONIO)

DATE: 19 MAY 1965
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S.
FBI FILE NO: 105-1998 (MIAMI)

14-00000

INDEX: [ ] YES [X] NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-269349
X-REF TO FILE NO 201-749653 - filed by branch
FILE RID [X] RET. TO BRANCH [ ]
DESTROY [ ] SIG.

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INFO VR, FILE, DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, WH/ - FI

R

SECRET 120126Z

DIR INFO MEXI CITE WAVE 8185

TYPIC AMSPICE

MICROFILMED
MAY 9 1961
DOC. MICRO. SER.

12 FEB 65 IN 78972

1. 8 FEB 65 WAVE RCVD TELEGRAM DTD 7 FEB FROM AMSPICE/1 URGENTLY REQUESTING CONTACT WITH WAVE C/O. WAVE FOUND AMSPICE/1 REQUEST RATHER ODD YET INTRIGUING PARTICULARLY VIEW FACT AMBLINK/1 HAD LAST CONTACTED AMSPICE/1 ON 6 FEB PRIOR DEPARTING MEXI FOR WAVE AREA.

2. NOT WISHING USE PHONE FOR REASONS SECURITY, WAVE DISPATCHED AMBLINK/1 MEXICO CITY 8 FEB ORDER DETERMINE NATURE AMSPICE/1 PROBLEM.

3. 9 FEB AMBLINK/1 PERSONALLY CONTACTED AMSPICE/1 AT HOME. SHE STATED HAD RCVD URGENT TELECON FROM IDEN'S WIFE WAVE AREA ASKING HER COME WAVE AREA HELP HER CARRY OUT CAMPAIGN OBTAIN PBRUMEN GOVT CLEMENCY FOR HUSBAND. AMSPICE/1 STATED SHE FULLY COMMITTED ASSIST IDEN AND WIFE SINCE THEY OLD FRIENDS AND THAT UNLESS WAVE CO HAD STRONG OBJECTIONS SHE PLANNED PROCEED WAVE AREA WITH CHILDREN. SHE IMPLIED WOULD NEED WAVE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO MAKE TRIP.

4. AMBLINK/1 WAS INSTRUCTED BY WAVE INFORM AMSPICE/1 HIS SUPERIORS GREATLY DISPLEASED AT FRIVOLUOUS MANNER IN WHICH SHE BECKONS ASSISTANCE AND WHIMSICAL NATURE HER REQUEST. AMBLINK/1 FURTHER

over

B-201-749653

201-269349
12 Feb 65

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

RI COPY RI COPY

INSTRUCTED AMSPICE/1 REFRAIN FROM SUCH TACTICS IN FUTURE.

5. WAVE NOT DESIROUS HAVE AMSPICE/1 CONTACT IDEN'S WIFE THIS TIME ORDER ATTEMPT SALVAGE AMSPICE OPERATION, IF POSSIBLE, FROM DAMAGES THAT WILL IN ALL PROBABILITY ACCRUE AS RESULT IDEN'S ARREST. AS STATED PARA 11W UFGA 16565 DTD 29 JUNE 64, AMSPICE/1, PRIOR HER INITIAL CONTACT WITH WAVE, CONFESSED HER CIS MISSION TO IDEN, AND HER INTENTION DISCLOSE EVERYTHING TO ODYOKE AUTHORITIES. IDEN ALLEGEDLY COUNSELED HER DO LATTER. AS WILL BE RECALLED PART AMSPICE/1'S MISSION WAS PENETRATE IDEN AND HIS ORG.

6. WAVE OF BELIEVE IN SPITE FOREGOING THAT AMSPICE OP HAS FIFTY-FIFTY CHANCE BEING SALVAGED. SINCE AMSPICE/1 IS CIS AGENT, WAVE DOES NOT FEEL IT LIKELY THAT CIS WILL HAVE SURFACED HER NAME DURING IDEN'S INTERROGATION AS IT NOT LOGICAL CIS WOULD DISCUSS THEIR AGENTS WITH ONE OF THEIR AGENTS' VICTIMS. IF A/1 NOT MENTIONED BY CIS, IT POSSIBLE IDEN MAY HAVE SEEN FIT NOT BRING HER NAME UP. HOWEVER, SINCE IDEN'S CURRENT SITUATION IS ONE OF LIFE OR DEATH, IT VERY POSSIBLE IDEN MAY HAVE VOLUNTEERED FACT A/1 BETRAYED CIS ORDER GAIN ONE MORE POINT HIS FAVOR.

7. ORDER SAVE A/1 OP, WAVE HAS INSTRUCTED A/1 AS FOLLOWS:

A. SHE TO REFRAIN FROM MIXING IN IDEN AFFAIR.

B. IF CONFRONTED BY CIS WITH IDEN ADMISSION SHE TO DENY SHE TOLD IDEN HER MISSION AND SUGGEST HER HUSBAND MAY HAVE BEEN CULPRIT.

C. SHE ALSO TO CLAIM SHE DID NOT INFORM ODYOKE AUTHORITIES

AND WILL POINT TO HER INSOLVENCY, LOSS OF HER BUSINESS, HER PRESENCE MEXICO, AND VARIED ASSORTMENT PAWN TICKETS AND BILLS AS EVIDENCE SHE NOT WORKING FOR ODYOKE. SHE TO STATE THAT IF SHE WERE IN ODYOKE EMPLOY SHE WOULD BE LIVING IN LUXURY RATHER THAN POVERTY.

8. WAVE WILL CONTINUE CLOSE MONITORING OP IN HOPES A/1 CAN EXTRICATE SELF FROM CURRENT RATHER PRECARIOUS SITUATION.

SECRET

12 Feb. 1965

201-269349

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: TYPIC/Operational
AMDELL-1 Information on Eloy *GUTIERREZ Menoyo

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FYI:

1. AMDELL-1 spoke with AMRAZZ-1 on two separate occasions and learned the following information with the dates and sources as indicated.

2. AMRAZZ-1 spoke on 31 January 1965 with Sergio (LNU) who had just reached Miami from the Dominican Republic. Sergio stated that GUTIERREZ had gone to Cuba with three other men on 20 December 1964, landing near Baracoa, Oriente. The only members in this first infiltration were those arrested. GUTIERREZ had promised to contact his base by radio on 31 December 1964, but no message was ever received. Plans called for another group of about seven men to infiltrate into Cuba at Baracoa on or before 20 January 1965. The group left the Dominican Republic on 20 January according to plan. Near the Cuban coast, they were pursued by three Cuban patrol boats and one airplane but managed to escape. The boat used in both infiltration attempts was called the "Betrand" which may mean a Bertram boat.

3. AMRAZZ-1 reported on 1 February that he had spoke on 31 January 1965 to Reynaldo ABREU in charge of GUTIERREZ' affairs in Miami who in turn had spoken to Celio VAZQUEZ, GUTIERREZ' main contact in the Dominican Republic by telephone on 30 January 1965. VAZQUEZ stated he could not come to Miami at that time as he was taking charge of dismantling the base there. He also needed about $10,000.00 to clear up back bills owed by the group. However, on 3 February 1965, AMDELL-1 reported AMRAZZ-1 had again spoken to Reynaldo ABREU who declared the members of GUTIERREZ' group in the Dominican Republic intended to go ahead with the plan to infiltrate Cuba. To his knowledge a leader had not been decided upon but ABREU believed the only person capable was Angel BAÑOS. (See paragraph 5 below for traces).

/ CONTINUED /

Distribution:
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c/s copy filed 19-9-12

201-269349

GROUP 1
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CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
10 Feb 65	FEB 15 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA 19,816

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 19-9-12-2

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

4. Finally, on 31 January 1965, AMRAZZ-1 was invited to the home of "Pepe" (Jose) AGUIAR, secretary to Manolo RAY, to meet an Englishman whom AGUIAR privately described to AMRAZZ-1 as the head of British intelligence in the Caribbean just released four months ago from jail in Cuba. Later, after being introduced, the Englishman told AMRAZZ-1 the British Embassy in Havana had information that GUTIERREZ had been arrested on 4 January 1965. He did not state how he received this information or when and how he had come from Cuba. AMRAZZ-1 added he did not know how AGUIAR met this individual or where he was residing. AMRAZZ-1 described the Englishman thus: about 30 years old, 5' 10", medium build, 160 pounds, dark complexion, British accent, spoke little Spanish, wore sport shirt and pants.

5. WAVE files describe Angel Gilberto *BANOS Pantoja as a former U. S. citizen who fought in the Escambray, was a rebel army captain, arrived in the U. S. by boat along with Eloy GUTIERREZ Menoyo in 1961. He is considered a possible DSE agent. Extensive traces are as follows:

a. WAVE files: AMOT report of 21 September 1963, BANOS reportedly stated II-Front had boats stolen from Varadero in action credited to II-Front and Alpha 66; 12 June 1961 "Miami Herald" reported Subject arrived in Key West with Eloy GUTIERREZ Menoyo and others. Detained by Immigration and Naturalization Service at McAllen, Texas, released, arrived Miami 11 June 1961; AMOT report of 11 December 1962 describes subject as II-Front member waiting on a Key for supplies necessary to go to Escambray mountains; AMOT report of 22 January 1963 describes subject as contact of Eloy GUTIERREZ Menoyo, an ex-rebel army captain in Escambray during fight against Batista. Born Miami on 12 August 1943, lost citizenship for serving in Cuba under arms, came to U. S. with GUTIERREZ Menoyo and detained in McAllen, Texas; CSCI 3/775,277 of 12 March 1963 describes subject as confidant and courier for GUTIERREZ Menoyo; memorandum dated 22 January 1963 stated subject reportedly returned from 40-day trip inside Cuba as courier for II-Front; AMOT report of 11 April 1963 included Subject on list of those presented with prevention of departure notices by FBI; CSCI-3/772,476 describes subject as reportedly anti-United States, pro-Communist; AMCHEER-1 report and AMOT report of 16 June 1962 describe subject as having worked in G-2 offices at Rancho Boyeros Airport and being commander of a militia group there. Belonged to National Air Federation in 59/60. Reportedly had problems with Cuban authorities over theft of a jewelry store.

b. Headquarters traces: DBA 49631 of 28 August 1963; UFGA 11981 of 18 October 1963; DBA 55602 of 24 October 1963; OSMA 13,496 of 26 January 1962; 00-1512, February 1961; DBF 49905 of 17 May 1960; DBF 77248 of 18 May 1961; WAVE 3206 of 26 January 1961 and WAVE 3228 of 27 January 1961; CS-3/378,712, HKH-1754 of 24 November 1958; CO-A-3/180,639 of 7 March 1961 and CSCI-3/764,579 typed 22 March 1961; DBA-32298 of 18 January 1963; FBI-105-6243 of 15 April 1963; UFG-04958 of 14 April 1964; UFGA 07467 of 30 January 1963; WAVE 03604 of 23 January 1963; UFGA 05173 of 9 August 1962;

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

A14653

14-00000

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12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GUTIERREZ MENOYO, ELOY
201-269349
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?

201-762117
UFGA-19792A01
15 FEB 65
P4

INFO RE CONNECTION WITH BLANCA ROSA MAURE (DE) CABRERA. WIFE OF SUBJ 201-762117.

R 6502191772

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 269349 201-269349

PRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 269349

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FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/SA 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED 11/WH/SA

TIME 2145

INFO VR, FILE, DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, CS/RF, WH7, CA2, CA/PROP, CI/IC2, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT

S E C R E T 040052Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO SDOM CITE WAVE 79--

TYPIC

REF WAVE 7588 (68557) *

4 FEB 65 IN 73186

1. AMSCREAM-1 REPORTS KEY WEST JAMMED BY EXILES NIGHT 2 FEB TO WATCH HAVANA TV APPEARANCE GUTIERREZ MENOYO, DOMINGO ORTEGA, NOEL SALAS AND RAMON QUESADA. AMSCREAM-1, UPI'S MIKE ALONSO, AMOTS, AND AMSHADY-1 SUBSOURCES WHO WATCHED TV AT KEY WEST SAY PRISONERS LOOKED BETTER GROOMED AND DRESSED, MORE RELAXED THAN G-2 INTERROGATORS, SHOWING NO VISIBLE EVIDENCE TORTURE OR "BRAIN WASHING." ALONSO OBSERVED MENOYO LOOKED AND SOUNDED COLD AND CALCULATING, UNEMOTIONAL, IN CONTRAST WITH PREVIOUS CASTRO CAPTIVES SHOWN TV WHO SEEMED WEARY, TIRED, HOPELESS PRISONERS. AMSHADY-1 SAYS SFNE PEOPLE DO NOT BELIEVE MENOYO WAS DRUGGED OR TORTURED, BUT PLAN SAY SO FOR PROP PURPOSES.

2. INFO RESULTING FROM MENOYO'S TV INTERROGATION BASICALLY SAME GIVEN BY MINFAR FROM PREVIOUS INTERROGATION (REPORTED PARA 3 REF). NEW ITEM WAS RAMON QUESADA'S TV STATEMENT THAT HE RECEIVED CIA TRAINING MAP READING AND ARMS HANDLING. ALSO NEW WAS MENOYO'S ADVICE TO EXILES GIVE UP EFFORTS BECAUSE PEOPLE INSIDE SUPPORT CASTRO. GENERAL CONSENSUS AMONG EXILES MENOYO DID NOT REVEAL ANYTHING NOT

201-269349

4 Feb 1965

SECRET

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS RI COPY RI COPY (35)

PREVIOUSLY REPORTED BY EXILES OR CASTRO REGIME. THIS FEELING REFLECTED MIKE ALONSO'S REPORT FOR UPI, AND IS THE INTERPRETATIVE LINE GENERALLY BEING FOLLOWED BY MIAMI PRESS AND RADIO. EMPHASIS CONTINUES ON ALLEGED ROLE DOMINICAN AND PUERTO RICAN GOVTS.

3. CANVASSING OF EXILE REACTIONS SHOW IMPACT MENOYO'S CAPTURE AND SUBSEQUENT STATEMENTS HEAVIER AND MORE DOMORALIZING THAN MANOLO RAY'S FIASCO. PARTICULARLY UPSETTING WAS MENOYO'S ADVICE TO EXILES THAT THEIR EFFORTS CAUSING UNNECESSARY BLOOD LETTING WITHOUT CHANCE SUCCESS BECAUSE PEOPLE INSIDE SUPPORT CASTRO. MENOYO'S UNEMOTIONAL DELIVERY AND WARNING TO EXILE ADVENTURERS THEIR FATE WILL BE WORSE THAN HIS BEING INTERPRETED AS EVIDENCE HE EITHER COWARD OR TRAITOR WHO KNEW WOULD NOT BE SHOT. AMCORE-4 REPORTS THAT EXILES UNABLE TO RECONCILE MENOYO'S ALLEGED BACKGROUND AS BRAVE GUERRILLA FIGHTER WITH LAST NIGHT TV PERFORMANCE AND FEEL ONLY EXPLANATION IS MENOYO WAS CASTRO AGENT ALL ALONG.

4. MOST EXILE LEADERS CONSIDER WORST DAMAGE FROM MENOYO EPISODE WAS UNDERLYING PROMOTION CASTRO GOVT AS POWERFUL REGIME AGAINST WHICH EXILES OR INSIDE RESISTANCE ELEMENTS CAN DO LITTLE. AMCORE-4 REPORTS SFNE PEOPLE ARE WISHING OUT LOUD FOR RAID BY ARTIME OR ORLANDO BOSCH TO COUNTER EFFECT MENOYO MUST HAVE HAD AMONG ANTI-CASTROISTS

SECRET

IN 73126
P-3

INSIDE CUBA. AMCORE-2, AMRAZONR-1, AND AMSHADY-1 AGREE THAT DEMORALIZING EFFECT MENOYO TV PERFORMANCE WORST AMONG OPPONENTS CASTRO REGIME INSIDE.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

*Reports on JMWAVE area publicity concerning captured exile Gutierrez Menoyo.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☑ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 269349
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. Ant

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TIME | BY

INFO: VR, FILE, DDP, CA 2, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2

AN	FI	
PB	DEST	
ABSTRACT	INDEX	

SECRET 040052Z

DIR CITE WAVE 7909 (INGHURST ACTING)

IN 73193

TYPIC PSYCH

REF A WAVE 7908 (73156)

B WAVE 7906 (IN 73176)

1. STATION BELIEVES MAIN DAMAGING IMPACT MENOYO CAPTURE AND TV APPEARANCE WILL BE ON MOTIVATION ANTI REGIME ELEMENTS INSIDE CUBA. MAIN PSYCH TARGET WAS OBVIOUSLY CUBAN POPULATION AND TV SHOW WAS DESIGNED IMPRESS DOUBTING THOMASES AND ANTI REGIME ELEMENTS THAT REGIME INVINCIBLE AND ANY RESISTANCE USELESS. AS LATEST IN SERIES EXILE FAILURES MOUNT EFFECTIVE ACTION OPS AGAINST CASTRO, MENOYO CASE BOUND HAVE STRONG NEGATIVE IMPACT ON ANTI REGIME ELEMENTS INSIDE WHO WILL VIEW THIS AX ONE MORE INDICATION NO OUTSIDE HELP FORTHCOMING. BEST COUNTERACTION OF COURSE WOULD BE FEW SUCCESSFUL AND DRAMATIC RESISTANCE ACTS EITHER BY INSIDE GROUPS OR FROM OUTSIDE.

2. WHILE PROPAGANDA CANNOT CHANGE BASIC PSYCH ATMOSPHERE INSIDE HOEPFULLY CAN PARTIALLY COUNTER IMPACT MENOYO CASE BY RE-DIRECTING CUBAN AUDIENCE ATENTION TO LONG-TERM PROBLEMS CASTRO REGIME NOTING THAT CAPTURE FEW INDIVIDUALS CANNOT SAVE CASTRO FROM ULTIMATE

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SECRET

SECRET 14-73193, pg. 2

INEVITABLE DOWNFALL. UNDERLYING THEMES WAVE PROP WILL BE RESISTANCE TO CASTRO INSIDE CUBA CONTINUALLY INCREASING, ECONOMIC SITUATION DETERIORATING, INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE SLOWLY ISOLATING CASTRO, DOWNFALL INEVITABLE. FOLLOWING PARAS REPORT SPECIFIC PROP ACTIONS BEING CARRIED OUT.

3. FEB 3 AMCORE-2 RELEASING TO PRESS AND BROADCASTING OVER JMHOPE AMTHIGH LETTER FROM INSIDE INFORMANT REPORTING SUGAR CANE BURNING. RELEASE PICKED UP BY UPI AND AP 3 FEB. BROADCAST WILL ALSO POINT OUT MENOYO CASE ONE ISOLATED PROPAGANDA OPERATION BY CASTRO REGIME AND CANNOT CHANGE BASIC FACT FIGHT AGAINST CASTRO CONTINUES OVER WIDE FRONT: SABOTAGE, PRODUCTION SLOWDOWNS, ECONOMIC BLOCKADE, DISAFFECTION IN UPPER LEVELS REGIME, ETC., AND SUCH EVENTS AS MENOYO CAPTURE WILL ONLY INSPIRE AMCORE AND OTHER RESISTANCE ELEMENTS IN CUBA REDOUBLE EFFORTS SABOTAGE PRODUCTION WHICH ACHILLES HEEL CASTRO REGIME.

4. AMICE PROGRAMS WMIE (3 FEB) JMHOPE (5 FEB) AMTHIGH (6 FEB) EXPLOITING DECISION PANAMANIAN WORKERS NOT SERVICE SHIPS TRADING WITH CUBA AS SIGN ECONOMIC BLOCKADE CONTINUING, AND BLOCKADE TOGETHER WITH WORK SLOWDOWNS AND SABOTAGE BY WORKERS HITTING CASTRO MOST VULNERABLE SPOT.

SECRET

IN 73193 PG 3

SECRET

5. AMDOFF-1 AIRPORT STATEMENT PER REF B EXPECTED TAKE SOME PUBLICITY LIMELIGHT AWAY FROM MENOYO CASE AMDOFF-1 WILL ALSO APPEAR AMCORE-2 PROGRAM 3 FEB.

S E C R E T

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CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-269349

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID [X] RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY SIG.

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84 SECRET

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FROM CARACAS

ACTION WH8 WH/SA

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UNIT WH

TIME 1802 BY DD

Jan 26 22 37z65

INFO VR. FILE DDP, WH/SA8, CI/OPS, CI/OA

S E C R E T 262010Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE CARA 9833

26 Jan 65 IN 67522

IMMEDIATE ACTION

ON 26 JANUARY, DR. ARMANDO FLEITES, OF SEGUNDA FRENTE DE ESCAMBRAY, URGENTLY CALLED ON POL COUSELLOR EDWARD LONG (TWO WEEKS PRIOR VIA MUTUAL FRIENDS FLEITES HAD REQUESTED ONE WEEK VISITOR VISA "ON COMPASSIONATE GROUNDS" TO VISIT FAMILY IN WAVE AREA; BOWDLER IN PERSONAL LETTER TO LONG ADVISED THAT FLEITES HAD FORFEITED RIGHT TO SPECIAL TREATMENT AND WOULD HAVE TO APPLY FOR IMMIGRATION VISA). FLEITES, WHO ACCEPTS AS PROBABLY ACCURATE PRESS STORIES RE CAPTURE GUTIERREZ MENOYO, NOW CLAIMS THAT IN CAPACITY AS NUMBER TWO LEADER OF FRENTE, IT URGENTLY NECESSARY HE TRAVEL TO WAVE AREA TO SPEND ONE WEEK WITH HIS GROUP. STATES HE WOULD NOT EVEN WANT TO SEE HIS FAMILY, ADDING NOW WAS TIME FOR PBPRIME TO PROVE WHETHER "FRIEND OR ENEMY" OF CUBAN FREEDOM. ON OFFHAND CHANCE KUBARK MAY HAVE OPERATIONAL EQUITIES IN FRENTE, COUNSELLOR LONG ASKS STA CHECK WITH HEADQUARTERS. TENTATIVELY ADVISED HIM KUBARK NOT INVOLVED, BUT WOULD INQUIRE IN ANY CASE. SUGGEST HQS ADVISE BOWDLER AND ASCERTAIN WHETHER IN LIGHT ABOVE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES ODACID POSITION RE FLEITES ENTRY (AS STATED IN HIS LETTER TO LONG)

SECRET

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26 Jan 65

14-00000

IN 67522
PAGE 2

IN ANY MANNER CHANGED. IF NEGATIVE, LONG WILL ADVISE FLEJIES ACCORDIN: Y.

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SECRET

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FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/SA 5

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED TUBED

UNIT WH/SA TIME 1335 BY

INFO VR. FILE, DDP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/SPG, WH 7

S E C R E T 261724Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE WAVE 7519

TYPIC

REF WAVE 7501 (IN 6 6863) 26 JAN 65 IN 67362

1. ACSI REPS MIAMI CONTACTED WAVE CIRCA 1800 HOURS 25 JAN AND ASKED FOR EMERGENCY MEET 2200 HOURS 25 JAN IN ORDER COORDINATE PRIORITY OP WHICH WOULD BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN ACSI AND KUBARK HQS AM 26 JAN. WAVE AGREED MEET AS REQUESTED BY ACSI.

2. UPON INITIATION 2200 HOURS MEET ACSI REPS STATED SITUATION HAD CHANGED COMPLETELY SINCE 1800 HOURS 25 JAN AND THEY NO LONGER HAD PRIORITY OPS PROPOSAL WORTH CONSIDERING. ACSI INDICATED HOWEVER THEY DID WANT BRIEF REUTEMAN AND EDWARD F. HUSEBY, WHO WAVE LIAISON TO ACSI, RE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS THEIR OP. THIS BRIEFING REVEALED FOLLOWING:

A. MAY 64 MIAMI ACSI INHERITED FROM ACSI PUERTO RICO OP WHICH INVOLVED USE RAFAEL HUGUET DE VALLE (201-269895) AS POTENTIAL W/T OPERATOR AND SINGLETON INTEL COLLECTOR. CONCEPT IN THIS OP WAS HUGUET WOULD INFIL CUBA WITH SFNE LEADER ELOYO GUTIERREZ MENOYO BUT WOULD REPORT BY W/T TO ACSI ON OB ETC. GUTIERREZ MENOYO KNEW OF THIS ARRANGEMENT AND HAD GIVEN HUGUET PERMISSION MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH ACSI. GUTIERREZ KNEW SPONSORING ORGANIZATION FOR THIS OP WAS ACSI. IT ACSI THESIS

201-269349

THAT IN THIS OP THEY WORKING WITH INDIVIDUAL AGENT, I.E. HUGUET BUT THEY NOT SPONSORING GUTIERREZ OR SFNE.

B. GUTIERREZ INFILTRATED CUBA CIRCA 18 DEC 64. OP MOUNTED FROM BASE IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC BUT DETAILS UNKNOWN ACSI. IDENTITIES OF MEN INFILTRATING CUBA WITH GUTIERREZ NOT KNOWN ACSI.

C. HUGUET RECENTLY OBTAINED WORD FROM GUTIERREZ TO JOIN HIM IN CUBA. ACSI WANTED DISPATCH HUGUET SOONEST AND WANTED COORDINATED SUCH INFIL WITH WAVE. IMPLICATION BEING ACSI WAS GOING ASK FOR WAVE ASSISTANCE IN THIS OP. EXTENT OR NATURE THIS ASSISTANCE NOT IDENTIFIED.

D. ACSI LEARNED CIRCA 2000 HOURS 25 JAN OF HAVANA ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT GUTIERREZ APPREHENSION THUS ALL PLANS FOR HUGUET INFIL CANCELLED FOR TIME BEING. MIAMI ACSI NOT SURE WHAT FUTURE HOLDS FOR HUGUET BUT WOULD LIKE DISCUSS THIS WITH WAVE AT LATER DATE.

E. MIAMI ACSI MOST CONCERNED GUTIERREZ WOULD IDENTIFY ACSI TO GOC AS AGENCY SPONSORING HIS MISSION. IF THIS EXPLOITED IN PROP FIELD BY GOC THEY WANTED KUBARK KNOW ACSI DID NOT SPONSOR GUTIERREZ.

3. AFTER FURNISHING PARA 2 INFO ACSI ASKED IF WAVE WOULD GIVE THEM TRACES ON HUGUET AS THEY HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY TRACED HUGUET WITH WAVE. WE AGREED FURNISH TRACES WHILE CHIDING ACSI IN LOW KEY THAT THIS LATE DATE FOR RUNNING LOCAL TRACES.

SECRET

IN 67356 PAGE 3

4. MIAMI ACSI ASKED INFORMALLY WHAT WAVE THOUGHT OF THEIR OPS CONCEPT RE HUGUET AND GUTIERREZ. WE POINTED OUT THAT BASED FRAGMENTARY INFO AVAILABLE TO US WE FELT THEY HAD LIAISON AND NOT AGENT RELATIONSHIP WITH HUGUET THUS IT HARD ENVISION HUGUET AS CONTROLLED ASSET. ADDITIONALLY IT POINTED OUT EXPERIENCE WITH WIDE VARIETY OF DIFFERENT ETHNIC EXILE GROUPS HAD CONVINCED REUTEMAN IT IMPOSSIBLE MAKE ACSI CONCEPT RE HUGUET WORK. THIS EXPRESSED AS REUTEMAN OPINION AND NOT AS KUBARK DOCTRINE.

5. TRACES RE HUGUET FOLLOW IN SEPARATE CABLE.

6. ASSUME HUGUET OP COORDINATED WITH KUBARK AT HQS LEVEL. IF NOT, PLS ADVISE.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: [ ] YES [ ] NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-269341
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID [x] RET. TO BRANCH [ ]
DESTROY [ ] SIG. 477264

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE   TOTAL COPIES 24

27 SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/SA 8

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INFO VR. FILE DDP, WH7, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI

RI COPY

30 JAN 65 IN 70252

S E C R E T 292332Z

DIR INFO CARA CITE WAVE 7654

TYPIC

1. ON 28 JAN AMSHADY-1 WAS AT HOME ZENAIDA (MARRERRO) WIFE OF RENE (DECHARD) FORMER CUBAN CONSUL TO US, WHO ALTHOUGH AUTENTICA AND NOT BELONG SNFE IS CONSIDERED PERSONAL FRIEND MOST REVOLUTIONARIES WHILE AMSHADY-1 THERE AMAURY (FRAGINALS) ARRIVED AND SAID SENT WAVE AREA BY ARMANDO FLEITAS WHO STILL CARA AS NOT YET RECEIVED PASSPORT FOR US. FRAGINALS HAD SEVERAL MISSIONS ACCOMPLISH ACCORDING PART CONVERSATION AMSHADY-1 HEARD. FIRST, FLEITAS CONCERNED THAT INTERVIEW GUTIERREZ WIDOW GIVEN TO BATISTIANO BENJAMIN DE LA VEGA WHO IN TURN GAVE SAME TO ONLY BATISTIANO COMMENTATORS. FRAGINALS TO ASSURE THIS NOT RECUR EVEN IF NECESSARY BEAT UP DE LA VEGA. FLEITAS ALSO AUTHORIZED FRAGINALS BEAT UP ANYONE CALLING GUTIERREZ COMMUNIST AS THAT LAST STRAW. ACCORDING FRAGINALS, FLEITAS PLANS REORGANIZE SNFE WAVE AREA AS DISPLEASED THEIR HANDLING GUTIERREZ INCIDENT. ALSO FLEITAS PLANS GO PBRUMEN SOON AS CAN SAY GOODBY TO WIFE AS OWES MORAL DEBT OTHER ALLIANCE MEMBERS AND GUTIERREZ.

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30 Jan 1965

2. AMSHADY-1 ALSO HEARD FROM SAME SOURCE THAT PARENTS ...

FORM 1389 RI COPY RI COPY (35)

SECRET FORWARDED IN 70252
RID/MIS PAGE 2

QUESADA, ONE OF THOSE CAPTURED, ARRESTED. ALSO SEVERAL ATTEMPTS
FEB 17 8 39 AM '65
CONTACT PARENTS GUTIERREZ BY PHONE UNSUCCESSFUL HENCE ASSUME THEY
FEB 15
ALSO PRISONERS.

3. FRAGINALS SAID AFTER FLEITAS REANIMATED EXILES CARA FOLLOWING FIRST WAVE DEPRESSION UPON NEWS CAPTURE, THEY COLLECTED ABOUT $4000 CARA.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

INDEX: [ ] YES [ ] NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 269349
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID [ ] RET TO BRANCH [ ]
DESTROY [ ] SIG

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 44

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM: JMWAVE

ACTION: WH/SA 8

INFO: VR. FILE, DDP, SR 7, CA 2, CA/PEG, DO 4, DD/H3, FI, FI/INT, OGC 2, CI, CI/PS, CI/IC 2, RWH 7

S E C R E T 302142Z

DIR INFO SDOM CITE WAVE 7712

TYPIC

REF WAVE 7648 (IN 69406) *

1. AS REPORTED REF, AMLYRIC-1 TRIED CONTACT AURELIO NAZARIO SARGEN AS ONE OF FEW MEMBERS REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCE SANE ENOUGH HELP REPAIR PROP LINES DAMAGED IN SFNE CONTENTION GUTIERREZ BETRAYED BY INTERNAL CONTACTS. BEFORE MAKING CONTACT HOWEVER AMLYRIC-1 ADVISED BY AMHIM-2 THAT AURELIO WAS AMONG THOSE AT 27 JAN PRESS CONFERENCE ARGUING IN FAVOR DELEGATION TO APPEAL POW STATUS FOR GUTIERREZ THROUGH SOV AMBASSADOR. AMLYRIC-1 THREW IN SPONGE AT THIS POINT; SEES NO HOPE BRINGING ORDER OUT OF CURRENT CHAOTIC ACTIONS THIS HEADLESS EXILE GROUP. SFNE OFFICIAL AMAURY FRAGINALS WHO CAME FROM CARA LATE 27 JAN ALSO DISSATISFIED PUBLICITY HANDLING BUT MOSTLY ON SUCH MATTERS AS EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH MRS GUTIERREZ BEING GIVEN TO WELL KNOWN BATISTIANO BENJAMIN DE LA VEGA.

2. 28 JAN DIARIO LAS AMERICAS REPORTS LETTER BEING SENT UN SECGEN ENCLOSING PETITION POW STATUS FOR GUTIERREZ SIGNED BY "NUMEROUS" EXILE ORGANIZATIONS (TO OUR KNOWLEDGE NOT INCLUDING WAVE GROUPS). ACCORDING WMET NEWS BROADCAST CUBAN EXILES MEXI CALLING FOR EXECUTION

AN FI
ABSTRACT X
30 JAN 65

SECRET

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30 Jan 1965

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

ALL COMMUNIST PRISONERS HELD LA IF GUTIERREZ GETS DEATH SENTENCE.

3. AMATEUR ANALYSTS AMONG LOCAL EXILES KNOWINGLY POINT OUT EXPENSIVE LATE MODEL ARMS CARRIED BY GUTIERREZ AND APPARENT "GREEN LIGHT" FROM U.S. AND DOMREP AUTHORITIES AS EVIDENCE HE SPONSORED BY KUBARK, BUT LEFTIST BROADCASTER MAX LESNICK REFUTED THIS POSSIBILITY ON RADIO REPLICA (WMIE) 28 JAN.

4. MOST TALK OF GUTIERREZ NOW LIMITED TO GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS HAVING DIRECT INTEREST OR INVOLVEMENT. SOME DISINTERESTED PARTIES OPINE HE MAY BE DEAD ALREADY. OTHERS LOSING INTEREST BECAUSE RECENT REPORTS LACK DETAIL. THREE CAPTAINS WAVE VESSELS EXPRESSED SORROW FOR GUTIERREZ PLIGHT BUT RELIEF THAT HE NO LONGER IN POSITION ENDANGER KUBARK MARITIME OPS.

5. GUTIERREZ ISSUE DIMINISHING IN IMPORTANCE ON LOCAL SCENE. THERE PRESENTLY NO REPORTED REACTIONS ON ARREST FROM CUBA VIA TELEPHONE CALLS TO EXILES THIS AREA, THUS IT DIFFICULT JUDGE WHAT IMPACT THIS ARREST HAS HAD ON OPS CLIMATE CUBA.

6. PLA RESTRICT PROP COVERAGE ON GUTIERREZ ARREST TO STRAIGHT NEWS REPORTING FOR NEXT FEW DAYS, I.E. WILL PUBLICIZE D.R. DENIAL THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THIS OP, ETC.

SECRET + 28 JAN CONFUSION STILL REIGNS AMONG EXILES ON NEARLY ALL ASPECTS ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO CASE.

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SECRET

3 AUG 64

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING 1 2 3 4 5 6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION : WE 8

INFO : FE 6, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, FI, VR

ADDED: CI/IC 2, VR

Jfk-Gibson

S E C R E T 011135Z

11 Aug 64 IN 40021

DIR CITE PARI 5567 BINGHAM ACTING

LCHARVEST

1. VERGES MAGAZINE REVOLUTION COMBINED ISSUES NO'S 10-11 APPEARED ON PARIS NEWSSTANDS 30 JULY. STA BUYING UP COPIES FOR STUFFER PSYCH OP. WILL ADVISE.

2. FYI BULLETIN INSIDE FRONT COVER STATES:

FOLLOWING GRAVE ACCUSATIONS CONVEYED BY COMRADES IN NEW YORK, LONDON AND ACCRA AND CONFIRMED ON INQUIRY, REVOLUTION INFORMS ITS READERS THAT RICHARD GIBSON WHO MISUSED HIS OFFICE AS FORMER SECRETARY OF "FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE" IN ORDER PENETRATE RANKS OF INTERNATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT MUST NO LONGER BE CONSIDERED COLLABORATOR OF THIS REVIEW. NO EDITION OF REVIEW MAY BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS DOINGS.

3. DURING OUR OWN PREVIOUS CONSIDERATION OF APPROACHING GIBSON FOR WTRK JERVAY (also RCDJERVAY) ASKED LOCAL ODENVY IF HE WAS THEIR AGENT AND WAS TOLD NO.

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE | 13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GIBSON, RICHARD
201-306052
SEX M DOB ?

040-006-138/03
NBDA-10084
12 MAR 64

PAZR 1918303

CIT USA
OCC EDITOR
Δ FRANCE
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE EDITION OF REVOLUTION DISPATCH CONTAINS CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SUBJ AND PADBAYON/1

1 918 303

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.
2. Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.
3. Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.
4. Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.
5. Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.

1. CRYPTONYM	2. PSEUDONYM
QREBONY/1	Frederick T. Dominic

SECTION I — CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

In response to Headquarters requests, London Station officer George H. KatZenbach contacted Subject in London in mid-January 1965 for the purpose of debriefing him on his experiences in the pro-ChiCom milieu in Africa and western Europe up to the time of his departure from the staff of Revolution in sping 1964. This was followed up by in-depth debriefing sessions carried out by Katzenbach in a PBSWING conference room on 17,18,19 and 23 February. On the basis of these talks it was decided to recruit Subject for a test assignment in Algiers during the summer of 1965 during which time he would attempt to build long-term access and cover for reporting on activities and personalities in the Afro-Asian community. KUDESK/ICG staffer Joseph S. Tiffany was dispatched to London TDY 1-7 June for this purpose. ~~Afrm~~ After recruitment and agreement to LCFLUTTER examination, Subject was introduced to his Paris-based Case Officer, Rufus F. RODIGAST, on 3 June.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Yes/ To any Case Officer introduced to him by RODIGAST, TIFFANY or KATZENBACH.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

KATZENBACH - known to Subject as "Earl Wilson"

TIFFANY - " " " " "Robert 'Bob' Gustke"

RODIGAST - " " " " "Paul Weller"

SECRET

SECTION II — MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.")*

Subject's lack of funds and a job are of primary importance. His need for cash (evidenced to some extent by his attempt to peddle articles to China Quarterly, Encounter and Atlantic Monthly in the fall of '64) was critical. But of even greater significance is his desire to effect his long-range rehabilitation in order not to be stuck in the morass of the impecunious and "morally fraudulant" extreme left

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

for the rest of his life. Also important in Subject's motivation is the sense of adventure connected with "The Game", which is enhanced by his desire to deceive (to put one over on) those persons, such as Verges, who exploited and deceived him. Subj. evinces deep contempt for these professional revolutionaries and what he refers to, with feeling, as their "moral fraud".

Control exists quite strongly in the area of Subject's material welfare and need for rehabilitation.

SECTION III — COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Subj. explained to his wife that "Wilson" (Katzenbach), who telephoned his home was an American publisher's representative. Subj. and Rodigast will use a journalist/literary agent cover in the unlikely event their clandestine meetings are compromised.

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

Freelance journalist, author. - sympathetic leftist

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working)*.

KUBARK

SECTION IV — INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

Subj. applied for association with KUBARK in 1950 and again in 1960; his enemies have tried to discredit him by calling him a KUBARK agent, but there is good evidence that this rumor campaign has not hurt him among his friends, even his friends on the extreme left of the political spectrum. No known I. S. connection.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

None.

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

Basic security tradecraft briefings in London 1 - 7 June 1965;
SW training in Paris 14 June 1965.

SECTION V — COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

British. Subj. resided in London from June '64 to June '65. His wife is a British subject.

SECTION VI	OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

In December 1963 Subj. was interviewed by a consulate officer in Paris for information on Lee Harvey Oswald, who reportedly had some contact with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Subj. was completely co-operative and the interviewer suggested follow-up, but the contact was dropped.

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

Subj. elicits information from his broad circle of friends and acquaintances in the Afro-Asian/liberation movement areas.

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Nothing

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject will operate under free lance journalist cover to develop contacts in the target milieu of Afro-Asian "Anti-imperialist" activity and solicit information from them on their activity, plans and views. It is possible that such contacts may lead to a possibility of employment or association with some organization in this field, but whether or not he will be instructed to accept will depend on the specific nature of the job and similar factors which cannot be anticipated now.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

No PM duties or use is anticipated. No systematic CA exploitation is anticipated given the risk of compromise. Selective CA exploitation within his cover situation - i.e. as a provacateur or means to surface anti-Soviet material from a "National Liberation" standpoint - will be continually possible.

SECTION VII	PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

None.

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY:

SECTION VIII	AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT: I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER, REMUNERATION, IF ANY; AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subj. has a contract for 1 June - September 1965 providing for salary of $500.00 per month, non-accountable expenses of $100.00 per month and per diem computed at the rate of $20 for days spent travelling to and from Algiers and $10 for period of residence in Algiers. (The $10 rate represents an oral amendment to the contract.) This is to be renegotiated o/a 1 September for extension to two years with 30-day termination clause.

SECTION IX QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

Subject's skill as writer/editor may qualify him for CA work.

SECTION X COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

See Section VIII. In addition it is set forth in the Letter of Agreement with Subject, that KUBARK will compensate Subject for any relocation of his family required by virtue of an approved change in place of employment.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. *(Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.)*

See Letter of Agreement. KUBARK recognizes its moral obligation to protect Subject against any adverse action which might result from activities engaged in by Subject at the request of KUBARK during his period of employment.

SECTION XI CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

London, Algiers, Paris Station files; JAGUAR, ODENVY traces and reports are also included in material available on Subject.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

Reports have been received by various QKOPERA contract agents.

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED.

No POA required under the terms of CSI 10-5.

4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

Subject is a rather cynical intellectual. He has a keen sense of what is in his best interest, however, and there is xxx every reason to believe that he considers a reliable and secure performance for KUBARK to be in his best interest. He showed a good sense of security in communications during his recruitment period. LCFLUTTER examination 13 June 1965 revealed no deception by Subject.

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

While working for AFP in Paris (1958) Subject forged the signature of a personal enemy, Ollie Harrington, to a letter to the editor calculated to get Harrington in trouble with French authorities. Subject ahsamed of this action.

SECTION XII SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS; GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

Liquor in moderatiion, no drugs. He is believed to have engaged in extra-marital sexual affairs, but in a discreet manner.

SECRET

SECTION XIII — **AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS**

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

None known

SECTION XIV — **GENERAL**

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Subject speaks fluent but foreign-accented French. He has a functional speaking command of Spanish and Italian and can read German. Except for his language, he could pass as an Algerian.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

All source, including extensive interview of Subject during the period January - June 1965

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para. 43b, supra.)*

None anticipated

SECTION XV — **EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS**

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W: WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE: WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

Original method of contact was phone call to Subject's home (by Katzenbach) using ~~him~~ the name Wilson. Subsequent RODIGAST contacts have been laid on at prior meetings and vary as to time and place. A~~x~~ signal is provided for (removal of glasses, which both wear) should either wish to prevent the meeting. A simple carbon-pad type, low level SW was used by Subject for sending emergency messages to a Paris drop. This has been replaced by an open code system to cover specific requirements, laid ~~xx~~ on at each meeting.

SECTION XVI — **MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS**

LCFLUTTER examination of Subject o/a 13 June (no deception reported PALP 4056).

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER
29 June 1965	Austin Goodrich (CI/ICG/Ops)

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

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IMMEDIATE PALP ~~DIR SITE~~ ALGI 6237

KUDESK QRPREY STEBONY ZIEET

REF : PALP 4712*

LOCAL SECURITY EXPECTED BE GIVING SPECIAL ATTENTION ANYONE PREVIOUSLY CONNECTED BEN BELLA, COMMUNISTS (LOCAL HUMANITE REP FORCED DEPART YESTERDAY). HAVE NO ENTRY INFO EXCEPT BELIEVE LIKELY BE EASIER FROM TUNISIA. SUGGEST YOU CHECK ALGI EMB PARI ON VISA POLICY. FROM HERE ASSUME IF IT NOT EXPIRED CAN BE USED WITHOUT REVALIDATION. .

S E C R E T

*APPARENTLY WRONG REF. POSSIBLY PALP 4172 (IN 86695) INTENDED

** STEBONY UNABLE ENTER ALGI.

IN 01015

201-306052

29 June 65

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. OELA-43,459
TO Chief, ~~KUDESK~~ AF; Chief, LCPIPIT INFO Chief, WE; Chief, ~~AF~~ KUDESK; Chief, KUWCLP		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-
FROM Chief of Station, London		DATE 28 June 1965
SUBJECT STEBONY JAGUAR JAGUAR Report of STEBONY Surveillance		RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE) MARKED FOR INDEXING X NO INDEXING REQUIRED INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED		
REFERENCE(S)		

1. Pursuant to the suggestion contained in DIR 04341, 23 April 1965, we asked JAGUAR to lay on such coverage as they could manage. After some weeks has passed, and JAGUAR had not moved in this direction, we repeated our request, pointing out that STEBONY/1 would soon be leaving. Short-handed and hampered by certain restrictions, JAGUAR moved in to do what they could, and their coverage was due to start almost at the same time as TIFFANY was to begin his meetings with S/1. We contacted JAGUAR and told them to lay off (much to our chagrin) for the time being. This they did, but then, without our being advised, they resumed their coverage. We don't know exactly how long they actually had him in their sights, but they have now given us a letter (text below) suggesting that he was watched on 5, 6 and 7 June. A JAGUAR officer advised us informally that S/1 "seemed to be out of town" for one or two days. (TIFFANY had mentioned that he might take S/1 to the country for a day, but we don't know whether in fact he did so.)

2. Here is JAGUAR's notes:

"As explained in conversation on the 8th June, 1965, we have received a report on S/1's movements during the period 5th - 7th June, 1965. Nothing of interest was learnt about his movements on the 6th and 7th June, but you may be interested in the following information relating to the 5th June: -

"S/1 left his home at 11.25 and travelled by taxi to the Haymarket where he entered the American Express offices. He obtained a ticket for an air passage to Brussels and a train journey to Basle, thence to Lausanne and Paris where he was due to arrive on the 10th June. He paid £20-29-1d for his ticket. He left the American Express at 12.30 and subsequently returned home at 13.20 hours.

"He left home again at 14.05 and went to the Clarendon Court Hotel in Maida Vale. He came out of the building after five minutes and wandered around for twenty minutes before returning to the hotel. He stayed there until 18.45 when he left alone and returned home.

3. The JAGUAR officer also told me that S/1's contact at the Clarendon Court Hotel was not identified by the surveillant, who in fact did not know which room S/1 had visited. The contact, of course, was TIFFANY, registered as GUSTKE.

George H. KATZENBACH

Distribution:
~~2~~-Chief, KUDESK
2-Chief, LCPIPIT
3-Chief, WE
~~2~~-Chief, AF
2-Chief, KUWCLP

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-306052

CS COPY

30 JUN 1965

14-00000

SECRET/KAPOK

Chief, KUWOLF; Chief, KUDESK; Chief, AF
Chief, WE;
Chief of Station, Algiers; Chief of Station, London.

Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT
DTDORIC/Operational
QRPRAY/Launching the Good Ship STEBONY

REFERENCES: A. PALP 4056

B. PALP 4057

201

ACTION REQUESTED: Para 7, Para 8, Para 46.

SUMMARY

On 12 June 1965 STEBONY/1 met KUWOLF Career Agent Rufus F. RODIGAST in Paris in accordance with instructions and for the next three days underwent debriefings, briefings, an LCFLUTTER examination, and training in preparation for his summer 1965 assignment to Algiers. At the conclusion of this period LCPIPIT felt that S/1: had absorbed sufficiently the guidance given him, had responded satisfactorily to Case Officer control, was apparently clear of hostile direction, and was motivated to perform creditably throughout his three-month trial employment.

ATTACHMENTS U.S.C.:

A. Idens.
B. RODIGAST contact reports for 12,14&15 June meetings
C. RODIGAST report on STEBONY/1's comments re Frantz Fanon Documentation Center, Milan.
D. RODIGAST report on STEBONY/1's comments re the British Guiana PPP office in London.
E. RODIGAST review of two published works by STEBONY/1
F. Cy of STEBONY/1 initial s/w letter to RODIGAST.

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - C/KUWOLF w/atts. A,B,C,D,E,F u.s.c.
1 - C/KUDESK w/atts. A,B,C,D,E,F u.s.c.
1 - C/AF w/atts. A,B,F u.s.c.
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1 - C/WE w/atts. A,B,C,D u.s.c.

JUN 29 1965

OFPA 2555 25 June 1965

SECRET/KAPOK 201-306052

Personally, S/1 appeared to understand and to follow good security practices by and large, but he was concerned that his wife now suspected him of being "up to something" of which she did not approve. In short, his overall long-term security appeared weakest closest to home. Nevertheless, he appeared highly confident that previous denunciations to which he had been subjected would not "stick" and that he could rapidly reestablish himself among revolutionary circles.

His relationship to KUBARK over the longer period has apparently been of considerable interest to him, to the extent that he stated he would be interested in some sort of career status with KUBARK (with retirement benefits) and perhaps one day a "less covert" position. At this time in our relationship with S/1, however, LCPIPIT is concerned primarily with what to do with him on 1 September 1965. In fact, in view of the 19-20 June developments in Algiers and the possible postponement of most of the activities S/1 was to cover in efforts to reestablish himself as a legitimate propagandist for national liberation movements, KUBARK may find it not only feasible, but necessary, to revise S/1's initial KUBARK mission.

In the days and weeks to come we will be reporting S/1's progress as he relates his accomplishments and problems through S/W communications and in meetings with RODIGAST. We shall be submitting recommendations on S/1's longer term utility to KUBARK as we have more information upon which to make some judgments. We know that addressees will be subjecting the STEBONY operation to constant evaluation and analysis throughout the summer, and we will appreciate continued and coordinated guidance on how best to exploit the unique potential represented by this asset.

I. LCPIPIT SUPPORT FOR THE STEBONY OPERATION

1. On 3 June 1965 STEBONY/1 signed a letter of agreement with ODYOKE in London, in effect a contract with KUBARK. Upon signing the letter of agreement and agreeing to undergo an LCFLUTTER examination, S/1 was introduced to Rufus F. RODIGAST, a KUWOLF Career Agent based in Paris who had been designated S/1's outside case officer. RODIGAST is known to S/1 under the alias "Paul Weller." RODIGAST met at length with S/1 on 3, 5, and 6 June and made arrangements for S/1 to meet him in Paris 12 June and undergo further training, briefing, and security processing prior to embarking on a trial assignment of some 10 weeks.

2. On 12 June 1965 S/1 made contact with RODIGAST in Paris in accordance with instructions and was taken immediately to a safehouse for debriefing on his 8-11 June trip in West Europe and for training in the use of S/W system #64. RODIGAST's Contact Report on this meeting and his report of the debriefing are included in Attachment B (USC.). S/1 was passed $200.00 to make travel arrangements for his trip to North Africa. (See also PALP 4057).

3. On 13 June S/1 again met RODIGAST in accordance with instructions and was taken to his LCFLUTTER examination at an LCPIPIT safehouse. The results of this examination were forwarded in PALP 4056. In short, the outcome of the examination was considered satisfactory for the proposed operational use of S/1.

4. On 14 and 15 June RODIGAST again met with S/1 for further debriefings on the latter's contacts in Paris. RODIGAST then briefed him on KUTUBE requirements for MHMINCE and passed on the requirements and information forwarded in DIR 18107 and DIR 18675. RODIGAST's reports on these meetings are also included in Attachment B (USC). On 14 June S/1 was passed $500.00 as an advance on his per diem and travel expenses for his next meeting with RODIGAST. RODIGAST considers S/1 an apt student who learned the S/W system well in some two hours of instruction. Paris KURIOT Officer DONAHY noted some carelessness on S/1's part in the test messages, and this was subsequently brought to S/1's attention in the overall security briefing he received from RODIGAST.

5. The communications system established with S/1 consists of pre-arranged meeting sites and times, a one-way S/W system, and the use of the classified advertising section of the Algiers El Moudjahid (received daily in Paris) by S/1 to signal a postponement of meeting dates. The one-way system was chosen for this initial stage of the agent's operational relationship with KUBARK for reasons of security; given the operational climate in Algiers and the specific circles in which S/1 must move, and adding to the sudden political upheaval in Algeria, S/1 would not be in a position to receive incoming communications safely. As of 23 June S/1 had initiated S/W correspondence, his initial effort being clearly legible and the content operationally worthwhile. (See Attachment F).

6. The next RODIGAST contact with S/1 is scheduled for 15 July in Rome. (See OFLA 2538 for LCPIPIT's request for Rome Station support.) In view of the events that have just taken place in Algeria the meeting may well be concerned as much with rethinking S/1's operational objectives for the period following 16 July as with debriefings, briefings, and passage of funds. Even though latest indications are that Bandung II will proceed as scheduled, it is questionable whether the AAJA or the Afro-Asian Women's conference will be held in Algiers this summer. Moreover, there is no assurance at this writing that MHMINCE will not be either postponed, canceled, or moved elsewhere. Add to this the possibility that IDEN A might be on the scene profiting from the sudden rise in the political fortunes of his friends, and Algiers suddenly loses some of its appeal as an area in which to carry out a meaningful test of S/1's operational capabilities. The next three weeks will tell us much and perhaps allay many of our apprehensions.

7. Nevertheless, RODIGAST must be prepared to handle a number of eventualities in his 15 July meeting, not the least of these being a possible revision of S/1's mission. The following possible alternatives present themselves; we ask Headquarters to address its attention to them and to other developmental targets and to cable recommendations and guidance prior to 13 July:

A. S/1 to remain on site, continue his efforts to establish credentials and find a job in Algiers, or elsewhere, in the national liberation movement, and report on political developments in Algeria.

B. S/1 to travel to Dar es Salaam to look into the job offer made some time ago by Dennis PHOMBEAH.

C. S/1 to proceed to Brussels to continue development of IDEN B (see OFLA 2541).

D. S/1 to return to London to write up reports and operational proposals and polish up the translation of IDEN B's book.

E. S/1 to follow the MHMINCE caravan wherever it may lead (perhaps Sofia?) and continue to look for job leads (outside the Bloc).

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8. The second RODIGAST meeting of the summer with S/1 is tentatively scheduled for the second week in August, site to be determined. Addressees will know that S/1's wife is expecting their third child c/a 11 August and that S/1 intends to be in London at that time if at all possible. Although he told RODIGAST he would forego a visit to London at that time if it were operationally necessary, he would find it difficult to justify his absence to his wife unless he were to have a truly plausible and urgent cover assignment. We must therefore anticipate in all likelihood that S/1 will be out of action for most of the second week of August. In any event, RODIGAST will probably be able to meet S/1 somewhere in Europe when S/1 returns to be with his wife and will at that time hope to be in a position to discuss with S/1 the best employment of his talents for the balance of the three-month contract period and to pursue with him his longer range utilization as well. Headquarters views, then, are needed both with respect to the weeks immediately following the 15 July meeting referred to in the previous paragraph as well as with respect to the post-August period.

9. Administratively, LCPIPIT has so far funded S/1 to the extent of $700.00 and has initiated action to have his salary and nonaccountable operational advance deposited to his Swiss bank account. These payments are being made in advance because of S/1's initially pressing financial needs. It is our understanding that the 1 July and 1 August 1965 deposits of $600.00 to S/1's Swiss bank account will be effected securely and on time through KIMAD/1 (see DIR 20944 and DIR 21703). Action was also taken to clarify the question of S/1's per diem. We have received his initial accountings for travel, per diem, and operational expenses for the period 8 - 12 June.

10. ON the basis of information available to LCPIPIT, S/1 has received the following payments from KUBARK since he was first contacted in London by George H. KATZENBACH in January of this year (we have no record at hand of the KUBARK funds passed S/1 by FAIRMAN of KMCENESIS):

AMOUNT	DATE	COMMENT
$300.00	1/25/65 (c/a)	Ops payment per DIR 78506
400.00	2/23/65	Ops payment per ORLN 21869
400.00	April/65	Ops payment per DIR 98974
400.00	May/65	Ops payment per DIR 04341
100.00	6/2/65	Ops payment per DIR 04341 (signing bonus)
500.00	6/3/65	Ops salary advance for June/65
100.00	6/3/65	Nonaccountable ops advance for June/65
200.00	6/3/65	Travel and per diem advance
200.00	6/12/65	Travel Advance
500.00	6/14/65	Travel and per diem advance.

TOTAL: $3,100.00

11. Beginning with the Ops payment in May 1965, these payments have been T/A'd to Headquarters for charge to YGHITCH. In addition to his present salary of $500.00 per month and his $100.00 monthly nonaccountable advance for operational expenses, S/1 is entitled to the following under the letter of agreement he signed 3 June 1965:

a) necessary expenses incurred in connection with such operational travel as may be directed or authorized by ODYOKE.

b) operational expenses in excess of $100.00 monthly nonaccountable advance as are specifically authorized by ODYOKE.

c) compensation in an amount mutually agreed upon for the relocation of S/1 and his family to a new residence if such relocation is considered desirable by S/1 and ODYOKE.

d) per diem at the rate of $20.00 per day during periods of authorized travel (i.e.: during absence from London).

II. PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT

12. At this stage in KUBARK's relationship with STRBONY/1 it is well to note certain factors that must be taken into consideration as we seek to devise a longer-term operation centered on his capabilities and potential. For the sake of brevity, if not precision, we will discuss these factors under the following headings: Personal Assets, Motivation, Handling & Guidance, Security, Termination, and KUBARK Operational Requirements.

PERSONAL ASSETS:

13. STRBONY/1, as has been noted in OELA 42,750 "really astonishes with the breadth of his personal information and understanding... [of] African affairs (especially in left-wing fields), European Trotskyists and Communists and their general milieu, and Chinese-oriented international front organizations. Similarly, he appears to be informed on certain Chicom efforts at subversion and propaganda in Latin America." Combined with this knowledge and understanding is a long list of personal contacts in left-wing revolutionary circles and a reputation as an articulate and committed agitator for national liberation movements.

14. The Agent exudes an air of self-confidence and presents himself well and dynamically in interpersonal relationships. He has demonstrated talent as a working journalist, especially as a reporter. While we have limited information here upon which to base an evaluation of the accuracy and thoroughness of his reports, they have tended to be consistent on the whole and reveal the workings of a mind capable of storing many vast amounts of information and recalling it with minimal stimulation. S/1 seems to have good command of the French language and can get by in Italian and Spanish. He has had considerable experience in international travel, apparently accommodating well to various degrees of discomfort and hardship as the case may require. He is able to use cameras and tape recorders operationally, and he quickly learned s/w techniques.

15. Because of his coloring and facial characteristics S/1 can pass relatively unnoticed as a North African, Near Easterner, South Asian, or American Negro, inter alia. He gives the impression of being able to strike up casual friendships readily and easily.

MOTIVATION:

16. This is a sticky area open to considerable speculation at this point, though there are specific actions and statements on the part of S/1 indicating he has sought some professional relationship with KUBARK for several years. We understand, for example , that he tried to establish contact with ODYOKE while a student in Italy in 1951-52, that he appeared to be most cooperative when questioned by PBSWING Paris in relation to the assassination of President Kennedy, and that he took a calculated (?) risk by writing in directly to KUBARK in the summer of 1962 offering his services. In his contacts with KUBARKers since January of this year he has given every indication of being forthcoming and, apparently, sincerely interested in cooperating with us. One has the impression he was hoping to be recruited, and he certainly didn't play hard to get.

17. Now that he has signed a letter of agreement, undergone an LCFLUTTER, and been passed a considerable amount of KUBARK money he may consider himself already "on the team," though in effect he was told specifically at the outset that he had to prove himself over the next three months. He has intimated to BODICAST that he would like to parlay his present association with KUBARK into a long-term career relationship including retirement, insurance, etc. He has even alluded to an interest in working for BODICAST's "service" in a "less covert" capacity sometime in the future.

18. One basic question rests with all of us concerned: Why?

In his early talks with the London Station and again in his talks with BODIGAST and TIFFANY the Agent has indicated some degree of disenchantment with the organizations and personalities, if not the ideology, of the left-wing factions with which he had been so intimately involved. He has never gone so far as to renounce his birthright and citizenship, nor does he consider himself disloyal after several years of professional anti-PBPRIME activity. He intimates that he would someday like to return home, though he doubts he would be allowed to live down his past and start a new career in PBPRIME.

19. On the basis of information available to us we could not say that SUBCUBE/1 is or ever was an ideologically committed Marxist-Leninist. We might say that he has nurtured over the years a smouldering prejudice against the "in" group, both domestically and internationally. He has been an "out" most all of his life, and he has shown a strong attachment to the causes of the downtrodden Cubans, the colonially oppressed Africans, the organizationally subdued "young Turks" of orthodox communist and other leftist movements, etc. There is no question that in his sympathy for such causes he overstepped the bounds of reason and good sense, but it is doubtful that he actually committed any treasonable offense. One has the feeling that S/1 really sought to hedge his bets on the revolutionaries by putting out feelers to KUBARK.

20. There is a strong case for the argument that hard cash plays a significant role in motivating S/1 to cooperate with KUBARK at this point in time. All reports emphasize that he was not just broke, but deeply in debt, when he began talking to London Station. Subsequently he has been receiving what amounts to a salary at a rate somewhat in excess of average for a European journalist, let alone a professional small-time revolutionary. Since he has had no valid cover story for anything other than the first advance(s) from GKOPERA, we cannot be sure that he has let his wife, his in-laws, or his immediate circle of associates know the extent of his newly-acquired affluence. He is quite capable of thinking big operationally and has bluntly stated that it takes money to "move" in Algiers and that "poverty is no virtue in the 'Third World' ".

21. But S/1 does not appear to be an out and out mercenary. There must be other factors than money alone that would lead him to cooperate with KUBARK. It could well be that he is reacting philosophically to an outlook on life that let him down despite years of devoted cultivation. In the long debriefings he rarely, if ever, mentioned anyone who he felt had really accomplished anything as a professional left-wing revolutionary. There are indications that he regards his activities over recent years as somewhat unrewarding, though there is little indication that he didn't enjoy much of what he did or that he doesn't consider the cause of the national liberation movements a just and honorable cause. He may, simply, have reappraised the results of some years of revolutionary activity with a somewhat jaundiced eye and decided it was time for a change.

22. Certainly S/1 builds a convincing case about the reasons for his break with IDEN C, but it must also be noted that ideology is not among them. If anything, it would seem he was reacting to a breach of contract and perhaps wounded pride. The net result seemed to be a well of resentment against one individual, which resentment fermented into spite and determination to "get even." If this assumption is granted, then the letter he had published in ZHEARTH and the manuscript he submitted to KMNEMESIS are both explainable and explain such. It was his involvement with these publications that triggered KUBARK's operational interest in him, and we initiated contact at a period when he was, perhaps, basking in (what he probably considered) the success of his attack on IDEN A.

23. Looked at from still another angle, S/1's future prospects in January of this year (both in his professional and his personal life) were anything but bright for: he was jobless, in debt, to some extent cast off by the revolutionary movement, apparently felt homeless (as far as having something to which he could return in PBPRIME), and (from what scraps of information we can piece together) was not experiencing a mutually agreeable marital life. (He asserts he was unfaithful and that his wife knew it. We have learned from KATZENBACH's talks with the SMOOTHERS that she was unfaithful in her turn,

though we have no confirmation of this from S/1). In such a situation KUBARK was able to offer S/1 an opportunity to, in effect, begin anew, get out of a hole, rebuild his own self-esteem, and perhaps even build up some credit toward an eventual return to PBPRIME under conditions which he would find bearable.

24. It is interesting that in his long conversations with RODIGAST he should raise the question of his motivation as if to reassure ODYOKE that he was "on the level." He protested that we must not think that he had taken on this job just to "get out of a hole" for three months and explained that he wasn't really in a hole. He claimed that his debts to his brother-in-law were not a pressing matter at all. (However, during his LCFLUTTER examination we are told that the area in which he reacted most strongly was that concerning personal obligations, especially financial. We were probing to find out if he was indeed under some obligation, financial or otherwise, to certain of his revolutionary associates of the past two and a half years, and what ensued was an outpouring of all the small and not so small debts he owed virtually everyone he knew. Foremost among these was the debt of some £ 1,500 to his brother-in-law. Whether or not he feels pressed to repay is not as important as the fact that there seem to be times when it weighs heavily on his mind.)

25. Giving S/1 the last word, the following report from RODIGAST on his 14 June conversation with the Agent should be given careful consideration: "It was clear that he was telling me, without spelling it out in words, that he had made up his mind to cooperate with us because, or partly because, he had decided he wanted to be on our side. He even used expressions like 'our side'. I had the feeling that he did not want to say outright that he was changing his political orientation for fear that we would not believe him, but that in fact he might very well be doing so; I think there was something genuine in his protestation that he wasn't with us 'only for the money'."

HANDLING & GUIDANCE:

26. The least that can be said of S/1 in summarizing his relationship with his KUBARK contacts so far is that he is not docile and passive. He appears to be a self-starter with a sense of what is necessary to get an operation off the ground. From his account of his work for IDEN C it would appear that he can honestly claim a great deal of credit for putting the English edition into business.

27. To date S/1 has expressed no reluctance to undertake his current mission nor to consider other missions for KUBARK which might work a hardship on him or place his person or reputation in jeopardy. His responsiveness, in fact, encourages us to believe that he willl accept assignments which permit him to move easily in those revolutionary left circles which are natural to him and which comprise, in effect, his natural target. He has, of course, made a case for working out of Paris, Rome, or Geneva rather than Algiers or Djakarta, but this was prior to his entering into a formal relationship with ODYOKE.

28. RODIGAST feels that he has been able to establish a good degree of working rapport with S/1 and perhaps even some degree of personal rapport. They have had some half-dozen meetings so far, including three working sessions in Paris. RODIGAST has stressed to him the vital importance of good security habits, not the least of which involves such personal behavior as will keep him out of compromising situations (in respect to his work for KUBARK).

29. S/1 has been on time for all his meetings with RODIGAST and has complied well with instructions; he submitted without hesitation to the LCFLUTTER and agreed to work with S/W (accepting the risks involved in disposal of the working materials). S/1 has not failed to remind RODIGAST of the probable cost of his upkeep and operational activities while in Algiers and has been assured that RODIGAST "fought for the $20.00 per diem

right on up the line." Needless to say, STRBONY/1 seemed most happy to know that RODIGAST was concerned for his welfare.

30. RODIGAST feels that he can manage S/1's self-assertion and dynamism, and LCPIPIT points to RODIGAST's record of handling "difficult" agents. RODIGAST's experience is reassuring in this connection, and we have no reservations about RODIGAST's ability to keep STRBONY/1 motivated in the months ahead.

31. A last word on the matter of handling: turn-over. So far S/1 has dealt with KATZENBACH, TIFFANY, and RODIGAST and has been forthcoming with all. There is no indication at this early stage that he has placed his relationship with KUBARK on a person-to-person plane nor are we sure he should be encouraged to do so. As representatives of ODYOKE the three persons mentioned above have apparently earned S/1's trust, and anyone introduced to him by one of them would probably be accepted with the same degree of confidence should the introduction of another case officer become necessary. In effect, then, we foresee no handling problem with S/1 as far as a change in case officers might be concerned. We would point out, though, that S/1 has been handled sympathetically and without hostility to date and that those who have dealt with him would strongly advise firm intelligent direction and against a provocative or heavy-handed approach to such a complex and self-centered personality.

SECURITY:

32. S/1's very background is enough to pose all the security problems one would want to contend with in any operation. At the same time it is that very background that makes him valuable to KUBARK. Therefore we can discount many logical apprehensions about his personal loyalty and motivation (discussed previously) and proceed to questions of operational security.

33. First of all, S/1 has been denounced as a KUBARK agent since the mid-1950's when, to the best of our knowledge, he wasn't actively involved in revolutionary activities. He traces this original denunciation to an incident in which he resorted to some rather unscrupulous practices (forgery and false denunciation) to get an erstwhile friend and CPUSA member (with whose wife he had become involved) discredited in France. (See Attachment to OELA 43,272). The upshot was that S/1 was considered by many who knew him in Paris to be a KUBARK agent who had informed on his communist "friend" to the French police. From that time to the present the KUBARK tag has stuck in certain circles, though STRBONY/1 feels those who really know him, and those important revolutionaries and communists whom he knows and who are his potential targets as a KUBARK agent, have largely discounted the possibility that this could be so. There is no denying the fact, however, that this denunciation is a handicap. It has been used fairly effectively by his last employer, IDEN A, to burn him in a number of places where he was probably previously unknown. Certainly the publication of the denunciation in IDEN C did not raise his stature in some quarters. LOND 7620 indicates S/1's enemies have little desire to let sleeping dogs lie.

34. Furthermore, IDEN A seems at this moment to hold as great a grudge against S/1 as S/1 holds against him, and IDEN A may still have better connections in the national liberation movement than S/1. This is especially so in view of the 19-20 June 1965 downfall of the Ben Bella regime in Algeria. IDEN A was not a Ben Bella man, and his fortunes declined sharply in inverse proportion to the rise of Ben Bella's. IDEN A's closest link to Algeria's power elite has long been Rabah Bitat, according to S/1. In the papers of 22 June we read that, in a "startling development," former Vice-President Mohammed Bitat flew into Algiers from exile in France and said he was ready to "assume his responsibilities." We presume that IDEN A will seek to move quickly to derive personal advantage from this sudden change in Algeria. As if operating in the Algerian security climate were not hazardous enough, S/1 may well have to contend with a vendetta mounted by IDEN A.

35. [illegible]/1's family situation presents some cause for concern, also. As noted in the discussion on motivation, he has been receiving funds since January with only QKOFFRA to give as a source. His wife, who is a conscientious leftist, is presently suspicious of his activities, he says, largely because he received a phone call from PBSWING London in January. He explained it was a PBPRIDER journalist passing through who wished to talk with him, to which she was supposed to have retorted: "Why should someone from PBPRIME be interested in you, and, moreover, why should you be interested in working for anything or anyone from PBPRIME?" S/1 told RODIGAST that the backstopping effort initiated by LOND 8004 did not fully dispel her skepticism. S/1's reaction to the FLUTTER examination on the question of "what his wife thinks" suggests that the matter is not laid to rest.

36. S/1 seems to be most concerned that his wife not find out he is working for ODYOKE, let alone KUBARK, and we presume he has reason to feel she would probably say or do something, whether deliberate or not, that would compromise him in his present situation. We do not know the history of S/1's marriage, but we have received indications from him that lead us to believe he could not count on her discretion and loyalty in all circumstances. His relationship with his wife, therefore, must be watched with some care to insure that it does not comprise an undue hazard or that she does not become vulnerable in some way to forces inimical to his effectiveness in his work for KUBARK.

37. Aside from speculation about possible repercussions in this area of their marital relationship, there remains the question of cover for some $3,180 passed S/1 by KUBARK in the past six months. His wife has been in the journalism business long enough to know that virtually unemployed journalists are not usually given travel and salary advances merely for the asking, especially when their press credentials are largely notional or the nominal sponsor has yet to go into publication. Thus, we have reason to believe she has some rather nagging doubts as to the legitimacy of S/1's present cover job. This is implicit in Paragraph 5 of the attachment of OELA 43,272.

38. On 15 June S/1 told RODIGAST his wife told him on the phone that a letter to him from IDEN D warned him to be careful "as things might be 'hot' for him in Algeria." IDEN D had apparently heard of S/1's forthcoming trip from contacts in New York and Paris, and S/1 surmises this means news of his summer's travels must be rather common knowledge by now.

39. At TIFFANY's request S/1 let IDEN E know he was in Paris, and S/1 says that latter "came rushing around" to see him. S/1's report on this contact was passed to the Paris Station 17 June by LCPIPIT. In the report is S/1's assessment that IDEN E would probably be willing to talk to RODIGAST's "service." We shall discuss this case further with Paris Station, but in the meantime it should be noted for the record that as long as S/1 is said by many to be a KUBARK agent, it would not be unreasonable to assume that IDEN E might connect an approach by an ODYOKE representative with his recent conversations with S/1. Therefore, the possibility of a flap here should not be ignored.

40. As far as S/1's contacts with KUBARK, he knows no one by true name and his case officer will continue to use an alias in all future contacts. At the same time, there is the ever-present danger that he may some day come to know RODIGAST's true name because of the number of acquaintances they have in common in Paris. It was largely for this reason that RODIGAST will avoid holding future operational meetings with S/1 in Paris. RODIGAST has already reportedthe rather unsettling experience of having S/1 tell him: "I think I've seen you someplace before." RODIGAST says this is quite possible. Were S/1 ever to stay in Paris for a considerable length of time the chances are Not remote that RODIGAST's identity would be compromised to S/1.

TERMINATION:

41. The question of termination is not academic at this time, for explicit in the letter of agreement which S/1 signed is his termination on 1 September 1965 unless specific conditions are met. It is doubtful that KUBARK will indeed terminate S/1 on that date unless such action is made imperative for reasons of security or of gross malfeasance on his part.

42. In the event of the termination of S/1 we foresee at this time no great cause for concern about possible repercussions against KUBARK personnel or installations. In addition to the use of aliases, RODIJAST's meetings with him will be in third countries, and S/1 has not been passed classified information. He does keep in his possession materials for the use of S/W System #64. He received training in the use of these materials (and underwent his LCFLUTTER) 2 in the apartment of two LCPIPIT contract personnel. This apartment, an LCPIPIT safehouse, was used only once previously for a clandestine meeting, and it will not be used again for at least two months.

43. Should it prove necessary to terminate S/1 the greatest danger which we can anticipate at this time grows out of his considerable skill as a writer and the possibility that this skill might be used to attack KUBARK or ODYOKE in some way, perhaps from the forum of the national liberation movement propaganda machinery which he has now foresaken. His knowledge of our operations and personnel has been kept to a minimum. Hence the danger of his pen speaking with great force or effectiveness is, we believe, not great and a problem which, though we must anticipate it, we believe to be remote.

Alu KUBARK OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS:

44. All concerned would agree that a KUBARK agent who is unable to service KUBARK operational requirements would not be worth his keep. At the same time, it would be presumptious to expect that in a situation where the agent is being handled at arm's length and under such disadvantages in time and distance as in S/1's case, KUBARK's operational requirements could be regularly and, if necessary, speedily measured against the agent's capabilities and specific requirements levied on the agent.

45. So far in KUBARK's relationship with S/1 we have outlined a general target area for him, levied the requirement that he prove to KUBARK he can effectively penetrate that target area and operate in place, and levied subsidiary KUTUBE requirements for him to service as a by-product of his basic operational task. What we have assigned, in effect, is a short term operational mission upon which longer term operations might be based.

46. There is evidence in the reams of "testimony" KUBARK has taken from S/1 that he is a man who likes to operate, act, produce. There is also evidence that he, like any other human, consciously seeks approval and recognition of his work. The question to be posed is: Has KUBARK at this time, or will it have on 1 September 1965, an assignment for S/1 in which he can find satisfaction in producing a marketable product and find that approval and recognition which he requires? We must be more specific with him than to say: "Go out to Djakarta and see what you can dig up. We'll meet you again in two months for discussions." Rather, it would be well at this stage to review with the various area divisions those geographic areas in which S/1's talents could be fully exploited (Chile with PUSBB?, Venezuela as an FALN penetration?, Djakarta as an AAJA staffer?, Ghana as a BAA writer?, Tanzania as a Government Radio editor?, etc., etc.) and to have a definite assignment for S/1 in hand at the moment we negotiate the extension of his contract.

47. Certainly the sudden change of leadership in Algeria can be expected to affect the national liberation movement and personalities in that movement who have drawn succor from the Ben Bella regime. As noted in the section on security, it is reasonable to assume that S/1 will be in a less

than fortuitous position if his efforts to reassert himself on the national liberation movement stage are to meet with brickbats from IDEN A from a front row seat. ALGI 6171 and PARI 1938 tend to support the estimate that S/1's friends in the Ministry of Information may now be gone, while IDEN A's Algerian friends may soon be in positions of power. While it is still too early to assume that such a situation will arise, it is not too soon to assess the possible damage this could do S/1 in the general target area so far assigned him and to watch closely for signs that he may truly be burned beyond operational usefulness to KUBARK. We would hope this should not come to pass, but we cannot ignore the possibility.

48. In the event, then, that the next two month's activities compromise S/1's credentials in the national liberation movement, where would we go from there? One suggestion would be a TDY to ZRMETAL where his brain might be picked for operational leads and KMTUNE, KUDESK, and KUWOLF information. He could also be urged to write out and edit a number of exposés on fraud, deception, and general double-dealing in the national revolution movement and in certain communist circles. He might find a job with IDEN B who may well need a new crutch if S/1's reports of his diminishing influence are to be given credence. In short, steps ought to be taken now to define the alternatives awaiting S/1 as of 1 September 1965.

Harvey G. FABRICH

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/[illegible]	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. OELA-43,458
TO Chief, KUDESK		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
INFO Chief, LCPIPIT; Chief, WE; Chief, AF		201-
FROM Chief of Station, London		DATE 25 June 1965
SUBJECT KUDESK STEBONY 6 STEBONY-Related BAIRN Items		RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE) MARKED FOR INDEXING X NO INDEXING REQUIRED INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED		

REFERENCE(S)

1. Attached are selected extracts from BAIRN reports. BAIRN is a very sensitive SMOTH operation, and the items should be treated accordingly.

2. Marc SCHLEIFFER (misspelled in BAIRN) is of interest. Pablo is Pable FERNANDEZ, Cultural Attache at the Cuban Embassy in London. Other items should be self-explanatory. On page 3 of the attachment, "integration", where underlined, should read "segregation."

3. As with these items, London will try to bring to Headquarters (and other addressees') attention STEBONY-related items that we notice. On the other hand, we do not require to be info'ed on all STEBONY traffic in the future. We would like to see copies of all of his intelligence reporting, whether for passage to the SMOOTHERS or not. On that topic, we would like to recommend that a liberal policy be followed in determining what of his stuff to pass to liaison here. We will be glad to review his reporting for passage, if there is doubt about whether to pass it. We would also like to see any materials relating to him that may have a bearing on London Station operations, relating principally to the U.K., or relating to any of our liaison services here, of course.

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment:
Herewith

Distribution:
2-Chief, KUDESK w/att h/w
2-Chief, LCPIPIT w/att h/w
3-Chief, WE w/att h/w
2-Chief, AF w/att h/w

GROUP 1
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CS COPY

201-306852
~~201-128665~~
JUN 1965

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE. CLASSIFICATION SECRET/[illegible] CONTINUED PAGE NO. 1

TO: Chief, KUDESK
FROM: Chief of Station, London
Attachment to OELA-43,458
25 June 1965

31 May 1965

17.10 hours: Mark SCHWEIFFER (or SCHWEISSER ph) calls Pablo, tells him he arrived in LONDON two hours ago. (Note : he speaks English with a U.S.A. accent) Pablo says he had been talking about Mark last Saturday with Richard GIBSON, who Mark had thought to be living in Switzerland. Pablo says Richard has lived in LONDON for a year. Mark is now married, his wife and two children are with him. Pablo says that Roberto Yepe and his wife Galina are also in LONDON at the Embassy. Mark is in a hotel near the British Museum. Will come to the Embassy at once. Farewells.

17.15 hours: Roberto Yepe calls Galina at home, tells her Mark is in LONDON. Both overjoyed. They arrange to meet. Yepe does not know yet what he is doing here or how long he will be staying.

18.30 hours: Present: Pablo and Mark SCHW...ER (pres.). Voices very indistinct.

Pablo and Mark appear to be talking about mutual acquaintances, who are mostly poets and authors. Pablo goes out.

Yepe comes in and greets the visitor; he says that his wife Galina would like to see Mark this evening. Yepe explains about his transfer from Glasgow to London; he then asks [Ma]rk when he is going to Nigeria (?Algeria). Mark appears to [s]ay that he will not be going until February next year, afte[r] he has been to the States; after that he would like to settle down in Africa, in Zanzibar, or in (?Tanzania) - he does not know.

Yepe asks where he can find Dennis PHOMBEAH: Mark says that he is in the Tanzanian High Commission at 43 Hertford St. and that Yepe can mention his name. Yepe goes out (pres. to telephone Dennis) and does not return.

10.00 hours: Richard GIBSON (ph, speaks English with U.S.A. accent) calls Pablo in some excitement to say that SCHWEIFFER (ph) "is arriving today". Pablo says he already knows, had seen him yesterday (see 31st May above) and had given him Richard's telephone number. Richard asks for Mark's address. Pablo checks with Yepe, who was taken by Mark SCHWEFFER to the latter's hotel, but does not remember the name or address. Richard remarks that he knows Mark's plan. He is on his way

/ to . . . . .

(i)

1st June, Cont.

to Africa, is going to ALGIERS and wants to stay. Is going to Tanzania if he can. Had planned to leave LONDON today, but is staying over. Pablo replies, to see Richard and someone else. Richard thinks this is Dennis POMBEY (ph) to whom Mark had written from NEW YORK. Richard is ready to find accommodation for Mark and family while they are in LONDON, as Mark has little money. Richard is going out now until 16.00 hours when he will return to PRImrose 8775. Then he is due to go out again to the Tunisian Embassy. Asks Pablo to tell Mark that he (Richard) is going to Algeria, that he wants to see Mark, that there are possibly things that they can do together, that he or Mark could take the job offered by Dennis (POMBEY) in DAR-ES-SALAAM. Pablo says Mark is staying here to see Richard and presumably Dennis, then going to PARIS for five days, then on to Algeria. Richard says Mark can call him at home between 12.30 and 13.30 hours or after 16.00 hours.

Richard gives Pablo greetings from PETITA (or BETITA, ph) who says she is sending Richard and Pablo a new magazine called "Street" to be shared. She is working for the "Student Non-Violent Co-ordinating Committee", Sue WRIGHT's (ph) group, and has "given up her job at the Nation". Pablo will send her some collaboration for the magazine. Farewells.

1 June (cont'd) 13.55 hours: Mark SCHLEIFFER (ph) calls Pablo (out). Then asks for Yepe. Tells Yepe that they (Mark and family) had slept late and are checking out of the hotel now. Confirms with Yepe that the latter's wife Galina is at home. Is going to telephone her. Yepe confirms Mark's having Galina's number, then remarks that one of the two people Mark had wanted to contact - GIBSON - had rung the Embassy. Mark reminds Yepe of their having looked up together the telephone numbers of the Tanzanian Mission. Mark has two numbers, one GRO number and one FLA number (Note: the FLA number is FLA 2327, home number of Dennis PHOMBEAH, Administrative Attache. Mark had earlier said he had two people in LONDON to contact, Richard GIBSON and Dennis.) He asks Yepe which is the office number. Yepe checks then says it is GRO 8951. Mark notes the Mission's address. Farewells.

1st June, Cont.

17.10 hours: Mark SCHLEIFFER calls from the Embassy to Yepe's flat, speaks to Yepe's wife, Galina, says he, "Maria and the children" will spend the night with the Yepes. His wife and children are at present in Pablo's flat (Note: Both flats are in Park West).

17.30 hours: Mark SCHLEIFFER called at Embassy by Richard GIBSON, who suggests their sharing a flat in ALGIERS. Both need to brush up their French before "the others pour in" to ALGIERS. Mark agrees to go to Richard's flat, 30 Stockleigh Hall, Prince Albert Road, to discuss various points. Mark mentions that his wife is an "Afro-American". Richard says that integration is much worse here than in the U.S.A.

2nd June

11.00 hours: Yepe calls the C.F.T.E., speaks to telex room, asks whether they can send a telex to Yepe's brother in Rumania. He explains that his (Yepe's) brother is Cuban Ambassador to Rumania and is due to go to Cuba today or tomorrow. He wants first to establish whether his brother is still in Rumania. If he is, Roberto wants the following message passed: "If you see Leo HUBERMAN in Cuba, please pass this message to him - 'If you come to LONDON, Dennis PHOMBEAH is anxious to see you'. (Signed) Roberto Yepe".

3 June

12.30 hours: Pablo calls Cuban Embassy (believed PARIS) (Obtained by direct dalling.) Speaks to Esther, then asks for Paco, who mentions that Guillermo has to return to Cuba, because his daughter has a cerebral haemorrhage. Pablo says he and Manuja are also "going to return". Paco asks "But they haven't called you?" Pablo replies "No". Gives no further explanation, but will write to Paco. Mentions that Mark SCHLEIFFER is coming to PARIS and will telephone Paco. Guillermo, Paco remarks, has already caught his plane to PRAGUE. Miriam is alone. Guillermo had been in touch with FRANQUI, and ROA had agreed to his going. This leaves the Commercial Attache.

SECRET

24 JUN 1965

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Directory for Plans

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Malcolm X - Carlos Moore and Sandy Bethune. (Afro-American Unity Group in Paris)

1. Forwarded herewith as Attachment is a Xerox copy of a photostat of a transcript of a telephone conversation between Carlos Moore (and his friend Sandy Bethune) and the late Malcolm X, which took place 8 or 9 February 1965. SUGAR obtained this transcript on 4 June from the editor of the West Indian Gazette, (fnu) Manchanda. SUGAR believes that Manchanda got the photostat from the Ghana High Commission office in London. He further believes that the Afro-American unity group in Paris (among whom there is only one member with U. S. citizenship: the American Negro photographer, John Taylor) probably supplied the transcript to the Ghana officials as a means of building their credentials as a bona fide revolutionary organization, perhaps one entitled to receive financial support.

2. SUGAR gave the current (June 1965) address of Jamaican/Cuban Carlos Moore as: c/o Pedro Filipe, 168 Rue Grenelle, Paris 7e, France. SUGAR said that Filipe is a Cuban national.

CSCI-316/02636-65

Attachment: 1

CI/ICG-AGoodrich:lac
22 June 1965

SECRET

GROUP 1
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201-759145

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23 Jun 65 IN 98790

REF A DIR 20944
B DIR 21708
C PALP 3983 (NOT SENT BUEN) (IN 83309)

1. REQUEST DIR RELAY BUEN SUBSTANCE REF C, ESPECIALLY DEADLINES FOR DEPOSITS IN SWISS ACCOUNT.

2. BUEN PLS ADVISE WHEN TRANSFERS EFFECTED.

3. NO INDEX

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201-306052

23 June 65

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file Stebony ops

21 June 65

Talked to Cy Goodrich this morning about STEBONY. He feels that he is on the level with us, that he is legitimately disenchanted with the far left, that he sees himself as a loyal American, that KATZENBACH was incorrect in saying that STEBONY would find it morally repugnant to act as a political action agent but would willingly serve as an FI collection asset (which doesn't make a whole lot of sense.) STEBONY was not in the least reluctant to take the LCFLUTTER; passed it apparently clean. The cover is admittedly a bit flimsey, but is supplemented by a connection with Tunisian L'Action for which he will do some layout work and writing. Cy believes that ST understands perhaps better than he did the need for cover and attribution of income. Contract provides for $500 a month plus $100 non-accountable ops expenses plus $10 a day while in Algiers, plus $20 a day while in travel status, 1 June through 31 August, renewable for a two year period if mutually desirable and satisfactory, with 30 day termination clause. We have told JAGUAR of our recruitment of STEBONY - Cy does not believe that they are in direct touch with him, but that they are in contact with friends of his, particularly one MARCHANT? or some such name. I asked Cy what STEBONY had been asked to do for us in Algiers, and he replied " to work himself into a position of access - to get information on factions and all developments in the conferences which have not been publicized." I asked if he had been given any requirements which dealt with strictly Algerian matters and he said No, that Rodigast had been told that we would send further requirements for the meeting tentatively scheduled with STEBONY in Rome or Tangier around 16 June.

I talked to Bob Wiley, who will draw up a list of requirements to send RODIGAST. Cy Goodrich and I agreed that I would open ops files on STEBONY, even though we have no project yet, and he will give me the contents of his soft file to include in it. He is also having the 201 file tidied up by RI and will have it charged to AF/1

NP

SECRET

Chief KUWOLF X

Chief, KUDESK; Chief of Station, Brussels; Chief, WE

Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT
DYVOUR/Operational
STEBONY/QRPREY/Operational Contact with Iden A

201

1. For the Information of COS, Brussels: KUDESK and KUWOLF are jointly engaged in the operational exploitation of the peculiar talents and contacts of a newly-acquired asset, STEBONY/1 (Iden B). STEBONY/1 has had a rather turbulent career as a leftist revolutionary agitator and propagandist over the past several years during which time he came to know (and be known by) a number of significant personalities in the pro-Chinese factions of several European Communist Parties. Among these personalities is Iden A. STEBONY/1 has been denounced within these same circles as a KUBARK agent for some time, though until January of this year KUBARK was not in contact with him. It was only early June of this year that he actually signed a letter of agreement with an "ODYOKE Service". Currently STEBONY/1 is in Algeria seeking to re-establish himself in revolutionary circles as a prelude to a long-term penetration operation (at KUBARK's behest) targeted against the revolutionary cadres of Africa, Asia and Latin America which are apparently being given increasingly direct support by Peking.

2. One of STEBONY/1's bona fides in revolutionary circles is his acquaintance with Iden A who has told him that, personally, he does not share the doubts spread about STEBONY/1 because, as Iden A puts it, STEBONY/1's primary accuser not only charges he is a KUBARK agent but also an Iden A agent, which Iden A of course knew not to be the case. However, STEBONY/1 is actually in the process of seeking to ingratiate himself with Iden A and of winning his confidence to such an extent that their personal relationship might serve as STEBONY/1's credentials for some time to come. At present the relationship shows signs of being off to a good start. STEBONY/1 visited Iden A in Brussels on 9 June 1965 with the intention of getting himself accredited as a correspondent of Iden A's newspaper, Iden C. Iden A told him that, in fact, Iden C was sending Iden D to Algiers to cover the summers activities there. Iden A then added that Iden D would get in touch with STEBONY/1 in Algiers (c/o Iden E) so that STEBONY/1 could "introduce him around". STEBONY/1 considers this a fortuitous circumstance in that

-continued-

Attachments:
Identity List usc
Book usc

Distribution:
3 - Chief, KUWOLF w/atts usc
✓2 - Chief, KUDESK w/att 1
2 - COS, Brussels w/att 1
2 - Chief, WE w/att 1

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

OFLA-2541 18 June 1965

JUN 22 1965

SECRET 200-126-19/3

he can exploit Iden D as a "walking credential" in Algiers a unique way to suggest he himself is one of Iden A's "boys". It should be noted on the other hand, that this situation provides Iden A a unique means of monitoring STEBONY/1's activities and contacts

3. Of priority interest at this moment, however is the fact that Iden A has expressed to STEBONY/1 his dissatisfaction with the progress to date in getting his book (Iden F) published in English Iden A claims that an Australian is supposed to be working on a translation but that he has heard nothing from him in over six months STEBONY/1 then told Iden A that he himself could do the translation job with the aid of friends but that he would have to spend some time with Iden A to work over fine points and to write together a new chapter updating the book In this way STEBONY/1 feels he could cement his personal relationship with Iden A

4. There are obviously operational and Station policy questions that should be considered in this context. First of all, our sole reporter on the STEBONY/1-Iden A relationship is STEBONY/1 himself Is he really seeking to set up a meaningful operational gambit to be exploited by KUBARK, or is he seeking to regain status among his former peers? We tend to believe the former on the basis of the results of STEBONY/1's LCFLUTTER examination and his long conversations with his deep cover case officer. Secondly, would the damage to the PBPRIME national interest inherent in the publication of Iden A's book in English outweigh the operational gain to be made by putting STEBONY/1 in Iden A's confidence. STEBONY/1 argues that, on the contrary, the publication of the book in English could hurt no one except possibly Iden A himself, because STEBONY/1 claims the book is a tiresome polemic against one small communist group by another small communist group. WOFIRM has no intention of recommending that KUBARK help get the book in print in any case for that would be Iden A's own problem Moreover, if STEBONY/1 did not undertake the translating job, the Australian would probably come through before too long anyway.

5. We are sure that addressees can see in this situation the seeds of a useful operational contact with Iden A who, according to various reports STEBONY/1 is receiving from other of his contacts in the pro-Chicom factions of the European Communist Parties, is starting to lose his grip on his own organization

6 In any event, unless advised to the contrary, we intend to encourage STEBONY/1 to continue developing his relationship with Iden A, especially as regards translation of the book. We are forwarding to Headquarters (usc) a copy of the book and request that the appropriate office in KUCHAP be approached immediately and asked to provide, on a priority basis, an English-language translation which we can pass to STEBONY/1 He could then rework this translation somewhat and involve his wife in the editing of it presenting the finished product to Iden A as a family effort Of particular importance from a critical point of view is that translations of quotations from non-francophone sources (Marx and Lenin for example) should be consistent with the "official" English-language version of the quotations.

7 The time element involved is this: KUWOLF Career Agent Rufus P BOLIGAFT will be meeting STEBONY/1 in Rome on or about 15 July. At that time he should have some firm word from KUBARK on the status of the translation effort In matter of fact of course, the ideal situation would be to have the translation in hand at that time though we cannot gauge from here whether that is within the realm of possibility In any case BOLIGAFT would have to have the translation definitely in hand the first week of August when he will be leaving Paris for his second one meeting with STEBONY/1

8. Paris/LCPIPIT would welcome advice and guidance from addressees on this venture and would be happy to clarify further any points which may have been raised in this dispatch but not fully answered

Harvey G. FABRICK

SECRET

Attachment to OFLA 2541
Under Separate Cover

Identity A - Jacques Grippa

Identity B - Richard T. Gibson, formerly of Fair Play for Cuba Committee and former editor of English edition Révolution Africaine

Identity C - La Voix du Peuple

Identity D - Arnold Hauwaert

Identity E - Georges Arnaud

Identity F - Marxisme-Léninisme ou Revisionnisme?

SECRET

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING

TO: AF
Chief, KUDESK

INFO: Chief, LCPIPIT; Chief, KUWOLF; Chief, WE; Chief of Station, Algiers

FROM: Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT: STEBONY
JAGUAR Report on STEBONY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: LOND 8101

1. Following is the full text of the JAGUAR letter, a part of which was transmitted under ref:

"We have received the following two items of intelligence about S/1:

1. Some time in May this year, S/1 said that he would be going to Tunisia on 15th June to work on the staff of the paper "L'Action."

2. After his quarrel with Jacques VERGES in 1964, S/1 received £200 as "personal financial assistance" from Jacques GRIPPA, the leader of the pro-Chinese Communist faction in Belgium. Nils ANDERSSON also gave him financial help.

Our sources were not able to say when the financial assistance was given to S/1 but presumably that from GRIPPA was made available some time between July and November last year."

2. S/1 reported to Station in May that he had had an offer of a job on L'Action, but there was no intention of his accepting it.

3. London has some doubts about whether S/1 in fact received this much money from GRIPPA. We suspect that he has told people this to enhance his stature as a "Chinese agent"; we still wonder, though, what funds he may have been covering this way, since we had not contacted him as of the time in question. Perhaps, as a result of ref, LCPIPIT may shed some light on this point.

George H. KATZENBACH

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Distribution:
2-Chief, KUDESK
2-Chief, LCPIPIT
2-Chief, KUWOLF
3-Chief, WE
2-Chief, AF
2-COS, Algiers

CS COPY

201-306052

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
17 June 1965	22 JUN 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OELA-43,382

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

Chief of Station, Rome, Chief KUWOLF

Chief, KUDESK; Chief, WE (Attention: WE/4)

Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT

PRIORITY

DTDORIC/Operational
GAPREY/STYBONY/1 Contact in Rome.

1. KUWOLF Career Agent Rufus P. RODIGAST is now the deep cover case officer for STYBONY/1 a newly-acquired potential penetration asset targeted on the pro-Chicom revolutionary movements of Africa Asia and Latin America. On or about 15 July 1965 STYBONY/1 will proceed from his current base of operations (Algiers) to meet with RODIGAST in Rome per Iden A

2. While in Rome STYBONY/1 plans to stay with Iden B Moreover Iden B's apartment may be used as a meeting site for RODIGAST and STYBONY/1 when Iden B is at work. In view of this we request Station and Headquarters traces (KUDASK and ODENVY only) on Iden B.

3. While in Rome RODIGAST will more than likely require Station support in the nature of pickup and pouching facilities for documents cash travel advances for STYBONY/1 (which are to be T/A'd to Headquarters. charge YOKITCH) and cable commo facilities should the need arise. RODIGAST is known to Rome Station Officer Lowell F AISTON and perhaps others in the Station. RODIGAST is also known to and knows the witting personnel in PEGREGALE.

4. We would appreciate hearing from Rome Station at your earliest convenience concerning your capability to render the type of support noted above. RODIGAST would plan to make contact with the Station through PEGREGALE unless the Station should desire an alternate contact plan

Harvey S FARERIGE

Attachments:
Identity List (See PALP 4070) TO: ROME + ~~[illegible]~~ DIR

Distribution:
3 - COS Rome
✓2 - Chief KUWOLF
2 - Chief, KUDESK
2 - Chief, WE

CS COPY

JUN 17 1965

201-306052

OPLA-2538

17 June 1965

SECRET

200-126-73/3

file STEBONY/1
201-306052

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/KAPOK

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, KUDESK

INFO: Chief, LCPIPIT; Chief, WE; Chief, KUWOLF

FROM: Chief of Station, London R/F

SUBJECT: KUDESK STEBONY SMOTH
BAIRN Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Attached is a copy of an item culled from a report of BAIRN (a sensitive SMOTHop) reflecting contact between Mrs. Sarah GIBSON and Pablo FERNANDEZ, the Cultural Officer at the Cuban Embassy. There is nothing particularly new or startling here, and it is forwarded for inclusion in the records.

2. Maruja is Pablo's wife; Sarah is, of course, the wife of Richard GIBSON.

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachments
Herewith

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Distribution:
~~2~~-Chief, KUDESK w/att h/w
2-Chief, LCPIPIT w/att h/w
3-Chief, WE w/att h/w
2-Chief, KUWOLF w/att h/w

201-306052

1 att

CS COPY

DATE TYPED: 16 June 1965

DATE DISPATCHED: 17 JUN 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OELA-43,353

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-306052

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/KAPOK

TO: Chief, KUDESK
FROM: Chief of Station, London
Attachment to OELA-43,353
16 June 1965

26th May, Cont.
16.40 hours: Mrs. Sarah GIBSON (ph), of the Press Department, Tunisian Embassy, calls Cuban Embassy, explains to Margo that she wants Pablo to send, as previously discussed, some copies of "Revolucion Pueblo y Cultura" and "Lunes de Revolucion", either just on temporary loan, or if some copies can be spared, for retention by the Tunisian Embassy. The Press Secretary in the Tunisian Embassy is on the point of leaving to go back to TUNIS (going on 28th May) and before doing so, he very much wants to have a look at those papers. Margo promises to arrange this matter with Pablo, for delivery of copies to the Press Department, Tunisian Embassy, 29 Prince's Gate. Sarah GIBSON asks for delivery today if possible, if not, the following morning.

16.50 hours: Pablo calls Mrs GIBSON at KEN 4133 on Christian name terms, asks how her husband, Dick, and the children are, confirms that he will let her have some copies of "Ruega" (ph) given to him by a Cuban in LONDON, also "Pueblo y Cultura", but has no copies of "Revolucion". Confirms he will come to Sarah's house on Saturday afternoon (29th May) with Maruja and the children if it is fine, but he will come anyhow, as he wants to have a talk with Sarah. The GIBSON's home number is PRI 8776. Sarah remarks that the Tunisian Press Secretary is being sent back to Tunisia to take charge of a newspaper, and he has been most impressed by the Cuban layout in their publications. He needs the copies to give him ideas for his own work, and Sarah wants the influence to be Cuban.

Jeune Afrique?

att #1 to ELA-43353 CS COPY 201-306052

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, KUDESK

INFO: Chief, LCPIPIT; Chief, WE; Chief of Station, Algiers; Chief, AF

FROM: Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT: KUDESK STEBONY
Processed STEBONY/1 De-Briefing Material

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Transmitted herewith are copies (one for KUDESK, one for LCPIPIT) of the processed material resulting from the initial series of debriefings of STEBONY/1. Again London Station is indebted to Roberta L. HORRELL for her superb work in preparing this excellent study.

2. We have made most of this material available to JAGUAR. The sections headed "Interest of Foreign Communist and Leftist Groups in the American Negro Problem," "The Robert Williams Case," "Black Nationalism," and "The American Negro" were not passed to JAGUAR.

3. We are retaining one copy of the entire study, which we are making available for review by ODENVY/London, who have expressed interest in this material. We trust that ODENVY Headquarters will be appropriately advised of the contents of these papers.

4. We see no reason for London Station to retain this copy in the files, and propose to destroy it unless Headquarters asks us to send it on to some other addressee. Similarly, we plan to destroy our copy of the rough transcript of the debriefing (previously forwarded under OELA 42,706, 9 March 1965) unless Headquarters would like us to send it on. In either case, let us know of your wishes regarding these items by, say, 15 July. In the absence of any instructions by that time, we will destroy them.

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment:
Herewith

Distribution:
2-Chief, KUDESK w/att h/w
2-Chief, LCPIPIT w/att h/w
3-Chief, WE w/o att
2-COS, Algiers, w/o att
2-Chief, AF w/o att

[stamp:] GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-306052

CS COPY IN 200-124-156/4

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 15 June 1965

DATE DISPATCHED: 17 JUN 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OELA-43,329

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-306052
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 37

15 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM: [illegible]

ACTION: [illegible]

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TYPED

UNIT: AF TIME: [illegible]

INFO: FILE, VR, ADDP, [illegible]

S E C R E T [illegible]

PRIORITY DIR INFO BERN LOND CITE [illegible] 4053

ZIBET QRPREY STEBONY KUDESK QKFIND

REF A PALP 3983 (IN83509)

B BERN 5384 (IN83502)

1. IN VIEW REF B, REQUEST HDQS EXPLORE WITH DIEARN CAPABILITY EFFECT SUGGESTED EXTERNAL BANK TRANSFER UNDER CONDITIONS SPECIFIED REF A. BRUSSELS MIGHT BE LOGICAL SOURCE IF CAPABILITY EXISTS.

2. NO INDEX.

S E C R E T

SECRET

4 SUGGESTED EXTERNAL BANK TRANSFER.

201-306052

15 Jun 65

14-00000

INDEX: ___ NO ___
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ___
X-REF TO FILE NO. ___
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. ___

...FIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 42

201-

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIB...

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED 9

FROM PARIS (LCPIPIT)

ACTION WE 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE, VR, CA 2, CA/O 4, AF 6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, TSD 6, FE 6, RI/AN

S E C R E T 151530Z

DIR INFO ALGI LOND PARI CITE PALP 4056

KUDESK STEBONY CRPREY

15 JUN 65 IN 90665

REF A. LOND 7991 (IN 81357)

B. LOND 7995 (IN 81479)

C. DIR 15660

D. FRAN 5087 (IN 82159)

1. STEBONY/1 (S) MET RODIGAST (R) 12 JUNE PARI AS PLANNED AND PROCEEDED SAFEHOUSE WHERE R DEBRIEFED S AND TAUGHT HIM S/2 SYSTEM 64.

2. IN 13 JUNE LCFLUTTER S ANSWERED NEGATIVE TO FOLLOWING KEY QUESTIONS WITH NO INDICATION DECEPTION:

A. HAS ANYONE EVER APPROACHED YOU TO SERVE NON-PBPRIME IS?

B. HAVE YOU EVER SERVED ANY NON-PBPRIME IS IN ANY CAPACITY?

C. ARE YOU NOW A PAID AGENT OF ANY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT?

D. DOES YOUR WIFE KNOW YOU HAVE A CONNECTION WITH AN ODYOKE SERVICE?

E. HAVE YOU TOLD ANYONE ABOUT YOUR CONTACTS OR YOUR AGREEMENT TO COOPERATE WITH AN ODYOKE ORGANIZATION?

F. ARE YOU UNDER OBLIGATION TO ANYONE TO REPAY ANY DEBTS

SECRET

R copy

201-306052

14-00000

SECRET

FOLLOW IN 90665 Page 2
RID/MIS

OR FAVORS? (PER LOND 8131) (IN 87361)

Jun 21 11 PM '65

G. IS THERE ANYTHING THAT WOULD MAKE YOU A TARGET FOR BLACKMAIL? (PROBE TO SEE IF REVOLUTION ASSOCIATES HAVE ANY HANDLE)

H. HAS ANYONE EVER ATTEMPTED TO BLACKMAIL YOU?

I. HAVE YOU EVER ATTEMPTED TO BLACKMAIL ANYONE?

J. HAVE YOU DELIBERATELY GIVEN US ANY FALSE OR FABRICATED INFO IN TALKS WE HAVE HAD WITH YOU?

3. 14 JUNE R BRIEFED S RE BANDUNG II MHNINCE AAJA, ETC, PASSED S ONE S/W SYSTEM 64 CARBON, ADVANCED 733 DOLLARS CASH TOWARD TRAVEL AND PER DIEM.

4. S ETA ALGI O/A 20 JUNE VIA SURFACE TRANSPORT FROM MOROCCO. S FUTURE CONTACTS WITH R SCHEDULED OUTSIDE ALGERIA. NO RPT NO STA CONTACT REQUESTED BUT WOULD APPRECIATE INFO HIS ALGI ACTIVITIES AS MAY BE ACQUIRED PASSIVELY BY STA STAFF PERSONNEL.

5. POUCHING COMPREHENSIVE WRAP-UP.

6. INDEX 201-336352.

* Suggested SW Carbon for STEBZNY be obtained from Paritech.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: OELA-43,311

TO: Chief, KUDESK

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 201-

INFO: Chief, WE; Chief, AF; Chief, KUWOLF; Chief, LCPIPIT; Chief of Station, Algiers

FROM: Chief of Station, London

DATE: 11 June 1965

SUBJECT: STEBONY
JAGUAR Report on STEBONY/1

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
- MARKED FOR INDEXING
- XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

Following is the text of a JAGUAR letter, dated 2 June:

"According to a secret and reliable source, STEBONY/1 has stated that he is working for the Belgian newspaper 'La Voix du Peuple'. He will be leaving London shortly for the Continent and will later be going to Algiers. He has told his friends that his job with 'La Voix du Peuple' turned up in time to save him and his family from 'starvation'."

George H. KATZENBACH

Distribution:
2-Chief, KUDESK
3-Chief, WE
2-Chief, AF
2-Chief, KUWOLF
2-COS, Algiers - Out Pouch
2-Chief, LCPIPIT

CS COPY

201-306052

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PAGE NO. 1

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: OELA-43,308

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.:

TO: Chief, KUDESK

INFO: Chief, WE; Chief, LCPIPIT; (Attn: RODIGAST); Chief, AF; Chief of Station, Algiers

FROM: Chief of Station, London

DATE: 10 June 1965

SUBJECT: KUDESK STEBONY JAGUAR
JAGUAR Officer's Comment on STEBONY/1 and Wife

RE: "43" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCES

1. In the course of an informal discussion on 8 June with the JAGUAR officer most familiar with the history of STEBONY/1 (and our relationship with him), the JAGUAR officer commented that he was frankly surprised at the volume of sexual activity of the African Communists and far-leftists. His first reference was to types such as Jeanne PYNOR, but he broadened the comment to include Rosalynde AINSLIE and others, and of course there were the recipients of these girls' affections as well - Africans (usually black) such as Kenyatta and Babu.

2. The JAGUAR officer then added that S/1's wife was also known to have shared her favors with other black men than S/1 - to such an extent, at any rate, that her promiscuity had come to JAGUAR's notice. (I mentioned that this must be some new news, since we had not heard of it before, but he indicated that this was old news, and apparently not of the type to be considered "derogatory.") The JAGUAR officer went on to say that S/1 himself has put in a certain amount of time in the beds of other white girls, and perhaps this is how he knows of the promiscuous propensities of some of them.

3. While S/1 has not particularly affected prudery in our talks, neither has he professed himself to be a great and universal lover.

George H. KATZENBACH

Distribution:
2-Chief, KUDESK
3-Chief, WE
2-COS, Algiers - Out Pouch
2-Chief, AF

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CS COPY

201-306052

FORM 1-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

CONTINUED

PAGE NO. 1

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 30

3 SECRET

AF/1/CI

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM LONDON

ACTION WE 8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CA 2, CA/O 4, AF 6, CI, ADDP, CA 4, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/OA,

10 Jun 65 IN 87361

S E C R E T 101531Z

PALP INFO DIR ALGI CITE LOND 8101

STEBONY KUDESK KUWOLF JAGUAR

1. JAGUAR REPORT STATES "AFTER HIS QUARREL WITH VERGES IN 1964, STEBONY/1 RECEIVED 200 POUNDS AS 'PERSONAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE' FROM JACQUES GRIPPA. NILS ANDERSSON ALSO GAVE HIM FINANCIAL HELP".

2. JAGUAR DO NOT KNOW WHEN GRIPPA FUNDS GIVEN TO S/1, BUT ASSUME BETWEEN JULY AND NOVEMBER 1964.

3. IT POSSIBLE, OF COURSE, ULTIMATE SOURCE JAGUAR INFO IS S/1. MIGHT BE USEFUL, NONTHELESS, GET S/1 COMMENTS.

S E C R E T

CFN

201

SECRET

unsolicited, or did we ask for this?

2

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/[illegible]

PROCESSING ACTION: XXX — NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief of Station, Paris (Attention: COVERDALE)

INFO: Chief, WE; Chief, LCPIPIT; Chief, KUDESK; Chief of Station, Madrid

FROM: Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT: STEBONY/Operational Data on Antonio LOPEZ Campille

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: OFPA 79622, 19 May 1965 (not sent all addressees)

1. On 4 June STEBONY/1 provided the following information on the personality and living pattern of Subject which we hope will be helpful to COVERDALE in mounting an eventual recruitment approach.

a. Subject is smarting with desire for revenge against those who have cut him off from all meaningful political activity and probably from a source of income as well. (NOTE: Subject told S/1 that currently GRIPPA is providing his PCB-ML with the equivalent of $1,000 per month.) He is particularly angry with [illegible], who owes him some money.

b. An intellectual, Subject has never been particularly effective in the area of practical organisational politics. He is rather weak in the sense that in a conflict situation he tends to pull back. In other words he is not aggressive by nature. At the same time, S/1 felt certain that Subject's indignation and desire for revenge were deeply seated in his emotions and he would not be able to rationalise away these feelings.

c. Subject is basically a friendly and courteous person.

d. Subject speaks French and Spanish but no English. His wife, described by S/1 as a stronger personality than Subject, does speak English. She teaches school.

e. Subject has mixed feelings towards GRIPPA, but uppermost is his desire to rehabilitate himself with the Belgian "gauleiter." It is thought that if someone telephoned Subject and made reference to "Jacques" or "a message from a friend in Belgium" Subject would most likely come out for a meeting.

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

f. Subject has irregular working hours at the CNRS and it would be easy for him to leave the job for an hour or two without anyone becoming suspicious. He works on research projects and more or less sets his own hours.

g. Asked if he thought Subject would be in a position to provide much information on the PCE Pro-ChiCom dissident groups, S/1 said that he thought Subject was well-informed and, if willing, would be

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	COPY OELA-43,294	~~201-[illegible]~~ 9 June 1965 201-306050
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/[illegible]	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-

able to provide a great deal of information despite his having been pushed aside from active and direct participation in recent months.

2. Based on the foregoing, the best ploy for getting at Subject might be a telephone call to his place of work with the caller using a cover pretext for meeting him alone and deferring all detailed questions to such a meeting on the grounds of not wanting to discuss these over the telephone. If this gets Subject out, then COVERDALE could apologize for the minor deception while explaining that it was required by reason of his not wanting to cause Subject embarassment or injury in the course of contacting him. Good hunting.

3. It may be possible for STEBCNY/1 to contact Subject during his visit to Paris 11 - 17 June. If COVERDALE would like to get a more current reading on Subject, please get in touch with Rufus F. RODIGAST, who will be meeting S/1 on 12 June.

Joseph S. TIFFANY

Distribution:
2-COS, Paris (Attn: COVERDALE)
3-Chief, WE
2-Chief, LCPIPIT
2-COS, Madrid
2-Chief, KUDESK

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET KAPOK

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, KUDESK

INFO: Chief, WE; Chief, FE; Chief, AF; Chief, KUWOLF; Chief, KURIOT; Chief, LCPIPIT

FROM: Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT: STEBONY KUDESK QRPREY
Asian-African Journalists' Association Correspondence

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Transmitted as separate cover attachment are copies of correspondence from the AAJA to STEBONY/1. Among these materials is an original copy of one letter, which is forwarded for KURIOT's exemplar stockpile.

2. These materials were passed to TIFFANY by S/1.

3. London Station is not retaining copies of this material, nor do we anticipate passing any of it to JAGUAR.

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment:
(USC)

Distribution:
2-Chief, KUDESK w/att (USC)
3-Chief, WE w/o att
2-Chief, FE w/o att
2-Chief, AF w/o att
2-Chief, KUWOLF w/o att
2-Chief, KURIOT w/att (USC)
2-Chief, LCPIPIT w/o att

201-306052

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 8 June 1965

DATE DISPATCHED:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OELA-43,273

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-306052

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET KAPOK

14-00000

Asian-African Journalists' Association

(Persatuan Wartawan Asia-Afrika)

Sekretariat : Press House — Djakarta
Telp. 21/47

No.: Djakarta, April 3rd 1964

Dear Colleague,

Warmest greetings!

As you are aware the Secretariat at its Second Meeting held in Gadok, Bogor (Indonesia), from November 30th to December 1st 1963, decided, inter-alia, to name April 24th, the opening day of the first Asian-African Journalists' Conference, "THE ASIAN-AFRICAN JOURNALISTS' DAY".

You will readily agree that the naming of April 24th, as Asian-African Journalists' Day, is of immense importance to us Afro-Asian journalists.

The Secretariat call on all its member organizations and members to observe this Day by celebration and meetings; press statements, articles and write-ups etc. in the various Afro-Asian newspapers and mass media generally.

This day will also mark the first anniversary of our Association and we earnestly call on you, dear members and colleagues, to mark this day as a historical event in the life of all Afro-Asian journalists particularly, and the Afro-Asian peoples generally.

We hope that you have by now received copies of the first issue of "the Afro-Asian Journalist". If you have not, please contact us and we will gladly let you have some (state how many).

We further call on you to continue sending us articles on the press-as well as on the struggle either for independence, or for the defence of your independence in your country-for publication in "the Afro-Asian Journalists".

We look forward to receiving material, newspapers etc. from you.

So as to inform all our member colleagues of your activities could you write us of or send us clippings of your activities on "the Asian-African Journalists' Day".

We look forward to hearing from you soon and wish you, in the Bandung spirit, all success and the further solidarity of our Association.

Yours fraternally,

LM/hif.-

Asian-African Journalists' Association

(Persatuan Wartawan Asia - Afrika)

Sekretariat : Press House — Djakarta
Telp. 62109 ext 777

ns.-

No.:

Djakarta, March 31st 1964.-

Statement on Cambodia

In response to an urgent appeal by the Cambodian Journalists, to journalists throughout the world, the AAJA calls on all its members to voice support for Cambodia's policy of peace and neutrality and to denounce the U.S. Imperialists, Thailand and South Vietnam, for their aggression against peaceful Cambodia.

We urge all our members to join their voices in demanding that the U.S. Government and all its allies agree readily to the proposal made by the Cambodian Head of State, Prince Norodom Sihanouk for guaranteeing the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia; and to give valuable support to the just struggle of the Khmer people for developing their economy independently.

oooOOOooo

Enclosed a complete set of the daily bulletin that we ran for the duration of the [illegible] Film Festival III, which ended in great success, and which thoroughly exposed all those who refuse to recognise that our common enemy is ~~xxx~~ imperialism headed by the [illegible]. The bulletin helped much to make the Communique possible.

We will be writing to you more fully,

comradely yours,

[illegible] Morrison.

[signature]

With our compliments and best wishes !

PS Some Translations at the back

Secretariat
Asian — African Journalists' Association
Press House
Djakarta
Indonesia

Phone : 61749

[illegible handwriting]

Asian-African Journalists' Association

(Persatuan Wartawan Asia-Afrika)

Secretariat : Press House — Djakarta
Telp. 61749

Registered.

No.: 110/KL/LK/64/P. Djakarta, 11th. May 1964

Richard Gibson,
Editor
"Revolution",
40 rue Francois 1er,
P A R I S.-

Dear Colleague,

Thank you ever so much for readdressing the letters of comrade Viriato da Cruz to him in Algiers. We are eagerly waiting for some response from him.

Your suggestions of sending us 100 copies of the English and a further 100 copies of the French editions is most welcome. We will gladly accept any subscription funds here in Indonesia and hold such funds until it can either be transmitted or used it by you here in Indonesia.

Your remarks about devoting some efforts to encouraging the progressive press for Afro-American in the USA were noted. We will be discussing the matter soon. (There is no objection in principle- indeed there can't be any at all). What is worrying us the prospects of getting information and articles regularly from any Afro-Americans progressive pressmen. Maybe you have some suggestions and ideas. Let us know, as we urgently feel the need to widen and strengthen unity, with our Afro-American brothers in the states. (We have dispatched 50 copies of the second issue of the AAJ to you).

We are just having some material typed and would let you them as soon as they are done. We would like you to assist (we can supply the articles) in popularising the convening of the next Bandung Conference (Heads of Afro-Asian States). Various forces are already working against such a conference and we have to forcefully put forward the suitability etc of a Second Bandung Conference.

Have you any suggestions etc.?

Our Deputy Secretary-General Joesoef who attended the Sixth session of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Council meeting in Algiers as an observer, had hoped to call on you in Paris, but unfortunately he was delayed somewhere else and could not thus meet you. However we hope that soon one of our colleagues will have the pleasure of meeting you and colleague Verges and discuss various common problems.

In the meantime, dear colleague, accept our warmest greetings.

Fraternally yours,

Joesoef
Deputy Secretary-General

Asian-African Journalists' Association

(Persatuan Wartawan Asia - Afrika)

Sekretariat : Press House — Djakarta
Telp. 61749

No : 962/Sekr/63

Djakarta, 30th December, 1963

REGISTERED AIR MAIL

The Director,
"Revolution",
Metropole,10/12,
LAUSANNE,
Switzerland.

Dear Colleague,

Greetings! The Asian-African Journalists Association founded in April,1963 by 48 countries and Asian African Journalists Unions, took various far reaching decisions and resolutions.

Inter-Alia, it has decided to publish a monthly news bulletin; and to set up a Lumumba Academy, which will serve as a centre of information and reference.

The monthly magazine "Africa Latin America Asia Revolution, is of such a revolutionary content and import that we would like to receive two or three copies regularly monthly. In our turn we will send you copies (state how many) of our bulletin, the first issue which will be ready for dissemination mid January6- next month.

Is there a possibility of you also sending us back number issues of your magazine, as well as the special illustration-"Revolution"- for our office and for usage in the Lumumba Academy.

We are sending you, under seperate cover, some documents relating to the decisions and resolutions passed by the historic conference; and hope that you will keep in close contact with us, as we are aware that we have much in common, in our struggle against the common enemy-imperialism, colonialism in all its forms and manifestations.

Wishing you a prosperous New Year and further successes in your revolutionary work,

Yours fraternally,

Djawoto
SECRETARY GENERAL.

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Asian-African Journalists' Association

(Persatuan Wartawan Asia - Afrika)

[Secr]etariat : Press House — Djakarta
Telp. 61749

MR/AB

REGISTERED

No.: Djakarta, March 13th 1964

Richard Gibson,
Editor-in-Chief,
REVOLUTION
Paris.

Dear Colleague,

We have received the various copies of REVOLUTION, which we heartily thank you for.

Your letter was ver encouraging, and we have noted the contents. We share your ideals, and are thoroughly convinced that our struggle against the forces of reaction will still further advance, and triumph.

We will bear in mind your request for articles etc., and will do all in our efforts to help.

REVOLUTION plays an important part in our revolutionary struggle against imperialism and colonialism in all its forms and manifestations, and as such we would like to help in the further distribution of REVOLUTION. We are widely distributing it in Indonesia, and hope to do the same in South EastAsia as well. In addition, because of the foreign exchange problem, we will rather give you names of other interested persons outside Indonesia to whom you can send sample copies. Or we could do that if you so desire. Please let us know! A little note to the effect that we will distribute and wherever possible in South East collect articles for you, in REVOLUTION will be welcomed and facilitate matters.

We are printing initially 6.000 English copies of the 'the Afro-Asian Journalist',and hope to have an extra 4.000 in French ready soon.

We will dispatch 50 copies of 'the Afro-Asian Journalist' to you, under seperate number immediately -(one we will send airmail). If you would like more please do not hesitate to contact us.

Can you also send us some more French copies of REVOLUTION, if possible, as well as some posters.

Dear Colleague, our struggle is gaining momentum and the forces of reaction manifested in colonialism and imperialism in all its forms and manifestations are on the retreat. Our very close co-operation will further help in destroying colonialism and imperialism, which is the curse of all mankind.

/We look .....

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Asian-African Journalists' Association

(Persatuan Wartawan Asia-Afrika)

Sekretariat : Press House — Djakarta
Telp. 61749

No.: Djakarta, ____________ 19__

We look forward to hearing from you again. Greetings and warmest wishes to your Director Comrade Verges and all the other revolutionaries who are working together with you.

Fraternally yours

Djawoto
Secretary-General
A.A.J.A.

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4-65 SUIU

INDEX: ☐ YES ☑ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-306052

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☑

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 23

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

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PARIS (LCPIPIT)

ACTION
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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED

UNIT WE TIME 0946 BY

INFO
FILE, VR, CA2, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, RI/AN

S E C R E T 071148Z 7 Jun 65 IN 84527

PRIORITY DIR INFO LOND CITE PALP 3990 AF/1 - C. Billings will reply.

KUDESK STEBONY QKPREY

REF LOND 7991 (IN 81357)

1. IN FINAL LOND MEETING STEBONY/1 (S) TOLD RODIGAST TIFFANY HE ASSUMED PER DIEM WOULD ACCRUE S ENTIRE ALGI STAY. S CLAIMED IMPOSSIBLE LIVE WITHOUT PER DIEM BECAUSE:

A. HIGH COST LIVING ALGI

B. MAINTAINING TWO HOUSEHOLDS

C. WIFE BEGINS MATERNITY LEAVE 1 JULY.

ANSAS	FI	CI/ICG
RS	DEST	
ABSTRACT	X	INDEX

2. TIFFANY SUGGESTED TEN DOLLAR PER DIEM COMPROMISE AND S ACCEPTED. ESTIMATE TOTAL ADDITIONAL EXPENSE 450 DOLLARS.

3. CONSIDER THIS REASONABLE ARRANGEMENT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES AND REQUEST HQS APPROVAL BY COB 10 JUNE. 7 JUN 1965

4. S SUPPLIED FURTHER EVIDENCE GOOD FAITH 6 JUNE IN PASSING ADDRESS BOOK AND REVOLUTION AFRICAINE AND AAJA CORRESPONDENCE FOR COPYING. LOND POUCHING.

5. INDEX: 201-306052.

SECRET

S E C R E T

CFN

*RYBAT REF 201-306052 7 JUNE 65

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/KAPOK

PROCESSING

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	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief of Station, Algiers

INFO: Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT; Chief, AF; Chief, WE; Chief, KUDESK; Chief, KUWOLF

FROM: Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT: STEBONY/Operational - Plans and Progress with STEBONY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: OELA 43,237

Forwarded herewith as Attachment is a report written by TIFFANY and RODIGAST covering their meeting with STEBONY/1 during the period 1-5 June. Though meetings will be held with S/1 on 6 and 7 June, it is not expected that these will produce any new information to alter the substance of Attachment. Info supplied by S/1 on a variety of personalities and activities will be handled by separate dispatch and info reports.

Joseph S. TIFFANY

Attachment:
Herewith

Distribution:
2-COS, Algiers w/att h/w
2-COS, Paris/LCPIPIT w/att h/w
2-Chief, AF w/att h/w
3-Chief, WE w/att h/w
2-Chief, KUDESK w/att h/w
2-Chief, KUWOLF w/att h/w

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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POUCH SECURITY VIOLATION
NO FIELD DISTRIBUTION

201-306052

DATE TYPED: 4 June 1965

DATE DISPATCHED:

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OELA-43,272

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-306052

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/KAPOK

att - 1

TO: Chief,
FROM: Chief of Station, London
Attachment to OELA-43,272
4 June 1965

1. Cover Situation. S/1 was not successful in lining up any cover arrangement in the U.S. Around 28 May he received word from New York of a flat turn-down on his offer to serve as correspondent for Monthly Review. ~~Maro Schleiffer, who was on the spot got this job, and~~ MR's chief editor Leo Hubermann plans to attend 2nd Bandung himself. Locally, however, S/1 was able to line up the following sponsors (though none is in a position to pay much for his services they collectively provide him with sufficient reason for being in Algiers; he will let on that his travel costs were advanced him by his wealthy brother-in-law):

a. Cinnamon, a sort of British Ebony scheduled to bring out its first issue on 20 June.

b. West Indian Gazette, described in earlier correspondence, will provide S/1 with a letter of accreditation.

c. Institute of Race Relations. This politically neutral, academic outfit publishes a monthly newsletter. Connected with Chatham House, the Institute's secretary, Sheilla Paterson is a good friend of S/1. She has asked him to do a paper back book for the Institute on Africa. Again, though they could pay little for this effort it constitutes a highly respectable piece of cover.

During the last two months, S/1 has explained his income to his wife as coming from advances, expense money and articles for Encounter. This has not pleased her, as she dislikes both the Congress for Cultural Freedom and Laskey, but has at least satisfied her curiosity. To explain Katzenbach's telephone calls to his home (K. identified himself to S/1's wife ~~xxx~~ as "Mr. Wilson") S/1 had to improvise a purely notional affiliation with an American feature story syndication service called "Metropolitan Features". This will help explain some of his income to his wife, but will not be used with others.

2. The above skeletal cover will hopefully be reinforced in Algiers where S/1 will scour around for bits and pieces of work for his many contacts there. His visits to Grippa and Andersson on his way to Algiers will also help to fill out his ostensible sources of income, though S/1 has agreed not to overplay this angle. In other words, he will not pretend that these two have given him any funds, but if others want to make the assumption, so much the better.

3. On 1 and 2 June, Tiffany expounded at some length on the importance of S/1 trying to get an Opposition (Soviet, Cuban, Algerian or ChiCom) sponsor for any further cover, such as the researching of a book or establishment of an Afro-Asian news service for U.S. leftist periodicals and/or individuals. While we could easily set him up in this enterprize, we do not ~~want~~ to for the simple reason that this would at best only provide him with a superficial sort of access. What we want him to strive for is Opposition sponsorship that will lead him into one of the nerve centers of the national liberation movement in Algiers or Djakarta. (S/1 ruled out Cairo on the grounds that his wife is Jewish) S/1 accepted this reasoning and agreed to go for a position that holds out the prospect of long-range penetration in depth.

Att #1 to OELA-43272

201-306052

4. Turnover to Rodigast. After getting S/1's unhesitating agreement to an LCFLUTTER examination and his signature on a Secrecy Agreement on 2 June, Tiffany introduced him to Rodigast, under the alias "Paul Weller" on the morning of 3 June. It was explained that Rodigast would serve as S/1 point of contact in the future. S/1 and Rodigast hit it off well from the outset, the latter's knowledge of Paris and Tangiers-based American beatniks and other intellectuals serving him well in the rapport-building process. Rodigast ~~xxxxxx~~ has laid on firm meeting arrangements for Paris and has discussed arrangements for meeting S/1 at least twice during the summer outside Algiers. Final agreement on a mid July meeting will be made in Paris to conform to a normal pattern by S/1 and ~~xxxxx~~ arrangements which S/1 succeeds in developing in Lausanne and Paris. In the process of discussing communications Rodigast is also imparting instruction in good security practices on the part of S/1. Rodigast will instruct S/1 in the use of SW in Paris. Hopefully, Rodigast will be able to spend a day or two with S/1 in Paris, even though we want S/1 to get to Algiers as soon as possible.

5. Financial Arrangements. After discussing all possible alternatives, it was decided that the most secure arrangement would be to give S/1 an advance of the equivalent of $200 for his travel London-Brussels-Lausanne- Paris and per diem and ~~his~~ an advance of the equivalent of $600 for his June salary plus non-accountable expenses. These advances were made and signed for on 3 June. One ~~xxxxxx~~ important reason for the large cash advance was the fact that S/1 ~~ixxxxxxxxx~~ was completely broke, and he had to make some funds available to his wife to meet expenses and pay off a 65 pound Sterling debt to his brother-in-law before leaving on his trip. (S/1 will explain the funds as the last of the advances and payments for articles by Encounter and other publications.) For essentially the same reason (poverty) we agreed to make S/1's July and August salary payments in advance (to be paid into his Swiss bank account on the first of each month). We recognize that this procedure is

somewhat irregular, but we went ahead with it principally on the grounds that this was necessary to head off the security and morale problems posed by an irate wife.

6. In the course of his initial talk with S/1, Rodigast pursued the matter of the allegations made at various times in the past to the effect that S/1 is or was a "CIA agent" or "FBI agent". S/1 explained the situation as follows:

a. S/1 was a schoolmate of William Gardner Smith, and with Smith's encouragement came to Paris and worked with Smith on the English desk of Agence France Presse. S/1 took over the left bank apartment of Ollie Harrington, American Negro cartoonist and CPUSA member. S/1 had a falling-out with Harrington over the apartment (rent), and in what he describes as a moment of weakness he sought revenge by forging a letter with Harrington's signature which indicated support for the FLN (Algerian nationalists); at that time the French were extremely sensitive to the subject, of course, and S/1's act was designed to hurt Harrington, and perhaps his friends as well. S/1 was found out, and questioned by the French police; his break with William Gardner Smith and that crowd dates from this moment. S/1 had been forced to write an apology to Harrington, confessing to the forgery.

b. S/1 believes that Jacques Vergès obtained the letter of apology (to Harrington) from Smith or from Ellen Wright (an American, white, widow of the Negro novelist Richard Wright; she continues to reside in Paris as a literary agent handling books of writers connected with Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir; S/1 says that she is a friend of Harrington). As for Harrington, S/1 believes he is now in Ghana or in East Germany; in East Germany he has American friends: a Negro singer Aubrey Pankey and his white wife Kay; she is an editor of the East German publishing house Seven Seas (which prints books in English), and is close to Shirley Graham Dubois.

c. The CPUSA knew of the Harrington forgery and

according to S/1 told the Cubans about it, since the CPUSA hoped to discredit S/1 and put their own people in touch with the Cubans. S/1 told the Cubans a tall tale which he hopes they believed (among those he spoke to was Roa): he said that during the French drive against the FLN various people were writing letters in support of the Algerians and signing prominent names to them, and that the Harrington forgery was carried out in this spirit.

d. The hostility to S/1 from Ainslee and McGowan had as its origin their anger that Vergès had given S/1 a job that should have gone to an Englishman (or woman); they felt that Africa was a problem of the British CP; and so they spread the story about S/1.

e. Rodigast recalled that William Gardner Smith had once written a letter to the Paris Herald Tribune denying that a pro-Castro letter which appeared several days earlier signed W G Smith had been sent by him. At the time (perhaps 18 months ago) Smith told Rodigast, who questioned him on the matter, "Oh, that's an old story." Without indicating that he knew Smith, Rodigast raised the question of Smith's Herald Tribune letter to S/1, who said he had never seen it or heard of it before.

f. Rodigast gave S/1 the recent clipping from Le Monde which indicated that Patricia MacGowan's husband or lover Carlos Lansa had been arrested by the Algerians in connection with the investigation of the Delgado killing. Rodigast warned S/1 that we did not know whether a charge would be made, or indeed whether Lansa had already been released along with others arrested at the same time. Nevertheless S/1 thought the clipping would be useful to show to those not terribly familiar with the details, but who might be favorably influenced by a report showing that the people who denounced S/1 as a "CIA agent" had also sent Delgado to his death.

7. Questioned on his residence status vis a vis French and Swiss authorities, S/1 said:

a. He feels he can come and go to Switzerland without

problems. When Revolution was closed down by the Swiss, S/1 was called in and notified that he had three months to leave the country because of the undesirable nature of his activities; the Swiss told Nils Anderssen informally that should S/1 change to a "desirable" activity he would be allowed to stay. Following his departure on what S/1 considered very polite terms (i.e., the three-month notice period), S/1 traveled regularly to Switzerland (once a month, on Revolution business), although he tries to arrive by means which expose him to minimal border checks (train rather than plane, and Trans Europe Express best of all) and while in Switzerland lives with friends rather than in a hotel to avoid having to fill out police cards. (S/1 was notified of his expulsion in September 1963 and left in December before the deadline. His most recent trips were in January-February 1965.)

b. S/1 was never arrested by the French, merely interrogated on the Harrington forgery charge. He has resided in Paris since that time. During the early stages of S/1's suit against Vergès for payment of back wages, Vergès' attorney said in open court that S/1 had been in France illegally (as he had no carte de sejour; he could not obtain one since Vergès never agreed to a work contract which would be required at the time of application for a carte de sejour). (In connection with the Vergès suit: S/1's French lawyer Pierre Schwarzenberg, has not pressed the charges; he is a Communist and an old friend of Vergès, and told S/1 he believed he could obtain a settlement through persuasion. S/1 has already paid Schwarzenberg's fee (the money was obtained from S/1's brother-in-law), and does not know whether he can whip up Schwarzenberg's enthusiasm. Should S/1 win a judgement for the some $5000 owed to him, he could force Vergès' bankruptcy (there is a printer in the same legal position who has not insisted on payment because he is reluctant to bring on bankruptcy). S/1 says that it is possible that if he engaged a first-class non-Communist attorney in France (who would have to be paid in advance) he might achieve

14-00000

this goal, but it is not certain that he could get the original fee back from Schwarzenberg.

8. For future contacts, Rodigast gave S/1 "an alias I am using: James Sunderland, c/o American Express, 11 rue Scribe, Paris 9, the "c/o American Express" being optional. Rodigast will also look into the possibility of emergency contact via want ads placed in Alger Republicain or Le Peuple (the latter is preferred by S/1), which Rodigast believes will be purchased and read daily by LCPIPIT during the summer anyway-- they arrive in Paris a day or two after publication. S/1 could advertise for a stenographer able to take perfect English shorthand, for example.

Rufus F. Rodigast

Joseph S. Tiffany

CS COPY

POUCH SECURITY VIOLATION
NO FIELD DISTRIBUTION

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET RYBAT

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
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XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
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	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, WE

INFO: Chief of Stations; Algiers; Paris/LCPIPIT; Chief, AF; Chief, KUDESK; Chief, KUWOLF (Attn: Noel D. KAMMERMAYER)

FROM: Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT: STEBONY/KUDESK/QRPREY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: A LOND 7991
B DIR 15660

1. Forwarded under separate cover true name pouch as Attachment 1 is the original Letter of Agreement signed by STEBONY/1 on 3 June. Attachment 2 forwarded with this dispatch is a santized version of this contract.

2. Attachment 3 forwarded under separate cover true name pouch is a Secrecy Agreement signed by STEBONY/1 on 2 June.

3. Attachment 4 forwarded underseparate cover true name pouch is PRQ Part I, filled out by STEBONY/1 on 2 June. It should be noted that due to limitation of time this was prepared in great haste.

4. Attachment 5 is the top half of the signature specimen assigning a pseudonym to STEBONY/1. The bottom half of this document is forwarded as Attachment 6 under separate cover true name pouch.

Joseph S. TIFFANY

Attachments 1,3,4,& 6 (USC)
Attachments 2 & 5 Herewith

Distribution:
3-Chief, WE w/o att
2-COS, Algiers w/o att
2-Chief, AF w/att 2 h/w & 4 (USC)
2-Chief, KUDESK w/att 1, 3, 4 & 6 (USC) & 2 & 5 h/w
2-Chief, KUWOLF w/o att

automatic downgrading and declassification

CS COPY

DATE TYPED: 4 June 1965

DATE DISPATCHED:

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OELA-43,237

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-306052

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET-RYBAT

SECRET

LETTER OF AGREEMENT

Mr. Richard T. Gibson

Dear Mr. Gibson:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you for the purchase of certain information and related services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the purchase of such information and services, you will be paid an amount calculated at the rate of $500.00 per month. Payments will be made in a secure manner acceptable to you. No taxes will be withheld from this amount. Escrow: A mutually agreed portion will be withheld in an escrow account for you for reasons of security as soon as this becomes a practical possibility.

2. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary expenses incurred in connection with such operational travel as may be directed or authorized by the U. S. Government. You will be required to account for such expenses in a manner consistent with good security. Since security conditions generally preclude the detailed accounting of miscellaneous travel expenses, per diem will be paid at the rate of $20 per day during periods of authorized travel.

201

3. Operational Expenses. You will recieve $100.00 per month for necessary operational expenses on a non-accountable basis. Any operational expenses incurred beyond the amount must be specifically authorized by U. S. Governemnt.

4. The U. S. Government will compensate you in an amount mutually agreed upon for the relocation of you and your family to a new residence if such a relocation is considered desirable by you and the U. S. Government.

5. The Organization, in recognition of a clear moral obligation will undertake to protect you against any adverse actions related to your activities and associations entered into at the request of the U. S. Government during the term of this agreement.

6. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by U. S. Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under applicable laws and regulations.

7. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges, or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment hereto shall be binding on the U. S. Government.

8. Term. This contract is effective as of 1 June 1965 and shall continue thereafter for three months (to 1 September 1965). Extension to two years (to 1 June 1967) will be contingent upon the granting of full operational clearance and your performance during the summer 1965 assignment in North Africa and access acquired during that period. Furthermore, it is understood

a. That on or before 1 September 1965 it will be possible to renegotiate the terms of compensation of this contract for the period following that date;

b. That after 1 September 1965 this contract (and its extension) can be terminated by either party with 30 days notice.

Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath (Secrecy Agreement) you have signed.

United States Government

By [signature]

SECRET

TO: Chief, KUDESK
FROM: Chief of Station, London
Attachment No. 2 to OELA-43,237
4 June 1965

LETTER OF AGREEMENT

STEBONY/1
Dear Mr. STEBONY/1

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, Hereby contracts with you for the purchase of certain information and related services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the purchase of such information and services, you will be paid an amount calculated at the rate of $500.00 per month. Payments will be made in a secure manner acceptable to you. No taxes will be withheld from this amount. Escrow: A mutually agreed portion will be withheld in an escrow account for you for reasons of security as soon as this becomes a practical possibility.

2. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary expenses incurred in connection with such operational travel as may be directed or authorized by the U. S. Government. You will be required to account for such expenses in a manner consistent with good security. Since security conditions generally preclude the detailed accounting of miscellaneous travel expenses, per diem will be paid at the rate of $20 per day during periods of authorized travel.

3. Operational Expenses. You will recieve $100.00 per month for necessary operational expenses on a non-accountable basis. Any operational expenses incurred beyond the amount must be specifically authorized by U. S. Governemnt.

4. The U. S. Government will compensate you in an amount mutually agreed upon for the relocation of you and your family to a new residence if such a relocation is considered desirable by you and the U. S. Government.

5. The Organization, in recognition of a clear moral obligation will undertake to protect you against any adverse actions related to your activities and associations entered into at the request of the U. S. Government during the term of this agreement.

6. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by U. S. Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under applicable laws and regulations.

7. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges, or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment hereto shall be binding on the U. S. Government.

8. Term. This contract is effective as of 1 June 1965 and shall continue thereafter for three months (to 1 September 1965). Extension to two years (to 1 June 1967) will be contingent upon the granting of full operational clearance and your performance during the summer 1965 assignment in North Africa and access acquired during that period. Furthermore, it is understood

a. That on or before 1 September 1965 it will be possible to renegotiate the terms of compensation of this contract for the period following that date;

b. That after 1 September 1965 this contract (and its extension) can be terminated by either party with 30 days notice.

Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath (Secrecy Agreement) you have signed.

United States Government

ACCEPTED: 3 June 1965

/s/ STEBONY/1

By [signature]
Robert C. Gusske

SECRET

SECRECY AGREEMENT

1. I, Richard Gibson, understand that upon entering on duty I am undertaking a position of trust in the Organization responsible for intelligence relating to the security of our country. I understand that in the course of this association I will acquire information about the Organization and its activities and about intelligence acquired or produced by the Organization.

2. I have read and understand the provisions of the espionage laws of our government and I am aware that unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to the national defense may subject me to prosecution for violation of such laws, whether such disclosure be made while I am associated with the Organization or at any time thereafter.

3. In addition, however, as I am undertaking a position of trust, I have a responsibility to the Organization not to disclose any classified information relating to the Organization without proper authorization. I undertake, therefore, not to discuss with or disclose to any person not authorized to hear it from information relating to the Organization, its activities, or to intelligence material under the control of the Organization. I further understand that this undertaking is a condition of my association with the Organization, that its violation may subject me to immediate dismissal for cause or to other appropriate disciplinary action, and that this undertaking shall be equally binding upon me after my association with the Organization as during it.

4. I understand that the burden is upon me to ascertain whether or not information is classified and if so, who is authorized to receive it, and, therefore, I will obtain the decision of authorized officials of the Organization on these points prior to disclosing information relating to the Organization, and failure to obtain such a decision will be grounds for my dismissal.

5. I understand that my unauthorized action or verbal or written utterance which would reasonably be expected to result in publicity on intelligence or intelligence activities would be in violation of government and Organization regulations and would be grounds for my dismissal.

6. I understand that there are established procedures within the Organization permitting appeal at all times of any legitimate criticism, grievance, or complaint and that to carry any such grievance or complaint which I may have outside the Organization will be considered a violation of the undertaking set forth above in paragraph 3.

7. I further understand and agree that my association with the Organization is conditioned upon my understanding of and strict compliance with the Organization security requirements.

8. I will not undertake to publish or participate in the publication of any information or material relating to the Organization, its activities, or intelligence activities generally, either during or after the term of my association with the Organization without specific prior approval by the Organization.

611038

Visas

IMPORTANT INFORMATION FOR YOU

- **TRAVEL IN DISTURBED AREAS**

  If you travel in disturbed areas, you should keep in touch with the nearest American diplomatic or consular office.

- **PROLONGED RESIDENCE ABROAD**

  If you make your home or reside for a prolonged period abroad, you should register at the nearest American consulate.

- **LOSS OF NATIONALITY**

  [illegible]

- **VIOLATION OF CONDITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS**

  [illegible]

- **LOSS OR DESTRUCTION OF PASSPORT**

  [illegible]

- **ALTERATION OR MUTILATION OF PASSPORT**

  [illegible]

9. I agree that all information or intelligence acquired by me in connection with my official duties with the Organization remains the property of our government, and I will surrender, upon demand by an appropriate official of the Organization or upon separation from the Organization, any material relating to such information and intelligence in my possession.

10. I take the obligations set forth above freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and seal this 2nd [redacted]

day of June 1965.

Richard Gibson (SEAL)

Witness:

Robert [illegible] Approved:

Date

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

__/PRQ/ __

PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Instruction: 1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply, write "not applicable" (NA)
3. Attach blank pages if additional space is needed.

1. Full Name RICHARD (First) THOMAS (Middle) GIBSON (Last)
2. Name in native script NA
3. Name at birth (if different from 1.) NA
4. Aliases, nicknames, legal changes (State briefly time, reason and place of use.) NONE
5. a. Date of birth 13 MAY 1931 b. Place of birth LOS ANGELES, CALIF.
6. Present citizenship, race if appropriate Negro
7. Nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities (if different from 6.) U.S.
8. Present residence (Owner, tenant, sub-tenant.) 30, STOCKLEIGH HALL, PRINCE ALBERT ROAD, LONDON, N.W.8 (tenant)
9. Permanent address (if different from 8.) NA
10. Present occupation (full title, salary etc.) FREELANCE JOURNALIST
11. Naturalization of subject or of close relatives in the United States. (Give date and name in which certificate granted.) NA
12. Relatives, friends, correspondents in United States. (Explain relationship) MRS. SADIE THOMAS (grandmother)
MR. CLARENCE GIBSON (father)

/PRQ/

13. Father - full name, occupation, present residence, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and subsequent nationalities.

CLARENCE LOUIS GIBSON, CURRENT ADDRESS UNKNOWN IN PHILADELPHIA, PA. RETIRED MAILMAN. US. CITIZEN BORN IN U.S. BUT DATE AND PLACE UNKNOWN

14. Mother - same information as 13.

ALICE M. GIBSON (née THOMAS)
DECEASED 1936 or 37 (?)

15. Wife (or husband) - full name, maiden name, date and place of birth, date and place of marriage, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence, divorce, annulment. (Give data for all previous marriages.)

JOY MARJORIE GIBSON (née KAYE), BORN HENDON, ENGLAND 12 July 1926, British, 30 STOCKLEIGH HALL, PRINCE ALBERT RD., LONDON, N.W.8
Married 24 MARCH 1956 in PARIS.

16. Children - full names, sex, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence.

Dominique Elisabeth GIBSON, F. 29 Oct. 1956 in Paris, Nationality U.S.
Frederick William Gordon GIBSON, M. 5 March 1958 in Paris - U.S.

17. Brothers and sisters - Same information as 16.

None

14-00000

/PRQ/

25. Military service - dates, country, unit, rank, duty, where services performed, decorations, when discharged, why. Give details if ever prisnor of war

Entered U.S. Army in Trieste, Italy - Dec. 1952 ~~sent to~~ Fort Dix, N.J. for basic training, later transferred Fort Benning, Ga., then to 37th Engineer Gp (Const), Gttingen, Germany as Public Information NCO - discharged in Germany Dec. 1954

26. Present and past membership in organization (professional, social, political, etc.) FPCC - see #21

member NAACP, Urban League and American Society of African Culture

27. Special skills, abilities, hobbies (radio, photography, etc.)

Can operate camera, tape recorder

28. Financial status - earnings, bank deposits, securities, property

Owe £1500 to my brother-in-law (Gordon Kaye)

Various lesser debts in Paris resulting from Revolution fiasco

29. Employment history - type of work, salary, dates, employers, addresses, reasons for leaving. Include employment by any government.

cub reporter - Philadelphia Afro-American (newspaper) Autumn, 1950 - Spring 1951 - salary approx. $50 per week - left for literary fellowship at "Yaddo", Saratoga Springs, N.Y. 1951-1952 - Rome - worked freelance for Italian Films Export, film publicity outfit, and Edmund Stevens, then Rome correspondent of Christian Science Monitor [illegible]

/PRO/

18. Relatives in service of any government, names and positions held.

None

19. List all official identity papers held with dates, numbers, place of issue and duration of validity.

20. Religion - degree practiced, membership in religious orders

EPISCOPAL — NOT PRACTICED

21. Present and past political affiliations

FOUNDING MEMBER, FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE

1960 – 1962

22. Travel outside country of present residence - country, dates, purpose, people and firms visited (see attachment)

1951-52 ITALY John Hay Whitney Fellowship;
1954 – W. GERMANY – U.S. ARMY
1954-58 FRANCE – GI BILL at Sorbonne, then editor Agence France Presse 1960-61 Four or Five visits to Cuba for FPCC

23. Education - school, location, course, degree, dates

24. Languages and dialects (Indicate proficiency as good, fair, poor.)

Language	Speak	Read	Understand
French	good	good	good
Italian	poor	fair	fair
Spanish	poor	fair	fair
German	poor	fair	fair

/PRQ/

29. (Continued)

Also assisted late Italian writer and film producer, Curzio MALAPARTE, on Italo-American film project. Salaries were all small and based on piecework. Drafted in U.S. Army in Dec. 1954.
1955-58 English editor at Agence France-Presse in Paris.—was discharged when "Ollie" HARRINGTON brought forgery charges against me. Salary 900 frs. per month
1959-61 CBS News, New York—newswriter—salary approx. $200 per week. Discharged because of involvement in Fair Play for Cuba, but was given CBS Fellowship at Columbia Grad. School (mainly African studies) for 60-61

30. Has subject done any writing? Give details including titles of books, articles, publishers, dates. A MIRROR FOR MAGISTRATES (novel), London, 1958. Numerous articles in many periodicals, such as KENYON REVIEW, GIORNALE D'ITALIA, PERSPECTIVES U.S.A., MONTHLY REVIEW, THE NATION, REVOLUTION, BOHEMIA (Havana), REVOLUCION (Havana), etc.

31. List persons living at same address, close associates, (individuals or groups,) correspondents at home and abroad.

Wife and children live with me.

~~See attached~~ Correspondents at home and abroad too numerous to list here but have been reported earlier.

32. List five character references.

NA

/PRQ/

33. Court record - court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals, denazification, etc.

None

34. Description (Use American standards of measurement, if possible.)

Age 34 | Posture stooped
Apparent age 36 or 37 | Weight 165 lbs.
Height 5 ft 10 in | Teeth gap in front
Eyes black | Hair kinky black
Face - shape oval | Scars —
Complexion light | Build medium
Sex M

General appearance fairly neat, reasonably well dressed

Prominent features none

Other identifying features wear glasses

35. Other miscellaneous biographical data and comments.

14-00000

22. Travel (cont.)

1962 - ENGLAND, FRANCE, ~~[illegible]~~ MOROCCO, ALGERIA
Departure from FPCC, no fixed objective abroad, Employed by Jacques VERGÈS and Révolution Africaine in Algiers, Nov. 1962

1963 - 64 SWITZERLAND, FRANCE, BELGIUM HOLLAND, ENGLAND - residence or trips involved with business of editing Revolution

1964 - ENGLAND - Stay with wife's family, seeking employment

1965 - JAN. + FEB. ITALY, SWITZERLAND, FRANCE, BELGIUM - trip financed by Encounter to research article

29. EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

1961-62 Acting Executive Secretary, Fair Play for Cuba Committee - salary ran from $150 to nothing per week. Left because of unwillingness to continue an unpleasant task.

1962-64 - Editor Révolution Africaine and later Editor of its English edition - salary 1000 (new) French frs. at first and later 1500 frs. per month - rupture based on financial collapse of publication and various disagreements with Vergès, its publisher.

14-00000

TO: ~~Chief,~~ KUDESK
FROM: Chief of Station, London
Attachment N. 5 to OELA-43,237
4 June 1965

Signature Specimen London 2 June 1965

In the future I will use the following pseudonym and signature.

Frederick T. Dominie
Frederick T. Dominie

TO: Chief, KUDESK
FROM: Chief of Station, London
Attachment No. 6 (USC) to
OELA-43,237, 4 June 1965

Richard T. Gibson
Richard Gibson

14-00000

FBI doc.
24 May '65 (Wash.)
Re: Richard Thomas Gibson
no Bufile given

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, WE

INFO: Chief, KUDESK; AF; FE; LCPIPIT; Chief of Stations, Algiers; Paris

FROM: Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT: KUDESK STEBONY QRPREY JAGUAR
JAGUAR Report on STEBONY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

JAGUAR had made the following available to us, in response to our request for information on a continuing basis relating to STEBONY/1:

"In mid-May STEBONY/1 was still trying to arrange a visit to Algiers this summer - on the strength of help he has received from 'some comrades'.

"Robert WILLIAMS in Havana has given STEBONY/1 the impression that he may visit Algiers as a member of a Cuban delegation. Also, STEBONY/1 understands that William WORTHY, who has been in Hanoi, will be going to Algiers. STEBONY/1 expects to meet a number of his friends there and his main reason for wishing to make this trip is to discuss his problems, past and present, with these friends and other interested parties. He hopes to clear up doubts and uncertainties and, in this context, he has commented that one of the reasons for much of the hostility shown to him has been the reluctance of others to involve themselves in the differences which arose between himself and Jacques VERGES because the latter was clearly more influential and more important than STEBONY/1.

"STEBONY/1 had heard that VERGES was still insisting that STEBONY/1 was a KUBARK agent and that Nils ANDERSON and Jacques GRIPPA were 'ODYCKE double agents'. GRIPPA, who is leader of the pro-Chinese Communist group in Belgium, is planning to bring up-to-date his book 'Marxism-Leninism or Revisionism', published two years ago, by adding a new chapter. STEBONY/1 is looking into the possibility of its publication in the UK or PBPRIME and, in this context, he considers 'Monthly Review' to be the only possible medium although Leo HUBERMAN, one of the publication's editors, is not enthusiastic about the idea."

George H. KATZENBACH

201-306052

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Distribution:
~~3~~-Chief, WE
2-Chief, KUDESK
2-Chief, AF
2-Chief, FE
2-Chief, LCPIPIT
2-COS, Algiers
2-COS, Paris

CROSS REFERENCE TO: CS COPY

DATE TYPED: 2 June 1965

DATE DISPATCHED: 9 JUN 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OELA-43,235

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-306052

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-306
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 34 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM LONDON

ACTION C/WE 3 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT WE TIME 1534

INFO FILE VR, ADDP, C/CI

S E C R E T 021651Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO ALGI PARI PALP CITE LOND 7991 2 Jun 65 IN 81357

KAPOK STEBONY KUDESK QRPREY

2. ON 1 JUNE KATZENBACH INTRODUCED TIFFANY TO STEBONY/1 (S/1). ON 2 JUNE S/1 FILLED OUT PRQ PART ONE, SIGNED SECRECY AGREEMENT AND PSEUDO CARD, AGREED SIGN TWO YEAR CONTRACT 3 JUNE ON FOLLOWING TERMS:

A. COMPENSATION: FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS SALARY PLUS ONE HUNDRED NON ACCOUNTABLE EXPENSE ALLOWANCE PER MONTH.

B. TRAVEL COST PLUS AUTHORIZED MISCELLANEOUS OPS EXPENSES.

C. TERMINATION: TERM FIXED 1 JUNE THROUGH 31 AUGUST AT END OF WHICH IT POSSIBLE RENEGOTIATE SALARY IN LINE WITH S/1 ALGI PERFORMANCE AND DEGREE ACCESS HE HAS ACHIEVED FOR LONG TERM PENETRATION ASIAN AFRICAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT. ALSO ON 1 SEPT THIRTY DAY CANCELLATION CLAUSE BECOMES OPERATIVE.

D. KUBARK AGREES PAY COST RESETTLEMENT S/1 FAMILY AT END ALGI SUMMER TOUR IF THIS REQUIRED BY S/1 JOB LOCATION.

E. QUESTION OF HOLDING PART S/1 COMPENSATION IN ESCROW TO BE DECIDED 3 JUNE. DUE OBLIGATION FAMILY MAINTENANCE, HOWEVER, IT UNLIKELY LARGE PORTION CAN BE WITHHELD DURING NEXT THREE MONTHS.

SECRET

3 JUN 1965

ANT ✗	~~PS~~	WE/BC/4
~~BC~~		
ABSTRACT ✗		~~INDEX~~

201-306052

2. SINCE THIS CONTRACT IN LINE WITH TIFFANY TALKS WITH AF DIV PRIOR DEPARTURE HQS, WILL ASSUME APPROVAL UNLESS NOTIFIED OTHERWISE AND PRESENT CONTRACT FOR S/1 SIGNATURE 1000 HOURS 3 JUNE. IMMEDIATELY AFTER WILL INTRODUCE RODIGAST. S/1 PASSED EQUIV 100 DOLLARS SIGNING BONUS.

3. TENTATIVE ITINERARY FOR S/1 IS DEPART LOND 8 JUNE SPEND ONE DAY TO VISIT GRIPPA AND OR RAINDORF BRUS; TO LAUSANNE BY RAIL 9 JUNE; TO PARI BY RAIL LATE 11 JUNE; TO TANGIER BY AIR 16 JUNE AND ON TO ALGI BY RAIL 17 OR 18 JUNE.

4. WE BELIEVE S/1 HAS ADEQUATE COVER FOR ALGI SUMMER, DETAILS BY POUCH.

5. ON BASIS TALKS WITH MARC SCHLEIFFER 1 JUNE S/1 SUGGESTED THAT HE TAKE TAPE RECORDER (OSTENSIBLY SUPPLIED BY BROTHER IN LAW) TO ALGI TO USE TOGETHER WITH S FOR RECORDING INTERVIEWS FOR PACIFICA FOUNDATION NEW JERSEY RADIO STATION WBAI. TIFFANY GAVE TENTATIVE TURNDOWN THIS IDEA, SINCE IT HIGHLY IMPLAUSIBLE REPORTER IN S/1 POSITION WOULD SPEND TIME MAKING TAPES FOR POSSIBLE (NOT CERTAIN) NOMINAL PAYTS BY WBAI. HOWEVER, THIS GIMMICK MIGHT BE USEFUL TO GET S/1 ACCESS FOR PRIVATE TALKS WITH TARGET PERSONALITIES. LEAVE TO ALGI AND HQS DISCRETION WHETHER

SECRET IN 81357 PAGE 3

TO AUTHORIZE TAPE RECORDER FOR S/1 WHICH RODIGAST COULD PROCURE AND TURN OVER S/1 PARI 13-16 JUNE.

6. FORWARDING PRQ ONE AND SECRECY AGREEMENT. WITH THIS AND S/1 AGREEMENT LCFLUTTER TRUST HQS CAN EXPEDITE APPROPRIATE SECURITY CLEARANCE S/1.

S E C R E T

SECRET

CFN

3 JUN 1959

file R. GIBSON

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 23

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM LONDON

ACTION OS 2

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED TUBED

INFO VR. FILE, EE 4, WE 6, CI/OA, CI, AF 6, CI/OPS,

S E C R E T 271700Z

DIR INFO FRAN GMNY CITE LOND 7909

FJDUST LCFLUTTER KUDESK STEBONY

27 MAY 65 IN 77375

REF DIR 13891

DUE HIS NATIONALITY, WE DO NOT NEED SMOOTHERS OKAY TO FLUTTER STEBONY/1. HOWEVER, OUR GENERAL POLICY IS NOT TO FLUTTER HERE ANYONE WHO LIKELY REACT AND RAISE FUSS CAUSING SERIOUS POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT FOR US OR HMG. BECAUSE OF POINTS IN HIS HISTORY AND PERSONALITY, WE HAVE REASON TO DOUBT STEBONY/1 WILL COTTON TO FLUTTER, AND PREFER DEFER DECISION UNTIL TIFFANY BRIEFED AND HAS TALKED TO STEBONY/1. MAY THEN DECIDE, IF FLUTTER IN ORDER, CONDUCT IN EUROPE WHILE HE EN ROUTE ALGIERS.

CFN

SECRET SECRET

201

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, London

INFO.: Chief of Station, LCPIPIT (Paris)

FROM: Chief, WE

SUBJECT: STEBONY - Transmittal of Interview Tapes

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. PALP 3904 (IN 75497)
B. OELA - 42,706
C. OELA - 42,410

1. Forwarded herewith as Enclosure are the tapes of KATZENBACH's interviews of STEBONY/1 requested in Reference A. Hopefully, this package will reach London in time for background use by Rodigast.

2. After Rodigast is finished with the tapes, please save one reel or send it back to Headquarters for retention, and destroy the other three.

SXG
STEWART F. ROLNICK

2 - London w/att
1 - Paris w/o att

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OELW - 22238

DATE: 26 May 1965

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-306052

1 - RI
1 - CI/ICG
1 - WE/BC/U

AN SPFI
REP TEST
ABSTRACT X INDEX

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
CI/ICG	A. Goodrich	dab	5928

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WE/BC/U		John K. Roberts

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DCWE(BC)	26 May	John F. Caswell

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, FE Attn: Chief, WE

INFO: Chief of Station, London

FROM: Chief of Station, Paris

SUBJECT: KOBIRD/LCHARVEST/KUDESK/STEBONY - "Revolution" Mailing List

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: OELA-43,113 of 13 May 1965

Action: Please provide copy of subject list.

We note London Station's comment that the only copy of the "Revolution" mailing list, as provided by STEBONY, has been sent to Headquarters. We are not clear whether the STEBONY list was for the English-language edition of "Revolution" only, or for all subscribers. If possible, we should appreciate Headquarters' forwarding a list of "Revolution" subscribers and addresses in France.

Ann E. DUCOTE

Distribution:
- 2 - Chief, FE
- 3 - Chief, WE
- 2 - COS, London

201-306052

MAY 21 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OFPA - 79535

DATE: 21 May 1965

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief of Station, Paris; Chief, WE

INFO: Chief, FE

FROM: Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT: KUDESK STKBOHY LCHARVEST QRPREY
"Revolution" Address List

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: OFPA 79410, 3 May 1965

London Station was able to make only a single copy of the list, and, due to its bulk and the length of time required to copy it, we have not retained a copy. We doubt that the entire list, which runs to several thousand names (mostly in the U.S.) would be useful to Paris Station, but Headquarters may be able to supply an extract of names to suit your need — or the whole thing, if you wish.

George H. KATZENBACH

Distribution:
2-COS, Paris
~~3~~-Chief, WE
2-Chief, FE

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-306052

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 13 May 1965

DATE DISPATCHED: 14 MAY 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OELA-43,113

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

14-00000

BF

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 28

SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED: file STEBONY/1

FROM: LONDON

ACTION: WE 8

ADVANCE COPY: ISSUED / SLOTTED / TUBED

UNIT / TIME / BY

INFO: VR. FILE, AF 6, CA 2, CA/O 4, FE 6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 121711Z

DIR INFO ALGI PAPI PALP CITE LOND 7628

12 MAY 65 IN 65581

KUDESK STEBONY

JAGUAR HAVE INFORMALLY ADVISED US OF NEW REPORT THAT "RUMORS HAVE RECENTLY REVIVED SAYING THAT STEBONY/1 IS CONNECTED WITH A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY." STA REQUEST FOR ELABORATION, INDICATION OF AREA IN WHICH RUMOR CIRCULATING, ETC., MET WITH COMMENT THAT JAGUAR UNABLE TO SAY ANY MORE AT PRESENT, AND CANNOT "YET" LET US HAVE THIS COMMENT IN WRITING. WILL PURSUE AND ADVISE ANY DEVELOPMENTS.

201

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING: MARKED FOR INDEXING; XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED; ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING; ABSTRACT; MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WE

INFO: Chief, KUDESK; Chief, AF; Chief, FE; Chief, LCPIPIT; Chief of Station, Algiers; Chief of Station, Paris

FROM: Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT: STEBONY KUDESK QRPREY
Cover Possibility for STEBONY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. During a recent meeting, STEBONY/1 called my attention to the book Political Africa, by Ronald SEGAL, published London 1961 by Stevens and Sons, Ltd. STEBONY/1 used the book to look up a brief bio squib on, as it happened, Patrick Duncan. He commented that the book, although out of date and far from objective (one of the collaborators was Rosalynde AINSLIE), was extremely useful to him.

2. I subsequently got a copy of the book, and find it useful. Nonetheless, it is far out of date. It would appear that there is a great need for an up-dated version, more comprehensive and more objective. STEBONY/1 might be the ideal person to work up such a book (he could even put some of his wife's talents to work, in such a project), and, in turn, such a project could augment nicely his cover for, say, a year.

3. For Headquarters consideration then, the following suggestion: Contact Praeger (who published Political Africa in the U.S.) or another appropriate firm, and lay on a commission to compile such a compendium of facts, figures and faces on the African scene. Have them in turn commission STEBONY/1 to do the job, and provide him with enough of an advance to help cover his needs for a period of a year, say, starting after STEBONY/1's summer in Algiers. (Alternatively, of course, STEBONY/1 could be instructed to come to Praeger with such a proposal, which we could encourage Praeger to accept.) This could run concurrently with STEBONY/1's news-letter, if it materializes, and without any apparent conflict. It could also afford him additional cover for travel and interviews, as well as funds. And a useful reference tool could result.

4. This is just a suggestion, but we'd like to know what you think of it.

George H. KATZENBACH

Distribution:
~~3~~-Chief, WE
2-Chief, KUDESK
2-Chief, AF
2-Chief, FE
2-Chief, LCPIPIT
2-COS, Algiers - Out Pouch
2-COS, Paris

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO: CS COPY

DATE TYPED: 11 May 1965

DATE DISPATCHED: 13 MAY 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OELA-43,110

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-306052

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

14-00000

201-306052

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 6

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM ALGIERS

ACTION CI

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO VR. FILE AF7, CA/02

RI COPY

SECRET 111100Z

(11 Mar 65 IN 64377)

LOND INFO DIR PARI PALP BRUS CITE ALGI 5878

LCHARVEST (PRTN GRBLD-BEING SVCD) QKOPERA QRPREY

REF: LOND 7141 (IN 46013)

RE PARA 8 REF. SOURCE IN ALGERIAN DIRECTORATE OF INFO SAYS R[illegible] IS STILL HERE, ON PAYROLL OF DIRECTORATE ALTHOUGH NOT PRODUCING. CASE OFFICER SAYS SOURCE CAN PROVIDE SPECIFIC INFO [illegible] SUBJECT IF DESIRED.

SECRET

CFN

AN [illegible] | AF/1/A
RS [illegible] | INDEX
ABSTRACT Y

SECRET

201-306052

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS RI COPY RI COPY (35)

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 2 TOTAL COPIES 28

201 - 306052

27 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM: LCPIPIT (PARIS)

ACTION: ~~WE 8~~ CI/IC 2

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO: VR. FILE ADDP, AF 6, FE 6, CA/O 4, CA 2, CI, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS, CCS 3, CI/OA, CA/PROP

S E C R E T 031055Z

DIR INFO LOND ALGI CITE PALP 3756 3 MAY 65 IN 57528

KUDESK STEBONY QRPREY

REFS A DIR 04341

B LOND 7341 (IN-55353)

C DIR 98974

1. RE PARA 2 REF A, RODIGAST (R) MOST INTERESTED THIS ASSIGNMENT. HE AVAILABLE FOR JUNE 1 INTRODUCTORY MEETING LOND. WILL POUCH SHORTLY OUR THOUGHTS RE COVER ACCOMMODATION, ADDRESS, ETC.

2. MEANWHILE LCPIPIT AND R AGREE WITH REF B PARA 4 POING CONCERNING S/1-R MEETING ALGI. ALTERNATIVELY SUGGEST CONSIDER TANGIERS TRAVEL TO WHICH R CAN COVER AS TRIP TO DEVELOP FEATURE ARTICLE ON AMERICAN EXPATRIATE LITERARY COMMUNITY WHICH CONGREGATES THERE. CASA ALSO A POSSIBILITY.

8 MAY 1965

3. HAS PRECIS OF TAPE DEBRIEFING MENTIONED REF C BEEN FORWARDED? PLEASE CABLE DISPATCH NUMBER.

4. NO INDEX.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

AF/2/A

ABSTRACT

201-306052

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

RI COPY RI COPY (35)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, WE

INFO: Chief, KUDESK; Chief, AF; Chief, FE; Chief of Station, Algiers; Chief, LCPIPIT; COS, Paris

FROM: Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT: STEBONY KUDESK QRPREY JAGUAR
JAGUAR Records on STEBONY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Separate cover attachments to this dispatch are:

1 - A JAGUAR letter, forwarding
2 - A poor photocopy of STEBONY/1's passport, and
3 - A list of STEBONY/1's movements from 14 September 1962 to 7 October 1964, all derived from entries in the passport.

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachments 1, 2 & 3:
(USC)

Distribution:
3-Chief, WE w/att 1, 2 & 3 USC
2-Chief, KUDESK w/att 1 & 3 USC
2-Chief, AF w/att 1 & 3 USC
2-Chief, FE w/att 1 & 3 USC
2-COS, Algiers w/att 1 & 3 USC
2-Chief, LCPIPIT w/att 1 & 3 USC
2-COS, Paris, w/att 1 & 3 USC

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-306052

306052
~~201-128663~~

CA/CF

S/C ATT'D BY RI/AN
Dated 3 MAY 65

DATE TYPED: 27 April 1965

DATE DISPATCHED: 28 APR 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO: CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OELA-43,000

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-306052

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SECRET

TO: Chief, WE
FROM: Chief of Station, London
Attachment No. 1 to OELA-43,000
27 April 1965

Richard Thomas GIBSON
Born: Los Angeles on 13.5.31
Address: 30 Stockleigh Hall,
Prince Albert Road, London, N.W.8.

2. As requested, I am now enclosing for your perusal a photocopy of GIBSON's passport, number B.131994. I should be grateful if you would return this to me at your earliest convenience.

3. I am also enclosing for your easy reference a list of GIBSON's movements between 14th September 1962 and 7th October 1964 which has been compiled from his passport.

4. Apart from a visit to Paris for three weeks earlier this year, GIBSON and his wife, Joy Marjorie, have continued to live with their two children at the London address shown above. On his return from Paris on 14th February 1965, GIBSON was landed for three months as a visitor. In April he was reliably reported to be still apparently unemployed.

5. The above information, together with a copy of the list of GIBSON's movements, is being sent to ODENVY/LOND

SECRET

14-00000

TO: Chief, [illegible]
FROM: Chief of Station, London
Attachment No. 3 to OELA-43,000
27 April 1965

Richard Thomas GIBSON

United States Passport D.1[illegible]

issued 25.1.61 (valid 3 years)
renewed in London (valid for further 2 years)

Born 13.5.31 in California

U.S. address struck through

Foreign address: c/o Mr. Sidney Kaye,
3 Langland Mansions,
Finchley Road, N.W.3.

Passport not valid for communist controlled parts of China, Korea, Vietnam, or for Albania or Cuba.

		Passport Page No.
14.9.62.	Arr. U.K., London Airport, visit up to 3 months.	9
5.10.62.	Dep. U.K., London Airport.	5
23.10.62?	Arr. MOROCCO, Casablanca.	7
20.11.62.	Dep. MOROCCO, Oujda-Gare.	5
20.11.62.	Arr. ALGERIA, Zoudj-el-Beghal.	5
28.2.63.	Arr. SWITZERLAND, Geneva, air.	7
6.3.63.	Arr. ALGERIA, Maison Blanche.	7
9[illegible].63.	Dep. ALGERIA, Maison Blanche.	5
[illegible].63.	Arr. FRANCE, Orly.	7
[illegible].63.	Arr. SWITZERLAND, Geneva, air.	7
[illegible]4.4.63.	Dep. FRANCE, place illegible.	5
21.4.63.	Arr. U.K., Folkestone, visit up to 3 months.	9
[illegible].4.63.	Dep. U.K., London Airport.	9
[illegible].63.	Arr. SWITZERLAND, Geneva, air.	7.
[illegible].63.	Arr. FRANCE, Vallorbe.	8
[illegible].63.	Arr. FRANCE, Vallorbe.	7
[illegible].6.63.	Dep. FRANCE, Le Bourget.	9

/4.6.63. ....

SECRET

		Passport Page. No.
4.6.63.	Arr. U.K., London Airport, visit up to 3 months.	9
5.6.63.	Dep. U.K., London Airport.	9
5.6.63.	Arr. FRANCE, Orly.	7
6.6.63.	Dep. FRANCE, Vallorbe.	8
26.6.63.	Dep. FRANCE, Orly.	7
26.6.63.	Arr. U.K., London Airport, visit up to 3 months.	10
2.7.63.	Dep. U.K., Gatwick.	10
2.7.63.	Arr. FRANCE, Le Bourget.	5
[illegible].63.	Arr. U.K., London Airport, visit up to 3 months.	10
[illegible].63.	Dep. U.K., London Airport.	10
[illegible].63.	Arr. SWITZERLAND, Geneva, air.	7
1.10.63.	Dep. FRANCE, Le Bourget.	5
1.10.63.	Arr. U.K., London Airport, visit up to 3 months.	10
3.10.63.	Dep. U.K., London Airport.	10
3.10.63.	Arr. FRANCE, Le Bourget.	10
27.10.63.	Arr. FRANCE, Vallorbe.	8
28.10.63.	Dep. FRANCE, Gare du Nord.	11
[illegible].10.63.	Arr. BELGIUM, ? Brussels.	7
[illegible].12.63.	UK/R Rubber Stamp.	11
10.1.64.	Arr. FRANCE, Vallorbe.	11
23.1.64.	Dep. FRANCE, Gare du Nord.	11
23.1.64.	Arr. U.K. Folkestone, visit up to 3 months.	11
26.1.64.	Dep. U.K., Folkestone.	11
26.1.64.	Arr. FRANCE, Gare du Nord.	11
11.2.64.	Dep. FRANCE, Vallorbe.	11
11.2.64.	Arr. BELGIUM, Brussels.	11
20.2.64.	Dep. BELGIUM, Brussels.	12

/17.3.64. ....

		Passport Page No.
17.3.64.	Dep. SWITZERLAND, Geneva-Cornavin.	11
1.4.64.	Dep. SWITZERLAND, Geneva-Cornavin.	12
27.5.64.	Arr. BELGIUM, Brussels.	8
30.5.64.	Arr. FRANCE, Gare du Nord.	8
7.10.64.	Arr. U.K., Dover, visit up to 3 months.	10

TO: Chief, WE
FROM: Chief of St[illegible]on,
London
Attachment No. 2 to
OELA-43,000, 27 April 1965



IMPORTANT

This passport is NOT VALID until signed BY THE BEARER on page two. Please fill in names and addresses below.

BEARER'S ADDRESS IN THE UNITED STATES

[illegible]

BEARER'S FOREIGN ADDRESS

[illegible]

IN CASE OF DEATH OR ACCIDENT NOTIFY

[illegible]

EXPIRATION AND RENEWAL

Unless limited to a shorter period, this passport expires three years from the date of issue shown on page two. It may be renewed for an additional period not exceeding two years from the date of issue shown on page two. The renewal fee is Five Dollars. This passport must be presented with your renewal application. Renewal is shown by a stamp placed in the passport on page [illegible].

NEW PASSPORT

When this passport expires and you require a new one, this passport should be presented with your application for the new passport.

[illegible]

The Secretary of State
of The
United States of America
hereby requests all whom it
may concern to permit the
bearer to pass without delay
or hindrance and to extend
such courtesies aid and protection
as would be extended to
like citizens of foreign states
travelling to the United States.

14-00000

WARNING—Alteration, Addition or Mutilation of Entries is Prohibited. Any Unofficial Change Will Render This Passport Invalid.

NAME: RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON

BIRTH DATE: MAY 13, 1951 | BIRTHPLACE: CALIFORNIA

HEIGHT: 5 FEET 10 INCHES | HAIR: BLACK | EYES: BROWN

WIFE: X X X | ISSUE DATE: JAN. 25, 1951

MINORS: X X X

PASSPORT RENEWED
LONDON, ENGLAND.
[signature]
VICE CONSUL
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

SIGNATURE OF BEARER: [signature] Richard T. Gibson

IMPORTANT: Unless Otherwise Limited
This Passport Expires Three Years From Issue Date.
If Renewed, It Expires Five Years From Issue Date.

Photograph of bearer

ATTACHED
OF STATE

THIS PASSPORT IS NOT VALID FOR TRAVEL TO OR IN COMMUNIST CONTROLLED PORTIONS OF

CHINA
KOREA
VIET-NAM

OR TO OR IN

ALBANIA

CUBA

"A person who travels to or in the listed countries or areas may be liable for prosecution under Section 1185, Title 8, U.S. Code and Section 1544, Title 18, U.S. Code."

4

Extensions, amendments, limitations and restrictions

-3 OCT 1963

FRANCE

JUIL 1963

5

14-00000



Visas
IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PASSPORT BEARER
TO OBTAIN NECESSARY VISAS
Visas
SUISSE
E -6 SEP. 1963
E 26 AVR. 63
E 28 FEV 63
9 MARS 1963
FRANCE
02 OCT 63
29 X 1963


Visa
SURETÉ NATIONALE
10. 05. 63
27 MAI 1964
BRUXELLES-Nº 12
05. 05. 63
FRANCE
Gare du Nord
30. 05. 64
FRANCE
Visa
2 JUIN 1963
FRANCE
IMMIGRATION
IMMIGRATION OFFICER
21 APR 1963

14-00000


LE BOURGET
OCT 1963
25 FRANCE
VD
R 15-12-63
26JUN1963
LONDON AIRPORT
29 JUN 1963
DOVER
16.01.64
73 FRANCE
23 JAN 1964


GENÈVE-CORNAVIN
Frontière-Suisse
Visas
Visas
12
13

14-00000

46

MESSAGE FORM

ORIG: A. Goodrich
UNIT: CI/ICG
EXT: 1176
DATE: 22 April 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO: LOND

FROM: DIRECTOR

23 APR 65 23 19z

CONF: CI/IC 2

INFO: CI, WE 6, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, AF 6, FE 6, FI, DO 4, DO/H 3, FI/INT 2

TO LOND INFO PARI, PALP, ALGI CITE DIR CCS 3, CI/OA, VR, FILE 04341

RYBAT KUDESK, STEBONY, QKOPERA, QRPREY

REF: LOND ~~7061 (IN 43053)~~ 7141 (IN 46013)

1. ON BASIS KATZENBACH (K) DEBRIEFING STEBONY/1 BELIEVE S/1 KNOWLEDGEABILITY CONTACTS IN AREA WHERE CURRENT KUBARK ACCESS THIN SUFFICIENT WARRANT OPS FOLLOW THROUGH. STILL BELIEVE THAT ALGI DURING PERIOD MID JUNE TO MID AUGUST OFFERS BEST TESTING GROUND FOR PROBATIONARY ASSIGNMENT AND POSSIBILITIES FOR S/1 DEVELOP NATURAL COVER FOR EVENTUAL LONG RANGE PENETRATION PRO CHICOM GROUPS AND INTERNATIONAL FRONTS.

2. FOR PALP: DESIRE RODIGAST (R) HANDLE S/1 DURING LATTERS VISIT ALGI AND PROBABLY AFTERWARDS, ~~IF S/1 SETTLES WEST EUROPE~~. WOULD HOPE THAT DURING PROBATIONARY PERIOD PARA 1 ABOVE, R COULD USE JOURNALIST COVER FOR SOME TRIPS ALGI TO COVER BANDUNG AND FESTIVAL. THIS SUPPLEMENTED WITH S/1 VISIT LOND OR PARI AND ONE WAY SW SHOULD INSURE CLOSE AND EFFECTIVE MONITORING S/1 CONTACTS, INFO AND DEVELOPMENT JOB PROSPECTS IN TARGET AREA. BELIEVE R CONTACT COULD BE KEPT ON SECURE ALIAS BASIS EVEN IN PARI ALONG LINES TPSHRIFT OP. PLEASE ADVISE CONCURRENCE.

201-306052

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG: A. Goodrich
UNIT: CI/ICG
EXT: 1176
DATE: 22 April 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

Jun 21 11 PM '65

TO: LOND

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO

TO LOND INFO PARI, PALP, ALGI CITE DIR 04341

AND AVAILABILITY R FOR INTRODUCTION AT LOND MEETING WITH S/1 FIRST WEEK JUNE. IF AGREE ABOVE, SUGGEST ALSO PALP DEVELOP ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE PARI FOR S/1 CONTACT R IN FUTURE.

3. UPON RECEIPT POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM R, REQUEST K MEET S/1 AND EXPLAIN FOLLOWING:

A. ODYOKE INTERESTED AND GRATEFUL HIS COOPERATION AND HOPEFUL RELATIONSHIP CAN MATURE.

B. AS EARNEST OUR CONTINUED INTEREST WE EXTENDING ONE HUNDRED DOLLAR WEEKLY RETAINER ADDITIONAL FOUR WEEKS. IN ANTICIPATION OF POSSIBLE CONTINUED RELATIONSHIP, HOWEVER, WE CANNOT KEY SUCH PAYT TO SPECIFIC NEEDS SUCH AS KIDS TUITION. THIS PAYT CAN BE MADE IN LUMP SUM ADVANCE.

C. PRETEND K WILL BE ABSENT LOND UNTIL LATE MAY.

D. PRESENT THINKING IS THAT MID JUNE TO MID AUGUST PERIOD ALGI, WITH AFRO ASIAN CHIEF OF STATE MEETING AND WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL PLUS PERHAPS ALSO AFRO ASIAN WOMENS AND JOURNALISTS CONFERENCES, COULD OFFER VALUABLE AND APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — SECRET — GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

ORIG : A. Goodrich
UNIT : CI/ICG
EXT : 1176
DATE : 22 April 1965

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
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4		8	

TO : LOND

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO

TO LOND INFO: PARI, PALP, ALGI CITE DIR 04341

FOR S/1 CLARIFY HIS REPORTING VALUE TO ODYOKE AND HOPEFULLY DEVELOP LONG RANGE ASSOCIATION OF INTEREST TO US.

E. AS PRELIMINARY STEP WE WANT HIM USE NEXT MONTH TO LINE UP VIABLE COVER VISIT ALGI THIS PERIOD. IN ADDITION ANY NOTIONAL OR REAL HELP FROM BROTHER IN LAW, S/1 XXX SHOULD TRY LINE UP FIRM AGREEMENTS WITH ONE OR MORE FAR LEFT PUBLICATIONS FOR ACCRED-ITATION TO COVER ALGI EVENTS. EXPLOITATION CONTACT WITH INDO EMBASSY MIGHT FACILITATE. (SEE PARAS 5 - 7 FOR GUIDANCE ON REF QUERIES.)

F. EXPRESS CURRENT INTENTION TO LINE UP DEFINITIVE MEETING WITH K COLLEAGUE 27 MAY TO HANDLE FURTHER ARRANGEMENTS. ARRANGE FOR S/1 CONTACT K 24 or 25 MAY FOR FIRM MEETING INSTRUC-TIONS. FYI KUDESK STAFFER JOSEPH S TIFFANY PLANS TDY LOND 26 MAY FOR SHAKE DOWN OPS TALKS WITH S/1 PRIOR TURNING OVER TO R EARLY JUNE. THIS STEP CONSIDERED DESIRABLE IN ORDER SCREEN OUT K AND PBSWING FROM OPS FOLLOW THROUGH.

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

ORIG: A. Goodrich
UNIT: CI/ICG
EXT: 1176
DATE: 22 April 1965

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
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4		8	

TO: LOND

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO:

TO LOND INFO: PARI, PALP, ALGI CITE DIR 04341

4. BELIEVE NOW USEFUL BRIEF JAGUAR SMOTH OUR INTENTION DEVELOPING OPS RELATIONSHIP S/1. WE SHALL FORWARD SUMMARY ALL S/1 DEBRIEFING SHORTLY MOST OF WHICH CAN BE PASSED. IN VIEW POSSIBILITY S/1 WORKING WAY INTO SENSITIVE POSITION, PERHAPS IN DENIED OR SEMI DENIED AREA, TRUST JAGUAR/SMOTH WILL TREAT CASE AS SENSITIVE FROM OUTSET. REQUEST JAGUAR COOPERATION TO SHED LIGHT ON S/1 WIFE AS POTENTIAL SECURITY PROBLEM AND PROVIDE LIMITED SURVEILLANCE S/1 CONTACTS OVER NEXT MONTH. COULD THEY SECURE PHONE TAP ON S/1? TRUST IT WILL BE POSSIBLE ENLIST JAGUAR/SMOTH COOPERATION WITHOUT NECESSITY ACKNOWLEDGING EITHER TIFFANY OR RODIGAST (LATTER NON OFFICIAL COVER) TO THEM. PLEASE ADVISE IF THIS ASSUMPTION INCORRECT.

5. RE PARA 1 REF PROPOSAL, SUGGEST K DISCUSS WITH SMOTH AS FUTURE POSSIBILITY. HOWEVER BELIEVE SECOND S/1 TRIP SUISSE AT THIS TIME WOULD LOOK SUSPICIOUS NOT LEAST TO NILS ANDERSON AND S/1 WIFE. MEANWHILE, IT WOULD BE GOOD FOR S/1 TO ATTEMPT RAISE FUNDS FOR WEST INDIA GAZETTE FROM LOCAL SYMPATHIZERS AND MAKE ARTICLE CONTRIBUTION TO PUBLICATION.

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — SECRET — GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG : A. Goodrich
UNIT : CI/ICG
EXT : 1176
DATE : 22 April 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : LOND

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO

TO LOND INFO PARI, PALP, ALGI CITE DIR 04341

6. RE PARA 2 REF PROPOSAL S/1 SHOULD SHOP THIS AROUND AS AN IDEA BUT SHOULD NOT START ANYTHING YET AS EVERYONE KNOWS THAT EVEN MODEST EFFORT THIS TYPE IN PUBLISHING FIELD REQUIRES START CAPITAL OF WHICH S/1 CANNOT CURRENTLY EXPLAIN SOURCE.

7. RE PARA 3 REF, S/1 MIGHT WRITE A FEW LETTERS RECOMMENDING WILLIAMS BOOK TO PROSPECTIVE WESTERN PUBLISHERS.

8. PLEASE TA PAYT PARA 3 B ABOVE TO HQS YQHITCH ~~ALGERIA HQS FINAN ACCOUNT NUMBER 5138-1708~~. END

AF/CCPS [signature]
AF/B&F [signature]
AF/1 [signature]
DC/WE/BC J. Roberts (in draft)
CA/CF J. Murphy (in draft)
CA/PROP J. Culbertson (by phone)
CA/3 S. Braham ✓
CO/IO J. Downes (by phone)

[signature]
WE/INT
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[signature]
Lothar Metzl
C/CI/ICG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Copy No.

SECRET

14 April 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM : CA/CF; CI/ICG

SUBJECT : Richard Gibson

1. Areas of Knowledgeability. A reading of the transcription of Gibson's taped debriefing clearly underlines KATZENBACH's assessment that Gibson possesses an encyclopedic knowledge of personalities and groups ranging from Zanzibar to the U.S. It is not always clear from the debriefing to what extent Gibson enjoys either a first-hand knowledge or even a friendly relationship with specific individuals or groups. What is clear is that Gibson moves in a milieu on which we presently have very little coverage; that he is already a member of this loosely defined society and thus can be presumed capable of developing new contacts or strengthening old ones by means of present and past associations.

It is difficult to categorize or devine what this milieu is. It is not the world of communist parties -- although it contains a preponderance of communists; and it does not seem to be a society which necessarily revolves about the Chinese. The primary common denominator covering most of the personalities involved in Gibson's reporting is some association with the revolutionary movement in Africa -- particularly Algeria. A secondary means of characterizing these contacts is a correlation with the radical French and Belgian left which lies outside such organized party structures as the PSU, PCF, BCP. (His main access to Chinese communists runs through Jacques GRIPPA in Belgium and Nils ANDERSSON in Switzerland with whom he claims to be on good terms at the present time.) Another common thread, almost as general, is association with Trotskyism, although the meaning or clarification of this political description is never spelled out. In general, Gibson displays a good and often personal knowledge of target areas which might be grouped as follows:

a. African exile revolutionary circles in France, Algeria and London, including the PAC, ANC, MPLA, MPA, and other less organized pockets.

b. European leftist sympathizers of the liberation movement in Africa.

c. Algerians or Algerian contacts in Europe who were associated with the war for independence.

d. Algerian personalities currently active or occupying official positions in Algiers.

SECRET

e. The exile American Negro community.

f. Minor political writers and polemicists in exile leftist circles in Europe.

2. Access and Limitations on Access. There apparently has been circulated a charge that Gibson is a CIA agent. (This is reflected in his 201 as dating from his days with the FPCC.) In dealing with this question, however, KATZENBACH cites Gibson's own belief that he is still able to operate in the circles which would be of interest to us. It is, of course, difficult to tell from his debriefing the extent and seriousness of this charge against Gibson, insofar as it affects his bona fides. It does seem that in Gibson's milieu, gossip, personal attacks, muddled loyalties and an aura of conspiratorial confusion are everyday facts of life and that personal contact and effectiveness in building rapport would far outweigh such critical personal charges -- which, indeed, probably circulate about most people. At the present time, for reasons not entirely clear, Gibson feels that he would be unwelcome and restricted were he to visit Ghana, and, in fact, would not like to make such a trip. He has indicated, on the other hand, that he has friends in Algeria and believes he could probably get some kind of job there or at least find a receptive and generally friendly reception. He also appears to have some contact and standing with the Indonesian government, since he claims their London Embassy offered him employment. It is not known to what extent he might be able to parley such a contact into employment in Djakarta or some form of official association in Europe, although these questions could be explored further. The termination of his association with Revolution and Verges would not, according to his account of it, discredit him in the eyes of those who might have been partisans of the ideological line which this magazine purveyed. According to his account, Verges is not in good standing with the pro-Chinese like Grippa or even the Chinese, and that his (Gibson's) quarrel with Verges over unpaid salary is well known. While this may not be unbiased, it is apparently true that he has lodged a claim for payment against Verges, and thus is not in the position of having been expelled from Revolution for ideological deviation. As Gibson recounts it, it is Verges, not he, who is discredited.

3. Motivation and Readiness to Cooperate. The debriefing reflects between the lines what KATZENBACH judges in his covering dispatch to be a readiness to collect information for us knowing that we are an official agency and probably suspecting that we are KUBARK. His professed motivation is monetary, and frankly so, although a certain degree of fatigue with his past profession of ideological punditry is discernable. There are also a number of indications that Gibson would like to rehabilitate himself lest he be forced to make his living for an indefinite period of time in an environment that he finds both unpleasant and materially unrewarding. It is not possible, of course, to make an intelligent judgement from this debriefing on the firmness and consistency with which he

might undertake continuing assignments for us, but this is not an unusual area of uncertainty with a new agent and one which a probationary period should dispel. (It should be noted that in one instance, he volunteered a name as an operational lead -- i.e., as someone whom we might find it worthwhile to look up. He also provided what is apparently an accommodation address in Bogota for Chinese mailings.)

4. Long-Range Usefulness and Initial Targetting. Gibson's long-range usefulness, of course, would depend not only on his effectiveness and dependability, but on the opportunities which will emerge and take shape as a result of his initial activity. As a general proposition, he can be viewed as an intelligence collection asset targetted at radical independence movements, pro-Chinese personalities and organizations, and official personalities in newly emerged countries, primarily in Africa. Specifically, these targets would include:

a. PAC and ANC: Gibson claims to have friends in both.

b. FLN and Algerian government and publishing circles.

c. Afro-Asian Journalists Association, and by extension, other Afro-Asian groups, such as exist or promised in youth, labor, women, and so forth.

d. Pro-Chinese European parties, including the Belgian (he claims to have access to Grippa), the Marseilles faction and the Swiss activity of Nils Andersson.

e. By extension from these, although at present only a remote possibility, developing Chinese propaganda and intelligence instrumentalities.

In the short range, a current assignment for us should meet the following criteria:

a. lend itself to probationary exploitation;

b. not tie Gibson down indefinitely to one location or involve him in an identification with one faction, group or party that would limit his later flexibility;

c. permit him to respond to targets of opportunity as we may define them, both to have a maximum test of the range of his capability and access, and to probe for the best long-range use we can put him to;

d. enable him to build his bona fides and his contacts as we may direct.

SECRET

The best likely assignment to fulfill these requirements is that of a journalist, preferably operating from Europe, capable of credible travel in Europe, Africa and even Asia, with some associations which will preserve his bona fides with target Afro-Asian groups. Assuming the development of adequate cover, he could then spend an initial period this spring and summer in Algeria to cover the Second Bandung Conference (29 June) and the World Youth Festival (28 July). (Other international conferences, including followup AAPSO meetings to the Ghana Congress in May, an Afro-Asian Journalists Conference or further PAJU meetings cannot be anticipated as targets at present either because of indefinite planning or because of unsuitable location. There is little doubt, however, that additional meetings will take place in Algiers and Africa bringing together interesting target personalities from Africa and Asia whom Gibson might attempt to report on.) In addition to his contribution in coverage of these meetings he might also attempt to develop his access and contact among the official Algerian community at least with the value of developing biographical and operational support data.

5. Proposed for Discussion. The following questions seem to present themselves for discussion at this time:

a. decision on the continuation of support to Gibson on a probationary period;

b. determination on targetting for initial probationary and possible long-range employment;

c. mechanics of establishing a project;

d. timetable for assignments.

James M. Murphy
CA/CF

Attachments:
LOND-7065 (re tentative cover arrangements)
Partial list of names cited in Gibson's debriefing
Selections from the initial processing of Gibson's debriefing

Distribution:
1 - AF/1 Mr. Baker
1 - CO/SD Mr. Downs
1 - CA/B3 Mr. Raymond; CA/PROP Mr. Culbertson
1 - CA/PEG
1 - WE/INT Mr. Landreth
1 - WE/BC/U Mr. Roberts (w/o att.)
1 - CI/ICG Mr. Goodrich
1 - CA/CF Mr. Murphy

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 36

15 SECRET

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FROM LONDON

ACTION WE 8

INFO VR. FILE, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CA 2, CA/C 4, AF 6, ADDP, FI, FI/INT 2, FE 6

S E C R E T 121250Z

12 APR 65 IN 43053

DIR INFO PARI PALP BRUS ALGI CITE LOND 7065

LCHARVEST KUDESK QKOPERA QRPREY

REF DIR 98974

1. STEBONY/1 (S), STILL UNEMPLOYED, IS PLEASED WITH PROSPECT OF ACTIVE SUMMER IN ALGI. WHILE WE REPEATED WE NOT READY MAKE ANY COMMITMENT BEYOND CURRENT MONTH'S RETAINER, HE NOW MAKING PLANS TO CONTACT POTENTIAL SPONSORS FOR PROLONGED VISIT ALGI. BEST BET MAY BE CONTACT WITH MONTHLY REVIEW RPT MONTHLY REVIEW. FRANCES KELLY (UK CITIZEN) WHO NOW IN LONDON WAS SECRETARY TO MONTHLY REVIEW WHILE IN US. HUBERMAN, WHO RUNS MR RPT MR, DUE COME UK SOON ON TRIP. PABLO FERNANDEZ OF CUBAN EMB HAS ALREADY SUGGESTED KELLY CONTACT S, AND S WILL INVESTIGATE POSSIBILITIES GETTING MR RPT MR ACCREDITATION FOR ALGI. STA POINTED OUT THAT SEVERAL SMALL OSTENSIBLE BACKERS COULD EACH BE PAYING S, IN ABSENCE ONE LARGE AND WELL-KNOWN OUTFIT. S WILL BEGIN SERIOUS CANVASS POSSIBILITIES, KEEP STA INFORMED, AND WILL NOT COMMIT SELF WITHOUT OUR OKAY. S EVENTUAL MOVE TO ALGI NICELY COVERED IF MORE PEOPLE AWARE OF HIS GROWING DISSATISFACTION PRESENT STATUS.

2. LOND DISSEMING (ZRWAHOO) TWO ITEMS FROM MEETING. HQS

ABSTRACT X AF 1 A

13 APR 1965

SECRET 201-306052

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS RI COPY RI COPY (35)

ADVISE WHAT SYSTEM YOU WISH FOLLOWED IN FUTURE ON SUCH ITEMS. SUGGEST ANY FOREIGN DISSEM CHANGE PARA. ADVISE ALSO ON PASSING SMOOTHERS. SUGGEST WE PASS AT OWN DISCRETION, ADVISING HQS IN EACH CASE.

3. OF POSSIBLE INTEREST, S MENTIONED THAT WILLIAM WORTHY RECENTLY ARRIVED DJAKARTA FROM CAMBODIA. INDONESIANS DID NOT KNOW HE COMING, UNTIL HE SENT TELEGRAM FROM CAMBODIA SAYING HE ARRIVING SOON. S AMAZED AT WORTHY'S ABILITY TRAVEL SO DISCREETLY, ESPECIALLY SINCE HE DID NOT APPEAR HAVE PASSPORT.

4. DID NOT DISCUSS DIR 88977 QUESTION, BUT S NOTED SCHLEIFER NOW IN NEW YORK. HQS MAY WISH REFINE QUESTIONS ON BASIS FORMER DEBRIEFINGS, OR WE CAN INCLUDE IN NEXT MEET. PLS ADVISE.

5. S FINANCIAL CONDITION DIRE. NEEDS 150 POUNDS FOR KIDS' TUITION. CURRENTLY LIVING OFF WIFE'S SMALL SALARY, BUT STILL HAVE TO PAY RENT AND TUITION. S CLOTHES OBVIOUSLY VERY SHABBY, HE SAID HE WEARING HIS LAST WHOLE PAIR OF PANTS. WILL NEED BUY SOME CLOTHES BEFORE HE GOES ANYWHERE. MAY WE GIVE HIM 150 POUNDS FOR KIDS TUITION IN ADDITION TO 400 DOLLARS AUTHORIZED?

S E C R E T

CFN

14-00000

ORIG: A. Goodrich
UNIT: CI/ICG
EXT: 5928
DATE: 5 April 1965

MESSAGE FORM 34
48/60
SECRET

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TO: LOND
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: CI/IC 2
VR, FILE, WE 6, FE 6, CA 2, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, AF 6
INFO: PARI PALP BRUS ALGI

AF 1 A
98974

TO LOND INFO:

LCHARVEST KUDESK QKOPERA QRPREY

REF: A. OELA 42750 (SENT HQS ONLY)

B. OELA 42410 (NOT SENT ALGI)

RICHARD GIBSON

1. ~~USRT~~ SUBJ REF B (IDEN TO ALGI) ASSIGNED CRYPTO STEBONY/1. WE PROCESSING SUMMARY REF DEBRIEFING TRANSCRIPTS WHICH WILL BE POUCHED ADDEES MID APRIL. TENTATIVE APPRAISAL IS THAT S/1 OFFERS PRIMARILY KUDESK KUTUBE POTENTIAL IN PROCHICOM NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL FRONT AREAS. PERHAPS SERIES CONFERENCES ALGI THIS SUMMER ~~XXXXX~~ BRINGING TOGETHER KEY TARGET FIGURES OFFERS BEST OPPORTUNITY FOR S/1 DEVELOP NATURAL COVER AND GAIN NATURAL ACCESS TO TARGET AREA.

2. PENDING FINAL DECISION AND SELECTION CASE OFFICER FOR FUTURE HANDLING REQUEST KATZENBACH CONTACT S/1, GIVE HIM RETAINER FEE ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS PER WEEK FOR NEXT FOUR WEEKS TO INSURE HE DOES NOT TAKE ON FULL TIME JOB WHICH WOULD LIMIT OR PRECLUDE FUTURE OPS ACTIVITIES. DURING THIS PERIOD K (OSTENSIBLY ACTING ON BEHALF ODYOKE FRIEND WHO KEENLY INTERESTED IN INFO ON

201-306052

COORDINATING OFFICERS
RELEASING OFFICER
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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MESSAGE FORM

ORIG : A. Goodrich
UNIT : CI/ICG
EXT : 5928
DATE : 5 April 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

TO : LOND
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: INFO

TO LOND INFO: CITE DIR

PRO CHICOM ACTIVITIES) SHOULD REQUEST S/1 SURVEY POSSIBILITIES JOBS TO PROVIDE COVER FOR ATTENDING SECOND AFRO ASIAN JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION (AAJA) CONFERENCE (CAN S/1 DETERMINE EXACT DATES?), SECOND BANDUNG CONFERENCE AND WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL IN ALGI. FOR EXAMPLE AS STRINGER FOR MONTHLY REVIEW AND/OR IN CONJUNCTION WITH AAJA. PERHAPS LETTER TO OLD FRIEND LIONEL MORRISON OF AAJA IN DJAKARTA MIGHT HELP. TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT INDONESIAN EMBASSY LOND MIGHT ALSO FACILITATE S/1 REENTRY TARGET AREA.

3. WITHOUT MAKING ANY COMMITMENTS BEYOND THE RETAINER SUGGEST K PUT RELATIONSHIP WITH S/1 ON CLANDESTINE BASIS. SPECIFICALLY MEET OUTSIDE PBSWING, GET AWAY FROM NECESSITY K TELEPHONING S/1 HIS HOME AND PROVIDE S/1 WITH MEANS CONTACTING K FOR MEETING TO REPORT ON ANY IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS.

4. REQUEST WINTERROWD DISCOURAGE FAIRMAN FROM PUBLISHING S/1 ARTICLE UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

END OF MESSAGE

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14-00000

ORIG : A. Goodrich
UNIT : CI/ICG
EXT : 5928
DATE : 5 April 1965

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MESSAGE FORM

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ROUTING

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TO : LOND

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO

TO LOND

INFO

CITE DIR

WE/BC John G. Roberts
CO/IO(LSI) [signature]
AF/1 [signature]
CA/CF J. MURPHY (by phone)
CA/PROP J. CULBERTSON (by phone)
CA/3 W. RAYMOND (by phone)
WE/3/INT. R. LANDRETH (by phone)

Thomas J. Thiele
DC/WE
C/CI/ICG [signature]

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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LOTHAR METZL
C/CI/ICG

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MESSAGE FORM 34

48 SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

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TO : ALGI

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: CI/IC 2

INFO: VR, FILE, WE 6, FE 6, CA 2, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, AF 6

SIG CEN

TO ALGI RE DIR 98974 INFO: CITE DIR 98975

IDEN: RICHARD T. GIBSON

END OF MESSAGE

R
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C
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Y

AF 1 A

201-306052

W D Malloy CSDO for C/WE/INT

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING		
		PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
TO Chief, WE			MARKED FOR INDEXING	
		XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
INFO.			ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
FROM Chief of Station, London R.F			ABSTRACT	
			MICROFILM	

SUBJECT Richard Thomas GIBSON (201-306052), Memo of Understanding

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Transmitted herewith are copies of a memorandum of understanding signed by GIBSON on 23 February 1965. The original is being retained in the Station.

2. Two receipts signed by GIBSON on 19 February and 23 February 1965, each in the sterling equivalent of $200, were forwarded to Headquarters with London's TA 5-190. We suggest that these receipts be obtained from Finance and incorporated in GIBSON's 201 dossier.

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment:
Herewith

Distribution:
3-Chief, WE w/att h/w

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
	25 March 1965	26 MAR
	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	
	OELA-42,807	
CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 201-306052	

1 ATT

To: Chief, WH
From: Chief of Station, London
Attachment to OELA-42,807
of 25 March 1965

I hereby acknowledge that I have voluntarily provided information to the United States Government, for which I received compensation. I have no further claim against the United States Government for this activity.

I further understand and agree that the entirety of this relationship is confidential and that nothing relating to it will be revealed by me to anyone.

Richard Gibson

Date: 23 February 1965

ATT #1 to
OELA 42807

CS COPY

201-306052

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FROM: England, London

REPORTS OFFICER: Leroy T. WADSWORTH

REPORT APPROVED BY: Victor T. CRONEIGH

SOURCE: SKXXXX JAGUAR

REPORT NO. OEL-40,731

DATE 19 March 1965

NO. OF PAGES 2

ATTACHMENTS

REFERENCE

COUNTRY: International

SUBJECT: Plans for the Sale of "Afro-Asian Journalist" in Europe

DATE OF INFO: 17 March 1965

SOURCE: Official British Service from "A reliable but very delicate source which must be given the utmost protection."

LONDON STATION COMMENT: Will Field Addressees please consider this report as for KUBARK BACKGROUND USE ONLY.

N.D.

DISTRIBUTION: Washington 1
Bern 1
Rome 1
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Brussels 1

Registry

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201-306052

Plans for the Sale of "Afro-Asian Journalist" in Europe

201-306052

Richard GIBSON, the former editor of the pro-Chinese Communist publication "Revolution", left London towards the end of January 1965 and returned in the second half of March, having visited Lausanne, Milan, Rome, Paris and Brussels. During his travels he met Nils ANDERSSON, who was formerly connected with "Revolution" in Lausanne and Jacques GRIPPA, the leader of the pro-Chinese dissident group of the Belgian Communist Party. Since his return to the U.K. he has made proposals to the Afro-Asian Journalists' Association for these persons to receive copies of the Association's publication, "Afro-Asian Journalist". He has also suggested to the Afro-Asian Journalists' Association that copies of the publication should be sent to the following:-

i. Bulletin d'Information Marxiste-Leniniste,
11, rue du Landry,
Clichy,
France.

ii. The English Bookshop,
42, rue de Seine,
Paris 6e.

iii. Nuova Unita,
Piazza Cavour 2,
Milan.

iv. Marxtisch-Leninstisch-Centrum,
Postbus 1505,
Rotterdam.

2. It appears that GIBSON is trying to establish contacts in Europe with the object of expanding sales of the English and French editions of "Afro-Asian Journalist".

17th March, 1965.

23 MAR 1965

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: PRIORITY SECRET

PROCESSING: MARKED FOR INDEXING; NO INDEXING REQUIRED xxx; ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING; ABSTRACT; MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WE

INFO: Chief, KUDESK; Chief, FE; Chief, AF

FROM: Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT: KAPOK
Richard Thomas GIBSON

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: OFLA 42,706

1. Ref forwarded the tapes and a rough transcription of the debriefing session with Subject, which were held on February 17, 18, 19, 23, 1965.

2. In accordance with Headquarters' instructions, these meetings were kept on a don't-call-us-we'll-call-you basis - in fact GIBSON was given no means for calling us. Also in accordance with Headquarters' instructions, we did not pay GIBSON at a constant rate of over $100 per hour. The first ($300) payment to GIBSON was in fact more than we had originally intended to give him as a "binder", but in light of the imminence of his trip to Europe we advanced him that sum to help him to meet his expenses. This nicely coincided with our own time table, since the time he was gone - some three weeks - should have provided adequate time for the initial tape to be reviewed and for requirements to be prepared and pouched to the field. At any rate, the total sum given to GIBSON, for his time and a shot at his mailing list, was $700.

3. LCHARVEST may well feel that it has been done out of $700 in COA funds. The information obtained on ChiCom contacts of GIBSON, or on any ChiComs at all, was slight. GIBSON claims not to have had more than very little contact with them, and not to know too much about them. Unless there is hard info to the contrary, we are inclined to believe that GIBSON was telling pretty much the truth in this respect, as indeed seems to have been the case almost all of the time. While this is a bit of a disappointment, in a way, and seems to lessen the immediacy of LCHARVEST interest, it certainly does not appear to eliminate GIBSON's potential worth.

4. The London Station continues to feel that GIBSON has considerable potential as a source of positive intelligence on a wide range of targets - targets that appear to be only lightly covered otherwise, although we are not always able to judge this. A review of this debriefing can only cause one a certain amount of amazement at GIBSON's encyclopedic knowledge of many, many groups, personalities and parties of the far left, literally from America to Zanzibar. We leave it to Headquarters, of course, to evaluate

201-306052

Distribution:
3-Chief, WE
2-Chief, KUDESK
2-Chief, FE
2-Chief, AF

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CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 15 March 1965
DATE DISPATCHED: 18 MAR 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OFLA-42,750

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

POUCH SECURITY VIOLATION
NO FIELD DISTRIBUTION

CLASSIFICATION: PRIORITY SECRET

his material; to the London Station, however, it appears to be not only rather massive but detailed as well. We do not doubt that he will be caught out from time to time on facts, and perhaps interpretations as well. But the totality of his information - and the whole performance was without notes - is astonishing.

5. Several points should be noted. First of all, a conscious effort was made to show GIBSON that his comments on the American scene were not being made a matter of record. (I took notes during our talk, and always stopped making notes when such a topic came up.) This is, as KULPA noted in OELW 1903 of 12 February 1965, an area of sensitivity with GIBSON. The only times that GIBSON really became emotional were when he talked about the American scene, his involvement, and the involvement of his close associates. And he kept reverting to the topic, and his involvement in it, throughout our conversations. We did not share KULPA's impression that GIBSON's dissatisfaction with the state of racial relations in America makes him generally anti-American. He does say that he would not like to be living in America for the coming year; but in the context of one who does not wish to be caught up in a period of growing violence, which GIBSON appears not to believe to be the solution to the problem. He states: "I can understand how they feel that way, I can recognize the problems, but I sure don't know what the solution to the problem is." His judgments on Negroes in the front of the racial struggle (Walter Bowe, Malcolm X, etc.) reflect not only an intimacy with the problem and a genuine concern, but also a generally reasonable and real understanding of many of the forces at work. GIBSON tends to condemn individuals - he spares no sympathy for the FBI, understandably - but he does not appear to condemn the United States as a whole, nor even the United States Government as a whole. At the same time, he makes no phoney protestations, either.

6. Regarding Cuba, GIBSON showed a similar emotional involvement (he acknowledges "my pro-Castro bias") but, withal, manages to give a more balances portrayal of the situation than many rabidly anti-Castro commentators. (Cuba, and Cuban matters, were also similarly low-keyed by me during our talks.)

7. Where GIBSON really comes into his own, and really astonishes with the breadth of his personal information and understanding, (and largely, it appears, without the same personal involvement and bias) is in African affairs (especially in left-wing fields), European Trotskyists and Communists and their general milieu, and Chinese-oriented international front organizations. Similarly he appears to be informed on certain ChiCom efforts at subversion and propaganda in Latin America.

8. Rather as if reading our thoughts, GIBSON offered to recruit himself. He didn't get too specific, and neither did we. But he did make it quite clear that he would be willing to collect information for us, knowing only that we were ODYOKE, probably suspecting that we were KUBARK, and probably equally doubting (because he knows the difference(that we were ODENVY. His motivations can be compiled from his own words. He has for some time been unable to find a suitable job here in London, He has economic pressures working on him - now exacerbated by the fact that his wife has caused her brother to withdraw some of the support that he had been providing. Venal? Opportunistic? Or someone who has a wife and two kids to support, and no job for the past eight months? GIBSON acknowledges that he has become somewhat bored with the "micro-biology" of chasing petty ideological differences, the kind that make factions of six members or less. At the same time, he acknowledges that he has to have a job, and that his access to and knowledge of these persons and groups are marketable commodities. His preference, he says, would be to have a nice quiet journalistic or public relations job here, but his efforts to find such a job have been fruitless. How, obviously, can one of his background and talents better employ them than as a collector and reporter of information? He says that he would like public relations or press work for the UN, perhaps, or an ODYOKE agency, but he is certain that he could never get the requisite security clearance. Still, obviously, he suspects that an "irregular" arm of ODYOKE, such as we, might be able to work something out.

9. How about his ideological motivation? We had hoped for some more concrete expression than we got, on this score, but what we have is not too bad. He states that he will not be "intellectually dishonest" to the point of becoming a "professional anti-Communist," by which he means a propagandist. At the same time, he agrees that he has no desire to be a professional revolutionary. Again we note that he is not blindly or unduly critical of ODYOKE. Granted, he criticizes many elements of ODYOKE policy and tends to defend some enemies of ODYOKE. A failure for him to do so would be sufficiently remarkable to make us totally suspicious of him. Note further his comment that he would havebeen perfectly willing to talk to us a year ago in Paris in the same fashion as he has here. This would sound rather suspicious and difficult to believe, were it not for the fact that he did show himself to be candid and cooperative in his Paris interview with a PBSWING officer.

10. How badly blown is GIBSON, then, if we are thinking of using him. After all, he has been publicly labelled a "CIA agent." Could he, then, work for KUBARK successfully? GIBSON himself is certainly a better judge of that than the London Station, and we feel that there are only two indices that can be used to judge the matter. The first and most immediate is GIBSON's own opinion, since he has lived with the problem, and has tested the idea in practice. He feels that he could still operate ("move" is his term) in most of the desirable areas successfully, provided he has adequate cover for being where he is and doing what he does. The second index would be for us to test his continuing access to targets of interest. It should not take too long to make such a test without putting anything into real jeopardy.

11. Cover for GIBSON, of course, would be a serious problem. He himself proposes the obvious answer: some kind of vaguely left journalistic tie-up. We should think that such cover could be arranged. And we propose to discuss a number of possibilities with Headquarters in due time.

12. Utilization and locale are most closely related, of course. From our vantage point here, it would appear that Algiers would be the most desirable home base for GIBSON. He could range out from there into Europe or the rest of Africa (the two best targets, apparently) and maintain a regular flow of information on Algerian affairs while "at home." He has spoken several times of the ease with which he is integrated into the Algerians environment, and he has a fairly well established base there from which to expand his operations. He has said that he would be willing to go there, or France, or most any other place where his children can continue their education in French. And Algiers appears to be, for the foreseeable future, a worthwhile target in its own right, as well as the site of a growing number of international front organization meetings, for which GIBSON would appear to have exceptionally fine credentials. As he says, he could go elsewhere in Africa, but Algiers is where he would fit best. We would be inclined to keep him, for the most part, away from the Cuban milieu (except, perhaps, incidentally) to avoid straining his reportorial objectivity. In the African, European, and international front areas, we suspect that careful checking would ensure such objectivity.

13. His utilization could best be considered on a straight information-collecting basis. To use him as a propaganda tool would be not only repugnant to him but destructive of his utility as well. Presumably he could be permitted to continue to write, not only for his overt employers (in a straight news fashion), but perhaps occasionally for leftist periodicals of his own choosing, in order to maintain his own cover. (This is, admittedly, seeing rather far into the future.) We do feel, however, that GIBSON could be an admirable and highly valuable collector of positive information on that whole spectrum of the left with which he is already so familiar.

14. GIBSON and security, to this point: GIBSON has met only myself, under alias, and under the impression that I was here temporarily. This idea was apparently made to stick, throughout our conversations. We would propose that, if GIBSON be recruited in fact, he be handled in alias and at a good, safe distance - more than arm's length. Until sufficient operational testing had been carried out, we would suggest that he not have a "resident case officer" anywhere - i.e., neither here nor in Algiers. Control of GIBSON is partly exercised by the documents we have received from him (receipts, memo of understanding) plus the voluminous taped comments. These, while not worthy of a court, are sufficient to do him considerable professional and personal damage - note particularly that his wife, according to him, would not approve of any of our contacts, and this appears to be quite meaningful to him. Financial control would be a continuing factor. And, perhaps to an unusually high degree, we feel that GIBSON would feel considerable gratitude to whoever (i.e., KUBARK) rescued him from his present and difficult position, "forgiving all", and providing him with a measure of respectability (at least in his own eyes) that he has henceforth been unable to achieve and maintain. In sum, we feel that a reasonably strong combination of control factors exist, and can be continued for as long as GIBSON would be properly handled.

15. We should also like to comment on the reliability of GIBSON's comments in the course of our meetings to date. We have found him to be thoroughly consistent in his comments and attitudes throughout. We found no indication of deliberate deception or serious attempts to mislead. He may have provided some erroneous materials, or he may have erroneously interpreted some events; but his comments and attitudes remained sufficiently consistent to lead us to believe that he was being reasonably honest all the way. He played down some items, no doubt, and played up others. In the course of a debriefing such as this was there seemed little or no point in pushing hard at such points - besides, his knowledge of the areas covered so far outdistanced mine that I could not have attempted to probe or pin him down on specifics. (Note also his tendency to make corrections in the debriefing questionnaire, as when the wrong name would appear for a political group in Switzerland.)

16. GIBSON's present status is that he is out of work, in debt, and without any prospects of reasonable employment in the near future. He is somewhat occupied with an article he is writing for Encounter; this will probably keep him from taking another job for the next few weeks. Beyond that, nothing is definite. If we would like to give him a try, then, some move should be made to formalize matters with him before he accepts some job that will put him out of the market.

17. Recognizing that there are risks involved, it nevertheless seems most undesirable to pass up what has the earmarks of being a highly useful asset. We request, therefore, that Headquarters review and consider the entirety of our knowledge of GIBSON to this point, and give us a reading on his potential worth, as viewed by LCHARVEST, AF Division, KUDESK/ICG and other interested parties. If, for reasons of which Headquarters is aware, and we are not, GIBSON is considered unacceptable as a KUTUBE asset, let us know. If, on the other hand, there appears to be a market for his talents and capabilities, we should move rather rapidly to pre-empt him. His present flexibility is not likely to last for long, and any plan to use him should take this into account. As WE/BC is aware, we are not in a position to put this into the form of a London Station project. This should not be the reason for neglecting what appears to be such a potentially rewarding asset for KUBARK, however.

18. We would appreciate a reply within a couple of weeks of Headquarters' receipt of this dispatch.

George H. KATZENBACH

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: ~~Chief, WE~~

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT: KUDESK/LCHARVEST
Debriefing of Richard T. GIBSON

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Transmitted herewith are the tapes of the 17, 18, 19 and 23 February sessions with GIBSON. Also transmitted is a copy of the Station-prepared transcript of the tapes. The quality of the transcription varies: the first session is mostly summarized, the subsequent ones are almost verbatim. Roberta L. HORRELL did the transcripts, and I subsequently reviewed them, filling in comments, names, etc., that HORRELL had missed.

2. As rough as these transcripts are, a careful review of them is fairly revealing about GIBSON, and about his knowledge of the topics discussed. Further comment from this end will be contained in an operational dispatch. Right now we are anxious to get the present material into Headquarters' hands for further processing. This is about as far as we can take the material here, due to extreme time limitations. We are retaining a copy of the transcript, however, for further use and future reference.

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment:
Herewith

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Distribution:
2 ~~3~~-Chief, WE w/att h/w
1 - CO

Attachment ~~file~~ CI/ICG 20 Mar 65

reattached 5/7/67

201-306052

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 9 March 1965

DATE DISPATCHED: 15 MAR 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OELA-42,706

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Iatt.

I was in Rome when there was sun.
I had left Rome when the snow arrived.

I had a reasonably cordial reception almost everywhere. I got some information. I didn't push too hard. Where I encountered a little bit of suspicion but not very serious, was in Brussels, and actualy I think it was because Guippu was so busy there. He said if I could have stayed on a few days, but I didn't have time or money to hang around. But I can always go back and see him again.

I went from here to Zurich, to Lausanne. The only reason I went to Zurich was simply because Nils Andersson claimed that the Swiss had, you know we had been expelled from Switzerland with the magazine, and he said that they had told him that I was interdit de séjour, that is, can't come into the country.

But I have been in the country numerous times since then; nevertheless I wanted to make certain. I know they know me in the Geneva airport. I went in the Zurich airport, and took the train there (for Lausanne). And there I didn't stay in hotel so that the local police would probably not know about it. They probably were aware, but they weren't going to bother, anyway. From Lausanne I went to Milan, Milan to Rome, Rome back to Lausanne to Andersson again, then Paris, and from Paris to Brussels and back here. Altogether it took three weeks. One could have taken much more time. Actually, it was more establishing of contact. I got some information for this thing I am writing for Encounter. In fact I got enough to do what I want to do. (I have to) see what Lasky wants.

I would like to follow up - - to go on to Algiers, to talk to some more people down there - apparently they have got a lot more information about Verges. Or so they told Andersson,

of course useful if I'm going to play the money market. But for Algerian currency it was hard to find a buyer. The opposition has been the principal buyer of the new currency. In other words Krieger and the people who could not go out of the country when the change in currency came and who were short of hard cash for their people going in and out, were buying this currency. And this has created a more favorable exchange rate. In any case, at that time the exchange rate was hardly favorable and you had to give a sell order 24 hours in advance for the bank to find someone. And that was the thing. The money, he (Anderson) says that the exact sum in the bank he is not certain, in that account. He knows that Verges's figure was around 75,000. He thinks that was fairly accurate. That is, 75,000 dollars, in Algerian currency. The money was placed there between the end of July or August of 1962 and December of that year. In other words it was just after independence but during the period of struggle for power between the GPRA and the Tlemcen group. Where he got the money from... As for the second $75,000, Verges said he had another account. He knows (Anderson knows) as he said before, nothing about this. And frankly he doesn't believe it existed.

However, he does think that Verges has received small amounts of money, where from he doesn't know. The Chinese line is ending. In fact, you can tell from looking at the magazine, the last editorial. He changes- The editorial is called Compagnon de Route, which means Fellow Traveler, This is just what he didn't want to be called. And it ends up by saying in French- en a fait nous sommes des compagnons de route- we're fellow travelers, we're for a united front of all the liberation movements with comprehension but without condescension. It's much more modest, it's a playing down of their own role. In fact some of the articles inside the magazine of course are not in line with the editorial. The editorial doesn't have Verges's style, either.

((Who do you suppose wrote it?))

That is very difficult to say. It doesn't to my mind seem to be the style of Kier either. I would suspect that it was written by Kessel (?) but for what purposes? Grippa's people told me, well, they considered this a favorable turn, that they were willing to accept Verges as a fellow traveler but as nothing more, and they told him that long ago. This is a power struggle. They told him that and what's more they're still not certain that they want to have anything to do with him. And apparently it's gotten to be the standard-- something that you demand-- they demand that people who come to see Grippa now are - forced to say "we have nothing to do with Verges; if we had something to do with Verges, we make our self-

14-00000

I would like to follow up. For instance, I would have like to have gone to Algiers. Apparently

They some people down there that I could talk to. Apparently they've got a lot more information about Verges and so on. That's what they told Anderson.

Who told Anderson?

Oh, some members of the Algerian Foreign Ministry who, I think, is in Switzerland. He sees a lot of Algerians because he worked with them during the Algerian war, in various capacities. So he still sees them. He has kept on fairly good terms with them.

You turned up some information in your talks with Anderson.

Yes, some. You mean about the source of funds. He assures me that the money was not as I thought it was; it was in the form of Algerian currency. I thought it was in stocks and bonds. My assumption that it was in stocks and bonds was based on his statement that he used to make whenever we would ask him for money he would say, "I must go to the bank to tell them to sell." Now apparently what this meant was that they were holding Algerian currency. You could deposit money in Swiss banks, held currency in the deposit. If I deposit pounds, give a sell order. . this is

criticism. You know, we ~~makexmxxxsixsxxmxsngxtfxms~~ to do so, and we won't do this anymore."

A number of groups, apparently so. . You know, they have created the so-called Spanish Communist Party, (parenthesis) Marxist-Leninist, and this was one of the conditions. There are talks going on in France between the ~~Tricny~~ Clichy group and the Marseilles group and that was one of, again, the conditions of the Marseilles people who were tied up with Kiení and ---nard, that Verges had nothing to do with them. On the other hand there are talks between ~~the Tricny group~~ Clichy and a young left students, they call themselves the Drapeau Rouge group. It's a very small group anyway. That again was a condition. They put out a magazine, a news letter, called Drapeau Rouge which had been mainly written— it's one single edition- mainly written by ~~Chem?~~ Kiení. So obviously, the wind has turned very much against him(them). Verges has said, howver, strange things too. To Maspero, not very long ago at a cocktail party, he said, "I don't see why people reproach me for accepting the aid ~~from~~ of African friendsand comrades- African comrades, no longer Chinese comrades. He also says that he admitted that they had made mistakes, that the magazine had been too sectarian, dogmatic.

((Verges said this to Maspero?))

Yes. Andersson told me that.

((When he says African, does he mean Black African or Arab?))

This is what we don't know. We have no idea who would waste that much money on him. First of all, who has the money, with which parties does he have connection. The UPC and the Cameroons, that split. The UPC and the Cameroons, a certain amount of money comes from Russia, other money coming from the Chinese, but very small amounts, because no one wants to pour money into this very divided organization. And he had contacts with one wing of it. I can't see them giving him any money. The Salaba Salawa party - ~~Lugere and~~ in Niger, they also, according to Andersson, ~~Mani~~ Mamani, who is one of their executive people, who is in Algiers, and who comes to Switzerland quite often, said that he no longer even bothers when he goes to Paris, to see Verges, that he sort of considered it worthless, (that he was) sort of an adventurer, an opportunist.

The thing that was for me a bit frustrating in all of this was that every once in a while — — — — this that and the other, ~~He~~ (Verges) has always had this equivoque, this doubt hanging over him. But no one has anything hard and fast about him. You can get- well in the past, what did he do. We know vaguely what he did, but nevertheless, what would you say that he did that would be really decisive and so on. It seems a ...

his ambition, but his ambition seems to shift from one thing to the other. You don't know exactly what does he want. When he started this magazine, obviously he wanted to play a role in Algeria and Africa. Driven out of Africa, he still thinks he's going to get back to Algeria within a relatively brief period of time, six months to a year. And he kept saying to us, "Oh, yes, we'll be back, we'll be back." He's already prepared a list of people he's going to have thrown in jail, or shot, (laughing) or threaten with firing squads and so forth. That fell through (going back to Algeria). And now, of course, I suppose it must be extremely bitter to him to see Bitat, who had been really, the closest, and Zora DRIFF, (they had) been his closest associates inside of Algiers, with exception of Djamila Bouhired, but she doesn't have any real weight, politically, Bitat is back in Algiers, has made his peace with Ben Bella, and now represents, he's the General Manager for Volkswagen. (laughing)

Anderson's conversation with the Algerian (in Switzerland) about Verges was based just on Bitat. He said "Well, Bitat is going back. I suppose Verges will be following behind." He said (the Algerian), "No he won't. We have a file on him," what he's done. With money, in particular. Apparently they claimed that he had been dipping into the funds for years.

((This is the Algerian claim--)) Yes, that's what they told Anderson.

I think it's probably true. The funds of the Federation in France. You see he was, after all, a lawyer and then became the top lawyer of the FLN defense team in France. The legal defense team, and this meant that he had access to enormous sums of money. The FLN -- obviously an underground organization, even as well-structured a one as the Algierian one in France, cannot demand very accurate bookkeeping. There were all sorts of very funny jokes about how the money was handled, (receipts) receipts written on the corner of a newspaper for millions of old francs. And so under those circumstances — Verges himself has told me some things about this.

As for his connection with Khider, Anderson thinks that Khider may have helped him (Verges) to get money inside of Algeria, but he doesn't think that he got anything after he left and Khider left Algeria. In other words, he said as long as he was on the scene and formed part of this vague opposition to Ben Bella which Khider sought to at least unite on a few issues around himself, he may have received some money. But afterwards, he doesn't think he received any. He has no proof, of course. If he did receive, it would have been small sums given to Djamila Bouhired as a token of friendship more than anything else. That may have explained her trip to Geneva, when she did bring some money.

That was in March or April, last year.

((What is the current financial relationship between Verges and Anderson?))

FOURTH SESSION

23 February 1965
(morning)

~~His connection with Khider. Anderson thinks he got no money after he left (Algiers).~~ ?

~~If any came it would have been small sums given to Geneva as expression of friendship.~~

A (Anderson) and V (Verges) V maintains A owes him money because of a Swedish offset press bought originally for Revolution. He was very careless about money. At one point V asked A to buy a house. Evidently V thought he had enough money for anything. They bought press which turned out to be useless.

A. then took it. ~~Ex~~ A said he wanted it. Haggled over price. Then Vessel went to Brussels to sell the same press to Grippa, to play off Grippa and Anderson, because Grippa was also looking for an offset press. In fact, he did eventually buy an identical press, which is now installed in his place in Brussels. Anyway, Anderson did pay ~~paid~~ ~~bought~~ a certain amount. But they didn't decide price definitely. The

But A. paid a debt to a printer (Gonguin) Swiss printer (which was) owed by Verges.

This printer (Gauguin) has sued for ~~XXXXX~~ 48,000 swiss francs. He has blocked Revolution's account at NMPP (Nouvelle Messagerie de Presse Parisienne). They had 7.50 francs in the account when he blocked it. They had a previous debt with a French printer.

Amount of money coming in from sales is very small. Verges has not contacted Gauguin to settle the matter. Gauguin Could put the magazine out of existence. He has ~~Has~~ only to demand money and if Verges don't find it in 48 hours, Gauguin could force bankruptcy. But he wouldn't do that unless someone would guarantee he would get his 48,000. Creditors wait, hoping they will get something.

To Guarantee Gauguin ~~for~~ that amount of money, (would be) best way to put Rev. out of business. I could do it myself if I could get the money. I could get a similar judgment and force bankruptcy.

Actual legal composition of the company Nouvelles Editions ~~Internationales~~ found by my lawyer:

22 Aug 1963, Verges through a lawyer deposited papers of corporation for a Societe Anonyme RL at ~~16th~~ 6 bureau Paris. capital of 10,000 new francs ~~8~~8,000 held by Verges and 2000 by Maurice ~~Pinet~~ Sinet.

I thought there were at least five members but there were only two.

The money was actually deposited by a check through the lawyers guild.

There is 10,000 francs somewhere along the line. So Gauguin could get that much.

Company does exist but nobody is able to find it.

my current legal status- we are fighting for back wages. He ~~he~~ denies. He said we were paid too much. Then he said we then it goes before fact-finding agent. ~~says~~ they were "in ~~confidence~~" were incompetent - one look at the magazine disproved that.

This continues to drag on. The lawyer in Paris is not energetic. Bro-in-law paid the lawyer 5oo francs. He probably thinks that is all he is going to get out of it. Question of preparing Translations, etc. He shows lack of will power.

He is an orthodox Communist. He is very honest. But hates scandal. probably thinks "they are out of France" so why push it? I don t think he has sold out

of Revolution I can do it in 48 hrs. Lots of people want Rev out of business. ~~Question~~ (?)

Question is where does Verges get the small sums necessary to keep going. He's paying at least 5 people full-time, plus the ~~[illegible]~~ printer.

Delduecea printed No. 12. it is a high powered firm. what terms of agreement?

13th issue has gone back to offset press, the old printer. ~~I~~ I don't know why.

I should have spent more time in Paris. I dont want to overplay my hand. The last thing I should have done was ~~Recognize need~~ to question people systematically.

In Paris only important contact is Valdes, Spanish. Gave ~~me~~ some info on Spanish groups. Claims ~~they~~ Verges asked Cuba for money and got turned down. Cubans don't have much money. (SINÉ)

It's a Great shock to these people to find that Chinese aren't putting in money. It is always someone else, like ~~Pinot~~ Siné — Jr ... Verges always indirect. doesn't want to ask anybody for money. probably through Juan Arcocha, press & cultural attache, Paris, former secretary ~~sectorep~~ of Carlos Franqui, editor of Rev. lucion, Havana Arcocha is very anti-Communist, hipped on persecution of homosexuals. Not necessarily one himself. Very interesting. I did not see Franqui. I don't know where he is.

I was getting enough info for my personal needs. but didn't want to overdo it. I do need a better story to travel around on.

Grippa generally was busy, lot of people around, obviously delegations, from where I don't know. there was a catastrophe, Something had happened. He is rather vague.

~~Shock~~ Sharp clash between Grippa and ~~Verges~~ V came on question of money. After many months, ~~Verges~~ V went to Brussels, talk ended abruptly. V said, "Grippa ~~he~~ went too far, laid down political line, etc. I rejected." But this came only after an exchange over the source of funds. Grippa asked ~~mx~~ Verges where he was getting his money, and Verges got huffy. ~~axEs~~ Delegate general said Grippa didn't believe any of the stuff Verges said about me. Predisposed to oppose ~~Verges~~ Verges.
(Verges will not confide to anyone — even Anderson — where the money comes from.)
Verges and Algerian money. ~~Hm~~ Did he just say, just tell them, that he got the money from the Chinese? Did he get it from someone in Algeria but he is afraid of disclosing.

He wouldn't tell the Chinese at Bern the source of his funds.

(Q: Verges debts total $30,000?) ~~D~~ Now he must have cleared away at least the big debt with the original French printer. I said 30,000,000 francs or about $60,000. ~~Castel~~ Kessel confirmed that it was about that amount. ~~Castel~~ Kessel and I and my wife worked out the estimate. I don"t rembmber the breakdown. Mainly Printing, photographs, paper, rent. We said between 30 and 40 million (old francs)

promissory notes. and having them countersigned by Jerome Pandon, publisher of L'Edition Eminent

I have to leave around noon. my little girl at home by herself. Wife working in Tunisian Embassy, 14£ a week. She is (isn't) very happy there. Not much money, remember taxes.

Anderson: general background- he is Swedish, 32 years old, born in France of French mother and Swedish father. His parents settled in Lausanne when he was 6 months old. He was raised in Switz. had so little connection with Sweden that when finally had to go into Swedish army had to learn Swedish. Married to woman who is daughter of a prominent Conservative Swiss politician, may be a member of the Parliament. Don't know his name. Husband does not see her parents. He chose Swedish nationality because most convenient, during Algerian war and didn't want to go into French army. Swiss nationality would cost both money and military service. Therefore took Swedish. In his youth he was involved with literary and dramatic groups, still has keen interest in poetry and drama. He is connected with Theatre Populaire Romande .His press serves mainly for material for them. About all he prints. He is forbidden to print any political material but he can print or have printed Chinese literature, which is classified as philosophical. He can't print October. That now printed by Gauquin in Montreux.

He has never incorporated name La Cite -
privately owned press and business, means personal risk.
He is distributor, mainly, for French books in Switz. Has some substantial clients.

Most of his things are not political (now) but literary. Not essentially a political operation. Has two employes, a secretary and a Spanish boy who takes care of the press.

He for a time very much involved with the FLN, how it happened don't know. He was one of their principal agents in Switz. Operated as far as Paris and Lyons. He represented Swiss end of the support net work, to do tasks FLN couldn't do themsevles. Carrying weapons, money, etc. He operated the Swiss base. Much material was smuggled over Swiss border at Geneva. With Henri LeClerc?

Through connection with FLN probably made first personal contact with Verges and with Maspero. He got into publishing from distributing through contacts with Maspero who was printing books. Algerians wanted these books to contenue coming out in French. They proposed that A print them. He took them to Gauquin who agreed to print and that's how he became a publisher.

He had no trouble. Swiss police thought his life was in danger. From the SBS.

Is he solvent? Yes. But his wife works as a school teacher. They have a car. They pay low rent. B All his operation is in one building - the Ms Sagale. Building of very mixed occupancy. His father and mother had flat in this building. The father and mother were decorators. Has office on upper ground floor and press on lower ground floor. His father dead. His mother remarried. Still a decorator.

Dont know just when A started this business. He began in decorating busines paper hanging, etc. Then got into poetty, etc. had a little magazine. He had some money and bought the distributorship of these publications. From that he went into publishing, during Algerian war.

October- Anderson and group around him, established in 1964, summer, after fiasco of the Swiss Communist Party. Extremely small group. I doubt if they have more than 30 people. Operate mainly inside of the PdT official Communist party - Workers Party. Aim to convince the people inside of the rightness of Chinese thesis and provide a rallying point for those expelled from the party. Print October in Italian, French & German

I estimate 30 to 40 people involved. Swiss CP has all of 15 people. Very weak organization. It might be discreetly financed by the Chinese. Though a little money handed over to Anderson. A is obviously no longer really the center of it. He was the initiator. Fact he is not Swiss may have helped. I feel he was gradually pulling back from political involvement. Is under close surveillance by the Swiss police - has been warned what he can and can't do. People even went up to Berne and asked for his expulsion. They got from Vevey very little satisfaction.

There still are numbers of Spaniards-- who come in he has Chinese and Albanian literature in Spanish.

Once they get out of Spain and can get this stuff they do go and look at it. MOR no longer exists - has been fused into new Spanish CP. They are just workers. Mundo Obrero Revolucionario produced on offset or mimeograph, principally by Tiafer (phon) Tagliaferro in Anderson's office Catalan. The two leaders are out of it.

Three groups: Frente Proletario, Chispa group is third. That has two people according to Valdes. The leaders of the other two groups were expelled from this Lenin-Stalin party.

Don't think he still has distribution of October officially. Jaquier prints it, he stores it. That's political. This ban derived from the Revolution incident. Swiss authorities told us. We, could stay in Switzerland if we wanted to but had to get out of all political activity.

Don't know whether A still acts as a contact between various groups on the outside and the Chinese Embassy in Berne - couldn't tell. I feel that he is much less active than he was. He was not well informed about Italian group, (Nuova Unita)

He is in contact with Grippa and with Maspero but very unhappy about the political line of Maspero's paper.

Andersson's wife: a silly woman -- self-dramatizes.

She went to Albania (anniv of Albanian rev.) and some other people from the October group. Went to reproach them for the aid they had given ~~Guiyard~~ Billiard-Jenvey. His wife does many things he can't do because he is a foreigner. She would act as his agent - did not go in her own right. He doesn't have much to do with Albanians. Her trip gave him a better impression. But she thought the Albanians ~~were~~ better informed about Europe and Marxist affairs, party in Europe than the Chinese.

She at one time was a member of the central committee of the ~~French~~ Swiss Communist Party. ~~Maybe~~ That only had about 35 members. Practically anybody who joined the party was immediately on the Central Committee.

~~Among~~ Andersson is known as the man in Switzerland to see if you want to set up a base for any kind of a revolutionary movement. Maybe this is how he got in touch with Spaniards.

There is a ~~Churiel~~ Curiel group - very active he had contacts with them. Rev Father Donde Dadsis? former worker priest, from Lyons, formerly with FLN now involved in Congolese, etc. rebel groups. Always gun-running - with missal in one hand, sub machine gun in other. Extraordinary priest. Had high protection in the Church, with Cardinal Gerlié (sp) of Lyons who recently died. When priest was arrested, money to help from Cardinal.

Some left the Catholic church. I would say this Algerian generation provides the basis for the pro-Chinese element within the left-wing youths of France. The ones who saw the total ineffectiveness of the Party in a colonial situation and who were, from idealistic reasons, disgusted with it and sought to make up for this failure on the part of the Communist Party.

Spanish, Italian, Portugese workers in Switz. Many are left-oriented and interested.

~~dax~~ they are just workers.

~~Tifer~~ Tagliaferro, Catalan.

Marxist-Leninist Communist party made of the three groups- Mundo Obrero, Proletario, Chispa groups. Two members.

I can perfectly believe it.

cease any activities on behalf of Revolution which was felt as undesirable. Whether he is still a contact between groups on outside and Chinese Communists in Berne cannot say. He is much less active.

Much of this page appears on right page in fuller transcription.

all these movements diminishing in size and importance....

He may be going to Brussels. He is in contact with Grippa. I don't know about it. He is unhappy with the political line of Maspero's publications

aid they had given Builliard.

Apparently that was ironed out. His wife does many things that he can't do because he is a foreigner. She acts as his agent.

But he doesn't have much to do with Albanians, but her visit has somewhat raised the prestige of Albania in their eyes.

I think he would much rather deal with the Chinese.

He may have come in contact with the Spaniards through the Algerians.

He is known as the man in Switz to go to see if you want to set up a base for any kind of revolutionary movement. Can give you advice,

put you in touch with the right bunch of people to sell you arms, if that's what you want.

There was a group called Curiel group, extremely active in all sorts of things. He had contacts with them, with the Rev Father Daney Donde, who is a Catholic priest from Lyons, former worker priests, involved with the FLN,

very much on the left, now involved in various things, rebels, Congolese, with missal in one hand and machine gun in the other, always gun-running, but had very high protection in the church, his ties were with Cardinal Gesier of Lyons, who just died. He had ties with the Algerians. Cardinal would be informed and money would be made available to take care of him.

Many of people from the were Catholic, just Catholic, some left the church. The Com Party didn't want anything to do with the Algerians.
Some are now in Algeria. Algerian gave basis for pro-Chinese elements in leftwing youth of France generation ones who saw the total ineffectiveness of the Com party in France

were disgusted with it and sought to make up for this failure of the Com party. I understand

now that there is great conflict among new generation in youth movements in France. As far as Spaniards concerned, suspect it came about that way.
A's contacts with the Spaniards were extremely broad, many not even Marxists, Spanish Social Democrats, some of them. Broad left spectrum. He published a book about ______ Spanish Workers. Bitterly attacked by Kien and Valdes. It wasn't Marxist at all.

A has fairly easy access to Chinese Embassy. With Ambassador? No with a man named Chu, think First Secretary. He apparently is the one delegated to deal with Europeans, Communists and so on.

Don't know whether A has contact with other Chinese in Berne mission. Some Chinese came to him. Normally a question of publishing books. And a very modest type of thing.

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A has nothing to do with ~~NCAD~~ NCNA His is basically with the Embassy.

He told me had an incident with the Sov First Sec. at the Cuban Embassy last Jan. The Sov heard his name. said are you ~~Swiss~~ English? He said, no, I'm ~~Swiss~~ Swedish. You must be the Anderson. Sov. told him he couldn't get away with that sort of thing long. They had ways of stopping people like him. An emotional outburst. The Russian Tried later to leave better impression- I admire what you have been doing, etc.

A is known. to the Soviets.

He has been in contact with the Sekou Party, with the Eritrean Liberation movement. That was slight. He is in touch with Curiel and company.

I'm not certain he is in complete approval of what Curiel group doing.

At one time Curiel group interested in something in the French West Indies. I understand that they were trying to send arms into Martinique and Guadeloupe - which arms one can get in Switzerland, and ship.

A was in contact with French West Indians. I don't know how far that went.

Here in London Curiel wanted to found a magazine last summer to be devoted to West Indies.

(9) New published here, Flamingo and Daylight. Don't know whether Curiel has anything to do with it. There is a new one, Magnet. And said to be another one on the way. I've seen Dabois (?) in Algeria and Lausanne, as a courier - point, but I really don't know what Curiel is up to.

The Spaniards- I had no real knowledge onthat.

He is likely to keep up contacts with the Spaniards. Also has contact with the Portuguese - e.g. students in Lausanne. Knows what's going on.

He is mixed up with Angola, was involved with the MPLA.

He was disappointed when the exaggerated claims of the MPLA were exposed: i.e. their claims that they had planes, arms on the inside, etc. But they couldn't document their claims for the OAU.

Turned out a monstrous bluff. The UPA is a much more conservative organization; it did have a fighting force. And continued until quite recently to struggle. And that was when Viriato da Cruz and others switched from the MPLA.

Understand Dr. Neto still running around, ~~has contacts~~ with the Chinese.

He probably is in Algiers now.

A. has contacts which consist of merely being there. Anyone who comes to Lausanne comes to see him.

A. kept in contact with Verges when Verges in Algiers. He had cultivated the Andersons. Mrs. A. went down there to visit Verges. Anderson doesn't tell me everything about Verges' money. A. had full power of attorney to sign for the Verges bank account in the Union des Banques Suisses in Lausanne. This account was from November 1962 until probably Jan 1964. Verges claimed that A had taken money. Anderson claimed the funds were down to 500 Swiss francs anyway.

(2) Verges sent Kessel to close the account. Behind A's back, and when A found out he was furious. Verges claimed he also had a second account in Geneva.

Anderson & Verges haven't seen each other since spring 1962.

CURIEL? MUST MEAN QUERIELLE

In Oct of 62 before I went to Algiers, ~~but~~ when I came to Paris I saw Sinet who had a large amounts of Algerian curreency in his flat, it was indiscreet — the clost shelves were covered with bundles of Algerian currency: several million of Algerian francs.

I had met Sinet in New York when he came back from Cuba. He and his wife.

He came through FPCC office.

He asked me if I had time to help him change some of this money, which he claimed was given him by an Algerian friend who was going on a world tour, and had brought it from Algiers, but banks after independence did not want to change large amounts of Algerian money — would only take up to a certain amount. He was sending it by various people to airport, etc. small banks, to change a little at a time. at a one-for-one rate. This of course was part of the money thatVerges got, I assume.

Verges had met Sinet during the Algerian war, when and how I don-t know. Sinet had been closely involved with the Algerians during the war. But He was too conspicuous to do much in an open way. He may have given money and such. certainly helped in propaganda.

He knew Chandesli at the UN, and His Algerian connections very good. He was in contact with Ben Bella.

The French govt would never allow Sinet to go to see Ben Bella but did allow Sinet's wife to go. When Ben Bella was suddenly released, he said he had no proper clothes. It was she who took clothes to Ben Bella when he was released, and went to Cairo. Rabat

In 62 when I saw Sinet in Paris I was thinking of going to Algiers. I was vague about. He told me all about Verges and someone named Maurice Masquino (ph.) who then was Editor of El Mujahid, weekly, official organ of the FLN.

It was actually throgh Sinet that I really got the job with Verges.

I had heard of him (Verges) and he apparently had heard of me, but I had never known him before. Sinet had proposed that I meet him then — in October — but I couldn't — I don't know why. He had gone to Morocco or something.

This was at the time between the struggle between the GPRA and the Tlemcen group TLEMCEN for power in Algeria. And I don't know where he was. Again, he played a role in the transfer of funds. They needed money for a large parade. Verges carried the money from Morocco for Khider ~~to~~ Algiers.

July - First meeting with Verges about 15 minutes. Talking about an English lang. edition then of Revolution Africaine

Ali Buzuren, who then business manager, later secy of Algierian Embassy in Leopoldville.

First meeting (with Verges) was in November. 1962

Offices of Journal d'Alger had to be cleaned up. had been bombed. by OAS. get staff, etc. He (V) in meantime went to Paris saw people connected with Maspero — Gerard Chaliand — to whom he proposed coming to Algiers as editor. He was careful to make sure he had foreign editors not Algerian.

Revolution Africaine lasted 18 issues. I have the full file if you are interested.

why did Verges lost post,

The political ~~section~~ bureau was breaking up. Bitat & Khider disagreed with Ben Bella.

Khider was seeking to use his post as secretary of the party to ensure he had some sort of hold

but his middle class background used very successfully against him by

Ben Bella. Since he came out of this milieu of small shop-keepers and grocers and there were scarcities it was easy to blame Khider every time there was something short.

Everyone knew of Khider's speculation with money. Turned out he had

$12,000,000 in Switzerland, probably much more elsewhere.

Verges was originally the head of the African Section of the Algerian

foreign ministry. After the Tlemcen group came in. Due to his African contacts

He did not get along at all well with Khemisti who was then

~~was Ben Bella's~~ foreign minister.

He ~~then~~ at same time made contacts with Bitat and Khider, I'm certain, for money.

Ben Bella never gave approval, but other members of the political bureau did.

And the money came from Khider - it was un-blocked by Khider, finally -

Fifty million francs in cash brought in to start magazine.

It went behind Ben Bella's back. Once it came out it was a fait accompli, and he didn't care.

Verges
He maintained later he didn't expect to hold out as long as he did.

Djamila Bouhired
His wife under Moslem law, was asked by Ben Bella if she would marry

him. She had ferocious animosity against Ben Bella, still has, I think.

So all this had blood - frustrated desire - came into play.

When Verges was asked to go to the Addis Ababa conference he was not busy in the Foreign Ministry, he smelled something fishy and he begged off. Two or three days later he was called to party headquarters - It was already [illegible] - and they

told him ~~was asked~~ to turn over everything to ~~a man named HARVEY~~. At 11 next morning,

That same evening he left by car, with Djamila Bouhired's uncle, went to Morocco and then he went to Paris.

He has connections in Morocco. as high as the Palace, so I understand, but I don't know who.

Verges always cultivated a myth of big connections. But he does

circulate in worldly circles. Claims contacts in Pompidou's office.

I never saw any benevolence from Pompidou's office, though.

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obviously the money Sinet had had

So he went to Paris and then he came to Switzerlandm and/then he started to set up -- he had some money, obviously in France . . . and then he started transferring his funds from Algiers-from Lausanne - - transferred it on his person, on my person - no he never carried any money, but I carried some, and Kessel did too. Kessel claimed that he was actually stopped and searched and that he had this money in 500 franc bills in his hip pocket and they never looked in there. Any way, he did get the money in from Fracne. And he began publication of Revolution as a monthly in September of 1963.

((Had you known in advance what he was going to do?))

No. In fact, it was a question for a while, whether he would do it in Switzerland.

A wanted Verges to set up magazine in Switzerland. ~~Sinet~~ was very

much against it. I'm certain Verges ~~may~~ never intedned to go to Switzerland

~~Harvey~~ Hachi immediatey spread story that Verges had stolen something like

[illegible] ... Was very upset. He was

very upset when he heard that Verges was in Paris. He didn't like being connected with somebody who had stolen money. I called Verges and said he better get in touch with Andersson himself, better see him soon, because he would keep putting him off. The fact was that Andersson and I went to Paris. That's when we saw Verges. Verges placated him, said there was no truth in the charges. In fact, the charges were reduced. Harbi himself came to London. (The amount) went down, from 300 million to 200 million from 60 million to 50 million, and the whole thing was dropped. Buzerin, the business manager, was extremely indignant about the talk about misappropriation of funds and demanded an audit of the books. They found 6 million francs surplus. That was even more disturbing to them down there. ~~Habbi~~ Harbi is supposed to have said "this isn't swindling; this is an affair of state." Buzerin was then given his clean bill of health and he went off to be secretary (of Embassy) in the Congo, in Leopoldville. On his way back last Spring from Leopoldville -- he was no longer going to stay there; I think he is in Algeria now-- he and his wife stopped in Paris and saw Verges. He had been in contact with Verges and he was very much tied, family-wise, with this whole Bitat-Zohra Driff crowd.

Our transfer/was simply that here we had been working for Verges personally. The money, there -in Switzerland, had been his money and the Algerians never made any attempt to get in touch with us. None whatsoever. There was a letter to Anderson from Chalion, who remained with the Algerians. There was an attempted phone call from them down there- probably Chalion or someone with the magazine- which Andersson refused to accept. So we really were never before the choice. In other words, he proposed (the work); we were doing what he proposed. He was going to continue and the Algerians had no coherent story about the money and what was going on. At that time they weren't interested in the English edition. Later, when it continued, they did produce in Algiers one issue of an English edition, an imitation of ours, which was very badly done. That was the last. They never did any more. That was edited by Patricia McGowan Pinheiro, who was involved with a half-Anglish, half-Portuguese leader from Mozambique who allegedly-- his group is extremely small-- He was kept going by the ~~Filemo~~ FRELIMO people from Mozambique because of the fact that they needed a European to represent the progressive European element (laughing) for when the day comes for takeover by Africans- well, Carlos (her husband) was waiting for the day when Carlos will be produced as a genuine Mozambiquan of European origin. She was also involved with the Portuguese. She wrote a book about Portugal

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a man by the name of (under the name,) Peter Fryer, published it in 1962. I can't remember the title. She speaks Portuguese. May be- apparently is connected with the Trotskyist group.

The Portuguese, from what I understand is going on — — I would like to get back to Algiers to see what is going on as in Great (ferment - splitting - the Eldorado business was)

Just part of the iceberg that stuck up above the water. She was close to the Algerians. She produced this one issue. Then that flopped. She had been asked by Verges to go with me to Lausanne to be the joint editor of the edition in English. She refused because she wanted to stay in Algiers, stay close to her Portuguese group. She didn't think very much of me simply because she had set up the publication of the English edition , (which) was supposed to have been done in London. And then suddenly behind their backs Verges arranges it Switzerland. The British Communist Party was very much upset about the whole thing. They had thought that they might be able to have something to do with it, that they might take it over. They had a woman who was working for us here, named Rosalind Ainslie, South African, a European woman from South Africa, who obviously - she works for East Germ News

Agency here now - would have been their agent. It was even going to be incorporated here under her name. Verges was going to be the junior and silent partner abroad. Obviously he wasn't going along with that. This was the summer of 63. At the time of the break with Algiers, she was working as our correspondent here; (she) was extremely upset. She was holding £1000 of Verges' money. She didn't know which way to go. Harbi came here and talked to her. The whole thing fell through. Finally she chose the Algerians and then they dumped her. And she was forced to repay the money to Verges that she owed.

And so we then stayed on in Switzerland. We were perfectly content to stay in Switzerland. Out of the . . .

Verges wanted to move to Paris. He had little justification for a move to Paris. He was absolutely delighted when the Swiss expelled us. They gave us three months to get out. It really wasn't any expulsion. We continued it (the magazine). The editor and publisher were out of the country. Andersson had nothing to do with it. It was still being produced by Panguin. Only the English edition was banned. That was to prevent any further publication (in Switzerland, presumably) . . . . . . That's why it had to be done

SECOND SESSION

18 February 1965

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(Tape starts a little late. G. had brought in bound volume of Revolution Africaine — all 18 issues — and we are discussing this when tape picks up.)

18 Feb 1965 10 to 11:30

It was essentially put together by Europeans, the magazine. The actual editor being Gerard Chalion which he got from Maspero who now works for a professor Bettelheim. These are the entire issues that were put out by Verges. It started 2 Feb. His last issue, 18th May. (was later than I thought)

I have two copies of these. I'm trying to sell these to the University of California. Don't know what I'll get for this, something between $25 and $50.00 for the full set. Verges doesn't even have this. There are three sets. Andersson has one, I have two. I'm planning to keep one. Verges departed precipitously from Algiers — didn't even take a mailing list. This I got together in Lausanne.

~~Swipt~~

~~Gyppsum~~ I got them out of the binder.

Andersson had a file. ~~He distributed them.~~

I had to take Andersson with me to the binder to get them out. He kept one.

What I would like to talk to you about (is future work possibility.)

(I have the Atlantic Monthly article to do.)

~~They want autobiographic article.~~

~~I don't mind writing about Revolution.~~

CY: Does this page refer only to the Algiers phase?
Do the 18 issues refer only to French ed, only to ENG. ed., or to both?
What year (2 Feb & 18 May)?

But what they want is a sort of autobiographical type of article. I don't mind writing about Revolution. Here's the problem. Once I write about-- it's all right for me to write about Revolution. Nobody will object about how far I go one way or the other. What I feel told you I could put in the public press generally, except for this about the other group, but in terms of Revolution itself there's no objection. However, if I have to go any further than that, that means that as far as I'm concerned most of these people will never touch me with a ten foot pole. (As it is,) what contacts I have, some are more delicate than others- - but I see that after this trip they could be built up again, after somehow finding some means of interviewing people relatively regularly. So what I want to ask you is, one - what sort of ideas-if any, - you had in relation to me for future things; were you interested in my going, investigating anything further for you or are you satisfied with what little I know now. As I say, I don't think I know terribly much really, except incidental things which might corroborate what you know (from other sources.) Secondly, in terms of following up, if there's anything (in particular) For instance, I would suggest, the person to get the Algerian (side of this story from) would be Georges Arnault, the French writer who was in Algiers and (who) worked on the first issue of Revolution Africaine, after that (there) never was any more, The split with Verges, who now works in the Ministry of Information and remains fairly friendly (to me) on a personal basis and who could get me a good deal of information on the Algerian side (if that's what you're interested in.) again Secondly there is a possibility (through Jate (?) and the Atlantic Monthly) that we might both try to cover the Second Bandung Conference.

((Through who?))

Jate (?), the European representative of the Atlantic Monthly, and we might cover the Second Bandung in Algiers together. That's in June if it is going to be held at all. Soviet pressures and other pressures might Cul at ...

If you're interested in other things, you know, now I have contacts

That's why I'd like to know, I don't know what-- really, for instance - I've got a possibility - although it's a very slim one- just over across the street here. The Indonesian press office needs somebody. But I don't know whether--. These are little things. The people of the Pan African Congress- South Africa, the PAC, they came to see me to know if I could help them a little here in London, in setting up their offices and handling their press campaign. Of course they haven't real money,

((That wasn't so appealing on that ground))

No, that wasn't so appealing on that score. And then also, they don't have a policy. They're sort of wavering between a policy which means telling one thing to the Congress for Cultural Freedom and telling another to the Chinese in Peking, which any nationalist group has to do, obviously. It's extremely difficult to get any kind of a straight answer even inside the organization. And they are going through a period of reorganization, after some highly scandalous, not political offense, but just plain misappropriation of funds, the usual thing that happens in many, many African organizations, it's incredible (laughs). But I think the people here in London, at least on the surface, are somewhat more honest.

((Basically, you're not interested per se, in staying in the same milieu.))

No, no. But I'm not interested per se, shall we say, in becoming a sort of professional anti-Communist. That isn't--

((Not either way- either a professional anti-Communist or a professional revolutionist-))

(laughs) No, no. No. The two careers. Frankly, I do have a feeling, you know I feel very bad about someone like Walter Bow; I know his problems. Only I don't know how the hell to solve them, and what interests me is to see- again it is always a problem- what can the US government do - what will the people do now that they've got Walter Bow — — — —. To a certain extent I'm certain it was provocation, though Walter was game for anything. If you had gone to him and proposed to shoot the President, he would have said yes. Well, he would have thought about it anyway, and probably would have agreed. He would probably suggest that you'd [illegible] President and the Supreme Court along with it, you know. And he's not wild. He's a very sensible, moderate boy, except that he has such a - it's not a chip on his shoulder, he's got half of the forest, a redwood on his shoulder. He comes from , the papers say he comes from Philadelphia; he doesn't, he comes from Camden, New Jersey. I remember when he was playing jazz as a kid. I met him through this fellow in the Department of Agriculture

I told you about, Haggard. He was a very good friend of his as well. Poor ______ he must be very nervous, down there in Agriculture, because he's known me personally, he's known Walter personally, they'll think he had some very strange friends.

Anyway, I'm certainly — you asked me for some information which I'm perfectly willing to give you. And if you had come along a long time ago and asked, in Paris, I probably would have given the same information. The point was that nobody seemed to want to know. I was talking to an American newsman-- I wasn't running around peddling information, either- but I talked to people, sometimes saying just the opposite of what Verges was saying. He never really protested too much about this. He pretended that what he was doing was fairly on the level but it was fairly obvious that it wasn't. Anyway, I — what I want to know, if possible, in a relatively short period of time... I've got to make up my mind what I'm going to do. I don't know how I'm going to do anything, in fact, But I do not intend, even for economic reasons, to do something which I think is absolutely dishonest, in the sense of writing an article, if someone asked me to write an article about Communist attractions for African students in France- in fact the Communist Party has very few for African students in France. It's just the opposite. The FEANF ______, the association for African students, is very resentful of what they consider — — — and they would only love to be enticed and wooed. But this American had an idea which was based on some, on his own mythology actually, of beautiful French white girls being sent to lure these simple-minded boys. In actual fact that's not true at all. I'm perfectly well aware that people have written articles which bear no relation to reality, they think what the hell, they want this sort of slop, they pay for it. The Reader's Digest at one time was a regular market for that sort of thing.

But what's the point. It isn't true and even though it might- it isn't even good propaganda, in the long run. a titillation value, especially the racial thing with sex thrown in- -

((What about your wife?))

Well, my wife, doesn't know - first of all, she knows of only once that I was seeing you, and she would highly disapprove of it. Not because my wife is a— has ever been a member of anybody's party, including the Communist party; it's just that she would feel that that would be a highly

the Encounter thing. She doesn't really like it at all. I hate to

Revolution and all I don't see any reason not to. She can accept that.

The fact is, the reason we have our financial problem, to a certain extent, is because her family is by no means poor but My brother-in-law who has carried us for months, has to pay rent, right this week and she has practically told him we didn't want any money. So now, there I am, you know. This has caused — I respect, I know what her problem is- very often children that come from very wealthy homes — and her family — She comes from the poorest branch of her family, which is quite wealthy in this country. It's an Anglo-Jewish family, has a sort of monopoly on kosher food prepared kosher food here, sort of like a Manischevitz operation or racket. One of the relatives is — they're all in business. Her brother, one brother, is constantly having business failures. He's a very nice fellow, and all, but at one point he made phonographs, now the last thing, he made tape recorders, a little transistor tape recorder, but that's just flopped too. The other brother, is a chartered accountant. He has his own firm in the City, He does quite well. He's married.

She gets along very poorly with him. And while I was away, unfortunately relations deteriorated to such a point that I don't know quite how I'm going to — — —

She's happy that she's got this job in the Indonesian Embassy. The only thing she's not happy about is the salary but she likes the job. — — — It's not serious. The Indonesians spend most of the time telling her stories about people — —

If I take a job this thing in the Indonesian Embassy the practically in a state of war with Indonesia. Although my wife is English that doesn't give me an automatic right to stay in England, not that I'm terribly (eager) — — — to stay in England. I would much rather be some place on the Continent. I would much rather, for instance.. take a job with some sort of a bureau — — Obviously that's out of the question. I could never get a security clearance, but I think a job with some sort of international organization, the UN, in Paris, Rome, or Geneva, which would be for me, information — I'd be quite happy at that. As for working for an American outfit, I can't see much possibility either, except this sort of free lance business, which could perhaps be extended. That I would certainly like, but it is precarious — when you have - kids, and then what I feel pretty solid commitments here and then 3000 miles of water in between —

((Let me see what I can find out. . soon as I can. . . now questions and answers. Who invited Verges to Algeria in 63))

He didn't go to Algeria in 63. He went to China. He was already in Algiers. He was in Algiers from the point of independence, that was in July of 62. And Verges arrived there with the clandestine group, that is, Ben Bella, Khider, Bitat, I suppose in October or November of 62. He was invited to China in March of 1963.

((How invited?))

The first time he went as the Director of Revolution Africaine and he (went with) Djamila Bouhired, the heroine of the Algerian War, and (there was) an enormous amount of publicity in the Chinese press was given to her. In fact there had been a book about her. She was well known for her part in the Algerian war and this is how he got the interview with Mao, as he was an official Algerian representative, the Director of Publications sponsored by the Political Bureau of the FLN, and, I think it was, The Committee (for) Foreign Relations, something like that, that handled the visit.

((When did he marry Djamila)) in prison

Nobody knows. Nobody knows whether they are really married. This is again one of the things that he loves to keep a mystery. It is rumored, it has been said by a lot of people that he has a Moslem marriage. We know he was converted to Islam. During the war, the Algerian War, he used the code name of MANSOUR for his contacts within the Front. After he came to Algeria, apparently he became a Moslem. and became J. M. Verges, Jacques Mansour Verges. Now he becomes Mansour Verges, then it becomes J. M. (referring to the magazine file)

((When he went to China. .))

Here he is back already. It must be about the 30th of March. It must be, because he and Djamila and my wife and I and our children left Algeria on the same plane for Paris when we left Algiers definitively, he changing planes in Paris for Moscow, and I going a day or so later to Geneva., and from Geneva, Lausanne.

(checking on name) He uses J. M. all the way through. This is the last issue of his. There are sixteen issues here. He knew that he was under pressure and he tried to protect

himself. He put Djamila along with — — — — and himself as a Comite de Direction — — — — Number 1 and 2 to could protect him from the wrath of Ben Bella but it didn't work.

(How long- we wont say when did they married- -)

It must have happened in the month right after independence. That's what I think. You see she had been held in prison, in France, she'd been sentenced to death and he had won her - well, he didn't win anything but he managed to keep her from being executed. In the course of this he became extremely close to her. Not only in sexual plane. And this is very strange, his sexual life. I don't know if he has one, in fact. He has a French wife and the French wife has a child, a boy about 12-14 years old and he still is apparently married to the French wife. By becoming a Moslem he could take a second wife.

(Did he live with her- with Djamila B)

Never, really. In Algeria he had his own place and she lived with her family. When she comes to Paris she stays with him and actually they sleep in the same bed. So it's more than (platonic.) But I dont think that- - it's a sort of - a very curious relation it seems to me.

(If they were married, they were married when they went to China)

Yes. I don't know about how the Chinese treated it. They never referred to her as his wife. But that is done very often. He is very close to her family, her brothers. One is in Czechoslovakia, the other one was in Leningrad, I think, going to school. And it was Verges who arranged for transfers of money. Her uncle is head of the family. Her father is a terrible alcoholic and skirt chaser who has no respect from his children. He and his wife had a divorce. The father came to Paris and Lausanne once and caused us a great deal of difficulty (laughing). Anyway, Verges has family connections there. This marriage, that is supposed to have taken place, who saw it I don't know. Nobody knows. Even the father doesn't know. He said "Well, if she's married to him, why doesn't she say it. Why doesn't she tell even me."

He was never really accepted as a Moslem in Algiers. People thought, you know, you don"t take a man — a man who is a Communist or even— an ex-Communist, of his kind, he wasn't a member of the Communist Party, and convert him into a Moslem just like that. And yet there are certain characteristics of his behavior which are very strange to explain. One would say he did it for expediency, like going along with Ramadan, for instance, this is by no means pleasant, fasting- And even in Paris, he would fast during Ramadan. He used to drink rather heavily, I'm told. He no longer touches any kind of alcohol. And this he does all the time, whether there are Algerians around or not.

optics,

And his perspective toward the Algerians. He was always talking of going back to Algiers, going to shoot Gerard Chalion just because Chalion had double-crossed him with the staff. He thought, well, since I have these Europeans they won't be able to take over the magazine, so quickly? He's very clever. He surrounds himself with people who are in a weaker position than he. in other words, a defense. — — — — have to be very strong willed. — — — — — things that took place in Algeria, other side,
But Chalion made a deal with the Ben Bella people and kept the entire staff on.

((Revolution in Switzerland or Paris))

Once he saw that the old charges against him on account of the Algerian War would not be that the French Government had forgotten all this, that the Ministry of Justice had no intention of prosecuting not only him, but Fran celle Jeanson) was sitting there. He was under sentence of death. And Jean — — — — , no one had ever bothered.

(Embassy.)

He claimed he had contact with somebody in Pompidou's office

He had- well the only person who worked with the magazine was somebody in the Ministry of Finance who writes under the name of Jalet. He does the economic section. I forget his real name-- maybe Roget. He handled Common Market things. That's why his articles for Revolution always deal with the Common Market. Maybe he writes one paper for the Ministry and another for Revolution.

((How long did V stay in Switzerland))

He never really stayed in Switzerland at all. He just came through there and stayed a few days. And he was traveling on an Algerian diplomatic passport. He still has one. I don't know how he went to Japan, because he had been very reluctant to reply to the demand- to request, for renewal of his ordinary French passport. It was quite possible to have dual nationality- French- Algiers. I don't know whether the Algerians (recognize) this. I think that he didn't have a normal Algierian passport, that he only had a diplomatic one, which should, I think, have been cancelled once he ceased to have any thing to do with the government. So he didn't want to travel on it. He wanted to come to London on several occasions but he didn't dare to try his Algerian passport. He could travel around much of Western Europe with his expired French passport. Most European passports are considered valid for five years after the date of expiration

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You don't really need it anyway, just an identification. They will take an expired passport in Common Market countries, up to five years.

How he got to Japan I don't know. He may have finally applied for a French passport. I thought that he still wanted to maintain the fiction of his Algerian nationality, by not making any request for French passport. In Japan he was called the Delegate from Reunion (?) and no mention was made of Revolution. There has never been, to the best of my knowledge and the knowledge of Andersson any mention in any Chinese publication whatsoever of Revolution, and they have mentioned all sorts of two-bit publications that they have financed lock, stock and barrel. And yet the Chinese did purchase it. I understand they do not purchase it any longer. And according to Andersson contact between the Chinese Embassy group and Verges in Paris had ceased.

((When))

As of last month.

((When they ceased purchasing))

According to Andersson. He says he has heard it from other people. He doesn't know from Chinese sources. He did tell the truth (was) in Berne, I had written a letter to the China Quarterly about the article by Feito on Verges, refuting what Feito said, Asking what he thought of that. And he replied that they had no objection but they thought it was about time that somebody ended the fiction... that they thought Revolution was extremely embarrassing to them.

((How long did the English language edition stay with Andersson))

The English language edition was produced in Switzerland for the first year, the entire twelve issues, And was printed in Switzerland on the press of this Mr. Garguin in Montreux. And Gonguin was introduced to Verges by Andersson. Andersson paid him and so forth. But Andersson didn't have any official connection with Revolution as of November I think, December, of 63. I went back and forth and Strelkof, who did the layout and art work, went back and forth to Lausanne and saw Gonguin almost every month, once or twice a month, from Paris. But once I left Paris, the bank account was closed down - I mean, shortly thereafter, by Kissel who came in behind Andersson's back and closed the account at the Union des Banques Suisses.

((That ended the Swiss production))

No, the Swiss production continued, but Andersson had nothing to do with it from that point. The twelve issues of that year were printed there.

He represents nothing. He's a sort of hopeless person. She's a very dynamic woman. Verges claimed that she had become a police informer, for the Algerian police, and that she talks to opposite groups and to occasionally, to Mamani of the Salawa party in Algiers. But she no longer has anything to do with Revolution Africaine. She didn't have anything to do with Verges after the moment that she refused to go to Lausanne.

((Why))

Why did she refuse to go? Well, she couldn't leave Carlos there by himself. God knows what would happen to him. Secondly, she wanted to be in the spot in Algiers. She wasn't interested in running a magazine in Switzerland, the magazine interest was secondary to her.

There was another Portuguese-speaking person in Algiers. That was a man by the name of Braganza. Braganza is a Goan and Goan who has lost his reason for being with the end of the Portuguese colonial rule in Goa, he should have gone back! But he had been a Goan revolutionary with the Portuguese opposition. For years he had been in Rabat hooked up to the, at that time it was the CONCP, Conference Nationaliste des Colonies Portuguese, which grouped together what later came to be the Falimo and the MPLA. It was part of the hard line countries There was another one elsewhere which was soft line. Braganza was also sort of adviser to the magazine Revolution Africaine questions of India and so on. He stayed on and worked with Mohammed Harbi and came to London.

((Did he have anything to do with Patricia Macgowan))

Yes. They had been together in Rabat.

((Did he have anything to do with Carlos))

Yes. It's all the same crowd. But Carlos was waiting for destiny to call him and Braganza had already lost his chance. The Indians had got in. They'd liberated Goa, so what next, you know. Go back to India. He obviously wasn't going to go back. He was living too well, as it was. What was he going to do in Goa, nobody knew him in Goa. He was a Goan educated in Portugal. One of these people without a real national identity. He knew that he wasn't Portuguese and had this feeling of alienation from Portugal, which made him like most of the colonials students there-- the MPLA really started in Portugal- made him an oppositionist. He didn't have enough roots with the homeland. So he's just sort of floating around. His wife is a school teacher. He speaks excellent French. He was working for Revolution Africaine. I don't know if he still is. I'm certain he'll find something to do. He'll never go back to Goa.

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((This points up the need for a continuing revolution, when the revolution is completed))

Yes. You don't have jobs unless you're in the government. And that's a problem, too. In his case, he never really did much, wasn't even a real revolutionary, just a bureaucrat in Rabat and other places.

((How did Macgowan get involved with Verges))

That I don't know. I don't know how he knew her in the beginning. I imagine he met her in Rabat. He used to go to Morocco quite often and had contact with all the African people there. I suspect that's where he met her.

((So much for those guys))

Now you've got Harbi. He was the person who replaced Verges. He's out now, but I'm told by Andersson, who has his ear to the ground in Algiers as well as in Switzerland, that Harbi is still in a very good position. He is one of the leading advisers to Ben Bella, represents the Left position. He's a Trotskyist, or a Trotskyist sympathiser without any formal organizational ties. He is very close to the Pablo group. That's Michel Raptis. He's Pablo, we could'nt have overlooked him, he's a feature of Algiers life. He played an extremely important role in the agrarian reform, in determining the type of agrarian reform that was going to be carried out. He came down on the Yugoslav model, that is collectives which are privately owned by the collectives and run on the profit model, that is on a profit basis.

Harbi, they were all inside of this Bureau des Biens Vacants which then became the Bureau of the Socialist Sector. I once did an article for Monthly Review, about how it operated. What really happened was that the Europeans fled just before and just after Independence, as they should have, considering what they had done. They had expected a blood bath. The blood bath never took place. It was incredible. That was one of the most incredible things to me in Algeria was that the Algerians didn't — — — — —

Because the stories were horrifying. You know what happened. A month or so before, they (the French) were just shooting everybody on the street, trying to provoke them, and the discipline of the FLN was incredible. Nobody would shoot back, no matter what they did. So they fled and left all these farms. It was a question of ploughing and seeding. There is only a certain time of year that you can do this. This had to be organized and it was organized almost spontaneously locally. This was institutionalized later, an accomplished fact. They wanted some sort of a socialist system of agriculture. They

didn't know how and the institutionalizing of it was really directed by these Trotskyists. There was Pablo, Harbi, a French lawyer named Matthieu from Grenoble who had been involved with the FLN, and he became sort of legal adviser of Biens Vacants, which was vaguely under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture which was at that time under Omar Usgam who is now Minister of State, and Director of Revolution Africaine at present. He replaced Harbi.

Harbi is deeply resented by the army elements which are pro-Egyptian. However, the Army, despite its religious inclination, had its socialist bias and would like to see more centralization, more on an Egyptian model. In other words, they would like to see much more control from the center than this confused type of regional or local control. They feel that in the long run the business of the private collective ownership is going to cause trouble. It's all right if it is a rich one, but what happens if you are in a poor one? You don't split profit, you split a deficit. Obviously, according to the Yugoslav model, the state intervenes. The State taxes the rich one and then distributes subsidies to the poor ones, but this a debate that is still going on in Algeria. Curiously enough these Trotskyists have been in contact, very close contact, with the Yugoslavs. As you recall, the campaign, the so-called campagne de labeur, the ploughing, was made possible only by the delivery of 500 Yugoslav tractors which turned out to the great deception (disillusionment) of some of the Algerians not to be Yugeslav but to be American tractors put together in Yugoslavia under license.

(This is getting us a little bit far afield)

This is Harbi and this is the group. Harbi represents the leading spokesmen of this sort of Trotskyist-leaning Left group within the FLN, and his post is still very high, even though he is no longer Director.

(When was he dropped)

I think last summer. I'm not certain. With Usgam it has become much more ________________ the word Socialism appears in Arabic because it is felt that Socialism in French doesn't have the same meaning as it has in Arabic. It's very silly, it represents the very muddled mind that Usgam has. He is very much split between his religious (and political) inclinations. Usgam is a full member of the Communist party of Algeria but he left for nationalist reasons when they refused to support the rebellion, and joined the FLN. His wife is supposed to be fanatically religious and has made him more religious than he was.

(Curious mix-up - - this religion and politics.)

(Returning to our first subject, Strelkoff. Is he a practicing Jew?)

No.

(Just an ethnic Jew)

Yes.

(Next on the list here is Robert Williams. Whoever made this up calls him an American in Peking.)

But ~~where was he now~~

He's in Havana. He was in Peking recently and he may still be there, for that matter. He went on a second trip to the Far East. He was in one of the countries that had a celebration. I think he was in Hanoi, if I'm not mistaken. He was in Asia. He may still be there.

Robert Williams is a Negro, former President of the Union County North Carolina branch of the NAACP, who had a hell of a battle on his hands against the local Kuklux Klan and discovered the the best way to deal with the Kuklux Klan was to shoot back at them. And it worked. They never had seen it, in that part of the south, anyway, the small towns of the South. Up until recently there's been sort of gentlemen's agreement in the south that the Negro civil rights groups would go into the big cities, where they would be reasonably protected. But they had to leave the rural areas alone because they couln't expect much. Williams of course, was a great embarrassment to everybody, there is no doubt, and they were on his back. He got no sympathy from the NAACP leadership. He first came to national prominence after a case of obvious injustice where a white man had done something to a Negro woman and some local jury had thrown it out. Williams said, well if we can't get justice in the courts we'll have to take justice in our own hands." But even the fact that Negroes would fight back got the older, more conservative Negro leaders very upset. People immediately came to his support, particularly the Trotskyites, not the Communists. The Trotskyites came in, and tried to take him over. They did give him some support. There had been a case before, another case, locally called the Kissing Case. Two Negro boys, you may have heard of it, were sentenced to indefinite terms in prison for having kissed a six-year-old white girl. He was involved in that and again, it was the Trotskyites who came to his support, with other liberal groups. In terms of organizational support it was the Trotskyites. I heard of him at the time I was in CBS and I thought that it was very understandable and sent him a message of support. I met him at the time of the NAACP Conference in New York in 1959 and when the FPCC was formed he was among the eight Negroes who were among the 30 founding members, to the great shock of

of the Communist Party of the United States which did not particularly approve of seeing the two issues mixed, Cuba and Negroes.

Williams, very volatile, a very determined person on a local level, has no ability whatsoever on a national level. He has become a symbol now to Negro youth in particular, as a Negro who is not an Uncle Tom, who will fight. We knew what was coming in the summer of 61, obviously was embarrassment for the national executive of the NAACP, embarrassment for the Justice Department, and more than embarrassment Terry Sanford, who was the Governor, told him, "I wish you were dead. Period." Finally, by one of these flukes of fate, there was a demonstration over a swimming pool. They didn't want to integrate the pool. They just wanted to swim in it. But the local people said they didn't want to do that because they would have to change the water, and it would take too much time to change the water after Negroes swam in the water. So they had some demonstrations. Williams was almost murdered on one of these occasions. The demonstrations were getting pretty violent. And then King sent in some Freedom Riders who were going to show them how non-violence was going to work in this town. They decided to make an example. So Williams said, "I'm going to get out of this. I don't want anything to do with your non-violence. But you go ahead and I'll see what happens."

Well the non-violent demonstration became even more violent. There were people shot. There were arrests. There was an English girl who now figures here in the British Trotskyist party, who was over there. People were coming from all over, reports in the European press. Williams now had nothing to do with this. He was just sort of staying there saying well you see where non-violence gets you-- but there was a report that they were going to lynch the people who had been arrested. As often happens in this type of thing the Negroes and whites, outside whites who were involved, really came in for a hell of a beating, and as in the Philadelphia, Mississippi, case, they have been killed. Williams was more or less a victim of the mob in the Negro community which said "we've got to do something. We've got to free these people, get them out of jail."

He had arms, including machine guns, which had been purchased in New York and sent down there. They didn't use them because they got scared, but they had arms. The community was armed. The people out in the street in front of his house when a car with a white couple came down the road. It was surrounded and they told to get out. The crowd wanted to string them up right there. This man came from a neighboring

town, claimed had lost their way. They said, no you're a member of the Klan in this town." They wanted to kill him, or hold him as hostage. Williams said, "bring these people in my house and you know I won't let them go." He called the Sheriff, and said, "Look, I have these people here and my people are very upset and I want you to know that I don't want anything to happen to our people that you have in the jail." The Sheriff immediately called the National Guard, State Troopers and what not. They couldn't hold out very long. Williams escaped. Julian Mayfield was there, a well known Negro writer who now lives in Ghana as a result of this. Minnie Mallory, a Negro woman from New York who was there was later arrested and convicted and sentenced to 16 years in prison for kidnapping, and the case is on appeal now. Williams was spirited across the United States — I knew vaguely where he was, but he was kept very carefully by Cubans and by Negro groups in contact with the Cubans, to Canada, from Canada he was flown by private plane and by Castro himself, to Havana, where he is now.

On two occasions the FBI came to me asking for information about Williams, and I damn sure wasn't going to give any of what I knew. We had tried to get in touch with Bobby Kennedy himself. I had sent telegrams. I even tried to get a telephone call in. Because I knew what was going to happen on this thing, to get some kind of Federal intervention. It was one of the most sickening things that I ever saw. They wanted him out of the way. Even the way they came to me later — two of the agents came to the FPCC office in New York. They said, "We have 500 agents. We'll get him. He'll never get away." Well, he was away at that point. His aunt died in New York around that time. They went to the funeral parlor where the body was and put a wanted poster for Williams, on the coffin and stood there to see if he would come. Really, they should have been thrown out on their heads, frankly. If it hadn't been Negroes I'm certain they would never have done that sort of thing. The trouble was — the trouble is — the whole attitude. Anyhow, as it is, Williams is not a Communist, he's not a Trotskyite. He's a former Marine, who's just had enough. Really, you know. And he's turned into a world-wide figure because people like Bobby Kennedy and others could not bother to try to see what could be done about it. It was no use, though. I mean, it's no use now.

I'm certainly [illegible] everybody."

Well, that's too bad. Just like the case of these boys, Walter Bow, and so on. And they're not the only ones. For every Walter Bow there must be at least a hundred others. I must say, I would no more want to live in the States now — you're going to really see something. I don't really

~~The twelfth issues were only 200 copies maximum, but~~

It was still printed until No. 12, ~~the end of the year.~~ the end of that first year. The twelfth issues were printed there. The twelfth issue was only 200, or 366 copies maximum. It was never distributed. I still have some. Those are the ones I sold for $10.00 a book. The American libraries are desperate to complete their sets. It was never distributed because Verges hadn't paid Gauguin the money that he promised and while the copies were sitting there waiting for some arrangement of the financial business, ~~other financial arrangement~~ the Swiss Federal Council finally took action and seized them. Actually the seizure was more "platonic" but they just wanted to say said you can't send out anything. I understand Gauguin had 50 copies of every issue, which ~~of every issue, that~~ he had salted away. He knew he could sell them. I think he could sell them in the States.

American university libraries, you know, ~~Libraries~~ are extremely - - political files. Revolution became a sort of ~~--~~ it was the American press. If Revolution had a success, it came from the American press, not the French press, or the British press, the American press. It was really fortuitous but ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] that you can't blame them - seeing this move to Paris, a new magazine ~~that~~ with a pro-Chinese line which really ~~was a~~ vaunts its pro-Chinese line, coming out at the same time as French recognition of China, so obviously you write things about a new twentieth century Europe, Verges, the Chinese top man in Europe, and this that and the other. And that was what started it. We had three articles, I believe, in the Christian Science Monitor, ~~and~~ one of them even had the address in. Right ~~[illegible]~~ then the letters came in, the subscriptions came in. ~~[illegible]~~ All sorts of people wanted them. A subscription agency in the United States saw it, and and started taking orders from university libraries. ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~ The State Department took 20 copies, I think. ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~ There was one airmail subscription for the Embassy ~~[illegible]~~ in Tokyo. The Congress for Cultural Freedom had even more than that. They had a list of every one of their correspondents, magazines, etc. Everyone got one. So we were doing well. And he could have, actually, on the English edition, whichhad a much lower cost than the others, he could have broken even. He would never have made anything, (however).

But his policy for the French edition, [illegible] printing and all, he could never have balanced the budget without a hefty subsidy from someone.

((Some colleagues on the editorial staff))

The ~~[illegible]~~ editorial staff was again a fiction. ~~There was no~~ If you've been following Revolution since, you see each month, each ~~use~~ issue this [illegible]

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~~because he want s to make sure that they have~~ grows larger. The mainly fictitious names, many of them.

He's got Carlos . He's supposed to be from Spain. This was a name made up by ~~Chen~~ Klein to replace Valdes. Valdes was actually a person, who ~~is~~ is a Spanish scientist, chemist, who works for the CNRS, The Centre Nationale de ~~Research~~ Scientifique, in Paris. He did write the articles on Spain under ~~Chen~~'s supervision with strong ~~rewritat~~ rewriting. And his real name is Lopez, I saw him, his first initial is S. Martin Valdes is not his real name. His address ... ~~Nowxxxxxxxx~~ He is ~~the person who~~ he is now wandering about very much at odds, but he is still very well informed about the Spanish situation. I think that if approached in the proper fashion, he might be willing to talk.

((How old is he))

In his late thirties. I had no trouble talking with him, He is very bitter. ((Why)) He was expelled from the Proletario group which he had founded, ~~and~~ more or less relegated. He isn't really made up for practical politics and he ... matter of pride, etc. but he keeps his hand in. He said he wanted to go see Grippa, but he didn't have much idea of doing anything. He is the one who told me about what was going on in the Spanish group. I could have gotten more. He had no idea that I was pumping him for information. He seemed to be approachable, willing to talk about the Spanish situation. He can lecture for hours. He is the professorial type, not for the rough and tumble of clique-like politics. He was used by Klein.

((What caused his rupture with group))

I don't know the exact story. He had group called Proletario. They put out a four-page news letter of the same name, most of which was in theory written by Valdes. But was rewritten by Klein. Klein was in contact with the members of the group and at one time Valdes and his wife were actually told that they were going to edit Revolution, a Spanish edition, which was going to be publised in Europe. By the way the Spanish edition does exist, so I'm told, in Bogota. They have managed to get out a Spanish edition - but it has nothing to do with Verges. It was brought out by the MOEC committee — Movimiento Obreros Estudiantes y Campesinos . . . a kind of Fidelista. ~~movement~~,

and which is quite pro-Chinese and is getting Chinese subsidy I think. They had quite a scandal about misappropriation of funds. Apparently the Chinese were giving them fifteen thousand, twenty-five thousand and twenty thousand, and ten thousand of it would arrive, and somewhere along the line 5,000 or 20,000 on the way in Europe would disappear. One of the persons was expelled.

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((What's relationship of Spanish edition to))
It has — takes some of the articles — --

Said to have copies in Brussels. I haven't seen. Brussels is used as a European headquarters for MOEC ~~Western Europe~~. People going through either to China or to North Vietnam coming through there. ((Can they take stuff without any copyright problems?)) Oh, yes, at first Verges wanted them to be identical-- same as Revolution in France, but and they would say, well,-- they wanted the editorial work done in Paris, which he would finance, and they would finance all of the production side. But he was unable to pay for even the editorial thing, so they said they would do all of it in Colombia.

He would finance and they would finance all of the production, but ~~theyxxwere~~ unable

They had a commercial printer, who was going to front for them in Bogota on the same format as the English edition, the old English edition; now the English and the French editions are exactly identical. The pocket format. I don't know what they've done. They didn't expect it to last very long- sort of a prestige operation. Expected three 3 or 4 issue to get out, before it would be seized, but that was enough for them. I think what they wanted to do was to establish themselves on an international plane, even nationally, as the leading left party

They've had a running battle with the Communist Party. They accuse the MOEC CP of having given the names of all their liaison people between the city and countryside - they are running ~~xcountrxxx~~ - a guerrilla campaign in certain areas of the country which has become quite serious. And they do have organizational ties with the FALN of Venezuela. They are by no means a joke. / And they are having people trained in North Vietnam. They were supposed to. And in China.

They have some people in Algeria. They may even have persuaded

the Algerians to train some people. I don't know. But they were trying.

// Actual editorial policy of the magazine- selected by me.
When I was at magazine, I selected the articles as I chose.
In the English edition, with very few exceptions, almost everything was
Then there was a hiatus when no French edition. Then I was completely

on my own. While there was a French edition, all I had to do was pick out and
translate. Basically it was a translation. ~~Then there was~~
Verges strangely has very little concern about what goes into his magazine.
as it seems ((Who now in control))
He doesn't write and he doesn't even care terribly much.
Manh Lan, former prof of philos. taught at ~~the Lycee~~ a Lycee in Paris, has connections
then. His true name is
with Trotskyist groups. Is now suspected by the group, the people in Clichy, who make up the French
Chinese group on the fringe of the Communist Party of being a Trotskyist

agent. Certainly is a person who has had extremely close ties and maintains
them with Trotskyist groups, particularly the so-called Lambert- (Groupe Lambert)
(How old) Probably
He is in late thirties. Married to French woman, from whom he was separated.

His route from Vietnam to Algeria. He never went to Algeria. He can't
leave France because has no French passport. Has been in Fr 12-15 years. but can stay as long as wants- French Viet

Came end of the forties or early fifties, in the forties, after the war. definitely

He finished his Lycee in France and went to Sorbonne, received doctorate.

philosophy, sociology. He is apparently quite brilliant. He went into French Communist
I don't think he was in the CP in Vietnam, but he was connected to the
party./In France have organizational structure and also have ~~prominent~~ Communist permanent
their permanent people.
people. Think he was one of the latter. Was at one time to write a book
title- "Vietnam depuis Dienbienphu," published by Maspero.
on Vietnam, now being translated into English and will be pub in US
within month or so
by Monthly Review Press. This represents the most cogent ~~thought~~ soft line

that - one could put up for the National liberation Front of South Vietnam.

This is the soft position. It is not the Chinese position. It's an equal

co-existence one where they don't talke about socialist revolution. They
don't even talk about taking power. but coalition, neutralization.
He wrote it '63. Has been updated with a new chapter. He does not still

remain within the Com party. Neither expelled nor did he leave but just became

inactive. He was a member of the economic commission of the party.

When Verges ~~when he~~ was in the party, was a member of the colonial ~~commission~~ commission

He has much less imagination than Verges, does not have the verve, certainly
none of more than anything else.
not the gambling instinct. He is a hack, is very cautious, wants to protect

his situation. For quite some time ~~he~~ has been going to see Maspero after

each issue of Maspero's mag comes out to say how good it is, etc.
~~Maspero told Andersson.~~ --Andersson told Maspero ~~that~~ "he launched a terrible

campaign against you.

~~Complex person, numerous ties.~~

even proving his good faith by bringing manuscripts that were originally destined for Revolution. That Verges knew anything about that I seriously doubt . This went on to such an extent that Maspero told Andersson. Andersson said, "why he has launched a terrible campaign against you as a Trotksyite---" Maspero said he didn't believe it, so Andersson showed him a letter that ~~Chen~~ had written in which he demanded that he sever all ties with Maspero, and so on. with Trotskyists.

He is a complex person. He has numerous ties. ~~With~~ He printed two articles by ~~the~~ British ~~Communist Party~~ Trotskyists about the British Communist Party, printed in Revolution, under the ~~pseudonym~~ name of Joshua Linton, which turned out to be Thomas Kent, written by one of the executive members of the British ~~XXXXXXXX~~ Trotsky Socialist Labor League, which is an incredible thing. Now he is really considered by many of these Chinese people to be a Trotskyist, or a Trotsky sympathiser. I don't know about it. He does have very curious ties. I don't what he present relationship is to the Vietnamese though he claimed that he had received ~~XXXXXXXX~~ a letter from Hanoi from a friend who was in a high position there who urged him not to do anything that could be considered anti-Soviet. This was some time before - in the spring. And they said that really He should be returning home. But he has no intention of returning.

((Why))

He ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ quite used to the life in the west. He's one of these fellows who particularly likes running around and having a ~~XXX~~ girl . . says he's gathering information from --- one day a girl said I'm not an encyclopedia, will you stop asking me all these questions?

((His relationship with the Chinese))

He has some contact with the New China News Agency ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ but it is a very slight contact. He was the one who finally in a state of panic went to the one of the ~~Chi Emb and~~ Chinese news agency correspondents in Paris and told him of the financial plight of the magazine. And that's when the ~~man~~ man from Chinese agency told him to prepare a budget. They said they would see what they could do. He told ~~Castell~~ Kiesel and ~~Castell~~ Kiesel put his foot down. He said the Verges . . .

((Who did he see))

A Mr. Yan. They were at that time Yan and Yang. Yan a heavy set man, in his forties the senior of the two, had contacts with various groups of political people. The Embassy aparently didnt want any direct contacts because the people in Marseilles and elsewhere used to go to Berne. They had obviously first made contacts with the Chinese in Berne and then they continued them in Berne (after French established relations with Chinese) because obviously it wouldn't look very good to be....

* Possibly ID

(Shouldn't be too aggressive too soon, after established in France, that sort of thing?)

I don't know. After all, they have reasonably good relations with the French so I think probably the French will be disappointed that they haven't been able to get more concrete things out of them, trade and so forth.

(The French don't want the Chinese to --)

Dabble in French politics too much. However, everyone knows one of the things someone threatened-- No nothing to do with Verges, a friend of mine who works for ABC television in Paris, Lou Chioffi, talking to someone about Revolution in the French Foreign Ministry he said- what do you think about this Chinese magazine put out here? And he said- I don't know anything about it. Besides if we wanted to examine subsidies that go into the political publications in France we would certainly start with the Russians and Humanite and then go on with some of your American financed publications. (laughs) And that was the end of that.

That may have just been a sort of snide rejoinder. I think that they do intend to be discreet, that they were very happy about the situation there. I was in the Chinese Embassy only once. I was invited to a reception. I never saw so many people from top brackets of government as at that reception. Everywhere you went a Legion d'Honneur in the button. The top structure of the civil service were there -- -- from all the important industries.

(What's Kin's loyalty then)

Kin's loyalty is basically to himself. He's interested in Marxism. He's very academic minded. He really is a pedantic, academic person. And he's got a tremendous number of interests. He is a very hard worker when he works. It's he who writes and rewrites most of the magazine. He used to write most of the editorials. Verges does very little. He does not like to write. He doesn't like to be bothered with editorial things. He likes the promotional aspects of things. He likes to convene meetings every so often to discuss things. But as for the actual running of things- though he did exercise a closer control over the French edition than he did over the English edition, he never- well once or twice he said put this in or don't put this in. He printed an article about Algeria which

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was veiled criticism in the French issue, and he told me not to print that, for instance, in the English edition, his story being that he didn't want to embarrass the Chinese. He said that after all the Chinese were buying it and this wasn't their line about Algeria and they might be asked embarrassing questions by the Algerians saying why do you distribute this magazine, which has this sort of unfriendly article.

((You mean the Chinese were buying)

The Chinese at that time were buying 3000 copies of the English edition. — 300 of the French. They didn't seem to mind the French

In actual fact, the Chinese so far as I know never made any comment about the magazine or its contents. None whatsoever.

((Is Kiev's willingness to go to Maspero and knock Verges and go to Andersson and knock Maspero- is this inconsistent with his pedantic Marxism?))

For him a lot of it is academic. It's not related too much to life, except that he is a plotter, a born conspirer. He loves to have ten people around him and to tell them what to do, how to maneuver. Of course whatever he tells them generally turns out to be disastrous for them. For example, the so-called pro-Chinese students inside of the UEC, the Union des Etudiantes Comunistes at their congress last year--~~let's see they've got one coming up~~ he was the one behind who was telling them what to do, their tactics and strategy. They had a terrible catastrophe. (laughing) In fact the pro-Chinese students represent a negligible faction now inside the Communist students, the largest faction being the Italian faction, which is actually financed by the Italian Communist Party. The struggle has gone on for years between the French party and the Italian party and it continues there.

Then he had a group of youths who called themselves the Drapeau Rouge group. They put out again a four-page, like a newsletter, which he promised to get money from Verges to subsidize. Verges had no money, as you know. One single issue came out.

Proletario, with Valdes, managed to keep on because Valdes had his own sources of income from the Spaniards who belonged to (his group) apparently. They kicked in quite a lot a month, you know, to keep it going. It wasn't too expensive. The main thing is finding a printer who will print it clandestinely, in France. ~~Because all these things that have no~~ Under French law you're supposed to have a ~~Directeur Association~~ Gerant(?) who is responsible for it and anything in a foreign language is exempt from the liberty of press, from freedom of press, in France. The only foreign languages that you can use are Basque and Breton and I think, Alsatian dialect.

For a magazine addressed to the Spanish workers in France and in Western Europe, the problem was for them to find someone to print it, clandestinely. And they found someone I think with Sinet and Strelkoff.

(What about Strelkoff)

Let's go down the line. The next one in order would be Castell: Chastel (?) is the nephew of Joseph Castell of the French Academy.

(Castelli's first name?)

Patrique

Patrick. He is the nephew of a very famous man and he has worked, again, for Maspero. All these people worked for Maspero. Verges takes great pleasure in sort of taking people away from Maspero. He used to boast about the people that he had gotten away from Maspero. I suppose this fellow can't do anything for us, so why do you want to get him? but the idea that he might be able to undercut Maspero or bring Maspero down — he is extremely petty in this sense, and once he built up this grudge against Maspero, because he felt that Maspero didn't support him 100% when he wanted to buy, and then when he wanted to buy out Maspero, Maspero wasn't interested in combining forces. So from that point on he, in a petty way, did everything possible he did — can't do too much now, — to draw people away, play down. He went to the Chinese and said Maspero was a Trotskist. The joke of the matter was that all of the Trotskyists who had been and who are in this organization, and I'm sure they are there, came through Kien. It was Kien who had introduced them to Maspero. And Maspero was the sort of person who really couldn't care less whether the Trotskyites got in as long as there was some sort of free discussion. He's not a committed person anyway; he's the sort of a man who is sentimentally on the left but outside of any party, and for whom this thing has become a fairly good business. Those magazines are by no means expensive. Only sells about 2000 copies per issue, which is all now that sells Revolution — it has come down a long way.

Anyway, Chassel was one of Maspero's authors and he worked for Algeria. Liberation. He's been to Laos and to the French West Indies. He's a journalist. He's worked I think for France Observateur. — — —. He's never been a member of the Communist Party. His main problem is trying to be bigger one day than his uncle, whom he dislikes intensely but nevertheless finds very useful, though he claims his uncle is very tight with his money, but in any case he gets him credit — He says I am Kessel, and they aren't certain whether it's him or the nephew or son, so they give him credit. He was the business manager. He knows damn little about business, but — Verges had a great deal of confidence in him and he knew a lot about money manipulation and so forth.

Verges tried to divide things up. On two occasions Verges asked me to change some money. In one case he gave me a brief case which contained $30,000 to cash, and asked me to go to the bank and change it to French francs. I went into the bank and said I wanted to change some money. They didn't faint, nor ask any questions either. Then on the second occasion I think I changed only $2000. It was in cash, in hundred dollar bills. And the other one was in ten dollar bills. That was the problem, they had to count it all. They weren't at all pleased. Where he got the money from I don't know. It was in used American bills, old bills, wrappers on them had no identification. But he didn't want anyone else to know. He didn't want Cassell to know I had changed it.

((You say Cassell was never in the French Communist Party))

No.

((Why not?))

I don't think Cassell is a person homme de gauche without even intellectual he likes to live well and the party's bureaucratic organization doesn't attract intellectuals very long. Many of them go through it but just that. They go in and out. In fact it's almost- it's very good reference if you've been in and out of the party. You've got so many people who have been in and out of the party that you can go almost anywhere and find sympathy and jobs and so on. People at Expresse and so on are made up of people of that type.

((Does Cassell write?))

Yes. He has written one or two articles for Revolution, but very little. The only thing that he used to do was to re-write some of Chen's things, the editorials in particular, after Chen had worked on them, to put them into really good French. Chen's French sometimes has a tendency to be very esoteric and baroque.

((No substantive editorial work))

No. He is definitely a lesser figure but he likes his position. He likes being the sort of front man. Though with the financial troubles, he was the one who did suffer most. Because all the creditors got to him. Verges was hiding, didn't come into the office sometimes for days, or would come in only for a very short period of time, because he was afraid that people would want to serve summones and whatnot on him for debt. Cassell was there. Cassell was not a member of the company, I thought he was.

By the way I don't know whether I got that correct, yesterday. That was the Bureau No. 6 where this thing was - - not 16 22nd of August- - that was '63. When they set up the company.

(That's Bureau no. 6)

Now Sine.

Sinet is listed with Strelkoff as Secretaire de la Redaction, which sounds like he had something to do with the editorial side of it but has nothing to do with that. He is of course the partner of Verges, at least on paper. Whether the 2000 thousand francs in his name actually represent his money I doubt. I think it is probably all Verges' money. I think that Verges needed at least another person to go into the . . . He is the lay-out, make-up (man), ~~When Verges went into~~ the layout, art work, cartoons, ((He handle photos, too??)) Well, yes, They just send around to see where they can get them. But as they have no money now, it's just a matter of begging. They used to buy almost exclusively from Magnum. -- that's why they had so many Cartier-Bresson. Magnum has beautiful photos, except they are expensive. And then they couldn't pay them.

((Sinet is French))

His real name is Maurice Sinet. He is French. He is in his thirties. Married, rather unhappily; has one child, which his wife claims is not his. He's more of an anarchist. He was in the French Communist Party but for a very brief period, I gather. He is very virulent. Before Revolution came out he put out his own little magazine, a cartoon magazine called Sine Massacre which (had) the most virulent cartoons I've ever seen. They depicted things like the clergy, or love - a very, very sick type of cartoon, which contrasted greatly from what made him famous, the Sine cat. He made a fortune with his cats and he also had a tie-in with some promotional things, Key-chain and others - That's where of course he made a lot of money. He does a lot of commercial art work. He sells quite a bit here in England. He does work for British ad agencies.

((Why does a man this successful put this much effort into Revolution?))

Because he is-- again, the same sort of thing- he is an emotional Leftist, He's incapable of any real organizational (work)- - So is Verges. I think that no matter what sort of organization, he couldn't stay (with it) too long. He must be the big boss of it. He must be a grand patron. Sinet is much more juvenile. He is forever throwing bottles of ink, you know! His financial success has been seriously endangered - not from Revolution, but the business of Sinet Massacre, because Mme. De Gaulle did not like what she considered blasphemous cartoons, and so he was arrested for Outrage au publique, outrage a la police, outrage au chef d'etat- - He got out of most of

them but it cost a lot of money ~~tax~~- it put this thing out of existence and Mme de Gaulle said she thinks he is a very nasty man.

(Does he get paid by Revolution or does he supply funds for Revolution)

No, he supposedly gets the same thing that ~~everyone~~ everyone else gets- getting 1500 francs a month. Everyone allegedly gets or did receive 1500. He has an assistant because he can't devote much of his time to it. He's got to earn a living. He has a very expensive establishment. His mother and father, wife and child, maintains two cars and has a three story- sort of duplex, bigger than an apartment. It is magnificent, on the Rue Plichie (Clichy?) in Paris. In order to maintain this he's got to find ways of earning ~~additional~~ a living mainly advertising work. He had worked for Express which paid him very well, but he broke with them on a political issue. He likes to eat well, drink well and run around after women and this is expensive. So a lot of the work, the donkey work, is done by Strelkoff, whose real name is Alexander Strelkoff.

The main thing to read in Verges are the editorials. That's the only thing ginsberg (?) cared about. The editorials are very-- towards the end for example, there's the ~~phr~~ phrase - "it's better to have for the future a failure that is luminous, une chef lumineux, than success in confusion" whatever that means. This is Verges' line in many things. ~~They~~ They're (editorials) filled with phrases ~~like~~- - he wanted at one point to circle these ~~like~~ phrases with a crayon to show people that his line has always been the same.

GINZBERG? - is Pierre Villon (FCF CC real name) coincidence?

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THIRD SESSION

19 February 1965

Reel no. 2

((You have an acute memory for the last phrase of yesterday.))

I happen to be a journalist.

((You have a very retentive mind. You do very well about these things.))

As you get older you forget. Doesn't it frighten you sometimes when you can't think of a name- - I'm really beginning to feel bad about . . something I can't remember- - I think my God, what's happening. .

Strelkoff is Alexander Strelkoff. He is in his early thirties, son of Russian immigrant parents in France,

((Born in France?))

Born in France. Speaks Russian fluently. His parents were members of the Communist Party in Russia, Bolshevik Party but with Trotskyite tendencies. That's why they had to get out of Russia after the Revolution but he has no Trotskyist leanings at all. In fact because of his parents, he seems more or less to lean the other way, to be at least verbally, a violent Stalinist. He is married and has three (children), thsee by one wife, has one illegitimate and several others. He is very active sexually. He is a very handsome fellow and has a great deal of success with girls. He earns his living as a graphic designer. He worked for Hachette doing layouts for them, until the great Sinet Massacre scandal, when de Gaulle finally took umbrage at this. He and Sinet were the two cartoonists who put this out,

((Strelkoff can draw, as well))

Yes. In those things I gave you you will see cartoons by Strelkoff. He is essentially an artist, a cartoonist, though no one ever printed his cartoons before he ran into Sinet because they were considered just too disgusting for {publication}. He is really the acolyte, if you will, of Sinet. And any success, any money that he has come to him through Sinet. He is Sinet's man, and Sinet passes on work to him. They sort of pass around girls to each other and that sort of thing. He does, nevertheless, count for a certain amount in the magazine. He did count, because he was considered reasonably disinterested. That is, he wasn't concerned very much about money. He lives very poorly, with his wife and children, and has made far more sacrifices than Sinet but he is a very loyal, I was going to say, a faithful retainer, of Sinet's. I think that would sum him up. His loyalty is to Sinet and not to Verges.

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((What are his principal types of contact outside of ___))

He doesn't have any contacts outside of ___ His contacts are mainly body to body with girls. In terms of politics, he didn't like the idea that perhaps Chen was deeply involved with Trotskyism, that sort of thing, but that was just a small comfort and (?), his scruples on this point. He wanted to keep it going. He was very anti-Chinese in the sense that he didn't think that the magazine should accept any Chinese money if the Chinese were willing to give it, the reason for this being that he thinks that should have a free hand in the arts, and so forth, jazz and all this, which of course he and Sinet are very much interested in.

((He's a literary liberal, then-))

Yes, in terms of the arts, he would be. He doesn't care much for abstract art,

((But he's not a party liner))

By no means. A former Communist, but he wasn't expelled. He also just withdrew.

((If his parents were emigres from Russia, I assume this would have been in the twenties, or))

Yes, in the twenties, just before he was born. (They left) because of their Trotskyist leaning. I suppose they were members of the Trotskyist faction of the Sovit Communist party at that time.

((Do you know whether they were expelled or left voluntarily))

I don't know. I think they left voluntarily, but that's just supposition. I think he mentioned something about it. I think that they really fled ahead of the Sovbet police, the Cheka- - he's Jewish, and maybe some of his relatives did end up in Soviet concentration camps. I think he still has some living relatives (in Russia) yes, because he was one of the chefs de chantier, construction foreman, in the final stages of the French exposition in Moscow. That was in 61 or 62. He speaks Russian fluently. There he met some of his relatives.

((Has he made other trips to the Soviet Union))

I think he has made two trips. One was with the French exposition, he was there before and I think throughout the expodtion, putting it up and so on. He is very compeèent as a designer, a little bit lazy — he tries to get other people to do his work for him if he can, just as Sinet passes it on to him he tries to pass it on to others. Where money is concerned he is not terribly scrupulous but he's not money hungry. His weakness is women. Very much so. He shocked the Anderssons. He used to come to Lausanne and he had so many girls

to meet(?)
they couldn't keep up (with it).

((Did Sinet bring him to Revolution))

Yes. He was delegated to do the work of the English edition. Sinet couldn't do it and this was before the French edition was started in France, so it was Strelkoff who did it. He came to Lausanne for a couple of days to do the layout and so on. Then he found someone in Lausanne, a Swiss graphic artist, who then did the major part of the work. Strelkoff came to oversee it.

That's about all there is about him. It's not very much, really. He's not very active politically. His life centers around females, jazz, night clubs. He would get drunk occasionally. He shares Sinet's tastes there - and women.

BABU

Now after Chen, Kien Pissell and Sinet and Strelkoff, you have really reached the end of the immediate editorial staff as such. There was an editorial board which was a fiction. It had names of people like Babu on it. Babu saw Verges actually twice. He never contributed anything to the magazine except one interview which I did with him, taped in Geneva, when he was at the UN Conference on Trade and Development.

((Babu's biographic details are well enough known but how did he come to get involved in Revolution in the first place.))

Dennis Phombeah

He was suggested by Dennis Phombeah, now the delegate from Tanzania to the UN. Phombeah. Dennis Phombeah is a former student - he's a Tanzanian diplomat now, He is Tanganyikan by birth. He was the secretary of the Committee of African Organizations here in London for a number of years. This was a Ghana-subsidized attempt to group together and unify all of the various African national groups. He's married to a girl by the name of Ilona. She is a Jewish girl from London. Her parents also former leftists. But she is very much anti-Communist. Dennis has very close ties with the British Communist party. He was a member of their African student committee. They had a committee headed by a woman named Kay Beauchamp/Beecham who was delegated the task of sort of watch over the African students in London and they didn't have very much success. But Dennis was able to milk them, the Ghana Government, by getting a subsidy, plus he had direct ties with the Soviets. He was a graduate student at Moscow University under Professor Ivan Potekhin (r.i.p.) He is now dead, as you know, he was the head of their African studies department. He was getting his doctorate. I think it was in anthropology, I don't know exactly. But he was one of the very few persons

getting a doctorate in Moscow while sitting in London, and his wife spent most of her time writing his thesis. He would tell her, "now read this book and tell me what it says" and then "work this into my general thing". He had very little time. He also had some connections with the Chinese and had been to Peking, when I don't know, and had been invited to go to Peking last summer. He managed to keep from getting there. I suppose he felt that if he went - he did go to Moscow on several occasions, theoretically it was to see Prof. Potekhin. That was just before Potekhin's death. The Zanzibar revolution is a year old, so it was before the Zanzibar Revolution early last year. I saw him last at Orly Airport when he - -

came through later on his way to Moscow. He took the Air France flight and he had an hour to kill in Paris, and I went out to the airport and saw him. He gave me photos of Zanzibar.

((You had known he was coming))

Yes. They told me. This was for the magazine. Some of the photos that later appeared were the photos he brought. They were pretty bad photos. They were all one could get.

Then he took the Air France flight to Warsaw and Moscow. When he came back of course, although he was Tanganyikan, Babu knew him and had strong confidence in him and appointed him adviser to the Zanzibar High Commission here in London. The Commissioner, who had been one of the Sultan's men, had left. There had been a Civil Servant by the name of Omar, Omar Zoran, who remained. He said he didn't want to lose his pension, this was his main concern, revolution or no revolution. He didn't know much about revolutions. In fact, he was very touching, because he asked us could we suggest books that he could read about revolutions. He was a time server. While he was quite useful as the First Secretary, nevertheless Babu couldn't trust him.

So Dennis Phombeah, was put in as a sort of watchdog.

When the Geneva Conference came up, Dennis was there until Babu arrived, as the chief delegate, from Zanzibar. In fact, he had everybody sitting in as delegates, I sat in as a delegate from Zanzibar for a few minutes without even knowing it. He said "sit down. I've got to go out." There I was sitting there. Somebody came up and took my photograph. I assumed that I was either being photographed by the CIA or by the State Department or the Soviet side or probably both.

((Did you ever see the product))

No. I assume it was for private consumption. There was an East German

for press purposes. He wanted to take portraits of all the Africans. He got their names. He had a tremendous file there. (laughing) And he also had a wire-photo machine which worked right out of his studio. He did Phombeah and another fellow while I was there.

Anyway, Phombeah was known to Verges. He may have met him when Verges was in the IUS, International Union of Students, in Prague. He was a VicePresident. There are four vice presidents. Verges was one of them.

As I said, when we were in Algeria, we had this woman Rosalind Ainslie as our correspondent here. When there came the blow-up there was Phombeah - - he knew Rosalind Ainslie and was giving her political advice. In other words, he was much higher up in the hierarchy of the British Communist Party, although theoretically he is not a member of the party. That I don't know. But she certainly accepted what he said, to a great extent. But he was going everyone. So when she ceased to work for us he agreed to work, for £50 a month, but not to have his name used. He didn't want his name to appear in the magazine. "however, I'm certain that Babu now this was before the revolution I'm certain that Babu will be willing." He sent a cable to him and got a reply which was favorable. Babu then turned up in Paris and London. He was at the Labor Party congress at Scarborough. On his way back to Africa from that congress he stopped in Paris and that was his meeting with Verges.

He told Verges then: He said "we will be in power within six to eight weeks after independence" And of course he was. And really that shocked Verges, to see somebody who really knew what he would do. Also Babu- - very strange in that he doesn't dress well at all. He looks very sloppy.

We both saw him next, at the UN conference, the Geneva Conference. He came to Paris with the Omar character who is still here. I saw he was presented to the Queen not too long ago. And his so-called Chef de Protocol, who just happened to be a boy who could speak French which was a convenience. He also came with an Italian girl by the name of Betti, her last name, and I suspect, although I am not certain, that she is Laura Betti, who is a well-known Italian actress and the alleged mistress of Pierre Paolo Passaly the film director, He was the man who made Accatonia and just made the Gospel According to St. Matthew which got a big prize and all that. He is a homosexual and so it is a very strange sort of relationship. She was supposed to be a member of

Nenni Socialists. I don't know if she has gone with the PSIUP, ~~people~~ the new left split, or not. I tried to get more information about her in Rome but I couldn't just walk in and say "weren't you the girl I ~~found~~ found in bed with Babu". She speaks English well and she spent a considerable amount of time in Geneva with him and came to Paris with him.

He (SAGA) was also with Murray ~~Fells~~ Sales (phon) an Australian who spent most of his time as a mutual funds salesman. Murray was based in Geneva. I suspect that he also was supplying girls.

Murray was also in contact with and introduced Babu to a man by the name of Victor Herbert, who is an American Mutual Funds salesman. He used to be an executive with OIS, Overseas Investment Service, in Geneva, which is the biggest American overseas fund, run by a man by the name of Bernie ~~Cants~~ Kornfell ~~Cornbelt(?)~~. Exactly what this curious crowd was doing with Babu there in Geneva I don't know. Murray Sales then later told stories which were not quite true of a man who was going around the Hotel Intercontinental in Geneva knocking on doors saying "are you a Foreign Minister?" "Yes" " Well, I want to invest $50,000 in your country. Which country do you come from." Now Murray Sales' story is different. He told Melvin Lasky of Encounter that someone came and said, "I'm from the CIA. Here's a gold watch and I'll give you $50,000 if you'll work for us." ((Who are you)) Yes, who are you? Exactly.

Despite some of the curious antics I heard of with Cubans, I can't believe anybody would get that way. And besides, Babu was very amused by the man who did come. And he didn't get a watch. He told me that he'd gotten a camera from the West Germans once. They said "don't recognize Ulbricht and we'll give you this lovely camera." Of course they had already made a deal with East Germany.

((What was Victor Herbert's role in all this?))

I suspect that they were trying to invest money, that was all. The thing which interests me about all of this is that Babu, despite the fact he is a revolutionary, and a very competent one, I think, he has other strings to his bow.

One, he is very much interested in women. Two, he drinks heavily. Money, which is extremely scarce in Zanzibar like most places in the world, is of great interest to him. He also told us, that he had informed the Chinese that he was going to carry out the coup and the Chinese were opposed to it. They went ahead anyway. They thought it was an adventure. Then afterwards--- since you were able to do it, ((Is that what he told you?))

Yes, that's what he told Vergest and me. Actually that wasn't for publication.

Phombeah brought in Babu. Babu had no real connection with the magazine except on these two occasions. He gave me an interview which was printed in the last issue - in both issues of Revolution, and that was all. Then he went off to Indonesia. That's history. The merger was ~~being~~ made between Tanganyika and Zanzibar and it was ~~mainly~~ partially behind his back although he knew that it was going to go on and he was not at all opposed. He felt that it was a good thing. We found it difficult to understand why he felt it was a good thing, but he thought that in Tanganyika the chaos was so great and the lack of defined goals, the lack of ability, ~~the~~ cssi capacity to satisfy the growing needs of the masses there would be such that the Indian community ~~communities~~ which had its hand on the ~~floor~~ small business, and also the big ~~time~~ fibre plantations and what-not were an especially vulnerable target group, that [Julius] Nyerere, despite all of his humanism and his Catholic religion wouldn't be able to put up much resistance. I think he was quite right. That's what happened. That is, Zanzibar ~~which~~ is taking over Tanganyika into Tanzania. There was a struggle between Babu and Hanga, but that seemed to calm down to a great extent. I think that's over now. I've heard different things. I don't know.

One of the things that this fellow Curtis Cate of the Atlantic monthly proposed to do - he has more proposals than he has dollars- unfortunately, is that we try to go to Zanzibar. No one has even done any (reporting) I probably could get in. No one really has written anything of any particular note about Zanzibar since the revolution. Don't know whether that is possible or not.

(There was a great deal of noise at the time of the Zanzibar revolution about Babu's relationship with Kao Liang, the NCNA man.)

Well, yes, it's true he has worked for them. And after he informed them of what he was going to do, they — — — — —

that was about two or three days before the revolution. They had given him a small amount of money, but not much. . it wasn't their money - - the Zanzibar revolution, it was extremely confusing because he was out of the country at the time. He knew what must be done. But for instance, the bringing in of- - the fellow - - Okello which was an incredible thing to do. the former police corporal from Uganda. I have the feeling that he was by no means all powerful , that it was a coalition of forces. ~~The~~ It revolution was popular in the sense that the overwhelming majority of the island's population were represented among the revolutionaries who turned against the Arab and Indian populations.

which had long had a standing grudge against that and saw no way of doing away with, but obviously they weren't all as left as Babu. You had for instance Osman Sharif, who was made Ambassador to United States. He was made Ambassador in Sweden ... Zanzibar to keep him out of Tanganyika. He was going to be here in London, I think he was the High Commissioner in London, for a very short period of time. And then when the merger came, it was the Tanganyikan High Commissioner who represented the merged countries, with Omar Zoran still staying on as the Secretary, Dennis Phombeah going to the UN where he had been, in Geneva at one point, now in New York, Sharif going to Washington

((And was recently recalled),

Yes. Sharif's position is extremely shaky, but they really disliked him greatly, but because he is the head of the Shirazi Community they couldn't strike him down right away. What they wanted to do really was to put him in a position where he would finally be bought out. They figured that he would go over to the Western side. One day or the other he would jump. And that's the way of getting rid of him- without them having to do anything. That's one reason he was sent to Washington. They thought that after a while he would. .

((So much for Babu. Now on the Board))

Now we have the Mulana Bashani- - he is a Pakistani. Dennis Phombeah was unable to continue his work. He was unable really to do anything. He was just collecting £60 a month. The reason that he did absolutely nothing was that the actual work was done by a Pakistani named Hamza Alavi a former secretary, Third Secretary or something, Of the Pakistan National Bank. He is a Marxist, I doubt that he is actually a member of the Pakistan Communist party. He comes from one of the Ismaili Moslem Sects, and his family is extremely wealthy and has holdings in a Tanganyika, a fibre plantation. He also has relatives in Zanzibar. When he was asked by Dennis Phombeah to go to Zanzibar to help straighten out their balance of payments problems, which he wanted to do, his family told him that if he did he'd never come back to them, since they had lost some money. He is a great friend of Ralph Milleband of LSE (London School of Economics) here. He is an academic. He has contacts with Trotskyist groups. His contacts with the British Communist party are not very good. He is very easy going, a rather soft personality. He is by no means 100% or even 50% pro-Chinese. In particular because he doesn't approve of Chinese support for President Ayub Khan. This led to his replacement finally.

Hamza Alavi

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Hamza Alavi

~~Xxxxxxxxx~~

Verges wanted somebody from Pakistan on the board. He (Alavi) said "I'm certain that the Mulana Bashani Kahn will agree".

((That would be Mulana Abdul Hamid Bashani))

That's right. He's sometimes called Kahn as a title of respect. He's a 70 or 80 years old man. He's called the Red Mullah, sort of like the Red Dean of Canterbury.

He's the leader of one of the East Pakistan parties. He had been to China and was quite pro-Chinese. He was more than willing. But he had absolutely no contact whatever with the magazine.

((Did he come in to replace Hamza Alavi))

Yes.

((How long did Hamza Alavi work with the magazine))

You would have to check the issues of the English edition. He was there until slightly before we dropped Rosalind Ainslie. That would be May of 63, right up to spring of 64.

((Did Hamza Alavi do anything actually)) ~~or did he just~~

He found manuscripts and so on. He actually did the work that Phombeah never did. But that was all. And it was sort of contre coeur with him because he did not agree with the thing. He had the idea that the magazine was an open forum, sort of rostrum for debate between all sorts of revolutionary movements. But when it became very obvious that Verges wanted to try, at that time, at least, to stay with the Chinese line, it particularly because of ~~the state of his~~ his feelings about the situation in Pakistan and he wasn't happy. Also on the question of India, he felt that the Chinese position vis-a-vis India wasn't just, and he didn't like the hook-up, ~~between Pakistani~~ the growing friendship and actual solidarity between Pakistan and China.

((So he was through amicably. What is the present relationship betweenAlavi and Verges))

I doubt if he has any at all. He is very active here in London with Pakistani groups. He has money. His wife"s family has money, his own family has. It wasn't a question of money for him.

((Has he continued to be active in AfroAsian things))

He's an academic. The Socialist Register published last year an article on Imperialism by him. He is active around the London School of Economics. He is known to the academic Left, friends with the boys who do Left Review and so on. His only practical work would be working with Pakistani groups for instance during the last election

the Tories ran in several constituencies Pakistani independent candidates in the hope of breaking the Labor vote, hoping that the Pakistanis would vote for these Pakistani independents. Hamza worked with the Labor Party in those constituencies, to counter this; in fact they were quite successful. He has very good connections inside the Labor Party. And he does not have very good ties at all with the Communist Party, though he is not by any means anti-Communist. He's a skeptic.

((How about Bashani))

He has never done anything. Never heard from him except once when he said we could put his name on the board. As far as I know there has never been any contact.

((Do they get paid for this))

No.

Next is Hassan Riad. He is S. Amir. He is an official of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, with headquarters in Dakar. He has a very high position inthat. He is Egyptian, a full member of the Egyptian Communist Party with very very pronounced Trotskyist views. That is, he feels, he has a theory about the role of bureaucracy in under-developed countries - the progressive and reactionary bureaucracy- fits into general Trotskyist theories but applied there. He has done work on Egypt, state capitalism in Egypt. A book of his published recently by Edition de Minuit in Paris, part of which appeared in Revolution. Some of it was so obviously Trotskyist that Kien, despite his somewhat partial agreement with parts of it felt that it was too obvious even to print in Revolution. He only comes through Paris occasionaly. His main interest in REvolution is getting his things printed. He is very interested in having his things published. He is very cynical about many of the African States. His article on Senegal appeared recently in Revolutian, in French, I think in No. 12. It was written under a pseudonym and based on the UN Economic Commission for Africa research, stuff that he couldn't say in his official capacity. (Like Jalet, yes.

He is not overly pro-Chinese. He feels that the Chinese philosophical position isn't quite adequate, the ideological model isn't adequate for under undeveloped countries, certainly for Africa.

((Do you know him- How old is he))

Yes I know him. He is in his thirties. About 35. Married. He is Egyptian. He is anti-Nasser really. He feels that the Egyptian Communist Party has really abdicated any constructive role inside Egypt, even from the

concentration camps where they were held putting out secret clandestine tracts supporting Nasser, which was the craziest thing I've ever heard. ~~Because~~ Now they've been liberated - in fact the old Communists are now being given very high organizational posts in the new Egyptian Party, ~~and~~

Communism and Marxism ~~is~~ are extraneous to Arab socialism but they are very useful people so ~~...~~ let's use them in there. And the group that are under Soviet influence are perfectly willing to go along with this.

((Is he pro-anything in Egypt))

No, I think that he is sort of resigned to the flow of events of history. He analyzes what he considers state capitalist developments, the rise of a new bureaucratic middle class, the officer class and he tries to show in his writings how the officer class has crushed the old land-owning Wafdist ruling class which had its links with British and French financial interests, and has now consolidated itself in power, and there is a certain social mobility, but for them only. In other words, how limited it is and the officer caste certain of its functionaries — but still the problem of the masses remains.

((Does he concern himself very much with the state of Egypt?))

From an academic point of view only. He's more academic. He's not even particularly concerned wih revolution. If you want his address . . ~~not here~~.

Now who do we have- Marcos Ferrer- that's Colombia. I don't know anything about it. It probably stands for Dr. Leiva ~~Semper~~ SEMPER of the MOEC IN Paris. He is a Colombian doctor, the representative in Paris of the MOEC. He is the one who conducted negotiations with Verges for a Spanish edition in Colombia. I assume Marcos Ferrer ~~(or Ferra)~~ to be a pseudonym.

~~Frenda~~ Frene Ginwalla, next on the list, is a member of the Indian Congress for South Africa. She was a correspondent of Revolution in Dar es Salaam and she published a magazine called Spearhead until she was expelled from Tanganyika under a cloud and accused of being a Western spy. The accusations were not made openly. She was known to have contacts with the ~~Western~~ West German Embassy. She received West German money from the Carl Ebert Foundation and actually printed West German propaganda in ~~the~~ her magazine. She had gone to West Germany and done this so obviously that ~~I dont know~~ she couldn't have been very sophisticated about it because it was just too (open). She was accused of having ~~told the Soviet Embassy of having~~ offered to carry information for the Soviet Embassy, volunteering as ~~a Communist~~ a South African Communist, to give them information, two-thirds of which turned out to be totally useless and false, which again might have been to ingratiate herself. ~~I The works~~ She was here in London after she was

expelled, I'm not certain of the exact dates. She was also known to have slept around with almost every Minister of the Tanganyikan government including Julius Nyerere. This is one of the reasons why there was so much hushhush about her, that she had obviously gotten a lot of information out of these fellows. She was very close to Oscar Kambona and she claimed that Oscar Kambona was going to get her back into the Foreign Ministry.

She was just Revolution's correspondent there. She did practically nothing. When she got out, she managed to keep her little office going. They didn't seize anything, and she turned over the mailing list of her Spearhead magazine to Revolution. Verges had paid her £1000 for a deposit so she could do some work but she really didn't do anything, but she, unlike Rosalind Ainslie, turned over the unspent portion of that to Verges when she came to London. She wasn't interested really in continuing her work with Revolution. Being Indian of course posed a problem for her with anything to do with the Chinese. She was very close to the Indian community, as anyone who looks through that mailing list will see we have lots of missionaries, Indian businesses, and so forth in East Africa, who were taking subscriptions to the magazine more or less out of friendship and solidarity with another Indian. They didn't care much whether she was a Communist or not.

She was supposed to have been the mistress of Dr. Dadu. At least they say she slept with Dr. Dadu and they had a very close relationship to him. Dr. Dadu is the president of the Indian Congress for South Africa and a member of the Communist Party of South Africa, a very important member. Because the Indian community has holdings up and down East Africa, Mozambique as well, their role in the liberation struggle is very equivocal. Obviously the Africans want to go ahead while the Indians are thinking - well - Africanization menaced them - the Indians. The English used them as a sort of buffer, they preferred to bring an Indian clerk to East Africa rather than to train an African. That was a typical colonial maneuver but now it has put the Indians in a situation historically which is untenable, for a long period. You know people talk about multi-racial states but in East Africa it is a joke. It won't hold up. I don't think it will, anyway.

The Indian Congress of South Africa is related to the African National Congress, and to the Colored people's congress, all of this in a so-called Congress Alliance. She had contacts with the African - the ANC people. the ANC people here in London. They were suspicious of her. But she managed somehow to get back in, she was ill, she was in hospital hurt in an auto accident, and she had to have a very complicated bone operation. That put her out of action for some time. I don't know, but I heard that she is now back in Tanganyika. She may well be. She has quite a bit of money; her family has money. Of course the Indians do have money. She did very little for the magazine. She occasionally told me about people in the ANC who might do something for the magazine. But most of the people she told me abut were members of the South African Communist Party. That party has taken a pro-Moscow stand and most of its people don't want to do anything for Revolution, though we did have articles by Bryan Bunk another South African Communist. That was before their party took their stand on the Sino-Soviet conflict. And there is a struggle going on right now inside of the ANC. That's a long complicated thing. That has nothing to do with Revolution.

(On my list here we have Diallo)

Diallo is an adviser of the President of Mali- ~~what's his name~~ Modewa Keida.

He is married to a French woman, a Leftist, he knows Verges through friendship and offered to help. He put him in contact with ____________ who is Minister of Information, who is very, very pro-Chinese.

(In Mali)

Yes. When Chou en Lai visited Mali, you recall, that he got quite committed. There were some gratuitous, open handed slaps

~~There's nothing very much. He just knew him.~~

~~This is again one of Verges attempts to have a finger in another African country.~~

I didn't mention, with Phombeah, one of the reasons that he (Verges) kept Phombeah was Phombeah's connection with Odinga, in Kenya. Phombeah at one time had hoped to be made the secretary of this new Lumumba Institute there, outside Nairobi. Verges, odd as it may seem, had at one time, proposed himself as a sort of security adviser to Odinga. We felt that he continued to pay Dennis Phombeah for doing nothing mainly to keep a line of communication open to Odinga. He had met Odinga but got nowhere with him. In Algiers he was ~~a friend of~~ Le Chinois

President of Mali, Modibo Keita. Married to a French woman. Leftist.
He knows Verges through friendship and offered to help. He put him in contact with a man by the name of Mogotogo (?) who is Minister of Information, who is very very pro-Chinese. And when Chou en Lai visited Mali you recall that he got quite a committed welcome in Mali. And there were some gratuitous open-handed slaps the Russians made. Didn't have to be made but were.

(How did Verges and Diallo get together)

I don't know. He had known him for a considerable time. There is nothing very much. This is again one of Verges's attempts to have a finger in another African country. One of the reasons that he kept Phombeah was Phombeah's connection with Odinga.

→ insert from page ...

If in Algiers he was referred to as Le Chinois (as he was), I don't think the Kenyans would accept him.

This is a real problem. He says, "well, we colored people and so forth" and it is true that he is part - he's Eurasian, but it is very hard for Africans to accept that. They just put him down as Chinese.

I don't know very much about Demba Diallo. He played very little role in the Magazine except that he was a contact inside of Mali. He came to France early last year, the spring of last year (64), with his wife. He went to Vichy for his health and drank the waters for two or three weeks and he saw Verges. Verges had ideas, had mentioned to Ken that if he couldn't keep the magazine going he might go to Mali. Ken was going to be sent off to wherever (was), Viriato da Cruz of the Angolan Federation of Liberation, as adviser, and I was going to be sent to Indonesia for the Afro-Asian Journalists. That was how he was going to take care of everybody.

(How about Castro Da Silva)

Castro Da Silva is the pseudonym used for Viriato da Cruz, formerly of the MPLA, and now of the UPA. He is a poet, again, in the late thirties, married, has a child and is based more or less in Algiers. He has virtually no money at all. He has a small group which went into the UPA.

Holden Roberto, the head of the UPA is very suspicious of him. but nevertheless he needs him. He needs the Left. He has been to China and this give him a sort of, gives the Chinese a guarantee, but on the other hand the Chinese didn't even want to give Viriato money to transfer

himself from Algiers to Brazzaville. And he was threatened by the MPLA people, who are of course Soviet-backed to the hilt, in fact more Dr. Neto apparently more than ever now. And the Algerians, Ben Bella, who had supported the MPLA up until the great fiasco when people discovered that they didn't have what they claimed to have have given their support to the UPA. Nevertheless, the MPLA people still remain and they are promising to reform and really carry out things. I think that ideologically the MPLA is much more congenial to the Algerians and to all of the hard revolutionary line people.

Holden Roberto is considered to be an American agent pure and simple and always has been. In actual fact, he received a lot of money through various Protestant missionary groups, American Protestant missionary groups. He himself is a Christian Protestant. These tie-ups have helped the Rightists to back him. He did go off to China, made some talk which the Chinese were pleased with.

The Chinese haven't made any real decisive choice between the MPLA and the UPA. They're just waiting to see who is going to be able to produce.

((What about da Cruz? What is his function))

He has no function except to write articles about Angola, which he has done, one of which he signed with his own name. He has very little money and he hoped that Verges would be able to smooth the way with the Chinese, but alas! poor fellow, he learnt to his horror, I understand, that Verges was by no means the Chinese agent that he presumed him to be. I understand that he has virtually retired from politics. He is a poet. And he'd much rather be a poet than anything else. He told me on several occasions in Paris when he came to my house there for dinner that he really wished he could get out of the whole thing, but what was he going to do, he didn't have a passport, he had all these people sort of pushing him in into this. He didn't have any money. He didn't know what to do.

((He lives in Paris))

No, he lives in Algiers. He is still in Algiers to the best of my knowledge. He is one of the people in Algiers I would see. If I were to go to Algiers I would look him up. He's not terribly dynamic but events threw him up into a leading position and he sort of stuck there and doesn't know how to get out. The Chinese haven't given him the all-out support that he had hoped for

((Neither have they turned him down))

No.

Castro de Cruz

((Amilcar Cabrera))

That was a name used, not a pseudonym, a false name. It doesn't represent anyone, it represents the FALN, of Venezuela in Europe. They have a bureau in France. I didn't really know them. I knew there were several people. One of them, a graphic artist, some of whose drawings were printed in Revolution. They brought the things. They are authentic. Because when Verges had a young French boy traveling through Latin America he went to Venezuela. They got him into the guerrillas. They got him all around. We had some very authentic first-hand reports. So whoever they are they are authentic. They were very, very cautious, probably suspicious of me because I was an American, so I never had any real conversation with them.

((Do you known anything about who Verges's link to them was))

No.

((Do you know if he still has them))

I know this, that they asked him to remove the name Amilcar Cabrera and it has been removed, because it was identified with them. He then put in a note in the twelfth French edition that in the future he would receive an article from the information department of the FALN. They'd be foolish not to send material, but they didn't want to be identified with the editorial policy of the magazine. This many reflect verious tendencies inside of the FALN which I have read about. I don't know anything first-hand, that they split between a hard line, those who want to continue the guerrilla struggle and the sabotage struggle and those who want to look for possible negotiated solutions. One group a little more pro-Chinese.

In any case these people did represent the FALN, there is no doubt about it. I didn't know any of them. They never had any dealings with me.

((Patricia Magowan))

I know very little about her. She did this book on Portugal. She was connected with the —— she has ties with the British Communist Party but also with British Trotskyists. She was the one who found Rosalind Ainslée to work here in London for the magazine. She is the mistress of a man named Carlos

((Lanca?))

I'm not certain. That might be it. He is a European born in Mozambique, a Portuguese, who has been kept going by various African movements for years because he represents (laughing) what the French call an interlocateur, when they want to call him out

He represents nothing. He's a sort of hopeless person. She's a very dynamic woman. Verges claimed that she had become a police informer for the Algerian police and that she talks to opposite groups occasionally and to Mamani of the Salava party in Algiers. But she no longer has anything to do with Revolution Africaine. She didn't have anything to do with Verges after the moment that she refused to go to Lausanne.

((Why))

Why did she refuse to go? Well, she couldn't leave Carlos there by himself. God knows what would happen to him. Secondly, she wanted to be in the spot in Algiers. She wasnt interested in running a magazine in Switzerland, the magazine interest was secondary to her.

There was another Portuguese-speaking person in Algiers. That was a man by the name of Aquino Braganza. Braganza is a Goan and Goan who has lost his reason for being; with the end of the Portuguese colonial rule in Goa, he should have gone back! But he had been a Goan revolutionary with the Portuguese opposition. For years he had been in Rabat hooked up to the, at that time it was the CONCP, Conference Nationaliste des Colonies Portuguese, which grouped together what later came to be the Falimo and the MPLA. It was part of the hard line countries There was another one elsewhere which was soft line. Braganza was also sort of adviser to the magazine Revolution Africaine on questions of India and so on. He stayed on and worked with Mohammed Harbi and came to London.

((Did he have anything to do with Patricia Mcgowan))

Yes. They had been together in Rabat.

((Did he have anything to do with Carlos))

Yes. It's all the same crowd. But Carlos was waiting for destiny to call him and Braganza had already lost his chance. The Indians had got in. They'd liberated Goa, so what next, you know. Go back to India. He obviously wasn't going to go back. He was living too well, as it was. What was he going to do in Goa, nobody knew him in Goa. He was a Goan educated in Portugal. One of these people without a real national identity. He knew that he wasn't Portuguese and had this feeling of alienation from Portugal, which made him like most of the colonials students there-- the MPLA really started in Portugal- made him an oppositionist. He didn't have enough roots with the homeland. So he's just sort of floating around. His wife is a school teacher. He speaks excellent French. He was working for Revolution Africaine. I don't know if he still is. I'm certain he'll find something to do. He'll never go back to Goa.

((This points up the need for a continuing revolution, when the revolution is completed))

Yes. You don't have jobs unless you're in the government. And that's a problem, too. In his case, he never really did much, wasn't even a real revolutionary, just a bureaucrat in Rabat and other places.

((How did Macgowan get involved with Verges))

That I don't know. I don't know how he knew her in the beginning, I imagine he met her in Rabat. He used to go to Morocco quite often and had contact with all the African, liberation people there. I suspect that's where he met her.

((So much for those guys))

Now you've got Harbi. He was the person who replaced Verges. He's out now, but I'm told by Andersson, who has his ear to the ground in Algiers as well as in Switzerland, that Harbi is still in a very good position. He is one of the leading advisers to Ben Bella, represents the Left position. He's a Trotskyist, or a Trotskyist sympathiser without any formal organizational ties. He is very close to the Pablo group. That's Michel Raptis. He's Pablo, we could'nt have overlooked him, he's a feature of Algiers life. He played an extremely important role in the agrarian reform, in determining the type of agrarian reform that was going to be carried out. He came down on the Yugoslav model, that is collectives which are privately owned by the collectives and run on the profit model, that is on a profit basis.

Harbi, and Pablo(?) were all inside of this Bureau des Biens Vacants which then became the Bureau of the Socialist Sector. I once did an article for Monthly Review, about how it operated. What really happened was that the Europeans fled just before and just after Independence, as they well should have, considering what they had done. They had expected a blood bath. The blood bath never took place. It was incredible. That was one of the most incredible things to me in Algeria was that the Algerians didn't — — — — — — —

Because the stories were horrifying. You know what happened. A month or so before, the French were just shooting everybody on the street, trying to provoke them, and the discipline of the FLN was incredible. Nobody would shoot back, no matter what they did. So they fled and left all these farms. It was a question of ploughing and seeding. There is only a certain time of year that you can do this. This had to be organized and it was organized almost spontaneously locally. This was institutionalized later, as an accomplished fact. They wanted some sort of a socialist system of ...

didn't know how and the institutionalizing of it was really directed by these Trotskyists. There was Pablo, Harbi, a French lawyer named Matthieu from Grenoble who had been involved with the FLN, and he became sort of legal adviser of Biens Vacants, which was vaguely under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture which was at that time under Omar Usgam who is now Minister of State, and Director of Revolution Africaine at present. He replaced Harbi.

Harbi is deeply resented by the army elements which are pro-Egyptian. However, the Army, despite its religious inclination, had its socialist bias and would like to see more centralization, more on an Egyptian model. In other words, they would like to see much more control from the center than this confused type of regional or local control. They feel that in the long run the business of the private collective ownership is going to cause trouble. It's all right if it is a rich one, but what happens if you are in a poor one? You don't split a profit, you split a deficit. Obviously, according to the Yugoslav model, the state intervenes. The State taxes the rich ones and then distributes subsidies to the poor ones, but this a debate that is still going on in Algeria. Curiously enough these Trotskyists have been in contact, very close contact, with the Yugoslavs. As you recall, the campaign, the so-called campagne de labeur, the ploughing, was made possible only by the delivery of 500 Yugoslav tractors which turned out to the great deception (disillusionment) of some of the Algerians not to be Yugoslav but to be American tractors put together in Yugoslavia under license.

((This is getting us a little bit far afield))

This is Harbi and this is the group. Harbi represents the leading spokesmen within the FLN of this sort of Trotskyist-leaning Left group, and his post is still very high, even though he is no longer Director.

((When was he dropped))

I think last summer. I'm not certain. With Usgan it has become much more ______________ the word Socialism appears in Arabic because it is felt that Socialism in French doesn't have the same meaning as it has in Arabic. It's very silly, it represents the very muddled mind that Usgan has. He is very much split between his religious (and political) inclinations. Usgan is a full member of the Communist party of Algeria but he left for nationalist reasons when they refused to support the rebellion, and joined the FLN. His wife is supposed to be fanatically religious and has made him more religious than he was.

((Curious mix-up- - this religion and politics.))

((Returning to our first subject, Strelkoff. Is he a practicing Jew?))

No.

(Just an ethnic Jew)

Yes.

((Next on the list here is Robert Williams. Whoever made this up calls him an American in Peking.) But where was he now

He's in Havana. He was in Peking recently and he may still be there, for that matter. He went on a second trip to the Far East. He was in one of the countries that had a celebration. I think he was in Hanoi, if I'm not mistaken. He was in Asia. He may still be there.

Robert Williams is a Negro, former President of the Union County North Carolina branch of the NAACP, who had a hell of a battle on his hands against the local KuKlux Klan and discovered the best way to deal with the KuKlux Klan was to shoot back at them. And it worked. They never had seen it, in that part of the south, anyway, the small towns of the South. Up until recently there's been sort of a gentlemen's agreement in the south that the Negro civil rights groups would go into the big cities, where they would be reasonably protected. But they had to leave the rural areas alone because they couln't expect much. Williams of course, was a great embarrassment to everybody, there is no doubt, and they were on his back. He got no sympathy from the NAACP leadership. He first came to national prominence after a case of obvious injustice where a white man had done something to a Negro woman and some local jury had thrown it out. He said, "well if we can't get justice in the courts we'll have to take justice in our own hands." But even the fact that Negroes would fight back got the older, more conservative Negro leaders very upset. People came to his support, particularly the Trotskyites, not the Communists. The Trotskyites came in, and tried to take him over. They did give him some support. There had been a case before, another case, locally called the Kissing Case. Two Negro boys, you may have heard of it, were sentenced to indefinite terms in prison for having kissed a six-year-old white girl. He was involved in that and again, it was the Trotskyites who came to his support with other liberal groups. In terms of organizational support it was the Trotskyites. I heard of him at the time I was in CBS and I thought that it was very understandable and sent him a message of support. I met him at the time of the NAACP Conference in New York in 1959 and when the FPCC was formed he was among the eight Negroes who were among the 30 founding members, to the great shock of

of the Communist Party of the United States, which did not particularly approve of seeing the two issues mixed, Cuba and the Negroes.

Williams, very volatile, a very determined person, on a local level, has no ability whatsoever on a national level. He has become a symbol now to Negro youth in particular, as a Negro who is not an Uncle Tom, who will fight. We knew what was coming in the summer of 61, ~~perhaps it was before... no...~~ obviously was embarrassment for the national executive of the NAACP, embarrassment for the Justice Department, and more than embarrassment for Terry Sanford, who was the Governor, and who told him, "I wish you were dead. Period." Finally, by one of these flukes of fate, there was a demonstration over a swimming pool. They (the Negroes) didn't want to integrate the pool. They just wanted to swim in it. But the local people said they didn't want to do that because they would have to change the water, and it would take too much time to change the water after Negroes swam in the water. So they had some demonstrations. Williams was almost murdered on one of these occasions. The demonstrations were getting pretty violent. Then King sent in some Freedom Riders who were going to show them how non-violence was going to work in this town. They decided to make an example. So Williams said, "I'm going to get out of this. I don't want anything to do with your non-violence. But you go ahead and I'll see what happens."

Well the non-violent demonstration became even more violent. There were people shot. There were arrests. There was an English girl who now figures here in the British Trotskyist party, who was over there. People were coming from all over, there were reports in the European press. ~~The rumor went around~~ — Williams now had nothing to do with this. He was just sort of staying there saying well you see where non-violence gets you-- but there was a report that they were going to lynch the people who had been arrested. As often happens in this type of thing the Negroes and whites, outside whites who were involved, really came in for a hell of a beating, and as in the Philadelphia Mississippi case, they even have been killed. Williams was more or less a victim of the mob in the Negro community which said "we've got to do something. We've got to free these people and get them out of jail."

He had arms, including machine guns, which had been purchased in New York and sent down there. They didn't use them because they got scared, but they had arms. The community was armed. The people were out in the street in front of his house when a car with a white couple came down the road. It was surrounded and the couple was told to get out. The crowd wanted to string them up right there. This man came from a neighboring

town, claimed had lost their way. They said, no you're a member of the Klan in this town." They wanted to kill him, or hold him as hostage. Williams said, "bring these people in my house and you know I won't let them go." He called the Sheriff, and said, "look, I have these people here and my people are very upset and I want you to know that I don't want anything to happen to our people that you have in the jail." The Sheriff immediately called the National Guard, State Troopers and what not. They couldn't hold out very long. Williams escaped. Julian Mayfield was there, a well known Negro writer who now lives in Ghana as a result of this. Minnie Mallory, a Negro woman from New York who was there was later arrested and convicted and sentenced to 16 years in prison for kidnapping, and the case is on appeal now. Williams was spirited across the United States—I knew vaguely where he was, but he was kept very careful by Cubans and by Negro groups in contact with the Cubans, to Canada. From Canada he was flown by private plane and by Castro himself, to Havana, where he is now.

On two occasions the FBI came to me asking for information about Williams, and I damn sure wasn't going to give any of what I knew. We had tried to get in touch with Bobby Kennedy himself. I had sent telegrams. I even tried to get a telephone call in. Because I knew what was going to happen on this thing, to get some kind of Federal intervention. It was one of the most sickening things that I ever saw. They wanted him out of the way. Even the way they came to me later—two of the agents came to the FPCC office in New York. They said, "We have 500 agents. We'll get him. He'll never get away." Well, he was away at that point. His aunt died in New York around that time. They went to the funeral parlor where the body was and put a wanted poster for Williams, on the coffin and stood there to see if he would come by. Really, they should have been thrown out on their heads, frankly. If it hadn't been Negroes I'm certain they would never have done that sort of thing. The trouble was—, the trouble is— the whole attitude. Anyhow, as it is, Williams is not a Communist, he's not a Trotskyite. He's a former Marine, who's just had enough. Really, you know. And he's turned into a world-wide figure because people like Bobby Kennedy and others could not bother to try to see what could be done about it. It was no use, though. I mean, it's no use now. I'm certainly [illegible] everybody."

Well, that's too bad. Just like the case of these boys, Walter Bow, and so on. And they're not the only ones. For every Walter Bow there must be at least a hundred others. I must say, I would no more want to live in the States now — you're going to really see something. I don't really

~~Xxxxxxxx~~

Verges wanted somebody from Pakistan on the board. He (Alavi) said "I'm certain that the Mulana Bashani Kahn will agree".

((That would be Mulana Abdul Hamid Bashani))

That's right. He's sometimes called Kahn as a title of respect. He's a 70 or 80 years old man. He's called the Red Mullah, sort of like the Red Dean of Canterbury.

He's the leader of one of the East Pakistan parties. He had been to China and was quite pro-Chinese. He was more than willing. But he had absolutely no contact whatever with the magazine.

((Did he come in to replace Hamza Alavi))

Yes.

((How long did Hamza Alavi work with the magazine))

You would have to check the issues of the English edition. He was there until slightly before we dropped Rosalind Ainslee. That would be May of 63, right up to spring of 64.

((Did Hamza Alavi do anything actually)) ~~or did he just~~

He found ~~got~~ manuscripts and so on. He actually did the work that Phombeah never did. But that was all. And it was sort of contre coeur with him because he did not agree with the thing. He had the idea that the magazine was an open forum, sort of rostrum for debate between all sorts of revolutionary movements. But when it became very obvious that Verges wanted to try, at that time, at least, to stay with the Chinese line, it particularly because of ~~the state of his~~ feelings about the situation in Pakistan and he wasn't happy. Also on the question of India, he felt that the Chinese position vis-a-vis India wasn't just, and he didn't like the hook-up, ~~between Pakistani~~ the growing friendship and actual solidarity between Pakistan and China.

((So he was through amicably. What is the present relationship between Alavi and Verges))

I doubt if he has any at all. He is very active here in London with Pakistani groups. He has money. His wife's family has money, his own family has. It wasn't a question of money for him.

((Has he continued to be active in AfroAsian things))

He's an academic. The Socialist Register published last year ~~by~~ — an article on Imperialism by him. He is active around the London School of Economics. He is known to the academic Left, friends with the boys who do Left Review and so on. His only practical work would be working with Pakistani groups, for instance during the last election

the Tories ran in several constituencies Pakistani independent candidates in the hope of breaking the Labor vote, hoping that the Pakistanis would vote for these Pakistani independents. Hamza worked with the Labor Party in those constituencies to counter this, in fact they were quite successful. He has very good connections inside the Labor Party. And he does not have very good ties at all with the Communist Party, though he is not by any means anti-Communist. He's a skeptic.

(How about Bashani)

He has never done anything. Never heard from him except once when he said we could put his name on the board. As far as I know there has never been any contact.

(Do they get paid for this)

No.

Next is Hassan Riad. He is S. Amir. He is an official of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, with headquarters in Dakar UN economic adviser in Dakar. He has a very high position inthat. He is Egyptian, a full member of the Egyptian Communist Party with very very pronounced Trotskyist views. That is, he feels, he has a theory about the role of bureaucracy in under-developed countries - the progressive and reactionary bureaucracy- fits into general Trotskyist theories but applied there. He has done work on Egypt, state capitalism in Egypt. A book of his published recently by Edition de Minuit in Paris, part of which appeared in Revolution. Some of it was so obviously Trotskyist that Chen, despite his somewhat partial agreement with parts of it felt that it was too obvious even to print in Revolution. He only comes through Paris occasionaly. His main interest in REvolution is getting his things printed. He is very interested in having his things published. He is very cynical about many of the African States. His article on Senegal appeared recently in Revolutian, in French, I think in No. 12. It was written under a psepdonym and based on the UN Economic Commission for Africa research, stuff that he couldn't say in his official capacity. (Like Jalet, yes.

He is not overly pro-Chinese. He feels that the Chinese philosophical position isn't quite adequate, the ideological model isn't adequate for under undeveloped countries, certainly for Africa.

(Do you know him- How old is he)

Yes I know him. He is in his thirties. About 35. Married. He is Egyptian. He is anti-Nasser really. He feels that the Egyptian Communist Party has really abdicated any constructive role inside Egypt, even from the

concentration camps where they were held putting out secret clandestine tracts supporting Nasser, which was the craziest thing I've ever heard. ~~Because~~ Now they've been liberated - in fact the old Communists are now being given very high organizational posts in the new Egyptian Party, ~~and~~

Communism and ~~Marxism is~~ are extraneous to Arab socialism but they are very useful people so they use them in there. And the group that are under Soviet influence are perfectly willing to go along with this.

Q (Is he pro-anything in Egypt)

No, I think that he is sort of resigned to the events of history. He analyzes what he considers state capitalist developments, the rise of a new bureaucratic middle class, the officer class and he tries to show in his writings how the officer class has crushed the old land-owning Wafdist ruling class which had its links with British and French financial interests, and has now consolidated itself in power, and there is a certain social mobility, but for them only. In other words, how limited it is and the officer caste certain of its fonctionnaires — but still the problem of the masses remains.

(Does he concern himself very much with the state of Egypt?)

From an academic point of view only. He's more academic. He's not even particularly concerned wih revolution. If you want his address . . ~~and here~~

Now who do we have- Marcos Ferrer- That's Colombia. I don't know anything about it. It probably stands for Dr. Leiva SEMPER of the MOEC IN Paris. He is a Colombian doctor, the representative in Paris of the MOEC. He is the one who conducted negotiations with Verges for a Spanish edition in Colombia. I assume Marcos Ferrer ~~(or Ferra)~~ to be a pseudonym.

Frene Ginwalla, next on the list, is a member of the Indian Congress for South Africa. She was a correspondent of Revolution in Dar es Salaam and she published a magazine called Spearhead until she was expelled from Tanganyika under a cloud and accused of being a Western spy. The accusations were not made openly. She was known to have contacts with the ~~Western~~ West German Embassy. She received West German money from the Carl Ebert Foundation and actually printed West German propaganda in ~~the~~ her magazine. She had gone to West Germany and done this so obviously that ~~I don't know~~ she couldn't have been very sophisticated about it because it was just too (open). She was accused of having ~~told the Soviet Embassy of having~~ offered to carry information for the Soviet Embassy, volunteering as ~~a Communist~~ a South African Communist, to give them information, two-thirds of which turned out to be totally useless and false, which again might have been to ingratiate herself. ~~I The works~~ She was here in London after she was

expelled, I'm not certain of the exact dates. She was also known to have slept around with almost every Minister of the Tanganyikan government including Julius Nyerere. This is one of the reasons why there was so much hushhush about her, that she had obviously gotten a lot of information out of these fellows. She was very close to Oscar Kambona and she claimed that Oscar Kambona was going to get her back into the Foreign Ministry.

She was just Revolution's correspondent there. She did practically nothing. When she got out, she managed to keep her little office going. They didn't seize anything, and she turned over the mailing list of her Spearhead magazine to Revolution. Verges had paid her £1000 for a deposit so she could do some work but she really didn't do anything, but she, unlike Rosalind Ainslie, turned over the unspent portion of that to Verges when she came to London. She wasn't interested really in continuing her work with Revolution. Being Indian of course posed a problem for her with anything to do with the Chinese. She was very close to the Indian community, as anyone who looks through that mailing list will see we have lots of missionaries, Indian businesses, and so forth in East Africa, who were taking subscriptions to the magazine more or less out of friendship and solidarity with another Indian. They didn't care much whether she was a Communist or not.

She was supposed to have been the mistress of Dr. Dadu. At least they say she slept with Dr. Dadu and they had a very close relationship to him. Dr. Dadu is the president of the Indian Congress for South Africa and a member of the Communist Party of South Africa, a very important member. Because the Indian community has holdings up and down East Africa, Mozambique as well, their role in the liberation struggle is very equivocal. Obviously the Africans want to go ahead while the Indians are thinking - well - Africanization menaced them - the Indians. The English used them as a sort of buffer, preferred to bring an Indian clerk to East Africa rather than to train an African. That was a typical colonial maneuver but now it has put the Indians in a situation historically which is untenable, for a long period. You know people talk about multi-racial states but in East Africa it is a joke. It won't hold up. I don't think it will, anyway.

The Indian Congress of South Africa is related to the African National Congress, the Colored people's congress, all of this is a so-called Congress Alliance. She had contacts with the African - the ANC people. the ANC people here in London. They were suspicious of her as well. But she managed somehow to get back in; she was ill, she was in hospital She was hurt in an auto accident, and she had to have a very complicated bone operation . That put her out of action for some time. I don't know, but I heard that she is now back in Tanganyika. She may well be. She has quite a bit of money; her family has money. Of course the Indians do have money. She did very little for the magazine. She occasionally told me about people in the ANC who might do something for the magazine. But most of the people she told me abut were members of the South African Communist Party. That party has taken a pro-Moscow stand and most of its people don't want to do anything for Revolution, though we did have articles by Bryan Bunk another South African Communist. That was before their party took their stand on the Sino-Soviet conflict. And there is a struggle going on right now inside of the ANC. That's a long complicated thing. That has nothing to do with Revolutin.

(On my list here we have Diallo)

Diallo is an adviser of the President of Mali- what's his name - Modewa Keida.

Married to a French woman, a Leftist, he knows Verges through friendship and offered to help. He put him in contact with ____________ who is Minister of Information, who is very, very pro-Chinese.

(In Mali)

Yes. When Chou en Lai visited Mali, you recall, that he got quite committed. There were some gratuitous, open handed slaps

There's nothing very much. He just knew him.

This is again one of Verges attempts to have a finger in another African country.

I didn't mention, with Phombeah, one of the reasons that he kept Phombeah was Phombeah's connection with Odinga, in Kenya. Phombeah at one time had hoped to be made the secretary of this new Lumumba Institute there, in Nairobi. Verges, odd as it may seem, had at one time, proposed himself as a sort of security adviser to Odinga. We felt that he continued to pay Dennis Phombeah for doing nothing mainly to keep a line of communication open to Odinga. He had met Odinga but got nowhere with him. In Algiers he was a friend of Le Chinois

President of Mali, Modibo Keita. Married to a French woman. Leftist. He knows Verges through friendship and offered to help. He put him in contact with a man by the name of Mogotogo (?) who is Minister of Information, who is very very pro-Chinese. When Chou en Lai visited Mali you recall that he got quite a committed welcome in Mali. And there were some gratuitous open-handed slaps the Russians made. Didn't have to be made but were.

(How did Verges and Diallo get together)

I don't know. He had known him for a considerable time. There is nothing very much. This is again one of Verges's attempts to have a finger in another African country. One of the reasons that he kept Phombeah was Phombeah's connection with Odinga.

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If in Algiers he was referred to as Le Chinois (as he was), I don't think the Kenyans would accept him.

This is a real problem. He says, "well, we colored people and so forth" and it is true that he is part - he's Eurasian, but it is very hard for Africans to accept that. They just put him down as Chinese.

I don't know very much about Demba Diallo. He played very little role in the Magazine except that he was a contact inside of Mali. He came to France early last year, the spring of last year (64), with his wife. He went to Vichy for his health and drank the waters for two or three weeks and he saw Verges. Verges had ideas, had mentioned to Ken that if he couldn't keep the magazine going he might go to Mali. Ken was going to be sent off to wherever Viriato da Cruz was of the Angolan Federation of Liberation, as adviser, and I was going to be sent to Indonesia for the Afro-Asian Journalists. That was how he was going to take care of everybody.

(How about Castro Da Silva)

Castro Da Silva is the pseudonym used for Viriato da Cruz, formerly of the MPLA, and now of the UPA. He is a poet, again, in the late thirties, married, has a child and is based more or less in Algiers. He has virtually no money at all. He has a small group which went into the UPA.

Holden Roberto, the head of the UPA is very suspicious of him. but nevertheless he needs him. He needs the Left. He has been to China and this give him a sort of, gives the Chinese a guarantee, but on the other hand the Chinese didn't even want to give Viriato money to transfer

himself from Algiers to Brazzaville. And he was threatened by the MPLA people, who are of course Soviet-backed to the hilt, in fact more so Dr. Neto, apparently more than ever now. And the Algerians, Ben Bella, who had supported the MPLA up until the great fiasco when people discovered that they didn't have what they claimed to have — didn't have the fighting forces — have given their support to the UPA. Nevertheless, the MPLA people still remain and they are promising to reform and really carry out things. I think that ideologically the MPLA is much more congenial to the Algerians and to all of the hard revolutionary line people.

Holden Roberto is considered to be an American agent pure and simple and always has been. In actual fact, he received a lot of money through various Protestant missionary groups, American Protestant missionary groups. He himself is a Christian Protestant. These tie-ups have helped the Rightists to back him. He did go off to China, made some statements which the Chinese were pleased with.

The Chinese haven't made any real decisive choice between the MPLA and the UPA. They're just waiting to see who is going to be able to produce.

((What about da Cruz? What is his function))

He has no function except to write articles about Angola, which he has done, one of which he signed with his own name. He has very little money and he hoped that Verges would be able to smooth the way with the Chinese, but alas! poor fellow, he learnt to his horror, I understand, that Verges was by no means the Chinese agent that he presumed him to be. I understand that he has virtually retired from politics. He is a poet. And he'd much rather be a poet than anything else. He told me on several occasions in Paris when he came to my house there for dinner that really he wished he could get out of the whole thing, but what was he going to do, he didn't have a passport, he had all these people sort of pushing him in into this. He didn't have any money. He didn't know what to do.

((He lives in Paris))

No, he lives in Algiers. He is still in Algiers to the best of my knowledge. He is one of the people in Algiers I would see. If I were to go to Algiers I would look him up. He's not terribly dynamic but events threw him up into a leading position and he sort of stuck there and doesn't know how to get out. The Chinese haven't given him the all-out support that he had hoped for

((Neither have they turned him down))

No.

Castro de Cruz

((Amilcar Cabrera))

That was a name used, not a pseudonym, a false name. It doesn't represent anyone, it represents the FALN, of Venezuela in Europe. They have a bureau in France. I didn't really know them. I knew there were several people. One of them, a graphic artist, some of whose drawings were printed in Revolution. They brought the things. They are authentic. Because when Verges had a young French boy traveling through Latin America he went to Venezuela. They got him into the guerrillas. They got him all around. We had some very authentic first-hand reports. So whoever they are they are authentic. They were very, very cautious, probably suspicious of me because I was an American, so I never had any real conversation with them.

((Do you known anything about who Verges's link to them was))

No.

((Do you know if he still has them))

I know this, that they asked him to remove the name Amilcar Cabrera and it has been removed, because it was identified with them. He then put in a note in the twelfth French edition that in the future he would receive an article from the information department of the FALN. They'd be foolish not to send material, but they didn't want to be identified with the editorial policy of the magazine. This many reflect various tendencies inside of the FALN which I have read about. I don't know anything first-hand, that they split between a hard line, those who want to continue the guerrilla struggle and the sabotage struggle and those who want to look for possible negotiated solutions. One group, a little more pro-Chinese.

In any case these people did represent the FALN, there is no doubt about it. I didn't know any of them. They never had any dealings with me.

((Patricia Magowan))

I know very little about her. She did this book on Portugal. She was connected with the —— she has ties with the British Communist Party but also with British Trotskyists. She was the one who found Rosalind Ainslie to work here in London for the magazine. She is the mistress of a man named Carlos

((Lanca?))

I'm not certain. That might be it. He is a European born in Mozambique, a Portuguese, who has been kept going by various African movements for years because he represents (laughing) what the French call an interlocateur, when they want to call him out

obviously Neto does ~~xxxxx~~ have some American support as well or had some American support. His father did, I think.

((Do you know Michael Tabasa))

No, never heard of him.

((We come to Maspero))

Maspero is just a third-generation French elite intellectual who has a little bit of money, runs a publishing house, and magazine, and who is extremely non-committed in his Left commitment. In other words he is a leftist but he is not a member of any party and is not really involved in active politics. His magazine more and more is taken over by Trotskyists at present. That was not always the case. He came really to the fore with the Algerian War. Considering the failure of the French Communist Party to do anything about ~~the~~ the Algerian question, it was ~~the Left~~ intellectuals, the Intellectuals who were out of the party who responded, who made up the Jensen network, the support ~~network~~ for the FLN underground in France, and who did the propaganda work and who gave the support. If ~~is~~ the FLN had French support it was among these people, not among the Communist party.

((Verges consistent efforts to))

Yes. To wean ~~xxxx~~ away authors (from Maspero). Hassan Riab wrote for him. Chalion, whom he got for Revolution Africaine wrote for him and now is back again working for him, writing for him. ~~Cassell~~ also. ~~Chen~~ Kien also. Almost everyone. Even I knew him because he published student material and he used ~~to things to~~ [illegible] in the States and I had correspondence and I used to send him material that we had.

((The competition between Verges and Maspero- was this a personal as opposed to ideological competition))

No it was personal. There is very little ideological about Verges. Verges is an extremely ~~heady~~ [illegible], personal person. He is generous in many ways but ~~he~~ even his generosity is [illegible] personally. ~~He is either for you.~~ He is a grand patron. He is extremely generous with money when he has it. He throws it around. You could never go anywhere with Verges that he doesn't ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ want to pay. When we traveled it was ~~most times~~ first class, ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ on a plane. He ~~II~~ has a deep-seated desire to be big, (he is a small man, he is short) to be talked about. He wants publicity. He wants to be known. He doesn't have any real commitments, I ~~don't~~ think, that are terribly deep. And I'm certain that if he were sure of money from the other side but nevertheless so that his name would stay big, I'll bet he'd. . . ~~He wants money not for himself but for prestige. After all Verges's father was the founder of the Communist Party~~

money not for itself but for prestige. After all, Verges's father was the founder of the Communist party of Reunion, member of the French Assembly. His brother is the head of the Communist party of Reunion right now. He grew up in this sort of French Left-wing upper class, which in France is the hereditary Left which goes all the way back to 1848 or before. Some families were extremely distinguished. And he is in that sort of group. In France it is very much respected, just as you might respect a well-to-do land-owning family. You know that a member of such and such a family obviously must be Left because his grandfather and his greatgrandfather were.

((Maspero again))

Maspero fits just into that category.

((That same Leftist heritage))

That's right.

((Does he run his operation on a self-sustaining commercial basis))

More or less except that for instance he published a book on China recently, which the Chinese subsidized. I suspect that he has received some aid from the Italian Communist party. The Italians look with great favor on him because of his openness, his critical approach, his Anti-Stalinism. Andersson says he got money from the Chinese for this book on China.

Verges has tried desperately to smear him with the Chinese as a Trotskyite but apparently the Chinese didn't give a damn.

((You said that the Trotskyists seem to be moving in on Maspero))

Yes.

((Would they be giving him any kind of financial aid))

I really doubt it. The Trotskyists generally are poor. I think that what it is, is that he is really short of hands, short of manuscripts, short of people who can think and produce something. And here are these Trotskyist-leaning intellectuals who don't have any outlet, so naturally.. It's just that he doesn't have any great sectarian feelings against them, so more and more tend to come in.

((Andre Belge?))

Never heard of him.

(Neither have I. Imokay in Nigeria)

Oh, Imokay is a student. He's no bureau man at all. He was a student at the university of Nsuka. He distributed the magazine. else.

He never did anything else. ~~Just a student, graduate~~ he has graduated now. I think he is working in the government somewhere.

((Did he get paid))

No- oh yes, he did, he got a commission on subscriptions. He got 30 some subscriptions from students at the university, in one week, as I recall which was unheard of. Just a student, and just by sheer chance he handled the magazine.

((Mme. Michele Mestre))

Oh, My, Michele Mestre Madame Mestre I don't know anything about. Michel Mestre is one of Maspero's people. I thought it was a man. I've never met him, don't know anything about him. I know there is a Michel Mestre who has written a number of books on the Congo for Maspero. Had nothing to do with Verges although Verges did put out feelers to get this person, man or woman, to work for Revolution. He wasn't successful. It was part of his general campaign of leaving Maspero with no authors at all.

((Rosalind Ainslie))

She's married. She works for the East German news agency ADN. She is obviously connected with the South African Communist party. She is a member of the Congress Alliance in South Africa and she is married to an Indian. She has several ~~some~~ children and she lives here in London. She comes from a wealthy family in South Africa, I imagine. She was found by Patricia Magowan Pinheiro to work for Revolution. That flopped after a short period. They didn't know which way to go, to stick with the Algerians or stick with Verges. The business of the magazine being pro-Chinese by no means was obvious, nor even clear in Verges's mind. The magazine wasn't pro-Chinese for an awful long time, ~~it wasn't a question of being~~ pro-Chinese. Certainly not when I was hired. It was Algerian, that was all.

((Americans attending subversive sabotage school in Prague))

I never heard of a subversive sabotage school in Prague. The Americans that I have known (who were) going through Prague have gone to Havana.

((Between Moscow and Havana en route))

Yes. I don't know anything about a subversive sabotage school. I don't doubt that there might be one. I imagine there's one in Washington too.

((I never heard of it. Either one))

(Laughs)

((Current addresses of some of these people))

Well, who do you want? ~~Chen~~ Kien now, has no address. He sleeps around

everywhere. He literally was sleeping on my floor at one point. If you had told me, I could have brought my book. I gave you people whom I contacted on my trip.

Hamsa I can give you his- 74 Hartford Road London NW 11

FALN- they have an office here in London. I don't have much. Mammi, BP 35, Plateau Saulieres, 121 Rue Mouradidosh, Algiers. I have a bigger address book at home.

(You mentioned DuBois. Do you know very much about his group in Ghana)

Dr. DuBois had a number of people around him but he was an elderly man; he was more interested in producing the African Encyclopoedia than anything else, which he did set up before his death. His wife is now one of the directors of Ghana television. She is a Ghana citizen, she has renounced her American citizenship. There are a number of people who are close to her or were close to Dr. DuBois such as Dr. Alpheus Hunton who is an American Negro who has written on Africa, and works for the enclyclopoedia, The Ghana Institute. He was a member of the Communist party of the US. I think Shirley Graham may have been a member. Certainly Dr. DuBois became a member several years before his death. At the time of his death he was extremely pro-Chinese and was very unhappy. His wife, Shirley Graham DuBois, is very pro-Chinese. There is William Gardner Smith, an American Negro writer, who works for Ghana radio and who worked with me at the AgenceFrance Presse in Paris. Smith is close to Shirley Graham, or was. There is a girl by the name of Maya Angelou, who was married, still married but separated, to form representative of the PAC in South Africa in Accra. He has been removed from his post for misappropriation of funds- Vusi Make. Those are the ones that I know of.

(Subsidiary question- Hammer and Steel)

The Hammer and Steel group in Boston is an alleged Chinese group that operates in Boston, (They are) former members of the US Communist party. After a period of inactivity it has suddenly become active and not more than a few days ago, while I was out of the country , without any effort on my behalf (ie. my own part) they had my address here and I received two of their publications. Two recent publications, which were sent to my London address. So someone here, someplace, has sent them my new address. Very interesting that they should have it. We had an exchange between them and Revolution, but I had not kept this up. They have just formed a so-called New England party of Labor which is supposed to be the Chinese party, Marxist-Leninist party, and is opposed, and they give the reasons for

their opposition, to the progressive labor group and to the POC, Provisional Organizing Committee for a new Marxist-Leninist party which was an old pro-Albanian group. Progressive Labor is of course a split-off from the Communist party and split off because of the Cuban revolution and the civil rights question and so forth. POC has a large number of Negro and Puerto Rican members, almost the majority of them. PL has a number of Negro contacts and has been extremely active in the South but has made some serious mistakes. They had people in Monroe, North Carolina, after Williams, taking Williams place they had a white man, which is a ridiculous thing to do. They didn't understand what ("black nationalism") nationalism means.

This new Hammer and Steel group, which has been a sort of group without a party, has now announced the formation of this New England Party of Labor which they hope will be the nucleus of a new Chinese Communist Party in the United States. But I don't know anything about them. (sic!!)

((Back to Switzerland))

((How long were you in Lausanne.))

From March, 1963, to December of 63. Then I used to go back every month. magazine

((What contact did you maintain there))

With Andersson.

((Did you have any American contacts))

No. What do you mean- with the American Embassy?

((Any Arab contacts))

No. Just the people that came in and out of Andersson's place. But I didn't . . Being an American I was very much aware of the fact that everybody was suspicious of me. So I made it a point not to bother.

((You talked about Drapeau Rouge. Is there any relationsship with the John Llewellyn Davis Red Flag))

(laughing) Who is John Llewellyn Davis! That sounds like something out of- - - The Drapeau Rouge is a group of young, French students, university and licee students who had been connected with the youth group of the JSU which is the PSU, [a rough equivalent to] the Nenni Socialist Party in France. This was their youth group. They were dissatisfied with - - for instance, the Belgian section, Arras. One of the boys had been in Chen's philosophy class in Licee had got in touch with Chen and he had given them advice and helped them to form this group, 61

or to continue

the group and it produced a news letter. He had promised them money, they put out one issue, and he never got any money. I heard that they were in contact with the Clichy group down [illegible] and were seeking some sort of recognition there, among the things that they had promised they did a self-criticism admitting that they had done wrong to have accepted Kier's supervision and saying that they will never do this again.

((John Llewellyn Davis, you say who the hell is he))

Yes.

((We talked about Pablo. Is this Michael R[illegible]))

He is a member of the Trotskyist IVth International - or was. He has been expelled for his heretical views, not that they all don't have heretical views, but his were extremely pro-Algerian. I think he has become an Algerian citizen. He is Belgian, I believe, or Dutch, but I think it is Belgian. He was arrested in Holland. He worked with the FLN during the War, went to Algeria, was arrested in Holland, spent some time in jail, was released, went to Algiers with his wife and became very active in the Bureau de Biens Vacantes, later the Bureau of the Socialist Sector. His influence has been of an ideological nature and he has very close ties with the Yugoslavs, despite his Trotskyism he is also not at all persona non grata with the Soviets, and he has now been expelled. He has a group called Pabloites.

((How did he hit on Pablo))

This was his nom de guerre, I suppose.

He represented for a while a majority tendency in the international Trotskyist movement. Being held by the American SWP Socialist Workers Party. Finally expelled. I don't know the ins and outs of the Trotskyists very much.

((When did you first run into him))

I had heard of him for years. The first time I saw him in the flesh was sitting in a cafe in Algiers. I never had anything to do with him. He used to hang out in a cafe which was right under the offices of Revolution Africaine, which was sort of a center for European Leftists and whatnot. It was called the Cafe Very (?) [illegible]

((Did he ever have anything to do with Revolution))

He made have had something to do with it later with Harbi but not under Verges.

((I meant in Europe, not Algiers.))

No, no, nothing.

((Do you know anything about the formerly dissident PDP of Montreux?, The Pro-Chinese Communist party of Switzerland)

They've got it wrong. There's only one pro-Chinese Communist party and that's the so-called Parti Comuniste Suisse, started in Verve, not Monteaux, Verve, Nestle's headquarters. Headed by Gerard Buillard, a small businessman who has become a member of the PLP, that the Communist Party. When to Albania last year, summer, as a tourist, and sold the Albanians on the idea of supporting a breakaway Marxist-Leninist party. He came back to Switzerland and with five people formed this Swiss Communist Party, which grew, they often of 35 people. Andersson was hostile at first, but when the Chinese took a more benevolent view on it in Berne, he went along, and he may have received some money from the Chinese, I don't know. But we know that he received money from Albania. He became increasingly quarrelsome, he was very much worried about Andersson because Andersson was printing his newspaper, L'Etincelle (The Spark). He owned this offset press in Lausanne. Anderson also was recruiting people for the group and he has more connections inside the Communist party, the PLP, than Guilliard did, since he had been only a recent member. The Lausanne group became larger than the Verve group. I don't know what happened after that. But then, relations deteriorated rapidly and both the Albanians and the Chinese realized that they had made a drastic mistake. Builliard then phoned the Albanians and the Chinese in Berne and told them that if he didn't receive 3000 francs by a certain time of day that he would denounce Andersson to the police. Obviously, he didn't receive the 3000 francs and he went to the police. Apparently they knew more than Builliard about him. Then he got a delegation and went to the Federal Council, to the Parliament in Berne, and they made an open public request that this foreign agent, this Swedish national, who had taken advantage of Swiss hospitality, be expelled. The Federal Police came in. They banned Revolution and there was the gneral blowup. They didn't get very far, except that now it is suspected that he is more or less subsidized by the Swiss police, that he is keeping going and his group, is down to about 15 people, according to Andersson. He obviously has a small amount of money which he is not getting from the Chinese. He later told Andersson, he proposed that Andersson retire from politics, if he would be paid the sum of 5,200 Swiss francs. The reason for this was he wanted to keep the mimeograph machine that he had given him and he was deducting. I think he wanted 7,000 francs altogether for his exit from politics.

but he was willing to deduct the price of the mimeograph machine. He didn't receive that either. So he can't be considered very (important). At one point, to show you how silly he is, he was in contact with Kevin ? DELVIN ! Delman of Radio Free Europe, in Munich, asking him to organize a meeting for him there. This I found out through the Congress for Cultural Freedom people. With his copies of "Sinned(?) he has many ties, DETINGELLE with his furniture business and his wine business. He also sells wine.

((Relationship and persons involved in Revolution with the New Leftist review in Great Britain)

They didn't particularly agree with the views of Revolution but they were sympathetic nevertheless. They are leftists, some inside the Labor Party, people like Thomas Balogh, one of the economic advisers. They are very well connected there (Labour Party). They helped us here for a while. Hamsa Alavi had friends (among them). Dennis Phombeah also knew the editors, Perry Anderson, Roger Murray, who is now in Ghana, professor Hodgkins of the African Study Institute in Accra. There was no connection other than that, sympathetic cooperation. They were willing to help. Their views are quite different. They're not Communists. We weren't Communists either.

((They didn't buy space. You just swapped ads))

Yes. That's a normal arrangement between magazines. You exchange advertising.

((Movement for Colonial Freedom))

With Movement for Colonial Freedom it was the same thing. We got very little real cooperation from Movement for Colonial Freedom. We exchanged ads, they promised to accept subscriptions on our behalf but John Eber, who is the Secretary, was very much afraid that he might lose Algerian support, because Movement for Colonial Freedom depends on getting support from all different African countries, Asian countries, etc. Therefore anything that might be anti-governmental in terms of Algeria he was very much afraid of. He is an ex-Communist. He told me - "What are you doing going around with Phombeah? He has been here with Harbi, the week before you came with him. Which side are they on?" Phombeah walked in just as he was saying this, and overheard it. He (Eber) was very embarrassed, but had to go on with it. Phombeah said, "I'm just helping all the brothers- -" (laughing) He was hopeless.

I have both children home now. This is mid-term, so the little boy is out.

My exact address: 30 Stockleigh Hall an apartment house on Prince Albert Road, 21-31 entrance. 4th floor.

(Cannot give definitive answer for some time, would advise- play it reasonably safe, maintain access you have or could reestablish.)

My problem is short-range. I need money by next week. I have people who want me to write things. The things about Revolution, nobody particularly will care about. That's no embarrassment to anybody. Not even to the Chinese. Andersson said in fact they would be rather pleased with it, if somebody would finally get this off their backs, because they can't say anything at all. I'm committed to write the article for Encounter. There's a letter, which is appearing in the current issue of the China Quarterly. The question is what to do with the Atlantic Monthly people.

I've got to arrange something quickly. I didn't expect the situation to crop up quite so quickly as this. It was relatively well taken care of when I left here, with my brother-in-law but my wife has gone and fixed up, loused up things with her brother which makes it extremely difficult. I can probably get some more money, but not very much more out of the Encounter people. They have already given me a large sum of money, more than they expected, they expected Atlantic Monthly to come through and pick up part of it, which they never did. Now it is a question of exchange of letters. Just one or two mis-steps and the whole thing... So far as Revolution concerned, I can continue this article, but I have the problem of getting money. That should be self-evident.

Anyway, I shall try to hold things off. I'm going to try to see if I can arrange something as a temporary emergency measure, this afternoon. If I can and if I'm successful, then everything will be all right till the end of next week.

(I can let you have $200 this afternoon.)

That would certainly be a great (help), That would be very helpful. That would solve my needs-- Thirty-five pounds. How much is £35 in dollars?

(Under $150.00) (Transcript)

That's what I need. That's what I actually need immediately. If I take care of that I'm off the hook until next week. Now I've got to go and clear myself with Lasky of Encounter. You haven't been in touch with Lasky in any way, have you, with these Encounter people?

(No)

Well, somebody has. Some very strange- - you see ~~[illegible]~~ the Congress for Cultural Freedom are sort of pushing in the background, and I know vaguely that they have the idea that maybe, that I might like to take a long-term job ~~for long term,~~ with them in Paris. Personally I'm not terribly keen on some of the things the Congress for Cultural Freedom does. Some things are not too bad, besides the pay. But worse still, my wife would just about blow sky high over the Congress for Cultural Freedom, even though she knows Chi Quarterly and Encounter were subsidized by the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Encounter is no longer. But there has been a lot of hankypank going on between them . Even the letter- I told you about the letter. They did everything possible to try to keep the editor of Chi Quarterly ~~to keep~~ from printing the letter, telling him all sorts of reasons, that it would blow my cover completely, and then the money that I got from Encounter, Lasky said well, maybe you won't write anything at all. I don't know, why they give me any money at all, send me off to write. .

((I don't know. You're talking mysteries to me))

As I say there are verious people who are hovering around and since I've been back, now here is the truth, he (Castro) hasn't bothered to really, to find out what I have.

((Couple of questions occur to me-- you mention the possibility of going to Paris to work for Congress for Cultural Freddom. . . Would you also be interested if things worked out, in going back to Algeria)

Oh, yes.

(To stay)

Sure. Certainly. All I need is a proper cover, ~~one that is not a~~ that's (just) very hard. The suspicions of these groups are extremely slight. There was a fellow we haven't mentioned. You've probably heard about Dr. Robert Ramsey who was an American who was in Zanzibar. He's now locked up in jail in Algeria. He may be a Negro although I doubt it. I've never met him. I think that he's white, a liberal, member of the NAACP and all sorts of things. I forget what he's a doctor of, not M.D. ~~He wrote~~ He was sending out wild ~~[illegible]~~ letters in favor of the Zanzibar revolution. Then he claimed he was expelled from Kenya by sinister forces. He didn't have a US passport. He was here without a US passport. For a short time the British National Council for Civil Liberties gave him some support and the next thing I knew he was in Algeria. Now what is game is, and whether he is just a crackpot God knows. Every ~~thing Revolution and~~ revoltionary movement brings ~~[illegible]~~ forth such a bunch of screwballs as one can only see inside

a madhouse, you know.

((He's now in jail?))

Now in jail, in Algiers, no charges against him. I understand the US Embassy is trying to get him out (laughing). I don't know whether Dr. Ramsey was actually an agent of some kind, although he had too many confusions to be really a good agent. Yes, too confused. There was too much wrong. In any case, what I found was that people were generally (not very suspicious) if you had something to do and didn't live too lavishly, though Africans don't question too much on money. This business of feathering one's nest goes on all over Africa, apparently in Algeria now more than ever. Andersson said there are large transfers of money by Algerian francs into Switzerland (which are still) being bought up by the opposition for their own purposes, One day.

Yes, Algeria would be fine-- provided I could find some reasonable - any kind of a newspaper assignment , a vaguely Left thing, better than anything else. but the more innocuous the better.

((You said once before, you fit well in Algeria, you didn't fit well in Black Africa))

I could move throughout Africa, but one has to start ones-thing. For instance, for me to go to Ghana would create, at this point, innumerable suspicions, but to go to Algeria where I have people like Georges Arnaud? who is a very close personal friend, they would welcome me, and try to find something for me to do . .
That would be easy, to arrange. And from there I have South African friends with both PAC and ANC, I have very good contacts. Wherever they have offices I can move inside. But one has to have some reasonable sort of thing. On this trip I used some of the Afro-American journals, the magazine (Encounter) which was quite successful in some places.
In fact Grippa said, "why don't I have this magazine. They send it to Verges and don't send it to me." Nvertheless with Grippa there was some suspicion. And I had the opinion-- I'm not paranoic and I don't like playing cops and robbers- or go for cloak and dagger stuff, but I had the opinion that somebody was watching me, was following me when I left there, which was one reason why I didn't see all the people I was going to see.
I knew some Trotskyists there who (could) give me some stories about Grippa's organization - they're on the fringes of it, etc.- but I just didn't go to see them because I thought that Grippa might have someone watching to see where I was gong. He wouldn't like the connection with Trotskyites, anyway.

((I'll be away. . closed on Monday. Washington's birthday))

Oh, my God, is it?

((You'll have to buy a cherry pie this week end))

The kids know all about the cherry tree.

((Can you come on Tuesday))

Yes. But my coming in and out of this Embassy is not the best thing ~~in~~ in the world. Right ~~next to you~~ over there are the Indonesians, whom I know. Around the corner are the Cubans who know me very well. All it would take is one Cuban to see me walk in here.... I can always concoct a reason but . . I don't know how many people are watching. For one thing, ~~take~~ certainly the British Home Office, they've had me under surveillance ever since I've been here . There's no doubt about that. I got a tip on that from ~~Mark Eegel~~ Tim Ennals of the National Council of Civil Liberties~~xxx~~. . . British may be allies and all, but after all....

As far as my wife is concerned, she is by no means a dyed-in-the-wool Communist. She is not a Communist at all, never has been, but she would not like that in the slightest. . . I can't get her to understand. .

Editorial signs

(( ))	query or comment by interviewer
( )	editorial insert
------- or - - -	omission
. . .	incomplete statement
--	dash

Taspe No. 3 Gibson

((What do you think about that - Malcolm X))

I could have told you it was coming.

((Well, you did. You didn't single out Malcolm X))

it becomes / make

Now comes the real thing. It's going to ~~affect~~ the Algerian struggle. You remember the Algerian struggle throughoutwas marked by clashes between the MNA and the FLN right up to and after the Independence. And this is what is going to happen now in the States, as far as I can see. But what I don't really like is -- there are so many small groups, uncontrollable groups, little kids, fifteen-year-old kids who are planning to shoot the President, and that sort of thing. You don't know how far it goes. So the idea of being a leader- leading what, at this point. leader of what? As to Black Ghettoes, there this thing-- I don't know (who responsible).

((Do you think that was Elijah))

I'm not at all certain. There are many, many, many people who would be glad to see Malcolm out of the way. For one thing, it does resolve a certain problem and that -is, there was a clash, certainly it was going to come about between Williams's group and Boggs' men in Detroitx and Malcolm X, people who were more committed to an armed struggle. Malcolm's major contradiction was that he ~~xxxxx~~-- logically, what he was preaching would have led even to negotiations with Washington, to some kind of arrangement, or else to an armed struggle, an underground struggle. As soon as you have a vocal leader who is exposed and who is in the country, on one hand he knew what was happening. He was very much aware of this proliferation of groups and activities, like the little business of Walter Bowe, which ~~was highly innocuous, in comparison~~ really highly symbolic and almost innocuous, in comparison with some of the things His trips abroad, most of his trips abroad were in a way - he wanted to create unity by contacts with Williams and otherx people, but here, in Europe and Cairo. One of the problems that he had was simply in getting to see Williams. He didn't want to go to Havana. He probably could have brought an extraordinary amount of pressure on the State Department to allow him to go as a journalist or something like that if he really wanted to. But he didn't want to, because he didn't want to be exposed on a political issue which might have cost him support. So where was he going to see Williams? Prague, perhaps, Moscow. But he didn't want to go to Eastern European countries either.

((You said that one of his ~~things~~ aims might have been to negotiate with

Washington))

Exactly. At first the whole idea was that there was going to be a Black State. This was originally. But no one had any real. . . except for Elijah Muhammed's people -- I think that some of them did have. You saw the London Times article todayx? One of the things that disgusted him with the Elijah group was this talks with the American Nazi Party and with the Ku Klux Klan, particularly with the Klan, to buy a county, if you will, a county in Georgia, which the Ku Klux Klan was going to sell. They were going to see that all property in the country was turned over and this was going to be the nucleus of a Black State. He felt that the Muslims were seeking to perpetuate segregation for their purposes. He really was not a segregationist nor did he at the end believe in -- he wasn't a racist. This is whole thing, backing away from a religous point, from a racist poin trying to find some modus vivendi for a modified Black nationalism. But he wanted to talk this over. Thisxisxhisx I don't know if he ever had any contacts with anyone beside New York City and State officials and police. He had rather good relations. He was extremely moderate in person and you could talk to him. I think this is what he really wanted or what would have come out of it. He just wanted the contact - to feel that there was somebody opposite him. To a lot of these people, thisx a lot of the stink could be taken out just hs by talking to them, not necessarily with publicity.

((If he wasn't involved for the racial or theological grounds, what was benefit))

Not a racist. For instance, it is said that the Muslims are anti-white and there is an anti-white elementx, and particularly and an anti-Semitic elementx, directed against Jewish shopkeepers. Obviously the Jewish shopkeepers, being exposed, being in the Ghetto, the resentment comes out against them. In New York it comes out against the Jewish element in the garment district. as many Negroes work in the garment district. It is unskilled, underpaid. and sweat shop type of thing. I must say that Malcolm sometimes played this tune himself. He knew it was facile, and also it pleased the Arabs. frxxxxjx from whom he received considerable support.

((You mean the Cairo type Arabs?))

Yesx, the Nassertype. I don't know how much support he ever received financially, but I think they did receive support. And also the Black Muslimsx did receive support at certain times. It was no accident that he set kup a headquarters in exile in Cairo. He did go to Ghana and I know that in Ghana he was attacked by the orthodox Marxists. They are the first to launch an attack, for Black fascism or something. I feel that he was evolving, trying to get out of a box. His reaction was that of a Negro who

grew up in a Ghetto, who becomes a criminal under pressures, he is intelligent he is extremely intelligent. Not an intellectual but far more capable as an organizer say, than Williams. Williams is utterly hopeless. He is not slow to catch ideas, but he has certain fixed ideas which have developed, certainly under pressure. Malcolm was moving and he as a figure could have done a lot too.

((Was this a maturing))

Yes, a maturing, a process of facing reality also. I suppose this is an explanation to a large extent of why there are so many children who are young kids, who are really involved in the nationalist movement. They're facile, frustrated. They don't know what else. They feel that the older organizations are incapable of doing anything for them. There is a class thing. They feel that there is sort of a Black bourgeoisie for whom there is now in general a possibility of integration, has sold them out, but they, who live in the Ghettoes, who go to the bad schools, who come out of poor homes and so forth, by the time they're sixteen, their hope of, their the real hopes of integration, of being something in contemporary American society, is dead. It's this whole business, the motivation in schools, the good schools, the housing and the family even. If a child grows up in a home where they don't have books- there is a great difference between a Jewish child in the Lower East Side, no matter how poor that family, motivated by a long Jewish tradition, and a Negro child or a Puerto Rican child, Middle Class ideals are beginning to sink down into the Negro community, but among Puerto Ricans there is an even greater gap, so I understand, ---------

Many of these Negro kids, they just feel this enormous wall around them, and one of the things that I am most aware of, even-- when I was a child, I grew up in Philadelphia. Many of my friends were white. We lived in a neighborhood in West Philadelphia which had Negro and white Irish, Italians, Jewish people, Italian, in proximity. Lived in the same block. That neighborhood now is solidly black. The school I went to was always mixed. Now most of these schools are black. There is de facto segregati today, through real estate, through housing, than there was 20 years ago.

((Is this intentional or is this because this was an area that was mixed and where a Negro could move in and so Negroes did.))

Yes. One of the problems is that around most American cities the city line marks the end of expansion for Negroes. They can't move into the suburbs. A middle class Negro who has money can move into the suburbs. And what areas they can move into are filled up . The whites flee out of

the city,x

((Washington would be the primary example of that))

Washington is that much more complicated because you are in the midst of the Southern States. Except that I notice, I have relatives that live around Washington. As a kid I used to go to Washington every summer. And going out towards Chevy Chase and Montgomery county, the Maryland side, there is a certain desegregation that has gone on. Obviously on the Virginia side it is the opposite. Also the Maryland counties to the South. That is a more segregated area. That is also the history-- the sort of slave line. in Maryland before the Civil War sort of went where Washington is now. across the State, to the South were they grow tobacco there was slavery, to the North there was no slavery. And there was a great deal of intermarriage- not intermarriage but racial intermixture. I have relatives who are to all intents and purposes white. When I was a child and went there in the summer, I really had no real awareness of race. It was a curious back~~ground~~ of interracial mixture, that had gone on just before and after the Civil War. Now that has changed considerably., That's in Montgomery county.

I brought the address book.

((It's extremely interesting to consider the racial problem at home but I would like to finish this up.))

Yes. What sort of addresses do you want.

((The people we talked about))

This is Hassan Riad. ~~Amoui~~ is his name, ~~we may have Ameer~~. Boit postale . 3186 - Dakar, Senegal

M. Amiabel. was a Canadian, former Communist. He was setting up, he did set up a pro-Chinese group near Vancouver. Apparently there was considerable activity there. (6323 Marine Drive, Burnaby 3, B.C., Canada)

This is address of the Mulana. To the best of my knowledge Verges never heard from himx yet (Bhashani - c/o Janata Weekly, 16/20 Haba Roy Lane Dacca 1, E. Pak.)

~~Vohegra~~ BOSGRA Is a very interesting person, in Holland. He is a man who works with Andersson occasionally. He is not a Communist, is a vague Leftist with the ~~Christian Pacifists~~, the Pacifist Socialist Party, in Holland, which has gathered in a strange grouping of Leftists. He has contacts with the Angolans and Algerians. He goes to Algeria quite often. I have a feelin' he is somewhat connected with the ~~Giriut~~ Curiel people. (Vinkenstraat 13" Amsterdam (Angola Comite)

CHARTRAIN ... Montreal P.Q., Canada

Michel
Chartain xix, you know. He is secretary general of the Partie Socialiste de Quebec and is of course very much connected with the Cubans. And has had a great deal of contact with American Negro groupsx of the Left.

- GLN, Congo, in Brazzaville. It's so open, and so obvious, you know.

They used to send things CUELLAR - (Apartado Aéreo 13777, Zone 1 Bogota - or Ap. Aereo 15332 Bogota)

In Colombia, Alfonso ~~Queila~~- Not(?) this address is where they receive special materials. Things that they think will get by the censorship.
These things came from peking. They came to Revolution.

x The one great advantage of Revolution was if one watched it closely you could find i . . at one time, not any more, but certainly in the arly period, they weren't told by the Chinese to come there but they had seen Revolution on sale. (Orlando LINERO Calle 56, No. 63-30, Barranquilla, Colombia)

17
Colonia Anahuac Mexico D.F.

Federico Emery, was a Mexican ~~settler~~ citizen, who had been in Peking and was supposed to be representing ~~the~~ Mexican Marxist-Leninist group, the pro-Chinese group. (Tizoc #19, Col. Anahuac, Mexico 17, D.F.)

Jurema Finamour, this poor Brazilian. who was involved in a most vague way. Verges put this person's name- I don't know whether it is a man or woman- think it's a woman- on the magazine, actually never received ~~xxtyxn~~ anything from her. I heard later that she was pro-Moscow, certainly not pro-Chinese. She's probably in jail now, after the coup down there.

~~iMmsxJsxnmmxRxymmx~~

M. ~~Mx~~Jean ~~Payou~~ FALLOT. This is the fellow who was Communist leader in the Haute Loire, who is the only one who is still supposed to remain in contact.
still

Le Chambon sur Lignon, Haute Loire. Everybody knows Mrs. Gunawardene . The Russians claim is parachuted everywhere. (P.O. Box 300, Dept 245, Peking)

Gregorio Goldenberg, in Peking, is Chilean. He works, think he works, inside of the Foreign Languages press. He is correspondent for El Mundo. of Havana. At one time he was correspondent for the Cuban radio. He was a very curious fellow. He wanted to set ~~x~~ up a Spanish edition of Revolution with Chinese money and offered to do this, when he came through Paris, ~~hmix~~ about a year ago. Verges managed to avoid ever giving him any answer on this. He actually offered to bring the money. for this.

Han Su-yin. Very interested in the magazine. She sent material from Cambodia and Verges does have some contacts in Cambodia, someone in the office of Norodom Sihanouk ~~Norda~~. A Frenchman, I think his name is Mayer. He was close to the chief of state.

Elpheus Hunter. W. A. Hunton ~~Hunter~~. Anyone would know him in Accra.

(undoubtedly Charles Meyer, well-known figure in Phnom Penh

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His group at the university of Ghent, which no longer exists, so I'm told.

MASAO KITAZAWA - 20 Muhammed Said Flat 81, Cairo
Masao Kitazawa, was the Japanese representative to the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference. He used to pass through Paris quite regularly. I don't think he is there any longer. Was much interested in the magazine. He used to use the pseudonym of Walter Johnson sometimes.

Ab Karina? was one of the leaders of the SWAPU of Southwest Africa.

used to send in articles. I knew him personally from New York.

has been going back and forth between Peking and also East Germany and West Germany. He's playing all sides. on this Southwest Africa thing.

Cozengizi is the head of SWANU, the other Southwest Africa group. (SWANU & SWAPU) They have a unity. . once there was a struggle between Karina and Kozengizi. Karina was virtually eliminated. Karina is an American agent, and so forth. The Last story that I heard about Karina was that he was working for the Peace Corps in Bechuanaland. These are the stories that they circulated. Karina has been unable to hold up his end of it. He is kind of sulking. And violence hasn't helpt him at all. Kozengizi has embarrassed people i over and over- - monomania but its worked.

Abdul Rahim KARIM (190a Finchley Rd., Lond NW3) special representative now, in London, for Verges. He is in Singapore. His article on Malaysia, against Malaysia, was greatly appareicated by the Indonesian government and a large number of copies of the issue of Revolution which contained it were bought up and i twas later reproduced. We received from Indonesian Embassies all around sub- orders for that issue. Subscriptions came from the UN, their missions to the UN, perhaps here in London.

Julian Mayfield, Acadamy of Science, P.O. Box 2848, Accra, in Ghana doesn't use this address as often as he used to. because he is now editor of something called the African Review. It is a new magazine..

F. M. MOLL - Amstelkade 157, Amsterdam Phone 717032.
Now here's an interesting fellow- Moll, I aver quite figured him out. He is a Surinam nationalist. in Amsterdam. He is close to almost all the Left parties. there. He pret4nds to be Marxist but claims that he is not involved in the Sino-Soviet dispute. He doesn't want anything to do with that. That is the reason he never wrote anything for the magazine. though I did see him. x

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Carlos Moore. I have no address for him. He is an Afro-Cuban boy whom I first met in New York. He is in Paris and you might be able to reach him through Presence Africaine. He supposedly was writing a book about Cuba He was very much involved with Robert Williams, with Malcolm X, he is extremely young but very active in --- . He is of Jamaican origin. There is a Jamaican minority in eastern Cuba, in Camaguey and Oriente Province. That's how you get names like Moore, etc. His father and brother live in New York, his mother is still in Cuba. He went back to Cuba after the Bay of Pigs, and went to school there. He became very disillusioned. He left, claiming that there was racial discrimination and so forth in Cuba. He went to Cairo. He managed to get out, and he went on a Yugoslav ship, I think or a Greek ship, and got to Egypt. He had met some Angolans of the UPA who had been in Havana and they took care of him for a while until there was a split inside of the UPA, and the fellow who was there quit and went to Switzerland. He brought Moore out to Switzerland. Then Carlos wound up in Paris, where he still is, to best of my knowledge. He supposedly has written an article for Presence Africaine which is violently counter-revolutionary. He claims there is no revolution. His position, is relatively bizarre. It's not terribly justified. But what I think is, that here is a case of Black Nationalism in the States being transported to Cuba. What he claims is that the only Cuban revolution that remains to be made that would be valid would be a black revolution. and that really the population of Cuba is overwhelmingly black, or of African descent, and that this has been a plot that has gone on for generations even now with Fidel Castro, particularly Dorticos, he claims, the white leadership has been able to perpetuate itself regardless of the political thing. This is his theme. He is interesting but extremely wild and emotional. I think it's a case where the intoxication of Harlem never went off. Anyway he might be worth talking to.

The Congress for Cultural Freedom people were going to try to get in touch with him but they weren't any too convinced that his thesis was correct. I don't think so. He claims of course that I am completely blinded by my pro-Castro sympathies. He claimed that Williams was very unhappy for racial reasons in Cuba. I thought that Williams was simply unhappy. He couldn't speak Spanish. He was under pressure from the American Communists and Soveit Communists that didn't like him, the old Cuban Communists, which was one of the reasons for his wholehearted turn towards Peking. That was the only way out. And he wanted to come back to the States.

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The FBI was in no mood- we could probably have arranged something that is that he was a fugitive, if the Federal thing weren't going to be held against him, that Rockefeller wouldn't extradite him most likely to New York. There were talks on this. A lawyer by the name of Conrad Lynn had discussed this, a Negro lawyer who was connected with a party called the Freedom Now Party, another Black Nationalist group, but with basically a Trotskyite front. It was put up 99% by the SWP which was one of the reasons for its failure. This lawyer was well aware of Williams's desire to come back to the United States if he could stay out of the hands of a North Carolina lynch mob. The one talk I had with the FBI people convinced me that they were in no mood whatsoever, even though they realized what the situation was.

(Pan African Press - P.O. 8364 - Pinto, Private Box 8159, ...)

Pinto is a very curious fellow. Pinto is a man who is close to Kenyatta. In Kenya. who has or is involved with the Pan-African Press, who is not hooked up with Odinga, not openly in any case, but who is sort of playing all sides, looking for hand-outs. I understand that he received substantial sums from Russia, so that he has shown more Muscovite color than any other.

William J. Pomeroy, 48 Balcombe, Lond NW1, is the American who was captured with the Huks in the Philippines, you remember? He lives here in London, more or less retired from politics except that he writes. That's how he earns his living. But he depends more or less on the good graces of the British Labor Party the Left of that party and the British Communist Party to stay here. What he has to say about the failure of the guerrilla campaign in the Philippines and the present Leftward turn in the Philippines apparently--- There is an outfit called the Philippine Progressive Review which I think we (Revolution) gave publicity to- here it is- - the Progressive Review. It is connected with Pomeroy. They are about as Communist as they can get under the present law of the Philippines.They have hopes of what they call an Anti-Imperialist ground swell, in other words, an anti-American trend in the present government. They felt that the anti-Malaysia campaign might help, and the editor has been very much in contact with the Indonesians. He has been to Djakarta on several occasions recently. He is in contact with Pomeroy. Pomeroy's position is one inwhich he has to be very careful of what he says because the British Communists will dump him. His wife is Philippine.She can't get an American visa, so they have to live here. This makes him the captive of a certain part of the British Labor Left and the British CP. His book, The Forest, was published here and in the States by Communist publishing houses.It is an account of the guerrilla campaign in the Philippines, at least his personal account, but he pointed out to me, that it is also an account of its failures. He has tried to keep out of the Sino-Soviet thing but I have

a feeling that if the situation in the Philippines changed both he and his wife would like to go back there. This is what he may be going (working for) through his contacts with the Progressive Review. I don't know how far they have contacts with the people inside the Philippines government but they claim to have.))

Shashikant R. Patel — 8 Modhav Kunj, Dixit Rd, Bombay 57. was an Indian from Bombay who wrote several articles among other things. He is a business man and I imagine a rather successful business man. He is on the fringe of the Indian Communist Party and now involved with the pro-Chinese wing of the party.

~~Madagxkunai~~ Modhav Kunj? Dixit Rd Bombay 57

Strelkoff address — 151 Ave. Sufrin, Paris 15, Phone 54F 34 56

Miss C.J. SNETHLAGE ~~Nex-lage~~ from Amsterdam is the head of the Cuba group. the com Cuba committee in Holland, She is very prominent in this Pacifist Socialist Party. She ~~is very~~ has been to Cuba, ~~but~~ despite her advanced age she is seventy-some, and very active. She

Torild SKARD, c/o GOMNAES, C 14 Studentbyen, Oslo, Norway ~~Sklaar~~ is a student leader in Norway. I think she is now a member of Parliament. She did a lot of publicity for the magazine.

Dr. Leiva Samper- MOEC representative in Paris He is a doctor, a cardiologist and seems to be quit a distinguished one. He is a heart surgeon. (129 Rue de Tolbiac, Paris 13e Phone POR 47-39 (hospital)

Schwartzenberg is my lawyer in Paris. SINE — 35 Rue de Crichy - ph. TRI 73-32.

Manuela Sikes is a member of the Liberal Party (U.K.) She's a standing candidate for Ipswich, very pro-Cuban and pro-Algerian. She's got a lot of influence inside the party because of who she sleeps with. I don't know who it is, but I've heard an awful lot of stories.

Jose Venturelli, ~~Torrelli~~ Calle E, #158 1-B, Vedado Havana / Havana, is a Venezuelan artist and member of — — — supposedly very very interested in the magazine. He is a friend of ~~Maxxxx~~ Martha Dodd, you may find on the cards the magazin was going to him c/o Martha Dodd at the Havana Libre hotel.

Martha Dodd had no direct contact with the magazine. She ~~xxxx~~ reportedly had taken quite a pro-Chinese position but to be so hopelessly compromised with the Czechs and Russians that she can't say too much except en cachet, to everybody she meets, especially young people. Whether this is her real attitude or not, I don't know. She might also be doing this to gain the confidence of people. There is no question that Venturelli is her very close friend.

Costas Veropolous (?) is a student group leader from Greece, who edited a magazine in Greece called Africa Asia Latin America. It was a cut-down version of Revolution and represented for the Greek youth, the left wing of the ~~EC~~ EDA

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who were unsatisfied with the reformist tactics the Social democratic tactics of the EDA and EDAMx youth. He got in contact with the magazine he wanted material to reproduce in Greek. I suppose he did. I took one year of Greek and I know nothing of modern Greek, I could just about make out the title.

Pierre Valliers(?) is a Canadian Communist who was setting up a thing called Revolution Quebequoise. He was dissatisfied with Chartain. He had been xmxm close to Chartain and he was going to be holier than Chartain. He worked for La Presse, which was on strike

Sydney WANASINGHE was a Celonese Trotskyist in member of the xxxxx committee of the Lanka Sama Maja party before it split. the militant part of it split. He distributed I think 25 to 50 -- more likely 25 copies of Revolution, each issue. I understand that his group of the Trotskyists were more pro-Chinese than the pro-Chinese wing of the Celonese Communist party. He tried to get us to take their magazine in exchange.

That covers all of the real addresses that I have.

((At this point let's take stock of you. Is your kid back in school?))

Yes.

((You're not under pressure))

No. Thank the Lord, I've got that off the hook for a little while.

22 ((You have largely answered the question- What is the function of the Advisory Board of Revolution))

Nothing more unless it was to give prestigex to the enterprise. This is why it keeps growing larger and larger. First it started out as an editorial board, then he changed the title, to advisory board. then he calls it permanent collaborators. I don't know why. He claimed that under French law you had only exemption from seizure if you were really French - - now I do know what it was- - one issue of the magazine was seized in France. That was No. 7 which had Ho Chi Minh on the cover. It wasn't seized for Ho Chi Minh but because of an article on Reunion and the French West Indies. It was a platonic seizure, more in the way of a warning. The seizure order came down after the matazine had been distributed. There were virtually no copies picked up-. Undistributed and returned copies were seized but the money wasn't seized. That's about the nicest way you can seize a magazine. It was a warning. And he felt that an editorial board made xf up of foreigners didn't give him enough protection in France. That was the reason for changingx to permanent collaborators.

They certainly are quite active. For instance, the Colombian I mentioned- I still can't think of his name-- but his daughter was put in an Albanian school. Poor girl, about eleven years old, and she didn't know a word of Albanian and most of the Albanians didn't know Spanish. She has managed to suffer through a year of it. It is very interesting to talk to this little girl, now about 12, She was in Cuba, where you might think of the revolution as extremely informal lax in many ways easy-going. It's a libertarian type of revolution. Certainly it hasn't had the puritannical type of after-period that one finds in most revolutions, certainly ~~in and these the puritans~~ in China which proves a great obstacle for the Africans who go there. They are virtually unable to keep African students because of the fact that there is no sex. They used to let them go to HongKong and they would all come back with syphilis and gonorrhea to the great disgust of the Chinese. This girl, who seemed to ~~like~~ like Cuba, in Albania was shocked by the degree of formality of relationships and for instqance she said that at the beaches -- in Cuba all the beaches were open, anybody can go to the beach. In Albania they have, as I suppose you find in many Communist countries, high officials, middle officials, low officials and then just plain working people. (~~and~~ ~~[illegible]~~). This to her was (shocking). She wasn't aware of politics as such and that is what made talking to her so interesting.

((What do you think of Cuba nowadays?))

I know one thing, that the PSP has virtually been defeated in every way, the old Communists. I was very much involved, obviously, the Cubans who were my friends ~~were~~ are not Communists. I suppose that one of the things that made the Cuban revolution attractive was that it wasn't doctrinaire. For Americans, college students, the young people, after all of the years of disenchantment about revolution as such, the Cuban revolution looked like a romantic thing. It was extravagant. All these bearded fellows coming out of the mountains, and anyone who went to Cuba coulnd't help but feel the contagion.

((I think there was a sympathetic feeling within the States because it was not alien to our own revolutionary background, the idea of little men hiding behind trees shooting at the Redcoats.))

Right. Only they were shooting at Batista's troops who were armed by the United States. This is one of the things that many Americans are unable to realize, how deeply involved the US is with these military regimes. It has obviously been exploited from ~~their~~ an academic point of view, but from the popular imagination, we just don't think of it.

The Fidelista youth were not Marxist. They are more so today than they were before, but they have had this experience of dealing with the United States - - I have had a lot of argujments with them about it. - - - - - For instance when they came to the United States ini- - 28 March of 59, you remember, Felipe Pasos (?) came, Fidel went to Washington and he went to New York and it was extraordinarily badly handled. Christian Herter wouldn't see him at the State Department. He insisted on taking a hotel suite, rather than do that. Certainly it wasn't an official visit but a lot of people have gone to Washington xxx. . . Then it was a question of whether the Cubans wanted money or not. The Cubans claimed, . . . that they asked for $3,000,000 on short term credit, just a stop-gap and that this was turned down cold. until they had made some guarantees about American property. From that point on I think that their attitude towards the United States was one of expecting, looking for the worst. They were able to work out a few arrangements with xxfex American companies concerning take-overs. EAch time, they were vetoed by the State Department or someone else, who said don't go into this, because we want to have a solid front, no one should make an agreement with them otherwise.

It was provocation and counterprovocation. They would do something then there would be American xxxixx reaction, then a Cuban counterreaction until it was real escalation, diplomatically, to the point at which it fell completely into the hands of the Russians. That could have been short-circuited and prevented. They really are not happy where they are now. They want some independence, ~~of even~~ vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Ideologically they are not very happy with the Russians. They have managed though to maintain incredible independence, not signing the nuclear test ban agreement, they have never made any anti-Chinese statements at all, though Fidel came very close-- he did in one of the statments where Kruschev mentioned peaceful coexistence, and said that there had never been disagreement with the Russians over the missiles .xxxxxxxx In actual fact they were boiling. They were furious about the missile business. This left a bad taste in their mouths. The Escalante business, you know the ~~president~~ first attempt of the old X PSP ~~was going~~ to to take over and create a faction which would displace the romantic revolutionaries, if you will. It failed but that didn't mean that Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and more capable technocrats inside the party didn't continue. They failed. Now Carlos Rafael who had the highest place of the old Communists is out as you know. And almost all of them went out at this point.

I am always struck by - Grippa said, for instance, of Guillermo Cabrera Infante, the Cuban Cultural Attache in Brussels, whom I know very well, that: "he's an anti-Communist". Which is true. He is a nationalist. That's all. And that's the one thing that keeps him there. But he and many of the people like Carlos Franqui and around Carlos Franqui and Haidee Santamaria. her husband, who is the Minister of Education, they are liberal, in their views about the arts, they are non-dogmatic, non-doctrinaire, Leftist if you will, but Leftist by situation and circumstance. They represent, if there is anyone in Washington who still has a sober mind about Cuba and who is not completely filled with venom - and frustration- about Cuba, they would, I think, represent the real hope of reaching a modus vivendi in the future. They are the real heirs, I think, the people who will take over. I do not think the PSP can do it. They have the mass support in the country behind them. It is always said, that if anything ever happens to Fidel and there is the slightest suspicion that it was done by a Communist, there wouldn't be a Communist left alive in the Island in about five hours. These were many people who felt that the Communists would have liked to do this. At one time it became almost a hysterical rumor spread around that the Communists wanted to kill Fidel.

The bitterness that I found against the old Communists was because they were compromised with Batista. Even now, this explains their pro-Chinese stand. But that can't go very far, either. Because they are not doctrinaire. The Chinese have been extremely flexible in dealing with Cuba - they can't offer them very much - and they can't push them, so they have been easy-going. - - - The handling of the October crisis between the Russians and the United States when they got together over the heads of the Cubans, was an insult. Being a small country and semi-colonial, it was a colony, it has an exaggerated sense of its national rights. This was, in terms of Cuba, not the world situation in general, perhaps it was the only way to solve the October question, it seemed to be the only way, but in the terms of Cuba that was one of the grave mistakes of the Russians. The way the handled it. They didn't seem to soften the blow for the Cubans.

((They're very sensistive people.))

Right. And they've never forgotten it. They have nourished lots of hopes about DeGaulle and the possibility of trade with France. Trade is increasing, they've tried desperately to get DEGaulle to visit Cuba which he wouldn't do. He would do lots of things against Washington, but there are certain limits (laughing), and that's one of them.

I know that's one of the things in back of their minds, in Paris. Every French delegation to Havana, even one just recently, I heard about, Fidel went around sayings- why doesn't De Gaulle come and visit us.

There is a Gaullist group, France -Cuba (?)   , not the Communist, but there is a Communist organization, There is also one inside of the government party concerned with Cuba and they have made recommendations for increasing trade. One of the things also encouraged is the increase of Spanish trade. Ironically one of the heroes of Cuba is Franco, because he continued trade and they say "You know, when we go to Madrid, there is never any trouble from the counter-revolutionaries. They behave themselves." I have a feeling that the Spanish attitude has some influence on the French. I would imagine that they hope that eventually this will be communicated to the West Germans.

Cuba certainly, I feel, if they did have diversification of trade and an opening horizon -- because so many problems with the United States become emotional problems that no matter what the head of the government or State wants to do, you've got the problem of how to put it before the Congress and public opinnon, which has been so sensitized to it that this is the problem of American statesmanship that you don't have in any other places. De Gaulle for example, say "the people? [illegible]" but even he wouldn't go beyond a certain point.

~~Another thing~~, Algeria. Probably only DeGaulle cold have reached a settlement.

((In two minutes, that's your prognosis for future US-Cuban relations.))

It depends very much on the United States. I think, I know, there are elements in Cuba who are more than willing. But they don't want to be pushed. The trouble is that when a Cuban talks to America, the next question is "when are you going to get rid of the Red regime," or something like that. That is the end of the dialogue. I would imagine that it would have to be through talks. I understand - this is one thing that this Carlos Moore, the Afro-Cuban boy who is extremely anti-revolutionary- he says he wants a real revolution. He worked in the Foreign Ministry at one time. What he used to claim was that Dorticos and people around Dorticos are very very anxious for a rapprochement with the United States. That they would love to have contact. I certainly know that Dr. Roa, Foreign Minister, wanted somehow to have contacts, more direct contacts. He had a problem too, that in public he couldn't say anything, and whenever he was in New York he was boxed in.

((I don't want to start a debate but you say that the -- when are you going to get rid of the Red regime-- this is a reflection of the

Similarly, isn't
sensitivity that you spoke about.)) the Cuban population sensitized in such fashion as to come up with a comparably provocative and dialogue-ending remark.))

It seems a little bit less. One of the problems is that of the Cuban immigration. There isn't in Cuba, to the best of my knowledge, a broad anti-Americanism. Always even in Fidel's speeches, he makes a distinction between the American government and the American people. There is a very open ambivalence about the Cuban counter-revolutionaries. They may be counter-revolutionaries but they also happen to be uncles, cousins, nephews, and almost everybody has some one among them, from Fidel on down.

((The exiles in Miami and elsewhere))

That's right. They are relatives. Just as the treatment for instance of the people at the Bay of Pigs- which was extraordinary. In many countries they would have been -- in a Latin country, they would have taken them all out and shot them. There they weren't allowed to beat them; they said they "had been misled" and so forth. This wasn't merely for propaganda, this was a feeling. I have seen it happen over and over again They might shoot someone. They did, they shot three people, a Batista sergeant and some others. It was an incredible gaffe to include among these people an old Batista torturer. He was shot and no one much protested. I have been told by people who have been there recently that you have only to say that you are an American to get a sympathetic audience around you immediately. People want to discuss with you, why did they do this, that. You see they can hear Miami. They listen -to the American radio all the time, and they listen to Radio SWAN. I heard Radio SWAN in Cuba. Radio SWAN was a CIA radio operated off of Swan Island off of Nicaragua. [actually off of Honduras] an island which is claimed by Nicaragua [Hondurans] but in actual fact is possessed by the United States (laughing). The Nicaraguans have never been able to persuade us to leave. We just have some sailors on it. They built this enormous radio which broadcast to Cuba. It wasn't an official radio. It was called Radio SWAN. It was a CIA operation. It was so crude, it was really pathetic, the type of thing-- people are starving, that type of thing. Now this was directed at Cuba and when you have propaganda like that - it is very little that can be confirmed. You say people are starving, and they are able to go out and buy something. There was a lot of racist material in there about Congolese troops stationed in Central Cuba. There were no Congolese troops. This short of attitude came out later. During the time of the Bay of Pigs operation they

the press releases were incredible. This isn't ...

going to be Machiavellian, my God you don't do it like that, you know. The best propaganda is the one that comes closest to the truth, that just slightly goes off, you don't have to push the point.

In any case, I do feel that there are an enormous number of people in Cuba and inside of the government, particularly among the old 26th of July people, who would be - - they don't want to make a capitulation to the United States. They want an independent government. They would like trade . They would like to get out of the dependence on the Soviet Union such as it is. They have managed to keep from being swallowed up by the Russians just by enormous effort on their part.

((Do you think that both sides have committed themselves so far that it is impossible to have any kind of rapprochement or normalization of relations without a feeling that one side or the other or both, had been forced to capitulate?))

I think at one point this was true, but I don't think it's true any more. To a certain extent in recent months there has been a sort of cooling down in Cuban-American relations, though there have been continued charges about Venezuela, and it is certainly true that the Cubans were encouraging the Venezuelan FALN. They certainly gave financial support not so much in the way of arms, I think, but money , and in a guerrilla campaign you get your arms anyway from the police and the army, from the army that's around you. That's the easiest way.

I have the feeling, nevertheless, that the Cubans are somewhat disappointed, disillusioned, about their ability to agitate these revolutionary groups elsewhere in Latin America, their ability to carry out any effective revolution, just as the Alliance for Progress has proved to be a great disappointment to many people in Washington so has the Cuban open solidarity with other, almost any, revolutionary movement in Latin America, proved a disappointment.

On the other hand, the Cubans are not going to issue a statement saying that we will not export revolution. Certainly in the first years of the (Cuban) revolution, they did some extremely insane things, with expedition to Haiti, expedition to Santo Domingo, expedition to Panama, remember, and they had to send people in to Panama to get them to surrender. It was totally ineffective. The people in Santo Domingo were just slaughtered. In Haiti they were slaugtered also.

14-00000

((Probably got them by Black magic in Haiti))

A messy situation. On the other hand, every once in a while Duvalier makes overtures. He's not beyond anything.

Well, if you want to get in touch with me again, you have only to give me a call. I don't imagine that anything much will happen. If I'm not there just say that Earl called, or something like that. But do avoid giving this address or telephone number. I imagine with my wife working now for the ~~Indonesians~~ Tunisians

((It would be someone else answering))

It would be ~~thexmxidx~~ me. I dont think I'm quite going to set up shop down ~~at~~ with Leo Labedz ~~right away~~ & Company.

((Again, I do appreciate your cooperation))

No. Thank you.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM 32

ORIG: A. GOODRICH
UNIT: CI/IC/G
EXT: R-1176
DATE: 8 MARCH 1965

INDEX / NO INDEX / FILE IN CS FILE NO. Gibson's 201

SECRET

ROUTING: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

TO: LONDON
FROM: DIRECTOR

DESTROY / RETURN TO BRANCH / FILE RID

CONF: CI/IC 2 INFO: WE 6, ADDP, FE 6, CA 2, CA/O 4, AF 4, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, VR, FILE

8 Mar 65 21 07z

TO LOND INFO PARI PALP CITE DIR SIG CEN

KUDESK LCHARVEST QKOPERA

REFS: A. LOND 6396 *

B. OELA 42604

C. LOND 6360 *

90655

1. APPRECIATE ADDRESS LIST RECEIVED HQS 4 MARCH.

2. DO NOT WISH YOU ACKNOWLEDGE HAVING IT TO SMOOTHERS FOR TIME BEING.

3. REF C PARA 1: APPROVE YOUR PASSAGE SUMMARY OF TRANSCRIPT YOUR DEBRIEFING OF GIBSON INCLUDING DETAILS ON REVOLUTION ORGANIZATION AND HOW IT WORKS. HOWEVER, DO NOT PASS INTELLIGENCE OF POTENTIAL OPERATIONAL VALUE.

END OF MESSAGE

* 16552
* 14617

AF 1/A — ABSTRACT / INDEX

201-306052

CO/OPS ✓
AF/CI ✓
CA/3 W. Raymond (by phone)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

John G. Roberts
C/WE(BC)
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

WE/BC/II
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

INDEX [ ] YES [X] NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-306052
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID [X] RET. TO BRANCH [X]
DESTROY [ ] SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 34

SECRET

RI [X] COPY [ ] DUMMY
REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM: LONDON

ACTION: FE 8

ADVANCE COPY [ ] ISSUED [ ] SLOTTED [ ] TUBED

INFO: VR. FILE WE 6 ADDP CI CI/OPS CI/IC 2 FI FI/INT 2 AF 4 CA 2 CA/O 4

SECRET 031139Z

DIR INFO PARI PALP CITE LOND 6363

KUDESK LCHARVEST

REF DIR 85977*

AN FI
ABSTRACT INDEX

3 MAR 65 IN 14617

1. GIBSON DEBRIEFING COMPLETED 23 FEB. STA DOING ROUGH TRANSCRIPT TAPES AND PREPARING OPS DISPATCH, TO BE POUCHED NEXT FEW DAYS.

2. WHILE REF QUESTIONS NOT PUT TO G, HE DID MAKE COMMENTS ON SMITH AND GRAHAM, WHICH IN TRANSCRIPT. NO MENTION OF SHLEIFER. QUESTIONS CAN BE INCLUDED IN SUBSEQUENT MEET WITH GIBSON, HOWEVER. ASSUME ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS WILL DERIVE FROM MATERIAL NOW IN HAND.

SECRET

CFN *QUESTIONS FOR DEBRIEFING

201-306052

3 MAR '65

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, WE

INFO: Chief of Station, LCPIPIT; Chief, KUWOLF; Chief, KUDESK; Chief, FE

FROM: Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT: LCHARVEST/KUDESK/MHSPAWN Revolution Mailing List

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Transmitted herewith is one copy of the cards that constitute the mailing list for Revolution. These were borrowed from Richard GIBSON and copied in the station. GIBSON's wife, who compiled the cards and was responsible for distribution of Revolution (and to whom, therefore, they more properly belong) is not aware that GIBSON has "loaned" the cards out. They were returned to GIBSON's flat the same day he brought them in for copying.

2. We have not made any attempt to count them. There are several thousand. A few comments will be in order about some of the marks and notations that appear on the cards.

3. One general category is "Promotional". The first bunch of sheets - about twenty, it appears - are in this category. They are marked "Promotional" or "PR". These were sent out gratis either to induce publicity, or to encourage new subscribers, or to make friends happy. (Presumably, Robert WILLIAMS and several others are in this category).

4. Thereafter, the cards run in categories of one sort or another, with given countries generally lumped together. Those where the address was obviously stapled onto a card are some of those that were taken from Frene GINWALA's Spearhead mailing list. Some are marked "ex-Spearhead"; which means that the name came from the Spearhead list, and the person subsequently subscribed on his own, after a little promotional treatment.

5. The coded symbols, unfortunately, GIBSON could not explain, since this was his wife's territory, rather than his own. The first set of letters obviously refers to the country (e.g.,UK/). Other numbers and letters are not clear. The name that appears apart from the name of the subscriber usually indicates who arranged the subscription (this may be an agent, or something like a gift subscription). For instance, S. V. LEE is Sheldon LEE, who handles

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

ABSTRACT
AF 1
RGS COPY

/att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 25 Feb. 65

DATE DISPATCHED: 2 MAR

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OELA-42,604

201-306052

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

some subscriptions. Expiration dates are obvious. "Private" merely means that someone ordered a subscription directly, himself, rather than through an agency.

6. Any further questions relating to the list can be included in any subsequent contacts with GIBSON, if they merit inclusion, and if it seems likely that he will know the answers.

7. We note that the list's accuracy cannot be guaranteed, especially after the time when the GIBSON's parted ways with Jacques VERGES.

8. At some time, the SMOOTHERs may ask us for this list. We would appreciate being advised as to whether Headquarters would like us to acknowledge having it.

George E. KATZENBACH

Attachment:
Herewith

Distribution:
3-Chief, WE w/att h/w
2-COS, LCPIPIT w/o att
2-Chief, KUWOLF w/o att
2-Chief, KUDESK w/o att
2-Chief, FE w/o att

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM 31

ORIG: A. Goodrich
UNIT: CI/ICG
EXT: 5928
DATE: 18 Feb 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201 - 306052

SECRET

ROUTING 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

☐ DESTROY
☐ RETURN TO BRANCH
☐ FILE RID

TO: LONDON

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: CI/IC 2 INFO WE 6, FE 6, FI, ADDP, DDP, WH/SA 8, FI/INT 2, CI, CI/OPS, SR, FILE

TO LOND INFO: CITE DIR 86097

KUDESK LCHARVEST

RE: A. LOND 6129 (IN 81502)*

B. OELW - 21869

1. IN ADDITION QUESTION THIRTY-SIX REF B, WE PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN DESCRIPTION GIBSON'S CURRENT CUBAN CONTACTS AS BASIS FOR FOLLOW UP REQUIREMENTS. SPECIFICALLY HAS G BEEN IN TOUCH RECENTLY WITH ANY CUBAN OFFICIALS WHO SUPPLIED INFO ON CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION, STRUGGLE BETWEEN CASTRO AND OLD COMMUNISTS, STABILITY OF CUBAN REGIME, OR CUBAN SOVIET RELATIONS?

2. BELIEVE PROBING INTO HISTORY G RELATIONS WITH CUBA AND FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE SHOULD BE AVOIDED AT OUTSET SINCE THIS APPEARS TO BE AREA WHERE HE MOST SENSITIVE ABOUT GIVING POTENTIALLY SELF INCRIMINATING INFO AND FURTHERMORE OF MARGINAL VALUE.

END OF MESSAGE.

201-306052

*Lond query re rqmts on Gibson's Cuban contacts if any.

WH/SA/EOB
WH/SA/CI

John Caswell
DCWE(BC)
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WE/BC/U
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

1176

INDEX: [ ] YES [X] NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-306052
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID [X] RET. TO BRANCH [ ]
DESTROY [ ] SIG

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 9

SECRET

18 FEB 1965

RI [✓] COPY [ ] DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM: LONDON

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION: WE 4

ADVANCE COPY [ ] ISSUED [ ] SLOTTED [ ] TUBED

TIME | BY

INFO: VR, FILE, FE 6, FI, ADDP, DDP, WH/SA 8, FI/INT 2

SECRET 161247Z

16 FEB 65 IN 81502

DIR CITE LOND 6129

KUDESK LCHARVEST

REF DIR 84695

OELW 21369

NOTE NO RQMTS ON GIBSON'S CUBAN CONTACTS INCLUDED REFS. IS THIS OVERSIGHT, OR IS THERE REASON FOR NOT FOLLOWING THIS LINE? PLS ADVISE, INCLUDING RQMTS IF ANY.

SECRET

AN SR
ABSTRACT
AF 1/A

201-306052

SECRET

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

RI COPY

(laughing) That's right. I think that going into that would take a long time and I'm not that--it's also very hard to say, and contacts with the Chinese, you look, we need a car for political work. Chinese turn up a car take car. If the US embassy turned up a car, they would say take a car from the US Embassy. It doesn't make them any more American agents. It makes them Chinese agents. It's just a matter of who can produce. Africa is full of poor people. Just as the Negro community in the United States is full of poor people. Poor people don't have any sense of loyalty in the ordinary sense of the word. They have a sense of loyalty to their poverty, and colonial experience also mixed in nation-hood. The national sense is extremely weak. They see things in terms of Western former colonial, that's all.

(Holden Roberto is down here. You talked about him. I know about him)

You ought to know him better than I do. (laughing) I met him only once and that was in New York. I had a long discussion with him about 1 to 3 in the morning, and he was terribly afraid that somebody would think he was a Communist. I tried to assure him I didn't think he was a Communist no matter what (laughing).

(Did he have anything to do with the magazine)

None, because while Verges was there in Algiers, and up until Viriato da Cruz changed his position, the magazine was following the MPLA and only changed about when Viriato changed from the MPLA to the UPA.

Holden went to China and I suppose he gave the Chinese some guarantees but I don't know.

(Mario d'Andrade)

He is the active Secretary - I don't know his official title- of the MPLA and represents another tendency different from Dr. Neto is the President. He had contacts with Revolution and with Viriato da Cruz. He sought to get Viriato to come back to the MPLA. He is a poet also. They are all poets. They are all former students in Portugal. The last time he came through Paris. After Viriato published his article in Revolution, he asked for the right of reply which was granted by Verges but he never wrote the article. He could be said to be much more pro-Soviet than pro- (Chinese) if anything. I think that Neto

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, London
Attention: KATZENBACH

INFO: Chief of Station, Paris
Chief, LCPIPIT

FROM: Chief, WE

SUBJECT: DEBRIEFING OF RICHARD T. GIBSON

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

RE: OELA - 42,410, 26 January 1965

1. On 11 February KUBARK Staff Agent Errol S. KULPA, who had contact with GIBSON in 1363-64, listened to reference tape and made the following comments, which may be helpful to Katzenbach. KULPA felt that the GIBSON that he was hearing on the tape had indeed changed rather radically since the last time KULPA had any contact with him or the Revolution. KULPA remembers GIBSON as anti-white and probably (because of this racial orientation) anti-U.S. KULPA is therefore quite suspicious of GIBSON's motivations and advises that extreme precaution be taken in the handling of GIBSON.

2. KULPA's view of Gibson's motivations:

KULPA has strenuous doubts as to any idealogical motivation on the part of GIBSON. He recognizes the obvious monetary motivation and feels that this probably plays a large part in the man's being willing to talk to ODYOKE. Another very possible motivation is GIBSON's disaffection with VERGES. Parenthetically, KULPA added that in Algiers and probably in Paris, GIBSON was really nothing more than a name that VERGES wanted on the masthead. GIBSON's primary duties as "editor" were probably in the area of translation. In light of this KULPA feels that perhaps some legitimate information of value can be obtained in the area of the Revolution. Again, parenthetically, it might be noted that KULPA felt that GIBSON was not as "idealistic" as his wife. Where GIBSON might adhere to the aspects of Marxism-Leninism that called for revolutionary change (probably because of his dissatisfaction with a world in which the black man had to endure a certain amount of discrimination), he is not a strict doctrinaire in any of his beliefs. On the other hand, KULPA pointed out that GIBSON's wife (who by the way is a Central European by birth--not British) is idealistic in the sense that she feels her brand of leftism must be internally and idealogically consistent. (This is why she objected to GIBSON's writing for Encounter and why she probably would get upset if she knew exactly what type of game her husband was currently playing with ODYOKE.)

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE...

CROSS REFERENCE TO: CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OELW - 21903

DATE: 12 February 1965 — 15 FEB 1965

CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201 - 306052 (201-306052)

ROUTING: INGRI (201-306052)
1 - AF/1
1 - CI/ICG
1 - CA/3
1 - CO/IO
1 - WE/BC/Chrono

DESTROY

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	TYPIST	EXT.
CI/ICG A. GOODRICH	dab	5928

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AF/1	12 Feb 65	C. Baker (in draft)
CA/3	12 Feb 65	W. Raymond (by phone)
CO/IO	12 Feb 65	R. Brown (by phone)
WE/BC/U		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DCWE(BC)	12 Feb.	John F. Caswell

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OELW - 21903

3. We are currently having reference tape transcribed and will forward the transcription to the field as soon as it is completed.

JOSEPH S. TIFFANY

STEWART F. ROLNICK

2 - London
1 - Paris
1 - LCPIPIT

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM 33

ORIG: A. Goodrich
UNIT: CI/ICG
EXT: 5928
DATE: 12 Feb 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201 - 306052

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

TO: LONDON   INFO: PARIS, LCPIPIT

☐ DESTROY
☐ RETURN TO BRANCH
☐ FILE RID

12 FEB 65 Z 1

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: CI/IC 2   INFO ADDP, WE 6, CA 2, CA/O 4, FE 6, FI, FI/INT 4, WH 7, VR, FILE

TO LOND   INFO PARI, PALP   CITE DIR

84695

LCHARVEST/KUDESK/QKOPERA

RE: A. OELW 21369

B. OELA 42410

15 FEB AM

FOLLOWING SUPPLEMENTARY REQUIREMENTS MAINLY DERIVED FROM REF B TAPE, FOR USE KATZENBACH DEBRIEFING GIBSON (G):

1. G SPEAKS ABOUT VERGES CONTACTS WITH FLN FEDERATION OF FRANCE AND FACT THAT $75,000 WAS FUNDED TO HIM THROUGH THE FEDERATION FOR REVOLUTION. WOULD BE INTERESTED IN G'S DETAILED COMMENTS ON THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION OF ALGERIANS IN FRANCE: LEADERSHIP, TIES WITH BEN BELLA, TIES WITH ERSTWHILE ALGERIAN OPPOSITION, TIES TO VERGES, SOURCE OF FUNDS, HOW MUCH SENT TO ALGERIA IN FORM OF REMITTANCES.

2. ENCOURAGE G TO TELL MORE ABOUT HIS WIFE, HIS WIFE'S CONNECTIONS WITH RABAH BITAT AND LATTER'S WIFE, HER POLITICAL IDEAS AND ANTECEDENTS.

3. "VERGES HAS DEBTS AMOUNTING TO MORE THAN $30,000". CAN G GIVE US A BREAKDOWN, ESTIMATE?

201-306052

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE...

AF 2/A

RELEASING OFFICER   COORDINATING OFFICERS   AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 1-64 1389a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

Copy No.

RECEIVED R.I./HIS

MESSAGE FORM

ORIG: A. Goodrich
UNIT: CI/ICG
EXT: 5928
DATE: 12 Feb 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201 - 306052

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

TO: LONDON INFO: PARIS, LCPIPIT

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO

- PAGE TWO -

TO LOND INFO PARI, PALP CITE DIR 84695

4. WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE G TALK ABOUT HIS CONTACTS WITH ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR CHANDERLI IN GREATER DETAIL. WHAT FAVORS DID HE DO FOR CHANDERLI AND VICE-VERSA.

5. ANY INFORMATION ON ORGANIZATION, PERSONALITIES AND ACTIVITIES OF LATIN AMERICAN BUREAU BRUSSELS. ANY INDICATION THIS BUREAU INVOLVED IN TRAINING OF LATIN AMERICANS IN ALGERIA?

6. INFORMATION ON RELATIONS OF VERGES WIFE WITH ALGERIANS BITAT AND KHIDER.

7. INFORMATION ON REVOLUTION BUREAUS ABROAD. HOW WERE STAFFS CHOSEN? WHAT ARE THEIR FUNCTIONS, OVERT AND COVERT?

END OF MESSAGE.

CA/B3 - W. Raymond (by phone)
CO/IO - R. Brown (by phone)
AF/1 - C. Baker (in draft)

John Caswell
DC/WE(BC)

C/WE/BC/I

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

3
TOTAL COPIES

RI COPY

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FROM: LONDON
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION: WE 8
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO: VR, FILE, FE/, CA2, CA/4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/A, FI, FI/SPG, FI/INT2

SECRET 04/1802Z

4 FEB 65 IN 73844

DIR INFO PALP PARI CITE LOND 5957

KUDESK LCHARVEST QKOPERA

REF LOND 5867 (IN 71348) *

1. JAGUAR STATE (SHAME-FACEDLY) THEY NOW LEARN GIBSON DEPARTED LOND 25 JAN FOR ZURICH.

2. OBVIATES NEED FOR IMMEDIATE PASSAGE FUNDS PER REF, BUT WOULD STILL LIKE KNOW STATUS FAIRMAN/GIBSON RELATIONSHIP PRIOR 15 FEB.

SECRET

CFN

* CLARIFICATION INSRUCTIONS GIVEN FAIRMAN

201-306052?

Richard Gibson's 201-
Thomas

201-306052
4 Feb 65

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

RI COPY

RI COPY

14-00000

DISPATCH

S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, London

INFO.

FROM: Chief, WE

SUBJECT: KUDESK/LCHARVEST
Debriefing of Richard T. GIBSON - Transmittal of Requirements

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: OELA - 42,410, 26 January 1965

1. Forwarded as enclosure are requirements for the debriefing of Subject. Together with the requirements is a KUDESK narrative on VERGES-ANDERSSON-Revolution complex for the background information of Katzenbach. Further background on Revolution can be found, if you have not already done so, in the following dispatches:

OELA - 39,346, 26 Sept '63
OELW - 20,852, 16 Dec '63
OELA - 40,208, 24 Feb '64
OELA - 40,542, 15 Apr '64
OELA - 41,545, 10 Sept '64
OEL - 30,251, 24 Sept '64

2. We have not yet had time to review the tape of your first session with Subject forwarded with Reference, nor do we expect to get a transcription completed in time to reach you by 15 February. The list of names attached to Reference indicate considerable knowledgeability on the part of Subject as well a tendency to pour out his knowledge in a sort of stream of consciousness style. We fear that, if given the opportunity, Subject will take the bit in his teeth and as much money as he can in his hot little hands and be off and running. To prevent this we would like to suggest that the debriefing be set up on a tightly organized, businesslike basis. It would probably be advisable to write up the terms in a Letter of Agreement contract for Subject's signature before getting started, making sure to include a paragraph in which ODYOKE's obligations and promises are limited to the terms specifically enumerated in the document. We think that any meaningful debriefing will take 3 - 5 days, and there is good reason to believe that Subject will have information of sufficient interest to justify this expenditure of Case Officer time. We do not foresee any long range operational relationship with Subject. While we look at the debriefing as basically a one-shot proposition there will probably be follow-up questions and, perhaps, specific action requests, requiring a later contact. Therefore, the communication channel to Subject should be left open on a "don't call us, we'll call you" basis.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE...

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
1 Att — CS COPY	OELW - 21869	3 February 1965 (3 FEB 1965; 201-306052)
	CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201 - 306,052

Distribution:
1 - RI (201-306052)
1 - CI/ICG w/encl
1 - C/CO/IO w/encl
1 - CA/3 w/encl
1 - WE/BC

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
C/WE/BC/U	John G. Roberts	dab	7220

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/ICG	3 Feb 65	Mr. Goodrich Coord in draft
C/CO/IO	2/3/65	Mr. [signature]
C/CA/3	2/4/65	[signature]
C/CA/3	2/4/65	[signature]

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DCWE(BC)	5 Feb 65	John F. Caswell

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40) DISPATCH

3. In line with the need to put the debriefing on a businesslike (rather than a "flexible") basis, it might be a good idea to start by getting Subject to supply a personal history statement from the time of his first entry into leftist political movements to the present day. (This can be presented to Subject as a basis for us to formulate meaningful questions, not as any sort of personal "confession" on his part.) In addition to providing us with a check on his veracity, this will set the stage for a debriefing conducted on KUBARK's terms, not Subject's. It is important that it be made clear to Subject at the outset that we want facts, not speculation, commentary and analysis.

4. Please charge payments to Subject for the debriefing to Acct. Nr. 5137 - 1468 (Hqs. LCHARVEST OOA). Three hundred dollars for the initial 2½ hours talk with Subject is on the steep side. We are thinking in terms of $700 for five days debriefing with a bonus for a copy of the Revolution mailing list.

JST
JOSEPH S. TIFFANY

for James K. Griffith
STEWART F. ROLNICK

2 - Lond w/2cc encl.

Narrative

Nils ANDERSSON, Swedish-born resident of Switzerland, heads a printing and publishing establishment ("Editions la Cite") in Lausanne, said to have been set up in 1957 for the printing and distributing of Chinese literature. (This ties in with other information that the firm was established in Switzerland during the Algerian war in order to publish printed matter banned in France.) Since 1963 the firm had been responsible for the English-language edition of Revolution, but in 1964 the printing of the English-language edition was transferred to Paris where Revolution's main office is located. Swiss authorities had ordered ANDERSSON to cease publication of Revolution.

Revolution has had a complicated history. It is descended from African Revolution which first appeared in early 1963 in Algeria. Its editor, Jacques VERGES, is a former member of the French CP who broke with that party over the Algerian question. After VERGES, who briefly headed African Revolution, had a falling out with Algerian officials later in 1963 and left that country, he began a new publication in Switzerland using the facilities of the already established ANDERSSON firm. His new publication was called Revolution, sometimes known as Revolution — Asia, Latin America, Africa. (The Algerians continue to publish African Revolution, which has no known connection with Revolution.) Initially both the English and French editions of Revolution were handled by ANDERSSON's firm, but the publishing operations of the French edition were very soon moved to Paris. Later the printing, too, of the French edition was moved to Paris and only the English edition continued to be printed in Switzerland. VERGES and the main offices were located in Paris.*

Currently ANDERSSON is reported to publish Octobre, which is described as the organ of an organization in Switzerland called the "Centre Lenine." Both Octobre and the Centre Lenine are said to be controlled by ANDERSSON, but very little information is available about either. The Centre has been described as a propaganda arm of the Chinese Communists. There is some indication that they also have some connection with pro-Chinese dissident elements of the Spanish CP.

ANDERSSON's firm has also printed Mundo Obrero Revolucionario (MOR),

* Although the English edition was printed in Switzerland, its editorial office was also in Paris, headed by Richard GIBSON, American negro. In late May and early June 1964 — when it was already apparent that Swiss authorities were going to close down the printing of Revolution in that country — GIBSON and Alexandre STRELKOFF went to The Netherlands seeking a firm there to print and distribute the English-language edition. It is not known why this effort was made instead of transferring the printing directly to Paris as was ultimately done.

ATT #1 to CELW 21869

201-306052

the clandestine publication of a major pro-Chinese Spanish Communist group called the Partido Comunista Revolucionario. In view of recent reports that the MCR group may merge with one or more of the other dissident Spanish Communist groups and that a joint organ will be published, MCR may soon cease (or may already have ceased) publication. What role ANDERSSON may play in new publication efforts of the pro-Chinese Spanish dissidents is not known.

The clandestine leadership of the Partido Comunista Revolucionario has been located in Lausanne, Switzerland, with some representation also in Paris, but this group has apparently been receiving Chinese financial assistance through the GRIPPA party in Belgium. Another pro-Chinese Spanish group in Switzerland, the Oposicion Revolucionario Comunista located in Geneva, has been publishing La Chispa. The Chispa group has reportedly been receiving funds from the Chinese Embassy in Bern. Still another pro-Chinese Spanish group, the Agrupacion Comunista Proletario, has been publishing Proletario, apparently from Paris but with some representation also reported in Belgium. While the group has apparently had some contact with GRIPPA in Belgium, the Paris-based group at one time at least appeared to be sponsored or aided by VERGES. (GRIPPA has played an active role in trying to bring the different Spanish dissident groups to a merger.)

The relationship between GRIPPA and ANDERSSON, GRIPPA and VERGES, and VERGES and ANDERSSON is anything but clear. Some part of the confusion may result from GRIPPA's driving efforts to function as the director of Chinese political operations in Europe, and to try to bring the activities of others under his control.

a. GRIPPA was once reported to have said he had "lost confidence" in Revolution. Among his reported reasons was a belief that VERGES wanted to be designated absolute leader in Europe for the "revolutionary movement." Somewhat later GRIPPA was reported as saying that the Chinese were no longer subsidizing Revolution and that it was now being backed by Paris editor Francois MASPERO.

b. GRIPPA or his aides also appear to have been responsible for stories circulating among some pro-Chinese European dissidents that ANDERSSON had been written off by the Chinese as a "Trotskyite." GRIPPA has also been quoted as saying that the printing of MCR would be transferred from Lausanne to Belgium and to GRIPPA's own publishing facility. (This is not known to have taken place.)

c. There have been reports, unexplained, that there is bad blood between VERGES and ANDERSSON.

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REQUIREMENTS

ANDERSSON

1. Life story, with particular coverage of the founding of his firm "Editions la Cite" in Switzerland. Dates, contacts, financing. Biographic data also on his wife.

2. Details on "Centre Lenine" and its publication Octobre. Why founded, by whom, how financed, present activities?

3. Details of relationship between ANDERSSON and the MOR group of dissident Spanish Communists. How were they put in contact with each other, how is MOR printing financed? Does ANDERSSON play any role vis-a-vis other Spanish dissident groups?

4. Methods and channels by which he has contact with the Chinese Communists?

5. Full details on the relationship between ANDERSSON and VERGES, past and present?

Revolution

6. How is "Revolution" financed? We should like to have the whole funding situation described: amount of support, from what sources, method of transmittals, payment of editorial and publication costs.

7. Life story of VERGES, with particular coverage of period 1962 to present. Who invited him to Algeria in 1963, why did he quarrel with the Algerians? Who directed him to ANDERSSON in Switzerland, why did Revolution's main office move to Paris? Did VERGES live in Switzerland in 1963. Where and for how long?

8. Why was the English-language edition continued with ANDERSSON's firm?

9. Biographic data on members of editorial staff.
   a. What is the magazine's policy toward the use of stringer correspondents?

10. Relationship of VERGES to pro-Chinese dissident Spanish factions, in particular the group publishing Proletario.

11. Any info on the mechanics of international distribution of Revolution. How are mailing lists compiled? Use of foreign distributors? (NOTE: We are keenly interested in procuring a copy of the mailing list.

12. Methods and channels by which VERGES has contact with the Chinese Communists or any others who currently provide him with backing.

13. With whom does VERGES associate most closely in Paris?

14. With which Algerians is VERGES in contact today. How and where is this contact maintained?

15. Discreet probing on STRELKOFF and his orientation and sponsorship is also indicated.

16. What are the functions of the advisory board of Revolution? Were members chosen by Verges? How do they communicate with VERGES?

17. What guidance if any do the financial sponsors of Revolution give the editorial staff? Do they supply packaged articles? Who decides what articles are to be used in the different language editions?

18. Complete review of GIBSON's relationship with Verges. When and where did they meet, under what circumstances? What briefing did Verges give GIBSON concerning the purposes, sponsorship and line of Revolution?

19. What exactly were the duties of GIBSON in Paris and Lausanne on Revolution?

20. Does "Revolution" grant reprint authorization? If so, do you know of any publications that have carried "Revolution" material?

21. What is the source of photographs used by the magazine?

GRIPPA

22. Explain his relationship to other pro-Chinese dissident factions in Western European CPs. Is he in contact with VERGES? With ANDERSSON? Details.

23. Why was GRIPPA not asked to assist in finding a new printer for the English edition of Revolution?

24. Has he ever made any financial contributions to VERGES or ANDERSSON?

FRONT GROUPS

25. All information available on Lionel Morrison, including biographic data, current status of Gibson-Morrison relationship.

26. All information available on the Afro-Asian Journalists Association, headquartered in Cairo. (Note, an AAJA conference is slated for March in Algiers).
    a. Identify any of the individuals (outside of Morrison) connected with it.
    b. Identify any AAJA contacts in Europe or Africa.

27. Any information on the structure, plans, finances or personalities of the Pan African Journalist's Union, headed by Kofi Baatsi, and headquartered in Accra.

28. Any knowledge of the International Organization of Journalists, headquartered in Prague. Has GIBSON met any of its officials, or attended any of its meetings.

29. Any direct knowledge of the officers, employees, procedures etc. of Prensa Latina offices in Europe.

30. Any knowledge of the officers and operations of the NCNA offices in Europe and North Africa?

31. Any contact with representatives of, or any knowledge of the propaganda operations of the NFLSV (National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam), which has an office in Algiers?

32. Knowledge of any officers or national leaders of the World Peace Council in Noth Africa or Europe?

<u>Carribean</u>

33. Any current or past contacts with Caribbean revolutionaries? Describe.

34. Info on the present status of the Mouvement de Liberation pour la Zone des Caraibes (MLZC), which has been mentioned by name in the <u>Economist</u>.

35. We are interested in the present stage of organization or disorganization of the MLCZ (which has not been heard from for almost two years) and any other info available on the coordination of the anti-colonial struggle in the Caribbean; especially involvement of Cubans, Algerians, Soviets, Trotskyists, others. (See attached dispatch, OCOW-4718, for background on the MLCZ.)

36. Does <u>Revolution</u> receive Cuban assistance? Specifically what is the nature of the relationship with <u>Revolution</u> in Havana? Contact with Carlos FRANQUI?

<u>Miscellaneous Leftist Groups</u>

37. Describe relationship, and persons involved, of <u>Revolution</u> with the <u>New Left Review</u> and the Movement for Colonial Freedom in Great Britain. (These

14-00000

groups have placed ads in the magazine. What did they pay for the space? How?

38. Any info on GIBSON contacts with members of the pro-Chinese Communist Party of Switzerland (formerly dissident PDT of Montreux).

39. Did GIBSON or any other member of the Revolution staff ever have dealings with Michael RAPTIS (aka "Pablo") or any of his group? Describe in detail.

40. Any info on the Red Flag and that monthly's editor John Llewellyn DAVIS. Describe contacts between the DAVIS group and Revolution.

41. Any info on, contacts with, the Du Bois group in Ghana? Hammer and Steel in Boston?

Switzerland

42. What American contacts did GIBSON maintain in Lausanne and surroundings, particularly with young students in the area? Any Arab contacts?

43. Describe the Party mechanism to which you belong, if any, in Switzerland. Indentify the individuals involved, meeting places.

Personal Contacts

Biographic data, including current addresses and activities and the status of your relationship with the following individuals and/or groups would be appreciated:

44. Maurice SINE, cartoonist. His past and present role, first in Revolution Africaine and then Revolution. Others in Express crew (e.g. STRELKOV) who went to Algeria? Did all return to France?

45. Do you know any Americans attending the subversive/sabotage school in Prague? Any info on this institution and the indentities of participants would be much appreciated.

46. Rosalynde AINSLIE (London).

47. Mme. Michele MESTRE (Paris) Relationship to VERGES group.

48. F.E.I. IKOKHAI, Rev. bureau man in Nigeria.

49. Hamza ALAVI. Former editorial board who reportedly resigned his post. Circumstances of his resignation? Current position? Revolution Editorial Board Members:

50. BABU

51. Amilcar CABRERA

52. Demba DIALLO

53. Castro da SILVA

54. Martin VALDES

55. Hacen RIAD

56. Maulana Abdul Hamid BHASHANI

57. Marcos FERRER

58. Frene GINWALA, East African residing in London.

59. Carlos LANCA and Patricia McGowan PINHEIRO, reported to be Lanca's wife, in Algeria? Any other current Algerian contacts?

60. Muhamed HARBI, who replaced VERGES as editor of *Revolution Africaine*.

61. Robert WILLIAMS (American in Peking)

62. Muhamed KHIDER. Was his departure from Algeria related in any way to the depature of VERGES?

63. Sub Sahara Africans, particularly in Guinea, Mali and Ghana, with pro-ChiCom links or sympathies.

64. Holden ROBERTO (Angola)

65. Mario DeAndrade (Angola)

66. Michael TABATA (South Africa)

67. Francois MASPERO, Paris publisher of *Partisan*. How financed?

68. Andre BELGE. Any connection with *Rev.*?

69. Nguyen KIEN (or Lan Ngo MANH or Ngo Manh LAN).

Latin America

70. Background circumstances leading to the decision to publish Revolution in Spanish in Bogota.

71. Biographic info on Cesar PALACIOS P., described as editor of the Bogota edition.

72. Mario ARANGO, Director of the Bogota edition.

73. Is it intended to publish a Spanish edition of Revolution in other cities in Latin America? Are any other foreign editions planned?

74. Are articles translated into Spanish in Europe and then sent to Bogota, or is the translated work done in Bogota.

75. How and through whom is the Spanish language edition of Revolucion financed. Details.

76. Biographic info on Jerome FINAMOUR, bureau man in Brazil.

ChiCom Contacts

77. Did you have any contact with the New China News Agency? If so, explain the nature of the relationship and persons with whom you dealt.

78. In the course of your editorial activities did you meet any Chinese Communists? If so, please provide information on the individuals with whom you had contact.

79. Any info on contacts by VERGES and/or other Revolution staff members with NCNA representatives or ChiCom diplomats in Paris or Bern.

80. An account of GIBSON's time in Algiers when he worked on Revolution Africaine would be useful. Also, circumstances under which GIBSON went to Algiers and then to Switzerland to start English-language edition. With whose funds?

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FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-306-052

FROM: LONDON

ACTION: WE-8

INFO: VR. FILE, AddP, CI, CI/OPS, CA/O-4, CA-2, FE-6, FI, CI/IC-2

SECRET 01/1714Z

PALP INFO DIR PARI CITE LOND 58[illegible]

1 FEB 65 IN 71348

SKOPERA LCHARVEST KUDESK

1. REQUEST CLARIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN FAIRMAN RE PASSAGE MONEY TO GIBSON AS DISCUSSED WITH SOTHERN 25 JAN.

2. LOND BELIEVES GIBSON HAS NOT YET DEPARTED FOR EUROPEAN TRIP AND HOLD-UP MAY BE DUE NON-RECEIPT 100 POUNDS FROM FAIRMAN. IF NOT INCONSISTENT YOUR LATEST INFO FROM FAIRMAN AND UNLESS HQS OBJECTS SUGGEST LOND CONTACT FAIRMAN AND AUTHORIZE PASSAGE FUNDS NOW RATHER THAN AS STATED DIR 72596.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

201-306052
1 Feb 65

2 FEB 1965

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS — RI COPY — RI COPY (35)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING: XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief, WE

INFO. Chief, KUWOLF; Chief, KUDESK; Chief, FE; Chief, AF; Chief, WH; COS, Paris; Chief, LCPIPIT; COS, Brussels

FROM: Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT: LCHARVEST/KUDESK/JAGUAR
JAGUAR report on GIBSON

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: OELA-42,410, 26 January 1965

1. Transmitted herewith are copies of JAGUAR's latest report on Richard Thomas GIBSON, which they compiled for us on being informed of our current operational interest in him. We expect that further information will be forthcoming since, as previously noted, they have instituted additional coverage of GIBSON's activities.

2. JAGUAR refer us to their previous reporting on GIBSON, which has been contained in their reports on Revolution. These include OEL-36,105(29 August 1963); OELA-40,542(15 April 1964); OELA-41,545(10 September 1964); OEL-39,251(24 September 1964); OELA-4[illegible],788(20 October 1964).

3. JAGUAR also point out that the paper contains information received from a number of secret sources, and they request that we not give it any distribution beyond KUBARK without consulting them, unless, of course, we have the information from other sources. JAGUAR have made a copy available to ODENVY London.

4. JAGUAR also informed us orally that the persons they suspect to have played a most prominent role in the 1963 charges of GIBSON's CIA affiliation - the two persons referred to in para 3 of their paper - were Rosalynd AINSLIE and Patricia McGOWAN. JAGUAR gave us this information informally and off the record. It is interesting to note that, in Ref, GIBSON agreed that AINSLIE was one but made no mention of McGOWAN.

5. GIBSON spoke of the affair of JAGUAR's para 3 (a) at some length, giving a rather different interpretation, however. Paras 3 (b), (c), and (d) are rather more speculative.

6. JAGUAR also told us, informally, that some of their information on GIBSON, as contained herein, derives from some of his correspondence. The implication is not that JAGUAR has been reading GIBSON's mail, but that, by intercepts or penetrations, they have been reading the mail of some of the

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Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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1att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 27 Jan. 65

DATE DISPATCHED:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OELA-42,411

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-306052

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

persons to whom he has written - or, of course, mail of other persons, in which mention is made of GIBSON.

7. As a belated footnote to Ref, we learn that JAGUAR had previously identified the Swiss printer as Nils ANDERSON (see OEL-39,251, 24 September 1964).

8. JAGUAR informed us on 26 January that GIBSON had requested (prior to 23 January) a one-month extension of his residence permit, to enable him to make his proposed European trip and return to the U.K. The extension was granted without demur.

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment:
JAGUAR report, herewith

Distribution:
- 3-Chief, WE w/att h/w
- 2-Chief, KUWOLF w/att h/w
- 2-Chief, KUDESK w/att h/w
- 2-Chief, FE w/att h/w
- 2-Chief, AF w/att h/w
- 2-Chief, WH w/att h/w
- 1-COS, Paris w/att h/w
- 1-Chief, LCPIPIT w/att h/w
- 1-COS, Brussels w/att h/w

Richard Thomas GIBSON
Born: Los Angeles on 13.5.31
Address: 30, Stockleigh Hall,
Prince Albert Road, London, N.W.8.

GIBSON has been connected with the pro-Chinese Communist publication "Revolution" and its predecessor, "African Revolution", at least since April, 1963. He made available the following information about himself as part of a publicity campaign planned for "African Revolution" in the first half of 1963:-

1951-52:	worked in Rome for the Mediterranean News Bureau of the "Christian Science Monitor";
1955-58:	editor with the English language service of "Agence France Presse" in Paris;
1958:	arrested by the French authorities because of his work for the Algerian National Liberation Front;
1959-60:	returned to the U.S.A. and employed by the C.B.S. News in New York until dismissed because of his pro-Cuban activities;
	awarded a C.B.S. fellowship in African Studies at Columbia University;
1960-September, 1962:	Executive Secretary of the "Fair Play for Cuba" Committee in the U.S.A.

2. In 1963, GIBSON lived in Lausanne, where "African Revolution" and subsequently the English edition of "Revolution" were printed, but he paid frequent visits to "Revolution's" Paris office until the end of the year when "Revolution" was banned in Switzerland and he was refused permission to continue to live there. He then settled in Paris where, according to one report, he and his wife lived in "quite a luxurious flat". It would, however, be wrong to infer from this that GIBSON's means enabled him to enjoy high living standards, as another source subsequently reported that he had not paid any rent for the flat from May to October, 1964.

3. As far back as August, 1963, there were rumours in Communist circles in London that GIBSON was an American agent and that he had provided United States Intelligence with the names of certain unidentified United States negroes in accordance with a brief received from the Americans. Information from a well-placed source suggests that these rumours may have originated from the jealous reactions of two persons, connected with "Revolution", whose aspirations with the publication were cut short when GIBSON became Editor of the English edition. However, by mid-1964, VERGES, the Editorial Director of "Revolution", was claiming that complaints about GIBSON's activities had been received not only from London, but also from Cuba, American negroes in New York and a relative of GIBSON's who was working for the magazine "Spark" in Ghana. As a result, GIBSON was dismissed from the editorial staff of "Revolution". Charges made against him include the following:-

/ (a) ...

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(a) denouncing, in 1958, an unidentified negro, possibly a Communist, who was expelled from France;

(b) informing the publication's contacts in China that "Revolution" was disintegrating;

(c) providing "Newsweek" and the "New York Herald Tribune" with information in an attempt to discredit "Revolution";

(d) connections with the C.I.A.

Although GIBSON has denied the charges made against him, he realises that they have stuck and that it will be some years before he will be acceptable to any left wing organisation.

4. Having failed to find employment in Paris after leaving "Revolution" in July, 1964, GIBSON went to the United Kingdom on 7th October and was joined later by his British wife, Joy Marjorie, and his two children. He hoped to find work in London, but at the end of November, he was still without a job and dependent on his wife's family, who were paying the rent of his flat at 30, Stockleigh Hall, Prince Albert Road, London, N.W.8. It is now known whether GIBSON has been able to find employment.

5. Nothing is known at present about GIBSON's contacts in the United Kingdom. Although during the time he worked for "Revolution" he was in touch with members of the pro-Chinese Communist splinter group in the United Kingdom - the Committee to Defeat Revisionism, for Communist Unity - it is not known whether he has resumed contact. It has been reported that he still keeps in touch with the coloured South African journalist, Lionel NORRISON, who is employed by the Chinese-backed Afro-Asian Journalists' Association (A.A.J.A.) in Djakarta.

Comment: Para. 5: "Afro-Asian Journalist", no. 4, dated July, 1964, and published by the A.A.J.A., contains an article "Two Revolutionary Journals" by NORRISON, the journals being "Revolution" and "Spark".

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / ABSTRACT / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WE

INFO: Chief, KUWOLF; Chief, KUDESK; Chief, FE; Chief, AF; Chief, WH; COS, Paris; Chief, LCPIPIT; COS, Brussels

FROM: Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT: KUDESK/LCHARVEST/REVOLUTION
Tape of Interview with Richard Thomas GIBSON

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: LOND 5706, 21 January 1965

1. Attached is the tape of the interview with GIBSON, recorded in an Embassy office, using a Uher 4000 Report - 5 recorder, recording at a speed of 15/16 feet per minute. The interviewer used the alias of Earl Wilson. Gibson arrived at 1745 and departed at about 2030.

2. We are not attempting to summarise or analyze GIBSON's comments in this dispatch. The tape provides a much more revealing picture than our subjective comments could. A few notes, however, appear to be in order.

3. Speaking of his departure, GIBSON said he planned to leave London on 24 or 25 January. As of noon 24 January, at least, he was still in London because I saw him walking on St. John's Wood High Street. (A potential problem exists here: GIBSON and I live within a few blocks of one another and not infrequently ride the same bus line. This problem can only be met when it manifests itself.) JAGUAR, incidentally, has alerted its immigration contacts (prior to our meeting with GIBSON) and requested that his name be put on a watch list. They said that they would inform us if they learn that he has left the country. We have not yet heard that he has left.)

4. GIBSON was given money amounting to $300. Under the circumstances of his plans, as he expressed them, it seemed reasonable to do so, to ensure, at least partially, that he would come back to talk more. He was more than willing to take the money and raised the initial suggestion of $200 to $300 or $400. His obvious shift in his line regarding dollars (as opposed to pounds) is further indicative of his willingness to get what he could.

5. The considerable number of names mentioned by GIBSON makes the transcription of the notes a sizable chore, and in order to lessen this burden a listing has been compiled of almost all of the names, in the order in which they appear in the tape, with the exception of VERGES and the Free Play for Cuba Committee, CBS and a few others. The names appear only one time each on the list, although many of them crop up repeatedly in the tape.

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO: CS COPY

DATE TYPED: 26 Jan. 65

DATE DISPATCHED: 27 JAN

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OELA-42,410.

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-306052

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Gatts.

A few of the phrases that do not appear too clearly on the tape are included on the list. Occasionally the names are written phonetically, indicated by (ph.).

6. GIBSON's offer of a photograph of VERGES was not accepted, on the assumption that KUBARK already has a photo. If this is not the case, let us know, and we will include that in our requirements for a subsequent meeting.

7. The Afro-Asian Journalists Association man is apperently Lionel MORRISON. He is also referred to as the "man from Djakarta". (See LOND 5575 of 12 January 1965.)

8. The reference to the Cultural Attache of the Cuban Embassy corroborates (rather, is corroborated by) the material referred to in para 4 of LOND 5337 (22 December 1965). We are not fully aware of the Cuban's political orientation, however,

9. In reviewing the tape, it will become apparent that the arrangements with GIBSON were left fairly flexible for the future. It would appear, from his responses, that a longer range relationship with him could, in fact, be established if, after thorough review of his materials, that seems necessary or desirable.

10. We will expect, in addition to the requirements that have been promised, that Headquarters will advise us on their desire to arrange for the one-shot approach previously suggested by Headquarters, or a different arrangement. We are unable to assess the validity or worth of all the comments he made. Our impression, however, is that he is reasonably knowledgeable of a number of fields of interest to us. We also suspect that in some areas his knowledge is quite superficial. His access to various areas of potential interest may be partially proved by his trip around Europe and should be a useful indication of how we may be interested in playing him. The possibility of his being a provocation has not been overlooked, of course, and we welcome Headquarters' comments on this score as well.

11. We would also appreciate further comments on various personalities, with whom we are not familiar - "Anderson" is the most obvious in this category.

12. Headquarters is requested to provide us with a transcription of this tape, as well as the promised requirements, prior to 15 February. ODENVY should also be provided with as much of the material as is of interest to them, and a copy of that material should be given to us to pass to the ODENVY office here. We are also obliged to pass to JAGUAR such elements of this material as is of legitimate concern to them. In this case, we would suggest that this be interpreted rather liberally and Headquarters-prepared copy be forwarded along with the other items listed above. (Note that JAGUAR has been quite cooperative while we have been approaching this case, and their recent run-down on GIBSON is being pouched almost simultaneously with this dispatch.)

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment: herewith
1-List of names
2-Tape (WE only)

Gibson was not aware that the interview was being taped.

Distribution:
~~3~~ 2-Chief, WE w/att h/w
2-Chief, KUWOLF w/att h/w
2-Chief, KUDESK w/att h/w
2-Chief, FE w/att h/w
2-Chief, AF w/att h/w
2-Chief, WH w/att h/w
1-COS, Paris w/att h/w
1-Chief, LCPIPIT w/att h/w
1-COS, Brussels w/att h/w

Attachment to OELA-42,410
26 January 1965

List of names on tape, approximately in order of appearance:

PRJTO - "very silly man in Paris"
"next to Balmain"

"PR stunt"

"told by ANDERSON"

DELDUCCA (ph.)

to BABU

in POMPIDOU's office

Rabah BITAT

Zohra DRITT (ph.)

Revolution Africaine

Djamila BOUHIRED

Bill GRIFFITHS

French DST

articles for Encounter

Jerome LANDON (ph.)

Edition Lingui (very ph.)

Argument

Reunion Island

Hachete

Ngo Kanh LAN - Nguyen KIEN

Mr. SOONG

Fanonist - FANON

ODINGA of Kenya

Robert LEHMAN

Dennis POMBEYE of Tanzania Foreign Office

BABU and HANGA

Rosalynd AINSLIE

Sen BASHID (??ph.)

Jack WODDIS

Kay BEAUCHAMP (ph.)

POMBEYE (again)

CHANDRA (Algierian Ambassador to UN - ph.)

SARTRE saw Fidel

att #16
OELA-42410

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201-306052

Dienbienphu - Evian

OPRA

Ollie HARRINGTON (the comment "You take Harrington" means "You use Harrington's name.")

Pittsburgh Courier

Richard WRIGHT

William ___________ SMITH - Ghana television

C. L. R. JAMES

George PADMORE

AFP

Miles STEWART

Tony BLOND (ph.)

Tony HAGEN

(Robert) WILLIAMS

Bayard RUSTIN

Emmet TILL

PATTERSON

ANDERSON (again)

(Jacques) GRIPPA

Veuvey

Bill WORTHY (ph.)

Monthly Review

??? SUBERMAN and Paul SWEAZEY (ph.)

Centre d'Etudes et Documentation de Marseilles

Amitie Franco-Chinoise

Clichy

BEAULIEU

TSHOMBE

ADOULA

Bob TABER

Cleanth BROOKS

Carlos FRANQUI

Leo LABEDZ

Ved MEHTA

Magnum

Week - published in Nottingham

14-00000

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DESTROY [ ] SIG

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27 SECRET

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FROM LONDON

ACTION WE 8

INFO VR. FILE CA2, CA/O4, FE6, ADDP, CI, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, AF4, DO4, DO/H3, FI, CCS3

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S E C R E T 211612Z

21 Jan 65 IN 64592

DIR INFO PALP PARI CITE LOND 5706

LCHARVEST KUDESK

REF DIR 78506

AF | 1 | A

1. LOND OFFICER, POSING AS ODYOKE TDY FROM WASH, ARRANGED FOR GIBSON COME EMBASSY FOR INTERVIEW. G, WITHOUT ASKING QUESTIONS, CAME WILLINGLY FOR INTERVIEW, WHICH LASTED OVER TWO HOURS, MOSTLY SQUIRT TRANSMISSION WITH DIRECTIONAL PRODS FROM INTERVIEWER.

2. G VEHEMENTLY, REPEATEDLY AND APPARENTLY SINCERELY VOLUNTEERED HIS CONVICTION THAT NO CHICOM FUNDS, OTHER THAN 3000 SUBSCRIPTIONS, SUPPORTING REVOLUTION, ALTHOUGH VERGES HAS LONG HOPED ENTICE THEM TO DO SO. IN GENERAL TERMS, G COVERED HISTORY HIS INVOLVEMENT ANTI-COLONIALIST AFFAIRS SINCE 1958 - ALGERIAN INVOLVEMENT IN PARI, FPCC WORK IN NEW YORK, TRAVEL ALGIERS AND SUBSEQUENT VICISSITUDES WITH REVOLUTION.

201-306052

22 JAN 1965

3. G LEAVING NEXT FEW DAYS TO TRAVEL EUROPE, TO INTERVIEW VARIOUS LEFTISTS AND COMMIES (INCL GRIPPA) AS WELL AS NUMBER OF PERSONS ASSOCIATED WITH PRODUCTION OF REVOLUTION. LATTER

SECRET

SECRET

JN 64592
PAGE 2

IN ORDER PRY FURTHER INTO VERGES' FINANCIAL CONDITION AND SOURCE OF REVOLUTION FINANCING, WHICH G BELIEVES HAS BEEN FROM ALGERIAN SOURCES VIA SUISSE. WILL TALK WITH "LITTLE MAN WHO DOES MANY THINGS FOR CHICOMS IN BERN" FNU ANDERSON, WHO ONE OF G'S BEST SOURCES ON VERGES RELATIONSHIP CHINESE BERN. WILL BE AWAY FROM LOND TILL ABOUT 15 FEB WHEN NEXT CONTACT SCHEDULED. STA GAVE G 300 DOLLARS TO HELP PAY COSTS OF TRIP, MAKE SURE HIS FUTURE COOPERATION. G SAYS HE EXPECTS RECEIVE 100 POUNDS FROM FAIRMAN 300 DOLLARS FROM ATLANTIC MONTHLY, WHICH WILL ALSO MAKE TRIP POSSIBLE. HAS AGREED PROVIDE MANUSCRIPTS AND, IF WAY CAN BE FOUND GET THEM OUT WITHOUT AROUSING WIFE'S SUSPICION, SEVERAL BOXES OF CARDS WHICH CONSTITUTE MAILING LIST.

4. DISPATCH WILL FOLLOW, PLUS TAPES (FOR DIR ONLY) OF MEETING.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX [ ] YES [X] NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-306052
X-REF TO FILE NO
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VR. FILE CA2, CA/PROP, WE 6, FE 6, CI/OPS, FE/AN

ABSTRACT / FI / INDEX / DESTROY

S E C R E T 201543Z

LOND INFO DIR PALP CITE PARI 8742
KOBIRD LCHARVEST DIDORIC QKOPERA KUDESK

RE A LOND 5652 (IN 61219)
B PALP 3873 (IN 60705)

20 Jan 65 IN 63559

1. PARI CONCURS REF A.

2. PALP INFORMS US GIBSON LETTER (REF B PARA 1) NOT BEING PUBLISHED. HOWEVER LETTER ITSELF PROMPTS FOLL STA QUESTIONS: (A) DOES GIBSON BELIEVE OWN DENIALS OF CHICOM SUPPORT "REVOLUTION"? IF SO HE LESS WELL INFORMED THAN WE HOPED. NOTE HE OFFERS NO EXPLANATION FOR MAGAZINE FINANCIAL RECOVERY, WHICH RECENT PRICE REVISIONS AND BI-MONTHLY ISSUE UTTERLY FAIL EXPLAIN. (B) IF GIBSON DELIBERATELY FALSIFYING QUESTION CHICOM SUPPORT, WHAT WERE HIS MOTIVES SINCE HE PRESUMABLY HOPED LETTER BE PUBLISHED?

3. OFPA 77970 (POUCHED HQS 18 JAN, LOND 20 JAN) PROVIDES BACKGROUND MATERIAL INCLUDING MEMO GIBSON CONVERSATION WITH GOSSETT, AMEMBASSY PARI.

4. INDEX 201-306052.

20 Jan 65

201-306052

FORM 1-64 1389 SECRET (35)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, London

INFO.

FROM: Chief, WE

SUBJECT: DTDORIC LCHARVEST KUDESK
Transmittal copy of Gibson Letter to KUBARK

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: DIR 78506

As stated in reference we forward herewith copy of Gibson's letter which the Station might consider using ultimately to establish bona fides if other means of establishing bona fides (such as phone call to Embassy) does not satisfy Gibson. London case officer in showing the letter to Gibson need not admit to or represent himself as a member of KUBARK, though Gibson might well make that assumption.

STEWART F. ROLNICK

2 - London
(w/att U.S.C.)
T.N.

201- 306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
GR COPY	OELW-21828	21 JAN 1965 19 January 1965
	CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T-	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201 - 306052

1 - RI w/att
1 - WE/BC

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	SPS
RID/...	
R...	
RID/...	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WE/BC(U)	John G. Roberts	ib	7220

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DCWE(BC)	19 Jan '65	JOHN F. CASWELL

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING; XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED; ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING; MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WE ATTN: Chief, FE

INFO.: Chief of Station, London

FROM: Chief of Station, Paris

SUBJECT: KOBIRD/LCHARVEST/UNBOUND - Identity A, formerly employed by Identity B

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: PARI 8052

NOTE: The following round-up and commentary on Iden A had been drafted before PALP 3017 of 6 January 1965 and later traffic presented the case in a somewhat different light. We forward the following anyway, as some of the background and suggestions still seem pertinent. Several questions raised below have now been resolved, notably the allegation of an Iden A/KUBARK link (explained by the ODENVY letter of 1 December 1964, not available when the following was written). Copies of recent PALP correspondence on Iden A, passed to us on 13 January 1965, are attached as Attachment 3, USC.

1. Upon receiving the memorandum cited in the reference, we requested further details from UNBOUND, stressing our interest in the report that CPUSA members had given IDEN C documents which showed IDEN A belonged to "the services of KUBARK". D/5986 of 30 December 1964, UNBOUND's answer to our query, merely reiterates that the UNBOUND source, a good one, based the report on a "communication of documents" by American Communists to IDEN C, which supposedly established that IDEN A belonged to KUBARK; UNBOUND states that the source is not in a position to identify the persons in question. UNBOUND's reply suggests the information might have come from an audio operation; we might mention here that IDEN A has appeared occasionally on UNPAY, but never in an informative way. A mail intercept might also be the source of UNBOUND's report, or it may have come from a third service (conceivably JAGUAR or SMOTH).

2. Our continuing preoccupation with the IDEN A question is three-fold: (a) his expulsion from IDEN B (and thus from acceptance by pro-Peiping groups) opens the door for his possible recruitment; (b) we would like to determine whether his ouster was engineered by personal enemies or whether he actually did work for an intelligence service, and which one; (c) as Peiping regards the USA as its primary target, the Chinese can be expected to continue propaganda attacks designed to create IDEN D tension and inflame the Afro/Asians

Attachments: 1. Excerpt from RFE research bulletin, 19 Nov 64, h/w
S/C attached in R/fund 2. Memorandum of Conversation, USC
3. Letters dated 4 and 6 Jan 65, USC
4. Identities, USC

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WE w/atts
~~2 - Chief, FE w/atts~~
4 atts 2 - COS, London w/atts

CS COPY

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OFPA - 77970

DATE: 15 January 1965 (JAN 18 1965)

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-306052

against the U.S.A. While domestic effects of such propaganda are properly handled by ODENVY, the manipulation of IDEN Ds to further Chinese propaganda abroad becomes KUBARK's concern.

3. KUBARK's recruitment of IDEN A, or establishment of controlled access to him, could be extremely useful in countering attempts to undermine the USA with the Afro-Asians. IDEN A presumably still has a reasonably up-to-date idea of IDEN B plans in this regard, and he must know the names and locations of many persons involved. The most effective approach to IDEN A would probably be through an offer of money (his history indicates venality, and at present he appears to be in financial difficulties), and by stressing his chance to get even with IDEN C. The purity of IDEN A's Communism is open to question and should not impede recruitment; a more formidable obstacle to a successful operation is his possible connection with a foreign intelligence service. This could be a Western service but might also be the Soviets, for whom he would serve the dual purpose of causing trouble for the USA and at the same time reporting on the Chinese propaganda machine; it is a matter of record that the Soviets view IDEN B seriously. Whatever the basis for a KUBARK approach to IDEN A, it would require careful security planning, taking cognizance of his instability and his known attitude toward ODYOKE as an IDEN D.

4. "Revolution" has featured articles by three American Negroes, Richard GIBSON, Robert Franklyn WILLIAMS, and Malcolm X, all obviously intended to prejudice readers against the USA on ground of racial injustice. All three men are or have been involved with foreign Communists: GIBSON and WILLIAMS with the Chinese and the Cubans, notably, and Malcolm X with the Chinese and various African Communists (actual or crypto). The "New York Herald Tribune" of 4 January 1965 reported Malcolm's statement that he hopes to "internationalize" the American Negro problem, and that he claims to have influenced several African governments to make representations in the U.N. against the USA's treatment of its Negroes. This may be a foretaste of Chinese plans for foreign exploitation of this issue; Malcolm was interviewed by "Revolution" in Cairo, which has since proved its enthusiastic anti-Americanism.

5. OFP-14693 reports that Philip BART, a pro-Soviet official of the CPUSA, stated in December 1964 that the CPUSA has positive proof that four members of their Chinese faction are being paid by the Chinese Communists. (It is perhaps relevant to note here that the advent of "Revolution" was hailed by letters to the Editor from American leftists, including the FPCC; according to OFPA-37875, Vincent T. LEE of "All Worlds Publications" in New York City takes subscriptions for "Revolution"). It is hard to say where IDEN A enters into the clouded picture of American Communist partisanship in the Sino/Soviet rift, but in view of his shifting allegiances he may have divulged to pro-Soviet CPUSA members, or to the Soviets themselves, information on Chinese subversion in the USA. The October 1964 issue of "Hammer & Steel Newsletter" is cited by the Radio Free Europe research bulletin of November 1964 in the latter's review of pro-Chinese factions among Western Communist Parties; RFE research describes "Hammer & Steel" as a monthly produced in Boston by a small American faction. (Portions of the RFE research bulletin with its citations from "Hammer & Steel" are attached as Attachment 1). The marked paragraph from "Hammer & Steel" hits at the idea of white nations' inherent superiority; this is consistent with China's claim of a bond among the colored peoples of the world, which permits such effective anti-Soviet propaganda as the cover of "Revolution" for May 1964, which shows KHRUSHCHEV saying, "We, the whites...".

6. IDEN C's denunciation of IDEN A may have been at least partially caused by suspicion he was trying to gain control of IDEN E; it will be recalled that very shortly before his ouster, IDEN A was in Holland negotiating for that type of printing equipment (HAGU 6137 and OCHA 23818). He is now living in London; he has presumably been obliged to find work there (unless he actually is on an intelligence payroll), and he may have landed with some leftist publishing outfit or even with the CPUK, which is sufficiently divided to afford room for his current views, whatever they may be. In addition to IDEN A's potential for reporting on Chinese propaganda efforts, his uses as a penetration of British or other European Communist publishing circles are obvious.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OFPA 77970

7. UNBOUND reported that American Communists had allegedly given IDEN C documents showing IDEN A worked for KUBARK. One explanation of this allegation may lie in IDEN A's visit to the American Embassy, Paris, in late 1963, at the request of Mr. John G. GOSSETT, then Acting Consul General. GOSSETT was interested in any information he might have on possible connections between IDEN F, with which IDEN A had been connected, and President Kennedy's assassination. (A copy of GOSSETT's Memorandum of Conversation is attached under separate cover as Attachment 2; his appraisals of IDEN A and his reservations concerning his motives are interesting). IDEN A and GOSSETT had a far-ranging talk, including what may have been a tentative feeler by IDEN A for ODYOKE employment. It seems likely that IDEN A would have reported an American Embassy inquiry to his friends in IDEN F, and he may even have mentioned the possibility of future "work" for ODYOKE, which could have led to eventual allegations that he had been recruited by KUBARK. This is of course speculation, but IDEN A's flexible loyalties and liking for money are surely known to his colleagues, and, if he had already aroused antagonism among them, the Embassy visit would serve as a peg for sincere or expedient denunciation.

8. We can shed no light on the allegation that IDEN G is a KUBARKER (LOND 5337). Our only trace is OELA 39346, stating he is IDEN H. We are not clear as to the relationship between IDEN A, IDEN G, and IDEN I, also mentioned in OELA 39346, which states she "appears to be" IDEN A's wife. According to ODENVY Paris, however, IDEN A is married to IDEN J. OEL 39251 of September 1964 reported that IDEN A and his wife (unnamed) had successfully sued IDEN B for salary arrears; the fact that the wife was also employed recalls the IDEN I professional status, which might make her operationally significant whether or not she is married to IDEN A.

Believe IDEN "G" does not exist, & that someone confused him with IDEN "A".

Ann E. DUCOTE [signature]

Iden "I" is wife of IDEN "A". She is British and not negro. Don't believe there is an IDEN "J"; again there must have been confusion, and her name is that given for IDEN "I"

Att . to: OFFA - 77970, HW

RADIO FREE EUROPE Research

November 17, 19[illegible]

United States

One of the most violent reactions came from the heartland of capitalism, from the small American faction which produces the monthly Hammer & Steel Newsletter in Boston. The October issue of the mimeographed bulletin vengefully gives a list of eight reasons why Khrushchev fell -- each one a vindictive crow of triumph, and many attacking not only Khrushchev but basic Soviet policies such as "the distortion of peaceful coexistence." Points 2, 3 and 8 will serve as illustrations:

2. His German policy -- Khrushchev sought to ingratiate himself with West Germany. He was obviously ready to sell out the German Democratic Republic...

3. The declining influence of the CPSU among the Socialist countries and the Communist Parties. The proposed Moscow gathering was shaping up as a conference of only those Party leaders ready to openly serve U.S. imperialist aggression against the national liberation struggles. For example, Asian supporters of Khrushchev could have gathered in a telephone booth.

8. The nuclear success of People's China. Khrushchev had maintained that nuclear power was the exclusive responsibility of revisionists and imperialists -- of white nations. Khrushchev's great power chauvinism was blown sky high in Sinkiang Province.

Although there is no evidence that the politically insignificant Hammer & Steel group enjoys any direct support from the Chinese (as the Russians alleged in their "Open Letter" of July 14, 1963), it has always offered its allegiance to Peking in the most extreme form. This is expressed again in the claim that "Khrushchev's failure to recognize the contradiction between the oppressed peoples and imperialism as the focal contradiction of our time resulted in blindness concerning the leading rôle of the Chinese Party."8 This is a claim that the Chinese themselves would not want to make, expecially at this juncture.

att #16
OFPA-77970

201-306052

14-00000

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SECRET 151646Z

DIR INFO LOND PARI BRUS CITE PALP 3073 (CILIBERTI ACTING)

DYDORIC QKOPERA LCHARVEST KUDESK

REF A. DIR 76497
(IN58385)
B. LOND 5575 (ALSO PER BASTEAR)

15 Jan 65 IN 60705

1. AIRMAILING TO BASYUAR KATZENBACH LETTER WRITTEN TO ENCOUNTER BY GIBSON AT LASKY'S INVITATION RE FINANCIAL BACKING OF REVOLUTION. LASKY WILL NOT RPT NOT PUBLISH SINCE OBVIOUSLY WOULD BURN BRIDGES BETWEEN GIBSON AND OLD COLLEAGUES.

2. SABA LCPIPIT SUGGEST FOLLOWING COURSE OF ACTION:

A. KUBARKER UNDER ODACID POLITICAL OFFICER COVER GET ALL POSSIBLE INFO OUT OF GIBSON USING NECESSARY MINIMUM FINANCIAL INDUCEMENT. DEBRIEFING SHOULD START ASAP AND RELATIONSHIP SHOULD CONTINUE AS LONG AS FRUITFUL (LASKY FEELS GIBSON, AS "RACIAL REVOLUTIONIST, ENTHUSIAST AND OPPORTUNIST" WOULD RESPOND BADLY TO OPEN KUBARK PITCH):

B. MEANWHILE LASKY GIVE GIBSON 100 POUND GRANT TO TRAVEL AND PREPARE ARTICLES WHICH WOULD NOT BE PUBLISHED UNTIL EVIDENT THAT GIBSON BURNED AMONG FORMER CONTACTS;

C. WHEN EVIDENT GIBSON BURNED AND FI POTENTIAL EXHAUSTED

SECRET

15 Jan 65

201-306052

FORM 1-64 1389 RI COPY RI COPY

SECRET

IN-60705
PAGE 2 of 2

ENCOUNTER AND OTHER CONGRESS PUBLICATIONS WOULD TRY FOR MAXIMUM PROPAGANDA IMPACT GIBSON'S WRITINGS.

3. APPREC ADDRESSEES REACTIONS ABOVE.

4. NO INDEX.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

4. HRS KEENLY INTERESTED KUBARK DEBRIEFING SUBJ.

FEB 3 2 25 PM '65

FEB 3 11 03 PM '65

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM

ORIG : A. GOODRICH
UNIT : CI/ICG
EXT : 5928
DATE : 14 JAN 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

43 S-E-C-R-E-T

☐ RETURN TO BRANCH
☐ FILE RID

TO : LONDON BRUSSELS

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: CI/IC 2 INFO: CI, CI/OPS, FI, FE 6, CA 2, CA/O 4, WE 6, FI/INT 2

RI COPY

TO LOND INFO: BRUS CITE DIR 77493

KUDESK LCHARVEST DTDORIC

RE LOND 5575 (IN 58385)*

DIR 76497**

FRIEND

WHILE APPRECIATE ANY INFO AVAILABLE JAGUAR, HQS HAS VOLUMINOUS FILE ON GIBSON WHICH ADEQUATE BASIS FOR LONDON STATION DIRECT CONTACT WITH GIBSON NOW TO DETERMINE AVAILABILITY AND PRICE FOR ONE WEEK DEBRIEFING BY ODYOKE OFFICIAL ON CONTINENT. WISH CONTACT HIM NOW WHILE HE UNEMPLOYED AND [illegible] PROBABLY AVAILABLE.

END OF MESSAGE

*CITED INFO FROM JAGUAR RE GIBSON.

**REQUESTED LOND STATION CONTACT GIBSON DETERMINE HIS AVAILABILITY FOR DEBRIEFING.

AF 1/h

201-306052

John Caswell
DCWE(BC)

FE/CH [illegible] SMITH
COORDINATING OFFICERS

WE/BC/C

RELEASING OFFICER — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

14-00000

INDEX [ ] YES [X] NO
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2P

S E C R E T 121737Z

DIR INFO PALP PARI BRUS CITE LOND 5575 (CAWOOD ACTING)

KUDESK LCHARVEST DIDORIC

12 JAN 65 IN 58382

MICROFILMED FEB 10 1965 DOC. MICRO. SER.

REF A. DIR 76457

B. BRUS 1858 (NOT SENT ...)

1. MATTER DISCUSSED BROAD TERMS WITH JAGUAR. EXPLAINED TO THEM THAT GIBSON OF CURRENT INTEREST TO US, WITH POSSIBLE OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES WHICH NOT YET RESOLVED. WOULD APPRECIATE THEIR READINGS CURRENT ACTIVITIES, ATTITUDES, ETC BY CHANCE THEY HAVE RECENTLY DIRECTED THAT FULLER INFO BE GATHERED ON SUBJECT, IN SUPPORT OF CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF INFO CURRENTLY IN HAND. WILL MAKE AVAILABLE ROUND-UP ON SUBJ WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS.

2. ITEMS CITED FROM MEMRORY BY JAGUAR REP: GIBSON DOES NOT YET HAVE JOB: NOT STAYING WITH KAYE (IN-LAW), BUT IN SEPARATE FLAT WITH WIFE AND KIDS; KAYE (BROTHER-IN-LAW) HAD BEEN SUBSIDIZING GIBSONS; GIBSON CORRESPONDING WITH (NEGRO) SOUTH AFRICAN ANC ACTIVITIST CURRENTLY IN INDONESIA WITH AFRO-ASIAN JOURNALISTS ORG, LIONEL MORRISON (201-725837); THERE OBVIOUSLY EXTREMELY BAD BLOOD BETWEEN GIBSON AND JACQUES VERGES (VERGES WAS IN LONDON IN DECEMBER

SECRET

12 Jan. 65

B-201-725837

201-306052

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS — RI COPY — RI COPY

SECRET

IN 58385 pg. 2

64; JAGUAR TRYING FIND OUT WHOM HE VISITED BUT THINK HE DID NOT SEE GIBSON); GIBSON HAS CONTACTED BBC IN SEARCH OF JOB AND AT LEAST ONE PERSON OF "PREVIOUS RECORD" AS LEFTIST; JAGUAR HAVE COPIES OF SEVERAL OF GIBSON'S LETTERS OVER PAST YEAR; JAGUAR VERY CURIOUS ABOUT WHERE GIBSON'S MONEY IN PAST CAME FROM, SINCE HE LIVED IN VERY ELEGANT STYLE IN PARIS.

3. LOND FEELS DECISION RE DIRECT APPROACH TO GIBSON SHOULD BE DEFERRED AT LEAST PENDING FUTHER ANALYSIS INFO DUE TO BE RECEIVED. TOLD JAGUAR WE KNOW GIBSON IN TOUCH MACFARQUHAR AND CAN ASK SMOTH PROVIDE FURTHER INFO THIS CHANNEL IF MACFARQUHAR NOT ALSO IN TOUCH JAGUAR, BUT PREFER KEEP QUERIES IN ONE PLACE. WILL DEFER QUERY OF SMOTH TILL THIS POINT RESOLVED.

4. VIEW FOREGOING, NO PRESENT NEED THESSIN LOND. WILL ADVISE IF SERVICES REQUIRED. APPRECIATE REF B.

5. ODENVY/LOND BEING KEPT INFORMED AND MOST COOPERATIVE.

6. FURTHER INFO FROM JAGUAR WILL BE FORWARDED SOONEST.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

FEB 4 11 08 PM '63

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SECRET 081550Z

DIR INFO PALP PARI CITE LOND 5512 CAWOOD ACTING 10 Jan 65 IN 56408

ZIBET LCHARVEST OKOPERA

REF A. LOND 5337 (IN 45127)

B. PALP 3017 (IN 55241)

1. WHILE LOND HAS RESERVATIONS ABOUT DTLEAFAGE/GIBSON TIE UP, SUGGEST DEFER DECISION TILL MORE INFO IN HAND. REF B DEVELOPMENT WOULD SEEM PROVIDE USEFUL MEANS GETTING MORE THOROUGH ASSESSMENT OF GIBSON (VIA SMOTH/MACFARQUHAR) AND IT WOULD BE INTERESTING KNOW HOW HE GOT ONTO MACFARQUHAR.

2. VIEW MACFARQUHAR ASSOCIATION SMOTH AND CONTINUED JAGUAR INTEREST GIBSON AND REVOLUTION, WOULD APPRECIATE HQS' PERMISSION DISCUSS WITH SMOTH AND JAGUAR. WILL BE SEEING APPROPRIATE JAGUAR OFFICER 12 JAN AND WOULD LIKE DISCUSS AT THAT TIME.

SECRET

CDN 5512 5337 3017 DTLEAFAGE/GIBSON REF B GIBSON VIA SMOTH/ MACFARQUHAR MACFARQUHAR SMOTH JAGUAR HQS' 12 JAN

BT

8 Jan 65

201-306052

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
When Filled In

7 January 1975
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on GIBSON, Richard (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

[ ] should be closed.

[X] witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

[ ] potential witting collaborator; date opened ______ OI Code A2.

[ ] former witting collaborator (relationship terminated). OI Code A3.

[ ] potential witting collaborator never contacted (security reasons, derogatory information). OI Code A4.

[ ] counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

[ ] all others. OI Code A6.

Signed Robert W MAYHEW (name) Ops/Off (title) EUR/ROG (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed KM (initials) 22 Jan (date) 1975

This document is a permanent part of this file.

201-306052

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054979

When Filled In
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

14-00000

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
When Filled In

SECRET 23 Dec 1974
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on GIBSON (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ should be closed.

☑ witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ potential witting collaborator; date opened ____________ OI Code A2.

☐ former witting collaborator (relationship terminated). OI Code A3.

☐ potential witting collaborator never contacted (security reasons, derogatory information). OI Code A4.

☐ counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☐ all others. OI Code A6.

Signed Barbara Bush (name) IA (title) SS/CAG/PAB (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed EH (initials) 8 Jan 1975 (date)

This document is a permanent part of this file.

201-306052

SECRET
When Filled In
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054979

SECRET
(WHEN MATERIAL INSERTED)

BLACK TAPE 201 FILE

TO: IP/Files, GC-52

FROM: EUR /RMO, 4B4402 6771
(Rm. #) (Ext.)

TO BE OPENED BY Personnel of EUR/ROG ONLY!
(DON 5-50 Designation)

I certify that the enclosed 201 volume has been checked before sealing to ensure that the material is arranged in chronological order, duplicates have been removed, each Record Copy has been properly input to the DO Records System, and that all Record Copy material in this volume is classified to this file. Form 2021 to restrict this file is attached hereto.

[signature]
(Signature of RMO)

VOL. V of VII enclosed.

Inclusive Dates of Enclosed Material (Multi-Vols. Only):

From 1 July 65 to Dec 68
(Date) (Date)

201- 306052

FORM 11-73 3299 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(7-30)

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

14-00000

THIS VOLUME CLOSED AS OF

31 DECEMBER 1968

LIVER FUNCTION TESTS

On 24 October 1968, I saw Dr. Daly of the Bio-chemistry Laboratory of West London Hospital for liver function tests. My family doctor, Dr. Hodes, sent me to Daly as a private patient, as British practice is not to take these tests unless the patient's condition seems to be worsening. My doctor thought I showed no signs of a recurrence of hepatitis and the normal practice would have been, at most, for me to have been examined by the specialist at the hospital, who might then decide to ask for the tests.

Daly said that all required tests, except the B.S.P., would be done. He said he thought the B.S.P. unnecessary unless the others indicated negative factors. In which case, he said he would ask me to come in again for that test.

Daly will send me the results of the tests and his bill c/o American Express, Rome, within a week.

201-306052

TM# 072369, 29 Oct 68

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

STATEMENT of EARNINGS and DEDUCTIONS

NAME	EMPLOYEE NO.	PAY PERIOD DATE	ROLL	COST CENTER	STA
CRPHCNE I	802799	12/01 12/31 1968	20	1242930	000

CD	EARNINGS NORMAL	EARNINGS OTHER	DESCRIPTION
C9	[illegible]000		REG SAL

NOTE:
THIS FORM IS ISSUED ONLY WHEN AN EMPLOYEE ENTERS ON DUTY OR THERE IS ANY CHANGE IN THE PAY ACCOUNT

CD	DEDUCTIONS NORMAL	DEDUCTIONS OTHER	DESCRIPTION
73	8000-		LIQ PAYMT
80	89000		CPA EX CR
96	8000		FED TAX F

REMARKS:

Changing tax code for the quarter and reducing tax to $80.00 per memo, dated JULY 1968.

EMPLOYEE NUMBER:

802799 ORPHONE

FORM 8-63 1314 Previous editions obsolete (20-51)

SECRET

ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION DATA								REFUND DUE FROM EMPLOYEE			NET PAY		
PP	OT/HRS	NT/HRS	HD/HRS	RATE	O/T-NT AMT	H/D AMOUNT		CD	NORMAL	OTHER	CD	NORMAL	OTHER
											00		

REMARKS:

PAID AT HQS.

FORM 8-63 1315A

SECRET

(20-51)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING; XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED; ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING; MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WOLIME

INFO. Chief of Station, London
Chief, EUR Division

FROM: Chief, LCPIPIT/London

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/Operational
QRPHONE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. After considering several alternatives and given QRPHONE/1's lack of financial forward planning, LCPIPIT believes that it would be beneficial and advantageous for WOFIRM to offer to subsidize a portion of an overt life insurance program designed to give him both life insurance and a cash value toward retirement. We have discussed this with QRPHONE/1 and he has agreed to the desirability of such a program. He is willing to participate in such an arrangement and has undertaken to explore the possibilities available to him. We are forwarding under separate cover a copy of several proposals which he has received from the local representative of a reputable WOLADY insurance firm.

2. LCPIPIT requests authority to subsidize up to 1/2 of the cost of a life insurance program for QRPHONE/1. (This WOFIRM portion not to exceed $50 per month.) From an administration standpoint this would merely take the form of an increased monthly payment and we would take the necessary steps to verify that the funds were indeed being devoted to their designated purpose.

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Attachment: u/s/c
As stated above

DOC FORWARDED U/S S/C BY RID/SD 29 OCT 1968

Distribution:
3 - C/WOLIME w/att
1 - COS/London w/o att
1 - C/EUR w/o att

RYBAT CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPA-1397	OCT 2? 1968 22 October 1968
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-306?052

14-00000

> C at. chmen – to OEPA-1397

J. SPENCER LANGFORD, C.L.U.

REPRESENTING

MUTUAL LIFE OF NEW YORK

(MONY)

31 QUEEN ANNE'S GATE

LONDON, S.W.1

01-930 971?

13 September 1968

Dear

The following will give you an idea of the protection, cash at 65, and retirement income you will get under three different plans on the basis we discussed on the phone. Let me know if you need any more information.

Premium -	$50/month	$ 75/month	$100/month
Plan Type			
Whole Life			
Death Benefit	23000	35000	47000
Cash at 65	21200	33100	44400
Life Income @ 65	133	207	278
Endowment at 65			
Death Benefit	17000	25000	33000
Cash at 65	25600	38100	50300
Life Income @ 65	160	239	315
Retirement Endowment @ 65			
Death Benefit	11000	17000	23000
Cash at 65	25300	39100	52900
Life Income @ 65	158	245	331

I look forward to hearing from you in the near future.

1 - The retirement income figures are monthly income at 65 using the 10 year certain option

CS COPY

Note:

I would be willing to put up, or have deducted, part of such a scheme, say $25 a month.

201-306052

2 - Any figures concerning dividends are not guarantees nor estimates since dividends depend upon future experience and the annual action of the companies trustees

3 - All figures are in the US dollars and based on standard male issue at age 37.

Sincerely,

Spencer

J Spencer Langford, C. L. U.

ORIG: DIANE L. CHATELAN
UNIT: CA/CF
EXT: 7767
DATE: 9 Oct 68

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 11

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 46 PER

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NO INDEX / FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/CA 3 — RID COPY
INFO: FILE, VR, C/EUR/BC, C/EUR 4, C/CI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 10 21 22 z OCT 68 CITE DIRECTOR 40570

TO LCPIPIT INFO LONDON, ROME

RYBAT DTDORIC QRPHONE MHPROBE

REFS: A. LCPIPIT 7508 (IN 08511)

B. OEPW - 405, 8 Oct 68

1. DEFER PARA 2 REF A TO ROME (PER OIRW-27586, TELEPOUCHED ~~TODAY~~ 9 OCT).

2. REF B, POUCHED 8 OCT, REPORTS GENERALLY SANGUINE MEDICAL PROGNOSIS QRPHONE/1 HEALTH FOLLOWING HEPATITIS, PERMITS SHORT TRIPS TO CONTINENT PROVIDED HE WATCHES DIET CAREFULLY AND DOES NOT OVER TIRE, UNTIL CLINICAL AND CHEMICAL TESTS RECOMMENDED IN REF B PRONOUNCE HIM FULLY RECOVERED.

3. FILE 200-124-156/3.

END OF MESSAGE

EUR/1 [signature]
EUR/BC/UK [signature]

Q/201

[signature]
C/CA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

[signature]
DIANE L. CHATELAN
Chief, CA/CF
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

COPY NO.

DISPATCH

RYBAT SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: XX MARKED FOR INDEXING

TO: Chief, LCPIPIT/London

INFO: Chief of Station, London

FROM: Chief, WOLIME

SUBJECT: RYBAT/DTDORIC/ORPHONE
ORPHONE/1 Physical Condition

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: OEPA-1312, 10 September 1968

1. On the basis of the documentation submitted under reference dispatch, the Medical Staff feels that ORPHONE/1 made a surprisingly fast recovery and seems well on the way to complete health. However, the hospital report (a quick translation of which into English is attached for your ready reference), dated as it is, still reflects some inconclusive levels in the results of the various chemical tests shown. Undoubtedly these have by now been lowered to completely safe levels, since ORPHONE/1 apparently felt well enough to travel to France, but the Medical Staff believes it would be advisable for ORPHONE/1 to undergo another series of liver function tests, to include the following:

a. SGOT
b. SGPT
c. Bilirubin (1) Direct
(2) Indirect
(3) Total
d. B.S.P. (Bromsulfophthalein)
e. Serum Proteins
Albumin
Globulin
Total

We assume ORPHONE/1 has consulted his own physician on his return to the UK, but the Medical Staff has pointed out that clinical examination alone is not always sufficient to determine complete recovery from hepatitis.

(continued)

Attachment:
Hospital report

Distribution:
2 - Chief, LCPIPIT/London w/att
1 - COS, London w/o/att

CS COPY

8 OCT 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPW - 405	7 October 1968

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFICATION: RYBAT SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-306052

1 - EUR/BC/UK
1 - RID - files
2 - CA/CF

ABSTRACT X INDEX

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	TYPIST	OFFICER	EXT.
CA/CF	gm	Diane L. Chatelan	7767

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
OMS/OD		Dr. Patrick
EUR/BC/UK	7 OCT 1968	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DC/CA	8/10/68	Fred W. Valtin

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

2. In terms of our operational utilization of QRPHONE/1 at this time, while they reserve finite comment until all the returns (per above) are in, the Medical Staff did stress the paramount importance of proper rest and of not over-taxing the strength of the agent, coupled with his strict adherence to regular, warm, balanced meals in accordance with the dietary restrictions usually imposed, and complete absence of alcohol, in order to prevent a relapse. So long as these caveats are adhered to, however, there is no reason why he could not make some more short trips during the next few months, if necessary. However, since he also has an office to set up and we would like him to concentrate on the Kambona offer, perhaps it would be a good idea to keep those trips to a minimum for the time being.

3. The Medical Staff will be glad to review any further chemical tests per para. 1 above suggestions, or any others which his doctor may have already run.

JULIA R. CONGREVE

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WOLIME

INFO.: Chief of Station, London
Chief, EUR Division

FROM: Acting Chief, LCPIPIT/London (PARFORTH Acting)

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/Operational
QRPHONE/Illness

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. At their meeting on 4 September QRPHONE/1 submitted a report to RODIGAST on his hospitalization for hepatitis. Attached to his report is a copy of this medical record with results of blood and urine analyses written in Serbo-Croatian. We are forwarding a copy of the report under separate cover for evaluation by the Medical Staff. We are interested in having as thorough as possible an evaluation made of QRPHONE/1's illness in order that we may assure ourselves of his condition and the degree to which he ought to be active in the forthcoming months. We will appreciate it if Headquarters will pursue this matter with the Medical Staff and advise us of its findings and recommendations.

2. Also forwarded under separate cover is a memorandum prepared from RODIGAST's notes which elaborates upon QRPHONE/1's symptoms.

ACP

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Attachment: u/s/c
1 - QRPHONE/1 Report & Medical Record
2 - Memorandum for the Record

Distribution:
3 - C/WOLIME w/atts
1 - COS/London w/o atts
1 - C/EUR w/o atts

DOC FORWARDED U/O S/C
BY RII ... 12 Sep 68

CS COPY

201 - 305052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPA-1312	10 September 1968
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT 1 TO: OEPA-1312

HEPATITIS BOUT

What I had thought was a touch of malaria and the extreme fatigue I felt when I returned to London in July proved in time to have been acute infectious hepatitis. The disease -- which takes two to three weeks to develop -- was probably contracted in Uganda. At least, I imagine so because my principal contact in Kampala insisted on taking me to a number of local restaurants of dubious cleanliness to sample Uganda delicacies.

Hepatitis was diagnosed by a doctor in Komiza, Vis, where my family had been holidaying since the beginning of July, and I was hospitalized in the isolation section of Split Hospital (there is no hospital on Vis) on the 7th of August.

My liver was swollen by one finger and blood and urine analysis indicated a fairly severe infection. Treatment consisted of terramycin and cortisone therapy, with massive doses of vitamins.

I was put on a fat-free diet, which I have been told to follow for at least six months. Naturally, no alcohol.

On 20 August, I was released from the hospital, mainly because I was pestering the doctors to let me go. I was told to have "absolute rest" for four to six weeks and to have another blood test within several weeks.

(Attached is the Yugoslav doctor's description of my case and treatment, with results of all blood and urine analyses. It is written ~~Croatian~~ in Serbo-Croatian.)

#14 [illegible] to OEPA 1312

201-306055-2

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT 2 TO:
OEPA-1312

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 7 September 1968

SUBJECT: [redacted] Illness

1. The following information was obtained by [redacted] from [redacted]/1 at their meeting on 4 September 1968. It supplements the report which was submitted by [redacted]/1 which deals with his recent hospitalization for hepatitis.

2. Toward the end of his African trip [redacted]/1 had been feeling rather weak and nauseous, with no appetite. He was constipated, feverish and had gas pains. These symptoms persisted and after his return from Africa and on 6 August, while in Yugoslavia on vacation, [redacted]/1 suffered from acute gas pains and vomiting. He was taken from Vis, where he was vacationing, to Split where he was hospitalized. The address of this hospital is:

Opca Bolnica
Zarazni Odjel (Firule)
Split, Yugoslavia

His doctor was Dr. Juraj FILIPOVIC.

3. [redacted]/1's treatment was free inasmuch as he was able to show his British National Health Card and a reciprocity agreement exists between Britain and Yugoslavia.

4. [redacted]/1 states that at no time did he receive narcotics nor was he ever unconscious. During his stay in the hospital a young British youth (Derek WHITTAKER, age 19, from Shoreham-by-Sea, Surrey) was in his ward suffering from food poisioning.

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

#2 s/c att to OEPA 1312 201-306052

att to OEPA-1312 10 Sept 68

Admitted to the section for infectious diseases 7. August, 1968

Observation: Malaria

Medical history: The patient had felt for about a week definite weakness, lack of appetite, an inclination to eructation and distress, a somewhat feverish temperature, heaviness under the right rib cage and in stomach.

Clinical observation under hair follicles showed: subicteric, afebrile, the liver + the epigastrium about 1. p.f., slight feeling accompanied by other regular findings.

Hepatitis tests showed damage of the liver parenchyma of an average nature, resembling infectious hepatitis.

Clinical course: Icterus progressed in the first 2 days, till corticostroide was introduced in the body, after which there began an improvement and the Icterus disappeared.

After 8 days the whitish-red disappeared from the urine, appetite was restored, abdominal pains disappeared and after 13 days a control hepatogram was made / see findings /.

As it was necessary to continue

treatment of the disease, the patient asked to be discharged under medical supervision.

Diagnosis: Acute infectious hepatitis

Treatment: Only Serbo-Croatian words translated in this section. names of drugs are English

Discharged — 20 Aug 1968 as recovered

The patient needs to observe absolute quiet + stay at home, follow diet as instructed, under supervision of doctor and control of hepatogram for about 14 days.

He will continue with the recommended medicines [medicines

not translated. Only Serbo-Croatian words translated [kroz 3 dana / for 3 days, kroz 5 dana / for 5 days]

and further depending on the condition of the patient /ULTER tbl/ while he takes dexason/

Translation penciled in on attachment, where meanings could be found.

SECRET

EPIKRIZA:

primljen na zarazni odjel 7.VIII.68 pod dg:
Observatio-Malariae

Anamnestički: zadnj. . oko tj. dva dana osjeća izvjesnu slabost, napetanost i [illegible], eruktaciju, nevoljkost i subfebrilne temperature, te težinu pod desnim rebrenim lukom, i [illegible]. Kliničkim pregledom kod dolaska utvrdi se subikteričan, afebrilan, jetra opipljiva za oko 1 p.p., lagano osjetljiva uz uredan ostali nalaz.

Hepatalni testovi ukazuju na oštećenje jetrenog parenhima srednje jakog intenziteta, odgovarajući slici infekcioznog hepatitisa.

Klinički subikterus progredira u prvih par dana, dok se ne uvede u terapiju kortikosteroide, nakon čega očito dolazi do poboljšanja općeg stanja, to iščezavanja ikterusa.

Nakon 8 dana nestaje bilirubin iz mokraće, apetit uspostavljen, [illegible] tegobe iščezavaju, te se nakon 15. dana napravi kontrolni hepatogram/vidi nalaz/.

Iako je bilo potrebno nastaviti liječenje u bolnici, bolesnik želi otpust, te se uz upute otpušta.

DIAGNOZA: HEPATITIS INFECTIOSA ACUTA

LIJEČEN: Bevitplex drag-C vit tbl-[illegible]-cholin drag-Teria [illegible] caps-Dexason amp i tbl-Ulter tbl-Antipernicin amp+[illegible] amp+Aneurin amp-Digestal tbl-Dijeta.

OTPUŠTEN: 20.VIII.68.kao poboljšan.

Potrebno je nastaviti apsolutno mirovanje u kućnoj njezi, dijetalnu ishranu po uputi, te kontrolu liječnika, te kontrolu hepatograma za oko 10-14 dana.

Od lijekova preporuča se nastaviti Bevitplex drag 3x2-[illegible] cholin drag 3x2-[illegible] caps 4x1-Dexason tbl/4x1 kroz 3 dana, 3x1-2 dana, 2x1 kroz 3 dana, a dalje prema stanju bolesnika/ Ulter tbl/dok uzima dexason/-

Odjelni liječnik:
/dr.J.[illegible]ević/

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SECRET

SECRET

... dir.

indir.

ukup.

Thymol

Meulengracht ukup

Cjel. bjelančevine

Albumini

Globulini

Weltman

Sublimat test

Alkalna fosfataza: 5 K.j. - alkale (?) phosphate

SGOT=4o6 W.j.
SGPT=7oo W.j.
SE=12mm
L=4.1oo
DKS: eo 1, st 5, seg.31, Ly 56, mo 7
E=4,14o.ooo
Hb: 86%
I.B.=1,o
Fe=242 gamma %
Cu=15o " "
Gusta kap - drop of blood smear
Razmaz krvi malarija Ø - malaria

Urin: alb. -+
urobil. 1:32
bil. ++
sahh. Ø - sediment
Sed: nešto L i sluzi - some L in service

sugar
ŠUK=93mg%

14.VIII
URIN: alb trag
urob. 1:4
bil. Ø - sediment
Sed: 3-4 L na sv. vid. polju small type of fields

19.VIII

... dir.

indir.

ukup.

Thymol

Meulengracht

Cjel. bj.

Albumini

Globulini

Weltman

Sublimat test

SGOT = ...
SGPT = ...

SECRET

14-00000

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AN	FI	
PS	DEST	RF/CF
ABSTRACT	X	INDEX

S E C R E T 061556Z SEP 68 CITE LCPIPIT 5726 (PARFORTH ACTING) [OALP]

DIRECTOR INFO LONDON

RYBAT DTDORIC QRPHONE

6 SEP 68 IN 86805

1. QRPHONE/1 MET 4 SEPTEMBER IN BRUSSELS. HE NOW UP AND ABOUT FOLLOWING HOSPITALIZATION FOR HEPATITUS BUT MUST SEVERELY RESTRICT ACTIVITIES FOR AT LEAST NEXT MONTH. SOME ITEMS OF INTEREST OBTAINED WHICH BEING FORWARDED BY TM.

2. NEXT MEETING SET UP FOR DUBLIN 18 SEPTEMBER.

S E C R E T

BT

CS COPY

201-306052

SECRET

14-00000

c F

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

STATEMENT of EARNINGS and DEDUCTIONS

NAME	EMPLOYEE NO	PAY PERIOD DATE	ROLL	COST CENTER	STA
CRPHONE 1	802799	08/01 08/31	20	1242930	000

1968

CD	EARNINGS NORMAL	EARNINGS OTHER	DESCRIPTION
09	89000	2000	REG SAL

NOTE: THIS FORM IS ISSUED ONLY WHEN AN EMPLOYEE ENTERS ON DUTY OR THERE IS ANY CHANGE IN THE PAY ACCOUNT

CD	DEDUCTIONS NORMAL	DEDUCTIONS OTHER	DESCRIPTION
73	9000-	2000-	LIQ PAYMT
80	89000	2000	CPA EX CR
96	9000	2000	FED TAX F

REMARKS:
Amendment for additional compensation and tax liability increased from $870.00 to $890.00 per month for free compensation at $800.00 per month, effective 1 July 1968. Actual amount of tax liability increased from $70.00 to $90.00 per month, for the July 1968 pay period.

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: CRPHONE - 1

802799

FORM 8-63 1314 Previous editions obsolete

SECRET

CA/oro

ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION DATA								REFUND DUE FROM EMPLOYEE			NET PAY		
PP	OT/HRS	HT/HRS	ND/HRS	RATE	O/T-HT AMT	N/D AMOUNT		CD	NORMAL	OTHER	CD	NORMAL	OTHER
											00		

REMARKS:

PAID AT HQS.

FORM 8-63 1315A

SECRET

14-00000

and Trust Company of Chicago

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC.

CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

American National Bank

and Trust Company of Chicago

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC.

3708 S. STATE 324-6520

CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

Richard Gibson

Two Hundred 4 no/100

American National Bank

and Trust Company of Chicago

14-00000

PAYEZ A L'ORDRE DE
UNION DE BANQUES SUISSES

1-8 NEW YORK, N.Y. 1-8

01 14.69 608 5225

BY BARCLAYS BANK LTD.

P.E.G.

1-30

14-00000

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC.
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

10-25 19

PAY TO THE ORDER OF Richard Gibson

Two Hundred

DOLLARS

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

⑈001260⑈ ⑆0710⑆00778 339022⑈

[illegible]

14-00000

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC.
5708 S. STATE
CHICAGO, ILL.

1172

PAY TO THE ORDER OF

DOLLARS

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC.
5708 S. STATE 324-6320
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

1166

2-77/710

PAY TO THE ORDER OF Richard Gibson

DOLLARS

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC.
5708 S. STATE 324-6320
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

1155

4-26 19

2-77/710

PAY TO THE ORDER OF Richard Gibson $200.00

Two Hundred & no/100 DOLLARS

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

⑆001155⑆ ⑆0710⑉0077⑆

14-00000

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC.
5708 S. STATE 324-6320
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

PAY TO THE ORDER OF

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

⑆0011498⑆ ⑆0710-0077⑆ 339028⑈ ⑆0000030000⑆

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC. 1144
5708 S. STATE 324-6320
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

439177

2-77/710

PAY TO THE ORDER OF

DOLLARS

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

⑆0011448⑆ ⑆0710⑆0077⑆ 339028⑈ ⑆0000030000⑆

SECRET

Chief of Station, London/LCPIPIT

Office of Finance

Increased Federal Income Tax Liability - QRPHONE-1, Employee No. 802799

Steve
Gayle - file

In compliance with the recent Enactment of the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, Subject's tax liability has increased from $70.00 to $90.00 per month. This represents the additional Surtax charge and begins with the July 1968 pay period. Effective 1 December 1968 (1969 tax year) the tax liability will be reduced to $80.00 per month. The Station should effect the change and continue to T/A tax withholdings to Headquarters.

HARRIET C. VINCOLEER

Distribution:
3 - C/S, London/LCPIPIT

15 AUG 1968

OSPB-396 8 August 1968

SECRET

2 - CA/Staff
1 - EUR/Div.
3 - APB/CAAS
2 - OP/Registry

CMTD/APB/CAAS/THorsley:bj (8 August 1968) 8213

C/CA/EF

Q-201

C/EUR/SS 13 AUG 1968

Richard Gibson Reports

International news & features

Opća Bolnica
Zarazni Odjel
(Firule)
Split
Yugoslavia

13 August 1968.

Dear Mrs. Randall,

Unexpectedly, I found myself in this hospital in Split, Yugoslavia, on the 7th of August, confined to the isolation ward with a fairly rough case of infectious hepatitis, undoubtedly picked up in West Africa. (They tell me the incubation period is about 3 weeks.) In any case, I am hoping to be released from here in another 10 or 15 days at the most. The treatment is good and seems thorough. My biggest problem was originally linguistic. I still speak with the doctors, who know no English, in German or Italian, but my knowledge of Serbo-Croatian has increased steadily with the injections, blood testing and intravenous injections of glucosaline solution, etc.

The urgency behind this note is, through you, to inform the firm of my condition. I hope to return to London — without many, if any, days on the beach — as planned, but I am told that I should restrict my activities physically for another month. There are many things to do in Britain and on the Continent, but I regret not being able to undertake the conference assignment in September, at

least, I do not think my strength will be sufficiently restored for that event. Anyway, we shall see...

Fortunately, my family is on Vis, an island 5 hours boatride from Split, and have not had their vacation completely ruined because of me. Since this is an isolation hospital for infectious diseases, no visitors are allowed and there is no temptation or urgency on my wife to make that lengthy crossing just to see me. For me, also, my holiday on the beach in the sun has simply turned into lying on my back in a hot room, but it could be worse and I hope to be up and about in the next week or two, at most. I feel certain that I will be able to meet all my major commitments in London and elsewhere at the beginning of September but wanted to draw the firm's attention, as soon as possible, to my possible inability to handle another big assignment immediately.

Very sincerely yours,

Richard Gibson



14-00000

FBI doc.
6 Aug 68 (NY)
Re: The "Guardian," Formerly Known
as "National Guardian," Weekly
Guardian Associates, Inc.
Bufile: 100-357044
NY file: 100-93572

14-00000

CF

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

STATEMENT of EARNINGS and DEDUCTIONS

NAME	EMPLOYEE NO	PAY PERIOD DATE	ROLL	COST CENTER	STA
QRPHONE 1	802799	04/01 04/30	20	1240062	000

CD	EARNINGS NORMAL	EARNINGS OTHER	DESCRIPTION
09	74600		REG SAL

NOTE:
THIS FORM IS ISSUED ONLY WHEN AN EMPLOYEE ENTERS ON DUTY OR THERE IS ANY CHANGE IN THE PAY ACCOUNT

CD	DEDUCTIONS NORMAL	DEDUCTIONS OTHER	DESCRIPTION
80	74600		CPA EX CR
96	4600	7200	FED TAX F

REMARKS:

T/A 270 from London transferred taxes for the month of Dec., Jan., and Feb. in the amount of $210.00. $70.00 for each. payrolled was $46.00 each month, adjustment made herewith. Sub-object code changes for Accounting Only.

EMPLOYEE NUMBER:
QRPHONE/1

802799

FORM 8-63 1314 Previous editions obsolete

CA/Staff 000 (30-51)

SECRET

ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION DATA								REFUND DUE FROM EMPLOYEE			NET PAY		
PP	OT/HRS	HT/HRS	ND/HRS	RATE	O/T-HT AMT	N/D AMOUNT		CD	NORMAL	OTHER	CD	NORMAL	OTHER
								86	4600	7200.00			

REMARKS:

PAID AT HQS

FORM 8-63 1315A

SECRET

(30-51)

2

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

ORIG: DIANE L. CHATELAN
UNIT: CA/CF
EXT: 7767
DATE: 23 Apr 68

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 3 PER

CONF: CA5 [X] RID COPY

[ ] INDEX [ ] DESTROY [ ] RETURN TO BRANCH [ ] FILE RID
[ ] NO INDEX [ ] FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-124-156/2

INFO: FILE, VR, 3R8, CA/PROP, C/IC2, CA/PEG, MPS/RB2

SECRET (classification) 27 16 41 Z (date and time filed) CITE DIRECTOR 95170 (reference number)

TO LCPIPIT INFO LONDON

DTDORIC QRPREY QRPHONE

REF: OEPA 1003, 19 MARCH 68

MOC APPROVED.

END OF MESSAGE

CA/PERS
CA/B&F
DC/CA
EUR/BC/UK

C/CA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

DIANE L. CHATELAN
Chief, CA/CF
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

April 66

REVISED MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENT

1. QRPHONE/1 collaborates with WOFIRM as a Field Agent who provides certain services of a confidential nature. He has received a Provisional Operational Approval, dated 23 MAY 66. Financial aspects of his activity are charged to approved Project QRPHONE.

2. QRPHONE/1's employment by WOFIRM, which began 1 June 1965, was originally formalized by a Letter of Agreement for a period of three months, replaced by a Memorandum of Oral Commitment dated 1 September 1965. Under this MOC, which remains in effect (as amended) since that date, QRPHONE/1's employment continues on a month-to-month basis. It can be terminated by either party on a 30-day notice.

3. QRPHONE/1 receives the following financial entitlements:

a. Compensation so computed as to give QRPHONE/1 a "tax-free" income of $800 per month (this figure effective 1 July 1967).
NOTE: The actual breakdown of QRPHONE/1's finances as carried on WOFIRM's books is $800 monthly salary and $70 per month tax supplement withheld at Headquarters to discharge QRPHONE/1's WOLADY tax obligation. These taxes are remitted through the Covert Tax Committee. This procedure was devised to honor the original "tax free" commitment made at the time of his recruitment and at the same time to fulfill the requirement that all WOLADY citizens pay taxes on funds received from LNFORT.

b. Reimbursement for operational expenses and travel unless these are paid by other sources in which case WOFIRM will offset such outside reimbursement against WOFIRM financial obligations to QRPHONE/1. Since security considerations preclude processing of detailed accountings for miscellaneous operational expenses, and as an added inducement to QRPHONE/1 in connection with his obtaining certain confidential information of interest to WOFIRM, a small operational payment, as authorized by Chief, LCPIPIT will be made to QRPHONE/1 for each day during which he is required to be absent from his home on confidential business.
NOTE: Write-off of the funds passed to QRPHONE/1 is to be effected on the basis of the procedure approved by Chief, LCPIPIT and COS/London, a copy of which is attached. This procedure is authorized in view of the security considerations applicable to QRPHONE/1 and the need to limit the knowledge of this operation within WOMACE.

c. QRPHONE/1 is authorized to receive a non-accountable office allowance of $100 per month.

4. QRPHONE/1 will be compensated by WOFIRM in an amount mutually agreed upon for the relocation of himself and his family to a new residence if such relocation is considered desirable by him and WOFIRM. NOTE: This provision was included in QRPHONE/1's original Letter of Agreement and was retained in this MOC since it may be operationally desirable for QRPHONE/1 to accept employment with a target organization based elsewhere.

5. WOFIRM has arranged for a portion of QRPHONE/1's financial entitlements to be funded to him by QRPURE, which has also agreed to repatriate QRPHONE/1 to WOLADY. This has been done for operational reasons to enable QRPHONE/1 to qualify for foreign residence. Should QRPURE be obliged to honor this commitment, WOFIRM will guarantee this QRPURE commitment and will reimburse QRPURE for any costs incurred.

6. LCPIPIT is authorized to approve purchase by QRPHONE/1 of certain items of operational equipment which are to be non-accountable and which shall be charged against the operational expense category of approved Project QRPHONE.

7. QRPHONE/1 signed a separate Secrecy Agreement (in true name) at the time of his original recruitment. He is aware that its provisions are still in effect.

8. QRPHONE/1 is aware that he may be required, from time to time, to undertake an SGSWIRL.

9. QRPHONE/1 is aware of all provisions of the Memorandum of Oral Commitment with the exceptions of paragraph 6, which describes an internal WOFIRM procedure; certain aspects of paragraph 3a--specifically that WOFIRM is paying LNFORT taxes in his behalf; and certain aspects of paragraph 3b--specifically the procedure for write-off of funds since this is an internal WOFIRM procedure.

SIGNED: Aaron C Laginestra
Aaron C. LAGINESTRA
Case Officer

REVIEWED AND APPROVED:

Maslott

Adrian B. MASLOTT
Chief, LCPIPIT

Date

SBHasso Jr - 26apr 68 April 25, 1968

O + 2 to CPD - 26apr 68
(1 for FD
1 for CCS)

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

ORIG: DIANE L. CHATELAN
UNIT: CA/CF
EXT: 7767
DATE: 23 Apr 68

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 3 PER

CONF: CA 5 [X] RID COPY

[ ] INDEX [ ] DESTROY [ ] RETURN TO ____ BRANCH [ ] FILE RID

[ ] NO INDEX [ ] FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-124-156/2

INFO: FILE, VR, DDP, CA/PROP, C/IC 2, CA/PEG, MPS/RG2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 27 16 41 Z CITE DIRECTOR 95140

TO LCPIPIT INFO LONDON

DTDORIC QRPREY QRPHONE

REF: OEPA 1003, 19 MARCH 68

MOC APPROVED.

END OF MESSAGE

CA/PERS [signature]
CA/B&F [signature]
DC/CA [signature]
EUR/BC/UK [signature]

201

[signature]
C/CA

[signature]
DIANE L. CHATELAN
Chief, CA/CF

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

COPY NO.

14-00000

SECRET

23 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/CA/SG

VIA: DC/CA

SUBJECT: QRPHONE/1 Memorandum of Oral Commitment

1. Forwarded herewith is the original revised MOC for QRPHONE/1, submitted by LCPIPIT under OEPA - 1003, dated 19 March 1968. The field requests notification of approval.

2. The MOC appears to cover adequately all points previously at issue; it is therefore requested that, subject to DC/CA approval and CA/PERS and CA/B&F concurrence, the attached outgoing cable to LCPIPIT signifying this approval be coordinated and released.

3. It is also requested that the MOC be further transmitted to the Office of Finance, via appropriate administrative procedures.

DIANE L. CHATELAN
Chief, CA/CF

Attachments: 2
MOC for QRPHONE/1
Cable to field

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
2 - CA/CF ✓

SECRET

201

Who said he is CIA agent:

1. Andersson said Hamza Alavi told Franz Fanon Institute in 1964 Gibson an Am. agent (Eb. rept. 18/2/66)

2. William Demby said he had recently been assured by Ignazio Silone Gibson was a CIA agent (Gibson had not seen Silone since 1952) (20/2/66 – Eb Rome rept.) (Demby said he had been accused of the same thing, by whom unspecified.)

3. "British" professor, China hand, told Franz Fanon Institute

Leese – Gibson
201

BRITISH VISA GRANTED

On 10 April 68, I was finally granted a British visa, without restrictions, valid until 15 Feb. 1969. No questions were asked when I went to the Home Office to get the visa.

My Home Office file number is: G 110880.

From the Metropolitan Police, I received Aliens Registration Certificate E 662567, which lists me as correspondent for Negro Press International.

I was told by the police that I could apply within a year to have the registration requirement waivered because I am married to a British subject. Moreover, I am free to take any sort of employment or open a business without restrictions or having to request permission from the Ministry of Labour.

Tmd 017385 23/4/68

14-00000

B.E.1

1070

HOME OFFICE

Princeton House, 271 High Holborn, LONDON W.C.1
Telegrams: Aldep, London WC1
Telephone 01-405 4321
Telex 261867

Please address any reply to
THE UNDER SECRETARY
OF STATE
and quote: G 11 0180
Your reference:

10.4.68

Name	
Nationality U.S.C.	Date of Birth 17.5.31
Passport Particulars U.S. Passport no. issued on 1.12.65.	

This is to certify that the bearer of this letter, named above, does not require to obtain permission of the Ministry of Labour or of the Home Office before taking employment, either paid or unpaid, in Great Britain. (For work in Northern Ireland the Ministry of Labour and National Insurance for Northern Ireland should be consulted.) The bearer is free, so far as the Home Office is concerned, to set up in business, subject to any statutory laws and regulations governing the business or professional activities in which he/she may be interested.

This letter should be retained for production to the Ministry of Labour or other authority if required.

[signature]

for Under Secretary of State

TN# 072385/ 23/4/68

INLAND REVENUE MONOLOGUE (required)

Until April of this year (1968), I lived mainly on assistance from my wife's family and occasional freelance journalism outside Britain. Also, I had some savings and investments in America and Switzerland to draw upon. My brother-in-law, Gordon Kaye, purchased a house at 32 Hartswood Road, Stamford Brook, London, W.12 for us — the price of the house being considered a loan to be repaid over the years as is possible. My children's school fees were paid by convenant by my brother-in-law, as well as a grant in convenant to my youngest daughter.

I was not a legal resident of the U.K. until 8 April 1968, and on that date I began officially my duties as Overseas Representative and Correspondent for Negro Press International of Chicago, with a salary of $300 per month.

TM# 072385, 23/4/68

1072

My brother-in-law askod me to send him from abroad the following lètter, which I mailed on 16 April 68 from Rotterdam.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Jeffreys, Henry Rxx Rudolph & Marks
Lee House
Londonx Wall, E.C.2

Dear Sirs,

In response to the Inspector's request, I confirm that I have xxxx authorized my wife, Mrs. , to apply for Monique's income repayment for 1967. And I also confirm that she has no other incomex other than the XXXX Covenant for that year.

Yours faithfully,

TN# 072385, 23/4/68

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING; XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED; ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING; MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WOLIME

INFO: Chief of Station, London
Chief, EUR Division

FROM: Chief, LCPIPIT/London

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/MHPROBE/Operational
QRPHONE/Memorandum of Oral Commitment

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. OEPW-160, dated 18 October 1967
B. OEPA-240, dated 21 September 1967

1. Forwarded under separate cover is a revised Memorandum of Oral Commitment covering the WOFIRM relationship with QRPHONE/1. This revision reflects most of the suggestions made in Reference A.

2. As said in Reference B, QRPHONE/1 does not fall into the category of WOFIRM asset usually handled by LCPIPIT. This fact plus the very stringent security considerations which must apply to this operation dictate that certain procedure be followed in QRPHONE/1's case. Handling of this case has been facilitated by Headquarters' understanding and approval of the need for such care.

3. We request that this revised Memorandum of Oral Commitment be approved, and that we be so notified.

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Attachment: u/s/c
Memorandum

Distribution:
3 - C/WOLIME w/att
1 - COS/London w/o att
1 - C/EUR w/o att

QRPHONE
301

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPA-1003	19 March 1968
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER

REVISED MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENT

1. QRPHONE/1 collaborates with WOFIRM as a Field Agent who provides certain services of a confidential nature. He has received a Provisional Operational Approval, dated 27 MAY 66. Financial aspects of his activity are charged to approved Project QRPHONE.

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SECRET

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SIGNED: Aaron C Laginestra
Aaron C. LAGINESTRA
Case Officer

REVIEWED AND APPROVED:

Maslott

Adrian B. MASLOTT
Chief, LCPIPIT

Date

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: QRPHONE/1 FINANCES

1. This memorandum outlines a new procedure which is to be followed in the handling of the operational costs of field agent QRPHONE/1. This new procedure is being instituted in order to enhance the security and compartmentation of the handling of the administrative aspect of this project and parallels revisions in the handling of operational traffic. The new procedure which is discussed below is in accordance with accepted field procedures.

2. Currently QRPHONE/1 receives advances and accounts for these with detailed statements of expenses accompanied by true name receipts, etc. These accountings and the accompanying receipts have been maintained in the LCPIPIT files. This system is to be changed. Henceforth monies for operational expenses will be given to QRPHONE/1 by his handler (Career Agent Rufus P. RODIGAST) and will be carried on RODIGAST's accountings as operational expenses supported by receipts from QRPHONE/1 acknowledging receipt of the funds. This RODIGAST accounting and the QRPHONE/1 receipt will be used for write-off of the funds against approved project QRPHONE. No detailed accountings and no receipts carrying QRPHONE/1's true name are to be maintained in the LCPIPIT/Admin files.

3. It will be the responsibility of Chief, LCPIPIT and the project case officer to ensure that QRPHONE/1 is supplied with the funds necessary for the furtherance of the operation and to ensure that these amounts are carefully controlled to avoid overpayment. In discharging this responsibility the Chief, LCPIPIT may require QRPHONE/1 to itemize the various expenses to be covered by the payments.

APPROVED:

[signature] 1/29/68

Chief, LCPIPIT Date

[signature] 8 Feb. 68

Chief of Station, London Date

SECRET

14-00000

FBI doc
30 Jan. 68 (Wash.)
Re: Richard Thomas Gibson
no Bufile given

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING; XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED; ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING; MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WOLIME
Chief of Station, Bern

INFO.: Chief of Station, London; Chief of Base; Geneva; Chief, EUR Division

FROM: Chief, LCPIPIT/London

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/MHPROBE/Operational
QRPHONE/Switzerland

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. GENEVA-2464
B. LCPIPIT-1711

1. We are forwarding under separate cover a copy of QRPHONE/1's report on his expulsion from Switzerland. In it QRPHONE/1 concludes that the Swiss Border Police must have learned of his planned arrival through a phone tap on a call he made to Lausanne from Italy on the 18th of January.

2. Regarding QRPHONE/1's statement in paragraph two of his report concerning his having visited Switzerland many times since 1963, please see PALP-4738 of 1 October 1965.

3. QRPHONE/1 has been instructed not to pursue any further protests with the authorities (either Swiss or American) over this matter.

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Attachment: u/s/c
Report

Distribution:
3 - C/WOLIME w/att
2 - COS/Bern w/att
1 - COS/London w/o att
1 - C/EUR w/o att —— EUR/BC/UK, who given copy of attachment, will route to Swiss desk
1 - COB/Geneva w/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
200-124-156/3	OEPA-892 (CS COPY)	6 February 1968
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-306052

XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

#XXXXXX

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO:

OEPA-892

ARREST AND EXPULSION FROM SWITZERLAND

Brigue, 20 Jan. 1968.

The Milan-Geneva TEE reached the Swiss border at Brigue at about 1030. It was evident that the Border Police were expecting me -- the usual lone civilian inspector of passports was accompanied by a uniformed policeman. I was taken, with baggage, to the station immigration office. My wife went with me, but was apparently not covered by the ban on me. When the official in charge of the office phoned Lausanne and Berne, he was informed that I was to be expelled immediately and that they did not want to interrogate me.

Great effort was made by the official in charge of the office to be polite, especially when I made a rather vigorous protest at the expulsion, claiming that I had never been informed of the ban on my entry in Switzerland, said to date from 16 Dec. 1963, and that, in any case, I had visited Switzerland on numerous occasions since 1963 without interference. Moreover, I was a professional journalist accredited to the United Nations and was indeed on my way to Geneva to visit the U.N. Office there, I said. The official seemed somewhat baffled by this, because he had been informed I was en route to Lausanne, but I showed my tickets valid to Geneva. Nevertheless, with the greatest of apologies, I was escorted -- this time by a plainclothesman -- to a train back to Italy at 1130. My wife could have stayed in Switzerland but I asked her to return with me.

During my detention, my wife phoned Gilbert Etienne in Lausanne, informing him of the situation, the Associated Press office in Geneva (speaking to a Mr. Atkins) and the U.S. Press Attaché, Frederick ~~Xxxxxxx~~ Steiner, in Berne. Actually, I had told her to phone as many wire services as possible, but she assumed I also wanted to get the Press Attaché to protest on my behalf. In any case, the shortness of time between trains prevented her from making more calls.

When given the attached formal notice of the travel ban by the Swiss official, I refused his request that I sign it and warned that the expulsion was a violation of Swiss agreements concerning the freedom of access to the U.N. Office in Geneva which I fully intended to protest formally and bring to world attention.

Later, from Verona, I spoke myself ~~xxxx~~ with Gilbert Etienne, who was convinced -- quite correctly, I believe -- that his phone is tapped and that my arrival was ~~xxxxxx~~ communicated to the Swiss Federal Police through a phone conversation I had with Etienne from

swiss explusion - 2 last

Milan on 18 Jan. (My train reservation was made in Milan, not London.) I also spoke with Atkins of AP in Geneva, who told me he had filed a story after my wife's call about an American Negro journalist being refused entry into Switzerland. He asked for more background on me, claiming that New York had expressed interest in developments. Atkins believed that I could get the ban lifted by protesting to the Swiss Press Attaché in London as a professional newsman. He said he believed Swiss authorities were rather jumpy about "suspicious" individuals entering the country since the large Biafran shipments of Nigerian currency to Zurich earlier in January. Whatever the real reason, although I do resent not being able to talk with Etienne -- I was counting on him to reestablish links with Nils Andersson in Albania and to give me a picture of the altered situation among pro-Chinese Communist parties in Western Europe since the latest split from Jacques Grippa's party in Belgium --, I think the expulsion is a most useful incident to prove that I am indeed a good revolutionary and I intend to exploit it as fully as possible, within reason. That is, no overt diatribes against "how the Man operates in Switzerland," say in the Los Angeles Herald Dispatch, but to inform as many people on the Left as possible of the incident and let them draw their own conclusions.

Michael Bakafa/Petros Defta, who was expecting me in Geneva for an interview on 22 Jan. was informed by a wire from Verona that force majeure prevented me from keeping the appointment and that I would be writing him when I returned to London.

14-00000

VALAIS WALLIS

POLICE CANTONALE
KANTONSPOLIZEI

Poste 3900 Brig-Bhf. , le 20.1.1968.

An Herrn

GIBSON Richard Thomas

3900 B r i g - Bahnhof

Référence :

Objet : Notifikation einer Verfügung der Eidg. Bundesanwaltschaft.

Wir bringen Ihnen zur Kenntnis, dass Sie im Schweiz. Polizeianzeiger des Jahres 1963 unter Einreisesperre gültig ausgeschrieben sind. (Art. 33 667/1963)

Die Verfügung wurde durch die Eidg. Bundesanwaltschaft am 16.12.1963 getroffen.

Dauer: unbestimmte Zeit.

Von der Verfügung Kenntnis genommen:

GIBSON Richard Thomas
des Clarence und der Alice
Thomas, geb. 13.5.1931
Los Angeles/Amerikaner.

Zugestellt durch:

KANTONSPOLIZEI Passkontrolle Brig

14-00000

S E C R E T

ORPHONE 1   802799   24   000   20

1967 EARNINGS

	TAX W/H	FICA W/H	ST TAX W/H	TAX GROSS
(96)	67200			945280

S E C R E T

Paid Gross by Cover
No Covert Return Req.
Tax Committee
Flat Rate Tax W/H

SECRET

20 December 1967
(C-2929)
Murray

MEMORANDUM FOR: CA/CF

SUBJECT: Accountings from QRPHONE/1

Enclosed in the attached sealed envelope are copies of accountings from QRPHONE/1.

Thomas K. Strange
Chief,
Central Cover Staff
Nonofficial Cover Branch

Attachments: One

201- 306052
Dec 67
~~201-306052~~

SECRET

14-00000

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC.
5708 S. STATE 324-[illegible]20
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

1050

8-3 1967 $\frac{2-77}{710}$

PAY TO THE ORDER OF Richard Gibson $100 $\frac{00}{}$

One Hundred & no/100 DOLLARS

American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago

⑆001050⑆ ⑆0710⑉0077⑆ 289086⑈ ⑆0000010000⑆

THIS IS AN UNNUMBERED TRANSACTION

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC.
5708 S. STATE 324-6320
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

418166 1067

PAID

SEP 18 1967

BARCLAYS BANK LIMITED (4) ST. JOHN'S WOOD 40 WELLINGTON ROAD, LONDON, N.W.8 20-74-63

8-31 1967 $\frac{2-77}{710}$

PAY TO THE ORDER OF Richard Gibson $100 $\frac{00}{}$

One Hundred & no/100 DOLLARS

American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago

⑆001067⑆ ⑆0710⑉0077⑆ 289086⑈ ⑆0000010000⑆

14-00000

DISPATCH SECRET

Chief of Station, London for LCPIPIT

Chief of Station, [illegible]

Chief, [illegible]

[illegible] Administrative

ORPHONE/1 Employment Agreement

REFERENCES: A. [illegible] T-342, 21 Sept. 1967
B. OEPW-161 (PYDAT) (execute)
C. LCPIPIT 8782 (IN 55628)

1. We appreciate LAGINESTRA's effort to combine and bring up to date all commitments made to ORPHONE/1 in a revised MOC, forwarded under REF A. We hope that the following comments, geared to the paragraphs as numbered in the MOC, will help to further streamline the product:

a. Para. 1:

Please see Reference B, PYDAT dispatch.

b. Para. 2:

As indicated in the REF A covering dispatch, ORPHONE/1's initial employment began 1 June 1965, rather than the 1 September 1965 date given in the draft MOC. Since the effective date of his relationship with WOFIRM will one day be the basis for an equitable terminal settlement, or might assume other administrative significance, we suggest that the paragraph be amended to reflect this: "ORPHONE/1's employment with WOFIRM which began 1 June 1965, was originally formalized by a Letter of Agreement for a period of three months, replaced by a Memorandum of Oral Commitment dated 1 September 1965. Under this MOC, which remains in effect (as amended) since that date, ORPHONE/1's employment continues on a month-to-month basis. It can be terminated by either party on 30-day notice."

(continued)

Distribution:
2 - COS, LCPIPIT
1 - COS, London

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPW-169	26 OCT 1967 18 October 1967
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 200-124-156/2

1 - CA/B&F
1 - CA/Personnel
1 - C/CA/SG
1 - EUR/BC/UK
2 - CA/CF
1 - RID-Files

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
CA/CF	Diane L. Chatelan	gm	7767

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CA/B&F		L. O. Healy
CA/PERS		
C/CA/SG DC/CA		Fred V. Valtin
EUR/BC/UK		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/CA		B. Hugh Tovar

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

c. Paragraph [illegible]:

From talking with [illegible], it would appear that the fine line of demarcation between ORPHONE/1's real "salary" and his "non-accountable [illegible]" is so vague to him (if indeed he was ever fully aware of it in our own bureaucratic terms) as to be virtually non-existent. It is equally confusing and often non-recognizable in other administrative paper-trails (see [illegible] C). In terms of the tax [illegible], the $[illegible] has already been adjudicated taxable and the $[illegible] supplement has been computed as tax due on the $[illegible] total. We suggest, therefore, in the interest of administrative simplicity, that we convert the total $[illegible] to salary, and amend the MOC to reflect this.

d. Paragraph [illegible]:

A question came up concerning ORPHONE/1's per diem in connection with the three accountings which RODIGAST submitted for processing direct at Headquarters. Included were several operational lunches and dinners. ORPHONE/1 indicated he was leaving the computation of per diem due him up to Headquarters (we have allowed for 27 days @ $20 per day). Since regulations state that no one may receive double compensation for any reimbursable expenditure, and ORPHONE/1's per diem by definition is supposed to cover food, etc., we will have to deduct 15% for each meal specifically claimed by him in his detailed accounting (i.e., $3.00 per meal). This will be the subject of separate correspondence when the accountings are processed and we T/A the appropriate amount for credit to ORPHONE/1's account, but we raise it now as we are not certain as to LCPIPIT's intent or previous practice in this regard. The amount that ORPHONE/1 would be assessed is, of course, not very substantial, but if LCPIPIT feels ORPHONE/1 should receive greater financial assistance to further defray his personal as well as operational costs while in travel status, we suggest that this enabling paragraph be amended to permit greater flexibility in the establishment of the per diem amount. Now would be an appropriate time to amend the MOC to give Chief, LCPIPIT/London, the authority to set ORPHONE/1's per diem at ". . . $20 to $30 per day during periods of authorized travel, amount to be set in advance by Chief, LCPIPIT/London." Fifteen per cent will, of course, still need to be deducted from ORPHONE/1's accounting for every meal he correctly claims as an operational expense. As to travel which does not extend overnight, regulations only require that 35% be deducted from his per diem, rather than the 50% which, in effect, the $10.00 represents. We leave it up to you as to which provision you wish included in the final MOC, but in any event we suggest that it be incorporated in the body of the paragraph, rather than set apart as a quotation from another document.

2. We have no further comments concerning the remainder of the MOC.

3. If you concur with the above suggestions, please resubmit an amended MOC which would also reflect these additional changes. We are sorry not to have been able to meet LCPIPIT's 15 October requested deadline, but press of business related to ORPHONE/1's WOLADY mission intervened.

JULIA R. CONGREVE

SECRET
RYBAT

26 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: CCS/NC

SUBJECT: QRPURE/QREBONY/1 Relationship

1. This will confirm our conversation of 18 September 1967, in which we discussed QREBONY/1's plan to visit QRPURE some time during the week of 25 September 1967, and you agreed to give QRPURE/2 prior warning of this visit. In accordance with the same conversation QREBONY/1 was briefed that his visit should be mainly a question of touching base with QRPURE, maybe a friendly luncheon with QRPURE/2 -- but that no substantive discussions affecting their ostensible relationship (i.e., amount of money, amount of QREBONY/1 production for QRPURE, etc.) were to take place. You were to brief QRPURE/2 along the same lines, and also to indicate to him that, contrary to our original thinking, we would now like to have QREBONY/1 given a by-line, whenever QRPURE/2 feels he can do so.

2. In addition to the above, we would appreciate it if you would take up with QRPURE/2 (and/or QRPURE/1, as appropriate) the possibility of increasing the amount of money funded to QREBONY/1 via QRPURE. As indicated to you, we would like to increase the current $100.00 monthly to $300.00 monthly, but would like your careful examination with QRPURE principal(s) that this amount is not excessive either in terms of their willingness to handle or in terms of QRPURE's ostensible ability to cover.

3. Please also mention to QRPURE/2 our desire to have QREBONY/1 open a small office in London, and our thought of perhaps including QRPURE (along with other publications) as a name on the door or on his letterhead. Would QRPURE/2 (or QRPURE/1) have any objections? Would he have any objections if any of the other names are of more radical publications? It would not be operationally feasible or desirable to let him know in advance which these would be, but since both

RYBAT
SECRET

Glory
201-306052

QRPURE's have been briefed carefully as to QREBONY/1's radical aura, presumably they would have a good idea as to the kind of publications these might be.

4. For operational reasons, we would prefer that the arrangements indicated in paras 2 and 3 above not be broached until after QREBONY/1's departure from the United States, some time in mid-October. We will advise you of his departure so that you can make the necessary arrangements thereafter at your convenience.

DIANE L. CHATELAN
Chief, CA/CF

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee - Attn: J. Murray
2 - CA/CF ✓
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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 12

ORIG: DIANE L. CHATELAN:G..
UNIT: CA/CF
EXT: 7767
DATE: 18 Oct. 67

SECRET

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C/CA2 C/EUR 4 CABLE SEC TRNG

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 44750

OCT 19 15 11 Z

TO LCPIPIT INFO LONDON

RYBAT DTDORIC QREBONY

1. FOR SECURITY REASONS RELATING TO ITS ACTUAL DESCRIPTIVENESS, IT HAS BEEN DECIDED TO CHANGE THE QREBONY CRYPT TO IDEN A. THIS NEW CRYPT WILL BE USED HENCEFORTH.

2. TO ASSIST IN EASIER COMMUNICATION IN AN AREA OF HIGH SENSITIVITY, THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL CRYPTS HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED: QRPEONY (IDEN B); AND QRPETTY (IDEN C).

3. IN FUTURE, PLS SEPARATE ALL QREBONY/1 PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE, EXCISE QREBONY/1 NAME, AND FORWARD BY RYBAT CHANNEL ONE COPY TO DTDORIC ~~[illegible]~~ AND ONE COPY TO KEYWAY.

END OF MESSAGE

CI/OPS/DO – Ober (in draft)

EUR/BC/UK P.F. [signature]

EUR/CA [signature]

[signature]
C/CA

[signature]
DIANE L. CHATELAN
Chief, CA/CF

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO. 19 Oct 67

CS Copy 201-306052

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TOTAL COPIES: 2

ORIG: DIANE L. CHATELAN:gm
UNIT: CA/CF
EXT: 7767
DATE: 18 Oct 67

SECRET

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3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION BY 7 PER ___ #

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☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-366052 ~~200-124-156~~ 201-108746 201-248083

CONF: C/CA/O 2 ☑ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, C/RI/SD, C/CA 2, C/EUR 4

CABLE SEC TO ... O.

SECRET | Oct 19 15 11Z | CITE DIRECTOR 44751

TO LCPIPIT INFO LONDON

RYBAT DTDORIC QREBONY

REF: 44750

IDEN A - QRPHONE/1

IDEN B - ROBERT F. WILLIAMS - 201-108746

IDEN C - DANIEL WATTS - 201-248083

END OF MESSAGE

DC/CA ___

EUR/BC/UK [signature]

EUR/CA ✓

[signature]
C/CA

[signature: Diane Chatelan]
DIANE L. CHATELAN
Chief, CA/CF

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

COPY NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WOVIEW

INFO.: COS/London (Support)

FROM: Chief, LCPIPIT/London

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/Administrative
QREBONY/1 Employment Agreement

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. QREBONY/1 was recruited by WOFACT on 3 June 1965. This recruitment was performed by an officer from WOMUSE/ICG since QREBONY/1 (then known as STEBONY/1) was viewed as a "double agent" penetration of pro-Chinese communist groups. QREBONY/1 has performed well in a difficult and dangerous environment. He is a clandestine agent operating against targets violently anti-WOLADY and of priority interest. The administration of QREBONY/1 requires special care since, by the very nature of his role, he is not typical of the average LCPIPIT asset.

2. QREBONY/1's initial employment was by Letter of Agreement for a period of three months. This Letter of Agreement expired 1 September 1965 and was replaced by a Memorandum of Oral Commitment dated the same day. This oral employment agreement remains in effect at this date--some two years later--, but has been amended to adjust compensation. Certain inaccuracies in the original MOC have also been corrected subsequent to its preparation. Given the sensitive nature of QREBONY/1's relationship with WOFACT it is sometimes difficult to adapt the operational realities of his situation to the administrative requirements of WOFACT. However, with great understanding at home and in the field, we have reached a very manageable situation.

3. In order to codify the entitlements and procedures applicable to QREBONY/1's employment the undersigned has prepared the attached revision of the MOC underwhich QREBONY/1 is employed. It is requested that HQS approve this revised MOC and notify LCPIPIT of approval by 15 October.

Attachment: HW
MOC

AARON C. LAGINESTRA

Distribution:
3 - C/WOVIEW w/att HW
1 - COS/London (Support)

SEP 27 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPT - 240	21 September 1967
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

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ACTION

S E C R E T 301632Z CITE LCPIPIT 1286

30 AUG 67 IN 42132

DIRECTOR INFO: LONDON

RYBAT DTDORIC QREBONY MHPROBE

1. BELIEVE QREBONY/1 SHOULD MEET WITH QRPURE IN ORDER DISCUSS HIS COVER AND ITS EVOLUTION AND IMPROVEMENT. IN LAST FEW WEEKS QREBONY/1 HAS NOTICED HIS ARTICLES STILL BEING USED BY QRPURE BUT WITHOUT HIS BYLINE. THIS MAY INDICATE SOME POLITICAL SENSITIVITY ON PART OF QRPURE, WHICH WOULD BE UNDERSTANDABLE. HOWEVER THIS MAY NOT BE THE CASE AT ALL. THUS FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS SHOULD BE FOR HQS TO DETERMINE STATE OF QRPURE MIND RE QREBONY/1. IF THIS POSITIVE, MEETING, WITH WOFACTER PRESENT, WOULD BE HELPFUL IN SOLIDIFYING RELATIONSHIP.

2. SHOULD SITUATION BE PROPITIOUS WE WOULD APPRECIATE HQS DISCUSS TWO ITEMS WITH QRPURE ON AN IN PRINCIPLE BASIS. FIRST, IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO INCREASE THE SIZE OF THE PAYMENTS FROM QRPURE TO QREBONY/1. QREBONY/1'S COVER HERE IS SUFFICIENTLY

Jack Murray will be in Friday. 1/9/67

SECRET

PAGE 2 LCPIPIT 1286 S E C R E T

WELL ESTABLISHED TO SUPPORT, AND INDEED TO REQUIRE, AN ANNUAL SALARY FROM QRPURE OF AT LEAST $3-4,000, WHILE WE UNSURE OF QRPURE'S FEELINGS THIS SUBJECT IT OUR IMPRESSION HE MOST ACCOMMODATING AND WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT INCREASE WOULD ENHANCE QREBONY/1'S COVER. SECONDLY, WE ARE DISCUSSING THE IDEA OF QREBONY/1'S ESTABLISHING A DINGY ONE-ROOM OFFICE FROM WHICH TO CONDUCT HIS AFFAIRS. THIS WOULD FACILITATE HIS OPERATIONS BY GETTING HIM OUT OF HIS HOUSE. IT WOULD ALSO BE A CONVENIENT GATHERING PLACE FOR HIS CONTACTS AND IF COST FACTOR CAN BE KEPT MINIMAL, ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH HIS COVER. WE DESIRE OBTAIN QRPURE REACTION TO IDEA OF QREBONY/1 HAVING OFFICE WITH QRPURE ON DOOR, EITHER ALONE OR IN TANDEM WITH QREBONY/1 REPORTS OR SOME OTHER TITLE. ALSO COULD QRPURE ACTUALLY PASS THE FUNDS FOR THE OFFICE IN THE FORM OF A MONTHLY CHECK OR SOME OTHER ARRANGEMENT? REALIZE THAT OFFICE PLUS SALARY RAISE TOGETHER REPRESENT CONSIDERABLE INCREASE IN QRPURE INPUT TO QREBONY/1 AND WE NOT NOW IN POSITION TO ASSESS QRPURE WILLINGNESS DO SO.

SECRET

NEVERTHELESS WE WOULD APPRECIATE HQS EXPLORING THIS WITH GRPURE IF POSSIBLE.

3. HQS SHOULD DISCUSS ABOVE QITH RODIGAST WHO IN POSITION EXPAND ON THIS SUBJECT.

S E C R E T

BT

14-00000

SECRET

14 September 1967

REVISED MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENT
(Revised to include all changes and amendments operative as of 14 September 1967)

1. QREBONY/1 is employed by WOFACT as an independent contractor for certain services of a confidential nature. He has received an Operational Approval, dated . Financial aspects of his activity are charged to Project QREBONY.

2. QREBONY/1's employment under this agreement commenced 1 September 1965 and continues on a month-to-month basis. It can be terminated by either party on 30-day notice.

3. QREBONY/1 receives the following financial entitlements:

a. Compensation so computed as to give QREBONY/1 a "tax-free" figure of $800 per month (this figure effective 1 July 1967). NOTE: The actual breakdown of QREBONY/1's finances as carried on WOFACT books is $700 monthly salary; $100 non-accountable operational allowance; $70 tax supplement withheld at HQS to discharge QREBONY/1's WOLADY tax obligation. These taxes are remitted through the Covert Tax Committee.

b. Reimbursement for operational expenses and travel, unless these are reimbursed by other sources in which case WOFACT will offset such outside reimbursement against WOFACT financial obligations to QREBONY/1. Since security considerations generally preclude the detailed accounting for miscellaneous travel expenses, per diem will be paid at the rate of $20 per day during periods of authorized travel. This per diem authorization was qualified by a personal ruling of Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT dated 12 July 1965:

> "If subject is absent from his home station on authorized travel for part of one day and returns to his home station the night of the dame day (i.e. if no hotel expense is involved in the sense of overnight accommodations), then he shall be entitled to draw 1/2 of his authorized per diem of $20 per day (i.e. $10)."

NOTE: QREBONY/1 has a revolving fund (advance) to assist in meeting operational and travel expenses.

SECRET

4. QREBONY/1 will be compensated by WOFACT in an amount mutually agreed upon for the relocation of himself and his family to a new residence if such relocation is considered desirable by him and WOFACT. NOTE: This provision was included in QREBONY/1's original Letter of Agreement and was retained in this MOC since it may be operationally desirable for QREBONY/1 to accept employment with a target organization based elsewhere.

5. LCPIPIT is authorized to approve purchase by QREBONY/1 of certain items of operational equipment which are to be non-accountable and which shall be charged against the operational expenses category of the budget attached to the FY 1968 project renewal.

6. QREBONY/1 signed a separate Secrecy Agreement (in true name) at the time of his original recruitment. He is aware that its provisions are still in effect.

7. QREBONY/1 is aware of all provisions of this Memorandum of Oral Commitment with the exception of paragraph 5, which describes an internal WOFACT procedure, and certain aspects of paragraph 3b, specifically that WOFACT is paying LNPORT taxes in his behalf. NOTE: He was promised tax-free compensation in his original recruitment and we have devised the current procedure to honor this commitment while fulfilling the requirement that all WOLADY citizens pay taxes on funds received from LNPORT.

SIGNED: ____________________

AARON C. LAGINESTRA
Case Officer

REVIEWED AND APPROVED:

____

ADRIAN B. MASLOTT
Chief, LCPIPIT

- - - - - -

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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INFO FILE, VR, CS/DO, C/CA2, C/EUR-4, C/CI, C/DO 4

965-5422

S E C R E T 251459Z CITE LCPIPIT 1268

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO LONDON

25 Aug 67 IN 39155

RYBAT DTDORIC MHPROBE QREBONY DIOVERTAX

REF DIRECTOR 29537

1. WILL CABLE ITINERARY REQUESTED REF AFTER RODIGAST MEETING WITH QREBONY/1 25 AUGUST.

2. APPRECIATE THAT WASHINGTON PROBABLY MOST CONVENIENT LOCATION FOR HQS MEETINGS WITH QREBONY/RODIGAST BUT BECAUSE SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS MUST BE PARAMOUNT REQUEST THAT SESSIONS TAKE PLACE ELSEWHERE, PREFERABLY NEW YORK CITY. HAVE SO INFORMED RODIGAST.

3. SECURITY RISKS ATTENDANT QREBONY MEETINGS WITH WOFACT IN U.S. ARE OF PARTICULAR CONCERN. THUS REQUEST THAT QREBONY CONTACTS WITH WOFACT OFFICERS BE HELD ONLY WHEN ABSOLUTELY REQUIRED AND LIMITED TO ESSENTIAL PARTICIPANTS. ALSO BELIEVE IT WILL BE DIFFICULT AND PROBABLY INSECURE HAVE QREBONY/1 SET ASIDE BLOCK OF DAYS FOR MEETINGS ONCE HE ARRIVES IN U.S. AND THAT CONTACTS WITH QREBONY/1 WILL HAVE TO BE AD HOC INSTEAD OF AD SERIATIM. QREBONY/1 WILL DO HIS BEST ADHERE TO ITINERARY, HOWEVER

SECRET

WE FEEL IT ONLY REALISTIC TO ASSUME THAT HIS MOVEMENTS AND SCHEDULE WILL BE CONDITIONED BY DEVELOPMENTS FROM MOMENT HE STEPS OFF PLANE.

4. FOR SECURITY AND HANDLING REASONS IT MOST IMPORTANT FOR RODIGAST TO MEET AND BRIEF EACH WOFACTER IN ADVANCE WOFACTERS MEETING WITH QREBONY/1. NO TRUE NAMES OF WOFACTERS SHOULD BE USED AND SPECIAL CARE SHOULD BE TAKEN PROTECT RODIGAST, WHOSE TRUE NAME AND ADDRESS NOT KNOWN BY QREBONY/1.

5. RODIGAST ETA NEW YORK 10 SEPTEMBER. HE WILL PHONE VARASANO WHOM HE HAS MET MORNING 11 SEPTEMBER AT EITHER IDEN A OR IDEN B TO ARRANGE FOR MEETINGS WITH HQS OFFICERS. QREBONY/1 WILL BE TOLD ARRIVE NEW YORK 15 SEPTEMBER THUS GIVING FEW DAYS LEAD TIME FOR RODIGAST/ HQS PREPARATIONS. REQUEST VARASANO, WHO WILL WISH DISCUSS RODIGAST PERSONAL AND DTOVERTAX OPERATIONAL MATTERS, ARRANGE FOR INTRODUCTION TO CONGREVE.

6. NO FURTHER REGULAR MEETING WITH EITHER QREBONY/1 OR RODIGAST BEING SCHEDULED ALTHOUGH PROVISIONS FOR EMERGENCY MEETING BEING LAID ON. ANY INFO FOR EMERGENCY PASSAGE TO

PAGE 3 LCPIPIT 1268 S E C R E T SECRET

EITHER MUST REACH LCPIPIT BY COB 31 AUGUST.

S E C R E T SECRET

BT

We all agree. Fred

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO: Chief, WOVIEW		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO: COS/London		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM: Chief, LCPIPIT/London ABM		MICROFILM

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/Operational
QREBONY/Basic Project Documents

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. LCPIPIT is revising the QREBONY Project files--which have been rather haphazardly maintained over the past year or so (much of this time the project was without a case officer). In our attempts to locate basic project documents we have been unable to find any copy of the provisions of the Operational Approval applicable to QREBONY/1. We do have a copy of the Provisional Approval granted 23 May 1966 forwarded with OFLW - 1591, 7 July 1966. Possibly the relevant document was destroyed during the reduction of files attendant upon the LCPIPIT move, or possibly it was inadvertantly not forwarded to LCPIPIT. At any rate we will appreciate being sent a copy.

2. We would also like to have a sterile version of the FY 68 Project Renewal as well as all other basic documents which ought to be available to LCPIPIT.

AARON C. LAGINESTRA

Distribution:
3 - C/WOVIEW
1 - COS/London

AUG 30 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPT - 210	24 August 1967
	CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T	HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WOVIEW

INFO: COS/London, C/Eur Div

FROM: Chief, LCPIPIT/London *RBM*

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/Operational
O QREBONY/Jacques Verges

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

We are forwarding USC a copy of a letter sent QREBONY/1 by Jacques Verges' lawyer in which he makes a settlement offer on behalf of his client. QREBONY/1 will probably accept this, after a suitable waiting period, as it offers very telling and effective ammunition for use in his continuing battle to counter Verges' allegation that he was a WOFACT agent. It is our reading at this point that QREBONY/1 has been quite successful in this effort and that this settlement from Verges will be the final triumph in his campaign.

ACZ

AARON C. LAGINESTRA

Attachment: USC
Letter

DOC FORWARDED F/O S.L.C. BY RID/AN 5 SEP 1967

Distribution:
3 - C/WOVIEW w/att USC
2 - C/Eur Div w/o att
1 - COS/London w/o att

201-366852
~~201-150164~~

AUG 30 1967

1 att a/s

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPA - 499	24 August 1967
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

S. SCHWARTZENBERG
AVOCAT A LA COUR
28, FAUBOURG MONTMARTRE
PARIS - IX^e

TÉL. : TAITBOUT 63-19
OU 824 63-19

SUR RENDEZ-VOUS

AFF. GIB... C/ V...

Paris, le 24 Juillet 19..

Monsieur et Madame GIBSON
32, Hartswood Road
Stamford Brook
London, W. 12
Grande Bretagne

Chers Madame et Monsieur,

Je m'empresse de vous faire savoir que le Conseil des Prudhommes par jugement rendu le 20 juillet 1967 a retenu sa compétence conformément au rapport du Conseiller rapporteur.

En tout état de cause, j'attends votre réponse à ma dernière lettre par laquelle je vous ai transmis les propositions de règlement à l'amiable faites par M. VERGES.

Je vous remercie de votre prochain courrier à ce sujet et,

./...

CS COPY

201-306052

~~201-186164~~

S/C ATT 1 TO OEPA-499

Vous prie de croire, Chers Madame et Monsieur, à l'expression de mes sentiments dévoués.

14-00000

S. SCHWARTZENBERG
AVOCAT A LA COUR
25. FAUBOURG MONTMARTRE
PARIS - IXe

TÉL. : TAITBOUT 63-10
OU 824 63-10

SUR RENDEZ-VOUS

PARIS, le 13 juillet 1967

Monsieur et Madame GIBSON
30, Stockleigh Hall
Prince Albert Road
LONDON N.W.8 - Grande Bretagne

Aff. GIBSON/ VERGES

Chers Madame et Monsieur,

Je m'empresse de vous faire savoir que Maître VERGES propose de vous régler ~~s~~ en dinars algériens la moitié des sommes demandées, ce qui me semble intéressant pour vous, compte tenu de l'ensemble des circonstances de cette affaire, soit :

7.500 fr pour M. GIBSON d'une part, et
5.250 fr pour Mme GIBSON d'autre part
total : 12.7 0 fr

Je dois vous indiquer que cette proposition est un peu inespérée, car il est clair qu'en poursuivant la Société des NOUVELLES EDITIONS INTERNATIONALES, vous gagnerez une certaine somme dont je ne puis fixer le montant, mais ne toucherez jamais rien.

En ce qui concerne la lettre dont M. GIBSON m'avait entretenu, mon Confrère ne me répond rien sur celle-ci. Je pense qu'il n'y a quand même pas lieu d'en faire une question de principe et que nous pourrions, dans le cadre d'un reçu, obtenir une phrase ~~[illegible]~~ sur ce qui a été dit à votre sujet.

En tout état de cause et si nous parvenions à un accord sur cette base, Me VERGES propose de tenir cette somme à votre disposition dès votre premier voyage en Algérie.

Je crois qu'il serait préférable que, d'une manière ou d'une autre, cette somme soit remise à une personne ayant votre confiance.

Si toutefois vous pensez que je dois tenter d'obtenir un peu plus, vous voudrez bien je vous prie me le faire savoir, mais j'insiste sur ce point qu'il est quelque fois préférable d'attraper une proposition à la balle, plutôt que de risquer de tout perdre.

CS COPY

201-306052

...

DISPATCH

SECRET SECRET

TO: Chief of Station, London - for LCPIPIT	X	MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO: Chief of Station, London		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM: Acting Chief WOVIEW		MICROFILM
SUBJECT: DTDORIC/GREBONY LNERGO Report		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Transmitted, under separate cover, for your information only, is a copy of a LNERGO Report dated August 10, 1967. Please note paragraph 4 and bring to the attention of RODIGAST.

ISABELLE R. PRIAMI

Attachment: 1
LNERGO Report u/s/c

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS, LCPIPIT w/att u/s/c
1 - COS, London w/att u/s/c

File in 201-306052

25 AUG 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
201-306052	OEPW - 117	18 August 1967
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: CS Copy 200-124-156/3

2 - RID files w/att
1 - E/BC/UK w/o/att
1 - CI/ICG w/o/att
2 - CA/CF w/att

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
CA/CF	Ann J. Long	gm	7767

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/CA/CF	18 Aug 67	Diane L. Chatelan
CI/ICG		Dave Hornstein

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/CA		B. Hugh Tovar

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MPO. 1-66 (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

FBI doc
10 Aug 67
Re: Communist Party of Belgium
Bufile - illegible

SECRET

18 AUG 1967

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: SUGAR's Trip to the United States

1. This is to advise the Bureau that this Agency plans to have SUGAR come to the United States during the month of September 1967. In addition to periodic consultation with Headquarters elements, the purpose of this trip will be to renew previous contacts, particularly among American Negro radical elements, primarily in order to develop information on possible Cuban (or other foreign) financial or other lines of support to these groups. He will be under instructions not to engage directly in any civil rights or other protest activities while in the United States.

2. We would appreciate the Bureau's concurrence in this activity. We would also welcome any Bureau requirements which the Agency would levy on SUGAR for servicing during his stay in the United States.

CSCI-316/03777-67

DDP/C/CA/CF/DChastelmaraJl (18 August 1967)

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - CI/LSN
1 - CI/R&A
1 - CI/ICG
1 - E/BC/UK
1 - CA/SEC
2 - CA/CF
1 - RI (201-306052)

CS COPY

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-306052

CONTINUING BRITISH IMMIGRATION PROBLEM

Returning to London from Stockholm on 10 July, I was again queried by British Immigration about my failure to register as a permanent resident. My excuse has always been that I did in fact go to the Home Office, but no action was ever taken because I rarely remained in the country more than a month. However, this tale is wearing thin and I fear that I may have much more serious trouble in the near future.

It would seem to me that the best solution might be to become the official London correspondent of KPI or any other outfit that might have me. I would need a letter to that effect and would require a notional salary of about $5,000 per year,* I believe, but even this might raise questions from the British Inland Revenue.

Some advice on this problem would be appreciated.

* Must be at least £1000 yearly.

G/ 201 file

TPI# 072269 15/8/67

14-00000

FBI (X-ref)
10 Aug 67.

FBI doc
8 Aug. '67 (Wash)
Re: Richard Gibson
Bufile: (15) 105-93072

12 NYT. 16 JULY 67

NEGRO, IN PEKING, ACCUSES CUBANS

'Vicious Smear' of China in 'Forged' Letter Charged

Robert F. Williams, an American Negro who is now a black nationalist spokesman in Peking, has charged that the Cuban regime of Premier Fidel Castro has counterfeited a newsletter he puts out and used the bogus periodical for "a vicious smear attack" on Communist China.

In the May issue of the newsletter, The Crusader, which has arrived here, Mr. Williams asserted that the "forged" version "carries a metered postmark that is available only for Cuban Government bulk mailing." He charged that the newsletter was put out by "the Cuban G-2", which he said was heavily infiltrated by the United States Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Williams left his home in Monroe, N. C., in 1961 and went to Cuba, where he advocated a "freedom struggle" for Negroes in the United States. He left Cuba last year.

Another American Negro nationalist, Richard Gibson, in a current newsletter from London, describes Mr. Williams as "chairman-in-exile of the all-black Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM) in the United States." Sixteen persons, who were said to be members of the revolutionary movement, were arrested in Queens last month on charges of having plotted to murder moderate Negro civil rights leaders.

The Crusader that Mr. Williams contended was mailed from Havana last month, has a headline, "China Betrays The Cuban Revolution," and has Mr. Williams saying that he was "deceived by the soft lies and subtle flattery" of Chinese Communist leaders. It goes on to say that Mao Tse-tung was now "old and sick and can no longer control his arrogant, power-mad underlings who, although acting in his name, have abandoned the people's revolution."

Mr. Williams' current Peking newsletter asserted that "Afro-Americans should refuse to fight" in Vietnam. But it added that "those who are trapped into it" could "work among the troops to educate them to the true facts of life."

As advice to Negroes at home, the newsletter said:

"Revolutionaries must play it cool. Infiltrate the police and the master infiltrators, the C.I.A. We must learn to subvert him at his own expense while using his facilities to advance our cause of Black liberation."

On Monday, Workers World, a weekly here with a Trotskyist tendency, announced that it had obtained a statement from Mr. Williams denouncing the alleged murder plot here as a "frame-up."

"It is not my policy nor RAM's to kill condescending Uncle Toms," the statement said. "We are not an organization advocating pointless assassinations. We are dedicated freedom-fighters stressing armed self-defense. Our objective is to make America a just and decent place to live."

201

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WOVIEW

INFO.: Chief, EUR; Chief, LCPIPIT

FROM: Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT: DTDORIC QRELLY QREBONY JAGUAR LEPAGE
QREBONY's Group

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Refs: OEPA 156, 5 May 1967
OELA 4737, 10 May 1967

1. We now have JAGUAR's comments on the proposed "group" designed to allow QREBONY to expand his access by "representing" something - even if only a purely notional group. The letter from JAGUAR is attached.

2. We would observe that JAGUAR's comments are obviously made in a constructive vein. Similarly, JAGUAR seems to take a protective, almost proprietary interest in considerations affecting the QREBONY project. We naturally welcome this feeling on their part, since QREBONY continues to exist as a U.K.-based operation at their pleasure. And we think that JAGUAR's comments are sound, in substance. Their final comment also veils, to say the least, the understandable SMOTH... reluctance to see yet another splinter group a-spawning, with the frightful political implications if a WOLADY spy were exposed while running a phoney "pro-Chinese" group in the U.K.! (It would probably be not too good in WOLADY, for that matter, but a government could fall here as a result.)

3. We have now had an opportunity to talk this over with CILIBERTI, LAGINESTRA and RODIGAST, and all are agreed that QREBONY's trial balloon will not be re-floated. We think no harm is done. If JAGUAR should come into possession of a copy of QREBONY's letter, and ask us about it, we will acknowledge that he wrote it to try out on a limited number of friends and aimed at his Swedish audience, preliminary to (he hopes) Rob WILLIAMS' arrival in Sweden. We are now merely replying to JAGUAR that we are grateful for their cogent comments, and that "the group" will not be activated unless there is a significant change in the QREBONY operational situation such as to require "the group" to be created, in which case we will again seek their concurrence.

Arthur T. JOSLVICK

Attachment: h/w
Letter - as stated
Distribution:

CROSS REFERENCE TO: 2-C/WOVIEW, w/att
3-C/EUR, w/att
2-C/LCPIPIT, w/att.

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OELA-47,650

DATE: 16 June 1967

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 200-124-156

SECRET

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
TO C/WOVIEW		MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO. COS/London, C/WOMUSE, C/Eur Div		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, LCPIPIT		MICROFILM

SUBJECT CTDOPIC/Operational
QREBONY/QREBONY/1 and AMSQUAW/1's Relationship

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. The relationship between QREBONY/1 and AMSQUAW/1 is a particularly important one from both the production and security points of view. AMSQUAW/1 has been a prolific and reliable reporter, especially on items dealing with the International War Crimes Tribunal, and it will be highly desirable for her to continue to serve in this capacity in the forseeable future. It is recognized that AMSQUAW/1 is not a controlled agent and that her personal willingness to serve as a clandestine informant of QREBONY/1 is based upon a complex and inter-related series of reasons, both personal and ideological. QREBONY/1 helped her out of a tight situation in Africa and has befriended her since her arrival in London. For the last several months she has been living at his house. QREBONY/1 has a very agreeable personality and is a genuinely likeable person. At the same time, although she is not an ideological person, she shares his pro-Chinese ideological position and she has never questioned his explanation - that her reporting is for the Chinese. Lastly, we cannot and have not, overlooked the likelihood of a physical attraction between the two. In the last analysis it is impossible for us to state exactly what motivates her to act as a clandestine informant for QREBONY/1.

2. It is quite possible for the relationship between QREBONY/1 and AMSQUAW/1 to change at any time. Should their relationship take a turn for the worst it might possibly have adverse security implications for QREBONY/1. This subject has been discussed at length with QREBONY/1 and he agrees that great care must be taken. He is careful to use AMSQUAW/1 only in situations where it would be plausible for the Chinese to have an interest. Thus far this has been relatively easy, indeed at the Stockholm sessions of the Russell Tribunal the absence of any Chinese representatives served to confirm in AMSQUAW/1's mind that QREBONY/1 was the Chinese man on the scene. At this point no actual problem exists, but both LCPIPIT and QREBONY/1 are alert to the possibility that one could arise.

AARON C. LAGINESTRA

Distribution:
3 - C/WOVIEW
2 - C/WOMUSE
2 - COS/London
2 - C/Eur Div

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPA - 281	1967 15 May 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER CS Copy filed 201-294316

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: C/WOVIEW

INFO.: C/WOHUSE, COS/London, C/Eur Div

FROM: Chief, LCPIPIT

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/Operational
OREBONY/OREBONY/1's Meeting with RNSLIVER

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Transmitted herewith is a brief memo for the record summarizing a conversation between the undersigned and RNSLIVER in which the latter recounted his impressions of a meeting with OREBONY/1. Transmitted USC is a brief note from OREBONY/1 to RODIGAST covering the events of the same evening.

P.F. CILIBERTI

Attachments: H/W & USC
As stated memo H/W
Brief note USC

Distribution:
3 - C/WOVIEW w/atts H/W & USC
2 - C/WOHUSE w/atts H/W & USC
2 - COS/London w/atts H/W & USC
2 - C/Eur Div w/o atts

CS COPY FILED IN 200-124-56/3

File in 201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OEPA - 268

DATE: MAY 11 1967
10 May 1967

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER:

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: CILIBERTI Conversation with RNSLIVER 26 April Concerning His Meeting with QREBONY/1

1. On 25 April BASTEAR told me that RNSLIVER was in London and was planning to meet with QREBONY/1. BASTEAR accordingly suggested that RNSLIVER be debriefed by the undersigned the following morning. Accordingly I met with RNSLIVER for about one hour, from which meeting the following highlights seem worth recording:

A. I told RNSLIVER that we (WOFACT) had been interested in QREBONY/1 at the time that he was writing for China Quarterly concerning his dispute with the editor of Revolution, Jacque Verges, but that we had lost tract of him of late. Now that we are in QREBONY/1's home town, RNSLIVER was told that we and Headquarters would be interested in any information on QREBONY/1 which could be reported as a result of such meetings as RNSLIVER had had with him.

B. RNSLIVER said that he had told Leo Labedz that he would like to meet Ibrahim to gain some understanding o" what was going on in the African exiled community, particularly as it related to the Sino-Soviet split. Labedz said that he thought that RNSLIVER would do much better by talking to QREBONY/1 whom he, Labedz, said was one of the few people around from whom Labedz could learn anything.

C. RNSLIVER met QREBONY/1 at QREBONY/1's house. RNSLIVER did not have a complete roster of those who were there to participate in what RNSLIVER described as a "political bull session". He remembered only (in addition to himself and QREBONY/1) of Matthew Nkoana and a girl from Mexico City named Sucesos, who he said knew a great deal about guerrilla goings-on in Venezuela and whose address he said was Calzada, Tacuboya 103, Mexico 18. RNSLIVER said that Nkoana said practically nothing throughout the evening, apparently because he found RNSLIVER's presence odd and unnerving.

D. RNSLIVER was as impressed with QREBONY/1 as Labedz had predicted he would be. He described QREBONY/1 as remarkably knowledgeable concerning Chinese factions of Communist movements in Western Europe and Africa. He said that QREBONY/1 had described his recent trip to Nicosia and Cairo, had mentioned that he had visited Dar-es-Salaam, that he knew Jacques Grippa, and that he intended to visit Stockholm in connection with the Russell Tribunal and a possible Stockholm visit by Robert Williams.

SECRET

CONTINUING BRITISH IMMIGRATION PROBLEM

Returning to London from Stockholm on 10 July, I was again queried by British Immigration about my failure to register as a permanent resident. My excuse has always been that I did in fact go to the Home Office, but no action was ever taken because I rarely remained in the country more than a month. However, this tale is wearing thin and I fear that I may have much more serious trouble in the near future.

It would seem to me that the best solution might be to become the official London correspondent of NPI or any other outfit that might have me. I would need a letter to that effect and would require a notional salary of about $5,000 per year,* I believe, but even this might raise questions from the British Inland Revenue.

Some advice on this problem would be appreciated.

* Must be at least £1000 yearly.

G/ 201 file

Tpi# 072269 15/8/67

E. RNSLIVER was particularly impressed by QREBONY/1's library of radical books and pamphlets. RNSLIVER turned over to the undersigned for copying and return a recent issue of Williams' The Crusader, and a copy of QREBONY/1's own newsletter. These were received with feigned interest, although of course we had earlier received the same items from RODIGAST (already forwarded to Headquarters).

F. RNSLIVER did not recall meeting Mrs. QREBONY/1, and did not know how many children QREBONY/1 had. He described QREBONY/1's house as attractively middle class. He was aware of the fact that QREBONY/1 had gone to Kenyon College and praised QREBONY/1's writing skills. QREBONY/1 showed him a number of articles he had written which RNSLIVER said completely followed the Chinese Communist line. RNSLIVER was surprised that some of these articles had been printed in the United States in spite of their political orientation.

P.F. CILIBERTI

14-00000

att to OEPA-00268

Att

GRIFFITH VISIT

Conversation with Prof. William E. Griffith, London, 25/4/67.

Tadeusz Horko phoned my home to tell me that XXXXXX Griffith, who is spending a sabbatical year in Munich from MIT, wanted to see me. Later that evening, Leo Labedz and Griffith arrived. Stella Joyce of Amnesty International and Matthew Nkoana also arrived unexpectedly. It turned out that Labedz and Joyce had often talked over xxxxxxx the phone, but had never met.

Griffith told me that he had recently visited East Africa. In Dar es Salaam, he had met David Sibeko and Ahmed G. Ebrahim of the PAC (Pan Africanist Congress). He said his distinct impression was that PAC was on a strong pro-Chinese course. Griffith said he had written to Nana Mahomo's old address in London in an effort to contact him, but had learned later that Mahomo was now at Xxxxx Kirkland House, Harvard University. He said he looked forward to talking with Mahomo when he went briefly to the USA in May.

CS COPY

S/C att to OEPA 268

350-124-156/3

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: C/WOVIEW

INFO.: C/WOMUSE, COS/London, C/Eur Div

FROM: Chief, LCPIPIT 2061

SUBJECT: LTDORIC/Operational QRPREY/QREBONY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

As HQS is aware, QREBONY/1 has been pursuing a legal action against Jacques Verges. He has now received a letter from his lawyer which seems to indicate that Verges is willing to make some sort of settlement--although he can only pay in Algerian dinars. QREBONY/1, of course, is willing to accept a settlement provided it includes some sort of apology from Verges. Armed with this apology QREBONY/1 could then dispose of any lingering doubts regarding his political reliability caused by Verges' accusations and would also have the ego gratification of forcing Verges to eat his own words.

FX 201-190164

ACL

AARON C. LAGUESTRA

Attachment: USC
As stated above USC

S/C ATT'D BE ... Dated 12 MAY 1967

MICROFILMED MAY 15 1967 DOC. MICRO. SER.

Distribution:
3 - C/WOVIEW w/atts USC
2 - C/WOMUSE w/o atts
2 - COS/London w/o atts
2 - C/Eur Div w/o atts

CS COPY

15/C

MAY 3 1967

201-306652

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPA - 245	2 May 1967
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

Me Serge Schwartzenberg
Schwartzenberg
Avocat à la Cour
Fbg. Montmartre
PARIS-IXe

PARIS, le 17 AVRIL 1967

Monsieur GIBSON
30, Stockleigh Hall
Prince Albert Road
LONDON N.W.8 (Grande Bretagne)

AFF. GIBSON C/Nouvelles Editions Internationales

Cher Monsieur,

Mon confrère adverse, Conseil de la Société Nouvelle des Editions Internationales, et de Monsieur VERGES, me fait savoir qu'il a eu une conversation avec Me VERGES qui lui a indiqué qu'il vit actuellement en Algérie et serait disposé à rechercher un règlement amiable des difficultés qui vous opposent.

Il m'a fait part qu'actuellement sa situation ne lui permet pas de payer en une autre monnaie que la monnaie algérienne, savoir le dinar.

Il y a là une question de principe. Pourriez-vous, je vous prie, me faire savoir si vous pourriez envisager une transaction aux termes de laquelle vous seriez réglé en dinars. J'ignore d'ailleurs dans quelles conditions l'exportation des capitaux d'Algérie est encore possible à ce jour.

Quoi qu'il en soit, peut-être seriez-vous intéressé par cette proposition.

Je n'ai pas encore discuté de chiffres avec mon confrère adverse puisqu'il s'agit là d'une question préjudicielle à toute discussion sur le fond de la somme due.

J'attends donc votre prochaine réponse et vous prie de croire, cher Monsieur, à l'expression de mes sentiments dévoués.

I phoned Schwartzenberg and informed him I would agree to a settlement, but the amount to be paid in any currency would necessarily depend on the extent to which Jacques Vergès apologized for his accusations against me in 1964. I said I did not mind if Vergès attempted to lay the blame for those accusations on a "misunderstanding" or on erroneous or malicious misinformation given him by others.

[Copies sent to J. Griggs, R. Reindorf, [illegible] Anderson, Gilbert [illegible] ([illegible]).]

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

STATEMENT of EARNINGS and DEDUCTIONS

NAME	EMPLOYEE NO.	PAY PERIOD DATE	ROLL	COST CENTER	STA
QREBONY 1	802799	04/01 04/30	20	1240062	000

CD	EARNINGS NORMAL	EARNINGS OTHER	DESCRIPTION
09	74600	18400	REG SAL

NOTE:
THIS FORM IS ISSUED ONLY WHEN AN EMPLOYEE ENTERS ON DUTY OR THERE IS ANY CHANGE IN THE PAY ACCOUNT

CD	DEDUCTIONS NORMAL	DEDUCTIONS OTHER	DESCRIPTION
80	74600	18400	CPA EX CR
96	4600		FED TAX F

REMARKS:

Increase Normal Salary from $700 to $746 effective 1 December 1966.

EMPLOYEE NUMBER:

802799 QREBONY-1 CA/000

FORM 8-63 1314 Previous editions obsolete (30-51)

SECRET

PP	OT/HRS	ST/HRS	ED/HRS	RATE	O/T-ST AMT	S/D AMOUNT		CD	NORMAL	OTHER	CD	NORMAL	OTHER
								86	4600-		00		

REMARKS:

PAID AT HQS.

FORM 8-63 1315A

SECRET

(30-51)

CHANGING PLACES

[illegible]R Wilmot Rogers is one of two [edi]torial staff members of the Car[lisle] Cumberland Journal who have [move]d to the production side [illegible] (Carlisle) Ltd. — the [publ]ishers.

Brothers have an expanding web-offset printing [illegible] and among [publi]cations they handle is the new [illegible] JAG (U.K. Press Gazette, [illegible]).

Rogers, who is 37, is to become [product]ion controller after five years in [illegible] post. He started in journalism [illegible] News and later worked [illegible] Newspapers in the [illegible]. Before joining the Journal he was for five years of the Cumberland [News] and Cumberland Evening Star.

[illegible] appointment is that of chief photo[grapher], Laurie Kemp as works manager. He succeeds Charles Latimer shortly to take up a post in the [illegible].

Rogers' successor is assistant editor, [illegible] Adkins, a former Merchant Navy [illegible].

[illegible] TO SUNDAY MIRROR

[illegible] GARROTT, former features editor [of the Br]istol Evening Post, is joining the [Sunday] Mirror's features sub-editors after [illegible] as a features sub-editor with the [illegible].

[illegible]SHONE has joined the Flintshire [illegible] reporters at Mold after three [illegible] a reporter and sub-editor on The [illegible] Gazette and the Islington Gazette.

HE'LL EDIT QUARTERLY

[illegible] L. RANSLEY has been appointed [informa]tion officer to the Muscular Dys[trophy] Group of Great Britain and will [edit] its quarterly Muscular Dystrophy [illegible].

FROM WWN INTO TV

[illegible] VACK, who joined Plymouth's [Western] Morning News from the Redditch [illegible] last September, has moved to [illegible] Television as reporter and news-[reader]. KATIE CRIEB is leaving WMN [illegible] Recorder. Two newcomers [to the] staff are JON ADDISON and NEIL [illegible] from Auckland, New Zealand.

NEW DEVON EXECUTIVE

[illegible] NOON has been appointed assist[ant edit]or of the South Devon Journal at [illegible]. He has worked with the [Daily Ex]press and Daily Mail and has [been] a magazine editor before moving [illegible].

[G]irl from 'Queen' [join]s colour weekly

[illegible]S ROBERTS, formerly with Queen [magazin]e and London Evening Standard, [is editor] of Colour News Feature Weekly, [launched] on April [illegible]. The magazine will be printed web-offset by the [illegible] Publishing Co. at Middles[illegible] incorporates the old Londoner [illegible].

AGENCY [illegible] SET

[The secon]d meeting of the Newspaper Con[tribu]tors' Association—formed in Ox[ford on] March 11 (Press Gazette No. 115, [illegible]) will be held at the Midland Hotel,

Manchester on April 22. Idea of the meeting is to bring together freelances from the north with those from the south who attended the inaugural meeting.

Alistair Cooke has said it 1,000 times

ALISTAIR COOKE, home from the US to celebrate the thousandth BBC broadcast of his "Letter from America", was chief guest at a luncheon of the Association of Circulation Executives on March 27 in the Connaught Rooms, London.

Mr. Cooke gave an off-the-cuff, off-the-record talk which ranged from international affairs to golf and religion.

Chairman Bernard Aron welcomed continental members of Distripress, including Dr. G. Lesrig, Inter-Orbis, Milan; M. Vandevelde, Société de Bibliothèque des Gares, Brussels; K. Olsen, Dansk Centralagentur, Copenhagen; Dr. Hans Mertens, Distripress Secretariat; David Money-Chappelle, Consultant to Distripress Committee.

PICTURED with Mr. Cooke, at microphone, are Mr. Aron and N. H. Neims, managing director of Rita Books.

Express O'Farrell gets racing post

MICHAEL O'FARRELL has been appointed racing correspondent of Dublin's Irish Times. He joined the newspaper's sports staff six years ago from the London office of the Daily Express.

JOHN DANDER has left the London advertisement staff of Eastern Counties Newspapers after three years as a media representative to join the Kensington and Chelsea Post's reporting staff.

SHE'S GROUP PRESS OFFICER

JUDITH TURNER has joined the Wedgwood Group as press officer, based in London, for Wedgwood, William Adams, Susie Cooper and Royal Tuscan.

PETER MUMMERY, formerly Time sales representative in Britain, is moving to South Africa to handle the US news magazine's advertising sales following the opening of a new office there. Another new office has opened in Amsterdam.

Hendon editor now group MD

GRANT MILLARD, at present editor and general manager, has been appointed managing director of the Hendon Times group, owned by Merritt & Hatcher.

He began with the London and Essex Guardian series at Walthamstow and moved to Hendon after three years with Mansfield's Chronicle-Advertiser.

NEGRO PRESS MOVE

RICHARD GIBSON has been appointed overseas representative and correspondent of Negro Press International, a news and feature service based in Chicago. He remains editor for Africa, Asia and Europe of the New York Afro-American monthly Liberator and international columnist to another US monthly, Independent.

ILIFFE TO MACLAREN

JOHN FENNER has been appointed advertisement manager of Maclaren's Modern Refrigeration and Air Conditioning. He was previously advertisement manager for Iliffe's Data Processing.

REPORTER FOR PR

RICHARD GUEST, deputy chief reporter of the Worthing News Telephone, has joined Nicholas Mendes and Associates Ltd. — a Birmingham-based public relations company — as press service editor.

NEWS CONTACT DIRECTORY

New entries include:

USA EXHIBITION AT IEA
See under ELECTRONICS

J. & E. HALL LIMITED
See under REFRIGERATION

AVON RUBBER COMPANY
See under MOTORING

ROVER COMPANY LIMITED
See under MOTOR CAR MANUFACTURERS

OMAL GROUP LIMITED
See under BUSINESS EFFICIENCY

HOME BREWING AND WINE MAKING
See under HOME BREWING

CONSUMER COUNCIL
See under CONSUMER ORGANISATIONS

See Pages 33-44

TMF 114551, 17/5/68

R. Gib

201-306052

22 Apr 68

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING ACTION
SECRET	MARKED FOR INDEXING
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO: C/WOVIEW

INFO: COS/London, C/Eur Div

FROM: Chief, LCPIPIT

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/Operational
QREBONY/QREBONY/1's Taxes

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. QREBONY/1 told RODIGAST at their most recent meeting that he did not have to file an overt tax form for 1966 because his gross overt income for 1966 was less than $600. This will not be true for the 1967 tax year and he will have to file in the Spring of 1968. The operative sentence in the 1966 Tax Guide For US Citizens Abroad, US Treasury Dept IRB Pub No 54 states--"Every citizen of the United States, regardless of where he resides who is under 65 years of age and has a gross income of $600 or more during a tax year must file an income tax return."

2. For the record the undersigned who is as yet unfamiliar with all administrative details, would appreciate HQS confirmation of the above.

ACR

AARON C. LAGINESTRA

Distribution:
- 3 - C/WOVIEW
- 2 - COS/London
- 2 - C/Eur Div

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201-306052
APR 25 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPA - 228	22 April 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CA 2, EUR 8, CI/IC 2, CI/OA

SECRET 191034Z CITE LCPIPIT 0701

DIRECTOR INFO LONDON

DTDORIC QREBONY

REF: DIRECTOR 90256

1. AGREED PARA 3 REF THAT RAISE NOT BE PASSED THRU QRPURE. ALSO AGREE JULY EFFECTIVE DATE. REQUEST HQS TAKE STEPS HAVE RAISE ADDED TO SALARY DEPOSITS MADE BY HQS TO QREBONY'S ACCOUNT.

2. WILL COMMENT ON PARA 4 REF WHEN PROMISED DISPATCH RECEIVED.

SECRET

BT

13 Apr 67 ... 43420

SECRET

Harrison =

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: C/WOVIEW

INFO: COS/London, C/Eur Div, C/WOMUSE

FROM: Chief, LCPIPIT

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/Operational
QREBONY/British Immigration Status

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. The USC memoranda sets forth a problem which QREBONY/1 recently encountered at London Airport and how it was solved with the assistance of London Station and JAGUAR.

2. As matters now stand, British Immigration will take no action against QREBONY/1 without checking with JAGUAR.

ACL

AARON C. LAGINESTRA

Attachment: USC
As stated above para 1 USC

S/C ATT'D BY RI/AN
Dated 1 MAY 1967

Distribution:
3 - C/WOVIEW w/att USC
2 - C/WOMUSE w/att USC
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APR 18 1967

15/c

201-305057

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPA - 211	17 April 1967
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

TO: [illegible]

[illegible] with Home [illegible] [illegible] Roddy [illegible] tell [illegible] what the Immigration people at the airport say. As long as he's properly documented (visa current and all that) they [illegible] step him out (unless, of course, they catch him in flagrante delicto. So as long as he keeps his nose relatively clean, he's okay. He doesn't need to worry until the Home Office comes to him; when that happens - IF it happens, and that is unlikely, the way the British Law works - we will look into things further. Tell him that having a British wife makes him immune to most out-kicking activities - as long as his nose is clean.

In fact, it is all fixed with the Home Office. They will not take any action against him without checking with JAGUAR, and they, of course, will check with us. Eb should not be encouraged to be flippant or sassy with the Immigration people, but he doesn't need to panic, either. He should behave in a reasonably straightforward and natural way - so he should not be encouraged to think we have "fixed" things for him.

I also discussed again with JAG the question of having him taken off the watchlist. They are willing to do so, if we want, but their [illegible] still is that it is better for him to be watchlisted. There could probably be no better credential for him, if traveling with Ibrahim or Nanchanda or Raimond, [illegible] of that sort, than to get the business from the [illegible] or Immigration people. And, of course, he should, for our sake (security, and all that) be discouraged from carrying anything incriminating, and if he knows that he may be searched any time he comes or goes, that should help his discretion along.

Now, if, on the other hand, the airport harrassment really gets to be too much of a burden, maybe we will want to review the situation. On the basis of the two incidents to date, however, I vote for leaving him watchlisted.

Let me know if you see any problems, or if there are any unanswered questions.

(Oh, yes: consensus is that he should not apply for permanent residence permit. If he wonders about it, Roddy should point out that in applying for one he would have to give some info about his income, etc., which he doesn't have to do now. And, again, since his British wife is an ace in the hole, he doesn't have to volunteer that information; so he shouldn't.

FROM: J[illegible]VICK

OEPA - 211
15 Apr 67

URGENT

BRITISH IMMIGRATION PROBLEM

Returning to the U.K. on 15/3/67, I was warned by British Immigration at London Airport that I was spending more time in Britain than outside the country. The Immigration Officer inspected my passport closely, counting the number of trips I had made since getting that passport, which had been issued by the U.S. Embassy in London, on 1 December 1965. However, no explanation was asked for concerning the travel. I explained that I had intended to resettle in Switzerland or France and was spending so much time in Britain only because my wife, who was British, had been helping to take care of her elderly parents in London. I was told nevertheless that I should go to the Home Office and apply for temporary residence in Britain.

Before doing so, I would need to know:

1) whether I should in fact do so;

2) how should I describe my work, if any, and source of income.

At present, upon investigation, the British would learn that I have no visible means of income, except for perhaps for my Reports and some freelance journalism, but nevertheless receive money regularly from a Swiss bank account.

If I told the Home Office, I was a freelance journalist, I imagine they would demand some sort of bank or other financial statements, which would probably be examined by British tax authorities for possible taxation. Even if I say I have no employment of any consequence and maintain myself on income from investments made in Switzerland and elsewhere, I might have to verify that statement and pay some sort of British taxes. Considering the positions of my brothers-in-law, I doubt if either could get away with claiming to fully or partially support my family, although my brother-in-law Gordon Kaye, who is a Chartered Accountant, has been deducting my children's school fees from his taxes by means of an educational trust fund, although he no longer pays anything towards the fees. I could say that I was the beneficiary of a tax-free U.S. fellowship, but this might prove more cumbersome and dangerous than necessary, in the present circumstances.

In any case, I need advice on this matter urgently, as I suspect I may soon have a visit from the Home Office if I do not go to them voluntarily.

CS COPY

S/C att to OEPA-211 201-306052

14-00000

AFRO - ASIAN PEOPLES' SOLITARITY ORGANISATION

VIII Council Session

NICOSIA - CYPRUS

201

Journalist Card No. 34

Name Richard Gibson

Country England

Organisation

ΚΥΠΡΟΥ

TO	Chief of Station, London For LCPIPIT	X	MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO	Chief of Station, London		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM	Chief, WOVIEW		MICROFILM

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/QREBONY/Operational
QREBONY/1 Mentioned in Senate Hearings

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

See paragraph 4.

1. Transmitted under separate cover is an excerpt from a recent Senate debriefing of a PBRUMEN defector, in which QREBONY/1's name was mentioned.

2. We do not believe that the testimony is particularly awkward for QREBONY/1, and while we had an opportunity to have this portion of the testimony stricken from the record, we elected not to do anything about it since it would have involved revealing WOFACT interest in QREBONY/1.

3. FYI, In order to avoid any concern on the part of QRPURE should this portion of the testimony ever hit the press, KAMMERMAYER mentioned the reference to QREBONY/1 in low key to QRPURE at a recent meeting. QRPURE exhibited no concern.

4. Please have RODIGAST brief QREBONY/1 concerning the testimony at an early opportunity.

JULIA R. CONGREVE

Attachment:
As stated above (u/s/c)

Distribution:
Original & 2 - LCPIPIT w/att.
1 - COS, London w/o att.

15/c ff

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
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	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-306052

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1 - CI/IC w/att.
1 - WH/COG/CA/EW
1 - CCS/NC

AN / PS / ABSTRACT / CA/CF / INDEX

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	EXT
CA/CF	Diane Chatelain	7767

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/IC	4/4/67	D. Hart
for WH/COG/CA/EW	4/12/67	J. Moughan

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OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/CA		Cord Meyer, Jr.

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

Mr. Volta. I don't know, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know if they did in fact organize this conference in London, involving --

Mr. Volta. I think they did, but I never heard of it --

Mr. Sourwine. Involving the North Vietnamese. You heard nothing further?

Mr. Volta. No, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. Now, did you have any information about the presence in London of any other United States citizens who had attempted to obtain a visa to travel to Cuba?

Mr. Volta. No, sir. Not that I remember.

Mr. Sourwine. Didn't you have something to do with an individual who wanted to go to Cuba, to interview Castro?

Mr. Volta. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Tell us about this.

Mr. Volta. There was a newspaper man, a colored man.

Mr. Sourwine. A Negro?

Mr. Volta. Yes, a Negro. And he used to be, I think, president of Fair Play for Cuba here in the States, I think in New York. I don't know if this was in New York. And he visited the Embassy, trying to get a visa.

Mr. Sourwine. The Cuban Embassy in London?

Mr. Volta. Yes, the Cuban Embassy in London.

Mr. Sourwine. To get a visa to go to Cuba?

Mr. Volta. Yes. And then we sent this request to Cuba,

but we never had a reply. He wanted to have an interview with Castro for a magazine -- Playboy Magazine.

Q Playboy Magazine.

What did this Negro newspaper man do, do you know? Do you know where he worked?

Mr. Volta. As far as I know, he was editing a bulletin, newspaper bulletin, in London.

Mr. Sourwine. In London -- not in Paris?

Mr. Volta. I hardly can tell you exactly. But I know he was editing a news bulletin.

Mr. Sourwine. What kind of a news bulletin?

Mr. Volta. Well, a sheet of paper with news about different aspects.

Mr. Sourwine. Well, do you know whether this was really a news enterprise, or whether it was a propaganda enterprise?

Mr. Volta. I think it was a private news service, because his name was in the head.

Mr. Sourwine. What was that name?

Mr. Volta. I tried to remember his name.

Mr. Sourwine. Didn't you tell our man in Miami that it was Richard Gibson?

Mr. Volta. Right, that one, yes, sir. Richard Gibson.

Mr. Sourwine. Now, do you have any details about the alleged contract with Playboy Magazine for an interview with Fidel Castro?

SECRET

MR. [illegible]. [illegible].

MR. [illegible]. [illegible]?

MR. [illegible]. [illegible].

MR. [illegible]. [illegible]?

MR. [illegible]. [illegible]. [illegible]
[illegible], [illegible]
[illegible].

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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LONDON

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INFO
FILE VR, CA2, WE 8, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 021318Z

PALP INFO DIR CITE LOND 2425

21 Mar 65 65923

DTDORIC QRPREY QREBONY

1. QREBONY RAW REPORTS RECEIVED 1 MARCH. APPRECIATE PROMPT FORWARDING.

2. SINCE WILL BE CONTINUING REVIEW OF CASE WITH JAGUAR IN NEXT FEW DAYS (THEY HAVE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE OUR CONTINUED RUNNING OF HIM IN UK), WOULD APPRECIATE CABLE SUMMARY LATEST MEETING WITH QREBONY AND PLANS FOR IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

S E C R E T

CFN 2425 QREBONY RAW 1 JAGUAR UK QREBONY

BT



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SECRET

1 FEB 1966

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

201

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: SUGAR's Involvement with American Radical Organizations

1. This memorandum requests your Agency's comments, on a priority basis, relative to improving the operational capabilities of SUGAR, a source of this Agency known to you, whose reporting on expatriate American leftist personalities we are forwarding on a continuing basis.

2. Despite our hopes and his efforts, SUGAR was unable to obtain an invitation to the Tri-Continental Conference recently held in Havana, which was a target for collection by this Agency. It is our belief that SUGAR's reputation of being pro-Chinese was responsible for his exclusion. In discussing this problem with important pro-Chinese communist personalities in Europe recently, the latter suggested that his ability to secure access to such meetings would be considerably enhanced if he could obtain a "grass-roots" base or connection in the United States which he could represent. In reporting this suggestion--which strikes us as valid--SUGAR speculated on the possibility that he might attempt to become the European "representative" of the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), an American organization of which he knows little but which seems, from what he does know, to be consistent in its outlook with his ostensible political orientation.

3. In this connection, we would very much appreciate receiving any information you possess on RAM, its structure, personalities and membership. We would welcome particularly, any mailing list or address roster of this organization which might be passed on to SUGAR without compromise to security considerations.

SECRET

4. Most of all, we would welcome your comments on this general problem, given your Agency's broad knowledge of such organizations as RAM in this country. As a negro expatriate with pretended pro-Chicom sympathies, SUGAR has also cultivated a reputation for sympathy toward the admittedly vague and diverse manifestations of "black nationalism", and toward such personalities as Robert Williams who embody it. We would be most interested in receiving both your comments on this general movement of opinion in the United States, and your descriptions of the organizations associated with it which could enable us to provide information and guidance to SUGAR for developing an association which would increase his operational access and effectiveness.

CSCI-316/00844-66

CA/CF:JMurphy:ajl (16 February 1966)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - CI/LSN
1 - CI/R & A
1 - CI/IC
1 - RID (200-124-156/3)
1 - CA/INT
1 - CA/SEC
2 - CA/CF

13 February 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

ATTENTION: Mr. John Brewer

SUBJECT: Field Investigation of QREBONY; Qrebony Clearance (201-306052)

1. Pursuant to our conversation of 11 February in your office, this memorandum requests that the usual field background investigation not be undertaken in the clearance process instituted for QREBONY.

2. We make this request for limitation because of our strong belief that such an investigation would run an unacceptably high risk--approaching certainty--of causing serious damage to QREBONY's reputation and therefore his effectiveness with the targets against which he is directed as an informant. In the past, both here and abroad, QREBONY has made warm enemies, as well as friends, among dissident and leftist circles. He has particularly alienated both U.S. Communist and Trotskyist elements, apparently by his dealings with them while serving as Executive Director of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in the early 60's. His reputation for pro-Chicom sympathies--which is the basis of his present operational usefulness to us as a source--constitutes an additional grievance against him by such parties as the CPUSA and the CPGB which are pro-Moscow and anti-Peking. We know from independent sources as well as from his own testimony, that such hostility has taken the form of charges--completely false at the time--that he was an ODENVY or KUBARK agent. (Apparently a favored smear technique in such circles this charge has been leveled in other cases with equal lack of justification.) These allegations against QREBONY' have not prevented him from winning the apparent confidence of many leftist target elements who, if they are aware of them at all, no doubt realize the prevalence of such backbiting and gossip and who have not been prevented from developing personal and confidential relations with him. Such charges, however, do represent a dormant vulnerability: they have made Subject something of a controversial figure in a millieu which rightly feels itself a target for intelligence collection and is extremely sensitive to the dangers of penetration.

14-00000

3. Against the background of this vulnerability, it must also be stressed that the sources to be contacted by such a field investigation would include many individuals whose suspicions of government interest--and hostility toward it--we could not reasonably expect to disarm. QREBONY's career in the United States in FPCC and similar groups put him in contact with a wide range of individuals who are not merely sophisticated but highly sensitive concerning any such inquiry. It is not possible to conceive of any method of approach which would not provoke their suspicions that a government connection with QREBONY was involved. (It is, moreover, hardly likely that cooperation could be expected of any of them, except in such cases where the individual sensed an opportunity to record damaging information.) In view of what we know about the rapid circulation of gossip among such individuals, and their great interest in, and suspicions of government interest, such an inquiry could be calculated with reasonable confidence to spell the end of any effectiveness QREBONY could offer this Agency.

4. While we realise fully that the aim of such an inquiry is to resolve unknowns in an individual's background and develop materials beyond those presently available, we note that QREBONY has been a subject of continuing interest to ODENVY for many years, and that, as a result, the basic politically derogatory associations in his past are a matter of record. As you know, a successful polygraph was performed on him indicating the absence of IS connection beyond such associations, and confirming (to the extent that it can be said to do so) his assertions of loyalty despite them.

5. In requesting clearance in this case, we are seeking to exploit QREBONY's ability to report information to us which he receives in the course of his contacts with national liberation leaders, pro-Chinese communists and similar personalities. Such information represents general political and biographical material relative to the interests, activities and plans of such individuals. Requirements passed to him in this connection involve instructions for the refinement and completeness of the reporting he is capable of providing from his normal intercourse with source personalities. It is anticipated that his usefulness will be increased by travel to those areas where his access to targets known to him permits firsthand reporting. It is also anticipated that he may be able to serve selected CA purposes by surfacing information available to him, when this does not prejudice his cover status.

His use is understood to be, and has been, limited and precludes revelation of classified information, either by operational assignments supporting or servicing other KUBARK operations, witting participation in the recruitment of other agents, or the passing of such requirements as would reveal a classified status of KUBARK knowledge or interest in any collection target.

James M. Murphy
C/CA/CF

Austin Goodrich
CI/IC

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION (Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)	DATE: 10 February 1966
TO: X CI/Operational Approval and Support Division Security Support Division/Office of Security	FROM: James Murphy CA/CP 4 D 30 X7767
SUBJECT: (True name) Richard Thomas GIBSON	PROJECT: QREBONY
CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES: QREBONY/1 Frederick T. Dominic (P)	CI/OA FILE NO.
	RI 201 FILE NO.: 201-306052 / SO FILE NO.

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
X	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		COVERT NAME CHECK
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO field investigation)
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

International

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

It was planned to use Subject in a test assignment at the Afro-Asian Journalists' Conference and the IX World Youth Festival, both in Algiers during summer 1965. When both of these events were cancelled, our test of Subject came to be based on his reporting capability relative to accessible contacts. His value confirmed in this way, we intend to help him expand his circle of contacts, using him as a penetration and informant on Afro-Asian national liberation and pro-Chicom elements in various countries.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION? See F below		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM? CIA has not been explicitly identified, but subject doubtless suspects CIA interest.	X	

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. No FBI - All info from them has been received and reviewed.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. Only extreme left-wing cover truly applicable. Very limited credit cover interest is conceivable but inadvisable in US.

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY
Possible long-range assignment to cover Communist targets in Algiers, Cairo or Djakarta makes case highly sensitive from the start.

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

X	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED		PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
X	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	X	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 169669

6. RI TRACES

	NO RECORD	X	WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

	NO RECORD	X	WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

	NO RECORD	X	WILL FORWARD
	NO DEROGATORY INFO.		DEROGATORY ATTACHED
	LIST SOURCES CHECKED Rome Frankfurt Algiers London Paris		
	NOT INITIATED (Explanation)		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF

FORM 1-62 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (9)

14-00000

Gen List #169069

Richard Thomas GIBSON

8 February 1966

201- 306052

13 May 1931, Los Angeles, California

James Murphy
CA/CP
4 D 30
7767

U.S.

Freelance Journalist London, England

X

Journalist

X

Student John Hay Whitney Fellowship	Italy	1951 - 52
NCO U.S. Army	Germany, U.S.	52- 1954
Editor Revolution Africaine	Algiers	1962-64
Executive Secretary for Fair Play for Cuba Committee	New York	1961-62
Newswriter, ~~XXX~~ CBS News	New York	1959-61
English Editor Agence France Presse	Paris	1955-58
Freelance Italian Films Export & Christian Science	Rome	1950-52
Cub Reporter Philadelphia Afro-American	U.S.	1950-51

~~Xxx~~ Founding member of Fair Play for Cuba Committee; member NAACO, Urban League and American Society of ~~X~~ African Culture

5'10" 165 Black Kinky black Negro

Joy Marjorie Nee Kaye

Son - Frederick William Gordon Gibson DPOB 1958 Paris
Daughter Dominque Elizabeth Gibson DPOB 1956 Paris

FULL SEARCH

X 7468

SECRET

Chief of Station, Paris (LCPIPIT)

Chief, WH, Deputy Chief, WH/C; Chief, KUDESK

CA/6

Chief of Station, Madrid
RYDORIC CRPRIT CAREONY/PBRUMEN
Transmittal of Background Reports on Subjects of Reference
: A. PALP 5275, 30 December 1965
B. MADR 6774, 12 January 1966

Attached herewith are copies of the reports prepared by AMPOSE 2 concerning the Subjects of reference.

George D. SOCRGONY

Attachments:
As stated above, herewith

Distribution:
2 - COS, Paris (LCPIPIT), w/att, h/w
2 - C WH, w/o att
1 - DC/WH/C, w/att, h/w
1 - C/KUDESK, w/att, h/w

GROUP I
Excluded from
automatic downgrading
and declassification

CA/KF

OSMA-20639

14 JAN 66

ALGUNAS OPINIONES SOBRE LA VIDA Y PERSONALIDAD DE:

ROBERT TABER
RICHARD GIBSON
ROBERT WILLIAMS
WILLIAM WORTHY

Robert Taber

(Los datos sobre la vida y currícula de estos señores anteriores a su visita a Cuba deberán encontrarse en otra parte.)

Bob es el mejor del grupo, casi el único que realmente vale. Hombre gran valor personal y un buen periodista, estuvo en la Sierra en 1957 y de nuevo en 1958, donde entrevistó y filmó una película para la CBS, de Fidel Castro y sus guerrilleros. Al triunfo de la Revolución, estuvo en Cuba de visita varias veces y fue luego uno de los fundadores del Fair Play Committee For Cuba. Aparentemente, perdió su puesto en CBS y se enajenó el amor de su esposa (de esto se quejaba a menudo en Cuba) por causa de la Revolución Cubana. Amigo personal de Raúl Roa y Gómez Wanguemert y también de Fidel Castro, según parecía en 1961. Con relaciones personales con Manuel Piñeiro (de quien se reía de sus ínfulas de policía) y Ramiro Valdés y Raúl Castro, aunque nunca pareció estimarlos mucho. Este sentimiento parecía recíproco. Gran enemistad hacia los miembros del PSP y enemistad de ellos hacia Taber, sobre todo de Aníbal Escalante y Joaquín Ordoqui y Carlos Rafael Rodríguez. Una de las tragedias en la vida de Bob Taber fue el darse cuenta de que se había malquistado con Fidel Castro por hacerle, personalmente y cada vez que lo veía, críticas periódicas. Fue entonces (a fines de 1960 y principios de 1961) que comenzaron verdaderamente sus problemas y que comprendió que no solamente había perdido el favor de sus amigos, sino que estaba en desgracia con sus enemigos. Fue esto, sin duda, lo que le hizo buscar la muerte en Playa Girón, mientras actuaba como corresponsal del periódico Revolución. Fue gravemente herido en un muslo y salvó la vida por pura suerte. Antes había renunciado a su pasaporte o había sostenido una polémica pública con periodistas o senadores norteamericanos, desde las páginas del "El Mundo", donde colaboraba. En Cuba por poco muere también, poco después, de una infección amebiásica contraída en Guatemala, en los días de la revolución contra Arbenz. A fines de 1961 salió de Cuba con un documento (ni siquiera pudieron darle un pasaporte cubano, el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores ya en manos totalmente de los comunistas) personal de identidad, tratando de ir a China como corresponsal, pero en Praga le negaron el permiso para visitar este país y la URSS. Pasó a Francia y luego a Londres —y de ahí regresó a USA via Canadá.

Taber no es un comunista ni parece haberlo sido nunca. Es un romántico político y un hombre ingenuo, que creyó que la Revolución cubana, de alguna manera, encarnaba algo de los ideales de Jefferson y Lincoln, asombrosamente. Hoy sabe que nada hay que esperar del comunismo en general y de la Revolución Cubana en particular.

14-00000

2. Robert Taber (continued)

En la actualidad mantiene lazos de amistad en Cuba con Carlos Franqui, Juan Arcocha y Gómez Wangüemert, ya que una de las características de Robert Taber es su sentido del agradecimiento. Es uno de los hombres que mejor conocen en USA la Revolución Cubana, sus motivaciones, sus verdaderas intenciones, sus intenciones enmascaradas, sus logros reales y falsos y sus verdaderos fracasos. Políticamente, por sus cartas, parece ser alguien que regresa a un socialismo ingenuo y primitivo, a lo Oven y Proudhon y aborrece el cinismo comunista de que el fin justifica los medios.

En Cuba, en 1961, realizó un acto de gran coraje intelectual, poco después del coraje físico en Playa Girón, al ser el único periodista (siendo extranjero, además) que defendió el film "P.M.", que prohibieran Alfredo Guevara y el ICAIC y que originara la gran, primera purga de intelectuales de izquierda y fueran el pretexto para las llamadas Conversaciones de la Biblioteca Nacional y el famoso discurso de Fidel Castro a los intelectuales, tan citado dondequiera. El artículo de Taber fue aceptado por la dirección del periódico El Mundo, pero no fue publicado--aunque Fidel Castro conociera su contenido al ser leído públicamente en una de las sesiones de la Biblioteca. Este gesto apresuró su salida de Cuba y selló su suerte política.

Richard Gibson

Ultimamente residía en París con su esposa francesa. Era director de la edición en Inglés del mensuario "Revolution", publicado en Lausana por Jacques Vergés, antiguo director de "Revolution Africaine", argelino de madre china y amigo de Ben Bella, con quien disputó al probársele que recibía dinero de China Comunista para expresar los puntos de vistas chinos en el periódico argelino. "Revolution" era o es (ignoro si se publica todavía) financiado por China Roja. Gibson salió de su puesto en esta publicaciones, al ser acusado de ser un agente infiltrado de la CIA. En 1964 estuvo en Bruselas, ofreciendo una conferencia en la ULB (Universidad Libre), con motivo de una Exposición Latinoamericana, auspiciada por la facción pro-china de la Federación Comunista de Estudiantes de Bélgica (Federación de Bruselas) y pagada por el grupo de disidentes del PCB, Grippa, Reindorf, etc. Esa noche habló sobre la Revolución cubana y su visita a Cuba y en la presidencia del acto estaba el propio Jacques Grippa.

Richard Gibson estuvo en Cuba en 1960, invitado especialmente por el periódico Revolución y por el magazine Lunes de Revolución. Era entonces presidente del Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Fue invitado a sugerencias de Bob Taber por Pablo Armando Fernández, que viajó a Nueva York para invitar a un grupo de intelectuales negros norteamericanos a los festejos del 26 de julio de 1960. Junto con Richard Gibson viajaron a Cuba Robert Williams, Leroy Jones, Julian Mayfield, su esposa y un nutrido grupo de escritores y poetisas negras. Fue entonces que Williams conoció a Cuba. La presencia de Gibson fue mal acogida por el PSP y los núcleos intelectuales y políticos que en Cuba giraban en la órbita del Partido Comunista Cubano, ya que Gibson era acusado por el PC de USA de dejar fuera del Comité Pro Justo Trato a Cuba a prominentes figuras comunistas norteamericanas, mientras daba cabida en el mismo a trotzskyistas y gente de la Nueva Izquierda. Williams, por su parte, era considerado un agitador casi anarquista, por estos mismos círculos comunistas cubano-americanos.

Richard Gibson es hombre de un carácter turbio. Un buen periodista y no mal escritor, pero una persona más bien desagradable, dentro de un complejo no solamente político, sino también psicológico, alimentados por su problema racial. Es un intelectual fracasado y hombre poco franco, de una comunicabilidad torcida. La policía francesa le consideraba un agente al servicio de una potencia extranjera--China Roja.

14-00000

Robert Williams

Robert Williams es considerado en Cuba como una calamidad que hay que soportar---al menos esa es la opinión que se tiene de él en los círculos políticos y revolucionarios y oficiales. Conversé con él, brevemente, en La Habana, en agosto de 1965. Es hombre con quien no se puede hablar mucho, no solamente por su complicado acento del Deep Sputh, sino también por su incoherencia mental y verbal. Suele vérsele acompañado siempre de un traductor, por lo general un negro cubano. Su penúltimo traductor fue Carlos Moore, que hoy reside en París y que provocó una aguda polémica en los círculos cubanos y amigos de Cuba en Francia, al publicar en el periódico "Solidarité Africaine" un artículo que tomaba las tesis del intelectual negro cubano, Walterio Carbonell, sobre la pretendida discriminación racial que existe en los medios políticos y dirigentes cubanos. Este asunto tuvo repercusiones en Cuba y no solo trajo problemas al verdadero autor del artículo (Walterio Carbonell, hoy expulsado de la Unión de Escritores de Cuba), sino al propio Williams; quien más de una vez había expresado tal opinión en público y en privado. Las desventuras de Williams no comenzaron aquí, sino cuando insistió en su línea china revolucionaria mucho tiempo después que todos los medios políticos, oficiales, intelectuales y dirigentes de Cuba se habían re-orientado hacia Moscú. Williams complicó su situación con un viaje a China Roja y su vuelta. En Cuba se encuentra casi aislado y ya no suele ver a Fidel Castro, a Dorticós y a los otros dirigentes revolucionarios con la facilidad con que solía hacerlo antes. Todavía conserva muchos de sus privilegios (el traductor perenne, la casa, la comida, la educación de sus hijos y, creo, que la hora radial anti-americana), pero solamente porque su caso es muy conocido fuera de Cuba y en el Sur llegó a tener una cierta audiencia después de su fuga de Estados Unidos a Cuba y de haber dispuesto de una potente emisora (Radio Habana Cuba) para sus confusos mensajes de odio racial.

No me extrañaría que Robert Williams fuese declarado insano por un grupo de psiquíatras competente. En Cuba, la gente de la calle, lo tiene por tal. Ahora, en la Conferencia Tricontinental, estará asimilando su inestabilidad psíquica a la teoría de la revolución permanente --o a la lucha de la liberación de los pueblos de color.

William Worthy

Es el menos conocido de los cuatro y quizás el más peligroso, porque es el más estable emocionalmente, el más mediocre y más trabajador del grupo. Fue a Cuba en 1961, recomendado por Richard Gibson y el Fair Play Committee, pero también por su cuenta. Se hospedó en el Havana Riviera, no sin dificultades, pues sus puntos de vista, nada asimilables por los comunistas cubanos, fieles perritos de Moscú, le atrajeron el odio del PSP y una --ligera acusación-- de posible agente del FBI infiltrado en el Movimiento Negro y en Cuba. Hablé poco con él y solamente recuerdo su extraño acento, tal vez de Chicago o simplemente algún defecto anatómico, su aspecto de metodista negro y los shorts de cuero de alpinista italiano que siempre usaba en el hotel. Luego se hizo famoso en Cuba y en Europa, cuando fue procesado por haber ido a Cuba y a China Comunista sin permiso válido. Worthy no es un fanático ni un comunista ni un oportunista, pero parecía en camino de convertirse en un abanderado de cualquier causa que le fuera afín. Entonces me pareció que esta causa sería el Movimiento Por Avance de la Gente de Color. Hoy podría ser la Revolución Negra o Latinoamericana --o, simplemente, mundial.

Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT XX

Chief, KUWOLF

DTDORIC/QRPREY/QREBONY

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REF: A. PALP 5033 (IN 96553)
B. OFLA 3128 (18 November 1965)

1. We have discussed the substance of the question raised in Ref B through the regular Headquarters channel with the ODENVY Rep here who has acted as a point of liaison for QREBONY material in the past. We passed on, also, the materials which you prepared for the ODENVY representative with whom you are in contact in Paris. We raised specifically the question of passing QREBONY's identity to the Paris ODENVY representative, which you mentioned in Ref B, stating that, so far as KUBARK is concerned, we had no objections. The ODENVY representative here, however, thought that this might serve to confuse somewhat the lines of coordination for QREBONY's information, for which ODENVY headquarters has sole responsibility. He therefore felt that we should continue the present arrangement by which, in effect, QREBONY's identity is held here at the point where his material within ODENVY originates. He appreciated, however, your initiative in filling in the Paris ODENVY representative on the targets which QREBONY can service, thus alerting him to possible leads he might look into. He suggests also that we be kept aware of your liaison with ODENVY in the field to guard against false confirmation or other possible duplication which could lead to confusion here in those quarters of ODENVY responsible for processing the QREBONY material.

2. With respect to Freedomways, discussed in Ref A, and Q's possible relationship with it, we will report separately.

Howell D. KAMMERMAYER

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS, Paris/LCPIPIT

7 JAN 1966

OFLW-1414

S-E-C-R-E-T 200-124-156/2

1 - 200-124-156/2 CA/CF James C. Murphy mht (30-12-65) 7767
1 - CA/CF Chrono
1 - CI/ICG

CI/ICG

C/CA

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 43

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM LONDON

ACTION AF 7

INFO VR, FILE, WE6, CA 2, CA/O 4, FE6, FI, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI/INT 2, DDP, C/WH/SA 8

SECRET 221745Z

PARI DIR INFO PALP CITE LOND 5337 CAWOOD ACTING

ZIBET LCHARVEST

REF PARI 8052 (IN 39470)

22 DEC 64 IN 47512

1. UNBOUND HAS MADE AVAILABLE TO ODENVY SAME INFO AS CONTAINED REF. ODENVY LOND INSIST THEY HAVE NO OPS INTEREST GIBSON. SERIOUSLY DOUBT EITHER SMOTH OR JAGUAR HAVE ANY RELATIONSHIP GIBSON., SINCE WOULD BE GROSS (AND SOONER OR LATER APPARENT) CONTRAVENTION OUR AGREEMENTS RE USE ONE ANOTHER'S NATIONALS.

201

2. LOND PHONE DIRECTORY LISTS JEFFREYS ALFRED HENRY AND MARKS (CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS), 9 BASINGHALL ST., E.C.2. NO STA TRACES.

3. ODENVY FILES HERE REFLECT FURTHER INFO ON CHARGES GIBSON A KUBARKER, ALTHOUGH NOTHING TO INDICATE BASIS FOR SUCH CHARGES. (SEE ODENVY/WASH LETTER TO KUBARK INFO ODENVY/LOND AND PARI, 1 DEC64, CAPTIONED RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON.) CAN HQS SHED ANY LIGHT?

4. SINCE ARRIVAL LOND, GIBSON HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH CUBAN EMB

SECRET

AND MR. KENNETH TYNAN (LATTER IN CONNECTON JOB POSSIBILITY FOR GIBSON). (THIS INFO SENSITIVE, FROM SMOTH. HQS SEE OEL 39690 AND OEL 39490.)

5. SMOOTHERS HAVE PREVIOUSLY ACKNOWLEDGED THEY WOULD LIKE SCUTTLE REVOLUTION REPEAT REVOLUTION. REQUEST LOND BE ADVISED OF SCHEME OF DIR 63751. THEN, IF APPROPRIATE, SUGGEST WE DISCUSS WITH SMOTH/JAGUAR/LCBEFORE AS NECESSARY TO ENLIST THEIR COOPERATION. JAGUAR IN PARTICULAR MAY BE USEFUL IN PROVIDING CURRENT DATA ON GIBSON AND MAY BE ABLE GET SOMEONE CLOSE TO HIM IN ORDER OBTAIN OPS DATA IN SUPPORT ANY PLAN FOR OP AGAINST REVOLUTION REPEAT REVOLUTION. PLS ADVISE.

SECRET

* UNBound INFO Re Richard GIBSON.

14-00000

R I C H A R D   G I B S O N

30, Stockleigh Hall
Prince Albert Road
London, N.W.8
Tel.: PRI 8778

Age: 34.   Born: Los Angeles, Calif., U.S.A., 13 May 1931.

Married - wife English.   Three children - ages 7, 9 and 5 mos.

Education: Primary schools, Philadelphia, Pa., U.S.A.
Central High School, Philadelphia, Pa.
Kenyon College, Gambier, Ohio (read English lit.)
University of Rome (Italian lit., 1951-52)
Sorbonne, Paris (French studies, 1955)
Columbia University Graduate School, New York
(CBS Fellowship, 1960-61)

First entered journalism in 1950 as reporter-clerk for Philadelphia Afro-American, a Negro weekly.

In 1951-52, while attending the University of Rome, I worked as legman for Edmund Stevens, then chief of the Mediterranean News Bureau of the Christian Science Monitor of Boston. I also did parttime work -- English-language public relations -- for Italian Films Export, a semi-governmental Italian agency for the export of Italian films to English-speaking countries.

1953-54: drafted into U.S. Army. Served as non-com in Trieste, West Germany and U.S.A.

1955-58: English-language editor, Agence France-Presse, the French national news agency in Paris. Also wrote for the Agence Intercontinentale, AFP's feature service.

1959-61: newswritter for Columbia Broadcasting System for radio and television in New York. Fired from this job because of my activities in founding the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in the U.S.A. to support the Cuban Revolution.

1961-62: Secretary-treasurer of the Institute for the Improvement of Inter-American Relations, Inc., chartered as an "educational foundation" under the laws of the State of New York. The Fair Play for Cuba Committee was a permanent committee of the Institute. As the chief paid officer of the organization, I directed a public relations campaign aimed at countering U.S. propaganda against Cuba. I published books, newsletters and placed advertizing on behalf of Cuba in the U.S. press.

1962-64: English-language editor of the international review Revolution. Was one of the founding editors of Revolution Africaine in Algiers and was later sent to Switzerland to edit a monthly in English. Directed all aspects of the editing, publishing and distribution of the magazine.

1965-   : Publisher of Richard Gibson Reports, a regular news and features service, mainly for Afro-American newspapers.

201-306052

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 31

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING

ORIG : JAMES M. MURPHY
UNIT : CI/CF
EXT : 7767
DATE : 9 DEC 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-306052

SECRET

10 DEC 65 14 32 z

TO : PARIS/LCPIPIT LONDON

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: CA/O 4 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY, WE 8, WH/C 8, CA 2, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CCS 3

TO PALP INFO LOND

CITE DIR 64369

DTDORIC QRPREY QREBONY

REFS: A. LOND 0723 (IN 00407)

B. DIR 61637

1. CONSULTATION WITH STATE CONTACT YIELDS FOLLOWING:

A. TRAVEL WITH U.S. PASSPORT FROM AREA OUTSIDE U.S. CONSIDERED TECHNICAL VIOLATION, NOT BASIS FOR CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.

B. EVIDENCE OF SUCH TRAVEL, E.G. CUBAN VISA STAMP, IS BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION BY STATE DEPT AGAINST HOLDER OF PASSPORT. I.E. WHEN HE PRESENTS HIS PASSPORT FOR RENEWAL, EMBASSY WILL REFER TO DEPARTMENT FOR GUIDANCE. ~~USUALLY RESULTING IN ISSUANCE OF NEW PASSPORT GOOD ONLY FOR ONE WAY TRAVEL HOME.~~

C. DESPITE REF A REPORT FROM ODENVY THAT LOND PASSPORT FILE IS CLEAN, DEPARTMENT CONTACT HERE CANNOT ASSURE THAT LOND PASSPORT OFFICE PROCEDURES WOULD AUTOMATICALLY RENEW QREBONY PASSPORT ON REQUEST, WITHOUT REFERRAL TO DEPT IF SUCH MADE, THERE MAY EXIST DEROG IN EBONY PASSPORT FILE HERE RESULTING IN INSTRUCTIONS TO LOND EMBASSY ISSUE LIMITED PASSPORT FOR TRAVEL HOME. CAN NOT CLARIFY FURTHER STATUS EBONY FILE HERE WITHOUT DIVULGING TRUE NAME.

Continued...

201-306052

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

DEC 14 8 56 AM '63

TO :

PAGE TWO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 64369

2. IN ANY CASE WE ABLE PROTECT QREBONY THRU CLEARED STATE CONTACT. IF EBONYS REQUEST FOR RENEWAL IS REFERRED TO DEPARTMENT BECAUSE OF CUBAN TRAVEL OR SOME OTHER CAUSE, WE CAN HAVE DEPT INSTRUCT EMB ISSUE FULL RENEWAL ON BASIS THERE INSUFFICIENT LEGAL GROUNDS PROCEED OTHERWISE.

3. PLEASE ADVISE WHEN EBONY PASSPORT EXPIRES. IF IT HAS BEEN RENEWED RECENTLY, CUBAN VISA WILL PRESENT NO PROBLEM FOR LIFE OF DOCUMENT. EBONY SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT RENEW WITHOUT PRIOR COORDINATION WITH HQS.

4. PLEASE ADVISE ALSO WHETHER EBONY HAS RECEIVED CUBAN VISA FOR TRAVEL, HOW ACQUIRED, AND WHAT ARRANGEMENTS HE PLANS FOR TRAVEL. APPRECIATE BREAKDOWN ESTIMATED TRAVEL COSTS.

END OF MESSAGE

CCS [signature]
CI/IC [signature]
WE/BC/U [signature]

CORD MEYER, JR.
C/CA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JAMES M. MURPHY
CA/CF
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

COPY NO.

14-00000

SECRET

Chief, KUWOLF XX

Chiefs: KUDESK; KURIOT; CSB, FRANKFURT (MKTOPAZ for OVERSEAS);
WE. Chiefs of Station: Germany; Paris (TECHS).

Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT.
DTDORIC/Operational
QHBONY/Security of QHBONY/1 S/W Communications System

201

References:

A. OFIA 3044 (Not sent Chief, CSB, Frankfurt; COS, Germany; COS, Paris)

B. FRAN 9240

1. Forwarded herewith is a Memorandum for the record concerning Paris/LCPIPIT's investigation of the security of QHBONY/1's S/W communications system following an episode involving an 11 October 1965 message received from him by LCPIPIT.

2. We request Headquarters' guidance concerning this situation, with special reference to Paragraph 3 of the attached Memorandum, in order that we may take all appropriate steps to resolve the problem of maintaining secure communications with QHBONY/1, especially in view of the plans to send QHBONY/1 on an extended visit to Cuba commencing sometime in mid-December 1965.

Harvey C. FAIRMICH

Attachment:
Memorandum hw

Distribution:
1 - C,KUDESK w/att. hw
1 - C,KURIOT w/att. hw
1 - C, CSB,Frankfurt w/att. hw
1 - COS, Germany w/att. hw
1 - COS, Paris w/att. hw
1 - C,WE w/o att.
3 - C,KUWOLF

NOV 26 1965

OFIA 3152 24 November 1965

SECRET 200-124/156/2

14-00000

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Record

FROM : Harvey G. FAHNRICH

SUBJECT : Security of QREBONY/1 S/W Communications System

REFERENCES : A. OFLA 3044
B. PALP 4385
C. FRAN 5087

1. In early June of this year KUWOLF developmental agent QREBONY/1 (formerly STEBONY/1) was trained by KUWOLF Career Agent Rufus F. RODIGAST in the use of the S/W system prescribed by MKTOPAZ per Reference C. QREBONY/1 took one carbon sheet of the system with him on a brief trip to North Africa and used it for four messages in the latter part of June. Concurrently, Paris Station TECHS, on LCPIPIT's behalf, requested in OFPT 10348 that MKTOPAZ prepare for QREBONY/1's use an S/W carbon pad which would alleviate the carbon concealment problem for the agent. The pad was received subsequently and passed to QREBONY/1 on 18 July 1965, at which time his original single carbon sheet was withdraw.

2. QREBONY/1 first used his new S/W pad for a message dated 22 July 1965, comments on which were transmitted to interested KUBARK Headquarters and Field components in Reference B. QREBONY/1 underwent a corrective briefing on the use of his pad on 4 August 1965, carbon No. 1 (rearmost of three in the back of his pad) was withdrawn since it bore an imprint of the 22 July message, and QREBONY/1 was authorized to use carbon No. 2 (middle of three) but only for "essential" messages. (a 24 July S/W message was also critiqued at the 4 August meeting--because the carbon impression was relatively weak.)

3. On the basis of LCPIPIT's instruction to refrain from using his S/W pad except for "essential" messages, QREBONY/1 did not employ it again until 11 October 1965. The nature of the message indeed met the criteria for use of the pad, but as in the 22 July letter the message was clearly legible without development. To quote Paris Station TECHS:

> "SW impressions were clearly visible under Ultraviolet Light (short wave and long wave) and also under a plain desk light."

On the basis of this report, QREBONY/1's previous performance in use of the pad, and the fact that the next point from which he was to use the pad would be Algiers, LCPIPIT determined that the risk of compromise outweighed the necessity of QREBONY/1 carrying this communications system with him and withdrew the S/W pad on 20 October 1965. LCPIPIT retains possession of

the pad which contains the two remaining carbon sheets (No. 2 detached and inserted in the back of the pad, No. 3 still bound in the pad.) The 11 October message is clearly legible to the naked eye on carbon No. 2.

4. Of greater concern to LCPIPIT, however, were the following additional comments of Paris Station TECHS regarding the 11 October message:

> "The envelope you sent has evidence of tampering. There was glue bleeding plus fiber tears. Plus, additional glue had been added to the upper flap (glue must have run and was sticking inside on the letter.)"

5. In the 20 October meeting at which his S/W pad was withdrawn QREBONY/1 stated that he had written the 11 October message on a sheet of glass, perhaps with a pencil that was too soft. He conceded that there was some imprint on the carbon, but nothing which could be read on the actual message sheet. He said he wrote the message at 1100 hours when he was alone at his home and burned the remainder of the message stack immediately. He said he then put the message in an envelope immediately and sealed it gently under another sheet of paper to avoid rubbing it. He added that he then placed the proper postage on the envelope, placed it in his pocket, and mailed it two hours later at the closest mailbox to him home. QREBONY/1 asserted that he did not reopen the letter after sealing and was certain that his wife had not seen it.

6. Pursuant to LCPIPIT's exploration of this question with QREBONY/1 we sent an informal note to MKTOPAZ via a Paris Station Officer on 20 October 1965 requesting assistance in efforts to determine whether QREBONY/1's correspondence was indeed subject to tampering. MKTOPAZ prepared five "booby-trapped" envelopes for our use. Two of these were mailed to the LCPIPIT letter drop from two different cities on the continent, and the remaining three were passed to QREBONY/1 on 5 November for him to mail from his home.

7. The five "boody-trapped" envelopes were picked up at the LCPIPIT letter drop over a period of a week and were handcarried by a Paris Station Officer to Frankfurt on 18 November for processing by MKTOPAZ. Paris/LCPIPIT asked the opinion of MKTOPAZ on the following points:

a) Was there evidence of tampering with any of the five envelopes?
b) If so, which envelopes bore evidence of tampering?
c) Was it possible to determine from a study of the cachets whether such tampering occurred before or after the cachets were applied?
d) Did such tampering appear to be of a professional or of an amateur nature?
e) Any other MKTOPAZ observations which would help LCPIPIT determine the source of any tampering that may have taken place.

8. MKTOPAZ advised LCPIPIT on 19 November via FRAN 9240 that there was "no evidence of tampering on the five booby-trapped letters."

Report QREBONY/1's Security Aspects

OFLA-3146/1
30 Nov. 1965

In reply to the attached (Memo on Home Situation) Rodigast told QREBONY/1:

1. We can't do anything about his housing problem in view of non-permanent nature of our present arrangement.

2. Avoid formalizing periodical at this point; it should require no authorizations for publication as it is merely a news correspondent's report, mimeographed for convenience--not a magazine.

3. In order to control content, Q alone should have responsibility for putting out issues-- can't delegate to wife and above all to other contacts.

CS COPY

201-306052

OFLA 3146/1

MTG:

HOME SITUATION

My wife was rather hostile to my news about my contacts with the Chinese comrades. She said she was sorry I couldn't work something out with Metropolitan Features. I hadn't done enough work for them because I was lazy, she said. She said if I weren't careful I'd be treated by the Chinese just like Hils. What future was there in that? she asked. Anyway, she added, I didn't really give a damn about the Chinese.

She pointed out the situation was difficult for us. The landlord in London was trying to evict us and we had no idea where we were going. I had no substantial funds from the Chinese and was still living on the generosity of the Americans (Metropolitan), she said.

Moreover, she was tired of being a grass widow. I was keeping secrets from her, she had been certain for sometime, she said. She had had enough trouble with my "secrets" in the past, she said.

However, she liked the idea of [illegible] Reports, but was sorry about the "objectivity" and the 50 copies only limit. There was no reason, if I could get some help from the Chinese, that I couldn't make a success of the newsletter and really be independent, she said.

I emphasized to her that I had had contacted with the Chinese without Hils' knowledge and that she should on no account ever mention the matter with him. She said that showed how the Chinese treated people. Nobody was more honest than Hils, she added. What was happening to him now would happen to me one day, she said.

However, she was genuinely pleased with the newsletter and spent some time trying to collect material for the dummy I was preparing. She wrote x herself a piece on xC.A.R.D. (I havex the feeling that a lot of her resentment would be dissipated if she would allowed to handle most of the business involved with the newsletter.)

The housing problem remains a serious one and we may have to move. A temporary furnished flat in London would cost us at least £25 to £30 a week today — at present, we pay £12-12-0 per week. We have given the case to a lawyer, but, because it is a furnished flat, we will probably have to get out sometime soon.

The other important question to be settled is that of a mailing address for the Report. Should I get a London mail drop and run the risks of running into the Home Office or should I get a lawyer and set the thing up legally, perhaps under my wife's (British subject) name? In that case, I could take a one-room office somewhere around Fleet St. and my wife could take care of the mail with an occasional office temporary helper during my absence.

I suggest that the Report always be mailed out from the same address, London or whereever. My wife will be able to get sufficient copy from various people, such as Pomeroy and Jeanne Pynor [30-year old freelance journalist who specializes in African affairs, now married to a Kenya parasitologist studying in London, formerly worked for Dennis Phombeah]. For my purposes, if I can obtain press rates, I can wire copy to London ~~ta~~ from Havana or Dar es Salaam, thus giving tangible evidence of my activities as a bonafide newsman. It would be helpful if I could get an American Cable & Radio System Credit (Transferred Account) Card, such as I got from Revolucion in Havana for use at the U.N. in 1961.

14-00000

Copy to Katzenbach

18 Nov 65

OFLA 3146/1

Subject: QREBONY/1 - Security at home

1. At his 17 November meeting with Rodigast QREBONY/1 (Q) was asked some questions concerning keep of files and correspondence. He keeps copies of all correspondence (except routine letters transmitting articles he has written, for example) in a file to which his wife has access. He maintains a minimum of questionable notes, and keeps his personal notebook (with addresses, expenses, etc.) in his coat pocket day and night.

2. His wife has two brothers. The one to whom Q owes money is Gordon, a chartered accountant, who during World War II was in British Military Intelligence. He visits the Q home to bring gifts from the wife's mother to the Q children, but has a cat-and-dog relationship with Q's wife; indeed, he will not stay for a meal because he can't stand talking to her, and the feeling is mutual. Q is certain she would never think of confiding in Gordon, for example to say: "Look at these awful letters Q has written!" Gordon is more likely to confide in Q himself. Gordon's politics are apparently solidly conservative. (His wife's other brother, less involved with them, works for Rank.)

3. Q mailed the three test letters as follows: one in the morning, the two following on successive afternoons, at the local box in the normal way. One of the three envelopes actually contained a note: a simple statement that "William" (Guillermo) had not defected but his brother had (Cabrera Infante), information acquired from a Cuban official (see separate contact reports).

4. Q wanted to get a lawyer's opinion on what regulations govern publishing a periodical in his country of residence (he is not of course officially a resident at all). Sensing additional costs and unnecessary formality, Rodigast suggested that he keep it on the basis of being a correspondent's reports, not a separate commercial press venture requiring eventual licenses of payment of business taxes, at least for the time being. Mailed first class, the material should require no permit from the mail authorities. A contact had suggested he might have difficulty with the locals (see report of Q's 15 November contact with WP).

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CL[ASS]IFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 4

SECRET 2

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
PARIS (LCPIPIT)

ACTION
CA/04 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE VR CA 2 WE 8 CI CI/OPS CI/IC 2 FI FI/INT 2

SECRET 171642Z
DIR CITE PALP 5033
DYDORIC QREBONY KUDESK
REF DIR 57747, PARA 3

17 Nov 65 IN 96553

201

1. PALP POUCHING DETAILS FIELD LIAISON WITH ODENVY/PARIS RE EXCHANGE INFO PERTAINING QREBONY PBPRIME CITIZEN CONTACTS. QREBONY/1 (Q) IDENTITY NOT DIVULGED LOCALLY.

2. AMONG INFO RECEIVED FROM ODENVY IS REPORT DATED 17 DEC 64 NEW YORK (FILE NO: BUFILE 100-434819) RE FREEDOMWAYS ASSOCIATES, INC (F). REQUEST HDQRS STUDY THIS DOCUMENT WITH PURPOSE ASSESSING FEASIBILITY HAVING Q ENTER INTO CONTACT WITH F IN ATTEMPT SECURE SPONSORSHIP/OUTLET HIS JOURNALISTIC VENTURES, INCLUDING POSSIBLE COVER RE PROJECTED TRIP HAVANA.

3. APPRECIATE Q-F LINK MAY BE INADVISABLE IN VIEW: A) F RELATIONSHIP CPUSA; B) Q'S CLAIM HE ON CPUSA BLACKLIST; C) SEEMING INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN INDIRECT ASSOCIATION CPUSA AND EFFORTS BUILD BONA FIDES AMONG PRO-PEKING ACTIVISTS AND ORGANIZATIONS

SECRET

IN NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT. ALSO APPRECIATE Q-F ASSOCIATION SHOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH ODENVY.

4. FOREGOING NOT YET DISCUSSED WITH Q OR RODIGAST AND WILL NOT BE RAISED WITH FORMER PENDING HDQS REPLY.

5. NO INDEX.

SECRET

CFN 5833 57747 PARA 3 PALP ODENVY/PARIS RE QREBONY PRPRIME REBONY/1 (Q) NOT DIVULGED INFO ODENVY 17 DEC 64 NEW YORK BUFILE 100-434819 RE FREEDOMWAYS INC (F) HDQS Q F RE HAVANA Q-F A) F CPUSA B) Q'S CPUSA C) CPUSA BONA FIDES PRO-PEKING Q-F ODENVY NOT YET Q RODIGAST NOT BE HDQS NO INDEX

T

SECRET

Chief, KUWOLF X

Chiefs, AF, WE, KUDESK, KURIOT; Chiefs of Station, LONDON, BRUSSELS, ALGIERS.

Chief of Station, PARIS/LCPIPIT

DYDORIC/Operational
QHEBONY 20 October 1965 Contact with LCPIPIT

1. Forwarded herewith as Attachment A is Career Agent Rufus F. RODIGAST's Contact Report of his 20 October 1965 meeting with QHEBONY/1.

2. Forwarded as Attachment B (USC) is the identity list for RODIGAST's Contact Report.

3. Forwarded herewith as Attachment C is the "Progress Report" submitted by QHEBONY/1 to RODIGAST at the 20 October meeting. A careful review of the report's content did not justify KUTUBE dissemination of any of the material therein.

4. Copies of recent correspondence addressed to and sent by QHEBONY/1 will be forwarded by nonaccountable manifest as appropriate.

5. Paragraph 5 of Attachment A refers to a security flap which has arisen in QHEBONY/1's use of his S/W system. In a letter to LCPIPIT dated and postmarked 11 October and picked up by LCPIPIT 14 October, QHEBONY/1 had prepared an S/W message. LCPIPIT received the following report from TECHS in Paris concerning this letter: "The envelope you sent has evidence of tampering. There was glue bleeding plus fiber tears, plus additional glue had been added to the upper flap (glue must have run and was sticking inside on the letter). S/W impressions were clearly visible under ultraviolet light (short wave and long wave) and also under a plain desk light."

Attachments: As stated.

Distribution:
2 - C,KUWOLF w/Atts. A,C, hw; B use
1 - C,AF w/Atts. A,C, hw; B use
1 - C,WE w/Atts. A,C, hw; B use
1 - C,KUDESK w/Atts A,C hw; B use
1 - C,KURIOT w/Att. A hw
1 - COS, LONDON w/Atts. A,C, hw; B use
1 - COS,BRUSSELS w/Atts. A,C hw; B use
1 - COS, ALGIERS w/Atts. A, hw; B use

OCT 28 1965

CS Copy filed in 200-124-156/3

File in 201-306052

OFLA 3044

26 October 1965

SECRET

~~200-124-156/3~~

6. Because of QHEBONY/1's repeated carelessness in use of his S/W system and the obvious risk inherent in his seeking to use this system from Algeria, [illegible] withdrew the system from him at the 30 October meeting. His carbon sheet carried deep impressions that were easily readable by the naked eye. Also, we have, in cooperation with KUSODA/ Paris, taken urgent action on an informal basis (to be followed up by dispatch) to have KKTOPAZ prepare a set of envelopes in order that we may run a series of tests on the possibility, as well as the source, of tampering with QHEBONY/1's correspondence to us. A full report on this matter, including its resolution, will be forwarded appropriate addressees as soon as the investigation can be completed.

Harvey G. FAIRRICH

C

File in: 201-306052

~~[illegible]~~

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: X NO INDEXING REQUIRED; MARKED FOR INDEXING; ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING; MICROFILM

TO: Chief, ~~KUDESK~~ AF

INFO: Chief, WE; Chief, ~~AF~~; Chief, KUWOLF; Chief, LCPIPIT KUDESK

FROM: Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT: STEBONY QKPREY JAGUAR
JAGUAR Report on STEBONY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: A OELA 43,522, 2 July 1965
B OELA 43,802, 11 August 1965

1. The following is the text of a JAGUAR report on STEBONY/1 and Marc SCHLEIFER. JAGUAR states that the information was received from a "most secret and delicate source which has been found reliable on previous occasions."

> "STEBONY/1 was in contact with Marc SCHLEIFER while the latter was staying in London with his family, en route for Algeria. SCHLEIFER had planned to leave London for Algiers via Paris on the 2nd June, but he deferred his departure in order to meet STEBONY/1. It seems that SCHLEIFER wanted, if possible, to visit Tanzania also. STEBONY/1 apparently was prepared to help SCHLEIFER and his family to find accommodation while they were in London because they had little money. He is also reported to have said that there was a possibility of his co-operating with SCHLEIFER in Africa.
>
> "According to our source, SCHLEIFER, while in London, arranged to contact the Tanzanian Mission, in connection with a job in Dar-es-Salaam which might be taken by either SCHLEIFER or STEBONY/1."

2. Ref A contains previous JAGUAR comments about STEBONY/1 and SCHLEIFER, of about the same period. While TIFFANY was in London (which puts it at the right time) STEBONY/1 was in touch with SCHLEIFER, and TIFFANY should be able to compare JAGUAR's comments with what STEBONY/1 said at the time. Ref B reflects a different contact between the two, from a different source.

George H. KATZENBACH

Distribution:
~~2~~-Chief, KUDESK
3-Chief, WE
2-Chief, AF
2-Chief, KUWOLF
2-Chief, LCPIPIT

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OELA-44,033

DATE: 30 SEP 1965 — 29 September 1965

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER:

14-00000

RID

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-735837
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 4

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FROM: PARIS (LCAPIT)

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INFO: FILE VR, CA2, ADDP, CI, WE8, AF7, FE8, C/IC2, CA/PROP, C/OA, FI, FI/INT

C/ICG

SECRET 271812Z

ALGI INFO DIR CITE PALP 4723

27 SEP 65 IN 60611

UNCRISP

DTDORIC QRPREY STEBONY KUDESK

REF ALGI 6529 (IN 58850)*

1. RELUCTANT GIVE UP STEBONY/1 (S) FOR FOLLOWING REASONS:

A. S TO BE ACCREDITED JOURNALIST TO CONFERENCE, WITH RENEWED PRESS AUTHORIZATION AND NEW VISA. AS GUEST NEW REGIME WITH NO CONNECTION TO OLD, LESS LIKELY TO BE DISTURBED. S TO REMAIN IN NORMAL CONFERENCE MILIEU THROUGHOUT.

B. EVIDENCE AVAILABLE HERE IS ONLY ORTHODOX COMMUNISTS OR TROTSKYISTS ASSOCIATED WITH OLD REGIME HAVE BEEN TROUBLED, BUT NOT PRO-CHINESE. S IS PART OF MINORITY WHICH FOLLOWED CHINESE IN SUPPORTING NEW REGIME FROM FIRST DAY.

C. MOST OF S' OLD LIBERATION MOVEMENT CONTACTS IN ALGI ARE GONE SO HE NOT LIKELY BE INVOLVED WITH THEM. EXCEPTION IS ARNAUD WHO SEEMS TO HAVE MADE PEACE WITH REGIME. S' OTHER CONTACTS WILL BE LIKE HIMSELF BE GUESTS OF NEW REGIME AND OF CONFERENCE. THEY WILL USUALLY BE PRO-CHINESE ELEMENTS SUCH AS AAJA BANDUNG CROWD.

D. WE CONTINUE HOLD TO ORIGINAL VIEW THAT S ATTENDANCE AT

201-306052
~~201-735537~~
07 Sept. 65

SECRET

SECRET

IN 60611

PAGE 2

CONFERENCE WOULD BE USEFUL TO BUILD UP HIS CONTACTS AND COVER FOR FURTHER OPERATIONS. S WILL CONTINUALLY BE MOVING IN POTENTIALLY

HOSTILE CIRCLES; THIS COULD BE TRUE OF TRIPS HAVANA, DARE, DJAK AT SOME TIME OR ANOTHER. IN VIEW OF NATURE OF OPERATION, THE RISK WOULD SEEM TO BE WORTH TAKING.

2. PALP UNABLE EVALUATE POSSIBLE COMPLICATIONS VERGES REAPPEARANCE MIGHT PRESENT. AS OF 15 SEPT S NOT OVERLY APPREHENSIVE.

3. PALP REMAINS MOST INTERESTED DISCUSSING ABOVE WITH ALGI OFFICER PER PALP 4689 (IN 56988) AND PALP 4712 (IN 59208). PLS ADVISE.

SECRET

* ALGI CONCLUDED IT UNWISE TRY HAVE STEBONY/1 OPERATE IN ALGI

CFN 4723 6529 STEBONY/1 S S NO CONNECTION S MILIEU TROTSKYISTS NOT PRO-CHINESE S CHINESE S' ALGI ARNAUD S' PRO-CHINESE AAJA BANDUNG S S HAVANA DARE DJAK PALP VERGES 15 S NOT OVERLY PALP ALGI PER PALP 4689 PALP 4712 PLS

BT

AUG 19 74

HS

SEP 31 11 34 AM '65

RECEIVED RID/MIS

INDEX: [X] YES [ ] NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-306052

X-REF TO FILE NO. 201-726122

FILE RID [ ] RET. TO BRANCH [X]

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM: PARIS (CC P.P.T)

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ADVANCE COPY [ ] ISSUED [ ] SLOTTED [ ] TUBED

INFO: FILE VR WE8 DAJ CA/04 ADDP CI DD4 DO/H3 CA/PROP CI/ICS CI/OPS SR8 FE8 FI

SECRET 221643Z

DIR INFO MADR LOND CITE PALP 4675

UNCRISP TYPIC PBRUMEN STEBONY ORPREY KUDESK

REF: DIR 41939

1. IN 15 SEPT MEETING STEBONY/1 (S) TOLD RODIGAST PABLO FERNANDEZ (F) NAMED AMBASSADOR LOND PER LEE BAXENDALL 1 SEPT REMARKS TO S AND 5 SEPT STORY LONDON "OBSERVER". (BAXENDALL EDITS "VIET REPORT" OF U.S. "EMERGENCY COMMITTEE ON VIETNAM" AND HAS BEEN AN EDITOR OF "STUDIES ON THE LEFT.")

2. FIVE SEPT S CABLED F C/O FORNMIN HAVANA ASKING F CONTINUED SUPPORT S EFFORTS RE FREE RIDE HAVANA AND ROBERT WILLIAMS CONTACT.

3. S HAS KNOWN F AND WIFE SINCE 1963. F WIFE'S FAMILY HAS FURNITURE BUSINESS NEW YORK CITY AND F WORKED LAS AMERICAS BOOKSTORE AND PUBLISHING HOUSE.

4. S HAS MET WITH F IN NYC HAVANA PARI LOND OVER PAST FIVE YEARS. THOUGH CLOSE FRIENDS, S CLAIMS F WARY OF HIM BECAUSE OF S "PRO-CHINESE" ORIENTATION (BUT NOT BECAUSE OF OLD CHARGES S IS KUBARK AGENT.)

5. S CLAIMS F NONMARXIST, NOT EMOTIONALLY ANTI-AMERICAN, NOT IDEOLOGICALLY MOTIVATED, NEITHER COMMUNIST NOR ANTI-COMMUNIST. F "FRANK" WITH S THAT HE HAS BEEN ACCUSED IN CUBA OF HOMOSEXUALITY, BUT S SAYS F

IN 55673

ZZ PROCESSED 27 Sept. 65

20 Sept 65

B 201-726122 201-306052

SECRET

SECRET 1d 55673 PAGE 7

ALSO SHOWS INTEREST IN WOMEN. F/S WIFE NOT PHYSICALLY ATTRACTIVE AND OTHER ACQUAINTANCES CLAIM HE MARRIED FOR MONEY.

6. S SAYS F DOES NOT APPEAR HAVE MUCH MONEY AND HAS MAINTAINED MODEST LOND APARTMENT.

7. F'S WIFE WORKS CUBAN EMBASSY. WIFE'S SISTER CAME LOND AT BIRTH F'S THIRD CHILD THREE MONTHS AGO. ON RETURNING HAVANA WITH F 31 AUG UNDERSTANDING WAS SHE TO CARE FOR INFANT SIX MONTHS SINCE F'S WIFE WORKED MORNINGS EMBASSY AND COULDNOT CARE FOR INFANT UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS.

Why didn't S/I report this at the time? ?

8. S SAYS F TOLD HIM MONTH AGO HE WANTED TRANSFER MADR OR HOPED OBTAIN FELLOWSHIP OR LEAVE ABSENCE PERMITTING STAY WESTERN EUROPE. DESCRIBES F AS POET OF BEATNIK BENT BUT NATIONALIST "LIKE ROA AND FRANQUI". S CLAIMS F LOST NOTHING IN COMMUNIST TAKE-OVER CUBA.

9. A. MANCHANDA, PEKING-LEANING EDITOR VIRTUALLY BANKRUPT "WEST INDIAN GAZETTE" JUST RETURNED LOND FROM PEKING HAS PREVIOUSLY TOLD S THAT F SPOKE AT COMMUNIST RALLIES LOND AND TOOK PRO-MOSCOW LINE ON SINO-SOVIET ISSUES. S KNOWS NOTHING OF THIS AND QUESTIONS MANCHANDA ACCURACY.

10. APPARENTLY S NOT FOREWARNED F HASTY DEPARTURE.

11. S. VOLUNTEERED F WOULD "QUIT" ONLY UNDER TERRIFIC ATTACK AND

SECRET

IN 55673 PAGE 3

PRESSURE FROM HOME OR IF SOVIET AMBASSADOR LOND TWISTED ARM (RODIGAST DID NOT SPECIFY REASON FOR DEBRIEFING.) LCPIPIT WILL TRY CLARIFY.

12. POUCHING FULL REPORT.

13. NO INDEX.

* HQS HIGHLY INTERESTED STEBONY-1 CUBAN CONTACTS

SECRET

CFN: 4675 41989 15 SEPT STEBONY/1 S RODIGAST PABLO FERNANDEZ F PER LEE BAXENDALL 1 SEPT S 5 SEPT LONDON OBSERVER BAXENDALL EDITS VIET U S VIETNAM SEPT S F C/O FORNMIN HAVANA F S RE HAVANA ROBERT WILLIAMS

S F 1960 F WIFE'S NEW YORK CITY F LAS AMERICAS S F NYC HAVANA S F S PRO-CHINESE NOT BECAUSE S KUBARK AGENT S F NON-MARXIST NOT EMOTIONALLY ANTI-AMERICAN NOT IDEOLOGICALLY NEITHER COMMUNIST NOR ANTI-COMMUNIST F FRANK S CUBA HOMOSEXUALITY S F F'S NOT PHYSICALLY S F NOT APPEAR F'S CUBAN F'S HAVANA F 31 AUG F'S NOT CARE S F WESTERN EUROPE FRANQUI S F NOTHING IN CUBA A MANCHANDA PEKING-LEANING WEST INDIAN GAZETTE PEKING S F PRO-MOSCOW SINO-SOVIET S NOTHING OF MANCHANDA S NOT FOREWARNED F S F SOVIET RODIGAST NOT SPECIFY LCPIPIT NO INDEX

BT

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENTS

1 September 1965

TO: Director, DTEARN

VIA: Contract Approving Officer

FROM: Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT

SUBJECT: Engagement of STEBONY/1, as Independent Contractor

1. Term and Project Charge. The subject individual has been engaged under oral contract as a developmental agent for an as yet unwritten Project involving KUWOLF and KUDESK and coordinated through QRPREY. Subject's salary and expenses are to be charged against the BOLINABLE Field Allotment per DIR 36066. The effective date of the oral contract is 1 September 1965, and it shall continue thereafter on a month-to-month basis subject to termination by, and at the convenience of, ODYOKE without prior notice.

2. Security Approval. Per CSI 10-5, STEBONY/1 does not require a POA (cf: DIR 15660), and OA not being requested pending establishment definite STEBONY Project (cf: DIR 36066). LCPIPIT advised 2 June 1965 STEBONY/1 granted clearance for LCFLUTTER (cf: DIR 15660).

3. Citizenship. The subject is not a foreign national.

4. Compensation. The subject will be paid $600.00 per month. The subject will be advised that he must file a covert income tax return through KUBARK.

5. Operational Expenses.

(A) The subject will be reimbursed for operational travel, except as noted in para. 8 below.

(B) The subject will be reimbursed for operational expenses, except as noted in para. 8 below.

6. Other Commitments. The following additional commitments have been made to the subject: "Since security conditions generally preclude the detailed accounting of miscellaneous travel expenses, per diem will be paid at the rate of $20.00 during periods of authorized travel." Per Personal Ruling of Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT dated 12 July 1965: "If subject is absent from his home station on authorized travel for part of one day

14-00000

SECRET

and returns to his home station the night of that same day (i.e., if no hotel expense is involved in the sense of overnight accommodations), then he shall be entitled to draw 1/2 of his authorized per diem of $20.00 (i.e., $10.00)." Per diem under the above terms will be paid except as noted in para. 8 below.

7. Contingent Obligations. No additional commitments have been made to the subject under this oral contract. However, in the original Letter of Agreement signed by subject 3 June 1965 and which expired on 31 August 1965, paragraph 4 stipulated: "ODYOKE will compensate you in an amount mutually agreed upon for the relocation of you and your family to a new residence if such a relocation is considered desirable by you and ODYOKE." Under the circumstances ODYOKE may have to supplement such funds as subject may receive for relocation from a target organization, institution, or government in order to defray such relocation expenses as subject may personally incur.

8. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to the subject. Moreover, in cases where travel and/or operational expenses and/or per diem are provided or furnished in money or in kind from other than ODYOKE sources, ODYOKE will offset such funds, goods, or services against the obligations assumed in the above oral commitments.

9. The substance of paras. 1, 4, 5, 6, and 8 (except as noted in the second sentence of para. 4) have been communicated to, and accepted by, the subject.

SIGNED [signature]
Richard D. SOHMEN
Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT

REVIEWED: ______________________
Contract Approving Officer

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT

INFO: Chief, of Station, Paris

FROM: Chief, KUWOLF

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/OPERATIONAL
STEBONY/STEBONY/1 Reporting

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
OFLA-2658

1. OFL-12 and OFL-13 were passed to the appropriate Headquarters desk for the evaluation requested in reference.

2. The results of the evaluations were that the reports based on STEBONY/1's elicitation contained "nothing more than chit-chat and opinion" with no new information that could be disseminated. As indicated in the last sentence of reference this result was not unanticipated by LCPIPIT.

3. In view of STEBONY/1's reportorial capabilities however, we hope that his continued efforts to elicit and report timely information will be vigorously maintained.

Raymond N Endlein
RAYMOND N. ENDLEIN

EMERY T. RAMTHUN

Distribution:
3 - COS, Paris/LCPIPIT
1 - COS, Paris

201-306052

23 AUG 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
CS COPY	OFLW-1240	20 August 1965
	CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T	HQS FILE NUMBER: 200-6-81

1 - RI
1 - WE/3
1 - CA/B3
1 - CA/INT

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	TYPIST	EXT.
CA/INT	Karl W. Kalassay ped	7486

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DC/CA		for L. J. MacKinley

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

14-00000

SECRET

Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT X

Chief, [illegible]

DTDORIC/[illegible]/SPZHONY/1 - Transmittal of Background Materials

REF: OFLA-2613, 9 July 1965

1. Forwarded herewith is the following material compiled in response to your request in reference dispatch.

a. Copy of the final draft paper on the pro-Chinese dissident element in Belgium (SECRET NOFORN).

b. Copy of the "Applications for Membership" presented to the IV AAPSO Conference (UNCLASSIFIED - Possession by KUBARK is CONFIDENTIAL).

c. "The Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement - A Status Report" (SECRET).

d. "Notes on Africa - #7 - The Fourth Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference" (CONFIDENTIAL).

e. CS-3/5?9,256, 8 January 1964, AAPSO Mailing list (SECRET NOFORN).

f. Comments on Afro-Asian Journalists Association (SECRET and UNCLASSIFIED).

g. The Afro-Asian Journalist, No. 1, Vol. 2, January-February 1965.

h. Bibliography - AAPSO and Afro-Asian Liberation Movements (OUO).

Book Dispatch No. 4761, 21 January 1965, and its attachment, "Pro-Chinese Elements in the International Communist Movement," which LCPIPIT already has, would also be useful for this purpose.

2. It is likely that we shall be able to work up a more comprehensive bibliography than the one included above (h), and will forward the books as they become available.

Attachments: H/W
A-H, as listed above

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

HOWELL D. KASSENMAYER

Distribution:
2 - COS, Paris/LCPIPIT, w/atts., h/w

201-306052 OFLW-1234 19 AUG 1965

SECRET

200-126-79

1 - CI/ICG
1 - CA/CF
1 - RID/Files (for 200-126-79 file)
→1 - 201-306052

CA/CF Robert Daniel mcm 7767

CI/ICG 17 Aug 65 A. Goodrich (in draft)

14-00000

DISPATCH

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SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, LCPIPIT

INFO.
Chief, WE; Chief, KUDESK; Chief, KUWOLF

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT KUDESK QRPREY STEBONY JAGUAR
Info Requested from STEBONY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. JAGUAR, in acknowledging receipt of the processed STEBONY/1 material that we forwarded to them, have also asked for "further information about Francois MASPERO and Professor Nguyen KIEN. We should be most grateful for any further identifying particulars for both MASPERO and KIEN and with regard to the latter, we should particularly like to know his present position in connection with 'Africa, Asia, Latin America Revolution' and whether he still holds a teaching appointment in France."

2. JAGUAR's note was shown to RODIGAST in London on 12 August, just before RODIGAST met with STEBONY/1. LCPIPIT please provide anything that can be had for passage to JAGUAR.

3. As should be fairly apparent, I think, from reading the material we passed to JAGUAR, plus the fact that there has been no "Revolution" for lo! these many months, the status of anyone connected with the magazine is about as uncertain as the status of the magazine itself. Nonetheless, we will be happy to let JAGUAR know as much as we can.

George H. KATZENBACH

Distribution:
2-Chief, LCPIPIT
3-Chief, WE
2-Chief, KUDESK
2-Chief, KUWOLF

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OELA-43,827	16 August 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / X NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, LCPIPIT

INFO: Chief, WE; KUWOLF; KUDESK; WH

FROM: Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT: KUDESK QRPREY STEBONY SMOTH
BAIRN Report on STEBONY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. BAIRN, a sensitive SMOTH operation, provides the following report relating to STEBONY/1 (date of info, 26 July 1965):

"STEBONY/1 (previously in touch with Pablo FERNANDEZ while in London, en route with family to Algiers for the international conference postponed when Ben BELLA was overthrown) calls Pablo FERNANDEZ, tells him he (S/1) is just back from North Africa if the confernece is held in November. Says he has been unable to get any news of (Marc) SCHLEIFFER, and asks whether Pablo has heard of him. Pablo says he had a letter, brought by hand from SCHLEIFFER in Algeria, saying he (SCHLEIFFER) was going the next week to Cairo, and would write to Pablo from there. He has not yet written. S/1 says they had hunted for him high andlow in Algiers - he disappeared completely from the conference scene, and they thought that perhaps he had got mixed up in the (troubles between the new regime and Ben BELLA's faction), Pablo assures S/1 that SCHLEIFFER is all right. He knows this from a negro journalist, on "the Guardian" in the U.S.A. and coming from Pennsylvania, who covered the Algiers conference preparations. The journalist's name is, Larry HENRY or something similar. Pablo and S/1 agree to meet to-morrow (27th July), S/1 will call Pablo then to fix time and place. At 10.35 S/1 calls FERNANDEZ, arranges to call for him at the Embassy at 13.30 hours for them to lunch together."

2. This is for background information only.

Not to be Dissem outside U.S.

George H. KATZENBACH

Distribution:
2-Chief, LCPIPIT
2-Chief, WE
2-Chief, KUWOLF
2-Chief, KUDESK
2-Chief, WH

#7

CS COPY

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Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OELA-43,802	11 August 1965
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-306052

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT

INFO: Chief of Station, Rome

FROM: Chief, KUWOLF

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/QRPREY/STEBONY/Grace Elizabeth Anne Russo

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: FYI

REFERENCES: A. OFLA-2538

B. DIR-27779

ODENVY traces on Subject have turned up general background data containing no derogatory information.

HOWELL D. HAMMERMAYER

Distribution:
2 - COS, Paris/LCPIPIT
2 - COS, Rome

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OFPW-1222	9 AUG 1966
CS COPY	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-306052

1 - WE/4
1 - CA/CF
→1 - RID/Files

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
CA/CF	Mary C. Massey	mcm	7767

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WE/4		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DC/CA		Lewis J. Lapham

ZFI
ABSTRACT Y INDEX

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 39

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
LONDON

ACTION
CA/O 4

RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WE 8, CA 2, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FE 9, FI, FI/INT 2
AF 7

SECRET 291003Z

29 Jul 65 IN 21357

DIR INFO PALP CITE LOND 8835

KUDESK GRFREY STEBONY

REF: PALP 4385 (IN 20682)

1. LOND HAS LONG SUSPECTED LIONEL MORRISON A JAGUAR SOURCE. WHILE WISH PASS REF INFO, WOULD LIKE WAIT WEEK OR SO TO SEE IF WE GET SAME FROM THEM.

2. REQUEST PERMISSION PASS CAREFULLY SANITIZED VERSION REF INFO TO JAGUAR ABOUT AUG 10, UNLESS THEY PROVIDE SAME INFO IN MEANTIME.

3. FIRST SUBJ PARA 2 D REF IS AUSTRALIAN COMMIE WILFRED BURCHETT.

SECRET

CFN 8835 4385 LIONEL MORRISON A JAGUAR REF REF AUG 10 2 D AUSTRALIAN COMMIE WILFRED BURCHETT

BT

SECRET

29 July 65
201-306052

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO 201-306052

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 31

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM LONDON

ACTION WE 8

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, FE 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, CA 2, CA/O 4, CI/OA

23 JUL 65 IN 17638

S E C R E T 231422Z

PALP INFO DIR CITE LOND 8762

KUDESK QRPREY STEBONY

REF: LOND 8728 (IN 4730)

LATER JAGUAR NOTE STATES STEBONY/1, WHO NOW HAS U.K. VISITOR'S PERMIT FOR THREE MONTHS, STATED HIS INTENTION TO GO TO PARIS TO GATHER MATERIAL ABOUT FRENCH GOVT'S FOREIGN POLICY.

S E C R E T

CFN 8762 8728 JAGUAR STEBONY/1 U K PARIS FRENCH GOVT'S

BT

SECRET

CA/CF

23 JUL 1965

201-306052

23 July 65

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

DBB 15

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

16 JUL 1965

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Grace Elizabeth RUSSO

CIA Paris has requested that material on Grace Elizabeth RUSSO be made available. Subject was born 23 September 1925 in Boston, Massachusetts. She is presently employed by FAO, Rome, and resides at Via Annia Faustina 56, Rome. CIA Washington traces reveal no pertinent information on Miss Russo. It is therefore requested that a check be made of the Bureau's records.

In response to your request there are attached 5 reports which appear to relate to the subject of your inquiry.

see additional reports on subj: DBB-15798
DBB-15591
DBB-15592

CSCI-316/02909-65

[handwritten] 29 July 1965

28 July 1965

This reply is result of check of FBI investigative files. To check arrest records request must be submitted to ...

CS Copy

CONFIDENTIAL

201-306052
~~100-2-18~~

DBS 15788

FD-204
(5-7-54)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Title: GRACE ELIZABETH ANNE RUSSO
LOYALTY OF EMPLOYEES OF THE
UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Report of: Special Agent JOSEPH HOLIDAY

Date and Place: Albany, New York, July 16, 1957.

DBD 15788

GRACE ELIZABETH ANNE RUSSO
LOYALTY OF EMPLOYEES OF THE
UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Albany, New York
July 16, 1957

RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION

Professor JOHN K. GALBRAITH, Economics Department, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, presently vacationing at his summer residence, Newfane, Vermont, advised on July 12, 1957, that applicant has been his secretary and general assistant at Harvard University for the past four years. Professor GALBRAITH said he highly recommends the applicant as to character, reputation and loyalty. He further stated the applicant is a first-rate person, very superior, intelligent, and well qualified for the position she seeks. Professor GALBRAITH stated he is aware of the position the applicant seeks in view of the fact that he recommended her for this position.

Professor GALBRAITH was investigated in 1950 as "JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, also known as J. KENNETH GALBRAITH, KENNETH GALBRAITH, Consultant-Appointee, Commodities Division, Office of the Director, Office of Industry and Commerce, United States Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., - LOYALTY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES" under the provisions of Executive Order 9835. On March 2, 1951, the Civil Service Commission advised that JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH resigned or otherwise separated from Federal service, prior to decision on loyalty.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

TO	Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT	X — NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO	Chief of Station, Brussels	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM	Chief, KUWOLF	MICROFILM
SUBJECT	DTDORIC/QRPREY/STEBONY	

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF. OFLA-2541, 22 June 1965

1. Subject to Brussels Station views, Headquarters believes that STEBONY's proposal in Reference is a good one and very consistent with our interests that he develop his access and acceptability within the circles of which Ref Iden A is a significant figure. We realize that the picture is a complicated one, and that Iden A of Ref may or may not yet prove to have the staying power of the successful political figure. At the same time, it does seem that he is the most outstanding leader of the anti-revisionists today, and as such merits our attention.

2. With regard to Reference para 4's concern about possible damage to our national interest by publication of the book in English, we tend to side with STEBONY in feeling that the support which such a publication might render to our enemies could not really be detected by the naked eye. Similarly, while agreeing with the sentiment that would critically scrutinize all proposals by new assets, we note that STEBONY is, indeed, supposed to be seeking to regain status among his former associates, and that Ref proposal does not, to our view, contain any hint which would suggest that in following out this line of action at our direction, he is motivated by any ulterior or concealed aim different from that which led us to impose the commission in the first place.

3. We are attempting to get a rough translation done on a priority basis. STEBONY, of course, should understand that such a translation will be unfinished, and should be carefully reviewed for the proper "feel," to rule out usage or interpretation which STEBONY, with his background, would never have inferred from the French text. Nonetheless, as the document has come to hand only on 2 July, and given the holiday weekend, the limitation on the number of translators available, the existence of other translation assignments, and, finally, the pouch transit time back to Rome, we regret that it will not be possible to get this product to RODICAST for his 15 July meeting.

Distribution:
2 - COS, Paris/LCPIPIT
2 - COS, Brussels

CLAYTON P. NURNAD

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OFLW-1152	15 JUL 1965
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-306052

CS COPY

1 - CI/IC
1 - WE/2/BL
1 - CA/CF
1 - 201-306052

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
CA/CF	James M. Murphy	mcm	7767

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/IC		Ralph Bergland (in draft)
WE/2/BL	12/7	[illegible signature]

DEST: CA/CF
ABSTRACT X INDEX

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/CA	13 JUL 1965	Cord Meyer, Jr.

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: OELA-43,589

TO: Chief, KUDESK

INFO: Chief, WE; Chief, AF; Chief, KUWOLF; Chief, LCPIPIT; Chief of Station, Algiers

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 201-306052 19 JUL 1965

FROM: Chief of Station, London

DATE: 13 July 1965

SUBJECT: KUDESK QRPREY STEBONY
Old Letter from STEBONY/1

RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)

- MARKED FOR INDEXING
- X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

1. Cleaning out some old papers, I ran across a letter from STEBONY/1 (copies attached). The letter was seen by TIFFANY, RODIGAST, et al., during the busy week they all spent in London, and is sent along now to bring the record more or less up to date.

2. A batch of other materials, which arrived through our postal arrangement, were turned over to TIFFANY, and they are presumably now a part of Headquarters' records.

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment:
Herewith

Distribution:
2-Chief, KUDESK w/att h/w
3-Chief, WE w/att h/w
2-Chief, AF w/att h/w
2-Chief, KUWOLF w/att h/w
2-Chief, LCPIPIT w/att h/w
2-COS, Algiers w/att h/w

GROUP 1
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CS COPY

1 att.

201-306052

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

CONTINUED

PAGE NO. 1

TO: Chief, KUDESK
FROM: Chief of Station, London
Attachment to OELA-43,589
13 July 1965

Dear Katzenbach,

I'm pleased you have received at least one of my letters, but I still wonder if you got a large envelope containing three letters which had been held and returned all at once. As one of the letters was rather detailed and dealt with matters of some importance, I'm rather disconcerted -- to say the least -- to think that it may not have found its way to you. The envelope measured 8 by 5 inches and was light tan in color. A confirmation of its receipt would be appreciated.

Of course, I understood about the service, the newsletter, not being a definite thing. In any case, I am not looking for a sinecure, but for a good, deep cover and that seemed to be one. It also gave me something to offer contacts and would have strengthened my position considerably. At present, my cover is as light as the Emperor's new clothes.

Still no positive reply from any publication in the States, and the general silence from my American "friends" is not very encouraging. Here, the situation is much better, and if I can get to Algiers in good time, after visiting Grippa and Andersson and seeing some contacts in Paris, my position will be better, but I still see myself representing the West Indian Gazette or Cinnamon and/or the Institute of Race Relations. Mrs. Sheila Patterson, their editor, even suggested that I do a short paperback book for them, gathering together the conference documents with an analysis. All of this is better than nothing, but it definitely isn't much.

On the other hand, for the future, Noureddine Medjdoub, who has been Tunisian cultural attaché here, is returning to Tunis to take over the editorship of the Socialist Destour Party paper, L'Action. He has suggested that I write some features for him, after the Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers and that I try to get to Tunis to discuss future projects with him while I am in North Africa. You well know what many Africans and Arabs think of Tunisia at present, so there may not be much that we can do with this arrangement.

This afternoon, I saw Dennis Phombeah at the Tanganian High Commission. Until three months ago, he was at the U.N. He claims that Vergès came to London last December and saw Babu about me and other matters, but that Babu was not convinced. He says he did not know that I was in London until recently -- this was our first meeting since the spring of 1964. Now, he proposes that he try to get the editorship of The Nationalist, the TANU paper in Dar es Salaam, for me. We will discuss the matter again at lunch next Monday. It would be a fixed post in Dar and I can't yet fathom why he is willing to suggest me for the job. He claims he has not been in touch with Vergès.

att 1 to OELA-43589 CS COPY STEBONY11 201-306052

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief, KUDESK

INFO: Chief, KUWOLF; Chief, WE

FROM: Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT

SUBJECT: DYDORIC/Operational
ORPHEY/STEBONY/Request for Background Materials

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action requested: Paragraph 3.

1. Career Agent Rufus F. RODIGAST has been briefed by Paris/LCPIPIT on an ad hoc basis to date regarding information on the Afro-Asian national liberation movement of operational interest to his handling and guidance of STEBONY/1. As the STEBONY operation progresses, however, it is LCPIPIT's intention that those handling STEBONY/1 become more knowledgeable on the subject of the national liberation movement than STEBONY/1, himself, as a means to ensure the best possible operational guidance to the agent and to provide another element of agent control--superior knowledge.

2. LCPIPIT's limited files include two basic documents: Attachment to OFLW 630, and Book Dispatch No. 4463. We also have selected disseminations and reports on Chinese Communist activities in Africa. What would be most useful, however, would be a collection of reports and analyses, whether overt or covert, discussing the following topics: a) Jacques GRIPPA and the pro-Chinese European Communist factions; b) the Afro-Asian Journalists Association (the Headquarters TPRANSACK c/o has had a file on this organization's founding); c) the individual national liberation movements and their leaders; d) operations of the national liberation movements, individually and collectively, out of such centers as Algiers (at least up to 19 June 1965), Dar es Salaam, Accra, Cairo, Djakarta, Havana, etc/.; e) national liberation movement relations with, and operations out of, the Bloc, both Moscow and Peking oriented; f) support and guidance of the national liberation movement by non-Bloc communist parties and selected fronts.

3. We recognize that much of the information on the above mentioned topics may not yet be collated, if indeed it is available; however, we should appreciate receiving from Headquarters such materials as you feel would best meet LCPIPIT's operational needs in working with STEBONY/1. Of special value would be a bibliography of overt writing on the subject, greatly alleviating the security problem and mere logistics of bringing RODIGAST and a large volume of classified reading together, in a secure environment, over an extended period.

Harvey G. Fahnrich
Harvey G. FAHNRICH

Distribution:
2 - C/KUDESK
1 - C/KUWOLF 1 - C/WE

201-306652

CROSS REFERENCE TO | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OFIA 2613 | DATE: JUL 9 1965 — 9 July 1965

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET | HQS FILE NUMBER: 200-126-79/3

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief, ~~KUDESK~~ AFRICA

INFO: Chief, WE; Chief, ~~AF~~; Chief, LCPIPIT; Chief of Station, Algiers; Chief, KUWOLF

FROM: Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT: STEBONY JAGUAR
Report on STEBONY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Transmitted under separate cover is a JAGUAR report on STEBONY/1. While JAGUAR did not state what the DOI was, JAGUAR's letter was dated 15 June 1965.

2. ARNOUD, in JAGUAR's para 2 ii, should be ARNAUD.

3. The comments contained in the report are either consistent with what STEBONY/1 has told us or consistent with what STEBONY/1 is supposed to have been telling other people - sometimes both.

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment:
(USC)

Distribution:
1-Chief, KUDESK w/att USC
3-Chief, WE w/att USC
~~2~~-Chief, AF w/att USC
2-Chief, LCPIPIT w/att USC
2-COS, Algiers w/att USC
2-Chief, KUWOLF w/att USC

GROUP 1
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Dated 15 JUL 65

CS COPY

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OELA-43,522

DATE: 2 July 1965

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER:

SECRET

TO: Chief, KUDESK
FROM: Chief of Station, London
Separate Cover Attachment to
OELA-43,522, 2 July 1965

Richard Thomas GIBSON

2. The following further information has been received from a secret and reliable source:

i) GIBSON was to leave London on the 8th June en route to Algiers via Brussels, Lausanne and Pàris, and he expects to arrive in Algiers about the 20th June.

ii) GIBSON has said that he will be in Algiers in his capacity as a journalist and that while there he may be contacted through Georges ARNOUD at the Directorate of Information or through an American, Marc SCHLEIFER, who is the representative in Algiers of the 2nd of May Movement. He has also said that he is anxious to meet some responsible members of the Afro-Asian Journalists' Association Secretariat in order to clear his name of the charges brought against him by VERGES.

iii) As a journalist GIBSON is hoping to be allowed to attend the Second Afro-Asian Journalists' Association Conference and he has made enquiries as to when it will be held.

iv) In commenting on an invitation which has been extended to Hodee EDWARDS to visit North Korea, possibly via Indonesia, GIBSON has said that he would very much like to visit Indonesia but that there is little chance of his doing so as the West Indian newspapers by which he might be employed would be unlikely to pay the cost of his fare.

15 JUL 65

SECRET CS COPY

201-306052

14-00000

DIANE CHATELAN
CA/CF
7767
6 APRIL 1967

MESSAGE FORM
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SECRET

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SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION: 46 PER ___ #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH ☒ FILE RID

☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-124-156/2
X FILE 201-306052

CA/04 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, CA2, RI/AN, EURS, C/IC2, FI, FI/INT2, WH/COG8, CCS3, CI, C/OPS, C/OA (elite) CA/PEG (pica)

SECRET 6 23 25 Z CITE DIRECTOR 90256

LCPIPIT INFO LONDON

DTDORIC QREBONY

REFS: A. OEPA 90
B. OELA 43237
C. LCPIPIT 0619 (IN 38606)

1. CONCUR $ 100 PER MONTH PAY RAISE FOR QREBONY/1 RECOMMENDED REF A. WOULD PREFER EFFECTIVE DATE 1 JULY 67. TAX SUPPLEMENT WILL BE $70.

2. TO SATISFY ADMIN REQUIREMENTS, PLS PROVIDE AMENDMENT TO LETTER OF UNDERSTANDING REF B, REFLECTING THIS AND OTHER INTERMEDIATE RAISES GRANTED QREBONY/1 SINCE DATE REF B.

3. WOULD ALSO PREFER ABOVE RAISE BE GIVEN QREBONY/1 IN THE HAND RATHER THAN THRU ~~XXXXX~~ QRPURE, RESERVING LATTER CHANNEL FOR SPECIAL EXPENDITURES (SUCH AS TRAVEL COSTS) WHICH INVOLVE RELATIVELY LARGER SUMS OF MONEY AND FOR WHICH IT MIGHT BE MORE USEFUL USE QRPURE COVER FOR ATTRIBUTION. PLS ADVISE.

4. BELIEVE THIS WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TIME SATISFY QREBONY/1 CLEARANCE REQUIREMENT FOR PERIODIC SGSWIRL. IN ADDITION ~~XX~~ OBVIOUS QUESTIONS, REQUEST HE BE SPECIFICALLY QUERIED ~~XXX~~

File in 201-306052

CS COPY FILED IN 200-124-157/2

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MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

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APR 13 0 33 PM '67

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

RID COPY

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 90256

PAGE TWO

RE (A) KNOWLEDGEABILITY HIS WIFE AND AMSQUAW/1 REGARDING HIS WOFACT AND OR LNFORT CONNECTIONS AND (B) HIS ESTIMATE THEIR RESPECTIVE ACCEPTANCES HIS PRO-CHICOM COVER AURA.

5. DISPATCH, ORIGINALLY PREPARED TO INCORPORATE ABOVE CONCURRENCE, FOLLOWS WITH ADDITIONAL COMMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

CA/B & F L.H. Shoemaker

E/BC/UK R.H. Webster

CI/ICG [signature]

[signature]
CHIEF, CA

[signature]
JAMES MURPHY
CHIEF, CA/CF

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

SECRET

4 APR 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: QREBONY/1 - MOC Amendment

REFERENCE: OFLW - 1699, 1 November 1966

1. Effective 1 September 1966, the MOC of QREBONY/1 was amended to provide compensation of $746.00 per month.

2. Please see attached reference for the salary breakdown.

3. We regret that due to an administrative oversight, this memorandum was not submitted at an earlier date.

Signed Thomas Mc Kinley

Thomas Mc Kinley
Chief, CA Support Group

APPROVED:

____
CPD

Attachment:
OFLW - 1699

DDP/CA/Pers/JChaplin:nd (30 March 1967)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - OF/APB/CA(S)
1 - CA/Pers

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

SECRET

ORIG: DIANE L. CHATELAN
UNIT: CA/CF
EXT: 7767
DATE: 24 MARCH 1967

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☒ RETURN TO CA/CF BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-306052

DISSEM: CA/04 ☒ RID COPY
INFO: FILE, VR, DA 2, EUR 8, CI/ICZ, CI/OA

25 15 32Z

CITE DIRECTOR 86838

LCPIPIT INFO LONDON

DYDORIC QREBONY QKOPERA

RE LCPIPIT 0519 (IN 24171)

RE PARA TWO REF, PLS ADVISE DETAILS OF CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH WINTERROWD AND SABA WERE MADE WITTING WOFACT'S CONTINUING INTEREST IN QREBONY/1.

END OF MESSAGE

AN	FI	
		CA/CF
ABSTRACT X		INDEX

C/CA/B3 - Mr. Fallow (telecord)

EUR/BC/UK - Mr. Webster (telecord)

CA/COPS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

DIANE L. CHATELAN
CA/CF 25 March 1967
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

COPY NO.

201-306052

14-00000

FBI doc.
23 Mar. 67 (Wash)
Re: Richard Thomas Gibson
no Bufile given

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING ACTION
SECRET	

TO	Chief, WOVIEW	MARKED FOR INDEXING
		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO	Chief, EUR; COS, London; Chief, WOMUSE	XX ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM	Chief, LCPIPIT	MICROFILM

SUBJECT DTDORIC/Operational
CRPREY/QREBONY/Institution Base

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

References: A. LCPIPIT-8161
B. DIRECTOR-66211, paragraph 3

At their 15 March meeting, QREBONY/1 and RODIGAST discussed QREBONY/1's running his own pro-Chicom group, at least as a paper organization to allow him to get close to target conferences and institutions as a bona fide delegate rather than bystander. QREBONY/1 feels that if not done right this could cause trouble, because of usual organizational rivalries. He is thinking of beginning by writing and circulating a statement in support of the statement on "Afro-American Liberation" which appeared in the 6 December Ad Hoc Bulletin (Marxist-Leninist) in Chicago. He would use a pseudonym to sign his statement, but would let all his friends know that the pseudonym was really himself, and he might use Manchanda's address. Perhaps Grippa would agree to circulate or print it. If this statement goes over, QREBONY/1 could escalate into a small organization. He will show RODIGAST a draft of his statement, but also will discuss it with Manchanda for "ideological purity".

P. F. CILIBERTI

Distribution
~~3-C/WOVIEW~~
2-C/WOMUSE
1-C/EUR
2-COS/London

MAR 22 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPA-164	20 March 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	200-124-156/3

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, WOVIEW	XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
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FROM Chief, LCPIPIT		MICROFILM

SUBJECT DTDORIC/Operational
QREBONY/Salary Raise for QREBONY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. At the time of his recruitment in June 1965, QREBONY/1 was told that his $600 monthly tax-free salary would be raised to $800 once he got a job in a target organization, which of course was the goal of his planned summer activity in Algiers.

2. Through no fault of his own, the Algiers assignment (and other possibilities, such as Djakarta) evaporated shortly thereafter. Meanwhile, WOFACT changed its signals and eventually decided to base QREBONY/1 in Europe targeted against individuals and groups in various countries.

3. From the beginning, QREBONY/1 has proved more than satisfactory as an agent. He has carried out assignments given to him with knowledge and tact and the proper spirit, has used his own initiative as much as our guidance, and has not violated our instructions. No one will argue that he hasn't proved to be better than we collectively thought he would be, and in terms of his own abilities—apart from targets which may or may not be accessible to him—he is getting better all the time.

4. Last year, about a year later than QREBONY/1 might have expected his salary to go up from $600 to $800, we raised it to $700. He was pleased, and he has not complained as much as he used to about a shortage of funds. (Presumably QREBONY/1 is responsive to the generally good treatment he has had, to the respect for him as an individual and the appreciation of his services; probably he is carried along as much by his own personal satisfaction in knowing he is meeting requirements and continually breaking new ground.)

5. Nevertheless, LCPIPIT believes the time has come to raise QREBONY/1's salary to the promised level. We can all agree that we are still getting his services cheap; QREBONY/1 receives no quarters, living allowance, or educational allowance for his children. His increased gratitude, the relief he will undoubtedly feel at being able to reduce his present financial worries, are more than worth the extra $100.

(continued)

Distribution:
3-C/WOVIEW
2-COS/London
1-C/EUR

201

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPA-090	FEB 24 1967 21 February 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 200-124-156/2

6. If Headquarters agrees, the money can be paid through QRPURE (whose monthly check will go up from $100 to $200 in this event). QRPURE could write to QREBONY/1 expressing his pleasure at the results of syndication of QREBONY/1's material, and announcing that the monthly fee will go up to $200; alternatively, QREBONY/1 could write to QRPURE saying he feels the sum should go up, and QRPURE would reply affirmatively.

P. F. CILIBERTI

14-00000

Monsieur et Madame GIBSON
30, Stockleigh Hall
Prince Albert Road
LONDON N.W.8 -(Grande Bretagne).

AFF. GIBSON C/VERGES -

Chers Madame et Monsieur,

Je m'empresse de vous faire savoir que j'ai fait citer la Société des NOUVELLES EDITIONS INTERNATIONALES pour l'audience du 13 avril prochain.

Or, je viens d'appendre que celle-ci est mise en faillite et que Monsieur PINTA, Syndic de faillite, a été nommé par jugement du Tribunal de Commerce.

Je ne vois pas, dans ces conditions, l'intérêt que vous avez à poursuivre le paiement de sommes qui vous sont dues par cette Société dont le passif dépasse de loin tout actif.

Voudriez-vous, je vous prie, me donner vos instructions définitives compte tenu de cette situation.

Je vous indique d'ailleurs que vous pouvez produire à la faillite entre les mains du syndic, mais que bien entendu celui-ci vous demandera un jugement pour pouvoir inscrire votre créance toute théorique contre la Société qui, comme je vous l'indique plus haut n'a que des dettes et aucun actif.

J'attends donc de vos nouvelles et vous prie de croire, chers Madame et Monsieur, à l'expression de mes sentiments dévoués.

S. SCHWARTZENBERG,
Avocat à la Cour.

TM# 79462

201

14-00000

Ebony soft 201

Joy Gibson, fwded in OEPA-0006, 26/1/67, filed QREBONY logs.

DBB 71942, 25 January 1967 100-300-004

Abstracted from pages 38 and 37

q · At a meeting held on August 14, 1966, STANFORD mentioned that Rbbert Williams allegedly has $1,000,000 available for the use of RAM.

NY T-10 advised on September 26, 1966, that STANFORD prior to moving to Philadelphia on September 18, 1966, discussed RAM and ROBERT F. WILLIAMS with him. According to the source, STANFORD has alleged WILLIAMS has money available for RAM.

During the course of the conversation, STANFORD stated that the contact man between RAM in the US and R. Williams' is one Richard GIBSON in Paris, France. STANFORD stated that GIBSON passes on messages from WILLIAMS and will be the man contacted by whoever is designated as a courier to go to China to get the money.

Source also stated that he was told Richard GIBSON was living in the ~~OEX~~ Crystal Hotel (phonetdc), Paris, France, and was working out of the La Royale Cafe (phonetic), Paris, France.

Gibson

OBB - 61450

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. (IS) 105-93072

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

BY LIAISON

Date: October 24, 1966

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: RICHARD GIBSON
INFORMATION CONCERNING

A source of this Bureau who has furnished reliable information in the past recently advised that during the Fall of 1966, a member of an Italian pro-Chinese Marxist-Leninist organization stated that one Richard Gibson was suspected of being a spy for the Central Intelligence Agency. According to this individual, Gibson recently had been in Milan, Italy, in the company of a female secretary from Paris, whose home is in New Rochelle, New York. At that time Gibson remarked his travel and activities were possible because he had married a wealthy English woman. Other things were said which aroused the suspicions of the Italian.

According to our source, the Italian pro-Chinese Marxist-Leninist subsequently relayed his suspicions concerning Gibson to Rene Raindorf, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belgium (Marxist-Leninist). Raindorf reportedly thereafter met in Brussels, Belgium, with Gibson although he had indicated the Belgian pro-Chinese communists would look into the charges of the Italian Marxist-Leninist.

CS COPY

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201-306052

Chrono

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 34

ORIG: JAMES M. MURPHY
UNIT: CA/CF
EXT: 7767
DATE: 31 AUGUST 1966

SECRET

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-124-156/3

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
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4		8	

DISSEM BY 30/3 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: CA/O 4 ☒ RID COPY INFO: VR, FILE EUR8, AF7, CA2, CCS3, CI/OA, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT2, CI/IC2

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET (DATE AND TIME FILED) 1 17 45 Z (REFERENCE NUMBER) CITE DIRECTOR 32195

TO LCPIPIT INFO LONDON

REF: LCPIPIT 7388 (IN 83410)

DTDORIC QREBONY

1. RE REF PARA 7: GHANA DESK REP MET QREBONY FOR ASSESSMENT WITH VIEW TOWARD HIS POSSIBLE LATER USE AGAINST GHANA TARGET. DISCUSSION HODEE EDWARDS WAS GENERAL PROBING OF QREBONY RELATIONSHIP AND ESTIMATE ~~XXX~~ HER PERSONALITY. WHILE QREBONY MAY HAVE INFERRED POSSIBILITY RELATED OPERATION CAL ~~XXXXXXX~~ COMMISSION, WOFACT REP AVOIDED SUGGESTING SUCH WAS PLANNED MUCH LESS IMMINENT. IN FACT, DESK HAS NOT DEVELOPED SUCH DETAILED HQS PLANS FOR QREBONY OPERATION GHANA, GIVEN UNCERTAINTIES IN DEVELOPING SITUATION ON GROUND. WHEN AND IF CLEAR FOCUS SUCH OPERATION WORKED OUT AND AGREED WITH ACCRA STATION, WEST ~~XX~~ AFRICAN TRIP WOULD PRESUMABLY BE FIRST STEP.

2. WHILE SUCH TRIP MENTIONED TO QREBONY AS PROBABLY USEFUL, EMPHASIZED TO QREBONY THAT VIETNAM IS TOP PRIORITY AT THIS TIME. STRONGLY FEEL HE SHOULD SIT TIGHT AND PLAY OUT THIS STRING WITHOUT PLANNING FOR EXTENSIVE AFRICA SWINGS, PARTICULARLY AFTER HAVING JUST RETURNED FROM ~~XXXX~~ WOLADY TDY. WITH VIET TRIP AND RUSSELL FOUNDATION MORE IMMEDIATE HIGHER PRIORITY TARGETS CLOSE TO HOME AT THIS TIME, SEE LITTLE VALUE AND UNNECESSARY RISKS IN OVEREXTENDING HIM IN WIDE AFRICA SWINGS OF LESS IMMEDIATE INTEREST. THIS EVEN MORE TRUE FOR EAST AFRICA GIVEN STATION VIEWS

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FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

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PAGE TWO

CITE DIRECTOR 32195

TO

PER AJDA 1989 ON NEED FOR LONGER STAY, WITH ACCOMPANYING COVER AND CONTACT PROBLEMS, AND INDICATIONS OF PHOMBEAH HOSTILITY, NATURE AND EXTENT OF WHICH WE CANNOT IMMEDIATELY ASSESS. HQS VERY SATISFIED WITH QREBONY PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT SO FAR. WHILE UNDERSTAND HIS TEMPERMENTAL INCLINATION TO PRESS FOR ACTION ~~ES~~ ASSIGNMENTS INVOLVING TRAVEL, HE SHOULD BE ASSURED, IF NECESSARY, THAT SUCH ~~DEMONSTRATION OF USE~~ (BEING CONSTANTLY USEFUL) NOT NEEDED AND ~~T~~ NOT ALWAYS IN BEST INTERESTS PROJECT DEVELOPMENT.

3. REF PARA 8: WILL BE POUCHING LONGER REPORTS ON QREBONY VISIT HERE WHICH DELAYED BECAUSE OF PRESSURE OTHER WORK. KAMMERMAYER RETURNED TO QREBONY ORIGINALS FINEMAN AND OTHER CORRESPONDENCE HE LENT, BUT SENDING COPIES WE ~~HAD~~ MADE OF THESE AND REPORTS HE SUBMITTED ON WOLADY CONTACTS BY TRANSMITTAL MANIFEST 722028.

4. RE PARA 9 REF: YES. WE WOULD STRONGLY PREFER THAT RAISE BE MADE AVAILABLE TO QREBONY BY TRANSFER FROM COVER FIRM, WHICH WE WILL EXPECT ARRANGE SOON (AWAITING CLEARANCE ON ONE ~~A~~ INDIVIDUAL WHO WOULD HAVE TO BE CUT IN). CAN YOU MAKE DIRECT TRANSFER UNTIL THIS IS ~~B~~ SET UP.

END OF MESSAGE

CA/COPS

AF/4/3. Foy (in draft)

JAMES M. MURPHY
CHIEF, CA/CF

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ACTION
C/A/o 4

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INFO
FILE VR, CA 2, EUR 8, WH/C 8, FE 8, SAVA 2, AF 7, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

25 Aug 66 IN 83410

S E C R E T 251622Z CITE LCPIPIT 7388 (CILIBERTI ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE

DTDORIC QREBONY

1. RODIGAST (R) QREBONY/1 (Q) AS SCHEDULED 23 AUGUST. BALANCE VOLADY REPORTING BEING POUCHED AS WELL AS NEW RPORTS. Q PLANNING TRAVEL PARI BRUS-ROTTERDAM POSSIBLY FRANKFURT, VIENNA 2-12 SEPT. ROD WILL MEET Q ANTWERP 8 SEPT.

2. ROBERT WILLIAMS IN LETTER TO Q 25 JULY FROM PEKING SAID HOPES BE EUROPE LATER IN YEAR PROBABLY GOING SWEDEN TO MAKE SPEECH. ALSO ADVISED HE MAY TRY PUBLISH CRUSADE FROM PEKING AND ASKS Q'S HELP WITH DISTRIBUTION. ATTACKED HYPOCRITICAL RACIST CUBANS. (THIS INFO BEING DISSEMINATED).

SECRET

3. Q THINKS ENTRY NORTH VIETNAM MAY BE DIFFICULT AT PRESENT BECAUSE OF MILITARY SITUATION AND PROBABLE NORTH VIETNAMESE DESIRE NOT TO ENTERTAIN ELEMENTS OPENLY HOSTILE SOVIET UNION. LIONEL MORRISON SAYS WILLIAMS CAN'T GO HANOI AT PRESENT. RICHARD WARD TOLD FINEMAN ENTRY WOULD BE DIFFICULT. GRAY IN SAN FRANCISCO SAID HIS TOUR POSTPONED INDEFINITELY BECAUSE OF MILITARY SITUATION.

4. AT KATZENBACH SUGGESTION Q MADE PRECISE APPOINTMENT NORTH VIETNAMESE JOURNALISTS SAW AND DINH, LONDON 26 AUGUST WHICH KATZENBACH INFORMING JAGUAR TO ALLOW SURVEILLANCE.

5. RE DIR 26709, Q HOPES OBTAIN FURTHER INFO MOCK TRIAL FROM RALPH ROSENBAUM, US LEFTISTS CONNECTED RUSSELL FOUNDATION BUT WHO OPPOSED TO TROTSKYISTS. Q'S STRATEGY IS EXPOSURE FOUNDATION AS RIFE WITH CONFLICTS AND INFILTRATED BY TROTSKYISTS.

SECRET

PAGE 3 LCPIPIT 7388 S E C R E T

6. POUCHING FULLER REPORT Q CONVERSATIONS SUTHERLAND NEW YORK WHICH Q TOLD KAMMERMAYER BY PHONE. SUTHERLAND INSISTED CARMICHAEL HAS NOT ACCEPTED RUSSELL INVITATION.

7. IF NOT SENT, PLEASE CABLE DETAILS HQS PLANS FOR Q OPERATION GHANA INVOLVING HODEE EDWARDS DISCUSSED WITH Q AT HQS. WOULD THIS BE IN FRAMEWORK Q VISIT WEST AFRICA AND APPROXIMATELY WHEN? WHERE DOES THIS PLACE EAST AFRICA TRIP, NOT MENTIONED TO Q BY HQS?

8. ASSUME HQS POUCHING ALL Q WOLADY REPORTING AS WELL CORRESPONDENCE. FOR EXAMPLE Q HAS NO COPY LETTERS FROM FINEMAN ON PARIS SITUATION WHICH SUBMITTED KAMMERMAYER.

9. CAN RAISE OF $100 IN Q TAKE-HOME AFTER TAXES BE MADE EFFECTIVE 1 SEPTEMBER? PLS CABLE WHEN BEGINNING DEPOSITS SO CAN NOTIFY Q.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

$106.00 /

Cable sent answering 9 in affirmative.

14-00000

8 July 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT: Field Traces on QRKBONY/1 201-306052

This is to inform you that there were no additional traces on QRKBONY/1 from the Field Stations--Algiers, Rome, Paris, or London. Negative traces from Frankfurt Station.

Ann Jane Long
CA/CF

201 file

201-306052

14-00000

SECRET RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION

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MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT

INFO.

FROM: Chief, KUWOLF

SUBJECT: POA for QREBONY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

None, information only

Attached herewith is the text of the Provisional Operational Approval on QREBONY/1. An Operational Approval is awaited pending receipt of final Agency traces which, we understand have not yet come in. Your attention is directed to paragraph 3 and to paragraph 5. The latter will be the subject of further correspondence in the future.

NOWELL D. KAMMERMAYER

Attachment:
POA h/w

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Paris/LCPIPIT w/att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OPLW-1591	7 JUL 1966
GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-306052

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
CA/CF	James M. Murphy	ajl	7767

Distribution:
1 - RI w/o att.
2 - CA/CF w/o att.

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/CA	6 JUL 1966	Cord Meyer, Jr.

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

8. Not applicable. The Agent is not in the status of a tour of assignment but will be exploited in his current operational role as long as it is viable.

9. This request is not for interim cover.

10. No relative is witting for such emergency contact, nor is Benefits and Counseling Branch involvement applicable in this case.

11. None.

12. Agent has served in the U.S. Army, is not now eligible for induction.

13. Spouse is not witting and not clearable.

D. Operational Information

1. Type of Operation. FI. Duration is indefinite. Should be considered a penetration asset of a hostile propaganda establishment, rather than of an organised hostile intelligence service. No one, other than those indicated, are to be made witting.

2. Location: The Agent is to reside in London, with a possible alternative of Rome.

3. The Agent should be free to visit Cuba, all European countries, West Africa and E. Africa (particularly Tanzania) as well as North Vietnam and China. Impossible to anticipate the times or duration of such visits, which will, however, be at his (and our) control.

4. Special groups Agent should be able to contact: Not applicable.

5. Approximately $2,500 to $3,000.

6. Not applicable.

7. Communications channels desired: None.

8. Cover Suggestions: None not already expressed in previous documents prepared by CA Staff in identifying the cover mechanism and requesting IEP approval.

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II The arrangement between the cover firm and QRBONY/1 should be on the basis of a regular subvention to QRBONY/1 to act as a foreign stringer contributing feature-type material to the press service. An agreement having been ostensibly entered into by QRBONY/1 and the cover firm during the former's trip to the U.S. (expected around 20 July), a regular monthly check should be forwarded to QRBONY/1 by the cover firm, along with any correspondence it may see fit (suggestions for pieces to write, comments on pieces received etc.)

III The following steps are proposed to set this cover in motion:

A. At a meeting on 6 July, QRBONY/1 will be instructed to write a number of U.S. news media organizations stating that he expects to travel to the U.S. shortly, describing his news background and indicating he would be interested in developing some outlets for his writing. The cover organization is one of those addresses.

B. CIA's contact in the cover organization receives this letter and, pursuant to our direction, writes an answer stating 1) what his firm does, 2) that it would be very interested in handling QRBONY/1's product if it seems to fit the needs and 3) that it would be ready to reimburse some of QRBONY/1's expenses if he could come to Chicago to discuss the matter further.

C. QRBONY/1 does not meet the contact in the cover organization. He is briefed to offer the story, on his return, that he had entered into a regular arrangement with the cover firm to produce feature material usable by the cover firm (not specifying the frequency) in return for which he is to receive a monthly retainer.

D. Any letter QRBONY/1 may later wish to send to the cover firm should be given to us in copy preferably before it is sent.

E. Copies of any correspondence initiated by the cover firm should be made available to CIA and, particularly, to the Project Case Officer.

James M. Murphy
Chief, CA/CP

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SECRET

28 JUN 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

VIA: Chief, CCS/NC

SUBJECT: Request for Approval for Operational Use of U.S. Free-Lance Writer - QREBONY/1

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval pursuant to CSI 240-6, 10 January 1963, paragraph 6, governing operational involvement of personalities in the field of journalism. This request concerns cover support for QREBONY/1, an asset currently handled by CA Staff, and involves the cooperation of Russell R. DeBow, a Chicago city official and proprietor of the Negro Press International Inc. QREBONY/1 was granted a POA on 23 May 1966, and a full operational approval is pending. The project under which he is handled was approved by Acting ADDP on 14 June 1966. Mr. DeBow was granted a Covert Security Approval on 19 April 1966.

2. QREBONY/1 is an American Negro expatriate journalist and author presently residing in London. He is the author of one novel and numerous contributions to a wide variety of publication, such as the Kenyon Review, Monthly Review, The Nation, The Liberator and others. He worked as a reporter for the Philadelphia Arro American in 1950, for Agence France Presse in 1959, for CBS in 1960 and, in Europe, for the now defunct, pro-Chinese magazine Revolution. As a result of broad contacts and acceptance among radical, pro-Chinese and Negro militant circles, he has offered valuable access to important targets spanning four continents, and has demonstrated considerable skill in elicitation and exploitation of contacts for intelligence purposes in the process. The immediate and paramount operational objective for this agent is to gain direct access to hostile political targets in North Viet Nam and China. The outstanding requirement to be met in support of this objective, and of his continued effective exploitation generally, is the development of a backstopped and viable explanation for at least a portion of his income, which presently derives almost exclusively from clandestine CIA support. The proposal outlined below represents the conclusion of considerable research, including an interview with Mr. DeBow, to identify suitable cover arrangements which would make possible this explanation.

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201-306052

3. Mr. DeBow, a lawyer, is an Administrative Assistant to the Mayor of Chicago as well as a long time, if casual, contact of Domestic Contacts Service. His background includes assignment to the Intelligence Division of the Chicago police and cooperation with CIA in the course of a trip to Africa in 1961. Mr. DeBow also is part owner and in effective control of a very small feature syndicate in Chicago, the Negro Press International, Inc., which distributes rewritten news to Negro newspapers in the United States on a subscription basis.

4. On 20 June 1966, Mr. DeBow was approached by representatives of CA Staff and Central Cover Staff, acknowledging CIA connection, and interviewed with a view to determining the feasibility of using his service to backstop modest payments to QREBONY/1 for real or ostensible contributions of feature stories and reporting. (Since the contact was made to develop information pertinent to the present request for DDP approval, the interview was conducted on a hypothetical basis: QREBONY/1's identity was not revealed nor were any commitments entered into.) This conversation, despite its limitation, demonstrated clearly that such an arrangement involving Mr. DeBow and his firm would be practical from Mr. DeBow's point of view and well suited to the needs of the QREBONY Project. Mr. DeBow grasped the problem involved and suggested various means by which he could plausibly implement a cover arrangement should this be our decision. He was made aware of and understood the incongruity between his and QREBONY/1's ostensible political positions, and stated that this need offer no impediment to creation of the type of relationship which would be involved. The nature of Mr. DeBow's feature service and its modest size clearly enhance its usefulness and appropriateness for our objectives. Mr. DeBow, in conclusion, expressed his agreement in principle to participate in this cover support activity should CIA, on further review of its needs, decide to proceed with a request for his cooperation.

5. In the light of the very favorable response from Mr. DeBow and the determination, from reviewing the outlines of his operation, that it would be a uniquely appropriate backstopping for QREBONY/1, your approval is requested to recontact Mr. DeBow and establish with him suitable cover

SECRET

arrangements for this purpose.

for CORD MEYER, JR.
Chief
Covert Action Staff

RECOMMEND APPROVAL:

Chief, CCS/KC

APPROVED:

AA DDP

30 June '66

SECRET

SECRET

27 JUN 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

VIA: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: QREBONY/1 - Amendment of Memorandum of Oral Commitment

1. The Memorandum of Oral Commitment with QREBONY is amended effective 15 June 1966 to provide indemnification in the amount of $10,000 in case of death, and payment of $600 per month up to $10,000 to his wife in case of total incapacitation or disappearance.

2. It is anticipated that a trip planned for late summer or early fall will take QREBONY into VC controlled areas of South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and China. Indemnification is intended to apply to death or disability resulting from air accident, act of war, or for disappearance.

3. Without being able to specify the possible circumstances, it is intended that such indemnification as outlined above be deemed to apply to loss of life or functions suffered by QREBONY as a direct result of his KUBARK relationship during the trip. Such indemnification, if made, must be presented to his widow by a cover mechanism which would hide KUBARK involvement.

Signed Thomas Mc Kinley

Thomas Mc Kinley
CA Staff Contract Approving Officer

CA/PERS/RHBELL:bg (24 Jun 66)

Distribution:
2 - Addressee
1 - CPD
1 - CA/Pers
1 - CA/Chrono

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14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / XXX ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, KUWOLF

INFO.: Chief, KUDESK; Chief, EUR

FROM: Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT RDS/8

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/Operational
QRPREY/QREBONY/Photo of QREBONY/1 and Contact

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded under separate cover is a photograph of QREBONY/1 with one of his contacts.

Zaffaresi
Karen H. ZAFFARESI (Dams)

Attachment usc
Photo usc

EBRAHIM, Gora

Distribution
3-C/KUWOLF w/att usc
2-C/KUDESK w/o att
1-C/EUR w/o att

S/C ATT'D BY RI/AN
Dated 13 JUN 1966

CS COPY

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

1 E/C ATT

201-306052
JUN 2 1966

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OFLA-3903	1 June 1966
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	200-124-156/3

14-00000

SECRET

1-OFLA-3903

DTDORIC/QRPREY/QREBONY

To: Chief, WHOLF

USC Att to OFLA-3903

201-306052

Photo: Do not bend.

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CA/CF - James Murphy	NUMBER: 201 - 302052
	SUBJECT: QRBBOUY/1
	REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated 10 February 1966 -jab

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

(1) POA is granted to utilize Subject in an international context to exploit his contacts and/or associations with a wide variety of personalities and organizations (particularly Cuban and Chinese) engaged in "anti-imperialist" propaganda operations. Subject will be expected to renew his old relationships and expand his circle of contacts with Afro-Asian national liberation leaders, pro Chinese Communist, and similar personalities and to report general political and biographic material relative to the interests, activities and plans of such individuals and their organizations.

(2) Requirements passed to Subject will be confined, insofar as it is operationally feasible, to instructions for the refinement and completeness of the reporting he is capable of providing from his normal intercourse with source personalities. Disclosure of classified information will be held to a minimum, he will not be given operational assignments supporting or servicing other KUBARK operations, nor will he participate directly and/or wittingly in the spotting and/or recruitment of other agents.

(3) In addition to this background, certain of Subject's past statements and behavior are inconsistent with, and give rise to an uncertainty about, the nature and degree of his presently professed motivations and loyalties. It is impossible to resolve this uncertainty with the knowledge now available. At the present time, therefore, it is believed that his bona fides have not been established to an extent which would warrant handling him in any way than "at arms length".

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	23 May 1966

Continuation of PCA - 201 - 306052 - 23 May 1960

(4) This case has been discussed in detail on several occasions between representatives of CI/OA, CI/ICG, and CA/CE and there is agreement that it is primarily because of Subject's background and contacts that he is of interest and, therefore, it is believed, if he is handled with circumspection, the possible benefits to be derived justify the security risks involved in the use of Subject within the limits set forth above.

(5) Polygraph is recommended at least once a year.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

ISOHUSE
QRIREY

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GIBSON, Richard Th 201-306052

9 May 1966 poa os James Murphy 7757

THERE IS A ... /OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201

FORM 11-56 449 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ABSTRACT FILE SLIP (18)

THERE IS A ... CI/OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 30 60 52

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING; XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED; ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING; MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, London (ATTN. KATZEN[illegible])

INFO: Chief, KUWOLF

FROM: Chief of Station, Paris (LCPIPIT)

SUBJECT: DYDORIC/Operational
QRPREY/QREBONY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: OELA 45254

1. At his 6 April meeting with RODIGAST, QREBONY/1 pointed out that his brother-in-law (the accountant) still thinks that QREBONY receives regular income from an American radio or news feature service, paid through Switzerland, and undeclared for tax reasons (QREBONY's and the American company's taxes).

2. RODIGAST thought that if the brother-in-law finds this story hard to believe he may guess that QREBONY is really working for KUBARK and may have passed this information on to the British. Thus he would be the source of the story relayed in reference.

3. At the same meeting, on another subject, RODIGAST asked QREBONY whether he had ever told anyone pointblank that he (QREBONY) is a Chicom agent. He said that he never had. RODIGAST broke in: "or the agent of any other country, including ODYOKE?" QREBONY said he had not.

Karen H. ZAFFARESI

Distribution:
2 - COS, London
3 - C/KUWOLF
1 - C/WE

CS COPY

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201-306053
~~201-124-563~~
APR 18 1966

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OPLA-3731	15 April 1966
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

XXXX

TO: Chief, KUWOLF NEC AJD

INFO: Chief, NE; COS, Cairo; COS, Dar-es-Salaam; Chief, AF COS, London; Chief, WE; Chief, KUDESK; COS, Rome; CIR CEL

FROM: Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/Operational
QRPREY/QREBONY/QREBONY/1's New Contact, Carole Piña

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. We are manifesting reports and correspondence concerning QREBONY/1's new contact, Carole Piña, an American, age 31, born in New York City (possibly Bronx County), whose father's last name was Appel or Appell. Her husband's name is Carlos Piña (Mexican), but she is separated from him and he is seeking a divorce. She holds US passport, No. D633873, issued 5 August 1963 in New York; it comes up for renewal in August (at which time she expects to be in Rome). She is afraid that her having traveled to Cuba in 1964 with a Progressive Labor delegation will hurt her chances of getting a renewal of her passport.

2. Subject had been having a series of political and amorous affairs during her stay in Dar, and was in serious trouble when Q met her. After rejecting Dennis Phombeah's advances, she was in serious danger of being declared a prohibited immigrant; Q befriended her, and he and Colman Ferrer of the Cuban Embassy (who had been having an affair with her) saw that she got out of Dar safely. Q was to meet her in Cairo (but in fact had no intention of doing so) and later caught up with her in Rome. She indicated a desire to work with Q (without quite knowing for whom she would be working--he hinted rather broadly to her that he was in cahoots with "our friends in the East," but it will be noted that in one of her letters there is this disarming phrase: she warns him about how to deal with certain persons and adds: "Be cool with them--do not show your true colors (whatever they are)").

3. Q seized on the opportunity of using subject as an unwitting informant and eventually agent on the same basis. She submitted to an interview on tape in a Rome hotel room which lasts about 2-1/4 hours, in which Q debriefs her on her knowledge of every Tanzanian, liberation movement, or Bloc personality with whom she had contact, and in view of her attractiveness and willingness she knew quite a few. (She had some amusing run-ins with ODYOKE personnel in Dar, which we shall edit out of the tape only for a fee.)

Distribution
3-C/KUWOLF
2-C/KUDESK
2-COS/London
2-COS/Dar
2-COS/Rome
2-COS/Cairo
1-C/NE
1-C/WE
1-C/AF

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

MAR 31 1966

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OFLA-3638	30 March 1966
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	200-124-156/3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OFLA-3638

4. Q feels that she is emotionally unstable--his firmness in dealing with her, his making it clear he was not out for her body, have made him a guardian and true friend. She seems to be a good political reporter, understanding her own (confused) political yearnings and where her various contacts stand; she also seems to have a good memory for details. Q says that her "anti-revisionism" is incipient anti-Communism. He could eventually recruit her as an ODYOKE witting agent, but that would take a lot of time and trouble; with much less effort he could effect a false-flag recruitment, and indeed, he has already done this on an informal basis by making it clear that he was collecting material for his Chicom friends. She would undertake further assignments for him. He actually asked her, "Suppose I asked you to go somewhere, would you go?" To which she replied, "If it's not cold." It is unlikely, however, that she would be able to return to Dar because of Phombeah's hostility. Wherever she goes, her main asset will be her physical attraction.

5. She could be debriefed further on any point raised in the tape interview. The ideal would be to have the questions by the time Q goes to Rome in the second half of April, but this does not seem to be a likely possibility.

Karen H. ZAFFARESI

SECRET

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. OELA-45,254
TO Chief, KUWOLF		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
INFO Chief, WE; Chief, KUDESK; Chief, LCPIPIT		200-124-156/3 MAR 31 1966
FROM Chief of Station, London		DATE 30 March 1966
SUBJECT DTDORIC QRPREY QREBONY Relations with JAGUAR		RE: "43" - (CHECK "X" ONE) MARKED FOR INDEXING; X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED		INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCES

Ref: LOND 2425, 2 March 1966

1. A number of lengthly and fruitful discussions have been held with JAGUAR officers regarding our continued running of QREBONY in the U.K. Their comments on the quality of QREBONY's reporting have been reported from time to time. Similarly, we will not dwell here on the mechanical arrangements we have evolved (with SMOTH's agreement) to expedite the passage of information to JAGUAR, on the one hand, and avoid duplicate reporting (prinicpally by passing the same materials as CS dissems to SMOTH) on the other hand. Suffice it here to say that achieving both of these goals, without compromising QREBONY as a source throughout both JAGUAR and SMOTH (due largely to the wide range of areas he reports on), is a complex problem. We think we have reached a mutually satisfactory arrangement for achieving both aims.

2. What we are concerned with here, then, is JAGUAR's permission for us to run QREBONY from here, for the time being at least. The exact phrasing from JAGUAR's letter, agreeing to our request is: "With regard to the continued use of QREBONY by your service on a temporary basis while he remains in this country we have no objection to this provided we are kept fully informed of as much detail as possible."

3. JAGUAR pointed out that QREBONY operates in the same areas as some of JAGUAR's own agents, and this necessitates a fair amount of frankness regarding his activities in the U.K. We have made every effort to date to display to them that frankness. In return, JAGUAR has been cooperative, if not downright helpful. In one of our discussions, SMILL confidentially stated that one of their sources had quoted a sub-source as saying that QREBONY had admitted tohim that he is a KUBARK agent. We assured JAGUAR that QREBONY is under instructions not to reveal his KUBARK relationship, of course; that QREBONY is not supposed to be recruiting any sub-agents and has not done so; that the remark could well have been made in jest, in reference to the charges levelled against QREBONY three years ago (or longer). We told JAGUAR that it would obviously be advantageous for us to know to whom QREBONY is alleged to have made the statement, and we would be grateful if JAGUAR could tell us. We have repeated this request in writing, but with no reply to date. SMILL stated at the time that he had doubts about whether they could identify to us the person who had made the statement; he was sure that they could not go back to their agent for elaboration without showing an undue interest in QREBONY. We may yet hear who the person was. All this is repeated here merely to indicate how far JAGUAR will go to be helpful, and how far, to date, they will not go.

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

4. This, then, reflects the state of our relations with JAGUAR as it relates to QREBONY. We trust that this will be of value to Headquarters and LCPIPIT in planning QREBONY's future.

George H. KATZENBACH

Distribution:
- 2-Chief, KUSOLF
- 3-Chief, WH
- 2-Chief, KUDESK
- 2-Chief, LCPIPIT

SECRET

29 June 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Central Cover Staff

SUBJECT: Cover Arrangements for QREBONY/1

This memorandum contains information solicited by CCS to implement cover arrangements, already proposed by CA Staff and approved by DDP, involving Russell R. deBow of Chicago and CA Staff asset QREBONY/1. It is keyed to the headings set forth in the "Nonofficial Cover Request for Individual, Headquarters Edition."

A. General Information

1. QREBONY/1 (previously carried as STEBONY). No previous request has officially been forwarded for cover support.

2. Currently a Contract Agent. Currently compensated at the rate of $7,200 per year with a $1200 nonaccountable allowance.

3. Agent has not nor will be reviewed by the Agency's medical psychiatric assessment and evaluations Staff. He is already overseas and will remain there.

4. The Agent uses a complex of related cover stories, based primarily on exaggerated implications of fact: Namely, that his income derives from free-lance journalism and money available from his wife's family. Some quarters suspect or believe that he may possess funds from the CPR, but this has never been alleged by the Agent himself.

5. Agent is available now for cover.

6. Agent is overseas.

7. QREBONY Project.

B. Biographic Information

1. DPOB: 13 May 1931, Los Angeles, California; M; Negro; None; U.S.; No prior citizenship; Married; 3 children; 30 Stockleigh Hall, Prince Albert Road, London NW 8.

2. Adult and minor dependents are already in place and sharing the same residence. No readily available biographic information. He has 2 sons and one daughter, ranging in age from one to ten years.

SECRET

QREBONY - 201 file

3. BA Kenyon College 1950; Foreign graduate study 1951-52.

4. Reporter, Philadelphia Afro American 1950; Miscellaneous: public relations--Italian Film Exports 1951; 1952-54 U.S. Army; 1957-58 Agence France Presse, Paris; 1960-61 CBS news, New York.

5. N.A.

6. Perceptive, aggressive but effective in personal relationships, literate.

7. Agent has fairly sizeable, but not pressing, debts to his in-laws. He lives modestly within his income from us.

8. Has resided only in U.S., Algiers, Paris and London, although he has travelled widely in other areas.

9. Fluent in French, competent in Italian and Spanish, and can read German.

C. Security Considerations

1. Agents has been receiving CA support for 13 months. POA granted 23 May 1966 with caution requiring care in view of the considerable derogatory information developed as a result of the Agent's past association with left-wing and radical organizations.

2. Agent is aware of U.S. intelligence interest, has not been explicitly apprised of CIA involvement but no doubt suspects it.

3. Agent has never entered any installations associated with CIA.

4. There is no U.S. identification of the Agent with CIA outside of Staff personnel. British intelligence (see paragraph 5 below). His wife (whose family resides in England) is unwitting.

5. The Agent is known in true name to the MI-5 and MI-6 of the United Kingdom.

6. None. It should be noted that the contemplated cover will not be a relationship which the Agent (any more than the cover) will proclaim or flaunt, given the fact that in his highly anti-American circle, such a connection would be regarded as unsavory. The purpose of the cover is to backstop the Agent's story that he receives income from hack journalism which he keeps separate from his "real" if unrewarding involvement with radical politics.

7. No.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

QREHONY
201-306052
SEX M DOB ?

200-124-156/02
PALP-06112
30 MAR 66

CIT ?
OCC ?
SUBJ RPTS HIS FAMILY SITUATION DIFFICULT BCAUSE MUST LEAVE APT 1 JUN AND MAKES LOT OF DIFFERENCE WHETHER MOVE IS PERMANENT /ALLOWING LONG-TERM ADVANTAGEOUS LEASE OR PURCHASE/OR TEMPORARY.

R 6605110149

FILE IN 201-306052

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-40)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: XXXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief, KUWOLF

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/Operational Assessment of QREBONY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: OFLW-1494

1. Forwarded herewith is a 6-1/2 page answer by RODIGAST to the questions posed in reference. If any further clarification is required by Headquarters, please advise.

2. With regard to QREBONY/1's overt tax return, it has been determined that declarations must be filed by all citizens with over $600 income. If it turns out that QREBONY/1 cannot justify a $600 income from overt sources, and we think he cannot, he simply has no declaration to file and will be advised to so state to the Embassy.

Karen H. ZAFFARESI

Attachment h/w
As stated above

Distribution
3-C/KUWOLF w/att h/w

MAR 29 1966

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OFLA-3627	29 March 1966
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-306052

A. QRLBONY/1 (Q) gives the convincing impression that he is at home in his new work. He responds well to suggestions and instructions, adds suggestions of his own for improving the plan-- an indication that he wishes to please. In the beginning he showed a tendency to raise minor objections involving personal material problems (e.g., inconvenience to family life of a long tdy) but less of this was remarked as he came to realize that requirements were to be reasonable and he was to be treated as a human being with his own problems.

He has stated that he would not continue his present involvement with target personalities and institutions if it were not that we wish him to, i.e., his own inclination would be to withdraw from the political fringe. Rodigast feels that this is consistent with his background, which was not a party career; in his youth he was willfully apolitical and hostile to the "movement"; later he was involved in opposing party people in his New York work; in Paris he didn't get along with his party friends (the affair of the forged letter) and of course broke with the magazine crowd there.

He seems to be genuinely committed to working against enemies of ODYOKE, ready to accept even deeper commitment; he has expressed no reservations as to what he will do. He doesn't object to reporting on old friends, fellow FBPRIMERS, et al. He raised no objection to FLUTTER, or using s/w techniques (which he took with him on a trip to what was then a very hostile area, where he had known enemies, and where there was a recent history of dealing roughly with outsiders). When orders conflict with personal desires (for example, when he planned to spend a weekend in a city he enjoys but was told he should proceed immediately to his next stopping place), he obeys without hesitation.

The foregoing is a collection of miscellaneous facts, but taken together they paint the portrait of a promising agent, both in terms of motivations and abilities.

B. Rodigast's knowledge of Q's attitude in the months prior to recruitment (June 1965) is limited. Rodigast has the impression Q had simply reached the end of his rope-- he had nowhere to go, he had earlier decided that he would like to work for or at least cooperate with ODYOKE (although earlier attempts to make contact met with no success). The humane treatment received at the hands of his recruiter, the subsequent sympathetic handling by his case officer, undoubtedly convinced him that he had not made a mistake.

The material factor is not to be underestimated. The demoralizing position of living on his wife and worse, on her family, must have lowered his resistance to any possible alternative. Rodigast simply doesn't know how Q might have responded to a reasonable offer from enemies of ODYOKE at that point. The prospect of immediate engagement at a decent wage may have been decisive.

Since that time, Rodigast feels Q's motivation has been reinforced and perhaps considerably altered: he has been asked to do obviously necessary tasks, and so he can feel he is needed by someone; he has been given reasonable instructions on how to accomplish them; he sees that others are concerned for his personal safety and material wellbeing. Rodigast has taken pains to avoid giving the impression that there was any confusion or error or difference of viewpoint in running the project (even at a time when there were plenty of all three); such problems were

resolved before being taken up with Q, and thus he has a somewhat rosy view of the operation. The satisfaction of accomplishment (i.e., being able to produce useful answers to our questions) is surely a factor in his present attitude.

Though light-skinned, with a voice and accent which would be considered acceptable in any PBPRIME society, Q is extremely sensitive to the fact that he is a Negro. He has not said or suggested any such thing to Rodigast, but this is so obvious a factor in his correspondence (even discounting the extent to which the correspondence is part of his conscious cover) that it seems to Rodigast that it must be a factor in his life. On the other hand, Rodigast has known another Negro who was a close friend of Q (and now one of his major enemies, as a result of the Paris forged letter incident and contributing events) who was so sensitive about race that he makes Q in retrospect seem like an Uncle Tom.

Still, Rodigast does not believe Q could be handled by someone who is not genuinely a "nigger lover", i.e., who could not convey a convincing image of a person for whom a color difference was not a barrier (Q would surely detect the false "pal"). Q has mentioned anti-Negro prejudice as a reason for his refusal to cooperate with ODENVY officers who talked to him while he was in New York. In fact, Q deals with his present case officer as a possible if not a true friend; they share an interest and involvement in writing, English literature, living happily abroad, etc.; Rodigast has tried to read Dante in the original and Q has done so; Rodigast would like to write a novel and Q has published one; Rodigast doesn't know much about the post-logical positivists who interest Q but probably gives a convincing impression that he would like to know about them, and just might be capable of understanding them. What all the foregoing means is that in Q we have an accomplished person, and it is a useful tactic to treat him if not as a superior than at the very least as an equal.

There remains the possibility that opportunistic reasons are primary: Q joined the organization and stayed with us because he could not do as well in any other job, could in fact get no job (because of his background, his alien status abroad, etc). Rodigast does not exclude this, although he feels that whatever the original motivation, it has been strengthened and perhaps converted into something more worthy. But even if his primary motivation remains material, the history of the project over its first nine months suggest it is a viable one.

C. Q has lived in the underground for so many years without breaking that it is likely he will be able to continue to do so. He thinks fast, handles himself well in matters presenting security problems. He is not fully trained for clandestine activity. Rodigast's long meetings with him always include advice on one or more specific aspects of clandestine work, which when added yp may be taken to represent a short course, but that is all. The lack of training has led Q to do or say things which Rodigast would not have wished him to do or say, and whenever possible this has been brought to Q's attention, and he seems responsive to such instruction.

Rodigast would not recommend that Q be given a training course, but this would not preclude more formal sessions with Rodigast during which Rodigast could give more complete instruction on various phases of clandestine work.

Q gives the impression of not being easily moved. He has already survived violent attacks, questioning by legislative committees and police (including abroad), public denunciation; now that he has KUBARK as a friend he should resist at least as well as before. One negative trait is his need to take revenge for injury, and this tendency must be controlled; his instinct to be spiteful to an enemy could conflict with a longer-range plan.

It is to be hoped that the present situation regarding his wife (who believes him to be working for the arch foe of PBPRIME) will be possible to maintain. She doesn't like the situation much, but accepts it, and apparently hasn't betrayed his "confidence". If he is moved to another city which both Q and his wife would consider agreeable (Rome) she would probably be even happier and less likely to revolt, especially if a quarters allowance helped them get out of their present financial straits (they can pay rent and buy food but not save or repay debts-- so his wife says he is doing an unpleasant thing without even being able to say they are better off than they were in Paris). If he were sent to a less agreeable place for six months or a year (say Dar) he would want to settle his wife in a desirable place (London but preferably Rome) for the children's schooling; here too her attitude would depend on their material position and on the possibility of his being able to visit on occasion (if he were in Dar, say, and she in Rome, he would return for visits-- which would also be cover for his meetings with his case officer). Rodigast recommends that once in place, Q's basic wage be raised (as promised in June 1965) from $600 to $800, but that he also receive quarters and if possible an educational allowance.

D. Q says he is a local PBPRIMER. He now does act like one. Rodigast feels the evidence for his loyalty is at least as good as it is for most other PBPRIMERS he knows. Early in their relationship (probably mid-June 1965 in Paris) Q had said he had turned away from the revolutionary movement and toward his own country; even though there were opportunistic reasons for him to have done so, he is seemingly not anti-PBPRIME. His views on Negro problems in PBPRIME probably have not changed, but he never was a black nationalist, and has many friends, besides his wife, who are white). He might not agree with ODYOKE policy in Vietnam, Cuba, or elsewhere-- he obviously has not been questioned on his personal beliefs-- but his dissent, if dissent there be, is not disloyalty, and in any case should not prevent him from executing KUBARK policy to the letter. Undoubtedly he has a leftist economic orientation, but there is no evidence that it is an orthodox Marxist one (or that it ever was).

He seems to like Rodigast; in any event they work well together. He has made no effort to develop a warm relationship with Rodigast, however, apparently feeling that this is not necessary, might not be appreciated, and would conflict with the compartmentalization so obviously kept in force by Rodigast (who hasn't told Q his true name, address, marital status, or any other personal fact which might lead to identifying him). Seemingly Q does not believe the name which Rodigast used at their introduction was a true name, for he didn't bother to remember it (the last name), and all this would tend to discourage the building up of a personal friendship.

It is probable that he respects rather than scorns KUBARK for its decent treatment of him. KUBARK through Rodigast has always kept its promises, Rodigast has never been a minute late for a meeting (Q has

rarely been a minute or two late, and in recent meetings--presumably because he feels that Rodigast's never-failing appearance on the precise second of the meeting must mean that this is required KUBARK practice-- he has been even more precise. Rodigast is always ready with a suggested solution to a security or other problem which will be faced by Q in carrying out a new assignment.

On the other hand, part of Q's satisfaction with KUBARK might derive from a feeling that KUBARK is a "soft touch". Rodigast does not recommend that anything be done to change Q's opinion (if he really does hold it); Rodigast feels that we are going to pay Q as much whether he likes us or doesn't, and for the same money we might as well make sure he likes us and will do his utmost for the organization rather than simply be a timeserver keeping up appearances. If given cause for resentment, his behavior is unpredictable, for he hasn't much to lose-- reputation for loyalty, good name, etc. One solution would be to give him enough so that he would indeed stand to lose much.

Q appears to possess a realitsic, sane view of ODYOKE, what its people are like, what can and can't be done by it. As already indicated, he seems to be as loyal a PBPRIMER as other people who don't give much thought to the matter, certainly a lot more loyal than his background would lead one to expect. In any case, we have no recent evidence to contradict his statement that he considers himself to be a loyal PBPRIMER; it may just be true. If it isn't, this won't make any difference to the project as it is understood by Rodigast.

Q is unlikely to hold sympathetic feelings for ODENVY, having had what he described as an unfortunate experience or two with them. On the other hand, he is sophisticated enough to assume that his reporting on PBPRIMERS is of concern to ODENVY, and he must know that his own suggestion for tdy in PBPRIME to contact target institutions and old friends there would put him into ODENVY territory. He would probably accept any necessary collaboration without showing that he didn't like it.

E. Rodigast does not believe Q is at present working for another service, but it is difficult to know what would happen if another service approached him. Rodigast assumes he would report this to us, just as he reported in detail the overtures by two persons apparently working with the services of the country in which he resides. As part of the present operation involves the possibility that Q will in fact be approached by the opposition, and Q is aware of this, one assumes he is prepared to remain loyal to KUBARK; one would also assume he would recognize the heightened value of his services to us should he be approached by the other side and continue to remain loyal to us.

Q certainly would not agree to work for an opposition service for peanuts, but if offered a considerable sum of money (given that he just breaks even in his present arrangement with us, in the thinking of Q's wife), there is no telling what he would do. When recruited, Q was told he would get a raise once he got settled "in place" (to $800), and when this promise is kept he will have enough extra money to begin to pay debts and buy clothing, and thus have more concrete evidence of the material advantages of his present arrangement.

Rodigast would be very surprised if Q agreed to work for an opposition service not for financial reasons but through ideology.

Q likes to live well. He believes in wearing good clothes, staying in good hotels, being able to invite others out for food and

drink. He says that in the revolutionary movement poverty is no virtue, but merely indicates lack of influence. He says that the most popular persons are those who can dispense money, alcohol, and women. This may well be true. It is certainly true that such a role would please Q immensely (that is, having a plush apartment in which he could entertain target personalities, satisfying KUBARK's requirements and his personal desires).

F. Q must be dealt with firmly, with continued serving of requirements and planned itineraries for trips. At the same time, it is obvious that he improvises well when left without instructions; he is versatile, and can create situations which will result in an intelligence product. Rodigast's method is to suggest reasonable plans and to be ready to show that they can be implemented, and how they can, anticipating objections.

While there is no evidence that if left alone Q would drift, dragging out an assignment to fill time, it is possible that he would. He has not written as many free-lance articles as Rodigast would have liked him to, because each requires thinking out a subject, gathering material, selecting a point of view and thinking of the public to which it would be addressed-- a lot of work for articles meant to serve mainly as cover, for publication in obscure organs, or perhaps merely to be used to convince editors that he was active. On the other hand, he produced the first issue of the newsletter in record time, following instructions to the letter (indeed, accepting what must at times seem like petty editorial changes made by Rodigast). Perhaps he produced the latter so efficiently because he saw in it added prestige, an opportunity to get his name back before the public in a respectable context.

Ideological motivation would not seem to be a level of control in his case. What is most important is his contentment with being (he hopes) a permanent part of a large organization, with a steady salary (he has never said this, of course); the power of ODYOKE is less important than its known reputation for keeping its promise to pay, something one doesn't find among the opposition groups known to Q, and he finds new examples of this daily.

Doubtless, his tendency to bear a grudge is a factor here-- Q is now in a position where he can thumb his nose at some of his enemies.

Rodigast feels that considerate dealing with Q, letting him know where he is going, what he can expect, not changing the rules abruptly or pulling a rug from under his feet, letting him see the possibility of small but certain increases in material benefits in the course of his career, compose the ideal formula for handling him. In the course of time, the ideological factor, which is perhaps marginal at this time, would probably be reinforced, could one way be a major factor. Q, meanwhile, must feel that the persons who deal with him are concerned with his material wellbeing and also of his physical safety, appreciating the risks in his work and understanding that not all assignments will bear fruit. Our relationship with Q could be destroyed very rapidly if we failed to pay him as promised, or wasted his time with make-work, or came him confusing or contradictory instructions which suggested that KUBARK was not the all-powerful institution he may now think it is.

G. Very early in our relationship Q said that he would like to make a career in KUBARK, outside now, perha s inside some day. He would work in PBPRIME or abroad. There was no indication then, and has been none since, that he regards the present relationship as a distasteful one to be terminated as soon as conditions permit.

He would like to settle in en expatriate's paradise, such as Paris or Rome, presumably involved in journalism and other writing. If he could do these things in connection with his work for us, so much the better.

H. Q is conscious of the need for security and handles himself well— as well as an amateur could in this context. But he is far more naive about techniques and especially the nuances of technique than Rodigast would have expected in one who had been involved in the revolutionary movement for so long. He often needs instruction on obvious points, and responds quite well to it, the exception being his clumsy handling of the s/w method-- he is an intellectual and not a technician, and Rodigast assumes that he (Rodigast) would not do much better if forced to use some technical system.

Q is quite observant. He will recall a personal remark made to him by Rodigast from one month to the next. His reports written some time after the event are thorough and apparently accurate.

He read A Spy and His Master by Christopher Felix, and has mentioned it a couple of times when a remark by Rodigast reminds him of something said in the book.

Rodigast doesn't think that even after training Q would be very good at throwing off surveillance (for example) as he seems too matter of fact to be sly, and perhaps slightly lazy about what might be gratuitous behavior (e.g., changing subway trains or taxis just on the assumption that someone might be following him). Rodigast's solution is not to depend on Q for such things, but to attempt to plan meeting and stage other operations so as to minimize the need for dependence on Q's skill in such areas. After patient briefing Q does understand the need for tradecraft efficiency, and as already noted he follows the advice.

I. At first Q qas quite concerned about money— he needed an advance for clothes, for travel, etc. His requests were really plaints, and he may have left the impression that he thinks of nothing but money. It was the complex of a poor boy who never had anyone he could turn to— despite a scholarship he had to leave a fine college after a brilliant freshman year. Once he received his advance and began receiving his money at the beginning rather than at the end of each month, and when he realized that he would receive complete and prompty reimbursement of expenses, he began to relax. Now he submits accountings without himself totalling the figures or keeping his own record (Rodigast knows this for he has seen Q's notes), so he must rely on us to tell him how much he claimed for (even Rodigast would never do that). He is, in sum, relaxed.

The same ease is to be noted in his substantive work; he submits his reports knowing he has done his best, and done well; he accepts compliments with a very slight nod. When Rodigast first met Q in a hotel room, Q had something of the hunted man. He still seems harried, slightly nervous at the moment of contact, but on the whole he is more sure of himself.

At the outset, Q would argue about assignments, suggesting alternatives, worrying about not having time to buy tickets, or enough money to pay for them. Now he accepts instructions without a murmur,

even when they contradict a previous tentative plan. His excellent response to instructions may be his desire to please, his satisfaction with his job, or personal pride in accomplishment. Whatever the reason or reasons, the fact is that he does respond well.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING; X NO INDEXING REQUIRED; ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING; MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT

INFO.

FROM: Chief, KUWOLF

SUBJECT: Assessment of QREBONY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

See below

It would prove very useful to us--both as a contribution to the preparation of the Project Outline now in progress and as a backgrounder for possible discussions of QREBONY's operational utilization--if RODIGAST could provide us with an interpretive assessment of him based on the impressions and judgements he has been able to develop over the past months. We have some such initial assessments, of course, and can infer more from current reporting. However, we would like to get the benefit of RODIGAST's unique and direct contact, now that QREBONY has passed through a breaking-in phase and settled down in a regular relationship which, at its inception, is certainly a difficult one for most people to adjust to. We would suggest the following outline of topics for RODIGAST to follow:

A. Estimate of loyalty to ODYOKE and QREBONY's psychological adjustment--his comfortableness--in working for ODYOKE clandestinely: his attitude, as RODIGAST can infer it, toward targets hostile to ODYOKE: in short, his ideological motivation.

B. Estimate of his motivation generally: his personal reasons for association with KUBARK.

C. Psychological suitability and staying power in leading a "double life". Possible or actual strains on him by virtue of his wife's attitude. Qualms about the "morality" of his position or fears about being found out.

D. His own views of his patriotism or loyalty. His attitude toward RODIGAST, KUBARK, ODYOKE and ODENVY.

E. His susceptability to approach or control by an opposition service.

F. Methods of control to which he is mort, and least, responsive. What represents the effective lever of his control--internal ideological

Distribution:
2 - COS, Paris/LCPIPIT

continued

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OPLW-1494 (GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification)	17 MAR 1966
CS COPY	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-306052

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2 - CA/CF

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
CA/CF	James M. Murphy	ajl	7767

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/ICG	15 March 1966	Goodrich (in draft)

ABSTRACT X

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER SIGNATURE
C/CA	17 MAR 1966	Cord Meyer, Jr.

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DISPATCH

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OFLW-1494

motivation? financial need? resentments? a desire to identify himself with ODYOKE's power? or some combination of these?

G. His longer range plans, if any.

H. His security consciousness--i.e. his efficiency in tradecraft.

I. Any changes in his attitudes or personality which RODIGAST has detected over the period of their association.

HOWELL D. KAMSERMEYER

201-306052

DISPATCH SECRET

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MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, London for LCPIPIT

INFO.: Chief of Station, London

FROM: Chief, WOLIMR

SUBJECT: RYBAT/DTDORIC/PLQRPHONE/MHPROBE/STFLIMFLAM Training

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 294821

1. Being forwarded USC are copies of the QRPHONE/1 training report, the JBMINIMUM evaluation, contact reports of meetings with QRPHONE/1, a WOGEAR review of QRPHONE/1's book and some notes made by the STFLIMFLAM Headquarters officer, Harvey B. DAITCHMAN (IDEN), after his meetings with QRPHONE/1. These are for the information of both LCPIPIT and London Station and, taken together, should give you both the flavor of the variety of measures taken to assess the operational potential of QRPHONE/1.

2. During PAUPEROS' TDY at Headquarters we discussed the necessity of having QRPHONE/1 undergo an intensive seven day STFLIMFLAM training program to be conducted by DAITCHMAN. It is our opinion that in order for this training to be of maximum benefit, QRPHONE/1 and DAITCHMAN ought to be ensconced in a safehouse facility which provides security, comfort and an atmosphere conducive to learning. It is important that the training be conducted in a locale which will allow QRPHONE to give his full attention without being disturbed by his multitude of business and social contacts. Therefore, we recommend that LCPIPIT rent a cottage or beach house away from London for the duration of the training cycle. In discussing this with QRPHONE, he readily agreed and indicated that there would be no difficulty in getting away from his family for as long as we thought necessary. He

Attachments:
A. As Stated (u/s/c)
B. Iden Sheet (u/s/c)

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2 ATT

approval of OCI

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CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OEPW-1814

DATE: 4 AUG 1972

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 200-124-156/1 ~~200-124-156/3~~

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
DDP/CA/B3/Ken Rosen:ckj		(31 July 1972)	7767

Distribution:
1 - E/BC
1 - E/CA
1 - AC/CA/B3
1 - CA/B3
1 - CI/SO

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AC/CA/B3	2 Aug 72	[signature]
E/BC	2 AUG 1972	[signature]
E/CA	2 Aug 72	[signature]
CI/SO	2 Aug 72	[signature]

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
ADC/CA	2 AUG 72	Dino J. Pionzio

CA/B3

PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

simply would tell them and his business contacts that he was traveling on the continent. Please advise us of the dates which are determined to be convenient to PAUPEROS and QRPHONE/1. The Headquarters officer would prefer either the third or fourth week of September, and certainly not before.

3. As indicated in the reference we solicit comments from LCPIPIT and London Station on the results of our varied assessments of QRPHONE/1 and our decision to move ahead in the new operational directions described in OKPW-1661. We view the coming year as a trial one for these purposes and the Project Renewal has been submitted with that understanding clearly described.

4. Since QRPHONE/1 might refer to conversations he had with Andrew F. TELQUIST (P), PAUPEROS should know that TELQUIST used the alias "Bob" in all his meetings with QRPHONE/1.

Allan W. TEUTSCHMAN

200-124-156/1
~~200-124-156/3~~

17 June 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WOLIME

SUBJECT: Completion of Training Report for QRPHONE/1, Training Program "SHAM"

REFERENCE: Memo for Director of WOMOLD From Chief, WOLIME, dated 23 May 1972; Subject: "Covert Training for QRPHONE/1"

1. QRPHONE/1 was trained covertly in New York from 22 June to 14 July 1972. There were sixteen sessions for a total of eighty seven training hours.

2. This was a happy reunion of trainee and instructor. Less than two years ago, PHONE was given three days of reports training (Please see Completion of Training Report dated 19 October 1970). Just as then, PHONE was totally engrossed in every training session from the moment of his arrival to the moment of his departure. Remembering that the instructor does not eat lunch, PHONE brought a sandwich with him daily and took this lunch while listening to the instructor. Thus, every minute of every day was made to count.

3. The only time lost was three hours for JMWHISK and on the several phone calls he had to make daily to check for calls to his cover office, then follow up with calls to those persons who had called his office and had left messages to be called back. At the most, these calls took half an hour. On some days, they took far less.

4. His cover organization work took up a considerable portion, everyday, of his free time with the result that he could not do any thing to speak of for subsequent preparation of commo plans for exercises. For example, told early on to prepare two dead drop commo plans, he was not able to come up with anything till the last week — and then with only one written one and one that he received orally. As a result he had to be given time during the training day to write reports of his countersurveillance exercises and one of his agent developmental exercises. After one such exercise, asked if he wished to take time out during the training day to write his report he said: "No, tonight I will make time to write it." And he did. And it was a good report.

5. On each Sunday, he went out of town to visit his aged Grandmother. He used the travel time to read tradecraft books (he read seven altogether).

S/C ATT. 1 to OEPW-1814 CS COPY 200-124-156/1 ~~200-124-156/3~~

On Tuesday, July 4th, his publisher appointed him baby sitter for the publisher's teen age son and there went any hope of getting any casing done that day. At least one time, he continued that he did not go to bed till two that morning and as he had left the afternoon before, he had stated that he had meetings starting at four thirty that afternoon. With all that, he nevertheless was fully alert and attentive every minute of every training session.

6. In his developmental recruitment series of exercises, his instructor played the role of operations officer -- and a real dumb-dumb he was. In such circumstances, PHOKE had to do all the thinking, all the planning, all the casing for meeting sites, all the analyzing, all the preparing and pointing for the recruitment. It was pure joy to watch this man, after each meeting and again before the next one, go to work on the problem. He knew where he was, knew where he wanted to go, knew how to get there. When TELQUIST , during the critique at the end of the series of exercises said: "He did a beautiful job," PHOKE had earned that accolade all by himself. The instructor's only contribution had been in the teaching of the subject of Agent Acquisition.

7. At this point, the instructor wishes to execute a low bow in the direction of TELQUIST He played his agent role excellently well and made the exercise a meaningful one for PHOKE. The three trips to New York by TELQUIST must have been very taxing, particularly in view of his immediately upcoming TDY trip, but they were efforts well spent.

8. No man, of course, is perfect. Each has an Achilles heel, a weakness, or an all-too-human trait, at the very least. Our PHOKE has his. He has a very quick mind. He knows it. And knowing it, he relies on it, counts on it. This, in turn, leads to a small failure in self-discipline. For example, told to write out his plan for the recruitment pitch, he came in with six words (maybe not that many) scratched on a 3 by 5 leaf torn out of his pocket notebook. He then proceeded, from these few words, to run off his plan without a single pause for an ah, hm, er, etc. It was as though he was reading a definition from a dictionary, so smoothly did his mind and thoughts run. He prepares everything in his mind, it appears, and does not like to write out that which he feels he should not have to write out. While it is great to have so facile a mind, a bit of discipline, to write out in full so important an act as a recruitment pitch, might one day save grief when an error would have been spotted had the entire plan been written out then looked over for possible flaws.

9. This small flaw, the instructor feels, accounts in considerable measure for PHOKE's failure to bring in a written dead drop plan till the last days of the program. PHOKE felt he could just as easily report orally. In fact, the other dead drop (he had been asked to do two) on which he reported orally, he discussed as though the paper was in front of him and he was reading from it. Nothing was missing -- area

description, access, hours of availability, the opposition, pros and cons as to suitability — it was all there. He just didn't like to write out that upon which he could report orally.

10. In writing reports on the two counter-surveillance exercises, he dashed those off in jig time. No pause for thinking, no pause to look up at the ceiling or out the window. Just straight writing, including paragraphing. Mind and pen were as one. Same thing for his oral analysis before and after each meeting — no pause to think, to review, to reconstruct, to remember — just an IBM-type printout.

11. The instructor sets down this reluctance on our hero's part to write out certain things, not to downgrade him, but to alert desk and field officers that if they must have a certain report by a certain time, and they want it in writing, they must be firm. For example, after the second meeting in the developmental series, the instructor said: "I must have that report first thing in the morning. Do you want to take time out from this afternoon's training session to do it?" And, as already reported above, FHOBE preferred to save the training time and he answered "I will make time to write it". In this case, time was of the essence because TELOUIST had to see the report before the next meeting. To sum up this item: When FHOBE feels that an oral report is adequate he finds it a little difficult to bring himself to find time to make a written report. Told definitely that he must write a report and given a deadline, he meets the deadline and the report is everything it should be.

12. His reports on his recruitment meetings, Mr. Sweet said, were excellent. No jumping to conclusions, no padding, no misinterpretations, no omissions.

13. The surveillance team captain, reading FHOBE's report on his actions during the countersurveillance exercises, marvelled at the completeness, total accuracy of description of the surveillants FHOBE had made, including their ages (but always made each man an inch or two shorter than the actual height -- which FHOBE admitted he does consistently), and the total recall of every move, every street crossing, every compass direction. (In the first countersurveillance exercise, sprung on FHOBE without a moment's prior notice, he made one of his two surveillants. In the second one, with plenty of time to prepare, he made all three of them. These were two different teams from the New York WOBONE ___). Concluding his admiration of FHOBE's reporting, the surveillance team captain said to the instructor: "You should be very proud of him".

14. In both exercises, the surveillance teams criticized the rapidity of FHOBE's movements. He walks very rapidly from place to place, then spends time to browse in a book shop. Then off again at a high rate of speed to his next stop. They also criticized his looking both ways while crossing a one way street. They felt it made him appear

[illegible] conscious. These are a typical New Yorker's habits. The instructor, also a New Yorker, is guilty of the identical actions. We are highly kinetic in our movements and as for looking both ways while crossing a one-way street, we follow the old Marine Corps adage: "There's always one S.O.B. that doesn't get the word". By sheerest coincidence, when the instructor was on his way to the safesite to deliver the surveillance team's report, he violated his own rule of looking both ways in crossing a one-way street and was bowled over by a hippie on a loaded bike — going the wrong way. Only the large heavy film case the instructor was carrying kept him from being knocked flat.

15. Nevertheless, PHONE is now fully cognizant of the appearance that his actions create and will watch it in the future.

16. One last note on the counter-surveillance exercises: He chose his positions well and he camouflaged his actions beautifully. One example: The instructor called the surveillance team for a quick feedback on the first exercise and caught the men just as they returned to their office. They got on different phones for a three way conversation. They reported one incident as follows: "So rapid were PHONE's movements, that when he met a friend of his, he hardly paused to speak with him, just waved him off". The second surveillant: "No, it didn't look like that at all, to me. To me it looked like this Indian-looking person stopped PHONE and asked him for directions and PHONE gave them and just went about his business". PHONE's own report, which he wrote up before he learned about the two different interpretations of the incident: "— where I stopped a foreign-looking man, apparently Indian in origin and asked him for the Museum which I knew perfectly well is on 53th Street. I turned around as he pointed south to 55th Street and spotted the same man in the grey suit, now holding his hat in his hand".

17. In the second exercise, there were two items of note: One, the team was surprised to note in PHONE's report that PHONE even had the name of the book that the surveillant picked up when he followed PHONE into a book store. Second, when the exercise was over, the team compared notes and decided that PHONE may have made two of them but could not possibly have made the third man. The team captain, on reading PHONE's report, was stunned to see that PHONE had indeed made the third man also, but good.

18. PHONE had an elicitation exercise (in addition to the developmental acquisition series) with   an instructor in the New York office. After relating the fine job that PHONE had done, the instructor's report concluded: "A first rate performance by PHONE, who's obviously been around — both coverwise and for real".

19. His choice of meeting places with his agent could not be faulted. For one, he chose an East Side restaurant (where diplomats, as Mr. [illegible] held himself out to be, would properly be seen dining).

You it was far enough away from the United Nations building to lessen the chances that PHONE himself and his putative diplomat target would be spotted by friends or acquaintances. His choice for the next meeting was at an impressively named new restaurant near the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts on the West Side of town. This restaurant was located in the safesite complex. He was thus able very smoothly to invite his agent to the safesite from the restaurant for the recruiting pitch.

20. He did very well in executing two recognition meetings and two brush passes. He had no time to write his own commo exercises (as stated, he was able to write up only one dead drop commo plan) so he was given commo plans written up by another trainee. To give him variety, he was alternately the higher and the lower echelon, alternately accepted and made the hand-off.

21. In operational and intel reports, he did very well. He very successfully separated the operational from the intel info and the source comments from the positive intelligence.

22. Instructor's Observation: PHONE is a proud man, both as an individual and as an operator. While he was very discreet about it, very circumspect, he did, nevertheless, let the instructor know that he has, on occasion been handled with something less than pure genius. This, like the previous item, is noted not to down-grade PHONE, but to alert both desk and field officers that this man, being very sure, positive, definite and strong, hopes to be handled in a manner that would have those same words apply.

23. In sum: A very good man.

24. In an effort to evaluate the effectiveness of the training, we would appreciate a detailed evaluation report in July 1973 from the field station. This report should indicate the extent to which the training has made the trainee a more useful and effective asset and should evaluate the performance in each area of tradecraft in which training was conducted; negative as well as positive comments are solicited. The field station's report should also include the trainee's own comments. Please ask the field station to slug the report WOLAID/[illegible]/1/SHAW. Upon receipt of the report at Headquarters, please forward a copy to the undersigned.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF WOVOLD

Chrono

18 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with QRPHONE/1

1. I met with QRPHONE/1 for much of the 12th of July and wearing two hats. We first went through the third phase of the training exercise in which I had been playing the role of an agent prospect whom he was to assess and recruit, and then later in the OTR safehouse I identified myself as the Headquarters officer responsible for his project. Incidentally, he did an excellent job in all three phases of the training exercise and did particularly well on the recruitment itself. QRPHONE/1 is clever, imaginative, has an excellent grasp of this aspect of tradecraft and handled himself particularly well in a complex and changing training scenario.

2. As the Headquarters staff officer responsible for his project, I described in detail the reasons for the long, serious look at his performance these last several months, the changing intelligence and operational requirements we face, and the careful scrutiny he had been given as we began to map out new directions for him, all of which ended with this advance four-week training program, testing, and evaluation and substantive briefings. He said he was a bit confused by the WOMUSE briefing of last week so I explained how that tied in with this evening's planned discussion on the China program.

3. We discussed his itinerary, personal plans and the pacing of the next several months, all of which were clarified to his satisfaction.

a. He will be debriefed on 24 July at 1000 hours at the OTR safesite in NYC following his return from the operational trip around the country.

b. I will meet him for the final operational briefing session at 1000 hours on 26 July in the same OTR safesite.

c. He will depart New York the night of 26 July on the 8:00 p.m. TWA flight to London.

d. This will get him in London in time for a previously scheduled ops meeting with PAUPEROS on 27 July. He leaves on 1 August for a one-month vacation touring most of Europe with his family and spending one week in Malta.

4. Before the arrival of DAITCHMAN we discussed other operational matters as follows:

a. His friend in New York City, Richard Ward, (Apt. 11K, 372 Central Park West) recently returned from Hanoi and Paris with the manuscript of a new book written by Cambodian Prince Nordom Sihanouk titled "My War with CIA." Sihanouk gave the manuscript to Wilfred Burchett who gave it to a North Vietnamese friend to give to Ward. Ward was asked to find an American publisher and he, in turn, asked for QRPHONE/1's help. Burchett is an old friend of Ward's and stays at his apartment whenever he visits New York. The manuscript has already been given to a publisher in Europe. QRPHONE/1 asked if we would be interested in a copy. I told him to get one if he could do so without straining his cover.

b. His friend, Lyle Stuart, the publisher, has been trying to buy the American branch of the Oxford University Press, and apparently is about to consummate the deal. He offered QRPHONE a job as his European representative if the deal goes through.

c. Per TEUTSCHMAN' request I asked QRPHONE to give his instructor a copy of the long list of names and organizations given to him by Sibecho. Also per Ken's request, and in answer to my question, QRPHONE said he received the magazine published by the Turkish party in Collards Book Shop in London.

5. From 5:00 p.m. until a little after midnight on 13 July, DAITCHMAN of FE Division briefed QRPHONE/1 in substance on the STFLIMFLAM program, our interest in having QRPHONE/1 pursue such a role, and explained the great amount of dreary work that would be involved in learning the communist dialectic thoroughly if the whole venture were to be successful. I will make no effort to condense these seven hours

of ethereal discourse, but QRPHONE was fascinated, captivated by it and clearly interested in pursuing that long murky path to "enlightenment." /DAITCHMAN did an outstanding job in setting the stage, describing the target, and then explaining step by step how he and QRPHONE/1 and PAUPEROS would work together as the operation progressed. Regarding QRPHONE's upcoming trip in the U.S. /DAITCHMAN explained exactly how QRPHONE should act as he meets each of his friends and how he should develop his new-found "interest" in studying Marxist-Leninism as he meets with those various people. QRPHONE was very responsive, took notes, had ideas of his own, but more importantly was very appreciative of the tactical advice that /DAITCHMAN described. QRPHONE/1 will meet the following people over the next ten days.

a. Richard Ward in New York City.

b. Libel Bergman in Newark (on three different occasions)

c. Benjamin Blake, Milton Henry and a fellow named Boggs in Detroit (he's with NAR).

d. Don Wright, Herb Block, and Sidney Lens all in Chicago.

e. LPWEAKLY/1 and family in Chicago

f. Davida Fineman and Saul Landau in San Francisco.

g. The Martin Luther King Foundation in Atlanta.

6. All of the above were carefully chosen because of who they were, what organization or philosophy they represented, or their interest in the Chinese, and the extent to which the whole would knit together and form a viable base which QRPHONE can use as a springboard when he returns to London. /DAITCHMAN urged QRPHONE to join, or in some cases rejoin, Maoist study groups in London including the one conducted by Manchanda. The role that QRPHONE should play with these groups, as well as others in Europe who were singled out during various parts of the conversation, was also spelled out in detail. By the end of the evening QRPHONE had clearly in mind what it was all about, what he should do next and the purpose of our reconvening on the 24th and 26th to decide finally what it all amounts to.

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7. I asked QRPHONE to call on the sterile line using the "Mr. Stanley" indicator on Monday afternoon, 21 July. This is simply to check in and let us know he is on the way and how things have come thus far. He calculated that he needed another $500.00 for the U.S. portion of his overall trip since LCPIPIT apparently had not anticipated this when he was given his original advance. I arranged through the good offices of in New York to get $500.00 to QRPHONE today.

8. QRPHONE asked if we had any intelligence requirements for him to pursue while he is in Malta. I said Ken would brief him on those requirements on the 24th of July if we had any. Incidentally, QRPHONE mentioned that Libol Bergman comes to New York City every Thursday and told QRPHONE that he could be reached on telephone number 265-2500. QRPHONE said if we cared to we might want to track that number and see where Bergman hangs out.

Andrew F. TELQUIST

SECRET/RYBAT

31 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Final Contact with QRPHONE/1 in New York City

1. As arranged previously, I met with QRPHONE/1 at the WOMOLD safesite in New York City from 1000 hours to 1230 26 July. The meeting was intended to wrap up loose ends, convey our decision to pursue the STFLIMFLAM program (providing QRPHONE/1 himself was amenable), and to make clear that we expect measurable operational progress within the next year.

2. Although QRPHONE/1 had been debriefed on 24 July by other Headquarters officers regarding his trip around WOCORK, I asked him to review it again for my information so I could put it clearly in perspective as it related to our plans for him in the coming year. I'll not bother with the details here because such have already been written for the record elsewhere, but suffice it to say that QRPHONE/1 was both pleased and relieved at the reception he got from his old contacts because of the reflection these receptions had on his own bona fides. The allegations of his BKTRUST affiliation which had floated through Europe were never mentioned by his WOCORK contacts; on the contrary at least one of them urged QRPHONE/1 to return soon to WOCORK because this is where the action is. This same individual gave QRPHONE reading materials on the Communist dialectic and urged him to study them closely. This greatly impressed QRPHONE because it showed how accurate were the briefings given him by the Headquarters STFLIMFLAM officer and demonstrated that we knew our tactics.

3. I then reviewed with QRPHONE/1 the reasons for our long close scrutiny of him and his performance these last several months followed by our selection of him for advance training, testing, and redirection in the strong hope we had that he would accept this new task because of its priority importance to our national collection requirements. I asked

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SECRET/RYBAT

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QRPHONE/1 his impressions of it all, his reaction to the STFLIMFLAM proposal, and whether he would accept its demanding obligations. QRPHONE said he certainly would and that he found it a real challenge to his intellect and his operational skills. The tedious study of the dialectic would not deter him. His only concern was how he should actually play it as he developed relationships with appropriate party members and, ultimately, the Chinese in SMORANGE. I pointed out he needn't concern himself with the last point because that would be part of the purpose of the ten-day training program in SMORANGE in September which would be given him by the Headquarters STFLIMFLAM officer. I said the training would require total emersion for ten days straight, probably in some secluded beach house on the coast where all involved could reside full time. He said this would present no problem cover-wise; he would simply tell his family he had gone to the continent. I said that PAUPEROS would be working out the details of this with him, probably after his return from vacation.

4. I said that given QRPHONE/1's past performance, his credentials with the radical left, and his apparent interest in vigorously pursuing the STFLIMFLAM program we expected to be able to measure in six to eight months the likelihood of his being able to achieve all the STFLIMFLAM objectives based upon the progress he would have made by then with his Chicom contacts. Should it appear that the STFLIMFLAM operation would not succeed we would be discussing alternative courses of action with him by the end of the year. He did say that of all the countries in Europe where his STFLIMFLAM and radical left potential is probably the best, Italy would be first and Denmark second.

5. I told QRPHONE/1 that his meeting with PAUPEROS had been moved to 31 July as he requested, reviewed his European vacation plans and his Malta trip and wished him the very best of luck. At this point QRPHONE/1 certainly seems willing and able aggressively to pursue our operational plans. We shall see.

Andrew F. TELQUIST

WOGEAR Review of African Liberation Movements

In general, the author has done a reasonably good job describing the historical development of the various African liberation movements, especially when one considers the complexity and number of splits and mergers that have occurred within and among the movements over the years. There are several glaring inaccuracies, however, in the author's conclusions about the current position and effectiveness of the several Portuguese African liberation movements.

Regarding Angola, the author characterizes the MPLA as an ideologically-oriented group (i.e., Soviet doctrine) that has failed to grasp and utilize to its advantage the tribal realities that exist in Angola. The author fails to acknowledge, however, that the MPLA has had some success, albeit limited, in building a movement that is national and multiracial in character rather than tribally oriented. Despite its urban intellectual leadership, the MPLA has had some success winning local support in rural eastern Angola.

By contrast, GRAE ranks a poor second. From inception, its primary base of support has been the large Angolan refugee population of Bakongo tribesmen who live in southwestern Zaire. Although the organization has won some support among Bakongo kinsmen across the border in northwestern Angola, it has failed to broaden its base because of its thinly disguised regional and tribal make-up. Moreover, Roberto's unwillingness to delegate authority or compromise have produced chronic disputes at the leadership level. The author's conclusion that GRAE is a formidable force to be reckoned with in the future of Angola is contradicted by the fact that the MPLA is by far the largest and most effective of the three nationalist groups opposing the Portuguese in Angola.

MOZAMBIQUE

The present FRELIMO leadership does not appear to be in the state of disarray in 1972 that the author believes it is. Although some differences undoubtedly persist, the present leaders seem to have closed ranks somewhat since the departure of Simango in late 1969. For the present, any internal squabbles that may exist are not noticeably affecting FRELIMO's fighting abilities inside Mozambique.

RHODESIA, SOUTH WEST AFRICA, SOUTH AFRICA

Reasonably straightforward and up to date. No serious deficiencies.

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Direct Psychological Assessment
of
ORPHONE/1

The psychological evaluation consisted of an extended interview and the JBMINIMUM test. His intelligence as measured by the JBMINIMUM is within the Bright Normal range by U.S. standards. The test scores were not as high as would be expected in comparison to his behavior and life style. The discrepancy could be due to the fact that he suffers from inferiority feelings and is working overtime to compensate. He gets considerable satisfaction and mileage out of his authorship; however, it takes a great deal of his energy in order to discipline himself enough to write a book. His talents are much more in the field of journalism. Mentally alert and very perceptive, he is aware of what is happening around him. These same traits would serve him well as an access agent. However, his reporting may reflect some distortions because his memory is not strong, and he tends to remember those events that are of interest to him. He naturally has good manual-manipulative skills, plus a practical bent that should enable him to easily and effectively learn and carry out tradecraft techniques.

Emotionally, Subject is fickle. "Out-of-sight - out of mind," describes the way he relates to others. The reason for this is that one of his primary needs is to be accepted and liked. Most of his life has been spent seeking acceptance, and because he is emotionally dependent he rapidly and intensely becomes involved. If separated from someone with whom he is involved, he has difficulty maintaining loyalty, and begins to look for another way to satisfy his needs.

An important fact which his case officer should remember is that he is not motivated by an ideology, but rather by the person who represents a particular ideology. His relationship with his case officer is of prime importance. To ensure his loyalty to the organization and consistent performance, he will need intense handling. The problem is that he may balk since he resists authority. He has the tendency to think that he knows it all, as witnessed by his never completing a degree.

Subject is not by nature a role player, and it would not be operationally advantageous to have him switch roles, for he cannot psychologically handle role playing over a period of time. He has worked hard to establish an identity for himself, and could not cope as effectively with a new one.

Conclusion:

Subject is a bright, extremely ambitious, and aggressive individual who appears to be motivated to work for the Agency by three needs: 1) a need to be accepted and liked; 2) a materialistic need; and 3) as a vehicle to be vindictive to former loyalties, i.e., the far left or radical movement in this country.

Though he is capable of switching loyalties, and his life history attests to this fact, it is very difficult to predict his future behavior since so much depends on his life circumstances. One statement that can be made is that, given his personality, it is very doubtful if he would return to his former allegiances. But if not personally involved with someone from this agency who can give him acceptance and support, he is likely to look elsewhere for his need satisfactions.

PAS Formula: 14(E+u+c Rc+c+ Uoo)L+

Notes on QRPHONE by Harvey B. DAITCHMAN

1. Revolutionary Image: Discussed briefly how it is obtained. Pointed out there is a pattern to it which is discernable among revolutionaries. It is usually issue oriented in the beginning, the war being one of the key issues, and it gradually evolves into a desire to engage in practical activities which usually expressed best on a continuing basis through work in an organization. Also connected with this process is the gradual development of a different "outlook." It is usually a mixture of idealism and Marxism-Leninism-socialism-Mao Tse-tung thought. Usually unstructured but developing.

It is possible in this stage to move from one group to another without any particular approbation being attached for this transience. This is particularly so if one starts way outside a M-L-ist group and moves inward towards it. Quite a different thing to start in a M-List group and go out.

Also in development of a new outlook one comes to study a variety of revolutionary literature. This can take one into different areas, anarchism, GW advocacy, revolutionary nihilism, socialism, Marxist-Lenism, etc. However, to get to latter it must be done logically.

2. Tightly Structured Op: Emphasis upon tight, controlled contacts which seek to accomplish a specific purpose--collection of info not necessarily one nor always one. Purpose is to lay ground work for future developments. Purpose to establish certain contacts which can be later used in either positive or negative fashion. Structured conversation is also essential. It too should seek to accomplish something, directed so as to be useful to future development of op: e.g., desire to have an explanation for an action to be undertaken later--so bring up in conversation with someone so that can use that conversation later as explanation for interest in a subject, knowledge of a subject, etc. It is checkable.

3. Study: Most important aspect in opening phases of op. Without correct study and without development (understanding) of "correct outlook" one will always be a dilettante to the, outside looking in, someone who is useful to them "under certain conditions," but not someone who is reliable, and not a dependable revolutionary. This is really the key, the ideological tool, it will open doors that cannot otherwise be entered.

4. Contacts: Those to be exploited now and those to be used in or for future time. In the beginning the contacts which are developed are to be used as a means of building his justification for having begun the <u>serious</u> study of Marx,

Lenin, and Mao. This must be discussed with people so that many are aware of it. These conversations will be later used when he explains how and why and when he became interested.

5. Diffuse Nature of Op: In beginning op has a diffuse nature. It is necessary to make many contacts. Some will be more useful than others, but all have potential for use in one circumstance or another. Since we have no way of knowing how or from whom the Chinese collect their intelligence, seek out, or otherwise spot budding revolutionaries we can assume that some one of his acquaintances will report his interest in Mao, etc. We can assume that through some of his activities Chinese will build up his dossier so that at a later date when we go directly to the Chinese for help they can look in their dossier and see that x number of months ago, etc., various things were reported. Etc.

6. Ops as a Process of Development: Permit no diversions or detours which might become permanent. This would include targets of opportunity, etc. Must always maintain correct operational line and cannot reach target by following various diversionary tributaries in the temporary interest of collecting marginal intelligence. Must be prepared to sacfrice diversionary tasks in pursuit of main goal or objective. If tangential things are folled up we then have a different op, and a new op line, must be cautious with this. Ops line serves as guide for whole op from beginning to end.

7. Tactics in Op: Must always be carefully thought out so as to insure forward development of op. Something must be seen emerging or useful, or having potential future value for development of op, otherwise it is pointless to undertake it. Tactics are details. Details are most important aspect in day to day running of op. They must be paid attention to, must be contributory, must be carried out in correct sequence, and we must keep in mind that at one or more points it is these details which will be subject of the scrutiny of the opposition. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THESE DETAILS APPEAR LOGICAL TO THIS OPPOSITION, even if they may seem illogical to us at times. Our logic is not the same as communist logic.

8. Ops is Step by Step Process: Op should/or can be divided into steps, phases, stages, segments, whatever. Each phase should dovetail into the next. To some extent a general outline can be developed. Each of the major phases should be sub-divided into stages so that they can be dealt with step by step. For example: Three broad categories:

1st Phase: All initiatives are ours. We do all the work, lay ground for future stages. We have a flexible line which permits making maximum contacts to be correctly exploited. We give training. Also devise concrete activities for him to carry out.

2nd Phase: Chinese and others have shown interest. We will exploit this interest. After he has completed first phase we will begin to make structured contacts with the Chinese. In these contacts he will show that he has a grasp of the ideology, is interested in learning more, desires to study more intensively. Will use as negative examples: his book, Panthers, some aspects of Bergman's behavior, the unstructured and undisciplined nature of most revolutionary activists in U.S., particularly among the blacks, or whatever may seem appropriate at time contact is made. However, will seek their help to further his study and will indicate recognition of need to return to U.S. in order to undertake correct role in revolutionary struggle. At this stage we will have an idea of interest of Chinese. We will be able to determine whether we can expect progress or not. If they prove willing to help they will then be asked to guide his further study, to help him. Through this help they will be able to see the development which has taken place. We should get a good feeling of their willingness to guide him after a couple of meetings. If we are shut out then must make ops judgement from that point on--can always target against Soviets and use Chinese as negative example. If they are interested we will then lose some aspects of our initiative, but in essence the more initiative we lose to them, the more they try to direct him, the deeper he becomes involved with them, which is our objective--one of them. He must continue his study.

3rd Phase: Continue his study; continue his contacts all around, but by now should have significant contacts and can dispense with the more general "sparrow" approach. Once certain of their willingness to help we ask about a trip to Peking to study after which he wants to return to U.S. and take active role.

Recognize that this may be a sticking point. We don't want him here. However, this idea has to always be in the forefront as far as the Chinese are concerned otherwise they have little reason to be interested in him. This MUST appear to be his goal. We may be able to circumvent it later for one reason or another, or it might be useful to bring him back temporarily. This decision must be reserved for that time.

These stages and sub-stages must be further divided if we are to understand the operation correctly and are to carry it out correctly. Each action he is asked to undertake must be seen leading to something concrete in the next or another step. The whole op goes STEP BY STEP. We do not insert unrealistic objectives, or those which would be desirable but may be difficult. This is a waste of time. We only seek to do what is possible--possible is what can be turned into reality.

Emphasis must be made on "step by step" approach and must be maintained. Otherwise we can trip ourselves up by trying to accomplish something which is out of sequence FOR THEM. For

example: He has read Marx and Lenin. We might say he's quite familiar with it. We could then say that he will read Mao and after that he will be able to pretend to be a Maoist. All of this is true. He could say it and act like he and others thought a Maoist should act. However, appearance and essence are not synonomous. It might appear to non-Maoists that our troop is a Maoist because he can talk as good a game as anyone else--or better than those who have not studied as much--but the essence of being a Maoist is not contained in such superficialities. Nor is the essence of being a Marxist-Leninist so contained. He cannot, for example, bloom or emerge as a Maoist and find acceptance with the Maoists. They know the process it takes to get there: "Several years of assiduous study can produce good results." (Some Chinese quote on studying Mao.)

9. **Their Weapon is Also Our Tool:** Once we understand correctly how they wield their weapon, the dialectical method, it can serve as our tool to pry our way into their camp. Through proper study and understanding we can develop and promote Q's superiority among his friends and acquaintances. To Marxists he will be much more acceptable and his intel product will probably be enhanced since they will talk on subjects they might not have touched upon in the past, he will be more trusted, and also he will have better recognition of key developments in Marxist world through better understanding of their reality.

10. Some activities which we might consider enroute.

a. Start His Own Study Group: Chinese would be very interested. Unlike most study groups with which I am familiar he would stress study of ideology--in correct way. However, to prevent them from profiting from such study they can be tied in knots for months dealing with a variety of ideological problems. There is no point in our developing for their use good revolutionaries. However, it would provide reason for frequent contact with Chinese in order for them to help him in the development of his group. Would probably lead him into contact with other interesting types. Might have it for "Americans only" abroad--to avoid problems with Brits: whatever:

b. Might Talk About Starting a One Man Institute for Studying African Revolution: could put out a four page broadsheet for peanuts. It would discuss various African problems. His book gives him good reason for such study. He might draw one or two people to him. Can use this too as basis for approach to Chinese. He will have come to recognize that he had not painted the true picture of national lib struggle in his book and through his broadsheet he seeks to rectify some his ideas.

c. He could seek to do another book on "The Dialectics of African Revolution." Here again the help of various communists, Marxist-Leninists, and particularly the Chinese in providing guidance (correct guidance) would give him frequent access and contact--providing the Chinese are willing to help.

d. Start a Broadsheet for American Revolutionaries Abroad: This would give him contct with a wide variety of radical U.S. types abroad. It would also have feed back into the American scene and in part fulfill his requirement to have an active role with U.S. revolutionary developments. Etc. Etc.

e. There are other activities which he might also undertake. The above are a few ideas of what we can do to "promote" QRPHONE. He can do a number of different things at the sametime since much of it overlaps and is hence compatible. However, each must be structured, carefully handled, with great attention to the details. STEP BY STEP.

Some Words of Caution: Our experience clearly indicates that it is incorrect to rely upon either the agent or the station to provide the impetus. This seems to be true for a number of reasons. Case officers change often, chiefs of ops, bases, or stations change--there is not much continuity. We are thinking of a long term operation which, as it grows, becomes very complex. It is not easily understood by someone who gets involved after it has been going for sometime. It is even more true of changes in station leadership whose attitude is largely developed on his subjective feelings from reading only cable traffic. The initiative, the operational ideas, etc. are best kept in Hqs. There is so much more information here to work with, people with whom one can talk, staffs, etc. Also most officers in the field simply do not have the time to sit down and plan in the kind of detail that is needed to continue and develop the op. It calls for solid knowledge of the communist reality in order to insure that no errors creep in those contacts he may make. It calls for someone to have the time to read, study, certain publications, articles, etc., and then to figure out whether or not a given publication or article can be used to make a useful contact, write a useful letter, etc. If so, how, and then go the field with the idea, and concrete directions about how it should be used. Case officers most likely won't be exposed to the same material and probably wouldn't have the planning time necessary, or the various resources of Hqs to do what needs to be done.

This is not to suggest that the field has nothing to say. However, if the understanding can be clearly made that this is in fact a joint operation, with Hqs having an opportunity for big input, with the understanding that the only thing which matters to all concerned is the correct development of the operation in the given concrete conditions and not either the Hqs or the field trying to establish some kind of supremacy of rights over the other--there is a good chance of success.

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Under Separate Cover Attachment B to OEPW-1814

IDEN - Andrew Ness

S/C ATT. 2 to OEPW-1814

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Agent Profile - QRPHONE/1

QRPHONE/1 is an American citizen and a singleton agent who has been a recruited asset for some seven years. He has extensive contacts among leftist, radical, and communist movements in Europe and Africa and was able to sustain his relations with many such figures for operational purposes in spite of a formal disassociation some years ago. Originally a member himself of a radical pro-communist group, his disenchantment with internal personal and political dissension in an organization to which he had firmly committed himself led later to his acceptance of an operational relationship with the Agency. Although targeted after his recruitment at the plethora of new left and radical elements in Europe, essentially for intelligence collection purposes, QRPHONE/1 has recently been redirected toward the Chinese Communists with a view to ingratiating himself and seeking their guidance and support as he demonstrates an interest in more effectively acting on their behalf. Our ultimate objective is to precipitate invitations to Mainland China which will lead to successively higher echelons of contact within the Chinese Government.

To prepare QRPHONE/1 for this demanding task, extensive retraining, assessment and remotivation were recently accomplished and selective recontact was made by him with his more influential and pertinent communist contacts. Reactions to QRPHONE/1's alleged desire to more fully commit himself to the communist Chinese cause and the assistance rendered thus far by these communist contacts are encouraging indicators of the potential success of this agent to achieve our goal.

Although a complex man to manage operationally because of his own background and the mix of his ideological and professional motivations, QRPHONE/1's intelligence and personality are such as to well equip him to meet the challenge of the tests the Chinese are likely to throw his way. He is based in England, as is his case officer, and operational meetings are held in secure safe sites, sometimes on the continent.

QRPHONE/1 has produced numerous intelligence reports on communist and radical targets in addition to his covert action functions as a journalist and author. His long-term tenure with the Agency will be determined in part by the degree of success of his new Chicom directions.

14-00000

SECRET/KYDAI

1 August 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with QRPHONE/1

1. On 24 July 1972, Andy Ness (in alias as Andy), Frank Falko (in alias as Frank) and the undersigned (in alias as Ken) converged on the OTR safesite in New York City to meet with QRPHONE/1 in order to debrief him on his trip through WOCORK.

2. The discussion was started by having QRPHONE relate the details of his trip on a city by city basis describing the people he met and his reception by them. It should be noted here that several of the individuals that QRPHONE was to have seen were out of town or unavailable, however, QRPHONE will correspond with these individuals in order to maintain his relationship with them.

NEWARK

QRPHONE met with Leibel Bergman at his home and stayed overnight (14-15 July) as his guest. QRPHONE told Bergman that he had decided to make a full-time commitment to the study of Marxist-Leninist (M-L) doctrine in order to become more proficient in M-L theory and would like to join the RU to further this ambition. Bergman's reaction, according to QRPHONE, was enthusiastic. Bergman gave QRPHONE some M-L literature (which was the same as the literature Andy gave him several weeks ago to study) which he felt would be helpful. Bergman stated that if QRPHONE was really interested in becoming involved in the M-L movement he should return to WOCORK because that "was where all the inconsistencies were." Bergman invited QRPHONE to

QRPHONE 201

take part in some M-L study groups but didn't say what exactly would be studied. The following are some general comments QRPHONE provided about Bergman. Bergman doesn't like Newark, he has been mugged several times and would like to go back to California; however, that is not possible at this time, so Bergman will instead move to New York City. Bergman is pleased with the current development of the RU. He said that the recent trip to China by several RU members was successful and that the trip had been pleasant for them. QRPHONE commented that it appears that Bergman does not have the same control of the RU that he formerly had, although he is regarded as the "guru" of the RU.

NEW YORK

QRPHONE said that Richard Ward is attempting to sell the English language rights of Prince Sihanouk's book My War With the CIA. Ward had been trying to get Lyle Stuart to purchase the rights but Stuart's antipathy toward Wilfred Burchett, "that old Communist" according to Stuart, was too great. Burchett apparently wrote the forward and Stuart doesn't want to publish anything with his name on it. QRPHONE, in our presence, called Stuart and convinced him to at least read the manuscript of the book before he turned it down. Ward has a South Vietnamese student living with him as a combination houseboy/companion. This student, whose name is David Truong, is the son of the South Vietnamese presidential candidate Truong Dinh Dzu, who ran in the 1967 South Vietnames election on a peace platform and who is now in prison. QRPHONE said that this student has amassed a large collection of books on intelligence, that the books are expensive and that he doesn't have any idea where the money to buy the books came from. He also said he doesn't think Truong has immigration papers to stay in WOCORK legally. I asked if Truong was in any way involved with the recent attempt to hijack a plane to Hanoi. QRPHONE stated that Truong knew the hijackers and might have known something about the attempted hijacking because the hijackers had also stayed at Ward's apartment.

Ward is going to France soon for a vacation with a girlfriend he refused to identify because he feels his apartment and phones are bugged "by at least ten intelligence agencies." Before he goes on vacation he intends to stop in Paris and meet with DRV and PRG officials as well as with Wilfred Burchett. (Ward also met with Jane Fonda prior to her recent trip to the DRV). Ward will try to visit QRPHONE in London sometime in September before he returns home. Ward claimed that a "wealthy benefactor" gave him some $1000 to cover the cost of his vacation. Ward himself is broke and makes only about $60 per week salary.

DETROIT

QRPHONE was unable to see Milton Henry, leader of the New Republic of Africa, who was on vacation in Japan. He did manage to see FNU Boggs, who is apparently no longer involved with radical organizations but who is acting as a clearinghouse for black and white radicals. QRPHONE characterized Boggs as less doctrinaire and less dogmatic than he had been in the past. Boggs' feeling about the black radical movement is that it is in considerable disarray.

CHICAGO

QRPHONE saw LPWEAKLY/1 who told him that he was trying to get an invitation to visit China. LPWEAKLY/1 told QRPHONE that if he went he would see about taking him along. This was the first that QRPHONE knew about LPWEAKLY/1's plans. QRPHONE was unable to see either Sidney Lens or Hal Block because they were out of town. He did corroborate the fact that Block had recently been to China. QRPHONE spent some time with Don Wright, who was a member of the RU delegation to China. Wright is now a full-time RU official responsible for organizing RU cells in the Mid-West and seems committed to revolution although he doesn't speak in M-L terminology. Wright stated that one problem now facing the RU involves national exposure, i.e., getting minorities to become involved with the RU. This is a change from past RU philosophy which was that

minority groups should form their own organizations separate from the RU. QRPHONE said Wright is very bitter toward the Black Panther movement and thinks that Eldridge Cleaver is "bad" and that Huey Newton and Bobby Seale are "corrupt".

SAN FRANCISCO

In San Francisco QRPHONE stayed with Davida Fineman. The mysterious M, who appeared in several of her letters to QRPHONE, is Martin Nichols, a Marxist scholar of note who translated into the English the entire Fundamentals of Political Economy. He was once a member of the RU.

Emotionally, Davida is not as depressed as she was several months ago, even though her brief exposure to the world of labor union organizing was a failure. Her comments about the RU were to condemn the Bruce Franklin group (Venceramos Organization) which she said is going to bring disaster to the whole RU because of its predilection for violence before the groundwork for revolution has been laid. Fineman feels that Robert Avakian, a high RU official, is less wild and erratic than in the past and has in fact become a good M-L.

QRPHONE saw Paul Richards, Hodee Edwards' son-in-law. Richards is a former CP member from the Mid-West, which he left because of the people. He feels that the Mid-West is a part of the country where the Government ought to test nuclear warheads. QRPHONE also met with Earl and Lee Rose. Earl was in the RU delegation to China where he must have caused some embarrassment to the delegation by his naivete. He attempted to meet African revolutionaries, particularly members of the MPLA, which he didn't realize were Moscow-oriented. Rose asked QRPHONE to write and send him material on the various African liberation movements. Lee Rose works for Bell Telephone Company although Earl, her husband, is unemployed.

ATLANTA

QRPHONE went to the Martin Luther King Center for Social Change, formerly the Martin Luther King Foundation, where he met with Tom Porter, the head staffer of the organization. There was recently a split in the Center and the Executive Director, a Dr. Scott, was forced out of office. The office is still vacant and, according to Porter, will remain so for the immediate future. The reason for the continued vacancy is apparently to allow Coretta King and other members of the Board of Directors to maintain direct control. Porter is a former writer for Freedom Ways Magazine. QRPHONE said that Porter knew of him but didn't say exactly how. QRPHONE told Porter he would consider writing a brief on the Center for LPWEAKLY. QRPHONE said that the Center is going to establish a foreign affairs staff which will be headed by Jack O'Dell, an old CP member.

3. After QRPHONE's discourse on his trip, Andy discussed in broad terms what he could expect in the next year with regard to securing entre to the Chinese. QRPHONE was told that once he was proficient in M-L he would be expected to go out and test his knowledge with various individuals and organizations in order to gain access and become known to the Chinese. Andy emphasized it wouldn't be easy, that QRPHONE would have to be diligent and patient, but that in the end, if he was successful, the benefits would be many. QRPHONE accepted this.

Kenneth Rosen
Branch 3
Covert Action Staff

DDP/CA/B3/KRosen:ckj (1 August 1972)

Distribution:
Orig. - routed to AC/CA/B3
1 - AC/CA/B3
1 - CA/B3

Pho 201

TSD/BAB MEMO # 275-72
20 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Rod Sweet, Chief CA-3

ATTENTION : Mr. Ken Rosen, Rm 3D18

SUBJECT : ORPHONE/1

1. Attached is the psychological assessment of ORPHONE/1. A preliminary verbal read-out was given on 7 July in which it was stated that Subject was an emotionally stable individual. We still support this statement, but a more in-depth analysis revealed there are certain aspects of his personality that are susceptible. These are discussed in the report. If any part of the report is unclear or requires further discussion, please contact us. Meanwhile, we would appreciate receiving follow-up information on Subject's performance in order to help us refine and improve our methods of assessment.

James M. Keehner
TSD/BAB

Attachment:
Report

Direct Psychological Assessment
of
ORPHONE/1

The psychological evaluation consisted of an extended interview and the JBMINIMUM test. His intelligence as measured by the JBMINIMUM is within the Bright Normal range by U.S. standards. The test scores were not as high as would be expected in comparison to his behavior and life style. The discrepancy could be due to the fact that he suffers from inferiority feelings and is working overtime to compensate. He gets considerable satisfaction and mileage out of his authorship; however, it takes a great deal of his energy in order to discipline himself enough to write a book. His talents are much more in the field of journalism. Mentally alert and very perceptive, he is aware of what is happening around him. These same traits would serve him well as an access agent. However, his reporting may reflect some distortions because his memory is not strong, and he tends to remember those events that are of interest to him. He naturally has good manual-manipulative skills, plus a practical bent that should enable him to easily and effectively learn and carry out tradecraft techniques.

Emotionally, Subject is fickle. "Out-of-sight - out of mind," describes the way he relates to others. The reason for this is that one of his primary needs is to be accepted and liked. Most of his life has been spent seeking acceptance, and because he is emotionally dependent he rapidly and intensely becomes involved. If separated from someone with whom he is involved, he has difficulty maintaining loyalty, and begins to look for another way to satisfy his needs.

An important fact which his case officer should remember is that he is not motivated by an ideology, but rather by the person who represents a particular ideology. His relationship with his case officer is of prime importance. To ensure his loyalty to the organization and consistent performance, he will need intense handling. The problem is that he may balk since he resists authority. He has the tendency to think that he knows it all, as witnessed by his never completing a degree.

Subject is not by nature a role player, and it would not be operationally advantageous to have him switch roles, for he cannot psychologically handle role playing over a period of time. He has worked hard to establish an identity for himself, and could not cope as effectively with a new one.

Conclusion:

Subject is a bright, extremely ambitious, and aggressive individual who appears to be motivated to work for the Agency by three needs: 1) a need to be accepted and liked; 2) a materialistic need; and 3) as a vehicle to be vindictive to former loyalties, i.e., the far left or radical movement in this country.

Though he is capable of switching loyalties, and his life history attests to this fact, it is very difficult to predict his future behavior since so much depends on his life circumstances. One statement that can be made is that, given his personality, it is very doubtful if he would return to his former allegiances. But if not personally involved with someone from this agency who can give him acceptance and support, he is likely to look elsewhere for his need satisfactions.

PAS Formula: 14(E+u+c Rc+c+ Uoo)L+

I	HIGH	(Digit Span)	Low	E

INTERNALIZER | **EXTERNALIZER**

INTERNALIZER	EXTERNALIZER
Self Contained	Responsive, reactive
Inner Directed	Outer Directed
Physically Inactive, contemplative	Physically Active, relating
Values ideas, symbols	Practical, concrete, realistic

R	HIGH	Block Design	LOW	F

REGULATED	FLEXIBLE
Organized	Loose
Focused	Diffuse attention
Persistent	High imagination
Rote learning	Trial and error
Emotionally insulated	Spontaneous, expressive, sensitive
Memory good for procedures and routines	Memory good for feelings and impressions

A	HIGH	(Picture Arrangement)	LOW	U.

Role ADAPTIVE	Role UNIFORM
Versatile role player	Limited role player
Socially responsive and suggestible	Socially guarded and negativistic
Socially imitative	Often ignored
Reflects group behavior	Socially specialized or stereotyped
Overestimated	Often in conflict with group behavior
	Underestimated

OS 0257-72

SECRET

17 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Covert Action Staff
ATTENTION: Mr. Jim Anthony

SUBJECT: Completion of Training Report for QRPHONE/1, Training Program "SHAW"

REFERENCE: Memo for Director of Training, From Chief, Covert Action Staff, dated 23 May 1972; Subject: "Covert Training for QRPHONE/1"

1. QRPHONE/1 was trained covertly in New York from 22 June to 14 July 1972. There were sixteen sessions for a total of eighty-seven training hours.

2. This was a happy reunion of trainee and instructor. Less than two years ago, PHONE was given three days of reports training (Please see Completion of Training Report dated 19 October 1970). Just as then, PHONE was totally engrossed in every training session from the moment of his arrival to the moment of his departure. Remembering that the instructor does not eat lunch, PHONE brought a sandwich with him daily and took this lunch while listening to the instructor. Thus, every minute of every day was made to count.

3. The only time lost was three hours for JBMINIMUM and on the several phone calls he had to make daily to check for calls to his cover office, then follow up with calls to those persons who had called his office and had left messages to be called back. At the most, these calls took half an hour. On some days, they took far less.

4. His cover organization work took up a considerable portion, everyday, of his free time with the result that he could not do any casing to speak of for subsequent preparation of commo plans for exercises. For example, told early on to prepare two dead drop commo plans, he was not able to come up with anything till the last week -- and then with only one written one and one that he reviewed orally. As a result he had to be given time during the training day to write reports of his countersurveillance exercises and one of his agent developmental exercises. After one such exercise, asked if he wished to take time out during the training day to write his report he said: "No, tonight I will make time to write it." And he did. And it was a good report.

5. On each Sunday, he went out of town to visit his aged Grandmother. He used the travel time to read tradecraft books (he read seven altogether).

SECRET

On Tuesday, July 4th, his publisher appointed him baby sitter for the publisher's teen age son and there went any hope of getting any casing done that day. At least one time, he mentioned that he did not go to bed till two that morning and as he had left the afternoon before, he had stated that he had meetings starting at four-thirty that afternoon. With all that, he nevertheless was fully alert and attentive every minute of every training session.

6. In his developmental recruitment series of exercises, his instructor played the role of operations officer -- and a real dumb-dumb he was. In such circumstances, PHONE had to do all the thinking, all the planning, all the casing for meeting sites, all the analyzing, all the preparing and pointing for the recruitment. It was pure joy to watch this man, after each meeting and again before the next one, go to work on the problem. He knew where he was, knew where he wanted to go, knew how to get there. When Mr. Rod Sweet, during the critique at the end of the series of exercises said: "He did a beautiful job," PHONE had earned that accolade all by himself. The instructor's only contribution had been in the teaching of the subject of Agent Acquisition.

7. At this point, the instructor wishes to execute a low bow in the direction of Mr. Sweet: He played his agent role excellently well and made the exercise a meaningful one for PHONE. The three trips to New York by Mr. Sweet must have been very taxing, particularly in view of his immediately upcoming TDY trip, but they were efforts well spent.

8. No man, of course, is perfect. Each has an Achilles heel, a weakness, or an all-too-human trait, at the very least. Our PHONE has his. He has a very quick mind. He knows it. And knowing it, he relies on it, counts on it. This, in turn, leads to a small failure in self-discipline. For example, told to write out his plan for the recruitment pitch, he came in with six words (maybe not that many) scratched on a 3 by 5 leaf torn out of his pocket notebook. He then proceeded, from these few words, to run off his plan without a single pause for an uh, hm, er, etc. It was as though he was reading a definition from a dictionary, so smoothly did his mind and thoughts run. He prepares everything in his mind, it appears, and does not like to write out that which he feels he should not have to write out. While it is great to have so facile a mind, a bit of discipline, to write out in full so important an act as a recuitment pitch, might one day save grief when an error would have been spotted had the entire plan been written out then looked over for possible flaws.

9. This small flaw, the instructor feels, accounts in considerable measure for PHONE's failure to bring in a written dead drop plan till the last days of the program. PHONE felt he could just as easily report orally. In fact, the other dead drop (he had been asked to do two) on which he reported orally, he discussed as though the peper was in front of him and he was reading from it. Nothing was missing -- area

description, access, hours of availability, the opposition, pros and cons as to suitability -- it was all there. He just didn't like to write out that upon which he could report orally.

10. In writing reports on the two counter-surveillance exercises, he dashed those off in jig time. No pause for thinking, no pause to look up at the ceiling or out the window. Just straight writing, including paragraphing. Mind and pen were as one. Same thing for his oral analysis before and after each meeting -- no pause to think, to review, to reconstruct, to remember -- just an IBM-type printout.

11. The instructor sets down this reluctance on our hero's part to write out certain things, not to downgrade him, but to alert desk and field officers that if they must have a certain report by a certain time, and they want it in writing, they must be firm. For example, after the second meeting in the developmental series, the instructor said: "I must have that report first thing in the morning. Do you want to take time out from this afternoon's training session to do it?" And, as already reported above, PHONE preferred to save the training time and he answered "I will make time to write it". In this case, time was of the essence because Mr. Sweet had to see the report before the next meeting. To sum up this item: When PHONE feels that an oral report is adequate he finds it a little difficult to bring himself to find time to make a written report. Told definitely that he must write a report and given a deadline, he meets the deadline and the report is everything it should be.

12. His reports on his recruitment meetings, Mr. Sweet said, were excellent. No jumping to conclusions, no padding, no misinterpretations, no omissions.

13. The surveillance team captain, reading PHONE's report on his actions during the countersurveillance exercises, marvelled at the completeness, total accuracy of description of the surveillants PHONE had made, including their ages (but always made each man an inch or two shorter than the actual height -- which PHONE admitted he does constantly), and the total recall of every move, every street crossing, every compass direction. (In the first countersurveillance exercise, sprung on PHONE without a moment's prior notice, he made one of his two surveillants. In the second one, with plenty of time to prepare, he made all three of them. These were two different teams from the New York Office of Security). Concluding his admiration of PHONE's reporting, the surveillance team captain said to the instructor: "You should be very proud of him".

14. In both exercises, the surveillance teams criticized the rapidity of PHONE's movements. He walks very rapidly from place to place, then spends time to browse in a book shop. Then off again at a high rate of speed to his next stop. They also criticized his looking both ways while crossing a one way street. They felt it made him appear

tail conscious. These are a typical New Yorker's habits. The instructor, also a New Yorker, is guilty of the identical actions. We are highly kinetic in our movements and as for looking both ways while crossing a one-way street, we follow the old Marine Corps adage: "There's always one S.O.B. that doesn't get the word". By sheerest coincidence, when the instructor was on his way to the safesite to deliver the surveillance team's report, he violated his own rule of looking both ways in crossing a one-way street and was bowled over by a hippie on a loaded bike -- going the wrong way. Only the large heavy film case the instructor was carrying kept him from being knocked flat.

15. Nevertheless, PHONE is now fully cognizant of the appearance that his actions create and will watch it in the future.

16. One last note on the counter-surveillance exercises: He chose his positions well and he camouflaged his actions beautifully. One example: The instructor called the surveillance team for a quick feedback on the first exercise and caught the men just as they returned to their office. They got on different phones for a three way conversation. They reported one incident as follows: "So rapid were PHONE's movements, that when he met a friend of his, he hardly paused to speak with him, just waved him off". The second surveillant: "No, it didn't look like that at all, to me. To me it looked like this Indian-looking person stopped PHONE and asked him for directions and PHONE gave them and just went about his business". PHONE's own report, which he wrote up before he learned about the two different interpretations of the incident: "--- where I stopped a foreign-looking man, apparently Indian in origin and asked him for the Museum which I knew perfectly well is on 55th Street. I turned around as he pointed south to 55th Street and spotted the same man in the grey suit, now holding his hat in his hand".

17. In the second exercise, there were two items of note: One, the team was surprised to note in PHONE's report that PHONE even had the name of the book that the surveillant picked up when he followed PHONE into a book store. Second, when the exercise was over, the team compared notes and decided that PHONE may have made two of them but could not possibly have made the third man. The team captain, on reading PHONE's report, was stunned to see that PHONE had indeed made the third man also, but good.

18. PHONE had an elicitation exercise (in addition to the developmental acquisition series) with Mr. Harry Webster, an instructor in the New York office. After relating the fine job that PHONE had done, Mr. Webster's report concluded: "A first rate performance by PHONE, who's obviously been around -- both coverwise and for real".

19. His choice of meeting places with his agent could not be faulted. For one, he chose an East Side restaurant (where diplomants, as Mr. Sweet held himself out to be, would properly be seen dining).

Yet it was far enough away from the United Nations building to lessen the chances that PHONE himself and his putative diplomat target would be spotted by friends or acquaintances. His choice for the next meeting was at an impressively named new restaurant near the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts on the West Side of town. This restaurant was located in the safesite complex. He was thus able very smoothly to invite his agent to the safesite from the restaurant for the recruiting pitch.

20. He did very well in executing two recognition meetings and two brush passes. He had no time to write his own commo exercises (as stated, he was able to write up only one dead drop commo plan) so he was given commo plans written up by another trainee. To give him variety, he was alternately the higher and the lower echelon, alternately accepted and made the hand-off.

21. In operational and intel reports, he did very well. He very successfully separated the operational from the intel info and the source comments from the positive intelligence.

22. Instructor's Observation: PHONE is a proud man, both as an individual and as an operator. While he was very discreet about it, very circumspect, he did, nevertheless, let the instructor know that he has, on occasion been handled with something less than pure genius. This, like the previous item, is noted not to down-grade PHONE, but to alert both desk and field officers that this man, being very sure, positive, definite and strong, hopes to be handled in a manner that would have those same words apply.

23. In sum: A very good man.

24. In an effort to evaluate the effectiveness of the training, we would appreciate a detailed evaluation report in July 1973 from the field station. This report should indicate the extent to which the training has made the trainee a more useful and effective asset and should evaluate the performance in each area of tradecraft in which training was conducted; negative as well as positive comments are solicited. The field station's report should also include the trainee's own comments. Please ask the field station to slug the report WOMOLD/QRPHONE/1/SHAW. Upon receipt of the report at Headquarters, please forward a copy to the undersigned.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

CALEB L. BATTEN
DC/OS/ALT/TR

Originated by:
Aristides G. Lazarus

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 10 March 1972

TO:
- [X] CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
- [ ] CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
- [ ] CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: Ann Jane Long, CA/B3

SUBJECT: (true name) Richard Thomas Gibson

PROJECT: QRPHONE

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA, OR ALIASES: QRPHONE/1

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 201-306052

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
X	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		COVERT NAME CHECK
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SPECIFY)*
	CONTRACT TYPE A		CONTRACT TYPE B
	SECURITY AND RELIABILITY DETERMINATION		

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

International

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

See PRQ Part II, page 3, Section VI, 4 and 5.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM? ~~US~~ Identified but subject doubtless suspects ~~KCIA~~	X	
E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. No FBI - All info from them has been received and reviewed.		
F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.		

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? [X] YES [ ] NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE OF CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY: See Memorandum dated 15 February 1966

5. PRQ STATUS

- [X] PRQ I OR BIO DATA IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED — Updated
- [X] PRQ II OR EQUIVALENT WILL BE FORWARDED PRIOR TO EXPIRATION OF POA. 1 COPY — Updated

6. R.I. TRACES-INCLUDING COMINT

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY/SIGNIFICANT ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES-INCLUDING COMINT — previously sent

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY/SIGNIFICANT ATTACHED

*8. FIELD TRACES ** — NA previously sent

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY/SIGNIFICANT ATTACHED

9. CRS/ISG ** — NA

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY/SIGNIFICANT ATTACHED

	SPECIAL CHECK NSA INDICES	10. FI/D **	CS REFS TO FI/D (BR. FILES)

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY/SIGNIFICANT ATTACHED

*LIST AREAS CHECKED | **IF NOT CHECKED - WHY? | [ ] NOT APPLICABLE | [ ] OTHER *(EXPLAIN)*

Comint no additional since last check 1966

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER: Roderick I. Sweet

EXTENSION: 1055

SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF: [signature]

FORM 5-71 772 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

201-306052 (8)

AMENDMENT TO PRQ PART I

Name: Richard Thomas Gibson

DPOB: 13 May 1931 Los Angeles, California

Section II, 12

Present Residence: 32 Hartswood Road
Stanford Brook, London W. 12 (owner)

Section X

Monique Gibson Female Born 1966 U.K. U.S. Citizen

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.
2. Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.
3. Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.
4. Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.
5. Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.

1. CRYPTONYM: QRPHONE/1 formerly QREBONY/1

2. PSEUDONYM:

SECTION I — CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

No change

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM. See previous Part II

Yes To any Case Officer introduced to him by RODIGAST, or Aaron C. LAGINESTRA.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN. See Previous Part II

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA known to Subject as "Mike"
Louise R. CONGREVE " " " " "Louise Chapman"
~~XXXXX~~
Isabelle R. PRIMMI " " " " "Ann"
Howell D. KAMMERMAYER " " " " "Jim"
Marie M. LUEBBERT " " " " "Pat"

SECRET

SECTION II	MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. (Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.") See Previous PRQ Part II

This image of BKTRUST as a powerful, professional organization has been enhanced in QRPHONE/1's case by the circumstances of his agent relationship, which require very professional handling. Indeed Q/1 has probably come to hold a rather glamorous "storybook" image of BKTRUST and of the importance of his contribution to the XXXXX BKTRUST EFFORT. This is a very human trait and should not be exaggerated in his case,

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. (If no control, or if there is a lack of resources control explain.)

QRPHONE/1 is dependent upon a BKTRUST salary and has signed recruitment documents and a security pledge. QRPHONE/1 is not a handling problem and there has never been any instance in which either he or his handler has had occasion to allude to these control factors.

SECTION III	COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Subject and RODIGAST use a journalist/literary agent cover in the unlikely event their clandestine meetings are compromised. Other officers will use cover of both being Americans in a foreign country.

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

Freelancexx jornalist, authors, and as a sympathetic leftist

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE (Will work) (Is working).

BKTRUST

SECTION IV	INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

No change from previous PRQ Part II

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS (Agents, relatives, friends) WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

None

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

See Previous PRQ Part II
Reporting Instruction with emphasis on spotting and assessment reports 14-16 Oct. 197[illegible]

SECTION V	COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

No change

SECRET

14-00000

PRQ PART II

QRPHONE/1

SECTION II Motivation and Control

1. but every one of the wild anti-BKTRUST stories which he heard probably only serves to accentuate the feeling on his part of being a member of a very impressive outfit.

Having accepted BKTRUST employment for a combination of reasons, it must be added that QRPHONE/1 clearly likes his work. He enjoys dealing with international issues and political subjects. He enjoys the travel and the opportunity to exercise his language capability. In short, the rather sophisticated and cosmopolitan life which he has been able to live appeals to him.

QRPHONE/1 was recruited at a time when he was in serious financial straits. BKTRUST has given him a job, paid him reasonably well and regularly, and has enabled him to be independent of his wife's family's charity.

SECRET

SECTION VI	OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

No Change

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

No Change

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Nothing

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES. Subject will operate under free lance journalist cover and as a sympathetic leftist to develop contacts in the target milieu of Afro-Asian radical, pro-commie groups and solicit information from them on their activity, plans and views. Subject will also contact, assess recruit and possibly handle assets in these groups. In pursuit of operational objectives, he may be required to join a radical organization and/or travel to Bloc countries.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

No PM duties or use are anticipated. Selective CA exploitation within his cover situation - i.e. as a provacateur or means to surface anti-Soviet material from a "National Liberation" standpoint - will be continually possible.

SECTION VII	PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

None

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL OF ANOTHER AGENCY OF THIS GOVERNMENT:

SECTION VIII	AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT: I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER; REMUNERATION, IF ANY; AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject has MOA providing for salary of $950.00 per month, (tax free), reimbursement for operational expenses and travel unless these are paid by other sources.

SECRET

SECTION XIII	AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

None known

SECTION XIV	GENERAL

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Subject speaks fluent but foreign-accented French. He has a functional speaking command of Spanish and Italian and can read German. Except for his language, he could pass as an Algerian.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

Research, files,correspondence and assessment by previous case officers

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para. 43b, supra)*

None anticipated

SECTION XV	EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W: WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE: WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

SECTION XVI	MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS

SGSWIRL EXAMINATION OF SUBJECT on 21 September 1970 (no deception reported).

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER
10 March 1972	

SECRET

7 MAR 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Covert Action Staff

SUBJECT: Review of Project QRPHONE

1. A review in some depth of Project QRPHONE was conducted in January 1972 by DC/CA and me with Branch 3 personnel, with the participation of Richard Berkey (now of Branch 4, formerly QRPHONE Case Officer at LCPIPIT). Attached at Tab A are the questions which formed the basis for the review. A full record of the responses to these questions and the review discussion is not practical so I have attempted below to summarize the general conclusions which emerged. Attached at Tab B are two charts prepared by Branch 3 for the review plus a rough draft "CI Assessment" which they also prepared.

2. FI and CA. Excluding FBI Sensitive Reports, QRPHONE dropped from 157 reports in FY 1968 to 6 reports in FY 1971. His FI reports have evidently not been used as a basis for CA activities since 1967. This situation is apparently due to a variety of factors: the character of the man himself, restrictions placed upon him, a changing political context which compounded targetting difficulties, the complications of his own security situation, and the method by which he was handled. It was agreed that QRPHONE does have inherent skills which should have an application to either FI or CA work. He is politically attuned; he writes well; he can handle contacts in several languages; he knows how to move internationally; he has an engaging social personality; he has an established (if controversial) reputation as a left-oriented journalist/writer with some scholastic credentials. The problem remains one of focussing his talents and determining the platform from which he should operate.

3. Mobility. QRPHONE can be viewed as essentially possessing mobility and has expressed a willingness to move. There are, however, qualifications on this. He has small children and an unwitting, anti-US, white, English wife, who would only be willing to leave her England if the overt job to which QRPHONE was going was clearly a step upward in his career.

4. Handling. The method by which QRPHONE has been handled, i.e. mainly through Rodigast (although there has been direct LCPIPIT contact recently), is unnessarily cumbersome and not suited to the close consultation needed to explore QRPHONE's future directions. Having been declared to the British Services the most secure place to meet QRPHONE is in the UK and he should be handled directly by an LCPIPIT officer.

5. Security. QRPHONE cannot escape the record of allegations that he is Agency-connected. What he can do, however, is face-up to these charges, challenge them and deny them. There may thus always be some element of suspicion attached to him, but, as time passes without definite proof of such a connection, its impact on his activities may be minimized and he may be able to engage in effective work inspite of it.

6. Sub-agents. It was felt that QRPHONE may possibly have a flair for recruiting and handling sub-agents. It was believed that this should be explored and that he should be given relevant training, based in New York. This would also provide the opportunity for Headquarters exploration with him of his future development.

7. Future Focus. What QRPHONE's own thoughts might be on his most natural course of development are not clear. He may have an inclination toward African Liberation Movements--the subject of his most recent major writing--but it could be questioned whether on this or on anti-fedayeen work, there is sufficient Agency interest to merit such focus. He has no significant base in the American black community (rather the contrary) which would make him of interest to others on this basis. His overt political orientation is described

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as "radical," but it is an intellectual "radicalism," not revolutionary. Further, he is basically a theoretician not a personal activist by nature. He might be asked and might undertake an activist role--but it is felt that it would not sit naturally upon him and would probably not achieve whatever access might have been postulated. Within his theoretician, non-activist context it was nevertheless felt that the probably-to-be-expanded field of Chinese Communist activities in Europe provided the focus which might most usefully be explored. The expansion of Chinese Communist activities in Europe may come quite slowly but, in view of the probable shortage of assets in this field, it was a matter on which we should have some patience. It is also a field which could be explored without QRPHONE's needing to move. Whether he focusses on this field or another, however, QRPHONE needs to develop some job or organizational base which will make him interesting as a target himself to those we wish to focus him on. At the present time his cover does not provide a power or influence base and he is essentially completely dependent upon us.

8. CA Staff Termination/Redirection Responsibility. It was felt that in this process of redirection of QRPHONE, CA Staff should retain responsibility for QRPHONE. Even if a London-based assignment did not work out and it was decided to move QRPHONE to another area CA Staff should keep the project during the trial period and with this the responsibility for termination if the trial proved unsuccessful. If the trial was successful, on the other hand, then we would have discharged our responsibility for QRPHONE and could relinquish control.

9. Some time has passed since the above discussions took place. I am not aware of the extent to which there may already have been a follow-up to them. Needless to say, they have decided field implications in which LCPIPIT needs to be consulted, should they be pursued.

James E. Knott
Programs Officer
Covert Action Staff

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - ADC/CA
1 - C/CA/B3
1 - CA/B3-Sweet
1 - CA/B4-Berkey
2 - CA/PO

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AGENT EVALUATION

NAME: QRPHONE/1 DATE: 18 January 1971

PROJECT: QRPHONE STATUS: Contract Agent (Under a Memorandum of Oral Agreement)

OVERT JOB DESCRIPTION: International correspondent for "Sunday supplement" type color magazine distributed by twenty major newspapers in the U.S. Also represents owner of this color magazine in other of his business ventures in Europe. This overt job was assumed in December 1970. Prior to that, Q/1 was the London representative of small U.S. news service. Q/1 does free lance journalism and is an occasional contributor to several magazines and newspapers.

COVERT JOB DESCRIPTION: Singleton agent targeted at the radical left, including Maoist, African liberation, and Palestinian groups. Q/1's access derives from his many contacts in these circles.

PERFORMANCE OF COVERT DUTIES: Q/1 continues to perform well and without posing problems for his handler. His personality is easy-going and his attitude positive. If his efforts are not always totally successful -- leaving us with tantalizing bits of information and many unanswered questions -- this is generally due to operational circumstances in which he was simply unable to elicit more information on a given subject.

PERFORMANCE OF OVERT DUTIES: Q/1 does a solid and workmanlike job as a journalist. He has acquitted himself well both as a representative of his cover firm and in his free lance activity. Occasional prompting on this subject produces added effort and in this connection the operation profits particularly from the energy and knowledge of the deep-cover agent handler who himself has faced similar cover demands over many years.

ATTITUDE TOWARD JKLANCE: QRPHONE/1's attitude is positive. (See below under Motivation.)

ATTITUDE TOWARD COVER EMPLOYER: Q/1's attitude is good. He has made an effort to discharge his part of the cover arrangement and to understand the weaknesses and problems which plagued his former cover organization. He is approaching his new cover arrangement with enthusiasm.

MOTIVATION IN ACCEPTING JKLANCE RELATIONSHIP: This is a subject on which a good deal has been said over the course of this operation. The following points can be made on the subject of Q/1's motivation:

A. His basic image of JKLANCE is positive.

B. This image of JKLANCE as a powerful,professional organization has been enhanced in Q/1's case by the circumstances of his agent relationship, which require very professional handling. Indeed Q/1 has probably come to hold a rather glamorous "storybook" image of JKLANCE and of the importance of his contribution to the JKLANCE effort. This is a very human trait and should not be exaggerated in his case, but every one of the wild anti-JKLANCE stories which he heard probably only serves to accentuate the feeling on his part of being a member of a very impressive outfit.

C. In his political evolution over the years, Q/1 has become active in at least two "causes". In both instances he saw these causes undermined by petty jealousy and factional struggles and in both cases he was personally harmed as a result. The product of this situation has been a certain disillusionment with "causes" and a cynical political outlook. (In other circumstances this might be called political maturity.) Q/1 now tends to view political trends as a detached observer rather than a participant.

D. Following on the foregoing thought is the fact that he is an American (and does not consider himself disloyal). Given his citizenship and his disinclination to feel "involved" in the currents of the radical left, he has been perfectly willing to accept employment by JKLANCE to report on those currents. He does not give any indication that he views this as "squealing" on his friends -- indeed the contrary seems to be the case.

E. On a more mundane level, it must be realized that Q/1 was recruited at a time when he was in serious financial straits. He was without a job and was living off the charity of his wife's family. JKLANCE has given him a job, paid him reasonably well and regularly, and has enabled him to be independent of his wife's family's charity.

F. Having accepted JKLANCE employment for a combination of the reasons set forth above, it must be added that Q/1 clearly likes his work. He enjoys dealing with international issues and political subjects. He enjoys the travel and the opportunity to exercise his language capability. In short, the rather sophisticated and cosmopolitan life which he has been able to live appeals to him.

G. In assessing the relative importance of these several factors which make up Q/1's motivation, the undersigned would stress that C and E were probably the immediate causes of his acceptance of recruitment while A and D were more underlying. B and F have arisen since recruitment and probably play an important role in his current motivation.

WIFE'S ATTITUDE TOWARD JKLANCE: Q/1's wife is not witting of his JKLANCE affiliation. She was allowed to believe that he was working indirectly for the Chinese. She certainly is aware of the past JKLANCE accusations which have been leveled at Q/1, but as far as Q/1 can determine (and this is not a subject on which he can come right out and ask a direct question) she continues to accept the Chinese story . It should be added that Mrs. Q/1 is British and is the holder of some rather typical "left" anti-JKLANCE attitudes. It should also be noted that the relationship between the two is fraught with a variety of problems thereby adding to the complexity of the situation. Certainly the whole subject of Q/1's activities is one which Mrs. Q/1 views with misgivings and which is simply not discussed -- lest it lead to acrimony. Mention should also be made that Mrs. Q/1 seems to accept as legitimate the small amount of money received from Q/1's cover and to regard this as a genuine stringer relationship.

RESPONSE TO CASE OFFICER HANDLING: QRPHONE/1 has a very pleasant personality and responds well to Case Officer handling. He is a most willing asset requiring no special handling care -- other than the normal professionalism expected in the handling of a sensitive asset such as Q/1.

WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT INSTRUCTIONS OR GUIDANCE: Q/1 is willing to accept guidance and criticism -- provided it is constructive. If anything, he may sometimes be too willing. His willingness occasionally exceeds his sense of security and it then falls to his handler to bear in mind security and/or operational considerations which may affect his pursuit of a given target. However, this should not be over dramatized.

RESPONSIVENESS: Q/1 is most responsive to requirements levied upon him. In this connection it should be recalled that his ability to respond fully is usually restricted by the nature of his relationship with his informants; i.e., since he is only eliciting the information from unwitting informants he is rarely able to press for all the desired details.

JKLANCE CONTROL: Q/1 is dependent upon a JKLANCE salary and he has signed recruitment documents and a security pledge. We hasten to add that Q/1 is not a handling problem and there has never been any instance in which either he or his handler has had occasion to allude to these control factors.

PERSONAL SECURITY: Q/1 has a good sense of personal security and his handler makes an effort to build upon this at every opportunity. As cited above, Q/1's enthusiasm sometimes leads to his failure to consider all aspects and implications of a given situation.

OTHER SECURITY AND COVER SITUATIONS: The past allegations of Q/1's affiliation with JKLANCE, many pre-dating his actual recruitment, add an extra dimension to Q/1's cover situation. We have no indication that any of these allegations are based on any proof, nor have they produced a significant reduction in his number of contacts.

ABILITY TO WORK WITHOUT SUPERVISION: Q/1 is a self-starter and can work well for extended periods without supervision.

ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS: Q/1 poses only a minimum administrative burden. He is not overly concerned about his administrative and financial position, allowances, payments, etc. He merely expects JKLANCE to do the fair thing by him. However, on the rare occasion when JKLANCE has failed to perform as he expected, he can be very upset.

REPORTING: Q/1 is a journalist by training. He is an effective reporter -- both in terms of ability to elicit and writing style.

PERSONAL ENERGY AND ENDURANCE: Q/1 is quite energetic and can continue his efforts on a sustained basis.

LANGUAGES: In addition to his (native) English, Q/1 can speak French, Italian and German. AND SPANISH

WILLINGNESS TO TRAVEL: Q/1 is quite willing to travel -- and even enjoys it!

AREA KNOWLEDGE: Q/1 is quite widely travelled in Europe and Africa and consequently has acquitted an extensive area knowledge.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL ABILITY: Q/1's present operating context does not provide an adequate basis to evaluate these talents. It is assumed that he has a satisfactory competence in both these areas, however.

WEAKNESSES; PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL: Q/1 has no major weaknesses, either personal or professional which inhibit his operational use. The existence of his "reputation" as a JKLANCE asset -- which is believed by some and rejected by others of his contacts is a definite limitation on his employment.

CAREER POSSIBILITIES: Q/1 has mentioned to his handler that he hopes to be able to make a career of his relationship with JKLANCE. He enjoys the work and presumably the financial security. However,

the combination of the security factors operative in this case and the unlikelihood of Q/1's continued access to targets of interest over a prolonged period argue against his being regarded as a career asset.

AARON C. LAGINESTRA
FIELD CASE OFFICER

COMMENTS OF SUPERVISOR: This is another thoughtful evaluation of this agent, and reflects the views of the agent handler as well as of the Case Officer.

I doubt that we have really divined Q/1's motivations for working with JKLANCE, and this evaluation should be read as the best stab we can make at this enigmatic subject.

I disagree - I think we do know!

ADRIAN B. MASLOTT
CHIEF, LCPIPIT

14-00000

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
Rod Sweet CA/B3		DATE 5 January 1972

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DC/CA/B3		5 Jan	A	- I'm all for the long-range objective cited: attached - An assessment of ... by Andy Hem, re ... potential to become a permissive dialectician, will be of value.
2.				
3. C/CA/B3		6 Jan	D	
4. DC/CA/3		6 Jan	A	
5. Rod S.				3-4 FYI - attached background info on OR Plan alternatives may be useful to you prior our 17 Jan. meeting this subject. DM
6.				- I have been proposed to re-direct ... to ... & then East Africa. - A.
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

5 January 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/CA/B3

SUBJECT : Chicom Aspect of QRPHONE/1's Operational Potential

1. In continuing my efforts to probe operational areas for the redirection of QRPHONE/1, I talked at length on 3 January with his former case officer (Mr. Richard Berkey) and received a very favorable prognosis regarding QRPHONE/1's mobility (i.e. his possible move to another European city or to Africa), his agent recruiting capability (preceded by additional training), and the prospects of making himself attractive to the Chicoms (again preceded by appropriate training).

2. In pursuit of the latter item I talked at length today with Mr. Andrew Ness, the FE Division expert on long-range Chicom and CP penetration programs. I described in detail QRPHONE/1's background, current status, and the variety of plans we have in mind and received Ness' reactions as follows:

A. The butterfly characteristics that QRPHONE has demonstrated thus far will never result in his becoming of interest to either the Chicoms or the Soviets for any operationally meaningful purpose. While the Soviets would perhaps see him as potential FI source, the Chicoms would not even do that.

B. Chicom officers abroad are still totally obsessed with Communist doctrine and its strategic and tactical application to a degree significantly more zealous than their Soviet counterparts. Therefore, in looking at potential foreign assets the Chicoms discard persons of shallow substance as far as their knowledge of Communism is concerned. They are interested in only those who have a serious intellectual understanding of Communist doctrine and a serious revolutionary goal. The thousands of leftists of whatever coloring floating around Europe are seen as only of marginal use to the Chicoms and certainly not the sort that they would take into their confidence.

C. To become of long-term operational use to us in the sense of exploiting his possible long-term use to the Chicoms, QRPHONE/1 should do two things: join an existing "acceptable" organization such as the Trotskyite Party or a black radical party and, at the same time begin a serious study of Marxist/Maoist doctrine. As he gets into this program (preceded by some ten days training and close Headquarters direction) he should begin to seek out Communist intellectuals, party members, leaders of radical groups, etc., to ask questions about the dialectic, seek additional guidance, borrow books and so forth. In doing this he will in time come into the attention of the professional spotters the Chicoms have and begin to develop the sort of bona fides that the Chicoms, in time, will find appealing. He should also in this period seek out Chicom officials with the same requests for help. The key here is to demonstrate not that QRPHONE/1 is simply sympathetic, with Maoism or any other Communist shading but that he is a dedicated serious revolutionary.

D. A quicker way to come into the Chicom spotlight might be for QRPHONE/1 to join the Black Panthers, the SDS or one of the other radical groups with which the Chicoms are already known to be in touch. He will obviously have to sweat out a period of probation in joining any such group until he divests himself of his tattered leftist reputation and those JKLANCE accusations. Ness feels that a successful passing of this baptismal period will depend solely on QRPHONE/1's willingness to plunge wholeheartedly into a serious study of the terribly boring and lengthy volumes of the dialectic. As he demonstrates his capability to move more deeply into this field to the satisfaction of the "spotters" he will be accordingly provided additional help and encouragement by Chicom contacts and officials.

E. The Chicoms will be looking at him as a possible asset in their long-range targetting of the American revolution, hence QRPHONE/1's utterances ought to be couched in terms of his ultimate aim of contributing to and participating in the American revolution. In other words the Chicoms would see little or no use for QRPHONE/1 operationally in Europe or Africa (just as we would assess and recruit a Thai for operations in Thailand, not in Nigeria).

F. Ness felt that should we pursue the above as a long-term operational goal for QRPHONE/1, the city in which this takes place is almost irrelevant. He could do it perhaps as well in an African setting as in Europe and his cover status i.e., with LPWEAKLY, really makes no difference because the Chicoms would test the fiber of the man himself and would not be deterred by his external trappings.

3. In answer to my question, Ness said he would be happy to meet with QRPHONE to assess his potential in this area and then, assuming we all decided to go ahead with such redirection, Ness could train him and guide him thoroughly enough to get him well on the track by spending some seven to ten days with him on a concentrated program.

Roderick I. Sweet
Branch 3
Covert Action Staff

DDP/CA/B3/RISweet:ckj (5 January 1972)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - C/CA/B3
2 - CA/B3

28 DEC 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CA Branch 3

SUBJECT: Review of Project QRPHONE

REFERENCE: My Memorandum, "Review and Planning," dated 23 November 1971

1. As stated in referenced memorandum we are beginning a review in depth of certain CA Staff projects. I propose to meet with you and relevant branch personnel to examine Project QRPHONE on or about 21 January 1972. Please advise me when the necessary preparations have been made for this review and we will fix a mutually convenient time.

2. Prior to our meeting, I request that the two charts of Part A of the attached listing be drawn up and copies sent to me and CA/PO. It is not necessary to prepare written responses to the questions posed in Part B of the attachment. These questions provide the basis for our oral review at the time the meeting is held.

Fred W. Valtin
Acting Chief
Covert Action Staff

CA-71-1369

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Donald W. Muntz
Chief, Branch 3
Covert Action Staff

EXTENSION: 6053

NO.:

DATE: 17 DEC 1971

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/CA		17	AF	7-8 let's discuss DM / FYI.
2.				
3.				
4.				
5. DC/CA		27/12	[illegible]	Hold for
6.				1-5, 7 In discussing with China Ops last week, I asked them to take a joint look with us in terms of possible attractiveness to CPR if, as I assume, they become more aggressive in Europe. Want to talk about this one before my trip.
7. C/CA/B3		27/12	DM	
8. Rod				
9. DC/CA/3				
10. C/CA/3				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

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17 DEC 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, Covert Action Staff

SUBJECT: QRPHONE

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Same Subject, Dated 29 November 1971

1. What follows below are some initial comments of mine on the referent memorandum, per your request. We really feel in Branch 3 that for a variety of reasons, we need more time to deliberate on QRPHONE's future operational activity than the previous two weeks. Partly this is due to extended absence by the case officer in charge who has been plagued with a recurring illness--I believe you are familiar with this. It is also in part attributable to the Section Chief's being new to the position and having his time absorbed by matters of current priority. So if you don't mind, we should like to address ourselves further to this subject following the Christmas holidays. At that time we should like to initiate some meetings on this matter both with yourself and with other area components including representatives from CI Staff.

2. Background: Your memo, of course, was triggered by an earlier one of mine which proposed that QRPHONE become operationally engaged in attempting to establish a black Communist cell in either Paris or Rome. The purpose of this would be twofold--namely, to exacerbate relations thereby between the Soviet Union and mainland China through various low-key covert action undertakings, and in the process to further enhance QRPHONE's own credentials as a Maoist activist. This tentative assignment, it should be noted, arose because Branch 3 personnel had become increasingly aware of the possibility that QRPHONE's project status might be terminated in the not too distant future. While it is true that in the immediate preceding month or so, we have benefited from his intelligence reporting, it is all too clear that over the past two years, he has been of diminishing utility to CA Staff and other area divisions. In discussing his future with his recent case officer, Miss Chatelan, her recommendation was that unless something could be found for him in the near future, we should give serious consideration to terminating

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his services during the coming year. Thus my foregoing proposal arose from a desire on my part not to terminate an asset of proved capabilities without giving the agent in question suitable opportunity to become useful once more.

3. CI Type Review/QRPHONE Personal Security: Your memo makes out there have been frequent security reviews of QRPHONE's security status, and you question the efficacy of our doing still one more. On this let me point out that in making such a security assessment, we would be doing so in response to a current request by the area division concerned whose cooperation we need to direct this agent. One hardly needs stress that such a request probably should be honored in the interests of maintaining good relations even if its fulfillment means redundant work. But apart from this, the case officer also informs me that the case file does not contain any general summary of the alleged security breaches involving QRPHONE and their implications vis-a-vis his activities. It is true however that his security status has been reviewed for each annual project review and that assessments of his security status were made following each alleged breach, but no up-to-date summary exists. As for our own gut feelings on his personal security, one hazards that he is still in pretty good shape. I agree with you that many of the past charges leveled against him are of the same ilk as those leveled against other leftist colleagues(who do not have any Agency association) by their rivals. And as for the structure of his case officer relationship--that is, having him handled by a deep cover officer from an adjacent country--this would appear to be secure in the extreme (so much so that one would advocate that it be dropped due its operational inefficiency.)

4. Location: We tentatively agree that in all likelihood Paris should not be the venue for our proposed operational undertaking due the location of the Wright clan. Rome, however, might do very well. If not Rome, perhaps you or EUR Division might suggest another locale. As for the question as to whether or not the Rome station would want him permanently, only time and his own operational success could determine this. One hazards that if QRPHONE were able to make his way with some good local leftists and had promise of developing some kind of relationship with mainland China representatives, the station might come to regard him as a capital asset.

5. Substance: You noted that QRPHONE . . . "cannot just simply show up and start a leftist nuclei . . ." Why not? Others have. He is a well-known leftist in intellectual circles in Europe and has written many articles in praise of Mao. This should do for a start. As for what he might have to offer local leftists . . . money, energy and ideas will do. A great deal of money, of course, is unneeded, but some is. We can supply it. As for ideas and energy, he has both. Concerning the "built-in jealousy, animosity, etc." which such action would likely engender on the part of local rival leftists, this may or may not occur. But is this such a calamity if it should occur? Are not leftists usually fighting among themselves anyway? In any case, we have nothing to lose by trying to salvage this agent. What we have to lose by not trying is an agent asset of proved worth.

6. Credentials: You say in effect that QRPHONE has not been known as an activist but only as an intellectual. (Frankly, the distinction is not very important in my mind.) Be that as it may, he has written many articles on leftist subjects and has talked to innumerable leftists around Europe over the years. True, he has not been involved in such actions as street demonstrations, but we would not like him to be so personally involved in the future in any case. What we would want him to do is to write pamphlets, informally recruit associates to his group and provide a little money to the group as might be required for various undertakings. Aside from the organizing and funding, actually this is not very different from what he has been doing--except that it will be in one place for a change.

7. Book Dispatch Sale: You may be very correct in saying that shopping him around to European stations by book dispatch is a poor way to solicit useful tasks for QRPHONE. But again, I took my lead from C/EUR/CA who made a request along these lines. Certainly sending book dispatches wouldn't hurt any. If Spence is willing at some future time to visit various field stations and to attempt selling QRPHONE's services personally, we would be happy to have him do so. We, of course, don't know when he will be available to do so, and time is passing.

8. Concluding Comment: I really feel that we should relate to you in some detail the success which Andy Ness once had with the kind of undertaking which we have proposed for QRPHONE. It may interest you. On the other hand, it may be perfectly possible that the situation which Andy Ness once manipulated is not applicable to

the conditions which would confront ORPHONE in say Rome. But if we are not to channel his energies in this direction, it is incumbent upon us to think of something else for him to do before we begin thinking about writing him off. And so when you suggest that . . . "the first order of business is to undertake a basic assessment of the project. . ." I agree. And to this end, we should like a couple of weeks more before coming to you with some general conclusions of ours about the current viability of this case and some future alternative course of action.

Donald W. Muntz
Chief, Branch 3
Covert Action Staff

14-00000

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
Roderick I. Sweet Branch 3 Covert Action Staff	7767	DATE 17 December 1971

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/CA/B3		13/17	D	1-4. Fred has always taken a big interest in this case, and so he will have to be brought into the planning. Rod's of course a good idea — and your analysis of past failures is excellent. Providing AF is for it, we should give it major consideration. Let us not, however, wholly discard the Rome play just yet. Dy
2. DC/CA/3			D	
3. Don			D	
4. Poo S.			[initials]	4 to 3 - Returned per your request
5. Jane Roley				
6.				
7.				
8. Phone 201				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

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17 December 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/CA/B3

SUBJECT: Operational Redirection of QRPHONE/1

1. In response to your request that I examine the QRPHONE/1 project to determine how it might best be redirected in order to gain greater value for the time and money involved, I have talked at some length with appropriate officers in CI/SO and Africa Division. I have been advised that the primary reasons for QRPHONE/1's dwindling productivity are as follows:

A. Key centers of activity of the radical left in Europe are London, Paris, and Stockholm. For different reasons QRPHONE/1's access in these three capitals is either circumscribed or off target. The British have asked that he not operate in London against African targets. His reputation among much ~~target~~ groups of interest to us in Paris and Stockholm has been so tarnished that he has not taken into their confidence significantly enough to be of value.

B. Although he has a multitude of contacts among the left, virtually all are shallow, periodic, and then very brief when they do occur. Even his correspondence to the more important radical leaders, which used to be quite informative, has fallen to almost nothing.

C. Because his contacts are so cursory, he has been unable to develop a close and continuing personal relationship with any one of them in order to develop the intimate confidence so necessary for operational exploitation.

D. His cover has always been thin and thus has circumstantially at least lent credence to the periodic allegations of his being a JKLANCE agent.

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

E. Close case officer direction has been made very difficult because of the echelons existing between QRPHONE/1 and LCPIPIT, coupled with relative infrequency of field case officer meetings.

F. What contacts he has within the African target, for example, are rendered virtually useless because his case officers are unfamiliar on a timely basis with Africa Division requirements and also miss valuable operational leads simply because they do not recognize them. (This is no fault of the case officers because they obviously have little opportunity to keep abreast of such requirements.)

G. The somewhat artificial nature of his trying to portray a pro-Mao stance may help him a bit with targets similarly inclined but renders him ineffective with other political shadings among the left.

2. With all of the above in mind and without belaboring the history of this project, the following recommendation is offered and has been concurred in informally by CI/SO and Africa Division officers with whom I have talked.

A. Accepting the fact that QRPHONE/1's operational utility in Europe is minimal, I propose LCPIPIT be directed to begin making arrangements for his transfer PCS to Africa and, hence, his operational control transferred to Africa Division as soon as feasible.

B. From the point of view of MHCHAOS requirements and Africa Division's own requirements, both elements felt QRPHONE/1 could best be exploited in Tanzania. It is one of the two most active cities in Africa for the radical left, it is a hot-bed of both Soviet and Chicom shenanigans, and it is politically vital to East African stability.

C. However, because of QRPHONE/1's well-known association with two exiled Tanzanian opposition politicians in London and current reports that these oppositionists are plotting the overthrow of President Nyere (perhaps with Soviet assistance), it would be very imprudent for QRPHONE/1 to arrive bag and baggage in Dar es Salaam in the near future. Nyere and his police might well conclude that QRPHONE represents the advance probe of the coup plotters and promptly throw him into jail.

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D. Both to give QRPHONE/1 time to cleanse his tattered image and because there are almost as important operational tasks in West Africa, the idea is to move him (1) to Nigeria or (2) to Ghana for perhaps a year. This is to be done in concert with a suitable strengthening of his cover (i.e. two or three more stringerships) and a concurrent mutation of his political posture to that of a plain old anti-imperialist rather than the more confining pro-Mao stance. He would be run directly by Lagos or Accra Station against local targets but with periodic trips to other parts of Africa for cover as well as operational purposes. Meantime, in the intervening months the dust may settle a bit in Tanzania, the close association with opposition elements would be allowed to fade and QRPHONE/1's writings and pronouncements concerning Tanzania would be calculatedly designed to support the Nyere government.

E. At the appropriate time, a year or so perhaps, he then moves PCS to Tanzania.

3. If you concur with the above, I will procede to staff this out more formally here at Headquarters and to advise LCPIPIT.

Roderick I. Sweet
Branch 3
Covert Action Staff

DDP/CA/B3/RSweet:ckj

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - C/CA/B3
2 - CA/B3

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PROJECT QRPHONE

PART A. CHARTS REQUESTED

Chart I: For the period FY 1967 through FY 1971 provide the number of disseminated reports according to the subject field of the report. The headings would be: Fiscal Year, African Independance Movements, Anti-US Demonstrations, European Maoist Groups (etc., or whatever other subject fields you wish to set up).

Chart II: List the specific events or organizations against which covert action was in fact undertaken and give the number of QRPHONE reports which were submitted on such events/organizations.

PART B. QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What is the basic reason for this being a CA Staff project (other than history)? To provide multi-divisional tasking for FI purposes of general U.S. intelligence interest? To provide CA operational information for possible DDP use?

2. As regards FI reports, which have lately been described as being of only marginal interest, the main criticisms appear to be a lack of depth and detail. CA Staff's counter to this has been that QRPHONE goes as far as he can, and can go no further through elicitation. Have these depth/detail criticisms been valid? Is our defense valid, or could he reasonably be expected to elicit more depth and detail than he does?

3. If he can go no further through elicitation and we wish to keep him on the FI path, what is implied? That he develop and run agents himself? That he actually goes to work for an organization of intelligence interest to us? How realistic would either of these lines of pursuit be?

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for Rod: this rough draft.

Draft.

CI Assessment

1958 Q/1 worked for Agence France Presse - Paris. He was discharged by AFP when Ollie Harrington (American negro) brought forgery charges against him. Q/1 sent to a weekly American publication and to to the British daily The Observer, over the signature of O. Harrington, xx xxx violently anti-French articles which were printed and counld have brought about the expulsion of author. William G. Smith (still in Paris), Richard Wright (deceased) widow still living in Paris and John Flint all took sides with Harrington.

2

30 July 1964. Accusations received from unidentified Americans, members of USA CP reportedly forward to Verges, editor of Revolution, certain documents which established Q/1 was working on behalf of CIA. This was because of fight over money that was due Q/1 and his wife. (Q/1 had his lawyer bring suit against Verges and finally in 1969 Verges agreed to pay certain amount and also an apology. This Q/1 can use to counteract the accusations by Verges.

Fall 1966 FBI Report: Source recently advised that during the Fall 1966, a member of an Italian pro-Chinese Marxist Leninist Organization stated that Subject was suspected of being a spy for CIA. This person reported this to Rene Raindorf a member of the Jacques Grippa Pro Chinese Belgian CP.

June 1967: XXXXX FBI Report: GRIPPA and RAINDORF indicated to a member of an American pro-Chinese Communist organization that they thought highly of Q/1 and that they were of the belief he was doing a good job (in the cause of

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militant Marxism-Leninism).

March 1968: Stockholm. AFTONBLADET - Radical Social Democratic Daily 18 March 1968 published Photo and Biog Data on Q/1 in conjunction with story recent redefection American soldier Ray Jones implying Q/1 responsible in part Jones redefection. Note: Bjorn Kumm, an Aftonbladet journalist who is a friend of Q/1's wrote him a long and unsolicited letter the day following the appearance of the article in which he denounced his paper for libeling Q/1 and gave Q/1 advice on how to proceed to clear his name.

Stockholm. TIDSIGNAL / Radical Weekly - Also published article re Q/1. Bo Hammar editor of TIDSIGNAL is pro- Cuban. and Q/1's loyal to Williams who is anti-Cuban. They oppose Q/1 for his pro-Chinese and anti-Cuban stance.

May 1969: Report from Pretoria 6916 (in 49487) That Q/1 is now suspected widely of being both a CIA agent and a South African Intell contact.

Dec. 1969" Report from FBI: Source stated that he overheard Cleaver accuse Bon Wright from Chicago of being seen in company of Q/1 whom Cleaver characterized as a well known CIA agent. This was at the Algerian Congress - Palestine Dec. 1969.

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Feb. ~~1969~~ 1970 SYNIC: a London publication of leftist orientation, carried an article mentioning Q/1 by name and stating that he is widely believed to be an CIA agent. (Two of the Four persons listed as contributons to SYNIC were at the Algiers Palestine Solidarity Meeting which Q/1 attended in Dec. 1969. They were members of the British delegation representing the Palestine ~~XXX~~ Solidarity Committee (PSC) which was a rival delegation to that led by A. Manchanda in which Q/1 sat. ~~This~~ ~~W~~ Q/1 believes this story was printed in order to discredit the Manchanda-led Palestinian group which is in competition with the PSC.)

8 Feb. 1970: BEIRUT 6963 (IN 262712). Reliable Source reported that during his conversation with Ghassan KANAFANI, latter mentioned Q/1 and accused him of being a CIA agent. (Q/1 believes KANAFANI ~~picked~~ suspicion of Q/1 due to accusatio tions against Q/1 spread in Beirut by Palestinian personalities who were formerly in London and who picked up story as result of accusation leveled against Q/1 in SYNIC.)

QRPHONE REPORTING

	Cuban	AAPSO AAJA	African Liberation	War Crimes Tribunal	Anti-US	European Communism	FBI	FBI SR*	Total Dissems
FY67	3	5	13	27	12	24	22	-	106
FY68	1	3	24	32	27	27	43	30	187
FY69	1	-	12	-	17	10	2	43	85
FY70	-	-	13	-	-	9	-	9	31
FY71	1	-	1	-	1	3	-	31	37
	6	8	63	59	57	73	67	113	446

* Sensitive Reports

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Fred W. Valtin
Deputy Chief
Covert Action Staff

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE 29 Nov 71

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/CA		29	✓	
2.				
3. DC/CA		11/30	✓	2-3 My real question is: Does this fellow really have it? Your comment in the 1st para under "credentials" seems to me about right. Who knows him personally besides Roddy?
4. C/CA			✓	He has it, but not (I think) for what has been proposed. Several of us here and in the field know him well. FD
5. Chief, CA/B-3		12/2	D	Pls. read, return to me. We will discuss answers Don
6. DC/CA/B3			A	
7. Doos				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

29 November 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CA/B-3

SUBJECT: QRPHONE

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Subject: QRPHONE Operations in Europe, Dated 24 November 1971

1. I made some notes in the margin of referent memorandum upon first reading it. However, since these are too brief, I thought it best to let you have my thoughts on this matter in fuller form.

2. As you may know, we had tried for years to give QRPHONE more meaningful assignments, but there are certain facts about him and the operation today which simply cannot be ignored. It seems to me that your memorandum takes inadequate account of these factors.

a. Security: RODIGAST's and QRPHONE's personal security cannot be faulted, in my judgment. However, that has not protected QRPHONE from accusations of being CIA, which have haunted him throughout the years. This is such an endemic charge in the milieu in which he operates that I feel certain he would have had the same charges leveled at him whether or not the Ollie Harrington incident had happened in Paris.

b. Location: Apart from the efficiency of the French police, there are a number of good reasons arguing against the desirability of QRPHONE's even going to Paris for a meeting, let alone being stationed there (e.g., protection of RODIGAST's identity, the Harrington incident, and the location there of the Wright clan). I cannot imagine why he would consider it, or why we should advocate it.

A different cover for a move to Rome might be developed, but not that of a Maoist developing new cells. Rome Station is glad to have him come there and give them "grass roots" reports whenever he visits, but would they want him permanently??

c. Substance: More generally, QRPHONE cannot just simply show up and start forming nuclei -- there are already Maoist nuclei -- the various Marxist-Leninist parties (miniscule though they may be) that existed, and they continue to exist with or without Chinese help. If he were to have something to offer them -- money, preferably -- they might welcome him with open arms. Otherwise he will encounter built-in jealousy, animosity, rivalry, and a source of accusation all over again.

d. Credentials: As a Maoist intellectual (or an intellectual Maoist??), QRPHONE can travel all over. As a Maoist activist, he has only minimal credentials. The only group he is actively involved with is Manchanda's insignificant group -- and even with that he has never carried a placard, and I doubt if he has even helped them with making up a placard. He has helped them with their press releases, leaflets, etc. In short, with the written word, not the deed. By nature -- which we must also take into consideration -- QRPHONE is no longer a "doer" -- if he ever was one. And I doubt very much that he can at this stage in his life become a "doing" radical. We would be misusing his natural talents, which could still serve us well, in favor of dubious undertaking.

In effect, the proposal (if I read it correctly) is to have QRPHONE develop a group which would serve to distribute anti-Soviet material. I cannot judge if that would be worth the cost ($40,000??) to Rome, but I doubt it. I also do not know enough about the "Andy Ness" operation to comment on that aspect, particularly as to its feasibility in a sophisticated European community.

e. Book Dispatch Sale: Shopping him around to the European Stations is the wrong approach, in my judgment. In the first place, any Station likely to have a use for him is already extremely well up on QRPHONE's background. There are only three Stations really

heavily involved in anti-CP ops (in which field I suppose this would fall), and those three have former CI/ICG men who know QRPHONE well: Breckenridge, Hornstein and Friend. QRPHONE has talents and abilities and weaknesses which can best be explained/sold in person, not through dispatch. I think, that the way to do it, if at all, is by Spence during a visit to these Stations.

f. "CI-Type" Review: A review of the file will show how often this has been done, and how thoroughly. (I can understand Horvath asking for a security review -- he had no background knowledge of the operation that would have given him this information.) I do not know what you now expect to find. In all frankness, and unless CI Staff feels the need for yet another review and is willing to undertake it, I would consider a Staff-internal review pretty much a waste of time.

3. Having gone around this problem several times in the past several years with CI Staff and the pertinent area divisions (as the files will clearly show), I am most doubtful that any of them will consider QRPHONE of sufficient interest (current or potential) to pay what it costs to maintain him. We may be able to justify it since we attempt (as no one area division would) -- and to some extent succeed -- to target him on a multi-divisional basis. In light of these considerations, and since I have developed serious reservations on the long range viability of this operation (in terms of the cost-effectiveness factor), I believe that the first order of business is to undertake a basic assessment of the project. After some internal discussions, this will also, of course, entail consultations with the CI Staff and at least three area divisions.

4. I will appreciate receiving your comments by mid-December.

Fred W. Valtin
Deputy Chief
Covert Action Staff

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee

24 November 1971

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

SUBJECT: QRPHONE Operations in Europe

1. Mr. Leo Horvath, EUR/CA, and myself briefly discussed prospective QRPHONE operations on 8 November. During the discussion I outlined to him a general proposal which had been bruited about during my recent TDY at LCPIPIT in mid-October. In substance, this proposal was that following QRPHONE's forthcoming trips through Scandinavia and Africa, he then repair to either Rome or Paris for an extended period of time. In either of these locations he would then attempt to identify and to enlist the cooperation of various unwitting contacts in the left sector of the student and youth population, who could assume in time the trappings of a Maoist study group. QRPHONE would have excellent cover for doing so inasmuch as he is an established writer of the Maoist stripe. His relationship with these contacts or followers would not be set in the routine JKLANCE operational context. Rather, he would guide and motivate such contacts as would an alleged covert representative of a Maoist group, and would claim to have been a member of a larger such group say, in Britain. He would, of course, imply to his followers that he is attempting to develop a similar nucleus in (France) (Italy) or whenever, as good Communists should.

2. Operational activity would be of a twofold nature. First, exploitation of the prospective group of Maoists would follow along lines of a typical black Communist cell, emulating the kind of notional movement which Mr. Andy Ness developed in the Middle East some seven or eight years ago. Hopefully, these unwitting followers, in turn, would each recruit two or three other sympathizers who over time could distribute anti-Soviet literature and perform other low-key CA operations, as directed by the Station, and which could be attributed to the PRC. Presumably their actions would result in some local embarrassment to the USSR and the PCI. Second, QRPHONE, himself, would no doubt enhance his own Maoist credentials-- already strong--to the point where he might well become

Is this really still true?

of focal interest to the PRC. This could lead to invitations to Peking (as it did in Ness's case) and possibly an FI operation of consequence vis-a-vis the China target.

3. The efficacy of the aforementioned scheme seemed to pose some doubts to Mr. Horvath. On the one hand, he did not feel that either Rome or Paris Stations had sufficient case officer strength on hand to direct and support a tricky operation of this type which might have only marginal utility, in their view. As for Paris, the French police, being as efficient as they are, would probably come upon QRPHONE's "black net" in time, and could conceivably pose security problems for him. As an alternative, Mr. Horvath proposed that CA Staff write a general dispatch to all EUR Stations describing the asset and indicating that the Staff would like to see greater use made of QRPHONE's capabilities on the Continent. The dispatch should ask the Stations to comment on the service that QRPHONE might provide them and suggest the means for accomplishing it. Mr. Horvath also asked that, prior to forwarding the dispatch, a security review be conducted of this case. He did comment that, if the security review indicated no severe compromises of QRPHONE's cover or personal security, it would be a pity not to make greater use of this agent's notable contacts in the European leftist community.

4. Accordingly, I agreed with Mr. Horvath's two recommendations; namely, to conduct a security review of the case and, subsequently, to forward a blanket dispatch to the Field, if appropriate. I mentioned that we would still like to raise the possibility of a black operation in Paris and Rome in that dispatch and to this, Mr. Horvath posed no objections.

Donald W. Muntz
Chief, Branch 3
Covert Action Staff

Addendum: Following the above conversation, Miss Jane Long has initiated a CI type of review of the Subject's security status.

DDP/CA/B3/DMuntz:lb

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ACTION NO. 436

S E C R E T 231613Z JUN 71 CITE LCPIPIT 21251 23 JUN IN 363995

BERN INFO DIRECTOR LONDON

RYBAT DTDORIC QRPHONE

REFS: A. OEPA-3285

B. LCPIPIT 20673 (IN 344001)

1. DATES OF QRPHONE/1 VISIT TO SWITZERLAND CHANGED. Q/1 WILL NOW VISIT GENEVA 27 JUNE TO 4 JULY.

2. FILE: 200-124-156/3, AND 201-306052.

GP-1

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ACTION NO. 081

S E C R E T 271644Z MAY 71 CITE LCPIPIT 20673

BERN INFO DIRECTOR LONDON

27 MAY IN 344001

RYBAT DTDORIC QRPHONE

REF: OEPA-3285

1. PER REF AND MASLOTT CONVERSATION WITH BACHMAN, QRPHONE/1 RECEIVED VISA TO VISIT SWITZERLAND 10-17 JUNE TO COVER EXHIBITION OF BLACK AMERICAN ART BEING HELD AT RATH MUSEUM IN GENEVA.

2. QRPHONE/1 INSTRUCTED LIMIT SELF TO JOURNALISTIC PURSUITS DURING SWISS STAY.

3. FILE: 200-124-156/3 AND 201-306052.

GP-1

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27 May 71

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4. The charge is made that QRPHONE is too thinly spread and there is a recurring urge that his targetting be better focussed. Can he in fact be better focussed on a multi-divisional basis or would focussing, in practice, result in his being narrowed down to a primarily divisional target?

5. Granting that the CIA label is somewhat indiscriminately used for character assassination in the conspiratorial fringe in which QRPHONE has been operating, isn't he in fact stuck with this label and in view of the international character of this conspiratorial fringe, won't it turn up wherever he goes? In this milieu is there really much chance he will be given any significant information (and not deception information) by anyone who will do so because he wants the information passed to CIA?

6. When he was looked into in April 1968 by a Chicom official, what do we suppose to be meant by the officials finding that it was not clear if he was completely reliable in a Marxist-Lenist sense?

7. How eagerly sought-after are travelers to China now-a-days? What is the forecast as to demand for such travelers by next summer?

8. With a reportedly anti-US, white, British wife and 3 small children, how really mobile is QRPHONE in a PCS sense? If we should move QRPHONE and family to a new location for a trial period and it didn't work out, wouldn't resettling him have considerable complications?

9. In how many languages does QRPHONE have verbal and written fluency?

10. What are the current clearance limitations upon our use of QRPHONE?

11. One gathers from the project renewals that QRPHONE's CIA status is known to MI-5, MI-6 and Scotland Yard. A French service penetration (UNDERBID/39) indicated

that Rodigast was under some suspicion. QRPHONE has been refused entrance at the border by the Swiss authorities. Does anyone doubt that in view of the groups and individuals he contacts on his travels he has a dossier in each of these countries? Does anyone doubt that in many of these dossiers the alleged CIA connection is recorded? In view of this, isn't it a fact that probably the safest place for him to be contacted is London, in spite of whatever tradecraft he and Rodigast may practice? In spite of a rapport and background knowledge elements which he undoubtedly benefits from with Rodigast, are these factors worth the extra handling complications? Doesn't this handling method essentially double the cost of the operation?

12. What were the reasons for the break with "Fair Play for Cuba?" the break with Verges? Does QRPHONE have a power base at all among American negroes (SNCC doesn't like him and it is recorded in the renewals that blacks and revolutionaries sense that he is not "sincere")?

13. Can't we determine right here at Headquarters the degree of interest in the Italian branch in having a rather low-level propaganda operation involving anti-Soviet propaganda ostensibly emanating from pro-Chicom sources? Now that the PRC has decided to go "legit," what is our best estimate as to the likelihood that they will lose interest in previous and current pro-Chicom fringe groups?

14. Other than on the above, if we asked QRPHONE to become involved in depth with one of the groups he is in touch with, wouldn't he have to act "more Royalist than the King," and wouldn't he be the first to come under suspicion in case action against the group pointed to a leak?

15. If he could not take covert action himself through such a group to what extent are we now or potentially likely to become involved with covert action by other groups against:

- anti-Vietnam action
- African liberation movements
- New Left groups
- pro-Chicom groups
- Fedayeen groups

16. What are QRPHONE's real talents? Why hasn't he been able to do more about establishing himself on a more self-sustaining basis? Is it because of the targets we keep pushing him on? What is meant by these allusions to QRPHONE's "work discipline?" Do his talents possibly point toward some covert action use in a role where the CIA label is relatively less important?

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T/[redacted]

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: COS, London

INFO.: C/LCPIPIT

FROM: Chief, AF via Chief, EUR

MICROFILMED MAR 31 1971 DOC. MICRO

SUBJECT: JAGUAR Reporting on African Expatriates in London

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: a. OBLW-25,380 (26 Feb 70)

b. OELA-53,167 (24 Dec 70)

c. DIRECTOR 063010 (27 Aug 70)

d. OEPA 3090 (18 Jan 70)

1. For over a year ZIBET personnel have sought to stimulate more SMORANGE reporting on the activities of certain high level African expatriates in London. Up to now the results have been meager and discouraging, and in addition JAGUAR gained JKLANCE's agreement that QRPHONE/1 should desist from pursuing these London targets.

2. Perhaps stemming from the recent visit of SMOVID to Headquarters, however, we have just received an informative and useful report, prepared by JAGUAR, on Osumba L a n g i, the principal radical Kenyan expatriate in London, along with promises of other studies on targets mentioned during the Headquarters discussions. This is possibly a hopeful note for the future.

3. Prior to this development, JKLANCE had received only one report from JAGUAR in response to various appeals and the submission of requirements. That report, received in December 1970 was in response to Headquarters-supplied requirements forwarded the previous February (and resubmitted in August 1970), but contained very little positive information. Furthermore, the report's format and tone suggested that JAGUAR's reply was intended as a one-time affair. It certainly did not invite further questions nor indicate an intention to volunteer further details later.

4. In reviewing the correspondence on this matter, it was noted that the verbatim minutes of February 1970 Headquarters discussions with SMENCB and SMUMBRAGE contained a passage that may cast new light on JAGUAR's position. In response to ZIBET officers' queries about what JKLANCB could expect from JAGUAR (it previously having been made clear by the SMOTH officers that the target was JAGUAR's), the visiting SMOTH officers said of JAGUAR's position: "They have a quite serious

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(40)

DISPATCH 30 Mar 71

constitutional problem with their responsibilities to IDEN. The idea of passing out political information on exiles is repulsive to him." It should be noted for the record that JAGUAR itself has not given such an explanation to JKLANCE, but, knowing JAGUAR's bureaucratic position and its traditionally conservative role in the SMORANGE community, it may be that JAGUAR in fact is thus inhibited.

5. As to QRPHONE/1, SMOVID on 15 June 1970 followed up his March 1970 complaints to JADWIN about QRPHONE/1's contacts with expatriates in London. SMOVID expressed JAGUAR's concern about QRPHONE/1's security and its view that QRPHONE/1's information was of marginal value. SMOVID, emphasizing that he was expressing a view personally endorsed by SMUPSILON, outlined three possible options: withdraw QRPHONE/1 from the country; stop running and tasking QRPHONE/1 as an agent; or have JAGUAR take over the running of QRPHONE/1. (QRPHONE/1 subsequently was instructed to stop pursuing his SMORANGE targets.)

6. Thus JKLANCE is stymied. The question is whether there is anything that can be done to improve the situation. The one new factor in the equation that possibly could be used to reopen the discussion with a view to ameliorating the situation is the fact that there now is a different IDEN than when the February 1970 SMOTH explanation was offered. Even though JAGUAR has not specifically given that explanation, to JKLANCE, the Station, without reference to SMOTH's explanation presumably could elect to reopen the discussion in terms of a possible change of atmosphere since the change of IDEN. Such a discussion at least should give an indication of whether SMOTH's explanation is JAGUAR's (and JKLANCE's) major obstacle.

7. Were QRPHONE/1 permitted to resume his London contacts he could obtain some information of the type JKLANCE would like to get from JAGUAR. But, in view of the June 1970 SMUPSILON-approved SMOVID demarche to JADWIN, it might be unwise, for the moment at least, to sound out JAGUAR about reactivating QRPHONE/1. We would appreciate receiving London Station's views on this subject.

8. One final point that should be noted is that McGRILLEN, in forwarding the above-mentioned JAGUAR report on 24 December 1970, mentioned that visiting ZIBET officer Jeremy R. FREYMARK recently had discussed these JKLANCE requirements in London with SMOVID, SMENDIVE and SMEVICT and that it was McGRILLEN's understanding that "it was generally agreed to limit our requests in the future to selected targets on which there is evidence of coup plotting or subversion." McGRILLEN added that he looked forward to any followup questions based on the above criteria that Headquarters wanted the Station to submit to JAGUAR. FREYMARK's recollection of his talks with JAGUAR is at slight variance with McGRILLEN's account. FREYMARK recalls that he had agreed to limit JKLANCE's future requests to those cases in which JKLANCE had an active interest and where there was good reason to suspect a real threat to the stability of the African country against which the London-based African might be acting. Accordingly, there is attached a select list of individuals about whose contacts and activities JKLANCE would like to have updated information from JAGUAR. The type of information we desire is indicated by the illustrative questions and other data in support of our request. Whereas we would like to have unsolicited and regular reporting on these targets, we realize that JAGUAR is not equipped or prepared to accept such a continuing requirement. We believe that the attached list along with the paragraph five discussion pegged to a change of IDENS are good pegs for GIBSON or his designee in reopening the discussion with JAGUAR.

9. London Station's report on the outcome of its discussions with JAGUAR is awaited with considerable interest.

RICHARD I. FELS

Attachment:
As stated above

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS London (Att. herewith)
1 - C/LCPIPIT (Att. herewith)

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- 306052

14-00000

ATTACHMENT TO DISPATCH NO. OLLA-26059

ZIBET would appreciate receiving from JAGUAR any current material on the activities and contacts of the following Africans who either reside in London or who visit there frequently. These targets have been selected according to the criteria outlined in paragraph 8 of the referenced dispatch.

Ghana

William B E D O E-A N S A H - Sensitive Headquarters' sources have indicated that John K. T E T T E G A H is planning to return to West Africa. Since B E D O E-A N S A H is known to maintain contact with T E T T E G A H and was in fact responsible for T E T T E G A H's employment with a Japanese business firm in Cairo, we feel he may be involved in any new subversive moves undertaken by T E T T E G A H.

Kojo B O T S I O - There has been some indication through sensitive sources that B O T S I O has recently been travelling in Africa and that he too may be involved in T E T T E G A H's current activities.

(In addition we are still interested in the other targets mentioned in Reference C.)

Nigeria

L. B A L O G U N - He is the purported author of the recently published Manifesto of Nigerian Young Revolutionaires Organization.

Alex C H I N A - He is an Ibo resident in London who is not only a self-described Marxist but is also a regular contributor to Advance the organ of the Marxist Nigerian Trade Union Confederation.

Sam I K O K U - Although I K O K U is the Commissioner for Economic Development and Reconstruction of the Nigerian East Central State and is resident in Europe, we understand that he occasionally visits London. We would appreciate being alerted to these visits and receiving information on his London contacts.

ATTACH TO OELW 26059

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/R~~YBAT~~

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: ~~OELW-26059~~

IDEN: The Home Secretary

MAR 1 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

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201- 306052

FORM 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/R~~YBAT~~

CONTINUED

PAGE NO

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WOLIME

INFO.: Chief, EUR; COS, London

FROM: Chief, LCPIPIT/London

SUBJECT: RYBAT/DTDORIC/QRPHONE/MHPROBE/British Residence Status

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. QRPHONE/1 has received a letter from the Home Office which removes the previous restrictions on his stay in Britain. There is now no limit on the length of his stay in Britain and he does not need to report his address, etc., to the police. Further, he may now obtain employment in Great Britain without the need to obtain official permission.

2. For the record, we are forwarding under separate cover, a copy of the letter.

MICROFILMED
MAR 30 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Attachment: USC Letter

S/C ATTD BY RID
Dated 30 MAR 71

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - Chief, WOLIME, w/att.
1 - COS, London, w/att.
1 - Chief, EUR, w/o att.

1 ATT

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
200-124-156/2	OEPA-3221	18 March 1971
	CLASSIFICATION: RYBAT S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-306052

GRACIOUS, EUROPEAN-BORN LADY in mid-60s, of independent means, residing in Berkeley, seeks gentleman companion, scholar, writer, artist, with progressive political interests and desire to share tomorrow. NYR, Box 3511.

WOMAN, 50, Manhattan resident, 5'2" attractive, articulate, seeks male companion to share interests and experiences. Loves politics, music, time at home and cooking. NYR, Box 3507.

FEMALE UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR, 27, marooned in Ottawa seeks unattached, intelligent man, 25-35, who appreciates food, music, travel and the outdoors. PO Box 4445, Station E, Ottawa.

CREATIVE, petite woman, in search of sensitive mature unattached man 55-60, whose poignant longing is for more than just hello-goodby. NYR, Box 3501.

UNIVERSITY TEACHER, Denver area, 37, wishes to meet interesting and warm woman. All letters answered. NYR, Box 3495.

ATTRACTIVE, INTELLIGENT LADY, stable, responsive personality, sense of humor, seeks gentleman companion with similar attributes, prefers successful professional who enjoys home and country living. Minimum age, 45. NYR, Box 3494.

I AM 36, beautiful, intelligent, accomplished, strong, wise, modest. I have much love to give vital, expansive, solvent, rich adult male seeking mate. NYR, Box 3493.

SUCCESSFUL WRITER IN LATE FIFTIES, tall, attractive, amusing, seeks quasi-Platonic relationship with mature, sensitive woman interested in wearing rubber. Montreal area. NYR, Box 3500.

MODERN, IRONIC PENELOPE, tired of waiting for wandering Odysseus seeks eligible suitors who are tall, over 40, and who have intellect, imagination, and integrity. No need to fear, Odysseus, unless you are a male chauvinist pig and answer all advertisements placed by females. NYR, Box 3491.

REPUTEDLY CHARMING MAN, turning youthful 60, Southwestern Connecticut cliff dweller, writer-communicator of many interests, considering modest early retirement, seeks committed relationship with intelli-

BERKSHIRES: 1½ beautifully wooded acres, 175 foot paved road frontage, 500 feet brook frontage. PO Box 98, South Egremont, Mass. 01258.

WILL EXCHANGE 2 bedroom Manhattan apt. (E. 41st) and car for similar accomodations in London during May and June. NYR, Box 3488.

PUTNAM COUNTY, year-round rental, charming country cottage, two rooms, fireplace, all facilities. Sixty miles from NYC, suitable for single person or weekend couple. $125 per month plus utilities. (914) 225-8086 or write NYR, Box 3487.

RENT. Cliffside Cottage, Barbados, Sleeps four, secluded beach, maid service. Will meet arrival. $135. weekly. NYR, Box 3430.

LONDON, BARNES AREA, separate furnished flat in Edwardian house. Livingroom, bedroom, kitchen, bath, central heating, maid service, linens, dishwasher. Private garden faces common and lovely babbling brook. Near transport, shops and Thames. 20 minutes Hyde Park. $300 per month to June, $350. per month through September. Write Langdale, 21 Cedars Rd., London S.W. 13, England, Phone, London, 878-0963.

FRANCE: ROYAN. Furnished four bedroom house. Near beaches, Language Center. April-July, Sept.-July $145 month including all utilities. Johnson, 16 Rue des Orchidees, Paris (13e).

UNUSUAL LOFT, beautifully designed and furnished. Safe, quiet, convenient. Spacious, Sky-light. $300/month. (212) 962-1054.

COMMODIOUS VACATION HOME, secluded village location nr Manchester, Vt., May-Jun-Jul, $350/mo. Sheedy, 1 Schoolhse. La., Syosset, N.Y. 11791.

VILLA SALE/RENTAL. Completely modern. Classic style. Galilea Mallorca. Near Palma/Mediterranean. Fully equipped large pool grounds five bedrooms furnished. Ideal year round use/investment. Write illustrated brochure: 160 East 70 Street. New York, 10021.

VILLA RENTAL. Galilea Mallorca. Modernized 18th century stone house. Four bedrooms, terraces pool. Write illustrated bro-

LONDON—light, airey four bedroom family home of American correspondent, large garden, all conveniences, completely furnished, close to Thames, Underground and bus, 25 minutes to Picadilly, from 23 July to 5 September for $600, all utilities included. Write Mrs. Joy Gibson, 32 Hartswood Road, London, W12 9NA or phone 01-749-0546.

PIERMONT, NEW YORK. June 1 to Oct. 1. Artistic tastefully furnished house. Terraced garden. Every convenience. Overlooking Hudson. 15 miles from City. $1,500. (914) EL 9-0077.

MARTHA'S VINEYARD. 2 bedroom cottage. Oak Bluffs. Memorial Day to Labor Day. $1000 or by month. NYR, Box 3477 or (212) 254-7127 after 8 p.m.

MAINE rental (Mt. Desert Island): 3 bedroom furnished farmhouse on cove. Swimming, barns, separate study. Rent month or season. Call 413-584-1550.

EAST HAMPTON house available to share with teacher-writer couple. Private bedroom. Near beaches. Car needed. 691-7697, 790-4613, Wa 4-9465.

ETC.

RATIONALISTIC, non-occult astrology. Natal chart interpreted, $15. Give place, date exact time of birth. Sag/Aries, Box 51, RD 3, Hudson, NY 12534.

POETRY WANTED for cooperative poetry anthology. Include stamped return envelope. Idlewild Press, 1807 East Olympic Blvd., Los Angeles, California 90021.

STAINED GLASS STUDIO authentically recreating small parts of 11th-16th century windows. Colorful, decorative. Herbs, animals, Medieval scenes. Available window hanging, shelf standing. We use technique, material of Medieval craft. Color catalog, 25c. Glass Masters, Box 272R, New York, N.Y. 10009.

COUNTERACT! If you were reluctant to support Friends of Art at your local museum, join ENEMIES OF ART. $1.00. ENEMIES OF ART, Box 5615, Milwaukee, Wis. 53211.

WILL BUY participation in Broadway or Off Broadway plays. Those running, past shows. Give full details. NYR, Box 3485.

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SECRET

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2P

HOME OFFICE
Princeton House, 271 High Holborn, LONDON W.C.1
Telex: 261867 Telegrams: Alidep, London WC1
Telephone: 01-405 4321

Please address any reply to
THE UNDER SECRETARY
OF STATE
and quote: P.E.O
Your reference:

- 9 MAR 1971

Sir/Madam

I am directed by the Secretary of State to inform you that he is now prepared to remove the restrictions on your stay in this country. The conditions attached to it have therefore been cancelled.

Cancellation of conditions means that you are now also exempt from the requirement to report changes of address and other particulars to the police.

There is now no necessity for you to obtain permission from a government Department to take employment in Great Britain. The Secretary of State would, moreover, have no objection if you wished to establish yourself in business or a profession, but it should be clearly understood that this does not relieve you of the obligation, in that event, to conform to any regulations governing the business or professional activities in which you may be interested.

This cancellation of your conditions does not extend to the Channel Islands which have their own laws relating to aliens. You should therefore consult the Immigration

SECRET

Authorities of the island concerned if at any time you contemplate going there to live.

This cancellation of conditions extends to Northern Ireland and the Isle of Man only as far as residence is concerned. If you are going to take work in either place, you will have to consult the Northern Ireland Ministry of Health and Social Services or the Employment Division, Government Office, Isle of Man.

Your passport and police registration certificate have been endorsed and are returned herewith. The endorsement in the registration certificate shows that you are now exempt from registration.

I am Sir/Madam
Your obedient Servant

Also enclosed:

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING; X NO INDEXING REQUIRED; ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING; MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WOLIME

INFO.: Chief, EUR; COS, London

FROM: Chief, LCPIPIT/London

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/QRPHONE - Agent Evaluation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached is an Agent Evaluation for QRPHONE/1 covering the period to 31 December 1970.

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Attachment: H/W
Agent Evaluation

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - Chief, WOLIME, w/att.
1 - Chief, EUR, w/o att.
1 - COS, London, w/o att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
200-124-156/3	OEPT-1289	19 January 1971
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-306052

JAN 21 1971

file

AGENT EVALUATION

NAME: QRPHONE/1

DATE: 18 January 1971

PROJECT: QRPHONE

STATUS: Contract Agent (Under a Memorandum of Oral Agreement)

OVERT JOB DESCRIPTION: International correspondent for "Sunday supplement" type color magazine distributed by twenty major newspapers in the U.S. Also represents owner of this color magazine in other of his business ventures in Europe. This overt job was assumed in December 1970. Prior to that, Q/1 was the London representative of small U.S. news service. Q/1 does free lance journalism and is an occasional contributor to several magazines and newspapers.

COVERT JOB DESCRIPTION: Singleton agent targeted at the radical left, including Maoist, African liberation, and Palestinian groups. Q/1's access derives from his many contacts in these circles.

PERFORMANCE OF COVERT DUTIES: Q/1 continues to perform well and without posing problems for his handler. His personality is easy-going and his attitude positive. If his efforts are not always totally successful -- leaving us with tantalizing bits of information and many unanswered questions -- this is generally due to operational circumstances in which he was simply unable to elicit more information on a given subject.

PERFORMANCE OF OVERT DUTIES: Q/1 does a solid and workmanlike job as a journalist. He has acquitted himself well both as a representative of his cover firm and in his free lance activity. Occasional prompting on this subject produces added effort and in this connection the operation profits particularly from the energy and knowledge of the deep-cover agent handler who himself has faced similar cover demands over many years.

ATTITUDE TOWARD JKLANCE: QRPHONE/1's attitude is positive. (See below under Motivation.)

ATTITUDE TOWARD COVER EMPLOYER: Q/1's attitude is good. He has made an effort to discharge his part of the cover arrangement and to understand the weaknesses and problems which plagued his former cover organization. He is approaching his new cover arrangement with enthusiasm.

MOTIVATION IN ACCEPTING JKLANCE RELATIONSHIP: This is a subject on which a good deal has been said over the course of this operation. The following points can be made on the subject of Q/1's motivation:

A. His basic image of JKLANCE is positive.

B. This image of JKLANCE as a powerful, professional organization has been enhanced in Q/1's case by the circumstances of his agent relationship, which require very professional handling. Indeed Q/1 has probably come to hold a rather glamorous "storybook" image of JKLANCE and of the importance of his contribution to the JKLANCE effort. This is a very human trait and should not be exaggerated in his case, but every one of the wild anti-JKLANCE stories which he heard probably only serves to accentuate the feeling on his part of being a member of a very impressive outfit.

C. In his political evolution over the years, Q/1 has become active in at least two "causes". In both instances he saw these causes undermined by petty jealousy and factional struggles and in both cases he was personally harmed as a result. The product of this situation has been a certain disillusionment with "causes" and a cynical political outlook. (In other circumstances this might be called political maturity.) Q/1 now tends to view political trends as a detached observer rather than a participant.

D. Following on the foregoing thought is the fact that he is an American (and does not consider himself disloyal). Given his citizenship and his disinclination to feel "involved" in the currents of the radical left, he has been perfectly willing to accept employment by JKLANCE to report on those currents. He does not give any indication that he views this as "squealing" on his friends -- indeed the contrary seems to be the case.

E. On a more mundane level, it must be realized that Q/1 was recruited at a time when he was in serious financial straits. He was without a job and was living off the charity of his wife's family. JKLANCE has given him a job, paid him reasonably well and regularly, and has enabled him to be independent of his wife's family's charity.

F. Having accepted JKLANCE employment for a combination of the reasons set forth above, it must be added that Q/1 clearly likes his work. He enjoys dealing with international issues and political subjects. He enjoys the travel and the opportunity to exercise his language capability. In short, the rather sophisticated and cosmopolitan life which he has been able to live appeals to him.

G. In assessing the relative importance of these several factors which make up Q/1's motivation, the undersigned would stress that C and E were probably the immediate causes of his acceptance of recruitment while A and D were more underlying. B and F have arisen since recruitment and probably play an important role in his current motivation.

WIFE'S ATTITUDE TOWARD JKLANCE: Q/1's wife is not witting of his JKLANCE affiliation. She was allowed to believe that he was working indirectly for the Chinese. She certainly is aware of the past JKLANCE accusations which have been leveled at Q/1, but as far as Q/1 can determine (and this is not a subject on which he can come right out and ask a direct question) she continues to accept the Chinese story. It should be added that Mrs. Q/1 is British and is the holder of some rather typical "left" anti-JKLANCE attitudes. It should also be noted that the relationship between the two is fraught with a variety of problems thereby adding to the complexity of the situation. Certainly the whole subject of Q/1's activities is one which Mrs. Q/1 views with misgivings and which is simply not discussed -- lest it lead to acrimony. Mention should also be made that Mrs. Q/1 seems to accept as legitimate the small amount of money received from Q/1's cover and to regard this as a genuine stringer relationship.

RESPONSE TO CASE OFFICER HANDLING: QRPHONE/1 has a very pleasant personality and responds well to Case Officer handling. He is a most willing asset requiring no special handling care -- other than the normal professionalism expected in the handling of a sensitive asset such as Q/1.

WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT INSTRUCTIONS OR GUIDANCE: Q/1 is willing to accept guidance and criticism -- provided it is constructive. If anything, he may sometimes be too willing. His willingness occasionally exceeds his sense of security and it then falls to his handler to bear in mind security and/or operational considerations which may affect his pursuit of a given target. However, this should not be over dramatized.

RESPONSIVENESS: Q/1 is most responsive to requirements levied upon him. In this connection it should be recalled that his ability to respond fully is usually restricted by the nature of his relationship with his informants; i.e., since he is only eliciting the information from unwitting informants he is rarely able to press for all the desired details.

JKLANCE CONTROL: Q/1 is dependent upon a JKLANCE salary and he has signed recruitment documents and a security pledge. We hasten to add that Q/1 is not a handling problem and there has never been any instance in which either he or his handler has had occasion to allude to these control factors.

PERSONAL SECURITY: Q/1 has a good sense of personal security and his handler makes an effort to build upon this at every opportunity. As cited above, Q/1's enthusiasm sometimes leads to his failure to consider all aspects and implications of a given situation.

OTHER SECURITY AND COVER SITUATIONS: The past allegations of Q/1's affiliation with JKLANCE, many pre-dating his actual recruitment, add an extra dimension to Q/1's cover situation. We have no indication that any of these allegations are based on any proof, nor have they produced a significant reduction in his number of contacts.

ABILITY TO WORK WITHOUT SUPERVISION: Q/1 is a self-starter and can work well for extended periods without supervision.

ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS: Q/1 poses only a minimum administrative burden. He is not overly concerned about his administrative and financial position, allowances, payments, etc. He merely expects JKLANCE to do the fair thing by him. However, on the rare occasion when JKLANCE has failed to perform as he expected, he can be very upset.

REPORTING: Q/1 is a journalist by training. He is an effective reporter -- both in terms of ability to elicit and writing style.

PERSONAL ENERGY AND ENDURANCE: Q/1 is quite energetic and can continue his efforts on a sustained basis.

LANGUAGES: In addition to his (native) English, Q/1 can speak French, Italian and German.

WILLINGNESS TO TRAVEL: Q/1 is quite willing to travel -- and even enjoys it!

AREA KNOWLEDGE: Q/1 is quite widely travelled in Europe and Africa and consequently has acquitted an extensive area knowledge.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL ABILITY: Q/1's present operating context does not provide an adequate basis to evaluate these talents. It is assumed that he has a satisfactory competence in both these areas, however.

WEAKNESSES; PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL: Q/1 has no major weaknesses, either personal or professional which inhibit his operational use. The existence of his "reputation" as a JKLANCE asset -- which is believed by some and rejected by others of his contacts is a definite limitation on his employment.

CAREER POSSIBILITIES: Q/1 has mentioned to his handler that he hopes to be able to make a career of his relationship with JKLANCE. He enjoys the work and presumably the financial security. However,

the combination of the security factors operative in this case and the unlikelihood of Q/1's continued access to targets of interest over a prolonged period argue against his being regarded as a career asset.

Aaron C Laginestra

AARON C. LAGINESTRA
FIELD CASE OFFICER

COMMENTS OF SUPERVISOR: This is another thoughtful evaluation of this agent, and reflects the views of the agent handler as well as of the Case Officer.

I doubt that we have really divined Q/1's motivations for working with JKLANCE, and this evaluation should be read as the best stab we can make at this enigmatic subject.

ADRIAN B. MASLOTT
CHIEF, LCPIPIT

SECRET

SECRET

19 October 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, Covert Action Staff

ATTENTION: Miss Diane Chatelan

SUBJECT: Completion of Training Report for QRPHONE/1 (P), Training Alias: PERSHING

REFERENCE: Memorandum for Director of Training dated 28 September 1970, Attention: Chief, Covert Training/CS/TR, Subject: Covert Training for QRPHONE/1, From: Deputy Chief, Covert Action Staff

1. QRPHONE/1 was trained covertly in New York on 14, 15, 16 October 1970. There were twelve hours of training in the three sessions.

2. In accordance with the reference training request and discussions between the instructor and the two Case Officers, QRPHONE/1 was given a concentrated dosage of reporting instruction with emphasis on spotting and assessment reports.

3. QRPHONE/1 is a professional writer, so there was no problem in the writing department. The need was for channelling the writing capabilities of this man who has been an Agent for five years, into our type of reporting and to end his "stream of consciousness" style of reporting, as one Case Officer put it.

4. QRPHONE/1 quite quickly got into the spirit of the training and by the end of the first session was obviously enjoying it and appreciating the opportunity to learn to write our way. He pointed out that his big problem is having to retain substantial amounts of information in his head for two or three weeks, then put it all down the night before he meets his Case Officer. From his conversation, it appeared that organizing a report had never occurred to him before and he several times said "no one ever told me about this", "this is the first I've learned of this, etc." These things were said in happiness at having discovered ways of improving his reporting and simultaneously making his reporting less of a chore and more of a joy.

If true, this is a sad reflection on C/O; [illegible] to [illegible]

SECRET

5. In organizing a report exercise, he did extremely well. In exercises separating fact from inference, he did only fairly well, considering his background and compared to trainees with no where near his experience or education. He has a slight tendency toward jumping to conclusions and reading meanings into words. He realized this and from then on he overcame this weakness to a considerable degree. However, even on the last day, writing reports based on New York Times newspaper articles, he twice (out of five reports) substituted his own word for a word in the article for no valid reason and which new word in fact changed the meaning of the sentence, though only slightly.

6. This small weakness is not unique to QRPHONE/1. It is also true of other equally highly literate trainees, who, like QRPHONE/1, unconsciously substitute their own language for that which has been directly given to them, not realizing that they thereby sometimes change the meaning of that which they are reporting. Happily, QRPHONE/1 realized this during the exercises, recognized the changed meaning, and earnestly stated that he will watch it in the future.

7. In observation and description exercises, he did well after a rocky start. Here, he at first concentrated on individuals, almost completely ignoring the actions they were engaged in. He soon saw that he has a mental capacity to watch both at once and there was no problem thereafter.

8. He was excellent in his ability to separate hard facts and put those in the body of his reports while listing as comments those items which legitimately were comments and which had no place in the report itself.

9. For the final session, he had been asked to do assessment reports on two people. He was mortified when he came in on the last morning, happily handed in his five intel reports and suddenly realized that he had completely forgotten to do the other reports. However, in discussing spotting and assessment reports, it appears that he now understands them.

10. In an effort to evaluate the effectiveness of the training, we would appreciate a detailed evaluation report in November 1971 from the field station. This report should indicate the extent to which the training has made the trainee a more useful and effective asset and should evaluate the performance in each area of tradecraft in which training was conducted; negative as well as positive comments are solicited. The field station's report should also include the trainee's own comments. Please ask the field station to slug the report WOMOLD/QRPHONE/1/PERSHING. Upon receipt of the report at Headquarters, please forward a copy to the undersigned.

Caleb L. Batten
Caleb L. Batten
DC/OS/ALT/TR

Originated by:
Aristides G. Lazarus

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) QRPHONE/1

FROM: CI/OA

EXTENSION:

NO.:

DATE: 12 OCTOBER 1970

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CA/CF 3-D-0002			✓	
2. ATTN- GLORIA BENNETT			✓	
3. TUBE EW-7				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
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14.				
15.				

GLORIA -

I WILL CALL YOU ON THIS BY MID-AFTERNOON, BUT AM SENDING THIS ADVANCE COPY SO THAT YOU WILL HAVE THE BASIC INFO IF DIANE CALLS BEFORE I DO.

THE TRAINING MEMO WILL BE CARRIED ON TO THE DDP/TRAINING OFFICER THIS AFTERNOON.

CAL BATTEN, CHIEF, COVERT TRAINING WILL BE BRIEFED ORALLY (BY ME) AS TO CI/OA'S RESERVATIONS AS EXPRESSED IN THE STIPULATION ATTACHED TO THE POA AMENDMENT.

DICK RUPPNER

YOU WILL NOTE THAT THIS IS AN AMENDMENT TO THE POA AND NOT THE OA WHICH DIANE IS INTERESTED IN OBTAINING.

THE OA, I BELIEVE, WILL HAVE TO AWAIT FURTHER DISCUSSION BETWEEN DIANE AND CI/OA.

[initials]

201-file

12 OCT 70

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE	12 October 1970
CASE NO. 201-	306052

SET UP FOR POA	EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES / DATE
SET UP FOR OA	SPECIAL INQUIRY	COVERT NAME CHECK	ORSD / AREA:

USE

ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST GREEN LIST
✓ AMEND ~~ISSUE~~ PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM: SECURITY OFFICE / DIVISION
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE: ATTACHMENT / PRQ I	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED (No notice to Division)	REVIEW AT CI/OA: FBI REPORT / LCFLUTTER REPORT
CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION (Reason checked below,* or see remarks)	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE. ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
REQUEST RI TRACES	FILE
REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	TICKLE
REQUEST FIELD TRACES	NOTICE: FIRST / SECOND / FINAL
REQUEST: PRQ I / PRQ II	ORSD NOTICE TO DIVISION

ADVANCE COPY

POA EXPIRED ____________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

*FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

CA/CF - D. L. CHATELAN

Subj's POA is amended [illegible], only to include the covert training outlined in paragraphs 2 and 3 of CA's 20 Sept 1970 memorandum for the Director of Training and with the stipulation that any information revealed to Subj during the training will not be of such a sensitive nature that its later revelation by the Subj to anyone, particularly anyone inimical to the US and/or the Agency, would represent a loss.

SIGNATURE [signature]

FORM 9-65 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(21)

14-00000

SECRET
SENSITIVE

28 SEP 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

ATTENTION: Chief, Covert Training/OS/TR

SUBJECT: Covert Training for QRPHONE/1

1. This is to confirm telephone conversation between Mr. Caleb L. Batton and Miss Diane L. Chatelan, Chief, Counter Front Branch, requesting covert training for subject contract agent.

2. We would like to have this training begin 14 October 1970, and can make the agent available full time for three days only. We are planning to have the training take place in New York City, and Mr. Lasarus has already indicated orally to Miss Chatelan that he will be available.

3. Our main objective is to provide QRPHONE/1 with a firm understanding of what is required for good intelligence reporting and also the skills needed for spotting and assessments. QRPHONE/1 has been an Agent for over five years and has absorbed a good deal of tradecraft in the process. He has not, however, had any formally organized training.

4. We would like to have QRPHONE/1's outside case officer (handler) present during this training.

5. Subject and his operational background represent a highly sensitive area and we would appreciate the selection of a training site with this in mind. Biographic background as needed by your instructor will be provided by Chief, CA/CF with whom all further arrangements for this training should be made.

FRED W. VALTIN
Deputy Chief
Covert Action Staff

CA-70-933

QRPHONE/1
306052

SECRET SENSITIVE

DDP/CA/CF/DLChatelan:djr (25 September 1970)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - DDP/TQRO
1 - DC/CA
1 - CA/CRU (Dummy)
2 - CA/CF

SECRET

TO : ID/1 23 September 1970

FROM : Interrogation Research Division

SUBJECT: Richard Thomas GIBSON IRD# 54454
201-306052

BACKGROUND:

Subject is a 39-year-old, married, male U.S. citizen who has been utilized by this organization since 1966 as a covert action asset. He was granted a POA on 23 May 1966. His previous polygraph examination was on 13 June 1965.

PROCEDURE:

On 21 September 1970, Subject was interrogated and given a polygraph examination in a Commodore Hotel suite in New York City which was used as a covert site. Subject's interrogation and examination were conducted in the English language.

PURPOSE:

The examination was requested through Miss Diana Chatelin of the CA Staff. ADDP approval was granted for the examination. The examination was conducted in order to determine if Subject had revealed his covert relationship with this organization, whether or not Subject had been approached by any other intelligence organization seeking his cooperation, whether or not Subject was maintaining a secret relationship with any other organization, whether or not Subject was deliberately withholding any contacts which he has developed from this organization, and whether or not Subject is currently subject to blackmail or other direct forms of coercion.

201-306052

SECRET

23 Sept 70

SECRET

IRD# 54454
Page 2

CONCLUSION:

Subject's polygraph examination did not contain any indication of deception to any of the above listed specific areas of inquiry.

Lawrence J. Howe

Distribution:
Orig. - True, Coleman, Gaynor
1 - Coleman
1 - CI/OA
1 - File

OS/IRD:LJH:ydc

SECRET

→ WARNING—ALTERATION, ADDITION OR MUTILATION OF ENTRIES IS PROHIBITED. ANY UNOFFICIAL CHANGE WILL RENDER THIS PASSPORT INVALID.

NAME: RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON	
BIRTH DATE: MAY 13, 1931	BIRTHPLACE: CALIFORNIA, U.S.A.
HEIGHT: 5 FEET 10 INCHES	HAIR: BLACK / EYES: BLACK
WIFE: X X X	ISSUE DATE: NOV. 10, 1969
MINORS: X X X	EXPIRATION DATE: NOV. 9, 1974
	Richard Gibson — SIGNATURE OF BEARER

→ IMPORTANT: THIS PASSPORT IS NOT VALID UNTIL SIGNED BY THE BEARER.



PHOTOGRAPH ATTACHED
PASSPORT SERVICE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

[illegible] NEW YORK, N. Y. 271
SEP 20 1970

201-306052

14-00000

Visas

IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PASSPORT BEARER TO OBTAIN NECESSARY VISAS

IMMIGRATION OFFICER (200) EMBARKED 12 NOV 1969 LONDON AIRPORT

-2 DEC 1969

IMMIGRATION 13 NOV 1969 LONDON AIRPORT

Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom longer than 11.2.70

Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom 15. .70

IMMIGRATION OFFICER (700) -6 DEC 1969 LONDON AIRPORT

IMMIGRATION OFFICER (297) EMBARKED 25 DEC 1969 LONDON AIRPORT

6

LUCHTHAVEN 12 XI 1969 BRUXELLES NATIONAL

LUCHTHAVEN BRUSSEL - NATIONAAL -2 XII 1969 AEROPORT BRUXELLES - NATIONAL

LUCHTHAVEN 11 II 1970

GRENSBEWAKING NEDERLAND -4 DEC 1969 SCHIPHOL

31 DEC 1969 FRANCE

Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom longer/later than 15.2.70

IMMIGRATION OFFICER (220) EMBARKED 11 FEB 1970 LONDON AIRPORT

IMMIGRATION OFFICER (819) 31 DEC 1969 LONDON AIRPORT

7

-6 IV 1970

Visas

Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom longer/later than ONE MONTH

26 FEB 1970

IMMIGRATION OFFICER

10 FEB 1970

LONDON AIRPORT

Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom longer/later than ONE MONTH

CAIRO AIRPORT PASSPORTS

٢٨ فبراير ١٩٧٠

Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom longer/later than 15 - 2 - 71

IMMIGRATION OFFICER

1 SEP 1970

MAR 1970

20 SEP 1970

LONDON A.

8

THE CONSULATE GENERAL OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC LONDON

Entry Visa No......501.........

Type of Visa.........Tourist.........

Date...10.....2.......70.........

Good for.....One.......journeys of...One Month...duration from date of arrival. The validity of this Visa is for ...3.....Months......from date of issue provided passport remains valid.

Fee received....500 mms....

B. El ...

Consul General

UAR

9

14-00000

-6 IV 1970

Visas

Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom longer/later than ONE MONTH

(047) EMBARKED 26 FEB 1970 LONDON AIRPORT

IMMIGRATION OFFICER 13 FEB 1970 LONDON AIRPORT

Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom longer/later than ONE MONTH

CAIRO AIRPORT PASSPORTS

٢٨ فبراير ١٩٧٠

RESIDENCE VISA

Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom longer/later than 15/2/71

IMMIGRATION OFFICER CAIRO 1 SEP 1970

MAR 1970

IMMIGRATION OFFICER (80) EMBARKED 20 SEP 1970 LONDON A

8

THE CONSULATE GENERAL OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC LONDON

Visas

Entry Visa No. 501
Type of Visa Tourist
Date 20/2/70
Good for One journeys of One Month duration from date of arrival. The validity of this Visa is for 3 Month from date of issue provided passport remains valid.
Fee received 500 Mils

B. El ...
Consul General

UAR

9

14-00000

Visas

The conditions attached to the grant of leave to land is hereby varied so as to require departure from the United Kingdom not later than 15th Feb. 1971

for Under Secretary of State
Home Office.
Date 12 MAR 1970

The holder is hereby required to register at once with the police.

for Under Secretary of State
Home Office.
Date 12 MAR 1970

Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom longer than
15th February 1971

IMMIGRATION OFFICER (232) EMBARKED 6 APR 1970

Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom longer than 15/2/71

IMMIGRATION OFFICER (216) EMBARKED 11 MAY 1970 LONDON AIRPORT

IMMIGRATION OFFICER (752) 12 APR 1970 LONDON AIRPORT

26 JUL 1970 Harwich Harbour

10

Visas

GRATIS مجانا

Valid for several journeys

سفارة المملكة الاردنية الهاشمية — لندن
Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan — London
Consular Section القسم القنصلي

Ordinary Visa	تاشيرة عادية
Transit Visa	تاشيرة مرور
Serial No. 42	الرقم المتسلسل
Valid Till	صالحة لغاية
Provided the passport is so long valid	ما دام الجواز معمولا به
Date	التاريخ
The Consul	القنصل

CONSULAR — JORDAN EMB. ASSY. — LONDON

دخول

11

14-00000

12

Visas

Visas

السفارة اللبنانية في لندن

Ambassade du Liban à Londres

No. 1004 رقم

Visa Séjour سمة

موافقة خارجية رقم

Autorisation A.E.O. du

Motifs أسباب الدخول

صالحة لغاية

Utilisable jusqu'au 24 Août 1970

N. de Voyages عدد السفرات

Londres, le 24 FEB 1970 لندن في

S. EL KHOURY

PERCU
Piastres Libanaises
[illegible]
Monnaie Locale
[illegible]

Visa holder must not take up Employment in Lebanon

لا يحق للحائز على هذه السمة العمل على الاراضي اللبنانية

AMBASSADE DU LIBAN * LONDRES *

13

SECRET/RYBAT

FBI info concerning Richard Gibson

1

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 11

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED

INDEX: YES NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY 35 PER CA FILE RID RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT C/CA 3

FILE, VR DDP, ADDP, C/EUR, C/CI/SO, C/CCS

ACTION NO. 951

SECRET 121600Z AUG 70 CITE LCPIPIT 3737 (THOHURST ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO LONDON

12 AUG 70 141393

RYBAT DTDORIC QRPHONE

REF: DIRECTOR 057975

1. IN VIEW REF WE INCLINED ASK QRPHONE/1 MAKE OFT-POSTPONED VISIT TO U.S. IN SEPTEMBER AT WHICH TIME HE COULD FULFILL SGSWIRL REQUIREMENT AND ALSO MEET PERSONALLY WITH PRESIDENT OF LPWEAKLY TO FIRM UP DETAILS OF NEW CIER. MID-EAST TRIP WOULD BE POSTPONED UNTIL AFTER U.S. VISIT.

2. WILL DISCUSS WITH RODIGAST WEEK OF 17 AUG AND ADVISE RE DATES, DETAILS, ETC.

3. FILE: 200-124-156/3. GP-1

SECRET

K WILL SEC UPON REQ.

Q-201

cc Q/Cover.

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 9

ORIG: DIANE L. CHATELAN
UNIT: C/CA/CF
EXT: 1959
DATE: 27 February 1970

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 48/103 PER CA # 1

INDEX / NO INDEX / RETURN TO ______ BRANCH / FILE RID / FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/CA3 INFO FILE. VR. DDP, ADDP, C/EUR, C/CI/SO,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 03 00 10Z MAR 70 CITE DIRECTOR 013859

TO LCPIPIT INFO LONDON

RYBAT DTDORIC QRPHONE

REFS: A. LCPIPIT 9405 (IN 031696)

B. LCPIPIT 9348 (IN 029903)

~~1. IF YOU BELIEVE PROJECT CEILING FY 70 CAN BEAR COST, SEE NO PROBLEM RE A TRIP. NOTE HIS OPS EXPENSES AND OBLIGATIONS END JAN TOTAL $7,800. TO THIS MUST ADD $800 RECENT PAY AND TAX INCREASES, LEAVING ONLY SOME $2,500 ALL OPS TRAVEL REMAINDER FY 70 (UNLESS THIS SUM FURTHER OBLIGATED).~~

1. [illegible] VIEW REF B ACCESS POSSIBILITY, REQUEST TRIP BE DELAYED ADDITIONAL FEW WEEKS IN ORDER PERMIT Q/1 FOLLOW-UP ON ISSA CONTACT AND SERVICE RELATED DETAILED REQUIREMENTS (FORTHCOMING SOON) AFTER HIS EXTENDED ABSENCE MIDDLE EAST. SUGGEST HE BE GIVEN GREENLIGHT FOR TRIP MID-MAY, SUBJECT TO URGENT LEADS THAT MIGHT MEANWHILE EMERGE FROM TRIP OR ISSA/PHOMBEAH/STANDARD.

File: Q/201
CC: Q/Kaamboza

2. RE PARA 2 REF A, AGREE SUBJECT TRIP NOT BE OPERATIONAL.

(continued)

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

 3 Mar 70 COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

PER ______ # ______ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET PAGE 2 CITE DIRECTOR 013859

ER, REQUEST Q/1 ALLOCATE TIME FOR DEBRIEFINGS/ANALYSIS

A/PHOMBEAH POSSIBILITIES BY ZIBET OFFICER WITH CONGREVE

NEW. ALSO THERE STILL IS STANDING REQUIREMENT FOR

RL, WHICH CAN POSSIBLY BE ACCOMPLISHED SAME TIME. UNLESS YOU

OBJECTIONS, SUGGEST Q/1 BE PREPARED SPEND WEEK IN NEW YORK

HESE MEETINGS.

SINCE CONGREVE HAS MET Q/1 AND ANTICIPATES NO PROBLEMS

VISE ABOVE, NO NEED RODIGAST PRESENCE UNLESS HE TAKING

LEAVE SAME TIME.

FILE: 200-124-156/3. GP-1

END OF MESSAGE

CA/B&F [signature]

CI/OA [signature]

CI/SO [signature]

EUR/BC [signature]

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/CA [signature] RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DC/CA [signature] AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.









14-00000

Photos of office
at
35 Long Acre, W.C.2

201-306053













14-00000

Photos of office
at
35 Long Acre, W.C.2

201-306053







14-00000

PHONE 201

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WOLIME

INFO.: COS, London; C/EUR

FROM: Chief, LCPIPIT London

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/Operational
~~QRPHONE/Verges~~

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

For the record we are forwarding, u/s/c, a copy of the letter to QRPHONE/1 from his Paris lawyer which outlines the status of QRPHONE/1's action against Jacques Verges. As Headquarters will recall this letter was used by QRPHONE/1 to good advantage in connection with his recent trip to Algiers. The letter says, in effect, that Verges has proposed a settlement of the matter and has agreed to pay this settlement in Algerian dinars. Needless to say, QRPHONE/1 has yet to receive payment. Nevertheless QRPHONE/1's purposes are well served by this attestation of Verges' expressed willingness to pay, with its implied admission of guilt!

ACL

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Attachment: u/s/c
QRPHONE/1 - Verges Letter

S/C ATT'D BY ...D'SD
Dated 9 mar 70

Distribution:
3 - C/WOLIME w/att
1 - COS, London w/o att
1 - C/EUR w/o att

1 ATT

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPA - 2425	26 February 1970
	CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-306052 ~~201-306-352~~ 200-124-136/3

S. SCHWARTZENBERG
AVOCAT A LA COUR
29, FAUBOURG MONTMARTRE
PARIS-IXe
TÉL. : TAITBOUT 63-10
OU 824 63-10
SUR RENDEZ-VOUS

PARIS, LE 19 DECEMBRE 1969

AFF. GIBSON C/VERGES -

Monsieur GIBSON
32, Hartswood Road
Stamford Brook
LONDON W.12 -
(Grande Bretagne)

Chor Monsieur,

Je vous confirme l'entretien téléphonique que nous avons eu au sujet de votre affaire.

A de nombreuses reprises, Maître VERGES a proposé de régler votre affaire et notamment le 1er juillet 1967 ~~et~~ il a proposé - ce que j'ai accepté immédiatement - de vous régler ainsi qu'à votre femme , en dinars, lors de votre premier voyage en Algérie, une somme équivalente à la moitié de vos demandes respectives.

J'ai vu dans le cadre de nos pourparlers, la proposition manuscrite de Maître VERGES, dont les termes sont assez fidèlement reproduits ci-dessus.

A plusieurs reprises, Maître CAIN m'a confirmé l'accord de Maître VERGES pour régler sur ces bases ; toutefois ces derniers mois, il m'a fait savoir qu'il ne l'avait pas revu depuis un certain temps.

Pour vous permettre de discuter utilement avec Maître VERGES, si vous le rencontrez, je vous rappelle le montant des deux demandes :

1°) pour vous-même : salaire : 4.500 Fr -
préavis : 9.000 Fr -
congés payés : 1.500 Fr -

Il est demandé en outre un certificat de travail, des fiches de paye et la régularisation de votre situation à l'égard de la Sécurité Sociale.

S/C ATT. 1 to OEPA-02425 CS COPY 201-306052

14-00000

.....

Je pense que vous abandonnez ces trois derniers postes qui n'ont aucun intérêt pour vous, je crois.

2°) pour votre épouse : salaire : 4.500 fr
préavis : 4.500 fr
congés payés: 1.500 fr .

Il est en outre demandé des fiches de paye et la régularisation à l'égard de la Sécurité Sociale. Ces deux derniers postes me semblent sans intérêt, comme pour vous-même.

Je pense donc que vous pourriez demander à Me VERGES de remplir les engagements qu'il a pris à votre égard, savoir paiement de la somme de 12.750 fr français convertis en dinars.

Merci de me tenir au courant.

Veuillez, je vous prie, transmettre mes amitiés à votre épouse.

J'espère avoir le plaisir de votre visite lors de votre retour en Angleterre.

Je vous prie de croire, cher Monsieur, à l'expression de mes sentiments dévoués.

201-306052

14-00000

S. SCHWARTZENBERG
AVOCAT A LA COUR
59, FAUBOURG MONTMARTRE
PARIS-IX°
TÉL. : TAITBOUT 63-10
OU 824 63-10

PARIS, LE 19 DECEMBRE 1969

SUR RENDEZ-VOUS

AFF. GIBSON C/VERGES -

Monsieur GIBSON
32, Hartswood Road
Stamford Brook
LONDON W.12 -
(Grande Bretagne)

Cher Monsieur,

Je vous confirme l'entretien téléphonique que nous avons eu au sujet de votre affaire.

A de nombreuses reprises, Maître VERGES a proposé de régler votre affaire et notamment le 1er juillet 1967 ~~xx~~ il a proposé - ce que j'ai accepté immédiatement - de vous régler ainsi qu'à votre femme , en dinars, lors de votre premier voyage en Algérie, une somme équivalente à la moitié de vos demandes respectives.

J'ai vu dans le cadre de nos pourparlers, la proposition manuscrite de Maître VERGES, dont les termes sont assez fidèlement reproduits ci-dessus.

A plusieurs reprises, Maître CAIN m'a confirmé l'accord de Maître VERGES pour régler sur ces bases ; toutefois ces derniers mois, il m'a fait savoir qu'il ne l'avait pas revu depuis un certain temps.

Pour vous permettre de discuter utilement avec Maître VERGES, si vous le rencontrez, je vous rappelle le montant des deux demandes :

1°) pour vous-même : salaire : 4.500 Fr -
préavis : 9.000 Fr -
congés payés : 1.500 Fr -

Il est demandé en outre un certificat de travail, des fiches de paye et la régularisation de votre situation à l'égard de la Sécurité Sociale.

....

Je pense que vous abandonnez ces trois derniers postes qui n'ont aucun intérêt pour vous, je crois.

2°) pour votre épouse : salaire : 4.500 Fr
préavis : 4.500 Fr
congés payés: 1.500 Fr .

Il est en outre demandé des fiches de paye et la régularisation à l'égard de la Sécurité Sociale. Ces deux derniers postes me semblent sans intérêt, comme pour vous-même.

Je pense donc que vous pourriez demander à Me VERGES de remplir les engagements qu'il a pris à votre égard, savoir paiement de la somme de 12.750 Fr français convertis en dinars.

Merci de me tenir au courant.

Veuillez, je vous prie, transmettre mes amitiés à votre épouse.

J'espère avoir le plaisir de votre visite lors de votre retour en Angleterre.

Je vous prie de croire, cher Monsieur, à l'expression de mes sentiments dévoués.

14-00000

Rod: this rough draft.

Draft.

CI assessment

1958 Q/1 worked for Agence France Presse - Paris. He was discharged by AFP when Ollie Harrington (American negro) brought forgery charges against him. Q/1 sent to a weekly American publication and to to the British daily The Observer, over the signature of O. Harrington, xx xxx violently anti-French articles which were printed and could have brought about the expulsion of author. William G. Smith (still in Paris), Richard Wright (deceased) widow still living in Paris and John Flint all took sides with Harrington.

2

30 July 1964. Accusations received from unidentified Americans, members of USA CP reportedly forward to Verges, editor of Revolution, certain documents which established Q/1 was working on behalf of CIA. This was because of fight over money that was due Q/1 and his wife. (Q/1 had his lawyer bring suit against Verges and finally in 1969 Verges agreed to pay certain amount and also an apology. This Q/1 can use to counteract the accusations by Verges.

Fall 1966 FBI Report: Source recently advised that during the Fall 1966, a member of an Italian pro-Chinese Marxist Leninist Organization stated that Subject was suspected of being a spy for CIA. This person reported this to Rene Raindorf a member of the Jacques Grippa Pro Chinese Belgian CP.

June 1967: XXXXX FBI Report: GRIPPA and RAINDORF indicated to a member of an American pro-Chinese Communist orgenization that they thought highly of Q/1 and that they were of the belief he was doing a good job (in the cause of

militant Marxism-Leninism).

March 1968: Stockholm. AFTONBLADET - Radical Social Democratic Daily 18 March 1968 published Photo and Biog Data on Q/1 in conjunction with story recent redefection American soldier Ray Jones implying Q/1 responsible in part Jones redefection.

Note: Bjorn Kumm, an Aftonbladet journalist who is a friend of Q/1's wrote him a long and unsolicited letter the day following the appearance of the article in which he denounced his paper for libeling Q/1 and gave Q/1 advice on how to proceed to clear his name.

Stockholm. TIDSIGNAL / Radical Weekly - Also published article re Q/1.

Bo Hammar editor of TIDSIGNAl is pro- Cuban. and Q/1 loyal to Williams who is anti-Cuban. They oppose Q/1 for his pro-Chinese and anti-Cuban stance.

May 1969: Report from Pretoria 6916 (in 49487) That Q/1 is now suspected widely of being both a CIA agent and a South African Intell contact.

Dec. 1969" Report from FBI: Source stated that he overheard Cleaver accuse Don Wright from Chicago of being seen in company of Q/1 whom Cleaver characterized as a well known CIA agent. This was at the Algerian Congress - Palestine Dec. 1969.

Feb. 1970 SYNIC: a London publication of leftist orientation, carried an article mentioning Q/1 by name and stating that he is widely believed to be an CIA agent. (Two of the Four persons listed as contributors to SYNIC were at the Algiers Palestine Solidarity Meeting which Q/1 attended in Dec. 1969. They were members of the British delegation representing the Palestine Solidarity Committee (PSC) which was a rival delegation to that led by A. Manchanda in which Q/1 sat. Q/1 believes this story was printed in order to discredit the Manchanda-led Palestinian group which is in competition with the PSC.)

8 Feb. 1970: BEIRUT 6963 (IN 262712). Reliable Source reported that during his conversation with Ghassan KANAFANI, latter mentioned Q/1 and accused him of being a CIA agent. (Q/1 believes KANAFANI suspicion of Q/1 due to accusations against Q/1 spread in Beirut by Palestinian personalities who were formerly in London and who picked up story as result of accusation leveled against Q/1 in SYNIC.)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GIBSON, RICHARD
201-306052
SEX M DOB ?

200-009-054
OEP -00737
26 JAN 70
P3

CIT UK
OCC ?
JOURNALIST FOR LIBERATOR
< ALGERIA, ALGIERS ATTENDED CONGRESS OF
PALESTINE SOLIDARITY COMMITTEES ALGIERS 26 -
28 DEC 69

080

R 7002111871

FILE IN 201-306052

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / X NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: CHIEF, WOLIMS

INFO.: COS, LONDON: Chief, EUR Division

FROM: CHIEF, LCPIPIT

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/OPERATIONAL
Quarterly Operational Status Reports

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: OEPW-792, dated 11 September 1969
OEPA-2325, dated 20 January 1970

Forwarded herewith are Quarterly Status Reports for the period ending 31 December 1969 for CREPITOME/CRMISSION, CRSTRIP, CRPADRE, and CRPTONE.

ADRIAN B. MASLOTT

Attachments: h/w
As stated (in duplicate)

Distribution:
3 - C/WOLIME, w/atts (2 copies)
1 - COS, London, w/o atts.
1 - C/EUR, w/o atts

201-306052
200-124-156/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OEPA-2327

DATE: JAN 21 1970
21 January 1970

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER:

14-00000

SECRET

QUARTERLY REPORT

STATION/BASE : LCPIPIT (London)
AGENT'S CRYPT : QRPHONE/1
PERIOD COVERED : 1 October-31 December 1969
CASE OFFICER TIME: 12 working days per month (average)

PROJECT : [illegible]
DATE OF POA/OA: [illegible]
COSTS : [illegible] (Field Costs Only)

1. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS DURING [illegible] IOD: During the quarter an effort has been made to target QRPHONE/1 on the activities of the Palestinian liberation groups and their European supporters. A good start has been made in this effort. QRPHONE/1 undertook a "reconnaissance" of those European leftist groups active on this issue. (See OEPA - 2227) This in turn led to his being invited to attend the Congress of Palestine Solidarity Committees which was held in Algiers in late December. (See LCPIPIT 7667).

In early November QRPHONE/1 made a brief visit to Paris to re-contact certain of his radical contacts there. (See OEPA - 2229) He likewise made a visit to The Netherlands in mid-December.

In October QRPHONE/1 made another extended visit to Italy in order to "take the temperature" of the radical left. The reporting from this visit was forwarded to Headquarters and Rome in OEPA - [illegible] and OEPA - 2175. This visit was deemed to have been useful by Rome Station which asked that another such visit be scheduled for February 1970.

A visit to Nairobi by QRPRANK in late December may offer an opportunity for an added assessment of her - something which has been sought for some time.

QRPHONE/1 continues his cultivation of various African personalities in London who are of operational interest. See OEPA - 2147 for a discussion of QRPHONE/1's relations with Dennis Phombe[illegible] and OEPA - 2197 for a discussion of his relations with Genevieve Mar[illegible].

2. SPECIFIC MATTERS OF OPERATIONAL SECURITY: [illegible] QRPHONE/1 by the Special Branch of Scotland [illegible] - spurred by his activity in connection with the Palestine issue - [illegible] security problems. The decision was taken [illegible] Special Branch in order to end the police [illegible] LONDON 8082, DIRECTOR 090343 and LONDON [illegible] for added details.

The suspension of activity by QRPURE [illegible] for a new cover to be found for QRPHONE/1. Although the [illegible] story can still [illegible] used for one or two more months, a new cover arrangement must be sought with all deliberate speed. One suggestion [illegible] was made in LONDON 70[illegible]. It is our understanding that Headquarters is [illegible] and possibly others. Meanwhile QRPHONE/1 has been instructed to project a "business as usual" image. He should be able to do so with no adverse effect on his cover.

3. ESTIMATE OF AGENT'S CONTINUED DEGREE OF ACCESS TO TARGETS: QRPHONE/1's access remains substantially unchanged - with a possible improvement in access to the Palestinian target due to his attendance at the Algiers meeting.

SECRET

4. EXTENT TO WHICH AGENT HAS BEEN ABLE TO [illegible] INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION: QRPHONE/1 has [illegible] with energy and enthusiasm. He has fulfilled [illegible] maximum degree feasible - given the limitations [illegible] by the unwitting informant-type relationship [illegible]. Despite every effort by QRPHONE/1 to [illegible] be recognized as a factor in this operation.

During the quarter QRPHONE/1 was the source [illegible].

5. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS LEVIED UPON AGENT [illegible]: QRPHONE/1 will follow-up on his access to the Arab/Palestinian target. [illegible] attempt to cultivate leaders in this cause - both European and Arab - with the objective of taking a trip to the Mid-East (Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Beirut).

QRPHONE/1's postponed trip to the U.S. has [illegible] re-scheduled for April (in the next quarter).

QRPHONE/1 will re-visit Italy, per Rome Station's request, for another look at the activities and attitudes of the [illegible] in Italy.

QRPHONE/1 will continue his development of [illegible] personalities of operational interest in London.

6. AGENT'S PERSONAL RESPONSE TO ASSIGNMENTS [illegible] PERSONAL SECURITY, ETC.: QRPHONE/1's response to assignments, like his performance, continues to be enthusiastic and [illegible]. The comments made in previous quarterly (and other reports) remain valid [illegible] - LCPIPIT and RODIGAST are able to judge.

7. AGENT'S PERSONAL RESPONSE TO CASE OFFICER [illegible] REPORTING TECHNIQUE: QRPHONE/1 has a very [illegible] relates easily to others. This is a positive factor [illegible] information from his many contacts and also [illegible] pleasant and uncomplicated experience. QRPHONE/1 [illegible] case officer handling - including direction and criticism - well [illegible] constructive vein. The same holds true of critique of his reporting.

8. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER, INCLUDING PROMOTION, [illegible]: A new method of funding the bulk of QRPHONE/1's salary to his Swiss bank has been approved and will be put into operation in January. [illegible] necessitated by the problems of BIRNEE - which were cited in previous reports.

An increase in salary of $100 per month has been approved for QRPHONE/1. This will be effective 1 January and will be paid into an escrow-type arrangement in order that it not increase QRPHONE/1's standard of living.

9. GENERAL COMMENTS ON AGENT PERFORMANCE: QRPHONE/1 is an excellent asset. He has performed well and effectively against his targets.

10. ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND EVALUATION OF EFFECTIVENESS OF [illegible]: The initial effort to gain useful access to the Palestinian target seems to be progressing well. In subsequent quarters we will see whether or not this progress can be maintained.

The progress toward operationally useful contact with key Africans in London (Phombeah and Kambona) is painfully slow. In this - as in all other situations - the problem is mainly the nature of QRPHONE/1's access to his

contacts (that of an unwitting informant). We feel that given this situation QRPHONE/1 is doing as well as might reasonably be expected.

OEPW - 858 was a much appreciated analysis of QRPHONE/1's recent reporting on the Italian target and explained why much of this has not been judged disseminable. Having reflected on this we realize that this is actually not surprising. It should be recalled that Rome Station specifically requested that QRPHONE/1 get away from rigid formal CS-type reporting and render more opinionated journalistic type reports. This type of reporting has been judged quite useful by Rome Station - but it is useful in an operational manner and for general appreciation of the situation. Thus it was not surprising that an analysis of this particular group of reports turned out as it did. Rome Station has orally noted to LCPIPIT that QRPHONE/1's visits will continue to be welcome and his reporting of definite use - even if this utility is outside the CS framework.

In general we feel that this operation is progressing well. In the past there may have been a tendancy on the part of certain "customers" to exaggerate QRPHONE/1's potential - with a consequent let-down when the realities of QRPHONE/1 the man and his access to targets was brought home. We now feel that this is behind us. Judged against the realities of his situation, his access and the nature of his targets, we think that QRPHONE/1 makes excellent progress against those targets assigned him.

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

14-00000

FBI (X-ref)
14 Jan '70

December 1969

Richard Gibson

→ **WARNING**—Alteration, Addition or Mutilation of Entries is Prohibited. Any Unofficial Change Will Render This Passport Invalid.

NAME: RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON	
BIRTH DATE: MAY 13, 1931	BIRTHPLACE: CALIFORNIA, U.S.A.
HEIGHT: 5 FEET 10 INCHES	HAIR: BLACK / EYES: BLACK
WIFE: X X X	ISSUE DATE: NOV. 10, 1969
MINORS: X X X	EXPIRATION DATE: NOV. 9, 1974
	Richard Gibson (SIGNATURE OF BEARER)

→ **IMPORTANT:** This Passport is NOT VALID Until Signed BY THE BEARER.

201-306052

SECRET

17 Dec 69

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division, OP

VIA: Chief, OPSER

SUBJECT: QRPHONE/1 - Amendment of Memorandum of Oral Commitment

1. It is requested that QRPHONE/1's Memorandum of Oral Commitment be amended to increase Subject's tax free income from $850.00 to $950.00 per month effective 1 January 1970.

2. This $100.00 a month increase will be set up in an interest bearing escrow account.

/s/

B. HUGH TOVAR
Chief
Covert Action Staff

Concur: /s/ Rogers C. Brooks
Contract Personnel Division

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Chief, OPSER
1 - CA/PERS
2 - CA/CF
1 - CA/CRU
1 - C/CA

CA-69-1163

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING; X NO INDEXING REQUIRED; ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING; MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WOLIME

INFO.: COS, Paris; COS, London; C/EUR

FROM: Chief, LCPIPIT/London

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/Operational
QRPHONE/Passport

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: OEPA - 2223

2R 201-306052

1. Reference reported QRPHONE/1's having lost his passport and having obtained a replacement at the U.S. Embassy in London.

2. On 17 November Air France returned the lost passport by mail. No explanation was offered regarding the delay in finding and returning the passport. Since QRPHONE/1 had already obtained a new passport, he returned the old one to the U.S. Embassy in London for cancellation.

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

MICROFILMED
DEC 17 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Distribution:
3 - C/WOLIME
1 - COS, Paris
1 - COS, London
1 - C/EUR

CS COPY

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPA - 2263	DEC 10 1969 10 December 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER ~~201-306052~~ 200-124-156/3

24 November 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: CA/BF

SUBJECT: Escrow Statements of Account

1. Forwarded herewith is the 30 September 1969 Statement of Account for the escrow accounts maintained by Project MHMUTUAL for your division.

2. If any of these statements do not relate to your division, please advise so that we may change our records.

3. Effective 1 May 1969 the interest rate was increased from four to five per cent per annum on interest bearing accounts.

Daphne H. Merriman

DAPHNE H. MERRIMAN (P)
OGC/MHMUTUAL

Attachments: a/s

201-306052

ATLANTIC INVESTMENT CORPORATION
ESCROW ACCOUNT
Statement of Account
LARRY A. CUR

June 17, 1969 - September 30, 1969

Date	Receipts	Disburse-ments	Interest Payable*	Principal Balance	Account Balance
6/17/69	$ 3,200.00			$ 3,200.00	$ 3,200.00
6/30/69			$ 6.22	3,200.00	3,205.22
9/30/69			40.00	3,200.00	3,246.22

* 5% interest from day of deposit to day of withdrawal compounded annually on value date (6/17).

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION: X — NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief, WOLIME

INFO.: COS, London; C/EUR; COS, Paris

FROM: Chief, LCPIPIT/London

SUBJECT: TDORIC/Operational/MHPROBE
QRPHONE/Passport

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

2A 201-306052

1. At their most recent meeting QRPHONE/1 reported to RODIGAST that he had lost his passport in Paris during his recent visit to France. The loss occurred on 8 November in the departure lounge at Orly Airport as QRPHONE/1 was waiting to board AF 822 for London (leaving at 1755 hours). QRPHONE/1 had shown his passport to the immigration officials when he entered the lounge. He then went to the duty free shop to purchase a bottle of Scotch and a carton of cigarettes for his wife (she smokes Galoises). He presumes that his passport slipped from his pocket during the process of producing his wallet to pay for these items. At any rate he did not discover the loss until the flight was airborne.

2. QRPHONE/1 had no difficulty re-entering Britain using his Home Office Certificate of Registration. He reported the loss to Air France immediately but as of his meeting with RODIGAST on 13 November it had not been located.

3. On 10 November QRPHONE/1 went to the U.S. Embassy in London and obtained a new passport (the number of this passport is IDENTITY - u/s/c).

4. We advised CHALEMSKY, of Paris Station, of this loss during his visit to LCPIPIT on 14 November.

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Attachment: u/s/c
Passport Number

S/C ATTD BY RID/SD Dated 9 Dec 69

Distribution:
3 - C/WOLIME w/att
1 - COS, London w/o att
1 - COS, Paris w/att
1 - C/EUR w/o att

1 ATT

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPA - 2223	21 November 1969
	CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T/RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER: ~~201-306-052~~ 201-356052 ~~200-124-156/3~~

14-00000

11P

SECRET

UNDER SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT

TO: OEPA - 2223

IDENTITY

Z 1057628

SECRET

S/C ATT. 1 to OEPA-2223 CS COPY 201-306052
~~200-124-156/3~~

SECRET

7 NOV 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, CA Staff

SUBJECT: LCPIPIT Request for QRPHONE/1 Salary Increase

REFERENCE: OEPA - 2122

1. The following is a breakdown of QRPHONE/1's salary history:

Starting salary, June 1965	$600 per month
1 September 1966	$700 per month
1 July 1967	$800 per month

All of the above figures are tax free. In addition, as of 1 May 1969, Subject was given an additional $50 per month (also tax free) as our contribution toward some form of insurance against the future (endowment, lump sum cash value, or whatever the Field and he finally selected). This appears on the books as a salary increase. However, although to his ultimate advantage, it does result in a small decrease in take-home pay since Q/1 is also required to make a contribution to the payment of the premium.

2. In addition, Q/1's MOC also provides for $10,000 indemnification in case of death, or payment of $600 per month up to $10,000 to his wife in case of his total incapacitation or disappearance while employed by CIA. Allowance had originally been made for this provision when he seemed to have an excellent chance for travel to Peking; this year we included the provision as a general benefit, not tied to any particular type of hazardous travel alone. Finally, this year's amendment to his MOC also included a severance bonus of one month's salary for each year of satisfactory service. We placed $3,200 in a special escrow account to cover his previous four years' service, and are providing in our Project renewals for each year's required deposit to that escrow account. Please note, however, that this benefit has not yet been surfaced either to QRPHONE/1 or to RODIGAST, by decision of LCPIPIT (a decision which I believe was wise).

3. It is my feeling that the proposed salary increase of $250 tax free per month is way out of line. I believe that paragraph 3 of the reference, comparing Q/1 with a hypothetical GS-12 is a rather specious and unrealistic argument. Q/1, although an American, is an agent, and nothing more, and as you note in your penciled comment the question of quarters, allowances, and periodic step increases is not relevant. In addition, while I do not subscribe

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Q/201

to some of the criticisms that have been leveled at his production, the fact remains that I have not seen any marked improvement during the past two years in the quality of the material he provides us. As time goes on and the realistic criteria of what is disseminable and what is not are applied more and more to his production, and this production in turn remains at its present level of superficiality, we will see less and less of it qualify for dissemination. Since he is an FI agent, this has considerable significance, although it of course does not present the full picture of his capabilities. His operational intelligence has been received with mixed evaluations; usually his initial coverage of a subject is very well received and often whets the appetite of the recipient for more; somehow, however, that "more" never seems to materialize -- they get more of exactly the same caliber, but little more in terms of depth of reporting. Perhaps the fault lies in QRPHONE/1, in which case we should realize early that what we have here is not a true FI agent, but a sort of "operational intelligence butterfly." Perhaps, on the other hand, the fault lies in RODIGAST's handling of the man, not in terms of the personal relationship which RODIGAST has been able to build up with him, but maybe even because of that relationship. I remember when I first talked with RODIGAST I quickly realized that he felt he knew more than Headquarters as to what was important for Q/1 to cover and what was not; I am sorry I missed RODIGAST on his TDY here and when I was in London, and that his home leave has been postponed, for I had hoped to determine for myself whether RODIGAST still felt that way. Whatever the reason, I am by no means giving up on Q/1, but will continue to try to narrow down his targets so that he will have a fair shake at showing what he can do when he is not allowed to cover the waterfront.

4. What the above paragraph is leading up to, is that I do not in all honesty feel that he has done anything to really deserve a promotion, except build longevity since the last one, and perhaps not follow up (actively) on that newspaper job offered to him (his preference, in any event). However, I do realize that a man must have an incentive, and would like to propose that we suggest to LCPIPIT that a more realistic increase might be in the neighborhood of $100 a month, and that the severance bonus mentioned in paragraph 2 above might now be surfaced both to RODIGAST and to Q/1 as a new benefit.

5. Attached for your ready reference is a copy of the QRPHONE quarterly report for 1 April to 30 June 1969; this is the last one we have received.

DIANE L. CHATELAN
Chief, CA/CF

Attachment: as stated
Distribution:
1 - CA/CF
Orig. & 1 - DC/CA

14-00000

INF

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GIBSON, RICHARD
201-306052 200-124-156/03
SEX M DOB ? OEPA-02115
14 OCT 69
CIT ?
OCC ?
< UK, ENGLAND, LONDON
FORM ON EDITORIAL BOARD OF REVOLUTION
PRESENTLY IN ITALY

R 6911060376

FILE IN 201-306052

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

QUARTERLY REPORT

STATION/BASE	: LCPIPIT (London)	PROJECT	:	QRPHONE
AGENT'S CRYPT	: QRPHONE/1	DATE OF POA/OA:		23 May 1966
PERIOD COVERED	: 1 July-30 September 1969	COSTS	:	~~$4,334.14~~ 6,619.14 (Field Costs Only)
CASE OFFICER TIME:	12 working days per month (average)			

1. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS DURING PERIOD: Pursuant to plans developed as a result of Marie R. LUEBBERT's TDY, QRPHONE/1 made a continuing effort to deepen his contacts with various African personalities connected with the "London group". Although some progress has been made with persons who seem of secondary importance, QRPHONE/1 still is unable to gain the confidence of the central characters such as Dennis Phombeah and Oscar Kambona.

   QRPEONY's one week stay in the U.K. was a week of intense activity for QRPHONE/1 and saw his local "credentials" put to a most demanding test. QRPHONE/1 performed extremely well throughout the week. See OELA - 51297 for details.

   QRPHONE/1 has been able to monitor the activity of Belgian Communist Rene Raindorf who is attempting to become a key figure in the Palestinian liberation movement. See OEPA - 2037, 2099 and 2123.

   Following an overature from a U.S. newspaper QRPHONE/1 made a quick trip to New York to consult with Headquarters officers regarding the implications of this overature on his RVROCK status. See LCPIPIT 4222 and DIRECTOR 28728 for details.

   Through two unwitting female informants QRPHONE/1 was able to obtain reporting on the Algiers Cultural Festival. See OELA - 51298.

   QRPHONE/1 has continued his monitoring of the activity of various African liberation movement figures in London.

2. SPECIFIC MATTERS OF OPERATIONAL SECURITY AND COVER: QRPHONE/1's vacation in Italy with his family produced a marked improvement in his domestic situation - with its consequent impact upon the cover and security of the entire operation. This remains a matter of concern and one which will be carefully monitored.

   QRPURE is now entering into a more meaningful overt correspondence with QRPHONE/1, including discussions of his participation in the new magazine. This will have a positive impact upon QRPHONE/1's cover as a representative of QRPURE.

   A new means of funding QRPHONE/1's salary is being sought to replace BIKNEE, which is no longer functioning due to unrelated problems encountered by the principal agent of that operation. For a review of the security implications of this matter (which are thought to be minimal) please see DIRECTOR 46178.

3. ESTIMATE OF AGENT'S CONTINUED DEGREE OF ACCESS TO TARGETS: QRPHONE/1's access to his various targets remains substantially unchanged.

4. EXTENT TO WHICH AGENT HAS BEEN ABLE TO SERVICE ASSIGNMENTS, INCLUDING INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION: QRPHONE/1 has approached all his assignments with enthusiasm and energy. He has fulfilled these assignments to the maximum

degree feasible - given his cover and the unwitting informant-type nature of his relationship with his many contacts. QRPHONE/1 makes every effort to overcome this limitation and in this regard a plentiful supply of background information greatly facilitates his elicitation of added details from his informants. However, this limitation is one which will always be with us in the case of QRPHONE/1 and it is one which can sometimes be particularly frustrating. During the past quarter QRPHONE/1 has been the source of 11 intelligence reports prepared by LCPIPIT/Reports.

5. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS LEVIED UPON AGENT FOR ENSUING PERIOD: QRPHONE/1 will make a trip to Italy in late September and early October in order to survey the situation within the Italian new left/radical sector. This trip is one which has been requested by Rome Station. (The trip will have been completed by the time this report is received by Headquarters.)

QRPHONE/1's contact with an official of the Eritrean Liberation Front led to a TDY by AF Division officer Geoffrey B. DRANSTON to brief LCPIPIT on the ELF and to discuss possible operational exploitation of this contact.

QRPHONE/1's trip to the United States has been deferred until spring 1970 by which time any possible repercussions from QRPEONY's return will be relatively unlikely.

An effort will be made to explore the operational possibilities posed by QRPHONE/1's existing (or potential) contacts within the Arab liberation movements. Headquarters views on this matter were requested in OEPA-2044.

A re-scheduling of QRPHONE/1's trip to Germany has been proposed and Headquarters and Bonn have been asked for guidance/requirements.

6. AGENT'S PERSONAL RESPONSE TO ASSIGNMENTS LEVIED INCLUDING MOTIVATION, PERSONAL SECURITY, ETC.: QRPHONE/1's response to assignments, like his performance, continues to be enthusiastic and energetic. The comments made in previous quarterly reporting regarding his security and motivation remain valid insofar as RODIGAST and LCPIPIT are able to judge.

7. AGENT'S PERSONAL RESPONSE TO CASE OFFICER HANDLING OR CRITIQUE OF HIS REPORTING TECHNIQUE: QRPHONE/1 has a very pleasant personality and relates easily to others. This is a positive factor in his elicitation of information from his many contacts and also makes dealing with him a pleasant and uncomplicated experience. QRPHONE/1 accepts case officer handling - including direction and criticism - well and in a constructive vein. The same holds true of critique of his reporting. Please see previous reporting on this subject for added details.

8. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS, INCLUDING PROMOTIONS, TRAINING: A new means of funding QRPHONE/1's salary is now being devised. This has been the subject of several items of correspondence between Headquarters and LCPIPIT. We plan to consult with the SGFLAG representative in Bern on this matter.

QRPHONE/1 has had some purely overt problems with his Chicago bank (an apparent error in his statement, etc.) He is also being charged very high service charges for the performance of routine transfers. If he is not able to resolve his problems with this bank it may be necessary for him to change banks.

At LCPIPIT's insistance QRPHONE/1 has begun to invest a portion of his monthly salary in a reputable Mutual Fund of his choice. This modest investment program will enhance his financial security in the event of termination and/or a rainy day".

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC.
5708 S. STATE 324-6320
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

PAID

1514

APR 25 1969

4-11 1969 $\frac{2-77}{710}$

PAY TO THE ORDER OF Richard Gibson $200.00

Two Hundred & no/100 DOLLARS

American National Bank of Chicago CHICAGO ILLINOIS 2-77

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

⑈001514⑈ ⑆0710⑉0077⑆ 289086⑈ ⑈0000020000⑈

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1555

April 30, 1969 $\frac{2-77}{710}$

MAY 2 1969

PAY TO THE ORDER OF Acct. of Richard Gibson -6288401 Harris Trust & Savgs Bank 200.00

TWO HUNDRED AND NO/100-- DOLLARS

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American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

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3-1 1969 $\frac{2-77}{710}$

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Richard Gibson

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Richard Gibson

APP

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NEW YORK, N.Y.

PAY ANY BANK
FEB CHICAGO

20-74-66

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FEB 25 '69

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BANKERS TRUST COMPANY
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FEB CHICAGO

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American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago

Henry [illegible]

⑆001316⑆ ⑆0710⑉0077⑆ 289086⑈ ⑈0000020000⑈

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC.
5708 S. STATE 324-6320
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PAID

MAR 1 8 1969

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PAY TO THE ORDER OF Richard Gibson $200.00

Two Hundred & no/100 DOLLARS

American National Bank of Chicago
CHICAGO ILLINOIS 2-77

American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago

Henry [illegible]

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Richard Gibson

Richard Gibson

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CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/RYBAT

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TO: Chief, WOLIME

INFO.: Chief, EUR; Chief, LCPIPIT/London

FROM: Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT: QRPREY/QRPHONE/MHPROBE/JAGUAR

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. As previously reported, we related to JAGUAR the incident in which Lionel Morrison is believed to have searched QRPHONE's papers while the latter was out of town. As you know, there have been some indications in the past which might be taken to suggest that Morrison was a JAGUAR contact - he works for the Daily Telegraph and seems to be in touch with David Floyd, and on one occasion provided QRPHONE with a report (on QRPEONY) which came almost simultaneously from JAGUAR. Clearly, this does not add up to much of a case, and we could hardly conceive that JAGUAR would be involved in the harrassment of QRPHONE. Even if there was no JAGUAR contact with Morrison, however, we felt it might be possible that JAGUAR could add to our understanding of this peculiar development from sources available to their own net. JAGUAR's reply is as follows (CORONET is the agreed crypt for QRPHONE):

> "With reference to your letter of 24th April 1969, we have been informed by a secret and delicate source that David M. SIBEKO, the newly appointed P.A.C. representative in London, has recently been told by Elias NTLOEDIBE, the P.A.C. representative in Nairobi, of the incident of MORRISON's search of CORONET's papers. According to Elias, MORRISON had written him a letter in an attempt to blackmail him. Elias told SIBEKO that what annoyed him was that MORRISON had sent photostat copies of Elias's own correspondence with CORONET.
>
> "Elias went on to say he was satisfied that MORRISON must have had covert access to CORONET's personal effects. Elias was surprised that CORONET had not replied to letters

/Continued/

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	OELA-50928	26 June 1969
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-306052

A substantial increase in QRPHONE/1's salary has been requested by LCPIPIT. We have further proposed that this increase be paid into an escrow-type account. See OEPA - 2122 for details.

9. GENERAL COMMENTS ON OVERALL AGENT PERFORMANCE: QRPHONE/1's overall performance has been superior.

10. ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND EVALUATION OF EFFECTIVENESS OF PROJECT: QRPHONE/1 continues to perform in a most effective manner.

ACL

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

he had written to him about the A.N.C. and enclosing press cuttings. He has asked SIBEKO fo find out if CORONET got those letters, and to warn CORONET that MORRISON or someone acting for him has been stealing mail from his (CORONET's) house.

"Elias speculates that the spy, whoever he is, may be working for Black Power or Marxist/Leninists or The Telegraph or even M.I.5., and wants CORONET told of this.

"Elias has written to MORRISON telling him to go to hell and that he (Elias) and his friends will stand by SIBEKO.

"Elias has said that he held no brief for CORONET, but he notes that CORONET was introduced to the party by MORRISON and that in June 1968, MORRISON wrote an article in the Zambian Mail describing CORONET as a great Afro/American and a great revolutionary.

"According to Elias, CORONET was then living in London and he recalls that there was correspondence between CORONET and MORRISON at that time; and that CORONET used to supply MORRISON with pocket money. SIBEKO wonders when MORRISON began to work for CIA and infers that he and his friends should no longer be taken in by the 'coloureds.'

"In view of the delicacy of the source I should be grateful if the above information is not passed on to CORONET."

2. This reply does not of course answer all our questions, but it does seem to be in accord with what we know of the incident from QRPHONE. It seems reasonable to attribute Morrison's actions to factional fending with PAC - a crossfire in which QRPHONE happened to be caught.

NWK

Nowell D. KAMMERMAYER

201-306052

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

VIA: MPS/BG
OGC/MHMUTUAL

SUBJECT: MHMUTUAL Escrow Account for CRPHONE/1

1. It is requested that an MHMUTUAL interest-bearing escrow account be set up in an appropriate alias for agent CRPHONE/1. In accordance with an amendment to the agent's MOC concerning a severance bonus, the account is intended to accommodate annual payments of one month's salary for every completed year of satisfactory service. The initial deposit consists of $3,200, retroactively covering four years' service and computed at the rate of $800 per year. Additional deposits, in the amount of the agent's salary on the anniversary date of his contractual relationship (1 June), will be made annually to his account on or about that date.

2. Any additional questions that might arise may be taken up with Chief, CA/CF, ~~or with Miss Ann Jane Long~~.

B. HUGH TOVAR
Chief
Covert Action Staff

APPROVED ______ Hies
MPS/BG
signed June 6

201-306052

CA-69-560

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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735

S E C R E T 201634Z MAY 69 CITE LONDON 2779

LOND

20 MAY 69 IN 62534

DIRECTOR INFO LCPIPIT

RYBAT DTDORIC QRPHONE MHPROBE

REF: DIRECTOR 03219

1. LOCAL USIS HAS REPORTED THAT VISITING USIA OFFICIAL HAS INFORMED THAT QRPURE IS A LEGITIMATE OUTFIT BUT APPEARED TOO SMALL TO BE ABLE TO SUPPORT FULL TIME STRINGER ABROAD. ADVISED LNPURE NOT ENCOURAGE LANDY TO GO TO BAT FOR ARPHONE.

2. LANDY IN MEANTIME FOUND THAT QRPHONE OUT OF TOWN AND FREQUENTLY TRAVELS ABROAD. THIS HAS SET LOCAL USIA TO SPECULATING THAT QRPHONE MIGHT HAVE WANTED PRESS PASS TO ESTABLISH BONA FIDES AS NEWSMAN ABROAD. LOCAL USIA HAS DETERMINED THAT MORNING STAR (CPGB) HAS PRESS PASSES, BUT THAT THEY NOT GIVEN TO BLOC JOURNALISTS.

3. LANDY WILL SIMPLY INFORM QRPHONE THAT SCOTLAND YARD TURNED DOWN APPLICATION AND THAT NOTHING CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT. QRPHONE WILL DROP MATTER.

4. FILE: 201-306052.

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20 May 1969

201-306052

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604			

S E C R E T 081705Z MAY 69 CITE LONDON 2484 8 MAY 69 IN 53923

DIRECTOR INFO LCPIPIT

RYBAT QRPHONE MHPROBE

REF: LCPIPIT 2389 (IN 51831)

1. USIA CABLE DISCUSSED REF WAS UKNT MAY 7, NO. 3516, FOR ATTENTION IOS MCNICHOL.

2. FILE: 201-306052.

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8 May 69

201-306052

SECRET

INCOMING TELEGRAM

United States Information Agency

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

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R 071012Z MAY 69

ACTION
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INFO:
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02940

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO USIA WASHDC ~~802~~

STATE GRNC

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON 3516

USIAC

FOR IOS MCNICHOL. FOR GUIDANCE OF PRESIDENT OF AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS IN LONDON WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL OF CHICAGO IS LEGITIMATE CLIENTEL. ALSO WOULD LIKE TO KNOW IF U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS ANY INFORMATION OF RECENT ACTIVITIES OF RICHARD GIBSON, NPI REPRESENTATIVE HERE WHICH WOULD MAKE HIS CLAIM TO BE REPUTABLE PRESS REPRESENTATIVE SUSPECT. FYI SCOTLAND YARD HAS REFUSED ISSUE POLICE PASS TO GIBSON AND ASSOCIATION WISHES TO SUPPORT HIS REQUEST UNLESS HE HAS RECORD WHICH CLEARLY INIMICAL TO U.S. INTERESTS. WOULD APPRECIATE CABLED REPLY CONTAINING ESTIMATE WHICH COULD BE PASSED TO ASSOCIATION OFFICERS PURELY AS GUIDANCE. KING

PF file QRPHONE

SO2 / AF / ONE / CI/WE5 / DCS / INDIO / CA/E / EUR3 / CA3 / CI / 17

201-300052

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/RYBAT

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TO: Chief, WOLIME
Chief of Station, Bern

INFO.: Chief of Station, London; Chief, EUR Division
Chief of Base, Geneva

FROM: Acting Chief, LCPIPIT/London

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/Operational
QRPHONE/Switzerland

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. As addressees are aware QRPHONE/1 has officially been denied entry into Switzerland since 16 December 1963. This order was issued in connection with his employment with Identity A, which was then receiving money from the Chinese--in violation of Swiss neutrality. A similar order was also issued at that time for Identity B, who was the Editor of Identity A.

2. It is now some six years later and QRPHONE/1 (at least overtly) is employed as a legitimate journalist. He is not a member of any group which is proscribed by the Swiss authorities--although, of course, he maintains contact with a wide variety of leftist individuals in pursuit of his operational tasks. QRPHONE/1 has noted that Identity B has been allowed back into Switzerland--in connection with his defense of Arab terrorists and feels that if the Swiss are willing to do this for Identity B then they should also lift the ban on his entry into Switzerland. QRPHONE/1 obviously feels personally about this, and it may be that future operational benefit could be gained if QRPHONE/1 were again able to enter Switzerland.

3. We are forwarding under separate cover a copy of a report written by QRPHONE/1 following his contact with the Swiss Embassy in London on this matter. We are also forwarding under separate cover a copy of the letter which he sent the Embassy in which he formally states his request that the entry ban be lifted.

/CONTINUED.../

Attachments: u/s/c
1-As Stated above
2-Identity Sheet

DOC FORWARDED U/S/C
BY RID/SD 13 MAY 1969

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2 - C/WOLIME w/atts
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1 - C/EUR w/o atts
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D 200-124-156/3	OEPA-1794	7 May 1969
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-306052

4. You will note that the Swiss Embassy suggested that QRPHONE/1 work through the U.S. Embassy on this matter. We have told QRPHONE/1 not to do this, but rather to deal directly with the Swiss. If he needs certification of his status as a working journalist we suggested that QRPHONE/1 obtain this from the appropriate professional organization (of which he is a member) in London.

5. We presume that the Swiss Embassy in London will be forwarding QRPHONE/1's letter to Bern. We will appreciate being advised of any Swiss action, or statements, on this case which may come to the attention of Bern Station. Any advice which Bern Station can offer regarding QRPHONE/1's pursuit of this matter will be welcome.

6. Of course Bern Station should continue to be guided by the contents of DIRECTOR-69543 in any dealings with the Swiss concerning QRPHONE/1.

ACL

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT 1 TO: 1660

OEPA-1794

3P

SWISS ENTRY BAN PROBLEM

On 15 April 1969, I spoke with Charles Henry Bruggmann, First Secretary at the Swiss Embassy in London and who handles press affairs, by phone. I tried to arrange a personal meeting with Bruggman, who insisted on knowing the exact nature of my business with him. He claimed there was nothing he could do for me in London, except to forward a letter from me through channels to the proper authorities in Berne. (I later sent him ~~him~~ such a letter.) Bruggmann urged me to work through the U.S. State Department, which could take up the matter through the Embassy in Berne. If the U.S. Embassy would only vouch for me as a professional journalist, Bruggmann added, I would be almost certain to get the ban lifted.

Naturally, I have made no efforts to contact anyone at the Embassy in London, but perhaps something might be done to get the Embassy in Berne to acknowledge at least, when queried by the Swiss, that I am a bonafide journalist in the employ of a reputable U.S. news and features agency?

SCA #1
OEPA-1794

D 200-124-156/3

201-306052

1984

REGISTERED

17th April, 1969.

Mr. Charles Henry Bruggmann,
First Secretary,
Embassy of Switzerland,
77/81 Gloucester Place,
London, W.1.

Dear Sir,

Following our telephone conversation a few days ago, I am now writing formally to you to request that the ban on my entry into Switzerland be lifted. This ban, which dates from 1963, was never personally directed against me but against the publication for which I was then working as an Editor. That publication, 'African Revolution', no longer exists and I note that its former Algerian publisher, Me Jacques Verges now visits Switzerland frequently. In any case I am now in no way connected with him.

As you know, I am the overseas representative and correspondent, based in London, of Negro Press International, the major Negro news and features agency in the United States, which serves some 270 newspapers. This is a bona fide commercial journalistic enterprise and serves no political purpose. I personally am a member of the Foreign Press Association and the Association of American Correspondents in London and am accredited to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office here.

It is part of my duties to report on the activities of the United Nations and its agencies. I have been, for many years, accredited at United Nations Headquarters in New York and I was also an accredited correspondent at the founding conference in Geneva of UNCTAD. Many important meetings are scheduled to be held in Geneva during this year and I have been asked by my firm to cover these conferences. Therefore, I ask your consideration and cooperation in

obtaining the removal of the ban on me in Switzerland which prevents me from fulfilling pressing professional duties.

I wish to make it most clear here that I am in no way connected with any political organization or bodies in Switzerland or elsewhere and am an established and well-known professional international journalist.

Sincerely Yours,

14-00000

SECRET RYBAT 1P

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT 2 TO: OEPA-1794

IDENTITIES

MICROFILMED
MAY 13 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

A - Revolution Magazine

B - Jacques VERGES

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SCA #2 to
OEPA - 1794
D 200-124-156/3

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6 MAY 69 IN 51831

S E C R E T Ø61128Z MAY 69 CITE LCPIPIT 2389

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO LONDON

RYBAT DTDORIC QRPHONE MHPROBE

ABSTRACT X — CA/2F

1. USIA REPS HAVE BEEN APPROACHED BY JEROME LANDY, UK REPRESENTATIVE OF WESTINGHOUSE BROADCASTING AND PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN PRESS ASSOCIATION IN LONDON, CONCERNING YQPHONE. LANDY FORWARDED QRPHONE'S APPLICATION FOR A POLICE PASS TO SCOTLAND YARD (METROPOLITAN POLICE), WHICH TURNED IT DOWN, REFUSING TO GIVE A REASON. LANDY HAS CAPABILITY RAISE CONSIDERABLE FUSS ON QRPHONE BEHALF AND WANTS TO REPRESENT MEMBERS OF HIS ASSOCIATION AS BEST HE CAN. QRPHONE HAS PUT SOME PRESSURE ON HIM, CLAIMING TO BE LEGITIMATE REP OF QRPURE, ETC., RAISING QUESTION WHETHER TURN DOWN HAS SOME RACIST OVERTONE. SOMEWHAT CAUGHT IN MIDDLE, LANDY TURNED TO EMBASSY TO ASK WHAT IT CAN TELL HIM ABOUT QRPHONE TO HELP HIM JUDGE LATTERS JOURNALISTIC BONA FIDES. ACCORDING TO USIA OFFICER WHO INTERVIEWED HIM, LANDY IS ALSO HAVING QUIET INQUIRY INTO QRPURE MADE THROUGH HIS CHICAGO CONTACTS.

2. USIA QUERIED LOCAL LNERGO WHICH REPORTED IT HAD

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FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 LCPIPIT 2389 S E C R E T

NOTHING SINCE 1962 AND FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA CONNECTION. IN ANSWER TO USIA QUESTION, STATION REPLIED THAT IT HAD COME ACROSS QRPHONE NAME ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS BECAUSE OF RELATIONSHIP WITH REVOLUTION, EXPULSION FROM SWITZERLAND, ETC. TOLD USIA THAT IT SOUNDED TO US THAT JUDGMENT WHETHER TO GIVE OR WITHHOLD POLICE PASS IS POLICE DECISION, AND WE WOULD NOT HAVE ANYTHING TO TELL LOCAL USIA WHICH WOULD ARGUE THAT LANDY SHOULD MAKE A CASE OUT OF IT. DID STATE THAT OUR RECOLLECTION FROM THE FILE WAS THAT QRPURE WAS A LEGITIMATE OUTFIT, BUT DID NOT KNOW ANYTHING FURTHER ABOUT IT THAN THAT.

3. IN ORDER TO PERMIT US CHANCE TO ALERT YOU, WE PERSUADED USIA DELAY ITS MESSAGE "WHILE WE CHECKED STATION FILES FOR ANY RELEVANT INFO." USIA CABLE WILL REPORT PROBLEM AND ASK GUIDANCE ON HOW TO ADVISE LANDY.

4. WILL FORWARD USIA MESSAGE NUMBER WHEN AVAILABLE. SUGGEST YOU ALERT QRPURE TO POSSIBLE INQUIRY (ALTHOUGH THEY MAY NOT, OF COURSE, BECOME AWARE OF IT).

5. QRPHONE OUT OF UK SINCE 24 APRIL, RETURNING 13 MAY. WILL BE TOLD NOT RPT NOT TO PRESS LANDY TO ESCALATE THIS MATTER INTO MAJOR ISSUE.

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PAGE 3 LCPIPIT 2389 S E C R E T

6. FILE: 201-306052.

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SECRET

14-00000

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SECRET

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CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

[ ] FILE RID [ ] RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

DISSEM BY 6 PER

ACTION UNIT: AF 7

FILE, VR 2/AA, C/CI 2, EUR 6, CA 5, CA/PROP, FI 2

ACTION NO. 099

S E C R E T 021205Z MAY 69 CITE PRETORIA 6916 (PRET) 2 MAY 69 IN 49487

DIRECTOR INFO LONDON (OEL)

SECROWBAR

1. SELEVER/17 PROVIDED FOLLOWING MEMO ON 2 MAY:

"SUBJECT: RICHARD GIBSON 201-306052

SUBJECT IS BELIEVED TO BE AN AFRO-AMERICAN JOURNALIST RESIDING IN LONDON. HE TAKES A KEEN INTEREST IN AFRICAN POLITICAL AFFAIRS.

IT HAS COME TO OUR KNOWLEDGE THAT SUBJECT, WHO HAS OFTEN BEEN IN TOUCH WITH SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL EXPATRIATES, IS NOW SUSPECTED WIDELY OF BEING BOTH A (NCFIRM) AGENT AND A SOUTH AFRICAN INTELLIGENCE CONTACT. THE TANZANIAN ASSISTANT HIGH COMMISSIONER IN LONDON HAS APPARENTLY ALSO BEEN INFORMED OF THE SUSPICIONS AGAINST SUBJECT AND HAS PROMISED TO ALERT HIS GOVERNMENT WITH A VIEW TO HAVING SUBJECT DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA IN AFRICA.

ABOVE MERELY FYI."

2. IN PASSING THE ABOVE, SELEVER/17 COMMENTED GIBSON PUTS OUT SOMETHING CALLED "THE GIBSON LETTER" ON ABOUT A WEEKLY BASIS AND SELEVER HAS FOUND THAT HIS INFO RE

[Handwritten: Δ U.K. London; CIT: USA; OCC: Journalist; AF/2/SA]

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SECRET

02 May 69
201-306052

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE SECRET IN ______ PAGE ______

MAY 6 3 20 PM '69

PAGE 2 PRETORIA 6916 S E C R E T

MAY 9 3 58 PM '69

RECEIVED RID/EDI

PAC, AAC, ETC. IS FAIRLY ACCURATE. ALSO STATED HE NOT RPT NOT ONE OF SELEVER CONTACTS.

3. REQUEST TRACES ON GIBSON, WHICH WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE FOR PASSAGE TO SELEVER.

4. INDEX.

5. FILE: 72-2-2/3.

S E C R E T

SECRET

as MANCHANDA, which are obviously known to the security authorities. Furthermore QRPHONE/1 himself might think it odd that he was being treated in that fashion and suspect that the Home Office was aware of his role which would not help your relationship with him. Alternatively (a) would obviously be a nuisance to say the least, so we felt that the obvious answer was (b) i.e. an extension of another year on present conditions."

3. We have attached QRPHONE/1's brief report of his visit to the Home Office to obtain this visa renewal.

ACL

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

I think JAGUAR was absolutely right! [initials]

14-00000

HEREWITH ATTACHMENT TO: OEPA-1708

BRITISH VISA RENEWED

On 12 March, I got my British visa renewed until 15 February 1970. As in the past, my request seemed to cause some panic at the Home Office and I had to wait from 0930 until 1500 before finally obtaining the visa, albeit with apologies for the lengthy delay — normally it takes about an hour.

H/w att #1 to OEPA-1708

CS COPY

201-306052

14-00000

SECRET

20 March 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Jane Long, CA/CF, 3D0101

SUBJECT : Laboratory Tests, QRPHONE/1

REFERENCES : (1) OEPA-1662, 28 February 1969
(2) OEPW-405, 7 October 1968

Review of the laboratory studies from the initial dispatch and the one dated 28 February indicate a definite improvement of the liver function tests. It is our opinion that the individual has recovered from his hepatitis and should have no complications if he continues to follow his doctor's advice as to diet.

ROBERT A. INGRAM, M.D.
Operations Division
Office of Medical Services

Attachments:
Above references

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T/R Y B A T

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING; XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED; ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING; MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WOLIME

INFO. Chief, EUR Division
Chief of Station, London

FROM: Chief, LCPIPIT/London QBM

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/Operational
QRPHONE/Medical Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

QRPHONE/1's doctor has determined that his liver function has now returned to normal following his attack of hepatitis last Fall. We are forwarding under separate cover a copy of the report of clinical tests given QRPHONE/1.

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Attachment: u/s/c
Report

DOC FORWARDED W/O S/C
BY RID/SD 19 MAR 1969

Distribution:
3 - C/WOLIME w/att
1 - COS/London w/o att
1 - C/EUR w/o att

21 Mar. 69
cf. + [illegible]

MAR 8 1969

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPA-1662	28 February 1969
	CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T/R Y B A T	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-306052 ~~200-124-156/3~~

Dr. J. R. DALY

1 RIVERSIDE CLOSE
KINGSTON UPON THAMES
SURREY
01 - 546 5828

Dept. of CHEMICAL PATHOLOGY
WEST LONDON HOSPITAL
HAMMERSMITH
LONDON, W.6
01 - 748 3441

Jan. 2oth, 1969.

To professional charges for biochemical investigations carried out on Jan 14th, 1969 :

£6. 6. 0.

With the compliments of Dr. Daly.

Dr. J. R. DALY

1 RIVERSIDE CLOSE
KINGSTON UPON THAMES
SURREY
01 - 546 5828

Dept. of CHEMICAL PATHOLOGY
WEST LONDON HOSPITAL
HAMMERSMITH
LONDON, W.6
01 - 748 3441

Jan. 20th, 1969.

Dear [illegible]

Herewith your liver function tests, which now seem virtually as good as new.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

John Daly

1 RIVERSIDE CLOSE
KINGSTON UPON THAMES
SURREY
KINgston 5828

Dept. of CHEMICAL PATHOLOGY
WEST LONDON HOSPITAL
HAMMERSMITH
LONDON, W.6
RIVerside 3441

Jan 20th, 1969.

Liver Function Tests, Jan. 14th, 1969.

Plasma	total bilirubin	less than 0.5	mg./100ml.
	alkaline phosphatase	3	K-A. units.
	alanine aminotransferase	9	i.u./l.
Serum	total protein	7.4	g./100ml.
	albumin	3.8	g./100ml.
	globulin	3.6	g./100ml.

Electrophoresis of serum protein showed a normal pattern.

Comment : All parameters of liver function tested appear to have returned to normal.

John D[illegible]

Chemical Pathologist.

NOTE:
This is sensitive information and must be cleared with E/AS/S prior to forwarding to HSCA.

(Gibson) OLC-78-1790/1

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING: XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief, AF

FROM: Chief of Station, Algiers

SUBJECT: Monthly Report/Errol S. KULPA

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Attached find contact and subject reports covering activities of KULPA during the month of January 1963. The two outstanding characteristics of this project remain a helter-skelter operational pattern and the usual difficulties in administration.

2. We can not really blame KULPA for the former. His forte is moving around and being able to convince. These two qualities are rare enough not to demand in too loud a voice for the third--serious concentration on a long range target. It is not that KULPA lacks the professionalism, rather it is the tempo of his personal and professional life that inclines him to speed rather than accuracy. As last month was marked by the stop and go of SCIMITAR/6, so this month was hampered by the upcoming Congo voyage. It is not that these ventures are unimportant, it simply remains difficult to judge KULPA's performance on events occuring outside our area of competence.

3. We can say nothing new or nothing untrue on the administrative aspects of the project. The cry is the same from all small stations--why must so much valuable time be spent on tiny administrative detail. In KULPA's case the matter is perhaps compounded by his transfer from Casablanca but his complete file is living evidence of the imbalance of the outside staffer. In the regular four way breakdown, the file reflects almost no paper in Plans and Development, Production is not fat, Operations is fuller but transitory, Support is a swollen, blistering monster. We see no end to it. Our present agenda for the next KULPA meeting calls for a discussion of eleven separate administrative items. One more chestnut and we are finished. The KULPAS of the world take precise careful case officering with sufficient time prior and post the meeting to bring order from chaos. It is just this time that a small station lacks. So far, we are glad to state, KULPA seems to be worth the price paid.

David W. Lawton

DAVID W. LAWTON 3-6-25/4

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - C/AF (w/att h/w)

Attachments:
a.s.a (1 copy of each)

INDEX

DATE TYPED: 17 Feb 1963

DATE DISPATCHED: FEB. 19 1963

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: AAAA-554

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 3 - 6 - 25/4

CS COPY

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T

SUBJECT : [illegible]
TIME/DATE : 15 [illegible]
PLACE : [illegible]

1. [illegible] out with E. the [illegible] very helpful for E's [illegible] to the spirit of [illegible] drinking, however. [illegible] putting off the [illegible]

2. [illegible] to our previous report to [illegible] that [illegible] [illegible] and that at least [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] asked that [illegible]

... [illegible] ... restriction [illegible] ...

3. [illegible] at least to [illegible], [illegible] according to this, [illegible], his [illegible] ... cannot second hand and at least part of the [illegible] ... on this one. [illegible]

4. [illegible]

5. [illegible]

6. [illegible] ... of the silly thing; for [illegible]

7. [illegible] Government pay for [illegible] ... [illegible] and this clause [illegible]

[illegible] ... 21 January at [illegible] ... of the [illegible]

Secret

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WOLIME

INFO.: Chief of Station, London
Chief, EUR Division

FROM: Chief, LCPIPIT/London

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/MHPROBE/Operational
QRPHONE/British Immigration Status

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. On 12 March 1969 QRPHONE/1 was granted an extension on his British visa valid until 15 February 1970.

2. Since QRPHONE/1's file at the Home Office indicates an interest on the part of JAGUAR in his case, JAGUAR was consulted prior to the issuance of the extension. (This is not unusual in the cases of persons such as QRPHONE/1 and does not necessarily imply an "agent" status. Of course WOFIRM is not mentioned at all in this file.) In coordination with London Station it was decided that a re-newal of QRPHONE/1's one-year visa was preferable to the granting of permanent resident status--which would normally have been the case. We quote from the appropriate memorandum from JAGUAR to London Station on this matter:

"The choice was between:-

a) an extension of two months
b) an extension of one year i.e. a repeat of what was granted to him last year
c) that his temporary residence should be made "unconditional" which would be the normal procedure if there were no special considerations.

Our feeling was that for QRPHONE/1's cover purposes (c) would be undesirable; if his friends got to know of it they might think he was being treated over-generously in view of his contacts with leftwing revolutionaries such

/CONTINUED.../

Attachment: h/w
Report

Distribution:
3 - C/WOLIME w/att
1 - COS/London w/o att
1 - C/EUR w/o att

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPA-1708	2 April 1969
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-306052

14-00000

Secret

22 January [illegible]

CONTACT REPORT [illegible] PROJECT LUSTLIKE.

1. The record of KULPA'S dealings with Serge Michel and Roberto Holden appear to be as follows.

a. Four (4) initial meetings with Michel on 17 and 18 Jan.

b. Two (2) meetings with Holden on [illegible]th and 20th Jan. It was evidently at these meetings that the trip to the Congo was arranged.

2. KULPA contacted Exmore during the afternoon [illegible] January, Saturday. Exmore explained that he could not pass on the [illegible] of the plan discussed that day between KULPA and Holden. [illegible] should call [illegible] at 0900 the following day, Sunday and discuss the matter with him.

3. Exmore contacted Lawton that same evening and [illegible] between the two showed that it would be difficult to ask [illegible] on the minimum info Kulpa had give Exmore over the phone [illegible] wait for the next day's contact and to advise KULPA to hold off [illegible] with Holden. The latter was leaving for Tunis at 1[illegible]0 on Sunday.

4. KULPA telephoned Lawton at 1020 instead of 0900 [illegible] his watch was wrong. He had quite obviously overslept. Lawton advised him to put Holden off and KULPA gave no indication of any difficulty in this respect. A meeting was set up for 1600 on Sunday, [illegible] January.

5. It was at this meeting that it became apparent [illegible] had indeed committed himself and that Holden was making firm plans to have K. join him the following week in Leopoldville.

Secret

Secret

LISTENER REPORT 228, Anlma 19 Jan 63

Subj: Contacts with Serge Michel

PARIS Aletti Hotel, two meetings 17 Jan and two meetings 19 Jan

1. Michel is starting a new publication to be called ATLAS, much on the order of Paris-Match, which will be aimed at French-speaking North Africa, Middle East, and Algerians in France. An Algerian trained at Franc-Tireur in Paris will be editor (he was unnamed) and Michel will be the guiding genius. Color will be used for the cover and adds inside, the plates being made in West Germany. An Arabic edition will be issued later.

2. Michel plans to use three photographers for the magazine, fnu Lakhdar aka Djamal (trained in Czech), Djmal Tchanderli (if he consents to use a camera instead of a movie camera), and me. (Michel said he had to use Algerians even they were not "photographers", but that he needed me to back them up technically.) He has already taken twenty-some photos from me and has given me a long listof others he wants. He has promised to pay 150 francs each to start, with raise in pay as the magazine progresses. I said my present work earns my living, and a question ofprestige was more important than pay for the moment. (Comment: I'm not sure how serious Michel is, nor if he has the authority to use me. At least he talks a good game, and he has taken some photos to show the editor for use in the first few issues.)

3. Before Michel offered employment on the magazine, he asked if I would be free to spend three or four weeks in Angola and the Congo with Roberto Holden to take "several thousand" photos which could be used for the next several years in a continuing campaign for the liberation of Angola, with me retaining selling rights in the negatives and the entire trip being paid by Holden. I said I was willing if I could arrange it with my employers. That was at noon 18 Jan. At six p.m. 18 January, Michel announced to me that Holden had agreed to sponsor a trip for me to Angola. As a first step, Holden wanted me present at 1000 Jan 19 to take photos of his interview with Ben Bella. I will be there.

4. Michel then said the Atlas once underway would not be his responsibility, just as he had loosed the reins of Al Shaab once it was started. Then he will publish an entire series of slick,one-time publications on the various phases of the Algerian government and its efforts, a photo book on Algeria, photo books on the various regions and problems of Algeria. Concurrently, he will be doing publications on Black African subjects, taking many, long swings through Africa to gather the information andphotos. He said, "You will be working more with me and traveling through Africa at that time than working on Atlas, which should have a good backlog of Algerian photos by then." He added, "Of course, I'll have to get permission to take you on these trips—maybe they'll want an African photographer instead."

5. After the Holden/Ben Bella interview today, I am to meet Holden and Michel to make further plans.

Secret

Secret

LISTRUK [illegible] REPORT #230, [illegible]

21 Jan 63

Subj: Contacts 1?-20 Jan

1. Serge [illegible]: Saw twice daily. He proceeded very rapidly re the proffered trip to Angola, including arrangements with Robert Holden to pay for the trip. Only other interesting subject discussed was Atlas/ Al Chaab/ Afrique Revolution. He says the [illegible] will be merged with Atlas [illegible] this year.

2. Josie Fanon: Met her twice with Serge [illegible], [illegible] same subject. She seems to be quite in the heart of Atlas, is very strong, treated as equal by Serge.

201-114045

3. Roberto Holden: Saw him twice, on 1?th and 20th. On 19th after Ben Bella interview, Josie Fanon presented me to him, and [illegible] mentioned that "Mr. Serge" had [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] for him, to discuss publicity for Angola. The 20th with Michel & Fanon, before I could [illegible], Holden told me he was applying for my visa in Tunis that afternoon, and that he would send my ticket to Leopoldville the day [illegible] returned to [illegible]. He is stopping at Continental, but [illegible] ticket [illegible] [illegible] 27th. I explained that I was willing [illegible] I had told [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] country might not let me go if things were [illegible] in Algeria. (Holden is going to Moscow in the very near future, according to Taleb Jamal who says Holden told him.)

4. Commandant [illegible]: Saw him twice, once at [illegible] only on 19th and at my home night of 20th. Said he was going to C[illegible] for 10 days at maximum, would see me when he returned to give me his impressions. Said Algerians prepared do anything possible for Angolans.

5. Taleb Jamal: Saw him several times, including once at my home. Said never saw anything like the [illegible] of the [illegible] congress by the FLN and Polit Bureau. [illegible] Irving [illegible], and his new assistant [illegible] is "stupid", are both CIA agents.

6. Mahjoub Ben [illegible] 4 [illegible], of [illegible]. Had cocktails and dinner my home 20 h. Mahjoub declined talk about the Congress or anything faintly resembling politics.

4

Secret

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION

TO: Chief, WOLIME — XXX

INFO: COS, London; C/EUR

FROM: Chief, LCPIPIT/London

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/Operational/YKPROBE QRPHONE/JAGUAR Reporting

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Through London Station's liaison with JAGUAR we are sometimes able to monitor the reactions and attitudes of QRPHONE/1's enemies within radical circles in the U.K. We are forwarding, u/s/c, copies of two such recent JAGUAR reports. In this case they were particularly helpful in underlining the continuing need for attention to the cover backstopping of QRPHONE/1's sources of income.

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Attachments: u/s/c
stated above

S/C ATTD BY RID/SD
Dated 04 NOV 69

Distribution:
3 - C/WOLIME w/atts
1 - COS, London w/atts
1 - C/EUR w/o atts

1 ATT

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OBPA - 2115	14 October 1969
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S E C R E T/RYBAT	200-124-156/3

2R 201-725837 2R 201-301058 418 Lc OEPA- 211

Lionel MORRISON and Richard GIBSON

MORRISON says Richard GIBSON is gunning for him because he is too involved with GIBSON's wife Sara. MORRISON had had an affair with Sara when he was working for the "Afro-Asian Journalist" and was visiting London. GIBSON had found out, and told a member of the P.A.C. about it. He in turn told MORRISON, and he told Sara. She challenged her husband, and asked how he dare spread rumours about her. Once before she had walked out on him.

2. MORRISON said GIBSON was worried because he did not know exactly what information MORRISON has about him. There was a confrontation of the two at a meeting of the Race Relations Institute at which GIBSON refused to sit with MORRISON. MORRISON asked him on that occasion to report the matter to "his masters", implying that GIBSON was an agent provocateur.

3. MORRISON says Sara told him that they live far above their means but are never in debt, and she could not understand it. That is why she had started a nursery school, and no longer did any work for GIBSON. Previously she had taken part in a number of GIBSON's activities, for instance "the MANCHANDA attempt to break up the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign".

4. Once GIBSON went to the Foreign Press Association claiming that MORRISON had forged an application form and was not working for "Zambian Mail". MORRISON is now a weekly contributor to that paper but was not when he first applied to the F.P.A. MORRISON says that at present GIBSON and his wife are on holiday for two months in Italy.

1P

2R 201-833039 A secret and reliable source states that TARIQ ALI is certain that GIBSON is working for the Americans. He claims that the Chinese have documentary proof of this, and for that reason they removed him from the editorial board of "Revolution", the Paris magazine they were financing. GIBSON had then come to London.

2. TARIQ ALI says GIBSON is very wealthy but no-one knows where his money comes from. From time to time he hands out donations to sympathisers saying that they are "on behalf of the Chinese".

2R 201-108746
3. TARIQ ALI also has suspicions that Robert WILLIAMS, "who was thrown out of both Cuba and Peking" may be working for the C.I.A.

[illegible] 124-156/3

Lionel MORRISON and Richard GIBSON OEPA-

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2R 3. 201-108746 TARIQ ALI also has suspicions that Robert WILLIAMS, "who was thrown out of both Cuba and Peking" may be working for the C.I.A.

S/C ATT. 1 to OEPA-2115. CS COPY 200-124-156/3

14-00000

SECRET

INFORMATION REPORT COVER SHEET

FROM:	England, London/LCPIPIT	OEP-737
		23 January 70
CASE OFFICER:	Aaron C. LAGINESTRA	JAN 26 1970
REPORTS OFFICER:	Norman C. BULSTRODE	
RELEASING OFFICER:	Adrian R. MASLOTT	080

DISTRIBUTION:

- 4 - WOLIME, w/master
- 2 - LONDON (OK for SMOTH and JAGUAR, provided source description is changed to read "a fairly reliable source".)
- 2 - Algiers
- 2 - Paris
- 2 - Bonn
- 2 - Rabat
- 2 - Tunis
- 1 - Geneva
- 2 - Bern
- 1 - Amman
- 1 - Beirut
- 2 - Rome
- 2 - LCPIPIT

DTDORIC/QRPHONE

SUPDATA:

Subject: First International Congress of Palestine Solidarity Committees in Algiers, 26 - 28 December 1969

Source: QRPHONE/1

Note: Request Headquarters verify and correct names. INDEX participants.

Congress documents gave several English translations for this Congress. We have chosen the one which we believe is the most accurate translation of the French.

File: 200-124-156/4

SECRET

CS COPY

9-50

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

BACKGROUND USE ONLY

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

REPORT NO. CX OEP-737

DATE DISTR. 23 January 1970

COUNTRY International/Algeria

DOI 26 - 28 December 1969

SUBJECT First International Congress of Palestine Solidarity Committees in Algiers, 26 - 28 December 1969

ACQ (16 January 1970)

FIELD NO.

SOURCE Radical European who attended the Congress. His reporting has been generally reliable.

Summary: The First International Congress of Palestine Solidarity Committees in Algiers was sponsored by the Algerian Committee of Solidarity with Palestine. About 200 delegates, most of whom were Western European pro-Chinese militants, attended the event. In the proceedings of the Congress these militants sought to apply the Chinese theses of the "People's War" to the Palestinian struggle. The Congress firmly backed the notion that Al Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) were one and the same body with Al Fatah acting as the vanguard body for bringing about unity among all Palestine commando/liberation organizations. A major decision of the Congress was the acceptance of a Palestinian proposal to create an information bureau in Algiers. The Algerians claimed that fifteen countries were represented. There was no list of delegates and the Algerian hosts went out of their way to assure anonymity among the participants. End Summary.

1. The Premier Congres International des Comites "Palestine" (First International Congress of Palestine Solidarity Committees) was held at the Club des Pins conference site ten miles outside of Algiers from 26 to 28 December 1969. It was attended largely by pro-Chinese militants from Western Europe. The total number of delegates was 188 -- 148 foreign, 20 Palestinian and 20 Algerian. The French delegation was the largest one present and the most divided into various factions.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/ BACKGROUND USE ONLY

DISTRIBUTION

NONE

The Congress was officially sponsored by the Algerian Committee of Solidarity with Palestine.

2. The participants, for the most part, espoused the Chinese theses regarding the "People's War" and applied these theses to the Palestinian struggle. While not directly criticising the Soviet policies in the Middle East, it was evident in the Congress documents that the European militants sought to do so. For example, they strongly condemned the United Nations resolutions on the settlement of the Middle East conflict. The main conclusions of the Congress were: an acceptance of the Al Fatah as being the only genuine Palestinian revolutionary organization, and a decision to create an information bureau in Algiers which will be run by Palestinians. The bureau will provide information on developments in the Palestinian revolution to all the Palestinian committees throughout the world and to all revolutionary movements which support the Palestinian people. In conjunction with those Palestine committees, the bureau will sponsor meetings, lectures, debates, film shows and an annual conference. (Source Comment: Abu el H a s s e n, a prominent leader of the Palestinian delegation, confided to one of the delegates after the Congress that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) would probably sponsor a conference in Jordan sometime in 1970 or 1971.)

ALL CARDS "II" -- ALGERIA, ALGIERS — ATTENDED CONGRESS OF PALESTINE SOLIDARITY COMMITTEES, ALGIERS, 26-28 DEC 69

3. (Source Comment: In private conversations with some of the Algerian participant-observers, they were not altogether pleased with the Congress, feeling that its conclusions were excessively leftist. The chief spokesman for the Algerians was M'hamed Y a z i d, who is the Algerian representative on the United Nations Security Council.)

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ALGERIA ALGERIA, BLIDA
DIPLOMAT

4. The delegates slept at the Zeralda Tourist Center located about eleven miles from the Club des Pins, and were bussed daily to the Congress site. The Algerian hosts saw to it that the delegates were kept busy and together. Strict security was maintained and the delegates had no chance to mingle with the Algerian people. There was no list of delegates and several of the participants used pseudonyms.

M
ALGERIA
LAWYER

5. The first session of the Congress on 26 December, which included the attendance of a large group of Algerians, was chaired by Larbi B e n t o u m i (Algerian). (Field Comment: TDCSDB 315/05408-69, dated 31 December 1969, described Bentoumi as the Algerian defense lawyer in the recent trial in Switzerland of the three Palestinian terrorists charged with attacking an El Al Boeing 707 in Zurich in February 1969.) Most of the first session was devoted to assigning the delegates to the commissions and in arranging the timing of the various speakers, such as Yasir A r a f a t, Al Fatah's official spokesman and chairman of the PLO. Upon the recommendation of a Palestinian representative, the Congress voted by a majority of 33 votes to create three commissions for the event. These were commonly known as follows: Political Commission, Information Commission and Organization Commission. (Source Comment: The Palestinians obviously had come to the Congress with only one immediate practical aim, i.e., to obtain left-wing acceptance of the creation of a Palestinian information bureau.)

M
C 28
PALESTINE
ENGINEER

6. At the beginning of the second day of the Algiers Congress, 27 December, Bentoumi ceded the chair to Nabil N a s s e r of the PLO. For the rest of the Congress the Algerians played no active role, thus leaving the Palestinians with considerable freedom of action in the proceedings. The

M
PLO MEMBER

Palestinians took over the chairmanship of the three commissions and guided much of the work of these groups. A "Comrade M a h a o u t" from Paris chaired the Information Commission; Abu El Hassen chaired the important Political Commission. (Field Comment: Source did not know the name of the Palestinian who chaired the Organization Commission.)

7. The most important Congress document was a political declaration which had been drafted in the Political Commission mainly by Abu El Hassen and Abhimanyu M a n c h a n d a, a British citizen of Indian descent who is chairman of the pro-Chinese British-Vietnam Solidarity Front (BVSF). (Source Comment: Manchanda confided that he was not completely satisfied with the text of the document, but considered it worthwhile nonetheless because it came close to what he considered were general Chinese positions, although it did not condemn the Soviet Union by name. Abu El Hassen and other Palestinians congratulated Manchanda for his success in ramming through such a hard-line political document. Manchanda had in fact dominated the final plenary session of the Congress on 28 December which voted affirmatively on the declaration.) On one occasion during the discussions in the Political Commission, Yazid tried to persuade the Commission (whose revolutionary commitments he claimed to share) that it should go easier in its condemnations of the United Nations.

8. Delegations from the following countries were represented at the Congress:

a. Austria - Represented by an observer from the Moscow-line Communist Party of Austria

b. Belgium - a divided delegation headed mainly by Reno R a i n d o r f but which included a few supporters of Jacques G r i p p a, a current political enemy of Raindorf.

c. Brazil - Represented by a youth named McGill who lives in London.

d. Great Britain (two rival delegations) - Delegation led by Manchanda as follows:

(1) Manchanda, representing the Solidarity Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Arab Peoples, and the Revolutionary Marxist-Leninist League

(2) Diana L a n g f o r d, of the Women's Equal Rights Campaign

(3) Mike K r y l i t s i a s, of the Revolutionary Marxist-Leninist League

(4) Mishek C h i n a m a s s a, of the Zimbabwe Students Union in Europe (ZSUE). (Field Comment: An official British Service reported in August 1969 that Chinamassa was expelled by the executive committee of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) as president of the ZSUE.)

(5) Richard G i b s o n, journalist for "Liberator"

(6) Jane W i l l i a m s, a school teacher

Handwritten annotations: SEX M / DOB / CIT UK / OCC (Manchanda); SEX M, DOB 22 DEC 18, CIT BELGIUM (Raindorf); SEX M, DOB 30 MAR 13, BELGIUM (Grippa); SEX M, CIT: BRAZIL (McGill); SEX F, CIT: UK, MEMBER OF (Langford); SEX M, CIT UK, MEMBER (Krylitsias); SEX M, CIT UK, MEMBER (Chinamassa); DPOB 13 MAY 31, USA, SEX M, CIT: UK (Gibson); SEX F, CIT: UK, OCC (Williams)

from London who came as an observer

(7) Max Hunt, a teacher in London who came as an observer for the Schools' Action Union

(8) Matt L g a c e, manager of the Scottish Vanguard Bookshop at 270 Paisley Road, Glasgow, which is owned by the Scottish Workers Party

(9) David R. S h a n k s, from the Scottish Workers Party who lives at 66 Dundee Street in Edinburgh

Delegation from the Palestine Solidarity Campaign (PSC) as follows:

(1) Roger Y o u n g, treasurer of Friends of Palestine which is now affiliated with the PSC

(2) Norman T e m p l e, of the Friends of Palestine

(3) Abdullah Y a s a m e e n, of the Friends of Palestine

(4) Louis E a k e s, of the Young Liberals

(5) an unidentified girl friend of Eakes

(6) (fnu) H a l l i e r, of Agit-Prop (a PSC member)

(7) (fnu) W a l k e r, who came as an observer

(8) Bill G u n n, of Reg Birch's Communist Party of Britain/Marxist-Leninist and of the PSC

(9) Dave H u n d e l l, of the Revolutionary Socialist Students Federation (RSSF) in London

(Source Comment: This delegation had been sent to Algiers by the London-based PLO representative, (fnu) A r m a n a z i, who is apparently the editor of the newspaper "Free Palestine". The newspaper, however, lists its editor as "Aziz Yafi". Armanazi had supplied the airfare for this delegation because he did not want the PSC people to go to Algiers under the arrangements of Manchanda. All of the PSC people were young and no match for Manchanda who, in the final session of the Congress, was able to isolate them completely inasmuch as they opposed the recognition of Al Fatah and the establishment of the information bureau in Algiers.)

e. Italy - Represented by delegates from the Italian Communist Party and the Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP). They decided to be in an observer status, although they were entitled to be participants by the fact that they belong to a Palestinian Solidarity Committee in Italy. The only open political opposition to the overall political line of the Congress came from the Italians who passed out a statement at the final session deploring the importation of left-wing quarrels into the issue of Palestine.

f. France - The delegation was initially divided into factions but, on 27 December, a sort of truce was worked out and there was no overt trouble. Prominent members of the delegation were: Roger Fury, a leftist University lecturer, Jean-Pierre Vigier; Maurice Kravitz, brother of Alain Krivine; Frank Castro; and Marie-Claude Vignaud, the mistress of Abderrezak Benhadji (Algerian living in Paris).

g. West Germany - The delegation was composed primarily of unidentified militants of the Socialist German Student League -- SDS. The group took a very left sectarian position and joined with the PSC from Britain in openly refusing to give full support to the Al Fatah. On the other hand the Germans played no role, speaking only briefly in the Political Commission.

h. Spain

i. Switzerland

j. The Netherlands - Represented as observers by Kees Wagtendonk and Bertus Hendriks who came from Amsterdam. (Source Comment: Wagtendonk said that he was still a member of the Pacifist Socialist Party; Hendriks described himself as a Marxist-Leninist.)

k. Scandinavia - Included Sweden, and perhaps two other Scandinavian countries. (Source Comment: The small Scandinavian group, which came as observers, was guided during the proceedings by Samir Boutani who resides at Kulbacken 31, Hagersten, Stockholm. He is an Arab journalist who claims to write for Lebanese and Syrian publications and who had attended the Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal in Stockholm.)

l. Algeria

m. Palestine

n. United States - Delegation as follows:

(1) Herb Block, of the Ad Hoc Committee for a Marxist-Leninist Communist Party who led the delegation

(2) Mrs. Block, wife of Herb Block (Source Comment: The Blocks announced that they were attending the Congress under the pseudonym of "Douglas". Mrs. Block even went to the length of wearing a reddish wig and dark glasses. Neither Block played any significant role.)

(3) Eldridge Cleaver, Black Panther Party leader now residing in Algiers

(4) Don (LNU), a Negro from Chicago who accompanied the Blocks and who claimed to be a member of the Black Panther Party.

(5) Lewis Bergman, a former member of the Communist Party of USA in Chicago who now

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SEX F resides in San Francisco.
DOB 1943 USA, CALIF
CIT USA
OCC STUDENT

FR (201 - 271715)

(S) David F i n e m a n, who resides in San Francisco.

(Source Comment: The US delegation was accompanied by two newsreel photographers from the West Coast, one who gave his name as "Hardesty" FNU. They only attended the final session of the Congress and were primarily concerned with lobbying the PLO for facilities to go to Jordan to photograph guerrilla activities there.)

SEX M
CIT: USA
OCC: PHOTOGRAPHER

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION: XXX

TO: Chief, WOLIME

INFO: COS, London; C/EUR

FROM: Chief, LCPIPIT/London

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/Operational/[illegible]
QRPHONE/JAGUAR Reporting

Through London Station's liaison with JAGUAR we are sometimes able to monitor the reactions and attitudes of QRPHONE/1's enemies within radical circles in the U.K. We are forwarding, u/s/c, copies of two such recent JAGUAR reports. In this case they were particularly helpful in underlining the continuing need for attention to the cover backstopping of QRPHONE/1's sources of income.

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Attachments: u/s/c
stated above

S/C ATTD BY RID/SD
Dated 04 NOV 69

Distribution:
3 - C/WOLIME w/atts
1 - COS, London w/atts
1 - C/EUR w/o atts

1 ATT

CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
OSPA - 2115	14 October 1969
CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
S E C R E T/RYBAT	200-124-156/3

2R 201-725837 2R 201-301055 418 lc
OEPA-211

Lionel MORRISON and Richard GIBSON

MORRISON says Richard GIBSON is gunning for him because he is too involved with GIBSON's wife Sara. MORRISON had had an affair with Sara when he was working for the "Afro-Asian Journalist" and was visiting London. GIBSON had found out, and told a member of the P.A.C. about it. He in turn told MORRISON, and he told Sara. She challenged her husband, and asked how he dare spread rumours about her. Once before she had walked out on him.

2. MORRISON said GIBSON was worried because he did not know exactly what information MORRISON has about him. There was a confrontation of the two at a meeting of the Race Relations Institute at which GIBSON refused to sit with MORRISON. MORRISON asked him on that occasion to report the matter to "his masters", implying that GIBSON was an agent provocateur.

3. MORRISON says Sara told him that they live far above their means but are never in debt, and she could not understand it. That is why she had started a nursery school, and no longer did any work for GIBSON. Previously she had taken part in a number of GIBSON's activities, for instance "the MANCHANDA attempt to break up the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign".

4. Once GIBSON went to the Foreign Press Association claiming that MORRISON had forged an application form and was not working for "Zambian Mail". MORRISON is now a weekly contributor to that paper but was not when he first applied to the F.P.A. MORRISON says that at present GIBSON and his wife are on holiday for two months in Italy.

1P

2R 201-833039 A secret and reliable source states that TARIQ ALI is certain that GIBSON is working for the Americans. He claims that the Chinese have documentary proof of this, and for that reason they removed him from the editorial board of "Revolution", the Paris magazine they were financing. GIBSON had then come to London.

2. TARIQ ALI says GIBSON is very wealthy but no-one knows where his money comes from. From time to time he hands out donations to sympathisers saying that they are "on behalf of the Chinese".

2R 201-108746
3. TARIQ ALI also has suspicions that Robert WILLIAMS, "who was thrown out of both Cuba and Peking" may be working for the C.I.A.

Lionel MORRISON and Richard GIBSON — OEPA- [illegible]

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S/C ATT. 1 to OEPA-2115. CS COPY 200-124-156/3

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LISTENER REPORT #221, Algiers — 9 Jan 63

Subj: PRESIDENT BEN BELLA'S VIEWS

PADA: Ben Bella's apartment, Villa Joly, 20-2200 Jan 8
N.B. BEN BELLA REQUESTED ANY OF THESE VIEWS BE KEPT PRIVATE.

1. The moment of crisis in Algeria is over, and relatively speaking a breathing spell is here. Opposition is nil, with the students and labor unions won over, the Federation disbanded, other opposition dispersed or too unorganized to be effective, and the people persuaded to give Ben Bella's government a lengthy and sincere support to overcome Algerian problems. For the first time since emerging from prison, Ben Bella is getting six or seven hours sleep per night. He is relaxed, calm, confident.

2. Algeria's greatest problem now is reconstruction of the economy, including housing, agricultural reform, dams and irrigation, and some roads. In this respect, foreign aid is essential. He wishes that talks with the U.S. could start as soon as possible, and feels the best method to do this is to have an economic delegation visit Algeria to see on the spot the needs and special conditions. (He repeated several times that he wished the talks could start as soon as possible.) As for aid, he does not wish aid "which will help us eat better or have a higher standard of living" but rather aid "which will be of a developmental, constructional type" to permit the Algerian economy to help itself. In reply to the question whether he hoped more aid would come from the U.S. than from Russia, he said "I hope so, I hope so." (He gave the slight impression he felt the U.S. was much better equipped to aid.) The preliminary estimate of the government committee for the reconstruction of Algeria ~~[illegible]~~ is one hundred billion francs. This figure might go higher, but the final figure will be what Algeria will ask from France in additional help over the next two years. He stressed his appreciation for the American Ambassador, Mr. Porter, saying one of his most valuable qualities is that he actually loves the Algerian people, a trait extremely appreciated by him and the Algerian people.

3. The above help is in addition to the regular administrative budget and the operational budget. The administrative budget of 280 billion francs is a balanced budget, with receipts — especially because of the new taxes — expected without fail to equal expenditures. He mentioned several times that Algeria is too proud to ask anyone else to pay its administrative budget, i.e., pay its running expenses.

4. On the question of the economy, there will be a code established soon which will delimit the private and public sections of the economy. He was posed that some people do not believe there will be a private section, and said "People will someday learn to take me at my word. If I didn't mean it, I didn't have to say it. And if I change my mind, I will say that too, and I will give the reasons. But, there <u>will</u> be a private section of economy, and we do want foreign private investment."

5. Land reform in Algeria is and will be an experiment never tried anywhere. There will be both collective and state farms — Ben Bella does not believe in giving land to individual peasants because cut-up plots are economically un-productive. And in any case, the question of communal lands has been a tribal custom in Algeria for thousands of years, which even the French could never wholly erase, and the new arrangements are but a slight change from this ancient custom. To buttress this argument, he pointed to the fact that the peasants have

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already accepted with no difficulties the communal arrangement for the one million hectare of Biens Vacants (abandoned French lands) now being put into production. He contrasted this with the resistance of the Russian peasant "which caused the slaughter of millions of Russians from which Russian agriculture has not yet recovered". He feels even if production on these million hectares is lower than it was under French control, it is definitely worth it, since the profits won't go to one rich class which spends the money on the Riviera but will greatly boost the peasants' standard of living. In this respect, he was definitely not in agreement with Prof. Dumont's major criticisms of Algeria given on 9 January, and so told the professor in private.

6. With respect to Cuba, He was disappointed to return home to find that the misale bases did exist. His main hope in visiting Cuba—as he told President Kennedy quite frankly but correctly—was to help lower temperatures. He had advised President Kennedy not to invade, andhe had advised Castro to be more discreet in acceptance of arms. The end result was not disappointment, however, since "no man can be disappointed if a nuclear war has been avoided."

7. The U.S. reaction to the Yemen revolution disappointed him also, and he felt U.S. early actions were mistakes. It had appeared relations between Cairo and Washington were going to well prior to the Yemen crisis, andit had been a shame to ruin good relations. U.S. recognition of the Republic of Yemen however was highly welcome to him, and he feels this will do much to return U.S./Cairo relations to the previous high plane.

8. With respect to a United North Africa, he feels the time to act is now on a cultural and economic level. He feels identical textbooks, exchange of teachers, cultural exchanges, lowering of frontier custom and administrative barriers, etc. will start a movement which in the end will force constantly greater unity, even if the politicians don't really feel the time is ripe. He feels this is especially true in education and the exchange of economic advantages, such as procuring electricity from Oujda for Marnia or Tlemcen instead of from Oran.

9. "Upon his honor as a man" he swore he nor any Algerian had anything to do with the attempted assassination of Bourguiba. He also felt sure the two Youssefists in Algeria, who are good friends of his, had nothing to do with it. He felt his friendship with these two persons might have led to ~~[illegible]~~ suspicions that Algeria was involved. He said "that is not my way, and I have too many problems of my own to meddle in Tunisian affairs. It was a plot mounted andsupported in Tunisia itself."

10. Personal information gained: DOB 25 Dec 1916, Marnia, of parents born in Marrakech, Morocco, secondary studies at Tlemcen college, French army in France 1937–40, then demobilized, then French army 1943–45 in Italy where he received Military Medal and two others (highest medal possible, and he was first of three so decorated), then back to Algeria. In 1945 he was in 5th Moroccan regiment in Setif when 45,000 people were slaughtered, which marked his entry into politics. That action branded him for life, and he realized that force was the only answer to Algeria's cry for liberty. He does not hate the French in any way, however. That is in the past.

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*** Both at the beginning and the end of the evening, Ben Bella remarked how each time we met, he was reminded of the "fine" times at Tlemcen and how much he appreciat the help those broadcasts were to him. I delivered the tea set he had requested in D

LUSTRIMER REPORT #222, K lpa 9 Jan 63

Subj: Americans/ Marc Schleifer/Richard Gibson/Afrique Revolution

PADA: Home of Jean Marie Boeglin (Jeanson Network), 7 January 63

1. Boeglin scheduled an informal discussion between himself, Schleifer, an exile leader from the Union of South Africa, and Yves Mathieu (phonetic) at the Boeglin/Mathieu apartment. I was invited to participate, and to translate for Schleifer who speaks no French. The South African didn't appear, but we were joined later in the evening by a French lawyer Maurice Lm who works in Bienne Vacante and by Francois Lm, another Jeanson network character.

2. Boeglin has accepted me as being very leftist, "objective", and perhaps even communist—an impression I have nurtured with him. Thus, his acceptance of me as a like-minded person gave confidence to the others.

3. The evening was a discussion of the Cuban and Algerian revolutions. Schleifer was more or less the oracle, having been in Cuba twice, once for two months Dec 60/Jan 61 and recently for nine months. Personally, I felt Schleifer is so extremely left that he is a communist in everything except perhaps the card and the party membership. He is intelligent, reasons well, and is obviously well-read, being able to give quotes from books by title of the principal communist authors, especially Lenin. He is also fuzzy in that he seems to suspect U.S. positions as being propaganda positions and does not assume the same for Russian positions. At the same time, he gave me an impression of sincerity, quite a bit of criticism for Russia, and an obvious search for the truth. He didn't blink an eye when Mathieu assumed that we were all "Marxist, Socialist, and hoped for the eventual implantation of socialism even in the U.S." If he is not a communist, he is an extreme left fellow traveler.

4. The principal conclusions of the evening were that the Algerian revolution has proceeded along the path of socialism much faster than the Cuban revolution did, but that the Cuban revolution will reach true socialism before the Algerian revolution because of the limitating factor of the Evian agreements; the Cuban army was the spearhead of the revolutionary reforms in Cuba, but the Algerian army has not been due to the political crisis, a defect which is being corrected at the moment as plans are now being made for the Algerian army to assume the same position here; Russian and the U.S. after the Cuban brush have implicitly or explicitly made an agreement to keep out of Algeria in particular and Africa in general in favor of French and other European domination in order to keep from having a further stand-off as in Cuba; Russia is not ready for nor does it want further revolutions in Latin America or Africa—as opposed to Asia—since it is not ready to back such revolutions in the face of American or European opposition to the limit, and thus she can only lose face and the position of monopoly of communist leadership which she wishes to retain. Schleifer made one interesting statement that Morgan had been killed by Castro because he took funds from the CIA to finance a counter revolution.

I caused a flurry of dropped jaws during the evening, especially Mathieu—which was later forgiven because of my "known" objectivity—when I described the lower middle-class farm of my family with its 80 hectares, tractors, combine, etc., and declared communism couldn't work in such a wealthy atmosphere. Mathieu agreed that perhaps in the U.S. no more effective utilization and distribution of land could be envisaged.

5. Later I took Schleifer to his room, the home of Richard Gibson. He was due to leave for Morocco on 9 January, but stayed over to get an interview with Ben Bella which was to be arranged, or "guaranteed" as he put it, by Doeglin. From there he is to go to the States. I asked him what he was doing here, and he replied just traveling. Doeglin hadtold me he was a sociologist with a study grant, but Schleifer denied he was a sociologist, volunteering nothing about a grant. He told me Gibson was staying in Algiers to put out a new paper called "Afrique Revolution" which was to be a big, slick publication with many photos and a selling price which would enable it to replace Jeune Afrique throughout Africa. When I asked about financing, he said the Algerian government was financing it heavily. He suggested we meet again 8 January so he could present me to Gibson who was looking for a photographer, and suggested I could be that photographer at a nominal salary. I replied I would be interested more from the point ofprestige and publication rather than salary since I was doing well in my present journalistic endeavor as far as salary went. I was kept from making the meeting, but I talked by phone with Gibson (who speaks French so badly he couldn't complete a sentence on the phone) and the meeting is to be set up on 10 January.

6. Doeglin requested Mathieu, who is a high official in the Biens Vacants section dealing with agriculture problems to set up a series of photos for me. Mathieu met me at the CO office 8 January and sent me on a visit to communal lands in Zeralda with an assistant, Mohamed Cherif Mosteghanemi (a real "pure" militant) on 9 January. Mathieu also presented me to the Director of the program, Mahjoub (phonetic) whom I had known since his days in the Ben Khedda cabinet. Mahjoub has given me carte blanche for a report in depth of the entire program, to be made over the next few weeks. At Zeralda, the regional monitor turned out to be an acquaintance from Tlemcen FLN office, and I was permitted to photograph any and everything I desired. To finish this report, I will be furnished with complete figures, etc., as well as further trips in the field, especially in the Constantine area.

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LUSTRIX-R REPORT #223, Kulpa 9 Jan 63

Subj: Requested list of continual contacts, for which requirements are to be tailored.

1. President Ben Bella; seems to answer quite frankly whatever question I pose.

2. Commandant Sliman; slippery in questioning, but has evidenced desire to make recorded interview which will "shock" America on whatever subject I choose; Also has suggested a report on the army of the south with him as guide; has also agreed to explain army system to me; also has agreed to intercede with Boumedienne to permit me to photograph Angolan trainees.

3. Braham Bouzar; has sewed up Gendarmerie and Army oil contracts for Shell and sees army leaders frequently, worked on budget with Boumedienne; is married to sister of Minister of Finance Francis; step-daughter married to Bedjaoui of Ben Bella's office.

4. Dr. Hadj Hamou and brother of same name who works in Finance Ministry; has suggested I arrange informal meeting with him and Ambassador Porter at my home.

5. Mohamed Madjad; former Director of Security, now to work in Ministry Foreign Affairs; to present me to his successor Yousseffi.

6. Jamal Kiari, Director of Tourism; good friend Security Director Yousseffi, Madjad, other important government members.

7. Jean Marie Boeglin, former Jeanson Network now assistant Ministry of Information.

8. Yves Mathieu & Mahjoub (promotio) of Biens Vacants

9. WHA[illegible]MY/4, now Algerian Radio.

10. Marc Schleifer/ Richard Gibson, American "leftists", connected with Afrique Revolution.

11. Louis Aletti, Hotel Aletti; good friend of Chinese Ambassador, agrees/and to find produces generally any information I request of him. Knows most bloc people.

12. [illegible] Nahi (in spite of lack of firstname, we are quite good friends & exchange visits frequently), formerly with Shell, now in Government office dealing with all Oil questions.

13. Mohamed Yazid, deputy; seems anxious deepen our old but rather light friendship.

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LUSTRIKER REPORT #231, Kulpa 30 Jan 63

Subj: Contacts, Jan 25-29 Jan.

1. Serge Michel: Saw him Aletti hotel, his house, and three times my house. He says Yazid is de facto Minister of Information now, and will become Minister of Information over the next few weeks or month. Michel stayed with El Chaab long enough to get it on its feet, then moved on to plans for Atlas. When Atlas is established, he will move on again to books on Algeria and one-shot publications. He is going to the Congo in early April for a week to gather material for articles on Angola and the Congo. He is taking the line that Kennedy and Khruschev are "allies", with De Gaulle and Mao as enemies; thus Algeria should not support nor attack either one too much. He feels the Afrique Revolution is making political mistakes in this respect by attacking the United States (presumably with an article on Meredith & Mississippi) and can be termed the extreme left in Algeria. He feels Afrique Revolution will be taken over by Atlas staff in six months or less, and run on aless violent basis. Serge talked of his ancestors, saying they were all from Georgia, and that a translator was used when he talked with his grand parents who only spoke Georgian not Russian. He is an apatride with a Moroccan passport (which I saw but couldn't get the number) which contains his nationality as Moroccan, as opposed to other Moroccan passports for Algerians which have the nationality lined through. His father was apatride also, and Serge claims he feels more for Algeria than any other country. He arrived here the first time when he was 20 years old, and from that time lived with Algerian rebels. He is 41 years old now. He has three boys, about one year, four and six, all with Russian first names, and occupies a villa in Hydra. His wife speaks French with an accent, Russian I believe. His infant is very sick with athsma.

2. Richard Gibson & wife: Saw them in his office as result of his request for photos for Dave Watts in New York for the latters "Liberator" publication, which is a slick, leftist publication with a format something like a cross between Newsweek and The New Yorker. I gave him fourphotos without my name, but he insisted on putting my name on the back for credit. He said Watts would pay me directly, since he had my address already. He also said I would probably get photo requests from London from a person whose name he didn't remember. This person and Watts are also correspondents for Afrique Revolution in their cities. Mrs. Gibson is white, and appeared to me to be jewish, probably from Brooklyn, judging from her accent. However, she could be foreign since the accent is difficult to place. Eduardo dos Santos was in the office, but wasn't very friendly. Gibson knew of my trip to Angola, probably from dos Santos via the Congo embassy in Tunis, and wanted some photos when I returned.

3. Jean Marie Boeglin: Boeglin phoned me, after having missed a luncheon with me last week. He has acted on my request to speak to Jacques Verges about using me when possible for Afrique Revolution. Verges is to meet me tomorrow to discuss photos. I am to bring one—violent action if possible—which is to be used as the first cover of Revolution, if it is a suitable photo. Boeglin will be there, and we are to meet today to plan the conversation with Verges to make sure I benefit.

4. Djmal Tchanderli: (brother of U.N. Chanderli, although name spelled differently). He came to my home with Michel. He is going to the Congo to film Angolans in March, and wanted my agreement not to film for my cover company while there. I finally agreed, extracting a promise from him that he would not take myphotos, thus leaving me that monopoly in exchange for the film monopoly. He & Michel feel they are related, both families coming from Georgia, & Michel having an uncle named Tchanderli.

Secret

AF/Pied.

LUSTRIFER REPORT #231, Kulna   25 Jan 62

Subj: Contacts 21-24 January

1. Serge Michel: Saw him four times at Hotel Aletti, discussed mostly "Atlas". Asked me to prepare six color covers in advance, first one to illustrate ancient Corbusier plan for face-lifting of Algeria which is now planned by Algerian Government. Claims Afrique Revolution will be "absorbed" by Atlas (probably both under same editorship). Roberto Holden phoned Josie Fanon from Tunis, he will be in Rome Saturday, will send my ticket and visa for Congo from there. I am to leave soon as possible.

2. Louis Aletti, about sixty years, 220 pounds, 6'2", white hair, blue eyes, French, worked in States several years in 1920's, speaks English well, friend of most diplomats in city including Chinese, is accepted by Algerians as being anti-OAS in spirit. He claims the East German government has full recognition by the Algerians, cited Ben Bella's attendance at national holiday of East Germans, though Scharfenberg is only Charge d'Affairs. Gave me Chinese embassy address as 35 Rue Luciani, El Biar, phone 65-19-48. Will have me to lunch with East Germans whenever I wish.

3. Taib Jarai, Hotel Aletti & the city. Jarai had difficulty with reporters of RepubliqueAlgeric and was in rage over "stupid communists". Again claimed Irving Brown was CIA agent in front of a French radio speakerine.

4. Dr. Hadj Hamou, Jamal Misri, Braham Bouzar, at my home and at their homes. Nothing of interest conversed.

5. Fmu BOUZAR, police ~~xxxxxxx~~ officer, plus two of his friends, at Rora. Nothing of interest except the three of them very idealistic, insisting everyone must work to ~~maximum~~ for minimum pay in order build Algeria. Seems to be typical attitude among young Algerians.

6. Zerati, police commissioner, Les Pecheries for lunch. Extremely pro-American, talked of all his OIS friends from Morocco at Ben Guerir while he worked in Marrakech. He should be contacted by someone under official cover as being "sent by his old OIS friends" or some such ploy. He can be developed.

7. Abdelkader Mazery (phonetic), Secretary General of the Assembly, my home. Nothing of interest, but he is quite likeable and certainly of importance. Will see him again rather frequently.

Secret

Secret

LUSTRIKER REPORT #832, Fulpa 31 Jan 63

Subj: Contacts, 30 Jan— 31 Jan.

1: Jean Marie Boeglin: Saw him three times, his home, office of Revolution Africaine, and Brasserie du Berry, 30-31 January. He arranged meeting with Jacques Verges, Director of Revolution Afrique, having told Verges that I was "practically a militant" who would work well for the cause instead of the salary. He also offered me the "exclusive" job as photographer for the Information Bureau of Biens Vacants, with all expenses for trips etc paid for by the ministry, but with very little extra salary. I accepted, saying that was a good method to study the reforme agraire deeply for an article. Yves Mathieu will be my boss in that job. Boeglin then took me to the Opera where he has an office in capacity as Technical Director of the National Theatre. He requested me to furnish him with photos he could use for the Theatre posters and for the programs for the first production scheduled in mid-March. I agreed.

2. Jacques Verges: Saw him 1100 31 Jan in the office of Revolution Africaine, of which he is director. Madame Zahah Bitat is to be the editor in chief of this publication. Verges immediately offered me a job as a regular salaried photographer of Revolution or as a piece-meal photographer. I indicated I thought payment by the job was better, since my cover outfit is not "liberal" as I am. Regular salary for everyone on the paper, from the lowest secretary to Verges himself, as decided by Verges, is to be 100,000 francs per month. My job payments will amount to about thatmuch. I will take a trip once a week with Georges Arno (phonetic) to do photos on the feature article on Algeria for each week's publication. Verges also ordered six photos from me from my contact prints, and took one photo on the spot for the cover of the second issue due out 9 February. The cover of the firstissue of 2 February is to be a photo of Lumumba. Verges took me around to introduce me to the rest of the staff—all sullen characters who hardly said hello with the exception of Cinat, the ex-Express cartoonist—and showed me the physical layout. He invited me to the opening cocktail party for Saturday night also. Boeglin later said he was quite impressed with my photo collection.

3. Serge Michel: Came to my home 31 Jan when I wasn't home, but I talked with him from Botras' house. Michel had with him "an FLN responsable" who wants to commission me to produce the photos for an FLN publication, slick style one-shot but presented as a "weekly", on Algerian women. We set up a meeting for Saturday morning to discuss it. We will take a trip into the Kabyle area to start these shots of women.

4. Djamal Tchanderli: Saw him down town, said he wanted to discuss something important with me, made date for tonight, but he didn't show. Will see him tomo[rrow]

5. Talked by phone with Tony Pell and Frank Kearns (directing CBS Paris since Kleiman is in New York since Christmas with rumored sick wife—he may be getting fired) in Paris. They are extremely interested in the Congo trip, approve it fully in spite of leaving radio uncovered here, want both radio broadcasts and actuality tapes. Also want me to shoot movies, and insist I make a deal with Tchanderli to permit me to shoot movies. Am to phone them tomorrow for latest word from New York on actual requirements and possible premium payments for Congo/Angolese movies.

6. Abdelkader Bel Hacene, two Deputies, at Hotel Aletti. Nothing of interest.

13

14-00000

C/NE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

TO: Chief of Station, Paris

INFO: Chief, NE
Chief, WE

FROM: Chief of Station, New Delhi

SUBJECT: KOBIRD/LCHARVEST/PADBAYON
PADBAYON/1 Relationship with Jacques M. Verges

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: FYI

RI: Index this dispatch to 201 file of Jacques M. Verges, French citizen, Director of pro-Chinese Communist magazine "Revolution". Also index to 201 file of Richard Gibson, U.S. citizen, Editor-in-Chief of the English language edition of "Revolution".

201-179169

1. Forwarded, herewith, as Attachment 1 to this dispatch is a copy of the letter cited in the reference from PADBAYON/1 to Jacques M. Verges. Attachment 2 is a copy of the reply written by Richard Gibson on behalf of Verges. Attachment 3 is a personality sketch of Verges prepared by PADBAYON/1.

2. Regarding Attachment 1, Tilak is a mutual friend who currently is studying in Canada. "Algerian Sister" refers to Jamila Bouirhead. The remainder of the attachments are believed to be self-explanatory.

3. Headquarters asked (DIR 05476) if PADBAYON could furnish any information on Hamsa Alavi of Pakistan who is on the Editorial Board of "Revolution". PADBAYON/1 had not previously heard of this individual.

Attachments
1,2,3 as stated

Edmund F. LAHSENE

Distribution:

2-COS, Paris w/att
2 - C/NE w/att
2 - C/WE w/att
2 - Files

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CS COPY

40-6-138/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: NPDA-10,084

DATE: 12 March 1964

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 40-6-138/3
201- (Verges)
201- (Gibson)

14-00000

3

Jacques Verges 10 March 1964

__Physical details__

Verges is about 38 years old; about 5'5" tall and of medium build. He is fair colored, has a Chinese-looking face and wears spectacles. He has dark hair and dark eyes.

__Parentage__

Verges was born in Reunion Island which is a French Protectorate. His father is a citizen of that Island and his mother was from Indo-China. He has at least one older brother. The father was a Member of the French Parliament representing Reunion Island. Now the brother Paul Verges, is a Member of Parliament from that Island.

__Marital Status__

Verges was married about 1946 but was divorced in about 1959. He has one son from this marriage. It is now heard that he has married again in about 1963 to Jamilia Bouirhead, the famous Algerian prisoner who was sentenced to death but was given a reprieve. He defended her during her trial.

__Personal Habits__

Verges was a prominent student in Paris and was from the very beginning a very good debator. He is a charming conversationlist and can keep any audience completely enraptured by his talk. He has been extremely popular with all groups and particular with females. He is very fond of eating well. He takes spicy food which would put even an Indian to shame. He drinks very little, works late hours, sleeps long in the mornings. He has an artistic temperament and good taste.

__Career__

In about 1950 Verges started working in the International Union of Students in Prague. There he was Secretary of I.U.S. and later also of International Students' Relief which was formed moreor less in his time. He remained there till 1954. After this he returned to Paris and studied to get his law degree. From about 1955 to 1962 he worked as a lawyer in France. As a lawyer he rose to prominence immediately. He was elected to the first Secretaryship of the French Young Lawyers' Body, which is a post of academic distinction. From the very beginning Verges started taking political cases of those who were accused in the various French colonies of "sedition". He was adopted by the F.L.N. of Algeria as the Chief of the Legal Defence Bureau in Paris. He conducted several famous trials including that of Jamilia and at the same time carried on the campaign for Algerian independence in France and elsewhere. For

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14-00000

some time he was in trouble at the hands of the political groups opposed to Algerian independence. He was provided a guard outside his house and for a little while had even to leave France to live in Geneva because of fear for his life. Even in the legal defence that he conducted, the basis was entirely political. He was all this period subscribing to an extremist view which may be called ultra-revolutionary. For example, in his legal defence his theory was always to justify an act of killing by an accused on the ground that it was part of a war of independence.

Almost from the very beginning and in any case from 1951 Verges had serious difference with the French C.P. He considered them to be reformists and accused them of being cowardly in their support to the Algerian revolution. He was never a member thereof in this period and often worked against them.

In 1962 he shifted to Rabat as Political Adviser to the King. He was very friendly with a Senior Minister, "Ahmad", and his post in Rabat was brought about by the Minister. However, it appears he did not continue long in this post and was back in Paris in 1963. Now he is the Chief Editor of a political monthly journal called "Revolution". He is also reported to be the head of the China Lobby in Paris.

Acquaintance

The writer met Verges in 1951 when he visited Delhi. In 1955 the writer stayed with Verges in Paris twice and twince again in 1958. The last time the writer saw Verges was in Paris in 1961. (In 1951 Verges was in Delhi in connection with an I.U.S. meeting. In 1955 the writer was in Paris on his way to and from Prague in connection with I.U.S. matters. In 1958 he visited Paris going to and from Stockholm for the Youth Festival Preparatory Committee meeting. And in 1961 the writer was in Paris to attend an I.A.D.L. Commission on Algeria.) Verges has always been very friendly and cordial with the writer and openly discusses his problems, views, activities, etc.

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. CELA-38,485
TO: Chief, WE		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 11-500.
FROM: Chief of Station, London		DATE 14 May 1963
SUBJECT: OLENVAY/JAGUAR Charles GIBSON		X MARKED FOR INDEXING
ACTION REQUIRED: Provide traces		NO INDEXING REQUIRED / INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

1. JAGUAR have reported that a secret and delicate source has provided information about an Afro-American who is editing the English edition of a publication, entitled "African Revolution". French editions of this paper are being published in Algiers under the title of "Revolution Africaine" and the English edition is being published in Lausanne, where the journal has established an office. The American editor is Charles GIBSON, who was born in California in 1931, and was until September 1962, the Executive Secretary of an organization styled "The Fair Play for Cuba" Committee in the United States. GIBSON is said to have been previously employed by the CBS News in New York, who dismissed him for his pro-Cuban activities. He is also said to have worked for the F.L.N. in Paris and to have had a Fellowship in African Studies at Columbia University Graduate School at one time.

2. JAGUAR would appreciate any additional information that Headquarters could provide about this man's background and activities.

LAWRENCE L. HOLDY

Distribution:
4-Chief, WE

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201-300-11 11-2-3

14-00000

SECRET CONTROL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

	REPORT NUMBER: OEL-30,251
FROM: ENGLAND, LONDON	DATE. 24 September 1964
NUMBER OF PAGES: 1	NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS:
REPORT MADE BY: LEROY T. WADSWORTH	REPORT APPROVED BY: VICTOR T. CRONBIGH

DISTRIBUTION BY COPY TO: Washington 1

Paris (LCPIPIT) 1 OFL

Paris 1 OFP

Bern 1

Registry

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JAGUAR
ORIGINATING ~~XXXXX~~ SECTION: E.1 REFERENCE OSLA-41,545 of 10 Sept 64.

11-4-105

SOURCE, OPERATIONAL DATA AND COMMENTS:

JAGUAR Comment: "The attached report contains some futher information (see reference which was not sent Bern) about the difficulties experienced in recent months by "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution".

"Please do not give contents of this report any further distribution, other than to ODACID, WASHINGTON, without prior reference to us."

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SECRET CONTROL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

D 200-4-305
D 29-4-105

11-4-105

14-00000

SECRET

Att. to OEL-39,251
24 Sept 1964

RICHARD GIBSON
CIT. U.K. OCC PUBLISHING
BA ENGLAND
WAS ED. "AF, LAT AM, ASIA REVO." SEPT 64 TOOK LEGAL ACTION + WON £1,500 DUE HIM IN PAST SALARY. SUBJ DOESN'T EXPECT J. VERGES WILL BE ABLE TO PAY.
O "AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION"

A secret source has provided the following information about "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" and its French counterpart "Revolution" and about the differences between Jacques VERGES, the publication's Director, and Richard GIBSON who was Editor until he was dismissed about two months ago.

2. On 13th August 1964, the Swiss Federal Council banned "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution", which had hitherto been printed in Lausanne, and the Swiss authorities took possession of previous issues and subscription lists. GIBSON was however able to retain possession of one copy of the subscription list as well as distribution records and most of the unpublished manuscripts.

3. When GIBSON was removed from his position as Editor of the publication he and his wife were owed a substantial sum in arrears of salary. Jacques VERGES made no attempt to pay these arrears with the result that the GIBSONs took legal action and received judgement in their favour early in September for a sum in excess of £1,500. GIBSON expects that VERGES will be unable to pay this sum or to meet other debts and that he will be declared bankrupt. GIBSON hopes that it will then be possible for Nils ANDERSON, the Swedish printer of the English edition, to take over both the English and French editions.

4. 201- [illegible] <Because of his financial difficulties with "AF, Lat Am, Asia Revo" JACQUES VERGES has had to give up the tenancy of the Paris office of the publication at rue François 1er, and has moved to 52 rue Galande, Paris 5e. Richard Gibson expects he will be declared bankrupt.>

RICHARD GIBSON
CIT. U.S. — OCC PUBLISHING
OA ENGLAND
EDITOR ED. "AF LAT AM, ASIA REVO" SEPT 64 TOOK LEGAL ACTION + WON £1,500 DUE HIM IN PAST SALARY. SUBJ DOESN'T EXPECT J. VERGES WILL BE ABLE TO PAY

O "AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION"

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NILS ANDERSON
Δ ENGLAND
OCC. PRINTER
SWEDISH PRINTER OF ENG EDITION OF "AF LAT AM ASIA REVO"
RICHARD GIBSON HOPES SUBJ WILL TAKE OVER BOTH ENG + FR EDITIONS

22nd September 1964.

INDEX -X

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING: XX — NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief, WE

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT: KEYWAY Psych
Jacque VERGES & Richard T. GIBSON Expelled from Switzerland

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REFERENCE: OELW - 20852 (9 December 1963)

1. LCBEFORE reported on 17 January 1964 that Subjects, both of whom are mentioned in reference dispatch concerning Révolution Africaine (GIBSON is a US citizen) and were working from that publication's Lausanne office, have left Switzerland at the request of the Swiss Government. According to LCBEFORE, VERGES departed Switzerland on 25 November 1963 for Latin America (possibly Brasil); and GIBSON departed on 15 December 1963.

2. LCBEFORE believes that in part it can take credit for these expulsions in view of the fact that LCBEFORE-inspired publicity about Révolution Africaine has appeared in the Swiss press and that this publicity helped to draw the matter to the Swiss authorities' attention, thus prompting them to expel these two propagandists.

3. LCBEFORE also noted on 17 January 1964 that the November 1963 issue of Révolution Africaine lists Lausanne as a bureau (and Paris as the Main Office) whereas the October 1963 issue listed Lausanne as the Main Office and Paris as one of the bureaus.

LUKE B. TANCHESTER

3 - C/WE

DATE TYPED: 22 Jan 64

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OELA - 40613

CROSS REFERENCE TO: CS COPY

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING

TO: Chief, WE

INFO: Chief, KUWOLF; Chief of Station, Paris
Chief of Station, Paris(LCPIPIT); Chief, KUDESK

FROM: Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT: JAGUAR Paper on Revolution

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: OELA-40,542(15 April 1964)

1. Reference forwarded a JAGUAR paper dealing with the well-known Communist magazine Revolution. Attached are (1) another JAGUAR note from SMOCK's office, and (2) the paper received with it. Please note JAGUAR's caveats on the use of the material.

2. SMIMPISH also remarked to me, on one recent occasion, that he had learned that Richard GIBSON had been expelled from the staff of Revolution (as is indicated here), but the reason that SMIMPISH gave was that GIBSON had been accused of working on behalf of "subversive" elements, which SMIMPISH implied to mean KUBARK. Maybe SMIMPISH was speculating on or misquoting this JAGUAR report. I haven't been able to go back to SMIMPISH on this, because he has subsequently gone on leave.

3. We (and JAGUAR) would appreciate any comments on this report.

George E. FATTENBACH

Attachment: herewith
1-Letter
2-Report

Distribution:
3-Chief, WE w/att h/w
2-C/KUWOLF w/att h/w
2-C/LCPIPIT w/att h/w
2-C/KUDESK w/att h/w
2-COS/Paris w/att h/w

CS COPY

DATE TYPED: 10 Sept 64

DATE DISPATCHED:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OELA-41,545

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER:

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

14-00000

ADD/2

2P

"AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION"

Reports received from a number of sources make it clear that "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" has been in difficulties for several months and it appears that the last issue was No. 11 dated March 1964. The trouble began, apparently, when the French authorities seized copies of issue No. 7 of the French edition, "Revolution", dated March 1964 because of an article it contained on French overseas territories. Creditors became alarmed, fearing that the publication might be banned, and demanded settlement of their debts which were then estimated to exceed £10,000. Jacques VERGES, the publication's Director, tried to effect administrative economies in order to cope with the situation but according to VERGES, Richard GIBSON, the Editor, argued that the Chinese should be asked to pay the debts. Matters worsened when, again according to VERGES, GIBSON persuaded the Lausanne printer to write to Peking and ask the Chinese to settle the publication's debt to him. VERGES regarded GIBSON's activities as deliberately disruptive and designed to produce proof of China's support for the publication.

201-180164

2. Also, VERGES complained that GIBSON was working for Communist splinter groups in Europe to the detriment of the international Communist movement, and that he was dealing tactlessly with the magazine's agents and contributors. The situation was such that VERGES visited the U.K. in mid-July to discuss the position with BABU, a member of the Editorial Board. BABU, who is now Minister of State for Development Planning of the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, was in London for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference.

201-379225

3. In July 1964 there were rumours that the English edition had gone bankrupt but these were denied by GIBSON who suggested that the English and French editions should be made quite separate, and that the former should be published in London. At about this time the split between VERGES and GIBSON became complete and the latter was removed from his position as Editor and from the Editorial Board, which issued the following "warning":-

> "Comrades from New York, London and Accra (Ghana) have raised up grave charges against Richard GIBSON. These charges have been confirmed and underlined by Richard GIBSON's present disruptive activities. Revolution's Editorial Board has decided to dismiss Richard GIBSON from all his responsibilities and expell him from the Editorial Board.
>
> "From now on, Richard GIBSON's activities can not in any way engage the responsibility of the review in all its editions.
>
> for the Editorial Board"

A similar statement was published in "Revolution" No. 10-11 dated July-August 1964.

(JACQUES VERGES (201-180164) DIRECTOR OF AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION, EXPELLED RICHARD GIBSON EDITOR, BECAUSE LATTER ARGUED THAT CHINESE/4. With GIBSON.. SHOULD BE ASKED TO PAY DEBTS OF PUBLICATION.)

14-00000

SECRET

- 2 -

4. With GIBSON out of the way, VERGES and his supporters were hoping to resume publication of the English edition.. GIBSON also seemed determined to carry on and it has been reported that as early as June 1964 he was enquiring into the possibility of publishing an English version in the Netherlands.

5. The only other change of significance which has occurred during 1964 has been the resignation from the Editorial Board of Hamza ALAVI who objected to the publication's pro-Chinese attitude. Issue No. 11 of "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" shows that he was replaced by another Pakistani. the 78 year old Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan BHASHANI. BHASHANI, who lives in East Pakistan, is the leader of the National Awami Party.

201 2d-070343

1st September 1964.

FR
HAMZA ALAVI
CIT. PAKISTAN
RESIGNED FROM EDITORIAL BOARD OF "AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION" BECAUSE HE OBJECTED TO ITS PRO-CHINESE ATTITUDE

FR
<MAULANA ABDUL HAMID KHAN BHASHANI (201-070343) LIVES EAST PAKISTAN + IS LEADER OF NATIONAL AWAMI PARTY. ON EDITORIAL BOARD OF AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION" REPLACED HAMZA ALAVI WHO OBJECTED TO ITS PRO-CHINESE ATTITUDE.>

FR
< RICHARD GIBSON (201-300252) EXPELLED FROM STAFF OF "AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION" JACQUES VERGES CLAIMED HIS ATTEMPT TO HAVE CHINESE PAY PLA'S DEBT DELIB DISRUPTIVE + DESIGNED TO PROVE CHINA'S SUPPORT, THAT HE WORKING FOR COM SPLINTER GROUPS TO DETRIMENT OF INTERNAT COM, + THAT HE DEALING TACTLESSLY WITH PLA'S AGENTS + CONTRIBUTORS.>

from London who came as an observer

SEX M
CIT: UK

(7) Max H u n t, a teacher in London who came as an observer for the Schools' Action Union

MEMBER

SEX M
CIT: UK
OCC: BOOK SHOP MANAGER ASSOCIATED WITH

(8) Matt L . g a . . , manager of the Scottish Vanguard Bookshop at 27_ Paisley Road, Glasgow, which is owned by the Scottish Workers Party

(9) David R. S h a n k s, from the MEMBER Scottish Workers Party who lives at 66 Dundee Street in Edinburgh

SEX M
CIT. UK

Delegation from the Palestine Solidarity Campaign (PSC) as follows:

(1) Roger Y o u n g, treasurer of Friends of Palestine which is now affiliated with the PSC

(2) Norman T e m p l e, of the Friends of Palestine MEMBER

(3) Abdullah Y a s a . . o, of the Friends of Palestine MEMBER

(4) Louis E a k e s, of the Young Liberals MEMBER

(5) an unidentified girl friend of Eakes

(6) (fnu) H a l l i e r, of Agit-Prop (a PSC member) MEMBER

(7) (fnu) W a l k e r, who came as an observer

(8) Bill G u u n, of Reg Birch's Communist Party of Britain/Marxist-Leninist and of the PSC MEMBER

(9) Dave H . l u n d e ll, of the Revolutionary Socialist Students Federation (RSSF) in London MEMBER

SEX M
CIT UK
AFFILIATED WITH ~~MEMBER OF~~ PALESTINE SOLIDARITY CAMPAIGN

SEX M

(Source Comment: This delegation had been sent to Algiers by the London-based PLO representative, (fnu) A r m a n a z i, who is apparently the editor of the newspaper "Free Palestine". The newspaper, however, lists its editor as "Aziz Yafi" Armanazi had supplied the airfare for this delegation because he did not want the PSC people to go to Algiers under the arrangements of Manchanda. All of the PSC people were young and no match for Manchanda who, in the final session of the Congress, was able to isolate them completely inasmuch as they opposed the recognition of Al Fatah and the establishment of the information bureau in Algiers.)

e. Italy - Represented by delegates from the Italian Communist Party and the Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP). They decided to be in an observer status, although they were entitled to be participants by the fact that they belong to a Palestinian Solidarity Committee in Italy. The only open political opposition to the overall political line of the Congress came from the Italians who passed out a statement at the final session deploring the importation of left-wing quarrels into the issue of Palestine.

14-00000

f. France - The delegation was initially divided into factions but, on 27 December, a sort of truce was worked out and there was no overt trouble. Prominent members of the delegation were: Roger Wury, a leftist University lecturer, Jean-Pierre Vigier; (fnu) Kravitz, brother of Alain Krivine; (fnu) Castro; and Marie-Claude Vignaud, the mistress of Abderrezak Benhadji (Algerian living in Paris).

g. West Germany - The delegation was composed primarily of unidentified militants of the Socialist German Student League -- SDS. The group took a very left sectarian position and joined with the PSC from Britain in openly refusing to give full support to the Al Fatah. On the other hand the Germans played no role, speaking only briefly in the Political Commission.

h. Spain

i. Switzerland

j. The Netherlands - Represented as observers by Kees Wagtendonk and Bertus Hendriks who came from Amsterdam. (Source Comment: Wagtendonk said that he was still a member of the Pacifist Socialist Party; Hendriks described himself as a Marxist-Leninist.)

k. Scandinavia - Included Sweden, and perhaps two other Scandinavian countries (Source Comment: The small Scandinavian group, which came as observers, was guided during the proceedings by Samir Boutani who resides at Slutbacken 31, Hagersten, Stockholm. He is an Arab journalist who claims to write for Lebanese and Syrian publications and who had attended the Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal in Stockholm.)

l. Algeria

m. Palestine

n. United States - Delegation as follows:

(1) Herb Block, of the Ad Hoc Committee for a Marxist-Leninist Communist Party who led the delegation

(2) Mrs. Block, wife of Herb Block (Source Comment: The Blocks announced that they were attending the Congress under the pseudonym of "Douglas". Mrs. Block even went to the length of wearing a reddish wig and dark glasses. Neither Block played any significant role.)

(3) Eldridge Cleaver, Black Panther Party leader now residing in Algiers

(4) Don (LNU), a Negro from Chicago who accompanied the Blocks and who claimed to be a member of the Black Panther Party.

(5) Leslie Bergman, a former member of the Communist Party of USA in Chicago who now

14-00000

S E C R E T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/
BACKGROUND USE ONLY

SEX F resides in San Francisco.
DOB 1943 USA, CALIF
CIT USA
OCC STUDENT

(8) David Fineman, who resides in San Francisco

(Source Comment: The US delegation was accompanied by two newsreel photographers from the West Coast, one who gave his name as "Hardesty". They only attended the final session of the Congress and were primarily concerned with lobbying the PLO for facilities to go to Jordan to photograph guerrilla activities there.)

SEX M
CIT: USA
OCC: PHOTOGRAPHER

S E C R E T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/
BACKGROUND USE ONLY

200-9-54

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING: XXX — NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief, WE

INFO: Chief, KUWOLF; COS, Paris; Chief, LCPIPIT, Chief, KUDESK

FROM: Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT: KEYWAY
JAGUAR Paper on Revolution-Africa, Latin America, Asia

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REFERENCE: OELS 6746 (7 January 1964)

1. Reference authorized the Station to pass the 3 January 1964 issue of Propaganda Notes, Series H-40 (b) on Subject Chicom-financed publication to liaison.

2. We passed the KUBARK paper to SMOTH, LCBEFORE, and JAGUAR and requested comment.

3. JAGUAR's 3 April 1964 response, prepared by SMOCK, is attached. Please note the caveat in SMOCK's paragraph five; and that SMOCK indicates in paragraph four that the JAGUAR response is on behalf of LCBEFORE and SMOTH as well.

Luke B. Tanchester
LUKE B. TANCHESTER

Attachment: herewith
1. SMOCK response
2. Note "Africa, LA, Asia Revolution"

Distribution
3 - Chief, WE w/att.
1 - Chief, KUWOLF w/att.
1 - COS, Paris w/att.
1 - Chief, LCPIPIT w/att.
1 - Chief, KUDESK w/att.

INDEX

CS COPY

DATE TYPED: 15 April 64

DATE DISPATCHED:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OELA - 40,542

CROSS REFERENCE TO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

14-00000

SECRET 3912952

DIR INFO ROME LOND CITE PALP 6112 IN 86048

DTDORIC QRIBONY QRPREY

REF PALP 6111 (IN 86062)
201-306056

1. QREBONY REPORTS HIS FAMILY SITUATION DIFFICULT BECAUSE MUST LEAVE APARTMENT 1 JUNE AND MAKES LOT OF DIFFERENCE WHETHER MOVE IS PERMANENT (ALLOWING LONG-TERM ADVANTAGEOUS LEASE OR PURCHASE) OR TEMPORARY. IF STAYS LONDON WIFE CAN GET JOB, AND IS TRYING AT INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION FOR FAMILY PLANNING, WHICH WOULD INVOLVE TRAVEL NEAR EAST ETC. WIFE WOULD NOT MIND STAYING IN LONDON BUT WOULD LIKE ROME AS WELL. IN ANY CASE, DECISION NECESSARY. REQUEST ADDEE COMMENTS.

2. Q WOULD LIKE HAVE WIFE IN ROME OFR AT LEAST 3-4 DAYS DURING HIS END-APRIL STAY THERE TO IMPROVE HER MORALE (COMPLAINS SHE NEVER GOES ANYWHERE) AND MAINLY TO MEET CAROLE PINA, ABOUT WHOM SHE HAS HEARD. MORE INVOLVED USE OF PINA WILL REQUIRE PUTTING TO REST WIFE'S JEALOUSY. PALP REQUESTS AUTHORIZATION TRAVEL NOT PER DIEM FOR Q WIFE TO ... CRET

201-124-156/2
30 March 66

SECRET

98

AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION

Origin

The monthly publication "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" is the successor to "African Revolution" which was the monthly English digest of the Algerian weekly "Revolution Africaine". "Revolution Africaine", which is published in French, first appeared in February 1963 with the declared aim of helping to build socialism in Africa. In order to increase its effectiveness it began to publish a monthly edition, "African Revolution", consisting largely of material selected from previous issues of "Revolution Africaine". The editorial office of "African Revolution" was established in Lausanne, Switzerland by March 1963 and the first issue appeared two months later.

2. When the first editor of "Revolution Africaine", Jacques Mansour-VERGES, was replaced by Mohamed HARBI in May 1963, he left Algiers and took control of "African Revolution" in Lausanne. After two issues had been published the connection between it and "Revolution Africaine" was severed and "African Revolution" became "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution". In December 1963 the editorial board moved from Lausanne to Paris, and the publication now appears monthly in English and French, although the two editions are not identical. The former is printed in Switzerland and the latter, which carries the title "Revolution", is printed in Paris.

Editorial Policy of "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution"

3. The Editorial "Europe too . . ." in issue No. 8 (December, 1963) urged the European working-class movement to take up the revolutionary struggle. Thus "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" made it clear that it intended its message to have a world-wide application. At first, however, it had directed its attention to the destruction of colonialism in Africa and the establishment of national independence and socialism, and had later acknowledged the logic of its arguments by changing its title to "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution".

4. To begin with, "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" did not give the impression that it was advocating any particular brand of socialism. The Editorial on "Ideology" in issue No. 3 acknowledged the existence of various types of socialism in Africa and recognised that they were based on the "profound logic of experience". In time, however, it became increasingly apparent that the publication was lending its support to the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution, and the Chinese Communist interpretation of it. The principal article in issue No. 7 (November, 1963) which had the anodyne title "Third World? Which Third World?", was largely an exposition of the Chinese Communist attitude towards the national liberation movement, drawing material and inspiration from the Chinese Communist Party's document "A proposal concerning the general line of the International Communist Movement". (This was the letter, dated 14th June 1963, from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; it is a major document in the ideological dispute between the two parties.) The article contained the following quotation from the Chinese letter:

> "The various types of contradictions in the contemporary world are centred in the vast areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America; these are the most vulnerable areas under imperialist rule and the storm-centres of world revolution dealing direct blows at imperialism."

/As if . . .

As if to emphasise the extent of Chinese influence in the publication's policies and at the same time to denigrate those Communist Parties which supported the Soviet line, the Editorial in issue No. 8 referred scornfully to "the proponents of the peaceful road to socialism" and the "treason of the revisionists", and proclaimed the end of the "isolation in which revolutionary Marxists have been held because of the revisionism of the leaderships of the Communist parties". Clearly, therefore, "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" supports the Chinese Communist argument that it is most unlikely that socialism can be achieved by peaceful means.

5. "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" has for the most part shunned theoretical discussion, although issue No. 9 (January, 1964) has a heavier ideological content than previous issues. It has made its appeal in extremely practical terms: its range of subjects has been wide and by no means confined to politics. Appendix A contains a list of the articles, and the names of their authors, which have appeared in issues 1 - 2 of "African Revolution" and issues 3 - 9 of "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution".

Chinese Support and Influence

6. When VERGES was in Peking in the early part of 1963, the Chinese agreed to take out 3,000 subscriptions to "African Revolution" and these were in due course transferred to "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution". It is quite likely that this was a form of subsidy and, initially, when the publication sold for 5s. 0d., it was worth £750 a month. An article in "Newsweek" dated 9th March 1964 refers to a report that the Chinese Embassy in Berne provided the publication with £25,000 in 1963. In addition, each issue has contained at least one full page advertisement of Chinese Communist publications. In those circumstances, it is not surprising that it has been stated that the Chinese are in a position to control to some extent what appears in "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" but no clear, reliable information is available to show how this is done. The publication has also had contact with the Chinese through Abdul Rahman Mohamed BABU, a member of the Editorial Board who is now Minister for External Affairs and Trade in Zanzibar. He visited China in 1960, became the East African correspondent of the New China News Agency in 1961 and went to China again in October 1963.

Cuban Support

7. A Spanish edition of the publication was envisaged as early as May 1963 and it has been reported that members of its staff have been in touch with Cuban diplomats in Europe with a view to the latter editing the proposed Spanish edition. There is however, no confirmation that it has yet been published in Spanish. It may be that this Cuban connection was of assistance in providing the pictures of the Cuban revolution which appeared in issue No. 3 (July, 1963).

Contact with the Communist Splinter Group in the U.K.

8. By the end of 1963, "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" had established contact with the Communist splinter group in the U.K. which is sympathetic to the Chinese line in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Publications of this group - the British Committee to Defeat Revisionism, for Communist Unity - were advertised in issues No. 8 and 9. An article on "The Fight Against Revisionism" by Michael McCreery the leader of the group was published in issue No. 9.

-/Staff, Editorial . .

Staff, Editorial Office and Agencies

9. The following persons are listed in issue No. 9 as members of the Editorial Staff:-

Director	Jacques M. VERGES	
Editorial Board	Hamza ALAVI	- Pakistan
	A.R. Mohamed BABU	- Zanzibar
	Amilcar CABRERA	- Venezuela
	Richard Thomas GIBSON	- U.S.A.
	Nguyen KIEN	- Vietnam (This is believed to be a pseudonym)
	Hassan RIAD	- U.A.R.
	Castro DE SILVA	- Angola

The same names are listed in issue No. 6 of "Revolution" as members of the editorial staff of that paper.

10. Secret sources have reported that the Business Manager of "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" is Nils ANDERSON, a Swede, and the Legal Adviser Bernard Arthur MARDER, a U.K. lawyer whose main task is to check proofs. Brief pen-pictures of some of the individuals prominently concerned with the production of the publication are given in Appendix B, from which it will be seen that, of the ten persons named in this paragraph and paragraph 9, at least three are Communists and two Communist sympathisers. Appendix C contains details of the Editorial Office and Agencies.

Publication and Circulation

11. "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" is published by Nouvelles Editions Internationales and is printed in Switzerland. The circulation of the English edition is believed to be about 20,000 while that of the French edition, which is printed in France, may be as much as 50,000. The English edition is given a world-wide distribution.

3rd April 1964.

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APPENDIX A

LIST OF ARTICLES WHICH HAVE APPEARED IN ISSUES Nos. 1 - 2 of "AFRICAN REVOLUTION" and ISSUES Nos. 3 - 9 of "AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION"

"AFRICAN REVOLUTION"

Volume 1 Number 1 (May 1963)

Liberate Our Brothers of South Africa	Ahmed Ben BELLA
Umkonto we Sizwe	Oliver TAMBO
For Revolutionary Unity	Bakary DJIBO
Blida, Year One	J. MINCES and M. BEKKOUCHE
Yemen: A New Beginning	Ahmed DJIDJELLI
The New Strategy of Imperialism	A.R.
The Holy Alliance	Joaquin DIAZ
"Our Victory Depends on All the African Peoples"	Agostinho NETO
"Five Months of Independence in Angola"	Commander BENEDITO
We Will Avenge Lumumba	Abdou ALFA
Hammer or Sickle?	Charles BETTELHEIM
War in South Vietnam	Ir. RAKJAT
The Slums of Nanterre	P.P.
Moscow, Peking and the Third World (documents)	.. ..
Guinea: Two Steps Forward?	Gerard CHALIAND
Mali's Road to Socialism	Gerard CHALIAND
Swaziland, Verwoerd and the British	.. ..
Larbi Ben M'Hidi	.. ..
Sine Looks at the News	SINE
London, Colonial Capital	Abdou ALFA
Abd-El-Krim Is Dead	M. VERGES
Agrarian Reform in Morocco (document)	.. ..
New Colonial War in Borneo	.. ..
An American in Algiers	Don STEFFEN
Cuba Si!	SINE
Negroes with Guns	Robert F. WILLIAMS
African Art	.. ..
Jazz: Renaissance or Decline	Philippe KOECHLIN
Jazz: The Avant Garde	Le Roi JONES
Sports and Racism in South Africa	Rosalynde AINSLIE

Volume 1 Number 2 (June 1963)

The Chinese Spring	Djamila BOUHIRED and M. J. VERGES
I. Interview with Mao Tse-tung	
II. The Army and the Party	
III. The Commune of the "Four Green Seasons"	
The Peoples Will Decide	.. ..
Africa in Question	Noureddine TIDAFI
The Working Class in Africa	
The Perspectives	A. SPANELA
The Stages	Anusse SALAH-BEY
Clarity in the Struggle	A.R.
Economic Planning in Tropical Africa	Charles BETTELHEIM
Modibo Keita Speaks	Gerard CHALIAND
Sine Looks at the News	SINE
The U.A.R.'s New Victory at Suez	Mansour EL RIFFI
The People Have Spoken	A.R.

/Algeria's . . .

Algeria's Workers Management Committees	Gerard CHALIAND
End of an Era. Borgeaud Leaves Algeria	J. MINCES and M. BEKKOUCHE
The U.A.M. and French "Presence"	Albert-Paul LENTIN
Algeria's Investment Code	Jacques CHARRIERE
The Kenya-Somali Crisis	Tony HUGHES
The Malagasy Rebellion	Aristide RATSIMBAZAFY
The Testament of Andrianampoinimerina	.. ..
The Virtues of the Truth	SEKOU TOURE
The War in "Portuguese" Guinea	Amilcar CABRAL
Black Africa between the Two Wars	Jean SURET-CANALE
The Workers University in Conakry	Gerard CHALIAND
What Is Sanwi?	.. ..
Force and Violence in South Africa	Johannesburg Correspondent
Walter Sisulu, Underground Leader	Johannesburg Correspondent
South West Africa and the Nazis	.. ..
Agrarian Reform in Morocco (Part Two)	.. ..
Tears: "Negritude? Dangerous Mystification"	.. ..
Towards an African Cinema	G.C.
Martinez: Painter of the Repression	G.C.
The Civilization of Benin	.. ..
Algeria: Sports and Independence	.. ..

"AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION"

Volume 1 Number 3 (July 1963)

The Cuban Revolution in Pictures	.. ..
Our New Name	.. ..
Ideology	.. ..
Ghana Builds Socialism	Jack WODDIS
National Revolution in Africa and Asia	Mehdi BEN BARKA
Modibo Keita: Lenin Peace Prize	.. ..
Africa and the Common Market	V. PILLAY
Morocco and the Common Market	Abdelaziz BELAL
The Dangers of Foreign Aid	Afana OSENDE
"I Accuse!"	Nelson MANDELA
The Poqo Affair	Johannesburg Correspondent
Algiers, Capital of Youth	.. ..
A School for Building the Future	Mohamed BEKKOUCHE
An Open Letter to President John F. Kennedy	.. ..
The Chinese Spring	Djamila BOUHIRED and J. M. VERGES
Spanish Students Fight Fascism	.. ..
Four Deserters from Mozambique	.. ..
For the Defence of Democratic Freedoms in Africa	.. ..
Sine Looks at the News	SINE
The Politics of Culture	Abdou ALFA
The Manding Epic: The Death of a Tyrant	.. ..
Young Artists of Southern Rhodesia	.. ..
Two Jazz Artists	Philippe KOECHLIN

Volume 1 Numbers 4-5 (August-September 1963)

The Afro-American Struggle	.. ..
Negro Nationalism and the Left	Harold CRUSE
Uncle Tom Goes to Africa	Julian MAYFIELD
You Can't Come Home Any More	William WORTHY

/Aiding . .

Aiding the Struggle in "Portuguese" Guinea	Aulio Monteiro DUARTE
The New Slave Trade	MAURIENNE
Aswan. Monument for the Future	Wilfrid BURCHETT
The Battle of Dien Bien Phu	General Vo Nguyen GIAP
Towards Victory in South Vietnam	.. ..
The F.N.L. of South Vietnam	Nguyen KIEN
Notes for a Biography of Fidel Castro	Carlos FRANQUI
"If Fidel Castro Were Elected President of the United States"	William WORTHY
African Nationalism and the Common Man	Julius NYERERE
The War of National Liberation of Irak' Kurdistan	Ismet Cheriff VANLY
Documents from Addis Ababa:	
Resolutions of the African Summit Conference	.. ..
Charter of the Organization of African Unity	.. ..
The Powers Behind Apartheid	C. FASULO
Education for African Servitude	Johannesburg Correspondent
Two South African Poets:	
Musisi Kunene	
Dennis Brutus	
Modern Poetry in Africa	Ken GEERING
Ibn Khaldun Today	Mouloud MAMMERI
The Magic Art of the Congo	.. ..
Sini-Kory	Keita FODEBA
A Jazz Great: John Coltrane	Le Roi JONES

Volume 1 Number 6 (October 1963)

The Freedom Struggle in South Africa	.. ..
An Introduction to African Economic Problems	Stephen KAZADO
Dr. DuBois is Dead	Julian MAYFIELD
My Last Message to the World	Dr. W.E.B. DUBOIS
State Capitalism in Egypt	Hassan RIAD
The O.A.S: "U.S. Ministry of Colonies"	Carleton BEALS
Why I Came to China at the Age of 72	Anna Louise STRONG
Socialist Planning in Cuba	Major Ernesto "Che" GUEVARA
Barbudos Si!	NUEZ
Techniques of the Guerrilla Fighter	Robert TABER
The Real Meaning of the Washington March	A.B. SPELLMAN
The Agrarian Situation in India	Dr. Sulekh C. GUPTA
Five Poems	Faiz Ahmad FAIZ
Will Handicrafts Survive?	Interview with Leonardo CREMONINI
White Critics, Black Musicians, New Music	Le Roi JONES
Appeal of the Executive Committee of Afro-Asian Writers	

Volume 1 Number 7 (November 1963)

Third World? Which Third World?	Pierre JALEE
The White Dictators of Southern Rhodesia	Fenner BROCKWAY, M.P.
"Malaysia" - the Neo-Colonialist Federation	Abdul RAHIM KARIM
The Agony of the Spanish Bourgeoisie	E. FERNANDEZ
A Day with Francisco Juliao	Dulce RODRIGUEZ
Venezuela: Empire of Oil and Iron	Carleton BEALS
Cuba at the United Nations	Interview with Dr. Carlos LECHUGA

/The . . .

The Preparation for November	Rabah BITAT
Verwoerd's Bantustan Bluff	Brian BUNTING
Illusion, Emulation and Integration	Wilmot Alfred FRAZER
Free Mae Mallory!	Clarence Seniors
Robert Williams Speaks from Peking	
Our Struggle in British Guiana	Dr. Cheddi JAGAN
Which Way for British Guiana?	Jeannette SCOTT
Crude Weapons that Helped Destroy an Army	Chou Chih-ching
New British Poets of the Left	Ken GERRINO
Mr. Rockefeller's Museum of Primitive Art	Marion BROWN, Jr.
A Handful of Wheat	Prem CHAND

Volume 1 Number 8 (December 1963)

Europe, too!	.. ..
Spain - the Strikes and the Parties	Martin VALDES
The Crisis in Soviet Agriculture	A.H. EVANS
The Alliance for Plunder	Robert TABER
The End of the Mexican Revolution?	Carleton BEALS
Why We Went to Cuba	Phillip Abbott LUCE
The Road of Revolution in Peru	The C.C. of the M.I.R.
Cartoons from Cuba	CHAGO
The National Liberation Struggle in South West Africa	J. KOZONGUIZI
Underdeveloped Countries and the Problem of Peace	Andrew Gunder FRANK
The Kennedy Assassination	Fidel CASTRO
The Rights of Man in an Age of Abundance	James BOGGS
Repression and Torture in South Africa	Brian BUNTING
"Negroes" (filmed and staged in the U.S.A.)	Wilmot Alfred FRASER
The Failure of the "Peaceful Road" in Chile	Pedro ANDINO
U.S.A: The Shady Side of the Street	Thomas TOPOR
Protest Through Music in South Africa	Todd T. MATSHIKIZA
Ornette Revisited	Marion BROWN, Jr.

Volume 1 Number 9 (January 1964)

The Revolution in Africa	Editorial
The People's Victory in Zanzibar	J.M. VERGES
What Kind of Independence for Angola?	Viriato da CRUZ
The Class Struggle in Africa	.. ..
Must They Hang?	.. ..
The Fight Against Revisionism	Michael McCREERY
Panama: "Big Steal"	Carleton BEALS
Support the Panamanian People's Just Struggle	MAO Tse-tung
The Unfinished Revolution in the Philippines	William J. POMEROY
China: Where, How and Whither?	Keith BUCHANAN
What China Means by "Readjustment"	Anna Louise STRONG
The Meaning of Black Revolt in the U.S.A.	James BOGGS
Five Young Afro-American Poets	A.B. SPELLMAN
	Lorenzo THOMAS
	Sonia SANCHEZ
	Joe JOHNSON
	Le Roi JONES
Unchain My Soul	C. LINDSAY BARRETT
Don Cherry: Trumpet of the Year	Le Roi JONES

SECRET

APPENDIX B

INDIVIDUALS PROMINENTLY CONCERNED WITH THE PRODUCTION OF "AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION"

n.201

Hamza ALAVI - was born on 10th April 1921. He is a Pakistani resident in the U.K. and has strong Communist sympathies. Member of Editorial Board

n.201

Freddy Nile ANDERSON - was born on 14th February 1933 at Lausanne. He is a Swede and the business manager of "Revolution". He has been a Communist for a number of years.

201-339225

Abdul Rahman Mohamed BABU - was born on 22nd September 1924 at Zanzibar and is at present Minister for External Affairs and Trade in the Zanzibar Government. His sympathy towards Communism is well known. Member of Editorial Board

201-306052

Richard Thomas GIBSON 201-306052 - was born on 13th May 1931 in the U.S.A. He is the Editor-in-Chief of "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" and works in the Editorial Office in Paris. An American negro, he was Executive Secretary of the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee" in the U.S.A. until September 1962.

n.201

Bernard Arthur MARDER - was born on 25th September 1928 at Manchester. He is a Communist and has taken a close interest in African affairs. Reported to be Legal Adviser

201-180164

Jacques Camille Raymond VERGES 201-180164 alias Jacques Mansour VERGES - was born on 5th March 1925 or 5th March 1929 at Oubone, Thailand. He was a member of the French Communist Party in 1951 and subsequently was employed by the I.U.S. as Secretary of its International Relief Organisation. More recently he was Defence Counsel in the trial of a number of members of the Algerian National Liberation Front (F.L.N.). Director and key figure of the publication, "AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION"

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SECRET

APPENDIX C

EDITORIAL OFFICE AND AGENCIES OF
"AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION"
and "REVOLUTION"

The Editorial Office is at 40, rue François 1er, Paris 8e and there are the following agencies.-

Brazil - Jurema FINAMOUR, Avenida Viera Souto 86, Ipanema, Rio de Janeiro, Guanabara.

Britain - 4, Leigh Street, London, W.C.1
(Note - This is the business address of a Pakistani Communist, Tusaduq Ahmed)

China - A.M. KHEIR, 9 Tai Chi Chang, Peking; distribution: Guozi Shudian, P.O. Box 399, Peking (37)
(Note - KHEIR, a Sudanese Communist, is a member of the World Council of Peace and works for the China Peace Committee which is located at 9, Tai Chi Chang, Peking. Guozi Shudien is the official Chinese Government centre for the distribution of Chinese literature and propaganda)

Cuba - General Suarez entre Ayestaran y Calzada de Rancho Boyeros, Havana.

Nigeria - F.E.I. IHOKHAI, 309, Awolowo Hall, University of Nigeria, Nsukka.

Switzerland - Metropole, 10-11, Lausanne.
(Note - This is Nils ANDERSON's home and business address)

Tanganyika - Jweli MGOGO, P.O. Box 9221, Dar-es-Salaam.

U.S.A. - Room 603A, 1 Union Square, New York, N.Y.

Zanzibar - P.O. Box 1146, Zanzibar.

14-00000

18

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING

TO: Chief, WH

INFO: Chief, KUWOLF; Chief, KUDESK; Chief, AF; Chief of Station, Paris; Chief of Station, LCFIPIT

FROM: Chief of Station, London RIF

SUBJECT: "Revolution, Africa, Latin America, Asia"

REF: (A) OELA-41,545 (10 September 1964)
(B) OEL-39,831 (24 September 1964)

Attached is a recent JAGUAR report dealing with Subject publication, and the comments of Richard GIBSON. In light of the continuing interest of the Addressee offices, this material is being made available on a strict KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY basis. JAGUAR has asked that the report's PBPRIME distribution (if any) be limited to ODACID only. Any distribution beyond that indicated above should first be cleared with JAGUAR.

INDEX

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment:
Report, herewith

Distribution:
3-Chief, WH w/att h/w
2-Chief, KUWOLF w/att h/w
2-Chief, KUDESK w/att h/w
2-Chief, AF w/att h/w
2-COS, Paris w/att h/w
2-COS, LCFIPIT w/att h/w

COPY

D 200-4-305
D 200-4-331

CROSS REFERENCE TO: D 29-4-105; D 29-4-131

DATE TYPED: 20 Oct. 64

DATE DISPATCHED:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OELA-41,788

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 11-4-105

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

14-00000

"AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION"

RICHARD GIBSON
CIT OF ... ENGLAND
FORMER CO-ED ... AFRICA ...
SAID ... CHINESE HELP
FINANCE ...
SAID ... IN RESPECT THEY
HAD STANDING
ORDER 3,000
COPIES ...

The following information was received in the first half of October 1964 from a source in close touch with Richard GIBSON, the former Editor of "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution".

2. GIBSON was aware that a number of people had thought that the Chinese Communists had provided some financial backing for "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution", but this was true only to the extent that the Chinese had a standing order for 3,000 copies of each issue of the English edition. If the Chinese had given more general financial assistance VERGES, the publication's Director, would not have had to contend with the present financial difficulties and possible bankruptcy.

3. VERGES had had access to a relatively large sum of money which had been held in Switzerland from the time of the Algerian war of independence. When this had dried up VERGES had been unable to replenish it. Reports that VERGES had stolen this money were not true.

4. The publication owed 45,000 Swiss francs to a business-man, possibly Swiss, named KESSEL and 30,000 francs to the French printers. In GIBSON's view too much money had been spent on maintaining prestige offices at 40 rue François 1er, Paris.

5. When "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" was banned in Switzerland all except 100 copies of issue No. 12 were seized by the Swiss authorities. These 100 copies had already been sent to GIBSON.

6. The French edition "Revolution" has not appeared since August 1964.

16th October 1964.

Comment 1) Para. 4

Source could not provide any further particulars about KESSEL.

"AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION"

RICHARD GIBSON
CIT. U.S. A ENGLAND
FORMER ED OF L A A REV.
SAID ALONG MANY ... (handwritten margin notes)
CHICOMS HELP
FINANCE ...
SAID ONLY IN
RESPECT THEY
HAD STANDING
ORDER 3,000
COPIES

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16th October 1964.

Comment i) Para. 4
Source could not provide any further particulars about KESSEL.

ii) Para. 4
Source did not say whether the sum owed to the French printers was in French or Swiss francs.

(JACQUES VERGES (FR.) ... HAD ACCESS LARGE SUM MONEY HELD SWITZ. SINCE ALG. WAR. LATER ... UNABLE TO REPLENISH IT. REPORTS THAT SUBJ HAD STOLEN THIS MONEY UNTRUE.)

COPY

SECRET

OELA-41788 - Encl-1   011-204-105

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING: XXX — NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief, WH

INFO: Chief, KUWOLF; Chief of Station, Pari (LCPIPIT); Chief, AF; Chief, KUDESK; Chief of Station, Paris

FROM: Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT: LCBEFORE Draft of Round-up on Revolution

ACTION REQUIRED: REFERENCES

REF: OELA-42,233, 5 January 1965

1. As noted in Ref, mention was made during one of LCBEFORE's bi-weekly meetings that I did not attend, of a "round-up in preparation". The apparent antecedent was Richard Thomas GIBSON, and I undertook to find out from LCBEFORE just what was what.

2. As it turns out, LCBEFORE was preparing a round-up of information on Revolution, rather than on GIBSON. In response to my somewhat agitated query (due to recent traffic relating to GIBSON, in particular), LCBEFORE rushed forth with the rough draft of their round-up, which is attached. They point out, however, that this draft is completely uncleared; it has not made the rounds of the responsible political departments and should not be regarded as a final product. In addition, it should be noted that it is intended, when completed, only for circulation within the SMOOTHER government - principally in overseas elements - and not for general publication.

3. LCBEFORE, after expressing the foregoing qualifications, invite any contributions that KUBARK would like to offer. The substance of the round-up seems to offer little room for controversy, although KUDESK/ICG may be able to contribute additional information. We also wonder whether the English-language edition has made any impact in the Western Hemisphere.

4. We assume that the appendix of personality data will be forwarded to us along with the final draft, or the final edition.

George E. [illegible]

Attachment: herewith

Distribution:
3-Chief, WH w/att h/w
2-Chief, KUWOLF w/att h/w
2-Chief, LCPIPIT w/att h/w
2-Chief, AF w/att h/w
2-Chief, KUDESK w/att h/w
2-COS, Paris w/att h/w

CROSS REFERENCE TO: CS [illegible]

DATE TYPED: 12 Jan. 65

DATE DISPATCHED:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OELA-42,304

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER:

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

14-00000

DRAFT SECRET

REVOLUTION

1. During the past year Révolution and its English edition African Latin American Asian Revolution have undergone several important changes. For a time during the summer it was reported that the publication was in financial difficulties, but in the most recent French edition, No.12, dated October/November it was announced that the magazine would continue on a new basis, with an enlarged Advisory Board, appearing every two months, not only in an English and a French edition but also in a coming Spanish edition to be published in Bogota for Latin America.

2. The changes which are being made do not in any way alter the pro-Chinese complexion of the magazine. Though the magazine now seems on a much firmer financial basis, there is as yet no evidence that the Chinese are directly subsidising it. They are however buying copies and taking advertisements. It has been reported that when Verges was in Peking in the early part of 1963, the Chinese agreed to take out 3,000 subscriptions to "Africa [illegible]" and these were in due course transferred African Latin American Asia Revolution. When the publication sold for five shillings, this was worth £750 a month. Each issue has contained at least one full page advertisement of Chinese Communist publications.

201-351226

3. The publication has also had contact with the Chinese through Abdul Rahman Mohamed Babu, a member of the Advisory Board who is Minister for Commerce and Co-operatives in the Tanzanian Government. Babu visited China in 1960, became the East African correspondent of the New China News Agency in 1961, and went to China again in October, 1963.

4. By the end of 1963, Révolution had established contact with the Communist splinter-group in the UK, led by Michael McCreery, which is on the Chinese side in the Sino-Soviet cold war.

/The ...

ABERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

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The French Edition

3. Entitled Revolution, this is now published in Paris by S.A.R.L. Nouvelles Editions Internationales, 79, rue Galande – Paris 5°. The first issue of Revolution in September, [illegible] was published at 40, rue Francois 1er – Paris 8°, printed by "La Cite", Lausanne, Switzerland, but bound by Brigny, France. When in the spring, the Director, Jacques M. Verges, had run into financial difficulties, he found cheaper premises for his editorial office at 52, rue Galande – Paris 5° and with No.10/11 of July/August changed his printers to Offset-Presse. It seems that Revolution was in financial difficulties for several months. The trouble began, apparently, when the French authorities seized copies of issue No.7 of the French edition of March 1964 because of an article it contained on French overseas territories. Creditors became alarmed, fearing that the publication might be banned, and demanded settlement of their debts which were then estimated to exceed £10,000.

The Editorial Board

Under the new arrangements Jacques M. Verges remains Editorial Director, with the following as Advisory Board ("Collaborators permanents"). New-comers to the Board since the last issue in July/August are marked with asterisks.

Mohamed [illegible]	Zanzibar
Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani	Pakistan
Amilcar Cabrera	Venezuela
Demba Diallo	Mali
Nguyen Kien	Vietnam
Hassan Riad	UAR
Castro da Silva	Angola
Carlos Ferran	Spain
Marcos Ferrer	Colombia
Abdul R. Karim	Malaya

The first change on the original Advisory Board came with the inclusion in No.8 of Martin Valdes – Spain. The next change was in issue No.9 when Hamza Alavi – Pakistan–was replaced

/by ...

by Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani also from Pakistan. It was reported that Hamza Alavi resigned because he objected to the publication's pro-Chinese attitude. An important further change came with the appearance of issue No.10/11 last July in which was prominently published a "Communique" announcing the dismissal from the Advisory Board of Richard Gibson - U.S.A. The Communique accused Richard Gibson, who is an American Negro, of having "used his former position as secretary to the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee" to infiltrate the International Revolutionary Movement". Some details of personalities are given at appendix.

[appendix to follow]

7. In Révolution No.12 it is claimed that the total issue of the new and enlarged bi-monthly magazine, including French English and Spanish editions, will be 50,000. However, since his dismissal, Richard Gibson has stated that, during his time on the magazine, while about 20,000 copies of the French edition were printed, the top sale of any issue was never more than 7,500 copies. In the case of the April No.8 issue, he says that the total sale in France was 3,000 copies. The prices of Revolution are given as: Africa: 2.5 dirham, 2.5 dinars, 150 C.F.A. Europe: 4.50 Francs. This represents a 15% increase in the price of the French edition. But this is accompanied by a lowering of the price by 35% in countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Those taking out annual subscriptions are informed that they are entitled on request not only to make use of Révolution's Documentation Centre on International Workers' Movement and the Struggle for National Liberation, but also to free copies of the magazine Pekin-Information. Those taking out a long-term subscription now will also be entitled to "publications in foreign languages from Peking".

8. A main feature of issue No.12 is a leading article by Jacques Verges entitled "Hiroshima, plus jamais!" Possibly by coincidence, this was published at the same time as the

/first ...

first Chinese nuclear device was exploded.

9. The Russian view of Revolution was made clear in Pravda on June 3 in an article attacking China, containing the following passage: "factionist groups ... are also involved in the publication in several languages, with Peking's help, of a new "international" journal with the high-flown title of Revolution."

The English Edition

10. Now entitled Africa Latin America Asia Revolution, the English edition was originally published in Algiers with the title African Revolution. From the third issue onwards it was published in Lausanne as Africa Latin America Asia Revolution. In issue No.7 of November 1963, it was announced that the editorial offices were then located in Paris, with the offices of the French edition, but it continued to be printed in Switzerland. In August, 1964, the Swiss Government banned the "printing edition and the transit" through Switzerland of the English edition because they considered Africa Latin America Asia Revolution "an organ of propaganda of the Chinese Communists, designed for non-European countries, which does not limit itself to supporting the liberation struggle of the so-called colonial peoples but also propagates the political views of Red China".

11. The last English issue in the old series which has come to hand was No.11 of March. The first in the new series, No.1 Vol.II dated September/October is published in Paris by S.A.R.L. Nouvelles Editions Internationales, from the same address as the French Edition, 52, rue Galande - Paris 5e. This English edition, which was previously similar in format to Readers Digest, is now glossy and similar in format to the French edition. Most of the articles in it are re-printed from the French edition of Revolution.

The Editorial Board

12. As with the French edition, the Editorial Director remains Jacques M. Vergès, with the same Advisory Board except except

that ...

that Amilcar Cabrera - Venezuela - is not included and there are two members not listed on the French Board - [illegible] - New Zealand - a member of the Peace Liaison Committee of the Asian and Pacific Regions, and A.S.-Khoiy of the [illegible].

13. Prices of this new edition are given as follows: Africa: 2 shillings; America: 75 cents; Europe: 5 shillings, 3.50 Francs.

Secret

CONTACT REPORT #12 25 January 1963.

TIME/PLACE : Safe House #2, 1000 Jan 25

PRESENT : Kulpa, Tiptoft, Lawton.

1. Purpose of this meeting was to inform Kulpa that Headquarters had agreed to his trip to the Congo and to pass contact instructions re McInturff. K. said that he had not as yet received instructions from Holden and that the latter planned to be in Rome on Saturday. He would send the airline ticket from that city. K. also stated that Serge Michel had agreed that the first six covers on the new Afrique Revolutionaire (?) would be shot by K. K. hit us up for a light meter since he said that his present one was broken and since he had to take the pictures prior to his departure for the Congo which he anticipated would be either early or mid next week.

2. Another twist was that he had been contacted by Gibson, who informed him that a certain Dave Watts who runs a highly slanted sheet in New York City had written to Gibson asking him for photos. Gibson will purchase and forward several of K.'s negatives. Since all this is vague enough, Kulpa promised to get more facts.

3. The rest of the meeting was taken up by Tiptoft straightening out his accountings.

4. Next meeting. 1000 Tuesday 29 Jan.

5

Secret

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: LEDNOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
201-132139
VOL. III

INCLUSIVE DATES: ______

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: ______

ROOM: ______

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFIC
			NOT REVIEWED BY HSCA.

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

14-00000

SECRET

MEXICO CITY

STROD DULOKT

REFERENCES: A. [illegible]-27577

B. MEXI 4824 (IN 30690), [illegible]

1. REF A, PARA 9-B, MENTIONS HIS CONNECTIONS [illegible] CARDENAS RIDAJAS (201-248906) AND SUGGESTS [illegible] BE ASKED TO INTERROGATE CARDENAS ABOUT THESE CONNECTIONS. [illegible] DESCRIBES STOP FLAP IN 1963 AGAINST [illegible] SERGEYEVICH [illegible] (201-132139) IN WHICH AN ARTICLE WAS PLACED IN "[illegible] NOTICIAS" 31 MAY 1963 CITING CARDENAS AS CLANDESTINE CONTACT OF [illegible] FOR SMUGGLING ARMS TO GUATEMALAN REVOLUTIONARIES. REQUEST [illegible] BE GIVEN ABOVE NEWS REFERENCE AS ADDITIONAL AMMUNITION FOR [illegible] OF CARDENAS ABOUT HIS AND DULOKT-1'S PAST RELATIONS WITH SOVIETS AND INVOLVEMENT OF [illegible] WITH SOVIETS.

2. FILE: 200-124-182/3; 201-248906; 201-132139.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/SAO

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WALTER J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

201-132139

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201-132159

201-132139

LA REPUBLICA

EL DIARIO DE LOS HOMBRES DE TRABAJO

Tarifa Postal Reducida número 10 de la Administración Postal Nal. | BOGOTA, D. E., VIERNES 25 DE JULIO DE 1969. | Dirección: Calle 14 número 4-24 Conmt. 422-100, Dist. via Avianca

Los Secuestros, Clave de Siniestro Plan Comunista

Denuncian Actividades en Colombia

El secuestro de que acaba de ser víctima en Cali el conocido médico y ganadero Ernesto González Caicedo, ha venido a confirmar trágicamente la existencia de una vasta conjura comunista para subvertir el orden constitucional y sumir de nuevo al país en una ola de terrorismo y violencia que parecían sepultados para siempre.

En efecto, este periódico así como también los demás diarios de la capital, habían anunciado en sus ediciones del 12 y del 18 de los corrientes basadas en informaciones oficiales que el Departamento del Valle había sido escogido por los comunistas prosoviéticos para continuar la ola de atracos, atentados terroristas y secuestros iniciados recientemente en el Departamento de Antioquia.

Después del secuestro del hacendado antioqueño Rubén Noreña se produce ahora en el Valle el del médico Ernesto González Caicedo por cuyo rescate los bandoleros comunistas están exigiendo la crecida suma de cuatro y medio millones de pesos. Se vienen cumpliendo así cronológicamente, las etapas del nuevo plan subversivo, comenzando por estos cuyos objetivos son obviamente los de conseguir los dineros necesarios para financiar las cuadrillas de bandoleros en las áreas rurales ya escogidas.

Este incremento de la violencia en Colombia, al que hay que sumarle el reciente asalto en cuadrilla a San José de Ure, similar al "simacotazo" de años pasados, se produce inmediatamente después de la denuncia formulada hace pocos días por el diario "La Prensa" de Buenos Aires, uno de los periódicos más serios y prestigiosos del continente; en esa oportunidad, el rotativo argentino mencionó editorialmente a Colombia como uno de los países q' serían más gravemente afectados por la violencia comunista, junto con Venezuela, Perú, Ecuador y Bolivia.

Los hechos indican, además, que, pese a las divergencias ideológicas, la fauna comunista en sus diversas tendencias "maoísta", "castrista" y "moscovita" está solidamente unida y comprometida en el plan de terrorismo y violencia que se viene [illegible].

Estamos en capacidad de informar a la opinión pública, que en poder del DAS, la Policía y el Ejército, reposan informaciones según las cuales el partido comunista colombiano, adicto a la "línea de Moscú", ha cursado instrucciones a todos sus afiliados para que se apresten a ingresar a la clandestinidad.

En las mismas fuentes se informó que los secuestros del señor Noreña y del doctor González, obedecen a móviles y tienen características similares a los perpetrados por bandoleros a las FARC en años pasados a resultas de los cuales fueron asesinados los conocidos hombres de negocios, Harold Eder y Oliverio Lara Borrero.

Las FARC, como lo sabe todo el mundo, es un organismo paramilitar, creado por los comunistas prosoviéticos y dirigido por el tristemente célebre "Tirofijo", quien es miembro del comité central del partido comunista adicto a Moscú. Precisamente para revitalizar a este organismo, que había quedado reducido a las más precarias condiciones, gracias a la patriótica labor de las Fuerzas Armadas, un funcionario de la embajada soviética, entregó en México la suma de cien mil dólares al comunista colombiano Feliciano Pachón Chocontá, quien, por fortuna, fue descubierto y capturado cuando estaba a punto de culminar con éxito su fatídica misión.

En torno a este sonado asunto que en su época tubo resonancia mundial, el diario "La Tribuna", de Lima, identifica en una serie de crónicas recientes a un ruso de apellido Lenov como "el funcionario soviético que le dio el dinero a Pachón en México", y agrega basado en informaciones de la Interpol que Lenov viaja con otros agentes de la KGB, Alexander Oreshunov y Víctor Mednikov, todos ellos disfrazados de "científicos", en una extraña correría que comprende justamente los países mencionados por "La Prensa" de Buenos Aires como enclaves del nuevo plan violento del comunismo, es decir, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Perú y Bolivia.

Según "La Tribuna", de Lima, estos tres rusos estuvieron en Colombia recientemente, y es justamente después de su paso por aquí que se están presentando los secuestros y actos violentos mencionados.

En abundancia de detalles, el importante periódico "Ya", editado en Madrid (España), se ocupa también en fecha muy reciente de la conjura comunista contra Colombia y otros países de América Latina. Según el diario madrileño, las sedes de las agencias Tass y Novosty son verdaderos "nidos de espionaje y subversión" a través de los cuales se desarrolla la más peligrosa actividad del comunismo soviético.

14-00000

COMMUNISTS PROMOTE VIOLENCE IN LATIN COUNTRIES

Source: La Republica, 25 July 1969

The kidnapping of which the noted doctor and rancher Ernesto Gonzalez Caicedo was recently the victim in Cali has served to confirm, tragically, the existence of a vast communist plot to subvert the constitutional order and to plunge the country again into a wave of terrorism and violence which appeared to be buried forever.

In fact, this newspaper, like the other dailies in the capital, reported in its 12 and 18 July issues, on the basis of official statements, that the Department of Valle had been selected by the pro-Soviet communists as the scene of the continued wave of terrorist attacks and assaults and kidnappings recently begun in the Department of Antioquia.

Following the kidnapping of Antioquia rancher Ruben Norena, the kidnapping of Doctor Ernesto Gonzalez Caicedo has now occurred. The communist bandits are demanding the enormous sum of 4.5 million pesos in ransom. Thus the chronological stages in the new subversive plan are being carried out, beginning with the steps which are obviously designed to obtain the money necessary to finance the bandit gangs in the rural areas they have already selected.

This increase in violence in Colombia, to which must be added the recent gang attack in San Jose de Urama, similar to the incidents of past years, occurred immediately after the charges made a few days ago by the Buenos Aires daily La Prensa, one of the most serious and prestigous newspapers on this continent. On this occasion, the Argentine newspaper made editorial mention of Colombia as one of the countries which will be most seriously affected by the communist violence, along with Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia.

The facts indicate, moreover, that despite the ideological differences, the various "Maoist," "Castroist," and "Muskovite" categories of communist fauna are solidly united and pledged to the plan of terrorism and violence denounced in these charges.

We are in a position to inform the public that the DAS /Departmento Administrativo de Seguridad; Administrative Department of Security/, the police and the army have in hand information revealing that the Colombian Communist Party, a supporter of the "Moscow line," has issued instructions to all its affiliated organizations calling for immediate engagement in secret activity.

The same sources have stated that the kidnappings of Mister Norena and Doctor Gonzalez were similar in motivation and method to the kidnappings committed in past years by FARC /Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia/ bandits, resulting in the murder of the well-known businessmen Harold Eder and Oliverio Lara Borrero.

The FARC, as everyone knows, is a paramilitary organization established by the pro-Soviet communists and headed by "Tirofijo" (Dead-eye), of unsavory notoriety, who is a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party

supporting Moscow. Precisely in order to revitalize this organization, which had been reduced to the most precarious status thanks to the patriotic efforts of the armed forces, an official of the Soviet Embassy handed over the sum of 100,000 dollars to Colombian communist Feliciano Pachon Choconta in Mexico. Fortunately, he was found and captured when he was on the point of successfully completing his prophetic mission. On the subject of this notorious matter which had worldwide repercussions at the time, the Lima daily La Tribuna identified a Russian called Lenov in a series of recent reports, as "the Soviet official who gave Pachon the money in Mexico," and, on the basis of information obtained from Interpol; it added that Lenov is traveling with two other KGB agents, Alexander Operbunov and Victor Mednikov, all claiming to be "trade union leaders," on a fantastic tour which covers precisely the countries mentioned in the Buenos Aires La Prensa as the targets of the new communist plans for violence, that is to say, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia.

According to the Lima daily, La Tribuna, these three Russians were recently in Colombia, and it was precisely after their stay here that the kidnappings and acts of violence referred to erupted.

Providing an abundance of detail, the major periodical Ya, published in Madrid, Spain, also analyzed the communist plot against Colombia and the other Latin American countries in a very recent issue. According to this Madrid daily, the headquarters of the Tass and Novosty news agencies are real "hotbeds of espionage and subversion" in which the most /illegible/ activity of the Soviet communists is carried out.

201-132139

EL TIEMPO

BOGOTA, COLOMBIA ✧ 1969, VIERNES 25 DE JULIO

Un Investigador Especial Nombró la Procuraduría

La Procuraduría General de la Nación [illegible] la investigación [illegible] Ernesto González Caicedo. [illegible]

Para [illegible] el [illegible] fue comisionado el [illegible] Carlos Julio [illegible] en Cali y [illegible] cargo del negocio.

Juez 11

También la Procuraduría comisionó al [illegible] Bradio Gutiérrez para que investigara penalmente al [illegible] penal municipal [illegible] Eduardo Ramírez Jiménez. Este funcionario [illegible] hizo [illegible] a don Enrique Gutiérrez Salazar, en un bar [illegible] de la [illegible] doctor Santiago Romero Sánchez.

Secuestros en Colombia Tienen Fines Políticos

Nueva denuncia sobre el plan subversivo internacional hace el principal diario de Lima.

Que los secuestros de ricos ganaderos y agricultores ocurridos últimamente en Colombia obedecen a fines políticos, denunció anteayer "La Tribuna", de Lima, el más [illegible] órgano informativo del Perú, basado en informaciones suministradas por la Interpol.

Haciendo eco a la denuncia formulada anteriormente en días pasados por "La Prensa", de Buenos Aires, el diario limeño denunció, igualmente, la existencia "de un vasto plan subversivo comunista a escala continental que afecta igualmente a Colombia, Venezuela, Perú, Ecuador y Bolivia".

Al dar cuenta de las andanzas de tres agentes soviéticos de la KGB en América del Sur, dice el diario que "viajan disfrazados de 'sindicalistas'" y que "uno de ellos, Izrov, es el mismo funcionario de la embajada soviética en [illegible] que entregó al bandolero colombiano Feliciano Pachón la suma de $ 100.000 para los grupos subversivos de ese país".

Izrov ha estado en compañía de los agentes de la KGB Alexander Operkinov y Victor Donaikov. Y ha sido notorio el hecho de que poco después de la visita de los "sindicalistas" a varios países del Continente, han estallado en ellos actos violentos contra las autoridades, terrorismo citadino y secuestros como en el caso de Colombia, y más concretamente, en Medellín y Cali.

Alerta.

"El plan de los comunistas prosoviéticos está encaminado a crear un nuevo clima de incertidumbre en el Continente", dice el diario limeño, mediante la utilización de toda clase de atentados terroristas, atracos, secuestros, etc.

En el caso colombiano estos hechos están dirigidos, tal como a principios de este mes lo denunciaron altos funcionarios, a obtener recursos económicos para reorganizar el movimiento guerrillero de las FARC, actualmente en plena quiebra.

Los recientes atentados ocurridos en Medellín contra las residencias del jefe del DAS, de varios conocidos profesionales y [illegible] el periódico "El Diario", lo mismo que el secuestro del hacendado [illegible] Rubén Nevera, forman parte del plan de los extremistas de la línea moscovita.

Crisis Nerviosa Sufrió el Médico al Ser Rescatado

Cali, 24. (Por Cristian Martínez Sarria). — Familiares [illegible] informaron [illegible] que había regresado sano [illegible] una [illegible] de que [illegible] en una clase de [illegible]

[illegible] de la familia González [illegible] en la residencia de su padre [illegible] horas de la [illegible] y fue atendido por varios médicos que esperaban su llegada.

De acuerdo con las informaciones [illegible], González Caicedo recibió calmantes para controlarle su estado de ánimo y [illegible] la crisis nerviosa que al parecer sufría al ser rescatado.

Familia Elogia la Información de EL TIEMPO

Cali, 24. (Por Cristian Martínez Sarria). Ignacio Valencia López, uno de los familiares de Ernesto González Caicedo, más accesible a la prensa, elogió la forma responsable y serena como El Tiempo suministró las informaciones sobre el secuestro de su cuñado.

Valencia López, hermano de Alma Valencia de González Caicedo, vino acompañado desde Popayán de su cuñado Aurelio [illegible] a [illegible] se conoció la noticia del secuestro.

Estamos Reconocidos.

Valencia López añadió: "Estamos reconocidos con El Tiempo por la forma que presentó las informaciones en torno a este caso y de [illegible] su serenidad y responsabilidad".

Sinembargo criticó algunas otras informaciones publicadas en órganos distintos a El Tiempo, que estuvieron a punto de hacer fracasar las negociaciones y el rescate de Ernesto González Caicedo.

No Hubo Intento de Secuestro en Tulúa

Cali, 23. (Por Cristian Martínez Sarria). Quedó totalmente desvirtuado que en el caso de Ignacio Ayala Mosquera, se trataba de intentar un secuestro. Al respecto se reveló que se trata simplemente de un caso de extorsión cometido por un ex-agente del F-2 de la Policía Nacional, según lo informó un alto vocero de la institución armada.

Los hechos ocurrieron el martes en Tuluá, cuando Carlos Alberto Lozano, quien fue agente secreto del F-2 y retirado de esta institución por mala conducta, [illegible] acompañado de [illegible] Idarraga y José de Jesús Ortega, exigió a Ignacio Ayala Mosquera quien varias veces fue detenido por ejercicio ilegal de la medicina, una fuerte suma de dinero para las amenazas de [illegible]

Se aclaró, por parte de voceros de la Policía, que Lozano e Idarraga portaban fotocopia de carnés de la institución y placas que hábilmente lograron conseguir. Los tres antisociales se encuentran detenidos en Cali para la correspondiente investigación.

201-132139

POLITICAL MOTIVES BEHIND COLOMBIAN KIDNAPPINGS

Source: El Tiempo, 25 July 1969

Day before yesterday the Lima daily La Tribuna, the most prestigous newspaper in Peru, charged on the basis of information obtained from Interpol that the reasons behind the kidnappings of rich ranchers and farmers which have occurred in Colombia recently are political.

Echoing the charges made in the editorial pages in recent days by the Buenos Aires newspaper La Prensa, the Lima daily also claimed that there is "a vast plan for communist subversion on an international scale affecting Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia equally."

In reporting the activities of three Soviet KGB agents in South America, this daily said that "they travel under the guise of trade union leaders," and that "one of them, Lenov, is the employee of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico who turned over to Colombian bandit Feliciano Pachon the sum of 100,000 US dollars for the subversive groups in that country."

Lenov is traveling in the company of the KGB agents Alexander Operkunov and Victor Dednikov. And no one is unaware of the fact that shortly after the visits of the "trade union officials" to various countries on this continent, there were outbreaks of acts of violence directed against the

authorities, incidents terrorizing the population and kidnappings, as in the case of Colombia, or more specifically, Medellin and Cali.

"The plan of the communist sympathizers is designed to create a climate of uncertainty on the continent again," said the Lima daily, adding that all kinds of terrorist incidents, attacks, kidnappings, etc., are being used.

In the case of Colombia, these acts are designed, as high officials asserted at the beginning of this month, to facilitate obtaining economic resources for the reorganization of the FARC /Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia7 guerrilla movement, which is currently in a state of complete collapse.

The recent attacks made in Medellin on the homes of the head of the DAS /Departmento Administrativo de Seguridad; Administrative Department of Security7, various well-known professional people and the premises of the newspaper El Diario, like the kidnapping of the Antioquia rancher Ruben Norena, are a part of the plan of the extremists pursuing the Moscow line.

* * *

Relative of Victim Comments on Press Coverage of Kidnapping

Cali, 24 July (By Cristian Martinez Sarria). Ignacio Valencia Lopez, one of the members of the family of Ernesto Gonzalez Caicedo, who has been most willing to talk to journalists praised the responsible and severe manner in which El Tiempo reported on the kidnapping of his brother-in-law.

Valencia Lopez, the brother of Alma Valencia de Gonzalez Caicedo, traveled from Popayan, accompanied by his brother-in-law, Aurelio Iragorri Hormaza, as soon as the news of the kidnapping became known.

Valencia Lopez said: "We are grateful to El Tiempo for the way in which it presented the report about this matter, and stressed its severity and criminal nature."

However, he criticized some other reports published by other newspapers, which very nearly caused the failure of the negotiations for the rescue of Ernesto Gonzalez Caicedo.

Tulua Incident Not a Kidnapping Attempt

Cali, 23 July (by Cristian Martinez Sarria). The report that the case involving Ignacio Ayala Mosquera was one of attempted kidnapping has been entirely discredited. In this connection it was revealed that all that occurred was an attempt at extortion committed by a former national police F-2 agent, according to a highly placed spokesman for that armed branch.

The incident occurred on Tuesday in Tulua, when Carlos Alberto Lozano, a former F-2 secret agent with a dishonorable discharge for bad conduct from that organization, accompanied by Phaller /name not clearly legible/ Idarraga and Jose de Jesus Ortega, demanded a large sum of money under threat of arrest from Ignacio Ayala Mosquera, who had previously been arrested several times for the illegal practice of medicine.

Police spokesmen added that Lozano and Idarraga were carrying photostats of police identification papers and cards which they had managed to obtain secretly. The three criminals are being held in Cali pending the pertinent investigation.

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abstracted (& some translation)

FOR PRESS MATERIAL PERTAINING TO SUBJECT OF THIS 201

SEE FILE # 74-126-60/3. (AEASSAULT Program, SB/PO/A, 4D30)

14-00000

LA REPUBLICA

EL DIARIO DE LOS HOMBRES DE TRABAJO

Tarifa Postal Reducida número 13 de la Administración Postal Nal. | BOGOTA, D. E., VIERNES 25 DE JULIO DE 1969. | Dirección: Calle 16 número 6-24 Conmut. 433-160. Dist. Vía Avianca

Los Secuestros, Clave de Siniestro Plan Comunista

Denuncian Actividades en Colombia

El secuestro de que acaba de ser víctima en Cali el conocido médico y ganadero Ernesto González Caicedo ha venido a confirmar trágicamente la existencia de una vasta conjura comunista para subvertir el orden constitucional y sumir de nuevo al país en una ola de terrorismo y violencia que parecían sepultados para siempre.

En efecto, este periódico así como también los demás diarios de la capital, habían anunciado en sus ediciones del 12 y del 18 de los corrientes, basadas en informaciones oficiales, que el Departamento del Valle había sido escogido por los comunistas pro-soviéticos para continuar la ola de atracos, atentados terroristas y secuestros iniciados recientemente en el Departamento de Antioquia.

Después del secuestro del hacendado antioqueño Rubén Noreña se produce ahora en el Valle el del médico Ernesto González Caicedo, por cuyo rescate los bandoleros comunistas están exigiendo la crecida suma de cuatro y medio millones de pesos. Se vienen cumpliendo así cronológicamente las etapas del nuevo plan subversivo, comenzando por estos cuyos objetivos son obviamente los de conseguir los dineros necesarios para financiar las cuadrillas de bandoleros en las áreas rurales ya escogidas.

Este incremento de la [illegible] en Colombia, al que hay que sumarle el reciente asalto en cuadrilla a San José de Ura[illegible] similar al "[illegible]" de años pasados, se produce inmediatamente después de la denuncia formulada hace [illegible] días por el diario "La Prensa" de Buenos Aires, uno de los periódicos más serios y prestigiosos del continente; en esa oportunidad, el rotativo argentino mencionó editorialmente a Colombia como uno de los países q' serían más gravemente afectados por la violencia comunista, junto con Venezuela, Perú, Ecuador y Bolivia.

Los hechos indican, además, que, pese a las divergencias ideológicas, la fuerza comunista en sus diversas tendencias "maoísta", "castrista" y "moscovita" está solidamente unida y comprometida en el plan de terrorismo y violencia que se viene denunciando.

Estamos en capacidad de informar a la opinión pública, que en poder del DAS, la Policía y el Ejército, reposan informaciones según las cuales el partido comunista colombiano, adicto a la "línea de Moscú", ha cursado instrucciones a todos sus afiliados para que se apresten a ingresar a la clandestinidad.

En las mismas fuentes se informó que los secuestros del señor Noreña y del doctor González, obedecen a modelos y tienen características similares a los perpetrados por bandoleros a las FARC en años pasados, a resultas de los cuales fueron asesinados los conocidos hombres de negocios Harold Eder y Oliverio Lara Borrero.

Las FARC como lo sabe todo el mundo, es un organismo paramilitar creado por los comunistas pro-soviéticos y dirigido por el tristemente célebre "Tirofijo", quien es miembro del comité central del partido comunista adicto a Moscú. Precisamente para revitalizar a este organismo, que había quedado reducido a las más precarias condiciones, gracias a la patriótica labor de las Fuerzas Armadas, un funcionario de la embajada soviética, entregó en México la suma de cien mil dólares al comunista colombiano Feliciano Pachón Chocontá, quien por fortuna, fue descubierto y capturado cuando estaba a punto de culminar con éxito su fatídica misión.

En torno a este sonado asunto que en su época tubo resonancia mundial, el diario "La Tribuna", de Lima, identifica en una serie de crónicas recientes a un ruso de apellido Lenov como "el funcionario soviético que le dio el dinero a Pachón en México", y agrega basado en informaciones de la Interpol que Lenov viaja con otros agentes de la KGB, Alexander Oyerbunov y Víctor Medmisov, todos ellos disfrazados de "sindicalistas", en una extraña correría que comprende justamente los países mencionados por "La Prensa" de Buenos Aires como enclaves del nuevo plan violento del comunismo, es decir, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Perú y Bolivia.

Según "La Tribuna", de Lima, estos tres rusos estuvieron en Colombia recientemente, y es justamente después de su paso por aquí que se están presentando los secuestros y actos violentos mencionados.

En abundancia de detalles, el importante periódico "Ya", editado en Madrid (España), se ocupó también en fecha muy reciente de la conjura comunista contra Colombia y otros países de América Latina. Según el diario madrileño las sedes de las agencias Tass y Novosty son verdaderos "nidos de espionaje y subversión" a través de los cuales se desarrolla la más peligrosa actividad del comunismo soviético.

201-132139

EL TIEMPO

BOGOTA, COLOMBIA — 1969, VIERNES 25 DE JULIO

Un Investigador Especial Nombró la Procuraduría

La Procuraduría General de la Nación [illegible] González Caicedo. [illegible] Carlos Julio Trujillo [illegible] se halla en Cali y [illegible] del negocio.

También la Procuraduría [illegible] al instructor [illegible] Gutiérrez para que investigara [illegible] penal [illegible] doctor Eduardo Ramírez Jiménez [illegible] cionario [illegible] oportunamente [illegible] a don Enrique González [illegible] en un bar de la ciudad [illegible] investigación [illegible] de [illegible] Santiago Romero Sánchez.

Secuestros en Colombia Tienen Fines Políticos

Nueva denuncia sobre el plan subversivo internacional hace el principal diario de Lima.

Que los secuestros de ricos ganaderos y agricultores ocurridos últimamente en Colombia obedecen a fines políticos, [illegible] "La Prensa", de Lima, el más [illegible] órgano informativo del Perú, basado en informaciones suministradas por la [illegible].

Haciendo eco a la denuncia formulada [illegible] por "La Prensa", de Buenos Aires, el diario limeño [illegible] la existencia "de un vasto plan subversivo comunista a escala internacional que afecta igualmente a Colombia, Venezuela, Perú, Ecuador y Bolivia".

Al dar cuenta de las andanzas de [illegible] soviéticos de la KGB en América del Sur, dice el diario que "viajan disfrazados de sindicalistas" y que uno de ellos, Lenov, es el único funcionario de la embajada soviética en México que entregó al bandolero colombiano Feliciano Pachón la suma de US$ 100.000 para los grupos subversivos de [illegible].

Lenov ha [illegible] en compañía de los agentes de la KGB Alexander Operskov y Victor Dcomikov. Y ha sido notorio el hecho de que poco después de la visita de los "sindicalistas" a varios países del Continente, han estallado en ellos actos violentos contra las autoridades, terrorismo citadino y secuestros como en el caso de Colombia y más concretamente, en Medellín y Cali.

Alerta.

"El plan de los comunistas pro-soviéticos está encaminado a crear un nuevo clima de incertidumbre en el Continente" dice el diario limeño, mediante la utilización de toda clase de atentados terroristas, atracos, secuestros, etc.

En el caso colombiano estos hechos están dirigidos, tal como a principios de este mes lo denunciaron altos funcionarios, a obtener recursos económicos para reorganizar el movimiento guerrillero de las FARC, actualmente en plena quiebra.

Los recientes atentados ocurridos en Medellín contra las residencias del jefe del DAS, de varios conocidos profesionales y el periódico "El Diario", lo mismo que el secuestro del hacendado antioqueño Rubén Noreña, forman parte del plan de los extremistas de la línea moscovita.

Crisis Nerviosa Sufrió el Médico al Ser Rescatado

Cali, 24 (Por Cristian Martínez Sarria). — Familiares de [illegible] González [illegible] y [illegible] Ernesto, [illegible] que [illegible] sano y salvo [illegible] ha sido [illegible] que estaba en una clase de reposo, después de las [illegible] horas que le tocó [illegible].

No obstante, algunos empleados de la familia González [illegible] afirmaron que González Caicedo se encontraba en la residencia de su padre [illegible] desde tempranas horas de la madrugada, y fue atendido por varios médicos que esperaban su llegada.

De acuerdo con las informaciones recogidas, González Caicedo recibió calmantes para devolverle su estado de ánimo y [illegible] la crisis nerviosa que al parecer sufría al ser rescatado.

Familia Elogia la Información de EL TIEMPO

Cali, 24. *(Por Cristian Martínez Sarria). Ignacio Valencia López, uno de los familiares de Ernesto González Caicedo, más [illegible] a la prensa, elogió la forma responsable y seria como El Tiempo suministró las informaciones sobre el secuestro de su cuñado.*

Valencia López, hermano de Alma Valencia de González Caicedo, vino acompañado desde Popayán de su cuñado Aurelio [illegible], una vez se [illegible] la noticia del secuestro.

Estamos Reconocidos.

Valencia López anotó: "Estamos reconocidos con El Tiempo por la forma que presentó las informaciones en torno a este caso y destaco su serenidad y responsabilidad".

Sinembargo criticó algunas otras informaciones publicadas en órganos distintos a El Tiempo, que estuvieron a punto de hacer fracasar las negociaciones y el rescate de Ernesto González Caicedo.

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Los hechos ocurrieron el martes en Tuluá, cuando Carlos Alberto Lozano, quien fuera agente secreto del F-2 y retirado de esta institución por mala conducta y acompañado de [illegible] Idárraga y José de Jesús Ortega, exigió a Ignacio Ayala Mosquera quien varias veces fue detenido por ejercicio ilegal de la medicina, una fuerte suma de dinero bajo las amenazas de ponerlo preso.

Se aclaró, por parte de voceros de la Policía, que Lozano e Idárraga portaban fotocopia de carnés de la institución y placas que hábilmente lograron conseguir. Los tres sindicados se encuentran detenidos en Cali para la correspondiente investigación.

201-132139

EL SIGLO
Bogotá, D. E., Viernes 25 de Julio de 1969

Secuestros y Atracos del F.L.N.

Para Financiar el Movimiento Guerrillero

Las autoridades han recibido informes allegados por la Interpol en relación con el plan subversivo a escala continental que el comunismo internacional viene ejecutando en varios países con el fin de turbar el orden público y allegar fondos para el sostenimiento de los focos alzados en armas.

De acuerdo con los datos obtenidos por la Interpol y que ya han sido divulgados por el diario "La Tribuna" de Lima, una fuente allegada a los servicios de inteligencia adscritos a las secciones de orden público informó que los atentados dinamiteros ocurridos en la ciudad de Medellín, la distribución de propaganda subversiva y los saboteos ocurridos en los teatros en donde se exhibe la película "Las Boinas Verdes", hacen parte del plan denunciado por "La Prensa" de Buenos Aires y que por no alarmar a la ciudadanía, algunas autoridades han afirmado que no se sabe nada.

También se supo que las autoridades han dispuesto el adelanto de severas investigaciones y la intensificación de la vigilancia en varias regiones de los departamentos de Antioquia y Valle, en donde se ha venido notando la actividad subversiva, que de acuerdo a documentos hallados en el campamento de Jesús de Dios Aguilera, cuando huyó ante el avance de las tropas de la IV Brigada, de las cercanías de Segovia en Antioquia, está orientada por el comunismo pro-soviético, que intentan crear un clima de zozobra mediante la ejecución de atentados terroristas, atracos, secuestros y chantajes, para asimismo [illegible] la reorganización de los grupos [illegible] que han sido notificados en el [illegible] que no recibirán [illegible] por [illegible] haberse dilapidado los dineros en manos de los jefes.

En el Departamento del Valle, como ya se había informado hace pocos días, también se está notando un clima de incertidumbre, y dicen las autoridades, nada tendría de extraño que los secuestros de conocidos hombres de negocios, ocurridos recientemente, hagan parte del plan subversivo.

Sobre esta nueva ola de agitación la Interpol ha informado que se sabe de tres agentes soviéticos de la GKB que bajo la apariencia de "sindicalistas" y que han sido identificados como Victor Medinkov, Alexander Operin[illegible]rov y N. Lenov vienen recorriendo a Latinoamérica y quienes precisamente estuvieron recientemente en Colombia. El último de los nombrados, según la Interpol, fue el diplomático ruso que en México entregó al bandolero colombiano Feliciano Pachón Chocontá la suma de 120 mil dólares para que junto con una mujer que lo acompañaba los trajera al país y los hiciera llegar a los jefes de las FARC. Como se recordará Pachón fue descubierto en Eldorado por el DAS que le decomisó el dinero y lo puso a órdenes de un juez que lo mantuvo preso por algún tiempo hasta que hace poco fue beneficiado con una excarcelación.

Las revelaciones de la Interpol sobre las actividades subversivas en Latinoamérica y que ya en Medellín han dejado como saldo un muerto y varios miles de pesos en pérdidas, también hacen mención de las agencias TASS y Novosty, señalándolas como centros de agitación, hecho del cual, anotaron las autoridades, se divulgó en el periódico "Ya" de Madrid.

En cuanto hace al terrorismo en la capital antioqueña, los servicios de inteligencia ya han efectuado cerca de diez capturas de conocidos extremistas contra quienes recaen graves indicios de estar comprometidos en los atentados terroristas ocurridos recientemente en Medellín.

Por otra parte se dijo que en cuanto hace a Bogotá, el DAS investiga, dentro del mayor hermetismo, a unas ocho personas que fueron capturadas cuando transportaban apreciable cantidad de dinamita, fulminantes, cajas de proyectiles de diverso calibre y otros elementos bélicos, que se cree iban a ser enviados a otros lugares del país o a servir para perpetrar actos terroristas en esta capital.

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183

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REF LIMA 5256 (NOT SENT PARIS)

IP

21 JUL 69 IN 06694

1. ON 17 JULY NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV (201-132139) DEPARTED PERU FOR SOVIET UNION VIA PARIS WHERE HE WILL STAY APPROX 2 DAYS ACCOMPANIED BY NORMA SERRA, MEMBER OF JCP/PCP, WHO WILL STUDY IN THE SOVIET UNION. PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE, LEONOV TOLD DULAUREL-1 THAT IF LATTER WANTED SEND CORRESPONDENCE OR MESSAGES VIA SOVIET DIPLOMATIC POUCH TO CONTACT VLADIMIR IVANOVICH SHPAKESVICH (201-343894) WHO WILL HANDLE IT.

2. ABOVE RECEIVED FROM DULINDEN-11.

3. FILE: 58-8786, 201-132139, 201-343894.

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21 July 69

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TO LIMA INFO: MADRID 11 22 21 Z JUL 69

REF: LIMA 5122 (IN 90235)*

1. NO HEADQUARTERS TRACES ON CARLOS JIMENEZ ORTEGA. ~~[illegible]~~. MEXICO CITY REPORT DATED NOVEMBER 1947 IDENTIFIED A CARLOS JIMENEZ, WRITER AND NEWSPAPERMAN, AS SIGNER OF A GREETING SENT BY GROUP OF SPANISH INTELLECTUALS TO THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE ON ANNIVERSARY OF THE SOVIET REVOLUTION. ACCORDING TO A SANTIAGO REPORT, JUNE 1949, CARLOS JIMENEZ, FORMER MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF MADRID (SIC), HAD DEPARTED CHILE IN 1943.

2. FILE: 201-132139.

END OF MESSAGE

* Request for traces on Carlos JIMENEZ Ortega, Spanish journalist who the Station is considering recruiting as an access agent to Soviet Novosti representative LEONOV.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

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ALFONSO G. SPERA
C/WH/3

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11 Jul 69

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EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO

Miércoles 9 julio de 1969

201-132139

Tema 3995

Enviados Sindicales Soviéticos

Por FELIPE RUSSEK

Tan poco respetuosa de las decisiones de nuestros gobiernos es la URSS, que no obstante que el seudodiplomático ruso Alexander Openkunov fue expulsado por las autoridades de Colombia el año 1954 —a causa de sus actividades subversivas y nada diplomáticas—, ahora ha sido enviado por el Kremlin al Perú como miembro de una misión sindical soviética. Tanto Openkunov como Lenov que lo acompaña, son oficiales de la K.G.B., así como también Víctor Mednikov y Boris Papov, quienes también estuvieron en Perú como representantes sindicales moscovitas.

Los gobiernos latinoamericanos que recientemente han reanudado relaciones diplomáticas con la URSS, parten de dos supuestos completamente erróneos. El primero es creer que pueden mejorar en forma sustancial su situación económica incrementando el actual intercambio comercial con Rusia. Un examen de las relaciones mercantiles entre nuestros pueblos y la URSS, pone al descubierto lo ilusorio de tales esperanzas. El insignificante comercio con Rusia soviética no aumenta con los convenios protocolarios. Sigue siendo igualmente pequeño y precario. Los artículos que podemos ofrecer, tales como café, azúcar, no interesan a los rusos. El primero porque consumen muy poco café; para beber tienen otros líquidos más exitantes. El azúcar, porque están obligados a comprarlo a Cuba Castrocomunista. Por lo que toca a los artículos que nuestros países necesitan adquirir en el exterior, la URSS no los puede ofrecer ni en la calidad, ni en el precio, ni en las condiciones que en Europa o Estados Unidos podemos conseguir. El trato comercial más formalizado entre nuestros países y la URSS, carece así de validez para justificar relaciones de más alto nivel, que los actuales trueques de mercaderías de poca monta.

El segundo supuesto de que parten nuestros gobiernos para reanudar relaciones diplomáticas con Rusia, es suponer que los designios del comunismo internacional han cambiado, y que la subversión contra los gobiernos constituidos y la lucha de clases violenta, ya no son los propósitos de los soviéticos. Si nos atenemos a un análisis frío de la conducta moscovita en nuestros países, veremos que no sólo sigue proclamando sin ambages sus pretensiones de conquistar el imperio mundial a ultranza, sino que las actividades de sus nutridas delegaciones diplomáticas, que nada tienen que hacer en materia de comercio, están dedicadas a exportarnos agitaciones y la rebelión contra nuestros gobiernos nacionalmente constituidos. En este aspecto, la presencia de los llamados "enviados sindicales" resulta muy importante.

201-132139

SOVIET LABOR UNION ENVOYS

By Felipe Russek

Source: El Universal Gráfico (Illustrated Universal Daily), 9 July 1969, Mexico City

The USSR has so little respect for the decisions of our governments that even though the Russian pseudodiplomat Aleksandr Openkunov was expelled by Colombian authorities in 1964 (for his subversive, not at all diplomatic, activities), he has now been sent by the Kremlin to Peru as a member of a Soviet labor union mission. Both Openkunov and Lenov, who is accompanying him, are officials of the KGB, as are likewise Viktor Modnikov and Boris Papov, who also were in Peru as Moscow's labor union representatives.

The Latin American governments that recently renewed diplomatic relations with the USSR did so on the basis of two completely mistaken assumptions. The first was to believe that they can substantially improve their economic situation by increasing their present trade with Russia. An examination of trade relations between our countries and the USSR reveals the illusory nature of those hopes. The insignificant trade with Soviet Russia is not increased by the protocolar agreements; it continues to be equally small and precarious. The articles that we can offer -- coffee, sugar, etc -- are of no interest to the Russians. Not coffee, because they drink very little coffee; they have other, more stimulating liquids to drink; and not sugar, because they are committed to buying it from the Communist Cuba of Castro. As for the articles that our countries need to buy abroad, the USSR is unable to offer them to us with the quality, or at the price, or on the terms that we can obtain them in Europe or the United States. The best executed trade treaty between our countries and the USSR is therefore incapable of justifying relations on a higher level than the present exchange of merchandise of

small importance.

The second assumption on which our governments base their decision to renew diplomatic relations with Russia is to imagine that the intentions tions of international Communism have changed and that subversion of con-

[illegible] continuing to pro- [illegible] [illegible] missions [illegible] which have nothing to do in [illegible] -- are devoted to the business of exporting to us agitation and rebellion against our nationally constituted governments. In this respect, the presence of the so-called "labor union envoys" has proved to be very significant.

EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO

Miércoles 9 de Julio de 1969

Enviados Sindicales Soviéticos

Por FELIPE RUSSEK

Tan poco respetuosa de las decisiones de nuestros gobiernos es la URSS, que no obstante que el seudodiplomático ruso Alexander Openkunov fue expulsado por las autoridades de Colombia el año 1964 —a causa de sus actividades subversivas y nada diplomáticas—, ahora ha sido enviado por el Kremlin al Perú, como miembro de una misión sindical soviética. Tanto Openkunov como Lenov, que lo acompaña, son oficiales de la K.G.B., así como también Victor Mednikov y Boris Popov, quienes también estuvieron en Perú como representantes sindicales moscovitas.

Los gobiernos latinoamericanos que recientemente han reanudado relaciones diplomáticas con la URSS, parten de dos supuestos completamente erróneos. El primero es creer que pueden mejorar en forma sustancial su situación económica incrementando el actual intercambio comercial con Rusia. Un examen de las relaciones mercantiles entre nuestros pueblos y la URSS, pone al descubierto lo ilusorio de tales esperanzas. El [illegible] significante comercio con Rusia soviética no aumenta con los convenios protocolarios [illegible] [illegible] igualmente pequeños y [illegible] que podemos ofrecer, tales como café, [illegible], no interesan a los rusos [illegible] consumen muy poco café; para beber tienen otros líquidos más excitantes. El azúcar, porque están obligados a comprarlo a Cuba Castrocomunista. Por lo que toca a los artículos que nuestros países necesitan adquirir en el exterior, la URSS no los puede ofrecer ni en la calidad, ni en el precio, ni en las condiciones que en Europa o Estados Unidos podemos conseguir. El trato comercial más formalizado entre nuestros países y la URSS, carece así de validez para justificar relaciones de más alto nivel, que los actuales trueques de mercaderías de poca monta.

El segundo supuesto de que parten nuestros gobiernos para reanudar relaciones diplomáticas con Rusia, es suponer que los designios del comunismo internacional han cambiado, y que la subversión contra los gobiernos constituidos y la lucha de clases violenta, ya no son los propósitos de los soviéticos. Si nos atenemos a un análisis frío de la conducta moscovita en nuestros países, veremos que no sólo sigue [illegible] sin [illegible] sus pretensiones de conquistar el imperio mundial a ultranza, sino que las actividades de sus nutridas delegaciones diplomáticas, que nada tienen que hacer en materia de comercio, están dedicadas a exportarnos agitaciones y la rebelión contra [illegible] nacionalmente constituidos. En este [illegible] la presencia de los llamados "enviados sindicales" resulta muy importante.

SECRET 6

Chief, WH Division
(ATTN: Thomas C. LOCKHART)

Chief of Station, Mexico City

LITEMPO/Forwarding of Interrogation

ACTION REQUIRED: For Your Information

REFERENCE : MEXICO CITY-0842

1. In accordance with Reference, forwarded herewith are two xerox copies of the results of the interrogation of Lorenzo CARDENAS Barajas (201-248806).

2. SOURCE: LITEMPO-12 on 2 July 1969.

for/John A. PROBERT

Attachment:
As stated, h/w

Distribution:
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201-133137

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-37402	2 July 1969
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET RYBAT	200-124-162/3

..., de los cuales el principal es el denominado "Modelo"; que la relación que en este acto tiene a la vista en fotocopias negras del uno al seis, que se inician con el título de: "Domicilios de logias AJOF de diferentes partes de la República", los nombres y domicilios que aparecen en las mismas, corresponden a los miembros responsables de cada logia, pero esta relación la recibió el declarante de JORGE PRIZ, conservándola en su poder porque pensó que le sería útil para el caso de irse al Estado de Guerrero, ya que todos los citados en la relación son gentes de absoluta confianza, incluyendo desde luego las direcciones que corresponden a esos Estados, y por lo que hace a la relación compuesta de nueve hojas, igualmente en fotocopia, que contienen exclusivamente nombres y lugares del mencionado Estado de Guerrero, le fue entregada al de la voz por un compañero del Frente Revolucionario de Liberación, diciéndole que todos los nombres allí anotados son "contactos". Que en el mes de Diciembre del año anterior, el dicente solicitó a la Embajada del Perú en nuestro país que su Gobierno le concediera asilo político, toda vez que consideraba ése el único medio para salir de México, pero además con la intención de reunirse en la ciudad de Lima, con CARRERO ROCHE, para continuar sus trabajos pre-revolucionarios a nivel continental, pero como el asilo solicitado se le negó, optó a final de cuentas por trasladarse a Belice, como lo hizo, con la mira de obtener la protección de JORGE PRICE y además de continuar los trabajos del Movimiento Latinoamericano de Liberación con el apoyo de éste, como Primer Ministro de aquella colonia Británica, pues el plan trazado era de viajar de todas maneras a Perú para hacer el contacto con CARRERO ROCHE y discutir sus problemas, como ya dijo, a nivel Continental, a efecto de insistir en la revolución en Belice, buscando su independencia, para de allí prolongar el movimiento armado hacia México, iniciándolo en Quintana Roo, para seguirlo a Yucatán y demás Estados del sureste hasta Coatzacoalcos, Veracruz, por ser ésta la primera fase conforme a la planeación hecha, teniendo la seguridad de poder contar para ello, con las armas y elementos en general que produjeran la re-

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Samuel K. CASTELON

CAS/twb

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La Cronica
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Los Manifiestos del Apra y AP

Sincronizadamente el Partido Aprista y Acción Popular emitieron enterayer comunicados, en vísperas de la fecha que el Gobierno anterior tenía pensada para la realización de las Elecciones Generales.

Es respetable la posición de ambos Partidos al exigir al Gobierno Revolucionario que fije fechas y objetivos. Merecen también tomarse en cuenta las críticas que el APRA, especialmente, formula en su Manifiesto. El PAP admite que hay buenos propósitos al intentar la reforma de estructuras, pero que ésta sólo puede llevarse a cabo con una democracia representativa en el país.

Ayer muchos se hicieron esta pregunta: ¿Qué resultados estaríamos comentando de haberse realizado las Elecciones bajo el Gobierno de Belaunde?

A nada conduce, ahora, hacer especulaciones sobre el desenlace de un proceso que ni siquiera llegó a iniciarse. Pero, con todo, es interesante recoger opiniones y, siempre en el terreno de "lo que pudo ser", dar la propia.

Muchos creen que Acción Popular (belaundista) y el APRA iban a formar un solo bloque en las Elecciones del 69. Basan esta presunción en el acercamiento que hubo entre ambos Partidos al final del Gobierno, y, también, en el rompimiento del APRA con la UNO, que dejó al Partido de Haya de la Torre si el aliado —tradicional en las luchas políticas de los últimos 25 años— que lo avalara ante las fuerzas de derecha. Y esos mismos piensan que para hacer frente al PAP-AP se hubieran unido UNO-MDP-PDC e Independientes, dejando en el "tercer frente" a la izquierda con los democristianos y los seoanistas.

Nosotros creemos que un pacto AP-APRA se habría tornado difícil por la designación del candidato a la Presidencia. Los apristas habrían reclamado uno de los suyos. Y en este caso, el nombre de Haya de la Torre tenía que salir al frente. Es difícil que AP gobiernista hubiera aceptado la candidatura de Haya. Más bien podía haber exigido la de un elemento independiente, pero el APRA ya no tenía salida ante sus huestes para que votaran por un candidato que no fuera aprista. Los motivos del 45 y del 57 habían desaparecido.

El segundo frente se tornaba con muchas posibilidades, si consideramos el desgaste del Gobierno de FBT, muchos de cuyos errores eran compartidos al final por la mayoría aprista del Parlamento. Debemos admitir que esta colaboración del PAP se debió, en parte, a su deseo de hacer lo que fuera necesario para evitar el pronunciamiento militar y llegar a las Elecciones de 1969.

Para comandar ese "segundo frente" se sindicaba a Bedoya Reyes, aunque muchos consideran hasta ahora problemático que el Alcalde de Lima hubiera recibido el visto bueno del jefe de la UNO y de los líderes del MDP. Mas como todo es posible en política, la candidatura de Bedoya apoyada por esos sectores habría tenido una fuerza singular y una chance de primera.

El repunte en cifras de la izquierda estaba asegurado. Se dejó entrever en las Elecciones de 1967 con la buena votación de Malpica. El refuerzo del DC y seoanistas, aunque no muy cuantioso, hubiera significado de todas maneras pasar los 200 mil votos, lo que representaba llevar un bloque aceptable de representantes al Parlamento.

En fin, todas son especulaciones, considerando lo que era nuestra política por octubre de 1968. Lo que sí es hecho concreto que a los siete meses de establecido el nuevo Gobierno, los únicos grupos que están realmente en la oposición son el APRA y AP belaundista. Y ellos han sido, precisamente, los que acaban de añorar las Elecciones que pudieron haberse realizado ayer.

● A fines de la próxima semana llegarían a Lima los diplomáticos rusos que se establecerán en el Perú. Ha trascendido que antes de ellos vendría Nicolai Leonov con el objeto de escribir notas en torno a las relaciones peruano-soviéticas. Según publicaciones de diarios de Venezuela y Colombia, Leonov sería muy adepto a intervenir en los asuntos internos de los países que visita. Últimamente habría residido en México, desde donde habría sido eje de un vasto movimiento subversivo en países americanos. "El Tiempo" de Caracas lo denunció el 24 de mayo de este año como el jefe de "Gregorian", un ruso expulsado de Venezuela. "El Siglo" de Bogotá (22 de mayo de 1969) sindicó a Leonov como el diplomático que entregó 120 mil dólares a dos grupos subversivos colombianos. "La República" de Bogotá (17 y 22 de mayo) sindica a Leonov como el elemento clave de una red de subversión y espionaje. ¿Qué hará en Lima? Ya lo veremos. Pero no deben echarse en saco roto las denuncias que se han formu-

abaratar el precio de los artículos alimenticios merece todo el apoyo de la ciudadanía. Lo propio debe ocurrir con el control de precios que entrará a regir dentro de seis días, pese a tratarse de una medida sumamente peligrosa.

El control que anuncia el Gobierno, si no es llevado cuidadosamente y si no se toman las providencias necesarias, puede constituirse en un remedio más grave que la propia enfermedad.

Y es que aun está fresco el recuerdo de lo que ocurrió hace 20 años, cuando el Gobierno de Bustamante y Rivero decretó el control general de precios que a la postre, originó el mercado negro y largas colas en los puestos de abastecimiento.

Creemos que la disposición dictada puede aceptarse como un paliativo, pero no como solución de un problema que radica en el acentuado déficit de la producción alimentaria.

El control de precios puede dar resultados si se lleva a efecto con el máximo cuidado posible, pero consideramos que el Gobierno debe también

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La Prensa 12 de Junio de 1969

Infiltración Soviética en Sindicatos Peruanos

Por la revelación de un soviético que se encuentra en Lima, se ha tenido noticia de que un grupo sindical peruano de inspiración comunista mantiene tratos personales constantes con miembros del Presidium del Consejo Central de los Sindicatos de la Unión Soviética.

Las organizaciones sindicales peruanas están ciertamente en libertad de mantener contactos con cualquier entidad similar extranjera, mientras esa relación no represente una interferencia foránea en problemas que son de incumbencia exclusiva de los peruanos. Pero no es éste el caso del vínculo entre el grupo sindical que, ni de hecho ni de derecho, tiene títulos para presentarse como la Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú, y el Presidium del Consejo Central de los Sindicatos de la Unión Soviética.

Es menester señalar que el grupo sindical local no tiene la representación genuina y mayoritaria de los trabajadores peruanos. Se trata de conocidos dirigentes comunistas que aspiran desde hace tiempo a lograr la división de los sindicatos, objetivo que no han llegado a cumplir. Los dirigentes de la verdadera CTP conservan la representación de los trabajadores de los gremios y sindicatos principales. Los dirigentes de la CTP, conformando la representación peruana con el Ministro de Trabajo, han viajado a Ginebra a la reunión internacional que ha organizado la OIT, con la participación principal del Sumo Pontífice.

Es, pues, con una organización apócrifa con la que está manteniendo relaciones el Presidium de Sindicatos de la Unión Soviética. Y esto quiere decir que está interviniendo y alentando una maniobra divisionista en desmedro de los trabajadores peruanos que son contrarios al sistema totalitario de trabajos forzados y de represión de los trabajadores libres que encarna la Unión Soviética. En otras palabras: bajo la fachada de una organización sindical, la Unión Soviética está inmiscuyéndose, en convivencia con un grupo falsamente representativo de los trabajadores peruanos, en problemas que son de competencia de nuestros grupos laborales.

De otro lado, a nadie escapa que en la Unión Soviética no existe ninguna especie de libertad laboral y que los trabajadores están sometidos a un régimen completamente opuesto a la concepción sindicalista imperante en el mundo democrático. Si esto es así ¿qué clase de asesoramiento sindical pueden ofrecer quienes no son sindicalistas sino agentes de un gobierno totalitario que nunca ha admitido una reclamación salarial, una huelga o cualquiera de los procedimientos conocidos en Occidente?

El establecimiento de relaciones con la Unión Soviética implica riesgos como éste que se ha descubierto en el nivel sindical. Es imperioso que las autoridades gubernamentales impidan la intromisión soviética en los asuntos sindicales, porque, entre otras infracciones, significa el menoscabo de la soberanía peruana.

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¿Espías en Casa?

Parece que los agentes extranjeros están últimamente muy activos en el Perú. Esta vez se trata de agentes de la Unión Soviética —país con el que acabamos de entablar relaciones diplomáticas— que trabajan para la K.G.B., la tristemente célebre policía secreta que alguna vez estuvo dirigida por Lavrenti Beria.

En editorial del 14 de junio, CORREO se refería a dos presuntos "dirigentes sindicales" soviéticos, los señores Boris Popov y Víctor Mednikov, quienes han asistido como observadores a las reuniones de una rama fantasma de sindicatos que pretende erigirse como rival de la Confederación de Trabajadores del Perú o CTP. Señalaba nuestro diario la contradicción que supone el hecho de que dichos señores se atribuyan calidad de dirigentes sindicales cuando es sabido que, en Rusia, el régimen sindical no es libre y los sindicatos son allí nada más que apéndice del régimen totalitario.

También ha estado en el Perú el titulado periodista Nikolay Leonov, y fue entrevistado por el diario "La Crónica". Respecto de Leonov, recuerda el diario "El Siglo", de Bogotá, en su edición del 17 de mayo del año en curso, que Leonov, actuando entonces como diplomático, fue sorprendido en México cuando entregaba a agentes extremistas la cantidad de cien mil dólares en efectivo presumiblemente destinados a financiar la insurrección. Por su parte, el diario "El Tiempo" de la misma Bogotá se refiere a la "red de espionaje y subversión que desde México dirige el seudoperiodista soviético Leonev, protegido además durante varios años, con el fuero diplomático como "segundo secretario" de la embajada rusa".

Según informa "La República", igualmente de Bogotá, en su edición del pasado primero de mayo, otro agente soviético Alexander Operkunov, quien fuera expulsado de Colombia en 1964, regresó como miembro de una misión sindical soviética. Tanto Leontov como Operkunov han estado, recientemente, en el Perú, lo que indica que a la Unión Soviética no le importa emplear en nuestro país a los mismos agentes que ha empleado en otras latitudes, y lo que vendría a justificar a quienes estiman como peligroso el establecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas con Moscú.

SUCESO Dominical de CORREO

22 Junio 1969

ALARMANTE PENETRACION COMUNISTA EN EL PERU

Por Nicolás LYNCH JR.

Se comentó ayer en esta misma página la expulsión del conocido agente del comunismo internacional, Ezequiel Ramírez Novoa, ordenada por el gobierno de Colombia. Y se recordó que ese agitador indeseable está realizando una activa campaña al servicio del imperialismo soviético con el título de "Secretario General del Comité de Abogados Pro Defensa del Petróleo Peruano", en una costosa gira a lo largo de todo el Continente que no se sabe quién paga.

Ayer, un diario local ha publicado con honores de primera plana, la prueba fotográfica de que otra organización fantasma —llamada "Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú"— celebra sus sesiones bajo el control y supervigilancia de dos procónsules sindicales soviéticos, llamados Boris Popov y Víctor Medinkov. Ambos actúan libremente en nuestro país e intervienen en la política obrera nacional sin que nadie se lo impida; pues la supuesta "confederación" no es sino una agencia más del comunismo imperialista internacional, cuyas actividades aquí son del dominio público.

La expulsión del agitador comunista Ramírez Novoa, ordenada por el gobierno de Colombia, y la reveladora fotografía e información publicada ayer, son dos expresivos testimonios de la avanzada intervención política rusa en nuestro país.

El comunismo que ya hizo su ingreso clandestino y sangriento en el Perú por medio de las bien financiadas y armadas guerrillas de tantas vidas han costado a nuestras fuerzas militares y policiales, vuelve ahora por los caminos legales y diplomáticos. Los enviados comunistas extranjeros tienen libre entrada. Y, como ya lo vemos, su derecho para tomar parte en actividades obreras, y consiguientemente políticas y sociales, parece ser irrestricto y público.

El comunismo internacional está actuando a dos manos en el país: Los soviéticos realizan la penetración pacífica, suave, agazapada y adiestran a sus agentes y secuaces en la infiltración burocrática; a tiempo que los "pekineses" se presentan como disidentes violentos y agresivos usando todos los medios de la delincuencia y del terror. El antagonismo entre unos y otros es aquí, en nuestro medio, más ficticio que real. Al usar como recurso y táctica la supuesta división entre dos bandos, la acción de cada uno está bien distribuida y ubicada. Uno encubre al otro y ambos engañan a los crédulos y tontos útiles al aparecer como contrapuestos.

Es innegable y es obligante remarcarlo que ya va cundiendo en la opinión pública una creciente alarma ante los desembozados avances de los agentes extranjeros del comunismo internacional en el Perú. Con muy buenas razones se comenta y se interroga acerca de los alcances y peligros de esa penetración. Hechos como los que comentamos justifican la inquietud general que las actividades solapadas de los comunistas del lado ruso y las vandálicas de los del lado pekinés están causando entre los peruanos que no quisieran ver a su patria arrastrada a los horrores que el comunismo causa a donde llega.

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"LA TRIBUNA" — Lima, Viernes 13 de Junio de 1969

¡ANTIMPERIALISMO, SI, PERO COMUNISMO, NO!

Por J. HIDALGO VALERA

Día a día aparecen nuevas pruebas de la torcida interpretación y del interesado aprovechamiento que el Comunismo Internacional está haciendo de las sanas corrientes antimperialistas que son sincera expresión democrática de la conciencia cívica del pueblo peruano.

Bajo el pretexto de un nacionalismo que no pueden sentir, quienes están a órdenes y paga de una potencia extranjera, los comunistas criollos esconden su mercenarismo apátrida al servicio del Imperialismo ruso apareciendo como "patriotas" peruanos adversarios del Imperialismo yanqui.

Y con esta máscara se embanderan como defensores de la "soberanía nacional" o del petróleo. Y ya realizando correrías continentales que cuestan muchísimo dinero — como es el caso del agitador Ramírez Novoa—, o ya organizando "confederaciones generales de trabajadores", bajo la auditoría vigilante de agentes del gobierno ruso, están actuando en el Perú en una siniestra obra de penetración disolvente.

Neutralizada Cuba como base irradiadora de la propaganda y subversión comunista, aparece claro que los grandes empresarios del imperialismo ruso han escogido al Perú para trampolín de sus actividades sobre América Latina. El aislamiento de la isla cubana, su incomunicación con América y el fracaso de su política de "guerrillas" han hecho que su propaganda resulte desacreditada e ineficiente. Pero las facilidades que el Perú depara ahora, con amplias relaciones diplomáticas y abierto paso a los emisarios de todo tipo y camouflage comunista, permiten un trabajo de penetración sin restricciones y de expansión continental, ilimite. A él contribuye la festejadora tolerancia de nuestra bien llamada "fuerza de los vivos", listos a todo acomodo, y dispuestos a entrar en tratos con Moscú como el mercader que caído en el pozo trataba de salir de él tirándose de las orejas.

La táctica de penetración rusa está actuando ventajosamente sobre la confusión de una llamada "clase dirigente u oligarquía peruana", (sin conciencia y sin clase), y valiéndose además del caos ideológico dominante en el improvisado oficialismo que por la fuerza gobierna al Perú. La odiosa ceguera antiaprista de "El Comercio". — gran mentor y mandamás reaccionario del país—, ha arrastrado a muchos "izquierdistas" de nuevo cuño a aceptar el lema proditor de "Primero los comunistas que el APRA", Y de aquí que por no haber aceptado el constructivo antimperialismo aprista, basado en el principio del "interamericanismo democrático sin imperio", de la integración y del fortalecimiento de una democracia social representativa jurídicamente institucionalizada, es que está cayendo el país en un confusionismo desmoralizador.

Bueno es recordar que el izquierdismo democrático aprista trajo al Perú la verdadera concepción e imagen de un antimperialismo de veras transformador y progresista. Jamás dijo el Aprismo que ser antimperialista era ser xenófobo o demagogo, ni menos enemigo del pueblo norteamericano. Y siempre afirmó que nuestra posición revolucionaria es resistir al imperialismo, pero sin olvidar que nuestro país necesita de capitales extranjeros y de ayuda tecnológica para su desarrollo.

En consecuencia, menos pudo el Aprismo propiciar nuestra entrega al colonialismo comunista como remedio contra los males que acarrea nuestra interdependencia con los Estados Unidos, tan mal llevada por ambas partes. Tal recurso habría sido copiar la receta castrista que por librarse de un amo al cual juzgaba malo se echó a los pies de otro que ha resultado peor.

No, el lema aprista ha sido y es el de propiciar una conciencia y actitud antimperialista constructiva y no caer bajo otro imperialismo rival, enemigo de la libertad del hombre. Nuestro antimperialismo es democrático y se basa precisamente en la libre integración de nuestros pueblos, en la afirmación de nuestra soberanía continental sobre la base de las soberanías nacionales, que emanan de las soberanías populares libremente ejercidas y en el nuevo concepto de la justicia de pan y libertad.

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✦"Sindicalistas" Soviéticos Pretenden Colonizarnos

Entre risas, protestas y estupor, se ha recibido la noticia de que dos "sindicalistas" rusos han estado en enjuagues con pretendidos dirigentes del sindicalismo peruano.

Boris Popov y Victor Mednikov, miembros del llamado Presidium del Consejo Central de los Sindicatos de la Unión Soviética, así [illegible]ron el lunes a una asamblea de delegados de la fantasmal Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú. Y en esta ocasión se hizo público que los "sindicalistas" rusos mantienen contacto con el laborismo peruano desde que se iniciaron las gestiones para que el Perú y Rusia entablasen relaciones diplomáticas.

Esta "confederación general", alentada por los comunistas y "El Comercio", carece de reconocimiento y sólo se representa a sí misma. La forman un puñado de trabajadores y agitadores que hacen, sin resultado alguno, la guerra a la Confederación de Trabajadores del Perú (CTP), que sí es el organismo auténtico del sindicalismo peruano, goza de reconocimientos nacional e internacional y representa a los trabajadores en las cajas de los seguros sociales. A mayor [illegible]miento, la CTP también tiene la personería legal y masiva de los trabajadores peruanos, pues sus dirigentes, acompañ[illegible] al Ministro de Trabajo, General Jorge [illegible]namot, viajaron a la reunión de la OIT en Ginebra, donde el martes habló Paulo VI.

Si los "sindicalistas" rusos tuvieran honestos propósitos de solidaridad e intercambio laboral, podrían haber buscado contacto con la auténtica representación peruana, esto con la CTP. ¿Por qué, en cambio, "confraternizan" con la institución divisionista y fantasmal?

Una sola es la respuesta. En Rusia no existe sindicalismo. Sus entidades sindicales, su pomposo "Presidium", sólo son una farsa. Porque en Rusia los trabajadores carecen de derechos, están virtualmente esclavizados y jamás, desde que allí impera el comunismo, han hecho una huelga. Por eso Popov y Madnikov, "confraternizan" con sus pares, los comunistas peruanos que se suman a la mascarada moscovita.

Por lo demás, lo ocurrido —y más y más sucesos que tendremos que lamentar— era de esperarse. Las embajadas de los países comunistas según lo hacen en América Latina y en el resto del mundo, son agencias de penetración, propaganda y subversión.

Ya están llegando, como puntas de lanza, "sindicalistas", "periodistas" y "técnicos". Sin duda tienen buenos métodos de persuación, disponen de mucho dinero y dispensan favores a manos llenas. Frente a todo ello, por suerte, el auténtico sindicalismo está en alerta.

✦¡Medicinas Baratas!, Verdad...

El General FAP Eduardo Montero Rojas, Ministro de Salud, debe estar muy contento. La asistencia hospitalaria es necesariamente costosa, y los recursos que el Estado tiene nunca serán suficientes.

Pero ha recibido un ofrecimiento extraordinario: medicinas a precio de costo que pueden cubrir las necesidades de los múltiples servicios gratuitos que el Estado mantiene dentro de su política asistencial.

El ofrecimiento le ha sido hecho por la Asociación de Laboratorios Farmacéuticos del Perú (Alafarpe) "consecuente con su espíritu de servicio y su sensibilidad social".

Montero recibió el ofrecimiento de viva voz, de los directivos de Alafarpe que lo visitaron en su despacho. Agradeció, sin duda complacido, y dijo que una comisión especial estudiará debidamente el ofrecimiento.

Que una industria ofrezca sus productos renunciando a lícitas ganancias, para beneficiar a quienes lo necesitan, es algo que tiene muy pocos precedentes. Es cosa que recuerda los felices tiempos en que los perros eran amarrados con sartas de salchichas. Algo que a todos parece bien, que se agradece, y que, como queda dicho, debe tener contento a un Ministro que nunca tendrá todo el dinero que necesita su Ministerio.

Siete Días. (La Prensa)

17 de Junio de 1969.

LA PRENSA
DIARIO POPULAR PARA TODO EL PERU
DIRECTOR: Manuel Solano R.
EDITOR: Eduardo Obando Lino
VI EPOCA — Lima, Martes 17 de Junio de 1969 - N° 1.500

QUEBRAR SINDICALISMO DEMOCRATICO ES CONSIGNA COMUNISTA EN EL PERU

Con la llegada de las misiones diplomáticas y "especiales" de la Unión Soviética y con el apoyo que desde esferas del gobierno de facto se brinda al comunismo, en todo el país está arreciando la ofensiva contra el sindicalismo democrático, llevada a cabo por los agentes coloniales al servicio de la misma causa que provocó las guerrillas. La protección oficial está testimoniada por informaciones que se recogen diariamente en el ambiente sindical: en el Norte, donde los trabajadores saben que las autoridades "protejen" "toda maniobra destinada a eliminar apristas y reemplazarlos por dirigentes comunistas", maniobras que son patentes en Lambayeque y la Libertad; en el Sur y en el Centro, la ofensiva se está realizando en el sector bancario, así como en Loreto y en Lima; y hay que decirlo con claridad, con la protección inclusive de algunos torpes elementos patronales semiquebrados, que creen que contribuyendo a la división del sindicalismo democrático "se pondrán bien" con los comunistas y que mantendrán sus buenas relaciones con la Junta, para salir de su crisis.

En cuanto al apoyo exterior, es sabido que los "diplomáticos" comunistas y otros visitantes con pasaporte especial, visitan cuotidianamente a las organizaciones que se agrupan en la espuria Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú, ofreciendo a esas organizaciones toda clase de apoyo. No es extraño este procedimiento, porque de él hay experiencia en todo el mundo. Pero lo que sí resulta insólito es que haya autoridades complicadas en esta política.

Para los comunistas romper el movimiento democrático es una línea necesaria y lógica. Ellos están en su juego internacional. Pero para lo peruanos, ese juego entraña los caminos de la traición, porque equivale a sujetar la fuerza básica de la producción a los intereses foráneos. Tàn negativo es esto como la política que entregó el petróleo. Y si traición se llama a tal política, traición a la patria hay que llamar también a lo que facilite o proteja la penetración comunista en el país, a través de la quiebra del sindicalismo democrático.

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Correo

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Infiltración Comunista en la Política Sindical

Es universalmente sabido que en la Unión Soviética no hay sindicatos. La férrea dictadura que impera en ese país, la organización totalitaria en torno a una sola fuente de poder y decisiones, que es el Partido Comunista, hacen tan imposible la existencia de asociaciones libres de trabajadores para la defensa de sus intereses colectivos, como sería la vida en el interior de un alto horno.

Que los rusos hayan decidido escamotear también esa verdad, esencia misma de su concepción doctrinaria del Estado y la sociedad, y llamen "sindicatos" a las organizaciones mediante las cuales el Partido todopoderoso ejerce precisamente su dictadura y su activismo entre el sector laboral, es cuestión que sólo interesa a los soviéticos. Ante tamaña mistificación sólo cabe sonreír.

Pero lo abismal es que los trabajadores comunistas peruanos, que protestan por la "política antisindical" del gobierno peruano, reciban con aplausos a dos "dirigentes sindicales" soviéticos, los señores Boris Popov, y Víctor Mednikov, que han tenido la gentileza de concurrir a las celebraciones de la Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú (CGTP), dominada por los comunistas peruanos, que a su vez están dominados por ellos.

Esta es la primera vez que la Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú, a menudo descrita en algunos órganos de prensa como "democrática", "independiente" o libre de influencia "sectaria" aprista, se identifica tan ostensiblemente con el centro productor de su energía, Moscú.

La penetración comunista en la vida sindical peruana no es, por cierto, nueva. Data de fines de la década del veinte. Pero rechazada por la abrumadora mayoría de los trabajadores nacionales, que quieren la satisfacción de sus aspiraciones colectivas y no servir de instrumento a una política cuyo sentido y proyecciones escapan del todo a su control; que desean, en una palabra, ser actores y no títeres, quedó simplemente reducida a las proporciones de un pequeño mecanismo, perfectamente localizado y de influencia reducida, de presión foránea.

Durante los últimos años, empero, el movimiento comunista sindical ha cobrado nuevo y peligroso auge en el Perú. Al amparo de la extraordinaria movilización laboral estimulada por el gobierno constitucional anterior, que reconoció muchos más sindicatos que los organizados en toda nuestra historia; escudados en esa sana política participatoria, propia de un estado democrático, los comunistas tomaron posiciones, precisamente para destruir la democracia.

Como resultado de esta política la Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú, totalmente dominada por los comunistas, se ufana hoy de contar a medio millón de trabajadores peruanos en los organismos de base que controlan. Más todavía, sostienen que próximamente se agregarán a sus filas otros 150 mil trabajadores.

Aun pasando por el colador estos cálculos optimistas, no podemos dejar de expresar cierta preocupación por el logro obtenido hasta el momento por los comunistas en su permanente esfuerzo por infiltrar el movimiento sindical, a fin de desviarlo hacia sus propios fines, contrarios por igual a los intereses de la clase obrera y del país.

¿Cuáles son estos fines comunistas? La CGTP nos tiene, por suerte, bien informados. Son, entre otros, la modificación de la política económica con el establecimiento del control de cambios, la moratoria de la deuda externa, la explotación estatal del cobre, la nacionalización de las exportaciones, la anulación de las concesiones petroleras, los aumentos de sueldos por decreto, la prohibición del cierre de fábricas y varias medidas adicionales que bastarían para provocar un colapso del país y nuestra entrega, como presa de la miseria, a la dominación internacional del Partido Comunista, que —como bien lo sabe la CGTP—, jamás ganó una elección en país alguno, ni capturó pueblo que hubiese sido antes sacudido por conmoción social y económica.

LAS RELACIONES PELIGROSAS.

Cuando se anunció que nuestro país iba a establecer relaciones con los países socialistas, entendimos que dichas relaciones serían aprovechadas convenientemente desde el aspecto comercial, sin descartar por supuesto la vinculación de amistad que siempre robustece transacciones y mejora el cuadro de los negocios a nivel internacional.

Al mismo tiempo que expresábamos nuestro respaldo pleno a dicha resolución, que marcaba, lo creíamos de buena fé, una nueva etapa con el ensanchamiento de las posibilidades económicas para el Perú; hicimos constar también nuestro recelos por los datos que aporta la experiencia acerca de este tipo de vinculación con países de la órbita roja, que siempre llevan escondido el propósito subversivo, de ingerencia en los asuntos internos, de penetración en sindicatos y de financiación de movimientos contra el órden establecido.

Estos temores estan recibiendo confirmación. Y lo estan siendo apenas iniciadas las relaciones con los países socialistas, en especial con la Unión Soviética. Cuando todavía no llega la delegación diplomática más importante ya han visitado el país prominentes miembros de organismos comunistas, caracterizados más que por una honesta función diplomática, por la acción subversiva que realizaron en otros países.

Uno de esos personajes que nos visitara recientemente bajo la inocente apariencia de una actividad periodística, fué NICOLAI LEONOV, elemento que registra antecedentes subversivos, xx que ha sido cabeza de un movimiento financiador de extremistas y que en distintos puntos de América ha dejado sentir su acción disociadora, de ingerencia en asuntos internos y como elemento de apoyo a movimientos nacionales de acción contra el órden establecido.

Nicolai Leonov ha sido sindicado por diversos órganos de prensa de América Latina, como elemento peligroso, tal como lo señalan diarios de Venezuela y Co-

Radio Victoria
12 June 65

lombia, como lo confirman autoridades y voceros de expresión de Méjico y como también lo deben haber registrado los servicios de inteligencia de varios países. En Méjico por ejemplo se le ha sindicado como cabeza de un vasto movimiento subversivo en países latinoamericanos. "El Tiempo" de Bogotá en su edición del 24 de mayo del presente año, lo señala como jefe de un sujeto apodado "Gregorian", ruso expulsado de Venezuela. Lo mismo sostienen los diarios "El Siglo" y La República de Bogotá.

Todo esto pues nos indica que, mientras el Perú tiende su mano amiga hacia el mundo socialista, concretamente, hacia la Unión Soviética, ya empiezan a deslizarse elementos que, coludidos o no con su Gobierno, esto deberán establecerlo nuestros servicios de inteligencia, tienen el propósito de inmiscuirse en nuestra política interna con propósitos subversivos.

Avala aún más este aserto el concluyente registro gráfico de un diario local donde se muestra a dos miembros del Praesidium del Consejo Central de los Sindicatos, con sede en la Unión Soviética, participando en las deliberaciones de una llamada Asamblea Nacional de la denominada Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú, organismo paralelo a la CTP y que no es sino el reducto de unos cuantos sindicatos comunistas.

Este era el tipo de relaciones que esperábamos con la Unión Soviética y los países del mundo socialista? Creemos que no. Y por ello convendría que se movilicen nuestros elementos de seguridad y detecten las actividades que realizan o van a realizar los diplomáticos que se han de establecer en nuestra Capital. Que tendamos una mano de amistad, no quiere decir que toleremos el abuso de confianza de quienes pretenden corromper nuestras instituciones par enfrentarlas con el órden establecido... Si los elementos Boris Popov y Victor Mednikov que aparecen en la foto con trabajadores peruanos, forman parte de la delegación diplomática no lo sabemos, pero de todos modos, estan avalando, auspiciando y quizá hasta financiando un movimiento laboral divisionista que no podemos permitir... por que ello no es amistad, sino abuso de confianza y penetración inadmisible en los asuntos internos de nuestro país.

¿Qué clase de asesoramiento?

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MADRID, DIRECTOR

REDCOAT

1. REQUEST TRACES CARLOS JIMENEZ ORTEGA, SPANISH JOURNALIST, DIRECTOR-GENERAL EFE IN LIMA. JIMENEZ BORN CIRCA 1923, MARRIED. HE IS PRESIDENT OF THE ASSOCIATION OF FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS IN LIMA. JIMENEZ HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH TDY SOVIET NOVOSTI REPRESENTATIVE, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV (201-132139), KNOWN KGB.

2. STATION PLANS ASSESS JIMENEZ AS POSSIBLE ACCESS AGENT.

3. FOR MADRID: LIAISON MAY BE QUERIED.

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FROM: Chief, SB via Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: REDTOP/AEKICK
Translations of Intercepted Letters

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HPLA 10070, 16 May 1969

1. As requested by the Station in Reference, we have had translated the letters written by Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV, and the translations are forwarded herewith.

2. The attachment to LEONOV's letter of 2 May, and all but the postscript of the 3 May letter are, as the Station pointed out, apparently pure propaganda. The same cannot be said, however, for the 2 May letter, which is full of less than laudatory comments on Lima, its climate, and the insect population of the Hotel Savoy. Of even more significance are LEONOV's opinions on the VALCARCELS, which appear in the 2 May letter, and the revelation in the 3 May letter postscript of the precarious financial position of the magazine. One wonders why an intelligence officer of LEONOV'S experience and intellect would include such matters in letters sent through the open mail.

NORMA W. LETCHWORTH

Attachment:
As stated H/W

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3-COS, Lima

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DISPATCH

Post and Telecommunications of Peru

Mr. Khachaturov K. A. [as given]

Novosti Press Agency

Ploshchad Pushkina 4

Moscow USSR

Moscow, Attention K. A. Khauaturov [sic]

Sender: N. Leonov

Hotel Savoy 525

Lima

Peru

h/w. Att HF HPLW-5320

201-132139

Lima 2, 5, 1969

Karen,

Beside my greetings, which you do not need, I wish to inform you of the following: all the assignments concerning the office I have completed to the best of my ability. Violetta is excessively subservient toward our people, and because of this I warned her [to see to it] that this side of her character shouldn't touch or infringe upon APN [Novosti Press Agency] interests. Our fellows are real cads. Her life is terrible: her husband is a cripple; besides that he is dangerous (he drinks), she has two children, barely makes it from one payday to the next, is torn between household duties and her work, and on top of that she has "guests," and what guests!! She works conscientiously, but she is short on experience and training and does not have much time. The print shop where the magazine is printed is excellent. It can function as well as the one in Mexico, and without difficulties. The owner insists that we immediately increase the circulation to 3,000 copies [, the number] currently needed to cover the cost. Based on the two issues published so far, we have discovered that we are selling [raskhodyatsya] [only] 50 percent. The remaining [copies] we distribute free after the next issue has been issued. She even complained about Arisalu, who has been selling his magazine in Peru at a cheaper price. They settled that question between themselves.

At her place I saw newspaper clippings covering our materials: there are not many of them, but they are there, and she insists that she sent duplicates to you. Here the situation is worse than in Mexico (in the press) and one must maneuver between competing newspapers.

It seems I will have an interview with the president. Answers to questions will be in writing - guaranteed 100 percent. But I want a personal interview. And that is the whole business.

The situation is altogether normal. The humidity is terrible: 93 percent. I am wet all day long. A strange city: the skies are sullen all day long but there is not a drop of water, and they tell me there never is. Can you believe it, the annual rainfall is 1 mm, but dampness penetrates to your intestines. In comparison with Mexico this is a backward province and one can see this in everything. But it has much charm. Its colonial buildings are good. I cannot talk about the provinces, I have not seen them, but I have heard that in their picturesqueness they are unique. There are as few hotels as in Moscow. I live in a [illegible] for 8 dollars and kill cockroaches day and night and place patches on the scratches on my legs which I do not know where to put because of the restricted area. I am very happy that this one was built for the Americans. They deserve it.

Give me a call. It seems everything is in order [illegible].

/s/ N. Leonov

For Kuznetsov, Yu.

International Information

Lima 2 May 1969

Robbery on the High Seas

"To a strong man it is a weakling who is always guilty" - that is the sad conclusion to which Latin Americans have come again when they face the payments for deeds with which they had nothing to do. Some time ago the dock workers of the Pacific coast of the U.S.A. went on a strike which lasted almost 2 months. As a result of interference in loading and unloading operations, the vessels' demurrages greatly increased and the curve line of profits of the shipping companies turned downwards. The shipowners, instead of helping with a speedy solution of this labor conflict, decided to turn to the high seas robbery to compensate for their "losses," which is their name for the profits they have missed. With this in mind the U.S. companies arbitrarily introduced on 12 March a 10-percent increase in rates for transporting goods to the Pacific ports of Latin America.

This piratic step means that the Latin American countries from now on will be losing annually 60-80 million dollars, paying for the internal disturbances in the U.S. In former times pirates attacked only defenseless ships. These habits have lasted up to these days. The U.S. monopolies calculated that Latin America, which has no meaningful navy, will simply have to turn out its pockets. But these calculations overlooked the fact that now resistance to the economic dictations of the U.S. is increasing daily in Latin America.

In reply to the freight rate increases, the victimized countries--Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and Chile--are planning to raise the cost of port services

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for the ships of the U.S. companies and to adopt measures for utilization of their own vessels for sea-borne transportation. Taking into consideration increased competition and the chance that vessels of other countries will engage in the transport of Latin American goods, it may still happen that the sea robbers who aimed to clip will find themselves clipped.

[Signature: ~~illegible~~]
N Leonov

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Post and Telecommunication

of Peru

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Moscow USSR

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Hotel Savoy 525

Lima

Peru

for Yu. Kuznetsov

International Information

Lima, 3 May, 69

Peruvians Are Becoming More Determined To Defend Their Independence.

From ancient days, there has existed a custom in Latin America to convene in the time of great danger open meetings by representation of all the estates to adopt special measures. So in times of attacks by pirates, of large-scale domestic disturbances, unusual natural calamities, and at present in connection with the threat of economic intervention in Peru as a revenge by the US for the nationalization of the property of the American oil firm International Petroleum Company this ancient custom has been resurrected.

Not very long ago such a meeting took place in the largest Peruvian port, Callao, where the participants adopted a "Declaration To Proclaim The Economic Independence of Peru." It was pointed out there that the people of Peru will not abandon their just demands and that they will achieve their economic independence in the same manner as they won their political freedom.

Yesterday an all-peoples gathering took place in Arequipa, the second largest city in the country. The public court dealing with the imperialist policies of the U.S.A. lasted approximately 4 hours. It has been a long time since Arequipa heard such passionate and patriotic speeches. The speakers petitioned the government to organize a general campaign of protest against USA policies to get the people out on the squares and streets, to arm them if possible to repel any attempts by the USA to carry out military or economic attacks.

The question was brought up of returning to the Peruvians all the natural resources of the country, particularly copper and [illegible] which are owned by American companies. One should point out that USA capital investments in mining are six to seven times as great as those in the nationalized oil company, whose property has been appraised at 72 million dollars.

The open meeting of the inhabitants of the city of Arequipa sent a message to the president of the country assuring him of their support for the nationalistic policies of the government. After this act the spontaneously assembled demonstration went along the main streets of the city accompanied by the sound of a historical bell, which in its day called the people to resist the Spanish aggression of 1866. The bell was especially brought to Arequipa for this occasion.

The powerful [illegible] of patriotism of the Peruvian people has blossomed forth. No internal or external enemy will be able to control it. The hope of these enemies is to lull it to sleep or to cheat it.

/s/ N. Leonov

P.S. Everything is o.k. with me.

The office has received no money. The situation is desperate. The mess is unendurable. If this continues, there will be no work done. I question whether KY will be published on time because the printers will not do this just on my promise. They require 50 percent deposit before they begin with their work. This is no Mexico, where [illegible] cooperation became the basis for great trust. Here everything is just beginning to take shape; because of this, accuracy is very much needed.

What will the readers say when they do not receive their next issue?

14-00000

Correos y Telecomunicaciones
del Perú

Sr. JACHATUROV K.A.

Agencia Prensa Novosti
Plaza Pushkin 4
MOSCU
URSS

Mockha,ATT,K.A.Xayatypoby

Remite: N.Leonov,Lima Perú
H."Savoy"525

CORREO AEREO

Лима 2. 5. 1969 г.

Карен! Кроме моих приветов, в которых ты мало нуждаешься, хочу тебе сообщить следующее: все поручения, касающиеся бюро я выполнил по мере сил моих. Виолетта страдает излишком усердия по отношению к нашим людям, поэтому я её предупредил, чтобы эта черта характера не затрагивала и не унижала интересы АПН. А наш брат — [illegible] хам. Удивляюсь как у Смирнова С.Р. хватило такту оставить Виолетту в покое. У неё ужасная жизнь: муж калека, да к тому же алкоголик (запойный), двое ребят, [illegible] от получки до получки с ложечкой, сама разрывается между хозяйством и работой, а тут ещё "гости" да какие!! Работает она добросовестно, но опыта у нее не хватает, подготовки тоже, да и со временем худо. Типография, где печатается журнал обычно, может работать так же как в Москве без трудностей. Виолетта настаивает на немедленном увеличении тиража до 3 тыс. при нынешней себестоимости книги. Хотя по цифрам двух последних данных о продаже свидетельствуют, что расходится 50%. Остальные идут после выхода очередного номера в бесплатную рассылку. Она даже [illegible] на [illegible], который продавал в Перу свой журнал по несколько более низкой цене. Этот вопрос они решили между собой.

Я у нее видел [illegible] выдержки из газет с нашими материалами: их немного, но они есть, и она утверждает, что публикуют много лучше. Здесь, конечно, обстановка сложнее чем в Москве (в прессе) и надо лавировать между соперничающими газетами.

У меня видимо выйдет интервью с президентом. Ответы на вопросы в письменной форме — гарантия на 100%, но я хочу всё-таки лично. Ну вот, собственно, и всё дело.

Обстановка в целом нормальная. Только ужасная влажность: 98°. Целый день мокрый. Чудной город: небо весь день хмурое, а дождей никогда и, вообще, никогда не бывает. Представляешь — 0 мм. годовых осадков, а сырость до кишок пробирает. По сравнению с Москвой это конечно глубокая провинция и, видно, это во всем. Но своих прелестей много — хорошие колониальные постройки. О провинции говорить нечего — я пока не видел, но говорят по колориту бесподобно. Прелестей мало как в Москве. Живу в отеле за 8 долларов, а [illegible] днём и ночью тараканы и зелёные [illegible] по [illegible], которые [illegible] от [illegible]. Одно радует, что это не [illegible] для [illegible]: так же и [illegible].

Поздравь [illegible]. Скажи что всё в порядке, что [illegible] [illegible]

Для [illegible] международной информации Р.

CORREO AEREO

Лима 2 мая 1969 г.

Грабеж на морских дорогах.

"У сильного всегда бессильный виноват" - к такому печальному выводу ещё раз пришли латиноамериканцы, которые вынуждены через посредство расплачиваться за дела, к которым они не имеют никакого отношения. Некоторое время тому назад тихоокеанское побережье США охватила забастовка докеров, продолжавшаяся почти 2 месяца. В результате нарушения погрузочно-разгрузочных работ, резко возрос простой кораблей и покатилась вниз кривая доходов пароходных компаний. Судовладельцы, вместо того чтобы способствовать скорейшему разрешению этого трудового конфликта, решили встать на путь морского грабежа, чтобы компенсировать свои "убытки", под которыми они понимают недополученную прибыль. С этой целью компании США ввели с 12 марта с.г. произвольное увеличение на 10% цены тарифы на транспортировку грузов в тихоокеанские порты Латинской Америки.

Этот пиратский шаг означает, что латиноамериканские страны теперь будут терять ежегодно от 60 до 80 миллионов долларов, расплачиваясь за внутренние неурядицы в США. В старое время морские разбойники нападали только на безоружные суда. Эти повадки сохранились и поныне. Монополии США рассчитывали, что Латинской Америке, не имеющей сколь нибудь значительного флота, придется покорно вывернуть карманы. Но эти расчеты упустили из виду одно обстоятельство, что теперь в латиноамериканских странах с каждым днем растет решимость к сопротивлению экономическому диктату США.

В ответ на увеличение грузовых тарифов, потрясавших страны - Перу, Эквадор, Колумбия и Чили - заявили поднять ~~[illegible]~~ расценку на портовое обслуживание кораблей компаний США и приняли меры по всемерному использованию своих собственных судов для морских перевозок. Учитывая большую конкуренцию и возможность фрахта кораблей других стран для перевозки латиноамериканских товаров, можно вполне случится, что морские разбойники, пойдя на попятную, вернутся сраженными.

[illegible signature]

Correos y Telecomunicaciones
del Perú
•••••

Carta Certificada Nº 220936

DESTINATARIO: Sr. Jachaturov K.A.

Agencia Prensa Novosti, Plaza Pushkin, 4

MOSCU URSS.

Mockba,

REMITENTE: L. Neovov, Lima Perú,
Hotel Savoy 525.

ТАЗ Кузнецова Ю.
межд информац...

CORREO AEREO

Лима ... марта 69.

Крепнет решимость перуанцев защитить свою независимость

В давние времена в Перуанских городах существовал обычай, созывать в дни особой опасности открытые собрания представителей всех сословий для принятия ~~[illegible]~~ чрезвычайных мер. Так было в период налетов пиратов, крупных внутренних потрясений, необычных стихийных бедствий. Сейчас в связи с угрозой экономической интервенции в Перу в ответ на национализацию имущества американской нефтяной компании "Интернэшнл петролеум к°" - этот древний обычай возрожден.

Не так давно такое собрание состоялось в крупнейшем портовом городе Перу - Кальяо, где присутствовавшие приняли текст ~~[illegible]~~ "Декларации о провозглашении экономической независимости Перу", в которой указывается, что народ Перу не отступит от своих справедливых требований и добьется экономической свободы, так же, как он завоевал свободу политическую.

Вчера, всенародное вече собралось в ~~[illegible]~~ АРЕКИПЕ, втором по величине городе страны. Около 4 часов проходил публичный общественный суд над империалистической политикой США. Давно Арекипа не слышала таких страстных, патриотических речей. Ораторы обращались к президенту с просьбой организовать всеобщую кампанию протеста против политики США, вывести народ на площади и улицы, вооружить его, если это возможно, для отражения любой попытки военной или экономической интервенции со стороны США.

Был открыто поставлен вопрос о возвращении нации всех без исключения естественных богатств страны и главным образом меди и железа, которые находятся в руках американских компаний. Кстати, следует отметить, что капиталовложения США в горнорудную промышленность составляют сумму в 6-7 раз большую чем ценность национализированной нефтяной компании, имущество которой оценено в

CORREO AEREO

в 7.2 млн. долларов.

Открытое собрание жителей города Арекипы в послании президенту страны заверило его в поддержке националистической политики правительства. После окончания акта стихийно собравшаяся демонстрация уже в 11 часу ночи прошла по главным улицам города под набатный звон исторического колокола, созывавшего в свое время людей для отражения испанской агрессии в 1866 г., и который был специально привезен на этот случай в Арекипу.

Могучий джинн патриотизма перуанского народа вырвался наружу. Совладать с ним не под силу ни внешним, ни внутренним ~~[illegible]~~ врагам, вся надежда которых состоит в том, чтобы усыпить либо обмануть его.

[signature]

P.S. [illegible] все О.К.

Деньги в [illegible] так и не получили.
Положение просто отчаянное. Беспорядок невыносимый.
Если так будет и дальше, то работа не пойдет.
Ставлю вопрос о том, что N 4 не [illegible] в [illegible] время
[illegible] [illegible]. Не хочу тратить лишние слова.
Она требует 50% задатка до начала работ. Это не
[illegible], он четверть века сотрудничества [illegible]
[illegible] доверия. [illegible] [illegible],
поэтому [illegible] [illegible] как нужно.
И что [illegible] [illegible], не [illegible] предполагается?

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Ref [illegible] 4.LA 10124, 20 Jun 69



NIKOLAY SERGEEVICH LEONOV
Photo taken BY DULINDEN-8
on 13 June 1969 at Lima Airport.

201-132134

201-132139

RUSSIA FINANCES GUERRILLA WARFARE IN COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA

[Unsigned article; San Jose, Costa Rica; La Prensa Libre; Spanish, 19 June 1969]

Caracas (PI). There exists adequate proof that journalist Mario Renato Menendez Rodriguez, the former director of the journal Sucesos and of the new subversive publication Por Que?, has met with Soviet agents and received the 50,000 dollars directed toward the guerrilla warfare in Colombia and Venezuela which have been reported by the international press.

Menendez Rodriguez, who once more foiled the Venezuelan police, is being actively sought in Colombia, where he arrived following his interview with Venezuelan guerrilla leader Douglas Bravo. Two years previously, the same Menendez visited Colombia and went on to Venezuela, where he carried out another mission of economic aid from the Soviet Union to the armed groups in that country. Now it is known with firsthand proof that a third mission will be directed to Venezuelan territory, following the assumption of the presidency by Dr. Rafael Caldera.

The 50,000 dollars. It has been reported that the 50,000 dollars carried by the Mexican to the two countries in question were destined for the Colombian bandit leader "Tiro Fijo," but subsequent documentation proves that the sum delivered on this occasion by the Soviet Union is approximately 200,000 dollars, part of which is to go to the armed groups in Venezuela.

Another Communist agent, Colombian Feliciano Pachon Choconta, traveled to Bogota carrying 100,000 dollars of the 150,000 he had received in Mexico, and 60,000 of which he had delivered to a dealer in clandestine arms in Panama. Choconta was arrested at the "El Dorado" international airport, and the police confiscated the 100,000 dollars. The sum had been delivered to him by a member of the embassy of the Soviet Union.

"Communist unity" money. The activities of the Soviet embassies in Mexico and Colombia -- especially with regard to Menendez Rodriguez -- confirm the great falsehood that Russia and Castro are marching "apart" with respect to armed subversion, with the dictator of Cuba being depicted as the great seditious and interventionist chief and the Soviet Union as the great power opposed to Castro's methods.

201-132139

The money which Moscow has been supplying with criminal objectives against the democracies of Latin America, especially against Venezuela and Colombia, throws off the mask and shows that "communist unity" between Russia and Castro with respect to subversion is as clear as the impunity which the Soviet diplomatic missions enjoy in Bogota and Mexico City.

It is believed here that, with the establishment of relations between the Soviet Union and Venezuala, Menendez Rodriguez and his accomplices, with a Russian embassy in Caracas, will not have to travel such a long way. Instead, the funds for the guerrilla groups of the two countries will flow from the Venezuelan capital itself.

For now, the third "economic" mission to Venezuela is "approved" and ready. With respect to the denial issued by Colombian police authorities with respect to the activities of Menendez Rodriguez in that country, it is known here that this involves instructions issued by the Presidency of the Republic for the purpose of minimizing the importance of the subversive activities, because of the fact that there is a Soviet mission in Bogota. The Colombian press has criticized the Lleras Restrepo government because of its existence.

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CSO: 408-D

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Rusia financia a las guerrillas de Colombia y Venezuela

CARACAS —(PI)— Hay suficientes pruebas de que el periodista Mario Renato Menéndez Rodríguez, ex-director de la revista "Sucesos" y de su nueva publicación subversiva "¿Por qué?", se entrevistó con agentes soviéticos y recibió los 50 000 dólares de que ha informado la prensa internacional, dirigidos a las guerrillas de Colombia y Venezuela.

Menéndez Rodríguez, quien una vez más burló a la policía venezolana, es activamente solicitado en Colombia, adonde llegó después de su entrevista con el jefe guerrillero de Venezuela Douglas Bravo. Dos años antes el mismo Menéndez visitó Colombia, y pasó a Venezuela donde igualmente cumplió una misión de ayuda económica de la Unión Soviética a los grupos en armas en ese país. Ahora se sabe de acuerdo con elementos probatorios a la mano que una tercera misión será dirigida a territorio venezolano, después de la toma presidencial del doctor Rafael Caldera.

Los 50.000 dólares.— Se había informado que los 50 000 dólares llevados por el mejicano a los dos países en cuestión estaban destinados al jefe de bandoleros colombianos "Tiro Fijo", pero documentación posterior prueba que la suma entregada esta vez por la Unión Soviética se aproxima a los ... 200.000 dólares, parte de los cuales corresponde a los grupos en armas en Venezuela.

Otro agente comunista, el colombiano Feliciano Pachón Chocontá, había viajado a Bogotá llevando 100 000 dólares, de ... 150.000 que había recibido aquí en Méjico y de los cuales entregó 60.000 a un vendedor de armas clandestinas en Panamá. Chocontá fue detenido en el aeropuerto internacional de "El Dorado", y la policía le incautó los 100.000 dólares. La suma le había sido entregada por un miembro de la Embajada de la Unión Soviética.

Dinero de "unidad comunista".— Las actividades de las Embajadas de la Unión Soviética en Méjico y Colombia, especialmente en cuanto a Menéndez Rodríguez se refiere, confirman la gran mentira de que Rusia y Castro marchaban "separados" en cuanto a la subversión armada, mostrando al dictador de Cuba como el gran jefe sedicioso e intervencionista y a la Unión Soviética como la gran potencia contraria a los procedimientos de Castro.

El dinero que viene suministrando Moscú con fines criminales contra las democracias de América Latina especialmente contra Venezuela y Colombia descorre el velo y muestra q' la "unidad comunista" entre Rusia y Castro en materia de subversión es tan clara como la impunidad de que vienen gozando las misiones diplomáticas soviéticas en Bogotá y Méjico.

Se considera aquí que la extensión de las relaciones de la Unión Soviética a Venezuela significa que Menéndez Rodríguez y sus cómplices de situarse una embajada rusa en Caracas no tendrán que viajar tan largo trecho sino que, desde la propia capital venezolana, fluirán los fondos para grupos guerrilleros de los dos países.

Por ahora, está "aprobada" y lista la tercera misión "económica" hacia el país venezolano. En cuanto al desmentido dado por las autoridades policiales de Colombia sobre lo actuado por Menéndez Rodríguez en ese país, se sabe aquí que se trata de instrucciones impartidas por la Presidencia de la República a fin de minimizar la importancia de las actividades subversivas, por el hecho de que en Bogotá existe una misión de la Unión Soviética respecto de la cual la prensa colombiana ha hecho críticas al gobierno de Lleras Restrepo.

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13 JUN 1969

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ DESENSITIZED	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO: Chief, Soviet Bloc Division	XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.: Chief, WH Division		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM: Chief of Station, Lima		MICROFILM

SUBJECT: REDTOP/AEKICK - Forwarding of Intercepted Letters

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HPLA-10070, 16 May 69

1. Forwarded herewith are copies of letters written by Nikolay LEONOV, the NOVOSTI representative described in Reference. The letters were intercepted through liaison (DUBRIDE) and passed to the Station with request for translations.

2. Attachment A was translated into Spanish by DUMAGENTA-3, while Attachment B was translated into English by our Headquarters translator. The latter attachment was subsequently translated from English to Spanish by Byron W. GUTRADT.

3. For the information of the WH Desk, we are forwarding (as Attachment C) a Spanish translation of Attachment A and an English translation of Attachment B.

for Clarke A. Stodola
Samuel K. CASTELON

CAS:mes

Attachments: hw/
A,B,C as stated

Distribution:
2 - C, SB w/atts. A,B,
1 - C, WHD w/att.

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: Desensitized
Signed: Donald E. Poole
R.O. #323 - Unit SB/CI/X
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

WH/CI W/ATT
O W/O ATT.

CS COPY

2 ATT.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HPLA-10111	6 June 1969
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-132139

для Ю. Кузнецова
международная информация.

CORREO AEREO

Лима, 6 мая 1969.

Chief, SB

ATTACHMENT A
HPLA-10111

Политическая карьера и воровство

В Лиме, в ресторанные часы "пик" в лучших алтарях обжорства, собираются группами бесчисленные профессиональные (политические) деятели и просто бывшие околоправительственные прожигатели, отброшенные сейчас от государственной кормушки военным правительством президента Веласко Альварадо. Эти "канцлеры в отставке" и никчемные министры на все лады критикуют нынешнее правительство, с каким-то прямо садистским наслаждением обсасывают действительные и воображаемые экономические трудности, которые, по их мнению, вот-вот придавят военную администрацию, и тогда вновь будет открыт путь к вакханалии казнокрадства и грабежа. Все те, что ныне больше других шумят о демократии, о народном представительстве, те что 7 месяцев назад стояли у власти в Перу, они более других повинны в тяжелом экономическом положении страны. Буржуазные политические партии Перу полностью обанкротились в глазах общественного мнения страны. Глумясь над самим понятием "демократия" политические дельцы этих партий грабили и разворовывали и без того скудную казну нации.

Рано пока судить о военной администрации президента Веласко Альварадо. Время, и весьма недалекое, покажет, сколь глубоко смело реформы взрежут панцырь феодальных отношений и зависимости от США. Но сейчас факт остается фактом: то, о чем без умолку болтали профессиональные политики на протяжении многих лет, т.е. о необходимости национализации американской нефтяной компании "Интернэшнл петролеум", сделали военные через 6 дней после прихода к власти.

То, что было нормой при правительствах "представительной демократии", т.е. коррупция, казнокрадство и злоупотребление служебным положением в корыстных целях — стало теперь законно квалифицироваться как преступление. Кампания по оздоровлению нравов, аресты и отдача под суд

h/watt | to HPLA-10111

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жуликов и воров государственного масштаба, чуждых всех проходимцев, для которых американская карьера стала синонимом самого бессовестного личного обогащения. О морали этих людей, брюзжащих в адрес военной администрации, говорит скандальная жизнь разыгравшийся на днях в Нью-Йорке.

Член Верховного Суда Перу (1967) Фелипе Портокарреро Олаве выехал 27 июля в Нью-Йорк, испросив 30-дневный отпуск для лечения. Однако вместо госпиталя, он махнул в Тель-Авив, где послом Перу занимал его брат Фелипе Портокарреро. В поездке его сопровождал не врач, а известный перуанский ювелир Эктор БАНЧЕРО. Купив на черном израильском рынке бриллиантов на сумму более 100 тыс. долларов эти блюстители закона с дипломатическим паспортом в карманах, пытались нелегально провезти их через США в Перу, где уже обеспечили их продажу за 170 тыс. долларов. В аэропорту Нью-Йорка накануне были свидетелями тяжелой сцены, когда таможенник один за другим извлек из карманов вельможного контрабандиста 5 мешочков с бриллиантами.

Правительство Перу дало знать властям США, что они могут поступать с Портокарреро по законам их страны, ибо действия его не совместимы с дипломатическим статусом. Он уже исключен из Верховного Суда Перу и лишен права заниматься адвокатской практикой.

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CORREO AEREO

национальным посланцем, изображая из себя политического беженца.

Военные руководители Веласко Альварадо получили всенародную поддержку в конфликте с "Интернэшнл петролеум" и вызвали понимание в борьбе с коррупцией, насквозь пронизавшей механизм прежней политической машины.

P.S. Как в Москве все ли и т.д. У меня вроде все O.K. Привет всем родным и знакомым.

Есть возможность записать интервью с президентом для телевидения Москвы и записать его голос. Это должна находившаяся здесь группа наших телевизионщиков во главе со Шрагиным В. У них не получилось из-за нехватки времени. А я сам не смог [illegible] отснять с помощью местных операторов. Стоимость — 100-150 долларов. Если вы считаете возможным и нужным дайте Москве телеграмму, а если нет, то нет.

С большим приветом

Зав. Ю. Кузнецов
Международная информация.

CORREO AEREO

Лима, 6 мая 1969.

Политическая карьера и воровство

В Лиме, в ресторанные часы "пик" в лучших алтарях обжорства, собираются группами бесчисленные профессиональные (политические) деятели и просто бывшие околоправительственные прихвостни, отброшенные сейчас от государственной кормушки военным правительством президента Веласко Альварадо. Эти "канцлеры в отставке" и пикейные жилеты на все лады критикуют нынешнее правительство, с каким-то прямо садистским наслаждением обсасывают действительные и воображаемые экономические трудности, которые, по их мнению, вот-вот придавят военную администрацию, и тогда вновь будет открыт путь к вакханалии казнокрадства и дележа. Все те, кто ныне больше других шумит о демократии, о народном представительстве, и кто 7 месяцев назад стоял у власти в Перу, они более других повинны в тяжелом экономическом положении страны. Буржуазные политические партии Перу полностью обанкротились в глазах общественного мнения страны. Глумясь над самим понятием "демократия" политические дельцы этих партий грабили и разворовывали и без того скудную казну нации.

Рано пока судить о военной администрации президента Веласко Альварадо. Время, и весьма недалекое, покажет, сколь глубоко лемех реформ взрежет панцирь феодальных отношений и зависимости от США. Но сейчас факт остается фактом: то, о чем без умолку болтали профессиональные политики на протяжении многих лет, т.е. о необходимости национализации американской нефтяной компании "Интернэшнл петролеум", сделали военные через 6 дней после прихода к власти.

То, что было нормой при правительстве "представительной демократии", т.е. спекуляции, казнокрадство и злоупотребление служебным положением в корыстных целях — стало теперь законно квалифицироваться как преступление. Кампания по оздоровлению нравов, аресты и отдача под суд

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жуликов и воров государственного масштаба среди всех проходимцев, для которых империалистическая карьера была синонимом самого бессовестного личного обогащения. О морали этих людей, брюзжащих в адрес военной администрации, говорит скандальная жизнь, разыгравшаяся на днях в Нью-Йорке.

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нашим посольствам, изображая из себя политического беженца.

Военное правительство Веласко Альварадо получило всенародную поддержку в конфликте с "Интернэшнл петролеум" и выиграло [illegible] начало в борьбе с коррупцией, насквозь пронизавшей механизм буржуазной политической машины.

[signature]

P.S. Всем в [illegible] все [illegible] и ц. У меня вроде все о.к. Привет всем родным и знакомым.

Есть возможность записать интервью с президентом для телевидения Москвы и записать его голос. Это должна была находившаяся здесь группа наших тележурналистов во главе со Шрагиным В. У них не получилось из-за недостатка времени. А я не смог [illegible] снять с помощью местных операторов. Стоимость — 100-150 долларов. Если вы считаете возможным и нужным дай Виктору телеграмму, а если нет, то нет.

С большим приветом

[signature]

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LIMA, 6 de MAYO de 1969

CARRERA POLITICA Y ROBO

EN LIMA, EN LAS HORAS NORMAL DE RESTAURANTES EN MEJORES ALTARES DE GOLTONERIA, SE REUNEN LOS GRUPOS PROFESIONALES Y POLITICOS, EX EMPLEADOS DEL GOBIERNO Y LOS ACOSTUMBRADOS ABANDONADOS DE LA ALIMENTACION DEL GOBIERNO, POR EL GOBIERNO MILITAR DEL PRESIDENTE VELASCO ALVARADO. ESTOS "CANCILLERES DESTITUIDOS" CON CHAQUETAS DE PIQUE POR TODOS LADOS ESTAN CRITICANDO AL GOBIERNO ACTUAL, CON MUCHA DELICIA SADICOS ESTAN CHUPANDOS DE FANTASIA IMAGINANDOSE DE GRANDES DIFICULTADES ECONOMICAS, LOS CUALES, SEGUN OPINIAN ELLOS, ESTAN APRETANDO LA ADMINISTRACION MILITAR, Y ENTONCES SERA DE NUEVO ABIERTO EL CAMINO BACANAL, DILAPIDACION Y SAQUEO. TODOS AQUELLOS, QUIENES ACTUALMENTE HACEN MAS RUIDO SOBRE LA DEMOCRACIA Y REPRESENTACION DEL PUEBLO, 7 MESES ATRAS, LOS MILITARES LLEGARON AL PODER EN PERU ELLOS MAS QUE LOS OTROS SON INOCENTES EN ESTA DIFICIL SITUACION ECONOMICA DEL PAIS. PARTIDOS DEMOCRATICOS-BURQUESES DEL PERU TOTALMENTE ESTAN EN QUIEBRA EN VISTA DE LA OPINION PUBLICO DEL PAIS. BURLANDE SOBRE LA NOCION "DEMOCRACIA" NEGOCIADORES POLITICOS SAQUEABAN Y ROBABAN TODO LA POBRESA DE LA CAJA DE LA VIDA.

ES TODAVIA TEMPRANO PARA JUZGAR LA ADMINISTRACION MILITAR DEL PRESIDENTE ALVARADO TIEMPO, EN LA PRIMAVERA, VEREMOS QUE PROFUNDIDAD REJA DE REFORMAS EXCAVARA EL CORAZON FEODAL DE LAS RELACIONES Y DEPENDENCIAS DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS. POR EL MOMENTO HECHO SE QUEDA HECHO: ES DECIR, DE QUE SIN CESAR DE HABLAR LOS POLITICOS PROFOSIONALES DURANTE LARGOS AÑOS HABLABAN SOBRE LA NACIONALISACION DEL PETROLEO DE LA COMPANIA AMERICANA "INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM", PERO LOS MILITARES LO HAN HECHO DURANTE 68 DIAS DESPUES DE LLEGAR AL PODER DE GOBERNAR.

EN LOS TIEMPOS PASADOS "REPRESENTACION DEMOCRATICA, E DE LA DEMOCRACIA" DE LOS GOBIERNOS FUERON DILAPIDACION Y ABUSO DE AUTORIDAD EN PROVECHO PERSONAL-AHORA LEGALMENTE ESTA CALIFICADO COMO CRIMEN. LA COMPANIA DE MEDIDAS, O SALUBRIDAD DE LAS COSTUMBRES, O MORALIDAD, ARRESTOS Y ENTREGA AL JUICIO LADRONES Y ESTAFADORES EN GRAN ESCALA DEL GOBIERNO SE ASUSTA A TODOS BRIBONES, PARA CUALES LA CARRERA POLITICA ERA SINONOMA, O COMO SINONIMO. LA MORAL DE ESTA GENTE, REFUNFUNANDO EN DIRECCION DE LA ADMINISTRACION MILITAR, SEÑALA, O DEMUESTRA DE UN EPISODIO ESCANDALOSO DESENDADENADO EN ESTOS DIAS EN NUEVA YORK. MIEMBRE DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO EN PERU DESDE 1967, FELIX PORTOCARRERO OLAVE PARTIO 27 DE ABRIL A NUEVA YORK, PEDIENDO PERMISO POR 30 DIAS PARA CURARSE. SIN EMBARGO, EN LUGAR DE IR AL HOSPITAL, EL PARTIO A TEL AVIV, EN DONDE SU HERMANO FELIPE PORTOCARRERO OCUPA CARGO DEL EMBAJODOR. EN SU VIAJE EN LUGAR DE SER ACOMPAÑADO POR EL MEDICO, FUE ACOMPANADO POR EL CONOCIDO JOYERO PERUANO HECTOR BANCHERO. COMPRANDO EN EL MERCADO NEGRO ISRAELITA LOS BRILLANTES POR MAS DE CIEN MIL DOLLARES AMERICANOS, ESTE GUARDIAN DEL ORDEN PUBLICO CON PASAPORTE DIPLOMATICO EN SU BOLSILLO, LLEVADA LOS BRILLANTES ILEGALMENTE ATRAVES DE USA AL PERU, EN DONDE TENIA GARANTIZADO Y ASEGURADO VENDERLOS POR UN VALOR DE 170 MIL DOLLARES AMERICANOS. EN EL AEROPUERTO DE LOS ESTADO UNIDOS DE NORTE AMERICA LOS PASAJEROS FUERON TESTIGOS DE LA ESCENA E ESCANDALOSA Y PENOZA, CUANDO LOS ADUANERO UNO POR UNO EL EXTRAJERON DE BOLSILLOS AL ALTO DIGNATARIO DEL CONTRABANDO 5 SAQUITOS DE BRILLANTES.

EL GOBIERNO DEL PERU HA DADO CONOCER AL GOBIERNO DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE NORTE AMERICA, QUE LOS AMERICANOS PUEDEN APLICAR LAS LAYES DE SU PAIS A PORTOCARRERO PORQUE EL EFECTO, O ACCION NO RESPONDEN AL ESTATUTO DIPLAMATICO. EL, YA ESTA EXPULSADO DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO DEL PERU Y SERA RETIRADO DEL DERECHO DE PRACTICAR LA CARRERA DE ABOGACIA. ACONTECIMIENTO DE PORTOCARRERO ______________________, NO, DESGRACIADAMENTE EL FENOMENO ES ORDINARIO PARA EL PERU. BAJO DE LA INSTRUCCION JUDICIAL ESTA ES EX MINISTRO DE FINANZAS SANDRO MARIATEQUI, ACUSADO DE LA, O CON LA COOPERACION DE GRAN ROBO DE DOLLARES. EL CANON PEQUEÑO NO SE QUEDO ATRAS: EL EX DIPUTADO DEL CONGRESO NAPOLEON MARTINEZ MACAYRA IMPORTO SIN DERECHOS DE ADUANA 10 AUTOS DE ______________________, GANANDO MUCH PLATA DE REVENTA. MAS DE UN MILLON DE SOLES USURPO EX JEFE DE ABASTECIMIENTO DE ALIMENTACION DEL MINISTERIO DE LA SALUD PUBLICA LUIS BERNALES, CUAL POR EL MIEDO SE ASILO EN LA EMBAJADA DE GUATEMALA, COMO REFUGIADO POLITICO.

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EL GOBIERNO MILITAR DE VELASCO ALVARADO HA RECIBIDO EL APOYO DEL PUEBLO EN EL CONFLICTO CON LA "INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM COMPANY" Y ENCONTRARIA ENTENDIMIENTO, O COMPRENCION LUCHANDO CONTRA LA CORRUPCION, DE PARTE A PARTE ROER, O CORROER EL MECANISMO DE LA MAQUINA POLITICA PERUANA.

P.S.
ME PARECE QUE TENGO TODO O.K.

TENGO POSIBILIDAD DE FOTOGRAFIAR, O RETRATAR UNA ENTREVISTA CON EL PRESIDENTE PARA LA TELEVISION DE MOSCU Y INSCRIBIR SU VOZ. EL GRUPO DE NUESTROS TELEVISORES HAN TRATADO DE CONSEGUIR ESTA POSIBILIDAD CUANDO ELLOS ESTABAN AQUI CON EL JEFE SCHRATIN V. ELLOS NO LO HAN PUDIERON HACER POR FALTA DE TIEMPO. YO LE PODRIA HACER EN 5 MINUTOS. EL PRECIO ES DE 100 a 150 DOLLARES. SI HUBIERA POSIBILIDAD Y NECESARIO ________ TELEGRAMA, Y SI NO, ________

CON MUCHOS SALUDOS.

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Latin-American public [illegible] has been [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] with [illegible] [illegible] ... [illegible] [illegible] nation [illegible] of Latin America as 'gorillas' at any time ready to come with assistance of the American [illegible] interests. The Peruvian generals and officers turned into energetic courteous diplomats, seeing their country's future only in safeguarding of its economic and political independence. The Military Government shapes and takes necessary steps which carry wise and necessary for the country characteristics under difficult economic situation created by severe cuts in influx of foreign credits due to the conflict with the American oil company and the Peruvian wealthy class, preferring at the present situation to hold their capital, or for safety reason, to transfer it abroad.

Few years ago in sparsely populated area of Peru the construction of ironic [illegible] luxurious highway was undertaken. It was one of those constructions not for (accomplishments) of country's real needs, but it was dictated only by self-satisfaction of commericial leaders wishing at any cost that their

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name is written in history books. At the time when the population had known distress because of lack of good work in irrigation system and shortage of electric power, the construction of the superhighway became a haemorrhage wound in the country's economy. American companies had sucked 9 million soles per 1 mile of road from the skinny Peruvian treasury for the building and supervising at the time when average cost of highway did not exceed 1-2 million soles (1 dollar = 43 soles). For the technical personnel [maintaining USA] Peruvians were bearing huge charges. However, the patience got exhausted when the company - contractor presented an additional bill in amount of 130 million soles besides the fantastic estimate.

The Finance Minister, general ("Hannibal Mesa Quadra") announced that supervision over works in the future will be carried out by the Peruvian engineers, that construction will be re-examined into more convenient direction of the route and that necessary steps were taken to use construction as means of contractor's enrichment.

Recently the Government decided to nationalize land and live-stock belonging to the American company "(? Sierra de Pasco Corporation. Over 96,000 hectares

of land and tens of thousands of cattle went under control of the Government. Naturally, the nationalization was accomplished with condition to pay off a considerable sum as a compensation, however, it is necessary to say that Americans are not accustomed to such treatment in Peru.

Even more they are worried by a unclear future. Hints by Peruvian generals that in the future the Government will develop state-owned sector in mining industry as a counterbalance vis-a-vis American capitals, and that it intends little by little to force out foreigners from banking system, etc, chills and puts in fever USA businessmen because their investments in Peru exceed 600 million dollars and they never before experienced such a disturbing time!

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P.S. Everything is OK. Regards to all. On the 20th [illegible] I'm leaving for Chile, ~~After the arrival of the Embassy it became more gay,~~ if there are no unencountered unexpected difficulties. Life became more joyous after the arrival of the Embassy. (?Kiren?), I ask you to phone (?Lera?) and tell her literally the following: "The hero forgot your letter in Moscow and after the arrival to Mexico mixed up everything. He gave all your [illegible] and Yoskobaynikova regards to Alla and she does not know what to do with them. Take steps you consider necessary. The Kosmynkhins, who came from Mexico to Lima told me about this." To comfort her, tell that books in her line I will select: I have already 5 good ^researchers/or^ (explorations) concerning Peru and a decree of yet concerning agrarian reform.

Not a word from you. I am sending this as to the other world. Answer at least a few words, fear overcomes me.

14-00000

Sr. Jachaturov K.A.

Agencia Prensa Novosti

Plaza Pushkin Nº4

Moscu

Urrs

[illegible]
инф. [illegible]

CORREO AEREO

г. Лима. 13 мая 1969.

НАЦИОНАЛИСТИЧЕСКИЕ ШАГИ ПЕРУАНСКОГО ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВА.

Латиноамериканская общественность пристально следит за развитием событий в Перу, где руководство вооруженных сил, взявшее контроль над страной, серьезно поколебало традиционное представление о латиноамериканских военных, как о "гориллах", готовых в любое время прийти на выручку интересам американских монополий. Перуанские генералы и офицеры превратились в энергичных администраторов, умелых дипломатов а прежде всего в политиков, которые видят будущее своей страны только в защите её экономической и политической независимости. В условиях тяжелой экономической обстановки в Перу, вызванной резким сокращением притока иностранных кредитов из-за конфликта с американской нефтяной компанией и трусостью имущих классов Перу, предпочитающих в нынешней обстановке придерживать капиталы или вывезти их ради сохранности за границу, военное правительство формулирует и принимает меры, которые носят разумный и нужный стране характер.

Несколько лет назад в Перу было предпринято строительство роскошного шоссе по малонаселенным районам тропической сельвы. Это было одно из тех строительств, которые не вызываются насущными экономическими требованиями страны, а продиктованы лишь тщеславием политических руководителей, желающих любой ценой ~~[illegible]~~ попасть в историю. В то время как население страдало от безработицы, отсутствия средств транспорта и катастрофической нехватки жилищ, строительство супершоссе превратилось в кровоточащую рану в экономике страны. Строившие и осуществлявшие контроль над строительством американские

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Компании драли с тощей перуанской казны по 9 млн. солей за 1 км. дороги, в то время как обычная стоимость дорожного строительства не превышает 1-2 млн. солей (1 доллар=43 соля). Огромные расходы несли перуанцы по содержанию технического персонала США. Однако чаша терпения лопнула, когда компания-подрядчик предъявила к оплате счёт ещё на сумму в 100 млн. солей сверх бюджета и без того фантастического.

Министр транспорта генерал Анибал Меса Куадра заявил, что впредь контроль над работами будут осуществлять перуанские инженеры, что строительство будет переориентировано в более выгодном направлении трассы и что будет положен конец использованию стройки в качестве орудия обогащения подрядчиков.

На днях правительством было принято решение о национализации земель и скота, принадлежавших американской горнорудной компании "Серро де Паско Корпорэйшн". Более 96 тыс. 200 га земли и десятки тысяч голов скота перешли под контроль правительства. Правда, национализация была совершена при условии выплаты солидной компенсации, но при всём этом нельзя не признать, что к такому обращению с ними в Перу американцы не привыкли.

Ещё больше их беспокоит "железное" будущее. Намеки перуанских генералов на то, что впредь правительство

CORREO AEREO

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[signature]

P.S. Все O.K. Привет всем. Числа 20 еду в Чили, если не возникнут непредвиденные трудности. По участке посольства еще стало веселее.
Карен, прошу тебя позвони Леле и скажи ей текстуально следующее:
"Богатырев забрал твое письмо в Москве и по приезде в Мексику все прочитал. Отдал все ~~[illegible]~~ твои шмотки и просьбы Воскобойниковой Алле, которая не знает, что с ними делать. Принимай меры, которые сочтешь нужными. Обо этом мне сказали Корнюхины, приехавшие из Мексики в Лиму." Скажи ей в утешение, что книги по ее теме я ей подберу: уже есть 5 хороших исследований по Перу и текст закона об аграрной реформе.
От Васи ни слуха, ни духа. Посылаю как на тот свет. Хоть письмецо в ответ, а то страх одолевает.

[signature]

в архиву
нач. кадровому [illegible]

CORREO AEREO

г. Лима, 13 мая 1969.

НАЦИОНАЛИСТИЧЕСКИЕ ШАГИ ПЕРУАНСКОГО ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВА.

Латиноамериканская общественность пристально следит за развитием событий в Перу, где руководство вооруженных сил, взявшее контроль над страной, заметно поколебало традиционное представление о латиноамериканских военных, как о "гориллах", готовых в любое время прийти на выручку интересам американских монополий. Перуанские генералы и офицеры превратились в энергичных администраторов, деловых дипломатов и прежде всего в политиков, которые видят будущее своей страны только в защите её экономической и политической независимости. В условиях тяжелой экономической обстановки в Перу, вызванной резким сокращением притока иностранных кредитов из-за конфликта с американской нефтяной компанией и трусостью имущих классов Перу, предпочитающих в нынешней обстановке попридержать капиталы или вывезти их ради сохранности за границу, военное правительство формулирует и принимает меры, которые носят разумный и нужный стране характер.

Несколько лет назад в Перу было предпринято строительство роскошного шоссе по малонаселенным районам тропической сельвы. Это было одно из тех строительств, которые не вызываются насущными экономическими требованиями страны, а продиктованы лишь тщеславием политических руководителей, желающих любой ценой попасть в историю. В то время как население страдало от безработицы, отсутствия средств транспорта и катастрофической нехватки жилищ, строительство супершоссе превратилось в кровоточащую рану в экономике страны. Строившие и осуществлявшие контроль над строительством американские

CORREO AEREO

Компании драли с тощей перуанской казны по 9 млн. солей за 1 км. дороги, в то время как обычная стоимость дорожного строительства не превышает 1-2 млн. солей (1 доллар = 43 соля). Огромные расходы несли перуанцы по содержанию технического персонала США. Однако чаша терпения лопнула, когда компания-подрядчик предъявила к оплате счёт ещё на сумму в 100 млн. солей сверх бюджета и без того фантастического.

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[illegible]

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[illegible]

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 30

ACTION SR 8 RID COPY

OBP

S E C R E T 241625Z MAY [illegible]

DIRECTOR INFO [illegible] CARACAS [illegible] CITY

REDTOP AEASSAIL 3

REF A. BOGOTA 2281

B. BOGOTA 2284

1. STATION PLACEMENT [illegible] GREGORIAN APPEARED 24 MAY "EL TIEMPO" [illegible] TITLE EXPULSA A UN ESPIA SOVIETICO [illegible] GREGORIAN [illegible] REVEALS [illegible] DETAINED VENEZUELA AND [illegible] CONSUL [illegible] DIRECTED BY SOVIET DIPLOMAT [illegible]

2. FORWARDING CLIP FOR [illegible] FROM REF A AND B.

3. FILE 74-128-115/3 [illegible]

S E C R E T

CS COPY FILED IN 201-851562

file 201-132139

SECRET

14-00000

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO 54

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X-REF TO FILE NO.

BY: AT:

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY: PER

ACTION SB 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO. FILE. VR. WH 8, RI/AN, CAS, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/PS, FI 2 (043)

S E C R E T 232215Z MAY 69 CITE BOGOTA 2281

DIRECTOR INFO: LIMA, MEXICO CITY, ~~SANTIAGO~~, CARACAS 24 MAY 69 IN 65682

REDTOP AEASSAULT

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 99095 (SENT LIMA, MEXICO CITY)

B. LIMA 4775 (IN 62617) (SEND SANTIAGO)

C. BOGOTA 2114 (IN 47944)

1. STATION PLACED ARTICALS "LA REPUBLICA" AND "EL SIGLO" 17 MAY WHICH IDENTIFY SOVIET NIKOLAY LEONOV AS DIPLOMAT WHO PASSED ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PLUS US DALLARS TO COLOMBIAN FELICIANO PACHON IN MEXICO CITY IN APRIL 1968. PACHON ARRESTED ENTERING COLOMBIA WITH FUNDS. ARTICLES TIE LEONOV TO PACHON BY REVEALING THAT SCRAP OF PAPER IN POSSESSION PACHON WHEN CAPTURED HAD WRITTEN NOTATION OF "AVENIDA MAZATLAN." LEONOV OFFICE ADDRESS WHILE PRESS ATTACHE IN MEXICO REVEALED AS SAME "AVENIDA MAZATLAN, NO. 206." FACT THAT LEONOV RECALLED TO MOSCOW IMMEDIATELY AFTER ARREST PACHON ALSO CITED AS CONFIRMING EVIDENCE.

2. LEONOV IDENTIFIED AS KGB FORMERLY INVOLVED SUPPORT L.A. GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS, WHO ON 23 APRIL TRANSITED BOGOTA WHERE HE MET IN AIRPORT WITH SEVERAL MEMBERS OF CLANDESTINE

AN / AB / IN / PS / BX 4 / FI

74-120-115

SECRET

CS COPY
201-132139
24 May 69

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INDEX: [ ] YES [ ] NO

JUN 13 1 45 PM '69

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BY: AT: RECEIVED RID/EDI

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY:

FILE RID [ ] RET. TO BRANCH [ ] DESTROY [ ] SIG.

ACTION [ ] RID COPY

INFO:

FILE, VR,

PAGE 2 MAY 69 CITE BOGOTA 2281 S E C R E T

APPARAT. INTERPOL SOURCES QUOTED AS SAYING LEONOV SUSPECTED OF INVOLVEMENT NEW GUERRILLA FRONTS PANAMA-COSTA RICA BORDER, VENEZUELA, COLOMBIA AND URBAN TERRORISTS PUERTO RICO.

3. FORWARDING CLIPS. SUGGEST REPLAY CONTAIN DETAILES AND GUIDANCE PER REF C. DEFER HEADQUARTERS TO FORWARD CLIPS ADDITIONAL STATION.

4. FILE: 74-120-115/1 AND 201-132139.

S E C R E T

SECRET

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: AT: Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 76 PER

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION SB 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE. VR. EUR, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI 2

787

SECRET 201845Z MAY 69 CITE LIMA 4775 20 MAY 69 IN 62617

SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR, BOGOTA

REDTOP AEKICK

1. ACCORDING DUHIKE SURVEILLANCE, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV (201-132139), KNOWN KGB, SUB-DIRECTOR OF NOVOSTI FOR LATIN AMERICA, TRAVELED FROM LIMA TO SANTIAGO VIA AIR FRANCE 19 MAY 1969.

2. SUGGEST FUDUEL-5 DETERMINE IF LEONOV HAS FURTHER TRAVEL RESERVATION FROM SANTIAGO. LEONOV MAY BE RETURNING LIMA AFTER TDY SANTIAGO. IF SO PLEASE CABLE TRAVEL DATA.

3. FILE: 201-132139

SECRET

AN	
AB	X
IM	
PS	
SX	
D[illegible]D	
FI	

CS COPY

201-132139
20 May 69

SECRET

C, SB

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING ACTION	
SECRET		MARKED FOR INDEXING
	XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
		MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Lima

SUBJECT
REDTOP/AEKICK - Forwarding of Intercepted Letter

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

201-132139

1. Forwarded herewith as Attachment A are copies of two letters written by Nikolay LEONOV, a Soviet journalist with "NOVOSTI" who is currently in Lima on an extended TDY. The letters were intercepted and reproduced by liaison (DUBRIDE) and passed to the Station with a request for a Spanish translation.

2. The letters were translated for the Station from Russian to Spanish by DUMAGENTA-3. Following the correction of some obvious Spanish grammatical erros by DUMAGENTA-3 and a re-typing for security reasons, the translation was passed to DUBRIDE. A copy of the Spanish translation (marked as Attachment B) is attached for the information of the Desk. The letters give the appearance of being pure propaganda and the information contained therein may well appear in the Soviet press.

3. We assume that the Attachment will be translated from Russian to English and we would appreciate a copy of the English translation being forwarded to the Station.

Samuel K. CASTELON

CAS:mes

Attachment: h/w
as stated

Distribution:
2 - C, SB w/att. A
1 - C, WH w/o att. B
1

CS COPY

2 att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HPLA 10070 ~~HDLA-10070~~	16 May 1969
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-132139 ~~201-LEONOV~~

14-00000

Correos y Telecomunicaciones
del Perú

ATTACHMENT A
(HPLA-10070)

Sr. JACHATUROV K.A.

Agencia Prensa Novosti
Plaza Pushkin 4
MOSCU
URSS

Mookba,ATT,K.A.Xayatypoby

Remite: N.Leonov,Lima Perú
H."Savoy"525

CS COPY

L/W Att / TO HPLA-10070

201-132139

CORREO AEREO



Лима 2.5.1969 г.

Карен! Кроме моих приветов, в которых ты мало нуждаешься, хочу тебе сообщить следующее: все поручения, касающиеся бюро, я выполнил по мере сил моих. Виолетта страдает избытком усердия по отношению к нашим людям, поэтому я ей предупредил, чтобы эта черта характера не задевала бы но(?) [illegible] интересы АПН. А наш брат — [illegible] хам. Удивляюсь как у Смирнова С.Р. хватило такту отдать Виолетту в наем(?). У неё ужасная жизнь: муж калека, да к тому же опасный (запой), двое ребят, живут от получки до получки с родными(?), сама разрывается между хозяйством и работой, а тут ещё "шеф" да какие!! Работает она добросовестно, но иногда у нее не хватает квалификации тоже, да и со временем худо. Пожалуйста, [illegible] обычного(?), может работать так же как в Москве без трудностей. Виолетта настаивает на немедленном увеличении оплаты до 3 тыс. при нынешней стоимости жизни. Пока по первым двум номерам данные о продаже свидетельствуют, что расходится 50%. Остальные идут после выхода очередного номера в бесплатную рассылку. Она даже [illegible] на Аркаду(?), который продавал в Перу свой журнал по несколько более низкой цене. Этот вопрос они решили между собой.

Я у неё видел вырезки из газет с нашими материалами: их немного, но они есть, и она утверждает, что публикаций много [illegible]. Здесь, конечно, обстановка другая чем в Москве (в прессе) и надо лавировать между соперничающими газетами.

У меня видимо [illegible] с президентом. Ответы на вопросы в письменной форме — гарантия на 100%, но я хочу всё-таки лично. Ну вот, собственно, и всё дело.

Обстановка в целом нормальная. Только ужасная влажность: 98%. Целый день [illegible]. Чужой город: небо всё время хмурое, а дождей ни капли и, говорят, никогда не бывает. Представление — О им.: [illegible] осадков, а сырость до кишок пробирает. По сравнению с Москвой это конечно глубокая провинция и, видно, это во всём. Но своих прелестей много — хорошие коммунальные постройки. О провинции говорить нечего — я пока не видел, но говорят по колориту бесподобно. Времени мало как в Москве. Живу в отеле за 8 долларов, а [illegible] днём и ночью тараканы и [illegible] на песок, которые некуда сунуть от [illegible]. Одно радует, что это очень страшно для [illegible]: так им и надо.

Позвони маме. Скажи, что всё в порядке, что, мол, [illegible]

Для [illegible] международной информации P.

CORREO AEREO

Лима 2 мая 1969 г.

Грабеж на морских дорогах.

"У сильного всегда бессильный виноват" — к такому печальному выводу ещё раз пришли латиноамериканцы, которые поставлены перед необходимостью расплачиваться за дела, к которым они не имеют никакого отношения. Некоторое время тому назад океанские побережья США охватила забастовка докеров, продолжавшаяся почти 2 месяца. В результате нарушения погрузочно-разгрузочных работ, резко возрос простой кораблей и покатилась вниз кривая доходов пароходных компаний. Судовладельцы, вместо того чтобы способствовать скорейшему разрешению этого трудового конфликта, решили встать на путь морского грабежа, чтобы компенсировать свои "убытки", под которыми они понимают недополученную прибыль. С этой целью компании США ввели с 12 марта с.г. произвольно увеличенные на 10% новые тарифы на транспортировку грузов в южноамериканские порты Латинской Америки.

Этот пиратский шаг означает, что латиноамериканские страны теперь будут терять ежегодно сумму от 60 до 80 миллионов долларов, расплачиваясь за внутренние неурядицы в США. В старое время морские разбойники нападали только на беззащитные суда. Эти повадки сохранились и поныне. Монополии США рассчитывают, что Латинской Америке, не имеющей своего мощного значительного флота, придется покорно вывернуть карманы. Но эти расчеты упускают из виду одно обстоятельство, что теперь в латиноамериканских странах с каждым днем растет решимость к сопротивлению экономическому диктату США.

В ответ на увеличение грузовых тарифов, потерпевшие страны — Перу, Эквадор, Колумбия и Чили — намерены поднять ~~[illegible]~~ расценки на портовое обслуживание кораблей компаний США и принять меры по всемерному использованию своих собственных судов для морских перевозок. Учитывая большую конкуренцию и возможность фрахта кораблей других стран для перевозки латиноамериканских товаров, легко может случиться, что морские разбойники, пойдя по шерсть, вернутся стриженными.

[signature]

201 - 13 2129

Correos y Telecomunicaciones
del Perú

Carta Certificada Nº 220936

DESTINATARIO: Sr. Jachaturov K.A.

Agencia Prensa Novosti, Plaza Pushkin, 4

MOSCU URSS.
Mockba,

REMITENTE: L. Neovov, Lima Perú,
Hotel Savoy 525.

HPLA-10075

Сад. Кузнецова Ю. межд. информация

CORREO AEREO

Тема: [illegible]

Крепнет решимость перуанцев защитить свою независимость

В давние времена в Перуанских [illegible] существовал обычай, согласно которому в дни особой опасности, [illegible] всех сословий для принятия чрезвычайных мер. Так было в периоды налетов пиратов, крупных внутренних потрясений, стихийных бедствий. Сейчас в связи с угрозой экономической интервенции в Перу в ответ на национализацию имущества американской нефтяной компании "Интернэшнл петролеум к°" - этот древний обычай возрожден.

Не так давно такое собрание состоялось в крупнейшем портовом городе Перу - Кальяо, где присутствовавшие приняли текст "Декларации о провозглашении экономической независимости Перу", в которой указывается, что народ Перу не отступит от своих справедливых требований и добьется экономической свободы, так же, как он завоевал свободу политическую.

Вчера, всенародное вече собралось в Арекипе, втором по величине городе страны. Около 4 часов происходил публичный общественный суд над империалистической политикой США. Давно Арекипа не слышала таких страстных, патриотических речей. Ораторы обращались к правительству с просьбой отказаться выплачивать компенсацию тресту путём помощи США, вывести народ на площади и улицы, вооружить его, если это возникнет для отражения любой попытки военного или экономического нажима со стороны США.

Был открыто поставлен вопрос о возвращении нации всех без исключения естественных богатств страны и особенно меди и железа, которые находятся в руках американских компаний. Кстати, следует отметить, что капиталовложения США в горнорудную промышленность составляют сумму в 6-7 раз большую, чем сумма национализированной нефтяной компании, имущество которой сейчас в

CORREO AEREO

в 7.2 млн. долларов.

Отрицательная реакция жителей города Арекипы в послании президенту страны заключена его в поддержке националистической политики правительства. После окончания акта единодушно собравшиеся демонстранты ушли в 11 часу ночи прошли по главным улицам города под набатный звон исторического колокола, созывавшего в свое время людей для отражения испанской агрессии в 1866 г., и который был специально привезен на этот случай в Арекипу.

Могучий дух патриотизма перуанского народа вырвался наружу. Совладать с ним не под силу ни внешним, ни внутренним врагам, вся надежда которых сейчас в том, чтобы усыпить либо ослабить его.

[signature]

P.S. Я писал вам о К.

Деньги в Перу еще так и не получил.
Положение просто отчаянное. Бардак невыносимый.
Если так будет и дальше, то работа не пойдет.
Стоит вопрос о том, что N 4 не войдет в своё время
в колонию [illegible] не хочу этого [illegible] слово.
Она требует 50% задатка до начала работ. Что и
[illegible], он [illegible] сотрудничества дом [illegible]
большого доверия. Эта [illegible] только начинается,
поэтому [illegible] как нужно.
А что скажут [illegible], не получив представителя?

S E C R E T 132102Z MAY 69 CITE LIMA 4745

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY, REP/LANT 13May69 IN57530

INTEL

SUPDATA DULINDEN SOURCE DULINDEN-8 WHO OBTAINED INFORMATION FROM VIOLETA CALVARCEL. CITATION PARA 2 IS FROM HPL-4987, NOT USED AS REFERENCE BECAUSE OF LIMITED DISTRIBUTION. INDEX BOGODOVOV, [illegible]EVICH. FILE: 58-8-1.

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13 MAY 69

58-8-17

S E C R E T

201-132139

14-00000

COUNTRY: PERU/USSR

DOI : 12 MAY 1969

SUBJECT: COMMENTS BY VIOLETA CARNERO HOKE DE VALCARCEL, NOVOSTI REPRESENTATIVE, REGARDING THE VISIT TO PERU OF ALEXEI BOGODOVOV, SOVIET GEOLOGIST

ACQ : PERU, LIMA (13 MAY 1969) FIELD NO. HFL-4939

SOURCE : A MEMBER OF THE PRO-SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU. SOURCE HAS BEEN REPORTING FOR MORE THAN ONE YEAR AND HIS INFORMATION AT TIMES HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES.

1. VIOLETA CARNERO HOKE DE VALCARCEL, NOVOSTI REPRESENTATIVE IN PERU AND LONG-TIME MEMBER OF THE PRO-SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU (PCP/SOVIET), SAID THAT ALEXEI BOGODOVOV, SOVIET GEOLOGIST WHO ARRIVED IN LIMA ON 7 MAY, IS MAINTAINING CLOSE CONTACTS WITH THE MINISTRY OF MINES AND ENERGY. SHE SAID BOGODOVOV HAS COME WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO STUDY AND DETERMINE IN WHAT MANNER THE SOVIETS MIGHT ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT OF PERU IN EXPLOITING AND ADMINISTERING THE

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COPPER INDUSTRY IF THE INDUSTRY WERE UNDER STATE CONTROL. SHE SAID HIS PRESENCE IN PERU IS VERY IMPORTANT AND THAT SHE WAS INTRODUCED TO HIM BY NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV, A NOVOSTI JOURNALIST CURRENTLY VISITING PERU.

2. (FIELD COMMENT: ACCORDING TO THE PRESS, ALEXEI BOGODOVOV, GEOLOGIST AND PRESIDENT OF THE WORLD TECTONIC MAP COMMITTEE, IS THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF GEOLOGY WHICH IS BEING HELD IN PERU. ANOTHER SOURCE, USUALLY RELIABLE, HAS REPORTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF PERU PLANS TO NATIONALIZE THE COPPER INDUSTRY IF IT RECEIVES ASSURANCE OF ASSISTANCE FROM THE SOVIET UNION. THAT SOURCE ALSO CITED GENERAL JORGE FERNANDEZ MALDONADO SOLARI, MINISTER OF ENERGY AND MINES, AS THE FURTHEST LEFT MEMBER OF THE CABINET.)

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USAID USIS CINCSO CINCLANT.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

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353

S E C R E T 131715Z MAY 69 CITE LIMA 4733 — 13 MAY IN 57264

BOGOTA INFO DIRECTOR

REDTOP AEASSAULT

REF: BOGOTA 2193 (456480)

1. LEONOV EXPECTED REMAIN LIMA APPROXIMATELY TWO MONTHS. DO NOT ANTICIPATE DEPARTURE PRIOR JUNE 69.

2. FILE: 74-120-115/1, 201-132139.

S E C R E T

201-132139
13 May 69

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

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1	WH	5	CI
2	FS	6	
3	C	7	
4		8	

ORIG: H.Mulloy
UNIT: WH/3/C
EXT: 1535
DATE: 9 May 69

FILE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION: 26 PER ___ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: WH 8 | FILE, VR. RI/AN, SB 8, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 09 21 35 Z MAY 69 CITE DIRECTOR 00703

PRIORITY BOGOTA INFO MEXICO CITY LIMA

REF: BOGOTA 2157 (IN 53837)*

1. APPROVE USE MAZATLAN ADDRESS.

2. FILE 201-841194.

END OF MESSAGE

*Ref requested approval to surface Mexico City address of N.S. Leonov who known RIS.

C/WH/3/P [signature]

SB/X/WH [signature]

SB/PO Thomas F. Thiele

SB/CI/O [signature]

C/WH/1 Charles M. Bauer
C/WH/CA ✓

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

Spera
ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO. 201-132139

DISPATCH | SECRET

TO: Chief of Station, Guatemala City
Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: JMTEAK
Jose Alberto CARDOZA Aguilar (201-042366)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: Guatemala City, see Paragraph 6.

1. Attached for Mexico City and Guatemala City Stations is a Guatemalan Personality Report (GPR) on Jose Alberto CARDOZA Aguilar (201-042366). The GPR covers his activities up to 25 March 1968. In preparing this GPR, we have noticed a few items which addressees may wish to comment on and, if possible, provide Headquarters with information, as it may become available, to supplement the available information on CARDOZA.

2. We would appreciate Station Mexico City furnishing additional information on CARDOZA's legal status in Mexico. From subsequent immigration material (on CARDOZA or his wife), please determine if CARDOZA ever informed the Mexican authorities of his departure from Mexico following his obtaining political asylum there on [illegible] June 1954? Note he left Mexico clandestinely in September 1961 destined for Guatemala. Further, the Mexican Immigration Department, as of August 1967, had no intention of granting him any immigration documents.

3. Following are some questions concerning CARDOZA's health. In addition to his heart ailment, does he also have (or did have) liver trouble? This is raised because [illegible]-10 reported in HGG-4508, CS-311/10742-67, dated 18 October 1967, that CARDOZA, while in the USSR, was to receive medical treatment for a liver ailment according to statements made by Bernardo ALVARADO Monzon, Secretary General of the PGT. On the other hand, [illegible]-2 reported that CARDOZA was traveling to the USSR and would remain there for three months to undergo medical treatment for an ailing heart. As for the number and the significance of CARDOZA's heart attacks, the following questions are raised: Has his health affected his attitude and motivation towards his involvement and dedication in PGT activities? Will any medical assistance remedy or control his problem? What exactly is his illness? Who are the doctors in Mexico and the USSR who are treating CARDOZA?

4. Following are questions concerning CARDOZA's attitudes towards his family which may have a bearing on his motivation.

CONTINUED...

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
201-160430 201-821311 201-828917	HGGW-4744	6 May 69
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-042366

Leonor P.5 At.

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/2/CI	M. Osborne	bjr 201-135139	4438

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/2/G		
WH/1		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WH/2		John C. Murray

What are his feelings toward his wife and toward his mistress, Fantina RODRIGUEZ? What are his attitudes and aspirations for his children?

5. In connection with his financial status, we would appreciate learning if the PGT is still supporting and paying him a salary? If so, please furnish details concerning the salary.

6. For Guatemala City: Headquarters defers to Guatemala City as to whether Mexico City may query liaison.

Milton C. SAMIRELLA

Attachment:
As stated, h/w

Distribution:
2 - COS, Guatemala City, w/att
2 - COS, Mexico City, w/att

22 April 1959

201-023466

NAME: Jose Alberto CARDOZA Aguilar (2)

ALIASES:

1. Julian was his alias when he was secretary of the Buro in 1956 in Mexico City (7).

2. Robert ROCA was his pseudonym when, in May 1961, he was chief of the Department committee (10).

3. Roberto ARGUETA Rodriguez (variations: Roberto RODRIGUEZ, Roberto URGUETA Rodriguez) was the name which appeared on documents which he used for his 1967 travel to Havana and to the USSR (14).

4. ANITA was his cover name which he used in his correspondence between Cuba, Mexico and Guatemala as of 13 June 1962 (18).

5. Claudio AVILA Godoy was the name on documents which he used for his 30 September 1961 trip to the USSR (13).

6. MARIO is his PGT alias in Mexico as of 6 September 1968 (15).

7. CHAYO is his PGT alias in Guatemala as of 6 September 1968 (15).

DPOB: 1922 in Guatemala (2).

CITIZENSHIP: Guatemala (2).

OCCUPATION AND EMPLOYMENT: Printer (2, 20).

By letter on 21 October 1955, he provided the Mexican Immigration Department with reasons and information on his prospective employment at Impresiones Moderna, S.A., a publishing house in Mexico City. The Immigration Department granted him authorization to work for Impresiones Moderna, S.A. on 10 March 1955 provided that within 60 days from 10 March 1955 he offer proof that he had paid to the cashier of the Immigration Department the fee provided in Article 1, Paragraph (F) of the Immigration Taxes Act (20).

ADDRESS(ES):

Current -

July 1955 - 15 Avenida and 14 Calle No. 14-27, Guatemala City (20).

September 1954 - Pension Zalamel, at Jose Maria Iglesias and Edison, Mexico City, Mexico (20).

1953 - 21 Avenida y 2A Calle de la Palmita No. 82, Guatemala City (3).

PASSPORTS AND DOCUMENTS:

1. Jose Alberto CARDOZA Aguilar's Official Passport 1483 was issued on 29 October 1951 and was valid until 29 October 1953 (2).

2. For his travel to the USSR on 20 September 1961, he used a passport which was issued to Claudio AVILA Godoy who was described as a bachelor farmer, born in Guanagazapa, Escuintla, Guatemala and living at 3 Avenida 40, Escuintla (13).

3. For his 1967 travel to Havana, he used Passport 20[illegible]9 issued in the name of Roberto ARGUETA Rodriguez, born 13 May 1924, Guatemala and a commercial agent (17). (COMMENT: The application for the above described passport did not bear a signature of any issuing immigration official. The photograph on the application without any doubt was that of CARDOZA).

4. With reference to the fraudulent Cedula A1-19334 which he used for the 1967 travel to Havana, this number was issued to a woman named Maclovia ROMERO Lopez (17). (COMMENT: No traces as of 30 October 1967).

5. Travel records reflect information on one Julian GONZALEZ, a Guatemalan Army man who was in Havana on 26 June 1967.

6. On 13 August 1954, CARDOZA and his wife were granted safe-conduct numbers 13564 and 12899 and issued document no.'s 890 and 891, dated 7 September 1954, by the Mexican Embassy, Guatemala (20).

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION:

A. Race:

B. Height:

C. Weight:

D. Hair:

E. Eyes:

F. Health:

G. Dress:

H. Handwriting Specimen:

I. Fingerprints:

J. Other Physical Characteristics:

K. Photograph(s):

POLITICAL AFFILIATION:

He is currently a central committee member of the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT - Guatemalan Communist Party) (2, 7, 10). (COMMENT: As early as 195[illegible], he was reported as being possibly a central committee member of the PGT (3). As of 6 April 1961, he was serving as the PGT liaison with the printers' cell of the PGT (11). As of 9 May 1961, he was Chief of the Department Committee of the PGT for the Department of Guatemala (16). Sometime prior to 13 September 1966, he was named Secretary of the PGT Political Commission for Workers and Peasants (10).

LANGUAGE(S):

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND INFLUENCE:

FINANCIAL STATUS:

VEHICLES OWNED/USED BY SUBJECT:

ARREST RECORD:

RELATIVES:

WIFE: Yolanda Consuelo RODRIGUEZ Artiaga was born in 1931 and is a Guatemalan citizen (20). They were married on 28 March 1953 (3). Her PGT alias is OFELIAS as of 14 February 1958 (7). Sometime prior to 26 November 1968, she visited CARDOZA in Mexico City, according to Jose Luis BALCARCEL Ordonez and Carlos Enrique FORNO (15). On 30 May 1951, one Yolanda RODRIGUEZ, a suspected communist sympathizer, departed Guatemala for Mexico with Eliosa de RODRIGUEZ, Alicia RODRIGUEZ and Luis I. RODRIGUEZ, Mexican Ambassador to Guatemala (29). (COMMENT: It is not known if the above Yolanda RODRIGUEZ is identical with CARDOZA's wife who was 20 years old in 1951).

CHILDREN: A son, Jorge Alberto CARDOZA Rodriguez was born in January 1954 (20). This son and Cristobal CARDOZA Rodriguez accompanied their mother back to Guatemala sometime after 19 October 1956 (9).

FATHER, MOTHER: CARDOZA is the legitimate son of Patrocino CARDOZA and Angela AGUILAR de CARDOZA (3).

BROTHER(S):

SISTER(S):

ASSOCIATES:

1. ALVARADO Arellano, Humberto (201-065125), PGT member.

On 4 April 1957, CARDOZA suggested that ALVARADO Arellano replace him on the three-man secretariat of the BURO of the PGT in Mexico City since CARDOZA planned to return to Guatemala (7).

2. AREVALO, Juan Jose (201-006603), former President of Guatemala.

On 18 March 1957, CARDOZA was in mail contact with AREVALO and addressed a letter to AREVALO using the latter's alias Juan Francisco CLAYTON. AREVALO was receiving mail at P.O. 10396, Santiago, Chile (30).

3. CAPUANO DEL VECCHIO, Ernesto (201-086191), Guatemalan Communist living in Mexico City.

On 17 July 1966, CARDOZA informed Manuel CONTRERAS, a member of the CAOC, to contact CAPUANO for travel arrangements to Cuba via Mexico (14). (COMMENT: Although, there is no reporting on CARDOZA and CAPUANO's relationship, CAPUANO is included due to his apparent importance in the lines of communications between Guatemala via Mexico to Cuba as well as the likely possibility that both are collaborators).

4. *DEBROT Yaguin, Guillermo

In 1957, CARDOZA gave DEBROT Yaguin's address: Septima Calle 1-35, should aid be necessary during his re-entry into Guatemala (7). In April 1967, DEBROT, Jr. in Guatemala P.O. Box 342, was listed as presumably a correspondent of Carlos Manuel PELLECER (201-225) (7).

5. DEL CID, Oscar (201-149558), former active member of the PGT.

On 3 January 1957, DEL CID contacted CARDOZA in Mexico. They had been very close through DEL CID having served as assistant secretary of the federation and as a member of the Graphic Arts Union of Guatemala. Through his friendship with CARDOZA, DEL CID won the confidence of the PGT directors in Mexico City and carried out political tasks of some significance, including serving as one of Jacobo ARBENZ' bodyguards (7).

6. *GALICIA, Concha - Influential PGT member (6)

CARDOZA's wife lived at Concha GALICIA's home in February 1958 and reportedly the home served as a means of communications between Guatemala and Mexico (7). In 1957, she was the mistress of Florencio MENDEZ Orozco, (201-787943) who in 1965 was a businessman, owner of a drug store, in Guatemala.

7. GONZALES Coronado, Otto Raul (201-066999), alias Otto Raul GONZALES, is a PGT member.

GONZALES was named as successor to Subject as one of the delegates of the PGT to the meeting of the UPG as of 26 March 1957 (7).

8. *GUTIERREZ Garbini, Victor Manuel, Secretary-General of the Confederacion General de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CGTG) (7)

During December 1961 to February 1962, relations between Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ and CARDOZA worsened considerably (7). In January 1962, GUTIERREZ told friends that he and CARDOZA have not had good relations, since CARDOZA is jealous of GUTIERREZ (7). Further, CARDOZA, then secretary of organization of the PGT, had raised obstacles to prevent GUTIERREZ from regaining the power he once had in the PGT and has tried to

keep him out of the limelight (7). As of 4 September 1968, CARDOZA was to take the place of GUTIERREZ who had been the head of the PGT in Mexico. GUTIERREZ was killed by Guatemalan police in early 1966 (15).

9. LEONOV, Nikolay Sergeyevich (201-132139), former Press Attache at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City and known KGB officer.

CARDOZA and Jose Luis BALCARCEL Ordonez (201-160430) as of 18 October 1968 were in direct contact with LEONOV for handling travel of Guatemalans to the USSR and for receipt of money from the Soviets. When handling travel matters, contact was arranged by having the Guatemalan travelers to the USSR, accompanied by CARDOZA or BALCARCEL, go near the Soviet Press Office in a car. The Guatemalan travelers were given an identification document to present to LEONOV and they then would visit the office alone. When arranging for receipt of money or the exchange of documents, contact was accomplished by CARDOZA or BALCARCEL by one of them going directly to the Soviet Press Office (15). However, the wife of BARCARCEL has had most of the contact with LEONOV as an extra precautionary measure. LEONOV and family departed Mexico PCS on 22 December 1968 and Svyatoslav Federovich KUZNETSOV (201-087222) replaced LEONOV as the Soviet Press Attache (21).

10. fnu LNU.

As of 26 November 1968, a secretary at the Czechoslovakian Embassy in Mexico City was a contact of CARDOZA. BALCARCEL has been present on two occasions when Subject and the secretary met (15).

11. LOMBARDO Toledano, Vicente (201-000229)

As of 10 March 1955, CARDOZA was receiving mail, from the Mexican Immigration Department, at LOMBARDO Toledano's address: Villa Obregon, D.F., Mexico City, Mexico (20).

12. MACIAS Mayora, Julio Cesar (201-303518) alias Cesar MONTES, leader of the FAR.

In 1967 when CARDOZA was preparing for his trip to Cuba in behalf of the PGT at the First OLAS Conference, Bernardo ALVARADO Moñzon, PGT Secretary General, cautioned CARDOZA that MACIAS may attempt to attend the OLAS despite an agreement with the PGT that MACIAS would not attend (14).

13. PELLECER Duran, Carlos Manuel (201-00225)

Subject in 1957 gave PELLECER's address: Primera Calle Poniente 6, should aid be necessary during his re-entry into Guatemala (7).

14. REYES, Olegario (201-733761), FAR member.

CARDOZA, Jose Luis RAMOS Martinez, and Huberto ALVARADO Arellano were seen riding together in the PGT "undercover" vehicle prior to 8 September 1966 (1, 15).

15. RODRIGUEZ Padilla viuda de LEON, Fantina (201-828917), PGT member.

She is CARDOZA's mistress. On 11 July 1967 when CARDOZA was departing Guatemala for Cuba, she took him to the Guatemala Airport (14). Sometime prior to 5 December 1967, she received a letter from CARDOZA who was then in Moscow (14). The above mentioned letter arrived in Guatemala from the Soviet Union via Peru (14).

16. SANCHEZ Gonzales, Hector (201-[illegible]), bonafide Cuban Diplomat and suspected DSE officer.

.. Between 11 and 18 October 1966, CARDOZA met Hector SANCHEZ Gonzales and the latter informed CARDOZA that he has authority from Cuban government to do whatever is necessary to reorganize FAR (15).

17. SOLIS Barrios, Rafael (201-225483), PGT member.

In 1957, SOLIS, CARDOZA and families were photographed together. In the transmittal dispatch it is not clear whether the SOLIS and CARDOZA families are related (7).

CURRICULUM VITAE:

1922	born in Guatemala (2) .
29 August 1952	issued an official visa for China (2)
30 August 1952	issued an official visa for Mexico (2)
	issued an official visa for Cuba (2)
1 September 1952	traveled via Mexico en route to China by TACA according to Nuestro Diario, 31 July 1952 and (5).
5 September 1952	arrived in Mexico City via TACA Flight 100 (Travel)
6 September 1952	departed Mexico City for Miami via Guest Flight 100 with reservations for connections with EAL Flight 602, for Idlewild to travel on to Zurich (Travel).
7 September 1952	was to depart Idlewild for Zurich via TWA Flight 902, (Travel). He was traveling without a visa for the U.S. but with an official Guatemalan passport.
8 September 1952	arrived in Switzerland (2).
14 September 1952	departed Switzerland (2).
14 November 1952	arrived in Switzerland (2).
17 November 1952	issued an official visa for Mexico (2)
18 November 1952	departed Switzerland (2)
18 November 1952	arrived in France (2)
23 November 1952	departed France (2)
	arrived in Switzerland (2)
25 November 1952	departed Switzerland (2)
February 1954	traveled from Guatemala to Mexico City (5)
29 June 1954	requested political asylum in the Mexican Embassy in Guatemala (20).
8 September 1954	arrived in Mexico at Tapachula, Chiapas from Guatemala with his family (20).
14 December 1956	departed Mexico City for Tapachula, Mexico (7).
23 December 1956	Arrived in Mexico City from Tapachula (7).

12 April 1957
: and his family departed Mexico for Veracruz where they were to remain for one day and then go by train to Tapachula. His wife and son were to travel legally to Guatemala while he planned a clandestine re-entry into Guatemala (7).

June 1959
: traveled to Czechoslovakia (10).

30 September 1961
: was planning to travel via Panama and South America to the USSR where he planned to attend the 1961 CPSU Congress (13). Early in the morning of 30 September 1961, he departed Guatemala by land for Mexico enroute to Moscow, USSR (13).

3 October 1961
: arrived in Mexico by air from Guatemala (7).

January 1962
: was in Moscow and was expected to return to Guatemala by the following route: Moscow, Havana, Ecuador, Central America, Guatemala (7).

February 1962
: was in Moscow and planned to travel to Havana (7).

7 December 1962
: was in Moscow and attended the WFTU Conference (7).

2 January 1963
: was in Cuba (12).

26 June 1967
: arrived in Cuba possibly traveling in the name Julian GONZALEZ according to travel records.

11 July 1967
: had plans of leaving Guatemala by air for Mexico City destined for Havana and to attend OLAS (14). He departed Guatemala City for Mexico by ACR at 1930 hours but the plane had to return to Guatemala City the same night because of engine trouble (14).

12 July 1967
: departed Guatemala City 0845 by Air PANAM for Mexico City using fraudulent documents in the name of ARGUETA (14).

18 July 1967
: departed Mexico for Europe on Aeronaves/BOAC airlines Flt. 676/068 using fradulent documentation (ARGUETA). He was expected to travel via Prague to Cuba (15). He was to travel to the USSR and remain there for three months to undergo medical treatment for an ailing heart (15).

19 July 1967
: traveled to Mexico via London, UK and was destined for Cuba according to travel records.

22 July 1967
: traveled from the United Kingdom via Frankfurt to Czechoslovakia and to Cuba according to travel records.

26 July 1967
: traveled to Cuba possibly using the name Julian GONZALEZ, according to travel records.

August 1967
: traveled from Cuba to the USSR probably using the passport of ARGUETA (15).

As of 5 December 1967
: was in the USSR and planned to remain there until June 1968 (14).

8 April 1968	was to return to Mexico within a few days according to Jose Luis BALCARCEL Ordonez (15).
15 April 1968	arrived in Mexico according to Jose Luis RAMOS Martinez who said on 23 April that CARDOZA had arrived in Mexico some 8 days previous (14).
28 May 1968	was in Mexico according to his mistress Fantina RODRIGUEZ Viuda de LEON (14).
9 August 1968	was still in Mexico but planned to travel to Salvador and then return to Mexico with a new visa (15).
Prior 26 November 1968	his wife, Yolanda Consuelo RODRIGUEZ Artiaga visited him for a week in Mexico (15).

PERSONALITY, ASSESSMENT AND HEALTH:

1. As of 10 March 1952, his name was on a list of persons considered by CTAL as being loyal to WFTU policies and to Marxism (27). He requested political asylum at the Mexican Embassy in Guatemala on 29 June 1954 because he was subject to persecution by forces of the new administration in Guatemala due to his political ideals and his sympathy with the former ARBENZ administration. He served as Deputy in the Congress of the Republic of Guatemala (20). In January 1957, he was unhappy in Mexico and was anxious to return to Guatemala because he believed life would be better in Guatemala. He personally set April 1957 as the target date for his departure from Mexico (7). As of 7 February 1957 at a Buro meeting of the PGT, he announced to other members on the Commission of Organization and Control that he would be replaced since they (PGT in Guatemala) had summoned him to Guatemala and he was in the process of preparing for the trip (7). On 6 July 1957, he was in charge of notifying the interested persons of the exact date of the Central American Labor Conference and he apparently forgot to do so and one delegate was delayed in attending the conference (7).

2. In early September 1961, he was planning to travel to the USSR and to seek medical treatment for a stomach ailment believed to be aggravated by ulcers(10). In the USSR he was to serve as a Guatemalan delegate to the CPSU October 1961 celebrations (10). When discussing his problems and aprehensions on his prospective travel to the USSR for the 1961 Congress, he feared that the Guatemalan Government would unleash a wave of persecution against the Communists because of rumors that the Communists were ready to attack the government. He blamed the rumor on the Cubans who had issued a news bulletin claiming that the Guatemalan and Salvadoran Communist Parties had agreed to take up arms to overthrow their respective governments (13). Also in September 1961 when he was using a fraudulent passport for his travel to the USSR, he became worried because a border official asked him if he would be accompanied on the trip since another Guatemalan traveler on the previous day had the same visas listing Mexico, Switzerland, Europe. He reported the incident to the PGT central committee (13).

3. In January 1962 he had a heart attack in Moscow and had been seriously ill according to comments made by GUTIERREZ. CARDOZA had recuperated physically, but he was morally depressed and felt that he would be an invalid (7).

4. As of 5 December 1967, CARDOZA had suffered another heart attack and would remain in the USSR until June 1968 (14). He was expected to come to Mexico from the USSR within a few days after 8 April 1967, according to Jose Luis BALCARCEL [illegible]

5. As early as April 1958, he was recuperating from a heart ailment which resulted from a highly nervous condition (15). As of 26 November 1958, he was in Mexico City and still undergoing treatment for a heart condition (15).

6. As of 15 February 1959, he had suffered another heart attack and was confined to his bed at home (15). According to BALCARCEL on 19 February 1969, BALCARCEL's replacement as Chief of the PGT exile group in Mexico by CARDOZA has caused discontent among PGT exiles. BALCARCEL thought the change had been made in order to justify CARDOZA's continued membership on the PGT central committee and felt that CARDOZA was not suited for the post because CARDOZA is ill and in Mexico illegally (15).

COMMUNIST AND OTHER SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES:

(Political and Organizational Involvement)

Date	Activity
5 - 11 September 1949	attended the American Continental Congress for Peace as the Guatemalan delegate. The Congress met in Mexico City (5, 27).
6 September 1950	was very active in FSG affairs, holding executive offices and signing among other things, a resolution affiliating the FSG with the CTAL and the FSM and a letter from the FSG to the Venezuelan government dated 6 September 1950 which protested the rumored round-up of Spanish Republicans into concentration camps for deportation to Spain (9).
13, 18 and 19 September 1950	was a delegate and present in the gallery of the Guatemalan National Congress. He tried to influence the Congress against ratifying the Rio Treaty (9).
7 November 1950	attended the October celebration of the 33rd anniversary of the Russian Revolution (9).
14 December 1950	was a Congressional candidate of the "PAR RN CPNT" coalition and made a communist-line speech at the Concha Acustica in Guatemala City (9).
March 1952	was invited to the Conferencia Continental Americana por la Pas in Brazil (26).
1 September 1952	was one of fifteen Guatemalan delegates to the Peking Peace Conference which was held in October 1952 in China (5). According to the Guatemalan daily newspaper Nuestro Diario, 31 July 1952, he was to be a delegate to the Asian and Pacific Peace Conference (9).
1951, 1952, 1953	was an addressee on three different occasions for letters from Cuba. Prior to 6 March he had received letters from Cuba addressed to him as Deputy, Congreso de la Republica, Guatemala, April 1952. He was on the mailing list of Prensa Continental Publication, dated 5 April 1952. On 3 August 1953, he was the addressee for a letter sent by the PSP (Cuban CP) calling for solidarity against BATISTA, liberty for the arrested PSP leaders and CP propaganda (25).

10 March 1953	was one of the signers of an open letter to the Soviet Government and people expressing sympathy on the death of Stalin. The letter was published in the 10 March 1953 edition of La Hora (3).
18 March 1953	was a member of the greeting party at the Guatemala City Airport to meet Vicente LOMBARDO Toledano and Henri JOURDAIN (WFTU directors who stopped on the way to CTAL Congress in Santiago) (3).
As early as April 1953	was a member of the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT) (2, 3). As of 18 June 1953, he was serving as a Congressional deputy to the National Congress from the Department of Guatemala, having been elected on the ticket of the PGT. His term was to expire in 1955 (2, 3).
18 June 1953	was regularly receiving the News Bulletin of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City at the address of the Communist-dominated Sindicato de Artes Graficos (SAG) (3).
October 1953	was scheduled to act as Secretary General of the CGTG while Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ and four other CGTG members attended the World Federation of Trade Unions' Third World Labor Conference, which was to meet in Vienna, Austria, in October 1953, according to the Communist newspaper Tribuna Popular (5).
1954	was in Caracas and acting as Secretary General of CGTG. He denounced the U.S. proposal to put the question of Communist activity in the Western Hemisphere on the agenda of the Tenth International.
As of 20 January 1954	was a member of the presidium of the Second Guatemalan Syndical Congress (19).
28 January 1954	was among the members of the presidium at the Second Guatemalan Syndical Congress which was inaugurated in the Teatro America before a large audience (28).
February 1954	was a delegate to a mass meeting in Mexico City which was sponsored by the Society of Friends of Guatemala (5).
5 May 1954	met Obdulio BARTHE and family at the La Aurora Airport, Guatemala City and was accompanied by other Guatemalan Communist leaders and leftists (9).
29 June 1954	requested for himself and his family asylum in the Mexican Embassy in Guatemala.
14 September 1954	he and his family appeared before Licenciado Gustavo GARCIA Guerrero, Assistant Chief of the Immigration Department, Department of the Interior, in Mexico City for the purpose of clarifying the matter of his internment and stay in Mexico (20).
30 October 1954	was listed as an exile on whom extradition procedings had been filed (4).

25 January 1955	was included on a list of exiled Guatemalans who applied for political asylum in [illegible] (8).
June 1956	was identified together with Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ, Cesar MONTENEGRO and Rafael SOLIS Barrios as being directors of the Central Guatemalan Confederation of Trade Unions in Exile (CGTG). In June 1956 the CGTG and other various exile groups in Mexico joined together in the Union Patriotica Guatemalteca (UPG) to form both a clandestine and legal group inside and wherever possible as an opposition party to the Guatemalan Government (24).
19 October 1956	his wife, Yolanda Rodriguez de CARDOZA, name appeared on a list of 157 exiles who were being permitted to return to Guatemala according to the Ministry of Foreign Relations (9).
As of 3 December 1956	in Mexico, he was the Secretary of the Directive Organism (BURO - Buro de la Fraccion del Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo (PGT) (7). Also he was a member of the PGT central committee which was located in Mexico. At the time there were two PGT central committees, one in Mexico and one in Guatemala (6). During 1954-57, he was a member of the PGT cell "LUBE" in Mexico (7).
5 December 1956	attended a meeting of the Directive Organism (BURO) in Mexico where he with others discussed political problems of one Guatemalan member in Prague (7).
14 December 1956	departed Mexico City for Tapachula, Mexico where he met a courier. He coordinated the plans of the PGT as to the stand to take in the event of a revolt which was planned for 24 December 1956 (7).
23 December 1956	returned to Mexico City after having made clandestine contact with a party leader from the interior (7).
18 January 1957	he would be pulled off of his job in the printing shop at Tabasco 2750 in Mexico in order to make him into a professional of the PGT, but the possibility was remote since it was difficult to obtain a job as advantageous as that which he then had, one which permitted him to take part in political activities during the afternoon (7).
24 January 1957	attended a meeting of the Buro of the PGT faction in Mexico where a communique on the Hungarian Problem was made known to the rank and file of the PGT in Mexico (7).
7 February 1957	attended a meeting of the Buro of the PGT in Mexico at the home of Jose Manuel FORTUNY where he and others discussed the organizational report first presented by the PGT in Mexico (7).

12 February 1957	attended a meeting of the Buro of the PGT in Mexico at the home of Manuel SANCHEZ to discuss the regulations governing the UPG as proposed by the Partido Accion Revolucionario Unificado (PARU) (7).
14 February 1957	attended a meeting of the Buro of the PGT in Mexico which was held at the home of Manuel SANCHEZ (7).
21 February 1957	attended a meeting of the Buro of the PGT in Mexico which was held at the home of Jose Manuel FORTUNY (7).
April 1957	in Guatemala, he replaced Carlos Rene VALLE y Valle, PGT member, who was then ill (7).
	carried eighty dollars from Mexico to Guatemala. The funds had been sent to Mexico by the Guatemalan exiles in Costa Rica (7).
16 April 1957	was to enter Guatemala to carry out clandestine work for the PGT there according to a letter that Alfredo GUERRA Borges received from Mario SILVA Jonama (7).
31 May 1957	signed a petition dated 31 May 1957 which was prepared by the members of the UPG for the Consul General of Guatemala in Mexico to request the restoration of his passport and permission to return to Guatemala (23).
14 February 1958	his wife was living at the home of Concha Galicia. GALICIA's home served as one of the principal means of communications between Guatemala and Mexico (7).
June 1959	traveled to Czechoslovakia to work on the publication, <u>Problemas de la Paz y del Socialismo</u> (10).
18 February 1961	was director of <u>El Militante</u>, internal organizational bulletin of the PGT (10).
7 September 1961	attended a meeting with members of the Departmental Committee of the PGT in a home located at 5 Avenida 5-42, Zone 7, Guatemala City (13).
21 September 1961	attended a meeting of the Departmental Committee and delivered a lecture on the foundation, growth and strengthening of the Party (13).
October 1961	was to attend the CPSU Congress. He was making plans in early September and was to serve as one of the two Guatemalan delegates (10).
7 December 1961	attended the WFTU Conference in Moscow (7, 13).

As of early January 1963	was aware of the possible return of Jacobo ARBENZ Guzman to Guatemala with a Cuban guerrilla group. He and ARBENZ were in Cuba as of 2 January 1963.
29 January 1963	met with labor leaders of the PGT at the home of Manuel Francisco CONTRERAS to consider and approve a document which sets forth the 1963 PGT line for labor matters (12).
14 February 1963	he and eight other top labor leaders of the Labor Commission of the PGT were arrested. The PGT and the Communist (PGT) controlled FASGUA were without leaders (13).
29 June 1963	released by a Guatemalan military court. He and others had been accused of having plotted against the Ydigoras government in accordance with International Communist plans according to El Imparcial, Guatemala City, 29 June 1963.
July 1963	assumed the direction of the Comision Sindical, the labor commission of the PGT, in Mexico (13).
October 1963	planned to be made head of the Escuintla Departmental Committee of the PGT (13).
November 1963	was a member of the Labor Commission of the PGT which is under the direct authority of the central committee which was formed to fulfill the following missions: 1. direct the activities of the Chamale Committee (Communist faction of the Federacion Autonoma Sindical Guatemalteca (FASGUA-Communist dominated labor federation); 2. issued propaganda favoring the working class; run a labor school in Quezaltenango for Party members involved in labor matters, etc. (12). and others were PGT members who received a salary from the Party. The lowest paid is sixty quetzales (U.S. $60) and the highest at least two hundred quetzales (U.S. $200) per month. In addition to salaries, the Party pays the expenses for houses, cars, and maintenance and the cost of printing leaflets and other publications (13).
3 December 1963	met with other leaders of the PGT in the Headquarters of the Federacion Autonoma Sindical Guatemalteca (FASGUA - PGT dominated labor federation). The group discussed the current political and general situation in Guatemala (14).
8 March 1965	had been delegated by other Party leaders to come out of hiding in order to make plans for an important meeting of opposition leaders (14).

23 December 1965

Huberto ALVARADO Arellano, and Arturo HERNANDEZ Garcia met in FASGUA headquarters with a small group of PGT party members to discuss the expected overthrow, probably on 24 December 1965 of the government of Colonel Enrique PERALTA Azurdia. CARDOZA and ALVARADO ordered the members of the group to remain within their homes on call on 24 December (14).

24 - 27 February 1966

was renamed to the PGT central committee at the National Conference of the PGT which was held 24 through 27 February 1966 (14).

27 March 1966

was in charge of a meeting which PGT leaders attended in order to discuss the status of the investigation on the disappearance of some PGT members (14).

19 April 1966

told a group of leading members of Party and Party Labor leaders that a new labor policy has been adopted by the PGT and the FAR, in response to instructions from Moscow (14).

was the chief spokesman at a meeting of a group of 15 leading members of the PGT and announced that the PGT and FAR have decided to initiate a new campaign of violence on 1 May 1966 (14).

28 April 1966

and Armando CASTILLO Morales, PGT and FAR members, met with a group of Party members and labor leaders on 23 April to discuss plans for May Day and a week of terrorism. According to CARDOZA, the PGT would go along with a peaceful parade on May Day. However, if the police attempt to obstruct the parade or halt the speeches, the PGT and FAR will be ready to put up strong resistance (14).

9 and 11 May 1966

met with PGT and PGT labor leaders to bring them up to date on the attitude of the Party toward the present state of siege and to reveal Party plans for the adoption of a new labor policy (14). CARDOZA informed the group that the PGT and FAR are ready to initiate a new type of labor plan, as a result of which Communist-controlled labor throughout Guatemala would be geared to acts of violence, sabotage, and terrorist activity in general. According to CARDOZA, the first step in the plan was to give military training to selected key labor people (14).

18 May 1966

met with leaders of the PGT for the purpose of furnishing them with a report on the National Party Conference which was held in late February 1966 and to distribute a booklet entitled <u>La Guerra Revolucionaria del Pueblo</u> (14).

29 May 1966	met with a group of PGT labor leaders and members of the FAR. It was announced that a meeting will definitely be arranged with representatives of the Movimiento Revolucionario 13 de Noviembre (MR-13 November Revolutionary Movement), guerrilla organization headed by Marco Antonio YON Sosa (14).
13 -17 July 1966	was at meetings of the Comision de Asuntos Obreros y Campesinos (CAOC - Commission for matters concerning peasants and workers), labor commission of the PGT which were held on 13 and 16 July 1966. He had extensive knowledge about Guatemalans who already were in Cuba and others who were scheduled to go there (14).
Prior 8 September 1966	was seen in Zone 6, Guatemala City with Jose Luis RAMOS Martinez, Huberto ALVARADO Arellano and Olegario REYES. They were riding in one of the "undercover" vehicles used by the PGT and the FAR (1).
22 November 1966	was in charge of a meeting of the National Labor Commission of the PGT which met in the home of a Party member in Guatemala City to discuss the present situation in Guatemala insofar as the PGT and its revolutionary fighting arm, the FAR, are concerned (14).
12 January 1967	gave members of the PGT's National Labor Commission a situation report on the results of the PGT central committee members who had been in the mountains of Guatemala with a leader of the FAR (14).
25 January 1967	discussed with PGT labor leaders the growing dissension between the PGT and the FAR (14).
24 February 1967	came to Guatemala City from Escuintla, where he has been in hiding, to meet with PGT labor leaders. He and other political commission and central committee members of the PGT had been in hiding since 20-22 February as a means to avoid capture by the military and police forces. The Party at that time was underground and almost completely inactive. According to him, for all practical purposes the PGT and the FAR were then two separate organizations (14).
9 March 1967	called an urgent meeting with Party Labor leaders to inform them that during the latter part of March 1967, he would be occupied in organizing and later, attending a National plenum of the central committee of the PGT (14).
27 March 1967	gave Party labor leaders a hasty and incomplete version of the so-called plenary session of the PGT central committee held at an undisclosed site in the mountains of Guatemala from 20 through 24 March. Among the few agreements reached was that the PGT will form its own guerrilla force and call it "Guerrilla Leonardo Castillo Flores" (14).

14-00000

22 April 1967	gave Party labor leaders information on the PGT plans for May Day celebration and explained that the party will cooperate with the Rebel Armed Forces in a terrorist campaign after 1 May 1967 (14).
8 July 1967	was to head the PGT delegation to the First Conference of the Latin American Solidarity Organization (OLAS). After OLAS he had plans to travel on to the USSR (14).
11 July 1967	was provided false bottom suitcase to carry documents to Cuba prior to his departure from Guatemala City enroute to Cuba via Mexico City (14).
22 July 1967	transitted Orly Airport for Prague with documents belonging to Roberto ARGUETA Rodriguez (16).
14 - 27 July 1967	under the name Julian GONZALES, he was reported as having arrived in Havana as a "FAR delegate" to LASO according to a 28 July 1967 Havana broadcast.
27 July - November 1967	was to receive a two-month course in military tactics as well as medical treatment for a liver ailment in the Soviet Union following his attendance at the 1967 LASO Conference according to Bernardo ALVARADO Monzon, Secretary General of the PGT (14).
11 August 1967	The Mexican Immigration Department by letter on 11 August 1967 informed the Mexican Consul (presumably in Guatemala) that the Immigration Department would not issue any document granting any immigration status, nor would CARDOZA be allowed to enter Mexico without the previous authorization of the Immigration Department (20).
Late December 1967	was Chief of the Mazatenango Regional Committee of the PGT and the FAR, which consists of the Departments of Retalhuleu and Suchitepequez for the most part, according to Francisco HERNANDEZ Alvarez during his interrogation (22).
Early April 1968	had strict orders to remain inactive in Mexico and do no work as CARDOZA is recuperating from a heart ailment. CARDOZA probably would remain inactive for at least one year according to Luis BALCARCEL Ordonez (15).
28 May 1968	was to stay in Mexico and work with PGT exile community there, according to his mistress, Fantina RODRIGUEZ Viuda de Leon (14).
18 July 1968	is receiving complete financial support from the Mexican Communist Party because of his high position in the PGT. This support includes money for room and board and doctor bills. In Mexico, he visits his doctor once a week (15).
9 August 1968	was still in Mexico but was to leave Mexico because his visa has expired, according to Jose Luis BALCARCEL Ordonez. Also, CARDOZA had plans of traveling to Salvador and then returning to Mexico with a new visa because he needed approximately six more months of medical treatment (15).

5 October 1968	met Jose MEJIA, aka Carlos SALDIAS Murillo on the street and latter told CARDOZA about the attempted recruitment of him by a "special agent". MEJIA asked CARDOZA for money but the latter refused (15).
As of 18 October 1968	he and Jose Luis BALCARCEL Ordonez are handling travel of Guatemalans to the USSR and receipting for funds and documents directly with Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV, know KGB officer and Press Attache at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico (15).
4 September 1968	headed a meeting of Guatemalan Communist exile leaders in Mexico and they discussed the reorganization of the exiles in Mexico (15).
15 February 1969	had been named overall Chief of the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) exile apparatus in Mexico to replace Jose Luis BALCARCEL Ordonez, according to Carlos Enrique FORNO Reynoso. The change had been made as the result of instructions which had just been received from the PGT in Guatemala. The change was twofold. CARDOZA is a member of the central committee of the PGT whereas BALCARCEL is not, and BALCARCEL has been lax in his duties, once being unavailable when some important PGT members passed through Mexico. However, BALCARCEL will continue to act as chief of the exile group until CARDOZA is on his feet again since the latter had suffered another heart attack and was confined to his bed at home. Until this change CARDOZA had been the central committee representative in Mexico and had functioned as an advisor (15). Presumably BALCARCEL replaced GUTIERREZ and CARDOZA replace BALCARCEL although on 4 September 1968, CARDOZA was to take GUTIERREZ' place in Mexico (GUTIERREZ was killed in Guatemala in 1966) (15).
As of 19 February 1969	was replaced by BARCARCEL as Chief of the PGT exile group in Mexico in order to justify CARDOZA's continued membership on the PGT central committee (15).
Prior 9 March	met with Jose Maria ORTIZ Vides who had recently arrived in Mexico City from Cuba. ORTIZ informed CARDOZA that the Cubans had sent him to Mexico to "spy" on the PGT in Mexico in behalf of Cuba (15).

SOURCES

(1) ESRECESS-19

(2) No source, passport

(3) ESCONSON

(4) ESODIC-1

(5) LNPURE

(6) ESGEM-7

(7) LINLUCK

(8) LIBETHERITE-4

(9) No source

(10) ESPEG-1

(11) ESADAGE-1

(12) ESRECESS-11

(13) ESMESSAGE-3

(14) ESRECESS-16

(15) LIREBEL-2

(16) UNBOUND travel information

(17) ESMICA

(18) LNERGO

(19) ESCROW

(20) LIKAYAK-2

(21) LIFEAT, LIENVOY

(22) ESRECESS-17

(23) HUSSY

(24) ESABIDE

(25) AMPLECT

(26) JURANT

(27) LIFTER

(28) ESCROW

(29) ESCALATOR

(30) FUGLEMAN-13

14-00000

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C. MEXICO CITY 5719 (IN 20342)*** (BEING RELAYED TO LIMA)

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2. FILE 201-841194.

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET PAGE TWO CITE DIRECTOR 99095

TO

*Outlines prop play being conducted by Station Bogota in connection with recent discovery of an ELN cache.

**Reports arrival of Leonov in Lima a Soviet RIS officer who is under cover of Second Secretary of Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

***Reports connection between Leonov and Pachon.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

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639

S E C R E T 011620Z MAY 69 CITE SANTIAGO 9169 (DIFFENDAL ACTING) SAGO

LIMA INFO DIRECTOR

1 MAY 69 IN 48858

REDTOP AEKICK

REFS: A. LIMA 4603 (IN 46110)

B. SANTIAGO 9164 (IN 47992)

1. BELIEVE SUBJECT REF A IS GUILLERMO RAVEST SANTIS, POLITICAL EDITOR PCCH DAILY "EL SIGLO". 30 APRIL "EL SIGLO" REPORTED RAVEST IN LIMA COVERING IPC SITUATION.

2. INDEX: RAVEST.

3. FILE: 58-8-1.

S E C R E T

201-132139

1 May 69

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581

S E C R E T 301742Z APR 69 CITE SANTIAGO 9164 (DIFFENDAL ACTING)

SAGO 30 APR 69 IN 47992

LIMA INFO DIRECTOR

REDTOP AEKICK

REF: LIMA 4608 (IN 46110)

1. PLEASE CHECK AND RETRANSMIT NAME OF CHILEAN JOURNALIST. NO TRACES ON GILLERMO RAVOSL S. RAVOSL.

2. FILE: 58-8-1.

S E C R E T

AN PRP
IP X

Leonov 201
Leonov, Nikolay Sergeevich
201-132139
30 Apr 69

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INFO. FILE, VR, RI/AN, WH-8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI-2

496

S E C R E T 291859Z APR 69 CITE LIMA 4608

29 APR 69 IN 47110

DIRECTOR, SANTIAGO

REDTOP AEKICK

1. ON 20 APRIL FOLLOWING ARRIVED LIMA FROM SANTIAGO VIA LAN NO 4251:

A. LEV NOVIKOV, PASSPORT NO. 062220

B. VICTOR CHRAGQUINE, PASSPORT NO. C-159754, JOURNALIST

C. VILLY GOREMIKINE, PASSPORT NO. C-139862, JOURNALIST

ALL THREE STAYING HOTEL SAVOY, NOVIKOV ROOM 623 AND OTHER TWO ROOM 614. REQUEST TRACES ON B AND C ABOVE.

2. REQUEST TRACES ON CHILEAN JOURNALIST, ~~GILLERMO RAVOSL~~ S. RAVOSL OCCUPIES ROOM 523 AT HOTEL SAVOY AND HAS BEEN OBSERVED IN CONTACT WITH B AND C ABOVE AS WELL AS NIKOLAI LEONOV (201-132139) NOVOSTY REP FROM MOSCOW AND KNOWN KGB WHO OCCUPIES ADJOINING ROOM 525 OF SAVOY.

Guillermo RAVEST Santis, political editor Pech daily "El Siglo" No 201 ✓

3. FILE : 58-8-1

S E C R E T

PRP

X

Leonov ✓
201-132139
29 Apr 69

SECRET

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299

S E C R E T 252043Z APR 69 CITE LIMA 4575

25 APR 69 IN 44867

DIRECTOR INFO BOGOTA

REDTOP AEKICK

REF: A. BOGOTA 2047 (IN 41592)

B. DIRECTOR 91987

NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH

1. LEONOV ARRIVED LIMA FROM BOGOTA VIA APSA FLIGHT 61 ON 23 APRIL. ACCORDING DUHIKE SURVEILLANCE, LEONOV MET BY DULAUREL-1 AND FAMILY, RICARDO TELLO NEYRA AND WIFE BEATRICE AND ONE UNIDENTIFIED SUBJECT. LEONOV TAKEN TO HOTEL SAVOY WHERE CHECKED INTO ROOM 525. EARLY AFTERNOON OF 23RD LEONOV WITH ABOVE PERSONS WENT TO DULAUREL-1 HOME WHERE REMAINED UNTIL EARLY EVENING. LEONOV LEFT DULARUEL-1'S HOME IN COMPANY ALL ABOVE PERSONS, TOOK DRIVE ALONG OCEAN AND HAD DINNER BEFORE BEING DROPPED OFF AT SAVOY WITH THE UNIDENTIFIED SUBJECT.

2. MORNING OF 24 APRIL VISITED FOREIGN MINISTRY WITH DULAUREL-1 AND HUSBAND AND MET ABOVE UNIDENTIFIED SUBJECT AT FOREIGN MINISTRY. DURING AFTERNOON OF 24TH AND MORNING OF 25TH, LEONOV OBSERVED WITH ABOVE UNIDENTIFIED SUBJECT AND ON SEPARATE OCCASSIONS WITH GUSTAVO VALCARCEL AND RAUL ACOSTA SALAS.

3. ACCORDING TO DULINDEN-8, DULAUREL-1 INSTRUCTED HIM NOT GO TO AIRPORT TO MEET NEW VISITOR AS NO PHOTOS TO BE TAKEN OF

25 APR 69

201-132139

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FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 LIMA 4575 S E C R E T

HIM.

4. DUHIKES HAVE DETECTED POLICE SURVEILLANCE OF LEONOV AT HOTEL AND AREA OF FOREIGN MINISTRY. POLICE SURVEILLANCE APPEARS BE VERY CLOSE. STATION WILL ATTEMPT CONTINUE UNILATERAL COVERAGE TO EXTENT POSSIBLE BUT POLICE ACTIVITY WILL NECESSARILY LIMIT STATION EFFORT.

5. FILE: 201-132139, 201-758184, 201-845308, 201-026294, 201-054508

S E C R E T

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279

S E C R E T 241715Z APR 69 CITE BOGOTA 2075 (BOGO)

25 APR 69 IN 44613

LIMA INFO DIRECTOR

REDTOP AEKICK

REFS A) BOGOTA 2047 (IN 41592)

B) DIRECTOR 95945

1. DUE INDICATIONS FROM GIWREN BELIEVE IT POSSIBLE NIKOLAY SEREYEVICH LEONOV (201-132139) TRASITED BOGOTA 23 APRIL. UNFORTUNATELY COLOMBIAN AUTHORITIES DO NOT KEEP RECORDS OF PASSENGERS IN TRANSIT. CAN LIMA CONFIRM LEONOV'S ARRIVAL THERE?

2. FILE: 201-132139.

S E C R E T

AN ms
AB
FI

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25 APR 69
201-132139

ORIG: P. EARNEST
UNIT: SB/X/WH
EXT: 6412 1315
DATE: 23 APRIL 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 25

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24 23 28Z APR 69

CITE DIRECTOR 95945

TO BOGOTA INFO LIMA

REDTOP ALKICK

BOGOTA 2047 (IN 41592)*

1. APPRECIATE REFERENCE NOTIFICATION. TRACES ALREADY FORWARDED LIMA ON BASIS PREVIOUS INFORMATION ABOUT LEONOV TRAVEL.

2. FILE: 201-132139.

END OF MESSAGE

*Reference reported information acquired from Teltap that known KGB Officer LEONOV, who implicated in "PACHON Case", traveling to Lima.

C/SB/X/WH L. [signature]

SB/BIO [signature]

SB/CI/O J Walters

WH/3/C Calvin M. Smith

C/WH/3/P [signature]

AF MS
AB X
IP
EX
FI

[signature]
WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WHD

SB/XO C T Malton

24 APR 69
201-132139

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006

S E C R E T 221517Z APR 69 CITE BOGOTA 2047

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, LIMA

REDTOP

MICROFILMED MAY 2 1969

22 APR 69 IN 41592

1. GIWREN REPORTED JOSE ARIZALA POSSO (201-815588) CHIEF NOVOSTI OFFICE BOGOTA AND MEMBER COMMUNIST PARTY OF COLOMBIA, REQUESTED INFORMATION FROM PROSPERO MORALES, PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SECRETARY, CONCERNING LEGALITY OF SOVIET CITIZEN NICOLAY LEONOV ENTERING COLOMBIA ON TOURIST CARD. ARIZALA STATED HE HAD RECEIVED A CABLE INFORMING HIM LEONOV WOULD ARRIVE BOGOTA 22 APRIL ON AVIANCA FLIGHT 71 FROM PARIS AND WOULD TRAVEL TO LIMA ON 23 APRIL. ARIZALA ADDED LEONOV WAS AN IMPORTANT MEMBER OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO BUT HAD NOW GIVEN UP HIS DIPLOMATIC CARREER AND IS A MEMBER OF THE APN "TEAM". MORALES LATER TOLD ARIZALA THAT HE HAD LEARNED FROM DAS THAT LEONOV COULD ENTER COLOMBIA ON A TOURIST CARD.

CIT COLOMBIA
PRESC COLOMBIA, BOGOTA
CONTACTED BY JOSE ARIZALA POSSO /201-815588
RE SOVIET ENTERING COLOMBIA

2. BELIEVE SUBJECT IS NIKOLAY SEREYEVICH LEONOV (201-132139) WHO ONCE STATIONED MEXICO CITY AS SOVIET EMBASSY PRESS ATTACHE AND KNOWN RIS. SUGGEST HQS TRACES TO LIMA SOONEST.

CS COPY

22 APR 69 Leonov
201-132139

SECRET

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PAGE 2 APR 69 CITE BOGOTA 2047 S E C R E T

3. FILE: 201-132139 AND 201-815588. INDEX MORALES.

S E C R E T

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Lima

INFO.

FROM: Chief, SB via Chief, WH

SUBJECT: REDTOP AEKICK
Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: DIRECTOR 92246, 13 April 1969

As promised in Reference, there are attached hereto two of the latest and best photographs available of Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV. The date of the photographs is sometime in 1964.

Norma W. LETCHWORTH

Attachment: H/W
Photographs H/W

Distribution:
3-COS, Lima

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HPLW 5283	15 APR 1969 / 14 APRIL 1969
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SB/CI/O	14.4.69	[signature]
WH/3/P	14 Apr 69	[signature]

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C/WH/3	14 Apr	[signature]

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ORIG: LEE G. MESTRES
UNIT: C/SB/X/WH
EXT: 6412/1515
DATE: 12 APRIL 1969

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SECRET

13 01 30Z APR 69

CITE DIRECTOR 92246

TO PRIORITY LIMA ROUTINE MEXICO CITY

REDTOP AEKICK

REFERENCE: LIMA 4446 (IN 34730)*

1. LEONOV DPOB AUGUST 1928, RYAZAN OBLAST. SUBJECT IS 170 CENTIMETERS TALL, SLENDER BUILD, BLOND HAIR, BLUE EYES. LEONOV IS VERY ATHLETIC AND HIS GENERAL FACIAL FEATURES AND BUILD ARE THOSE OF RICHARD WIDMARK, STEVE MCQUEEN, AND ALLAN LADD. HIS SPANISH IS FLUENT. HIS APPEARANCE IS NORDIC. OCCASIONALLY HIS LONG BLOND HAIR IS WORN IN CREW CUT STYLE.

2. LEONOV WILL BE SURVEILLANCE CONSCIOUS AND IS ADEPT IN COUNTERMEASURES.

3. POUCHING PHOTOGRAPHS PRIORITY WEEK 14 APRIL.

END OF MESSAGE

*HQS COMMENT: STATION REQUESTED PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AND PHOTOS PRIORITY TO FACILITATE SURVEILLANCE.

CSDO NOTE: TYPED AND RELEASED BY DIRECTION OF JOHN HORTON, DC/WH.

13 APR 69
201-132139

C/WH/3 AL SPERA (TELECOORD)

CORNELIUS MCCAULEY
CSDO
RELEASING OFFICER

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PRECEDENCE

SECRET 122205Z APR 69 CITE LIMA 4446

12 APR 69
IN-34730

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY

REDIOP AEKICK

REF DIRECTOR 91937 (NOT SENT MEXICO CITY)

1. IN ORDER FACILITATE SURVIELLANCE KGB OFFICER, NOKOLAY SERGEYVICH LEONOV (201-132139) REQUEST DETAILED PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION BY CABLE AND PHOTOS BY POUCH.

2. FILE: 201-132139.

SECRET

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12 APR 69
201-132139

14-00000

DIANA DAVIS
SB/X/WH
6412 1315
11 APR 69

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(classification) SECRET (date and time filed) 11 23 22 Z APR 69 (elite) (reference number) (pica) CITE DIRECTOR 91987

PRIORITY LIMA

REDTOP AEKICK

1. ACCORDING TO SENSITIVE HEADQUARTERS SOURCE, FRENCH DOUBLE ENTRY TRANSIT VISA GRANTED TO NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV WHO PLANS TRAVEL TO PERU DEPARTING MOSCOW 10 APRIL.

2. LEONOV IS SUBJECT OF 201-132139. HE WAS PREVIOUSLY PCS IN MEXICO FROM 1953 TO 1956 AS INTERPRETER AND AMBASSASDOR'S SECRETARY AND FROM 1961 TO 22 DECEMBER 1968 AS SECOND SECRETARY AND PRESS ATTACHE. LEONOV IS KNOWN KGB AND HIGHLY EXPERIENCED OFFICER. HE WOULD BE WORTHY OF DISCREET UNILATERAL SURVEILLANCE (IF IT DETERMINED PERUVIANS NOT FOLLOWING HIM.) IT QUITE ~~PROBABLE~~ POSSIBLE THAT LEONOV IS NOVOSTI CHIEF TO WHOM DULINDEN-8 WAS REFERRING.

3. FILE 201-132139.

END OF MESSAGE

SB/X/WH L. MESTRES
SB/CI/O F. Walters
WH/3/P C. L. Conelly
C/WH/3 Specia

11 APR 69
201-132139

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WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
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L. MESTRES
SB/XO
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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TO: Chief, SB Division

INFO.: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: REDTOP/AEKICK
Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. LEONOV, his wife, Valeriya Ivanovna, and Daughter, Irina Nikolayevna, departed Mexico PCS on 22 December 1968. They travelled on Sabena Flight 556 with destination Moscow via Brussels. Upon his PCS departure, LEONOV completed seven and one half consecutive years on his second tour in Mexico.

2. LIFEAT and LIENVOY have reported that Svyatoslav Fedorovich KUZNETSOV (201-087222) is replacing Subject as the Soviet Press Attache. LEONOV held the title of Second Secretary. KUZNETSOV is a First Secretary.

3. Travelling with the LEONOV family on the same flight was Petr Fedotovich GORELOV (201-265458).

for Willard C. CURTIS

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-36147	31 December 1968
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-132139

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DISPATCH

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TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.: Chief, SB Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: POA and Trace Request

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: (A) HMMW-15480, 4 May 1967

(B) MEXICO CITY 7743, 22 October 1968

1. We would appreciate receiving Headquarters traces on Identity, subsequent to the negative results per ref. (A), and a POA for contact and assessment. We are considering Identity as a possible access agent in the REDTOP field, specifically against Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139), known KGB, and his eventual replacement.

2. As Headquarters is aware, the Station maintains an active interest in LEONOV. Per ref. (B), he has been a principal contact and source of both funds and documents for Guatemalans travelling to the USSR and for Central American exiles, and he has also been linked repeatedly and prominently with the support activity provided to Latin American Communist parties.

3. Although LEONOV may depart before Identity can be used effectively against him, we feel certain that his replacement will be engaged in similar extra-Press Office activities of prime interest to us.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Identity Sheet, under separate cover

Distribution:
2 - C/WH, w/att. CS Copy in 201-842977
2 - C/SB, w/att.

Leonov

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201-132139

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-35828	14 November 1968
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-

Separate Cover Attachment:

HMMA-35828, 14 November 68

IDENTITY SHEET

Identity: Rolando CABALLERO Pedraza (201-).

He has been an employee-messenger of the Soviet Press Office in Mexico City for several years. To supplement his salary, he took a job in November, 1966, as a salesman for Searle de Mexico, S.A., a pharmaceutical firm. Although he was considering resigning from the Press Office in May, 1968, to work for a higher salary in a detergent factory, he was still working in the Press Office as of September, 1968. As of July, 1966, he was married to Celia SILVA de Caballero and had two young daughters. He has several paramours, at least one of whom he has met regularly since 1966.

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DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
201-132139
SEX M DOB ?

201-770128
HMMA-35797
08 NOV 68
P2

CIT ?
OCC ?
LEONOV 15-23-04 SOV PRESS ATTACHE HIS
HOME AND OFFICE PHONE NO /KNOWN KGB/
MENTIONED IN DOC RE SILANTYEV, V. I.
/201-770128/

R 6811290831

FILE IN 201-132139

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

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CITE TDCSDB-315/03882-68

DIST 24 OCTOBER 1968

COUNTRY GUATEMALA/MEXICO/USSR 21 36Z OCT 68

DOI 18 OCTOBER 1968

21 21 35Z OCT 68

SUBJECT IDENTITY OF SOVIET DIPLOMAT IN MEXICO CITY WHO SERVES AS INTERMEDIARY FOR GUATEMALANS IN TRANSIT TO THE USSR

ACQ GUATEMALA, GUATEMALA CITY (22 OCTOBER 1968) FIELD NO.

SOURCE A MEMBER OF THE GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PGT) WHO RECENTLY TRAVELLED TO MEXICO. HE HAS BEEN A RELIABLE REPORTER IN THE PAST. HE RECEIVED THIS INFORMATION FROM A PGT TRAVELLER WHO TRANSITED MEXICO EN ROUTE TO THE USSR.

TO STATE: NO DISTRIBUTION EXCEPT TO THOMAS L. HUGHES
TO DIA : EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARROLL
TO NMCC/MC: EXCLUSIVE FOR ARMY ACSI, GENERAL MCCHRISTIAN;
NAVY ACNO (INTEL), ADMIRAL HARLFINGER;
AIR FORCE AFCIN, GENERAL THOMAS
TO NSA : EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARTER
TO FBI : FOR MR. S. J. PAPICH

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1

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(classification) (dissem controls)

1. NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV, SOVIET PRESS ATTACHE IN MEXICO CITY, IS THE CONTACT MAN FOR GUATEMALANS IN TRANSIT FOR THE USSR. JOSE LUIS BALCARCEL ORDONEZ AND JOSE ALBERTO CARDOZA AGUILAR, EXILED MEMBERS OF THE GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PGT) IN MEXICO CITY, SERVE AS LIAISON BETWEEN PGT TRAVELLERS AND LEONOV.

2. IF TRAVELLERS NEED TO CONTACT LEONOV ONLY TO FIRM UP TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS, THEY ARE GIVEN AN IDENTIFICATION CARD BY BALCARCEL OR CARDOZA AND DROPPED OFF NEAR LEONOV'S OFFICE TO VISIT HIM ALONE. WHEN AN EXCHANGE OF MONEY OR DOCUMENTS IS INVOLVED, BALCARCEL OR CARDOZA GO TO LEONOV'S OFFICE WITH THE TRAVELLER. (SOURCE COMMENT: LATELY BALCARCEL'S WIFE HAS BEEN MAKING MOST OF THE CONTACTS WITH LEONOV AS AN ADDED SECURITY MEASURE.) LEONOV'S MOST RECENT CONTACT WITH GUATEMALANS WAS TO ARRANGE ONWARD TRAVEL FOR SIX PGT MEMBERS ENROUTE TO PARTY SCHOOLS IN MOSCOW. HE GAVE EACH ONE U.S.$600.00. (FIELD COMMENT: SEE HGG-4853, CS-311/09285-68 FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THIS TRAVEL.)

3. LEONOV IS SOON TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM MEXICO CITY, BUT HIS REPLACEMENT WILL CONTINUE TO CARRY ON CONTACT WITH THE GUATEMALANS. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: LEONOV IS A KNOWN KGB OFFICER WHO HAS BEEN IN

5
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1

MEXICO SINCE 1961.) (SOURCE COMMENT: IT WOULD APPEAR AS IF LEONOV ALSO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR CONTACTS WITH OTHER CENTRAL AMERICANS.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: NONE.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE DOCUMENT
DATE: 23 OCTOBER 1968
CLASSIFICATION: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE FILE NUMBER: 24962-601
SUBJECT: ENCOUNTER WITH SOVIET NATIONAL

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S E C R E T 230031Z OCT 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY GUAT 9611

IN 18707

23 OCT 68

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

REDCOAT MHIGLOO

REF: MEXICO CITY 7743 (IN 18668)

1. STATION GUATEMALA CITY MOST INTERESTED IN REF INFORMATION, ESPECIALLY EXILE INVOLVEMENT IN PGT FUNDING CHANNEL, AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE INFO DISSEMINATED, PROVIDED, OF COURSE, ADEQUATE PROTECTION CAN BE GIVEN LIREBEL-2.

2. IT SUGGESTED THAT NOTIONAL BYLINE (I.E., MEMBER OF PGT WHO TRAVELLED TO MEXICO CITY AND RECEIVED INFO FROM BALCARCEL)) AND FULL CONTROLS ON REPORT MAY PROVIDE NEEDED SOURCE PROTECTION. REQUEST ADDRESSEES' COMMENTS.

3. NO INDEX. FILE 201-132139.

S E C R E T

MICROFILMED NOV 13 1968 DOC. MICRO. SER.

AN / PS / EX / I/SND / FI

201-132139

CS COPY

SECRET

23 OCT 68

50-9-11

B 201-132139

14-00000

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ACTION WH-8 ☐ RID COPY	INFO FILE, VR. SB-8, RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2	
#759	FI-2, DDP, AddP	

S E C R E T 222220Z OCT 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 7743

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

REDCOAT MHIGLOO 22OCT68 IN 18668

1. AT HOME OF JORGE ALBERTO CARDOZA AGUILAR EVENING 18 OCT 68, LIREBEL-2 RECEIVED FOLLOWING INFO DIRECTLY FROM CARDOZA.

2. JOSE LUIS BALCARCEL ORDONEZ AND JORGE ALBERTO CARDOZA AGUILAR ARE GUATEMALAN COMMUNISTS IN MEXICO WHO HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH SOVIETS IN MEXICO TO HANDLE TRAVEL OF GUATEMALANS TO SOVIET UNION AND FOR RECEIPT OF MONEY FROM SOVIETS. THEIR CONTACT IS NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV (201-132139), PRESS ATTACHE WHO LIVES AT MAZATLAN 206 (PRESS OFFICE).

3. IF CONTACT REQUIRED FOR GUATEMALAN TRAVELLERS TO SOVIET UNION, BALCARCEL OR CARDOZA TAKE TRAVELLERS NEAR PRESS OFFICE IN CAR AND THEN GIVE THEM IDENTIFICATION CARD TO PRESENT TO LEONOVM THEY THEN VISIT OFFICE ALONE. IF CONTACT FOR RECEIPT OF MONEY OR EXCHANGE OF DOCUMENTS, BALCARCEL OR CARDOZA GO DIRECTLY TO PRESS OFFICE. LATELY, WIFE OF BALCARCEL HAS HAD MOST CONTACT WITH LEONOV AS EXTRA PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE.

4. ACCORDING CARDOZA, LEONOV TO BE TRANSFERRED SOON AND

201-132139
Leonov

SECRET

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ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE VR.

HIS REPLACEMENT WILL CARRY ON CONTACT WITH GUATEMALANS.
CARDOZA SAID HE BELIEVES LEONOV PROBABLY CONTACT FOR ALL CENTRAL
AMERICAN EXILES BUT HE NOT POSITIVE OF THIS. MOST RECENT
CONTACT WAS TO ARRANGE TRAVEL FOR SIX GUATEMALANS WHO TO
ATTEND CONSOMOL SCHOOL IN SOVIET UNION (SEE MEXICO CITY 7575).
EACH GIVEN 600 DOLLARS FOR TRIP.

5. LEONOV IS KNOWN KGB OFFICER WHO HAS BEEN MAKING
PLANS FOR TRANSFER AFTER BEING IN MEXICO SINCE 1961.

6. DUE SENSITIVITY OF SOURCE, REQUEST ABOVE INFO BE LIMITED
TO WOFIRM ONLY AND NO DISSEMINATION.

7. NO INDEX. FILE 50-6-141/4, 35-4-100 AND 201-132139.

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, SB via Chief, WH Division
REDTOP AEKICK
Vladimir Ivanovich Silantyev (201-770128)

Reference: Mexico City 6054 (IN 39568)

Forwarded under separate cover is a LNERGO report concerning Subject. Persons mentioned by surname on page six of the report are identified at Headquarters as the subjects of 201-205304, 201-132139, 201-763035 and 201-285412 respectively. Can the Station identify any of the other persons mentioned on pages five and six?

Ambrose T. RIBARICH

Attachment:
as stated u/s/c

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City
w/attachments
u/s/c

24 OCT 1968

201-132139, 201-205304, 201-763035, 201-285412

HMMW-16779

16 October 1968

SECRET

201-770128

Internal Dist:
1 - 201-770128
1 - 201-205304
1 - 201-132139
1 - 201-763035
1 - 201-285412
1 - SB/X/WH
1 - SB/CI/K
1 - C/WH/1

SB/CI/K F. Walters rah 6991

C/SB/CI

SB/X/WH

C/WH/1

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ACTION SB8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, WH8, FI 2, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

ACTION COPY

S E C R E T 262320Z SEP 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 7359 26 SEP 68 IN 00477

DIRECTOR, INFO SAN JOSE

REDTOP

REF: A. SAN JOSE 0480 (IN 98375)

B. MEXICO CITY 7301 (IN 98545)

1. LIFEAT REPORTED KAREN ARMENOVICH KACHATUROV ARRIVED MEXICO 22 SEPTEMBER. WAS MET BY NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV, SOVIET PRESS ATTACHE.

2. FILE HEADQUARTERS 201.

SECRET

Leonov 201 file

SECRET

201-132139

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ACTION #765 WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. RI/AN, SD 8, CA 5, CA/PROP, EUR 6, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 281920Z AUG 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 6949

RIO DE JANEIRO, RECIFE INFO DIRECTOR

REDCOAT

28 Aug 68 IN 80609

REF: RECIFE 4670 (IN 79641)

1. ACCORDING LIENVOY 24 AUG 68, FRANCSICO JULIAO DE PAULA CONTACTED NICOLAY LEONOV THAT DATE AND REAFFIRMED HIS SOLIDARITY WITH THE SOVIETS IN REFERENCE TO THE CZECH SITUATIONS. HE THEN MENTIONED BOOK H E JUST FINISHED WHICH SHOULD BE PUBLISED END SEPTEMBER. HE HAS A COPY IN FRENCH WHICH HE WANTS TO GIVE TO LEONOV. BOOK IS TO BE PUBLISHED IN MEXICO, FRANCE, ITALY, GERMANY, SWEDEN. LEONOV MIGHT BE ABLE TO HAVE IT PUBLISHED IN SOVIET UNION.

2. PER REQUEST PARA THREE REF, STATION ATTEMPTING OBTAIN ADDITIONAL INFO ON BOOK. WILL ADVISE.

3. ABOVE MAY BE PASSED CONGEN.

S E C R E T

BT

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201-132139

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ACTION WH8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, SBP, CAS, CA/PROP, FI 2, 415, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CA/PEG, DDP, ADDP, CSDO

S E C R E T 240016Z AUG 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 6885

PRIORITY RIO DE JANEIRO INFO ROUTINE DIRECTOR 24 Aug 68 IN 77213

REDCOAT

1. ACCORDING LIENVOY 22 AUG 68, FRANCISCO JULIAO DE PAULA CONTACTED NICOLAY LEONOV, SOVIET PRESS ATTACHE IN MEXICO, AND KGB AND DECLARED HIS SOLIDARITY WITH THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO AND WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT (APPARENTLY REFERRING TO CZECH SITUATION).

2. STATION PLANS INCLUDE THIS IN ROUNDUP OF LOCAL REACTIONS TO INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA BY THE SOVIET UNION.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

201-132139

2P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: X MARKED FOR INDEXING

TO: Chief, SB

INFO: Chief, WH

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: REDTOP DIZTAG: Unconfirmed Report of Travel to Mexico of Oldrich NOVICKY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. It was first reported by the LITEMPO airport personnel (according to their list of passports photographed by them at the airport) that Oldrich NOVICKY was among the passengers arriving in Mexico from Havana on 7 June 1968, at 0958 hours. According to the LITEMPO list, he was the only Czech on the CUBANA flight.

2. However, the CUBANA manifest did not list NOVICKY's name; the only Czech on the manifest was: F manifest bio data

Frantisek PROCHAZKA CIT: CSR

OCC Diplomatic Courier

Diplomatic Passport No. 3076 ΔCSR

Therefore, the LITEMPO film, accompanying the list, was checked carefully, and it was found that the only Czech passport actually photographed by LITEMPO was that of PROCHAZKA, (even though his name was not on their list).

3. The LIFIRE team was then queried (and showed a photograph of NOVICKY), and they responded that the only Czech they

.......continued

Distribution:
2 - C/SB
2 - C/WH

CS COPY

201-257691

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
200-8-34	HMMA-35196	7 August 1968
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-257691

201-132139

recalled seeing arrive on the CUBANA flight was the courier PROCHAZKA; they could not recall having seen NOVICKY. LIENVOY reports during this period gave no indications of NOVICKY's presence here. LIHABIT-1 also reported that NOVICKY was not seen in the vicinity of the Czech Embassy.

4. Nevertheless, there are several mystifying aspects to the LITEMPO report. It is quite incredible that the LITEMPO airport team would know NOVICKY's name, and equally incredible that they could confuse this name with that of PROCHAZKA. They listed NOVICKY's full name, correctly spelled. Where then, if NOVICKY had not actually arrived, did they get his name?

5. Secondly, it is most unusual, and the only instance the Station can recall, for only one courier to make the trip to Mexico. They have always traveled here in pairs. (NOTE: It has been the case recently, however, for the couriers to travel to Mexico via Cuba and leave via Cuba, instead of traveling via Air France through New York, then to Havana, return to Mexico and depart Mexico via Air France again.) Further, PROCHAZKA's name is not on the list of known career couriers or audio technicians and sweepers of Book Dispatch 6423, dated 21 June 1968. A further curious departure from normal procedure was that according to LIENVOY (7 and 8 June 1968) reports, the courier PROCHAZKA did not stay at the Czech schoolhouse but at the Ambassador's residence. Per LIENVOY, and confirmed on the CUBANA manifest, PROCHAZKA departed Mexico on 10 June 1968, for Havana.

6. Finally, but quite possibly purely coincidental, there were two references to NOVICKY about the same time as his reported arrival. In one of the DISPERSE tapes, #351, in mid-June 1968, Oldrich STANCL (201-777862), in a rambling, slightly drunken speech, refers to one IYKA NOVICKY, as "his brother" (presumably referring to Oldrich NOVICKY). Another even more oblique reference, but again intriguing because of the timing was a reference in a LIFEAT report dated 7 June 1968; a local leftist journalist, Jorge ROSALES Natividad in a conversation with Nikolai LEONOV (201-132139), the Soviet Press Officer, sometime before 1120 hours, said that he "had asked NOVICKI for an opinion on SIEMPRE" (a Mexican magazine). There was no further explanation of who "NOVICKI" was, but Station records indicate ROSALES Natividad had been a regular contact of Oldrich NOVICKY, during the latter's tour here as Press Attache of the Czech Embassy. Just prior to this reference to "NOVICKI", ROSALES had been talking to LEONOV about having gotten a lot of material from Cuba (for an article about Che GUEVARA). Does Headquarters have any information about a possible trip or assignment for NOVICKY in Cuba?

7. In summary, the Station does not know exactly how, or why, NOVICKY, a Czech intelligence officer, might have entered Mexico clandestinely, but believes it was possible.

[signature]
for/Willard C. CURTIS

201-257691

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INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, CA 5

S E C R E T 020057Z JUL 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 6103

DIRECTOR 2 JUL 68 IN 41948

REDTOP

1. FERNINAND ROBERTOVICH GINNO (201-256876) ARRIVED MEXICO CITY 25 JUNE ON SABENA FLT 555. GINNO ACCOMPANIED BY NINE SOVIETS, WHO PER MAY 68 LICOZY-5 REPORT ARE HERE TO ATTEND THIRD INTERNATIONAL ENDOCRINOLOGY CONGRESS BEING HELD MEXICO.

2. LIENVOY REPORTED GINNO CALLED OLD FRIEND, NIKOLAY S. LEONOV (201-132139) ON 26 JUNE. TOLD LEONOV HE TRAVELLING TO LEON, GUANAJUATO ON 27 JUNE TO RETURN 5 JULY. WANTED TO GIVE SOMETHING TO LEONOV. GINNO ADDED THAT GROUP WILL DEPART MEXICO 7 JULY.

S E C R E T

BT

CS filed 201-726604 (GINNO)

SECRET

201-132139

14-00000

ORIG: ROBERT BUCKMAN
UNIT: WH/3/C
EXT: 7271
DATE: 18 JUNE 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 32

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18 22 31 z JUN 68 CITE DIRECTOR 09166

TO PRIORITY BOGOTA INFO MEXICO CITY, CARACAS

REDTOP AEASSAULT

REFS: A) BOGOTA 0123 (IN 32576)* NOT SENT CARACAS

B) DIRECTOR 04579** NOT SENT CARACAS

C) BOGOTA 0127 (IN 32609)*** NOT SENT MEXICO CITY

1. UPON RECONSIDERATION HQS FEELS THAT IT WOULD BE INADVISABLE IN TERMS OF GREATEST IMPACT TO SURFACE LEONOV CONNECTION WITHOUT PEG OF MAZATLAN ADDRESS. WITHOUT ADDRESS CONNECTION WOULD AT BEST BE TENUOUS.

2. IN VIEW REPERCUSSIONS FROM REF C LEAK CONSIDER IT INADVISABLE FOR TIME BEING TO CONTINUE EXPLOITATION ANY ASPECT PACHON CASE IN CARACAS.

3. FOR BOGOTA: PER REF C, HQS APPRECIATIVE NEED OF KEEPING EXPLOITATION UNATTRIBUTABLE AND KEEPING PRES. LLERAS' NAME OUT OF IT. WILL CABLE ALL STATIONS TO ONLY REPLAY MATERIALS WHICH CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO OVERT COLOMBIAN SOURCES.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/1 Ernest J. [signature]

COORD: SB/O/WH Jim Noland (telecord)

WH/3/V Keith Gardiner (draft)

WH/CA [illegible]

201-132139

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PAGE 2

CITE DIRECTOR 09166

TO

WH Comments: *Station will continue to attempt placement of Leonov's connection in case in Bogota press
**Advised Station Bogota of pitfalls of surfacing Leonov connection without Mazatlan address, but deferred to Station's judgment.
*** Leak of case in Caracas newspaper. Information sourced to "a high official of American Intelligence Service."

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chiefs of Station, Bogota and Mexico City

INFO.

FROM: Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: AEASSAULT/Forwarding of Photographs on Nikolay Sereyevich LEONOV (201-132139)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: DIRECTOR 08247

Forwarded herewith, for Bogota and Mexico, are seven photos of LEONOV.

James M. BEGLINGER

MICROFILMED JUL 2 1968 DOC. MICRO. SER.

Attachments: NO
Photos, h/w, for Bogota
Photos, h/w, for Mexico
~~Negatives, h/w, for Mexico~~

Distribution:
2 - Bogota
2 - Mexico City

201-132139

20 JUN 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
D-17-4-135 CS COPY	HLBW-5907	17 June 1968
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-132139

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1 - Chrono

FILES — ABSTRACT — INDEX

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WH/3/C	L. Therry	sh	7271

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
SB/O/WH		(in draft)
C/WH/1	17/6/68	Walter J. Kaufman

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	17 June 68	Alfonso Spera

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG. 1-66

DISPATCH

14-00000

TO: Mr. Scott

FROM: Deputy Chief of Mission

By hand please

11/7

Ambassador Freeman
told me on 24 June that
he used this for full dis-
cussion with Foreign
Minister Antonio Carrillo
Flores on 22 June 1968

14-00000

SECRET

17 June 1968

Reviewed with ACP 6/22/68

MEMORANDUM TO : THE AMBASSADOR

FROM : Winston M. Scott

SUBJECT : Soviet Participation in Colombian Subversive Activities

Returned 24 June 68

1. On the morning of 16 April 1968 our surveillance of Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV, Soviet Press Attache and Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, who is a known KGB officer, determined that he had a clandestine meeting with a Latin American male. LEONOV passed a small bundle to this individual. We followed the Latin American to the Hotel Principal, Bolivar 29. Checks at the hotel revealed that he was registered at the hotel as Feliciano PACHON Chaconta, a Colombian citizen, and that a woman, Librada MORENO Leal, also a Colombian citizen, was registered in the same room with him. Airline checks revealed that PACHON arrived in Mexico City on 6 April 1968 and that MORENO arrived on 12 April 1968. Both came from Bogota. Checks with our representatives in Bogota showed that they were both important members of the (PCC) Communist Party of Colombia. Further checks revealed that PACHON and MORENO had air reservations for 20 April 1968 to return to Bogota on separate airlines. Our surveillance confirmed their departure from Mexico City on 20 April 1968 on separate flights.

2. We informed our representatives in Bogota who informed the Colombian Security Service. Both were picked up upon arrival in Bogota. PACHON was carrying $70,000 (U.S.) and MORENO was carrying $30,000 (U.S.).

3. Both couriers broke and provided considerable information, the most important of which is:

a. Identification of the entire clandestine leadership of the PCC and FARC.

b. FARC: personnel and plans.

GROUP 1
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SECRET

201-132139

c. One courier has made several trips to Mexico to receive money from the Soviets. The largest amount was $200,000 (U.S.) which he got from LEONOV in June 1967. The smallest amount received was $75,000 (U.S.).

d. The address and identification of the PCC clandestine printing press. The Colombians raided this installation and captured the operator plus false documents and passports, forging material, presses, etc. He talked and said that he had received 1 1/2 years of training in the USSR in forgery. All equipment and false passport blanks were supplied by the Soviets.

e. All clandestine support and direction to the PCC and FARC comes from the Soviet Embassy in Mexico. The regular contact is Nikolay S. LEONOV. The chief referent for Communist Party matters in Latin America is Boris Aleksandrovich KAZANTSEV, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

4. This whole affair has been personally very embarrasing to Colombian President LLERAS because he had just agreed to diplomatic relations with the USSR. (The new Soviet Ambassador to Colombia, Nikolay A. BELOUS, presented his credentials on 27 May 1968). LLERAS had already been criticized in the press, when it was learned after BELOUS had been accepted, that BELOUS had been declared Persona Non Grata in Argentina in 1958, for direct involvement in fomenting Communist inspired strikes. (COMMENT: In the official curriculum vitae which the Soviet Foreign Office sent to Colombia on BELOUS, his assignment in Argentina was omitted.) Although LLERAS ordered a forceful prosecution of this matter, he insisted that the blame be put on the Cubans rather than the Soviets in order to avoid personal embarrassment.

5. We have been covering LEONOV thoroughly because he is the principal KGB contact in Mexico for Communist Parties in other Latin American countries. He has been in Mexico for ten (10) years doing very little other than handling Communist Party matters.

6. One of the principal clandestine activities of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico is the support, direction and financing of Latin American Communist parties in those Latin American countries where the Soviets do not have diplomatic representation. The Soviets have diplomatic relations with only six (6) Latin American countries, namely, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay, Argentina and Mexico. Thus, the importance of Mexico in this matter.

12,979

7. Please return this material to Room 521 for filing.

#12,979

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Orig - THE AMBASSADOR
Mr. Scott

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MESSAGE FORM
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INFO: FILE, VR, C/SB5, C/CA3, C/CI, DDP, ADDP, CS/DO

14 15 10z JUN 68

CITE DIRECTOR 08247

TO BOGOTA INFO: MEXICO CITY

RYBAT TYPIC ASSAULT
REF: A. HLBA 10,698

B. MEXICO CITY 5893 (IN 29961)

1. CAN BOGOTA FORWARD ORIGINALS OF REF A LETTERS TO HQS. FOR POSSIBLE SW ANALYSIS?

2. HQS WILL POUCH SEVEN PHOTOS OF LEONOV 17 JUNE TO MEXICO AND BOGOTA. THESE INCLUDE TWO CLOSEUPS OF LEONOV (1964) AND FIVE OTHERS OF LEONOV WITH CASTRO AND KHRUSHCHEV.(1963)

END OF MESSAGE

COORD: SB/0/WH [signature] (by phone)

[signature: Calvin M. Smyth] for
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

[signature]
MAURICE J. GREMILLION
AC/WH/3

201-132139

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ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, CA5, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, DDP, ADDP, SB8, CSDO

S E C R E T 130122Z JUNE '68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5893 (MEXI-5873)

BOGOTA, INFO DIRECTOR

AEASSAULT

Nikolay S.

13 Jun 68 IN 29981

1. PASSPORT AND OTHER PHOTOS OF LEONOV DO NOT APPEAR SUITABLE. AIRMAILING NEGATIVE OF PRESS PHOTO OF LEONOV SCOWLING OVER SHOULDER OF YEVGENIY YEVTUSHENKO. IN PHOTO LEONOV APPEARS TO BE TRYING TO CONTROL YEVTUSHENKO AND LOOKS VERY SINISTER. BELIEVE THIS PHOTO WILL BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE FOR PRESS USE.

2. MEXICO STATION BELIEVES FROM PAST EXPERIENCE THAT ONCE LILISP-E PUBLISHERS ARTICLE REPORTING LEONOV INVOLVEMENT IN COLOMBIA SUBVERSIVE NET CASE, GOM WILL ISSUE ORDERS TO MEXICAN PRESS NOT TO PUBLISH ANY FURTHER ARTICLES ON THIS TOPIC. STATION THEREFORE IS HOLDING OFF ANY FURTHER PUBLICATION OF MATERIAL ON COLOMBIA SUBVERSION UNTIL IT CAN PUBLISH STORY OF LEONOV INVOLVEMENT. ONCE STORY PUBLISHED HERE STATION ASSET SIMONCINI WILL ALERT UPI CONTACT TO STORY IN ATTEMPT TO GET STORY RELAYED ON WIRE SERVICE.

S E C R E T

BT

PS	DEST	SB/C/WH
ABSTRACT	X	INDEX

SECRET

13 June 68
201-132139

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LEONOV, NIKOLAY SEREYEVICH
201-132139 — 017-004-135
SEX M DOB ? — BOGO-00096
11 JUN 68
CIT USSR ?
OCC ?
< MEXICO

HMM — R 6807170475

FILE IN 201-132139

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. — SECRET — (7-46)

14-00000

SECRET
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SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LEONOV, NIKOLAY SEREYEVICH
201-132139
SEX M DOB ?

017-004-135
BOGO-00037
04 JUN 68

CIT USSR
OCC ?
< MEXI
SOV PRESS ATT MECICO CITY

R 6807170479

FILE IN 201-132139

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FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

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BY: D AT: 0145 Z

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PRECEDENCE

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ACTION: WH8 — RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, SB8, WH/COG8, CA5, CA/PROP, CA/PROP, CA/PEG, DDP, ADDP, CI/OO, CI/IC2, CI/OPS

S E C R E T 290050Z MAY 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5719

PRIORITY DIRECTOR PRIORITY BOGOTA

REDCOAT MHSTAWN AEASSAULT

REF: A. BOGOTA 0969 (IN 16602)

B. DIRECTOR 03594

29 MAY 68 IN 20342

1. ON BASIS AVENIDA MAZATLAN NOTATION THAT PACHON WAS CARRYING AND FACT NIKOLAY S. LEONOV (201-132139) LIVES AND HAS OFFICE AT AV. MAZATLAN 206 AND IS KNOWN KGB WHO HAS CLANDESTINELY SUPPORTED CP ACTIVITIES, STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT LEONOV BE IDENTIFIED AS THE SOVIET DIPLOMAT IN REF A WHO GAVE PACHON MONEY IN MEXICO.

2. BY SURFACING ADDRESS BOGOTA CAN TELL PRESS CONTACTS ADDRESS BELONGS TO LEONOV ON WHOM BOGOTA OBTAINED FOLLOWING

TRACES: NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV DOB 22 AUGUST 1928 IS A KGB OFFICER WHO USES THE COVER OF SECOND SECRETARY AND PRESS ATTACHE OF THE SOVEMB IN MEXICO. ALL OF HIS FOREIGN ASSIGNMENTS HAVE BEEN IN MEXICO WHERE HE HAS SERVED A TOTAL OF TEN YEARS STARTING IN 1953. HE IS THE MASTERMIND FOR SOVIET CLANDESTINE SUPPORT, DIRECTION AND FINANCING OF CPS IN LATIN AMERICA.

3. FYI - LEONOV ABOUT TO LEAVE PCS AFTER SEVEN YEARS MEXICO ON CURRENT SERIES OF TOURS. IF BOGOTA CAN SURFACE HIM, MEXICO

action to SB/O/WH — 29 May 68 — 201-132139

SECRET

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BY: JAN 7 8 13 AM '68 Z

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ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE. VR.

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 5719 S E C R E T

CAN PICK UP CONCURRENT WITH HIS DEPARTURE AND SAY HE BEING SENT HOME FOR POOR TRADECRAFT, UPSETTING CURRENT SOVIET DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE IN LA, ETC.

4. REQUEST ADDRESSEES COMMENTS.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 27

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

ORIG: TOM WHITE
UNIT: SB/O/WH
EXT: 6412
DATE: 27 MAY 68

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 3 PER

CONF. SB8 ☒ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO SB/O/WH BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-132139 ✓

INFO: FILE , VR WH8, CA5, CA/PROP, CI/ICZ

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 03613

TO 28 19 01 Z MAY 68

MEXICO CITY INFO BOGOTA

REDTOP

AN MJ FZ	SB/O/WH
ABSTRACT ✓	INDEX

REFS: A. BOGOTA 0978 (IN 18170)

B. DIRECTOR 00038

IN VIEW RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF EVENTS AS REPORTED IN REF A, REQUEST STATION ALSO FORWARD TO BOGOTA PRESS CLIPS REQUESTED IN REF B.

END OF MESSAGE

C/SB/O/WH [signature]

C/WH/1 [signature]

C/WH/3/E [signature]

C/WH/3 [signature]

27 MAY 68 ✓
201-132139

C/WH [signature] DC/SB/AO [signature]

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

 967

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ACTION WH 8 [X] RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. CA 5, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, SB 8, WH/COG 8, SOD 6, FI, FI/INT 2, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 241932Z MAY 68 CITE BOGOTA 0978 (KRUSKALL ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO: CARACAS MEXICO CITY 25 MAY 68 IN 17...

FINAL SECTION OF TWO

MHSPAWN #183

PAGE 6 MAY 68 CITE BOGOTA 0978 S E C R E T (KRUSKALL ACTING)

BY DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN EFFORT TO PUT SOME BACKBONE IN PRESIDING JUDGES.

6. DEFER TO HQS TO FILL IN OTHER STATIONS ON BACKGROUND THIS CASE.

7. SINCE AS PER PARA 4 ABOVE STATION IS AWARE OF POSSIBLE POLITICAL REPERCUSSION WHICH 24 MAY EL TIEMPO ARTICLE MAY PRODUCE ON PRESIDENT, STATION IS KEEPING LNPURE CLOSELY INFORMED ON CASE AND HAS ALERTED REELFOOT AND OTHER STATION SOURCES WITH ACCESS TO PALACE TO KEEP US INFORMED ON LLERAS' REACTIONS.

8. CLIPS BEING SENT KMFORGET.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

201-132139

14-00000

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 47 | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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INDEX YES NO

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FILE RID RET TO BRANCH DESTROY SIG

DISSEM BY 24/21 PER

ACTION WH-8 [X] RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. CA 5, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, SB-8, FI, FI/INT-2, WH/COG-8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, SOD-6

S E C R E T 241932Z MAY 68 CITE BOGOTA 8978 (KRUSKALL ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO: CARACAS MEXICO CITY

SECTION ONE FOR TWO

24 MAY 68 IN 18170

MHSPAWN

REFS: BOGOTA 8969 (IN 16602)

1. FOLLOWING TWO DAYS OF DISTORTED, FUZZY, CONFLICTING ARTICLES APPEARING IN ALL BOGOTA DAILIES CONCERNING ROLL UP OF CLANDESTINE APPARAT OF PCC INCLUDING GRADUAL APPEARANCE OF PACHON AS A FACTOR IN CASE AND INSERTION OF THE UNCOVERING OF VAST LATIN AMERICAN SUBVERSIVE NET INVOLVING COLOMBIA, BOLIVIA, MEXICO, VENEZUELA,, THE 24 MAY EL TIEMPO BROKE OUT WITH FOLLOWING HEADLINE: "LA RED SUBVERSIVA: EN MEXICO ENTREGARON LOS DOLARES A FELICIANO PACHON...ERAN 150,000 Y NO LOS 101,000 QUE LE HALLARON EN BOGOTA - PACHON CHOCONTA ES HERMANO DE 'RAPIDOL', JEFE DE LAS 'FARC', AL SUR DEL CAQUETA. EL CASO DEL VENEZOLANO JOSE MARIA QUERALES MERCHAN. -LA 'AVANZADE CHE GUEVARA' FUE DESEMBARCADA EN VENEZUELA Y EN LAS BOCAS DEL AMAZONAS".

2. ARTICLE GOES ON TO SAY "LA RED SUBVERSIVA DESENMASCARADA EN COLOMBIA ES APENAS PARTE DE UNA INMENSA CONJURA COMMUNISTA CON RAMIFICACIONES EN GRAN PARTE DE AMERICA LATINE...Y EN DESARROLLO DE UNA DE LAS CUALES

SECRET

201-132139

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ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE. VR.

PAGE 2 MAY 68 CITE BOGOTA 8978 S E C R E T (KRUSKALL ACTING)

FUE CONDENADO EL SUJETO FELICIANO PACHON CHOCONTA, A QUIEN AGENTES DEL DAS Y UNO DE INTERPOL DETUVIERON EN ELDORADO, DESPUES DE SEGUIRLO DESDE MEXICO, Y EN SU PODER HALLARON LA NO DESPRECIABLE SUMA DE 101,000 DOLARES GIRADOS CON DESTINO A LOS 'FRENTES REVOLUCIONARIOS DE COLOMBIA' SEGUN FUENTES DIGNAS DE TODO CREDITO, FELICIANO PACHON CHOCONTA CONFESO HABER RECIBIDO LA VALIOSA SUMA EN MEXICO DE MANOS DE UN FUNCIONARIO DE LA EMBAJADA SOVIETICA EN CUBA, Y QUIEN SE TRASLADO A LA CAPITAL AZETECA CON ESTE FIN..."HAY SIN EMBARGO EN ESTE CASO UN DETALLE CURIOSO Y ES QUE, DE ACUERDO CON ALGUNAS INFORMACIONES, FELICIANO RECIBIO DE MANOS DEL DIPLOMATICO LA SUMA DE 150,000 DOLARES. Y EN ELDORADO UNICAMENTE LE HALLARON 101,000. LOS 49,000 RESTANTES DESAPARECIERON 'MISTERIOSAMENTE". ALGUIEN DIJO QUE HABIAN IDO A PARAR A MANOS DE 'LOS TESOREROS DE LA REVOLUCION' AL PARECER EN PANAMA." LOS ABOGADOS DEFENSORES DE FELICIANO PACHON MANIFESTARON AYER PARA UN PERIODICO LOCAL QUE LO OCURRIDO A SU PODER ANTE NADA TIENE QUE VER CON LAS GUERRILLAS Y QUE SIMPLEMENTE 'DON FELICIANO LO QUE ESTABA

SECRET

14-00000

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ACTION [ ] RID COPY

INFO

FILE. VR.

PAGE 3 MAY 68 CITE BOGOTA 6978 S E C R E T (KRUSKALL ACTING)

ERA TRAYENDO DOLARES A PAIS'. PERO RESULTA QUE PACHON CHOCONTA ES HERMANO DE EDUARDO PACHON PRIETO, ALIAS 'RAPIDOL', UNO DE LOS MAS SOBRESALIENTES JEFES 'GUERRILLEROS' DEL GRUPO QUE OPERA AL SUR DEL CAQUETA (FARC) U QUE SIGUE LA LLAMADA 'LINEA DE MOSCU' Y PARA ESTE 'FRENTE' ESTABA DIRIGIDO EL DINERO ENTREGADO POR EL DIPLOMATICO SOVIETICO EN MEXICO, MIENTRAS LOS DOLARES QUE LLEGABAN POR VENEZUELA A TRAVES DE BOLIVIA TAL COMO AYER LO INFORMAMOS EN FORMA EXCLUSIVA, IBAN DIRIGIDOS PARA LOS ALZADOS EN ARMAS EN EL 'ALTO SINU' Y AL NORTE DE SANTANDER ESTABLECIENDOSE ASI UNA FUERTE RELACION ENTRE LOS CASOS DE FELICIANO PACHON Y EL DE LOS ARQUITECTOS CASAS Y TAPIA, QUE A LA VEZ SON APENAS ESLABONES DE LA MISMA CADENA QUE ENVUELVE A VENEZUELA, ECUADOR, PERU, BRASIL, Y BOLIVIA." ARTICLE GOES ON TO TIE RUSSIAN SHIP "KEGOSTROV" INTO TRANSPORTING A GROUP OF "GUERRILLEROS CASTRISTAS...PERTENECIENTES A UNA NUEVA UNIDAD DENOMINADA 'AVANZADA CHE GUEVARA'".

3. STATION THEREFORE HAS MORE THAN ENOUGH AMMUNITION TO KEEP PROP PLOY BOILING ALONG LINES THIS CASE DRAMATIC PROOF

SECRET

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ACTION [ ] RID COPY INFO FILE. VR.

PAGE 4 MAY 68 CITE BOGOTA 0978 S E C R E T (KRUSKALL ACTING)

SOVIETS HAVE NOT ONLY NOT CHANGED THEIR WAYS BUT HAVE NO INTENTION OF DOING SO AND FACT THAT ALSMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH BELOUS ARRIVING IN COLOMBIA, OOZING SWEETNESS AND GOOD FELLOWSHIP, STOUTLY DECLARING SOV GOVERNMENT WOULD NEVER INTERFERE IN INTERNAL COLOMBIAN AFFAIRS AND EMPHAZING THAT NO COUNTRY SHOULD EXPORT REVOLUTION OR COUNTER REVOLUTION, THAT SAME SOV GOVERNMENT WAS SECRETLY PUMPING IN FUNDS, MATERIAL SUPPORT, AND PRPAGANDA MATERIALS FOR SUBVERSIVE USE IN UNDERMINING COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT. TIMING MOST PROPITIOUS AS BELOUS PRESENTING CREDENTIALS AFTERNOON 24 MAY. PROP PLOY WILL ALSO HAVE SLANT THAT RELATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION MIGHT CONCEIVABLY PROVIDE USEFUL ECONOMIC DIVIDENDS BUT COUNTRIES PRESENTLY SO AFFILIATED PLUS THOSE CURRENTLY CONTEMPLATING SUCCUMBING TO SOVIET WOOING BEST BEWARE THAT BEAR BEARING GIFTS SINCE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF SOVIET RELATIONS IS EXPORT OF SUBVERSION, NOT GOODS AND MATERIALS AND COLOMBIA IS ALREADY EXCELLENT CASE IN POINT.

4. ANY PROP PLAY THAT CAN BE GENERATED ALONG LINES PARA 3 MOST WELCOME. BOGOTA STATION CAUTIONS AGAINST

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INFO

FILE, VR

PAGE 5 MAY 68 CITE BOGOTA 0978 S E C R E T (KRUSKALL ACTING)
ATTACKING OR ACCUSING PRESIDENT LLERAS PERSONALLY HOWEVER
SINCE HE REACTS UNPREDICATABLY AND SOMETIME RASHLY TO
PERSONAL CRITICISM. THEREFORE REQUEST THAT COLOMBIAN
PERSONALITIES BE KEPT OUT OF ANY PROP PLAY SINCE CURRENT
SITUATION INEVITABLY WILL PRESENT LLERAS WITH EXTREMELY
DIFFICULT AND EMBARRASSING POLITICAL PILL TO SWALLOW AS WELL
AS CREATE AN INTERNAL COLOMBIAN POLITICAL RHUBARB INVOLVING
LLERAS GOVERNMENT, THE MILITARY, AND THE OSPINISTAS. POSSIBLE
RESULTS FROM SUCH A SITUATION COULD INVOLVE DISMISSAL OF
GISOY-92 FOR PERMITTING STORY BE BREAK IN ALL ITS GLORY AND
STATION WANTS TO MINIMIZE PERSONAL REPERCUSSIONS, SINCE ONCE
STORY STARTED LEAKING, STATION URGED GISOY-92 TO RELEASE AS
FACTUAL A PRESENTATION AS POSSIBLE. WHETHER OR NOT STATION
RECOMMENDATIONS HAD ANY WEIGHT IN PRODUCING WIDE-SCALE
PUBLICITY, STATION COULD WELL BE MADE SCAPEGOAT BY LLERAS
AND GISOY-92.

5. STATION ALSO MOVING TO HAVE VARIOUS PRESTIGIOUS
LOCAL ATTORNEYS COME OUT WITH STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF
MILITARY TRIALS AND REFUTATIONS OF INANE POINTS BEING MADE

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief of Station, Bogota		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, WHD		MICROFILM

SUBJECT Forwarding of Documents of Correspondence between Carlos A. BONILLA and Nicolay Sergeyevech LEONOV

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: DIRECTOR 99758, 14 May 1968

Action Required: For Information

Forwarded herewith are copies of documents relating to an exchange of correspondence between Carlos A. BONILLA Sanchez (201-273728) and the Soviet press attache in Mexico City, Nicolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139). The Station may wish to look into this relationship, possibly through GITERSLOR-10.

James M. BEOLINGER

Attachment: documents, h/w

201-273728

Distribution:
2 - Bogota

201-132139 Leonov

20 MAY 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
201-132139	HLBW-5869	
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-273728

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, SB	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, WH		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM

SUBJECT REDTOP/Headquarters Request for Press Clippings

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 00038, 16 May 1968

1. Transmitted herewith are the press clippings described below. The Station has no record that the clips requested in Paragraph (5) of reference were ever received; though MONTERREY 0766 of 4 November 1963 stated clips were being pouched, a check of Station records does not reveal a transmittal dispatch.

2. In response to Reference Paragraph (3) request, only the Ultimas Noticias article was located. The original clip is forwarded as Attachment A. It will be noted that according to MEXICO CITY 4814 dated 1 June 1963, this is the same article as that appearing on the same date in Atisbos.

3. The article requested in Reference Paragraph (4) is forwarded as Attachment B, in copy, since the original was not in our files. It was Station inspired.

4. The clip requested in Reference Paragraph (6) is also forwarded in the original as Attachment C. This was forwarded to Headquarters as an attachment to HMYA-2032 (received HMYA-032) of 5 December 1963.

5. The Station is unable at this time to come up with additional information to support future exploitation, but will be on the lookout for material that may be of use.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:
Press Clippings, A,B,&C.

Distribution:
~~2~~ - C/SB, w/atts.
2 - C/WH, w/o/atts.

Group 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

3 Atts. h/w

CS COPY

201-132139

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-34693	20 May 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-132139

(A)

Ultimas Noticias de EXCELSIOR

PRIMERA EDICION DIARIO DE MEDIODIA

MEXICO, D. F.—VIERNES 31 DE MAYO DE 1963

GERENTE GENERAL J. JESUS GARCIA

México en los Planes de Castro y Krushchev



EN ESTA FOTO, tomada en la URSS, durante la actual visita de Fidel Castro, puede verse en el extremo izquierdo al tercer secretario y agregado cultural de la embajada soviética en México, Sergeyevic Lenov Nikolai, en animada charla con Castro Ruz y Krushchev. Discutieron la agitación en Iberoamérica, alentada desde Cuba y México.

Huyó Aniceto del Valle, que Estuvo Allegado a Castro Ruz

Dice que se Planea la Agitación Continental Desde Cuba y México

Aniceto del Valle, uno de los más conocidos abogados de La Habana y que hasta hace veinte días parecía ser un simpatizador de Castro (ahora se ha exiliado) declaró anoche, antes de salir para Panamá, que la Unión Soviética prepara un plan subversivo para los países de la América Central, especialmente.

Según Del Valle, "Cuba será la cabeza de playa visible y México el centro distribuidor de armas de marcas mexicanas y norteamericanas".

El abogado aseguró que él obtuvo esta información en el Departamento de Asuntos Latinoamericanos del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba en donde tiene muchos amigos.

Dos "hombres-clave" son los más importantes para realizar el plan, según Del Valle: Sergeyevic Leonov Nikolai, tercer secretario de la embajada rusa en México y agregado cultural de la misma embajada; y el capitán mexicano Lorenzo Cárdenas Barajas, el encargado de comprar armas y el encargado de entregarlas a Nikolai, que es el distribuidor.

De estas dos personas se habla (dice Del Valle) en el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Fidel Castro, como de los más importantes a los complotistas centroamericanos.

SIGUE EN LA PAGINA TRES

HUYO ANICETO DEL CALLE, QUE ESTUVO ALLEGADO

Sigue de la primera plana

Por otra parte, afirmó que Nikolai salió de México el 21 de abril de este año rumbo a la URSS para que su llegada a Rusia coincidiera con la llegada de Castro a Moscú. Así, Nikolai participó en las reuniones de Castro y Krushchev. Para el caso afirmó que Nikolai apareció fotografiado junto con Castro y Krushchev en el periódico "El Mundo" de La Habana. El periódico es del 8 de este mes y la foto se encuentra en la página 8.

14-00000

(B)

Excelsior, Mexico City
26 March 65

Lee Oswald en México

Por ALBERTO WILLIAMS

HACE poco se exhibió en un bonito salón de cine de la ciudad de México, una película que a quienes sómos admiradores del Presidente asesinado de los Estados Unidos, nos interesó y nos conmovió en alto grado. Era un filme muy realista, basado en la vida y la muerte del insigne estadista que supo ganarse el cariño y la admiración de todo el mundo. Se llama la película "Años de Relámpago, día de Tambores". Para la mayoría del público ese filme, no importa hasta qué grado haya despertado su interés, sólo significó un filme más acerca de John F. Kennedy.

Para nosotros los periodistas representó mucho más de eso, porque nos recordó la tragedia de Dallas y despertó nuevamente nuestra curiosidad respecto al asesino Lee Oswald y su visita a México en septiembre de 1963. Pensamos que tiene importancia el recordar a las personas con quienes tuvo tratos el asesino durante su permanencia en nuestra capital.

Aunque suele dudarse de la exactitud del informe rendido por la Comisión Warren acerca de sus investigaciones en torno a ese doloroso crimen, anotamos que ese reporte hace saber que Oswald visitó en la ciudad de México la embajada de Cuba comunista y la de la Unión Soviética. Como miembro activo que era de una organización llamada "Juego Limpio para Cuba en los Estados Unidos", ya se imaginarán los lectores que era bien conocido del presonal de la embajada de la Cuba comunista en México.

No se ha llegado a saber con seguridad los términos de la conversación que sostuvieron Lee Oswald y los rojos cubanos; pero es un dato seguro que Oswald salió de la embajada de Castro y se dirigió a la de la Unión Soviética, donde ya era conocido por los muchos años que pasó Oswald en el paraíso soviético. En esa misión diplomática sostuvo largas conversaciones con dos agentes rusos de la KGV, famosa agencia policiaca secreta cuya principal misión es dirigir campañas de terror y subversión desde puestos diplomáticos que simuladamente les asigna el Gobierno de Moscú para que actúen protegidos por un derecho internacional mal aplicado.

Diremos de paso que ese arreglo desleal de las cosas, que hace aparecer a la Unión Soviética como país amigo, en tanto que sus representantes diplomáticos asestan puñaladas traperas al país que no sabe defenderse, facilita el que los agentes rusos enviados a países pacíficos como México, sean muchos y que cada embajada soviética disponga de un personal tan numeroso, que aquello no es un misión diplomática, sino una verdadera inmigración de rojillos.

Lee Oswald tuvo tratos con los agentes secretos Pavel Yatskov y Valery Kostikov. Estos "diplomáticos" de la KGV están todavía en servicio. El primero aparece como segundo secretario de la embajada rusa en la ciudad de México. Kostikov figura como "agregado" de la misma embajada. Este diplomático tiene fama de representar en forma destacada la escuela antigua de accion de la KGV. Es de carácter frío, brusco y de poco refinamiento. Muestra poco respeto para sus compañeros soviéticos y menos todavia para los mexicanos en general.

Yatskov, en cambio, es el ejemplo moderno de los agentes secretos graduados por aquella institución de espionaje. Cortés, atento, no expresa nunca criticas de México y de los mexicanos, como suele hacerlo su compañero Kostikov. Pero ambos son agentes activos y de mucha confianza de la KGV en nuestro país. Los dos son personajes de cuidado, a quienes sin duda vigilan de cerca las autoridades para impedir que repitan el caso de otro esbirro soviético, Nikolai S. Leonov, que hace unos dos años estuvo dedicado por el Gobierno de Moscú a meter de contrabando armas de la Cuba castrista en los pacíficos países de la América Latina.

Nikolai S. Lenov, que vive y trabaja en la ciudad de México, dirige y realiza un amplio programa de distribución de impresos subversivos en la República, en Centroamérica y en la parte septentrional de la América del Sur. ¡Hay impresos que son más terribles que las armas y los pertrechos!

su discurso,
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MUNDO MEJOR (C)
México, D. F., 7 de Diciembre de 1963.

EN NUEVO LEON

Piden al Gobernador Meta en Cintura a los Rojos

Agentes Castristas, "Diplomáticos" Rusos y Rojos Criollos se Mueven en Monterrey, como Peces en el Agua.

DESCARADAMENTE, los agentes castristas que agitan en la Universidad de Nuevo León solicitan apoyo de los mexicanos para "las fuerzas armadas de Liberación Nacional en Venezuela" en tanto que los marxistas hechos fuertes en el "Instituto de Intercambio Cultural Mexicano-Ruso", sección Monterrey, también abiertamente realizan labor de proselitismo entre el estudiantado, los obreros y otros fuertes núcleos ciudadanos.

En el número anterior, MUNDO MEJOR denunció que esos mismos "agentes castristas pretenden hacer un congreso comunista en Monterrey en complicidad con los rojos criollos, con intención de crear en esa ciudad el primer "Campamento Juvenil por la Paz y una Vida Mejor", uno de tantos señuelos de los rojos para engañar a la juventud mexicana". Nuestro periódico también dio cuenta de la propaganda abiertamente marxista que en favor de los rojos de Venezuela fijado y repartido por toda la ciudad los agitadores comunistas. He aquí las leyendas de algunos de esos carteles y volantes:

"Venezuela en armas. Hacer la patria libre, morir por Venezuela. Las fuerzas armadas de Liberación Nacional libran en estos momentos una lucha decisiva contra el imperialismo norteamericano y la pandilla entreguista y traidora de R. Betancourt. ¡Solidaridad con el pueblo venezolano! ¡Viva la revolución de América Latina! (Leyenda alrededor de una paloma que empuña un fusil que sirve como asta a una bandera tricolor en cuyo centro se leen las iniciales: FALN —Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional).

"Venezuela adelante en la revolución antiimperialista. Los pueblos de América Latina están contigo! Juventud Comunista de Nuevo León".

"Los monopolios yanquis saquean las riquezas de América y nos hunden en la miseria y explotación. Apoyemos a un pueblo hermano que lucha heroicamente por liberarse: ¡Venezuela! ¡Adelante, los obreros, campesinos y estudiantes de toda América están contigo, pueblo hermano! ¡Vivan las F. A. L. N.: Juventud Comunista de Nuevo León".



Uno de los volantes que han pegado en los muros de la ciudad de Monterrey agentes castristas y rojos criollos que agitan en la Universidad de Nuevo León. Asimismo, una "invitación" a estudiantes, obreros y campesinos, del "Instituto de Intercambio Cultural Mexicano-Ruso" de Monterrey a asistir "con su apreciable familia" a un acto en apoyo de las fuerzas comunistas de Liberación Nacional en América.

EL GOBERNADOR YA ESTA ADVERTIDO

Por otra parte, una muestra de la propaganda marxista que se incuba en el llamado Instituto de Intercambio Cultural (???) Mexicano-Ruso de Monterrey es esta invitación: "El próximo viernes... en el local de nuestro Instituto, el Honorable Agregado Auxiliar de la Embajada de la URSS en la República de México, señor Nikolay Sergeyevich Leonov, disertará sobre el papel de la URSS en la lucha por la liberación nacional y las revoluciones populares de la América Latina.

Nos permitimos invitar a usted y a su apreciable familia, así como a sus amistades, y esperamos tener el gusto de verlo entre nosotros. La Directiva".

Por supuesto que el gobernador del Estado, Lic. Eduardo Livas Villarreal, ya tiene en su poder las denuncias y protestas contra esta situación por parte de más de 50 profesionistas —como también informó MUNDO MEJOR en su número anterior—, por los padres de familia y numerosos organismos de todo tipo, por lo que toca a ese mandatario tomar las medidas en forma enérgica con los alborotadores rojos, tal como el pueblo de Sabinas hace unos meses los arrojó de sus límites.

14-00000

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-132139

X-REF TO FILE NO.

temp cy - KI cy sent 21 May

BY: AT: Z

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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO SB/WH BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION SB8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE. VR. WH8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT2, CI/IC2, CAS, CA/PROP

S E C R E T 161828Z MAY 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5583

DIRECTOR

REDTOP

REF: DIRECTOR 99929

ACTION

16 MAY 68 IN 12506

1. LISADDLE-2 DID NOT REOPEN CHANNEL TO SOVIET PRESS OFFICE NOR DID HE MAKE EFFORT TO DO SO. HE CLAIMED THAT THERE WAS NEVER VALID EXCUSE OR OPPORTUNITY.

2. STATION SKEPTICAL ABOUT INFO IN PARAS FOUR AND FIVE OF HMMA-31117, 19 JANUARY 1967, DUE FACT ALLEGED VISITS TO SOVIET PRESS OFFICE TOOK PLACE SOMETIME BEFORE HE REPORTED INCIDENT TO STATION, AND HIS PROVEN FABRICATION OF INFO IN OCTOBER 1967. ON OTHER HAND, EXCEPT FOR OCTOBER 1967 FABRICATION DURING PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO CIUDAD JUAREZ, HIS INFO BELIEVED BE RELIABLE. IN MANY CASES STATION WAS ABLE CHECK THROUGH OTHER SOURCES, AND ON STILL MANY OTHER OCCASIONS HIS INFO VERIFIED BY SUBSEQUENT EVENTS AND PRESS.

S E C R E T

BT

tom ✓

File in Leonar 201

SECRET

201-132139

14-00000

ORIG: LEN THERRY:mcb
UNIT: WH/3/COLOMBIA
EXT: 7271
DATE: 14 MAY 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

SECRET

FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-273728
x 201-132139

CONF: WH 8 — RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, SB 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, CI/OA

SECRET — Mr 14 22 07 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 99758

TO BOGOTA

[illegible] REDCOAT

REFERENCES: A. BOGOTA 0735 (IN 88470)
B. BOGOTA 5109 (IN 33580) 1 DEC 64
C. HMMA 30130, 26 SEPT 66
D. HMMA 33295, 17 OCT 67

STATION MAY WISH TO LOOK INTO TIE-IN OF GITEMBLOR-15 (201-273728) WITH SUBJ (201-132139). AS HAVING POSSIBLE CONNECTION WITH REF A. REFS C & D INDICATE HE HAS BEEN IN CORRESPONDENCE WITH 201-132139 IN MEXICO CITY SINCE AT LEAST 1966. REF B REPORTED THAT GITEMBLOR-15 HAD LEFT BOGOTA FOR MEXICO ON 26 NOVEMBER 1964. REF C NOTED THAT SUBJ 201-132139 WAS ALSO IN MEXICO CITY AT THIS TIME, AND THAT FROM A LETTER INTERCEPT IT APPEARED THAT GITEMBLOR-15 KNEW SUBJ AND HIS FAMILY PERSONALLY. MOST RECENT INDICATION OF THEIR CORRESPONDENCE IS A LETTER FROM MEXICO TO BOGOTA FORWARDED WITH REF D. WE WILL POUCH COPIES OF REFS B & C.

END OF MESSAGE

SB/O/WH Lee Mestres (by phone)

CONTINUED

201-132139

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

COPY NO.

14-00000

ORIG: TOM WHITE
UNIT: SB/O/WH
EXT: 6412
DATE: 14 MAY 68

MESSAGE FORM
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ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
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INFO: FILE, VR, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

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SECRET — MAY 15 17 30 Z — CITE DIRECTOR 99929

TO MEXICO CITY

REDTOP

REF: HMMA 31117, 19 JANUARY 67

1. PARAS 4 AND 5 OF REF RELATE ALLEGED VISITS BY LISADDLE/2 (FORMERLY LISATURN/1) 201-809883 TO SOVIET PRESS OFFICE WHERE LISADDLE/2 SUPPOSEDLY RECEIVED SOME MONEY FROM VARIOUS SOVIETS. PARA 6 OF REF INDICATES LISADDLE/2 DIRECTED TO REOPEN THE CHANNEL TO SOVIET PRESS OFFICE. FILE DOES NOT REFLECT ANY FURTHER ACTION ON ABOVE. REQUEST STATIONS COMMENTS RE ACTION SUBSEQUENT TO ABOVE.

2. IN VIEW OF LATER DISCOVERY OF LISADDLE/2'S UNTRUSTWORTHINESS, REQUEST STATIONS COMMENTS RE VERACITY OF INFO IN PARAS 4 AND 5 OF REF.

END OF MESSAGE

AB/Com...		SB/O/WH
ADP...	X	INDEX

C/SB/O/WH [signature]

C/WH/1 [signature]

for C/WH Calvin M. Smyth

DC/SB/AO [signature] 15 May 68

201-132139

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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MESSAGE FORM
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ORIG: TOM WHITE
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SECRET 15 20 10 Z CITE DIRECTOR 00038

TO MEXICO CITY

REDTOP

AN/ FI	
SB	
ABSTRACT X	INDEX

REF: A. MEXICO CITY 5455 (IN 03860)

B. MEXICO CITY 4814, 1 JUNE 63

C. MONTERREY 0766, 4 NOVEMBER 63

D. HMYA 2032, 5 DECEMBER 63

1. REVIEW OF FILE, SUBJECT OF REF A, DISCLOSES CONSIDERABLE PRESS PLAY RE SUBJECT'S CONTACTS IN MEXICO ALTHOUGH SOME BACKUP MATERIAL MISSING FROM FILE. FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE EXPLOITATION REQUEST STATION FORWARD MATERIAL CITED BELOW AND ANY COMMENTS OR ADDITIONAL INFO STATION MAY HAVE RELATIVE THERETO.

2. SUBJECT'S PERSONAL CARD (PLANTED) FOUND IN ADDRESS BOOK OF FIDEL CASTRO RUZ WHEN LATTER ARRESTED 21 JUNE 56 BY MEXICAN POLICE AND THIS FACT APPARENTLY PLAYED UP IN PRESS AT TIME. REQUEST STATION FORWARD ORIGINAL CLIPS OF PRESS ARTICLE.

3. REQUEST STATION FORWARD ORIGINAL CLIPS OF PRESS ARTICLES REFERRED TO IN PARAS 2 AND ~~R~~ 5 OF REF B.

15 May 68
201-132139

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — SECRET — GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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MESSAGE FORM
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PAGE TWO

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CITE DIRECTOR 00038

TO

4. ON 26 MARCH 65 ARTICLE APPEARED IN "EXCELSIOR" UNDER TITLE "LEE OSWALD EN MEXICO." ARTICLE WRITTEN UNDER BYLINE "ALBERTO WILLIAMS" AND APPARENTLY STATION INSPIRED. REQUEST STATION FORWARD ORIGINAL CLIP OF ARTICLE.

5. REQUEST STATION FORWARD ORIGINAL CLIPS OF PRESS ARTICLES REFERRED TO IN PARA 1 OF REF C AND PARA 2 OF REF C IF LATTER EVER CONSUMATED.

6. REQUEST STATION FORWARD ORIGINAL CLIP OF PRESS ARTICLE REFERRED TO IN PARA 1 OF REF D.

END OF MESSAGE

C/SB/O/WH [signature]

C/WH/1 [signature]

C/WH [signature]

DC/SB/AO [signature]

RELEASING OFFICER

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

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SECRET

5 May 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SB

Chief, WH

SUBJECT : Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV, KGB Officer
Possibly Linked to PACHON Case in Colombia

1. BACKGROUND:

Feliciano PACHON Chaconta is the Colombian Communist courier apprehended by Colombian security officials in late April 1968 when aligting from a commercial flight from Mexico with U.S.$80,000 apparently destined for the Communist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Military Arm of Orthodox Communist Party - FARC). A female cohort of PACHON was picked up several hours later aligting from a second aircraft with U.S.$20,000. Both arrests were based on a tipoff by another Colombian Communist, Adelmo URREA Garcia, whose motives are as yet unclear. URREA who first claimed that the funds were of Cuban origin later changed his story to the effect that they are in fact Soviet. Subsequent interrogation of PACHON, URREA, and the female courier has failed to shed further light on either story.

2. However, a re-examination of PACHON's suitcase turned up a compartment in which were found several cryptic notes, including a reference to Avenida Mazatlan. Mexico City 5455 (IN 03860) reports Avenida Mazatlan 206 to be the address of the Soviet Press Office, and Soviet Press Attache Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139) to be a KGB officer, known to have handled CP operations in the past.

3. A review of LEONOV's file reveals the following possibly significant information, when related to the PACHON case:

a. 1956: Subject's personal calling card was found in an address book taken from Fidel CASTRO Rus when Fidel was arrested by Mexican police on 21 June 1956 in Mexico City. (See MEXICO CITY 6859, 27 June 1956, IN 35556.) This event was apparently reported in the Mexican press but the file does not contain a copy nor the date of publication, and there is some indication that the card may have been a plant. (See HMMW 10265, 24 Nov 61.)

NOTE: CARD WAS DEFINITELY PLANTED BY LIVESTOCK-2. This was discovered by the Station much later. [illegible] Walker

SECRET

201-132139

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b. 1963: April. Subject was Fidel Castro's interpreter during the latter's tour of the Soviet Union. The file contains many photos of the two with all the big-wigs of the USSR. The event was reported in El Mundo with a picture of Subject, Fidel, etc. on 8 May 63.

c. 1963: May. Subject was observed in a meeting with a former Mexican army captain Lorenzo CARDENAS Barajas who was supposed to be an arms smuggler to the Guatemala guerillas. A Station inspired article appeared in the 31 May 63 edition of Atisbos, Mexican newspaper, accused Subject and Cardenas of being the key figures in Central American revolution plans. The source of the information was attributed to a former lawyer exiled from Cuba. The article was picked up and played in the 31 May 63 edition of Ultimas Noticias. A photo copy of the article is in Vol. 3 of Subject's file attached to HMMA 33295, 18 Oct 63.

d. 1964: A letter was obtained through LIMUD addressed to Subject from Carlos A. BONILLA S. (201-275728). The letter indicated that the two were apparent close friends. Bonilla at that time was the president of the Federation of Workers of Cundinamarca (FTC) and a leading Colombian Communist. (See HMMA 30130, 30 Sept 66 and HLBA 9425, 7 Oct 66.)

e. 1966: Subject was reported as being a close friend of Bernardo LEMUS Mendoza (201-91375) since 1953. LEMUS was at one time a prominent Guatemala communist, on Central Committee. Subject was also reported as being in contact with Ricardo MIRANDA Aldana, also a prominent Guatemalan communist who is now dead, during January 62 (201-737566).

f. 1967: Soviet Press Office, where Subject also lives, was used as a payoff point for funds given to support the Central Nacional de Estudiantes Democraticas which organization is controlled by the Communist Party of Mexico. Subject was not the contact man for the funds. (See HMMA 31117, 19 Jan 67.)

g. HMMA 33215, 5 Oct 67, gives a rundown on other contacts of Subject with Guatemalan communists or guerillas.

4. LEONOV was in Mexico from July 1953 to October 1956, as Secretary to the Ambassador, and returned in July 1961 as a Third Secretary and Assistant Cultural Attache. He has served since October 1964 as Second Secretary and Press Attache.

James B. Noland
C/SB/O/WH

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: X MARKED FOR INDEXING | NO INDEXING REQUIRED | ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING | MICROFILM

TO: Chief, SB Division

INFO.: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: REDTOP
Yuliy Mikhaylovich VORONTSOV (201-113626)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE : MEXICO CITY 5269

1. LIFIRE reported Subject's arrival in Mexico City on 9 April 1968 aboard PAA Flight 501. According to LIENVOY Subject departed Mexico City for Washington, D.C. on 13 April 1968.

2. The reason for Subject's trip to Mexico City is unknown. LIFEAT reported that Subject was in contact with Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139), Soviet Press Attache and known KGB officer. Valeriya Ivanovna LEONOVA described Subject as being "a husband of her friend, visiting from Washington". LEONOVA on another occasion stated that her husband was quite busy with a visitor and mentioned Subject by name. LIFEAT also reported that Subject was a guest at the LEONOV's house on 10 April.

3. LILYRIC reported that Subject visited the Soviet Embassy on 11 April 1968. He was seen arriving at 0953 hours in a car driven by Soviet Embassy chauffeur, Viktor Petrovich STRIZHOV (201-779301). It is not known with whom Subject had contact while at the Soviet Embassy. He left the Embassy at 1240 hours.

.......continued

Attachments:
- #1 - Legal Attache Memo
- #2 - Station Memo
- #3 - Photos

Distribution:
- 2 - C/SB, w/atts. 1, 2, &3
- 2 - C/WH, w/atts. 1 & 2 only

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

XR. 201-132139   201-132139

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-34575	2 May 1968
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-113626

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-34575

4. On 26 April 1968 the Legal Attache in Mexico City requested information concerning Subject's visit to Mexico City and to Brazil. Attached is a copy of this memorandum. Forwarded also is our answer to the Legal Attache, in which your attention is called to Paragraph 5. We leave it to Headquarters discretion on the dissemination of any further information on Subject, particularly that contained in RIO DE JANEIRO 5932 concerning Subject's request for a Brazilian visa.

5. Forwarded herewith for Chief, SB are photographs of Subject as obtained through LILYRIC.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

1P

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
		X MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO: Chief, SB Division		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.: Chief, WH Division		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM

SUBJECT: REDTOP - Personality Sketch on 201-132139

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMA-33215, 5 October 1967

1. Transmitted herewith is a personality sketch prepared by LIFEAT transcriber Carol K. ZINSMEISTER on Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139), Soviet Second Secretary and Press Attaché in Mexico.

2. Of the three persons mentioned in the sketch with whom LEONOV appears to be in clandestine contact, the only one identifiable is Juan REJANO (Parras), 201-109935. He is a Spanish Communist, one of the leaders of the Spanish Communist Party in Mexico, with close ties to other Communist groups, especially Cuban and Czech; and at least once he was seen going into the Cuban Embassy with a leader of the Guatemalan Communist Party in Mexico. REJANO is in frequent contact with the Czech Press attaché. He is editor of the Czech bulletin published in Mexico. He is also frequently in touch with employees of the Soviet Press Office. In December 1967, according to an LNERGO report, REJANO gave NELSON (LNERGO double agent?) material on American bases in Spain when NELSON visited the Spanish Communist Party Headquarters in Mexico. On 28 January 1968, REJANO was among a group of "old friends" attending a dinner in Mexico City for Juan MARINELLO Vidaurreta, President of the Cuban-Mexican Society and Cuban UNESCO Ambassador.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Sketch

Distribution:
1 - C/SB, w/att.
2 - C/WH, W/o/att.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

1 Att

CS COPY

201-132139

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
3. 201-109935	HMMA-34470	15 April 1968
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-132139 201-109935

1P

Nicolas LEONOV, Press Attache

LEONOV is an extremely bright, intelligent man, and very quick-thinking. He is popular among the press people because he appears very frank, open and nice to them. He is not the kind, like many other Soviets, who is afraid to make comments, in his own name, on news items and this pleases the press who like personal opinions if nothing more. He is helpful and hard-working and any reasonable request he makes an effort to fulfill.

Apart from his work with the press, he does appear to be involved in intelligence work. He meets with David, Juan Rejano and another man (name not known) on matters which appear to have nothing to do with his press activities. It is possible that money is channeled through LEONOV for economic aid to certain magazines and propaganda work (perhaps even to the University groups although he is very cautious and this many not be true).

LEONOV tolerates (but does not love) his wife, who is quite a shrew. He apparently continues to live with her for the sake of their daughter, Irina, but they appear to have nothing in common. LEONOV is very popular with nearly everyone, but LEONOVA is almost universally disliked.

The actual work of the Press Office he leaves nearly entirely in the hands of his employees, who appear to do their job quite well. They only consult him on special problems and money matters, but he appears to devote very little time to the actual work done at the office. He is busy making contacts, seeing people, visiting newspapermen and doing extra and special jobs for the Embassy (since his Spanish is so good and his personality so nice). He interprets for most of the important Soviet artists when they come to Mexico and he accompanies the Ambassador on many occasions. The previous Amb. apparently trusted his judgment greatly and called on him frequently.

LEONOV apparently plays chess quite well and likes to hunt and fish, but is unable to devote much time to this. He has quite a social life, but mostly alone, and he appears to be high in favor in the USSR since he is able to take vacations frequently and do, more or less, as he likes.

H/W att. #1 to HMMA-34470 CS COPY 201 — 132139

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, SB

INFO.: Chief, WH

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: REDTOP/Nikolay LABROV (201-)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Headquarters attention is invited to Department Airgram A-696 of 4 February 1968 reporting on a lecture given by Subject at Mexico's National University on 30 January 1968. The lecture dealt with Latin American Studies in the USSR and carried the current Soviet line that what was progressive in the Mexican-American war was the fight of the Mexican people against U. S. imperialism.

2. Nikolay LABROV, a Soviet scholar, arrived in Mexico City in late October 1967 to do research on Mexican revolutionary history. He has booked return passage via Canadian Pacific for 27 February. During his stay he has resided with the family of Soviet Press Attache Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139). The information in this paragraph is from LIENVOY.

3. Forwarded herewith are photographs received from LILYRIC taken on 7 November 1967 of the man believed to be Nikolay LABROV with Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV and wife.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Photos

Distribution:
2 - C/SB, w/att.
2 - C/WH, w/o/att.

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

1 att h/w

CS COPY

201-132139

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-34078	15 February 1968
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-132139

14-00000

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: LEDNOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
201-132139
VOL. V

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
			NOT REVIEWED BY HSCA

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

14-00000

SECRET

1. A trace reply prepared for the FBI in November 1976 indicated that from 1956 until 1961 LEONOV was in Moscow during which time he was reported to have attended the KGB school from 1958 until 1960. From 1960 until 1961 LEONOV was at the Fifth Department of KGB Hqs. A statement was also included which said that during his tours in Mexico LEONOV was consistently active in clandestine support of Latin American revolutionary and subversive activities, particularly relating to Guatemala.

PDSTORAGE: As of 1976 LEONOV was Chief of Service No. 1 (Information) of KGB Headquarters First (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate in Moscow. LEONOV has been considered for at least two Ambassadorial posts.

A statement that a reliable defector had identified LEONOV as a KGB officer was transmitted to the State Department in August 1966 (NOTE: DERYABIN's iden in September 1964 was inconclusive but could have been misinterpreted.)

SECRET

14-00000

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE PASSED TO
MR. CHEPANEK ON 9 August 1978
FOR PERUSAL OF MR. BRECKINRIDGE.

IF APPROVED, DOCUMENT WILL BE
SENT TO HOUSE SUB-COMMITTEE ON
ASSASSINATION. FOUR PHOTOS
WERE INCLUDED FOR PASSAGE.

MR. CHEPANEK IS LOCATED IN 2D18.

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE
OF
NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV

1. Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV was born on 22 August 1928 in Almazovo, USSR (also reported as Ryazan, USSR.) LEONOV graduated at an unknown date from the Institute of Foreign Relations in Moscow. He was assigned as Interpreter and Secretary to the Ambassador at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City from May 1953 until 17 October 1956. On 31 July 1961 LEONOV returned to Mexico City as Third Secretary and Assistant Cultural Officer. He served in this capacity until his PCS departure in June 1964. LEONOV and his family went on home leave to the USSR from 21 April to 20 July 1963. During this leave LEONOV served as Fidel CASTRO's interpreter in the USSR in May 1963. LEONOV was assigned to Mexico City again on 10 October 1964 as Second Secretary and Press Attache at the Soviet Embassy. He departed PCS for the USSR on 22 December 1968. From April to July 1969 LEONOV served temporarily as representative of the Soviet News Agency "NOVOSTI" in Lima, Peru.

2. Additional travel information reflects that LEONOV served as interpreter for Soviet Vice Premier Anastas MIKOYAN on his trips to Mexico and Cuba in November 1959 and again in February 1960 when the Soviet Cultural and Technical Exposition was being held. LEONOV traveled to the Dutch West Indies and Trinidad in September 1962; his position and purpose of his

trip are unknown. LEONOV was a delegate to the 31st Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City from 19 September to 10 October 1976. In late June 1977 LEONOV accompanied two other Soviet officials on a visit to Panama where they were scheduled to visit with Panamanian Government officials. The next day LEONOV traveled to Bogota, Colombia where he remained until 3 July 1977. On this date he departed for Frankfurt, West Germany, presumably enroute home to the USSR.

3. LEONOV and his wife, Valeriya Ivanovich, who was born 30 April 1928 in Ryazan, have a daughter, Irina Nikolayevna, who was born on 16 March 1962 in Mexico City. LEONOV reportedly speaks excellent Spanish, good English, some French and little German. He has been described as pleasant, outgoing, intelligent, shrewd, conscientious, and reliable. He has a sense of humor but displays a temper at times.

4. Based on his activities and associations in Mexico City during his tours of duty between May 1953 and December 1968 LEONOV is considered to be a staff officer of the KGB (Soviet Committee for State Security.)



-/29/ SECRET FRP: , , , , , ,

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CONF: IP/DP-7 INFO: FILE, RF, ODPD-D, (9/P)

78 0800005 PAGE 001 TOT: 0514512 JUN 78 WASHINGT 234172

SECRET
DEFERRED TELEPOUCH 0514512 WASHINGTON 234172
TO: GUATEMALA CITY.

FROM KA/MGSB, INFO SE/X/LA
SUBJECT: INTEL ESNOTCH

REF: DIRECTOR 222905

1. UPON FURTHER REVIEW OF FILE ON BERNARDO L E M U S MENDOZA (201-0091575) FOR CLEARANCE PURPOSES, ONE DOCUMENT WHICH MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE TO STATION INDICATES THAT LEMUS WAS IN CONTACT WITH A KGB OFFICER WHILE IN MEXICO. ACCORDING TO HGGW-4035 DATED 2 DEC 66, INFORMATION TAKEN FROM CAPTURED PGT DOCUMENTS REVEALED THAT LEMUS, WHILE IN EXILE IN MEXICO FROM 1953-56, WAS A CLOSE PERSONAL FRIEND OF KNOWN KGB OFFICER NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH L E O N O V (201-0132139).

2. LEONOV WAS BORN 22 AUG 28 IN USSR. HE SERVED IN MEXICO FROM 1953-56 AS INTERPRETER/SECRETARY TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR. (FYI: PER POSTORAGE FROM 56-61 HE ATTENDED KGB SCHOOL AND SERVED AT
KGB HQS.) DURING 1961-64 LEONOV WAS THIRD SECRETARY, ASSISTANT CULTURAL OFFICER AT SOVIET EMBASSY, AND FROM 64-68 HE WAS SECOND SECRETARY AND PRESS ATTACHE. DURING HIS TOURS IN MEXICO, LEONOV WAS REPORTEDLY CONSISTENTLY ACTIVE IN THE SUPPORT OF LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, PARTICULARLY THOSE RELATED TO GUATEMALA. LAST KNOWN LOCATION OF LEONOV WAS TRIP TO BOGOTA FROM 27 JUNE TO 3 JULY 1977.

3. FROM ABOVE DATA IT WOULD SEEM THAT LEMUS KNEW LEONOV PRIOR TO LEONOV'S KGB TRAINING.

4. FILE: 201-0091575, 201-0132139. E2 IMPDET.> ORIG LA/MGSB/GSB GUILIANI/HEILMA X1091 COORD SE/OR/X SE/OP/S SE/X/LA (PHIPPS); REL: C/LA/MGSB/GSB (SIEGLE); CL BY: 029163.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

201-0132139

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
201-0132139 074-005-102
SEX M SX-05555/74

CIT USSR

KNOWN KGB.

DATE 23 JUN 78 09616515

201-132139

E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 7 PER [illegible] TOTAL COPIES 28 RUN BY

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STAFF

ACTION UNIT LA 8

ACTION #

INFO: FILE. VR IP/DMS, SE 8, CI 4 EPS/EG 2, SIA, SIA/IC, PCS/INT

T 996916 EIA255 PAGE 01-01 IN 338551

TOR:282235Z JUL 77 BOGO 31270

S E C R E T 282212Z JUL 77 STAFF

CITE BOGOTA 31270

TO: PANAMA CITY INFO DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL CKLEG INTEL

REFS: A. PANAMA CITY 41931 (IN 329718)

B. BOGOTA 31003 (IN 330958)

1. ACCORDING TO TRAVEL RECORDS RECEIVED TODAY ONE NIKOLAI LEONOV ARRIVED IN BOGOTA ON 27 JUN ABOARD AIR FRANCE FLIGHT 301. HE HOLDS PASSPORT DK030674, VISA 53. HE IS A RUSSIAN NATIONAL, AGE 48, MARRIED AND A PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMAT. WILL ADVISE WHEN AND IF SUBSEQUENT TRAVEL RECORDS INDICATE FURTHER TRAVEL TO PANAMA AND RETURN TO BOGOTA.

2. FILE: 56-8-0. E2 IMPDET

202 079

SECRET

CKTOP-Colombia

"1 MFG 7/76

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ACTION UNIT LA8

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE. VR. 1 Plans SER PCS/INT C14 EPS/EG2

T 976965 EIA122 PAGE 01-01 IN 330952

TOR:3021102 JUN 77 BOGO 31023

S E C R E T 302233Z JUN 77 STAFF

CITE BOGOTA 31023.

TO: PANAMA CITY INFO DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL CKLEG INTEL

REF: PANAMA CITY 41831 (323660) 23 Jun

1. ACCORDING TO TRAVEL RECORDS COVERING PERIOD 20-26 JUN ONLY ONE SOVIET ENTERED COLOMBIA VIA BOGOTA. HE WAS ONE YURY T I M O F E E V, PASSPORT CK277749, AGE THIRTY-NINE, MARRIED. HE ARRIVED ON AVIANCA FLIGHT 83 ON 26 JUN AND LISTED HIS PROFESSION AS ENGINEER. HE APPARENTLY ARRIVED WITHOUT A COLOMBIAN VISA AND DID NOT LIST AN ADDRESS FOR HIS STAY IN BOGOTA.

2. FILE: 56-8-0. E2 IMPDET.

S E C R E T

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 4 PER TOTAL COPIES 32-1 RUN BY

S E C R E T

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT: 1A8

ACTION #

INFO: FILE VR. I/PDMS PCS/INT SEB SIA/IC SIA CA4 EPS/EG2 CI4

T 973902 EIA136 PAGE 01 IN 329718

TOR:292231Z JUN 77 PACY 41931

S E C R E T 292132Z JUN 77 STAFF

CITE PANAMA CITY 41931

TO: BOGOTA INFO DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL CKLEG INTEL

1. STATION IS ATTEMPTING TO IDENTIFY HIGH SOVIET OFFICIAL WHO IS BELIEVED TO BE CURRENTLY VISITING PANAMA. ACCORDING TO SENSITIVE SOURCES, THE SOVIET OFFICIAL WAS EXPECTED TO VISIT COLOMBIA SOMETIME BETWEEN APPROXIMATELY 22-27 JUNE, AND FROM THERE TRAVEL ON TO PANAMA.

2. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFO BOGOTA MIGHT HAVE AS TO POSSIBLE IDENTITY THIS SOVIET OFFICIAL.

3. FOR HQS: ACCORDING TO HYGRUFF-1, THE THREE SOVIET OFFICIALS REFERRED TO IN PARA 3 OF PANAMA CITY 41917 (IN 329530) ARRIVED IN PANAMA ON 28 JUNE ABOARD KLM FLIGHT 779 FROM LISBON. THEIR ARRIVAL AND MEETING WITH PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS REPORTED IN PANAMANIAN PRESS ON 29 JUNE.

4. FILE: 56-8-0. E2, IMPDET.

S E C R E T

[illegible]	LEONOV, IVAN LEONTYEVICH (T)			USSR		
270249	LEONOV, IVAN MAKSIMOVICH (T)			USSR		
252489	LEONOV, IVAN PETROVICH (T)			USSR		
270113	LEONOV, IVAN PETROVICH (T)			USSR		
292539	LEONOV, IVAN SERGEYEVICH (T)			USSR		
080279	LEONOV, L (T)			USSR		
037653*	LEONOV, L I (T)			USSR		
118692	LEONOV, LEONID (T)	USSR		USSR		
062588	LEONOV, LEV IVANOVICH (T)			USSR		
267822	LEONOV, MATVEY IVANOVICH (T)			USSR		
173604	LEONOV, MIFHA		+1965	+USSR		
203758	LEONOV, MIKHAIL ALEKSANDROVICH (T)	USSR	CA 16	USSR		
266615	LEONOV, MIKHAIL ALEKSANDROVICH (T)			USSR		
257778*	LEONOV, MIKHAIL IVANOVICH (T)			USSR		
078288	LEONOV, MIKHAIL VASILEVICH (T)			USSR		
[illegible]	LEONOV, NIKOLAY ALEKSEYEVICH (T)	USSR	22 JUL 29	USSR		
[illegible]*	LEONOV, NIKOLAY ANDREYEVICH (T)	+USSR	+DEC 20	USSR	+201-0285216	+WIFE MARINA PETROVNA B
[illegible]	LEONOV, NIKOLAY GAVRILOVICH (T)	USSR	07 AUG 21	+USSR	+201-0285094	+WIFE TAISIYA B 19 FEB
[illegible]	LEONOV, NIKOLAY IVANOVICH (T)	USSR	19 MAR 34	USSR	+201-0774548	+WIFE YULIYA SERGEYEVNA
[illegible]	LEONOV, NIKOLAY IVANOVICH (T)	USSR	22 MAY 06	USSR	+201-0264522	
251997	LEONOV, NIKOLAY IVANOVICH (T)			USSR		
023539	LEONOV, NIKOLAY NIKOLAYEVICH (T)	USSR	21 SEP 41	USSR	+201-0836586	+WIFE TATYANA ANATOLYEV
[illegible]155*	LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH (T)	USSR	22 AUG 28	USSR	+201-0132139	+WIFE VALERIYA IVANOVNA
259455	LEONOV, PARFIRIY LUKICH (T)			USSR		
242286	LEONOV, PAVEL AFANASYEVICH (T)			USSR		
251028	LEONOV, PAVEL BORISOVICH (T)			USSR		
[illegible]*	LEONOV, PAVEL SEMENOVICH (T)	+USSR	+01 JAN 16	USSR	+201-0309517	+WIFE KLAVDIYA GRIGORYE
003835	LEONOV, PETR IVANOVICH	+USSR	+13	+USSR		+WIFE KLAVDIYA TIMOFEYE
003885	LEONOV, PETR IVANOVICH (T)	USSR	13	USSR		+WIFE KLAVDIYA TIMOFEYE
266645	LEONOV, SERGEY ANDREYEVICH (T)			USSR		
271031	LEONOV, SERGEY ARKHIPOVICH (T)			USSR		
221860	LEONOV, STANISLAV (T)	USSR		USSR		+WIFE LYUDMILA IVANOVNA
259061	LEONOV, TIMOFEY IVANOVICH (T)			USSR		
246777	LEONOV, V A (T)			USSR		
071099	LEONOV, V. S. (T)			USSR		
4081·2*	LEONOV, VADIM VASILYEVICH (T)	USSR	19 AUG 49	USSR	+201-0948594	+WIFE-YEKATERINA VLADIN
246417	LEONOV, VALENTIN IVANOVICH (T)			USSR		
227715*	LEONOV, VALERIY PAVLOVICH (T)	USSR	20 OCT 42	USSR	+201-0915566	+WIFE FNU
284769	LEONOV, VASILIY DMITRIYEVICH (T)			USSR		
179071	LEONOV, VASILIY IVANOVICH (T)			USSR		
265862	LEONOV, VASILIY OSIPOVICH (T)			USSR		
017085	LEONOV, VASILIY PAVLOVICH (T)	USSR	24 JUL 05	USSR	+201-0732595	
405781*	LEONOV, VIKTOR (T)	USSR	36	USSR		+WIFE NEONILA B 37
186423*	LEONOV, VIKTOR IVANOVICH (T)	USSR	43	USSR		+WIFE TATYANA PAVLOVNA
228604*	LEONOV, VIKTOR MIKHAYLOVICH (T)	USSR	12 AUG 36	USSR	+201-0921769	+WIFE SVETLANA VLADIMIR
047955*	LEONOV, VILEN NIKONOROVICH (T)	+USSR	+29 APR 25	USSR	+201-0241239	+WIFE LENINA ANDREYEVNA

M.D.NO	SURNAME, GIVEN NAME, MIDDLE NAME	POB	DOB	CITZ	201 NUMBER	WIFE NAME
295237	LEONOV, VLADIMIR ALEKSANDROVICH (T)			USSR		
017021*	LEONOV, VLADIMIR ALEKSEYEVICH	+USSR	+03 SEP 31	+USSR	+201-0732596	+WIFE ZINAIDA VASILIYEV
017021*	LEONOV, VLADIMIR ALEKSEYEVICH (T)	USSR	03 SEP 31	USSR	+201-0732596	+WIFE ZINAIDA VASILIYEV
02473[illegible]*	LEONOV, VLADIMIR ANDREYEVICH (T)	USSR	26 JUN 26	USSR	+201-0148594	+WIFE VALENTINA MIKHAYL
053991	LEONOV, VLADIMIR F		+06 DEC 38	+USSR	+201-0788619	+WIFE OLGA PETROVNA B 1
053991	LEONOV, VLADIMIR FEDOROVICH (T)		06 DEC 38	USSR	+201-0788619	+WIFE OLGA PETROVNA B 1
28488[illegible]	LEONOV, VLADIMIR PORFIRYEVICH (T)			USSR		
29442[illegible]	LEONOV, VLADIMIR STEPANOVICH (T)			USSR		
22629[illegible]*	LEONOV, VYACHESLAV STEPANOVICH (T)	USSR	13 JUN 39	USSR	+201-0916881	+WIFE VALENTINA YEGOROV
22448[illegible]	LEONOV, YURIY	+USSR	+CA 33	+USSR	+201-0921125	
18831[illegible]	LEONOV, YURIY (T)	USSR		USSR		
22448[illegible]	LEONOV, YURIY (T)	USSR	CA 33	USSR	+201-0921125	
09482[illegible]	LEONOV, YURIY ALEKSANDROVICH (T)	USSR	03 JUN 26	USSR	+201-0831521	+WIFE TAMARA GRIGORYEVN
00388[illegible]	LEONOV, YURIY BORISOVICH (T)	USSR	12 MAR 30	USSR	+201-0182275	+WIFE GALINA ALEKSEYEVN
040399	LEONOV, YURIY PETROVICH (T)	USSR	25 NOV 39	USSR	+201-0776624	+WIFE SVETLANA
27[illegible]	LEONOVA, ALEKSANDRA FEDOROVNA (T)			USSR		

14-00000

72A01 S	ITAL	ROME	29 DEC 72	
72A01 T	REPLACEMENT-MOSKVICHEV CONTACTS TURNED OVER TO ISTOMIN			
72A01 U		OIRA-56345		07 FEB 73
A 73A01 R	VOLCHANOV	VLADIMIR	VLADIMIROVICH	007483
A 73A01 S	ITAL	ROME	24 FEB 73	
A 73A01 T	REPLACEMENT-VOLCHANOV REPLACED MOSKVICHEV			
A 73A01 U	PCS REPORTS	OIRA-56871		14 AUG 73
00A00 A	011155	201-0172139		
00A00 B	LEONOV	NIKOLAY	SERGEYEVICH	
00A00 C	USSR	RYAZAN	22 AUG 28	
00A00 D	USSR			
00A00 E	WIFE VALENTINA IVANOVNA B 26 APR 25 RYAZAN			
A 61A01 B	LEONOV	NIKOLAY	SERGEYEVICH	
A 61A01 C	USSR	RYAZAN	22 AUG 28	
00A02 D	USSR			
A 53A01 D		5010724	MOSCOW	52
A 61A01	USSR			
A 61A01		5016263	MOSCOW	02 JUL 64
64A01 D				
A 50A01 F	EN GOOD			ENGLISH

08/07/77 PAGE 0111 5

SECRET NOFORN SOV RICS FILE E2 IMPDET CL BY 0 5877

SECRET/NOFORN SOV RICS FILE
CONT.

011155

A 50A01 F	EN GOOD			POLISH
A 53A01 F	5 5.07 W 155 H GRY BLD SMALL			
A 61A01 F	WIFE VALENTINA IVANOVNA B 26 APR 25 RYAZAN			
A 61A01 F	DAU IRINA NIKOLAYEVNA B 62			
61A02 E	EN EXCELLENT			SPANISH
A 61A02				FRENCH
00A01	SUSP RIS FROB ST SEC			
00A01	EMPLOYEE		74-6-61616	
00A02	CHIEF OF TECHNICAL SECTION			
00A02	KNOWN SOV ST SEC			
00A02 N	AUST	BADEN		
00A03 N	MEX			
00A04				TOLUTOTE
00A04	KNOWN SOV ST SEC			
00A04	POSTCARAGE	54-5555762	4-5-	AN 72
00A04	SEE HOLDER OF FILE FOR ADDITIONAL INFO			
A 50A01	EMPLOYEE			
A 50A01	SUSP RIS FROB ST SEC			
A 50A01	CONSULATE			
A 50A01	POLA	WARSAW	CA 50	
A 50A01	PCS REPORTS	8T-400		69
A 53A01 G	EMPLOYEE ADMINISTRATIVE			
A 53A01				
A 53A01 M	EMBASSY			
A 53A01 N	MEX	MEXICO CITY	CA 25 MAY 57	
A 53A01 U	PCS REPORTS	8T-400		
60A01 N	CUBA	HAVANA	60	UNK
60A01	MEMBER MIKOYAN ENTOURAGE TO CUBA FOR EXPOSITION			
60A01 U		REDCAP		13 NOV 64
A 61A01 G	3RD SECRETARY/ASSISTANT CULTURAL OFFICER			
A 61A01 H				8602777
A 61A01 M	EMBASSY			
A 61A01 N	MEX	MEXICO CITY	31 JUL 61	FR JUL 65
A 61A01 Q	PROMOTED 2ND SECRETARY FR JUL 65			
A 61A01 U	PCS REPORTS	SCI		2 OCT 63
A 61A01 W	MEXICAN DIP LIST JUL 65			
61A02 M	PACHUCA CONDESA			153/405
61A02 N	MEX	MEXICO CITY	61	64
61A02 Q	RESIDENCE			
61A02 U	REDCAP	HMMA 33293	201-132139	16 OCT 67
61A03 N	USA	NEW YORK	61	UNK
61A03 Q	SUBJ LEFT NEW YORK FOR MEX 31 JUL 61			
61A03 U		REDCAP		13 NOV 64
A 61A04 G	2ND SECRETARY/ PRESS ATTACHE			
A 61A04 K	KNOWN SOV ST SEC			
A 61A04 M	EMBASSY			
A 61A04 N	MEX	MEXICO CITY	FR JUL 65	22 DEC 68
A 61A04 Q	PROMOTED FR JUL 65			
A 61A04 U	PCS REPORTS	HMMA 33293	201-132139	18 OCT 67
A 61A04 W	HMMA-36146, 31 DEC 68 HMMA-36147, 31 DEC 68			
A 61A04 X	LEONOV AND WIFE FREQUENTLY ST CODS WITH EACH OTHER			ENGLISH
C 62A01 J	OFFICER			
C 62A01 K	KNOWN SOV ST SEC			
C 62A01	MEX	MEXICO CITY	62	UNK

A 73A03 T	REPLACEM
A 73A03 U	PCS REPO
A 73A04 R	DEGTYAR
A 73A04 S	MEX
A 73A04 T	REPLACEM
A 73A04 U	PCS REPO
A 76A04 R	ROGOV
A 76A04 S	UK
A 76A04 T	REPLACEM
A 76A04 U	PCS REPO
00A00 A	011180
00A00 B	BORINSKIY
00A00 C	
00A00 D	USSR
00A00 E	WIFE TAIS
T 46A01 B	BORINSKIY
52A01 B	
T 46A01	
52A01 C	
T 46A01 D	USSR
52A01 D	USSR

08/07/77 PAGE

011180

T 46A01 E	WIFE TAISI
A 51A01 F	WIFE TAIS
A 51A01 F	DAU VALEN
T 00A01 F	KNOWN SOV
T 00A01 V	OVERT
T 00A01 W	HARR
T 46A01 G	EMPLOYEE
T 46A01 H	UNRRA
T 46A01 N	USA
T 46A01	NATL ARCH
T 46A02 G	CHIEF OF
T 46A02	UNRRA
T 46A02 N	GLAVZIST
T 46A02	OVERT
T 46A02 W	MAFSH
A 51A01 G	DEPUTY EXE
A 51A01 H	
A 51A01 M	
A 51A01 N	
A 51A01	
52A01 G	EXECUTIVE
52A01 H	OFFICE
52A01 J	OFFICER
52A01 K	KNOWN SOV
52A01 N	SWIS
52A01 U	ENCAPLE
00A00 A	011188
00A00 B	LNUER
00A00 C	
00A00 D	SWED
57A01 B	LNUER
57A01 C	
57A01 D	SWED
57A01 G	DIPLOMAT
57A01 J	TARGET,
57A01 K	T/KNOWN S
57A01 N	USSR
57A01 Q	EITHER UKF
57A01 U	POLAPLE
57A01 Z	ENU SWED
00A00 A	011191
00A00 B	MESHKOV
00A00 C	USSR
00A00 D	USSR
00A00 E	WIFE VALENT
A 61A02 B	MESHKOV
A 61A01 C	USSR
62A01 C	USSR
A 61A02 D	USSR
A 61A01 D	
A 68A01 D	
A 75A01 D	

** C18**

SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE
CONT.

011155

Code	Entry			
A 50A01 F	E4 GOOD			POLISH
A 53A01 E	T 5/07 W 155 H BRN BLD SMALL			
A 61A01 E	WIFE VALERIYA IVANOVNA B 28 APR 28 RYAZAN			
A 61A01 F	DAU IRINA NIKOLAYEVNA B 62			
61A02 E	E4 EXCELLENT			SPANISH
A 61A04 F				FRENCH
00A01 Y	SUSP RIS PROB ST SEC			
00A01 H	FOHELMET		74-6-626/A	
00A02 J	CHIEF OF TECHNICAL SECTION			
00A02 K	KNOWN SOV ST SEC			
00A02 N	AUST	BADEN		
00A03 N	MEX			
00A04 H				50023018
C 00A06 K	KNOWN SOV ST SEC			
C 00A06 U	POSTORAGE	SX-5555/62	74-5-112	JAN 77
C 00A06 W	SEE HOLDER OF FILE FOR ADDITIONAL INFO			
A 50A01 G	EMPLOYEE			
A 50A01 Y	SUSP RIS PROB ST SEC			
A 50A01 M	CONSULATE			
A 50A01 N	POLD	WARSAW	CA 50	CA 53
A 50A01 U	PCS REPORTS	RT-400		19 AUG 69
A 53A01 G	EMPLOYEE ADMINISTRATIVE			
A 53A01 H				MB02778
A 53A01 M	EMBASSY			
A 53A01 N	MEX	MEXICO CITY	CA 25 MAY 53	17 OCT 56
A 53A01 U	PCS REPORTS	RT-400		19 AUG 69
60A01 N	CUBA	HAVANA	60	UNK
60A01 G	MEMBER MIKOYAN ENTOURAGE TO CUBA FOR EXPOSITION			
60A01 U		REDCAP		13 NOV 64
A 61A01 G	3RD SECRETARY/ASSISTANT CULTURAL OFFICER			
A 61A01 H				MB02777
A 61A01 M	EMBASSY			
A 61A01 N	MEX	MEXICO CITY	31 JUL 61	PR JUL 65
A 61A01 Q	PROMOTED 2ND SECRETARY PR JUL 65			
A 61A01 U	PCS REPORTS	SCI		2 OCT 63
A 61A01 W	MEXICAN DIP LIST JUL 65			
61A02 M	PACHUCA CONDESA			153/405
61A02 N	MEX	MEXICO CITY	61	64
61A02 Z	RESIDENCE			
61A02 U	REDCAP	HMMA 33293	201-13[illegible]	18 OCT 67
61A03 N	USA	NEW YORK	61	UNK
61A03 G	SUBJ LEFT NEW YORK FOR MEX 31 JUL 61			
61A03 U		REDCAP		13 NOV 64
A 61A04 G	2ND SECRETARY/ PRESS ATTACHE			
A 61A04 K	KNOWN SOV ST SEC			
A 61A04 M	EMBASSY			
A 61A04 N	MEX	MEXICO CITY	PR JUL 65	22 DEC 68
A 61A04 Q	PROMOTED PR JUL 64			
A 61A04 U	PCS REPORTS	HMMA 33293	201-132139	18 OCT 67
A 61A04 W	HMMA-36146, 31 DEC 68 HMMA-36147, 31 DEC 68			
A 61A04 X	LEGNOV AND WIFE FREQUENTLY AT ODDS WITH EACH OTHER			ENGLISH
C 62A01 J	OFFICER			
C 62A01 K	KNOWN SOV ST SEC			
C 62A01 N	MEX	MEXICO CITY	62	UNK

** D1**

SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE
CONT.

011155

Code	Entry			
C 62A01 U	POSTORAGE-241	SX-3735		14 MAY 63
C 62A01 W	CONTACT HOLDER OF FILE FOR ADDITIONAL INFO			
[illegible]	[illegible]	CURACAO	62	UNK

14-00000

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SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE E2 IMPDET CL BY 005877

SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE
CONT.

011155

C 62A01 U POSTOFAGE-241 SX-3735 MAY 63
C 62A01 W CONTACT HOLDER OF FILE FOR ADDITIONAL INFO
62A02 N DWIN CURACAO 62 UNK
62A02 Q SUBJ TO LEAVE MEX FOR DWIN 27 AUG 62 ENROUTE TRIN
62A02 U REDCAP 13 NOV 64
62A03 N MEX MEXICO CITY 62 UNK
62A03 Q SUBJ RETURNED MEX FROM DWIN AND TRIN 8 SEP 62
62A03 U REDCAP 13 NOV 64
62A04 N TRIN PORT OF SPAIN 62 UNK
62A04 Q SUBJ TO LEAVE DWIN FOR PORT OF SPAIN 28 AUG 62
62A04 U REDCAP 13 NOV 64
63A01 J INTEL OFFICER
63A01 K KNOWN SOV ST SEC
63A01 M PACHUCA 353
63A01 N MEX MEXICO CITY 63 UNK
63A01 U REDCAP 63
63A02 N USSR MOSCOW UNK
63A02 U REDCAP 13 NOV 64
63A02 Y SUBJ WENT MOSCOW WITH CASTRO SEE KRUSHCHEV RE PLAN FOR
63A02 Z SUBVERSIVE ACTION TO BE CARRIED OUT FROM CUBA AND MEX
63A03 N MEX MEXICO CITY 63 UNK
63A03 U REDCAP 13 NOV 64
63A03 Y SUBJ IN CLANDESTINE CONTACT ARMS SMUGGLERS MAY 63
64A01 N MEX MEXICO CITY 64 UNK
64A01 G RETURNED MEXICO CITY 10 OCT 64
64A01 U LIFIRE/LICRAVE-1 MEXI 1218 14 OCT 64
64A01 Y SUBJ HAD NEW PASSPORT BELIEVED BE WORKING AS TRANSLATOR
C 75A01 K KNOWN SOV ST SEC
C 75A01 N USSR 75
C 75A01 U POSTOFAGE SX-5555/25 74-5-102 07 APR 75
C 75A01 W CONTACT HOLDER OF FILE FOR ADDITIONAL INFO
B 76A01 G DELEGATE
B 76A01 M UNGA 31ST SESSION
B 76A01 N USA NEW YORK 19 SEP 76 OCT 76
B 76A01 [illegible] PRESENCE REPORTS
B 76A01 [illegible] FBI MACHINE DOSSIER L-319 L UNS 22 NOV 76
00A05 R SHPALEVICH VLADIMIR IVANOVICH 017922
00A05 S MEX MEXICO CITY
00A05 U 201-SUMMARY APR 65
A 54A01 R SAPRONOVA VERA VLADIMIROVNA
A 54A01 S MEX SEP 54
A 54A01 T SAPRONOVA LIVED WITH LEONOV FAMILY
A 54A01 U PCS REPORTS SFR JAN 66
56A01 R CASTRO FIDEL 013128
56A01 S MEX MEXICO CITY 21 JUN 56
56A01 T WHEN CASTRO ARRESTED MEXI 21 JUN 56 HAD CALLING CARD LEONOV
56A01 U REDCAP 13 NOV 64
N 56A02 R SALGO RENEE BURGER 287911
N 56A02 S FRAN FEB 56
N 56A02 T LEONOV CONTACT SALGO
N 56A02 U AGENCY RT-400 20 JUN 74
61A05 R BROVKIN ALEKSANDR MIKHAYLOVICH 022520
61A05 S MEX MEXICO CITY 61 67
61A05 T LEONOV WORKS CLOSELY WITH BROVKIN

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SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE E2 IMPDET CL BY 005877

SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE
CONT.

011155

61A05 U REDCAP HMMA 33293 201-132139 18 OCT 67
62A05 R NOVIKOV VLADIMIR G 010484
62A05 S MEX MEXICO CITY 62

011191

A 52A01 E
A 61A01 E
A 61A02 F
62A01 E
62A01 F
A 68A01 E SON
F 75A01 F
F 00A01 U
F 00A01 W
A 52A01 G ATTA
A 52A01 M EMBA
A 52A01 N
A 52A01 Q
A 52A01 U PCS
A 52A01 Z
A 52A02 G
A 52A02 M EMBA
A 52A02 N
A 52A02 G
A 52A02 U PCS
A 52A02 W
61A01 N
61A01 Q
61A01 U
A 61A02 G 2ND S
A 61A02
A 61A02 M EMBA
A 61A02 N
A 61A02 Q
A 61A02 U PCS
A 61A02 W
62A01
62A01
62A01
62A01 U
A 63A01 G 1ST S
A 63A01 M EMBA
A 63A01 N
A 63A01 Q FROM
A 63A01 U
A 68A01
A 68A01
A 68A01 M EMBA
A 68A01 N
A 68A01 U
A 68A01 W
68A01 U
A 75A01 G MINIS
A 75A01 M EMBA
A 75A01 N
A 75A01 U PCS
A 75A01 W
F 75A02 U
F 76A01 L
08/07/77 PAGE

011191
F 76A01 U
61A03 R NECHA
61A03 S ETHI
61A03 T MESHK

E18

SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE
CONT.

011155

61A05 U REDCAP HMMA 33293 201-132139 18 OCT 67
62A05 R NOVIKOV VLADIMIR 010484
62A05 S MEX MEXICO CITY 62
62A05 T LEONOV FORMERLY WORKED AS ASST FOR NOVIKOV
62A05 U REDCAP 13 NOV 64
62A06 R BAZAROV SEMEN TARASOVICH 000559
62A06 S TWIN CURACAO 27 AUG 62
62A06 T LEONOV ACCOMPANYING BAZAROV TRIP TO TWIN AND TRIN
62A06 U REDCAP 13 NOV 64
62A07 R BAZAROV SEMEN TARASOVICH 000559
62A07 S TRIN PORT OF SPAIN 23 AUG 62
62A07 T LEONOV ACCOMPANYING BAZAROV ON TRIP
62A07 U REDCAP 13 NOV 64
62A08 R KUZNETSOV SVYATOSLAV FEDOROVICH 003738
62A08 S MEX MEXICO CITY 62
62A08 T LEONOV WORKED FOR KUZNETSOV
62A08 U REDCAP 13 NOV 64
62A09 R GLOTOV VIKTOR NIKOLAYEVICH 008172
62A09 S MEX MEXICO CITY 62
62A09 T GLOTOV CRITICIZED LEONOV FOR FAILING APPEAR WHERE ORDERED
62A09 U REDCAP 13 NOV 64
62A10 R SL[illegible] NIKOLAY 006489
62A10 S MEX MEXICO CITY SEP 62 JUL 64
62A10 T COLLEAGUE
62A10 U LILYRIC HMMA-23983 30 JUL 64
62A11 R FLORES HORACIO 032096
62A11 S MEX MEXICO CITY 62
62A11 T NO REPORT ON NATURE LEONOV CONTACT WITH FLORES
62A11 U REDCAP 13 NOV 64
62A12 R BAZAROV SEMEN 000559
62A12 S MEX MEXICO CITY 27 AUG 62 08 SEP 62
62A12 T UNKNOWN
62A12 U REDCAP 05 OCT 64
62A13 R FLORES HORACIO SANCHEZ 025125
62A13 S MEX MEXICO CITY 62
62A13 T NO REPORT ON NATURE OF CONTACT W/FLORES
62A13 U AGENCY REDCAP 13 NOV 64
63A04 R ANTONOV SERGEY NIKOLAYEVICH 15317
63A04 S MEX MEXICO CITY SEP 63
63A04 T LEONOV IN FREQUENT TOUCH ANTONOV DURING LATTER MEX
63A04 U REDCAP 13 NOV 64
63A05 R CARDENAS LORENZO [illegible]
63A05 S MEX MEXICO CITY 12 APR 63
63A05 T LEONOV VISITED HOME CARDENAS.
63A05 U REDCAP 13 NOV 64
63A06 R FERRER OLGA 032095
63A06 S MEX MEXICO CITY 0 SEP 63
63A06 T FERRER MADE ARRANGEMENT MEET LEONOV EVENING 02 SEP 63
63A06 U REDCAP 13 NOV 64
63A07 R FLORES ROBERTO JARAMILLO 32197
63A07 S MEX MEXICO CITY 05 AUG 63
63A07 T FLORES TALKED TO LEONOV RE URGENT MATTER AGUA PRIETA, SONOR
63A07 U REDCAP 13 NOV 64
63A08 R JOHNSON JR CHARLES WILLIAMS 032101

E18

SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE
CONT.

011155

63A08 S MEX MEXICO CITY 08 OCT 63
63A08 T LEONOV PHONED JOHNSON RE RUSSIAN LESSONS
63A08 U REDCAP 13 NOV 64
63A09 R TULIO HUGO 032110
63A09 S MEX MEXICO CITY 30 OCT 63
63A09 T TULIO IN TOUCH LEONOV RE SUPPLY SOV BOOKS AND PUBLICATIONS
63A09 U REDCAP 13 NOV 64
64A02 R KONSTANTINOV SERGEY SERGEYEVICH 003200
64A02 S MEX MEXICO CITY 23 MAR 64
64A02 T UNKNOWN
64A02 U 201 SUMMARY 16 MAR 65 [illegible]

14-00000

63A0? U RELCAP 13 NOV 64
63A0? R JOHNSON JR CHARLES WILLIAMS 032101

08/07/77 PAGE 5312 011155
SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE E2 IMPDET CL BY 005877

SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE
011155 CONT.

63A08 S	MEX	MEXICO CITY	08 OCT 63	
63A08 T	LEONOV PHONED JOHNSON RE RUSSIAN LESSONS			
63A08 U	RELCAP			13 NOV 64
63A09 R	TULIO	HUGO		032110
63A09 S	MEX	MEXICO CITY	30 OCT 63	
63A09 T	TULIO IN TOUCH LEONOV RE SUPPLY SOV BOOKS AND PUBLICATIONS			
63A09 U	RELCAP			13 NOV 64
64A02 R	KONSTANTINOV	SERGEY	SERGEYEVICH	003200
64A02 S	MEX	MEXICO CITY	23 MAR 64	
64A02 T	UNKNOWN			
64A02 U		201 SUMMARY		19 MAR 65
64A03 R	CULIN	VLADIMIR		023605
64A03 S	MEX	MEXICO CITY	03 FEB 64	
64A03 T	COLLEAGUE			
64A03 U		201 SUMMARY		[illegible]
64A04 R	KUKHARENKO	SERGEY		018479
64A04 S	MEX	MEXICO CITY	10 OCT 64	
64A04 T	LEONOV TO REPLACE KUKHARENKO AS CHIEF PRESS ATTACHE EMB			
64A04 U	STATE			24 OCT 64
64A05 R	FERRER	OLGA		032095
64A05 S	MEX	MEXICO CITY	29 JAN 64	
64A05 T	FERRER MET WITH LEONOV 29 JAN 64			
64A05 U	RELCAP			13 NOV 64
A 65A01 R	BELFRAGE	CEDRIC	HENNING	015079
A 65A01 S	MEX	MEXICO CITY	65	
A 65A01 T	LEONOV AND WIFE ON FRIENDLY TERMS WITH BELFRGE AND WIFE			
A 65A01 U	FCS REPORTS	HMMA 33293	201-132139	18 OCT 67
66A01 R	NIKIFOROV	LEONID	VASILYEVICH	027106
66A01 S	MEX	MEXICO CITY	DEC 66	67
66A01 T	LEONOV PROB MET NIKIFOROV IN CHAPULTEPEC PARK			
66A01 U		SPR	201-756168	22 SEP 67
67A01 R	CARDENAS	LORENZO	BARAJAS	032091
67A01 S	MEX	MEXICO CITY	67	
67A01 T	CLANDESTINE CONTACT			
67A01 U		HMMA 33293	201-43.139	18 OCT 67

00A00 A	011162			
00A00 B	MALRAUX	ANDRE		
00A00 C				
00A00 D	FRAN			
00A01 B	MALRAUX	ANDRE		
T 29A01 B	MALRAUX	ANDRE		
T 29A01 C				
T 29A01 D	FRAN			
T 33A01 E	WIFE CLARA			
00A01 U	FUNEVLND	OFPA 28540	100-6-113	15 MAR 57
00A01 W	FROM INTERROGATION OF A OBOBO JANE ZLATOVSKY			
T 00A05 V	OVERT	CD-664 P364	100-6-13974	63
T 00A05 W	SERGE VICTOR.MEMOIRS OF A REVOLUTIONARY			
T 29A01 G	WRITER			
T 29A01 N	USSR	MOSCOW	29	UNK
T 29A01 Q	ON VISIT			
T 29A01 V	OVERT	CD-1100 P195-351		41
T 29A01 W	FISCHER, LOUIS MEN AND POLITICS			

08/07/77 PAGE 5313 011162
SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE E2 IMPDET CL BY 005877

SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE
011162 CONT.

T 33A01 N	FRAN	PARIS	33	UNK
T 33A01 V	OVERT	CD-1466 P??? 307	100-6-13974	67

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ___

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ACTION #

INFO RF FILE. VR.

T 041941 EIA533 PAGE 01-01 IN 355710

TOR:262225Z JUL 77 BOGO 31183

S E C R E T 262216Z JUL 77 STAFF

CITE BOGOTA 31183

TO: DIRECTOR, PANAMA CITY.

WNINTEL RYBAT CKLEG PDQUICK TRACE

REF: DIRECTOR 070125

1. TRAVEL INFORMATION RECEIVED TODAY INDICATES LEONOV DEPARTED BOGOTA FOR FRANKFURT ON 3 JUL ABOARD VIASA FLIGHT #903.

2. FILE: 201-0132139; 201-0101794. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

PANAMA CICTOP

OUTGOING MESSAGE

11-3

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PAGE 1

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SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP: 222151Z

CITE: DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 070125

CONF: C/LA 5 INFO: FILE C/IP/DMS, C/SE 4

DISSEM BY: 43

PER 32P

111

TO: PANAMA CITY INFO BOGOTA.Y

UNINTEL RYBAT CKLEG PDQUICK TRACE Y

REFS: A. X/00/9787-77, 18 JULY 1977 (NOT SENT BOGOTA)

B. DIRECTOR 060370

C. PANAMA CITY 41931 (IN 329718) Y

1. FOLLOWING IS FOR STATIONS' BACKGROUND ONLY. Y

2. BELIEVE SOVIET PERSON CITED REF A MAY BE IDENTICAL WITH NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH L E O N O V (201-132139), BORN USSR 22 AUGUST 1928. GRADUATED AT UNKNOWN DATE FROM THE INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS IN MOSCOW. FROM JULY 1953 UNTIL OCTOBER 1956 SERVED AS INTERPRETER AND SECRETARY TO THE AMBASSADOR AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY. FROM 1956 TO 1961 REPORTEDLY ATTENDED KGB SCHOOL AND SERVED AT KGB HQS. HE TRAVELED TDY TO MEXICO IN NOVEMBER 1959 AND TO CUBA IN 1960 AS INTERPRETER. IN JULY 1961 HE RETURNED TO MEXICO CITY AS THIRD SECRETARY AND ASSISTANT CULTURAL ATTACHE OF SOVIET EMBASSY AND SERVED THERE UNTIL JUNE 1964. FROM OCTOBER 1964 UNTIL DECEMBER 1968 HE WAS SECOND SECRETARY AND PRESS ATTACHE AT MEXICO CITY EMBASSY. FROM APRIL 1969 UNTIL JULY 1969 HE SERVED

IP/EHI	X	ABSTRACT
		INDEX
IP/AB		CODE NO. (2, 3)
		RYBAT REST. CODE
		CABLE IDEN (11)
		NFD (8)
		FOR FILING

SE/X/CA

DATE: 22 JULY 77
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

201-132139
22 Jul 77

B 201-101794

RECORD COPY

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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CLASSIFICATION
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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
CITE: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

070125

DISSEM BY: PER #

TEMPORARILY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF SOVIET NOVOSTI NEWS AGENCY IN LIMA. DURING TOURS IN MEXICO LEONOV WAS CONSISTENTLY ACTIVE IN SUPPORT OF LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, PARTICULARLY THOSE RELATED TO GUATEMALA. Y

3. SENSITIVE FYI ONLY: PER PDSTORAGE, AS OF 1976 LEONOV WAS CHIEF OF SERVICE NO. 1 (INFORMATION) OF KGB FIRST (FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE) DIRECTORATE IN MOSCOW. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: POSITION IS EQUIVALENT TO BKHERALD CHIEF OF REPORTS.) LEONOV HAS BEEN CONSIDERED FOR AT LEAST TWO AMBASSADORIAL POSTS. Y

4. REF A INDICATES THAT LEONOV RECENTLY WAS IN PANAMA. THERE IS POSSIBILITY THAT VISIT WAS MADE IN COMPANY OF VLADIMIR KONSTANTINOVICH T O L S T I K O V, FELLOW KGB OFFICER WITH WHOM LEONOV SERVED IN MEXICO DURING 1962-66 PERIOD (REF B). WASHINGTON CUSTOMERS ARE VERY INTERESTED IN OBJECTIVES AND ACCOMPLISHMENT OF SOVIET INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS DURING VISIT TO PANAMA AND PROBABLY TO BOGOTA (REF C). HAVE STATIONS OBTAINED ANY INFORMATION ON THIS TOPIC? Y

5. FILE: 201-132139, 201-101794. E2 IMPDET.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E2 IMPDET

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

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CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP:
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER:

CONF: / INFO: FILE

070125

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

ORIG: LA/PNC/P {THOMPSON-1454}; COORD: SE/CI/X {CROCKER};
LA/OPS {DiStefano}; SE/RR{EVERETT}; AUTH: C/LA/PNC {DESMOND}; REL: DC/LA
{LAUDER} {WARREN}.

LA COMMENT: A. SENSITIVE SOURCE INFORMATION REFERING TO SOVIET PERSON

B. TRACES ON SOVIET INTEL OFFICER WHO MAY RECENTLY HAVE VISITED PANAMA

C. PANAMA CITY REQUESTS BOGOTA STATION ASSISTANCE IN IDENTIFYING SOVIET VISITOR

DATE: 22 JULY 77
ORIG: D. THOMPSON:RJ
UNIT: LA/PNC/P
EXT: 1454

SE/X/LA
SE/RR

DC/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

SE/CI/X
LA/OPS
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/PNC
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

E 2 IMPDET

14-00000

SECRET

28 JUL 1977

TO : Office of Central Reference/
Information Services Group
ATTN: Karen Davis, USSR Division

FROM : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: LEONOV, Nikolay Sergeyevich (U/AIUO)

1. (U/AIUO) Reference is made to your telephonic request dated 19 July 1977 for information concerning Subject.

2. (S) Our files show no indication of any connection between Subject and prominent Soviet officials.

3. (S) According to a reliable defector source, Nikolay LEONOV was identified as a KGB officer.

4. (S) Subject was graduated from the Institute of Foreign Relations in Moscow, at an unknown date. From July 1953 until October 1956 he served as an interpreter and Secretary to the Ambassador at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, Mexico. He traveled to Mexico in November 1959 and to Cuba in February 1960 as an interpreter. In July 1961 he returned to Mexico City as Third Secretary and Assistant Cultural Attache at the Embassy and served in this capacity until June 1964. He was assigned there again in October 1964 as Second Secretary and Press Attache. He remained in this position until December 1968. From April 1969 until July 1969 he served temporarily as representative of the Soviet News Agency Novosti in Lima, Peru.

CIR-316/02384-77
IP/EIS: J Edwards/L Foltz/et
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER: C/IP/RB
BASED ON: XAE 1251 dated 15 October 1976
HMMA 29141 dated 8 June 1966
FILE IN: 201-132139
COORD IN DRAFT:
SE/CI/X: M Biskup
LA/MEXI: R Lehman

RECORD COPY

21 July 1977
316-02384 77
201-132139

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exemption category 5B (1), (2), (3)
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SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TELEPHONIC REQUEST

TELEPHONIC REQUEST	DATE

REQUESTING AGENCY	REPLY
OCR via Karen Davis for State X9187 FBI	

REQUEST TAKEN BY	DATE	ANALYST
Stacey	19 July 1977	

SUBJECT (Last, First, Middle)
Leonov, Nikolay Sergeyevich

AKA OR NEE

DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP
22 Aug 1928	USSR	

OCCUPATION (Include Dates)	RESIDENCE (Country, Town/City, Street, Include Dates)

FATHER (Last, First, Middle)	MOTHER (Last, First, Middle, Include Nee)

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA

IP/ETS		20 July 77
ANALYST	Linda Foltz	
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SIEMPRE
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DESTACADO LATINOAMERICANISTA RUSO NIKOLAI LEÓNOV, QUE VIVIÓ 12 AÑOS EN MÉXICO, HABLA A SIEMPRE! DE LOS MUCHOS PROBLEMAS DE NUESTRA AMÉRICA

POR INNA VASILKOVA

Estimado Sr. Pagés:

Nikolái Leónov –uno de los principales latinoamericanistas soviéticos de hoy, doctor en Ciencias Históricas y hombre por lo regular moderado en manifestar sus sentimientos– se pone sentimental cuando se habla de México...

"Considero a México, hasta cierto punto, mi segunda patria –dice–. He vivido allí doce años en total. Me enamoré de él a primera vista y estoy seguro de que mi cariño a este país no se empañará con los años."

Poco amigo de las entrevistas, esta vez Nikolái ha hecho una excepción. Para **SIEMPRE!** y para mí.

Ante todo, hablamos de la capital. Tanto más que Leónov publicó hace poco en la revista soviética *America Latina*, un extenso ensayo sobre ella. Pido a Nikolái que diga lo que, a su parecer, determina la fisonomía de esa ciudad.

Leónov: Cuando rememoro la ciudad de México e intento dilucidar en qué conjuntos arquitectónicos de la capital mexicana está mejor reflejado el espíritu de la nación, me vienen a las mientes, ante todo, los nuevos monumentos. Esos en los que se ha perpetuado la heroica lucha del pueblo por su independencia política y económica. Y entre ellos, en primer lugar, el dedicado a los "Niños Héroes", los cuales, aunque no pudieron librar de los norteamericanos a la ciudad, a costa de sus vidas salvaron el honor y la dignidad de la nación. Eso para mí es el símbolo de México... Recuerdo que el general Ridgway, verdugo del pueblo coreano, visitó México y depositó una corona al pie del monumento. A la mañana siguiente la corona estaba ante la puerta de la embajada de los EE.UU. con la siguiente inscripción: "De asesinos no admitimos coronas".

Un símbolo de México es también el monumento a los trabajadores del petróleo. No se puede ver con frecuencia en un Estado capitalista un monumento a obreros, y que además, éstos no estén representados en un estilo banal-alegórico, sino en el proceso del trabajo.

Al pensar en México, recuerdo siempre asimismo la obra simbólica de Francisco Eppens en la fachada de la Facultad de Medicina de la Universidad. La gigantesca cabeza que ocupa el centro de la composición es, para mí, personificación de la nación mexicana; en ella parecen haberse fundido tres caras: la de una mujer india, la de un hombre español y la de un mestizo.

Y por último, la singular plaza de las Tres Culturas. Me parece que esa "triada" es precisamente lo que da a la ciudad de México su originalidad sin par.

Pregunta: Pero una ciudad no son sólo las

En 1968, en la inauguración de la XIX Olimpiada.

Leónov con Siqueiros, en su taller de Cuernavaca.

Leónov: Para comprender aunque no sea más que un poco el alma mexicana hay que ver, por lo menos, tres cosas: la plaza del Zócalo en la noche del 15 al 16 de septiembre, una corrida y la plaza de Garibaldi.

En la plaza del Zócalo se percibe con particular agudeza el hálito del pasado remoto, de la rica y turbulenta historia del país, que forjara el carácter de la nación. Allí se llega a comprender a fondo el arrogante amor de los mexicanos a su patria, sus seculares anhelos de libertad e independencia y su odio abrasador a los colonizadores de todo género, que hollaran inclementemente la antigua cultura y las tradiciones del país.

La corrida es una emocionante fiesta de valor, destreza y, de seguro, suerte, donde brota a raudales el fogoso temperamento de los mexicanos. Entre las infinitas tradiciones de la corrida mexicana, una es de mi grado en particular: la de perdonar la vida y poner en libertad al toro que por su bravura, potencia y tesón se gana la simpatía del público. Me subyuga la sabiduría del bicho que tiene como base tal costumbre y que emplear al hablar ...

nes que interpretaban mariachis. Para mí eso era siempre una fiesta. Y no sólo porque estoy enamorado del arte popular mexicano. Allí el alma mexicana se ofrece abierta de par en par, poniendo en evidencia su prodigalidad espiritual, su afecto y, lo que es más importante, la habilidad de compartir con uno –sin que ello resulte importuno– la alegría y la tristeza. Se sienta usted alegre y afligido, los mariachis están siempre dispueto a embellecer la alegría o a hacer romántica la tristeza.

El Robin Hood de América Latina

En agosto del año pasado, cuando Fidel castro cumplio cincuenta años, Leónov publicó en la revista soviética América Latina un artículo titulado "Salud te deseamos, Fidel". Aquello no era tanto una característica de relevante hombre, cuando una exposición de todo lo grande que tiene la nación cubana. Aparte de que, como historiador, Nikolái Leónov se ha dedicado a estudiar la Revolución Cubana y a sus líderes, con Fidel le liga

Rubén Figueroa Come

Ave De Las Tempestad

mía universitaria, entendida según el concepto ya generalizado de la libertad de cátedra y de investigación científica, no como zona extraterritorial en el marco de las instituciones jurídicas ni como fuero para vulnerar el orden público ni los intereses sociales". Insistió en que son las autoridades judiciales las que han realizado averiguaciones sobre la presunta injerencia de universitarios, maestros y alumnos, en el secuestro y muerte de varias personas. Ante eso Figueroa Dijo: "Yo no he inventado los secuestros; mucho menos los muertos, cosa bien difícil". Añadiría, tras otras consideraciones, que "a nadie se le ha detenido en razón de sus ideas o de su militancia políticas. Cuando éstas han salido a relucir en los procesos legales, ha sido por propia declaración de los inculpados". En 1976 el gobierno del estado concedió a la Universidad de Guerrero un subsidio total de 19 millones 610 mil 482 pesos con 64 centavos, que casi duplica el otorgado el año inmediato anterior al inicio del gobierno de Figueroa. El gobernador reveló ante el Congreso y el numeroso públicó, que hay sectores locales que le han llamado la atención sobre un uso inadecuado del subsidio por parte de las autoridades de la Universidad y afirmó que "toda institución que recibe un subsidio tiene la obligación ineludible de informar a la sociedad respecto de su empleo, del mismo modo que los gobernantes informamos de nuestros actos y de la aplicación del presupuesto".

Al margen de la polémica, que siguió mantenida en esta parte del informe –o quizás como consecuencia de ello– Rubén Figueroa, hizo una proposición que constituye novedad en la materia; advirtiendo que no se vaya a interpretar mal su opinión y se piense que él se propone proscribir la enseñanza superior en Guerrero. Lo que desea es –aclaró– contribuir a la búsqueda de una solución pronta, eficaz y realista a este problema. Su gobierno está en posibilidad de aplicar una parte equitativa de su gasto educativo en becas otorgadas a alumnos de escasos recursos que deberían asistir a lo que llamó la Universidad compartida y solidaria. En el ambiente quedó una interrogante que demandaba una explicación de este concepto sorpresivamente nuevo. No flotó por mucho tiempo, pues acto seguido el gobernador contestó así: "Entiendo por Universidad compartida y solidaria un sistema nacional de enseñanza superior que, independientemente del que existe en el Valle de México, pueda instituir en cada entidad federativa una o varias escuelas, institutos o facultades que adopten aquellas especialidades que reclamen las características y las más ingentes necesidades de cada estado, a fin de que no se despilfarren recursos ni se malogren esfuerzos en la repetición de las mismas especialidades o profesiones, lo que redunda en la formación de profesionales frustrados, que no tienen ocupación".

la pesca, actividades de enorme importancia y de gran entidad, la cual carece de verdaderos especialistas. Esto n carreras liberales, las cuales según el plán del gobernado sujetas a otro régimen en el que los interesados cubran e enseñanza, mediante becas, crédito educativo o cuotas re Otra vez frente a cualquier interpretación, el gobernador "no estoy colocándome en el plan de reformador de l universitaria a escala nacional. Sólo indago las posibilid solución a un problema que particularmente en mi estado y sobrepasa nuestra capacidad económica".

Refiriéndose en circulo íntimo esta incursión en delicada cuanto conflictiva, el ingeniero Figueroa dijo al más, propio de su estilo: "Ni modo, me lancé al agua fría' comentó: "¿Y qué? Si usted nada todos los días".

Al licenciado Reyes Heroles, el gobernador Figue llevarle al presidente López Portillo el recado de que toman en cuenta todas sus recomendaciones para impulsar del estado, en lo agropecuario, lo industrial, en lo educa turístico, igual en lo relativo a la salud del pueblo como a la familiar, lo mismo a los derechos sociales como a las individuales, "pues deseamos que la incipiente democrac Guerrero empieza a abrirse paso, lo sea sobre bases sólidas, y políticas, en un ambiente de verdadera solidaridad social".

Si bien el informe del gobernador no fue un mazacote h reiterativas afirmaciones burocráticas, tampoco la respuesta sentante presidencial, Reyes Heroles consistió en las palab tradicional cortesía que el centro debe a los estados. Si Guerrero, por conducto de su gobernador, expresa su decidida en la alianza democrática popular y revolucionari producción, para satisfacer las auténticas necesidades de la mayorías. Pero lo más significativo fue que el secretario de Go escogiera Guerrero para anunciar una serie de reformas que p a las minorías tener representación reconocida. Y esas minoría son más que los partidos y grupos de izquierda afuera del electoral. Clamó allí contra la intolerancia que "sería el camir para volver a México bronco y violento. Señaló, ante los enfre tos ideológicos, a quienes desearían que surgiera la autor derecho, y, en otro lado, a los que recurriendo a las vías d violentas o atentatorias de derecho, desearían que en México se triste caso del derecho sin autoridad. Para unos y otros, dijo, la del Gobierno Federal es bien clara: ni autoridad sin derecho ni

Jinete sobre el espinazo de Améric

El 'Charro' Leono



Durante la ceremonia solemne de la entrega por Leonid Brezhnev a Fidel Castro de la Orden de Lenin y la Estrella de Oro del Héroe de la Unión Soviética, en mayo de 1963. A la izquierda, N. Leónov.

Castro es, sin duda, una Personalidad con mayúscula. ¿Cómo definiría usted el papel de él en la historia de Cuba?

Leónov: Los numerosos biógrafos de Fidel, de entre los historiadores burgueses, hacen desesperados intentos de hallar ciertos factores externos que puedan explicar la victoria de la Revolución en Cuba. Se suelen remitir a fenómenos de orden subjetivo, repitiendo la versión sobre la "culpabilidad" de Eisenhower, que prefirió jugar un partido de golf a entrevistarse con Castro cuando éste visitó los EE.UU. en la primavera de 1959. Y ninguno de esos "investigadores" ha querido analizar las regularidades objetivas de carácter socio-económico ni el papel del mismo Fidel, quien sutil y oportunamente captó la orientación principal del desarrollo histórico y guió enérgicamente al país por el nuevo camino. Aquél fue un trabajo muy duro. Si antes Fidel hubo de dar reiteradas muestras de heroísmo personal, ahora ponía de manifiesto una colosal valentía política como hombre de Estado, asumiendo la responsabilidad por todas las decisiones relacionadas con la reestructuración del país. El aporte personal de Fidel a la primeros años consecutivos a la victoria de la Revolución había que dar a las masas trabajadoras la posibilidad de palpar inmediatamente los frutos de esa victoria, sus resultados prácticos. Y en un país subdesarrollado, atrasado, se buscaron los recursos para construir una vasta red de hospitales y escuelas.

Los sistemas de salud pública y educación, creados en breve plazo, son hoy los mejores de América Latina. Pero una reestructuración de la economía tan rápida y profunda no podía, naturalmente, llevarse a cabo sin dificultades ni errores. Hay que reconocerlo: Fidel ha admitido más de una vez lo erróneo de algunas decisiones, y eso únicamente ha reforzado su autoridad entre el pueblo.

Una cualidad relevante de Fidel es, a mi entender, que sabe inculcar a la gente una fe inquebrantable en la victoria de su causa. La gente le sigue dominada por la idea y segura de que todo lo ideado se hará realidad.

Me vienen ahora a la memoria las frecuentes intervenciones de Fidel por la televisión, en asambleas y mítines. Recuerdo cómo personas de miras superficiales, adoptando la pose de comentaristas políticos, pretendían ironizar

Castro para educar al pueblo cuban colosal autoridad de Fidel, su profunc erudición científica y sus vivas dotes de mista desempeñaron un papel que es sobrevalorar.

Debido al gran porcentaje de analf que había en el país y a la débil prepa política de la población, las intervencio Fidel eran una verdadera academia p para el pueblo cubano.

Hoy la autoridad de Cuba ha crec manera inconmensurable. Los nombres dirigentes no se caen de las páginas prensa mundial. Por pequeña que sea de la Libertad y por fuertes que se tradiciones imperialistas de no tener en ta los intereses de los pueblos [illegible] cubanos se han hecho respetar. [illegible] defender sus derechos es un ra[illegible] de la nueva política exterior de[illegible]is, d por Fidel Castro.

Este hombre de sino legendario, el Hood de América Latina, el artífice de las revoluciones socialistas más originale Edad Contemporánea, cuenta sólo cinc años. Estamos acostumbrados a que los cos y estadistas extranjeros, a esa edad, regular sólo empiezan a dar los primeros en la palestra nacional e internacional. ha dejado tras de sí montañas de logros. todo eso quiero hablar yo en un libro Fidel Castro, el cual estoy escribiendo actualidad.

América Central en el Espejo de la Historia

Me han contado que cuando Nikolái nov defendió las tesis de su doctorad Ciencias Históricas, la sala de conferenci Instituto de América Latina de la Acad de Ciencias de la URSS estaba literaln de bote en bote, tan grande era el interé el tema del estudio: "La historia mode contemporánea de América Central".

Cuando esa disertación publicóse en M en separata, al cabo de unos días er imposible encontrarle en las librerías: e bajo atraía no sólo a los especialistas, también al más amplio círculo de lectore lo singular de los datos reunidos por el durante su estancia en América Latina.

Nikolái Leónov me contó que, en los a vos centroamericanos, la mayoría de los mentos de esos tiempos han sido destru los dictadores han procurado no dejar ni rastro de sus crímenes. Y Leónov reuni una en una, en archivos de México y d EE.UU. y comprándoselas a particulare pias de valiosísimos documentos, las c abriga el propósito de regalar en breve a

cartas a Siempre!

ACLARACIÓN...

(Viene de la página 5) co muy a mi pesar (a pesar también de los esfuerzos realizados por el gobierno) por causas insuperables fue imposible emprender la construcción de una nueva Penitenciaria. Sin embargo, siempre he tenido confianza en las instituciones y los gobiernos, esperando con vehemencia que algún día continuará esa cruzada de humanidad carcelaria. Algún día también, habré de tener la oportunidad de comentar directamente al admirable Blanco Moheno, que en efecto mi sueño no es tranquilo, mientras existan problemas vitales que resolver en México. Como no soy millonario ni corruptor, siento como hombre y en carne propia las desgracias de los míos.

Agradeceré, señor Director, su benevolencia y atención para estas aclaraciones que espero sean publicables, rogándole de igual modo me tenga desde siempre, como amigo y devoto de SIEMPRE!

Respetuosamente,
Lic. Alberto Rosas Benítez.
Av. Corona 380-A 1º piso.
Guadalajara, Jal.

c.c. al Sr. D. Roberto Blanco Moheno.
Oficinas Generales de SIEMPRE!

A ESPAÑA...

(Viene de la página 15) multitudinario de la península.

Va a ser invitado don Gustavo a partidas de caza. En los Montes de Toledo, podrá echarle el ojo aunque difícilmente la bala al gato montés y al lince, al ciervo seguramente meterle en las paletas un pedazo de plomo y de todos modos abismarse con el espectáculo de las liebres trigaleras que por el rumbo se multiplican como estrellas en una noche de verano. Igual hará en Pontevedra, en la Sierra de La Estrada y Lalín; en Teruel igual. Y en Salamanca, con menos suerte que puntería cobrar un jabalí de los centenares que nomadean los cotos aledaños.

Y vuelta a la comida que no lo dejará jamás; que de él va a ser sombra y manera de calar sus excelencias de gastrónomo "Indiano". Y el vino, sin el cual no es imaginable tragar ningún bocado español. Vamos a ver, a repasar, a presentir el bicarbonato que don Gustavo utlizará de continuo: en la misma Pontevedra, para no ir más lejos, pulpos a la Marinera, chuletas de Moaña y empanadas de todo lo que vive la tierra, el mar y el aire. ¡Recuerda usted, jefe, las panzurronas de bacalao con pasas y piñones y las apretaditas de lampreas, anguilas, salmonetes y mejillones? Para que toda esa masa luculesca se quede en el fondo hay que ayudarla con melindres de Silleda y Fuenteareas.

Tendrá que beber don Gustavo. En verano, valdepeñas ligerito. Y llegado el invierno los vinos espesos de Rioja. Recuerdo, jefe, que allá en Logroño, una tarde de frío junto a la chimenea de don Augusto Chenel, di cuenta de unos bizcochos de Torrecilla que insistía en mojar en un riojano de color igual al terno de luces que Paco Camino estrenó un domingo en Madrid, cabe el recuerdo de una Feria de San Isidro. ¡Mi dios, qué vino aquél para darle calor a mis huesos y andando el tiempo a mis nostalgias! Volveré.

Si le digo cuántos primores más lucirá el Embajador de México obli- [illegible] gremio de pedantes que exige que debe saber tanto de España que pueda distinguir entre Picasso y Dalí, entre Gaudí y Tarragó, entre Albeniz y Falla, entre Camilo José Cela y Unamuno, entre un colmao y una venta de gitanos, entre una farruca y una bulería. ¡Bah! Tanto de todo eso saber, ni los nacidos allá.

Usted movía tristemente la cabeza cuando intentábamos el diseño del Embajador. Yo hacía lo mismo. El meneadero lo hemos interrumpido. Ya tenemos. Y hay que reiterar que no me parece mal. Don Gustavo tiene apariencia formal, muy formal. Pero no sé por qué presiento que también gusta de vivir intensamente, a la manera española.

Cosas que platicamos hace poco, jefe, en su casa de Émerson, mientras dábamos cuenta de un arroz con azafrán hecho por las manos bordadoras de doña Beatriz, su señora esposa; de un cordero chilindrón con igual sello culinario y de una montaña de Lacón de El Bierzo leonés.

No exijo exclusivamente tragón a don Gustavo. También, jefe, es menester que sepa beber. A más de otras cosas intrínsecamente españolas. Lo demás, será lo de menos.

Lo saludo con afecto
Luis Gutiérrez y González.

EL ANTICOMUNISMO...

(Viene de la página 34) París, consideraba que la batalla a ser trabada en 1978 por las fuerzas liberales en defensa del régimen actual será la última frente al programa común de los partidos de izquierda cuya meta es alcanzar una sociedad que no sólo se transformará en marxista sino que será irreversible.

[illegible]eigh y su grey no se convencen de que Europa siempre modeló el destino de nuestra América. De ahí partieron [illegible]stros conquistadores. De ahí vinieron las ideas liberales de la Revolución Francesa. De ahí se derivó el fascismo que, derrotado en la segunda guerra mundial, se refugió en nuestro Continente para vivir oculto en los países que, hoy, lo exhiben, como una fiera sedienta de sangre, aun sabiendo que sus días están contados.

Los crímenes que el fascismo comete en Chile, en Uruguay, Argentina y otros países, muestran que su naturaleza no mudó, mas no abaten la resistencia de los pueblos afectados, sobre todo cuando esos pueblos se alientan con las victorias alcanzadas en Europa contra Franco y Salazar, en Asia (Vietnam, Camboya, Laos) y en África (Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, Argelia, etc.). Si los muros erguidos por el fascismo, el imperialismo y el neocolonialismo están cayendo, estrepitosamente, en otros Continentes, ¿por qué nuestra América habría de ser la excepción?

El mundo es una totalidad. Los dinosaurios de Asunción no pueden ignorarlo. Ellos suman 180. Y la América Latina son 300 millones. Es eso lo que los exaspera, que los irrita, que los atormenta.

Estas bestias ya no duermen. El marxismo es su pesadilla.

Francisco Juliao
Cuernavaca, 4/abril/77.

EL CHARRO...

(Viene de la página 43) una obra originalísima, que sin duda alguna llamará la atención también de los historiadores latinoamericanos.

Pregunta: ¿Por qué eligió usted precisamente ese tema?

Leónov: La historia de Centroamérica me [illegible] queños países a quienes los grandes "manejaban" como les daba la gana. Y en segundo, quería rendir tributo de respeto al gran historiador y científico guatemalteco Víctor Manuel Gutiérrez, un hombre de extraordinaria honradez e inaudita valentía, quien me inculcó el cariño a la América Central y me regaló una parte de su biblioteca particular. Entonces me dijo unas palabras que resultaron proféticas: "Por lo que se ve, ni yo ni mis compañeros podremos ya escribir acerca de la sufridísima América Central. Tal vez eso lo hagas tú".

Víctor Manuel sucumbió en las mazmorras de la dictadura guatemalteca. Y esas palabras suyas devinieron para mí un mandato, que yo consideraba indispensable cumplir.

Pregunta: ¿Qué enseñanzas puede sacar la humanidad, a entender de usted, de la experiencia histórica de América Central?

Leónov: La historia de cada país, aunque sea pequeño, y más aún la de toda una subregión, es aleccionadora. Lo importante es seleccionar los problemas y acontecimientos significantes que caractericen con más plenitud las peculiaridades del desarrollo histórico de esos países precisamente.

A mí me parece que América Central, ante todo, da una lección de lucha por la unidad. Toda su historia es la mejor confirmación de una vieja y sabia verdad: "La unión hace la fuerza".

Al mismo tiempo, al analizar la lucha por la unidad en América Central, se llega a la conclusión de que la unidad por sí misma no es un bien o un mal. Todo depende de en interés de quién se realiza. En las condiciones históricas concretas del siglo XIX, la lucha unionista de Francisco Morazán y Justo Rufino Barrios era, sin duda, un fenómeno progre[illegible], pues se mantenía bajo las consi[illegible]s que postulaban la defensa de la [illegible]ependencia de la región, el acelera[illegible]esarrollo socioeconómico y la ampliación de la democracia. Pero no se debe olvidar que también el aventurero norteamericano Willian Walker, que se apoderara de Nicaragua, lanzó asimismo la consigna de la unidad centroamericana: "¡Cinco o ninguna!", pero a base del restablecimiento de la esclavitud y de la supeditación absoluta de esa región a los Estados Unidos. Los pueblos de América Latina rechazaron y rechazarán la unidad en tales condiciones.

Quisiera señalar otra importante enseñanza que se puede sacar al estudiar la historia de América Central: la importancia que tiene valorar y comprender a tiempo a los grandes patriotas y luchadores por la libertad, apoyarlos cuando aún están vivos. Por trágica ironía de la suerte, todos los verdaderos héroes de América Central fueron ejecutados o asesinados por compatriotas suyos, cuyos descendientes hoy idolatran literalmente a aquéllos. Esos héroes son hoy la gloria y el orgullo de las naciones. Pero como suele acaecer con frecuencia, el reconocimiento y la comprensión de sus ideales llegaron sólo muchos años después de haber muerto ellos.

Pregunta: En el libro de usted se menciona con bastante frecuencia a los Estados Unidos. ¿Qué podría decir usted del papel de los mismos en la historia de América Central?

Leónov: A mi entender, la noción más plena sobre la política de los EE.UU. en esa subregión la dan las instrucciones redactadas por el Departamento de Estado para William Jeffers, el primer enviado extraordinario de los EE.UU. en América Central. Se decía en ellas que Centroamérica ofrecía un interés singular para los EE.UU. debido a la situación geográfica de la misma y a la posibilidad de [illegible] Central. En particular se decía en ellas que el bajo nivel de desarrollo industrial y la necesidad de capitales y de hombres diestros debían poner a América Central, para largo tiempo, en dependencia de los suministros extranjeros de diversas mercancías.

Ofrece gran interés en este plano, a mi entender, el discurso que pronunciara el 14 de septiembre de 1853 el enviado extraordinario norteamericano en Nicaragua, Solon Borlund, al hacer entrega de sus cartas credenciales. Declaró sin ambigüedades que la nación que ocupaba tan favorable posición geográfica no podía poseer esa riqueza sólo y exclusivamente en su propio interés, cerrando el acceso a todas las demás.

Mientras tanto, el enviado extraordinario mexicano en América Central (con residencia en Guatemala) escribía a México el 1 de abril de 1854 que los norteamericanos no ponían freno a sus actividades y con una insolencia inaudita procuraban el dominio de todo el subcontinente, apoderarse de él, por lo que creía la necesidad de dar otro giro a las relaciones entre los Estados hispanoamericanos, pues se trataba ya de defenderse, mediante la creación de alianzas militares, de la catástrofe que les amenazaba.

Pregunta: Por cierto, ya que se ha tratado de México, ¿qué influencia ejerció éste, a juicio de usted, en el desarrollo del acontecer en América Central?

Leónov: Se dio el caso de que en algunos periodos, bajo la presión reaccionaria, México actuó en la región de común acuerdo con los EE.UU. Así fue, por ejemplo, en los tiempos de la lucha de Justo Rufino Barrios por la reunificación de América Central (1871-1885). Pero en general, el papel de México ha sido progresista. No cabe ninguna duda de [illegible] el acontecer en México ejerció c[illegible]recuencia una gran influencia [illegible]a en sus vecinos meridionales. C[illegible] ejemplo aduciré aunque no sea más que el periodo de las Reformas en Guatemala, parecido al periodo de las transformaciones realizadas en México por Juárez, quien simpatizaba con sus correligionarios políticos en aquel país y los ayudaba.

Recordaré asimismo que precisamente a bordo de un buque de guerra mexicano marchó al exilio José Santos Zelaya, presidente de Nicaragua depuesto bajo la presión de los EE.UU. Y en los años veinte de nuestro siglo, el gobierno de México concedió a Sandino y a sus compañeros más inmediatos –en los tiempos más duros para ellos– la posibilidad de entrar en México para descansar y curarse y hasta se encargó del mantenimiento de los mismos.

Con frecuencia México hubo de hacer equilibrios en sus relaciones mutuas con sus vecinos norteño y meridionales. Así, explicando el porqué se había negado la ayuda en armas y municiones a los patriotas nicaragüenses, el expresidente mexicano Portes Gil decía en sus memorias que aunque el gobierno y el pueblo de México simpatizaban con la lucha de aquéllos, él no había podido entregarles armas, ya que durante los últimos dos años México mantenía las relaciones más cordiales con los Estados Unidos y él no debía dar ningún paso que redundara en perjuicio de dichas relaciones...

• • •

Para terminar le pregunto a Nikolái Leónov ¿qué quisiera transmitir él a sus numerosos amigos en México?

"Mis más cordiales, más fervientes y más sinceros votos de felicidad, éxitos y salud", responde. A continuación toma mi libreta de apuntes y escribe en ella: "[illegible]

14-00000

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THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
201-0132139 C74-005-102
SEX M SX-05555/62

CIT USSR

KNOWN KGB
SEE HOLDER OF FILE FOR ADDITIONAL INFO.

DATE 18 FEB 77 09475796

201-132139

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LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
201-0132139 074-005-102
SEX M SX-05555/25
POB USSR
CIT USSR

RES USSR.

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201-132139

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SECRET SEP 17, 1976

[illegible] FINDLAY SERGEYEVICH

[illegible] FINDLAY SERGEYEVICH
[illegible] [illegible] 22.26
[illegible] [illegible] SEP 6 76
[illegible] [illegible]

FBI NAME TRACE REQUEST. These data were furnished by the FBI COBICS Program. These and any additional data from the COBICS Program are being incorporated into appropriate DDO area division machine collation programs.

MD011155

201-132139

SECRET CS

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY NUMBER 2
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON INDEFINITE

SECRET NOV 22, 1976

00 04319 011155 L-ONOV NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH

3 G-2 DURATION SEP 14 76
E DELEGATE
F UNGA 31ST SESSION SEP 19 76
J 09/19/76 -A
M SEP 19 76

INACTIVE
J 10/10/76 -D

THIS CONTAINS ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION FROM FBI

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CLASSIFICATION

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DATE-TIME GROUP 082020Z CITE CIA/DDO MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 939725

CONF: IR/21 INFO: FILE c/OPS CI LSN/ID, SE8 DISSEM BY: 25 PER SOP

201-132139 104

TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

ROOM 4426 J EDGAR HOOVER BUILDING

SECRET WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

CIR-316-04209-76

REF: MACHINE LISTING REQUEST NUMBER OO 04319 DATED 17 SEPTEMBER 1976 AND RECEIVED IN THIS OFFICE 7 OCTOBER 1976

1. SUBJECT: LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH (MD NO 011155)
(AKA KOLYA AND KOLYECHKA LEONOV)

DPOB: 22 AUGUST 1928, ALMAZOVO, USSR (ALSO REPORTED AS RYAZAN, USSR)

2. CITIZENSHIP AND PASSPORT DATA: USSR; PASSPORT NO. 10724, ISSUED IN MOSCOW 29 JANUARY 1952; D 68863, ISSUED 22 JULY 1964; D 18009.

3. CURRENT POSITION: EMPLOYEE OF MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

4. LANGUAGES: EXCELLENT SPANISH, GOOD ENGLISH, SOME FRENCH, LITTLE GERMAN.

5. RELATIVES: SPOUSE: VALERIYA IVANOVNA LEONOVA DPOB: RYAZAN,

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

8 Nov 1976

201-132139

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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PAGE 2

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0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER

939725

0201-132339

USSR, 28 APRIL 1928. PASSPORT DATA: C 11507, ISSUED 28 FEBRUARY 1953; D 6862; D 18010. DAUGHTER: IRINA LEONOVA DPOB: 16 MARCH 1962, MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

6. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: AS OF 1966 SUBJECT WAS DESCRIBED AS THIN WITH A LONG FACE, BLONDE HAIR AND BLUE EYES. HE WAS FIVE FEET EIGHT INCHES TALL.

7. PERSONALITY TRAITS: SUBJECT HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS PLEASANT, OUTGOING, INTELLIGENCT, SHREWD, CONSCIENTIOUS, AND RELIABLE. HE HAS A SENSE OF HUMOR BUT DISPLAYS A TEMPER AT TIMES.

8. CURRICULUM VITAE: SUBJECT WAS GRADUATED FROM THE INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS IN MOSCOW, AT AN UNKNOWN DATE. FROM JULY 1953 UNTIL OCTOBER 1956 HE SERVED AS AN INTERPRETER AND SECRETARY TO THE AMBASSADOR AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY, MEXICO. FROM 1956 TO 1961 HE WAS IN MOSCOW DURING WHICH TIME HE WAS REPORTED TO HAVE ATTENDED THE SCHOOL FOR THE SOVIET COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY (KGB) FROM 1958 UNTIL 1960/ FROM 1960 UNTIL 1961 HE WAS AT THE FIFTH DEPARTMENT OF KGB HEADQUARTERS/ HE TRAVELED TO MEXICO IN NOVEMBER 1959 AND TO CUBA IN FEBRUARY 1960 AS AN

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CLASSIFICATION
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CONF: INFO: FILE

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INTERPRETER. IN JULY 1961 HE RETURNED TO MEXICO CITY AS THIRD SECRETARY AND ASSISTANT CULTURAL ATTACHE AT THE EMBASSY AND SERVED IN THIS CAPACITY UNTIL JUNE 1964. HE WAS ASSIGNED THERE AGAIN IN OCTOBER 19864 AS SECOND SECRETARY ABND PRESS ATTACHE. HE REMAINED IN THIS POSITION UNTIL DECEMBER 1968. FROM APRIL 1969 UNTIL JULY 1969 HE SERVED TEMPORARILY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET NEWS AGENCY NOVOSTI IN LIMA, PERU./ DURING HIS TOURS IN MEXICO, HE WAS CONSISTENTLY ACTIVE IN CLANDESTINE SUPPORT OF LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, PARTICULARLY RELATING TO GUATEMALA.//

9. FOR FUERTHER INFORMATION YOU ARE REFERRED TO CSCI-316/ 03956-66, DATED 5 AUGUST 1966, WHICH WAS ADDRESSED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE WITH AN INFORMATION COPY TO YOUR BUREAU.

10. NO CRS INFORMATION

11. NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

12. CLASSIFIED BY 062147. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY PARA: 5B(2). AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON DATE IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE.

DATE:
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CLASSIFICATION

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0201-132139

BASED ON: HMM 1524, 9 APRIL 1956
HMMA 18303, 15 DECEMBER 1961
MEXI 9740, 04 JUNE 1964
MEXI 1218, 14 OCTOBER 1964
HMMA 24698, 6 NOV 64
HMMA 29141, 8 JUNE 66
HMMA 29934, 31 AUG 66

FILE IN: 201-132139

DATE: 2 NOV 76
ORIG: D HAMMER
UNIT: IP/EIS:JE/DM
EXT: 9245

COORD IN DRAFT:
SE/X/FR: B WILHITE

C/PCS/SLN
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SECRET SEP 17, 1976

KIRSLAY SERGEYEVICH

NIKILAY SERGEYEVICH
AUG 22 28
RESPTY SEP 6 74

7-10 76

[illegible] COORDINATION	DATE: JUL 1976
ANALYST: [illegible]	ROYAL: [illegible]
OFFICE	[illegible] NAME	SIGNATURE
SE/R/FBby	B. WILHITE	B Wilhite

FBI NAME TRACE REQUEST. These data were furnished by the FBI COBICS Program. These and any additional data from the COBICS Program are being incorporated into appropriate DDO area division machine collation programs.

MD#011155

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201-132139

15 October 1976

COVER MEMORANDUM FOR XAE-1251

SUBJECT: Nikolay Sergeyevich Leonov (201-132]39)

SOURCE : Petr Deryabin, a former KGB officer whose information has proven reliable in the past.

1. The attached report on Leonov was prepared by Deryabin, who knew him personally in Moscow as an officer of the KGB First Chief Directorate.

2. A review of Leonov's 201 file indicates that he had been granted a US visa as a member of a Soviet delegation to the United Nations General Assembly scheduled to depart Moscow on 19 September 1976.

Thomas A. Ryan
C/CI/R&A/E

Attachment:
As Stated, XAE-1251

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

11 September 1976

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Deryabin comments on (...) ~~Nikolay Sergeyevich Leonov, KGB Officer and Personal Friend of Fidel Castro of Cuba.~~

1. Soviet magazine Latinskaya Amerika, issue No. 4, for July-August 1976 (pp 127-142) published an article entitled "To Your Health, Fidel!" by N. S. Leonov, who is identified in the article as a "journalist".

On page 138 there is a photograph of Fidel Castro with the author of the article, journalist N. Leonov. In this photograph I definitely recognize KGB officer Nikolay Sergeyevich Leonov. I knew Leonov in Moscow as a KGB officer of the First Chief Directorate (FCD). The last time I saw him in KGB Hqs was during the summer of 1953. At that time I did not know in what department of the FCD Leonov worked. (Copy of this photo is enclosed)

2. I recognized another photo of Leonov, N.S., in the late 1950's or the beginning of the 1960's for the Agency or the FBI.

N. S. Leonov also was recognized by me on the photograph published in the Soviet book Viva Cuba, which was published in Moscow in 1963 or 1964. In this photograph Leonov appeared in the company of Khrushchev, Castro and Alekseyev (Shitov) Aleksandr Ivanovich, (also known to me personally as a KGB senior officer.) the Soviet Ambassador to Cuba at that time.

N. S. Leonov also was recognized by me in the photograph published by Golos Rodiny, issue No. 32, for April 1963. In this photograph Leonov's face is shown between Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Castro at Vnukovo Airport on 23 April 1963 when Castro arrived on his visit to the USSR. (Copy of this photograph is enclosed)

XAE-1251
14 Sept. '76

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3. In his article, highly praising Fidel Castro, Leonov reviews Castro's life and his accomplishments as a "revolutionary leader". The author revealed that when Castro lived in Mexico, 1955-56, he established contact with Alberto Bayo, former colonel of the Spanish Republican Army, who emigrated to Mexico after the Spanish Civil War, and who became Castro's "military instructor". Also, in Mexico Castro was joined by Che Guevara, who became his close friend. The author briefly mentioned that the CIA had planned "a physical liquidation of Fidel Castro".

In 1963 Castro was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

The article was written in connection with Castro's 50th birthday, which was on 13 August 1976.

The article provided photographs of Castro and some of his associates. The photographs for the article were provided by Novosti press agency, and by the Soviet magazine Kuba , which is published in Russian and in Spanish.

Petr Deryabin

CIRA/E Comment: According to information in Leonov's 201, he had applied for a visa as an employee of the MFA to the UNGA, in September 1976.

According to SE/CI/Ext. Leonov is presently chief of Service #1 (Information) of the First Chief Directorate.

Первое посещение Советского Союза. Рядом с Фиделем Кастро на трибуне митинга, состоявшегося на Уралмаше,— автор статьи, журналист Н. Леонов

Latinskaya Amerika # 4, July-August 1976. (p 138)

Caption: "First visit to the Soviet Union. Next to Fidel Castro ... author of the article, journalist N. Leonov".



Golos Rodiny, # 32 for April 1963.

Caption under the photograph:
"23 April 1963. Arrival in Moscow of Fidel Castro, Prime-Minister of the Revolutionary Government Republic of Cuba. Greetings at Vnukovo Airport. From left to right: N. Khrushchev, Chairman Council of Ministers of the USSR, /N.S. Leonov/, L. Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and F. Castro."

attachment to
XAE-1251
14 Sept. 1976

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

PDSTORAGE
S856- 2051

Country: USSR

Subject: Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV

: 1975-1976

Source: Two sources Reporting Separately

Any dissemination of this information to field stations or to officers not on the initial distribution must be coordinated with SE/CI/X. As a general rule, PDSTORAGE information is not releasable to foreign or domestic liaison services or to any office outside the DDO.

1. LEONOV, a high-ranking KGB officer, is currently Chief of Service No. 1 (Information) of the KGB's First (Foreign Intelligence) Chief Directorate in Moscow. According to one source, LEONOV was to be appointed Ambassador to Poland, but that assignment was cancelled when he became Chief of Service No. 1. Another source reported in early 1975 that LEONOV was Chief of Service No. 1 and was scheduled to be appointed as Ambassador to Portugal when he received his Service No. 1 assignment instead.

2. LEONOV is very knowledgeable on Latin America and speaks excellent Spanish.

COMMENTS:

1. For previous PDSTORAGE reporting on LEONOV, please see PDSTORAGE report 984, 16 September 1964.

Con't

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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CI-132139

2. According to LEONOV's 201 file, he is scheduled to attend the 1976 session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York.

22 October 1976

Distribution:
1;C/SE/CI/X
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201-132139

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FILE VR. [illegible]

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TOR:2911293 SEP 76

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6476
RUEHFL/DIRECTOR FBI
INFO RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN 5443
BT
UNCLAS MOSCOW 14177
DEPT FOR VO AND EUR/SOV INFO
E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: CVIS UR/UN (KHRUSTALEV, YEVGENIY VLADIMIROVICH)
SUBJECT: VISAS: SOVIETS TO UNGA
1. VISAS FAAR
2. KHRUSTALEV, YEVGENIY VLADIMIROVICH
JAN [illegible] 1927 ROSTOV NA DONU
EMPLOYEE OF MFA
3. LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
[illegible] 1928 RYAZANSKAYA OBL
EMPLOYEE OF MFA
4. [illegible], PETR PORFIRIYEVICH
[illegible] VOROSHILOVGRAD
EMPLOYEE OF MFA
[illegible] SEPT 19, 1976
[illegible] OF SOVIET DELEGATION TO UNGA. STOESSEL

NAI to CSCI-316/03740-69, dated 29 Oct 69 & repeat to FBI. 17SEP 1976

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201-132139

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create chrono copy . IR-475

19 June 1975

SECRET

To: J. A. ~~DJR's Preliminary Rundown of Soviet KGB Officers in Mexico City Associated with OSWALD Assassination of Pres. KENNEDY: Notes on~~

This is what I could dig out so far.

1. Notes on : ALEKSEYEV, A. I., known to me personally, senior KGB officer.

2. LEONOV, N. S., known to me personally, KGB officer.

3. SAGATELYAN, M. R. I didn't know him personally, but I have no doubt he is an RIS/KGB officer.

4. ANDRONOV, I. On the basis of his writings, he is probably RIS/KGB officer. For certain, at least a co-optee.

5. KOSTIKOV, V. V. I don't remember whether I identified him previously. He is exposed as a known KGB officer.

6. YATSKOV, P. A. Known RIS KGB officer and I have no doubt about him.

7. I have found some interesting writings in the Star for 18 June 1975, in the column: Party Talk Is Always CIA, by Betty BEALE. There is a discussion about the KGB involvement in the assassination.

Also, in the Washington Post for 19 June 1975, in the editorial page "Russia Reports on the CIA." A copy of these articles is included.

Please let me know if I can provide more assistance to you.

cc chrono (p. 1 only) Temp

Thank you,

Orig to J.A. 19/6/75

Att - 2 pages of clippings

SECRET

D.J.R.

CL by 012208
E2 Impdet
XAE-857
19 June 75
100-6-154/4

X-REF. SHEET S-E-C-R-E-T DATE 03/01/76

X-REF.	SYMB. NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DOC. FILED IN
201-0132139	HMMA-30416	28 OCT 66	201-0685685

THE ABOVE DOCUMENT(S) ARE CROSS-REFERENCED
TO THE 201 FILE CITED UNDER LEFT MARGIN.
FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING THE LOCATION OF
THE FILE CONTAINING THE RECORD COPY DOCUMENT,
CALL FILES SECTION, EXTENSION 4127.

S-E-C-R-E-T E2 IMPDET CL BY C54979

FILE IN 201-0132139

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: XX MARKED FOR INDEXING

TO: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIREALM Progress Report, 31 October 1965 through 30 April 1966

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. HMMA-27674, 2 December 1965

B. HMMA-28838, 6 May 1966

1. Attached is the second LIREALM progress report, which covers largely the period during which Robert L. EASBY has assumed the handling of this agent. It will be noted that the main headings are those laid out in the statement of objectives forwarded with reference B.

2. Each month, LIREALM gives EASBY a list of new contacts, a brief sketch of each, and any ideas he has on how they might be used to get at his main targets. These are routinely traced in order to give him indications of people of particular interest, or of possible danger to his cover. For example, when he listed Charles and Bertha SMALL as persons he had met at an art exhibit, he was told to avoid them and their group unless at a social function where they could not be avoided. We have no desire to have ODENVY open a dossier on him.

3. Of the attached listed contacts, Station has traces only on the following:

Attachment:
Progress Report, h/w

CONTINUED

Distribution:
2 - Chief, WHD, w/att

CS COPY

201-773727

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-28979

DATE: 18 May 1966

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: FFN: P-11185

a. Alimuddin LUBIS. The only material available is that contained in HMMW-14223, 22 December 1965.

b. Suzanne *FELICIEN. LIREALM has previously reported she is in charge of "medical relations" and scholarships at the French Embassy. The only other information in the files is that provided by Albert de BONFILS in June 1962 through a casual Station contact. Since we were never in direct touch with him, and owing to the questionable nature of the whole BONFILS background and the lack of any solidity, this information must be accepted with some reserve. "Extreme Communist--propagandist--extremely dangerous--bad influence on scholarship students whom she uses as instruments and contacts--head of the scholarship service--much favoritism in the distribution of scholarships--accepts and demands gifts and money--obliges certain applicants to take French lessons which she gives and charges for. These lessons are her method of indoctrinating them."

c. Jean-Claude *DUCLAY. A routine memo from Barbara C. HUFIG, dated 26 November 1964, mentioned subject as having been in charge of the intensive French course taken by members of the doctoral and the history programs at El Colegio de Mexico. On 23 November 1964 he married Irene *AZNAR, then about 27, who was also teaching in the course and who had been here only since 1963, coming directly from France where she had been a teacher.

d. Beno and Carol Cook *LIEBERMAN. LIREALM and his wife met Mrs. Lieberman shortly after they arrived here. Beno they met in late January at the Mexican Folklore Association, which they conduct weekly at their home. It is a variety of "hootenanny" where both hosts and guests perform, and occasionally visiting entertainers appear. It is a meager living indeed, with 25 pesos a person being charged, and fortunately they do not have to depend on it, since Carol Lieberman has a fairly well paying job at The News. Beno was described as aesthetic-looking, undernourished, ill-kempt and very Jewish looking. However, LIREALM found him sensitive, gentle and interested in people. It was at one of these evenings where LIREALM met Nikolay LEONOV (see below). The Lieberman's were also reported to have attended a luncheon at the home of Pearl [illegible], one of the reporters for The News, at which two officers of the Soviet Embassy were guests.

14-00000

e. Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132134)
Leonov and LIREALM spent the evening discussing chess and later made an appointment to play at LIREALM's house. This visit was marked by totally unpolitical conversation and Leonov asked no leading questions. The two couples got on well, and a return match is planned. (A personality report is being prepared on Leonov and will be submitted after the second meeting. LIREALM is being encouraged to see Leonov, about whom little concrete is known outside of his cover work.)

4. The format of these reports will require some reworking, and this will be done following EASBY's return from home leave. During EASBY's absence, LIREALM will report to Willard C. CURTIS whom he has already met.

R.Easby
for
Willard C. CURTIS

45

LIREALM Progress Report

31 October 1965 - 31 April 1966

1. The period October 1965 to February 1966 was largely devoted to building a circle of useful contacts in the French colony and intellectual world and getting to know the case officer. When the latter left in early 1966, I was introduced to my present case officer. Past activity was reviewed and evaluated, targets discussed and objectives clearly defined.

2. The following will give some indication of advances made so far against the target objectives laid out in HMMA-28838:

   a. French Embassy floor plan. Under various pretexts, numerous visits have been made to the Embassy. A rough diagram is ready with the occupants of most of the offices identified. Remodeling of the building is in process. Some officers will be transferred from one room to another. The basic structure of the building will not be altered.

   b. Contacts leading toward the French target. Those persons named below have all been met at least once during April and are deemed to be worthy of further development for their apparent access in the French community. This number represents only a fraction of persons met and virtually discarded for lack of operational promise:

      201-...

      (1) Regis Thillaye du Boullay. Met on several occasions. Press Attache of the French Embassy, and possibly their Political Section head. Several sources

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describe him as displeased with his present rank at the Embassy. Some bio data is now available, but further development is definitely warranted. He is friendly and approachable. His value lies in (a) his leading to other Embassy officers and providing bio data about them; (b) his being disgruntled and providing information wittingly; (c) his being an intelligence officer.

(2) Henri de *Coignac. Met on several occasions. Have made tentative tennis date. Is very close to the Ambassador. The nature of his relationship or the services provided to the Ambassador have to be determined.

(3) Genevieve *San Jose. Have seen on several occasions and have established fairly friendly relationship. She is a journalist with the Le Journal Francais. Has already been a source of some bio data about Embassy officers, introduced to some members of French colony, corroborated some information obtained elsewhere.

(4) Marie Bidenult *Lesort. Switchboard operator at Embassy. Unmarried, friendly, helpful. Have visited her on various pretexts, now stop by just to say hello. Hope to set her up for another agent to meet and develop.

(5) Valentine *Honorat. Secretary to Jacques Seigle, Attache at Embassy. Elderly, friendly, helpful. Corrected letter I wrote to Ambassador. In return I gave her a box of chocolates for which she seemed genuinely grateful. Offered to help me in future in any way she could.

(6) Suzanne *Felicien. Assistant to Cultural Attache. Seen several times on business. Friendly. Known to mutual friends. Possible source of bio data on other Embassy personnel. Has invited my wife and me to dinner. This could be our first important break.

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c. Possibly Significant Contacts. Because of my close friendship with them, their access or their lack of apparent income.

(1) Jacques C. *Derney. Private businessman, "Artistic Counselor." Lives outside his apparent income, probably homosexual.

(2) Jean-Claude *Duclay. Professor at Centre Scientifique. Very friendly. Function of Centre and reason for its enormous staff not clear.

(3) Francois and Monique *Gilliot. Commercial Attache. He is very anti-U.S. She is friendly to my wife.

(4) Andre and Norma *Lesur. Close ties with Andre could lead to close friendship. Very prominent in French colony. Wealthy businessman. Possibly willing to collaborate with us wittingly.

d. Mexican Intellectuals

(1) Beno and Carol Lieberman. Run Mexican Folklore Association. Have access to large circle of Latin American semi-professional musicians and entertainers. Gradually obtaining bio data on Beno and his friends.

(2) Policiano *Bejar. Prominent artist. Friend of the U.S., but has many friends among the Mexican left.

(3) Martin *Foley. British national. Manager of Bejar. Technical director of Ballet Folklorico. Brilliant, friend of many Mexican artists and intellectuals, left and right.

(4) Adrian *Leyva Schoonmaker. Professor at Unidad Prof, de Zacatenco. A professed socialist. Brilliant student, introverted and peculiar. Access to leftist circles.

e. UAR

(1) Michel •Hamed. Low ranking member of Embassy. Met once, January 1966. No further progress or efforts made.

f. Indonesia

(1) Alimuddin •Lubis. Press and cultural attache. Very friendly. I have not yet followed up.

g. Soviet

(1) Nicolay T. Leonov. Press Attache. Off to a very friendly and casual start socially. Have permitted one month to pass without contacting him in order not to seem overly eager. I feel I can call him next week and proceed cautiously to develop him if mutual interest seems to be there.

3. Over the next few months, these contacts will be further refined, in coordination with the case officer. Owing particularly to the variety of French contacts, it should be possible to settle before too long on a handful of fairly productive sources of personality information.

SUBJECT: AESTORAGE No. 984
Nikolay LEONOV (201-132,139)

DOI: 1964

NOTE: AESTORAGE represents a collation of information provided by several reliable and sensitive sources, some of them documentary. AESTORAGE information is not to be released outside of the Clandestine Services Components of CIA unless written authorization has been granted by C/SR/CI. AESTORAGE information may be transmitted to CIA field stations only after it has been coordinated with C/SR/CI.

1. Subject is an officer of the Fifth Department (Latin American), First Chief Directorate (Foreign Intelligence), KGB who has been assigned to the residentura in Mexico City since approximately 1961. Source has no information on his specific assignments in Mexico.

2. Prior to his service in the KGB, Subject graduated from the Institute of Foreign Relations. He then served in Mexico for four years as a member of the Soviet representation there. Source does not know what his position in Mexico was. (Comment: Subject was an employee of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City from July 1953 to October 1956). He then returned to Moscow and entered the KGB Intelligence School in ca 1958 and graduated in 1960. (Comment: Presumably Subject joined the KGB after his return from Mexico). He was then assigned to the Fifth Department, First Chief Directorate in KGB Headquarters where he served until his assignment to Mexico in 1961.

3. Subject is reported to be an excellent Spanish

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speaker. In Mexico he had additional duties as "government interpreter". He acted as Fidel CASTRO's interpreter during the latter's trip to the USSR. He also accompanied Anastas MIKOYAN on the latter's trip to Mexico and Cuba. In addition on several occasions he has served as interpreter to official Cubans visiting the USSR.

P.L.DILLON
C/SR/CI/KGB

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - SR/O/WH for 201-132,139
1 - WH/1
1 - SR/CI/KGB
1 - RID
1 - AESTORAGE chrono

P.Dillon,C/SR/CI/KGB:mbg 16 September 1964

SECRET

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

11 March 1964

SUBJECT: AESTORAGE No. 928
Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139)

DOI : 1962

NOTE: AESTORAGE represents a collation of information provided by several reliable and sensitive sources, some of them documentary. AESTORAGE information is not to be released outside of the Clandestine Services Components of CIA unless written authorization has been granted by C/SR/CI. AESTORAGE information may be transmitted to CIA field stations only after it has been coordinated with C/SR/CI.

In August, 1962, Source reported that Subject, reportedly assigned to Mexico City, was a KGB agent.

Distribution:
1 - LEONOV dossier
1 - DC/SR/CI
1 - SR/CC/S&T/CI:TRyan

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

14 May 1963

SUBJECT: AESTORAGE No. 841
Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139)

DOI: 1962

NOTE: AESTORAGE represents a collation of information provided by several reliable and sensitive sources, some of them documentary. AESTORAGE information is not to be released outside of the Clandestine Services Components of CIA unless written authorization has been granted by C/SR/CI. AESTORAGE information may be transmitted to CIA field stations only after it has been coordinated with C/SR/CI.

In August 1962 Source identified Subject as a KGB officer, presently assigned to Mexico City.

Distribution:
Orig. - LEONOV dossier
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1 - SR/CI/K

SR/CI/K:DRyan

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
201-0132139 074-005-102
SEX M SX-05555/25
POB USSR
CIT USSR

RES USSR. KNOWN KGB

DATE 28 APR 75 09274849

201-0132139

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DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LEONOV, NICHLAS
201-132139 050-008-010
SEX M DOB ? HHMA-32864
23 AUG 67
CIT COLOMBIA
OCC ?
PRESS ATTACHE OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY.

HLR R 6709110184

FILE IN 201-~~132731~~ 132139

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

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4. On 6 January 1956 the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the clinical [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] they were having some trouble getting the documents [illegible] because of the [illegible] [illegible] but said they should be ready in about five days.

5. On 6 January 1956 Dr. Enrique [illegible] informed Juan Pablo [illegible] y [illegible], [illegible], that on [illegible] (calculated to be 10 January) there would be a meeting at the home of General J[illegible]. Later that day [illegible] told [illegible] there would be a meeting on Monday at [illegible] home at [illegible], [illegible] of the "peace contact." [illegible] said the "white doctors" had been informed of it but that [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and "[illegible]" (this is believed probably to be [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] in the [illegible] [illegible] and the Partido Popular) had not yet been informed. [illegible] said that there would then be a meeting with the General Sunday afternoon.

6. On 7 January [illegible] informed [illegible] that the meeting with the General had been changed to Monday (9 January) at 20.0 hours. Apparently, the group which would meet with J[illegible] was to gather first at the home of [illegible] at [illegible]. Among them, in addition to the names mentioned above would be Dr. [illegible] (believed to be Dr. Guillermo [illegible] [illegible]). (It is concluded that the meeting referred to in paragraphs 6 and 7 must have referred to the [illegible] [illegible] Committee since the people mentioned are all active in it.)

7. On 12 January 1956 Mrs. [illegible], daughter of General J[illegible], again called the Soviet Embassy about the clinical [illegible]. They were not ready. She stated her father was ill in Veracruz. She gave her telephone number as 14-[illegible]-39, which is that of Dr. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] at [illegible] [illegible], D.F.

Action: It is proposed that when LIEMPTY-2 is finally cleared, he be given the assignment of identifying as many as possible of JARA's supporters who have positions in the Mexican Government. It is believed that JARA still has many adherents in the government and that they, like the followers of [illegible] [illegible], are in a position to exert a good deal of influence.

Meanwhile, it seems likely that other [illegible] information will be received through [illegible].

201-132139

HMM-A-3735 -
[illegible]
5 Dec. 1955
Page 79

73. [illegible], Rodolfo
[illegible] [illegible] Telephone: 36-3[illegible]

On [illegible] May 1955 this subject called [illegible], Soviet Embassy employee, and was told: "We have found the books and material you requested (re Soviet foreign policy)." [illegible] said he would take the books to [illegible] the next day.

On 3 August 1955 [illegible] called the Embassy to inquire about the type of dress to be worn to a social function that evening.

This matter aroused the interest of the Station because it is not often that the Soviets deliver documents to private parties.

[illegible] was requested to supply information on this subject on [illegible] Sept. 1955. On [illegible] Sept. he replied (B-2) that [illegible] was for many years active in the Mexican Diplomatic Service, at one time being Chargé of the Mexican Legation in Warsaw, Poland. He was never very [illegible]. He is now about 75 yrs. old, inactive in the government, but does write articles for the newspaper Excelsior. He is a brother of the poet, Amado [illegible].

Action: None contemplated.

- 4600

[illegible]

1. [illegible]

2. [illegible] a message for [illegible] that [illegible]

3. [illegible] reference [illegible] that [illegible] is a representative of the [illegible] Federation. On 7 [illegible] 1960 he called the [illegible] and [illegible] on the [illegible] of [illegible] an international chess match in Mexico ([illegible] Mrs. [illegible]). In this conversation it was [illegible] that [illegible] has a telephone in his home and he [illegible] academic line of work. He stated that he was "back in classes" and that [illegible] no longer be held in his home. He told [illegible] that a tournament [illegible] a person named [illegible] would begin Monday (12 [illegible]) and invited [illegible] to [illegible] of it. [illegible] said he would attend if he had time. [illegible] then asked when he could [illegible] him a list of books [illegible] wants. [illegible] told him to come to the [illegible] at any time and [illegible] he would [illegible].

4. Although the last reference may serve to explain the [illegible] relationship between [illegible] and the Soviets, the role of [illegible] is less clear. It should be kept in mind that the Soviets here are not accustomed to [illegible] time playing chess or socializing with people for the pure pleasure of the thing. Furthermore, the allegation that Andres [illegible] is a Communist should be noted.

5. The Mexico City telephone directory lists one Andres [illegible] at 5 de Mayo [illegible], with telephone 2[illegible]-61

6. The following information on the name [illegible] was reported by [illegible] on 2[illegible] April 19[illegible]:

a. Renee [illegible] Frankel de [illegible] Immigration file [illegible]
Born in Hungary.
Past address: [illegible] 40; [illegible] 131-2; [illegible]
Insurgentes [illegible] (present)
Occupation: [illegible]
No police record or record in Federal or [illegible]

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.: Chief, SB Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Lima CAS

SUBJECT: Operational/JMROD Transmittal of Letter

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 26973

Forwarded herewith is a copy of the torn letter as requested per Reference.

for Samuel K. CASTELEN

DOC MICRO. SER. FEB 11 1972 MICROFILMED

HJG/chf

Attachment: h/w
as stated

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1 cc w/o ATT TO SB/X/WH

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201-132139

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
D 200-124-162/3	HPLA-10216	8 August 1969
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: ~~200-124-162~~/3

14-00000

ATT to HPLA-10216
in C/WHD

18 июня 1969 г. АПН

3P

ПЕРУ: ВСТРЕЧА С МИНИСТРОМ

Нужно немало поколесить по Лиме, прежде чем выберешься на окраины города. На одной из них, на пустыре возводится новое здание министерства энергетики и горнорудной промышленности Перу. Раньше такого министерства не существовало, так как соответствующие отрасли народного хозяйства были на откупе у монополий США. Но времена меняются. Перуанцы не только берут под свой контроль иностранные капиталовложения в столь жизненно важной сфере народного хозяйства, но намерены сами управлять этой отраслью экономики своей страны.

Третий этаж здания еще в лесах, крыши нет. Кругом - лязг и грохот, как на всяком строительстве. А в цокольном и первом этажах уже кипит работа. Сотрудники нового министерства разрабатывают основы политики в области энергетики и горнорудного дела.

Министр Хорхе Фернандес Мальдонадо, в январе этого года произведенный из полковников в генералы, один из активных участников военного переворота 3 октября 1968 года. Он согласился встретиться с корреспондентом АПН. Кабинет министра находится в полуподвальном помещении. Ни приемной, ни секретарей. Внутри - скромная мебель. За столом Фернандес Мальдонадо.

Нефть и горнорудная промышленность являются основой экономики Перу. (В 1968 году продукция этих отраслей составила 52 процента национального экспорта и дала стране

8 aug 69

201-132139

440мин. долларов).

-Каковы будут главные принципы политики правительства в этих важных отраслях экономики? - Спросили мы министра.

- Революционное правительство намерено обеспечить эксплуатацию горнорудных богатств в интересах страны. Находясь в руках частного капитала, эти богатства нередко служили спекулятивным целям, - заявил он. - Мы примем законы , которые в обязательном порядке заставят концессионеров разрабатывать месторождения и не позволят приобретать за бесценок право собственности на эксплуатируемые месторождения.

Мы надеемся развивать мелкие и средние предприятия, росту которых будут содействовать и налоговые льготы, и особенно наша кредитная политика, система государственного строительства дорог, геологических исследований и т.д. Конечно, - подчеркивает министр, - это не значит, что мы [illegible] действовать развитию крупных горно[illegible]й, когда их деятельность не будет проти[illegible]в[illegible]сам нации.

Учитывая частые заявления прессы и политических деятелей США о том, что в Перу-де начинаются "гонения" на американские капиталы, мы поинтересовались у министра, чем обоснованы подобные заявления.

- На иностранный капитал, - ответил Фернандес Мальдонадо, - у нас не накладывается других ограничений, кроме необходимости подчиняться перуанским законам. Мы намерены создать из разрозненных законоположений единый

кодекс норм, регулирующих деятельность иностранцев. Этот кодекс охватывает проблемы налогообложения и контроля над использованием валютных средств, вопросы техники безопасности и гигиены труда, основы взаимоотношений между иностранными концессионерами и рабочими и т.д.

В области ископаемых энергетических ресурсов (нефть, газ, уголь) государство оставляет за собой преимущественное право добычи, обработки и реализации продукции. Основная нефтехимическая промышленность также будет принадлежать государству. Революционное правительство заявило: частный капитал будет допускаться только на основе временных производственных контрактов.

Касаясь перспектив укрепления энергетической базы страны, министр сказал, что сейчас в центральной части Кордильер ведется строительство гидроэлектростанции. Мощность первой очереди составит 325 тыс.киловатт. Затем она будет доведена до I млн.квт. Осуществление многих других проектов, имеющихся в портфеле министерства, пока задерживается из-за напряженности в платежном балансе страны. Специалисты министерства работают над проблемой быстрейшего использования для выработки электроэнергии попутных газов нефтяных месторождений.

Министр говорит о том, что придет время, когда Перу наверстает потерянное и сможет приступить к использованию ядерной энергии в народном хозяйстве. Для выполнения намеченных планов стране потребуется экономическая и техническая помощь извне, и любое участие СССР в этой области будет приветствоваться.

– Путь революции не усыпан розами, но мы готовы идти по нему вперед, невзирая на разные уколы и занозы, – сказал министр в заключение встречи.

Лима.

Н.ЛЕСНОВ,
спец.корр.АПН.

8 aug 69

[illegible] ATTITUDES

[illegible] PASSED

[illegible] INSTRUCTIONS TO [illegible]

[illegible] ABOVE INFO WITHOUT REQUESTING

[illegible]

[illegible] 201-[illegible], GP-1

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
201-132139
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
SUBJ KNOWN KGB, SECOND SECY AND PRESS
ATTACHE, MEXICO 61-68

201-193170
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C2C DDP, ADDP, CS/DO, CA-5, C/ECS

S E C R E T 162238Z NOV 70 CITE LIMA 7932 16 Nov 70 IN 207552

DIRECTOR

REF: LIMA 7923 (IN 207566)

1. SUSPECT DULAM-2 SPEAKING FOR EFFECT ON HIS SPECIFIC AUDIENCE IN VIEW PAST COOPERATION WITH STATION, INCLUDING PART HE PLAYED IN LEONOV EXPULSION. IN JANUARY 1970 HE HAD SPOKEN FRANKLY OF HIS BELIEF THAT U.S. WAS BUILDING CHILEAN MILITARY STRENGTH AS COUNTER TO VELASCO GOVERNMENT BUT C/O HAD BELIEVED HE HAD DISABUSED HIM OF THAT MISCONCEPTION (LIMA 6345). ATTEMPTS TO DISABUSE DULAMA-2 OF VELASCO GOVERNMENT ACCUSATIONS SURROUNDING CHAPPERS' DEPORTATION POSSIBLY LESS SUCCESSFUL. IN ANY CASE, DULINDEN-11'S ACCOUNT OF DULAMA-2'S OBSERVATIONS ACCEPTED AS FACT AND WILL BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN FUTURE DEALINGS WITH THIS STATION CONTACT.

2. FILE: 201-852600 GP-1

S E C R E T

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207

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DIRECTOR

2 DEC 69 IN 95959

[redacted] REDTOP AEKICK

REFS: A. LIMA 6094 (IN 90718)

B. LIMA 5278 (IN)

C. HPLW 5421

SB/X/WH

1. IN RECHECKING REF A STORY WITH IDEN A REF A, DUBRIDE 20 LEARNED SOVIET INVOLVED WAS NOT NIKOLAY ROMANOV BUT KGB OFFICER NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV WHO WAS HERE ON TDY FROM 23 APRIL TO 17 JULY 69. HOWEVER IDEN A CLARIFIED REF A STATEMENT ON "QUIET" PNG ACTION BY STATING "IT IS PRESUMED" THAT DIPLOMATIC NOTE REQUESTING LEONOV'S DEPARTURE WAS PASSED TO SOVIET EMBASSY. IDEN A ALSO STATED THAT REASON FOR PNG ACTION BASED ON REPORT WHICH REVEALED THAT ON 8 JULY 69 LEONOV DELIVERED SPEECH AT LUNCHEON MEETING OF FLN COMMITTEE.

IDEN A ADDED THAT THIS REPORT, WHICH WENT TO (ARMY INTELL SIE), PROVIDED CONFIRMATION OF HIS POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN PERU.

2. STATION ATTEMPTING CONFIRM "QUIET" PNG ACTION. WE KNOW DUBRIDE KEPT CLOSE WATCH ON LEONOV PARTICULARLY AFTER RECEIVING STATION TRACES ON HIM. SIE INTEREST PROBABLY AROUSED AS RESULT OF MEETING BETWEEN NADELHOFFER AND DULAMA/2 ON 4 JULY 69 WHEN LATTER GIVEN LEONOV PAPER. QUIET PNG WAS DISCUSSED AS POSSIBLE COURSE OF

CS COPY

Leonov file 2 Dec 69

SECRET

201-132139

64516

14-00000

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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR.

ACTION DURING THIS MEETING. PER REF B, DELAMA/2 STATED 18 JULY THAT ORIGINAL OF PAPER WENT TO PRESIDENT VELASCO AND COPIES TO FOREIGN MINISTER MERCADO AND TO INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION OF MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. DULAMA/2 ALSO STATED THAT MERCADO READ LEONOV PAPER TO CABINET 15 JULY THUS QUIET PNG TWO DAYS LATER APPEARS PLAUSIBLE.

3. STATION NOT RULING OUT POSSIBILITY THAT CURRENT GOP EFFORT AGAINST COS AND LNPURE OFFICER MAY BE CONNECTED WITH ABOVE ACTION PARTICULARLY IF GOP POLICY IS TO MAINTAIN BALANCE AND IMPARTIALITY IN DEALING WITH U.S. AND USSR.

4. VIEW ABOVE DEVELOPMENT, MODIFIED FORM OF REF C JMROD PAPER ON LEONOV MIGHT BE VERY SUITABLE FOR PRESS EXPOSURE IN BOGOTA OR SOME OTHER LA CAPITAL WITH ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF REPLAY HERE AND IN COUNTRIES SUCH AS BOLIVIA AND VENEZUELA WHERE ESTABLISHMENT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH SOVIETS PENDING.

5. FILE 201-132139

S E C R E T

SECRET

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM	EXTENSION	NO.
RID/CE/SB USSR		CSCI 316/ 03740-69
		DATE: 15 OCTOBER 1969

TO (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CI STAFF 2C 35				
2.				TO: STATE
3. RID/CE GA 10				
4.				
5. RID/AN GA 50				REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED
6. RID/CE/SB				
7. RID/EDI GB 34				
8.				
9.				AN / AB / IN / PS / BX 2 / FI
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				FILE NUMBER 201-851222
14.				DOCUMENT DATE 27 OCT 1969
15. RID/FI 1B 4003				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

SECRET

21 Oct 69

TO : Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security
Department of State

FROM : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : VOL...V, Valeriy
(aka . VOL...V, Valeriy Vasilyevich)

1. Reference is made to your request dated 12 September 1969 concerning Subject.

2. On 22 December 1966, an article entitled "Russians Continue Passing Themselves Off As Journalists" appeared in La Prensa Libre, a newspaper published in San Jose, Costa Rica, which made the following statements concerning Subject. According to the article, Subject, a journalist, had shortly prior to the date of the article arrived in Chile to attend the Congress of the CUT (Central Worker's Union). In this respect Subject's name was linked with that of one Mikhail KOLESNIKOV and one Aleksandr OPERUNOV, who were also to attend the Congress, and who, according to the article, on a previous visit to Colombia, had been accused of espionage activities by the Colombian authorities. La Prensa Libre article goes on to quote the Chilean magazine Politica, Economia, Cultura, as stating that Subject "does not work for any publication or information medium of the USSR which operates regularly. He prudently has not bragged about doing it, because recently no less than 100 representatives of Soviet newspapers, radio, or information agencies who work abroad (Pravda, Izvestia, TASS, Novosti, Radio Moscow) have been accused of being spies in the service of the KGB. In Latin America alone 15 Russian journalists have been declared persona non grata."

3. According to a report dated 12 August 1969 from a usually reliable source, Subject, the editor (sic) of Komsomolskaya Pravda, who had been permanently stationed in Havana, Cuba, since March of 1966, had visited Peru from 4 July to 5 August 1969. The files of this office contain the following reports concerning Subject's visit to Peru which may be of interest:

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a. A report dated 8 July 1969, from the same usually reliable source of paragraph 3, provided the information that on arrival in Lima, Peru, on 4 July, Subject was not met at the airport by representatives of the Soviet Embassy, but went directly to a private residence where he spent the night. Source stated that shortly following his arrival in Lima, Subject made comments to the effect that he was a very close friend of one Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV. For your information, LEONOV had arrived in Peru on 23 April 1969, as a NOVOSTI representative and remained until 17 July 1969. Based on his activities and associations during his tour of duty in Mexico from May 1953 to 22 December 1968, LEONOV is considered to be a staff officer of the KGB (Soviet Committee for State Security). Further comments by Subject on this occasion which were reported by Source referred to a trip to Moscow to attend a World Peace Conference which Subject had made shortly prior to the date of the report. According to Source, Subject stated that while in Moscow he met one Felix Cabada ARIAS Schreiber, a member of the Central Committee of the Pro-Soviet Communist Party (PCP/Soviet) of Peru, and followed this statement with various questions concerning members of the PCP/Soviet, the situation in the universities, and the current strength of the revolutionary vanguard. Finally, Source also reported that on the following morning, 5 July 1969, Subject contacted the Soviet Embassy and was instructed to immediately obtain a room at the Savoy Hotel, where LEONOV was staying. According to Source, Subject was informed by the Soviet Embassy that staying at a private residence in Lima might create suspicions on the part of the local authorities and that the Soviet Embassy preferred to avoid such problems.

b. A second report, dated 11 July 1969, from a reliable source, provided the information that since Subject's arrival in Lima, Peru, on 4 July 1969, he had been in frequent contact with the Soviet Ambassador to Peru, one Yuriy Vladimirovich LEBEDEV, and with LEONOV (paragraph 3a). Source also stated that Subject was treated with notable deference by the Ambassador.

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c. According to a report dated 1 August 1969 from the same reliable source of paragraph 3b, during his Peruvian visit Subject contacted one Edwin PEREZ, Traffic Manager of Faucett Airlines, and offered to sell him a small aircraft on very attractive terms. Source stated that PEREZ is interested in planes for a small private air service which he runs apart from his job with Faucett Airlines.

d. In an additional report dated 11 August 1969, the same usually reliable source of paragraphs 3 and 3a reported that prior to his departure from Peru on 4 August 1969, Subject stated that he hoped to have his office of Komsomolskaya Pravda transferred from Havana, Cuba, to Lima, Peru. He stated that the Soviet government is extremely interested in the current situation in Peru and is watching developments closely. According to Source, Subject also stated that he believed he had made a good impression on the Peruvian government and had made friends in Peru. In this regard, Subject mentioned that he had become very friendly with one General Marco Fernandez BACA Carrasco, the head of PETROPERU (Peruvian State Petroleum Agency). Subject also stated that BACA had arranged trips for Subject at the expense of the Peruvian government to Talara and Iquitos, Peru. [Comment: No immediate explanation was apparent for Subject's activities and comments as reported in paragraphs 3a and 3d.]

4. For your information, in the same 12 August 1969 report of paragraph 3, the same usually reliable source stated that Subject stated before his departure from Peru that he planned to return to attend the Congress of the Youth Faction of the Pro-Soviet Communist Party of Peru (JCP/Soviet), and stated that he planned to visit other Latin American countries, including Colombia and Ecuador, after leaving Peru. The comment was made in this report that Subject might also be planning to attend the meeting of the World Federation of Democratic Youth which was scheduled to be held in Bogota, Colombia, the 9th through the 12th of October 1969.

SECRET

SECRET

CSCI-316/03740-69

Encl. 1 name check

CC: Federal Bureau of Investigation
with copy of name check

RID/CE: JFS/JLB/nkc

BASED ON: 201-850222

para 2: La Prensa Libre
article dated 22 December 1968

para 3: IN 22200
12 August 1969

para 3a: IN 98046
LIMA 5209
8 July 1969

para 3b: HPLA-10167
11 July 1969

para 3c: IN-15298
LIMA-5366
1 August 1969

para 3d: IN 21242
LIMA-5421
11 August 1969

para 4: IN 22200
12 August 1969

FILE IN: 201-850222

SECRET

14-00000

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REQUEST FOR BIOGRAPHIC DATA

TO	FROM	DATE
FBI CIA	SCA/VO	9/12/63

FULL NAME (Married woman include maiden name)	ALIASES NICKNAMES	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
VOLKOV, Valeriy		May 24, 1938 Kirsan Region, USSR

HOME ADDRESS	SEX	CITIZENSHIP	MARITAL STATUS	SPOUSE'S NAME
	M	Russian	Married	

OCCUPATION	NAME AND ADDRESS OF PRESENT EMPLOYER
News a er man	

PREVIOUS EMPLOYERS AND FORMER ADDRESSES (Approximately last ten years)

FOR USE OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE ONLY

OFFICE	TYPE OF DEPARTMENT PROGRAM
SCA/VO	
DATE 9/12/63	
NAME OF SUBMITTING OFFICER OCBurke:gcb	

FOR USE OF OTHER OFFICE(S) OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SB 3/6
RIS - NPTI
SCI - NPTI

MEMORANDUM COORDINATION

	INITIALS
SB WH	
WH WH/3/P	
SB /X/	
BY TYPIST	

FILE IN 201-950222

15 SEP 1969

FORM DS 430

SECRET

30 September 1969

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBJECT: Interim Reply- VOLKOV, Valeriy

1. The final reply to your request for information on Subject is being delayed due to detailed analysis of file material that may be relevant. Every effort is being made to expedite this processing and to reduce any further inconvenience to you.

2. Should you desire additional information on the processing of this case you may contact this Office through normal liaison channels.

RETURN TO:
SCA/VO
GCBurke:geb

DATE:
12 September 1969

J. BARNES

SECRET

14-00000

S E C R E T 091703Z OCT 59 CITE LIMA 9685
BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR
REF: BUENOS AIRES 3335 (IN 61647)

1. PERUVIAN POLICE LIAISON CONTACT (DUBRIDE-30) ADVISED THE STATION ON 8 OCTOBER THAT COL. JORGE (ROSAS) BENEVIDES, CHIEF OF PERUVIAN ARMY INTELL SERVICE WAS ABOUT TO DEPART FOR TWO WEEK "BUSINESS TRIP" TO BUENOS AIRES. DUE TO SENSITIVITY OF SOURCE OF REF, THIS INFO MAY NOT BE OF VALUE, BUT COL. ROSAS WOULD BE AN EXTREMELY VALUABLE ALLY IN ANY EFFORT TO DISCREETLY REMOVE HUGO BRESCANO FROM PERU TO ARGENTINA.

2. QUITE APART FROM ABOVE, IF BUENOS AIRES HAS CONTACT IN MILITARY INTELL THAT MIGHT POSSIBLY BE IN TOUCH WITH COL. ROSAS, WOULD BE PARTICULARLY BENEFICIAL TO LIMA IF ARGENTINE EXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH SOVIETS COULD BE DRIVEN HOME TO COL. ROSAS. GROWTH OF SOVIET OFFICIAL MISSION HERE IS ALARMING AND SHOWS NO SIGNS OF STOPPING. LARGE NUMBER OF TDY'ERS, MANY OF THEM KNOWN OR SUSPECT RIS, INCLUDE TWO OUTSTANDING EXPERTS IN LABOR AFFAIRS, NICOLAI LUCHINSKIY AND VADIM KUCHERTOV (WHO NOW TRAVELLING IN PERU UNDER ALIAS VADIM LISTOV). PROOF OF EFFECTIVENESS THESE PROFESSIONALS IS FACT THAT ALMOST FROM A STANDING START, PCP/SOVIET CONTROLLED LABOR CONFEDER-

201-
58-8-17

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50-5-1
09Oct59

PAGE 2 LIMA 5823 S E C R E T

ATION HAS GROWN TO PRACTICALLY DOMINATE THE LABOR FIELD,
AND WITHIN SIX MONTHS COULD HAVE COMPLETE CONTROL OVER PERUVIAN
LABOR AND REPRESENT DIRECT CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTING
ANYTHING LESS THAN MOST RADICAL OF REFORM MEASURES. IF BUENOS
AIRES STATION COULD ARRANGE SUCH A CONVERSATION, LIMA WOULD BE
MOST INTERESTED IN ROSAS' VIEWS.

3. FILE: DEFER.

S E C R E T

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
201-132139
SEX M DOB ?

050-008-010
HMMA-37724
20 AUG 69
P2

CIT ?
OCC ?
VOICE SAMPLE ATTACHED

R 6909030716

FILE IN 201-132139

16. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
201-132139
SEX M DOB ?

201-850222
SX -16129
12 AUG 69

CIT ?
OCC ?
CONTACT IN LIMA PERU
WITH VALERIY VASILYEVICH VOLKOV
NOVOSTI REP AND KNUWN KGB OFFICER

R 7003100149

FILE IN 201-132139

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

C 2[illegible]

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WHD; Chief, SBD

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Lima

SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL/REDLEG
Copy of EL CASO LEONOV

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None

References: A. HPLA-10157, 3 July 69
B. LIMA-5278

1. Forwarded herewith is a copy of the Spanish language version of the paper EL CASO LEONOV which is the subject of paragraph three (b) of referenced dispatch. Please refer to Reference B for the details concerning the passage of this document on to DULAMA-2.

2. The Station inadvertently destroyed the rough English draft from which the Spanish version was made. Should a translation of this document be desired, it is requested that this be accomplished at Headquarters.

Donald P. Mac[illegible] (signature)
Samuel K. CASTELON

DPN:mes

Attachment: h/w
As stated

Distribution:
2 - C, WHD w/att.
2 - C, SBD w/att.

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1 ATT 2 cc w/ ATT TO SB/X/[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HPLA-10204	6 August 1969
	CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-132139

14-00000

HFLA-10204

EL CASO LEONOV

Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV arribó a Lima el día 23 de Abril de 1969. LEONOV, subdirector del servicio de prensa NOVOSTI en Latino-America, es experto en asuntos latino-americanos. Y también es alto oficial de la KGB, el servicio secreto de inteligencia de la Unión Soviética. Durante su estada de diez años en Mexico, funcionaba como segundo secretario y agregado de prensa de la Embajada Soviética para dirigir el curso y financiamente del apoyo clandestino de la Unión Soviética a todos los partidos comunistas de Latino-America. Si estos años de actividad subversiva muestran indicios del papel que desempeñó como representante oficial del gobierno soviético (y así lo indican los contactos que tomó) se puede suponer que el propósito de su misión en Lima no consiste meramente en informar al pueblo soviético sobre el Peru y los Peruanos.

Las actividades de LEONOV tambien incluyen apoyo a los movimientos guerrilleros. Como se vera, en Abril de 1968, mientras que desempeñaba su misión como oficial de la Embajada Soviética en Mexico, LEONOV fué identificado como el diplomático soviético que entregó más de cien mil dólares al colombiano Feliciano Pachon Choconta para uso de la FARC y el ELN. PACHON fué capturado al ingresar a Colombia con este dinero. (Al ser capturado PACHON, se le incautó un trozo de papel que contenía la dirección de la oficina de LEONOV en Mexico en la Avenida Mazatlán.) Como una prueba más de su complicidad en este caso, Moscú ordenó su regreso inmediato cuando el citado asunto fué desenmascarado por la prensa.

Pero, a pesar del riesgo que acarreaba la publicación de dicho incidente, de conducir a la ofensiva diplomática de los soviéticos en Latino-America hacia un fracaso, el régimen soviético persistió en su propósito de alentar la subversión en nuestro continente y para lograr su objetivo nos ha enviado a LEONOV por segunda vez. El 23 de Abril, cuando se encontraba de tránsito en Bogotá, tomó contacto en el aeropuerto con varios miembros de la unidad clandestina del Partido Comunista de Colombia. Se presume que en esta ocasión se discutió sobre la presunta complicidad de LEONOV y su dirección de los nuevos frentes guerrilleros que vienen operando en la frontera panameña-costarricense, así como también de los grupos en Venezuela y Colombia y los terroristas en Puerto Rico.

A su arribo a Lima el mismo día, LEONOV se reunió con los representantes locales a quienes dió a conocer su plan de establecer oficialmente un despacho de NOVOSTI en Lima---un bien establecido método de los soviéticos para sentar la base legal y abierta que luego se emplea para ocultar el verdadero propósito de los soviéticos que es la dirección y financiacion de la actividad subversiva. (Hasta la fecha no menos de cien representantes de la prensa soviética han sido publicamente desenmascarados como agentes de espionage en diversos paises del mundo. Treintaidos de estos fueron expulsados como persona non grata, incluso quince que operaban en Latino-America.)

LEONOV no ha perdido cualquier oportunidad para establecer sus contactos. De fuentes fidedignas bien informadas en Mexico se destaca que LEONOV ha tomado contacto en el Peru con estos miembros del PCP: Jorge Vladimiro del PRADO, Raul ACOSTA Salas; Isidoro BAMARRA Ramirez; Mariano Eleuterio MUNIZ Yabar; y con los activistas del FLN, Pedro Anibal MOROTE Cornejo; Angel CASTRO Lavarello; Walter SOLORZANO; Jesus HORNA Galvan; Purificacion ROMERO Esquivel; y Amelia FLORES, Ademas, ha visitado en Piura y Talara donde tomó fotografias de las instalaciones petroleras; y en Pisco y Tambo de Mora donde estableció contacto oon los sindicatos de obreros pesqueros; y en junio viajó tambien a Arequipa y Cuzco. Lev Aleksandrovich NOVIKOV, representante de Radio Moscú en Santiago de Chile y presunto agente de espionaje, se reunió en Lima con LEONOV y estuvo con él varios dias.

Durante su estada en Mexico, LEONOV viajaba a menudo a Cuba donde se reunía con altos dirigentes del régimen cubano, incluso

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con Fidel Castro y Che Guevara. Como entonces no existían relaciones diplomáticas entre la Unión Soviética y los países de Centro-America, ni tampoco con los de la costa norte de Sud America, uno de los cargos principales de LEONOV era coordinar con los cubanos la guerrilla armada, y especialmente en Venezuela y Colombia. Ademas LEONOV era el especialista de la Embajada Soviética en Mexico en las actividades con los exiliados comunistas que vivían en esa capital. Interesa saber que en 1961 LEONOV viajó a Cuba con el cargo especial de actuar como interprete en las charlas secretas sostenidas entre Fidel Castro y el entonces representante soviético a las Naciones Unidas, Anastas Mikoyan. No cabe duda de que entre la Unión Soviética y Cuba existen diferencias ideología y táctica, pero en lo que se refiere al establecimiento clandestino de focos guerrilleros en Centro-y Sud America, existe amplia evidencia de estrecha cooperación entre los dos gobiernos y del financiamiento soviético de estas operaciones. El caso Pachon, previamente citado en este informe confidencial, es uno de los muchos que se divulgó publicamente, gracias a la diligencia del servicio nacional de seguridad de Colombia. El interés de Cuba por los hechos que ocurren en el Perú sin duda estarían ligados a la presencia de LEONOV aqui y con sus largos y frecuentes viajes al interior. Ocurre preguntar: ¿se le permitiría a un periodista peruano tomar fotografías de refinerías de petroleo en la Union Sovietica, tal como lo ha hecho LEONOV en el Peru? ¿Se le permitiría a un diplomático o periodista peruano viajar tan libre y extensivamente por la Unión Soviética, pretextando estar reuniendo informaciones y articulos para NOVOSTI? ¿Existe alguna relación entre los desordenes provacados por estudiantes y campesinos que se vienen desencadenando en el interior del país y los extensos viajes de LEONOV a esta región? La respuesta parecería lógica si se toma en cuenta la vasta experiencia de este agente en las actividades subversivas. Y más lógica aparece la conclusión cuando se sabe que estableció contacto clandestino en el Perú con el comunista Pedro Anibal Morote Cornejo, citado en los primeros párrafos de este informe, que también es miembro y dirigente del FLN. Morote se entrenó en la guerra de guerrillas en Cuba en 1962 y a petición personal de Fidel Castro se unió al FLN para actuar como enfermero. Ahora se encuentra en el Perú y ha tomado contacto con LEONOV. Precisa preguntar por qué, y para qué.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO : Chief of Station, Lima
: Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : JMROD/Monograph on Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See paragraph 2 and 3 below.

Reference : DIRECTOR 27524, 6 August 1969

1. Attached herewith is a draft version of the monograph on Subject, which has been prepared by JMROD per discussions between Thomas G. URQUHART and Samuel K. CASTELLON during the former's TDY to Lima in July 1969.

2. It is requested that the Mexico City Station review the paper and cable Headquarters and Lima as soon as convenient, signalling approval of the paper for passage to Peruvian liaison, or any changes which should be made. This paper has been reviewed and approved by the REDWOOD division and by the Guatemalan desk. For the convenience of Station Mexico, appended to the paper are copies of the references on which material pertaining to Mexico has been based.

3. Upon receipt of Mexico City's cabled approval Headquarters will prepare a Spanish translation and pouch it to Lima for passage to liaison.

[signature]
Wendy R. HARRIDGE

Attachments:
A. Monograph on Leonov h/w
B. Backup material h/w

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Lima w/att A
2 - COS, Mexico City w/att A & B

NOTE: THE PAPER WAS BY [illegible] DEEMED UNSUITABLE FOR PASSAGE TO PERUVIAN LIAISON, BECAUSE OF THE PREPONDERANCE OF MEXICO CITY STATION OR INFO. [illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
200-124-162/3	HPLW-5390	
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-132139

Monograph of Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV

Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV, the Soviet official who visited Peru from 23 April 1969 to 17 July 1969 as a representative of the Soviet news agency NOVOSTI, is a long-time,firmly identified KGB officer who served in Mexico during most of the period 1953-1968. Although he was able to function effectively in his overt jobs as Cultural Attache and later Press Attache, he was consistently active in clandestine support of Latin American revolutionary and subversive activities, particularly relating to Guatemala. Following are details of his career.

LEONOV was born 22 August 1928 in Ryazan oblast, USSR. His wife, Valeriya Ivanovna, was born 28 April 1928 in Ryazan. As of 1968 the LEONOVs had one daughter, Irina, born in 1962.

LEONOV was first posted to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico in May 1953. His initial position was secretary to the Soviet Ambassador. In addition to administrative duties and cultural matters, LEONOV functioned as a translator and interpreter, since he spoke excellent Spanish.

Two of LEONOV's most interesting contacts from his first tour in Mexico were:

a. Fidel CASTRO. CASTRO, who was in exile in Mexico from 1953-56, was arrested by the Mexican police in June 1956, and a ~~police~~ search revealed LEONOV's calling card in CASTRO's possession. [1]

b. Bernardo LEMUS Mendoza. LEMUS, an important Guatemalan Communist youth leader, was a close friend of LEONOV's dating from the period 1953-56, during part of which time LEMUS was in exile in Mexico. [2] LEMUS, who was a friend and former prison-mate of Raul CASTRO, allegedly conducted liaison in Mexico City during 1955-56 between the Cuban Communist Party exiles and the Fidel CASTRO group.

LEONOV and his wife departed Mexico City on 17 October 1956 for the USSR, where they remained until their return to Mexico in 1961. While in the USSR, LEONOV was used for important interpreting chores; most notably, he accompanied Soviet Vice Premier Anastas MIKOYAN on his trips to Mexico and Cuba in November 1959 and February 1960. During the

February 1960 trip to Cuba, LEONOV first met Ricardo MIRANDA Aldana, Guatemalan Communist and revolutionary who was then in Cuba recovering from wounds received in a Cuban-sponsored, Nicaraguan-led movement to overthrow Nicaragua's President, General Somosa. Leonov was to have later clandestine contact with MIRANDA in Mexico.

On 31 July 1961, the LEONOVs returned to Mexico. This time, LEONOV was listed as Third Secretary and worked as assistant to the Cultural Affairs Officer, Svyatoslav Fedorovich KUZNETSOV. A KGB officer KUZNETSOV is, as of this writing, once again serving in Mexico, this time as First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy.

During this tour of duty, LEONOV's particular responsibility for support of the Guatemalan revolutionary effort began to emerge. In January 1962, Ricardo MIRANDA Aldana, Guatemalan revolutionary mentioned above, passed through Mexico City on his way to Cuba for guerrilla training. MIRANDA, reported to be in charge of accumulating arms for the activist arm of the PGT (Guatemalan Communist Party), brought to Mexico a message for the Soviets. He delivered this message to the leading Guatemalan exile in Mexico in direct touch with the Soviets, Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ, who passed it to his Soviet Embassy Contact.[2] During MIRANDA's stay in Mexico, LEONOV met with him. MIRANDA returned to Guatemala from Cuba

in October 1963 and thereafter took a leading role in PGT/FAR guerrilla actions. As of 1965, he was a member of the Military Commission of the PGT and conducted terrorist actions. He had in his possession at that time sketches of the homes of various Guatemalan officials who were on the PGT/FAR assassination list. MIRANDA was arrested in September 1965 on charges of assassination of two Guatemalan businessmen. He apparently was released, or escaped, about mid-1966. He left Guatemala, and is believed to have gone to Mexico and to have had clandestine contact with LEONOV there in December 1966.[3] MIRANDA returned to Guatemala after spending some time in El Salvador, and was killed on 3 May 1967 near Guatemala City by unknown assailants.

In 1963, LEONOV was also in clandestine contact with a former Mexican army officer named Lorenzo CARDENAS Barajas, who was heavily involved in the procurement of arms for the Guatemalan revolutionaries. CARDENAS, a fervent adherent of the revolutionary left, had contact with Victor N. GLOTOV, another KGB officer in the Soviet Embassy, Mexico, as well as LEONOV. LEONOV is known to have met CARDENAS clandestinely two days before LEONOV left for the USSR on vacation on 21 April 1963.

LEONOV is believed still to have been in contact with CARDENAS as recently as March 1967.[5] In recent years, CARDENAS has been active in the Movimiento Latinoamericano de Liberacion, a Latin American revolutionary organization founded in Mexico in 1964 and headed by Guillermo CARNERO Hoke, a Peruvian who has spent many years in exile in Mexico, and is now back in Peru. CARDENAS' activities have involved agitation among Mexican students and peasants, which led increasing difficulties with the police, and he claims to have asked for asylum in Peru in 1968.[6]

LEONOV and his family went on home leave to the USSR 21 April 1963 to 20 July 1963. During this leave, LEONOV renewed an old acquaintance with Fidel CASTRO, serving as CASTRO's interpreter in the USSR in May 1963. After home leave, LEONOV returned to Mexico, where he remained (except for two more trips to the USSR in 1964 and 1966) until 22 December 1968, when he and his family departed permanently from Mexico. Upon his return to Mexico from home leave in 1964, LEONOV was promoted to Second Secretary and Press Attache at the Soviet Embassy.

LEONOV, in his role as Press Attache, was energetic and effective. Although he was mainly responsible for the work of the Press Office, which was in the same building as

his living quarters, he spent a great deal of time at the Soviet Embassy proper, going out frequently for his many meetings. He was popular among his wide contacts among newspapermen in Mexico and his most intimate press contact was Luis SUAREZ Lopez, a Spanish Communist journalist with the Marxist weekly magazine, Siempre. LEONOV saw SUAREZ very frequently on press placements and possibly other matters. SUAREZ has a long history of pro-Soviet activities, is a member of the Communist front International Organization of Journalists, and has traveled extensively in the Soviet bloc, Communist China, and Cuba.

As to LEONOV's personality, he has a pleasant, outgoing manner, is extremely intelligent, and gets along well with both his colleagues, and his numerous outside contacts. He is hard-working, generally accommodating to people, and is a good conversationalist. He enjoys playing tennis, volleyball and soccer. He also likes to hunt and fish, and enjoys chess. In addition to excellent Spanish, he speaks English. On the negative side, LEONOV gets along badly with his wife; they often quarrel violently, and he neglects her for his numerous sports and social activities. He is also quite unkind and cutting with those whom he regards as his

intellectual inferiors, treating them quite rudely when he is in a bad mood.[7, 8, 9, 10]

As Press Attache, LEONOV had the pretext for contact with many people with whom he had apparently innocuous relationships, but probably developed for intelligence purposes.

As an example, he had close contact with Victor RICO Galan, a Spanish-born, naturalized Mexican Communist journalist, who has very close ties to both the Guatemalan revolutionary movement and the Cubans.[11] RICO was a founding member in 1962 of the MLN, a pro-Cuban Communist front organization. A regular writer for Siempre and Politica magazines, RICO acted, in Spring of 1965, as the Radio Havana representative in Mexico for coverage of the Dominican situation. LEONOV consulted frequently with him at this time, meeting in RICO's home or in cafes. LEONOV also established direct contact with certain Dominican exiles through RICO.[12] In August 1966, RICO was arrested and imprisoned because of his leading role in the Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo, which had been organizing an armed insurgent movement in the Mexican countryside.[14] This movement was reported to have secret radio contact with Cuba. RICO was arrested as he was about to board a flight to Cuba.[15]

Other LEONOV's Mexican contacts of particular interest are:

Roberto JARAMILLO Flores, Mexican former President of the youth Section of the Mexican Socialist Party (JPS), and in 1967 involved with the revolutionary Students Front, youth affiliate of the National Organization of Revolutionary Action. JARAMILLO and LEONOV were in frequent contact, particularly in 1963-64, on matters involving the JPS, over which the Soviets were exerting active control.[16]

Juan REJANO Porras, Spaniard, member of the Central Committee of the Spanish Communist Party, leading intellectual and poet. REJANO and LEONOV had been in regular contact since at least 1965. Meetings between them were arranged through a third person, another Spanish Communist employed in LEONOV's Press Office.[17] REJANO was, as of 1968, editor of the Czech Bulletin, published in Mexico by the Czech Embassy.

Enrique SEMO Calev, Bulgarian-born long-time member of the Mexican Communist Party. LEONOV and SEMO had frequent social contact, as well as dealings on press and cultural matters. SEMO assisted LEONOV in developing social contacts outside of his normal area of access.[18]

A particularly interesting foreign contact of LEONOV's was Carlos BONILLA Sanchez, Communist labor leader from Colombia. He and LEONOV, reportedly close friends, were in correspondence during 1966-67. BONILLA was President of the Federacion Sindical de Trabajadores de Cundinamarca (FESTRAC) until November 1964, when he was removed because of his Communist sympathies. He visited Cuba at the special invitation of Fidel CASTRO in November 1964, transiting Mexico on the way,[19,20] where LEONOV was at that time. It should also be noted that LEONOV traveled to Lima on 23 April 1969 via Bogota.

LEONOV's connections with Feliciano PACHON Choconta, Colombian Communist courier arrested in April 1968, have been discussed in a paper previously provided to you, and so will not be repeated here.

Although LEONOV's sphere of KGB activity obviously broadened considerably over the years, as he gained contacts and area knowledge; his involvement with Guatemalan matters continued throughout his long stay in Mexico. As recently as 1968, he was reliably reported to still be the main clandestine Soviet contact for the Guatemalan Communists in Mexico.[14]

The LEONOVs left Mexico permanently on 22 December 1968, and returned to the USSR.

LEONOV, during his years in Mexico, showed himself to be a capable, hard-working intelligence officer, who was able to fulfill his cover job with skill and at the same time pursue his clandestine missions. It may be presumed, on the basis of his capacities demonstrated in Mexico, that he will have worked effectively in his apparent task of setting up the Novosti news agency in Peru, and that he will also have begun to develop contacts among the Peruvian Communist Party and other sympathetic elements with an eye to spotting and assessing prospective agents for subsequent exploitation by the KGB reszidentura which will inevitably function as a part of the new Soviet Embassy.

Footnotes to LEONOV Monograph

1. MEXI 839, 26 June 1956, S: LIVESTOCK-3.
2. HGCW-4035, 2 December 1966 (Headquarters compilation), S: LINLUCK, ESDEW-1
3. HMMA-33293, 18 October 1967, (Spr.), page 20, para 51, S: LIFEAT.
4. HMM-6405, 22 May 1962, S: LINLUCK
5. HMMA-33215, 5 October 1967.
6. HMMA-37462, 2 July 1967, (CARDENAS Interrogation), page 10, S: LIEMPO-12
7. HMM-1524, 9 April 1956, S: Station compilation of mostly LIFEAT.
8. 7 March 1956, S: LIFEAT.
9. HMMA-29141, 8 June 1966, S: FRINGLASS (transcriber)
10. HMMA-34470, 15 April 1968, S: ZINSMEISTER (Transcriber).
11. HMM-10628, 24 August 1966, S: LIFTER-8.
12. HMM-6770, 5 October 1962, S: LICOOKY (RICO)
13. HMMA-26223, 28 May 1965, S: LIFEAT (raw LIFEAT-7 May 65)
14. MEXI 7743, 22 October 1968, S: LIREBEL-2.
15. MEXI 8310, 24 August 1966, S: Press Accounts (RICO).
16. HMMA-33293, 18 October 1967, (Spr.), page 17, 18, para. 38, S: LIENVOY.
17. HMMA-33293, 18 October 1967, (Spr.), page 22, 23, para. 62, S: LIFEAT since 5 April 1965.
18. HMMA-33293, 18 October 1967, (Spr.) page 20, 21, para 55, S: LIFEAT (on LEONOV since 5 April 1965), (on SEMO).
19. HMMA-32864, 23 August 1967, S: LIMUD
20. HMMA-30130, 26 September 1966, S: LIMUD.

Comments on Dispatch HPLW-5390
Prepared by WH/SAO

These Comments were Prepared by Ernest Tolliverdaues, AC/WH/1.

SUBJECT: The LEONOV Matter (Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV, (201-132139)

REF : HPLW-5390, Typed 29 August 1969

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS:

1. With one exception (HCGW-4035, 2 Dec 66), the personality and biographic report on LEONOV is based entirely on Mexico City reporting. Much of this appears to be quite sensitive if passage to Peru liaison is intended.

2. Since the report concerns a Soviet official, the fact that the report is based upon WH Division material exclusively appears to be self-limiting and, possibly, self-defeating.

3. Although the writer of the report refers to its acceptability to SB Division, there is no SB coordinator.

4. It would appear that, to achieve the desired result (and we don't really know what this is), it would not be necessary to go into such exacting detail. A more generalized report, following more or less an AEASSAULT format, might achieve the results desired by Station Lima without the pitfalls of utilizing the sensitive material incorporated in the present compilation.

5. Seeking approval of Station Mexico City for the release of the total report seems to violate the concept of Headquarters control of operational information. Would it not be more appropriate to ask Station's opinions only in areas of doubt in the matter of source-sensitivity?

6. Although this dispatch was coordinated according to para 2 with SB Division and the Guatemalan Desk, the first inkling this Branch got of the paper is when the dispatch arrived on my desk.

7. This is a good paper for the Lima Station background information. For passing to a third liaison service, it poses some potential danger to the Mexico Station clandestine sources:

a. page 2 - LIVESTOCK-3 is now dead but he was also a Soviet Embassy contact in Mexico and was run by the British. He was fired by us for unreliability.

The search team that arrested Fidel CASTRO and did the interrogation was LITEMPO-4 (now an important Station contact) and only about four years or so ago told COS about the calling card of LEONOV.

b. page 3 - Specific information about MIRANDA trip in January 1962 and delivery of message to GUTIERREZ could pinpoint the source : LINLUCK/ ESDEW-1.

c. page 4 - Specific date of clandestine contact between MIRANDA December 66 could pinpoint LIFEAT on LEONOV residence.

d. page 4 - Specific date of clandestine contact between LEONOV and CARDENAS 19 April 1963 might reveal surveillance (LIEMBRACE though probably would not identify team members. It could also be argued that Soviets have long ago identified these teams.)

e. page 5 - CARDENAS' request for asylum in Peru could pinpoint BITEMPO-12. In any event, references to the police sources throughout the report definitely tell Lima authorities that CIA is working closely in Mexico with the Mexican officials.

f. page 8 - REJANO Porras and LEONOV. The sentence "Meetings between them were arranged through a third person, another Spanish Communist employed in LEONOV's Press Office" implies clandestine coverage of that office (LIFEAT).

g. page 8 - the same is true with Enrique SEMO Calev and LEONOV.

h. page 9 - BONILLA Sanchez and LEONOV "being in correspondence" implies mail intercept (LIMUD) which it is.

i. page 9 - LIREBEL-2 is a sensitive source and about the main source right now on Guatemalan exile activities. The last sentence might implicate him. At least it tells the Peruvians that CIA has a penetration here.

8. Finally - It tells the Peruvians that the Station (CIA) Mexico has phone taps, mail intercepts, penetration of the Cuban IS, penetration of Guatemalan exiles, surveillance and police liaison.

It concentrates throughout that the information was developed by coverage of LEONOV while he was stationed in Mexico. These activities are treated in specific terms whereas his activities <u>outside</u> Mexico are treated in a very general manner.

The Branch would prefer to have the paper re-written omitting all specific dates and references which reveal the clandestine collection technique which produced the information,

and should incorporate AEASSAULT information and be coordinated with SB Division in writing. It might be pointed out that previous efforts to "burn" LEONOV have not been successful.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Lima

SUBJECT: REDLEG
Conversations between DULINDEN-11 and Nikolay S. Leonov and DULAUREL-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

1. On 15 July after leaving a local publisher's office DULINDEN-11 drove Nikolay S. Leonov to his hotel. DULAUREL-1 who accompanied them to the publisher's office was left at her home and DULINDEN-11 and Leonov were alone during the course of the drive. Leonov proceeded to ask DULINDEN-11 various questions about his private life including his economic situation and also queried him about his future goals in life. DULINDEN-11 responded to all questions and said he enjoyed his work with DULAUREL-1 and was interested in journalism and felt that he had learned quite a bit in the short time he has been involved in assisting DULAUREL-1 with Panorama Internacional. He said that he did not work with DULAUREL-1 for money alone but because he saw this as an opportunity to improve himself which would eventually lead to an improvement in his economic standard. DULINDEN-11 said that it was a relaxed conversation, Leonov was very friendly and appeared to be interested in DULINDEN-11's goals and aspirations.

2. On 16 July DULINDEN-11 saw DULAUREL-1 and the latter asked him how his conversation went with Leonov. DULINDEN-11 gave DULAUREL-1 a summary of what had been discussed and commented that Leonov appeared to have a genuine interest in his future. DULAUREL-1 then told DULINDEN-11 that previously she had a rather lengthy conversation with Leonov about DULINDEN-11 and told Leonov the problems he had with the party, the accusations made against him, her conversations with DULINDEN-11 during this period and the investigation she had conducted while DULINDEN-11 was under party control. Leonov told DULAUREL-1 the fact that DULINDEN-11 was under party control is of no significance and once again re-iterated his general disgust with the party leadership.

[illegible] 201-736290

KTR/cng

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD

[illegible] 132139

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
201-850222 201-132139	HPLA-10206	6 August 1969
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-736270

3. It appears from the foregoing that DULAUREL-1 arranged the circumstances which led to the private conversation between Leonov and DULINDEN-11. The above "interest" displayed by Leonov in DULINDEN-11 might be nothing more than politeness on his part but the Station believes that DULINDEN-11 is undergoing an assessment by Leonov, DULAUREL-1 and Valeriy V. Volkov and at least up to this juncture apparently has made a favorable impression.

Samuel K. CASTELON

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
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ORIG: Patricia L. Johnson:ddm
UNIT: WH/SAO
EXT: 9061
DATE: 5 August 1969

SECRET

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CONF: WH8 INFO FILE, VR. RI/AN SB8 FI2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

TO LIMA

05 20 15 z AUG 69

REFERENCE: LIMA 5335 (IN 13361)*

269778

1. IF AVAILABLE TO STATION, PLS POUCH COPY OF TORN UP LETTER CITED SUPDATA REF.

2. FILE: 200-124-162/3; 201-132139.

END OF MESSAGE

*DUBRIDE-30 provided info on interview between LEONOV and Minister of Energy and Mines FERNANDEZ MALDONADO based on torn up letter collected from wastebasket in hotel room occupied by Sovs.

C/WH/SAO

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

ALFONSO G. SPERA
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

201-132139

COPY NO.

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: ITKIN, HERBERT
201-836808

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
			NOT REVIEWED BY HSCA

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

14-00000

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BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 34 PER

ACTION UNIT WH8

ACTION NO 890

FILE, VR, IP/AN, CI/OPS, CI/SO, CI, FI

S E C R E T 282234Z AUG 72 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 13099

694715

DIRECTOR.

WOMUSE EMPYREX

201-836808

1. EMPYREX LIAISON ADVISES HERBERT I T K I N ARRIVED SANTO DOMINGO 22 AUG 72 FROM NEW YORK PAA 235 PROHIBITED ENTRY AND RETURNED NEW YORK SAME DAY PAA 236. ITKIN BORN (19 NOV 26, NEW YORK, US PP B 1220178.

2. NO STATION TRACES. EMPYREX RECORDS INDICATE SUBJ BLACKLISTED BECAUSE HE ENGAGED ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES AND HAS MAFIA CONNECTIONS. ACCRODING SAME FILE, NY TIMES REPORTED SUBJ PROVIDED INFO TO BKCROWN ON PERSONS IN DOMREP.

3. TRACES REQUESTED.

4. INDEX. FILE 201-836808, 22-2-20/3. E2 IMPDET WH-SISM.

S E C R E T

AH
AB
IE
PS
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D-22-2-20/3

28 Aug 72

201-836808

14-00000

ORIG: ELISABETH VETTER:BA
UNIT: WH/7/DR
EXT: 9156
DATE: 20 AUGUST 1972

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15-3

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY: 28 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH8 INFO FILE, VR. Sels, ciko, secur 4, ci, cilops,

DOC. MICRO. SER.
SEP 2 8 1972
MICROFILMED

SECRET

25 Aug 72 23

CITE DIRECTOR 306944

TO SANTO DOMINGO

REF SANTO DOMINGO 13099 (IN 694715)

21

1. BELOW ARE ILLUSTRATIVE TRACES HERBERT I T K I N (201-836808), PARTNER LAW FIRM ITKIN, ROBERTS, GREENBAUM, NEW YORK.REGISTERED AGENT FOR "HAITIAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE" REPRESENTING LOUIS D E J O I E (201-240483) AND OTHER HAITIAN EXILE GROUPS 1963. REPORTEDLY FURNISHED MONEY TO GROUP INVADING HAITI AUG 63. A AND B ARE FOR STATION USE ONLY.

A. HAITIAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE USED SUBJECT'S OFFICES IN NEW YORK CITY; SUBJ SAID HE MADE PERSONAL LOAN OF $15,000 TO DEJOIE. (DBA-63510, 19 FEB 64).

B. SUBJECT'S FORMER FATHER-IN-LAW CALLED WODISH, NEW YORK TO SAY SUBJ CLOSELY TIED TO BKCROWN, GIVING IT MUCH ASSISTANCE HAITI AND ELSEWHERE, IMPLYING SUBJ TRUSTED INFORMANT OR AGENT, NOT STAFF EMPLOYEE. WARNED BKCROWN SUBJ NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF DOUBTS RE RELIABILITY, DISCRETION, ABILITY TO MEET FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS, AND MENTAL EQUILIBRIUM. (WODISH MEMO, 15 FEB 66)

C. NEW YORK TIMES, 9 MARCH 68, REPORTED U.S. OFFICIAL DESCRIBED SUBJ AS UNDERCOVER AGENT WHO INFILTRATED ORGANIZED

AN	
AB	X
PS	4
BX	4
DEF	
FI	

29 Aug 72
201-836808

CS COPY (CONTINUED...)

D-22-2-20/3
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ORIG: ELISABETH VETTER:BA
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

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BY PER # RECEIVED FILE IN CS FILE NO.
CONF: INFO FILE, VR. IP/EDI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 266944

TO

CRIME, REPORTING REGULARLY TO LNERGO. ONE HIGH OFFICIAL SAID SUBJ RISKED HIS LIFE TO "STAND UP TO MAFIA." ARTICLE ALSO STATES SUBJ REGISTERED SEPT 63 AS FOREIGN AGENT DOM REP, MAKING NUMEROUS TRIPS THERE. (TM-ING COPY THIS ITEM.)"

D. WASHINGTON POST, 19 JULY 68, REPORTED SIX ALLEGED ASSOCIATES OF SUBJ, A KEY FIGURE IN JAMES L. MARCUS (FORMER NYC WATER COMMISSIONER) KICKBACK CASE, INDICATED CHARGES OF ANOTHER KICKBACK CONSPIRACY INVOLVING MORTGAGE APPLICATIONS MADE TO TEAMSTERS UNION PENSION FUND; TWO OF SIX ALLEGED ASSOCIATES IDENTIFIED AS MAFIA MEMBERS. SUBJ NOT INDICTED BUT NAMED IN FOUR OVERT ACTS CITED INDICTMENT.

E. NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, 15 OCT 68, REPORTED SUBJ, LABOR LAWYER, TRYING HAVE HIS TRIAL MOVED FROM STATE TO FEDERAL COURT, CONTENDING HE ACTING AS LNERGO AND BKCROWN AGENT IN CONNECTION ABOVE CASE.

2. JULY 68 CHECK NUMEROUS BKCROWN COMPONENTS FAILED REVEAL ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN SUBJ AND BKCROWN.

3. FILE: 201-836808 AND 22-2-20/3. E 2 IMPDET

END OF MESSAGE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG: ELISABETH VETTER:ba
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______ #

INDEX   NO INDEX   RETURN TO ______ BRANCH   FILE RID
FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: INFO   FILE, VR.

(classification)   (date and time filed)   (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET   CITE DIRECTOR 300944

TO

PAGE THREE

WH COMMENT: REQUESTED HQS TRACES SUBJ WHO ARRIVED DOM REP 22 AUG 72 FROM NEW YORK, PROHIBITED FROM ENTERING, AND RETURNED NEW YORK SAME DAY.

CI/EXO F.E. HUBBARD - IN DRAFT

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

WILLIAM P. MACLEAN
C/WH/7

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

secret

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

14-00000

US Army file (??) on ITKIN.

To Itkin folder

9 June 71
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101 WHICH MAY BE USED.
AUG 54 (47)

PRIORITY

FILE WHEN INITIALLED

NAME CHECK REPORT - MPRC

DATE CHECKED: 7 JUN 1971

SUBJECT: ITKIN, Herbert

CASE NO. AND CATEGORY: 544867-FBB-HRK.

NAME(S) FROM RECORD: (No Middle Name)

SERVICE	RECORD	NR
ARMY	X	
NAVY		
AIR FORCE		
COAST GUARD		
USMC		

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 19 NOV 1925 Richmond Hill, LI, N.Y.

ADDRESS (include date): 1738 48 St. Bklyn, NY — (1/47)

ACTIVE DUTY

	DATE (From-To)	SERIAL NO.	RANK	TYPE DISCHARGE
OFFICER	—	—	—	
ENLISTED	14 Feb 45 — 26 NOV 46	12 230 694	S SGT	Hon

MILITARY SPECIALTY OR CHIEF DUTIES: Admin.

EVALUATIONS (Efficiency, etc.): Exc.

FOREIGN SERVICE (date from - to): 8/45 — 10/46

THEATRE: APTO

EDUCATION (College, if shown): 1½ yrs - Cornell (44) // Brooklyn Coll (45)

CIVILIAN OCCUPATION: Student

SECURITY CLEARANCES

NONE INDICATED		DATED	BASED ON	BY	COMPLETED ON
X					
	SECRET				
	TOP SECRET				
	CRYPTOGRAPHIC				

COURT MARTIAL(S): X NONE ; YES (see remarks)

REMARKS - (Give details re court martials, disciplinary actions, special qualifications, language abilities, unusual info., decorations, citizenship, etc. Use extra page and/or add attachments if apropos.)

1) Mother: ITKIN, Edythe

2) Good Cond. Med.

WILLIAM P. KOSTERMAN
Special Agent in Charge
7 JUN 1971

DISTRIBUTION: HQS | ORIG ✓ | ORIG A1 | OTHER 1 X OC-CFO

ATTACHMENTS: YES | NO ✓

Herbert ITKIN

Date and Place of Birth: 19 Nov. 1926, Queens (also given as Jamaica, L.I., New York).

Description: 5'11". Brown hair. Brown eyes. (Photos in file).

Passports and Travel:

Ppt. B122634, issued 4 Jan. 1961. Renewed 11 Feb. 1964.

Ppt G097867, issued 14 Jan. 1966.

a. Was to depart NYC for UK, BOAC 506 o/a 14 Jan. '66. Had made 4 trips abroad in earlier 12 months.

b. Was to depart o/a 8 Jan. '61, UK & Western Europe. Two weeks vacation.

Father: Arthur ITKIN. Born 18 May 1901, Russia (also given as "Poland", 18 May 1900). US citizen (by naturalization? marriage?) Last stipulated residence: 118 Front St., Dublin, Ga (?).

Mother: Edith HAVES, born 27 April 1907 (also given as "27 April 1905"). US citizen by birth.

Permanent Residences:

440 E. 79th St., NYC (Jan. 1966)

33 Greenwich Ave., NYC (Jan. 1964)

168 Rim Lane, Hicksville, New York (Jan. 1961)

Shelton Towers Hotel, Lexington Ave., NYC (Aug. 1966)

300 Madison Ave., NYC (Legal offices, 1965).

14-00000

Marital Status/Spouse:

Adah Itkin, born 4 May 1925, married 12 Dec. 1963

Diana Kane, born 8 Feb. 1930

14-00000

DEPT OF STATE PASSPORT APPLICATION

DATE: 14 JANUARY 1966

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: HERBERT ITKIN

14-00000

RH

File

Is there an accts appl. for this person? If so, this c/B should be attached to it

Jon 1/18

Not in file yet 1/19/61 - Dotcha
1/24/61
1/30/61
2/1/61
2-2-61

ITTKIN HERBERT

14-00000

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REFERENCE SLIP

1-13-60

TO: NAME OR TITLE	ORGAN. SYMBOL	ROOM NO.	BLDG.	INITIALS	DATE
1. PT/RAF					
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					

	APPROVAL		NOTE AND FORWARD
	AS REQUESTED	X	NOTE AND RETURN
	COMMENT		PER CONVERSATION
	FOR YOUR INFORMATION		PREPARE REPLY
	INITIAL FOR CLEARANCE		SEE ME
	NECESSARY ACTION		SIGNATURE

REMARKS OR ADDITIONAL ROUTING

Our records indicate ppt.
B122634 Issued 1-4-61

FROM (NAME AND ORGANIZATION)	ROOM NO. AND BLDG.
PT/NY	
SIGNATURE	PHONE NO.
[signature]	

TATE.
ENCY
CENTER
630 FI TH AVENUE
EW YORK 20, NEW YORK

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
PASSPORT OFFICE

1/4/61

B122634

IT RIN

NEW YORK PASSPORT AGENCY
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 20, N. Y.

GRAND CENTRAL STATION

Itkin, Herbert

Bureau of Records and Statistics | Department of Health | The City of New York

CERTIFICATION OF BIRTH

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that Herbert Itkin

Sex Male was born in the City of New York on Nov. 19 1926

according to Birth Record No. 11185 filed in the QUEENS

Office of this Bureau on Dec. 3, 1926

In witness whereof, the seal of the Department of Health of the City of New York has been affixed hereto this 4 day of Jan 1961

Carl L. Erhardt — Director of Bureau

[signature] — Borough Registrar

Q 60104

Warning: This certification is not valid if it has been altered in any way whatsoever or if it does not bear the raised seal of the Department of Health.

5411-115M 701361(59) 114

14-00000

SECRET 282234Z AUG 72 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 13099

694715

DIRECTOR.

WOMUSE EMPYREX

1. EMPYREX LIAISON ADVISES HERBERT ITKIN ARRIVED SANTO DOMINGO 22 AUG 72 FROM NEW YORK PAA 235 PROHIBITED ENTRY AND RETURNED NEW YORK SAME DAY PAA 236. ITKIN BORN 19 NOV 26, NEW YORK, US PP B 1220178.

2. NO STATION TRACES. EMPYREX RECORDS INDICATE SUBJ BLACKLISTED BECAUSE HE ENGAGED ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES AND HAS MAFIA CONNECTIONS. ACCORDING SAME FILE, NY TIMES REPORTED SUBJ PROVIDED INFO TO BKCROWN ON PERSONS IN DOMREP.

3. TRACES REQUESTED.

4. INDEX. FILE 201- , 22-2-20/3. E2 IMPDET WH-SISM.

SECRET

Coord: CI
CI/EXO

SECRET

14-00000

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

CURRENT CABLE

FROM: RID/SD 17
1 D 17
DW-3

EXTENSION | NO. | DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. E/BC			W	
2.				
3.				
4.				
5. DC/CI Office	8 JUN 1970	12 JUN 1970	✓ P	
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.			D	
15.		ys		

TO: ACTION ADDRESSEE

1. Cables forwarded herewith have not been integrated into the CS record system.
2. If you feel they should be classified into a CS file, please indicate file number (and other necessary processing) and return to RID/SD, Room 1 D 17, TUBE: DW-3.

RETAIN: ______
CS File Number

INDEXING: YES NO
(If yes, indicate names.)

3. If these cables do not require processing into the CS Records System, please destroy.

To 5: E/BC cable action turned over to Office of General Consul with DIRECTOR 035476, 19 May 70; with following from CI office DIR 037202. No file designation on either outgoing. Per telecom with DC/CI Secy forwarding RID cable for proper disposition on clandestine element. Particularly info that sheds some unfavorable publicity toward Agency.

D: We have this already don't we-?

Rp: Yes we have c/c cy. Shall I just file this in his 201 file?

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 14

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: [ ] YES [ ] NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

[ ] FILE RID [ ] RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

30

C/EUR5 FILE, VR C/RI/SO C/CI C/FI2 DDP ADDP CSDO

C 513

S E C R E T 181745Z MAY 70 CITE LONDON 1613 (LAUTERBACH ACTING)

DIRECTOR

RYBAT KEYWAY

IN ... 005508

1. SMOTH (SMUPROOT) EXPECTS BE ASKED BY HMG TO COMMENT ON ACCURACY LONDON TELEGRAPH ARTICLE 16 MAY TO EFFECT THAT MR. HERBERT ITKIN, AMERICAN LABOR LAWYER, WAS ON JKLANCE SECRET MISSION IN BRITAIN IN 1965. ARTICLE SAYS JKLANCE HAS FORMALLY ACKNOWLEDGED IN PAPER SUBMITTED TO NEW YORK SUPREME COURT THAT ITKIN WORKED AS AN AGENT IN BRITAIN AND THAT THIS ONLY SECOND TIME JKLANCE HAS PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN UNDERCOVER AGENT NOT OFFICIALLY ON JKLANCE PAYROLL (POWERS WAS FIRST).

2. ACCORDING LOCAL LNERGO, IT ACTUALLY HANDLED ITKIN IN LONDON AS INFORMANT ON CRIMINAL MATTERS IN 1965. JAGUAR AWARE OF THIS. HOWEVER, LOCAL LNERGO AS CONFUSED AS WE ARE AS TO ITKIN'S JKLANCE CONNECTION AT THAT TIME.

3. REQUEST HQS ADVISE WHAT WE MAY TELL SMOTH.

4. NO STATION RECORD ITKIN.

5. FILE DEFER.

18 May 70

CS COPY

GP-1

S E C R E T

14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr. Holmes CI/R&A		
2			
3	~~We would appreciate your comments~~		
4	~~at your earliest convenience and~~ at		
5			
6	prior indication of G's response		

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks: if one is forthcoming on the

Seen by John Greaney and John Warner. Neither has any problems with it.

questions concerning G's knowledge of HARBM. If ~~there is any question~~ ~~this dispatch~~ the ~~intent of this~~ is anything unclear in this dispatch is not clear, hqts would welcome any questions by cable.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
OGC	2/13/69

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions GPO : 1968 O - 297-542 (40)

TO: Chief of Station, San Salvador

INFO: Chief, WH Division — X

FROM: Chief, WOMUSE

SUBJECT: Interview of Mr. Luis E. GUTIERREZ

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

See paragraph 1 below.

1. Your assistance is requested in interviewing the Salvadorian citizen, Luis E. GUTIERREZ, for information which would be helpful to this Government in determining the accuracy of certain claims made confidentially by Herbert L. ITKIN. Mr. ITKIN is a prime witness in legal proceedings presently underway in New York City involving the Mafia and related underworld organizations. ITKIN lives under the protection of U.S. Federal Marshals.

2. The following data is for your information. It should not be used in dealing with GUTIERREZ or outside of this Organization. ITKIN has been an FBI informant since March 1963. He has now claimed to have worked for this Organization during the period 1954/55 to 1960. ITKIN asserts that his contact during these years was one Philip HARBIN. This inquiry is concerned solely with ITKIN's claimed relationship with this Organization from 1954/55 to 1960 when he alleges HARBIN was his contact. As will be seen, GUTIERREZ, ITKIN alleges, also knew HARBIN during that time and that fact, therefore, is material to the credibility of ITKIN's story.

ITKIN's first contact with Philip HARBIN was in 1955 when he claims to have been contacted pursuant to a meeting he, ITKIN, had in Philadelphia with a leading personality of this Organization and another high-government official late in 1954 or early 1955. According to ITKIN, HARBIN never made the specific claim of being from this Organization but that was ITKIN's assumption.

ITKIN describes HARBIN as about 42 or 43 (in 1955), an American. He had receding hair, combed back but parted. He was about 5'8" in height,

Attachments:
As stated (2 copies)

Orig & 1 - COS, San Salvador

5 ATT

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HSSW-2742	14 February 1969
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET/RYBAT	201-836808

Dist:

2 - COS, Salvador w/a
1 - WH/2/ES&HD w/o
1 - CI/R&A w/a
1 - 201-836808 w/a

CI/R&A

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
CI/R&A	R. B. Holmes	np	7468

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/2/ES&HD	14 Feb	[signature]

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/2	14 FEB 1969	[signature]

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG. 1-66 (40)

DISPATCH

well-built with little evidence of fat. He always wore a vest. He spoke fluent Spanish and could have been of Polish or Russian family background. HARBIN always drank tea, never coffee. He appeared affluent with a professorial air about him.

Following an initial meeting, ITKIN alleges that he and HARBIN met periodically in New York City. ITKIN alleges that he passed to HARBIN copies of the correspondence developed by his law firm, Delson, Levin and Gordon, dealing with Indonesia, Burma, and India. ITKIN left that law firm in mid-1957, presumably thereby losing total access. Among the materials ITKIN claims he passed to HARBIN before he left the Delson, Levin and Gordon firm was information he picked up from a friend who worked at the United Nations for the Government of El Salvador. This friend was Luis E. GUTIERREZ (see biographic sketch, Attachment A). ITKIN claims that he became very friendly with GUTIERREZ, who was studying either at New York University or Columbia where he prepared a master's thesis on El Salvador's economic position. HARBIN, he says, was interested in the topic and ITKIN alleges he furnished HARBIN notes of GUTIERREZ' monograph.

Sometime presumably after mid-year 1957, HARBIN asked ITKIN if he knew anybody else who could do (intelligence) work. ITKIN recalled GUTIERREZ, who meanwhile had moved to the position as Consul General of El Salvador in New Orleans, Louisiana. HARBIN--ITKIN says--accepted the suggestion and ITKIN provided an introduction for HARBIN by letter, which he sent to GUTIERREZ in New Orleans. ITKIN asserts that HARBIN--according to his own statement--went to New Orleans and made the "new contact". ITKIN claims he last saw HARBIN in 1960.

3. A comparison between the key points of ITKIN's account as summarized in the immediately preceding paragraph with the data set out in Attachment A and E will show immediate contradictions that tend to destroy any credibility in ITKIN's account, particularly with respect to his relationship to GUTIERREZ. We also point out, solely for your information, that we have found no confirmation in our records of any relationship between this Organization and ITKIN during the period 1954-1960. No traces have been found in our records or anywhere in government thus far of a Philip HARBIN, and there is explicit denial that there was any meeting in Philadelphia in 1954 between ITKIN and the high officials he nominates. Finally, there is no substantiation in our files of any of the intelligence product which ITKIN allegedly passed to HARBIN. This case, however, is of such a nature that we must strive, if possible, to have GUTIERREZ' own statement for the record.

4. We leave to the Station determination of the best manner to approach GUTIERREZ. It is our preference that a Station officer, under suitable cover, perform the interview, but it may well be that a consular or embassy officer might be the best person to do the job. We repeat that we are concerned in this matter solely with the verification or denial of ITKIN's statements, specifically the allegation that he introduced HARBIN to GUTIERREZ in New Orleans and that as a consequence GUTIERREZ would be in a position to identify and describe HARBIN in a way that would permit us to locate him if he exists. The request for GUTIERREZ' assistance in this matter is in no way predicated upon hostility towards ITKIN nor is there any predisposition against his claims if indeed evidence is found to back them up. If GUTIERREZ indicates that he is willing to provide whatever information he can, you can assure him that his information is solely for U.S. Government use and will not be made public by us at any time without his expressed consent. Also, it is clear that we are prepared to accept his decision to give no assistance in the matter.

5. We have compiled a short statement that might be used by the interviewer to explain to GUTIERREZ the purpose of the interview (see Attachment B). A list of questions, which should be given orally, is elaborated in Attachment C. You will note that these questions concern the larger as well as narrower elements of GUTIERREZ' relations with ITKIN. We are willing to settle for a specific answer to the narrower question of Philip HARBIN in preference to generalizations about the whole relationship. If, as a consequence of your handling, GUTIERREZ is willing to talk in depth, we will be grateful.

6. Attachment D is a copy of a New York Times article concerning ITKIN and one of the completed federal cases in New York City. This item is attached for your background reading. This may be shown to GUTIERREZ, of course. Attachment E is a copy of a letter dated 26 February 1965 from GUTIERREZ to ITKIN. Again, the content of this letter tends to support the theory that ITKIN's story, as elaborated in paragraph 2 above, is a fabrication. While possibly based on a real relationship, it appears to be a fabrication with respect to chronology and with respect to the exact mutual interests involved. Also included in this attachment is ITKIN's answer to the letter. We feel in retrospect that GUTIERREZ might be unhappy to read his own letter in the course of a consular interview. We, therefore, suggest that this not be shown to him. However, there is no objection to an indication that the U.S. Government is aware that GUTIERREZ was in perfectly correct correspondence with ITKIN during 1965 on business matters.

7. We would appreciate compliance at your earliest convenience and a preliminary indication by cable of GUTIERREZ' response, if one is forthcoming, on the questions concerning GUTIERREZ' knowledge of HARBIN. If there is anything unclear in this dispatch, Headquarters would welcome any questions by cable. All correspondence should be addressed Chief, WOMUSE, via Chief, WH.

James R. Rumsey

Attachment A to HSSW-2742

GUTIERREZ, Luis Enerique

Born in San Salvador, El Salvador, on 15 July 1916; son of Luis and Concepcion G.; B. Commerce from Sir George Williams University, 1948; M.A. from New York University, 1951; Ph.D. in Economics, University of San Salvador, 1959; married Lydia DIAZ on 21 September 1940; one daughter, Maria Marta; vice consul of El Salvador in Montreal, 1944-1949; consul in New York City, 1949-1952; consul general, New Orleans, 1952-1958 (30 December 1952-3 April 1958)*; supt. banks and corporations, El Salvador, 1958-1961; general manager inversiones commerciales, 1961 - present; professor of economics, University of El Salvador, 1958 - present; commissioner, City of San Salvador, 1964 - present; served to first lieutenant, Salvadorian Army, 1933 - 1939; member of American Economists Association, Association of Salvadorian Economists; home: 83 avenida Norte 619; office: Apartado Postal 1144, San Salvador, El Salvador.

Who's Who in Commerce and Industry, 1968-1969, page 558.

* Foreign Consular Offices in United States, 1954 through 1959.

Attachment B to HSSW-2742

Suggested Statement to GUTIERREZ

I understand you have a friend named Herbert ITKIN, a lawyer, now living in New York. Mr. ITKIN is under the protection of United States authorities because he is the prime witness in very significant legal cases presently pending before the Federal court in New York City. Mr. ITKIN, in private testimony to U.S. authorities, has indicated that you were a friend of his; he met you in New York while you were at the United Nations. He has also indicated that sometime in 1957 he sent a letter of introduction to you in New Orleans, presenting one Philip HARBIN whom ITKIN claims did go to New Orleans and introduced himself to you. Your answers to questions relating to the above would be of great help to the U.S. Government in determining the veracity of ITKIN's statements.

Attachment C to HSSW-2742

Questions to be presented orally to Luis E. GUTIERREZ

Would you describe the circumstances leading to your introduction to Mr. Herbert ITKIN and the nature of your contacts with Mr. ITKIN? When did you first meet Mr. ITKIN? Where were you working at the time? What was your position?

What school or university were you attending at the time? For what degree were you preparing? In what subject? What subject did you use for your thesis? Did you show it to ITKIN and/or did you give him a copy?

Did you continue to maintain contact with him after your departure from New York? Do you still maintain correspondence with him? When did you last have contact with Mr. ITKIN?

In 1957 or 1958 did you receive a letter from Mr. ITKIN introducing a Philip HARBIN?

Did a man named Philip HARBIN come to New Orleans and introduce himself to you? Did he have a letter of introduction from Mr. ITKIN? (How did he represent himself, i.e., whom did he represent?) Would you describe Philip HARBIN? Would you describe your first meeting with Philip HARBIN? What subjects were covered? How long were contacts maintained? When were they terminated? For what reason?

H/W att # 3 to HSSW-2742 201-836808

14-00000

Attachment E to HSSW-2742

DR. LUIS E. GUTIERREZ
ECONOMISTA

APDO. POSTAL 1144
TELEFONO No. 7190

SAN SALVADOR,
EL SALVADOR, C. A.

February 26,1965.

Mr. Herbert Itkin,
300 Madison Ave.,
New York City, N.Y.

Dear Herby:

It was a real good surprice to receive your letter of February 15, 1965. I had written you twice in the last three years, and I had no answer. I went to New York to the C.I.O. Convention in September 1963; then I looked for you every where, but I found you nowhere. So I realized that you had disapeared from New York and moved to another place. But what a relief now;; You still are in the Empire State kicking around and thinking about your old friends.

As you probably remember we do not see each other since 1952. Let me give you a rough breifing on what happens during this time. In November 1952 I was appointed Consul General of El Salvador at New Orleans; in 1958 I resigned and came back to my country and was appointed Comptroler of the Bank Inspecting Bureau; then in 1960 I was appointed General Director of the Social Security Bureau. then in 1961 I moved to private business as General Manager of INVERSIONES COMERCIALES, S.A., a small insurance company. Among some of my present extra activities, I am: a) member of the City Government (City Commissioner); b) member of theAdvisory Board of the Central Bank and c) Professor of Economics and Business Management at the School of Engineering of the University of El Salvador.

Although, as you can see, I am in the High Brass category I belong at the same time to the low income bracket group. For that reason I have been looking for a more juicy business, but so far I have found nothing. That is why I would say you are just on time offering me to do some business with you. I hope you will write and tell me more about what you have in mind. Also I will be waiting for you in April or any other time; the sooner the better.

There is something else I must tell you. I want to go back to New York and I need your help very badly. You know that in order to work in the States one must have a resident visa and to obtained such visa one must have an affidavit from an American Citizen. Could you be so kind giving me such a help? I hope you will say YES.

With best regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

Luis

H/W att. #5 to HSSW-2742 CS COPY 201-836808

14-00000

~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ 300 Madison Avenue
(14th Floor)

March 2, 1965

Dr. Luis E. Gutierrez
APDO, POSTAL 1144
San Salvador, Central America

Dear Luis:

I will plan to see you in April and will let you know a few weeks before.

I am sure that we will be able to work out something together that will be to our mutual benefit in getting you back to America.

Sincerely yours,

Herbert Itkin

HI:gtc

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, MARCH 9, 1968

U.S. Officials Say Itkin Was an Agent, Reporting to F.B.I.

ITKIN AN INFORMER WHO HELPED F.B.I., U.S. OFFICIALS SAY

Figure in Marcus Case Said to Have Risked Life to 'Stand Up to Mafia'

By BARNARD L. COLLIER

Herbert Itkin, one of six persons indicted in the Marcus kick-back scandal, has been described by Federal officials as an undercover agent who infiltrated the world of organized crime and reported regularly to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. Itkin, now under 24-hour armed guard by Federal marshals, is to be the Government's key witness in a Federal conspiracy case. He is a co-defendant along with former Water Commissioner James L. Marcus; a reputed Mafia leader, Antonio (Tony Ducks) Corallo; Henry Fried, owner of a New York construction company; Daniel J. Motto a union leader, and Charles J. Rappaport, a former law partner of Mr. Itkin.

Mr. Itkin—called one of the most important Government informers in recent years—is described as having provided undercover information to the F.B.I. while he engaged in numerous private business ventures around the world.

There is no solid information on his motives for becoming an informer. However, one high Federal official has called the 41-year-old Manhattan lawyer a "strange" man who risked his life to "stand up to the Mafia."

An Element in Other Cases

Federal officials disclosed that Mr. Itkin was providing the Government with large quantities of "inside" information on underworld characters and their dealings. He is a potential witness, they say, in numerous criminal cases apart from the Marcus affair.

These cases are said to involve labor racketeering, gambling, bribery, income-tax evasion and a whole range of other felonies at the city, state and federal levels, some with international dimensions.

The story of Mr. Itkin's activities as an undercover agent was pieced together by The New York Times—and then confirmed by Government officials—after extensive interviews and a search of public and private documents and letters in New York, Washington, the Caribbean area and elsewhere.

Along with his activities as an undercover agent, Mr. Itkin was involved in numerous international business ventures.

Some of His Involvements

His associations and business dealings—at least those indicated by the available documents and by people who are willing to talk about him—show that his involvement was not only with Mafia figures like Corallo and public figures like Mr. Marcus, but with politicians in the Dominican Republic, coup-minded exiles from Haiti, businessmen in Miami, union officials in New York and Detroit, and gamblers in London.

Investigations are already proceeding on the basis of in-

Continued on Page 25, Column 2

Continued From Page 1, Col. 4

Southern [illegible] has provided. [illegible] officials say they are hopeful that the inquiries will enable them to obtain several indictments in the near future.

Government officials would not specify whether Mr. Itkin was a paid or unpaid informant.

Government officials are quick to point out, however, that Mr. Itkin, despite his free-spending ways over the last several years, did not, as far as is known, amass a lot of money from his business activities.

"In fact," said one Federal official, "he is damned near broke, his family life is in a mess, he can't practice law and he can't do anything but wait it all out."

Concern has been expressed by some high Government officials about a disclosure of Mr. Itkin's background.

"There are many people," said one official, "who would like to discredit Mr. Itkin as a witness in this [Marcus] case and in other cases that might be made."

Edward Bennett Williams, the Washington lawyer who is representing Mr. Marcus in the conspiracy case, said he could not comment on the disclosure of Mr. Itkin's role.

Also of concern, some Government officials say, is Mr. Itkin's personal safety.

"But we are going to preserve him in good health until he can testify," one official said. Federal investigative agents say privately that Mr. Itkin had already been the target of an alleged murder plot for which two Long Island men are now under Federal indictment, although he has never been officially identified as the intended victim.

In a development of this aspect yesterday, Federal Judge Marvin E. Frankel ordered the Government to disclose officially who the murder target was. The indictment did not name anyone as the intended victim.

Identification Due Soon

Assistant United States Attorney Robert G. Morvillo said he would identify the alleged victim next week to the lawyers for two men indicted in the murder plot.

The two under indictment are Robert Schwartz, 43, a lawyer, of Huntington Station, L. I., and Robert Roden, 39, of Uniondale, L. I., a carpenter. No motive has ever been ascribed to the alleged plot, but it is said that it had nothing to do with the Marcus kickback case.

Judge Frankel also ordered that the Government name the city or other place where the two men or "collaborators carried on any activities connected with 'arranging the murder' as charged in the indictment," and the names of any persons who allegedly collaborated or conspired in "arranging the murder."

Mr. Itkin's relationship with Mr. Marcus, as far as is now known, was as a friend, business partner and his personal lawyer. City Hall [illegible] say that Mr. Marcus introduced Mr. Itkin to other commissioners and city officials as "my lawyer."

According to some of these commissioners, Mr. Itkin made attempts afterward to meet and discuss business matters with them.

Mayor Lindsay has said that every city official who came into more than casual contact with Mr. Marcus or Mr. Itkin has reported in full to city investigators.

Mr. Itkin has been under protective custody since shortly after he was arrested by the F.B.I. last Dec. 18 in connection with the Marcus case. Aside from Federal and local law-enforcement officials, only a few close friends know his whereabouts.

People who have spoken recently to Mr. Itkin describe him as extremely nervous. His second wife is under guard with him.

Several of Mr. Itkin's friends have described him as confident that when the Marcus case comes to trial his "real role" as an undercover agent will be made clear.

"Won't Be a Defendant"

"I won't be a defendant when the case comes up," Mr. Itkin is quoted as having told a friend. "I didn't do anything I didn't have to do to keep from being suspect."

His current status as a defendant in the Marcus case could be changed before the trial and the charges against him could be dropped, Federal officials say.

Mr. Itkin has also told close friends that within the last five years he provided information to the Central Intelligence Agency on the activities of persons in the Dominican Republic, where he often traveled, and in Haiti, where he is also known to have had dealings.

A spokesman for the Central Intelligence Agency denied that there was anything about Mr. Itkin in its files.

Mr. Itkin appears to have been many things to many people. To some lawyers who knew him he was, as one put it, "brilliant in his law practice." Another described the swarthy, well-dressed Brooklyn Law School graduate as "formal, retiring, not one to seek the spotlight."

Called a "Fast Talker"

But a friend describes him as "a fast-talking guy, a fast-thinking guy, who said he knew everybody and could make a deal in the blink of an eye." He added: "Herb was always on a jet going somewhere—to London, Geneva, Rome, Santo Domingo, Haiti, Puerto Rico."

Many people regard Mr. Itkin as a specialist in labor law, but several labor leaders and mediators say they know little of his activities for unions.

It was the highly publicized Marcus case, a scandal that stunned Mayor Lindsay's administration, that first brought Mr. Itkin to wide public attention.

He was charged in a Federal indictment, along with Mr. Marcus, Corallo and others, with being part of a scheme whereby 5 per cent of an emergency contract awarded without bidding by the Department of Water Supply, Gas and Electricity would be paid as a kickback.

The contract, estimated at $800,000, was awarded to S. T. Grand, Inc., which is owned by Mr. Fried and his family. It called for the cleaning and refurbishing of the Jerome Park Reservoir in the Bronx.

The indictment charges that Mr. Fried and his company paid Mr. Marcus 2 per cent of the total contract price, and gave 1 per cent each to Mr. Itkin, Mr. Motto, and Corallo.

It further charges that the conspiracy began on or about Jan. 1, 1966—eight months before Mr. Marcus became Water Commissioner on Sept. 1 and 10 months before Mr. Marcus awarded the contract to S. T. Grand.

At the same time the alleged conspiracy began, Mr. Marcus was acting as an unpaid mayoral assistant—he took responsibility for water department business and Mr. Itkin was his lawyer and partner in several joint ventures.

On Jan. 11 the case took its bizarre murder twist when the F.B.I. arrested Mr. Roden on charges of trying to buy the murder—for $2,500, a Federal official said then—of an unidentified witness in the Marcus affair. Mr. Itkin was said then to have been that witness.

Four days later, Mr. Schwartz, the Long Island lawyer, was arrested in Manhattan as a participant in the same alleged murder conspiracy. He was charged with being involved in an attempt to murder "a witness and defendant" in the Marcus case.

Exactly a month after the Federal kickback indictment was obtained by United States Attorney Robert M. Morgenthau, both Mr. Marcus and Mr. Itkin were arrested for the second time on a warrant by District Attorney Frank S. Hogan.

They were charged with having accepted a $10,000 bribe as a down payment on any emergency contracts that a company called Vintray Enterprises, Inc., might receive from Mr. Marcus's department.

Scarcity of Documents

There are very few public documents in which Mr. Itkin's name appears. And even what is available only serves to deepen the mystery surrounding his career.

On Sept. 16, 1963, for example, Mr. Itkin filed with a form with the Justice Department to register himself as a foreign agent of the Dominican Republic.

He declared that his purpose was to act for a Coral Gables, Fla., company called Westrade, Inc., in efforts "to negotiate on behalf of the Dominican Republic and bank or brokerage company in the United States, a bond issue in the amount of $35-million to extend over a period of 15 years."

Westrade, Inc., described as

14-00000

a concern that dealt in the export of furniture and the production of prefabricated buildings, has since gone bankrupt and was formally dissolved last year for nonpayment of Florida state taxes.

Despite the filed registration, the company's former president, a Haitian-born Miami businessman named Robert Deschamps, denies that Mr. Itkin was ever authorized to represent him or the company.

"I spoke to him exactly twice," Mr. Deschamps said recently. "Once in New York and once in Miami in either late 1961 or early 1962. He was sent to me, I recall, by Louis Dejoie [a Haitian political exile who opposed the Haitian President, François Duvalier]. He said he had met Dejoie in the Dominican Republic.

"We talked first in a hotel in Miami and he told me he could get us financing from a union pension fund—I think he said the teamsters, or maybe the teachers union. I told him to see what he could do and we'd discuss it again."

"Then I went to New York," Mr. Deschamps said, "and saw him in his office. I was put off by him right away. One thing was, he opened a black cabinet behind his desk and I saw a secret telephone and a nightstick. I had done some checking on him and I didn't like all the secrecy business."

Can't Recall '$2,000 Fee'

Mr. Deschamps insists that the New York meeting was the last he had with Mr. Itkin, and that he is completely unaware of any agreement between Mr. Itkin and Westrade, Inc.

As for a $2,000 fee that Mr. Itkin stated in the registration form that he received from Westrade, Inc.: "Perhaps that was for some expenses he might have had, but I don't remember paying it," Mr. Deschamps said.

Mr. Itkin was also registered as a foreign agent for the Provisional Government of the Republic of Haiti in San Juan, P.R. This exile group was headed by Mr. Dejoie.

In an agreement filed with the registration and dated May, 1963, Mr. Itkin was to be paid an annual retainer of $50,000 for a period of two years—"immediately due and owing as soon as the said Provisional Government becomes the de facto or de jure Government of the Republic of Haiti and Haitian Territory."

The records indicate that the relationship between Mr. Itkin and the Haitian group was terminated in September, 1964, and that instead of getting his retainer, Mr. Itkin personally lent Mr. Dejoie $15,000 for unstated purposes.

Mr. Dejoie was unavailable for comment, but Haitian exiles who asked not to be identified, said that during the time the registration was in effect Mr. Dejoie was often in the Dominican Republic, and was active in one abortive attempt in 1963 to invade Haiti across the Dominican frontier.

A Washington [illegible] man, who also asked not to be named, said that during that same period Mr. Itkin met with him [illegible] in New York [illegible] the possibility [illegible] arms and developing a clandestine organization to help overthrow the Duvalier regime in Haiti.

In the years since, Mr. Itkin's contacts in the Dominican Republic have been maintained, and records show that he traveled to Santo Domingo numerous times up until his indictment last fall.

Dominican 'Mission'

According to businessmen, Mr. Itkin made about 20 visits to the Dominican Republic in 1965, beginning shortly after the civil war broke out in April of that year.

A close friend said Mr. Itkin described his trips to Santo Domingo as "missions" having to do with United States efforts to bring stability to the war-torn country.

It is not clear exactly when Mr. Itkin first became involved with Corallo, the reputed Mafia figure, but [illegible] officials say it was before 1963 and after 1961.

The officials confirm that Mr. Itkin traveled with Corallo to London—a city Mr. Itkin visited often—in 1966, when the British Government refused to permit Corallo to remain. The reported cause of Corallo's ouster was that he was trying to gain control of some of England's legal gambling casinos for Mafia "families" in the United States.

John F. Malone, assistant director in charge of the F.B.I.'s New York office, said he would not comment on any aspect of the Marcus case. United States Attorney Morgenthau was unavailable for comment.

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CONFIDENTIAL

22 OCT 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Newspaper Argicle on Herbert Itkin

On 22 October 1968, the attached article from the 15 October 1968 edition of the New York Daily News concerning James Marcus and Herbert Itkin was shown in a low key to Mr. Edward Long, Country Director ARA/CAR, by Mr. Paul V. Harwood, Chief, WH/7. Mr. Long expressed no interst in the article.

Bob Berg
WH/7/Ht

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible] York Daily [illegible]
25 October 19[illegible]

Marcus Sentencing Put Off

The sentencing of former city Water Commissioner James L. Marcus on state charges of [illegible] [illegible] was put off yesterday for two months pending developments in the related case of labor lawyer Herbert Itkin.

Marcus, 37, is serving a federal term for conspiracy to [illegible] a $10,000 kickback on a job bid. He was to have been sentenced in Manhattan [illegible] Court on charges for which he has been indicted with Itkin. Marcus pleaded guilty.

Sentencing was put off until Dec. 18 to await the outcome of Itkin's effort to have his trial moved from state to federal court. Itkin contends he was acting as an agent for the FBI [illegible] [illegible] criminal acts. Itkin's trial in state Supreme Court is tentatively set for Nov. 6.

Note:

[illegible]

[illegible] Marcus on state charges [illegible] was put off yesterday [illegible] for two months pending [illegible]

[illegible] 37, [illegible] charges for which he had been indicted [illegible]

Sentencing was put off [illegible] moved from state to federal court. [illegible] acting as an agent for the FBI.

Note:

Reminder: do you Oliver this or does Harwood Long it?
(He prefers the latter.)
JH

C/WH 7

Long it
B

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, WH/FI

SUBJECT : Herbert Itkin

1. There has been no Agency contact with ITKIN. Ray ROCCA, C/CI/R&A stated that CI Staff definitely never was in contact with him. Ray ROCCA's source of info on the DEJOIE-Max BOLTE-ITKIN & Company, activities was Max BOLTE and not ITKIN.

2. Offices checked for possible contact, all of which proved negative, were: Office of Security, Domestic Contacts Service, Domestic Operations Division, CA/3, CA/4, WH/7 and CI/R & A.

3. On 13 May 1963 ITKIN reported to DIA in San Juan the results of his meeting with DEJOIE, BOLTE, FIGNOLE and Luc STEPHEN in their formation of the Provisional Haitian Government in Exile formed in San Juan on 12 May & that ITKIN had been hired by that group as its Attorney. On 10 June 1963 ITKIN registered with the Department of State as a Foreign Agent for this group adding that he made a personal loan to DEJOIE of $15,000.

4. A 22 May 1963 Memorandum of Conversation from the Department of State sets forth the results of an informal meeting (possibly held on 28 April 1963) attended by Forrest E. ABBUHL (Officer in Charge, Haitian Affairs, State ARA/CRA), DEJOIE, BOLTE, a (fnu) BRODIE, and ITKIN, in which DEJOIE expressed his political views, asked for U.S. support for an invasion of Haiti, U.S. recognition of the Provisional Government in Exile, etc.

5. Appropriate documents substantiating above are herewith attached.

James T. O. Braafladt
C/WH/7/CI

19 July 1968

18-19 July 1968

[illegible] 10/7/61

Herbert ITKIN (201-[illegible])

Security (Frederick [illegible])
Security has checked this name out many times + still comes up NEGATIVE on any Agency connections

Domestic Contact Service (DCS) (Sucharo)
No contact w/ DCS. In 1966 ITKIN's (former) father-in-law (E. Kent KANE, a prominent attorney in Pennsylvania, Republican politician + close to Hugh SCOTT) called DCS in N.Y. asking if ITKIN was affiliated in any way w/ CIA as ITKIN bragging of being agent for CIA. DCS says that for years ITKIN has bragged of being agent or informer for CIA, but he is not.

Domestic Operations (John MARKHAM)
No record of any contact.

CA/4-Labor - (Dinny)
No record of any contact. However, since info in DOJ's file indicates some Haitians were involved w/ ORIT - CA/4 will check w/ an ORIT asset over weekend & will advise Monday 22 July of any possible connection of ITKIN with ORIT.

CA/3 (Glenn Roundsworth)
No record of any contact with ITKIN.

CI/Liaison [illegible] - No contact with ITKIN whatsoever by WH Division or CI/K+A. [illegible] 201-836808

14-00000

ITKIN, Herb

Eric Eisenstadt of Funding Branch reported on 1 Apr 68 that he found a piece of paper which said that subject was once registered as a Duvalier agent. WH/7/HT checked with State who in turn checked with Mr. Lanvin of Registration Section of Justice who said there is no record of Itkin as ever having been a Duvlaer registered agent. In Jun 63 he registered as a representative of the Dejoie-Fignole provisional government in exile and was to have been paid $50,000 when this government took power. No further info.

ITKIN, Herbert — [illegible]

JMWAVE [illegible]
[illegible]
1 [illegible] 1968

Louis Dejoie [illegible] Herbert Itkin, 10[illegible] Park Ave, NY [illegible] contact for funds against Duvalier. Dejoie stated Itkin previously gave Dejoie $200,000 and [illegible] provide additional financial [illegible] future date (JMWAVE [illegible], 2 July 1968) — [illegible]

Unbelievable that Itkin gave Dejoie $200,000. In 1961 Dejoie still had enough following so that if he had that kind of money he could have upset the [illegible]

ITKIN, Herb

[illegible] New York Lawyer and friend of Ambassador [illegible] called [illegible] to advise Wayne Carley (formerly of WH/7) [illegible] that [illegible] subj had advised the ambassador that [illegible] revolutionary undertaking would take place in Haiti in Aug. Mr. Carley did not know what subj's connections with [illegible] matters is nor the source of his info. [illegible] Desk Comment: Nothing happened.) Source: Harold C. [illegible]. Date 1[illegible] Aug 67.

Article about subject appeared in the New York Times on 13 January 1968. Described as a superb story teller, fast mover and wheeler. Article filed in 100-9-16.

ITKIN, Herbert HAITI

Subj, under the Foreign Agents Registration [illegible] as follows.

Foreign agent for Provisional [illegible] Government of the Republic of Haiti San Juan, Puerto Rico. Had various [illegible] with Mr. Louis DEJOIE who was Leader of the Provisional Government. On [illegible] Jun 1963 made personal loan of $500.00 to Louis DEJOIE (Chairman Prov Gov't of the Republic of Haiti - San Juan, Puerto Rico.)

Address: 303 Park Avenue, N.Y. 10017

Residence: 33 Greenwich Avenue, NY.NY.

[illegible]
12 Oct 1968
Filed: [illegible]

C1/R+A

201-836818

201-[illegible]

14-00000

Washington Post
19 July 68

N.Y. Jury Indicts 6 in Marcus Kickback Case

NEW YORK, July 18 (UPI) —A Federal grand jury indicted today six alleged associates of attorney Herbert Itkin, key figure in the Marcus kickback case, on charges of another kickback conspiracy involving mortgage applications made to the Teamsters' Union pension fund.

U.S. Atty. Robert Morgenthau identified two of the defendants, Salvatore Granello, 45, and James Plumeri, 65, both of New York, as members of the Mafia. Their codefendants were David Wenzer, 57, Great Neck, N.Y.; John Kielly, 37, Oyster Bay Cover, N.Y., and Hyman Levine, 58, of Coral Gables, Fla., and Leonard Russo, 45, of Larchmont, N.Y.

Itkin was not indicted but was named in each of four overt acts cited in the indictment.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, JULY 19, 1968

6 LINKED TO ITKIN INDICTED BY U.S.

Accused of Kickback Plot Involving Teamster Fund

By MARTIN TOLCHIN

Six men linked to Herbert Itkin — the key Government informant in the James Marcus kickback case — were indicted yesterday by a Federal grand jury in an alleged kickback conspiracy involving a teamster union pension fund.

Itkin was not indicted, but was named in most of the overt acts charged in the indictment, and he appeared to be the unifying figure in the conspiracy.

Itkin, who was an informant for the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, testified in Federal Court that he had paid off teamster officials and criminals to arrange loans from the fund on behalf of individuals and corporations.

Itkin did not name the persons who allegedly received the payoffs. However, Government officials indicated privately that the indictment—and three previous indictments involving teamster pension funds — had resulted from Itkin's information.

Construction Involved

Yesterday's indictment charged that the six men had participated in a scheme to get a $1,350,000 mortgage for Big Value Discount Department Stores, Inc., of 24 West 25th Street, for the construction of three discount centers in Pompano Beach, Cocoa and Fort Lauderdale, Fla.

Robert M. Morgenthau, United States Attorney, said that the men had obtained a tentative mortgage commitment from the Central States Southwest and Southeast Areas Pension Fund of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, based in Chicago. Mr. Morgenthau added, however, that the loan never was made.

This was the fourth indictment involving the pension fund since May. Three of the

201-536808

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
LIGrant/bm DCS/Operational Support Staff 900 Key Bldg.	2268	DATE 12 March 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CCS/Funding Mr. Erich Isenstead	13 MAR 1968			Attached is copy of the letter our New York office sent to Kane in answer to his inquiry re ITKIN.
2.				13 Mar: 1 cy: DC/WH Mr. Goodwin
3.				

14-00000

P.O. Box 1294
Grand Central Station
New York 17, New York
February 18, 1966

Mr. E. Kent Kane
R. D. #1
Kane, Pennsylvania

Dear Mr. Kane:

While in New York on February 15, 1966 on your way to Florida, you phoned me to inquire about a New York attorney. You will recall that I promised to make some inquiries and communicate the results to you. Please be advised that the gentleman in question is not affiliated or connected with my colleagues or myself.

I regret I was unable to convey this information to you prior to your departure from New York.

Very sincerely yours,

W. L. Freund

WLFreund:mac

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Inquiry Concerning CIA Connection of Herbert Itkin, New York Lawyer

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
Lillian L. Grant/js DCS/Operational Support Staff 900 Key Building	2263	CS 3051 DATE: 5 March 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CCS/Funding Mr. Erich Isenstead	6 MAR 1968			Per our conversation, attached is copy of our file record re: Mr. Herbert Itkin. This office has no record of direct contact with Itkin at any time.
2.				
3.				
4.				1 copy to CI/PLOBE 11 MAR 1968
5.				1 copy To DC/NH
6.				1 copy To Mr. Gagnin

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

NY 104-66
15 February 1966

TO : Director, Domestic Contact Service
C. Delaney

FROM : Chief, New York Field Office

SUBJECT: Inquiry Concerning CIA Connection of Herbert ITKIN, New York Lawyer

1. A call received on the listed telephone of the New York Office on the afternoon of 15 February 1966 concerned claims by Herbert Itkin, a lawyer now practicing in New York City, to the effect that he was closely tied in to the CIA.

2. The call was made by Mr. E. Kent Kane, R.D. #1, Kane, Pennsylvania. Mr. Kane is a prominent attorney in Pennsylvania, Naval Reserve Officer (USNR 192947), a Republican politician who gave the present Governor and Senator Hugh Scott as references.

3. Herbert Itkin is a former son-in-law of Mr. Kane's. Itkin allegedly claimed that he had been of considerable assistance to CIA in Haiti and elsewhere. The implication was that he was a trusted CIA informant or agent, not a staff employee.

4. Mr. Kane contacted this office for two specific reasons:

(a) He wanted to warn CIA that Itkin was not at this time a desirable CIA contact because of doubts concerning his reliability, discretion, ability to meet his financial obligations, and mental equilibrium.

(b) He (Kane) did not wish to proceed any further in pursuing his (unspecified) course of action against Itkin if there were any substance to Itkin's claims. Put in another way, Kane is planning to take some action against his former son-in-law, and he wants to disprove the latter's claims of some CIA affiliation or backing before proceeding further.

5. Mr. Kane phoned the New York office from a room at the Hotel Drake, New York City, prior to his departure for

Florida. He thought perhaps this office could clear up his problem. Recently, Itkin phoned Kane from New York and put on an alleged CIA staffer, who identified himself only as "Charley" and who dutifully confirmed Itkin's great value to the Agency. Kane is suspicious of the whole business.

6. We explained that it would take some time to have our headquarters check this out. Although Kane would have liked an immediate response, he agreed that a written advice to his Kane, Pennsylvania, address within two weeks would satisfy him. Such a reply could be quite cryptic and need not be signed. We assumed that it would originate in Washington rather than in New York. Mr. Kane did not ask for our name and was given no name.

Jay B. L. Reeves

WLFreund:mme

14-00000

SECRET

FROM
26

ACTION
C/WH/COG 5 RID COPY

INFO
FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/CI

SECRET 292324Z FEB 68 CITE JMWAVE 1469 ADDED: C/WH 6 VR

DIRECTOR

IN 61161

RYBAT JMOCEAN

REF: JMWAVE 1464 (IN 61103)

FOLLOWING TRACES SUBJECTS LISTED IN PARA 3 REF:

1. ROBERT DESCHAMPS (201-748948), HAITIAN EXILE AND OWNER OF WESTRADE IMPORT-EXPORT COMPANY, CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA; SUPPLIED HAITIAN EXILES WITH ARMS; ASSISTED BY BUSINESS ASSOCIATE LOUIS DEJOIE (201-242483), CONTACT OF EVLUCID FEBRUARY 1964. (UFGA-14392, 2 MAR 64; UFGA-17300, 17 AUG 64; UFG-6428, 29 DEC 64) LNERGO TRACES INDICATE HE BORN 25 NOV 28, ST MARC, HAITI; ARRIVED IN U.S. AS PERMANENT RESIDENT 28 JAN 60, RESIDED 5010 SAN AMARO DRIVE, CORAL GABLES. GENERAL REPUTATION: GOOD. INTERVIEWED BY LNERGO IN DEC 1961 IN CONNECTION WITH POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT WITH HAITIAN EXILE GROUP, PATRI. STATED HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF PATRI AND WHILE SYMPATHETIC WITH THE AIMS OF THE HAITIAN EXILES AND DESIROUS OF SEEING A DEMOCRATIC FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN HAITI, WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE FUNDS OR OTHERWISE INVOLVE HIMSELF IN HAITIAN POLITICAL MATTERS. DESCRIBED AS A MAN OF MEANS WHOSE NET WORTH WAS APPROXIMATELY

SECRET

$502,002. LNERGO CLOSED CASE ON 29 DEC 61.

2. ROBERT LEGER: HAITIAN COMMUNIST, SECRETARY FOR LOUIS DEJOIE AND ASSOCIATE OF ROBERT DESCHAMPS (WAVE 6104, 16 DEC 64; EVLANE/4 CONTACT REPORT 3 JAN 66) (201-727690). LNERGO TRACES INDICATE HE BORN 16 FEB 30, PORT AU PRINCE, HAITI. OCTOBER 1961 RESIDED AT 5840 SW 93RD COURT, MIAMI AND WAS TRAVELING SALESMAN FOR WESTRADE, INC. JANUARY 1962 WAS EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT OF WESTRADE, INC. INTERVIEWED BY LNERGO AND STATED HAD BEEN CONTACTED BY HAITIAN EXILES BUT DID NOT PLAN TO BECOME INVOLVED WITH THEM. LNERGO CLOSED CASE 13 JULY 62. (SISTER, LISA LEGER, ALSO WORKED FOR WESTRADE.)

3. LOUIS DEJOIE (201-240483): FORMER HAITIAN SENATOR BORN 23 FEB 96, AND PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. SINCE EARLY 60'S EXILE LEADER PLOTTING AGAINST DUVALIER, TRAVELS EXTENSIVELY. ARRIVED MIAMI JULY 1964 AND BECAME ASSOCIATED WITH EVLUCID-1. BUSINESS ASSOCIATE OF ROBERT DESCHAMPS (WAVE 8541, 6792, 8916 (1964), UFGA 17308, 21374, 22527). LNERGO TRACES INDICATE HE REPUTED TO BE INVOLVED IN HAITIAN ACTIVITIES IN OCTOBER 1958 AND RESIDED 16 E. 96TH STREET, NEW YORK CITY

SECRET

PAGE THREE JMWAVE 1469 S E C R E T

IN JUNE 1964 WAS INTERVIEWED BY LNERGO AT HOME OF ROBERT DESCHAMPS, 5150 GRANADA BLVD., CORAL GABLES, DISCLAIMED ANY INVOLVEMENT IN ANTI-DUVALIER ACTS. OCTOBER 1964 WAS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AS A SALES MANAGER FOR WESTRADE, INC. LNERGO CLOSED CASE DECEMBER 1964.

4. BUENAVENTURA (SANCHEZ) FELIX (201-130312): DOMINICAN EXILE, ANTI-COMMUNIST, RESIDED HAVANA, CUBA DURING LATE 50'S AND WAS STATION SOURCE. ASSOCIATE OF JUAN BOSCH (TKH-1383, 1459, 1474, 1484) MINISTER OF EDUCATION DURING JUAN BOSCH'S ADMINISTRATION AND LEADER OF PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO DOMINICANO (PRD) 1964. APPOINTED AMBASSADOR TO VENEZUELA, AUGUST 1966 ((UFG-3958, 4718; SDOM 1537). NO LNERGO TRACES.

5. VICTOR AYBAR - NO STATION TRACES. LNERGO TRACES INDICATE FULL NAME VICTOR LEON (AYBAR) DE SOSA; DPOB 15 MAR 28, SANTO DOMINGO, D.R.; MARRIED TO MARY BOSWELL, AMERICAN CITIZEN; FORMER D.R. CONSUL IN CHICAGO. LNERGO HAD ALLEGATION HE WAS AGENT OF SIM. INTERVIEWED IN JULY 1961 AND DENIED ANY SIM CONNECTIONS. STATED HE HAD BEEN APPROACHED BY SIM WHILE IN CHICAGO AND THAT WAS THE REASON HE HAD LEFT

SECRET

THE D.R. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE. WAS EMPLOYED BY WESTRADE, INC., BUT RESIGNED AND RETURNED TO OTHER EMPLOYMENT IN CHICAGO.

6. GUAROA (VE) LAZQUEZ - NO STATION TRACES; NO LNERGO TRACES.

7. COL (?) WILLIAM BOND: POSSIBLY IDENTICAL WITH MAXWELL WILLIAM BOND (JR.); DPOB: 30 APRIL 21, SAN FRANCISCO. SUBJECT OF 201-283995 WHICH NOT AT STATION. POA REQUESTED 7 SEPT 60 WHEN HE WAS PROCUREMENT OFFICER AT THOMPSON-CORNWALL INC., CONSTRUCTION COMPANY IN GUATEMALA. POA GRANTED 29 SEPT 60; LATER CANCELLED. NO SUBSEQUENT RECORD AND NO LNERGO TRACES.

8. JMWAVE FILES CONTAIN FOLLOWING ITEM ON HERBERT ITKIN: LOUIS DEJOIE PROPOSED HERBERT ITKENS (SIC), 103 PARK AVE., NEW YORK, AS POSSIBLE CONTACT FOR FUNDS AGAINST DUVALIER. DEJOIE STATED ITKENS PREVIOUSLY GAVE DEJOIE $200,000 AND COULD PROVIDE ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL BACKING SOME FUTURE DATE. (WAVE 8792, 2 JULY 64)

9. JMWAVE FILES CONTAIN FOLLOWING TIDBITS ON BARNARD (ALSO BERNARD) COLLIER; WAS OCCASIONAL CONTACT OF AMCARBON-1

PAGE FIVE JMWAVE 1469 S E C R E T

IN 1964-65. HAD SERIES OF EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEWS WITH FIDEL CASTRO IN SUMMER 1964, COMMENTED UPON IN WAVE 8640, 17 AUGUST 64. WORKED FOR NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE AT THAT TIME. DENIED CUBAN VISA IN FALL 1965. ALLEGEDLY WROTE REPORT ON FOREIV PROCUREMENT IN U.S. OF T-28 AIRCRAFT CRITICAL OF WOFIRM AND LHERGO IN 1966. THIS DOCUMENT WAS OFFERED FOR SALE TO A STATION CONTACT BY LOCAL HOTEL OPERATOR, BILL THOMPSON IN OCTOBER 1966; NO OFFER WAS MADE AND MATTER DROPPED.

S E C R E T

14-00000

DEPT OF STATE DOCUMENT   OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL

DATE: 30 JUNE 1966

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL DELEGATION TO THE INAUGURAL CEREMONIES AT SANTO DOMINGO, D.R.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DOCUMENT

REGISTRATION STATEMENT (REGIS. NO: 1774

NAME OF REIGSTRANT: JEAN ANTOINE MAX BOLTE, AKA
MAX BOLTE

DATE: NOT LEGIBLE

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 4 AUGUST 1964

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: LOUIS DEJOIE

FBI FILE NO: 105-31661 (NEW YORK)

SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE 201-240483

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DDP, SOD 6, CA 2, CA/O 4, FI, FI/INT 2, WH/SA 8, VR

S E C R E T 032103Z

DIR INFO PRIN CITE WAVE 8792

03 JUL 64 IN 20813

DYVOUR PBRUMEN

REF: WAVE 8541 (IN 15961)

1. DEJOIE LEFT 30 JUNE 64 FOR VISIT NEW YORK AND TALK JOAQUIN BALAGUER RE LATTER'S COLLABORATION DEJOIE OPERATIONS AGAINST HAITI. WILL PROBABLY VISIT WASH BEFORE RETURN MIAMI. PRIOR LEAVING, DEJOIE JOINED FORCES WITH EVLUCID-1. UNTIL DEPARTURE, DEJOIE AND EVLUCID-1 WERE PLANNING ORGANIZATION OF HAITIAN GOVT FOLLOWING TAKEOVER BUT STILL NOT SUCCESSFUL IN MUSTERING WHEREWITHAL MOUNT INVASION. (SOURCE: UOAMBER-3 AND UOAMBER-6 COMBINED.)

2. DEJOIE SAID HE MET ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO IN SDOM EARLY JUNE AND CLAIMS GUTIERREZ SAID HE HAD CUBAN EXILE ARMS CACHED IN IGUANA ISLAND BUT USE OF ARMS FOR DEJOIE FORCES NOT POSSIBLE WITHOUT KUBARK APPROVAL. DEJOIE GETTING SAME STORY OTHER CUBAN EXILE GROUPS. (SOURCE: 201-240483

D 36-124-23/3

SECRET

RI COPY

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

Copy No.

201-836505

UOAMBER-6, 29 JUNE.)

3. ON 1 JULY E-1 CONTACTED BY ELISEO GOMEZ, BUSINESS PARTNER OF TEOFILO BABUN, CUBAN SHIPPING MAGNATE WHO NOW OPERATING IN MIAMI AND PROBABLY INVOLVED CONTRABAND ACTIVITIES. GOMEZ TOLD E-1 THAT GOMEZ REPRESENTED GROUP WHO ABLE TO HELP E-1 IN OPS AGAINST HAITI AND WOULD COLLABORATE IN RETURN FOR HAITIAN BASES. E-1 ASKED UOAMBER-3 OPINION GOMEZ, WAS TOLD THAT HE BUM AND DEALING WITH GOMEZ GROUP SURE TO END IN FAILURE IN VIEW FACT BABUN AND COMPANY AFTER MONEY ONLY AND WITHOUT SCRUPLES. WOULD PROBABLY LEAD E-1 ON FOR ADVANCE ON ARMS, THEN NOT DELIVER MID-STREAM. (SOURCE: U-3 FROM E-1, 1 JULY).

4. CONTACTS PROPOSED BY DEJOIE FOR IMMEDIATE FUTURE INCLUDE HERBERT ITKENS, 103 PARK AVE., NEW YORK, IN EFFORT OBTAIN FUNDS FOR ANTI-DUVALIER OPERATION. (DEJOIE SAYS ITKENS PREVIOUSLY GAVE DEJOIE $200,000 AND MAY PROVIDE ADDITIONAL BACKING SOME FUTURE DATE.) DEJOIE ALSO PLANNING APPROACH EDWARD JOSEPH, 17 BATTERY PLACE, NEW YORK. (JOSEPH APPARENTLY LEGAL COUNSEL FOR BALAGUER AND DIEGO BORDAS.) WILL PROBABLY ATTEMPT OTHER CONTACTS MIAMI AREA ON RETURN. (SOURCE: UOAMBER-6).

SECRET

5. IN DISCUSSING FINANCIAL SUPPORT HAITIAN OPS DEJOIE SAID EX-DOM GEN LUIS REINISO TRUJILLO PASSED DUVALIER $370,000, LATER GAVE ADDITIONAL $140,000 FOR DUVALIER PROTECTION TRUJILLO CLAN. DEJOIE DID NOT REVEAL WHEN FUNDS PASSED BUT SAID USED BY DUVALIER FOR PURCHASE WEAPONS IN EUROPE. (SOURCE: UOAMBER-3, 28 JUNE.)

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: * GAVE SUMMARY DEJOIE ACTIVITIES FOR 24 AND 25 JUNE 64.

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 19 FEBRUARY 1964

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: JEAN ANTOINE MAX BOLTE

FBI FILE NO: 97-1576 (NEW YORK)

14-00000

SECRET [illegible]

TO: Chief of Station, Port au Prince

INFO

FROM: Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: Conversation with IDEN-A on 3 October 1963 with HQS Fan (Using Alias)

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

1. I called on IDEN-A at the home of his son-in-law in ZRMETAL. IDEN-A remembered me from our previous meeting in May of this year, and his greeting was cordial. He said that he was in ZRMETAL and was going to New York for the purpose of making the situation of his followers known and to see if he could obtain support for maintaining his activist following in the DR.

2. IDEN-A believes that it has now been proven that no reliance could be placed on any of the Haitian military: EVLUSH/1 is obviously finished; EVLIFE/1 is unwilling to act without positive guarantees of ODYOKE support; Colonel Armand is able but weak; and General Boucicaut lacks courage. Colonel Biambi is a good man but is being supported by the Dominican government. If anything effective is to be done, it must be done through non-military personalities. Only a national leader who has the support of the people can do anything effective. Had he been in charge of the EVLUSH/1 effort, the peasants would have rallied to the invading forces, but they will not do so to a force under the command of a military man.

3. IDEN-A's camp is still in existence in the DR and contains about 70 men at present. Among these are EVLUTE/4 and Henri Clermont. He said that EVLUTE/4 is able but somewhat erratic and he (IDEN-A) fears that he would accept support from any source including the Communists, though he knows that EVLUTE/4 is not himself a communist. He likewise mistrusts the EVLUTE group because it s leadership is too far to the left. Again, he does not believe that the members of EVLUTE are themselves Communists, but they attempted to obtain support from Mexican Communists.

4. IDEN-A concerned at the moment in obtaining support to enable him to continue feeding the men in his camp. He said that he has been informed that the former followers of EVLUSH/1 are now flocking in, thus placing an intolerable burden on his slim resources. He needs a few thousand dollars for food supplies and hopes to get some help in New York from CARE or some other philanthropic organization.

5. IDEN-A regrets the overthrow of the Bosch government. He says that he is aware of Bosch's shortcomings as an administrator, but that he had the interests of the Dominican Republic at heart and had demonstrated his sympathies for IDEN-A and his followers. Nevertheless,

CONTINUED

201-240483

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HTPW-627	11 OCT 1963 / 9 October 1963
CS COPY	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-240483

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/6	Norman Descoteaux VD	jar	4596

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
		201-836808

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
RID/FI	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	9 Oct 63	J. C. King

53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

IDEN-A believes that he will be able to have a friendly relationship with the new regime. He has an appointment to see Ambassador Jose [illegible] today and hopes to obtain his support. He also is a good friend of [illegible] and believes this will stand him in good stead. He thinks that the new government must be recognized within 60 days.

6. He has received some aid from PBPRIME friends and from Cuban and Dominican private individuals. He did not further identify them other than to say that they were not the same persons who had supported EVLUSH/1 who had been counting on the support of Masferrer. This support had not been forthcoming due to the fact that certain of the Haitians and Cubans that Masferrer was supposed to provide, refused to work with Masferrer. IDEN's Cuban supporters' aim is to use Haiti as a base against Cuba. He agrees this should be done.

7. IDEN-A is certain that Garrido informed EVMAYA of EVLUSH/1's plans. He said that Garrido was greedy and would take money from any source.

8. IDEN-A says that ODYOKE plans to send a new ambassador to Haiti will greatly strengthen the government. He said this fact is known and has caused considerable disappointment among exiles. (I made no comment on this.)

9. IDEN-A had wanted to bring these matters to the attention of IDEN-B. He has no selfish ambition. In outlook, he is a Catholic and a capitalist who wants to do what he can for his country. This is his sole reason for wanting to be President. I explained that his views would be made known to IDEN-B and other interested senior officials. IDEN-B regretted not being able to talk to him personally, but was prevented from doing so at present due to the many demands on his time caused by the present critical situation in the Caribbean.

10. Our parting was cordial and IDEN-A said that when he returned to the DR in the next few days, he would be glad to establish contact with one of my associates should we desire to do this. I told him that should it be necessary to get in touch with him, the person chosen would identify himself as my friend.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
—Original & 1 - Port au Prince

IDENS (U/S/C)

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 21 AUGUST 1963

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: :PIOS DEJOIE - REGISTRATION ACT - HAITI

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (WASH., D.C.)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 6 AUG 63 30

SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : DODS

ACTION: WH 8. (WH & IW NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1715 6 AUG BP)

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, SOD 6, DODS/L, DODS 4, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT, IW, DD/I, AD/CI 2, RF 2.

ROUTING: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

AUG 6 2108Z 63

PRIORITY

IN 94397

TDCS

PRITY DIR CITE DODS 0466

INTEL

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO.[1] WUARMOR/1[2] WHO RECEIVED HIS INFORMATION BY PHONE ON 6 AUGUST 1963 FROM ARTHUR HAAS, PRESIDENT OF CARIBBEAN MILLS, OWNER OF THE BIGGEST FLOUR MILL IN HAITI WHO RESIDES IN DALLAS. HAAS OBTAINED THIS INFORMATION ON 6 AUGUST FROM HERBERT ITKIN, A NEW YORK CITY LAWYER WITH THE FIRM ITKIN, ROBERTS, AND GREENBAUM. ITKIN TOLD HAAS THAT HE REPRESENTS LOUIS DEJOIE, ONE OF THE HAITIAN EXILE LEADERS, AND GAVE HAAS TO UNDERSTAND THAT THIS INFORMATION COMES FROM DEJOIE. ITKIN TOLD HAAS THAT, BECAUSE ALL OF THE HAITIAN EXILES ARE NOW WORKING TOGETHER, HE REPRESENTS ALL OF THE EXILES AS WELL AS DEJOIE. HAAS TOLD WUARMOR/1[2] THAT CARIBBEAN MILLS WOULD BE WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE TO SUPPORT THE INVASION OF HAITI IF IT LOOKS AS THOUGH THE INVADING FORCE WILL SUCCEED

IW COMMENT:

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED TD PORTION OF THIS CABLE HAS BEEN MADE OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

TDCS PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE / PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO: CS in 36-1-6

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

BASED ON:

LIAISON:

SECRET

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

PAGE 2

IN 94397

TDCS

AND IF ALL OF THE OTHER COMPANIES CONCERNED CONTRIBUTE. WUARMOR/1 HAS ASKED DODS WHETHER KUBARK WOULD ADVISE THAT HIS COMPANY CONTRIBUTE ALSO. DODS UNDERSTANDS KUJUMP DALLAS OFFICE RECEIVED SIMILAR AND AMPLIFIED REPORT FROM HASS DIRECTLY AND THAT THIS REPORT HAS BEEN PASSED BY KUJUMP TO HQS BY PHONE. HQS MAY PREFER DISSEM AS FROM HAAS ONLY AND OMIT WUARMOR/1. REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM NO DISSEM ABROAD CONTROLLED DISSEM. HAITI SUBJ: HAITI INVADING FORCE DOI: 6 AUGUST 1963 PADA: OMIT PLACE ACQUIRED 6 AUGUST 1963 APPR: DEFER HQS. UWC-22 SOURCE: AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN WITH INTERESTS IN HAITI (F) FROM A SECOND AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN WHO OBTAINED THIS INFORMATION FROM HERBERT ITKIN, NEW YORK ATTORNEY WITH THE FIRM OF ITKIN, ROBERTS, AND GREENBAUM WHO SAID THAT HE REPRESENTS LOUIS DEJOIE AND ALL OF THE HAITIAN EXILE LEADERS. ITKIN GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT LOUIS DEJOIE IS HIS SOURCE FOR THIS INFORMATION.

IW COMMENT:

TDCS PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

BASED ON:

LIAISON:

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

Copy No.

INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In) CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

COUNTRY

REPORT NO. TDCS

SUBJECT

DATE DISTR.

PRECEDENCE

DATE OF INFO.

REFERENCES IN 94397

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

APPRAISAL

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE

1. THE FORCE INVADING HAITI ON 6 AUGUST 1963 REPRESENTS ALL OF THE HAITI EXILES AND IS NOT REPRESENTATIVE ONLY OF THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH LEON CANTAVE. ACCORDING TO LOUIS DEJOIE, HAITIAN EXILE LEADER THE PRESIDENT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES SOME TIME AGO ARRANGED THAT ALL OF THE HAITIAN EXILE GROUPS SHOULD ACT TOGETHER AS ONE BODY.

2. THE FORCE IS COMPOSED OF 500 ARMED MEN RATHER THAN THE 250 FIRST REPORTED BY THE PRESS. THE GROUP HAS 1500 ARMED MEN STANDING BY. (FIELD COMMENT. WHERE THE GROUP IS STANDING BY IS NOT STATED.)

CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO
STATE/DIR																

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

3. THE FORCE MUST RAISE U.S. $250,000. IN ORDER TO MAKE THE INVASION SUCCESSFUL. HALF OF THAT AMOUNT HAS ALREADY BEEN RAISED IN EUROPE. HERBERT ITKIN, A NEW YORK ATTORNEY REPRESENTING LOUIS DEJOIE AND OTHER HAITIAN EXILE GROUPS, IS PHONING AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN IN AN ATTEMPT TO RAISE THE OTHER HALF.

END OF MESSAGE

STATE DEPT DOCUMENT - MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: 22 MAY 1963

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: VIEWS OF HAITIAN OPPOSITION LEADER LOUIS DEJOIE

FILE NO: 819192

DEPT. OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

DATE: 16 MAY 1963

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL - NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SUBJECT: HAITIAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE

REPORT NO: 2231011563 (Puerto Rico)

SECRET

201 PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE TYPE OR PRINT

TO: RID/201 Section Room GA-20 Tube Address DW-6 | DATE: [illegible]

FROM: Name	OFFICE	ROOM	PHONE	TUBE ADDRESS
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]

1. TYPE ACTION	2. FILE RESTRICTED	3. PERMANENT CHARGE
OPEN / AMEND / CLOSE	YES / NO	YES / NO

4. TRUE NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	5. 201 NO.
[illegible],	[illegible]		336568

6. NAME VARIANTS AND TELECODES (see Instructions, item 6)

TYPE	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)

7. SEX	8. DATE OF BIRTH	9. COUNTRY OF BIRTH	10. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
M F	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

11. CITIZENSHIP	12. OCCUPATION (clear text)	OCC. CODE	13. SWL	14. OI CODE
US [illegible]	Lawyer	[illegible]		

15. DOCUMENT SYMBOL & NUMBER	DATE	16. RESIDENCE
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

17. COMMENTS (text for Index cards)

[illegible] in 19[illegible]. [illegible] in law firm of [illegible], Roberts & [illegible]

18. COUNTRY OF LOCATION	CODE	19. ACTION DESK	CODE	20. SECONDARY DESK	CODE
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

21. INFORMATION ADDRESSEES [illegible]

22. CRYPTONYM

HAND CARRY OR FORWARD BY TUBE IF TRUE NAME APPEARS ABOVE.

23. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTER [signature] | 201 NO. 336368

FORM 9-65 831 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(38-51)

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH
201-305052
VOL. III

INCLUSIVE DATES: JAN 65 - JAN. 75

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
			NOT REVIEWED BY HSCA

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS FROM [illegible]

Vol. I	STATE DEPT (Moscow #19074, 28 Aug 59)	
	STATE DEPT (Moscow #20771, 31 Aug 59)	
	STATE DEPT (Moscow #22299, 30 Jun 61)	
Vol. II	STATE DEPT fm Tijuana	14 Mar 63
	STATE Memo fm Tijuana	15 Mar 63
	STATE Tijuana	15 Mar 63
	FBI (Oklahoma City)	2 Apr 63 re TUMBLEWEED
	FBI (Hoover to CIA)	31 May 63 re TUMBLEWEED (E)65-65652
	FBI (Excerpt only fm document dated 27 May 63 (CIA #DBA 43665)	
	STATE (Tijuana ConGen)	10 Sep 63
	STATE Dept #CA-3646	29 Oct 63
	FBI (San Diego)	7 Oct 63
	STATE Airgram A-12 fm Tij	10 Oct 63
	STATE Official-Informal Memo fm Mexico to Tijuana	10 Oct 63
	FBI (San Diego)	7 Feb 64
Vol.III	STATE (Mexico #4042)	23 Jul 69
	STATE (Moscow #4192)	12 Aug 69
	FBI - travel items (4)	August-October 1969
	FBI (San Diego)	18 Dec 69
	STATE (Mexico #4475)	14 Aug 70
	STATE (Mexico 4693)	26 Aug 70
	FBI travel items (2)	10 Sep 70 re KOSTIKOVA
	STATE Request for Bio	29 Sep 70
	FBI travel items (2)	21 Oct 70
	FBI travel items (2)	30 Oct 70
	FBI (San Antonio #78206)	13 May 71
	STATE (Mexico #5211)	14 Sep 71
	FBI travel items (2)	28 Sep 71
	FBI travel items (2)	1 Oct 71
	FBI (Oklahoma City)	24 Jan 75 re TUMBLEWEED

SECRET

INDEX SEARCH AND 201 CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

FROM: NAME (Use gummed labels)	BADGE NO.	DATE	IP/FI CONTROL NO.
Hopkins, Chas	1-C-516	12 Apr 77	

BRANCH	ROOM	EXTENSION
LAD/COG	3D57	4272

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE	INITIALS
IP/INDEX	DT-5	1B4003	04/12/77	Go
REQUESTER				
IP/FILES	DT-6	GC52		
REQUESTER				
IP/RMS	DB-6	GA-20		

REQUESTER'S NOTES

NO. OF REFERENCES ORDERED

THIS REQUEST REFERS TO (Doc. Ref.)

SEARCH INSTRUCTIONS (TO IP/IN)

SUBJECT OF INDEX SEARCH

SURNAME: KOSTIKOV

GIVEN NAMES: Valery

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE SEARCHED

201 NO. IF KNOWN: 201- 305052

AKA, ALIASES

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.)

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE

RESULTS OF IP/INDEX SEARCH

	NO RECORDS IDENTIFIABLE WITH SUBJECT
	SURNAME NOT FOUND IN FILES
X	INDEX RECORDS ATTACHED
	THERE ARE ______ RECORDS OF WHICH ______ ARE FNU'S WHICH MAY PERTAIN TO THE SUBJECT OF THIS SEARCH; THESE MAY BE REVIEWED IN IP/IN. 1B4003.

COMMENTS

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

THERE ARE OTHER INDICES THAT YOU SHOULD CONSIDER. SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR CHECKLIST OF OTHER INDICES AND 201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS.

TO ORDER DOCUMENTS

1. REVIEW INDEX RECORDS.
2. DRAW GREEN DIAGONAL LINE ACROSS ITEMS YOU DO NOT WANT.
3. FORWARD TO IP/FILES.

TO EDIT THE INDEX RECORDS

AFTER RECEIPT OF THE DOCUMENTS, EDIT THE INDEX RECORD ACCORDING TO DOI 70-19.

1. TO DESTROY INDEX RECORD: MARK THE INDEX RECORD WITH A GREEN D, AND CITE THE REASON.
2. TO MAKE CORRECTIONS/ADDITIONS: ENTER THE CHANGES ON THE INDEX RECORD IN GREEN INK.
3. FORWARD TO IP/RMS VIA YOUR RECORDS OFFICER

REQUEST NO./DATE/TIME: 122019 1977 APR 12 AM 9:35

201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE.

14-00000

XAE - 852 - 20775

S-E-C-R-E-T

MAIN INDEX SEARCH RESPONSE 122019 016
IMMEDIATE

REQ NO: 122019A01 REQUESTER: HC516 HOPKINS CHRI LA/C/CI 3D5331 9061 BU7

NAME: KOSTIKOV, VALERY YOB: SEX: CIT:
ORIGIN:A DOR: PURPOSE:FOS PRTY:I OTPT:D999 FNU: SPELL: MASK: MAT:

CONTROL CODE 016-VCF-770412-093553-00002 093550

0001 KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH 074-005-102
SEX M SX-05555/05
CIT USSR
RES MEXICO
FORMERLY: 00 NO DATE,
***LOCATOR DATA: FILE PERMANENTLY CHARGED TO SE/CI/X, 4D18 , 1203, 13/03/75
SX-05555/05 01 FEB 77 02175526

0002 KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH 201-0305052*
SEX M DOB 17MAR33 POB USSR, MOSCOW TYPE NAME T
CIT USSR RCD DATE 61
REF HMMA-25722, 02 APR 65
RES USSR KGB OFFICER, FORMER EMPLOYEE SOV EMB,
MEXICO CITY, DEPARTED PCS 04 AUG 65, WIFE KOSTIKOVA,
ROZA ALEKSANDROVNA
***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
31 DEC 65 00150737

Ordered
CI

PAGE 0001
---CONTINUED--- HC516 122019 016
S-E-C-R-E-T E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

S-E-C-R-E-T

0003 KOSTIKOV, ARDP-00011
OSS REFS ARE AVAILABLE TO THIS NAME IN THE MAIN 01JAN46
INDEX CAT. III FILE. THESE REFS MUST BE MANUALLY
SEARCHED AND APPLICABLE CARDS REPRODUCED AND ATTACHED
TO THE NAME TRACE REQUEST.
***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
ARDP-00011 01 JAN 46 01859765

0004 KOSTIKOV, FNU 078-004-002
APPEARS TO HAVE LEFT PERMANENTLY. POSSIBLY PETER KAHI-00650
PAKHOMOVICH, BORN 21 SEP 11 CHAUFFEUR SOVIETS 01JUN53
STATIONED IN KARACHI. SER-41
IN29381
***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
KAHI-00650C0653 24 AUG 59 05877390

0005 KOSTIKOV, FNU 041-008-005
AKA ANIRUT KALITROV KOSTOKOV AKA KOSTAKOV, ISSAD NIT-00693
KALISTROVICH 27MAR54
74-7-2041.206-
4
FORMERLY: FCN NO FCN, DD NO DATE.
***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
NIT-00693 27 MAR 54 07478948

S-E-C-R-E-T

```
0006 KOSTIKOV, FNU                                           EGQA-89069
     RIS OFFICER, EAST GERMANY                               13MAY57
                                                             11 MAY 56
                                                             ATT DATED
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     EGQA-89069                       13 MAY 57  07602864

0007 KOSTIKOV                                                201-0805767
     SEX M                      OCC INTELL                   DST-14913
     CIT USSR                                                07OCT66
     < USSR, SAMARKAND AKA OF KOLCHOV 6FT 1IN TALL,          STATE
     SLENDER BUILD, RECEDING HAIR, REDDISH IN COLOR. SMALL   P9
     V-SHAPED SCAR ON UPPER LEFT FOREHEAD. RESPONSIBLE FOR
     INTURIST RELATIONS WITH THE SAMARKAND AUTHORITIES. MAJ
     FIGURE IN LT. JON VIEGEL /201-805767/ CASE. QUESTIONER
     AND INTER+#DEFERRED
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     DST-14913                        18 APR 67  03492759

0008 KOSTIKOV                                                074-005-011
     SEX M                                                   CD-00406
     C OF KRAVCHENKO, M. KH. NAME APPEARED IN GERMAN         08APR65
     PROPAGANDA LEAFLET WRITTEN IN RUSSIAN WHICH CONTAINED   P4
     NKVD AGENTS AND INFORMANTS PLANTED IN SOVIET 44TH
     RIFLE DIVISION, 42
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     CD-00406                         25 AUG 65  03694375
```

END OF REPLY - 0008 RECORDS LISTED

14-00000

Russ

1. Which [illegible] TUMBLEWEED - seems related with Dept. 13 of KGB - (assassinations). KOSTIKOV ever involved in TUMBLEWEED. Was in clandestine contact with TUMBLEWEED.

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

XAE-852
7 October 1975

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Photo Identification of Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV, XAE-852, 20 June 1975

The attached photo identification request was generated by DJR himself on the basis of XAE-851, also attached. It is being processed into the record as a part of a backlog which is currently being processed.

Lee H. Wigren
C/CI/R&A/E

File: 201-305052
D-100-6-154/22

SUBJ on Pg 2

RECORD COPY

D-100-6-154/22

7 OCT 75
201-305052

E2 IMPDET CL BY 012201

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING; XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED; ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING; MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

INFO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM: Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Mexico City Soviet Personality Files

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith, for inclusion into their Headquarters 201-files, are the Station's Personality Files of the following Soviet Diplomats who were previously assigned to Mexico City. The Files have been purged of all Headquarters correspondence.

BOLSHAKOV, Aleksandr Vladimirovich	201-837295
FEDIN, Yevgeniy Ivanovich	201-[illegible]
KOSTIKOV, Valeriy Vladimirovich	201-[illegible]
KUCHEROV, Valentin Ivanovich	201-758017
PETROV, Vladimir Stepanovich	201-050867
VANOVSKIY, Yuriy Yakovlevich	201-[illegible]

Felix C. PESCATURO

Distribution:
2 cys - C/SBD, w/att h/w
1 cy - C/WHD, w/o att

CLASSIFIED BY ...

EXEMPT FROM ... OF E ... § 5B(1) ... 0 ... APDI.2

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-42157

DATE: 21 July 19[illegible]

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER:

KOSTIKOV VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH A-018973 S 036780

DPOB: 17 MAR 33 MOSCOW 201-0305052 PPT

WIFE: ROZA ALEKSANDROVNA B 02 MAR 32 REF: OBBA 31097 07 JUL 72

Deleted from photo system

MH

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES
ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)
REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED

BY AT Z

DISSEM BY 28 PER

ACTION UNIT SB8 FILE, VR IP/AN, WH8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI

ACTION NO 115

S E C R E T 310020Z MAY 72 CITE MEXICO CITY 19978

DIRECTOR

REDTOP (IN 543028) 30May 72 IN 623421

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 19049, 22 FEB 72

B. DIRECTOR 237413, 29 FEB 72

1. XDADORN REPORTED PCS ARRIVAL 22 MAY 1972 AEROMEXICO FLT 401 OF:

A. VLADIMIR MIKHAYLOVICH M E L N I K O V (201-820393), DIP PASSPORT D-003383, ACCOMPANIED BY WIFE, TATYANA IVANOVNA AND SON, MIKHAIL, AGE THREE. BIO DATA CONTAINED IN AMEMB MOSCOW 1153, 8 FEB 72. PER SENSITIVE HQS SOURCE, MELNIKOV IS THIRD SECY, TO OCCUPY SLOT VACTED BY VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH K O S T I K O V (201-305052), KNOWN KGB.

B. ANDREY BORISOVICH G L I K H O V T S E V (201-897655), SERVICE PASSPORT S-253248. SEE AMEMB MOSCOW 5264, 26 JULY 1971. GLIKHOVTSEV TO OCCUPY ADDITIONAL SLOT AS "TRAINEE" AND GUARD AT SOVEMB. NO FAMILY REPORTED.

2. TRAVELLING WITH MELNIKOV FAMILY WAS VADIM V. V E N E V T S E V, 14 YEAR OLD SON OF 201-738468, TO SPEND VACATION WITH PARENTS.

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- 305052

CS COPY FILED IN 201-820393 SECRET

[illegible]

Chief, [illegible]

Chief, Western Hem[illegible]

Chief of Station, [illegible]

[illegible]

ACTION [illegible]

REFERENCE [illegible]

1. [illegible]

2. [illegible]
late afternoon. He [illegible]
drinking. [illegible]
with Subject [illegible]
[illegible]
but [illegible]-10 offered [illegible]
glasses. [illegible]
[illegible]
and now living in Guadalajara. [illegible]

3. While talking about [illegible]
10 would understand his feelings [illegible]
learned that his only son, [illegible]
[illegible] inducted into the [illegible]
would be sent to the Chinese border, [illegible]
had served for one year, [illegible]
Subject stated that there are as many as [illegible]
killed daily at this border [illegible]
known in the USSR. Subject [illegible]
there himself and from [illegible]
Subject indicated that he [illegible]
his son transferred but he was a "communist" [illegible]
friend [illegible]
and "Vladimir" (Inu) could help him get his son [illegible]
would not ask for their help. [illegible]

4. Subject became very emotional as he [illegible]
son. [illegible]-10 reported that Subject was [illegible]

CS COPY [illegible] 201-351744

DISTRIBUTION:
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[illegible] 1 - C/WHD

Kostikov

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- 305052

[illegible] 41,793

29 [illegible] 197[illegible]

S E C R E T

[illegible]

[illegible] Chinese [illegible].

5. Subject, who arrived in [illegible] developed [illegible] friendship [illegible]

[illegible]

6. Dulcin is officially an employee of the [illegible] Office, although he physically works in the [illegible] of the Embassy and spends the entire [illegible]. He functions as an all-night security guard once a week at the Embassy. He is paid and also takes his turn at [illegible] Office. We carry Subject as a [illegible] officer [illegible] exclusive contacts with [illegible] officers, [illegible] pattern of activities, the fact that he replaced a [illegible] officer in slot, and from [illegible] identification. [illegible] functions as the [illegible] code clerk [illegible] folder appears on [illegible], so there is no information available on his outside contacts.

7. In January 1972, Subject and family moved to [illegible] Zuazua 39, Apt. 102, Colonia San Miguel Chapultepec. He drives a recently purchased 1972 yellow-brown [illegible] with diplomatic license plates [illegible].

8. We felt the information provided by [illegible] was of sufficient significance to forward to Headquarters for your information. Our only viable access to Subject is [illegible]. Subject has no known outside contacts, and he is [illegible] diplomat, a situation which precludes social access by [illegible] officers. We will continue to monitor Dulcin's activities through KDADAGE-10 and seek some other way to get to know him better.

[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH
201-305052
SEX M DOB ?

050-008-010
HMMA-41550
26 JAN 72
P2

CIT ?
OCC ?
SUBJ DEPARTED MEXICO PCS IN 71 REFER TO DOC
FOR ADDITIONAL INFO

R 7202110020

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201- 305052

FORM 8-68 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(7-46)

SECRET

ATTACHMENT TO HMMA-41,070, 27 September 1971

TO : Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SECRET

H/w att. 1 to HMMA-41070 CS COPY

201-305052

14-00000

① Bear Priority
② PR
③ Hored 9/15

request req'd COB
Sept 15.

No. 247

La Embajada de la Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas saluda muy atentamente a la Embajada de los Estados Unidos de América y tiene el honor de pedir que se sirva extender las visas de tránsito en los pasaportes diplomáticos del Sr. KOSTIKOV Valeri, Segundo Secretario de la Embajada de la URSS en México, y pasa su esposa Sra. KOSTIKOVA Roza.

Las personas mencionadas salen de México a Nueva York el día 20 de septiembre del año en curso por la cía "EA-902" y van a continuar su viaje rumbo a Moscú el día 22 de septiembre por la cía "Aeroflot".

La Embajada de la URSS agradece de antemano la atención que la Embajada de los Estados Unidos de América tenga a bien de prestar a esta solicitud y aprovecha la oportunidad para reiterar las seguridades de su más alta y distinguida consideración.

México, D.F., 13 de septiembre de 1971

A LA EMBAJADA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS
DE AMERICA

14-00000

APELLIDO	NOMBRE	SEGUNDO NOMBRE	DOCUMENTO DE VIAJE
Costikov	Valeri	Vladimirovitch	pas diplomático D No. 022184

RESIDENCIA: Embajada de la URSS en México

FECHA Y LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO	DIA	MES	AÑO	TEZ
Moscú	17	3	1933	

CABELLO	OJOS	ESTATURA	NACIONALIDAD	SEÑAS
			Soviet	

ESTADO CIVIL	SEXO	PROFESION	DURACION Y PROPOSITO DE ESTANCIA EN LOS EE UU
☒ C ☐ S ☐ V ☐ D	☒ M ☐ F	3º secretario de la Embajada de la URSS	tránsito por Nueva York por 3 días

Entiendo que la posesión de una visa no le concede al portador el derecho de entrar a los EE UU si al llegar al puerto de entrada se descubre que es inadmisible.

Certifico que la información que figura en la presente solicitud, incluso cualesquiera declaraciones que formen parte de la misma, ha sido suministrada por mí y es correcta y completa según mi saber y entender.

El solicitante fué entrevistado por mí y su solicitud fué firmada en mi presencia.

el:

[signature]

(Firma del solicitante)

FORM FS-257 SPANISH — Form Approved

...CATION FOR ...IMMIGRANT VISA AND ALIEN ...

CLASSIFICATION	POST SERIAL NO	REMARKS
ISSUED ON	FOR	9/13/71
	Unlid or ( ) Appl	Visa: Bl...
VALID THROUGH	REFUSED	
SERVICE NO.		
TARIFF ITEM NO		
FEE PAID: U S $		
LOCAL CY. EQUIVALENT		

APPLICATION FOR NONIMMIGRANT VISA AND ALIEN REGISTRATION

UNION
DES RÉPUBLIQUES
SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

PASSEPORT
DIPLOMATIQUE

Д № 022184

СОЮЗ СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ
РЕСПУБЛИК

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКИЙ
ПАСПОРТ

Д № 022184

RESIDENCIA *Embajada de la URSS en Mexico*

FECHA Y LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO	DIA	MES	AÑO	TEZ
[illegible] de Azjangelsk	*2*	*?*	*1932*	

CABELLO	OJOS	ESTATURA	NACIONALIDAD	SEÑAS
			Rusa	

ESTADO CIVIL	SEXO	PROFESION	DURACION Y PROPOSITO DE ESTANCIA EN LOS EE UU
☑ C ☐ S ☐ V ☐ D	☐ M ☑ F	*esposa del segundo [illegible] [illegible]*	*Transito por [illegible] Nueva York [illegible]*

Entiendo que la posesión de una visa no le concede al portador el derecho de entrar a los EE UU si al llegar al puerto de entrada se descubre que es inadmisible.

3 dias

Certifico que la información que figura en la presente solicitud, inclusive cualesquiera declaraciones que formen parte de la misma, ha sido examinada por mí y es correcta y completa según mi saber y entender.

El solicitante fué entrevistado por mí y su solicitud fué firmada en mi presencia.

[signature]

(Firma del solicitante)

FORM FS-257 (Spanish) Form Approved

CLASSIFICATION	POST SERIAL NO	REMARKS
ISSUED ON	FOR Unltd	
VALID THROUGH	REFUSED ON	
SERVICE NO		
TARIFF ITEM NO		
FEE PAID U. S. $		
LOCAL CY. EQUIVALENT		

9/13/71

[illegible]

APPLICATION FOR NONIMMIGRANT VISA AND ALIEN REGISTRATION

UNION
DES RÉPUBLIQUES
SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

PASSEPORT
DIPLOMATIQUE

Д № 022185

СОЮЗ СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ
РЕСПУБЛИК

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКИЙ
ПАСПОРТ

Д № 022185

Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV: He is a 38-year-old officer of the KGB who occupies the cover position of Second Secretary. He first visited Mexico in 1959 for a Soviet Industrial Exposition and later came from September 1961 until August 1965. He returned again in September 1968 to replace another KGB officer. KOSTIKOV is considered to be one of the most effective and dangerous of the intelligence officers in Mexico. He has had a wide range of responsibilities which have included operations among emigre groups in western Mexico, operations directed against the United States and currently against the governments of Central America. He presently meets with exiles from Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras. He is known to have passed funds to these groups as well as tactical guidance.

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

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DEC 1 7 1971
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BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 38 PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT SBB

FILE, VR, RF/Ab, WHB, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI,

ACTION NO. 333

S E C R E T 262220Z OCT 71 CITE MEXICO CITY 18258

DIRECTOR

26 OCT IN 454800

REDTOP AEKICK AESMASH Soviet Travel from Mexico

REF: DIRECTOR 194115

1. VLADIMIR STEPANOVICH P E T R O V (201-858287), KNOWN KGB OFFICER, DEPARTED MEXICO WITH FAMILY ON 13 AUGUST 71 ON WHAT PRESUMED BY STATION TO BE HOME LEAVE, DUE HIS LENGTH OF SERVICE IN MEXICO, AND DUE FACT OUR COVERAGE SOVIET INSTALLATIONS GAVE NO INDICATIONS PRIOR DEPARTURE THAT PREPARATIONS BEING MADE FOR PCS MOVE, KDBADGER OF 7 OCTOBER 71, HOWEVER, CONTAINED REFERENCES TO PACKING AND SHIPMENT OF PETROV'S HHE. STATION INCLINED BELIEVE NON-RETURN OF PETROV LINKED WITH HIS POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT IN VALINK CASE (SEE MEXICO CITY 17460 (IN 405813) AND RELATED TRAFFIC). WHILE NOT CONNECTED AESMASH DEFECTION, REFERENCE POSES POSSIBILITY OUR SUSPICIONS VALID AND KGB FEARED FLAP POTENTIAL IN PETROV'S CONTINUED PRESENCE IN MEXICO.

2. VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH K O S T I K O V (201-305052), KNOWN KGB AND SUSPECTED DEPARTMENT 13 OFFICER, DEPARTED MEXICO WITH FAMILY 20 SEPTEMBER 71. KOSTIKOV ARRIVED MEXICO 13 SEPTEMBER 68, AND PCS DEPARTURE MAY HAVE BEEN ROUTINE, ALTHO 1 JUNE 71

26 Oct 71

B201-858287

D74-6-756/3

CS COPY

201-305052

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

INFO.: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: REDTOP/AEKICK - Valeriy Vladimirovich Kostikov (201-305052)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None; for your information and files.

1. KDADORN reported the 20 September 1971 departure of Subject and his wife Roza Aleksandrovna for New York via Eastern Airlines Flight 902 en route to Moscow.

2. Although Station has no information concerning a replacement, recent KDBADGER coverage has contained comments regarding the packing and moving of Subject's household effects, indicating his departure was PCS.

3. Attached for Subject's Headquarters file is a copy of his visa request, including a photograph, and the opening page of his passport. Subject's Station file will be retained until it is known that his departure was PCS.

Olive S. Eckholm

Olive S. ECKHOLM

ATTACHMENT:
Envelope containing visa requests and applications and opening page passports, h/w

DISTRIBUTION:
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RID INPUT NO. 33

CS COPY

1 att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-41,070	27 September 1971
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-305052

14-00000

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SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

KOSTIKOV, VALERIY
201-305052
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
PHOTO AVAILABLE

200-124-200
MEXI-16022
24 MAR 71

HVCHRSHLBHBRHBBHBC-

R 7104120340

FILE IN 201-305052

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

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ACTION UNIT WH8 | INFO FILE, VR R/AN, SB8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI

ACTION NO. 419

SECRET 241956Z MAR 71 CITE MEXICO CITY 16021 24 MAR IN 295186

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

REF: A. MEXICAN EMBASSY TELEGRAM 1581 (#99460)

*B. GUATEMALA CITY 12912 (IN

1. TO BE READY FOR ANOTHER REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON GUATEMALA BY KDGLACIERS ON BEHALF ECHEVERRIA, TORMET IS PULLING TOGETHER INFORMATION ON INDIVIDUAL PGT AND FAR TARGET PERSONALITIES LOCATED MEXICO. IN CASE OF FAR, OUR KNOWLEDGE THEIR ACTIVITIES MEXICO SO LIMITED FEEL WE HAVE NOTHING TO LOSE IN TRYING BRING GOM DOWN ON HEADS OF LEADING SUSPECTS TO SEE WHAT WE CAN TURN UP. RE PGT, WE PLAN PASS NAMES OF MOST PROMINENT ACTIVISTS, LEAVING OUT KDLADDER-1 AND OTHER SECRET MEMBERS. WE PREPARED PASS INFORMATION ON FUNDING OF PGT BY SOVIETS, INCLUDING IDENTIFICATION OF VALERIY K O S T I K O V AS PGT CONTACT IN SOVIET EMBASSY. ALSO PREPARED USE INFORMATION ON PURCHASE OF ARMS IN U.S. FOR PGT BY CARLOS MANUEL P E R Z A B A L MARCUE. IN BOTH CASES WILL TAILOR INFORMATION IN SUCH A WAY TO INSURE PROTECTION KDLADDER-2.

2. THIS WOULD BE GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE ECHEVERRIA

* BEING SVC'D.

LEE
CON 7
CHA
CLY
DIA
KAT K
BOB
FIL Kostikov
DES
RET

SECRET

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ACTION UNIT | INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 16021 S E C R E T

BACKGROUND BRIEF WHICH WOULD ENCOURAGE HIM TO TAKE STEPS IN MEXICO AGAINST PGT OR FAR. DEFER TO YOU AS TO WHETHER YOU OR HQS PREPARE IT BUT SUGGEST YOU DO SO.

3. HEADQUARTERS: REALIZING DIFFICULTY YOU HAD MEETING ECHEVERRIA'S PREVIOUS REQUEST, WISH TO EMPHASIZE THAT WE ARE NOT MERELY TRYING TO "BRIEF LIAISON" BUT TO ENCOURAGE ECHEVERRIA TAKE ACTION OF THE SORT COS, GUATEMALA, HAS BEEN SEEKING IN MEXICO FOR SOME TIME. THUS, WOULD APPRECIATE RELAXING PREVIOUS STRICTURES AGAINST PASSAGE OF INFORMATION FOR PURPOSE ACCOMPLISHING AN END WHICH, IT SEEMS TO US, IS TO U.S. ADVANTAGE.

4. IF KDGLACIERS DO NOT ASK US FOR INFORMATION, THINK WE CAN EVENTUALLY COME FORWARD WITH IT ON BASIS PAST REQUESTS (AND ON BASIS RECENT SURVEILLANCE TEAM FLAP IN ARANA'S MEET WITH ECHEVERRIA.

5. GUATEMALA CITY: PLS POUCH PHOTOS ARTURO "CHINO" R I V E R A ESCOBAR, PERCY AMILCAR J A C O B S DE LEON, AND FRANCISCO ANTONIO V A S Q U E Z RIVERA, AND ADVISE US OF YOUR FEELINGS ABOUT ABOVE. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

FORM 3013 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
5-69

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ACTION UNIT WH 7 | INFO | FILE. VR.

SERVICE

ACTION NO.

MEXICO CITY 1?21	2? MARCH 71	2?1??-A
STA & NR	DATE	IN NR

PLEASE CORRECT THE GARBLED PORTION(S) OF THIS MESSAGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

"REF B. GUATEMALA CITY 12192"

ALSO CORRECT PARA FOUR (4) TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

"TEAM FLAP TOO)

WITHOUT REVEALING THAT WE HAVE TAKEN ANY INITIATIVE IN"

SECRET

201- 305052
Kostikov
Mexico

FOR PRESS MATERIAL PERTAINING TO SUBJECT OF THIS 201

SEE FILE # 74-126-60/3. (AEASSAULT Program, SB/PO/A, LD30)

201- 305052

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BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 24 PER

FILE RID RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT SB-8 | INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, WH-8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI-2

ACTION NO. 921

S E C R E T 222214Z JUL 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 5743 (Mich)

DIRECTOR

REDTOP AEKICK

REF: MEXICO CITY 3712 (IN 125025)

22 JUL 70 IN 127835

1. CUBANA MANIFEST SHOWS VALERIY V. KOSTIKOV RETURNED MEXICO 17 JULY FROM HAVANA ABOARD FLT 464.

2. FILE: 201-305052. GP-1

S E C R E T

AN
AB
IN
PI
BI
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FI

CS COPY

SECRET

22 July 70
201-305052

14-00000

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

ACTION UNIT SB8 | INFO | FILE, VR RI/AN, WH8, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI 2

ACTION NO. 728

17 JUL 70 125025

4

SECRET 171921Z JUL 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 3712

DIRECTOR

REDTOP AEKICK

1. VALERIY V. KOSTIKOV (201-305052) UNEXPECTEDLY DEPARTED MEXICO CITY 13 JULY ON COBANA FLT 465. REASON FOR TRØP UNKNOWN AND UNEXPECTED. WIFE AND CHILD REMAIN MEXICO.

2. FILE: 201-35052. GP-1

SECRET

AN
AB
IN
PB
SK
DES / NFD
FI

CS COPY

SECRET

17 July 70

201-305052

[illegible] 29 Sep. 64 L34-[illegible]-1529 #304
In. 1352 hrs. Casa de Modas Bell (?) talks to KOSTA in Spanish.
Mrs KOSTIKOVA speaks excellent Spanish, ~~[illegible]~~

2.
15-60-55 3 Oct. 64. L34-MB-T535 #122
Out. 2034 hrs. MO (KOSTA) asks to talk to her husband, he answers but starts to fool around talking to her in Spanish, French, English and Russian. Both KOSTIKOV and Roza KOSTIKOVA speak Spanish well and very little English.

Voice samples,
Kostikov

Voice sample
Kostikov

14-00000

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INFO: ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

MICROFILM

SUBJECT: REDLEG AEKICK AEBURBLE/Request for Assessment Information on Subject of 201-305052.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: Send Assessment if available.

Reference: A. HMMA-36888, dated 9 April 1969
B. DIRECTOR 021485

In our review of AEBURBLE's Headquarters file, we noted that he has been in a position to provide PAQ (now PCQ per reference B) information on Subject of 201-305052 according to reference A. Please advise if Station can arrange to obtain the PAQ information from LNERGO locally. If not, we will attempt to obtain the assessment information through LNERGO Headquarters.

Milton C. SANTRELLA

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
[illegible]	HMMW-17908	27 MAY 1970 14 May 1970
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-305052

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1 L.M.Osborne	lmr	4167

1 - RI-
1 - Chrono
1 - SB/X/WH
1 - CI/OPS/WH
1 - SB/CI/O

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
SB/X/WH	20/5/70	[signature]
CI/OPS/WH	21/5/70	F. W. Hughes
CI/OPS/SB	22 May	[signature]

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	14 May 70	John C. Murray

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

57) Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV: Works in the consular department. He goes out a lot at night and always alone. He travels often in the interior of the republic. He has Mexican friends. He studied philology in the University of Moscow. He is very intelligent and clever in carrying out his work, which he does meticulously, taking every precaution. He apparently belongs to the KGB group. He was in Mexico as a bachelor more than 10 years ago.

58) Roza Aleksandrovna KOSTIKOVA: Wife of above. Speaks very little Spanish. Apparently has no job.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.: Chief of Station, Guatemala City HGG
Chief, SB Division

FROM: Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIAREA/REDLEG/Confirmation of Contact Between Valery KOSTIKOV (201-305052) and Guatemalan Communist Party Representative in Mexico

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None, FYI.

References: A. HMMA-38449, 10 February 1970.
B. MEXICO CITY 2303, 21 January 1970.

(in contact with Subject of 201-305052)

1. On 10 February 1970 LIREBEL-2 provided the details of his 6 February meeting with Jose Luis BALCARCEL Ordonez (201-160-30), leader of the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) exile organization in Mexico. LIREBEL-2 reported that he arrived at BALCARCEL's home at 2000 hours on the 6th, and found BALCARCEL about to leave. BALCARCEL requested that LIREBEL-2 take him to a garage where his car was being repaired, which LIREBEL-2 did. Since BALCARCEL's car was not ready, BALCARCEL asked LIREBEL-2 to drive him to a meeting which he had scheduled for 2100 hours with his "Soviet contact." (Note: BALCARCEL had previously told LIREBEL-2 that Valery KOSTIKOV was his contact in the Soviet Embassy.) LIREBEL-2 and BALCARCEL drove to the "Parque Escondido," also known as the "Parque Hundido," located on Insurgentes Sur between Gomez Farias and Millet Streets. LIREBEL-2 parked and BALCARCEL held his meeting with his "Soviet contact" standing on the sidewalk of Gomez Farias Street bordering on the park. The meeting lasted for 30 minutes.

2. BALCARCEL commented after re-joining LIREBEL-2 that his "Soviet contact" had been very upset about a long distance telephone call which he had received from a Guatemalan student. The student had asked to talk to the Soviet by true name and asked him for some information on the Soviet national soccer team, which is scheduled to play some games in Guatemala. The Soviet told BALCARCEL that he had told the student that he could not provide any current information on this subject, and that the student should try to get this information from El Salvador, where the team was to play some games prior to their arrival in Guatemala. BALCARCEL said that the Soviet was angry that this student had asked for him by true name, and he speculated that the University Students Association (AEU) leader who was recently in Mexico (see Reference B) may have been indiscreet in giving his name out to unauthorized persons.

Continued.........

Distribution:
✓Orig & 1 - C/WHD
1 - COS/Guatemala City
1 - C/SBD

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
~~B 201-160430~~	HMMA-38463	13 February 1970
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: ~~201-160430~~ ✓201-305052 ~~50-35-4-3~~

14-00000

3. Addressees will recall that per Reference A, LIENVOY reported that KOSTIKOV received a long distance call on 6 February in which the conversation conformed exactly to that described by BALCARCEL to LIREBEL-2 in paragraph 2 above.

4. It is of interest to note ~~that past LIENVOY reporting has shown~~ his contact with Subject 201-305052 KOSTIKOV setting up clandestine contacts with Alejandro ~~HERNANDEZ~~ Alegria (201-062689), leader of the Nicaraguan Communist Party exile organization in Mexico, and similarly with Lorenzo ZELAYA Romero (201-045172), a Honduran Communist in Mexico. By virtue of these contacts, it appears that at least one of KOSTIKOV's responsibilities is maintaining contact with representatives of Central American Communist Parties in Mexico.

Leonard S. Durant by [signature]
for/Horace E. PRALLETT

FORM 8-64 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION. | CLASSIFICATION SECRET | CONTINUED | PAGE NO. 2

201-305052

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING; X NO INDEXING REQUIRED; ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING; MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Guatemala City

INFO.: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Phone Call from AEU Representative to Valery KOSTIKOV

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None, FYI.

Reference : MEXICO CITY 2303, 21 January 1970

1. LIENVOY reported that on 6 February 1970 Valery KOSTIKOV (201-305052), 2nd Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico, received a long-distance telephone call from Guatemala. The operator asked for KOSTIKOV by name, then told the caller "Mr. MONTENEGRO, I have your call to Mexico ready". When KOSTIKOV came to the phone, the caller stated he was calling on behalf of the Guatemalan University Students Organization, but did not further identify himself. The caller and KOSTIKOV discussed the USSR national soccer team and its scheduled appearance in Guatemala. KOSTIKOV stated he was not certain exactly what date the team was scheduled to arrive in Guatemala, and suggested that the caller contact the soccer federation in El Salvador, where the team would be playing prior to its arrival in Guatemala. The caller also inquired whether there was any information on the Ballet (Reference) and was told that there was none.

2. It should be noted that normally queries concerning the Soviet soccer team or the appearance of a Russian Ballet troupe would be handled by one of the Cultural or Sports Affairs officers of the Embassy. KOSTIKOV's participation in these matters, as reported above, would seem to confirm previous Station reporting that KOSTIKOV handles dealings between the Soviet Embassy in Mexico and Guatemalan leftist organizations.

For: Horace E. PRALLETT

Distribution: Orig. + 1-COS, Guatemala City
2-Chief, WH Division

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO: 0 50-4-124

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-38,448

DATE: Typed: 10 February 1970

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-305052
~~35-8-0~~

14-00000

[illegible] 2_ 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM :

SUBJECT : TUBELAYERED
(65-465)

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 6 March 1970.

2. The telephone number (14-18-34) given to Subject as one he could use in contacting the Soviets if necessary, is an unlisted number registered to Nella WEISS Sajovitz at Liverpool 165-702.

3. This is the same telephone number given to Subject by his Soviet case officers on 4 February 1969, to be used only if it was absolutely necessary to contact the Soviets. We refer you to page 19 of your Memorandum, same Subject as above, dated 1 April 1969.

4. Our coverage of Nella WEISS Sajovitz is continuing. We would like to be informed if Subject is given a new address to be used as a letter drop in Mexico City.

#14,210

THIS INFORMATION IS FROM A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE. IT MUST NOT BE DISSEMINATED IN WHOLE OR IN PART OUTSIDE YOUR OFFICE WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL FROM THE ORIGINATING OFFICE IN MEXICO CITY.

Grace E. FARNSWALTH:mss (23 March 1970)

Distribution:
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792502

305052

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ACTION UNIT C/SB 5

ACTION NO. 182

FILE, VR DDP ADDP C/CI C/WH 2

S E C R E T 252314Z FEB 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 2565

DIRECTOR

RYBAT REDTOP AEMIDRIFF FJPASTIME

26FEB 70 IN 031930

REF: MEXICO CITY 2557 (IN 031735)

1. PER REF, AEMIDRIFF CONTINUED REVIEW OF PHOTOS WITH HQS DEBRIEFER AND LITEMPO-14. REVIEW OF 83 PHOTOS (INCLUDING WIVES) DURING 20 AND 21 FEBRUARY SESSIONS PROVIDES FOLLOWING HIGHLIGHTS IN ADDITION TO OTHER INFORMATION WHICH WAS ALREADY KNOWN:

VALENTIN BAKULIN: CHIEF OF ONE OF AEGRIP SECTIONS. EXPERIENCE IN LATIN AMERICA FROM PRIOR TOURS BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA.

LEV GOLOUZOV: WORKS UNDER BAKULIN (WHICH TENDS CONFIRM AEGRIP STATUS PREVIOUSLY SUSPECTED). WHILE DRUNK AND NASTY, INFORMED AEMIDRIFF SHE BEING SENT HOME.

SERGEY PROVOROV: WORKS UNDER BAKULIN. AEGRIP.

NIKOLAY SOKOLOV: CHIEF OF REFERENTURA.

LYUDMILA SHAPOVALOVA: WORKS UNDER SOKOLOV IN REFERENTURA. SERVED IN CUBA AT ONE TIME.

ALEKSANDR KOZLOV: WORKS IN REFERENTURA UNDER SOKOLOV. IN CHARGE OF PHOTO PROCESSING AND MICROFILMING. ALSO WORKS AT INTERNAL SECURITY AND AS WATCHDOG. HAPPY AND AGREEABLE PERSON.

LEE / BOB / JACK / JERRY / TRISH / KATHY / DIANA / BARB / KATHY / FILE / DESTROY / RETURN TO

P&L DISSEM

RYBAT

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SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 2565 S E C R E T

VLADIMIR TSERADZE: WORKS IN REFERENTURA BUT IS ALSO UNDER ORDERS OF BAKULIN. TIMID, DOMINATED BY WIFE.

YURIY ROMANENKO: WORKS IN REFERENTURA. FREQUENTLY ACCOMPANIES PAVEL KOVALEV OUT AT NIGHT. DRINKS A LOT AND HAS TROUBLE WITH WIFE BECAUSE OF IT.

YURIY KUPLYAKOV: HAS JOB SIMILAR TO KOLOMYAKOV'S. VERY IMPORTANT PERSON WITHIN EMBASSY AND HAS ACCESS TO REFERENTURA. VERY REFINED AND CULTURED. MANY IICMU CONTACTS THROUGHOUT MEXICO AND ALSO CULTIVATES FRIENDSHIPS WITH DIRECTORS OF MUSEUMS, LIBRARIES AND OTHER SUCH INSTITUTIONS.

BORIS CHMYKOV: VERY EXPERIENCED. SEEMS TO HAVE PERFORMED BRILLIANTLY IN PAST WITH NO FAILURES. SOMETHING OF A LADIES' MAN AND HAS, ON OCCASION, BEEN MIXED UP IN INTERNAL SCANDAL. ENAMORED OF SOKOLINA. TRAVELS FREQUENTLY THROUGHOUT MEXICO.

VLADISLAV KORMUSHKIN: AEKICK. SERVED IN BRAZIL, SEVERAL MONTHS IN FRANCE AND FOUR TO SIX MONTHS IN ARGENTINA. SPEAKS SPANISH, FRENCH AND PORTUGUESE.

VALERIY KOSTIKOV: AEKICK

OLEG KOROLEV: AEKICK

VLADIMIR MAKAROV: NOT CERTAIN, BUT PROBABLY AEGRIP. HOWEVER, FREQUENTLY ACCOMPANIES BOLSHAKOV. APPEARS COLD AND CRUEL. ONE

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ACTION UNIT | INFO | FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

OF AEMIDRIFF'S WATCHDOGS DURING JANUARY 1970. SPENT TIME IN RED CHINA.

IOAKIM BULAVIN: ASSIGNED TO COMMERCIAL OFFICE BUT DOES NOT PHYSICALLY WORK THERE. PROBABLY WORKS FOR KOLOMYAKOV, AEKICK REZIDENT.

SERGEY VERBENYEV: RIS, SERVICE UNKNOWN. PERFORMS INTERNAL SECURITY AND WATCHDOG FUNCTIONS.

VLADIMIR GORDEYEV: BELIEVES HE AEKICK WORKING FOR SOKOLOV AND KOLOMYAKOV.

PAVEL KOVALEV: CONSIDERS HIM DANGEROUS. SPEAKS SPANISH AND ENGLISH ALMOST WITHOUT ACCENT. HAS MANY FRIENDS IN GOVERNACION.

ANATOLIY STEKLYANNIKOV: BACHELOR. BODYGUARD FOR KOVALEV. WORKED FOR SECRET POLICE IN MOSCOW AFTER THREE YEARS IN MILITARY. WILL RETURN MOSCOW SOON.

KONSTANTIN BOGATYREV: CHIEF OF ALL GROUPS OF MILITARY INTEL IN MEXICO. (AEMIDRIFF PREVIOUSLY INDENTIFIED CHMYKOV AS AEGRIP CHIEF. STATION BELIEVES CHMYKOV POSSIBLY CHIEF FOR THOSE UNDER CIVILIAN COVER BUT JUNIOR TO BOGATYREV.)

OLEG SHEVCHENKO: SPEAKS SPANISH WITH ARGENTINE ACCENT. THIS IS FIRST TOUR IN LATIN AMERICA.

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ACTION UNIT | INFO | FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 4 MEXICO CITY 2565 S E C R E T

VALENTIN LOGINOV: ALTHOUGH HAD AFFAIR WITH AEMIDRIFF, RECALL SIX MONTHS EARLY WAS DUE TO SOME FAILURE AND NOT TO AFFAIR.

VALERIY SOKOLIN: RECALLED SIX MONTHS EARLY DUE TO SOME FAILURE ALSO.

VIKTOR IVANOV: LIKED TO LIVE WELL. OWNED 27 SUITS AND OFTEN CHANGED TWO OR THREE TIMES A DAY. GOOD FRIEND OF OCTAVIANO CAMPOS SALAS, SECRETARY OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE. NOW IN MOSCOW IN CHARGE EXPORTING FURS FOR SOYUZPUSHNINA.

BORIS KAZANTSEV: SERVED IN CUBA WHERE HAD SOME PROBLEM OR FLAP DUE TO DRINKING AND HIS CHARACTER. DOMINATED BY WIFE WHO INFLUENCES MANY OF HIS DECISIONS. WIFE WORKS AS TYPIST IN REFERENTURA. SHE VERY JEALOUS OF HUSBAND, YET FLIRTS WITH YOUNGER OFFICERS WHICH HAS CAUSED MARITAL PROBLEMS.

FEDOR YEVESYEV: BELIEVES HE RIS, PROBABLY AEGRIP. BODYGUARD FOR AMBASSADOR AND CURRENTLY FOR CHARGE. BELIEVES HE HAS NO OTHER FUNCTION.

MIKHAIL DAVIDOVSKIY: GRADUATED MFA ACADEMY ABOUT THREE YEARS GO, MEXIC IS FIRST POST. AEKICK. HAS ACCESS TO REFERENTURA. FREQUENTLY ACCOMPANIES KAZANTSEV AND YEVSEYEV.

SECRET

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ACTION NO.

HAS MARITAL PROBLEMS DUE TO NEUROTIC WIFE AND FACT HE HAS, BY FORMER WIFE, EIGHT YEAR OLD CHILD WHO MENTALLY RETARDED FROM INFANTILE PARALYSIS.

DMITRIY DYAKONOV: MEMBER OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE CPSU. BELIEVES HE AEKICK. HAS MANY FRIENDS IN GOBERNACION AND RELACIONES EXTERIORES. SERVED IN ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL. MORE REFINED AND INTELLIGENT THAN PRESENT CHARGE, KAZANTSEV.

BORISKOLOMYAKOV: AEKICK REZIDENT, THIRED IN IMPORTANCE IN EMBASSY. GRADUATE ACCOUNTANT, SERVED AS ACCOUNTANT IN USSR, ARGENTINA AND FIRST TOUR MEXICO. RETURNED TO MEXICO AS REZIDENT. VERY STRAIGHTFORWARD, STRONG PRINCIPLES. DRINKS MODERATELY. CLOSE FRIENDSHIPS WITH ARGENTINE DIPLOMATS. FREQUENTLY TRAVELS WITH KAZANTSEV, SOMETIMES WITH BOLSHAKOV.

YEVGENIY FEDIN: FOURTH IN IMPORTANCE IN EMBASSY. FREQUENTLY WORKS IN REFERENTURA. HAS FEW FRIENDS WITHIN EMBASSY BECAUSE OF FICKLE CHARACTER, AND FACT HE AT ROOT OF MANY INTERNAL INTRIGUES BY SENDING ANONYMOUS ACCUSATORY LETTERS.

VALERIY NIKOLAYENKO: AEKICK. IN CHARGE OF ASSIGNING HOUSING AND FURNISHINGS. SPENT SIX MONTHS IN CUBA AS EMPLOYEE, RATHER THAN DIPLOMAT, BEFORE MEXICO. ATTENDED MFA ACADEMY IN MOSCOW.

2. FILE: 201-835670. GP-1 SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING; X NO INDEXING REQUIRED; ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING; MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO: Chief of Station, Guatemala City
Chief, SB Division

FROM: Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIARENA/LIREBEL/Confirmation of Contact Between Valery KOSTIKOV (201-305052) and Guatemalan Communist Party Representative in Mexico

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None, FYI.

References: A. HMMW-38449, 10 February 1970.
B. MEXICO CITY 2303, 21 January 1970.

J.H. Jerry
2. Kostikov 201

1. On 10 February 1970 LIREBEL-2 provided the details of his 6 February meeting with Jose Luis BALCARCEL Ordonez (201-160430), leader of the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) exile organization in Mexico. LIREBEL-2 reported that he arrived at BALCARCEL's home at 2000 hours on the 6th, and found BALCARCEL about to leave. BALCARCEL requested that LIREBEL-2 take him to a garage where his car was being repaired, which LIREBEL-2 did. Since BALCARCEL's car was not ready, BALCARCEL asked LIREBEL-2 to drive him to a meeting which he had scheduled for 2100 hours with his "Soviet contact." (Note: BALCARCEL had previously told LIREBEL-2 that Valery KOSTIKOV was his contact in the Soviet Embassy.) LIREBEL-2 and BALCARCEL drove to the "Parque Escondido," also known as the "Parque Hundido," located on Insurgentes Sur between Gomez Farias and Millet Streets. LIREBEL-2 parked and BALCARCEL held his meeting with his "Soviet contact" standing on the sidewalk of Gomez Farias Street bordering on the park. The meeting lasted for 10 minutes.

2. BALCARCEL commented after re-joining LIREBEL-2 that his "Soviet contact" had been very upset about a long distance telephone call which he had received from a Guatemalan student. The student had asked to talk to the Soviet by true name and asked him for some information on the Soviet national soccer team, which is scheduled to play some games in Guatemala. The Soviet told BALCARCEL that he had told the student that he could not provide any current information on this subject, and that the student should try to get this information from El Salvador, where the team was to play some games prior to their arrival in Guatemala. BALCARCEL said that the Soviet was angry that this student had asked for him by true name, and he speculated that the University Students Association (AEU) leader who was recently in Mexico (see Reference B) may have been indiscreet in giving his name out to unauthorized persons.

Continued.........

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-38463	13 February 1970
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-160430, 201-305052, cc: 35-4-3

3. Addressees will recall that per Reference A, LIENVOY reported that KOSTIKOV received a long distance call on 6 February in which the conversation conformed exactly to that described by BALCARCEL to LIREBEL-2 in paragraph 2 above.

4. It is of interest to note that past LIENVOY reporting has shown KOSTIKOV setting up clandestine contacts with Alejandro BERMUDEZ Alegria (201-062689), leader of the Nicaraguan Communist Party exile organization in Mexico, and similarly with Lorenzo ZELAYA Romero (201-045172), a Honduran Communist in Mexico. By virtue of these contacts, it appears that at least one of KOSTIKOV's responsibilities is maintaining contact with representatives of Central American Communist Parties in Mexico.

for/Horace E. PRALLETT

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING — XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED — ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING — MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.: Chief, SB Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City — SB/X/WH

SUBJECT: REDLEG
LISACK Progress Report, 1 July - 30 September 1969

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA-37451, 1 July 1969

1. Operations

Under this roof project, operations continue to be directed against the MHMARSH target and, on occasions, Bloc targets. Activities covered by the Project include providing information on MHMARSHers, their activities, personalities, visitors, and contacts (LISACK-2, -4, -6, and LICOWL-1); serving as access agents (LICRAVE-1, -2, -3, LIROCKET-1, and BESABER); spotting, assessing and occasionally recruiting access agents (LIEMPTY-3); providing information on DMLET activities (DMPETAL-1) and BEBOX activities (BESABER); and performing such other tasks as may be required on an ad hoc basis (LISACK-7 and all other assets of the Project).

2. Administration

As assets take on a permanent character in terms of expenditure or other continuing administration, they are transferred from SB/OOA to LISACK for orderly handling. Beginning with this reporting period, and as outlined in the LISACK Project Renewal, BESABER, DMPETAL, and LICOWL-1 were transferred from SB/OOA to LISACK. Details of the functions, security, and meeting procedures are reported below for each asset.

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201-305052

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-38126

DATE: 18 November 1969

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: ~~50-6-144/3~~

3. Assets

a. LICRAVE-1, -2, and -3: The activities of these assets have been covered in detail in recent and continuing correspondence dealing with AETAKEOFF. Please see HMMA-38364 of 5 November 1969.

b. BESABER: During the reporting period, BESABER was met six times. When he travels to Mexico City, meetings are held in his hotel room at a pre-arranged hour using a telephone code to establish the location. On occasions, he is met at his home in Cuernavaca. BESABER is currently targetted against Subject of 201-268115, with whom he has re-established a good social relationship. Through Subject of 201-268115 he also met Subject of 201-276184, Chief of the Referentura. In addition to serving as an access agent to Subject of 201-268115, he has fulfilled spot requirements such as providing information on Centro Intercultural de Documentacion (CIDOC) and personalities of Station interest. Although BESABER has a fairly good social relationship with the BEDOX Ambassador and his wife and has entree to other BEDOXers and MHHARSHers, we are having him concentrate his efforts on the higher priority MHHARSHer, Subject of 201-268115.

c. LICOWL-1: He was met routinely once a month during the reporting period. Each meeting date is established at the preceding meeting and no further contact or confirmation is required. LICOWL-1 arrives by bus at a car pick-up point and is then driven by the case officer to a small coffee shop where he reviews his diary with the case officer. Due to the nature of his job and the level of his access, LICOWL-1 is not in a position to do more currently than to report on the brief encounters he has with MHHARSHers who come into his store. His reports normally consist of his assessment of personalities, description of new arrivals and, occasionally, biographic information he has been able to pick up. He also gives timely reports of demonstrations and other unusual activity in the vicinity of the MHHARSH installation.

d. LIEMPTY-3: LIEMPTY-3 is met at irregular intervals at various out-of-the-way restaurants for the purpose of briefing and debriefing on operational assignments and discussion of his written reports. Meetings are arranged by phone using open code. His most recent assignment has been the development, assessment, and recruitment of 201-810981. LIEMPTY-3 has few peers at the art of developing an operational lead, but his extensive operational activity in past years against the MHHARSH target has required that he be used sparingly, selectively, and always under alias. Development of 201-810981 has been his only assignment during the reporting period, and LIEMPTY-3 made good early progress. Purporting to be the representative of a film club for architects, LIEMPTY-3 was able to get 201-810981 to agree to become a consultant. Thereafter, LIEMPTY-3 continued to ask questions about 201-810981's work, to the point where 201-810981 realized that more than a film club for architects was involved. At this point it was decided to let LIEMPTY-3 break cover, recruit 201-810981 to supply information on the work of his office (but not--at this point--the people in his office), and continue to handle him until the recruitment was firm and previous questions about the stability and reliability of 201-810981 had been resolved. This was done, and 201-810981 accepted recruitment, knowing that WOLADY intelligence was involved. LIEMPTY-3 held several meetings with 201-810981 after recruitment, and countersurveillance did not reveal any signs of MHHARSH surveillance. For about a month, however, LIEMPTY-3 has not been able to contact 201-810981, and it is possible that the latter has developed cold feet. If LIEMPTY-3 can reestablish contact, he will continue to

handle this case for the time being. If he is unable to reestablish contact, he will be given another lead to follow up. LIEMPTY-3 is a very active person who has an extremely full business day, with many contacts. The Station believes that within this busy "cover" life, LIEMPTY-3 can handle selected operational tasks without coming to hostile attention. As long as proper security precautions are taken by him in his operational activities, and by him and the Station officer (who meets him in alias) in their meetings, there is no reason why LIEMPTY-3 cannot be a useful part-time contributor to the Station's REDTOP program for the foreseeable future.

e. LIROCKET-1:

1) LIROCKET-1 is met monthly, time and place arranged at the previous meeting. During these meetings he is debriefed on his twice-weekly teaching sessions at the MHHARSH Embassy. His regular student has been the Subject of 201-028975, and he has had occasional dealings with other MHHARSHers, particularly AESEASICK. The meetings with 201-028063 have not been of particular interest, and we had been waiting impatiently for the latter's replacement to arrive, so that LIROCKET-1 would have a better target to work on. It was LIROCKET-1 who came up with the first local confirmation of the identity of this replacement (MEXICO CITY 1105, 2 August 1969). Dealings with AESEASICK have been concerned with attempts by the director of the school where LIROCKET-1 teaches to borrow sociological films from the MHHARSH film office.

2) It now appears, however, that LIROCKET-1 has reached the end of the line. For some time he has been involved in a rather messy divorce action, and in August LIROCKET-1 reported that his wife had denounced him to Mexican authorities as an RVROCK agent (a few months previously, she had denounced him as an MHHARSH agent). LIROCKET-1 was not inclined to take his wife's ravings too seriously since he considered her slightly nuts. However, LIENVOY reported that on 16 September 1969 LIROCKET-1's wife called 201-028975 and told him she had to see him urgently on something of extreme interest about her husband. 201-028975 told her to come to the Embassy, which she did, and she presumably repeated her accusation. Since that time, LIROCKET-1 has received a polite brush-off. He has been told that the MHHARSH Embassy has run out of funds for English language training, and that there would be no more lessons unless 201-028975's replacement, or the new Ambassador (when and if one arrives) wanted to rehire him. He was told, however, to check in regularly, and he was given, as usual, an invitation to the annual MHHARSH national day reception (he did not attend because he was ill). LIROCKET-1 has not spoken with 201-028975 since his wife's visit--all dealings have been through AEPOLYP, who has for some time been the paymaster for LIROCKET-1.

3) LIROCKET-1 was not aware of his wife's visit, and even after the case officer, without telling him that we knew of the visit, brought LIROCKET-1 around to the conclusion that she might have done this, he still does not think that she spilled the beans to 201-028975. (It is apparent that the MHHARSHers, whether or not they believe Mrs. LIROCKET-1's story, have concluded that LIROCKET-1 represents a security hazard, and they are simply going to drop him. LIROCKET-1 will continue to press the MHHARSHers for an answer regarding his future with them, and if, as suspected, they keep putting him off, he will be instructed to break contact and he will be terminated by the Station.)

4) Other than the blowing of LIROCKET-1 himself, little damage has been done. The wife has never seen the current case officer and knows none of the meeting arrangements or other

details, and neither she nor LIROCKET-1 knows the true name of any of LIROCKET-1's past or present handlers. Necessary security precautions have been taken at all meetings with LIROCKET since his wife's conversation with 201-028975, and there have been no signs of MHHARSH surveillance.

f. DIPETAL-1: She has been met weekly for a total of 13 times during the period. Meeting hours are prearranged and the location is always a safehouse. Her normal function has been to report on the activities at the DMLET installation where she is employed as the secretary to the DMLET Ambassador. In addition, she performed some casing and investigation in support of the AETAKEOFF audio operation. Since the DMLET target is of low priority, DIPETAL-1 has been attempting to increase her usefulness to us by trying to obtain a job in the office of the President of the PRI, the ruling political party, with excellent prospects for success.

g. LISACK-2: Until he lost his job in September, he was the resident administrator of the apartment building in which both AEMERGER and AEMAESTRO reside. Meetings were held bi-weekly for a total of four times, pre-arranged by telephone call several days in advance to his office in a publishing firm. Meeting location was a restaurant/cafe and meetings normally lasted about thirty minutes. He provided information on the activities of these two MHHARSHers and their families, license plate numbers, and descriptions of visitors.

h. LISACK-4: He is the portero of the apartment building in which Subject of 201-305870 resides. He maintains a daily log of the movements and activities of this and other MHHARSHers, and he reports the license plates and description of visitors to the building. He was met weekly for a total of 12 times, always in a small restaurant within walking distance of the downtown office where he works a half day. Meeting hours are pre-arranged to permit LISACK-4 to attend on the way to or from this second job. He compensates for his lack of formal education by responsiveness to case officer direction, natural intelligence and cooperation.

i. LISACK-6: He is the portero of the building in which Subjects of 201-837203 and 201-788861 (who took the apartment of Subject of 201-205304) reside. He maintains a daily log of these two MHHARSHers, their families and visitors. He was met 12 times during the period. Since he cannot be absent from the building for over thirty minutes without arousing suspicion, meetings are always for a brief ten minutes and are held in a nearby park. As has been reported, the case officer who handles LISACK-6 became the target of unknown surveillance in August, and again in October, following meetings with LISACK-6. The Station believes that the surveillance was accidental, in that the meeting place was in a neighborhood frequented by male and female prostitutes and other undesirable characters. In any event, LISACK-6 has been put on ice, to be revived if the occupants of his building become higher priority targets.

j. LISACK-7: She was not met during the reporting period. She remains a "reserve asset" for special requirements in the real estate field for such potential uses as safehouse rental, key acquisitions and locating tenants when needed. Although there is no immediate requirement for her talents, we would like to maintain her Operational Approval so that she can be called on as a cleared asset when needed.

4. Problems

There are no problems connected with this Project.

5. Security

There are no known unresolved problems of security. The security problems relating to LIROCKET-1 and LISACK-C (discussed above) are under control with no adverse effects noted.

6. Plans

a. There are several assets of the REDTOP section who have been carried under SB/COA for a fairly long period of time. Since the targets of their access change from time to time, as well as the nature of the information they provide, we do not believe they warrant special or new projects to cover them. We do believe, however, that they should be brought under a project to facilitate orderly reporting and administration without resorting to separate progress reports on each.

b. Since their activities closely parallel those of assets already covered by LISACK, we believe it would be logical to include LIROBBIN-1 and -2, LIORDER-1 and Subject of 201-843659 (on whom we are awaiting an Operational Approval) in this Project. Although none of these is paid a salary, such a change will require some cost amendment to the Project to account for minor operational expenses which have heretofore been charged to SB/ODA. Separate correspondence will follow on these assets.

c. There are several additional assets currently in the developmental stage who may eventually be administered under LISACK. These include Subject of HMMA-37742 of 28 August 1969, targetted against AEPOLYP; Subject of 201-851552, targetted against AEMERGER; Subject of 201-848881, currently in social contact with Subjects of 201-259583 and 201-029068 under Station direction; and Subject of 201-859225, who reports on his contacts with Subjects of 201-305052 and 201-744341, among other MHHARSHers.

Timothy M. Archbold
for/John A. PROBERT

201-305052

~~50-6-144/3~~

entities [illegible] que trabaja poco" ("Russian Embassy in Mexico has a ~~xxtx~~ ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ large staff which does little work") Cy sent to 201 in Aug 69 with translation.

vv - SB/PO/A z6495

"EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO"

Viernes 17 de enero de 1969

Las "Instalaciones Diplomáticas" Rusas en Lima

Por CARLOS MONTIEL

En una carta llegada a es[ta] redacción, periodistas peru[a]nos me informan que, enter[a]dos de mi artículo del 11 d[e] enero "Ahora Perú", pregun[ta]ron al Canciller de aquel país, Edgardo Mercado Jarrín, si la llegada de una misión comercial rusa a tierras peruanas sería sólo la primera entrega de otra misión más importante, la de una representación diplomática soviética.

En ese artículo comentaba que miembros de la Embajada moscovita en México, habían asegurado en los corrillos sociales de esta ciudad, que en menos de dos semanas Perú establecería relaciones diplomáticas con el Kremlin, a nivel de embajada.

Según me informan en esa misiva, apenas tres días después, el 14 de enero, el diario limeño "La Prensa", confirmó en su primera plana la noticia que comenté en EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO, y que obtuve gracias a la indiscreción de los diplomáticos soviéticos que figuran en el "circuito coctelero" que aquí se lleva al cabo por los embajadores y encargados de negocios de las naciones extranjeras.

Recuerdo que también en EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO, el colega Alonso Fonseca G., publicó el 20 de diciembre una nota titulada "Alegres Diplomáticos", con la divertida historia de la "juerga de Vladislav Kromovshkin y Valeri Kosunov, agregado y segundo secretario, respectivamente, de la embajada rusa en México, quienes la empezaron "entre burbujas de vinos caros en la zona rosa de la ciudad de México, y se vieron obligados a ponerle fin en Ciudad Victoria entre sus insultos a México bajo inmunidad diplomática". Al parecer los diplomáticos soviéticos no sólo han renunciado a ser decentes, sino que también están [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

El Canciller peruano, Mercado Jarrín, quien anunció la [ll]egada de la misión comerc[i]al rusa, respondió a la pre[g]unta de los periodistas con [u]n lacónico "oportunamente [t]endrán información si es que el Gobierno decide dar ese paso" (el de establecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas con la URSS). Antes de que el Gobierno de Lima "decida dar ese paso", quisiéramos pasarle traslado de estos dos párrafos que el periodista Bernardo Escalante acaba de publicar en un artículo de "El Sol de Mexico" (14 de enero de 1969), bajo el título: "La Embajada Misteriosa".

"Lo extraño está en que la Embajada de la URSS es una de las que cuentan con personal más numeroso y las que menor quehacer tienen. Las dependencias contadas que tienen trato con el público —sección consular, sección cultural, agencia turística— laboran sólo cuatro horas a la semana. Con los dedos de la mano se podrán contar los mexicanos que en un año van a solicitar una visa. El comercio entre México y la URSS es casi nulo. Las "relaciones culturales", como todos lo saben, consisten sólo en hacer propaganda "de allá para acá", ya que en los dominios de Brezhnev y de Kosygin ni idea tienen de lo que es México".

"¿A qué se dedica, pues, ese enjambre de personal ruso —en esa Embajada en que no trabaja un sólo mexicano y hasta la servidumbre es soviética— en esa enorme mansión que podía ser guarida de vampiros? El misterio sube de punto si se toma en cuenta que la Embajada de México en Moscú apenas si está integrada por unas seis o siete personas, y en cambio la URSS mantiene aquí más de un centenar ¿Por qué la URSS tiene una Embajada tan numerosa en nuestro país, si hace lo mismo que la nuestra en Moscú?

201-305052

UNIT: WH/1 3E04
EXT: 6954/9041
DATE: 15 October 1969

SECRET

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CONF: WH 8 INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, SB 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S-E-C-R-E-T

16 23 24 Oct 69

CITE DIRECTOR 47091

TO MEXICO CITY

REDLEG AEKICK

REF: MEXICO CITY-1672 (IN 64675)*

1. SUBJECT REF ASSIGNED 201-859225. HQS TRACES FOLLOW:

A) HMMA-30563, 17 NOV 66. SUBJECT IN SOCIAL AND BUSINESS CONTACT WITH 201-756168, KNOWN KGB.

B) HMM-10877, 30 NOV 66. SUBJECT IN CONTACT WITH SOVIET EMBASSY CONCERNING TRAVEL OF SOVIET TOURISTS.

C) HMMA-31965, 9 MAY 67. SUBJECT AND 201-744341, KNOWN KGB, IN APPARENT FREQUENT PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL CONTACT. BOTH WERE PLANNING TO MEET LATER WITH 201-202379, KNOWN KGB.

2. POA ACTIONS BEING DEFERRED PENDING FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF CASE. INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF SUBJECT ENCOURAGING, BUT IN VIEW OF REPORTED CONTACTS WITH KGB STAFFERS, SINCE 1966, BELIEVE CASE BEST HANDLED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CSI-F-10-5, PARA 19. COVERT NAME CHECKS IN PROCESS.

3. FILE: 201-859225.

END OF MESSAGE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S-E-C-R-E-T

CITE DIRECTOR 47091

PAGE TWO

WH Comments: *Heriberto SAGREDO Mugica, Senior Sales Rep. for Sabena Airlines in Mexico City, has good access to a number of Soviet KGB Staffers.

(Soviets above are: 1 a., Leonid V. NIKIFOROV; 1 c., Vladislav S. KORMUSHKIN and Aleksandr V. PRIKHODKO.)

SB/X/WH [signature]
SB/CI/O [signature]
CI/OPS/WH [signature]
CI/OA [signature]
COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

JOHN C. MURRAY
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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INFO. FILE VR. R/AN, SB 8, CI/OA

317

S E C R E T 132342Z OCT 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 1672

DIRECTOR

REDLEG

13 Oct 69 IN 64675

1. REQUEST TRACES, POA HERIBERTO SAGREDO MUGICA, MEXICAN CITIZEN DPOB: 13 JAN 32, MEXICO, D.F. HE IS EMPLOYED LOCALLY AS SENIRO SALED REP FOR SABENA AIRLINES AND IS CURRENTLY APPLYING FOR POSITION OF MANAGER OF CANADIAN PACIFIC AIRLINES IN GUADALAJARA.

2. SAGREDO IS IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCAIL CONTACT WITH VARIOUS MHHARSHERS, AMONG THEM, SUBJECTS OF 201-325052 AND 201-744341. HE HAS BEEN CONTACTED AND ASSESSED AS COOPERATIVE, RELIABLE AND TRUSTWORNTHY BY BRUCE H. FERNALD (P) AND HAS PROVIDED INITIAL REPORTS ON HIS CONTACTS WITH MHHARSHERS.

3. WILL FORWARD PRQ PRTS I AND II WHEN COMPLETED.

4. FILE 201-SAGREDO.

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ACTION UNIT WH8 | INFO | FILE, VR RI/AN, SB8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2 FI2

ACTION NO. 303

S E C R E T Ø12230Z OCT 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 1547

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

1 Oct 69 IN 56648

LIARENA REDLEG

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 1433 (IN 55393)

B. GUATEMALA CITY Ø754 (IN 56342)

C. MEXICO CITY 1102 (IN 15322)

1. LIREBEL-2 REPORTED 30 SEPT HE CONTACTED BY JORGE ANTONIO (CRUZ) ROJAS AND CARLOS ENRIQUE (RODRIGUEZ) ECALANTE 28 SEPT. CRUZ AND RODRIGUEZ TOLD LIREBEL-2 THEY HAD JUST ARRIVED FROM GUATEMALA AND HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY PGT CONTACT LIREBEL-2 UPON ARRIVAL HERE. CRUZ AND RODRIGUEZ REQUESTED LIREBEL-2 ARRANGE FOR MEETING WITH JOSE LUIS (BALCARCEL) ORDONEZ (201-16043Ø) SO THAT BALCARCEL COULD ARRANGE FOR ONWARD TRAVEL CRUZ AND RODRIGUEZ TO PATRICE LUMUMBA UNIVERSITY IN MOSCOW.

2. LIREBEL-2 REPORTED HE PASSED ABOVE MESSAGE TO BALCARCEL 29 SEPT. BALCARCEL ADVISED LIREBEL-2 TELL CRUZ AND RODRIGUEZ GO TO SOVIET EMBASSY AND ASK FOR VALERY KOSTIKOV (201-305Ø52), WITH MESSAGE THAT "THEY SENT BY SRA. MARTHA." KOSTIKOV WOULD THEN MAKE ALL NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR TRAVEL TO USSR. BALCARCEL ALSO TOLD LIREBEL-2 THAT KOSTIKOV WOULD GIVE CRUZ AND RODRIGUEZ AN ENVELOPE

15005

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ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 1547 S E C R E T

FOR THEM TO DELIVER TO LIREBEL-2, AND THAT LIREBEL-2 SHOULD DELIVER THIS ENVELOPE TO BALCARCEL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. LIREBEL-2 SHOWED ENVELOPE TO TORVESTAD, WHICH HE REPORTED HE HAD RECEIVED FROM CRUZ AND RODRIGUEZ MORNING 30 SEPT. ENVELOPE CONTAINED THREE STAPLES AND HAD SCOTCH TAPE ALONG FLAP AND COMPLETELY AROUND ENVELOPE. UNDER TAPE ALONG FLAP WAS SHORT, WAVY INK LINE. DUE APPARENT TRAP AND FACT LIREBEL-2 FELT HAD TO GET ENVELOPE TO BALCARCEL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, NO ATTEMPT MADE TO OPEN IT. HOWEVER, TORVESTAD CERTAIN ENVELOPE CONTAINED MONEY PLUS SOME NOTES. LIREBEL-2 TO ATTEMPT TO SEE WHAT IN ENVELOPE WHEN HE DELIVERS IT TO BALCARCEL.

4. ACCORDING LIREBEL-2, CRUZ AND RODRIGUEZ DEPARTED MEXICO CITY VIA AIR FRANCE ON 30 SEPT, EN ROUTE TO MOSCOW.

5. LIREBEL-2 ALSO REPORTED ANA MARIA (GOMAR) VILLACORTA DE ORTIZ SCHEDULED DEPART MEXICO CITY 4 OCT. FOR GUATEMALAN FRONTIER BY BUS. STATION WILL FORWARD PRIORITY ANY CHANGE GOMAR TRAVEL PLANS OR CONTACT PLAN FORWARDED REF A.

6. INDEX CRUZ, RODRIGUEZ FILE : 201-160430, 201-305052.

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: NO INDEXING REQUIRED XX

TO: Chief, SB Division

INFO: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: REDTOP AEKICK
Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: MEXICO CITY 1102, 1 August 1969

1. LIFIRE reported that Subject had departed for Moscow on 29 July 1969. Previously LIENVOY had reported that Subject would be going to Moscow for approximately one week. Subject's wife did not accompany Subject to the USSR. LIFIRE reported that KOSTIKOV returned to Mexico City on 18 August 1969 on Air France flight 707.

2. The reason for Subject's trip to Moscow is unknown, but such TDYs are unusual.

for/John A. PROBERT

SB TRAVEL INPUT PROGRAM

Distribution:
2 - C/SB
1 - C/WH

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-37839	17 September 1969
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-305052

SECRET

24 SEP 1969

TO: Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security
Department of State

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

201-305052

SUBJECT: KOSTIKOV, Valeri Vladimyrovich

1. Reference is made to your request dated 25 August 1969 concerning Subject.

2. The files of this office contain the following information concerning Subject. On 19 September 1961 Subject arrived in Mexico City, Mexico, as an employee of the USSR Embassy. Subject was subsequently promoted to the rank of Vice Consul, and as of March 1963, held the position of Consular Attache. Subject was reassigned to Moscow on 4 August 1965. On 13 September 1968 Subject was again assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, this time as a Second Secretary of the Embassy. Subject is currently serving in this position.

3. In a report from a reliable source dated 27 June 1967, Source stated that Subject was in constant contact with Alejandro BERMUDEZ ALEGRIA, the leader of the Nicaraguan Communist Party (PCN), while the latter was in Mexico City during June and July 1965.

CIT: NICARAGUA
A NICARAGUA
SUBJ. MENTIONED AS CONTACT OF ONE VALERI V. KOSTIKOV (201-305052) IN TRACE REPLY ON KOSTIKOV SENT TO STATE DEPT. CONTACTS BETWEEN THE TWO TOOK PLACE IN MEXICO CITY JUN AND JUL 65

4. On 13 December 1968, a reliable source reported that Subject and another member of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City were arrested in Ciudad Victoria, Mexico, on 12 December 1968 for physically assaulting four Mexican citizens with whom Subject and the second Soviet had been socializing. Subject and the second Soviet claimed diplomatic immunity and were released by the Mexican authorities.

SECRET

201-305052

SECRET

5. Based on his activities and associations while in Mexico City, Mexico, this office considers Subject to be a staff officer of the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB).

6. For additional information concerning Subject, you are referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

CSCI-316/03381-69

~~Encl. 1 name check~~

CC: Federal Bureau of Investigation
with copy of name check

RID/CE: JKS/EGV/akc

BASED ON: 201-305052*

para 2: 201-305052*

para 3: 201-305052
HMMA-32359
27 June 1967

para 4: 201-305052
MEXI-8437
13 December 1968

para 5: 201-305052*

FILE IN: 201-305052

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REQUEST FOR BIOGRAPHIC DATA

[illegible] - Original
is dated 7/25/69

TO:	FROM:	DATE
CIA		

FULL NAME (Married woman include maiden name)	ALIASES, NICKNAMES	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
Valeri Vladimyrovich KOSTIKOV 305052		March 17, 1933 Moscow

HOME ADDRESS	SEX	CITIZENSHIP	MARITAL STATUS	SPOUSE'S NAME
previous check 7/3/61	m	Soviet		

OCCUPATION	NAME AND ADDRESS OF PRESENT EMPLOYER

PREVIOUS EMPLOYERS AND FORMER ADDRESSES (Approximately last ten years)

Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico

C-3 visa issued; arriving NY July 29, 1969 via Air France flight 700.
Departing for Moscow July 30, 1969 via Aeroflot 001.

SB/BIO
1. #18973 -memo
2. Ref-ND

Ref 26/8/69

FOR USE OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE ONLY

OFFICE	Visa Office	TYPE OF DEPARTMENT PROGRAM
DATE	8/25/69	
NAME OF SUBMITTING OFFICER	SCA:VO:BWDuncan	FEDIN, Evgeni I.

FOR USE OF OTHER OFFICE(S) OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FILE IN 201-305052

10 Sept. 1969

SB	SB/CI/C
SB	SB/X/OC
SB	SB/X/WH
WH	WH/1

3

26 AUG 1969

FORM 9-65 DS-939

201-305052

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ACTION UNIT WH8 | INFO | FILE, VR RI/AN SB8 FI2 CI CI/OPS CI/IC2

ACTION NO 787

S E C R E T 012320Z JUL 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 1102 (MEXI)

DIRECTOR INFO GUATEMALA CITY

2 Aug 69 IN 15322

LIARENA REDCOAT

REF: MEXICO CITY 0831 (IN 93513)

1. LIREBEL-2 REPORTED 30 JULY HE TOLD BY JOSE LUIS (BALCARCEL) ORDONEZ (201-160430) 27 JULY THAT "VALERIAN" LEAVING THAT WEEK-END FOR MOSCOW.

2. ACCORDING AIR MANIFESTS, VALERY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV (201-305052) DEPARTED MEXICO CITY 29 JULY FOR MOSCOW. ACCORDING LIENVOY, KOSTIKOV RETURNING MOSCOW FOR 8 DAYS CONSULTATIONS.

3. ABOVE ADDS WEIGHT TO REF SPECULATION THAT "VALERIAN", WHO REPORTED BY BALCARCEL BE CONTACT OF GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN SOVIET EMBASSY MEXICO, IDENTICAL WITH KOSTIKOV.

4. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-160430, 201-305052.

S E C R ET

AN	
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BX	4
DES	N/D
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WH	1

Colleen: Pls file

D50-6-151/3
B201-160430

SECRET

201-305052
02 Aug 69

19 SEP 1969

SECRET

TO: Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security
Department of State

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: KOSTIKOV, Valeri Vladimyrovich

1. Reference is made to your request dated 25 July 1969 concerning Subject.

2. In a report dated 27 August 1962 from a reliable source, Subject was listed as a known or suspect KGB (Soviet Committee for State Security) officer. Although this report did not specify how Subject's position or possible position as an intelligence officer was determined, numerous additional reports have established that Subject is an officer in the KGB. Several of these reports are noted below.

a. A report dated 12 January 1962 from a reliable source indicated that Subject had a background which "smelled strongly" of Soviet intelligence service (RIS) connections (i.e., a graduate of the Foreign Language Institute and/or the Institute of Foreign Affairs in Moscow). Subject was described as possibly RIS as early as 1959 when he attended an Electrotechnical Congress held in Madrid, Spain, from 30 June to 10 July 1959. During this congress, Subject was frequently absent from the delegation, studiously avoided having his picture taken, and was generally noted for his "suspicious" behavior.

201-305052

14-00000

SECRET

b. According to a report dated 16 March 1962 from a reliable source, Subject participated in a Soviet effort to cultivate an American Embassy employee.

c. A report dated October 1962 from a reliable source indicated that Subject was believed to be a KGB officer because of his position in the Consular office where most of the personnel were connected with the KGB. Subject had been known to attend meetings in place of other identified KGB officers.

d. According to a report dated 20 December 1963 from other reliable sources, Subject KOSTIKOV had apparently taken over as the case officer for one Margarito LNU, an agent of the Soviets who was formerly handled by First Secretary ~~Viktor Nikolaevich~~ GLOTOV 201-053674. GLOTOV was suspected by reliable sources to be the KGB Resident in Mexico City. Subject also had VALERI V. KOSTIKOV HAD considerable contact with Ivan Gavrilovich 201-236701 ALFERYEV, the Pravda correspondent and suspect KGB officer with whom Subject KOSTIKOV traveled to Tijuana, Mexico, on 1 September 1963. Subject frequently escorted diplomatic couriers to and from the airport, a function primarily of the consular section officers and, as far as was known, strictly a KGB responsibility. This same report identified all of Subject's close friends as KGB officers. PER TRACE REPLY ON KOSTIKOV (201-305052) SENT TO DEPT. OF STATE

SUBJECT IS MENTIONED AS AN CONTACT OF ONE VALERI V. KOSTIKOV (201-305052) IN A TRACE REPLY ON KOSTIKOV SENT TO DEPT. OF STATE.

3. In a report dated 14 May 1965, a reliable source, in an attempt to analyze the KGB Residentura in Mexico City, Mexico, stated that Subject was probably a KGB officer.

4. According to reports dated 22 December and 27 June 1967 from reliable sources, when Subject came to Mexico he replaced a suspect KGB officer. When he left Mexico, he was replaced by an identified KGB officer.

4. For further information concerning Subject, you are referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

CSCI-316/03145-69 SECRET

CC: Federal Bureau of Investigation with copy of name check

Encl. 1 name check

14-00000

SECRET

RID/CE:	JKS/SC/nkc	
BASED ON:	Review of 201-305052*	
	Para 2:	HMMA-19696, 27 August 1962
	Para 2a:	OSMA-13451, 12 January 1962
	Para 2b:	HMMA-18727, 16 March 1962
	Para 2c:	HMMA-19996, 10 October 1962
	Para 2d:	HMMA-22652, 20 December 1963
	Para 3:	HMMA-26081, 14 May 1965
	Para 4:	HMMA-32359, 27 June 1967 HMMA-30941, 22 December 1966
FILE IN:	201-305052*	

SECRET

14-00000

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REQUEST FOR BIOGRAPHIC DATA

TO:	FROM:	DATE
C 1/201		

FULL NAME (Married woman include maiden name)	ALIASES, NICKNAMES	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
Valeri Vladimyrovich KOSTIKOV	-----	March 17, 1933 Moscow U.S.S.R.

HOME ADDRESS	SEX	CITIZENSHIP	MARITAL STATUS	SPOUSE'S NAME
previous check 7/3/61	M	Soviet	UK	

OCCUPATION	NAME AND ADDRESS OF PRESENT EMPLOYER
	Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Mexico.

PREVIOUS EMPLOYERS AND FORMER ADDRESSES (Approximately last ten years)

C-3 visa issued; arriving New York July 29, 1969 via Air France flight 700. Departing for Moscow July 30, 1969 via Aeroflot 001.

GN 30/7/69 REF

FOR USE OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE ONLY

OFFICE	TYPE OF DEPARTMENT PROGRAM
Visa Office (Room 511 SA-2)	
DATE: July 25, 1969	
NAME OF SUBMITTING OFFICER: SCA:VO:BWDuncan:bjf	V FEDIN, Evgeni I.

FOR USE OF OTHER OFFICE(S) OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM OF COORDINATION
Date 14 AUG 1969
RI ANALYST SC
DIV. BRANCH
SB/X/DO
WH
E/BS
RI EDITOR

(*) SB/B10 *14973 ✓
1
2 ✓

3E04 482607

SB/CI/O

28 JUL 1969

FILE IN 201-305052

201-305052

FORM 9-65 DS-939

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ACTION NO 789

S E C R E T 012320Z JUL 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 1102

DIRECTOR INFO GUATEMALA CITY

2 AUG 69 IN 15322

LIARENA REDCOAT

REF: MEXICO CITY 0831 (IN 93513)

1. LIREBEL-2 REPORTED 30 JULY HE TOLD BY JOSE LUIS (BALCARCEL) ORDONEZ (201-160430) 27 JULY THAT "VALERIAN" LEAVING THAT WEEK-END FOR MOSCOW.

2. ACCORDING AIR MANIFESTS, VALERY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV (201-305052) DEPARTED MEXICO CITY 29 JULY FOR MOSCOW. ACCORDING LIENVOY, KOSTIKOV RETURNING MOSCOW FOR 8 DAYS CONSULTATIONS.

3. ABOVE ADDS WEIGHT TO REF SPECULATION THAT "VALERIAN", WHO REPORTED BY BALCARCEL BE CONTACT OF GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN SOVIET EMBASSY MEXICO, IDENTICAL WITH KOSTIKOV.

4. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-160430, 201-305052.

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ACTION WH8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, SB8, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, 825 FI2,

S E C R E T 020007Z JUL 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 0831

2 JUL 69 IN 93513

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

LIARENA REDCOAT

1. IN CONVERSATION WITH LIREBEL-2 27 JUNE, JOSE LUIS (BALCARCEL) ORDONEZ (201-160430) COMMENTED UPON DIFFICULTIES GETTING RAPID

ACTION IN HIS CONTACTS WITH SOVIET EMBASSY HERE. IN THIS CONTEXT BALCARCEL STATED HIS CONTACT IN EMBASSY ONE "VALERIAN". BALCARCEL STATED SOMETIMES "VALERIAN" TAKES HIM INSIDE SOVIET EMBASSY GROUNDS IN "VALERIAN'S" CAR, BUT OTHER TIMES HE MUST GO TO EMBASSY FRONT GATE AND ASK SEE "VALERIAN". BALCARCEL STATED HE AND "VALERIAN" USUALLY MEET IN OFFICE OF "KUNETSOV", SOVIET PRESS ATTACHE.

how about AETHEDRE??

2. THERE NO SOVIET OFFICIALS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED MEXICO CITY WITH FIRST NAME "VALERIAN". IT POSSIBLE "VALERIAN" IDENTIFIABLE WITH VALERY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV (201-305052), 2ND SECRETARY IN EMBASSY AND KNOWN KGB OFFICER. ACCORDING STATION FILES, IN 1965 KOSTIKOV IN CONTACT WITH ALEJANDRO (BERMUDEZ) ALEGRIA (201-62689), NICARAGUAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCN) LEADER WHO SUSPECTED RECEIVE FUNDING FROM SOVIET FOR USE BY PCN. SEE ALSO HMMA-37406, WHICH REPORTED ONE RICARDO RAMIREZ, POSSIBLE IDENTIFIABLE WITH RICARDO (RAMIREZ) DE

SECRET

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INDEX: YES NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID RET. TO BRANCH DESTROY SIG

ACTION RID COPY INFO FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 0831 S E C R E T

LEON (201-083287), CALLED SOVIET EMBASSY 18 JUNE ASKING SPEAK WITH KOSTIKOV.

3. "KUNETZOV" ASSUMEDLY IDENTIFIABLE WITH SVYATOSLAV KUZNETSOV (201-87222), CURRENT SOVIET PRESS ATTACHE MEXICO AND KNOWN KGB OFFICER. HOWEVER, SOVIET PRESS ATTACHE OFFICE LOCATED IN HOME KUZNETSOV, RATHER THAN IN EMBASSY.

4. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-160430; 201-305052.

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

201-305052

Embajada rusa en México tiene un gran personal que trabaja poco

Por Carlos Montiel, desde México.

En una carta llegada a esta redacción, periodistas peruanos me informaron que, enterados de mi artículo "Ahora Perú", preguntaron al Canciller de aquel país, Edgardo Jarrín, si la llegada de una misión comercial rusa a tierras peruanas sería sólo la primera entrega de otra misión más importante, la de una representación diplomática soviética.

En ese artículo comentaba que miembros de la Embajada moscovita en México, habían asegurado en los corrillos sociales de esta ciudad, que en menos de dos semanas Perú establecería relaciones diplomáticas con el Kremlin, a nivel de embajada.

Según me informan en esa misiva, apenas tres días después, el diario limeño "La Prensa", confirmó en su primera plana la noticia que comenté en EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO, y que obtuve gracias a la indiscreción de los diplomáticos soviéticos que figuran en el "circuito coctelero" que aquí se lleva a cabo por los embajadores y encargados de negocios de las naciones extranjeras.

Recuerdo que también en EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO, el colega Alonso Fonseca G., publicó una nota titulada "Alegres Diplomáticos", con la divertida historia de la "juerga de Vladislav Korcmovshkin y Valeri Kostikov, agregado y segundo secretario, respectivamente, de la embajada rusa en México, quienes la empezaron "entre burbujas de vinos caros en la zona rosa de la ciudad de México, y se vieron obligados a ponerle fin en Ciudad Victoria entre sus insultos a México bajo inmunidad diplomática". Al parecer los diplomáticos soviéticos no sólo han renunciado a ser decentes, sino que también están demostrando ser incapaces.

El Canciller peruano Mercado Jarrín, quien anunció la llegada de la misión comercial rusa, respondió a la pregunta de los periodistas con un lacónico "oportunamente tendrán información si es que el Gobierno decide dar ese paso" (el de establecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas con la URSS). Antes de que el Gobierno de Lima "decida dar ese paso", quisiéramos pasarle traslado de estos dos párrafos que el periodista Bernardo Escalante, publicó en un artículo de "El Sol de México", bajo el título: "La Embajada Misteriosa".

"Lo extraño está en que la Embajada de la URSS es una de las que cuentan con personal más numeroso y las que menor quehacer tienen. Las dependencias conectadas q' tienen trato con el público — sección consular, sección cultural, agencia turística — laboran sólo cuatro horas a la semana. Con los dedos de la mano se podrán contar los mexicanos que en un año van a solicitar una visa. El comercio entre México y la URSS es casi nulo. Las "relaciones culturales", como todos lo saben, consisten sólo en hacer propaganda "de allá para acá", ya que en los dominios de Brezhnev y de Kosygin ni idea tienen de lo que es México".

"¿A qué se dedica, pues "se enjambre de personal ruso —en esa Embajada en que no trabaja un solo mexicano y hasta la servidumbre es soviética— en esa enorme mansión que podía ser guarida de vampiros? El misterio sube de punto si se toma en cuenta que la Embajada de México en Moscú apenas si está integrada por unas seis o siete personas, y en cambio la URSS mantiene aquí más de un centenar. ¿Por qué la URSS tiene una Embajada tan numerosa en nuestro país, si hace lo mismo que la nuestra en Moscú?

LA PRENSA LIBRE
SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA
6 - MAY 1969

201-305052

14-00000

SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO HAS LARGE
STAFF WHICH DOES LITTLE WORK

by Carlos Montiel

Source: La Prensa Libre (Free Press), 6 May 1969, San Jose, Costa Rica

Mexico City -- In a letter addressed to our editorial department Peruvian newsmen informed me that, being acquainted with my article "Ahora Peru" [Now Peru], they asked that country's chancellor, Edgardo Jarrin, whether the arrival of a Soviet trade mission in Peru would be only the prelude to another more important mission, that of Soviet diplomatic representation.

In that article I had observed that members of the Soviet embassy in Mexico City had predicted in that city's social circles that in less than 2 weeks Peru would establish diplomatic relations with the Kremlin at the embassy level.

According to the letter, barely 3 days later the Lima daily La Prensa confirmed with prominent play the report that I had made in El Universal Grafico whose substance I had obtained thanks to the indiscretion of Soviet diplomats included in the "cocktail circuit" organized here among the ambassadors and trade representatives of foreign countries.

14-00000

I recall that also in El Universal Grafico my colleague, Alonso Fonseca G., published a note entitled "Alegres Diplomaticos" [Tipsy Diplomats] recounting the entertaining story of the "binge of Vladislav Koromovshkin and Valery Kostikov, attache and second secretary respectively at the Soviet embassy in Mexico. These officials began their spree "between glasses of expensive wines in the 'red' district of Mexico City but had to bring their adventure to a close at Ciudad Victoria amidst the abuse they hurled at Mexico under the diplomatic immunity which they enjoyed." Apparently, the Soviet diplomats not only have given up decent beha but are also demonstrating their incompetence.

The Peruvian chancellor, Mercado [sic] Jarrin, who announced the arrival of the Soviet trade mission, answered the newsmen's question with a laconic comment that "at the appropriate time you will learn whether the government has decided to take that step" (of establishing diplomatic relations with the USSR). Before the Lima government "decides to take that step," we would like to reproduce these two paragraphs which the journalist Bernardo Escalante published in an article entitled "La Embajada Misteriosa" [The Mysterious Embassy] in the newspaper El Sol de Mexico.

"The strange thing is that the Soviet embassy is one of those with the largest staff but with the least to do. Those branches that have contact with the public -- consular section, cultural section, tourist agency -- work only 4 hours a week. One can count the number of Mexicans applying for a Russian visa on the fingers of one hand. Trade between Mexico and the USSR is practically nil. The 'cultural relations,' as everyone knows, consist simply

in making propaganda 'from one place to another' inasmuch as in the land of Brezhnev and Kosygin they do not even have a remote idea of what Mexico is like.

"What is this plethora of Soviet personnel used for then in that embassy where not even a single Mexican citizen is employed, where the domestics themselves are Soviet, in that huge mansion that could serve as a den of vampires? The mystery deepens if one considers that the Mexican embassy staff in Moscow barely numbers six or seven employees whereas the USSR has more than a hundred in Mexico. Why does the Soviet Union have such a large embassy staff in our country if it does what ours does in Moscow?"

201-305052

EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO

Viernes [illegible] de Diciembre de 196[illegible] (MEXICO)

Alegres Diplomáticos

Por ALONSO FONSECA G.

Querido lector: esta es [illegible] divertida historia de una "parranda" que [illegible] en la [illegible] madrugada del [illegible] de diciembre, entre borrachos de [illegible] rusos en [illegible] de la ciudad de México, y que terminó [illegible] en Ciudad Victoria. Se trata de dos marxistas-leninistas de la URSS que por haber caído [illegible] en las [illegible] de los diplomáticos [illegible] "templaron" el [illegible] en [illegible] burgueses, no para [illegible] y olvidar una que otra [illegible] que les [illegible] el [illegible], sino para [illegible] una [illegible] de [illegible] e injurias a México y a los mexicanos, con el pretexto de que, cuando uno está "alegrito" todo se le dispensa.

Los diplomáticos de la embajada rusa en México, Valeri Kostikov, segundo secretario, y Vladislav Koromovshkin, agregado, no sólo olvidaron entre hipos la moral socialista, para colocarse una "guarapeta de esas que hacen época", sino que en medio de una gran "Luna" a base de [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] y [illegible] [illegible] en [illegible] a Ciudad Madero, [illegible] después de [illegible] que [illegible] los [illegible] del alcohol, la "[illegible]" [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] "[illegible]", de [illegible] que la [illegible] de la [illegible] de [illegible] señala como las grandes [illegible] conquistados por los hombres [illegible] del [illegible], y [illegible] los [illegible] contra los mexicanos. Los cuatro ingenieros de PEMEX —como lo hubiera hecho cualquier hijo bien nacido— defendieron con firmeza a su Patria. Sin [illegible] los rusos se convirtieron [illegible] en diplomáticos pistoleros, al empuñar sus armas contra los ingenieros, pero sin duda [illegible] la preparación rusa consiste más bien en el manejo de cohetes teledirigidos hacia la Luna, que en manejar con habilidad [illegible] pistolas [illegible], se vieron prontamente desarmados por los mexicanos.

Al llegar a Ciudad Victoria, los ingenieros de PEMEX entregaron a las autoridades locales los agregados rusos y sus pistolas. Pese al clamor unánime de todos los allí presentes para que los soviéticos fueran castigados, éstos, con arrogancia insultante, [illegible] el respeto a su inmunidad diplomática. [illegible] nota de la agresividad de ambos [illegible] al gobierno chino de Mao Tse Tung tan empeñado en seguir la línea dura, aunque no creemos que los contrate, ya que son pistoleros malos.

El lector que quiera confirmar los detalles de esta borrachera interplanetaria y sideral con [illegible] de quienes creen que con la conquista [illegible] del poder en Rusia el [illegible] y la decencia en todo el mundo [illegible] [illegible]

201-744341

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief, SB Division

INFO: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: REDTOP/AEKICK/AEBURBLE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA-36517, 14 February 1969

1. On 1 April 1969 the Station received a memorandum from local LNERGO concerning the latest meeting AEBURBLE had with his Soviet Case Officers. This memorandum is forwarded under separate cover as Attachment #1. The meeting took place in Mexico City on 3 and 4 February 1969. The Soviet case officers were Aleksandr Aleksandrovich NIKITIN (201-784917) and Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052).

2. On 8 April 1969 we answered LNERGO's memorandum with comments concerning NIKITIN's and KOSTIKOV's whereabouts on 3 and 4 February 1969, the possible meeting place on 4 February 1969, and the cars used. Recent photographs of NIKITIN and KOSTIKOV were forwarded to local LNERGO also. This Station memorandum is forwarded under separate cover as Attachment #2.

3. It is interesting to note that the 1969 Volkswagen with Mexico City plates 787 IW, assigned to Stanislav Vasilyevich SYCHEV (201-326963) was used as the vehicle to drive AEBURBLE to the meeting site on 4 February 1969. The use of SYCHEV's vehicle, which is one of two Soviet vehicles which do not have diplomatic license plates, strengthens our suspicion that SYCHEV is a KGB officer.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
1. LNERGO Memo u/s/c
2. Station memo u/s/c

Distribution:
2 - C/SB w/att u/s/c
2 - C/WH w/o att

201-248427

file 201-305052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
201-784917 201-305052 201-326963	HMMA-36888	9 April 1969
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-248427

14-00000

SECRET

27 FEB 69

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV
Aleksandr Aleksandrovich NIKITIN

Per your request, enclosed are the following most recent photographs available of subject Soviets who are presently assigned to the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City:

a. Photo 1: Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV, born: 13 March 1933, Moscow, photo dated 1959.

b. Photo 2: Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV - 1965

c. Photo 3: Rosa Aleksandrovna KOSTIKOVA, born: 2 March 1932, Arkhangelsk, photo dated 1965.

d. Photo 4: Aleksandr Aleksandrovich NIKITIN, born 7 June 1929, Sverdlovsk, photo received 1965.

e. Photo 5: Nina Afanasyevna NIKITINA, born 1931, Arkhangelsk Oblast, photo received 1965.

CSCI-316/00518-69

SB/CI/P:AJHPeck X-4496 17 Feb 69

Distribution:
1 - CI/LS
1 - CI/OPS/SB
1 - CI/R&A
1 - SB/X/WH
1 - SB/CI/P/AP - Chrono
1 - SB/CI/P/AP - Comeback
2 - RID/AN/SB - Please classify: KOSTIKOV, 201-305052
NIKITIN, 201-784917

VB 201-784917 CS COPY

SECRET

201-305052

Valeri V.Kostikov I have met him but I do not know him much.

Valentin Longuinov, in charge of consular affairs, his wife Alexandra has been an ~~skimingzzzkarm~~ skating star, both and friendly very nice, speak very good Spanish and fair English. Their daughter ~~Kkirinam~~ Kirina, sixteen years old, very sophisticated, came here for a holiday. The only child of that age we have ever seen here. They have another child, who is in Moscow. Both have been at our house for a party. In general soviet people come alone, leaving the wives behind. Longuinov was an exception.

Dmitri Prygov, wife Natalia, have an small child born here, he has been writing a book on the Mexican revolution. We are fairly good friends. He was introduced to me by Boris Kazantsev who invited me for lunch for the ocasion. When we go to the Soviet embassy both he and Tchmykhov are always very attentive.

I know several other people from the Soviet embassy but really I could not place them together with their names.

Extract from HMMA-36436, 12/2/69 (RedTop Ops)

14-00000

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ACTION WH-8 RID COPY

<629>

FILE VR. RF/AN, SB-8, CA/Reg, CA/Rep

S E C R E T 211825Z JAN 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 8796

DIRECTOR INFO LIMA, BUENOS AIRES 21 Jan 69 IN 76296

MHSPAWN REDCOAT

REF: LIMA-3640 (IN 71317)

201-305052

1. FOLLOW UP STORY REF REF PARA 2 PUBLISHED "EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO" OF 17 JAN. POUCHING CLIPS ALL ADDEES.

2. FILE 50-126-22/3.

S E C R E T

Montiel-
Koromorrolkin
Krotilov

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201-305052

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING; XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED; ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING; MICROFILM

TO: Chief, SB Division

INFO.: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: REDTOP
Aleksandr Mikhaylovich BROVKIN (201-185114)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: HMMS-6229, 19 December 1968

1. LIFIRE reported the PCS departure of the BROVKIN family on 22 September 1968 aboard Sabena Flight 556. Subject travelled on Soviet Diplomatic Passport D-008133.

2. BROVKIN held the position of Third Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. He was replaced by Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052), who assumed the title of Second Secretary.

3. Forwarded herewith are recent LICALLA photographs of Subject.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Photo h/w

Distribution:
2 - C/SB w/att h/w
2 - C/WH w/o att

185114

CS copy filed in 201-[illegible] file in 201-305052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
201-305052	HMMA-36121	27 December 1968
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-185114

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ACTION: SB 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, WH8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI2, CA5, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, DDP, ADDP, CSDO

S E C R E T 241800Z DEC 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8531

DIRECTOR

24 Dec 68 IN 60590

REDTOP AEKICK AEASSAULT

REF: MEXICO CITY 8437 (IN 54340)

1. LILYRIC REPORTED THAT KORMUSHKIN AND KOSTIKOV LEFT THE SOVIET EMBASSY TOGETHER AT 16:33 ON 9 DECEMBER. THEY WERE NOT SEEN UNTIL THEY RETURNED TOGETHER AT 15:20 ON 20 DECEMBER. THEY LEFT AND RETURNED IN THE REGULARLY ASSIGNED TO YURIY S. CHERMYSH. UPON RETURN KORMUSHKIN, KOSTIKOV, AND THE CAR WERE GRIMY AND DIRTY.

2. ON 20 DECEMBER ONE OF LIQUIFIER'S WRITERS PLACED STATION WRITTEN ARTICLE IN EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO. ENTITLE "HAPPY DIPLOMATS," IT IS TONGUE IN CHEEK TWO COLUMN ARTICLE STATING TWO SOVIETS GOT OFF MARX-LENINIST WAGON TO ENJOY BOURGEOISE JOYS AND ENDED UP INSULTING MEXICO AND PULLING GUNS. THEY DEMANDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY WITH INSULTING ARROGANCE. INVITES READERS TO CALL SOVEMB TO CONFIRM STORY.

3. AMBASSADOR WHO INTRIGUED WITH STORY PASSED IT TO HIS FRIEND, GARCIA VALSECA, PUBLISHER OF EL SOL CHAIN. VALSECA SENT REPORTER FROM TAMPICO TO CIUDAD VICTORIA. ON 21 DECEMBER EL SOL FRONT PAGED STORY ENTITLED " MEMBERS OF SOVIET EMBASSY, DRUNK,

D. 74-126-6013

B 201-305052

24-12-68

201-744341

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ACTION [ ] RID COPY

INFO

FILE. VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8531 S E C R E T

TREACHEROUSLY ATTACKED TWO MEXICAN ENGINEERS," A PURE MIRACLE THAT THE TWO MEXICANS WHO ARE NAMED ESCAPED WITH THEIR LIVES WHEN SOVIETS THREATENED THEM WITH A RIFLE AND PISTOL AFTER DRIVING THEM TO REMOTE POINT. INDIGNANT THAT THE SOVIETS WERE SET FREE WITH ONLY 200 PESO FINE. HOPES FOR INVESTIGATION ABOUT WHAT SOVIETS DOING IN TAMAULIPAS (STATE) AND SPECUALTES THEY ENGAGED SUBVERSIVE WORK. UNFORTUNATELY KORMUSHKIN'S NAME IS HOPELESSLY GARBLED.

4. ON 22 DECMEBER THE NEWS, ENGLISH DAILY, RAN SHORTER VERSION OF EL SOL STROY. ON 24 DECEMBER THE NEWS IN FOLLOW-UP GIVES MORE DETAIL AND QUESTIONS LENIENCY OF 200 PESO FINE. NOTES THAT KOSTIKOV IS IN DIPLOMATIC LIST BUT CANNOT FIND NAME OF VLADISTOK KOMOSKID(KORMUSHKIN) THERE.

5. ON 23 DECEMBER COS GAVE AMASSADOR PICUTES OF KORMUSHKIN AND KOSTIKOV WITH FACT THEY GONE FROM MEXICO CITY FROM 9 TO 20 DECEMBER AND CORRECT SPELLING FOR KORMUSHKIN. AMBASSADOR PASSED TO GARCIA VALSECA WITH SUGGESTION HE DO FOLLOW-UP STORY INSISTING ON INVESTIGATION AND EXPLANATION BY SOVEMB ABOUT ABSENCE OF SOVIET "DIPLOMATS" FOR 11 DAYS PROWLING MEXICAN COUNTRY SIDE. WILL ALSO SUGGEST THAT GARCIA PUBLISH STORY AND PICTURES IN HIS CHAIN OF

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ACTION ☐ RID COPY INFO FILE. VR.

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 8531 S E C R E T

PROVINCIAL PAPERS ASKING READERS IF THEY SAW THESE TWO SPYS DURING ABOVE PERIOD.

6. LITEMPO-12 HAS STATED THAT STORY WILL APPEAR IN 24 DECEMBER EDITION OF "ALARMA," A WEEKLY SCANDAL MAGAZINE.

7. ON 20 DECEMBER USIS GAVE STORY TO LOCAL UPI AND AP CORRESPONDENTS. DO NOT KNOW IF STORIES CABLED.

8. WILL ADVISE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS AND POUCH COPIES ALL ARTICLES.

9. FILE: 74-126-60, 201-744341, AND 201-305052.

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14-00000

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	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

KOSTIKOV, VALERIY
201-305052
SEX M DOB ?

050-002-004
HMMA-36090A01
20 DEC 68
P3

CIT ?
OCC ?
12 DEC VALERIY KOSTIKOV 2ND SECY AND VLADISLAV KORMUSHKIN ATTACHE LEFT HOUSE OF PROSTITUTION HAD SPENT ENTIRE EVENING DRINKING IN ZONA ROJA COMPLETELY DRUNK LEFT WITH FOUR PEMEX ENGINEERS ARGUMENT BROKE OUT INTO FIST FIGHT BOTH DREW PISTOLS MEXICANS DISARMED THEM PREFERRED CHARGES CLAIMED DIPL IMMUNITY NOT SEEN SOV EMB SINCE

R 6901020073

FILE IN 201-305052

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-03)

14-00000

EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO

Viernes 20 de diciembre de 1968

201-305052

Alegres Diplomáticos

Por ALONSO FONSECA G.

Querido lector, ésta es la divertida historia de una "parranda" que empezó en la álida madrugada del 12 de diciembre, entre burbujas de vinos caros en la zona rosa de la ciudad de México, y que terminó muy lejos, en Ciudad Victoria. Se trata de dos marxistas-leninistas de la URSS, que por haber roto las cadenas de la oprobiosa tiranía de los diplomáticos decentes, "empinaron el codo" en bares burgueses, no para alegrarse y olvidar una que otra tristeza que les rasguñaba el corazón, sino para lanzar una andanada de denuestos e injurias a México y a los mexicanos, con el pretexto de que, cuando uno está "alegrito" todo se le dispensa.

Los diplomáticos de la embajada rusa en México, Valeri Kostikov, segundo secretario, y Vladislav Koromovshkin, agregado, no sólo olvidaron entre hippies la moral socialista, para colocarse una "guarapeta de esas que hacen época, sino que, en medio de una gran "feria" a base de odiosos orgías y whisky capitalistas, decidieron acompañar a cuatro ingenieros de PEMEX en un viaje en automóvil a Ciudad Mante. En el camino, después de los desmanes habituales que provocan los humos del alcohol la "cruda" los hizo llegar a los peores extremos de la grosería, expuesta sin ningún "academicismo", de esos que la Universidad de la Amistad de Moscú señala como los grandes derechos conquistados por los hombres avanzados del leninismo, y llovieron los denuestos contra los mexicanos. Los cuatro ingenieros de PEMEX —como lo hubiera hecho cualquier hijo bien nacido—, defendieron con firmeza a su Patria. Sin más, los rusos se convirtieron súbitamente en diplomáticos pistoleros, al empuñar sus armas contra los ingenieros, pero sin duda porque la preparación rusa consiste más bien en el manejo de cohetes teledirigidos hacia la Luna, que en manejar con habilidad prosaicas pistolas obsoletas, se vieron prontamente desarmados por los mexicanos.

Al llegar a Ciudad Victoria, los ingenieros de PEMEX entregaron a las autoridades locales los agregados rusos y sus pistolas. Pese al deseo unánime de todos los allí presentes para que los soviéticos fueran castigados, éstos, con arrogancia insultante, exigieron el respeto a su inmunidad diplomática. Corremos nota de la agresividad de ambos moscovitas al gobierno chino de Mao Tse Tung tan empeñado en seguir la línea dura, aunque no creemos que los contrate, ya que son pistoleros malos.

El lector que quiera confirmar los detalles de esta borrachera interplanetaria y sideral, con desmanes de quienes creen que con la conquista soviética del poder en Rusia el respeto y la decencia en todo [illegible] puede llamar al teléfono 15-30-33.

201-305052

TIPSY DIPLOMATS

by Alonso Fonseca G.

Source: ~~Not Identified.~~ [illegible]

This is the amusing story of a "spree" which began in the frosty dawn of 12 December among bubbles of expensive wines in the "red light" district of Mexico City and reached its conclusion very far off, at Ciudad Victoria. What are involved are two Marxist-Leninists from the Soviet Union who, on breaking the chains of disgraceful tyranny weighing on respectable diplomats, "tanked up" in bourgeois bars, not in order to cheer up and forget some sorrowful episode or other that gnawed at their hearts but rather to fire a broadside of abuse and insults at Mexico and Mexicans under the pretext that when one is "tipsy" everything that he does is absolved.

The diplomats of the Russian embassy in Mexico, Valery Kostikov, second secretary, and Vladislav Koromovshkin, attache, not only forgot among hippies the socialist ethics in order to indulge in a "small drink among those who are in the limelight"

but, in the midst of a big "binge" made possible by hateful capitalist brandy and whiskey, they decided to accompany four engineers of PEMEX [Petroleos Mexicanos; Mexican Petroleum] in an old automobile to Ciudad Mante. On the way, after the customary excesses that alcoholic fumes provoke, the "wine" drove the Russians to the worst extremes of crudeness exhibited without any of the "academic bearing" that the Friendship University of Moscow notes as the major assets acquired by the progressive men of Leninism. Accordingly, abuse rained on the Mexicans.

The four PEMEX engineers, as any well-born sons would have done, defended their country with firmness. Thereupon, the Russians suddenly became transformed into diplomat-gunmen, brandishing their weapons at the engineers. However, no doubt because Russians are better at getting ready to handle remote-controlled spaceships directed at the moon than in the skillful discharge of prosaic pistols, they found themselves disarmed in short order by the Mexicans.

On reaching Ciudad Victoria the PEMEX engineers handed the Russian attaches and their guns over to the local authorities. Despite the unanimous desire of all those present to see the Soviet representatives get their comeuppance the latter, with insulting arrogance, insisted that their diplomatic immunity be respected.

Let us compare the aggressive stance of both Muscovites with the Chinese government of Mao Tse-tung so insistent on

14-00000

following the hard line even though we do not believe that Mao would hire Russians of this ilk considering how ineffective gunmen they proved to be.

201-305052

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☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

ACTION UNIT WH8 | INFO | FILE, VR, WH8, CI, OPS, CI/IC 2, FI 2

ACTION NO.

IS E C R E T 140225Z DEC 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8437

DIRECTOR

13Dec68 IN 54340

REDTOP AEKICK

1. ON 13 DEC LITEMPO-12 CALLED COS AND SAID HIS MAN IN CIUDAD VICTORIA HAD REPORTED THAT AT CA 05:02 ON 12 DEC VLADISLAV S. KORMUSHKIN (201-744341) AND VALERIY V. KOSTIKOV (201-305052), BOTH KNOWN KGB, LEFT A WHORE HOUSE IN CIUDAD VICTORIA WITH FOUR MEXICAN PEMEX ENGINEERS. ENTIRE PARTY WAS DRUNK. ALL GOT INTO

SECRET

SECRET

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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR.

A CAR AND STARTED TOWARD CIUDAD MANTE. ON WAY ARGUMENT BROKE OUT BETWEEN SOVIETS AND MEXICANS. CAR WAS STOPPED AND FIST-FIGHT ENSUED OUTSIDE. BOTH SOVIETS DREW PISTOLS AND COVERED MEXICANS. MEXICANS MANAGED TO DISARM THEM BY TACKLING FROM BEHIND AND TOOK THEM IN CUSTODY TO CIUDAD VICTORIA WHERE CHARGES AGAINST SOVIETS WERE PREFERRED. SOVIETS PRODUCED DIPLOMATIC PASSPORTS AND CLAIMED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY WHEREUPON JUDGE RELEASED THEM. DISPOSITION OF PISTOLS UNKNOWN.

2. LITEMP-12 STATED GOBERNACION IS PREPARING FACTS FOR MEMO TO RELACIONES EXTERIORES WITH RECOMMENDATION THAT SOVIETS BE PNGED FOR ABUSE OF DIPLOMATIC STATUS.

3. STATION IS ENCOURAGING LITEMPOS TO GET INCIDENT INTO PRESS IN SENSATIONAL MANNER WITH PHOTOS.

4. FILE: 201-744341 AND 201-305052.

SECRET

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 56 | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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DISSEM BY 28/21 PER

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ACTION SB8 [ ] RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. RI/AN, WH8, CI, CI/OPS, FI2

S E C R E T 192015Z SEPT 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 7224

DIRECTOR

19 SEP 68 IN 95628

REDTOP AEKICK

REF: DIRECTOR 16046, 13 JULY 1968

1. LIFIRE REPORTS PCS ARRIVAL VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV (201-305052), ACCOMPANIED BY WIFE, ROZA ALEKSANDROVNA AND DAUGHTER, SVETLANA. THEY ARRIVED 13 SEPTEMBER ON KLM FLIGHT 683. KOSTIKOV TRAVELLED ON DIP PASSPORT D-022184. WIFE AND DAUGHTER ON DIP PASSPORT D-022185.

2. PER REFERENCE KOSTIKOV (201-305052) SCHEDULED REPLACE ALEKSANDR MIKHAYLOVICH BROVKIN (201-185114), THIRD SECRETARY. ACCORDING TO LICOZY-5, BROVKIN HAS RESERVATION TO DEPART MEXICO 22 SEPTEMBER.

3. LIFIRE REPORT INDICATES KOSTIKOV HAS TITLE OF SECOND SECRETARY.

4. FILE 201-305052. CROSS FILE 201-185114.

SECRET

BT

AN / AB / IN / PS / FX / FI / SB/0/WH

19 Sep 68

CS COPY

201-305052

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

ORIG: DIANA DAVIS
UNIT: SB/O/WH
EXT: 6412
DATE: 11 JULY 68

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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3	8
4	9
5	10

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BY 3 PER ___ #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-305052
x- 201-185114 (BROVKIN)

CONF: SB8 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE RI/AN, WH8 ciops. ci/ic, CI, FI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 11 July 68 CITE DIRECTOR

MICROFILMED JUL 29 1968 DOC. MICRO. SER.

22 05z JUL 68

TO MEXICO CITY
REDTOP

Box 4

16046

1. ACCORDING TO SENSITIVE HQS SOURCE VALERIY KOSTIKOV, WIFE ROZA AND DAUGHTER SVETLANA HAVE BEEN GRANTED NINETY DAY DIP VISAS, EXTENDABLE IN PROTOCOL OFFICE OF FOREIGN MINISTRY. 201-305052 KOSTIKOV IS SCHEDULED TO REPLACE ZR 201-185114 BROVKIN, ALEKSANDR MIKHAYLOVICH

2. SUBJECT IS IDENTICAL WITH VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV (201-305052) PREVIOUSLY PCS MEXICO 1961-1965. HE IS XXX KNOWN KGB.

END OF MESSAGE

ACSB/O/WH L Hestres
C/SB/CI/K T Cormier
for C/WH/1 W Belt

CS COPY

C/WH+ [signature] DC/SB/AO H Hestres
11 JUL 68
201-305052

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

 465 COPY NO.

DISPATCH — SECRET

Chief, WH Division

Chief, SB; COS, Managua; COS, Panama City

Chief of Station, Mexico City

REDCOAT [illegible]

Soviet Contact with Alejandro BERMUDEZ Alegria (201-062689)

1. The Station believes that Alejandro BERMUDEZ Alegria, Nicaraguan Communist living in exile in Mexico and known to have been the link between Moscow and the Nicaraguan Communist Party in regard to sending Nicaraguans to both CPSU school and Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow, is identical with the Modesto *RIVAS who in 1965 was reported in contact with identified KGB officer Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052) as well as with the Modesto *BERMUDEZ, originally thought to have been a Panamanian, who in 1965 was reported in contact with KOSTIKOV and then with his successor, Vladislav Sergeyevich KORMUSHKIN (201-744341), who is also an identified KGB officer. It is noted that Alejandro BERMUDEZ Alegria uses the alias Modesto RIVAS for receiving mail at his post office box letter drop.

2. Following is a chronology of the LIENVOY reporting on "Modesto's" contact with the Soviets. As will be seen, it appears that the combination "Modesto BERMUDEZ" was a conclusion jumped to by LIENVOY and was in fact probably never given as such. The references to "Panamanians" could be a cover for "Nicaraguans."

a. On 1 Jun 1965 "Modesto RIVAS" called at the Soviet Embassy for KOSTIKOV and arranged to meet him at four o'clock "in the same place."

........continued

Attachment:
Photograph

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD, w/att.
1 - C/SB, w/att.
1 - COS, Managua, w/att.
1 - COS, Panama City, w/att.

201-305052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-32359	27 June 1967
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-062689

b. On 29 Jun 1965 "Modesto RIVAS" called KOSTIKOV to say he would like to talk with him and also to give him the message that Ricardo was waiting in his office for him. KOSTIKOV asked if Modesto was working that day, and when Modesto said no, he would be working at home all day, then KOSTIKOV said he would stop by his house in the afternoon.

c. On 6 Jul 1965 "Modesto" called KOSTIKOV and asked if there was anything new about the people travelling to Helsinki. KOSTIKOV said nothing yet, but he hoped to have word by the end of the week. KOSTIKOV also asked if Modesto had received any news from the doctor, and Modesto said no, even though he had sent a telegram. Modesto said he would keep a copy of the telegram he sent for KOSTIKOV.

d. On 7 Jul 1965 "Modesto" told KOSTIKOV that, after he had talked to him the day before, he had received a cable asking the same question, i.e., what was with the trip to Helsinki, and Modesto wanted to know what to answer. KOSTIKOV said that they would have to wait about two more days but that he would send a cable to pressure for an answer. Modesto said he would answer his cable saying that they were trying to get a cabled reply and added that he would be in his office in the afternoon, if KOSTIKOV wanted to reach him.

e. On 8 Jul 1965 a man identified by voice as the above Modesto called at the Soviet Embassy for the Vice Consul (i.e. KOSTIKOV). He was told to call back, and when asked who was calling, he said he was calling on behalf of the Panamanians ("de parte de los panameños").

f. On 9 Jul 1965 a man called at the Soviet Embassy for KOSTIKOV, who was out. The man then said to leave the message that "BERMUDEZ...no...tell him that Modesto called." (This is evidently what made the LIENVOY monitors assume that the caller's name was "Modesto BERMUDEZ.")

g. On 9 Jul 1965 a man left a message at the Soviet Embassy for KOSTIKOV saying that Modesto had called. (This comes out in LIENVOY as being a call from "Modesto BERMUDEZ, panameño," but this was probably the monitor's way of identifying the same man of the above conversations and not what the man actually said.)

h. On 12 Jul 1965 Modesto again spoke to KOSTIKOV (and is again described by LIENVOY as "Modesto BERMUDEZ, panameño"). Modesto informed KOSTIKOV that the job from Ensenada ("el encargo de Ensenada") had arrived. KOSTIKOV suggested meeting Modesto at the usual place and asked if (he, she, it?) was with Modesto. Modesto said yes, at his house, and KOSTIKOV said then it would be better for him to visit them at his house. Modesto also asked about the "other matter," but KOSTIKOV still had no news.

i. On 14 Jul 1965 it was again reported that "Modesto BERMUDEZ, panameño" called and left a message to tell KOSTIKOV that he had called. (Again, the "Modesto BERMUDEZ, panameño" is probably a LIENVOY assumption, rather than what Modesto actually said.)

j. On 4 Aug 1965 "Modesto BERMUDEZ, panameño" (again, probably the LIENVOY assumption) called at the Soviet Embassy for KORMUSHKIN and was told to call him on another number. (No record of a second call.)

k. On 12 Aug 1965 LIENVOY reported that "Modesto BERMUDEZ, panameño" called KORMUSHKIN and asked whether the young man had been dispatched. KORMUSHKIN said he had just left. [illegible]

l. On 22 Sep 1965 LIENVOY reported that "Modesto BERMUDEZ, panameno" called from inside the Soviet Embassy at 1128 hours to a local travel agency (T.C.I./Greyhound) and spoke with Miss LABASTIDA, asking her about the price of the ticket to Prague under the same system they had used to send the other people. LABASTIDA asked for one of the names in order to pull the card to see how it had been done, and "BERMUDEZ" gave her the name Guillermo *AGUIRRE. LABASTIDA gave him various possible flights and asked that he call back in the afternoon for more definite information. (Station traces show that Guillermo AGUIRRE Rodriguez, 201-245711, is a Nicaraguan who was at the CPSU school in Moscow in 1965.) (LILYRIC reported that the man in the attached photograph, who is undoubtedly identical with Alejandro BERMUDEZ Alegria, visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City from 1111 to 1137 hours. There therefore seems no question that he is the "Modesto BERMUDEZ, panameno" who has been reported by LIENVOY in all the above conversations.)

m. On 29 Sep 1965 LIENVOY reported that "Modesto BERMUDEZ, panameno" called KORMUSHKIN and said he had some things ("encargos") for him. KORMUSHKIN said he would see Modesto at seven o'clock in the usual place.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

201-305052

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING; XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED; ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING; MICROFILM

TO: Chief, SB Division

INFO: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: REDTOP - Voice Samples of Soviets in Mexico

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith for Headquarters retention are voice samples, taken from LIENVOY, of the following Soviets previously stationed in Mexico :

Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV (201-236701)
Yuriy Aleksandrovich ANDRIANOV (201-230429)
Ivan Afanasyevich BEKETOV (201-754500)
Ina Nikolayevna BOLDOVA (201-245416)
Vasiliy Karpovich BUTSEV (201-273883)
Yuriy Aleksandrovich DOMRACHEV (201-297666)
Aleksey Ivanovich GARMASHEV (2010277418)
Vladimir Petrovich GULIN (201-734985)
Viktor Petrovich KALININ (201-735049)
Nikolay Konstantinovich KHLEBNIKOV (201-227420)
Sergey Sergeyevich KONSTANTINOV (201-101794)
Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052)
Sergey Semenovich KUKHARENKO (201-260831)
Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO (201-305870)
Vladimir Petrovich OBRUBOV (201-731394)
Ivan Dmitriyevich OSYEDKOV (201-779495)
Aleksandr Petrovich PAVLOV (201-761265)
Georgiy Aleksandrovich SHCHUCHKIN (201-242728)
Vasiliy Vasilyevich SIMONOV (201-735055)
Sergey Iosifovich SOKOLOVSKIY (201-025485)
Gennadiy Fedorovich STROGANOV (201-735056)
Georgiy Stepanovich VISKO (201-243602)

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Voice samples

Distribution:
2 - CSB, w/att., H/W
1 - CWH, w/o att.

file Kostikov
201-305052

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA - 31217

DATE: 27 JANUARY 1967

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-8-10/1

14-00000

Wayne CTS
Jockey
Joan
Va.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 25

ORIG: J. CARLSON
UNIT: SR/O/PA
EXT: 8208 6213
DATE: 15 APR 66

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-305052

26 SECRET
201-305873

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING			
1	DA	5	BI
2	WH	6	CI
3	C	7	RP
4	G	8	

TO: SANTIAGO

18 APR 66 20 12z

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SR 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY WH 8, RI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI/INT2,

TO SAGO INFO CITE DIR 97152

REDWOOD LCIMPROVE

REF: MEXI 6866 (IN 95002)*

THE FOLLOWING IS FYI:

1. NECHIPORENKO OF REF BORN 4 JUL 32, WIFE LIDIYA N. ATTENDED CONFERENCE CARACAS ALSO POSSIBLY BUEN DEC 57, VICE CONSUL MEXI AUG 61 TO AUG 65. SPEAKS FLUENT ENGLISH AND SPANISH. ABLE TO PASS AS MEXICAN. CLEVER, INTELLIGENT, RESERVED. THOROUGH BACKGROUND MEXICAN CULTURE.

2. KOSTIKOV OF REF BORN 17 MAR 33, WIFE ROZA ALEKSANDROVNA BORN 2 MAR 32. IN 58 AND 59 ATTENDED CONFERENCES IN MADRID, IN 59 AND 60 INDUSTRIAL FAIRS IN MEXI AND HAVANA. EMPLOYEE THEN VICE CONSUL MEXI SEP 61 TO AUG 65. SPEAKS GOOD ENGLISH AND SPANISH.

3. BOTH SUBJS KNOWN KGB PER EXTENSIVE ACTIVITIES MEXI. KOSTIKOV BELIEVED IN THIRTEENTH DEPT FIRST CHIEF DIRECTORATE.

4. EXTENSIVE TRACES SUBJS AVAILABLE HQS. PLEASE ADVISE SOONEST IF SUBJS ARRIVE SAGO. WILL THEN POUCH SPRS WITH PORTION FOR LIAISON.

END OF MESSAGE

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

18 APR 66 20 12z

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 97152

*REF ANNOUNCED POSSIBLE ASSIGNMENT XOXSAGOMORXBNBXBXM OF SUBJS TO SAGO.

BDCØSBØØØØX

DC/SR/O/PA [signature]
SR/O/WH [signature]
SR/CI/K [signature]
WH/4/CH [signature]

C/WH [signature]
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SR/COP [signature]
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

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X-REF TO FILE NO.
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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3		7	RR
4		8	

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION SR

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ACTION

INFO FILE, VR, WE 8, CS/DO, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O, C/I/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D 4, FI/INT, IW, DDP/ESS, 3/OCI-2(G)

SECRET 121526Z

12 APR 66 IN 95002

SAGO INFO DIR CITE MEXI 6866

REDWOOD

LICOWL-1 REPORTS THAT ON 2 APR SOV EMB GUARD STANISLAV SERGEYEVICH SILNIKOV 201-271103 TOLD HIM THAT VITALIY BORISOVICH SHUBIN 201-266547 WAS NOW CONSUL IN CHILE, ADDED THAT PROBABLY OLEG MAKSIMOVICH NECHIPORENKO 201-305870 AND VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV 201-305252 WOULD ALSO BE GOING TO CHILE.

SECRET

CFN 6866 LICOWL-1 2 APR SOV EMB STANISLAV SERGEYEVICH SILNXEV 201-271103 VITALIY BORISOVICH SHUBIN 201-266547 CHILE OLEG MAKSIMOVICH NECHIPORENKO 201-305870 VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV 201-305252

BT

SECRET

Kostikov

3 March 1966
HMMA 28421
File: 201-305025) (KOSTIKOV)

From the LICOWL-1 Progress Report

HMMA 28421, 3 March 1966

(Original filed in 201-741655)

Processed by Millie Rodriguez, SR/O/WH. Date Process: 28 March 1966

Valeriy V. KOSTIKOV (201-305025) [Subject reported on KOSTIKOV in detail in Reference]. During the summer of 1965, KOSTIKOV also asked Subject to obtain a prostitute for him. Subject did so but KOSTIKOV failed to meet the girl. Shortly thereafter, KOSTIKOV returned to Moscow.

Reference mentioned is : HMMA 25677, March 1965

201-305052
~~201-305025~~

SECRET

SECRET

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
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	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH
201-305052
SEX M DOB ?

050-008-010
HMMA-27102
08 SEP 65
P2

CIT ?
OCC ?
LEFT MEXICO PCS DURING 4 AUG 1965-

R 6509151382

FILE IN 201-305052

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-63 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief, SR Division

INFO: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: REDWOOD - Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. LIFIRE reported the departure on 4 August 1965, Sabena flight 556 of Subject, his wife and daughter. Subject was travelling on Soviet diplomatic passport no. 2240, his wife and child on no. 2241. Travelling on the same flight with Subject was Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV, who has been assigned as guard at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, and was returning to the USSR.

2. Subject has left Mexico PCS. His replacement, Vladislav Sergeyevich KORMUSHKIN, arrived on 27 July 1965.

3. The bulk of Station information on Subject has already been reported to Headquarters. Below are a few additional items of interest.

4. LICOWL/1 reported that Subject's only close friends among the Soviets in Mexico were Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO (201-305870) and Leonid Vasilyevich NIKIFOROV (201-756168). LICALLA reports also show that Subject is almost constantly seen at the Embassy with these two individuals.

5. Subject speaks French (Source: LIENVOY, 14 June 1965).

6. Subject has hemorrhoids (Source: LIENVOY, 2 June 1965).

7. Subject has occasionally made appointments to see individuals "at the same time" or "at the same place." The Station has not, however, been able to identify these individuals. These individuals have identified themselves on the telephone as :

a. "Senora MONTIEL."

b. "Ricardo."

MICROFILMED AUG 20 1965 DOC. MICRO. SER.

-continued-

Attachment: Photos of Subject & wife

Appropriate photos retained in B.O

Distribution:
2 - CSR, w/att, H/W
1 - CWH, w/o att.

CS COPY

201-305052

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA - 26853

DATE: 11 August 1965

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-305052 FFN: P-7455

c."Froilan." The latter is possibly identical with a "Froilan TIRADO" who called Subject on 29 March 1965. There are no Station traces on Froilan TIRADO.

Source of the above is LIENVOY.

8. Attached are LICALLA and LILYRIC photographs of Subject and his wife.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

KOSTIKOVA
20 May 65
LILYRIC

V.V. KOSTIKOV
19 Jun 66
LICALLA

Att to HMMA-26853 11 Aug 65 201-305052

14-00000

(When Fi...

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH
201-305052
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
IDENTIFIED KGB OFFICER.

201-744341
HMMA-26823
10 AUG 65
P1

R 6508251399

FILE IN 201-305052

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, SR Division

INFO.: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: REDWOOD - Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV (201-779495)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. LIFIRE reported the departure on 4 August 1965, Sabena flight 556 for Brussels (and Moscow) of Subject. (It is not known whether Subject's travel was PCS or TDY. Subject's wife and son had left Mexico on 7 July 1965).

2. LIFIRE reported that Subject was travelling on Soviet service passport no. 009260; his wife and daughter had travelled on no. 009270. Subject's age was given as 35, that of his wife as 34, and that of his son Vladimir as 9. (Comment: These ages may be as of 1962, when Subject originally entered Mexico.)

3 3. Travelling on the same flight with Subject were Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052) and his family. KOSTIKOV is an identified KGB officer who was returning to the USSR PCS.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
2 - CSR
1 - CWH

COPY

201-305052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 26824	10 August 1965
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-779495 FFN: P -8125

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

9 AUG 1965

1	PA	5	B1
2	WH	6	CI
3		7	RR
4		8	

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION SR8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH8, C/CI2, C/OPS, FI, FI/INT, WH/C8

SECRET 261701Z

DIR CITE MEXI 4349

6 Aug 65 IN 27258

REDWOOD

1. LIFIRE AND LITEMPO REPORT ARRIVAL 27 JULY VLADISLAV SERGEYEVICH KORMUSHKIN, AGE 31, WIFE INNA NIKOLAYEVNA AGE 30, SON SERGEY AGE 5. KORMUSHKIN ASSIGNED AS ATTACHE SOVIET EMB, BELIEVED REPLACING KOSTIKOV (201-305052).

2. REQUEST TRACES AND 201.

SECRET

CFN: 4349 LIFIRE LITEMPO 27 VLADISLAV SERGEYEVICH KORMUSHKIN 31 INNA NIKOLAYEVNA 30 SERGEY 5 KORMUSHKIN SOVIET EMB KOSTIKOV 201-305052 201

BT

SECRET

~~201-744344~~

~~A-22936~~

File 201-305052

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES: 4

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	CI	5	131
2	WH	6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, SR8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI

S

SECRET 262244Z

DIR CITE MEXI 4247

file KOSTIKOV 26 JUL 65 IN 19199

REDCOAT LCIMPROVE

1. ACC LIENVOY 15 JULY MR BRECK (PHONETIC) CALLED SOVEMB FROM PBPRIME ASKED FOR SOV CONSUL WHO NOT IN. CALLED TWICE AGAIN 15 JULY WAS TOLD CONTACT KOSTIKOV (201-305052) WHO SPEAKS ENGLISH.

2. 0952 HRS 19 JULY UNK MEXICAN CALLED SOVEMB ON PART AMERICAN WHO JUST ARRIVED BY BUS FROM PBPRIME AND WHO HAD SPOKEN KOSTIKOV. SINCE K NOT IN MAN CALLED AGAIN 1104 HRS SAID WAS MR BRECK. ARRANGED SEE K SAME DAY 1200 HRS AT EMB.

3. LIEMPTY 6 RPTED YOUNG AMER TYPE MALE ENTERED SOVEMB 1233 HRS 19 JULY. LIEMBRACE SURVEILLANCE MOUNTED WHEN HE LEFT EMB AT 1317 HRS. NOT DROPPED UNTIL 23 JULY WHEN HE IDENTIFIED BY LIEMBRACE THROUGH HOTEL AS EUGENE ALLEN BREKKE, "RADIO ANNOUNCER," 1257 ROBERT ST., "DESMOINES, IOWA."

4. EMB CHECK SHOWED PROTECTION WELFARE CASE JULY 64 EUGENE ALLYN BREKKE DPOB 4 MAY 37 BRITT, IOWA. RES 1257 ROBERT ST., HILLSIDE, N.J. BREKKE COULD NOT PAY HOTEL BILL AND SOUGHT EMB AID.

5. 23 JULY STA OBTAINED ACCESS TO LARGE ENVELOPE CONTAINING LTRS TO BREKKE. ENVELOPE MAILED FROM JULIA BREKKE, 605 STOCKDALE

SECRET

201-305052

SECRET

IN 19199 2/2

ST. WEBSTER CITY, IOWA. SENT C/O MR. E. PEARSON, 4001 FREIDA ST., LITTLE ROCK ARK. PEARSON APPARENTLY SENT TO PBSWING. LTRS TO BREKKE SHOWED HE WRITING BAD CHECKS, SEEKING IMMIGRATION AUSTRALIA, BEHIND ON LOANS, SEARCHING FOR HIS FATHER, ANTONE SAUERIN BREKKE AND HAS MADE FCC APPLICATION FOR RADIO OPERATOR'S LICENSE.

6. POUCHING PHOTOS AND FURTHER DETAILS. LOCAL ODENVY ADVISED. REQUEST HQS TRACES.

S E C R E T

CFN 4247 ACC LIENVOY 15 JULY MR BRECK NOT IN 15 JULY KOSTIKOV (201-305252 ENGLISH 0952 HRS 19 JULY UNK MEXICAN AMERICAN BUS K NOT IN 1104 HRS MR BRECK K 1200 HRS LIEMPTY 6 RPTED 1233 HRS 19 JULY 1317 HRS NOT DROPPED 23 JULY HOTEL EUGENE ALLEN BREKKE 1257 ROBERT ST "DESMOINES IOWA JULY 64 EUGENE ALLYN BREKKE DPOB 4 MAY 37 BRITT IOWA RES 1257 ROBERT ST HILLSIDE N.J. NOT PAY HOTEL 23 JULY BREKKE JULIA BREKKE 605 STOCKDALE ST WEBSTER CITY IOWA C/O MR. E. PEARSON 4001 FREIDA ST LITTLE ROCK ARK AUSTRALIA ANTONE SAUERIN BREKKE FCC HWS

BT

SECRET

NNN

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: XXXXX MARKED FOR INDEXING; NO INDEXING REQUIRED; ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING; MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Panama City

INFO.: Chief, WH; Chief, SR

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: REDCOAT - Modesto BERMUDEZ

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES: Δ MEXICO CIT PANAMA

REFERENCE: PACY - 7321, 8 July 1965

1. Panama City traces are requested on Modesto BERMUDEZ, a Panamanian currently in Mexico City. BERMUDEZ has been in touch with Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052), Vice Consul at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City and identified KGB officer, on several occasions.

2. On 7 July 1965 "Modesto" called KOSTIKOV, saying that he had just received a cable asking about the trip to Helsinki, to which "Modesto" wanted to cable a reply. KOSTIKOV said that they had to wait a day or two, but that he would send an urgent cable. On 8 July 1965 an individual identified by voice as the "Modesto" above called KOSTIKOV, who was out, and left the message to tell him that he had a call "from the Panamanians." On 9 July "Modesto BERMUDEZ," a Panamanian, left a message for KOSTIKOV to call him. (Source: LIENVOY.)

3. It appears that the conversations above refer to the Panamanian delegation to the World Peace Congress being held in Helsinki 10-17 July 1965. BERMUDEZ is not, however, one of the Referenced six Panamanians who arrived in Mexico on 6 July on their way to the Congress.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
2 - COS, Panama City
1 - CWH
1 - CSR /cc SR/c/WH

CS COPY

201-305052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 26602	14 July 1965
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-305052 ffm: 7455

TO	Chief of Station, Mexico City
INFO	
FROM	Chief, SR via Chief, WH
SUBJECT	REDWOOD SPR ON Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052)

MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None, for information only.

REFERENCE : HMMA-25722, 2 April 1965

Subject SPR typed in final form is forwarded herewith.

John T. Ossenbrink

3-COS, Mexico City, W/attachment
ATTACHMENT:
Orig & 1 SPR

201-305052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-13801 CS COPY	9 July 1965
	CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-305052

1-WH/1 w/att
1-SR/O/WH w/att
1-RID w/att

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
SR/O/WH	George Finney	lam	6412

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/SR/O/WH	9 July	Kendall G. Lyon
C/WH/1		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH		[signature]

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

SPR PREPARED BY: Vera T. WEISCARVER

DATE: 15 February 1965

201 NUMBER: 305052

A-NUMBER: 18973

1. NAME: Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV

2. DPOB: 17 March 1933, Moscow. (1)

3. CITIZENSHIP AND PASSPORT DATA (including past citizenship and passports, with dates):

   Soviet citizen.

   Service passport no. C-64352, when he arrived in Mexico City on 19 September 1961. (2)

4. ETHNIC ORIGIN:

   Unknown.

5. OTHER NAMES USED (with dates, circumstances, DPOB, citizenship and passport data, if appropriate):

   Unknown.

6. CURRENT POSITION (non-intell):

   When Subject arrived in Mexico City, he had employee status. Later Subject was raised to the rank of Vice Consul and, since March 1963, Subject has held the rank of Attache in the Consular Office. (3)

att #1 -HMMW-13801

201-305052

7. RELATIVES (including DPOB, location/address, passport and other personal information where available and appropriate):

a. Father: Not known.

b. Mother: Not known.

c. Spouse (including maiden name and date of marriage):

Roza Aleksandrovna KOSTIKOVA

DPOB: 2 March 1932, Arkhangel Oblast. (1)

Service passport No. C-64353, 19 September 1961.

According to LICOWL/1, Subject's wife has blond hair, blue eyes, is short in stature and speaks excellent Spanish. LICOWL/1 also stated that Subject's wife appears to be in charge of the Embassy kitchen. (4) (5)

About 18 February 1964, Subject's wife underwent a stomach operation for an unknown ailment. (6)

Dr. SORIANO (See Western Contacts) has treated Subject's wife for her illnesses. (7) (8) (9)

Subject's wife was to be the Soviet Representative in the annual U.N. Parade held in Mexico City in October 1962. (10)

d. Children.

Daughter - Svetlana Valeriyevna. DPOB: 1959, Moscow. (11)

Passport No. C-64353. (Child arrived in Mexico on Mother's passport.)

e. Others:

None known.

8. LANGUAGES (with degree of fluency):

a. English:: Good. (11)

Subject used English while conversing with WANSTROM (See Western Contacts). (12)

b. Spanish: Good. (11) (13)

c. Subject is reported to be a graduate of the Moscow Institute of Languages: (14)

9. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AND PHOTOS:

(March 1965 - basis LIEMPTY, LICOWL/1 and Staffer Observation.)

a. Apparent age - 35-38 years.

b. Height - 5'10".

c. Build - Stocky, paunchy stomach.

d. Hair - Dark brown, receding hairline, giving effect of widow's peak, kinky hair.

e. Eyes - Small, color not definitely known but believed to be hazel, always wears tinted sunglasses.

f. Complexion - White, rough, with heavy beard that is not always well shaved.

g. Shape of face - Round, somewhat heavy jowls, thin lips, wide nostrils, Head goes up to point at top but this is covered by his hair.

h. General appearance - More Semitic or Near Eastern than Slavic. In general a sloppy dresser with ill fitting clothes.

i. Outstanding features and identifying marks - Always wears tinted sunglasses.

j. Others - Drinks, uses profane language. (Source - LICOWL/1)

Public photographs taken at the Mexico City Airport in 1964. Picture attached to original only.

10. PERSONALITY, CHARACTER, HABITS (with specific details and examples where appropriate including subjects covered in personality/operational assessment questionnaire):

Subject plays volleyball. (16) (17)

Subject is a frequent visitor to LICOWL/1's store and according to LICOWL/1, Subject is a person who can be very polite and very kind. LICOWL/1 and Subject have a very friendly relationship. (16) (19) However, see also HMMA-25516, 4 March 1965.

LICOWL/1 gave a fiesta at his home on 12 September 1964, which was attended by several Soviets. Subject and Yuriy Dmitriyevich KALININ (see Soviet contacts) became drunk and sick. When Subject fully realized what a state KALININ was in, he pulled himself together and drove KALININ home. During this fiesta, Subject became interested in Juana Valdes aka Juana Prieto GONZALES (see Western contacts). Sra. GONZALES (see Western contacts) Juana's mother, told LICOWL/1 that Subject had offered the girl 300 pesos a week to be his girl friend. (4) (20)

Prior to the fiesta, LICOWL/1 told Yuriy Dmitriyevich KALININ (see Soviet contacts) that Subject and Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO (see Soviet contacts) were also invited. KALININ stated that he did not like these two, that they were tyrants and felt that they were important personnel since they were diplomats. KALININ also said he did not like the idea of their attending the fiesta, and while speaking appeared to be very disgusted and spat on the floor. (21)

11. CURRICULUM VITAE:

Date	Entry	Source
	Subject graduated from higher studies at the Moscow Institute of Foreign Languages.	(22)
September-October 1958	Subject was a member of the Soviet Bloc Delegation to the 17th International Railroad Congress Meeting in Madrid, Spain.	(22)
June 1959	Subject visited Barcelona after the Congress, listed as an interpreter, and used passport no. S-39990.	(22)
June 1959	Subject attended the CEI Congress in Madrid.	(22)
September 1959	Subject requested a U.S. visa as a member of KHRUSHCHEV's party. Subject was listed as an employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.	(22)
November 1959	Subject attended the Soviet Industrial Exposition in Mexico City.	(22)
6 January 1960	Subject flew from Mexico City to Havana.	(22)
February 1960	Subject attended the Soviet Industrial Exposition in Havana, Cuba.	(22)
7 March 1960	Subject departed Havana for Europe, still using passport no. S-39990.	(22)
19 September 1961	Subject arrived in Mexico City, accompanied by his family, via Sabena no. 555.	(23)
8 December 1961	An unidentified male called the Embassy and asked for Aleksandr Mikhaylovich BROVKIN (Third Secretary, suspect KGB officer). The caller was told BROVKIN had left Mexico and Sr. KOSTIKOV had taken his place.	(24)
6 January 1963	Subject was in Vera Cruz.	(25)
7 April 1963	Subject departed Mexico City, via Sabena no. 556, accompanied by his family for home leave in the USSR.	(26)
14 May 1963	Subject returned from home leave, accompanied by his family.	(27)
4 December 1963	Subject's address was Progreso 9, Apt. 6. In early 1965, Subject still had the same address.	(28) (29)
	March 1965, "Diario Official" lists Subject at this same address.	
7 December 1963	Subject went to Cuernavaca.	
	(COMMENT: Duration of his stay unknown, but believed to have been a pleasure trip.)	(30)

12. INTELLIGENCE AFFILIATION (including justification, sources and narrative discussion):

Subject is a known KGB Officer probably from the 13th Department of the First Chief Directorate, identified as such through the AEBURBLE case. (See Intelligence Activities). (3?)

Subject was a member of the group who met Sergey Nikolayevich ANTONOV, Chief of the Latin American Department of the KGB, at the Airport. (32)

Subject continued the clandestine contact with Margarito LNU (See Western Contacts), an unidentified agent previously handled by First Secretary Viktor Nikolayevich GLOTOV, formerly KGB Rezident. (33)

Subject has frequently escorted diplomatic couriers to and from the airport, a function primarily of the consular section officers and, as farras is known, principally a KGB responsibility. (33)

In the consular office all of Subject's immediate associates are identified KGB officers. (See Soviet contacts). (34)

14-00000

13. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY (positions, functions, agents, contacts, other details, including how we learned about each item, all in chronological order including narrative summary where necessary, such as D/A cases, incidents, etc):

About March 1963, Subject and CARMASHEV (see Soviet Contacts) flew from Mexico City to Tijuana, Baja California, where they rented a Hertz car allegedly for a recreational visit. The men travelled to Mexicali and Ensenada and departed for Mexico City on 13 March 1963. (35) (36)

On 1 September 1963, Subject and ALFERYEV (see Soviet contacts) flew from Mexico City to Tijuana where they rented a Hertz auto. While renting the auto, Subject was asked for identification. Subject stated he was an employee of the Mexican Department of Exterior Relations. Later, when pressed for identification, Subject stated he was an employee of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Subject and ALFERYEV spent most of their time in the company of Isaak Carlos Chapluk (see Western contacts). The Soviets visited Estero Beach, Punta Banda and Nuna SIMANOVICH's curio shop (see Western contacts). On 7 September 1964, they visited the Bahia Hotel for dinner and a floor show in the company of Miguel POPOFF (see Western contacts). On 10 September 1963 the Soviets purchased 20,000 bales of cotton to be shipped to Ensenada, final destination unknown. Subject and ALFERYAV were also in contact with Demetrio ALMAGUER (see Western contacts). ALMAGUER was allegedly authorized by the Soviets to find three Mexican youths to travel and study in the USSR. The two Soviets departed Tijuana on 13 September 1963. (37)

On 19 January 1964, when LICOZY/5 (a Station double agent) returned to his apartment building, SHUBIN (see Soviet contacts) and Subject were seated in a car outside and NECHIPORENKO (LICOZY/5's case officer) was about to ring the door bell. NECHIPORENKO told LICOZY/5 that PRIKHODKO (the former KGB case officer) was in town and wanted to see LICOZY/5. NECHIPORENKO also gave LICOZY/5 tickets for the Soviet Soccer game on 19 January 1964. (38)

(COMMENT: LICOZY/5 is being handled by NECHIPORENKO and is a KGB agent. This is the only known occasion of Subject being involved with LICOZY/5 in anything but an overt business contact.)

Subject met with AEBURBLE in Mexico City on 9, 11 and 12 February 1963 and received information from AEBURBLE on industrial and missile sites in PBPRIME. Subject also gave AEBURBLE requirements of the same nature to be carried out in the future. Subject made arrangements with AEBURBLE for his next meeting, to be held in New York City, with a different, unidentified Soviet. On 6 May 1963, AEBURBLE was met in accordance with the above arrangements by Oleg Danilovich BRYKIN (201-292588), a translator assigned to the U.N. Secretariat in New York City. BRYKIN has been identified by a sensitive reliable source as a member of the KGB's 13th Department. (31)

Substantiating information that Subject is a member of the KGB is derived from his connections with Margarito LNU (see Western contacts) undoubtedly an agent (unidentified) formerly in contact with the former First Secretary and KGB Rezident Viktor Nikolayevich GLOTOV. (33)

Subject attempted to cultivate David T. PATON (see American contacts) an American Embassy officer formerly assigned to the Visa Section and who now has protocol functions (1965). This cultivation ceased, as far as is known to the Station, immediately after the Station (with Embassy approval) advised PATON to indicate to Subject his disinterest in socializing with him. (33)

201-305052

Since 1 August 1964, Subject has received in double talk, apparently clandestine calls from Ricardo LNU, an unidentified male with a Central American or Cuban accent. Meetings have been arranged at unnamed places.

(COMMENT: A Ricardo LNU with a Central American or Cuban accent has been in contact with Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, Second Secretary and Intelligence Officer, Cuban, Embassy, Mexico City.) (39) (40)

On 11 March 1963, one Ricardo PEREZ (not further identified) attempted to call Subject and left a message that he would like to meet with Subject the "place Subject knows" on the next Friday. (41)

(COMMENT: Ricardo PEREZ may be identical with RICARDO LNU of the above paragraph because of the similar trend in conversation in arranging meetings. One Ricardo PEREZ called the Cuban Embassy, on 26 June 1964 to tell Antonio GARCIA Lara, 201-328338, Commercial Attache and Intelligence Officer, Cuban Embassy, Mexico City, that he had a message for GARCIA from Marguerita DALTON Mexican citizen, student at University of Havana and sister of Raque DALTON, Cuban IS Agent. (42)

14. NON-INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY (positions, function, contacts, general activity):

On 18 January 1962, Subject called Valeriy Aleksandrovich ANDRIANOV, GRU Chauffeur, and asked for data on the trade of Mexico with Red China for "this year". (43)

On 27 March 1962, Subject called the Belgian Embassy to obtain transit visas for two Soviet artists transiting Belgium. (40)

On 7 July 1962, Subject was in Cuernavaca, probably for a pleasure trip. (44)

Subject called LICOZY/5 on 24 August 1962, and asked about travelling by plane from Mexico to Trinidad. LICOZY/5 explained that one would have to go from Mexico to Caracas to Trinidad. Subject stated he would order tickets in September. (19)

(COMMENT: The Station has no additional information on this matter.)

Subject called Jorge RUEDA to complain because two weeks previously an order had been placed with RUEDA to find a specialist to repair the billiard table at the Embassy. (45)

On 7 January 1963, Subject called GARMASHEV (see Soviet contacts) long distance from Vera Cruz, where he had gone to make medical arrangements for a Soviet seaman burned in a shipboard fire. Subject had an automobile accident while on his trip which he related to GARMASHEV. GARMASHEV told Subject he would have to pay his own expenses back to Mexico City and also pay his expenses when he returns for the car after it's repaired. (25)

In mid-November 1963, Subject went to Cuautla, (near Mexico City) apparently for recreational reasons. (46)

On 16 April 1964, Subject called the Embassy and asked that Aleksandr Mikhaylovich DENISOV, Third Secretary and GRU officer, call New York and tell "them" (not further identified) the couriers left on Aeronaves de Mexico, flight # 400 at 10:45 am and also asked that DENISOV then call Vladimir P. GOULINE, Attache-Chief of the Secret Files and Suspect KGB Officer, and tell him "everything is all right". (47)

On 29 January 1963, an unidentified man called the Embassy and left a message for Subject to go to the EDITORIAL to see the new edition. The caller also said "it's urgent". (48)

(COMMENT: EDITORIAL may be identical with Editorial Jus S.A. Plaza de Abasolo 14, Col. Guerrero, Mexico 3, D.F.)

In September and October 1963, Lee Harvey OSWALD (see Western contacts) was in contact with Subject regarding a visa so that OSWALD might return to the Soviet Union.

On 14 September 1964, FNU ALFARO of Mexicana de Aviacion called Subject to say that Subject's Customs Declaration for importing two cameras to Mexico was valid until the 17th, and that he (ALFARO) needed information for the financial details to be arranged. (50)

Subject has made travel arrangements for members of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City and also visiting delegations and Soviet TDYers. Subject has ~~good~~ relationship with Sabona, Cubana and LICOZY/5 for this purpose. (51) (52) (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) (58) (59)

Subject has acted as an interpreter and guide for visiting Soviet delegations. (60) (61) (62) (63) (64)

Subject directed Sr. HERON (see Western contacts) in sending packages to the USSR. Subject advised that the duties for the Soviet value for the articles to be sent had to be paid in Mexico. (65)

Subject has often been in contact with Villana Cia, a customs brokerage firm, about shipments of articles to or from Mexico. (66) (67) (6)

Subject is a member of the Consular Corps in Mexico (Organization of Consular Officers). (68) (69)

15. CONTACTS (all known friends and associates; including foreign diplomatic, business and social contacts, with dates, nature of association and identifying data broken down in the following categories):

a. Soviet friends and associates:

Luz Maria Koulfman de SERLOVA aka Luz VERNOVA, wife of Carlos LAGUNAS Zavala (201-138040). Subject was called on 5 June 1962 by SERLOVA, who said she would like to see him. The arranged a time. (70)

Oleg Pavlovich MOSKVICHEV: Former employee of the Commercial Office and identified KGB Officer for S&T work. Subject called MOSKVICHEV on 13 November 1962tto ask if he might borrow MOSKVICHEV's car to go to the dentist. (71)

Antonia Libertad PATAN Lopez: Spanish "nino" employed in the Soviet Information Bulletin Office. PATAN called Subject on 21 November 1962 and stated that she'd left some documents at the Consular Office and was told to call Subject. Subject said he looked through her documents and they were all in order. (72)

(COMMENT: It is unknown what kind of documents these were, but they may have concerned a Soviet passport.)

Aleksey Ivanovich GARMASHEV: First Secretary and KGB Officer, suspect deputy KGB Rezident. Subject and GARMASHEV flew from Mexico City to Tijuana in March 1963. (35)

Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO: Vice-Consul and known KGB Officer. Subject and NECHIPORENKO are social contacts. NECHIPORENKO called Subject at the Embassy on 26 June 1964 and told Ivan Ivanovich OBYEDKOV, Employee Guard and suspect KGB Officer, to get Subject on the phone, "but don't say anything to the others". NECHIPORENKO instructed Subject to go to his (NECHIPORENKO's) house and said, "I'll wait for you near the store that sells paints, but not the nearest one, the one on the corner." NECHIPORENKO called Dr. SORIANO (see Western contacts) for Subject who was sick in bed. Subject and NECHIPORENKO share the use of a Volkswagon. (73) (74) (75) (13) (76)

Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV: Pravda Correspondent and identified KGB Officer. Subject and ALFERYEV flew to Tijuana on 1 September 1963. (77)

Vitaliy Borisovich SHUBIN: Attache and identified KGB Officer. Subject and family and the SHUBINs have taken vacations together at Cuernavaca. SHUBIN and Subject are personal friends. (78) (79) (80) (13)

Igor KRUGLIY: Member of the Soviet Trade Union Delegation visiting Mexico in December 1963. Subject accompanied and interpreted for members of this group. Subject and SHUBIN drank with KRUGLIY while on the town one night. (64)

Sergey Sergeyevich KONSTANTINOV: First Secretary and KGB Rezident. Subject and KONSTANTINOV are in business and social contact. (13) (76)

Boris Aleksandrovich KAZANTSEV: Minister Counsular and suspect KGB Officer. Subject has dined at the KAZANTSEV home. (13)

Rudolph Petrovich SHLYAPNIKOV: Soviet Youth Leader on UNESCO scholarship (suspect KGB) who visited Mexico during September 1964 and was in contact with Subject at this time. (81)

Leonid Vasilyevich NIKIFOROV: INTOURIST Representative in the Commercial Office and suspect KGB Officer. Subject used NIKIFOROV's car in January 1965, after he'd had an accident with his own car. (82)

Yuriy Demitriyevich KALININ: KGB Chauffeur. He visits LICOWL/1's store frequently and Subject is often with him. Subject drove KALININ home after KALININ got very drunk at LICOWL/1's fiesta in September 1964. (20) (83)

Jana KANKOVSKA: Secretary at the Czech Commercial Office. KANKOVSKA called Subject on 16 December 1964 and apologized for not being at home when Subject came over to pick up the "notes". (84)

Alfredo MIRABAL Diaz: Cuban Consul in Mexico City and known Cuban Intelligence Officer. MIRABAL called the Soviet Embassy on 22 November 1963 and asked to speak to Pavel Antonivich YATSKOV, Consul and identified KGB Officer, who was unavailable. Subject took the call and spoke to MIRABAL using the familiar tu.

SUBJECT: Forgive me for arriving late.

MIRABAL: Did you recover the suitcase?

SUBJECT: Yes.

MIRABAL: Then it was arriving on the other trip.

SUBJECT: Yes.

MIRABAL: I called to tell you the following, that regarding that matter that we had talked about, to see if we would spend Sunday in Chapultepec park because my wife is preparing some food to eat there.

SUBJECT: I'm sorry but I've just made plans for another trip and I'm leaving this very day. So please forgive me for not being able to go with you. (At this point Subject in error addressed MIRABAL as AZCUE and MIRABAL corrected him. COMMENT: MIRABAL replaced Eusebio AZCUE Lopez, Former Cuban Consul. COMMENT: According to LILYRIC Subject did not go on a trip.) Have you already talked with NECHIPORENKO?

MIRABAL: I'd like to talk with Pavel YATSKOV.

Subject: Wait a minute, he'll come now.

MIRABAL: If he's busy I'll call him later, but I'll be available for the next half hour on # 11-28-47 (phone).

SUBJECT: Okay. (121) (122) (123)

b. PBPRIME citizens, official and non-official, including KUBARK staff officers and contract types:

Lee Harvey OSWALD: When OSWALD was attempting to return to the USSR he contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City and spoke with Subject. (49)

David PATON: U.S. Embassy Clerk in charge of processing diplomatic visas. Subject was in contact with PATON, when Subject went to the U.S. Embassy to obtain a transit visa for Yelene Nikolayevna FILIPPOVA. Subject handed to PATON, CARMASHEV's calling card on the back of which was a time notation for a previous invitation CARMASHEV had extended to PATON. PATON explained to Subject that he could not accept this invitation. Subject continued to have legitimate contact with PATON arranging transit visas for travelling Soviets. (85) (86) (87) (88) (89) (90) (91) (92)

Carol MILLER: Employee of Life Magazine. MILLER called Subject on 2 October 1964 to ask if there were anything the Soviets wished to add to an article being printed in Life magazine. Subject said no. (149)

LIERECT-1: A former Mexico City Station asset of current interest to the Station as an LCIMPROVE possibility. See 201-212649 Subject visited LIERECT-1's Cuernavaca home on Easter 1964. (58)

c. Other Western officials and citizens:

LICOZY-5: Subject has had legitimate business contact with LICOZY/5 while making travel arrangements for Soviets. Subject has also been in social contact with LICOZY/5. (93) (94) (95) (96) (97) (72) (98)

Dr. Mario LAGUNILLA Leca: Medical Doctor used by the Soviet Embassy personnel. Subject has been in contact with LAGUNILLA for medical reasons. (7)

Margarito LNU: An unidentified male who has been in seemingly clandestine contact with members of the Soviet Embassy since 27 January 1961. Subject has had several calls from Margarito arranging times to meet at places "they know". Margarito has usually stated in his calls that he has some new books. (99) (100) (101) (102) (103)

Oscar GUTIERREZ: A Cuban who called the Embassy on 28 November 1962 and asked for "Valeriy". (104)

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Natalia DARE: (Not further identified.) DARE called Subject on 21 October 1963 and left a message that "Natalia DARE from Acapulco called and she will return to do it because tomorrow she is leaving by plane". (105)

Maria de la Paz CERVANTES: Mexican employee of Sabena Airline's downtown office. Subject has made travel arrangements with CERVANTES. On 16 April 1962, CERVANTES called the Embassy to invite Soviets to a dinner she was giving for Igor OISTRAKH, the violinist, to which Subject invited himself.

(COMMENT: The entire guest list consisted of RIS types.)

CERVANTES and Subject have a friendly relationship and on one occasion after she had taken care of some problems with passports for him, Subject asked what he owed her. The answer was "caviar", Subject then asked what else, CERVANTES replied "a kiss". (113) (114) (115) (116) (117) (118) (119) (120)

Dr. Emilian SORIANO: Medical doctor used by Soviet Embassy personnel. Subject was in contact with SORIANO on several occasions because his wife required an operation. (7) (124) (9) (125)

Lorenzo ZELAYA Romero: Honduran Communist and members of the PPS in Mexico. ZELAYA called Subject on 4 January 1963 to ask if Subject had heard anything about Rafael LNU (not further identified). Subject has been in subsequent contact with ZELAYA for unknown reasons. (64) (126) (127)

Jorge de la GARZA Corcho: Employee of La Libertad Cia Gral de Seguros, S.A. Insurance Company. Subject was in contact with GARZA following his car accident in Vera Cruz. (128) (129) (130) (131) (103) (132) (133)

Terro de WANSTROM or WANSTROHM (phonetic): Swedish citizen. On 12 November 1963, WANSTROM called the Soviet Embassy and asked to speak to Mr. Andre PURITS (phonetic) later spelling it as Anheny PYRCZ, who alledgedly worked for the Soviet Embassy in Mexico, in the Trade Commissions Department. WANSTROM stated he had met this man in a restaurant in Oaxaca and related his problem of finding a ship on which to travel to Europe. The unidentified man suggested he call the Soviet Embassy, which WANSTROM did, and was referred to Subject with whom he spoke. On 13 November 1963, Subject told WANSTROM there was a Polish Ocean Lines Co., at Alvaro Obregon 223-102, leaving Vera Cruz and going to Bremen, Germany, and Gdynia, Poland. WANSTROM thought Bremen would suit their purpose. Subject gave WANSTROM the telephone number of the company and was most solicitous about WANSTROM's arranging proper accomodations. (134) (12) (135)

(COMMENT: The response of the Soviet Embassy Officials was very unusual in this case. Requests of this nature are usually brushed aside and most often in a very rude manner. Judging by his non-British accent and almost flawless English, WANSTROM must have lived in the U.S. or Canada for some time.)

Dr. Antonio KARCZMAR Bugarskiy: Medical Doctor used by the Soviet Embassy. Subject's wife was treated by KARCZMAR. (66)

Ramon PENUNERE and Demetrio ALMAGUER: PENUNERE is an MLN member and a farmer residing in the Ejido Mezquital, Mexicali, Baja California. ALMAGUER is a PCM member residing in Mexicali, Baja California. (136)

ALMAGUER contacted PENUNERE some time before mid-November 1964, stating he'd been in contact with to two Soviets in Tijuana. ALMAGUER said the Soviets had authorized him to locate three youths for travel and study in the USSR. ALMAGUER asked PENUNERE if he had a son who could meet the qualifications. PENUNERE subsequently stated he had received information leaflets on scholarships in the USSR from ALMAGUER, who allegedly had gotten them from the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City when he visited there. ALMAGUER later stated he had seen Subject and ALFERYEV (see Soviet contacts) in Baja California and that they had given him two bottles of vodka and instructed him to select two students to attend the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University in the USSR. (136)

Antonina SHIPPER Podornick: SHIPPER is a contact of Pavel Atonovich YATSKOV, Consul and KGB Officer. YATSKOV apparently instructed SHIPPER to call Subject. On 29 June 1964, she requested that Subject go to the Judge with her, since she had problems arising from the fact her father died leaving an estate without a will. (138) (139) (140)

Sr. Justo BRETON: (not further identified) BRETON called Subject on 3 July 1964 about a "help" certificate (certificado de ayuda).

LICOWL/1: Owner of a store frequented by Soviets. Subject has attended parties at LICOWL/1's home, and also frequents the store. (143) (144)

Ricardo LNU: (Not further identified) Ricardo LNU calls Subject at the Embassy, and meetings at unstated places are arranged. These calls do not seem to have a specific pattern but definitely seem to be clandestine. Ricardo LNU and Subject always know where they will meet, usually the calls are for arranging the time. (145) (146) (147) (148) (61)

Isaac Carlos CHAPLUK: (201-229418) Owner of Playa Bungalows in Ensenada, Baja California. Subject and ALFERYEV were guests of CHAPLUK's for dinner on several occasions when they visited Ensenada. CHAPLUK also took them to SIMONOVICH's store (see Western contacts). (37)

Miguel POPOFF: Allegedly Richfield Oil Distributors in Ensenada, Baja California. Russian-born with Mexican citizenship. Subject and ALFERYEV were in contact with POPOFF in September 1963, while in Ensenada. (37)

Miguel BAZHER: Hungarian living in Mexico. BAZHER spoke to Subject on 17 October 1964 in regard to bringing a Hungarian to Mexico. Subject stated he was only authorized to handle problems of this nature for Soviets, but, that if BAZHER could get a letter from Hungarian officials, Subject would see what could be done about it. (150)

Unidentified Nicaraguan: An unidentified Nicaraguan male called Subject on 8 November 1965 and stated he had something for Subject. Subject asked him to come by the Embassy the next day. (151)

Virginia GOMEZ Nieto: Hairdresser, member of the Women's Group of International Organization of Journalists, and a leftist. GOMEZ called the Embassy and left a message for Subject, stating she would be over to see him on the following Monday. (152)

Sra. Maria GONZALEZ and her daughter Juana: Subject became interested in Juana at LICOWL/1's fiesta in September 1964. Maria GONZALEZ stated to LICOWL/1 that Subject had offered her daughter 300 pesos a week to be his girl friend. Subject and Viktor KALININ, Administrator, met with Maria GONZALEZ and Lourdes CUEVAS on 26 September 1964, in an attempt by GONZALEZ to fix Subject up with CUEVAS, because she didn't want her daughter going with Subject. (4)

Sr. fnu HERON or HARON: HERON called Subject on 19 January 1965, in order to find out how to mail a package to the Lithuanian USSR. Subject gave HERON a detailed explanation. (65)

Dr. Arseny LEPEAUCA: Medical doctor residing at Sinaloa 109, telephone 28-95-28. LEPEAUCA called Subject on 5 January 1965 to invite him to a "Rosca" party at his home the next day. (153) (155)

Jose Luis FERNANDEZ: FERNANADEZ was in contact with Subject concerning a trip to the USSR for an operation. (154) (155)

Manuel SUAREZ Angeles: Pianist who has studied music in Moscow (1963). Subject, NECHIPORENKO (see Western contacts) and the Ambassador were invited to the SUAREZ home. (156)

Dr. Luis QUINTANILLA del Valle: Leftist Director of the Institute for Living, Mexico. QUINTANILLA's secretary called the Embassy and told Subject, 19 manuals of Marx were missing from the package Subject or Svyatoslav Fedorovich KUZNETSOV, First Secretary, Cultural Officer and KGB Officer, sent over and would they please send copies when they are again available. (158)

fnu SAN MARTIN: Employee of Television Channel 11. SAN MARTIN called the Embassy on 5 March 1964 to cancel a date he had with Subject. (159)

Armando MARTINEZ: MARTINEZ called the Embassy on 26 October 1964 and left a message that he wanted to speak to Subject. He also stated that he had told Subject he would call, and that it was urgent. (29)

Nuna SIMANOVICH: Owner and operator of the NUNA SIMANOVICH Curio Shop, Ruiz Ave., Ensenada, Baja California, Mexico. Subject and ALFERYEV (see Soviet contacts) visited SIMANOVICH's store in September 1963, and Subject told him if he wished to travel to the USSR, it could very easily be arranged. Subject also told SIMANOVICH he was attached to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. (136)

Marta BORQUEZ de la Fuente (201-745287): BORQUEZ called the Embassy on 29 April 1964 and asked for the Vice-Consul. It is unknown whether she meant Subject or NECHIPORENKO (see Soviet contacts), as neither was available.

d. OTHERS (Subject has numerous business and social contacts at Sabena Airlines, especially the following):

Jorge CORTES R.: Assistant Station Manager of Sabena Airlines at the Mexico City Airport. CORTES has invited Subject for a beer at his house and was also one of the signers of a Christmas card sent to Subject by Sabena Employees. (106) (107) (78)

(COMMENT: NECHIPORENKO (see Soviet contacts) LICOZY/S's case officer, levied a requirement on LICOZY/S for information on CORTES. According to LICOZY/S, CORTES is a young, serious, honorable employee who was previously in Sabena's cargo department, later promoted to assistant Station Manager and is now on his way up.)

Adolfo BUCIO G.: Employee of Sabena at Mexico City Airport. BUCIO called Subject to invite him to a party at the home of Maria del Socorro VOLLRATH. Subject often calls BUCIO to find out arrival times of planes. BUCIO was also a signeroof the above Christmas card. (108) (109) (57) (110) (111)

Maria del Socorro VOLLRATH: Employees at Sabena Mexico City Airport. VOLLRATH resides at Pennsylvania 254, Apt. 2. VOLLRATH signed the above Christmas card and is apparently on a friendly relationship with Subject. T She expected Subject to meet her at the airport "with a drink" when she returned from a trip to Europe. (57) (109) (110)

The following are employees of the Sabena office at the airport which LIFIRE found to be in contact with Subject. (112)

Alberto L. ALFARO
Carlos ALANIS Cantu
Jorge CASTILLO Carrera
Carlos MENDOZA S., Jr.
Enrique NUNEZ S.
Yvonne HENONIN

16. PAST OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY AGAINST SUBJECT: (chronological, with narrative summary of each item):

During his tours in Mexico City, Subject has been under routine LIENVOY and LIEMPTY surveillance. However, during the period following 22 November 1963, LILYRIC, LIEMBRACE, [illegible] and LIRICE surveillance were mounted on Subject because of his telephone contact with Lee Harvey OSWALD. (49)

After 23 November 1963, the LIEMBRACE surveillance team and LILYRIC and LIMITED base houses all reported Subject under DFS surveillance and Station surveillance was dropped. (160)

On 19, 20 and 21 January 1965, Subject was under LIEMBRACE surveillance as a followup to a report from LIEMPTY stating that Subject was not behaving in his normal fashion. Nothing significant was developed. (16)

17. OPERATIONAL PLANNING DATA:

a. for access:

(1) current residence (address, floor plan, owner, neighbors, other pertinent data):

Subject lives at Progreso 9, Interior (apartment) 6, Mexico D.F. (28)

(2) phone:

Subject has no known home phone.

(3) Car (license, description, where garaged and serviced):

Subject shares a 1963 white Vokswagon, license # D-336, with NECHIPORENKO. During 19,20 and 21 January 1965, while Subject was under LIEMBRACE surveillance, it was noted Subject had had an accident and was using a white 1963 Volkswagon, license # D-335 usually used by NIKIFOROV (see Soviet contacts) and Boris Sergeyevich ZOBNIN, Commercial Officer Employee and suspect KGB officer. (13) (34) (32)

(4) Office (location, floor plan, phone number, immediate associates, etc.):

Subject usually occupies a desk on the second floor of the Embassy in an area allotted to the Consular section. (76)

(5) current pattern of daily activity (including routes taken, hours, where eats, sports, hobbies, clubs):

Subject arrives at the Embassy at approximately 9:00am and leaves and re-enters many times during the day. (161)

(6) usable contacts:

Members of the Consular Corps:

Subject seems to be more than moderately active in this organization.

LICOOL/1

b. for assessment:

(1) exploitable points

(2) Other data

(3) Handwriting samples

18. OPERATIONAL STEPS TO BE CARRIED OUT NEXT YEAR (planning, with concrete steps for action or investigation, acquisition or further data, etc.):

a. Continuance of regular LIEMPTY and LIENVOY reporting and occasional coverage by LIEMBRACE surveillance.

b. Continuance of LICOWL/1 regular reporting on Subject and, in addition, further LICOWL/1 effort to get Subject embroiled in intimate relationship with indigenous females.

c. Effort to obtain another access agent against Subject. The Station is presently investigating the possibility of developing one of Subject's several Sabena Airlines contacts for this purpose.

19. SOURCES

(1) USEMB Moscow 3662, Control 22299, 30 June 1961

(2) LIFIRE, 29 September 1961

(3) KUBARK Memo to Political Section, 25 September 1963

(4) LICOWL/1 Contact Report, 29 September 1964

(5) LICOWL/1, Contact Report, 27 August 1964

(6) LIENVOY, 18 February 1964

(7) LIENVOY, 27 October 1962

(8) LIENVOY, 29 October 1962

(9) LIENVOY, 9 November 1962

(10) LIENVOY, 17 October 1962

(11) DIR-20944, 28 February 1963

(12) LIENVOY, 13 November 1963

(13) LIENVOY

(14) Memot to State Dept, 25 September 1963

(15) Memo to Legal Attache, 13 November 1964

(16) MEXI-7061, 25 November 1963

(17) LIENVOY, 19 February 1964

(18) LICOWL/1 Contact Report, 20 August 1964

(19) LICOWL/1 Contact Report, 24 August 1964

(20) LICOWL/1 Contact Report, 17 September 1964

(21) LICOWL/1 Contact Report, 3 September 1964

(22) REDCAP Sheet from Headquarters

(23) MEXI-9079, 3 October 1961

(24) LIENVOY, 78 December 1961

(25) LIENVOY, 7 January 1963

(26) MEXI-4126, 9 April 1963

(27) MEXI-4615, 16 May 1963

(28) LIENVOY, 4 December 1963

(29) LIENVOY, 26 October 1964

(30) LIENVOY, 7 December 1963

(31) HMMW-13305, 13 January 1965

(32) MEXI-7690, 8 January 1964

(33) HMMA-22652, 20 December 1963

(34) STATION OBSERVATION

(35) PBSWING Telegram, 14 March 1963

(36) PBSWING Memo, 15 March 1963

(37) FBI Memo to KUBARK, 31 January 1964

(38) MEXI-7930, 24 January 1964

(39) Cuban LIENVOY Resumen, 6 March 1962

(40) Cuban LIENVOY Resumen, 27 March 1962

(41) LIENVOY, 11 March 1963

(42) Cuban LIENVOY 26 June 1964

(43) LIENVOY, 18 January 1962

(44) LIENVOY, 7 July 1962

(45) LIENVOY, 21 August 1962

(46) LIENVOY, 15 November 1963

(47) LIENVOY, 16 April 1964

(48) LIENVOY, 29 January 1963

(49) MEXI-7025, 23 November 1963

(50) LIENVOY, 14 September 1964

(51) LIENVOY, 6 August 1964

(52) LIENVOY, 5 April 1963

(53) LIENVOY, 17 August 1964

(54) LIENVOY, 26 September 1964

(55) LIENVOY, 19 July 1963

(56) LIENVOY, 9 January 1964

(57) LIENVOY, 3 March 1964

(58) LIENVOY, 18 September 1964

(59) MEXI-0277, 15 July 1964

(60) LIENVOY, 31 January 1964

(61) LIENVOY, 1 October 1964

(62) LIENVOY, 6 November 1964

(63) LIENVOY, 3 November 1964

(64) LIENVOY, 6 December 1963

(65) LIENVOY, 19 January 1965

(66) LIENVOY, 19 Febeuary 1964

(67) LIENVOY, 24 February 1964

(68) LIENVOY, 14 February 1962

(69) LIENVOY, 6 October 1964

(70) LIENVOY, 5 June 1962

(71) LIENVOY, 13 November 1962

(72) LIENVOY, 21 Nobember 1962

(73) LIENVOY, 23 May 63

(74) LIENVOY, 26 June 1964

(75) LIENVOY, 6 January 1965

(76) LIEMPTY Observation

(77) PBSWING Memo, 10 September 1963

(78) LIENVOY, 23 October 1963

(79) LIENVOY, 8 December 1963

(80) LIENVOY, 29 May 1964

(81) MEXI-1242, 14 October 1964

(82) LIEMBRACE

(83) LICOWL/1 Contact Report, 10 September 1964

(84) LIENVOY, 16 December 1964

(85) HMMA-18727, 16 March 1962

(86) LIENVOY, 21 March 1962

(87) LIENVOY, 28 May 1962

(88) LIENVOY, 6 June 1962

(89) LIENVOY, 2 July 1962

(90) LIENVOY, 21 July 1962

(91) LIENVOY, 13 July 1962

(92) LIENVOY, 16 July 1962

(93) LIENVOY, 24 August 1962

(94) HMMA-20199, 14 November 1962

(95) HMMA-20775, 20 Febmary 1963

(96) LIENVOY, 9 August 1963

(97) LIENVOY, 18 July 1964

(98) LIENVOY, 27 August 1964

(99) MEXI-7051, 24 November 1963

(100) RESUMEN, 15 August 1962

(101) LIENVOY, 22 November 1962

(102) LIENVOY, 4 January 1963

(103) LIENVOY, 25 February 1963

(104) LIENVOY, 28 November 1962

(105) LIENVOY, 21 October 1963

(106) MEXI-2436, 8 February 1965

(107) LIENVOY, 22 October 1963

(108) LIENVOY, 26 August 1964

(109) LIENVOY, 26 September 1963

(110) LIENVOY, 21 April 1964

(111) LIENVOY, 28 May 1964

(112) LIFIRE, 21 March 1964

(113) LIENVOY, 16 April 1962

(114) LIENVOY, 24 December 1963

(115) LIENVOY, 10 December 1963

(116) LIENVOY, 28 March 1963

(117) LIENVOY, 10 June 1964

(118) LIENVOY, 20 May 1964

(119) LIENVOY, 6 March 1964

(120) LIENVOY, 9 March 1964

(121) MEXI-7035, 23 November 1963

(122) LIENVOY, 22 NOvember 1963

(123) MEXI-7038, 23 November 1963

(124) LIENVOY, 29 October 1963

(125) LIENVOY, 10 November 1962

(126) LIENVOY, 17 March 1964

(127) RESUMEN, 4 January 1963

(128) LIENVOY, 21 January 1963

(129) LIENVOY, 22 January 1963

(130) LIENVOY, 21 February 1963

(131) LIENVOY, 22 February 1963

(132) LIENVOY, 27 February 1963

(133) LIENVOY, 6 March 1963

(134) LIENVOY, 12 November 1963

(135) HMMA-22630, 19 December 1963

(136) Memo from Legal Attache, 11 March 1964

(137) LIENVOY, 29 April 1964

(138) LIENVOY, 3 June 1964

(139) LIENVOY, 2 June 1964

(140) LIENVOY, 29 June 1964

(141) LIENVOY, 1 July 1964

(142) LIENVOY, 3 July 1964

(143) HMMA-23982, 27 July 1964

(144) LICOWL/1, Contact Reports

(145) LIENVOY, 5 October 1964

(146) LIENVOY, 1 August 1964

(147) LIENVOY, 9 December 1964

(148) LIENVOY, 18 December 1964

(149) LIENVOY, 2 October 1964

(150) LIENVOY, 17 October 1964

(151) LIENVOY, 8 November 1963

(152) LIENVOY, 15 November 1963

(153) LIENVOY, 5 January 1965

(154) LIENVOY, 31 July 1964

(155) LIENVOY, 5 August 1964

(156) LIENVOY, ~~25 April 1964~~ 9 June 64

(157) LIENVOY, 24 April 1964

(158) Memo, 2 April 1964

(159) LIENVOY, 5 March 1964

(160) MEXI-7041, 23 NOvember 1963

(161) LILYRIC Logs

201-305052

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

PAGE 1 OF 2

FROM
Mexico City

ACTION
C/WH 6

☒ RID COPY

INFO
FILE VR, ADDP, C/SRC, C/CI, C/FIZ C/RI/SD

S
E C R E T 222354Z

DIR CITE MEXI 3885

MEXI 3885

SUBJ TO LEAVE MEXI 28 APR FOR ABOUT A WEEK TRIP NEW YORK, WASH.

KAPOK REDCOAT LCIMPROVE LICOZY 5

23 Jun 65 IN 96432

REF MEXI 3339 (IN 61154)*

23 June 65

1. SUBJ RETURNED MEXI 13 JUNE. NECHIPORENKO AND KOSTIKOV AT HIS OFFICE 14 JUNE ARRANGE EMB RESERVATIONS. HAD LUNCH WITH N 17 JUNE.

2. RE EUROPEAN TRIP, N ASKED IF HAD LOOKED UP TOUR OPERATOR ASSOCIATES. GOT GENERAL AFFIRMATIVE FROM SUBJ WHO EXPLAINED CONDUCTED LITTLE BUSINESS SINCE WITH FAMILY. OUT OF BLUE, N ASKED IF SUBJ KNEW GINETTE PALACCI OF SIRTAM VOYAGES 49 RUE ST ROCHE PARIS. L 5 SAID SUPERFICIALLY ACQUAINTED, SHE ABOUT 27, JEWISH ORIGIN, LEFT CAIRO AFTER SUEZ CRISIS, WENT PARIS AFTER STAY ROME. N SAID SHE OF INTEREST SINCE MARRIED BRIT ABOUT FEW MOS AGO, AND BRIT IS NATO EMPLOYEE. INSTRUCTED SUBJ ASSESS CULTIVATE WHEN NEXT SEES HER. L 5 DID NOT CATCH BRIT'S NAME AS GIVEN BY N.

3. N ADVISED SUBJ OF HIS "PROMOTION" TO CAPTAIN AND SAID WOULD BE ADVISED MORE FORMALLY OF SAME BY PRIKHODKO OR HIGHER LEVEL PERSON IF SUBJ VISITS MOSCOW. SUBJ JUST ABOUT TOLD N THIS A JOKE, WENT ON VEHEMENTLY ASK N WHAT WAS OP ALL ABOUT, WAS THERE POSSIBILITY END OF SOV PROCRASTINATION RE BRANCH OFFICE, HAVE THEY

SECRET

201-305052

EARNED BY NOW HE HAS NO TIME OR INCLINATION SNEAK AROUND SATISFY PERTH AMBOY TYPE REQUIREMENTS. WOUND UP ASKING IF COULD DISCUSS MATTERS WITH PRIKHODKO. N REPLIED WITH USUAL ROUTINE OF NECESSITY PATIENCE, SUBJ'S INVALUABLE POTENTIAL, THAT PRIKHODKO'S PRESENT HIGH OVERT POSITION INHIBITED CLANDESTINE MEETS. SAID HAD WRITTEN ANOTHER REPORT HOME RE BRANCH OFFICE, INCLUDING INFO OF SUBJ'S AFL CONNECTIONS AND THEREBY POINT OUT THAT BRANCH WOULD HAVE NO MONEY LOSSES. BUT NO MOSCOW REPLY YET. N STILL WANTS SUBJ FIND CANDIDATES BRANCH MGR.

4. NO ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR NEXT MEET.

5. SUBJ TENTATIVELY PLANNING GO LOS ANGELES 9 JULY FOR BUSINESS WITH UNITOURS.

6. INDEX PALACCI.

SECRET

S E C R E T

14-00000

KOSTIKOV

DISPATCH | SECRET

Chief, WH Division | XX | NO INDEXING REQUIRED

Chief, SR Division | ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

Chief of Station, Mexico City | MICROFILM

Operational/REDCOAT/Sylvia MCDONALD

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: MEXI 3395

Transmitted herewith is a report amplifying reference information.

for
Willard C. Curtis

Attachment:
Contact Report

Distribution:
2 WHD, w/att, (2 copies)
1 SRD, w/att, (1 cy)

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-26118 HMMA-26118	21 My 65 21 May 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER (201-

12 May 1965

SUBJECT: Contact Report/ Silvia McDonald
12 May; Maria Cristina garden

1. Gestetner, known as Don Jackson, and Marheinz, introduced as Mort Bryan, met Subject on 12 May. Subject reported on her attendance at the WWII Victory celebration at the SovEmb held on 9 May, and its aftermath on 11 May at the art gallery of Alfredo Santos.

2. Subj, who attended the reception alone, her invited friend Georgina did not go, attracted a small circle of companions during the evening. First, there was a Guatemalan, a professor at the National University, who made conversation, learned she was a singer, and spoke of having her appear at a concert in Puebla. Next, Vladimir Andreev, his receiving line duties ended, joined her. Their conversation dealt with artists in Mexico, a pick-up from the first time they had met at the Santos Gallery some two months ago. Then, Valeriy came by and seemed to be mostly interested in watching Subject. Subj took an instant dislike to Valeriy (probably Kostikov). A short, blond Russian then drifted into the group, whom Subj pegged as a parachutist. This turned out to be accurate (probably Nikolai Leonov). Andreeva came by just about the time Subj was inviting the group to visit the Santos Gallery. Subj was just about able to include Andreeva in the invitation, and then Andreeva was gone from the group. The invitation was for 11 May at 1100. During the evening Andreev mentioned that he would like Subj to perform at the SovEmb. Subj said she would, but nok details for the engagement were made.

3. On 11 May Andreev and Valeriy showed up at the Santos Gallery. Subj introduced them to Alfredo Santos. Andreev seemed to be enchanted by the Gallery; Valeriy was less demonstrative. They had brought a bottle of Vodka and passed a few hours in the company of Alfredo. Subj confirmed her distaste for Valeriy, and formed her impression of Andreev that he wanted to break out of dull Soviet circles into the gayer, freer atmosphere of the artist set in Mexico. No specific appointment was made for Subj to see either of the two Sovs another time.

4. Subj, in her concern to know where this operation was taking her and the part she was to play in it, rang in some additional characters in her personal life. There was Georgina (lnu), her very good friend, aimless, clinging to Subject's orbit, student at U of A, who considered Andreev a "dear." Subj considered that Andreev and Georgina might very well develop a relationship

because she, Subject, though willing to pursue a platonic friendship with Andreev would have none of the other, and it was not unlikely that Georgina might captivate Andreev. There was Antonio Garza, Subject's current boy-friend, a bodyguard to Diaz Ordaz, who was giving evidence of growing serious about her. Subj was concerned that her participation in the operation might in some way cause harm to Antonio. Subject who entertains a host of artist friends at her home expressed concern that if she were followed and spied upon, a misleading impression might be gained.

5. Other personal matters about Subject that came out in the conversation were that she has income from stocks (sufficient to maintain her in Mexico), she is in visitante artista status, would like to attain inmigrado because she has difficulties with the Musicians Union (AMDA) that hampers pursuit of her profession; she is not interested in marriage; she is opposed to by-passing the limitations on her work imposed by her status.

6. The C.O.'s, in their guidance to Subject, made it clear that she could pull out of the operation any time she wanted, that it was in her power to terminate it either with us or with the Sovs, if she got involved with them. She was told that there was absolutely no harm that could befall her boy-friend, Antonio, from her continued participation. As for Georgina, the chips would have to fall as they may with Andreev; since Subject was Georgina's confidante, we would be appreciative of knowing about Andreev's involvement in any affair. She wanted to know why we were interested in Andreev, and the C.O.'s gladhanded her to the extent of telling her that it was our business to know about important Soviets, since one never knew when a Soviet might be in need of "help." Subject indicated she was willing to go along further at a slow pace.

7. In talking about the Soviet Victory reception, the presence there of LICRAVE-1 (his picture had been in the News) came up. Subject said she knew L-1. She characterized L-1 as flighty. She said he didn't get along with his wife. She intimated that when L-1 was lonely, he chasedxx after female companionship. L-1 drops by Subject's place every so often. She knew that L-1 had left his father's business and had gone in for crop-dusting (a relatively recent development).

8. Arrangements were made that "Mort" would keep in touch with Subject about once a week by phone (Tel. 46-71-06, Calle Rio Neva #32) and that later she would be given an emergency number to call.

PRM

14-00000

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(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
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	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

KOSTIKOV, V. V.
201-305052
SEX M DOB ?

050-008-010
HMMA-26081
14 MAY 65
A01 P1

CIT ?
OCC ?
C/O 13TH DEPT.
MEMBER KGB REZIDENTURA, MEXICO CITY.

R 6505262127

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-63)

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM Mexico City

ACTION WH 8

INFO

RR. FILE

KOSTIKOV

S E C R E T 130150Z

DIR CITE MEXI 3395 MEXI 3395

13 May 65

REDCOAT

13 May 65 IN 65759

1. SUBJ IS SYLVIA MCDONALD NEE MELANSON BORN 25 AUG 1934 BEVERLY, MASS. MARRIED 11 YEARS, DIVORCED MAR 1964 FROM BENSON MARION MCDONALD, AGE 40, RESIDENT MULLBERY, FLA. FATHER GREGORY MELANSON, MOTHER CAROLINE. SUBJ'S PROFESSION IS CONCERT LIEDER SINGER, RECENTLY CHANGING OVER TO POPULAR AND FOLK SINGING, ABOUT TO HAVE RECORDING RELEASED. IN MEXI THREE YEARS, VISITANTE STATUS. LIVES RELATIVELY POORLY, INCOME PRINCIPALLY FROM STOCKS DERIVING FROM ALIMONY SETTLEMENT. NO STA OR EMB TRACES.

2. PHONED EMB POLITICAL SECTION 8 MAY ASKING ADVICE RE PROPRIETY ATTEND 9 MAY SOVEMB RECEPTION. STATION DEBRIEFING YIELDED FOLL: ABOUT TWO MOS AGO SENT INVITATIONS TO ENTIRE DIP CORP FOR PAINTING EXHIBITION OF FRIEND. ONLY SOV ATTENDING WAS FIRST SEC VLADIMIR IVANOVICH ANDREYEV, SUSPECT KGB. LATTER THEN TENTATIVELY INVITED SUBJ TO EMB RECEPTION, EXPRESSED MUTUAL INTEREST FOLK SINGING, ALSO INVITED SUBJ HIS HOME HEAR SOV RECORDS BUT MADE NO SPECIFIC DATE. BASIS STA CURRENT INTEREST ANDREYEV (SEE BELOW), C/O ASKED SUBJ ATTEND, TAKE NO INIATIVE CULTIVATE A, REPORT RESULTS.

SECRET

201-305052

SECRET

3. 12 MAY SUBJ ADVISED THAT A, KOSTIKOV AND LEONOV SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME WITH HER AT RECEPTION, SMALL TALK PRINCIPALLY, BUT THEY EXPRESSED INTEREST VISIT FRIENDS ART GALLERY AND THAT SHE GIVE RECITAL AT EMB. A AND KOSTIKOV AT GALLERY 11 MAY FOR TWO HOURS WITH HER.

4. SUBJ'S IMPRESSION OF ANDREYEV FOLL: ADEQUATELY SOPHISTICATED AND WESTERNIZED, PROBABLY UNHAPPILY MARRIED, ACTIVELY INTERESTED IN ASSOCIATIONS AND MENTAL CLIMATE AWAY FROM SOVEMB ENVIIRONMENT.

5. APART FROM SPR ON A, STATION'S ONLY RECENT SUBSTANTIAL INFO IS FROM SMATTER WHO SAYS A RELATIONSHIP WITH WIFE PARTICULARLY STRAINED, AND IS ONLY SOV HAS NOTED WITH POSSIBLE VULNERABILITY AT EMB. (AS SEPARATELY REPORTED, SMATTER AND A HAVE RECENTLY BEGUN ACT MUTUAL CULTIVATION.)

6. ALTHOUGH PREMATURE JUDGE SUBJ'S ABILITY AND INTEREST FOR LONG TERM ACCESS ROLE, SHE ATTRACTIVE, APPEARS INTELLIGENT PERSONABLE AND LEVEL-HEADED. REQUEST TRACES AND INITIATION POA.

7. ALSO REQUEST HQS RETRACE FOR ADDITIONAL INFO ANDREYEV, PARTICULARLY FROM ODENVY.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

55-60 attache, 3rd Secty Wash, 2nd. Prev. contacts associated with LA dips

63 — Mexi, 1st Secty

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	WH	5	US
2	CI	6	BI
3	C	7	
4	B	8	

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8

INFO

VR. FILE, SB 7, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, ...

ADVANCE COPY [ ] ISSUED [ ] SLOTTED [ ] TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

S E C R E T 200026Z

DIR CITE MEXI 3151 (EASBY ACTING)

REDCOAT LCIMPROVE

REF A MEXIC 3090 (IN 43571)

B MEXI 3113 (IN 45367)

19 APR 65 IN 47738

1. FOLL RESULTS INTERROGATION SUBJ 19 APRIL:

A. BOTH SUBJS (SEEN SEPARATELY) FREELY ADMITTED TWO VISITS SOVEMB. MET AT FIRST SESSION 12 APR BY SOV FITTING DESCRIPTION SERGEY NIKOLAYEVICH LEONOV (KGB). LATTER ACTED SYMPATHETIC THEIR INTEREST LIVE USSR, GOT SOME BASIC BIO DATA, AND ASKED THEM RETURN 13 APR TO SEE CONSUL.

B. SOV AT SECOND VISIT FITS DESCRIPTION VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV (KGB). THEY FILLED OUT AND SIGNED LENGTHY SPANISH OR RUSSIAN LANG FORM COVERING BIO DATA, AND ALSO WROTE AUTO-BIOGRAPHIES. ACCORDING CRAYNE, GREEN AGREED JOIN COMMUNIST PARTY AND ACT AS SPY. ACCORDING GREEN, NO MENTION WHATEVER OF ESPIONAGE. SOV GAVE THEM IMPRESSION THEY WOULD GET ASYLUM USSR, SAID PROCESSING WOULD TAKE 2-3 MONTHS, IMPLIED SOVEMB WOULD GIVE THEM LIVING EXPENSES IN MEXICO UNTIL THEN. TOLD THEM RETURN THE NEXT DAY FOR POSSIBLE HANDOUT.

SECRET

201-305052

SECRET IN 47738

C. SOV ASKED CRAYNE IF HAD BEEN IN ARMY, GOT NEGATIVE REPLY. SOV ASKED IF COULD JOIN ARMY. YES. SOV IMPLIED INTEREST BUT NO FURTHER COMMENT. SOV APPEARED INTERESTED GREEN ALLEGED ABLITY READ BLUEPRINTS.

2. SUBJS ADMITTED THAT TALE REF APUREFABRICATION. NOW ACT REPENTANT AND MEK ABOUT ENTIRE MISADVENTURE.

3. LOCAL ODENVY ADVISED. SUBJS WILL BE DEPORTED THIS WEEK.

S E C R E T

CFN

* INFO ON ABOVE SUBJS,

SECRET

SECRET

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5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH
201-305052 074-126-060/01
SEX M DOB ? HMMA-25843
16 APR 65
CIT ? A01 P4
OCC ?
CONSULAR OFFICE ATTACHE. KNOWN KGB OFFICER.

R 6505032151

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

mgm

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5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMEROVICH
201-305052 050-008-004
SEX M DOB ? HMMA-25800
08 APR 65
CIT ? 050-8-4/2-1
OCC ? P1
ATTACHE IN THE CONSULAR OFFICE OF THE USSR
EMBASSY, MEXICO. RE 19 MAR 65 CONTACT WITH
LUBOMIR BLAZIK /201-206043/ 2ND SECT CONSUL
AT CZECH EMB IN MEXICO.

R 6504260537

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-60)

201-305052

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING; XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED; ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING; MICROFILM

TO: Chief, SR Division

INFO.: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: REDWOOD/Transmittal of Soviet Personality Report on Identified KGB Officer, ~~Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV~~

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Forwarded herewith is the completed SPR on Subject prepared by Vera T. WEISCARVER.

2. Because of the lack of secretarial help, the Station is transmitting this to Headquarters with the request that one copy be returned to the Station in final form when Headquarters has the possibility of re-typing it.

for
Willard C. Curtis

Attachement:
as stated above

Distribution:
2 SRD w/att, h/w, (1 copy, including photos)
1 WHD w/att, h/w, (1 copy, without photos)

1AH. CS COPY 201-305052

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-25722	2 April 1965
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-305052 FFN: P-7455

mg m

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH
201-305052 — 201-741655
SEX M DOB ? — HMMA-25677
26 MAR 65
CIT USSR — P8
OCC ?
RE SUBJ ACTS IN MEXICO CITY AND RELATIONSHIP
WITH SUBJ OF 201-741655.

R 6504091301

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

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SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH
201-305052 201-101794
SEX M DOB ? HMMA-25693
26 MAR 65
CIT ? ΦP-8187
OCC ? P2
OLEG MAKSIMOVICH NECHIPORENKO AND SUBJ,
BOTH KGB

R 6504070066

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

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DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
		X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
		MICROFILM

TO : Chief, WH Division

INFO. : ~~Chief, SR Division~~

: Chief, KUDESK

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Operational/REDCOAT/LCIMPROVE/Characterization of Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Forwarded herewith is a characterization of Subject prepared by Douglas J. FEINGLASS. The SPR on Subject has been prepared and will be forwarded as soon as typed.

2. It is interesting to note that LICOWL-1 describes KOSTIKOV as follows: He is a man who would do anything to anybody. He is without morals, education or manners. He uses foul language and has no respect for others. When KOSTIKOV drinks at his (LICOWL-1's) establishment, with Soviet women present, KOSTIKOV will run his hand over the legs of the wives of other Soviet employees, while their husbands are present, and thinknothing of it. According to LICOWL-1, the husbands say nothing when KOSTIKOV does this. (Comment: However, from a recent LICOWL-1 tape, it appears that Yuriy Aleksandrovich ANDRIANOV, GRU chauffeur, was complaining to Viktor Petrovich KALININ, administrative employee, that his wife was running around with KOSTIKOV and he (ANDRIANOV) was going to say something to KOSTIKOV - someday - but had not said a word to him as yet.)

Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:

2 WH w/att. h/w (2 copies)
1 SR w/att. h/w (one copy)
~~1 KUDESK w/att h/w (one copy)~~

1 SR/6/WH
KUDESK

CS COPY

201-305052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-25516	DATE 4 March 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-305052 FFN P-7455

Valerly Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV

Valerly Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV is approximately 35 years of age, corpulent and paunchy, with a round somewhat fleshy face that sports a 5 o'clock shadow, and wears oversized tinted glasses in dark heavy frames, which partially obscure a pair of small, but piercing eyes. His heavy jowls, thin lips, wide nostrils and dark hair add to an impression that his features are more of a Semitic, or a Near-Eastern type than that of a Slav. A shapeless dark suit-coat, carelessly put over a white shirt, with unbuttoned collar, through which protrudes a tuft of dark hair complete a photograph of Valerly Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV, Attache ot the Consular Office and identified member of the KGB.

KOSTIKOV arrived in Mexico in December 1961 and assumed his duties as an attache at the USSR Consulate at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Owing to his extrovert nature and propensity for drinking, he soon acquired several "buddies" of similar background and with similar tastes. Among these individuals, his closest associates have been, or still are, the following: Vitaly Borisovich SHUBIN, Attache and identified member of the KGB, who left for the USSR in July 1964; Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERIYEV, Pravda Correspondent and KGB officer, who left for the USSR in October 1964; and Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO, Vice-Consul and identified member of the KGB, who is still in Mexico, and who has accepted KOSTIKOV into his circle of intimate friends.

att 1 to HMMA 25516 CS COPY 201-305052

However, it was mostly with SHUBIN and ALFERIYEV that KOSTIKOV felt entirely at ease. Many a time KOSTIKOV would talk to either one of them on the phone and indulge in a friendly exchange of obscenities, whereas he has never spoken to NECHIPORENKO in a like manner, even though KOSTIKOV has been a frequent guest at NECHIPORENKO's house. KOSTIKOV developed an exceedingly close relationship with SHUBIN. They used to travel together to various parts of the country and to spend time together with their families at the Casino de la Selva, a hotel in Cuernavaca. But it was ALFERIYEV's wife Roza, who became the prime target of KOSTIKOV's attentions. An embittered acrimonious woman, Roza, who despised her husband and had a fierce hatred for NECHIPORENKO, was transformed into a different human being when KOSTIKOV talked to her on the phone in his best unctuous and ingratiation manner. It is impossible to say whether they had sexual relations, but the obvious and strong sexual overtones in Roza's voice led one to presume that she had more than just a friendly interest in KOSTIKOV, who on the other hand, was probably using Roza as a target for his amorous or illicit aspirations.

It seems that KOSTIKOV is quite preoccupied with matters of sex and if given an opportunity would turn into a veritable profligate. Apparently his

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wife Roza has a tolerant attitude towards KOSTIKOV's probable incursions into the domain of marital infidelity, since, on one occasion, when KOSTIKOV had been invited to a supposed stag party at ALFERIYEV's home, and Roza KOSTIKOV had phoned to caution KOSTIKOV against drinking too much, a woman answered the call and then called KOSTIKOV to the phone. When Roza talked to KOSTIKOV it sounded that she was more peeved at the fact that she had not been invited to the party rather than that other women were present there at the time.

When KOSTIKOV started talking to his wife on this particular call, he already had had a few drinks and in disguised voice spoke to her in Spanish, French and English, possibly to impress those who were present. His Spanish is quite good and fluent, his French is rather tolerable, but his English is somewhat stilted and of a school-room type. Possibly, he studied these languages at the Moscow Institute of Languages.

This fluency in Spanish affords KOSTIKOV a great latitude for making friends among Mexicans and his easy-going earthy approach is presumably of considerable help to him in developing contacts. Since his consular duties are quite negligible, he can easily engage in this sort of activity. In fact, this neglect of official duties prompted a heated argument between NECHIPORENKO and the visiting Soviet correspondent Timur GAYDAR,

who declared that ostensibly the consular staff does not preform any useful function, but just loafs around. His assertion has been confirmed in part by the attitude of this particular group of Soviet Embassy employees, who quite often seek some diversion of a non-intellectual type. Thus, on one occasion, when a group of Soviet tourists has a brief stay in Mexlo, one of them - a woman, complained during a phone call to the Embassy that KOSTIKOV and Leonid Vasilyevich NIKIFOROV, Intourist representative in Mexico, had taken the group leaders to NIKIFOROV's apartment in order to have a few drinks, leaving the rest of the tourists without any information about their next move and letting them shift for themselves.

Since the departure of SHUBIN and ALFERIYEV, KOSTIKOV has started to "cultivate" NIKIFOROV, presumably as a potential drinking companion, and has been talking to him on the phone a number of times recently in quite a familiar tone of voice. It seems that NIKIFOROV, a younger man, is being influenced by KOSTIKOV to a certain degree.

KOSTIKOV's family life does not appear to be a stormy one, because his wife Roza A. sounds easy-going and friendly. She is in charge of the Embassy's dining-room. Her co-workers treat her with a good-humored tolerance and a slight contempt. KOSTIKOV's daughter Svetlana, born in 1959, seems to be an average child, who does not present any outstanding problems to her parents.

To summarize KOSTIKOV's character traits and abilities: KOSTIKOV is well trusted to take trips around the country in the company of another Soviet Embassy employee on various matters of importance and, on occasions, he acts as an interpreter for visiting Soviet officials. His known physical defect is weak eyes. Sometime ago KOSTIKOV called up an eye-specialist for an appointment, because his eyes were troubling him and that is probably the reason for his wearing tinted glasses. Sometimes Mexicans refer to him as the man with glasses. It is quite possible that an auto accident KOSTIKOV had in Vera_cruz may have been caused by his somewhat defective vision and was not the result of carelessness. However, when KOSTIKOV was excusing himself for it, GARMASHEV, to whom he spoke on the phone, told him dryly that it was about time KOSTIKOV learned to drive.

Owing to this shortcoming of having weak eyes and his physical make up, KOSTIKOV does not participate in various indoor or outdoor sports as much as do other members of the Soviet Embassy. It seems that billiards are about the most strenuous exercise that he undertakes. However, it must not be surmised that he is a weak individual in a physical sense and will probably give a good account of himself if a situation will demand it. Many of his intimate collaborators call him "Kopchenyy" or "Smoked"

which in Russian slang may mean an individual with a dark skin, or may refer to the fact of his wearing tinted glasses, or it may signify that he went through a school of hard knocks

It is quite certain that KOSTIKOV and ALFERIYEV belong to the same group of former hooligans, who by dint of sheer disregard for moral standards forged ahead and became "somebodies".

KOSTIKOV seems to be quite unsrupulous, ready to perform any sort of task set before him, not in a cold and methodical way, but with a certain zest and bravado. It appears that he has no moral, religious, or any other type of scruples. He is vulgar, untidy and lecherous, with a penchant for using lewd and obscene expressions in conversation with his "buddies", with whom he drinks quite a lot, circumstances permitting. In addition, it must be noted that he is a shrewd and resourceful individual unquestionably loyal to the Communist system.

KOSTIKOV

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

FROM: MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

VR. FILE ADDP, C/SR 5, C/CI, C/FI 2, RI/AN/DUMMY, C/C 4, C/SR 113

S E C R E T 292230Z

DIR CITE MEXI 2337

30 JAN 65 IN 70188

KAPOK REDCOAT LCMPROVE LICOZY-5 AEPETREL

REFS A. DIR 43148 2123 (IN 55744)

B MEXI 1377 (IN 39578)

1. 11 JAN PRIKHODKO WENT SUBJ OFFICE, ASKED L-5 GET ASTHMA MEDICATION FOR HIM WHICH PRODUCED BRAZIL. SUBJ PROMISED DO SO THRU FRIEND TRAVELLING RIOD. REQUEST HQS CHECK P STORY THAT WENT RIOD DURING 63 OR 64 WITH SOV SOCCER TEAM. P SAID WOULD SOON HAVE OP MEET WITH HIM AND NECHIPORENKO.

2. 12 JAN N WENT SUBJ OFFICE CANCEL TRAVEL RESERVATIONS SOV FAMILY, URGED SUBJ PREPARE REPORT IN ANSWER QUERIES REF B AND MAKE REPORT ON IMMIGRATION CUSTOMS PROCEDURES ENTER U.S. L-5 TOLD N GOING LOS ANGELES ON BUSINESS, N HAD NO REQUIREMENTS.

3. 25 JAN SUBJ PREPARED REQUESTED REPORTS, CLEARED BY STA, PASSED TO N 28 JAN. (SEE HMMA 25275 FOR REPORTS) N APPEARED REASONALY SATISFIED REPORTS, BUT QUIZZED SUBJ CLOSELY ON STATEMENT THAT TOWN PARA 3 C REF B KEPT ONLY ONE REGISTRY BOOK. L-5 EXPLAINED LACKED TIME MAKE CAREFUL INVESTIGATION, BUT OBTAINED GENERAL INFO RE SMALL TOWN FROM CIVIL REGISTRY PERSON. (L-5 DID NOT

201-305052

SEE TORTELLA. HIS INFO BASED ONLY ON TALK WITH NOTARY AT RECENT CIVIL WEDDING.)

4. BASIS NOTES WHICH CONSULTED CAREFULLY, N GAVE SUBJ FULL INSTRUCTIONS:

A. NOW HAS CONCRETE DEAL. WANTS SUBJ SPOT AND NAME 3-4 CANDIDATES PROFESSIONALLY QUALIFIED OPEN BRANCH OFFICE NEW YORK. PERSONS MUST NOT NECESSARILY BE AMERICAN BORN, BUT SUBJ MUST HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THEM FOR HIS PURPOSES AND ALSO FOR OWN PURPOSES SINCE [illegible] BE USED FOR MANY THINGS BY US". *If they really put an elegant ... I don't think ... [illegible]*

N WANTS LIST IN MARCH WHEN SUBJ RETURNS FROM EUROPE. L-5 ASKED IF REQUIREMENT MEANT CANCELLATION MOSCOW MAN. N SAID BY NO MEANS, HIS ARRIVAL WILL BE DELAYED CONSIDERABLY DUE NECESSITY PLAN EVERY ASPECT CAREFULLY. L-5 REMONSTRATED THAT TIME SPAN SPOTTING AND [illegible] BRANCH MGR COULD NOT BE PROTRACTED, ASKED IF N PREPARED EXECUTE THIS PLAN QUICKLY IF CAME UP WITH SUITABLE TYPE. N [illegible]

(COMMENTS: A. IT PATENTLY UNREALISTIC FOR [illegible] BELIEVE L-5 [illegible] SHORT TRIPS TO NEW YORK CAN SPOT PERSONS WHO [illegible] AT NEXT MEET 3 FEB SUBJ WILL ASK FOR CLARIFICATION [illegible] SAY HAS THOUGHT OVER REQUIREMENT AND CATEGORICALLY [illegible] UNABLE UNWILLING GO FAR ENOUGH WITH CANDIDATES TO ASSURE WOULD [illegible]

14-00000

IN 90152 PAGE 3

ENGAGE ESPIONAGE, REQUIREMENT RUNS COUNTER COM PROMISES HE NOT ENDANGER SELF. B. ABOVE FLIP IN KGB PLANS OBVIOUSLY STRANGE. DEFER HQS, ODENVY IF AND HOW INSERT CONTROLLED ASSET AS MGR. PLS ADVISE. NOTE ALSO N ASKED IF SUBJ PREFERRED OPEN BRANCH IN LOS ANGELES RATHER THAN NEW YORK. SUBJ SAID HAD NO BUSINESS INTEREST WHATEVER IN BRANCH, CHOICE IS SOVS.

B. N SAID WESTERN EUROPEAN TOUR OPERATORS (AS DISTINCT FROM TRAVEL AGENCIES) WHO RUN TOURS INTO USSR BEING UTILIZED BY AIS INSERT AGENTS INTO TOURS. WANTS SUBJ PROVIDE LIST HIS EUROPEAN TOUR OPERATOR FRIENDS BY NEXT MEET. UPON L-5 RETURN FROM EUROPE WANTS SUBJ'S RECOMMENDATIONS OF CANDIDATES WHOM "OUR PEOPLE IN EUROPE CAN WORK ON".

C. N URGENTLY NEEDS INFO ON JORGE CORTES, ASSISTANT STATION MGR FOR SABENA. L-5 KNOWS BY SIGHT ONLY. (COMMENT: WILL FORWARD BIO DATA WHEN OBTAINED. ONLY STA TRACES ARE LIENVOY. ON 16 JAN 65 CORTES CALLED FOR IDEN KGB VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV WHO NOT IN. 18 JAN CORTES TOLD K THAT SINCE NOW IN SABENA TRAFFIC DEPT HAS TIME BEING RUSSIAN LANG STUDY AND ASKED K'S HELP ON ENROLLMENT (PRESUMABLY FOR IICMR). K SAID WILL HELP AND SET MEET FOR 19 JAN.)

SECRET

14-00000

IN 70274

INTERESTING NOTE THAT NECH ASSOCIATES MOSTLY WITH K AND THEY

~~[illegible]~~
WELL ACQUAINTED
~~[illegible]~~ SABENA PERSONNEL.)

D. N WANTS NAMES OF MEXICAN POLICE PERSONNEL, PARTICULARLY OF FED JUDICIAL POLICE, WHO VISIT HIS OFFICE SOLICITING ADS FOR THEIR PUBLICATIONS (IN EFFECT FOR PETTY GRAFT).

E. DURING MEET N BORROWED COIN TO MAKE PHONE CALL. WHEN RETURNED L-5 ASKED WHO CALLED, ANSWERED PABLO KUSHER. (COMMENT: L-5 TOLD C/O FOR FIRST TIME THAT N HAD MADE COUPLE CASUAL INQUIRIES RE KUSHER RECENTLY, L-5 GIVING INFO THAT NOT ACQUAINTED WELL, K IS YOUNG JEWISH LAD WORKING FOR U.S. TRAVEL SERVICE OFFICE CONNECTED BUT LOCATED APART FROM AMEMB. NO STA TRACES BUT SEC FILES REFLECT FOLL: PABLO KUSHER RAZOVSKY BORN 28 OCT 1942 MEXICO CITY, EDUCATED MEXICO CITY, FATHER NU DECEASED, MOTHER CIMA NEE RAZOVSKY BORN 5 SEP 23 BARANOVICH, POLAND. WORKED FOR AERONAVES FROM SEP 58 TO AUG 63 WHEN EMPLOYED AS TRAVEL PROMOTION CLERK U.S. TRAVEL SERVICE.)

F. N TOLD L-5 PHONE ROSENBLUTH WHEN PASSES THRU NEW YORK 7 FEB ENROUTE EUROPE, AND ALSO MAKE VISUAL OBSERVATIONS PERTH AMBOY. SUBJ HEATEDLY REFUSED PERTH AMBOY REQUIREMENT, WHICH PROVOKED N STATE SUBJ COULD NOT REFUSE ANY ASSIGNMENT (NELZYA OTKAZYVAT). SUBJ STUCK TO GUNS, N CALMED DOWN AND DID NOT PRESS.

14-00000

IN 75157 PAGES

5. IN DISCUSSING PRIKHODKO, N CONFIRMED STATEMENTS REF A THAT P NOW THIRD RANKING MAN SOVEMB.

6. INDEX.

S E C R E T

CFN

X ASKED FOR SOV TIMETABLE OF PLANS.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
OPERATIONAL/REDCOAT Aleksandr Mikhaylovich BROVKIN, Third Secretary, and Suspect KGB Officer	2. RI FILE NO. 201-18511 3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. HMMA-25256 4. DATE 28 Jan 65 7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM LIEMPTY 8. DATE OF INFO. Jan 65 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST Virginia Sturdivant 6. DATE PROCESSED 3 Feb 65	10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

2. According to LIEMPTY, BROVKIN has been seen within the compound mostly with Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV and Aleksandr Ivanovich PRIKHODKO, KGB officers, since his arrival. LIEMPTY also reports that he has been using a 1964 green Ford sedan, also driven by YATSKOV and KGB chauffeur, Vasiliy Stepanovich MIROSHNIKOV, and a 1962 beige Volkswagon which has also been used by Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV, KGB officer and Valentin Ivanovich KUCHEROV, Tass Correspondent and suspect KGB.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-505052

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH
201-305052
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
KNOWN KGB OFFICER

201-727109
HMMA-25188A01
22 JAN 65
P2

R 6502033268

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-37 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

13 Jan 65

AEPURPLE

AEPURPLE positively identified photo of Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV as Soviet who had met him in Mexico City on 9, 11 and 12 Feb 1963. KOSTIKOV gave PURPLE meeting arrangements for next meeting to be in NYC. Soviet who appeared in NYC was Oleg D. BRYKIN. BRYKIN has been identified as member 13th Dept of KGB's FCD.

PURPLE is naturalized German American, has crop dusting business in Middle West, furnished info on industrial and missile sites in area. BRYKIN particularly interested in pipelines, [redacted]

The 13th Dept may have exercised its prerogative and taken over case from First (American) Dept. Former case officer Yuriy V. KOSTIKOV was apparently from American Dept, not 13th. But it appears that BRYKIN asked PURPLE for same ~~ixix~~ type of info assigned by KOSTIKOV, suggesting that KOSTIKOV was from same KGB dept as BRYKIN.

SR/CI/G
ch

This information should not be released without permission of SR/CI.

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City — XX — NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM: Chief, SR via Chief, WH

SUBJECT: REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE
Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

C-94.....

1. We have recently reviewed available information on Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV, a consular attache at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. It appears quite possible that KOSTIKOV may be a member of the Thirteenth Department of the KGB's First Chief Directorate, as will be seen below.

2. KOSTIKOV has been positively identified as the Soviet who met AEBURBLE in Mexico City on 9, 11 and 12 February 1963. (Mexico City Station identified KOSTIKOV as the only Soviet in Mexico who fit the description, and subsequently AEBURBLE identified him from a photo spread.) KOSTIKOV received information from AEBURBLE on industrial and missile sites in PBPRIME and gave him requirements of the same nature for the future. KOSTIKOV also made arrangements with AEBURBLE for his next meeting, to be held in New York City with a different, unidentified Soviet. On 6 May 1963 AEBURBLE was met in accordance with the above arrangements by Oleg Danilovich BRYKIN (201-292588), a translator assigned to the United Nations Secretariat in New York City. BRYKIN has been identified by a sensitive, reliable source as a member of the KGB's Thirteenth Department. AEBURBLE passed BRYKIN aeronautical charts and was given additional requirements particularly relative to missile bases. Nothing transpired during the latter meeting to suggest that BRYKIN wished to change the nature of the case, and in fact he told AEBURBLE that he was doing a good job. It therefore can reasonably be assumed that BRYKIN and KOSTIKOV both were representing the same KGB department.

(Continued)

3 - COS, Mexico City

201-305052

CROSS REFERENCE TO: ...

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-13305

DATE: 13 January 1965 (21 JAN 1965)

CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-305052

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
SR/CI/G	C. Hausmann	FS	7735

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
SR/CI/K	IN DRAFT	V. Valpey
C/SR/CI	IN DRAFT	T. Bagley
CI/OPS	15 Jan 65	[signature]
SR/O/WH	15 Jan 65	[signature]
WH/1/Mex		[signature]

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	18 ...	[signature]

ROUTING / INITIALS
1 - RID
1 - SR/CI/K
1 - SR/CI/G
1 - SR/O/WH
1 - CI/OPS
1 - WH/1/Mex

SR/CI/G

DESTROY

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

3. It has been reliably reported that at present the KGB's Thirteenth Department places the greatest emphasis on its sabotage mission. Sabotage targets include the most important strategic military and industrial facilities of Western countries. The requirements assigned to AEBURBLE by both KOSTIKOV and BRYKIN correspond to this mission.

4. In view of the obvious ODYOKE interest in any activities of the Thirteenth Department, we urge that you prepare an analysis of KOSTIKOV's activities and contacts in Mexico.

JONATHAN L. WEENING

SECRET

KGB 201 FILE REVIEW CHECKLIST

NAME: Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV 201-305052

ACTION DATE 13 Jan 65

FULL TRACE CONSOLIDATION no

RIS INPUT SYSTEM done

INTEL AFFILIATION known KGB (AEBURBLE, LINILE c/o)

ASSIGNMENTS
Sep 61 - attache & Vice Consul in Mexico

FUNCTIONAL/ORGANIZATIONAL ASSIGNMENT possibly 13th dept. (AEBURBLE case)

AGENTS/OPERATIONS
c/o for AEBURBLE in 63

COMPROMISE

AEASSAULT

MISCELLANEOUS CHECKLIST TDY trips

KUBARK OPS AGAINST

(This form is primarily for the use of SR/CI/K and should be attached to the 201 file of any known or highly suspect KGB officer. Its purpose is to enable SR/CI/K to determine quickly whether, and if so when, a file has been reviewed and what degree of action has been taken regarding extraction of certain categories of operational information of special interest to SR/CI/K. For additional information, consult SR/CI/K.)

SECRET

201-305052

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: KORENGOLD, ROBERT

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
			NOT REVIEWED BY HSCA

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

14-00000

SECRET

SX-25505
1 Sept 66

AEWIGWAG/2

September 1966 Debriefing

<u>Soviet Personalities</u>

AG-095
74-6-636/3

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Viktor MARTYNOV

Age about 30-35. Not very tall. Rather French looking. He is a photographer for Novosti. Source met him through visitors from Paris Match, whom MARTYVOV makes a practice of guiding around town. He has never been stationed abroad but comes out to Paris once in a while. The next time he comes he will look up Source. He speaks very good French, and has a pleasing personality. He is rather outspoken at times. For instance, when someone said "bunch of stupid people" about the Soviets, MARTYNOV replied, "You're damn right." He appears to be tempted by western living. He concentrates on the French. He is married to a nice girl with brown hair and eyes. They have children, but Source is not sure whether one or two.

14-00000

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Vladimir ZAKHAROV

About 40 years old, he is the administrator of the Conservatory, and Source will see him in Paris when he next goes there. He speaks very good Spanish, having formerly been stationed in Buenos Aires as a cultural attache or something. He is probably a KGB officer, but he works hard at his cover job. During a trip to Paris, he called Source's father to arrange for the quick renting of two pianos for the orchestra he was with. He looks like a frog and is rather bald, short, blond, with dark blue eyes. He is very friendly and accommodating, lively, and nice. He goes out a lot, and sees a lot of foreign colony, particularly Argentines and other Spanish speaking people. He is married and has a little boy called Emilyan. He once invited Source to go to his dacha, but she didn't have time. She intends to send him a postcard with her new address.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date Acquired: 13 August 1966

201-835492

Valeriy LEDNEV

Works for Sovietskaya Kul'tura. Speaks no foreign languages. Blond, almost bald. Blue eyes, very nearsighted. Wears glasses. Roman profile. A little plump. Tall. Formerly stationed in Iran for TASS or Izvestiya. Source thinks undoubtedly KGB. A big flirt. Chases women. Likes to have a good time. Knows the KORNGOLDS very well. Expects to come to Paris for two weeks circa 15 September 1966, where he will contact Source, who expects to take him to see some striptease acts.

CO Comment: Attached are Headquarters traces on Subject.

15 SEP 1966

14-00000

SECRET

Valeriy Vadimovich LEDNEV

1. Subject, an IZVESTIYA correspondent, was identified as a good source of information for two American journalists in Moscow who were suspected of having been recruited by the KGB.

2. Although we have no record of his being stationed abroad, Subject has made several visits to non-bloc countries. In June-July he visited New Delhi and Bangkok. In December 1962 he visited Iran. While in Iran he was introduced as IZVESTIYA's special correspondent. He corrected the individual who was making the introduction by saying that he was an international observer.

3. Subject visited Turkey in April 1963. While in Ankara he is reported as having participated in "propaganda tactics" and made an "attempt to feel the pulse of the public" as part of the Soviet efforts at that time to establish closer relations with Turkey. During visits with various heads of mass media organs he commented that while in Iran he had written "friendly articles" which were well received by the Iranians. As a result he was the first Soviet journalist to be admitted to the oil regions of Abadan and Ahvas.

4. LEDNEV is described as tall, balding dark hair, high cheek bones, small mouth, wears clear plastic-rimmed glasses, smokes Kent cigarettes. He speaks English, but speaks better German.

15 SEP 1966

14-00000

SECRET

~~FC - 295~~
SX-25502
15 Sept 66

AEWIGWAG/2

September 1966 Debriefing

New Third National Personalities

SX-25502
~~FC 295~~ is
15 September 66 briefing
C'65 briefing is SX-4896

SECRET

74-6-636/3
15 SEP 1966

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Omar OUSSEDIK, Algerian Ambassador

He came to Moscow after the fall of Ben Bella. He is intelligent, but rather pro-Soviet. He was very active in the FLN. He and his wife are both Kabyles, a non-Arab tribe.

 15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Frank H BOURGHOLTZER, American NBC Correspondent, 1962-?
After this tour in Moscow, BOURGHOLTZER returned to Moscow without his wife, lived in a hotel, and went around with a lot of Soviet girls.

SECRET 15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEKIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Jose Antonio MENDIA, Counsellor (Cultural and Press)
Argentine Embassy

He was chief correspondent of La Prensa in Paris and married a Frenchwoman. Source thinks he is a likely target of the KGB because he needs a lot of money. This is because his wife is very snobbish and ambitious and insists on buying quantities of expensive clothes. MENDIA thinks he is shrewd, but he is not.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

J.A.L.H MORGAN, 1st Secretary, British Embassy

He had an affair with the ballerina PLISETSKAYA eight or nine years ago, while previously stationed in Moscow, and was kicked out of Moscow for it. However, he is now married, apparently happily, and has three children. He is a very bright and charming man who speaks Mongolian and Chinese. He is a cultural officer, but since these languages are rare among cultural officers, Source assumes that he is MI-6.

SECRET

15 SEP 1969

14-00000

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Huy KANTHOUL, Cambodia Ambassador

Very anti-American regarding the war in Viet Nam, but doesn't like the Chinese. He hopes the Soviets will step up aid to Cambodia.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

Source: AENIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Catherine BARSACQ, Secretary Archivist, French Embassy

She is young and speaks Russian well. She is the daughter of the well-known French theatrical producer (?) Andre BARSACQ. She works in the cultural office of the Embassy. She goes out with Soviet men, one of them Andre VOLKONSKY, the well-known pianist.

C.O. Comment: VOLKONSKY, as a teen-age boy, came to the USSR after World War II with his father, who repatriated voluntarily from France. He was the target of an SR/10 recruitment operation, since he groused openly about his father's decision to leave France and go to the USSR.

15 SEP 1966

14-00000

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Marina LOPOUKHINE, Secretary Archivist, French Embassy

This girl comes from a prominent family in imperial Russia, now in the emigration in France. She resigned to marry a Soviet (NU) who is a translator for the Moscow News. She will stay in the USSR, but will retain her French passport.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Daniel PRIOLLET, Agence France Presse

This is a very nice bachelor, who recently arrived in Moscow. Source warned him against taking on Jean RAFAELLI's Soviet girl-friend Olga Lnu, which he has not done. He has a girl friend, Gerda Lnu, who works as a secretary at the West German Embassy. Source has absolutely nothing against this girl, but she refugeed out to West Germany from East Germany and still has relatives there. She is unmarried, attractive, and goes out with a lot of Americans (unspecified).

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Georges H BORTOLI, Representative of Radiodiffusion Television Francaise (ORTF)

His wife is an emigre Russian who thinks everything is wonderful in the USSR and wrote an article to this effect in Paris Match, praising the wonderful Moscow markets. BORTOLI is under his wife's influence, but Source does not know his politics. (Source obviously was concealing something she knew about BORTOLI, as she sometimes does about the French).

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

14-00000

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

2R 201-125368

Igor WITSINOS, Correspondent for Der Spiegel (West Germany)

His wife is a Soviet citizen, Jewish. He is a German citizen, but of Latvian or Russian origin. They have been in the USSR a long time. Source thinks his wife has been allowed out. She doesn't know their political views.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

George D. VARSAMY, Greek Ambassador

Looks like a peanut vendor. His wife is always covered with vulgar jewelry, and she looks like a manicurist. He endulges in a great deal of commercial operations (personal) buying and selling rugs, icons, etc.

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Dimitri S. MANOLATOS, First Secretary, Greek Embassy 1963-?

MANOLATOS conducted an extensive trade in icons and rugs, far above the norm even for Greeks in Moscow.

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Ahman MIRFENDERESKI, Iranian Ambassador

zR 201-766698

He is a very interesting character. His grandfather was Ambassador to Russia before the revolution, and he speaks extremely good Russian. He is a very sharp man who knows a lot of Soviets, and has excellent rapport with them because of his language and open manner. In his diplomatic pose, he doesn't seem to be anti-Soviet, but Source does not know his true feelings on that score. He is not anti-American, although he sometimes considers some American actions stupid. He is married, but his wife is often out of Moscow. He is able to stand a lot of liquor.

C.O. comment: AEPASSIVE stated that the Ambassador had some of his primary education in Russia and confirmed his expertise in the language and knowledgeability, but stated definitely that the ambassador is 100% anti-Soviet.

15 SEP 1966

14-00000

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

201-868224

Giovanni MIGLIUOLO, Counselor, Italian Embassy

Married to a Czech. They both speak fluent Russian, English, German, French, and Italian. He married his wife while stationed in Prague. He is a very bright, intelligent man, whom Source regards as an intelligence officer. He is tremendously interested in politics, and is a Kremlinologist. Source does not know his attitude toward the Soviets.

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Dino H CAPELLO, Italian Counsellor (Commercial)

He is from Sicily and is a member of the Mafia.

15 SEP 1966

14-00000

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

LUCCAN, Fnu

A correspondent for an Italian paper, age about 42, who lives in Source's building. (Not listed Information Moscow). He has been in Moscow for at least ten years and is married to a Soviet woman. They have two children. His Soviet wife has a miserable life and never leaves the apartment. He is always out, hanging around the Hotel National bar, trying to make friends with businessmen and journalists. He is a crashing, insensitive, boor and bore. He drinks a lot and probably goes out with girls. He comes to a lot of cocktail parties without an invitation, always without his wife, whom Source has never seen. He has another wife in Italy, which causes him serious financial problems, but in spite of this he has a very expensive apartment. He speaks Russian, French, and English, and occasionally makes anti-Soviet remarks. Source is certain he is a KGB agent because of his Soviet wife, his need for money, his expensive apartment, and the way he operates in trying to make contacts and crash parties.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

2R201-271332

Kaname TAKAHASHI, business representative of International (Japanese firm)

This man is about 55 and lived in China for a long time. He married a White Russian girl from Harbin. They left Shanghai in 1951, which Source considers strange, i.e. it would have been normal for them to leave in 1949 when the Communists took over. They have a son in the United States who is married, and possibly a daughter there as well. They have another daughter, unmarried, Svetlana TAKAHASHI, who lives in Japan. Source met her by chance at Orly airport and also in Moscow. She is a beautiful girl, half Japanese and half Russian. She speaks good Russian, as does her father. Her mother, TAKAHASHI's wife, is in Japan. TAKAHASHI also speaks Chinese and poor English. He has a lot of Soviet contacts. Source thinks he is probably somebody's agent, theirs or ours, probably ours and/or the Japanese. A curious and interesting man.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

14-00000

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Edward GHORRA, Lebanese Ambassador, 1960-63

GHORRA's wife was an American who had an antique shop in New York City. The two of them made a great deal of money in a three-way antique business, Moscow-Lebanon-New York, using their diplomatic privileges.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

14-00000

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Hassine EL GHOUYEL, Tunisian Counsellor

Drinks a tremendous lot. Source saw him dead drunk at the British Club. He stayed at the Ukraina Hotel without his family for a while. The police took his car keys away so he couldn't drive in a drunken condition. He is a very weak man.

SECRET 15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

2R 201-140017

Yusuf Abd-al-Aziz SHARARA, First Secretary, UAR Embassy

He has a very good looking wife, for which reason he is always invited out in ambassadorial circles, which he normally would not be in. Source instinctively thinks he is an intelligence officer, without being able to say why.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

CANADIAN

Mr. Robert A. D/H/FORD

Position (Jan 65): Ambassador, Canadian Embassy, Moscow, USSR

Closest English speaking friend of SOURCE in Moscow. Anti-Gaullist in outlook but otherwise quite "French-friendly." Is a cripple but often tries to take a few steps on the dance floor. Suffers from Polio. Former university professor in Canada (medieval history) before becoming diplomat. Wife is the most charming ambassador's wife in Moscow. She was introduced to FORD by the former Brazilian ambassador to Moscow (currently the Brazilian foreign minister) when the latter served at the UN in New York as a member of Brazil's delegation. The Fords are very much in love with each other and are a fine couple. Mrs. Ford is the best dressed, most cultured woman in town, also has the best jewels. Her name is Terese. Both speak good Russian and he is probably one of the most competent ambassadors in the Soviet Union. Mrs. Ford is a particularly close friend of the Israel ambassador Mr. TEKOAH.

DATE ACQUIRED : September 1966.

He is very pro-American.

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

AEWIGWAG/2

August 1966

MUGBOOK Debriefing

74-6-65/3

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date Acquired: 13 August 1966

MUGBOOK Debriefing

C. O. Comment: The following information is the result of a hurried debriefing which lasted one hour only.

I Previously identified by Source, not yet in new book.

#1 (SAMOYLOV, Nikolai A.)
Nothing to add. Has not seen in a long time.

#2 (ZARUBINA, Zoya V.)
Has something to do with the press or Inturist. Speaks French.

#3 (TOCHILIN, Sergei)
Has seen, but remembers nothing.

#4 (MEDVEDEV, Vladimir A.)
Source remembers this man, because he is a dead ringer for Kosygin. The picture is a good likeness, although he now has somewhat less hair. He is about 55, is dark and of medium height.

#5 (KHARLAMOV, Mikhail A.)
This is a good likeness. He is of medium height, with a "typical Soviet figure." Nothing more remembered.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

#6 (SHIBAYEV, Pyotr A.)

Sourco does not remember seeing this man.

#7 (KOBYSH, Vitally)

Source has not seen this man.

#8 (NOSENKO, Yuriy A.)

Source has never seen this man, nor #192 in regular Mugbook.

#9 (VLADYKIN, Nikolai A.)

Source had difficulty identifying this picture. Said she hardly knows this man.

II New Mugbook: Previously identified by Source

#13 and #60 (SUNTSOV, Aleksei V.)

Source has never seen this man.

#25 (PETROV, Vladimir I.)

Source has never seen this man.

#27 (SHUBNYAKOV, Fyodor G.)

The picture looks familiar to Source, but she can state nothing about the man.

#32 (SUMSKOY, Mikhail M.)

Source has never seen this man.

#34 (SHCHERBAK, Fyodor A.)

Source definitely has seen this man, but can say nothing about him, other than that he is about fifty, stout, upper medium height, and she saw him at the 14th July French reception, 1966.

#37 (FEDYANIN, Vladimir P.)

Source does not recognize this man.

#40, 93, 138, 172 (PANASENKO, Ivan A.)

#40: Source thinks this man has something to do with the military; she has seen him with military attaches.

#93: No recognition.

#138: This man is from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, speaks a lot of languages, including English and French. He is a good-looking, charming man, about 38-40 years old, 178 cm. tall, well built. She saw him at the 14th July French reception, 1966.

#49 (SUNTSOV, Aleksandr V.)

Source did not recognize this picture.

#72 (KURILENKO, Ivan P.)

At first Source did not recognize this picture. She later said she had seen him during the de Gaulle visit and at various national day parties.

#97 (DITYATYEV, Dmitriy A.)

Source did not recognize this picture.

15 SEP 1966

#101 (GLAZUNOV, Ilya S.)

Source recognized this picture by name. GLAZUNOV is about 35; the picture is a good likeness but makes him look too healthy. He looks like an "uncooked spaghetti," pale complexion, thin, short. He speaks Italian. Source considers GLAZUNOV not intelligent, and entirely too eager to mix with foreigners. Source sent the Canadian, Benoit de Margerie, to GLAZUNOV when the Canadian was interested in having his portrait painted. GLAZUNOV's wife (NU) is about thirty, has long dark hair; is very intelligent.

#106 (SHVARTS, Ilya P.)

Source did not recognize this picture.

#122 (FILIPPOV, Grigoriy A.)

Source did not recognize this picture.

#163 (GUK, Yuriy I.)

Source stated she may possibly have seen this man a long time ago at a diplomatic party.

#192 (NOSENKO, Yuriy I.)

Source did not recognize this picture, nor #8 in Section I.

III New Mugbook: new identifications.

#5 (FEDYANIN, Vladimir P.)

Source has seen this man but could not remember anything about him.

#20 and #76 (ALYOSHIN, Yevgeniy N.)

Source thought these two pictures might be of her husband's "friend", meaning the case officer who keeps dogging him, turning up at the next seat in the theatre, etc. She said she would check with her husband as to this man's name, and ask him for details. She said she already discussed this "friend" during the last debriefing. He poses as a history professor.

#39 and #63 (ZHUKOV, Georgiy A.)

Source identified this picture as that of Yuriy ZHUKOV, either TASS or MFA press department man. She last saw him at the farewell party for Source and her husband at their embassy. She could not remember anything else about him, but promised to ask her husband, who, she knows, hates him for some reason.

#61 (ZAITSEV, Lev N.)

Source identified this picture as that of a Novosti man, or at least a journalist. He is about 35, tallish, good looking. Speaks French. Has been abroad. Deals with foreign journalists.

#125 (LOUIS, Viktor)

Source identified this picture as Viktor LOUIS. There was no time to update her previous information. She made the remark that she was sorry to see him in such sorry company, meaning in the Mugbook.

15 SEP 1966

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date Acquired: 13 August 1966

Tatyana PHILIPOV or PHILIPOVA

Has an American passport. She was employed by Waldemar VICHNEVSKY, AFP correspondent in Moscow, as a governess for his children. Source claims Subject was a bad children's nurse and very stupid. VICHNEVSKY wanted to fire her. She always goes around with Soviet men. She went off for a three day weekend and was gone for eight days. VICHNEVSKY reported this disappearance to the French Embassy.

14-00000

SECRET

AEWIGWAG/2

1965 and 1966 Debriefings

U.S. Citizens in Moscow

SX-4876 (65) 74-6-63/3

SECRET ~~[illegible]~~ (66) 15 SEP 1966

SOURCE : AEWIGWAG-2

DATE ACQUIRED : September 1966

American Intelligence Officers in Moscow

During the debriefing, Source was encouraged to state which diplomats in Moscow she thought were intelligence officers, including the Americans.

Source said she and her husband had wondered about which Americans were intelligence officers and had come to the conclusion that the following Americans were:

Roger Kirk

Alan Logan

Abraham Katz

Their reasons for picking Logan and Katz are contained in the individual reports on these two gentlemen.

19 SEP 1966

SECRET

NEW YORK TIMES

Mr. Peter GROSE

Position (July 1965): Chief, New York Times Bureau in Moscow, USSR

Appears to be a very intelligent chap, new on the scene in Moscow. Getting married to a 19 year old girl. He is Jewish.

DATE ACQUIRED : September 1966.

He married an American girl who appears to be of good family. She is expecting a child and has been very sick during her pregnancy, so they both stayed home. Normally they give occasional cocktail parties with a lot of Soviets present. The only Soviet friend of theirs that Source knows about is (Fnu) Shnirson, a music critic. They are friendly with the Loorys (NY Herald Tribune) and Hughes Rudd (CBS).

15 SEP 1966

LIFE MAGAZINE

Mr. Robert BRIGHAM

Position (Jan 65): Correspondent for LIFE MAGAZINE in Moscow, USSR

No Comments - SOURCE only knows him slightly.

15 SEP 1966

BALTIMORE SUN

Mr. Adam CLYMER

Position (JAN 65): Correspondent for BALTIMORE SUN in Moscow, USSR

Called "head of the calf" (French expression) because he accident-prone.

15 SEP 1966

14-00000

SECRET

UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL

Mr. Nicholas DANILOFF

Position (Jan 65): Member, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL Bureau in Moscow, USSR

Very nice, intelligent man. Not Jewish. Overworked by SHAPIRO, who tends not to like him. Very sick when he left Moscow (ca. March/April 65). Saw a good many Russians and tended to be well informed. Has good promise as a journalist.

Very close to Korengold.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

NEW YORK TIMES

Mr. Henry TANNER

Position (Jan 65): Chief, New York Times Bureau in Moscow, USSR

Peggy Tanner, secretary-archivist in the Danish embassy, is TANNER's wife. Terribly intelligent and good-hearted individual. Both SOURCE and SOURCE's husband like them a lot. Remarkable thing about TANNER is that he never gets mad and is always smiling, even when things are most trying. Appears to be a very good, happy marriage. Both are first class people. Neither is Jewish. Transferred to Paris in the late spring of 1965.

15 SEP 1966

14-00000

NEW YORK TIMES

Mr. Theodore SHABAD

Position (Jan 65): Member, New York Times Bureau in Moscow, USSR

Most Jewish type of Jew in the entire Moscow press corps (exactly what SOURCE means by this hard to pind down - but would appear she means he keeps to his own co-religionists, and does not mix with others.) Lives in the same entryway as SOURCE. Did not like TANNER (Bureau Chief) and TANNER felt the same way about him. Has a stupid wife who talks too much at parties.

DATE ACQUIRED :: September 1966.

Shabad's wife had a nervous breakdown and left Moscow.

& How to be a Jewish Mother

SECRET 15 SEP 1966

UNITED STATES

America House Club

SOURCE comments this is little more than a brothel where the lower echelons of the foreign diplomatic colony arrange trysts. There is a great deal of passing whiskey and cigaretts here, particularly among the foreign service personnel (maids, etc) of members of the diplomatic corps. At least within the French embassy the general feeling is that one should stay away from the place, since no diplomats of status go there, except on rare occasions (an especially good film). The enlisted American military personnel are known to use the facilities of the club to shack up with foreigners.

DATE ACQUIRED: SEPTEMBER 1966

The tone of the Club has improved greatly owing to security measures which have been introduced in controlling the people who may enter. It has now become chic and even ambassadors go there.

SECRET

UNITED STATES

Mr. Marshall BREMENT

Position (Jan 65): Second secretary, US Embassy in Moscow, USSR

SOURCE speculates B. may be an intelligence officer because of the penetrating questions he asks. Also he appears to be far better informed than the run-of-the-mill American foreign service officer. Has a good memory and speaks some Chinese. Wife is socially cautious.

DATE ACQUIRED: SEPTEMBER 1966

He drinks and flirts. His wife is very jealous. He loves girls but Source does not think he goes around with Soviet girls.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

UNITED STATES

Mr. Abraham KATZ

Position (Jan 65): First secretary, US Embassy, Moscow, USSR

SOURCE and her husband see more of KATZ and his wife at than almost any other Americans of the US embassy. He is quite sharp and intelligent and SOURCE's husband has a high professional regard for him.

DATE ACQUIRED: SEPTEMBER 1966

Source's husband thinks he is an intelligence officer because of his position in the Embassy.

NEWSWEEK

Mr. Robert KORENGOLD

Position (Jan 66): Correspondent for NEWSWEEK Magazine in Moscow, USSR

SOURCE and SOURCE's husband like the K's a lot, they are clever people and both well informed. Has good Soviet contacts and digs out the news through them. Both speak good Russian. He goes by the name of "Bud". Both are Jewish.

DATE ACQUIRED: SEPTEMBER 1966

Wife is French and would be a very good source for information on the nefarious activities of third nationals in Moscow. She is not Jewish as previously stated.

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

UNITED STATES

Mr. Alan LOGAN

Position (Jan 65): Second secretary, US embassy, Moscow, USSR

A too serious type, wife never smiles. Very impressed with his position in the embassy - a "heavy" person. Both drink a good deal and only after they've had a few drinks do they let their hair down. His wife is French. SOURCE sees them at a number of American and British parties. Frequently present at African parties, since he is embassy officer responsible for African affairs. Wife is a bore.

DATE ACQUIRED: SEPTEMBER 1966

Source and her husband think LOGAN is an intelligence officer because the Soviets are very interested in him and publicized him as a spy for his interests in Africans in Moscow. After this article, the Africans stopped seeing LOGAN. He was very well liked however.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE

Mr. Stuart H. LOORY

Position (Jan 65): Chief New York Herald Tribune Bureau in
in Moscow, USSR

Both LOORY and his wife are Jewish. SOURCE considers them nice but does not see a very great deal of them socially.

DATE ACQUIRED: SEPTEMBER 1966

Has problems with his job because of the closing down of the New York Herald Tribune.

 15 SEP 1966

14-00000

SECRET

UNITED STATES

Mr. Roger A. PROVENCHER

Position (Jan 65); Second secretary, US embassy in Moscow, USSR

They are the most socially adept members of the US embassy. They entertain well and their parties are fun. They both dance well. She serves wonderful buffets. She is French. Has visited SOURCE's father in Paris on one occasion. SOURCE has had the Provenchers to her apartment about 15 times (since Oct 62). SOURCE speculates Provencher may be an intelligence officer based on the fact that he has "too good" an apartment for his rank and more care is taken of him than of Mr. Logan in the political section.

DATE ACQUIRED: SEPTEMBER 1966

Source says her husband has changed his mind about PROVENCHER's being an intelligence officer. Possibly he is one, but not in Moscow.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

14-00000

WASHINGTON POST

Mr. Stephen ROSENFELD

Position (Jan 65): Correspondent, WASHINGTON POST (USA) in Moscow, USSR

Noted for fact that he has a very large apartment by Moscow standards. Wife knows what she wants and gets it from the UPDK by constant badgering of this office. Lives in same block with SOURCE but entryway three. Wife was in Moscow before as a single girl correspondent. They both speak very good Russian. Both are Jewish.

DATE ACQUIRED: SEPTEMBER 1966

Source heard no comments from the Soviets about ROSENFELD's PNG for the Washington Post publication of the Penkovskiy Papers. Third National Colonies also had no comments but were very sorry for ROSENFELD.

SECRET 15 SEP 1966

SECRET

UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL (UPI)

Mr. Henry SHAPIRO

Position (Jan'65): Chief, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL Bureau in Moscow, USSR

SOURCE and SOURCE's husband like S. He is Jewish, sharp and quick, speaks excellent Russian. Knows a tremendous amount about Russian, very well informed. SOURCE speculates SHAPIRO may have helped the Russians in the past (she means the RIS) but does not think he has to now that he has established himself. SOURCE comments that SHAPIRO, like all Western press people have to be extremely careful what they file, otherwise they will be thrown out of the SU. This is very true in SHAPIRO's case, since he married to Soviet national who might not be able to leave with him if he were thrown out. Most noteable thing about SHAPIRO is his very extensive contacts in the dip circuit - Henry literally knows everybody worth knowing. On very good terms with past US ambassador (Thompson). Probably because of religious bonds, he is also on very good terms with current Israeli ambassador.

DATE ACQUIRED : September 1966.

Shapiro hates to spend money. He is very hard on his assistants, and very quick-tempered. He hates Edmund Stevens and his wife. He is close to the Austrian ambassador (Walter Wodak), the Italian ambassador (Federico Sensi) and the Norwegian ambassador (Frithjof Jacobsen). Recently Shapiro decided to do a story on the prostitutes who hang out at the Hotel National. He sent someone to interview some of these girls. As a result he was attacked in Pravda. Shapiro was terribly upset at this, almost crying. He is normally a very careful man. He knows all the Soviet journalists well, and possibly cooperates with them. SET

15 SEP 1966

NEWSDAY

Mr. Edmund STEVENS

Position (Jan 65): Correspondent for NEWSDAY (USA) in Moscow, USSR

Neither SOURCE nor SOURCE's husband like. Drinks a lot, especially early in the morning - often drunk, and when so tends to make stupid remarks. However, terribly well informed about what is going on in the Soviet Union, in fact one of the best informed Western correspondents in Moscow. He has a find collection of modern paintings. SOURCE believes he probably works for the KGB, since he openly involved in black marketing, selling of ikons, and always seems to have more than enough money. He is the type who would sell his sould for cash. Daughter now in Rome, trying to become a movie actress. She was formerly a student at the Bolshoi Theater, studying ballet. She was something of a whore and slept with a number of Russians.

15 SEP 1966

Edmund Stevens

Date Acquired: September 1966

STEVENS' wife told Peter GROSE of the New York Times that she wasbuying up paintings from Soviet artists and reselling them for a profit. Source considers Mrs. STEVENS a real bitch. STEVENS argues with her a lot. Source thinks he is no longer capable of having a sex life. Source has no doubts that he works for the KGB.

STEVENS' contacts in the foreign colony are extensive. He sees most of the important ambassadors, including KOHLER (US), HARRISON (UK), and SENSI (Italy). Among the many Americans he sees are GUTHRIE and ARMITAGE.

The only Soviet contacts of the STEVENS whom Source knows are figures from the artistic world: musicians MOISSEYEV and KAGAN, and the ballerina PLISETSKAYA.

UNITED STATES

US EMBASSY MOSCOW

General Comments:

Embassy officers all believe they are very important people by virtue of the fact that the Department sent them to Moscow to represent the States. They try to impress everybody with their position and with their knowledge of Soviet affairs (which is not too good in the first place). They tend to live a getto-like existence, do not mix with other members of the dip set. Stay at home or in the embassy and do not get out around in the city. From a social point of view they are for the most part boring - only wish to talk business and office politics. No lightness of sense for "things gay." Heavy. Do not have many of the social graces, do not dance well, do not play cards well, etc. Wives are poor dressers and can not cook.

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL (UPI)

Mr. Jordan AXELBANK

Position (Jan 65): Member, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL Bureau, in Moscow, USSR

"Jay" is stupid, more so than average press correspondents. Not intellectually quick. SHAPIRO runs rings around him.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

UNITED STATES

Capt. James W. BIZZELL, USAF

Position (Jan 65): Assistant air attache (medical), US Embassy, Moscow

SOURCE is very fond of Dr. Bizzell and considers him an excellent doctor, especially for children. Much more friendly than this predecessor. SOURCE gave Dr. Bizzell the name of her sister (UNSOX 10) and suggested he look her sister up when he went to Paris on vacation. The sister would show him around Paris. SOURCE does not know whether Dr. Bizzell contacted her sister. Mrs. Kohler is very fond of him. Bizzell used to squire young Miss. Stoessel around town. Dances well; plays good bridge.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

ASSOCIATED PRESS (AP)

Mr. Henry S. BRADSHER

Position (Jan 65): Chief of the ASSOCIATED PRESS Bureau, Moscow, USSR

SOURCE and SOURCE's husband do not like B. Consider him rude, barbarian. He is a <u>very</u> nervous man. Tries very hard (but does not make the grade) to keep up with chief AFP man (ULIMAN) and chief UPI man (SHAPIRO).

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

14-00000

SECRET

AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANY

Mr. Sam JAFFE

Position (Jan 65): Representative, AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANY in Moscow, USSR

Sam and June are attractive people and SOURCE would like to become more friendly with them. However, neither SOURCE nor her husband trusts the JAFFES completely - in their view something about them does not add up. JAFFE good newspaper man - knows how to ask questions that will get news. SOURCE feels she has to watch what she says to JAFFE, lest he uncover some of her husbands "sources" for news. JAFFE does a good job, knows the ropes of his profession and is a thoroughly competent journalist. Knows a great many Russians and now has very good contacts with the North Vietnamese - this rather unusual for an American correspondent in Moscow. Both are Jewish.

His Soviet news contacts? No info

Photos 56 and 77? X no info

15 SEP 1966

Mr. Foy D. KOHLER

Position (Jan 65): US Ambassador in Moscow, USSR

SOURCE wonders why, in view of his position, Mr. Kohler has a Chinese cook - she thinks this is a poor security practice. SOURCE knows of no specific things about the ambassador's cook which would make him a security risk other than his nationality. The fact that the American ambassador has a Chinese cook is often the subject of conversation on the Moscow dip circuit. Wife has <u>no</u> taste in clothes.

UNITED STATES

Mr. Walter J. STOESSEL, Jr.

Position (Jan 65): US Minister-Counsellor in Moscow, USSR

The STOESSELs tried to entertain in a grand way but were obivously amateurs. They would serve entirely too much liquor before dinner and get their guests potted. Their food at dinners was indifferent though of good quality. They did serve good French wines. One got the impression Mrs. STOESSEL did not take too many pains in planning and serving her dinners. She has a terrible cook. SOURCE entertained the STOESSELS in her home on about 10 occasions (from Oct 62 to the time the STOESSELS left). Wife dresses badly, even worse than Mrs. Kohler.

UNITED STATES

Mr. Malcolm TOON

Position (Jan 65): Counsellor for political affairs, US Embassy, Moscow

Socially better than most of the US Embassy personnel.

Wife dresses badly.

15 SEP 1966

Moscow News - 8 Jun 63



The hero of the Island of Freedom about to leave for home. Fidel Castro and his party were seen off by N. Khrushchov, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and R. Malinovsky, Soviet Minister of Defence.

The handshake followed the signing of the Soviet-Cuban joint statement in the Kremlin

Soviet Weekly
6 June 63

201-132139

14-00000

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, SR 6, S/C 2

S E C R E T 312304Z

DIR CITE MEXI 4811

IN50644

1 JUN 1963

LCIMPROVE

REF MEXI 4329 (IN 24821)+

RE REF PLEASE RECHECK DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DIP PLATE 171.

SAME CAR AND PLATES OBSERVED AGAIN, PLATES EXPIRED 3-31-60.

S E C R E T

201-132139

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

S E C R E T [illegible]

DIR CITE MEXI [illegible]

3 JUN 62 IN [illegible]

[illegible] LCIMPROVE

REF: MEXI [illegible] (IN 24[illegible])

1. [illegible] MAY ISSUE OF HAVE NEWSPAPER EL MUNDO PUBLISHED PHOTO OF NIKOLAY [illegible]VICH LEONOV TOGETHER WITH KHRUSHCHEV AND FIDEL CASTRO IN USSR, LEONOV EVIDENTLY INTERPRETING.

2. 31 MAY STATION PLACED ARTICLE IN [illegible], ENTITLED "PLAN PREPARED COMMUNIZE ALL LATIN AMERICA". ABOVE PHOTO ALSO APPEARED. NOTIONAL CUBAN EXILE RELATED SOV-CUBAN PLAN FINANCE SUBVERSION LA, AND WET ON TO STATE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE THAT LEONOV IN CHARGE OF ARMS SMUGGLING INTO CENTRAL AMERICA, AND LATTER WORKS WITH UNNAMED MEXICAN ARMY CAPTAIN THIS PURPOSE.

3. DIRECT HQS ATTENTION REF RE CARDENAS INVOLVEMENT WITH LEONOV.

4. FORWARDING CLIPS MAJOR STATIONS FOR REPLAY.

5. ADDENDUM: SAME ARTICLE WITH PHOTO APPEARED 31 MAY FRONT PAGE ULTIMAS NOTICIAS, NAMED LORENZO CARDENAS BARA[illegible] AS MEXICAN CAPTAIN INVOLVED.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *CONCERNED SURVEILLANCE OF LEONOV.

201-132139

14-00000

MOSCOW NEWS Saturday, May 25, 1963



At the Bratsk hydroelectric project.

201-133139

In the assembly shop of the "Uralmashzavod" enterprise in Sverdlovsk.

201-132139

25 May '63

MAGNIFICENT PAEAN TO SOVIET-CUBAN FRIENDSHIP



"Long live eternal friendship!" Nikita Khrushchov and Fidel Castro at the Luzhniki Stadium during the Soviet-Cuban friendship rally.

CUBA-USSR
CASTRO, FIDEL (L3) CUBA, WITH KHRUSHCHEV (L2) USSR, V.F. PROKYSLOV [illegible]
BREZHNEV, (L6) USSR, AT FRIENDSHIP MEETING, CENTRAL LENIN STADIUM, [illegible]
NIKOLAY S. LEONOV (L1) USSR, INTERPRETER FOR CASTRO.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
[illegible]

CUBA-USSR
CASTRO, (L1) CUBA, RESPONDING TO ACCLAIM ACCORDED HIM DURING SPEECH [illegible]
MIKOYAN (L4) USSR, JOINS IN APPLAUSE. NIKOLAY S. LEONOV (L2) USSR, INTERPRETER FOR
CASTRO ON VISIT TO USSR.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CIA-P-162771

201-132139

Fidel Castro visiting the Volgograd Tractor Works.

(For material on Castro's visit to the USSR see pages 3 and 7.)

18 May 63
Moscow News

201-133139

14-00000

Moscow News 18 May 63



Fidel Castro watches the antics of a "Baikal" bear cub he has received as a present.

201-132139

14-00000

Moscow News 18 May 63

'WE ARE FORGING HAPPINESS AND PEACE ON EARTH'

Fidel Castro at the Bratsk Hydropower Station.

201-132139

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SX-3735
14 May 1963

SUBJECT: AESTORAGE No. 841
Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139)

DOI: 1962

NOTE: AESTORAGE represents a collation of information provided by several reliable and sensitive sources, some of them documentary. AESTORAGE information is not to be released outside of the Clandestine Services Components of CIA unless written authorization has been granted by C/SR/CI. AESTORAGE information may be transmitted to CIA field stations only after it has been coordinated with C/SR/CI.

In August 1962 Source identified Subject as a KGB officer, presently assigned to Mexico City.

Distribution:
Orig. - LEONOV dossier
1 - DC/SR/CI
1 - SR/CI/K

SR/CI/K:DRyan

CS COPY

RIS INPUT NO. 6
27 May 63

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

201-132139

14-00000

Moscow News
11 May 63

201-132139



Nikita Khrushchov and Fidel Castro. In the background, right, Leonid Brezhnev

Soviet Weekly
9 May 63

201-133139

Nikita Khrushchov and Fidel Castro at the Likhachov Automobile Works, which they visited the day before May 1.

The workers of the plant were holding a social evening at their Palace of Culture, and the distinguished guest was greeted by thousands of people. Both Nikita Khrushchov and Fidel Castro were presented with models of the ZIL car made at the Works. Before the concert, Nikita Khrushchov, Fidel Castro and his party saw a documentary film about the Works, which was the first Soviet automobile plant. Famous performers and amateurs took part in the concert, which wound up with the "July 26th March". The last [illegible]s were drowned in enthusiastic applause, and cries of "Viva Fidel!" and "Viva Cuba!" resounded in the hall long afterwards.



Moscow News

-1963

14-00000



Fidel Castro *(centre)* **pictured with Nikita Khrushchov and Leonid Brezhnev on the tribune in Red Square, during the Cuban leader's tumultuous welcome last weekend**

Soviet Weekly
3 May 63

201-132139

LEFTIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES-Soviet Directed Insurgency

Monthly CI Report
OSI District 30
May 1963

See Mexi[illegible] publication HCSI
this source was

(S) (Gp-1) A Soviet Embassy official in Mexico City, Nikolai S. LEONOV, is allegedly actively planning an insurgent movement in Latin America. LEONOV left Mexico for the USSR on 21 April to confer with KHRUSHCHEV and CASTRO. Credence is given this report by the publication of a photograph of the three on 8 May in a Cuban newspaper. The photograph was purportedly taken during a recent meeting.

(S) (Gp-1) Cuba and Mexico, according to LEONOV's schemes, would serve as bases for the insurgency. Cuba would be the "invisible beachhead" and Mexico the point for covert distribution of arms.

(S) (Gp-3) The individual selected as the contact man for arms acquisition is said to have been engaged in similar activity in Guatemala about a year ago.

(S) (Gp-3) Another report from sources in Colombia stated that pro-CASTRO ex-President CARDENAS planned to call a meeting in Mexico City of "leftist bent", disgruntled retired military officers from Latin American countries on the subject of insurgency. (DIA, 3 June 1963)

201-132135

NEW YORK TIMES SUNDAY, MAY 5, 1963.

..WS OF THE WEE..

CASTRO AND SOVIET LEADERS WATCH MAY DAY PARADE IN MOSCOW



SUBJ IN MOSCOW WITH THIS GROUP AS INTERPRETER APR MAY 63

/ 32137



CUBA-USSR APRIL 28, 1963
CASTRO IN USSR. LEFT TO RIGHT, LEONOV, N, USSR; KHRUSHCHEV, N., USSR; CASTRO, F., CUBA; BREZHNEV, L., USSR; SHVERNIK, N., USSR; SUSLOV, A., USSR; KOSYGIN, A., USSR; AND POLYANSKY, D., USSR.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY CIA-P-163872

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

1	C/(A)	4	B
2	4	5	RP
3	C	6	6

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, SR 6, DD/I, AD/CI 2, S/C 2

S E C RFICBXW52226Z

DIR CITE MEXI 4327 25629 26 APR 1963

REDCAP

ACCORDING LIFIRE NIKOLAY LEONOV LEFT MEXI FOR USSR WITH FAMILY 21 APR ON SABENA.

S E C R E T

Bill W
Frank

201-132139 25 APR 1963

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
CABLE	2. RI FILE NO. 201-2[illegible]8906
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. MEXI-04309 — 4. DATE 24 APR 63
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM — 8. DATE OF INFO. — 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST — 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN — 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.
201-132139	

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LEONOV, NIKCLAY SERGEYEVICH /201-132139/

NIKCLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV /201-132139/ STATIONED MOUNTED LIEMBRACE SURVEILLANCE FOR EVENTUALITY HE MIGHT MAKE LAST MINUTE CLANDESTINE MEETS. MEXI EFFORTS PAID OFF IN THAT TEAM ABLE SPOT OVIOUS CLANDESTINE HALF HOUR MEET EVE 19 APR. TEAM TAILED MEXICAN CONTACT WHOM STATION HAS NOW IDENTIFIED AS LORENZO CARDENAS BARAJAS, CIT MEXICO. FOR INFO CARDENAS, DIRECT HQS ATTENTION LINLUCK TRAFFIC MEXI 0545 ON 11 APR 62, MEXI 0563, 0698, 0827, 0873, AND ALSO OTHER MEXI REPORTING RE CARDENAS.

LIEMBRACE SURVEILLANCE LEONOV 20 APR DROPPED DURING LATE AFTERNOON AFTER LEONOV MADE OBVIOUS EFFORTS DETERMINE IF HE UNDER SURVEILLANCE. INTERESTING NOT E THAT LEONOV WAS THEN DRIVING AROUND SAME AREA WHERE HAD CLANDESTINE MEET PREVIOUS EVE. TEAM BELIEVES LEONOV DID NOT DETECT THEIR PRESENCE.

ACCORDING LATEST LIEONOV INFO, APPEARS LIKELY LEONOV RETURNING MEXI AFTER HOME LEAVE, USSR.

STATION FILES REFLECT THAT BASIS LINLUCK INFO, MEXI ADVISED LITEMPOS DURING APRIL 1962 THAT CARDENAS INVOLVED SMUGGLING ARMS GUAT, APR 63 MEXI LITEMPO PROVIDED FOLL INFO CARDENAS- ENROLLED MILITARY COLLEGE.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-132139

FORM 10-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

EVALUATION OF SOURCE: A. Completely reliable. B. Usually reliable. C. Fairly reliable. D. Not usually reliable. E. Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence.) F. Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources.)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1. Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2. Probably true. 3. Possibly true. 4. Doubtful. 5. Probably false. 6. Cannot be judged. Documentary: Based on original document.

SECRET

COUNTRY	Cuba/Mexico	REPORT NO.	1201-6770
SUBJECT	Travel of Victor Rico Galan, Mexican Marxist, to Cuba	DATE OF REPORT	5 October 1962
		NO. OF PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	27 July to 2 October 1962		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Mexico, Mexico City (27 July to 2 October 1962)		

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. NOTE FOREGOING EXPLANATION.

SOURCE: Para. 1: Person (B) in close contact with Rico Galan.
Para. 2: Person (B) with good access to travel information.
Appraisal of Content: 2

Rico 201

1. Victor Rico Galan, Mexican Marxist journalist and head of the National Press and Propaganda Committee of the Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN - National Liberation Movement, rabidly anti-United States, pro-Cuba, Communist front, plans to write a political biography on Fidel Castro Ruz, Communist Prime Minister of Cuba. Rico Galan, who proposed the idea to the Cuban Government and was accepted, will spend two months in Cuba working on the project.

2. On 2 October Rico Galan left Mexico for Habana, Cuba, on Cubana Airlines. He carried Mexican passport No. 51115, with a Cuban courtesy visa.

201 FILE OPENED ON THE BASIS OF THIS DOCUMENT

SECRET 201-336474

DISTRIBUTION

CS COPY

M 1725,084

14-00000

REPORT COVER SHEET

SECRET/RYBAT CONTINUED CONTROL

REPORT NO.: [illegible]

FROM: Mexico City

DATE OF REPORT: 22 May 1962

REPORTING OFFICER: Louis J. [illegible]

RD NO.: 200-7-38-1

REPORTS OFFICER: Portia L. [illegible]

PROJ.: LIMLUCK

APPROVING OFFICER: Willard C. CURTIS

STICK CO.: LIMLUCK

BACKGROUND DATA AND COMMENTS:

Source got the information reported in the attached from his conversation with Lorenzo Cardenas on 5 May. Cardenas told Subject he received the information from Viktor Nikolayevich Glotov, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

RI - PLEASE INDEX AS INDICATED AND FORWARD CARDS TO THIS STATION FOR ITS FILES.

OPTIONAL: ENTRIES BELOW NEED NOT BE FILLED IN IF DUPLICATED IN ACCOMPANYING REPORT

DISTRIBUTION

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HCG

201-132139

COUNTRY:

NO. OF ENCLOSURES: None

NO. PAGES: 1

SUBJECT:

REFERENCES:

SECRET/RYBAT CONTINUED CONTROL

FORM 1467

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

EVALUATION OF SOURCE: A. Completely reliable. B. Usually reliable. C. Fairly reliable. D. Not usually reliable. E. Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence.) F. Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources.)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1. Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2. Probably true. 3. Possibly true. 4. Doubtful. 5. Probably false. 6. Cannot be judged. Documentary: Based on original document.

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY	Cuba/Guatemala/USSR/Mexico	REPORT NO.	HMM-6405
SUBJECT	Soviet Assistance to Cuba and Guatemala	DATE OF REPORT	22 May 1962
		NO. OF PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	5 May 1962		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Mexico, Mexico City (5 May 1962)		

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. NOTE FOREGOING EXPLANATION.

SOURCE: Persons (B) with good connections in Guatemala Communist circles in Mexico City. Appraisal of Content: 2

The Soviet Government has assured the Cuban Government that it will give its assistance to the Cubans in the event of an aggression against Cuba. The Soviets consider Guatemala to be the most sensitive spot in Latin America at the present time, and are very interested in the Guatemalan problem. Because of this the Soviets are prepared to give their all out assistance to both countries in their current political struggles.

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

DISTRIBUTION

COPY

DISPATCH

TO: Chief, WHD

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. EMMA-15907

50-126-3

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 15 December 1961

SUBJECT: Possible Exploitation of Links of Soviet Embassy Officer with Cuban 26th of July Movement

ACTION REQUIRED: For your information

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCE: HMM-10265, 29 November 1961

Nikolai Sergeyevich LEONOV returned to Mexico 11 July 1960 and has been assigned to the Soviet Embassy staff, Third Secretary, diplomatic rank, as an assistant to Vladimir NOVIKOV in the Office of Cultural Affairs. While the Station feels that Fidel CASTRO Ruz's recent public statements admitting his long-time sympathies and associations with Communism somewhat lessens the exploitation impact of this "expose", it is also felt that LEONOV's Mexican background, dating back to 1955 and including the incident played up by the Mexican press in 1956, is worthy of press replay. LEONOV's return and present responsible position in the Soviet Embassy of Mexico will provide added interest in the story. The Station will therefore attempt to obtain the Mexican press accounts of the 1956 incident, updating this information into a press article for exploitation as suggested in reference.

Willard C. Curtis

14 December 1961

Distribution:
3 - WHD
5 - Files

201-132139

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

14-00000

Chief, WH Division

[illegible]/Operational/Exploitation of Possible Contact of Soviet Embassy Employee with FIDEL/CASTRO Ruz

ACTION REQUIRED: Publicize previous links of Soviet Embassy with Cuban 26th of July Movement and return of LEONOV, if feasible; and para. 5.

REFERENCES : A. [illegible]-039, (IN 35356)
B. [illegible]-9793, 23 March 1959
C. [illegible]-8593 (IN 49057)

1. Your attention is directed to reference A which mentioned the proposed [illegible] exploitation of the finding of the personal calling card of Nikolai S. LEONOV in the address book of Fidel CASTRO Ruz.

2. Although there were OTHER reports at the same time as reference A, which reported that the Mexican press carried a generally accurate and complete account of the breakup of the Cuban revolutionary conspiracy, that the leader was linked with the Soviet Embassy and that he carried in his wallet a card of LEONOV, secretary to the Soviet ambassador, it can not be determined at Headquarters whether there was specific Station play-up of this incident.

3. In reviewing Station dispatches pertaining to the CASTRO case, reference B was examined, as well as its attachment, the report of LEONOV. The latter apparently attempts to explain the circumstances under which the personal card of LEONOV was "planted" in the CASTRO address book. A discrepancy is noted in the reconstruction of the incident of the arrest of CASTRO and the discovery of LEONOV's card in that both the reference and the attachment describe the circumstances surrounding the arrest of CASTRO as occurring in November 1956 whereas reference A had already reported the arrest and discovery of the card in the address book as having occurred in June 1956.

4. Now, there is renewed interest in this matter due to the fact that reference C reported LEONOV's return to Mexico for what appears to be a second tour of duty.

CONTINUED

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City

201-132139

1 - RI
1 - WH/Registry
1 - WH/3/Mexico/Chrono
1 - SR/10

See 2017 14 Nov 63
50-6-83

CROSS REFERENCE TO [illegible]

DATE TYPED: 24 Nov 1963

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW 10265

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-12-3

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/Mexico	A. E. Grunwell	baf C/WH/3/Mexico	5555

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
SR/10		Frank Lovy (In Draft)
WH/C/CA		

RELEASING

C/WH | | J. C. King

DISPATCH

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	[illegible]-10265

5. The views of Station Mexico are requested as to whether it would be feasible to replay the original incident indicating the tie between CASTRO and LEONOV. Even if the incident was not exploited before, it is the opinion of Headquarters that it would be useful to cite a specific CASTRO tie with the Soviets before he took over in Cuba. From a Headquarters viewpoint the alleged action of LIV[illegible]/2 in "planting" the card would still not impair the replay of the original incident.

END OF DISPATCH

FPI DOCUMENT
DATE: 9 AUGUST 1961
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
FPI FILE NUMPER: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)
SUPJECT: LEONOV, NIKOLAI SERGEEVICH aka
N. S. Leonov

14-00000

Manifest # 360902
1 Sept 61

SECRET 1-1-5

PERSONAL INFORMATION DATA

201 NUMBER: 201-132139 A#11155

PHOTO

NAME: L[illegible]NOV, Nikolay Sergeyevich

TITLE (Position and country): * 3rd Secy Asst Cultural Employee? Officer MEXICO

DATE OF ARRIVAL: 31 July 1961

PCS DEPARTURE:

PASSPORT NO.: D-18009 Wife: D-18010

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 22 August 1928/Ryazan

MAILING ADDRESS: Pachuca - 153-405 Condesa

NAME OF WIFE: Valeriya Ivanovna

WIFE'S DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 30 ~~28~~ April 1928/Ryazan

CHILDREN: Dau: Irina, b. 62

LANGUAGES: Spanish EXCELLENT

Margin notes (right): Dipl List 1 Sept 61; HMMA 17[illegible] 5 Sept 61; MEXI 8593 6 Aug 61; DBF 85321 9 Aug 61; HMMA 22430; HMMA 18913 27 APR 62

DESCRIPTION

HEIGHT	WEIGHT	COLOR OF EYES	COLOR OF HAIR	COMPLEXION

IDENTIFYING MARKS

OTHER (Include personality, habits, hobbies, vices, etc.)

MEXI 839, 27 Jun 56 — Subject's calling card found in address book of Fidel CASTRO Ruz when latter arrested in Mexi 21 June 1956.

HMMA 18305, 15 Dec 61 — Disptch re poss exploitation of Subj with Cuban 26th of Jul Movement.

HMM 8492, 15 Feb 64 — Subj's wife works at Sov. Emb. (capacity unknown, probably typist).

CAREER

1. See old REDCAP sheet from previous tour of duty Mexi 1953-56.
2. Subj accompanied MIKOYAN entourage to Cuba for the Soviet Exposition February 1960.

RIS INPUT NO. 211

FORM 1-59 498 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (20)

201-132139

14-00000

USSR 1963

~~IVANOV, LEONID.~~

INTERPRETER FOR CASTRO.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CIA-P-163160

[illegible], Nikolay Sergeyevich

14-00000



CUBA-USSR
CASTRO, FIDEL (L2) CUBA, WITH KHRUSHCHEV (L3) USSR, SHAKING HANDS WITH FOREIGN DIPLOMATS IN RED SQUARE. NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV (L1) USSR, ACTING AS INTERPRETER FOR CASTRO.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CIA-P-162805

201-132139

14-00000

SECRET HMMA-19770

FROM	DATE OF REPORT
Mexico City	5 October 1962
REPORTING OFFICER	RD. NO.
Clyde K. SHROCK	P-7354
REPORTS OFFICER	PROJ.
Portia L. SPARESUS	LIFIRE
APPROVING OFFICER	SOURCE CR.
Willard C. CURTIS	Para. 1: LICOOKY-1 Para. 2: LIFIRE

BACKGROUND DATA AND COMMENTS:

The information in paragraph one of the attached was taken from several small items submitted by LICOOKY-1 since 17 July. The information in paragraph two was taken from the LIFIRE airlists.

OPTIONAL: ENTRIES BELOW NEED NOT BE FILLED IN IF DUPLICATED IN ACCOMPANYING REPORT

DISTRIBUTION

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COUNTRY	NO. OF ENCLOSURES	NO. PAGES
	None	1

SUBJECT	REFERENCES
	201-132139

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

APPR	SECRET	DOI

FORM 8-60 1467

CS COPY !

201-336474

14-00000

FPI DOCUMENT
DATE: 9 AUGUST 1961
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
FFI FILE NUMPER: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)
SUBJECT: LEONOVA, VALERIA IVANOVNA aka
V. I..Leonova

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 4 AUG 61

363

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, SR 6, DD/I, AD/CI, S/C 2
COP, CI/IC 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2	RP	5	
3		6	

AUG 6 06 14Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 49057

DIR CITE MEXI (WARE ACTING) 8593

REDCAP

1. ACCORDING AIRLISTS FOLL ARRIVALS 31 JULY VIA AIR FRANCE 707: NIKOLAI SERGEYEVICH LEONOV AND WIFE VALERIYA IVANOVNA.

2. REQUEST HQS PROVIDE TRACES SUBJS ACTIVITIES SINCE DEPARTURE MEXI OCT 1956.

3. ODENVY ADVISED.

END OF MESSAGE

RI trace req 10 Aug 61
Bio card typed 10 Aug 61

SECRET

201-132139

Copy No.

30 June 61 X

SR/6/Bio (Rebecca T. Clarke) 1608 J. 8550

X X X

SR/6/Bio cards 1953 to 1960

LEONOV NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH X X

22 08 28 USSR RYAZAN USSR USSR

Probably and interpreter

SR/6/Bio 706

Administrative clerk at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City between March 53 and October 1956. In February 1960 accompanied MIKOYAN entourage to Cuba for the Soviet Cultural and Technical Exposition.

D. - 11 201-132139

14-00000

FBI DOCUMENT
DATE: 17 FEBRUARY 1960
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
FBI FILE NUMBER: 105-83963 (BUREAU)
SUBJECT: SOVIET CULTURAL AND TECHNICAL EXPOSITION
HAVANA, CUBA
INTERNAL SECURITY, CUBA

14-00000

SECRET

[illegible] City Report No: [illegible] Local: [illegible]

No. of Pages: 11 No. of Enclosures: None

Report Made by: Janice J. [illegible] Approved by: Willard C. [illegible]

Distribution: 4-Hqs (& AUSRAP, [illegible]) Orally to: 12P 5 Dec 56
By copy to: 2-Files

Source Cryptonym: LIFEAT/LIERRIE References: None

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

SUBJECT: Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, October 1956

CHARGED FROM RID/FI

Classification SECRET

RI COPY

201-132139

14-00000

SECRET

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY: Mexico

REPORT NO. [illegible]-2278

SUBJECT: Activities of the Soviet Embassy Mexico City, October 1956

DATE OF INFO: 1-31 October 1956

DATE ACQUIRED: 1-31 October 1956

PLACE ACQUIRED: Mexico City

DATE OF REPORT: 5 December 1956

SOURCE, SOURCE EVALUATION, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: Source having access to Soviet diplomatic circles in Mexico. Appraisal of Content: Documentary.

I. [illegible]

The following information on the activities of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico was developed during the month of October 1956. Separate reports will be furnished on the Commercial and on Cultural and Propaganda Activities of the Embassy. References made below to the visiting Soviet musicians will be detailed in a special report concerning the activities of the musicians while in Mexico.

II. DIPLOMATIC

A. Relations with Mexican Government

1. On 1 October the secretary of Alfonso [illegible] Diaz, Private Secretary to Foreign Minister Luis PADILLA Nervo, conferred with Leonid [illegible], Third Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, about a dinner being given by the Embassy the following evening. Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy G. [illegible]KOV invited [illegible] and his wife to attend a piano concert with him after the dinner. On 3 October [illegible] informed [illegible] that he was very embarrassed about what had happened the previous evening, but he had had a meeting with PADILLA Nervo and had not gotten out until 8:30 p.m. He had not known whether to go to the Embassy or to the concert, and asked that [illegible] excuse him with the Ambassador.

2. The private secretary of Jose [illegible]ZA, Sub-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, left a message at the Soviet Embassy on 3 October indicating he would be unable to accompany the Ambassador to the concert by a Soviet violinist that evening, as he had to attend a special dinner. However, [illegible] had apparently accompanied the Ambassador to a piano concert the previous evening.

SECRET

FORM NO. 51-58 PREVIOUS EDITIONS MAY BE USED.

50-4-1-303

SECRET

HMM-2178
Page 2

3. Eduardo GUZMAN of Perex and (fnu) GARCIA Rojas, also of Perex, accepted invitations from Boris A. KAZANTSEV, recently appointed Counselor of the Soviet Embassy, to lunch on 5 October at 2:30 p.m. When GARCIA Rojas became ill that day, KAZANTSEV and GUZMAN decided to lunch alone, and meet another day with GARCIA Rojas. Later GUZMAN had to postpone the luncheon because of a special meeting with Antonio [illegible] of Perex. Both GUZMAN and GARCIA Rojas were invited and since the latter could not attend, GUZMAN had to be present. GUZMAN suggested to KAZANTSEV that they postpone their luncheon date until 8 October when GARCIA would probably be able to attend also.

4. On 4 October KAZANTSEV contacted Bernardo [illegible] Morales of the Press Section of the Foreign Ministry and apologized for not being able to obtain a third ticket for him for a concert that evening. [illegible] had requested a ticket for his daughter, but KAZANTSEV assured him that since their tickets were for the balcony all three could probably enter on the two tickets.

5. The secretary of Ricardo J. ZEVADA (of the Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior) informed the Embassy on 8 October that ZEVADA was back at work. The Embassy had been trying to contact him, probably for the purpose of inviting him to a dinner or concert.

6. On 10 October a farewell reception was held at the Soviet Embassy in honor of Mikhail F. CHERKASOV, Counselor of the Embassy, who was scheduled to leave Mexico on 17 October. On 9 October Jose MARTINEZ Caballos of the Protocol Office told Viktor N. GLOTOV, First Secretary, that Jose MUNOZ Zapata of the Foreign Office wanted to know if it would be possible for the Embassy to give four invitations to the following friends of Mrs. PADILLA Nervo (believed to be the wife of Luis PADILLA Nervo, Secretary of Foreign Relations): Enrique [illegible] and wife; Dr. Grover [illegible] and wife; M. [illegible]; and Mrs. Mary [illegible]. The Embassy agreed to send the invitations to Mrs. PADILLA Nervo, who would pass them on to her friends. MARTINEZ Caballos also indicated that in case the Ambassador and CHERKASOV did not know, that Eduardo ESPINOSA Prieto of the Mexican Diplomatic Service, and his wife Tamara were in Mexico and it would be a good idea to invite them. GLOTOV replied that these people were their good friends. MARTINEZ Caballos did not know if Minister PADILLA Nervo and Sub-secretary GOROSTIZA would be able to attend, but added that he and MUNOZ Zapata would be there. Federico A. MARISCAL, new Director of Protocol, also planned to attend. Pablo CAMPOS Ortiz of the Foreign Ministry could not be there because he was still in the hospital recovering from an operation.

SECRET 50-4-1-303

14-00000

SECRET

7. [illegible] CHAVEZ Ramirez, Minister of Hydraulic Resources, and his wife received an invitation to a concert of the Soviet musicians on 21 October and requested eight seats. On 20 October they asked that eight seats be reserved for the 28 October concert.

8. Enrique ROSA Pontones, private secretary of Antonio CARRILLO Flores, Minister of Finance, informed [illegible] on 15 October that CARRILLO enjoyed attending the concert with the Ambassador on Sunday, but would not be able to accompany him on Wednesday, 17 October because of a meeting with the French Economic Commission.

9. Soviet Ambassador [illegible] made an appointment to meet with Director Rodrigo [illegible] of the Banco de Mexico on 18 October at 12:00 noon.

10. On 16 October the Ambassador consulted with [illegible] Zapata concerning an idea he had of organizing a small concert at the Embassy for a very restricted group - only Secretaries and some Sub-secretaries and their wives. [illegible] and told [illegible] Zapata that the question of attending was difficult because of the limited time and the protocol. [illegible] Zapata suggested that the Ambassador send out invitations or indicate to him who might be interested. He and MARISCAL could not attend on the 17th because they were invited to a cocktail party in the afternoon at Bellas Artes and a dinner in the evening. [illegible] had already heard the artists at Bellas Artes and at the cocktail party at the Embassy.

11. On 24 October [illegible] received a message from Salvador [illegible], secretary of President [illegible] Cortines, thanking the Embassy for offering a concert by the Soviet artists as mentioned in the note received from the Soviets. However, they would not be able to attend due to the fact that the wife of the president had some engagements out of town.

12. The private secretary of [illegible] informed [illegible] on 27 October that [illegible] had received the Ambassador's invitation to the concert on 28 October, but had to go out of town and would not be able to attend. He asked that the tickets be given to his son.

B. Relations with Other Latin American Diplomats:

1. Ambassador [illegible] made arrangements with Gral. Gabriel [illegible] Quiroga, Bolivian Ambassador, to meet at the Bolivian Chancellery on the afternoon of 2 October.

SECRET 50-4-1-303

SECRET

2. On 5 October [illegible]OV contacted Jorge [illegible], Attache at the Panamanian Embassy, to make an appointment with Ambassador Eusebio A. [illegible]. However, the ambassador was in Panama City so [illegible]OV made arrangements to meet with RAMIREZ the following day.

3. On 17 October [illegible]OV informed (Dr) Otto [illegible] Salazar, Second Secretary at the Nicaraguan Embassy, that the Soviet Ambassador would participate in the ceremony in honor of Carlos PEON del Valle, former Chief of the Mexican Protocol Office. The Soviet Ambassador had indicated that they could handle the matter of the money as they liked, taking from the funds of the diplomatic corps if they wished.

4. On 31 October KALANTSEV invited Bolivian Ambassador ARCE and First Secretary Raul Alfonso GARCIA and their wives to lunch on behalf of the Soviet Ambassador as a farewell to ARCE. However, ARCE was leaving on a trip that day and could not accept.

C. Relations with Iron Curtain Missions:

1. Czech Legation: On 2 October Ambassador BAZAROV invited Czech Minister Bedrich PISTORA and his wife to attend the concert of Soviet pianist [illegible] to be held that evening at Bellas Artes. On 4 October Karel [illegible] of the Czech Legation met W. CHERKASOV. PISTORA and [illegible] and their wives accepted invitations to the farewell cocktail party for CHERKASOV given on 10 October. On 29 October Boris P. KOLOMYAKOV, Attache, invited Bedrich [illegible] and Lubomir BLAZEK to a small recital which the visiting Soviet artists were to give at the IICMR.

2. Polish Legation: Polish Charge d'Affaires Bernard BOGDANSKI was scheduled to visit the Soviet Embassy the evening of 11 October, probably with his wife.

D. Miscellaneous Diplomatic Relations:

1. CEPAL: On 1 October [illegible] made arrangements to visit (fnu) VILLASECA, assistant to (fnu) URQUIDI of CEPAL (Comision Economica para la America Latina).

2. Indian Embassy: [illegible] K. [illegible] of the Indian Embassy received an invitation to the farewell party for CHERKASOV on 10 October. He also invited CHERKASOV to lunch on 15 October and indicated that CHERKASOV should bring along any other friend or couple he chose. It is believed that Ambassador BAZAROV attended the luncheon. On 20 October [illegible] and his wife were invited to a concert of Soviet singer [illegible].

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3. Office of the Indonesian Republic: On 1[illegible] October the Soviet Embassy was informed that the Indonesian Charge d'Affaires would not be able to attend (the reception for C[illegible]) that day because of illness. The following days the secretary of the Indonesian Charge contacted the Soviet Embassy concerning the premiere of some Indonesian dancers on 21 October, indicating that she would send invitations to the Ambassador, [illegible]TSEV, [illegible]YAKOV, and First Secretary Victor N./[illegible]. She also expressed an interest in learning Russian and was directed to contact the IIC[illegible]. On 26 October the Indonesian Charge and Bees Effendi were invited to lunch by the Soviet Ambassador.

4. French Embassy: Mrs. Guillaume/[illegible]-PICOT, wife of the French Ambassador in Mexico, attended a dinner and showing of two films at the Soviet Embassy on 2[illegible] October. While with the Soviets she contacted the French Embassy and asked someone there to inform Mrs. ROSENZWEIG Diaz of a change of a meeting time at the hotel Alffer the following morning.

5. Yugoslav Embassy: The Soviet Ambassador invited Mirko [illegible]SIC, First Secretary of the Yugoslav Embassy, and [illegible]/[illegible] (fn), new Charge d'Affaires, and their wives to dinner on 29 October at 1:30 p.m.

6. Israeli Legation: On 31 October the Minister of the Israeli Legation received the Soviet Ambassador at the Chancellory, Alejandro Dumas 231, Mexico, D.F. Vladimir N./[illegible]OV of the Soviet Embassy had attempted to make an appointment for KULAZHENKOV with the Minister earlier in the month, but the latter had been on a trip to Panama, El Salvador, and Guatemala.

III. ACTIVITIES OF THE MILITARY

A. Nikolay I./ROSCHIN, employee in the office of the Soviet Naval Attache, contacted Enrique/[illegible]AZ Holt, Acting G-2 of the Mexican Navy, on 3 October and said he had received a letter stating that the Secretary of the Navy could not attend a reception by the Ambassador to be held sometime between 5 and 10 October. ROSCHIN wanted to know if the other officers could attend, or whether they should wait until the Secretary could come also. ROSCHIN suggested that perhaps the Secretary could come sometime after 10 October, but [illegible]AZ indicated that he was not sure, because the Secretary was often out of town on inspection tours. [illegible]AZ consulted with Comandante [illegible] and said they would let ROSCHIN know later about the date and whether the officers would attend. ROSCHIN said they would be glad to give a reception to the Secretary on any date he chose. (Comment: As usual, [illegible]AZ did not seem particularly enthusiastic in his dealings with ROSCHIN.)

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B. On 4 October Lt. (fnu) QUIROZ contacted Nikolay M. [illegible], Assistant Naval Attache, on behalf of the "Comandante" and stated that the latter could not (see [illegible]) that evening because he had been called to Veracruz.

C. On 4 October an unidentified person in Vancouver, Canada unsuccessfully attempted to contact the Soviet Military Attache.

D. Comandante Alfonso/[illegible] Gomez of the Comision Inspectora invited [illegible] to join him on 6 October. However, [illegible] had plans to go fishing at the Dock of Valle de Bravo, and since it had been four Saturdays since he had been able to go, he would prefer to get together some day during the week.

E. On 3 October Major Alfredo [illegible] Arguello of the Army Second Section asked Vladimir N. [illegible] of the Soviet Military Attache's office, how General (fnu) [illegible] could send some things to his relatives in the USSR. [illegible] suggested he send them by international airmail.

F. On 19 October Major [illegible] informed [illegible] that the list of high officials of the Defense Department which he had requested, was ready. On 25 October [illegible] informed [illegible] he would like to talk with him about some motion pictures.

G. On 27 October Major Miguel [illegible] Penaguri was in contact with Nikolay [illegible], employee of the Office of the Military Attache and a known Soviet Intelligence Officer. (see [illegible]-2061)

IV. CONTACTS:

A. Communist and Pro-Communist Contacts:

1. An unidentified hotel employee called the Soviet Embassy on 1 October on behalf of Mrs. Ayten Onanian de [illegible], wife of Communist professor Macedonio GARZA, and inquired whether Consul [illegible] had received a reply from Baku, USSR or if he had received a copy of the bachelor's certificate from that city. The Embassy informed him that [illegible] was no longer in Mexico and that the new Consul would be receiving the public on the following day.

2. Emma de RIVERA, wife of Communist artist Diego RIVERA, informed [illegible] on 2 October that she hoped they could enjoy together some of the vodka she had received from the Ambassador. She had just come from Acapulco where her husband still was staying, and she was planning to return that afternoon. [illegible] would call the Ambassador when they came back to Mexico City the first of the week. (For further contacts between the RIVERAs and members of the Soviet Embassy, see [illegible].)

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3. An unidentified individual from FOARE (Federacion de Organismos de Ayuda a la Republica Espanola) asked [illegible] on 3 October if he could sell him an ampoule of [illegible]. [illegible] replied that they expected to have some in a few months, but did not have any at the moment.

4. One Zita Vasich de [illegible] was in contact with Vladimir [illegible], Second Secretary, on 3 October concerning an ampoule (of [illegible]) he had for her. He indicated that this one was free, but in case she needed more there were six other ampoules for sale in Mexico and they would cost seventy-five pesos each. (Comment: The caller is the wife of Federico [illegible], pro-Communist artist.)

5. Jose [illegible], pro-Communist writer, and (fnu) [illegible]OS, a lawyer, visited [illegible] during the month of October.

6. (Miss) Rosario [illegible], journalist, accepted an invitation from KOLOMYAKOV to a cocktail party at the Soviet Embassy on 8 October. (Comment: [illegible] is known to be pro-Communist.)

7. On 12 October (Dr.) [illegible] de [illegible] of the Society of Friends of China attempted to contact [illegible] concerning some pictures.

8. On 19 October Joaquin MacGREGOR Sanchez told [illegible] that he had looked for him at [illegible]'s concert but had not seen him there. MacGREGOR went on to say that he had seen an article about a Brazilian man of science who was in the USSR. [illegible] informed him that this man was an Armenian who had been repatriated from Brazil to the USSR. MacGREGOR indicated that he might be the right person to read his thesis, since he had studied existentialism, spoke Spanish, and was enrolled in the Soviet Academy of Science. [illegible] said the thesis had been sent two months ago, and that they were working on it and would probably show it to the individual mentioned.

9. Josefina ZAVALA of the Propaganda Office contacted (fnu) [illegible] on 19 October to ascertain if she had issue #9 of the magazine Comunist, but it had not arrived. [illegible] is believed to be identical with one Sra. del Carmen [illegible] Fuchi, who is connected with a shop known as "Todo para el Nino," located at Pte. de Alvarado [illegible]. She is believed to be a Communist and is frequently in contact with the Czech Legation.)

10. On 30 October Rosa [illegible], pro-Communist journalist, arranged to go by the Embassy to see [illegible] concerning some articles she had written and wanted to send to TASS, Soviet news agency.

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B. Contacts of Special Interest:

1. On 26 October (fnu) RIVERA, a lawyer, informed KOMAKAROV that he had found an article in the "Diverse Column" of Universal which suggested the name of one Ing. DIAZ as a person to assist people with the type of problem KOMAKAROV had been handling for RIVERA. (Comment: The newspaper advertisement read as follows: "Tiene Ud. algun problema migratorio? Se lo arreglo. Mexico Tacuba 598. Ing. Diaz" (Do you have any migration problem? I will arrange it for you. Mexico Tacuba 598. Eng. Diaz.) It appears that RIVERA and KOMAKAROV have been having discussions concerning migratory matters.

2. A. MONTESSI Bradley and Lev N. ZHUKOV, First Secretary, arranged to meet for lunch on 31 October. MONTESSI suggested meeting somewhere other than their usual place since there were so many couples, etc., there, and he didn't like it. However, ZHUKOV replied that they would meet "alone" at the usual place. (An article in the 24 November issue of Excelsior listed one A. MONTESSI Bradley as attending the inauguration of an art exhibit by Diego RIVERA. MONTESSI is believed to be identical with the individual previously reported as (fnu) MONTESSI y Bradley. There is no record in station files on MONTESSI.)

3. Mauricio de la SELVA was in contact with KOMAKAROV on 22 October. (see HMM-2055)

4. (fnu) [illegible] contacted KOMAKAROV on 23 October and suggested that they get together for a chat and a drink. They arranged to meet that afternoon "in the old place."

5. On 27 October Nicolas (probably KAZANOV) called David ALFARO, son of Mexican Communist artist David ALFARO Siqueiros. On 20 October ALFARO was in contact with Matvey P. IZOTOV of the Soviet Commercial Office (see HMM-2062).

6. On 30 October Sergio [illegible], leftist journalist, attempted to contact MASYUKEVICH or [illegible]OV. On 27 October he conferred with MASYUKEVICH (see HMM-2045).

C. Miscellaneous Contacts:

1. On 20 October Lic. (fnu) [illegible] Mejia contacted Georgiy [illegible] of the Commercial Office on behalf of Lic. [illegible] about some Bogomoletz serum.

2. On 20 October MASYUKEVICH attempted to call Federico de [illegible] Sotomayor, indicating that [illegible] had left a visiting card at his home.

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3. Carlos LARRA contacted Pavel LATSKOV on 27 October concerning a visa to the USSR. (see HMM-2066)

4. On 30 October LATSKOV contacted Jose Alfredo HOLGER (see HMM-2117)

5. Yuriy N. PAPOROV, Cultural Attache, and his wife were invited on behalf of Diego RIVERA to a cocktail party begin given on 5 November by Silvia PINAL to show the portrait RIVERA had painted of her. The party was to be held at Avenida de los Fuentes 629, Jardines del Pedregal. PAPOROV indicated he still had no fixed address, but would send out address cards when he found a permanent place of residence. (Comment: PINAL is a movie actress.)

6. On 20 October [illegible] contacted Carlos CALDERON of the Asociacion Nacional de Importadores y Exportadores de la Republica Mexicana, I Isabel la Catolica 38, and informed him that the Ambassador would like to postpone their dinner to 25 October.

7. One Luis Julio [illegible] arranged to visit PAPOROV at the Embassy on 26 October.

V. GOODS AND SERVICES:

A. On 3 October the wife of Leonid I. [illegible], Commercial Counselor, visited Dr. Walter SCH[illegible], a dentist with offices at J. Moran 12, to have her teeth cleaned.

B. During October members of the Soviet Embassy were in contact with Mrs. Mercedes P[illegible] of Tokyo 5, a seamstress.

C. On 22 October Albert A. [illegible], Attache, ordered a tank of oxygen from 11-31-74, Unidad Medica de Oxigeno. They promised to send him the note for renting the other tanks. (In the 1956 Mexico City telephone directory this number is listed under the name of Dr. Guillermo DE DIAZ DC, Plaza Miravalle 3-A, and also under Oxigeno Para Enfermos at the same address.)

D. Also on 22 October [illegible] contacted Juan DIAZ Rodriguez, Extinguidores, Moctezuma 246, and asked that they send mechanics to check and recharge the fifteen or sixteen extinguishers at the Embassy.

E. Aleksey D. [illegible], Assistant Commercial Officer, contacted Dr. Jorge SEPURA Millan, well-known doctor with offices at Articulo 123 #116, on 25 October concerning some x-ray treatments for his heart.

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VI. PERSONNEL:

A. One Daniel [illegible] is believed to be the new chauffeur for the Soviet commercial office.

B. On 4 October [illegible] reserved a room, the cheapest available with a ten-percent Embassy discount, at the Hotel Roosevelt for Yevgeniya Petrovna [illegible], new employee in the Commercial office who arrived in Mexico on 5 October.

C. On 9 October Nikolay S. [illegible], Secretary to the Ambassador, contacted one Lic. [illegible] (ph) and informed him that [illegible] had to leave Mexico in a hurry, and would like to postpone their appointment until Thursday, 11 October.

D. Georgiy [illegible], new employee in the Soviet Commercial office (motion pictures), arrived in Mexico on 10 October.

E. On 11 October KAZANTSEV explained to an unidentified person that the Embassy did not have a Press Attache, but that MASYUKEVICH was head of publications and he ([illegible]) was in charge of the press department.

F. On 17 October [illegible] was reported to be in Veracruz and was expected back in Mexico City on the 20th.

G. CHERNAKOV, [illegible], and wife, and LA[illegible] and wife and children departed Mexico on 17 October as previously reported.

H. Mariya [illegible] and Yuriy and Galina [illegible] returned to Mexico on 23 October following home leave. The [illegible]s were accompanied by their son.

I. Soviet diplomatic couriers Jouri (Yuriy) [illegible] and Anatoliy [illegible] are believed to have arrived in Mexico on 22 October. According to Air France manifests, they departed on 29 October for New York.

J. Tamara [illegible], the wife of Second Secretary Nikolay [illegible], is working in the film section of the Soviet Embassy.

K. Mariya [illegible], wife of the Soviet Naval Attache, appears to be having a clandestine affair with a person believed to be Nikolay [illegible], subordinate to her husband and assistant Naval attache.

VII. [illegible]:

A. On 12 October Vitaliy [illegible], First Secretary, left a message for one (fnu) [illegible] (ph) at Departamentos de la

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Paz, Iturbide 18, that he would not be able to visit them that day, because they were having a reception.

B. On 16 October [illegible] talked with (fnu) RIVERA concerning a recorder which the Embassy wished to buy to use for music. RIVERA said that the National University had ordered three and he had asked for one extra so as to get it into the country without taxes. There was also the possibility of obtaining one in Mexico. [illegible] promised to discuss the possibilities with the friend who was interested.

C. Ultramar Express contacted [illegible] of the Commercial Office on 16 October concerning data on visas for Mexican citizens going to the USSR. They were making up a list (of visa regulations) for Consulates and Embassies.

D. [illegible] contacted Mariano [illegible] Huerta during early October and indicated that a family would be moving from one of [illegible] apartments at Coahuila 1[illegible], and another family would like to move in. [illegible] replied that since they were from the Soviet Embassy there would be no problem and they could make whatever arrangements would be easiest for them. The family leaving were in apartment 9 and would move out on the 19th. ([illegible] is listed as living at Coahuila 1[illegible]-9.)

E. On 19 October the Soviet Commercial Office moved to Saltillo 19, Mexico, D.F.

F. General Alberto [illegible] Carranza, Director of Civil Aeronautics, informed [illegible] on 25 October that during the month of November there was to be a series of lectures at the Department of Communications and [illegible] was to give one of them on the subject of "The Future of Civil Aviation." He wanted to obtain some data on Soviet commercial planes and planes from the other countries in that part of Europe. [illegible] indicated that if they had anything he would be glad to give it to him.

G. On 23 October [illegible] called Alfonso [illegible] Diaz of the Foreign Office and reported that a group of some one-hundred persons had met in front of the main door of the Soviet Embassy and were shouting imprecations, making a lot of noise, and obstructing passage to and from the Embassy. [illegible] asked [illegible] if he could do anything, since he could not get in touch with Protocol or any other responsible person. [illegible] made arrangements for members of the Mexican police force to give protection to the Embassy.

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Mexico City	Report No: [illegible]-2033	File No:
Pages: 17	No. of Enclosures: None	
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SUBJECT: Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, September 1956

p. 14

201-132139
Nikolay Sergeyevich
LEONOV
Known KGB

Classification

SECRET

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201-132139

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY: Mexico

REPORT NO.: [illegible]-2038

SUBJECT: Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, September 1956.

DATE OF INFO: 1-30 Sept. 1956

DATE ACQUIRED: 1-30 Sept. 1956

PLACE ACQUIRED: Mexico City

DATE OF REPORT: 7 November 1956

SOURCE, SOURCE EVALUATION, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: Source having access to Soviet diplomatic circles in Mexico (B). Appraisal of Content: Documentary.

I. SOVIET EMBASSY ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO:

The following information on the activities of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico was developed during September 1956. Information on Soviet commercial activities is detailed in a separate commercial report.

II. DIPLOMATIC:

A. Relations with Mexican Government:

1. On 11 September Jose MUNOZ Zapata of the Mexican Foreign Ministry invited Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Georgiyevich KULAZHENKOV to a luncheon to be held on 12 September in honor of Jose FIGUERES, President of Costa Rica visiting in Mexico. Boris Aleksandrovich KAZANTSEV, First Secretary, informed (fnu) CARRION Andrade of the Protocol Division that he would accept the invitation to the luncheon for FIGUERES, but that he would attend alone as his wife was in Moscow.

2. On 12 September Rafael FUSONI, formerly of the local United Nations Office of Information, thanked Mikhail Frolovich CHERKASOV for the use of the typewriter, and asked what the Russian delegates had thought of the Geology Congress. CHERKASOV indicated that they thought it "magnificent." FUSONI also informed CHERKASOV that on Friday evening, 14 September at 8:00 p.m., a small dinner was being held at his home for an engineer named Eduardo GUZMAN of Pemex, (fnu) GARCIA Rojas, and some other engineers who helped organize the Congress, and that he would like to invite CHERKASOV and the man who accompanied him the last time. CHERKASOV indicated that he and Vitaliy Aleksandrovich KHARITONOV, First Secretary, would be pleased to attend.

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3. KAZANTSEV informed the Oficina de la Comision Economica para la America Latina (CEPAL) on 13 September that the Ambassador would be unable to attend the reception that day, but that CHERKASOV would come in his place.

4. The Ambassador's request for an audience with the Mexican Foreign Minister was postponed until 11:00 a.m., Tuesday of the following week, 18 September, which is the usual reception day.

5. On 19 September Carlos PEON del Valle, Chief of Protocol, informed Nikolay Sergeyevich LEZHKOV, Secretary to the Ambassador, that he would be unable to accept Ambassador KULAZHENKOV's invitation to dinner on 27 September because of a previous engagement with the Ecuadorean Ambassador.

6. On 20 September Boris A. KAZANTSEV, First Secretary, discussed with Cristobal LARA of CEPAL a meeting of the Economic Commission scheduled to take place in La Paz, Bolivia at the beginning of 1957. No definite date has been set, but LARA estimated it would probably be held in May of the following year. Since LARA was leaving the city on Monday, 24 September, for a two-week vacation, he could not accept KAZANTSEV's invitation to lunch, but promised to call him on returning to Mexico City.

7. On 25 September KAZANTSEV indicated he was sending a gift to Delfin SANCHEZ Juarez, a lawyer, of the International Affairs Office of Seguro Social (Social Security).

8. Also on 25 September KAZANTSEV tentatively arranged a luncheon date for Thursday, 27 September, with Eduardo GUZMAN and (fnu) GARCIA Rojas to thank both of them, in the name of the Ambassador, for all the attention they had paid to the Soviet delegation to the Geological Conference.

9. Alfonso ROSENZWEIG Dias of the Foreign Ministry invited Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich POPOV, Third Secretary, and his wife to dinner at his home on Tuesday, 2 October. POPOV, who expected to be out of town from Saturday until Tuesday or Wednesday, suggested a later date. Arrangements were then made for Thursday, 4 October, at 8:30 p.m. at ROSENZWEIG's home, Pirules 136. ROSENZWEIG promised to send POPOV directions for reaching his home, since it was a little difficult to find.

10. Octavio PAZ of the Foreign Ministry accepted an invitation to dinner at the Soviet Embassy on 27 September.

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11. Arrangements were made for KAZANTSEV to meet with Bernardo REYES Morales of the Direccion General de Prensa (Foreign Ministry Press Section) on 29 September at 12:00 a.m.

B. Relations with other Latin American Diplomats:

1. Vladimir Mikhaylovich PANOV of the Soviet Embassy arranged a meeting between CHERKASOV and the Venezuelan Ambassador on 4 September. The Ambassador had previously expressed a desire to see CHERKASOV on that date.

2. On 3 September PANOV made arrangements for CHERKASOV to see the Haitian Ambassador ~~at 1:00 p.m.~~ at the Haitian Embassy. PANOV also made similar appointments at the Guatemalan, Dominican, and Costa Rican Embassies. An attempt to contact the Honduran Charge d'Affaires was unsuccessful at that time, but an appointment was made later in the week.

3. Gaston MORALES Barragan, Second Secretary of the Peruvian Embassy, contacted the Soviet Embassy on 7 September concerning a communication about the disarmament question addressed to the President of the Chamber of Deputies and a note of Soviet opinion on the Suez question. Since Peru does not have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, MORALES could not send these notes to his country, and would return them to POPOV.

4. On 12 September KAZANTSEV contacted Hugo NAVARRO Bolandi, First Secretary of the Costa Rican Embassy, who said he had attempted to reach KAZANTSEV about a certain matter, for President FIGUERES had told him that he would have an opportunity to see the Russian Ambassador both at dinner at the Foreign Office that day and at the reception in the evening.

5. On 17 September The secretary of the Nicaraguan Ambassador made arrangements through Nikolay LEONOV, Embassy official, for a meeting between the two Ambassadors for 27 September at 8:00 p.m. in full dress.

6. KAZANTSEV attempted on 19 September to arrange a meeting with Antonio CHOCANO Batres, First Secretary of the Guatemalan Embassy. CHOCANO appeared hesitant to commit himself to a specific date, and finally asked KAZANTSEV to call him on the 25th. KAZANTSEV seemed to ignore CHOCANO's disinterest in the matter.

7. On 19 September LEONOV left a message at the Ecuadorean Embassy, saying that Ambassador KULAZHENKOV wished to invite the Ecuadorean Ambassador to luncheon or dinner on 25 or 26 September. No definite plans were made.

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8. On 20 September the Argentine Ambassador attempted to contact KULAZHENKOV who was busy at the time with the Norwegian Charge d'Affaires. He wished to know the time of the Soviet dinner on 27 September as the Venezuelan Embassy was having a ceremony from 7:00 to 9:00 p.m. on the same day, and he would like to attend both functions. The Soviet invitation was for 8:00 p.m. so the Argentine Ambassador decided he would go to the Venezuelan ceremony first, and arrive a little late for the Soviet dinner.

9. On 21 September the secretary of the Cuban Ambassador informed Albert Alekseyevich MATVEYEV, Attache, that she had just talked to the Cuban Ambassador who was ill, and would like to postpone their luncheon date for that day until Thursday or Friday of the following week. They decided on Friday, 28 September and MATVEYEV said that the Soviet Ambassador would also like to invite the wife of the Cuban Ambassador to a motion-picture showing that same day. After checking with the Ambassador arrangements were made for 7:30 p.m., Friday, 28 September. The Cuban Ambassador and his wife, and Francisco DOMINGUEZ Comas, Second Secretary of the Cuban Embassy, would attend.

10. Plans were made for KAZANTSEV and DOMINGUEZ of the Cuban Embassy to meet for lunch on Wednesday, 26 September. However, KAZANTSEV later cancelled the date upon learning that they would have an opportunity to see each other at the Soviet Embassy.

11. On 25 September KAZANTSEV talked to Francisco AGUILAR, Counselor of the Salvadoran Embassy, concerning some records which RIZANOV had sent to AGUILAR. The latter put off a proposed meeting with KAZANTSEV, suggesting that he contact him the following week.

C. Relations with other Iron Curtain Missions:

1. Appointments were arranged between CHERKASOV and Bedrich PISTORA, Minister of the Czech Legation, for 3 and 10 September.

2. Plans were made between Boris PUTILIN, employee of the Soviet Embassy, and Lubomir BLAZIK, Czech Cultural and Propaganda Officer, for a volley-ball game to be held at 10:00 a.m., 9 September, at the Balneario Olimpico.

3. On 7 September Bedrich ZUBES, Attache of the Czech Legation, made arrangements to stop by the Soviet Embassy on 10 September to discuss some motion pictures. Although the Soviets had no special representative for motion pictures, ZUBES was told that either Leonid Ivanovich BOLSHAKOV, Commercial Counselor, or Aleksey Danilovich MAYEVSKIY, Assistant Commercial Officer, could help him.

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4. Czech Minister PISTORA and his wife were expected at the Soviet Embassy at 1:00 p.m. on 19 September.

5. On 22 September a member of the Czech Legation informed Mariya ZINOVOYVA, Soviet employee, that Minister PISTORA accepted the invitation to dinner at the Soviet Embassy. On the same day BLAZIK arranged to confer with Lev Nikolayevich ZHUKOV, First Secretary, concerning the fiesta which was to be held at the Minister's residence, Amores 923, on 29 September. Further information indicated that some forty Soviets were expected to attend the party.

6. On 27 September an appointment was set up for Karel STARECKY, Counselor of the Czech Legation, to visit the Soviet Ambassador that day.

7. The Czech Legation contacted the Soviet Embassy on 29 September to ask if they had a truck or pick-up that could be used to transport a ping-pong table from the Czech Legation to the Minister's residence for the party that evening. At first PANOV replied that they did not have such a vehicle, but later offered to pick up the table for them in their "truck."

D. Miscellaneous Diplomatic Relations

1. On 7 September (Mrs. (fnu) MARCHETTI of the Italian Embassy thanked KHARITONOV for the photos he had sent her, and indicated that she and her husband were planning to have a dinner at her home for the people, including CHERKASOV, who had been together in Aguascalientes. (This probably refers to the group who attended the Grape Fair in Aguascalientes in August.)

2. The Indonesian Charge d'Affaires accepted an invitation to a motion picture showing at the Soviet Embassy for 8 September.

3. On 14 September a woman from the Association of Diplomats advised GLOTOV, KAZANTSEV, POPOV, and ROMANOV that the association would meet at 1:30 p.m. on 17 September at the Restaurant 1-2-3. GLOTOV informed her that all would probably attend, and that KAZANTSEV would like a receipt for his association dues.

4. Arrangements were made for Ambassador KULAZHENKOV to receive the Israeli Minister at 12:00 on 17 September, and the Norwegian Charge d'Affaires at 11:45 on 18 September.

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5. KULAZHENKOV, CHERKASOV, and POPOV and their wives were invited to attend a reception on Friday, 28 September at the Lebanese Legation in honor of the Lebanese Ambassador to Washington, D.C., who was passing through Mexico. The Soviet Charge d'Affaires also accepted an invitation for dinner at the Lebanese Legation on 29 September at 8:00 p.m.

6. On 19 September ROMANOV made arrangements to call on Dr. Guillermo de ASSA (ph) of the Cultural Committee of the Organization of American States, who had recently been home to Argentina. ROMANOV mentioned that he had also spent three months away from Mexico on vacation in the Soviet Union.

7. Felice STERN (ph) of the British Embassy contacted CHERKASOV on 19 September concerning plans for a luncheon and some table tennis games on Saturday, 22 September at 1:00 p.m. Since she could only seat ten persons and there would be five from the British Embassy, she would like to invite five of the Soviets. They decided on the Ambassador, CHERKASOV, AKSENOV and his wife, and GLOTOV and his wife. However, since that added up to too many guests, CHERKASOV agreed to let her know exactly the following day, and added that since he played table tennis badly, he would serve as referee.

8. On 21 September J. K. Ganju of the Indian Embassy congratulated KAZANTSEV on his promotion (see section on Personnel) and asked about the chart which the Soviet geologist delegates had distributed at the cocktail party at the Embassy. Part of the chart received by the Indians was missing and they would like another copy. KAZANTSEV said that all but six or eight of the delegates had returned and the rest were visiting in Yucatan. He would try to get another copy, but if he could not, he was sure the Indian delegates could get it through the Soviet delegate at New Delhi.

9. Olavi K. MURTO, Charge d'Affaires of the Finnish Legation and his wife, accepted an invitation to a reception at the Soviet Embassy on 27 September.

III. CULTURAL AND PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES:

A. Relations with Cultural Institutes:

1. Instituto Mexicano Bellas Artes

a. On 12 September Luis SANCHEZ Arriola of Bellas Artes invited Vladimir K. KHASYUKEVICH, Second Secretary, and Boris P. [illegible]

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KOLOMYAKOV, Attache in the Cultural Office, to a cocktail party being given at the Palacio de Bellas Artes that same day in honor of Maestro (fnu) HERRERA de la Fuente who was leaving for Europe. SANCHEZ apologized for not having been able to notify them sooner, but stated that he had been sick. He informed MASYUKEVICH that Jan PAWALOWSKI, Cultural Attache of the Polish Legation, was going to attend and that he thought that it would be very interesting for the people from the Soviet Embassy to speak with the people that were going to be there. MASYUKEVICH promised he would do everything possible to be there.

b. On 13 September SANCHEZ Arriola apologized to MASYUKEVICH for not having come that morning and said he had been with KOLOMYAKOV the night before. MASYUKEVICH was aware of this and said arrangements had been made. SANCHEZ inquired about some pictures, but KOLOMYAKOV knew nothing about them and was leaving next day for San Luis Potosi, so MASYUKEVICH would talk to him about it later.

c. Arrangements were made for the Ambassador to see Miguel ALVAREZ Acosta, Director of Bellas Artes, at 1:30 p.m. on Monday, 24 September.

2. IICMR (Mexican-Russian Institute for Cultural Interchange)

a. KOLOMYAKOV contacted the IICMR on 13 September and told Tomas CHAVEZ Morado that it would not be necessary for the Institute to send over an operator and projector as they had been able to obtain a 35mm copy of the film they were going to show.

b. On 25 September the president of the Sociedad de Guerrerense contacted the Soviet Embassy and requested some motion pictures to take on a cultural tour through his state of Guerrero. He was referred to the IICMR as the films were not kept at the Embassy.

B. Specific Cultural Activities of the Embassy:

1. Art:

a. Ignacio MARQUEZ Rodiles, prominent Mexican leftist in education and artistic circles, informed KOLOMYAKOV on 7 September that he had received at the Comite del Trece a letter from the Soviet Painters' Federation or Union, and would like to talk to KOLOMYAKOV concerning it, because it was related to a plan which they had already taken up at the Embassy about Mexican cultural relations. An exposition of Mexican paintings would be ready to leave China around the end of November and they must decide whether it would return to Mexico, or whether

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they should take advantage of the invitation which the Soviet painters had made for 1957. The Soviet painters could not receive the exhibition this year because of lack of space and other expositions being presented. MARQUES indicated that they would like to have the exhibition go to the Soviet Union, and he would like to talk with both KOLOMYAKOV and the Ambassador concerning this matter.

b. MARQUEZ called MATVEYEV on 7 September, and told him that the committee of the Frente Nacional de Artes Plasticas, of which he is a member, had received a letter from the Union de Artes Plasticas in the USSR and he would like to talk with the Ambassador concerning it. He was told to take the matter up with the Cultural Attache first. Later arrangements were made for MARQUES to see the Ambassador at 10:00 a.m. on Thursday, 13 September. MARQUES wished to bring all the committee with him, because of the importance of the matter, but was told to bring just one other person.

2. Motion pictures:

a. Gaston GARCIA Cantu (of previous record) contacted MASYUKEVICH to ascertain if he had any photographs of the film "Viva Mexico." MASYUKEVICH replied negatively, but added that they did have a photograph of "Sergio" and he would look for a copy.

b. On 15 September MATVEYEV conferred with Mario CALVET to see if he had received the new Soviet films. CALVET said they had received the following: "Las Damas"; a short entitled "Monumentos Historicos del Kremlin"; "El Gallito de la Cresta de Oro"; a short, "Antilope de Oro"; "Kashtanta"; and "La Daga" of which they had a previous copy. Later the same day a man from CALVET's office contacted BOLSHAKOV to see if he could come by/for the film, "Cerilla Sueca," which was to be used for a matinee showing to the Sindicato de Cinematografistas (Motion Picture Union), who had requested it. The man was told to come by the Embassy and ask for Boris BORZAKOV.

3. Dance - Theatre:

a. On 12 September, SANCHEZ Arriola asked MASYUKEVICH if Juan TOLEDO had to ask authorization to put out publicity on the ballet. MASYUKEVICH said he only had to make some arrangement with the Soviet Embassy so as to be in agreement about the publicity, but he believed they could publish what they wanted.

b. KOLOMYAKOV confirmed to Juan TOLEDO on 19 September what they had previously said, and stated that they were supporting his idea. TOLEDO said that it was only a matter of consultation

because (fnu) LUMBROSO had told him that they usually asked for the opinion of the Embassies of each country to be certain that no country would object. Soviet opinion was positive. KOLOMYAKOV promised to go by one day and greet TOLEDO in person.

e. Jose Luis MARTINEZ of Exito informed MASYUKEVICH that the article on the Russian ballet had been published.

C. Soviet Information Bulletin:

1. During the month of September Honorio MATEOS Mendez, of Privada General Jesus A. Flores 3, Colonia del Observatorio, D.F., called the Soviet Embassy and requested that they send his copy of the bulletin to his new address as listed above.

2. On 18 September Salomon KAHAN, music critic for Tiempo, contacted the Embassy to ascertain how he could obtain a copy of the bulletin which carried an article about the Russian pianist, Yevgeniy MALININ. KAHAN gave his address as: Tribuna Israelita, Bolivar 36, office 505, DF.

3. Honorato de CASTRO called the Embassy to give them a change of address for mailing his bulletin: Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra 547, Colonia Irrigacion. (CASTRO is a member of the Spanich Peace Committee)

D. Miscellaneous Cultural Activities:

1. On 3 September an unidentified woman contacted the Soviet Embassy in an attempt to locate some pamphlets on Hungary. She was referred to the Soviet Cultural Attache.

2. Also on 3 September an unidentified man called the Embassy, stating he was interested inobtaining literature on the Social Security Law of the USSR. He was told to contact Matvey Petrovich IZOTOV, the representative of International Book in Mexico.

3. On 17 September Srta (fnu) FLORES Covarrubias of Pemex, Paleontology Laboratories, informed SAFRONOVA that on Saturday she had delivered some micro-paleontological samples to the Embassy for Madame ZUBOTINA, in care of KUZTASIKOV (phonetic), and she wanted to be sure they had reached the proper persons, as the gateman to whom she had given them spoke very little Spanish. She also stated that she had left a small box containing a silver item and Mexican cent-piece which she was sending to ZUBOTINA as a remembrance of Mexico. Sra Maria Luisa ROBLES, Chief of Paleontology of Pemex, had asked her to check on these things. She would stop by the Embassy around 3:00 p.m. to check further, as she lived near by.

4. On 28 September MASYUKEVICH talked to (fnu) RODRIGUEZ Toro and his wife and apologized for the glass broken by their child when they were at the RODRIGUEZ home. He said he had some gifts for them, perfumes from Moscow, and was only awaiting an occasion to give them to them. RODRIGUEZ told MASYUKEVICH that he had his lighter. MASYUKEVICH had thought it lost and bought another. RODRIGUEZ mentioned that he had been in Veracruz and had seen ALEKSEYEV there. He also had spoken with Alberto BELTRAN, pro-Communist artist, concerning the possibility of going out to the country on Sunday. MASYUKEVICH thought it an excellent idea.

IV. ACTIVITIES OF THE MILITARY

1. Captain Carlos SANTANDER Bonilla of the Second Section of the Mexican Army Staff informed Naval Attache Mikhail [illegible] REMIZOV on 2 September that Captain Vladimir Nikolayevich KALININ, of the Soviet Military Attache office, had brought them a list of Soviet technicolor movies from which they could choose. It was arranged that KALININ would talk to SANTANDER about sending the following pictures which they had chosen: "Circo Ruso," "Los Virtuosos del Ballet Ruso," "Cerilla Sueca," "Romeo y Julieta," "Deporte Sovietico 57," and "Vuelo a la Luna." On 5 September KALININ contacted the office about the movies, stating that they could not send them all at once, but that he would bring by "Los Virtuosos de Ballet Ruso" and "Romeo y Julieta" when they were ready.

2. Naval Lt. Jesus RAZO Reguero cancelled a luncheon engagement with REMIZOV on 4 September because of the illness of his daughter. (Field Comment: RAZO, who joined the Mexican Navy on 14 September 1939, was promoted to Lt. j.g. in 1948, served as an assistant at Petty Officers School in 1950, and currently is an aide to Vice Admiral CHAPITAL, Inspector General of the Navy.)

3. On 6 September REMIZOV contacted Comandante Alfonso CASILLAS Gomez and asked when they were going to "hear Mexican music." Arrangements were made to get together at 8:00 p.m. on 11 September at REMIZOV's home. Both men sent greetings to each other's families.

4. Nikolay Desmidovich BYKOV, Assistant Naval Attache, talked to (fnu) RAY at the Second Section concerning the invitations they had received to the ceremony of delivering of flags to the Naval Units of Mexico and checked on the address.

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5. On 11 September ROSCHIN attempted to make arrangements for Admiral Mario RODRIGUEZ Malpica to visit Grigori Korneyevich NIKIFORETS, Naval Attache, at the latter's home. However, RODRIGUEZ was leaving for Guaymas early the next morning and would not be back until January. RODRIGUEZ expressed the hope that NIKIFORETS would still be in Mexico when he returned so they could renew their "friendship."

6. On 12 September Major Isver FERNURI (of previous record) left word with TROFIMOV for NIKIFORETS and the Military Attache that he would be pleased to have them attend a luncheon at "Jardines del Pedregal" on Friday, 14 September to celebrate the inauguration of his equestrian school. He also invited TROFIMOV and told him that the school is on Boulevard de la Luz at its furthest point.

7. On 13 September REMIZOV informed Enrique BALTANAZ Holt, Acting G-2 of the Navy under CHICO, that ROSCHIN had not received an invitation to the Independence Day parade. BALTANAZ later contacted ROSCHIN to say that the Defense Department had sent out invitations to four officers in the Naval Attache's office, but they had obviously been mislaid. A duplicate would be sent to ROSCHIN, but in case it was not received in time ROSCHIN would have no problem getting into the stand, as he was expected. ROSCHIN was business-like in the conversation to the point of being curt. Later KALININ called Major Alfredo NUNEZ Arguello, Army Second Section, concerning the same matter of the invitations.

8. Comandante SANDOVAL of the Naval Staff contacted ROSCHIN on 18 September and said he had just received a letter from Luis NUNEZ Cepina (ph), whom he described as a very small man. ROSCHIN knew to whom he was referring. NUNEZ has asked SANDOVAL to convey his thanks to ROSCHIN, stating that the injections had a marvelous effect, and that his wife would require further injections in four or five months. He said he would make another request for serum at that time, and ROSCHIN promised to order five more ampoules for December. ROSCHIN also expressed his pleasure at the recovery of Comandante ZETINA and sent greetings to ZETINA and SANDOVAL. (Field Comment: The Soviets appear extremely polite with all members of the Naval Staff, surpassing all efforts at courtesy with other officials in the Mexican government. This may possibly be attributed to better indoctrination of the Naval Attache's staff.)

9. The secretary of the Guatemalan Military Attache advised REMIZOV on 19 September that invitations were on the way for the Military Attaches Association meeting to be held on 21 September in the Restaurant Los Montejos, Insurgentes 675. After checking, REMIZOV advised that the following would attend: NIKIFORETS

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and his wife, MAKOVIN and wife, REMIZOV and wife, BYKOV and wife, and CHELPANOV. He was not certain about CHELPANOV's wife, who had a one-month old baby at home.

10. An appointment was made for NIKOPORETS to see SANDOVAL at 12:00 on 24 September. NIKIPORETS also wanted to see Comandante OROZCO but the latter had not yet returned from Tamaulipas.

11. On 24 September KALININ informed Ricardo RAMOS Flores, then Army G-2, of the proposal of the Ambassador "for this meeting" on 29 September. RAMOS Flores agreed to inform the appropriate persons.

12. On 27 September ROSCHIN took a message for REMIZOV that Lt. Jesus RAZO Reguero of Comision Inspectora had to go out of town and could not meet with REMIZOV that day.

13. On 28 September Yuriy Alekseyevich CHELPANOV talked to Col. RAMOS Flores and asked if General Tomas SANCHEZ Hernandez were coming to the reception at the Embassy the following day. However SANCHEZ had left for Toluca and Tenancingo, and Col. Eduardo SOBRINO Quintero, Chief of Staff, Air Force, would attend alone, as his wife was ill. In all, four persons with wives would attend and SANCHEZ without his wife. RAMOS Flores mentioned that Col. Rosendo ESPARZA Arias would be taking his place on the first of January, and asked if they would like for him to invite ESPARZA also. However, CHELPANOV apparently did not understand, and they decided only on those mentioned previously.

14. On 29 September ROSCHIN contacted Lt. Miguel LOSADA of the Second Section of the Navy and asked why they hadn't sent for any motion pictures. LOSADA answered that the projector had been out of order for about a month, and was being fixed at Casa Steele. ROSCHIN said that they had some new pictures, and that BALTAZAR should let them know when they wanted some.

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V. CONTACTS:

A. Communist and Pro-Communist Groups:

1. On 6 September Jose REVUELTAS, calling from the Sindicato de Trabajadores de Produccion Cinematografica de la RM, Section de Autores y Adaptadores (Sindicate of Motion Picture Workers of Mexico, Section of Authors and Adapters), attempted to contact CHERKASOV.

2. On 19 September Rosa CASTRO, pro-Communist journalist, and MASYUKEVICH held a friendly conversation. MASYUKEVICH, who had been meaning to call her, but had had a great deal of work, indicated that his wife had seen Rosa in the Regis. Rosa mentioned that she was writing an article on a place she had visited and was afraid the dimensions were wrong because she had two different sets of data. MASYUKEVICH said he could not help her. Rosa invited him out to eat, and he indicated he would call her early the following week to set the time.

3. Juan REJANO, Spanish Communist, contacted MASYUKEVICH on 27 September, and said that he would like to see him for just a few minutes. MASYUKEVICH who appeared glad to hear from him, stated that he had to go out for ten minutes, but that if REJANO wanted to come by in about twenty minutes, he would be back.

B. Contacts of Special Interest:

1. (fnu) MONTES y Bradley (ph) - On 3 September (fnu) MONTES y Bradley contacted First Secretary Lev ZHUKOV, who asked if he had something so they could get together for lunch the following day. MONTES replied that he wanted to invite ZHUKOV for 5 September, and said he would go by the Embassy for him. However, on the fifth, ZHUKOV suggested meeting at a bar. On 13 September MONTES contacted ZHUKOV and explained he was unable to call him on the day they had agreed upon, for he had been out of town and had just returned three days ago. Arrangements were made to meet at the Embassy at 10:00 a.m. the following day and lunch together afterward. (MONTES' phone number, 21-96-07, was listed in the 1956 Mexico City telephone directory under the Hotel Apartamentos Dolores, Sombrereros 9.) On 27 September MONTES talked to ZHUKOV and indicated that he had not been able to do some work, as he had been very busy. MONTES suggested they have coffee together, and ZHUKOV said he would phone him about the hour.

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2. Sra. de ESCAME - On 4 September one Mrs (fnu) ESCAME and Aleksandr DRUZHININ of the Military Attache's office discussed the matter of the books which her husband wanted to know about, because he had to have some bound, and needed to know the quantity of which DRUZHININ planned to dispose. She asked DRUZHININ to call her on the following day to let them know, because they were leaving on the 11th. She added that her husband has few books bound and these are for the Siderurgica (Steel Works). The following day Mrs. ESCAME contacted DRUZHININ who informed her he had only talked to one man, but that he told him he would talk with his friends. He had not seen him yet because they were all busy attending the congress. Mrs. ESCAME gave him the following number to use to contact her: 31-91-57. This number belongs to a woman who lives in front of her, and she can be phoned there at any hour. (The 1956 telephone director lists this number in the name of Luisa GARCIA Galva, Revillagigedo 108-504, D.F.

3. Sergio NOVELO - On 21 September Sergio NOVELO, leftist journalist of previous record, cancelled an appointment he had for that day with MASYUKEVICH and "Nikolay", because something urgent had come up. On 27 September he unsuccessfully attempted to contact AKSENOV. The same day he chatted with MASYUKEVICH who greeted him with pleasure, calling him "the disappeared one." NOVELO apologized, saying he had had a great deal of work and adding that he wanted to issue them an invitation for today at 6:00 p.m. MASYUKEVICH replied that he could accept, but Nicolas had gone out, and it would be better to make the date for the following day. He would notify Nicolas.

4. On 21 September KAZANTSEV contacted Genaro CARNERO Checa, Peruvian Communist journalist, and arranged for an appointment for Tuesday, 25 September. CARNERO suggested they meet at the same place where they had been with "Paco" (Francisco MARTINEZ de la Vega) the day before.

C. Miscellaneous Contacts:

1. Jorge SUAREZ advised LEONOV on 13 September that they would be playing chess at his home that day from 4:30 p.m. on. LEONOV promised to come if he had time.

2. LEONOV called Estudios Universitarios on 13 September, identifying himself as the Attache from the Soviet Embassy who called on Hector MURILLO a week ago, and added that he would like to speak to him concerning an inquiry about requirements for receiving a doctorate. MURILLO was not in.

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3. On 19 September Mikhail SHLERAU Kogan (of previous record) unsuccessfully attempted to contact KOLOMYAKOV, and left a message to call him at the Joyeria Louvre.

4. On 19 September ROMANOV received a message that (Lic) CASTANEDA was pleased to accept the invitation to luncheon on 25 September at the Normandia.

5. On 20 September one Pedro AGUILA called the Embassy concerning Russian lessons. He was told that the lessons were given at the Institute.

6. On 26 September "Paco" and Lino, husband of Consuelo(lnu) of the Propaganda Office, contacted Consuelo to determine the address of Santiago ALVAREZ, who lives in the same place as Martin IGLESIAS. Consuelo offered to ask IGLESIAS who was in the Embassy, but Paco did not want to bother him, and Lino said they could check with IGLESIAS' wife.

See mem. 117 7. On 27 September Consuelo unsuccessfully attempted to contact Gordon CARMONA on behalf of MASYUKEVICH.

VI. GOODS AND SERVICES:

1. Hermanos Rosas, Enceradores de Pisos, Martires de Tacubaya 7, D.F., were contacted during the month of September concerning cleaning and waxing floors.

2. On 5 September Josefina ZAVALA ordered two tubes of ink from Guillermo PAIRO. (The phonenumber, 23-89-10, is listed in the 1956 phone directory under the name of Luis BAZ, Av. Col. del Valle 104-2, D.F.)

3. An appointment was made for the Ambassador to see (Dr) SODI y Pallares at the Cardiology Institute on Monday, 17 September at 11:00 a.m.

4. On 13 September Josefina ZAVALA ordered 50,000 sheets of paper from one (fnu) ARGUELLES.

5. On 20 September MASYUKEVICH tried to contact one Teodoro ESTRADA of the Mexico Auto Service, 13-18-02. This number is listed under Mexico Auto Service, S.A., Atenas y A. Gonzalez, DF.

6. On 20 September TROFIMOV made arrangements to see (Dr) Jose Felix VALDES, Gutenberg 61-6, D.F.

7. On 24 September MASYUKEVICH called one (fnu) ARANDU (at 11-61-59, listed under the name of Francisco LEON Diaz, Puebla 377-3) at

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Consultorio Medico, and asked when they could come by so the doctor could see his wife. ARANIU informed them that the new office was on Puebla. MASYUZEVICH asked about Ofelia, and ARANIU told him that she had gone to New York on a scholarship. MASYUZEVICH was afraid they would have a problem bringing the child then, but ARANIU said he could recommend a friend of Ofelia, who was dedicated to ortodonxia. Arrangements were made for an appointment.

8. A representative of Jose R. Villesana y Cia., Landero y Coss 31, Veracruz, forwarded information to the Embassy concerning some things for them that had arrived in port.

VII. PERSONNEL

1. The home address of Vasiliy Mikhaylovich DRONOV was established as Tacambaro 4-6. DRONOV's wife recently had an operation.

2. Matvey Petrovich IZOTOV of the Commercial Office serves as the representative of International Book in Mexico.

3. Soviet couriers Gennadi ZHUKOV and Konstantin IPATOV held reservations for a flight to New York on 5 September, departing Mexico City at 8:00 a.m.

4. KULAZHENKOV and KAZANTSEV returned to Mexico from the Soviet Union on 6 September.

5. The following Soviet Embassy personnel planned to depart Mexico by rail on 17 October: CHERKASOV; LEONOV and wife; LARIN, wife and two children. They held reservations on the Queen Elizabeth which was scheduled to leave New York for Southhampton on 24 October, and on the Molotov, scheduled to leave London on 31 October. They planned to be in Leningrad on 5 November.

6. A reporter from Excelsior was told on 21 September that Boris KAZANTSEV was promoted from First Secretary to Counselor of Embassy.

7. BYKOV told Rafael MUNOZ that he was now working in "Communications" and usually arrived home late. MUNOZ invited him to his home to have a drink "with some friends." Apparently it was the first time BYKOV had been invited for he asked for the address - Jardin 5.

8. An Operation on Sra. ZURABKOVA was scheduled to take place on 27 September. She was to be in the hospital located at Guadalquivir 78.

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9. LUKASOV informed BOLSHALOV on 27 September that he had returned from his trip and would be in town for one more day, then would leave at 8:00 a.m. by air the day after for New York, and from there on to Paris and Moscow.

10. A son was born to DRUZHININA on 28 September.

11. AKSENOV was reported to be in Veracruz during September, according to (fnu) RODRIGUEZ Toro who saw him there.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

S-E-C-R-E-T

COUNTRY	Mexico/USSR	REPORT NO.	CS -LT-10962
SUBJECT	Photographs of Soviet Diplomatic Personnel	DATE DISTR.	2 November 1956
		NO. PAGES	1
		REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	1 October 1956		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Mexico, Mexico City 1 October 1956		

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Person with good contacts in diplomatic circles (B).
Appraisal of Content: Documentary.

Available from CIA Graphics Register are photographs of the following former members of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, who left Mexico on 17 October 1956:

a. Mikhail Frolovich Cherkasov, Counselor of Embassy, born on 16 September 1909 at Moscow. Cherkasov arrived in Mexico with his wife, Aleksandra Cherkasova, and their minor son on 27 September 1952. His wife and son left Mexico on 24 July 1956.

b. Nikolai Dementyevich Larin, chauffeur, born on 15 January 1922 at Riazan; and his wife Praskovia Artemovna Larina, born on 30 November 1923 at Riazan; and their minor children, Aleksandr and Irina. The Larins arrived in Mexico on 11 September 1953.

c. Nikolai Sergeyevich Leonov, administrative employee, born on 22 August 1928 at Ryazan; and his wife, Valeriya Ivanovna Leonova, born on 30 April 1928 at Moscow. The Leonovs arrived in Mexico on 11 July 1953.

Distribution of Attachments:
OCR Graphics Register (Retention)

S-E-C-R-E-T

201-132139

STATE	X	ARMY	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	FBI	X	AEC		I&NS	X	

(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

EE		SR	X	CI	X	WH/CP	X		HMMA-5440; 5439; 5438
FE		WE		CI/ICD	X	WH/PW	X		
NE		WH	X	(IE-Brit, Fr)		WH/3/Mexi	4		
SE		10		SR/CE/Redcap	X				NONE

HL LNZ
LNG LNG
MK
des

FBI DOCUMENT
DATE: 31 OCTOBER 1956
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: MOVEMENT OF SOVIET NATIONALS
LEONOV, NICOLAI SERGEVICH
FBI FILE NUMBER: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)

14-00000

FPI DOCUMENT
DATE: 25 OCTOPER 1956
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
FPI FILE NUMFER: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)
SUPJECT: MOVEMENT OF SOVIET NATIONALS
LEONOVA, VALERIA IVANOVNA

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PERSONAL INFORMATION DATA

Field	Value
USSR ADDRESS	
NAME	LEONOV, Nikolay Sergeyevich
OFFICE ADDRESS	
ALIAS OR CRYPTONYM	
HOME ADDRESS	
TITLE	Administrative Employee, Embassy Mexico City
INCOME	
DATE OF ARRIVAL	c. 25 May 1953 Date of Dep - End Tour 17 Oct 56 -
HEIGHT	
WEIGHT	
EYES	
HAIR	
COMPLEXION	
PHOTO	
DATE OF BIRTH	22 August 1928
BIRTHPLACE	Ryazan

FAMILY

Wife: Valeriya Ivanovna, born 28 April 1928 Ryazan

DOCUMENTATION

Service PP 10724 issued 29 October 1952
Wife's 11507 issued 28 February 1953

LANGUAGES

Spanish (good)

PREVIOUS CAREER AND EDUCATION

Prior January 1950: One Nikolay Alekseyevich LEONOV, mechanic, arrived India. Description: 5'5", fair complexion, brown hair & eyes, previously AMTORG employee U.S. from 1947 to Oct 48 (NELA 6701). One N. L. LEONOV private secretary to Ambassador in India (ZID 38).

8 October 1951: Above LEONOV arrived Italy from India (WIR 258) en route USSR.

PERSONALITY (Habits, use of money, hobbies, literature, vices)

FORM NO. 498
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RIS

(AEDIPPERs Negative

CONTACTS

MISCELLANEOUS

9 May 1953: Subject arrived Rome from Moscow. Stayed Primrose Pensione (R-374-53 6/53).

13 May 1953: Subject departed for Genoa to leave by sea for Mexico (R-374-53).

c. 25 May 1953: Subject and wife met in Vera Cruz by Aleksandr BELYAKOV (HMM 370 7/53).

SECRET

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMM-A-5438

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, WHD

DATE 10 OCT 1956

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico

SUBJECT GENERAL Operational/REDCAP
SPECIFIC Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV, Secretary to Ambassador, Soviet Embassy, Mexico

REF: MEXI 137, MEXI 230

ACTION REQUIRED: None

1. A U. S. transit visa has been issued for subject and his wife, Valeriya Ivanovna LARINA. Subject plans to depart Mexico by rail on 17 October 1956, entering the United States through the Port of Laredo. Subject will depart the United Stated on 24 October 1956 on the "Queen Elizabeth" through the Port of New York.

2. Two sets of photostatic copies of subject passport and of the accompanying completed questionnaire which was furnished to the Embassy visa section are enclosed. With these are included 6 additional photos of subject. Photostats, identical in number, are furnished of the same items for subject's wife.

SOURCE: Visa Section
DISSEM: ODENVY

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C. CURTIS

Attachments:

Photostats(2 sets each)

8 October 1956

Distribution:
4 - HQS(1 for REDCAP)(w/atts)
2 - Files(w/atts)

gfb

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CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. MAR 1949 51-28A

RI COPY

201-132139

Oct 6 02 54 '56

481 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ED/WS

DATE : Ø5 OCT 56

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

IN 34844

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : COP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, SR 3, S/C 2

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR
CITE: MEXI 231

RE: MEXI 137 (IN 27164)

1. U.S. TRANSIT VISAS ISSUED 1 OCT TO FOLLOWING SOV EMB PERSONNEL:

NIKHAIL FROLOVICH [illegible] CHERKASOV, COUNSELOR;

NIKOLAY LEONOV, EMPLOYEE AND WIFE, VALERIA;

NIKOLAY LARIN, EMPLOYEE AND WIFE, PRASKOVIA, CHILDREN ALEKSANDR AND IRINA.

2. GROUP DEPARTING MEXI 17 OCT BY RAIL, ENTERING U.S. VIA LAREDO; DEPARTING NEW YORK 24 OCT ON QUEEN ELIZABETH. SOURCE: VISA SECTION, EMBASSY; DOC. DISSEM: ODENVY, KUBARK.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

201-132139

14-00000

DEPARTMENT OF STATE INCOMING TELEGRAM
FROM MEXICO CITY TO SECRETARY OF STATE
DATE: 1 OCTOPER 1956
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE FILE NUMPER:
NUMPER 566, OCTOPER 1
SUPJECT: NONE GIVEN

14-00000

LEONOV, Nikolai Sergeyevich

MEXI-839 27 Jun 56	Personal calling card of subject found in address book of Fidel Alejandro CASTRO Ruz, Cuban revolutionary who was arrested by Mexican police on 21 Jun 56. (LIVESTOCK-3; B-Doc)
USArma MexCity MEX C-20 28 Jun 56	At time of his arrest Cuban revolutionary Fidel CASTRO had in wallet personal card of Nicolas L. LEONOV, adminis officer in Soviet Embassy and Secretary to Soviet Ambassador.
HMM-1752 5 Sep 56 No dissem	Translator for Soviet delegates to Eighth Internat'l Radiology Congress at Mexico City, 22-29 Jul 56.
Tele 566 AmEmb MexCity 1 Oct 56	Embassy today issued C-3 visas to: Mikhail CHERKASOV, b. Moscow, 16 Sep 1909, Counselor Nicolai Sergevich LEONOV, b. Russia 22 Aug 1928, Clerk Valeria Ivanovna LEONOVA, b. Russia, 30 Apr 1928 Nicolai Dementievich LARIN, b. Riazan, 15 Jan 22, Clerk Praskovia Artemovna LARINA, b. Riazan 30 Nov 1923 minor children Alexandre LARIN and Irina LARINA Departing Mexico 17 Oct by train via LAREDO; dep NYC 24 Oct 56 via QUEEN ELIZABETH.
MEXI 231 IN 34844 5 Oct 56 OUT to FBI	(Same info as above)

201-132139

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO. 201-124630
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. HMMA-04994 — 4. DATE 4 Aug 1956
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM — 8. DATE OF INFO. — 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST — 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN — 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.
201-132139	

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

THIS REFERS TO A TOP SECRET DOCUMENT HELD IN OG/SIS.

TS#-145923

(This document contains no information pertaining to kthe investigation of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.)

LEONOV, Nikolay S.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-132139

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

4P

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch) DISPATCH NO. [illegible]

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, WHD DATE 29 June 1956

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico

SUBJECT GENERAL Operational/REDCAP
SPECIFIC Soviet Embassy Personnel

1. In an effort to standardize spellings of names of personnel assigned to the Soviet Embassy, Mexico, and to conform with the transliteration table employed by KUBARK, the following spellings are being provided. Inasmuch as many of the names have not been seen, verification through pronounciation and their spelling has been made by Faith S. GRIELS while on TDY here. In the future, reports concerning local Soviet Embassy personnel will carry the spellings are provided herein.

AKSENOV, Nikolay Vasilyevich - Second Secretary
wife: Tamara Aleksandrovna AKSENOVA
dau: Natalia Natalya

BOGUNOV, Mikhail - employee
wife: Nadeshda N. BOGUNOVA
son: Georgiy (or Yuriy)

BOLSHAKOV, Leonid Ivanovich - Commercial Counselor(on leave)
wife: Tamara Sergeyevna BOLSHAKOVA

BURENKOV, Boris Stepanovich - employee/guard
wife: Nadeshda Grigoryevna BURENKOVA
dau: Olga

DEMYANOVICH

BIKOV, Nikolay Damidovich - Asst. Naval Attache
wife: Taisiya Pavlovna BIKOVA

CHELPANOV, Yuriy Alekseyevich(or Aleksandrovich) - Asst. Military Attache
wife: Valeriya CHELPANOVA

CHERKASOV, Mikhail Frolovich - Counselor of Embassy
wife: Aleksandra Vladimirovna CHERKASOVA
son: Andrey

COPY ROUTING
1 [illegible]
2 [illegible]
3 [illegible]
4
5

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28 JUN 1949

RI

201-132139

14-00000

SECRET

DRONOV, Vasiliy Mikhaylovich
wife: Galina M. DRONOVA
son: Vyacheslav

DRUZHININ, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich - employee, Military Attache office
wife: Irina M. DRUZHININA
son: Andrey

GLOTOV, Viktor Nikolayevich - First Secretary
wife: Klavdiya Mikhaylovna GLOTOVA
sons: Yuriy and Aleksandr

GUNDAREV, Ivan Yefimovich - employee, Cultural Office
wife: Lyudmila Ivanovna GUNDAREVA

ILIN, Vasiliy Semyonovich - Attache
wife: Valentina ILINA

IZOTOV, Matvey Petrovich
wife: Anastasiya IZOTOVA
sons: Igor and Aleksandr

IVASHKOV, Leonid Dmitriyevich - employee/guard
wife: Lyudmila Vasilyevna IVASHKOV
dau: Tatyana

KALININ, Vladimir Nikolayevich - employee, Military Attache office
wife: Olga N. KALININA
son: Yevgeniy

KAZANTSEV, Boris Aleksandrovich - First Secretary
wife: Varvara Andreyevna KAZANTSEV
son: Boris
dau: Irina

KOLOMYAKOV, Boris Pavlovich - Attache
wife: Lidiya Alekseyevna KOLOMYAKOVA
dau: Irina

KOTOV, Sergey Maksimovich - Third Secretary
wife: Valentina Ivanovna KOTOVA
dau: Galina

KULAZHENKOV, Anatoliy Georgiyevich - Ambassador (on leave in USSR)
wife: Yekaterina Ivanovna (in USSR) KULAZHENKOVA

HMM-A-4833
Page 2.

SECRET 50-4-1-282

SECRET

LARIN, Nikolay Demyanovich - chauffeur
wife: Praskovya Artemyevna LARINA
son: Aleksandr
dau: Name unknown

LEONOV, Nikolay Sergeyevich - Secretary to Ambassador
wife: Valeriya Ivanovna LEONOVA

MAKOVKIN, Vladimir Sergeyevich - Military Attache
wife: Sofia MAKOVKINA
sons: Arkadiy and Aleksandr

MASYUKEVICH, Vladimir Ilyakovich - Second Secretary
wife: Lyudmila Kirillovna MASYUKEVICHA
son: Aleksey

MATVEYEV, Al'bert Alekseyevich - (employee? - attache?)
wife: Yelisaveta Zakharovna MATVEYEVA
dau: Yelena

MATVEVSKIY, Aleksey Danilovich - Asst. Commercial Officer
wife: Zoya Ivanovna MATVEVSKIYA
sons: Viktor and Vladimir

MITROFANOV, Vasiliy Vasilyevich - Guard/chauffeur
wife: Klavdiya Semenovna MITROFANOVA
son: Yevgeniy

NASEDKIN, Dmitriy Pavlovich - Guard/chauffeur
wife: Lidiya Grigoryevna NASEDKINA
son: Boris(not believed to be Here)

NAUMOV, Anatoliy Ivanovich - employee, Military Attache office
wife: Yevgeniya NAUMOVA

NIKIFORETS, Grigori Korneyevich - Naval Attache
wife: Mariya Antonovna
son: Viktor

PANOV, Vladimir Mikhaylovich - employee, Commercial Office
wife: Lyudmila Vasilyevna PANOVA
dau: Tatyana

POPOV, Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich - Third Secretary
wife: Vera Dmitriyevna POPOVA
son: Yevgeniy

PUTILIN, Boris - employee
wife: Margarita PUTILINA

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Page 3.

SECRET

50-4-1-282

14-00000

SECRET

- 4 -

REMIZOV, Nikolay Matveyevich - diplomat, Naval Attache office
wife: Nelli A. REMIZOVA
son: Aleksandr
dau: Larisa

ROSHCHIN, Nikolay I. - employee, Naval Attache office
wife: Larisa ROSHCHINA

SAFRONOVA, Vera Vladimirovna - employee

SHIKIN, Aleksandr Sergeyevich - employee
wife: Lilya Nikolayevna SHIKINA
son: Yevgeniy

SIDYAKIN, Vasiliy Fedorovich - employee
wife: Aleksandra Nikolayevna SIDYAKINA

SOKOLOV, Vladimir Nikolayevich - Asst. Military Attache

TROFIMOV, Nikolay Ivanovich - employee, Military Attache office
wife: Lyudmila TROFIMOVA
son: Sergey
dau: Nataliya

TROFIMOV, Viktor Nikolayevich - employee, commercial office
wife: Lyudmila TROFIMOVA
dau: Nataliya

VERIN, Konstantin Andreyevich - employee/guard
wife: Lyudmila Vladimirovna VERINA
dau: Larisa

ZABRODIN, Fedor Nazarovich - employee/guard
wife: Mariya Konstantinova ZABRODINA
daus: Nina and Margarita

ZHUKOV, Lev - First Secretary

ZINOVIYOVA, Mariya Ilinichna - employee

2. This list comprises a roster of personnel known to be present at the Soviet establishment as of 15 June 1956 and includes positions which they are known or presumed to hold.

Gene F. Braddock
Gene F. BRADDOCK

Distribution:
4 - Wash(1 for REDCAP)
2 - Files

28 June 1956

HMM-A-1833

SECRET

50-4-1 - - 7 -

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Mexico	Report No: HMM-1610	Local File No:
No. of Pages: 1	No. of Enclosures: 1 (5 pages)	
Report Made By: Howard O. Moschinao/Inc	Approved By: Peter R. [illegible]	

Distribution:
By copy to:
2 - Headquarters
1 - Embassy (incl'LA & MA)
1 - Havana
2 - Files

Orally to:

28 June 56

Source Cryptonym: LIFESTOCK-1	References: HMMT-839

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

Subject: Arrest of Fidel CASTRO Ruz, Cuban Exile in Mexico

Classification

FORM NO. 51-60 FEB 1949

 201-97456

E1-132139

CONFIDENTIAL

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY: Mexico

REPORT NO. HMM-1640

SUBJECT: Arrest of Fidel CASTRO Ruz, Cuban Exile in Mexico

DATE OF INFO: 22 June 1956

DATE ACQUIRED 22 June 1956

PLACE ACQUIRED: Mexico City

DATE OF REPORT: 23 June 1956

SOURCE, SOURCE EVALUATION, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: Person with connections in Mexican Federal Security Police (B).

Appraisal of Content: 2

Among the personal effects of Fidel CASTRO Ruz, Cuban exile arrested 21 June 1956 by the Mexican Federal Security Police as a suspected plotter against the government of Cuba, was an address book. ~~Addresses extracted from this book are attached to this~~ report. The contents, including addresses and telephone numbers, are listed below.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ALDAMA, Hector
[illegible]ma 17 (Detras de la Iglesia)
~~Frente a la Iglesia~~ Mexico D.F.
46-50-64

ALVAREZ, (Dr.)
13-03-55

BARRERO, Rodolfo Armand
H. Royalty
hab no.29 (13-48-22)
18-42-20

[illegible]ENCISIA, Armando
313 Vandelinda Ave.
Teaneck, New Jersey, USA
[illegible]-1155

[illegible], Arsacio
2a. Penitenciaria 27
Colonia Morelos Mexico D.F.
22-38-54

Blanco
Luis Moya 87. Apto 115
~~Apto. 105~~ Mexico D.F.
21-41-99

BOUDET, Ociispio
Emilio Carranza 99
Col. Mocleannis. Mexico D.F.
22-27-29 (Cafeteria)

BODIA, Alfonso
Cadiz 215-B. Mexico D.F.

BOSH, Juan
Roma 37-(13). Mexico D.F.
36-52-54

BENITEZ R.
14-06-76

CABRERA, José (para DIAZ, Eslardo)
1397 Webster
Corner 170 Bronx, N.Y.C.

NIEVA, Carlos
B no.610 - 25 y 27
Vedado - Habana. Cuba
FO-2554

CASTRO, Orlando
Infanta 53.
Apto 802
Habana. Cuba

CARDENAS, Lorenzo
R. Cuba 13, Apto 801.
(Lus 310 Este. Vibora
Habana, Cuba

ROMAN, (Dr.) Alfonso
Castro Madero 34
Apto 38
"Edif. San Luis" Mexico D.F.

CABALLERO, Catalina
[illegible]
Lopes 50-203. Mexico D.F.
(25-09-77)

CALZADILLA, Miguel
Victoria 94, Apto 1. Mexico D.F.
18-46-15/Trata(?)

CASTRO, Lydia
18 no.312 Apto 15
Vedado - Habana. Cuba
F-9022

DARO, Cartoya
14-01-61

DUBOIS, Elia (altos)
Godines no. 3118, Apto 4.
Esq. a 33 Marianao, Habana, Cuba

ROCHA, David D.
21-96-14
Etex 53-C. Mexico D.F.

FRANCO, Mary
Alejandro Dumas 131
also Tenancingo 8, Montes de Oca. y Juan Escutia
14-11-17
(Col. Polanco & Col. Condera)
Mexico D.F.

CONFIDENTIAL

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-2-

FIDALGO, José M.
Agustín Lara no. 8-D
Veracruz, Ver.

FERNANDEZ, Angel
Calle 18 no. 371
Lawton, Habana, Cuba

GARCIA, Fela Campo
Luis Moya 87/312. Mexico D.F.
21-44-90

GOMEZ, Cesar
Ave. Chapultepec 512
(San Antonio) Apto 21. Mexico D.F.
11-71-84

ANTONIA, Maria
13-25-52

GONZALEZ, Isidoro (& Lucrecia?)
Rio de la Plata 55. Mexico D.F.
28-86-68

ANGUSTIA, Gailan
Fronton, México
[illegible]-84-62

GUTIERREZ, Norma
Lopez no. 134
Altos 2. Mexico D.F.
21-34-99

GUTIERREZ, Alberto
Ponciano Arriego 16
Apto. B. Mexico D.F.

GUEVARA, E.
Napoles 40
Apto 105 Mexico D.F.
laboratorio: 19-27-69

Guadalupe
Espinish
Igrl Mariscola
36-31-80

GOMEZ, Mercedes (de Alvarez)

GUTIERREZ L., Alfonso
Av. Juarez no. 119-53. Mexico D.F.
14-89-22 office: Perforaciones, S.A.
21-37-25, 21-36-42

JIMENEZ, Eva y Cra.
Independencia y Balderas
Edif. Altamira, Mexico
Apto 12 Mexico D.F.
18-14-94

Juan Manuel
16-42-17

Lucy
Atenas 31. Mexico D.F.
36-23-16

LOPEZ, Nico
ML-0501

LOPEZ, Juan
Gutenberg 16
Apto no. 1. Mexico D.F.
11-22-05

LINARES, Gloria
Caluzo no. 92
Cd. Pepalrillo
Apto 8. Mexico D.F.
26-95-77

Granado 139

VELAZQUEZ, Lucila
Rhin 28, Apto 17. Mexico D.F.

LOZANO, Pascual
Rio Tigris no. 42-3
Col. Cuauhtémoc. Mexico D.F.

MARCOLLES, Fdo.
P.O. Box 351
2477 N.W. 34 St.
Miami 48, Fla., USA

MENDEZ, Marta Cabezón
San Frco. 712, (alto) 14 y 15
Reparto Lauiton, Habana Cuba

de JESUS, Mario
Casa 16-05-92
Trab. 35-57-48

MENENDEZ, Victor Ruiz
Tamaulipas no. 65. Mexico D.F.
23-36-69

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MARTINEZ, Carlos (***)
Cerrada de Vallarta no. 10 Mexico D.F.
13-83-46

NUIRY, Juan
B-7958

OSUNA, Maria Luisa
R. Guzmán 19, Apto 5 Mexico D.F.
Alfredo
21-07-45

PEREZ, Alvaro
Canaria 60, Apto 2
Colonia Portalao
Mexico D.F.
(above X'd out)

PEREZ, Dora
Dominguez no. 4507
Steinhart, Rosendo Collazo
Marianao. BO-9691

PIFERRER, Ramón Aguilar
Cuauhtemoc no. 647
Apto no. 6 Colonia Narvarte. Mexico D.F.

POELIO, Pina
Ave. México
Cd. Hipódromo, Mexico D.F
13-34-23
Frontón 35-25-82
Casa 25-37-51
Apto 302

"PAPI" Fotografía
Insurgentes Sur 18, Mexico D.F.
12-66-05

PEÑA, Lazaro
Lopes 44-203. Mexico D.F.
36-10-66

MORERA, José
PI, Aida
Nicolas San Juan 125
Apto 3 (23-37-81) Mexico D.F.

NARVARTE, Col.
Pardo Lleda
C.O.C.O. Reina 314
Habana Cuba

RODRIGUEZ, Raúl Santos
20-16-38

ROSELL (Chama)
Apto 1
11-90-55

SABADI, Ramón
A-31-27

SANCHEZ, Fdo. Amaya
Ramón Guzmán no. 6, Apto. 21
Apto21, Mexico. D.F.
21-31-61

SEVILLA, Ninón
36-82-89

SAVIUR (John Sabatin)
Benoit
23-13-55 (apto. 7)

SOLIZ, Piedad
Trab. 18-06-60, ext 222
13-44-28

SPINDOLA

TULIO, Guido
18-53-50

VEGA, Juan Valero
Garaje "Mirtío" Uncanta y 23
Vedado, Habana. Cuba
(above X'd out)

VANEGAS, Arsacio Arroyo
2a Penitenciaria no. 27
Col. Morelos, Mexico D.F.
22-23-96 H 22-93-57

VASALLO, Antonio
Figuras 52 (bajas)
Esq. Lealtad, Habana Cuba

VERTIS, Capitán
Bar Riviere
Col. Polanco Mexico D.F.
13-08-93
gobernación 12-95-96
botica 20-58-53
casa 20-13-13

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

WALBERG, Enrique
22-34-14

Miscellaneous, cards, etc.

LEONOV, Nikolas S.
Embajada de la U.R.S.S. Mexico D.F.
Tel. 15-61-55

SUAREZ, Jose Blanco
República no. 120
Artemisa
~~Pinar del Rio~~ Pinar del Rio,
Cuba

SANTOS, Francisco Herrera
(Pintura General)
Don Martín no. 19
Col. Irrigación
20-39-85
México, D.F.

FERRER, Marta
Sec. Defensa
Lomas de Sotelo Camión
Reformas: Hosp. Militar
(en la puerta)

CASTRO, Alfonso Ramón
Madero 34, Apto 38, Mexico D.F.

Radio Servicio Franco
Laboratorio Tecnico de Radio y TV
Ing. FRANCO, Roberto T., Dir.
Niños Heroes No. 181 y Dr.
Erazo Lts. D y E Mexico D.F.
tels: 13-45-01, 36-07-73

VERTIS, Dr. Papy, No. 631
13-31-00, 19-32-50

PERFORACIONES, S.A.
Av. Juarez No. 119-55
21-37-25 y 21-36-42
Mexico, D.F.
Ing. GUTIERREZ, Alfonso L. (gerente)
Fuego 791, esq. Risco, Mexico D.F.
14-39-22 (casa)

GONZALEZ, Eduardo Reyes
Tigris 42, esq. Salras
Apto 8
Col Cuauhtemoc. Mexico D.F.

~~EDICIONES ...~~, S.A.
SANDOVAL, Gonzalo E.
Libreria Juarez
Av. Juarez 102
Revillagigedo 25. Mexico D.F.
tel. 21-35-74

[illegible]
Calzada de Guadalupe, no. 35 Mexico D.F.
17-17-03

GREAVES Y CANTAYA
(compra y venta de autos.)
CANTAYA, David de J.
Av. Chapultepec 481
Mexico, D. F.

ROCHA, D.
Donceles 24-C
Apto 55-C
Altos Teatro Fabiego. Mexico D.F.

Importadora Fotográfica, S.A.
Insurgentes Sur 13
(antes Ramón Guzmán)
México 4, D. F.
tel. 12-56-05

"California"
Gral. Prim y Paseo de la
Reforma
Mexico, D. F.
36-55-73, 36-73-55 (hab 205)

PARRON, Arnaldo
203 W. 85th St., Apt. 5
New York, N.Y.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

COTU, Enrique
No. 439
Reforma y Elba . Mexico D.F.
28-63-13

FERNANDEZ, Sr. Roberto
Gagueruela no. 17
Esq. Agustina
Vibora, Habana . Cuba

ICHICO, Srta. Cruz
25-06-60

de la BARRERA, Juan 95
no. 95
Colonia Condesa, Mexico D.F.

MARTINEZ, R.
Calle 11 no. 1007, 10 y 12
Apto. 12
Vedado - Habana, Cuba

BUSTAMANTE, Guido
Hotel Rey
[illegible] no. 21

Yolanda
Ave. CuitMahuac. Mexico D.F.
25-44-48

SAN JUAN, Nicolas 125 (?)
Apto 3
Colonia Navarte. Mexico D.F.

ANDRADE, C.
Nina 137, apto 305
Col. Guerrero
Mexico, D. F.

REYES, Esther Fina.
29 Nor. no. 53
Veracruz, Ver., Mexico

CAZALI, Augusto Avila

CONFIDENTIAL 201-97056

20 May 1955: Rodolfo NERVO called Subject and was told "We have found the books and material you requested (re Soviet foreign policy)." LEONOV said he would take the books to NERVO the next day. NERVO for many years active in the Mexican Diplomatic Service, at one time being Charge of the Mexican Legation in Warsaw, Poland. Now about 75 and inactive in Government, but does write articles for the newspaper Excelsior (HMMA 3735 5 Dec. 55).

6 January 1956: The daughter of General Heriberto JARA spoke with Subject at the Soviet Embassy saying she had been told that he was the person who could inform her of when she should come by to pick up translations of the "clincial documents" relative to herself and her father. Subject said they were having some trouble getting the documents translated because of the medical terms, but said they should be ready in about five days (HMMA 4200).

1 February 1956: Subject called Velia Jara de NIETO, daughter of General JARA, and told her that the translations of her father's clinical history had been made from Russian into Spanish. Mrs. NIETO said she would visit the Embassy the next day and ask LEONOV for the materials (HMMA 4410).

24 February 1956: One Samuel RAMOS contacted Subject who acts as secretary to Soviet Ambassador, Mexico. RAMOS told LEONOV "We are not going to meet at my house this afternoon, but at SALGO's (which is at) Insurgentes 429-51 at the usual hour." Subject replied that he thought he could get to the meeting at 1900 hours and sent greetings "to the boys." RAMOS said "we have some books we want to order through LEONOV" (HMMA 4536).

2 March 1956: Samuel RAMOS left a message for Subject that "if he has time I hope he will come to my house today" (HMMA 4600).

7 March 1956: Samuel RAMOS called Embassy and asked for data on the possibility of staging an international chess match in Mexico. In this conversation it was indicated that RAMOS is in the academic line of work. He stated that xx he was "back in classes" and that meetings could no longer be held in his home. He told LEONOV that a tournament featuring a person named "POMMARD" would begin Monday (12 March) and invited Subject to see some of it. LEONOV said he would attend if he had time. RAMOS then asked when he could see LEONOV to give him a list of books "we want". LEONOV told him to come to the Embassy at any time, and RAMOS said he would come right away (HMMA 4600).

c. 27 June 1956: Subject's personal calling card found in address book of Fidel CASTRO Ruz, Cuban revolutionary detained in Mexico (MEXI 839 IN 35358 REF: MEXI 825 IN 34161).

22-29 July 1956: Subject served as translator for Eighth International Radiology Congress Soviet delegates (HMM 1752).

1 October 1956: Subject and wife requested U.S. transit visas to leave Mexico 17 Oct by rail, entering U.S. via Laredo; to depart New York 24 October on Queen Elizabeth (MEXI 231 IN 34833 6 Oct 56).

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Leonov

204 RIG/MI.
DATE : 26 JUNE 56

SECRET

ROUTING
1
2
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6

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION: WH 5
INFO : COP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RQM 3, FI/RI 2, PP 2, PP/OPS, SR 3, S/C 2, (SUSPENSE DD/I)

Revolutionary Activities - Cuba

MEXI 839 (IN 35356) 1520Z 27 JUN 56 ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR INFO: HAVA CITE: MEXI

RE: MEXI 825 (IN 34161) July

1. PERSONAL CALLING CARD OF NIKOLAS S. LEONOV, SOV EMBASSY EMPLOYEE, FOUND IN ADDRESS BOOK OF FIDEL CASTRO RUZ. SOURCE LIVESTOCK 3, EVAL B-DOC.

2. PLANNING KUCAGE EXPLOITATION.

END OF MESSAGE

Frank: copy was sent to Paul Oberst 18 Aug 61.

Mexi 817
DATE 30 July 56

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No

201-132139

SECRET

HMM-1524 (9 Apr 56)
LEONOV
page 49

S: mainly LIFEAT

Personal Data

Name: Nikolai Sergeyevich LEONOV
Born: 22 August 1923, Ryazan
Arrived in Mexico: 11 July 1953 with wife
Documents: Soviet Service Passport 10724 issued 29 January 1952
Title: employee
Position: Believed to be administrative. Secretary to the Ambassador. Possible Translator and interpreter overlapping with the cultural section work
Residence in Mexico: July 53 - Nov 53: Industria 71-4
Nov 53 - ??: Juanacatlan 81
at least Feb 54 to ??: Cuautla 161-8
Jan 55 to present: Unknown, possibly in Embassy, possibly at Juanacatlan 71
Wife: Valeriya Ivanovna, nickname "Lera"
Children: None known
Languages: Spanish (good to excellent)
Other Personal Data: Nicknames "Kolya," "Kolyechka"
Drives car

Official Activities

LEONOV remains an obscure figure and although we assume he is employed in the administrative section of the Chancellery, we cannot pinpoint his duties. He has identified himself from time to time as the secretary to the Ambassador, has been noted taking his turn as embassy duty officer and has taken hospital bedside guard duty. During 1953, before the arrival of the regular administrative officer, Vladimir Ivanovich ZHUKOV, in November 1953, LEONOV was handling calls concerning goods and services but was probably merely filling in, because of his facility with the Spanish language, until ZHUKOV's arrival. In December 1954 APARINOV asked one of the guards whether he had the keys to LEONOV's room in the embassy. Since, during that time, we believe LEONOV was residing at Industria 71, it would appear that LEONOV had a private office in the embassy, one which was apparently kept locked when he was away. One or two other very vague references indicate he might have something to do with communications work. Beginning about November 1955 LEONOV began to emerge as an interpreter and translator. He spent a good deal of time with the Social Security delegation, with Soviet pianist GILELS and with Soviet movie director ALEKSANDROV, each time appearing as the interpreter or translator. His recent association in January 1956 with the daughter of Communist General Heriberto JARA also involved translation work. Other more recent references make us begin to wonder now if LEONOV might not be connected with the Cultural Section. During the last two months of 1955 he appeared to be associated in work with NASYUKEVICH, director of the Soviet Embassy Information Bulletin. In March 1956, when PAPOROV could not keep an appointment at University City at the invitation of Mexican President RUIZ CORTINES, he asked that either LEONOV, GUNDAREV or POPOV keep the appointment. It is known that PAPOROV, GUNDAREV and POPOV are all definitely assigned to the Cultural Section indicating further that LEONOV may be associated with that group. We, therefor, classify LEONOV as

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having worked in the administrative section until late 1955 when his position began to appear as that of translator and interpreter, perhaps more clearly associated with the cultural section. Again, however, he may still be assigned to administrative work in the Chancellery which overlaps with the cultural end.

LEONOV's contact with Samuel RAMOS as dispatched in HMM-A-4356 (19 March 1956) was reported again on 7 March 1958 when RAMOS called LEONOV and the two discussed a chess tournament to which Soviet delegates were apparently to be invited. When LEONOV asked from where RAMOS was calling, he replied from his home. RAMOS stated he was now back in class "at the University" and so "we won't be able to meet at my house now." RAMOS invited LEONOV to one of the tournaments the following week and also made arrangements to visit subject at the embassy to give him the list of books "which we (want)..."

Unless LEONOV has something to do with consular affairs, we are at a loss to explain the following LIMERICK reference. On 10 November 1955 a man identifying himself as "your friend, Col. GONZALEZ" asked LEONOV if he had found out about some matter he had requested. It appeared that LEONOV had forwarded the "request" to the USSR and that the Mexican Ambassador to the Soviet Union was to notify Col. GONZALEZ. GONZALEZ stopped short after starting to ask what happened to that matter, explaining it would be better if they got together and talked it over. The two arranged to meet at the embassy. At the beginning of the conversation GONZALEZ, in recalling to LEONOV's mind who he was, stated,"We were chatting about this project which I have to present to the Presidencia about the use of the waters from the Toluca volcano, Chinantecatl." The Cia. Exportadora e Importadora Mexicana, S.A. (CEIMSA) had commissioned GONZALEZ to go to Chihuahua to see some farmers and therefore he was not able to contact LEONOV earlier.

Other than the two preceding LIMERICK references, which in themselves are inconclusive, we have no indication that LEONOV is engaged in RIS activities.

There are vague references suggesting that the LEONOVs may be leaving Mexico in April 1958.

Private Activities

During February 1954 LEONOV was hospitalized at the Sanatorio Dalinde where he underwent an appendectomy performed by Dr. Gustavo BAZ.

A LICOOL-2 reference of August 1954 revealed that former Soviet Consul MELNIKOV and his wife agreed that LEONOV played well (possibly a musical instrument or a ball game ??). During March 1955,after he had arranged a movie or given a lecture, two of the embassy wives remarked on how good LEONOV was. (It is known that LEONOV has taken his turn at giving Political Information Class lectures.) LEONOV also appears to enjoy athletics — he plays tennis, attends shooting matches, arranges football games with the Czechs, and plays volleyball. He takes some sort of lessons, not necessarily Spanish, in the embassy. As for LEONOV's feeling about American movies, he was heard to tell one of the Social Security delegates, "You can really run into trash in an American film."

It is reported by LIMERICK that LEONOVA gives some sort of instruction to embassy personnel and although it is not known just what type of lessons these may be, we venture a guess that she teaches Spanish. During October 1955 LEONOVA underwent a very serious operation, lasting two hours, during which the anesthetization had to be discontinued because her heart could not take the strain. LEONOVA returned to work again in November 1955.

Although one vague reference hinted that LEONOVA may be pregnant now, there have been no allusions to any children the LEONOVs might have. When MATVEYEV returned from home leave in the USSR in October 1955, while LEONOVA was undergoing her operation, he said he had seen LEONOVA's father but, because of his age, it would be better that he not be told of her sickness.

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AIR

HMM A-4336

Chief, WHD

29 March 1956

Chief of Station, Mexico

Operational/LCIMPROVE
Samuel RAMOS; Renee SALGO Burger; et al

1. LIMERICK reported that on 24 February 1956 one Samuel RAMOS contacted Nikolai S. LEONOV, who acts as secretary to the Soviet Ambassador in Mexico. RAMOS told LEONOV "We are not going to meet at my house this afternoon but at SALGO's (which is at) Insurgentes 429-51 at the usual hour." LEONOV replied that he thought he could get to the meeting at 1900 hours and sent greetings "to the boys." RAMOS said "we have some books we want to order" through LEONOV.

2. On the face of it, this conversation appeared to be quite unusual and attracted the interest of this Station. Furthermore, it is known that for years the Soviets have used the hours between 1900 and 2000 for meeting clandestine or unusual contacts in Mexico.

3. The following steps were taken to ascertain general information on RAMOS and "SALGO":

a. Station file record on Samuel RAMOS resulted in no clear identifications. There is a Samuel RAMOS who was listed in 1948 as Rector of the School of Philosophy and Letters of the University.

b. LIENTHENITE ascertained that the address mentioned is occupied by a female doctor named Renee SALGO Burger, allegedly of French nationality, who operates a beauty parlor. This is confirmed in the telephone book.

c. Files of this office indicate an ODENVY report that one Renee SALGO was a member of the Hungarian club EMUNA in 1951. The files also show that one Alejandro BURGER was a member of the club and that he and Renee lived at the same address. The file further shows that one Andres SALGO was a member of the club and describes him as a Communist sympathizer.

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19 March 1956
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4. Further investigations of the SALGOs will be conducted and their name, together with that of RAMOS, included in our CE suspects list.

Thomas G. URQUHART

Distribution:

4 - Wash(1 for LCIMPROVE)
2 - Files

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From: Mexico City | Report No.: HMM-1464 | Local File No.:

Number of pages: 8 | Number of enclosures: none

Report made by: Arthur S. Stough | Approved by: Peter R. Auront

Distribution:
By copy to: 3 - Headquarters
2 - Files

Orally to:

5 Mar 56

Source cryptonym: LIFEAT/LIERICK | References: none

Source, operational data, and comments:

Subject: Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico

Comments:

1. Forwarded herewith is the first in a proposed series of monthly reports on Soviet commercial activities in Mexico City. Source LIFEAT has since December 1955 developed so much more information on this subject than ever before, that this Station feels a separate monthly summary should be put out.

2. This initial report contains some general background and personnel information on the Soviet commercial office in Mexico for the guidance of Headquarters.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CLASSIFICATION
Changed to Secret
BY AUTHORITY OF
Name
Office
Date 5 June 56

Classification TOP SECRET /

FORM NO. FEB 1949 51-59

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132137

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY: Mexico REPORT NO. HMM-1464

SUBJECT: Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico DATE OF INFO: December 1955

DATE ACQUIRED: Same as above

PLACE ACQUIRED Mexico City. DATE OF REPORT: 5 March 1956

SOURCE, SOURCE EVALUATION, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: LIFEAT/LIMERICK. B-Documentary.

I. ORGANIZATION:

The commercial office of the USSR is located at Calle General Leon 32, in Mexico City. The phone number of the commercial office is 15-12-64. The commercial office was formerly located in the Soviet Embassy, main building at Tucubaya 204. Due to expansion of activities, additional personnel, and the resultant need for greater operating space, the office was moved in April 1955 to its present address.

II. PERSONNEL:

A. Commercial: Soviet Commercial Office - Mexico City

(1) BOLSHAKOV, Leonid Ivanovich, Diplomat-Commercial Counselor, since September 1954.
Diplomatic Passport - 04300
Residence - Calle General Leon 32
Phone - 15-12-64
Arrived in Mexico, 9 September 1954, accompanied by wife Tamara Sergeyevna
Children in USSR.

(2) VAIEVSKI, Aleksei Danilovich, Employee-Assistant Commercial Officer (and intelligence officer)? Not on diplomatic list.
Soviet Service passport - 15973
Residence - Carlos B. Zetina 2-3?
Phone - None.
Arrived in Mexico, 20 March 1954, accompanied by wife Zoya Ivanovna, and sons Viktor and Vladimir, aged eight (8) and four (4) respectively.

(3) IZOTOV, Matvei Petrovich, Employee-Commercial Office.
Soviet Service passport - 18051
Residence - Tamaulipas 125?
Phone - None Known
Arrived in Veracruz 25 January 1955, accompanied by wife Anastasiya and sons Igor and Aleksandr, aged eight (8) and four (4) respectively.

(4) TROFIMOV (or MITROFINOV), Viktor Nikolayevich, Employee-Commercial Office.
Soviet Service passport -
Residence -

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Phone - None Known
Arrived in Mexico 8 July 1955, accompanied by wife Lyudmilla, and daughter Natalia, age unknown.

B. Clerical: *Soviet Commercial Office Mexico City*

(1) KOTOVA, Valentina Ivanovna, Secretary-Typist since December 1954, does not work full time here (believed that commercial office has a branch in the Embassy and that KOTOVA works there too).

Passport -
Residence - Tacambaro 4-3
Phone - None
Arrived in Mexico May 1951, with husband and daughter Galina age unknown. (Husband is 3rd Secretary-Consul).

(2) PAPOROVA, Galina Petrovna, part time translator (Spanish?), since May or June 1955.
Passport -
Residence - Nuevo Leon 138-6
Phone - 11-35-67
Arrived April 1954 with husband and son Sergei age three (3) (husband is diplomat - 2nd Secretary, Cultural Attache).

III. HISTORY OF SOVIET COMMERCIAL ORGANIZATION SINCE 1949:

SAMOILOV, Mikhail Kuzmich, was Commercial Officer from November 1949 to 14 November 1954, part of the time under Commercial Counsellor KUDIN, since departed.

MAYEVSKI, Aleksei Danilovich, went through a break-in period in administrative and operational routines from March 1954, to September 1954, with SAMOILOV still nominally in charge.

BOLSHAKOV, Leonid Ivanovich, appeared in September 1954, and also went through a similar break-in period until 14 November 1954, when SAMOILOV left. From 14 November 1954, to date, BOLSHAKOV has been in complete charge of the Commercial Office.

IV. RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES OF THE COMMERCIAL OFFICE:

The main efforts of the Soviet Commercial Office as evidenced by its past and current activities are as follows:

(a) A determined effort to infiltrate into Mexican industry and trade, by the introduction and implementation of transactions advantageous to local industry and trade.

(b) Establishment of important economic and financial contacts in the Mexican government.

(c) Establishment of contacts with Mexican rank and file business people.

(d) Coordination with Soviet Cultural Office in the procurement of certain films, books, and other propaganda material, and distribution of same.

(e) Utilization of Mexico as springboard for trade with other countries in Latin America.

V. METHODS OF ECONOMIC PENETRATION:

In order to attain economic objectives in Mexico, the Soviets utilize various methods. According to observations made about past and current activities, most of them fall under two headings, which overlap. These are:

(a) Extensive use of local business contacts.

(b) Cultivation of key people in various organizations which can be easily used as propaganda outlets (i.e., films and newspapers) or as more conventional contacts (banks and customs officials, etc.).

VI. SOVIET COMMERCIAL CONTACTS AND TRANSACTIONS:

Set out below is a listing of the contacts made by the Soviet Commercial Office during December 1955, together with details as to the nature of these contacts, and the transactions made or proposed with them.

A. Combined Propaganda and Commercial Contacts:

1. BANDERA, Molino, Juan,
Peliculas Mexicanas
Ejido 43-107-105
Phones: 35-53-55; 36-46-05; 10-12-99; 18-22-48; 18-60-05; 21-30-81; 10-12-74.

BANDERA is a direct contact of the Soviet Commercial Office in the matter of film procurement, as well as an intermediary in securing Mexican films for the Soviets. It is known that the Soviets must purchase a certain amount of Mexican films, in order to be able to sell and exhibit theirs here. BANDERA was consulted several times during the month of December 1955, on film procurement. On 1 December 1955, MAYEVSKI (see IIA 2 Personnel), consulted BANDERA in reference to having BANDERA procure a certain film on time, so that a contract could be signed. Due to BOLSHAKOV's absence on a trip (see HMM-A-4109, pp. 2,3,4, 6 February 1956), MAYEVSKI wished to have the contract signed before 1 January 1956.

On 20 December 1955, BOLSHAKOV consulted BANDERA on whether the Mexican film "Raices" could be acquired. BANDERA explained that Cimex (a film company) controlled this film, but arranged a meeting for BOLSHAKOV with the director of Cimex, for 1100 on 21 December 1955.

2. CALVET Mario Arce, CALVET Arce, Mario
Dicina Films De Mexico SA
Av. Morelos 45-206-Bis 7-8
Phones: 21-13-46; 35-98-04.

CALVET appears to be a very important contact for the Soviets in the coordination of various factors. According to information received, he is very

active in h[illegible]g Soviet films presented in Mexico, smoothing out customs difficulties, arranging for favorable publicity for Soviet films, and is making an effort to circulate Soviet films elsewhere in Mexico beside in the capital. CALVET, according to one report, is the sole exhibitor of Soviet films in Mexico.

On 1 December 1955, MAYEVSKI consulted CALVET about some books which he (MAYEVSKI) wished sent to the Soviet Export Film Office. MAYEVSKI had received a cable from Soviet Export Films on returning films which were on permit No. 117773242. CALVET arranged an appointment with Jorge FERRETIS, head of Cinematografia (Mexican Government film department), for MAYEVSKI on 3 December 1955. It is believed that FERRETIS is the man to see for withdrawal approvals.

On 17 December 1955, LEONOV, Nikolai Sergeyevich, an administrative employee of the Soviet Embassy, contacted CALVET in reference to possible receipt by CALVET of new Soviet films. CALVET informed LEONOV that the only information he had, had been given to MAYEVSKI a few days back.

On 17 December 1955, it was ascertained that BOLSHAKOV had been shown parts of the films and titles of Soviet pictures, as revised for showing in Mexico. It was further ascertained that plans were afoot to inaugurate Soviet film showings at the "Teatro Ideal". The Teatro Ideal is alleged to have 1600 seats.

MAYEVSKI repeatedly told CALVET that he was interested in obtaining showings for the Soviet films, "Romeo y Julieta," and "Gran Familia."

On 17 December 1955, POPOV, Yevgeni Mikhailovich, 3rd Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, asked CALVET through MAYEVSKI to give certain films to the Soviet Embassy.

Arrangements were made for POPOV and ROMANOV, Leonid Mikhailovich, 3rd Secretary in the Embassy, to pick up some films. Among those obtained were "Gran Familia," "Romeo y Julieta," and the "Golden Antelope."

On 19 December 1955, it was arranged for POPOV to call on CALVET for certain films.

On 30 December 1955, the Soviet Embassy was notified by the Mexican Government that permission had been received for showing certain films, but not for "The Best in the World."

3. Editorial Popular (also known as Fondo De Cultura Popular),
Hidalgo 75
Phone - 12-37-77

This Communist publishing and bookselling shop has been noted as an outlet for Soviet books and periodicals for years. Its two managers, Jesus LAZCANO and Miguel Angel VASQUEZ, are both Communist Party members. Over the years they have imported a steady though relatively small amount of Soviet material.

In general, contact between the Editorial Popular and the Soviet Commercial Office takes place through LAZCANO and VASQUEZ on the one hand and IZOTOV and MAYEVSKI on the other.

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It was ascertained that in December 1955, the Editorial Popular was selling copies of two Maxim Gorki's works, their titles as translated into Spanish being "Los Sarta Monos" and "Mi Infancia."

4. GRIJALVO (or GRIJALBO) Serres, Juan,
General Manager of Exportadora De Publicaciones Mexicanas S. de R.L.,
Av. De La Granjas 82
Phone: 27-46-57

On 20 December 1955, GRIJALVO sent word to the Commercial Office that a book entitled "Economia Politica," which the Soviets were apparently anxious to acquire, was ready and asked the Commercial Office to state the quantity needed.

B. Purely Commercial Activities:

1. EISENBERG, Jacques, was contacted on 16 December 1955, and reportedly told the Soviets that the affair with the electrodes would have to be postponed until 10 or 15 January 1956, due to his (EISENBERG's) sickness. This electrode transaction was connected with the visit to Mexico of two Soviet engineering experts (Comment: See HMM-A-4129, pp. 2-4, 6 February 1956). EISENBERG is known to be considering a deal with the Soviets in agricultural machinery, and to be participating in a trade agreement with the French Government in cotton. EISENBERG has been noted in connection with Czech commercial activities in Mexico.

2. GONZALEZ, Jose R.
Uruguay 55-218

GONZALEZ is a frequent contact of the Soviet Embassy Commercial Section, and their actual and proposed transactions cover a rather wide range.

a. Rails and Pipe:

Early in December GONZALEZ and MAYEVSKI discussed the prospects for importing Soviet pipe and standard gauge railway rails into Mexico. It is reported that the market for rails in Mexico was not considered to be very hopeful, but the Soviets believed they might be able to arrange some sales in Central America.

b. Petroleum:

GONZALEZ brought news that the Matarazzo industrial combine in Brazil had bought sufficient petroleum (from outside the Soviet orbit) to cover its needs for four months, but would need more when the above time expired. MATARAZZO asked for an estimate on about 15-20,000 tons of Soviet petroleum delivered in about 100,000 drums per boat.

c. Cellulose:

GONZALEZ informed BOLSHAKOV that a US firm named PARSONS & WHITTEMORE wished to know why GONZALEZ was selling cellulose to Brazil, and further wished to know GONZALEZ' source of supply.

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GONZALEZ informed BOLSHAKOV that an unnamed Chilean company wanted to buy a 1000 tons of raw cellulose. Other information given by GONZALEZ was to the effect that he had received correspondence giving Finnish and Swedish prices on cellulose.

d. Wood Pulp:

GONZALEZ informed BOLSHAKOV that a large wood pulp company in Brazil was interested in doing business. It was reported that the transactions would be made with a Senor AMARAL in Rio. The difficulty in dealing with AMARAL was that he wished to have cargos marked as coming from another country, rather than the country of origin.

e. Copper

It was also reported by GONZALEZ that someone named CHILDS was interested in making a deal in copper (no details).

3. NASSER Quinones, Guillermo,
Director-Manager of Compensacion Internacional, SA
Bolivar 51
Phone: 21-70-63

NASSER engaged in talks with BOLSHAKOV on several occasions, discussing the following items:

a. Wood and the need for a factory and equipment of a (Sr.) RIVERA (fnu), probably sawmill machinery.

b. Samples of agricultural machinery from the USSR.

c. Information on unspecified chemical products.

d. Vague talk on watches, cigars, and medical equipment.

4. RIVERA, fnu,
Member of Comercial Ultramar SA
Hamburgo 138
Phones: 35-81-17; 35-81-15; 14-55-81.

RIVERA and BOLSHAKOV discussed the impending arrival of certain recorders reportedly due at the end of the month of December 1955 in Veracruz.

5. PEREZ Urizar, Adolfo,
Manager of Tractor Dept., Ford Motor Company SA
Calzada Guadalupe y Henry Ford
Phone: 17-50-00

PEREZ was visited twice in December 1955, by MATEVSKI; the talks were held on farm equipment, i.e., agricultural machinery, such as tractors, etc.

6. ROAN, Mony De (For more detailed report see HM-A-1166, 16 Feb. 1956)

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7. MORAN Valdes Ramon
Donatello 17

It is reported that MORAN discussed on various occasions the mechanics of credit modifications with MATEVSKI. It was reported that MORAN mentioned the fact that other business firms had requested banks to modify the letters of credit, and it was also ascertained that the modifications for the letters of credit the done. MORAN may be connected with the Naval foodshop.

8. ZELLINGER

A man named ZELLINGER also has various deals under discussion with the Soviets, among them being:

a) Alkalines and Alkaloids: ZELLINGER sought information on establishing a trade in alkalines. It is believed that this deal may be well advanced. ZELLINGER expressed a need for alkaloids and for a special machine needed for this. It is reported that BOLSHAKOV informed ZELLINGER that either the machine or information on the machine had already been sent, and that ZELLINGER had an excellent mechanic with General Electric experience to install this machine.

b) Acids: According to information received, the USSR claimed not to have Letters of Credit for transactions involving Red Black and Blue Black acids.

c) Radios: ZELLINGER claimed to have a market for radios on the condition that these not be imported fully assembled. The purchasing people desired information on parts, assembly, details and pictures. It was highly desirable to import and assemble the radios here. In conjunction with this ZELLINGER claimed to have a market for TV parts.

d) Drills (Unspecified type): It is reported that ZELLINGER was involved in a transaction for $8,200 worth of drills (ZELLINGER is reportedly connected with ZLOTNIK, see below).

e) Medicines: It was ascertained that ZELLINGER had presented a list of medicines most widely used in Mexico. ZELLINGER, according to reports, had stated that he could sell as much of the medicines as could be provided him by the USSR.

f) Cameras: It was reported that ZELLINGER claimed to have a market for cameras.

9. ZLOTNIK, Abraham
Toltecas 166

ZLOTNIK appears to be both an independent businessman and intermediary for other businessmen dealing with the USSR. It was ascertained that most of ZLOTNIK's transactions during the month of December concerned dyes. According to information gathered, delay on shipment of several types of (unspecified) dyes, was caused by the wait for a Letter of Credit. Direct Violet K dye, for which a Letter of Credit was opened on or about 30 November 1955, was not sent evidently due to shortage of same. It was reported that the Soviet Commercial Office stated that, according to a contract dated 29 October 1955, all the dyes were packed and awaiting shipment from an unknown

port of exp... It was stated that no Letter of Credit had been received for certain dyes, but ZLOTNIK claimed to have sent a Letter of Credit some time back to Sojuzk-Chemie Export, through the "Banco Popular."

ZLOTNIK stated that Violet Dye had arrived a few days back, but that he lacked information on how it was charged.

There was also some brief information to the effect that ZLOTNIK had given an order for tools.

C. Miscellaneous Commercial Activity:

Other transactions on which vague information has been received were:

1) Dyes: Confirmation received from Moscow on Letter of Credit 18 978 for Violet Dyes.

2) Coffee: BOLSHAKOV ridiculed a newspaper story that a Latin American country (Colombia?), claimed the Soviet Union was offering dollars for that country's coffee.

3) TV: Vague information has been received to the effect that Soviet Export Film is interested in the TV market in Mexico.

Information on certain contacts is rather vague; but it was ascertained that the Soviet Commercial Office had dealings with the following in December 1955, the exact nature of which was not clear:

1) GARCIN, Francisco, a member of the "Comision de Vigilancia" (Part of Mexican Social Security).

2) GARCIA Vidal, Raul, was contacted by BOLSHAKOV during the month of December 1955, with information that certain material was in readiness for GARCIA. It has not been ascertained exactly what GARCIA's relationship with the Soviet Commercial Office is.

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DISPATCH NO. EAVA-12223

VIA (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, EE
Attn: Silvan A. Hobson

DATE 31 October 1955

FROM Chief of Station, Vienna

INFO: Chief, SR

SUBJECT
GENERAL Operational/GREPIC
SPECIFIC DS-623 Identifications from Soccer Match Photographs

1. Shortly following DS-623's defection in January 1955, and again on 28 April 1955, Douglas M. Moir of VOB showed him the Vienna Station collection of soccer match photos. DS-623 was able to make 43 identifications from this collection, some by name and position, some only by function. In a few instances, as indicated specifically below, his identifications were erroneous, but are nonetheless forwarded on the assumption that even this fact will be of interest to you.

2. A total of twenty-one (21) separate photographs, some of them merely sections cut out of the original enlargements, are sent as an attachment to this dispatch. Persons identified by DS-623 are indicated on them by a heavy black inked circle around their heads; in a separate circle to the side, or in some instances above the circle surrounding their heads, are the numbers keyed to the list in Paragraph 3 below. In the event you have difficulty deciphering the numbers inked in on the front of the photos, you may refer to the reverse side, on which you will find the same numbers in approximately the same positions. We have just completed transmission of all negatives of the photos represented in the attachment. From these negatives, it will be possible for Headquarters to make individual blowups of the personalities identified by DS-623 for the appropriate Washington files. As you are already aware, the numbering system used on these negatives is that devised by the USIA Photo Section, which was responsible for taking the photos. For the six different matches represented in the attached photos, the following are the pertinent references:

a. Series 9954: Austria vs. Germany, Fall 1951. Negatives transmitted in EAVA-12175, 25 October 1955.

b. Series MFR 526: Austria vs. Portugal, 27 September 1953. Negatives transmitted in EAVA-12184, 25 October 1955.

c. Series MFR 532: Austria vs. Hungary, 11 October 1953. Negatives transmitted in EAVA-12183, 25 October 1954.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

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d. Series HFR 582: Austria vs. Hungary, 11 April 1954. Negatives transmitted in EAVA-12185, 25 October 1955.

e. Series HFR 631: Dynamo Moscow vs. Austria Rapid, 20 July 1954. Negatives transmitted in EAVA-12183, 25 October 1955.

f. Series HFR 653: Austria vs. Yugoslavia, 3 October 1954. Negatives transmitted in EAVA-12195, 25 October 1955.

3. The following are DB-623's identifications, the photo number(s) from which the identifications were made, and the DB-623 identification number:

DB-623 Number	Original Photo No.	Identification and Station Comments
(1)	HFR 526/8	(fnu) [illegible]OV, Acting Chief of USIA between departure of KRIVO[illegible] and takeover by [illegible]. Comment: this name given as "[illegible]" in [illegible].
(2)	HFR 631/14	Georgi Azarovich [illegible]EV, Acting Chief of A/O KABEL Accounting Section.
(3)	HFR 526/8	Ivan Alexeyevich [illegible]OV, Secretary of CPSU Organization, A/O [illegible]. Comment: this identification very uncertain.
(4)	HFR 582/8	(fnu) [illegible]KO, Chief of [illegible]-Energie-Abteilung.
(5)	HFR 631/16	Feodor Nikiforovich KARANOV, Chief Engineer of A/O KABEL.
(6)	HFR 526/5	NU, Soviet intelligence officer under [illegible] cover. Comment: apparently i/w individual holding Interzonal Pass in name of N. V. BELOV.
(7)	HFR 582/8	Alexander Petrovich [illegible]OV, CPSU representative in Austria.
(8)	HFR 582/8	(fnu) [illegible]ICHENKO, General-Director of USIA A/O PODIO[illegible].
(9)	HFR 653/4	(fnu) [illegible]EV, member of CO/[illegible], Vienna Garrison. Comment: [illegible] confirms identification of [illegible] (fnu) [illegible]EV as Deputy Chief, Vienna Detachment, CO/[illegible], CGF Baden.
(10)	HFR 631/18) HFR 653/9)	Sergei Nikolayevich [illegible]EV, General-Director of (USIA) Siemens-Schukert I.

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(continued)

DG-623 Number	Original Photo No.	Identification and Station Comments
(11)	NFR 653/9	(fnu) [illegible], General-Director of (USIA) Afa-Varta.
(12)	NFR 582/4) NFR 582/6) NFR 631/14)	Sergei Vasilyevich [illegible], General-Director of (USIA) A/o [illegible], and his wife.
(13)	NFR 582/4	Petr A. GRICHIN, Chief of USIA.
(14)	NFR 631/18	(fnu) [illegible], General-Director of (USIA) Wiener-[illegible]. Comment: incorrect, [illegible] identified this individual as D. A. [illegible], case officer of the Austria Group, KGB Residentura.
(15)	NFR 631/14) NFR 653/17)	Alexander Ivanovich [illegible], head of the Finance Section, A/O [illegible].
(16)	NFR 653/17	(fnu) [illegible], member of the Commercial Section, A/O [illegible].
(17)	NFR 631/16	Alexander Ivanovich KRUPNOV, General-Director of (USIA) Brown-Boveri.
(18)	NFR 582/4) NFR 653/17)	Anatoly Kirilovich [illegible], Second Deputy-Chief of USIA.
(19)	NFR 582/8	Franz [illegible], Austrian interpreter at the Soviet Information Center, allegedly an RIS agent.
(20)	NFR 582/4	Gregori Alexandrovich [illegible], Secretary of the CPSU organization, USIA.
(21)	NFR 653/17	(fnu) LAVRIONOV, Deputy-Chief of USIA. Comment: name reported as "LAVRENOV" in DG-2205.
(22)	NFR 582/4	Nikolai Sergeyevich [illegible], assistant to [illegible] and probably an RIS officer. Comment: [illegible] replaced V. I. [illegible], officer of the KGB Soviet Colony Group, in latter's cover position; DG-623's assumption that he is KGB, therefore, seems valid.
(23)	9954/3	Maria [illegible], Austrian interpreter in the 20th Bezirk Kommandatura. Comment: this identification made by DG-623 A.

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EAVA-12223
Page 4.

(continued)

DS-623 Number	Original Photo No.	Identification and Station Comments
(24)	KFR 582/4	Vitaly Ivanovich [illegible], KGB Officer under USIA Personnel Section cover. Cf. (22) above.
(25)		No. 25 eliminated; first identified by DS-623 as O[illegible]OV, later changed to A[illegible]OV.
(26)	KFR 653/3	(fnu) [illegible], Chief Bookkeeper at (USIA) Porr A. G.
(27)	KFR 582/5) KFR 653/3)	Yevgeni Arcentiyevich POLYAKOV, General-Director of an unspecified firm subordinated to A/O TEXTIL.
(28)	KFR 631/14	Gregoriy Ivanovich PU[illegible]EV, Chief of Personnel, A/O KABEL.
(29)	KFR 582/4	Sergei Mikhailovich ROZHKOV, Chief of Personnel, USIA.
(30)	KFR 653/4	NU, colleague of (fnu) [illegible], No. 9 above. Comment: this individual is, of course, Ivan I. [illegible]OV, Chief, Vienna Detachment, OO/KGB, and CHERNISHEV's immediate superior.
(31)	KFR 582/4	(fnu) [illegible]EV, member of the Soviet Trade Delegation in Vienna. Comment: TKP in name of N. A. [illegible].
(32)	KFR 582/4) KFR 631/14)	Nikolai Fedorovich SHIKHOVISOV, Chief, Commercial Section, A/O KABEL.
(33)	KFR 631/18	Robert [illegible], Austrian chief of the Technical Section, (USIA) AEG-Union.
(34)	KFR 631/16	Yevgeni Alexandrovich [illegible]OV, member of the Production Section, A/O KABEL.
(35)	KFR 631/18	(fnu) [illegible]OV, Cultural Referent, USIA. Comment: incorrect; [illegible] SO has identified this man as Ivan I. [illegible]OV of the KGB Rezidentura.
(36)	KFR 631/18	(fnu) VINOGRADOV, Chief Engineer of (USIA) Waagner-Biro.
(37)	KFR 631/14	Nikolai Savich VOLO[illegible], Chief, Production Section, A/O KABEL.

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6-6-9-707/1

(continued)

DD-623 Number	Original Photo No.	Identification and Station Comments
(38)	MFR 631/14) MFR 631/18)	(fnu) ZAVIALOV, Deputy to BRAZHNIKOV, CPSU representative (cf. No. 7 above)
(39)	MFR 582/10	Sergei A. [illegible]OLKIN, coordinator of Soviet economic enterprises in Austria.
(40)	MFR 653/9	NU, Chief, Commercial Section, (USIA) Siemens-Schukert I.
(41)	MFR 582/4	NU, bookkeeper in Soviet Military Bank.
(42)	MFR 631/18	NU, works with BRAZHNIKOV, CPSU representative (cf. No. 7 above)
(43)	MFR 582/4	NU, Soviet General-Director of (USIA) Walfrum liqueur distillery.
(44)	MFR 532/12	NU, frequently seen with V. I. [illegible], MGB officer under USIA cover (cf. No. 24 above).

4. Since the Vienna Station has adequate copies of photographs of the few individuals of current interest to Vienna among these identifications, strictly USIA personnel being of no further interest to us, the attached are for Headquarters use and files. No further servicing of them is required here.

Giles T. Crowen

Attachments: 21 photographs

Distribution:
3-[illegible] w/atts ← 1 cc destroyed 26 July 68 HR
1-G2
1-CC3
1-CCPS
3-Crowen/2152/2712/2185

6-64-1077

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: Air

DISPATCH NO. [illegible]

SECRET

DATE: AUG 26 1955

TO: Chief of Station, Vienna

FROM: Chief, [illegible]

SUBJECT: GENERAL: Operational/[illegible]
SPECIFIC: Possible members of the [illegible]

REF: [illegible] 201-69573

1. In the referenced report it is noted that [illegible] stated he thought Nikolay Sergeyevich [illegible] and Grigoriy Ivanovich [illegible] were members of the [illegible]. Traces were run on these two men and are forwarded for whatever value they may be to VOB.

a. [illegible] Nikolay Sergeyevich. Possible traces. Information evaluated [illegible] contained in [illegible] 17 July 1952 from Karachi, Pakistan, states one [illegible], Passport No. [illegible], dated [illegible] April 1952; Visa No. 73, was leader of agriculture delegation from Moscow to attend the Asian Regional Conference [illegible] held at Karachi on 3 May 1952.

There are numerous references on one Nikolay Sergeyevich [illegible], born 22 August 1912 [illegible]. This [illegible] has been, and believed to be at the present time with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. We did not collect the information on this person as it is not believed he is identical with the person in Vienna. However, if the [illegible] trace and VOB feels there is a chance that the two men are identical, the information can be obtained as well as photographs. There is also a photograph of the above mentioned [illegible]. There is a striking resemblance between the two men mentioned, although [illegible] is a much older man.

b. [illegible] Grigoriy Ivanovich. The only trace found was [illegible] dated 3 November [illegible], subject: "Miscellaneous Information from [illegible] Kabel Headquarters" states "The personnel head of [illegible] Kabel is [illegible]." No other information.

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22 Aug 1955 — EE/A

[signature] — [illegible] STYLES, EE/A

Distribution:
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SECRET

FORM NO. 51-29

RI

26 Aug 55

201-[illegible]

201-132139

the young priests undergo a thorough study of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. After graduation they are appointed to parishes where they exercise their pulpit prerogative by preaching Communism to the faithful. ~~[illegible]~~, when one of these young priests is first appointed to a given parish, his first step is to go to the [illegible] Communist Party secretary and ask him what the Party missions in the area are and how the priest would be of assistance in carrying out these missions.

6. ~~[illegible]~~ religion is becoming a tool of the Communist Party of the USSR since most of the older priests of the last generation, who would have fought Communism, have died off or have been purged and the younger priests, who have replaced them, are completely dominated by Communist Party influence.

26 Aug 55

26 Aug 55

201-69572

SECRET

REPORT NO. DS-2807

DEFECTOR RECEPTION CENTER

COUNTRY USSR/Austria

DATE DISTR. 28 Apr 55

SUBJECT Soviet Personalities in USIA

NO. OF PAGES 16

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to December 1954

REFERENCES: DS-2805

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE DS-623, a Soviet electrical engineer, born in 1914, is a graduate of the Leningrad Polytechnic Institute. From May 1950 to January 1953, he was General Director of the USIV Siemens-Schukert plant in Budapest. From January 1953 until his defection in January 1955, he was General Director of the USIA AEG Union plant in Vienna. During the war he became a member of the Communist Party and was always active in Party affairs, primarily because he found such participation expedient in furthering his career. He defected to the West because he feared that lengthy imprisonment would result from a forthcoming investigation of production of faulty transformers at his plant. Source is a well-educated, intelligent, and shrewd individual. Source was relatively reluctant to provide data on personalities known to him personally.

Following are biographic sketches of USIA Soviet personalities known to source. For further information on the duties of these individuals, see the above referenced report.

SECRET

28 apr. 55

NAME: ANDREYEV, Georgiy Lazarovich
DEGREE OR RANK:
NATIONALITY: Russian
DOB: c. 1905
OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Accountant
POB: Unknown to source
POSITION: Acting Chief of the Accounting Section of A/O Kabel, USIA
HT: c. 165 cm. **WT:** c. 60 kg. **BUILD:** Thin **HAIR:** Dark **EYES:** Unknown
OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Thin, sharp nose and face
PERSONAL HISTORY: Married
EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Worked as Chief Accountant of the "Asbest" Trust in the city of Asbest in the Urals, USSR, prior to coming to Austria in February 1954. Source knew nothing of his military record.
PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: A CP member although not active
REMARKS: A careerist, subservient to superiors, unprincipled in matters pertaining to work
BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from February to December 1954.
DATE OF INFO: December 1954

NAME: ANDRONOV, Ivan Aleksandrovich
DEGREE OR RANK:
NATIONALITY: Russian
DOB: c. 1925
OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Unknown to source
POB: Unknown
POSITION: General Director of the Osram Plant subordinate to A/O Kabel, USIA
HT: c. 168 cm. **WT:** c. 90 kg. **BUILD:** Stout **HAIR:** Dark **EYES:** Unknown
OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None that were outstanding
PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown
EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Unknown
PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: An active CP member; he was the secretary of the Soviet Party organization for A/O Kabel, USIA.
REMARKS: A stupid individual; blindly carried out the orders of the Party and his superiors at work without reflection
BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from February 1953 to December 1954
DATE OF INFO: December 1954

NAME: [illegible], Mikhail Vasilyevich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1915

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: A commercial specialist

POB: Unknown to source

POSITION: Chief of the Supply and Sales Office of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 1?0 cm. **WT:** c. 65 kg. **BUILD:** Short, medium **HAIR:** Light **EYES:** Unknown to source

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Round "Russian" face. He wears glasses with metal frames.

PERSONAL HISTORY: Married; he graduated from the Academy of Foreign Trade (Akademiya Vneshney Torgovli) in Moscow in 1946 or 1947.

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Unknown to source

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: CP member; active Communist

REMARKS:

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

NAME: BARANOV, Fedor Nikiforovich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: 1905-1910

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Electrical engineer (Inzhener-elektrik)

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Deputy Director and Chief Engineer of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: 173-174 cm. **WT:** c. 93 kg. **BUILD:** Quite stout **HAIR:** Blond **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Full face

PERSONAL HISTORY: Married

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Prior to coming to Austria in March 1954, he worked as Chief of the Equipment Department of the Chief Directorate of Electrical Machine Building, Ministry of Electrical Industry (Otdel Oborudovaniya, Glavnogo Upravleniya Elektromashino - Stroyeniya, Ministerstvo Elektropromyshlennosti). Military record unknown to source.

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: CP member, very active Communist

REMARKS: A very good engineer; fawns before his superiors in an effort to advance himself further. Does not treat subordinates fairly.

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from March to December 1954 **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

NAME: [illegible]ACHKOV, Sergey Nikolayevich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1915

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Electrical engineer (Inzhener-elektrik)

POB: Unknown

POSITION: General Director of Siemens Schukert I, plant subordinate to A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 1[illegible] cm. **WT:** c. 65 kg. **BUILD:** Thin **HAIR:** Light **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Was formerly Chief of Personnel Section of A/O Kabel but was transferred to present position

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Not a Party member

REMARKS: Good engineer, honest, and a thorough worker. Was frequently ill with some sort of stomach ailment.

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

NAME: FELOSENKO, (fnu) **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1923

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY:

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Member of Production Section of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 160 cm. **WT:** **BUILD:** Medium **HAIR:** Thick, red **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Full Russian face; wears reading glasses

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Unknown

REMARKS:

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work **DATE OF INFO:** 1954

NAME: GLADKIY, Sergey Vasilyevich — DEGREE OR RANK:

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1910

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Mechanical engineer (Inzhener-mekhanik)

POB: Unknown

POSITION: General Director of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: 173-175 cm. WT: c. 85 kg. BUILD: Stout HAIR: Dark, blond, partially bald EYES: Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Full face, Austrian haircut.

PERSONAL HISTORY: Married

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Prior to World War II worked as a plant director in Leningrad. After the war he worked in East Germany as director of a UFIG plant. Came to Austria in January or February 1954. Source had no information about his military record.

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: CP member, devoted Communist to point of fanaticism

REMARKS: Very dull person, rough, uncultured, poorly educated. Speaks Russian like a country muzhik.

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from January or February - December 1954 — DATE OF INFO: December 1954

NAME: GRITCHIN, Petr Aleksandrovich — DEGREE OR RANK:

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1903

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Unknown

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Chief of USIA

HT: c. 175 cm. WT: c. 65 kg. BUILD: Thin HAIR: Thick, black EYES: Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Wore glasses for reading

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Came to USIA from Moscow at the end of 1953; military record unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: CP member, active Communist

REMARKS: A very competent chief, had reputation of being honest and fair; intelligent, was generally quiet, never shouted at subordinates.

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work — DATE OF INFO: December 1954

NAME: IGNATYEV, Sergey Ivanovich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1903

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Electrical engineer (Inzhener-elektrik)

POB: Unknown

POSITION: General Director of Wiener Kabel and Ariadne plants subordinate to A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 165 cm. **WT:** c. 60 kg. **BUILD:** Thin **HAIR:** Dark **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None that were outstanding

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown to source

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Worked as a plant director for USIG in East Germany before coming to Austria in December 1953. Military record unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: An active CP member

REMARKS: Honest, a good technical specialist

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

NAME: [illegible]YEVLEV, Aleksander Ivanovich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1912

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Financial specialist

POB: Unknown to source

POSITION: Chief of the Financial Section of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 165 cm. **WT:** c. 60 kg. **BUILD:** Thin **HAIR:** Dark **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Hunched shoulders, thin face, straight nose, wears reading glasses. His right hand has no index and middle fingers up to the second joint.

PERSONAL HISTORY: Married

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Unknown to source

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: A CP member but not active

REMARKS: Liked to drink and was often drunk; considered a cultured, decent fellow who was well liked

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from February 1953 to December 1954 **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

NAME: KHAYLOV, Ivan Stepanovich DEGREE OR RANK:

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1903

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Electrical engineer (Inzhener-elektrik)

POB: Unknown

POSITION: General Director of Siemens Schukert II, plant subordinate to A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 165 cm. WT: c. 60 kg. BUILD: Thin HAIR: Light EYES: Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None that were outstanding

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Worked as a plant director for USIG in East Germany before coming to Austria in July 1954. Military record unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: An active CP member

REMARKS: A scoundrel, very impudent to equals and subordinates; typical careerist

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work DATE OF INFO: December 1954

NAME: KRUPNOV, Aleksandr Ivanovich DEGREE OR RANK:

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1910

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Unknown

POB: Unknown

POSITION: General Director of the Brown Boveri plant subordinate to A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 168 cm. WT: c. 75 kg. BUILD: Medium HAIR: Dark EYES: Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None that were outstanding

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: An active CP member

REMARKS: A big careerist who has no convictions. He would work as readily for any party that happened to be in power.

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work since January 1953, when source came to Austria. DATE OF INFO: December 1954

NAME: KRUTKO, Anatoliy Kirilovich
DEGREE OR RANK:
NATIONALITY: Ukrainian
DOB: c. 1908
OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Commercial specialist
POB: Unknown
POSITION: Second Deputy Chief of USIA, responsible for commercial and financial matters
HT: c. 180 cm. WT: c. 100 kg. BUILD: Heavy-set HAIR: Blond, brush-cut, slightly receding hairline EYES: Unknown
OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Wide shoulders, athletic build, full Ukrainian face
PERSONAL HISTORY: Graduate of the Academy of Foreign Trade in Moscow
EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Came to USIA in beginning of 1954 from East Germany where he worked for USIG, presumably in a similar capacity; military record unknown to source.
PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Active CP member
REMARKS: Very competent worker, however very stubborn; well thought of by his superiors
BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work
DATE OF INFO: December 1954

NAME: KRYLOV, Grigoriy Aleksandrovich
DEGREE OR RANK: Engineer
NATIONALITY: Russian
DOB: c. 1915
OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Party worker
POB: Unknown
POSITION: Head of the Soviet Communist organisation in USIA
HT: c. 170 cm. WT: Unknown BUILD: Medium HAIR: Brown EYES: Unknown
OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None
PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown
EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Came from Moscow to Vienna about the end of 1953 or the beginning of 1954; military record unknown
PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Party member, devoted Communist
REMARKS: None
BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work
DATE OF INFO: December 1954

NAME: [illegible] DEGREE OR RANK:

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 190[illegible]

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: believed to be an economist

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Chief of USIA Labor and Wage Section

HT: c. [illegible] cm. WT: c. [illegible] kg. BUILD: Slender HAIR: [illegible], partially gr[illegible] EYES: Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Came from Moscow to Austria in the summer of 1953; replaced YERS[illegible]. Military record is unknown to source.

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Active CP member

REMARKS: Lazy, not very competent in his job, always involved in intrigue

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work DATE OF INFO: December 1954

NAME: KUZNETSOV, Sergey Afanasyevich DEGREE OR RANK:

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1915

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Unknown

POB: Unknown

POSITION: General Director of the Paul Goerz plant subordinate to A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 1[illegible] cm WT: c. 70 kg. BUILD: Thin HAIR: Light EYES: Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: A Party member; active Communist

REMARKS: Deceitful individual; great "bootlicker" who would stoop to any baseness in order to advance himself or keep out of trouble

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from February 1953 to December 1954 DATE OF INFO: December 1954

NAME: LAVRENOV, (fnu)
DEGREE OR RANK:
NATIONALITY: Russian
DOB: c. 1903
OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Engineer
POB: Unknown
POSITION: Chief Engineer and First Deputy Chief of USIA
HT: c. 160 cm. **WT:** c. 80 kg. **BUILD:** Short, stout **HAIR:** Blond, partially bald in front **EYES:** Unknown
OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Wore glasses
PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown
EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Worked for USIG in East Germany prior to coming to USIA in early part of 1954. Military record unknown
PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Very active CP member
REMARKS: Had reputation for being a heavy drinker, lazy except in Party work; not very competent in his work
BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work. (Source actually met him only once.)
DATE OF INFO: October 1954

NAME: LEONOV, Nikolay Sergeyevich
DEGREE OR RANK:
NATIONALITY: Russian
DOB: c. 1920
OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Personnel worker
POB: Unknown
POSITION: Deputy Chief of Personnel Section, A/O Kabel, USIA, in charge of personnel matters for Austrian personnel
HT: c. 160 cm. **WT:** c. 60 kg. **BUILD:** Short, thin **HAIR:** Dark **EYES:** Unknown
OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None that were outstanding
PERSONAL HISTORY: Married
EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Had worked in the Soviet Embassy in Poland before coming to Austria in December 1953. Military record unknown
PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Not an active CP member
REMARKS: Believed by source to be a member of the MGB (KGB)
BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from January 1954 to December 1954
DATE OF INFO: December 1954

put this with 201-0132139

NAME: LYKOV, Ivan Ivanovich
DEGREE OR RANK:
NATIONALITY: Russian from Moscow
DOB: c. 1892
OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Economist
POB: Unknown
POSITION: Chief of USIA Planning Section
HT: 170-175 cm. **WT:** c. 60 kg. **BUILD:** Thin **HAIR:** Grey **EYES:** Unknown
OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Erect posture; lined face; wore pince-nez
PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown
EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Worked in GUSDZ in Moscow as planning accountant before coming to Austria about the end of 1953; military record unknown
PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Not a Party member
REMARKS: Cultured, intelligent, very competent specialist; gave appearance of an old Russian squire. Dressed very neatly, wore string tie; was generally well-liked
BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work
DATE OF INFO: December 1954

NAME: NAZAROV, (fnu)
DEGREE OR RANK:
NATIONALITY: Russian
DOB: c. 1902
OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Unknown
POB: Unknown
POSITION: Chief of the Labor and Wage Section of A/O Kabel, USIA
HT: c. 170 cm. **WT:** c. 75 kg. **BUILD:** Medium **HAIR:** Grey **EYES:** Unknown
OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None that were outstanding
PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown
EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Unknown
PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: A Party member but not an active Communist
REMARKS:
BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work
DATE OF INFO: December 1954

NAME: PECHATNAYA, (fnu) (female) **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian **DOB:** c. 1930

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Secretary-typist **POB:** Unknown

POSITION: Secretary to GLADKII, Chief of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 165 cm. **WT:** c. 50 kg. **BUILD:** Thin **HAIR:** Black, short, wavy **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Long nose, thin face

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Not a Party member

REMARKS: Quiet, serious, hard-working girl, pleasant to everyone and seemed to be quite intelligent. She did not like her boss, thought he was stupid, and stated as much to source.

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

NAME: PLUCHKIN, (fnu) **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian **DOB:** c. 1892

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Unknown **POB:** Unknown

POSITION: General Director of Sichtermann plant of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 170 cm **WT:** c. 70 kg. **BUILD:** Medium **HAIR:** Gray **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Wore glasses

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Not a Party member

REMARKS: Competent worker, fair to subordinates

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

NAME: PUZYREV, Grigoriy Ivanovich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian Jew

DOB: c. 1912

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Personnel worker, believed by source to be MGB (KGB) worker

POB: Unknown to source

POSITION: Chief of Personnel Section of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: 165 [illegible] cm. **WT:** c. 75 kg. **BUILD:** Heavy **HAIR:** Red with bald spot combed over **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Long full nose

PERSONAL HISTORY: Married

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Worked as chief of a personnel section in a division of USIG in East Germany prior to coming to Austria during the latter part of 1953. Military record unknown to source.

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Party member; devoted to the Party, strong belief in the Party.

REMARKS: Very unpleasant individual

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from January to December 1954 **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

NAME: ROZHKOV fnu **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1910

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Personnel worker (also probably a worker for MGB/KGB)

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Assistant to Chief, USIA, for personnel matters

HT: c 170 cm. **WT:** c. 65 kg. **BUILD:** Slender **HAIR:** Blond, balding on the sides **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None that were outstanding

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Came from Moscow at the end of 1953 or the beginning of 1954; military record unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Active CP member

REMARKS: Reputed to be very stupid; generally disliked by everyone

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work. (Source met him on only one occasion.) **DATE OF INFO:** November 1954

NAME: K EMIN, Vasiliy Nikitich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian **DOB:** c. 1900

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Economist **POB:** Unknown

POSITION: Chief of the Planning Section of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c 165 cm. **WT:** c. 85 kg. **BUILD:** Stout **HAIR:** Dark, bald on the top and sides **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Full face, occasionally wears dark horn-rimmed glasses, inside and on dark days, and has another pair of glasses for reading

PERSONAL HISTORY: Divorced

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Worked in the Ministry of State Control in Moscow prior to coming to Austria. He lost his job in this organization along with many others as a result of large personnel cuts invoked by government in this and other organizations. He came to Austria in January 1954. Military record unknown.

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: An active and loyal CP member

REMARKS: Acted like a lord (barin). He was used to commanding people all his life and did not like to work himself.

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from January to December 1954 **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

NAME: SERGEYEVNA, Klavdiya (female) **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian **DOB:** Unknown

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Engineer **POB:** Unknown

POSITION: Engineer economist on staff of Planning Section of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 165 cm. **WT:** Unknown **BUILD:** Medium **HAIR:** Black **EYES:** Black

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Wide nose, wide face

PERSONAL HISTORY: Wife of SERGEYEV of Torgpredstvo

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Assistant to Vasiliy Nikitich SEMIN, Chief of Planning Section of A/O Kabel

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Unknown

REMARKS:

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work **DATE OF INFO:** 1954

14-00000

SECRET

-15-

EC-2807

NAME: [illegible], N[illegible]lay Fedorovich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1920

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Commercial specialist

POB: Unknown to source

POSITION: Chief of the Commercial Section of A/C Kabel, USIA

HT: c [illegible] cm **WT:** c [illegible] kg **BUILD:** Medium **HAIR:** Dark **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Has a round Ukrainian face and wears his hair combed straight back

PERSONAL HISTORY: Graduated from the Academy of Foreign Trade (Akademiya Vneshney Torgovli) in Moscow in [illegible]. Married.

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Served as Commercial Section chief in a division of USIG in East Germany prior to coming to Austria in December 1953. Military record unknown to source.

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: An active Party member and a loyal Communist

REMARKS: He was lazy and did not know his specialty well.

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from January to December 1954 **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

NAME: [illegible]CHIKOV, Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1928

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Electrical-technician (Tekhnik-elektrik)

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Engineer in the Production Section of A/C Kabel

HT: c 16[illegible] cm **WT:** c [illegible] kg **BUILD** Short, thin **HAIR** Thick, blond **EYES** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS:

PERSONAL HISTORY: Married

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Had worked in East Germany for USIG prior to January 1954 when he arrived in Austria and began working as an engineer in Production Section of A/C Kabel, USIA. Military record unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: An active CP member

REMARKS: An able engineer

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

SECRET

28 April 55

14-00000

SECRET

NAME: [illegible] DEGREE OR RANK:

NATIONALITY: [illegible]

DOB: [illegible]

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: [illegible] engineer (inzhener-elektrik)

POB: Unknown

POSITION: [illegible] plant which was subordinate to A/G Kabel, USIA

HT: [illegible] WT: [illegible] BUILD: [illegible] HAIR: Blond EYES: Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: [illegible] that were outstanding

PERSONAL HISTORY: [illegible]

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: [illegible] engineer in "Kabel" plant in Moscow before coming to Austria [illegible] Never served in the army

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: [illegible] a Party member

REMARKS: [illegible] individual and a gossip. He would serve any government or organization which paid him [illegible]

BASIS OF INFO: [illegible] DATE OF INFO: December 1954

NAME: [illegible] DEGREE OR RANK:

NATIONALITY: [illegible]

DOB: c. 1900

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Mechanical engineer (inzhener-mekhanik)

POB: Unknown to source

POSITION: [illegible] Section of A/G Kabel, USIA

HT: [illegible] WT: [illegible] BUILD: Very thin HAIR: Dark and gray, long, balding on sides EYES: Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Has long neck, a long, thin nose and face, and very large [illegible] "[illegible] like Chamberlain". Looks younger than he actually is.

PERSONAL HISTORY: Married

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Worked as chief of a production section in a division of USIG prior to coming to Austria during the latter part of 1953. Source knew nothing about his military record

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: A CP member and loyal Communist, almost a fanatic

REMARKS: Very egotistical, stubborn, and stupid. He liked to squabble and was always involved in intrigue

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from beginning of 19[illegible] to December 19[illegible]. DATE OF INFO: December 1954

SECRET

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14-00000

SECRET

Mexico City — HMM-623

three — 24 March 54

Benedict O. Dunshurst/pdb — Hubert B. Tabakin

3 - Headquarters
3 - Files

LIMERICK, LIPSTICK, LIVESTOCK — HMM-562, dated 27 Jan 54

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CLASSIFICATION
Changed to: Secret
BY AUTHORITY OF
Name: David Brady
Office: C/WH/3
Date: 8 Nov 1959

SECRET

~~22222~~
#3
201-132139

Nikolai Sergeyevich LEONOV
Valeriya Ivanovna LEONOVA

IDN-623

2 Aug - 31 Dec 1953

Mexico City

same

B-Doc

24 March 1954

LIMERICK, LIPSTICK, LIVESTOCK

Name: Nikolai Sergeyevich LEONOV
Born: 22 August 1928 in Ryazan
Arrived in Mexico: 11 July 1953 aboard SS Andrea Gritti, Veracruz, with wife
Documents: Holds service passport 10724, issued 29 January 1952, in Moscow
Title: Unknown **Position:** Unknown
Residence in Mexico: Juanacatlan 81
Wife: Valeriya Ivanovna
Children: None known. None in Mexico
Languages: Spanish good
Other personal data: Nickname - KOLYA
Occasionally drives one of Embassy automobiles

Official Activities

Our few references to LEONOV make it appear that he, like BELYAKOV and ANTYASOV, with whom he seems to be vaguely associated, is a third echelon functionary who probably performs a variety of administrative tasks in support of one or another phase of the Embassy operations and might be in on-the-job training for a specialized job as assistant to, at a guess, SAMOILOV. In early August, shortly after his arrival, he called a woman instructor at an obscure local business school and was told that he could come by for his grades the following week. (We infer from another conversation that MATVEYEV was attending this school with him.) LEONOV was also with ANTYASOV and BELYAKOV when ANTYASOV was detained on their way "back from the University" at the end of September. (See: ANTYASOV.) This should indicate that he was principally occupied during the weeks after his arrival in acquainting himself with local business methods and commercial practices, and perhaps taking some further formal instruction. Otherwise, his appearances in the traffic have been limited to answering the telephone for both KOLOMYAKOV and SAMOILOV in their absence (without making decisions or taking any action) and, under the tutelage of LAZAREV before the latter's departure, making routine calls connected with ordering wine, repairing the movie projector, and the like. He has also occasionally been seen driving one or another of the Embassy automobiles, apparently filling in for one of the chauffeurs.

Private Activities

Our only information on LEONOV's private life is the fact that the ZHUKOVs moved into the LEONOVs' apartment (No. 4 at Industria No. 71) upon their arrival

62202

on 7 November and the two couples lived together for about three weeks, when the LEONOVs moved into other quarters at Juanacatlan 81. (There were no indications that the original arrangement had ever been intended to be other than temporary or that the subsequent move of the LEONOVs was due to friction between the two couples.) This raises the suggestion that ZHUKOV may be associated in some way with LEONOV within the Embassy as well, a possibility which is borne out to some extent by the fact that both habitually answer and make calls from the same Embassy telephones.

Comment

We cannot yet assess LEONOV for operational purposes.

Name: Valeriya Ivanovna LEONOVA
Born: Unknown
Arrived in Mexico 11 July 1953 aboard MS Andrea Gritti in Veracruz with husband
No known title or position
Residence in Mexico: Juanacatlan 81
Children: None known. None in Mexico
Languages: Unknown
Other personal data: Nickname: LERA

Private Activities

Although we have no definite indications to that effect, there is a fair possibility that LEONOVA is employed in some administrative or clerical position in the Embassy, since she seems to be present in the Chancery area a good deal during office hours and, without children, would not otherwise have a great deal to do.

Our only information relating directly to LEONOVA occurs during a conversation between APARINOVA and MELNIKOVA on 26 October in which APARINOVA complained bitterly that LEONOVA was shirking her share of responsibility in preparing food for the 7 November reception. LEONOVA had apparently failed to buy ingredients, after being asked to do so, on the plea that she had not been told exactly what kind of apples to get nor where to buy them. APARINOVA: "KOMSOMOLTSI always brag about being in the front line, but in actuality, bah!" MELNIKOVA: "Yes, when I was at their home, we happened to discuss the reception, and Rita (ANTYASOVA) said, 'Why should we do the work for the reception?' I told her she should be ashamed of herself. I work in the Embassy and hold out during receptions and all holidays, and I don't complain. LEONOVA claims she is not going to do any shopping because she was not given the responsibility." APARINOVA: "What does she mean? I met her and said 'Lera. . .' She said she'd come over Sunday and make a list of the things to be bought." MELNIKOVA: "And she didn't come over. She was probably afraid of the work and the money involved. APARINOVA: "How silly. I told her we would refund all expenses."

Comment

We infer that LEONOV (and perhaps her husband as well) is a good KOMSOMOL and may be endowed with the aggressively unpleasant personality which the Soviet system seems to foster so often. As shown in our photo coverage, both she and her husband have the appearance of persons who could be the well-disciplined, unquestioning, devoted Communists idealized in Soviet propaganda.

LEONOV, Nikolai

LIMERICK TS 90085 HMM-370 24 Jul 53 P. 5

P. 5-6 Nikolai LEONOV, "collaborator", and his wife, Valeria LEONOVA arrived at Veracruz aboard an Italian vessel 11 July 1953. Forwarded with this report are copies of photos of the subjects taken by LIVESTOCK. LEONOVs were met at Veracruz by Alexander BELIAKOV.

P. 10 Nikolai Sergeevich LEONOV and his wife, Valeria Ivanovna LEONOVA arrived at Veracruz by ship 11 July 1953. Forwarded with this report are the following pertinent photographs taken by LIVESTOCK:

6 copies of the pair leaving the ship
6 copies of LEONOV leaning over the ship's rail
3 copies of BELIAKOV speaking with LEONOVA at the dock
1 copy of pages from LEONOV's passport
1 copy of pages of LEONOVA's passport
Foreign Ministry cards with photos of LEONOV and wife are also attached (see Attachments 2 and 3)

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: [illegible]

SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. [illegible]-748

CLASSIFICATION

TO: Chief of Mission, Mexico

FROM: Chief, [illegible]

DATE: JUL 1953

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Soviet Embassy Personnel

SPECIFIC- Nikolai L[illegible]OV

REF: R[illegible]-5[illegible], R[illegible]-542

Headquarters files contain the information given below concerning one N. L[illegible]OV, who may be identical with subject. [illegible] was not able to provide additional information.

According to information [illegible] B-2 contained in P-K-176, dated 17 July 1952, from Karachi, Pakistan, one N. L[illegible]OV, passport number [illegible], dated 2[illegible] [illegible] 1952, visa number 70, dated 25 April 1952, was leader of an Agriculture Delegation from Moscow to attend the [illegible] Regional Conference on Epizootics held at Karachi on 3 [illegible] 1952.

J. C. King

By R. [illegible]

2[illegible] June 1953

Distribution:
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2 - E/[illegible]
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1 - Registry

E/[illegible]C/sr

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COORDINATING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

201-132139

14-00000

AIR

SECRET
Security Information

HMMW-748

JUL 1 - 1953

Chief of Mission, Mexico City

Chief, WHD

Soviet Embassy Personnel
Nikolai LEONOV

REF: ROMX-5898, ROMX-5242

Headquarters files contain the information given below concerning one N. LEONOV, who may be identical with subject. KUPALM was not able to provide additional information.

According to information evaluated B-2 contained in RCK-176, dated 17 July 1952, from Karachi, Pakistan, one N. LEONOV, passport number 09492, dated 24 April 1952, visa number 70, dated 25 April 1952, was leader of an Agriculture Delegation from Moscow to attend the Asian Regional Conference on Epizootics held at Karachi on 3 May 1952.

J. C. King

By R. Connally

24 June 1953

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J. C. KING

O.M. DOERFLINGER

SECRET

201-132139

INFORMATION REPORT

SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY	Italy/USSR	REPORT NO.	CS-11590
SUBJECT	Travel of Soviet Diplomatic Personnel	DATE DISTR.	2 June 1953
		NO. OF PAGES	1
DATE OF INFO.	16 May 1953	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
PLACE ACQUIRED	Italy, Rome (23 May 1953)	REFERENCES	CS-1.879

BY CABLE

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE: Through an official Italian channel. Appraisal of Content: 3.

Nikolai Leonov, an employee of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico, and his wife, Valeriya, left Genoa on 16 May 1953 aboard the SS ANDREA GRITTI, destined for Mexico.

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STATE	x	ARMY	x	NAVY	x	AIR	x	FBI		AEC						

(Note: Washington Distribution Indicated By "X"; Field Distribution By "#".)

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NE		WH				WH/FI/Ogden x	
SE		STD				STC/CB x	

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IN-28996
ROME-5898
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201-132139

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INFORMATION REPORT

SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY
SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY	Italy/USSR/Mexico	REPORT NO.	CS- 10879
SUBJECT	Travel of Soviet Diplomatic Personnel	DATE DISTR.	27 May 1953
		NO. OF PAGES	1
DATE OF INFO.	13 May 1953	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
PLACE ACQUIRED	Italy, Rome (19 May 1953)	REFERENCES	

BY CABLE

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE: An individual with good contacts in Italian Police circles. (B). Appraisal of Content: 3.

The following Soviet diplomatic personnel arrived in Rome on 9 May 1953 from Moscow and took lodgings at Primrose Pensione until 13 May 1953, when they departed for Genoa to proceed by sea to Mexico:

a. Nikolai Leonov, collaborator at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, who carries service Passport C 10724, issued in Moscow on 29 October 1952; and

b. Valeria Leonova, wife of above, who was born in Moscow on 28 April 1928 and who carries service passport C 11507, issued in Moscow on 28 February 1953.

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STATE	x	ARMY	x	NAVY	x	AIR	x	FBI		AEC						

(Note: Washington Distribution Indicated By "X"; Field Distribution By "#".)

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NE		WH	x	SR/Sanford	x			ROME- 5842
SE		STD		BR/CE/Grad	x			

DSG WLG JAP ACB

C A B L E

201-132139

ROME 5842
IN 26718
22 May 53

Nikolai LEONOV and wife Valeria arrived in Rome on 9 May 53 from Moscow and took lodgings at Primrose Pensione until 13 May 53 when they departed for Genoa to proceed by sea to Mexico. LEONOV carries service ppt C 10724, issued in Moscow on 29 Oct 52. Wife carries service ppt. C-11507, issued in Moscow 28 Feb 53

Nikolai b. Riozan (prob. Ryazan) 22 Aug 1928. Valeria b. Moscow 28 Apr 1928.

SO-96339 22 Sept '52: One N. LEONOV, passport No. 09492 dtd 24 Apr'52 Visa No. 70, dtd 25 Apr'52, arrived in Peshawar from Kabul on 2 May'52. This individual is leader of Agriculture Delegation from Moscow on way to Karachi.(this info. taken from ROK-175 dtd 17 Jul'52 and was acquired in Karachi, Pakistan.) Purpose of this trip was to attend Asian Regional Conference on Epizootics which was held in Karachi 3 May'52.

14-00000

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

22 MAY 53

IN 28713

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP ROME

ACTION: WE 6

ROUTING

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RQM/DB, CR 2, WH 2, FI/RI 2

ROME 5842

TO: DIR   INFO: SMEXI   CITE: SROME

INTEL REDCAP CONTROL

1. FOLLOWING ARRIVED ROME FROM MOSCOW 9 MAY, TOOK LODGING PRIMEROSE PENSIONE UNTIL 13 MAY WHEN DEPARTED FOR GENOA TO ... BY SEA TO MEXICO:

A. NIKOLAI LEONOV, BORN RIOZAN (PROBABLY RYAZAN) 22 AUGUST 1928, COLLABORATOR SOVIET EMBASSY MEXICO CITY, SERVICE PASSPORT C 10724 ISSUED MOSCOW 29 OCT 52.

B. VALERIA LEONOVA, BORN MOSCOW 23 APRIL 28, WIFE OF ABOVE, SERVICE PASSPORT C 11577 ISSUED MOSCOW 23 FEB 53.

2. SOURCE: DEVIATOR, RECEIVED 19 MAY, 53. ... DATA NOT RECEIVED.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COPY

ABSTRACT

DATE

S E C R E T

COPY NO.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

201-132139

14-00000

SECRET

TARGET PERSONNEL

NAME: LEONOV .... Nikolai .... Sergeyevich ....
(Last) (First) (Patronymic)

ALIASES: Nickname - "Kolya" ....

TITLE: Collaborator at SovEmb, Mexico City

INCOME: ....

Height: .... Weight: ....

Eyes: .... Hair: ....

Complexion: ....

Special features: ....

....

Date of birth: 22 August 1928 ....

Birthplace: Ryazan ....

Religion: ....

Wife: Name: Valeria .... Ivanovna
(First) (Patron-

Birthplace: Moscow ....

Description: Date of Birth: 28 Apr 1923 .... Weight: .... Height: ....

Eyes: .... Hair: .... Complexion: ....

Special features: ....

Comments: Service Passport C 11507, issued Moscow 28 Feb 1953

Religion: ....

Children: Name: None known. None in Mexico Age: .... Residence: ....

Name: .... Age: .... Residence: ....

Name: .... Age: .... Residence: ....

Documentation:

Nikolai LEONOV - Service Passport C 10724, issued in Moscow 29 Oct 1952.

201-132139

14-00000



14-00000

a/ Nombre completo: Leonov Nicolai Sergeevich

b/ Fecha y lugar de nacimiento: 22 de agosto de 1918, URSS

c/ D i r e c c i ó n: Tacubaya 204, México D.F. [illegible]

d/ Ocupación: Empleado de la Embajada de la URSS en México

e/ Color de pelo y ojos: rubio; azules

f/ Señas particulares: no tiene

g/ E s t a t u r a: 179 cm

h/ Nombre completo y direccion del pariente más cercano en la URSS: no tiene

i/ Motivo y periódo de su estencia en los EE.UU.: desde el 19 de octubre de 1958 hasta el [illegible] de octubre de 1958. en viaje de tránsito.

Fecha y lugar de su llegada en los EE.UU.: El 18 de octubre de 1958 en Laredo (Tex)

Manera de viajar: por ferrocarril

Fecha y lugar de su salida de los EE.UU.: El 24 de octubre de 1958 de Nueva York

Manera de viajar: por barco - Queen Elizabeth

Dirección durante su estancia en los EE.UU.: Park Avenue, [illegible]

[signature]



14-00000



Attachment to HMMA-5438, 10 Oct 56.

14-00000

a/ Nombre completo: Leonora Valeria Juanona

b/ Fecha y lugar de nacimiento: 30 de abril de 1928, URSS

c/ Dirección: Tacubaya [illegible] México D.F. [illegible]

d/ Ocupación: ama de casa

e/ Color de pelo y ojos: rubio; azules

f/ Señas particulares: no tiene

g/ Estatura: 158 cm.

h/ Nombre completo y dirección del pariente más cercano en la URSS: no tiene

i/ Motivo y período de su estancia en los EE.UU.: [illegible] hasta el [illegible] de octubre de 1956 en viaje de tránsito

Fecha y lugar de su llegada en los EE.UU.: el [illegible] de [illegible] de [illegible] en Laredo (Tex)

Manera de viajar: por ferrocarril

Fecha y lugar de su salida de los EE.UU.: el [illegible] de [illegible] de [illegible] de Nueva York

Manera de viajar: por barco

Dirección durante su estancia en los EE.UU.: Park Avenue, 680

[signature]

14-00000


СЛУЖЕБНЫЙ ПАСПОРТ

14-00000


PASSEPORT DE SERVIC
Le porteur a le droit, pendant la durée de validité du présent passeport, de retourner en URSS par tout poste de contrôle frontalier.
LE PASSEPORT EST DELIVRE
LE PRESENT PASSEPORT EST VALABLE



14-00000



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

МИНИСТЕРСТВО
ИНОСТРАННЫХ ДЕЛ СССР

СЛУЖЕБНЫЙ ПАСПОРТ

С № 10721

Предъявитель сего гражданин Союза Советских Социалистических Республик
Леонов Николай Сергеевич
сотрудник Посольства СССР в Мексике
родившийся 22 VII 1928 г. в Рязанской обл.
отправляется в Мексику
в сопровождении

Леонова
Николая Сергеевича

ПАСПОРТ ВЫДАН
в городе Москве
29 сентября

НАСТОЯЩИЙ ПАСПОРТ ДЕЙСТВИТЕЛЕН
до 15

14-00000


MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES
ETRANGERES DE L'URSS
PASSEPORT DE SERVICE





Nikolay LEONOV

20 May 1955: Rodolfo NERVO called Subject and was told "We have found the books and material you requested (re Soviet foreign policy)." LEONOV said he would take the books to NERVO the next day. NERVO for many years active in the Mexican Diplomatic Service, at one time being Charge of the Mexican Legation in Warsaw, Poland. Now about 75 and inactive in Government, but does write articles for the newspaper Excelsior (HMMA 3736 5 Dec 55).

6 January 1956: The daughter of General Heriberto JARA spoke with Subject at the Soviet Embassy saying she had been told that he was the person who could inform her of when she should come by to pick up translations of the "clincial documents" relative to herself and her father. Subject said they were having some trouble getting the documents translated because of the medical terms, but said they should be ready in about five days (HMMA 4200).

1 February 1956: Subject called Velia Jara de NIETO, daughter of General JARA, and told her that the translations of her father's clinical history had been made from Russian into Spanish. Mrs. NIETO said she would visit the Embassy the next day and ask LEONOV for the materials (HMMA 4410).

24 February 1956: One Samuel RAMOS contacted Subject who acts as secretary to Soviet Ambassador, Mexico. RAMOS told LEONOV "We are not going to meet at my house this afternoon, but at SALGO's (which is at) Insurgentes 429-51 at the usual hour." Subject replied that he thought he could get to the meeting at 1900 hours and sent greetings "to the boys." RAMOS said "we have some books we want to order through LEONOV" (HMMA 4336).

2 March 1956: Samuel RAMOS left a message for Subject that "if he has time I hope he will come to my house today" (HMMA 4600).

7 March 1956: Samuel RAMOS called Embassy and asked for data on the possibility of staging an international chess match in Mexico. In this conversation it was indicated that RAMOS is in the academic line of work. He stated that ~~xx~~ he was "back in classes" and that meetings could no longer be held in his home. He told LEONOV that a tournament featuring a person named "POMMARD" would begin Monday (12 March) and invited Subject to see some of it. LEONOV said he would attend if he had time. RAMOS then asked when he could see LEONOV to give him a list of books "we want". LEONOV told him to come to the Embassy at any time, and RAMOS said he would come right away (HMMA 4600).

c. 27 June 1956: Subject's personal calling card found in address book of Fidel CASTRO Ruz, Cuban revolutionary detained in Mexico (MEXI 839 IN 35356 REF: MEXI 825 IN 34161).

22-29 July 1956: Subject served as translator for Eighth International Radiology Congress Soviet delegates (HMM 1752).

1 October 1956: Subject and wife requested U.S. transit visas to leave Mexico 17 Oct by rail, entering U.S. via Laredo; to depart New York 24 October on Queen Elizabeth (MEXI 231 IN 34833 6 Oct 56).

201-132139

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
201-132139
SEX M DOB 22 AUG 28

074-005-102
SX -05555/09
NO DATE

CIT USSR
OCC ?
KGB FIRST CHIEF DIRECTORATE LATIN AMERICAN
DEPT INPUT 2 NOV 67

711719

R 6803140507

FILE IN 201-132139

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

CARD 1

LEONOV, Nikolai Sergeevich ~~(PP-[illegible])~~ (EMPLOYEE)

Nickname: KOLYA

"Collaborator" = EMPLOYEE

Arrived in Mexico: 11 July 1953—Veracruz (met by BELYAKOV)

Departing by rail 18 Oct 56 for NY and then on Queen Elizabeth 24 Oct. 56

(FKG — ship manifest: Arrived 19 Jun 53 (11 July believed correct) aboard Andrea Gritti. LEONOV carrying ~~Dip~~ Sv PP #10724 issued Moscow 29 Jan 52. ~~PP # also differs from LIVESTOCK #136693 above)~~ SV VISA (USSR) # 136693

Residence: ~~[illegible]~~
cor Zitacuaro and Juanacatlan a/o 27nov53-Liquation — Juanacatlan 81
([illegible])

Wife: Valeriga Ivanovna

*address - 21 Feb 54 - 3221: Cuautla 161-9 [illegible]

Description: born 22 AUG 28, RYAZAN

Height: 170 cms Weight: Build: Hair: blond Eyes: blue

other:

Languages: Spanish good (Follicove jan54)
English (13372, 21 Sept. 56)
French (Visa section)

Skills: 6 Feb 54 — seen driving Black Packard (#65) - ess (he was driving up Gutenberg tow rd Melchor Ocampo - at 6:00 p.m. he was ne r that corner. a woman was in the back seat.

201-132139

14-00000

HKM-W-748, dated 1 July 1953: One N. LEONOV was leader of an Agriculture Delegation from Moscow to attend the Asian Regional Conference on Epizootics hels in Karachi on 3 May 52.

14-00000



201-132139

14-00000



ЛАЯ ВИЗА

14-00000



102139

201-132139

14-00000

14-00000

Leonard

201-132139

Nikolay Sergeyevich LEON[illegible]

201-132139

14-00000

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO: RI/ANALYSIS SECTION

DATE: 17 Oct 56

ACTION: [X] OPEN [ ] AMEND [ ] CLOSE

FROM: RI/AN/FAHY

ROOM NO.: 1509 K

TELEPHONE: 8265

INSTRUCTIONS: *Form must be typed or printed in block letters.*

SECTION I: *List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.*

SECTION II: *List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.*

SECTION III: *To be completed in all cases.*

SECTION I

[ ] SENSITIVE
[X] NON-SENSITIVE

201 NO. 1.: 201-132139

SOURCE DOCUMENT: HMMA 5438

NAME (Last) (Middle) (First) (Title) 3.: LEONOV, Nikolay Sergeyevich

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2.	(Last)	(Middle)	(First)	(Title)

PHOTO 4.: [X] YES [ ] NO

BIRTH DATE 5.: 22-8-29

COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6.: USSR

CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7.: —

OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8.: 1. 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION: SECRETARY TO AMBASSADOR - Soviet Embassy - Mexico

OCC/POS. CODE 9.:

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM:

PSEUDONYM:

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10.: MEXICO

ACTION DESK 11.: WH/3/M

2ND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.:

3RD COUNTRY INTEREST 12A.:

COMMENTS:

201- 132139

PERMANENT CHARGE: [ ] YES [ ] NO

RESTRICTED FILE: [ ] YES [ ] NO

SIGNATURE: Patricia Fahy

FORM NO. 831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
1 JUL 56

ELIMINATED

(38)

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET/KAPOK

PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM ____________

FIELD CASE OFFICER Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

STATION Mexico City

CHIEF OF STATION Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

FORWARDED BY SPLIT TRANSMISSION
NO FIELD DISSEMINATION.

CS COPY

SECRET/KAPOK

R. SIDE OF ATT. #1 to HMMA-26353

50-124-28/1

L SIDE OF ATT. #1 to HMMA-26353

PROJECT OUTLINE

1. Identification

Mexico City, Mexico. Support for singleton contract agent operating into right-wing political milieu in Mexico for intelligence purposes with some covert action by-product.

2. Objectives

a. Objective The objective of this project is to provide support for a U.S. contract agent who has access to a wide variety of right-wing political elements and organizations in Mexico.

b. Conduct of Project The contract agent, LIHUFF/1, was born in Mexico and has had a long history of business experience in Latin America, as well as, over the past fifteen years, in Mexico. At the present time, he is Executive Director of U.S. Chamber of Commerce of Mexico City, which gives him a great deal of mobility in both American and Mexican business circles. Generally, it is from the Mexican business community that the financing and support for right-wing political movements, organizations, and institutions eminate. Given the general trend of recent Mexican regimes, as well as the present one, toward more governmental regulation and manipulation of the economic life of the country, the Mexican businessmen continue to support right-wing political movements or ostensibly non-profit civic, research, and other types of organizations used by them as front instrumentalities for expounding their philosophy and taking action in the politico-economic fields. LIHUFF/1 has natural access through his present position and past extensive experience in the business community here. Over the years, as a matter of fact, his numerous associations with these elements have earned him their trust and respect. In addition, for the past four years he has funded Lic. Agustin NAVARRO Vasquez (was LIHUFF/2) organization, consisting primarily of Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales y Economicos, A.C. (IISE), "Espejo" (a magazine on politico-economic affairs), and Movimiento Universitario de Renovadora Orientacion (MURO, a student organization). Also, he has handled LICHANT/1 who has a history of, and numerous associations in, the Mexican right-wing political arena. These and many other contacts of this type will provide the basis for his reports on this particular segment of the political spectrum in Mexico.

c. Targets Right-wing political elements and organizations in Mexico. This would include not only Lic. NAVARRO, IISE, "Espejo," and MURO, but Hugo SALINAS Price, Jorge SIEGRIST Clamont and numerous others of political significance on the Mexican scene. In connection with LICHANT/1's present

position, it should be possible to obtain information on the Ministry of Education and other aspects of the Mexican education system which, according to the last word received from Headquarters, is somewhat of a priority requirement.

d. RMD. This project is responsive to Priority A3d and f of the Related Mission Directive for Station Mexico City (approved October 1963). This priority reads in part: "obtain information on the stability of the Government ... through high-level penetrations and through surveillances and controlled assets of other powerful political groups such as the Frente Civico... and through continued development and influencing of high-level government contacts." As an ancillary measure, the project could contribute to MHSPAWN objectives of the RMD under certain circumstances where use of right-wing platforms and organizations is merited.

3. Background.

a. Developments Leading up to Project.

(1) Mexico, politically, is a country in which, increasingly, a centrist political concensus is developing based on the impact of education and economic development. On either side though of this growing central political spectrum are extreme left and extreme right wings which are quite active and quite vocal and which have an influence in the form of individuals, organizations, and movements greatly out of proportion to their numbers. Political disturbances and efforts to induce lack of stability eminate in the main from these two extreme wings. As the centrist force grows slowly, it is possible and probable that these two wings will intensify their efforts and become more and more radical. The Station has intelligence coverage of the extreme left-wing, but has neglected the equally important extreme right-wing when, in the final analysis, any threat to Mexican political stability by fomenting unrest and incidents does, and will continue to, eminate from the right-wing as well as the left-wing. Assumin g that, as indicated in the present RMD, the long range national policy objectives of the U.S. toward Mexico are to encourage a stable democratic government and political environment, then coverage of the right-wing is required if for no other reason than meeting normal Station responsibilities for political reporting. HBFINCH contacts in this area have been, and probably will continue to be, virtually nil. In fact, at present in this area HBFINCH contacts are non-existent.

(2) LIHUFF/1 was first picked up as a contact by Station Mexico City in 1950 after having been a contract agent for Station Panama City for some three years (while engaged in business in Panama). He has been in a continuing

relationship of one degree or another with this Station ever since then. This relationship developed from "contact" into formal contract status in November 1962. LIHUFF/1 has handled Station contacts and activities with LIHUFF/2 as well as LICHANT/1 from 1962 to date. In addition, he has done a good deal of reporting on right-wing activities from other sources and other contacts of his. Subsidy of the LIHUFF activity for MHSPAWN purposes will be terminated effective 30 June 1965. Use of LICHANT/1 will be continued in an intelligence reporting capacity and, in a limited way, for covert action efforts.

b. Prior Negotiations. There have been no prior negotiations with the Mexican Government, intelligence or security services, or ODYOKE elements on this project. LIHUFF/1 has been used in the past, prior to his contract with KUBARK, as a source by ODIBEX and ODMARK.

c. Relationship to Other Projects. This project has no relationship to any other Station project.

d. Utilization of Same Operational Assets. LIHUFF/1 has not been utilized on any other project, past or present, except to the extent he was involved with the LIHUFF activity indicated in subparagraph 3a(2) above.

4. Operational Assets.

a. Personnel.

(1) LIHUFF/1 (OA granted on 10 October 1962 with no number forwarded to field) -- Subject was born in Mexico, is fluent in Spanish, and is about 49 years old. Since World War II, he has been in private business in Latin America, first in Panama and then in Mexico from 1950 on. During World War II, he was in Army intelligence in China and, therefore, had an understanding of covert operations prior to his KUBARK experience. While in Panama, he was employed by the Station there for several years " to organize a net directed against a target of high priority interest". This association was terminated by reason of his move to Mexico for business reasons. Although he was in contact with this Station virtually from his time of arrival in Mexico, he was not picked up as a contract agent until November 1962. His cover for his past and proposed activities has been natural: that of a businessman with a conservative political outlook and interested in the economic and political posture of the

Mexican Government. Contact with him is covered by a social relationship between his case officer and himself; this is easily maintained given the large American community in Mexico City. He has had no formal intelligence training other than that he received from the Army during World War II and on the job with KUBARK. Control of Subject is no problem inasmuch as he is an American citizen and has had considerable experience with KUBARK by now. His motivation is that of an attraction to this type of work, being a U.S. citizen in a foreign area, natural concern forhis business interests, and, probably, the compensatory return from KUBARK. He is witting of his KUBARK association and, aside from his World War II intelligence experience with ODIBEX, in 1961 he had an intelligence relationship with ODIBEX which has long since been terminated.

(2) LICHANT/1. (OA granted on 22 April 1963, but no number forwarded to field) -- Subject is a very conservative Mexican educator and intellectual about 49 years of age. He has alternated between working in various capacities for the Government of Mexico and in Mexican universities. At the present time, he is Private Secy. in Min.of Ed., a position which gives him unique access in the government to the general fields of education and politics as well as considerable contact with other influential people in right-wing circles. He was recruited by LIHUFF/1 in August 1962 on the pretext of doing research work and collecting information for LIHUFF/1's general use for business purposes. Subject has natural cover for obtaining information on right-wing activities from others due to his long association with right-wing activities as a student, educator, and government servant. Contact between Subject and LIHUFF/1 is maintained under the guise of private business relationship. Subject has had no intelligence training from KUBARK other than that imparted by LIHUFF/1 in discussing his reports. There has been no problems in control since essentially Subject understands that this is a business relationship with certain requirements involved for it to be sustained. Subject's motivation is that of an intellectually-convinced conservative who has common objectives and outlook with LIHUFF/1 on political and economic matters plus the financial aspect of the LIHUFF/1 relationship. Subject is not witting of KUBARK or ODYOKE interest in his activities and reporting. He has no known contacts with other intelligence or security services, past or present.

b. Mechanisms. There will be no mechanisms involved in this project although LIHUFF/1 will continue to have access to Lic. NAVARRO, and, in turn, to IISE, "Espejo," and MURO for intelligence purposes.

5. Security Evaluation.

In the unlikely event of compromise, LIHUFF/1 could continue to claim that he was not doing anything that hundreds of other businessmen, U.S. and Mexican, aren't doing as commonly-accepted practice: trying to influence the politico-economic climate in Mexico for their own benefit. Whatever the extent of the compromise, there would be no repercussion insofar as other operations or activities *per se* were concerned except that there might be some tightening of the general operational climate for a while. If, somehow, LIHUFF/1's true role were disclosed, he could probably be backstopped with a minimum of publicity through high-level Station contacts with the Government (explaining the Station interest in right-wing circles as attempting to follow what they were up to in case they became a threat to the stability of the present government).

6. Coordination.

No coordination is desirable or required with other ODYOKE or PBPRIME elements, with the Mexican government, or with other governments and intelligence services. It is assumed that normal coordination with various elements within KUBARK Headquarters will take place.

7. Costs.

a. General. It is requested that this project be authorized in the amount of $9,000 per annum effective 1 July 1965.

b. Breakdown of Costs (per annum).

(1)	LIHUFF/1 salary	$3,600.00
(2)	Operational Expenses	3,000.00
(3)	Entertainment and Travel	2,400.00
	Total per annum	$9,000.00

No non-KUBARK funds will be involved in this activity.

c. Foreign Currency. It is anticipated that any forseeable foreign currency requirements will be within the Station's capacity to handle.

d. Commitments. No commitments have been made to LIHUFF/1 other than a salary of $300.00 per month with a thirty day's notice on termination.

e. Funding and Accountability. Since this project will only involve salary for the most part, no unusual requirements are deemed necessary for accountability. In the event that funds are passed for any type of special activity other than salary, normal standards of accountability will be used.

8. Annexes.

a. Administrative Plan or Fiscal Annex. Not applicable.

b. Communications. Not applicable.

c. Technical Support. Not applicable.

d. Logistics. Not applicable.

e. Intelligence. Not applicable.

9. Emergency Conditions.

If an official anti-USA atmosphere of sufficient intensity prevailed in Mexico, LIHUFF/1 very probably would not be able to maintain himself here, particularly if his employment continued in his present capacity. . This, however, is not seen as anything except a very remote contingency due to the Government of Mexico's dependence on the U.S. tourist trade. In a general war, it is probable that LIHUFF/1 would be able to continue in place without too much difficulty and would be willing to continue operating on current objectives or to undertake entirely new operations against new targets. Contact and communications should represent few problems in Mexico.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 33

ORIG: RHSnowdon:sdb
UNIT: SB/CI/KGB
EXT: 6991
DATE: 8 JULY 1966

SECRET

ROUTING: 1 CI, 2 CI, 5 EU, 6 WH

DISSEM BY 3 PER #

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SB 8 RID COPY

INFO: EUR 8, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2

SECRET

11 18 51 Z CITE DIRECTOR 18944

TO BRUSSELS THE HAGUE

REDBLOCK LCIMPROVE

1. NIKOLAY STEPANOVICH LEONOV, SECOND SECY XX (PRESS ATTACHE), SOVEMB MEXICO CITY ACCOMPANIED BY DAUGHTER IRINA WAS SCHEDULED DEPART MEXICO CITY 29 JUNE SABENA FLT 556 FOR BRUSSELS. LEONOV KGB OFFICER REPORTEDLY ON WAY MOSCOW FOR 20-DAY TDY. PLS CONFIRM ARRIVAL BRUSSELS AND DEPARTURE, PRESUMABLY NEXT AEROFLOT FLIGHT FOR MOSCOW.

2. SECOND REPORT THAT LEONOV PLANNED TAKE KLM FLT 684 FROM MEXICO CITY 29 JUNE FOR AMSTERDAM APPARENTLY IN ERROR BUT SHOULD BE CHECKED IF BRUSSELS CANNOT CONFIRM PARA ONE INFO. 3. MAY USE LIAISON.

END OF MESSAGE

C/SB/CI/K

C/SB/O/EU

SB/O/WH

C/E/BNL

E/BNL/B

DC/SB

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

201-133138

ORIG: RICHARDSON/as
HEITSMAN
UNIT: FE/CMO/CIDI
EXT: 5743/5645
DATE: 20 MAY 64

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING 1 2 3 4 5 6

TO: MEXICO CITY GUATEMALA CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: FE 8

INFO: WH 7, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, (ADDP), S1, S1/INT 2, VR

21 MAY 64 20 45z

DEFERRED

X ROUTINE

C-S 3492

TO MEXI INFO GUAT CITE DIR

LCHARVEST

File

22 MAY 1964 22829

REF: MEXI 9468 (IN 83286)*

1. SUBJ DESCRIBED FOR YEARS AS LEFTIST, BUT ANTI-COMMUNIST AND STRONGLY ANTI-AMERICAN. HQS WANTS DEVELOP INFO HIS CURRENT POLITICAL BELIEFS AND WHY SUBJ WANTED VISIT CHINA. HE OBVIOUSLY CONSIDERED MAN OF STATURE BY CHICOMS, COULD PROBABLY SWING NEW INVITATION TO VISIT CHINA. WE WANT EVALUATE ANSWERS PARA 2 AND 3 QUESTIONS TO DETERMINE HIS ABILITY PROVIDE INTEL, WITH VIEW TOWARD RECRUITING HIM FOR BRIEFED MISSION OR RESIDENCE IN CHINA. DO LINLUCK-1, LICOOKY-1 FEEL HE APPROACHABLE UNDER ANY GUISE? IF HE ASSESSED UNWILLING COOPERATE ODYOKE, SUGGEST CONSIDER FALSE FLAG RECRUITMENT.

2. CHICOMS MAY CONSIDER HIM COMMIE; IF SO HE MAY HAVE BEEN ASKED CARRY BACK MESSAGES, MONEY, OR PERFORM OTHER SERVICES IN MEXI. SUGGEST LINLUCK-1 OR LICOOKy-1 TRY QUERY HIM THESE POINTS. ALSO REPORT DATES TRIP, ITINERARY, INSTALLATIONS VISITED, INDOCTRINATION GIVEN, IF ANY, AND LECTURES SUBJECT GAVE.

3. AS OUTLINED PAGE 15, NEW PART IV/A CHINA HANDBOOK, DESIRE SUBSTANCE SUBJ'S CONVERSATIONS WITH ~~CHINESE LEADERS~~, DATES

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO GUAT INFO CITE DIR 22829

AND CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH HELD. PARTICULAR TOPICS OF INTEREST:

CHINA'S POSITION TOWARD UN ADMISSION AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE.

TRADE WITH AND RECOGNITION FROM LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES.

MORAL, FINANCIAL, LOGISTICAL, AND MILITARY SUPPORT FOR LATIN AMERICAN CP'S AND REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS--PARTICULARLY IN GUATEMALA.

REQUESTS FOR SUPPORT OF CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION ON VARIOUS ISSUES (INCLUDING NON-ALIGNED AND BANDUNG CONFERENCES) FROM LATIN AMERICAN PRESS, CP'S, GOVERNMENTS.

STATUS AND PLANS FOR ESTABLISHMENT AND EXPANSION NCNA AND TRADE OFFICES MEXICO.

END OF MESSAGE

*Requested rqmts for two Mexi Station assets use in eliciting info from exiled Guatemalan journalist on his recent trip China.

ADCFE(C) Andrew Rosen

C/WH/3

W Hood
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

WILLIAM E. COLBY
C/FE
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 9 NOV 61 414

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : GUATEMALA CITY

ACTION : WH 8 (WH TEMPO COPY SLOTTED AT 1500 9 NOV)

INFO : CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, BELL 5, S/C 2

ROUTING 1 2 3 4 5 6

NOV 9 1933Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 20212

PRITY MEXI INFO PRITY DIR ROUTINE CARA CITE GUAT 1824 CHATEMAN ACTING

REFS: A. GUAT 1822 (IN 19554)

(IN 19767)*

B. MEXI 9372 (NOT SENT CARA)

1. FURTHER INVESTIGATION SHOWS AMUPAS-1 TRIED LAND GUAT 3 NOV. WHEN DENIED ENTRY DUE LACK TOURIST CARD, CREATED SCENE, TRIED PURCHASE CARD, DELAYED PLANE DEPARTURE SEVERAL MINUTES.

2. A-1 RETURNED GUAT 7 NOV. SUITCASE SEIZED PER REF A PARA 1. A-1 STAYED HOME OF RODRIGO ASTURIAS AMADO, 12 AVENIDA AT 9 CALLE, NO. 12-12, ZONE 1. WAS ARRESTED THERE 0803 8 NOV. BY AGENTS OF GUARDIA JUDICIAL. STATION INFORMED A-1 CARRYING TWO U.S. PASSPORTS, NO. 273334 ISSUED 21 SEPT 1948 AND NO. 12494 ISSUED 28 SEPT 1953, AND THAT A-1 TO BE EXPELLED FROM GUAT 8 NOV ON CHARGE TRANSPORTING COMMIE PROPAGANDA.

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

IN 20212 GUAT 1824

3. CONSUL ADVISED BY IMMIGRATION 9 NOV THAT A-1 WAS TAKEN BY ROAD TO MEXI BORDER 8 NOV AND PUT ACROSS IN VICINITY TAPACHULA. THIS CONFIRMED TO STATION BY COLONEL MONZON OF ESTADO MAYOR.

4. ARREST AND EXPULSION GIVEN PROMINENT PRESS PLAY HERE AND AP STRINGER FILING STORY TO STATES.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *AMUPAS 1 ARRIVED MEXI 3 NOV. DECIDED CONTINUE MEXI AND NOT PRESS ATTEMPT STOP GUAT.

SECRET

Copy No.

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: ALVAREZ, Ramon Joseph
201-0119523 Vol III

INCLUSIVE DATES: 21 Feb 1966 - 3 May 1978

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: CI/EXO

ROOM: 3D57

DELETIONS, IF ANY: None

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
			NOT REVIEWED BY HSCA

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

THIS AGENT IS ACTIVE UNDER PROJECT LIEMPTY

HDM/94 — LIPSTICK - 20 (201-119523) — C-32743 — Ramon Joseph ALVAREZ DuRant

RI ck - 27 June 55 (NP11 5 July 55) — Part I - HMMA-3165

GL# 54229 - 1 July 55 (NP11 21 July 55)

To write contract for subj - wait answer to HMMW 2395. answered by HMMA-3394, 4 Aug. 1955

Pseudo: Raymond H. GERENDE

Field advised of contract approval in DIR 44689(OUT-63196), 26 Jan 56 Amt: $3,600.
Copies of contract fwd'd to field in HMM-W-

Married to LIEMPTY-19

...ectly classified documents and CS documents without file numbers should be sent to IP/AN for proper processing.

2. Maintain the material in this dossier in chronological order.

3. To transfer the charge for this dossier to another component or individual, call IP/Files, extension 4362.

4. Contact your Division/Staff Records Management Officer if you have any questions concerning the maintenance or disposition of this dossier.

NOTE: This dossier may not be complete. A listing of all CS material processed for this file may be ordered via Form 3414 "Request for File Content List" or by calling IP/Files, extension 4127 or 5831.

FORM 2731 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

14-00000

08/29/

SECRET FRP: STAFF

IN 0650621

ACTION: LA-8 (444) INFO: FILE, VR, DDO-4, C/PCS, CA, CI-4, EPS/EG-2, IP/DMS, ODPD-D, PCS/DEF, (24/W)

78 0650621 PAGE 001 IN 0650621
TOR: 0318542 MAY 78 MEXI 44921

S E C R E T 0317457 MAY 78 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 44921

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL FJPASTIME

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 215553
B. MEXICO CITY 44819 0613976

1. STATION APPRECIATES RECEIVING REF A FILE SUMMARY ON RAYMOND H. GERENDE. STATION DOES NOT PLAN MAKE CONTACT NOR USE GERENDE OPERATIONALLY.

2. FILE: 201-119523. E2, IMPDET.

RECORD COPY

3 May 78

201-119523

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

/29/ SECRET FRP: , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: LA-8 INFO: FILE, VR, DDO-4, C/PCS, CA, CI-4, DDO/DD, EPS/EG-2, IP/DMS, ODPD-D, PCS/DEF, (25/P)

78 0645361 PAGE 001
TOT: 021957Z MAY 78 DIRECTOR 215553

S E C R E T
STAFF 021953Z DIRECTOR 215553
TO: MEXICO CITY.

WNINTEL FJPASTIME

REF: MEXICO CITY 44819 0613976

1. RAYMOND H. GERENDE, (IDENTITY A) WAS RECRUITED IN MARCH 1955 AS A MEMBER OF A STATION UNILATERAL SURVEILLANCE TEAM. GERENDE RECEIVED AN OPERATIONAL APPROVAL ON 28 FEB 55 AND ON 1 OCT 55 WAS CONVERTED TO CONTRACT STATUS WITH AN INITIAL ANNUAL SALARY OF $3600. BY LATE 1956 HE HAD BECOME THE P/A IN CHARGE OF THE SURVEILLANCE TEAM AND ADDITIONALLY WAS IN CHARGE OF PHOTO SURVEILLANCE OF THE SOVIET MISSION, INCLUDING PROCESSING THE FILM. AT THIS TIME HE WAS DESCRIBED AS BEING "CONSCIENTIOUS, LOYAL, HARDWORKING AND DEDICATED." IN 1957 HE WAS GIVEN FIVE WEEKS OF CLANDESTINE OPS TRAINING IN THE HQS AREA, BEING DESCRIBED BY HIS TRAINER AS MORE "PRO-AMERICAN THAN MEXICAN." IN LATE 1958 HE WAS DESCRIBED AS ONE OF THE STATION'S "MOST VALUABLE ASSETS", ETC.

2. ON 12 DEC 58 GERENDE MARRIED LIEMPTY-19 (IDENTITY B), WHO ASSISTED HIM DURING THE NEXT TEN YEARS AS A PART-TIME SUPPORT ASSET. IN GENERAL GERENDE APPEARS TO HAVE PERFORMED A CREDITABLE JOB AS THE P/A FOR THE KDFACTOR ACTIVITY, WHICH PROVIDED SURVEILLANCE AND PHOTO COVERAGE OF THE SOVIET TARGET. AT THE TIME OF TERMINATION, HIS CONTRACT AGENT SALARY HAD INCREASED TO $7000 PER ANNUM. SIGNIFICANTLY EXCEPT FOR GIVING ENGLISH LESSONS AND OTHER MINOR COVER ACTIVITIES, GERENDE WAS CONSIDERED TO BE A FULL-TIME RTACTION EMPLOYEE. HE PERFORMED A NUMBER OF TASKS IN ADDITION TO KDFACTOR, INCLUDING SERVING AS LP KEEPER AND TRANSCRIBER/TRANSLATOR OF AN AUDIO OPERATION, INVOLVEMENT IN OPS AGAINST THE CUBAN MISSION AND CUBAN EXILE GROUPS, GENERAL OPS SUPPORT, AND SPOTTING AND ASSESSMENT. ON 8 OCT 1963, GERENDE SUCCESSFULLY PASSED AN SGSWIRL, ALTHOUGH IT EMERGED THAT HE HAD NOT ACCOUNTED FOR ALL FUNDS PASSED TO HIM (THE STATION DISMISSED THIS PROBLEM) AND FELT THAT HE WAS BEING UNDEREMPLOYED BY RTACTION. CONCERNING THE LATTER CHARGE, THE STATION SEEMS TO HAVE HAD PROBLEMS THROUGHOUT THE 1960'S KEEPING GERENDE FULLY OCCUPIED, SINCE FOR SECURITY REASONS THERE WAS RELUCTANCE TO INTRODUCE HIM TO ANY MORE OPERATIONS THAN THE CONSIDERABLE NUMBER HE WAS ALREADY AWARE OF. (FYI: IN ADDITION TO HIS WIFE, GERENDE'S MOTHER, 201-0262488, AND TWO BROTHER-IN-LAWS (KDFACTOR-1) AND (KDADAGE-14) WERE ALSO STATION ASSETS.

RECORD COPY SECRET

02 May 78
201-119523

14-00000

SECRET

STAFF

78 0645361 PAGE 002
TOT: 021957Z MAY 78 DIRECTOR 215553

3. IN 1969 GERENDE SEPARATED FROM LIEMPTY-19 IN WHAT TURNED OUT TO BE THE BEGINNING OF AN EXTREMELY ACRIMONIOUS DIVORCE PROCEEDING AND FIGHT FOR THE CUSTODY OF THEIR THREE CHILDREN. IN DECEMBER 1969 GERENDE WAS PUT ON HALF PAY AND HAD HIS OPS DUTIES SUSPENDED BY THE STATION BECAUSE OF HIS FULL-TIME INVOLVEMENT IN LEGAL MATTERS SURROUNDING THE DIVORCE. ON 26 JUNE 1970 GERENDE AND LIEMPTY-19 SIGNED QUIT CLAIMS AND SECRECY AGREEMENTS. GERENDE WAS PAID $10,000 AND LIEMPTY-19 $2500 AS TERMINATION BONUSES, AND THE PAYMENTS WERE MADE ON A MONTHLY BASIS SO THAT THE STATION WOULD HAVE SOME CONTROL OVER THE TWO AND THEREBY KEEP THEIR RTACTION STATUS FROM EMERGING DURING THE DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS. ON 8 JULY 1970 LIEMPTY-19 UNEXPECTEDLY APPEARED AT HQS IN AN ATTEMPT TO GET A LARGER TERMINATION BONUS. SUBSEQUENTLY LIEMPTY-19 AND HER CHILDREN WENT TO RESIDE IN THE HAGUE, NETHERLANDS, WHERE SHE WAS PAID THE REST OF HER TERMINATION BONUS VIA MONTHLY CHECKS SENT TO HER BROTHER IN THE HQS AREA. SHE WAS LAST REPORTED TO BE WORKING AS A SECRETARY AT THE U.S. MISSION IN THE HAGUE.

4. ACCORDING TO MEXICO CITY 19452, 10 APRIL 72, THE LAST STATION CONTACT WITH GERENDE WAS IN MAY 1971, WHEN HE RECEIVED THE FINAL INSTALLMENT OF TERMINATION BONUS. CABLE NOTED THAT GERENDE APPEARED FINANCIALLY PRESSED, BUT WAS GIVING DAILY ENGLISH CLASSES AND RENTING HIS HOUSE TO STATION STAFFER JESSE R. GARDALPHE. THERE WAS NO INDICATION THAT EITHER GERENDE OR HIS WIFE HAD VIOLATED THEIR SECRECY AGREEMENTS. STATEMENT WAS MADE THAT HE NO LONGER APPEARED TO BE DRINKING EXCESSIVELY.

5. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT GERENDE'S AGENT SERVICE RECORD QUALIFIES RECOMENDATION FOR HIS REUSE BY SAYING THAT HE SHOULD HAVE SUFFICIENT OUTSIDE EMPLOYMENT INCOME TO OBVIATE THE NEED FOR FULL-TIME RTACTION EMPLOYMENT, AND HAVE RESOLVED HIS PERSONAL PROBLEMS. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT EXCEPT FOR A POSSIBLE ROLE IN SERVICING SPECIFIC OPS SUPPORT TASKS, GERENDE OFFERS LITTLE POTENTIAL FOR THE STATION. SUGGEST THAT THE STATION MAY WISH TO DISCUSS GERENDE WITH THEODORE G. KINDOPP (P) UPON HIS ARRIVAL, SINCE GERENDE WAS HIS LANDLORD DURING PREVIOUS STAY IN MEXICO.

6. FILE: 201-119523. E2 IMPDET.>
ORIG: LAOMGSB (T-CHAMBERLAND); AUTH: AC/LA/MGSB (LEHMAN); REL: DC/LA/NR (DESMOND). CL BY 029163.<

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

/30/ SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: LA-8 INFO: FILE, VR, DDO-4, C/PCS, CA, CI-4, DDO/DO, EPS/EG-2, IP/DMS, ODPD-D, PCS/DEF, (25/P)

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78 0645456 PAGE 001
TOT: 022016Z MAY 78 DIRECTOR 215575

S E C R E T
STAFF 022016Z DIRECTOR 215575
TO: MEXICO CITY.

WNINTEL FJPASTIME

REF: DIRECTOR 215553

1. IDENTITY A - RAMON JOSEPH A L V A R E Z DURANT
DPOB: 7 DECEMBER 1933, NEW YORK CITY
GRADUATED FROM AMERICAN HIGH SCHOOL IN MEXICO CITY IN 1952; RECEIVED B.A. IN LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES FROM MEXICO CITY COLLEGE IN 1955.
RENOUNCED U.S. CITIZENSHIP IN 1952 TO PARTICIPATE ON MEXICAN OLYMPIC TEAM AND TO AVOID U.S. DRAFT. BILINGUAL IN SPANISH AND ENGLISH.

2. IDENTITY B - HESTER R O O S DE ALVAREZ
DPOB: 24 DECEMBER 1930, BANDUNG, INDONESIA, DUTCH CITIZEN.

3. FILE: 201-119523. E2 IMPDET.>
ORIG: LA/MGSB/M (CHAMBERLIN); AUTH: AC/LA/MGSB (LEHMAN); REL: DC/LA/NR (DESMOND). CL BY 029163.

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2 May 78

201-119523

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

14-00000

55/48/ SECRET FRP: STAFF

ACTION: LA-8 (149) INFO: FILE, VR, DDO-4, C/PCS, CA, CI-4, EPS/EG-2, IP/DMS, ODPD-D, PCS/DEF, (24/W)

78 0613988 PAGE 001 IN 0613988
TOR: 260154Z APR 78 MEXI 44820

S E C R E T 260025Z APR 78 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 44820

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL FJPASTIME Iden Cable to

REF: MEXICO CITY 44819 0613976

IDEN A: HARRY MAHONEY

IDEN B: RAYMOND H. GERENDE

E2 IMPDET.

889

26 APR 78

RECORD COPY

201-119523

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

14-00000

55/48/ SECRET FRP: , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: LA-8 (150) INFO: FILE, VR, DDO-4, C/PCS, CA, CI-4, EPS/EG-2, IP/DMS, ODPD-D, PCS/DEF, (24/W)

78 0613976 PAGE 001 IN 0613976
TOR: 260153Z APR 78 MEXI 44819

S E C R E T 260025Z APR 78 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 44819

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL FJPASTIME

1. ON 25 APRIL 1978 RAMON JOSEPH ALVAREZ DURANT (201-119523) WALKED INTO U.S. EMBASSY AND OFFERED HIS SERVICES TO RTACTION. HE WAS INTERVIEWED BY U.S. EMBASSY POLITICAL OFFICER (NOT STATION OFFICER) AND REPORTED THAT HE WAS RECRUITED BY IDEN A IN 1955 AT UNIVERSITY OF THE AMERICAS AND WORKED FOR RTACTION UNTIL 1969. HIS PSEUDO WAS IDEN B. AFTER READING ARTICLE IN 17 APRIL 1978 ISSUE OF TIME HE DECIDED TO OFFER HIS SERVICES TO RTACTION ONCE AGAIN. ALVAREZ IS CURRENTLY A PARTNER AT LOCAL RESTAURANT.

2. STATION FILE ON ALVAREZ WAS DESTROYED SHORTLY AFTER HIS TERMINATION IN 1970. INDEX CARD INDICATES THAT HE WAS RECOMMENDED FOR RE-USE. REQUEST HQS SUMMARY OF ALVAREZ 201 FILE AND HIS PREVIOUS DUTIES FOR RTACTION.

3. FILE: 201-119523. E2, IMPDET.

RECORD COPY

26 APR 78

201-119523

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECRET
(When Filled In)

4 Feb 75
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on ALVAREZ (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

- [ ] Should be closed. (If this category applies, affix Records Officer stamp.)
- [ ] Unwitting collaborator. OI Code A7. Explanation: ____
- [ ] Witting collaborator. OI Code A1.
- [ ] Potential witting collaborator; date opened: ____ OI Code A2.
- [X] Former witting collaborator (relationship terminated). OI Code A3.
- [ ] Potential witting collaborator never contacted. OI Code A4.
- [ ] Counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.
- [ ] All others. OI Code A6.

Signed Barry Gleason (name) Ops Officer (title) LA/M/F1 (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed NR (initials) 12 Feb 75 (date)

This document is a permanent part of this file. 201-119523

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECRET
(When Filled In)

E2 IMPDET CL BY 061475

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
When Filled In

SECRET

4 Feb 1975
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on ~~[illegible]~~ ALVAREZ (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ should be closed.

☐ witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ potential witting collaborator; date opened ________ OI Code A2.

☒ former witting collaborator (relationship terminated). OI Code A3.

☐ potential witting collaborator never contacted (security reasons, derogatory information). OI Code A4.

☐ counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☐ all others. OI Code A6.

Signed [signature] (name) IA (title) LA/M (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed NR (initials) 12 Feb 1975 (date)

This document is a permanent part of this file.

SECRET

201-119523

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054979

When Filled In
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ACTION UNIT WH8

FILE, VR IP/AN, CI, CI/OPS, FI

APR 10 11 05 PM '72

ACTION COPY

S E C R E T 102318Z APR 72 CITE MEXICO CITY 19452

DIRECTOR

KDFACTOR

10 Apr IN 582033

REF: DIRECTOR 252261

1. BRUCE H. FERNALD MET MONTHLY WITH RAYMOND H. GERENDE FROM JULY 1970 TO MAY 1971 TO PAY TEN INSTALLMENTS OF TERMINATION BONUS. LAST MEET WAS 4 MAY 1971. ALL IMPORTANT INFO ON PROBLEMS OF GERENDE AND WIFE (FORMERLY LIEMPTY-19) WAS REPORTED BY CABLE DURING THIS PERIOD, EXCEPT FOR NEWS THAT GERENDE VISITED HOLLAND DURING CHRISTMAS 1970 WHEN HAD AMICABLE VISIT WITH WIFE AND CHILDREN.

2. GERENDE IS OWNER OF HOUSE RENTED AUGUST 1970 BY STATION STAFFER JESSE R. GARDALPHE. HE STILL TEACHING ENGLISH TO EMPLOYEES OF TWO LOCAL FIRMS AND APPEARS FINANCIALLY PRESSED SINCE CLASS SCHEDULE REDUCED RECENTLY FROM SIX TO TWO HOURS PER DAY. STILL DRINKS, BUT APPARENTLY IN MODERATION. HAS INDICATED HE MIGHT VISIT WIFE IN HOLLAND THIS SUMMER. WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY TO INDICATE GERENDE HAS VIOLATED HIS SECRECY AGREEMENT OR PROBED INTO LNLUTE STATUS OF GARDALPHE.

201-119523

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

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4		8	

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

ACTION UNIT | INFO | FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 19452 S E C R E T

3. FILE: 50-6-74/3. GP-1.

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

ORIG: Julie Paulas
UNIT: WH/1/FI/CI
EXT: 4167
DATE: 6 APRIL 1972

MESSAGE FORM 13-1

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION BY: 29/36 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
X FILE IN CS FILE NO. 50-6-74/3

CONF: C/WH 8 INFO: FILE, VR, C/CPS, C1/OA, IP/AN

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 252261

TO MEXICO CITY

KDFACTOR

REF: A. HMMW-18,773, 23 DECEMBER 71
B. HMMA-41734, 10 MARCH 72

1. IN ORDER COMPLETE REF A KDFACTOR SECURITY REVIEW RE KNOWLEDGEABILITY OF TERMINATED AGENTS AND FAMILIES, STATION REQUESTED FURNISH BRIEF SUMMARY OF RAYMOND H. GERENDE'S ACTIVITIES FROM TERMINATION IN JUNE 1970 TO PRESENT. ABOVE INFO NEEDED PRIOR TO COB 11 APRIL, IN ORDER PROVIDE NEEDED DETAIL TO REF B.

2. FILE: 50-6-74/3.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Reference A requested an updated security review of KDFACTOR Operations and knowledgeability of terminated agents and families. Reference B is Station answer to Reference A. Reference B lacks detail regarding GERENDE, who handled KDFACTOR up to late 1970, present activities.

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

LAWRENCE C. LASER
AC/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ACTION UNIT WH 8 | FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR 6, CI/OPS, FI

ACTION NO. 295

S E C R E T 260926Z JAN 71 CITE THE HAGUE 9222 (HASU)

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

LIEMPTY

26 JAN 71 IN 251867

REF: DIRECTOR 104743

1. DCM, POLITCAL COUNSELOR AND ADMIN OFFICER ALL BRIEFED ON LIEMPTY/19 BACKGROUND PRIOR TO HER EMPLOYMENT. THIS SATISFIES STATION RESPONSIBILITIES TO EMBASSY AND SEE NO NEED RAISE MATTER WITH GPOUGHT AT THIS TIME.

2. FILE: 201-241621 AND 201-119523. GP-1.

S E C R E T

Gerende
B - 201-119523

CS COPY

SECRET

LIEMPTY/19
26 JAN 71
201-241621

14-00000

ORIG: FRED KRAVCOV:tr
UNIT: WH/1/FI/CI
EXT: 4167/1973
DATE: 22 Jan 71

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 17-1

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BY 35 PER

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 | FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR 6, CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 23 Jan 71 0 1 2 2 CITE DIRECTOR 0 4 7 4 3

TO THE HAGUE INFO MEXICO CITY

REF: A. THE HAGUE 9008*

B. ONHW 18507, 13 AUG 70 **

1. SUGGEST GPOUGHT BE BRIEFED ON LIEMPTY-19 PAST JKLANCE STATUS, STRESSING FACT SHE TERMINATED WITHOUT PREJUIDICE 30 JUNE 70, MARITAL PROBLEMS, AND THAT HQS MAINTAINING CORRESPONDENCE WITH HER VIA HER BROTHER FOR PURPOSE OF FORWARDING PAYMENTS DUE HER. NO OTHER CONTACT WITH HER EXPECTED OR DESIRED.

2. REF B. AND ATTACHMENTS CONTAIN SUMMARY LIEMPTY-19 CASE WHICH WOULD BE USEFUL IN BRIEFING.

3. FILE: 201-241621 AND 201-119523.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COMMENT: * LIEMPTY-19 assumed position as social secretary and receptionist to GPOUGHT.
**LIEMPTY-19 employment and termination data, Agency service record and quit claim.

C/WH/1
C/WH/FI
AC/E/BNL Wes Parker (in draft)

JOHN L. HART
CHIEF, EUR

WILLIAM V. BROE
CHIEF, WHD

201-119523

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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FORM 3020 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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ACTION UNIT WH 8 | INFO | FILE, VR DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, CS/RF, CI, CI/OPS, FI, RI/AN,

ACTION NO. 872 EUR 6

SECRET 211553Z JAN 71 CITE THE HAGUE 9208 21 JAN 71 249123

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

LIEMPTY

REF: DIRECTOR 103241*

* LIEMPTY/19 (1) wrote a letter to the Director dated 30 Nov. '70 reviewing her complaints against her ex-husband.

1. ON 1 JAN 71, LIEMPTY ASSUMED POSITION AS SOCIAL SECRETARY AND RECEPTIONIST TO GPOUGHT AND OCCUPIES DESK IN LNCUFF. SO FAR AS WE AWARE, SHE HAS GIVEN NO INDICATION HER PREVIOUS JKLANCE CONNECTION AND HAS DISPLAYED NO INTEREST JKLANCE PERSONNEL. WE SHOULD ASSUME, HOWEVER, THAT IN NORMAL COURSE OF EVENTS SHE WILL EVENTUALLY BECOME AWARE JKLANCE PERSONNEL, PARTICULARLY COS.

2. ON POSITIVE SIDE, THIS JOB PROBABLY SOLVES ANY PERSONAL FINANCIAL PROBLEMS SHE HAS HAD AND AT SAME TIME SHOULD INHIBIT HER FROM TAKING ANY ACTIONS AGAINST JKLANCE THAT WOULD PLACE HER JOB IN JEOPARDY.

3. FILE: 201-241621 AND 201-119523. GP-1

SECRET

K

GERENDE Liempty-I

SECRET

14-00000

74

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

FRED KRAVCOV:lml
WH/1/FI/CI
4167/1973
25 NOVEMBER 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 28 PER #

INDEX | NO INDEX | RETURN TO ____ BRANCH | FILE RID
FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WHS | FILE, VR. E/BNL, EUR6, CI, CI/OPS, FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

27 NOV 70 23 15Z

CITE DIRECTOR 090057

TO THE HAGUE INFO MEXICO CITY

LIEMPTY

REF: THE HAGUE 8743* (IN 212100)

1. CONCUR STATION SHOULD AVOID INVOLVEMENT WITH LIEMPTY/19. NO NEED INTERFERE WITH LIEMPTY/19 EMPLOYMENT PLANS.

2. HQS WILL CONTINUE HANDLING LIEMPTY/19 VIA IDENTITY D, DIR 057055 WHO IN TURN IS HANDLED BY WOBONE.

3. CURRENT READING WILL BE OBTAINED FROM IDENTITY D, DIR 057055.

4. FILE: 201-119523 AND 201-241621.

END OF MESSAGE

MICROFILMED
DEC 1 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

*WH Comment: LIEMPTY/19 visited LNCUFF at The Hague attempting to contact JKLANCE.

C/WH/1 John C. Murray

for C/WH/SEC R.B. Wright (in draft)

WH/NOC Ralph Hatrey (in draft)

E/BNL/N

AN | AB X | PS HR | RX 4 | DES | FI | WH/1

Liempty-1
27 NOV 70

JOHN L. HART
CHIEF, EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

B-201-241621

CS COPY
COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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WILLIAM V. BROE
CHIEF, WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

201-119523

 COPY NO.

14-00000

ORIG: HELLER:lml
UNIT: C/WH/1/FI/CI
EXT: 4167/1973
DATE: 13 NOVEMBER 1970

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION BY 30 PER

INDEX / NO INDEX / RETURN TO BRANCH / FILE RID / FILE IN CS FILE NO.

MICROFILMED NOV 30 1970 DOC. MICRO. SER.

CONF: WH8 INFO FILE, VR, ADDP/AN, EUR6, CI, CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

13 Nov 70 23 40z

CITE DIRECTOR 068827

TO MEXICO CITY INFO THE HAGUE

REF: MEXICO CITY 4801 (IN 204131)

1. GERENDE AND LIEMPTY/19 BOTH WERE TERMINATED MAINLY BECAUSE OF INSOLUBLE MARITAL DIFFICULTIES, AND JKLANCE HAS LESS WARRANT OR DESIRE THAN EVER TO INTERFERE IN ANY WAY. WE SPECIFICALLY DESIRE HOLD STATION INVOLVEMENT, EITHER MEXICO CITY OR THE HAGUE, TO ABSOLUTE MINIMUM, AND CERTAINLY DO NOT WISH INVOLVE DUTCH.

2. GERENDE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT HAVE ANY HAGUE STATION CONTACT FURNISHED. FILE SHOWS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT LIEMPTY/19 NOT SO COMPLETELY UNSTABLE THAT SHE WOULD CREATE SCANDAL. PRINCIPAL REASON WE INSISTED PAYING HER TERMINATION BONUS OVER PERIOD OF TIME WAS TO RETAIN SOME SEMBLANCE OF CONTROL IN SITUATION SUCH AS THIS. BOTH SHE AND GERENDE SIGNED TERMINATION AND SECRECY AGREEMENTS, AND WE INTEND TRY HOLD THEM BOTH TO THEIR COMMITMENTS.

3. RECOMMEND STATION AVOID GIVING ANY INDICATION OF TAKING SIDES. WHILE THESE MARITAL DIFFICULTIES DEPLORABLE, THEY ARE PURELY PERSONAL AFFAIR NOW AND BEST HANDLED BY THEIR RESPECTIVE ATTORNEYS. HQS SUGGESTS THAT HINT OF STRONG TONE TAKEN WITH GERENDE NOW MIGHT SAVE

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B201-241621 201-119523

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SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 026622

TO

PAGE 2

US EMBARRASSMENT LATER.

4. FILE: 201-119523 AND 201-241621.

END OF MESSAGE

E/BNL/N John Dixon - by phone

WH/Security [signature]

WH/FI/NOC [signature]

WILLIAM V. BROE
CHIEF, WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN C. MURRAY
CHIEF, WH/1

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FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR6, CI, CI/OPS, FI 2

ACTION NO. 559

S E C R E T 101925Z NOV 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 4301

DIRECTOR INFO THE HAGUE 10 Nov 70 IN 204131

REF: A. THE HAGUE 8217 (IN 137053) (Divorce)

B. HMMA 39384

1. 5 NOVEMBER RAYMOND H. GERENDE (P), HUSBAND OF LIEMPTY -19, TOLD US THAT 13 OCT COURT DECISION FOUND NO GROUNDS TO GRANT DIVORCE. THIS SHOCKED BOTH GERENDE AND ATTORNEY VIEW FACT LIEMPTY-19 FAILED APPEAR FOR 5 AND 3 AUGUST HEARINGS (WHICH NORMALLY SHOULD FORFEIT HER CASE BY DEFAULT) AND FACT SHE LEFT MEXICO ILLEGALLY WITH CHILDREN. GERENDE APPEALING DECISION WHICH MAY TAKE YEAR RESOLVE.

2. ON RECENT TRIP TO ARIZONA TO BROTHER OF LIEMPTY-19, GERENDE CONFIRMED HIS SUSPICION THAT WIFE IN NETHERLANDS (WHICH WE HAD AVOIDED TELLING HIM), AND PESUMABLY LEARNED HER ADDRESS. FROM DUTCH EMBASSY MEXICO, HE ALSO LEARNED THAT DUTCH MFA IN ALMOST WEEKLY TOUCH WITH EMBASSY ON LIEMPTY-19 BEHALF, ATTEMPTING HAVE EMBASSY PROCURE ATTORNEY FOR HER.

3. GERENDE DISTRAUGHT OVER COURT DECISION AND PROSPECT LENGTHY PROCEEDINGS BEFORE REGAINING CUSTODY OR EVEN SEEING CHILDREN. CLAIMS HE ABOUT DECIDED GO NETHERLANDS THIS MONTH TO

SI Ward | PS | EK 4 | WH/1

LIEmpty-1

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201-119523
10 Nov 70

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ACTION UNIT | INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 4801

MEET WIFE REGARDING CHILDREN AND, IF POSSIBLE, PRSUADE HER GIVE MARRIAGE ANOTHER TRY. THOUGH WE TRYING DISSUADE HIM FROM THIS COURSE, PROBABLY WTHOUT SUCCESS, HAVE ALSO URGED HE ADVISE IF AND WHEN HE PLANS GO FOR CONFRONTATION. SINCE HE MAY GO ON SPUR OF MOMENT WITHOUT ADVISING US, WE WISH ALERT THE HAGUE TO POSSIBILITY OF GERENDE'S UNANNOUNCED ARRIVAL WITH COINCIDENT SCREAMS BY LIEMPTY-19 AT LNCUFF, MEXICAN EMBASSY, DUTCH MFA OR ALL THREE. SHE UNSTABLE TO POINT OF CLAIMING IN PAST THAT GERENDE WANTS KILL HER.

4. DEFER TO HQS AND THE HAGUE ON BEST COURSE TO FOLLOW IF GERENDE MAKES TRIP. ONE POSSIBILITY IS GIVE HIM STAION CONTACT IN ORDER STAY ON TOP SITUATION AND AVOID UNPLEASANT SURPRISES.

5. FILE: 201-119523 AND 201-241621. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

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J.J. Barry:lml
C/WH/1/FI/CI
4167/1975
2 October 1970

SECRET

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30 OCT 70 00 15z

CITE DIRECTOR 074223

MEXICO CITY INFO THE HAGUE

RYBAT

REFS: A. THE HAGUE 8217 (IN 138093)

B. MEXICO CITY 3880 (IN 137738)

C. DIRECTOR 057054

D. DIRECTOR 057055

MICROFILMED
OCT 30 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. AT REQUEST OF HQS WOBONE REP CONTACTED IDEN D, OF REF D, AND REQUESTED HIS COOPERATION IN FORWARDING TERMINATION PAYMENT CHECKS TO LIEMPTY/19. IDEN D MOST COOPERATIVE AND ACCEPTED STERILE CHECK IN LIEMPTY/19 TRUE NAME FOR FORWARDING ON TO HER VIA INTERNATIONAL MAIL. FIRST CHECK FOR $750 FOR MONTHS JULY, AUG, SEPT PASSED AND FUTURE MONTHLY CHECKS, AT $250/MONTH, WILL BE MAILED TO IDEN D, FOR FORWARDING TO L/19.

2. HQS DOES NOT PLAN CORRESPOND DIRECTLY WITH LIEMPTY/19 ON ABOVE MATTER.

3. FYI THE HAGUE: HQS ASSUMES LIEMPTY/19 WILL NOT APPROACH LNCUFF ONCE CHECKS BEGIN ARRIVING.

Liempty-1 Gerende 201-119523

CONTINUED

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B201-241621

30 Oct. 1970

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CITE DIRECTOR 767223

PAGE 2

4. FILE: 201-119523 AND 201-241621.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Ref C advised The Hague and Mexico City that hqs attempting contact LIEMPTY/19 and pay her monthly termination bonus of $250/month for 10 months or total $2500.00. L/19 then resident in The Hague and corresponding with Hqs on matter. Ref C also noted Hqs would attempt use L/19 brother in Hqs area as cut out for funding, and Ref A &B concurred with this approach.

WH/NOC [signature]

WH/CONTRACTS [signature]

E/BNL/N W.H. Eckstein (draft) [initials]

[signature]
WILLIAM V. BROE
CHIEF, WHD

[signature]
JOHN C. MURRAY
CHIEF, WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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2 October 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. John F. Lally

SUBJECT : Forwarding of Agent Service Record on LIEMPTY/1 (201-119523)

Per the telephone conversation of 2 October 1970 between Mr. Lally and Mr. Lunsford regarding LIEMPTY/1, attached herewith is a copy of HMMA-39129 and a copy of LIEMPTY/1's Service Record for retention in your records.

John C. Murray
Chief, WH/1

Attachments:
1 - HMMA-39129
2 - Service Record

Distribution:
Orig. and 1 - Addressee
1 - 201-119523
1 - WH/1 Chrono

WH/1/CLunsford:lml/4167:1973/3E04

14-00000

22 September 1970

Mr. Maurits Roos
4744 Kenmore Avenue
Alexandria, Virginia

Dear Mr. Roos,

As you may be aware, your sister, Hestor Roos de Alvarez was associated with this Agency in Mexico City for a number of years, and due to personal problems with her husband, her services (and those of her husband) with this Agency were formally terminated on 26 June 1970. In the termination agreement, this Agency agreed to pay Mrs. Hestor Roos de Alvarez a bonus payment amounting to $2500 payable in ten monthly installments of $250 beginning 31 July 1970. Since Mrs. Roos departed Mexico City in July 1970 and came to the U.S., she could not be contacted in Mexico City to receive these payments. While in the U.S., Mrs. Roos de Alvarez contacted our Agency on 8 July 1970 and requested we pay her the funds here; and while her request was being considered she departed the U.S. for Mexico, and later went to The Hague where she is residing at Ary Schefferstratt 47, The Hague, Netherlands. Mrs. Roos de Alvarez has written to this Agency from the Hague requesting we forward the payments to her via international mail. If you concur, this Agency would perfer to forward these payments to you directly, and request that you forward them to your sister via the international mails. The initial check for $750 covers payments for the months of July, August, and September 1970; and hereafter, we will forward to you monthly a check (from October 1970 through April 1971) in the amount of $250 in your sister's name so that you can forward them on to her every month. We appreciate your cooperation in this matter and request that these payments not be discussed with anyone except your sister, Mrs. Hestor Roos de Alvarez, since the case is considered to be a sensitive matter by the United States Government.

file GENERAL
201

21 September 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Security/OSD

VIA : Chief, WH/Security

SUBJECT : Mr. Maurits ROOS

1. Mr. Maurits Roos is the brother of Hester Roos de Alvarez, an asset of Mexico City Station, who was terminated without predjudice on 26 June 1970. In the termination agreement, this Agency agreed to pay Mrs. Roos de Alvarez a bonus payment amounting to $2500 (USD) payable in ten monthly installments of $250 (USD) beginning 31 July 1970. Since termination, Mrs. Roos de Alvarez has departed Mexico City and is now resident at: Ary Schefferstraat 47, The Hague, Netherlands. Mrs. Roos de Alvarez has written directly to this Agency requesting that we forward the monthly payments directly to her or via her brother. For security reasons, this office has decided to obtain a cover check in the amount of $750 (USD) made out to Mrs. Hester Roos de Alvarez, to cover payments for July, August, and September (@ $250 (USD) per month); and it is requested that a representative of your office establish contact with Mr. Maurits Roos, her brother, brief him on the background of the case, and request he forward the check on to his sister in The Hague. A brief note for Mr. Roos to read is attached to this Memorandum and will explain how future monthly checks for his sister will be forwarded through him.

2. As the result of any inquiry to your office in August of 1969, the following information was developed on the Subject: Mr. Roos is presently a GS-13 research cryptographer at Ft. Belvoir, Virginia and has been employed by the U.S. Government since May 1952. Employment records further disclosed that Roos is a U.S. citizen, was born 2 January 1927 in Java and was granted a top secret clearance on 3 April 1970 by the U.S. Army. His local telephone number is 931-8132 and he resides at 4744 Kenmore Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia.

3. On 8 July 1970 Mrs. Roos de Alvarez appeared at the main gate of Headquarters building, and subsequently was interviewed by Mr. Paul Leverone, the Security Duty Officer; and a statement was taken from her. Mrs. Roos was given an Agency Security office telephone number for future contact while in the U.S., and on 13 July 1970, her brother, Mr. Maurits Roos, called the Agency and informed us that his sister had returned to Mexico and could be reached there at a certain address, so we are certain that Mr. Roos is aware of the fact that his sister was employed at one time by this Agency in Mexico City.

John C. Murray
Chief, WH/1

Attachment:
1 - As stated para. 2

Distribution:
Orig. and 1 - Addressee
1 - LIEMPTY/19
(1) - GERENDE, Raymond H. (P)
1 - WH/FI/NOC
1 - WH/1 Chrono

C/WH/1/FI/CI:JJBarry:lmr:4167/1973:3E04 (21 Sept. 70)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE: 7 August 1970 JM
TO: WH/1 J. Barry	C NO. 201-119523 C-32743
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /S/ John E. Howard	SUBJECT: LIEMPTY/1

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

	PRQ I		REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
	PRQ II		REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	FIELD TRACES		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
	RI TRACES		REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION		REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	GREEN LIST		OTHERS (See Remarks)

NOTICE: [ ] FIRST [ ] SECOND [ ] THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please forward Agent Service Record on Subject.
Form #1689 "Termination of Contract Personnel" of 4 August 1970 noted.

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION SECRET (20)

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457

SECRET 071110Z AUG 70 CITE THE HAGUE 8217 (GERNAND ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

REF: DIRECTOR 057054

11 AUG 70 130093

1. CONCUR HQS LATTER PROPOSAL REF.

2. IF LIEMPTY/19 NOW RESIDENT THE HAGUE AND UNHAPPY WITH JKLANCE TREATMENT ASSUME THAT SOONER OR LATER SHE WILL SHOW UP ON DOORSTEP LNCUFF. PLEASE POUCH ANY ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND, BIO AND PHOTOS, ETC. THAT MIGHT BE USEFUL SHOULD WE EVENTUALLY HAVE TO DEAL WITH HER HERE.

3. FILE 201-119523 AND 201-241621. GP-1.

SECRET

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201-119523 WH-1

7-20-70

B 201-241621
LI Empty-19

Ramon
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ACTION NO. 407

MEXI

SECRET 062054Z AUG 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 3880

DIRECTOR INFO THE HAGUE

RYBAT

REF: DIRECTOR 057054

1. CONCUR HQS LATTER PORPOSAL REF.

2. FILE 201-119523 AND 201-241621. GP-1

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6 Aug 70 IN 137738

TSD WH/1

CS COPY

GERENDE 6-Aug-70

SECRET

B201-241621

201-119523

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CITE DIRECTOR 057054

THE HAGUE INFO MEXICO CITY

RYBAT

1. THE FOLLOWING IS FWDED FOR YOUR INFO:

A. ON 26 JUNE MEXICO CITY STATION TERMINATED LIEMPTY-19, IDEN A. L-19 HAD BEEN UTILIZED INTERMITTENTLY SINCE 1958 AS A SUPPORT ASSET EMPLOYED UNDER MEMO OF ORAL COMMITMENT PRIMARILY IN SUPPORT OF ACTIVITIES OF IDEN B, HER HUSBAND. THE HUSBAND HAD BEEN A CONTRACT AGENT SINCE 1955 AND WAS ALSO TERMINATED ON 26 JUNE. L-19 WAS GIVEN A TERMINATION BONUS PAYMENT OF $2,500 PAYABLE IN TEN MONTHLY INSTALLMENTS.

B. L-19 AND HUSBAND HAVE HAD SERIOUS MARITAL PROBLEMS CULMINATING IN A SEPARATION IN NOV 69 AND DIVORCE ACTIONS WERE INITIATED BY BOTH PARTIES. THE DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS ARE STILL IN THE COURTS AND BITTER DISPUTES HAVE RESULTED BETWEEN BOTH PARTIES CONCERNING CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN, DIVISION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY AND MONETARY SETTLEMENTS.

C. ON 3 JULY L-19 APPEARED AT THE MAIN GATE OF JKLANCE HQS. SHE WAS INTERVIEWED BY WOBONE AND MADE THREE SEPARATE REQUESTS; TO BE RELEASED FROM THE STIPULATION OF HER SECRECY

CONTINUED....

B 201-241621 CS COPY

201-119523

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CONF: FILE, VR,

PAGE TWO

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SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 057054

AGREEMENT WHICH PROHIBITED HER FROM REVEALING HER OR HER HUSBAND'S AFFILIATION WITH JKLANCE, OR IF THIS COULD NOT BE DONE, SHE BE AWARDED A HIGHER AMOUNT OF SUPPORT FROM JKLANCE, OR FINALLY IF NEITHER OF THESE COULD BE DONE, SHE BE SENT THE MONEY DUE HER TO AN ADDRESS OF HER OWN CHOOSING.

D. L-19 DEPARTED WASHINGTON WITHOUT FURTHER CONTACT WITH JKLANCE AND MEXICO CITY STATION WAS UNABLE TO CONTACT HER.

2. ON 4 AUG HQS RECEIVED A LETTER FROM L-19 ADDRESSED TO JKLANCE ATTN: DUTY OFFICER, WOBONE. THE RETURN ADDRESS WAS SHOWN AS IDEN C. IN THE LETTER SHE ASKED IF THE PAYMENTS DUE HER COULD BE SENT TO IDEN C ADDRESS. SHE MENTIONED THAT THE FOREIGN OFFICE WAS QUITE AWARE OF HER SITUATION AND WAS OFFERING EVERY ASSISTANCE. SHE REQUESTED THAT HER WHEREABOUTS BE KEPT QUITE CONFIDENTIAL, ESPECIALLY THAT HER HUSBAND NOT BE TOLD. SHE ALSO ASKED THAT WE WITHHOLD PAYING HER HUSBAND HIS TERMINATION BONUS UNTIL HE HAD SETTLED HIS DEBTS WITH HER FAMILY.

3. WITH MEXICO CITY AND THE HAGUE CONCURRENCE, HQS PLANS ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT HER LETTER, TELL HER THE ONLY CONDITION THAT

CONTINUED

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 057054

TO

CAN BE MET IS TO FORWARD HER MONEY TO IDEN C ADDRESS AND REMIND HER THAT THE STIPULATIONS IN THE PAPERS SHE SIGNED ON 26 JUNE ARE STILL IN EFFECT. ALTERNATIVELY, HQS CAN REPLY TO L-19 AND FWD HER PAYMENTS TO IDEN D WHO ALREADY HAS BEEN USED AS AN INTERMEDIARY BY L-19. HQS PREFERS LATTER.

4. PLEASE ADVISE.

5. FILE: 201-119523; 201-241621.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/SECUL [signature]

C/EUR [signature]

WH/FI/NOC [signature]

William V. Broe [signature]
C/WHD

E/BNL/N. W.H. Eckstein(draft)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER [signature]

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EXT: 7375/9354
DATE: 5 Aug 1970

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CITE DIRECTOR

TO THE HAGUE INFO MEXICO CITY

057055

RYBAT

REF: DIR 057054

IDEN A - HESTER ROOS, BORN 24 DEC 30, BANDUNG, INDONESIA

IDEN B - RAMON JOSEPH ALVAREZ DURANT

IDEN C - ARY SCHEFFERSTRAAT 47, THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS

IDEN D - MAURITS ROOS, BROTHER AND NATURALIZED U.S. CITIZEN WHO EMPLOYED AT FORT BELVOIR, VA.

CS COPY

GERENDE

WH/SECUR

5-8-70

WH/PI/NOC

E/BNL/N W.H. Eckstein(draft)

C/EUR

William V. Broe
C/WHD

B201-241621

201-119523

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ACTION NO. 142

S E C R E T 041515Z AUG 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 3847 IN 135863

4AUG70

DIRECTOR

REDLEG

REF: MEXICO CITY 3839 (IN 135330)

1. ACCORDING FLIGHT MANIFEST, LIEMPTY-19, ACCOMPANIED BY HER THREE CHILDREN, DEPARTED MEXICO FOR SAN ANTONIO 30 JULY VIA AMERICAN FLIGHT 58.

2. FILE 201-119523 AND 201-241621. GP-1

S E C R E T

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ACTION UNIT C/WH8 | INFO FILE, VR D/OGC, DDP, ADDP, D/SECUR, C/CI

ACTION NO. 118 — EYES ONLY —

S E C R E T 030001Z AUG 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 3839

DIRECTOR

RYBAT

REF: DIRECTOR 051095

4 AUG 70 135330

1. FOLLOWING RECEIPT REF, BRUCE H. FERNALD ATTEMPTED CONTACT LIEMPTY-19 BY PHONE AT NETHERLANDS EMBASSY 16 JULY. WAS TOLD SHE NO LONGER THERE AND WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN. WHEN FERNALD ASKED IF IT POSSIBLE SEND LETTER TO HER VIA EMBASSY, WOMAN ON DUTY SAID NOT UNLESS L-19 HAD MADE PLANS FOR MAIL PICKUP, WHICH SHE NOT AWARE OF, AND THAT NO FORWARDING ADDRESS HAD BEEN LEFT.

2. ON 29 JULY, FERNALD WENT TO PREARRANGED SITE AT SPECIFIED HOUR, PREPARED TO PAY TERMINATION INSTALLMENT AND ADVISE L-19 REF TERMS. WAITED ONE HOUR BUT L-19 FAILED SHOW.

3. ON 31 JULY, FERNALD MET WITH GERENDE, PAID TERMINATION INSTALLMENT AND ASKED WHY L-19 HAD FAILED COME TO HER MEETING. GERENDE WAS DESPONDENT, REPLIED THAT L-19 APPARENTLY LEFT COUNTRY WITH CHILDREN AND OFFERED FOLLOWING DETAILS:

A. L-19 FAILED COME TO 1 JULY MEETING WITH GERENDE FOR BIRTHDAY CELEBRATION OF ELDEST CHILD. SINCE PLANS HAS ALSO

GERENDE

AC CWB

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ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 3839 S E C R E T

BEEN MADE FOR 4 JULY MEETING WITH CHILDREN, GERENDE ASSUMED L-19 HAD CHANGED MIND ABOUT 1 JULY BUT WOULD COME ON 4 JULY.

B. ON 4 JULY, BRITISH DIVORCEE FRIEND OF L-19 BROUGHT KEYS FOR GERENDE'S CAR TO GERENDE'S SISTER. STATED SHE FOUND KEYS AND INSTRUCTION FOR DELIVERY UNDER DOOR MAT. CLAIMED DID NOT KNOW WHEREABOUTS L-19 BUT APPARENTLY HAD GONE ON TRIP.

C. UPSET AT PROSPECT WIFE AND CHILDREN HAD SKIPPED, GERENDE SCOUTED NEIGHBORHOOD WHERE HE BELIEVED L-19 LIVING. QUERIED CHILDREN PLAYING IN STREETS AND LOCATED HOUSE WHICH OWNED BY BRITISH COUPLE. COUPLE ALLEGED THAT L-19 CHILDREN AND BELONGINGS GONE WHEN COUPLE RETURNED TO HOUSE 30 JUNE, DID NOT KNOW WHERE. GERENDE PAID SMALL AMOUNT BACK RENT BALANCE PLUS SMALL AMOUNT DAMAGES CLAIMED DONE BY CHILDREN.

D. GERENDE PAID CALL ON DUTCH AMBASSADOR 6 JULY AND WAS CORDIALLY RECEIVED. AMBASSADOR DID NOT KNOW WHEREABOUTS L-19 BUT BELIEVED HE HAD SEEN HER 2 JULY DRIVING IN AREA SOUTH OF CITY. AMBASSADOR FEARED SHE HAD GONE TO NETHERLANDS SINCE SHE HAD REPEATEDLY ASKED WHAT HER SITUATION WOULD BE IF SHE WENT. SAID HE HAD TRIED DISSUADE HER ON GROUNDS THAT SHE WOULD BE IN UNFAVORABLE POSITION RE MEXICAN LAW.

SECRET

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E. FRIEND OF GERENDE EMPLOYED AT LUFTHANSA TOLD GERENDE WIFE AND CHILDREN DEPARTED FOR NEW YORK 3 JULY. (UNKNOWN IF ABOARD LUFTHANSA OR THAT FRIEND HAD SEEN HER BOARDING SOME OTHER LINE'S PLANE.) CHECK OF ALL 3 JULY OUTGOING MANIFESTS NEGATIVE STATION NOW CHECKING ALL OUTGOING MANIFESTS FROM 29 JUNE THROUGHT 4 JULY.

4. GERENDE BELIEVES WIFE GONE FOR GOOD BUT THAT SITUATION WILL BE CLEARER 5 AUGUST WHEN BOTH GERENDE AND L-19 DUE FOR COURT HEARING. WHEN GERENDE'S ATTORNEY CONTACTED L-19'S ATTORNEY, WAS INFORMED HE NO LONGER REPRESENTS L-19. GERENDE'S ATTORNEY SPECULATES IT POSSIBLE L-19 HAS ALREADY OBTAINED CROOKED OR QUICKIE DIVORCE, BUT THIS PURE SPECULATION THUS FAR. WILL ADVISE RESULTS 5 AUGUST HEARING WHEN KNOWN AND RESULTS MANIFESTS CHECK IF POSITIVE.

5. FILE 201-119523 AND 201-241621. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

SECRET

17 July 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : Raymond H. GERENDE (P) and Wife.

1. Raymond H. GERENDE is a Mexican citizen and contract agent who has been employed by the Agency in Mexico City since 18 March 1955 under an MOC, during which time he has served this Agency well. During the past fifteen years GERENDE has been generally engaged in the area of operational support activities in Mexico City. For the past two years he served as a principal agent handler for a sensitive fixed surveillance project, LIEMPTY; was used in unilateral recruitment approaches against the Cuban target; and in special support investigations. Mrs. GERENDE, who is LIEMPTY/19, has been employed off and on since 1958 as a support asset, (transcriber/translator) under MOC, and during the past two years has worked intermittently transcribing unilateral telephone tap tapes.

2. During the past year GERENDE and his wife have had serious marital problems which culminated in a separation in November 1969, and divorce actions were initiated by both parties. The divorce proceedings are still in the courts, and bitter disputes have resulted between both parties concerning custody of the children, division of personal property, and the monetary settlements. The above problem is compounded by the fact that GERENDE's wife knows in some considerable detail of GERENDE's activities on behalf of the Agency and if she exposed him, it could lead to the surfacing of GERENDE's Agency employment and possible compromise of operations LIEMPTY, LIMESA, LIEMBRACE, and LIFEAT, as well as numerous individual Station assets such as LISTERINE, LIRAZOR/1, LIBAND/1, and David M. WILSTED (P). Since late 1969, Mexico City Station has been in touch with both GERENDE and his wife on this problem, and every effort has been made by the Station to have

SECRET

File: GERENDE (P)

both parties settle the divorce amicably and to protect GERENDE's cover and that of the projects. Because of the above family problems which threatened GERENDE's personal cover and security, he was relieved of all operational responsibilities and placed on half salary in December 1969.

3. In March of 1970, Mexico City Station decided that GERENDE's personal problems were not being resolved, and because of the continuing security threat, plans were made to terminate both GERENDE and his wife by the end of FY 1970. The LIEMPTY Project renewal, approved in May 1970, was amended to include a termination bonus for GERENDE of $10,000 for 15 years of service with the Agency, and in addition approval was received to pay Mrs. GERENDE the sum of $2,500 as a security measure designed to keep her from revealing her husband's Agency affiliation and what she knows about Agency operations in Mexico. This project approval carried the ADDP caveat that the termination bonuses to both GERENDE and his wife be paid on a monthly basis rather than in one lump sum as a security measure to assure at least an element of control over both individuals, since the continued receipt of these monthly payments depended on their loyalty to the Agency. GERENDE and his wife were terminated by Station representatives in Mexico on 26 June 1970 under standard Agency procedures, and separate Quit Claims and Secrecy Agreements were signed by both GERENDE and his wife. Neither GERENDE nor his wife had any objection to the wording of the Quit Claims or the Security agreements, and both appeared to be satisfied with the terms of the settlement, and with the fairness of the Agency's position.

4. On 8 July 1970 at 1115 hours, Mrs. GERENDE appeared at the main gate of the Headquarter's building, and requested to see an official from the Office of Security. During the subsequent interview, Mrs. GERENDE established her identity, and supplied the interviewer with details on her and her husband's past employment with the Agency in Mexico City and the fact that they had terminated said employment in late June 1970. Mrs. GERENDE made three specific requests of the Agency:

"A. That she be released from the stipulation in her secrecy agreement which prohibits her from revealing her or her husband's affiliation with the Agency, in order that she may substantiate her husband's salary to be awarded support payment from her husband.

"B. If her first request cannot be fullfilled, that she be awarded a higher amount of support from the NCE. Agency.

"C. If neither of the above two can be fullfilled, that she be sent the Agency check (in present amount) either at the address mentioned above or in care of the Embassy of the Netherlands in Mexico City, which is accepting mail for her."

In addition to the above, Mrs. GERENDE stated she feels she must permanently leave Mexico City because of threats made on her life by her husband, and that she cannot meet her AgencyEcontact in Mexico City as specified in her termination, to receive the monthly payments from him. Mrs. GERENDE has been given the phone number of the Agency Secur[illegible] Duty Officer and her local phone number and address, where she is temporarily residing, was obtained. She was advised she would be contacted within the near future with an answer to her requests.

5. Upon receipt of the above information, Mexico City Station was notified by cable of the situation and their comments were requested. The Station, on 10 July, recommended that Headquarters hold Mrs. GERENDE to her secrecy agreement, not grant her any increase beyond the amount agreed upon in her termination, and proposed that she be given her termination payment in one lump sum or that checks be mailed to her monthly.

6. Headquarters, in agreement with the Station's position on the case, attempted to telephone her without success on 13 July 1970. That same afternoon at 1400 hours, Mrs. GERENDE's brother, a naturalized U.S. citizen who resides in Alexandria, Virginia, and works at Fort Belvoir, called the Office of Security, using the number supplied to Mrs. GERENDE, and informed the security official that since Mrs. GERENDE had not received any response, she expects to hear from JKLANCE by letter in care of the Netherlands Embassy, Mexico City.

7. On 14 July 1970, Headquarters cabled Mexico City Station advising them of the above development, and requested they contact Mrs. GERENDE and inform her of the following Headquarters answers to her requests (as outlined in paragraph 4 above):

A. We cannot release her from her from her security agreement.

B. We cannot consider awarding her additional financail benefits beyond the amount stated in the termination agreement, which she accepted.

C. We are willing to forward checks to her by mail, but request an address other than the Netherlands Embassy.

8. Headquarters has also requested that Mexico City Station keep Headquarters advised of developments in the case of Mrs. GERENDE.

John C. Murray
Chief, WH/1

Distribution:
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WH/1/J.J.Barry:lmr/3E04/4167:1973 (17-7-70)

14-00000

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SECRET 14 23 53 Z JUL 70 CITE DIRECTOR 051035

TO MEXICO CITY

RYBAT

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 049889

B. MEXICO CITY 3649 (IN 120669)

1. ON 13 JULY 70, HQS ATTEMPTED CONTACT LIEMPTY/19 BY TELEPHONE WITHOUT SUCCESS. AT 1400 HRS 13 JUL 70 IDENTITY TELEPHONED THE WOBONE DUTY OFFICER, USING TELEPHONE NUMBER SUPPLIED TO LIEMPTY/19, AND INFORMED US THAT LIEMPTY/19 WOULD BE EXPECTING A REPLY TO HER SPECIFIC REQUESTS (SEE PARA 2, REF A) VIA LETTER CARE OF THE NETHERLANDS EMBASSY, MEXICO CITY, D.F.

2. REQUEST STATION CONTACT LIEMPTY/19 WITHOUT INVOLVING GERENDE AND INFORM HER HQS HAS CAREFULLY CONSIDERED HER REQUESTS OF PARA 2, REF A AND HAS FOLLOWING ANSWERS:

A. WE CANNOT RELEASE HER FROM HER SIGNED SECRECY AGREEMENT.

B. WE CANNOT CONSIDER AWARDING HER ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL BENEFITS BEYOND AMOUNT STATED IN TERMINATION AGREEMENT, WHICH SHE ACCEPTED.

GERENDE

CONTINUED-

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FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pic)

SECRET PAGE 2 CITE DIRECTOR 057095 / 057096

C. WE WILLING TO FORWARD CHECKS TO HER VIA MAIL, BUT REQUEST ADDRESS OTHER THAN NETHERLANDS EMBASSY.

3. REQUEST HQS BE KEPT ADVISED OF DEVELOPMENTS THIS CASE.

4. FILE: 201-119523, 201-241621

END OF MESSAGE

WH/FI/NOC Ralph Hatry (in draft)

OGC /TELECON Mr. John Greaney

WH/SO [signature]

C/WH/FI [signature]

WILLIAM V. BROE
CHIEF, WHD

JOHN C. MURRAY
CHIEF, WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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13 Jul 70

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SECRET 14 23 53 z Jul 70 CITE DIRECTOR 051097

MEXICO CITY

RYBAT

REF: DIRECTOR 051095

IDENTITY: MR. MAURITS ROOS, BROTHER AND NATURALIZED U.S. CITIZEN WHO EMPLOYED AT FORT BELVOIR, VA.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/FI/MCC

OGC /TELECON Mr. John Greaney/

WH/SO /MR. Greg Maruca/

WILLIAM V. BROZ
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

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ACTION NO. 054

— EYES ONLY —

PRECEDENCE

S E C R E T 101940Z JUL 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 3649

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

RYBAT 10 Jul IN 120669

REF: DIRECTOR 049889

1. IN STATION OPINION CONCERN EXPRESSED BY LIEMPTY-19 FOR WELFARE HERSELF AND CHILDREN PER PARA 3 REF IS PARTLY PARANOID AND PARTLY CONTINUATION ATTEMPTED BLACKMAIL OF JKLANCE FOR MONEY. HER POSITION HAS ALWAYS BEEN THAT (A) GERENDE WOULD LIKE TO KILL HER AND HAS EVEN TRIED TO DO SO, AND (B) GERENDE REFUSES PAY ANY MONEY TO SUPPORT HER AND CHILDREN. GERENDE DENIES MURDER THREATS EXCEPT AS RHETORICAL IN HEAT OF PAST ARGUMENTS PRIOR TO SPLIT, BUT ADMITS TO MINIMAL SUPPORT PAYMENTS ON GROUNDS AMOUNT OF SUPPORT MUST BE DECIDED BY COURTS. UNTIL THIS DONE HE REFUSES MAKE ANY COMMITMENT.

2. SINCE LIEMPTY-19 BLACKMAIL HAS ALREADY SUCCEEDED TO EXTENT 2,500 USD, DOUBT THAT ANYTHING BUT LARGE AND UNWARRANTED INCREASE WOULD HAVE DESIRED EFFECT. SUGGEST INSTEAD THAT EITHER SHE BE GIVEN PAYMENT IN ONE LUMP SUM OR PROCEDURE PROPOSED PARA 2 C REF BE FOLLOWED. BELIEVE SHE SHOULD BE WARNED ANY VIOLATION SECRECY AGREEMENT COULD RESULT IN CANCELLATION HER WOLADY VISA.

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ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 3649 S E C R E T

3. VICTOR BELLINI IS ALIAS USED BY BRUCE H. FERNALD, WHO HAD HANDLED GERENDE PRIOR TO SUSPENSION AND WAS INTRODUCED TO LIEMPTY-19 AT TERMINATION TO GIVE HER NON-TRUE NAME NON-LNPURE CONTACT FOR MONTHLY TERMINATION PAYMENTS. BILL MILLS IS LNPURE POLITICAL OFFICER WHO IN EARLY JUNE, WHILE HE WAS ACTING CHIEF OF POLITICAL SECTION, WAS APPROACHED BY LIEMPTY-19 WITH HER HARD LUCK STORY. (LIEMPTY-19 IS FRIEND OF MILLS' DUTCH WIFE AND WAS AT HIS HOME FOR BRIDGE.) LIEMPTY-19 APPARENTLY ASSUMED MILLS WAS JKLANCE CHIEF. MILLS (WHO CHARACTERIZED LIEMPTY-19 AS HIGHLY UNSTABLE) REPORTED APPROACH TO ACOS, WHO SAID HE HAD NEVER HEARD OF HER AND THAT HER STROY "SIMILAR TO MANY WE HEAR FROM UNSTABLE PEOPLE".

4. FILE: 201-241621; 201-119523. GP-1

S E C R E T

7

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UNIT: WH/1, 3E05
EXT: 4167, R1973
DATE: [illegible]

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Return to C/WH/1/81/21

TO PRIORITY MEXICO CITY

RYBAT

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 068632

B. MEXICO-2612 (IN 117477)

1. ON 3 JULY 1973 AT (11) HRS LIEMPTY/19 APPEARED AT JKLANCE HQS REQUESTING SEE A WODONE OFFICIAL. DURING INTERVIEW BY A WODONE OFFICER SHE SUPPLIED HIM WITH DETAILS HER EMPLOYMENT WITH JKLANCE MEXICO, AND RECENT HISTORY ON TERMINATION OF RAYMOND H. GERENDE AND HERSELF INCLUDING AMOUNT TERMINATION PAYMENTS.

2. LIEMPTY/19 MADE THREE SPECIFIC REQUESTS OF JKLANCE:

A. "THAT SHE BE RELEASED FROM STIPULATION IN HER TERMINATION SECRECY AGREEMENT WHICH PROHIBITS HER FROM REVEALING HER OR HUSBANDS AFFILIATION WITH JKLANCE, IN ORDER THAT SHE MAY SUBSTANTIATE HER HUSBAND'S "SALARY" IN ORDER TO BE AWARDED HIGHER SUPPORT PAYMENT IN CURRENT DIVORCE ACTION MEXICO.

B. IF ABOVE NOT POSSIBLE, "THAT SHE BE AWARDED A HIGHER AMOUNT OF SUPPORT FROM JKLANCE."

C. IF NEITHER ABOVE POSSIBLE, REQUESTED THAT JKLANCE FORWARD HER MONTHLY $250.00 CHECK TO EITHER A LOCAL ADDRESS WHERE SHE

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TO

STAYING OR C/O EMBASSY OF NETHERLANDS, MEXICO CITY, WHERE MAIL BEING ACCEPTED FOR HER.

3. LIEMPTY/19 STATES THAT "SHE CANNOT STAY MEXICO BECAUSE OF HUSBAND'S ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AGAINST WELFARE HERSELF AND CHILDREN." BY WAY OF REFERENCE SHE MENTIONED NAMES [illegible] PERSONNEL WHOM SHE KNOWS MEXICO: "VICTOR BELLINI," "BILL HILLS," AND TRUE NAME VINCENT P. RIZZUTO. PLEASE ADVISE TRUE IDENTITIES OF ALIAS NAMES ABOVE.

4. REQUEST STATION COMMENT ASAP ON SPECIFIC REQUESTS OUTLINED PARA 2 ABOVE, [illegible]

[illegible]

HEADQUARTERS WILL NOT CONTACT LIEMPTY/19 UNTIL STATION COMMENT RECEIVED. ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Reference A advised Mexico that LIEMPTY/19 in Washington area requesting contact with "senior representative" [illegible], and requested Mexico City Station comment. Reference B from Station advised termination of LIEMPTY/19 and GEREDE had taken place 26 June 1970 and all necessary termination agreements etc. signed. Advised Hqs. not to contact LIEMPTY/19.

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TO

WH/FI-DOC ________

OGC John Greaney

WH/SS ________

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN C. MURRAY
C/WH/1

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INCIDENT REPORT

FROM: BUILDING SECURITY BRANCH

DATE 8 July 1970

TIME 1330 Hours

NAME Hester Roos de Alverez GRADE N/A OFFICE N/A
Temp. 4744 Kenmore Avenue
Add. Alexandria, Virginia

INCIDENT Request for Assistance TIME 1115 PLACE Headquarters

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION: SUBJECT came to the Main entrance of the Headquarters building and asked the guard on duty to place her in touch with someone from the Office of Security. The undersigned responded to the Main entrance and escorted SUBJECT to the Main Reception area where she was interviewed. After displaying some reluctance to speak openly, SUBJECT related that she had been employed on a contract basis by the Agency at the Embassy in Mexico City. She gave in way of biographic data that she is the daughter of a former Dutch embassy official stationed in Washington, that she was employed at the Dutch embassy in Mexico City, and it was there that she met her presently estranged husband Ramon Alverez, who at the time of their meeting was employed also on a contract basis with the Agency. She stated that both she and her husband renounced their former citizenships to become citizens of Mexico. After her marriage to Alverez she gained employ with the Agency and stated that her specific duties included but were not restricted to the monitoring and translation of tapes. SUBJECT stated that her husband was terminated from Agency employment for Security reasons within the past year, and received at the time of his termination, six months salary and the promise of $1000.00 per month for 10 months. She stated that inasmuch as she is in the process of filing for divorce from her husband, and could not substantiate her husband's salary in a court of law because of the termination agreement she has signed, the Agency has agreed to and is paying her the sum of $250.00 per month which she is using to support her four children of whom she has been awarded custody. She stated that she is presently employed as a school teacher, but feels that she cannot provide ample support to her children on her salary and the allowance furnished by the Agency.

(Continued.....)

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

INCIDENT REPORT

FROM: BUILDING SECURITY BRANCH

DATE ____________

TIME ____________

NAME Alverez (Continued....) GRADE ____________ OFFICE ____________

INCIDENT ____________ TIME ____________ PLACE ____________

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION: SUBJECT made three specific requests of the Agency:
A) That she be released from the stipulation in her secrecy agreement which prohibits her from revealing her or her husband's affiliation with the Agency, in order that she may substantiate her husband's salary to be awarded support payment from her husband.
B) If her first request cannot be fullfilled, that she be awarded a higher amount of support from the Agency...
C) If neither of the above two can be fullfilled, that she be sent the Agency check (in present amount) either at the address mentioned above or in care of the embassy of The Netherlands in Mexico City, which is accepting mail for her. She stated she feels she must permanently leave Mexico City because of threats made on her life by her husband, and cannot meet Victor Bellini (allegedly Agency contact) at the specified restaurant location on a monthly basis to receive her check, as is the present requirement.

SUBJECT reiterated her statement that she cannot stay in Mexico City because of her husband's activities directed against the welfare of both herself and her children. By way of reference, SUBJECT mentioned the names of Victor Bellini, Bill Mills, and Don Vogel; all of whom are allegedly Agency personnel in Mexico City.

SUBJECT was advised that the undersigned could not make a decision on any of her requests but that a report of the interview would be made and forwarded to

ACTION TAKEN:

(Continued....)

CONFIDENTIAL

INCIDENT REPORT

FROM: BUILDING SECURITY BRANCH

DATE

TIME

NAME Alverez (Continued....) GRADE OFFICE

INCIDENT TIME PLACE

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION: the appropriate Agency officials. SUBJECT was given the phone number of the Security Duty Office and was requested to contact the undersigned later in the day when perhaps she could be given some concrete information. SUBJECT thanked the undersigned for the interview afforded her and departed the building stating that she would contact the OSDO later in the day. Responded to SR&CD and initiated an indices search which produced records of one covert source on each Mr. and Mrs. Alverez, and one covert reference file on Mr. Alverez. The Covert source files had been retired but will be forwarded to Mr. Kenneth Carroll at his request. Contacted and briefed Ed Duffy and Jack Poirier, PSD/OS, who referred the matter to Messrs. Kenneth Carroll, OS, and Greg Maruca, WH/SO, who requested and will be furnished with a copy of this report, and will initiate further checks within WH Division.

In the opinion of the undersigned, SUBJECT was completely coherent and sincere in her conversation, and seemed completely rational in her conversation and actions.

ACTION TAKEN: As stated above.

PAUL W. LEVERONE
REPORTING OFFICER

CHARLES B. GOOD JR.
CHIEF, BUILDING SECURITY BRANCH

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201-119523

FORM 1798

CONFIDENTIAL

7 July 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: GERENDE's Wife's Visit to Washington

1. On 6 July 1970, Mr. Walt Raymond of the CA Staff advised that GERENDE's wife was in Washington and had been in touch with him. Apparently Mr. Ramond and GERENDE's wife had been acquainted for some time in the past. Neither admits that Mr. Raymond is an Agency employee. GERENDE's wife advised that she wanted to get in touch with someone in Agency Headquarters. Mr. Raymond advised her he would contact his liaison people to see what could be done.

2. DIRECTOR 048632 was sent to the Station outlining this and requesting Station's advice as to whether a Headquarters representative should meet with GERENDE's wife. MEXICO CITY 3612 (IN 117477) outlined details of the termination of GERENDE and his wife and recommended against seeing her.

3. I discussed this matter briefly with Mr. John Green, Legal Counsel's Office, who felt even if Station should recommend seeing GERENDE and his wife, that it would be limited to WH Division representation. On 7 July I advised Mr. Raymond of the Station's answer as contained in MEXICO CITY 3612. He said he would contact GERENDE's wife approximately 8:30 of the evening of 7 July, and tell her that his liaison contact had been unable to find anyone who would see her. Mr. Raymond was uncertain as to what GERENDE's wife might do.

Charles M. Bounds

Charles M. Bounds
ADC/WH/1

14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	WH/SO		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks: PIR 03225 20 May 63

DIR 038379 GERENDE

" 048632

Office of General Counsel -
How long in Washington?
are children with you
What are your plans - temp hotel accomodations?
Travel -
DDP Dulles in room.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
C/BSB 1-E-20	

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

RELEASE AND SECRECY AGREEMENT

I, Hester ROOS de ALVAREZ, do hereby forever release the United States Government from any and all claims and demands of whatever nature which I or any member of my family has against the United States Government.

I agree to keep forever secret the fact of my confidential relationship, and that of other members of my family (specifically my husband, Ramon ALVAREZ Durant), with the United States Government. I also agree to keep forever secret my knowledge of all persons, methods, and equipment which I acquired in the course of my relationship (or that of my husband's) with the United States Government.

I understand that I am to receive a bonus payment amounting to $2,500 (USD) payable in ten monthly installments of $250 (USD) beginning 31 July 1970. I further understand that payment of this sum is contingent upon full compliance with this secrecy agreement, and that the United States Government shall be the sole judge of such compliance. Furthermore, I specifically renounce any claim to any similar bonus or other payment made to any other member of my family, including that made to my husband, Ramon ALVAREZ Durant.

This Release and Secrecy Agreement is effective as of the date it is signed. I acknowledge that I have read it and I fully understand its meaning.

26 June 1970
Date

[signature]
Hester ROOS de ALVAREZ

WITNESS:

26 June, 1970
Date

[signature]
Ramon ALVAREZ Durant

26 June 1970
Date

[signature]
Donald F. VOGEL

June 26, 1970
Date

[signature]
Victor E. BELLINI

S/C att #2 to HMMA-39130 CS COPY 201-341621

RELEASE AND SECRECY AGREEMENT

I, Ramon ALVAREZ Durant, do hereby forever release the United States Government from any and all claims and demands of whatever nature which I or any member of my family has against the United States Government.

I agree to keep forever secret the fact of my confidential relationship, and that of other members of my family, with the United States Government. I also agree to keep forever secret my knowledge of all persons, methods, and equipment which I acquired in the course of my relationship with the United States Government.

I understand that I am to receive a bonus payment amounting to $10,000 (USD) payable in ten monthly installments of $1,000 (USD) beginning 31 July 1970. I further understand that payment of this sum is contingent upon full compliance with this secrecy agreement, and that the United States Government shall be the sole judge of such compliance. Furthermore, I specifically renounce any claim to any similar bonus or other payment made to any other member of my family.

This Release and Secrecy Agreement is effective as of the date it is signed. I acknowledge that I have read it and I fully understand its meaning.

26 June 1970 Date	[signature] Ramon ALVAREZ Durant

WITNESS:

26 June 1970 Date	[signature] Hester ROOS de ALVAREZ
26 June 1970 Date	[signature] Donald F. VOGEL
June 26, 1970 Date	[signature] Victor E. BELLINI

S/C att. #2 to HHMA-39129

201-119523

S E C R E T

AGENT SERVICE RECORD

1. Agent Pseudonym: Raymond H. GERENDE

2. Project: LIEMPTY

3. Agent Recruited By: Matthew S. DINGLEY Date: 18 March 1955

4. Capacity in Which Agent Served: LIEMPTY Project principal agent, formerly member of surveillance team, also LIFEAT basehouse keeper.

5. Rate of Pay: $7,000.00 (USD) per annum

6. Other Commitments: Termination payment equal to one month's salary for each full year of service after 18 March 1955.

7. Agent Dismissed By: Vincent P. RIZZUTO Date: 30 June 1970

8. Reason for Dismissal: Subject became involved in a bitter divorce action with his wife (LIEMPTY-19). The protracted legal battle forced the Station to suspend GERENDE from operational activity for six months for security reasons. When it became evident that no early solution was in sight, termination had to be effected.

9. Security Remarks:

See attached sheet

10. Is the Agent Recommended for Reuse: Yes, assuming that his earlier service has not been exposed, that his marital problems have been resolved, and that he has sufficient outside employment income to obviate the need for full-time employment by JKLANCE.

11. Manner of Dismissal: Amicable. GERENDE expressed thanks for the generous settlement and swore to preserve security.

12. Letter of Termination Signed: Yes.

13. Cost of Termination: $10,000.00 (USD), payable in ten monthly installments.

14. Station Case Officer: Vincent P. RIZZUTO
(Signature in Pseudonym)

Acting
Chief of Station: Horace E. PRALLETT
(Signature in Pseudonym)

CS COPY

1/w att. #1 to HMMA-39129

201-119523

SECRET

Paragraph 9 of Agent Service Record:

Security Risks: GERENDE has known a number of Station officers in true name, although with the PCS departure of RIZZUTO the last of these will have left Mexico. (GERENDE's remaining contact will be Bruce H. FERNALD, whom he knows in alias.) GERENDE knows all agents currently associated with the LIEMPTY operation, as well as LIEMPTY-10 and -11, currently working with the LIEMBRACE team. He also knows LIEMBRACE-1, -2, and -4, and is, of course, aware of the objectives and methods of the LIEMPTY and LIEMBRACE operations. He knows that the Station has access to the entire LIMESA complex, although he does not know of the LIMUST operation. GERENDE knows the true names and JKLANCE status of Oliver G. SCANTLING, David N. WILSTED, and Raymond L. BARCENAS. He knows of the LIFEAT operation through his own former activities as well as those of his mother (LIFEUD-19) and his wife (LIEMPTY-19). The husbands of his two sisters work for the Station. One is LIEMPTY-4, who was handled by GERENDE, and the other is LIBAND-1, whose activity is not supposed to be known to GERENDE. In past years GERENDE was exposed to almost all phases of Station support activity. In recent years he has been more compartmented. GERENDE received five weeks of Headquarters covert training in 1957.

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES — ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

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C/WH E

BY: M AT: 0220z

DISSEM BY: 28 PER 123 (ED)

INDEX: [ ] YES [ ] NO

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X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

[ ] FILE RID [ ] RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT: C/WH 2

INFO: FILE, VR DDP, ADDP

ACTION NO. 7661

"EYES ONLY"

S E C R E T 060047Z JUL 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 3612 (PRALLETT ACTING)

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

ADC C/WH?

file Gerende 201

RYBAT

RPTS

7 JUL 70 17477

REF: DIRECTOR 048632

1. GERENDE AND WIFE TERMINATED IN JOINT CEREMONY 26 JUNE. TERMS OF TEMINATION PAYMENTS EXPLAINED TO EACH, AND EACH SIGNED QUIT CLAIMS (AND SIGNED THE OTHER'S AS WITNESS) WHICH SPECIFICALLY RENOUNCED ANY CLAIM TO TERMINATION PAYMENT MADE TO THE OTHER, OR TO ANY OTHER PAYMENT FROM WOLADY. EACH APPEARED SATISFIED WITH SETTLEMENT AND SIGNED WITHOUT PROTEST. DETAILS POUCHED 3 JULY IN HMMA-39129 AND 39130. GERENDE'S WIFE SAID NOTHING ABOUT TRIP TO WASHINGTON AND IN FACT THIS UNLIKELY AS SCHOOL SHE TEACHING AT STILL IN SESSION. ?

2. DIVORCE ACTION STILL BASICALLY AT IMPASSE DESCRIBED IN ATTACHMENTS TO HMMA-38700. IF GERENDE'S WIFE ACTUALLY DOES DESIRE CONTACT PER REF, IT PROBABLY TO SEEK MONEY RATHER THAN HELP OR ADVICE ON DIVORCE ACTION. VIEW ABOVE AND FACT THAT GERENDE'S WIFE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THERE WOULD BE NO FURTHER JKLANCE CONTACT EXCEPT FOR CASE OFFICER HANDLING MONTHLY TERMINATION PAYMENTS, AND THAT SHE ALSO UNDERSTANDS THAT ANY VIOLATION OF SECRECY AGREEMENT WOULD RESULT IN CANCELLATION HER TERMINATION PAYMENT, RECOMMEND

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: (6)

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: Charles M. Bounds
UNIT: ADC/WH/1
EXT: 7376/9354
DATE: 6 July 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY DDP/21 PER SOP -123 (EO)

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: C/WH 2 * INFO: FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP

— EYES ONLY —

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 06 20 02 Z JUL 70 CITE DIRECTOR 048632

TO PRIORITY MEXICO CITY

RYBAT

1. HAVE BEEN ADVISED BY FRIEND OF GERENDE'S WIFE THAT SHE IN WASHINGTON AREA AND DESIRES CONTACT WITH "SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE" JKLANCE. ASSUME THIS IN CONNECTION WITH PENDING DIVORCE ACTION.

2. PLEASE ADVISE BY 1200 WASHINGTON TIME 7 JULY STATUS DIVORCE ACTION BETWEEN GERENDE AND HIS WIFE. ALSO REQUEST STATION COMMENT ADVISABILITY HEADQUARTERS DISCUSSION WITH GERENDE'S WIFE AND LINE TO BE TAKEN IF STATION RECOMMENDS DISCUSSION.

3. FILE: 201-119523.

END OF MESSAGE

C ______
A DC ______
RPTS ______

file

* C/S COMMENT: SUGGEST ADDITIONAL DISSEM TO D/OGC.

WH/FI/NOC [signature]

WILLIAM V. BROE
CHIEF, WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN C. MURRAY
CHIEF, WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

COPY NO.

14-00000

ORIG: W.R. Hazen
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4167/1973
DATE: 28 May 70

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

INDEX / NO INDEX / RETURN TO ___ BRANCH / FILE RIO / FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 INFO: FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

S E C R E T 20 23 22 May 70 CITE DIRECTOR 033379

MEXICO CITY * DIR 032253 PROBABLY INTENDED

LIEMPTY

REF: DIRECTOR 03225*

1. LIEMPTY AMENDMENT APPROVED TO PAY MAXIMUM $10,000 TERMINATION BONUS FOR GERENDE AND $2,500 FOR LIEMPTY/19.

2. APPROVAL CARRIED CAVEAT THAT BONUSES BE PAID ON MONTHLY BASIS RATHER THAN IN ONE LUMP SUM. THIS ARRANGEMENT SHOULD GIVE YOU SOME CONTROL OVER FUTURE ACTIONS GERENDE AND LIEMPTY/19 BECAUSE THEY WILL KNOW THAT CONTINUED RECEIPT OF MONTHLY PAYMENTS DEPENDS ON THEIR CONTINUED LOYALTY TO JKLANCE.

3. FILE: 201-119523

END OF MESSAGE

*WH Comment: Ref informed field that Hqs would advise when LIEMPTY ammendment approved to pay GERENDE and wife termination bonuses.

AN / AB / IN / PS / RX / DES / NFD / FI / WH/1

WH/FI [signature]

WH/B&F THOMPSON/s/ (in draft)

WH/Contracts RENEHAN /s/ (in draft)

WILLIAM V. BROE
CHIEF, WHD

JOHN C. MURRAY
CHIEF, WH/1

201-119523

28 May 70

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CS COPY

S E C R E T

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

GERENDE LIEMPTY/1

COPY NO.

AC/WH/1/FI/RI
W.R. Hazen
WH/1
4167/1973
6 May 1970

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION: DEP PER #

INDEX | NO INDEX | RETURN TO ____ BRANCH | FILE RID
FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 | INFO | FILE, VR. PLAN LIEMPTY, BG CCS2

(classification) SECRET (date and time filed) 17 22 Z 08 MAY 70 CITE DIRECTOR

MEXICO CITY

LIEMPTY

032256

REF: MEXICO CITY 3069 (IN 072365)*

1. WE CURRENTLY PROCESSING PROJECT LIEMPTY AMENDMENT TO COVER COST GERENDE TERMINATION IN FY 70. HOWEVER, UNTIL THIS AMENDMENT APPROVED, WE UNABLE AUTHORIZE TERMINATION PAYMENTS REQUESTED REF. SUGGEST YOU PLAN TERMINATION FOR 30 JUNE 1970 INSTEAD OF 31 MAY 1970. WILL ADVISE AS SOON AS AMENDMENT IS APPROVED.

2. FILE: 201-119523.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH Comment: Ref. requests concurrence termination GERENDE effective 31 May 1970 and pay $10,000 termination bonus.

AN | AB | IN | RO | BK | DBS | RI | WH/1

WH/FI
WH/B&F
WH/Contracts

WILLIAM V. BROE
CHIEF, WHD

JOHN C. MURRAY
CHIEF, WH/1

201-119523
07 May 70

CS COPY

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

 GERENDE COPY NO.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 12

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X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

ACTION UNIT WH 8 INFO FILE, VR Bilan MPS/BG

ACTION NO. 227

S E C R E T 282205Z APR 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 3069 (MEXI)

DIRECTOR

LIEMPTY

28 APR IN 072365

REF HMMA-38700, PARA 11

1. ~~STATION~~ WISHES GIVE GERENDE TERMINATION NOTICE BY 30 APRIL, TO PERMIT SALARY CUTOFF BY 31 MAY.

2. REQUEST HQS CONCURRENCE AND APPROVAL TERMINATION BONUS AS PROPOSED REF.

3. FILE: ~~UPQAQGOIWEV~~ 201-119523 50-6-74/3. GP-1.

S E C R E T

AN	
~~AB~~	
~~IN~~	
~~PS~~	
~~BX~~	
~~DES~~	NPD
~~PI~~	
WH	1

EMPTY 4/1

GERENDE (P)

201-119523

28 apr 70

CS COPY

SECRET

DISPATCH

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: XX MARKED FOR INDEXING

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO: Chief, SB Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY Progress Report 1 November 1969 - 25 March 1970

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA-38119, 18 November 1969 PRIORITY

SUMMARY

1. The LIEMPTY Project has thus far survived the absence from duty of its principal agent, Raymond H. GERENDE, as well as the threat to the security of the Project represented by GERENDE's marital problems. Bruce H. FERNALD has been handling all Project personnel since early December 1969, when GERENDE was deactivated and placed on half-pay. No problems have resulted from this, other than a delay in the receipt of photos (FERNALD is unable to meet LIEMPTY personnel as frequently as GERENDE was). The security threat will remain as long as GERENDE's estranged wife has it within her power to expose GERENDE's RVROCK connection and the type of work he was engaged in. She has continually promised not to do this, and thus far she has kept her word.

2. The LIEMPTY product continues to be a valuable one for the Station. It continues to play an important CI role (particularly for LNERGO and LNREAD) but its greatest value, as far as the Station is concerned, is in the positive field. Two recent examples underline this: The early (and thus far only) debriefing of AEMIDRIFF was accomplished almost exclusively by showing her photos of all MEHARSH Embassy personnel and getting from her a character sketch on each individual. These photos were all obtained by LILYRIC and LICALLA. Secondly, LIEMPTY observations (as opposed to

Attachment:
Reports u/s/c

1cc w/ att to SB/...

Distbituion:
2 - C/WH w/att u/s/c
1 - C/SB w/att u/s/c

FILE: GERENDE

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-38700	25 March 1970
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-74/3

photos) played an important role in our total coverage of AESEASICK during the recent operational activity undertaken against AESEASICK. In short, LIEMPTY remains a highly effective and highly useful support asset, whose product is obtained in order to be used operationally, not simply collected for the files.

GERENDE

3. The GERENDE problem is unquestionably a serious one. We are forwarding under separate cover copies of several memoranda prepared by GERENDE. One outlines the history of his marital problems, another describes the current legal situation, and a third outlines proposals for a settlement. There is no hope of reconciliation. The Station's position with GERENDE from the start has been that he must agree to an amicable settlement with his wife in order to insure that she would not feel forced to take steps which would jeopardize the security of Station operations. For this reason, the Station insisted from the beginning that any financial settlement with his wife would have to take into account the fact that he was receiving a certain salary from RVROCK, and that he could not fairly keep this salary out of the settlement on the grounds that his wife could make no legal claim to that salary. GERENDE's wife was made aware of our position on this, and she was grateful, even though she realized that this arrangement was strictly informal. The Station felt that GERENDE could not be allowed to use his RVROCK salary as a weapon in the dispute with his wife, because if he did, she could hardly be expected to refrain from exposing his connections. Indeed, events have shown that GERENDE's wife is a vindictive woman, and if it had not been clear to her that she, as well as GERENDE, would lose money if he loses his job, she might have blown the whistle long ago. GERENDE, for his part, would have preferred to keep his RVROCK salary entirely out of the picture. Eventually, however, he agreed that the Station position was fair, and he said he would conform.

4. The attached memoranda from GERENDE are, in the Station's opinion, basically fair accounts. In the beginning, the Station was inclined to give GERENDE's wife (LIEMPTY-19) the benefit of the doubt, largely because her description of GERENDE's character weaknesses came as no surprise (particularly his tendency to procrastinate, even when his marriage was at stake). Early in the conflict, LIEMPTY-19 contacted RIZZUTO and asked point blank what she could tell her lawyer about GERENDE's salary. She was told she could not mention the RVROCK portion under any circumstances, and that if she told anyone that GERENDE had any connection with LNPURE, the connection would be denied and GERENDE would be terminated. She appeared to accept this gracefully, even though it meant she would have to scale her support demands down to the level of GERENDE's overt income (GERENDE's monthly salary from RVROCK was over 7,000 pesos; he earned an additional 4 to 5,000 pesos teaching English, and he has since rented their house, for which he is receiving slightly less than 7,000 pesos monthly). Subsequently, LIEMPTY-19 was told that the Station would see to it that as long as GERENDE continued to receive an RVROCK salary, he would give her the same proportion of this salary that the courts determined should be paid from his overt income. This, of course, was strictly an informal arrangement, one which would stop the minute GERENDE stopped receiving a salary. Later, as LIEMPTY-19's position hardened and her vindictiveness began to rule her actions, LIEMPTY-19 was reminded by the Station that the longer it took for an amicable solution to be reached, the greater was the chance that GERENDE would lose his job. If she persisted in having him arrested (which she succeeded in doing twice), his job would be jeopardized. While she continued to repeat sweetly that she had no intention of causing his termination, and had never breathed a word to a soul about his RVROCK affiliation, her attitude was in fact jeopardizing his job and if he lost his job, she and the children, as well as GERENDE, would lose income. Her attitude is

doubly disappointing in view of the fact that as she became more and more unreasonable, GERENDE was moving in the other direction.

5. The outcome can still not be predicted. As can be seen from GERENDE's memos, the two sides are still far apart on a number of points, including specifically money. LIEMPTY-19 insists on 10,000 pesos per month. GERENDE is willing to pay 5,000. GERENDE is currently on half-pay, which means that his total (all source) monthly income is around 14,000 pesos. From this, he would not only have to pay the amount which is finally agreed upon, he must also continue payments of 2500 pesos per month to LIEMPTY-19's father (paying off a loan obtained to build their house). The complicating factor is the uncertainly of GERENDE's future with RVROCK. The Station has maintained for some time that it is impossible to continue to pay GERENDE his full salary solely torun the LICALLA and LILYRIC basehouses. Now that FERNALD has absorbed this duty with only small inconvenience and some loss of timeliness, it makes even less sense to put GERENDE to work only to do this. GERENDE has long been aware of the Station's thinking in this regard, and prior to the current personal crisis he had been told that he would have to work harder at a greater variety of tasks in order to retain his position. As Headquarters is aware, he had been given additional tasks, and, as reported in reference, he had begun to respond very well. There has never been any question of GERENDE's ability. As we have previously stated, he is personable, intelligent, bilingual and binational, and has had good training and experience in certain fields. On the other hand, there has long been doubt about his seriousness of purpose, his initiative, and his ambition. The "reversal of roles" which he describes in one of the attached memos, which took place when he was confined to his home as an LP keeper, did more than cause domestic problems -- it apparently deprived him of the discipline of a daily job. His well-deserved reputation for being lazy was earned years ago.

6. The question which must be answered is whether or not to terminate GERENDE. He can be useful to the Station, but the Station has learned to get along without him. What are the security hazards involved? The general range of his knowledge is described in paragraph 5 of reference. If all of this were blown, the loss to the Station, particularly in terms of support operations against the MHHARSH target, would be considerable. The Station does not believe that GERENDE would deliberately expose any of this, but it is impossible to predict what LIEMPTY-19 might do, particularly since she would feel that she had nothing to lose, having already lost a possible source of income through the termination. GERENDE's termination bonus would probably be in the neighborhood of ten thousand dollars. Presumably LIEMPTY-19 is aware of the fact that he would get such a bonus, although the Station has never discussed this with her and the possible division of such a bonus between the two of them has never been mentioned.

LICALLA

7. The LICALLA basehouse continues to function without changes, except for the fact that Bruce H. FERNALD has been meeting LIEMPTY-9 since 9 December 1969. Brief meetings with LIEMPTY-9 are held once a week at pre-arranged times and places (well away from the MHHARSH area). Occasionally special meetings are called, by phone, by FERNALD, if special coverage is desired (as in the AESEASICK case, for example). There have been no problems, operational or personal, involving the basehouse or LIEMPTY-9 during the reporting period. LIEMPTY-9 provided 1,728 photographs during the reporting period, and in addition to his regular reporting on observed activities of MHHARSH personnel, he provided special coverage as requested. This "special coverage" consists of his observations of a selected individual -- who does he spend his time with, how is he behaving, when was he present (or absent), etc. LIEMPTY-9 spends over 40

hours a week just watching (and photographing) MHHARSH personnel, and over the years he has gotten to know them, and their habits, very well. He can spot unusual or atypical behavior, and when he is asked to put a certain individual under close scrutiny, his comments can be very useful. Newcomers, no matter what their cover, will frequently gravitate to their IS colleagues in the "safety" of the MHHARSH back yard, thereby enabling us to make tentative AEKICK or AEGRIP identifications. TDYers can often be linked up with their internal escort officers. In the case of specific targets, LICALLA special coverage can sometimes give clues to personal relationships which can be exploited. During the reporting period we had special coverage on AESEASICK (to determine any changes in pattern following the AEMIDRIFF defection and following the operation against him -- and in both cases LICALLA did report some change in pattern); 201-305870 (for much the same reason, although here the evidence was not as clear); AEPOLYP (to gather information on his patterns and his associations); AETAKEOFF (for the same reason); and 201-838166 (to find out if he did, in fact work in the "restricted area" and who his associates were, a requirement which was quickly satisfied). Also, LICALLA has been asked to report on the arrival and activities of TDYers such as the AEKICK security inspectors (he is not, of course, told that "security inspectors" are expected -- he is told of the expected arrival of visitors, and he can spot a visitor or newcomer immediately), the possible arrival of 201-314616 and, currently, to attempt to identify, at least by association, the person who went out to meet an LNREAD agent (subject of MEXICO CITY 2741, 17 March 1970). The value of LICALLA to the REDTOP program in Mexico City can scarcely be overstated.

LILYRIC

8. There have been no changes during the reporting period of the operation of the LILYRIC basehouse activity, except that Bruce H. FERNALD took over the handling of the LILYRIC personnel from GERENDE in early December. FERNALD normally meets only LIEMPTY-13, at pre-arranged sites and times (also well away from the MHHARSH area), once a week for pick-up of the films and reports. He occasionally meets LIEMPTY-14 (LIEMPTY-13's wife) when LIEMPTY-13 may be out of town. The LILYRIC coverage is a family enterprise with the work equally divided among LIEMPTY-13, -14, -26, and -27, who split up the hours of duty so that there is uninterrupted coverage Mondays through Fridays from 0800 to 1800 hours, and 0800 to 1500 hours Saturdays. (Extra-hour or week-end coverage may be requested as necessary, and the LILYRIC personnel responded to the Station request for such extra coverage during the AEMIDRIFF and AESEASICK cases.) The family has continued to provide reports during the reporting period on all activity centered on the front entrance of the MHHARSH Embassy. Such coverage included, as in the past, daily logs on the comings and goings of MHHARSH officials, up-to-date recording of MHHARSH license numbers, special activities and visitors (particularly Americans, of whom five were spotted and reported on during the reporting period), and some 3,500 photographs. As an example of the value of LILYRIC coverage, within one week of the change of license plates at the MHHARSH Embassy (a biannual change affecting all of Mexico, with new numbers bearing no relation to the old), LILYRIC had provided a complete list of the new numbers (along with the cars to which the plates are assigned). Among other things, this enabled the Station to identify AESEASICK's companions during his last few days in Mexico. Without LILYRIC, identification of the new license plates would have taken months and would have handicapped our operations. LILYRIC has also provided special coverage of the visit of a Latin American CP representative, and is currently watching for the two AEKICK security technicians, 201-314616, and the man who went to meet the LNREAD agent. Also, LILYRIC has reported on visits of Mexican students and the identity of the MHHARSH representatives who deal with them or hand out literature to them. In short, LILYRIC's services, even though the

MHHARSHers undoubtedly assume we have a LILYRIC-like facility, and act accordingly, are another vital element of the REDTOP program.

LIEMPTY-4

9. LIEMPTY-4 has continued to develop and to print all of the LICALLA and LILYRIC photographs. He has been met regularly by Bruce H. FERNALD (taking over for GERENDE) since 26 November 1969. The first few meetings at that time (late November and early December) were arranged by FERNALD by telephone to LIEMPTY-4 and primarily concerned LIEMPTY-4's reports on GERENDE's family problems and related security arrangements. Since mid-December, LIEMPTY-4 resumed a regular schedule (usually weekly) of meetings at pre-arranged sites and times. LIEMPTY-4 has been given a special extension in the Station to which he may call as "Dr. Carlos" to leave a message for "Victor" (FERNALD). FERNALD can change meeting plans by directly calling LIEMPTY-4. The only personal problem directly involving LIEMPTY-4 was surgery on his knee which required his wearing a full cast on his leg for over six weeks. During this period when LIEMPTY-4 has been unable to drive, FERNALD has been meeting LIEMPTY-4, for the exchange of LICALLA/LILYRIC films and prints, at LIEMPTY-4's office, under a suitable pretext and with appropriate security precautions. LIEMPTY-4's services are invaluable since the Station could not, on a continuing basis, process the LIEMPTY material in its own photo lab.

SECURITY

10. Other than the security problems inherent in GERENDE's personal problems, there have been no security problems during the reporting period.

FUTURE PLANS

11. As for GERENDE, the Station has reached the conclusion that he must be terminated. This is not an easy decision to make, nor will it be easy to confront GERENDE with this decision. He has, after all, devoted 15 years of his life to RVROCK. However, as noted above, in spite of his talents the Station has been able to get along without his services. Furthermore, the constant security risk posed by his wife is, frankly, an unacceptable risk. To try to molify her by promising her a portion of his salary is probably unworkable in realistic terms, particularly since her attitude has progressively hardened. The Station, therefore, intends to terminate GERENDE prior to the end of FY 1970. GERENDE's contract calls for a termination bonus of one month's salary per full year. This would come to $8,750 (USD). For various reasons, including the need to preserve the security of the operation by ensuring that the termination is amicable, it will probably be necessary, as stated in paragraph 6, to give GERENDE about $10,000 (USD). Furthermore, it will be necessary to inform LIEMPTY-19 of the termination, and, to keep her from revealing what she knows, she will undoubtedly have to be given some money herself. The Station does not believe that it would be equitable or sound from a security point of view to use the money which GERENDE himself has earned for this purpose. Therefore, while the figure will remain negotiable, the Station believes that the sum of $2,500 (USD) would be a reasonable amount. Total obligations for FY 1970 in the LIEMPTY Project are currently estimated at slightly less than $33,000 (USD). The Project has been approved in the amount of $38,970 (USD) leaving unobligated approximately $6,000 (USD). It is therefore requested that the LIEMPTY Project be amended for FY 1970 to provide an additional $8,000 (USD) to be used in the GERENDE termination. Funds will be available at the Station.

12. Regarding the project renewal for FY 1971, as far as LICALLA, LILYRIC, and LIEMPTY-4 are concerned, no changes in procedure are planned. The product is useful, it is as timely as present circumstances permit, and the personnel involved are doing their jobs well. The only change foreseen is an increase in salary for some, if not all, of these agents. The most recent salary increases took effect in May 1968. LIEMPTY-4 has not had an increase since January 1967, and LIEMPTY-13 since January 1964. Increase in cost of living alone would be sufficient justification to raise salaries, but in the case of these agents their consistently excellent work deserves to be rewarded. These salary increases will probably range between 10 and 20 percent.

13. As for other project expenses, LIEMPTY-10 and LIEMPTY-11 will no longer be funded under LIEMPTY, but have been transferred to LIEMBRACE effective 1 July 1970. Real estate expenses should remain fairly constant, with perhaps a slight allowance for inflation. The rent on GERENDE's dark room (MEXI 137) will no longer be paid with his termination. MV-2823 will be sold or otherwise disposed of and should not be included in the project for FY 1971. Equipment and operational expenses should remain constant.

Vincent P. Lirauto
for/John A. PROBERT

50-6-74/3

SECRET

15 March 1970

TO : Case Officer and Chief of Station

FROM : GERENDE

SUBJECT: GERENDE Background and Status Report of Present Marital Conflict

1. While this is not intended to be a full exposition of my personal and private life over recent years, I would like to make known some of the factors that have, from my point of view, led up to the present situation.

2. I realize that the interests of the organization and the interest of the individuals who may have opportunity to come in contact with my case dictate as little personal involvement as possible in the lives of agents. Indeed, the requirements of security, compartmentation and efficiency prescribe the modus operandi and, to a great extent the modus vivendi, of agency personnel not only in the sense of earning a living but also in manner of living. Ideally, the less said about an agent's private life, the better, but, as the years go by, changes may occur which go unreported or unnoticed and which may bring about unexpected events and repercussions. When a person has been working for the Station, as I have, for fifteen years with little or no personnel handling problems, no security flaps, no obvious problems on the job, and something comes up like the abrupt separation of my wife (LIEMPTY-19) and me with the personal and potential security risks it has entailed, I feel that some explanation is necessary. Should it be in order, I would like this explanation to reach not only my present case officer and Chief of Station but also the former Chief and officers with whom I have had the privilege to work over the years.

3. I would like to give thanks, in advance, for the patience and understanding that have been shown me thus far. Whatever the final outcome, I know that people have been bending over backward to be helpful and patient in hopes of an early solution to the conflict.

4. Back in September 1959, shortly after our wedding in late 1958, my wife and baby girl, were moved, by the agency, into a

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spacious, carpeted, furnished apartment near the DIZTAG Embassy, which served intermittently as a listening post-basehouse for the agency. At the time, LIEMPTY-19 was working as the manager of the bookstore at the University of the Americas and, at the same time, studying for a B.A. in philosophy. These were happy times. We received a two-month leave, went to Europe, the Rome Olympics and visited LIEMPTY-19's family in Holland. Back in Mexico, when the base was in operation I stayed home a lot (one of the requirements), minded the dial and tape recorders and the baby -- an unfortunate reversal of marital roles. After exactly five years the basehouse was closed down and we lost rent, LIEMPTY-19's salary and my mother's salary which she had been receiving as part-time basehouse keeper. My mother and youngest sister gave considerable help in taking care of the baby while LIEMPTY-19 worked and when we went to Europe and left the baby with them. This was during the first three years at the base until we had our second child, Christopher.

5. We moved to a small apartment in Lomas and, to supplement the loss of salary and rent allowance, the Station began paying 1,000 pesos a month for the use of a dark room I had built on the roof of the building. We had our third child, Madeleine, unplanned, two months after settling in the two-bedroom apartment. The apartment need not have been so small but we had chosen it for its location and style and because it was to be a temporary stop until we could find something better. We missed going to the Olympics in Tokyo which we had planned to do (1964) and instead began negotiating to buy a home building site at Rio Escondido but when the deal fell through, we decided to go on leave to Europe again, this time with the two older children, leaving the baby with my sister. We visited with LIEMPTY-19's parents in Holland (they had moved back to Holland after having lived in Washington, D.C., since 1943) and the two children stayed with them while LIEMPTY-19 and I made side trips. Traveling is LIEMPTY-19's greatest love in life. Upon our return to Mexico (I came back two weeks earlier), LIEMPTY-19 was so depressed at leaving Europe and being back in Mexico she was emotionally and physically inaccessible for about six weeks. She had not fully adjusted to living in Mexico or to settling down and becoming a housewife. Our cramped quarters, way of living, lack of money, my job, my irregular hours and habits, my Friday night poker games, the three children, all these got her down.

6. In the fall of 1965 after our return from Europe I began teaching English to beginners in the adult education program at the American School in the evenings. This started as a two-hour a week moonlighting experiment but by early 1966, through student contacts made at the school, I had branched out to teaching at the offices of Carnation Milk Co., Singer Sewing Machine, and Richardson-Merrell Drug Co. for a total of about twenty hours per week. LIEMPTY-19, meantime, was working part-time at the Hamilton School in Lomas where the two older children were attending. The family finances improved and I was able to convince LIEMPTY-19 that

the best thing to do was to invest in land and build a house big enough for our growing family which by now had a fourth child on the way. With three friends as partners, I entered on a land-buying deal which turned out to be complicated as we bought the land in the form of company stock. The company was liquidated and the assets were distributed, as land, to the four partners. I paid for our share with the proceeds from the sale of a small lot I had been paying for since 1955. LIEMPTY-19 was at first reluctant to tie us down with a house but when we finally got the papers and land deed straightened out, she threw herself wholeheartedly into the project and the building which began in August 1967. While LIEMPTY-19 supervised the construction, I worked during September and October almost full-time for the Olympic Organizing Committee and the group from Czechoslovakia which came to train in the pre-Olympics. My father-in-law deposited money in Mexico to help us with the major part of the financing of the house. We used $286,500 pesos of his money and about $60,000 that LIEMPTY-19 and I had saved and got the house finished enough to move in in March 1968. We were very short on furniture and shortly after moving in bought three bedroom sets, an automatic washer and even a piano. Naturally, cash was scarce, dirt was plentiful. The yard was a pile of rubble, the carpentry work had just begun, there were no closets, the house was unpainted. Thereafter, we did things on the house as the money came in: continued with carpentry, finished the driveway, put in grass, built a fence and front gate.

7. Six months after moving in came time for the Olympics and I worked, unofficially this time, with the water polo team from Australia. LIEMPTY-19 worked for the month with the Dutch and Belgian radio and TV group. LIEMPTY-19 was, once again, caught up in the atmosphere of being among Europeans and doing something exciting and out of the routine of home and children. She fell in love with the Australians as well, and for several months all she could talk of was that we should move to Australia. I gave it some thought but decided that we had neither the money to invest nor the youth and technical training to make it as pioneers "down under" and, on the other hand, family, friends, a house, and job seniority here in Mexico.

8. Toward the end of 1968, LIEMPTY-19 decided it was time for me to move out of the master bedroom as she could no longer face that aspect of our married life. For several months we tried this but it did not work out for me. One night in March 1969 after we returned home from a party, she asked me to help her undress and when she, once again, refused to have anything to do with me, I got rough with her, prompting a decision on her part, which she had already been pondering, to visit her parents in Holland as soon as possible. Her father provided the plane fare and she left in April for the United States to visit her brother and sister and Holland, for what she said would be a five week trip. She stayed away ten weeks. The four children remained with me, the maid, and

my mother who came to help three days a week. Upon her return, LIEMPTY-19 bore an air of resignation rather than of enthusiasm and, again, as on her previous return from Europe, was physically down and mentally unhappy. When asked about her thoughts on Australia she said that if she had wanted to live in Australia, she should have married an Australian. The separation had not improved our intimate relationship.

9. In August I was to take five weeks' leave and go with the children to Astro-World in Houston and visit my mother's family in South Carolina. When I suggested postponing making monthly payments on her father's loan until December when the Christmas Bonus would cover the back debt, in order to make the trip, she was adamant. saying that if I did not have the cash for going, I should not take leave. I borrowed from my life insurance policy and left with the three youngest children. Adriana had a touch of hepatitis and joined us three weeks later. After spending the month in South Carolina, we returned to Mexico to find that LIEMPTY-19 had very much enjoyed her solitude. We had already talked about divorce before her trip to Holland in the spring. I had told her that I would not consider parting with the children and she said she would consider leaving them to me if I would settle the debt to her father as well as give her a substantial share of what she considered was her part of the house. The title of the house was in my name and had been since the buying of the land. LIEMPTY-19 said I could mortgage or sell the house but that the money was what she was mainly interested in. I told her that the sale of the house was not financially wise in its unfinished state and that the house and land are very likely to appreciate sharply over the next three or four years considering the housing developments going on in the area. Added to this was the sentimental attachment to the house and area. A mortgage, on the other hand, for the amount of her father's loan plus what she was asking, was something I could not afford considering the more than 12 percent cost of such a mortgage in Mexico.

10. At the same time, during September 1969, that we were going through the above-mentioned discussions, LIEMPTY-19 was taking a course at Japan Airlines to become a tour guide and group leader for trips to the Orient as early as November 1969 and, certainly, to Expo '70 in Osaka during the spring and summer of 1970. She received a diploma to that effect. I told her that if she wanted out of the marriage and wanted to be free to travel it was all right by me but that the children would stay with me and I would continue to repay her father at the agreed rate ($2500 per month and 5 percent per year). She then sought legal advice from an old friend, Dutch lawyer Guillermo Floris Margadant who, in turn, steered her to a young woman lawyer, Dra. Berta Martinez, who must have advised LIEMPTY-19 that under the local legal system the only way to try for a sizable cash settlement and considerable support was to hang on to the children because LIEMPTY-19 made a radical "about-face" in her attitude concerning them and she now said that she could not

"abandon" the children. I refused to visit her lawyer with her saying I was not interested in getting divorced, whereas she said that her mind was made up and that we would have to split up.

11. Things came to a head on the night of 12 November when I got home around 9 PM and she suggested we have a drink and talk things over. I mixed some martinis and she began laying down the terms under which she thought we should get divorced, i.e. I should move out of the house, mortgage to pay back her father's money, grant her custody of the children and support of 2,000 pesos per month per child ($8,000). I said I would not get divorced under those conditions and we discussed and argued in the kitchen for about three hours, killing a bottle of gin in the process. We went upstairs and when I tried to make up to her she tried to rouse the children, unsuccessfully, and then tried to leave the house which I would not let her do. She got hysterical, phoned a neighbor, Uta de la Hoz, then she went into the front yard and awakened the next door neighbors, Walter Hurley and his wife, and asked to go to their house. A few minutes later, Uta and her husband Guillermo came and LIEMPTY-19 went with them to their home two blocks away. About a half-hour later I walked up to Uta's to ask LIEMPTY-19 to come home but was told that she was busy phoning her lawyer and would not return.

12. The following morning I took the children to school as usual and my sister Marcia (LIEMPTY-4's wife) picked them up and took them to her house where I joined them for lunch. LIEMPTY-19 came by in the late afternoon while my sister was out, picked up the children saying she was taking them home, failed to do so, then disappeared and was not to be found.

13. It was the subsequent action taken by LIEMPTY-19 in dropping her lawyers and taking on the services of Bernabe Jurado, the most notorious penal attorney in Mexico, that led to the potential security hazards that ensued.

9 March 1970

TO : Case Officer

FROM : GERENDE

SUBJECT: GERENDE Status Report

The present situation of the marital conflict between GERENDE and his wife (LIEMPTY-19) is as follows:

1. GERENDE is living at his mother's apartment at 99 Carlos B. Zetina Street, Apartment 9. He has rented a three-bedroom apartment at Tornel 3 corner with Pedro Antonio de los Santos where he has stored the household effects and furniture removed from his former address at Ladera 39, Lomas de Bezares.

2. The house at Ladera 39 is rented to an executive of Chrysler Corporation International, Dr. Leon MARKIEWICZ, his wife, and fifteen-year old daughter, all of Argentine nationality. The monthly rent is 6,700 pesos M/N and the contract is for two years, beginning 1 February 1970.

3. LIEMPTY-19 and the four children are apparently still living at the residence of the Netherlands' Ambassador, Baron Schelto Van Heemstra at Peña 360, Jardines del Pedregal. It seems fairly certain they are at that address from things that the two older children, Adriana and Chris, have said to GERENDE on the last two occasions he has seen them. They have been there since 5 December 1969. LIEMPTY-19 has denied that she has a fixed address and says that she is staying with "friends."

4. LIEMPTY-19 is continuing to use the services of Bernabe Juardo as her lawyer and, through him, is pressing for even more advantageous terms in the divorce than she had asked in November. Please see the attached copy and translation of the latest proposal made by Juardo on 4 March 1970.

5. The charges and accusations made by LIEMPTY-19 against GERENDE are still not completely resolved and are as follows:

a. Insults, threats and attempted homicide -- this charge rests at the 5° Juzgado Penal, 2ª Corte Penal located at

Lecumberri. The judge is CRUZ Mellado. These charges have not been pressed since they were originally made on 13 November 1969 by LIEMPTY-19. The ruling on these charges, should the case come to trial, must be made by three judges of the 2a Corte Penal composed of the 4th, 5th, and 6th Juzgados Penales. The judge of the 6° Juzgado is Lic. QUIRAZCO, an alumnus of GERENDE's lawyer, Jorge Mario MAGALLON. Together they have, on two occasions, been to speak to Judge CRUZ Mellado who agreed not to issue an arrest warrant and who has, finally, called for a hearing on 16 March (subsequently postponed) at 10:00. MAGALLON has given GERENDE assurances that the charges are likely to be dismissed.

b. Fraud -- this charge was made by LIEMPTY-19 and her lawyer on 11 December 1969, the day after GERENDE left the Villa Obregon jail after having spent a week there for disobeying a court order. (The court order had consisted of an unfounded request to have GERENDE expelled from his house and to have LIEMPTY-19 reinstated there with her father, as the temporary custodian of the children. GERENDE refused them admission under those terms, hence disobeying the Villa Obregon judge's order, so the judge's secretary arbitrarily ordered, on the spot, a 10-day detention. Subsequently, the judge, LUCAS del ARENAL, was forced to lift the detention after seven days and dismiss himself from the case and divorce proceedings as incompetent. The judge has had to face charges of collusion from and with the lawyers of both parties, i.e. Magallon and Jurado. The charge of fraud rests at Mesa 31a of the Procuraduria del Distrito Federal. The Public Ministry Agent in charge of that table is Jorge GUTIERREZ Cruz. LIEMPTY-19 claims that the money lent to her and GERENDE for building the house at Ladera #39 was actually loaned to buy the house and that GERENDE, knowing they were married under the separate property marriage clause had wrongfully placed the property in his name only, thereby committing fraud. Actually, the land was bought by GERENDE before Christmas 1965 in a complicated transaction involving three other partners: Robert Bancroft WHITEHOUSE, John (Dick) RENNA, and James Walter HURLEY, and each of the partners placed the property in their respective names with the complete knowledge of their spouses. Later the land was subdivided and after nineteen months the deeds were issued. LIEMPTY-19 supervised and prodded the notary who made the transaction and she was perfectly aware that the property was in GERENDE's name. In August 1967 when construction of the house began, LIEMPTY-19's father's money was used which he had deposited in Mexico for the purpose. Since January 1969, according to the terms of the loan agreement, GERENDE has been paying it off and has receipts from LIEMPTY-19 to show for it.

GERENDE has presented both the land deed ("escritura") pre-dating the construction of the house and the receipts

showing up to date payment of the loan at the "Mesa 31a."
No further action has been taken by LIEMPTY-19 or her lawyer on this matter but the charge has not finally been settled and is still pending. The charge is, of course, unfounded and is awaiting the proper "lubrication" in order to be filed away.

c. Neglect -- this charge was made by LIEMPTY-19 in December 1969 at the 7° Juzgado Mixto de Paz claiming that GERENDE had abandoned LIEMPTY-19 and the children to their fate and that they were utterly destitute. GERENDE was not notified of this charge and on 9 February after attending a hearing at the Villa Obregon juzgado (see below), once out on the sidewalk, Judicial police agents detained GERENDE, took him to the Procuraduria and from there to Lecumberri. This process involved being finger-printed and mugged. The following day GERENDE was out on a 2,000 pesos bond and three days later, 13 February, the justice of the peace (a woman) formally set GERENDE free for lack of evidence. GERENDE and Magallon went back on 5 March to pick up the bond money and see if Jurado had appealed but he had not and, apparently, that matter is closed.

6. On 14 November 1969, one day after LIEMPTY-19 disappeared from home taking the children with her, GERENDE brought charges against her for minor lesions and showed medical proof thereof. The hearing of 9 February after which GERENDE was detained, was called by Villa Obregon judge Bonfilio SEGURA. GERENDE reiterated the charge, LIEMPTY-19 denied it, the judge ruled against her, ordered her to prison but since the injuries were minor, it does not require privation of liberty and she must only go and sign-in once a week.

7. LIEMPTY-19 is at present teaching school at the Edron Academy on Caleri Street in San Angel Inn. The two older children are going to school there. During the latter part of November, all December and half of January, the children did not attend any school. On three occasions GERENDE has been to the school at 13:30 to try to speak to LIEMPTY-19 and see the children. LIEMPTY-19 has objected to this and the meetings have been short and fruitless except for GERENDE learning that they are still staying at the Dutch Ambassador's. GERENDE's last visit there was on 3 March (Tuesday).

8. After the Villa Obregon judge dismissed himself from the divorce proceedings, according to standard procedure, the case went to Coyoacan and Xochimilco respectively where the judges, in turn, excused themselves from the case and it has finally come to reside at the 1st Juzgado Civil in the D.F. The judge is Olda CORREA (woman) and has the reputation of being tough and pretty straight. Since LIEMPTY-19 has not given an address where divorce suit papers can be served her, the suit has not yet been initiated on GERENDE's part. LIEMPTY-19, on the other hand, has not had

GERENDE served with papers though his current address is known, apparently because she is still seeking a voluntary divorce along the lines and terms which are stated in the accompanying set of proposals. GERENDE cannot begin to accept these proposals in their present form as they are patently unfair and hardly a point to beginning bargaining from.

14-00000

8 March 1970

The following proposals were made to GEREDE on 4 March 1970 (Monday) by LIEMPTY-19's lawyer, Bernabe Jurado, through a mutual friend, Licenciado Carlos Heyn, to wit:

TERMS under which the problem of [LIEMPTY-19] and [Raymond H. GERENDE] could be solved.

1. The right (patria potestad) to the minors would be kept by both the mother and father.

2. The guardianship and custody of the four children is entrusted to the mother. The father may visit the children once a week between 10:00 and 19:00 hours; he may take them out once a month and will return them to the mother's address before 19:00.

3. The father is obliged to pay the mother the sum of 10,000 pesos MN, in advance, per month beginning with the month of November 1969, since which time he has not given the mother or children any money at all.

4. This agreement will be raised to the level of a formal public writ the day it is signed by both parties.

5. Both spouses agree to divorce voluntarily under the terms of this agreement.

6. Upon termination of the divorce procedure, by mutual consent, both parties will desist from the civil and penal actions that either might have initiated against the other.

7. Both spouses are obliged to attend punctually the meetings that the legal procedure establishes as well as grant the guarantees demanded by the Public Ministry and acting Judge for the approval of this agreement and granting of the divorce.

8. In order that the father may visit his children and take them out, the mother is obliged to give notice of every change of address.

9. With the exception of the one day a week that the father may visit the children and the one day a month when he may take

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them out, the father contracts the obligation of absolutely abstaining from calling on the mother's address, so that she may carry on her life freely without neglecting her children.

10. While the voluntary divorce is being processed, the mother and children will live at ______________________ and, as above stated, to satisfy their needs, the father will make the first monthly payment of $10,000.

11. Neither the father nor the mother may take the children out of Mexican territory without the authorization of the other.

12. Since GERENDE owes the parents of LIEMPTY-19 the sum of $286,500 plus agreed-on interest, minus whatever payments he has been able to make, the said GERENDE is obliged to mortgage the house at 39 Ladera, Lomas de Bezares in this city, precisely during the course of the divorce procedure by mutual consent as established in the antecedent clauses and before the divorce is granted so that LIEMPTY-19's parents are reimbursed on their loan or on the outstanding unpaid balance.

13. The expenses of making this agreement a formal writ as well as the fees of B. Juardo will be paid by GERENDE but these will be fixed in an equitable manner by Carlos Heyn to whose decision both will submit.

14. In case of failure to comply with any of the clauses of this agreement at any time or for just one time, either by GERENDE or LIEMPTY-19, both agree to expressly establish the following sanctions and terms:

15. If GERENDE is the one who violates any clause just one time, he will forfeit the house at Ladera 39 to the mother and children, LIEMPTY-19, Adriana Juliette, Christopher Ramon, Maria Madeleine, and Laurence Fernando, and said property will belong to the above mentioned persons.

16. If LIEMPTY-19 is the one who violates the terms of this agreement for just one itme, she will lose the custody of children in favor of the father or whatever person he designates for the guardianship and custody of the minors.

17. Since LIEMPTY-19 has to establish an appropriate place to live, in the company of her four children, both parties agree that the household effects will be turned over by GERENDE, to LIEMPTY-19 for that purpose, as well as the automobile she has been using throughout the marriage.

Mexico, D.F., 4 March 1970

NOTE: GERENDE's lawyer advised him not to make a counter proposal. His comments on the above terms are as follows (keyed to above):

1. OK

2. Visitation rights everyday at any time; he may take them out overnight once per week.

3. Will pay 5000 pesos per month, to begin with date of settlement (i.e. not retroactive)

4. OK

5. OK, assuming that agreement is reached on terms

6. OK

7. OK

8. OK

9. Revise to agree with GERENDE's version of paragraph 2

10. OK, except payment is to be 5000 pesos.

11. OK

12. No. GERENDE prefers to continue paying off under the terms of the loan agreement with LIEMPTY-19's father. Later, if a mortgage can be obtained at an acceptable interest, GERENDE might consider this.

13. No. GERENDE and LIEMPTY-19 will each pay their own lawyers.

14. See below

15. Not acceptable

16. Not acceptable (in context of paragraphs 14, 15, and 16)

17. She may receive household effects, but not the car.

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ACTION UNIT CI/WH 2

FILE, VR DDP, ADDP EYES ONLY

ACTION NO. 180

S E C R E T 261809Z NOV 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 2003

DIRECTOR

RYBAT LIEMPTY-1 GERENDE

C 26 Nov 69 IN 93191

DC

RPTS

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 1879 (IN 82190)

B. HMMA 38119

1. RAYMOND H. GERENDE PUT ON HALF PAY AND SUSPENDED FROM OPS DUTY FOR MONTH OF DECEMBER. PERSONAL PROBLEM MENTIONED REF A AND SPELLED OUT IN GREATER DETAIL REF B IS DIVORCE ACTION INSTITUTED BY WIFE, WHO CLAIMING MENTAL CRUELTY AND PHYSICAL ABUSE. GERENDE WARNED BY STATION HE OBLIGATED TO HANDLE SITUATION IN MANNER BEST CALCULATED AVOID EXPOSURE HIS RVROCK CONNECTIONS. WIFE PROMISED STATION HER COOPERATION THIS RESPECT AS HAS GERENDE, BUT SITUATION WORSENING DAILY, MAINLY DUE BATTLE OVER EVENTUAL CUSTODY OF CHILDREN.

2. AS GERENDE COMPLETELY PREOCCUPIED BY THIS PROBLEM, TO DETRIMENT HIS OPS ACTIVITIES AND WITHOUT REGARD FOR POSSIBLE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS, STATION DECIDED ON SUSPENSION AND 30-DAY GRACE PERIOD IN WHICH HE TO PULL SELF TOGETHER AND SETTLE PROBLEM IN WAY WHICH WOULD NOT JEOPARDIZE SECURITY OF OPS.

3. STATION NOT SANGUINE GERENDE CAN CHANGE ATTITUDE SUFFICIENTLY TO SALVAGE SITUATION. BELIEVE TERMINATION PRIOR TO END FY 70 DISTINCT

SECRET

14-00000

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ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 2003 S E C R E T

POSSIBILITY.

4. FILE: 201-119523.

S E C R E T

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ACTION UNIT WH8 — INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, OP 2

ACTION NO. 712

S E C R E T Ø71828Z NOV 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 1879 (MEXI)

DIRECTOR

7 Nov 69 IN 82190

LIEMPTY-1

REF DIRECTOR 51804

1. AS DISCUSSED WITH RAULERSON, GERENDE CURRENTLY "ON TRIAL" TO DETERMINE IF HE ABLE AND WILLING ASSUME ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND EARN RETIREMENT BENEFITS WHICH STATION WILL RECOMMEND IF HIS PERFORMANCE WARRANTS. GERENDE RESPONDING WELL TO CHALLENGE BUT HE NOW INVOLVED IN PERSONAL PROBLEMS WHICH MAY AFFECT HIS FUTURE WITH RVROCK. WILL ADVISE AS SOON AS STATUS RESOLVED.

2. FILE: 201-119523.

S E C R E T

| AN |
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| IN |
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| WH/1 |

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201-119523

07 Nov 69

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 1-3

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

ORIG: Jack Barry
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6754
DATE: 4 November 69

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ___ PER ___ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH-8 FILE, VR. RI/AN, OP-2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S-E-C-R-E-T 04 23 22z Nov 69 CITE DIRECTOR 51804

TO MEXICO CITY

REF: DIRECTOR-33808

1. PRIOR TO FURTHER HQS ACTION PER PARA 2, REF, REQUEST STATION ADVISE AS TO FUTURE PLANS UTILIZATION RAYMOND H. GERENDE.

2. FILE: 201-119523.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Reference advised Hqs reviewing feasibility of self participating commercial annunity in lieu termination/resignation provision for GERENDE.

C/WH/CONTRACTS William Renehan (in draft)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

CS COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN C. MURRAY
C/WH/1
201-119523
4 Nov 69
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

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DISPATCH | CLASSIFICATION: SECRET | PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

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ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

MICROFILM

SUBJECT: LIRAZOR/Progress Report for the Period 1 August-30 September 1969

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: For Your Information

REFERENCE : HMMA-37623, 4 August 1969 (Last Progress Report)

1. Although this report might normally be submitted one month from now, the use of Oliver G. SCANTLING has shifted sufficiently to warrant a special report at this time. Our next progress report will be submitted for the period 1 October through 31 December unless exceptional circumstances justify another change.

2. The fundamental change in the use of SCANTLING (who has suffered the past six weeks from paratyphoid) is that he has been divorced from routine cut-out operations and will henceforth be used for priority tasks and targets which will better utilize his proven talents. First, in late September ZARBOCK took over LICASA-1 for direct handling. The LICASA operation offered no particular challenge to SCANTLING and it is doubtful that his intermediary role offered any particular additional security in this case. In fact, if a flap should ever develop in this case SCANTLING would just add one more local who would have to be extricated from the tongs of the GOM. Second, it has been decided that SCANTLING will very soon turn LIANVIL-1 over to Raymond GERENDE. The details are presently being worked out.

3. PLANS: In line with our decision to use SCANTLING for recruitment efforts principally (and less so for routine agent handling) he is presently preparing for a recruitment attempt against Subject of * MEXICO CITY-1502. When that operation is completed he will be targeted against the MHHARSH target both through a commercial outlet of the Bloc and through various clubs and sports centers where he may have access to MHHARSH types. Aside from these responsibilities, he will be used as needed in other recruitment situations especially in support of a new surveillance team.

[signature]
for/John A. PROBERT

* Luis Castillo Ra[illegible] (201-8[illegible]) [illegible]

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - Chief, WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-37913	7 October 1969
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: GERENDE 201 ~~50-6-130/3~~

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	RAY. H. GERENDE	9/1/69	
2	(1) WH/CONTRACTS RENAHAN HAS		
3	Action draft proposal RE Annuity		
4	System.		
5	(2) Held for review with wilsted		
6	RE Relationships.	9/10/69.	

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

* NOTE: Gerende's wife works for Wilsted as LIEMPTY-19.

Cable drafted to send 11/4/69.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions GPO : 1968 O - 297-542 (40)

14-00000

SECRET

Mr. Raymond H. Gerende

Dear Mr. Gerende:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 October 1955, as amended.

Effective 1 October 1969, said contract is extended for a period of one year and is amended by increasing your basic rate of compensation to $7,000 per annum.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY [signature]
Contracting Officer

SECRET

ORIG: WSReneban
UNIT: WH/Contracts
EXT: 4460
DATE: 28 August 1969

MESSAGE FORM
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CONF: WH8 INFO FILE, VR, OP2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 28 22 46Z AUG 69 CITE DIRECTOR 33808

TO MEXICO CITY

ADMIN CONTRACTS LIEMPTY

REF: MEXICO CITY 1263 (IN 30562)

1. GEREDE CONTRACT AMENDED 1 OCTOBER RAISING COMPENSATION TO $7,000. PER ANNUM.

2. REVIEWING FEASIBILITY OF SELF-PARTICIPATING COMMERCIAL ANNUITY IN LIEU TERMINATION/RESIGNATION PROVISION. WILL ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Ref attached.

COORD: A.J. Barry Jr.
AC/WH/1

AC Ext
ADC Cint
Barry

John R. Horton
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

William S. Reneban
C/WH/Contracts
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ACTION UNIT: WH-8 | FILE, VR | OP-2, RI/AN

ACTION NO. 295

S E C R E T 252345Z AUG 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 1263 (PRALLETTT ACTING)
MEXI

DIRECTOR

LIEMPTY/1

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 21679

B. MEXICO CITY 0967 (IN 05042)

25 Aug 69 IN 30562

1. PLS ADVISE STATUS REF AMENDMENTS TO RAYMOND H. GERENDE CONTRACT. GERENDE RETURNING FROM ANNUAL LEAVE 8 SEPTEMBER AND STATION WISHES USE INCREASED BENEFITS INVOLVED AS PEG TO DISCUSS AND MOTIVATE FUTURE PERFORMANCE.

2. FILE 201-119523.

S E C R E T

Answered 8/26 AC/WH-1 says see contracts Jack Rosokan

CS COPY

SECRET

201-119523
25 AUG 69

SECRET   22 JUL 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Raymond H. GERENDE, Contract Amendment

1. It is requested that the contract for Raymond H. GERENDE, Independent Contractor be amended effective 1 October 1969 to extend the term for an additional year and to increase compensation from $6,500. to $7,000. per annum.

2. The Mexico Station recommendation, concurred with by WHD, was based on GERENDE's initiative overall performance, and demonstrated capability to perform assigned duties.

Carroll L. [illegible]

John R. Horton
Acting Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

DDP/WH/Contracts:WSRenehan:atl (18 July 1969)
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BY: AT: Z

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ACTION WH8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE VR, CCS2, CSPS, OP2

#402

S E C R E T 180035Z JUL 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 0967

DIRECTOR

05042

18 JUL 69 IN 05042

ADMIN

REF: DIRECTOR 21679

1. CONCUR SALARY INCREASE FOR GERENDE BUT WOULD PREFER IT BE MADE EFFECTIVE ON CONTRACT ANNIVERSARY DATE, 1 OCTOBER 69.

2. FILE: 201-119523.

S E C R E T

Jack: O.K. by me

AC
ADC
Barry

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 12

SECRET

ORIG: J.J. Barry
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954/9041
DATE: 16 July 1969

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION BY 28 PER

CONF: WH8 FILE, VR. OP2

INDEX / NO INDEX / RETURN TO BRANCH / FILE RID / FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET 17 19 50Z JUL 69 CITE DIRECTOR 21679

TO MEXICO CITY

ADMIN

REF: HMMA 36312

1. HQS REQUESTING AMENDMENT RAYMOND H. GERENDE'S CONTRACT AS PROPOSED BY STATION PARA 4 REF.

2. IN PARA 2 REF STATION NOTED "MORE THAN SATISFIED WITH GERENDE'S PERFORMANCE AND ANXIOUS TAKE ADVANTAGE FULL POTENTIAL." IN LIGHT ABOVE, AND SINCE GERENDE'S LAST SALARY INCREASE WAS GRANTED JULY 1965, HQS SUGGESTS A SALARY INCREASE FOR GERENDE FROM $6,500 TO $7,000 PER ANNUM EFFECTIVE 1 AUG 69, SUBJECT TO STATION'S CONCURRENCE. PLS ADVISE.

3. FILE: 201-119523.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/CONTRACTS
WH/FI

JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

ERNEST J. TSIKERDANOS
AC/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
WH/1/J. J. Barry [initials]		DATE 14 July 1969

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. AC/WH/1		14/7	[initials]	
2.				
3. WH/Contracts	14 JUL 1969	Jul 14	[initials]	My comments re the retirement/resignation are contained in my memo of March 25. Contract also provides for Christmas bonus of one month's salary. Also receives $960. per year for use of area of his residence for darkroom and related electricity and water in processing LIEMPTY take. [signature]
4.				
5. WH/FI	14 JUL 1969			
6.				
7. WH/EXO	15 JUL 1969		[initials]	5 to 7: Thoroughly reviewed the file, talked to WH/1, believe the proposed contract amendments are proper (and perhaps over-due). RECOMMEND APPROVAL. (Once this is done, I have suggested that the Branch should go out to the field and discuss salary adjustment as well as appropriateness of an annuity arrangement--as well as closer operational supervision and additional tasking). 15 July 1969 [initials]
8.				
9. C/WH/1				This seems reasonable and proper. [signature]
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14 July 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer, Western Hemisphere Division

VIA : WH/FI
WH/CONTRACTS

SUBJECT : Recommendation to Amend the Contract of Raymond H. GERENDE (Contract Agent) to Include Improved Termination Benefits and a Salary Increase

1. During the past year Mexico City Station has submitted several dispatches recommending that paragraph 11 of Subject's contract be amended to include new benefits in the event of Subject's termination and/or resignation from Agency service. These Station recommendations have been carefully reviewed by C/WH/Contracts and a Memorandum was forwarded to C/WH/1 containing guidance on the suggested contract amendment.

2. The above information has been reviewed again by AC/WH/1, and we are requesting approval for the following amendments to paragraph 11 of Subject's contract:

A) In the event of GERENDE's termination by the Agency he will receive three month's pay plus one month's pay for every full year of service since 18 March 1955, calculated at the rate applicable at the time of termination.

B) In the event of resignation and/or voluntary retirement upon 60 days notice the following schedule would be acceptable to the Agency as being in its best interests and a payment considered as a terminal payment as follows:

(1) Less than 15 years service (prior to March 1970) 20 days pay for each full year of service.

(2) Over 15 years service, but less than 20 years service (prior 18 March 1975) three months salary plus 20 days pay for each full year of service.

(3) Over 20 years service, three months salary plus one month's pay for each full year of service.

(4) All payments above are to be calculated at the rate of pay applicable at the time of retirement and/or resignation.

3. As to the points raised by WH/Contracts in their Memorandum concerning this amendment we would like to note the following:

A) GERENDE is a Mexican citizen, working for the Agency since 18 March 1955 under an MOC, who considers himself to be a "career" employee of the Agency, and whose initial local employment for cover purposes was largely notional under a system of "ghost payrolling". GERENDE received no income or benefits from this "cover" position which terminated due to the demise of the company on 31 December 1967. GERENDE's other "cover" is self generated in that he gives English lessons in his spare time to middle management Mexican nationals employed by American owned companies in Mexico City. His income benefits from this "cover" are minimal, but suffice for satisfying acquaintances as to the source of his income. In conclusion, GERENDE is considered by the Station to be a full time contract agent, on call at all times for operational activity. Any other local benefits which may accrue to him by the virtue of his being a Mexican citizen should not, we feel, be a concern of this Agency given the above circumstances of his employment with us.

4. This Branch is of the belief that the resignation and/or retirement schedule outlined in paragraph 2, B above provides career benefits for GERENDE in the event that he must resign and/or retire in the event of unforseen personal circumstances. It additionally rewards him for his loyalty of service, and at the same time provides him with incentive to remain in Agency service for the additional financial benefits that will accrue to him providing both future security and incentive.

SECRET

5. During the past two years GERENDE has served as a principal agent handler for a sensitive fixed surveillance project; has carried out unilateral recruitment approaches against the Cuban target; has been used in special support investigations; and is presently being considered for use in special operations of a sensitive nature. A review of the progress reports in GERENDE's operations discloses that the Station has been more than satisfied with GERENDE's performance and is anxious to take advantage of his full potential. GERENDE's last salary increase from $6,000 to $6,500 per annum was granted in July 1965, and there have been no increases since. Since the Field Station/Headquarters negotiation over amendment of paragraph 11 of GERENDE's contract has been in progress for over one year and a half, we are of the belief that the Station wished to finalize this amendment prior to requesting a salary increase for the agent. It is therefore requested, considering the above, that approval be given for a salary increase from $6,500 to $7,000 effective 1 August 1969, and that his contract be so amended. The Field Station will be queried for their approval via cable prior to implementation of the contract amendment.

Ernest J. Tsikerdanos
Acting Chief, WH/1

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : C/[illegible]/1

DATE: 7 March 19[illegible]

FROM : C/[illegible]/Contracts

SUBJECT: Raymond H. GERENDE - Severance/Retirement/Resignation Pay

REF : [illegible]-30312

1. Reference asks that GERENDE's contract be amended to provide the following:

a. Three months pay for purposes of a termination payment.

b. The following schedule in the event of resignation upon 30 days notice which would be acceptable to the Agency as being in its best interests and a payment considered as a termination or terminal payment as follows:

Less than 15 years service (prior 18 March 1970)--20 days for each full year.

Over 15 years but less than 20 years service (prior 18 March 1975)--three months plus 20 days for each full year.

Over 20 years--three months plus 1 month for each full year.

2. The Station has pointed out that Mexican law requires an employer (presuming that we are being considered as an employer in the sense of Mexican law) to grant an employee who is terminated three months pay plus an additional 20 days pay for each full year of service. In the event of resignation, Mexican law does not make any requirement for payment by the employer to the individual.

3. GERENDE's basic contract was effective 1 October 1955. An amendment, effective 1 July 1959, provides for a terminal payment of one months salary for each year of service since 18 March 1955, and thus bears out the Station's use of the date 18 March 1955 for service computation.

SECRET

4. It is to be noted that [illegible], who was born December 7, 1932, will have 20 years service in March 1975, and in December 1975 he will be 43 years of age.

5. The Station did not indicate whether or not [illegible]'s overt employment provides him any termination pay or pension benefits. Mexican law does provide that an individual covered under their "social Security benefit" program is eligible for annuity at age 65. Should he retire between the ages of 60 to 64, he would receive a reduced annuity.

6. I believe the Station's proposal is quite practical except it does, of course, give the individual an option of resigning at any time and thus being eligible to receive a "resignation payment" rather than what should, I believe, be considered as a retirement payment or program. I, therefore, suggest the following:

a. That prior to effecting a contract amendment providing for a resignation payment for acceptable reasons, information be obtained as to whether [illegible] would actually be entitled to receive from his overt employer additional payment(s) for termination and/or retirement. This then could be used as a basic figure on which to build in terms of termination and/or retirement.

b. The proposed schedule certainly appears adequate. As there is no limit on the accumulation, the individual might well reach a point of "temptation" to resign. I believe there should be a maximum limit on accumulation - why encourage the individual to resign?

c. As both the Station and [illegible] want some program for purposes of security and incentive, I believe more emphasis should be given to such a retirement program rather than on "resignation". Similarly, retirement would not be thought of at age 43.

A retirement program could provide for participation by the individual and also take into consideration what the individual would receive from his country's Social Security program. This type of plan would give the individual a vested interest as well as a feeling of security in terms of the future.

7. It is recommended that your dispatch in answer to Reference be coordinated with the appropriate WH Staff and WH/[illegible].

William S. Renchen
C/WH/Contracts

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.:

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Raymond H. GERENDE's Cover Status

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. In preparing a recent request for an amendment to Raymond H. GERENDE's contract, it occurred to us that it would probably be useful to bring Headquarters up-to-date on GERENDE's cover status. As a full-time contract agent, GERENDE is on call at all times for operational activity. His cover activity not only provides him with the necessary flexibility, it is also solid enough to provide him with a plausible explanation of his existence and his income.

2. GERENDE has two major cover activities. One is the teaching of English, mainly to middle-management personnel of American-owned firms in Mexico City. This is done on a regular basis for a few hours each day and earns GERENDE an income of about 5000 pesos per month. His second cover activity, and one which is largely a cover and not really activity, is working as a salesman for IDEN A. [OSRAM] GERENDE actually earns only about 500 pesos per month from this, but this fact is a closely guarded secret. GERENDE's acquaintances assume that a good part of his income comes from this cover. Previously, GERENDE had been able to "prove" a total income of about 8000 pesos per month, ostensibly from IDEN B. [CERSA] IDEN B was owned by LISTERINE, and for years he had carried GERENDE on his payroll as an independent salesman on commission. He would ostensibly pay GERENDE a certain amount of money, and IDEN B's accountant would duly file income tax returns and social security based on this alleged payment. IDEN B would also pay whatever taxes were called for by the statements filed. This

Attachment:
IDENs u/s/c

Distribution:
(3) - C/WH w/att u/s/c

S/c att: 1

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-36320	28 January 1969
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-119523

system of "ghost payrolling" is quite common in Mexico, as everybody gains: the company because its declared profit is lower than it really is and, therefore, subject to less tax, and the individual because he is ordinarily given a kickback for allowing his name to be used (or in GERENDE's case, because it provided cover).

3. All this ended on 31 December 1967, when LISTERINE sold IDEN B to IDEN A. For a while thereafter, GERENDE paid taxes only on the money he actually earned with IDEN A, which was, as stated, about 500 pesos per month. As of 1 July 1968, however, LISTERINE arranged, at GERENDE's request, to have his accountant (who continued to handle GERENDE's taxes as a favor to LISTERINE) to lump together all of GERENDE's earnings (from teaching as well as IDEN A) as "professional earnings" and to file returns for GERENDE which included the total amount. This is not quite as satisfactory as the old arrangement (among other things GERENDE must now pay his own taxes) but for cover purposes it is entirely adequate. Other than LISTERINE and the accountant, no one knows that GERENDE's ostensible earnings have dropped, and, as far as we know, LISTERINE is the only person who is aware of GERENDE's tie with WOFIRM.

Vincent P. Rizzuto
for/Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Amendment of Raymond H. GERENDE's Contract

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. HMMT-8751, 20 February 1968
B. HMMS-5971, 17 June 1968
C. HMMS-6090, 15 August 1968
D. HMMT-9286, 5 September 1968

1. The Station has finally compiled the information necessary to answer the questions raised in Ref B and, in doing so, wishes to repeat the request originally made in Ref A to amend Raymond H. GERENDE's contract to provide him with a certain amount of job security.

2. First, Ref B raised the point that there had been no efficiency reports written on GERENDE or "evidence of outstanding performance." GERENDE's performance has been evaluated regularly within the context of the regular LIEMPTY Project progress reports, and a review of the past several reports will demonstrate that the Station has been more than satisfied with GERENDE's performance and is anxious to take advantage of his full potential. The Station does not believe, however, that "evidence of outstanding performance" should be a prerequisite for the type of contract amendment being requested. It is perfectly true, as pointed out in Ref B, that the Station had gone on record in 1959 that GERENDE should not be paid a termination bonus if he should resign simply to get the extra money or to pursue another career. By now, however, GERENDE has cast his lot with WOFIRM. He really has no other career, and to try to start one at this point would be extremely difficult. On the other hand, if he should decide to try his hand at something else, the Station would

Distribution:
3 - C/WH

CS COPY

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-36312	27 January 1969
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-119523

undoubtedly wish to reward his long years of loyal service with a generous termination payment. He has earned it, and only termination for cause per paragraph 10 (b) of his contract would prevent him from receiving it.

3. Mexican law (it is the law, not custom) says that an employee who is fired must be paid three months' salary plus twenty days' salary for each full year employed by the company at the pay rate existing at the time of separation. GERENDE's current cover company adheres to this formula. Since GERENDE's termination clause has always read that he would be paid a full month's salary for every year of service (in the event of his termination by WOFIRM), we would not want to change that, and in fact we wish to add to it the three months' pay guaranteed by Mexican law. At the same time, we do see some virtue in the suggestion in paragraph 3 of Ref B that full retirement benefits (in the event of GERENDE's resignation) would apply only after 20 years' service, with lesser benefits until then. Our suggestion would be that in the event of his resignation prior to 15 full years of service (i.e. prior to 18 March 1970) he be paid twenty days' salary for each full year, that after 15 years but prior to 20 he be paid this amount plus three full months' salary, and that after 20 years he be paid three months' salary plus one months' salary for every full year. It is true, of course, that Mexican law does not make any provision for payment of a termination bonus to an employee who resigns, but most enlightened companies have some sort of retirement program, and, as Ref B correctly points out, "working for WOFIRM is a very special case and deserves exceptional financial consideration." In the case of GERENDE, we are not attempting to establish any pattern. This is a special case (as are most) and the Station merely wishes to insure that GERENDE, who has made WOFIRM a career without receiving any career benefits in return, is rewarded for his loyalty and is given some incentive for the future. GERENDE is not without his faults, and he is being adequately compensated for the work he performs, but we cannot expect to get more out of him without showing him greater respect.

4. The Station requests, therefore, that the following amendment be made in paragraph 11 of GERENDE's contract:

a. In the event of GERENDE's termination by WOFIRM, he will receive three months' pay plus one month's pay for every full year of service since 18 March 1955, calculated at the rate applicable at the time of termination.

b. GERENDE's resignation upon 60 days' notice will be accepted by WOFIRM as being in its best interest, and GERENDE will be eligible for terminal payment according to the following formula: Prior to 18 March 1970, GERENDE will receive 20 days' pay for every full year of service since 18 March 1955; after 18 March 1970 but prior to 18 March 1975, GERENDE will receive three months' pay plus 20 days for every full year since 18 March 1955; after 18 March 1975 GERENDE will receive three months pay plus one month for every full year of service since 18 March 1955. All payments are to be calculated at the rate applicable at the time of resignation.

5. Paragraph 10 (b) will, of course, remain in force.

6. Ref D asked that GERENDE's contract be extended for another year without change. We assume that this has been done, although we have not been notified.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

CS COPY

SECRET

UNDER SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO HMMA-36320, 28 JANUARY 1969

IDENTITIES

IDEN A - OSRAM

IDEN B - Cia. Electrica Mexicana S.A. (CEMSA); light bulb manufacturer

S/c att 1
HMMA- 36320

SECRET

201-119523

SECRET

TO: Chief, WH Division	XXX	MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO: Chief, SB Division		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
		MICROFILM

SUBJECT: 6 LIEMPTY Progress Report, 1 July through 31 December 1968

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA-35030, 22 July 1968

SUMMARY

1. There have been no basic changes in the operation of the project during the reporting period. Raymond H. GERENDE continues as principal agent, handling the personnel of the two base houses, LILYRIC and LICALLA, and performing other additional tasks. On 27 December 1968, consistent with our effort to get as much of the support activity as possible handled by outside officers, direct agent-handling responsibility for GERENDE and the LIEMPTY project was turned over to Bruce H. FERNALD. Vincent P. RIZZUTO remains as alternate and as FERNALD's inside contact.

GERENDE

2. Until the introduction of FERNALD, there was no change in the meeting arrangements with GERENDE. Meetings were held on an average of three times per week until October, when LIEMPTY-19 (GERENDE's wife) was relieved of the responsibility of transcribing the Spanish-language portions of LIENVOY coverage of the BEDOX installation. Thereafter meetings averaged twice per week, the main business being the transfer of LIEMPTY base house material and discussion of base house business.

Distribution:
(2) - C/WH
2 - C/SB 2cc - SB/X/WH

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-36272	22 January 1969
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	50-6-74/3

3. GERENDE's agent handling responsibilities within the LIEMPTY project remain as previously reported. He had also handled EMPAIN-2 until the latter's termination in August 1968. He developed a good relationship with EMPAIN-2, and he showed that he is quite capable, with proper case officer guidance, of providing useful service to the Station in the handling of agents beyond the support type to which he had been limited in the past. The Station intends to try to expand this role, with due regard for security and for GERENDE's limited experience. Furthermore, the Station still has every intention of using GERENDE selectively in cultivation and development of operational leads, as outlined in reference. No such leads were found for GERENDE during the reporting period (among other reasons, we have no intention of giving GERENDE a lead simply for the sake of giving him something to do), but as soon as a suitable lead is uncovered, it will be passed to GERENDE.

4. GERENDE was particularly useful during the Olympic period. While he did not get a job with the Olympic Committee as he had hoped, his wife was employed as a translator by the European television networks who had come to cover the games. This, plus other personal contacts, gave GERENDE a certain amount of access to Olympic facilities. Both GERENDE and his wife helped considerably in the distribution of AEEGGHEAD material, and GERENDE performed a number of miscellaneous tasks assisting the Station in various Olympic responsibilities.

5. GERENDE has also been used in support of JMROD operations, such as making mail pick-ups and delivering material and making phone calls to AMBASSOON. Following the Warsaw Pact Powers' invasion of Czechoslovakia, GERENDE was asked to cover a demonstration in front of the Soviet Embassy, and he wrote a good report which was used in Embassy briefings. Recently, GERENDE has enrolled at the University of the Americas to work for an M.A. in contemporary Mexican history. The Station will explore the possibility of his getting access to persons or information of interest on the University campus.

LICALLA

6. LIEMPTY-9's work (in the LICALLA base house) was inhibited in July due to the construction of a maid's room near his working quarters. During the reporting period, however, he took a total of 2,217 operational photos. His regular reporting and commentary continued as in the past. LIEMPTY-9 is a steady and dependable performer, and his unique vantage point remains the source of the most interesting and revealing photos as well as often very informative reporting.

LILYRIC

7. LIEMPTY-13, -14, -26, and -27 have been able to keep the LILYRIC base house manned on a regular basis from 0800 to 1800 hours weekdays and 0800 to 1500 hours on Saturdays, with other hours coverable upon request. This has proven to be a far better arrangement than depending on LIMITED for some of this coverage. In addition to the 6,763 operational photos taken during the reporting period and the daily fixed surveillance reports, LILYRIC reporting is of considerable help in compiling current vehicle and license plates lists, PCS arrivals and departures, unusual activities such as demonstrations or protests, unusual or lengthy absences of personnel, etc., all of which have obvious CI importance. It was LILYRIC photos which made it possible for LNERGO to identify the Subject of 201-841520, who had been in clandestine contact with AEGRIP officers. LILYRIC also reported on a half dozen other American (or American appearing) visitors, some of whom it was possible to identify through tracing license plates.

Charlie - who was this?

LIMITED

8. As reported in Ref, LIEMPTY-8 has been terminated and the LIMITED base house closed. All equipment has been turned in, and it can truthfully be said that due to the continuing quality performance of LICALLA and LILYRIC, LIMITED has not been missed at all.

PHOTO LAB

9. LIEMPTY-4 continues to process all photos made by the base houses. In addition, 101 enlargements were made during the reporting period, and 210 prints for LIENTRAP. The quality of LIEMPTY-4's work is good, and he rarely misses his routine deadlines.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

9/10/68

MEMORANDUM FOR : Office of Finance

FROM : Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Contract Extension for Raymond H. Gerende

1. Effective 1 October 1968, the contract (as amended) for the subject individual, effective 1 October 1955 is extended for a period of one (1) year.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY [signature]
Contracting Officer

notified
TH - 274636
30 Sept 68.

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING | X NO INDEXING REQUIRED | ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING | MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: JMROD/Jorge Francisco TIMOSSI Corbani

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

LIENVOY of 24 October 1968 reported that Subject was contacted by Felix LUNA Maderos, First Secretary and suspect replacement for Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez, who is believed to be the equivalent of the Cuban COS. TIMOSSI and LUNA agreed to meet that afternoon at the Embassy to take care of the matter which was pending between them. It is not known if this might possibly concern the material passed to TIMOSSI by GERENDE.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD

GERENDE 201-

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA - 35706

DATE: 28 October 1968

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-

File Gerende 201

SECRET

S/C Attachment #7 to HMMT-9317
dated 23 September 1968

Jorge MARTINEZ Durán:

Department of Defense Advisory Council
Army Liaison Staff

Alias Document available to GERENDE.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

201 file

16 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/Contracts

SUBJECT : Renewal of Contract of Raymond H. GERENDE (P)

Will you please arrange to have the contract of Raymond H. GERENDE extended for one year on the present basis but with one amendment, namely, provision of a termination or resignation bonus of 3 months' salary plus one-month's-salary-for-each-year-worked. His present contract expires on 30 September 1968. He has worked faithfully for the station since 1955 and definitely intends to make a career of his association with the Mexican station.

Ernest J. Tsikerdanos
AC/WH/1

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	SECRET
PROCESSING ACTION	MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM
TO	Chief, WH Division
INFO.	
FROM	Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City
SUBJECT	Raymond H. GERENDE's Contract
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES	

REFERENCE: HMMS-6090, 19 August 1968

Please extend GERENDE's contract, without amendments, for one year. We had hoped to have answers to HMMS-5971 prepared in time to have amendments included in the annual extension, but GERENDE's "cover company" has recently undergone a change of management, and we have been waiting for GERENDE to provide us with a written statement of his current cover status, as well as a statement of the retirement rights and benefits provided legitimate employees of the cover company. Our intention is to have GERENDE's contract provide, in so far as possible, termination benefits equivalent to those granted by his cover company to a normal employee. As soon as this information is available, a comprehensive reply to HMMS-5971 will be pouched.

for/Bernard A. HOGEBROOK

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMT-9286	9 September 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-119523

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: GERENDE's Contract

ACTION REQUIRED, REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA 16457 of 12 June 1968

GERENDE's contract expires on 30 September 1968, so we would appreciate receiving a reply to reference well before that time.

Theresa H. BACHARDY

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-6090	15 August 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-119533

SECRET

TO: Chief, WH

INFO: Chief, SB

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY Progress Report, 1 November 1967 through 30 June 1968

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE : HMMA-33459, 8 November 1967

Summary

1. During the reporting period, the project's principal agent, Raymond H. GERENDE, was assigned additional tasks, aimed at broadening his usefulness to the Station. These tasks included spotting and assessment as well as the handling of a recruited agent, ERFAIN-3.* GERENDE did well, and it is believed that a new dimension has been opened for him, and by the same token, the Station has, in effect, gained a new asset. The LIEMPTY base houses continued to produce at their usual rate and with their usual effective support to Station REDTOP operations. The LIMITED Base House and its operator, LIEMPTY-6, were terminated on 31 May 1968. Termination was decided upon partly to save money and partly because advancing age had measurably decreased the reliability and effectiveness of LIEMPTY-6's work. LIEMPTY-26 was rehired, which permitted the LILYRIC Base House to give us the same total hours of coverage as LILYRIC and LIMITED had together in the past.

.........continued

Distribution:
2 - C/WH
2 - C/SB 2 cc-SB/o/WH

Alvarez Durant
Ramon Joseph

CS COPY

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

50-6-74 3

CROSS REFERENCE TO | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-35080 | DATE: 22 July 1968

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET | HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-74/3

This sounds great except that ERFAIN/3 is being terminated, acc. to Marvin Francis!

GERENDE

2. During the reporting period, the case officer has been meeting GERENDE an average of three times per week. Meetings are usually pre-arranged, at various sites and times. Meetings average 20 to 30 minutes. GERENDE turns over to the case officer negatives, prints, logs, and other reports which he has picked up from the base houses since the previous meeting, along with brief contact reports on his meetings with base house representatives. Reports on other operational activities are also turned in and discussed, and GERENDE is given instructions, notes for the base houses, and negatives for any enlargements which may be desired by the Station. Also, LIENVOY tapes and transcripts are exchanged at each meeting. (The departure of LIACUTE-1 at the end of April 1968 left the Station without a BEDOX transcriber. As a temporary solution, pending the return of LIACUTE-1 or the recruitment of another BEDOX transcriber, GERENDE's wife, LIEMPTY-19, has been hired at the rate of 31.50 pesos per hour to transcribe the Spanish language portions of the tapes. She does the work in her home, and GERENDE transports the tapes.)

3. GERENDE has the direct agent-handling responsibility for the following LIEMPTY agents: LIEMPTY-4 (photo-processor; met twice per week); LIEMPTY-6 (LIMITED; met once per week until termination); LIEMPTYs 13, 14, 26, and 27 (LILYRIC; LIEMPTY-13 normally met twice per week -- in his absence LIEMPTY-27 makes meetings); and LIEMPTY-9 (LICALLA; met twice per week). He is responsible for directing their work, paying them, and handling all of the administrative problems which may develop. To judge from the results, GERENDE has excellent rapport with these agents and is able to get a consistently high performance rate from them — particularly LICALLA and LILYRIC personnel.

4. As noted in reference, GERENDE was employed by the Mexican MHRAVEL committee, which we found a useful side benefit. His MHRAVEL activity during the reporting period has been minimal, but we expect it to start picking up again. GERENDE has conducted a few discreet inquiries and investigations for us within the MHRAVEL complex, and we have instructed him to try to get an assignment which will keep him as close to the FJSTEAL delegation as possible.

5. Reference also pointed out that GERENDE had performed nicely in the cultivation and development of an operational lead, and that the Station planned to give GERENDE more of the same. Furthermore, GERENDE's standing assignments (LIEMPTY base houses, MHRAVEL activity, and occasional support of JMROD requirements) were not challenging enough or occupying enough of GERENDE's time. GERENDE is rather firmly committed to WOFIRM by virtue of the fact that he has worked for WOFIRM for over 13 years and has no other outside employment of any consequence. By the same token, he was, through no fault of his own, doing less work for WOFIRM than at any time in his career. GERENDE's operational exposure through the years dictated more and more restrictions on his activity, for sound security reasons. The solution to GERENDE's problem (lack of a promising future) and the Station's (not getting its money's worth) seemed to be to give GERENDE additional tasks which he could handle under suitable cover and with due regard to security precautions. Since most of GERENDE's support activities had been against the FJSTEAL target, particular care would have to be taken in committing him further in this direction. It was decided, therefore, that his principal retooling would be in a non-FJSTEAL field.

6. In line with the above reasoning, GERENDE was introduced to Andrew R. DOSCHER on 17 February 1968. The idea was that GERENDE would be trained to assist DOSCHER in some of his operations against Central American targets. GERENDE's principal duty thus far has been to take over the handling of ERPAIN-3, under DOSCHER's close supervision and guidance. GERENDE has performed quite creditably in this task. He seems interested in the work and has learned quickly. On the other hand, an apparently ingrained habit of procrastination has resulted in dilatory reporting. If GERENDE can overcome this (and both case officers are working hard to teach GERENDE the importance of prompt and complete reporting) there seems to be every reason to believe GERENDE will develop into a competent agent handler.

7. GERENDE was also given the task of locating and developing (in alias) a girl who, per LIENVOY, was being cultivated by AERODENT. Although GERENDE had to be continually reminded of the assignment, he did an excellent job of meeting the girl and gaining her confidence. It is quite likely that he could have recruited the girl as an access agent against AERODENT, but as this point was reached another operation against AERODENT was launched and it was not felt that attempting to recruit the girl would serve any useful purpose, for the time being at least (among other things, there was no indication that she had had any contact with AERODENT for some months). The only flaw in GERENDE's performance was the time it took him to get around to doing the job. It should be mentioned, however, that at the same time GERENDE had a number of pressing personal matters to attend to, including overseeing the completion of his new house, which he finally moved into on 10 March 1968, even though construction is still not entirely completed.

8. Among other assignments completed by GERENDE in the reporting period were the renting of an apartment for use as a listening post; and initiating a relationship with a Russian translator working for the MERAVEL committee.

14-00000

TO		
Chief of Station, Mexico City	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division		MICROFILM

SUBJECT: Amendment to GERENDE's Contract

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMT 8751

1. Before amending GERENDE's contract in accordance with reference, we would like to clarify a few points about GERENDE and about terminations and resignations in general.

2. We assume from the files that GERENDE's performance has been entirely satisfactory but since there are no efficiency reports or actual evidence of outstanding performance, we would like to have a statement from the station which would justify the requested amendment. Nine years ago the station said, in HMMA-13571 that "station would not want to give GERENDE a terminal payment if he elects to resign just to receive some extra money or to pursue some other career." That was a long time ago, however, and thirteen years of loyal collaboration may very well have changed your mind on this point.

3. Reference says that GERENDE has no intention of resigning, and we hope this is true if you feel that he is still as valuable as he ever was. Assuming, however, for a moment that he might have in the back of his mind the idea of leaving in a few months to take a more secure and productive job while the taking is good - do you feel that if he quits at his own convenience he is entitled to the same benefits that would normally accrue to him if he had worked longer and was released at our convenience? Assuming that he were to quit next week, would you still want to pay him the proposed termination bonus? Or would you want to include in the

...continued

17 June 68

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMS-5971	12 June 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-119523

RI

CHRONO

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	N. Perkins	rc	6954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
HC/WH/Contracts		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	12 June 68	W. J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG. 1-66 (40)

DISPATCH

contract the proviso that full retirement benefits (three months salary plus one month's salary for each year worked) should apply after, say, twenty year's service, with lesser benefits to apply between now and then?

4. Could you recapitulate for us the prevailing Mexican law or custom (which is it?) on termination-at-the-convenience-of-the-employer? A number of months ago you told us that it was three months pay plus 20-days-per-year-worked, but the LIFIRE/4 and 5 MOC's said that "following local custom of termination subject only has to be paid one month's salary for each year of employment". Your proposed GERENDE terminal payment formula, (which may be a special case rather than a pattern and which, as we understand it, makes no distinction between voluntary resignation and termination-at-the-convenience-of-the-employer) is one month's pay for each full year of employment, plus three months pay at the rate applicable at the time of termination. Does this imply that the one month's pay for each year worked is computed at the rate of pay prevailing during each respective year worked? Does Mexican law or custom dictate the payment of terminal bonus to employees who resign voluntarily? (Working for WOFIRM is a very special case, obviously, and deserves exceptional financial consideration, but we do want to understand the background as it applies to commercial work so that we may have a frame of reference or point of departure).

5. We apologize for the long delay in sending this dispatch. It was originally written in March, and mislaid in transit, but we thought it had been pouched.

6. Apart from the foregoing, do you recommend any changes in GERENDE's contract which will be due for renewal on 1 October 1968?

Theresa H. BACHARDY

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING ACTION
SECRET	MARKED FOR INDEXING
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO

Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM

Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT

Amendment of Raymond H. GERENDE's Contract

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMW-8281, 2 December 1959

1. It is requested that the following amendments be made to Paragraph 11 "Terminal Payment" of Raymond H. GERENDE's contract (see reference):

a. The amount of terminal payment, in addition to one month's compensation for each full year of employment since 18 March 1955, should also include three months' pay at the rate applicable at the time of termination.

b. GERENDE's resignation upon 60 days' notice will be accepted by the government as being in its best interest, and GERENDE will be eligible for full terminal payment.

2. The revision requested in paragraph 1 a above is for the purpose of having the contract conform to Mexican law, which calls for three months' salary plus one month for each year of service. The second revision is designed to give GERENDE the option of resigning without jeopardizing his terminal payment. He has no intention of resigning, but he feels that the contract, as it stands, leaves him with no security. The terminal payment is his only retirement program, but as written it does not give him the option of retiring. The Station advised GERENDE that any request of his to retire would undoubtedly be accepted as long as there were no adverse security or operational factors, but agrees that in fairness to GERENDE, who has, in effect, chosen a career with WOFIRM, the clause should be rewritten to guarantee him a termination payment. GERENDE understands that paragraph 10 (b) of the contract will remain in force, and if invoked will deprive him of any terminal payment.

for/Bernard A. EDGEBROOK

Distribution:
3 - C/WH

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
50-6-74/2	HMMT-8751	20 February 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-119523

GERENDE - 201

9. "As reported in reference, (HMMA 32721, 7 Aug 67) GERENDE had been developing a possible access agent to LIRING. This eventually culminated in an attempted recruitment of the prospect by GERENDE. Although the attempt was unsuccessful, GERENDE exhibited considerable resourcefulness and operational skill in developing the target to a point where the recruitment attempt was possible. We plan to use GERENDE in similar roles in the future as opportunities arise, and for this reason we plan to document him with a set of false Mexican documentation. GERENDE is collecting exemplars and getting the background information needed and once the necessary data are assembled, headquarters (WOACRE) support will be requested."

HMMA 33459, 8 Nov 67
LIEMPTY progress rpt,
1 Aug thru 31 Oct 67

14-00000

file GERENDE 201

201-119523

Initial approach IDEN (who previously selected by station for this job) by Raymond H. GERENDE under cover local detective Bureau operator took place 1 July. Will pouch details after G's second meeting wit IDEN. Would appreciate traces IDEN. Local traces Negative. MEXICO CITY 2219, 21 July 67

6 B. At station directive Raymond GERENDE made contact on 18 July with a young Mexican woman* spotted by this Station as a possible candidate to act as LIRING/9's girlfriend. The girl was found to be ideal for our purposes; she is attractive and has a good head on her shoulders. She was, however, unconvinced by GERENDE's story. Further meetings are planned.

HMMA 32957, Activities Against Cuban targets, Jul 67
31 August 67

The girl* with whom Raymond GERENDE had been in contact as a possible candidate to act as LIRING/9's girlfriend finally decided that she was not interested in working for the intelligence organization he claimed to represent (with the support of false documentation).

HMMA 33425, 3 Nov 67
Ops against Cuba
1 Aug-30 Sept 67

*Silvia TREVIÑO Caspani. 201-821734

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
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INFO FILE, WH/COG1, CCS3, C/OPS, CI/OA, FI, C/IC2

S E C R E T 071810Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2711

DIRECTOR

PBRIMEN

18Sep64 47466

REF A MEXICO CITY 2514 (N34914)

B MEXICO CITY 2643 (N42349)

C. DIRECTOR 33547

1. IT OBVIOUSLY NOT POSSIBLE SGSWIRL SUBJECT REFS A AND B WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING HEG COOPERATION. AS PREVIOUSLY POINTED OUT OFFICIAL LOOKING DOCUMENTATION IS NEEDED TO ACHIEVE THIS. AS ALSO MENTIONED PREVIOUSLY, FEEL WE CAN NOT WAIT ANY LONGER (REF A SENT ON 18 AUG) IF WE ARE TO HAVE A CHANCE TO RECRUIT WHAT APPEARS BE EXCELLENT CANDIDATE FOR OUR PURPOSES.

2. IN VIEW ABOVE, STATION ISSUING FALSE U.S.GOVT LNHARP INTEL CREDENTIALS TO GERENDE TO ENABLE HIM PURSUE INITIAL CONTACTS WITH SUBJECT REFS A AND B AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WILL ADVISE RESULTS.

S E C R E T

BT

WH/1

201-821734

14-00000

ORIG: J. Stewart
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954/9041
DATE: 6 September 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 44/53 PER ___ #

CONF: WH 8 RID COPY

[X] NO INDEX

INFO: FILE VR WH/COG 8, TSD 6, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, CI/IC 2

SECRET

SEP 6 23 03Z

CITE DIRECTOR 33547

TO MEXICO CITY

PBRUMEN

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 2643 (IN 42349)

B. MEXICO CITY 2514 (IN 34914)

1. SUBJECT'S POA WAS REQUESTED ~~ON ROUTINE BASIS SINCE STATION'S REQUEST NOT MADE ON PRIORITY BASIS AND HQS UNAWARE TIME ELEMENT MENTIONED REF A.~~ WILL CABLE PROMPTLY UPON RECEIPT. MEANWHILE CAN CONTINUE ASSESSMENT AND DEVELOPMENT.

2. WE RELUCTANT @ AUTHORIZE REQUESTED DOCUMENTATION IN CASE THIS NATURE AT OUTSET. SUGGEST STATION CONSIDER SGSWIRL, ASSUMING POA BY TIME OF ARRIVAL NEXT OPERATORS LATE SEPTEMBER. IF SGSWIRL SATISFACTORY AND FURTHER BONA FIDES STILL NEEDED, DOCUMENTATION COULD THEN BE INTRODUCED.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: * Mexico City wishes to actively pursue development to point of recruitment of Sylvia TREVINO Caspari, whom Station wishes to put in orbit of LIRING-9 to elicit info on Cubans and place financial strain on him.

William V. Broe
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/COG/CICS

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. Fisher
AC/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

COPY NO.

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 28 PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 20 COPIES

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

NOTIFICATION TO
ADV COPY
ISSUED SLOTTED BY: AT:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE VR, WH/COG 8, TSD 6, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI

S E C R E T 310015Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2643

31 Jan 62 IN 42349

DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN

REF MEXICO CITY 2514 (IN 34914)

WOULD LIKE ACTIVELY PURSUE DEVLOPMENT SUBJECT PARA TWO REF TO POINT OF RECRUITMENT. THE LONGER WE WAIT TO PUSH AHEAD THE LESS CHANCES WE WILL HAVE TO RECRUIT THE GIRL. REQUEST HDQS APPROVE ISSUE OF FALSE DOCUMENTATION CITED PARA TWO REF TO GERENDE AND THAT, PENDING RECEIPT OF POA, GERENDE BE ALLOWED TO PROCEED PER REF.

S E C R E T

3T

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ACTION: WH 8 — RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/OA

S E C R E T 190110Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2514 — 19 Aug 67 IN 34914

DIRECTOR

BPRUMEN LIRING

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 2219 (IN 16109)

B. MEXICO CITY 2220 (IN 16099)

1. IN LINE WITH STATIONS PLANS TO ATTACK LIRING-9 AS LONG RANGE TARGET (SEE PARA FIVE REF A AND ANALYSIS BEING POUCHED) ACCESS AGENTS ARE BEING SOUGHT. CONSENSUS IS THAT A FEMALE IS PROBABLY BEST AVENUE DESPITE REPORT MEXICO CITY 2490 THAT HE PLANNING MARRIAGE. (LIRING-9 REGULARLY GOES OUT WITH YOUNG MEXICAN BUT HAS HAD TROUBLE WITH HER FAMILY AND IS LOOKING FOR A NEW GIRLFRIEND.)

2. SUBJ REF B APPEARS BE EXCELLENT CANDIDATE. IN TWO EXPLORATORY MEETINGS AND NUMBER FOLLOWUP TELECONS WITH GERENDE, LATTER BROACHED POSSIBILITY OF HER WORKING FOR HIM PART TIME IN NEW INVESTIGATING FIRM. SUBJ REF A REFUSED COMMIT HERSELF OVER PROPOSAL UNTIL GERENDE COULD PROVE BONAFIDES AND UNLESS HE COULD SATISFY HER THAT THE WORK WAS "SERIOUS", IMPLYING SOMETHING "OFFICIAL" (SHE MENTIONED SHE DIS[illegible] APPOINTED GERENDE NOT LNERGO MEMBER). GERENDE ASSESSMENT IS SHE MIGHT BE WILLING COOPERATE IF HE CAN REVEAL LNHARP BACKING. IF APPROVAL GIVEN BY HDQS OWN ISSUE GERENDE FALSE "DEFENSE DEPARTMENT ADVISORY COUNCIL, ARMY LIAISON STAFF" CREDENTIALS FOR BONA FIDES.

TREVINO

JOAN PA GERENDE 201

SECRET

Attachment D to HMMA-33186 3 Oct 67

AUTHENTICATION

A "Defense Department Advisory Council Card" was issued to Raymond N. GERENDE in the name of Jorge MARTINEZ DURAN. This card was issued for one operation and is to be returned after it has served its purpose.

TSD/Doc says this is U.S. Defense Dept not a translation of an ostensible Mexican card inscription

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING | XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED | ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING | MICROFILM

TO: Chief/WHD

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY/Progress Report for the Period 1 May through 31 July 1967

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information

Reference : HMMA-32068, 23 May 1967 (Previous Progress Report)

1. From 1 May through 31 July 1967, 26 operational meetings were held with Raymond H. GERENDE, Principal Agent for the LIEMPTY Project. With the exception of one unscheduled meeting, meetings during this period were prearranged and meeting times and sites were varied. The unscheduled meeting was arranged via telephone using a prearranged open code. During the absence of GERENDE, two operational meetings were held with Oliver G. SCANTLING, alternate Principal Agent for LIEMPTY, and four with LIEMPTY-4, photo lab operator. All of these meetings were prearranged.

2. GERENDE met with LIEMPTY-4, -9, -10 and -13 on a twice a week basis and with LIEMPTY-6 on a once a week basis during this period. GERENDE's meetings with these assets were all prearranged. SCANTLING met with LIEMPTY-9 and -13 on two occasions and with LIEMPTY-6 once during the absence of GERENDE.

continued...

Distribution:

3 - Chief/WHD

201

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA - 32721

DATE: 7 August 1967

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-74/3

3. All assets involved in the LIEMPTY Project performed in a satisfactory manner during this period. Effective 1 July 1967 LIEMPTY-4 and LIEMPTY-11 were given slight salary increases, because of their increased activity.

4. There were no known security incidents affecting the LIEMPTY Project or the assets involved during the three months under review.

LICALLA

5. This basehouse, the operator of which is LIEMPTY-9, provided 1277 frames of operational photographs covering the patio and garden area of PJSTEAL. LIEMPTY-9 also prepared fixed-surveillance reports, sighting reports and special notes and comments.

LILYRIC

6. The LILYRIC basehouse, which is staffed by LIEMPTY-13, -14 and -27, produced 2854 frames of operational photograph during the period. The LILYRIC basehouse operators continued to prepare fixed-surveillance reports on each member of PJSTEAL and turned these in on a weekly basis. LIEMPTY-27 resumed his duties on 1 July as scheduled and this basehouse has now reverted to its normal hours of coverage. (See reference relative to the absence of LIEMPTY-27.)

LIMITED

7. The LIMITED Basehouse, operated by LIEMPTY-6, produced 279 frames of operational photographs plus weekly fixed surveillance reports on each of the members of PJSTEAL. The LIMITED basehouse was closed from 17 through 22 July because of the illness of LIEMPTY-6. During this period LIEMPTY-6 did very little radio-alerting for the LIEMBRACE surveillance team because of the variation of the surveillance team's activities.

LIENTRAP

8. The LIENTRAP mobile photo vehicle had a decrease in activity during this period because of the dismantling of the old LIENTRAP vehicle and the modification and installation of equipment in the new vehicle. The old LIENTRAP vehicle was used to cover photographically all of the residences of opposition elements in Mexico City. As in the past LIENTRAP provided photographic coverage of addresses of the local Communist parties, residences of members of other Hemisphere parties and several PBRUMEN targets. A total of 332 frames of operational photographs were provided by LIENTRAP.

PHOTO LAB

9. LIEMPTY-4, the operator of the LIEMPTY photo lab, processed all of the operational photographs mentioned above as well as providing from 2 to 6 enlargements of 299 frames of photographs of special interest taken by the basehouses. LIEMPTY-4 does the photo processing on Tuesday and Thursday nights.

10. Raymond H. GERENDE started the development of a possible access agent to LIRING and also continued to provide support for the JMROD operation. These task being aside from his regular LIEMPTY duties. GERENDE was on vacation from 25 May through 4 June 1967.

11. There will be one administrative change during the coming period when Vincent P. RIZZUTO will assume the Case Officer responsibilities for GERENDE/LIEMPTY. No problems are envisioned in this change over. No other significant changes are planned.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INFO.

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM: Chief, WH Division

MICROFILM

SUBJECT: Renewal of Raymond H. GERENDE's Contract

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES: HMMA - 32229

Effective 1 October 1967, GERENDE's contract will be renewed with no changes for a period of one year.

T.H.B.

Theresa H. BACHARDY

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

201-119523

CS COPY

17 JUL 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-15590	11 July 1967
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-119523

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	N. Perkins		6954

RI
Chrono

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
	RECEIVED	

ABSTRACT

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	7/13	W. J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

14-00000

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Finance

FROM : Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Contract Extension for
Raymond H. Gerende

1. Effective 1 October 1967, the contract, as amended, for the subject individual, effective 1 October 1955 is extended for a period of one (1) year.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY [signature]
Contracting Officer

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION:
- MARKED FOR INDEXING
- XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
- MICROFILM

TO: Chief/WHD

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Contract of Raymond H. GERENDE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: As indicated

Reference : HMMW-15530, 2 June 1967

It is requested that the contract for Raymond H. GERENDE be renewed for the coming period without change.

For/Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - Chief/WHD

201-119523

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-32229	13 June 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-119523

14-00000

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City | X | NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INFO. | | ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM: Chief, WH Division | | MICROFILM

SUBJECT: Contract of Raymond H. GERENDE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Subject's contract expires 30 September 1967. Shall we renew it on the present basis or do you wish to suggest any amendments?

Theresa H. Bachardy
Theresa H. BACHARDY

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

201-119523
LIEMPTY-1

CROSS REFERENCE TO: CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-15530

DATE: 2 June 1967

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-119523

RI
Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	N. Perkins	sas	6954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	6/5	W. J. Kaufman

ABSTRACT

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG. 1-66

DISPATCH

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 7

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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FROM
DISSEM by 25/M
ACTION
WH 8 ☒ RID COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED
INFO
FILE VR, CCS 3, CSPS, OP 2,

27 SEP 66 IN 04583

S E C R E T 271910Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8647

DIRECTOR

REF DIRECTOR 38346*

HMMW-14620 ANSWERED BY HMMT-7164, DATED 22 SEPTEMBER 1966.

S E C R E T *REQUEST REPLY ON GERENDE'S CONTRACT

BT

SECRET

HMMT-7164 requests extension without change - memo sent forward by Reichardt's office.
WH60

Gerende
201

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

ORIG: C. BUSTOS/nr
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 26 SEP 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-119523

SECRET

ROUTING: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

DISSEM BY 21 PER ___ #

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, CCS 3 CSPS

SECRET

27 14 33Z CITE DIRECTOR 38346

TO MEXICO CITY

REQUEST CABLE REPLY HMMW-14620 ON GERENDE'S CONTRACT.

END OF MESSAGE

*HMMW-14620 notified the Station that Gerende's contract expires on 30 Sept 1966 and requests Hqs be notified whether any changes are desired and whether it should be extended.

Gerende 201

William V. Broe
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

J. Fisher
AC/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

14-00000

Jane-file

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

FROM: Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Admin/Personnel - Contract for Raymond H. GEREDE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMW-14377, dated 12 September 1966

Please extend Raymond H. GEREDE's contract for one year.

ROBERT L. EASBY

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMT-7164	22 September 1966
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: Pers

14-00000

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

INFO.

FROM: Chief, WH Division

MICROFILM

SUBJECT: Raymond H. GERENDE

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

Reference: HMMW-14620

Please reply immediately to Reference concerning GERENDE's contract since it expires on 30 September 1966.

Elsie I. SCALETTI

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

201-119523

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
CS COPY	HMMW-14877	12 September 1966
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-119523

RI
Chrono

ABSTRACT X

W#1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1.	Charlotte Bustos	mr	3654

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
	SEP 13 8 05 AM '66	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	9/12	W. J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

14-00000

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City — XX

INFO

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: Raymond H. GERENDE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMS-4239

MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

The contract for Raymond H. GERENDE expires on 30 September 1966. Please notify Headquarters whether any changes are desired and whether it should be extended for another year.

Elsie I. SCALETTI

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

6 June 1966

201-119523

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-14620	9 JUN 1966
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-119523

CS COPY

RI
Chrono
WH/Pers/Renehan

AN	FI
PG	DESK
ABSTRACT X	INDEX

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	Charlotte Bustos	nr	3654

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	6/8	J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING; XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED; ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING; MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY/Raymond H. GERENDE
Emergency Contact System

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA-15981, dated 23 November 1960 201-119523

1. In compliance with KUBARK regulation, CSI-F 230-60, the following revised and up-dated Emergency Contact System, applicable to Raymond H. GERENDE, is forwarded for Headquarters' records.

2. Insofar as can be determined at the present time, GERENDE could probably be contacted at one of the following places:

a) Present Residence: IDENTITY A
b) Present Cover Employment Address: IDENTITY B

If Subject cannot be located at either of the above addresses, he possibly could be located through LIEMBRACE-3.

3. The following oral recognition dialogue, using the English language, is to be employed as indicated:

CONTACT: "Mr. (GERENDE, true name) Your Aunt and Uncle in the 'States' asked me to look you up."

GERENDE: "Then you are referring to the IDENTITY C"

CONTACT: "No, I meant your other relatives in South Carolina, the IDENTITY D"

GERENDE: "Yes, Auntie is my Mother's sister."

4. For use as physical bona fides, the Station is forwarding herewith the right-hand portion of a one peso note bearing the serial number V997634.

continued...

Attachments:
As stated herewith
Identities u.s.c.

DOC FORWARDED W/O S/C BY RID/AN ... 1966

Distribution:
(3) - Chief, WH Division

14H

CS Copy

201-119523

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
50-6-74/3	HMMA-28333	21 February 1966
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
GERENDE Pers	SECRET	50-6-74/1

GERENDE has been given the left-hand portion bearing the same serial number and has received a briefing on its use and purpose. It has been explained to GERENDE that he is to show his half of the physical bona fides only after the recognition dialogue has been accurately completed and his new contact has requested to see his bona fides. GERENDE has also been instructed to assure himself of his contact's bona fides by asking to see the other portion of the one peso note. (NOTE: These arrangements supersede those contained in reference). After visual identification of his new contact's bona fides, GERENDE will accept the new contact as his Case Officer.

Cornelius L. Pennison [signature]

for/ Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

SECRET

ATTACHMENT TO: HMMA-28333

TO: Chief, WHD

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SECRET



14-00000

UNDER SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO: HMMA-28333, dated 13 February 1966

IDENTITIES.

A. Sierra Amatepec 336 - Apt. 3
Lomas/Barrilaco
Mexico, D. F., Mexico
Telephone - 20-31-61

B. Cia. Electrica Mexicana, S. A.
Corner of Victoria and Escape
Fraccion Alce Blanco
San Bartolo Naucalpan
Estado de Mexico
Telephone: 27-52-38

C. "The Pates"
Mr. and Mrs. A.M. PATE
501 Capitol Place
Columbia, S. C.

D. "The Kolbs"
Mr. and Mrs. R. F. KOLB
3111 Grace Hill Rd.
Columbia, S. C.

CS COPY

1 HMMA-28333 201-119523

14-00000

Date:

Mr. Raymond H. Cerendo

Dear Mr. Cerendo:

Effective 1 Oct 55 all contracts written or oral entered into between you and the United States are hereby terminated and in lieu thereof the following contract is substituted:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you for the purchase of certain information and related services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the purchase of such information and services, you will be paid an amount calculated at the rate of $3600 per annum. Payments will be made as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to the Government.

2. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for authorized operational travel. All expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in compliance with Government regulations.

3. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses, as specifically approved by the Government. Such funds will be subject to accounting in compliance with Government regulations.

4. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

5. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

6. Status. You are not an employee of the United States Government under this agreement and are not entitled to any benefits normally incident to an employee status.

7. Secrecy. All information related to this agreement conveyed through instructions, this instrument, or otherwise, is secret and shall not be divulged to any person, organization or Government in any form or manner, except as authorized by the representative of the Government executing this agreement.

stitute and be an immediate and final breach of this agreement and will result in forfeiture by you of any and all benefits which may then have accrued to you by reason of this agreement.

8. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

9. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

10. Term. This contract is effective as of 1 October 1955, and shall continue thereafter for a period of two (2) years unless sooner terminated by the Government either:

(a) By thirty (30) days' actual notice to you from the Government, or

(b) Without prior notice, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be renewed for successive periods of one year each upon notice from the Government accepted by you. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY____________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Raymond H. Carende

WITNESS:____________________

APPROVED:

____

CIT ?
OCC ?
RE CUBAN GOVERNMENT BOOK ON MEXICAN PHASE OF THE REVOLUTION

FLD INDEX ONLY

MMMA 656

[illegible]

DOB: 13 [illegible] 19[illegible] in [illegible], [illegible] Cuba

CITIZENSHIP: Cuban

OCCUPATION: Owner and Manager [illegible], S.L. [illegible]

To be used to report on activities of Cuban revolutionaries [illegible] as a political action asset. Friendship with Castro and members of the [illegible] government.

POA granted [illegible] Jun [illegible]

OA granted [illegible] June [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible], Manuel ([illegible])

[illegible] 10-1[illegible] [illegible]	[illegible] and [illegible]. Subj, Cuban [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] 17 Dec 58 [illegible]	Subj. [illegible] Cuban [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] group [illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible] 13 Oct 59	Station [illegible] Subj, former [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Fidel Castro [illegible] Fidel [illegible] intimate friend Fidel and [illegible] Cuban army [illegible]...
[illegible] 6579 [illegible] Dec 59	Source of [illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible] Manuel [illegible]

[illegible] 977[illegible], [illegible] Dec. 59. Info in file, [illegible] Dec 59.
POA/OA req'd [illegible] Dec 59. Acknowledged by [illegible], 14 Dec 59.
POA granted [illegible] January 1960. Field informed [illegible], [illegible] January 1960.
OA granted 6 June 1960. Field informed [illegible], [illegible] June 1960.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
Memo Draft	13 Sept (73?)				

DOC. SUBJECT

Results of Our Survey of Cuban Assets

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM | DATE OF INFO.

TEXT OF

1. COS Lima did well to raise the question as to what will happen, vis a vis our operational security, when the Cubans achieve diplomatic recognition in the various Latin American countries where this is gradually occuring. The responses from the Branches indicate that we do have a considerable amount of operational activity and equity that revolve around our Cuban assets and that we would do well to begin a gradual cut-back in our use of Cubans, given the targetting that we presume will be made on them as the Cuban CI effort begins in the various countries.

2. However, the solution to our problem should be a gradual one and keyed initially to where the official Cuban presence is, and then to those countries where it is coming. Therefore we start with Peru.

b. GICITRON-4, who has been Treasurer of the 26th July movement in the period 1957-58 provides the cover for LITHGOE.

X

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				
SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle) GICITRON-4	201-			

FORM 8-68 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS | SECRET | GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION | (7-46)

SECRET

15 August 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/FI

SUBJECT : GICITRON-4

a. GICITRON-4

b. Subject is used by the Bogota Station to provide cover, status and funds for an operation handled by Errol R. LITHGOE, also a Cuban, who is nominally Subject's partner in the business enterprise.

c. Cuban

d. Legitimate businessman who was formerly in Mexico and now manages a Mexican business firm in Bogota.

e. Resident alien of Colombia.

f. Subject has received no training in clandestine operations, though he was involved in several clandestine Cuban activities while treasurer of the 26th of July Movement during 1957-58.

g. Since Subject provides cover for LITHGOE, he is not required to utilize any tradecraft. Having his own company provides for adequate cover.

h. Due to his position, Subject is probably well-known in the Cuban community, but he performs no operational tasks.

SECRET

14-00000

ORIG: DON MCCABE:SV
UNIT: WH/3/CO
EXT: 5269/1034
DATE: 7 AUGUST 1972

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 11-1

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 28 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ✓ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH8 INFO FILE, VR. IP/AN

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

7 AUG 72 21 17 Z

CITE DIRECTOR

TO BOGOTA

298135

1. HQS ATTEMPTING ASSESS THREAT GROWING PBRUMEN DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN HEMISPHERE CREATES FOR GKTRUST EMPLOYED PBRUMEN ASSETS.

2. HQS RECORDS SHOW ERROL A. LYTHGOE, REGINALD M. DACIEK, GICITRON-4 AND GICITRON-5 IN BOGOTA. PLS INDICATE IF STATION HAS ADDITIONAL PBRUMEN ASSETS WE UNAWARE OF, OR OTHERS WHOSE FILES SHOULD BE REVIEWED.

3. DOES GICITRON-5 CONTINUE WORK FOR LYTHGOE ANY CAPACITY?

4. FILE 17-120-21. EX-2, APDIR, WN-SISM.

END OF MESSAGE

HQS COMMENT: BASED ON MEMORANDUM, "SURVEY OF CUBAN EXILE ASSETS," DATED 25 JULY 1972, C/WH/FI.

C/WH/FI ✓

S. V.
Mar-ago

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

CLASSIFIED BY GRH
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
APPROVAL OF DIRECTOR
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GARDNER R. HATHAWAY
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

COPY NO.

14-00000

TO: Chief of Station, Bogota

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

MICROFILM

SUBJECT: GICITRON-4 (201-267298)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HLBA-12320, 10 November 1970

Operational Approval was granted on 8 February 1971 for the use of GICITRON-4 as requested in Reference.

Ernest A. PUKALA

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - COS/Bogota

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HLBW-6561	17 FEB 1971 typed 11 February 1971
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-267298

1 - RID
1 - WH/3/C (Chrono)

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/C	BMerrell	blb (11 FEB 71)	1034R

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/3/C		Calvin M. Smyth

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	12 Feb 71	Alfonso Spera

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

14-00000

SECRET

No. 201-267298

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3/C - P. Kaylor

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of GICITRON/4 ______________________, for the purpose specified in your request dated as follows: .

As outlined in Section VI (4) of Part II (undated).

Field Notified
11 Feb 71

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

/S/ John E. Howard

CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 8 February 1971 lc

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

FORM 1-67 124 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (9)

14-00000

SECRET

2 February 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. Lally

SUBJECT : GICITRON-4 (201-267258)

REFERENCE : Form 889, dated 19 January 1971

The information on GICITRON-4 contained in DBF-9745, 16 September 1958, was located and reviewed. The information is considered non-derogatory by this Desk. It duplicated information already in Subject's 201.

Pattie S. Kaylor
WH/3/Colombia

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - 201 File
1 - 1.1 Chrono

PSKaylor:WH/3/C:blb (2 February 1971)

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE: 1 February 1971 lc
TO: C/WH/3/C - P. Kaylor	C NO. 201-267288
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /S/ John E. Howard	SUBJECT: GICITRON/4

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

	PRQ I		REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
	PRQ II		REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	FIELD TRACES		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
	RI TRACES		REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION		REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	GREEN LIST	XX	OTHERS (See Remarks)

NOTICE: [ ] FIRST [ ] SECOND [XX] THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please locate and review FBI data re Rafael Mario LLERENA Rodriguez, sent to this Agency on 8-21-58, p. 1.

Please forward your analysis as to whether this information is derogatory or non-derogatory.

Answered on 1 Feb 71.

FORM 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET (20)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 19 January 1971 lc
TO: C/WH/3/Col. P. Kaylor	C NO. 201-267298
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /S/ John E. Howard	SUBJECT: GICITRON/4

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

	PRQ I		REVIEW OF STAFF'S DOSSIER
	PRQ II		REVIEW OF STAFF'S COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	FIELD TRACES		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
	RI TRACES		REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION		REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	GREEN LIST	XX	OTHERS (See Remarks)

NOTICE: [ ] FIRST [XX] SECOND [ ] THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please locate and review FBI data re Rafael Mario LLERENA Rodriguez, sent to this Agency on 8-21-58, p. 1.

Please forward your analysis as to whether this information is derogatory or non-derogatory.

Not considered de-rog.

DBF 9745, 16 Sept 58, 100-2-18.

Located in Llerena's 201-215431.

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

188 JAN 71 SECRET (when filled in) DT-6

RID CONTROL NO. (Filled in by RID)	DOCUMENT SERVICE REQUEST		
KAYLOR PATTI GG-196 WH/3/CO 3B2627 EXT. 5269 TUBE BS4	DATE OF REQUEST		
	BRANCH 12 Jan 1971	ROOM NO.	PHONE NO.

TO:	DATE RCD.	DATE FWD.	INITIALS
1 RID/FILES DT-6			LHD
2 REQUESTER			
3 RID/FILES			
4			
5			

SUBJECT: LLERENA Rodriguez, Rafael Mario

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Use this form to request files and/or documents from RID/FILES. (Not to be used in lieu of Form 362.)
2. Include badge number and tube station in "FROM" block if gummed label has not been issued.
3. Indicate type of charge:

[X] Temporary [ ] Permanent

VERIFIED

4. Indicate source of reference:

[ ] Document reference from RID/Index.

[ ] Document reference from source other than RID/Index.

HQ FILE NUMBER	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DOCUMENT DATE
100-2-18	~~FBI report~~	~~21 August 1958~~
	DBF-9745	16/9/58

NOT FOUND IN RID FILES
If Further Search Desired
Call X7672

Called 14 JAN 1971

FORM 11-64 1870 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification (38)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE	18 December 1970 lc
TO: C/WH/3/Col - P. Kaylor	**C NO.** 201-267298
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /S/ John E. Howard	**SUBJECT:** GICITRON/4

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

	PRQ I		REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
	PRQ II		REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	FIELD TRACES		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
	RI TRACES		REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION		REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	GREEN LIST	XX	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: [ ] FIRST [ ] SECOND [ ] THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please locate and review FBI data re Rafael Mario LLERENA Rodriguez, sent to this Agency on 8-21-58, p. 1.

Please forward your analysis as to whether this information is derogatory or non-derogatory.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM: Acting Chief of Station, Bogota KNP

SUBJECT: GICITRON-4 (201-267298)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: Process for OA

REF : HLBS-2641, 28 October 1970

Forwarded herewith are three copies of Subject's updated PRQ Part II as requested in Reference.

Orrin K. Banasiak

Orrin K. BANASIAK

DISTRIBUTION:

3-Chief, WHD w/att h/w

cc forwarded CI/OA 25 NOV 1970

CS COPY

1 Att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HLBA-12320	10 November 1970
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-267298

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. *This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.*
2. *Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.*
3. *Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.*
4. *Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.*
5. *Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.*

1. CRYPTONYM

GICITRON-4 (Originally LITAMIL-1)

2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I — CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED. First contacted by Mexico Station CO Clyde SHRYOCK (ps) on 21 Oct 59 (MEXI-4554). SHRYOCK visited Subject's business office and presented self as a "friend" of Gustavo ARCOS Bergnes, who at that time was Cuban Ambassador in Brussels, Belgium and a former contact of SHRYOCK while ARCOS was in Mexico prior to 1959. Purpose of meeting was to assess Subject's attitude towards the Castro regime. Subject was subsequently utilized by Mexico City Station to assist in coordinating anti-Castro activities.
Bogota Station contact with Subject established in 1970 through Station Contract Agent under non-official cover, Errol R. LYTHGOE. GICITRON-4 and LYTHGOE are long-time friends and preformed operational tasks for JKLANCE when both werer Mexico City assets.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could be turned over to any Spanish speaking Case Officer.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

None.

CS COPY

FORM 11-58 1050a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (4-20)

SECRET

H/watt to HLBA-12320 201-267298

SECTION II	MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.")*

Subject became disillusioned with the Castro regime early in 1959 because of the communist infiltration in the Cuban revolution. Subject is strongly anti-communist and anti-Castro and thus willing to lend his services to combat these regimes.

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

Except/ for long-time relations between Subject and Errol R. LYTHGOE, No actual control exists over Subject.

SECTION III	COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

NA

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

NA

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working)*.

Subject presumably knows he is cooperating with JKLANCE

SECTION IV	INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

Subject is not known to have worked for any intelligence service.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

None.

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

None. However, Subject was involved in several Cuban clandestine movements while treasurer of the 26th of July Movement during 1957-58.

SECTION V	COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

None.

SECTION VI — **OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT**

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE WAS FURNISHED.

In 1960 Subjct was utilized by the Mexico City Station to assist in the coordination of anti-Castro activities as part of the XX AMWAIL operation. Subject was rated a reliable source by the Mexico City Station.

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

NA

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

NA

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject is used by the Bogota Station to provide cover for status and funds for an operation handled by Errol R. Lythgoe who is Subject's nominal partner in the enterprise.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

NA

SECTION VII — **PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY**

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

NA

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL OF ANOTHER AGENCY OF THIS GOVERNMENT:

NA

SECTION VIII — **AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT**

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT; I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER; REMUNERATION, IF ANY; AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject is an unpaid field agent of JKLANCE.

SECRET

SECTION IX — QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

Subject has been in Latin America for a number of years during which time he has numerous contacts and friends.

SECTION X — COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

Subject is not paid a salary by the Station.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. *(Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.)*

None

SECTION XI — CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

Mexico City Station files have been checked re Subject.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

None.

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED.	4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED
Operational Approval	6 June 1960

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

Subject is an exile Cuban businessman with a strong character who is highly respected in the Bogota business community. Subject is an independent thinker and not ~~so~~ easily manipulated.

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

In 1960 Mexico Station CO Clyde K. SHRYOCK and Subject met several times in his business office. While at the office a Cuban representative, Ricardo VIDAL Dominguels, saw SHRYOCK and on 2 occasions talked with the CO. At the time Subject felt VIDAL would not talk about these contacts to Cuban officials. This occurred ten years ago in Mexico and the Bogota Station does not believe this incident will adversely effect the present operational use of Subj

SECTION XII — SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

Subject not known to have any overt vices.

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION XIII — **AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS**

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

Boxing enthusiast

SECTION XIV — **GENERAL**

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Subject could pass as a native of any Latin American country.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRC PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

Information obtained through LIFEAT, name checks of Mexico City and Bogota Station files, Mexican Government files, Dun and Bradstreet, and Headquarters.

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para. 43b, supra.)*

NA

SECTION XV — **EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS**

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS (I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W; WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE; WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE)

Not applicable for the circumstances in which he is being used. Should there be a break between GICITRON-4 and LYTHGOE and this or another Station want to meet with him to assess him for other operational activities in the future it would only be necessary to mention his friendship with SHRYOCK and his activities in conjunction with LYTHGOE.

SECTION XVI — **MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS**

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER
	Orrin K. Brock

SECRET

201-262298

14-00000

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,

WH/3/Col - B. Merrell

NUMBER: 201-267298

SUBJECT: GICITRON/4

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated 28 October 1970 mss

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

For limited use as requested in your memo of 28 October 1970, the POA is reinstated until 30 January 1971.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/S/ John E. Howard

APPROVAL	
BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	30 October 1970

FORM 8-65 125 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET GROUP 1 (9)

14-00000

SECRET

28 October 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. Lally

SUBJECT : GICITRON-4 (201-267298)

1. We have received your memorandum of 22 October 1970 informing us that GICITRON-4's file has been closed. However, from Bogota Station correspondence we know that GICITRON-4 is still of operational interest and there is a strong probability that the missing PRQ Part II has been delayed by the recent restriction on pouching material to and from the field.

2. It is requested that the file on GICITRON-4 be reopened and his POA be extended for an additional 30 days to allow time for the PRQ Part II to arrive or to be prepared if need be.

Burdell Merrell
WH/3/Colombia

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - 1.1 File
1 - 201 File

WH/3/C:BMerrell:blb (28 October 1970)

SECRET

14-00000

TO	
Acting Chief of Station, Bogota	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division	MICROFILM
SUBJECT: GICITRON-4 (201-267298)	

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: Forward PRQ Part II

REFERENCE: HLBS-2626, 15 September 1970

1. We have been notified that the POA for GICITRON-4 was cancelled on 22 October 1970 because we failed to provide a PRQ Part II showing the details of our present relations with him. We made an attempt to complete this Part II here at the desk, but found that there were too many items of information that we do not have.

2. We have requested that GICITRON-4's POA be extended for an additional 30 days to allow time to provide the Part II. We indicated that perhaps the document has been delayed by the recent pouch restrictions.

3. We would appreciate the receipt of the PRQ Part II within the next 30 days. If it has crossed this dispatch in the mail, please disregard this notice.

Ernest A. PUKALA

DISTRIBUTION:
2-ACOS/Bogota

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HLBS-2641	30 OCT 1970 typed 28 October 1970
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-267298

1 - RI (F201)
1 - Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/C	BMerrell	blb (28 October 1970)	1034R

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/3/C	28 Oct 70	Calvin M. Smyth

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	28 Oct 70	Alfonso Spera

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG. 11-69 (40)

DISPATCH

SECRET

CANCELLATION TO DIVISION

DATE 22 October 1970 lc

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/WH/3/C

Cmy
PSR -
what is status?

ATTENTION : C. Roberson, Jr.

201- 267298

C

The file on GICITRON/4 is cancelled and closed in CI/OA for the following reason:

Failure to submit PRQ-II as required under CSI No. 10-5 or to indicate any further interest in obtaining approval for the operational use of Subject.

Field notified 28 Oct 70

Prior to any future use of Subject, it will be necessary to furnish a new approval request (Form #772) to CI/OA.

/S/ John E. Howard

CHIEF, CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

DISPATCH | SECRET

TO: Chief of Station, Bogota

INFO.

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: GICITRON-4 (201-267298)

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Please forward PRQ Part II.

The POA on GICITRON-4 expired on 6 September 1970. Please submit a PRQ Part II based on the current proposed use of GICITRON-4 within 30 days.

Gracia V. TILLING

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - COS/Bogota

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HLBS-2626

DATE: 16 SEP 1970 / 15 Septembe

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-267298

ORIGINATING

OFFICE | OFFICER | TYPIST | EXT.

1 - RI (F201)
1 - Chrono

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL | DATE | OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL: C/WH/3 | DATE: 15 S 70 | OFFICER'S SIGNATURE: for Alfonso Spera

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE	7 September 1970 JR
TO: WH/3/C C. Roberson, Jr.	C NO. 201-267298
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /S/ John E. Howard	SUBJECT: GICITRON/4

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

	PRQ I		REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
X	PRQ II		REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	FIELD TRACES		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
	RI TRACES		REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION		REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	GREEN LIST		OTHERS (See Remarks)

NOTICE: [ ] FIRST [ ] SECOND [ ] THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Limited POA expired 6 September 1970. Please submit PRQ II. If, within 30 days, no further interest in Subject has been indicated, POA will be automatically cancelled.

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Bogota

INFO.

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: Forwarding of PRQ's I and II on GICITRON-4

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None.

REFERENCE : HLBS-2533, 6 April 1970

Forwarded herewith as Attachment 1 for Station information and the file are two (2) copies of PRQ Part II for GICITRON-4 (formerly LITAMIL-1). Separate Cover Attachment, Number 2, to this dispatch consists of two (2) copies of PRQ Part I.

Gracia V. TILLING

ATTACHMENTS:
1. PRQ Part II, h/w
2. PRQ Part I, u/s/c

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - COS/Bogota (w/atts 1 & 2 [two copies each], h/w & u/s/c)

20 MAY 1970

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HLBS-2564	~~15 MAY 1970~~ 13 May 1970
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-267298

1 - RI (201)
1 - Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/C	PSKaylor	ecw (13 May 70)	9494R

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/3/C	13 May 70	Calvin M. Smyth

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	13 May 70	Alfonso Spera

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG. 11-66

DISPATCH

14-00000

PRQ NO.

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

DOI-11/27/5 PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA"
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed.

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) (Nee)

Manuel MACHADO Llores

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT

3. NAME AT BIRTH (If different than Item 1.)

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME (State time, reason for and place of use)

"Manoelito"

5. DATE OF BIRTH

1? December 1913

6. PLACE OF BIRTH

Auras, Oriente

7. PERSONAL HABITS (Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)

8. COURT RECORD (Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals)

9. DESCRIPTION (Use American standards of measurements, if possible)

a. SEX	b. AGE	c. APPARENT AGE	d. HEIGHT	e. WEIGHT	f. COMPLEXION	g. FACE (Shape)
M			FT. 5 IN. ?	135 lbs		

h. COLOR OF HAIR	i. COLOR OF EYES	j. TEETH	k. BUILD	l. POSTURE
black	brown			

m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

n. GENERAL APPEARANCE

o. PROMINENT FEATURES

p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING: ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE

FORM 2-61 1050 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

(4-20)

SECTION II	CITIZENSHIP
10. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP	11. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS (If different than Item 10.)

12. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS (If different than Item 12.)

14. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

15. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE (Countries, dates and purposes)

United States
Cuba - 1959

SECTION III	OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA	
16. PRESENT OCCUPATION	17. TITLE	18. SALARY (Per annum)

19. FINANCIAL STATUS (Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)

(Well-off financially)

SECTION IV	ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

20. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

21. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

Former Treasurer of the 26 of July Movement in Mexico

SECTION V — EDUCATIONAL DATA

22. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	DEGREE RECEIVED

23. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE (List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ YES	READ NO	WRITE YES	WRITE NO	SPEAK YES	SPEAK NO	UNDERSTAND YES	UNDERSTAND NO
Spanish	X		X		X		X	

SECTION VI	SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

24. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

25. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

SECTION VII	MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES		UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
	FROM	TO			

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY, INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

SECTION VIII	EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: *INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.*

26	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER		c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
27	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER		c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
28	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER		c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
29	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER		c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
30	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER		c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING

14-00000

SECTION IX — MARITAL STATUS

31. CHECK ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

32. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

33. NAME OF SPOUSE *(First)* *(Middle)* *(Nee)* *(Last)*	
34. DATE OF MARRIAGE	35. PLACE OF MARRIAGE
36. DATE OF BIRTH	37. PLACE OF BIRTH
38. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH	39. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS
40. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Last residence, if deceased)*	

SECTION X — CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD *(Identify child and give his, or her, present address)*

SECTION XI — FATHER

41. FULL NAME	42. YEAR OF BIRTH	43. PLACE OF BIRTH	44. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
45. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	46. OCCUPATION	47. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SECTION XII — MOTHER

48. FULL NAME	49. YEAR OF BIRTH	50. PLACE OF BIRTH	51. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
52. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	53. OCCUPATION	54. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SECTION XIII	BROTHERS AND SISTERS				
FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Pablo MACHADO Llorens	X				

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER *(Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address)*

SECTION XIV — RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

55. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE; INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

56. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. *(Explain relationship)*

57. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. *(Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted)*

58. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV — PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

59. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

SECTION XVI — MISCELLANEOUS

DATE	SIGNATURE

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.
2. Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.
3. Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.
4. Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.
5. Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.

1. CRYPTONYM: GICILLON-4 (Originally LITAMIL-1)

2. PSEUDONYM:

SECTION I — CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

Case officer, Clyde K. SHRYOCK (ps), made contact with LITAMIL-1 on 21 Oct 59 (MEXI-4554). Case officer went to the business office of Subject as a "friend" of Gustavo ARCOS y Bergnes, who is presently Cuban Ambassador in Brussels, Belgium, and formerly a contact of Case Officer's while ARCOS was in Mexico prior to the downfall of BATISTA. Case Officer made contact with Subject in order to "feel him out" re his attitude toward the CASTRO regime.

Station, through LIFEAT, was able to evaluate Subject well before the approach was made.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could be turned over to any Case Officer with a speaking knowledge of Spanish.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

None

SECTION II — MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.")*

Subject, a highly [illegible] business man in Mexico, supported 26 of July Movement for idealistic reasons, i.e. rid the country of BATISTA & bring democracy again to Cuba. However, Subject has been convinced that the CASTRO regime has been infiltrated by Communists and CASTRO, his former friend, has done nothing about it. Subj, therefore, is motivated by patriotism, i.e., to rid Cuba of the

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

Case Officer has little control or no control over Subject, it is more of a cooperative arrangement wherein Subject is willing to assist PBPRIME in its desire to get rid of CASTRO.

SECTION III — COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Meeting usually at LITAMIL-1's business office, where Case Officer could pass as a client

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

Subject, a long time friend of officials of the Cuban Embassy, merely listens to his friends relate their problems & activities.

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working)*.

Subject knows he is cooperating with PBPRIME intelligence agency.

SECTION IV — INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

Subject is not known to have worked for any intelligence service, however, his service with the 26 of July Movement during the period 1957-58, has equipped him well for intelligence work.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

LITAMIL-2 knows that Subject is cooperating with PBPRIME.

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

None. However, Subject was involved in several clandestine movements while treasurer of the 26 of July Movement during 1957-58.

SECTION V — COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

Cuban Government.

SECRET

SECTION VI	OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE WAS FURNISHED.

During 1958 Subject was aware of Gustavo ARCOS' contact with the Case Officer and on one occasion called the Case Officer to say that ARCOS would not be able to make a meeting.

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

Subject obtains his information from officials in the Cuban Embassy as a friend.

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Subject is aware that the information he provides is sent to Washington.

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject will assist in coordinating anti-CASTRO activities in Mexico as part of the AMWAIL operation.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

NA

SECTION VII	PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

NA

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL OF ANOTHER AGENCY OF THIS GOVERNMENT:

NA

SECTION VIII	AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT, I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER, REMUNERATION, IF ANY, AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject is an unpaid field agent of KUBARK.

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION IX — **QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS**

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

Subject owns a printing plant and therefore could if necessary provide printed material clandestinely.

SECTION X — **COMMITMENTS**

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

Subject will be given gifts at appropriate times during the year.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. *(Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.)*

None

SECTION XI — **CE AND SECURITY**

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

Station Havana and Headquarters files have been checked re Subject.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

A financial check by Dun and Bradstreet was also run on Subject.

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED.	4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED
Provisional Operational Approval	8 J[illegible]

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

Subj is a liberal Cuban businessman who dedicated time & money to the Cuban 26 of July Movement in Mexico during 57-58. He is of strong character & highly thought of by most members of the Cuban colony in Mexico. He is an independent thinker & cannot be pushed around

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

The Case Officer has met LITAMIL-1 on several occasions during the past year at his business office. While at the office, Ricardo VIDAL Dominguels, Cuban Chargeas has been Case Officer at the office and on two occasions talked with Case Officer. LITAMIL-1 believes that VIDAL will not talk about these contacts to Cuban officials.

SECTION XII — **SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS**

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

Subject not known to have any obvious vices.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

SECTION XIII	AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

Boxing enthusiast

SECTION XIV	GENERAL

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Subject could pass as a native of any Latin American country.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

Information obtained through LIFEAT, name checks Station files, Mexican Government files, Dun and Bradstreet, and Headquarters.

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para. 63b, supra)*

NA

SECTION XV	EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W: WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE: WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

NA

SECTION XVI	MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS

Subject is owner and operator of a print shop employing approximately 50 employees

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER

SECRET

MARKED FOR INDEXING

TO: Chief of Station, Bogota

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INFO.

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

MICROFILM

SUBJECT: GICITRON-4

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. HLBT 1475
B. DIRECTOR 006731

Headquarters will prepare PRQs I and II and forward copies to Station Bogota. Reference B was a summary of pertinent information from GICITRON-4's 201 file.

Anita G. POMARLEN

Distribution:
2 - COS/Bogota

08 APR 10 8 1970

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: ~~HLBS 2533~~

DATE: 10 APR 1970 ~~6 April 1970~~

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-267288

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/C	Judy Hoopes	(mac 6 April 1970)	9494

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/3/C	7 Apr 70	Calvin M. Smyth

~~1~~ - RI
1 - Chrono

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DC/WH/3	7 Apr 70	Richard Conolly

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING ACTION
SECRET	MARKED FOR INDEXING
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Bogota

SUBJECT: GICITRON-4

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. HLBS-2503, 16 March 1970

B. BOGOTA 3483, 20 January 1970.

1. The receipt of Reference A Provisional Operational Approval for Subject was much appreciated. We were puzzled, however, by the request for PRQ Parts I and II on GICITRON-4 since all biographic and operational data on him with the exception of References and DIRECTOR 006731 is on record only at Headquarters as far as we are aware unless Mexico City has retained their old file on him. Paragraph 3 of Reference B specifically requested that pertinent material from Subject's 201 be forwarded to Bogotá, but we have never received it.

2. Errol C. Lythgoe, despite his old friendship with Subject, has no present justifiable reason consistent with cover to question him regarding all the biographic details required for preparation of a full PRQ Part I. Nor could Lythgoe logically elicit from Subject the answers to such PRQ Part II items as "How, when, where, why and by whom Subject was first contacted or developed" by KUROCK, "List other case officers who have handled Subject or whom he knows or has known...", and the like.

3. Subject's proposed present operational use is detailed in Reference B, and Headquarters has the rest of the basic data necessary for preparation of both parts of the PRQ. It is therefore suggested that this be done at Headquarters, with copies being forwarded to Bogotá for updating.

Joseph R. KENDON

DISTRIBUTION:
Original and two - Chief, WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HLBT-4475	25 March 1970
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-267298

14-00000

S E C R E T

TO: Chief of Station, Bogota

INFO:

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: GICITRON-4

Reference: A. BOGOTA 3483
B. DIRECTOR 06731

1. On 6 March 1970 a POA was granted GICITRON-4 to permit him to form a corporation to provide funding cover for Errol R. LYTEGOE. No other operational use is authorized.

2. Please submit a PRQ I and II as soon as possible.

Anita G. POMARLEN

Distribution:
2 - COS/Bogota

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HLBS 2503

DATE: 17 MAR 1970
16 March 1970

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-267298

~~1~~ - RI (201-267298)
1 - Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/C	Judy Hoopes	(mc 16 Mar 70)	9494

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/3/C	16 Mar 70	Calvin M. Smyth

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	16 Mar	Alfonso Spera

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,

WH/3/Col - C. Smyth

NUMBER
201-267238

SUBJECT
GICTTROE/4

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
22 January 1970 mse

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

To form a corporation to provide cover for Bogota Station asset Errol R. LYTEGOE business and funds on a strict need-to-know. No other operational use authorized.

Station notified 13 MAR 1970 J.L.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/S/ John B. Howard

APPROVAL	
BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	6 March 1970

FORM 8-65 125 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(9)

14-00000

SECRET

4 March 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Counter Intelligence/Operational Approval and Support Group

ATTENTION : Mr. Jack Lally

SUBJECT : GICITRON-4 (201-267298)

A review of the Staff D dossier on Subject reveals no derogatory information.

Joel H. Beyer
WH/3/C

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - CI/OA
~~1~~ - (201-267298)
1 - Memo Chrono
1 - Extra copy file

WH/3/C-JHBeyer:mac/x9494 (4 March 70)

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 24 February 1970 mss
TO: WH/3/C - C. Roberson, Jr.	C NO. 201-267293
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /S/ John E. Howard	SUBJECT: GICITECH/4

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

	PRQ I	X	REVIEW OF STAFF'D DOSSIER to CI/OA
	PRQ II		REVIEW OF STAFF'D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	FIELD TRACES		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
	RI TRACES		REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION		REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	GREEN LIST		OTHERS (See Remarks)

NOTICE: [ ] FIRST [X] SECOND [ ] THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 9 February 1970 mss

TO: WH/3/C - C. Roberson, Jr.

C NO.: 201-257298

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA
/S/ John E. Howard

SUBJECT: GICITRON/4

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

	PRQ I	X	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER TO CI/CA
	PRQ II		REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	FIELD TRACES		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
	RI TRACES		REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION		REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	GREEN LIST		OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: FIRST / SECOND / THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK

DATE ~~22 Jan 70~~

TO CHIEF, FI/D

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LETTERS - SURNAME IN UPPER-CASE) 201-267291

MACHADO Llosa, Manuel

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.

"Manuelito"

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH

~~12 Dec 13, Auras, Oriente, Cuba~~

4. CITIZENSHIP

Cuban

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION

Manager for Colombia of Galas y Cia., Mexican-headquartered Printing firm, Bogota, Colombia

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION

Printing

ORIGINATING OFFICER

NAME C. Roberson, Jr.

OFFICE DESIGNATOR WH/3/C

ROOM, BUILDING 3B 2627

EXTENSION ~~X-R-9494~~

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)

- ☐ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
- ☐ ADDITIONAL DATA
- ☒ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)

- ☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
- ☒ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
- ☐ OTHER

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Owner and Manager of "Machado, S.A." (Lithograph Plant)	Tlalpan #710 Mexi City, Mexi	Nov 59
Treasurer, 26th July Movement	Mexico City	'59

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

9. DESCRIPTION (HEIGHT) (WEIGHT) (EYES) (HAIR) (RACE) (OTHER)

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES

Pablo MACHADO Llosa (Brother)

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)

All information

FEB 10 53 AM '70

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY. SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI 10-7

FORM 6-61 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (9)

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

TO: C. Roberson, Jr.

FEB 1970
DATE

FROM: FI/D

A. [XXX] SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. [ ] A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. [ ] WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. [ ] FI/D HAS NO PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. [ ] THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

ORIG: C. M. Smyth
UNIT: C/WH/3/C
EXT: 9494
DATE: 30 Jan 70

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 7 PER #

INDEX | DESTROY | RETURN TO ___ BRANCH | FILE RID

NO INDEX | FILE IN CS FILE NO.

RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 31 18 02Z JAN 70 CITE DIRECTOR 006731

BOGOTA INFO MEXICO CITY PANAMA CITY

GICITRON TECES

REF: BOGOTA 3483 (IN 010310)*

1. SUBJECT PARA 2 REF ASSIGNED GICITRON-4 AND 201-267298. HE WAS ORIGINAL MEMBER 26TH OF JULY MOVEMENT BUT BECAME DISILLUSIONED WITH ADMINISTRATIVE INCOMPETENCE OF CASTRO REGIME (HE INVESTED $50,000 IN REVOLUTION) AND SOVIETIZATION OF CUBA. HE TURNED AGAINST CASTRO IN 1959 AND WITH OTHER ANTI-CASTRO REVOLUTIONARIES SUPPLIED ARMS TO CUBAN COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES FROM HIS EXILE IN MEXICO. WHILE IN MEXICO HE HAD EXCELLENT CONTACTS IN CUBAN DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES AND WITH CUBAN UNITED NATION AND MEXICAN POLICE OFFICIALS. HE WAS RATED RELIABLE SOURCE BY STATION MEXICO CITY. HE WAS GRANTED OA 6 JUNE 60 FOR ASSISTING IN COORDINATION OF ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO AS PART OF AMWAIL OPERATION. BY 1963, HOWEVER, HIS OPERATIONAL CONTACTS HAD BECOME MARGINAL AND THEREAFTER HE WAS NOT USED BY STATION. THERE IS NO INFO AT HQS TO PRECLUDE YOUR PROPOSED USE OF HIM. WE PROCESSING POA.

AN | AB | IN | RS | BY | DEC | NPD | FI | 201/3/C

201-267298
31 JAN 70

CONTINUED . . .

CS COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER | SECRET | GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

 COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION FEB 3 9 08 AM '70
BY ____ PER ____

INDEX / DESTROY / RETURN TO ____ BRANCH / FILE RID
NO INDEX / FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: RID/EDI RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR RID/EDI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 006731

TO PAGE TWO

2. CONCUR IN REF PROPOSAL THAT IMPROVEMENT GICITRON RECEPTION COULD IMPROVE PRODUCT AND, HENCE, WORTH PURSUING. THOUGHT OCCURS TO HQS THAT GISOY-92, BEING AWARE GICITRON OPERATION, WOULD PROBABLY SUSPECT PROPOSED LYTHGOE COVER OFFICE IN GICITRON BUILDING IS NEW LP. DO YOU PLAN MAKF GISOY-92 WITTING OF LYTHGOE ROLE? IF NOT, WOULD HE BE PIQUED IF HE LATER LEARNED OF IT? WHAT REPERCUSSIONS COULD THIS HAVE ON STATION/GISOY RELATIONS? WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS.

3. FILE: 201-267298.

END OF MESSAGE

* Ref proposed renting office space in building where Novosti news agency is located so that Station could acquire closer LP for monitoring "take" from present tech installation of Novosti.

WH/1 E. Sukenlaiis
WH/2/P Schafer
SB/X/WH R.L. Velty
TSD/AOB - Mr. Collyer (by phone)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

Spera
ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

COPY NO.

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION
(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 22 Jan 70

TO:
- X CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
- CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
- CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: C. Roberson, Jr.
WH-3-C 3B 2627
X. R-9494

SUBJECT: (True name) MACHADO Llosa, Manuel C-80433

PROJECT:

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:
LITAMIL-1 (Former Crypt)
"Manuelito"
GICITRON-4

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 201-267298

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

X	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		COVERT NAME CHECK
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO field investigation)
	CONTRACT TYPE A		CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

Bogota, Colombia

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

To form a corporation to provide cover for Bogota Station asset Errol R. LYTHGOE business and funds.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	X	

JAN 27 3 07 PM '70

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? YES NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

X	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED		PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	X	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO:

6. RI TRACES

NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD
X	NO DEROGATORY INFO.		DEROGATORY ATTACHED
	LIST SOURCES CHECKED Bogota & Madrid Station		SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
	NOT INITIATED (Explanation)		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER: [signature] | EXTENSION: R-9494 | SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF: [signature]

FORM 2-65 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

27 January 1965 travelled from Mexico City to Venezuela on a tourist visa.

14 April 1964 travelled from Cuba to Mexico on Ppt #696, file # 532/59 issued 19 January 1959. The passport was extended 14 April 1964 for 3 years by the Cuban ~~EMBASSY~~ Consul, Mexico City.

WH/3/C

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

MACHADO Llosa, Manuel		201-267298

WH/3/C

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/CA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT

OF THIS 201

FORM 7-58 44 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ABSTRACT FILE SLIP (18)

2 Feb 70

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201- 26 72 98

FORM 8-68 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET (7-46)

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

MACHADO, MANUEL

SFK M 005 ?

CIT ?
OFC ?
RE CUBAN GOVERNMENT BOOK ON MEXICAN PHASE OF
THE REVOLUTION

050-006-128/03
HMMA-33839
17 JAN 68
050-6-128/4
P2

UFG 050

FLD INDEX ONLY

WH/COG Cards
20 Jan 1970

Llanes.
MACHADO, Manuel — (201-267998)
[illegible] of Pablo [illegible]

Subj., Cuban exile in Mexico, has done well financially in own printing establishment, Manuel Machado S.A., located at [illegible] 710, Mexico, D.F. — [illegible] 3 Jan 60

Cuban businessman in Mexico & one of [illegible] of [illegible] Representatives. His business address is Calzada de [illegible] 710, Mexico, D.F. [illegible] entitled Circular de Organizacion from [illegible], Fidel exile in Miami. — 3 Jan 59

Subject says the airplane recently seized from Cuban exiles by the [illegible] will be returned to them. Subject [illegible] Cuban [illegible] in [illegible] in Mexico, and is owner of printing [illegible] Machado S.A., [illegible] Mexico City. (File: [illegible]) — [illegible] Jan 59

Subj. planned to leave Mexico City for Havana 13 June 1959. [illegible] June he expected to leave for New York. Hopes to be back in Mexico City on Sunday 14 June. Prime purpose is going to Havana was to report to Fidel Castro the excellent work being done by Salvador Massip Valdes, Cuban ambassador in Mexico. Massip is being considered for a position in Castro's cabinet. — [illegible] 15 June 1959 [illegible]

MACHADO Llanes, Manuel — 201-267998

Subj leaving [illegible] for [illegible] 12 Feb and will [illegible] Raul [illegible], Pedro [illegible], [illegible] Perez. Returning [illegible] 17 Feb at latest. — [illegible] 12 Feb 61

Reliably reported that subj was approached, in late Dec 59, by [illegible] Fuentes while in Mex City. Purpose of contact was to have subj inform [illegible] of people in Cuba who could provide arms for Alfaro Siqueiros group in Mexico. Alfaro Siqueiros, well-known Mex artist, reported heading group seeking a leftist-Communist overthrow of GOM. — [illegible] 3 Jan 60

Add. inf. available in [illegible]. 201-267998.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 21

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 16 PER

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT: WH 8 — INFO: FILE, VR RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, FI 2, TSD 6

ACTION NO. 881

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY: 1

S E C R E T 261705Z JAN 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 2329 (PRALLETT ACTING)

MEXI

BOGOTA INFO DIRECTOR, PANAMA CITY

GICITROH TECHS 26 JAN IN 013404

REF: BOGOTA 3483 (IN 010310)

1. NO DATA MEXICO CITY STATION WHICH MILITATES AGAINST USING MACHADO PER PARA 2, REF.

2. FILE: 201-267298.

S E C R E T

AN UG
AB
IP
FS
X
DDC HFD
SI
WH/1

WH/1, CI

CS COPY

SECRET

201-267298
26 JAN 70

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED WH/3/C

SECRET (When Filled In)

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CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 33 PER

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

ACTION UNIT: WH 8

FILE, VR RI/AN CI CI/OPS CI/RA FI2 TSD6 CCS2

ACTION NO. 482

S E C R E T 202245Z JAN 70 CITE BOGOTA 3483

DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY INFO: PANAMA CITY

GICITRON TECHS

20 JAN 70 IN 010310

1. STATION HAS LEARNED OF SPACE BECOMING AVAILABLE IN GICITRON TARGET BUILDING WHICH SHOULD IMPROVE RECEPTION AND THEREFORE TAKE CONSIDERABLY. FOR VARIETY REASONS BELIEVE ERROL R. LYTHGOE (FOR MEXI: FORMERLY LITAINT-1) SHOULD RENT AND SERVICE AND TOLD HIM TO FORM A COMPANY WHICH COULD PROVIDE COVER FOR THIS. HE SAID HE HAD ALREADY FORMED ONE FOR TAX PURPOSES IN CONJUNCTION WITH MANUEL MACHADO LLOSA, (201-267298) CUBAN MANAGER FOR COLOMBIA OF GALAS Y CIA., MEXICAN-HEADQUARTERED PRINTING FIRM. MACHADO IS LONG-TIME FRIEND OF LYTHGOE WHO PERFORMED OPS TASKS FOR RVROCK IN MEXICO AND IS AWARE OF LYTHGOE'S OPERATIONAL HISTORY.

AN
AB
FI

2. IF THERE NO DATA HEADQUARTERS OF MEXICO WHICH MILITATES AGAINST USING MACHADO OPERATIONALLY REQUEST HEADQUARTERS OBTAIN CLEARANCE OF PRIORITY BASIS TO PROVIDE COVER FOR LYTHGOE'S BUSINESS AND FUNDS. ALTHOUGH HE NOT TO BE INVOLVED DIRECTLY IN OPERATING IT MUST BE EXPECTED THAT,

CS COPY

SECRET

201-267298

20 JAN 70

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY [ ] ISSUED [ ] SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: [ ] YES [ ] NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

[ ] FILE RID [ ] RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE TWO CITE BOGOTA 3483 S E C R E T

CUBANS BEING CUBANS, HE WILL BE MORE THAN GENERALLY

AWARE OF WHAT IS GOING ON.

ADVISE SOONEST IF ANY HINDRANCE TO USING MACHADO SINCE MUST

MOVE FAST TO SECURE THE SPACE.

3. PLEASE FORWARD PETINENT MATERIALS FROM

MACHADO 201, CRYPTONYM AND 201 NUMBER.

4. NO INDEX. FILE MACHADO 201.

S E C R E T

* PORTION GARBLED - BEING SERVICED

8 JAN 1970

08

SECRET

14-00000

PRQ PART I EQUIVALENT

NAME: MACHADO Llosa, Manuel

DPOB: 12 December 1913, Auras, Oriente, Cuba

OCCUPATION: Manager for Colombia of Galas y Cia., Mexican-Headquarted Printing Firm in Bogota, Colombia

CITIZENSHIP: Cuban

BROTHER: Pablo MACHADO Llosa

SECRET

201 PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE TYPE OR PRINT

TO: RID/201 Section Room GA-20 Tube Address DW-6						DATE		
FROM: Name		OFFICE		ROOM		PHONE		TUBE ADDRESS
1. TYPE ACTION		OPEN / AMEND	2. FILE RESTRICTED		YES / NO	3. PERMANENT CHARGE		YES / NO
4. TRUE NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)						5. 201 NO.		

6. NAME VARIANTS AND TELECODES (*see Instructions, item 6*)

TYPE	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)
M2			
M2			
M2			
M2			
M2			

7. SEX F1 M F | 8. DATE OF BIRTH F1 | 9. COUNTRY OF BIRTH G1 | 10. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH G1

11. CITIZENSHIP H1 | 12. OCCUPATION (*clear text*) J1 OCC. CODE J2 | 13. SWL

14. ORGANIZATION OR INTELLIGENCE AFFILIATION — OI CODE M1

15. DOCUMENT SYMBOL & NUMBER — DATE | 16. RESIDENCE

17. COMMENTS (*text for Index cards*)

18. COUNTRY OF LOCATION CODE | 19. ACTION DESK CODE | 20. SECONDARY DESK CODE

21. INFORMATION ADDRESSEES

22. CRYPTONYM 4 | HAND CARRY OR FORWARD BY TUBE IF TRUE NAME APPEARS ABOVE.

23. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTER | 201 NO.

FORM 12-67 831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(36-51)

EXT. 5126 3B2627 TUBE 8S4

IDENTIFICATION REQUEST

DATE: 19 Jan 70

RID CONTROL NO.

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE	INITIALS
RID/INDEX	DT-5		21-1-70	ml
REQUESTER				②
RID/FILES	DT-6			
REQUESTER				③
RID/ANALYSIS	GT-7			
RID/201	DW-6			
RID/INDEX	DT-5			

CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS

JAN 21 3 07 PM '70

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME: MACHADO LLOSA

GIVEN NAMES: MANUEL

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED

201 NO. IF KNOWN

AKA, ALIASES

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.): CUBAN MANAGER FOR COLOMBIA OF GALAS y CIA, MEXICAN HQS PRINTING FIRM.

SEX: M | DATE OF BIRTH | PLACE OF BIRTH | CITIZENSHIP | RESIDENCE: BOGOTA, COLOMBIA

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK

NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION

✓ CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED

COMMENTS: C-25 [illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

IN ALL CASES

① Use gummed label; type or print all entries.

② Upon receipt of index card reproductions draw a green diagonal line across the items you do not want.

③ Edit (use green) the reproduced index cards to indicate:

(a) cards to be destroyed (mark with green D and note reason for destruction) Examples: document destroyed; duplicate or less informative than retained information; information of no CS value.

(b) corrections and additions, including infinity symbol ∞ when card includes all facts contained in the document.

201 CONSOLIDATION

1. Return this form with the card reproductions, also return pertinent documents, aperture cards and the dossier if a 201 on the subject exists.

2. For each document to be included in the consolidation (i.e., copy or cross reference to be placed in the 201 file), green D the corresponding card and check (a) or (b) below:

(a) ☐ Consolidate into 201-

(b) ☐ Open 201 file on subject.

RESTRICTION (If any)

CRYPTONYM ASSIGNED: YES / NO

OTHER INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS

FILE TO BE KEPT: RID / DESK

Note 1. Records of COI, SSU, OSS and CIG are in RID/ARD, and those that meet indexing criteria in CSHB 70-1-1 are carded in the CS Main Index. If you believe there could be additional information of value in these records, you must request an Archives Index search.

Note 2. Information concerning foreign public personalities (except military) may be available in BR/OCR x7997.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER

FORM 362 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-8-38)

@ 'MANUELITO'
Δ MEXICO
OWNER AND MANAGER OF 'MACHADO, S. A.'
/LITHOGRAPH PLANT/. LEADER OF 26 JULY GROUP,
CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY. /MEP/

ELOSA, MANUEL B. | IN 45700 Lima 387

Peru- 17 Jun 48 | OUT 6458 From: CIA To: State

New Minister of Finance.

310603

MACHADO, Manuel Vieira | 61-0-1-40y (HPLA-1538) (Book I) (Pg. 94)

VIEIRA MACHADO, Manuel

THIS CARD FILED IN MAIN INDEX

9 MAR 55

MACHADO, Manuel Richard
Born: 12 February 1925
Hudson, Massachusetts

The files of SO (Security Office) contains information on the subject of this card.

313127

14-00000

RES. OCCUPATION

THIS CARD FILED IN MAIN INDEX

16 Jul 57

013123

MACHADO, Manuel Richard
Born: 12-Feb 1925
Hudson, Mass,

[illegible] (SECO) [illegible] this card

[illegible] FILE

013123 IN MAIN INDEX

MACHADO, MANUEL JOAQUIM LOPES (DE) (SA)
201-852461*

SEX M DOB 20 JAN 35
PORTUGAL, MASOUCO
CIT PORTUGAL
OCC DIPLOMAT
REF HBB -1000, 12 MAY 69

TYPE NAME T
OCC CODE DIPT

OI CODE ?

< BRAZIL, BRASILIA
COUNSELLOR IN BRASILIA, BRAZIL
HUSBAND OF (SA) MACHADO, REGINA

010010061HBBHBROPL 6906111271

MACHADO, MANUEL GINESTAL /DR./

061-004-117
CPL -00808 E01
09 JUN 60
P 27

SEX M DOB ?

CIT PORTUGAL
Δ RUA DE S. NICOLAU, 36
MEMBER OF THE SANTAREM DISTRICT COMMISSION OF THE MOVIMENTO DE UNIDADE DEMOCRATICA /MUD/ AS OF 1947.

013123

MACHADO, Antonio Mendonca
MENDONCA, Catelina Adelaide
de FREITAS, Maria Alice
MACHADO, Celina M. Freitas
MACHADO, Antonio Mendonca Jr.
MACHADO, Jose Mendonca

AZORES

This card filed in
MAIN INDEX 15 Jan 1954
USA
"

SPONSORS:

013124

MACHADO, Manuel

Madrid-X-2-Pts-10
Folder M

013117

R-1763

REFERENCE CARD

MACHADO, MANUEL

Writes German and Italian propaganda for Legiones y Falange.

8-13 Jan. 2, 1943

013121

MACHADO, Manuel Richard

200-[illegible]

THIS CARD FILED
6MAY 1954
IN MAIN INDEX

013126

SECRET

T ED

MACHADO, MANUEL
DOB ?

201-005839
TMM -02878
09 SEP 52
SER. 16

CIT VENEZUELA

RES: MEXICO

ONE OF THE FOUNDERS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA.

013113

MACHADO, MANUEL
DOB ?

050-004-012
TMM -02758
SER. 245

CIT VENEZUELA

RES: MEXICO

MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

013114

14-00000

MACHADO, MANUEL

019-009-0008
MEXI-02164
14 AUG 58

CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY IN MEXICO.

013120

X-2 H-5207

MACHADO, MANUEL

SEE X-2 H-5207 O-15 MARTIKS, ANTONIO

1001
2/2/44

013122

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION

FROM: MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO: FILE, VR, WH/C 8, CI/OPS, FI/INT 2

9 JUN 65 IN 86780

S E C R E T 092228Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 3735

PBRUMEN LITAMIL

File 201 LITAMIL-1

1. LITAMIL-1 SUBMITTED FLWG NAMES IN RESPONSE SPOTTING RQM. (A) ING. MIGUEL L. PALMER, FORMER CHIEF FERROCARRILES OCCIDENTALES DE CUBA WHO WORKED FOR MANOLO RAY IN SABOTAGING CUBAN RR SYSTEM UNDER BATISTA (B) LUIS ARGIBAY, BORN C. 1930, CURRENTLY IN TOUCH WITH CURBELO OF CUBAN EMB IN ATTEMPT OBTAIN EXIT VISAS FOR ARGIBAY FAMILY. (C) RAUL VIANELLO GARCIA, FORMER CUBAN CONSUL GENL MEXI.

2. REQUEST TRACES ON ALL THREE WHO NOW MEXI. VIANELLO INTENDS PROCEED U.S. MOMENTARILY TO JOIN FRIEND DR. RODRIGO BUSTAMANTE AT V.A. HOSPITAL, WOOD, WISCONSIN (SIC). VIANELLO WAS NOT DEBRIEFED BY LICOMETS. L-3 SUGGESTS USE HIS TRUE NAME (IDEN) AS BONA FIDES IN EVENT FOLLOWUP ON VIANELLO.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

FILE IN 201-267298

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
MACHADO LLOSAS, Manuel	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

Mary Theven
WH/SM

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 HELD UNDER C# 80638

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-262298

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
WH 8

☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/C 8, CI/OPS, FI/INT 2

ACTION

86782

S E C R E T 292229Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 3737

FBRUMEN LITAMIL

REF MEXI 3736 (86783)

IDEN: DR. RICARDO VIDAL ("VIDALITO").

S E C R E T

CFN

201-267298

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MACHADO LLOSAS, MANUEL
201-267298
SEX M DOB ?

019-005-001
UFGA-21693/14
01 JUN 65
P35

CIT ?
OCC ?
BELIEVED IDEN/W MACHADO MANUEL WHO WAS CONTACT
OF SUBJ OF 201-754938.

R 6506161148

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨ 201-267298

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-60)

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR CANCELLATION

TO: CHIEF, CI/OA		FROM: (Division) WHD/3	(Case officer) Bustos	(Extension) 6026
SUBJECT'S NAME (Pseudo, crypt or true may be used) LITAMIL-1		NAME SHOWN IS: TRUE [ ] PSEUDO [ ] CRYPT [X]		
CI/OA NO. C-80638	201 NO. 201-267298	PROJECT none		
DATE OF BIRTH 12 Dec 1913	PLACE OF BIRTH Auras, Oriente, Cuba	AGENT'S SERVICE RECORD: [X] IS ATTACHED [ ] WILL BE FORWARDED		

REASON(S) FOR CANCELLATION

became marginal

DATE: 23 August 1963

SIGNATURE

IF SUBJECT IS USED IN ANY CAPACITY, A NEW REQUEST FOR APPROVAL WILL BE SUBMITTED TO CI/OA

FORM 2-58 937 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(38)

14-00000

1P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LITAMIL-1 and LITAMIL-5 now Amlow/1 - 201-302134

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

now amlumber/1 - 201-267298

ACTION: FYI

REFERENCES: A. HMMW 11727

B. HMMW 11729

Agent Service Record on Subjects are enclosed as requested in the References.

Willard C. Curtis

Willard C CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated above

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/att
3 - Files

MICROFILMED
AUG 16 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

201-267298

CROSS REFERENCE TO: D-201-302134 (cc filed)

Encl - 1

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA 21924

DATE: 9 August 1963

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

1P

AGENT SERVICE RECORD

1. Agent Cryptonym: LITAMIL - 1
2. Project: LITAMIL
3. Agent Recruited By: Clyde K. SHRYOCK Date: 6 Nov. 1959
4. Capacity in Which Agent Served: Spotter, info Cuban exiles, Cuban Officials, penetration 26 July movement.
5. Rate of Pay: None. Was given $10,000.00MN as a loan, will probably never be repaid.
6. Other Commitments: None.
7. Agent Dismissed By: Not dismissed, but not recontacted after SHRYOCK's departure. Date: June 1963
8. Reason for Dismissal: Became marginal.

9. Security Risks: None.
10. Is the Agent Recommended for Reuse: Yes, depending on circumstances.
11. Manner of Dismissal: No recontact made after SHRYOCK's departure.
12. Letter of Termination Signed: No
13. Cost of Termination: See 5 above.
14. Station Case Officer: Terrence P. MCGEE [signature]
(Signature in Pseudonym)
15. Chief of Station: Willard C. CURTIS [signature: Willard C. Curtis]
(Signature in Pseydonym)

SECRET

Encl #1. to HMMA - 21924 CS COPY 201-267298

MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City
INFO.
FROM : Chief, WH Division
SUBJECT : PBRUMEN/LITAMIL-1
ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

Headquarters files reveal no Station contact with LITAMIL-1 since October 1962. It is requested that the Station report on its current relationship with LITAMIL-1. If this agent has been terminated, please submit an Agent Service Record.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
C&1 - COS, Mexico City

201-267298

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-11727

DATE: 2 July 1963 — 11 JUL 1963

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-267298

ORIGINATING
OFFICE: WH/3/Mexico/C. Bustos:dd
EXT. 5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

ROUTING / INITIAL
RID/AN
RID/MIS
RID/FS
RID/FI
WH/3/M
DESTROY

RELEASING
OFFICE SYMBOL: C/WHD
DATE: 3 JUL 1963
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE: for J. C. King

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

081

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

LITAMIL-1
-2
3
5

SECRET

ROUTING

DATE :	17 OCT 62
TO :	DIRECTOR
FROM :	MEXICO CITY
ACTION :	C/TFW 5
INFO :	DDP, ADDP, C/SOD 3, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, S/C 2*

OCT 17 0508Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 40768

DIR GUAT INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 2221

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT CABLES.

GYROSE/LITAMIL

REF MEXI 2222 (IN 40773)

1. ON 16 OCT 62, LITAMIL-2 REPORTED MTG PRO-UNIDAD "CLANDESTINE UNIT" NIGHT 15 OCT COMPOSED FOL: LITAMIL-1, LITAMIL-2, LITAMIL-3, LITAMIL-5, HORACIO WIESZESUK GUERRERO, JOSE MANUEL LOPEZ ALFONSO, TULIO PRIETO RUIZ, FERNANDO OROZCO, AND DR. ALFREDO FERRER.

2. AT MTG LOPEZ TOLD GROUP THAT COL. ENRIQUE PERALTA AZURDIA, GUAT MINDEF, WHO CAME MEXI OFFICIAL VISIT SEPT 62, MADE CONTACT LOPEZ AND OFFERED ARMS, AMMO AND (SLOW) VESSEL. PERALTA LONGTIME FRIEND LOPEZ. LOPEZ SAID THAT COURIER PERALTA ARRIVED MEXI FEW DAYS AGO AND SAID PERALTA OFFER STILL STANDS BUT THAT DIRECT CONTACT MUST BE MADE WITH PERALTA GUAT. GROUP CHOSE LITAMIL-2 OR LITAMIL-3 AS MOST LIKELY PUC COURIERS VIEW FORMER'S BUSINESS INTEREST GUAT AND LATTER'S DIP CONTACTS. ACCORDING LOPEZ CONTACT WITH PERALTA SHOULD BE MADE BEFORE END OCT. PUC PLANS COLLECT FUNDS SEND COURIER GUAT SOONEST. WILL ADVISE. LOPEZ DID NOT IDENTIFY PERALTA COURIER.

3. L-2 REPORTED 16 OCT HE GAINING MORE CONFIDENCE WIESZESUK. DOES GUAT HAVE ANY INFO RE PARA 2?

4. ABOVE NOT BEING DISSEMINATED VIEW OPS INTEREST.

(END OF MESSAGE)

SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

Copy No.

14-00000

024

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 7 SEP 62

SECRET

ROUTING

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/TFW 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, S/C 2

SEP 8 0248Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 18812

DIR INFO WAVE SJAN CITE MEXI 1889

GYROSE/AMLAW-1/LITAMIL-1

REF A. MEXI 1614 (IN-40150)

B. DIR 28483

1. ON 5 SEPT 62, AMLAW-1 CALLED LITAMIL-1 AND ARRANGED MTG APARTMENT RAMON SINOBAS AT 1800 THAT EVENING.

2. AM-1 TOLD L-1 HE FELT HAD OBLIGATION MAKE CONTACT AS PROMISED PRIOR DEPARTURE FOR HAVA RE POSSIBLE DISCUSSIONS MEXI. SAID UPON ARRIVAL HAVA SAW RAUL ROA AND FIDEL CASTRO FIRST TWO DAYS THEN DISCUSSED SUBJ MATTER OF INTEREST L-1. HE DID NOT SAY WITH WHOM HE TALKED RE MATTER. AM-1 SAID THAT CUBAN GOV'T IN VIEW THREATS AND AGRESSIVE ACTION INCLUDING SHELLING CUBAN COAST COULD NOT CONSIDER "TALKS" IN MEXI. ANY "TALKS" WOULD DEPEND ON THE U.S. CLEAR DEMONSTRATION THAT IT REALLY INTERESTED IN "TALKS", THAT IS, THAT U.S. STOP ITS AGRESSIVE ACTIONS AND PROVE INTERESTED PEACEFUL APPROACH PROBLEMS. HE ADDED THAT THEY IN CUBA FELT THAT "TALKS" MEXI MERELY STALL FOR TIME

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

 Copy No.

201-267298

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :
TO :
FROM :
ACTION:
INFO :

PAGE 2

ROUTING
1 4
2 5
3 6

MEXI 1889 IN 18812

WHILE U.S. PLANNED FURTHER AGRESSION. AM-1 THEN TOLD L-1 HE NOT ABLE UNDERSTAND DUALITY U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, THAT IS, WHILE L-1 MEXI TRYING ARRANGE "TALKS" WITH U.S. REP OTHER AGENCIES PLANNING AGRESSION. L-1 TOLD AM-1 HE DID NOT KNOW REASON THIS, IF TRUE, BUT SUPPOSED DIFFERENT GROUPS INTERESTED CERTAIN ASPECTS PROBLEM AND THAT CAUSING DUALITY.

3. AM-1 ASKED L-1 WHY HE CONSIDERED VULNERABLE "DEFECTION". L-1 TOLD HIM THAT ALL EXILES SURPRISED SEE HIM REMAIN WITH REGIME WHICH THAY FELT NOT TO HIS TASTE. AM-1 SAID THAT WHILE HE HAVA PRESS RELEASE FROM STOCKHOLM REPORTED AM-1 HAD TAKEN ASYLUM.

4. L-1 SAID THAT AM-1 VERY MUCH ALARMED SITUATION. CONVINCED U.S. PLANNING AGGRESSION. TOLD L-1 HE PLANNED BREAK NEWS TO PRESS RE PLANNED AGRESSION TWO OR THREE DAYS. (COMMENT: AM-1 STATEMENTS APPEARED PRESS MORNING 6 SEPT). DOOR "LEFT OPEN" FURTHER CONTACT IF FELT CONVENIENT.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT CABLES.
**RE RECRUITING SUBJ.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

 Copy No.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] 5

[illegible], ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/[illegible] 5, S/C 2

[illegible]

[illegible]

IN 44830

[illegible] INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 1681

REF DIR 57823 ([illegible] 63556)

[illegible]/AMLAW-1/LITAMIL-1

[illegible] EVENING 9 AUG LITAMIL-1 CALLED AMLAW-1 AT CUBAN EMBASSY ([illegible] CONFIRMS). L-1 USING TRUE NAME LEFT TEL NUMBER WITH ANA MARIA BLANCO T., AMB'S SECRETARY ORDER AM-1 RETURN CALL. HALF HOUR [illegible] AM-1 CALLED FROM CUBAN EMB (LIENVOY CONFIRMS) AND WAS TOLD THAT RE "CONVERSATION WE HAD" THAT THOSE MEN ("AQUELLOS SENORES") [illegible] WITH HIM. [illegible] QUESTION WAS WHETHER PERSON SHOULD [illegible] FROM "THERE" ("DE ALLA") OR "HERE" ("AQUI MISMO"). L-1 [illegible] [illegible] ACCEPTABLE. AM-1 SAID WOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE TRIP CUBA [illegible] [illegible] THERE ("[illegible] LA COSA ALLI") AND UPON RETURNING [illegible] SOMETHING MORE CONCRETE. AM-1 ADDED THAT UPON RETURN WOULD CALL L-1 AND LET HIM KNOW.

[illegible] REP CURTIS SEES NO PROBLEM EMB/ODACID RELATIONS. [illegible] ODACID CHIEF [illegible] THAT EITHER LOCAL OR HQS [illegible] [illegible] CONTACT AM-1. CHOICE [illegible] MORE DIFFICULT AS PERSON [illegible] FIRST CONTACT MUST SPEAK FLUENT SPANISH AND BE FULLY [illegible] INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS CUBAN PROBLEM. SHOULD AM-1

SECRET

14-00000

PAGE 2

[illegible] 1687 IN [illegible]

THROUGH L-1 DEMONSTRATE DESIRE DISCUSS PERSONAL SITUATION CURTIS BELIEVES THIS COULD BE HANDLED LOCALLY ON CLANDESTINE BASIS. AT ANY RATE FUTURE ACTION DEPENDS REMARKS AM-1 WHO PLANS RETURN END AUG.

3. ANY DEVELOPMENTS RE MAN PLANNED CONTACT AM-1'S BROTHER-IN-LAW?

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT CABLES.

SECRET

14-00000

10 Aug 62

[illegible]

[illegible] reporting [illegible] as yet [illegible] for [illegible] have expanded considerably during July, and this report will attempt to give a birds-eye view of the overall [illegible] as a [illegible] for future progress reporting. In summary during July 1962 the [illegible] recruited a new penetration of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City [illegible] a former employee of that Embassy with excellent access to [illegible] Embassy circles; [illegible] had one [illegible] channel functioning actively during the month; they located a [illegible] for their clandestine radio; they have a cover company possibility which is being seriously considered for activation; and they have approximately seven legal traveler operations under development or active. The [illegible] now number 13, practically all of [illegible] are [illegible]

[illegible]
10 August 62

14-00000

ORIG: EDWARD MARELIUS:kk
UNIT: C/TFW/FI
EXT: 6072
DATE: 6 August 1962

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET
RYBAT

ROUTING
1 4
2 5
3 6

Aug 6 '62 19 05z

TO: MEXICO CITY JMWAVE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/TFW 5
INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, S/C 2

SIG CEN
DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

OUT 43555

TO MEXI INFO WAVE CITE DIR 28483

RYBAT GYROSE LITAMIL-1

DECLASSIFIED per CSH 43-43

REF: A. MEXI 1614 (IN 40150)

B. HMMA-19172, 8 JUNE 1962

1. SUBJECT REF A ASSIGNED CRYPTONYMN AMLAW-1.

2. CONCUR STATION OPINION REASONS AMLAW-1 INTEREST FURTHER MEETS AND DESIRE FOLLOW UP BY INTRODUCTION KUBARK STAFFER AT APPROPRIATE TIME. APPEARS FROM WHAT WE KNOW OF A-1 AND INTIMATIONS REF B, HE MORE INTERESTED IN HONEST BROKER ROLE THAN DEFECTION OR ANY OTHER TYPE ROLE IN PLACE. FEEL THEREFORE WE SHLD APPROACH HIM WITH THIS IN MIND AND PLAY HIM FOR INTEL, PREPARED HOWEVER TO PUT HIM ON PAYROLL OR CATCH HIM IF HE DROPS.

3. ABOVE RAISES PROBLEM OF HANDLING (1) VIS A VIS EMB AND ODACID AND (2) SELECTION APPROPRIATE STAFFER, I.E., SUFFICIENTLY SENIOR SPANISH SPEAKER PREFERABLY, WE ASSUME, FROM OUTSIDE MEXI, WHO AVAILABLE FOR PERIODIC MEETINGS.

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — SECRET RYBAT — GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification — CONT....... AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

201-267298

ORIG: EDWARD MARELIUS:kk
UNIT: C/TFW/FI
EXT: 6172
DATE: 6 August 1962

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
S E C R E T
RYBAT

ROUTING
1 2 3 4 5 6

TO: MEXICO CITY JMWAVE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO:

P A G E T W O

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT 63555

TO INFO CITE DIR 28483

WLD HAVE RENARD AVAILABLE THIS PURPOSE IN ABOUT A MONTH. REQUEST CURTIS COMMENTS ON ALL ABOVE. ESP ODACID/EMB ANGLE.

4. MEANWHILE, SUGGEST LITAMIL-1 RECONTACT A-1 PRIOR LATTER'S DEPARTURE FOR ANOTHER GENERAL TALK ALONG LINES STATION SUGGESTS WITH ADDED FILLIP THAT HE ABLE GUARANTEE CHAT WITH ODYOKE OFFICIAL ON A-1 OSTENSIBLE TERMS AFTER PBRUMEN TRIP.

5. IF IT TURNS OUT THERE IS MORE BEHIND A-1 CALL THAN WE HAVE READ INTO IT, HQS PREPARED AND STATION AUTHORIZED GO ALL OUT MAKE A DEAL WITH HIM.

(END OF MESSAGE)

TFW/SA [signature]

WH3/MEX [signature]

COORDINATING OFFICERS

[signature] for J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

[signature] WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T
RYBAT

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

264

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 4 AUG 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/TFW 5 (MR MULLOY TFW NOTIFIED & COPY SLOTTED AT 1745, 4 AUG)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/WH 5, S/C 2

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

AUG 4 2025Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 40150

PRITY DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 1614

REF MEXI 1475 (IN 32730)*

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

GYROSE/LITAMIL-1/RYBAT

1. NIGHT 3 AUG, CARLOS LECHUGA HEVIA, CUBAN AMB MEXI CALLED LILAMIL-1 AND ASKED HIM WHAT HAD DEVELOPED RE CONTACT PARA 4 REF. L-1 SAID HE HAD NOT HEARD BUT SUPPOSED CASE STILL UNDER STUDY.

2. LECHUGA MOVE HIGHLY INTERESTING AS L-1 WAS TO HAVE MADE CONTACT LECHUGA WHEN NEWS RE CONTACT AVAILABLE.

3. MEXI OPINION L-1 SHOULD CONTACT LECHUGA SOONEST ORDER EXPAND DISCUSSION REF AND SEEK COMMON GROUND RE LECHUGA PERSONAL POSITION. IN VIEW LECHUGA SCHEDULED TRIP HAVA 10 AUG REQUEST HQS COMMENTS SOONEST AS TO WHAT L-1 MIGHT SAY. STATION OPINION LECHUGA INTERESTED U.S. CONTACT ORDER DISCUSS CUBAN U.S. RELATIONS OR PERSONAL SITUATION.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *LITAMIL 7 TOLD CARDOS LECHUGA THAT LITAMIL 1 INTERESTED TALK TO HIM RE PERSONAL MATTER.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-267298

14-00000

22 MARCH 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT: Transfer of Agent Files to TFW

The following agent files have been permanently transferred to TFW. They will assume all responsibility for these agents effective this date. The area of operations and duties for the agents will not change, therefore, no PRQ II amendments will be submitted and the effective clearances are valid.

LITAMIL-1	C-80638	201-267298
LITAMIL-2	C-82583	201-275992
LITAMIL-4	C-86905	201-275058
LITAMIL-6	C-93632	201-304783

N. P. Holman
C/WH/3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG: Anita Potocki
UNIT: FI/D
EXT: 6471
DATE: 17 April 1961

TO: Tokyo
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO:

ROUTING: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

PRECEDENCE: DEFERRED / XX ROUTINE / PRIORITY / OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

Not Sent

TO TOKY INFO CITE DIR

RYBAT LCIMPROVE ZRPERUSAL ZRGRACE

REF: TOKY-6171 (IN 24886)

1. APPRECIATE REF, WHICH FIRST REPORT MARTIN CONTACT WITH DR JAKOB Y. FISCHER.

2. RE PARA 2B REF, FIND FISCHER QUOTE VOLUNTEERED COMMENTS END QUOTE AND ONI REACTION INTERESTING, ESPECIALLY REPORT QUOTE HE APPEARED INTRIGUED BY IDEA USE HIS PLACE FOR MTGS END QUOTE. THIS OUT OF CHARACTER IN LIGHT HIS KNOWN CONTACTS VARIOUS INTEL OFFICERS, INCLUDING KUBARKERS WHO USED HIS RESTAURANT FOR MTGS. PRESUME REF QUOTE YURI RASTVOROV AMER FEMALE CONTACT END QUOTE REFERS MISS MAUDE L. BURRIS (ALIAS QUOTE MRS. BROWNING END QUOTE), BORN TEXAS, ELDERLY DAC EMPLOYEE OF AEP SCHOOL TOKY, RASTVOROV'S ENGLISH TEACHER 48-END 53 AND CLOSE CONTACT. BURRIS WAS JOINT ODOPAL/KUBARK ASSET THROUGH WHOM ACTUAL DEFECTION CONTACT JAN 54 ESTABLISHED. (CF. JACO-1564

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER S-E-C-R-E-T AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO:

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

PRECEDENCE: DEFERRED / ROUTINE / PRIORITY (INITIALS) / OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE (INITIALS)

TO INFO CITE DIR

(IN 12657) 27 JAN 54.) JULY 56 SHE REPORTED CHIEF EDUC ADVISOR HQS FIRST CAVALRY DIV, ASSIGNED TROOP INFO AND EDUC OFFICE TOKY, WHO PRIOR 25 JUL 56 PUBLICATION RASTVOROV ARTICLES IN QUOTE YOMIURI TOKY NEWS END QUOTE WAS PATIENT DR. YEVGENIY AKSENOV, M. D., NAMED BY R. AS KGB AGENT SINCE 47. HOWEVER, SUSPECT COMMENT MAY ALSO BE VEILED REF TO ANTONINA JOHANSSON, CO-OWNER WITH VERA DUNAYEVA OF BEREZKA RESTAURANT, 21, ONE-CHOME, KAMIDORI, SHIBUYA-KU, SUSPECTED AS MTG PLACE AND POSS BASE OF OPS FOR SOV INTEL ORGANIZATION ALLEGEDLY FINANCED BY SOV MISSION TOKY. (CF: FJTA-13051, 18 SEPT 56; FJTA-13786, 30 OCT 56 AND FJBA-8146, ATT. 21 DEC 55 - AEMARBLE REPORT).

3. IN RE ABOVE, NOTE VALENTIN VALKOV, EX-SPOUSE MRS. TWILLEY, FORMER EMPLOYEE JOHANSSON AND DUNAYEVA AS MANAGER BEREZKA, ALLEGEDLY FIRED FOR PRO-SOV REMARKS TO CUSTOMERS. ALSO NOTE DUNAYEV AND WIFE MEMBERS CATHEDRAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER — S-E-C-R-E-T — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

TO:

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

ROUTING			
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PRECEDENCE: DEFERRED / ROUTINE / PRIORITY (INITIALS) / OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE (INITIALS)

TO INFO CITE DIR

PAGE THREE

NICOLAI-DO, AS ARE ANTONIOS E. PAPPADOPOULOS, MUEHLENBERG AND TWILLEY, PER ENCL. FJTA-32421, 26 APR 60. TWO LATTER INDIVIDUALS OF COURSE LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FIRST HANDLING RASTVOROV AND PROBABLY KNOWN JOHANSSON. ALSO NOTE AEMARBLE REPORTS 801 AND 807 OF FEB 57 SHOW AKSENOV IN CONTACT U.S. OFFICIALS VISITING BISHOP IRENEY AND SISTERHOOD OF NICOLAI-DO. FYI ONLY: FJTA 32421 INFO ON MEMBERS ADVISORY COMMITTEE CATHEDRAL AMONG INFO ON PAPPADOPOULOS SENT ODINCH, ODIBEX/ACSI AND ODENVY. THIS INFO MAY BE PASSED ONI THROUGH ODEARL/ACSI COMMITTEE AS IN CASE 18 NOV 60 PERIS MEMO.

4. CONCUR VIEWS PARA 4 REF RE LIAISON ONI. IN EFFORT EXPEDITE DIRECT REPORTING, WILL MERELY REQUEST DNI AT HQS LEVEL FURNISH TRACES GEORGE PERIS AND CONTACTS, INCLUDING PAPPADOPOULOS.

5. RECEIVED FIRST ODINCH REPORT DTD 4 JAN 61 INCLUDING FULL REPORT ONI:

INVESTIGATION JAPAN: NO MENTION PERIS ET AL. FOLLOWING

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER S-E-C-R-E-T AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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TO INFO CITE DIR

PAGE FOUR

ITEMS OF INTEREST:

A. JOHN J. CASEY RESIDENT NATICK, MASS, NAMED AS MUTUAL CONTACT AND CO-WORKER MITCHELL AND MARTIN WHILE ON DUTY YOKOSUKA. OCT 60 CASEY, SUSPECTED HOMO, IN LETTER CONTACT GARY A. LONG, USNR ENSIGN STATIONED YOKOSUKA. LONG ADMITTED HOMO UNDER ONI INVESTIGATION.

B. MARTIN REPORTED CLOSE CONTACT AND CO-WORKER AS DAC CIVILIAN TOKY OF JOSEPH W. JASON AKA JOSEPH W. GESUSK, DPOB 6 SEPT 26 WORCESTER, MASS. EMPLOYED AS GS-5 IN TELE-TYPE SECTION, FEC SIGNAL SERVICE BATTN, PERSHING HTS. JASON APPLIED KUBARK 1951, DECLINED APPOINTMENT TO ACCEPT ANOTHER JOB PRIOR COMPLETION BACKGROUND INVESTIG. AND CLEARANCE. FEB 45-DEC 46 SERVED AS T-5 ODIBEX DENTAL TECHNICIAN AT CAMP CROFT AND OSAKA, JAPAN. FEB 47-NOV 48 GOVT EMPLOYEE DENTAL TECHNICIAN, CONNECTED GRAVES REGIS-

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER — S-E-C-R-E-T — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

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FROM: DIRECTOR

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PRECEDENCE: DEFERRED / ROUTINE / PRIORITY (INITIALS) / OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE (INITIALS)

TO INFO CITE DIR

TRATION, MANILA AND OKINAWA. EOD TOKY UNKNOWN BUT DEPARTED 1956. AS OF NOV 60 ASSIGNED RUAW STARCOMM (RELAY STATION) ODIBEX, RYUKYU ISLAND, OKIE.

C. MARTIN ALSO CONTACT OF MAJOR PAUL ROCHELLE, DAC EMPLOYEE FEC SIGN BATTN, SUSPECT HOMO, CLOSE FRIEND J. W. JASON. RESIGNED TOKY JOB DEC 55 AND PLANNED RETURN ZI VIA EUROPE. RECORDS SHOW ROCHELLE STOPPED ENROUTE PARI WHERE HIRED AS DAC BY UNIDEN PBPRIME UNIT. LATER LEFT FRANCE ALLEGEDLY RETURNED NY WHERE HIRED AS TELETYPE OPERATOR BY ODUNIT.

D. 10 NOV 60 ONI INTERVIEW ROLAND ORA BELCHER, CT-2, IN HAWAII, SHOWS BELCHER FROM CA DEC 52 THRU JUL 55 MARTIN CO-WORKER KAMISEYA AND LATER TOKY. SHARED MARTIN QUOTE WATCHES END QUOTE. REPORTED PRIOR DISCHARGE, MARTIN OCCASIONALLY VISITED MALE JAPANESE ARTIST-POTTER WHO

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER | S-E-C-R-E-T | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

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EXT :
DATE :

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

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PRECEDENCE: DEFERRED / ROUTINE / PRIORITY (INITIALS) / OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE (INITIALS)

TO INFO CITE DIR

OWNED KILN LOCATED WITHIN 50 MILES KAMISEYA. RECALLED INSTANCE, PRESUMABLY SPRING 55, WHEN MARTIN RELATED HE GUEST AT LARGE PARTY ARRANGED BY ABOVE POTTER WHERE MARTIN MET QUOTE SOME ABOVE AVERAGE PEOPLE END QUOTE. MARTIN VISITED KILN DURING QUOTE TIME ON LIBERTY END QUOTE.

5. CONSIDER ABOVE MARTIN REMARK OF POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANCE IN LIGHT PRESENCE TOKY SPRING 55 OF AETANKARD 4 WHO INTERESTED ARTS, AND TRIP APR 55 TO TOKY OF AETANKARDS 1 AND 2. KILN OPERATOR COULD BE MUTUAL ACQUAINTANCE OR IN CONTACT SUCH OF MARTIN AND AETANKARD-4. REALIZE THIS EXTREMELY SLIM LEAD BUT SUGGEST BEAR IN MIND AND ATTEMPT THROUGH LIAISON WITH ODENVY AND ONI REPS OBTAIN FURTHER DETAILS JAPAN CONTACTS OF AETANKARD-4 AND MARTIN IN EFFORT IDENTIFY POTTER-ARTIST AND PARTY GUESTS.

6. REQUEST STATION TRACES JOHN JOSEPH CASEY, JOSEPH W. JASON AKA GESUSE AND MAJOR PAUL ROCHELLE. ALSO ADVISE IF BURRIS

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER S-E-C-R-E-T AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

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PRECEDENCE: DEFERRED / ROUTINE / PRIORITY (INITIALS) / OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE (INITIALS)

TO | INFO | CITE DIR

PAGE SEVEN

STILL TOKY.

END OF MSG

C/FE/JAO

C/FE
RELEASING OFFICER

C/CI/OPS
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/FI/D
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

Copy No.

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: ALVAREZ, Ramon Jr.
201-0119523 VOL II

INCLUSIVE DATES: 25 Jul 1956 - 14 Jul 1965
CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: CI/EXO
ROOM: 3D57
DELETIONS, IF ANY: None

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
			NOT REVIEWED BY HSCA

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

14-00000

SEE VOL III

1957-65

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
WH/Pers/W.S. Renehan	6576	DATE: 14 July 1965

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WH/PERS				
2. WH/B1 C/WH/SS		8/2 7/15		
3. C/CPD 5E 69	22 JUL 1965		WO	
4. O/F				
5.				
6. CAAS		7/31		
7. WH/Pers/Renehan GH-4404 Headquarters				Mr. Renehan. Per conv. this date with Charlotte B WH/B-1 this man is Foreign Natl No need for us to have.
8.				
9. WH/1 Mrs. Burton			B	
10.				7-8 - The attached for your retention. Thanks J.D.
11.				Copy sent Station under HMMJ-4239 - 28 Jul 65
12.				
13. [illegible]				file 201
14.				
15.				LIEMPTY-1

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

14 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Raymond H. GERENDE, Contract Amendment

1. It is requested that the contract, as amended for Raymond H. GERENDE, Contract Agent, be further amended as follows.

a. Increase compensation to $6500. per year effective 1 July 1965.

b. Extend period of contract for one year from date of expiration.

2. The recommendation of the Mexico City Station, concurred with by WHD, was based on his demonstrated technical ability and professional competence.

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

Mr. Raymond H. Gerende

Dear Mr. Gerende:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 October 1955, as amended.

Effective 1 July 1965 said contract, as amended, is further amended by deleting the figure $6000 from the first sentence of paragraph one (1) entitled "Compensation" and substituting in lieu thereof the figure $6500.

Effective 1 October 1965 said contract, as amended, is extended for a period of one (1) year.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY [signature]
Contracting Officer

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DATE: 2 July 1965

WHD AGENT BOARD

Part I - Request for Action

Raymond H. GERENDE	Contract Agent
Name (Pseudonym)	STATUS (Career Agent, Contract Agent, Contract Employee)

Raise in salary - $500 per annum

PROPOSED ACTION (Include Branch and/or field recommendations; specific operational task performed by individual; views re long and/or short range utility of individual for Branch area and over-all Division needs)

The contract for Raymond H. GERENDE expires on 30 September 1965. The Mexico City Station has recommended that the contract be extended for one year, and that GERENDE be granted a salary increase from $6,000 to $6,500 per annum.

GERENDE received his last salary raise on 1 August 1963, from $5,500 to $6,000. He was first placed under contract on 1 October 1955 at $3,600.

There are sufficient funds in the LIEMPTY Project to cover this salary increase, and GERENDE's local cover job can logically cover this additional income.

BOARD ACTION: DATE: __________

APPROVED BY: ____________________

S E C R E T

LIEMPTY-1
Gerende
201

201-119523

Date: ________________

WHD AGENT BOARD

Part II - Biographic Data

NAME--True [ ] Pseudo [x]	DOB New York City	CITIZENSHIP	201 Number
Raymond H. GERENDE	7 Dec 1933	Mexican	201-119523

MARITAL STATUS   DEPENDENTS--RELATIONSHIP--DOB

wife:
Hester Roos de Alvarez   2 sons - 4 and 1
1 daughter - 6 yrs old

EDUCATION

Dates	Name of School	Location	Degree	Major Studies
1952	American High School	Mexico City	high school	
1955	Mexico City College	Mexico City	B.A.	Latin American Studies

FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES--Indicate Proficiency--R-W-S-U

English - native) bilingual
Spanish - native)
French - poor

NON-AGENCY EXPERIENCE--Include Military Service (5 years prior to Agency connection)

Dates	Name of Employer	Location	Job or Function	Salary/ Grade
	Other than part time jobs which were many:			
May 1953- Dec 1954	Roger McCann & Chas Davis,	Mexico City,	Sales Manager	$40-50/montl

AGENCY EXPERIENCE--Staff [ ] Contract Agent [x] Career Agent [ ] Contract Employee [ ]

Dates	*Cover Employer Name	Location	Basic Salary	Ops Tasks
Mar 1955	Farolitos de Mexico (bona fide) salary offset	Mexico City	$3,600	Member of surveillance team, cutout/ P.A to phogographic bashouses, investigator, etc. basehouse operator and processor of tapes

*Indicate also nature of business and whether bona fide or Agency mechanism.

SECRET

WHD AGENT BOARD

Part III

Chronological Narrative Performance Report

NAME/PSEUDONYM:

(Summary of evaluation of past performance /if applicable/ with emphasis and details of current performance for assigned operational tasks)

DATES | LOCATION | AGENCY TASK

GERENDE was recruited in March 1955, just prior to his graduation from the Mexico City College. He was trained as a member of a surveillance team, and was also used as an investigator to collect operational data on persons and organizations of interest to the Station. He quickly demonstrated a capacity for leadership and at one time was leader of the team.

He was also used as a basehouse keeper in an audio operation and processor of tapes. He excelled in this type of work because of his bi-lingual Spanish/English facility, and, more importantly, due to his diversified experience in clandestine operations which permited him to spot operational leads.

Since 1958 his primary use has been as main cutout/principal agent to a group of photographic basehouses targeted against the Soviet Embassy, and one mobile photographic truck. He processes the raw photographic take and services the majority of the accomodation addresses used by the Station. He has contributed significantly to the AMROD operation

He performs all his tasks in a professional manner. He is well suited to intelligence work, and plans to make KUBARK his career. The Station depends heavily on him because of his knowledge of Mexico, and his mobility as a Mexican. He works full time for KUBARK; cover company requires very little time.

In case of "New Hire" give a personality assessment in terms of capability, attitude, and projected suitability; state names of Division personnel who have interviewed him; give account of his performance in current non-Agency job.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Raymond H. GERENDE/Contract Amendment

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMM-13688, 7 June 1965

1. Reference notified Station Mexico City that the current contract for Raymond H. GERENDE will expire on 30 September 1965. In recognition of GERENDE's increased operational responsibility and the professional manner in which he carries out his operational assignments, it is requested that his contract be amended to provide for a salary increase from $6,000 U. S. per annum to $6,500 per annum.

2. Project LIEMPTY can absorb this additional expense and GERENDE's local cover job can logically cover this additional income.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD

CS COPY

201-119523

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-26449	24 June 1965
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-119523

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: Payroud P. GERENDE

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA-24,220

1. The contract for GERENDE expires on 30 September 1965. Please notify Headquarters whether you wish to have the contract extended another year, and whether any changes are desired.

2. Headquarters regrets that the Station inadvertently was not notified last year of the extension of the contract.

Chester D. DAINOLD

Distribution:
O & 1 - COS, Mexico City

201-119523

10 JUN 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-13,688 CS COPY	7 June 65
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-119523

RI
Chrono

ABSTRACT

WH/1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1/C.Bustos-Videla:mep			4507

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHØD		Desmond FitzGerald

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

14-00000

MEMORAND[illegible]

FROM [illegible]

SUBJECT [illegible]

Raymond H. Gerende

1 [illegible] **1 October 1964**

[illegible] **1 October 1955**

[illegible] **one (1) year**

[illegible]

remain [illegible] effect

UNITED STATES [illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded [illegible]

IMPTY-1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

FROM : Renewal of Contract of Raymond H. GERENDE

Please extend for a period of one (1) year without change the contract of Raymond H. GERENDE, Contract Agent. The contract expires on 30 September 1964.

W. E. Brooks
Chief WH Support

Distribution:
Orig - Contract Personnel Div.
1 - WH/Pers
1 - Subject

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED; XX MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMW-12844, 21 August 1964

It is requested that Subject's contract be renewed as presently written. No changes are requested at this time.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD

CS COPY

201-119523

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-24220	1 September 1964
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-119523

14-00000

TO	
Chief of Station, Mexico City	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, WH Division	MICROFILM

SUBJECT

Raymond H. GERENDE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

P-R-I-O-R-I-T-Y

Subject's contract will expire on 30 September 1964. Please advise by return dispatch whether the contract should be renewed and if any changes are desired.

Chester D. DAINOLD

Distribution:
C&1 - COS, Mexico City

201-119523

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-12844	24 AUG 1964 21 August 1964
CS COPY	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-119523

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1/R. L. Lehman:chk			4506

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/PERS	21 Aug 64	[illegible] for [illegible]

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD		Desmond FitzGerald

Distribution:
1-Chrono

ROUTING	INITIALS
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
~~[illegible]~~	
RID/FI	

DESTROY

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

TO: WH/3/Mexico - Mr. Reichhardt	DATE: 20 March 1964 dlr
/s/ Edward P. Brown	C NO. C - 32743
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA	SUBJECT: LIEMPTY/1

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

	PRQ I		REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
	PRQ II		REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	FIELD TRACES		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
	RI TRACES		REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION		REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	GREEN LIST	XX	OTHERS (See Remarks)

NOTICE: FIRST [ ] SECOND [ ] THIRD AND FINAL [ ]

REMARKS:

Please come to CI/OA to discuss HMMA-22920.

discussed
CI/OA recommends
yearly infutter.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 6-63 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (20)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION: XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Raymond H. GERENDE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMW-12284 dated 24 January 1964

1. Station Mexico City fully agrees with Headquarters evaluation of Subject as a "valuable long term asset with stay behind potential." In order to place the matter of the 2,100 pesos in the apropriate frame of reference it is felt that a few background points should be noted.

In January 1956 the LIEMPTY/LILYRIC basehouse was set up and placed in operation in a site which provided visual coverage of the LIMERICK installation. A deposit of three months rent was made per terms of the rental contract at that time (2,100 pesos.) In April 1961 the building in which LIEMPTY/LILYRIC is located was sold by the owner. Normally the rental deposit would have been transferred to the new owner as part of the sale transaction. However, approximately three months after the transfer of the property to the new owner, the rental deposit was returned to the basehouse operator, LIEMPTY-13. The deposit was then returned to GERENDE. GERENDE did not inform the then LIEMPTY case officer nor the present case officer of the return of the LIEMPTY/LILYRIC deposit. This 2,100 pesos continued to be carried on the Station books as an outstanding operational advance charged to GERENDE. GERENDE used part of this 2,100 pesos to make loans to two sub-agents (LIEMPTY-6 and LIEMPTY-9.) It is probably that he also used some of this on ocassion for his own purposes.

On 16 October 1963 GERENDE returned the 2,100 pesos to the case officer and the Station has adjusted its books to reflect the return of this money. GERENDE noted at the time of the return that he had this money intact but did not know how to go about returning it so long after having received it. This is the same as he stated at the time of the LCFLUTTER interview. GERENDE was obviously impressed with his inability to "beat" the LCFLUTTER. He was sincerely remorseful when talking to the case officer

(Continued)

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-22920	17 February 1964
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-119523

about the incident and has twice stated that nothing of this nature would happen again. With the reality of future LCFLUTTER tests set firmly in GERENDE's mind, it is believed that he will not attempt any such action again.

As to what can be done of a positive nature (other than periodic re-LCFLUTTER) to prevent recurrence it must be noted that GERENDE kept apart the 2,100 pesos which were really still charged to him and the Station had no way of knowing that the money had been returned to him by the basehousekeeper. Only when the close down of the LIEMPTY/LILYRIC basehouse would be effected would the Station expect to have the rental deposit returned. Until such time the deposit would remain charged to GERENDE. The only way to completely safeguard against this type of action would be for the case officer to meet directly with the basehouse keepers, thereby eliminating GERENDE from the operation and causing unacceptable security risks. It is believed that periodic LCFLUTTER of GERENDE is the best insurance against a similar occurence in the future.

As to GERENDE's regular operational revolving fund, irregularities have never been discovered in his handling of these funds. Cash counts are conducted by the case officer to control the unspent portion of the revolving fund by comparison with accountings (receipts) GERENDE makes every two weeks. GERENDE's revolving fund is kept at the minimum amount consistant with efficient conduct of the operation for which GERENDE is responsible.

The "other false claims" GERENDE admitted making involved occasional use of his QP vehicle for personal driving while entering all receipts for gas on his KUBARK accountings. Station does not consider this a major problem. If GERENDE used his QP car for only operational employment any hostile surveillance of him would be relatively easy (i.e., surveilling only when he is using his QP vehicle) and it is believed that latitude must be allowed in this area for indigenous agents.

2. In the area of GERENDE's morale and his statement that he "is not being utilized to his full potential" the Station is as fully concerned as Headquarters. It should be noted however, that GERENDE has never written the report setting forth what he thinks he can do and when prodded on this has stated that he had been thinking about what additional work he could assume and that he "just does not know". The reason he gives is he does not know what else is being done in the operations area other than that to which he is already exposed. Additional operational work is assigned to GERENDE when this can be done securely and taking into account compartmentation of operations. An example of this was his introduction to the AMROD operation. Station is reluctant to expose GERENDE to additional operations only for the purpose of "improving his morale" since he already has considerable knowledge of many Station past and going operations. The Station appreciates Headquarters comments on the results of GERENDE's LCFLUTTER and will make every effort to determine the best possible utilization of GERENDE in the future.

Willard C. Curtis

WILLARD C. CURTIS

DISPATCH | SECRET

MARKED FOR INDEXING

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM: Chief, WH Division	MICROFILM

SUBJECT: Raymond H. GERENDE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: HMMW-12065

1. Reference is made to the results of the LCFLUTTER interview of Raymond H. GERENDE which was held on 8 October 1963. Headquarters would like to have a progress report on what steps have been taken by the Case Officer with regard to the 2,100 pesos which he had kept but belonged to KUBARK. Headquarters is also interested in what has been done about other false claims he admitted making in his accountings, and what precautions are being taken to see that this does not continue in the future.

2. The Station's comments are requested on GERENDE's statement that he is not being utilized to his full potential and that he often has free time. Headquarters would be interested in seeing a copy of the report which the LCFLUTTER examiner suggested he write, setting forth what he (GERENDE) thinks he can do and what he would like to do. Headquarters considers GERENDE a valuable long term asset with staybehind potential, and it is hoped that the Station will do what it can within the limits of security, to raise his morale and see that KUBARK is receiving full benefit of his services.

Oliver G. GALBOND

Distribution:
O&1-COS, Mexico City

Gerende 201

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-12284	20 January 1964 (21 JAN 1964)
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-119523

Distribution:
cc-CI/OA
1-RI
1-Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE - OFFICER - TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/Mexico/C. Bustos:chk	5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/OA	20 Jan	Lolly (in draft)

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	20 Jan 64	J.C. King

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE	30 December 1963 dlr
TO: WH/3/Mexico - Mr. Reichaardt	C NO. C - 32743
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ Edward P. Brown	SUBJECT: LIEMPTY/1

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

	PRQ I		REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
	PRQ II		REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	FIELD TRACES	XX	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
	RI TRACES		REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION		REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	GREEN LIST		OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: [ ] FIRST [X] SECOND [ ] THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 6-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (20)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Raymond H. [illegible], Contract Amendment

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMW-3077, 7 August 1963

Attached is executed copy of contract amendment in accordance with reference.

Willard C. Curtis

Attachment
As stated (h/w)

Distribution
3 - WH w/att (h/w)

Gireuda 201

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMT-3956

DATE: 20 August 1963

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER:

Mr. Raymond H. Gerende

Dear Mr. Gerende:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 October 1955, as amended.

Effective 1 August 195[illegible], said contract, as amended, is further amended by deleting the figure $5500 from the first sentence of paragraph one (1), entitled "Compensation", and substituting in lieu thereof the figure $[illegible].

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Raymond H. Gerende

WITNESS:

____

APPROVED:

____

29 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Increase in Compensation, Raymond H. GERENDE

1. It is requested that the contract, as amended, for Raymond H. GERENDE be further amended to provide increase in compensation from $5,500 per annum to $6,000 per annum.

2. This request, submitted by the Mexico Station and concurred with by WH Division is in recognition of GERENDE's operational responsibilities and the manner in which he carries out his operational assignments.

W. E. BROOKS
Chief, WH Support

SECRET

14-00000

		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM: Chief, WH Division		MICROFILM

SUBJECT: Raymond H. GERENDE/Contract Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

The contract of Raymond H. GERENDE expires on 30 September 1963. It is requested that the Station forward a request for renewal, together with any changes or amendments desired, to arrive at Headquarters by 1 September.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
0 & 1 - COS, Mexico City

201-119523

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-11732	11 JUL 1963 3 July 1963
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-119523

Distribution:
1 - RI
1 - Chrono

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
RID/IS	
RID/FI	
WH/3/m	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/Mexico	T. Ward	db	5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	5 JUL 1963	for J. C. King

FORM 53 1-63 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

PROCESSING ACTION

TO

Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM

Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT

Salary Increase - Raymond H. GERENDE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

In recognition of GERENDE's operational responsibility and the manner in which he carries out his operational assignments, it is requested that his contract be amended to grant him a salary increase from $5,500.00 p.a. to $6,000.00 p.a. effective 1 July 1963.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution
- 3 - WH

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-3885

DATE
3 July 1963

CLASSIFICATION

HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE | 13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LIEMPTY-3
201-117758
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
BUSINESS ASSOCIATE IN CUNASA OF
GUILLERMO SALAZAR POLANCO 201-239372

201-239372
HMMA-20956 E01
22 MAR 63
P5

1314294

PAZR

1 314 294

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 20 FEB 63

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CI/OA, CS 2, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

FEB 21 0310Z 63

ROUTINE

DIR CITE MEXI 3513 IN72031

REF DIR 17796

1. MEXI LCFLUTTER CANDIDATES: RAMOND H. GERENDE (BILINGUAL), OLIVER G. SCANTLING (BILINGUAL), LIEMBRACE-1 (SPANISH), LIEMBRACE-2 (SPANISH), LIEMBRACE-3 (BILINGUAL), LIEMBRACE-4 (SPANISH), LIEMBRACE-5 (SPANISH), LIEMBRACE-6 (SPANISH), LIEMBRACE-9 (SPANISH) (NOTE - PLAN USE LIEMBRACE-3, SURVEILLANCE TEAM LEADER, AS INTERPRETER FOR OTHER LIEMBRACE TEAM MEMBERS), AMSPRAWL-2 (BILINGUAL), LIFIRE-4 (SPANISH) AND LIFIRE-5 (SPANISH) (NOTE - NO STATION ASSET AVAILABLE INTERPRET FOR LCFLUTTER OF LIFIRE/4 AND 5. IF LCFLUTTER OPERATORS DO NOT SPEAK SPANISH CAN HQS PROVIDE INTERPRETER TDY THIS PURPOSE?) LIMOTOR-22 (ENGLISH). IF TIME AVAILABLE ALSO DESIRE LCFLUTTER LIMUST-7, LUMUST-5, LIMOTOR-19. ALL THREE SPEAK ENGLISH.

2. HQS EQUIPMENT BE POUCHED MEXI.

END OF MESSAGE

16 copies
1 in each 201

C/S COMMENT: *TWO MAN LCFLUTTER TEAM LEAVING HQS ABOUT 10 MAR. NAME CANDIDATES AND SPECIFY CASES FOR WHICH INTERPRETER AVAILABLE.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

201-119523
201-119523

ORIG :	Charlotte Bus...:sj
UNIT :	WH/3/Mexico
EXT :	5940
DATE :	4 Dec 62

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4
2		5
3		6

5 DEC 62 15 39z

TO MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO : CI/OA, CCS 2, S/C 2

RI File
No marking
C. Burke

~~SIG CEN~~
DEFERRED
R ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 03369

03369

REF HMMA-19978*

GERENDE CONTRACT AMENDED 8 NOV TO INCLUDE CHRISTMAS BONUS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH CMT: *Requested amendment for Raymond H. GERENDE (201-119523) contract for a one month's bonus at Christmas.

WHBM Rouvier

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	JM
RID/MIS	
~~RID/FS~~	
RID/FI	
~~DESTROY~~	

WH/PERS/RENAHAN
WH/~~COPS~~

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

DEC 11 9 21 AM '65

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

 Copy No.

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Raymond H. GERENDE

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: HMMA-19978

Attached is a copy of the contract amendment providing Subject with a Christmas bonus.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment: 1

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City

201-119523

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
5 Dec 62	7 DEC 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-11145

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-119523

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexico	Bustos	sj	5940

ROUTING	INITIALS
1 - RI	
RID/AN Chrono	
RID/MIS	
~~RID/FE~~	
RID/FI	
DESTROY	

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	5 DEC 1962	J. C. King

FORM 8-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 61Ob WHICH MAY BE USED.

DISPATCH

18 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

VIA: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Raymond H. GREENE, Contract Amendment

1. Effective 18 October 1962, the contract (as amended) for Raymond H. GREENE dated 1 October 1955 is amended to provide an annual Christmas bonus equal to one month's basic compensation.

2. All other provisions of the contract as amended remain in effect.

SIGNED

WH Contract Approving Officer

APPROVED:

SIGNED

Special Contracting Officer

18 October 1962

MEMORANDUM TO: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

1. It is requested that the current contract for Raymond H. GERENDE, be amended to include a Christmas bonus of one month's salary. This amendment should be effective immediately.

2. GERENDE is an indigenous agent, and this Christmas bonus is normal for all employees in Mexico.

Paul E. Arneson
C/WH/Support

O&1 - CPD
1 - WH/Pers
1 - C/WH/Support
1 - Subject

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING
SECRET/KAPOK	

TO	Chief, WH Division
INFO.	
FROM	Chief of Station, Mexico City
SUBJECT	Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

PROPOSED	ACTION
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	ABSTRACT
	MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

It is requested that Headquarters initiate the appropriate amendment to Subject's contract so that it will include as Christmas bonus one month's salary. This Christmas bonus is normal for all indigenous employees in Mexico, and should be included in Subject's contract.

Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD
2 - Files

201-119523

CS COPY

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
8 Oct. 1962	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-19978;KAPOK-1991

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-119523

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/KAPOK

045

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 17 SEP 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: EE 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, WH 7, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

SEP 18 0435Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 23918

DIR CITE MEXI 1957 (OUSLER ACTING)

NYXIS BEDOX

1. DUE LATE WORD THAT LAW SCHOOL STARTS 17 SEPT BETUMBLE DEPARTED MEXI 17 SEPT VIA AMERICAN FLIGHT 58. INSTRUCTED THAT HQS MAY CONTACT ALTHOUGH FINANCES (INCL. SALARY THROUGH 17 SEPT, OPS EXPENSES, TRAVEL AND 50 DOLLARS LIVING EXPENSE AUTHORIZED ORAL AGREEMENT, BUT NOT BONUS) CLEARED MEXI PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE.

2. AT LAST MEET WITH POTASZ 14 SEPT, WHICH AUTHORIZED BY CO, POTASZ INDICATED ALTHOUGH NOT PARTICULARLY SATISFIED WITH LIFE HE LONG AGO HAS CHOSEN POLAND. BETUMBLE ASSESSMENT HE WOULD NOT COOPERATE WITH KUBARK. POTASZ DOES HAVE BETUMBLE ADDRESS WASH.

3. AT DINNER WITH POTASZ 5 SEPT IN RESTAURANT BETUMBLE TOOK ALONG HIS FRIEND RAYMOND H. GERENDE, STATION CONTRACT AGENT. CO NOT

Gerende 201

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

AWARE GERENDE FRIENDSHIP WITH BETUMBLE OR BETUMBLE PLANS HAVE GERENDE JOIN HIM AND POTASZ FOR DINNER. DUE GERENDE SENSITIVE STATUS AND LACK RAPPORT BETWEEN HIM AND POTASZ DOUBT ANY FURTHER DEVELOPMENT ALONG THESE LINES CAN BE EXPECTED.

4. POUCHING REPORT BETUMBLE TDY EVENTS.

END OF MESSSAGE

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
SECRET	HMM-T-2553

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 9 February 1962

SUBJECT: Contract Amendment - Raymond H. GERENDE

RE "O.T" - CHECK "X" ONE: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: For your information

REFERENCES:

Forwarded herewith are copies of a contract amendment for Subject effective 1 January 1962.

Willard C. Curtis

Willard C. CURTIS

8 February 1962

Attachment - as stated

DISTRIBUTION
3-WH Division w/attachment
2-Files

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACTION FINISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: Raymond H. GERENDE Contract Amendment

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

1. Attached please find the original and two copies of the above Subject's contract amendment, effective 1 January 1962 and increasing Subject's compensation from $5040 to $5500.

2. The original copy is to be retained in the Field, and a signed carbon copy of the amendment returned to Headquarters.

3. All other terms of the contract remain in full force.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachments:
Per paragraph 1

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City, w/atts.

1 - Subject
1 - WH/Registry, w/o atts.
1 - WH/3/Mex/Chrono, w/o atts.

D.K.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 11 January 1962

DATE DISPATCHED: 17 JAN 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMM-W-10367

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-119523

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexico	D. Winters	mrd C/Mexi	3163

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	12 JAN 1962	J. C. KING

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 61OB WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

201-119523

27 December 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

It is requested that the contract for Raymond H. GERENDE, renewed on October 1961 for a period of two years, be amended to reflect an increase in annual salary from the current $5,040 to $5,500. This increase in salary should be effective 1 January 1962.

(SIGNED) P. E. ARNESON
NED P. HOLMAN
Chief, WH/3

CONCUR: (SIGNED) P. E. ARNESON
C/WH/Support

Mr. Raymond H. Gerende

Dear Mr. Gerende:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 October 1955, as amended.

Effective 1 January 1962, said contract, as amended, is further amended by deleting the figure $5340 from the first sentence of paragraph one (1), entitled "Compensation," and substituting in lieu thereof the figure $5500.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ____________________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Raymond H. Gerende

WITNESS: ____________________

APPROVED:

____

SECRET

27 December 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

It is requested that the contract for Raymond H. GERENDE, renewed on October 1961 for a period of two years, be amended to reflect an increase in annual salary from the current $5,040 to $5,500. This increase in salary should be effective 1 January 1962.

NED P. HOLMAN
Chief, WH/3

SECRET

DISPATCH | SECRET/KAPOK | KAPOK-1941

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-119523

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 11 Dec 1961

SUBJECT LIEMPTY/Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
Amendment of Subject's contract

REFERENCE(S)
HMMW-9364, 29 December 1960

1. By reference Subject's annual salary was increased to its present figure of US $5,040.00.

2. Station hereby requests a further increase in Subject's annual salary to US $5,500.00 based upon Subject's outstanding performance as Principal Agent in the LIEMPTY project. The latest LIEMPTY Project Renewal Request, recently forwarded to Headquarters, detailed GERENDE's duties. In Station's opinion, the noted salary increase is considered justified not only from agent's excellent job performance, but also as an incentive to continued superior work as well as an offset to the inflationary trend of the cost of living in Mexico.

3. It is requested that Headquarters initiate the appropriate amendment to GERENDE's contract increasing his yearly salary to thenoted figure of US $5,500.00 to be effective 1 January 1962.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

11 December 1961

Distribution:
3 - WHD

CS COPY

201-119523

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION SECRET/KAPOK

CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

14-00000

TO		
Chief of Station, Mexico City		MARKED FOR INDEXING
	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO		ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, WH Division		ABSTRACT
		MICROFILM

SUBJECT: Contract Extension for Raymond H. GEHENDE

REFERENCE: HMMA-17199, 4 August 1961

Effective 1 October 1961, the contract (as amended) for GEHENDE, effective 1 October 1957, is extended for a period of two (2) years. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City

DATE TYPED: 25 August 1961
DATE DISPATCHED: 29 AUG 1961

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-10039

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-119523

1 - RI
1 - WH/Registry
1 - WH/3/Mexico/Chrono

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	D.K.
RI/FI	
RI/FI	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH3/Mexico	C.Bustos-Videla	bj AC/WH3/Mexico	2555

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	25 AUG 1961	J. C. KING

10039

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

FROM : Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Contract Extension for Raymond H. GERENDE

1. Effective 1 October 1964, the contract (as amended) for the subject individual, effective 1 October 1955, is extended for a period of two (2) years.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY ____________________
Contracting Officer

SECRET
(When Filled In)

15 August 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)
Request for Contract Extention

1. It is requested that effective 1 October 1961, the contract (as amended) for Raymond H. GERENDE be extended for a period of two years or through 30 September 1963.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract should remain in full force and effect.

Ned P. Holman
C/WH/3

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - Subject's 201 file
1 - Chrono file

Basic HMMA-17499, 4 Aug 61.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMA-17499

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 201-119523

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 4 August 1961

SUBJECT: Raymond H. GERENDE/Contract Renewal

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
- MARKED FOR INDEXING
- X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: - Renew GERENDE's Contract.

REFERENCE(S):

HMMW-9873, 5 July 1961

It is requested that Subject's contract, as amended, be renewed for a two year period, 1 October 1961 through 30 September 1963. The Station does not desire to make any changes in Subject's contract at this time.

Willard C. CURTIS

2 August 1961

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

201-119523

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

CS COPY

	PROCESSING	ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
		ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
		ABSTRACT
		MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Operational/Raymond H. GEREDE/Contract Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Subject's contract will expire on 30 September 1961. The Station is requested to pouch their request for renewal, together with any changes or amendments they may desire, in order that it may reach Headquarters by 1 September 1961.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City

DATE TYPED: 5 July 1961
DATE DISPATCHED: 7 JUL 1961

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-9873

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-119523

1 - RI
1 - WH/Registry
1 - WH/3/Mexico

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexico	J. Brooke	bj AC/WH/3/Mexico	2555

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	5 JUL 1961	J. C. KING

9873

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

TO	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
Chief, WH Division	
FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City	DATE: 15 June 1961
SUBJECT: Amendment of Contract - Raymond H. GERENDE	RE: "43-I" — (CHECK "X" ONE) MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED: For your information	INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S): HMMW-8281, 2 December 1959

In reviewing GERENDE's personnel file, it was noted that a signed copy of an amendment to his contract, which was forwarded to the Station under reference, had never been forwarded to Headquarters. We therefore, are attaching a signed copy of the contract amendment for your files.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

13 June 1961

Attachment:
As stated

Distribution:
3 - WHD, w/att
2 - Files

Mr. Raymond H. Gerende

Dear Mr. Gerende:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 October 1955, as amended.

Effective 1 July 1959, the amendment effective 1 July 1959 to said contract is revised to read as follows:

(a) The figure $4080 is deleted from the first sentence of paragraph one (1) entitled "Compensation" and in lieu thereof the figure $4560 is substituted.

(b) The following paragraph is added after paragraph ten (10), entitled "Term":

"11. Terminal Payment. In the event your contractual relationship with the Government hereunder is severed for one of the reasons set forth below, you, or your estate, will be entitled to a terminal payment of one (1) month's compensation for each full year of your utilization by the Government after 18 March 1955. Said amount shall be calculated at the contractual rate of compensation applicable at the time said payment becomes due."

(a) Said contract is terminated by the Government under subparagraph (a) of paragraph ten (10) above, or

(b) Said contract expires and is not renewed by the Government, or

(c) Your resignation hereunder is accepted by the Government as being in its best interests (the Government's determination as to what constitutes its best interests shall be final and conclusive), or

(d) In the event of your death during the period said contract is in effect.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY [signature]
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

[signature]
Raymond H. Gerende

WITNESS: [signature]

REVIEWED: [signature]
Special Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

[signature]

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET

PROC. POSTED	ACTION
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	ABSTRACT
	MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM: Chief, KURIOT

SUBJECT: AQUATIC/Operational
UV Lamp for Raymond H. GERENDE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: HMMA-16102, 9 December 1960

1. As requested by reference, KURIOT is herewith forwarding the following: (Confirming documentation charging you for this item will be issued in the near future.)

1 each "Mineralight" Model SL-3660
Long Wave Ultraviolet Lamp

2. For ordinary F&S work, the difference between long and short wave lamps is very minor and the long wave UV lamp should prove adequate for the needs of Raymond H. GERENDE. Should a special need arise demanding the use of a short wave UV lamp by GERENDE, it will be supplied by KURIOT.

3. Disclosure of the existence, advantages, or uses of short wave UV lamps, or in any way making available such lamps to other than KUBARK personnel requires prior Headquarters approval. A copy of Instruction No. 20-2 containing the basic KURIOT policy governing the use of short wave UV lamps is herewith enclosed for your guidance.

4. Short wave UV lamps embody a definite health hazard and should be used with caution. Short wave UV rays quickly cause sunburn, to which the eyes are particularly susceptible, and should not be used without wearing protective goggles. Ordinary eye glasses cut out most of the harmful rays, but even persons wearing glasses may receive harmful eye burns from UV rays entering at the sides of the glasses. Short wave UV lamps also produce small quantities of ozone so that the lamp should be used in a well ventilated room, which, of course, must also be darkened. For the above reasons, it is advisable to use only a long wave UV lamp whenever possible.

Arthur B. Wizlatz
ARTHUR B. WIZLATZ

Enclosures: (1 Box and 1 Envl)
1. UV Lamp
2. Instruction No. 20-2

Distribution
3 - COS, Mexico City w/encls

1 - RI w/o encls
1 - TSD/SSS w/o encls
1 - WH/3/MEX w/o encls
1 - TSD/SAB w/o encls
1 - WH/LOG w/o encls
1 - TSD/LOG w/o encls

RI/FI

DATE TYPED: 5 April 61
DATE DISPATCHED: 10 APR 1961

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-9666

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-119523

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
TSD/SAB	ATejeda	ja	2922

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/3/MEX	3 April 61	COORD. BY PHONE Stewart Burton (x2555)

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/TSD/TA	7 APR 1961	ROBERT K. CRAVEN

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-16378
TO: Chief, WH Division INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-119523
FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City		DATE 1 February 1961
SUBJECT -Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)		MARKED FOR INDEXING X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED - None.		INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

HMMW-9364, 4 January 1961

As requested in reference, returned herewith is one copy of GERENDE's contract amendment. The original copy has been retained by the Station. The Station and GERENDE appreciate Headquarters prompt action in processing the request for an increase in salary.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

26 January 1961

Attachment:
As stated above.

Distribution:
3 - WHD (with one copy of attachment)
2 - Files (with original of attachment)

Mr. Raymond H. Gerende

Dear Mr. Gerende:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 October 1955, as amended.

Effective 1 January 1961, said contract, as amended, is further amended by deleting the figure $4560 from the first sentence of paragraph one (1), entitled "Compensation," and substituting in lieu thereof the figure $5040.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY Willard C. Curtis
Field Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

Raymond H. Gerende
Raymond H. Gerende

WITNESS: [illegible]

APPROVED:

Dow H. Lutsky
Special [illegible]

SECRET

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM: Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

ACTION: Execute attached contract and return one copy to Headquarters

REFERENCE: HMMA-16065, 30 November 1960

1. The salary raise for Subject which was requested in reference has been approved. The amendment to his contract has been prepared and the approving signature has been executed at Headquarters.

2. It is requested that the Station and Subject sign the attached contract amendment. Since Headquarters has no interest in the funding of Subject, the Station should retain the original of the amendment in their financial files. Please return one signed copy to Headquarters.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment:
Contract Amendment

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City (w/a)

1 - RI
1 - WH/Reg
1 - WH/3/Mexico

DATE TYPED: 29 December 1960
DATE DISPATCHED: 6 JAN 1961

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-9364

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-119523

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/Mexico	C. Gehrung	ngw	2555

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/Pers	29 Dec 60	J C Bowers

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD		J. C. King

REVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 6100 WHICH MAY BE USED (40)

DISPATCH

Mr. Raymond H. Gerende

Dear Mr. Gerende:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 October 1955, as amended.

Effective 1 January 1961, said contract, as amended, is further amended by deleting the figure $4560 from the first sentence of paragraph one (1), entitled "Compensation," and substituting in lieu thereof the figure $5040.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ____________________
Field Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Raymond H. Gerende

WITNESS: ____________________

APPROVED:

____

mmw -

13 December 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Finance Division

VIA : Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

It is requested that the contract for Raymond H. GERENDE, effective 1 October 1955, as amended and extended, be further amended, effective 1 January 1961 to raise the yearly compensation to $5,040.

Ned P. Holman
AC/WH/3

Distribution:
Orig and 1 - Addressee
1 - Subject

WH/3/Mexico/CYZehrung:bk

SECRET/KAPOK

KAPOK-1850

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-119523

TO : Chief, WH Division

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 30 November 1960

SUBJECT - LIEMPTY/Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

RE "43" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED - Amendment to GERENDE's Contract

REFERENCE(S)

HMMW-8281, 2 December 1959

1. The referenced dispatch forwarded the most recent contract amendment raising GERENDE's salary to $4,560.00 per year.

2. In the Station's opinion, GERENDE's continued Superior performance of his LIEMPTY Principal Agent duties justifies another salary increase. Headquarters attention is invited to the recent Request for Renewal of Project LIEMPTY wherein GERENDE's duties were specified.

3. It is requested that Headquarters initiate an appropriate amendment to GERENDE's contract increasing his yearly compensation to $5,040.00. This amendment should be effective 1 January 1961.

Willard C. Curtis

Willard C. CURTIS

28 November 1960

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

Special submitted 13 Dec 60

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION SECRET/KAPOK

CONTINUED

PAGE NO

201-119523

DISPATCH | SECRET/KAPOK | KAPOK-1843

TO : Chief, WH Division
INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 201-119523
50-6-74/1

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 23 November 1960

SUBJECT - Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)/Emergency Contact Arrangments

RE 433 - (CHECK "X" ONE)
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED - None, for Headquarters information only

REFERENCE(S)

HMMA-15979, KAPOK-1842 dated 18 November 1960

1. In compliance with the KUBARK regulation, CSI-F No. 230-60, Annex A, concerning contact arrangments under emergency conditions, the following information, including recognition signals and bona fides, is forwarded for Headquarters records. Due to the sensitivity of the information, it was believed more appropriate to forward it separately rather than to include it with reference (Request for Renewal of Project LIEMPTY).

2. Insofar as can be determined at the present time, GERENDE could probably be contacted at one of the following places:

a. Present Residence: IDENTITY A

b. Mother's Residence: IDENTITY B

c. Cover Employment Address: IDENTITY C

3. The following oral recognition signals, using the English language, are to be used as indicated:

CONTACT: "Mr. (GERENDE-true name), I bring the most sincere wishes and greetings from your Aunt and Uncle."

GERENDE: "Then you are referring to the IDENTITY D."

CONTACT: "No, I am referring to your other relatives in South Carolina, the IDENTITY E ."

GERENDE: "Yes, Auntie is my Mother's sister."

4. For use as physical bona fides, the Station is forwarding a one peso note with the serial number T348510 for Headquarters files. GERENDE has been given a one peso note with the next higher serial number, T348511, to keep in a safe place pending his having to show it to some future KUBARK contact. It has been explained to GERENDE that he is to show his half of the physical bona fides only after the recognition signals have been completely and accurately recited and his new contact has requested to see his physical bona fides. GERENDE has also been instructed to assure himself of his contact's bona fides by asking to see the contact's one peso note (T348510).

5. Assuming that adequate time will be available at the beginning of an emergency condition, it may well be possible to instruct GERENDE in Secret Writing so that correspondence could be conducted using IDENTITY D or E addresses.

6. It is assumed that Headquarters will advise the Station should more detailed or sophisticated contact arrangments be desired.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

17 November 1960

Attachments:
Peso note - attached herewith.
Three copies of Identities - under separate cover.

Distribution:
3 - WHD (with attachments)
3 - Files (with attachments)

201-119522

IDENTITIES TO HMMA-15981, KAPOK-1843 dated 23 November 1960

IDENTITY A - Suderman 304 - Apt. 401
Colonia Polanco
Mexico, D.F., Mexico
Telephone: 45-42-06

IDENTITY B - Ometusco 98
Colonia Hipodromo
Mexico 11, D.F., Mexico
Telephone: 15-32-28

IDENTITY C - Cia. Electrica Mexicana, S.A.
Victoria y Escape
Fracc. Alce Blanco
San Bartolo Naucalpan
Edo. de Mexico
Telephone: 27-52-38

IDENTITY D - "The Pates"
Mr. & Mrs. A. M. PATE
2130 Santee Ave.
Columbia, S. C.

IDENTITY E - "The Kolbs"
Mr. & Mrs. R. F. KOLB
3111 Grace Hill Rd.
Columbia, S.C.

201-119523


T348510
T348510
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TO: Chief, KUSIOT Attn: C/KURIOT/Training INFO: Chief, WH Division	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 50 - 6 - 61
FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City	DATE 18 Nov. 60
SUBJECT: Flaps & Seals Training of Raymond H. G[illegible]RDE AKEATIC/Operational	RE 43 ? — (CHECK "X" ONE) MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED: None	
REFERENCES:	

1. In compliance with a Station Request, LIEMPTY principal agent Raymond H. G[illegible]RDE, is being given training in basic flaps and seals techniques. It is felt advisable to have a second person outside the Station who can service this type of requirement in case MULFORD is prevented from doing so by the security situation arising from the ALPHUR case.

2. As an aid to this training, a copy of the portion of the MKCHARITY Operations Manual (Section I.D.I.) dealing with basic flaps and seals work has been made and turned over to GERNDE. A second copy is being forwarded herewith to Headquarters. This material was prepared on the basis of the content of the KURIOT training course of mid-1957. If KURIOT training is in possession of newer and improved techniques in this field and will make them available to MULFORD for use here, it would be greatly appreciated.

WILLARD C. CURTIS

14 November 1960

ECMULFORD/LCB

Attachment: 1 MKCHARITY Operations Manual (Section I.D.1.)

Distribution:
3 - HQS (2 s KURIOT) — 0 w/att. — To TSD
3 - File

FORM 10-57 53 (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION	CONTINUED	PAGE NO

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-119523

FROM : Chief, WHD

DATE 3 DEC 1959

SUBJECT : LIEMPTY/Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

RE "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED : Execution and Retention of Revised Contract Amendment

REFERENCE(S)

a. HMMT-1056, 9 October 1959
b. HMMA-13571, 21 August 1959
c. HMMW-7959, 12 August 1959
d. HMMA-13063, 5 June 1959

1. Reference (c) forwarded a contract amendment which provided increased compensation and a termination settlement for Raymond H. GERENDE. This dispatch also requested that the Station comment on the provisions of the Terminal Payment clause as written into this amendment.

2. Since the provisions of the original contract amendment were written in general terms and did not specifically cover the circumstances under which GERENDE would be eligible for a terminal settlement as interpreted by the Station and outlined in reference (b), a revised contract amendment was written. The attached contract amendment also shows corrected compensation figures. The original contract amendment was incorrect due to the absence of the amendment, effective 1 September 1957, which increased GERENDE's compensation from $3,600 to $4,080.

3. Since GERENDE's original contract was prepared at Headquarters and forwarded to you for execution and retention, this amendment should follow the same procedure. Therefore, the original and one copy are attached for your action and retention. Return one signed copy.

4. Reference (a) requested Headquarters to comment on a two-year extension for GERENDE's contract, indicating that the extension should be from 1 July 1959, the date of the last amendment, to 1 July 1961. There seems to be some confusion on contract extension procedures which Headquarters would like to clarify at this point. Contract extensions are based on the date of the original contract not the amendments. Accordingly, GERENDE's contract, originally effective 1 October 1955 and extended to 30 September 1959, was further extended for a period of two years from 1 October 1959 to 30 September 1961.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

30 November 1959

Attachment:
As stated above

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/3/Mexico
1 - RI

WH/3/Mexico/[illegible]:ngw

CS COPY
201-119523

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

RECORD COPY

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

FROM: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Contract Extension for Raymond H. [illegible]

1. Effective 1 October 19[illegible], the contract (as amended) for the subject individual, effective 1 October 19[illegible], is extended for a period of two (2) years.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY [signature]
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

____

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

NW-8281

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
Room [illegible]01, [illegible] Ext. 3565, 3909

NO.

DATE 18 November 1959

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH Contract Approving Officer	20 Nov		DCB
2. C/WH/3 Attn: Mary Therrien			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

0 to 1: For approval in pseudo

0 to 2: Terry. Sorry for the delay/hope this is adequate. Hqs. Finance Division has no financial interest in this individual, therefore, please have the field execute and retain the original of this amendment in their Station financial files. The field can then send a signed copy back to WH and you in turn can notify us of its receipt so our records will show that this transaction has been finally completed. Any questions, give me a call.

Dow H. Luetscher
Dow H. Luetscher

1703
Please call me on this since Mr. Arms [illegible] will not return until 21 Nov.
Bowers

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 O-[illegible]

Mr. Raymond H. Gerende

Dear Mr. Gerende:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 October 1955, as amended.

Effective 1 July 1959, the amendment effective 1 July 1959 to said contract is revised to read as follows:

(a) The figure $4080 is deleted from the first sentence of paragraph one (1) entitled "Compensation" and in lieu thereof the figure $4560 is substituted.

(b) The following paragraph is added after paragraph ten (10), entitled "Term":

"11. Terminal Payment. In the event your contractual relationship with the Government hereunder is severed for one of the reasons set forth below, you, or your estate, will be entitled to a terminal payment of one (1) month's compensation for each full year of your utilization by the Government after 18 March 1955. Said amount shall be calculated at the contractual rate of compensation applicable at the time said payment becomes due."

(a) Said contract is terminated by the Government under subparagraph (a) of paragraph ten (10) above, or

(b) Said contract expires and is not renewed by the Government, or

(c) Your resignation hereunder is accepted by the Government as being in its best interests (the Government's determination as to what constitutes its best interests shall be final and conclusive), or

(d) In the event of your death during the period said contract is in effect.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY____________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Raymond H. Gerende

WITNESS:____________________

APPROVED:

____

HHMW-8281

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

22 October 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Contract Extension for Raymond H. GEREDE (ps)

1. It is requested that effective 1 October 1959, the contract (as amended) for Raymond H. GEREDE, effective 1 October 1955 and extended to 30 September 1959, be further extended for a period of two years.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract should remain in full force and effect.

R.W. Dahlgren,
C/WH/III

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - Subject
1 - Chrono

SECRET

DISPATCH

SECRET

HMMT-1055

TO: Chief, WH Division

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 201-119523

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 9 October 1959

SUBJECT: Raymond H. GERENDE Contract Renewal

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

- MARKED FOR INDEXING
- X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: See below.

REFERENCE(S)

A. HMMA-13571, 21 August 1959
B. HMMW-7959, 12 August 1959
C. HMMA-13063 (RYBAT-1152), 5 June 1959

1. Reference C requested that a new two-year contract (with amendments) be prepared for Raymond H. GERENDE to be effective 1 July 1959. Reference B forwarded the amendment to the contract, but made no mention of the two-year renewal.

2. Therefore, unless we are notified otherwise by Headquarters, we will assume that GERENDE's present contract is due for renewal on 1 July 1961.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

vps
5 October 1959

Distribution
3 Hqs

Amendments effective, July 59
Contract " , Oct 59

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

CONTINUED

PAGE NO

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMA-13571

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 201-119523

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 21 August 1959

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY/Contract Amendment for Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

RE "431" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: None, for Headquarters information only.

REFERENCE(S)

A. HMMA-13063, 5 June 1959.

B. HMMW-7959, 12 August 1959.

1. Forwarded herewith as Attachment No. One is GERENDE's signed contract amendment. GERENDE is most appreciative for the raise in salary and is delighted with the new Terminal Payment clause.

2. The Station interprets the Terminal Payment clause to mean any termination by the Government or acceptance of GERENDE's resignation in the "best interests of the Government." Examples in connection with the "best interests of the Government" interpretation would involve GERENDE's resignation for health reasons or other logical personal reasons such as a change of residence to some geographical area where his services could not be utilized by KUBARK. Assuming that no security problems are involved in making such a payment, the Station also interprets the clause to be applicable for payment to GERENDE's estate in the event of his death while in the employ of KUBARK.

3. The Station understands clearly why the clause was not written as originally requested and concurs in Headquarters reasoning. Certainly, the Station would not want to give GERENDE a terminal payment, and he has been so informed, if he elects to resign just to receive some extra money or to pursue some other career. The Station hastens to add, however, that to the best of its knowledge, GERENDE has no intention of resigning from his present KUBARK job.

4. As requested in Reference B, enclosed as Attachment No. Two are the original and one copy of the contract amendment dated 1 September 1957. Headquarters will note that the amendment was accepted by GERENDE and approved by the Chief of Station, but was not formally witnessed. It is suggested that Matthew S. DINGLEY (ps), who is presently in Headquarters, be requested to witness the document. DINGLEY was the Case Officer handling GERENDE at the time this amendment became effective.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

QNO/vps
20 August 1959

Distribution
3 Hqs w/attachments as stated above

201-119523

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

14-00000

SECRET

13 August 1957

Mr. Raymond H. GERENDE

Dear Mr. GERENDE:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 October 1955.

Effective 1 September 1957, said contract is amended by deleting paragraph one (1) entitled "Compensation," and substituting in lieu thereof the following paragraph:

"1. Compensation. In full consideration for the purchase of such information and services, you will be paid an amount calculated at the rate of $4,080.00 per annum. Payments will be made as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to the Government."

All other terms and conditions of the contract remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ____________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

Raymond H. Gerende

Raymond H. GERENDE

WITNESS: ____________________

APPROVED:

Willard C. Curtis

SECRET

Mr. Raymond H. Gerende

Dear Mr. Gerende:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 October 1955, as amended.

Effective 1 July 1959, said contract, as amended, is further amended the following manner:

a. The figure $3600 is deleted from the first sentence of paragraph one (1) entitled "Compensation" and in lieu thereof the figure $4560 is substituted.

b. The following paragraph is added after paragraph ten (10) entitled "Term":

"11. Terminal Payment. In the event this contract is terminated by the Government under subparagraph (a) of paragraph ten (10) above or in the event of its expiration and nonrenewal by the Government, you will be entitled to a terminal payment of one (1) month's compensation for each full year of your utilization by the Government after 18 March 1955. Said amount shall be calculated at the contractual rate of compensation applicable at the time this payment becomes due."

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ____________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

Raymond H. Gerende
Raymond H. Gerende

WITNESS: [signature]

APPROVED:

Willard C. Curtis

ATTACHMENT NO. ONE
TO
HDCA- 1357

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-119523

FROM : Chief, WHD

DATE 12 AUG 1959

SUBJECT - LIEMPTY/Contract Amendment for Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

MARKED FOR INDEXING

INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED - See paragraphs 2,3, and 4.

REFERENCE(S)

HMMA-13063, 5 June 1959

1. In accordance with your request to amend Subject's contract providing him with an increase in compensation and a termination payment, the attached contract amendment was written.

2. Paragraph (a) of this amendment states that the figure $3600 is deleted from GERENDE's contract and in lieu thereof the figure $4560 is substituted. This figure of $3600 is the amount GERENDE was to receive under his original contract, dated 1 October 1955. According to the referenced dispatch, however, Subject's contract was amended on 1 September 1957 to provide him with an increase in compensation, bringing his salary up to $4080. Neither Contract Division nor your area desk has a copy of this amendment. Please forward a copy to Headquarters for our files.

3. Your attention is also directed to the "Terminal Payment" clause. Under the provisions of the attached amendment, GERENDE is not eligible for a termination settlement if he resigns from KUBARK. Only in the event that we give him 30 days' notice of termination or fail to renew his contract is he eligible for this termination payment. Your comments on the stipulations as written into the attached amendment are requested. In the event you feel that GERENDE should be entitled to a termination payment should he resign his position, the clause will be rewritten.

4. The attached amendment should be returned to Headquarters with your comments and a copy of the contract amendment dated 1 September 1957.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

10 August 1959

Attachment:
As described above.

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/III/Mexico Chrono
1 - RI

WH/III/Mexico/MTherrien:jmh

CS COPY

201-119523

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

RECORD COPY

RECORD COPY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT * Contract for GERENDE

In reviewing the last contract amendment, it came to note that CPD was deleting the original compensation figure of $3600 instead of the figure sent by the Station which was $4080. In checking this out, we find that we have no copy or notification of the amendment dated 1 September 1957 increasing his salary from $3600 to $4080. CPD is rewritting the contract without using a compensation figure for the amount to be deleted.

When we send this to the field, ask them to send us a copy of the contract amendment, dated 1 September 1957. Also inform them that they are to execute and retain the original copy of this new contract amendment. It may be well to point out that Subject's termination clause stipulates that he will received this benefit only if we terminate the contract.

MTherrien

for HMMW-7959

SECRET

22 July 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Contract Amendment for Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

1. It is requested that Raymond H. GERENDE's contract, effective 1 October 1955 (as amended), be further amended to provide him with compensation at the annual rate of $4,500, effective 1 July 1959. It is also requested that a termination clause, effective 18 March 1955, be written into his contract stipulating that GERENDE will receive a termination payment of one month's salary, calculated at the prevailing rate of compensation at the time of his termination, for each full year of his employment with the U.S. Government. GERENDE was employed by the Mexico City Station on 18 March 1955 under provisions of an oral agreement. All other provisions of his contract should remain in force.

2. GERENDE is covered by the LIEMPTY Project which was amended to include the above commitments to GERENDE and approved by Chief, FI on 16 July 1959

R. S. Gomes
AC/WHD

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - Chrono
1 - Subject

SECRET

SECRET RYBAT | HMMW-7593

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City
INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-119523 50-6-74/1

FROM : Chief, WHD

DATE 21 JUL 1959

SUBJECT - LIEMPTY Project Amendment
Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

RE "437" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

HMMA-13063, 5 June 1959

1. On 16 July 1957, an amendment to the LIEMPTY Project was approved granting permission to amend Raymond H. GERENDE's contract to provide him with a termination settlement of one month's salary for each full year that he works for KUBARK and to raise his salary effective July 1959 from $4,080 to $4,560 per year. No additional funds were requested for the Project.

2. A request to amend GERENDE's contract to include the benefits listed above has been submitted. You will be notified when the contract has been amended.

3. A copy of the approved Project amendment is attached for your information and records.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

21 July 1959

Attachment:
1 - (RYBAT)

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/III/Mexico RYBAT Chrono
1 - Subject
~~[illegible]~~

Scaletti

WH/III/Mexico/E.I. SCALETTI:jmh

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION SECRET RYBAT

CONTINUED

PAGE NO

RECORD COPY

RECORD COPY

DISPATCH	SECRET/RYBAT	HMMA-13003 rybat-1152
TO Chief, WH Division INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO 201-119523
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		DATE 5 June 1959
SUBJECT New Contract for Raymond H. GERENDE (p)		RE - (CHECK "X" ONE) MARKED FOR INDEXING X NO INDEXING REQUIRED INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED Headquarters preparation of a new contract.		

REFERENCE(S)

HMMW-5626, 3 December 1957

1. Raymond H. GERENDE was initially employed by the Station on 18 March 1955 under provisions of an oral agreement. Effective 1 October 1955 GERENDE was placed under a written contract, prepared by Headquarters, with an annual salary of $3,600.00. On 1 September 1957 his contract was amended to increase his salary to $4,080.00 per annum, which is the salary he is presently receiving. It is requested that a new two year contract be prepared, to be effective 1 July 1959, providing an increase in salary to $4,560.00 per annum and including a termination clause which will give GERENDE a termination payment of one month's salary, calculated at the prevailing rate of compensation at the time of termination, for each full year of his KUBARK employment. All other provisions of GERENDE's initial contract should remain in force. (The increase in salary to $4,560.00 per annum is already covered by the LIEMPTY Project.)

2. As pointed out in the attachment to HMMA-11368, 22 October 1958, paragraph three of MEXI-2836, 25 November 1958, and in the LIEMPTY Field Project Outline, GERENDE is a highly valued full-time Station asset who carries a significant work load and who has a great deal of responsibility. He is the LIEMPTY Principal Agent who handles the LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA base houses, the LIENTRAP operation, the outside photographic processing and translation service and all the agents participating in these activities. He performs his duties in a conscientious and professional manner and his already excellent abilities are showing continued improvement.

3. Paragraph eight of HMMA-12095, 4 February 1959, indicated that the Station was considering amending GERENDE's contract to provide for some type of retirement benefits. Although it is recognized that indigenous agents are not usually granted such contract provisions, the Station believes that GERENDE should have monetary incentive, in addition to his idealogy, to make a long career with KUBARK. Accordingly, the Station recommends that GERENDE's new contract provide for a termination settlement of one month's salary for each full year that he has worked for KUBARK. In other words, should GERENDE's career with KUBARK last for 24 years and his yearly salary at the end of this period is $8,000.00, then he, or his heirs, would receive a lump sum payment of $16,000.00. After considering different types of insurance plans, an escrow account and several other ideas, the Station considers the above proposal to come closest to meeting the criteria of control, production incentive and creation of the desire to make KUBARK a career. The date, 18 March 1955, should be used as the beginning date for the computation of GERENDE's termination benefits.

Willard C. CURTIS

QNO/vps
3 June 1959

Distribution
3 Hqs

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

14-00000

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI

SUBJECT : Project LIEMPTY Amendment

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

Name: J. B. Brady
Room: 2114 Barton Hall
Ext.: 2555
Date: 23 June 1959

1. It is requested that approval be granted to amend Raymond H. GERENDE's contract to provide him with a termination settlement of one month's salary for each full year that he works for KUBARK and to raise his salary effective July 1959 from $4,080 to $4,560.00 per year. His last salary increase was granted on 1 September 1957. The date, 18 March 1955, has been suggested by the Station as the beginning date for the computation of GERENDE's termination benefits. The Station believes that this benefit will provide GERENDE with the necessary incentive to make KUBARK a career and at the same time will give the Station an additional element of control.

2. As pointed out in the LIEMPTY Project Approval, GERENDE, an indigenous agent, is one of the Station's most valuable assets. He has a responsible full time job as the LIEMPTY Principal Agent who handles the LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA base houses, the LIENTRAP operation, the outside photographic processing and translation service and all the agents participating in these activities. He performs his duties in a conscientious and professional manner and his already excellent abilities are showing continued improvement.

3. Money was already allocated in the LIEMPTY Project approval for the salary increase. With the effective date of 18 March 1955, for the termination clause, GERENDE will already have accrued $1,520 (his salary is $4,560 per year) if he should resign today. The LIEMPTY Project, as approved, has sufficient funds to cover this cost if it is necessary to obligate this amount during the present Project year. Therefore, no additional funds are requested.

Attachments:
Folder with past approval
Envelope with true name

R. N. Dahlgren, C/WH/III

Concur: ______________________
Chief, FI/OPS

C. W. Anderson, WH/FI

Approved: ______________ Approved for Transmittal:
Chief, FI

J. C. King, C/WHD

Date: ______________________
Senior Staff Coordination
For C/FI/OPS -s/R. Bryant
For CI Staff -s/R. Brown

Approved: J. C. King, C/WHD

Date

SECRET

627 ER/OBS

ORIG : STANLEY J. SHULTZ:ms
UNIT : TSS/ID/FB#4
EXT : 8315
DATE : 26 MARCH 1959

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: TSS 4

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, WH 4, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE		
	DEFERRED	MAR 27 20 59
X	ROUTINE	REC'D CABLE SECT.
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 87295
OUT 87295

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 19063
19063

TECHS

RE MEXI 3522 (IN 34110)

REFERENCE PARA 3 YES

- End of Message -

RI Comment: Does HQS desire naturalized
Mexican citizen obtain tourist visa?

file GEREN...

C. V. S. ROOSEVELT
DC/TSS RELEASING OFFICER

WH/3 (coord by phone w/ Charles W. ANDERSON)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

CHARLES J. RYAN
ASSTC/TSS/AUTH
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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441/SE/IES/

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 19 MAR 59

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: TSS 4

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, WH 4, S/C 2

MAR 19 2329Z 59

ROUTINE

IN 34110

TO DIR INFO GUAL SANJ CITE MEXI 3522

AQUATIC

RE: DIR 16313 (OUT 82047)*

1. RAYMOND H GERENDE ADVISED BY CUBAN EMB 17 MARCH THAT DOES NOT NEED VISA ENTER CUBA AS TOURIST ON MEXICAN PASSPORT SINCE MEXI PP GOOD FOR 29 DAY STAY AND CAN EASILY BE RENEWED ONCE IN CUBA.

2. CUBAN EMB ADVISED ODACID BY PHONE 18 MARCH THAT TOURIST VISA NOT REQUIRED FOR ANY NATIVE BORN LATIN AMERICAN, U.S. BRITISH, FRENCH OR SWISS CITIZEN. TOURIST VISA IS REQUIRED FOR ANY ABOVE NATURALIZED CITIZEN. TRANSIENT VISA REQUIRED ON ANY NATIONALITY WHO TRAVELS VIA CUBA TO COUNTRY OTHER THAN HIS OWN.

3. DOES HQS DESIRE NATURALIZED MEXI CITIZEN OBTAIN TOURIST VISA?

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *REQUESTED IMMEDIATELY ON LOAN CUBAN TOURIST VISAS IN ORIGINAL PASSPORTS OTHER THAN U.S.

file GERENDE

SECRET

DISPATCH SECRET/KAPOK

HMMA-12089
KAPOK-1543

TO: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY Progress Report - July thru Dec 1958

ACTION REQUIRED: None, for Headquarters information and files only.

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-6-74/3

DATE: 4 February 1959

RE: "X" - CHECK "X" ONE

- X MARKED FOR INDEXING
- NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

SYNOPSIS OF DEVELOPMENTS

1. During the period covered by this report, a new Case Officer, Quinton N. OUSLER, assumed operational direction of several LIPSTICK assets (Oliver G. SCANTLING, Raymond H. GERENDE, LIMITED, LICALLA, LIENTRAP and several support agents), the LIJERSEY surveillance team and the LILYRIC Base. The Station has continued to use SCANTLING, primarily, to follow up LIMESA leads obtained from LIFEAT and the photographic bases; however, no positive returns have been realized from his prodigious efforts except the collection of a considerable amount of operational information. GERENDE performed his principal agent responsibilities for the photographic bases. LIENTRAP, LIJERSEY until 19 December 1958 handled the LIFEAT/BOMORNING and LIFEAT/ ... radio operations. The LIJERSEY surveillance team has been used sparingly for precise investigations and routine static surveillances; however, a principal agent, ... G. CLACKETT, is currently being trained in Headquarters to assume the full-time direction, control, training and development of the LIJERSEY team. The ... project, LIEMPTY, covering all the assets discussed in this report was submitted to Headquarters on 3 October 1958 with requested project year approval period from 1 December 1958 through 30 November 1959. An operational security review of Raymond H. GERENDE's activities was forwarded to Headquarters as an attachment to HMMA-11363, 22 October 1958.

ACCOUNT OF DEVELOPMENTS - OLIVER G. SCANTLING SEGMENT

2. Agent Information - Oliver G. SCANTLING has continued to perform his assigned tasks in an outstanding manner. SCANTLING's poise, common sense, education, ideology and native ability for the pursuit of clandestine activities make him one of the most valuable support assets available to the Mexico City Station. The fact that SCANTLING has full time overt occupation as Chief Engineer and Production Manager for a local manufacturing company adds to his long-range potential as a KUBARK agent. On two occasions during the past six months SCANTLING has indicated to his Case Officer that he would like to resign from his overt position and devote full time to his KUBARK operational duties; however, the Case Officer has discouraged him from doing this on the basis that he has more long-range potential when his cover occupation is legitimate. Of course, SCANTLING would be more valuable if he could work full time for the Station, but not sufficiently so to warrant his resignation from his overt job (his monthly salary in his overt job is in excess of $800.00 U.S.). The only significant limitation that SCANTLING has evidenced to his present Case Officer is his occasional delay in preparing written reports of investigations and other matters requiring reports for the files. However, this limitation gradually is being overcome and it is expected that SCANTLING's reports will continue to be factual, comprehensive and soon will be promptly submitted.

3. Security Developments - SCANTLING is constantly under a considerable amount of exposure and pressure when following up LIMESA leads obtained from LIFEAT and the photographic bases. Since time is always of the essence when ... such perishable leads, SCANTLING frequently is directed to make approaches to individuals performing services for the LIMESTICK target after routine, and sometimes only cursory, investigation. Therefore, the possibility always exists of his entanglement in an undesirable security incident. This necessarily

[illegible] calculated risk which both SCANTLING and the Station must take if penetration of the primary target is achieved, whether technically or by a recruitment in place. It is to SCANTLING's credit that he has not yet become involved in an incident which [illegible] has compromised him and/or alerted the target of KUBARK's [illegible] interest in them. The closest SCANTLING has come to being compromised and to being identified as a [illegible] agent stems directly from the LIPSTICK [illegible] of June 1956. The cut-out used by the surveillance team was [illegible] by SCANTLING in his true name at the time that he was leader of the team. No [illegible] indication, however, has been uncovered which points to SCANTLING [illegible] of investigation by a local police service. SCANTLING and the case officer [illegible] and will continue to watch closely for any sign of local police and other [illegible] interest in his activities.

4. Operational Success and Effectiveness - Briefly discussed below are some of the [illegible] operational activities in which SCANTLING participated during the period covered by this report:

A. Juan *CASTRO (201-) - SCANTLING continued seeing CASTRO through [illegible] 1958 following the last [illegible] of [illegible] the original LIMESA / [illegible]LIGHTING operation through CASTRO. As late as September 1958 possibilities [illegible] existed, or appeared to exist, that CASTRO would complete his work in the [illegible] LIMERICK office and that it might be possible to install MELIGHTING. While CASTRO, through SCANTLING, was the principal source of this information, portions were also confirmed by LIFEAT. During July, August and September 1958, SCANTLING had approximately eight meetings with CASTRO. In late September 1958 LIFEAT indicated that the LIMERICK target was [illegible] under the supervision of one of their regular local employees, [illegible] *[illegible] (201-2[illegible]), to complete some of the work CASTRO was supposed to finish and that other contractors were doing jobs around the target area which CASTRO would normally have been expected to do had he still been in the employ of the target. Thus, LIEMTRO and LIFEAT confirmed that the LIMERICK target had lost interest in CASTRO - he was not seen visiting the target installation nor did the target people attempt to get in touch with him. In view of this, SCANTLING was instructed to cease all contact with CASTRO as of 1 November 1958.

B. Pablo *[illegible] Rosas (201-) - During the period covered by this report SCANTLING had two interviews with [illegible] Rosas. SCANTLING's most recent report was forwarded to Headquarters as an attachment to HKMA-11143, 1 [illegible] 1958. Unquestionably the Station has identified [illegible] Rosas as the technician who services LIMERICK radio [illegible]. SCANTLING will continue his development of [illegible] Rosas (please see HKMA-11711, 19 December 1958).

C. [illegible] *VIDALES (201-) - SCANTLING's activities in connection with the LIMESA/MELIGHTING operation were summarized in HKMA-11297, 20 October 1958, and previous correspondence.

D. HERRERIA GABELICH - This is the firm that made the steel vault door for the LIMERICK installation. SCANTLING made two visits to this firm's workshop and succeeded in obtaining enough information to make an

...accurate drawing of the type door installed at LIMERICK. This drawing was forwarded to Headquarters via HMMA-11926, 21 January 1959.

E. Casing Report on West German Embassy - During June, July and August 1958, SCANTLING prepared a detailed casing report on the new West German Embassy. SCANTLING's engineering ability enables him to prepare accurate drawings and sketches from a minimum of data. Also, his personality and gregariousness permit him to visit the inside of such establishments, with an appropriate cover story, and retain minute details which later he commits to paper and drawings with a comprehensive floor plan and important construction data.

F. LIMERICK Construction - SCANTLING's long association with this target from the casing standpoint provides the Station with an unparalleled source of information about LIMERICK construction methods, modifications and reasons for same. All of the LIMERICK casing reports on file in Headquarters are the product of SCANTLING's casing ability and knowledge. Discussions with Station Officers about LIMERICK construction have been of benefit to the Station during this reporting period and they will continue to be of worthwhile importance.

G. Routine Investigations and Surveillances - Although the Station has several assets capable of performing investigations and surveillances, SCANTLING is utilized in situations requiring the utmost in discretion and dependability. His activities in this connection are too numerous to list here; suffice it to state that he has contributed materially to the Station's collection of operational information through his investigative efforts. SCANTLING's interview of Paul Frederick Kirschhoff (201-45345) of LCMAY-TOWL interest is an example of SCANTLING's use on investigations (see HMMA-11749, 17 December 1958).

H. ENGEM-15 - SCANTLING served as the contact with ENGEM-15 during the latter's December 1958 trip to Mexico City. In this connection SCANTLING is a support asset which is trustworthy and dependable. SCANTLING never displays undue curiosity in operations such as the ENGEM-15 case; he accepts the minimum amount of information given and performs his duties in a professional and sincere manner.

I. LIEMPTY/3 - SCANTLING handles the administrative matters connected with L/3. Dexter M. KILLGO provides operational direction to L/3. During this reporting period, the Station had hopes of SCANTLING taking over the operational supervision of L/3's activities. However, after a four-month trial period with both SCANTLING and KILLGO meeting with L/3, it was decided that it would be desirable for KILLGO to continue handling L/3. L/3's [illegible] personality and intellect indicated that he could best be directed by a PBPRIME citizen. Therefore, SCANTLING no longer attends KILLGO's and L/3's operational meetings, although he does continue to handle L/3's administrative problems.

J. Raymond H. GERENDE's Duties - During GERENDE's absence from

Mexico City in December 1958 and January 1959. It was considered appropriate for SCANTLING to handle LIMITED, LICALLA and LIENTRAP. Although this procedure defeats some compartmentation principles, it was the only manner in which the Station could maintain efficiency with the three operations listed above. SCANTLING has known the agents involved with LIMITED, LICALLA and LIENTRAP for several years. In fact, he was at one time the agent in charge of these three operations.

5. Operational Methods Evolved During the Period - The VIDALES operation [illegible] to [illegible] the necessity for thorough [illegible] and discussions with the agent making an approach to a target. This can hardly be described as a new operational method, but it does serve to illustrate the [illegible] of [illegible] that should be followed. The [illegible] LIENVOY IV [illegible] whereby SCANTLING must [illegible] the landlord of the target's building [illegible] SCANTLING and the Station the opportunity to prepare thoroughly for SCANTLING's recruitment pitch. The excellent documentation prepared by [illegible] and the story being created by SCANTLING and the Station should increase the [illegible] on SCANTLING's cold approaches. (See HMMA-11356, 22 October 1958, and HMMW-7000, 21 November 1958, for additional details on this aspect.)

In general terms, one other conclusion can be made about any Station's support assets - where technical and photographic operations are possible, the utility of the information obtained is enhanced considerably by accurate, [illegible] and timely casing reports. SCANTLING, as previously mentioned, is an excellent asset for this type of support.

6. Administrative - SCANTLING's contract expires on 18 February 1959. As of that date SCANTLING will have received an annual salary of $3,600.00 U.S. for two years. The Station plans to raise his annual compensation to $4,000.00 U.S. No other significant administrative problems exist.

7. Outlook for Future Developments - Station plans call for the continued utilization of SCANTLING in the same manner as he is presently being used. The Station will keep SCANTLING as an independent asset and, it is hoped, resist the temptation to make him a principal agent in charge of numerous sub-agents. It is believed that SCANTLING is the type of support asset that can be valuable to the Station for many years to come and that every effort should be made to protect his security and value to KUBARK.

ACCOUNT OF DEVELOPMENTS - RAYMOND H. GERENDE SEGMENT

8. Agent Information - Aside from the agent information given in HMMA-11366, 22 October 1958, the only significant development was GERENDE's December 1958 marriage to a U.S. [illegible] girl of Dutch citizenship. The $[illegible].00 U.S. for the purchase of two plane tickets as a wedding gift to GERENDE was designed to impress GERENDE with the fact that KUBARK thinks highly of him as an individual and that KUBARK has a great interest in his intelligence career. GERENDE is at the age and stage in life where he is beginning to wonder just what the future holds for him. In the near future, the Station will propose a salary raise for GERENDE

and request a new contract that provides for some type of retirement benefits - perhaps similar to the Civil Service Retirement program for KUBARK employees.

9. Security Developments - Again, the information on this subject was covered adequately in HMMA-[illegible]. GERENDE was relieved of his LIFEAT/[illegible] and LIFEAT/Cuban Exiles duties on 10 December 1958. This, of course, was in line with recommendations contained in HMMA-11[illegible] and represents a definite security improvement. GERENDE was told that LIFEAT/[illegible] was being [illegible] because it had not been productive of enough significant information and that LIFEAT/Cuban Exiles was being terminated because the occupants of the target [illegible] had moved [illegible]. (This was true where the Cubans are concerned.) Additional security improvements will be made when Morris D. CLACKETT returns to Mexico and relieves GERENDE of responsibility for the LIENVOY surveillance team.

10. Operational Successes and Accomplishments - Briefly outlined below are the [illegible] operational activities which GERENDE managed during the period covered by this report:

A. LIMITED - This base functioned smoothly, securely and effectively during the period July through December 1958. The base operator, LIEMPTY/6, demonstrated his usual competence and devotion to duty. In addition to the primary objective of taking photographs of individuals of interest, L/6 also prepared detailed daily logs on the arrivals and departures of all target personnel, weekly reports of workers activities at the LIMERICK installation, performed three one-man surveillances of Mexicans working at LIMERICK in an effort to identify them by name and home address, and provided SCANTLING with information on LIMERICK construction. During this six-month period, LIEMPTY/6 took approximately 800 photographs from the LIMITED base.

B. LILYRIC - This base is operated by LIEMPTYs/13 and 14, with LIEMPTY/12 serving as a contact between the base and GERENDE. LIEMPTY/14 does most of the photography and reporting for the base since LIEMPTY/13 has a regular job and is not on the premises during regular daytime working hours. L/14 devotes approximately six hours (0800-1400) each day to photography and the remaining time is spent preparing reports. The base prepares complete individual logs on each target personality indicating their arrivals and departures from the LIMERICK installation. These reports are filed in the appropriate Soviet 201 file and are available to [illegible] officers in analyzing a target personality's pattern of daily activity. LILYRIC also prepared a weekly report on workers activities at the Club and reports the license plate numbers of all vehicles discharging or picking up individuals at LIMERICK. (Note: These license plate numbers are then checked out through LIVESTOCK/2 for the owners names and addresses - in case of immediate or later operational interest.) During GERENDE's recent absence from Mexico City, [illegible] met directly with LIEMPTY/12. During this period approximately 2,000 photographs were taken from the LILYRIC base.

C. LICALLA - While LILYRIC and LIMITED are excellent bases for photographing individuals entering and leaving the LIMERICK installation, the LICALLA base is the Station's best source of photographs of LIMERICK

employees. LICALLA is so situated that photographs can be made of target personnel in the garden area of LIMERICK. LIEMPTY/9 is the base operator for LICALLA and in the Station's opinion performs his job in an excellent manner. As reported in HKMA-[illegible], LIEMPTY/9 is the brother of former LIPSTICK/27 (the first LIPSTICK surveillance team member arrested in June 1958). No repercussions, or indications of any impending ones, have resulted to this family relationship. This, certainly, is the major security problem faced by L/9 during this reporting period. L/9 and his family must still have to vacate the LICALLA base for the period of time required to [illegible] [illegible]. The Station is making sure that L/9 does not know that his current employer owns the LICALLA base and the three adjoining houses and every effort is being made to prevent this knowledge from L/9. (See HKMA-[illegible], 28 January 1959, for a more detailed explanation.) Of course, during the remodeling of LICALLA there will not be any LICALLA reporting or photographs. In addition to taking approximately 2,500 photographs during this six-month period, the LICALLA base also prepared weekly reports on LIMERICK garden activities. These reports indicate which LIMERICK employees are seen together each day, which vehicles different employees are accustomed to using, construction activities and other matters which appear of significance to L/9.

D. LIENTRAP - LIENTRAP continues to be a worthwhile Station asset. Approximately 1,400 clandestine photographs have been made of numerous targets during this reporting period and LIENTRAP type activities will undoubtedly remain one of the Station's best investigative assets. As explained in the Field Project Outline, forwarded to Headquarters on 8 October 1958, the Station is of the opinion that the LIENTRAP vehicle should be replaced as soon as possible. Nearly four months have elapsed without receiving Headquarters authority to replace the vehicle. The necessity to replace is even more acute now than at the time of the request. LIEMPTYs 10 and 11 do an excellent job on LIENTRAP operations.

E. LIEREST - This operation can be characterized as somewhat dormant for the July - December 1958 period. Because of CERENDE's other important activities, he did not have the time to train and work with the surveillance team. Also, the Station considered that it would be stretching security just a bit too far to have CERENDE engaged in surveillance at the same time that he was handling the photographic base houses and performing monitoring chores for LIFEAT/BOMBONERO and LIFEAT/Cuban Exiles. The expected arrival of Simon D. CLACKETT in April and his relieving CERENDE of LIEREST will enable the Station to retrain, within a year, an effective mobile surveillance team. At present, LIEMPTYs/15, 16 and 17 compose the LIEREST team.

F. LIFEAT - Until 10 December 1958 CERENDE served as monitor in the base houses covering LIFEAT/BOMBONERO and LIFEAT/Cuban Exiles. In addition to living in the base house, CERENDE also transcribed the majority of the BOMBONERO and Cuban Exile tapes. He performed these jobs satisfactorily even though his efficiency was handicapped by numerous other duties. Relieving CERENDE of his LIFEAT duties enables him to devote more time to his other operations with a corresponding increase in the security of all his activities.

c. LIEMPTYs/4 and 5 - LIEMPTY/4 does a truly professional job of developing and printing the base house photographs. No significant developments occurred in relation to L/4 except that OALLER met directly with him during the December 1958 period that GERENDE was away from Mexico City. LIEMPTY/5, L/4's wife, continued doing routine translations in a very competent manner.

11. Administration - Other than the fact that LIENSET and the above-mentioned portions of the LIPSTICK projects were combined into this new project, LIEMPTY, there is nothing of significance to report to Headquarters.

12. Outlook for Future Developments - Although not meaning to be repetitive or [illegible] upon those recommendations made above, a summary of the Station's outlook on the future of the LIEMPTY GERENDE Segment is believed to be appropriate. With the arrival of CLACKETT in April, GERENDE will be free to devote full time to photographic base house operations. GERENDE can do a lot to professionalize these operations by preparing written communications procedures, by thoroughly briefing base house operators on their methods of operation, by preparing detailed security reviews on each base and by supervising the trial of new photographic techniques. GERENDE will continue to be used on occasional sensitive investigations, [illegible] operational travel [illegible] and to perform other services for the Station which will not jeopardize the security of his primary responsibilities. It is planned that CLACKETT will put some life into the LIENSET surveillance team and that the Station will soon have another first rate investigative group to support other Station operations.

Willard C. CURTIS

WCC/vpe
[illegible]1 January 1959

Distribution
3 Hqs

TO: Chief, WH Division INFO:	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-119523
FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City	DATE: 24 December 1958
SUBJECT: Raymond H. GERENDE's Itinerary	RE "433" - (CHECK "X" ONE) MARKED FOR INDEXING X NO INDEXING REQUIRED INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED: None, for Headquarters information only.	
REFERENCE(S):	

1. In the event Headquarters desires to contact GERENDE while he is in the U. S., his itinerary is as follows:

24-30 December 1958
% Mr. & Mrs. Peter ARNOTT
1640 Aqua Vista Road
Richmond, California
Tel: BEacon 3-4188

30 December - 12 January 1959
% Colonel & Mrs. R. ROOS
3628 Windom Place, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
Tel: EMerson 2-3543

12-16 January 1959
% Mr. & Mrs. Joseph HANTIN
332 West 88th Street, Apt. B-1
New York, New York
Tel: LYceum 5-0333

16-24 January 1959
% Mr. & Mrs. R. F. KOLB
3531 Yale Avenue
Columbia, South Carolina

2. Reference to Quinton N. OUSLER's true name will be sufficient to establish the bona fides of a Headquarters officer.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

QNO/vps
22 December 1958

Distribution
3 Hqs

201-119523

DISPATCH SECRET/KAPOK

KAPOK-1545

TO: Chief, WH Division

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-163574
50-6-74/1

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 4 February 1959

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY/20 (formerly LIEARL)

RE: (CHECK ONE) MARKED FOR INDEXING / X NO INDEXING REQUIRED / INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: Amended Operational Approval

REFERENCE(S):
A. HMMA-6321, 15 March 1957
B. HMMA-9307, 2 April 1958
C. HMMW-6572, 12 July 1958

1. Forwarded herewith are the requisite number of copies of a revised PRQ, Part II, on the Subject individual. It is requested that the Operational Approval for the use of Subject be amended to permit his use on LIEMPTY/LIJERSEY.

2. It is also requested that Subject's cryptonym be changed to LIEMPTY/20 and that the necessary Headquarters action be taken to include Subject in the LIEMPTY project.

Willard C. CURTIS

QND/vps
2 February 1959

Distribution
3 Hqs w/attachment in triplicate

per HMMW-7342 w/Project action

BASIC DOCUMENT FILED IN 201-163574

Liempty/1
50-6-74/1

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION SECRET/KAPOK

CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

14-00000

038 ER/JG/JG

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :	8 DECEMBER 1958
TO :	DIRECTOR
FROM :	MEXICO CITY
ACTION :	WH 5
INFO :	CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, S/C 2

ROUTING

DEC 9 10 15 58

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 35553

TO	INFO	CITE
DIR		MEXI 2915

RE: A. MEXI 2781 (IN 26585) *

B. MEXI 2836 (IN 30929)

SINCE GERENDE WEDDING SET FOR 12 DEC, REQUEST ANSWER REFS BY 10 DEC.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: * REQUESTED AUTHORITY TO PURCHASE PLANE TICKETS TO U.S. FOR GERENDE AND BRIDE AS A WEDDING GIFT IN RECOGNITION OF GOOD WORK HE HAS DONE.

Gerende 201

SECRET

Copy No.

14-00000

538 RLG/SW/

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : C. ZEHRUNG
UNIT : WH
EXT : 2555
DATE : 8 DECEMBER 1958

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DEC 9 1937Z 58
SERVICE

PRECEDENCE	DEFERRED	X	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

DIR 03774

OUT 52222 A

TO INFO CITE DIR

C/S COMMENT: UNDERSCORED ABOVE IS CORRECT DIR NUMBER ORIGINALLY DISSEMINATED AS DIR 30774.

file Guerra 201

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

500 MJ/BM

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : C. ZEHRUNG
UNIT : WH
EXT : 2555
DATE : 8 DECEMBER 1958

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 5

INFO : S/C 2

PRECEDENCE: DEFERRED DEC 9 13 50z58; ROUTINE REC'... SECT.; X PRIORITY; OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

OUT 52222

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 30774

REF: MEXI 2781 (IN 26585)*

GERENDE GIFT AS OUTLINED PARA 2 REF APPROVED.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT:* CONCERNED PROPOSED KUBARK WEDDING GIFT FOR RAYMOND H. GERENDE.

File Gerende 201 (Kuempty-1 " Proj)

R. E. GOMEZ, AC/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

R. N. DAHLGREN, CWH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

441 MM/MCB/[illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 25 NOV 58

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, S/C 2

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

NOV 26 02 10:58

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 30929

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 2836

REF MEXI 2781 (IN 26585) *

1. STATION INFORMED ORALLY THAT HQS NEEDS KNOW IF GERENDE SALARY RAISE IS DESIRABLE TO PROVIDE FOR $600 WEDDING GIFT.

2. STATION PREFERS GIVE $600 GIFT WITHOUT REF TO SALARY. CONSIDER SALARY RAISE AS RECOGNITION FOR GOOD WORK PERFORMANCE AND NOT AS REWARD FOR MARRIAGE, THEREFORE, GIFT SHOULD NOT BE LINKED TO SALARY.

3. ASSUMING GERENDE CONTINUES GOOD WORK, STATION PLANS REQUEST SALARY RAISE WITHIN NEXT FEW MONTHS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED AUTHORITY PURCHASE PLANE TICKETS TO U.S. FOR GERENDE.

Gerende 201

SECRET

SECRET

17 November 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OS - Projects Branch

SUBJECT : Wedding Gift for Raymond H. GERENDE (ps), Contract Agent

1. It is requested that the Mexico City Station be authorized to give Raymond H. GERENDE (ps), as a wedding gift, two airplane tourist class tickets from Mexico City to San Francisco and Washington D.C. and return to Mexico City. Although this trip may appear to be a generous and unusual wedding gift, the Station considers it is more than justified in view of GERENDE's outstanding performance of his duties for the Station and his future value as a principal agent. GERENDE has been working for the Station since February 1955.

2. The Station estimates that the cost of the plane tickets will be $600.00. The LIPSTICK Project, which covers GERENDE, can absorb this added expense.

R. E. Dahlgren
Chief, WH/III

WH/3/Mexico/C.Zehrung:mgs

Distribution:
Orig & 1- Addressee
1- WH/Mexico Chrono
1- Subject

SECRET

433 CWT/WG DS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 14 NOVEMBER 58

433

ROUTING

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FE 4, OS 2, S/C 2

NOV 15 04:32 '58

REC'D CABLE SECT.

IN 26585

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 2781

RE: MEXI 2780* (IN 26525)

1. RAYMOND H. GERENDE PLANNING MARRY SUBJ REF 12 DEC.

2. AS KUBARK WEDDING GIFT REQUEST AUTHORITY PURCHASE PLANE TICKETS FROM MEXI TO SAN FRANCISCO TO WASH TO MEXI. ESTIMATE COST TOURIST CLASS TICKETS $600 U.S. COUPLE PLAN VISIT FRIENDS IN SAN FRANCISCO AND BRIDE'S PARENTS IN WASH.

3. ALTHOUGH TRIP GENEROUS AND UNUSUAL WEDDING GIFT, STATION CONSIDERS IT APPROPRIATE AND MORE THAN JUSTIFIED IN VIEW GERENDE PAST AND FUTURE VALUE AS PRINCIPAL AGENT MEXI SUPPORT OPS.

4. NOTHING HAS BEEN SAID TO GERENDE ABOUT PROPOSED GIFT.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED TRACES ON HESTER ROOS.

Gerende 201

SECRET

2[illegible] October 195[illegible]

[illegible] CI/OA

[illegible] Change of Cryptonyms

1. The following agents, [illegible] have been carried under the [illegible] and [illegible] Projects, and [illegible] being transferred to the [illegible] Project which will replace the [illegible] and LI[illegible] Projects. Please change your records to reflect the new cryptonym assigned [illegible].

[illegible] Number	New Crypt	Old Crypt
C-[illegible]	[illegible]-1	LIPSTICK-20
C-[illegible]	[illegible]-2	LIPSTICK-19
C-[illegible]	[illegible]	LIPSTICK-32
[illegible]	[illegible]	LIPSTICK-35
C-[illegible]	[illegible]-5	LIPSTICK-40
C-[illegible]	[illegible]	LIPSTICK-14
C-[illegible]	[illegible]-7	LIPSTICK-27
C-[illegible]	[illegible]	LIPSTICK-28
C-[illegible]9	[illegible]-9	LIPSTICK-39
C-[illegible]	[illegible]-10	LIPSTICK-2
C-[illegible]39	[illegible]-11	LIPSTICK-24
C-[illegible]	[illegible]-12	LIJERSEY-5
C-[illegible]	[illegible]-13	LIJERSEY-2
[illegible]	[illegible]	LIJERSEY-12
C-[illegible]	[illegible]	LIJERSEY-4
[illegible]	[illegible]	LIJERSEY-8
C-52507	[illegible]	LIJERSEY-13

2. Subjects will continue to be used in the same work as reflected by their present PRQ, Part II's. Therefore, no new [illegible] will be submitted.

SECRET

[illegible] October 19[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

1. [illegible] have been carried under the [illegible] transferred to the [illegible] and LI[illegible] Projects, [illegible] request the new cryptonym assigned [illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
C-2779	[illegible]	LIPSTICK-20
[illegible]	[illegible]	LIPSTICK-19
[illegible]	[illegible]	LIPSTICK-32
[illegible]	[illegible]	LIPSTICK-33
[illegible]	[illegible]	LIPSTICK-40
[illegible]	[illegible]	LIPSTICK-14
[illegible]	[illegible]	LIPSTICK-27
[illegible]	[illegible]	LIPSTICK-28
[illegible]	[illegible]	LIPSTICK-39
[illegible]	[illegible]	LIPSTICK-2
[illegible]	[illegible]	LIPSTICK-24
[illegible]	[illegible]	LIJERSEY-5
[illegible]	[illegible]	LIJERSEY-2
[illegible]	[illegible]	LIJERSEY-12
[illegible]	[illegible]	LIJERSEY-4
[illegible]	[illegible]	LIJERSEY-8
[illegible]	[illegible]	LIJERSEY-13

2. Subjects will continue to be used in the same work as reflected [illegible] their present [illegible], [illegible]. Therefore, no new [illegible] submitted.

[illegible] -1

SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO	DATE	ACTION
RI/ANALYSIS SECTION	24 Oct 58	OPEN [ ] AMEND [X] CLOSE [ ]

FROM	ROOM NO	TELEPHONE
Charlotte L. Zehrung	2120 Barton Hall	2758

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

SENSITIVE / NONSENSITIVE

201 NO: 201-119523

SOURCE DOCUMENT:

NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title) SEX M F

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title)

PHOTO: YES NO | BIRTH DATE | COUNTRY OF BIRTH | CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH | OTHER IDENTIFICATION

OCCUPATION, POSITION | OCC/POS CODE

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM: LIEMPTY-1 (formerly LIPSTICK-20)

PSEUDONYM:

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE	ACTION DESK	SECOND COUNTRY INTEREST	THIRD COUNTRY INTEREST
	WH/3M		

COMMENTS:

Note change in subject's cryptonym from LIPSTICK-20 to LIEMPTY-1

201- 201-119523

PERMANENT CHARGE: [X] YES [ ] NO

RESTRICTED FILE: [X] YES [ ] NO

SIGNATURE: Charlotte Zehrung (KS)

Form No. 831 1 Oct. 56 Use previous editions.

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

PUNCHED

TO Chief, WH Division
INFO

50-6-25/3
201-119523

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 22 October 1958

SUBJECT Review of Raymond H. GERENDE's Operations and Activities

RE "43" — CHECK "X" ONE:
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED Headquarters study and comments.

REFERENCE(S)

1. The subject paper is attached. It is believed that Headquarters will have a clearer picture of what GERENDE is doing at the present time together with several informative facts concerning the security of GERENDE's operations. Also included in this paper are several recommendations which the Station proposes to implement through Project LIEMPTY. Obviously, some of the recommendations are goals to work for and, because of a lack of personnel and other valid reasons, cannot be immediately adopted.

2. The attached paper should be read in conjunction with the new LIEMPTY field project outline, which was recently forwarded to Headquarters. Please note, however, that the old agent cryptonyms are used in this paper.

3. The attachment has been read and approved by Matthew S. DINGLEY, who recruited this excellent agent (GERENDE) and was his Case Officer until GERENDE was recently assigned to Quinton N. Ousler.

4. GERENDE is one of the most valuable assets of this Station. This review is considered to be a worthwhile exercise; but under the present operational pace and with present assets, security compartmentation, which is desirable, cannot be achieved. The main security precaution (viz getting GERENDE out of Mexico City and well hidden in case of an emergency) will constantly be kept in mind.

WILLARD C. CURTIS

QNO/vpe
21 October 1958

Distribution
3 Hqs (w/attachments)

BASIC ...

Gerende

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

CONTINUED

PAGE NO. 11368

SECRET

OPERATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW OF RAYMOND H. GERENDE'S OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES

1. SITUATION

As a result of the June 1958 LIPSTICK flap, it was decided by the Chief of Station on 30 June 1958 that Quinton N. OUSLER would assume direct contact with several of Matthew S. DINGLEY's agents, one of whom was Raymond H. GERENDE. After being introduced to GERENDE by DINGLEY on 1 July 1958, OUSLER assumed contact responsibilities with GERENDE on 2 July 1958. On 18 July 1958, the Chief of Station decided that OUSLER should be assigned permanent responsibility for the management and handling of GERENDE and GERENDE's operations.

2. PURPOSE

The purpose of this operational security review is threefold:

a. To identify possible security problems and conditions;
b. To establish a framework for recommendations which will result in the Station's submission of a new support project (LIEMPTY) with Raymond H. GERENDE as a principal agent; and
c. To acquaint the new case officer with the operational problems and agent personnel with which he should have a comprehensive knowledge and detailed understanding.

3. PRINCIPAL AGENT - Raymond H. GERENDE

a. Background - GERENDE has been employed by KUBARK since 18 March 1955, which was just prior to his graduation from the Mexico City College. He is now only 24 years of age, but in the Station's opinion, is a mature, experienced and dedicated KUBARK contract agent. During the three and one-half years that he has been working for the Mexico City Station, GERENDE has participated in a varied assortment of support and intelligence operations. Initially, he was trained and used by Matthew S. DINGLEY as a member of the LIPSTICK surveillance team. In addition, to surveillance work, he was used as an investigator to collect operational data on persons and organizations of interest to the Station. He quickly demonstrated a capacity for leadership and at one time was the leader of the LIPSTICK team. He has been used as a LIFEAT Base House operator

SECRET

and processor of tapes; he has excelled in this type of work because of his bi-lingual Spanish/English facility and, more importantly, due to his diversified experience in clandestine operations which permits him to spot operational leads much more readily than the average LIFEAT monitor.

b. Duties - GERENDE is currently serving as the principal agent in charge of LIMITED, LICALIA, LIPSTICK Photo Truck, LIJERSEY Surveillance Team and LILYRIC. In addition, he monitors and processes the BGMORNING and Cuban Exiles LIFEAT taps. He also supervises the photographic processing of LIPSTICK-38 (his brother-in-law) and the translation work of LIPSTICK-40 (his sister). He maintains contact with and provides administrative support to LIMITATIONS 5 and 6, LICOOL-7 Base operators. Quite obviously GERENDE's many duties overlap the bounds of several Station operations, namely LIPSTICK, LIJERSEY, LIFEAT, LICOOL and several activities which are not listed under formal projects such as BGMORNING. It is recognized by the Station that it is not advisable to have one principal agent connected with as many operations as is GERENDE. However, the present scarcity of both staff and contract agents of the principal agent type necessitate such efficiency measures. Every effort is being made to compartment the various segments of GERENDE's operations and to decrease, and to eliminate where possible, all lateral communications between agents.

c. Security Problems - The most serious security situation surrounding GERENDE and his many activities is the fact that LIPSTICKS 12 and 30 (two of the LIPSTICK Team members arrested in the June 1958 flap) know GERENDE by true name, and knew that he also worked for KUBARK. In fact, LIPSTICK-30 is a close personal friend of GERENDE's and was originally recommended for KUBARK employment by GERENDE. The operational security hypothesis that can be constructed from these existing acquaintances are too numerous to list in this brief review; suffice to say that should GERENDE be arrested by one of the local police agencies, most of the remaining support assets would be destroyed or so seriously compromised that the Station would indeed be foolish to continue using them. It is appropriate to state here, however, that neither GERENDE nor the Station believes that GERENDE has yet been named or otherwise identified as a result of the LIPSTICK flap. It is granted though that any future questions by one of the local police agencies to the compromised LIPSTICKERS represents a continuing type of danger for GERENDE. Based on the duties which GERENDE is currently performing, the readers of this review can well imagine what the consequences to several operations

would be if GERENDE were arrested by one of the local police agencies and interrogated in detail. Also, the Station must forever be aware that the local police agencies are certainly capable, for only a few dollars, of selling information concerning KUBARK to the Soviets and/or Satellites.

d. Recommendations - It would be unwise to consider terminating GERENDE since he is a highly competent agent and since his termination would not eliminate the fact that he knows a great deal about the Station's support operations. He has been reminded several times, and the Case Officer will continue to remind him, that his tradecraft professionalism must improve and stay ahead of the increasing sophistication of the local police agencies and opposition services operating in Mexico.

It is the opinion of the Station that GERENDE should continue to be used in about the same manner that he is presently being used. It would be advisable, however, to separate him from the two LIFEAT functions he is currently handling, BGMORNING and the Cuban Exile taps. This is suggested not only because of the possible future security ramifications, but also because GERENDE does not have time to run properly his support mechanism and to monitor taps seven days a week.

To provide for a situation whereby one of the local police agencies becomes aware of GERENDE's illegal activities and assuming that either GERENDE or the Station learns of this before the local police agency can take positive action, it is imperative that a warning system of communications be established to facilitate GERENDE's removal from Mexico. Arrangements such as those used for Wilfred O. CLOWER could be set up or local arrangements could be made with ODUNIT or ODOATH for a more expeditious exit from Mexico. The Case Officer will develop this plan in detail.

4. OPERATIONS

a. Limited

(1) Target - Stationary photographic surveillance of persons entering and leaving the LIMERICK installation.

(2) Personnel - LIPSTICK-14 is the agent in charge of the LIMITED Base. According to GERENDE, LIPSTICK-14 is conscientious, security minded, speaks no English, and on occasion is a bit over confident. He performs his operational duties competently and with discretion. In addition to his photographic duties, he is also used occasionally as a one-man

foot surveillance to follow individuals leaving the LIMERICK installation, LIPSTICK-14 receives a monthly salary of $1,800.00 (MN) and free rent and utilities at the LIMITED Base. His wife (LIPSTICK-27) and son (LIPSTICK-28) live with him at the LIMITED Base.

LIPSTICK-28 until 15 July 1958 assisted his father with photographic work at the LIMITED Base. However, on the above date he decided to resign from his LIMITED job and, strange as it may seem, to devote full time to working on a chicken farm. LIPSTICK-28 made this decision on his own and against the wishes of his father. He will continue to live at the LIMITED Base and it is believed that no security problems will result, since any security difficulties could adversely affect his mother and father. Although LIPSTICK-28 has been terminated and a termination report forwarded to Headquarters, it is suggested that we maintain his operational approval since he continues to live in the LIMITED Base.

(3) Communications - At the present time GERENDE meets with LIPSTICK-14 three times a week at contact points away from the Base. They have seven separate contact points which are used for their meetings. Usually the place of contact is prearranged at the previous meeting; however, a rapid means of communication exists whereby GERENDE telephones LIPSTICK-14 and through a pre-arranged open code, utilizing insurance policy numbers, sets the time and place of contact. LIPSTICK-14's overt occupation is that of an insurance salesman and adjuster; consequently, there is a cover basis for such a telephonic conversation. A reserve system of communication with LIPSTICK-14 has not yet been arranged. GERENDE has been instructed to do this as soon as possible, thereby giving the Station a means to contact LIPSTICK-14 directly should the need ever arise.

(4) Security - Excluding KUBARK staff personnel, the LIMITED Base is known to LIPSTICKS-2, 14, 27 and 28 and to Oliver G. SCANTLING and Raymond H. GERENDE and possibly to LIPSTICK-12 (GERENDE's opinion). Since LIPSTICK-14 has known LIMEWATER (LIFEAT Project) for many years and since LIMEWATER is LIPSTICK-2's brother, it is important to recognize that the desirable degree of compartmentation between LIPSTICK/LIMITED and LIFEAT probably does not exist. Although LIMEWATER must be aware of LIPSTICK-14's and 2's PBPRIME employment, it has not been possible to ascertain the extent of LIMEWATER's knowledge about their specific activities, and vice versa. LIPSTICK-14

worked with James O. AYCALL (LIMESTONE) during WW-II; however, he claims that the only members of AYCALL's family that he ever met was AYCALL's "alleged wife." Since she saw him only one time many years ago, LIPSTICK-14 does not believe that she would recognize him now.

Neither GERENDE nor LIPSTICK-14 are aware that KUBARK owns the LIMITED Base House. The extent of their knowledge is that LIMOUSINE is the owner and we simply rent from him.

(5) Recommendations - It is recommended that GERENDE continue to meet with LIPSTICK-14 and to supervise his operation. In this connection, GERENDE has been instructed to reorganize his existing communications arrangements with LIPSTICK-14 to include a new regular system, a rapid non-scheduled system and a reserve system. Also, GERENDE is to review with LIPSTICK-14 their cover reasons for meeting and knowing each other and to be prepared to use this cover story should they ever be apprehended together.

LIPSTICK-14 was instructed on 8 August 1958 to cease all social and business contact with LIPSTICK-2. Oliver G. SCANTLING, who has previously handled LIPSTICK-14 and sees him occasionally even now, has been directed to cease all contact with the LIMITED Base and LIPSTICK-14 except when approved by the Case Officer. (NOTE: It is necessary at times for SCANTLING to debrief LIPSTICK-14 for LIMESA leads).

b. LILYRIC

(1) Target - Stationary photographic surveillance of persons entering and leaving the LIMERICK installations.

(2) Personnel - LIJERSEY-5 is personnel manager of a Mexican affiliate of a large PBPRIME company. In addition to serving as a spotter for potential surveillance team members, he also serves as the cutout for the LILYRIC Base. GERENDE manages and directs the LILYRIC Base through LIJERSEY-5. LIJERSEY-5 maintains direct contact with LIJERSEY-2, the Base House operator, and his wife, LIJERSEY-12, who does most of the photographic work. LIJERSEY-5 is a PBPRIME citizen. He is paid a monthly salary of $1,000.00 (MN).

LIJERSEY-2 is the LILYRIC Base operator. He is a Captain in the Mexican Army Reserve and is also employed by Colgate-Palmolive Peet Company as an industrial engineer. He receives a monthly salary of $1,000.00 (MN) and he and his wife live rent and utilities free in the LILYRIC Base.

LIJERSEY-12 is the wife of LIJERSEY-2. She does most of the photographic and reporting work at the LILYRIC Base and has proven herself to be a capable and worthwhile asset. It has been necessary for her to become proficient in the LILYRIC work since her husband works at his regular job during the day. She receives a monthly salary of $800.00 (MN).

(3) Communications - GERENDE contacts LIJERSEY-5 twice weekly at prearranged contact points during the late afternoon hours. LIJERSEY-5 contacts LIJERSEY-2 two to three times weekly at prearranged car contact points and receives the "take" from the LILYRIC Base. On occasion GERENDE has contacted LIJERSEY-2 directly, but this procedure is used only when LIJERSEY-5 is out of town or otherwise not available. GERENDE does not know LIJERSEY-12 or vice versa. No reserve system of communications exists whereby a Station officer could contact LIJERSEY-2 directly should the need arise; however, GERENDE has been instructed to set up such a system of communications. The same will be done with LIJERSEY-5, although he is known to several Station officers and little difficulty would be experienced in contacting him directly.

(4) Security - The security of the LILYRIC Base appears, at least on paper, to be in better shape than the Limited or LICALLA Bases. Insofar as the Case Officer has been able to determine, the only indigenous agents aware of the LILYRIC Base are GERENDE, LIJERSEYS 2, 5 and 12, and LIPSTICKS 38 and 40, and all of these individuals have a close connection with the operation of the Base. The only tie-in the LILYRIC Base has with the LIPSTICK operations is through GERENDE.

(5) Recommendations - GERENDE has been instructed to change his meeting plans with LIJERSEY-5 and to review the communications set-up between LIJERSEY-5 and LIJERSEY-2 (L-5 and L-2 are long-time friends and, consequently, the cover problem is minimized). A staggered schedule of coverage of the LIMERICK target between LILYRIC and LIMITED was initiated on 18 August 1958. Although the operators of these two bases are unaware of the existence of the other, a suitable cover story has been worked out to satisfy any

curiosity that LIPSTICK-14 and LIJERSEYS-2 and 12 may have. This procedure is believed desirable due to the confining nature of the photographic tasks and the lack of additional personnel to assist at each of the bases. Also, this staggered schedule of coverage should reduce some of the duplication presently coming in from the two bases.

c. LICALLA

(1) Target - Stationary photographic surveillance of persons and activities in the garden area of the LIMERICK installation.

(2) Personnel - LIPSTICK-39, his wife and three small children live at the LICALLA Base. He is an accountant for a local bus line and works at his cover job in the evenings. LIPSTICK-39 does an excellent and conscientious job of photographic coverage at the LICALLA Base. In addition to the photos he takes, he writes a narrative description of the events which take place in the target's garden area. He receives a monthly salary of $2,000.00 (MN) and free rent at the LICALLA Base.

(3) Communications - GERENDE meets LIPSTICK-39 twice weekly, usually on Tuesdays and Thursdays. They have four contact points, one of which is selected at each meeting for use for the next meeting. In the event that contact is not established, GERENDE has the initiative in contacting LIPSTICK-39 by phoning him at the bus line office during the evenings. Then, by prearranged open code, a meeting site and time are agreed on. Since Oliver G. SCANTLING is also acquainted with LIPSTICK-39, it would be possible to contact him through SCANTLING should something happen to GERENDE. However, to facilitate proper and secure communications procedures, GERENDE has been directed to establish a reserve system of communications with Lipstick-39, using the customary oral and physical bonafides.

(4) Security - The most serious security problem concerning LICALLA is the fact that LIPSTICK-39 is the brother of LIPSTICK-47 (the first agent arrested by the local police agency during the recent LIPSTICKflap). Although it is generally believed by Station officers that LIPSTICK-39's name was not mentioned by LIPSTICK-47 nor that any indication was given concerning LIPSTICK-39's job, it must be understood that should the local police agency decide later to interrogate LIPSTICK-47, the probability exists of compromising LIPSTICK-39 and LICALLA. The Station sees no way to overcome this possibility.

It is important to note here that LICALLA occupies one of the four LIMUST properties. While it is believed that LIPSTICK-39 does not know that KUBARK owns the Base or has anything to do with the other three houses, it is entirely conceivable that should one of the local police agencies or the LIMERICK personnel become aware of LICALLA activities, they could very easily arrive at some logical conclusions about all of the LIMUST property. This would be detrimental, if not fatal, to our aims. However, another Station viewpoint on this same problem is that if compromised, LICALLA would divert suspicion from, rather than to, LIMUST. Should one of the local police agencies begin an investigation which might involve LIMUST and LICALLA, then LICALLA could be sacrificed to protect the LIMUST Base. These possibilities become somewhat theoretical and perhaps impractical due to the lack of predictibility of the local police agencies, but neverthe-less must be weighed one against the other.

In view of the apparent importance of the LIMESA/LIMUST operation a lot of thought and discussion have transpired at the Station about continuing the LICALLA operation in its present location or suspending it for the immediate future and attempting to find another suitable location away from the LIMUST property. A sound argument can be made for terminating the base since such an alternative might have the effect of limiting any knowledge LIPSTICK-39 may have about the LIMESA/LIMUST installation. However, the termination of a productive base such as LICALLA would require an explanation to LIPSTICK-39 which could not help but leave him a bit suspicious. For Headquarters information, the local rental laws are such that LIPSTICK-39 would not be able to comprehend why we did not insist on him maintaining "squatters rights" (as stated previously, LIPSTICK-39 apparently does not know that we own LICALLA or even have an interest in any of the other LIMUST properties) which can easily be done in Mexico. Therefore, any attempt to terminate LICALLA might cause more of a security problem with LIPSTICK-39 than permitting LICALLA to operate as it is now. Another possibility would be terminating LIPSTICK-39 and putting another agent in the present LICALLA Base. If this measure were followed, it would not eliminate the fact that LIPSTICK-39, even if terminated, would still know of the existance of the present LICALLA Base. Still another possibility would be to terminate LIPSTICK-39 and the LICALLA Base; however, since LICALLA and the other LIMUST properties are ostensibly owned by one man, LIMOUSINE, suspicions and investigations could still lead to LIMUST.

(5) Recommendations - The Station is inclined not to "rock the

boat" at this stage of the game and suggests that we maintain LICALLA at its present location and with its present operator, LIPSTICK-39. One alternative appears to be about as good as another in this case, and it is an acknowledged fact that LICALLA, at its present location, is a worthwhile and productive asset. Headquarters ideas and comments on the LICALLA Base would be appreciated.

At the present time it is planned to move LIPSTICK-39 and family to a furnished apartment when the time comes to remodel the LICALLA Base. After completion of the remodeling, LIPSTICK-39 and family will return to the present LICALLA Base.

d. PHOTO TRUCK

(1) Target - Investigative asset used for taking surreptitious photographs of persons, places and things that are from time to time of interest to the Station and Headquarters.

(2) Personnel - LIPSTICK-2, as indicated by the low numerical designation of his cryptonym, has been employed by KUBARK for several years. At the present time LIPSTICK-2 is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the photographic surveillance truck. He is also used occasionally to spot and rent operational apartments. In the past, LIPSTICK-2 has served as team leader of a low level surveillance team (which was compromised and subsequently disbanded), as a LIFEAT line inspector (when he was not busy with the photo truck), and as a static surveillance man (i.e., used as an outside sentry during the March 1958 entry of the LIMUST Base by KUTUBE/D, KURIOT and KUCLUB technicians. (NOTE: LIPSTICK-2 was assigned the task of watching the entire area during the day for any unusual activity on the part of target personnel. He was not told that he was to watch a specific house. He was dismissed from his static surveillance before dusk and the Headquarters technicians did not enter LIMUST until after 2030 hours.) LIPSTICK-2 is the brother of LIMEWATER (LIFEAT Project) and LIPSTICK-34 (LIPSTICK Surveillance team member) is LIPSTICK-2's wife's nephew. LIPSTICK-2's cover is buying and selling cars; however, about the only business he has in this connection is when he buys and sells cars for KUBARK. His cover is quite weak. He receives a monthly salary of $3,200.00 (MN) plus $600.00 (MN) per month for the use of his personal car.

LIPSTICK-24 does not know GERENDE and, presumably, knows only LIPSTICK-2, with whom he works on the photo truck. His cover is as a salesman of electrical appliances; however, he does not pursue his cover job to the desirable extent. LIPSTICK-24 was recruited by LIPSTICK-2 about one year ago and is currently receiving a salary of $1,000.00 (MN) per month. Since he has now worked a year for the Station, and performed satisfactorily, his salary should be raised to $1,200.00 (MN) per month (LIEMPTY will provide for this increase).

(3) Communications - GERENDE meets LIPSTICK-2 two to three times a week. These meetings are arranged by phone and take place at previously selected contact points which can be referred to in telephonic conversations by innocent sounding code names. LIPSTICK-2 also knows GERENDE's true name, where he lives, and his phone number. In the past he has had occasion to telephone GERENDE at the latter's home. LIPSTICK-2 knows DINGLEY, and could, in an emergency situation, contact DINGLEY. However, GERENDE has been instructed to arrange a complete communications plan with LIPSTICK-2, including a reserve means of contact. For security reasons, GERENDE has been instructed to inform LIPSTICK-2 that his only contact is with GERENDE and that in the future he is not to contact anyone else in the organization without GERENDE's permission. Also, that should contact with GERENDE be disrupted, he is to await for the higher echelon to establish contact with him (all agents under GERENDE are being so instructed). This is particularly important in the case of Lipstick-2, since he has by-passed GERENDE in two or three instances in the past.

(4) Security - Probably the most serious security situation involving the photo truck, LIPSTICK-2 and Lipstick-24 is the basic knowledge of the LIPSTICK surveillance team that such an asset exists, even to the point that one of the team members (LIPSTICK-34) is the listed owner of the photo truck. The personal knowledge of LIPSTICK-2 about the LIFEAT operation also represents a security hazard of the first class. For example, if LIPSTICK-2 were compromised and arrested as a result of his activities, there is a possibility that he could compromise his brother, LIMEWATER, the LIMITED Base and LIPSTICK-14, GERENDE and our interest in the highly sensitive LIMESA/LIMUST operation. (NOTE: According to the LIFEAT Case Officer and the former LIPSTICK Case Officer, both LIMEWATER and LIPSTICK-2 have been reminded on several occasions during the past few years that they were not to discuss any aspect of their operations with each other. Also, LIPSTICK-2, to the best of the Station's

knowledge, does not know the location of any of the LIFEAT Base houses).

A new truck should be purchased as soon as possible to replace the present truck. The new truck should be purchased in an assumed name and vehicle papers should list an untraceable address. LIPSTICK-2 has already been informed that he is to have no contact with LIPSTICK-14 or any other operational personnel he may know except, of course, LIPSTICK-24, with whom he works, and GERENDE, who supervises his activities. In addition to the above, the Station should begin thinking about a replacement agent for LIPSTICK-2 and every effort should be made to set up an independent and compartmented photo truck operation. This would permit the eventual termination of LIPSTICK-2, after we have given him several months to reduce his knowledge of current operations.

d. LIJERSEY

(1) Target - Foot surveillance and investigative support of other Station operations.

(2) Personnel - LIJERSEY-4 is of a low social class and lives with his mother in a slum area of Mexico City. He is the sole support for his mother and several younger brothers and sisters. He is described by GERENDE as having a lot of ambition and a strong desire to improve his standard of living and position in life. The Station has found him to be a good observer and, consequently, adequate for static surveillance work. Although he now has his drivers license, he is not a capable driver and probably will never develop into one. GERENDE has been encouraging LIJERSEY-4 to obtain employment as a salesman to supplement his KUBARK income of $1,000.00 (MN) and to establish himself in a cover job. However, LIJERSEY-4 has not yet obtained such employment. It is the Station's opinion that LIJERSEY-4 is definitely an asset of limited value and will never develop into the high-calibre surveillance asset which the Station really needs.

LIJERSEY-8's situation is about the same as LIJERSEY-4's. He lives with his family and is currently taking highschool courses (LIJERSEY-4 is doing the same). He is not an imaginative talker and has difficulty making up cover stories and spur-of-the-moment excuses and explanations - the vital qualifications for a good surveillance man. He is the best driver of the three LIJERSEY

team members and with more practice will probably develop into a capable and dependable driver. LIJERSEY-8 has recently shown a commendable amount of initiative where his cover situation is concerned. He has obtained a job as a commission salesman for UNDERWOOD typewriters and, according to GERENDE, is making a substantial amount of "pin" money. However, as in the case of LIJERSEY-4, LIJERSEY-8 is at best an asset of only limited value. LIJERSEY-8 also receives a salary of $1,000.00 (MN) per month.

LIJERSEY-13 does not know LIJERSEYS-4 and 8 and vice versa. LIJERSEY-13 is better dressed than the other two team members and can pass as a better educated and more socially flexible individual. He speaks fairly good English. He performs pretext investigation assignments with facility and imagination and is adept at making up cover stories. In brief, he makes a good impression on the people he interviews. He is not a good driver and is too nervous to develop into one. His salary is $1,000.00 (MN) per month.

(3) Communications - GERENDE has daily contact arrangements with the three LIJERSEYS. Prearranged meeting places are used on designated days of each week and the LIJERSEYS are instructed to go to each meeting. They have standing instructions to continue going to their meeting sites for two weeks; if they have not been contacted during that period of time, they can discontinue their communications plan and await contact by GERENDE or another appropriately selected agent at their respective homes. None of the LIJERSEYS have home telephones; hence, it is impossible to arrange any type of communications using this means. GERENDE is currently in the process of setting up new and more complete communications arrangements with the three LIJERSEYS.

(4) Security - Insofar as knowledge of other operations, personnel and assets is concerned, the LIJERSEYS appear to have the best security of any of the operations handled by GERENDE. New communications plans with the LIJERSEYS will do much toward increasing security and ability to meet contingencies. GERENDE will be instructed to give refresher training to all three LIJERSEYS in operational security, cover and communications. The major danger existing with the LIJERSEY team, and with any surveillance team, is the possibility of compromise and arrest by one of the local police agencies. Should this happen, GERENDE and his other operations would be placed in considerable danger.

For this reason, it is not advisable to have GERENDE connected with a surveillance team and also contacting and directing the sensitive photo base houses. Therefore, until such time as a suitable asset can be developed or acquired to take over the LIJERSEY team, their actual surveillance assignments will be kept at the minimum.

(5) Recommendations - It is suggested that the LIJERSEY framework be used for the recruitment of at least three competent and higher class local nationals for use on surveillance assignments. After the recruitment of such individuals, it may be suggested that LIJERSEYS-4 and 8 be terminated. LIJERSEY-13 should remain as an independent investigative asset to conduct "credit" and other type of inquiries which he can do without help from other agents. LIJERSEY-5 has already been asked to spot prospective candidates of a higher social standing for use on a new surveillance team; however, even under optimum conditions, one and a half years will be required to get such a team functioning. In order to recruit the type of team member that will be most worthwhile to the Station, we must plan to pay a minimum starting salary of $1,600.00 (MN) per month. The cost of living in Mexico is continually on the rise and where $1,000.00 (MN) was a good salary one to two years ago, it really is not adequate today.

f. LIFEAT

(1) Target - Conversations coming from two telephone taps, BGMORNING and Cuban exiles.

(2) Personnel - GERENDE lives in the apartment where these two lines are maintained. He personally processes the take from the lines and passes it to OUSLER for Station dissemination to Robert B. RIGGS (BGMORNING) and Calude K. Shyrock (Cubans). GERENDE, in accordance with LIFEAT procedures, is supposed to remain in this apartment seven days a week. However, this is impossible due to his other operational assignments and activities.

(3) Communications - GERENDE meets daily with OUSLER to pass the LIFEAT "take" and to discuss other operational matters.

(4) Security - It is not a good security practice to have a LIFEAT monitor working on anything except LIFEAT. Other duties, which GERENDE certainly has, limit one's capability for maintaining the required security alertness for telephone

repairmen and others who might accidentally discover one of our LIFEAT taps. Also, should GERENDE be compromised through any of his other operations, it is conceivable that the EGMORNING and Cuban Exiles LIFEAT taps would be discovered by one of the local police agencies.

(5) Recommendations - It is suggested that a replacement be found as soon as possible to relieve GERENDE of his present LIFEAT duties.

g. LICOOL-7

(1) Target - A planned technical installation against a person of interest to the Station and to Headquarters.

(2) Personnel - LIMITATION-5 and his wife, LIMITATION-6, are the LICOOL-7 Base House operators. LIMITATION-5 has been with KUBARK for several years. He was at one time the LIAXIOM Base House operator. He presently works for the DuPont Company. He dresses well, speaks some English and could be described as belonging to the rising middle class of Mexicans. His wife can do photographic work and has had previous experience with KUBARK in the dispatching of car surveillances by radio. LIMITATIONS-5 and 6 are not participating in any active work pending the installation of LICOOL-7 in their apartment. LIMITATION-5 receives a monthly salary of $500.00 (MN) and LIMITATION-6 receives $400.00 (MN) monthly.

(3) Communications - A complete communications plan does not exist between GERENDE and LIMITATION-5. At the present time it is only necessary for GERENDE to see LIMITATION-5 on pay day and when Harvey C. MULFORD desires to visit the apartment for technical surveys and other work. Therefore, GERENDE and LIMITATION-5 utilize an open code telephonic means of getting together. So far, this has worked quite well, but it will be necessary later to set up a more sophisticated communications system.

(4) Security - The operational aspects of LICOOL-7 are under the jurisdiction of Matthew S. DINGLEY; therefore, the author of this report is not familiar with the security ramifications, if any, surrounding this technical installation and the agents operating it.

(5) Recommendations - None.

h. MISCELLANEOUS

Also on the payroll as worthwhile assets are GERENDE's brother-in-law, LIPSTICK-38, and his sister, LIPSTICK-40. GERENDE and LIPSTICK-38 process and print all the LIMITED, LILYRIC, LICALLA and truck photos. LIPSTICK-40 does non-sensitive translation work for the Station. Both LIPSTICKS-38 and 40 are handled by GERENDE. They do not have contact with other agents or with station officers. LIPSTICK-38 receives a monthly salary of $1,000.00 (MN). LIPSTICK-40 receives the equivalent or $1.75 U. S. in pesos per hour for her work.

Although it is not adviseable from the security point of view to have any indigenous agent aware of all three of our LIMERICK photographic bases and the photo truck, the load on the Station photographer several months ago resulted in just such a solution to the problem. Previously, GERENDE and LIPSTICK-38 had processed only the photographs from LIMITED, LILYRIC and the truck.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations have been included in several sections of this paper. These same recommendations, excepting those which have already been carried out or are in the process of implementation, are listed below in a composite form to facilitate the readers' overall comprehension.

a. Continue the reorganization of communication arrangements with all agents.

b. Relieve GERENDE of his LIFEAT duties (BGMORNING and Cuban Exiles taps) as soon as possible.

c. Continue to use GERENDE for the time being as the principal agent in charge of LIMITED, LILYRIC, LICALLA, the Photo Truck, LIJERSEY, LIMITATIONS-5 and 6, and LIPSTICKS 38 and 40.

d. Arrange a warning system of communications for removing GERENDE to PBPRIME should he be compromised to one of the local police agencies.

e. Purchase a new photo truck for use by LIPSTICKS 2 and 24.

f. Begin planning for a compartmented photo truck operation which will later permit termination of LIPSTICK-2.

g. Spot and recruit at least three indigenous agents from the middle class social level to form the nucleus of a new LIJERSEY

surveillance team.

h. Eventually separate GERENDE from either LIJERSEY surveillance team duties or the three photographic base houses, preferably the former. The two types of activities are not compatible with each other and should not be handled by the same principal agent.

i. Implied, but not specifically stated elsewhere in this paper, is the suggestion that GERENDE be given a "cooling off" and training period of two to three months in PBPRIME. Of course, this will not be possible until other assets are developed to take over GERENDE's present duties. After his return from PBPRIME, GERENDE could be used to develop new support assets which would be completely compartmented from all of his previous operations, personnel and activities.

6. CONCLUSIONS

It would take several weeks of uninterrupted study of files to write a really comprehensive security review of GERENDE's operations and activities. However, based on the facts contained in this paper, it is the Station's opinion that GERENDE probably is not now known to the local police agencies as a KUBARK or PBPRIME agent. It is believed that GERENDE could be identified by the local police agencies at any time they choose to interrogate LIPSTICKS-12 and 30 in detail or when one of the other agent assets formerly or currently associated with GERENDE is compromised. Furthermore, if GERENDE is arrested, he could compromise most of the Station's support assets, plus the BGMORNING and Cuban Exiles portions of LIFEAT.

Given several months time, the slow process of compartmentation can be introduced into GERENDE's operations. Such compartmentation, however, will never reach the truly desirable point, but some improvement over the existing situation can be made. If GERENDE can emerge basically unscathed from the current incidents, then KUBARK will have an extremely valuable long-range support asset.

Quinton N. OUSLER

21 October 1958

SECRET

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF RAMOND H. GERENDE'S ACTIVITIES

SECRET



SECRET

TO: Chief, WH Division

50-6-23/3

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 23 July 1958

SUBJECT: Operational Security
Security Review of Project LIPSTICK

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ACTION REQUIRED: Comments on proposals in Paragraph 7

REFERENCES:
A. MEXI 1743
B. MEXI-1755
C. MEXI-1771

1. References outlined the arrest of LIPSTICK-47, the subsequent arrests of LIPSTICKS 12 and 30, their interrogation by the Mexican Secret Service and their eventual release from prison. References truly portrayed the incident with the following exceptions:

a. None of the arrested men was tortured.

b. LIPSTICK-45 was never arrested.

c. Only LIPSTICK 12, 30 and 47 were arrested.

d. LIPSTICK-29 was not taken from his home by force. In fact he was never arrested.

2. While under detention the arrested men told the story as it appears in Attachment A which was written by LIPSTICK-30. It is not believed that the men told anything more because:

a. The substance of the story was told to Station Mexico identically by three (3) separate and compartmented sources, i.e. from the arrested men, from the attorney, Raul F. CARDENAS, and from the Counselor of Canadian Embassy, Sidney FREIFELD.

b. Each operation mentioned in Attachment A, which was susceptible to a check by the Secret Service, was investigated by them. However, no operation not mentioned in Attachment A was investigated by the Secret Service.

c. LIPSTICK-47, who had only been with the team about one and a half months and who did most of the talking, did not know any information other than that in Attachment A.

d. LIPSTICK-12 and 30, who knew considerably more about our operations, are both made of sterner stuff than LIPSTICK-47 and have keener minds.

e. The "ring of truth" that Attachment A has. It is not believed that the Secret Service is sufficiently sophisticated to concoct such a believable story.

f. The combined opinion of every Case Officer who has known LIPSTICK-12 and 30 that they did not reveal any information other than that contained in Attachment A.

g. On 10 July 1958 LIPSTICK-12 and 30 were examined by Martin F. REMALEY on LCFLUTTER. REMALEY was satisfied that the results of this examination completely exonerated LIPSTICK-12 and 30 from any cooperation with the Mexican Police. The results of those tests are attached as Attachment B.

3. In order to assess what possible damage might have been done to Station Mexico's operations if the arrested men had told the Secret Service everything they knew, there follows a list of those operations known to the arrested men:

a. LIPSTICK-47 did not know anything more than he told the Secret Service as outlined in Attachment A.

53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS ... WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/KAPOK

CONTINUED

b. LIPSTICK-12:

(1) He was recruited by LIMITATION and knows that he works for Station Mexico but does not know in what capacity LIMITATION is employed.

(2) He knows that LIQUATION, LIMITATION-3 and LIMITATION-6 work for Station Mexico but does not know in what capacities they work.

(3) He knows the true names of Thomas G. [illegible], Edward P, [illegible], Matthew B. DINGLEY, Oliver G. SCANTLING, Wilfred O. CLOWER, Raymond S. GERUNDE, Harvey P. DENENHOLTZ, Boyd I. ROLLINGS and Clyde K. SHRYOCK.

(4) He knows all of the details of the FUMARIC 9 and [illegible] operations.

(5) He participated in the raid on Alfredo Guerra Borges' apartment.

(6) He knows of LIPSTICK Car #6 (photo truck).

(7) He knows all of the present LIPSTICK surveillance team and LIPSTICK-2 and 14 who used to be with the team.

(8) Through surveillance, he knows of the following operations:

LIMBORE	Samuel Brooks
LIJAG	Maurice Halperin
LIAXIOM	9 indigenous employees of the U.S. Embassy in MexicoCity
Roland Abbiate (Francois Rossi)	LITENSOR[illegible]
[illegible]	LI[illegible]FRATZ
Alfred Kaufman & Martha Dodd Stern	[illegible] (Michael ROUX & Jose Maria RIBEIRO Antunes
LIVESTOCK-3	
LIVESTOCK-1	

Surveillance of various officials of the Partido Comunista Mexicano
Surveillance of various Soviet officials. He probably knows of the existence of the LIMITED base since this base dispatched the radio cars on surveillance of Soviet officials.
Samuel RODRIGUEZ Rodriguez - individual who desired to purchase the LIMITED base.

c. LIPSTICK-39:

(1) He was recruited by Raymond S. GERUNDE. He knows that GERUNDE works for Station Mexico but does not know in what capacity.

(2) He knows the true names of Thomas G. [illegible], Edward P. SECHEN, Matthew B. DINGLEY, Wilfred O. CLOWER, Oliver G. SCANTLING, and Harvey P. DENENHOLTZ.

(3) He participated in the raid on the apartment of Alfredo Guerra Borges.

(4) He knows of the LIPSTICK #6 vehicle (photo truck).

(5) He knows all of the present LIPSTICK team and LIPSTICK-12 and 14.

(6) Through surveillance, he has learned of all the operations as listed in the case of LIPSTICK-8.

4. At the present time the LIPSTICK team is inoperative. The team members are working at their various cover jobs and writing a critique on the surveillance techniques they used which caused these three to be arrested.

Matthew S. DINGLEY has stopped all sensitive contacts and turned them over to Quinton N. CUSLER as a precautionary measure should DINGLEY be under surveillance. DINGLEY continues to see LIPSTICK-30 who now administers the team, and DINGLEY also continues to be the case officer for LIVEROCK.

LIPSTICK-47 has been fired and the LIPSTICK offices have been vacated and the furniture stored in a public warehouse. With the excellent cooperation of Nogales and Monterrey Bases, Wilfred O. CRAMER was smuggled out of Mexico.

5. Future planning for the LIPSTICK team will depend upon the results of operational tests and additional defective reassessment based upon the actions of the team and the results obtained. General Miguel MOLINAR Simondi, Chief of the Mexican Secret Service, has agreed to protect the team fully and assume responsibility for their actions for the sum of $240.00 U.S. per month. MOLINAR has also promised to issue the team credentials from the Secret Service, or some other official investigative group, after the presidential inauguration in November of 1958. The future of the LIPSTICK team will depend upon the following factors:

a. It is not believed that the Secret Service demanded, nor even suggested, that the team report future activities to the Secret Service. (Test leads, susceptible of checking, will be given to the LIPSTICK team to determine if they are being reported to the Secret Service).

b. Degree of access to Secret Service files given to the LIPSTICK team.

c. Effectiveness of General MOLINAR's protection.

7. Station Mexico recommends that the LIPSTICK team be allowed to continue operations for a period of three months at which time a reassessment will be made based upon the evidence accumulated over that period of time. The reassessment will be concerned mainly with whether or not the team is really under the control of the Secret Service and the degree of success of their "penetration" of the Secret Service.

Willard C. Curtis

Encls.
MSD/bct
22 July 1958
Distribution
3 - Hqs
2 - Files

6 November 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/III/Mexico

SUBJECT: Raymond H. GERENDE

REFERENCE: HMM-A-11368

1. This dispatch represents the type of operational reporting we need. I think any answer to the Station should lead off with an expression of appreciation for a good job. Maybe it will encourage them to write more of this type.

2. GERENDE is very exposed and should be taken off some of his jobs at once. Specifically, my ideas are as follows:

3. Re para. 3 a, agent is very capable and should be retained if secure means can be found. Getting rid of him would not solve the problem. As long as he is in Mexico he is vulnerable. Some thought should be given to how he would be supported in the event of arrest. Personally, I believe the Station would do better to sacrifice a case officer than permit things to drag on to the point where GERENDE might tell all to the police.

Recommendations:

a. GERENDE be briefed so as to be ever ready with an innocuous story to tell the police in the event of arrest.

b. GERENDE be told to contact one of already blown Station officers like HAZLETT in the event of arrest and that the Station officer be ready to appear personally at police station to free GERENDE. If the case officer named for this duty and GERENDE both know the innocuous cover story, there should be little problem. I have done it myself. A good cover story is "looking for draft dodgers" or some such tale which does not have implications of working against Mexican citizens.

c. That if not allowed to communicate directly GERENDE should tell the senior officer present at police station that he works on (cover story) for HAZLETT and insists HAZLETT be sent for.

d. That a second blown case officer's name be given as an alternate for HAZLETT, who is often out of town and unavailable.

e. That GERENDE be taken off LIFEAT at once and all suspicious audio equipment be removed from his home or offices. At present, LIFEAT is the only illegal activity being engaged in by GERENDE; if he is made merely in connection with his physical surveillance activities he is not likely to be hurt by the Mexicans.

f. Concur preparations should be made to hide out GERENDE if it is known he is to be arrested.

4. Re para. 4 a, GERENDE's participation in LIMITED is O. K. I believe no law is being broken. However, LIMITED is probably blown to the Soviets. Here is the more real danger. Station should find out who is the registered owner of the phone at LIMITED. Prior to leaving Mexico I noted to MAHONEY it was still held in the name of LIMESTONE-3 (now fired and hence a possible threat).

5. Re para. 4 b: This is the same situation as LIMITED but not so likely blown to the Soviets. There is no reason why GERENDE should not continue this work.

6. Re para. 4 c, LICALLA is a very special problem and should be taken up at once with Headquarters elements working on LIMESA/LIMUST. I thought LICALLA had been cancelled out when LIMESA began to shape up. I consider it a danger to LIMESA. Has LICALLA produced anything of value? I think we could vacate this in such a way that the agents in LICALLA would have no cause to be suspicious. (Put an obvious tail on the agent, scare him off, etc. This would throw off the Mexican police, too, in the event they are already wise to LICALLA through LIPSTICK 47. We could pretend to believe the Soviets ran the tail and the game is up.)

Recommendation: Get rid of LICALLA unless very productive. Better do this before the remodeling begins.

7. Re para 4 d, photo truck. LIPSTICK-2 does know of the locations of some of the basehouses on LIFEAT since he was a line inspector.

Recommendations:

a. New compartmented truck should be set up. Don't use false names and addresses. It could result in great harm.

b. LIPSTICK-2 be sent off to some small town as "resident agent" for general work and to get him out of the area.

8. Re para. 4 e. I have no particular thoughts on LIJERSEY but think it consistent for GERENDE to handle it.

9. Re para. 4 f: GERENDE should be taken off LIFEAT at once, even if it means losing lines. As of March this year the Station had enough agent personnel to handle bases for 24 lines. They should be able to fill the gap even though LIMESTONE-3 and his tribe were fired. Only 12 lines are now being handled (latest report). The way GERENDE is handling his LIFEAT work seems to be breaking all the rules we set up inseven years of experience.

10. Re para. 4 g, LICOOL-7. I see no harm in GERENDE's handling the operational aspect of this case. But through LIMITATION-5 the police could get back to LIMITATION and the main LIMERICK tap, that is, if they were able to make GERENDE talk before we could save him. The danger to LIMITATION was not brought out in the Station's survey.

11. In re para. 5, recommendations -

a. Approve.

b. Get him off LIFEAT right now.

c. Concur, but liquidate LICALLA.

d. This needs some discussion. What do we do with GERENDE in the U. S.?

e. Concur.

f. Concur with reservation noted above.

g. O. K.

h. I don't see why he can't handle all these jobs since they are physical surveillances.

i. Not a bad idea.

12. Final observations:

a. What is GERENDE's cover?

b. We must be sure he is not overworked. Sloppy work has resulted from people being overworked.

CHARLES W. ANDERSON
WH/FI

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. ~~HMMW-5760~~

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-119523

24 DEC 57 11 01

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - Raymond H. GEADDE

ACTION REQUESTED: Sign and Return Contract Extension

Attached are original and two copies of an extension of Subject's contract to be signed and witnessed and returned to Headquarters.

J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

19 December 1957

Attachment
3, as stated above

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City, w/atts.
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - RI
1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/ISulc:jck

(Releasing officer) J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

(Coordinating officer)

(Authenticating officer) R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29 JUN 1949

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Contract Personnel Division
Room 801 1016 16th St.

NO.

DATE: 10 December 1957

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECD	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. FI/OPS/Projects 1709 L Bldg.	12 DEC 1957	15	✓	The original of this contract was prepared in headquarters and forwarded to the field for their execution and retention. This amendment should follow the same procedure. Please let CPD know when subject has signed his extension so a copy of this document can be forwarded to Finance Division for their records.
2. WH Division 1405 Barton Hall		1957	P	
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				Contract to field, HANW-5760
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMM-5626

201-117523

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DEC 3 1957

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - Raymond M. G[illegible]

1. Effective 1 October 1957, the contract (as amended) for Subject, effective 1 October 1955, is extended for a period of two (2) years.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

J. C. KING
C, WHD

26 November 1957

Distribution:
3- Mexico City
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - Subject
1 - RI

WH/III/Mexico/[illegible]

for J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

R. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
for

(Releasing officer) (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

LIPSTICK Quarterly Ops Report

...MA 8773

27 Nov 57

c. Raymond H. [illegible], a contract agent, uses cover provided by [illegible] and is responsible for LIPSTICK office number 2. [illegible] supervises the work of [illegible] who processes the film from [illegible], LICALLA, and LILYRIC basehouses. [illegible] directs the activities of the [illegible] surveillance team (a separate project discussed in [illegible]-0151). [illegible] is also responsible for the activities of the fixed surveillance basehouse, LILYRIC.

(1) LILYRIC is a second story apartment which affords a view into the right angle of the main gate of the [illegible] installation at an angle which photographs from the top of the heads downward. The equipment is the same as that used in [illegible] and LICALLA and the film is processed in the same way. [illegible]-12 lives in this apartment and is responsible for the photographic and physical surveillance. His reports supplement but do not duplicate those submitted by the [illegible] basehouse. The photographs from LILYRIC are superior in quality to those obtained from either [illegible] or LICALLA. [illegible]-12 is an efficient stenographer and good photographer. Also, this base offers a better position from which to take photographs.

(2) [illegible]'s contacts in private investigative agencies are used to check leads from other operations. During June and July 1957 [illegible] received training at Headquarters and both he and the Case Officer feel this training has been most beneficial.

14-00000

SECRET

Air Pouch

HMM-A-8700

Chief, WH Division

19 November 1957

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Operational

William [illegible] BRAGG (201-2008)

Reference: HMM-5262

ACTION REQUESTED: None

1. There is attached for Headquarters retention a translation of a report concerning the Subject. The original report was obtained through a private detective agency in Mexico City which had been contacted by Raymond H. GERENDE. GERENDE posed as a businessman seeking credit and character reports on the commercial firm of Gibbon, Alonson y Cia., S.A. de Mexico. This was a trial assignment for the detective agency in order that Station Mexico could assess the investigative assets of the agency for possible future operational exploitation.

2. The sub-source of HMMA-1021, the former [illegible] chief in Mexico, knows the Subject personally. The Case Officer will contact him direct for additional information on the Subject and his activities.

Willard C. Curtis

Encl.

MSD/bct
15 Nov 57

Distribution
3 - Hqs w/atchmt
2 - Files

COPY

SECRET

LIPSTICK/20

4UCVS

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

FROM: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Contract Extension for Raymond H. Gorende

1. Effective 1 October 1957, the contract (as amended) for the subject individual, effective 1 October 1955, is extended for a period of two (2) years.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY ____________________
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

____

SECRET

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. ~~HMM-W-5261~~
201-119523

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE 10 Oct 57 11 57

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - Raymond H. GERENDE

The following is the evaluation of Raymond H. GERENDE written by the instructor of foreign trainees on 12 September 1957.

1. Instruction commenced 10 June and was concluded 12 July 1957. It covered tradecraft, observation, description, casing and reporting, principles of CE and CI, elicitation and interviewing, investigative techniques, and briefings in photo and use of recording machines.

2. Trainee was known as "Ray". He was easy to work with. He was always pleasant, courteous, cheerful and seemed genuinely interested in every phase of the training. He can speak, read and write English without any difficulty.

3. Ray seemed well motivated; more Pro-American than Mexican. He possesses a strong interest in clandestine work. He is an avid reader. He demonstrated ability to apply principles he had learned from reading and study. He seemed possessed of initiative although there was a limited opportunity of observing this quality in action.

4. While Ray's duties to date apparently have not given him a wide and varied experience in clandestine activity, he seemed to grasp the material quite readily, and although in the field of CI and CE he stated he had never thought of many of their aspects as applying to him, he seemed glad of the opportunity to learn and absorbed them quite readily. He now possesses a good working knowledge of fundamental principles involved. However, it is felt that if he is to work primarily in this field, it should be under the supervision of a case officer with considerable experience and background in this type of activity.

5. As previously indicated, Ray was an avid reader. In addition to certain case studies, he read the following books:

(Releasing officer) (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

201-119523

SECRET

"Handbook for Spies"
"The Spy Web"
"Out of Bondage"
"London Calling North Pole"
"A Spy Has No Friends"

The following films were exhibited and critiqued:

"House Search"
"Surveillance"
"Body Search"
"Under Cover"

6. It is felt that [illegible] benefitted considerably from this course of instruction. We feel that his concept and understanding of principles of clandestine activity have been broadened and strengthened. His interest, enthusiasm and production should reflect this in his future work.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

25 September 1957

Distribution:
- 3 - Mexico City
- 1 - WH/Mailroom
- 1 - WH/III/Chrono
- 1 - RI
- 1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/LSulc:mjm

Based on: CT/OS/TR memo, 12 September 1957

RI COPY

for J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

R. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

23 September 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

VIA : FI/OPS - Projects Branch

SUBJECT : Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

1. It is requested that the two-year contract of Raymond H. GERENDE, (LIPSTICK-20), which was executed on 1 October 1955, be extended for a two year period, effective 1 October 1957.

2. Raymond H. GERENDE's principal duties are administration and operational direction of the LIPSTICK team, processing film, contacting agents and acting as cut-out for the Case Officer, conducting individual investigations, and handling cash advances, accountings and property.

J. C. KING
Chief, WD

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - WH/III/Mexico
1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/LSulc:mjm

SECRET

14-00000

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, WH/3
ATTN : Mr. Larry Sulc

DATE: 12 September 1957

FROM : Instructor, Foreign Trainees

SUBJECT: Evaluation of trainee in Special Project LIPSTICK

1. Instruction in this project commenced 10 June and was concluded 12 July 1957. It covered tradecraft, observation, description, casing and reporting, principles of CE&CI, elicitation and interviewing, investigative techniques, and TSS briefings in photo and the use of recording machines.

2. Trainee was known as "Ray". He was easy to work with. He was always pleasant, courteous, cheerful and seemed genuinely interested in every phase of the training. He can speak, read and write English without any difficulty.

3. Ray seemed well motivated; more Pro-American than Mexican. He possesses a strong interest in clandestine work. He is an avid reader. He demonstrated ability to apply principles he had learned from reading and study. He seemed possessed of initiative although there was a limited opportunity of observing this quality in action.

4. While Ray's duties to date apparently have not given him a wide and varied experience in clandestine activity, he seemed to grasp the material quite readily; and although in the field of CI&CE he stated he had never thought of many of their aspects as applying to him, he seemed glad of the opportunity to learn and absorbed them quite readily. He now possesses a good working knowledge of fundamental principles involved. However, it is felt that if he is to work primarily in this field, it should be under the supervision of a case officer with considerable experience and background in this type of activity.

5. As previously indicated, Ray was an avid reader. In addition to certain case studies, he read the following books:

"Handbook for Spies"
"The Spy Web"
"Out of Bondage"
"London Calling North Pole"
"A Spy Has No Friends"

SECRET

The following films were exhibited and critiqued:

"House Search"
"Surveillance"
"Body Search"
"Under Cover"

6. It is felt that Ray benefitted considerably from this course of instruction. We feel that his concept and understanding of principles of clandestine activity have been broadened and strengthened. His interest, enthusiasm and production should reflect this in his future work.

Oscar H. Sells
OSCAR H. SELLS

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, WH Division DATE: 8 AUG 1957
Attention : Mr. Lawrence R. Sulc, WH/III/Mexico
Room 2114 Barton Hall
FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT: COVERT SITE
Apartment D-22
The President Madison
Presidential Gardens
Alexandria, Virginia
#122877

1. Reference is made to your request (Requisition No:57-51) for safehouse facilities. Further reference is made to your subsequent request that a survey be scheduled of the Subject covert site and that you be advised of the results thereof.

2. It is the understanding of this office that the Subject covert site was utilized for the training and housing of an agent of interest to your office in connection with Project LIPSTICK. It is further understood that motion pictures would be used as part of the training program at the site. The Subject apartment was leased in the name of Rufus KING, cleared attorney.

3. This confirms previous verbal advice that a security survey was conducted at the Subject premises with favorable results. You were previously advised of security approval for the use of the Subject premises for the above purposes.

4. In view of the fact that you have completed your use of the Subject covert site, copies of the report of the survey of the site are being retained in this office. Safehouse Branch and the Central Cover Branch are being advised of the confirmation of the security approval for the use of the site by copies of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Robert H. Cunningham
Robert H. Cunningham

cc: Chief, Safehouse Branch
Central Cover Branch

Lipstick (20)

SECRET

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA ___ (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. ___

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-119523

DATE 2 AUG 57 13 21

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL - Operational/LIENVOY
SPECIFIC - Raymond H. GERENDE

Reference: HMM-4554, 21 May 1957.

1. Subject departed from Washington, D.C. on 13 July 1957 to visit his relatives in South Carolina prior to returning to Mexico. He completed five weeks training on 12 July - an evaluation of the Subject by his instructors will be forwarded in the near future.

2. Subject was advanced two weeks per diem at the rate of $12 by Mexico Station. Since his lodgings were provided by Headquarters it was decided to pay him per diem at the rate of $6. Thus Station's payment was extended to cover four weeks and Subject was advanced $42 on 3 July to cover the fifth week (7 July through 13 July).

3. The net amount of Subject's telephone bill was not known at time of Subject's departure. Headquarters has Subject's receipt in the amount of $14.29 to cover the money order made out by him to the telephone company. Some of this amount will probably be returned to Subject whereupon he should be reimbursed for the net amount of the telephone bill.

J. C. King
J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

25 July 1957

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/ Mailroom
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - Subject
1 - RI

WH/B&F [signature] WH/III/Mexico/LSulc:rms

(Releasing officer) (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

Charles E. [signature] for
J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

[signature]
R. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

201-119523

VIA: Air Pouch

DISPATCH NO. HMM-A-7427

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WH Division

DATE: 12 July 1957

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Ramon ALVAREZ Durant

Reference: HMM-W-4554

ACTION REQUESTED: None

Attached for Headquarters retention are two copies of the subject's visa application obtained from the Visa Section of the United States Embassy in Mexico City on 6 May 1957.

Willard C. Curtis

Encl.

MSD/bct
11 July 1957

Distribution
3 - Hqs w/atchmt
2 - Files

RI COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28 A
MAR. 1949

201-117523

1.- Nombre como esta en el Pasaporte.

Ramón Alvarez Durant

2.- Telefono en Mexico

15-65-02

3.- Fecha en que piensa salir para los E. U.

15 MAYO

4.- ¿Como va a viajar? (tren, avion, coche, camion):

AVION

5.- Frontera por donde entrará o primer punto que tocará de los E. U.

MIAMI

6.- Dirección exacta y completa en donde se le pueda localizar en los E. U.

3135 Yale Ave. (Mr & Mrs R.F. Kolb)

Columbia S.C.

[illegible]-31

shall be required to depart from the United States at the expiration of my stay as authorized by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service. I hereby agree that if permitted to proceed to or to enter the United States ... risk and assume all responsibility for losses or damages which may result in the event I ...nited States, or in the event my departure should be delayed. I do ...plication are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

[signature]

(Signature of Alien)

Subscribed and sworn to, or affirmed before me

APR ... at ...

[signature]

Consul of the United States of America

APR

...nimmigrant classification B-2

...CFR 41.5 and Sect. 101 (a) (15), Immigration and Nationality Act, pursuant

...isa Numbers 11923

22

5.00

62.50

Application for Nonimmigrant Visa and Alien Registration

14-00000

FAMILY NAME	GIVEN NAME	INITIAL	2 PLACE AND DATE OF BIRTH	3
Al ... Baron			Dec. 7, 193. Mex...	V-2322298

4 HOME ADDRESS: ... # 9., Mexico, D.F.

5 ACCOMPANIED BY: ...

6 ADDRESS IN U S: South Carolina

7 NAME AND ADDRESS OF PERSON TO WHOM DESTINED: ... Columbia, S.C.

8 Name and address of nearest relative in home country: ... de Alvarez

9 TRAVEL DOCUMENTS PRESENTED: ... FC ... 4/5/..

10 Hair	11 Eyes	12 Height	13 Weight	14 Nationality	16 Race	18 SEX	19 MARITAL STATUS
Br.	Br.	5 FT ... IN	1.7	Mexican	white	M X / F	MAR ☐ SGL ☐ WID. ☐ DIV ☐
				15 Complexion: ...	17 Ethnic Classification: Mexican		

20 OCCUPATION: ...

21 DISTINGUISHING MARKS: none

22 Have you ever been arrested in/or deported or excluded from any country?

23 DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION TO U. S. (TO BE INSERTED BY IMMIGRATION OFFICER)

24 PURPOSE AND INTENDED LENGTH OF STAY IN U. S.: Pleasure trip 2 months

ITEMS BELOW HEAVY BLACK LINE TO BE FILLED IN BY IMM. OFFICER

25 ARRIVED BY	26 DATE TO WHICH ADMITTED	27

mem

U. S. IMMIGRATION OFFICER

Except as hereinafter stated, I have never been refused a visa, or deported, removed, or excluded from the United States. I understand that I

FORM FS-257c 9-1-52

TSS EVALUATION

NAME Raymond H. GEREDE DIVISION WH/VI

SUBJECT Audio Briefing

DATES TRAINED 3 July 1957 (1330 hours)

On 3 July 1957 an Audio Briefing was given to Raymond H. GERENDE. The major portion of the briefing was on the Revere T-700 tape recorder. When asked if he knew anything about recorders, GERENDE stated that he was quite familiar with the Revere T-700 as he had had some experience with this recorder when he was a disc jockey in a radio station. A step by step operation of the recorder was explained to him, the tape recorder head was explained also how the sound was recorded on the tape. The following were also explained to him: tape speeds, frequency response, footage indicator, dual tracks—how they can be used in the Revere T-700—, the mechanical section of the recorder and the amplifier.

The recorder was removed from the case by the Subject and the possible breakdown points were shown to him, the recorder and amplifier units were taken out of the case by him and the operation of the sections explained. The recorder was then put together by GERENDE.

GERENDE asked many questions relative to microphones and microphone installations. There were explained to him—carbon microphone, crystal microphone, dynamic and controlled reluctance.

He appeared to be intelligent and was interested in the subjects discussed.

EDWARD A. SIVIK
TSS/TRD/Instructor

Please return ~~(no.)~~ copies of this form to TSS/TD for overt distribution.
Please return ~~(no.)~~ copies of this form to TSS/TD for covert distribution.

OVERT DISTRIBUTION:
1 - Senior Staff Training Officer
1 - Division Training Liaison Officer
1 - CTR/Registrar
1 - Office of Personnel
1 - TSS/TD File

COVERT DISTRIBUTION:
1 - Operations Officer
1 - TSS/TD
1 - Senior Staff

S-E-C-R-E-T

T S S   E V A L U A T I O N

NAME: Raymond H. GERENDE DIVISION WH

SUBJECT Photography Briefing

DATES TRAINED 3 July - 0930-1230

On 3 July 1957 a Photography briefing was given to Raymond H. GERENDE. Mr. GERENDE was briefed on film processing, printing, telephoto lens, fixed and mobile surveillance. He was shown the following equipment: Leica, Exacta, Mikroma, Minox and Robot cameras, the hidden device for Robot Camera, Morse 100 ft. tank and Nikor Multiple tank. The briefing lasted three hours.

GEORGE O. KELLNER
Tss/TRD Instructor

Please return ~~four~~ copies of this form to TSS/TD for overt distribution.
Please return two copies of this form to TSS/TD for covert distribution.

OVERT DISTRIBUTION:
1 - Senior Staff Training Officer
1 - Division Training Liaison Officer
1 - OTR/Registrar
1 - Office of Personnel
1 - TSS/TD File

COVERT DISTRIBUTION:
1 - Operations Officer
1 - TSS/TD
1 - Senior Staff

S-E-C-R-E-T

11 June 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Raymond H. GERENDE (ps) Training

1. At 1000 - 1030 hours, 7 June 1957, I met with Mr. Robert Melberg, Chief Instructor, OTR/Covert Training and Mr. George Orton in the office of Mr. Oscar Sells, C/Covert Training (x2778, x8175).

2. Subject's training was discussed. Mr. Sells will take me to Subject's apartment (safehouse) at 0930 on 10 June to be introduced to Subject. He will be known as Mr. Stoker. At 1000 Mr. Melberg (to be known as Bob Brice) and Mr. Orton (George) will arrive to take over training.

3. At 1100 hours, 7 June 1957, I talked by telephone to Mr. Mexell (safehouse procurement officer). He informed me that a check for four weeks rent had been sent to the apartment firm by Mr. Rufus King's office to cover the cost of the apartment (safehouse).

L. SULC
WH/III/Mexico/CI

Distribution:
WH/III/Chrono
✓Subject

SECRET

4 June 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: LIPSTICK
Raymond H. GERENDE

(home phone. OL 2-9514)

1. On 28 May 1957, Harry Mexell (Safehouse Procurement Officer, X8185), William Lidenheimer (S.C.) and the undersigned met to obtain a safehouse for Raymond H. GERENDE (ps). The safehouse obtained was the following:

Apartment D-22, Madison
Presidential Gardens Apartment Hotel
Mount Vernon Avenue and Russell Road
Alexandria, Virginia
Telephone: TEmple 6-4400

2. This apartment was tentatively approved orally by Mr. Lidenheimer from a security standpoint. Registration was made by me in the name of Rufus KING, attorney, Southern Building, Washington, D. C. National 8-3115. GERENDE will be ostensibly a legal client of Mr. King and will be registered in true name upon his arrival. His name was not given upon obtaining the apartment nor was mine. Only Mr. King's name was used.

3. My cover story, if necessary to use one, was to be that of law clerk, Larry HERMAN, in Mr. King's office. Mr. Mexell has cleared this cover with Mr. King's office. Mr. King's office, according to Mr. Mexell, will pay for the apartment by check.

4. The apartment was rented at the rate of $155 a month from 8 June 1957 onward (to be through 13 July 1957).

5. Mr. Frazes of S.C. (SB/2, X547 and X3071) informed me telephonically on 31 May that the safehouse site had been approved.

Lawrence B. Sulc

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, WH-3 DATE: 28 May 1957
ATTN : Mr. Larry Sulc
FROM : Instructor, Foreign Trainees

SUBJECT: Special Project LIPSTICK

A. The following outlines the Special Project Training Plan for Special Project LIPSTICK:

1. Originator: WH-3 Mexico
2. Approvals: C/WH; C/WH-3, FI/TRO; CI Staff
3. Case Officer: Mr. Larry Sulc, ext. 2555
4. Chief Instructor, CT: Mr. Robert Holberg, ext. 2778
5. Purpose: To provide instruction and training which will assist trainee in carrying out field objectives of obtaining CE and opererational information thru surveillance and other means, working against designated targets.
6. Clearances: Project was approved 2 November 1956. OA amended approval, dated 19 March 1956. Trainee is a contract agent.
7. Number of Trainees: One
8. Nationality: Mexican (formerly U.S. citizen)
9. Biographical Data: Trainee was born 7 Dec. 1933, New York City. He received his education at the American High School, Mexico, D.F., Mexico City College, B.A. in Latin American studies, June, 1955. He speaks English and Spanish. He has received no formalized intelligence training, but some on the job training has been given.
10. Cover: Tourist

SECRET

11. Time Table: Instruction will commence 10 June and be completed on or about 13 July 1957.

12. Training Area: Training will take place in the Washington area in a safehouse secured by the Division.

13. Language of Instruction: English

14. Course of Instruction: See Appendix I

15. Finances: Financial expenses will be handled by the Division.

B. Copies of this memorandum are being distributed as follows:

Original and 1 - Chief, WH-3
Attn: Mr. Larry Sulc
1 - CI Staff
1 - AC/OS/TR; C/OS/TR
1 - Covert Files

Oscar H. Sells
OSCAR H. SELLS

APPENDIX I

PROJECT LIPSTICK

SCHEDULE OF INSTRUCTION

10 June — Security Briefing. Discussion of the program. Review of Intelligence terminology.

11-21 June — Tradecraft

(1) Nature and Characteristics of Clandestine Activity
Clandestine Activity of the Individual and the Group
Clandestine Activity of the Sovereign State
Relationship of Overt to Clandestine Activity
Elements of Clandestine Activity

(2) The Nature of Clandestine Action (By Political Entities)

(3) Principles of Organization for Clandestine Activity
Concepts of Compartmentation

(4) Concepts of Cover and Concealment
Requirements of Cover
The Cover Problem as Applied to Individuals, Groups

(5) Basic Obstacles to Clandestine Activity
Active Opposition
Administrative and National Boundaries as a means of Compartmentation

(6) Clandestine Communications
Introduction and Concepts of Clandestine Communications
Criteria for Clandestine Communications
Methods of Clandestine Communications
Principles in the Use of Codes, Secret Writing, Microphotography and Ciphers
Cutout Devices: Accommodation Address, Drops, The Courier, The Intermediary or Cutout
The Personal Meeting
Signals
The Safehouse

(7) Agent Personnel
Introduction
Agents and Their Functions

SECRET

(8) Spotting
Check and Investigations
Selection of Agents
Recruiting Methods
Training, Briefing, and Debriefing
Handling of Agents
Termination of Agents

Special emphasis will be devoted to agent spotting, acquisition and management.

24-28 June	Observation, description, casing, reporting. The latter will include operational reporting, surveillance reporting, CE type reports and principles of positive intelligence reporting.
1-2 July	Missions, functions, & principles of CE & CI.
3 July	TSS briefings, audio & photo
5-9 July	Continuation of CE & CI.
10-11 July	Principles, procedures, techniques of elicitation, interviewing.
12 July	Seminar on covert investigative techniques.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

495 ES/DM/BO

DATE : 29 MAY 1957 495

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAY 30 12 34 57

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 49174

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 1-2

INFO : COP 3, C/FI/OPS 4-5, DD/S 6, SSA 7, D/OP 8, S/C 9-10

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 463

RYBAT ADMIN

REF HMMW 4554

SUBJECT REF DEPARTS MEXI 9 JUNE 11ØØ HOURS PAA FLIGHT 5Ø2. DEPART HOUSTON EAL FLIGHT 5Ø2 ARRIVE WASH 214Ø HOURS 9 JUNE.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

Chief, WH-3 — 29 May 1957
ATTN : Mr. Larry Sulc

Instructor, Foreign Trainees

Special Project LI[illegible]

A. The following outlines the Special Project Training Plan for Special Project LI[illegible]:

1. Originator: WH-3 Mexico
2. Approvals: C/WH; C/WH-3, FI/TRO; CI Staff
3. Case Officer: Mr. Larry Sulc, ext. 2555
4. Chief Instructor, CT: Mr. Robert Melberg, ext. 2779
5. Purpose: To provide instruction and training which will assist trainee in carrying out field objectives of obtaining CE and opererational information thru surveillance and other means, working against designated targets.
6. Clearances: Project was approved 2 November 1956. OA amended approval, dated 19 March 1956. Trainee is a contract agent.
7. Number of Trainees: One
8. Nationality: Mexican (formerly U.S. citizen)
9. Biographical Data: Trainee was born 7 Dec. 1933, New York City. He received his education at the American High School, Mexico, D.F., Mexico City College, B.A. in Latin American studies, June, 1955. He speaks English and Spanish. He has received no formalized intelligence training, but some on the job training has been given.
10. Cover: Tourist

File: GERENDE (Expediente 20)

11. Time Table: Instruction will commence 10 June and be completed on or about 13 July 1957.

12. Training Area: Training will take place in the Washington area in a safehouse secured by the Division.

13. Language of Instruction: English

14. Course of Instruction: See Appendix I

15. Finances: Financial expenses will be handled by the Division.

B. Copies of this memorandum are being distributed as follows:

Original and 1 - Chief, WH-3
Attn: Mr. Larry Sulc
1 - CI Staff
1 - AC/OS/TR; C/OS/TR
1 - Covert Files

OSCAR H. SELLS

APPENDIX 1

PROJECT LIPSTICK

SCHEDULE OF INSTRUCTION

10 June — Security Briefing. Discussion of the program. Review of Intelligence terminology.

11-21 June — Tradecraft

(1) Nature and Characteristics of Clandestine Activity
Clandestine Activity of the Individual and the Group
Clandestine Activity of the Sovereign State
Relationship of Overt to Clandestine Activity
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Methods of Clandestine Communications
Principles in the Use of Codes, Secret Writing, Microphotography and Ciphers
Cutout Devices: Accommodation Address, Drops, The Courier, The Intermediary or Cutout
The Personal Meeting
Signals
The Safehouse

(7) Agent Personnel
Introduction
Agents and Their Functions

	(8) Spotting Check and Investigations Selection of Agents Recruiting Methods Training, Briefing, and Debriefing Handling of Agents Termination of Agents
	Special emphasis will be devoted to agent spotting, acquisition and management.
24-28 June	Observation, description, casing, reporting. The latter will include operational reporting, surveillance reporting, CE type reports and principles of positive intelligence reporting.
1-2 July	Missions, functions, & principles of CE & CI.
3 July	TSS briefings, audio & photo
5-9 July	Continuation of CE & CI.
10-11 July	Principles, procedures, techniques of elicitation, interviewing.
12 July	Seminar on covert investigative techniques.

Basic Tradecraft 2 weeks.

Observation, Description, Casings 3 days

Reporting - 1 week

Fundamentals of CI + CE 1 week

Elicitation, Debriefing
Investigation Techniques } 2 days

Photo + Audio Brieg. 1 day.

Mr. Bello
2C1 T-30
OTR

Harry Mixell, Safehouse Procurement Officer
2C54 Quarters Eye
x 8185
Reg. 243-1006
Reg. 45-1025

14-00000

GERONIC works for LIPSTICK-19 as purch. agent.

LIPSTICK/LIMITED · (Photo) GERENSE ← LIPSTICK-19

" /LILYRIC · (Photo) "

" /LIAXIOM · (Photo) " ← LIMITATION-5, -6.

LINSTOCK (Radio maintenance of tech.) LINSTOCK

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

KAPOK

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH NO. HMM-W-4554

201-119523

KAPOK #500

DATE 21 MAY 1957

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM : Chief, WHD

PRIORITY

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Operational Matters/LIPSTICK
SPECIFIC - Raymond H. GIRENDE/Training

Reference: HMM-W-4410, 26 April 1957 (201-119523)

ACTION REQUESTED: See Paragraph 5.

1. Subject is scheduled for covert training to begin Monday, 10 June 1957, and to last five weeks. Subject should arrive in Washington, if possible, on 8 or 9 June.

2. It is planned that Subject stay in a furnished apartment where he will also be trained on weekdays. For food, laundry and incidentals he will be given per diem of $6. Entertainment of Subject will be conservative.

3. It is suggested that Mexico City Station provide Subject with a round-trip ticket by air. From a cover standpoint it might be wise to have Subject visit his mother's relatives in South Carolina on the way to Washington. If feasible he should create the impression that he is visiting New York City or both New York and Washington on this trip.

4. Subject's cover while in the U. S. will be that of tourist.

5. Please cable Subject's time of arrival and flight number. He will be met at the airport by the desk operations officer, "Larry." In the event the meeting is not made he should call the telephone number forwarded under separate cover and ask for "Larry." In the event he is still unable to make contact he should go to the National Hotel,

(Releasing officer) KAPOK (officer) (Authenticating officer)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

1803 Fye Street, N. W., take a room and wait for a call. If unable to get a room he should leave a forwarding address for further contact.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

Attachment:
1 - As described above, u/s/c

17 May 1957

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City, w/att. u/s/c
1 - WH/III/KAPOK Chrono, w/o/att.
1 - Subject, w/o/att.

WH/III/Mexico/LSulc:mjm

J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III

SECRET

17 May 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief/WH/Support

Attn: WH/B & F

SUBJECT : Contract Agent Covert Training
Raymond H. GERENS (ps)

1. Subject, Project LIPSTICK contract agent, will arrive in Washington on approximately 8-9 June 1957 for five weeks of covert training. Covert training has been arranged and a safe house obtained.

2. The matter of entertainment of Subject was discussed with Mr. Wattles, C/WH/Support, who said that entertainment of contract agents is authorized under certain conditions and that it would be permissible to entertain Subject conservatively while in Washington. He spoke to Mr. Price of the General Counsil's Office who supported this view.

3. To favorably impress Subject and to maintain his morale while in Washington, it is contemplated that the desk operations office will entertain him with dinner and drinks approximately twice a week during the first and final weeks and once a week during the intervening weeks.

J. GALBRAITH
Chief, WH/III

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/III/Chrono
✓1 - Subject - Lipstick SO

WH/III/Mexico/LSalesters

SECRET

SECRET

15 May 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, Safehouse Branch, Office of Logistics

THROUGH : Chief, Central Cover Branch, DD/P

REQUESTING OFFICE : WH/III/Mexico

CASE OFFICER : Lawrence B. Sulo - Extension 2555

PROJECT : LIFETIME Allotment: 7-3570-83-130

Reference: R 45-1025, 25 June 1956.

Type of safehouse requested: Furnished apartment (efficiency apartment or larger). The apartment should be large enough to show motion pictures to trainee.

Location and Environment: Washington, D. C. Middle class or above type of environment.

Maximum Price Range: $10 per day.

Occupancy from: 8 June 1957 To: 14 July 1957

Intended Use: Safehouse will be occupied by one (1) agent for residence and training. The agent is a Mexican (completely bi-lingual in Spanish and English, was born in the U. S.), aged 23, a college graduate and purchasing agent for a Mexico City firm. He will occupy the safehouse most of the time, both day and night, for five weeks. Three or four other persons (from CTR and possibly the case officer) will spend time in the safehouse during the day. Sensitive material will be in the house during the day.

Cover Arrangement: Subject will be in the U. S. as a tourist from Mexico. He has American relatives in North Carolina. WH Division's memorandum requesting training for Subject, and which included this cover plan, was approved by the FI and CI Staffs on 14 May 1957.

Funds are available:

BUDGET OFFICER

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

WH/III/Mexico/IBSulc:mjm

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - CCB/DD/P
1 - WH/III/Chrono
✓2 - Subject

SECRET

VIA: Air Pouch
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. HMMA-6873
(201-119523)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WH Division

DATE: 15 May 1957

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Raymond E. Gerende

Reference: HMM-W-4410

ACTION REQUESTED: Contact with Gerende

1. The Subject has made reservations at the Hotel Emery, 1812 G Street, N.W., Washington 6, D.C., Telephone Republic 7-1812, for 9 June 1957. He will wait at this hotel for a telephone call from Malcolm Q. EDELAND sometime before 1200 hours on 10 May 1957. The Subject will meet EDELAND in the lobby of the Statler Hotel at the time stated in the conversation. Should this contact fail the Subject will remain at his hotel from 1300 hours until 1800 hours on 10 May 1957 and the same times on successive days until contact is made.

2. Station Mexico appreciates the efforts of the Headquarters desk in arranging this training.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. Curtis

MSD/bct
15 May 1957
Distribution
3 - Hqs
2 - Files

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

RI COPY

201-119523

AIR

HMM-W-4554

201-119523

KAPOK #500

: Chief of Station, Mexico City

: Chief, WHD PRIORITY

- Operational Matters/LIPSTICK
- Raymond H. GERENDE/Training

Reference: HMM-W-4410, 26 April 1957 (201-119523)

ACTION REQUESTED: See paragraph 5.

1. Subject is scheduled for covert training to begin Monday, 10 June 1957, and to last five weeks. Subject should arrive in Washington, if possible, on 8 or 9 June.

2. It is planned that Subject stay in a furnished apartment where he will also be trained on weekdays. For food, laundry and incidentals he will be given per diem of $6. Entertainment of Subject will be conservative.

3. It is suggested that Mexico City Station provide Subject with a round-trip ticket by air. From a cover standpoint it might be wise to have Subject visit his mother's relatives in South Carolina on the way to Washington. If feasible he should create the impression that he is visiting New York City or both New York and Washington on this trip.

4. Subject's cover while in the U. S. will be that of tourist.

5. Please cable Subject's time of arrival and flight number. He will be met at the airport by the desk operations officer, "Larry." In the event the meeting is not made he should call the telephone number forwarded under separate cover and ask for "Larry." In the event he is still unable to make contact he should go to the National Hotel,

HMM-W-4554
KAPOK #500
Page Two

1808 Eye Street, N. W., take a room and wait for a call. If unable to get a room he should leave a forwarding address for further contact.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

Attachments:
1 - As described above, u/s/c

17 May 1957

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City, w/att. u/s/c
1 - WH/III/KAPOK Chrono, w/o/att.
1 - Subject, w/o/att.

WH/III/Mexico/LSulc:mjm

J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. ~~HMM-A-4410~~

201-119523

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 26 APR 57 14 442

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
GENERAL - Operational Matters
SPECIFIC - Raymond H. Geronde

Reference: HMM-A-5661, 19 December 1956 (50-6-4-1316)

1. Plans are underway to bring subject to Headquarters for training as requested in reference. Geronde is tentatively scheduled to begin his training on 10 June 1957.

2. It is anticipated that subject will be trained in Basic Tradecraft, CI/CE matters, Photography and some audio surveillance. He should be able to complete his studies in about five weeks time.

3. It is believed that tourist cover for subject's visit to this country will be satisfactory, inasmuch as he has relatives living in South Carolina.

4. As further and more definite arrangements are made regarding the matters discussed in this dispatch, you will be so advised. Headquarters regrets the delay in answering reference dispatch.

John T. Flynn
for J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

19 April 1957

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - RI
1 - ~~Subject~~

WH/III/Mexico/MPCondon:elu

(Coordinating officer)

(Authenticating officer)

John T. Flynn
for J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

JK Galbraith
W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

201-119523

SECRET

Gerende (Lip - 20)

22 April 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/TR

ATTENTION : Assistant Chief For Covert Training, OS/TR

FROM : WH/3/Mexico

SUBJECT : Request For Covert Training

Project: LIFSTICK

Pseudo : Raymond H. Gerende

1. Initiated by: WH, Branch 3, Mexico - FI

2. Date of Project Approval: 2 November 1956

   Type and Date of Clearance: Amended Operational Approval C-32743 effective 19 March 1956. Supersedes OA granted 28 February 1955.

3. Agent Status: Contract Agent

4. Agent Nationality: Born in U.S., but renounced citizenship to become Mexican citizen on 31 July 1952.

5. Operations Officer: Lawrence B. Sulc Known to student as: Larry Room 2114, Barton Hall, x-2555

   Alternate Operations Officer: John B. Brady Known to student as: Jack Room 2111, Barton Hall, x-3162

6. Training dates: Beginning about 10 June 1957 for approximately 5 weeks.

7. Complete biographic background of trainee: See memorandum attached.

8. Previous intelligence training: Trained in surveillance and related techniques by his field case officer. No formalized training.

9. Project Objective: Physical surveillance in Mexico City area to obtain CE and operational information on Soviet/Satellite and Communist Party personnel, plans and activities. This project supports a technical surveillance project in Mexico. Some of the basehouses under Project LIFSTICK support the physical surveillance aspect of Station operations whereas some of the basehouses support technical surveillances.

SECRET

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10. Description of agents duties in the field: Under the direct supervision and guidance of the Case Officer, full operational and administrative responsibility and control of the following:

   a. LIPSTICK Team
   b. LIPSTICK Car #4
   c. LIPSTICK/LIMITED basehouse
   d. LIPSTICK/LILYRIC basehouse
   e. LIPSTICK/LIAISON basehouse
   f. LIPSTICK
   g. LIPSTICK office #2
   h. Pretext investigations
   i. Spot assignments

In summary it can be said that the subject's principal duties are administration and operational direction of the LIPSTICK team, processing 35 to 40 rolls of 35 mm film each week, contacting agents and acting as cut-out for the Case Officer, conducting individual investigations, handling cash advances, accountings, and property.

Description of agent's cover in the field: Gerende is perfectly covered working for LIPSTICK 19 as purchasing agent. He spends approximately three to four hours per day working on his cover duties. This cover is believed by all his friends, is durable and allows sufficient freedom for operational activity.

11. Proposed cover to be used during training: It is anticipated that subject will come to the U.S. as a tourist. Inasmuch as Gerende's mother has six sisters and three brothers living in either Columbia or Sumter, South Carolina, (as of June 1955) tourist cover for him would appear to be appropriate.

12. Student availability for training: full time.

13. Specific problems to be considered in handling trainee: None envisioned at this time. Subject speaks English.

14. Specific training subjects to be covered: Basic Tradecraft, CI/CE course, Photography, and some audio surveillance techniques.

15. Technical training requirements: Photography and audio surveillance techniques.

16. Has student in the past, or does he at present, visit overt installations of the organization? Never in the Washington area. Presumably he has never been in the Station in Mexico City.

17. Special attributes to be evaluated:

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

APPROVALS:

Senior Staff Training Officer

CI Staff

Attachment: Biographic Data

WH/III/Mexico/MCondentelo

Distribution:
Orig & 1 Addressee - w/attach
1 WH/III/Chrono - w/attach
1 Subject- w/attach

SECRET

SECRET

ATTACHMENT TO TRAINING MEMO

Name	:	Ramon Joseph ALVAREZ Du Rant
Born	:	7 December 1933 in New York City
Citizenship	:	Mexican
Father	:	Fernando ALVAREZ (deceased), Mexican citizen
Mother:	:	Janie Du Rant, vda. de ALVAREZ, U.S. citizen, born 13 December 1906 at Sumter, So. Carolina
Sisters	:	Marcia and Adria
Official Identity Papers	:	Mexican passport #41776 issued in Mexico City 19 December 1953; renewed 16 November 1954 #7714, good until 16 November 1956, Mexican draft card #1963865.
Religion	:	Protestant - non-denominational
Education	:	American High School, Mexico, D.F., diploma July 1952 Mexico City College, B.A. in Latin American studies, June 1955
Languages	:	English and Spanish
Military Service	:	January-December 1953—Mexico City—XV'a Division de Infanteria, 15/a Compania de Transmisiones Corporal

Physical Description :

Age	23
Height	5' 9½"
Eyes	hazel
Face shape	oval
Complexion	fair
Posture	erect
Weight	145 lbs.
Teeth	normal, straight
Hair	dark brown
Scars	½" horizontal on tip of chin
Build	medium

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR COVERT TSS TRAINING

IMPORTANT:
a) Approval of Staff Training Officer must be indicated on this form.

b) *Approval of CI Staff must be indicated on this form.*

c) If student is a member of a foreign intelligence or security service, the name of the service must be indicated in the space provided.

d) If student is a contract agent, he must have full operational clearance, must have signed his contract, and project must be an approved project.

e) TSS will provide training site facilities provided that the sites are available on the dates training is requested.

f) Should it be necessary for the student to enter agency buildings (other than safehouses), the requestor will undertake to procure CI staff approval, also building passes or badges when necessary.

1. Name of student: Raymond H. Gerende ☐ True ☒ Pseudo ☐ Crypto

2. Training alias to be employed: "Ray"

3. Name of Operations Officer: Lawrence B. Sulc Division: WH

Senior Staff: .... Room No. and Bldg.: 2114 B.H. Extension: 2555

4. Name of Approved Project: LIPSTICK Date and Type of Clearance: OA, 19 March 1956

5. Operations Officer known to student as: (Name) "Larry"

6. Nationality of student: Mexican

7. Status of student:

a. Staff agent: ☐ b. Contract agent: ☒

c. Foreign Intell. or Security Service Official (specify name of service): Not applicable

8. Language in which training will be conducted: English

(Note: Requestor agrees to provide interpreter should such be required.)

9. Country or area in which student will operate: Mexico

10. Will agent train others? Yes ☐ No ☒

11. Dates during which student will be available for training: From 10 June 1957 To 12 July 1957

12. Will training take place in:

a. TSS training site: ☐ b. Site provided by Area Division: ☒ (OTR will provide safehouse)

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig. & 1 – For one subject } TSS/TD
1 – For each additional subject
1 – CI Staff

SECRET

14-00000

...be given, indicating whether proficiency (development of skill) or familiarization (briefing) is desired. ...ning is to take place, if known.

...bject	Dates From	Dates To	Briefing	Proficiency	Will agent train others in subject
...mass work					
...landestine work					
...ly)					
			X		
			X		
...iques:					
...ng			X		
			X		
				*	
...ue:					

...ency training in these subjects must be preceded by a discussion with C/TSS/Training Div.

Subject	Dates From	Dates To	Briefing	Proficiency
SECRET WRITING:				*
a. *General technique:*				
b. *Will trainee be issued system:* ☐ *Yes* ☐ *No*				
c. *Is system now used in the field:* ☐ *Yes* ☐ *No*				
d. Other (Specify):				
AUDIO SURVEILLANCE:				
1. Microphone installation				
2. Wireless microphone installation				
3. Telephone tap installation				
4. Detect kits				
5. Other (Specify) Tape Recorders			X	
COVER AUTHENTICATION:				
1. Aspects of document authentication (Specify area)				
2. Use of documentation in CI activities				
3. Use of documentation in PP activities				
4. Document collection (Specify area)				
LOCKS & PICKS:				
All other TSS subjects should be specifically requested using a separate sheet as part two of this form.				

* Requests for proficiency training in these subjects must be preceded by a discussion with C/TSS/Training Div.

APPROVED: .... Staff Training Officer

.... Requestor's Signature

.... C/CI/OA

SECRET

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO RI/ANALYSIS SECTION	DATE 25 July 1956
FROM WH/III/Mexico	ROOM NO. 1026 Barton Hall — TELEPHONE 2555

INSTRUCTIONS: *Form must be typed or printed in block letters.*

SECTION I: *List 201 number, name, and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.*

SECTION II: *List cryptonym or pseudonym if assigned. If true name is sensitive, fill in the 201 number and Section II only. If true name is non-sensitive, both Sections I and II must be completed.*

SECTION III: *To be completed in all cases.*

SECTION I

201 NO. 1.	NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title) 3.
119523	ALVAREZ DuRant,	Ramon	Joseph	

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2.	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title)

PHOTO 4.	BIRTH DATE 5.	COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6.	CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7.	OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8.
YES [ ] NO [X]	071233	USA	New York City	

OCCUPATION/POSITION	OCC/POS. CODE 9.

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM OR PSEUDONYM	
Raymond H. GERENDE	SENSITIVE [ ] NON-SENSITIVE [X]

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10.	ACTION DESK 11.	2ND CITY INTEREST 12.	3RD CITY INTEREST 12A.
MEX	WH/3M		

COMMENTS:

Permanently charged to WH/III/Mexico

201-119523

OPEN FILE	RESTRICTED FILE	SIGNATURE
YES [X] NO [ ]	YES [X] NO [ ]	Kenneth S. Scho[illegible]

FORM NO. 831 TEST 1 NOV 55

SECRET

(38)

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

Card

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO	DATE	ACTION
RI/ANALYSIS SECTION		OPEN / AMEND / CLOSE
FROM: RI/AN	ROOM NO. 1504K	TELEPHONE 2919

INSTRUCTIONS: *Form must be typed or printed in block letters.*

SECTION I: *List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.*

SECTION II: *List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.*

SECTION III: *To be completed in all cases.*

SECTION I

SENSITIVE / NON-SENSITIVE	201 NO. 1.	SOURCE DOCUMENT
	119523	

NAME (Last) (Middle) (First) (Title) 3.

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2. (Last) (Middle) (First) (Title)

RECORD COPY

PHOTO 4.	BIRTH DATE 5.	COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6.	CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7.	OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8.
YES / NO	D / M / Y			1. 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION — OCC/POS. CODE 9.

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM	PSEUDONYM
	GERENDE, RAYMOND H.

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10.	ACTION DESK 11.	2ND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.	3RD COUNTRY INTEREST 12a.
MEX	WH/3 M		

COMMENTS:

PUNCHED

201- 119523

PERMANENT CHARGE	RESTRICTED FILE	SIGNATURE
X YES / NO	X YES / NO	

FORM NO. 831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. 1 JUL 56

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(38)

SECRET

12 DEC 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
National Security Agency

ATTENTION : Mr. Benson Buffham

SUBJECT : William Hamilton Martin and Bernon Ferguson Mitchell 201-282337 201-282338

1. Attached is a copy of a report recently received through Canadian liaison channels concerning a conversation between Canadian professor Dr. Hans Kunov and Martin in Moscow. The attachment outlines the conversation Kunov had with Martin and indicates that both Martin and Mitchell are attempting to leave the USSR.

2. Also attached is a report on Yuriy Igoryevich Torgov, 201-0862574 Kunov's host at the USSR Academy of Sciences Computer Center.

3. The Canadians have advised us that the FBI has received the information contained in the attachments.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS:

George T. Kalaris

Attachments:
As stated

CIOL-00164-75
DDO/CI/R&A/E:W.Kerbe:dnj (12/12/75)
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addee w/att
1 - C/CI w/att
2 - CI/R&A/E 1 w/att
2 - C/DIVD w/att 1 - DIVD/TCB

COORDINATION:
Paul L. Rinaldo
C/DIVD/TCB in draft
12 Dec 1975

201-282338
B-201-0862574
B-201-0282337

SECRET

SECRET

Dr. H[illegible] KUNOV professor, Univer[illegible]y of Toronto, visited Moscow from September 1-14, 1975 to undertake research at the USSR Academy of Sciences, under the USSR/Canada General Exchange Agreement. The research was carried out at the Academy of Sciences Computer Centre, 40 Vavcoha Street. KUNOV's host was Yuriy I. TORGOV, 2nd in charge of the Computer Centre and on whom a separate personality sketch is attached.

On September 3 while having a coffee break in the Computer Centre KUNOV was approached by a man who identified himself as William MARTIN, an American who defected to the USSR in 1960. MARTIN openly spoke about his past and stated that he now lives in Moscow and that he is a consultant to TURGOV's group at the Computer Centre. He said much of his work is done at home but he does drop into the Centre weekly.

It was at this time that MARTIN told KUNOV that he would like to get out of the USSR even if he has to run certain risks. He also said that (Bernon) MITCHELL feels the same and has voiced his desire to the Soviet authorities.

MARTIN asked KUNOV if he might enquire with the Canadian authorities on his behalf to see what his status would be in this country or if there was any chance of his being allowed in here as a political refugee. KUNOV agreed to contact the Canadian Embassy in Moscow to see what the official view would be and notify MARTIN at a later date. MARTIN seemed most pleased at this and left KUNOV his home telephone number, cautioning him not to say anything over phone that would tip off the Soviet authorities as to his intentions. This first meeting lasted a little over one half hour and took place in the coffee lounge area of the Centre. There were other Soviets present in the lounge, however, TORGOV was not among them. KUNOV does not believe the others were aware of their conversation.

On the 5 September 75 KUNOV called at the Canadian Embassy, Moscow and spoke to a doorman asking him who he might speak to regarding some Americans living in the USSR who would like to immigrate to Canada. The doorman referred KUNOV to the office of a Mrs. Louise O'CONNOR. KUNOV then spoke to a U/M who stated that he was the under secretary to Mrs. O'CONNOR. KUNOV enquired about the Americans living in the USSR and asked could they be allowed to immigrate to Canada. The Embassy official would not commit himself and stated that KUNOV should enquire officially with the nearest office of Manpower and Immigration when he returned to Canada. KUNOV did not give this official MARTIN or MITCHELL's names. KUNOV telephoned MARTIN after the Embassy visit and stated that the reply from the Embassy was negative. MARTIN seemed upset that KUNOV should phone him, then he later stated that it would probably be all right.

MARTIN met KUNOV on at least two occasions after the 5 September, all at the Centre, usually in the coffee lounge and in the general presence of others. They spoke English at all times. MARTIN thanked KUNOV for his trouble in enquiring at the Embassy and cautioned KUNOV not to get personally involved with him in this venture as it would be bad news. KUNOV promised MARTIN that he would check with Canadian Manpower and Immigration authorities on the matter when he returned to Canada.

SECRET

The following observations were made by KUNOV regarding MARTIN:

(a) Physical Description

5'7' or 8" tall, fair hair, crewcut, balding at the temples, not bellied.
- may suffer from a nervous condition, and bears the mark of a man who has experienced rough times.
- always dressed with a shirt, tie and jacket.
- spoke perfect English with a slight Russian accent on certain words.

(b) MARTIN provided KUNOV with the following home address and telephone number, cautioning him that his telephone was bugged.
- telephone number - 433-03-81
117421 Obrucheva Street
Building 4-1
Apt. 126
Moscow, USSR

(c) MARTIN stated that his friend MITCHELL lives in Leningrad and is married to the Dean of the Music Conservatory in Leningrad. MITCHELL is very unhappy and he has openly asked Soviet authorities for permission to leave Russia and return to the USA. Apparently he has never been able to adjust to the Soviet way of life and is now very desperate. MITCHELL is willing to divorce his wife and take any risk to get out of the USSR. To date however he has been met with a wall of silence by the Soviets.

(d) MARTIN is unmarried. He claims to have a comfortable apartment and feels that he has adjusted to the Soviet life and is accepted in the USSR. He does not want to return to the USA but would like to get out of the USSR. He said he would have quite a story to tell about his life in Russia as well as his past and that he would have no compunctions about telling all about the Russians. MARTIN at one point stated that he would not consider attempting to escape from the USSR.

(e) MARTIN claims that he is constantly harrassed by Soviet officials. His apartment has been broken into on several occasions and he refused to use the Soviet mail system. He has also refused to show up for work in the past as a form of protest. MARTIN also indicated that he has had several contacts with Americans in Moscow and that they have not shown any animosity towards him. He actually dated an American woman for some time but did not mention her name.

(f) MARTIN stated that in the past American journalists have tried to contact him many times, asking for interviews but their requests have been refused by Russian authorities. He said he hoped some day that one of these journalists would be able to just knock on his door and talk to him.

... /3

TORGOV and KUNOV spoke in general terms about MARTIN after the first meeting. TORGOV does not claim to know MARTIN well. MARTIN has been at the centre for approximately 6 to 8 months assigned to TORGOV's group. Prior to that he worked as a consultant in another area of the Academy of Sciences. TORGOV commented that MARTIN does much of his work at home. He said he felt sorry for MARTIN because he was not accepted by the Russians in the Academy. He also stated that he felt MARTIN was a basically honest man.

KUNOV said his motives for trying to assist MARTIN and MITCHELL are based on huminatarian grounds, only, as he feels they are suffering under the Soviet system. He does not intend to take any further action to assist them in leaving the Soviet Union. KUNOV hopes to return to the Soviet Union next year for a more extended period of study.

SECRET

Re: [illegible] Igoryevich T[illegible]GOV

TORGOV, DOB 6 June, 1932 Vitebsk, USSR, Head of Laboratory, Computer Centre, Academy of Sciences, Moscow, was a visiting professor in Toronto and Ottawa, Canada, for four months - November 1974 to February 1975.

A number of sources were impressed by TORGOV's frankness and his willingness to speak out, at social gatherings, on current problem areas in the Soviet system. For example he discussed dissidents in Soviet society and commented on one occasion that present day Soviet society allowed for far greater freedom of expression than had been allowed previously. He said that things were being said in Moscow that one would never have heard in Stalin's era. Nevertheless, TORGOV argued that a return to "terror tactics" under Soviet rule was always possible. He considered that such tactics were unlikely at this time because of the personal philosophy of Premier Leonid BRESHNEV.

TORGOV is reported to be the son of a scientist and party member and he himself is an admitted party member. He is married with three children. He is considered to be one of the top experts on his field (computers) in the Soviet Union. He mentioned having travelled to other Western countries two or three times. His English is good. He was very friendly towards Canadians during his visit but it was observed that he did not associate with three other Soviet research students at the same institution. On one occasion in Ottawa he was berated quite severely by a Soviet Embassy official for his failure to report periodically, as required, to the Embassy. TORGOV later told a source that this Embassy official "could be a dangerous man to your country".

SECRET

201-282338

The RCMP Liaison Office
2450 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008

US/75/539

75WLO-11S-38

2 December 1975

S E C R E T

Mr. George Kalaris
C.I.A.

Dear

Re: William Hamilton MARTIN, and
Bernon Ferguson MITCHELL

Further to your letter of 6 October 1975, we have identified and spoken to the Canadian professor, Dr. Hans KUNOV, referred to in your letter as Harry KERNOV. The attachment outlines the contact between KUNOV and MARTIN and MITCHELL. KUNOV has proven co-operative as a source on previous occasions and we believe he will continue to assist us within limits.

Also attached is a report on Yuriy Igoryevich TORGOV, KUNOV's host at the USSR Academy of Sciences Computer Center. In addition to any comments you may wish to make concerning MARTIN's approaches to KUNOV, we would welcome an assessment of TORGOV, if available.

The F.B.I. has received the information contained in the attachments.

Yours truly,

E.R.J. Miller,
Assistant Liaison Officer.

att. (2)

14-00000

SECRET

Re: W.H. MARTIN and B.F. MITCHELL

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SECRET

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SECRET

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This document is the property of the Government of Canada. It is provided on condition that it is for use solely by the intelligence community of the receiving Government and that it not be declassified without the express permission of the Government of Canada.

Le présent document est la propriété du gouvernement du Canada. Il est communiqué sous réserve d'utilisation par les seuls services de renseignements du gouvernement destinataire et à la condition que sa cote de sécurité ne soit pas modifiée sans l'autorisation expresse du gouvernement canadien.

(d) [illegible]

(e) [illegible]

SECRET

Re: Yuriy Igoryevich TORGOV

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14-00000

6 OCT 1975

US/75/539

Dear Harry,

We have learned that on the evening of 8 September 1975, James WILKINSON of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow had a conversation of interest with a Canadian Embassy Officer. Wilkinson stated that while attending a social function at the Australian Embassy, he engaged Canadian Consular Officer Geoffrey FARROW in conversation. Farrow advised that he had been recently approached by Dr. Harry KERNOV, an Associate Professor of English at the University of Toronto in Canada, regarding American defectors Bernon F. MITCHELL and William H. MARTIN. Kernov implied that he had had recent personal contact with one or both of the defectors and recommended that the Canadian government give Martin and Mitchell permission to emigrate to Canada. Farrow furnished no further details regarding Kernov's contact.

During the same conversation Farrow asked Wilkinson if he could supply any basic background material on Mitchell and Martin. Wilkinson replied that he would pass Farrow's request on to the Consular Section of the Embassy. Subsequently, Farrow was given an unclassified article concerning the defectors which appeared in the June 1961 issue of True magazine.

We would, of course, be interested in any indications that Martin and Mitchell are attempting to leave the USSR and would be grateful for any information you may be able to provide us in regard to the above.

I am using the CAZAB channel in this instance as this information has been passed to us informally.

Yours,

George T. Kalaris

George T. Kalaris

Mr. Harry Brandes

DDO/CI/R&A/T:LHWigren(2Oct75)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addee
1 - 165-2720 ✓
1 - Reading File

SECRET

201-282338

SECRET

CONTINUED CONTROL

1 August 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Bernon Ferguson MITCHELL, William Hamilton MARTIN, Espionage - R

1. Reference is made to our memorandum of 17 July 1961, captioned as above, and also to Bureau letter dated 22 June 1961, addressed to the Director, National Security Agency, with copy to this Agency, Subject: "Bernon Ferguson MITCHELL, William Hamilton MARTIN, MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING".

2. The following information supplements the material on Nicolas Georges DAMASCOU aka DAMASKOU aka DAMASKOS aka DAMASCUS, reported in paragraph 4 of our 17 July 1961 memorandum, referenced above.

a. Our representatives in Melbourne advised that Australian Security Service indices reflect that Nicolas Georges DAMASCOU aka DAMASCOS, Greek national born 10 March 1911 at Alexandria, Egypt, arrived in Sydney, Australia, for permanent residence on 26 October 1956, aboard the S. S. STRATHNAVER, traveling on Greek Passport No. 8063/1949, issued 8 March 1949 at Alexandria, Egypt. At the time of his arrival in Sydney, DAMASCOU was in possession of Australian Visa No. 4231, issued in Cairo on 18 July 1956. He was described as follows: single, 5 feet 10 inches tall, normal build, brown eyes, black hair, occupation "writer". He departed Australia on 25 May 1960 aboard the S. S. ORONSAY, destination not indicated, and as of 18 July 1961 had not re-entered Australia.

b. Our representatives in Mexico City meanwhile had learned that Anastasia Georges DAMASCOU aka DAMASCUS, sister of the above, on 8 July 1960 applied at the Mexican Consulate in San Antonio, Texas, for a Mexican Tourist Card to enter Mexico to visit her brother Nicolas Georges DAMASCUS, then residing at the Hotel

SECRET

CONTINUED CONTROL

New York to Mexico City. At the time of her application for an entry permit, she made no mention of any wedding plans. The Mexican Government approved her trip on condition that she deposit with the Consulate a 10,000 Peso bond, as a guarantee of her intention to depart Mexico upon expiration of her tourist card. Mexican Immigration files contain no record of her actual arrival in Mexico following approval of her 8 July 1960 application. The most recent correspondence on this case contained in Mexican files is dated 15 February 1961, reflecting that Anastasie DAMASCOU again requested a Tourist Card on or about the date of the letter, at which time her address in the United States was given as c/o Mexican Consul, San Antonio, Texas. In reply to her second application for an entry permit, Mexican authorities again replied with a request that she post a bond in the amount of 10,000 Pesos, to guarantee departure from Mexico upon expiration of her tourist visa. There is no further information currently available on her further travel plans.

c. With reference to Nicolas Georges DAMASCOU, on basis of the information reported in preceding paragraph, a recheck by our representatives with officials of the United States Embassy in Mexico City revealed that Nicolas Georges DAMASKOU, born 10 March 1931 at Alexandria, Egypt, holder of Greek Passport 1951 issued in Alexandria, Egypt, on 5 March 1949 and valid to 29 April 1961, with address of 3 Elizabeth Bay Road, Elizabeth Bay, Sydney, Australia, was the recipient of a United States Visa on 22 October 1960. On his application, DAMASKOU indicated that he desired to visit the United States for a period of four months, described as a pleasure trip to visit his sister. His visa application did not include any destination address in the United States. It was also noted that the visa card maintained on Nicolas DAMASKOU in the Embassy in Mexico City contains a notation "I-683 to Immigration and Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, May 29 1961."

d. Through a reliable confidential source our representatives in Egypt had learned in the interim that Nicolas DAMASCOU, who is identical with the individual described in preceding paragraphs, currently resides in Los Angeles, California, at 1430 North Gardner, Apartment 18, and that he advised his mother and younger brother, still residing in Alexandria, that he plans to marry the daughter of an American official, who is not further identified. The same source also advised that Georges DAMASCOU aka DAMASKOU, father of Nicolas and Anastasie DAMASCOU aka DAMASCUS, died during the summer of 1960. Following the demise of the father, Angelika DAMASCOU nee SAVOURAS, widowed mother of Nicolas and Anastasie

DAMASCOU, in company of a younger son not identified by name, had planned to emigrate from Egypt to join her son Nicolas in the United States. However, prior to the realization of these plans, Angelika DAMASCOU suffered a stroke, exact details concerning which are not known, but she is reported as of this writing still to be paralyzed and obviously is unable to travel. No further information was available on the possible future emigration plans of Angelika DAMASCOU nee SAVOURAS and/or of the unidentified younger brother of Nicolas DAMASCOU and of Anastasie DAMASCOU.

c. On basis of the reported filing of an application for a United States Visa in July 1956 at the U.S. Embassy in London by Anastasie DAMASCOU, our representatives in London were requested to initiate a check of British liaison indices in the names of Nicolas DAMASCOU and of Anastasie DAMASCOU. MI-5 advised that as of late July 1961, they held no traces on Nicolas Georges DAMASCOU aka DAMASKOU aka DAMASKOS aka DAMASCUS, but that although they had no traces on Anastasie DAMASCOU, they were continuing to check her possible residence in London during 1956, based on the reported visa application date. MI-6 advised that they held no traces on either Nicolas Georges DAMASCOU aka DAMASKOU aka DAMASCUS or on his sister Anastasie Georges DAMASCOU.

3. It is suggested that the indices of the Department of State, Visa Section as well as the indices of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, may contain further detailed information on the current immigration status, whereabouts in the United States, and also the contacts in the United States of Nicolas Georges DAMASCOU aka DAMASCUS, of Anastasie Georges DAMASCOU aka DAMASCUA, and any other members of the family who may have applied for entry visas from abroad.

4. With regard to Justo SIERRA Casasus, mentioned in above referenced memorandum of 17 July 1961 as a contact of Nicolas DAMASCOU aka DAMASCUS, it is suggested that the indices of the Department of State may contain additional information on his activities during his service at the Mexican Embassy in Washington, D.C.

5. The information reported above is for the internal use of

addressees only and may not be further disseminated without the prior permission of the originator.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

/s/
WILLIAM K. HARVEY

2 cc: National Security Agency
Attn: Mr. S. Wesley Reynolds

SECRET

NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL

HX-17
17 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Bernon Ferguson MITCHELL,
William Hamilton MARTIN,
Espionage - R.

1. Reference is made to the following communications, which contain information pertinent to the new information reported in succeeding paragraphs:

a. Memorandum of 14 June 1961 from this Agency addressed to the National Security Agency, a copy of which was forwarded to your Bureau, captioned as above.

b. Bureau letter of 22 June 1961, addressed to the Director, National Security Agency, with copy to this Agency, captioned: Bernon Ferguson MITCHELL, William Hamilton MARTIN; MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING.

c. Department of Immigration Name Check Request Form, File A-2, dated 28 June 1961 addressed to your Bureau with copy to this Agency, in the name of Justo SIERRA, born 12 July 1914, Mexico, D. F., who entered the United States at New Orleans, Louisiana, on 13 June 1961 with destination address of Mexican Embassy, Washington, D.C. (Not sent information addressee)

d. Various earlier Department of Immigration Name Check Requests on Justo SIERRA covering his previous trips to this country. (Not to NSA)

e. Our memorandum of 29 December 1960, addressed to your Bureau, our reference CSCI-3/769,270 with enclosure, Subject: SIERRA, Justo; Visa - Mexican, and earlier communications forwarding name trace results on this individual. (Not to NSA)

SECRET

NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL

SECRET

c. Further inquiries in Mexico by our officials there revealed that Nicolas DAMASCUS had been ordered to leave Mexico in October 1960 solely because of the expiration of his tourist card, which had been once extended. Mexican Records fail to show that he returned to Mexico, following his entry into the United States at Brownsville, Texas, from Matamoros, Tamaulipas on 24 October 1960. Upon arrival in Mexico on 22 June 1960, he indicated that the purpose of his visit was to attend the wedding of his sister, Anastasia, identified in preceding paragraph, however, as of 21 June 1961, there was no record of Anastasia DAMASCUS aka DAMASCOU in official Mexican Files, and there was as yet no identification of the individual she was alleged to have been scheduled to marry. From the same source it was learned that for the period 22 June through 6 September 1960, the only address listed in official indices for Nicolas DAMASCUS is c/o Justo SIERRA, Reforma 95-407, Mexico City, which is the law office maintained by Justo SIERRA Casasus, former Counselor of the Mexican Embassy in Washington, D.C., and who is further identified in the documents cited in paragraph 1. c. through h. above. DAMASCUS reportedly used SIERRA to attempt to obtain an extension of his tourist permit, although the details of his contacts with and knowledge of SIERRA himself are not known at this time. Neither has it been possible as of this date to verify the reported contact between Nicolas DAMASCUS and Subjects at the Hotel New Yorker, as reported by Mr. Thomas CONLON. Investigation efforts abroad by this Agency are continuing, however, and any further information developed will be forwarded as soon as available.

9. In light of the escape route used by the two NSA defectors, transitting Mexico and presumably Cuba enroute to the USSR, your particular attention is invited to the information concerning the contacts and views of Justo SIERRA Casasus furnished in the reports cited in paragraph 1. e., f., and g. above. It is noted Justo SIERRA Casasus is identical with the Senor Don Justo SIERRA, First Secretary at the Embassy of Mexico, mentioned in Bureau Reports cited in paragraph h. above as a contact of Boris A. KAZANTSEV, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington from 1952-54. It is further noted that Boris KAZANTSEV, after returning to Moscow in 1954 and assuming the post of First Secretary in the Latin American Division of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was next assigned from 1955 to 1957 as First Secretary and subsequently Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, and that as of 1960 he was assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Havana, Cuba, in the position of Counselor, departing Havana for Mexico, in company of his wife and daughter, on 30 June 1961, and then proceeding to Canada on 2 July 1961.

SECRET

f. Teletyped Information Report from this Agency, dated 9 April 1959, Report No. TDCS-3/639,947, Subject: Contacts Between Fidel CASTRO Ruz and Lazaro CARDENAS.

g. Intelligence Report of this Agency dated 7 September 1956, Report No. CS-102629, Subject: Marxist Indoctrination of the Partido Popular.

h. Bureau Report dated 17 June 1954, prepared at Washington, D.C. by Special Agent Boyd D. Adsit, captioned: Soviet Cultivation of Latin American Diplomats - Internal Security - R' and Bureau letter of 21 August 1954, addressed to this Agency, forwarding as Enclosure Washington Field Office Report of 16 August 1954, prepared by Special Agent William C. Cregar on the same subject, Bureau File Reference: 105-22386. (Not to NSA)

2. Since the writing of our memorandum of 14 June 1961 (cf. para 1.a. above), the following supplementary information has been developed concerning Nicolas Georges DAMASCUS aka DAMASKOS, who is a contact and client of Justo SIERRA Casasus, mentioned in the communications referenced in paragraphs 1. c. through h. above.

a. Nicolas Georges DAMASCUS reportedly is officially listed in Egypt under the name of Nicolas George DAMASCOU, born 10 March 1931 at Alexandria, the son of George DAMASCOU and Angelika DAMASCOU nee SAVOURAS. He is a Greek national and holds Greek citizenship. From 1947 through 1957, he resided at 57 Heliopolis Street in Alexandria. [Representatives of this Agency in Alexandria] advise that local available records indicate that as of May 1959, Nicolas DAMASCOU resided at 6 Birtley Place, Elizabeth Bay, Sydney, Australia, and that he listed his occupation as that of Clerk. Our field records indicate that as of May 1959, the United States Consulate in Sydney had some interest in him, and it is suggested that the indices of the Department of State may contain further information concerning this individual.

b. Anastasie (or Anastasia) George DAMASCUS aka DAMASCOU, sister of Nicolas DAMASCUS, above, was born March 1933, place of birth not indicated but presumably Egypt, was identified by [our representatives in Alexandria] as having filed application for a United States Visa at London, England in July 1956, listing her occupation as that of entertainer. It is suggested that the Visa Files of the Department of State may contain additional information on this individual.

SECRET

NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL

4. The records of this Agency indicate that Boris A. KAZANTSEV is a known Soviet Intelligence Officer, most probably representing Soviet State Security (KGB). It is requested that any further information which may be reflected in the indices of your Bureau, or those of information addressees, reflecting upon the relationship of Nicolas Georges DAMASCUS aka DAMASCOU and his sister Anastasia Georges DAMASCUS aka DAMASCOU with Justo SIERRA Casasus, on the latter's contacts with representatives or agents of the CASTRO government in Cuba, or on SIERRA's continued contacts with KAZANTSEV or other suspect Soviet officials or agents in this country or elsewhere be forwarded to this Agency as quickly as possible. A request along the same lines has already been forwarded to our representatives in Mexico City, and you will be kept advised of any further information which may be developed in this regard.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

WILLIAM K. HARVEY

2 cc: National Security Agency

DD/P/FI/D/APotocki:mem

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - addressee
1 - CS Copy - 100-6-124/3
2 - OS/SRS
1 - CI/OPS
1 - 201-282337
1 - 201-282338

Based on:
201-24592, SIERRA
ALEX 2793 (IN 37468), 12 Jul 61
MEXI 8266 (IN 28014), 21 Jun 61
DIR 49505 (OUT 79310), 7 Jul 61

SECRET

NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

560

DATE : 8 AUG 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/BELL 5 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED FOR BELL AT 2140, 8 AUG)

INFO : DDP, COP, ADDP/A, C/WH 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

AUG 9 0048Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 10213

PRITY DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 8621

JMZIP RYBAT

REFS: A. MEXI 8568 (IN 47539)

B. MEXI 8522 (IN 44276)

C. HMMW 9598

1. ON 6 AUG 61, LITAMIL-6 (IDEN A) WENT HAVA VIA MEXICANA ATTEMPT MAKE CONTACT HIS FRIEND LIOOZE-1 AND CARRY OUT INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN HIM BY LITAMIL-5 IN PRESENCE CO RE CONTACT SABOTAGE TEAM STILL INTACT INSIDE CUBA. LITAMIL-6 ALSO CARRIED (IDEN C) WHICH WILL BE USED AS "CODE BOOK" WHEN CUBA/MEXI RADIO COMMO ESTABLISHED. LITAMIL-1 WHO RECRUITED LITAMIL-6 ONLY ONE AWARE HIS ATTEMPT CONTACT LIOOZE-1.

2. L-5 TOLD L-6 GO HAVA MAKE CONTACT WITH ENRIQUE COLLAZO (NOT KNOWN WHETHER SUBJ MEXI 7723) WHO LIVES CALLE "A" 509 VEDADO, HAVA. L-6 CARRIED OTHER HALF MEDICAL FLYSHEET AS "BONA FIDES" WHICH PREVIOUSLY TAKEN TO COLLAZO BY DIETER LAEGENFELDER (NO TRACES) GERMAN DRUGGIST WHO WENT HAVA 32 JULY PER L-5 INSTRUCTIONS. COLLAZO WILL TAKE L-6 TO "JESUS BADAL" (PSEUDO) WHO

SECRET

201-267298

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

IN 10213 MEXI 8621

ACTION MAN SABOTAGE UNIT. L-5 REPORTS THIS GROUP HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH KUBARK PBPRIME BY RADIO. ALSO IN RADIO CONTACT TAMAYO FNU ("INDIO AZUL") IN CARA. L-6 WILL GIVE "BADAL" CODE BOOK AND TELL HIM CLANDESTINE RADIO MEXI USING NAME "RADIO CUBA LIBRE" WILL BE OPERATION SOON. WILL ASK "BADAL" ATTEMPT MAKE RADIO CONTACT MEXI.

3. RADIO TRANSMITTER MEXI RECEIVED THROUGH (IDEN B) AS "GIFT" TO LITAMIL-1. STATION THROUGH LITAMIL-1 PAID TRAVEL EXPENSES LITAMIL-6 AND FAMILY (2) PRESENTLY CUBA WHICH WILL RETURN WITH HIM. EXPECT RADIO BE IN OPERATION WITHIN TWO WEEKS. PLAN USE L-6 "VOICE" "RADIO CUBA LIBRE". STATION REQUESTS UTMOST SECURITY RE OP CITED ABOVE AS "LEAK" BACK TO MEXI WOULD SERIOUSLY DAMAGE RELATIONS LITAMIL COMPLEX HERE.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

(Carrillo)

MACHADO Llosas, Manuel 201-267298 (Machado) JUN 1960

1. Biographical Data: Born 12 December 1913, Auras, Oriente, Cuba. He now lives in Mexico and is owner and manager of a printing establishment, "Manuel MACHADO, S.A.", Tlalpan 710, in Mexico City. He is single and well-off financially.

2. Political Activities: Machado was a member of the 26th of July group of Cuban revolutionaries in Mexico. Now he is in exile in Mexico. He was Treasurer of the Mexican movement and handled operational funds. He was a good friend of Fidel Castro, but became disillusioned with the Castro government some months ago and is ready to fight against it.

3. Security Aspects: Machado is a CIA Agent (LITAMIL-1, POA/OA requested 9 Dec 1959; POA granted 8 January 1960; OA granted 6 June 1960). The Mexico City Station planned to use him to report on the activities of Cuban revolutionaries and possibly, due to his friendship with Fidel Castro and members of the Cuban Government, as a "political action" asset. (Note - the Mexican Desk is interested in any action taken on Machado, since he is their agent. They hold his 201-267298).

4. Contacts: Machado is a friend of Ambassador Arcos y Bergnes. He also has a certain amount of prestige in revolutionary circles.